UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4557

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

AARON MONROE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Dever III, 

Chief District Judge. (7:12-cr-00047-D-1)

Submitted: September 9, 2016 Decided: September 22, 2016

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United 

States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Aaron Monroe pleaded guilty to robbery of a business 

engaged in interstate commerce and aiding and abetting the same, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 2 (2012) (count one), using 

and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 

violence and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 2 (2012) (count two), and being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, and aiding and abetting the same, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924, 2 (2012) (count three).

On resentencing, after determining that Monroe qualified as a 

career offender, the district court sentenced him to 324 months’ 

imprisonment. We affirm.

At resentencing, Monroe objected to the determination that 

he was a career offender based on his North Carolina conviction 

for second degree rape in light of our decision in United 

States v. Shell, 789 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2015). The career 

offender sentencing enhancement applies if the defendant is at 

least 18 years old at the time of commission of the offense for 

which he is being sentenced and the instant offense is either a 

crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and the 

defendant has at least two prior convictions that qualify as 

either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (2015). Under the 

force clause for career offender predicates, a crime of violence 
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is any felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”

USSG § 4B1.2(a).

The Government contends, however, that any error by the 

district court in determining Monroe qualified as a career 

offender and sentencing him to 324 months of imprisonment is 

harmless because the district court asserted at sentencing that, 

even if Monroe did not qualify as a career offender, it would 

have imposed the same sentence based on its consideration of the 

sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). Procedural 

errors at sentencing are “routinely subject to harmlessness 

review.” United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 

(4th Cir. 2011); see Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 141 

(2009).

“‘[A]ssumed harmlessness inquiry’ requires (1) ‘knowledge 

that the district court would have reached the same result even 

if it had decided the guidelines issue the other way,’ and 

(2) ‘a determination that the sentence would be reasonable even 

if the guidelines issue had been decided in the defendant’s 

favor.’” United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th 

Cir. 2014). The error will be deemed harmless only where the 

court is “certain” of these two factors. United States v. 

Gomez, 690 F.3d 194, 203 (4th Cir. 2012). Because the district 

court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence as an 
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upward variance even if Monroe were not a career offender, we 

find that the first prong of the harmlessness inquiry is 

satisfied.

We “review all sentences — whether inside, just outside, or 

significantly outside the Guidelines range — under a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 41 (2007). We review the substantive reasonableness of a 

sentence, considering “the totality of the circumstances to see 

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding 

that the sentence it chose satisfie[s] the standards set forth 

in § 3553(a).” Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d at 382. When the 

district court imposes a variant sentence, this court considers 

“whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect 

to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to 

the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United 

States v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 

2007).

In determining Monroe’s sentence, the district court 

expressly considered his history and characteristics — including 

his numerous prior convictions, the nature and circumstances of 

the offenses of conviction, the seriousness of the offenses, the 

need to promote respect for the law, and the need to provide 

punishment. The court determined that there was a great need 

for deterrence. The court also emphasized the need to protect 
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the public, opining that Monroe participated in a “crime wave of 

terrible conduct that harms people” when he is not imprisoned.

After considering all of the § 3553(a) factors, the 

district court determined that a 324-month sentence was 

appropriate. In light of the district court’s thorough 

consideration of the sentencing factors and its individualized 

assessment of the factors as they related to Monroe, we conclude 

that the 324-month upward variant sentence is reasonable and 

that any error by the district court in concluding that Monroe 

was a career offender, is harmless. See Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 

at 382.

Accordingly, we affirm Monroe’s sentence. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED