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THE COMMERCIAL CREW PROGRAM: 

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 27, 2015 

Serial No. 114–9 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan 

STEVE KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington 

GARY PALMER, Alabama 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts 

DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

MARK TAKANO, California 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

HON. STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama, 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

STEVE KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland, 

AMI BERA, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

February 27, 2015 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Steven Palazzo, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 10 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11 

Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 15 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16 

Witnesses: 

Mr. Bill Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 17 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Vice Admiral Joseph Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory 

Panel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 29 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 31 

Mr. John Mulholland, Vice President and Program Manager, Commercial 

Programs, The Boeing Company 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 36 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 38 

Dr. Garrett Reisman, Director, Crew Operations, Space Exploration Technologies Corporation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 46 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 47 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 61 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Mr. Bill Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) .......................................................................................................... 82 

Vice Admiral Joseph Dyer, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory 

Panel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) .................... 123 

Mr. John Mulholland, Vice President and Program Manager, Commercial 

Programs, The Boeing Company ......................................................................... 137 

Dr. Garrett Reisman, Director, Crew Operations, Space Exploration Technologies Corporation ............................................................................................ 151 
Page

IV 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Prepared statement submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, 

Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 166 
(1) 

THE COMMERCIAL CREW PROGRAM: 

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:01 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven Palazzo 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 

Chairman PALAZZO. The Subcommittee on Space will come to 

order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses 

of the Subcommittee at any time. Good morning. Welcome to today’s hearing, entitled ‘‘The Commercial Crew Program: Challenge 

and Opportunities’’. In front of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies, and truth-in-testimony disclosures for 

today’s witnesses. I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

I would like to welcome everyone to our hearing today, and I 

want to thank our witnesses for taking time to appear before the 

Committee. Today’s hearing is a review of the Commercial Crew 

Program at NASA. This program holds the promise of tremendous 

value for both the taxpayer and the contractors, as long as the program is executed appropriately. 

Last year NASA chose two partners to continue through the final 

phase of the program, Boeing and SpaceX. Known as CCtCap, or 

Commercial Crew Transportation Capability, this final phase will 

provide funding for the partners to complete testing of their systems. This is a critical phase in our Nation’s efforts to develop and 

sustain assured U.S. human access to low-Earth orbit. To date, 

Congress and the Administration have not been able to reach consensus on the most efficient way to meet NASA’s launch requirements. However, the promise of this capability, and new contracting structure, has allowed for guarded optimism. 

The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 directed NASA to engage 

the private sector for access to the International Space Station, so 

long as it did not come at the expense of NASA’s other exploration 

development programs. Similarly, the NASA Authorization Act of 

2010 continued this direction, including reporting requirements related to safety, and directed NASA to ensure that the Orion vehicle 

was able to provide alternative means of delivering crew to the ISS 

in the event that partner supplied vehicles are unable to perform 

that function. NASA has done a lot to move the industry along in 

compliance with these laws. They have provided funding for early 

stage development, funding to mature spacecraft designs, funding 

to certify those designs, and ultimately they will provide a steady 

customer through the ISS program. 

Previous testimony before this committee indicated that taxpayers will fund roughly 90 percent of the development of these capabilities, and then in turn pay once again for the services derived 

from those capabilities. In total, NASA has spent, or plans to 

spend, over $8 billion on this initiative, which I believe represents 

a necessary investment, if managed effectively. In order to protect 

taxpayer interests, however, this level of investment by the taxpayer requires a similar level of transparency and accountability. 

To that end, it was concerning to read some of the findings made 

by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, also known as ASAP, in 

its annual report this year. The ASAP is congressionally chartered 

to examine the culture of safety at NASA. It is required to provide 

advice to Congress, and to the administrator, measures that can be 

taken to improve safety at the agency. 

This year, the ASAP was not able to complete their job insofar 

as it pertains to the Commercial Crew Program. According to the 

report, the Director of Commercial Space Flight Development at 
11 

NASA has provided excuses instead of information. This is described by the panel as a seamless set of constraints as to why information cannot be shared. Similarly, the report states this opacity and failure to engage in open and transparent communication 

is reminiscent of the problems that were explicitly identified by 

both the Rogers Commission and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board regarding causes of the Space Shuttle Challenger and 

Columbia mishaps, respectively. Unfortunately, this committee experienced similar issues when it attempted to get information on 

this program over the last year and a half. 

I want to be crystal clear to our witnesses here today, and to the 

Administration, denying information to ASAP or Congress about 

the Commercial Crew Program is unacceptable when the hardworking American taxpayers are footing the bill for the program, 

and the safety of our astronauts is on the line. Congress and the 

American people deserve to have answers to the questions posed by 

ASAP. I am pleased to hear that NASA is now being more open, 

and I hope this trend continues. 

Aside from the issues raised in the ASAP report, NASA must 

also address several outstanding questions as the program advances. The decision to use the Federal Acquisition Regulations to 

issue contracts for the final phase of the program was a welcome 

step from the Administration, and one that I endorse, but how will 

waivers to safety requirements from the Certification Products 

Contract phase be evaluated and issued? Given the delays in the 

Commercial Cargo Program, how will NASA maintain schedule discipline under the current crew contracts? Why can’t a scaled back 

Orion launched on a Delta IV Heavy provide a redundant capability and competition to the Commercial Crew Program? What 

level of price competition exists in the program, now that we know 

the contractors’ bids? 

I raise these questions because I want the program to be successful. In these difficult budgetary times, NASA must concentrate its 

limited resources on meeting its core requirements, one of those 

being domestic human access to low-Earth orbit. I truly believe 

that we can come together to address these concerns in a constructive, bipartisan way so that we can once again launch American astronauts on American rockets from American soil. I look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Palazzo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

CHAIRMAN STEVEN PALAZZO

Good morning. I would like to welcome everyone to our hearing today and I want 

to thank our witnesses for taking time to appear before the Committee. 

Today’s hearing is a review of the Commercial Crew Program at NASA. This program holds the promise of tremendous value for both the taxpayer and the contractors, as long as the program is executed appropriately. 

Last year, NASA chose two partners to continue through the final phase of the 

program, Boeing and SpaceX. Known as CCtCap (Commercial Crew Transportation 

Capability), this final phase will provide funding for the partners to complete testing 

of their systems. This is a critical phase in our nation’s efforts to develop and sustain assured U.S. human access to low-Earth orbit. To date, Congress and the Administration have not been able to reach consensus on the most efficient way to 

meet NASA’s launch requirements. However, the promise of this capability and new 

contracting structure has allowed for guarded optimism. 
12 

The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 directed NASA to engage the private sector 

for access to the International Space Station (ISS) so long as it did not come at the 

expense of NASA’s other exploration development programs. Similarly, the NASA 

Authorization Act of 2010 continued this direction, included reporting requirements 

related to safety, and directed NASA to ensure that the Orion vehicle was able to 

provide alternative means of delivering crew to the ISS in the event that partnersupplied vehicles are unable to perform that function. 

NASA has done a lot to move the industry along in compliance with these laws. 

They have provided funding for early stage development, funding to mature spacecraft designs, funding to certify those designs, and ultimately they will provide a 

steady customer through the ISS program. Previous testimony before this Committee indicated that the taxpayer will fund roughly 90 percent of the development 

of these capabilities and then in-turn pay once again for the services derived from 

those capabilities. In total, NASA has spent, or plans to spend, over 8 billion dollars 

on this initiative, which I believe represents a necessary investment if managed effectively. In order to protect taxpayer interests, however, this level of investment 

by the taxpayer requires a similar level of transparency and accountability. 

To that end, it was concerning to read some of the findings made by the Aerospace 

Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) in its annual report this year. The ASAP is congressionally-chartered to examine the culture of safety at NASA. It is required to provide advice to Congress and to the Administrator on measures that can be taken 

to improve safety at the agency. This year, the ASAP was not able to complete their 

job insofar as it pertains to the Commercial Crew Program. According to the report, 

the Director of Commercial Spaceflight Development at NASA has provided excuses 

instead of information. This is described by the panel as a ‘‘seamless set of constraints as to why information cannot be shared.’’ Similarly, the report states ‘‘This 

opacity and failure to engage in open and transparent communication is reminiscent 

of the problems that were explicitly identified by both the Rogers Commission and 

the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) regarding causes of the Space 

Shuttle Challenger and Columbia mishaps respectively.′′ Unfortunately, this Committee experienced similar issues when it attempted to get information on this program over the last year and a half. 

I want to be crystal clear to our witnesses here today and to the Administration. 

Denying information to ASAP, or Congress, about the Commercial Crew Program 

is unacceptable when the hardworking American taxpayers are footing the bill for 

the program and the safety of our astronauts is on the line. Congress and the American people deserve to have answers to the questions posed by ASAP. I am pleased 

to hear that NASA is now being more open and I hope this trend continues. 

Aside from the issues raised in the ASAP report, NASA must also address several 

outstanding questions as the program advances. The decision to use the Federal Acquisition Regulations to issue contracts for the final phase of the program was a 

welcome step from the Administration, and one that I endorsed, but how will waivers to safety requirements from the Certification Products Contracts phase be evaluated and issued? Given the delays in the commercial cargo program, how will NASA 

maintain schedule discipline under the current crew contracts? Why can’t a scaledback Orion launched on a Delta IV Heavy provide a redundant capability and competition to the commercial crew program? What level of price competition exists in 

the program now that we know the contractor’s bids? 

I raise these questions because I want the program to be successful. In these difficult budgetary times, NASA must concentrate its limited resources on meeting its 

core requirements - one of those being domestic human access to low-earth orbit. 

I truly believe that we can come together to address these concerns in a constructive 

bipartisan way so that we can once again launch American Astronauts on American 

Rockets, from American soil. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. 

Edwards, for an opening statement. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, of course, for as 

much time as I might consume, given that the clock was not running during your time. Good morning, and welcome to our distinguished panel of witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this hearing on the Commercial Crew Program, and the challenges and opportunities. 

There is no denying that NASA and its commercial partners have 
13 

taken great strides since commercial crew activities began about 

five years ago. 

Last fall NASA, in partnership with two companies, Space Exploration Technologies—SpaceX—and the Boeing Corporation, established contracts to finalize designs, undertake full development, 

and carry out the milestones needed to complete NASA certification 

requirements to carry NASA, and NASA sponsored astronauts, to 

and from the International Space Station. 

