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SECURING RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: 

EXAMINING THE THREAT NEXT DOOR 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 12, 2014 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN. Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Deputy Staff Director 

HARLAN C. GEER, Senior Professional Staff Member 

CARLY A. COVIEO, Professional Staff Member 

DEIRDRE G. ARMSTRONG, Professional Staff Member 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Minority Staff Director 

DANIEL P. LIPS, Minority Director of Homeland Security 

WILLIAM H.W. MCKENNA, Minority Investigative Counsel 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

LAUREN M. CORCORAN, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 1 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 25 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 2014 

Hon. Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department 

of Energy ............................................................................................................... 4 

Huban A. Gowadia, Ph.D., Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security ..................................................................... 6 

Mark A. Satorius, Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission ........................................................................................................... 8 

David Trimble, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 10 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Gowadia, Huban A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36 

Harrington, Hon. Anne: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27 

Satorius, Mark A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

Trimble, David: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

APPENDIX 

Charts referenced by Senator Carper .................................................................... 57 

(1) 

SECURING RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: 

EXAMINING THE THREAT NEXT DOOR 

THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:32 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CARPER 

Chairman CARPER. This hearing will come to order. 

A little over a year ago, the city of Boston, as we will recall, was 

struck by a tragedy during the running of the 117th Boston Marathon. Two terrorists detonated pressure cooker bombs near the finish line. As you will recall, they killed three people; they injured 

nearly 300 more. 

The horror of this attack, which we viewed again and again on 

television, and again on the first anniversary of the attack, will 

never be forgotten, but neither will the heroism that unfolded immediately following those attacks. Police, medical personnel, National Guardsmen, volunteers, runners, and spectators all ran toward the blasts to provide immediate aid to the injured. These acts 

of courage and selflessness saved countless lives. 

The tragic events of the 117th running of the Boston Marathon 

remind us that we must constantly seek to counter the threats and 

anticipate the threats from homegrown terrorists and to improve 

our Nation’s ability to anticipate—and prevent—the next attack. 

Today, as we strive to improve our counterterrorism efforts, we 

have the opportunity to look back at the Boston Marathon bombing 

and ask ourselves this question: What if the attack had occurred 

differently? What if it was even more deadly? What if the pressure 

cooker bombs were not just simply bombs but dirty bombs? The 

last question is what we are going to focus on today in this hearing. 

A dirty bomb is any kind of crude explosive device that, when 

detonated, disperses radiation around and beyond the blast. If a 

dirty bomb successfully goes off, those who survive the blast can be 

exposed to harmful amounts of radiation that could cause sickness 

or even death. Moreover, a dirty bomb could render areas uninhabitable for not just days or weeks or months but for years, making 

that particular weapon a highly disruptive weapon. 
2 

1The chart referenced by Senator Carper appears in the Appendix on page 58. 

If the Boston Marathon terrorists had turned their pressure 

cooker bombs into dirty bombs, then the consequences of that tragic day could have been multiplied by an order of magnitude. I want 

us just to think about that for a minute. 

For instance, when those police, medical personnel, volunteers, 

runners, and spectators all ran toward the blast to help the injured, what if they had been unknowingly exposed to harmful 

amounts of radiological material? In many cases, this material cannot be seen, as we know, it cannot be smelled, felt, or tasted. In 

this hypothetical, what would have been a heroic display of courage 

and selflessness could have quickly spiraled into a far more deadly 

and disruptive situation. 

Today’s hearing will focus on how we can ensure that this hypothetical situation does not come to pass. We will focus on the threat 

of a dirty bomb and specifically examine the security of radiological 

material here in communities across our country that could be used 

to create a dirty bomb. 

Two years ago, at the request of then-Senator Daniel Akaka, a 

good friend of us all, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

issued a report examining the government’s efforts to secure radiological material in U.S. medical facilities. 

GAO found that in many cases this radiological material was all 

too vulnerable to theft or sabotage. Shortly thereafter, I joined Senator Akaka and Senator Casey in requesting that GAO audit the 

security of radiological material used at construction and industrial 

sites. 

Unlike the radiological devices in hospitals that are stationary 

and large, industrial radiological sources are often found in small, 

highly portable devices, routinely used in open, populated areas. 

And we have on the poster over here an example of the kind of 

highly portable radiological device that we are talking about.1

This is a radiography camera. It is a camera that is commonly 

used at constructionsites to survey pipes and foundations for cracks 

and imperfections. These cameras contain radiological material 

that, if seized by the wrong hands, could be used to help create a 

dirty bomb. This clearly is the type of portable device that a thief 

or terrorist could walk away with if they found it left unsecured. 

GAO will testify today on the security of industrial radiological material like this camera, but the messages from their audit are clear. 

Despite government efforts, industrial radiological sources are 

far too vulnerable to theft or sabotage by terrorists or by others 

wishing to do us harm. In fact, GAO found four cases where potential dirty bomb material was stolen between 2006 and 2012. 

Moreover, GAO found two cases where individuals with extensive 

criminal histories were given unsupervised access to potential dirty 

bomb material. One of those individuals had been previously convicted of making ‘‘terroristic threats.’’ 

We are going to learn more about these vulnerabilities, and I 

think we are going to learn a little bit about maybe some commonsense fixes from our friends at GAO. But let me just say this: We 

have to do better. We have to do better than this. And given the 

consequences of a dirty bomb, there really is no excuse for the kind 
3 

of vulnerabilities identified by the Government Accountability Office. 

If we are to protect against the next Oklahoma City bombing, the 

next 9/11, or the next Boston Marathon bombing, we need to stay 

several steps ahead of the terrorists. We must anticipate and neutralize their evolving ability to carry out terrorist plots well before 

they are ever conceived and executed. 

Today we will also hear from three agencies that play a critical 

role in securing radiological material in the United States and preventing dirty bomb attacks from occurring. 

And with that, we are going to turn to our panel, and I am going 

to make some brief introductions of each of you, and then we will 

invite you to present your testimony. And I will ask some questions. Some of my colleagues will drift in and out; they will ask 

questions as well. And then by that time, it will be time for dinner. 

[Laughter.] 

Hopefully we will be done sooner than that. But I want to welcome each of you for joining us today. Thank you for coming. 

Thank you for your preparation for this hearing and for your willingness to respond to our questions. 

The Honorable Anne Harrington is the Deputy Administrator for 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation for the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA). Does that fit on a business card? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Barely. 

Chairman CARPER. Barely. That is a lot. A position you have 

held, I understand, since, what 2010. Thank you. Prior to the National Nuclear Security Administration, she served as the Director 

of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International 

Security and Arms Control. She has also held positions in the State 

Department as Acting Director and Deputy Director of the Office 

of Proliferation Threat Reduction. Welcome. 

Next on our panel we have Dr. Huban—and I am going to ask 

you to pronounce your last name. Let me try it, and then I want 

you to pronounce it for us. Gowadia? Is that right? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Gowadia. 

Chairman CARPER. Gowadia. That is a great name. The Director 

of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Dr. Gowadia was appointed Director in September 2013 after being Acting Director since 2012. 

Dr. Gowadia, welcome. I understand you served in multiple positions at the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office since 2005, and 

prior to that worked at the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Science and Technology Directorate, the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), and the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA). 

