J-S71043-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DARRYL YOUNG,

Appellant No. 928 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 24, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0006505-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2017

Appellant, Darryl Young, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his bench conviction of one count each of first-degree 

murder, attempted murder, criminal conspiracy, recklessly endangering 

another person, carrying firearms without a license, carrying firearms on 

public streets in Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of a crime, and 

two counts of aggravated assault.1 Appellant challenges the sufficiency and 

weight of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm.

We take the following facts and procedural history from our independent 

review of the certified record. This case arises from the shooting of two men, 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 901(a), 903, 2705, 6106(a)(1), 6108, 907(a), and 

2702(a), respectively.
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William Harriston, who died as a result of his injuries, and Shirvin McGarrell, 

who sustained eleven gunshot wounds and survived.

On February 2, 2009, at approximately 8:00 p.m., McGarrell and his 

daughter’s mother, Shaniece Thorton, were driving to McGarrell’s home after 

finishing a shopping trip. As they approached the home, Thorton saw 

Appellant, whom she recognized from the neighborhood, walking down the 

street with two other men, whose faces were covered by their hoods. 

Appellant motioned for McGarrell to come over towards him, and McGarrell 

dropped Thorton off in front of the home so that she could bring their 

purchases inside.

Meanwhile, Harriston and Darren Ricketts arrived at McGarrell’s home,

because they had plans with McGarrell for the evening. McGarrell asked 

Ricketts to move his car, and as Ricketts proceeded to do so, gunfire broke 

out. Ricketts saw Appellant run away with two guns in his hands. Appellant 

then stopped and ran back to search McGarrell, before again fleeing from the 

scene. Thorton also heard gunshots, from what sounded like more than one 

gun, and she ran towards McGarrell, who had been shot in his stomach, chest, 

legs, and arms.

2

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2 Ricketts testified that, while on the way to the hospital, McGarrell spoke 

words that Ricketts interpreted as identifying Appellant as the shooter. (See 

N.T. Trial, 2/22/16, at 35, 50-51, 53-54). This testimony was somewhat 

inconsistent with the statement Ricketts gave to police after the shooting, and 

the trial court stated that it considered Rickett’s testimony on this particular 

point neutral. (See id. at 52-54; see also N.T. Trial, 2/24/16, at 43, 45).
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On February 11, 2009, nine days after the shooting, McGarrell gave a 

statement to homicide detectives identifying Appellant as one of the shooters. 

On August 13, 2013, inmate Charles Bryant reported to detectives that, while 

he was incarcerated with Appellant, he asked Appellant about the Harriston

shooting, because Harriston was a close friend. Appellant confessed to 

shooting Harriston and McGarrell, and explained that the bullets were intended

for McGarrell only, as retaliation for his involvement in another killing.

Appellant proceeded to a four-day bench trial in January and February 

2016. At trial, McGarrell refused to identify Appellant as his assailant, despite 

his earlier statement to the contrary. (See N.T. Trial, 2/22/16, at 62, 65-66, 

68; N.T. Trial, 2/24/16, at 64). Appellant testified that he was present at the 

scene of the shooting, but was not involved in it, and that he fled when the 

gunfire started. (See N.T. Trial, 2/24/16, at 14, 17).

On February 24, 2016, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the 

above-stated offenses. It imposed an aggregate term of incarceration of life 

without the possibility of parole. The court denied Appellant’s timely postsentence motion on March 10, 2016. This timely appeal followed.3

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

A. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law, to establish 

[Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges 

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3 Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed a timely concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal on April 26, 2016. The trial court judge is 

no longer sitting on the bench in Philadelphia County, and the record was 

forwarded to this Court without an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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because the evidence presented at trial by the sole eyewitness 

was unreliable and not credible?

B. Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence because the 

Commonwealth’s principal witness gave contradictory and 

inconsistent testimony concerning his observations of the incident 

and his identification of [Appellant], a material element of the 

crime charged[?]

(Appellant’s Brief, at 2) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting all of the charges against him. (See id. at 14-27). He argues that 

the Commonwealth’s evidence was not believable because it was inconsistent 

and contradictory, and the testimony of Ricketts and Bryant was fabricated. 

(See id.). This issue is waived and does not merit relief.

We begin by noting,

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial [ ] 

in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the 

fact-finder. In addition, we note the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may 

be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 981 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 163 A.3d 403 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

With regard to issue preservation, it is well settled: 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) provides, 

inter alia, “Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised 

in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are 

waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). In Commonwealth v. 

Garland, 63 A.3d 339 (Pa. Super. 2013), this Court found the 

appellant had waived his sufficiency of the evidence claim where 

his 1925(b) statement simply averred the evidence was legally 

insufficient to support the convictions and in doing so reasoned:

In order to preserve a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s 

Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the 

element or elements upon which the appellant alleges 

that the evidence was insufficient. Such specificity is 

of particular importance in cases where, as here, the 

appellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of 

which contains numerous elements that the 

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Here, as is evident, [the a]ppellant . . . failed 

to specify which elements he was challenging in his 

Rule 1925(b) statement. . . . Thus, we find [his] 

sufficiency claim waived on this basis.