As I have recounted on other occasions, I used to be a skeptic of 

commercial crew and cargo transportation to support NASA requirements. I have evolved, but I still have questions. And while 

I am now supportive of the program, and industry’s partnership 

with NASA, I remain committed to ensuring that these systems are 

safe. And as the title of the hearing states, there are both challenges and opportunities ahead. 

First, the Commercial Cargo Transportation Program that is currently underway sheds light on some of those challenges. Initial 

operational flight showed up significantly later than initially anticipated, and a mishap last fall reminds us all that space flight, even 

in 2015, is indeed risky and hard, and when humans are involved, 

the stakes are immeasurably higher. 

Secondly, as we will hear from Vice Admiral Dyer, and I—the 

concern that I share with the Chairman, the Commercial Crew 

Program’s approach is to buy the commercial crew services, rather 

than make or manage a development program. This paradigm shift 

carries risks in and of itself, given that the services to be bought 

don’t yet exist. In addition, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel— 

ASAP—which Vice Admiral Dyer chairs, has raised concerns about 

the transparency of the program in providing the panel, and Congress, with the information it needs to evaluate safety. As you 

know, Mr. Chairman, safety has, and will continue to be, a priority 

of this committee, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2015, I 

would add, the bipartisan Act passed by the House, directs that 

safety be the highest priority of the Commercial Crew Program. 

Third, NASA is requesting $1.2 billion for the Commercial Crew 

Program for Fiscal Year 2016. That is an increase of over $400 million from the Fiscal Year 2015 enacted level. However, the Committee, despite having asked, has no independent external analysis 

by which to evaluate whether NASA’s budget requests for the Commercial Crew Program are on target, and whether the amount the 

taxpayers are being asked to pay is too much, too little, or about 

right. We don’t have any information. The NASA Authorization Act 

of 2015, again, directs NASA to provide that analysis. And while 

that isn’t law yet, it is clear that, from a bipartisan perspective, we 

expect the Committee to be provided with that information. 

I want NASA and its commercial partners to succeed so that 

NASA and the nation will regain human space flight access to lowEarth orbit once again. And I also want to understand what taxpayers are paying for, and the terms and the conditions involved. 

In particular, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about 

several questions. One, how will NASA—SpaceX—and Boeing ensure safety and a safety culture throughout the development process in the operational space flights, once they are certified? What 

contingency plans will be in place, should commercial systems not 
14 

be available by the anticipated 2017 date, or should one provider 

need to stand down for an extended period of time? What is needed 

to appropriately communicate the risks involved in commercial 

human space flights to Congress, the public, and other stakeholders? And what are the policies in place for cost reimbursement, 

liability, and risk assumption regarding individual passengers that 

contractors could potentially carry on NASA sponsored missions to 

the ISS? 

Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I want to note that, while the 

Commercial Crew Program is important, I hope that this committee will have the opportunity to discuss all of NASA’s programs 

and plans that comprise its $18 billion budget request for Fiscal 

Year 2016. I think we need to continue our tradition of inviting the 

NASA administrator to come in and testify on the agency’s budget 

request, and I hope we can lock in a hearing in the near future. 

Thank you, and I yield the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

RANKING MEMBER DONNA F. EDWARDS

Good Morning, and welcome to our distinguished panel of witnesses. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing on The Commercial Crew Program: Challenges and Opportunities. 

There is no denying that NASA and its commercial partners have taken great 

strides since commercial crew activities began about five years ago. Last Fall, NASA 

in partnership with two companies—Space Exploration Technologies and The Boeing Corporation-established contracts to finalize designs, undertake full development, and carry out the milestones needed to complete NASA’s certification requirements to carry NASA and NASA-sponsored astronauts to and from the International 

Space Station. 

As I have recounted on other occasions, I used to be a skeptic of commercial crew 

and cargo transportation to support NASA requirements. And while I am now supportive of the commercial space transportation industry’s partnership with NASA, 

I remain committed to ensuring that these systems are safe. 

As the title of the hearing states, there are both challenges and opportunities 

ahead. First, the commercial cargo transportation program that is currently underway sheds light on some of those challenges. Initial operational flights showed up 

significantly later than initially anticipated and a mishap last Fall reminds us that 

spaceflight is indeed risky and hard. When humans are involved, the stakes are immeasurably higher. 

Secondly, as we’ll hear from Admiral Dyer, the commercial crew program’s approach is to ‘‘buy’’ the commercial crew services rather than make or manage a development program. This paradigm shift carries risk in and of itself, given that the 

services to be bought don’t yet exist. In addition, the Aeronautics Safety Advisory 

Panel—ASAP—which Admiral Dyer chairs, has raised concerns about the transparency of the program in providing the Panel with the information it needs to 

evaluate safety. As you know, Mr. Chairman, safety has and will continue to be a 

priority of this Committee, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2015 directs that 

safety be the highest priority of the commercial crew program. 

Third, NASA is requesting $1.2 billion for the Commercial Crew Program for Fiscal Year 2016, an increase of over $400 million from the FY 2015 enacted level. 

However, the Committee, despite having asked, has no independent external analysis by which to evaluate whether NASA’s budget requests for the commercial crew 

program are on target, and whether the amount the taxpayers are being asked to 

pay is too much, too little, or about right. The NASA Authorization Act of 2015 directs NASA to provide that analysis. 

I want NASA and its commercial partners to succeed so that NASA and the nation will regain human spaceflight access to low-Earth orbit once again. 

Yet I also want to understand what the taxpayers are paying for and the terms 

and conditions involved. In particular, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 

about: 
15 

• How will NASA, SpaceX, and Boeing ensure safety and a safety culture 

throughout the development process and the operational spaceflights, once they 

are certified? 

• What contingency plans will be in place should commercial systems not be 

available by the anticipated 2017 date, or should one provider need to stand 

down for an extended period of time? 

• What is needed to appropriately communicate the risks involved in commercial 

human spaceflight to Congress, the public, and other stakeholders? 

• And what are the policies in place for cost reimbursement, liability, and risk 

assumption regarding individual ‘‘passengers’’ that contractors could potentially 

carry on NASA sponsored missions to the ISS? 

Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I would like to note that while the Commercial 

Crew Program is important, I hope that this Committee will also have the opportunity to discuss all of NASA’s programs and plans that comprise its $18 billion 

budget request for FY 2016. I think we need to continue our tradition of inviting 

the NASA Administrator to come in and testify on the agency’s budget request, and 

I hope we can lock in such a hearing in the near future. 

Thank you and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. I now recognize 

the Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. Smith. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. America has always been a Nation of innovators and explorers. We continue to remain on the forefront of new discoveries and technologies. Our history is filled with examples of entrepreneurs who pushed the 

boundaries of the possible. The Commercial Crew Program offers a 

new way to develop human rated systems for government access to 

space, with the goal, of course, of ending our dependence on Russia. 

Building on the Commercial Cargo Program could be an important 

change from traditional programs, but only if it is done correctly. 

Today the Subcommittee will examine the progress made in the 

Commercial Crew Program. This committee is dedicated to ensuring the government has safe, reliable, and affordable access to lowEarth orbit. 

The U.S. currently pays Russia $70 million a seat for access to 

the International Space Station. It should be a top priority to 

launch American astronauts on American rockets from American 

soil as soon as possible. American astronauts personify our nation’s 

pioneering spirit. They represent our leadership, as explorers, and 

agents of discovery. A great deal of trust has been placed in the 

commercial crew partners, Boeing and SpaceX, that are partnering 

with NASA to take our astronauts into space. This is an extraordinary responsibility for these companies. It is one that cannot be 

taken lightly. 

It is absolutely imperative that we understand the gravity of 

what it means to carry our astronauts into space. This committee 

will continue to monitor whether the Commercial Crew Program 

will ensure safety, while also respecting cost and schedule constraints. We can only do this if NASA is open and transparent 

about the program. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel’s recent 

report highlights questions about NASA’s level of transparency. 

The Committee has encountered similar issues as well. For the 

sake of all who are working to make this program a success, I hope 

this will change. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their 

progress on these systems, and their ongoing relationship with 

NASA. Their insights into the program are invaluable to us. The 
16 

commercial space industry offers improvements to the quality of 

life for every person on the planet. The discoveries and applications 

that have come from space technology are numerous. Since the 

dawn of the Space Age, contractors and the private sector have 

played a central role in making our nation’s aspirations a reality. 

The commercial space industry will ensure that America remains 

a world leader in space exploration. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FULL COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN LAMAR S. SMITH

Thank you Chairman Palazzo for holding this hearing. And I thank the witnesses 

for being here to share their expertise. America has always been a nation of 

innovators and explorers. We continue to remain on the forefront of new discoveries 

and technologies. Our history is filled with examples of entrepreneurs who pushed 

the boundaries of the possible. 

The Commercial Crew Program offers a new way to develop human-rated systems 

for government access to space with the goa, of course, of ending our dependence 

on Russia. Building on the Commercial Cargo Program could be an important 

change from traditional programs, but only if it is done correctly. 

Today the subcommittee will examine the progress made in the Commercial Crew 

program. This Committee is dedicated to ensuring the government has safe, reliable, 

and affordable access to low-Earth orbit. 

The U.S. currently pays Russia $70 million a seat for access to the International 

Space Station. It should be a top priority to launch American astronauts on American rockets from America soil as soon as is safely possible. 

American astronauts personify our nation’s pioneering spirit. They represent our 

leadership as explorers and agents of discovery. A great deal of trust has been 

placed in the commercial crew partners—Boeing and SpaceX—that are partnering 

with NASA to take our astronauts into space. This is an extraordinary responsibility 

for these companies. It is one that cannot be taken lightly. 

It is absolutely imperative that we understand the gravity of what it means to 

carry our astronauts into space. This committee will continue to monitor whether 

the Commercial Crew Program will ensure safety while also respecting cost and 

schedule constraints. 

We can only do this if NASA is open and transparent about the program. The 

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel’s recent report highlights issues with NASA’s level 

of transparency. 

This Committee has encountered similar issues as well. For the sake of all who 

are working to make this program a success, I hope this will change going forward. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their progress on these 

systems and their ongoing relationship with NASA. Their insights into the program 

are invaluable to us. 

The commercial space industry offers improvements to the quality of life for every 

person on the planet. 

The discoveries and applications that have come from space technology are numerous. Since the dawn of the Space Age, contractors and the private sector have 

played a central role in making our nation’s aspirations a reality. 

The commercial space industry will ensure that America remains a world leader 

in space exploration. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. If there are Members who wish to submit 

additional opening statements, your statements will be added to 

the record at this point. 

At this time I would like to introduce our witnesses. Mr. Bill 

Gerstenmaier is the Associate Administrator for the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate at NASA. Vice Admiral 

Joseph Dyer is the Chairman of NASA’s Aerospace Safety Advisory 

Panel, or ASAP. Mr. John Mulholland is the Vice President and 

Program Manager of Commercial Programs at the Boeing Com-
17 

pany. And Dr. Garrett Reisman is Director of Crew Operations at 

the Space Exploration Technologies Corporation, or SpaceX. 

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony 

to five minutes. Your entire written statement will be made part 

of the record. 

I now recognize Mr. Gerstenmaier for five minutes to present his 

testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. BILL GERSTENMAIER, 

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, 

HUMAN EXPLORATION AND OPERATIONS 

MISSION DIRECTORATE, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

(NASA) 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Thank you very much for allowing me to 

represent the teams that are heavily involved in the development 

of the crew transportation systems that will end our sole reliance 

on the Russian Soyuz for transportation to the ISS. This is a very 

important hearing, and a very important capability for the United 

States. 

NASA has made tremendous progress in developing these capabilities. The work began under Space Act Agreements looking at 

generic capability, and transitioned to contracts for crew transportation to the ISS. The first phase of the Contract Certification 

Products, made tremendous progress in establishing clear requirements for the commercial providers at NASA. During this phase, 

the providers submitted alternate standards, hazard reports, certification plans, and verification plans for their crew transportation 

systems. The products were developed by the contractors, and 

heavily reviewed by NASA. It is important that this phase allowed 

the contractors to use their expertise and best practices, and submit alternate ways of developing and designing spacecraft using 

the latest standards. 

I added two pie charts to my written testimony to highlight the 

significant amount and quality of work accomplished during this 

phase. The first pie chart shows the agency was able to accept 55 

percent of the alternate standards as meeting or exceeding NASA’s 

requirements. NASA only rejected five percent of the alternate 

standards proposed, but there is still open work to be done with the 

remaining 30 percent that were partially approved. 

The second chart shows the variances. These are items where the 

contractors proposed an alternate method for hazard control, certification, or verification. This chart shows a significant amount of 

open work, with 53 percent of the variances needing additional definition and discussion. I see this as a big plus, and it allows the 

teams to know, prior to contract start, areas that will need work. 

It also is an area that we need to focus on and work over the next 

several weeks. This chart answers one of the Committee’s pre-hearing questions, open work and risks. The work in preparation for 

the CCtCaP award has enabled the teams to understand the designs and risk areas, and will be a big advantage in achieving a 

safe system for crew transportation. Technically, the contract is off 
18 

to a very good start, however, development and flight of these systems will be complex and difficult activity for the teams. 

The Commercial Crew Program has not received the funding requested in annual budgets. This underfunding has caused delays in 

program execution, and in past, forced NASA to continuous Space 

Act Agreements, as opposed to contracts, because of funding uncertainty. The budget appropriated in 2015 by Congress showed a 

commitment to the program, and allowed the agency to proceed 

with the current contracts. This Congressional support is greatly 

appreciated, and the program hopes to earn Congressional approval 

for the solid budget request that we have made in 2016. The budget request is anchored by negotiated firm-fixed-price contracts. 

Funding at these levels is required to end our sole reliance on Russians for crew transportation in a safe and timely manner. 

In summary, the awarding of the contracts establishes the start 

of a new phase. Significant real progress continues to be made, as 

evidenced by the testimonies from Boeing and SpaceX. Despite the 

protested award, which limited communication, and made for a difficult contract start, work continued, and is accelerating. The decision, just like two contracts, was not an easy or trivial decision. 

The decision was carefully evaluated at contract selection, and the 

benefits of competition during the development phase was seen as 

necessary to allow for safe, timely, and cost-effective development. 

The decision was not simply to have competition, but was based on 

evaluating the details of the proposals, and making a selection decision that would provide best value to the U.S. government. 

Developing new low-Earth orbit human transportation systems 

will not be an easy task. There will be challenges, and difficult decisions will need to be made. The entire agency, safety, engineering, crew health and safety organizations are actively engaged in 

this program. The support and interaction with the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) will also be critical and important. The 

agency is working well with the FAA, and support for legislation 

on the government astronaut definition will be needed. The ISS 

will get a tremendous research benefit, 100 percent increase in 

crew research time,from the additional on orbit crew member provided by the system. 

The Commercial Crew Transportation Program will take us all 

working together to ensure the next generation of U.S. LEO crew 

transportation systems are developed effectively and safely. Congressional support is absolutely required to develop safe and timely 

crew transportation systems. I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:] 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. 

Now recognize Vice Vice Admiral Dyer for five minutes to 

present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH DYER, 

USN (RET.), CHAIRMAN, 

AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

(NASA) 

Vice Admiral DYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity 

to discuss the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel’s 2014 activities 

and annual report. Mr. Chairman, I have limited the scope of my 

testimony to focus on the Commercial Crew Program. Ms. 

Edwards, I would note that both the Chairman and I are Southerners, and I would hope the clock wouldn’t run during my testimony either. 

The ASAP salutes NASA on the many accomplishments achieved 

during 2014. Among others, these include safe International Space 

Station operations, growing traction on the ESD program, and success in supporting ISS logistics via commercial cargo. The leadership and program management of the ISS is highlighted for its 

openness, transparency, and candor. The ISS culture is, we believe, 

a space flight exemplar. 

In our 2014 report to the NASA administrator and the Congress, 

we noted that NASA is experienced and accomplished in space system procurement by making, managing, and buying. An example of 

making is a NASA custom produced satellite. An example of managing is a launch vehicle where NASA manages fulfillment of a 

performance spec often designed and generally produced by a contractor. An example of buying would be a commercial satellite 

launch service from a marketplace that has already established the 

bona fides of value, safety, and reliability. 

The CCP program falls into a chasm between the deep insight 

of managing and that of buying a product already proven by broad 

market acceptance. With CCP NASA is operating at arm’s length, 

and within a constrained budget. They are attempting to approach 

commercial crew transportation as buying a service, yet the maturity of the product may be more suitable for a managed development. Nevertheless, NASA is making laudable efforts to embrace 

this new model, but is trapped somewhere on a continuum between 

managing and buying. 

The panel strongly believes that communications and transparency are necessary to ensure safety must be a central part of 

the program. Regrettably, the panel has been unable to offer any 

informed opinion regarding the adequacy of certification, or the sufficiency of safety in the Commercial Crew Program due to constraints placed on our access to needed information. Within CCP, 

candid, timely and transparent information has been insufficient. 

The lack of transparency has been a concern for a number of years, 

despite the discussions with the Director of Commercial Space Development, and with senior NASA officials at headquarters. 

Those sets of constraints, Mr. Chairman, which you addressed as 

well, included a seamless series that began with the acquisition 
30 

strategy, is still being addressed, therefore, it can’t be discussed. 

That information is pre-decisional. Responses had said the incident 

investigation is still being conducted, and we are not prepared to 

address. Next was that it was source selection sensitive, and lastly, 

a protest has been filed, and we are unable to address. 

All these statements are true, but these should not have been absolute barriers to the sharing of information. The responses by the 

director have been a compilation of all the reasons information was 

withheld, rather than figuring out how to make things work. The 

ASAP members are, after all, special government employees. The 

panel is concerned that the lack of candor is not limited to interactions with the ASAP, but may extend to other internal and external stakeholders. This issue is reminiscent, we believe, of problems 

identified by both the Rogers Commission and the CAIB. NASA 

knows how to work in an open and transparent manner, and, as 

noted, the ISS is a great example. Going forward into 2015, the administrator has committed to making the changes necessary to resolve the situation. 

Two other quick topics, Mr. Chairman, if I may? I would like to 

address budget and constancy of purpose. With regard to budget, 

the panel believes it is critically important to sustain sufficient 

funding for the CCP program to sustain competition. With regard 

to constancy of purpose, the panel notes that many NASA human 

space flight programs that have been initiated in the last 20 years 

have not been carried to completion. The ASAP appeals for constancy of purpose, and notices that the objective is both important 

and challenging when there is a change in leadership at the Congress or the White House. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Vice Vice Admiral Dyer follows:] 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Vice Admiral Dyer. 

I now recognize Mr. Mulholland for five minutes to present his 

testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN MULHOLLAND, 

VICE PRESIDENT AND PROGRAM MANAGER, 

COMMERCIAL PROGRAMS, THE BOEING COMPANY 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Chairman Palazzo, Ranking Member 

Edwards, welcome, Chairman Smith, Members of the Committee, 

on behalf of the Boeing Company, thank you for the opportunity to 

provide an update on Boeing’s commercial crew transportation system. We are honored to be part of NASA’s Commercial Crew Program to provide safe and reliable crew transportation to support 

the International Space Station mission. Boeing is the only provider to have closed NASA’s commercial crew integrated capability 

contract on time, and to complete a successful critical design review. With that, we have laid the framework for completing our design during the current phase of the program, which was awarded 

last September. 

Boeing’s approach is a full service system, providing all elements 

needed to transport crew and cargo to and from low-Earth orbit, including the CST–100 spacecraft, spacecraft and launch vehicle integration and test, crew training and mission planning, cargo integration, mission operations, and crew and cargo recovery. In developing the Boeing system, we apply our unique integrated approach 

to meet NASA’s human rating requirements, leveraging our space 

shuttle and ISS program experience and tools, along with our certification products, which are approved by NASA during the certification products contract. We continue to work diligently to maintain our planned schedule, completing the first two schedule milestones on time, and the first two of the next three part milestone. 

We have made significant progress the first four months of the 

program. We have procured four Atlas V launch vehicles from 

United Launch Alliance for our two certification flight tests, and 

the first two service flights. Last week we held a formal 

groundbreaking with our partners to begin construction on the 

crew access tower for the Atlas V launch pad at Cape Canaveral. 

Work is underway on the Atlas V emergency detection system, part 

of the abort system that supports human rating of our integrated 

system. 

Boeing and the Kennedy Space Center have completed handover 

of the former Orbital Processing Facility, OPF–3. Boeing has transformed it into a modernized state of the art facility that will support manufacturing, assembly, and integration and test for the 

CST–100 spacecraft. We have installed tooling, and have received 

and inspected more than 150 pieces of flight hardware on the way 

to assembling the CST–100 structural test article. Later this year, 

hardware for the qualification test vehicle will arrive, and after 

that the orbital and crude flight test vehicle hardware. 

Other points of progress include system software and avionics development, along with development of our avionics and software integration lab. Wind tunnel testing and landing system testing in 

ongoing. Our space suit supplier has provided an innovative, safe, 
37 

and comfortable space suit prototype. And we are making significant progress with cabin interior design features. 

Throughout 2015 and 2016 we will complete a number of key development tests and reviews. We are confident these milestones 

will show progress and completion of our structural test article and 

qualification test vehicle. Demonstration of flight hardware, acceptance of the mission control center, integrated simulation system, 

and completion of a service module hot fire launch abort test. We 

are on track for a pad abort test in early 2017 to fully check out 

the abort system, an un-crewed orbital flight test in spring of 2017, 

and our crewed flight test in the summer of 2017. After successfully achieving human rating certification, we will be prepared to 

fly the first service mission by the end of 2017. 

As in most development programs, the Commercial Crew Program presents a number of technical and programmatic challenges. 

We are working proactively to meet these challenges. A key 

strength that Boeing provides to NASA is that we have depth in 

a wide range of engineering and manufacturing disciplines. We are 

able to apply those capabilities readily to achieve NASA’s objective 

for safe crew access to ISS. 

Commercial transportation to low-Earth orbit is the right solution to enable a robust portfolio of NASA programs in science and 

human space flight. The Commercial Crew Program provides safe 

and affordable transportation of our astronauts, helps stabilize our 

American human space flight work force, and frees up funding for 

NASA to invest in deep space exploration. Boeing is making substantial progress in our rigorous crew transportation development. 

Boeing is bringing the same quality to commercial space flight that 

we bring to our servicemen and women, NASA astronauts, and to 

the traveling public every day. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mulholland follows:] 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Mulholland. I now recognize 

Dr. Reisman for five minutes to present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. GARRETT REISMAN, 

DIRECTOR, CREW OPERATIONS, 

SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 

Dr. REISMAN. Thank you, Chairman Palazzo, Chairman Smith, 

and Ranking Member Edwards. Thank you very much for inviting 

me here today to talk to you about SpaceX’s progress under 

NASA’s Commercial Crew Program. SpaceX is proud to be serving 

our nation’s space program in a variety of ways. We are flying 

cargo missions today to the International Space Station using our 

Dragon spacecraft and our Falcon 9 launch vehicle. SpaceX currently offers the sole capability to return significant amounts of 

cargo to Earth from the ISS. We are also launching satellites for 

NASA and the Department of Defense, as well as the world’s leading commercial satellite providers. To date, we have successfully 

launched the Falcon 9 15 times, and we have—and that includes 

six Dragon flights up to the ISS and back. Capitalizing on lessons 

learned from these missions, and from our partnership with NASA, 

the safest and most advanced human space flight systems ever 

seen are our objective. 

Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to share a short video with 

you to provide a brief glimpse of SpaceX’s manufacturing capabilities, hardware, and activities. 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. Chairman, human space flight is the reason that SpaceX was 

founded. Safe human space flight is of paramount importance to 

SpaceX, and also to me personally. Having been an astronaut at 

the time of the Columbia accident, I could tell you that I never 

want our country to have to experience a loss like that again. The 

safety and reliability that we have designed into the Falcon 9 and 

the Dragon reflect this longstanding intent. We are working steadily, thoughtfully, and efficiently with NASA to yield the safest and 

most reliable astronaut transportation system that the world has 

ever seen. 

SpaceX believes that competition is critical to safe, timely, and 

assured access to space. The Aerospace Advisory Panel, the GAO, 

and NASA all agree that competition is an essential feature of this 

program. The value of redundant space transportation systems has 

also been repeatedly and recently demonstrated. 

However, since 2011, the United States has depended entirely on 

Russia to transport our astronauts to the International Space Station. This is not a situation our great nation should accept. Together, we will fix this, and in only a few more years we will be 

launching once again Americans, on American rockets, from American soil. Your ongoing support is essential to restoring that capability by 2017. 

Thank you for your contributions to the Commercial Crew Program, and to the American space exploration efforts. I am pleased 

to take any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Reisman follows:] 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Dr. Reisman. 

I thank the witnesses for their testimony. Members are reminded 

that Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes. The Chair 

recognizes himself for five minutes. Mr. Gerstenmaier, we are currently paying Russia $76 million 

for a Soyuz seat to the ISS, which has historically increased nine 

percent per year. Your testimony states that the commercial crew 

prices will be roughly 50 million per seat, but that is hard to calculate an apples to apples comparison, because the commercial 

crew price includes some cargo. So my question is, does this $58 

million price also include the investments NASA has made in the 

CC Dev 1, CC Dev 2, CCiCap, and the CPC phases, or is this just 

CCtCap post-certification mission? I can’t hear you. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. The cost for commercial crew are just the 

costs associated with the post-certification mission activities. They 

do not include the developmental costs. 

Chairman PALAZZO. What would the price per seat be if you included all development funding for the Commercial Crew Program. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, I can go ahead and do that calculation for you. I will take the question for the record. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Ballpark? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We did the calculation the way we did because it is a fair comparison with the Soyuz. We didn’t include the 

Soyuz development costs associated with the Soyuz vehicle in those 

numbers. So, it is the cost that NASA pays for the actual service 

we need to go to ISS. That is the reason we did the calculations 

the way we did. 

Chairman PALAZZO. So you don’t want to take a stab at—I mean, 

if you included the total development costs, would it be twice that 

of $58 million? Is it twice that—what we are paying the Russians? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. You could—— 

Chairman PALAZZO. Less than that? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. It will be probably slightly more than the 

Russian seat price if you include the development cost in there. 

And we can do the calculation. 

Chairman PALAZZO. All right. Thank you. Your testimony also 

states that you anticipate re-baselining the CCtCap schedule milestones, and that there will be a relatively large number of changes. 

Your statement also indicates that this will not affect contract 

costs. 

So my questions are, will these milestone changes affect schedules? What—and while I am sure that all parties are very motivated to develop a capability as soon as possible, does NASA have 

any leverage in these contracts to ensure performance based on a 

schedule? For instance, if schedules are not met, or payment simply delayed until milestones are completed, are the payments lost, 

or are the payments scaled back? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, the payments will not be made until 

the milestones are satisfied, so those payments are essentially held 

back, in a sense, until those are met. I think the contractors can 

talk directly about where the schedules have moved and where the 

milestones are changing. 

This is very typical in a contract startup, where you get the contractor on board, you go through, you evaluate the details of the 
62 

schedules. Many of the proposals were written about a year ago, so 

it is very appropriate for them to go ahead and see some updates 

in movement. We will continue to monitor the schedule. 

You know, we were careful to make 2017 as a goal. We didn’t 

want to make that as an absolute requirement, and the reason for 

that was purely safety. We felt that if we pushed too hard on 

schedule, we could sacrifice technical development. We could sacrifice safety to meet the date certain of 2017. So we will be cognizant of the date, we will move forward—as fast as we can, but 

we will also make sure that safety is present as we go forward. 

Chairman PALAZZO. All right. Mr. Mulholland? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Chairman, if I might add, our final proposal 

submittal to NASA assumed an August 1 authority to proceed, 

with the award near the end of September, and then subsequent 

protest. We re-baselined our proposal consistent with that approximate two month award delay. We did not want to compress our 

schedule, or take any technical risk at this time. 

That said, we are working very diligently on several opportunities to try and accelerate that delivery. But at this point in the program, it did not make sense to do anything other than adjust our 

schedule consistent with the award date. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Okay. Dr. Reisman, if you want to add anything? 

Dr. REISMAN. Just to say, with regard to schedule, that we—after 

the original proposal was submitted, we continued to work diligently on our design, and we found ways, during the blackout period of the procurement, and during the protest, to make our vehicle better, safer, and more reliable. 

And so that led to summary adjustment of some of the milestones, but I could tell you that we have a schedule that has been 

vetted by NASA, has been integrated upon with NASA, that has 

a margin built in to each milestone, and that has a significant 

amount of milestone—of margin to mean the ultimate goal of flying 

Americans in space in 2017. So we are confident that we are in a 

good position. 

Chairman PALAZZO. All right. And, lastly, Dr. Gerstenmaier, several media outlets have recently reported that the Russian space 

agency is considering exiting the ISS partnership to support their 

own Space Station. According to the reports, this could include decoupling the Russian segments from the rest of the station, and 

continuing on their own. Do you have a response to these reports, 

and how would NASA respond in such a situation? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think the details of those reports are basically that this would occur in 2024 or 2025, which is after the extension of the Space Station to the period of 2024, we have not 

heard anything officially from the Russians on their plans, but our 

understanding was, from the media reports, and from this internal 

meeting, that it was after 2024, so it would not have any impact 

to us through this period of ISS operations. 

Chairman PALAZZO. All right. And after 2024, that is when you 

expect industry, or non-profits, or somebody else to assume operations of the International Space Station? But if Russia does decouple their segments from the International Space Station, is that— 

I mean, have you given any thought to how NASA would handle 
63 

that? Even though you may not be the operator at the time, I 

mean, how would that affect ISS operations for, you know, whatever group that does take it over? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We will continue to work those plans, but we 

have an ability to operate station without our Russian partners, if 

absolutely required. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Okay. Well, thank you very much. I now recognize Ms. Edwards for her questions. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you to the witnesses today. As usual, we never have quite enough 

time to go into all the details, so please accept my apologies. And 

I just want to note, for the record, that many Democratic Members 

are not here today not because they are not concerned, but because 

a Democratic caucus meeting was called at 9 o’clock, at the time 

of this hearing, so we apologize for that. 

I want to focus on Vice Admiral Dyer, in Mr. Gerstenmaier’s prepared statements, he indicated that the Certification Products Contract efforts gave NASA an early insight into vehicle designs and 

approaches, and it would seem that access to the contractors’ proposals for variances to meet the various safety requirements, and 

how NASA handled them, would be pieces of information that 

would be critical to ASAP’s responsibilities in advising Congress. 

In fact, in Mr. Gerstenmaier’s statement, one point in particular 

stands out. He says, and I quote, ‘‘Overall, this phase of the contract was critical to allowing the contractors to understand the 

human rating requirements, and NASA’s understanding of how the 

contractors’ approaches intend to meet those requirements.’’ And I 

want to know from Vice Admiral Dyer, were you aware of NASA’s 

plans to assess contractor variance proposals, and did you request 

access to the variance proposals, and NASA’s subsequent disposition? 