Our next witness on this panel is Mr. Mark Satorius, Executive 

Director for Operations at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC), and in that role he serves as the Chief Operating Officer 

(COO) overseeing the day-to-day operations of that agency. Mr. 

Satorius joined the NRC 25 years ago as an operating licensing examiner and then as a reactor inspector and senior project engineer. 

Mr. Satorius, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, served as an officer 

in the U.S. Navy’s Nuclear Power Program and a nuclear-trained 

submarine officer. Thank you for that service, too. 
4 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Harrington appears in the Appendix on page 27. 

Our final witness this morning is Mr. David Trimble, who serves 

as a Director of the Natural Resources and Environment group at 

the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Mr. Trimble is the primary author of a GAO report underlining the threat presented by 

the security of domestic industrial radiological sources. In his current role at GAO, Mr. Trimble provides leadership and oversight on 

nuclear security and cleanup issues. Previously, he has focused on 

environmental causes, including controlling toxic substances, clean 

water, clean air issues, and the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) management. Before joining GAO in 2009, Mr. Trimble 

served at the Department of State’s Political Military Affairs Bureau where he was responsible for export compliance and enforcement issues. 

Those are the introductions. I am sure they do not do justice to 

each of you, but we are delighted that you are here and that you 

are willing to help better inform this Committee, and hopefully this 

Senate, with the potential threats that face us and what we might 

do about them. 

Ms. Harrington, please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ANNE HARRINGTON,1 DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

giving me the opportunity to testify on the Department of Energy 

(DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration efforts to enhance 

the security of vulnerable high-risk radioactive sources in the 

United States. I would like to thank you for your continued interest 

and the interest of the Committee and its leadership on this important issue. I would also like to thank my colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for being constructive and indispensable partners in the effort to reduce the risk of radiological incidents. 

The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, which I lead, in 

conjunction with our Federal, local, and industry partners, works 

to enhance the security of civilian radioactive materials in the 

United States and internationally. I have provided details on our 

programs in my written testimony. 

We do appreciate the comments and recommendations from the 

General Accountability Office, and we are actively implementing 

their recommendations to expand outreach to increase the number 

of program volunteers and enhance coordination with other Federal 

agencies. 

I want to use the time allotted for my oral remarks to look at 

the path forward and at the strategic approach we are developing 

to address the challenges of securing the materials that can be 

used in a dirty bomb. 

The importance of securing high-risk radiological sources was 

highlighted at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit when the United 

States and 22 other countries signed on to a so-called gift basket, 

committing to secure all International Atomic Energy Agency 
5 

(IAEA) classified Category I radioactive materials at a level that 

meets or, where possible, exceeds the guidelines of the agency’s 

Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. 

The goal is to accomplish this by the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. 

The recent theft in Mexico of a truck carrying a large cobalt-60 

source demonstrates how much our own security depends on the 

quality of security outside our borders. Commitments like the ones 

implemented under the Nuclear Security Summit process contribute in a meaningful way not just to the security of individual 

countries but to our joint security. 

While we continue to proceed with implementation of security enhancements for high-risk radioactive materials, several factors 

have led us to consider a new strategic approach to addressing the 

dirty bomb threat through actions that achieve more permanent 

and sustainable threat reduction. Factors that we considered include: the large number of radioactive sources worldwide; the fact 

that we secure or retire existing sources even as new sources and 

new devices are being introduced; the long-term cost for sustaining 

security systems; the limited options for disposal of these sources; 

and the general constraints within the Federal budgets. 

The grand challenge we should consider is how we can achieve 

permanent risk reduction rather than continuing in the current 

preventive posture. Just as we have demonstrated that highly enriched uranium (HEU), is not necessary for producing critical medical isotopes and that we can eliminate HEU from that technology 

cycle, can we apply the same principle to radiological sources? 

We should strive to not only further enhance security, but reduce 

the size and complexity of the overall problem and achieve permanent threat reduction by decreasing the number of sites and devices that require the high-activity radioactive materials. 

The centerpiece of this strategy is to engage in a worldwide effort 

to provide reliable non-radioactive alternatives to the highest activity radioactive sources that pose the greatest risk or to find ways 

to reduce the amounts of material needed for a given function. 

We will need to have the engagement and active participation 

from the research, industry, and medical communities, but the potential benefits—removing the risk of a dirty bomb altogether—are 

significant. 

Considering a range of incentives for replacement where commercially viable alternatives exist is something that we are investigating, and we are also collaborating with our research and development office to explore and assess technical improvements that 

could be developed and transferred to industry for commercialization. 

We recognize, however, that we may not succeed in replacing the 

need for all sources. For example, radioactive industrial sources 

such as mobile well logging and radiography sources may not have 

an acceptable and viable alternative. In such cases we are collaborating with industry partners to develop innovative and sustainable security solutions. 

We have seen that other countries are willing to go above and 

beyond international norms and standards for radiological security 

through collaboration with our programs and through commitments 
6 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Gowadia appears in the Appendix on page 36. 

they have made at the Nuclear Security Summit. We have also now 

seen domestically that some Agreement States have taken radiological security to a higher level. While we have an important role 

to play in this regard, we also encourage all other States to show 

the same initiative to demonstrate leadership and commit resources to take radiological security beyond minimum requirements. 

Thank you for your attention, and I am happy to answer any 

questions. 

Chairman CARPER. Ms. Harrington, thank you so much. Thanks 

for your testimony. Thanks for your service. 

Dr. Gowadia, would you please present your testimony at this 

time? Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF HUBAN A. GOWADIA, PH.D.,1 DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. GOWADIA. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Carper, and 

I would extend thanks also for holding this hearing. It is a good 

opportunity for us to appear today to present to you and discuss 

with you the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s efforts to prevent 

and prepare for radiological events. 

I am honored to be here today to testify with my distinguished 

colleagues. Their support and assistance are fundamental to the 

mission you have given my office. 

At the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, we are singularly focused on the nuclear threat and seek to make nuclear terrorism a 

prohibitively difficult undertaking for our adversaries. 

In coordination with Federal, State, and local partners, we develop and enhance the global nuclear detection architecture 

(GNDA), which is a framework for detecting, analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control. 

Although my office focuses on detecting and locating radioactive 

materials once they are lost or stolen, we work very closely with 

our colleagues at the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who are responsible for the safety and security 

of these materials. 

Our approach to detection is based on the critical triad of intelligence, law enforcement, and technology. By ensuring intelligenceinformed operations are conducted by well-trained operators using 

the right technologies, we maximize our ability to detect and interdict radiological and nuclear threats. 

The first leg of the triad, intelligence and information sharing, is, 

very frankly, the backbone of a robust detection architecture. Timely and accurate indicators and warnings are crucial to the deployment of resources and operations. Additionally, we analyze past nuclear smuggling cases and pertinent terrorism events and bring 

this knowledge to bear on the development of future detection architectures and systems. 
7 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Joint Analysis Center 

enables information sharing and also provides alarm adjudication 

support and situational awareness to our stakeholders. 

To increase the awareness of lost and stolen sources, we regularly publish information bulletins for our State and local partners, 

summarizing relevant news articles with useful facts about radioactive materials. 

