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March 1987 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Assistant Secretary for [Nuclear Energy 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reactor S

Development and Technology 

Under Contract Mo. DE-AC01-fNE32 I I 7 
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DOE/NE/32117-H1 

Atomic Power 

In Space 

A History 

March 1987 

DOE/NE/32117—HI 

DE87 01061 8 

Prepared by: 

Planning & Human Systems, Inc. 

Washington, DC j j 

Under Contract No. DE-AC01-NE32n7 

Prepared for: 

G.S. Department of Energy 

Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reactor Systems 

Development and Technology 

Washington, DC 20545 

MASTER 

DISTRiBl'TiC-i <i' "' '- •->--•''*' '' - " •"'^ 
CONTENTS 

Forward 

Preface iv 

Chapter I 

Introduction ...,<, i 

Chapter II 

The Begiiinings 4 

Chapter III 

Recognition of Potential ,,.., , 14 

Chapter IV 

Golden Days at the AEC 28 

Chapter ¥ 

Momentum from the Lunar Mace 56 

Chapter VI 

A Maturing Prosram 72 

Chapter VII 

Persistence Amid Change 83 

Chapter VIII 

Past Lessons and Future Challenses... . 99 
Foreword i 

FOREWORD 

On December 8, 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his famous 

"Atoms-for-Peace" address, proposed that the United Nations establish an 

international agency which would promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 

The President's purpose was to take a small step toward adapting the atom "to 

the arts of peace." Within a few years his small step had grown into a number of 

peaceful atomic activities, among them an International Atomic Energy 

Agency, bilateral agreements for cooperation in peaceful atomic development, 

research reactors built in foreign countries, two international peaceful uses 

conferences, the creation of special schools with curriculums centered on 

nuclear technology, and the expanded use of radioisotopes in medicine, 

agriculture, and industry. One such peaceful use developed late in the decade 

was the "world's first atomic battery." Unveiled for the first time in President 

Eisenhower's office on January 16, 1959, the "atomic battery" was a radioisotope thermoelectric generator, a special device which converted the heat 

created by the natural decay of a radioactive isotope directly into useable 

electric power. The President was gratified to learn that the generator, developed under the aegis of the Atomic Energy Commission's Space Nuclear 

Auxiliary Power program, could provide sufficient power to run the instruments aboard a satellite. 

Characterized as a part of "Atoms-for-Peace" programs, radioisotope 

thermoelectric generators did not provide power for satellites until after 

the nation had entered the space age. The U.S. Navy launched the first 

radioisotope thermoelectric generator-powered satellite on June 29, 1961, 

a month after President John F. Kennedy committed America to put a 

man on the moon. The power unit, called a SNAP 3A device, supplied 

electricity for instruments on a Navy navigational satellite. Despite extensive safety tests which the Atomic Energy Commission performed on the 

device, the Kennedy Administration had some qualms about launching 

the SNAP 3A device, resulting in a last-minute approval and some extraordinary effort to get the device to the launch pad on time. 
ii 

Although a small, self-contained unit might seem an obvious power source 

for a satellite, radioisotope thermoelectric generators actually powered only a 

few of the many satellites the United States placed into earth orbit. Altogether 

they provided electric power for six Navy navigational satellites, two Nimbus 

meteorological satellites, and two communications satellites. Solar panels 

provided a more suitable power source for most earth satellites. 

The race to the moon and the requirements of space exploration, however, 

created more varied and challenging uses for radioisotope thermoelectric 

generator power units than did satellite missions. Because they were relatively 

rugged, light weight, and compact, contained no moving parts and did not 

depend on the sun for power, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration decided that radioisotope thermoelectric generators should power 

instrument packages and probes which must survive severe environments with 

little or no sunlight. Radioisotope thermoelectric generators therefore were 

developed to supply electricity to instrument packages left on the moon during 

the long lunar night. Astronauts deployed five Apollo Lunar Surface Experimental Packages on the moon between November 1969 and December 1972. 

Not only did the radioisotope thermoelectric generators survive the lunar night 

but they also continued to supply power until shut down on command from the 

earth years later. 

The ability to supply power in severe, sunless environments also prompted 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to select radioisotope 

thermoelectric generator units to power the Viking unmanned Mars lander and 

the Pioneer and Voyager space probes to Jupiter, Saturn, and beyond. The 

Viking lander sent back the first pictures taken from the surface of another 

planet, correcting many misconceptions about the red planet. Although Mars 

was considered a prime candidate for supporting some form of life. Viking 

found no evidence of it on Mars. Surviving the Jovian radiation belts, the 

Pioneer and Voyager spacecraft provided a wealth of data about Jupiter, 

Saturn, and their moons, surprising scientists with unexpected discoveries. 

Overnight our conception of these worlds changed from planetary systems 

frozen in cold storage for eons to dynamic systems with swirling clouds of gases, 

tempestuous storms, ever-changing rings, and moons with active volcanoes 
iii 

and one with an atmosphere of methane. 

Entitling his work Atomic Power in Space, Dr. Richard Engler has taken us 

on satellite launches and to the outer reaches of the Solar System. Characterizing radioisotope thermoelectric generator technology as a "quiet technology," he has aptly pointed out that the generators have been a smaller part 

of larger shows, albeit a vital part. Although creating a small, "quiet" product, 

the radioisotope thermoelectric generator programs of first the Atomic Energy 

Commission, then the Energy Research and Development Administration, and 

finally the Department of Energy, have nevertheless grown and prospered 

while the rest of the nuclear space effort has been abolished. Dr. Engler has 

woven the contrast of prosperity and decline into his story while vividly 

capturing through oral history the views of radioisotope thermoelectric generator developers and users. Organizational change as well as ever-vigilant 

attention to safety has also characterized the program and Dr. Engler has 

discussed these themes in detail. Most thought provoking are the lessons he 

drew from the program. Regardless of the scale of the radioisotope thermoelectric generator program efforts, the lessons gleaned from such a successful program should be of value to anyone involved in technological 

development. 
iv 

PREFACE 

tomic Power in Space," a history of the Space Isotope Power 

Program of the United States, covers the period from the program's 

inception in the mid-1950s through 1982. Written in non-technical 

language, the history is addressed to both the general public and those more 

specialized in nuclear and space technologies. 

The Space Isotope Power Program has been highly successful and has made 

major contributions to the overall space program of the United States. It has 

been part of notable technical triumphs and large-scale organizational endeavors of the space and nuclear age and offers lessons from the program perspective 

on the problems of modem-day research and development. It is important to 

document the history now, while key participants can be located to relate their 

first-hand experiences. 

The story is told at a number of levels; developments and achievements at 

the technical level; major events in the key institutions closely involved in RTG 

technology, and the larger milieu of the time. A chronology (see Appendix) 

presents important events in these different lines of action for the period 

covered by the history. A Bibliography indicates major sources used in developing the different lines contributing to the total story; of course, classified 

documents were not used. 

Illustrations, diagrams, charts, and budgets are shown in Appendices. A table 

of isotope power systems for space is also appended, as is a chronological 

listing of launchings and an annotated chart on the different RTGs developed. 

Acronyms used frequently in this narrative include: 

AEG Atomic Energy Commission 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

RTG Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generator 

SNAP Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power 

In the series of SNAP devices developed for space and terrestrial use, oddnumbered SNAPS were RTGs while even-numbered SNAPs were nuclear 

reactor systems, not isotopic ones. 

The following outline of chapter coverage may be helpful in following the 

chronology of this history and of the program it describes: 

A 
V 

Chapter One: Introduction provides an overview of the story, notes how 

the RTG program reflected a merging of space and nuclear technologies, and 

identifies major themes. 

Chapter Two: The Beginnings covers the 1950s but flashes back from a 

significant public announcement in early 1959 to trace the beginnings of 

radioisotope power discovery and development. 

Chapter Three: Recognition of Potential describes developments in 1960 

and 1961, years of transition from the Eisenhower Presidency to that of 

Kennedy when the first RTGs were used in space satellites, and notes early 

safety concerns. 

Chapter Four: Golden Dai;s at the AEC covers the years 1962-1965 when 

a small group of people were intimately involved in the program, a reorganization which created the Space Nuclear Systems Division at the AEC, and the 

beginning of major growth in the program as it prepared to support APOLLO 

and other missions of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA). 

Chapter Five: Momentum from the Lunar Race describes the years 1966-

1970 when NIMBUS and the first APOLLO launchings occurred, with RTG 

developments and applications spurred by NASA's major space exploration 

goals while international and domestic unrest increased. 

Chapter Six: A Maturing Program describes developments in the years 

1971-1974, the PIONEER and last APOLLO missions, and technical accomplishments before major reorganizations at the AEC. 

Chapter Seven: Persistence Amid Change completes the historical narrative by taking the program from 1975 to 1982, describes the VIKING missions 

and the Lincoln Experimental Satellite (LES) and VOYAGER missions, and 

covers major organizational changes within the AEC. 

Chapter Eight: Lessons and Challenges presents important lessons in the 

history of a space-age R&D program and future projections for radioisotopic 

power in space. 

Planning & Human Systems, Inc., wishes to thank the many people who 

participated in developing this history. While not all who contributed their time 

to this project can be cited here, special thanks go to Bernard Rock and Orrice 

Murdock of the Office of Special Nuclear Projects, who gave initial impetus to 

this project, and to Jack Holl and Roger Anders of the History Division of the 
VI 

Deparfanent of Energy for providing guidance throughout the project and for 

making available archival materials. George Ogbum from the RTG program 

was an invaluable source of information on important contacts as well as a 

guide to budget and organizational materials. Finally, all those program participants and technology pioneers who gave their time for interviews made it 

possible to capture the personal recollections important for the history. 

Any errors in fact or interpretation found in this history are the responsibility 

of Planning & Human Systems, Inc. 

Richard E. Engler, Ph.D. 

Planning & Human Systems, Inc. 

Washington, D.C. 
1 

Chapter I 

Introduction 

echnological change has accelerated tremendously in recent decades. 

Today's new breakthroughs are disseminated almost immediately to 

the lay public via television and soon become tomorrow's routine 

occurrences. No technological developments of this accelerated age have 

captured more attention than those in space and those relating to nuclear 

energy. The technology which provided nuclear power for space missions cuts 

across these two broad fields of technical and scientific development. 

In spite of their many spectacular triumphs, both the space age and the 

nuclear age have very recent beginnings. They date from the period following 

World War II when America assumed worldwide responsibilities. Throughout 

the 1950s, the two technological revolutions gained momentum, and in the 

decades which followed they brought amazing technological feats to the senses 

of many people throughout the world. They also influenced, and were influenced 

by, other events in the world. 

The first man-made satellites, launched in 1957 by the Russians, led to a 

searching reassessment of American science and education. Eventually they 

triggered the race to the Moon of the 1960s and astronaut Neil Armsti'ong's 

"giant leap for mankind." Subsequently, unmanned Mars landings, missions 

to fly by Saturn and Jupiter, and other space probes punctured old beliefs and 

led to revised theories among space science specialists, while providing a view 

of the universe never seen by previous generations. 

Dramatic developments in nuclear energy also unfolded during those years, 

although their appearance frequently was accompanied by public concern 

after the earlier cheers had subsided. From the beginnings at Stagg Field and 

Alamogordo, awe was mixed with foreboding, and efforts to generate peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy have been burdened by fears of the uncontrollable. 

Growing concerns about ever more destmctive bombs and fears of fallout 

contamination led to concerted efforts to control testing and find peaceful uses 

for nuclear energy. As a consequence, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 

successor to the greatest weapon development project of all time, began to 
2 

devote more of its developmental efforts to civilian applications of nuclear 

energy. According to a history of the AEC, in 1966 ' 'the AEC budget for the first 

time was divided about equally between weapons and peaceful uses."' Yet 

even the peaceful applications of nuclear energy were to face some barriers. 

The radioisotopic program, a part of the overall effort to develop systems for 

nuclear auxiliary power for space missions, was a participant in these events. It 

benefitted from the plutonium produced and made available in sizable amounts 

by the many years of nuclear weapon development under the AEC. The space 

uses of isotopic power received their greatest boost from the highly-publicized 

missions conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA), in America's participation in the space race. 

The space isotopic power program, however, has been a quiet program, 

somewhat shielded from evolving public concerns about nuclear power and 

rarely the star of the space spectaculars. Space isotopic power has developed 

quietly because it is indeed a quiet technology. For example, it does not involve 

explosive power; nor does it require human interventions in nuclear processes 

to induce nuclear fission or fusion. It is a battery-like thermal power emanating 

from the natural decay of radioactive elements; when used in and applied to 

space missions, the technology operates far from the terrestrial environment. 

The history of the radioisotope power program is basically a success story, 

although it is certainly not one of linear success. The program was initiated by 

the AEC under impetus from the Department of Defense but first went public 

late in that decade as part of the "atoms for peace" movement, with President 

Eisenhower showing an atomic battery to the world and extolling its peaceful 

potential uses. Subsequentiy, while the Defense Department supported mostly 

test applications of the radioisotopic power devices in space, the program 

reached its pinnacle of success through uses by the civilian space agency 

NASA. 

The program never became tmly big but was a vital part of larger programs 

while outliving its "big brothers" in the space-nuclear field. In the spring of 

1961, as the first radioisotopic thermoelectric generator (RTG) space missions 

were about to be launched, proponents of the use of nuclear energy in space 

were projecting the future technologies that would enable Americans to achieve 

the goal set by President Kennedy—a man on the Moon by the end of the 

decade. They proclaimed: "Nuclear Rockets will get him there... Nuclear 
3 

Power will sustain him there." ^ 

The story told here will show how the second part of that prophecy came to 

fruition through the use of radioisotopic power.* It will describe how the RTG 

program matured in the 1970s to deliver RTGs that were vital components of 

missions to distant planets and beyond. It will look at the human, organizational, 

political, and social factors contributing to the survival and continuing achievements of the space isotopic power effort throughout its history. 

The history of the space isotopic power program is essentially one of 

opportunities, perseverance, and attentiveness to detail—especially regarding 

safety measures and public communications about them. In its ultimate measure, space isotopic power is a program sustained throughout its history by a 

team of people who, in spite of changes in the larger organizations surrounding 

them, were ready at the launch pads when opportunities arose to demonstrate 

the technology in which they believed. 

The story begins with the first glimmerings of opportunities for this space 

and atomic age technology. 

*The faltering of the nuclear propulsion and space nuclear reactor power efforts is a secondary 

theme in this history. 
4 

Chapter II 

The Beginnings 

An Auspicious Debut 

he radioisotopic power program made an auspicious public debut. A 

banner headline in the Washington, D.C. Evening Star of 16 January 

1959 announced: 

PRESIDENT SHOWS ATOM GENERATOR' 

An accompanying photograph showed President Eisenhower examining the 

"worid's first atomic battery" as it sat on his desk in the Oval Office of the White 

House. The president had personally ordered the display of the device shortly 

after seeing it himself for the first time. 

The small, lightweight device on the president's desk was a radioisotopefueled thermoelectric generator (RTG)—a companion effort to nuclear reactor 

developments in the Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) program. 

Ready for space missions, the RTG could provide the necessary auxiliary 

power to operate the instruments of a space satellite. The RTG displayed for 

the public in that historic moment had been designated SNAP-3 by the AEC. In 

later years, especially on missions to the Moon and beyond, the RTG role as a 

bit player in space spectaculars, kept it out of the headlines, but on that day it 

was the star of the show. 

Although the isotopic power device was not made public until January 

1959, the AEC had briefly discussed its development a year earlier before the 

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). The hearings before the JCAE 

had focused on "Outer Space Propulsion by Nuclear Energy," but Colonel 

Jack Armstrong, chief of the AEC Aircraft Reactors Branch, also introduced 

Committee members to the small isotope power program. The program had 

been spurred, he said, by indications that the Russian Sputnik, with its longlasting signals, used something other than conventional battery power for its 

transmitter. Efforts to develop space-nuclear power for the electrical equipment 

in the Air Force reconnaissance satellite 117L had led to research and development in both reactors and isotopes for space-power uses. Funds were found in 

rwi 
The Begififiiegs 5 

the nuclear propulsion appropriation for 1958 to finance a low-key, low-cost 

effort in isotopic power development "to provide an extremely light, an extremely small source of power...." ^ 

Only four months before the televised display on Eisenhower's desk, the 

Martin Company of Baltimore, Maryland received a contract for producing an 

isotopic generator. The Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company developed the conversion system by which heat from radioisotopic decay of 

polonium 210 was h-ansformed into electricity. The five-pound experimental 

unit which developed five watts of power had been developed soon after the 

Martin contract was signed. Armstrong was reported as saying that "the cost of 

the model was $15,000 exclusive of atomic material." He estimated the cost of 

fueling with 3,000 curies of polonium at $30,000. ^ 

The men from the AEC meeting with President Eisenhower hailed their 

small generator, which had no moving parts, as a "significant breakthrough" 

for its efficiency in producing electric energy from the heat of decaying radioactive 

isotopes through a method called "thermocoupling." According to Armstrong, 

until the breakthrough in conversion methods, American scientists exploring 

isotope technology used rotating machinery driven by radioactive power sources 

to produce electricity. The new generator achieved its efficiency, stated to be 8 to 

10 percent of electiical energy output from heat energy input,* through a 

radiating system of metal spokes, with each spoke in contact with a container that 

shielded the radioactive polonium and heat from the decaying polonium radiating 

up the outside ends of the spokes as electrical energy. The new RTG technology was not intended as propulsion for nuclear powered airplanes; Armstrong 

said that immediate uses were for NASA to decide, adding, "We can tailor the 

product to fit the customer."" 

Although NASA soon became the major user of RTGs in space, it was the 

Department of Defense that first capitalized on isotopic power technology for 

space—in satellites. Defense uses dominated nuclear energy developments 

throughout the 1940s and 1950s, with developments in the "big" nuclear 

technologies coming to public attention with the "world-shaking events at 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While opportunities for uses of isotopic power in the 

1950s were linked to the "big" nuclear technologies and the new atomic age, the 

* Later accounts reduced estimates of this efficiency to about 5 percent. 
6 

development of isotopic power itself has a history that goes back many decades. 

The Quiet Nuclear Technology 

Glenn Seaborg, Nobel laureate in chemistiT; and pioneer in the discovery of 

radioactive elements, has noted that while nuclear power plants generate 

headlines and engender debates about potential dangers, "the atom works 

away quietly, as it has for half a century, in medicine, industry, agriculture, and 

science."^ Radioisotopes and atomic radiation, used in medicine since the 

early 1900s, marked the first phase of the atomic revolution, a phase which 

Seaborg believed was already over. He described the quiet technology: 

The 'silent' atomic tools are varied; most depend not upon fission and 

fusion but upon more subtle properties of the atom, such as its precise 

clockwork, the high-speed projectiles it emits, and the vivid, distinctive 

label it provides." 

Behind these quiet tools was the discovery, in 1896, of radioactivity by 

Henri Becquerel. Investigating the phosphorescence of certain minerals after 

their exposure to light, the French physicist accidentally discovered that phosphorescent uranium salts affected a photographic plate. Most startling was his 

observation that uranium's phosphorescent property did not depend on prior 

exposure to light, but was an inherent characteristic of the element. He had 

detected the disintegrating nucleus of the atom of an unstable element and had 

shattered the assumptions of classical physics, which viewed the atom as the 

irreducible building block of matter.' 

Pierre and Marie Curie later used electrical methods to pursue the phenomena of radioactivity, building on the discovery that uranium and its compounds rendered the air near them a conductor of electricity. Their research 

into the radioactive properties of elements led them to the discovery of radium 

and polonium in 1898. They also detected, in their experiments with radium, 

the buildup of a voltage difference that was used in 1913 by English physicist 

H.G.J. Moseley in constructing the first nuclear battery. Moseley's battery 

consisted of a glass globe silvered on the inside with a speck of radium mounted 

on a wire at the center. The charged particles from the radium created a flow of 

electricity as they moved quickly from the radium to the inside surface of the 

sphere.* 
The Begirnilngs 7 

As late as 1945 the Moseley model guided other efforts to build experimental 

batteries generating electricity from the emissions of radioactive elements." 

These devices converted the motion energy of the charged particles fi'om a 

radioisotope directiy into electricity, without first converting the motion energies 

to heat, and thus generated very low powers (thousandths of a watt). At that 

time neither converters for transforming heat to electricity nor materials exhibiting sufficient efficiency in thermoelectric properties were available. The route 

that finally led to the RTG—obtaining heat from radioisotopic emissions and 

converting this heat to electricity—was not followed for some time." Before 

describing how that route was finally taken, it would be useful to describe the 

basic nuclear radiation process that is the essence of the quiet atomic tools. 

An isotope is "any of two or more varieties of the atoms of a chemical 

clement." " Isotopes of the same element have different numbers of neutrons 

in their nuclei, although they otherwise display the same characteristics of the 

element. The isotopes of elements that exhibit radioactive decay properties are 

called radioisotopes. Radioisotopes are unstable elements that produce usable 

energy in the natural process in which one chemical element is transformed 

into another. Thus, within a family of radioelements such as uranium, change 

through decay to another element of the same family is constant and spontaneous.'^ 

A radioactive isotope, then, possesses unique and valuable properties that 

are the basis of the quiet atomic technologies: "It spontaneously emits... nuclear 

particles It decays exponentially in time at a rate which cannot be altered by 

known physical forces." "* It is a potential source of usable electricity; its lifetime 

in generating energy for that purpose can be calculated exactly in terms of the 

half-life of the particular radioisotope as it decays. 

International Confrontations and Vistas for New Applications 

Before the Manhattan Project developed the atomic bomb, only very small 

quantities of radioisotopes were available. The AEC-sponsored reactors that 

continued to turn out large quantities of fission products brought about a great 

increase between 1940 and 1950 in radioiostopes and in the decay heat 

available to engineers. Moreover, in 1950 the need for small and reliable 

electrical power supplies was becoming manifest in the infant space program. '* 
8 

As the 1950s opened, the wedding of the quiet technology to early space efforts 

was spurred by cold war confrontations that dictated developments in both 

atomic and space science. 

The United States' monopoly of nuclear weapons ended in 1949 when the 

Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device of its own. The decision by President 

Truman to proceed with the development of a hydrogen bomb (H-bomb) 

followed within five months. Great power tensions reached a new high in June 

1950 with the beginning of the Korean War. New military demands and the 

development of the H-bomb led to a tremendous expansion of AEC production 

facilities in the fall of 1950. New plants for producing plutonium were a major 

part of this expansion. Nuclear weapon testing increased also, and America's 

first experimental thermonuclear device was detonated at Eniwetok in the fall 

of 1952. In the years 1950 to 1953 the AEC created a vast complex dedicated 

almost totally to military purposes.'^ 

During the cold war years, when the weapons race among the super 

powers intensified, the adversaries also pursued ever more sophisticated methods for learning about each other's technological advances. Surveillance satellites became major elements in the early space race, and radioisotopes had the 

potential for providing power for these military satellites. An eariy study by the 

North American Aviation Corporation had considered radioisotopes for space 

power. "* Then a RAND Corporation report in 1949 discussed options for space 

power in "Project Feedback," strategic satellite reconnaissance the corporation 

was studying, and concluded that a radioactive cell-mercury vapor system was 

feasible for supplying 500 watts of electric power for up to one year." These 

assessments and the growing recognition of power requirements in Project 

Feedback led the AEC in 1951 to commission studies of a 1-kilowatt electiical 

space power plant using reactors or radioisotopes. Several companies who 

performed these studies recommended the use of isotopes for space power. In 

1952, the RAND Corporation issued a Project Feedback summary report with 

an extensive discussion on radioisotopic power for space.'* The interest in 

isotopic power for space satellites increased. 

A significant achievement for the quiet technology occurred in early 1954 at 

Mound Laboratory in Miamisburg, Ohio. It was at this laboratory, which in 

future years prepared the fuel packages for succeeding generations of isotopic 

devices, that scientists pioneered the design of a thermocouple to convert 
The Beglimiogs 9 

isotopic energy to usable electncal energy Mound scientists Kenneth Jordan 

and John Birden had been frustrated m efforts to use decaying radioactive 

matenals as heat sources to boil water to dnve a steam turbine and generate 

electncity They hit upon the idea of applying the thermocouple pnnciple, using 

metals that differ markedly m electncal conductivity, to create a thermopile that 

would conserve and harness the heat from radioactive matenal and generate 

electncity * Withm a few days of working out the calculations, the Mound 

scientists constructed a working model of the technology The pnnciple of using 

the thermocouples was patented by Jordan and Birden, and today remains the 

basis for all radioisotopic-power thermolectnc generators ^^ 

A Program Takes Form in an Atmosphere of Challenge 

With the need for space reconnaissance being given high pnonty and 

nuclear power now viewed as feasible for uses m surveillance satellite systems 

the Department of Defense requested in August 1955 that the AEC perform 

studies and limited expenmental work toward developing a nuclear reactor 

auxiliary power unit for the Air Force satellite system under study ^' In agreeing 

to undertake the development of such auxiliary nuclear power systems, the 

AEC stated that it intended "to explore the possibilities of using both radioisotopes and reactors as heat sources "^^ This was the birth of what became the 

SNAP program of the AEC 

The titie "SNAP" replaced an eariier titie of the program In the 1958 

heanngs before the JCAE, Senator Clinton Anderson asked, "Is SNAP by any 

chance km to the Pied Piper'^" Armstrong's reply was "It is Pied Piper 

renamed, sir "^^ 

That exchange occurred after momentous events had shocked Amencan 

defense planners, space scientists, and the public at large In October 1957 the 

Soviet Union launched its first Sputiiik into orbit That same month, the editor 

oi Aviation Wee/c stated 

The Soviet satellite now orbiting around the earth approximately 16 

*The thermoelectnc conversion was discovered in the early 19th century by the German physicist 

Seebeck The Seebeck pnnciple of thermocouples indicates that an electncal current is produced 

when two dissimilar metals are joined m a closed circuit and the two junctions are kept at different 

temperatures '" 
10 

times every 24 hours.. .offers incontrovertible proof of another Russian 

scientific achievement 

We believe the people of this country have a right to know the facts 

about the relative position of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in this 

technological race which is perhaps the most significant single event of 

our times. They have the right to find out why a nation with our vastly 

superior scientific, economic and military potential is being at the very 

least equalled and perhaps being surpassed by a country that less than 

two decades ago couldn't even play in the same scientific ball park.^'' 

In the same issue of Aviation Week an article surmised that success of the 

Soviet Sputnik would give new impetus to a Lockheed project for a satellite 

reconnaissance project called "Pied Piper" being developed for the U.S. Air 

Force. The project referred to was the one for which the AEC took the 

responsibility of developing nuclear energy as a possible source of auxiliary 

power. Repercussions at the AEC came quickly. ^^ 

"Pied Piper" was the code name for the advanced reconnaissance system 

for which the AEC was preparing a nuclear auxiliary power unit. Since the 

publicity in Aviation Week compromised the term, the AEC issued instmctions 

on 27 October 1957 to all field offices and contractors involved in the AEC part 

of the program to discontinue using the code name. The unclassified titie 

"Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power," or "SNAP," became the authorized 

reference for AEC's work on nuclear auxiliary power units. ^'^ 

Technical work on SNAP devices went on, perhaps in an atmosphere of 

greater urgency^not so much due to immediate mission needs, but because 

of the challenge to American technological capabilities that Sputnik represented. 

The nation was caught up in self-doubt and questioning such as it had never 

known in the modem age. New institutions were being created to revitalize 

American science, especially space science. President Eisenhower, after presiding over a confident if turbulent era in the 1950s, was besieged for answers 

about the apparent decline in America's preeminence in modem technology. 

In response to this concern, Eisenhower created a President's Science 

Advisory Committee in November 1957, with James R. Killian becoming the 

first Science Advisor in the Executive Office of the President. Killian described 

the atmosphere of that time as America strove to recapture lost prestige: 
The Beglmiliigs 11 

On December 6, the first test of the US Vanguard space vehicle, 

carrying a three-and-one half pound satellite, seemed to the world an 

ignominious flop This spectacular failure, coming as it did after the 

successful Sputnik II, increased the hystena and embarrassment in the 

United States and the ndicule abroad In England, the press revelled m 

cancatunng Vanguard, calling it, among other things, Puffnik, Flopnik, 

Kaputnik, or Sta];putnik ^~' 

Later that month, however, KiUian prepared a memorandum for the Presi 

dent containing the judgment of a Science Advisory Committee panel chaired 

by George Kistiakowsky Taking on the implications of competitive space (and 

therefore missile) capabilities in light of the Russian Sputnik, the pane! expressed 

the judgment that "technically our missile development is proceeding m a 

satisfactory manner, "and although the United States was behind the Soviets in 

the space race, having started much later, the nation's technological progress in 

the missile field was, m fact, "impressive "^** 

Another panel of the Committee recommended outimes of an Amencan 

space program and the organization to manage it As a result, NASA was 

established in July 1958 to conduct civilian aeronautical and space research 

The first administrator of NASA, Keith Glennan, recalled the subdued tone of 

the president as he asked Glennan to take on the task of furthenng Amenca's 

advances in space science and technology 

The meeting with President Eisenhower was bnef and very much to 

the point He stated clearly his concern over the development of a 

program which would be sensibly paced and prosecuted vigorously 

As I recalled it, he made no mention of any great concern over the 

accomplishments of the Soviet Union although it was clear that he was 

concerned about the nature and quality of scientific and technological 

progress m this country ^^ 

To calm the public concerns and deflect Department of Defense strategies 

to mobilize U S space efforts pnmanly on a military basis, the president and his 

advisors set a course for civilian leadership m space The president sought to 

further calm matters m the international nuclear contest by announcing, m 

August 1958, a moratonum on nuclear weapons testing to begin October 31 of 

that year 
12 

Soon after it accepted the space nuclear assignment requested by the 

Defense Department, the AEC began parallel power plant efforts with two 

private corporations: odd-numbered SNAP programs using radioisotopes were 

spearheaded by contractual work at the Martin Company; even-numbered 

SNAP reactor power systems were developed through contractual work with 

the Atomics International Division of North American Aviation, Inc. The work 

by the Nuclear Division of Martin-Baltimore progressed through an early 

SNAP-1 effort to use the decay heat of cerium 144 to boil liquid mercury and 

drive a small turbine. In the course of following this development path, the 

Martin Company also let subcontracts to develop generators that would not 

require rotating equipment and the introduction of gyroscopic action to space 

vehicles. In 1958 work began on two thermoelectric demonstration devices at 

different companies, Westinghouse Electric and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M), while AEC contracts with other companies explored the development of demonstration thermionic units. * 

The program to develop advanced energy conversion techniques that did 

not require rotating equipment (as in SNAP-1) was given the designation 

SNAP-3. It yielded results quickly; the 3M Company delivered a workable 

thermoelectric generator to Martin in December 1958. Using polonium 210 

(capsuled by Mound Laboratory), the generator, quickly assembled and tested 

by Martin, was delivered to the AEC as a proof-of-principle device, producing 

2.5 watts with a half charge of polonium 210 fuel. The AEC thus had at hand a 

capability for producing units that would generate 120 watts of electricity 

continuously for a year.^" 

Echoes of "Atoms for Peace" 

President Eisenhower, shown this breakthrough in the quiet technology in 

January 1959, was eager to share the success story with the American public 

and the world at large. There was a sense of calm and composure about the 

debut of the proof-in-principle RTG. The event around President Eisenhower's 

desk emphasized "peaceful uses" for this technology. The president's eagerness to display the device openly testified to such purposes and provided an 

* Thermionic conversion is the transformation of heat to electricity by the process of boiling 

electrons off a hot surface and collecting them on a cooler surface. 
The Beginnings 13 

opportunity to issue a challenge to NASA, then a fledgling civilian space 

agency, to develop missions appropriate to the potential of the device. The 

small package that was the RTG appeared and was represented as harmless 

and non-threatening. 

Perhaps the president saw an opportunity to use this example of American 

technical capabilities to publicize calming themes for space research much as 

he attempted to tone down the nuclear contests throughout the decade. 

Eisenhower attempted early in his first Administration to turn worid ati:ention 

away from nuclear confrontations and toward peaceful uses of atomic energy. 

His "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations came in his first year in 

office. The Atomic Energy Act which soon followed made possible private 

development of nuclear power in the United States, and at the close of 

Eisenhower's first term the AEC made large amounts of U-235 available for 

use in power reactors in the United States and abroad. * President Eisenhower 

showed great determination throughout his Presidency to turn nuclear science 

and technology away from international confrontations and races for technological superiority. On the threshhold of a new international race—the quiet 

nuclear technology was not a powerful booster for such a race but a tool for 

sustaining people and their machines in the space ventures, whatever the 

purposes of those ventures. The momentum of a race eventually would open 

the greatest opportunities for applications of the quiet technology. 

* Sales of radioisotopes at Oak Ridge National Laboratory increased from 5,389 curies at the 

beginning of Eisenhower's Presidency to nearly 150,000 in the first year of his second term in 

office.^' 
14 

Chapter III 

Recognition of Potential 

A Time of Transition: 1960-1961 

hroughout his eight years in office. President Eisenhower strove to 

project attitudes of calm and of confidence in the future, but events 

worked against him. Early in his first term, the nation's sense of innate 

superiority was weakened by the realization that the Korean conflict was ended 

by a negotiated settlement rather than a clear cut military victory. Nine months 

into his second term, that sense was severely shaken by Russia's orbiting of 

Sputnik I. At that point, Eisenhower had already initiated programs to revive 

scientific, technological and organizational energies. In 1955, for example, he 

had approved plans for launching an American satellite as part of U.S. participation in the International Geophysical Year. After Sputnik's launch there was 

a greater appreciation of the political significance of such accomplishments.' 

Existing programs were accelerated and new ones undertaken. Eisenhower 

saw the need to match and surpass these achievements. He saw also a need to 

prevent the U.S. response to this challenge in space from being equated by 

other nations as being limited solely to military needs and objectives.^ It was to 

avoid this interpretation that from the outset, in planning for NASA, the 

emphasis was on scientific objectives, and on the peaceful, civilian pursuit of 

scientific goals. 

Homer Newell, a NASA administrator, and later an historian of the agency, 

wrote of the circumstances that helped shape its mission: 

A majority of those who would finally make the decision soon became 

convinced that the most effective way of proving U.S. leadership in 

space would be to demonstrate it openly. Moreover, a space program 

conducted under wraps of military secrecy would very likely be viewed 

by other nations as a sinister thing, a potential threat to the peace of the 

world.... It seemed important, therefore, that the U.S. space program 

be open, unclassified, visibly peaceful, and conducted so as to benefit, 

not harm, the peoples of the worid.^ 

T 
Recognition of Potential 15 

NASA's philosophy was thus in accord with the President's reservations 

about the power of the nation's military industnal complex He "was not 

disposed to foster further growth by adding still another very large, very costly 

enterpnse to the Pentagon's responsibilities "^ 

The content of the space program of the new civilian space agency was not 

specifically prescnbed by Congress m the NASA Act passed ml95 8 The 

charter provided only the framework for coordination and cooperation between 

NASA and other agencies Under its first administrator, the new agency moved 

vigorously in the directon of a civilian space science program, setting "a strong 

but measured pace," according to Newell The pace on senous commitments 

to a lunar science program was slow at first, and "Glennan for a while showed a 

reluctance to discuss planetary missions except as plans for later, for the more 

distant future "^ 

On the nuclear side of the nation's space efforts, two important aspects 

were forcefully addressed m that transition year of 1960 safety problems and 

organizabonal needs 

A few months earlier, the AEC had established an Aerospace Nuclear 

Safety Board "to analyze and project the possible effects of nuclear space 

devices upon the health of the peoples of the worid and recommend stan 

dards of safe prachce for the employment of nuclear powered space devices 

proposed by the US "'^ In May 1960, Glennan and AEC Chairman John 

McCone assessed the problems of safety along with the potential benefits in the 

use of nuclear components m space programs In that early speculative penod, 

Glennan wrote 

In respect to the use of nuclear sources for power generabon in 

spacecraft, it is our belief that for certain missions the use of nuclear 

components may be the only way m which the mission requirements 

can be fulfilled Here again, however, there is considerable question 

as to the acceptability of the hazards involved The hazards to personnel 

and equipment on the surface of the earth, the radiahon problem 

incident to manned space flight the interference with expenmental 

measurements m spacecraft, and the radiological contamination of 

extra terrestnal bodies, are all moderating influences on the use of 

nuclear systems" 
16 

Glennan suggested that the AEC begin to define the conditions for safe use 

of nuclear auxiliary power systems in space missions and propose the safeguards 

which would have to be provided. He assured McCone of NASA's willingness 

to work closely with the atomic agency on these matters.* 

In August 1960, the two agencies formalized arrangements for working 

together more effectively on all aspects of space nuclear efforts. A "Memorandum of Understanding between Atomic Energy Commission and National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration" affirmed "that Mr. Harold Finger will 

serve as the manager of the joint AEC-NASA project office and Mr. Milton 

Klein will serve as the deputy manager."" The new joint AEC-NASA Nuclear 

Propulsion Office reported to the Director of the Division of Reactor Development in the AEC and to the Director of Launch Vehicle Programs in NASA. As 

joint office manager. Finger wore two hats: he headed the joint office of nuclear 

propulsion and retained direction of the NASA office for space power. Finger 

thus exercised responsibilities for integrating AEC-developed RTGs into any 

NASA missions. 

Both the early safety concerns and the organizational effort to bring the 

AEC and NASA together for joint efforts in the space nuclear field had enduring 

effects on the future of nuclear auxiliary power and the progress of the quiet 

space-nuclear technology. Safety concerns led to new organizational mechanisms for handling and anticipating safety problems as opportunities were 

sought to prove the usefulness and value of isotopic technology in space. At the 

same time, the new joint AEC-NASA Office, while it dealt with nuclear propulsion, prepared the way for merging the SNAP program with NASA projects. 

NASA's missions eventually came to lead in using RTGs for power in space. 

The nuclear propulsion effort, designated Project Rover, now came under 

the single management of the new joint AEC-NASA office. The SNAP program 

continued as an AEC effort in the agency's Division of Reactor Development. 

When the AEC-DOD Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Office (ANPO) was disbanded, 

its director, Armstrong, became Assistant to the Director of the Division of 

Reactor Development at AEC. Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Anderson, formerly 

SNAP project officer in ANPO, became chief of the SNAP Branch in the new 

division. 

Before the momentum of the race into space increased, the SNAP program, 

particularly its quiet technology, was developing momentum of its own. At the 
Recognition of Potential 17 

end of the Eisenhower Administration, radioisotopic power stood on the 

threshhold of its first mission applications. The RTG technology was ready. Its 

proponents were looking for opportunities to put it to use. On Capitol Hill, in 

JCAE hearings, the pressure was on Project Rover. Committee members 

pressed for a flight schedule that would test nuclear propulsion in space. 