Vice Admiral DYER. Yes, Madam Ranking Member. We were—we 

are aware. We have asked for that insight. We have not received 

it during the 2014 period. As I indicated in my testimony, General 

Bolden, the administrator at NASA, has indicated he is going to 

correct the situation. We are beginning to see the early stages of 

making that turn. We don’t yet understand the waivers that have 

been granted, in terms of—beyond that which Mr. Gerstenmaier 

shared this morning. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Excuse me—— 

Vice Admiral DYER. We look forward to—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. —would that—— 

Vice Admiral DYER. —that insight, but we don’t have it yet. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Would that—that information would, of course, 

help you, in terms of your advice both to the Congress, but also 

the, you know, the kind of partnership that is necessary from 

NASA, so that we can make sure that we really are paying attention to the safety concerns that all of us have expressed an interest 

in. And we all want to be on the same page about those things, 

isn’t that right? 

Vice Admiral DYER. You are absolutely right—— 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. 

Vice Admiral DYER. —and we look forward for that insight. 
64 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. So I want to turn to Mr. 

Gerstenmaier, because I am—really, as I hear this, I am just incredibly dismayed about ASAP’s difficulty in obtaining the kind of 

information that they need to advise the Congress. So, you know, 

and although I hear that there are conversations now about how 

that is going to happen, it still hasn’t. 

And so I want some assurance today, and I know the—all of the 

Committee, actually, wants the assurance today that ASAP will 

have full and unfettered access to contract information that is required to ensure document traceability of safety throughout the development and certification of commercial crew systems. And so 

can you give me that assurance today? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. ASAP will have access to all the contract details associated with the variances and the other activities 

that could help them do their job. 

Ms. EDWARDS. When? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We already did that in January. Vice Admiral Dyer can discuss the meeting we had in January with the 

ASAP panel. We are beginning to give all that data to them, and 

we will continue to give it to them. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Okay. And so, I mean, when could we expect, if 

we were asking as a Committee, that ASAP would have what they 

need to date? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Immediately. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Okay. We will be asking about that again. Mr. 

Mulholland—— 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. And they have already received it in January, so they got a significant amount of information in January 

from the agency, and we will continue to give more as needed. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Well, I look forward to both NASA and ASAP 

communicating with the Committee about what has been received 

in what timeline, and what remains to be received, so we would appreciate that. 

Mr. Mulholland and Dr. Reisman, how will you ensure that 

NASA and ASAP don’t encounter the same problems that ASAP 

has experienced in acquiring documents that are needed to evaluate safety? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. I think that is an extremely important position. I have the utmost respect for Vice Admiral Dyer, the ASAP 

mission. We have had two very successful meetings with ASAP in 

the last year, where we went through the details of our certification plans, validation plans. I was disappointed also to see the 

report, and the lack of information provided. In our meeting with 

ASAP just a couple weeks ago, I personally pledged to Vice Admiral Dyer that we would give him any and all information of our 

products, regardless of the ability of NASA to provide it to them. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Dr. Reisman? 

Dr. REISMAN. We have also been open to the ASAP. We have had 

them out to our facility in Hawthorne, and have a standing invitation to them to invite—to come by anytime. I think we are talking 

about August for another meeting just earlier today. But we are 

committed to full insight. We are drastically ramping up our activities in terms of insight for NASA, and creating complete transparency. We have established working forums, working groups. 
65 

Each SpaceX technical group has a weekly or biweekly meeting 

with their NASA counterparts, and communication is happening 

daily so that NASA knows exactly what we are doing, in terms of 

design and development. We have a buddy system, where everybody at SpaceX has a point of contact at NASA. We have deep facility and data access. So, really, we are being as transparent as we 

could possibly be. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So—thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me, and—so I appreciate that, the—and the relationship 

that our commercial partners have with NASA. I want that same 

relationship with ASAP, so that Congress has the ability to make 

sure that we can make determinations about how we are spending 

taxpayers’ money, and about the progress of the program, and that 

we are continuing to stay focused on safety. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, 

again, I appreciate the leadership you and the Ranking Member 

are demonstrating by this hearing today, and the leadership you 

have taken in this job. 

Let us see. Let me give this—the President has requested a 54 

percent increase in the funding level for the Commercial Crew Program, so that is a $1.24 billion request for 2016, versus $850 million that was appropriated for 200—for 2015, so we have had this 

increase in the request. 

I guess we should ask Mr. Gerstenmaier—now, if we don’t get 

full funding, we have been hearing that the date for 2017 is at risk. 

We have heard that testimony several times. But yet, every year, 

we actually are spending less—we are appropriating less money 

than has been requested. Congress is appropriating less than what 

is requested, yet we are saying the 2017 date is at risk unless we 

meet these appropriations, but we are not doing it. Is the 2017 date 

at risk right now because of actions or inaction by Congress to fully 

appropriate the request of the Administration for the Commercial 

Crew Program? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, as I said in my written and oral 

statements, the problem with not getting appropriate funding in 

the past year has caused us to slip from earlier delivery dates, 

where we had planned to be earlier in 2015 and 2016, depending 

on which budget we submitted. Now we are saying 2017, the 805 

that was provided this year, in 2015, is acceptable to continue to 

hold that date. It is consistent with the contracts. The funding that 

we need in 2016 is absolutely required to hold the 2017 date. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So if we don’t get the full amount that 

you have requested, which is $1.24 billion, we could expect the date 

to slip? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, the date will slip, and, more importantly, there is very important work that needs to be done in this 

near term timeframe that is important for both safety, and also important for the overall design of the vehicles. And without that 

funding, we will impact those other objectives, as well as just the 

date. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So for every year that we let this slip, 

we are dependent on the Russians for the transportation at $76 
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million per seat. So how much will it cost us extra if we are letting 

that date slip? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We use six seats per year, so you could do 

the math. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So that is a very considerable price that we 

are paying, maybe more than even what—if we just go ahead and 

fund the program. I hope that that sinks into people’s minds there. 

So—and so let us just—and let us also note—let us—we are depending on the goodwill of the Russians, and I want to note that 

they are showing goodwill. They could actually cut us off altogether, which is one other reason why we want to make sure that 

we—the crew program that we are talking about, that we get back 

in this business. So every year that we delay this, underfunding, 

we actually are paying the Russians an enormous amount for 

transportation. That needs to sink in. 

Now, in terms of—how much would it cost, Mr. Gerstenmaier, if 

we were—we have heard the witnesses here from the two companies that are leading the way. They are point companies in this effort. How much more would it cost us if we were going about to 

achieve the same crew capabilities that we are trying to achieve, 

if we are going through the old process that NASA used to have 

in developing this type of technology? We have two private sector 

companies here. We know the cost of that. How much more or less 

would it cost if NASA would have gone through the old system, not 

the non-commercial system, as the admiral detail, the difference 

between what the commercial approach was, and the old NASA approach was? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I can’t provide you a specific number, but is 

extremely more efficient to do it the way we are doing it today. 

And, again, the structured approach we have used, where we used 

Space Act Agreements first, and then we did the CPC portion of 

the contract. This contract is to save the agency a significant 

amount of funds over a typical procurement that we would have 

done from a basic kind of managed from the beginning type of activity with these providers. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So, just in summary, Mr. Chairman, what we 

have, although we are looking at a major expense here, this is a 

lot less expensive to go with these private sector operations than 

if we went with the traditional way NASA would have gone about 

developing this same capability. Thank you very much. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Beyer. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Three questions for you 

Mr. Gerstenmaier. First, after the Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board said that safety should be the highest priority, NASA’s Astronaut office was more specific, urging that the next crewed spacecraft in a low-Earth orbit should have a Loss of Crew ratio of no 

more than 1 in 1,000. The Loss of Crew, loss of mission requirements for the commercial crew vehicles, are they still the 1 in 

1,000? How do they compare with those for the Space Shuttle? And 

do you have the insight into the commercial crew contracts necessary to be assured that these vehicles meet the Loss of Crew, loss 

of mission requirements? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We have the appropriate insight to evaluate 

meeting our Loss of Crew and loss of mission requirements. I think 
67 

we also have the requirements in our contracts, in the 1130 set of 

documents that describe exactly the Loss of Crew numbers. They 

are not the 1 in 1,000 numbers that the crew requested. And we 

believe that that is not technically achievable. We think it is also 

very difficult to determine Loss of Crew precisely. There is a tremendous variance about that number. It is a very difficult number 

to calculate with any assurance of exactly what that number is. 

But we are very interested in keeping that number understood. We 

will review that again with the ASAP. We had discussions with 

them again in January about how we will meet those numbers and 

ensure we have crew safety. 

The other big advantage of these systems is they have an abort 

system, which was not present on the Shuttle system. That allows 

for, essentially, the vehicles to abort if something occurs with the 

rocket underneath, which we did not have in the Shuttle program. 

And that gets factored in tangentially to the equation, but it is not 

directly in the calculation. Also, the capsules are safer to return, 

and require less stability during the return phase, which also 

makes them safer. 

So there is inherent safety in both of these designs. Both companies are very focused on safety. We will meet the requirements that 

are specified across the agency. 

Mr. BEYER. If 1 in 1,000, what the astronauts had requested, is 

not achievable, what is a number that you do use, and do think is 

achievable? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We have been using 1 in 500 for both ascent 

and entry, and it is the same for our exploration program, so the 

requirements for Loss of Crew is consistent across all agency programs on human space flight. 

Mr. BEYER. Mr. Gerstenmaier, on the slippage issue, if, for some 

reason, SpaceX, Boeing is not able to perform by 2017, will you be 

able to extend the contract with Roscosmos? And I know there is 

three year lag times on some of that. Or are there any other reasons for continuing the contract with the Russians as backup? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We have recently done a synopsis to begin 

the investigation to see what our options for extending the Soyuz 

into 2017. We currently have Soyuz capability through calendar 

year 2017, with a return flight of our crews in the spring of 2018. 

We did that synopsis to begin the discussion with the Russians 

about acquiring additional Soyuz capability. We will continue that 

discussion over the next several months. But again, if you look at 

the timing, we need to make a decision with the Russians sometime this spring to have that assurance. 