The second leg of our triad is law enforcement officers and first 

responders, those on the front lines of detection and prevention efforts. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office works to ensure that 

they have the necessary capabilities and are well trained and ready 

for the mission. Since 2005, through many collaborative efforts, we 

have provided radiation detection training to over 27,000 Federal, 

State, and local law enforcement personnel and emergency responders. Annually, we conduct approximately 15 exercises that 

stress operator’s abilities to detect illicit radiological and nuclear 

material while enhancing collaboration and building trusted networks. 

To date, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has engaged with 

29 States to raise awareness of this threat, and we assist our State 

and local partners as they develop their own detection programs. 

We work with them to build a flexible, multilayered architecture 

that can be integrated with Federal assets into a unified response 

in the event of a credible threat. By the end of 2015, we will have 

expanded these efforts to cover all 50 States. 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office further supports law enforcement operations by providing mobile detection deployment 

units. These are designed to supplement existing local detection 

and reporting capabilities, especially in support of national and 

other special security events. 

The program was instituted in 2008, and the trailers house 

equipment for up to 40 personnel. In fact, this year on July 4, we 

will complete our 150th deployment of the mobile detection units. 

The final leg of our triad is technology. In addition to acquiring 

and deploying radiation sensors for the Department of Homeland 

Security’s operational components, we maintain an aggressive 

transformational and applied research portfolio. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office collaborates with Federal research and development partners as well as with industry, academia, and the national laboratories to bring the right technologies to front-line operators. 

Operators are always included in all of our efforts. For instance, 

we recently led the development of a next-generation handheld radioisotope identification device. These are regularly used by law enforcement and technical experts in the field. 

We work closely with our operational partners to identify key requirements for the design of the system. The final product is now 

a device that is lightweight, easy to use, more reliable, and even 

has lower life-cycle costs. With your support, we will continue such 

collaborative efforts to develop breakthrough technologies and offer 

significant operational improvements and enhance our national detection capabilities. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office’s efforts to protect our Nation from radio-
8 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Satorius appears in the Appendix on page 42. 

logical and nuclear threats. I sincerely appreciate your interest and 

support for the entire nuclear security enterprise. Your leadership 

and our collaborations will help us ensure a safe, secure, and resilient homeland. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Dr. Gowadia, thank you so much. 

Mark Satorius, please proceed. When you left the Navy, how 

many years had you served? 

Mr. SATORIUS. Five years of active duty, sir, and then 18 years 

of reserve service. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. And so 18 years of reserve service, so 

that is like 23 years. 

Mr. SATORIUS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman CARPER. That is how many years I served, 5 active, 18 

reserve. And I was a Navy P–3 aircraft mission commander, and 

our job was to track Soviet nuclear subs. We did a lot of low-level 

missions off the coast of Vietnam, surface surveillance during the 

Vietnam War, including around those islands in the South China 

Sea where there is a big—— 

Mr. SATORIUS. Yes, sir, and you oftentimes spent time looking for 

U.S. submarines without as much success. 

Chairman CARPER. No, we were not stupid enough to try to look. 

We could not find them. They were so quiet. And the way we found 

them, as you know, was through sound. But we are very proud of 

your service there, and you are a retired captain? 

Mr. SATORIUS. Yes, I am. I am a retired captain. 

Chairman CARPER. So am I. Well, Captain, my son, Ben, calls 

me, ‘‘Captain, my captain.’’ [Laughter.] 

And I always say, ‘‘As you were, sailor.’’ So, Captain, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF MARK A. SATORIUS,1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. SATORIUS. Thank you, and good morning, Chairman Carper. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf 

of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Radiological source security has been, and continues to be, a top 

priority at the NRC. The NRC continues to work with the 37 

Agreement States and domestic and international organizations on 

a variety of initiatives to make risk-significant radioactive sources 

even more secure and less vulnerable. 

The events of September 11, 2001, changed the threat environment and resulted in significant strengthening of the security of radioactive sources. Immediately following September 11, 2001, the 

NRC, working with other Federal and State agencies, prioritized 

actions to enhance the security of radioactive sources. These initial 

actions resulted in the NRC issuing a number of security advisories 

to NRC and Agreement State licensees to communicate general 

threat information and recommend specific actions to enhance security and address potential threats. Once NRC identified actions 

that licensees needed to take to enhance the security and control 

of risk-significant sources, the agency issued orders that imposed 

legally binding requirements on our licensees. 
9 

In addition, as mandated by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the 

NRC convened an interagency task force on radiation source protection and security to evaluate and provide recommendations to 

the President and the Congress relating to the security of radiation 

sources in the United States from potential terrorist threats. This 

task force submitted its first report to the President and Congress 

in August 2006, concluding that there were no significant gaps in 

the areas of radioactive source protection and security. The second 

task force report was provided in August 2010, and the third report 

will be submitted this August. 

At a hearing on July 12, 2007, by the Permanent Subcommittee 

on Investigations of this Committee, a web-based licensing 

verification system was discussed. In an effort to better track 

transactions of radioactive material nationally, the NRC developed 

a portfolio of automated tools to verify licenses and track credentials, inspections, devices and sources, and events. This portfolio includes: the National Source Tracking System, the Web Based Licensing System, and the License Verification System. 

The NRC also ceased relying on the presumption that applicants 

for a license were acting in good faith and instead instituted a policy by which the NRC and the Agreement States would verify the 

legitimacy of applicants when first dealing with them. We also 

issued pre-licensing guidance that includes various applicant and 

licensee screening activities and site visits to ensure radioactive 

sources will be used as intended. 

The NRC also has implemented a process called the Integrated 

Materials Performance Evaluation Program (IMPEP), to assess its 

own regional materials programs as well as those of the Agreement 

States. This program provides the NRC with a systematic, integrated, and reliable evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of 

the respective programs, and it provides an indication of areas in 

which NRC and Agreement States should dedicate more resources 

or management attention. 

Through a significant collaborative effort between the NRC and 

the Agreement States, the agency developed a radioactive source 

security rulemaking to replace the earlier Orders and provide requirements to a broad set of licensees. This rulemaking was informed by insights gained through the implementation of the Orders. 

The resulting rule—10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 

37—is an optimized mix of performance-based and prescriptive requirements that provide the framework for a licensee to develop a 

security program for risk significant materials with measures specifically tailored to its facility. Compliance with the rule was required for NRC licensees by March 19, 2014. Agreement State licensees need to fulfill compatible requirements by March 2016. 

The NRC’s efforts in material security have not ended with the 

publication and implementation of our radioactive source security 

rule. The NRC will continue to assess its programs to ensure that 

they promote the secure use and management of radioactive 

sources. 

This concludes my remarks, Senator, and I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

Chairman CARPER. Captain, thanks so much. 
10 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Trimble appears in the Appendix on page 50. 

David Trimble, GAO, nice to see you. Thanks for joining us, and 

thanks for all you guys do at GAO to help our country and us. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID TRIMBLE,1 DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Thank you. My testimony today discusses the challenges Federal agencies face in securing industrial radiological 

sources in the United States and the steps agencies are taking to 

improve security. The potential vulnerability of radiological sources 

was highlighted last December when a truck in Mexico carrying a 

cobalt-60 source, a high-risk radiological source, was stolen. 

In our report being issued today, we examined two types of industrial radiological sources: mobile and stationary. We found that 

both pose security challenges even when licensees follow NRC’s security controls. 

