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45–991 CC 1998

INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY:

COLOMBIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 

REFORM AND OVERSIGHT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 9, 1997

Serial No. 105–72

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT 

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois 

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

STEPHEN HORN, California 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia 

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South 

Carolina 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey 

VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas 

BOB BARR, Georgia 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

TOM LANTOS, California 

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia 

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

GARY A. CONDIT, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, 

DC 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

JIM TURNER, Texas 

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine 

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee 

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

(Independent) 

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director 

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director 

WILLIAM MOSCHELLA, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian 

JUDITH MCCOY, Chief Clerk 

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Chairman 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

BOB BARR, Georgia 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia 

GARY A. CONDIT, California 

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

JIM TURNER, Texas 

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

ROBERT CHARLES, Staff Director 

SEAN LITTLEFIELD, Professional Staff Member 

IANTHE SAYLOR, Clerk 

MICHAEL YEAGER, Minority Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 9, 1997 ................................................................................. 1

Statement of: 

Davidow, Jeffrey, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American 

Affairs, Department of State; Myles Frechette, United States Ambassador to Colombia; Jane E. Becker, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department 

of State; Jim Thessin, Deputy Legal Advisor, Office of Legal Advisor, 

Department of State; Robert Newberry, principal director, Drug Enforcement Affairs, Department of Defense; Donnie Marshall, Chief of 

Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration; and Henry L. Hinton, 

Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, General Accounting Office ............... 12

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: 

Barr, Hon. Bob, a Representative in Congress from the State of Geogia: 

Article dated July 8 from La Nacion ....................................................... 103

Draft Memorandum of Understanding: End Use Monitoring ................ 131

Letter dated July 7, 1997 ......................................................................... 108

Letters dated June 13, 1997, June 26, 1997, and June 6, 1997 ............ 125

Title 31 U.S.C. Section 716 ....................................................................... 105

Becker, Jane E., Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State: ...............

Information concerning Boston Whaler riverine patrol craft ................ 119

Information concerning delivery of the C–26 aircraft ............................ 120

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 44

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 147

Davidow, Jeffrey, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American 

Affairs, Department of State, prepared statement of ................................ 15

Frechette, Myles, United States Ambassador to Colombia, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 28

Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: 

Letter dated June 5, 1997 ........................................................................ 10

Letters dated October 1, 1996, and March 20, 1997 .............................. 93

Hastert, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, prepared statement of ................................................................ 5

Hinton, Henry L., Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, General Accounting 

Office, prepared statement of ....................................................................... 72

Marshall, Donnie, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 59

Newberry, Robert, principal director, Drug Enforcement Affairs, Department of Defense, prepared statement of ..................................................... 54

Thessin, Jim, Deputy Legal Advisor, Office of Legal Advisor, Department 

of State, prepared statement of ................................................................... 52

(1)

INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY: 

COLOMBIA 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 1997 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:10 p.m., in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Dennis Hastert 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Hastert, Mica, Shadegg, Barr, Barrett, 

Blagojevich, Cummings, and Turner. 

Ex officio present: Representative Burton. 

Also present: Representative Gilman. 

Staff present: Robert Charles, staff director; Sean Littlefield, professional staff member; Ianthe Saylor, clerk; Michael Yeager, minority counsel; and Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk. 

Mr. HASTERT. The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice will now come to order. Over 

the Memorial Day work period I was joined by Mr. Souder, Mr. 

Blagojevich, Mr. Barr, and Mr. Sanford on a counternarcotics factfinding mission to the Andean drug-producing region of Colombia, 

Bolivia, and Peru. 

We spent 10 days in the jungles where cocaine is produced and 

on the rivers where it’s transported. We experienced first-hand the 

ongoing efforts of the United States and the host nations to combat 

narcotrafficking. We witnessed what has become of the current levels of U.S. support and what could be done with additional support. 

Clearly it’s paramount if we intend to be serious about the war 

on drugs that we make every possible effort to stop these poisons 

before they cross our border. Today’s hearing on Colombia will explore a number of issues related to the United States support for 

Colombian counternarcotics efforts. 

In February, this subcommittee conducted a hearing focusing on 

the United States counternarcotics assistance to Colombia and the 

extraordinary efforts of Colombians, especially the antinarcotics 

units of the Colombian national police, led by Colonel Gallego, to 

halt cocaine and heroin at their main source. 

Before us sat General Jose Serrano, director of the Colombian 

national police, and General Harold Bedoya, commander of the Colombian military chiefs. At that time and today, these men are engaged in the life and death struggle to win a war against the 

narcotraffickers. 

2

The truth is, they need our help. We’ve had the modest equipment and resources they need to turn the drug war around. In my 

view the lack of adequate support by our administration is inexcusable. The drug war can be won. And it is our moral obligation to 

give the Colombians the basic means to achieve that end, not just 

to save their nation, but to save our children as well. 

The facts are incontrovertible. And the obstruction of United 

States antidrug aid to Colombia by our own State Department is 

in my view almost unforgivable. It’s arguably costing thousands of 

lives in both Colombia and the United States. The Colombian national police vitally need the antidrug aid the United States Congress made available and which the United States State Department has apparently held back. 

The Colombian national police are locked in a genuine war 

against the narcotraffickers and the guerrillas who support them. 

Evidence of the danger the police and military face was clear this 

past week with the guerrillas shooting down a Russian-made MI–

17 helicopter, killing the 29 Colombian military on board. 

There should be no mistake: the guerrillas of Colombia long ago 

abandoned ideology. They work hand in hand with the international drug traffickers, providing security, cultivating crops, and 

manning the cocaine labs. These narcoguerrillas engage in some of 

the most ruthless and reckless behavior in our hemisphere. They 

kidnap and kill innocents, including American citizens, six of whom 

are currently being held hostage as we speak. They kill with indifference, and they sustain their carnage with drug money provided 

by American consumers and we think to the tune of almost $6 million a month. 

Our February panel also included Ambassador Robert Gelbard, 

former Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs. Ambassador Gelbard pledged that if Colombia 

were decertified for the second year in a row serious consideration 

would be given to granting them either a national interest waiver 

or a 614 Presidential waiver. Moreover, an additional promise was 

made to Congress that the waiver would swiftly be issued if Colombia were decertified. 

Either of these waivers would free up much-needed assistance to 

Colombian counternarcotics efforts. However, despite the administration’s decision to decertify Colombia for a second year, the national interest waiver was denied and the 614 waiver has yet to be 

finalized. Last Monday, however, the Department of State formerly 

announced to the Senate and the House authorizers and appropriators that the 614 process is being undertaken. 

I applaud this action. But I remain disappointed that it has been 

over 4 months since the decertification decision has been made before final consultation processes commenced. 

Over this past weekend both the Colombian military and Colombian national police experienced heavy casualties. More than 30 

Colombian soldiers and at least 5 Colombian national police officers 

were murdered by the guerrillas, with more than 100 wounded during these missions. Additionally, a helicopter was shot down in that 

battle. 

The administration has been promising to release rapid fire 

miniguns to protect Colombian national police helicopters during 

3

the missions like this for more than 3 years. Tragically, as with the 

614 waiver, this subcommittee has been told many different conflicting stories by the administration as to the availability and location of the miniguns. 

These excuses beg the question: How many poor people have to 

die before somebody owns up to its commitments to the Congress 

and to the brave soldiers trying to stop drugs in Colombia and, incidentally, stopping drugs from going into this country? 

Today we’re going to ask the administration why the 614 waiver, 

although apparently now underway, has taken so long to be granted. From Ambassador Myles Frechette to the State Department to 

the White House to the National Security Council, this subcommittee has received a dizzying array of conflicting excuses and 

stories as to why the 614 waiver still remains unsigned. 

That is why we have assembled the panel before us. The lifesaving assistance that we can and should provide to the Colombian 

national police will almost certainly result in substantially less cocaine and heroin heading toward the streets and schools of American cities and towns. 

It will provide much-needed protection for the CNP officers—the 

Colombian national police. Today, the Colombian national police is 

operating on a shoestring budget that affords them with less than 

2 weeks’ ammunition and insufficient tools and spare parts for helicopters’ repair and maintenance. These brave men and women are 

staring down death every day. 

Today, we will ask ask Ambassador Frechette why the DEA 

agents that Congress appropriated in fiscal year 1997 still have not 

been placed in Colombia. Last year Congress specifically earmarked 15 DEA personnel for Colombia, of which 11 are to be special agents. 

And since January 1997, a request for 11 DEA special agents, 8 

in Bogota and 3 in Barranquilla, and at least 4 support positions 

have been pending. Ambassador, we’re going to ask whether those 

blessings are there and the state approval to start approval is apparent. 

For this total Ambassador Frechette approved staffing increases 

for only four positions in Bogota. This was after our codel raised 

serious questions during our stop in Bogota. Four positions for Bogota country office and three positions for Barranquilla resident office are pending approval despite the well-established need. 

It appears that, Ambassador, you may have intentionally circumvented the intent of Congress with this and other issues. And 

this subcommittee demands an explanation of these actions. 

We will also ask the Department of State why the General Accounting Office, in conducting this review of counternarcotics assistance to Colombia, has encountered numerous obstacles and impediments which have negatively impacted the GAO’s ability to 

provide Congress with timely and accurate examination of drug 

control efforts in Colombia. GAO officials have informed this subcommittee that the Department has created a bureaucratic document screening that has delayed the release of documents requested as far back as April. 

Moreover, the Department continues to withhold documents requested from the United States Embassy in Colombia. The GAO is 

4

the investigative arm of the Congress, and as such enjoys certain 

privileges with regards to obtaining information from any agency 

in a timely manner. 

Ambassador, I may remind you that you said that we should 

have privy to any of those documents that you had numbered and 

provided to us. 

And finally, we’ve asked the Department of Defense to come before us today to discuss their proposal as part of the defense authorization process to provide Colombia with the riverine assets. 

These assets will counter the narcotrafficking shift from air transport to riverine transport by applying additional pressure to these 

routes. The air bridge, once unstoppable, has been shut down. And 

because of this, the rivers are new routes for narcotrafficking. 

The overwhelming majority of cocaine and heroin that leaves the 

shores of Colombia by air and by sea is headed straight for the cities and towns of our Nation. And the largest population for the 

growing and diversifying drug cartels is mainly our youth. As I 

have said before and will say again, the internationally driven drug 

onslaught is the most insidious national security threat we face as 

a Nation. This is why it’s so vital that we provide ample counternarcotics support of those people who are willing to help us. And 

namely in this situation it’s the Colombian national police and the 

Colombian military. 

These heroic and largely unknown men fight a death to death 

struggle every day, not only for Colombia’s survival but for ours 

and our children’s as well. 

And before I turn to Mr. Barrett for his opening statement, I 

would like to recognize the recent efforts in the Colombian Congress to pass a constitutional amendment which would be the first 

step toward implementing extradition between Colombia and the 

United States. We applaud these attempts, Colombia’s efforts to 

date. And we know that this important extradition provision will 

pass the Colombian Congress in this coming session. 

This remains one of the most important issues between our two 

countries. And I’m hopeful that the Colombian congress, with the 

support and courage of the business community, especially the Colombian flower growers and others, can get this done this year. 

I would now like to recognize my colleague and good friend and 

ranking member, Tom Barrett, for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. J. Dennis Hastert follows:]

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Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to join you in 

welcoming our distinguished panel of witnesses today. 

The significance of Colombia as the international center of cocaine production and smuggling cannot be overstated. Three-quarters of the world’s cocaine is produced both from locally grown coca 

and cocaine base imported from Peru and Bolivia. The lion’s share 

of cocaine that reaches our shores and destroys our communities 

comes from Colombia. We all have a deep and abiding interest in 

the success of our drug policy there. 

We’re going to spend much time today discussing the efforts of 

the Colombia military and national police risking their lives to 

fight narcotics traffickers and the guerilla groups that give them 

support. It is very important that we do that, and important that 

we commend the efforts of those committed to fighting the traffickers. We have a great deal to lose if they give up that fight. 

At the same time we must not lose sight of the consequences of 

our foreign assistance, both for the good and for the bad. Colombia 

is plagued by political and drug related violence. Much of that is 

committed by guerilla forces, but not only by guerrillas. Some 

members of the Colombian military are also responsible for grievous human rights abuses. 

We have a responsibility to take a hard look, to insist on accountability, and to make certain our military aid doesn’t add to the 

death toll. As the President considers the exercise of his authority 

to release additional military assistance, these considerations become all the more important. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing. And 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and discussing these 

issues today. 

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the ranking member, Mr. Barrett. Now I 

turn to one of our senior members in this committee and also the 

chairman of the International Relations Committee, Mr. Ben Gilman from New York. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you 

and Chairman Burton for arranging this very important meeting 

involving our battle against illicit drugs. In a recent poll by the 

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 85 percent of the American 

people expressed the view that the most important foreign policy 

goal of our Nation ought to be stopping the flow of illegal drugs 

into our Nation from abroad. 

The American people in their infinite wisdom are far ahead of 

many in our State Department on one of the post-cold war challenges and threat to our Nation today—illicit drugs. In our local 

communities, our constituents witness firsthand the vast destructive impact from these illicit drugs from abroad. They expect their 

Federal Government to take the lead in stopping these destructive 

drugs from ever entering our Nation. 

Overall, the annual societal cost for illicit drugs according to the 

Vice President’s Office—and I think it’s highly conservative—is a 

$67 billion figure. I think it’s much more. Heroin is a good example 

of the need for greater foreign policy focus on illicit drugs, especially in our own hemisphere. 

DEA Administrator Tom Constantine recently told a Senate subcommittee, ‘‘Colombian trafficking organizations are now providing 

9

free samples of South American heroin as part of their cocaine 

transactions in order to introduce users to their high potency and 

relatively inexpensive product.’’

The Boston Globe reported in June 1997 in their magazine article on soaring New England heroin use, much of which is now lowpriced heroin from Colombia. The Boston police superintendent in 

that same article said that eventually these Colombian drug dealers ‘‘are going to cut the purity and up the price. And that’s when 

the violence is going to really ignite.’’

Supply from abroad is being used to create increased drug demand here at home. The administration has been unable to cope 

with the narcoguerrilla crisis in the low plains of southeast Colombia where cocaine is produced—80 percent of the world’s supply. 

It’s even less likely to be able to fight the soaring opium production 

in the higher elevations of the Andes intended for eventual heroin 

production. 

In the United States, 60 percent of the heroin now seized originates in Colombia. We’re certainly at risk from that area. The illadvised decertification of Colombia 2 years in a row without a national interest waiver has cut the lifeline for our allies in the professional antidrug police, the Danti. 

These real drug fighters are sorely in need of ammunition, of explosives, helicopter spare parts, and chopper upgrades along with 

armaments. They need equipment and supplies essential to fight 

the better-armed and often better-financed narcoguerrillas who 

take in, by some U.S. Government estimates, some $60 million per 

month from the illicit drug trade. 

These security forces are our best, last hope before these deadly 

poisons hit our streets, infect our schools, and destroy our youth. 

The administration has let them down and the American people 

have been let down by this approach. Along with many of my colleagues, we have serious concerns surrounding the crisis situation 

in Colombia today, and especially the unconscionable 614 waiver 

delays. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for taking the time to raise the public’s 

consciousness with regard to these problems. 

Mr. HASTERT. I thank Chairman Gilman. And we’re going to recess for about 15 minutes. We’ll be right back as soon as we get 

this vote off. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask that my June 5 letter to Secretary Albright be included in the record on heroin production. 

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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[Recess.] 

Mr. HASTERT. At this time I’d like to introduce our witnesses. 

First of all, Myles Frechette is the current United States Ambassador to Colombia. Jeffrey Davidow is the Assistant Secretary of 

State for the State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. 

Jane Becker is the Acting Assistant Secretary for the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Jim Thessin is the Deputy Legal Advisor for the Department 

of State Office of Legal Advisors. Robert Newberry is the Department of Defense Principal Director for Drug Enforcement Affairs. 

Mr. Donnie Marshall is the Chief of Operations at the Drug Enforcement Administration, and Henry Hinton is Assistant Comptroller General for the General Accounting Office. 

I thank you all for being here today. In accordance with House 

rules, we will ask to swear you in. And I ask that you please stand 

and raise your right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. HASTERT. Let the record show that the witnesses answered 

in the affirmative and Ambassador Frechette, please proceed with 

your testimony. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Congressman Hastert, if it would be all right, I 

could go first and then proceed to Mr. Frechette and Ms. Becker. 

But it’s up to you. 

Mr. HASTERT. Fine. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. OK. Fine. Thank you very much. 

STATEMENTS OF JEFFREY DAVIDOW, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MYLES FRECHETTE, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO COLOMBIA; JANE E. BECKER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 

AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; 

JIM THESSIN, DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISOR, OFFICE OF LEGAL 

ADVISOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ROBERT NEWBERRY, 

PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; DONNIE MARSHALL, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; AND 

HENRY L. HINTON, JR., ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 

Mr. DAVIDOW. I have a very brief statement which I will make 

even more brief because I can see that you want to get to the business at hand. I’m pleased to be here today with you and my colleagues from DOD, DEA, and the State Department, all of whom 

are prepared to answer your questions and testify in a way that 

I hope will relieve you of the misimpression which you stated that 

the Department of State or other government agencies are engaged 

in some form of purposeful obstruction in promoting cooperation 

with Colombia on narcotics. 

Counternarcotics cooperation with Colombia is a complex issue, 

providing policymakers and implementers with difficult choices. As 

you know, the administration has, for the past 2 years, determined 

that the Government of Colombia has not cooperated sufficiently 

with the United States to warrant certification as defined by section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 

13

My colleagues and I are prepared to discuss the reasons for those 

determinations, but today I prefer to focus on how, within the context of decertification, we can continue to work cooperatively with 

elements of the Colombian Government, security services, and civil 

society to fight the narcotics traffickers. 

There can be no doubt as to the seriousness of the problem, 

which you have eloquently stated. There is a tidal wave of illegal 

narcotics flowing into the United States by land, air, and sea, inflicting damage on the health and productivity of our citizens, beleaguering our law enforcement and judicial systems. 

President Clinton and this administration are dedicated to confronting the narcotics traffickers abroad and at home. There can be 

no doubt about the valor and dedication of Colombian law enforcement officials cooperating with the United States in the battle to 

stem the flow of drugs from their country by eradicating illegal 

crops, destroying laboratories where drugs are produced, smashing 

the cartels which control the flow of drugs to consumer countries, 

disrupting financial transactions which launder illegal drug profits, 

and bringing to justice and imprisoning those engaged in this insidious trade. 

It is also important to recognize, as you have, Mr. Chairman, the 

efforts of many other Colombians, common citizens, organizations 

such as the flower growers. In fact, I think that the majority of Colombia’s citizens recognize the seriousness of the problem, are embarrassed and ashamed by their country’s involvement in it, and 

who wish to see Colombia cleansed of the scourge of illegal narcotics. 

The United States and all those who fight the drug trade are not 

without allies inside Colombia. You met many of them when you 

visited. Not just Colombian law enforcement agencies such as the 

Colombian national police, but also other public officials and private citizens who, with great courage and dedication, have joined 

the battle against narcotics. These are people who, in many cases, 

live under the constant threat of reprisal. 

The Colombian Government has in fact made progress during the 

last year. It is important to acknowledge its achievements. But 

more needs to be accomplished. The United States has called on 

the Colombian Government to enforce the laws it has passed, and 

to take further steps on controlling prisoners, eradicating illicit 

crops and extraditing kingpins. Specifically, we would like to see 

the extradition of Colombian nationals now prohibited or said to be 

prohibited by the constitution, including the Cali kingpins. 

We would like to see the full implementation of laws on asset forfeiture, money laundering and sentencing as well as our bilateral 

agreement on maritime law enforcement. We’d like to see tightened 

prison security to prevent traffickers from carrying out their operations from prison. We’d like to see more effective use of herbicides 

and eradication operations. And we would like to see efforts to 

bring corrupt officials to justice. 

As important as an all-out-effort is to combat the production and 

trafficking of illicit drugs, it is also imperative to state clearly that 

the United States cannot unequivocally and unqualifiably support 

all actions another government undertakes if such action may violate human rights of others. 

14

Clearly Colombia’s situation is unique in many ways. It has a 

very long history of violence. Guerilla organizations are active and 

well-funded. Many are little more than bandits selling their services to the highest bidders, including to narcotics traffickers. There 

is a growing and troubling paramilitary movement. 

All of these factors give Colombia its singularity today in our 

hemisphere. Yet, at the same time, we express around the world 

concerns about protection of individual rights, the need to confront 

criminality without succumbing to it, the obvious lesson that abuse 

of human rights leads to loss of governmental credibility, not greater governmental control. All of these concerns argue for us to maintain the highest levels of accountability when we provide assistance 

to the Colombian security forces. The United States Government 

has a full program of cooperation with the Colombian national police, whom you, Mr. Chairman, recently praised for their high morale and outstanding record of success. In addition, the United 

States wants to cooperate with the Colombian military services and 

support those services while enabling us to ensure Congress and 

the American people that United States assistance is not being 

used in a manner fundamentally incompatible with our own values 

and beliefs. 