The JCAE was also manifesting an interest in the SNAP program and its 

potential for providing long-lasting power to expensive satellite systems. In 

early 1961 hearings on "Development, Growth and State of the Atomic Energy 

Industry," JCAE Chairman Holifield told AEC officials that some committee 

members felt the SNAP program promised a payoff in continuing performance, 

perhaps for a year or two, from satellites costing hundreds of millions of dollars. 

Asked by Holifield if he was satisfied with the way the SNAP program was 

going, the Director of the Division of Reactor Development, Frank R. Pittman, 

replied: "As far as the technical aspects of the SNAP program are concerned, I 

am satisfied that it is.. .progressing quite well." Pressed, however, for information on whether progress had reached the establishment of requirements by 

user agencies, Pittman replied that such requirements had been established at 

that point only for certain even-numbered (reactor) SNAP systems. "We have 

requirements on the SNAP 2, the SNAP 10, and SNAP 8, with time requirements for testing." ^'' 

Potentials and Precautions 

The SNAP-3, which was demonstrated to President Eisenhower in 1959, 

later came to be known as "the salesman of our working SNAP devices." " The 

first proof-of-principle SNAP was shown at several foreign capitals as part of 

the American "Atoms for Peace" exhibits. Reactions from academicians and 

students attending seminars held in conjunction with the exhibits were highly 

positive, although sometimes questions regarding safety were raised. ^^ 

In the U.S., one of the first public expressions of concern followed the 

demonstration in Eisenhower's Oval Office. According to George Dix, then 

responsible for safety at the Martin Company's isotope power project, and later 

head of the total space nuclear safety program under Finger at the AEC, 

nuclear critic Ralph Lapp complained that a highly lethal item had been placed 

on the President's desk. RTG engineers were attuned to reactions regarding 

safety and in a matter of days they developed a safety evaluation which 
18 

apparently satisfied Lapp. The report, which covered handling procedures and 

all other matters regarding the safety of RTGs, thereafter accompanied SNAP3 when on display in foreign capitals.'^ 

Dix also pointed out that it was President Eisenhower who pressed for the 

use of the new technology in space satellites as soon as possible. According to 

Dix: "This successful demonstration came along about the time we had lost a 

Vanguard on the pad. Ike said, 'Let's fly this thing. [The Russians are] beating 

us on other things. Let's beat them on power.'" " 

During 1960, technical journals continued to make a case for nuclear 

auxiliary power in space, but they also expressed reservations over the safety 

factor." Despite the president's enthusiasm, the first RTG flight came two and a 

half years after the White House demonstration. The prevailing attitude was 

summed up by Nucleonics: "Isotopic Power Ready for Space But Caution 

Delays Use." Describing the comprehensive safety program of the Martin 

Company for SNAP-3, the journal noted that the "devices are being designed 

so they will remain sealed in any abort prior to leaving the earth's atmosphere 

but. ..will disintegrate to molecular-size particles on re-entry." These particles 

were described as so small they "will reside in space until long after the 

contained radioactivity has decayed to meaningless levels."'" 

Despite the conscientious safety programs at AEC and NASA, the Defense 

Department continued its preference for solar devices over isotopic power 

because the former presented no radiation problem. A series of solar device 

failures, attributed to leakage of storage batteries, forced a reconsideration of 

this policy. A need was seen to rely on isotopic power while industry worked at 

perfecting solar cell batteries. One unmanned source at DOD's Advanced 

Research Project Agency was quoted as saying RTGs could be "here to stay, 

particularly for missions where there is no sunlight."" 

The AEC approach was to face the safety issue head on and to take steps to 

systemize safety reviews and safety procedures shaped to criteria that left no 

apparent margin for error. These criteria were developed in June 1960 at a 

three-day meeting of the AEC's Aerospace Nuclear Safety Board,'** and 

spelled out in a September 1960 report to McCone. The criteria for the safe use 

of radioisotopic units, according to the report, provided that: 

The isotope material should be contained and the capsule present no 

hazard in the event of a launch abort. 
Recognition of Potential 19 

The above conditions should obtain m the event of failure to reach 

orbit, and m addition the capsule should fall m broad ocean areas 

In the event of failure to obtain a stable orbit, or m re-entry from a 

successful orbit for any planned time, the capsule and contents should 

be burned and dispersed in the upper atmosphere "* 

Citing results of tests already conducted, the Board indicated that a definitive 

program of further tests was being planned An initial step in this program 

would involve placing pods on Atlas test vehicles launched from Cape Canav 

eral'" 

At the end of 1960, the Chairman of the Aerospace Nuclear Safety Board, 

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A Connor, Jr, of the United States Air Force 

announced an AEC position on safety in the nuclear space program Addressing 

the Atomic Industnal Forum, he stated that SNAP isotope and reactor devices 

had been thoroughly tested and found capable of burn-up on re entry into the 

atmosphere at speeds above 24,000 feet per second, for a burn up time of 300 

seconds or more Connor concluded "the use of nuclear powered devices 

sufficient to meet all space requirements expected to be developed by 1980 

would release but a small fraction of the radioactivity considered by the Federal 

Radiation Council to be tolerable for the general population "^' 

Firming a Base for Accelerated Space-Nuclear Achievements 

President Kennedy had defined sharp views on new approaches to atomic 

energy and its confrol m the international arena at the outset of his Adminisfrabon Glenn Seaborg, then Chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, 

recalled being in the university's Radiation Laboratory on 9 January 1961 

when President elect Kennedy called to ask him to accept the post of Chairman 

of the AEC Upon his acceptance, Seaborg found himself "plunged into a new 

kind of chemistry, that of national and international events "^^ 

Seaborg was to find out that President Kennedy wanted a scienbst as the AEC 

Chairman, and although he wanted a Democrat for that job, he was not 

interested in the party affiliation of those named to fill the other senior level 

positions within the agency "I felt my job as chairman was nonpartisan," said 

Seaborg, and he added that it became clear to him that in the nuclear held the 

new president wanted most to mobilize the scientific community and involve its 
20 

members in the pending cmcial decision on atomic energy ^^ 

Seaborg's heading the AEC proved a boon to the isotopic power program In 

the course of his career poor to entenng government he had been involved in the 

discovery of plutonium and many of the fransuranium elements He was co 

discoverer of certain isotopes, including Pu-239 and U-233 As the AEC 

Chairman, he kept abreast of developments m isotopic power, arranging to be 

bnefed on RTG programs soon after his amval at the agency "^ 

Together with Seaborg, another man crucial to a growing space-nuclear 

partnership was James Webb, who was called on by the Kennedy Adminisfration 

to head NASA as it stood on the threshhold of the space age Webb had held 

several key adminisfrabve posibons in Washington He had been Executive 

Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury m the early Truman years, and the 

Director of the Bureau of the Budget when the AEC was formed In 1952 he 

had served as Undersecretary of State Noted for his expertise in adminisfration, 

Webb saw the New Frontier being faced by NASA as a venture in both space 

science research and development and adminisfrative research and develop 

ment ^^ 

When it was behind him, Webb saw the expenence at NASA as a lesson m 

the role of political factors in essenbally scientific programs He observed that 

If NASA program managers, scientists, engineers and top officials had 

not thought of their work in political terms if they had not arranged 

their activities to gain support from other NASA divisions. Congress, 

the Bureau of the Budget, the scientific community, etc —Apollo 

would not have met its goals 

polibcal relationships are not something added on to the work of 

line managers or program officials as less important than other duties, 

these relationships are an integral part of their work, inasmuch as 

personal relationships and a sensitivity to the total environment are 

essential parts of leadership responsibilibes if the system is to work at 

alP« 

A second basic lesson was the importance of being able to adapt to 

continuous change This, Webb found, was permitted by a feedback mechanism 

in the form of an executive secretanat established at NASA* to provide senior 

*The secretanat at NASA consisted of Administrator Webb his Deputy Administrator Hugh 

Dryden and Associate Administrator Robert Seamans Jr 
Recognition of Potential 21 

management with reliable information, as well as the systematic exchange of 

officials between headquarters and decenfralized offices. In addition to keeping 

senior management on top of things, the executive secretariat worked to insure 

a flow of information to other levels so that all NASA employees could grasp 

with greater clarity their specific roles in the accomplishment of established 

missions.^' 

Webb and Seaborg had not been close associates before they accepted 

their assignments in the Kennedy Adminisfration. Seaborg met with Webb on 

his first Sunday after arriving in Washington and recalled that the two "hit it off 

from the start.'' ^' Their working relationship sfrengthened as they ushered their 

agencies' joint programs through many congressional hearings on Capitol Hill 

and through budget sessions within the Executive Branch. 

Webb recalled that soon after his assignment at NASA there were pressing 

problems with the military which required immediate resolution. The Pentagon 

had not given up completely on its desire to be the lead agency in the space 

program. It saw the inauguration of a new president as a possible opportunity 

to swing the space effort from NASA to the Air Force. Defense Secretary 

McNamara, however, felt NASA should keep the space program, and key 

scientists around the country backed this support for civilian confrol. ^^ McNamara's position was consistent with NASA's mandate by the Space Act to 

develop extensive relationships with universities and corporations and undertake 

a major cooperative effort to develop the scientific, technical, and adminisfrative 

capabilities of the nation and its institutions. NASA was also mandated to share 

this effort with other nations, and therefore wanted the space program to be as 

open and non-secretive as possible. Webb later explained that he wanted to be 

able to "say to the press and the scientists and engineers of the eighty nations 

cooperating, 'Come and bring your camera."' TM 

The "open" approach of NASA would lead to some problems in AECNASA relationships, since the mandates and the fraditions of the two agencies 

differed in significant ways. A firm basis for cooperation was set by the two men 

who headed these agencies. The need for cooperation increased greatly once 

President Kennedy announced his challenging goal for space. 

It was four months after Kennedy assumed the presidency before he stirred 

the nation with his startling and exciting goal of landing a man on the Moon by 
22 

1970. Seaborg recalled that he was present by special invitation'" when the 

president, in a special message to Congress on 25 May 1961, announced: 

Now it is time to take longer strides—time for a great new American 

enterprise—time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space 

achievement,.. .1 believe this nation should commit itself to achieving 

the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and 

returning him safely to earth. ^^ 

Webb understood the significance of a "race" to put a man on the moon 

and he welcomed Kennedy's infroduction of this concept. "It meant we had a 

target. I kept reminding Congress that we were committed to putting a man on 

the Moon and to demonsfrating our technical capabilities in that achievement. 

Getting to the Moon would be proof positive that we had developed our 

capabilities in a full range of disciplines. If we could get man to the Moon and 

back with our technology, we could do anything." There were times, however, 

as NASA's program and budget quickly grew, when President Kennedy would 

question whether the full range of NASA's activities was necessary to carry out 

the landing on the Moon. "I told him we have to bring along the universities 

and the other institutions and push the total concept of development, '"^^ Webb 

recalled. One NASA task was to orchesfrate the combined efforts of many 

universities and other institutions whose common goal was to make the fantasies of centuries become a reality within a few short years. 

It was in the first year of the race to the Moon that the quiet technology got 

its chance to take its steps into space. Its proponents were impatient, but they 

too were learning about the importance of the chemistry of national and 

international events combining with technology in a total environment. 

First Success in Space 

The first successful use of RTGs in space occurred in a Navy satellite 

program. The Navy's Transit program had been underway for some time, ft 

was a system for orbiting a navigation satellite that would provide accurate 

sightings for ships and planes in all weather conditions. The effort began at the 

Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) of Johns Hopkins University in 1957. The 

first link between the Transit developers and the isotope people at the AEC 
Recognition of Potential 23 

(and their Martin Company confractors) came about almost fortuitously, as 

John Dassoulas of APL recalled. 

"I had been looking into the possibilities of isotopic power since we first 

began the Transit program. We had a five-year goal for the life of the operational 

Transit, and we weren't confident that the hermetic seals on batteries would 

hold up for five years. But I wasn't aware of the SNAP program at all."^'* 

In 1958 the Department of Defense sponsored a big meeting in Pasadena, 

California about space (satellite) power. Dassoulas attended the conference 

but did not meet with any of the nuclear power people until, on his return flight, 

he found himself sitting next to Anderson, who headed the isotope SNAP work 

atthe joint AEC-DOD office. Anderson responded to Dassoulas'expression of 

interest in isotopic power for the Transit program with an invitation for him to 

visit the Martin Company's Baltimore facility and to become acquainted with 

the work there on SNAP.^^ 

Following the visit, Dassoulas returned to APL and asked for and received 

permission to use an isotopic SNAP device on Transit. Plutonium, however, 

was then unavailable because of AEC restrictions, and APL refused to permit 

the use of sfrontium-90 because of the excessive weight of the necessary 

shielding. The AEC eventually relaxed its policy and agreed to provide the 

plutonium fuel and SNAP-3A, as a result, was converted from polonium-210 

to plutonium-238, permitting a power life of five years. ^^ 

At the request of DOD a development program was initiated by AEC in 

February 1961 "to provide two plutonium-238 isotope-fueled generators for 

TRANSIT satellites to be launched in June and July." The AEC, looking 

beyond the Transit mission itself, held that "a primary purpose of the flight test 

is to demonsfrate the performance of a SNAP.. .generator under actual space 

conditions."^'' 

Tests for the safe use of SNAP devices on Transit had been conducted the 

previous fall. The next spring "safety" remained a critical issue, although both 

the Transit people at APL and the RTG people at the AEC and Martin looked 

forward hopefully to a chance to fly the isotopic generator. The planned 

trajectory of the launch vehicle from Cape Canaveral was to take the Transit 

over Cuba and South America. This added further qualms to those advising 

caution because of anxiety about possible Cuban reactions to a fly-over after 

the Bay of Pigs incident. 
24 

In March, the Martin Company completed a comprehensive safety analysis 

of the Transit generator, focusing on potential hazards that might result if 

launch or re-entry failures were to occur. Martin concluded "that if the radioisotope generator considered is launched in the frajectory proposed for Transit 

vehicles, it will not produce a significant radiation hazard."^* 

In April, there were impact tests against granite at the Aberdeen Proving 

Ground to assess whether isotope containment would be maintained in the 

event the core experienced a crash landing.^" That same month a hazards 

analysis report was prepared by the Division of Licensing and Regulation.*" 

Later in the month this report and the Martin final safety report were shared at a 

joint meeting, attended by Navy, Air Force, DOD, and AEC personnel, where 

agreement was reached on the responsibilities of the various agencies."' In 

May, Seaborg and his fellow commissioners undertook extensive efforts to 

ensure the SNAP-3A's launch would be approved. Commissioner John Graham, 

Acting Chairman of the AEC, wrote to McNamara seeking his support and 

urging him to intercede at the State Department with Chester Bowles, who had 

expressed concern about the Transit frajectory over Cuba and South America."^ 

Seaborg's May 6 bi-weekly report to the president announced the AEC's 

approval of the SNAP-3 devices on pending Transit launches. His report urged 

Space Council and presidential approval of the missions, citing the findings of 

the hazards study that "any danger to the public is extremely unlikely." 

Seaborg told the president: "I call this to your attention since this first application 

of a nuclear auxiliary power source in space is likely to have a wide public 

impact." He then outiined the suggested procedures for a joint submission of 

the proposed plan by AEC and DOD to the Space Council for review. Were 

that not feasible, he said, a meeting could be arranged with Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk, and himself. Seaborg concluded: "It may be necessary 

to present the matter to you direcfly for your approval.""" 

In spite of Seaborg's efforts, the plan for a SNAP-3 demonsfration on the 

forthcoming Transit launch was rejected by the National Aeronautics and 

Space Council, primarily because of objections from the Department of State. 

The Department of Defense, however, reassured Seaborg that it expected 

"provision will be made for a SNAP unft to be included in the next TRANSIT 

shot after the one scheduled in June." " 

Reporters were quick to pick up on high-level government concern over 
Recognition of Potential 25 

radioactive material in space. On 16 May 1961, the New York Times pointed 

out that "cautious officials" had split with scientists on use of nuclear devices 

and that the "problem confronting the Adminisfration.. .is not so much a 

technical decision as one of diplomatic, political and psychological considerations." "'^ On May 19 the Times was more specific about the misgivings in certain 

U.S. government agencies—one article indicated that concern was evident at 

high levels. While officials believed the vehicle to be safe, concern had arisen, 

particularly in the State Department, "that in event of an unsuccessful launching, 

the satellite, with its radioactive parcel, could fall on Cuba or some other 

Latin-American country" provoking an international incident. Even a successful 

launch could lead Latin-American countries to "take offense about having 

radioactive materials flown over their territory.""" 

In early June hopes of the RTG proponents were high again; and throughout 

the month, right up to the June launch of Transit-4-A, hopes rose and fell. On 

June 8, Seaborg reported that he hoped for a reversal of the Space Council's 

decision but that he was not optimistic that a reversal could be achieved.*" By 

June 23, however, hopes were high as Gilpatric of DOD told the AEC that the 

Defense Department was making a last attempt to get the State Deparfrnent to go 

along with using the SNAP-3 device on Transit-4-A, scheduled for launch on 

June 27. Finally on the 23d, word came from Gilpatric that approval had been 

received."** 

At the working level, perceptions of how it all came about varied. Robert T. 

Carpenter of the AEC thought that Seaborg asked the JCAE to intercede witii 

the Space Council. Dassoulas believed that the go-ahead came about because 

Seaborg had dinner with President Kennedy one evening in June and persuaded 

him to approve the mission. All agreed that lead time was short and the situation 

hectic as the small RTG team found ways to get their device on the vehicle at 

Canaveral on time for the scheduled launch."^ 

According to Dassoulas, a fueled SNAP-3A device had already been shipped 

to the Cape sometime in June when, because of fears it might be launched 

without approval, an order came:' 'Return that thing to Washington and store it at 

the Martin Company." When the last-second go-ahead was received, the littie 

team scurried to meet the deadline. "One of our people was a Marine Corps 

pilot, and he checked out a small plane so that he and Carpenter could fly that 
26 

RTG out of Andrews to the Cape,"* recalled Dassoulas. The device was kept 

overnight at the APL in Laurel, Maryland, after Carpenter obtained it from 

Martin. "We decided he should just bring it over here to APL in his car. I met him 

in the lobby and we put it in one of the labs, with the rooms on each side 

vacated." The guards were all instmcted what to do and how to handle safety 

and security. The generator was in Horida the following evening, flown down 

by Carpenter and the pilot.'^'' Finally, on 29 June 1961, after a 24-hour launch 

delay, a Thor-Able rocket launched three satellites simultaneously—including 

the first orbiting of an RTG in space. 

Thus, two-and-a-half years after its debut on President Eisenhower's desk, 

the quiet technology made the front page headlines again. The New York 

Journal American of Thursday, 29 June 1961 announced: 

U.S. ORBITS ATOMIC BATTERY 

According to the newspaper "The successful orbiting of the nuclear device... 

gives American scientists a significant lead over Russia in the race to harness 

atomic power for space exploration."^' 

The AEC made efforts to capitalize on that first space-nuclear success by 

announcing in September that the "Worid's First 'Atomic Battery' In Space 

Continues to Operate Successfully" after ten weeks in orbit.'^^ In October, 

Seaborg promoted the atom in space and advocated future applications of 

nuclear power in space before an international symposium of space scientists 

and engineers looking back on the success of SNAP-3A on Transit: 

The presence of the 'atomic battery' in the satellite is a symbol of a 

'marriage' that was bound to occur—between Space and the Atom. 

We have known for some time that the two were made for each other. 

No one would be tempted, at the present time, to abandon other 

sources of energy for space. However, the atom has made greater 

strides toward coming of age for space application in the past few years 

than many of us could have hoped. The day is not far off when atomic 

energy will be available in many different packages for practical use in 

space vehicles.*'* 

*Both Carpenter and Dassoulas recalled that the device was flown to Florida on Saturday for an 

expected Sunday night launch which was delayed until Monday night Official records show, 

however, that the launch occurred on Thursday 29 June 1961 
Recognition of Potential 27 

As plans went forward for a second SNAP launching on another Transit in 

November, the political and environmental lessons leamed were being applied. 

Seaborg addressed a letter to Vice President Johnson, who also served as 

chairman of the Space Council, lauding the Council's role in the June launch. 

He provided information about the new launch mission, and he said that he 

was anticipating that the Space Council would again play a critical role.^" The 

Vice President replied that he was appreciative of this reference to the assistance 

of the Space Council in the June 29 launch and that the Executive Secretary 

would be asked to perform the coordination necessary for inclusion of a 

nuclear power source in the Transit-4-B launch.'^'^ 

A second successful launching of a SNAP-3A, aboard a Transit-4-B navigational satellite, took place on 15 November 1961. The RTG team, this time 

wtth plenty of lead time and operating without the uncertainties of the pioneering launch, was ready at the launch pad. In the wake of this success would 

come a period of search by this small team for opportunities for the RTGs, 

which now had demonsfrated their capabilities as power sources for space 

missions. 
28 

Chapter IV 

Golden Days at the AEC 

A Close Community 

any of the original RTG team thought of the early years after 

Seaborg came to the AEC as the "golden days" of the AEC— 

before the big and costly space systems and missions of NASA 

involved increasingly large numbers of people and organizations in the RTG 

program. 

From 1962 to 1965, the antinuclear movement was not yet vociferous, the 

future of nuclear power and its widespread uses looked promising, and the 

chairman of the AEC was a scientist who believed sfrongly in nuclear power 

and its wedding to space ventures. Moreover, Seaborg inspired loyalties and a 

sense of common purpose in the people of the AEC. 

Carpenter* recalled that it was common to meet the top man in the halls at 

AEC's Germantown building and to be greeted by name and asked questions 

about the program: "We had a personal relationship with Seaborg, and we also 

had a close arrangement with the Commissioners." He added that problems 

on the Hill were few and that the program received support from both the AEC 

and the Congress, whose members pressed for a flight schedule on space 

nuclear propulsion, eager to see the SNAP-isotope technology get its chances 

to fly. In those years, according to Carpenter, the AEC allowed engineers to do 

everything from start to finish on their programs—at least on the small isotopic 

power program. The RTG group chose to have just a few hands holding all the 

reins. Carpenter recalled: "I prepared budget documents, defended them 

before Congress, ran my program and participated in the launches."' 

Carpenter explained that few contractors were involved in the early days 

because the program was small and there wasn't a great deal of money 

available for space-isotopic power development. He indicated that SNAP-3 

was built on a purchase order from the Martin Company to the 3M Company 

*At that time head of the isotope office of the SNAP program under Armstrong, who reported to 

Pittman, director of the Reactor Division at AEC. 

M 
Golden Days at the AEC 29 

for a very small amount. Martin got involved in isotopic power, while others 

held back, because ' 'they were into space in a big way and their programs were 

long range. A lot of other firms that got involved later came in when there was 

more money in the budgets. Like when we got going on Apollo."^ 

In the initial development period, the circle was limited, encompassing the 

small group at the AEC and small groups in other institutions: the isotope 

power experimenters and developers at Martin-Baltimore and their subconfractors at 3M; the fuel packagers at Monsanto's Mound Laboratory; and users 

such as the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University which 

developed the Transit navigational satellite system for the Navy. This team 

proceeded to develop the SNAP-9A with its increased power requirements for 

the operational Transit scheduled for flight in late 1962. At the same time, a 

series of SNAP-7 devices were under development at Martin for use by the 

Navy, Coast Guard, and Weather Bureau for navigation lights and weather 

stations on earth. 

NASA began to enter into contracts with the AEC to study possible applications of isotopic SNAPs to future space missions. Even before Apollo, NASA 

recognized that there would be unusually severe power system requirements 

for lunar missions "due to the weight and space limitations of payload, the 

14-day lunar nights, and the variety of the intended experiments."^ By the fall 

of 1961, NASA reconfirmed its requirements for an isotopic power unit for the 

Surveyor soft lunar landing mission and the AEC prepared to provide two 

SNAP devices—designated SNAP-lis—to NASA for missions scheduled to 

take place two years later." In mid-1962 NASA began preliminary discussions 

with the AEC on the possibility that an RTG could provide primary power 

requirements for one of a series of satellites called Interplanetary Monitoring 

Probes. Along with foreseen technical advantages, NASA hoped to use the 

RTG to enhance its own "capability and experience in the use and application 

of nuclear devices." ** 

Reporting to the JCAE in September 1962 on space nuclear power applications, Commissioner Hayworth of the AEC stated "Nuclear power not only will 

enhance space exploration; its use, both for propulsion and for auxiliary power, 

is the key to extensive outer space exploration." He reviewed the developments 

and tests in the Rover program to develop nuclear rocket propulsion and 

admitted that there had been disappointments causing delays. Turning to the 
30 

isotopic power side of the SNAP program, Hayworth reported with "considerable satisfaction" on program successes: launchings in June and November of 

the previous year of isotope power devices on Navy Transit navigational 

satellites. Looking to the future, he said, "We are continuing to work closely 

with DOD and NASA to satisfy their requirements for space SNAP devices, 

and... we have developed a plutonium 238 fueled 25 watt unit, SNAP-9-A, for 

use in the Navy's operational prototype Transit satellites." Hayworth also 

spoke of the work with NASA on the development of the SNAP-11, a 25-watt 

curium-242 fueled thermoelectric generator planned for powering the Surveyor 

soft landing lander." 

Thus NASA readied itself for the time when it would become the major user 

of the isotope units and the small RTG group would open its membership to 

growing numbers of people and organizations. 

A Climate of Renewed Determination and Hope 

Great Power confrontations affected the RTG program. The Soviets broke 

the nuclear atmospheric test moratorium that had been honored by the United 

States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union since November 1958. President 

Kennedy ordered the resumption of underground testing. In April 1962, while 

the nation still hailed the triumph of John Glenn's first orbit of the Earth by an 

American, the president authorized the resumption of atmospheric tests off 

Christmas Island. The tests provoked considerable adverse public reaction 

around the world as well as at home.' The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 

marked the height of international tension. By the summer of 1963, Kennedy 

seemed determined on a course that would bring the Great Powers back from 

the brink of war and start them on a road of cooperation, at least on the issue of 

nuclear testing. Perhaps benefiting from international tensions, NASA and 

AEC research moved ahead while Great Power confrontations unfolded. 

In June 1963, the president chose the occasion of a commencement 

address at the American University in Washington, D.C., to lay out a new 

course for the Great Powers to follow in the search for peace and accommodation of their differences. Was peace possible? "Our problems are man made— 

therefore, they can be solved by man" the president believed. Was it possible 

to be at peace with an aggressive communist Super Power? "No government 
Golden Days at the AEC 31 

or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in 

virtue " Moreover, the peoples of both countnes shared a mutual abhorrence 

of war and had never been at war with each other Finally, turning to arms 

confrol, the president made two announcements 

First Chairman Khmshchev, Pnme Minister Macmillan, and 1 have 

agreed that high-level discussions will shortiy begin in Moscow looking 

toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban freaty 

Second To make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on this 

matter, I now declare that the United States does not propose to 

conduct nuclear tests m the atmosphere so long as other states do not 

do so ** 

The discussions which began in Moscow m July led before the summer was 

over to a "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, m Outer 

Space and Under Water " This Limited Test Ban Treaty was approved by the 

U S Senate, 80 to 19, on September 24 and ratified by the Praesidium of the 

Council of Ministers of the USS R on September 25 '* 

In a congressional reassessment of the nation's space program, the president's 

moves toward accommodation with the Soviet Union were seen not only as 

slowing the lunar race but also as undercutting overall support for the space 

program In an address at the United Nations m September, the president 

proposed that the two Great Powers conduct a joint manned lunar landing 

program Space technology advocates said this had "provided new arguments 

for further cuts m an already reduced space budget, and left the public puzzled 

as to whether Project Apollo still is an urgent national goal " Aviation Week 

expressed similar concerns 

President Kennedy has dealt his own national space program its 

hardest blow 

The immediate effects of the President's ill conceived invitation to the 

Soviets to join the U S Apollo program are twofold 

First, it will provide congressional opponents of his space program 

with the well sharpened ax they need to cut its Fiscal 1964 budget 

drastically and retard U S space progress even more than the restnc 
32 

tions of technical development 

Second, it will induce a psychological drag into the vast program that 

has just begun to build promising technical momentum '" 

By early November, the space journal pressed for a new national space 

policy and a Fiscal 1965 space budget "based on solid elements of national 

self-interest "" A week later Khmschev put Russia back into the manned 

lunar landing race by his statement that Russia had not given up on its lunar 

program and that his previous statements of being ready to "consider" a joint 

manned lunar landing program had been misinterpreted.'^ 

After Kennedy's assassination, editorialists tended to sfress the positives of 

this "truly modem president." In his last major speech, at the U.S. Air Force 

School of Aerospace Medicine in San Antonio, the day before his assassination 

in Dallas, Kennedy related an anecdote of the Irish boys who, when in doubt 

about trying to get over an orchard wall on their treks across the countryside, 

tossed their hats over the wall and then had no choice but to follow them. The 

president had said: "This Nation has tossed its cap over the wall of space, and 

we have no choice but to follow it." One editorial concluded that "when the 

first American asfronauts return safely from the moon, as they surely will, we 

should remember that it was John F. Kennedy... who tossed our caps over the 

wall of space and made us surmount it successfully."'^ The RTG program 

benefitted both from Kennedy's support of technology and from the national 

optimism. 

Other events competed for attention during the last summer and fall of the 

Kennedy Adminisfration. The massive "March on Washington" against poverty, 

the rioting of blacks for their civil rights, and the repercussions of the assassination 

of President Diem'" of Vietnam predominated in the media. The next steps in 

moving the isotopic power devices toward space flight tests on an operational 

prototype satellite went almost unnoticed that fall. In late September, a Navy 

Transit 5B navigational satellite powered completely by an isotope power 

generator was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base. Space journals in 

October"* briefly recounted this flight debut of the SNAP-9A. Clearly, the 

headline-grabbing days of the pioneering SNAP devices were over. A successful 

SNAP-9A launch on another Transit on 5 December 1963 did not even receive 

mention in either the space journals or the popular news magazines. 
Golden Days at the AEC 33 

The Technology Goes Forward 

On the first anniversary of nuclear power in space, AEC Chairman Seaborg 

reminded the public through the press of this historic milestone for the Atomic 

Age. The SNAP-3A device was still operating successfully after one year, its 

plutonium fuel, which had half a life of 90 years, had the potential for powering 

a space fransmitter for decades. Seaborg projected this vision of future uses for 

nuclear power in space: 

I firmly believe that nuclear energy provides the most feasible means 

of accomplishing long voyages in space and many other ambitious 

missions of our national space program... . 

Because of the exciting panorama of applications, the development of 

nuclear energy for space is most important. Mankind is only on the 

verge of the space age. Nuclear power will take us into this age—and 

close to the planets."' 

High hopes and expectations in Congress still rode with nuclear propulsion 

and space reactor power generators. The quiet technology already had proven 

itself and the AEC made plans to explore other possible applications for the 

RTGs." 

In late 1962, NASA's ten-year forecast of potential requirements for RTGs 

for space missions included Interplanetary Monitoring Probes, Orbiting Asfronomical Observatories, and Nimbus—a satellite system for providing 24-hour 

weather coverage on a global basis."* Preliminary work on RTGs for these 

systems began. Meanwhile, work proceeded on the SNAP-9A that would 

power the Navy's operational prototype navigational satellites. In the spring of 

1963 Pittman, the head of AEC's Division of Reactor Development, reported 

to a Senate Committee that ".. .our most dramatic success has been with the 

relatively small isotopic SNAP devices... .especially suited for space applications 

because they are able to operate under exfreme environmental conditions of 

temperature and elecfromagnetic radiations, and are not dependent upon 

sunlight to generate power."'" The AEC SNAP Fact Sheet of 1 September 

1963 set down program developments to that date: 

The SNAP-7 program developed "prototype isotopic units fueled 

with sfrontium-90.. .for the Coast Guard and the Navy for use in coast 
34 

navigational aids, deep sea sonar devices and automatic weather 

stations." All of the devices in this series were for terrestrial uses in 

severe environments. 

SNAP-9A was under design for use by the Department of Defense in 

the operational navigational satellites—formerly Transft, which flew in 

1961 SNAP-3AS. The SNAP-9A, like the 3A, was ftjeled by plutonium238 and was designed for a life of five to ten years. It generated 25 

watts of electrical power and weighed 27 pounds. 

NASA's inquiries about using RTGs for Project Surveyor—the unmanned soft lunar exploration program—had led to work at the AEC 

on SNAP-11. This devise, to be filled with curium-242, would weigh 

30 pounds, and would provide "a minimum of 18.6 watts of power 

continuously for 90-day lunar missions." 

Also under development for the NASA Surveyor mission was the 

SNAP-13, which would demonsfrate the feasibility of using an RTG in 

a cesium-vapor-thermionic-generator. This generator would produce 

12.5 watts, in line with Surveyor requirements. 

Under development for a classified mission was a SNAP-15—the 

smallest generator currentiy in the total program. It would use plutonium-238 and supply .001 watt of power for a design life of five years. 

NASA's interest in RTGs for the Interplanetary Monitoring Probe 

stimulated work on a unit similar to the 9A but allowing "for easier 

fabrication and lower system weight." Designed for a satellite to chart 

the magnetic field between Earth and the Moon, these generators 

would produce approximately 25 watts and be fueled with plutonium238. 

Finally, the AEC noted that proposals had been invited "for development 

of an isotopic generator for space using sfrontium 90 as the fuel," a device to 

supply electric power for the Medium Altitude Communications Satellite of the 

Air Force. ^° Confracts for these devices were awarded in November to General 

Electric and the Martin Company, and provided for conducting the first phase 

of a program assessing sfrontium-90 as a fuel for RTGs in space.^' 
Golden Days at the AEC 35 

Gradually other companies were drawn into RTG development, but the 

Martin Nuclear Division remained the major developer. Martin felt the tight 

funding squeeze of the program and the restrictions of "hardware-oriented 

research" even as the company extended its work to new devices for both 

DOD and NASA. In a briefing of the AEC Commissioners in late 1962, R.D. 

Bennet, general manager of Martin, complained that funding was limited, that 

the development of SNAP devices was restricted to specific missions, and that 

the program lacked a broad research and development effort that should be 

directed particularly toward increasing power-to-weight ratios and insuring 

reliability as power requirements increased. ^^ In refrospect, however, in spite of 

continuing complaints about lack of funding, proponents of the RTGs at the 

AEC realized that the sfrength of the program was in mission oriented research 

and development which focused on the requirements of specific missions. 

Experiences in preparing for the launch of the SNAP-9A second generation 

RTGs during 1962 and 1963 were repeated many times in the following years 

as the developers of the quiet technology became accustomed to uncertain 

lead times and strove to be ready at the launch pads whenever the signal on a 

mission finally was "go." Changes in load requirements for the Navy satellites 

affected the converter design. Other problems arose in thermal cycling: in the 

course of long term vacuum testing, air entered into one of the units and 

oxidized the thermoelectric package. Moreover, the launch vehicle had been 

modified in October 1962 and a first launch date, originally set for December, 

was postponed to Febmary and then to mid-May 1963.^^ Other postponements 

occurred. With launches finally scheduled for September, October, and November 1963, a process was instituted in August for receiving the Commission's 

and the president's approval for using the plutonium-238 fueled SNAP-9A 

generators on Navy navigational satellites flown out of the Pacific Missile 

Range. ^" 

In response to last minute disagreements regarding safety, information on 

safety was developed and provided to reviewers almost up to launch time.^^ 

Following the Commission's approval a few days before the first launch, the 

Space Council advised the AEC of the president's approval. An AEC press 

release on the late September launch announced that the Navy navigational 

satellite launched from Vandenberg was the "First To Be Wholly Powered By 

Nuclear Energy." ^'* In early December another AEC press release was headlined 
36 

"Second Satellite Wholly Powered By Nuclear Energy Launched Recently; 

Operating Successfully."^' A February 1964 status report, however, recorded 

that useful doppler signals from the first launching were no longer being 

received, although the second SNAP-9A, launched two months eariier, continued to perform perfectly.^" 

As plans matured for the launch of the third and last SNAP-9A in the series, 

attention to safety issues was even more concenfrated. A mission abort occurred 

on that launch, indicating that this attention was well placed. Procedures and 

mechanisms for handling potential hazards had placed heavy demands on 

resources throughout the development and use of the RTGs. Safety procedures 

became highly formalized before the manned lunar flights which required 

larger power supplies and multiplied the potential hazards of mishaps. 

Evolution of a Safety Program 

Dix, Finger's nuclear safety officer, commented "We always proceeded on 

the assumption that if we had one abort resulting in the release of radioactivity 

the program would be lost.'' ^^ Tom Kerr, who came to the Joint Space Nuclear 

Propulsion Office in June 1962 as NASA's coordinator of safety reviews for all 

space nuclear systems, also reflected this determination to keep failures from 

destroying the program. Kerr documented the story of procedures for safety 

clearances following DOD and the AEC informal reviews of the two SNAP-3A 

launches: 

In preparation for the SNAP-9A launches in 1963, an expanded 

review group and procedures were implemented. NASA was invited 

to participate in the reviews; although the launches were for DOD 

navigation systems. At that time the responsibility for these reviews was 

made a part of the responsibilities of the joint AEC/NASA Space 

Nuclear Power Office.... It was during these eariy reviews and launches 

that efficient and comprehensive review and approval procedures were 

developed.TM 

Specialists were not prepared initially to work with the space nuclear environment. Procedures used for ground based systems could not be followed; the 

RTGs were lightweight and heavy shielding had to be avoided. Moreover, a 

number of situations had to be considered: launch failure on or near the launch 
Golden Days at the AEC 37 

pad, re entry following an unsuccessful launch, and short orbital lifetime leading 

to re entry and terrestnal impact m unknown and uncontrolled areas In addition, 

approval had to be obtained at the highest level Kerr noted "It was cnbcal for 

the Department of State and the president and his staff to understand the 

potentials of these launches The potenhal for political repercussions was great 

in case of failure with impact and possible fuel release on foreign temtones "'*' 

Dunng the penod of SNAP 9A preparations, representatives from the 

AEC, DOD, and NASA outiined areas and procedures for improving the 

consistency and efficiency of the review and approval process They decided to 

use an ad hoc panel representative of the concerned agencies, rather than 

creating a standing interagency committee One factor influencing this decision 

was that a standing committee which included public parhcipahon would have 

difficulties handling classified information As early as January 1963 a model 

charter had been developed for a possible interagency review committee ^^ 

Eventually the safety review panel was given the name "Interagency Nuclear 

Safety Review Panel" (INSRP) Although these panels were always newly 

constituted ad hoc, through many years of safety reviews Dix was the assigned 

AEC coordinator and Kerr the assigned NASA coordinator 

In the spnng of 1964 a report to the Commission by the General Manager 

and the Director of Regulation set down an interagency safety review mechanism 

close to the one that eventually was adopted '"' The procedures agreed upon 

relied on the creation of an ad hoc panel for each mission and included 

development of a public information package and safety report These prepared 

packages anticipated the mishaps that might occur and contained appropnate 

safety information for distnbution 

Basic considerations on safety began with the fuel used m the devices The 

AEC selected plutonium 238 as the fuel for the first SNAP space missions 

because it emitted pnmanly "alpha" particles (the least penefrating type of 

particles) and had a relatively long half life could not support a chain reaction 

and even in large masses presented no danger of nuclear explosions The 

danger lay in its poisonous qualities if inhaled or ingested by living organisms 

The AEC descnbed the many tests, conducted on plutonium 238 fuel capsules 

for SNAP devices, that examined ability to survive launch pad accidents safely 

to withstand impact, and to burn up on re entry m the atmosphere ^" Dix said 

"We went with a 'burn up on re entry' concept in the early days because those 
38 

in authority believed that the release from a highaltitude abort was an improbable event and if it did occur would only add a very tiny increment to the 

plutonium that was in the atmosphere from weapons testing.^^ The "burn-up" 

aspects of safety considerations, however, caused the most problems in obtaining approval for the 9A launches. 

