### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

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444 444 444 444 444 Te xa s D e par tm e nt of P ublic Safe ty , A ppe lla nt

v. Jam es Joseph Briggs, App ellee

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F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 283,48 8, HO NORAB LE J. DAVID PH ILLIP S, JUDGE PRESI DING

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M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
The Texas D epar

tment of Public Saf

ety appea ls the county court at law’ s reve rsal of an administrative de cision, enter ed afte r a contested case hear ing, authorizing the suspension of the driver’ s license of J ames J oseph Br igg s. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042 (West Supp. 2005). I n two issues, the Depa

rtment argues that the trial c ourt err ed in rev er s i n g t h e dec ision of the admin is tr ative law judg e bec ause ( i) the dec ision was supported by substantial evidence and (ii) ther e
was re asonable suspicion to investigate a collision occur ring i n t h e p ar k ing lot of a n apar tment complex. W e re verse and re nder judg ment aff irming the administrative law judg e’s de cision. On May 9, 2004, at appr ox imately 10:30 p.m., a n Au s t in police offic er w as dispatched to a

n apar tment complex t o investigate a two- car motor vehicle a ccide nt. Upon arr ival at the ac cident sce ne at the a partment c omplex , the off i ce r o b s er v ed a truck with three males sta nd ingby it a nd a se c on d tr

uc k o c c up ie d b y

B ri g g s w ho wa s seat ed beh in d the wh e e l of his2

vehicle. A lthough pa

rt of the a partment c omplex was g ated, this portion of the lot was not g ated a nd was ope n to the public. The off icer approa ched B rig g s, asked if he was injured and then r equeste d his dr ive r’ s lic e ns e and pr oo f of ins ur anc e . B ri g g s to ld t he of fi c e r t hat he wa s th e dr ive r a

nd on ly occupa nt, that he had ba cked into the other parke d vehicle, and t hat he was willing to pay for it. As they conver sed, t he off

icer smelled an odor of

alcohol comingfrom B rig g s’s brea th and observe d that h i s ey es we re g lassy

and his speec h was slurre d. Br igg s admitted to consuming thre e or f our be e rs e arl ie r i n th e nig ht.

The off icer then aske d Br igg s to perfor m field sobriety t est s. As the offic er administered the hor izont al g aze ny stag mus test and Br igg s exhi bited lack of smooth pursuit and d i s t i n ct n y s t agm u s at m ax i m u m d ev i at i o ni nb o t h ey es , t h e o ff i ce r s t o p p edt h e t es tb ec au s e B ri ggs could not follow direc tions and almost fell into another off icer . When Br igg s almost fell during the walk-a nd-turn test, the office r stopped the test, believing that Br igg s was intox icated. T he off icer
arr ested B rig g s for driving while intox icated. Br igg s ref used to pr ovide a breath or blood specimen upon the re quest of the of fice r. The De partment soug ht the suspension of B rig g s’s driver ’s license at a he a r in g b e fore an administrative law

judge . At the suspension hea ring befor e the AL J , Br igg s raised a single issue: that the of fi c e r did no t have re a so na ble su sp ic ion to de ta in B ri g g s b e c a us e the c oll isi on

oc c ur re d in a par king lot of an apar

tment complex, which is not a “public pla ce” under the rele vant statute. Afte r the AL J suspended Brig g s’s driver’ s license, Brig g s appea led t o the county court at law. The tria l court g rante d the petition and re verse d the admini strative decision, finding that the offic er did not h a v e r e a s o n a

b l e s u s p i c i o nt o d e t a i nB r i g g s b e c a u s e h e w a s o np r i v a t e p r o p e rt y.3 The De partment now a

ppea l s t h e trial court’ s order reve rsing the administrative decision and removing the s uspension of Brig g s’s driver’ s license. I n two issues, the Depa rtment contends that the tria l court er red in re versingthe AL J ’s decision bec ause that decision was supported by substantial evidenc e and the t rial court erre d in finding that Brig g s was not oper ating his ve hic le “ in a p ub lic pla c e .” Ap ply inga su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e sta

nd ard to a n a dmi nis tr a tiv e lic e ns e suspension, see Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.043 (West 1999), see also M ireles v. Tex as Dep’t of Pu b. Sa fe ty , 9 S.W. 3d

12 8, 13 1 ( Te x. 19 99 ), a

re vie wi ng

c ourt re ve rs e s a

n A L J ’s de c isi on

on ly if
an a pp e lla nt’ s su bs tanti al ri ghts have b e e n p re jud ic e d a nd the AL J’s f

ind ing s are no t r e a so na

bly supported by

substantial evidence considering the reliable and probative evidenc e in the re cord a s
a wh ole
. Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 2 00 1. 17 4 ( Wes t 20 00 ); Texas De p’t of Pub. Safety v. Latimer , 939 S.W .2d 240, 244 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ).

