* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

______________

No. 96-20241

Summary Calendar

______________

ROBERTO MARINELLI PEREZ, JOAQUINA MARIA SALCEDO P.

DE MARINELLI, Plaintiff-Appellants,

versus

PAN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,

Defendants,

SEGUROS PANAMERICANA, S.A.,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(CA-H-94-3096)

_________________________________________________________________

August 20, 1996

Before DAVIS, WIENER and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

FORTUNATO P. BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge * :

Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal the district court's granting of

Defendant-Appellee Seguros Panamericana, S.A.'s ("Seguros") motion

to dismiss under F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 12(b)(2 ) for insufficiency of

process, (b)(4) for insufficiency of service, and (b)(5) for lack

of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.

I.2

On June 6, 1992, Plaintiffs-Appellants, who are residents of

G uatemala, purchased a health insurance policy from Seguros, a

Guatemalan corporation licensed to sell insurance in Guatemala and

a subsidiary of Defendant Pan American Life Insurance Company ("Pan

American"). When Plaintiffs-Appellants' son became ill, they

sought and received medical services from Texas Children's Hospital

in Houston, Texas. After Plaintiffs-Appellants accumulated several

hundreds of thousands of dollars in medical bil ls, Seguros

terminated their insurance policy and refused to pay their claims.

On September 8, 1994, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed suit in

district court in Texas against Pan American and Seguros to recover

benefits under the policy issued by Seguros. Pan American filed an

answer subject to a motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) and a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim pursua nt to F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Seguros did

not enter an appearance in the district court. On January 11,

1995, the court granted both motions and dismissed the suit against

all defendants.

Plaintiffs-Appellants appealed to this Court. On October 20,

1995, we affirmed the district court's di smissal of Pan American

for failure to state a claim for relief. Because Seguros did not

appear in district court, it was not a party of the appeal.

Therefore, we remanded to the district court the remaining claims

against Seguros for further proceedings. On remand, Seguros filed3

motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency

of process, and insufficiency of service. On February 9, 1996, the

district co urt granted all three motions and entered a final

judgment dismissing Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims against Seguros.

II.

Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that personal jurisdiction

exists because Seguros universally represented that its insurance

policies, including the one issued to Plaintiffs-Appellants,

entitled the holders to medical servic es at the Houston Medical

Center in Houston, Texas. They argue that Seguros approved their

application to go the Houston Medical Center to procure medical

services for their son, and that by capitalizing on the Houston

Medical Center to the detriment of Texas' hospitals, do ctors and

charities, has committed acts that constitute "doing business" in

Texas. Personal jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed d e novo

by an appellate court. R uston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co.,

Inc.

, 9 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff bears the

ultimate burden of demonstrating that personal jurisdiction exists.

Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc.

, 954 F.2d 1061, 1067

(5th Cir.), cert. denied

, 506 U.S. 867, 113 S.Ct. 193, 121 L.Ed.2d

136 (1992).

A federal court has jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

to the same extent that a state court in that forum has

jurisdiction. G undle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt,1 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945).

4 Inc.

, 85 F.3d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Wilson v. Belin

, 20

F.3d 644, 646 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

, ___U.S.___, 115 S.Ct. 322,

130 L.Ed.2d 282 (1994)). "The reach of a state court's

jurisdict ion is delimited by: (1) the state's long-arm statute;

and (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

federal Constitution." I d. (citing Bullion v. Gillespie

, 895 F.2d

213, 215 (5th Cir. 1990)). Under the Texas long-arm statute,

jurisdiction may be exercised over nonresidents "doing business" in

Texas. I d. (citing T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE § 17.042). The

exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant will

not violate due process principles if: (1) the nonresident has

purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the

forum state through "minimum contacts" established by International

Shoe Co. v. Washington 1 ; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction does

not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice." I d. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court

,

480 U.S. 102, 113, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)).

We find no evidence in the record that Seguros has any

contacts with the state of Texas, let alone "minimum contacts" to

allow the federal court to exercise jurisdiction in this case.

Seguros, a Guatemalan corporation, solicits no business in Texas,

does not maintain an office in Texas, and does not have a

representative or agent in Texas. The insurance policy at issue2 Because we find no personal jurisdiction in this case, we

need not address the remaining issues raised in this appeal.

5 was solicited and issued in Guatemala, and all billing and claims

handling occurred in Guatemala. In fact, the only arguable

"contacts" Seguros has wi th Texas is the worldwide coverage

language in the policy itself and Plaintiffs-Appellants' claim that

a Seguros representative approved treatment at Texas Ch ildren's

Hospital in Houston, Texas. The court's exercise of jurisdiction

based solely on these thin "contacts" would offend the traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the

district court did not err in granting Seguros motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction. 2

III.

For the reasons articulate above, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.