Currently, we are seeking to utilize special authorities to increase our assistance and make it more effective. We have delivered defense articles to the Colombian national police under section 

506A of the Foreign Assistance Act and will provide such equipment to the military forces as soon as we can reach agreement on 

human rights end use monitoring provisions. 

We will consult with the Congress this week on the President’s 

use of this Foreign Assistance Act section 614 authority to enable 

us to utilize foreign military financing and international military 

education and training funds, which have been frozen by decertification. 

Regrettably, we cannot always move as fast as we would like as 

a government. This is especially the case when dealing with complex issues with a foreign government which is itself prone to bureaucratic delays, frequent personnel changes, and consequent 

shifts in policy. Our efforts are continuing. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, neither the United States nor Colombia nor any other country acting alone could adequately confront the traders and traffickers in the poison that contaminates 

our society. Together, however, we can build the kind of unified effort that is both well-integrated and effective. 

Thank you very much for your demonstrated commitment on this 

issue. I’ll be glad to answer any questions you and your colleagues 

may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davidow follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Secretary Davidow. At this time I’d 

like to entertain a statement by our chairman of the full committee, Mr. Burton of Indiana. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to commend the 

Colombian national police and military for their efforts in the war 

on drugs. Without the guidance and leadership of General Serrano, 

Director of the CNP Gallego, Commander of the CNP’s Danti or 

counternarcotics unit, and General Harold Bedoya, chairman of the 

military joint chiefs, the defeat of the Cali and Medellin cartels 

would not have happened. Their strategy, along with the cooperation from civilian elements of the Colombian Government, has produced proven results even in the face of 2 years—2 years—of decertification by the Clinton administration, even though many of us in 

Congress oppose that. 

It is important to note that the Colombians have made significant progress with extremely limited United States assistance. I 

ask, where is the Clinton administration’s resolve and determination here? If the administration were serious about the war on 

drugs, they would not have decertified Colombia without a national 

interest waiver or as a show of good faith, at least signed the 614 

Presidential waiver, as promised more than 3 months ago. 

Now, Mr. Davidow, you just said that they were going to consider 

that. The President promised to sign that 3 months ago and it 

hasn’t been signed. The decertification has harmed the very elements we need to help. And despite that the morale of the CNP 

has never been greater. 

It is unfortunate that the Congress has had to fight tooth and 

nail with the administration, from the State Department to the 

United States Embassy and our Ambassador in Bogota, in an attempt to try to get some form of assistance down to the brave people who are fighting the war on drugs. 

It’s hard to tell with whom the blame lies for this apathy toward 

taking a stand in this fight. But it may lie at the Ambassadorial 

level in Bogota. One question is, has the Embassy in Bogota on numerous occasions and the Ambassador himself misled, misinformed, and otherwise been a hindrance to members of this subcommittee, to me as chairman of the full committee, and to members of our staffs? 

Almost a year ago, after Chairman Hastert returned from another codel, the Congress funded and directed the State Department to add an additional 15 DEA personnel to the country team 

in Colombia. In May, when Chairman Hastert was in Bogota, apparently Ambassador Frechette had yet to have any of these special agents in place. 

I talked to him on the phone in Bogota just recently, and he told 

me that 8 of them had been assigned—8 of the 15. I have since 

found that it wasn’t eight new agents, it was four new agents and 

four replacements. So out of the 15 additional agents we talked 

about, only 4 have been replaced, even though the Congress demanded that be done. 

I personally called Ambassador Frechette to inquire why he had 

not added these agents as directed by Congress. And, as I said, he 

told me that they had been replaced, but they hadn’t. I’d like to ask 

the Ambassador how many new agents are going to be added in the 

23

near future. I hope that you’ll tell us today that the total of 15 will 

be added very quickly. 

For more than a year, Chairman Ben Gilman, myself, and Chairman Hastert have been pressing the Clinton administration to provide more UH–1H helicopters to the Colombian national police for 

use in their eradication efforts. After months of repeated assurances by the State Department and other administration officials, 

Chairman Hastert’s recent codel found that none of the helicopters 

had been delivered until the day before the codel arrived in San 

Jose del Guaviare. 

Ambassador Frechette indicated he was withholding the delivery 

of the helicopters until he could get a new human rights pledge 

from the Colombian army. I’m happy to note that all these helicopters are now flying eradication missions. Unfortunately, several 

of them have already been shot at and hit by narcotraffickers. 

I can only wonder why Ambassador Frechette was so reluctant 

to provide these much-needed assets. We have provided these helicopters to the CNP for their use in fighting the war on drugs. 

When they get the helicopters, the State Department has stripped 

them of even the simplistic gun mounts needed to protect them 

during their eradication runs. It cost the CNP about $100,000 to get these helicopters in flying 

condition. But the CNP only has M–60 machine guns to protect the 

helicopters. The M–60’s are ineffective against the better-armed 

narcoguerrillas. What they need to protect the helicopters are rapid 

fire miniguns. And that has been languishing for so long in the bureaucracy. 

The miniguns have been promised to the CNP by the Clinton administration for more than 3 years. During those 3 years there 

have been more than 1,000 brave CNP officers killed and many 

helicopters shot down. These tragedies may have been avoided if 

the CNP had the right equipment to protect itself against the better-armed narcoguerrillas, who are getting tremendous amounts of 

money, as you know, from the sales and protection of the drug cartel. 

Ambassador Frechette and the Embassy staff in Bogota appear 

to have resisted sending the miniguns to the CNP at every turn. 

The State Department misinterpreted U.S. law that no lethal assistance can be provided. However, the law specifically permits lethal assistance if it is to protect assets such as these helicopters. 

Currently, the CNP has less than a 2-week supply of ammunition, which not only hinders the number of missions they can complete against the narcotraffickers and the FARC people, but also 

makes the missions they choose to undertake even more dangerous 

because they could very easily find themselves in a fight without 

enough bullets to protect themselves. 

The 506A drawdown package would have provided vital ammunition by June 30. The question is: Did Ambassador Frechette decide 

once again to apply the spirit of the Leahy law to prohibit the delivery of the much-needed ammunition? The State Department’s 

liberal interpretation of the Leahy law has no known precedent 

that I have been able to find. 

In essence, the State Department, for whatever misguided reason, is lending its hand to the narcotraffickers by delaying and proVerDate jul 14 2003 15:01 Dec 08, 2003 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HEARINGS\45991 45991
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hibiting the assistance Congress has requested, directed, and asked 

the administration to provide the Colombians in their efforts to 

fight the war on drugs. 

I am glad to see the witnesses from the State Department here 

today so that we can get a better understanding of their rationale 

for these actions. 

Mr. Chairman, let me just add one additional thing. Finally, I 

would like to call the Congress and the world’s attention to the hostage situation in Colombia. There are currently six American citizens being held hostage by the FARC guerilla organization in Colombia. Three of them are missionaries who have been held since 

1993. They are the longest-held American hostages anywhere in 

the world. 

Their families come from modest backgrounds and do not have 

the money to pay the astronomical ransom requested by the FARC, 

which requested $5 million for each one of them. The press corps 

has not publicized this. The administration has not made a high 

priority to attempt to find and bring home safely these Americans. 

I think it’s high time the international community, starting with 

our own State Department, start pressuring the FARC to release 

these Americans and all of their other hostages. 

It is shameful that there has not been a public outcry over this. 

The media and the State Department and everybody concerned 

ought to be to blame for this. I want to assure the families of these 

hostages that I, and I’m sure Chairman Hastert, are going to do 

everything in our power to do whatever we can as Members of Congress to secure the release of their family members. 

We never hear debate by the human rights groups in Colombia 

about the human rights of these Americans who have been dragged 

through the jungles of Colombia for years now, nor do we hear anything from these human rights groups about the thousands of CNP 

and Colombian military who have been murdered by guerilla 

groups who long ago abandoned their Marxist ideology for the enormous profits of the drug trade. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All Members will have 

the ability to submit their opening statements to the record. At this 

time, Ambassador Frechette. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and 

members of the subcommittee. Much of what I will tell you today 

about bilateral counternarcotics cooperation will be familiar to 

those of you who visited Colombia a few weeks ago. However, it’s 

an important subject and can bear some repetition. 

As Ambassador to Colombia for the last 3 years, I have focused 

on several key policy areas. Increased counternarcotics cooperation 

has, of course, been of primary importance. Other significant issues 

include trade and investment, human rights, the environment, and 

the Summit of the Americas process. 

I have also worked on a host of other issues, including kidnapped 

Americans. But I have devoted most of my time to the major areas 

I mentioned a moment ago. Today I am glad to report that some 

very important advances have been made, particularly in counternarcotics cooperation. I wish to share credit for these accomplishments with my country team, which is reputed to be the finest 

counternarcotics team in the region. 

25

The Government of Colombia has made a solid commitment to 

eradicating illicit drug crops. This effort was begun in late 1994, 

and it’s been strengthened with each passing year. The eradication 

program has reached the point where American citizens, pilots, and 

more United States-supplied equipment are now being used in Colombia, which helps the Colombians to be even more effective. 

Another breakthrough came less than 2 weeks ago when the Colombian Government approved testing, the second of two granular 

herbicides. As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, this was an issue that 

was raised at my residence with the foreign minister and with you 

the evening of May 26. With the help of the U.S. Government, tests 

of both of these will be conducted to determine their relative efficacy and cost. As many subcommittee members already know, 

granular herbicides have the potential to be much more lethal to 

coca plants than the liquid herbicides currently used. 

Probably the most visible accomplishment, at least in terms of 

press coverage, was the incarceration in 1995 and 1996 of all of the 

Cali cartel kingpins. They remain in jail, with the exception of Jose 

Santa Cruz London ̃ o, who was shot to death by the police after escaping from a maximum security prison in 1996. 

Grabbing fewer headlines but equally important has been the noticeable improvement in cooperation between the Colombian national police and the United States in recent years. The process of 

bilateral cooperation in general has also become more transparent. 

I have made a great effort to encourage Colombian authorities to 

speak openly about and acknowledge their desire for bilateral cooperation. 

Now, the director of the national police, the prosecutor general 

and other high-ranking Colombian officials talk openly about cooperating with U.S. Government agencies. I would like to note that 

one of my first challenges as Ambassador to Colombia was to ensure that General Serrano, who had just been sent to Washington 

as police attache, be instead brought back to Colombia to serve as 

the director of the Colombian national police. 

This was a wise decision. All Colombians as well as the international community recognize he has been an indefatigable, honest, 

and implacable enemy of narcotrafficking. At several points in 

1995, Mr. Chairman, President Samper and several of his cabinet 

members stated publicly their intention to expel the DEA from Colombia or to limit their activities so severely as to make them useless. This is a matter of record. It’s in the press in Colombia. 

I’m glad to tell you that my personal efforts successfully countered those attempts. As a result, the DEA is now accepted in Colombia as a friendly force whose expertise is valued and acknowledged by Colombian counterparts. 

In 1996 and 1997 Colombian legislators passed long overdue 

laws on asset forfeiture, money laundering, and sentence lengthening. These measures, although not as tough as American laws by 

a long shot, meet international standards, as required by the Vienna Convention, against drugs. These laws increased Colombia’s 

ability to hit the narcos where it hurts the most—their illgotten 

wealth and their benefiting from ridiculously low sentences which 

have outraged international opinion. 

26

In February of this year the United States and Colombia signed 

a maritime shipboarding agreement to combat narcotrafficking at 

sea, an accomplishment that had eluded the United States Government for 6 years. While this accord did not give us everything that 

we wanted, it represents a great step forward in our joint counternarcotics efforts. 

All of these accomplishments, Mr. Chairman, came about as a result of U.S. Government urging and the certification process. The 

national interest waiver in 1995 and the complete decertification in 

1996 convinced the Colombian Government to increase cooperation 

with the United States. As the subcommittee knows, Colombia was 

again decertified in 1997. 

But as Assistant Secretary Gelbard stated on February 28, when 

that decision was announced, ‘‘Colombia has a chance to receive a 

national interest waiver if it makes progress in a number of areas.’’

I have told Colombian Government officials on several occasions 

what these criteria are: using an effective, safe and reasonably 

priced granular herbicide against coca and opium poppy, repealing 

article 35 of the Colombian constitution to open the way for the extradition of Colombian nationals, including the four major kingpins—that is, returning them to the United States so we can put 

them on trial for their crimes against the American people—fully 

and effectively implementing the new asset forfeiture, money laundering, and sentencing laws and the shipboarding agreement, 

tightening prison security to prevent traffickers from carrying out 

their operations from jail, and bringing corrupt officials to justice. 

We now await the outcome of Colombian efforts to reverse the 

constitutional prohibition on extraditing Colombian nationals. If 

Colombia achieves this and, once again, honors our existing bilateral extradition treaty, it will have met most of the major requirements of the Vienna Convention, which Colombia signed and its 

Congress ratified several years ago. 

Regarding extradition, I should note that Colombian 

narcotraffickers managed in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s to convince the Colombian lawmakers who reformed Colombia’s constitution in 1991 that they should be punished—that is, they, the 

narcotraffickers—should be punished in Colombia and not abroad. 

This argument, of course, missed the point. Criminals should be 

punished in the country where they perpetrated their crimes. 

Moreover, at the time that the narcotraffickers successfully advocated this point of view, Mr. Chairman, Colombia had some of the 

weakest penalties for narcotrafficking in the hemisphere. 

With our help, they have brought their laws up to international 

standards. And in order to consolidate a fully cooperative relationship with the Colombian Government, the United States must be 

able to try the Cali kingpins and other narcotraffickers who have 

done so much damage to the American people. 

Of course, the laws I mentioned earlier have not yet been fully 

implemented. The proof is in the pudding, Mr. Chairman. That will 

be the next test of Colombia’s commitment to combatting narcotrafficking. Colombia has many exemplary laws on paper. What 

we’re interested in now is seeing them put into practice. As I told 

you, Mr. Chairman and other members of the subcommittee who 

27

recently visited Colombia a few weeks ago, Colombia needs systemic improvements that go far beyond law enforcement. 

Colombia needs stronger laws. It needs better trained police and 

investigators. It needs stricter controls on jailed narcotraffickers, 

who continue to run their businesses from their cells. And it needs 

an end to corruption, particularly official corruption. 

We are willing and ready to help them achieve these goals. Since 

the chairman and his colleagues visited Colombia, the government 

has taken the important and frankly long overdue step of approving the testing of additional granular herbicide, as I mentioned earlier. 

In sum, Colombia has accomplished a great deal in terms of bilateral narcotics cooperation, but usually as the result of consistent 

and untiring urging by the United States. Colombia must do more, 

Mr. Chairman, for its own sake. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Frechette follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. It’s the intent of this 

subcommittee to roll and keep this subcommittee in session 

through the vote. So if anybody would like to vote and come back, 

they’re welcome to do that. At this time I’d like to recognize Acting 

Assistant Secretary Becker. Welcome. 

Ms. BECKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. This hearing provides an extremely useful forum to give 

an update on the administration’s comprehensive illegal narcotics 

control efforts in Colombia. Before I provide a brief overview of my 

testimony, which I would submit for the record, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to thank you personally, Mr. Chairman, for your strong support of the administration’s counternarcotics policy and programs. 

I know you and several other members have longstanding personal interest in these issues, having recently visited Colombia and 

other key Latin America countries, and you’re familiar with the 

enormous challenge that faces us all. And I’m certain that you appreciate our unswerving determination to advance a lasting solution to the problem of illegal drug availability in our country. 

For the past 2 years, the President denied full narcotic certification for Colombia. As Secretary Albright said at the time of the 

announcement, ‘‘Denial of certification of Colombia was aimed at 

the senior levels of the Colombian Government, as cocaine and heroin continue to flow unabated from Colombia into the United 

States.’’

While fully implementing the intent of the law, denial of certification for Colombia had the unfortunate effect of cutting off significant foreign military financing funds—that’s FMF—and international military education and training—IMET—funds for counternarcotics purposes. 

As is crystal clear, the Colombian Governmental units which receive these categories of United States support desperately need assistance for their important drug interdiction and crop control efforts. We worked closely last session with the Congress—unfortunately unsuccessfully—in order to amend section 490 to allow for 

continuation of critical counternarcotics FMF and IMET. 

To draw upon the President’s authority offered under section 614 

of the Foreign Assistance Act to enable assistance to go forward despite existing legal bars, the administration is initiating this week 

formal consultations with the Congress to provide Colombia up to 

$30 million and up to $600,000 in frozen FMF and IMET, respectively. 

The President’s authority under 614 is not taken lightly. Its use 

now is against the backdrop of our overwhelming national security 

interest to ensure that our support for honest Colombian antidrug 

efforts is unimpeded. Moreover, our counternarcotics interest in Colombia must be in concert with other policy objectives. 

In this instance, I refer to respect for human rights. Republican 

or Democratic, consecutive administrations for more than two decades have made human rights a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. 

Let me elaborate on that point with reference to Colombia. 

Before approaching Congress to discuss the 614 waiver, our Embassy in Bogota has worked tirelessly for the better part of a year 

to secure end use monitoring agreements, including proper commitVerDate jul 14 2003 15:01 Dec 08, 2003 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HEARINGS\45991 45991
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ments on human rights, which we require from the various elements of the police and military. This linkage that we make between human rights and narcotics assistance has only been reinforced by the amendment to our appropriations law enacted last 

year which specifically ties the two together to prohibit provision 

of assistance to units of security forces if the Secretary of State 

finds credible evidence of gross violations of human rights. 

In February of this year we sent detailed instructions to our 

posts worldwide to ensure that the requirements of that amendment are met. In our relations with Colombia we have always 

worked from the premise that our human rights interests must be 

applied across the board. We have taken great care to ensure proper balance on the range of foreign policy objectives we seek with 

Colombia. 

Unfortunately, while we thought we were close to acceptable end 

use monitoring language on a number of occasions over the past 6 

months, we have been frustrated when the Colombian Government 

has repeatedly backed off. I reiterate: we will not provide FMF or 

IMET set-asides for any entity in Colombia absent its agreement 

to the assurances that we seek. 

To combat the narcotics scourge, we need an effective partnership with those Colombian officials who are as dedicated to fighting 

it as we are. Through your trip to the field, you and other members 

know about our efforts in Colombia. Nevertheless, I think it would 

be useful to give a quick recap of what we have done and are trying 

to do in addition to the 614 waiver. 

First of all, counternarcotics funds for Colombia from my bureau 

alone amount to close to $400 million since 1972. Using DOD drawdown authority, we are providing $40.5 million to Colombia for use 

by the Colombian national police and the Colombian armed forces 

to operate against heavily armed narcotraffickers. 

For the Colombian police, this drawdown includes 12 additional 

utility helicopters, flight crew and police field gear, two C–26 surveillance transport aircraft, communications equipment and other 

items. The 12 UH–1H helicopters were delivered on May 17. The 

5.56 millimeter ammunition is scheduled for delivery this week. 

From the 506 package the Colombian military will receive 3 Boston 

Whalers, 6 river patrol boats, 1 utility landing craft, 20 UH–1H 

helicopter hulks for salvage parts, 3 C–26 surveillance transport 

aircraft, and substantial amounts of additional technical equipment. 

The six river patrol boats and the UH–1H hulks for salvage parts 

arrived in Colombia on May 17 but have not been turned over to 

the Navy and Air Force pending completion of a satisfactory end 

use monitoring agreement. Since October 1996 the Department has 

deployed three additional T–65 aircraft to Colombia, provided four 

OV–10 aircraft, and brought in additional fixed wing assets and 

search and rescue helicopters. 

To augment support for eradication this year, U.S. contractor 

personnel have been increased. That includes security specialists, 

pilots, mechanics, operations advisors and search and rescue teams 

including medics, who have provided assistance to CNP members 

who are injured in the course of their duties. 

42

Over the years, United States support to the Colombian police 

has outstripped that supplied to any other comparable antidrug 

unit in the world. In 1997 we have doubled our assistance, mostly 

to the antinarcotics police, to $44 million as compared to $22.6 million in program and aviation assistance in 1996.

These figures represent INL program funds alone and do not include transfers of equipment by INL or under 506(a)(2) authority. 

There was an additional $100 million in equipment transferred 

thus far this year. Part of this increase makes up the shortfall in 

equipment purchases as a result of the frozen FMF after denial of 

narcotic certification. And the additional United States assistance 

also fills the void in funding for the CNP, which was inexplicably 

withdrawn by the Colombian Government.

I don’t want to repeat what’s already been said with regard to 

our overall broad policy toward Colombia. That was covered by Ambassador Davidow and Ambassador Frechette with regard to counternarcotics. We are very pleased, however, that the Colombian Government has agreed to test granular herbicides against 

coca.

Based upon prior USDA tests, we are confident that testing in 

Colombia will show a granular chemical can be used safely and effectively throughout the year, especially during the rainy season. 