To up ho ld a

lic e ns e su sp e ns ion , a

n A L J must

fi nd tha t th e De pa rtme nt h a s p ro ve n a ll el ements of section 724.042 by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042. Those ele ments are as follow: (1) rea sonable suspicion or pr obable c ause e x isted to stop or arre st the person; (2 ) pr ob a

ble c a us e e xiste d to be lie ve that th e pe rs on wa s o pe ratin g a

mot or ve hic le in a public place while intox icated; (3 ) the pe rs on

wa s p la c e d und e r a

rr e st b y the of fi c e r a nd wa s requ est ed to su

bmi t to the taking of a spe cimen; andSection 724.035 of the Texas T ranspor tation Code provides for suspension or denia l of a 1 driver’ s license: (a) I f a pe rson re fuses the request of a pe ace office r to submit to t he takingof a sp e c ime n, the de pa

rtme nt s ha ll: (1 ) su sp e nd

the pe rs on’s lice ns e to o pe ra te a mot or ve hic le on

a pu bli c highw ay for 180 da

y s. . . . Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.035 (West Supp. 2005). 4 (4) the per son ref

used to submit to t he taking of a spe cimen on re quest of the office r. 1
See id. W h en re n d er i n g h er d ec i s i o n , t h e A L J i s s u edfi n d i n gs o f f ac tt h at i n cl u d edt h e f

o l l o wi n g:

• The off

icer was investig ating a two-c ar c ollisi on at an a partment c omplex pa rk inglot ;

• The other driver identified Br igg s as the drive r of the ve hicle that had c ollided wi th h is l e g a lly

pa rk e d v e hic le in t

he pa rk inglot ;

• The c ollisi on occur

red in a parkinglot that was ac cessible to the public;

• Br igg s was sitting in the drive r’s seat of his vehicle, a dmitted that he had hit the parke d car

and off ere d to pay

the cost of the da

mag e;

• The office r had rea sonable suspicion to stop Brig g s to investigate the ac cident and pr ob a ble c a us e to a rr e st h im f

or fa ilure to p e rf

or m the fi e ld s ob ri e ty

te sts ; and

• Br igg s was re quested to and r efuse d to give a bre ath or blood spec imen. On appe al, Bri ggs re l i es on sec tion 550.041 of the transportation code, urg ing that the police do not have authority to investigate an acc ident in a “pr ivately owned r esidential par

king
are a .” Se c tio n 5 50 .0 41 pr ov ide s:5

(a ) A p e a c e of

fi c e r w ho is n oti fi e d of a moto r ve hic le a c c ide nt re su lti ng in i nju ry to or death of a person or property damag e to an appa rent e x tent of at lea st $1,000 may investigate the ac cident and f ile justifiable char g es re lating to the a ccide nt with ou t re

ga rd to whet hertheac c ide nt o c c urre d o n p ro pe rty to w hic h th is c ha pte r a pp lie s. (b) This section does not apply to: (1) a privately owned re sidential parking area ; or (2) a privately

owned pa

rking lot where a fee is charg ed for parkingor storing a vehic le.
Id. § 550.041 (West Supp. 2005) (emphasis added)
. I t is undisputed that the portion of the lot wher e the collision occurr ed wa s not gated and that it was a cce ssible to the public.

Th e his tor

y of sect io n 550 .0 41 is i ns tr

uc tiv e . I ts p re de c e sso r s ta tut e pr ov ide d in section 43A for

a pea ce of

fice r to investigate an a ccide nt and file c harg es without reg ard to whe ther the ac cident occ urre d on a public stree t or hig hway or other public pr operty , on a road ow ned and c ontrolled by any water control and improve ment district, whether or not a fee is charg ed for the use of the r oad, or on pr ivate prope rty commonly

used by t h e public such as su pe rm ark e t or

sh op pin g c e nte r p ark inglot s, pa rk ingare a s p ro vid e d b y

bu sin e ss establishments for the c onvenienc e of t h ei r customers, clients, or patrons, pa rking lots owned and ope rate d by the State or any other parking area owned and operate d for the conve nienceof, and commonly use d by, the public.
See Act of Ma