The size and portability of mobile sources makes them particularly challenging. IAEA officials have stated that the transportation of high-risk sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and radiological supply chain. NRC requirements to ensure 

security for these mobile sources provide a general framework that 

is to be implemented by the licensee. While NRC orders call on licensees to secure these sources, they do not explain how to do this 

by, for example, specifying the robustness of locks that must be 

used or even that alarms be installed in trucks carrying mobile 

sources. 

While all 15 industrial radiography companies we visited met 

NRC’s security requirements, we found great variation in the security measures employed, with some companies using only the most 

basic of locks to secure these high-risk sources. The risk to these 

mobile sources is underscored by four incidents of theft, all after 

NRC instituted increased controls for high-risk sources in 2005. 

In addition to these thefts, we identified two instances where unauthorized individuals, both claiming to be State inspectors, approached the crew while in the field. In one case, the individual 

was wearing a jacket with a logo of the State. This person gained 

access to the truck, sought detailed information about the source, 

and left with two accomplices only after the crew had made calls 

to confirm his identity. 

Regarding stationary sources, these typically involve aerospace 

manufacturing plants, storage warehouses, and panoramic 

irradiators used to sterilize food. While all of the 33 facilities we 

visited met NRC’s general security requirements, some facilities 

still appeared to have vulnerabilities. Nine facilities had unsecured 

skylights. One facility had an exterior roll-top door that was open 

and unattended. And the wall of the cage inside where the radiography cameras were stored did not go to the ceiling. Another facility had an irradiator on wheels near a loading dock that was secured with a simple padlock. 

In addition to these potential security vulnerabilities, we found 

that some well logging companies that separately secure their high- 
11 

1The chart referenced in the hearing appears in the Appendix on page 57. 

risk sources, did not have to comply with NRC’s increased security 

requirements. 

Licensees of both mobile and stationary sources also face challenges in determining which employees are suitable for trustworthiness and reliability certification, which is required by NRC 

before an employee is given unescorted access to high-risk radiological sources. The trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) certification is intended to mitigate the risk of an insider threat, which 

NNSA has stated is the primary threat to facilities with high-risk 

radiological sources. 

Under NRC’s security controls, it is left to the licensee to decide 

whether to grant employees unescorted access, even in cases where 

an individual has been convicted of a violent crime or making terroristic threats. 

About half of the 33 licensees we visited said they faced challenges in making these determinations, and seven stated they had 

granted the T&R certification to individuals with criminal records, 

giving them unescorted access to high-risk sources. In one case, the 

individual had been arrested and convicted multiple times of assault, forgery, failure to appear in court, driving while intoxicated, 

driving with a suspended license, and twice for terrorist threats. 

Notably, the two convictions for terroristic threats were not included in the background information provided by NRC to the licensee. According to NRC, this person was not convicted of threats 

against the United States but of making violent verbal threats 

against two individuals. 

Our report also examined the steps Federal agencies are taking 

to better secure industrial radiological sources. NNSA has a voluntary program to install enhanced security measures at facilities 

containing high-risk sources, and both NNSA and DHS have research projects to help track mobile sources if lost or stolen. In addition, at the time of our review, NRC was preparing a security 

Best Practices Guide for licensees. 

Our report includes recommendations to NRC to review and consider advising the T&R process and re-examine the regulatory gap 

that exempts some facilities from the increased security requirements. 

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

Chairman CARPER. David, thank you so much. 

I think we have a couple of photos here that have been enlarged, 

and I am going to ask, if I could, Mr. Trimble, for you to respond 

to a couple of questions. 

I think your report included in it a number of visuals that were 

especially interesting. We have taken I think three of those photos 

and put them on these large charts, and I am going to just present 

each of these three to you in sequence. I just want to ask you to 

describe the photo and the security concern that it represents. 

Here is the first one. What is the photo of?1

Mr. TRIMBLE. This is one of the sites we visited. This is a warehouse storing radiography cameras, and the potential security vul-
12 

1The chart referenced in the hearing appears in the Appendix on page 59. 

2The chart referenced in the hearing appears in the Appendix on page 60. 

nerability we identified in this is the large door that is obviously 

left open and unattended. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. And what is inside that might be 

of interest to—— 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Yes, these are the radiography cameras that you 

had the earlier picture of, and so the warehouse would be the central location where these cameras would be stored when they are 

not out in the field being used. 

Chairman CARPER. Would they be inside? Could it be two or 

three, or maybe a couple dozen? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Yes, there could be any number of radiography 

cameras located inside, and they would be in a storage room behind 

a locked container. And so because they were in a locked container, 

they are meeting the NRC’s security requirements, notwithstanding the open door and the unattended nature of that door. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Any idea how many of those handheld 

devices would be required if someone who knew how to handle radioactive materials could actually create a weapon of real concern? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. I think I would defer to colleagues at the table 

here, but I believe one would be sufficient. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Let us look at the next photo. And what 

do we have here?1

Mr. TRIMBLE. This is inside one of the storage warehouses for 

those radiography cameras, but as you can see here, while there is 

a lock on the caged door, the door and the wall next to it do not 

go all the way to the ceiling. So it is a rather imperfect barrier. 

Now, again, inside of there, the radiography cameras were in a 

locked container, and that is how—notwithstanding the vulnerability there they are still able to meet the NRC security guidelines. 

Chairman CARPER. Janet Napolitano used to be Secretary of 

Homeland Security, as you will recall, and I remember her sitting 

here at this table talking to us about border security. We were 

talking about building along the Mexican border with the United 

States a fence, or fences, and walls. I remember she said something 

to the effect of if I build a 20-foot fence, somebody will come along 

with a 25-foot ladder. Looking at this reminds me of that. 

I think we have maybe one more photo that has been enlarged 

and placed on a chart. Let us look at that, and maybe you can tell 

us about that photo. And what do we have here?2

Mr. TRIMBLE. This is a picture of a skylight, and at nine locations we visited, we identified unsecured skylights at the facilities. 

These facilities range from warehouses storing radiography cameras to scientific research facilities to large panoramic irradiators. 

So there are quite a range of facilities that had these 

vulnerabilities. 

Notably, I believe, in the NNSA program where they go in on a 

voluntary basis and beef up security. Skylights is one of the areas 

which they would target in terms of either closing the means of ingress or securing the skylight. 
13 

Chairman CARPER. Can you tell us in the building where a skylight exists, were the devices that we are talking about here locked 

up in a secure facility? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Yes. They are still meeting the NRC requirements 

because they would still be in a locked container inside the facility, 

but the skylight from our view is a potential vulnerability because 

it provides another way of getting inside the building to gain access 

to that container. 

Chairman CARPER. As we all know, there are locked containers 

and there are locked containers. And some are not very secure; others are quite secure. Can you comment on that, please? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Well, we saw the radiographers transporting their 

mobile sources on trucks. Some of these trucks were secured with 

very simple padlocks. Some had high security locks, and inside 

where the radiography cameras would be stored. Sometimes people 

would just have an Army surplus container with a cable securing 

it to the truck, which provides the second lock required under the 

NRC requirements. 

Some took the mission much more seriously, bought reinforced 

steel containers and had bolted them did a a better job to secure 

those containers. 

So there is a great variability that we observed in the field. 