The Division of Licensing and Regulation of the AEC expressed sfrong 

reservations about the safety of the forthcoming SNAP-9A launches and 

challenged assumptions regarding burn-up on re-entry. It reminded the Commissioners that the SNAP-9A devices contained ten times the amount of 

plutonium fuel that had been flown in the SNAP-3A. These concerns were 

never completely dispelled even though the launch went ahead with Commission approval. Approval was accompanied by the acknowledgement that 

safety review by the Division of Reactor Development and the Division of 

Licensing and Regulation was to continue and that throughout the Transit 

series the Commission would be advised of any "untoward events" that 

occurred.^** 

The failure of the third Navy 5B satellite to achieve orbit caused some flurry 

and placed pressures on the safety team. AR. Luedecke, AEC General Manager, 

reported to Chairman Seaborg: 

Preliminary data on the April 21,1963 SNAP-9A abort indicate that the 

payload reached a high altitude (over 1000 miles) over the South Pole 

and re-entered over the Mozambique Channel at a steep angle....'" 

A press release from Seaborg reassured the public; 

From previous safety analysis and tests it had been concluded the 

re-entry will cause the plutonium-238 fuel to bum up into particles of 

about one millionth of an inch in diameter. These particles will be widely 

dispersed... and would not constitute a health hazard.^** 

There were few negative repercussions. In June the AEC Commissioners 

were reassured by Duncan Clark, Director of the AEC Division of Public Information, that "the USSR is the only counby to voice reaction to the news of the 

SNAP-9A failure to orbit."^" The issue stayed alive; inquiries from U.S. Senators 

seeking information and reassurances were received and answered at the AEC 

as late as October."" In the fall a review of the failure of the April launch was 

presented to the Space Council."' As results from high altitude balloon samples 
Golden Days at the AEC 39 

continued to be received, the AEC prepared and distnbuted a reassunng press 

release stating that the recently collected data "clearly indicates that the fuel of a 

space nuclear generator burned up as expected last Apnl after its spacecraft failed 

to achieve orbit ""^ 

Carpenter remembered "We looked at aborts as 'good tests' ""^ Dix recalled 

proudly "We had done an analysis which spotted just where that RTG would 

go down—in the Mozambique Channel," (he also indicated that this predicted 

burnup analysis had been published in the open literature pnor to the launch)"" 

Strengthened by the "test" provided by the 9A abort, the safety program went 

forward as an integral part of the growing technology As Kerr explained the 

safety program pre-mission reviews and tests contnbuted to the design ot the 

SNAP devices and thus contnbuted to a phenomenal record of successful 

missions while also predicting and controlling the hazards from the few failures *^ 

The 9A abort led to a change m the fuel form, according to Kerr *® Eventually, 

with larger radioisotopic fuel loads, the basic safety concept changed from 

burn up and dispersion" to "intact re-entry " By the time that new concept 

was integrated into an RTG powered space mission, however, the mechanisms 

for interagency review and meticulous safety analysis were well established and 

in operation 

Crossroads for New Thrust and Directions 

In late 1963, space and nuclear scientists and technologists attempted to 

foresee how the new President, Lyndon Johnson, would proceed with the 

space program Johnson came to his new position with considerable legislative 

expenence in space and military activities as a result of his committee assign 

ments while a member of Congress and his chairmanship of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Council after his election as vice president In his first 

address to a joint session of Congress on 27 November 1963, Johnson pledged 

to continue Kennedy's ideas and ideals including "The dream of conquenng 

the vastness of space '' *" 

Johnson's first decision m space pnonties was viewed positively by Aviation 

Week "The national space program has taken a significant step forward with 

President Lyndon B Johnson's decision to develop a military orbital space 

station "'"' Two weeks later, however, the president tnmmed the FY 1965 
40 

budget, which led to the cancellation of nuclear flight programs. The AEC/ 

NASA Joint Office estimated that 1,300 employees at Aerojet, Lockheed, and 

Westinghouse were affected by the cancellation of the reactor-in-flight test 

project and the stretch-out on Nerva, the nuclear engine for rocket vehicle 

application."'* 

Reasons for the budget cut became apparent as the months passed. In April 

1964, space journals devoted much attention to the Vietnam War. Although 

Defense Secretary McNamara had said no decision had been made to extend 

the war, he rejected any suggestions that the United States withdraw from 

Southeast Asia.^" Tensions on Capitol Hill surfaced, engendered by Secretary 

McNamara's defense of his program to develop weapons. An attack by Congressman Laird on the military budget indicated that "guns and butter" was an 

issue of partisan contention. Laird challenged Secretary McNamara for using 

dollar amounts to justify the classification of each program as major: 

Using this criteria, perhaps we should classify the war on poverty as a 

major new weapons system. After all, the requirements of a new 

weapons system all seem to have been met in this program. The cost is 

certainly high enough. And the war on poverty, like the weapons 

systems Secretary McNamara claims as new, is obviously a combination 

of already exisiting programs. And, of course, the program has been 

given a new name.^' 

Administrators of NASA and the AEC took steps to maintain the momentum of 

their programs and to cope with this threatening environment. 

In January 1964 President Johnson asked Webb to review NASA's future 

space exploration plans with the object of relating hardware and development 

programs to prospective missions. The president also stressed the importance 

of coordinating research and development programs with the DOD and the 

AEC. Webb conferred with Seaborg and incorporated Seaborg's views regarding joint work between the two agencies into his report. Detailing the programs, 

their missions, and hardware, Webb layed out the panorama of development 

in which NASA was engaged, "a ten-year $35 billion program aimed at 

developing a national capability for operations in space." Attempting to save 

the broad programs, he discussed the many missions being considered and 

their coordination with other agencies. ^^ 
Golden Days at the AEC 41 

Seaborg had begun over a year earlier to prepare a case for the SNAP 

program and, as budget battles approached, ^^ invited private contractors, the 

military services, and other govemment agencies to attend seminars about the 

SNAP program.^" In response to the president's request, a draft report on the 

SNAP program was ready by January 1964. Commissioner Ramey criticized 

the report's apparent efforts "to lean over backwards to be fair to other types of 

systems like solar cells" and expressed reservations about the emphasis placed 

on nuclear safety.'^^ 

Distributed in February 1964, the report stressed the unique advantages of 

nuclear auxiliary power to a wide variety of space missions and maintained that 

the "performance of ambitious space missions will require amounts of reliable 

power so large that they can be achieved only from nuclear systems. "*'' Welsh, 

at the Space Council, offered to help defend the program vigorously, but made 

clear the priorities of the Council regarding the total SNAP program: 

My staff recognizes the usefulness of the isotope SNAP devices, but if 

anything is even more interested in the range of nuclear reactor work 

entailed in the total program. They feel very strongly that we must give 

every encouragement now to power development needed to support 

future missions. The Apollo landing will not be an end. Future possibilities include manned planetary explorations, a growing lunar base, 

and multi-mission advanced earth orbiting stations. All of these will 

have to have power sources of...magnitude above any available 

now. Only nuclear energy has this potential.^' 

Throughout 1964, the AEC and NASA moved toward closer coordination of 

both agencies' efforts in the space-nuclear field. The move was a response to 

many forces, including the economic squeeze; the emphasis on non-duplication 

of effort; the increasing need to justify mission requirements for research and 

development; and the anticipation of higher power requirements for future 

missions. In January 1965 a proposed agreement between NASA and the AEC 

to create a joint Space Nuclear Systems Division circulated for review in those 

agencies. The agreement stated the purpose and rationale of this reorganization: 

Recognizing that the development of nuclear energy systems and their 

application in space missions requires the technical and management capabilities, and involves the responsibilities, of both the National 
42 

Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Atomic Energy Commission, these agencies agree that these activities require a joint effort 

and a joint organization to insure effective system development and to 

insure that the responsibilities of each agency are properly fulfilled. It 

is, therefore, the purpose of this agreement to establish such a joint 

organization and to define its functions.^* 

Negotiations and preparations for the new division, which would include 

research and development on power systems and integration of the conversion 

system with the isotope source, continued through the spring of 1965. In June 

the new Space Nuclear Systems Division, headed by Finger, was established. 

In his first meeting with the JCAE, Finger stated that very large ranges in power 

were needed, but it was inconceivable that money would be available to 

develop a unique system for every particular mission. Therefore, he proposed: 

It is...important I think that in the Commission program, we try to 

develop systems that bracket as broad a range of potential mission 

uses as possible, and parallel with this, continue to push the technology 

into more advanced areas in order to try to improve the performance 

and life capability of these systems.'"' 

In the fall, at the annual conference of the Atomic Industrial Forum, Finger 

described the new AEC-NASA organizational arrangements, which included 

the coordination of Space Nuclear Systems programs among and between the 

AEC and NASA, as well as the AEC's Space Electric Power Organization 

(Figures 1 and 2.) A new juncture had been reached. As the small, selfconfident, and persevering RTG group prepared to launch their devices on 

vehicles to go to the Moon and beyond, they found the drama of space nuclear 

power filled with growing numbers of actors—both individuals and organizations. 
Golden Days at the AEC 43 

AEC 

Commission 

1 

General Manager 

Assistant General Manager 

for Reactors 

Space Nuclear 

Systems Division 

Director H Finger 

Assistant Director 

for 

Space Electnc Power 

» Isotope Power Systems 

B Reactor Power Systems 

Thermoelectnc & 

• Dynamic Power 

Conversion 

• Aerospace Safety 

Space Nuclear 

Propulsion Office 

(SNPO) 

Manager H Finger 

Deputy M Klein 

• KIWI 

' Nerva 

• Phoebus 

. Advanced Nuclear Rocket 

Propulsion 

» Safety 

" Facilities 

• Isotope Heated Rocket 

Administrator 

Deputy Administrator 

Associate Administrator 

Associate Administrator 

for 

Advanced Research 

& Technoloa^ 

Nuclear Systems 

I Space Power Division 

Director H Finger 

' Nuclear Electnc Power 

> Chemical & Solar 

Electnc Power 

' Electnc Propulsion 

» Nuclear Rocket 

Vehicles 

Fig 1 Organization of Space Nuclear Systems Programs 
44 

Assistant General Manager 

for Reactors 

Special Assistant 

R Kirk 

Safety Branch 

G Dix 

Director Space Nuclear 

Systems Division 

H Finger 

Assistant Director 

for Space Electnc Power 

(vacant) 

Isotope Power 

System Branch 

R Carpenter 

, Isotope Heat 

Sources and Systems 

. Thermoelectnc 

Conversion 

• Field Representatives 

Assistant 

for Administration 

A Jackson 

Assistant for Applications 

& Requirements 

Reactor Power 

System Branch 

' ZrH Reactors & Systems 

> Advanced 

Reactors & Systems 

• Dynamic 

Conversion Systems 

Fig 2 SNS — SEPO Organization 
Golden Days at the AEC 45 

1 

Public debut of the RTG technology, 16 January 1959 Viewing the SNAP-3 demonstration device displayed on President Eisenhower's desk are (left to right): President 

Eisenhower and (from the Atomic Energy Commission) Major General Donald J Keirn, 

Assistant Director for Aircraft Reactors, Division of Reactor Development, John A 

McCone, Chairman, AEC; Colonel Jack L Armstrong, Deputy Assistant Director for 

Aircraft Reactors, Division of Reactor Development, Lt. Colonel Guveren M Anderson, 

Project Officer, Missile Projects Branch, Division of Reactor Development. (Source: 

Department of Energy Archives.) 
46 

Glenn Seaborg (on the left) is shown the SNAP-9A by Robert Carpenter, of the RTG 

program, shortly after Dr Seaborg took over as Chairman of the AEC early in 1961 

(Source Department of Energy Archives ) 
I 

Golden Days at the AEC 47 

Paul J. Dick of the Martin Marietta Nuclear Division prepares to attach the SNAP-9A 

generator to the base of the Navy's Transit satellite prior to the launch on 29 June 1961 

which marked the first use of atomic power in space (Source. Teledyne Corporation.) 
48 

SNAP 19 RADIOISOTOPE ELECTRIC GENERATOR 

ISOTOPE 

FUEL CAPSULE 

(PLUTONIUM 238 

RADIATOR FIN 

THERMOELECTRIC 

ELEMENTS 

LEAD TELLURIDEl 

DESIGN POWER OUTPUT 25 WATTS 

DESIGN WEIGHT 30 LBS 

Cutaway illustration of essential features of the SNAP-19, developed by the Martin 

Marietta Nuclear Division and used, with modifications, on NASA missions beginning 

with the Nimbus weather satellite and including Pioneer to Jupiter and Viking to Mars. 

(Source. Department of Energy.) 
Golden Days at the AEC 49 

SNAP-19 HEAT SOURCES 

ON OCEAN BOnOM 

SNAP-19 heat sources photographed on the ocean floor of the Santa Barbara Channel 

after abort of the Nimbus weather satellite mission (launched on 18 May 1968) testing 

the first use by NASA of RTGs Heat sources were recovered and re-used and a 

subsequent Nimbus launch provided a successful test of the RTGs (Source Department of Energy Archives.) 
50 

On the Apollo 12 mission (launched 14 November 1969) Alan Bean removes the heat 

source from its carrying cask in the LEM pnor to insertng it into the SNAP-27 sitting at 

his feet on the surface of the Moon Beginning with Apollo 12, SNAP-27s powered 

scientific expenments left behind on the lunar surface by Apollo astronauts, the 

expenments were finally shut down after many years although the RTG power was still 

meeting operational requirements (Source NASA Archives ) 
Golden Days at the AEC 51 

Dr. John A Simpson (left) and Dr. James A Van Allen, pnncipal investigators involved 

with NASA's Pioneer 11 mission to Jupiter (using SNAP-19s for power), discuss 

preliminary estimates of Jupiter's intense radiation belts received at NASA's Ames 

Research Center at Moffett Field, California. Pioneer 11 entered and survived the 

region of Jupiter's most severe radiation on 2 December 1974. (Source: NASA Ames 

Research Center Archives.) 
52 

MHW RADIOISOTOPE THERMOELECTRIC 

GENERATOR 

BERYUIUMENDDOM 

CAS MANAGEMENT 

ASSEMBLY 

AW/ASIKOQUAKT; 

MUIII-FOIL 

INSULATION 

COUPLE AUACHMENTBOLT 

MHW RTG 

Cutaway illustration of essential features of the MHW RTG, the most advanced RTG 

used to date on space missions The MHW is designed to meet power requirements in 

the multi-hundred watt range and was used on the LES 8/9 satellite missions of the 

Department of Defense and on NASA's Voyager missions to the outer planets. (Source: 

Department of Energy.) 
Golden Days at the AEC 53 

Sand dunes and rocks on the surface of Mars, photographed by Viking I's camera on 

23 July 1976 The Amencan flags that can be seen are located on the two RTG wind 

screens, specially designed to protect the SNAP 19 RTGs from dust storms on the 

surface of Mars (Source NASA Archives ) 
54 

10 

Saturn and its rings photographed from a distance of 11 million miles by NASA's 

Voyager 1 (powered by MHW RTGs) on 30 October 1980. Such spectacular views of 

distant space phenomena are made possible by RTG power which can operate 

regardless of the distance of a spacecraft from the sun (Source: NASA Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory Public Information Office.) 
Golden Days at the AEC 55 

11 

The Voyager spacecraft awaitng encapsulation in the Spacecraft Assembly and Encapsulation Center at the Kennedy Space Center The extendable boom on the left 

bears three MHW RTGs (stacked black cylinders), while the boom on the nght cames 

science instiruments shrouded in black thermal blankets After launch, booms are 

extended to their full lengths and the RTGs providing electncal power are kept as far 

away as possible from the inshTjments they power (Source NASA Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory Public Information Office ) 
56 

Chapter V 

Momentum from the Lunar Race 

Memorable Achievements in Tumultuous Years 

harp contrasts in events marked the last half of the decade of the 

1960s. Fantastic space achievements—the astronauts of Apollo 8 

orbited the Moon and sent back spectacular pictures,' lunar landings 

tested many assumptions, the near-disaster of Apollo 13 demonstrated the 

effectiveness of fall-back support systems—shared the spotlight with recurring 

national tragedies and growing civil unrest. 

The RTG program, although it gathered momentum from its association 

with space triumphs, could not remain completely unaffected by the civil strife 

and the growing dissension over the nation's entanglements in the war in 

Vietnam. The war began to dominate not only coverage in the print media and 

television, but also the allocation of federal funding. The space program 

suffered as a result. 

In 1966 AuiatJon Week, commenting on yet another lull in the fighting in 

Vietnam, saw it as a pause "that hopefully might lead to meaningful negotiations 

but more likely [it] is simply a prelude to greater escalation of that conflict."^ 

This proved to be the case, and the government's apportionment of funds 

reflected a shift in priorities. NASA budgets began a steady decline even as 

technical developments, although slowed by the Apollo fire at Cape Kennedy 

in January 1967, progressed towards a manned lunar landing. 

AEC budgets for space nuclear applications came under ever closer scrutiny 

as well. Eventually, it was the more highly touted nuclear propulsion effort, 

followed by the space power reactor program, that felt the budget crunch most 

strongly. The RTG program, modestly funded at the start, received a boost 

from NASA contracts at the beginning of this period, and held its ground 

through the decade primarily by remaining anchored in defined missions while 

constantly seeking new roles for its devices. 
Momentum from the Liinar Race 57 

Building for Momentum 

The true space spectaculars projected in the early years of the decade 

required years of developmental steps After the third Transit carrying a SNAP 

9A was aborted in Apnl 1964, it was five years before another RTG flew on a 

successful space mission As preparations proceeded for using isotopic power 

on NASA missions, expenence dictated that safety continue to receive major 

attention Indeed, major changes m safety were an important part of the story 

of the RTGs m the last half of the decade One reason for the changes m safety 

concepts and procedures was the great increase m the amount of radioactive 

fuel being flown The SNAP-3 units used on the Transit launches at the start of 

the decade bore just 1800 cunes of Pu 238 on unmanned missions while the 

SNAP -27s that accompanied Apollo 12 on its manned lunar landing mission in 

1969 bore 45,000 cunes of Pu-238^ 

Dunng the latter part of the 1960's, the organizational changes implemented 

at the mid point of the decade had two significant impacts commitment to 

higher powered NASA missions, which progressively increased the magnitude of 

the RTG effort and the amount of radioactive fuel in the devices, and mobilization 

and decentralization of technical and administrative support so as to bnng into 

play more of the far flung laboratones and other facilities of both the AEC and 

NASA 

In descnbmg the new organizational arrangements for the nuclear space 

program of AEC and NASA, Finger noted that the changes brought together all 

of the AEC work on space nuclear systems into the agency's new Space 

Nuclear Systems Division It also brought together all of the AEC and NASA 

work on space nuclear systems so that the program could be conducted m a 

collaborative way The new arrangements allowed program review and discus 

sion to occur among all the responsible AEC and NASA people, including the 

personnel at the laboratones of these agencies, and those at headquarters" 

Under the new arrangement, when a specific nuclear power system was to be 

used on a particular mission, AEC personnel were assigned to the responsible 

Mission Center Finger explained the rationale for this policy 

The subsystems that must go into a spacecraft to make its operation 

fully successful must be so closely interrelated, their operating charac 

tenstics so closely integrated, that changes to any one of them may 
58 

have a significant effect on any other subsystem in the spacecraft. 

Further, the mission launch date depends on every component of the 

spacecraft; schedule charts and management controls must be established on a uniform basis for all subsystems. Only by close and 

intimate working relations can such coordination be assured "^ 

Finger saw the AEC laboratories as "large technical organizations that have 

deep competence in most of the disciplines involved in this work and also have 

test equipment that can be applied.. .in the isotope development program as a 

means of strengthening our management in this rapidly expanding area." In 

keeping with NASA and AEC policies of promoting the development of broad 

industrial competence, however, industry would be called upon and relied on 

"to develop and provide the isotope power systems that will be needed for 

mission application and...for development of advanced capabilities in this 

area."^ 

A major feature of the decentralization of responsibilities was the delegation 

of technical direction of AEC's isotope power supply development program to 

Sandia Corporation of Albuquerque, New Mexico—an AEC-affiliated laboratory that already had responsibility for testing in the SNAP safety work. 

Although it had limited experience with isotope heat sources, Sandia was 

considered to have extensive system analysis experience and the most comprehensive capability for and understanding of space system development in 

the AEC. Also considered in the selection of Sandia was the importance of tying 

the aerospace safety work closely to the power system design and development 

work. Finger held that Sandia's safety work "defines design conditions and 

should be incorporated as a direct part of the system design and development 

activity."' 

Finger recalled that he especially saw the importance of making it clear that 

the technology was no longer the province of one organization. Moreover, the 

new and complex systems that came on line and used RTGs after 1965 

required very strong technical expertise— the kind that could be best supplied 

by laboratory technical competence and no longer could be delivered by the 

central general manager of a program. He stressed his conviction that overall 

responsibility must devolve on the mission agency—the organization responsible for integrating all the components and subsystems, including the RTGs, 

into a final mission system. "If I had one problem fi-om the beginning," he said 
Momentism from the Lunar Race 59 

in considering the expansion of joint AEC/NASA efforts, "it was my feeling that 

much more testing was needed. The RTG people at the AEC had been 

operating on a shoestring, and they really didn't comprehend the extent of 

testing that was needed." In contrast, NASA, which was to develop the much 

larger systems that would use the RTGs, was accustomed to much testing.** 

Bernard Rock* recalled how the NASA missions influenced his own orientation. "My background was technical, but 1 soon saw how important management was in the NASA scheme of things; and I sensed that this concern with 

management was correct. I went out and enrolled in some courses in engineering 

administration." Recalling the major NASA missions that then came along for 

the RTG program, he said: "The Nimbus program really helped me a lot. I saw 

how much more detailed we had to be. Then Apollo was many orders of 

magnitude greater in size and complexity than Nimbus."^ 

The magnitude of the Apollo effort can be seen in the fact that the AEC's 

proposed fiscal 1965 budget of $6.3 million was doubled to $12.5 million'" for 

fiscal 1966. This figure did not include money being spent by other agencies, 

such as NASA and DOD, for work on isotope propulsion space power. For 

RTGs alone, the AEC, which had spent about $3 million in fiscal 1964 and 

1965, expected to spend more than $8 million in fiscal 1966 for development of 

isotope-fueled auxiliary power systems for space applications." 

As the RTG program looked ahead in early 1966 to expansion for new 

mission applications, close attention was given to the problem of maintaining 

momentum in the total space nuclear program. Preparing in March for a 

briefing of Vice President Hubert Humphrey on the space nuclear systems 

effort. Finger emphasized that it would be difficult to get Congressional support 

unless the space program were defined in a way that indicated the need to 

advance propulsion and power capability beyond the Apollo Mission for 

specifically-defined missions that would use the new systems.'^ 

Program momentum concerned the top administrators at NASA, as they 

sought to define post-Apollo research and development. In the words of 

Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans,t "The capability now coming on 

* Presently Director of the RTG program and at the time of the organizational change of the 

mid-1960s, a project engineer. 

tRobert Seamans, Jr., who had been Associate Administrator of NASA since 1951, became 

Deputy Administrator in January 1966 following the death of Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden 

in December 1965. 
60 

stream cannot be mothballed."'^ Nevertheless, as NASA in its fiscal 1967 

budget request attempted to break out of the $5.2 billion budget plateau it had 

been restricted to for three fiscal years, and to obtain funding for an extended 

Apollo Extension Systems program, prospects were that a cut rather than an 

increase was in the offing. Writing about NASA's budget problems and its 

requests for additional funds, a space journal commentator wrote in Febmary 

1966: 

... the harsh requirements of the war in Viet Nam punctured this happy 

prospect, and NASA found it could not even hold the old line on its 

budget. Though the final figure had not been disclosed at this writing, 

it appeared likely that it would come close to $5 billion, the first major 

rollback in the brief history of the space agency.'" 

Social and political influences had ever increasing impact on the nation's 

space program and its RTG components. Nonetheless, the major items in the 

RTG program inventory carried the program through the decade—to the 

realization of irriportant technical developments and a place of honor in the 

culmination of the race to the Moon. Two SNAP devices had major roles in the 

NASA missions which required the close AEC-NASA coordination that marked 

the last half of the decade. SNAP-19 became an auxiliary power source for 

NASA's Nimbus weather satellite. SNAP-27 provided the power supply for the 

Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package that was left on the Moon by all 

Apollo missions but the first one. These two milestone RTGs and their Nimbus 

and Apollo missions warrant special treatinent in this history of the RTG program. 

The Test on Nimbus 

A request fif-om NASA to the AEC to determine the feasibility of using a 50-wati: 

RTG for the Nimbus weather satellite was transmitted in July 1963. The request led 

to isotopic system design and integration studies by the AEC in cooperation with 

NASA and to NASA's establishment of a requirement for SNAP-19. The use of 

SNAP-19 on the NASA weather satellite Nimbus was a crossroads for the RTG 

program. It led to a major reconceptualization of safety procedures and was a 

prelude to NASA's uses of RTGs on Apollo and other space missions. Milt Klein'* 

* Deputy Manager under Harold Finger of the joint AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office 

After Finger's acceptance in March 1967 of a new role at NASA, Klein replaced Finger as manager 

of the joint office and Director of the AEC's Division of Space Nuclear Systems. 
Momentum from the Lunar Race 61 

recalled that the RTG program people persistently requested NASA to define 

missions using RTGs, but until Apollo, all they got were test flights.'^ 

With the Nimbus mission, however, the program received a test opportunity 

that was the gateway to space spectaculars. Early Nimbus spacecraft were 

powered exclusively by solar cells; as an experiment in the use of RTGs, the 

Nimbus-B satellites carried two of the isotopic units as auxiliary power supplies 

to the solar cells. Rock said: "Nimbus was an experiment to demonstrate to the 

civilian space community, as Transit had to the military community, that RTGs 

would work. We needed this experiment. After Nimbus, NASA made a commitment to RTGs, and Apollo brought us out of a low-level operation to a 

major effort."'** 

The SNAP-19 design resulted in a 30-watt generator. Two of these devices 

were to be used on the Nimbus-B spacecraft which, at the time the formal 

agreement between AEC and NASA was signed in September 1965, was 

scheduled for launch sometime in 1967." 

The AEC-NASA agreement on SNAP-19 was a prototype for all agreements 

between the two agencies on RTGs for NASA space vehicles. It acknowledged 

that both agencies recognized the potential performance advantages of RTGs 

over other space-power concepts "when applied to certain long duration 

space missions" and that cooperative efforts between the AEC and NASA 

would be required "to ensure effective system development and space vehicle 

integration...." The agreement covered the SNAP-19 power supply for Nimbus-B spacecraft and also other power units that might be mutually agreed to in 

writing.'" 

The safety issue became a major concern in the SNAP-19 Nimbus experience. "Before Nimbus," said Dix, "our safety concept was 'bumup on reentry.' But now we were going to 34,000 curies of radioactive material, which 

would be an appreciable fraction of the total in the atmosphere. We had some 

terrible sessions with the Space Council. That first INSRP (Interagency Nuclear 

Safety Review Panel) on Nimbus was a bloody one.'' '** The INSRP deliberations 

led to design changes in the SNAP device and to revised safety concepts. 

As a result of experiences on SNAP-9A and the increase in curies for 

SNAP-19, the fuel form for SNAP-19 had been changed from plutonium metal 

to plutonium oxide in the form of small microspheres carried in capsules. On 

SNAP-3 and 9A, the safety concept called for the plutonium metal to bum up 
62 

on re-entry and become molecular particles which would be distributed harmlessly and in very small quantities in the biosphere. The first safety concept on 

Nimbus was that the microspheres would be dispersed on re-entry as the 

capsule burned up and would fall to earth as BE-like particles 50 to 150 

microns in diameter—too large to be inhaled by living organisms. Tests at 

Ames, however, showed that the microspheres broke into sizes that could be 

inhaled. The second change on Nimbus was the adoption of the "intact 

re-entry/break open on impact" concept, in which a graphite block that 

contained the capsule which held the plutonium survived re-entry, with the 

capsule and plutonium becoming a frozen pudding during re-entry; upon 

impact with average soils of the Earth, the graphite block would break open, 

permitting the pudding inside to disperse in a small crater formed by the 

impact.^" The third change was the adoption of an "intact re-entry/intact on 

impact" concept, in which the capsule was made of refi-actory materials which 

did not melt during re-entry; the intact capsule, containing the plutonium, was 

retrieved as a whole unit after impact on Earth. 

Paul Dick at Martin-Nuclear (now Teledyne) remembered the "crash" 

effort required by this change in safety concept. "One morning we were called 

to Germantown by Bob Carpenter and told our safety concept on Nimbus 

wasn't working. We had six months to develop an intact re-entry source." Guy 

Linkous of Martin-Nuclear recalled that this project absorbed most of their 

people for a while. Dick noted with pride: "We did that job successfully, 

although I think no one believed we could do it I doubt if we could accomplish 

that kind of turnaround in six months today. There are more requirements 

imposed by more organizations today."^' 

Development activities for the intact re-entry heat source were initiated in 

March 1967.^^ Late in the year, INSRP recommended approval of the launch, 

after having evaluated various types of risks associated with different phases of 

the total mission. This did not eliminate dissent, particularly fi-om Harold Price, 

AEC's Director of Regulation, who went on record with the following position: 

.. .the risk of exposure of people firom failure of the SNAP-19/NIMBUS-B mission appears to be greater than that associated with the 

design basis accidents for nuclear reactors. For this reason, we are 

unable to concur in the recommended launch of the mission. On the 
Momentum from the Lunar Race 63 

other hand, we are not in a position to assess the importance of the 

mission or the potential benefit to be derived therefrom, and therefore, 

we do not recommend against it.^^ 

The launch was approved by the AEC in December 1967 and, with the 

recommendation of the Space Council, by the president in January 1968.^* A 

few days before the launch, Seaborg sent letters to both Webb at NASA and 

Foster at the Defense Department suggesting "that a joint DoD/NASA/AEC 

program be initiated to enhance the probabilities of locating and recovering 

nuclear sources lost in space operations "^ 

Linkous described his perspective on the happenings at Vandenberg on 18 

May, 1968 when the Nimbus-B launch was aborted some two minutes after 

liftoff: "We were all at NASA Goddard for the launch and all of a sudden these 

NASA guys all sat back and took their headsets off."^'' Harry Press, then 

Nimbus Project Director at Goddard, termed it "a frightening experience for all 

of us. We rewrote the press release right away. We really weren't prepared [with 

information] for an early abort like that one. The things we really worried about 

most in those days were blowups on the pad."^' It was discovered later that a 

human error in setting a guidance gyro had caused Nimbus-B-1 to veer off 

course shortly after launch. The Range Safety Officer sent a destruct signal at 

about 120 seconds into the flight, at an altitude of approximately 100,000 feet; 

thus, the RTG had not left the Earth's atmosphere nor gone through re-entry. 

The upper portion of the Agena stage (the spacecraft and RTG) was estimated 

to have fallen "about two to four miles north of San Miguel Island," in the 

Santa Barbara Channel. The water depth in this area was said to vary from 

about 300 to 600 feet. ^^ 

It was October 1968 before the RTG was recovered from the Santa 

Barbara Channel. A Navy search had failed to locate the spacecraft. Dix 

credited Sam McAlees of the Sandia Corporation for an analysis that accurately 

directed searchers where to look. He also praised the work of George Ogburn, 

responsible for emergency operations on his own staff, for long hours spent on 

a choppy channel troubleshooting the retrieval. Dix recalled: "Sandia had a 

submersible doing something in that area and we asked them: 'Can you go by 

that point on your way out?' There are terrible currents in that area. But they 

found the RTG on September 27 and it was recovered two weeks later.'' ^® The 
64 

media soon ran pictures showing the Nimbus-B spacecraft resting on the 

channel floor under 300 feet of water and cited the recovery of the SNAP-19 

nuclear generators near the spacecraft wreckage.'" The capsule was sent back 

to Mound Laboratory and the fuel re-used. 

The RTG safety program, although not truly tested in its new concept of 

intact re-entry through the atmosphere, had come through without a blemished 

record. Before the summer was over NASA announced publicly its plans for a 

launch in spring 1969 of a replacement Nimbus-B weather satellite with 

SNAP-19 power supplies.^' Procedures for approval of this Nimbus-B-2 went 

forward smoothly. Even though the fuel inventory increased slightly in order to 

utilize a slightly less efficient, but more stable thermoelectric conversion material,^^ 

approval came quickly after requested because interdepartmental review of 

the nuclear safety aspects of the mission had already taken place in preparation 

for the unsuccessful flight of 18 May 1968. ^'^ The second Nimbus to fly with 

SNAP-19s was successfully launched on 14 April 1969. 

Speaking from his perspective as the Nimbus project director who directed 

that NASA weather satellite project throughout the prior decade, Harry Press 

said: "It turned out that RTGs were really not well suited for near-Earth 

missions like Nimbus. But we had been having problems with solar cells, and 

the RTG people pressed those devices on me." Press had reservations because 

' 'the safety problems were so great, and even though all this was paid for by the 

AEC, it led to expenses for us. We hired some specialists to look over their 

shoulders. .. .on the rest of the Nimbus missions, we decided RTGs weren't 

worth the trouble, the hassle, the approvals, the safety testing. Solar cells were 

much more suitable."*^ 

Whatever the disappointments, negative reactions were not strong enough 

to retard the RTG program's forward motion with NASA. At least at top 

decision-making levels, the devices had proven themselves for space missions— 

and for the great technological feat that had been building for nearly a decade. 

Riding the Thrust of Apollo 

Webb saw the thrust to get man out to the Moon and return him safely to 

Earth as a demonstration that America had developed capabilities for doing 

almost anything with its technology. New technological advances of the Apollo 
Momeistum frossi the Lmiar Race 65 

program included the SNAP-27 RTG, and the program requirement for 

5,800,000 pounds of propellant fuel,^^ in contrast to the 100,000 

pounds used to launch earlier spacecraft carrying RTG's. 

On another technological front, scientists were interested in learning as 

much as possible from the manned lunar landing program and envisioned 

scientific stations emplaced by man on the Moon, transmitting data on such 

things as seismic lunar surface vibrations, global responses of the Moon to 

fluctuations in solar and terrestrial magnetic fields, and changes in the low 

concentrations of gas in the lunar atmosphere.^" These ideas crystallized in an 

ALSEP confract with Bendix Aerospace Systems Division of the Bendix Corporation. Beginning with the second lunar landing mission, Apollo 12, an 

ALSEP was emplaced at each landing site. 

In a move to broaden the industrial base of firms competent in RTG science 

and technology, in mid-decade the AEC encouraged corporations other than 

the Martin Company to respond to a request for proposals for development of 

a new Pu-238 fueled, 75-watt isotopic power unit for space uses.^'' In June of 

1965 a contract was awarded to General Electric for $4.6 million, for performance for the SNAP-27 program which at that time was to be applied to NASA's 

Surveyor Lunar Roving Vehicle. Within the year, however, NASA requested 

the AEC to develop a generator for the ALSEP on its Apollo missions; at this 

point the SNAP-27 program was redirected to the requirements of the ALSEP. 

By spring 1966, as a second modification to GE's contract was approved, 

SNAP-27 program costs were estimated to exceed $10 million. The RTG 

device under development was now defined as "a 50-watt (e) radioisotope 

power system for the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment Package (ALSEP)."'* 

The SNAP-27 would be the sole power supply for the ALSEPs left behind on 

the Moon. 

According to Augustine Pitrolo, who became the SNAP-27 program manager at General Electric, Bill Millard at General Electric came up with the idea of 

plugging in the power supply on the Moon. A later study at NASA undertaken 

to determine the power supply needed for the lunar surface experiments and to 

examine the feasibility of using SNAP-19, led the space agency to request the 

AEC to develop the SNAP-27. Pitrolo explained that the SNAP-27 could not 

work on an unmanned spacecraft as it was dependent on having an astronaut 

plug the fuel supply into the generator on the Moon.'^ 
66 

The SNAP-27 program was a part of the nation's most prestigious and 

challenging space program: the Apollo lunar landings. Pitrolo described the 

landing process: "We had to solve every problem you could imagine. You have 

to understand the pressure the Apollo program was under to get moving. With 

the original Apollo launch schedule, we only had a two-year lead time; and we 

would never have been ready with RTGs of the best quality." The Cape 

Kennedy fire in early 1967 delayed the total Apollo program approximately 

one year, which enabled the SNAP-27 program to catch up and supply high 

quality hardware to power an ALSEP. 

One of the first and biggest difficulties was getting predictability from the 

materials being used. The SNAP-27 team was committed to using the 3M 

Company's lead telluride thermocouples, and they had to learn about lead 

telluride processes themselves. Other tasks included learning how to join and 

coat the beryllium that was used as case material. There were numerous safety 

problems also. One of the biggest challenges was putting the RTG on the Lunar 

Module Craft, which carried two asfronauts from the command module to the 

lunar surface. Weight was a primary concern. Moreover, the Lunar Module was 

not a re-entry vehicle; it would remain on the lunar surface. Yet it was the 

vehicle on which, according to mission planners, the RTG had to be fransported. 

This meant that a re-entry container had to be constructed just to carry the 

RTG capsule. The RTG people were restricted to 7 to 12 pounds of weight for 

this cask."" 

