Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 27 , 2020

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO

. 14

- 19

- 00330

- CR NO. 14

- 19

- 00331

- CR

CLINTON JEROME FRANKLIN , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 122nd District Court Galveston Cou nty, Texas Trial Co u rt Cause No s . 17

- CR

- 1617 & 17

- CR

- 1618

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Clinton Jerome Franklin , appeals his conviction s for possession
of a controlled substance in cause number 17

- CR1617 ( 14

- 1 9

- 00330

- CR ) and
evadin g arrest/detention with a vehicle in cause number 17

- CR1618 ( 14

- 19

- 00331

- CR )

. A ppellant contends the trial court erred by deny ing his motion to suppress
evidence found during an inventory search because his “ initial detention was2

unlawful. ” W e affirm

. B A C KGROUND

A pp ellant was indicted for possession of a controlled substance , namely
cocaine , weighing less than one gram

. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481 .115(b). H e was also indi cted for evading arrest/detention with a vehicle

. See Tex. Penal Cod e Ann. § 38.04 (b)(2 ) ( A). A three

- day jury trial was held on February 19, 2019. At the motion to suppress hearing and later at trial , Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Woodard testifi ed about the e vents that led to Appellant ’ s indictments.

Tro o per Woodard testif

ied that he was on pat rol in a n area known for high criminal activity on J u ne 8, 2017 . Trooper Woodard “ was on Delaney Road parked on the side of the road ” with his lights turned off

. At about 2:55 a.m., he
observ ed Appe llant ’ s vehicle exit ing a motel pa rking lot on to Delaney Road “ at a pretty quick rate of speed ” without checking for traffic

. Trooper Woodard was about 300 yards from t he motel and “ had a clear view ” of Appellant ’ s vehicle

. Trooper Woodard turned on his h eadlights and taillights and immed iately

“ started to follow the vehicle as it continued to travel east on Delaney Road. ” A s Appellant wa s driving away on Delan e y Road , Tr oo per Woodard wa s “ following, closing this distance. ” A ppellant approached the inters e ction of Delaney Road and
the I

- 45 feeder road , which is “ a four

- way stop with a red light stoplight. ”
A ppellant had a green light as he dr ove up t o the intersection. Tr oo per Woodard
testified that he observed Appellant commit a t raffic violation because Appel l an t failed to signal his rig h t turn until after he already had started his turn motion

. T rooper Woodard “ ac c e le r a ted to get behind ” Appellant and “ ru n his license plate. ” He caught up to Appellant after Appellant ent ere d the freewa y

. Trooper Woodard o bserved Appellant change lanes a ggressively, “ accelerate and then at3

that high rate of acc eleration then stop

. ” He then activated his emergency lights to

“ initia te a traffic stop for the turn violation back on Delaney R oad. ”

W hen Trooper Woodard activated his red and blue lights, Appel l ant briefly

en gaged his vehicle ’ s bra ke s and then exited the freeway at the Vauthier exit. A s Appellant exited, Trooper Woodard believed the vehicle was evading him and he
acti vated his audible siren. A ppellant entered the freeway again and Trooper
Wood a rd pursued him a t “ speeds of 100 to 120 miles an hour southbound. ” A fter
6 miles of pursuit , Appellant pulled over on to the should er of the road.

Because Trooper Woodard was alone, he conducted a felony stop for officer safety. H e drew his weapon and i n structed Appella nt to exi t the ca r and lay on the ground. A ppellant at first laid down but then stood up and “ stuck his hands into his pockets. ” Trooper Woodard “ told him to remove his hands from his pockets
because [Trooper Woodard] didn ’ t know if he w a s getting a weap on

. ” A pp ellant

c omplied with Trooper Woodard ’ s instruct ions and laid back on the ground. A s

soon as other police officer s arrived at the scene, Trooper Woodard arrested Appellant and placed him in hi s patrol car. T rooper Woodard conduct e d an inventory s earch of Appella nt ’ s vehicle. When he approached the vehicle on the
dr iver ’ s side, h e found a small b aggie of cocai ne on the ground by the driver