The granular herbicide also supports safety considerations. We are 

also pleased that the granular herbicides are being tested, because 

we believe that they will prove significantly more effective against 

the opium poppy crop than liquid herbicides, because opium poppy, 

as you know, can be replanted immediately after spraying, whereas 

a granular herbicide stays in the soil and precludes that field from 

being used for some period of time.

On the maritime agreement, we are pleased with ad hoc cooperative shipboarding procedures, but still expect a much more serious 

effort to implement the accord by allowing U.S. assets to conduct 

sea and air detection and monitoring. With regard to prison security with the CNP now in charge, escape attempts are reportedly 

being thwarted and quantities of communications in computer 

equipment have been confiscated.

A great deal of work remains for the Colombian Government in 

the legal areas mentioned by Ambassador Frechette. We have seen 

little effort, also, to support investigations and prosecutions by the 

prosecutor general’s office to ensure that corrupt officials are 

brought to justice.

Progress in extradition remains the most problematic area in our 

bilateral drug control efforts. Although the extradition bill has completed the first of several rounds in Congress, there are many details to be settled, among them the issue of retroactivity, which is 

key to the transfer to American soil of four of the most prominent 

Colombian traffickers wanted by United States prosecutors. We’re 

worried about the outcome.

However, through an extradition and through all our counternarcotics programs in Colombia we will continue to press the government and provide practical support to those honest segments of government and security forces in society that are resolved to overcome the traffickers’ corrupting influences. 

43

I see that the red light is on, Mr. Chairman, and I don’t want 

to—pardon me? 

Mr. HASTERT. You can summarize and finish your statement. 

You have plenty of time. 

Ms. BECKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Despite our efforts to 

rapidly expand support for the CNP’s eradication efforts during the 

past year, coca cultivation in Colombia has almost tripled since 

1987. This worrisome trend, the result of a variety of complicated 

political and practical factors, represents one of the greatest challenges the Colombians and Americans face to stamping out the 

drug trade. 

It reflects an overall lack of political commitment at the senior 

level to take strong measures against narcotics trafficking or to 

fully support those Colombians who are, such as the prosecutor 

general and the CNP. I should also note that because of the successful activities in neighboring countries to interdict product, 

there has been a balloon effect, and we believe that that’s one of 

the reasons why there has been an increase in cultivation in Colombia. 

On a more positive note, our collaboration with the CNP has resulted in the stabilization of the Colombian opium poppy crop to 

about 6,400 hectares, thus stemming the flow of cheap Colombian 

heroin to our country. 

To carry out the programs that we’ve described here as well as 

others and maintain the momentum we have achieved, we are extremely grateful for this subcommittee’s abiding support, especially 

for our funding request this year for $230 million, which includes 

a $17 million increase over fiscal year 1997. In fact, our fiscal year 

1998 request represents only about 1 percent of our entire national 

budget to counter the drug threat. 

At the same time, as our U.S. National Drug Control Strategy 

makes clear, domestic initiatives are threatened unless they are 

bolstered by a solid U.S. foreign effort and significant multilateral 

support, which we are endeavoring to do. 

The increasing sophistication of criminal elements in Colombia 

and elsewhere must be matched and suppressed. President Clinton 

has repeatedly stressed the importance of combatting drugs and 

crime in the context of our national security. Aggressive policies 

and programs, sufficient financial backing and consolidated efforts 

at home and abroad must be sustained to meet the challenges we 

face. 

We look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and with 

this subcommittee in order to achieve these very important results 

for our citizens. Thank you, and I’ll be very happy to answer any 

questions that you and your colleagues have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Becker follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Ambassador Becker. 

Mr. Thessin. 

Mr. THESSIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to provide a broad outline of the Department’s approach to 

GAO requests for information. These principles guided the Department in responding to the GAO’s request in the current case. Let 

me emphasize a few points. 

First, the Department is committed to working with the GAO to 

provide it with the information it needs to perform its responsibilities in support of Congress. The Department attempts to respond 

promptly to GAO requests. But such matters as the complexity of 

the request and the volume of the materials may slow this process. 

Second, releases of information to the GAO must take account of 

the executive branch’s legitimate interest in protecting national security, preventing compromise of law enforcement efforts, and preserving the candor of its deliberative processes. 

For example, advisors may temper their advice to avoid criticism 

if they fear their recommendations will be disclosed to the detriment of the decisionmaking process. 

Third, the Department works to fashion practical solutions that 

accommodate the needs both of the GAO for information and of the 

Department to protect its interest in that information. Accommodations may involve such procedures as redaction of confidential 

sources, summaries of sensitive information and limitations on access. 

If one approach is deficient, the Department is prepared to discuss alternative methods to meet GAO’s needs. My colleagues and 

I stand ready to answer any questions the subcommittee may have 

on document matters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thessin follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Mr. Thessin. 

Mr. Newberry. 

Mr. NEWBERRY. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, 

thanks for this opportunity to appear before you and address your 

questions about the Department of Defense’s support to our Nation’s effort to stop the flow of illegal drugs. 

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Newberry, would you pull the mic up so we 

could hear you a little clearer. 

Mr. NEWBERRY. Sure. How’s that? Although we support both domestic and foreign law enforcement programs in the United States, 

Latin America and Asia, I understand this hearing will focus on activities in Colombia and possibly other areas in Latin America. 

As you’re aware, we have a variety of counterdrug activities ongoing in Colombia to include training, intelligence collection, providing target packages, detection and monitoring of air trafficking, 

joint planning, and assistance teams. 

Additionally, as you alluded to, we are currently seeking new 

limited authority that will allow the Department of Defense to enhance the capabilities of foreign nations by procuring and transferring equipment and to providing spare parts and maintenance support for that equipment. I certainly welcome all the support that 

this committee can provide to successfully pass this legislation. 

With that short summary, I’m prepared to answer any questions 

you have on our support to Colombia. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Newberry follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Mr. Newberry. 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I 

thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss the 

efforts of the Colombian national police and the Colombian military 

in our joint antinarcotic efforts. I’d like to thank you and the subcommittee for your continued support of our antinarcotic program. 

I know that you recently traveled to some of the source countries 

where you saw firsthand some of the initiatives that are being put 

into place as a result of the budget increases for Andean Ridge in 

fiscal year 1997. 

As you probably know, the narcotraffickers from Colombia seized 

virtually total control of the cocaine trade in the late 1970’s. The 

first group to dominate were the organized criminal groups 

headquartered in Medellin, Colombia, which were led by violent 

criminals like Fabio Ochoa, Jose Rodriquez Gacha, Carlos Lehder, 

and one of the most violent criminals in history, Pablo Escobar. 

One by one these leaders were brought to justice by the Colombian national police. And having had a degree of personal involvement in this effort during that era, I can tell you that the one thing 

that these traffickers most feared was being brought before the 

U.S. criminal justice system. 

I believe it was the extradition of Carlos Lehder during that era 

that really resulted in the beginning of the downfall of the Medellin 

cartel. So I can’t overemphasize, Mr. Chairman, the fact that extradition is in fact a very important tool, as you have referred to and 

a couple of other witnesses here have referred to. 

During this campaign to bring down the Medellin cartel, a group 

of young criminals in Cali, led by Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and 

his brother Gilberto as well as Jose Santa Cruz London ̃ o, were then 

proceeding to build what would become one of the most successful 

criminal enterprises in history. Again, through the very courageous 

leadership of General Serrano, Colonel Gallego, and General 

Bedoyo of the Colombian military, Colombian authorities methodically tracked down each of these leaders until the entire infrastructure of the Cali mafia was either incarcerated or dead. 

But the violence continues even today. On November 4, 1996, a 

van filled with dynamite was discovered outside a chemical plant 

which was owned by a family of the Senator sponsoring a bill to 

lift the ban on extradition of Colombian drug traffickers. This was 

just a few days before the bill was scheduled for debate. 

On June 18 of this year 8 Colombian national police officers were 

killed and 12 others were wounded as they tried to disarm a powerful truck bomb. And the extraditables—drug traffickers—took responsibility for this bombing. The Orejuelas have ready access to 

both pay phones and cellular phones in their prison cells, but they 

are unable to fully control their vast empire from their jail cells. 

Organized crime families in Mexico—most notably the Arrellano 

Felix brothers, the Caro-quintero organization, the Amesco brothers, and until his death last week, Amado Carrillo-Fuentes—have 

formed some very powerful alliances with the Colombian drug traffickers. 

An estimated 15 percent of the world’s coca leaf is grown in Colombia, and the vast majority of cocaine base and hydrochloride is 

58

produced in laboratories throughout Colombia. This cocaine is then 

either shipped via maritime or aircraft to traffickers in Mexico or 

it is shipped through the Caribbean and into the United States. 

Remnants of the Cali group are still being directed by the 

Orejuelas as well as Cali splinter groups who have become powerful drug trafficking forces in their own right. There are about five 

or six major groups of this type that we have targeted and are actively working, investigating with Colombian authorities. 

Adding significantly to the dangers faced by the antinarcotic 

forces in Colombia are the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia—or the FARC—as well as the National Liberation Army. The 

CNP helicopters and planes used in drug eradication efforts continually receive ground fire from these guerrillas when they’re conducting counterdrug operations. 

Through the United States Government and DEA’s law enforcement strategies we have been able to build cases on many of the 

bosses in Colombia as well as the United States based infrastructure of these Colombian syndicates. And with the assistance of foreign government, we have, in many cases, left these organizations 

in disarray. The central focus of the DEA office in Bogota and 

throughout Colombia is the identification, investigation and dismantling of the organized drug syndicates in Colombia. 

DEA and the Colombian national police have developed a series 

of programs to enhance these investigations. The expansion of the 

DEA and CNP wire intercept program is critical to building criminal cases against the leadership of these organizations in Colombia. 

The recently established information analysis and operational center plays a vital role in coordinating United States and Colombian 

information, intelligence, and coordinating activities. 

A flow reduction strategy will be extremely effective in reducing 

the movement of cocaine through the source zone. Maintaining and 

improving the investigative capabilities of special investigative 

units of the CNP are critical to our wire intercept and other enforcement programs in Colombia. Expansion of operations conducted jointly with the CNP is key to locating and destroying clandestine laboratories, air strips and storage sites. 

An expansion of information collection and investigative activities and support of the international emergency powers act—or 

IEPA—and money laundering schemes by Colombian trafficker organizations is also vital. The DEA working in Colombia with the 

CNP and domestically with Federal, State and local law enforcement counterparts will concentrate on the vulnerabilities of these 

Colombian organizations and their Mexican partners. 

First, we will continue to focus our domestic investigations on 

the United States based infrastructure of these groups, particularly 

those in the Caribbean theater, south Florida and the southwestern 

border. Second, we will work in Colombia to build cases on the 

leaders of the new groups vying to dominate the cocaine trade as 

well as direct resources against their production and transportation 

operations. 

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear here, and I will be 

happy to answer any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marshall follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. Hinton. 

Mr. HINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Hastert, 

Chairman Burton, Mr. Barrett, members of the subcommittee, as 

requested, I am here today to discuss the problems the General Accounting Office has encountered in conducting its review of counternarcotics activities in Colombia. 

On March 4, 1997, Mr. Chairman, you asked that we review the 

progress of United States and Colombian efforts to reduce drug 

trafficking activities and influence and any problems that exist. 

Subsequently, the chairman of the House Committee on International Relations and the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics control also requested that GAO address similar issues. 

In response to these requests, we are in the process of No. 1, reviewing the length of time it took the executive branch to determine what assistance would be affected by the administration’s decertification of Colombia and the subsequent impacts of decertification on United States assistance to Colombia; No. 2, the status of 

the proposed $40 million emergency assistance package being provided to Colombia under section 506A of the Foreign Assistance 

Act; and, No. 3, the planning and implementation of United States 

antidrug efforts in Colombia. 

Mr. Chairman, I have three main points to highlight: First, our 

review has been significantly delayed because the State Department has not given us timely and complete access to the information we require to address the issues you, Chairman Gilman, and 

Senator Grassley have raised. 

For example, it has taken the Department almost 2 months to 

provide us with the large number of documents that we have requested. The Department has established an elaborate process for 

considering our document requests by screening documents 

through multiple time consuming reviews before they are released 

to us. To date, we still have not received 10 of the documents we 

requested. 

I sent a letter to the Secretary of State on June 25 requesting 

assistance to break the log jam. I don’t know whether it was that 

letter or the scheduling of this hearing, but we received a lot of 

documents last week—last Thursday, to be exact. 

Second, the State Department has not granted us independent 

access to documents during this assignment. Based on our request, 

the Department determined what documents we could see and 

what documents would be provided to us. Throughout our visit to 

Colombia, we didn’t have independent access to Embassy files or to 

the State Department instructions detailing how the Embassy was 

to provide us documents. 

This is in contrast to other recently completed counternarcotic 

assignments we have conducted for this subcommittee in Colombia, 

Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and the Caribbean. In none of those past assignments, including a 1995 review of the Colombian counternarcotics program, did the State Department attempt to control our 

independent access to information as they have on this job that we 

are currently doing. 

Third, the Department has denied us access to some documents 

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thority to access records as contained in 31 U.S.C. 716. This statute 

gives GAO very broad rights of access to agency records for the 

purpose of conducting audits, investigations and evaluations. I 

would like to point out that there is no exemption for internal 

working papers or documents containing deliberative communications. 

This is a point that has been brought up by the State Department to us as reasons for not making documents available to us. 

We believe we have a right of access to these records and plan to 

pursue access to them with the Department. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, our concern is with the delay that 

we have experienced in obtaining timely and independent access to 

information necessary to respond to your request. We’re also concerned about the extent to which the State Department has controlled our access to all documents. 

We cannot say at this time with certainty that we have been provided with all of the information necessary to conduct an independent review of United States counternarcotics activities in Colombia. Furthermore, while these delays and restrictions appear for 

now, to be limited to this assignment, I would be seriously concerned—and I think you would also share that concern, Mr. Chairman—if this practice by the State Department continues on future 

GAO work that we undertake for this committee and other congressional committees. 

That concludes my statement. I stand ready to address any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hinton follows:]

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Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Mr. Hinton. Let me ask you a question: why do you suppose that the information has not been given 

to you? Now, Mr. Thessin says that this is highly classified information. Don’t all your folks have security clearances? 

Mr. HINTON. Yes, sir. I personally approve staffing for every one 

of our jobs. I can assure you that our personnel have all the proper 

security clearances. We have the proper facilities to store the documents. We have a very, very good track record on the handling of 

very sensitive documents. 

Mr. HASTERT. Now, when I was in Colombia, Ambassador 

Frechette supplied us with a list of cable numbers. And he said if 

we asked for those, we’d be able to get them and review them. We 

passed those on to you to make it a part of the—have you had a 

problem getting some of these cables? 

Mr. HINTON. Yes, sir. We’ve had problems that have been as long 

as 2 months getting access to documents. And we have a pretty 

good track on everything we have asked for. It’s been very time 

consuming. It’s been very much laborious on the part of the Embassy and State Department. They’re going through multiple reviews and I don’t understand why that is necessary, compared to 

all the past work that we have done. 

It’s interesting to note, Mr. Chairman, how this job has happened. We basically have identified the files we want to review. In 

the past we received access to all of these files, to go through them, 

then ask the questions of the appropriate officials. The way it’s 

worked on this one is that we have not had that access. We have 

had to ask on our own knowledge about particular documents. And 

then the Embassy folks or the State Department folks would make 

the determination themselves as to what we should and should not 

see. 

As the government’s independent investigator and auditor in 

this, we can assure ourselves that we’ve gotten access to everything 

that we need to see to be responsive to your request. 

Mr. BURTON. Would Chairman Hastert yield briefly? 

Mr. HASTERT. I yield to the chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just say to Chairman Hastert and to Mr. 

Hinton that if you’re not getting that proper cooperation, if Chairman Hastert feels that it’s necessary for his subcommittee and the 

full committee to subpoena these documents and records that you 

cannot get access to, we’re fully ready, Mr. Chairman, to work with 

you to issue subpoenas, to force the issue if the State Department 

and the Embassy in Colombia doesn’t want to give those documents 

to the GAO or to you. 

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the chairman for asking and supplying 

that. Ambassador Frechette gave us a list of cables, told us those 

cables would be available to us. And for some reason or other we’re 

having trouble getting them. So I would expect the Ambassador 

and the State Department to live up to its commitment so—I would 

hope we wouldn’t have to do that. 

Mr. Hinton, is there any reason that you think this might happen, why you’re having these difficulties? 

Mr. HINTON. I don’t have a good answer for that, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Burton knows the urgency of this job—when he called 

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try. We’ve taken that very seriously. Before we even left, we sent 

a list of the general documents that the Embassy we needed to do 

the job in country. We did not know we would run into a problem. 

When we got down there, they said, ‘‘Well, we can’t release anything to you, subject to instructions from the State Department.’’ 

That happened. Instructions came down. 

Mr. HASTERT. Can I ask you a question? Has that ever happened 

to you before in your investigations? 

Mr. HINTON. Not in this area. No, sir. We have not. All of our 

past work, we’ve had pretty much agreement with the State and 

the missions that we’ve been to. We’ve worked very closely with the 

folks. We don’t have anything to hold back. In fact, what we did 

when we took documents from the files, we’d also make a copy for 

the people at the Embassy or State so that they knew what we 

had. This time it’s the complete opposite of that. 

Mr. HASTERT. Let me ask you another question on this. One of 

the things that I understand the documents that you’ve been denied are what we’re talking about this granular herbicide issue—

which kind of a side issue, I think—but the Ambassador mentioned 

a meeting that we had with the foreign minister of Colombia. And 

you’re right, Ambassador, you made a statement that one of the 

reasons—and I’m paraphrasing, I can’t quote you exactly—but one 

of the reasons we didn’t offer the—one of the reasons that we had 

sanctions against Colombia was that they didn’t use granular herbicide. 

And the foreign minister said at that time, he said, ‘‘Well, Mr. 

Ambassador, you had a list of seven granular herbicides, and we 

chose one and after we chose that granular herbicide you took it 

off the list.’’

They have been using herbicides. It’s a round up. Basically the 

same thing that my farmers use in the 14th district in Illinois to 

kill weeds and shrubs and bad things that grow. Are you having 

trouble getting those particular cables? 

Mr. HINTON. They were part of the problem. To be specific, on 

May 8 we requested about 115 documents—2 of the cables pertaining to that subject were in that request that we made. We got 

a response back from the Department on June 11 with about half 

of the documents. The two cables that we were seeking dealing 

with that subject were not part of the package. We were told by 

State that that had to go through further review because of the 

very sensitive nature of it. 

On July 1, we got another response from State. And they faxed 

over the two cables. They were faxed to us on an unsecured line, 

even though they had previously characterized them to us as being 

very sensitive. So I’m kind of at a loss to reconcile why they held 

off giving those to us and then, in turn, released them through the 

fax. 

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you, Mr. Hinton. One of the other issues in 

this whole herbicide issue is that if this was one of the main issues 

for denying certification to Colombia—we also visited Bolivia. Bolivia used manual eradication. They went out and were chopping 

this stuff down. Very small use of herbicides, and it wasn’t granular herbicides. 

81

Peru hasn’t used chemical herbicides until a very short time ago. 

Neither of these countries were denied certification. And I’m somewhat stymied. I question why is granular herbicides over liquid 

herbicides when a country is actually going out and chemically 

eradicating and other countries aren’t held to the standard, and yet 

this standard is the decisionmaking point. Ambassador Becker, you 

might want to answer that. Why is this? It seems inconsistent to 

me. 

Ms. BECKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The laws in Bolivia and 

Peru currently do not allow for aerial eradication. We are working 

with those governments to try to change those laws. In Colombia, 

aerial eradication obviously is permitted. The reason—there are 

two principal reasons for our desire to move as quickly as possible 

in the direction of granular herbicides in Colombia. 

The major reason has to do with safety of pilots. Granular herbicides can be applied from a significantly higher altitude than liquid, and the planes can be going significantly faster, making them 

far less vulnerable to ground fire, which has been a continuing 

problem. 

I should mention, Mr. Chairman, that we are extremely concerned about the issue of pilot safety and, in fact, have spent a fair 

amount of resources in trying to improve the safety of the Colombia 

police and the United States contract pilots who fly side by side 

with them both in terms of armoring the aircraft and in terms of 

providing escorts—helicopters and surveillance—to ensure that 

they are not flying into a difficult situation that they cannot get 

out of. 

The second attraction to granular herbicide is that, unlike liquid 

herbicide, it stays in the ground. Liquid herbicide can be washed 

off by rain. Statistically, it rains in Colombia at least one 1 of 3 

days. So, 1 out of 3—whatever—is applied to the plants, is not effective. 

With granular herbicide weather is not a factor. In addition, as 

I indicated in my testimony, granular herbicides are also far more 

effective than liquid herbicides against the opium poppy crop. 

Mr. HASTERT. Ambassador, it still somewhat puzzles me. Once 

they chose a granular herbicide, the State Department took it off 

the list. 

Ms. BECKER. No. 

Mr. HASTERT. And, the issue of the—I think—I was on the 

ground. I watched the eradication process take place. I also understand the great risk to those pilots, most of them Colombian pilots. 