"Harry Finger saved our program," said Pitrolo. "When we first presented 

our ideas to him under the $4.6 million contract, he said: 'You're success 

oriented, but you don't have the technology base you need.'" Finger then 

defended the program with Congress to obtain more money. His success there 

enabled the General Electric people to expand their capabilities so that they 

could do the necessary tests themselves, learn about the materials, and become 

involved in safety. Pitrolo reported, "Later Finger told us: 'Now I feel confident 

if you run into trouble you'll be able to fix things.'"*^ 

The SNAP-27 program exemplified the type of broadened base of technical 

support Finger said was necessary as the RTG program became involved in 

more complex space-mission systems. According to Pitrolo, there were several 

budgets on the SNAP-27, including the fueling funds (Mound Laboratory), 

funds for the Sandia technical support (along with separate safety funds 
Mometituiii from the Lunar Race 67 

allocated to other laboratories), and the General Electric budget which included 

some funds for safety analyses. The General Electric personnel not only 

developed their own capabilities with materials and other key aspects of the 

generator, but performed many safety tests, sometimes going to Albuquerque 

to use Sandia test facilities. "We ran a lot of impact tests with sleds at Sandia," 

said Pitrolo, "and we did a lot of work with hot capsules. Remember, the 

re-entry velocities and the heating rates for a lunar return are much higher than 

for an earth-orbital mission." Sandia frequently ran independent tests to verify 

data that had been produced by General Electric."^ 

By the time of the first lunar landing mission, there had been personnel 

changes in the program. Prior to the fire at Cape Kennedy, Webb had called 

upon Finger to head a task force studying NASA organization. In March 1967, 

after the fire, Webb appointed Finger to serve as Associate Administrator for 

Organization and Management at NASA. Finger never returned to the spacenuclear work. He was replaced on the project by Milton Klein. 

Webb retired from NASA shortly before the elections in 1968, although he 

remained on call to President Johnson for further duty at NASA, should he be 

needed.*' Webb said he made this move to clear the way for the incoming 

Nixon administration and the final stages of the race to the Moon. He also said, 

"I would have been a little slower in taking those last steps [on Apollo 8, 9,10]. 

After the fire in 1967, we couldn't stand any more mishaps. But Paine [his 

successor at NASA] moved right along step by step with no delays in the 

revised schedule." Webb was delighted with the outcome and the successful 

culmination of the efforts he had set in motion and done so much to nurture.** 

At the AEC, Seaborg received unofficial word as early as 10 October 1968 

that the SNAP-27s would not be used on the first manned lunar landing.*'* 

When the decision had been firmed, he received an explanation from George 

E. Mueller, NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight: 

.. .we have sharpened the focus on some of the problems involved. 

The first landing mission represents a large step from orbital operations. . .The 1/6 g lunar surface environment will be a new experience. 

We cannot simulate it completely on Earth. We find.. .that we simply 

do not have as much metabolic data as we would like in order to 

predict with high confidence, rates in a 1/6 g environment. Only 

educated guesses are possible on the difficulties the asfronaut will 
68 

have in maneuvering on the surface or the time it will take him to 

accomplish assigned tasks.*** 

Mueller went on to reassure the AEC Chairman: 

The decision not to carry ALSEP on the first mission is due to the time 

necessary for deployment and not to any concern of operating with 

the RTG. You have the strongest advance assurance I can give that 

ALSEP will be carried on the second mission. I also foresee significant 

RTG use in the future as lunar exploration progresses.*' 

The RTG people and the General Electric SNAP-27 people watched the 

mid-summer Apollo 11 historical events and Neil Armstrong's "giant leap for 

mankind," like most Americans, as fascinated TV viewers. By November 1969 

some of these people were far more than ordinary spectators as the Apollo 12 

mission unfolded. Pitrolo was at Cape Kennedy on November 14 for the 

launch, ft was a rainy day with exfremely low clouds that caused the launch 

vehicle to disappear from view soon after liftoff. Then a half minute into launch 

a power failure was reported as a lightning bolt struck the spacecraft and 

opened the main circuit breakers. Pitrolo thought: "My God, we're going to 

have an abort." But the craft soared into the sunlight as Pete Conrad reported: 

"We had everything in the worid drop out." To which Mission Control replied: 

"We've had a couple of cardiac arrests down here too."*** 

When the mission reached the lunar surface, Pitrolo was at Mission Control 

in Houston as astronaut Alan Bean deployed the ALSEP and prepared to 

activate the RTG. By then America's second pair of Moon walkers had developed a TV audience fascinated by their light-hearted demeanor and "bunny 

hopping" across the lunar surface. But as the moment of truth of the RTGs 

approached, the TV transmission went out. Transcripts of the lunar surface 

dialogue recorded the problem encountered by Bean as he tried to remove the 

plutonium-238 fuel capsule from its graphite cask in the Lunar Module so that 

the SNAP-27 could be activated: 

Conrad: "It really gets you mad, Houston, ...Al put the tool on, 

screwed it all the way down and the fuel element would not come out 

of the kit. He's taking the tool off and working it again." 

Bean: "I tell you what worries me, Pete. If I pull on it too hard, it's a 
Momentum from the Luiiar Race 69 

very delicate lock mechanism.. .Just get the feeling that it's hot and 

swelled in there or something. It doesn't want to come out... .Come 

out of there, rascal."*" 

Pitrolo felt the real trouble was that after the removal of the cover, the unit 

had not cooled down as quickly as had been anticipated and was not at the 

temperature it had been during training for removal.^" Finally, with a few 

taps from a hammer on the tool to give it a better grip, the fuel capsule came 

out and the RTG activated. SNAP-27 began to produce the power for the 

ALSEP as planned and predicted. 

The quiet technology was not highly noticed by the general public in its 

lunar surface supportive role, but nevertheless it had shared in a truly spectacular 

space triumph. This was clear in the reaction of scientists to the ALSEP: 

Significance of the successful deployment and operation of ALSEP, in 

relation to the smaller experiment package left on the moon during the 

pioneer Apollo 11 landing mission, was expressed by one scientist this 

way: 

"It's really an enormous jump, probably the biggest jump we will 

ever take in understanding the moon. Not that we won't do more and 

better things, but this is the first enormous step."^' 

Reports on the ALSEP and the RTGs continued to appear in the news as the 

days went by. 

Pitrolo was present at Cape Kennedy for the launch of Apollo 13 in April 

1970—"A beautiful day; a beautiful, perfect launch." Back home in bed some 

nights later, this mood changed abruptly when he received a phone call at 3:00 

in the morning from Carpenter. "I answered immediately," he said, "because I 

was lying there awake. So Carpenter says: 'Oh, you've heard.' I said 'Heard 

what?' Then he explained about the explosion on Apollo 13 and said 'They 

might be coming back at higher velocity than normal.'" As all America was 

learning, the asfronauts were riding home using the Lunar Module and its life 

support systems and engine as a lifeboat. Plans were being made for them to 

re-enter the command module and to separate the Lunar Module from it 

before atmospheric re-entry. Pifrolo got his people together preparatory to 

calculating problems of a higher-than-normal-velocity re-entry. However, 

normal re-entry trajectory and velocity were achieved, as had been calculated 
70 

in the pre-launch safety review accounting for this type of abort. The detached 

Lunar Module broke up on re-entry, as anticipated, while the graphite-encased 

plutonium-238 fuel cask survived the breakup and went down intact in the 

20,000 foot deep Tonga Trench, as had been projected for an aborted mission 

in a 'lifeboat mode' situation. ^^ 

There was no noticeable public concern about a radiation hazard when the 

nuclear power devices returned to Earth. Carpenter went on national TV with 

CBS in Houston to reassure the public that there was no danger and that the 

heat source would not burn up on re-entry and would fall harmlessly into the 

deep Pacific. Interest in the problem proved limited to "reporters thinking up 

news" and asking "What about this nuclear thing?" Dix recalled only two 

inquiries from the public, one was from a dentist in California and the other 

came from a law school in Ausfralia. Pifrolo doubted "that the rank-and-file 

public was very aware of the nuclear thing on those Apollo missions^and on 

that one that was aborted. Of course, we were very alert and very much 

aware. "^' 

The AEC continued to pay attention to the Apollo 13 abort. A press release 

by the AEC on 28 April 1970 in response to press inquiries on SNAP-27 

re-entry reassured: 

Air sampling over the predicted impact area of the SNAP-27 fuel cask 

freed from the Apollo 13 lunar module showed no fraces of radiation 

above that already present in the atmosphere. The absence of additional radiation indicates that the cask containing the plutonium fuel 

survived as designed the heat of re-entry, impacted in the South 

Pacific intact and sank to the ocean bottom.^* 

The nation was showing signs of flagging interest in the race that had now 

been won. Even before the Apollo 13 launch an assessment in the frade press 

held that the: 

World tour by the Apollo 12 crew is being looked upon as a public 

relations flop by some National Aeronautics and Space Adminisfration 

officials, who are arguing against a similar trip by the astronauts of the 

forthcoming Apollo 13 mission. Crowds at parades and receptions for 

the three Apollo 12 crew members have been noticeably smaller and 

less enthusiastic than those during the tour of the Apollo 11 crew.... 
Momentum from the Lunar Race 71 

Requests for press credentials for Apollo 13 also are sharply lower than 

on previous flights ^^ 

The RTG program followed through on its commitments to complete the 

Apollo mission senes But the momentum and national spmt of the halcyon 

days of the race for a manned lunar landing were never recaptured The NASA 

plans for post-Apollo spectaculars—particularly manned missions, to other 

planets or for further lunar explorations—foundered m the budget crunch of 

the 1970s Still, the RTG program found ways to maintain modest momentum 

of its own even as other aspects of the space nuclear effort at the AEC faltered 

If there were no more Apollo supermissions to be served with power in space, 

there were other spacecraft, with highly interesting space missions, that could 

and would utilize the unique capabilities of isotopic power 
72 

Chapter VI 

A Maturing Program 

Competing Issues 

he first Apollo missions were the climax of a race to restore American 

prestige regarded as lost as a result of the initial Soviet space successes. 

The remaining Apollo missions, all carrying ALSEPs powered on the 

Moon by SNAP-27s, represented a winding down of the nation's space 

program. Spectacular pictures from the last Apollo missions provided final 

glimpses of America's end game in the manned race to the Moon. Even before 

this, however, the country was moving into a period when the focus that had 

been placed on the space program was shifting to other issues. 

In a ticker tape parade in New York City honoring the Apollo 14 astronauts 

there was evidence of conflicting public priorities. A sign held up along the 

parade route read, "White asfronauts fly to the moon while black children die in 

welfare hotels." Demonsfrators near the steps of the city hall competed with the 

mayor's remarks by chanting, "Cmmbs for the children, millions for the moon."' 

One industry spokesman saw mounting criticism of the defense establishment 

affecting technology in general. Writing in a space journal, he said: 

All these [dissenting] groups focus their criticism on the defense establishment and the "military-indusbial complex." They have increasingly 

included basic science and fundamental technological pursuits in their 

criticism.^ 

The NASA budget which stood at $5.2 billion in Fiscal Year 1965, had been 

pared to below $3.3 billion in Fiscal Year 1971, while social programs got $77.2 

billion that year, and defense $73.5 billion.' 

In the first five years of the decade of the 1970s, the RTG program 

participated in seven successful space missions, equalling the number of successful missions the program had known in the previous ten years, which 

began when the first SNAP-3A flew on a Navy Transit satellite. Two other 

missions during that decade, Nimbus-B-1 and Apollo 13, were aborted. Through 

this string of successes the program benefited from its own technical momentum 

T 
A Maturing Program 73 

and illusfrated a growing maturity even while the total space program was 

slowing down. The measure of its growing maturity was its ability to find 

missions in a shrinking space effort and solve technical problems even as 

nuclear technology lost public favor, and in the face of on-going organizational 

and personnel changes in the key federal agencies. 

Sustaining Program Momentum 

By the beginning of 1971, the RTG program had firm commitments for 

supporting a number of space missions, most of them for NASA but also one 

Transit navigational satellite for the Navy. Missions that would fly with RTG 

power systems during the succeeding four years were: 

Launch Date 

Apollo 14 (SNAP-27) 31 January 1971 

Apollo 15 (SNAP-27) 26 July 1971 

Pioneer 10 (SNAP-19) 2 March 1972 

Apollo 16 (SNAP-27) 16 April 1972 

Triad-01-lX (Transit-RTG) 2 September 1972 

Apollo 17 (SNAP-27) 7 December 1972 

Pioneer 11 (SNAP-19) 5 April 1973 

NASA had commitments to supply SNAP-19s for the Viking missions to 

Mars. The AEC confracted with General Electric to conduct a "technology 

readiness" effort for a Multi-Hundred Watt (MHW) RTG in anticipation that 

NASA would place specific requirements for a Grand Tour of planets later in 

the decade. At this time DOD also came to the AEC with a request for 

development of the Multi-Hundred Watt RTG for its Lincoln Laboratory 

communications satellites. 

In considering this request, the Director of Space Nuclear Systems, Milton 

Klein, expressed some of the major budgetary problems then current in the 

RTG program. Klein focused on the distinction between "technical readiness" 

and "development." The former was defined "as the conduct of work up to a 

point sufficient to demonsfrate that all significant technical problems have been 

identified and the solutions sufficiently demonsfrated so that a potential user 

will have confidence that the technology will work if developed on a realistic 
74 

schedule for mission use." "Development" was defined "as that work conducted 

beyond the technology readiness phase to provide a flight-worthy and qualified 

system and 'tailor' the system to a specific mission..." The current program 

situation was clarified: 

Over the last few years, firm mission requirements have been funded 

by reducing SNAP technology [readiness] programs. These reductions 

have reached the point where very little technology work is left in the 

program. Thus, that source of funding for firm user requirements is 

essentially no longer available. More importantly, there exists a dangerous lack of technology activity which if allowed to continue will 

severely impair the future use of nuclear power systems in space and 

affect the space program itself. (The SNAP program has virtually 

evolved into a 'job shop' to meet user agencies near term flight 

scheduled projects with only a very small effort being put into the 

technology which will be needed in the future. )* 

In spite of these concerns it was basically as a "job shop"—but an aggressive 

one, constantly seeking missions for its devices—that the RTG program sustained momentum through difficult years. Klein said: "The bloom went off the 

rose after the success of the Apollo man on the Moon program. But nuclear 

power was needed on more distant unmanned space missions, and we were 

lining up on those missions."^ 

Testifying before the JCAE on the Fiscal 1972 budget requests, Klein cited a 

history of recent successes. He told the committee: 

Nuclear power is already playing an important role in space activities. 

For 22 months, SNAP-19 radioisotopic thermoelectric generators... 

have been supplying supplemental power to the Nimbus III weather 

satellite... .On the moon, two SNAP-27 RTG's are working perfectly 

to supply power through the long lunar nights and days to the lunar 

surface experiments.. .left there by the Apollo 12 and Apollo 14 asfronauts. ..** 

Looking to the future, he told the committee that efforts on five flight 

missions would be supported, although activities to advance the technology 

beyond the flight-related projects would be limited. The Pioneer probes to 
A Maturing Program 75 

Jupiter, the Viking Mars Lander, and the Navy's Transit satellite were all to use 

RTGs. Deliveries for the Transit satellite were scheduled to occur later that year. 

Flights of the Pioneer spacecraft to Jupiter were scheduled for 1972 and 1973. 

Refrenchment from the decenfralization that had been fostered by Finger 

began to take effect. Sandia started to phase out its major technical role and 

AEC planned to continue only a "quality assurance" role for the corporation 

through 1971.' There were concerns in the program when Seaborg left the 

AEC in mid-1971, because he had been very much involved technically in the 

RTG program and had given it stature.** The program, however, continued to 

follow through on its mission commitments while it sought other commitments. 

Klein was replaced as director of the Space Nuclear Systems Division by his 

former deputy director, David Gabriel late in 1971. Gabriel's efforts to maintain 

the stature of the RTG program were actually aided in early 1973 by the 

decision to make major cutbacks in space nuclear propulsion and space reactor 

power. The radioisotope effort survived, while other more highly funded efforts 

to develop nuclear propulsion and reactor power for space uses did not. In 

surviving, the RTG program had the field of nuclear applications in space to 

itself. An AEC announcement in January 1973 made clear that the focus on the 

near-term was a major factor in the economy moves: 

Following a determination by the National Aeronautics and Space 

Adminisfration that its research and technology programs should 

focus on near-term developments, the AEC has taken parallel action 

in related programs. 

Programs to be terminated include nuclear rocket propulsion work 

at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station in Nevada.... 

The cutbacks will also affect the space reactor thermoelectric 

programs of Atomics International.. .and the space reactor thermionic 

programs of General Atomic.. .^ 

As a counterpart of this reduction in the overall space nuclear effort, the joint 

AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Systems Office was dissolved. 

The AEC announcement went on to publicize the extensive programs in 

RTGs which would continue at the agency. Cited specifically was the work on 

RTGs ".. .for NASA's Viking Mars Landing Program, NASA's Mariner Jupiter-
76 

Saturn mission, and for the military Lincoln Space Satellite." "* APL monitored 

RTG developments constantly because of its contracts on the Navy's Transit 

navigational satellite program, which had been using RTG equipment for 10 

years. APL's Dassoulas said that there had been problems with the SNAP-9As 

and that APL went back and forth between solar and nuclear, keeping an eye 

on developments in both technologies. During the decade, APL continued its 

concerns about the vulnerability of its systems and this rekindled its interest in 

the RTGs." The AEC had new thermoelectrics by then, so Triad could be 

outfitted with a 30-watt, 24,000 curie Pu-238 RTG as its sole source of 

power. ^^ The launch on 2 September 1972 was successful, and ten years after 

being placed in orbit, the Triad was still functioning. Dassoulas explained that 

the Navy did not continue then with RTGs because of an anticipated lag 

between launches and AEC cutbacks that would curtail production lines. 

Moreover, improvements in solar power made this source less vulnerable. 

Reflecting a mounting concern of those years, Dassoulas added that APL did 

not want to be caught with only nuclear systems if nuclear power in space was 

finally forbidden.'' 

The Apollo missions that completed the manned lunar landing program— 

Apollos 14,15,16 and 17—all canied SNAP-27s to power an ALSEP to be left 

on the Moon. The last of those launchings was on 7 December 1972. The 

Apollo RTGs worked so well they eventually had to be shut down." After the 

last launch, an AEC program status report showed that even Apollo 12, the first 

to carry a SNAP-27, which by then had been operating for over three years, 

was still producing 69 watts of power, compared with its initial output of 74 

watts. All the other Apollo SNAPs were producing at least 70 watts at the time 

of the report. ^^ Five years after its deployment on the Moon, the SNAP from 

Apollo 12 was producing 83.5 percent of its initial power. All five RTG-powered 

ALSEPs continued to operate until they were shut down on 30 September 

1977 16 

At the start of the decade, a year after the first lunar SNAP flew on Apollo 

12, as an honor to the RTG program, a SNAP-27 was presented to the 

Smithsonian Institution.'' Public interest in the lunar missions diminished, 

however, and cuts in funding forced curtailment of the Apollo program. Apollo 

17 was the last to fly, as Apollos 18,19, and 20 were cancelled. With the liftoff of 

Apollo 17 in December 1972, it seemed to many that it was unlikely man would 
A Maturin g Progra m 77 

return to the Moon again in the twentieth century."* 

General Electric's SNAP-27s were designed uniquely for manned space 

missions, but the momentum of the Apollo experience carried them to the 

Multi-Hundred Watt confract and future deep-space applications. Before the 

Apollo program ended, an unmanned planetary mission found uses for RTGs. 

The Challenge of PIONEER 

Charles Hall, Pioneer Project Manager at NASA-Ames in Sunnyvale, 

California, managed the program from the time it was moved to Ames and 

defined as an interplanetary probe to Jupiter. He refers to the Pioneer program 

as a "rowboat" compared to the Apollo "battleship." This meant that people 

did not scrutinize his program as much and because of its comparatively small 

budget, it could be pulled along in the wash of Apollo. Hall was one of the 

program directors sold on RTGs by the marketing of the RTG people.'® His 

experiences further proved the technical capabilities, under pressure, of the 

RTG program and its confractors. 

Hall had reservations about using the RTG on a three-year space mission 

because the first Nimbus carrying an RTG failed on launch and, also, the power 

degraded too fast on the RTG that accompanied the successful Nimbus launch 

in 1969. On the other hand, he was unsure whether a mission to Jupiter could 

use solar cells. The scheduled launch date for the first planetary Pioneer, 

Pioneer 10, was eariy 1972, and these questions about power source were 

undecided three years before the launch date. To expedite system development. 

Hall convinced NASA headquarters that a sole source confract should be 

negotiated with TRW. This was done, and TRW proposed the use of solar cells. 

"The design was pretty limited," Hall commented, "but it still looked better to 

me than going through all the hassles with the AEC of using RTGs."^" 

NASA headquarters favored the use of the RTGs, as did AEC's Space 

Nuclear Systems Division. At about the time of the completion of the solarpower study for Pioneer, Carpenter from the AEC came to Ames to talk with 

Hall about the SNAP-19, developed by Teledyne and last flown on the Nimbus 

weather satellite. Hall was finally convinced that much had been done to 

improve the SNAP-19 since Nimbus. It was made more atfractive, in Hall's 

view, by the AEC's agreement to fund all development costs and to build all the 
78 

prototypes free. Hall, still worried about reliability, because the RTGs would be 

the sole power source, decided to put four RTGs on the spacecraft when the 

Jupiter mission needed the power of only three. ^' 

A letter of agreement signed with the AEC, although difficult to put together, 

later avoided problems and contributed to good working relationships. TRW 

continued as the spacecraft confractor. In December 1970 prototype generators 

were delivered. It soon became apparent that good working relationships were 

vital. One of the generators, in testing, began to degrade rapidly in power and 

Hall insisted on a comprehensive assessment of what he feared was an inherent 

problem. He described the work that followed as a "tremendous engineering 

job" involving Teledyne personnel, and Bernard Rock and Harold Jaffe of the 

RTG program. This team identified the problem within a month. "^^ 

The defective device was examined at Teledyne facilities near Baltimore. A 

sample of the gas inside, supposed to be a mixture of argon and helium, 

revealed fraces of hydrogen and water vapor. Moreover, the metal of the RTG 

had been weakened by water which had saturated the device. Hall attributed 

the flaws to a failure to maintain a low humidity atmosphere in loading; 

Teledyne attributed the basic problem to outgassing from the heat source.^' 

Several actions were taken to correct the problem. The ratio of gas fill in the 

generator was altered. A redesign eliminated the many seals in the Nimbus 

SNAP-19 to the point that the device carried on Pioneer had only one seal. The 

assembly procedure changed to a glove box process whereby all the assembly 

steps, including welding, were carried out in a sealed box into which the worker 

inserts his hands by means of gloves mounted on the side of the chamber. The 

assembly was conducted in a submarine-like, controlled atmosphere chamber. 

A new and more efficient thermoelectric material called "TAGS"* was infroduced. These actions persuaded NASA and Hall to proceed with RTGs.^'* 

The launches of Pioneer 10 on 2 Marchl 972, and of Pioneer 11 on 5 April 

1973, received less publicity than the manned missions to the Moon. The 

purpose of the two spacecraft was to "extend the studies of interplanetary 

phenomena beyond the asteroid belt, fly-by Jupiter.. .and fransmit data several 

years after [a] Jupiter encounter before...departure from the solar system." 

*The term TAGS is derived from the names of the major constituents: tellurium, antimony, 

germanium and silver. TAGS is a solid solution of silver antimony teluride in germanium 

telluride.^" 
A Maturing Program 79 

Some of the thirteen expenments to be performed involved celestial mechanics, 

meteoroid asfronomy, asteroid detection and Jovian radiation belt examination 

The four SNAP-19 generators had to provide at least 120 watts of continuous 

electncal power throughout the mission, which would vary between 645 and 

795 days depending upon the specific day and hour of launch ^^ 

The launch of Pioneer 10 went relatively unnoticed by the public, but 

interest heightened considerably as the Jupiter fly by occurred twenty-two 

months after the mission began Hall recalled vividly the ten days at Ames m 

December 1973 when Pioneer 10 encountered the planet Jupiter The press 

was there every day, along with a gathenng of very interested space scientists 

One of the great unknowns was the sfrength of the radiation field that would be 

encountered "I thought the radiation problem had been oversold," said Hall, 

"but those readings really got high The press knew we were getting very 

concerned We prepared a release every day " 

Dix also was present at Ames to watch the data coming m In his view, 

' 'Pioneer was the most successful spacecraft ever flown '' Pioneer survived the 

radiation around Jupiter and continued to perform its expenments perfectiy A 

concern early m the mission had been that asteroids would penetrate the sealed 

capsules as the vehicle passed through the Asteroid Belt, but that problem 

never matenalized 

Headlines m the San Francisco Bay area papers proclaimed "Pioneer 

Makes It " The public, perhaps not as excited as space specialists about radiation 

hazards, saw pictures of that distant planet taken by special photo equipment ^" 

Space journals, too, gave extensive coverage to the tnumph of Pioneer 10 and 

the survival of its payload, the RTGs, m the severe radiation environment near 

Jupiter They noted, also, that Pioneer 10 was the first man-made object to 

leave the solar system ^** 

After the success of Pioneer 10, Pioneer 11 (enroute) was retargeted onto a 

path that would take it by Saturn as well as Jupiter Amval at Jupiter was 

scheduled for 2 or 3 December 1974, and amval at Saturn about 5 September 

1979 ^® On the amval at Jupiter, space reporters mentioned that Pioneer came 

through the zone of peak radiation danger m better shape than the eariier 

Pioneer The spacecraft had survived "worst case conditions" and there was a 

note of great expectancy in the reports that the functioning vehicle and its 

scientific equipment were continuing on a course to the first space encounter 
80 

with Saturn.'" 

Not only had radioisotopic power survived exfreme radiation, but according 

to Hall, "in the escape frajectories of those Pioneers from the solar system, the 

RTGs really paid off. They're still operating, although they are degrading. After 

13 years, the power on Pioneer 10 is down to about 120 watts. 1 think it will run 

out of power in 1994." According to Hall, later Pioneers—to Venus—did not 

use RTGs because they went close to the sun. He explained: "If you're going to 

stay near the Earth or even go around the sun, solar is cheaper, and less 

frouble.'"' 

Nuclear Fears and Energy Dilemmas 

At the close of 1974, the nation faced new unknowns both in space and in 

the future of nuclear power. An era ended as the AEC completed its final days. 

A history of the Atomic Energy Commission summarized the changed situation: 

In the preceding decade the Atomic Energy Commission had lost 

much of its privileged status with Congress and the American public. 

The exclusive monopoly and the mantle of secrecy had been largely 

removed, and no longer did atomic energy seemingly provide the 

perfect formula for both military defense and civilian energy needs.'^ 

The space program also faced many uncertainties. Plans for manned 

planetary exploration had been shelved. An unmanned space program was still 

alive, but there were revisions and delays in more ambitious plans for Grand 

Tours of the solar system. Viking '75 to Mars was firm and on schedule; NASA 

adminisfrators speculated about a Viking '79 mission and the possibility of a 

Pioneer Jupiter orbiter mission in 1980. Such a program would require RTG 

power—and perhaps reactor power for the deep space needs of the 1990s and 

after." 

A basic concern was the extent to which future missions would have to rely 

on the use of the space shuttle which NASA had been pushing since the 

beginning of the decade as a major cost-effective element in its post-Apollo 

programming. Use of a manned shuttle as a launch platform would bring new 

problems to designing for safety in the use of RTGs. Dick of Teledyne pointed 

out, "Early on, when nuclear was much in vogue, publicity was good. But 

when the anti-nuclear thing got started, we assumed a low profile on uses of 
A Maturing Program 81 

nuclear power." '* 

Exchanges between NASA and the AEC in 1974 reflected concerns about 

future space nuclear needs and capabilities for meeting them. In June, the 

NASA Adminisfrator, James Fletcher, wrote to AEC Commissioner William 

Anders of his concern about AEC plans to discontinue the SNAP-19 after 

Viking '75 and replace it with a new selenide technology RTG.'^ In his reply 

that summer, Anders expressed the problems posed by an $800,000 reduction 

in the AEC Fiscal 1975 appropriations request for the Space Nuclear Systems 

Division: 

.. .while we agree on the importance of such activities as maintaining 

the SNAP-19 and the Multi-Hundred Watt RTG capabilities; advancing 

toward the higher performance, low cost selenide RTG's; and continuing work on very high performance, lower cost dynamic systems as 

well as higher power reactor systems, the funding requirements of this 

program would exceed that expected to be available. This funding 

situation is one in which we will need your support of both near term 

and future budget cycles with all elements of Government if we are to 

enhance the program as we mutually desire. 

Anders proposed the creation of a joint AEC/NASA coordinating board to 

assure compatibility of programs, to exchange information, and to report status 

and needs as appropriate.'*' 

Six months later the AEC ceased to exist and was replaced by the Energy 

Research and Development Adminisfration (ERDA). Robert Seamans was the 

proposed new director. At his confirmation hearings in December 1974, he 

said: 

Our purpose in ERDA is to provide more options than we have today, 

to increase our sources and to improve the efficiency in the consumption of energy. 

! believe the President and the Congress have wisely recognized 

the importance for a strong R.&D. agency capable of developing and 

sustaining a balanced and practical program for energy generation 

and conservation that will anticipate the needs of our Nation. We must 

make the best use of all viable sources of energy, and we must at all 

times minimize the possible environmental risks that these sources 
82 

may pose. The creation of ERDA can meet these goals."" 

New actors entered the scene, new structures came into being, and a new 

orientation to nuclear power and to energy problems was implemented. At the 

space-nuclear program level, there were many uncertainties. 
83 

Chapter VII 

Persistence Amid Change 

Years of Uncertainty 

n January 19 1975, the Atomic Energy Commission was abolished 

and most of its functions fransferred to the new Energy Research 

and Development Adminisfration (ERDA), except for regulatory 

functions which were fransferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 

Nuclear power, under increasing attacks from public interest groups, and losing 

favor on economic grounds among private developers, suffered further slippage through this loss of the AEC, chartered by Congress to promote its 

advancement. At ERDA, nuclear energy was reduced in status to an option in 

direct competition with such alternatives as fossil fuels, solar energy, energy 

conservation and a nascent synthetic fuels program. More than any of its 

competitors, nuclear energy became wrapped in confroversy. The confroversy 

led to uncertainty in the nuclear power space and RTG programs. 

After Seaborg left the AEC, the RTG program lost its most visible advocate 

and the agency's public announcements on the RTG role in space missions 

became muted. Mission launches and anniversaries of successfijl RTG missions 

were no longer used as occasions to issue statements projecting future applications of nuclear energy. No voice from ERDA, nor later from the Department of 

Energy, would direct messages to the public about the accomplishments and 

promise of the quiet technology. 

Critics of the AEC's dual mandate—to develop and promote nuclear 

power while protecting the public safety through regulation—argued that the 

AEC neglected nuclear safety research while encouraging commercial licensing. 

Seaborg's replacement, James R. Schlesinger, tried to change the agency's 

public image from that of an agent of the nuclear industi^; to that of a "referee 

serving the public interest."' His successor. Dixy Lee Ray, created a Division of 

Reactor Safety Research, and continued to expand the safety research program.^ 

Throughout the RTG program, research and development in safety had always 

been combined with research and development in spacecraft and missions 

o 
84 

because of an awareness that one disaster would spell the certain end of the 

program.' 

Although energy policy had not been a major issue in the 1976 presidential 

campaign, soon after his election President Carter described the energy crisis, 

and its testing of the nation, as "the moral equivalent of war."* He requested 

the creation of an energy department to wage this battle. The Department of 

Energy (DOE) came into being on 1 October 1977, with James R. Schlesinger 

as its first secretary.* The competition nuclear energy had encountered at 

ERDA increased at DOE. In addition to focusing on the full range of energy 

options, the new department melded some 5,000 staff from the Department of 

Interior, almost 4,000 from the Federal Energy Adminisfration, some 1,500 

from the Federal Power Commission, and nearly 9,000 from the now disbanded 

ERDA.= 

Several actions and events during Carter's first days at the White House 

suggest a retreat from a Federal policy of embracing nuclear technology. Even 

before the establishment of DOE, the president announced that the United 

States would defer indefinitely the reprocessing of spent fuel from civilian 

reactors and delay construction of the Clinch River Fast Breeder Reactor.** A 

short while later, when a Soviet spy satellite containing a nuclear reactor fell in 

northwest Canada in January 1978, President Carter initially assured the 

public that the United States would not fly such devices in space. He was later 

to soften this position to make it less unequivocal.' Fourteen months later, in 

March 1979, a loss-of-coolant accident occurred at the General Public Utilities' 

commercial reactor Three Mile Island Unit 2.** Sensational press coverage 

resulted in intensified public concern over the risk of lethal radiation from any 

form of nuclear energy. By this time, however, even the sfrongest supporters of 

nuclear energy in Congress could no longer speak through the Joint Committee 

on Atomic Energy, whose disbanding had been approved concurrenfly with 

the passage of the legislation creating DOE and its responsibilities divided 

among a half dozen House and Senate committees. 

Some in the RTG program felt sfrongly about the changing environment. 

When the AEC building was fransferred to ERDA, the broadened scope of 

energy programs placed those working on nuclear programs in the minority. 

* A phrase borrowed from the philosopher William James. 
Persistence Amid Change 85 

and the emphasis, according to a recollection by Carpenter, shifted to the 

question of "how many barrels of oil did you save today." Carpenter resigned 

his post in the program after two years, to take a position in private industry." 

Dix stepped away from his safety role in both the program and on the INSRPs 

to become DOE's Director of Safety and Environmental Operations."* 

The joint AEC-NASA office had been disbanded several years eariier. 

Under ERDA, a new Division of Nuclear Research and Applications (NRA) was 

established to "carry out a program of advanced nuclear R&D in the areas of 

terrestiial and space applications...." " In June 1976, Rock became the Assistant 

Director for Space Applications.'^ With the loss of a sfrong advocacy voice at 

the top of the organization, key program administrators such as Rock became 

responsible for publicity of the program. At appropriations hearings, defenders 

of nuclear research and applications took the position that while development 

of the RTGs for the space program would continue to receive primary emphasis, 

emphasis on the terrestrial program would increase." 

Uncertainty pervaded the space front. One champion of the space program 

said of the years following the Apollo triumphs and the Watergate scandals, 

"For young Americans, in particular... the exploration of space came to be 

seen as just another gaudy sideshow in a carnival run by scoundrels." '* Space 

advocates saw the shuttle program absorbing much of the NASA budget and 

hoped that this manned orbital fransportation system would eventually lead to 

a new era in the nation's space program. In the meantime, momentum was lost 

in the space program. The major surviving manned space activity was the joint 

American-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz Test Project which used the Saturn launch 

vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft. The liftoff for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project 

in July 1975 marked the break-up of the Saturn launch team at the Kennedy 

Space Center and the loss of a team that, according to NASA Administrator 

James Fletcher, had made a "fantastic contribution to our country."^^ 

After assuming office, President Carter made it clear that no new major 

space efforts were planned and that exploiting the potentials of the shuttle 

would be the focus of America's space program. At a White House press 

conference in May 1977, the president spoke of expanded use of spacecraft in 

foreign policy and expressed interest in Landsat and communications spacecraft. ^^ Early in 1978, the journal Astronautics and Aeronautics decried "NASA's 

Loss of Thrust," and sought Webb's comments. Webb, who had set NASA on 
86 

its path to the Moon, saw the need for NASA to recapture its role as leader of a 

global enterprise; but he, too, felt this enterprise should sfress international 

terrestrial applications "...in education, communication and fransportation, 

looking toward more viable political, social and economic systems for nations 

willing to work with us in the years ahead." " 

In the RTG program in the last years of the decade, attention centered on 

remaining commitments to support NASA's unmanned planetary missions and 

military orbital missions. New initiatives to establish relationships with DOD 

resulted in the creation of a Space Nuclear Systems Applications Steering 

Group. RTG program directors recognized that regardless of the nuclear-power 

and space-program climate, the RTGs faced stiff competition from solar power 

systems—which were cheaper and avoided the complexities of the RTG safety 

procedures. A selling point with military users was the reduced vulnerability of 

RTGs to enemy countermeasures, as compared to solar-cell arrays. Remaining 

commitments to NASA, however, were for planetary missions that could not 

use solar cells because the missions went too far from the sun. Missions logged 

by the program during the last half of the decade were: 

Viking 1 (SNAP-19 

Viking 2 (SNAP-19 

LES8(MHW 

LES 9 (MHW 

Voyager 2 (MHW 

Voyager 1 (MHW 

Launch Date 

20 August 1975 

9 September 1975 

14 March 1976 

14 March 1976 

20 August 1977 

5 September 1977 

A summary of American space launches in the last half of the decade 

reveals how selective were the uses of RTGs. According to NASA figures from 

1975 to 1980, the United States launched: 77 applications satellites; 23 scientific 

payloads; and 11 space probes. Of this total, only six carried RTGs. Two RTG 

launches (the earth-orbital LES military communications satellite launches) are 

included in the total applications satellites. The other four all flew on space 

probes—and thus RTGs supplied power for over half of the missions."* Clearly, 

as in earlier applications, the RTGs were reserved for special uses. 

Amid the uncertainties of organizational change and public controversy, 

those heavily involved in space missions persisted in addressing primary tech-
Persistence Amid Change 87 

nical problems. Many of the RTG people, especially those assigned to facilities 

away from headquarters, did not experience the "changed climate" that 

Carpenter recalled. They remained relatively insulated from the changes in the 

parent organizations of the RTG program. At least on Viking, they were caught 

up in the excitement of teams of professionals who were realizing life-long 

dreams. 

Viking to Mars 

No space missions after Apollo recaptured the dynamism and public interest 

generated by the race to put a man on the Moon. However, Viking unmanned 

missions to Mars had a special fascination of their own. A select audience found 

Mars an exciting frontier for human exploration; some of this excitement 

carried over to a larger public that, even as it turned away from the space 

program, had become caught up in the Space Age. Audiences captured by 

"Star Trek" and "2001, a Space Odyssey" were among those enchanted 

by close human examination of the mysterious red planet.' 

Mars was considered a prime candidate for hosting life in some form. The 

Viking missions to Mars would put down unmanned "Lander" probes from 

orbiting vehicles. These Landers would carry experiments whose primary 

purpose was to search for evidence of life. For a long time, mission planners 

had argued that the Landers could not rely on solar power and would require 

isotope power systems in order to perform in the extreme temperatures, winds 

and nights of Mars. Jerry Soffen, NASA Viking project scientist, contributed to 

early planning of biological experiments to search for evidence of life on Mars. 

When NASA's Langley facility became involved in the soft Mars landing, 

Soffen left the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California, and 

went to Langley as project scientist. Langley, with Jim Martin as project 

manager and Tom Young as mission director, assumed responsibilities for the 

total Viking mission and for the Lander, while JPL retained responsibility for 

the Orbiter subsystem. "Viking was pretty big," Soffen said. "Of course 

nothing came close to the magnitude of Apollo—which absorbed almost 

everyone at NASA. But in its day, I would say Viking had some 20,000 people 

across the country working on it."TM 

The original Viking mission was scheduled to fly in 1973, but budget cuts 

caused a slippage to 1975. The creation of instrumentation and software were 
88 

distinctive challenges. Round trip communication at the speed of light required 

about 45 minutes, so the automated spacecraft had to interrogate itself and 

self-determine its actions, because corrections sent from Earth would be 

greatly delayed. The Martian night and dust worried planners. "When we were 

still considering solar power," said Soffen, "we even thought about ways to tilt 

solar panels while the Lander was on the surface to shake off dust from dust 

storms. But actually we always wanted RTGs and we put a lot of effort into 

keeping the AEC in line to provide them." Viking's design ended with RTGs as 

the only power source for the Lander and all its experiments.^' Each of the two 

RTGs on the mission was required to produce a minimum of 35 watts for 90 

days on the Martian surface. 