Id. at 344 (citations omitted).

Id. at 982 (footnote and some quotation marks omitted) (concluding appellant 

waived sufficiency claim where his concise statement failed to clearly state 

any element upon which he alleged evidence was insufficient).

Here, Appellant was convicted of eight separate offenses, each of which 

contain multiple elements. In his concise statement, he presented his 

sufficiency claim as follows: “The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law 

to establish [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges 
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because the evidence presented a [sic] trial by the sole eyewitness was 

unreliable and credible [sic].” (Rule 1925(b) Statement, 4/26/16, at 1 ¶ 1). 

This vague statement fails to “state with specificity the element or elements 

upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient[,]” and is 

inadequate to preserve his claim. Stiles, supra at 982 (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue is waived.

Moreover, it would not merit relief. In his brief, Appellant conflates his 

sufficiency argument with his weight claim by challenging the credibility of the 

witnesses’ testimony and arguing the standard applicable to weight claims, 

i.e., that the verdict shocks the conscience. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 21, 23). 

It is well-settled that credibility determinations “go to the weight, not the 

sufficiency of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1262 

(Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 630 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted)

(stating claim that factfinder should have believed appellant’s version of 

events rather than Commonwealth’s goes to weight, not sufficiency of 

evidence; appellant’s sufficiency claim arguing credibility lacks merit). 

Therefore, Appellant’s sufficiency claim would lack merit, even if it were not 

waived. See id.

Appellant next challenges the weight of the evidence, arguing that the 

testimony is replete with inconsistencies, and that the exculpatory evidence

presented at trial demonstrates the falsity of Rickett’s account of the shooting. 
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(See Appellant’s Brief, at 27-30).4 Appellant asserts that the trial court made

a fundamental error in convicting him and in denying his request for a new 

trial, given the number of inconsistencies and contradictions in the witnesses’ 

testimony. (See id. at 29). This issue lacks merit.

In assessing a claim that the verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that 

of the factfinder, which is free to assess the credibility of 

witnesses and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented.

When the challenge to the weight of the 

evidence is predicated on the credibility of trial 

testimony, our review of the trial court’s decision is 

extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is 

so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any 

verdict based thereon pure conjecture, these types of 

claims are not cognizable on appellate review. 

Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the 

weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to 

consider the underlying question of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, 

appellate review is limited to whether the trial court 

palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight 

claim.

Further, this Court will not reverse a verdict unless it is so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Fortson, 165 A.3d 10, 16 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted; emphasis added). 

Here, Thorton testified that, immediately before the shooting, Appellant 

motioned for McGarrell to come over to him and two other men who wore 

____________________________________________

4 Appellant preserved his weight claim by raising it in his post-sentence 

motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3).
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hoodies covering their faces. (See N.T. Trial, 2/22/16, at 8-9, 14-16). 

Ricketts testified that Appellant was the person closest to McGarrell before the 

shooting. (See id. at 26, 33). After gunshots rang out, Ricketts observed 

Appellant, holding two guns, initially run from the scene. (See id. at 29-32). 

Ricketts then saw Appellant return to McGarrell to search his person as he lay 

in the street, before again fleeing from the area. (See id. 32-34).

Before the trial court issued its verdict, it stated on the record that it 

had listened carefully to the evidence and reviewed its notes and the exhibits. 

(See N.T. Trial, 2/24/16, at 61). The court explained that it had considered 

the credibility of each of the witnesses, and that it found some of the testimony 

incredible, and other testimony and evidence reliable. (See id. at 62-64). 

The court specifically stated that it found credible the central aspects of 

Rickett’s testimony, and Bryant’s testimony that Appellant confessed to the 

shooting. (See id. at 62-63). It noted that the strongest piece of evidence 

in the case was McGarrell’s statement to police just nine days after the 

shooting, made while he was suffering from the effects of his numerous bullet 

wounds, identifying Appellant as the shooter. (See id. at 63-64). In contrast, 

the court found Appellant’s testimony denying involvement in the shooting 

and McGarrell’s recantation testimony from the witness stand “completely 

unbelievable.” (Id. at 62; see id. at 64). After cautiously weighing all that 

was before it, the court determined that Appellant was guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (See id. at 64-65).
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After review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not 

palpably abuse its discretion in ruling on Appellant’s weight claim. See 

Fortson, supra at 16. The court, as factfinder, was free to resolve any 

credibility issues and conflicts in the testimony, and to credit the version of 

events presented by the Commonwealth, rather than Appellant’s self-serving 

account. See id. Therefore, Appellant’s second claim merits no relief. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/29/17