We think it is probably in our best interest, even if the calendar 

shows that we will be well completed in 2017, there is some advantage of having an overlap of both Soyuz capability and U.S. capability at the same time. Because we could get very late into flow 

on the launch pad, have a problem with the launch pad, or have 

a vehicle very late in the flow having a problem, and if we don’t 

have a backup capability, we would be in the posture of having to 

de-crew the station. So we think it is in our interest to go pursue 

additional seats with the Russians. We will do that over the next 

several months. 
68 

Mr. BEYER. And is there any real wastage to have that overlap 

of taxpayer money, or NASA resources? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I believe we will use those Soyuz seats to 

our advantage. If the preference will be to fly the commercial providers as soon as they are ready, then we will use those Soyuz seat 

capabilities to the advantage—to give us additional research time 

on board station. 

Mr. BEYER. All right. Thank you. And one last question. Every 

day I pick up the Post and read about Russia violating the terms 

of the cease fire in the Eastern Ukraine, the seizing of Crimea, the 

continued conflict there. The U.S. sanctions, and the sanctions from 

any European countries, are they affecting your relationship with 

the Soyuz at all? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. No. To this point, we have a very strong relationship with the Russians. We work with them every day on 

board Space Station. Our teams are in constant communications 

back and forth. We have a team of roughly 20 to 30 U.S. citizens 

in Russia, constantly monitoring the Space Station activities, and 

the partnership at an engineering level, a technical level, and the 

program level has been very strong between the Russians and 

the—— 

Mr. BEYER. Okay. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. —U.S. and NASA personnel. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. I yield back, Mr. 

Chair. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Lucas. 

Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Admiral Dyer, I 

could not help but listen with great intensity to your opening comments, and, of course, the questions so accurately raised by Ranking Member Edwards. Most of us on this panel—all of us on this 

mantle—panel remember the loss of the two shuttle crews. I suspect most of us remember the loss of the first Apollo crew many 

years ago, so sensitivity to safety and understanding that our astronauts are the most valuable piece of asset in the programs is of 

great importance to us. 

Could you expand again for a moment about the challenges that 

the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel faced in 2014 trying to access 

the information? Now, I know we have been given assurances here 

today that everything is available, but could you expand on for— 

that for just a moment? 

Vice Admiral DYER. Yes, sir, I am happy to do so. It is, in my 

opinion, first and foremost a leadership level issue, below Mr. 

Gerstenmaier. It has been one that I have seen many times in my 

DOD experience, where an inexperienced program director, being 

perhaps right-hearted, but wrong-headed, believes that protecting 

the program from any criticism, or from any of those that might 

speak questioningly of it, is a first responsibility. It builds suspicion and distrust. It is not in the best interest of the program. 

That is beginning to turn around, as Mr. Gerstenmaier said, but 

only after the issuance of our annual report. The first thing we received were gigabytes of data that I would describe as there is 

something important in there somewhere, why don’t you see if you 

could find it? And we are following that up now with more detailed 

briefings, and the future is beginning to look better, but we can’t 
69 

yet answer the question as to whether or not the certification process looks good and safe to us, and whether or not the path forward 

looks to be of good technical conscience. We will, but we are not 

there yet. 

Mr. LUCAS. And the players that made it so challenging, 14 are 

still in place? 

Vice Admiral DYER. They are. 

Mr. LUCAS. I can assure you, Admiral, that the Committee will 

work with you to make sure that the panel’s mission is completed, 

for the sake of all of our investments. With that thought, Mr. 

Chairman, I actually yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Lucas. I now recognize Mr. 

Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Reisman, just curious 

about the extent to which NASA might impose safety requirements 

above the level of safety you would have if you did not have NASA 

oversight? 

Dr. REISMAN. That is an interesting question. We—we have designed a vehicle, first and foremost, for what we think is safe, and 

what we think is the best possible design. We then make sure that 

we comply with NASA requirements, but often we exceed them, 

and one example is our launch abort system, which is—as Mr. 

Gerstenmaier pointed out, is an essential advantage over both of 

our vehicles, compared to the one I rode, the space shuttle. 

Our launch abort system really has—the NASA requirement is 

not for fault tolerance, but we have made that launch abort system 

to be single fault tolerant, to make it even safer than it has to be 

per the requirements. So we look at—we make sure we meet the 

requirements, and we are committed to meeting NASA’s safety requirements, but we are—we think it is prudent we go beyond them. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Gerstenmaier, what was the 

original cost of a seat on a Soyuz? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Soyuz seat price was—I don’t remember 

what the original was. On the order of $50 million or so. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. And how much is it exactly today? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Today it is $76 million per seat. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. That is a pretty significant increase. Were 

those increases in cost, and I know they have gone up gradually, 

as I have seen—were they anticipated, were they agreed to in advance, or were they unilaterally set by the other side? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. They were anticipated and negotiated with 

the Russians. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. And how much higher does this cost go? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Our historical increase has roughly been 

about nine percent per contract, and that was, again, fact-found on 

our side, where we looked at that compared to actual manufacturing costs, inflation, Dollar to Ruble conversions. All those went 

into those calculations, and the nine percent was seen as a reasonable kind of increase. And how can they go, I can’t anticipate. 

Mr. POSEY. Yeah, when will we expect the negotiations, or recalculation about the next increase? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We are in the process of doing that now. We 

started with a synopsis, of which we received comments back. We 
70 

are beginning discussions with the Russians on the contract, as I 

have just described to you. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. And when do we anticipate that will be complete? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. It will probably be complete in the next several months. 

Mr. POSEY. And we should look at probably a minimum of nine percent, so another $7 million increase, minimum? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think that is very reasonable. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. And then when is the next re-analysis scheduled after that? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We don’t anticipate requiring any more additional seats after the seats we will acquire this time. We would anticipate acquiring six seats for 2018. We believe that provides sufficient overlap, as I described earlier. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. Mr. Mulholland, I understand that the CST–100 is designed to fly on multiple rockets. 

Can you discuss what makes the versatility possible, as well as 

what rockets it is capable of using, and why you chose the Atlas 

V as the launch vehicle? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Absolutely. One of our original design parameters on the CST–100 was to design the spacecraft for all launch 

vehicles in this class to make it easier, if—in the event we needed 

to switch to another launch vehicle. We chose the Atlas V, obviously, because of its reliability. It has flown 52 times, with 100 percent mission success, unparalleled technical and schedule reliability. 

But from day one we designed the CST–100 for launching on 

Delta. We have worked with SpaceX in the past to understand the 

loads of the Falcon 9, and we have also worked with emerging 

launch vehicle providers to ensure that we drive in long-term affordability through the entire life cycle of the program. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Knight. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks for having this 

today. I have just a couple quick questions. Mr. Gerstenmaier, on— 

as far as competition, we are having two companies involved. Can 

you give me kind of an idea how beneficial that is, having—competing for not just dollars, but competing for safety, competing for 

innovation? Can you give me an idea of where we are on that? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think there is a tremendous benefit to the 

U.S. government, and to NASA, to have competition during this development phase, and it is much more than cost, as you described. 

You know, if we run into a problem or concern with the safety aspect, to not be totally reliant upon one contractor, and have the 

other one available to go ahead and continue is very important to 

us. If they run into a technical problem, maybe a manufacturing 

problem, parts delivery problem, or they have a test failure somewhere along the way, having another provider available to us to 

move forward and continue to keep progress heading towards commercial services is extremely important. 

So there are numerous benefits along those lines during this development phase that keeps both companies at the top of their 

game, keeps innovation in the system, keeps making them want to 
71 

go ahead and make these milestones to keep moving forward. So 

it is extremely important to have competition during this development phase. 

Mr. KNIGHT. And I think—let us see. I think, Vice Admiral Dyer, 

we were talking about the 1,000 to 1, or the 500 to 1, or maybe 

Mr. Gerstenmaier wants to weigh in on this. What are the Russians—when we are sending them up, what do we expect of them, 

or what kind of track record do they have? Are they on a 1,000 to 

1, are they on a 500 to 1, or are they on less than that? 

Vice Admiral DYER. Mr. Gerstenmaier will be better prepared to 

speak to the quantitative numbers. I will tell you that the Soyuz 

services do represent, given their years of support, and the numbers of missions that they have launched, it does represent a buy 

opportunity. It is market proven, and the bona fides of reliability, 

safety, have been demonstrated over time. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I would say that if you look at—their actual 

demonstrated reliability it is probably a little bit less than 1 in 500, 

from kind of a calculation standpoint. But then if you look at their 

actual demonstrated performance, it is fairly high. And the fact 

that, again, they have a pretty robust system overall, with a good 

design margin in it, and it has been demonstrated over the years. 

So, the—Soyuz again has the abort system on the spacecraft, much 

like the other providers. It is also a capsule design, with a proven, 

fairly simple re-entry capability. 

So, it probably has a calculated number slightly less than what 

we will get with the commercial providers. But, from a demonstrated, and actually proven over the multiple years, it is probably slightly better. 

Mr. KNIGHT. And I think you can hear from this panel, and from 

any American, that safety is the most paramount issue when we 

are talking about sending our young men and women into space. 

When we were talking about cost, it is about 77 now, and I guess 

the new contract will bump it up to about 84, and that would be 

comparing to 58 when the American companies are doing this. 

We are not calculating in the development of the American companies, we are not calculating in all of the things that get us to 

that point where we are sending Americans into space, so it is a 

little apples to oranges when we are talking about tax dollars, but 

somewhere down the road those lines are going to meet, and the— 

or the American taxpayer is going to get a benefit. And so I would 

expect that that would be somewhere in the near future, five years 

into the program, or maybe even ten years into the program, so it 

will be beneficial to the taxpayer to do this. Also from a confidence 

standpoint, that we have American companies sending Americans 

into space, and we are backing the American dream of having 

space exploration. 

So I yield back, Mr. Chair, and thank you very much. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Perlmutter. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

indulging me, and letting me pass a couple times to listen to some 

of the questions and answers. I am new to this Committee. The 

acronyms are plentiful in your business, and I just wanted to have 

a chance to talk about, you know, from point of view—as a Member 

of Congress, safety issues, cost issues are going to be more up my 
72 

alley than the technical issues that you all are discussing. So let 

me get down to a couple questions that I have. 

And the first is the safety issue. The Atlas V, I think, Mr. 