y 27, 1967, 60th L eg ., R.S., ch. 526, § 2, sec. 43A , 1967 Tex. Gen. L aws 1175, 1175- 76 (ame nded 2001) ( curr ent version at Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.041 (West Supp. 2005)) (empha sis added). Thus, pr ior to its rec odification i n the t ranspor tation code, the statute specifie d that a pea ce of

fice r wa s permitted to investigate some ac cidents occ urringon private pr operty but6

no t ot he rs . Th e Re vis or ’s No te to the c ur re nt ve rs ion of the statut e state s that th e ph ra se “ pr op e rt y to w hic h th is c ha

pte r a pp lie s” wa s su

bs tit ute d f or the lis t in clu ded in the pr ior statut e “ be c a

us e Section 550.001 of this code pr ovides that this ch ap ter is applica ble to all of the prope rties listed sp e c if ic a lly in S e c tio n 43 A. ” Te x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann. § 55 0. 04 1 ( Wes t 19 99 ) ( re vis or ’s no te ). Th is langua g e the n wou ld sug g e st that the c ur re nt ch a pte r 550 re la tin g to ac c ide nts and a c c ide nt r e po rt s
a pp lie s to pu

bli c pr op e rt

y a s we ll a s c e rt a in p ri vate pr op e rt ie s, inc lud ingpa rk ingare a s, c omm on ly used by the public. Section 550.001 provides that cha pter 550 a pplies to, int e r a lia , “a hig hway or other pu bli c pla c e ” and “ a pr ivate a c c e ss wa y or pa rk ing are a pr ov ide d for a c lie nt or patr on by a bu sin e ss, oth e r than a p riv atere

sid e nti al p ro pe rty .” Id. § 55 0. 00 1( 3) , (2 ) (We st 1 99 9) . B ri g g s d oe s n ot c ite to a ny a uth or ity fo r the pr op os iti on that a par kin g lot of an ap artme nt co mpl e x that is a c c e ssi ble to the public is “private residential pr operty .” Id
.

Br igg s relies instead on the case of Ba llm an v . S tat e , 1 5 7 S. W. 3 d 6 5 , 73 (Tex. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 2 00 5, pe t. r e f’ d) , f

or the pr op os iti on that a citi zen may no t be de ta ine d in

a pr ivate parkinglot. Ballman is d is ti n g u is h a b le
. I n Ballman , the cour t found that the def

endant wa s imp ro pe rl y

sto pp e d a nd the n d e ta ine d f

or fa ilure to us e a tur

n sig na l in a sh op pin g c e nte r p ark inglot
. As the par king lot wa s not a hig hway , but a par king lot, neither

the transpor

tation code nor

the city ’s municipal code require d a turn sig nal. Id . at 70 ; see Tex. Tr ansp. Code Ann. §§ 542.001, 545.104 (West 1999) (operator of vehicle is require d to use a turn signa l to indicate an intention to turn when vehicle is b e in g o p e r a te d o n h ig h w ay )
. B u t B r ig g s c it e s n o a

u th o r it y th a t a p e a c e o f

f ic e r ma y not investigate a c ollisi on in a shopping cente r or other commerc ial parkinglot that is open to the public;I n addition, a police office r may arr est, without a war rant, a person f

ound in a suspicious 2 place and under

circ umstances that r easona bly show the person had been guilty of some fe lony

or brea ch of the peac e. Te x . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 14.03(a)( 1) (West 2005) . DWI is a brea ch of the pea ce. Ga llu

ps v . S tat e , 15 1 S .W .3 d 19 6, 20 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ). Whe the r a pla c e is s u s p ic io u s d e p e n d s o n th e to ta li ty o f th e c ir c u ms ta n ces. See Dya r v . S

tat e , 125 S.W .3d 460, 464 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 3 )
. Su s p ic io u s p la c e s ma y in c lu d e th e s c e n e o f an a c c id e nt. Id . at 468; Lay lan d v . S

tat e , 144 S.W .3d 647, 650 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2004, no pet.) (sc ene of acc ident considere d “suspicious place ”). 7 nor does he cite any authority that such a parkinglot is a “privately owned r esidential par

king a rea .” To the c on tr ary , sec tio n 550 .0 41 a llo ws a pe a c e of fi c e r t o inve sti g a te an a c c ide nt i nv olv ingpr op e rt y dam a g e e xce e din g $1 ,0 00 “ wi tho ut r e g ard to w he the r t

he a c c ide nt o c c ur

re d o n p ro pe rt

y to w hic h th is chapte r applies.” See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.041. And, in a ny event, a s the history