And we should be worried about those, plus the safety of the airplane. But mostly the lives of the pilots. Yet we consistently withhold miniguns, which are part of that process, that can ensure the 

life and the safety of those pilots. And we’ve withheld them and not 

made them possible. That was really the issue that will protect the 

lives of those pilots. I will recognize Mr. Barrett at this time. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The first thing I want 

to address is the GAO issue. Mr. Hinton, am I to understand that 

you now have received the documents that you requested? 

Mr. HINTON. No, sir. Based on what we requested, we are 10 shy. 

Mr. BARRETT. Ten shy. Ambassador, can you address this, 

please? 

82

Ambassador FRECHETTE. No, Mr. Barrett, I cannot. This is a decision made by the Department of State, as I explained to the GAO 

team when they got down there. They can request the cables and 

the Department of State decides which of them they can receive. 

Mr. BARRETT. Ms. Becker. 

Ms. BECKER. Yes. The entire request from GAO totaled 517 documents, all of which were multiple pages from multiple sources, both 

from the Department of State and from the Embassy in Bogota. 

The initial request from GAO was in early April. And the initial 

access granted to the documents was—actually the dates were 

April 11, and the first set of documents was made available on 

April 24. That pace of production continued. 

In addition, we unfortunately were unable to identify some of the 

documents for which the GAO provided numbers, because the numbers were not numbers that we could identify. To the best of our 

ability, we provided, as quickly as possible and as extensively as 

possible, access to the documents. As was indicated in the testimony. And I will ask perhaps for you to recognize our legal advisor 

as appropriate. 

The documents were subject to a review process that is a standard review process that is mandated within the Department of 

State’s procedures. All documents were made available with the exception of one. Four other documents were not made available because they contained drafts of information that was available in 

final form through a public source, that is, the INCSR—the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 

Mr. BARRETT. Let me yield at this time to Mr. Blagojevich. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Barrett. Ambassador Becker, 

you were unable to complete your answer on the granular herbicide. Why was the granular herbicide taken off of the list by the 

State Department? 

Ms. BECKER. The granular herbicide was not taken off the list by 

the State Department. We provided, in the course of discussions 

with the Colombians on the movement to granular herbicide, at Colombian request, a list of all the granular herbicides that are licensed for use in the United States. There are seven. 

The Colombian Government, after deliberations within the cabinet level and discussions with us, we thought was going to pick—

the object of this was to pick a number for testing. They picked 

one, which turns out to be the most expensive and the one that requires the most applications in succession in order to kill coca 

plants. So we asked the Colombian Government to—so we agreed 

to test that one, but we would also like to test an additional herbicide in order to give a comparative view of which one was more effective. And, also, we were concerned, again, about pilot safety. 

Having to go back again and again to the same field, as we would 

with the one which was selected, we thought created far too dangerous a situation for the pilots involved in this effort. May I—just 

to set the record straight, it was not withdrawn. 

Second, if I may just say one thing about granular herbicides. We 

do not—the reason for the sensitivity, which there may have been. 

I’m not intimately and directly familiar with the documents that 

were the cause of difficulty, apparently, for the GAO relating to 

granular herbicides. The reason for the sensitivity is the trade 

83

names. Companies are concerned about the safety of their personnel. 

So we do not like to release information in public about what 

these herbicides are and what their trade names are. It’s a safety 

issue with regard to the employees of the companies. Thank you. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Can I just ask one more question? The procedure in terms of—the past procedure with the State Department, 

vis-a-vis, the GAO, in terms of document requests and so forth: has 

that changed recently? Was it past procedure to ask for specific 

documents and made specific requests, and now you’ve been asked 

to respond to more general kind of broad requests? Is that a fair 

question? 

Mr. THESSIN. Mr. Congressman, I think we have—my experience 

is more with the practice that we’ve had with Members of Congress 

and with congressional committees. We have had a number of congressional requests where the sensitive documents were in fact reviewed at the State Department. When we were asked for guidance 

in this particular case on how the GAO’s documents should be handled, we said, ‘‘We should have GAO review the documents at the 

State Department as well, the sensitive documents.’’

These sensitive documents are in the GAO’s offices in the State 

Department. They have access to those documents, regular access 

whenever they please. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Thank you. No further questions. 

Mr. BARRETT. If I could followup a little bit on the whole issue 

of the monitoring agreements. And, again, I turn to you, Ambassador. My understanding from the claims I’ve heard is that the 

delay in providing the military assistance has been related to an 

insistence on end use monitoring agreements. Can you talk on that 

issue, please? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes, I can, Mr. Barrett. I began discussing the question of the 506(a)(2) drawdown with the Colombian 

minister of defense on October 3, 1996. And I explained to him that 

we intended to make this equipment available but there would be 

some end use monitoring requirements as well as a human rights 

requirement. I continued to discuss this with the minister through 

November and December. 

As I got more instructions and more clear instructions from the 

Department of what it was that we were expecting the Colombians 

to give us in the way of assurances—the minister of defense is now 

the Ambassador of Colombia to Washington. And he departed Colombia on January 18th. On January 14th he had still not given 

me the assurances that he had been telling me that he would. On 

January 15th, 3 days before he departed for Washington, he gave 

me a letter which was simply not useful in terms of what he and 

I discussed for a very long period of time. 

So, I have explained carefully to that minister of defense and 

then to his successor, who lasted 6 weeks in office until it was revealed that he had received $30,000 from a narco-trafficker for a 

Senatorial campaign in 1989. I have continued to discuss it with 

the current minister of defense. 

My last meeting with the minister of defense, as I get more instructions from the Department—by now I have been discussing 

not just the 506(a)(2) drawdown, but the 614. My last meeting with 

84

him was on July 7, just before coming here. And again they refused 

to undertake to give us the human rights requirements that we 

have. 

Now, Colombia is a sovereign nation, Mr. Barrett, and it has a 

perfect right to refuse any assistance it wants to from the United 

States. But we’re also a sovereign nation. And the taxpayers of the 

United States and the Congress of the United States have a perfect 

right to put whatever conditions it wants on the giving of this assistance. So we’re sort of at a standoff. 

I don’t mean to say that the issue is closed. I intend to return 

to post tomorrow. I will return again to explain to the minister of 

defense what it is that we require in the way of human rights monitoring requirements. Because, quite frankly, as I told Chairman 

Hastert and the members of this subcommittee, I have been working since October 1996—that’s many, many months—to try to get 

assistance for the Colombian Army, for the Air Force and the Navy, 

to recognize the support that they have given since at least May 

1996 to a very good effort in the southern part of Colombia. Those 

are the facts. 

If I may also, Mr. Chairman, add a couple of things raised by Mr. 

Blagojevich earlier. The account given to you at my residence on 

May 26 about removing one herbicide—it was not accurate. We had 

asked the Colombians to approve at least four herbicides so that 

we could do tests. Scientific tests are better if you can try several 

different products. They chose the least noxious. 

I’m very happy to report—perhaps because the fact that this was 

raised in your presence, Mr. Chairman, and the members, and in 

the presence of your subcommittee on May 26—that they have approved a second herbicide. Now we can do some tests. And we can 

test two different herbicides to see whether one is more effective, 

not just in terms of lethality of killing the plants, but also in terms 

of cost, which is also an interest to the United States. We pay for 

that, not the Colombian Government. 

Now, with respect to the names of the herbicides, when—about 

a year ago, Mr. Chairman, the people in Colombia who provide 

what we call Roundup in this country—glyphosate is the generic 

name—were threatened. And at one point they were frightened to 

continue to sell us glyphosate so that we could continue the spraying. 

And at one point they even suggested that perhaps we could buy 

it from China, where they also produce it, or from Hungary, where 

they also produce it. This is a real problem in Colombia. Those people who produce these herbicides do not want the trade name 

known because then they will be threatened. And, of course, who 

threatens them? The narcos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTERT. Well, thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I just want to 

make just a couple comments before I pass it on. It baffles me why 

you are withholding any documents from the U.S. Congress. I just 

don’t understand that. And maybe through the process of this subcommittee hearing we can get some better explanation. 

Second, the whole issue on granular herbicides—I think it’s pretty trite of an issue. This is the only country we’ve held up because 

of the type of herbicide they’re using. No other countries are using 

herbicides, they’re starting to—but when you’re talking about a 

85

granular herbicide, and we’re denying that, we took it off. But they 

chose one. I don’t know how you want to explain it. You can explain it seven different ways, but they chose a granular herbicide 

to use because this is what the conditions we laid out were. 

One of them that we held out—they chose it, and then we said, 

‘‘Oh, you can’t use that one that we gave you because it’s too expensive.’’

We’re talking airplanes protection. We’re talking about human 

life protection. And most importantly, I mean, look at the billions 

and billions of dollars that we spend to try to snuff out drugs coming into this country. And at the same time we’re saying, ‘‘Oh, by 

the way, you can’t use this herbicide. It’s too expensive.’’ I pass it 

on to Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I’d first 

like to ask Mr. Hinton—the State Department said that down at 

the State Department, all the records you want to look at are in 

a location where you have access to them whenever you want to, 

is that correct? 

Mr. HINTON. I do not have all the documents, sir. 

Mr. BURTON. So they’re misleading us? Is that correct? 

Mr. HINTON. We do not have 10 documents. I have some classified documents in our possession that we have access to. The point 

that I’ve tried to make here, that it’s been over 2 months that it’s 

taken us to gentleman these. There’s been delays that we’ve encountered through the process. What we do now have—we’ve gotten the majority of them, Chairman Burton, and now we’re starting 

to go through them. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Thessin. 

Mr. THESSIN. We can account for only five documents that they 

do not have. 

Mr. BURTON. I thought you said just a moment ago that all the 

documents were at the State Department in an area where they 

had access to them. Is that correct or not? 

Mr. THESSIN. I’d have to have my——

Mr. BURTON. Well, you just said a few minutes ago, sir. 

Mr. THESSIN. What I was trying to communicate, Mr. Chairman, 

was—it came right after Ambassador Becker spoke about the five 

documents. The ones in Bogota—they were draft documents of the 

final report. Also, the one document that she had mentioned, that 

was a legal document that they did not have copies of. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, the bottom line is that all of the documents 

requested by GAO at the request of Congress have not yet been delivered so they can look at them. Is that correct? 

Mr. THESSIN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. There are five documents that we can’t account for. 

Mr. BURTON. OK. Thank you. That’s what I’d like to know. Because the implication a while ago of your answer was that they had 

access to everything when they don’t. And the Congress wants 

GAO to take a close look at this at our instruction. I would also 

like to ask Ambassador Frechette. Back in 1994, Chairman Gilman 

and I served on the International Operations Committee. A question was asked of Robert Gelbard then the Assistant Secretary of 

State for Latin America, as I recall, about these miniguns and why 

they were being held up. 

86

Also, there was some concern about the human rights record of 

the Danti unit—of the CNP down there. And I think that you 

said—or it was reported to the State Department and I believe to 

the Congress, that the Danti antinarcotics unit had a stellar 

human rights record. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. In the time that I have been in Colombia, sir, yes, they have had a very good record. And I got there on 

July 21, 1994. 

Mr. BURTON. OK. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. I am not familiar with the statements 

made by Assistant Secretary Gelbard to you, sir. 

Mr. BURTON. I understand. But the point is, in 1994 and after 

that, it was verified that the unit that would be utilizing these helicopters with miniguns, they had a stellar human rights record. And 

yet the miniguns were not and have not been delivered. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible for you to swear in Mike Ryan, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for the INL? I’d like to ask him a 

question or two? 

Mr. HASTERT. Is he present? 

Mr. BURTON. I believe he is. 

Mr. HASTERT. Would you——

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order here. I 

don’t recall that we’ve had this witness listed. 

Mr. HASTERT. The witness volunteered to testify—and we 

thought because of the numbers. But if he has information and is 

here and is willing to testify. 

Mr. BURTON. He has operational information, Mr. Chairman. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. HASTERT. Let the record show that the witness answered in 

the affirmative. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Ryan, I’ve spoken with you about the minigun 

issue I think more than once. You assured me that you would monitor the progress of the delivery and keep me informed. Moreover, 

you informed my staff that these miniguns would be delivered, 

mounted, and in operation within 30 days of our conversation. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, point of order. I don’t know who 

this gentleman is. 

Mr. HASTERT. Would you state your name? 

Mr. RYAN. I’m sorry, sir. My name is Michael Ryan. My job is 

Executive Director Comptroller of the INL bureau in the Department of State. And currently I’m Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary reporting to Ambassador Becker. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, if I may continue my point of order. 

It appears obvious that Chairman Burton has some prepared questions. My understanding of the rules is that we have 3 days prior 

notice of a witness. It seems to me that the chairman has prepared 

questions. He knew that this gentleman was going to be a witness. 

Point of order. 

Mr. HASTERT. Ambassador Becker and Mr. Ryan are cohorts. 

They work together. He is support for Ambassador Becker. And I 

would assume that his testimony would be part of her testimony 

as well. Do you have any objection, Ambassador Becker? 

Ms. BECKER. No, Mr. Chairman, I don’t. And I don’t know what 

the rules of your committee are, to be honest. 

87

Mr. BARRETT. Is it correct—if I may ask Ambassador Becker—

is he a support person for you, so I understand the relationship between you two? 

Ms. BECKER. Yes, Mr. Barrett, he is. And he is more familiar 

with the specific details on the minigun question that Congressman 

Burton is asking than I am. He is more familiar with those details. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you. 

Ms. BECKER. Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I hope that this will not take away 

from my time so I can conclude my questions. 

Mr. HASTERT. You have 1 minute and 17 seconds extra. 

Mr. RYAN. I’ll talk fast. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Ryan, let me restate the question. I’ve spoken 

with you about the minigun issue. You assured me that you monitor the progress of the delivery and keep me informed. Moreover, 

you informed my staff that the miniguns would be delivered, 

mounted and in operation within 30 days of our consultation, 

which by my calculation should have been by the first week in 

July. Now can you inform me as to the current status of the 

miniguns? 

Mr. RYAN. Yes, sir. When we last spoke, we had—to back up the 

situation so everybody understands. We had requested 12 miniguns 

systems through normal channels in February. We made the request in the way we always request a loan of equipment from 

DOD. We’ve done it for M–60 machine guns in the past. We saw 

that request staffed through the Army up into the Assistant Secretary of the Army level here in Washington. And there was obviously a real reluctance on the part of the Army, which I don’t quite 

understand, to release the weapon systems to us. 

As a result of, I believe, your call, Mr. Chairman, to an official 

within DOD——

Mr. BURTON. Yes. 

Mr. RYAN [continuing]. On the very next day we received a letter 

faxed that they’d sent to you saying that the 12 systems would be 

released to us. The systems were in Anniston Army depot. At that 

time I thought that they had 12 systems, that they would package 

them, and send them to our depot in Patrick Air Force Base. 

I’m experienced with these kinds of matters. I wanted to inspect 

the systems. Because it’s a serious matter. It’s not sophisticated, 

but it’s a lethal system. We wanted to inventory it, to get serial 

numbers on all the parts, to make sure that we knew what we had. 

And I also wanted to make sure that we had the complete systems. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me——

Mr. RYAN. And I found out on Monday when I came back from 

leave that, in fact, on the 20th, a shipment arrived at Patrick, my 

staff opened them, inspected them, and found that they were barrel 

bolt assemblies, which while very useful and will be useful to the 

Colombians and to us, were not what we had expected. They were 

not a complete system. 

Mr. BURTON. They’re missing the motors? 

Mr. RYAN. Missing the feeder/clinkers and a number of other 

items. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, somebody said that this was due to a clerical 

error and that they were hunting for the motor somewhere else in 

88

the defense inventory. You informed us that you’re still looking for 

the motors or they are, and you’ve assured that they would be delivered, mounted and in operation by the first week in July. And, 

of course, that has not yet happened. 

You said that you would try to get them on the second of two 

channel flights to Colombia on July 16 or 23? 

Mr. RYAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BURTON. However, they need to be a high enough priority. 

Can we be assured today that it’s going to be a top priority to get 

them on those planes? 

Mr. RYAN. All I can do is request from the Department of Defense to put them on the planes. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest or urge that we get 

a hold of the Department of Defense and make sure this is a top 

notch, high priority. I would just like to end up by saying, first of 

all, we’d like to know who we need to call to make sure they’re on 

those flights. Second, an awful lot of the CNP officers have been 

killed, and we just wonder how many more have to be killed before 

this problem is solved. 

These miniguns should have been delivered in 1994. The people 

that are going to handle them have a stellar human rights record 

according to the Ambassador. There’s no need for them not to be 

delivered. We need to get them down there and we need to get 

them down there right now. 

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I think we have a representative 

from the Department of Defense here and I’m sure he took note of 

what you said. The gentleman from Maryland. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ryan, 

let me go back to what you were just talking about. It’s my understanding that from what Mr. Burton just said that somebody in the 

Department of Defense said there was some kind of clerical error 

here? 

Mr. RYAN. Well, let me—I don’t completely understand it myself, 

sir, so let me not try to pretend that I know more than I know. 

But yesterday, it was explained that there was some confusion at 

the depot or warehouse. They just didn’t ship or they didn’t have 

the proper parts that they thought they had, that the parts were 

not compatible with Hueys but were compatible with UH–60’s. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. RYAN. And when they shipped the bolt barrel assemblies, it 

didn’t include the motors. The Department of Defense stepped up 

to the plate—the Office of the Secretary of Defense—and said that 

they would help us expeditiously try to find the proper motors, if 

they weren’t indeed at Anniston and procure them. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you have any reason not to believe what they 

said? 

Mr. RYAN. I don’t have any reason not to believe, sir, no. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Well, I don’t think that there’s anybody 

on this side that would disagree that if there’s been a clerical error, 

we would like to see that clerical error cleared up and that these 

miniguns be delivered. I’m sure I speak for our side. 

Mr. RYAN. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. We want to do everything that we can, of course, 

to address this drug problem, because it’s a very serious problem. 

89

Mr. Ambassador, let me move on to you. I’m concerned about this 

human rights situation. And you said that you had had discussions 

with one Ambassador, the head of the defense, who lasted 6 weeks. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Three defense ministers. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Can you—I know you can’t disclose 

maybe certain information. Can you tell us about these discussions 

as best you can, what your concerns were, and give us an idea of 

what kind of problems you had? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes, sir. I was instructed to tell the Colombians that they had to give us certain assurances, not just with 

respect to the use of this equipment for counternarcotics, but also 

for human rights, to make sure that they were not in any way used 

for violations of human rights. This is a very sensitive issue in Colombia, sir. It’s a very sensitive issue to the military. And, quite 

honestly, it was very difficult for the Colombians to in the end 

make a commitment to meet our conditions. And they still haven’t 

done so. 

Almost 9 months plus of discussions—they still—they come very 

close to a settlement and then they back away. And, as I said, I 

have explained as I get further clarification from the Department 

what it is we want. It seems to me we’re getting close, and then 

it eludes me again; they refuse to do it. 

I am going back, and I intend to raise the issue again, hoping 

that we can close the deal so that we can make equipment available to the Colombia Army, to the Air Force, the Navy, as well as 

the national police. We don’t have these human rights problems or 

end use monitoring with the national police for two reasons: No. 1, 

All the equipment we give to the police is only to the counternarcotics police—that’s all they do is fight narcos; and, No. 2, That 

unit, which is only 2.5 percent of the total force of the national police—there are about 100,000 national police, and we deal with 

2,500 of them. The counternarcotics police have a very good human 

rights record, at least since I have been in Colombia. And they jealously guard that. They make sure that there are no suspicions or 

any violations of human rights. 

So I will continue, sir, trying to get this assistance. Because we 

in Colombia and in the Department have tried very hard to make 

available counternarcotics assistance to the armed forces of Colombia to recognize the fact that since at least May 1996 they have 

been working hand in hand with the national police in the southern region of Colombia. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me make sure I understand this. Negotiations—as a lawyer I’ve been involved in a lot of negotiations. And 

there are a lot of times you have situations where you have a list 

of things that you want. And then maybe let’s say you have 10 

things and you’re able to get 8. And then you try to figure out, can 

you compromise on the other two or whatever. Are these the kind 

of negotiations you have where you have a list of things you want 

and you just can’t get all of them and then, do you go back to the 

State Department? How does that work? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes, sir. I get the instructions from the 

State Department. I then present the position of the State Department—actually the U.S. Government. Because other agencies are 

involved in preparing this position. I present it to the Colombians 

90

and then they give me their reaction. Yes, they like it. No, they 

don’t like it. They’d like to have this changed. They wouldn’t like 

to have this changed. And in some cases, the changes they propose 

I know are simply unacceptable simply from the background documentation given to me by the Department. In other cases I don’t. 

I refer them to the Department. 

I am not a lawyer. It is the Department that fixes that position 

for us. And then the Department tells us, this is acceptable, this 

is not acceptable. As a matter of fact, on the 614, we have now 

made two proposals to the Colombians. The first one they rejected 

for a number of reasons which were unacceptable to us because 

they didn’t meet the requirements of the law or the policy that we 

had established for giving counternarcotics assistance to the armed 

forces. 

So the Department and other agencies, crafted a totally new proposal, a very different one that we thought met their requirements. 

But to my frustration and disappointment, I found out that that 

also did not meet their requirements. As I said, I will keep going 

back to them as long as I can, because I would like to make available equipment to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. And so 

does the Department of State. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTERT. I now recognize Chairman Gilman from New York. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let me 

try to set the record straight on the Leahy amendment. It does not 

apply, as I understand it, to a 506 drawdown or to the 614 waiver. 

I just don’t understand the rationale of attempting to apply it to 

those situations. Does anyone want to comment on that? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Mr. Gilman, the decision to apply the provisions 

relating to human rights of the Leahy amendment to articles provided under the narcotics legislation was a matter of policy. It was 

a policy decision. The decision was made to provide a consistency 

in the kinds of end use monitoring that we would conduct in Colombia and other countries that were receiving or are receiving 

goods, services, and military equipment from more than one account in the United States. 

The idea of providing consistency makes good sense. If a certain 

item is provided out of one governmental pot of money in the 

United States—let’s say a helicopter. If the same helicopter is provided from another governmental pot of money, it seems to me that 

if we’re going to have our messages understood about human rights 

in what we want to do, and established clear cooperation with the 

country in question, then it makes sense to have clear guidance 

that are applicable in all cases. 

Mr. GILMAN. What do you base your application of the Leahy 

amendment to the 506 drawdown and the 614? What language are 

you using? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. We’re using the language of the Leahy amendment. And as a matter of policy we made the decision to move 

ahead and apply it to 506 and 614. 

Mr. GILMAN. Doesn’t that apply only to INL money? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. The Leahy amendment itself. And I’ll ask the head 

of INL—yes, is restricted in its application. However, a policy decision was made to amplify that application. 

91

Mr. GILMAN. Well, you’re holding up all of the assistance, and yet 

this applies only to INL money. Perhaps the INL representative 

could clarify that for us. 

Ms. BECKER. Yes, sir. The Leahy amendment applies to—in its 

entirety—including certification by the Secretary of State—that no 

funding from the INL account is going to any unit of any security 

force that is suspected—where credible evidence exists that there 

has been an engagement in gross human rights violations. The certification only applies to the INL account. 

However, as Ambassador Davidow indicated, there was an administration——

Mr. GILMAN. Could you move the mic a little closer to you, 

please? 

Ms. BECKER. OK. Sorry. However, as Ambassador Davidow indicated, there was an administration decision taken that the Leahy 

standards without the certification—the Leahy standards would 

apply to all counternarcotics assistance. 

Mr. GILMAN. Well, isn’t that extending it beyond the statute? 

You’re extending it to all situations, and yet the Leahy amendment 

was only applicable to the INL account. 

Ms. BECKER. In strict point of fact, sir, that is true. However, in 

the course of the consultations that the administration undertook 

with the Congress in support of the 506(a)(2) package and the 

preconsultations that were undertaken in April on the 614 package, it was made very clear by a number of key members that unless there were standards similar to Leahy applied to these transfers that those members would oppose them quite strenuously. 

Mr. GILMAN. Secretary Becker, who were those consultations 

with? I’m chairman of the International Relations Committee. I 

don’t recall any consultation. Chairman Burton may recall come 

consultation. 

Mr. BURTON. I recall no consultation, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILMAN. Who were your consultations with? 

Ms. BECKER. They were with the—I will have to get the specific 

names of staff who were consulted. 

Mr. GILMAN. With staff? Are you saying consultations were with 

staff? 

Ms. BECKER. They were with the staffs of the Appropriations and 

Operations committees on both sides of the aisle. 

Mr. GILMAN. Authorization committee? 

Ms. BECKER. Both the House and the Senate were consulted, sir, 

at the time. And we received at least two communications from—

one from the Senate—both from the Senate with regard to the opposition of various Senators to the 614 package and the 506A package unless there was appropriate attention paid to human rights 

considerations, as expressed. I would be very happy to share those. 

Mr. GILMAN. Are you saying there were only two letters, and 

they came from the Senate? Is that correct? 

Ms. BECKER. There are two letters. Excuse me, one of the letters 

from the Senate was signed by 12 Members and the other—I’m 

sorry, the other is from the House, sir, signed by 5 Members. 

Mr. GILMAN. Who signed the House letter? 

Ms. BECKER. Congressmen Pelosi, Yates, Obey, Torres and 

Lowey. 

92

Mr. BURTON. Are any of those in the majority? 

Mr. GILMAN. What was the date of that letter? 

Ms. BECKER. March 20. 

Mr. GILMAN. March 20? 

Ms. BECKER. 1997. 

Mr. GILMAN. Were there any majority Members and were any of 

the Members on our International Relations Committee? 

Ms. BECKER. The committee staff—as I said, both sides of the 

aisle—were briefed on this package. And as a result of this briefing, this letter was received. 

Mr. GILMAN. But none of these Members that you recited are 

members of our International Relations Committee. Were there any 

of those Members, Mr. Burton, of your committee? 

Mr. BURTON. There were none of my committee. I think it’s reprehensible they make a decision with only one side. 

Ms. BECKER. May I also refer to the letter from the Senate, 

which was dated October and which refers to the 506(a)(2) package 

and to subsequent packages, which was signed by Senators Leahy, 

Dodd, Kerry, Jeffords, Obey, Yates, Sarbanes, Feingold and Representatives Torres, Hamilton, and Senator Harkin, which requests 

that in the future under 506(a)(2) and any other counternarcotics 

assistance, that written agreements for the transfer and receipt of 

lethal equipment or aircraft, that there be an explicit understanding with regard to those transfers. 

Mr. HASTERT. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Ms. BECKER. In addition to that, may I also—I’m sorry, sir. 

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I’m going to ask that those letters 

be made part of the record. 

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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45991.054
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45991.055
95


45991.056
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45991.057
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45991.058
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Mr. GILMAN. And I certainly would raise an objection to the fact 

that you had an agreement with the House and essentially, neither 

of the committees that have jurisdiction—the authorization committees—were consulted with regard to this change in policy. 

Mr. HASTERT. I’m going to move on, but I just want to make a 

comment. I just find it very interesting that we’re changing policy 

here not because of law or not because of the letter of the law, but 

because of interpretation of letters that are passed on. That might 

be a new way to legislate here. We’ll just write letters, and we’ll 

get the things done. But I am just aghast at what I hear. I’m going 

to yield to the gentleman from Chicago, IL. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to just 

open by saying that I had the pleasure of going down to South 

America with Chairman Hastert and the codel that specifically 

studied this issue of drug interdiction, not only in Colombia, but in 

Peru, Bolivia, and in Panama, as well. I will say as a ranking 

freshman on that codel who happens also to be a freshman and the 

only Democrat who happened to be there, it was a journey that was 

done in a bipartisan way. 

And while we probably did not reach the same conclusions on all 

of the issues, there is an area where I think all of the members 

on our trip would agree, and that is on the success of the Peruvian 

air interdiction campaign, interdicting the coca base from Peru to 

Colombia before it’s manufactured in the labs in Colombia. And because of that success, the desire of drug traffickers to do their 

transport either by ground or on the rivers, which leads to me to 

my question. 

I’d like to direct this to Mr. Newberry. And that is, the appropriations from the Department of Defense is presently in the Senate, I understand, in trying to get some of the necessary assets to 

supplement the riverine efforts down in South America, particularly in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia. Can you tell us how that is 

going and what, if anything, we here on this committee can do so 

that we can try to get the money necessary to be able to help the 

drug interdiction war by providing those resources on the rivers 

down in South America? 

Mr. NEWBERRY. Yes, sir, I’d be pleased to. You’re correct in saying that the traffic apparently is moving toward the rivers at this 

time, not that air is completely gone. Much of the traffic on the 

river is to get the coca paste close to the borders so that they can 

short hop the flights across and deter detection with the short 

hops. Traffickers also overfly Brazil as a way to transit from Peru 

to Colombia. 

As you are aware, we already in the Department of Defense have 

authority to provide training and have authority to provide or establish bases of operation. When you look at Peru especially and 

some parts of Colombia, to startup a good riverine program you 

need all three things: training, bases of operation, and equipment. 

Although we can provide equipment through section 506 and by 

providing excess equipment to help out in the air detection and 

monitoring—air interdiction—we don’t have that capability when it 

comes to small boats. We don’t have a large inventory of small 

boats. The special forces have some. But not really sufficient to esVerDate jul 14 2003 15:01 Dec 08, 2003 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HEARINGS\45991 45991
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tablish a riverine program in Peru or to enhance the one in Colombia. They have one started. 

The authority we’ve asked for was an extension of a similar authority we got this year for Mexico, where we were allowed to procure and transfer new equipment and also procure parts and provide maintenance support for systems. In Mexico it was oriented 

toward helping out with the UH–1H helicopters that we’re transferring to them. 

To do the riverine program we were asking for 5 years of authority to help out Peru and Colombia. The need for the 5 year authority is a lesson we learned with Mexico. In order to work with our 

budget office and actually construct a long-term program, you need 

more than 1 year authority or incremental authority. 

One year authority allows us to go out and buy something really 

quick, get something going. But we can’t program through the 

budget process for the next year and for the follow on years unless 

we have an extended authority. And that’s why we were really asking for the 5 year program. 

I solicit your help. We are under some criticism right now because it is a new initiative. We’re being asked—there’s concerns—

well, are we stepping into the riverine program without a real 

threat assessment? In fact, we’ve had a recent threat assessment 

done by Defense Intelligence Agency, and CNC is doing one now at 

the request of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. 

There are concerns about a plan. As many of you are aware, 

SOUTHCOM developed a concept for riverine as part of the overall 

program in South America. The Peruvian country team has developed a strategy recently which is similar in substance to the 

SOUTHCOM concept. And now it’s time to do a plan. 

There’s concern that the plan doesn’t exist yet, that we don’t 

have a coordinated inter-agency plan, that we don’t have a joint 

country team SOUTHCOM plan. I think that’s maybe an unnecessary concern. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Could I just interject a minute? 

Mr. NEWBERRY. There’s nothing that DOD ever does without a 

plan. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Right. 

Mr. NEWBERRY. I can tell you, we don’t polish shoes without a 

plan. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. I must tell you, though, while we were there 

we had the opportunity of being briefed by SOUTHCOM. And it 

certainly seemed to me that they had an idea of the need for the 

resources down on the rivers and, in particular, how they would 

use them. I would only remind you that I can speak for myself. I 

am very supportive of the concept of trying to be able to get those 

resources so we can help the riverine process. And I would only ask 

you to tell us what we need to do to help get that necessary money 

and to send it in the conference. 

Mr. NEWBERRY. There is some concern in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about us circumventing the FMF system, or foreign assistance program. I think, if you know DOD well, we certainly don’t give away our money easily. And it was quite an accomplishment in our building just to get through our building legisVerDate jul 14 2003 15:01 Dec 08, 2003 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HEARINGS\45991 45991
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lation that we would actually use DOD funds to buy something and 

give it away to somebody. 

We’ve offered that. We’ve offered it for a short-term program to 

get the riverine system started. And then once it’s established, to 

back away from long-term sustainment. So we’re not circumventing 

the system, we’re really supplementing it in a small way. We do 

have money already for training. We have money we can use for 

building facilities. 

We just need the funds for procuring systems. Anything that you 

can do to help on the Senate side or to get an amendment to get 

this thing going, I’d appreciate it. Right now the Senate Authorization Committee does have something for Mexico, Peru and Colombia. We’d like to keep it on the dock. Then in conference with the 

House, get the legislation passed. 

The House right now has nothing. They didn’t approve anything 

on the House side. 

Mr. HASTERT. The time of the gentleman has expired. I just want 

to say, I really appreciate Mr. Blagojevich giving up some time 

around Memorial Day to accompany us on a trip. It was certainly 

a bipartisan effort. He made a great contribution. And I have to 

say that General Wes Clark from SOUTHCOM is really working I 

think some good concepts and perspective. 

We’re losing him to the European command, unfortunately. And 

the DEA has worked to make especially the riverine project workable. So we keep that in mind. Now I yield to the gentleman from 

Florida, Mr. Mica. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Frechette, 

good to see you back. And I appreciate the opportunity to work 

with you over the years in different capacities. As you know, in the 

opening statement Chairman Burton referred to the missionaries 

that have been held hostage longer than I guess any other American hostages. Those three missionaries are from my district. 

And we’ve discussed the situation. I had lost some hope actually 

from the beginning of year. We now have a number of positive indications that they may be alive and continue to be held. I understand that there was a trade of some prisoners or hostages—military. Has there been any additional indication possibly from any of 

these individuals—are they being interrogated as to the whereabouts or to the condition of our three Christian hostages that are 

being held? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Mr. Mica, as you know, you and I have 

discussed this issue over the phone. I assured you that throughout 

my time—because these were kidnapped fully a year and a half before I arrived in Colombia—we have pursued every single lead. I 

have been visited by the spouses of these three missionaries. It’s 

heartbreaking, because they ask me, ‘‘Are they alive or are they 

dead?’’

I always give them the same answer: ‘‘We occasionally get indications that they might be alive and we track down every single indication.’’ Here I might say that I have a legal attache—that is, some 

FBI people—in the mission. They work very hard with this. I have 

gone many times to the Colombians to ask for their cooperation 

with respect to this. 

101

We did ask them when this trade of the 60 soldiers and the 10 

Marines was going to take place on June 15 if they would consider 

asking for them, and the answer was, no. I want to assure you, sir, 

that we will continue to followup every lead. I’m not at liberty at 

this open session to tell you some of things that we have done, 

some of the governments that we have gone to to ask for information on this. 

I might also say that for a very long time, the FARC—which is 

the guerilla group that we believe took them—have not even confirmed that they have them. In other words, they were taken by 

the FARC in Panama, not in Colombia. But the FARC crossed the 

border and then took them back into Colombia. 

But for a very long time the FARC has refused to acknowledge 

that they even have them. We believe they did take them. And in 

some of these messages that we have sent to the FARC from intermediaries from other governments we have said, ‘‘For goodness 

sake, return them.’’ And the answer given to these intermediaries 

from other countries is generally they won’t even acknowledge that 

they have them. But let me assure you as I’ve assured the families 

continually, we will continue to follow every lead, every possible indication that they may be alive. 

Mr. MICA. Were any of the individuals—was anyone from our 

State Department involved in the negotiation for the release of 60 

Colombians and 10 Marines? They were not. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. No, sir. They were not. 

Mr. MICA. Is it that——

Ambassador FRECHETTE. There was one American international 

observer at the time that those people were handed over. He is Mr. 

Robert Pastor of the Carter Center in Atlanta. But nobody from the 

United States Government was involved in any way in the negotiations for the release of those 60 soldiers and 10 Colombian Marines. 

Mr. MICA. Has anyone from the State Department, to your 

knowledge, or Office of the President, expressed to the Colombians 

our interest in securing the release of our three hostages, say, 

above your level, to your knowledge, in the last 6 months? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. I believe so. But I can’t tell you when 

and who did it, but I believe so. I believe that there have been people more senior to me and not just in the State Department who 

have raised this issue. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Mr. Mica, if I may add something? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. The issue—of course, you know there are six 

American hostages in Colombia. We are concerned with all of them. 

In relation to the 3 that you are mentioning, just recently—indeed, 

coincidental with the return of the 60 or 70 Colombian soldiers, we 

had conversations with a friendly government that was represented 

at that turnover ceremony. 

At our request, we initiated contact to see if there were something that could be done in terms of the, in particular, the three 

that you have noted. The friendly government, which I don’t identify for obvious reasons in this session, made it quite clear that this 

is a major concern of the U.S. Government. The conversations that 

were held with FARC representatives——

102

Mr. HASTERT. Would the gentleman yield for a second? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Sure. 

Mr. HASTERT. You said friendly government? I couldn’t quite understand. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Yes. I’m sorry. 

Mr. HASTERT. Friendly government? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Yes. A government that is——

Mr. HASTERT. Friendly to us? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HASTERT. And also is friendly to the FARC? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. No, sir. 

Mr. HASTERT. Has contact with the FARC? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. No, sir. It’s not friendly to the FARC. It is seen 

as a government that has——

Mr. HASTERT. I’m just trying—they have contacts and they 

can——

Mr. DAVIDOW. They have. 

Mr. HASTERT. OK. I’m just trying to clarify. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. They have. But not contacts which would in any 

way help the FARC. 

Mr. HASTERT. OK. I yield back to the gentleman from Florida. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Yes. The response was from the FARC representatives who were at the turnover had no information. The FARC is 

an organization which is highly fractionated. There is no indication 

that the group that was holding the Colombian Marines is the 

same group that may be holding the three missionaries. 

As Ambassador Frechette has said, one of the requests that we 

made through the intermediary was to receive some indication that 

the three gentleman are indeed alive. It’s an unfortunate topic to 

discuss. There has been no indication or credible information that 

I’m aware of in recent years that the gentleman are alive. We’d like 

to see some of that. But I just wanted to inform you about this. 

We can talk in greater depth in some other forum. This is a topic 

that we are following at the State Department as well as at the 

Embassy in Bogota. 

Mr. MICA. Well, my time has expired. But I do want to inform 

all the representatives of State and other agencies that this is a 

priority—these three hostages and the other three Americans. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. MICA. If Colombia can secure the release of their own folks, 

it should certainly be one of our priorities to secure the release of 

our citizens. If it isn’t, we need to know what’s going on. 

Mr. HASTERT. The time of the gentleman is expired. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr. 

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to insert into the record an article from the July 8 edition of La Nacion, 

which lists the—looks like about 20—brave Colombian military and 

other individuals who were killed when the helicopter was shot 

down just last weekend. 

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

103


45991.059
104

Mr. BARR. And I would appreciate all of the State Department 

witnesses at least considering in their own minds whether or not 

those brave men would be alive today had it not been for the 

bloviation, the obfuscation and the delays which we have been witnessing with the last many months in providing the helicopters, 

the guns, the ammunition, the armor plating, the vests and all the 

other equipment that is designed to save lives and defend. 

I’d also like, Mr. Chairman, to request unanimous consent to insert two pages of Title XXXI of the United States Code Section 716, 

which was referred to earlier by Mr. Hinton, which provides the 

authority under which the GAO ‘‘shall’’—that is a word quoted 

from the statute—be given the information that they have requested and that we have requested through them, and draw specific reference to the fact that the GAO may bring a civil action to 

enforce its requests and it may seek an order of contempt for failure to provide that. 

And I would encourage the GAO to reread those statutes and 

take some action. 

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

105


45991.060
106


45991.061
107

Mr. BARR. I would also like unanimous consent to insert into the 

record a letter dated July 7, 1997, from the U.S. Department of 

State by Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs—

a one-page letter and a three-page attachment. This is the 614 

waiver letter. And I’d like, Mr. Chairman, to have that inserted 

into the record. 

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

108


45991.062
109


45991.063
110


45991.064
111


45991.065
112

Mr. BARR. Mr. Thessin, on page 3 of the attachment to that letter, that attachment being titled: ‘‘Memorandum of Justification 

Under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act to Support the 

Provision of Foreign Military Financing Funds and International 

Military Education and Training to the Government of Colombia.’’

The second paragraph on page 3 says the following: ‘‘We would 

conduct a case by case review before expending any funds that 

have been committed to FMS cases and would proceed only with 

those cases we judged to be fully justified on counternarcotics 

grounds and consistent with our legal and policy requirements concerning human rights.’’

Is that a giant loophole that is going to be used as a justification 

for the Department of State to continue to delay and delay and 

delay the provision of this necessary equipment to the Colombians? 

Mr. THESSIN. Mr. Congressman, I am not an expert on that section. Let me have Ambassador Becker——

Mr. BARR. You’re not an expert on it? When we were down in Colombia we heard many references to the fact that it was in fact 

your office that was making these interpretations that were leading 

to the delays in providing the equipment. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Well——

Mr. BARR. Maybe that’s the reason you’re not an expert. 

Mr. THESSIN. I am not personally involved in that matter, so 

I——

Mr. BARR. You did not review this letter? 

Mr. THESSIN. No. I had no personal involvement with the letters. 

I’m sorry. 

Mr. BARR. OK. These letters from the Assistant Secretary for 

Legislative Affairs that deal with references to U.S. laws that deal 

with interpretations of the laws under which waivers are conducted 

did not go through the legal office at the Department of State? 

Mr. THESSIN. No, let me clarify, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. BARR. Please do. 

Mr. THESSIN. I was asked to attend this hearing because of my 

knowledge about document procedures. 

Mr. BARR. OK. So you don’t know anything about this? You don’t 

know what that language means? 

Mr. THESSIN. No. I think Ambassador Becker can address that. 

Mr. BARR. Let me decide who I want to answer my questions. Do 

you know what that language means? 

Mr. THESSIN. I’d have to study it, Mr. Congressman. I’m sorry 

that I haven’t studied it. 

Mr. BARR. Do any of the witnesses know what that language 

means? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARR. Let’s hear it, please. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. The language refers to what I was discussing before. In the provision of U.S. assistance overseas concern for human 

rights is a fundamental factor. 