Chairman CARPER. Let me just ask the other panelists just to 

react to what we have seen and what Mr. Trimble has said. Any 

thoughts before I ask a different question? Captain Satorius. 

Mr. SATORIUS. Well, Senator, I would just say that this is the 

first I have seen of these pictures. I have been made aware of 

issues that the GAO has found within their report. Being an organization that always strives to continually improve, we have a new 

security rule, which I mentioned, 10 CFR Part 37. We will look at 

that rule and see if there are things that we need to beef up. But 

as a regulatory body, we put regulations in place that are risk informed and performance based, and we do not typically have a onerule-fits-all. We leave it to the licensees to do. It is their responsibility to take our requirements and put their program into place 

and ensure that they are complying with our regulations. 

Now, we do provide with rules guidance that will instruct licensees on how they can construct and operate their program in a manner that will comply with our regulatory requirements. But we 

leave it to the licensee to put their program in place to document 

a written security plan. I would have to understand the security 

zone on some of these pictures to understand completely all the details. But I wanted to provide that short perspective. 

Chairman CARPER. OK, good. Is this an honor system that is in 

place, basically self-policing compliance? 

Mr. SATORIUS. No, because we also inspect these facilities, and 

where we have compliance problems, where they do not comply 

with our regulatory requirements, we have an enforcement program that can issue violations, civil penalties, Orders that will 

modify or revoke their license if necessary. So we have a very robust enforcement program. And like I say, we inspect these facilities on a periodicity that aligns with the potential danger that 

might befall a member of the public if they were to be exposed. 
14 

Our inspection program is quite robust. I am a former inspector 

myself. It is about a year program that has formal classes that 

have to be taken and passed successfully. There are many on-thejob type accompaniments where you are under instruction as you 

perform these inspection activities. And then, finally, you are qualified as an inspector through an oral board. 

So it is a rigorous program, and only inspectors can perform 

these sort of reviews of licensees. 

Chairman CARPER. Did you say the regulation had been updated 

recently? 

Mr. SATORIUS. Yes. 

Chairman CARPER. Give us just a flavor for how it was changed. 

Mr. SATORIUS. I had mentioned in the 2005 timeframe we had 

done an assessment since 9/11 and looked at what things we needed to make regulatory requirements, and what we typically do is 

we will issue orders that modify their license and has them perform certain activities. We will then take a little bit longer and go 

through the rulemaking process, which is a 2- to 3-year process, involves outreach to stakeholders and members of the public to help 

us in that rulemaking endeavor. 

And so that process took place, and we issued that regulation in 

March of this year. It involves, as you have heard, a background 

check to ensure that individuals that are allowed to have access by 

themselves, that they are trustworthy and reliable. The licensee 

performs that review and makes the determination as to whether 

the individual is trustworthy and reliable. 

We also have issued a guidance document of best practices for 

performing these type of reviews so that the individual that is responsible for making that call has guidance on what to look for and 

what the other thing that it requires is liaisoning with local law 

enforcement so that you have a plan that if in the course of the 

required detecting and assessing and responding to the potential 

theft of a source, you have to lay out a plan with local law enforcement so that they can respond. They are required to inform the 

NRC—they call the local law enforcement first, and they are required to call us as soon as they are done with that so we get early 

notification so that we can outreach to our Federal partners to 

make sure that this lost or stolen source has actually been absconded with and—— 

Chairman CARPER. OK. 

Mr. SATORIUS. Those are some of the things. 

Chairman CARPER. Can you give us some idea how often these 

reports to police and to the NRC come in for devices that are missing or are believed to be stolen? 

Mr. SATORIUS. I would say several a month, and the vast majority of those, all but—since 2005—I am sorry. 2010, 2011, 2012, and 

2013, there has been no Category I source lost or stolen. For Category II sources—— 

Chairman CARPER. Give us some idea what a Category I is as opposed to a Category II, please. 

Mr. SATORIUS. Yes. The IAEA standards and their Code of Conduct identifies Category I sources as, if not safely managed or securely protected are likely to cause permanent injury to a person 

who handled them or were otherwise in contact with them for more 
15 

than a few minutes, it would probably be fatal to be close to this 

amount of unshielded material for a period of a few minutes to an 

hour. And these sources are used in irradiators, and they are very 

strong sources. They tend to be cobalt-60. 

And Category II is one step down from that, where if you were 

in close contact to it for an hour or two, there would be serious injury and possibly a fatality. 

Chairman CARPER. I would assume that for Category I devices 

that the level of risk would be higher. 

Mr. SATORIUS. Yes. 

Chairman CARPER. And the requirement for securing the device 

would be greater, and maybe even inspections would occur more 

often. Give us some idea how often inspections would occur for 

these different categories. 

Mr. SATORIUS. Annually for Category I sources. 

Chairman CARPER. And for the other categories? 

Mr. SATORIUS. It varies. Some have a periodicity of every 2 years 

or every 3 years, depending upon the strength of the material and 

its potential to harm members of the public. And I will say also for 

Category I sources, Part 37, the new rule, requires that anytime 

the source is removed from its storage container, it sets off an 

alarm. So that is a new requirement that was in Part 37. 

Chairman CARPER. And is that for Category I devices? 

Mr. SATORIUS. Yes. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Let me just ask our panelists, would you 

just comment on the rule that Captain Satorius just described? 

What should we be encouraged by, maybe concerned about? Please, 

any of you. David. 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Well, as we note in our report, our site visits were 

assessing the current rules. Part 37 did not kick in for NRC-led 

States until this year, and it will not roll out for States until 2016. 

What I would highlight, however, is that many of the problems 

that were identified in our report I do not believe would be addressed. For example, the issue of collocation where some sites are 

able to not be subject to the security requirements because they are 

separately stored; therefore, they are not totaled up to hit the regulatory threshold that triggers the requirements for enhanced security. I do not believe that is addressed. 

I do not believe that some of the specificity that we have talked 

about in terms of types of locks for Category II sources is addressed. 

And then the issue about trustworthiness and reliability certifications and the process by which that is done I do not believe is 

addressed. 

So the decision is still being left to the licensee, and there is no 

process which—or criteria that would disqualify someone from 

being given such a certification. There is no process by which, say, 

for example, say you had a conviction or a red flag that would trigger greater NRC involvement. 

Chairman CARPER. Ms. Harrington or Dr. Gowadia, would you 

just react to what Mr. Trimble just said? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. I would like to take perhaps one of his points 

just very briefly, actually one of Mr. Satorius’ points, which is the 

coordination, and I think this is one of those places where we can 
16 

play a special role and do, along with NRC and DHS. Reaching out 

to law enforcement can often be very complicated. There are many 

different layers. You might be in a tribal area. It might be a university campus with its own security police. It could be an environment where you have local county and State police. 

So part of what we do collaboratively to go a bit above and beyond what is in the actual rule is to organize tabletop exercises 

that involve all elements of the community. These exercises really 

help bring together the different elements of the community that 

would be involved in response to any kind of incident. And so far 

in collaboration with our colleagues at the Department of Energy 

who do counterterrorism and counterproliferation, we have run 

well over 100 of these exercises all over the United States in communities—— 

Chairman CARPER. How often? Like in a year or what? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Several a year, usually. But we have found 

that the feedback from this kind of exercise is extremely positive. 