- s ide
door. Trooper Woodard testified that he had an in

- car camera s ystem , which
turned on whe n he activat ed his emergency lights. He explained the traffic
violation was not recorded beca use the vide o system in his patrol car “ was an older one, and the video set by our department only goes back 30 seconds, not like the
ones we have n ow that go bac k 2 m inutes. ” The video was played at trial and
showed that recording began when Trooper Woodard was beh ind Appellant ’ s car on the freeway. It showed , among other things, Trooper Woodard ’ s pursuit of4

Appellant on the freeway , Trooper Woodard ’ s and A ppell a nt ’ s actions during the stop , Appellant ’ s arr est, and the search of Appellant ’ s vehicle

. After the State and the defense rested , the trial court heard arguments on Appellant ’ s motion to sup p ress

. T he court denied the moti on, stating : Well, I ’ m going to r e spectfully deny your motion to suppress.

. . . I ha ve found at least in this case that there ’ s no evidence to contradict the officer ’ s version of the facts. There was not a video for me to look at to see when he turned his turn signal on

. We have this , basicall y, unimpeached testimony that he didn ’ t turn it on until during the turn, which certainly would have been less than a hundred feet from the intersection. So, for those reasons, I ’ m going to deny th e motion to suppress. The jury fo und A ppellant g u ilty of possession of a controlled s ubstance and
evad ing arrest/detention with a vehicle

. The trial court assessed Appellant ’ s punishment at 15 years ’ confinement for po ssession of a contr olled substance an d 25 years ’ confinement for evadi ng ar rest/deten t ion with a vehicle

. A ppellant filed
a ti mely appeal.

A N ALYSIS Appellant argues in his sole issue that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because his “ initial detention ” for the traffic violation of failing

to signal a turn for at le a st 100 feet before turn ing was unlawful

. We r eview a trial court ’ s ruling o n a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review

. State v. Ruiz , 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) ; V

asquez v. State , 324 S.W.3d 912, 918 ( Tex. App.

— H ouston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet ref

’ d)

. We aff

ord almost total deference to a trial court ’ s determination of historical facts. Ruiz , 577 S.W.3d at 545

. In a suppression hearing, the trial court is t he sole trier of fact and judge of the cr edibi lity of th e witnesses and the weight to be given their t estimony. Valtierra v. State , 3105

S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Aviles

- Barroso v. State , 477 S.W.3d 363, 380 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 20 15, pet. ref ’ d). The tri al court is
enti tled to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness ’ s test imony, even if that testimony is uncontroverted, because the trial court has the opportunity to observe
the witness ’ s demeanor and appearance. Valtierra , 310 S .W.3d at 447; Avile s

Barroso , 477 S .W.3d at 380.

I f the trial court makes express findings of fa ct, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to its ruling and determine whether the evidence supports
th o se factual findings. Valtierra , 310 S. W.3d at 447; State v. Smit h , 335 S.W.3d
70 6, 71 4 (Tex. Ap p

. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref ’ d). If the trial court does

not enter findings of fact , we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court ’ s ruling and assume it made im plicit findings of fact th at support its

r uling as long a s those findings are supported by the record. Valtierra , 310 S.W.3d

at 447

. We review a trial court ’ s application of the law to the facts de novo

. Ruiz , 577 S.W.3d at 545; Aviles

- Barroso , 477 S.W.3d at 380; see a lso Valtierra , 310
S.W. 3d at 447. We will s ustain the trial court ’ s ruli ng if that ruling is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.
Ruiz , 577 S.W.3d at 545; Adams v. State , 397 S.W.3d 7 60, 763 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist. ] 20 13, n o pet.).

Fo r Fourth Amendment purposes, a traffic stop is a seizure and must be
reasonable to be lawful. Vasquez , 324 S.W.3d at 919

. A police officer may make

a war rantless traffic stop based on reasonable s uspi cion of a traffic violatio n. See Jaganatha n v. Stat e , 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 2015). An officer has reasonable suspicion if he has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with
rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to r easonably suspect that a6

par ticular person h as been or soon will be engaged in criminal a ctivity. Id

. This is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis fo r th e stop exists. Wade v.
State , 422 S.W.3d 6 6 1, 668 ( Te x. Crim. App. 2013) ; Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d
488 , 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

. A determination of reason able suspicion is made by considering the totality of the circu mstances

. Wade , 4 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 66 8 ; Ford , 158 S.W.3d 492

- 93

. The burden is o n the St at e to demonstrate the

reaso nableness of the investigatory stop. Goudeau v. State , 209 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.