of sec tion 55 0. 04 1 ma

ke s c le ar, an o ff

ic e r m ay inv e sti g a te an a c c ide nt o n “ any pa rk inglot ow ne d b y

the State or any other pa rking are a owned and operated for the convenie nce of , and commonly

used by , the public.” See Act of Ma

y 27, 1967, 60th L eg ., R.S., ch
. 5 2 6 , § 2 , sec. 43A , 1967 Tex. Gen. L aws 11 75 , 1 17 5- 76 (a

me nd e d 1 99 5, 20 01 ) ( c ur

re nt v e rs ion a t Te x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann. § 5 50 .0 41 (We st Supp. 2005)). 2 I n a

ny e ve nt, it is cle ar that an ung a te d park ing lot op e n a nd a c c e ssi ble to t

he pu bli c is a “public plac e” w ithin the meaning of sec tion 724.042. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.042. A public place is defined a s “any place to which the public or a substantial g roup of the public ha s
acc ess.” Te x . Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a )(40) (West 2003). The remaining portion of sec tion 1.07(40)
c on ta ins a no ne xclu siv e lis t of

ill us tr a tiv e e xamp le s, inc lud ing“ bu t no t li mit e d to , s tr e e ts, hig hw a y s, and the common are as of sc hools, hospitals, apartment houses , o ff ic e bu ild ing s, tr ans po rt

fa c ili tie s,8

and shops.” Id . ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . In d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a pla c e is pub lic , the re le va nt i nq uir y is
w h e th e r th e p u

b li c h a s a c c ess to it. Sh au b v . S tat e , 9 9 S. W.3 d 2 53 , 2 56 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 20 03 , n o p et.) ; Loe ra v . S tat e , 1 4 S. W.3 d 4 64 , 4 67 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 0, no pe t.) ; State v. Nailor , 949 S.W .2d 357 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.). Courts have c onsistently held that parking lots a

re public place s. See , e.g. , In re W .T.O. , N o . 0 3

- 0 1

- 0 0 6 3 0

- C V , 2 0 0 2 T e x . A p p . LE X IS 8214, at *7 (Austin Nov. 21, 2002, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (apa rtment house par

king lot); Nailor , 949 S.W. 2d a t 35 9 ( ho te l pa

rk ingg ara g e e ve n th ou g h p e op le mus t pa y to e nte r) ; Kap us c ins k

i v . S tat e , 878 S.W .2d 248, 250 (Tex. App.—San Antoni o 1994, pet. re f’d) (mall parkinglot); Thi ba ut v . S tat e , 782 S.W .2d 307, 309 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1989, no pet.) (parking lot of condominium complex ). As the cour

t observed in Kapuscinski , the definition of public place is c ast in broad languag e. 878 S.W .2d at 250. Her e, the undisp uted evidenc e wa s that the apa rtment complex parking lot was
un g a te d an d ope n to th e pu bli c . We ho ld t

hat th e pa rk inglot is a pu bli c pla c e , f

a lli ngsq ua re ly wi thi n t h e statutory

definition. See T e x. Pe n . Co d e A n n . § 1
. 0 7 ( a ) ( 4 0 )
. T h e f in d in g s w e r e b a s e d

o nthe fac ts that the office rs had be en summoned t o investigate a c ollisi on in the apar tment complex p ar k i n g l o tt h at wa s o p en t o t h e p u b l i c, Br i ggs ad m i t t edt o dri v i n g an d ca u s i n g t h e c o l l i s i o n , Br i ggs exhibi ted sig ns of i ntox ication, and he refused to provide a breath or bl ood specimen. W e conc lude that th e re wa s su

bs tanti a l e vid e nc e to s up po rt the AL J’s f

ind ing s th at the of

fi c e r h a d r e a so na

ble
su sp ic ion to d e ta in B ri g g s, pr ob a

ble c a us e to be lie ve he wa s ope ratin g a mot or ve hic le in a pu bli c pla c e w h i l e i n t o xi c a t e d , an d t h a tB r i g g s r e f

u s e d t o s u b m i tt o t h e t a k i n g o f

a s p e c i m e nu

p o na r re st and the r equest of the office r.9 Ha vin g fo un d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt a pp lie d a n e rr on e ou s le g a l st and ard and er re d in
reve rsing the AL J ’s administrative dec ision, we sustain the State’s issues. W e re v er s e the trial court’s or der a

nd rende r j udg ment upholding the administrative decision authorizing the suspension of B rig g s’s driver ’s license
.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P atterson a nd Pury ear Reverse d and Rende red Filed: F ebrua

ry 9, 2006