There were significant problems in adapting the SNAP-19 to the requirements of the Viking mission. Thermal integration of the RTG with the Lander 

was a major difficulty. The RTGs were to fijmish all the electiicity for the Lander 

and the heat to confrol the Lander's temperature.^^ The cold nights and 

relatively hot days on the Martian surface led to concern about confrolling the 

heat of the instruments. A thermal switch was installed under the two RTGs. As 

the internal temperature of the Lander became high, a bellows would open a 

pair of plates to prevent heat from the RTGs from entering the Lander compartment; when the temperature became cold, the bellows would close the plates 

and allow heat from the RTGs to be conducted into the Lander compartment. 

Two other problems led to special design features for the SNAP-19s on 

Viking. The Martian winds caused designers to construct wind screens over the 

RTGs—and the wind screens, too, were part of the thermal confrol system. 

Even more distinctive was the problem of contamination which required the 

Lander and all its components to be sterilized before launch. The Viking 

experimenters wanted to ensure that the landing vehicle was carrying no 

contamination from Earth to the Martian surface—and they especially wished 

to guard against carrying life there that might be detected by their Martian-lifeseeking instruments. The entire Lander, including the RTGs, was sterilized— 

"encased in a cocoon which was sealed," according to Bob Brouns, RTG 

program representative at Langley for Viking. There were concerns that the 

RTGs might get too warm during the bake cycle, so a cooling coil was placed at 

the top of the RTG before it was capped with a dome. Water was run through 

this tube to take heat out of the RTGs during the sterilization cycle."' 
Persistence Amid Change 89 

The two Viking launches on 20 August and 9 September, 1975, although 

not heralded or publicized like Apollo, received increasing media and public 

interest as the days neared for the actual landings on Mars. The landing of 

Viking 1 was planned as a 4 July 1976 Bicentennial event. After the Orbiter 

began to send back pictures of potential landing sites, the journals became 

lavish in their coverage. Soffen explains the interest and publicity regarding 

Viking: "For one thing, it was a Bicentennial event. The new Smithsonian Air 

and Space Museum was opened by a signal beamed back from Viking to cut 

the ribbon. But I think people got interested because they were fascinated by 

Mars—and Viking stayed there taking pictures for a long time."^" 

The landing of Viking 1 was delayed beyond the original target date of July 

4 to permit the location of better landing sites. The delay only added to the 

suspense of the scientists, mission principles, newsmen, and selected laymen 

gathered at JPL. Mark Washburn, who was there, recorded the moment of 

touchdown in his book Mars At Last! 

The final seconds were agonizing. Years of work and decades of 

dreaming were about to be fulfilled—or smashed on an unseen 

Martian rock. 

And then—at 5:12:07 A.M. PDT (ERT), 20 July 1976—touchdown! 

Von Karman Auditorium erupted in an orgy of cheers, hugs, and 

tears. In mission control, the controllers shouted and whooped, tore 

off their headphones and danced by the light of their computers... 

Viking was on Mars.^'^ 

The life-detecting experiments on the two Vikings turned up no positive 

evidence of life on Mars. In fact, no organic chemicals, the building blocks of 

life, were found; yet meteorites contain organic chemicals. According to Soffen, 

one explanatory theory holds that the atmosphere of Mars allows penetration 

of ultraviolet rays to the planet's surface so that organic chemicals on the 

planet's surface are oxidized. Soffen added that the Viking's search for life was 

"a high stakes gamble" and many scientists lost their interest in Mars after 

Viking.^" 

The RTGs performed perfectly. "Considering what Viking did," said Soffen, 

"it was remarkable how the power worked."^' A status report of 4 December 

1976 on the RTGs indicated that on Vikings 1 and 2, requirements for 70 watts 
90 

of electrical power for 90 days were fulfilled. ^'^ Plans for Viking '79 and other 

Mars missions were cancelled, nevertheless. 

A Return to Military Applications 

Before the Vikings reached the Martian surface, another mission carried 

RTGs into space. Two LES 8/9 missions,* flew on 14 March 1976. Reports of 

the success of these communications satellites were issued before the news 

from Mars began to come in, although the LES mission was kept low key from 

the beginning. A defense mission for the Air Force, LES 8/9 was the first 

defense application of RTGs since the Navy Transit launched four years 

earlier—and only the second use of RTGs by DOD in 12 years. 

The two LES 8/9 spacecraft were launched simultaneously aboard one 

launch vehicle, placed in separate synchronous orbits, and intended to have a 

useful life of five more years. The two satellites were designed to communicate 

crosslink with one another and with surface terminals as well. The single pair, 

spaced thousands of miles apart, could "provide communications among 

terminals anywhere in an area covering more than % of the surface of the 

Earth."^^ As experiments, LES 8/9 were "designed to demonstrate and evaluate techniques to help satellites survive and continue dependable operation in 

a hostile environment."^" 

There had been a series of LESs, all designed and built by Lincoln Laboratory in the course of a continuing Space Communications Program conducted 

for the Air Force. None of the other LESs had been powered by RTGs. Phil 

Waldron, Associate Progamming Manager for LES 8/9, said that five years of 

planning preceded the launch. But once committed to the RTGs, Lincoln Lab 

stayed with its decision. Waldron explained: "At Lincoln Lab, we're in the 

business of R&D for the military. We're not in competition with anyone; we are 

learning things that improve space communications systems. We try to be low 

key." 

All the simulations and testing, as well as installation of the RTGs on the 

spacecraft, took place at the laboratory. No major problems or crises arose. 

Minor engineering problems mainly concerned the amount of fuel and heat 

* Lincoln Experimental Satellites (LES) were named for Lincoln Laboratory of MIT, responsible for 

system integration for this Air Force mission. 
Persistence Amid Change 91 

generated. A long string of trailers (referred to as the circus train) carried the air 

conditioning for the spacecraft and its RTGs whenever they were moved at 

Cape Kennedy. ^^ 

LES 8/9 also carried a new generation of RTGs into space. Ihe MHW 

(Multi-Hundred Watt) RTG, more high powered than previous RTGs, had 

been under development by General Electric for several years. The basic 

generator was a 130-watt modular unit; the two generators on an LES were 

designed to provide over 260 watts of power continuously for five years. ^^ 

Higher levels of power were achieved by using multiple units. Fuel for the 

MHW was in the form of a plutonium dioxide sphere, with each RTG containing 

24 of those spheres "protectively packed into a cylindrical graphite [re-entry] 

aeroshell... in turn encased in a metallic clad."^^ Thus, new precautions for 

safety were taken because the MHW-RTGs would carry 146,000 curies compared to 80,000 on Pioneer and 41,200 on Viking.^* Instead of lead telluride 

thermocouples the MHW used silicon germanium thermocouples, which could 

operate at higher temperatures to produce more watts per pound. ^^ 

Pitrolo recalled how some of the changes came about in the MHW. He had 

moved to the MHW program and worked closely with Lincoln Laboratory in 

early development work for LES 8/9. The AEC state-of-the-art had progressed 

from the microsphere fuel form to plutonia-molybdenum cermet. According to 

Pitrolo, his team at General Electric insisted on a solid fuel form. "1 went to Los 

Alamos and asked a guy to press me a solid oxide ball," he recalled. Then, 

because molybdenum was degrading the fuel form, a search began to find a 

material that could survive re-entry and be compatible with the fuel form and 

the graphite in the container cask. A search of the literature revealed that the 

iridium could be used instead of molybdenum. So the developers of the MHW 

learned to weld and work with iridium.^** 

The LES 8/9 mission met a basic Air Force requirement for development 

work on communications satellites, but did not lead to other DOD contracts or 

missions for the RTGs, although the mission contributed to the state-of-the-art 

for military use of RTG power in satellites. In addition to exploring and 

extending military applications of RTGs, the LES mission made contributions 

to the development of RTG technology. Lessons learned in developing the 

MHW were applied on the Voyager space probes, which also used the MHWs. 

Developers of Voyager sat in on LES safety meetings, observed operations. 
92 

and watched LES activities at Cape Kennedy, according to Waldron. Waldron 

also believes that the dollar cost per watt for RTGs, including about $10 million 

for safety, was a factor that inhibited Air Force uses.^' 

Before he left the RTG program. Carpenter played a very active role in 

pursuing RTG uses on DOD missions. He was a member of the DOD/ERDA 

Space Nuclear Applications Steering Group. The September 1976 issue of 

Aviation Week discussed the problem created by cuts in the budget and the 

need to pinpoint requirements before initiating development. Reporting that a 

joint DOD/ERDA committee hoped to select several types of future military 

satellite missions that could use high-power non-solar-cell energy sources in 

the 10 to 100 kw. range, the journal quoted Carpenter that "we cannot afford 

anymore false starts." It concluded: 

Carpenter is hopeful that, after the joint Defense Dept/ERDA committee 

has selected several space military missions that are potential candidates for nuclear power sources, funds will be made available for 

design studies by experienced spacecraft contractors.'" 

In the following six years, however, this hope was not fulfilled. 

Voyager to the Outer Planets 

The Voyager program began as a plan for a $2 billion program to send 

exploratory craft to Mars. This plan was cancelled and the NASA outerplanet mission received the recycled name "Voyager." NASA's planetary 

mission plans of the 1960s recognized that by the late 1970s Jupiter, 

Saturn, CJranus, Neptune and Pluto would all be lined up on the same side 

as the sun—an event that occurs once in a hundred years—and a 

multiplanet mission could be designed to visit all of the outer planets. NASA 

initially planned separate Grand Tours—each with twin launches—to visit, 

respectively, Jupiter-Saturn-Pluto in 1976 and 1977 and Jupiter-CJranusNeptune in 1977. Because of budget cuts, NASA's planners dropped 

Granus, Neptune, and Pluto from immediate plans.^^ 

Plans for missions to the outer planets included consideration of RTGs. 

During the planning stage, Vincent Truscello came to JPL from MartinNuclear in Baltimore; he and Gerhard Stapfer of JPL recalled that in the 

eariiest planning for the Grand Tours, there was recognition of the need 
A Maturing Program 93 

for a nuclear power source. "In the early 1960s," Truscello said, "I was 

writing position papers that said that there were no other options than RTGs 

for our planetary missions. The intensity of light decreases by 1 /r^ as you 

get away from the sun. So once you get beyond Mars, the size of solar 

panels you would need is huge."''° 

Although JPL had never worked with nuclear power sources, as the result 

of many years of planning and execution of planetary missions, the laboratory 

acquired a great deal of knowledge about RTGs. JPL also conducted a great 

deal of materials and lifetime testing. The laboratory's role was not to develop 

RTG systems, but to integrate them on planetary spacecraft. The misson's 

name, "Mariner Jupiter/Satum 1977," was changed to "Voyager" shortly 

before its launch; it was scheduled to have an RTG power source. "You can't 

easily shift schedules on a mission like Voyager," said Truscello, "the launch 

window occurs with much less frequency than for missions like Apollo." The 

abbreviated missions to the outer planets, finally defined in 1972, had stayed 

on schedule, but not without some technical problems. 

Each Voyager spacecraft was powered by three Multi-Hundred Watt generators having a combined output in the order of 475 watts per spacecraft. 

Thus, the total nuclear power for the Voyagers was about equal to that of all 

previous missions still in space in 1977.''^ As launch time approached for the 

two Voyagers, which would depart within a few weeks of one another, an 

ERDA announcement stressed the magnitude of this latest space exploration: 

Nuclear power generators provided by the Energy Research and 

Development Administration (ERDA) will make possible the longest 

space mission ever planned—a 10-year voyage starting with closeup 

television pictures of Jupiter and Saturn—then perhaps a look at our 

Sun's distant planets, Uranus and Neptune."" 

Rod Mills, NASA program manager on Voyager, explained, "Because the 

mission went so far out, we decided to send two spacecraft to insure against 

failure." A boom extending out from the spacecraft carried the RTGs. Instruments for the spacecraft were mounted on another boom located 180 degrees 

from the RTG boom.'*^ Voyager was launched on schedule, in 1977. The 

launching of Voyager 1 took place on 5 September 1977. Although Voyager 1 

was actually launched two-and-a-half weeks after Voyager 2, it was designated 
94 

" 1 " because it followed a trajectory that brought it to Jupiter before Voyager 

2's arrival. 

Carl Sagan, among others, hoped for significant information from Jupiter 

and anticipated that "abundant biota" might be found in the planet's clouds. At 

the time of launch, a space journal referred to the mission as "running a 

planetary post pattern": Voyager would "'mn straight' for Jupiter, then head 

toward Saturn, then fly toward Uranus and, finally, streak into the solar 

system's end zone—beyond the leading edge of the solar system." The 

impressive tour would fly by Jupiter, rendezvous with Saturn's rings and make 

close-up observations of eleven of the two planets' twenty-four satellites. 

Ballistics of the trajectory of Voyager 1 called for it to use Jupiter's gravity to 

sling it toward Saturn—thereby saving almost three years in flight time. Voyager 

2 would use Saturn's gravity to accelerate and change its course toward Uranus 

and possibly on to Neptune. "'^ 

In their distant travels, the Voyagers, even more than the Vikings, had to be 

able to run themselves. Communication time to Jupiter and back is 80 minutes, 

and to Saturn and back, about twice that amount. The Voyagers were able to 

transmit 115,200 bits of data per second from Jupiter and 44,600 bits per 

second from Saturn."" So again, the RTGs powered versatile and complex 

instruments, including independent computer brains, and thereby insured the 

success of a mission to the edge of the solar system. 

The planetary encounters elicited rapt attention from space scientists and 

considerable interest from the general public. As with the Vikings, information 

came to a central control center at JPL and from there to an eagerly awaiting 

audience at the Von Karman Auditorium. Mark Washburn documented impressions of the encounter with Jupiter in early 1979 as the atmosphere of the 

planet was revealed in vivid color: 

There had never been anything like it. For two weeks in late February 

and early March, 1979, Voyager I plunged through the Jovian system, 

shattering theories and changing forever the way in which earthlings 

look at the universe. The high-tech, soberly scientific Voyager mission 

turned into something different, something more—it was an interplanetary freak show, an expedition to the other side of the looking 

glass, where the Merry Prankster Imaging Team provided the pictures 
Persistence Amid Change 95 

and Lewis Carroll explained the science.... Magnificent, majestic Jupiter, king of Olympus, sultan of the solar system, grand Poo-bah of the 

planets, at last revealed its true Day-Glo colors,.. .Jupiter—the psychedelic planet."' 

Enthusiasts were ecstatic about the achievements of the Voyager spacecraft. 

Few in the lay public who saw the pictures remained unmoved by them as the 

returns came in from Jupiter—and then from Saturn. As the ten-year voyages 

continued, however, most people forgot about Voyager as other news eclipsed 

the long periods of travel between planetary encounters. As the Voyager 

reached Saturn in November 1980 and August 1981 and beamed back breathtaking pictures in color of that planet's rings, space exploration once again 

commanded the public's attention. The rings of Saturn provoked awe and 

wonder. The response was not enough, however, to generate support for the 

revival of a manned planetary program or even an expanded non-manned 

space exploration program."* If support were forthcoming in the future, the 

RTG program, whose devices were a necessity for such ventures, was determined to be ready at the launch pads. 

A Program Needing Missions 

As the last space launchings carrying RTGs took place in mid-1977, the 

RTG program received some mention in the nation's newspapers for its 

contributions. The New York Times said that the Voyager launching to Jupiter, 

Saturn and beyond "is the latest adventure for a little-noted power technology 

that has made possible much of the last decade's dramatic extension of 

knowledge of the solar system." Citing information obtained in a telephone 

interview with Bernard Rock, at the time assistant director for space application 

for ERDA's Division of Nuclear Research and Applications, the Times said: 

According to Mr. Rock, development of even larger future nuclear 

power systems for space is supported by a $30 million annual research 

program. Among its plans is the use of advanced selenide thermoelectric units along with plutonium 238 heat sources aboard a spacecraft 

that is to carry an orbiter and a probe to Jupiter. Launching is scheduled 

for 1982."« 
96 

Developmental work also proceeded on radioisotope-dynamic systems 

that would harness the plutonium heat source to drive an electricity-generating 

turbine. With improved spacecraft and gyro mechanisms to compensate for 

rotating equipment, space-nuclear power developers no longer avoided the 

isotope-heat-to-turbine option. Radioisotopic-dynamic systems, then competing for selection, would generate 1,000 to 2,000 watts of power; the 

anticipated outcome of the competition was a system qualified for space flight 

by early 1982 in the next satellite program of the U.S. Air Force.^^ 

Neither of these projected schedules for NASA and DOD missions was met. 

The Jupiter orbiter/probe, named Galileo, was rescheduled for a 1985 launch 

and then for 1986. The Air Force satellite using a dynamic isotope power 

system also was delayed greatly. Selection between competing dynamic isotope 

technologies for the Air Force's Space Based Surveillance Spacecraft (SBSS) 

was anticipated to occur "some time in 1986/1987." 

The competing dynamic systems were Brayton Isotope Power System 

(BIPS) and the Organic Rankine Isotope Power System (KIPS). In the early 

1980s, the RTG Program Plan said: "ft is.. .necessary to update the 1978-1979 

work completed on KIPS and perform comparable studies on BIPS in the 

integrated spacecraft configuration to provide information to candidate SBSS 

system contractors.^^ 

In the few missions where commitments for supplying RTGs still remained, 

there were many scheduling delays. A new NASA program named SolarPolar, sponsored jointly by NASA and the European Space Agency—each of 

which was to supply one spacecraft—was scheduled for launch in 1983, then 

delayed, and finally discontinued under U.S. budget re-evaluations. The 

United States retained commitments, however, to launch the European spacecraft from the U.S. space shuttle, to provide tracking and data services for the 

mission, and to supply RTGs for the spacecraft. ^^ 

With mission schedules slipping and new missions extiremely hard to pin 

down, the RTG program continued its work of technology improvement. 

While costs of the MHWs used on LES and Voyager were approximately 

$25,000 per watt of electric power, program officials expected to achieve a 60 

percent reduction, to approximately $10,000 per watt by 1981, and to less than 

$7,000 per watt by the mid-1980s, through the inb-oduction of an improved 

radioisotope heat source. Economies were achieved by increasing RTG output 
Persistence Amid Change 97 

per pound Earliest units had an output of approximately 1 8 watts per pound 

nearly 4 watts per pound by the mid 1980s were projected ^^ The new genera 

faon of RTGs that would provide power on the Galileo and Solar Polar 

missions was called General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) It was to be a 

modular system similar to the MHW, produce 285 watts of power m the RTG 

under initial space operational conditions, use Silicon Germanium thermocouples, and attain a heat to-electnc power conversion efficiency of 6 8 percent 

(compared to 6 7 for the MHW, 6 3 on SNAP 19, and 5 0 on SNAP 27) ^" 

Prospects for new missions were not good in the 1980s President Reagan 

advocated a strategy of converting the agency's role to one which encouraged 

pnvate enterpnse demonstrations of the commercial viability of technologies, 

while the federal government assumed the role of supporting "long term, 

high nsk energy research and development m which industry would not 

invest "^^ Reagan's administration seemed much more fiiendly to nuclear 

energy m immediately afftrmmg the nuclear power option and later breaking 

ground for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor The administration also expressed 

its intentions to stimulate growth and productivity of many energy technologies ^'^ 

Thus, the climate improved for advocates of technology development, but the 

quiet technology relied on development and applications opportunities m 

space, and the climate for space programs was uncertain 

Space and nuclear scientists and technicians continued to seek glimmers of 

hope A Hams survey m 1980 revealed that a majonty of those surveyed* 

believed the advantages of technology far outweighed the nsks "Even on the 

emotional subject of nuclear power," it was reported, "while 75% agreed 

that there could be no guarantee against a catasfrophic nuclear accident, most 

feft that the nsks were justified And most respondents seemed to have reasonable confidence m the judgment of scientists and engineers "^' 

On the space fi'ont, although the shuttle captured public attention and 

received much acclaim, a long-range and well-supported space program— 

especially for space science and space exploration—languished in the uncertainties of budget cutting and mixed signals about the value to the nation's 

strength and confidence of non terrestnal enterpnses In 1981, NASA and its 

scientific advisory groups took steps to salvage the planetary program A new 

*The survey was based on 1 500 interviews of a national cross section of the adult population 

plus an additional 600 Congressmen and business and financial leaders 
98 

policy maintained the earlier scientific objectives for solar system exploration 

but extended the time for obtaining the data for satisfying those objectives. 

New plans also envisioned spreading the return of data over more limited and 

less expensive planetary spacecraft.'^" 

Missions under the new policy would have much more limited science 

objectives than the Viking and Voyager projects of the prior decade. The 

members of NASA's Solar System Exploration Committee were concerned 

about possible effects of Reagan administration budget cuts on the Galileo 

Jupiter orbiter/probe mission. At the same time, the National Academy of 

Sciences expressed concems about a proposed 12 percent reduction in federal 

research and development expenditures, and the head of MIT's Department of 

Physics expressed fears that such a cut would diminish manpower in the 

physical sciences to pre-Sputnik levels.^** 

Space technology supporters searched for positive intepretations of President Reagan's 4 July 1982 welcome to the astronauts returning from the fourth 

shuttle orbiter at Edwards Air Force Base, before a crowd estimated at 500,000. 

The most promising Reagan statement was: "we must look aggressively to the 

future by demonsfrating the potential of the shuttle and establishing a more 

permanent presence in space." The president appeared to recommit the 

nation to the shuttle program, to more options for military uses of space, and to 

continued planetary exploration if the budget problems eased. "While the 

president did not say yes to anything," reported a frade journal, "neither did he 

say no."TM 

In the RTG program at this juncture, technical developments went forward 

methodically while space-mission schedules continued to slip. The problem 

was how to turn the "maybes" of potential users to "yeses." Even more 

important, was a need to generate a climate for "yeses," reinforced by successes, 

that represented a space program with purpose, continuity, and momentum. 

This could not be done by a program alone. As Webb had stressed in the days 

of Apollo, the larger environment was an important determinant of opportunity 

and action in the operations of large-scale endeavors. Key leaders of such 

endeavors must be sensitive to the larger environment and engage in relationships to influence decisions. For a component program of a large-scale endeavor 

in space the most appropriate axiom was: Be ready when opportunity appears. 
99 

Chapter VIII 

Past Lessons and Future Challenges 

Lessons from a Program Lineage 

he space-RTG program spans a period of less than three decades, 

although its antecedents can be traced back over a half-century more. 

There were many technical improvements and successes in the program 

despite cycles of budgetary growth and decline. Managed by a small core of 

dedicated professionals, the program persisted through numerous organizational changes and shifts in the climate for space exploration and nuclearpower applications. As a component of modern-day endeavors that require 

large allocations of public resources and support from many sectors of society, 

the program accumulated extensive experience concerning survival and continuity in the modem environment for technical research and development. 

Moreover, the RTG program activities cut across two technological fields— 

atomic energy and space exploration—that have been the focus of fremendous 

attention and confroversy in the second half of the twentieth century. 

Significant lessons stand out in this history of a technology developed in a 

relatively small program managed and fostered by a relatively small group of 

people. 

Advantages of Being Small and "Quiet." In an era when there are mixed 

emotions about technology (especially "supertechnologies"), there may be 

advantages in being both small and quiet. Many RTG program people would 

probably agree that it is not always best to be big—especially when bigness is 

accompanied by pressures of high expectations. For many years the space 

reactor-power and nuclear space-propulsion efforts drew far more resources, 

as well as far more attention and pressures, than the RTG program. When the 

reactor-power and space-propulsion efforts were curtailed by exfreme budgetary pressures and growing discontent with nuclear power and space, the 

quiet technology not only continued, it gathered increased support. Modest 

funding also meant less pressure from private sector confractors seeking a piece 

of the action and fostered conditions for a hard core of technicians and 

T 
100 

advocates to take shape—a core of people who, both among government 

employees and private-sector confractors, became zealous about proving and 

improving their technology. 

Importance of Solving Early, Basic Technical Problems. When the RTG 

technology first was made public, it was presented as a field where a "breakthrough" had been achieved—enabling electric power to be obtained directly 

from isotopic heat by thermocoupling, making space applications possible 

immediately. The breakthrough was nurtured and capitalized upon; opportunities for applications became building blocks for accumulating knowledge and 

experience around a proven technical capability. Through the years, improvements were sought and achieved in heat sources, materials, thermocoupling 

processes, conversion processes, and safety procedures. Moreover, the technology persisted to the day when the original breakthrough was no longer of 

definitive importance. Improvements in related technologies made the isotopicdynamic option feasible; improvements in cost-per-watt-delivered were sought 

in systems where isotope heat turned rotating equipment. Thus, RTG development cycle had continuity that carried beyond original breakthroughs and 

earlier barriers. 

Importance of Being Safe and Responsible. The RTG program people 

would agree that one can never be too careful, or too concerned vAth safety in 

the nuclear field. Fearful that one accident could desfroy the whole program, 

they began early to address safety problems. They also maintained a procedure 

of providing public information about potential hazards and follow-up information 

when mission aborts did occur. Safety research and development went handin-hand with research and development in the RTG technology and was 

wedded to specific spacecraft. Changes in safety concepts, procedures, and 

testing kept pace with new hazards associated with new mission requirements, 

new RTG configurations, and increased fuel loadings. Although the safety 

program added to the users' costs for RTG power, it helped to bring the 

program through years that were difficult for nuclear power. 

Importance of Having Missions. Technical research and development 

may be greatly consfrained and difficult to perform when it must be justified by 

and linked to mission requirements. This complaint was voiced early by the 

Martin-Nuclear developers; and it continued to be sounded throughout the 
Past Lessons and Future Challenges 101 

program's history, as complaints about a "job shop" role were expressed in the 

program. In refrospect, though, key program managers saw that it was the 

ability to find missions and obtain mission commitments that kept the program 

alive and enabled technical developments to proceed, for development wedded 

to missions greatly facilitated dealing with the larger environment and the 

capricious forces operating there. Program needs and responsible budgetary 

expenditures were demonsfrated in line with developments to meet mission 

schedules, while pressures for justifying missions and for meeting the schedules 

of costly missions, fell on those outside the program. RTG program people 

often commented that a slipped mission schedule was a help because "we 

would never have made that eariier launch date." Thus, the program sometimes benefited from slipped schedules in that this did not reflect badly on the 

program itself but instead left intact its record of always "being ready at the 

launch pads." Of course, rnission slippage, curtailment, or—worst of all—cancellation, can be very negative aspects of mission dependence if the program 

itself has to cut back or "stand down" from an effort, and thereby lose 

momentum and continuity. 

Importance of Flexibiliti;—and Continuity. Flexibility is exfremely important in accomplishing modem large-scale endeavors and helps in dealing with 

the larger environment. But positive flexibility requires competence with, and 

confidence in, a technology. The program's people must know what they have 

to offer and be ready to interpret that product to others while accommodating 

to changing priorities, perceptions, and concems. In the story of the RTG 

program, the many changes in larger organizations were not vital largely 

because they remained exfraneous for a long-term, dedicated, experienced 

program core caught up in missions and determined to prove and improve 

their technology. Today's RTG program manager, Bernard Rock, can look 

back on more than 20 years of his own participation in the program. Still close 

at hand are key personnel, George Ogburn, one of the ' 'originals'' from the late 

1950s, who now functions as safety nuclear officer on Galileo and Solar-Polar, 

and Ted Dobry, now in a higher level safety role at DOE. One of Rock's two key 

directors today is James Lombardo, who joined the program in 1971, and was 

manager on missions such as LES 8/9 and VOYAGER, and now is director of 

Nuclear Systems Development. The other is Gary Bennett, who eariier was 

nuclear power flight safety manager on LES 8/9 and Voyager, and later took 
102 

over program safety functions from Ted Dobry*. Thus continuity contributed 

greatly to competence, flexibility, and the ability to persist, learn, and adapt. 

Seizing Opportunity. In a large-scale endeavor, it is vitally important to 

actively engage forces in the larger environment in order to influence change. 

In confrast, a component program, which has less leverage for influencing the 

larger environment, must be able to wait out the tides of public and political 

changes while avoiding being swamped by them. The public, the president, 

and the Congress can be ambivalent and change their attitudes. They can 

ignore and neglect a space program yet be caught up in the Space Age; for 

example, they can fear nuclear power in its "big technology" forms yet accept 

and support the quiet nuclear technology in its medical and healing applications—and be ready to support new "miraculous" applications that open new 

vistas on uncharted frontiers. A program embedded in space and nuclear 

developments and applications must be ready to capitalize on opportunities, 

especially those that arise from captivation of the human imagination. 

Whither the ETG Program 

Many in the space business believe that an American space program will 

gather momentum in this century. NASA's Soffen predicted the possibility of 

manned missions to Mars: "The astronauts would have to stay a year so the 

planets would line up properly for the return. The Soviets have stayed in orbit 

211 days.'" Mills, also of NASA, sensed a change in the climate of the space 

agency, reflecting a general change in the larger environment. He spoke of the 

start-up, in 1985, of a Mars geo-chemical observer that would begin a more 

methodical examination of the planet and believed that NASA was not as concerned, compared to recent years, with Earth applications. Mills felt, "there is 

fairly strong support for space exploration just for the value of the knowledge 

gained. We can't get anything as large as Viking going anymore. But a year or 

so ago a committee was created to look at a planetary program for the next 20 

years. It is getting good support from the scientific community." Plans of the 

committee were for a new start in the space science program every year, with 

$1 billion now in NASA's science applications budget. "Anytime these missions 

*Mike Dix, still a consultant to DOE, recalled that he and Ted Dobry go back to the Pied Piper days 

at Martin Baltimore when the then-classified nuclear work was done in the closed "boiler room" of 

that company's Nuclear Division 
Past Lessons and Futiire Challenges 103 

go far out from the sun [m their explorations]," he said, "we will probably use 

RTGs "' 

At JPL, where Truscello and Stapfer were involved in the rescheduled 

Galileo and Solar Polar missions, more caveats are expressed about the future 

of the RTGs RTGs were a must for space explorations away frm the sun—and 

would be used on Solar-Polar because the spacecraft on that mission would go 

all the way out to Jupiter, using the planet's gravity for a slingshot effect, before 

swinging back into orbit around the poles of the sun But Stapfer cautioned 

"The big problem with RTGs is the cost, and the days of big, costly space missions may be numbered RTGs are a big chunk of the cost of a mission " Moreover, RTG fuel costs were low m the past because DOE assumed most of these 

costs, soon the user would have to pay the full costs of the fuel On the hopeful 

side, Stapfer said that RTGs could fit in with the future approaches to mission 

design "To save costs the idea now is to design spacecraft for multiple missions RTGs look good for this approach You don't have to do a lot of redesign 

of them "^ 

The RTG people at Teledyne, however, who had lost out m the later space 

missions, were less optimistic about the future of RTGs m space They were 

confident that terrestrial applications had a better future than space applica 

tions "There are really only two commercial firms m the RTG business any 

more," according to Linkous "GE has all the space RTG work, and we [Tele 

dyne] essentially have all the terrestrial RTGs GE picked up the bigger contracts for space RTGs, but 1 really feel our future is better developing the terres 

trial ones NASA put half of its budget into the shuttle in trying to capture 

the public eye for the future I'm m favor of the shuttle program, but I think it 

may take a lot away from a deep space exploration program that would need 

RTGs "" 

Carpenter, now working for a pnvate aerospace firm, saw future possibilities 

for space RTGs mostly in defense applications He acknowledged there were 

frustrations m getting the military to move on missions, the LES mission came 

about, he reported, because of one Air Force colonel who was enthusiastic and 

wanted to see it through Although LES flew in 1976 and there have been no 

defense missions using RTGs since then, Carpenter maintained that the great 

future for space RTGs was with the military, particularly when the civilian attitude toward nuclear matters was considered "The military tradionally feel they 
104 

must control all aspects of what they are doing. They can't allow it to be said the 

defense of the country depends on things the military can't control." So there 

are special problems in military applications of nuclear power-involving 

resources that have been kept under unique civilian controls in this country. In 

addition. Carpenter indicated, "ft's hard to get a requirement out of the military 

until they are sure something will work. They will tell you: 'We won't fly it 

first.""' 

In the larger organizational environment surrounding the RTG program, dismantiement of the Department of Energy went forward under President 

Reagan, although slowed by compromises in Congress over issues of assignment of DOE functions to other agencies. For example, Senator John Tower of 

the Armed Services Committee expressed concern that weapons programs 

might be overshadowed if placed in the Commerce Department.^ A changing 

climate regarding energy as a crucial problem further slowed plans to abolish 

the DOE. Outgoing Secretary of DOE James B. Edwards said in his farewell at 

the National Press Club in October 1982 that the era was behind us when 

energy was one of our most serious national problems. The in-coming Secretary, Donald Hodel, did not strongly advocate dismantlement of DOE although 

he expressed the view that the Department's functions could be performed by 

another existing agency.' 

As he considered the future. Rock reviewed the many technical accomplishments of recent years: 

We have been making steady advances. Our heat sources are more 

advanced. The thermoelectric materials are more advanced. Some materials in the generator are more advanced. Our eariier converters were all 

low temperature devices. Today we have very high temperature converters—and this required advances in metallurgy .... Our efficiency [electrical 

output from heat input] levels are now up to 6 to 7 percent; and the future 

looks like 9 to 10 percent ... . Solar-Polar will give us 2.3 watts per 

pound, while our eariiest units only gave about 1 watt per pound. In the 

future, we expect to be up to 4.5 watts per pound. 

Rock expected the dynamic systems using rotating equipment to play a large 

part in the future.^ 

The 1984 program plan of the Office of Special Nuclear Projects, Space and 

Special Radioisotope Systems Applications, set forth the two principal objec-
Past Lessons and Fiiture Challenges 105 

tives guiding current RTG operations: (1) "To provide the U.S. with a viable 

nuclear isotope option for space power by continuing development of technology and qualification of static and dynamic isotope power systems"; and (2) 

"To develop and deliver qualified isotopic energy systems for use on approved 

U.S. space missions.'" The plans cited two missions, Galileo and Solar-Polar, 

both scheduled for launch in May/June 1986. Budget projections in this plan 

showed marked increases in proposed funding.'" 

Rock was optimistic about the future: "Our forecasts are for growth. A NASA 

planetary series is pretty well defined. The military are showing increased interests. Beyond Galileo and Solar-Polar, NASA is set to start work in 1987 for 

launches in the 1990s. The military are looking at missions in the early 1990s. 

We are in a period of planning and development for these missions." Rock indicated that the latest developments in static RTGs for such missions were concentrating on a new device beyond the General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) 

RTG to be used on Galileo and Solar-Polar. The latest generation RTG was 

called "Modular Isotope Thermoelectric Generator" (MTG), and the modules 

for this device—which facilitated fine tuning on lower-power modules—were 

20 to 25 watt units." 

The supportive thrust of an overall long-range national endeavor was missing 

from the larger picture of space programs. Space advocates recognized that 

demonstrations of a quick, dollar and cents, return on investment were not 

feasible in space explorations and felt the need for visionary leadership willing 

to take political risks for potential long-term payoffs.'^ 

Few in the lay public, or in the technical inner circles, expected or wanted 

another race in space. Those with an abiding interest in the space-RTG program hoped that past experiences would lead to a better appreciation of the 

value of space exploration. In Distant Encounters, Mark Washburn quoted one 

project scientist as saying that Voyager had made us "human beings [that] now 

measure a billion kilometers in dimension." Washburn concluded: 

Voyager gave us a glimpse of all that lies beyond us, and the experience of 

Voyager gave us a new appreciation of what is within us . . . " 

As RTG technical developments went forward, the program was prepared to 

make new space achievements possible. 
106 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

A Note on Information Sources 

Various types of materials were used in preparing this history. At the outset, 

an extensive computer search of the Department of Energy (DOE) library, 

including the data base at the Oak Ridge Laboratory, revealed that the type of 

technical reports there would not be helpful in developing this history. Primarily, three other sources of information were relied upon: materials from 

DOE Archives, which were identified and assembled by Roger Anders of 

DOE's History Division; the data bases of the Library of Congress, which led to 

a review of newspapers, periodicals, technical journals, and books; and interviews. 

Three classes of information were used: technical events and developments, 

institutional developments, and related events in the milieu. The five categories 

of materials used are discussed below. 

Printed reports and government documents were used to identify particular 

facts about the RTGs and the program. Some of the materials provided 

relevant facts covering broad time periods; other sources pinpointed narrow 

time periods and revealed program status at a time, or presented important 

decisions or statements relevant to the program. A few of the materials focused 

on particular aspects of the program. 

Books and pamphlets provided a breadth and depth of understanding. 

Several stand out for an understanding of the technology and the broad and 

changing issues of the time period covered: the historical documents about the 

AEC, ERDA, and the DOE, and the energy chronology produced by the 

history staff of DOE (Buck, Dean, and Holl) were invaluable in succinctly 

presenting relevant events in the institutional environment. The work on 

radioisotopic power generation by Corliss and Harvey was a valuable primer in 

the technology. For background on the times and glimpses of the views of 

top-level scientists and adminisfrators, the cited books by Seaborg, Webb, 

Killian, Kistiakowsky, and Levine were profitable. The Newell book also 

proved helpful in tracing the history of NASA. Detailed information on specific 

space missions was found in several NASA documents on Apollo, Viking, and 
Bibliography 107 

Voyager; the books by Washburn added an emotional dimension. The books 

by Rolph and Ford aided in understanding the changing milieu at the time the 

AEC was disbanded. 

Articles from newspapers, periodicals, and technical journals were used to 

obtain insights into the changing technical, political, and social milieu during 

the period covered by the history. The articles used in the text are presented in 

chronological order since the chronology of changing foci and issues was most 

significant to the history. All of the newspaper articles came from the DOE 

archives: "Other Articles" cited were uncovered in a topical search for specific 

facts. 

Unpublished materials encompass a number of different types of items 

uncovered during the research, ranging from documents prepared by program 

participants, such as Mike Dix and Tom Kerr, to remarks of key functionaries on 

particular occasions. It is possible that some of this may have been published at 

a later date. 

It should be noted that archives materials were extremely helpful throughout 

the research and writing of this history. "Letters", "memos", and "news 

releases" are not cited in the Bibliography although they are cited with full dates 

in the chapter notes; such materials were invaluable in obtaining insight into 

day-by-day issues discussed and acted upon by key administrators during 

particular time periods. They were most numerous in the archives for the AEC 

years but much less so for ERDA and DOE. 