Mulholland, you said 52 missions, no failures. If, for some reason 

or other, Congress were to say, we are not dealing with any Russian engines from this point forward today, how long would it take 

us to come up with a new engine to power, say, the Atlas V, or 

some other rocket like that, to take on these missions? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. I would say ULA and the member companies 

of ULA are working diligently with Blue Origin, and also with 

AeroJet, to develop a replacement engine for the Atlas V. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I hear you, but—and I am not trying to lead 

you down a path. It isn’t like we could have an engine tomorrow. 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. No. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. I mean, not even next year probably. Three or 

four years, right? Now I am trying to lead you down a path. 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. No, it is, you know, ULA is on a plan for a 

2019 re-engine of the Atlas V launch vehicle. The Air Force recently thought that that program would take seven to nine years. 

And so it is very important for us to make sure that we have a 

launch vehicle that is as robust and reliable as the Atlas V. There 

are other launch vehicles we could move to, such as the Delta, if 

we needed to. We were not given a bid for the Falcon 9 during this 

previous phase of the proposal, but we have had discussions with 

SpaceX, if they would be willing to provide a proposal. But incredibly important that we thoughtfully move through the ULA re-engine. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. So, I mean, basically you have got one path 

where you are developing other engines that would be Americanmade? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Um-hum. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. At the same time, we have a reliable engine 

that has worked for us 52 times. And you can’t just go cold turkey 

on that immediately and hope to move forward with these different 

programs we have in place, is that right? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Correct. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. So, second question I have, and you all 

should know I am from Colorado, and I have certain companies in 

my state that are clearly interested in space exploration, and 

launches, and delivery, and all of that stuff. So, as I understand 

it, the Space Station has what I think Mr. Gerstenmaier, or somebody may have said, a—we expect a seven—well, a life through 

2024. Yet the missions that you two, Boeing and SpaceX, have been 

given as part of your competition really go until 2023. 

And I am just curious, and either—Mr. Gerstenmaier, you can 

answer, or, gentlemen, you can answer on behalf of your companies, am I now to take it that more or less competitive bids are 

over for any new kinds of commercial crew opportunities? And I am 

talking about the Dreamchaser, or whatever else might exist. 

So, Mr. Gerstenmaier, you are looking pretty forlorn that nobody 

has asked you any questions for a while, so I will ask you. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We anticipate a competitive selection for 

services beyond the existing contracts. We have required a minimum purchase of two flights per contractor in this first contract, 
73 

and anything beyond that, we have the option of going and competitively selecting for future services to the Space Station. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. And gentlemen—Dr. Reisman, would you agree 

that you are in this to compete and to win, and you think that 

SpaceX can do that? 

Dr. REISMAN. Absolutely. And I just wanted to add that, you 

know, John is talking about the possibility of making CST–100 

compatible with the Falcon 9. We have had some discussion. I 

would put out there that the Falcon 9 is, in our opinion, the best 

way for the U.S. to wean itself off its Russian dependency. It is 100 

percent American made. It has 15 consecutive flights, with 100 percent primary mission success. But by the time, in 2017, when we 

strap somebody in, we will be well over 50 missions, and so we will 

have the same type of flight heritage that the Atlas V has today. 

It was designed from the beginning with human rating in mind. 

It has triple avionics streams, factors of safety of 1.4, so it meets 

all the human rating requirements. Now, I don’t get a commission, 

so I can’t sell you one of those today, and it is above my pay grade 

to talk about these types of strategic alliances, but I just wanted 

to say the Falcon 9, in my opinion, with all the issues we have out 

there, is certainly the best path forward for America, not only for 

NASA, but for Department of Defense, to break our dependency on 

the Russians. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. My time is expired, but if Mr. Mulholland 

wanted to respond, it is—I don’t know. You—were you getting 

ready to say something? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. I think it is important, and obviously we work 

with and monitor the Falcon 9 performance as a launch vehicle 

buyer. It will be interesting to see, as—the Falcon 9 has gone 

through a couple of different design changes, and they are getting 

ready to go to larger engines, and so it will be interesting to see 

the stability and the scale as they perform. As Dr. Reisman mentioned, they expect to be over 50 missions by the time the launch 

services are provided, which would be a significant increase in 

their schedule reliability, to be able to achieve that number of missions per year. 

And as they achieve that, and have that demonstrated reliability 

that you would need to put crew on it, obviously it could be considered as a launch vehicle—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gerstenmaier, real 

quick question starting off. You know, maintaining two partners in 

the program provides competition to price, and a redundant capability, but if Russia stopped providing Soyuz seats to NASA, could 

NASA accelerate the development of a domestic capability by focusing resources on one partner? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. No, and the way the contract was awarded, 

or we put the proposal out, the stated requirement was we would 

select one or more providers, so that required both offerers to give 

us essentially their best schedule, and give us the best price, as an 

individual. There was no idea that we would pick two out of the 

selection. So they gave us the best schedules that they could give 
74 

us, and the best price at this award, assuming there might only be 

one winner out of this selection. So the current schedule we have 

is, I believe, the most aggressive schedule that we could get, and 

applying additional funds would not allow us to advance that date 

any earlier. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Also, Mr. Gerstenmaier, the Commercial 

Crew Program is a new way of doing business that requires new 

processes for investigating mishaps or accidents. What has NASA 

done to prepare for any mishaps or accidents that may occur in the 

Commercial Crew Program? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, we would treat these as a major mishap. There is also a Congressional investigation that would probably be required and incurred for a loss of life associated with these 

programs. It would be similar to the kind of requirements we have 

had before for our human space flight programs, in terms of investigation and requirements following a mishap. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So is it accurate to say, then, that procedures are 

in place to address investigations and oversight of investigations? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Those procedures are in place. We will review them again, probably along with the ASAP, and also with 

Congress, to make sure they are current and make sure they are 

up to date with where we stand today. But the processes and procedures we have in place today are the basis to start from. But like 

with any program, we can go back, reflect on them, look at them, 

and potentially improve and enhance them. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Are they spelled out in the contracts? Are these 

procedures spelled out in the contracts with the partners? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I don’t know if the accident procedures are 

called out specifically. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Can you share those procedures with the Committee? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Sure. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Can you point us to those? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Sure. They are available. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Great. Mr. Gerstenmaier, the two contractors have proposed very different prices for accomplishing the goals 

and mission requirements set forth in their respective contracts. 

How do you account for this large discrepancy in development costs 

between the two competitors? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. That question is better posed to them. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, you are—but don’t you work for NASA? 

Aren’t you overseeing the contracts? Do you—— 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, I am. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you have a concern about the—— 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I have no concern—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. —costs? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. —about the costs. We evaluated both costs 

to see if they were reasonable. We looked at the chance of default. 

We looked at them. They were reasonable, they were fully understandable to us, but the specifics of the differences we can understand. I can describe to you from a NASA perspective why they 

were there, but you have the luxury today of having both contractors here, and they can explain that to you in much more detail 
75 

from their perspective than I can from a NASA perspective. 

But—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask a follow-on, then. If you were to 

use the same joint confidence level methodology for the Commercial 

Crew Program that you used for the cost-plus contracts for SLS 

and Orion, would you expect the outcome to resemble the contractor prices and schedules? Would you see any similarities? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We did an independent cost analysis, where 

we looked at the cost of what these contracts should cost, and we 

evaluated those against what the actual proposals were, and they 

were reasonable and consistent with what we could see. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Have you done any—has NASA done—considered 

doing any JCLs on these contracts? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Right now we have firm fixed price contracts 

in place. We don’t believe there is a need to do a JCL on a firm 

fixed price contract because that value has been given to us for the 

service we require, and it is a commitment by the contractors to 

deliver for that price. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Mr. Mulholland and Dr. Reisman, what 

plan does each of your companies have to track and mitigate schedule and funding risks? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Absolutely, and first, if I might go back to the 

cost question, and you talked about the different approaches of the 

two companies—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. I am out of time, so we will have to see if the 

Chairman will indulge, but we will see. 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Well—— 

Chairman PALAZZO. Go ahead, Bill. 

Mr. JOHNSON. He wants—okay. Go ahead. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Yes, please. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Go ahead. 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. I would say that, you know, there is a difference in approach. I think the only objective evidence is the 

NASA evaluation from the source board. Mr. Gerstenmaier put it 

in the record, and so the whole source selection statement is laid 

out, but there were many instances of statements about the increase in confidence that NASA has in the Boeing plan because of 

the detailed understanding of the certification requirements, in 

comparison to SpaceX, who did not demonstrate as good an understanding of the certification products, or have as effective systems 

for development of these key products. 

And so it is, I think, that difference in approach. I mean, you 

have to remember that Boeing has been a partner with NASA in 

the development of every capsule that has taken domestic astronauts to space that this country has embarked on. And so it is that 

deep legacy, and knowledge of—and understanding of what it takes 

to design certified, and then field a human rated spacecraft. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. And so a lot of focus, from our standpoint, on 

the robustness of the design, and the robustness of the processes 

needed to not only ensure safety in the design, but safety in operation through the life cycle. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Reisman, if you want to—— 
76 

Dr. REISMAN. Well, John, I mean, it was a good qualitative answer, but I could tell you that if you looked in detail at the source 

selection official statement, that—you will see that we are—it was 

neck and neck when it came to technical mission suitability. There 

is a seven percent difference in the scores that were awarded, but 

there was a 70 percent difference in price. 

And I could tell you that the reason for that—first of all, we are very happy with the $2.6 billion that we did receive. That is every 

penny that we asked for. We have to—I should also point out that 

we have to meet the same contract requirements, the same objectives, and, most importantly, the same safety requirements that 

Boeing has to meet. So we have to do the same thing. 

As far as why we are so much ahead, in terms of cost, is because 

we are so much ahead in terms of the development of the vehicle. 

We have a cargo vehicle today that is flying to the Space Station. 

We have a Falcon 9 that is already integrated with that vehicle. 

We have a mission control today that is controlling that integrated 

rocket and vehicle. We have the luxury of performing two major 

abort tests, two of the most difficult validation tests—hardware 

tests integrated under the CCiCap contract, and those abort tests 

are about to happen. In fact, the test article is at the Cape right 

now. 

So we had a lot of runway behind us, and, at the same time, we 

are also very efficient. We are a vertically integrated company that 

does not have to pay subcontractors, upon subcontractors, upon 

subcontractors. So we have a lot of inherent efficiencies, and I 

think that explains the difference. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. All right. Well, thank you very much. Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. Thanks. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Admiral Dyer, the 

United States Government is working to replace the Russian RD– 

180 engine with a domestic alternative. Aside from the domestically sourced RS–68 used on the Delta IV launch vehicle, is there 

an alternative engine available today that could provide the same 

level of performance and reliability as the RD–180 engine? 