But if you were to try to regulate that sort of exercise, I am not 

sure exactly how you could do it. But this is one of the steps by 

looking together at how we can collaboratively improve the security 

posture, we have come up with some approaches like this that I 

think we feel are a very positive contribution to the overall security. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Speaking for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, sir, I could tell you that the collaboration one is very critical 

because the trusted networks by virtue of these exercises and all 

the work we do in our trilateral meetings, in our Government Coordination Council, et cetera, they help us build an ability to get 

the early indicator, the early warning, so that the law enforcement 

assets with the detection capabilities can respond and help find the 

lost or stolen sources. 

So we certainly support the regulatory work at the NRC and additional work that Administrator Harrington just mentioned, because it definitely enables our end of the mission spectrum, the detection, the find, fix, and locate piece. 

Chairman CARPER. How do the safeguards that have been described here this morning, how do they compare with safeguards 

that are in place in other countries around the world where they 

have whether it is radiography cameras or other devices, even medical radioactive materials? How does our work compare with that 

of other countries? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. This really is a global challenge, and I think 

to the credit of the countries involved in the Nuclear Security Summit process, they really have brought radiological security to the 

fore since the 2012 summit when it was added to the list of active 

targets for collaboration. I mentioned in my testimony that at the 

2014 summit the United States and 22 other countries made a 

commitment that by the time of the 2016 summit, we would have 

taken steps to secure all Category I sources. So that now is on our 

collective plates in the United States to deliver that to the 2016 

summit, and we will work collaboratively with other countries. 

But I would venture to say that the photographs that we saw 

here today could reasonably represent similar challenges within 

the international community. In fact, I was at a conference in 
17 

southern Africa earlier this year, and as you know, very rich in 

natural resources, and the countries are extremely worried about 

the dirty bomb threat because of the number of sources, the lack 

of regulation, lack of secure procedures, lack of a strong independent regulator to provide a framework. And so we will work 

with those countries collaboratively to try to help them improve 

their profile. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. When I was Governor of Delaware for 8 

years, I was very much involved in the National Governors Association (NGA), which had a clearinghouse for good ideas. I remember 

many cabinet meetings presiding over with our cabinet when we 

were discussing a particular challenge in our State, saying to my 

cabinet, ‘‘Some other State has faced this challenge, and they have 

figured it out, and they are the gold standard.’’ We had, as I said, 

in the National Governors Association this clearinghouse for good 

ideas, and we had the ability to find out what other State had addressed this satisfactorily, who the contact people were, how to get 

in touch with them, and it was actually very helpful in many instances. 

Do we have that kind of capability with maybe looking—I do not 

know if we would look from State to State, but if not from State 

to State to see who has the best practices in this regard, or maybe 

from country to country who has the best practices? Maybe it is us. 

But could you all speak to that, please? 

Mr. SATORIUS. I can start, Senator. 

Chairman CARPER. Please. 

Mr. SATORIUS. And I will speak from an Agreement State perspective where we have 37 States within the United States that 

have signed an agreement—the Governor has signed an agreement 

with the Chairman of the NRC where we first—where they want 

to take over the responsibilities for the safety and security of certain radioactive sources. And we have a process that we review 

their program and ensure that it has the right staffing, the right 

training. 

Chairman CARPER. Excuse me. Why would a State want to take 

over that responsibility? 

Mr. SATORIUS. Many reasons. The principal one that I hear is 

that we charge fees for licenses and for doing our regulatory activities. We are a 90-percent fee-recoverable agency. And so we charge 

fees. They oftentimes can do it for less money, so it is kind of a 

service to their constituents where they are able to provide those 

industrial users or medical users the use of these sources safely 

and compliant with our requirements at less cost to their citizens. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Others on the issue of compliance and 

best practices, whether it is within this country or outside of this 

country, please? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Well, you mentioned Senator Akaka before, 

and I had the honor to testify before him several years ago, and 

he was truly a leader in this area and worked very hard with—— 

Chairman CARPER. What do you suppose inspired him? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. I am not sure. I would ask my team, especially 

Ioanna Iliopulos, who runs this program for us, she worked very 

closely with the Senator and with the State of Hawaii to bring 
18 

them into full compliance with all regulations and, as far as I 

know, they were the first State to do that. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Ioanna, can you step a little closer to the 

microphone, please? If you can just take a moment, then we let you 

escape to your seat. 

Ms. ILIOPULOS. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Would you just say your name, please? 

Ms. ILIOPULOS. Yes. My name is Ioanna Iliopulos, and I work for 

NNSA, and I run the domestic program. 

Chairman CARPER. Ioanna Ilopulos? 

Ms. ILIOPULOS. Iliopulos. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you. There you go. 

Ms. ILIOPULOS. I think the Senator was truly a visionary and 

cared about a lot of post-September 11 threats, and there were a 

lot of indicators in the early days post-September 11, and intellectually had talked to other Congressmen and Senators on this issue 

and requested that the GAO look into the area. And I think with 

GAO’s audits, which were somewhat painful, on Federal programs 

but I think in the end raised the visibility of some of the 

vulnerabilities we have both domestically and internationally. And 

he was a clear advocate of it can be done in my State, I have medical facilities, I have USDA irradiators, I have a Navy base, I have 

a lot of things right in my own back yard, if it can be done in my 

State and we can increase the security posture, that could serve as 

a model going forward with other States. 

So it was a push on our part. We did not solely focus on Hawaii. 

We focus on major metropolitan areas and other States across the 

country on a voluntary basis, but his foresight and his advocacy on 

this issue clearly articulated the need for others to step up and 

step forward. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thank you very much. Mr. Trimble. 

Mr. TRIMBLE. I would just add that previously GAO has done 

some work in this area. We looked at the issue of orphan sources, 

and we looked at how they were handling this issue in France, and 

they had some innovative ideas. We have not looked at the crossorganizational sharing aspect per se, but we have done some work 

overseas to look at how other countries have tackled some of these 

issues. 

Chairman CARPER. I guess it would be understandable that if 

other nations have these devices that have radioactive materials in 

them, whether they are mobile or stationary, and if other countries 

do not secure them well and those materials were obtained, they 

could be used for bad purposes in those countries or maybe anywhere. What do we have to reduce the likelihood that if another 

country did not secure their radioactive materials well, what assurances do we have with the way we protect our own borders and our 

ports of entry that we will be able to detect or intercept any of that 

material coming in? Dr. Gowadia. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Yes, thank you, Senator, for that question. At 

DHS we believe in a multifaceted, layered approach to our security. 

So this begins well overseas. In my office, the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office, we work very closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency so that we can promulgate best practices across 

the globe. All 159 member States now have access to best practice 
19 

guides on building national architectures, exercising, training, and 

awareness, and we are even beginning to teach some of the courses 

at the International Law Enforcement Academy. So that is our first 

outreach. 

We also work with partner nations certainly to encourage them 

to have layered approaches within their nations. I guess as I go 

through my answer you will see me building layer after layer after 

layer so that we can make nuclear terrorism a harder and harder 

undertaking for the adversary. 

We use information such as manifest data to focus our overseas 

scanning efforts, and then certainly collaborate with our Intelligence Community partners so that we can get the early indicators, the early intelligence warnings, and surge our assets as necessary. 