Interviews were emphasized throughout the research, to preserve an oral 

history of the program on tape. All interviewees were cooperative, helpful, and 

for the most part eager to share their recollections. Some are now retired but 

made themselves available for interviews; others took time from busy work 

schedules to be interviewed. The list of those interviewed represents coverage 

of differing but important perspectives on and involvements in the program. 
108 

Printed Reports and 

Government Documents 

Bennett, Gary L., James J. Lombardo, and Bernard J. Rock. Nuclear Electric 

Power For Space Systems: Technology Background and Flight Systems 

Program. Published paper delivered at 16th Intersociety Energy Conversion 

Engineering Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, August 9-14, 1981. 

Bennett, Gary L., James J. Lombardo, and Bernard J. Rock. U.S. Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generator Space Operating Experience (June 1961-

December 1982), paper presented before the 18th Intersociety Energy Conversion En^neering Conference, Orlando, Florida, August 21-26, 1983. 

Craig, Carol. RTG Source of Power: A History of the Radioisotopic Generators 

Fueled at Mound. Miamisburg, Ohio: Mound Public Relations, 1983. 

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 

DwightD. Eisenhower, 1953. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1960. 

Harvey, D.G. and T.J. Dobry. Safety Analysis of the Transit Generator The 

Martin Company, MND-P-2479, March 1961. 

National Aeronautics and Space Adminisfration. Aeronautics and Space Report of the President: 1980 Activities. Washington: National Aeronautics and 

Space Adminisfration, 1980. 

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Snap Nuclear Generator Press Kit Washington: Atomic Energy Commission, June 26, 1961. 

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power: A 

Report by the Commission — 1964. TID-20103. Washington: U.S. Atomic 

Energy Commission, February 1964. 

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the U.S. 

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January 1958. 

U.S. Congress. Hearings Before Subcommittees of the Joint Committee on 

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Industry). Eighty-Seventh Congress, February 21, 23, 24, 27, 28; March 1, 2, 
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and 3, 1961. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961. 

U.S. Congress. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 

(Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry). EightySeventh Congress, March 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1962. Washington: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1962. 

U.S. Congress. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Research, Development and Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Space Nuclear 

Power Applications). Eighty-Seventh Congress (Second Session), September 

13, 14, and 19, 1962. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962. 

U.S. Congress. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 

(Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry). EightyEighth Congress, February 20 and 21, 1963. Washington: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1963. 

U.S. Congress. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (First 

Session on Space Nuclear Power Generators). Eighty-Ninth Congress, August 

6, 1965. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. 

U.S. Congress. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 

(Authorizing Legislation Fiscal Year 1967). Eighty-Ninth Congress (Second 

Session), January 25, February 15, and March 4 and 8, 1966. Washington: 

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U.S. Congress. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 

(Authorizing Legislation Fiscal Year 1968). Ninetieth Congress (First Session), 

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(Authorizing Legislation Fiscal Year 1969). Ninetieth Congress (Second Session), Part 1, January 30 and 31, February 5 and 6, 1968. Washington: U.S. 

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U.S. Congress. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 

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Office, 1969. 

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(Authorizing Legislation Fiscal Year 1971). Ninety-First Congress (Second 

Session), Part 1, February 18 and 19, 1970. Washington: U.S. Government 

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no 

(Authorizing Legislation Fiscal Year 1972). Ninety-Second Congress (First 

Session), Part 3, March 9, 16, and 17, 1971. Washington: U.S. Government 

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U.S Congress. Joint Hearing Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 

Congress of the U. S. and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the 

U.S. Senate (Nomination ofDr Robert C. Seamans, Jr., To Be Administrator, 

£/?D/4; Ninety-Third Congress, (Second Session), Decemberll, 1974. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. 

U.S. Congress. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Joint 

Committee on Atomic Energy (ERDA Authorizing Legislation Fiscal Year 

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U.S. Congress. United States Code: Congressional and Administrative News. 

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Buck, Alice L. A History of the Atomic Energy Commission. Washington: U.S. 

Department of Energy, July 1983. 

Buck, Alice L. A History of the Energy Research and Development Administration. Washington: U.S. Department of Energy, March 1982. 

Chapman, Richard L. Project Management in NASA. Washington: National 

Aeronautics and Space Adminisfration, 1973. 

Coriiss, William R. and Douglas G. Harvey. Radioisotopic Power Generation. 

Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. 

Cortright, Edgar M. Apollo Expeditions to the Moon. Washington: National 

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Dean, Prentice C. Energy History Chronology From World War II to the 

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Dempsey, John C and Paul Polishuk. Radioisotopes For Aerospace, Part I: 

Advances and Techniques. New York: Plenum Press, 1966. 

Ford Daniel. The Cult of the Atom. New York: A Touchstone Book Published 

by Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1982. 
I ll 

Gantz, Kenneth F. Nuclear Right. New York : Duell, Sloan & Pierce, 1960. 

Hewlett, Richard G. and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr. A History of The United States 

Atomic Energy Commission (Vol I): The New World, 1939/1946. University 

Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962. 

Hogerton, John F. The Atomic Energy Deskbook. New York: Reinhold 

Publishing Corporation, 1963. 

Holl, Jack M. The United States Department of Energy: A History. Washington: U.S. Department of Energy, November 1982. 

Killian, James R. Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower. Cambridge & London: 

The MIT Press, 1976. 

Kistiakowsky, George B. A Scientist At The White House. Cambridge: Harvard 

University Press, 1976. 

Klass, Philip J. Secret Sentries in Space. New York: Random House, 1971. 

Levine, Arnold S. Managing NASA in the Apollo Era. Washington: National 

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Logsdon, John M. The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the 

National Interest. Cambridge, Mass., and London, England: The MIT Press, 

1970. 

Mazuzan, George T., and Walker, J. Samuel. Controlling the Atom: The 

Beginning of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1962. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London; University of California Press, 1984. 

National Aeronautics and Space Adminisfration. Voyager To Jupiter and 

Saturn. Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Adminisfration, 1977 

(NASA SP-420). 

Newell, Homer E. Beyond The Atmosphere. Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Adminisfration, 1980. 

Pedersen, Erik S. Nuclear Energy in Space. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1964. 

Rolph, Elizabeth S. Nuclear Power and the Public Safety. Lexington, Mass: 

Lexington Books, 1979. 

Schell, Jonathan. The Time of Illusion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976. 

Seaborg, Glenn T. Kennedy, Khruschev, and the Test Ban. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. 

Seaborg, Glenn T. and William R. Coriiss. Man and Atom. New York: E.P. 

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112 

Washburn, Mark. Distant Encounters. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 

1983. 

Washburn, Mark. Mars At Last! New York: G.P. Puhiam's Sons, 1977. 

Webb, James E. Space Age Management: The Large-Scale Approach. New 

York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. 

Wilford, John Noble. We Reach The Moon. New York, Toronto, London: 

Bantam Books, 1969. 

Articles 

"Sputnik in the Sky" (by Robert Hotz). Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

October 14, 1957, p. 21. 

"USAF Pushes Pied Piper Space Vehicle." Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 14, 1957, p. 26. 

"5-Lb. Device Hailed as Big Breakthrough." The Evening Star (Washington, 

D.C.), January 16, 1959. (page number not discernible.) 

"President Shows Atom Generator." The Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), 

January 16, 1959, p.l. 

"First Atom Battery Developed by U.S." The Washington Post, January 17, 

1959, p.l. 

"Isotopic Power Ready for Space But Caution Delays Use." Nucleonics, July 

1960, pp. 26-27. 

"Nuclear Power in Outer Space." Nucleonics, August 1960, pp. 58-63. 

"Special Report on Nuclear Energy in Space." Nucleonics, April 1961 (Special 

Issue). 

"Nuclear Power Is A Space Issue." New York Times, May 16, 1961. (page 

number not discernible). 

"U.S. Wary of Using Atom Device in Satellite Flight Across Cuba." New York 

Times, May 16, 1961, p. 2. 

"3-in-l Satellite Is World's First." New York Journal American, June 29,1961, 

p. L 

"The March on Washington." (Cover Story), Newsweek, September 2,1963. 

"Test Ban: 16 to 1." Newsweek, September 9, 1963, p. 23. 
113 

"Kennedy's Offer Stirs Confusion, Dismay" (by Alfred P. Alibrando). Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, September 30, 1963, p. 21. 

"Kennedy's Space Boomerang" (Robert Hotz. Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 30, 1963, p. 21. 

"Snap 9-A Isotope Generator Powers Navy Navigation Satellite." Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, October 7, 1963, p. 21. 

"What The White Man Thinks Of the Negro Revolt." Newsweek, October 21, 

1963. 

"Vietnam: The Showdown." Newsweek, November 5, 1963. 

"An Indelible Mark" (by Robert Hotz). Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

December 2, 1963, p. 21. 

"Continued Space Effort "Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 2, 

1963, p. 28. 

"John Fitzgerald Kennedy." Newsweek, December 2, 1963. 

"Johnson Familiar With Aerospace Facilities." Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 2, 1963, p. 26. 

"Johnson Sfress on Military Space Seen." Awation Week & Space Technology, December 2, 1963, p. 26. 

"Another Step Forward" (by Robert Hotz). Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 16, 1963, p. 25. 

"Nuclear Flight Programs Cancelled As President Trims FY '65 Budget." 

Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 30, 1963, p. 22. 

"Options in Viehiam." Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 6, 1964, p. 

19. 

"South Vietnamese Raiders Extending War" (by Larry Booda). Aviation Week 

& Space Technology, April 6, 1964, pp. 16-18. 

"Washington Roundup." Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 27,1964, 

p. 25. 

"The Long War" (by Robert Hotz). Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

January 3, 1966, p. 11. 

"AEC Doubles Space Radioisotope Efforts." Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 10, 1966, p. 78. 

"Washington Scene: AAP-Wednesday's Child" (by Henry Simons). Astronautics and Aeronautics, February 1966, p. 5. 
114 

"Nimbus Snap-19 Generators Recovered." Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 14, 1968, p. 16. 

"Washington Roundup." Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 6, 1969, 

p. 17. 

"Exuberance Sets Tone of First EVA." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

November 24, 1969, pp. 20ff. 

"Scientists Concede Value of Man in Lunar Experiment Deployment." Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 1, 1969, pp. 20-21. 

"Crew Describes Apollo 13 Crisis." Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 

27, 1970, p. 20. 

"Fly on the Flypaper" (by Robert Hotz). Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

May 11, 1970, p. 13. 

"Outlook for 1971" (by Robert: Hotz). Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

January 11, 1971, p. 9. 

"Overlooked Space Program Benefits" (by Robert Hotz). Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, March 15, 1971, p. 11. 

"Aerospace Business in the Seventies" (by Abraham Hyatt, North American 

Rockwell Corp.). Astronautics and Aeronautics, July 1971, p. 49. 

"Sounder Planning Required" (by Robert Hotz). Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, December 11, 1972. 

"The Last Liftoff" (by Robert Hotz). Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

December 11, 1972, p. 17. 

"Pioneer 10 Blazes Path to Jupiter, Beyond." Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 10, 1973, p.21. 

"Pioneer's Successes Buoys Saturn Hopes." Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 9, 1974, p. 16. 

"Layoffs at Cape Total 2,000." Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 21, 

1975, p. 18. 

"Electric Power Systems for Space: A Progress Report." Astronautics and 

Aeronautics, December 1975, pp. 26ff. 

"DOD, ERDA Seek Space Power Focus." Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 30, 1977, p. 13. 

"Carter Discourages Major New Space Efforts." Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, May 30, 1977, p. 13. 
115 

"VOYAGER: Running a Planetary Post Pattern" (by Mark D. Zimmerman). 

Machine Design, August 25, 1977, pp. 26ff. 

"Technology: Plutonium Power for Space Exploration." New York Times. 

August 31, 1977. (page number not discernible.) 

"Space Nuclear Power Gains Foreseen." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

January 1978, p. 129. 

"NASA's Loss of Thrust" (by George C. Wilson). Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, January 1978, pp. 6-10. 

"Technology's Brighter Image." Machine Design, July 24, 1980, p. 67. 

"NASA Moves to Salvage Planetary Program." Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, November 2, 1981, p. 16. 

"Science Academy Asks Caution in Research, Development Cuts." Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, November 2, 1981, p. 16. 

"Bean-Counting the Solar System" (by William H. Gregory). Aviation Week& 

Space Technology, December 14, 1981, p. 11. 

"Solar Polar Plans Advance Despite PuUout by NASA." Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, December 28, 1981, p. 12. 

"Better Than Nothing" (by William H. Gregory). Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, July 12, 1982, p. 13. 

Reference Books 

"Glenn T. Seaborg." Who's Who in America, 42nd Edition, 1982-1983, p. 

2997. 

"Isotope." Collier's Encyclopedia (1982), Vol. 13, p. 320. 

"James E. Webb." Who's Who in America, 42nd Edition, 1982-1983, p. 

3494. 

"Radioactivity." Collier's Encyclopedia (1982), Vol. 19, pp. 604-607. 

"The Challenge of Space Exploration" (by Robert C. Seamans Jr). Annual 

Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution 1961. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, pp. 260-263. 

"Vietnam War." The Encyclopedia Americana (1983), Vol. 28, pp. 

112a-112b. 
116 

Unpublished Documents/Materials 

Connor, Lt. Col. Joseph A. Safety Aspects of the Nuclear Space Program. 

Remarks before the Annual Conference of the Atomic Industrial Forum, San 

Francisco, California, December 15, 1960. 

Dix, George P. Nuclear Safety of Space Nuclear Power Systems. Washington: 

Atomic Energy Commission, undated. 

Dix, George P. and Susan S. Voss. The Pied Piper—A Historical Overview of 

the U.S. Space Power Reactor Program. Paper presented at the First Symposium on Space Nuclear Power Systems, Albuquerque, New Mexico, January 11, 1984. 

Holifield, Chet. Remarks By Congressman Chef Holifield, Chairman JCAE, 

On The Occasion Of Presenting A SNAP 27 Generator To The Smithsonian 

Institute (sic), December 9, 1970. 

Kerr, Thomas B. Procedures for Securing Clearance. Washington: National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration, undated. 

Morse, J.G. Summary of Attitudes Encountered in Brazil Toward Operational 

SNAP Devices. The Martin Company, Nuclear Division, June 5, 1961. 

Roberts, Dr. Richard W. Statement for The FY 1976 Appropriations Hearings 

U.S. Congress. No date. 

Roberts, Dr. Richard W. Statement for The FY 1977 Authorization Hearings 

Before the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences U.S. Senate, 

February 3, 1976. 

Seaborg, Glenn T. Nuclear Power And Space. Remarks prepared for delivery 

at International Symposium on Aerospace Nuclear Propulsion, Las Vegas, 

Nevada, October 24, 1961. 

U.S. Air Force. Fact Sheet: Lincoln Experimental Satellites LESS and -9. 

Office of Information, Air Force Systems Command. (No date.) 

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. SNAP Fact Sheet. Washington: Atomic 

Energy Commission, September 1, 1963. 

U.S. Department of Energy. Organization and Functions Fact Sheet Washington: Department of Energy, Office of Public Affairs, October 1, 1977. 

U.S. Department of Energy. Program Plan: Office of Special Nuclear Projects 

(Space and Special Radioisotopic Systems Applications — Revised 6/12/84). 

Washington: Department of Energy, 1984. 
117 

U.S. Department of Energy. Space Nuclear Systems Briefing Book. Washington: Department of Energy, February 1982. 

U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration. ERDA Public Information Plan LES 8/9. Washington: Energy Research and Development Administration, July 1975. 

U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration. Information from 

ERDA: Multi-Hundred Watt Nuclear Generator—Power for LES Satellites 8 

and 9. Washington: Energy Research and Development Administration, July 

1975. 

Interviews 

Person 

Brouns, Robert 

Carpenter, Robert 

Dassoulas, John 

Dick, Paul 

Dix, George ("Mike") 

Finger, Harold 

Hall, Charles 

Kerr, Thomas 

Klein, Milton 

Linkous, Guy 

Mills, Rod 

Pitroio, Augustine 

Place 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Germantown, MD 

Fairchild Industoies, Inc. 

Germantown, MD 

Applied Physics Laboratory 

Howard Co., MD 

Teledyne, Inc. 

Timonium, MD 

Home 

Damascus, MD 

U.S. Center for Energy Awareness 

Washington, DC 

Home 

Los Altos, CA 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administi-ation 

Washington, D.C. 

Electric Power Research Institute 

Palo Alto, CA 

Teledyne, Inc. 

Timonium, MD 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administiration 

Washington, D.C. 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Morgantown, W.VA 

Date 

7/20/84 

11/3/83 

11/14/83 

12/8/83 

12/7/83 

12/6/83 

1/25/84 

11/10/83 

1/25/84 

5/9/84 

7/9/84 

5/23/84 
118 

Press, Harry 

Rock, Bernard 

Seaborg, Glenn 

Soffen, Gerald 

Stapfer, Gerald 

Truscello, Vincent 

Waldron, Philip 

Webb, James E. 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

Pasadena, CA 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Germantown, MD 

Lawrence-Berkeley Laboratory 

Berkeley, CA 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration-Goddard 

Greenbelt, MD 

JPL 

Pasadena, CA 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

Pasadena, CA 

Lincoln Laboratory (by phone) 

Lexington, MA 

Home 

Washington, D.C. 

1/23/84 

4/13/84 

1/26/84 

7/15/84 

1/23/84 

1/23/84 

7/16/84 

12/12/83 
FOOTNOTES 

Frequently government press releases. Fact Sheets and other 

documents provide information without naming a person or a 

title as the source; when such documents are referenced in the 

text, names of persons and/or titles as sources must, of course, 

be omitted. 

CHi%FTEE I 

1. Quoted from Alice L. Buck, A History of the Atomic Energy 

Commission (Washington: U.S. Department of Energy, 

July 1983), p. 6. 

2. "Special Report on Nuclear Energy in Space," Nucleonics, 

April 1961. (Quotations taken from cover page.) 

CHAPTEM II 

1. Headline, "President Shows Atom Generator," The Evening Star, (Washington, D.C), January 16, 1959, p. 1. 

(From DOE archives.) 

2. Statement of Col. Jack Armstrong in Hearings Before 

Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 

Congress of the United States, Eighty-Fifth Congress Second Session on Outer Space Propulsion By Nuclear Energy, January 22, 23, and February 6, 1958 (quotation, p. 

125.) 

3. "First Atom Battery Developed by U.S.," The Washington 

Post, January 17, 1959, p. 1. (From DOE archives.) 

4. "5-Lb. Device Hailed as Big Breakthrough," The Evening 

Star (Washington, D.C), January 16, 1959, p. 1. 

5. Glenn T. Seaborg and William R. Corliss, Man and Atom 

(New York: E. P. Dutiion and Company, Inc., 1971), p. 86. 

6. Ibid 

7. Becquerel's experiments taken from "Radioactivity," 

Collier's Encyclopedia (1982), Vol. 19, p. 604. 
8. Curies' discoveries and the nuclear battery of Moseley 

taken from ibid., pp. 604-605, and from Seaborg, op. cit., 

p. 87. 

9. See William R. Corliss and Douglas G. Harvey, Radioisotopic Power Generation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 10. 

10. Descriptions taken firom ibid, p. 8 and from Seaborg, op. 

cit, p. 87. 

11. "Isotope," Collier's Encyclopedia (1982), Vol. 13, p. 320. 

12. "Radioactivity," {Collier's. . .), op. cit, pp. 604-607. 

13. From Coriiss and Harvey, op. cit., p. 3. 

14. Ibid, p. 10. 

15. Chronology of world events and information on AEC expansion is from Buck, op. cit, pp. 1-2. 

16. Study cited in Corliss and Harvey, op. cit, p. 10. 

17. Study {RAND Report, February 1949) cited in ibid 

18. Corliss and Harvey, op. cit, pp. 10-11. 

19. SNAP Nuclear Generator Press Kit (Washington: Atomic 

Energy Commission, June 26, 1961), "Attachment 2: 

SNAP Fact Sheet," note, p. 2. (From DOE archives.) 

20. RTG A Source of Power: A History of the Radioisotopic 

Thermoelectric Generators Fueled at Mound (by Carol 

Craig, Mound Public Relations, Miamisburg, Ohio, 1983). 

21. Letter fi'om Assistant Secretary of Defense to Chairman 

Atomic Energy Commission, August 15,1955. (From DOE 

archives.) 

22. From SNAP. . . Press Kit, op. cit, "Attachment 4: History 

of. . . SNAP Program. . .,"pp. 1-2. (From DOE archives.) 

23. Cited in The Pied Piper—A Historical Overview of the U.S. 

Space Power Reactor Program (by George P. Dix and 

Susan S. Voss), paper presented at the First Symposium on 

Space Nuclear Power Systems, Albuquerque, New Mexico, January 11, 1984, p. 1. 
24. "Sputnik in the Sky" (by Robert Hotz), Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, October 14, 1957, p. 21. 

25. "USAF Pushes Pied Piper Space Vehicle," Aviation Week 

& Space Technology, October 14, 1957, p. 26. 

26. "Memorandum For the Chairman, Subject Chairman's 

Request For Information on Pied Piper Change of Name," 

from Director Division of Reactor Development AEC, February 24, 1958. (From DOE archives.) 

27. James R. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower {Cambridge & London: The MIT Press, 1977), p. 119. (Emphasis in original.) 

28. Ibid, pp. 144-145. 

29. Quoted in ibid., p. 140 (from a private memoir written by 

Dr. Keith Glennan). 

30. Description of SNAP-1 and SNAP-3 concepts and developments taken firom SNAP. . . Press Kit, op. cit., ("Attachment 4, History. . .," pp. 2-3). (From DOE archives.) 

31. Information on radioisotope sales from Twenty-third Semiannual Report of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 

(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 

1958), p. 158. 

CHAPTEE III 

1. John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project 

Apollo and the National Interest (Cambridge, Mass., and 

London, England: The MIT Press 1970) p. 13. 

2. Ibid 

3. Homer E. Newell, Beyond The Atmosphere (Washington: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administiration, 1980), p. 

89. 

4. Ibid, pp. 95-96. 

5. Ibid 
6. "AEC Establishes Aerospace Nuclear Safety Board," AEC 

public release, November 23, 1959. (From DOE archives.) 

7. Letter fi-om Keith Glennan to John McCone, May 12,1960. 

(From DOE archives.) 

8. Ibid 

9. Letter of transmittal (McCone to Glennan) for "Memorandum of Understanding," August 30, 1960. (From DOE 

archives.) 

10. From Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic 

Energy, Congress of the United States, Eighty-seventh 

Congress, First Session, on Development, Growth, & State 

of the Atomic Energy Industry, February 21,23,24,27,28, 

March 1, 2, and 3, 1961 (quotations pp. 19-20.) 

11. "Remarks by Leland J. Haworth, Commissioner U.S. 

Atomic Energy Commission At Luncheon of Space Nuclear 

Conference The American Rocket Society . . . May 5, 

1961." (From DOE archives.) 

12. Summary of Attitudes Encountered in Brazil Toward Operational SNAP Devices (by J. G. Morse, Manager Auxiliary 

Power Systems Department, Nuclear Division, The Martin 

Company, June 5, 1961). (From DOE archives.) 

13. Information about Dr. Lapp's call and the hurried preparation of a safety document obtained in a personal interview 

with George "Mike" Dix. Mr. Dix also indicated that a 

comprehensive safety report had already been prepared 

earlier for the SNAP-1. 

14. Personal interview with Mike Dix. 

15. See, for example, "Nuclear Power in Outer Space," Nucleonics, August 1960, pp. 58-63. 

16. "Isotopic Power Ready for Space But Caution Delays Use," 

Nucleonics, July 1960, pp. 26-27. 

17. Ibid 

18. "Announcement No. E-69: Aerospace Nuclear Safety 

Conference," May 27,1960 (AEC). (From DOE archives.) 
19. "Aerospace Nuclear Safety," memorandum for Chairman 

McCone, September 30, 1960, prepared by Director Division of Reactor Development. (From DOE archives.) 

20. Ibid 

21. Safety Aspects of the Nuclear Space Program (Remarks by 

Lt. Col. Joseph A. Connor, Jr., .. . Before the Annual 

Conference of the Atomic Industrial Forum, Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California, December 15, 1960). AEC 

press release, December 15, 1960. (From DOE archives.) 

22. Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Krushchev and the Test Ban 

(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 

Press), first page of "Preface." 

23. Personal Interview with Glenn Seaborg. 

24. Information on Seaborg's previous scientific work with 

radioactivity and isotopes taken from "Glenn T. Seaborg," 

Who's Who in America, 42nd Edition, 1982-1983, p. 

2997. 

25. Harold Finger (in a personal interview) stated that in 

Webb's mind NASA was not only a technical R&D center 

but a management R&D organization. Webb's own writings clearly bear out this approach and philosophy. 

26. Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era 

(Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Administi-ation, 1982), "Preface" (by James E. Webb), p. XII. 

27. Ibid P- XIII. 

28. Personal interview with Dr. Seaborg. 

29. Personal interview with James E. Webb. 

30. Recollections and expressions of philosophy by James E. 

Webb obtained in personal interview. Quotation at end is 

fi-om Levine ("Preface"), op. cit., p. XIII. 

31. Personal interview with Glenn Seaborg. 

32. Kennedy quotation taken from Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 

403-494. 
33. Webb's recollections and point of view are from a personal 

interview. 

34. Personal interview with John Dassoulas. 

35. Ibid 

36. Information from personal interviews with John Dassoulas 

and Paul Dick. 

37. Quoted material on specific initiation of the program for 

SNAPs at DOD request is taken from a letter to the Vice 

President of the U.S. (Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council) from John Graham (Acting 

Chairman of AEC) on May 10, 1961, urging approval by 

the Council of the use of SNAP-3 on TRANSIT. (From 

DOE archives.) 

38. Safety Analysis of the Transit Generator (by D.G. Harvey 

and T.J. Dobry, The Martin Company), MND-P-2479, 

March 1961, p. VII. (From DOE archives.) 

39. "Impact Test Results for the Transit Generator," memorandum for Seaborg and the Commissioners from AEC 

General Manager, April 22, 1961. (From DOE archives.) 

40. "Summary of Hazards Analysis of Transit Generator," April 

26, 1961, by Facilities Licensing, Division of Licensing and 

Regulation, AEC. (From DOE archives.) 

41. "Joint Meeting Concerning Nuclear Safety Responsibilities 

for Transit," memorandum to Director Division of Reactor 

Development from Chief SNAP Branch, May 4, 1961. 

(From DOE archives.) 

42. Letter to Secretary McNamara from John Graham (Acting 

Chairman, AEC), May 8, 1961. (From DOE archives.) 

43. Letter to the President fi-om Glenn Seaborg, May 6, 1961. 

(From DOE archives.) 

44. Letter to Chet Holifield (Chairman, JCAE) from Glenn 

Seaborg. (From DOE archives; date unclear.) 

45. "Nuclear Power Is A Space Issue," New York Times, May 

16, 1961. (From DOE archives; page number not 

discernible.) 
46. "U.S. Hesitates to Use Atom Device In Satellite Flight 

Across Cuba," New yoric77mes. May 19,1961, p. 2. (From 

DOE archives.) 

47. Memorandum, Seaborg to General Manager, June 8,1961 

(in DOE archives), accompanied by note: "This memo not 

sent Commission instructed me to convey this message 

orally to General Manager." 

48. Letter to Chairman Seaborg from his Special Assistant, 

Howard C. Brown, Jr., reporting conversation with Gilpatiic of DOD, June 23, 1961. (From DOE archives.) 

49. Personal interviews with Robert Carpenter and John Dassoulas. 

50. Account taken from personal interviews with Carpenter 

and Dassoulas. 

51. "3-in-l Satellite Is World's First," New York Journal American, June 29, 1961, p. 1. 

52. "Worid's First 'Atomic Battery' In Space Continues To 

Operate Successfully," AEC press release, September 8, 

1961. (From DOE archives.) 

53. Nuclear Power And Space (Remarks by Dr. Glenn T. 

Seaborg . . . Prepared for Delivery at International Symposium on Aerospace Nuclear Propulsion, Hotel Riviera, 

Las Vegas, Nevada, October 24, 1961. AEC press release. 

(From DOE archives.) 

54. Letter from Seaborg to Vice President Lyndon Johnson, 

November 4, 1961. (From DOE archives.) 

55. Letter from Lyndon Johnson to Glenn Seaborg, November 

6, 1961. (From DOE archives.) 

CHAPTEE I¥ 

1. Impressions of organizational atmosphere and relationships 

at AEC/ERDA from personal interview with Bob Carpenter. 

2. Ibid 
3. Letter to John McCone (Chairman, AEC) from T. Keith 

Glennan (NASA Administi-ator), August 3, 1960. (From 

DOE archives.) 

4. Information taken from "Opening Statement of Dr. Frank 

Pittman Before the JCAE Subcommittee on Research and 

Development and Radiation." (From DOE archives.) 

5. Letter to AEC General Manager from Robert C Seamans, 

Jr. (NASAAssociate Administirator), Augusts, 1962. (From 

DOE archives.) 

6. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Research, Development, & Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic 

Energy Congress of the United States, Eighty-seventh 

Congress Second Session, on Space Nuclear Power Application, September 13, 14, & 19, 1962 (quotations, pp. 10 

and 12-13.) 

7. Information on key international events in the period described taken from Seaborg {Kennedy . . . and the Test 

Ban), op. cit. 

8. Quotations in this paragraph are taken from Public Papers 

of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 

1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), 

pp. 460-461 and 463-464. 

9. Ibid, pp. 280-282. 

10. Quoted materials in text of paragraph are from "Kennedy's 

Offer Stirs Confusion, Dismay" (by Alfred P. Alibrando), 

Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 30,1963, 

p. 26. Offset quotation is from "Kennedy's Space Boomerang" (by Robert Hotz) in the same issue oi Aviation Week 

(p. 21). 

11. "New National Space Policy Needed" (by Robert Hotz), 

Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 4, 1963. 

p. 21. 

12. "Krushchev Puts Russia Back Into Manned Lunar Landing 

Race" (by Alft-ed P. Alibrando), Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, November 11, 1963, p. 29. 
13. "An Indelible Mark" (by Robert Hotz), Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, December 2, 1963, p. 21. President 

Kennedy is quoted from Public Papers of the Presidents of 

the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 (Washington: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 883. 

14. See Newsweek issues for September 2 and September 9 

(the march on Washington and the test ban treaty), October 

21 (poll of whites regarding the Negro revolt), November 5 

(Vietnam showdown.) 

15. "Snap-9A Isotope Generator Powers Navy Transit Navigation Satellite," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

October 7, 1963, p. 37. 

16. "Anniversary Statement by Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission," June 29, 1962, 

AEC press release. (From DOE archives.) 

17. See, for example, "The President's Policy Statements on 

Outer Space," draft from NASA circulated at AEC on June 

19, 1962. (From DOE archives.) 

18. Letter from NASA Associate Administrator to AEC General 

Manager, July 8,1963 — referring to a previous forecast of 

November 1962. (From DOE archives.) 

19. "Nuclear Space Projects — Briefing of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences," April 30, 1963. 

(From DOE archives.) 

20. All facts in the preceding summary taken from SNAP Fact 

Sheet (Atomic Energy Commission), September 1, 1963. 

(From DOE archives.) 

21. Information on the strontium-90 device contracts is from 

"AEC To Negotiate Contracts For Development of Space 

Nuclear Power Generator," November 15, 1963, AEC 

press release. (From DOE archives.) 

22. "Summary Notes of Briefing By Representatives of the 

Martin Company on the SNAP Program," Tuesday, March 

5, 1963 at D.C. office of AEC; published at AEC on March 

29, 1963. (From DOE archives.) 
23. "Summary Notes of Briefing On SNAP Program," Wednesday, February 13, 1963 at D.C. office of AEC; published at AEC on May 27, 1963. (From DOE archives.) 

24. "Use of SNAP-9A In Navigation Satellites: Report to the 

General Manager by the Director Division of Reactor Development," transmitted August 1, 1963 by Secretary 

AEC. (From DOE archives.) 

25. "Supplement to AEC 1000/75—Approval To Use SNAP9A On TRANSIT: Report to the General Manager by the 

Director of Reactor Development," August 26, 1963. 

(From DOE archives.) 

26. "Satellite, First To Be Wholly Powered By Nuclear Energy, 

Now In Orbit," September 30, 1963, AEC press release. 

(From DOE archives.) 

27. "Second Satellite Wholly Powered By Nuclear Energy, 

Launched Recently; Operating Successfully," December 6, 

1963, AEC press release. (From DOE archives.) 

28. "Status Report on SNAP-9A," memorandum from Director Division of Reactor Development to AEC General Manager, February 5, 1964. (From DOE archives.) 

29. Personal interview with Mike Dix. 

30. Procedures for Securing Clearance (by Thomas B. Kerr), 

no date. National Aeronautics and Space Administi-ation, 

pp. 1-2. Document provided to interviewer at time of 

personal interview with Mr. Kerr. 

31. Ibid, p. 2. 

32. "Safety Review of Aerospace Nuclear Projects," AEC 

memorandum to the Chairman and Commissioners from 

the General Manager, January 14, 1963. (From DOE 

archives.) 

33. "Expert Review and Advice on Space Nuclear Safety Problems: Report to the Commission by the General Manager 

and the Director of Regulation," April 1,1964. (From DOE 

archives.) 

34. SNAP Fact Sheet, September 1, 1963. (From DOE archives. ) 
35. Personal interview with Mike Dix. 

36. "AEC 1000/75—Approval To Use SNAP-9A On TRANSIT 

And AEC 1000/76—Supplement to AEC 1000/75," AEC 

memorandum to Director of Division of Reactor Development from Secretary AEC, September 3, 1963. (From 

DOE archives.) 

37. "Memorandum for Chairman Seaborg, Subject: SNAP9A," from General Manager, AEC, April 23, 1964. (From 

DOE archives.) 

38. Press release (April 22, 1964) attached to letter from Seaborg to Dr. Welsh (Executive Secretary National Aeronautics and Space Council), April 23, 1964. (From DOE 

archives.) 

39. "Foreign Reaction to SNAP-9A Failure to Orbit," AEC 

memorandum to Chairman and Commissioners from Director Division of Public Information, June 5,1964. (From 

DOE archives.) 

40. See, for example, letter to Senator Morse from Seaborg, 

October 29, 1964. (From DOE archives.) 

41. Letter fi-om Dr. Welsh to Glenn Seaborg, November 4, 

1964, commending the requested presentation by Dr. 

Joseph Lieberman and Mr. Robert Carpenter (From DOE 

archives.) 

42. Letter firom Seaborg to Senator Pastore (Chairman JCAE) 

and accompanying press release, January 5, 1965. (From 

DOE archives.) 

43, 

44 

45, 

46 

47 

Personal 

Personal 

Personal 

Ibid 

nterview with Bob Carpenter, 

interview with Mike Dix. 

nterview with Tom Kerr. 

See "Johnson Stress on Military Space Seen," "Johnson 

Familiar With Aerospace Facilities," and "Continued Space 

Effort," Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 2, 

1963 (pp. 26ff and 28). President Johnson quoted from 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 

Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, Book I (Washington: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 8. 

48. "Another Step Forward" (by Robert Hotz), Aviation Week 

& Space Technology, December 16, 1963, p. 25. 

49. "Nuclear Flight Program Cancelled As President Trims FY 

'65 Budget," Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 30, 1963, p. 22. 

50. "South Vietnamese Raiders Extending War" (by Larry 

Booda) and "Options in Vietnam," Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, April 6, 1964 (pp. 16-19). 

51. "Washington Roundup," Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 27, 1964, p. 25. 

52. "Preliminary Response by James Webb to President's 

Letter of January 30,1964," sent to Glenn Seaborg on May 

18, 1964. (From DOE archives.) 

53. "The SNAP Report: Suggested Outline," memorandum for 

the Commissioners, January 14, 1963. (From DOE archives. ) 

54. "Tentative Schedule—SNAP Program Study Seminars," 

memorandum for the Commissioners, January 31, 1963. 

(From DOE archives.) 

55. "Memorandum For Commissioner Tape: SNAP Report," 

firom James T. Ramey, January 24, 1964. (From DOE 

archives. Emphasis in original).) 

56. See "Conclusions" in Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power: 

A Report by the Commission—1964, TID-20103 (Washington: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, February 1964). 

(Copy from DOE archives. Emphasis in original.) 

57. Letter to Seaborg fi-om Welsh (NASC), February 7, 1964. 

(From DOE archives.) 

58. "Agreement Between The Atomic Energy Commission and 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on 

Space Nuclear Systems" (proposed agreement, attached to 

memorandum for Chairman and the Commissioners pre-
pared by AEC General Manager, January 22,1965). (From 

DOE archives.) 

59. "AEC Creates Division of Space Nuclear Systems: Harold 

B. Finger Named Director," AEC public announcement, 

June 17, 1965. (From DOE archives.) 

60. From Hearings Before The Joint Committee on Atomic 

Energy, Congress of the United States Eighty-ninth Congress First Session on Space Nuclear Generators, August 6, 

1965, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1966, p. 10. 

61. Organization charts taken from "Appendix 4 . . . Address 

by Harold B. Finger .. . [to the] Atomic Industrial Forum 

12th Annual Conference. . .Washington, D.C, November 

17, 1965"; in published proceedings of Hearings Before 

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (On Space Nuclear 

Power Generators), August 6, 1965 (Washington: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 251. 

CHAPTEM ¥ 

1. A good account of this (and other) APOLLO missions 

appears in Edgar M. Cortright (editor), Apollo Expeditions 

to the Moon (Washington: National Aeronautics and Space 

Administiration, 1975). 

2. "The Long War" (by Robert Hotz), Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, January 3, 1966, p. 11. 

3. Information on changed fuel amounts taken from Nuclear 

Safety of Space Nuclear Power Systems (by George P. 

Dix), no date, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. (Document supplied by Mr. Dix at time of personal interview.) 

4. See "Address By Harold B. Finger .. . [to the] Atomic 

Industrial Forum . . .," op. cit, p. 250. 

5. Ibid, pp. 252-253 (offset quotation, p. 253). 

6. Ibid, p. 253. 

7. Description of Sandia taken from memorandum from Har-
old Finger to Assistant General Manager for Reactors, AEC, 

"Assignment of Space Isotope Power To An AEC Laboratory," October 18, 1965. This memorandum actually describes discussions with, and sfi-engths and weaknesses of, 

three candidate AEC labs (Brookhaven, Oak Ridge, and 

Sandia) prior to the selection of Sandia. Information on 

Sandia, pp. 6-7. (From DOE archives.) 

8. Information in this paragraph taken from personal interview 

with Harold Finger. 

9. Personal interview with Bernard Rock. 

10. "AEC Doubles Space Radioisotope Efforts," Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, January 10, 1966, p. 78. 