Mr. BARR. Under what statute? Are these the so-called human 

rights assurances that Ambassador Frechette kept referring to? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARR. Under what specific legal authority can that be used 

as an impediment to providing aid that Congress has determined 

113

should go to that country and that the President has requested a 

waiver? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. I am not aware, Congressman. Congressman, 

what we are trying to do, sir, is to ensure that no equipment will 

be provided to units if we have credible evidence that such units 

have committed gross human rights violations. 

Mr. BARR. OK. So what we’re talking about here is the Leahy 

law? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Well, the spirit of the Leahy law. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARR. No. Answer—are we talking about the Leahy law? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Leahy——

Mr. BARR. I don’t know what the spirit of Leahy means, and I’m 

getting tired of hearing about it. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Well——

Mr. BARR. Are we talking about the Leahy law? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Yes. We’re talking about——

Mr. BARR. OK. The Leahy law says—and the State Department 

legal office may not be familiar with this, so let me read it—‘‘None 

of the funds made available under this heading may be provided 

to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence to believe such unit has committed gross violations of human rights,’’ et cetera. 

Where in there is the authority for the Ambassador to a particular country—in this case Colombia—to demand human rights 

assurances before lawfully certified equipment is given to the Colombian forces? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. It——

Mr. BARR. This says—and I think it’s an important point—this 

doesn’t say anything about demanding assurances. This says that 

only if the State Department has credible evidence of gross violations of human rights can the assistance be held up. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. What the Ambassador has been trying to obtain 

under the instructions of the government and the State Department is assurances from the Government of Colombia that they accept the human rights provision. And, indeed, if it is the role of 

this committee of Congress that we should not be concerned about 

human rights or critical evidence that human rights violations——

Mr. BARR. No. Now, come on. That’s not the point at all. What 

I’m talking about here is language in statutes——

Mr. DAVIDOW. Right. 

Mr. BARR [continuing]. That we here, at least, up here, believe 

have some meaning and ought to be adhered to. There is a difference between the language of the Leahy law and what the Ambassador was talking about, demanding assurances of human 

rights. And I’m just curious as to where this requirement that 

human rights assurances be given. I would also—may I ask unanimous consent for 1 more minute, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. HASTERT. I’ll give you a minute off of my time. 

Mr. BARR. OK. Unless we’re going to have another round? 

Mr. HASTERT. We’re going to have another round. 

Mr. BARR. OK. I’ll hold. 

Mr. HASTERT. You reserve? 

Mr. BARR. Sure. 

114

Mr. HASTERT. All right. Let me ask Mr. Marshall a couple things. 

The DEA, a year ago, for fiscal year 1997, this committee and others were very instrumental in making sure that 15 DEA agents 

were added to the ability for—were added to Colombia—to be able 

to do that. Now, DEA agents, as you well know, do a number of 

things: intelligence, special agents, all types of things. Why haven’t 

you put those 15 agents in? How come they’re not inserted in the 

country? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Chairman, following the allocation of the——

Mr. HASTERT. And let me just clarify—this is the 10th month of 

that fiscal year. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, DEA requested in the NSDD38 

process in a cable in January of this year authorization to place 11 

special agents and 4 support personnel. And thus far we have received approval to place four special agents and three support personnel. 

Mr. HASTERT. When did you get that approval? 

Mr. MARSHALL. I’m sorry, sir? 

Mr. HASTERT. When did you get that approval? 

Mr. MARSHALL. When? June 6 according to my records, sir. 

Mr. HASTERT. All right——

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, let me clarify that. The support positions 

were approved on April 24, the four agent positions were approved 

on June 6. 

Mr. HASTERT. And some of those were replacement, is that right? 

Mr. MARSHALL. No, sir. I’m referring directly to the new agents. 

Mr. HASTERT. Who makes that decision? 

Mr. MARSHALL. It’s done through the NSDD38 process. And the 

State Department people would be better qualified to answer——

Mr. HASTERT. Well, who do you deal with? 

Mr. MARSHALL. We deal with INL and ARA, and we actually, on 

the local level, deal with the Embassy there through the NSDD38 

process. 

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Thessin, can you tell us, why aren’t they 

there. 

Mr. THESSIN. Ambassador Becker. 

Mr. HASTERT. Ambassador Becker, that’s fine. 

Ms. BECKER. Yes. Mr. Chairman, the NSDD38 process, which is 

administered by the State Department reserves to the Chief of Mission determination with regard——

Mr. HASTERT. Who is the Chief of Mission? 

Ms. BECKER. Ambassador Frechette. 

Mr. HASTERT. So maybe I should ask Ambassador Frechette, 

right? We’ve gone one, two, three, boom, you’re in. 

Ms. BECKER. I was just explaining how the process works, sir. 

Mr. HASTERT. Why haven’t they been in country? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Mr. Chairman, I represent the President of the United States in Colombia. The President of the United 

States has instructed every Ambassador in the world under the 

NSDD38 procedure to make sure that each new position, from 

whatever agency of the Federal Government, asked to be placed in 

an Embassy, to be reviewed by the chief of mission, No. 1, to make 

sure that that position is consistent with the goals of that agency 

115

at that post; No. 2, is consistent with the goals of the post in general; and, No. 3, that there is room for that person, and so on. 

There is a series of——

Mr. HASTERT. That’s why they’re not there? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE [continuing]. Requirements levied upon 

each Ambassador by the President of the United States. 

Mr. HASTERT. You’ve made that decision that there’s no room? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. I beg your pardon, sir? 

Mr. HASTERT. There’s no room in your Embassy? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. No, sir. I didn’t say that. 

Mr. HASTERT. DEA—Drug Enforcement Agency——

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. HASTERT. A drug problem in Colombia. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. HASTERT. I’m just asking——

Ambassador FRECHETTE. I was asked for 15 positions. So far I 

have approved seven. I have informed Mr. Burton, who is not with 

us any longer, that that process of discussion with the Bogota country attache of the DEA will continue. And we will continue so that 

he can explain to me what it is those people——

Mr. HASTERT. Let me just remind you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. If I may, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTERT. I reclaim my time. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. HASTERT. Let me remind you that appropriation was made 

last year—a year ago, over a year ago. The fiscal year started October 1, 1996. We’re 10 months into that fiscal year. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. I understand. 

Mr. HASTERT. It was certainly the intent of this Congress to supplement the ability for the folks that we have in country—and 

you’re chief of mission—and your mission—to do a more quantitative job, if you will. And it was the intent of this Congress to 

do this. You have not—I would use the word ‘‘stall,’’ but I wouldn’t 

put that on your shoulders. You’ve not let this happen. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Mr. Chairman, when I approved three 

DEA positions recently in April, I was forced to ask two representatives of another agency to leave. I am very close on space in that 

Embassy. And we are soon going to be in a situation where if I 

take more DEA agents——

Mr. HASTERT. Are you saying that you don’t have space—and 

that’s a brand new Embassy. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. That is correct. 

Mr. HASTERT. We were there. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes. 

Mr. HASTERT. It is spacious, acreage. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. I do not have space. 

Mr. HASTERT. It’s a fort in the middle of Bogota. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes. To take all those DEA agents I 

may be forced to ask other agencies to leave. I have other people 

who work for the Treasury, who work for the Customs, who work 

for the FBI, who also work on counternarcotics, not just the DEA. 

I may have to ask some of them to leave. It is the President’s intention that each Ambassador judge who can come in and who can 

116

leave on the basis of his overall knowledge of the objectives of the 

country team. I am the Ambassador at that point. 

Mr. HASTERT. I’m going to reclaim my time so I can ask another 

question. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HASTERT. You were talking about the human rights negotiation that you were having, I would guess, with General Bedoya or 

the——

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Minister of defense. 

Mr. HASTERT [continuing]. Minister of defense, that’s right. And 

one of the things that you said is that one of the points that you’re 

looking for—you’re never specific. What are you asking? What are 

you asking that they aren’t delivering specifically? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. All right. They have to understand that 

if the Secretary of State reaches a conclusion that there is credible 

evidence of gross human rights violations by a unit of the Colombian armed forces——

Mr. HASTERT. Right. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE [continuing]. And that that process is 

not being taken care of by the regular judicial process in Colombia, 

then assistance should be cutoff to that unit. That’s what I am asking for specifically. 

Mr. HASTERT. I have a letter here from General McCaffrey written to General Bedoya. And it goes onto the issue of human rights. 

And I’m just going to take part of it. But I’ll start in the middle 

of this paragraph. ‘‘It’s a respect for democratic institutions and individual rights. I know you and I are in complete agreement on the 

importance of the armed forces as protecting and promoting human 

rights. Your leadership in this issue will continue to be vital.’’

Now, you’re saying that Bedoya and others—you have a suspect 

that they’ll be able to do this. There seems to me a conflict in this 

letter and what you’re saying. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. No, sir. I asked General McCaffrey to 

write that letter. 

Mr. HASTERT. June 20, 1997. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. I also asked him to call. Yes. And I also 

asked him to telephone General Bedoya. I also asked General 

Clark at SOUTHCOM to telephone General Bedoya to make him 

understand that this is what we are offering Colombia and that 

they should not lose this opportunity to gain assistance from the 

United States. It is my understanding although I have not personally spoken to both of those generals, that they intend to make that 

pitch to General Bedoya. 

Mr. HASTERT. Well, my time has expired. And I’m going to yield 

to the gentleman from Wisconsin. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, I would yield to Mr. Blagojevich. I 

think I have a vote in another meeting, so I’ll come back for another round. If you’ll excuse me. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Barrett. I would like to direct 

this question to Ambassador Frechette. Ambassador Frechette, a 

top general in the Colombian Army recently made press statements 

to the effect that he was unwilling to sign a human rights end use 

monitoring agreement with the United States. 

117

Ambassador FRECHETTE. I’m sorry, sir, could you repeat that? I 

didn’t hear you. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. A top general in the Colombian army has recently made press statements—I believe it’s General Bonett—to the 

effect that he was unwilling to sign a human rights end use monitoring agreement with the United States. Could you provide more 

details about that, and that impasse with the Colombian Army? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes, sir. I have not discussed this issue 

with General Bonett. I have discussed it with the minister of defense. It’s a democratic government and they have a civilian minister of defense. That’s who I deal with. Occasionally the minster 

brings in the generals. I have never discussed this issue with General Bonett. 

General Bonett has on at least two occasions publicly said for domestic consumption, obviously, that he refuses to sign anything 

that would condition any assistance from the United States to any 

human rights concerns. Now, that is not the official position of the 

Government of Colombia. In fact, the Government of Colombia continues to assure me at the ministerial level, and the foreign minister level and even the president, that the they wish to receive 

that assistance if we can work something out. 

So, General Bonett has said it twice. He’s said it very clearly. 

But, again, he doesn’t represent, in my view, the views of the Colombian Government. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. His failure to sign any kind of end use agreement does not necessary preclude aid to the Colombian Army or 

the Colombian Government, is that right? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. I think what he’s referring to, sir, is 

this 506 and now 614 drawdown. The assurances that I’ve been 

specifically instructed to get. I think that’s what he’s referring to. 

But I have not even discussed his public statements with him because he and I see each other very infrequently and we just haven’t 

had a chance to sit down together so that I could really know what 

it is he means. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. OK. In the last 3 minutes or so that I have, 

could you just tell us, in your experience down in Colombia, perhaps the difference in terms of the Colombian national police and 

how they’ve been in terms of working with the United States Government, vis-a-vis, the Colombian military? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes, sir. I’d be happy to do that. The 

Colombian national police reports to the minister of defense but 

does not report through the military command structure. They 

have procedures that allow the director of the national police, General Serrano, or whoever the director happens to be, to remove in 

an expeditious manner officers and enlisted men who have been accused of corruption or other violations of Colombian law. 

General Serrano and Colonel Gallego, who works for him as the 

head of the counternarcotics police, are extremely careful to make 

sure that the 2,500 men in the counternarcotics police understand 

that human rights is, along with counternarcotics, job one. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Now, could I just interject just briefly? And 

the two of them—General Serrano and Colonel Gallego—it’s fair to 

say, try to press upon the United States, those that they seek aid 

118

from, that they are in fact going the extra mile on this issue of 

human rights? Is that fair to say? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes, sir. And I know them both personally. I spend a great deal of time with them even socially. And I’m 

here to tell you that all the evidence I have had in my 3 years in 

Colombia is that they take special pains. And if anything comes up 

about anybody in the counternarcotics police, any kind of a shadow 

at all, they either transfer them out of the counternarcotics police 

to some other branch of the police or, in fact, fire them. 

Now, the process in the military, Army, Navy and Air Force, is 

nowhere near as expeditious and does not give the commanders the 

latitude that the commander of the national police has. And while 

I don’t know the origin of that, I suspect it’s simply that the national police works closer to the people and is perhaps more sensitive to human rights concerns and public concerns. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. From the standpoint of the United States and 

our ability to help them, that makes it, of course, a lot more difficult, does it not, working with the Colombian national military 

with regard to monitoring how they use our money and how they 

use our equipment? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes, sir. It makes it more difficult. 

We—I have put in place a more thorough end use monitoring process which is not perfect, I can assure you. I don’t have enough people at the post and I can’t put my military officers in harm’s way 

to send them where the Colombian Army is fighting to verify that 

every piece of equipment is used only for counternarcotics. 

But I feel, as I told you in Bogota when you asked me a similar 

question, I feel that this is about as good as it’s going to get. And 

I am prepared to testify before any committee of Congress that 

based on the information in the process that we have set in place, 

I would feel relatively comfortable about coming here and saying 

to you that the equipment is being used for the purposes for which 

it was intended by the U.S. taxpayer and the Congress. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTERT. Just briefly, Mr. Ambassador, you just said you 

didn’t have enough people in post. What kind of people might those 

be that would help you make those decisions? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Well, sir. I am prohibited from sending 

military officers into a zone of conflict. 

Mr. HASTERT. The question is that you didn’t have enough people 

in post. What kind of people do you need? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Well, I don’t have enough people in the 

military group who are familiar with this kind of stuff who could 

do that. But even if I did, I cannot send them into harm’s way, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. HASTERT. Fine. You just said that you didn’t have enough 

people in post to make that decision. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. That is correct. 

Mr. HASTERT. I just wanted to clarify that, thank you. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. No. It’s not to make the decision, to be 

able to—I cannot, as I told you in Bogota, it is to guarantee, Mr. 

Chairman, that absolutely everything is being all the time for the 

purposes intended. 

Mr. HASTERT. I recognize the gentleman from Florida. 

119

Ambassador FRECHETTE. But I would like to be able to assure 

you that I am satisfied that it is so. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last year, I was down with 

the committee and we visited, of course, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia. 

Peru is doing an excellent job on air strategy, containing some of 

the drug trafficking. And we surmised the need of a riverine strategy. It’s my understanding that the United States Marine Corps 

has had a full blown riverine program at Camp Lejeune, NC, where 

they’ve been training Colombians for 10 years. 

Mr. Newberry, you had testified earlier that the DOD doesn’t 

have the boats or the personnel to operate such a program or assist 

with such a program. What are you talking about here? 

Mr. NEWBERRY. No, sir. What I said was, we’re able to help other 

countries in the air side and helicopter side often with equipment 

by giving them excess equipment or with 506 drawdowns. We don’t 

have that luxury with providing that equipment to Peru and Colombia as far as small boats go. The Marines have boats that we 

bought for them to help train foreign nations on operating small 

boats, but we don’t have the number where we could take away 

boats from the Marines or the special forces and send them down 

country to create a large riverine force or units. 

Mr. MICA. So all you can do is the training? 

Mr. NEWBERRY. That’s all we can do right now, is train. Now, we 

had some drawdown to small boats, but we’re talking about three, 

four, half dozen. 

Mr. MICA. I thought there was some request to provide some assistance in equipment last year. 

Mr. NEWBERRY. We have new legislation we’re asking for this 

year. 

Mr. MICA. Last year. 

Mr. NEWBERRY. Last year, there was a 506 drawdown of, I think, 

a half dozen. I’d have to look at the boats. Some Mark 3s. And we 

did provide those. We took them—special forces had some extra 

boats. And we did accomplish that drawdown. 

Mr. MICA. They were provided and they are there? 

Mr. NEWBERRY. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. OK. Ms. Becker, INL funds for riverine strategy. 

What’s the status as far as Peru? Have the boats been ordered? 

Ms. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, the equipment that INL provides to 

foreign governments is generally EDA—excess defense equipment—provided under various DOD drawdowns. We do not have a 

budget. As I indicated, our annual budget worldwide is slightly 

over $200 million. We simply do not have the kind of funds available in there to engage in equipment purchases. 

Mr. MICA. We had talked with Ambassador Gelbard last year, 

wasn’t it—your predecessor—and I thought we were ordering 

boats. There was a manufacturer that was waiting on an order. 

Ms. BECKER. I’m not familiar with the specific conversations, sir. 

I will check into it and get back to you on the details. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Six Boston Whaler riverine patrol craft were designated under the 506(a)(2)

drawdown for Peru and Colombia. These boats are being drawn from Department

of Defense stocks and should be delivered to Peru and Colombia in September 1997.

We are unaware of any commitment made by the U.S. government to purchase

newly manufactured boats for riverine patrol in Peru. Section 506 drawdown only

120

authorizes the drawdown of existing stocks for counternarcotics use, not the purchase of new equipment.

Mr. MICA. Well, we have a riverine strategy, we’re providing 

training, and we’re not assisting—I thought the last hearing we 

had, that there was either an acquisition in process—INL. 

Ms. BECKER. I’m sorry, sir, but I’m not familiar with any commitment that was made to provide riverine boats to any country from 

INL funds. As I said, we generally, in the case of equipment, rely 

on excess defense equipment or other types of drawdown. We do 

not generally provide new equipment, because we simply do not 

have the funds. 

Mr. HASTERT. Would the gentleman yield for just a second? 

Mr. MICA. Yes. 

Mr. HASTERT. You might want to read the appropriation report 

to your department. 

Mr. MICA. Ms. Becker, the CNP has less than 2 weeks ammunition left and they’re fighting and dying as I understand it everyday 

in their war against the narcotraffickers. Can you explain why that 

we’ve had a delay in delivery of 506A drawdown assistance of ammunition that was slated for delivery June 30 of this year? 

Ms. BECKER. My understanding of the situation is that the first 

available transport for that ammunition would have been on July 

7. However, at the request of the country team, that flight was delayed. And it will go now on Saturday. And the ammunition will 

be delivered on Saturday the 12th. 

Mr. HASTERT. Clarification, who is the country team? 

Ms. BECKER. The Embassy in Bogota. 

Mr. HASTERT. So that’s the Ambassador. 

Ms. BECKER. The Ambassador and his——

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you. 

Mr. MICA. So you’re telling us now that it will be there on the 

12th. Are there any other items remaining for delivery to the Colombian national police other than ammunition? 

Ms. BECKER. Yes, sir. There are two C–26 aircraft which are currently undergoing refurbishing. 

Mr. MICA. When will they be delivered? 

Ms. BECKER. As soon as that is finished, which should be—I can’t 

give you an estimate, but it should be hopefully by the end of the 

year. And I can give you a specific date. I’m not familiar off the 

top of my head on the date. 

Mr. MICA. Could you supply the subcommittee with that information? 

[The information referred to follows:]

Delivery of the C–26 aircraft for Colombia is tied to the training of Colombian National Police (CNP) pilots and mechanics. The U.S. Air Force has scheduled CNP 

pilot and mechanic training beginning 22 September 1997. Delivery of the aircraft 

will take place at the end of October 1997.

Ms. BECKER. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I’d like that as soon as possible, hopefully within the next week that we could get a date certain. 

Ms. BECKER. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. Can you tell me, is there any other equipment under 

the drawdown items remaining for delivery? 

121

Ms. BECKER. For the police I will have to get back with you. The 

items I’m familiar with off the top of my head are the ammunition 

and the C–26 aircraft. The C–26 are certainly the largest. But I 

will get that information to you tomorrow. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I’d have the same request that that be 

delivered to the subcommittee immediately. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman from Wisconsin. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment 

please to a question raised by Mr. Mica? 

Mr. HASTERT. I think we’ll address you at a certain time. Let the 

gentleman from Wisconsin. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. OK. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Go ahead, Ambassador. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Barrett. 

Mr. Mica, the reason why I asked for a delay in that C–5A flight 

was because, in addition to the ammunition for the police, there 

was also equipment there for the Air Force and the Navy. It makes 

no sense to ask the Ambassador to seek certain assurances from 

the Colombian Government and to keep pouring in equipment that 

the Colombian Government has not yet agreed to receive and deal 

with in accordance with the instructions given to me by the Department. 

So I asked that that flight either be delayed or that only the 

equipment for the police be delivered. The Department’s decision 

was to put it off for a week in the hope that I could get the Colombian Navy and Air Force to agree. They have not agreed. I would 

hope that that flight comes only with the equipment for the police. 