At the borders itself, we have very robust capabilities, almost 100 

percent of our containerized cargo is scanned at our seaports; 100 

percent of vehicular traffic that comes across our land borders at 

our ports of entry get similarly scanned. We have well-trained law 

enforcement officers in Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and 

United States Coast Guard (USCG). Every boarding party in the 

United States Coast Guard carries detection equipment. All incoming general aviation flights are met by Customs and Border Protection officers who have the right equipment and scan the incoming 

aircraft. These are just some of the examples I can think of. 

And, of course, with your continued support, we will continue to 

make the right investments and appropriately balanced capabilities 

to build strength after strength at our borders and with our international partners. 

Chairman CARPER. Well, to be honest, all that is actually encouraging, and so we are grateful for the work that is being done. I like 

to say everything I do I know I can do better. Sometimes I say the 

road to improvement is always under construction. And just give 

us some examples of what we are doing better today than maybe 

what we were doing in the not too distant past, and maybe mention 

a couple of areas where we can do better still. This would be for 

you and for others as well. 

Ms. GOWADIA. I guess I will start. One of the things we do better 

today is inform our efforts based on a more holistic look at the risk. 

My office is responsible for coordinating the global nuclear detection architecture and implementing its domestic component. So in 

these fiscally constrained days, we have to balance our resources 

to get the maximum bang for the buck, so we are now analyzing 

risk-informed schemes, building better feeds from information so 

that our mobile, agile architecture can be more responsive to a 

credible threat. So that is something we are doing better. 

I could not agree with you more, Senator, no matter what we are 

doing, we can always do something better, a lot better. And with 

the adversary being adaptive, we have to continue to grow and stay 

ahead of their capabilities as well. 

You heard the Administrator talk about exercising. Illicit nuclear 

materials are not something a law enforcement officer sees on a 

day-to-day basis, so we must practice. We must keep our skills up 

to speed, and we do that with some of our field exercises where we 
20 

use uncommon sources to expose our officers to things they do not 

see on a normal basis. 

These are some of the activities. Integrated exercising I think is 

something we can do better moving forward. And our communications coordination function always can be better. 

Chairman CARPER. Anyone else? Ms. Harrington. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. So Dr. Gowadia mentioned the global nuclear 

detection architecture. There was a White House review of GNDA 

last year, and within the context of that review, some very specific 

areas for the programs that we run at the Department of Energy 

were identified as necessary to fill certain gaps. For example, our 

second line of defense program works very carefully and closely 

with DHS. We install radiological detection devices in ports where 

there is a lot of outgoing cargo traffic to the United States. So we 

try to catch things before they even are headed to the United 

States, and we are particularly interested in nuclear material. But 

radiological sources are also a very big concern, and a large number do get caught through this system, identified, isolated, and 

then handled appropriately. 

Also internationally, since 2004—and we just actually celebrated 

the 10-year anniversary of our Global Threat Reduction Initiative 

(GTRI)—we have done an enormous amount of work internationally to both secure sources, identify disposition pathways, work 

with countries to develop best practices, work on an international 

code of conduct for the security of radiological sources. This is an 

extremely active area of programming for us and one where we will 

continue to be extremely active. 

I think one of our biggest accomplishments was first identifying 

and then retiring the radiological thermoelectric generators (RTGs), 

used by Russia to power lighthouses in very remote locations and 

so forth. These were massive sources, and one of them could have 

been used for many dirty bombs. So that was a huge accomplishment over multiple years. But we have had similar kinds of work 

going on across the globe for the last decade. 

Mr. SATORIUS. Senator, I would just add that one of the things 

we are doing better today that we were not doing in the past has 

to do with our source security rulemaking that I mentioned earlier. 

There are six focus areas within that rulemaking that makes it a 

more effective rule, and that includes, as I think I had mentioned, 

background checks, including FBI fingerprinting, to help ensure 

that individuals who are allowed next to sources, can do so 

unescorted, controlling personnel access where risk-significant 

sources are being stored, documenting security programs. In other 

words, a written security program that lays out how the licensees 

will safeguard these sources, coordinating with local law enforcement to have a plan in place in case there is theft or diversion, and 

coordinating and tracking radioactive source shipments such that 

if they become lost during shipment, there is a manner to be able 

to find them. 

Chairman CARPER. OK, good. 

Mr. TRIMBLE. I would add just one—— 

Chairman CARPER. Mr. Trimble. 

Mr. TRIMBLE. I think the international efforts we have discussed 

today in terms of protecting the country highlight in an indirect 
21 

way the importance of the issues we bring up in our report, because as those pathways become more and more difficult for anyone to navigate, the easiest path is domestic. Why try to bring 

something in from overseas if you can just go to the local hospital 

or go to the warehouse to get the source? So this underscores the 

importance of making sure the NRC requirements for domestic 

medical and industrial users are robust, and the weaknesses we 

identified are addressed. The points I would highlight in terms of 

where we can do better. Specifically should be looking at the definition of ‘‘collocation’’ so that all vulnerable facilities are subject to 

the regulations, improving how we do background checks, giving 

better guidance on who should and should not be given such access, 

examining whether NRC should be playing a bigger role in that 

process and providing more specific guidance to companies and licensees who are not security professionals. These are commercial 

companies doing a business. They may have some health and 

science background, but they are not security professionals, so they 

need some more help than what we are giving them right now. 

Chairman CARPER. OK, good. Let us go back to those radiography cameras. Before, one of the questions I had asked is: Are 

they Category I or Category II? 

Mr. SATORIUS. They are Category II, and they have a source that 

needs to be replenished fairly often because of its half-life. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. What would be ‘‘fairly often’’? Every year 

or two? 

Mr. SATORIUS. About every 3 months. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. That is fairly often. All right. 

Are we aware of any effort to actually mount an attack using a 

dirty bomb in this country or another country? Are we aware of 

whether someone has actually attempted, much like in Boston 

where we had the effort, unfortunately successful, to use pressure 

cookers to hurt and kill and maim a lot of people? We have seen 

the use of a substance in the air to poison, try to kill people in subways, so we have actually demonstrated uses of technology to hurt 

people. Do we have any documentation about attacks either in this 

country or in other countries where this was actually tried, maybe 

failed, maybe aborted? 

Mr. SATORIUS. I do not, sir. There is the general threat that we 

make every effort to safeguard against. I am not sure if my colleagues are aware of any attempts to produce a dirty bomb using 

our sources? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. If you want to followup with a classified briefing on the topic, we could go into that in more detail. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Good enough. And I am going to ask a 

follow-on question, and if it is one that is not appropriate to answer 

in this space, just say so. But people can go on the Internet and 

learn all kinds of things, including how to build weapons, and nuclear weapons, pressure cooker bombs, and I presume dirty bombs. 

Given the access to that kind of information, why do you suppose 

no one has done it, at least to our knowledge—and they have certainly not been successful in doing it. And maybe it is because of 

the security measures that we are talking about in this country are 

pretty good, getting better. Maybe it is because that is true in other 

countries. Maybe it is not as easy as it sounds to do, and maybe 
22 

people just decided that it is too dangerous and they are going to 

hurt or maim other people, they maybe find some way to do it that 

is less damaging to the perpetrator, although a lot of them do not 

really seem to care about whether or not they live or die. But why? 