11. Ibid 

12. Memorandum, Finger to Director, Office of Congressional 

Relations, "Suggested Outline for Discussion of Space 

Nuclear Systems With the Vice President," March 9,1966. 

(From DOE archives.) 

13. Quoted from Robert Seamans' remarks to the National 

Space Club in November 1965 cited in "Washington 

Scene: AAP — Wednesday's Child" (by Henry Simmons), 

Astronautics and Aeronautics, February 1966, p. 5. 

14. "Washington Scene; AAP-Wednesday's Child," (by 

Henry Simmons), Astonautics and Aeronautics, February 

1966, p. 5. 

15. Personal interview with Milton Klein. 

16. Personal interview with Bernard Rock. 

17. See memorandum for AEC General Manager from Harold 

B. Finger, March 1, 1966, "Subject: Memorandum of 

Understanding Between AEC and NASA Concerning The 

Use of Isotopic SNAP Devices For NASA Space Vehicles." 

(From DOE archives.) 

18. "An Interagency Agreement Between the Atomic Energy 

Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Concerning SNAP Devices For NASA Space 

Vehicles," no date; however, effective date of agreement 

shown as September 1965. (From DOE archives.) 
19. Personal interview with Mike Dix. 

20. Ibid 

21. Information in paragraph obtained from personal interviews with Paul Dick and Guy Linkous of Teledyne. 

22. Infonmation from AEC "Discussion Paper: Use of SNAP-19 

Generators on the NASA Nimbus-B Spacecraft," November 13, 1967. (From DOE archives.) 

23. See memorandum for Chairman Seaborg (and the Commissioners), "Subject: Use of SNAP-19 Generators on 

NASA Nimbus-B Spacecraft," by Director of Regulation, 

November 29, 1967. (From DOE archives.) 

24. Memorandum to Milton Klein and Peter A. Morris (Director, Reactor Licensing) from Secretary AEC, "Subject: AEC 

1000/120 — Use of SNAP-19 Generators on NASA 

Nimbus-B Spacecraft," January 16, 1968. (From DOE 

archives.) 

25. Letters from Seaborg to Director DDR&E and to Administrator NASA, May 15, 1968. (From DOE archives.) 

26. Personal interview with Guy Linkous. 

27. Personal interview with Harry Press. 

28. Information taken from letter from General Manager AEC 

to Executive Director JCAE, May 20, 1968. (From DOE 

archives.) 

29. Personal interview with Mike Dix. 

30. "Nimbus SNAP-19 Generators Recovered" (picture caption). Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 14, 

1968, p. 16. 

31. "Second Nimbus-B," NASA news release, June 28, 1968. 

(From DOE archives.) 

32. Letter from Acting Adminisfrator NASA to the Vice President, March 13, 1969. (From DOE archives.) 

33. Letter from the Vice President to Acting Adminisfrator 

NASA, March 21, 1969. (From DOE archives.) 
34. Personal interview with Harry Press. 

35. Information obtained from Mike Dix. 

36. These identified elements of ALSEPs are taken from Cortright (editor), op. cit, pp. 240-241. 

37. Memorandum for Chairman Seaborg and the Commissioners prepared by Director Division of Reactor Development and Technology, "Subject: Selection of Confractor For Isotopic Orbital Space Power Unit. "January 14, 

1965. (From DOE archives.) 

38. "Report to the General Manager. . .: Approval of SNAP-27 

Program And Authority To Execute Modification No. 2 To 

Contract. . . With The General Electric Company For The 

Conduct Of SNAP-27 Work," fransmitted by Acting Secretary AEC, April 7, 1968. (From DOE archives.) 

39. Personal intereview with Augustine Pifrolo. 

40. Ibid 

41. Ibid 

42. Ibid 

43. In a personal interview Webb sfressed this point. 

44. Interview with James Webb. 

45. Notes of "Telephone Call from George Mueller" (NASA) 

from Cape Kennedy, 3:00 P.M., October 10, 1968. (From 

DOE archives.) 

46. Letter from George E. Mueller to Glenn T. Seaborg, November 13, 1968. (From DOE archives.) 

47. Ibid 

48. Information from personal interview with Augustine Pitroio 

and from Cortright (editor), op. cit., p. 225. Astronauts 

quoted from Cortiright 

49. Taken from "Exuberance Sets Tone of First EVA," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 24,1969, pp. 

19-21, quotation, p. 20. 

50. Personal interview with Augustine Pifrolo. 
51. "Scientists Concede Value of Man In Lunar Experiment 

Deployment," Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 1, 1969, pp. 20-21. 

52. Personal interviews with Pitroio and Dix. 

53. Personal interviews with Carpenter, Dix, and Pitroio. 

54. "Response To Queries On SNAP-27 Reentry," by Director 

AEC Division of Public Information, April 28, 1970. (From 

DOE archives.) 

55. "Washington Roundup," Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 6, 1969, p. 17. 

CHAPTEH VI 

1. "Overlooked Space Program Benefits," Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, March 15, 1971, p. 11. 

2. "Aerospace Business in the Seventies" (by Abraham Hyatt, 

North American Rockwell, Corp.), Astronautics and Aeronautics, July 1971, p. 49. 

3. Budget figures from ibid. 

4. "Report From The Director, Space Nuclear Systems Division To The General Manager (for information meeting 

item 'AEC/User Agency Funding For Space Nuclear Power 

Systems'," May 21, 1971, pp. 1-4. Offset quotation, p. 4. 

(From DOE archives.) 

5. Personal interview with Milton Klein. 

6. See Klein's testimony in AEC Authorizing Legislation Fiscal 

Year 1972: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on 

Atomic Energy Congress of the United States NinetySecond Congress First Session, March 9, 16 & 17, 1971, 

Part 3 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1971), pp. 1249 & 1251. 

7. "Correspondence on Sandia Participation In Space Electric 

Power Program, "October 23,1970. (From DOE archives.) 

8. Opinion expressed by Bernard Rock in a personal interview. 
9. AEC press release, January 5,1973, "Enclosure 1" to letter 

from AEC General Manager to Honorable John O. Pastore, 

Chairman JCAE on the same date. (From DOE archives.) 

10. Ibid 

11. Personal interview with John Dassoulas. 

12. Description of this RTG taken from "Nuclear Safety Review 

Procedures For Navy Satellite Mission," June 1, 1970. 

(From DOE archives.) 

13. Personal interview with John Dassoulas. 

14. Personal interviews with Augustine Pitroio and Tom Kerr. 

15. "Apollo 17/SNAP-27 Status Report," December 13,1972. 

(From DOE archives.) 

16. "Electric Power Systems For Space: A Progress Report," 

Astronautics and Aeronautics, December 1975, p. 26. 

17. See Remarks [By Congressman Chet Holifield, Chairman 

JCAE] On The Occasion Of Presenting A SNAP-27 Generator To The Smithsonian Institute (sic), December 9, 1970. 

(From DOE archives.) 

18. See "The Last Liftoff" (by Robert Hotz), Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, December 11, 1972, p. 17. 

19. Personal interview with Charies Hall. 

20. Ibid 

21. Ibid. (Hall was not sure, at first, of the AEC representative's 

identity, but finally decided during the interview it was Bob 

Carpenter.) 

22. Ibid 

23. Personal interviews with Charies Hall and Guy Linkous. 

24. Definition from U.S. Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generator Space Operating Experience (June 1961-December 

1982), (by Gary L. Bennett, James J. Lombardo, & Bernard J. Rock), paper presented before the 18th Intersociety 

Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, Oriando, 

Florida, August 21-26, 1983, note p. 6. 
25. Personal interview with Charles Hall and Guy Linkous. 

26. Information from "Use of Isotopic Nuclear Systems on the 

NASA PIONEER Spacecraft" (staff paper), December 30, 

1971. (From DOE archives.) 

27. Personal interviews with Charles Hall and Mike Dix. Hall 

told of the Bay Area newspaper coverage. 

28. "Pioneer 10 Blazes Path to Jupiter, Beyond," Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, December 10, 1973, p. 21. 

29. "Pioneer 11 Retargeted for Saturn Encounter," Aviation 

Week & Space Technology March 25, 1974, p. 18. 

30. "Pioneer's Success Buoys Saturn Hopes," Aviation Week 

& Space Technology, December 9, 1974, p. 16. 

31. Personal interview with Charles Hall. 

32. Alice L. Buck, A History Of The Atomic Energy Commission, op. cit., p. 8. 

33. See references to these missions in letter from James Fletcher (NASA Administrator) to William Anders (Commissioner AEC), June 7, 1974, (From DOE archives.) 

34. Personal interview with Paul Dick. 

35. Letter, Fletcher to Anders, June 7, 1974, op. cit. (From 

DOE archives.) 

36. Letter from Anders to Fletcher, June 28,1974. (From DOE 

archives.) 

37. See Nomination of Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr To Be 

Administrator, Energy Research & Development Administration: Joint Hearing Before the Joint Committee on 

Atomic Energy Congress of the United States & the Committee on Interior & Insular Affairs of the U.S. Senate, 

Ninety-Third Congress Second Session, December 11, 

1974 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1974), p. 7. 
CHAPTEM VII 

1. See Daniel Ford, The Cult of the Atom (New York: A 

Touchstone Book Published by Simon & Schuster, Inc., 

1982), p. 134. 

2. See Elizabeth S. Rolph, Nuclear Power and the Public 

Safety (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), pp. 

152-153. 

3. View expressed by Mike Dix in a personal interview. 

4. Jack M. Holl, The United States Department of Energy: A 

H/stofj/(Washington: U.S. Department of Energy, November 1982), p. 5. 

5. Organization and Functions Fact Sheet, Department of 

Energy, Office of Public Affairs, October 1, 1977. (From 

DOE archives.) 

6. Alice L. Buck, A History of the Energy Research and 

Development Administration (Washington: U.S. Department of Energy, March 1982), p. 63. 

7. See Prentice C Dean, Energy History Chronology from 

World War II To the Present (Washington: U.S. Department of Energy, August 1982), p. 63. 

8. Ibid, p. 66. 

9. Personal interview with Robert Carpenter. 

10. Personal interview with Mike Dix. 

11. Statement [of Dr Richard W. Roberts, Assistant Administrator for Nuclear Energy] For The FY 1977 Authorization 

Hearings Before the Committee on Aeronautical and 

Space Sciences U.S. Senate, February 3,1976, p. 2. (From 

DOE archives.) 

12. Personal interview with Bernard Rock. 

13. See, for example. Statement [of Dr Richard W. Roberts, 

Assistant Administator for Nuclear Energy] For The FY 

1976 Appropriations Hearings, U.S. Congress, no date. 

(From DOE archives.) 
14. Mark Washburn, Distant Encounters (San Diego: Harcourt 

Brace Jovanovich, 1983), p. 6. 

15. "Layoffs at Cape Total 2,000," Aviation Week & Space 

Technology, July 21, 1975, p. 18. 

16. Account of President Carter's remarks taken fi;om "Carter 

Discourages Major New Space Efforts," Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, May 30, 1977, p. 13. 

17. "NASA's Loss of Thrust" (by George C. Wilson), Asti-onautics and Aeronautics, January 1978, pp. 6-7,10; Webb 

quotation, p. 7. 

18. Information from Aeronautics and Space Report of the 

President: 1980 Activities, (Washington: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1980), pp. 95-97; Appendixes B-1, B-2, and B-3. 

19. Mark Washburn especially has made the point that in spite 

of terrestrial events that seemed to dull public interest in the 

Nation's space program, the Space Age had a dynamic of 

its own in sensitizing people and piercing their consciousness. See Washburn, op. cit., pp. 7-9. 

20. Personal interview with Gerald Soffen. 

21. Ibid 

22. Information from personal interview with Robert Brouns, 

RTG program representative at Langley for the Viking 

missions. 

23. Ibid 

24. Interview with Jerry Soffen. 

25. Mark Washburn, Mars At Last! (New York: G.P. Putnam's 

Sons, 1977), p. 217. 

26. Interview with Jerry Soffen. 

27. Ibid 

28. "Information Memorandum: Status of SNAP-19 Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators Aboard the NASA VIKING II Lander," to ERDA Administrator from Director 
Division of Nuclear Research and Applications, January 27, 

1977. (From DOE archives.) 

29. From Fact Sheet: Lincoln Experimental Satellites LESS 

and 9, Office of Information, Air Force Systems Command, 

no date, p. 1. (From DOE archives.) 

30. Ibid, p. 2. 

31. Telephone interview with Philip Waldron. 

32. Information from ERDA: Multi-Hundred Watt Nuclear 

Generator—Power for LES Satellites 8 & 9, July 1975, p. 

1. (From DOE archives.) 

33. Ibid, p. 2. 

34. "Questions and Answers on LES 8 and 9," p. 4, in ERDA 

Public Information Plan LES 8/9, September 1975. (From 

DOE archives.) 

35. Information from ERDA:. . ., op. cit, pp. 1-2. 

36. Personal interview with Augustine Pitrolo. 

37. Telephone interview with Phil Waldron. 

38. "DOD, ERDA Seek Space Power Focus," Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, September 13, 1976, pp. 79 and 83. 

39. Information in the first two paragraphs taken from Washbum, Distant Encounters, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 

40. Personal interview with Vincent Truscello. 

41. Ibid 

42. Space Nuclear Systems Briefing Book, Department of Energy, February 1982 (section on "Use of Nuclear Power in 

Space By The United States of America," p. 9). (From DOE 

archives.). 

43. "ERDA News Feature: Nuclear Power To Make Possible 

Longest Space Mission," July 29, 1977, p. 1. (From DOE 

archives.) 

44. Personal interview with Rod Mills. 
45. "VOYAGER: Running A Planetary Post Pattern" (by Mark 

D. Zimmerman), Machine Design, August 25, 1977, pp. 

26, 29. 

46. Ibid, p. 29. 

47. Washburn, Distant Encounters, op. cit., p. 83. 

48. Ibid. 

49. "Technology: Plutonium Power for Space Exploration," 

New York Times, August 31, 1977. (From DOE archives; 

page number not discernible.) 

50. "Space Nuclear Power Gains Foreseen," Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, October 17, 1977, p. 129. 

51. Program Plan: Office of Special Nuclear Projects (Space 

and Special Radioisotopic Systems Applications, Department of Energy), Revised 6/12/84, p. 13. (From DOE 

archives.) 

52. "Solar-Polar Plans Advance Despite PuUout by NASA," 

Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 28,1981, 

p. 12. 

53. "Space . . . Power Gains . . .," Aviation Week. . ., op. cit, 

p. 129. 

54. Nuclear Electric Power For Space Systems: Technology 

Background And Flight Systems Program by Gary L. Bennett, James J. Lombardo, and Bernard J. Rock, Space and 

Terrestrial Systems Division, U.S. Department of Energy) 

paper delivered at 16th Intersociety Energy Conversion 

Engineering Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, August 9-14, 

1981, p. 3. 

55. See HoU, op. cit., p. 8. 

56. Ibid. 

57. "Technology's Brighter Image," Machine Design, July 24, 

1980, p. 67. 

58. "NASA Moves to Salvage Planetary Program," Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, November 2, 1981, p. 16. 
59. "Science Academy Asks Caution In Research, Development Cuts," Axnation Week & Space Technology, November 2, 1981, p. 16. 

60. "Better Than Nothing" (by William H. Gregory), Aviation 

Week & Space Techology, July 12, 1982, p. 13. President 

Reagan quoted from Public Papers of the Presidents of the 

United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982, Boo/c//(Washington: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 892. 

CHAPTEH VIII 

1. Personal interview with Jerry Soffen. 

2. Personal interview with Rod Mills. 

3. Personal interviews with Vincent Truscello and Gerald 

Stapfer. 

4. Personal interview with Guy Linkous. 

5. Personal interview with Bob Carpenter. 

6. Holl, op. cit, pp. 9-10. 

7. Ibid, p. 10. 

8. Personal interview with Bernard Rock. 

9. Program Plan: . . . 6/12/84, op. cit, p. 3. 

10. Ibid, p. 6. 

11. Personal interview with Bernard Rock. 

12. See, for example, "Bean-Counting the Solar System" (by 

William H. Gregory), Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

December 14, 1981, p. 11. 

13. Washburn, Distant Encounters, op. cit, p. 262; citation of 

project scientist, ibid. 
Time Period 

1896 

1913 

1945 

July August 1945 

June July 1946 

August 1946 

Jan 1947 

Oct 1947 

1948 1952 

July 1950 

1951 

1952 

Nov 1952 

July 195^ 

Dec 1953 

Aug 1954 

MI'leu-Defining Events Institutional Events 

First A bomb detonated at Alamogordo Hiroshima and 

Nagasaki bombs dropped Atomic Age begins 

Operation Crossroads conducted at Bikini 

U S conducts numerous atomic tests m Pacific & Nevada 

Soviets detonate their first A bomb in 1949 first U S test of 

expenmental thermonuclear device at Eniwetok m 1952 

Eisenhower elected President 

Eisenhower delivers Atoms for Peace speech before U N 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives added impetus to develop 

ment of peacetime atomic uses & pnvate development of 

reactors 

ABC established by Atomic Energy Act 

AEC begins operations under David E Lilienthal 

AEC appoints Industnal Advisory Group to investigate 

peaceful uses of atomic energy 

Gordon Dean becomes chairman of AEC 

Lewis Strauss becomes head of AEC 

Technical Events & Developments 

H Becquerel discovers radioactivity 

H G J Moseley reports construction of first nuclear battery 

Nuclear battery (of Lebanov & Beliakov) generates 10 ^ 

amps device built by P H Miller using PO 210 

AEC lets senes of contracts to study 1 kw electncal space 

power plant using reactors or isotopes 

RAND issues Project Feedback report discussing radioiso 

topic power for space Several companies recommend using 

isotopes for space power as result of AEC contracts 

m 

z 

D 

> 

o 

o 

z 

Q 

< 

1954 KC Jordan&JH Birden build nuclear thermoelectnc gen 

erator at Mound Laboratory 

H-i 
July 1955 Eisenhower proposes "Open Skies"policy for mutual aenal 

inspection dunng Geneva Summit 

Aug 1955 

Feb 1956 

Mar 1956 

Juiy 1956 

Nov 1956 

Oct 1957 

Nov 1957 

July 1958 

Aug 1958 

Nov 1958 Sept 1961 

Jan 1959 

May 1960 

Oct 1960 

Nov 1960 

Feb 1961 

Mar 1961 

Space nuclear auxiliary power program begins m Joint 

AEC/DOD Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Office 

AEC makes available 20,000 kilograms of U-235 for use in 

power and research reactors abroad and 20 (XX) kilograms 

for power reactors in U S 

Eisenhower re-elected 

Soviets launch Sputnik Name "Pied Piper' (AF code name 

for 117L} compromised by Amotion Weefc article 

Eisenhower announces moratonum on weapons testing (to 

begin Oct 31} 

U S Great Bntam. & U S S R agree to moratonum on 

atmosphenc nuclear testing 

Eisenhower reveals existence of plutonium fuel (by product of 

weapons development} for spacecraft 

Summit conference broken up by U-2 incident 

Kennedy elected President 

AF advanced reconnaissance system designated WS-117L 

President's Science Advisory Committee created 

John McCone becomes chairman of AEC NASA established 

T Keith Glennan appointed first administrator of NASA 

Joint AEC/NASA Nuclear Propulsion Office created with 

Harold Finger as head 

James E Webb becomes head of NASA 

Glenn Seaborg named AEC chairman atomic regulatory 

function placed under AEC Director of Regulations 

Upon DOD request AEC begins work on nuclear auxiliary 

power system (reactor and RTG} for USAF uses 

AEC low-level effort undertaken by Martin Baltimore for 

isotope-fuel space power unit for military satellite 

AEC proceeds with development of heat source for WSn 7L 

New unclassified title of 'SNAP" authorized to refer to AEC's 

work on Space Nuclear Auxiliary Power 

Martin Company and AEC demonstrate SNAP 3B to president 

May 1961 Kennedy gives special message to Congress committing U S 

to reach the Moon "before decade is out" 
June 1961 SNAP 3 A orbits successfully on Navy TRANSIT 4A naviga 

bonal satellite 

Sept 1961 

Nov 1961 

Feb 1962 

Apn! 1962 

June 1962 

July 1962 June 1963 

Oct 1962 

Aug 1963 

Sept 1963 

Nov 1963 

Dec 1963 

Apnl 1964 

Aug 1964 

Nov 1964 

Dec 1964 

1965 1970 

Soviets break nuclear test moratonum Kennedy orders re 

sumption of underground testing 

John Glenn becomes first U S astronaut to orbit the earth 

Kennedy authonzes resumption of atmosphenc testing 

Undei^ound tests conducted in Nevada 

Cuban Missile Cnsis 

Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signing by U S Great 

Bntain & U S S R 

Kennedy assassinated Lyndon Johnson becomes President 

Gulf of Tonkin resolution begins heavy U S involvement 

in Vietnam Johnson signs Pnvate Ownership of Special 

Nuclear Matenals Act 

Johnson elected President 

U S involvement m Vietnam increases cnticism of govern 

ment and protests about nuclear safety begins to place stress 

on space budgets 

Office of Science & Technology created in Executive Office 

of President 

AEC issues permit to construct Oyster Creek power plant— 

first civilian reactor built on competitive basis without gov 

emment assistance 

Second SNAP 3 A orbits successfully on Navy TRANSIT 

4B navigational satellite 

SNAP 9 A orbits successfully on Navy TRANSIT 5BN 1 

navigational satellite 

Second SNAP 9 A orbits successfully on Navy TRANSIT 

5BN 2 navigational satellite 

Third SNAP 9 A launched on Navy TRANSIT 5BN 3 mis 

sion aborted (SNAP burned up on re entry) 

^ 

cn 
Apnl 1965 

June 1965 

Nov 1965 

Jan 1967 

Mar 1967 

Feb 1968 

Apnl 1968 

May 1968 

June 1968 

July 1968 

Oct 1968 

Nov 1968 

Dec 1968 

Jan 1969 

Mar 1969 

Apnl 1969 

July 1969 

Nov 1969 

Jan 1970 

SNAP 10 (reactor) successfully achieves orbit 

Fire on APOLLO at Cape Kennedy delays lunar program 

Tet offensive m Vietnam 

M L King Jr assassinated 

Robert F Kennedy assassinated 

Treaty for Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons signed 

Nixon elected President 

APOLLO 8 orbits Moon 

APOLLO 11 lands on Moon 

Harold Finger heads new Space Nuclear Systems Division of 

AEC 

Finger decentralizes many space nuclear functions to labor 

atones 

Harold Finger receives new permanent assignment at NASA 

replaced m AEC and RTG program roles by Milton Klein 

James Webb retires as administrator of NASA 

Council on Environmental Quality established 

Thomas O Paine becomes NASA administrator 

Russell Train appointed chairman of Council on Environ 

mental Quality first report of Council submitted to Congress 

m August 1970 

SNAP 19B2 launched on NIMBUS B 1 weather satellite 

mission aborted heat source retneved 

Official decision made not to use SNAP device on first 

APOLLO lunar landing 

SNAP 19B3 launched on NIMBUS 111 successfully achieves 

orbit 

SNAP 27 device successfully placed on lunar surface on 

APOLLO 12 mission 
Mar 1970 Treaty for Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ratified by 

U S Great Bntain USS R & 45 other nations 

Apnl 1970 

May 1970 

July 1970 

Jan 1971 

June 1971 

July 1971 

Aug 1971 

Nov 1971 

Feb 1972 

Mar 1972 

Apnl 1972 

May 1972 

Sept 1972 

Nov 1972 

Dec 1972 

Millions participate in first Earth Day anti pollution dem 

onstrations APOLLO 13 mission aborted on way to Moon 

Campus unrest and Kent State killings follow president s 

announcement of Cambodian incursion 

SNAP 27 heat source returned to Tonga Trench m ( 

Pacific 

President Nixon visits China pledges normalization of re!a 

tions 

President Nixon visits USS R holds summit talks and signs 

SALTl 

Nixon re elected President 

Environmental Protection Agency and National Oceanic & 

Atmosphenc Administration created 

President proposes new Department of Natural Resources 

James R Schlesinger becomes chairman of AEC replacing 

Seaborg 

David Gabne! replaces Milton Klein as director of Space 

Nuclear Systems Division 

SNAP 27 device successfully placed on lunar surface on 

APOLLO 14 

SNAP 27 device successfully placed on lunar surface on 

APOLLO 15 

SNAP 19 device successfully launched on PIONEER 10 to 

Jupiter and beyond 

SNAP 27 device successfully placed on lunar surface on 

APOLLO 16 

TRANSIT RTG device successfully orbits on Navy TRIAD 

01 IX navigational satellite 

SNAP 27 device successfully placed on lunar surface on 

APOLLO 17 ^ ^ 
Jan 1973 

Feb 1973 

Mar 1973 

Apnl 1973 

June 1973 

Summer 1973 

Oct 1973 

Nov 1973 

Dec 1973 

May 1974 

Aug 1974 

Oct 1974 

North and South Vietnam and U S sign peace treaty offic 

tally ending Vietnam conflict and U S involvement 

Last G!s leave Vietnam 

Joint AEC NASA Space Nuclear Systems Office dissolved Major cutbacks made in nuclear rocket propulsion & space 

reactor programs 

Dixy Lee Ray designated AEC chainnan 

National Energy Office established m Executive Office of the SNAP 19 device successfully launched on PIONEER 11 to 

President Jupiter Saturn and beyond 

Watergate heanngs held m Washington 

Yom Kippur War Arab OPEC countnes embargo oil sales to 

U S 

President Nixon calls for Project Independence (re energy) 

Gerald Ford sworn in as vice president following resignation 

of Spiro Agnew 

President Nixon resigns Vice President Ford becomes Pres 

ident 

President proposes to Congress a Department of Energy & 

Natural Resources & an independent Energy Research & 

Development Administration (ERDA} 

President establishes Energy Research and Development 

Advisory Council 

Federal Energy Office established 

Federal Energy Administraton Act establishes Federal Energy 

Administration incorporating Federal Energy Office 

Ford signs Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolishing 

AEC and establishing ERDA and Nuclear Regulatory Com 

SNAP 19 powers PIONEER 10 in its fly by of Jupiter 

Dec 1974 

Jan 1975 

Apnl 1975 

Aug 1975 

Sept 1975 

SNAP 19 powers PIONEER 11 m its fly by of Jupiter 

South Vietnam falls to North Vietnamese 

ERDA activated Robert Seamans Jr named administrator 

RTG programs become part of new Division of Nuclear 

Research and Applications 

SNAP 19 device successfully launched on VIKING 1 mission 

to Mars 

SNAP 19 device successfully launched on VIKING 2 mission 

to Mars 
Mar 1976 MHW devices successfully orbit on LES 8/9 DOD communi 

cation satellites 

May 1976 

July Aug 1976 

Mars landings 

Nov 1976 

Apnl 1977 

Aug 1977 

Sept 1977 

Oct 1977 

Jan 1978 

ERDA assumes responsibility for managing Clinch River 

Breeder Reactor 

SNAP 19 devices successfully power VIKINGs 1 and 2 m 

Carter elected President 

President announces U S will defer reprocessing of spent 

reactor fuel indefinitely delays Clinch River development 

President proposes a Cabinet level Department of Ener^ 

(DOE) 

Energy Reorganization Act creates DOE abolishing ERDA MHW device successfully launched on VOYAGER 2 mission 

Federal Energy Administration and Joint Committee on to Jupiter Saturn and beyond 

Atomic Energy 

MHW device successfully launched on VOYAGER 1 mission 

to Jupiter Saturn and beyond 

DOE activated James Schlesinger nominated as first Secre 

tary of Energy 

Soviet spy satellite containing nuclear reactor breaks up over 

northwest Canada 

Mar 1978 

Jan 1979 

Mar 1979 

July 1979 

Aug 1979 

Sept 1979 

Nov 1979 

Nov 1980 

Nuclear Non Proliferation Act authonzes president to pursue 

international studies on proliferation of nuclear matenals 

Revolution forces Shah of Iran to flee 

Three Mile Island accident 

U S embassy hostages seized in Iran 

Ronald Reagan elected President 

MHW successfully powers VOYAGER 1 fly through of Jo 

vian system 

Charles Duncan Jr named Secretary of Department of MHW successfully powers VOYAGER 2 fly through of Jo 

Energy vian system 

SNAP 19 successfully powers PIONEER 10 in Saturn fly by 

MHW successfully powers VOYAGER 1 in rendez vous with ^ 

Satumian system \0 
Jan 1981 

Feb 1981 

Aug 1981 

Oct 1981 

Reagan presents "Amenca's New Beginning A Program for 

Economic Recovery" to Congress 

Reagan announces nuclear energy policy proposes acceler 

ated deployment of methods for stonng high-level radioac 

tive waste lifts ban on commercial reprocessing of nuclear 

fuel 

James B Edwards named Secretary of Department of Energy 

Edwards announces major reorganization of DOE creates Energy Policy Task Force 

O 

MHW successfully powers VOYAGER 2 m rendez vous with 

Satumian system 
TABLE B. TABLE OF ISOTOPE SYSTEMS IN SPACE 

Power 

Source 

SNAP-3A 

SNAP-3A 

SNAP-9A 

SNAP-9A 

SNAP-9A 

SNAP-19B2 

SNAP-19B3 

SNAP-27 

SNAP-27 

SNAP-27 

SNAP-27 

SNAP-19 

SNAP-27 

TransitRTG 

SNAP-27 

SNAP-19 

SNAP-19 

SNAP-19 

MHW 

Sponsoring Agency 

and Spacecraft 

Navy-Transit 4A 

Navy-Transit 4B 

Navy-Transit-5BN-1 

Navy-Transit-5BN-2 

Navy-Transit-5BN-3 

NASA-Nimbus-B-1 

NASA-Nimbus-III 

NASA-Apollo 12 

NASA-ApoUo 13 

NASA-Apollo 14 

NASA-Apollo 15 

NASA-Pioneer 10 

NASA-Apollo 16 

Navy-'Transit" 

(TRIAD-01-lX) 

NASA-Apollo 17 

NASA-Pioneer 11 

NASA-Viking 1 

NASA-Viking 2 

AF-LES 8 

Mission Type 

Navigational 

Navigational 

Navigational 

Navigational 

Navigational 

Meteorological 

Meteorological 

Lunar 

Lunar 

Lunar 

Lunar 

Planetary 

Lunar 

Navigational 

Lunar 

Planetary 

Mars 

Mars 

Communications 

Launch Date 

June 29, 1961 

Nov. 15, 1961 

Sept. 28, 1963 

Dec. 5, 1963 

April 21, 1964 

May 18, 1968 

April 14, 1969 

Nov. 14, 1969 

April 11, 1970 

Jan. 31, 1971 

July 26, 1971 

Mar. 2, 1972 

April 16, 1972 

Sept. 2, 1972 

Dec. 7, 1972 

April 5, 1973 

Aug. 20, 1975 

Sept. 9, 1975 

Mar. 14, 1976 

Outcome 

Successfully achieved orbit 

Successfully achieved orbit 

Successfully achieved orbit 

Successfully achieved orbit 

Mission aborted; burned up on re-entry 

Mission aborted; heat source retrieved 

Successfully achieved orbit 

Successfully placed on lunar surface 

Mission aborted on way to Moon; heat source 

returned to South Pacific Ocean 

Successfully placed on lunar surface 

Successfully placed on lunar surface 

Successfully operated to Jupiter and beyond 

Successfully placed on lunar surface 

Successfully achieved orbit 

Successfully placed on lunar surface 

Successfully operated to Jupiter, Saturn, and 

beyond 

Successfully landed on Mars 

Successfully landed on Mars 

Successfully achieved orbit 

m 

o 

X 

o 

m 

< 

H 

m 

> 

n 

m 

Oi 
MHW AF-LES 9 Communi- Mar. 14, 1976 Successfully achieved orbit 

cations 

MHW NASA-Voyager 2 Planetary Aug. 20, 1977 Successfully operated to Jupiter, Saturn, and 

beyond 

MHW NASA-Voyager 1 Planetary Sept. 5, 1977 Successfully operated to Jupiter, Saturn, and 

beyond 
153 

APPENDIX C. BUDGETS FOR THE RTG PROGRAM 

TABLE C: BUDGETS FOR THE RTG PROGRAM* 

(Figures in thousands of dollars) 

1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 

46 485 1,890 3,526 2,386 1,170 4,189 11,279 27,260 28,643 

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 

37,158 48,154 35,516 29,703 20,645 18,294 16,372 29,030 27,900 27,272 

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 

25,085 29,137 24,100 34,000 33,700 36,000 34,246 37,962 27,735 27,950 

Explanation of Budget Figure Aggregations 

The space RTG program existed under many organizational names and 

within many organizational configurations. Therefore, it is not readily identifiable as a single, separate entity through the years since 1956. In preparing the 

budget figures and plottings for APPENDIX C, the following procedures were 

followed to identify dollar amounts that could be said to represent allocations to 

the "Space RTG Program": 

' for the years 1956-1972, subtotals were obtained from budgets for 

"Space Electric Power Development" at the AEC. The specific line 

items included to arrive at the program totals were: "Radioisotopes," 

"Power Conversion Technology," "Space Nuclear Safety," and "Isotope Fuel Development." "Isotope Fuel Development" did not appear 

as a budget item until 1962. 

• for the years 1973-1974, two items were taken from the "Space electric 

Power Program" budgets: "Total Isotope Systems Operating" funds 

and "Total Radioisotope Systems Equipment" funds. 

• for 1975, two items were taken from the "Space Nuclear Systems 

Program" budget: "Total Space Electric Power Operating" funds and 

"Total Space Electric Power Equipment" funds. 

• for 1976 and 1977, three items were taken from the "Nuclear Research 

and Applications Program" budgets: "Total Space Applications Operating, " "Space Applications Capital Equipment," and "Advanced Isotope Separation Technology Capital Equipment" funds. 
• for 1978 and 1979, totals for "Space and Terrestrial Applications 

Operating Expenses" "Space and Terrestrial Applications Capital 

Equipment" were used, but from each of these totals, sub-items for 

" Terrestrial Isotope Applications" were subtracted. In 1978, the latter 

amount was substantial for "Operating," $4,400 thousand; but in 1979, 

the figure on this item was $4,300 thousand. 

• for 1980-1982, subtotals under "Advanced Nuclear Systems" were 

taken for "Space and Terrestrial Applications Operating Expenses" and 

". . . Capital Equipment," and the sub-item " Terrestefa/Isotope Applications" was subtracted, amounting to $2,000 to $2,700 thousand in 

each of those years. 

• for 1983-1985, subtotals under "Advanced Nuclear Systems" were 

taken for "Space and Special Applications Operating Expenses" and 

". . . Capital Equipment," and the sub-item "Special Applications" 

(described as heavily terrestrially-oriented) was subtracted. This item 

amounted to -0- in 1983 and $1,000 thousand in 1984 and 1985. 

Dollars 

(1000) 

50—j > 

•55 '60 '65 7 0 '75 '80 '85 

Years 

Figure C-1 RTG budget fluctuations 
155 

APPENDIX D. CHANGES IN ORGANIZATIONAL 

LOCATIONS OF THE RTG PROGRAM 

During the years 1955-1982, the location of the RTG program within 

government agencies changed from time to time. (See organization charts in 

Figs. D-1 to D-7. 

AEC 

Division of 

Reactor 

Development 

1955-1960 

ANPO* 

1 

AF 

1 Deputy 

Chief of Staff 

for R&D 

Missile 

Projects 

Branch 

i 

Rocket Section 

Rover 

i Ramjet Section 

1 Pluto 

1 

Auxiliary Power 

Section 

SNAP 

1 

5 

j RTGs 

Martin Co 

1 Contracts | 

Aircraft 1 

Projects 1 

Branch f 

Reactor Power 

Atomics Int! 

Figure D-1 

* Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Office (Joint AEC/AF). 
156 

1961-1965 

(As of August 1960) 

AEC 

Division of 

Reactor 

Development 

Launch Vehicle 

Programs 

SNPC 

SNAP 

Branch 

Project Rover 

RTC 

Office 

Reactor 

Power Office 

Figure D-2 

*Space Nuclear Propulsion Office (Joint AEC/NASA). 

1965-1972* 

Safety Branch 

AEC 

Assistant 

General Manager 

for Reactors 

Space Nuclear 

Systems 

Division 

Space Eiectnc 

Power 

Office 

Isotope Power 

Branch 

NASA 

Associate Administrator 

for 

Advanced Research 

& Technology 

SNPO 

Nuclear Systems 

&. Space Power 

Division 

Reactor Power 

Branch 

Figure D-3 

*After creation of Space Nuclear Systems Division at AEC. There were 23 divisions at the 

Commission at this time. 
157 

1973-1974* 

AEC 

Division of 

Space Nuclear 

Systems 

Assistant Director 

for 

Safety & Reliability 

Isotope 

Technology 

Branch 

Assistant Director 

for 

Requirements 

& Applications 

Isotope 

Technology 

& Applications 

Branch** 

Figure D-4 

*After dissolution of Joint AEC/NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office. 