Vice Admiral DYER. Mr. Brooks, as you heard from both the 

SpaceX representative and Boeing representatives, there are hard 

discussionsto be made about domestic engines, both new ones, as 

well as extended use of the SpaceX engines, there is not currently 

a realistic path forward within the constraints of the schedules 

that we are talking about for commercial space, in my opinion. 

Now, I will follow it up by saying we believe that the two contractors represent a great competitive portfolio. On the Boeing side, 

they have challenges of process innovation, cost, and finding a way 

to a new engine in time. On the SpaceX side, we would submit that 

the challenges are configuration, control, and design stability, as 

they find innovative and new ways of doing business with new 

equipment, but it is a great portfolio. An engine is critically important, but it is not, in my opinion, on the path between now and the 

end of ISS. 

Mr. BROOKS. You have answered my second question to some degree, Vice Admiral Dyer, but if you would like to add anything additional to the second question, feel free. And after you have re-
77 

sponded, Mr. Gerstenmaier, Mr. Mulholland, and Dr. Reisman, if 

you would like to share your insight, I would appreciate it. How 

important, then, is it for the United States Government to develop 

a domestic replacement for the RD–180? 

Vice Admiral DYER. I think it is critically important for two reasons. For geopolitical reasons, to have an engine that is American 

made and unencumbered is important. And, perhaps it is a sin, but 

there is a prideful issue of American made that I think needs to 

be considered and addressed as well. 

Mr. BROOKS. Would any of the other three like to add their insight? Mr. Gerstenmaier? No? Mr. Mulholland? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. You know, I would say it is important to have 

domestic capability over the long term ULA, and the member companies are actively pursuing it. But I would also like to add that 

the relationship that we have had with Russia in human space 

flight has been long lasting, and beneficial to both companies, and 

has allowed us, I think, a bridge to weather some difficult political 

situations that we have had globally. And so that relationship with 

Russia has been beneficial to us, and I believe will continue to do 

so. 

Mr. BROOKS. Dr. Reisman? 

Dr. REISMAN. I think a number of us have mentioned that, you 

know, we all think it is very important for this country to have assured access to space without being dependent on any other country, especially a country that is—we are having a difficult geopolitical situation with. And there are multiple ways you can go 

about doing that. You can start a development program for a brand 

new engine for—to replace rockets that are using Russian engines 

today in America. 

But just—again, I want to emphasize we have a rocket that is 

100 percent American, and it is standing by, ready to do these missions. We are going through the certification process with the Commercial Crew Program for human certification. We are also getting 

very, very close to completing certification with the Department of 

Defense for EELV. So we think we are standing by and ready to 

provide that capability for the country. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Dr. Reisman. Vice Admiral Dyer, I have 

about a minute left. This question will be for you. Your recent report appears somewhat critical of NASA’s transparency regarding 

the Commercial Crew Program. Did the issues for which the criticism was based extend to the contractors? 

Vice Admiral DYER. NASA is the controller of information, and 

the nexus of many of our questions. The contractors have been 

open and sharing in showing us their facilities, sharing their designs with us, and sharing the questions that they have posed to 

NASA. Our questions, in terms of which waivers and deviations 

have been requested, how are they being filtered and sorted, which 

ones have been approved, and what is the thought process behind 

the approvals of those specific waivers? 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Vice Admiral Dyer, and thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you. I—yeah, votes have been called. 

We never have enough time to ask all the questions that we want. 

This is a very important topic, not just to Congress, but definitely 
78 

to the American people, so I am going to open it up to one question 

per side, and I will start with Ms. Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, and I will just be very brief. Mr. 

Gerstenmaier, I am just curious, because in—a couple of times in 

your testimony and your responses, you indicated a concern with 

slippage and budget, based on the fact that Congress hadn’t provided the appropriations that were necessary. And I wonder if you 

share the concern that I have, that, if NASA were to come up— 

were to be able to do an effective independent cost analysis, that 

actually that could provide a better basis for making appropriations, but, in fact, that some of the concern with the appropriation 

has been that NASA hasn’t been forthcoming in providing that 

kind of analysis. 

And, indeed, in the 2015 Authorization Act that Mr. Palazzo and 

I moved forward, we require that kind of analysis. And so, I don’t 

want to keep pointing fingers, but it would help to have that information in order for us to be the best advocates we can be for the 

kind of resources that you need. Would you be willing to do that? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, at this stage, we have definitized 

fixed-price contracts, and we would like to discuss those with you, 

show you the basis for those contracts, and show you the variance 

on those contracts. And that would essentially anchor any of our 

discussions for the budgets, and we could show you the other pieces 

around that. 

So I don’t—I am not sure that an independent cost model for a 

different acquisition approach, as we are doing with these commercial providers, provides any other insight, other than the specifics 

of the actual negotiated contract that we have. And we can show 

you the milestones and the details. We have already shared it with 

staff. We will continue to share that with staff as the basis for our 

budget. 

So we will provide you with the information you need to understand the budget, and all its detail, and what it is based on, but 

it is actually anchored extremely heavily upon these actual negotiated contracts, and the milestones that were provided by both 

SpaceX and Boeing. 

Ms. EDWARDS. And then, just in the time remaining—thank you, 

Mr. Gerstenmaier. In the time remaining, I just want to clarify 

that—both from Boeing and from SpaceX that, in terms of all of 

the development costs that have gone into the—your—both of your 

efforts, what percentage of that has been provided by taxpayers, 

and what percentage of that has been provided by you independently, as commercial companies? 

Mr. MULHOLLAND. Ranking Member, I don’t have that data readily available. I certainly will get that to you. I would say that 

NASA has paid the preponderance of the development cost, but 

Boeing has contributed significantly. 

Dr. REISMAN. So I am going to, unfortunately, have to say the 

same thing. And I just asked the guys behind me, they don’t know 

either, but—so we will get back to you on a precise number. But 

I can tell you that, similar to what John said, we have put—especially in the beginning, we put a lot of our own money in. We have 

our own skin in the game, but we have also enjoyed a lot of help 

from NASA, so—the exact numbers we will have to get back to you. 
79 

Ms. EDWARDS. It is important because, you know, the public believes that the work that you are undertaking now is entirely your 

own, and you are entirely footing the bill. We just saw a recent poll 

about that, which is actually undercutting our ability to make a 

sale that taxpayers need to continue to support NASA as an agency. And so it is a deep concern of mine that we have a public that 

believes, because you guys are very good at, you know, the promotion of your work, and it is exciting that it is all your skin in 

the game. And so why not just turn it all over to the private sector 

as though the taxpayer shouldn’t meet any of that burden at all? 

And my estimates, the estimates that I have, show that taxpayers have skin in the game to the tune of about 90 percent, and 

you all ten percent. And I don’t have a problem with that, but I 

don’t want anybody in the public going away believing that this is 

all commercial, and that taxpayers and NASA, therefore, don’t 

need to be doing this work. And I thank you for your testimony. 

Chairman PALAZZO. All right. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. Because 

of the lack of time, I am going to forego my question. I am going 

to submit questions for the record. 

You know, there has been a lot of talk about what is actually the 

true cost per seat for sending American astronauts on American 

rockets back into space. Only time will tell, but the American people are really going to be the ones to decide how much are they 

willing to spend on maintaining—or not maintaining—but achieving American access to space, and also maintaining America’s leadership in space. So, I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, and the Members for their questions. The record 

will remain open for two weeks for additional questions and written questions from Members. The witnesses are excused, and this 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(81) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
82 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Bill Gerstenmaier 
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91 
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Responses by Vice Admiral Joseph Dyer 
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Responses by Mr. John Mulholland 
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Responses by Dr. Garrett Reisman 
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(165) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
166 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY FULL COMMITTEE RANKING MEMBER

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Good morning. I would like to welcome each of our witnesses to 

today’s hearing. The topic of today’s hearing is an important one 

as it presages a new chapter in NASA’s human spaceflight activities. 

Now almost halfway through this decade, substantial progress 

can be seen. The International Space Station was completed in 

2010 and continues to show great promise as an orbital laboratory. 

NASA has started to build the next deep space exploration system 

of the future with the building blocks of the Space Launch System 

(SLS) and Orion crewed vehicle. 

With the Space Shuttle retired, cargo resupply of the ISS is 

being turned over to two commercial providers, albeit a success 

made possible through substantial NASA financial investment and 

technical transfer. And, as we will hear today, NASA is working 

with Boeing and SpaceX to develop of future crewed commercial orbital transportation services to the Space Station. 

This laudable progress is a testament to the hard work and perseverance by the NASA federal workforce and its industry partners. In the process, NASA has learned new ways of doing things 

and is adopting some of industry’s best practices. 

Yet, we should not lose sight of the fact that routine access to 

space is hard. Nor should we forget the painful lessons NASA has 

learned along the way to mitigate the risks of sending humans beyond the confines of Earth’s surface. 

This Committee has followed the many twists and turns NASA 

took in getting to this point with its Commercial Crew Program. 

Various contractual vehicles were used, and I will not take the 

time here to recount the Committee’s concerns about inadequate 

insight into contractor designs and conformance with NASA safety 

requirements. 

On one hand, I am somewhat comforted that Mr. Gerstenmaier 

is at the helm and feel confident in his commitment to fly NASA 

astronauts on commercial transportation systems only when safety 

has been demonstrated. 

On the other hand, I am not comfortable, nor am I pleased, that 

the Aerospace Safety Advisory Board known as ASAP, Congress’s 

safety adviser, was denied access to key information before contracts were awarded. Indeed, the Commercial Crew Program’s denial caused the Panel Chairman to state in the ASAP’s 2014 Annual Report that ‘‘the Panel is unable to offer any informed opinion 

regarding the adequacy of the certification process or the sufficiency of safety in the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) due to 

constraints on access to needed information.’’ 

Clearly, this is troublesome. 

If NASA is to convince Congress that the two commercial crew 

transportation systems are safe, it must provide ASAP with information, by which the Panel can make objective assessments. 

Mr. Chairman, I recognize that NASA and its two contractors 

have much work to do. The nation needs their important contributions to the space program. 
167 

I hope we can continue this dialogue through future hearings as 

part of the open communications that must form the basis of trust 

and transparency in this government-industry partnership. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and I yield back. 

Æ