Why do you suppose we have not seen it attempted more? Mr. 

Trimble. 

Mr. TRIMBLE. I will just jump in to start the conversation. I 

think the efforts of NNSA, DHS, and NRC deserve credit for all 

they have done to try to secure these sources. I think where the 

conversation is going is: Is there more that we can do, though? And 

that is really where our report is coming from, and really it is just 

premised on the idea that it only takes one to make a really bad 

day. 

Chairman CARPER. Others, please? 

Mr. SATORIUS. Just quickly, I would like to say that I believe 

some of the efforts that we have taken in putting together regulatory programs as well as other programs, that is certainly one of 

the drivers. We have made it very hard for people to get their 

hands on these things. 

Chairman CARPER. Doctor. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Senator, I would echo a lot of what you said and 

what we have heard today, but in a different setting, I think we 

can go into more specifics. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Ms. Harrington. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. I support Dr. Gowadia’s statement about taking this up in a different environment. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Fair enough. 

Captain Satorius, let me go back to you. Let me just ask, does 

the NRC have any mechanisms to immediately review unescorted 

access decisions made by licensees? For instance, if a licensee 

grants unescorted access to an individual with a violent criminal 

history, will the NRC be immediately made aware of this action 

and will it be able to take immediate action? 

Mr. SATORIUS. We would be able to inspect it at our next scheduled inspection activity. That is when we review the decisionmaking by the licensee staff on trustworthiness and reliability. 

Chairman CARPER. Mr. Trimble, do you want to react to that? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. My understanding of the guidelines, though, is 

that what is being reviewed is that the various factors were considered, but the actual decision is left to the licensee. So there is still 

no prohibition that if someone has convictions for certain things, 

they are not allowed to have access. 

Chairman CARPER. Does that sound satisfactory? Should we be 

concerned about that, ladies? 

Ms. GOWADIA. So I would respectfully defer to my regulatory colleagues on Director Satorius’ position. I support and advocate for 

this mission because, again, the more secure these sources are, the 

easier it becomes for the detection end of things. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Do you think it would be helpful, again, 

Mr. Satorius, to require that the licensee get a second opinion from 

their respective State or the NRC regarding the trustworthiness of 

an individual? 

Mr. SATORIUS. Well, Senator, I do not think it would, and the 

reason is, as a regulatory body, we expect our licensees to perform 
23 

these activities. We give them good guidance that they can follow 

and so that they will repeat the right decisions. But I would say 

that it is not within our purview to be consultants. We review what 

the licensee has done and make a decision on whether they comply 

with our regulations. 

Chairman CARPER. In any of your regulations, does the NRC expressly prohibit licensees from granting unescorted access to individuals previously convicted of making, for example, terroristic 

threats? 

Mr. SATORIUS. They do not. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Maybe one more question, and then we 

will wrap up. We are going to start voting in just a few minutes. 

This would be one for Ms. Harrington and for Captain Satorius. 

This is on security enhancement. I understand that the National 

Nuclear Security Administration’s Global Threats Reduction Initiative works with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, licenses 

State, local, and tribal governments and other Federal agencies to 

build on the existing regulatory requirements by providing voluntary security enhancements. Let me just ask you, Administrator 

Harrington, how many security enhancements has the National 

Nuclear Security Administration put into place on industrial and 

construction facilities? And a followup would be: What obstacles 

stand in your way from installing some form of security upgrades 

for all high-risk radiological sources? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. I do not know if these numbers break out 

strictly the industrial facilities, but according to our analysis, there 

are approximately 3,000 buildings in the United States containing 

high-risk radiological sources. Of that number, we have already 

worked in 650 buildings providing our security upgrade program, 

and we intend to complete another 45 in this fiscal year. So that 

is, I think, a reasonable accomplishment, but that only gets us up 

to 700 out of 3,000. 

We have also recovered—— 

Chairman CARPER. What about the other 2,300? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Well, those are in out-year plans, but with the 

budget environment as it is, we have had to extend the target date 

for completion farther than we had originally thought would be 

possible. 

The other part of this is the disposition pathway for these 

sources, and that is often a challenge because you either have to 

find a secure storage facility for long-term storage or, some other 

way to safely dispose of those sources. It is the licensee’s responsibility to do that unless the source that they have has no clear disposition pathway, in which case we can step in and assist. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Mr. Satorius, if you have something to 

add, feel free to do so briefly. Otherwise, I am going to bring this 

to a close for now. Anything else you want to add there on this 

point? 

Mr. SATORIUS. Not on this point. I think my colleague has said 

it very carefully. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. 

Mr. SATORIUS. These are enhancements, and we believe that 

compliance with our regulations provide adequate protection for 

the public. 
24 

Senator, I do need to correct one statement I made earlier for the 

record, if I could do that very quickly. 

Chairman CARPER. Sure. 

Mr. SATORIUS. That is, not all Category I sources are inspected 

on a yearly basis. The periodicity of the inspection is based on the 

safety and robustness of the device, and some Category I sources 

are scheduled for periodic inspections at a greater periodicity than 

1 year, at 3 years, 4 years, 5 years. 

Chairman CARPER. Good. Thanks for that clarification. 

Let me just say as we come to a close, our job in this Committee 

is to do oversight. We have the responsibility of oversight for the 

Department of Homeland Security. We also have broad responsibility or oversight for the whole Federal Government. And other 

committees have subcommittees that are responsible for investigations. Some of them take it seriously; others do not. But it is hard 

for one Committee such as this one to really exercise meritorious 

oversight over the entire Federal Government, like we have 15, 16 

people, and as good as we are, and our staffs and all, it is just a 

little bit too much for us to handle. But one of the things we can 

do from time to time is partner with the GAO and ask them from 

time to time to look at particular issues, in this case threats, and 

ask the question: How are we doing? What are we doing well? 

Maybe what are others in other countries doing even better that 

we can learn from, or even particular States? 

I hope and pray that the subject of today’s hearing is something 

that will just always be the subject for a hearing or for speculation 

and that nobody is ever going to be hurt or inconvenienced in any 

way because of an attack of this nature. You never know. And what 

we can do is try to make sure that we are doing everything we can 

to hope for the best and prepare for the worst. And I am encouraged today to hear that there is a fair amount of work going on 

to protect our people and to share that information with other nations so that they can better protect their own folks. But I certainly 

do not want to hear someone ever ask the question: Why didn’t 

somebody do something about this threat of a dirty bomb? Why 

didn’t somebody do something to protect against it? And I want us 

to be able to say, well, we have worked hard in order to protect our 

people and our country from a threat of this nature. 

So as I said earlier, everything I do I know I can do better. I 

think that is true of all of us, and that is true of every Federal program. And so our goal is perfection—probably hard to reach, but 

it is a pretty good goal for us. 

So I will conclude by saying how much we appreciate not just 

your being here, not just preparing for the hearing, not just answering my questions, but also we appreciate very much the work 

you do for our country. Thank you for your service to our Nation. 

The hearing record will remain open for 15 days—that is until 

June 27 at 5 p.m.—for the submission of statements and questions 

for the record, and, again, our thanks to each of you, and to our 

majority and minority staff, for helping us prepare for this hearing. 

Thank you so much, and with that this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
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