Now, what we have not delivered yet to the police out of the 

506(a)(2) drawdown is flight crew equipment, field equipment, field 

rations, boots, ammunition—2 million rounds—and communications gear and two C–26 aircraft. That is what we have not yet delivered to the Colombian national police. 

But, again, I did not say to stop the flight and prevent the ammunition to get to the Colombian national police. I asked that the 

stuff for the Air Force and the Navy be taken off of that flight so 

as not to undercut what the Department is asking me to negotiate 

with the Colombians, which is, get them to agree to the end use 

monitoring provisions. 

I just wanted to make that for record, sir, because I think the 

chairman thought that I had stopped ammunition going to the police. 

Mr. BARRETT. I’d like to try to bring the 506 and 614 together. 

Mr. HASTERT. I’m just going to say that I’m starting your time 

from scratch. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s my understanding—correct me if I’m wrong—that the 506 drawdown, that is 

going to the police? Who is that going to? Is that going to the military or is that going to the police? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. No, sir. It was going to the police, the 

Army, the Navy and the Air Force. 

Mr. BARRETT. So it is going to the military as well? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Oh, yes. 

Mr. BARRETT. OK. 

122

Ambassador FRECHETTE. If they will agree to the conditions. 

Mr. BARRETT. Well, I guess that’s my question. They obviously 

have not agreed to the conditions. So up to this point, who has it 

gone to? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. All right. We have delivered to the Colombian Air Force only the 12 helicopters that we promised them. 

They arrived in Santa Marta. Before the chairman arrived. And 

they are being utilized by the Colombian police now. 

Mr. BARRETT. OK. Even without—obviously you don’t feel that 

it’s necessary to have end use type monitoring for that. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. No, sir. And I’ll tell you why, Mr. Barrett. Because all that assistance goes only to the counternarcotics 

police. Therefore, by definition, it is used only for counternarcotics. 

Second, they have taken extraordinary pains to avoid human rights 

violations, at least during my 3 years. Therefore, the human rights 

concern does not exist. 

Mr. HASTERT. Would the gentleman yield for a second? 

Mr. BARRETT. Yes. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Did I say the Air Force, I beg your pardon. They went to the police, not the Air Force. I misspoke, myself. 

Mr. HASTERT. The police, not the Air Force. 

Mr. BARRETT. OK. 

Mr. HASTERT. Thank you. 

Mr. BARRETT. I think you both corrected him. Let’s go to the 614. 

Now, the 614 process basically has just begun, though. Am I correct there? And what are your intentions there? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Well, again, until we get the assurances 

from the Army, Navy and Air Force, it is my understanding that 

we will deliver none of the 614 to them until they give us the assurances. We will, however, be able to go forward with the national 

police. 

Mr. BARRETT. OK. So your position is absent the end use monitoring agreement from the military, they will not obtain these? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. It’s not my position, Mr. Barrett, it’s 

the instructions that I received in writing from the Department of 

State. 

Mr. BARRETT. That’s fine. I’m not quibbling as to whose instructions they are. I just want to make sure what the United States’ 

policy is. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes. The reason I made that clarification is that some Members seem to be under the impression that 

I’m inventing stuff, when, in fact, I receive direct written instructions from the Department of State. 

Mr. BARRETT. OK. I understand Mr. Barr’s criticism based on the 

Leahy amendment, that he feels that the human rights allegations 

don’t come into play other than for the international narcotics control funds. But could you tell me from a practical perspective, if you 

were to have restrictions on one source of funds and not on another 

source of funds, what would be your way to monitor that? Again, 

I say that—and, again, I understand where Mr. Barr is coming 

from. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. It would be incredibly difficult. It would 

be very difficult if we had one kind of restriction on some stuff and 

a different one on another, obviously. But what we’re talking about 

123

here is counternarcotics assistance—only counternarcotics assistance. And the Department has taken the spirit of the Leahy 

amendment and made a policy decision that it applies to the 

506(a)(2) drawdown as well as to the 614. 

Mr. BARRETT. And do you know of—and maybe Mr. Barr will address this—as I look at the 614 procedure, I see where the President is the one who initiates this—or the executive branch of the 

State Department——

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Yes. 

Mr. BARRETT. Although I don’t see the expressed language that 

you have for the Leahy amendment that applies to the other funding, I also don’t see the converse that says he cannot fashion some 

sort of conditions on doing that. I mean, what is your position on 

that? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Well, sir, I have done my level best for 

9 months to carry out the instructions of the Department of State. 

I have been unable to do so because the Colombians refuse to give 

us the assurances required by the United States Government. 

Mr. BARRETT. Let me ask Mr. Thessin or Ambassador Becker 

what your understanding is as to the conditions that the President 

or the executive branch can put on a 614 release. In other words, 

I’m asking you to respond to Mr. Barr’s statements. 

Ms. BECKER. Yes. As a matter of policy, the administration, taking account of the views expressed by members and staff of the 

House and Senate appropriations and authorization committees——

Mr. BARRETT. Let’s not get into that. 

Ms. BECKER. But I just want to make it clear. 

Mr. BARRETT. OK. 

Ms. BECKER. Made a policy decision—the administration made a 

policy decision that all counternarcotics assistance, regardless of 

source, including 614, including 506(a)(2), including the INL/INC 

account would be covered by Leahy provisions. The 614 proposal 

which is going to be consulted later on this week is based on that. 

And the proposal is that any service which agrees to appropriate 

end use monitoring regime will be eligible to receive funding or 

equipment under 614. 

Mr. BARRETT. Are you aware of anything that prohibits you from 

doing that? 

Ms. BECKER. Pardon? 

Mr. BARRETT. Are you aware of anything that prohibits you from 

doing that? 

Ms. BECKER. No. This is a matter of policy. And I realize that 

there are some people present who disagree with that policy, but 

it is a matter of administration policy. 

Mr. BARRETT. I saw you nodding your head. What is your response? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. The answer is no unless Congress wishes to pass 

legislation prohibiting the President from considering human rights 

criteria in terms of 614 or 506A. The President is in accordance 

with his executive powers and substantial elements of United 

States policy, not only in Colombia, but elsewhere in the world relating to human rights. He has the authority and, indeed, the responsibility to use human rights considerations in such matters. 

124

Mr. BARRETT. OK. Thank you. And if I could briefly turn to—and 

I’m sorry, I don’t see your name there. Mr. Thessin, is that correct? 

Mr. NEWBERRY. No. Newberry. 

Mr. BARRETT. I’m sorry. Mr. Newberry. How closely has the Department of Defense been working with the State Department on 

the riverine interdiction effort? 

Mr. NEWBERRY. Very closely. Daily. In fact, I have a meeting tomorrow with State Department to discuss how we’re going to—the 

process of developing the final plan. 

Mr. BARRETT. And has there been any discussion of having the 

State Department actually oversee this as opposed to Defense? 

Mr. NEWBERRY. I guess I’ve never looked at it that way, as somebody overseeing something. SOUTHCOM and the country should 

be working together on implementing a plan, if we’re using DOD 

appropriations and DOD people, to put together a plan to do that. 

Mr. BARRETT. The reason I ask that is because of the report language that raised that concern, but I think I’m out of time. So I 

yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. HASTERT. Just a couple of clarifications for the record. Ambassador Becker, basically, then, you take responsibility for giving 

Ambassador Frechette the ability to lever or use the leverage of 

holding up the ammunition to the CNP to get assurances out of the 

military. Is that your position? 

Ms. BECKER. No, sir. That is not. 

Mr. HASTERT. But he said that he had instructions from you to 

do that. 

Ms. BECKER. No, sir. That is not——

Mr. HASTERT. You didn’t do that? Somebody else did that? 

Ms. BECKER. No, sir. That is not factual. The ammunition is 

going to the CNP, as I said, on a flight that’s going on Saturday. 

Mr. HASTERT. It’s not going to the CNP. It’s being held up. 

Ms. BECKER. No. It’s going on a flight on Saturday. 

Mr. HASTERT. I pass to the gentleman from Georgia. 

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, I’m almost but not quite at a loss for 

words here after listening to this. But first, let me ask unanimous 

consent to have five letters inserted into the record. These were 

from Chairman Burton. 

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection. 

Mr. BARRETT. Without objection. Those are all letters from Chairman Burton? 

Mr. BARR. They’re letters that he wanted to have inserted into 

the record. 

Mr. BARRETT. But what I’m asking, are they all letters from him? 

Mr. BARR. No. 

Mr. HASTERT. Would you like to take a look at them? 

Mr. BARRETT. Yes. And I reserve the right to object after that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

125


45991.066
126


45991.067
127


45991.068
128


45991.069
129


45991.070
130

Mr. BARR. It’s really difficult to know where to start, Mr. Chairman. I have heard some of the most astounding statements born, 

I don’t know whether it’s of abject ignorance or absolute arrogance, 

today. We have an Ambassador saying that because it might be incredibly difficult to determine the applicability of a certain law, 

they just ignore it. 

Then we have an Ambassador stating that despite a law passed 

by Congress and signed by the President that mandates that certain personnel in our national security interest be placed in an Embassy, because he believes there’s not sufficient space, it does not 

happen. 

We have an official from the State Department that says the 

State Department can make a ‘‘policy decision’’ that would, in effect, change a congressional law. Now, I don’t know what’s going 

on here, Mr. Chairman, but I would certainly hope that the Inspector General’s Office at the Department of State would look into 

what I think are very clearly ultra vires actions. 

There may be somebody over there that can look that word up. 

It means operating outside of a legal mandate. We have the Leahy 

law and we have already established here today that it applies only 

to INL moneys. And in that Leahy law we have already established 

today that in it is found the language to the effect that if there is 

credible evidence to believe that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, then the funds otherwise available 

wouldn’t apply. 

Let me bring two other things to the attention of our learned witnesses today. Section 614, which we have talked about today, is not 

effected by Leahy. I also have, Mr. Chairman—I would like unanimous consent to insert this into the record—a ‘‘Draft Memorandum 

of Understanding: End Use Monitoring.’’

Mr. HASTERT. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:]

131


45991.071
132


45991.072
133


45991.073
134

Mr. BARR. This, apparently, is the document—and I don’t whether anybody here today will own up to authorship of this document? 

The legal office? Draft memorandum of understanding: end use 

monitoring between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Colombia, concerning procedures to be 

employed regarding the transfer, use, security and monitoring of 

articles, services and related training which may be transferred to 

the Government of Colombia by the Government of the United 

States of America. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. That was probably part of the instructions. Without having seen the full document I can’t attest to it, but it’s probably part of the instructions that were sent to Ambassador 

Frechette from the Department of State urging him to present that 

to the Government of Colombia for negotiation. 

Mr. BARR. OK. Now, this document, which is now part of the 

record—it is not limited in its terms to INL matters, but applies 

very broadly to basically all transfers of equipment or training or 

services from the United States to Colombia. And apparently this 

is being attempted to be forced on the Colombians as a requirement 

for them to receive anything from the United States of America. 

And in it one of the requirements is the language from Leahy. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. BARR. Now, where does the United States Department of 

State get off interjecting between lawful transfer of equipment, 

services and so forth to Colombia that are not prohibited by Leahy 

by simply making a policy decision, drafting up a memorandum of 

understanding, sending it to the Ambassador, and in effect telling 

him, ‘‘Don’t give this stuff to the Colombians because we want 

Leahy to apply even though Congress did not make Leahy apply?’’

And don’t give this business that simply because there’s no law 

that says we can’t do it, we can do it. Let’s go back to legislative 

interpretation 101. If you have transfer authority for category A 

and transfer authority to category B, and let’s say there are no restrictions placed on them—Congress comes along in the person of 

a hypothetical Senator Leahy and says, ‘‘I’m going to place a certain restriction on category A.’’

You cannot then say, ‘‘Well, simply because it wasn’t placed on 

B and simply because there’s no law that says it can’t be placed 

on B, we can therefore place those same limitations that are placed 

by law on category A transfers to category B.’’ You can’t do that. 

Congress intended for these types of military equipment that 

we’re talking about—and that is non-INL transfers—to get to the 

Colombians. The President has said in the 614 waiver now, which 

says explicitly that these other restrictions don’t apply. These are 

other laws that explicitly don’t apply. 

Now I know the State Department legal advisor is just sitting 

very quietly and disavowing any knowledge of anything here today, 

but could somebody shed some light on where the Department of 

State gets its legal authority to override the laws of this country, 

make up laws, simply based on some very broad interpretation of 

policy, not apply laws because it might find it incredibly difficult 

to do so? Where do you all get the authority to do those things? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Congressman, obviously I can’t enter into a constitutional debate with you. 

135

Mr. BARR. Yes, you can. I’m asking you to. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. OK. I will. Thank you. I was actually trying to be 

polite. 

Mr. BARR. You don’t need to be polite. Just be honest. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. OK. I am honest. And I hope I’m not one of the 

people that you think is either ignorant or arrogant. By a standard 

of common sense, if we’re putting the same kinds of equipment into 

a country under various authorities that are going to be used perhaps by the same units—if that unit gets its left boots under one 

authority and its right boot under another authority, if we’re going 

to maintain any sort of consistency in terms of end use monitoring, 

then we ought to have a consistency in the standards that apply. 

Mr. BARR. Congress has already made those decisions in the different laws that it passes and the different requirements on different categories. And if you all don’t like it, wouldn’t the proper 

remedy be to come back to the Congress and say, ‘‘It is impossible 

to make the distinctions here. We need to have the same restrictions apply across the board.’’

You’re trying to come in through the back door what Congress 

has not authorized you to do in the front door. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Well, I think there is room here for congressional 

activity. In fact, as Ambassador Becker said——

Mr. BARR. There already has been. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. No. I think as Ambassador Becker said——

Mr. BARR. There’s been Presidential authority, too. 

Mr. DAVIDOW [continuing]. The certification legislation which 

was passed by Congress, I think, inadvertently—or perhaps advertently—eliminated our ability to give FMF and IMET assistance to 

countries that have been decertified. That only became apparent 

when Colombia was decertified, because the countries that had 

been decertified before Colombia had not received such assistance. 

Attempts to discuss with Congress or within Congress itself to 

amend the certification legislation apparently did not prosper. 

Mr. BARR. May I ask unanimous consent just to ask one final 

question. 

Mr. HASTERT. And then we’ll move on to Mr. Blagojevich. 

Mr. BARR. Can we have your assurances on behalf of the State 

Department and the United States Government here today that in 

light of the President’s 614(a)(2) waiver, that this memorandum of 

understanding which tries to apply the restrictive language of 

Leahy to FMF and everything else, is no longer operative, no further efforts whatsoever will be made to force it on the Colombians 

in light of the fact that the 614(a)(2) waiver, which clearly states 

that these other provisions of law don’t apply, that those efforts 

will completely cease and desist? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. No. I cannot give you that, sir. 

Mr. BARR. Can we have those assurances from anybody today? 

Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Sir, I cannot give you that assurance. 

Mr. BARR. Why not? You just want to ignore the language of 

614(a)(2)? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Sir? 

Mr. BARR. Is this another law you just choose to ignore? 

136

Ambassador FRECHETTE. The way Ambassadors operate is they 

get their instructions from the Department of State and they carry 

them out. 

Mr. BARR. Sir, they get their instructions from the laws of the 

United States of America. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. I’m sorry, sir. I cannot make that distinction. 

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman’s time is——

Mr. BARR. Unbelievable. 

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman from Chicago, IL. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. This won’t be as difficult. I’ll try to be kinder 

and gentler, although I’m happy to yield some of the my time to 

Representative Barr, because he certainly is exploring a lot of 

issues that need to be explored. 

I just want to talk about the international narcotics control funds 

and the general principles. And I’m going to direct this question to 

Mr. Davidow—and, perhaps if you want to refer to some other 

member of the panel, that’s fine. In the end use monitoring, are we 

applying those rules of end use monitoring in the international narcotics control funds equally to other countries in South America or 

are we just using a different standard for Colombia? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. It is my understanding that we’re applying our 

concerns globally about the need for end use monitoring on international narcotics funds to take into consideration human rights 

factors. I’ll ask Ambassador Becker if she wants to make a comment specifically relating to one or other countries. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. I wish you would. 

Ms. BECKER. Thank you. That is correct. I should note that the 

only country in which we’ve had these difficulties arise has been 

Colombia. Thank you. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. How are we doing in Peru? Are we providing 

funds to Peru and are they complying with end use monitoring 

with the United States? 

Ms. BECKER. Yes. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. And Bolivia? 

Ms. BECKER. Same thing. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. OK. So Colombia is different from every other 

country in South America? 

Ms. BECKER. The only country in which we are having substantial difficulties with the end use monitoring provisions as they relate to Leahy is in Colombia. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. And, more specifically, in Colombia the problem has less to do with the Colombian national police and more to 

do with other aspects of the Colombian Government? 

Ms. BECKER. Yes, sir. The problem in Colombia has nothing to 

with the Colombian national police. It has only to do with the Colombian military. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. OK. It’s also the position of the State Department that the FARC and some of the revolutionary groups down 

there, whether they be on the right or on the left, are not friends 

of the U.S. Government. Is that fair to say? 

Ms. BECKER. Absolutely not. 

137

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. And, so, we certainly would like to hold members of the FARC accountable to human rights violations if we 

were in a position to do that? Is that fair to say? 

Ms. BECKER. Yes. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTERT. Well, this has turned out—what I thought would 

be a routine hearing has turned into something that I think is just 

incredible. Mr. Davidow, you want to go into the doctrine of common sense. I’m not sure that’s written into law. I’m not an attorney 

or a lawyer, so I wouldn’t even know where to look for that doctrine of common sense. 

But I’ve tried to do common sense things around here for the 11 

years I’ve been in Congress. But to me common sense would mean 

that the Ambassador wouldn’t hold up the shipment especially 

when the CNP is running out of ammunition. I would think that 

they could sort that stuff out at the Santa Mar. Take military out 

and police stuff out and supply that. I don’t know why we couldn’t 

do that. 

We have helicopter hulks sitting there and other things. That 

would be common sense to me to separate out and give it to the 

good guys and withhold where you suspect. We didn’t do that. That 

is another doctrine of common sense. 

The other doctrine of common sense is whose human rights are 

we protecting. And what the law that you hold up is that for none 

of these funds made available under the heading may be provided 

to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence—has credible evidence—to believe that such units has committed—past tense—gross violations 

of human rights. 

Now let me just tell you. You’re there. I was there. Been down 

there twice. You’re getting people—Army people—shot up by the 

FARC. You’re getting shot up by narcotraffickers, getting people 

shot up by paramilitary groups that support the narcotics business 

people. Whose human rights are we protecting? 

It seems to me that you’re protecting the human rights of the 

FARC. You’re protecting the human rights of those people who are 

breaking the law. And you’re protecting the human rights of people 

who want to transgress against the children of this country. 

We lost 20,000 people on the street corners of this country last 

year—20,000—either to narcotics or violence from street gangs and 

narcotics. 20,000, Mr. Ambassador. What about their human 

rights? What about the human rights of their families? What about 

the human rights of those people in those communities who are 

being ravaged by drugs and narcotics, most of them coming from 

Colombia day in and day out. 

And we’re saying—you’re saying that you’re holding up the ammunition that these people can fight and stop narcotraffickers, because they want to stop narcotics in their own country and moving 

into our country. But no. What we’re doing is holding up their ability to stop narcotics. The FARC, Mr. Ambassador, who, we understand, can bring in up to $6 million a month, because they’re involved in narcotrafficking. And they used to get their money from 

Fidel Castro in Cuba. 

138

And they used to get their money from Eastern Europe but that 

money was shut down. Now they get their money from 

narcotraffickers and being in the narcotics business. But the very 

people that want to be counter to them, to fight them, to stop narcotics, especially coming into this country, we’re holding up aid and 

we’re holding up ammunition to those people to try to help us. 

Where is common sense? Mr. Davidow, tell me about common 

sense doctrine here, would you, please? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. HASTERT. I’m asking Mr. Davidow. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. You asked a question. 

Mr. HASTERT. I asked Mr. Davidow. 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Mr. Chairman, I’m not concerned about the 

human rights of the FARC. I’m concerned about credible evidence 

that has existed over time of human rights violations that security 

forces in——

Mr. HASTERT. Then let me ask you——

Mr. DAVIDOW. Well, are you interested in my answer or not? 

Mr. HASTERT. I’m asking this question. The law says that you 

have to provide any unit of the security forces of a foreign country—the Secretary of State has credible evidence to believe such 

unit has committed gross violations of human rights. Has that happened? Has the CNP done that? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. No, sir. We believe the CNP has——

Mr. HASTERT. But you’re holding up their ammunition? 

Mr. DAVIDOW. Sir, the CNP’s ammunition will be there on Saturday. The issue that we’re trying to negotiate now with the Colombian military services is that they accept the concept that if a unit 

does have credible human rights charges against it, they will take 

the appropriate action. I don’t think that is illogical. 

Before we can give them the assistance that we would like to 

give under 506A and 614, we ask that they accept that as a concept, but that has not been done as of yet. That’s what we’re trying 

to negotiate. We’ve had that idea accepted on a couple of occasions 

and then they have pulled back. 