—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also Ford , 158 S.W.3d at 4 92

. The e vidence in th is case supports the trial court’s finding t hat Troo pe r Woodard had reasonable suspic ion to conduct a war rantless traffic stop based on Appellant ’ s traffic violation. Trooper Woodard te stified that he turned on his emergency light s to initi ate a traffic stop because he observed Appellant signali n g
a turn a ft er he already had start ed tur ning

. “ An operator intendi ng to turn a vehicle right or left shall signal continuously for not less than the last 100 feet of
movement of the vehicle be fore the turn. ” Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104 ( b ). Troope r Woodard ’ s u ncontroverted personal observation of Appell ant failing to signal his right turn continuously for at lea st 100 feet before turning provided objective, articulable facts supporting a reaso nable susp icion to stop A ppellant for
a traff ic violatio n. See Cas tr o v . State , 227 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (officer’s observation of illegal lane change provided sufficient objective, articulable facts to support finding of reasonable susp icion that driver committed
traffic violation by failing to signal hi s l ane change).

As the trial court state d, “ there’s no evidence to contradict the officer’s
version of the facts

. There was not a video for me to look at to see when he turned7

his turn signal on. We have this, basically, un impeac hed testimo ny that [Ap pe lla nt] didn’t turn it on until during the tu rn, which certainly would have been
less than a hundred feet from the intersection. ” I t is clear that the trial court
believed Trooper Woodard ’ s testimo ny

. The trial court was in the best position to observe th e c redibility and demeanor of the witness, a nd it was not unreasonable
for the t rial cour t to credit Trooper Woodard ’ s testimony and conclude that the Appellant was stopped for a traffic violation. See id . at 742

- 43.

A ppella nt argues in his b rief that “ th e t rial court’s findings of fact just

cannot be correct ” because “ Trooper Woodard testified that he was 300 yards away at 3:00 a.m. and he could see whether or not Franklin used his turn signal wit hin
100 feet before pulling out of a parking l ot onto Del an ey road

. ” According to Appellant, “ three hu ndred yards is three football fields ” and “ it is just not possible
to observe from three football fields at nighttime whether a person used his turn sign al within 100 feet prior to turning. ” Appella nt ’ s argume nt is without merit. Contrary to Appellant ’ s a sser tion , Trooper Woodard di d not testify that he
could see whether Appellant used his turn signal within 100 feet before driv ing out
of a mote l parking lot onto Delaney Road. H e only testified that he observe d App ellant ’ s vehicle exit ing a motel parking lot onto Delaney Road “ at a pretty quick rate of speed ” without checking for traffic

. He never testified he considered
any action Appellant to ok while exiting the motel parki n g lot to b e a traffic

v iolation

. A d ditio nally, Trooper Woodard did not ini tiate a traffic stop beca use Appellant failed to use his turn signal when he ex ited a motel parking lot

. I nstead, Trooper Wooda rd testified he init iated a traffic stop because he observed Appellant
commi tting a tra f

f ic vi olation at t he intersection of Delaney Road and the freeway
feeder road by failing to signal his right turn until after he already had started his right turn onto the freeway feeder road.8

M o r e o v e r , there i s no ev idence that Trooper Wood ard was 300 y ards from where he observed Appellant commit a traffic violation at the intersection. Although no testimony regarding the exact distance was elicited , Trooper Woodard
testified that he i mmediately started foll owing Appellant as he left the mo tel parking l ot an d was “ closing that distance ” and was “ coming up behind [App ellant ’ s] vehicle ” at the intersection. The trial court evaluated the credibility
of the sole witness , testimony, and evi dence provided at the suppression hearing
and at trial a nd believed T roope r Woodard ’s account of why he initiated and conducted a traffic stop

. W e concl ude the trial court did not err in denying Appellant ’ s motion to suppress. According ly, we overru le App ellant ’ s sole issue.

C ONCLUSION

W e affirm the trial cou rt ’ s judgme n t s

.

/s/ Meagan Hassan Ju stice

Panel consists of Ju stices Bourliot, Hassan , and Poissant

. Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. 47.2( b).