**Earlier divided into Reactor Power Systems Branch & Power Conversion Branch. 
1975-1977 

ERDA 

Assistant for 

Requirements 

& Applications 

Assistant 

Administrator 

Nuclear Energy* 

Division of 

Nuclear Research 

& Applications 

Office of 

Assistant Director 

Administration, 

Planning & Budget 

Office of 

Isotope 

Separation 

Office of 

Space 

Applications 

Office of 

Reactor 

Programs 

Assistant 

for Safety 

Assistant 

for Army Reactors 

Office of 

Technology 

Development 

& Special Projects 

Office of 

Nuclear 

Assessment 

Figure D-5 

*Other "Assistant Administrators" at ERDA were for. Administration, Conservation; Environment 

and Safety, Field Operations, Fossil Energy; International Affairs, National Security; Planning & 

Analysis, Geothermal & Advanced Energy Systems. 
159 

1978-1981 

DOE 

Assistant 

Secretary for 

Nuclear Energy* 

Office of 

Uranium Ennchment 

& Assessment 

De^ty Ass t S«:retaiy 

for 

Naval Reactors 

Office of 

Reactor Research 

& Technology 

Space Systems 

Team 

Deputy Ass t Secretary 

for 

Nuclear Reactor 

Programs 

Office of 

Coordination 

I Special Projects 

{Other Teams) 

Deputy Ass t Secretary 

for 

Nuclear Waste 

Management 

& Fuel Cyde FVogtams 

Office of 

Nuclear Power 

Systems 

(Other Teams) 

Figure D 6 

*At first the term at this level was Energy Technology, later it became Nuclear Energy Other 

Assistant Secretanes at DOE were for Conservation & Solar Applications, Defense, Environment, 

Intergovernmental & Institutional Affairs, International Affairs, Policy & Evaluation Resource 

Application 
1982* 

DOE 

Assistant Secretary 

for 

Nuclear Energy 

Office of Con 

version Reactor 

Development 

Office of Ter 

minal Waste Disposal & Remedial 

Action 

Deputy Ass't 

Secretary for 

Uranium Ennch 

m't & Assessm't 

Deputy Ass't 

Secretary for 

Breeder Reactor 

Programs 

Deputy Ass't 

Secretary for 

Naval Reactors 

Office of 

Spent Fuel 

Management 

Office of 

Support Programs 

Office of 

Space Nuclear 

Projects** 

Office of Clinch 

River Breeder 

React Plant 

Office of 

Breeder Facilities 

Office of Breeder Technology 

Projects 

Figure D-7 

*A!though configurations varied somewhat under DOE/Nuclear Energy, just two are shown 

Before and after a reorganization which "flattened" the organization 

**Later this was designated Space & Terrestrial Applications Programs, and then Space & Special 

Applications Programs. 
TABLE E. DEVELOPMENTS IN RTG TECHNOLOGY 

PARAMETERS 

MISSION 

BOM POWER' 

PER RTG, W(E) 

THERMOFI ECTRIC 

MATERIAL 

PU-238 FUEL 

FORM 

CONVERSION 

EFFICIENCY, % 

SPECIFIC POWER 

SNAP-3B 

TRANSIT 4 

2.7 

PBTE 2N/2P 

METAL 

5.1 

1.29 

SNAP-9A 

TRANSIT 5BN 

26.8 

PBTE 2N/2P 

METAL 

5.1 

2.2 

SNAP-19 

PIONEER 

40.3 

PBTE 2N/ 

TAGS-8 

PMC^ 

6.2 

3.0 

SNAP-27 

APOLLO 

73.4 

PBTE 3N/3P 

OXIDE MICROSPHERES 

5.0 

2.3= 

TRANSITRTG 

TRIAD 

35.6 

PBTE 2N/: 

PMC4.2 

2.6 

MHW-RTG GPHS-RTG 

VOYAGER GALILEO 

158.0 292.0 

SIGE SIGE 

PRESSED PRESSED 

OXIDE OXIDE 6.6 

4.2 

6.6 

5.2 

W(E)/KG 

Source Gary Bennett, James J. Lombardo, and Bernard J. Rock, U. S. Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator Space Operating 

Experience (June 1961-December 1982), Paper presented before the 18th Intersociety Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, Orlando, Florida, August 21-26, 1983. 

"Beginning-of-Mission. 

''Plutonia Molybdenum Cermet. (Cermet: a heat-resistant alloy formed by compacting and sintering a metal and a ceramic 

substance.) 

'The SNAP-27 Specific Power is calculated with the mass of the fuel cask included. 

The table above indicates changes and improvements in the RTG technology from early SNAP-3 devices to the GPHS = RTG to 

be used on the GALILEO mission. 

D 

m 

m 

O 

'V 

m 

H > 

^ ^ 

£3 W 

•^ Z 

WD 

gx 

m • 

o 

2 

O 

r 

O O 

< 

a 
162 

Significance of Developments in RTG Technology* 

Essentials of the Technology. An RTG basically consists of a radioisotopic 

heat source and a thermoelectric converter that transforms thermal energy into 

electrical energy through two conductors, made of different metals, which are 

at different temperatures at their point of juncture. The heat results from the 

radioactive decay of plutonium-238, a radioisotope which has a half-life of 

87.8 years. Plutonium-238 fueled all RTGs that flew on U.S. space missions. 

The principal decay process of this radioisotope is by emission of alpha 

particles, which are easily absorbed in the heat source to produce heat and 

require no special shielding. 

Design Type and Trends. The RTG's flown since 1961 can be grouped into 

six basic design concepts—SNAP-3, SNAP-9A, SNAP-19, SNAP-27, 

TRANSIT-RTG, MHW-RTG. The general trend was to improve generator 

performance, efficiency, and specific power (electric power per kg of weight). 

Basic Improvements. Power requirements for missions rose from a few watts 

electric to the 292 W(e) required in the forthcoming Galileo mission. Conversion efficiency rose slightly but specific power improved greatly as lighter 

weight converter materials (Beryllum or aluminum) reduced mass, even as fuel 

loadings increased and high-temperature thermoelectric power-conversion 

materials were introduced. 

Snap-3(B). Each generator in the SNAP-3(B) RTG, which was the first to fly, 

was designed to provide an initial power output of 2.7 W(e). Heat source was 

approximately 52.5 W(t) of encapsulated plutonium-238 metal. Design life 

was five years. The power-conversion subsystem consisted of 27 springloaded, series-connected pairs of PbTe 2N/2P thermoelectric elements operating at a hot-juncture temperature of about 783 K and a cold-juncture 

temperature of about 366 K. This subsystem had a power-conversion efficiency of 5 to 6 percent and specific power of 1.29. 

SNAP 9A. RTGs were adopted for the DOD Transit 5BN-1 and 5BN-2 

satellites because RTGs are inherently radiation-resistant, while solar cells on 

earlier Transits were adversely affected by the 1962 high-altitude nuclear 

explosion. Each SNAP-9A was designed to provide 25 W(e) at a nominal 6V 

for five years in space after one year of storage on Earth. Thermal inventory of 

approximately 525 W(t) was supplied by Pu-238 metal encapsulated in a heat 

*Abstracted from Bennett et al, 1983 paper (op. cit.) and Enhancing 

Technology Leadership: Space . . . (op. cit.), by the same authors. 

W(e) = Watts electric 

W(t) = Watts thermal 

K = Kelvin 
163 

source of six fuel capsules maintained in a segmented graphite heataccumulator block. The main body of the sealed generator was a cylindrical 

magnesium-thorium shell containing six heat-dissipating magnesium fins and 

36 threaded holes; 70 pairs of series-connected PbTe 2N/2P thermoelectric 

couples were assembled in 35 modules of two couples each. Hot-junction 

temperature was calculated at about 790 K at beginning of life. Some waste 

heat from the RTG was used to maintain electronic instruments in the satellite 

at a temperature near 293 K. 

SNAP-19. This technology-improvement program built on the SNAP-9A 

developments. The SNAP-19B power system was designed specifically for 

NASA's Nimbus weather satellites—a first demonstration of RTG technology 

aboard NASA spacecraft. Modifications to SNAP-19B were required to power 

the Pioneer and Viking missions. 

Nimbus/SNAP-19. Specifications required 50 W(e) deliverable after one 

year in orbit. Two SNAP-19B's, with higher fuel loadings than those of 

SNAP-9A, were used on Nimbus III. To meet safety requirements, the Pu-238 

fuel was changed from a metal form to oxide microspheres. Thermoelectric 

elements were made of cold-pressed and sintered PbTe. Each RTG thermopile 

consisted of 90 PbTe 3P/2N couples distributed in six modules of three parallel 

rows of five couples each. Modules were connected in series and enclosed in a 

magnesium-thorium housing. Hot-junction temperature was 800K. The two 

RTG's produced 56 W(e) — 49.4 W(e) usable — at launch and 47 W(e) one 

year later. Unlike the sealed capsules used in SNAP-3B and SNAP-9As, the 

SNAP-19B fuel capsule was vented into the generator. Possible sources of 

power degradation were identified as: rate of argon leakage; replacement of 

argon with helium in fuel decay; oxygen released from the PuO fuel attacking 

the thermoelectric elements and bonds. Design of subsequent RTGs was 

changed to reduce these sources of degradation. 

Pioneer/Snap-19. Improvements for powering the Jupiter fly-by were made 

in the 19B converter, heat source, and structural configuration. A 

TAGS-SnTe/2N* thermocouple was designed with modified electrical circuitry 

to limit the magnetic field from the RTG to very low levels. Fill gas was a 75:25 

helium-argon mixture, with a zirconium getter added to eliminate oxygen in the 

RTG. End covers were bolted and seam-welded to the cylindrical housing to 

further reduce gas leakage. Mission requirement called for four RTGs to 

produce 120 W(e) total at the Jupiter fly-by. Power output at Jupiter encounter 

was 144 W(e) for Pioneer 10 and 142.6 W(e) for Pioneer 11. Estimated 

minimum power requirements for a Saturn fly-by were 90 W(e) and the RTG's 

on Pioneer 11 actually provided 119.3 W(e) at Saturn. 

*TAGS: a solid solution of silver antimony telluride in germanium telluride. 
164 

Viking SNAP-19. Distinctive mission requirements for Viking included hightemperature (400 K) sterilization, storage during the long cruise to Mars, and 

ability to withstand the rapid, extreme temperature changes of the Martian 

day-night thermal cycle. Each Viking Lander used two Snap-19 RTG's modified to meet those requirements. Each RTG was to produce a minimum of 35 

W(e) during a 90-day Mars surface mission following an 11 to 12-month cruise 

after launch. The two series-connected RTGs were the primary power sources 

on each Viking Lander, supplying the energy for scientific instruments and for 

recharging four nickel-cadmium batteries. The RTGs also supplied the Landers 

with thermal energy. All four RTGs more than met the 90-day requirement. 

A modification from Pioneer SNAP-19 was the addition of a dome reservoir. 

Initial fill gas for the converter was a 90:10 helium-argon mixture; the reservoir 

was filled with a 95:5 argon-helium mixture. This configuration permitted a 

controlled interchange of gases in the two volumes to minimize heat-source 

operating temperatures up to launch while maximizing electrical output at the 

end of the mission. Although data-relay capability ended, the RTGs on the 

Viking Landers were still operating when last transmissions were received and 

those on Viking Lander-1 were capable of providing power through 1994. 

In the development of the SNAP-19s, the principal contribution to power 

degradation was judged to come from gas effects. Changes made in SNAP-9A 

and Nimbus SNAP-19 designs significantly minimized the degradation effects 

in the SNAP-19s. 

SNAP-27. The SNAP-27 RTG was developed to power the experiments of 

NASA's Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP). The RTG 

design requirement was to provide at least 63.5 W(e) at 16 V DC one year after 

lunar emplacement. The use of RTGs was a natural choice because of their 

light weight, reliability, and ability to produce full electrical power during the 

long lunar night-day cycle. Since the ALSEPs were to be positioned manually 

by the astronauts, the designers took advantage of this assembly capability: the 

converter and sealed-fuel-capsule were kept separate in the Lunar Module and 

assembled on the Moon. 

SNAP-27 used 442 thermoelectiic couples made of PbTe 3N/3P elements 

arranged in two series strings of 221 couples connected in parallel. Heat from 

the fuel capsule, which was loaded with Pu-238 oxide microspheres and had a 

nominal rating of 1,480 W(t), was transmitted to the hot frame of the RTG by 

radiation coupling. Design analysis and ground tests indicated that the hotjunction temperature was about 866 K and the cold-side thermoelectric 

temperature was maintained at about 547 K in the lunar environment. Both the 

cold frame and the outer case were made of beryllium. Eight cross-rolled 

beryllium fins were attached integrally to the outer case by brazing. The 

converter had a mass of 12.7 kg. The mass of the fuel-capsule assembly. 
165 

without the graphite Lunar Module cask, was about 7 kg. 

Five SNAP-27 powered ALSEPs were placed on the lunar surface. In each 

case, all of the RTGs exceeded their mission requirements in both power and 

life-cycle. All five ALSEPs, powered by RTGs, were operating when NASA 

shut down the stations on 30 September 1977. 

Transit-RTG. The Transit-RTG was developed specifically as the primary 

power source for the DOD TRIAD navigational satellite. Auxiliary power was 

provided by four solar-cell panels and one 6 Ah nickel-cadmium battery. The 

objective of the Transit-RTG program was to produce an RTG capable of 

providing a minimum end-of-mission power of 30 W(e) after five years, at a 

minimum of 3 V. To do this, the 12-sided converter used light-weight PbTe 

thermoelectric panels (Isotec) that operated at a low hot-side temperature of 

673 K in a vacuum, eliminating the need for hermetic sealing and a cover gas to 

inhibit the sublimation of thermoelectric material. The Transit-RTG was designed to be modular; each of the 12 Isotec panels contained 36 PbTe 2N/3P 

couples arranged in a series-parrallel matrix with four couples in a row in 

parallel and nine rows in series. The panels were supported structurally by 12 

webbed, magnesium-thorium corner posts with teflon insulators. The masses 

of the converter and heat source were 5.98 and 4.2 kg respectively. Including a 

titanium heat-source cage and support structure, the Transit-RTG had a mass 

of about 13.6 kg. The short-term objectives of the TRIAD satellite were 

demonstrated, including a checkout of RTG performance; however, a 

telemetry-converter failure caused a loss of further telemetry data. The TRIAD 

satellite continues to operate normally and to provide magnetometer data 

using power from the RTG. 

MHW-RTG. The MHW-RTG was designed to provide a major increase in 

the power output of a space RTG. The DOD Lincoln Experimental Satellites 8 

and 9,required 125 W(e) per RTG, with an output voltage of 30 (± 0.5) V at the 

end of mission — an operational life of at least five years after launch. The 

NASA VOYAGER mission required 128 W(e) per RTG, with an end-ofmission output of 30 (± 0.5) V or an operational life of at least four years after 

launch. To achieve these requirements, the MHW-RTG was equipped with a 

new heat source of 24 pressed plutonium oxide fuel spheres, each producing 

about 100 W(t). Electrical conversion was achieved through 312 silicongermanium (SiGe) thermoelectric couples—high temperature alloys. The 

converter consisted of a beryllium outer case; end-closure structures that 

physically held the heat source; thermoelectric elements; a multifoil 

(molybdenum-Astroquartz) insulation packet and a molybdenum internal 

frame; and a gas-management system. The gas-management system maintained an argon or xenon gas environment to allow partial power operation on 

the launch pad; full-power operation in space was effected by venting the gas 
166 

through a pressure-relief device. The average RTG flight masses were 39.69 kg 

for LES 8/9 and 37.69 kg for Voyager 1/2. The 312 thermoelectric couples 

were arranged in 24 circumferential rows, each row containing 13 couples 

individually bolted to the outer case. The design hot-junction temperature was 

1,273 K with a cold-junction temperature of 573 K. Design voltage was 30 V. 

The peak initial power was 159.6 W(e) for RTG Number 3 on Voyager 2. The 

MHW-RTGs allowed the LES 8/9 satellites to operate beyond the five-year 

operational life; enabled NASA to complete flights to Jupiter and Satum; and 

will enable Voyager 2 to conduct an extended mission to Uranus in 1986. 

CPHS-RTG. The successful performance of the MHW-RTG led to the use of 

SiGe technology for the high-power — 285 W(e) — General Purpose Heat 

Source RTG, which is to be launched in 1986 on the NASA Galileo Mission to 

Jupiter and the International Solar-Polar Mission around the sun. 

Transition to High-Temperature Materials. The use of high-temperature 

SiGe alloys as thermoelectric power-conversion materials was a direct outgrowth of spacecraft requirements for higher RTG power levels and lower RTG 

masses. In general, higher hot-side operating temperature means a high 

efficiency, although the optimum temperature is dictated by the mission life, 

i.e., minimizing sublimation. The cold-side temperature is optimized to obtain 

the desired power-to-mass ratio. To a first approximation, PbTe can be used 

from room temperature to about 900 K before materials properties and the 

figure of merit become concerns. The SiGe alloy can be used from room 

temperature to about 1,300 K and offers the potential of higher power with 

improved efficiency. 
System Efficiency 

(percent) 

System Specific Power 

(watts pound) 

Z CL 

a. H 

'J) 

is > < 

CL ; 

- 2 0 

1969 

1972 

1972 

1975 

1976 

1977 

1983 1986 

YEAR OF APPLICATION 

COMPETING 

Figure E RTG performance demonstrated predicted 

Source Gary L Bennett James J Lombardo and Bernard J Rock Enhancing Technohgical Leadership Space Nuclear Electnc 

Power St^stems Paper delivered at Annual Meeting of the Amencan Astronauticat Society October 20 23 1980 Boston MA 
168 

INDEX 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, 24 

aborts, 18, 36, 38-39, 57, 63, 68, 70, 72, 100 

AEC (Atomic Energy Commission), 1-2, 4-5, 7-10, 12-13, 15-21, 23-26, 

28-30, 33-38, 40-43, 45-46, 56-65, 67-68, 70-71, 73-78, 80-81, 83 

appointment of Seaborg, 19-21 

arrival of Seaborg, 28 

assuming RTG costs, 77 

budgets, 39-40, 56, 59, 72, 81 

cutbacks, 76 

demise of agency, 80-83 

policies, 58, 73-76, 81 

retirement of Seaborg, 75, 83 

Aerojet (Corporation), 40 

Aerospace Nuclear Safety Board, 15, 19 

Agena (stage rocket), 63 

Air Force (U.S.), 8-10, 21, 24, 90-92, 96, 103 

Alamagordo, New Mexico, 1 

"alpha" particles, 37 

ALSEP (Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package), 60, 65-66, 68-69, 76 

American University, 30 

Ames, (NASA, Sunnyvale, Calif.), 51, 62, 77, 79 

Anders, William, 81 

Anderson, Clinton (U.S. Senator), 9 

Anderson, Lt. Col. (USAF), 16, 23, 45 

Andrews AFB, 26 

antinuclear (movement/sentiments), 28, 72-73, 80 

APL (Applied Physics Laboratory), 22-23, 26, 29, 76 

Apollo (total program), 20, 29, 31, 41, 59, 64-71, 76-77, 85, 87, 98 

Extension Systems Program (AAP), 60 

fire at Cape Kennedy, 56, 67 

flagging public interest, 70 

post-plans, 71, 80 

Apollo 8, 56, 67 

Apollo 9, 67 

Apollo 10, 67 

Apollo 11, 68-70 

Apollo 12, 12, 50, 65, 68, 70, 76 

Apollo 13, 56, 69-72 

Apollo 14, 72-74, 76 

Apollo 15, 73, 76 

Apollo 16, 73, 76 

Apollo 17, 73, 76 
Apollo 18, 76 

Apollo 19, 76 

Apollo 20, 76 

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, 85 

argon, 78 

arms control, 31 

Armstrong, Col. Jack (USAF), 4-5, 9, 16, 28, 45 

Armstrong, Neil, 1, 68 

Asteroid Belt, 79 

Astronautics & Aeronautics (journal), 85 

Atlas (vehicle), 19 

Atmosphere 

controlled, 78 

low humidity, 78 

atomic 

age, 3, 5, 33 

battery, 2, 4, 26 

bomb, 7 

energy, 20 

fission, 7 

nucleus, 7 

radiation, 6-7 

revolution, 6 

Atomic Energy Act, 13 

Atomic Industrial Forum, 19, 42 

Atomics International (Div. of N. American Aviation), 12, 75 

"Atoms for Peace," 2, 12-13, 17 

Aviation Week (journal), 9-10, 31, 39, 56, 92 

Bay of Pigs, 23 

Bean, Alan, 50, 68-69 

Becquerel, Henri, 6 

Bendix Corporation, 65 

Bennet, R.D., 35 

Bennett, Gary, 101 

Berkeley (campus, Univ. of Calif.), 19 

beryllium, 66 

Bicentennial (U.S.), 89 

"big" nuclear technologies, 5, 99, 102 

BiPS (Brayton Isotope Power System), 96 

Birden, John, 9 

Bowles, Chester, 26 

"breakthrough" (in RTG technology), 5, 12, 100 

Brouns, Robert, 88 
170 

budget 

battles/crunch, 31-32, 39-41, 56, 71, 92, 96-99 

for AEC, 39-41, 56, 59 

for military, 40, 92 

for NASA, 40, 56, 59-60, 65, 72, 85, 87, 96, 102 

(and shuttle, 85, 103) 

for Pioneer, 77 

for SNAP-27, 65-66 

for RTG program, 59, 81, 99, 105 

for Viking, 87 

Bureau of the Budget, 20 

burn-up, 19, 37-39, 61-62 

Cape Canaveral (or Cape Kennedy), 19, 23, 68-69, 91-92 

Carpenter, Robert, 25-26, 28, 39, 44, 46, 62, 69-70, 77, 85, 87, 92,103-104 

Carter, Jimmy, 84-85 

cell-mercury vapor system, 8 

cerium, 12 

cesium-vapor, 34 

Christmas Island, 30 

Clark, Duncan, 38 

Clinch River Breeder Reactor, 84, 97 

Coast Guard (U.S.), 29, 33 

Congress (U.S.), 15, 20, 22, 28, 31, 39, 59, 66, 80, 83-84, 102, 104 

Connor, Lt. Col. Joseph A., Jr. (USAF), 19 

Conrad, Pete, 68 

conservation, 83 

convertors/conversion, 7, 35, 97, 100, 104 

Cuba, 23-25 

Cuban Missile Crisis, 30 

Curie, (Marie & Pierre), 6 

curies (fuel units), 5, 13, 57, 61, 65, 76, 91 

curium, 34 

Dallas, Texas, 32 

Dassoulas, John, 23, 25-26, 76 

decentralization (of organizations), 57-58, 75 

Defense Depari:ment (U.S.), 2, 5, 9, 11, 18, 23-25, 34-37, 52, 73, 86, 

90-92, 103-104 

Dick, Paul, 47, 62, 80 

dispersion, 39, 62 

Division of Licensing & Regulation, 24, 38 

Division of Nuclear Research & Applications, 85, 95 

Division of Reactor Development, 16-17, 28, 33, 38 
171 

Division of Reactor Safety Research, 83 

Dix, George ("Mike"), 17-18, 36-37, 39, 44, 61, 63, 70, 79, 85, 102 

Dobry, Ted, 101-102 

DOE (Department of Energy, U.S.), 83 

(creation of, 84), 85, 97, 102, 104 

Dryden, Hugh, 20, 59 

dynamic systems (for RTGs), 81, 96, 100, 104 

Edwards AFB, 98 

Edwards, James, 104 

efficiency, 5, 97 (improvement, 104) 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2, 4, 10-14, 17-18, 26, 45 

Eniwetok, 8 

ERDA (Energy Research & Development Administration), (creation, 83) 

(disbanding 84), 85, 92-93, 95 

European Space Agency, 96 

Evening Star (Washington, D.C. newspaper), 4 

executive secretariat (NASA), 20 

Federal Energy Administration, 84 

Federal Radiation Council (standards), 19 

Finger, Harold, 16-17, 36, 42-44, 57-58, 60, 66-67, 75 

Fletcher, James, 81, 85 

Foster, John, 63 

fuel 

capsule (for SNAP-27), 66, 68-70 

costs/funds, 66, 103 

form, 23, 37-38, 61-62, 66, 70, 91 

loads (curies), 57, 61, 64-65, 76, 91, 100 

propellant, 65 

re-use, 64 

sales of isotopes for, 13 

Gabriel, David, 75 

Galileo (mission), 96-98, 101, 103 

General Atomic Corporation, 75 

General Electric Corporation (GE), 34, 65-68, 73, 77, 91, 103 

Glenn, John, 30 

Glennan, T. Keith, 11, 15-16 

"glove box assembly," 78 

GPHS (General Purpose Heat Source RTG), 97 

(conversion efficiency, 97) 

Graham, John, 24 

Grand Tours, 73, 80, 92-94 

graphite, 62, 68, 70, 91 
172 

Great Powers 

confrontations, 8, 30 

joint lunar program, 31-32 

race, 14, 16 

"guns and butter," 40 

gyroscopic action, 12, 96 

half-life, 7, 33, 37 

Hall, Charles, 77-80 

Harris Survey, 97 

hazards, 15-19, 23-25, 35-39, 62, 100 

(radiation near Jupiter, 79-80) 

heat sources, 58, 62, 100, 104 

Hiroshima, 5 

Hodel, Donald, 104 

Holifield, Chet (Congressman), 17 

Humphrey, Hubert H., 59 

hydrogen bomb, 8 

IMP (Interplanetary Monitoring Probe), 29, 33-34 

INSRP (Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel), 37, 61, 85 

international 

affairs/arena, 19 

confrontations, 7, 13, 30 

incident, 25 

iridium, 91 

isotopes, 7-8, 13, 18-20, 23, 28-30, 59 

containment, 24 

power, 18, 28-29, 59 

sales of fuel, 13 

Jaffe, Harold, 78 

James, William (quotation), 84 

"job shop," 74, 101 

Johns Hopkins University, 22, 29 

Johnson, Lyndon B., 27, 39-40 

Joint AEC-DOD (AF) Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Office (ANSPO), 16, 23 

Joint AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Ofice (SNPO), 16, 36, 41, 43, 60 

(dissolution, 75, 85) 

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), 4, 9, 17, 25, 29, 42, 74 

(dissolution, 84) 

Jordan, Kenneth, 9 

JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory), 87, 89, 92-94, 103 

Jupiter, 1, 77-79, 92-95, 103 

communication time to, 94 
encounter by Pioneer, 79-80 

encounter by Voyager, 94-95 

organics on, 94 

pictures from, 94, 105 

use of gravity by spacecraft, 94, 103 

Keirn, Donald J., 45 

Kennedy, John F., 2, 19, 21-22, 25, 30-32 

(assassination, 32) 

Kerr, Tom, 36-37, 39 

Killian, James R., 10-11 

KIPS (Organic Rankine Isotope Power System), 96 

Kistiakowsky, George, 12 

Klein, Milton, 16, 43, 60, 67, 73-75 

Korean War, 8 

Krushchev, Nikita, 31-32 

Laird, Melvin (Congressman), 40 

Landers (Mars), 87-88 

Landsat, 85 

Lapp, Ralph, 17-18 

Latin America, 25 

lead telluride, 66, 91 

LES 8/9, 86, 90-92, 96, 103 

Limited Test Ban Treaty, 31 

Lincoln Laboratory (of MIT), 73, 90-91 

Linkous, Guy, 62-63, 103 

Lockheed Corporation, 10, 40 

Lombardo, James, 101 

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 75, 91 

LM (Lunar Landing Module), 66, 68-70 

(lifeboat use, 69-70) 

Luedecke, A.R., 38 

McAlees, Sam, 63 

McCone, John, 15, 18, 45 

Macmillan, Harold, 31 

McNamara, Robert, 21, 24, 40 

MACS (Medium Altitude Communications Satellite), 34 

Manhati:an Project, 7 

manned (missions), 

(lunar, 2, 46, 56-57, 65-71, 76 

planetary, 71, 80, 102 

"March on Washington," 32 
174 

Mars, 73, 75, 87-90, 92-93, 102 

communication time to, 88 

dust on, 88 

future missions, 102 

geo-chemical observer, 102 

landing, 89 

nights on, 88 

organics (lack of), 89 

oxidizing processes, 89 

winds on, 88 

Martin Company, 5, 12, 17-18, 23-26, 28-29, 34-35, 62, 65, 92, 100 

Martin, James, 87 

MHW (Multi-Hundred-Watt RTG), 73, 77, 86, 91, 93, 96-97 

contract, 77 

conversion efficiency, 97 

microspheres, 61-62, 91 

Millard, William, 66 

Mills, Rodney, 93, 102 

Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. (3M), 5, 12, 28 

MITG (Modular Isotope Thermoelectric Generator), 105 

MJS (Mariner-Jupiter-Saturn mission), 75-76, 93 

molybdenum, 91 

Moon, 2, 4, 21-22, 32, 34, 42, 56, 60, 64-65, 67-72, 76-77, 87 

aborted mission, 69-70 

first landing, 68-69 

orbiting by Apollo, 8, 56 

race to, 22, 60, 67 (climax, 72), 74, 87 

moratorium, 11, 30 

Moseley, H.G.J., 6-7 

Mound Laboratory, 8-9, 12, 29, 64, 66 

Mozambique Channel, 38-39 

Mueller, George E., 67-68 

Nagasaki, 5 

NASA (National Aeronautics & Space Administration), 2, 5, 11, 13-16, 

20-22, 28-30, 33-37, 40-43, 48-61, 63-65, 67, 70-73, 75, 77-78, 80-81, 

85-88, 92-93, 96-98, 102-103, 105 

Act 15 

budgets, 40, 56, 60, 65, 72, 85, 87, 96, 102-103 

changed climate, 102 

Goddard, 63 

Langley, 87-88 

Mission Centers, (role), 57 

policies, 20-21, 58, 64, 75, 80-81 
Webb appointment, 20-21 

Webb retirement, 67 

National Academy of Sciences, 98 

National Aeronautics & Space Council ("Space Council"), 24-25, 27, 39, 41, 

61, 63 

Navy (U.S.), 22, 29, 33, 35, 38, 63, 72-73, 76, 90 

Neptune, 92-93 

NERVA (nuclear engine for rocket vehicle application), 40 

Newell, Homer, 14-15 

New York City (parade for astronauts), 72 

New York Journal American, 26 

New York Times, 25-95 

NIMBUS, 33, 59-64, 72, 77-78 

Nixon, Richard M., 67 

North American Aviation Corporation, 8 

nuclear 

auxiliary power, 2, 10, 16, 18, 24, 41 

battery, 6 

confrontations, 13 

fears, 1, 80, 84 

private development of power, 13 

reactors, 3-4, 7, 9, 13, 19, 33, 41, 62, 75, 80-81, 84 

space power, 2, 33 (possibly forbidden, 76) 

space propulsion, 16, 28, 33, 56, 59, 75, 99 

weapons testing, 8, 11, 30-31 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 83 

Nuclear Rocket Development Station (Nevada), 75 

Nucleonics (journal), 18 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 13 

Ogburn, George, 63, 101 

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, 33 

organizational change, 16, 20, 28-30 (for space-nuclear program, 41-44, 

57-59), 73, 80-86, 99, 101-102, 104-105 

outgassing, 78 

Oval Office, 4, 17 

Pacific Missile Range, 35 

Pacific Ocean, 70 

Paine, Thomas O., 67 

Pasadena, Calif., 23, 87 

Pentagon, 15, 21 

phosphorescence, 6 

"Pied Piper," 9-10, 102 

Pioneer, 73, 77-80, 91 
176 

budget, 77 

Jupiter flyby, 79 

Pioneer 10, 73, 77-80 

Pioneer 11, 51, 73, 78-79 

Pitrolo, Augustine, 65-70, 91 

Pittman, Frank, 28, 33 

Pluto, 92 

Plutonium, 2, 8, 20, 23, 33-35, 37-38, 57, 61-62, 65, 70, 76, 91, 95-96 

dioxide sphere, 91 

metal, 61 

oxide, 61 

PMC (plutonia molybdenum cermet), 91 

political environment, 3, 10-15, 17-22, 25, 37, 60, 72, 102, 105 

polonium, 5-6, 23 

President's Science Advisor, 10 

President's Science Advisory Committee, 10-11 

Press, Harry, 63-64 

Price, Harold, 62 

"Project Feedback," 8 

quiet technology, 2, 6-8, 12-13, 16, 22, 26, 33, 35, 69, 97, 99, 102 

radioactivity, 6-7, 15, 18-19, 24, 36-39, 57, 61, 70, 79-80 

decay, 7, 18 

materials producing, 8, 25, 38, 57, 61 

near Jupiter, 51, 79 

radioisotopes/radioisotopic power, 2-3, 6-9, 12-13, 17-18, 20, 23 

radium, 6 

Ramey, James T., 41 

RAND Corporation, 8 

Ray, Dixy Lee, 83 

Reagan, Ronald, 97-98, 104 

recovery (of lost nuclear sources), 63-64 

re-entry, 18-19, 24, 37-39, 61-63, 66-67, 69-70 

abnormal, 69 

Apollo 13, 69-70 

container/cask for RTG, 66 

intact, 39, 62, 64 

vehicle, 66 

velocities, 67, 69 

regulation, 24, 37-38, 62, 83-84 

research and development, 20, 35, 40-42, 66-67, 73-74, 83, 90, 95-98, 

100, 105 

energy, 97 
177 

lack of funds for, 35 

military, 90-92 

mission requirements and, 41 

organizational, 20 

safety, 83, 100 

technical, 99-100 

Rock, Bernard, 59, 61, 78, 85, 95, 101, 104-105 

rotating machinery (for RTGs), 5, 12, 96, 100 

Rover, 16-17 

RTG (Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generator) 

budget, 59, 81, 99-100, 105 

group/team, 28-30, 42-44, 46, 68, 70, 99-102 

program, (plan, 95-96), (summary, 99-102), (future, 102-105) 

Rusk, Dean, 24 

safety, 3, 15-19, 24, 36-39, 41, 57, 58, 61-64, 66-67, 70, 80, 83, 91-92, 

100-102 

concepts, 39, 57, 60-62, 64, 100 

procedures for clearance, 36 

program, 36-39, 58, 64, 100 

reviews, 18, 36-37, 64 

shuttle and, 80 

testing, 19, 24, 39, 58-59, 62, 64, 66-67 

Sagan, Carl, 94 

Scandia Corporation, 58, 63, 66-67, 75 

San Miguel Island, 63 

Santa Barbara Channel, 49, 63 

Saturn (planet), 1, 54, 79-80, 85, 92-95 

communication time to, 94 

encounter by Voyagers, 95 

pictures from, 95 

rings, 94-95 

use of gravity by spacecraft, 94 

SBSS (Space Based Surveillance Spacecraft), 96 

Schlesinger, James, 83-84 

School of Aerospace Medicine (USAF), 32 

scientific community, 19, 102 

Seaborg, Glenn C , 6, 19-21, 24-27, 33, 38, 41, 46, 63, 67, 75, 83 

appointment to AEC, 19-21 

arrival at AEC, 28 

retirement, 75 

Seamans, Robert, Jr., 20, 59 

Seebeck principle, 9 

selenide, 81, 95 
178 

Senate (U.S.) Senators, 31, 33, 38 

shielding, 23, 36 

shuttle (NASA program/vehicle), 80, 96-98, (and NASA budget, 85, 103) 

silicon germanium, 91, 97 

Simpson, John A., 51 

Smithsonian 

Institution, 76 

Air & Space Museum, 89 

SNAP (Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power) 

Fact Sheet, 33 

program (general), 4, 9-10, 12, 16, 20, 23, 28-30, 41-44, 46, 57-60 

(Report, 41), (plan for future, 104-105) 

SNAP-1, 12 

SNAP-3/3A, 4-5, 12, 17-18, 25-28, 33-34, 36, 45, 61, 72 

SNAP-7 29 33 

SNAP-9A, 33-39, 46-47, 57, 61, 76 

SNAP-11, 29, 34 

SNAP-13, 34 

SNAP-15, 34 

SNAP-19, 48-49, 51, 53, 60-62, 64-65, 73, 77-79, 81, 86, 88, 97 

conversion efficiency, 97 

discontinuance, 81 

feasibility for Apollo, 65 

for Pioneer, 77, (redesign, 78) 

for Viking use, 88 

SNAP-27, 50, 57, 60, 65-70, 72-74, 76-77, 97 

activation on Moon, 50, 65, 68-69 

budget/costs, 65-67 

conversion efficiency, 97 

Soffen, Gerald, 87-89, 102 

software on Voyager, 94 

SOLAR-POLAR, 97, 103-105 

solar power, 18, 41, 61, 64, 76-77, 80, 86, 88, 93 

competition with RTGs, 86 

study for Pioneer, 77 

unsuitability for Viking, 88 

vulnerability, 76 

Solar System Exploration Committee, 98 

South America, 23 

Southeast Asia, 40 

Soviets (Russians), 1, 11, 14, 18, 30-31, 102 (space reactor falling, 84) 

Soviet Union (Russia, U.S.S.R.), 8-11, 26, 32, 38 

space, 

age, 1, 3, 87, 102 
and the atom, 26 

applications, 85-86, 95, 102 

missions, 28-29, 41, 56-57, 72 

(distant, 74), (decline, 85) 

program, 7, 11, 14-15, 21-22, 31-33, 39-40, 56-57, 72-73 (momentum, 

73), 80, 83, 85, 87, 96-98, 102 

race, 1-2, 8, 13, 21-23, 26, 31, 56, 60, 64, 67, 72, 105 

vehicles (craft), 11, 15, 39, 50, 53, 56, 58, 63-64, 68, 78-80, (in foreign 

policy, 85), 87, 88, 90, 93-94, 98 

Space Electric Power Office, 42-44 

Space Nuclear Systems Applications Steering Group, 86, 92 

Space Nuclear Systems Division, 42-44, 57, 60, 73, 75, 77, (budget, 81) 

Special Message to Congress, 22 

Sputnik, 9-11, 14, 98 

Stapfer, Gerhard, 92, 103 

State Department (U.S.), 24-25, 37 

sterilization (of VIKING), 88 

strontium 90, 23, 33-34 

Surveyor (soft lunar landing vehicle/mission), 29, 34, 65 

TAGS (thermoelectric material), 78 

technology, 

criticism of, 72, 97-99 

development (in program), 73-74, 98-100, 104-105 

Moon landing/return as demonstration (Webb), 22 

perceived advantages, 97-98 

readiness (in program), 73-74 

Teledyne Corporation, 47, 62, 77-78, 103 

terrestrial applications, 34, 85-86, 102-103 

test ban, 31 

thermal integration (on Viking), 88 

thermionic, 

conversion, 12 

generation, 34 

space reactor, 75 

thermocouple(s), 5, 8-9, 66, 91, 97, 100 

thermoelectric 

conversion, 9, 64 

material, 64 (TAGS, 78) 

thermopile, 9 

Three Mile Island, 84 

Tonga Trench, 70 

total environment ("larger" environment), 20, 22, 40, 98-102 

Tower, John, (U.S. Senator), 104 
180 

Transit, 22-27, 29, 32, 34, 38, 47, 57, 72-73, 76, 90 

TRIAD-01-lX, 73, 76 

Truman, Harry S., 8, 20 

Truscello, Vincent, 92-93, 103 

TRW, 77-78 

turbine (action), 9, 12, 96 

United Nations, 13, 31 

universities, 21-22 

unstable elements, 7 

uranium, 6-7, 13, 20 

Uranus, 92-94 

Van Allen, James A., 51 

Vandenberg Air Force Base (Pacific Missile Range), 32, 35, 63 

Vanguard, 11, 18 

Venus, 80 

VIKING 

budget, 87 

program, 73, 75, 86-91, 94, 98, 102 

wind screens on, 53, 88 

Viking 1, 53, 86, 89 

Viking 2, 86, 89 

Viking '75, 80-81 

Viking '79, 81, 90 

Von Karman Auditorium, 89, 94 

Voyager, 55, 86, 91-96, 98, 105 

Voyager 1, 86, 93-94 

Voyager 2, 86, 93-94 

Waldron, Philip, 90, 92 

War in Vietnam, 40, 56, 60 

War on Poverty, 40 

Washburn, Mark, 89, 94, 105 

Watergate, 85 

Water vapor (in SNAP 19), 78 

Webb, James E., 20-22, 40, 63-64, 67, 85-86, 98 

appointment to NASA, 20-21 

philosophy/approach, 20-22 

retirement, 67 

significance of race to Moon, 22, 64 

Welsh, Edward C , 41 

Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 12, 40 

White House, 84-85 

Worid War II, 1 

Young, Tom, 87 oU.S. G.P.O. 1987-181-180140304