Mr. HASTERT. You see, Mr. Davidow, I think you’re being a little 

silly. I see the drug threat to this country and to the children of 

this country being something that we can’t hardly describe. Kids in 

my district are getting crack cocaine. They’re finding heroin on the 

street delivered by crack cocaine dealers, because it’s coming from 

Colombia and they’re using the same distribution system. And 

they’re getting killed. 

And gangs. I spent all day Monday having hearings in my district about gang violence being funded by heroin, crack cocaine, and 

marijuana. And kids getting killed and families. A mother watching her son being shot down on the steps of a courthouse in Sycamore, IL—a rural community—because of drug involvement. 

And you’re bringing piddly little ‘‘If this happened,’’ to stop people from having the wherewithal to stop drugs in this country. And 

in my opinion, you’re aiding and abetting a very, very serious 

enemy. And that’s not acceptable to me. And I don’t think that’s 

acceptable to most people in this Congress. 

I don’t care how you stretch a common sense theory or doctrine. 

It doesn’t make very much sense to me. And what you’re doing is 

139

helping a very, very dark and evil group of people play their trade. 

Because you’re taking the ability for the people who want to stop 

that away. I don’t how you explain and I don’t apply your doctrine 

of common sense to that. Because I think it’s a little bit twisted. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Although I share the 

outrage that the chairman has stated about the drugs in America, 

I frankly think that the people who are here today are people who 

are trying to deal with this problem. And it is obviously a very 

complex problem. It is a problem that we’re trying to fight on 

many, many fronts. And, Ambassador, I don’t think you’re aiding 

and abetting anyone who is trying to do anything bad. 

I think you are trying to solve a very serious problem and I commend your efforts in doing so. I recognize that this is a difficult 

fight. This is not a situation where we have one perfect country 

dealing with another perfect country. If it were, we wouldn’t be sitting here today. And if the institutions in Colombia were perfect, 

there would be no need to have end use monitoring agreements. 

There would be no need to have legislative language, whether it 

applies to one type of assistance to another, where Congress did 

specifically—a majority of Congress did specifically say that we do 

care about human rights, that we do think that that’s an important 

component. 

And I’m not here to defend the human rights of drug traffickers. 

I can guarantee there’s not a single Member on this side of the 

aisle who is here to do that. But what I think that what we do 

have to do, is we do have to work together. I frankly don’t think 

it’s productive for us to be hurling these insults back and forth to 

each other. 

I do think that the Department of State has made some mistakes 

with the GAO. I urge the GAO to continue its fight to get those 

documents. I think that the Department of State should get those 

documents to them tomorrow. I don’t see any reason to be holding 

back on any of these documents. We in Congress want to find out 

what the truth is. We want to have effective policies. 

We shouldn’t have to be spending our time here today fighting 

over that. But I think we’re making a mistake if we’re going to say 

that the Ambassador to Colombia is the one responsible for the 

drug problems in the United States. Because I do not think you 

are. I don’t think that the Ambassador from the Department of 

State is. I don’t think anybody here today is responsible for it. 

I think, frankly, that the blame can be put on Members of Congress just as easily as it can be put on you. So I would ask that 

as we move forward, we work together. And if there are problems, 

they are not problems that should fester for several months. They 

are problems that should be handled in an adult-like fashion and 

solved quite quickly. Because it doesn’t behoove anyone to let this 

situation get into the type of situation where tempers can flare and 

we have people throwing insults back and forth to each other. 

I encourage you to do what you can to stop the flow of drugs into 

this country. And I know that you are doing that. And I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman from Florida. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Some of the faces are new 

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cerned then in 1993 when I got first served after the 1992 elections, about the dismantling of some of the strategies that had 

brought down the production, transhipment of narcotics, and I sat 

on this panel when nothing was done from 1992 to 1994. 

This panel has resurrected through the leadership of this chairman and the predecessor, Mr. Zeliff, really, the war on drugs, and 

particularly the war on drugs at its source, which is part of the 

topic here, which I personally believe, having been in this since 

1981, is very cost effective. 

But we’re trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. I 

don’t know if you sense this, but there certainly is outrage from all 

the members that we are not seeing a responsiveness from the bureaucracy or from the agencies to get the equipment, to get whatever it takes to these source countries to do the job. 

I was down there in April of last year—a year ago, not this 

year—and we were assured that this waiver was coming. We wrote 

the President. We begged. We asked. We pleaded. The waiver came 

yesterday or the day before yesterday. 

This equipment we want there. We set the policy for the Federal 

Government under law. We’ve tried to legislate that this equipment 

get through DOD. If it comes through international narcotics office 

and can be expedited, we want that implemented. The riverine 

strategy—we want not just us to be training people in these source 

countries that don’t have a boat to operate in. It’s great to train 

them, but we’ve got to have equipment in place. 

Ambassador, I was there last year, and I was told that heroin is 

now epidemic as far as its production in Colombia—10,000 hectares 

they told me were—they anticipated under cultivation. Is that still 

the case? Is heroin on the rise—the production? 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. Mr. Mica, I don’t think there are 10,000 

hectares. But does INL have a figure on how much? Ms. BECKER. It’s constant at 6,500, about. 

Ambassador FRECHETTE. It’s about constant at 6,500. 

Mr. MICA. About 60 percent of the heroin—DEA—is coming in 

now through Colombia? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes. That’s our estimate. About 60 percent of the 

seizures at least. The Colombian heroin is predominant on the 

Eastern coast of the United States. 

Mr. MICA. See, let me put a face on it like the chairman did. I’ve 

had nine teenagers die in central Florida. I’m in one of the most 

prosperous districts in America. Highest per capita probably in 

Florida. They’re dying in the streets. We’ve got 70 percent of the 

people in our jails, are there because they have been involved in 

some drug-related crime. That’s human rights violation. 

It’s devastating to this country. The minority population of this 

country—the black males are getting wiped out. Four hundred in 

Washington, DC. Close to 400 of the deaths are young, black, potentially productive males slaughtered on the streets between the 

ages of 14 and 44. Look at them. 

Look at last week’s—and this committee wants to get whatever 

resources it takes into these countries. Does heroin, Mr. Marshall, 

require a precursor chemical in big labs to produce heroin in Colombia? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Not to the extent that cocaine does. No, sir. 

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Mr. MICA. Is heroin transported in small 1 kilo lots and is it 

more difficult to interdict than cocaine? 

Mr. MARSHALL. It’s transported in much smaller lots. And, yes, 

it’s more difficult. 

Mr. MICA. So, the best place to fight heroin is at the source. And 

what kind of personnel do you have down there? Are you getting 

the personnel that you need? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, we have to have a heroin strategy that operates across the full spectrum that the traffickers themselves operate. That includes domestic investigations as well as foreign——

Mr. MICA. Sixty percent of the heroin coming into the United 

States now—and I was told that production is going to be 10,000 

hectares. We’re going to have an epidemic. And we are having an 

epidemic of heroin. You’ll be able to buy heroin cheaper on the 

streets in my community than you can cocaine. When are we doing 

it? 

How many folks do we have? Do we have the resources in place? 

Do we have an Embassy space shortage, I’m told? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, part of the reason that we requested the 

increased of the 11 agents and 4 support personnel are to increase 

our efforts in the heroin strategy in Colombia. 

Mr. MICA. When did you request them? 

Mr. MARSHALL. In January of this year. 

Mr. MICA. And they’re still not there. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Some of them are. But they’re still some that 

haven’t been approved. 

Mr. MICA. OK. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Now, we are investing at the outset of fiscal 1997 

about a little over $500,000 in heroin operations in Colombia. We 

also have a plan to get with the Colombian Government and establish a joint binational strategy in the not too distant future. 

Mr. MICA. All right. Well, we’ll continue trying to get you whatever you need. Ms. Becker, this waiver, if we’re trying to get boats 

into Colombia, will this waiver allow us to get boats now through 

FMS money—or riverine strategy, or should we just forget the 

riverine strategy? 

Ms. BECKER. May I go through very briefly what the intent is 

with this package for the Colombian Navy? May I also note that 

614 package includes FMF cases that previously existed. So, we are 

limited to some extent with regard to—we need to stick with what 

originally——

Mr. MICA. If we get you FMS funds in this appropriations, are 

you going to block a riverine? 

Ms. BECKER. Absolutely not. Sir, I would be very happy——

Mr. MICA. So, the boats will go if we fund them? 

Ms. BECKER. I would be very happy to take over responsibility 

in relation to the questions that were asked before of Mr. Newberry 

for a program similar to what Mr. Newberry is describing. However, the State Department has not had the funds available to it 

to make that a reality. The Colombian Navy—what’s supposed to 

be given to the Colombian Navy in the 614 package includes spare 

and repair parts for patrol boats, acquisition of spare parts for 22-

foot patrol boats which are used by the Colombian Marine Corps 

142

riverine interdiction units, vehicle spare parts, weapons spare 

parts, and ammunition. 

But there are spare parts for boats that are included in the 614 

package. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, just one final question of Ms. Becker 

and then I’m going to leave. Was it you that made the decision in 

1994 to pull the plug on providing the miniguns to the CNP? 

Ms. BECKER. Sir, I joined INL in June 1995. And so the history 

of the miniguns before that time is not known to me. And I would 

have to get—if you have specific questions I will endeavor to the 

best of my ability to get you the answers. But I do not know. 

Mr. MICA. So you were not involved in that decision. Thank you. 

Mr. BARR [presiding]. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like 

to say that I want to commend Congressman Mica and Chairman 

Hastert for their anger and their outrage and their frustration, because they have a right to be. They sincerely love their country and 

want to do everything they possibly can to win this war on drugs. 

We are all very much frustrated. It’s difficult because not all of this 

is in our control. 

Not all of what we can do is directly something that we specifically can do. We have to rely on others and other countries and 

other governments. One thing we can do, however, to help alleviate 

some of the anger, is press the Department of Defense and press 

the Senate to come up with the money so that we can get the resources to fight the drug interdiction program on the rivers, the 

riverine equipment. That is in more of our control than some of the 

other things. 

Relying on the Colombian Government is a whole different question. While, again, the testimony has been pretty consistent that 

the Colombian national police have been doing a pretty good job. 

And we’ve tried to provided them with the resources to interdict 

drugs. I think it’s fair to have some doubts about the Colombian 

Government. 

The campaign treasurer. The Colombian president admitted that 

the president took $5.9 million in drug cartel money. Twelve members of the legislature down in Colombia have been linked to receiving pay-offs from drug cartels. Were under investigation for 

drug related corruption. Colombian legislators publicly acknowledge that drug traffickers influence the country’s political system. 

One member of the Colombian Congress said that most political 

campaigns had received cartel money over the previous 15 years. 

So my question is, without the end use monitoring agreements, 

how do we, the United States and the State Department, in that 

environment, track the use of our military equipment and our resources if they won’t comply with our end use monitoring? And why 

would we trust them when we have those kinds of allegations and 

that track record? I’ll send this question to anybody who wants to 

answer it. 

Ms. BECKER. I think the answer is obvious. And that is that we 

can’t. What we’re seeking here is a workable mechanism to be able 

to do exactly what the Congressman just described. And I think 

what we’ve lost track of perhaps in the course of this hearing, is 

143

who is causing this problem. I don’t think, as was pointed out earlier by the Congressman from Wisconsin, that it’s the people at this 

table. 

I think the problem has been caused by the senior levels of the 

Colombian Government who have been insidiously toying with us. 

How else can you explain the fact that in mid-February Ambassador Frechette was promised by a minister of defense that the end 

use monitoring was fully agreeable, only to have a month later that 

agreement overturned by a successor? 

How can you explain that at the end of April, again, there was 

an ad ref agreement promised by the Colombian Navy and Air 

Force with regard to end use monitoring which was then repudiated? How can you explain that? See, what is happening is the senior levels of the Colombian Government, as the administration has 

consistently said, have not been cooperating in the fight against 

drugs. 

That’s why we have this problem. That’s why Colombia was decertified. And the problem is with the senior levels of the Colombian Government. They are the ones who are preventing the police 

and the military from getting the assistance that they need to protect their lives. They are the ones who cut for no reason the budget 

of the CNP, forcing the United States—my bureau—to come in 

with double the funding that we provided last year, which we were 

very happy to do. There are a series of incidents like this—and I’m 

sure Ambassador Frechette can embellish this as well—indicating 

that the senior levels of the Colombian Government have consistently tried to undercut the valiant efforts of the police and the military units who are supporting them. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Thank you. No further questions. 

Mr. BARR. I thank the gentleman from Illinois. I would like to 

state very sincerely that I think there are some individuals at the 

witness table that are doing a tremendous amount to win the war 

against drugs. That’s our DEA colleagues. Both from my knowledge 

as a United States attorney as well as my work here in the Congress, and most recently on our trip to South America that we’ve 

referenced here today, I’ve been uniformly impressed with the dedication and hard work and results by DEA both here in country as 

well as in the countries that we’ve visited. 

Mr. Marshall, is the zeal with which DEA agents in Colombia or 

any other foreign country approach their job, is how they perform 

their job, is the success of their job related in any way, shape or 

form to the size of their office? 

Mr. MARSHALL. I would say yes, sir, it is. Obviously——

Mr. BARR. You surprise me, because I’ve worked in OCDETF programs and administered OCDETF programs in which we have 

DEA agents crammed in two and three to a small office, and they 

yield tremendous results. I’m sorry that there are some that won’t 

perform if they don’t get a big office. 

Mr. MARSHALL. No. I misunderstood your question, sir. I thought 

you meant the size of the office, referring to personnel. 

Mr. BARR. No. The physical size of the office. 

Mr. MARSHALL. No, sir. DEA agents are not generally particular 

about the physical accommodations. 

144

Mr. BARR. Because apparently that’s a very important factor for 

the State Department. I’ve been to the Embassy. Now, granted, we 

did not see a lot of the Embassy down in Bogota. We were in a very 

nice facility that gave every appearance of being fairly large, spacious. Yet, apparently, you’re not able to get the additional agents 

down that General Serrano for one, among many, told us, he would 

very much like to see down there. Apparently you all have a very 

good working relationship with the Colombians, is that true? 

Mr. MARSHALL. That’s true. 

Mr. BARR. And is it your understanding as well that General 

Serrano would like very much to have additional help through additional DEA agents in country in Colombia? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, Congressman, that’s my understanding. 

Mr. BARR. Is it your view that those agents could be extremely 

productive in fighting the war against narcotrafficking? 

Mr. MARSHALL. I believe that we could. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARR. Just for the record, we have not stopped the flow of 

illicit drugs from Colombia into the United States, have we? 

Mr. MARSHALL. No, sir. 

Mr. BARR. So there remains much to be done? 

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, there does. 

Mr. BARR. Despite the fact that you all may not have the largest, 

most luxurious offices in the world. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Correct. 

Mr. BARR. I introduced into the record earlier an article from the 

July 8 edition of La Nacion, and it lists—as I said—I think over 

20 brave Colombian soldiers and others, some of whom are teniente 

Gustavo Benitez Duque, cabo primero Carlos Guzma ́n Me ́ndez, 

Noel Angel Montes, Carlos Ernesto Buitrago Conde, Alexander 

Calcedo, Argelin Castillo Rodrı ́guez, Ricardo Duarte Ascanio, 

Ne ́stor William Lindarte Urbina, Nau ́n Manosalva Cha ́vez, Luis 

Mercha ́n Nin ̃ o, Jose ́ Alberto Orozco Ca ́ rdenas, Joaqu ́in Ramos 

Fuentes, Juan Carlos Saldarriaga Varona, Rogelio Sa ́nchez Leo ́n, 

Gilberto Alonso Santana Romero, Jorge Argenio, Soler Madero, 

He ́ctor Sua ́ rez Tangarife, Germa ́n Geovany Te ́lles Forero, Jose ́

Manuel Varo ́n Cabezas, and Francisco Javier Sanabria Lo ́pez. 

In addition, Te ́cnico Orlando Ca ́ ceres Mun ̃ oz. All of these brave 

men died less than a week ago, shot out of the sky very likely because they were riding in an outdated, poorly armored, technologically inferior non-American-built helicopter. 

And we have here a four-page document of gobbledegook. A draft 

memorandum of understanding on end use monitoring and because 

of this document, perhaps that list of brave young men died. Because our State Department has decided it knows more about laws 

than this Congress or the President of the United States because 

it finds it difficult to interpret the laws, because they have made 

policy decisions that provisions in one law should apply to another 

law even through by the terms of that other law they don’t, because an Ambassador has decided that additional DEA agents shall 

not be stationed at the Embassy even though the Congress and a 

law signed by the President has directed that they be, because in 

his view there is not enough room. 

I think that what we’ve heard here today really is outrageous. I 

don’t know, Ms. Becker, how much you know about dealing with 

145

Latin American countries—maybe a great deal—and the way you 

deal with South American or Latin American military, but I suspect that there are quite a few perhaps graduate or even undergraduate students with some background in Latin American culture that could give you any number of reasons why if you put this 

document, which very clearly on its face says that the standards 

that we’re applying apply to one branch of the military but not another, why it would be very difficult for them to sign this document 

quite aside from what I consider the illegal intent behind the document as we’ve already talked about with regard to whether or not 

certain United States laws apply. 

I do appreciate the witnesses being here today. Mr. Hinton, perhaps you can see now that you may not really be surprised that 

the State Department has obstructed providing information to you. 

They give every appearance today of believing that they are completely above the law. 

But we do appreciate GAO’s effort to get at the truth here. We 

very much appreciate the work of all the men and women who 

serve in Colombia and other foreign countries, particularly the very 

brave personnel of DEA. And, Mr. Chairman, that’s concluded the 

final round of questioning. Is there additional questioning? 

Mr. HASTERT. I thank the gentleman from Georgia. You know, I 

think we all have to understand that this is a very, very important 

issue. I think it’s one of the most important national security issues 

before this country at this time. And you’ll have to excuse me if I 

get a little emotional about it, because I think this is something 

that we have to do. 

We have to win this war to protect our kids, to protect our neighborhoods, to protect our country. Because if we don’t do it now we 

may lose the ability to do it ever. We may lose generations—a generation of children because of it. I feel very strongly about that. 

And I just wanted to let you know that I feel strongly about that. 

What do we get out of this hearing. I’d certainly like to have assurances from all our State Department witnesses here that we’ll 

first of all get to the GAO all the documents that they need to get 

their report together. I hope that we’d be able to do that. Mr. 

Thessin, do you think that’s possible? 

Mr. BARRETT. Let me concur with that, Mr. Chairman, as well. 

Mr. THESSIN. We’re committed to working with the GAO. I think 

we can resolve the difficulties. Could I, if I might, Mr. Chairman, 

clarify one thing? I think as a former staffer to a Member of Congress I’m particularly sensitive to the need not to leave any 

misimpression. I know Chairman Burton was concerned that I may 

have done so in my previous remarks. 

I mentioned to him that there were five documents of the responsive documents we could find that GAO has not been provided. I 

want to make sure the committee is also aware that I’m informed 

that the Department has excised parts of approximately 10 documents in the substance involving matters such as foreign government information, intelligence information, law enforcement information, deliberations information, and information not relevant to 

the request. 

And I reiterate, we are prepared to sit down with the GAO and 

continue to work with them to resolve this matter. 

146

Mr. HASTERT. I think that’s a positive statement. I wanted to 

also get an assurance that you at least understand—maybe not 

agree with—but understand that many members of this committee 

in Congress, and likely the majority of the Members of Congress 

do not believe that Leahy applies at all to block the 614. 

We think that’s a different issue. I think we think, many of us, 

believe that you’re misapplying the law. And in fact, in many instances, by many people and the State Department—Ambassador 

Gelbard before he went to the Middle East and others—said, 614 

is going to happen. The waiver is going to happen. 

We’re sitting here 4 months after that point in time. It hasn’t 

happened. Whether you construe that there’s a probability that 

maybe this may happen and the law says something else. I don’t 

know how you construe that. But we’re at that point. I would like 

to have you understand that, that we believe very strongly on that. 

We also want to make sure that we feel, Mr. Ambassador, that 

the DEA agents that we appropriated for last year get placed. We 

think that’s very important. You may disagree. But we think that’s 

important. We hope that you would go along with the wishes of the 

Congress passed and signed by the President, incidentally. It’s an 

appropriation bill. So two bodies of this government said that that 

should happen. 

I hope that we can work together. The whole drug issue is something that’s bigger than this State Department. It’s bigger than 

this Congress. It’s going to take an incredible effort to make a dent 

and win the war. And I have to be very honest with you, I’m just 

a little bit dismayed after this hearing today. Because I think we 

get so tied into—I think the word was gobbledegook that another 

Member used—that we tend up to get into the gobbledegook and 

not the common sense that Mr. Davidow was talking about. There 

seems to be little common sense here. 

I would hope we use more of it in fighting this war. And I look 

forward to working with you. We need to work and do a lot of work 

together. I hope that we’re both on the same side of this issue. I 

think we are and if there is no further comment, I will leave the 

record open for 2 weeks for questions for the record. 

This hearing is closed. 

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings and additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

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