[Cite as Pearl Leasing Co., L.L.C. v. Budoris, 2016-Ohio-2628.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 103096

PEARL LEASING CO., L.L.C.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

MARYANN BUDORIS

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-15-840846 

BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, P.J., S. Gallagher, J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 21, 2016 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

David J. Tocco 

Kari B. Coniglio 

David J. Gingerich

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P. 

200 Public Square, Suite 1400 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Sara M. Donnersbach 

Matthew G. Burg 

Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A. 

323 West Lakeside Avenue 

Suite 200 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

{¶1} This cause came to be heard on the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R. 

11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1. Defendant-appellant, Maryann C. Budoris (“Budoris”), appeals an 

order denying a motion for relief from judgment and to stay the case pending arbitration 

that was jointly filed with plaintiff-appellee, Pearl Leasing Co., L.L.C. (“Pearl”). She 

assigns the following two errors: 

1. The trial court erred in not applying the Ohio Arbitration Act. 

2. The trial court erred in not staying Pearl Leasing’s claims, because the 

arbitration agreement is enforceable. 

{¶2} We find merit to the appeal and reverse. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶3} In February 2013, Budoris signed documents to admit her uncle, Edward 

Joseph Wrobel (“Wrobel”), into a licensed nursing home owned and operated by Pearl. 

The admission documents included an Ohio Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement 

(“ADR Agreement”), signed by Wrobel and Carol Nichols, a representative of Pearl. 

The ADR Agreement provided, in relevant part: 

Nonpayment of Charges. Any dispute, disagreement, or claim of any kind 

arising out of, or related to the Agreement, or the breach thereof, regarding 

nonpayment by Resident for payments due to the Facility shall be settled in 

binding arbitration as set forth in Section C below, or arbitrated if mutually 

agreed to by the other parties. 

Section C provided that “[a]ny claim or dispute arising out of or relating to this contract 

shall be resolved by binding arbitration by the parties.” The ADR Agreement further 
provided, in bold text, that “[b]inding arbitration means that the parties are waiving 

their right to a trial, including their right to a jury trial, their right to a trial by a 

judge, and their right to appeal the decision of the arbitrator(s).” 

{¶4} Despite the terms of the ADR Agreement, Pearl filed a complaint against 

Budoris, as Wrobel’s attorney-in-fact, alleging that Wrobel breached a contract by failing 

to pay for goods and services provided by Pearl. Budoris filed a motion to stay the action 

pending arbitration pursuant to the ADR Agreement. The trial court denied the motion 

even though it was unopposed, and Budoris appealed. Following mediation with this 

court’s conference attorney, the parties agreed that independent arbitration was the correct 

forum. 

{¶5} Accordingly, the parties filed a joint motion in the trial court seeking relief 

from judgment and to stay the case pending arbitration, and this court sua sponte

remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to rule on the parties’ jointly filed 

motions. The trial court subsequently denied the motions without opinion, and this 

appeal was reinstated. Pearl has not filed a brief in opposition to Budoris’s merit brief. 

II. Law and Analysis

{¶6} In the first assignment of error, Budoris argues the trial court’s failure to stay 

this litigation pending arbitration violates both public policy and the Ohio Arbitration Act, 

R.C. Chapter 2711. In the second assignment of error, Budoris argues the trial court 

should have stayed this litigation pursuant to the parties’ ADR Agreement because the 
agreement to arbitrate was enforceable. We discuss these assigned errors together 

because they both challenge the court’s judgment denying the motion to stay. 

{¶7} Public policy encourages arbitration as a method of settling disputes. 

Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 708, 711-712, 590 N.E.2d 1242 (1992). 

Arbitration is favored because it provides the parties “with a relatively expeditious and 

economical means of resolving a dispute.” Id. R.C. 2711.02 states that a trial court 

“shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until the arbitration of 

the issue has been had in accordance with the agreement.” (Emphasis added.) 

Therefore, the court must indulge a strong presumption in favor of arbitration and resolve 

any doubts in favor of arbitrability. Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 471, 

700 N.E.2d 859 (1998). 

{¶8} Arbitration agreements are “‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon 

grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’” Taylor Bldg. 

Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 117 Ohio St.3d 352, 2008-Ohio-938, 884 N.E.2d 12, ¶ 33, 

quoting R.C. 2711.01(A). In other words, because arbitration agreements are contracts, 

they are subject to the same defenses as other contracts. McCann v. New Century Mtge. 

Corp., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82202, 2003-Ohio-2752, ¶ 39, citing Doctor’s Assocs., 

Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684-685, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996) 

(generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may 

be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements); Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 

166 F.3d 308, 322 (6th Cir.1998). Common defenses include fraud, duress, and 
unconscionability. McCann at ¶ 39. The party opposing arbitration bears the burden of 

establishing the grounds for revocation of the agreement. Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 122 

Ohio St.3d 63, 2009-Ohio-2054, 908 N.E.2d 408, ¶ 20. 

{¶9} The appropriate standard of review on judgments pertaining to the 

enforceability of an arbitration agreement depends on the questions raised in challenging 

the applicability of the arbitration provision. McCaskey v. Sanford-Brown College, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97261, 2012-Ohio-1543, ¶ 7. 

{¶10} As relevant here, we review the trial court’s determination as to whether a 

party agreed to submit an issue to arbitration de novo. Id. at ¶ 7-8, citing Shumaker v. 

Saks, Inc., 163 Ohio App.3d 173, 2005-Ohio-4391, 837 N.E.2d 393 (8th Dist.), and 

Taylor at ¶ 38. 

{¶11} It is undisputed that the parties executed an arbitration agreement that 

specifically mandated that any dispute regarding nonpayment of charges were to be 

resolved in binding arbitration. Indeed, Pearl did not oppose Budoris’s original motion 

to stay pending arbitration, joined in her motion for relief from judgment and to stay 

arbitration, and does not oppose the trial court’s judgment on appeal. Therefore, because 

Pearl has not established any grounds on which the agreement should be revoked or found 

to be unenforceable, the presumption in favor of arbitrability has not been rebutted. 

{¶12} Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the parties’ joint motion for relief 

from judgment and the parties’ joint motion to stay litigation pending arbitration. 

Accordingly, we sustain both the first and second assignments of error. 
{¶13} The trial court’s judgment is reversed. We remand the case to the trial 

court with instructions to stay the case pending arbitration. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry this 

judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR