Table of Contents 

Welcome ................................................................. 1

Division Organization ................................................. 2

The Computer Security Division Implements

the Federal Information Security Management

Act of 2002.............................................................. 3

Security Management and Assurance Group......................4

Strategic Goal & Overview: .................................................... 4

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA Project)

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 

 Implementation Project – Phase I ..................................................4

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 

 Implementation Project – Phase II..................................................5

Outreach and Awareness........................................................ 6

Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC).........................................6

Federal Computer Security Program Managers’ Forum............................7

Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA).........8

Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) .........................9

Small and Medium-Sized Business (SMB) Outreach............................... 11

Health Information Technology Security ....................................11

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) ...................12

Smart Grid Cyber Security.....................................................13

ICT Supply Chain Risk Management ..........................................14

CAVP & CMVP Program..........................................................14

Cryptographic Validation Programs and Laboratory Accreditation............. 15

Automated Security Testing and Test Suite Development....................... 18

ISO Standardization of Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules... 19

Cryptographic Technology Group ................................. 20

Strategic Goal & Overview ....................................................20

Cryptographic Standards Toolkit..............................................20

Hash Algorithms and the Secure Hash Standard (SHA)-3 

 Competition ......................................................................... 20

Block Cipher Modes of Operation ................................................... 21

Key Management ...................................................................... 22

Security Guidelines Using Approved Hash Algorithms .....................23

Draft Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 180-4, 

 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)....................................................... 23

Random Number Generator (RNG).................................................. 23

Quantum Computing .................................................................. 24

Authentication......................................................................... 25

Security Aspects of Electronic Voting .............................................. 26

Development of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3

 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules ............................ 26

NIST Beacon – A Prototype Implementation of a Randomness Beacon ........ 27

Cryptography for Emerging Technologies and Applications (CETA) 

 Workshop............................................................................. 28

Pairing-Based Cryptography ......................................................... 28

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Test Cards.................................... 29

BIOS Security .......................................................................... 30

Privacy Enhancing Cryptography Project .......................................... 30

Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research Group ........................................... 31

Strategic Goal & Overview ....................................................31

Identity Management...........................................................31

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) and FIPS 201 Revision Efforts ............. 31

NIST Personal Identity Verification Program (PIV)................................ 32

Conformity Assessment Program and Qualified Product List (QPL) 

 for Identity and Credential Products for DHS/TSA............................. 33

Biometric Standards and Conformity Assessment Activities .................... 33

Research in Emerging Technologies ..........................................34

Automated Combinatorial Testing for Software .................................. 34

Cloud Computing and Virtualization................................................ 35

Security Ontologies for Risk Assessment........................................... 36

Mobile Device Security ............................................................... 36

Access Control and Privilege Management .................................37

Access Control and Privilege Management Research............................. 37

Conformance Verification for Access Control Policies ........................... 38

Metrics for Evaluation of Access Control Systems ................................ 38

Policy Machine ......................................................................... 39

Automated Vulnerability Management.......................................40

Security Automation .................................................................. 40

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP).................................... 40

National Vulnerability Database (NVD)............................................. 41

National Checklist Program .......................................................... 42

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Validation Program ............ 43

Technical Security Metrics .....................................................44

Vulnerability Measurement and Scoring ........................................... 44

Security Risk Analysis of Enterprise Networks Using Attack Graphs ........... 44

Infrastructure Services, Protocols, and Applications ......................45

Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec).... 45

Securing the Domain Name System (DNS) ......................................... 45

CSD’s Part in National and ISO (Organization for Standardization)

 Security Standards Processes ...............................................46

Honors and Awards .................................................. 50

Computer Security Division Standards & Guidelines (Publications)

Released in FY2011 ............................................................52

Draft Publications ..................................................................52-53

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)................................. 53

Special Publications (SPs)............................................................ 53

NIST Interagency Reports (NISTIRS)..............................................53-54

ITL Security Bulletins ................................................................. 54

Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011........ 55-69

Ways to Engage Our Division and NIST.......................70-71

Acknowledgements .................................................. 72
1

Welcome

The United States (U.S.) economy and U.S. citizens are reliant on information technology (IT). Federal agencies and the 

private sector cannot function without IT. Protecting IT, including its information and the information infrastructure, is 

critical for the Nation. The Computer Security Division (CSD), a component of the Information Technology Laboratory at 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is responsible for developing standards, guidelines, tests and 

metrics for the protection of non-national security federal information and information systems. The CSD standards, 

guidelines, tests and metrics have also become leading resources for information security in the private sector.

During fiscal year 2011 (FY2011), CSD extended its research and development agenda for high-quality, cost-effective 

security and privacy mechanisms to foster improved information security across the federal government and the greater 

information security community. This included addressing challenges for the protection of information and information 

systems for enterprise environments as well as in cloud computing and mobile infrastructures. In addition, we explored 

processes and mechanisms to protect personally identifiable information through the application of privacy controls 

and privacy-enhancing technologies. Our research also extended to non-traditional forms of IT including cyber-physical 

systems and security for sensor devices. 

Our ability to interact with the broad federal community continues to be critical to our success. This interaction helps 

to ensure that our research is consistent with national objectives related to or impacted by information security. This 

interaction is most prominent in our strengthened collaborations with the Department of Defense, the Intelligence 

Community, and the Committee on National Security Systems to establish a common foundation for information security 

across the federal government. The FY2011 release of Special Publication 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk: 

Organization, Mission, and Information System View, developed by the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative 

Interagency Working Group, is not only leading to more uniform and consistent ways to manage risks, but it is also 

providing a strong basis for greater information sharing among stakeholders.

The success of many of our technical programs is dependent on our partnership with industry. In FY2011, we continued 

to drive greater adoption of security automation protocols by major information technology manufacturers, as well as 

new and innovative applications of security automation to more diverse use cases including continuous monitoring and 

health information technology. Lower in the stack, CSD worked with the computer hardware industry on mechanisms 

to improve security at the hardware layer. Recently issued guidelines on protecting the BIOS in laptop and desktop 

computers have already had a major impact with several hardware vendors offering products intended to meet the 

guidelines, laying the foundation for more secure systems.

Other significant highlights of our work in FY2011 include NIST’s leadership role in supporting the establishment of the 

Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP), which facilitates a standard approach for provisional 

security automation of cloud computing products and services; and in hosting the third round of the SHA-3 competition 

to determine a successor to the current government-approved cryptographic hash algorithm.

For many years, the Computer Security Division (CSD) has made great contributions to help secure the nation’s sensitive 

information and information systems. Looking forward to FY2012, CSD will continue to lead in areas as diverse as 

risk management and continuous monitoring, awareness and outreach, privacy-enhancing 

cryptography, security for virtual environments, and mobile computing technology security. 

CSD will also focus on aligning our resources to not only develop and apply innovative security 

technologies, but also to enhance our ability to address current and future computer and 

information security challenges faced by critical national and international priorities.

Donna Dodson 

Chief, Computer Security Division 

& Deputy Chief Cybersecurity Advisor

Welcome
2 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Division Organization

Donna Dodson

Chief, Computer Security Division and 

Deputy Chief Cybersecurity Advisor

GROUP MANAGERS

Tim Polk

Cryptographic Technology

Group

David Ferraiolo

Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research Group

Matthew Scholl

Security Management and 

Assurance Group

Matthew Scholl

Deputy Division Chief
3

The E-Government Act, Public Law 107-347, passed by 

the 107th Congress and signed into law by the President 

in December 2002, recognized the importance of 

information security to the economic and national 

security interests of the United States. Title III of the 

E-Government Act, entitled the Federal Information 

Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, included 

duties and responsibilities for the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology, Information Technology 

Laboratory (ITL), Computer Security Division (CSD). 

In 2011, CSD addressed its assignments through the 

following projects and activities:

• Issued 17 final NIST Special Publications (SPs) 

that provided management, operational, and 

technical security guidance in areas such as: 

Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) protection, 

cloud computing, configuration management, 

cryptography, industrial control system security, 

information security continuous monitoring, 

key management, security automation, and 

virtualization. In addition, 19 draft SPs on a 

variety of topics, including: cloud computing, 

cryptographic key management, electronic 

authentication, personal identity verification, 

and risk assessments, were issued for public 

comment;

• Continued the successful collaboration with the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 

Committee on National Security Systems, and the 

Department of Defense to establish a common 

foundation for information security across the 

federal government, including a consistent 

process for selecting and specifying safeguards 

and countermeasures (i.e., security controls) for 

federal information systems;

• Provided assistance to agencies and the 

private sector: conducted ongoing, substantial 

reimbursable and non-reimbursable assistance 

support, including many outreach efforts such 

as the Federal Information Systems Security 

Educators’ Association (FISSEA), the Federal 

Computer Security Program Managers’ Forum 

(FCSM Forum), and the Small Business Corner;

• Reviewed security policies and technologies from 

the private sector and national security systems 

for potential federal agency use: hosted a growing 

repository of federal agency security practices, 

public/private security practices, and security 

configuration checklists for Information Technology 

(IT) products. Continued to lead, in conjunction 

with the Government of Canada’s Communications 

Security Establishment, the Cryptographic Module 

Validation Program (CMVP). The Common Criteria 

Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and CMVP 

facilitate security testing of IT products usable by the 

federal government; 

• Solicited recommendations of the Information Security 

and Privacy Advisory Board on draft standards and 

guidelines and on information security and privacy 

issues regularly at quarterly meetings; 

• Provided outreach, workshops, and briefings: 

conducted ongoing awareness briefings and outreach 

to CSD’s customer community and beyond to ensure 

comprehension of guidance and awareness of planned 

and future activities. CSD also held workshops to 

identify areas that the customer community wishes 

to be addressed, and to scope guidelines in a 

collaborative and open format; and 

• Produced an annual report as a NIST Interagency 

Report (NISTIR). The 2003-2010 Annual Reports are 

available via our Computer Security Resource Center 

(CSRC) website.

The Computer Security Division Implements the 

Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002

The Computer Security Division Implements the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
4 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Strategic Goal

The Security Management and Assurance (SMA) Group 

provides leadership, expertise, outreach, validation, 

standards, and guidelines to assist the federal IT community 

in protecting information and information systems, and in 

using these critical assets to accomplish federal agency 

missions.

Overview

Information security is an integral element of good 

management. Information and information systems are 

critical assets that support the mission of an organization. 

Protecting these information assets can be as important 

as protecting other organizational resources, such as 

intellectual property, physical assets, or employees. 

Organizations need to have assurance that the security 

practices and technologies that they implement provide 

adequate security necessary to protect their mission, 

systems, and information.

Ultimate responsibility for the success of an organization 

lies with its senior management. These officials establish 

the organization’s information security program and its 

overall program goals, objectives, and priorities in order 

to support the mission of the organization. They are 

also responsible for ensuring that required resources are 

applied to the program.

Collaboration with other organizations is critical for 

success. Within the federal government, NIST collaborates 

with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), and all Executive 

Branch agencies. We also work closely with a number 

of information technology organizations and standards 

bodies, as well as with public and private organizations. 

Internationally we work jointly with the governments of 

our allies, including Canada, Japan, Australia, and several 

European and Asian countries, to standardize and validate 

the correct implementation of cryptography.

Major initiatives in this area include:

• The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 

implementation project;

• The Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP);

• The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP);

• Security for Health Information Technology;

• Security standards and conformance for the nation’s 

Smart Grid;

• The National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education 

(NICE);

• Extended outreach initiatives to federal and 

nonfederal agencies, state and local governments, 

international organizations, and small businesses;

• Standards development; and 

• Producing and updating NIST Special Publications 

(SPs) on security management topics.

Key to the success in this area is our ability to interact 

with a broad constituency – federal and nonfederal – in order 

to ensure that our program is consistent with national 

objectives related to or impacted by information security.

Federal Information Security Management Act

FISMA Implementation Project – Phase I

Phase I of the FISMA Implementation Project focuses 

on developing a comprehensive series of standards 

and guidelines to help federal agencies build strong 

cybersecurity programs, defend against increasingly 

sophisticated cyber attacks, and demonstrate compliance 

to security requirements set forth in legislation, Executive 

Orders, Homeland Security Directives, and OMB polices. 

During 2010-2011, CSD strengthened its collaboration with 

the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, 

and the Committee on National Security Systems, in 

partnership with the Joint Task Force Transformation 

Initiative, which continues to develop key cybersecurity 

guidelines for protecting federal information and 

information systems for the Unified Information Security 

Framework. Previously, the Joint Task Force developed 

common security guidance in the critical areas of security 

controls for information systems and organizations, 

security assessment procedures to demonstrate security 

control effectiveness, security authorizations for risk 

acceptance decisions, and continuous monitoring activities 

to ensure that decision makers receive the most up-to-date 

information on the security state of their information 

systems.

Security Management and Assurance Group
5

In FY2011, CSD worked on the following initiatives:

(i) Risk Management and Risk Assessment Guidance: 

Developed a three-tiered risk management approach 

for enterprise-wide use focusing on an organization 

level, mission/business process level, and 

information system level. Developed a four-step 

risk management process that is applied across 

all three risk management tiers and that includes 

risk framing, risk assessment, risk response, and 

risk monitoring. Provided comprehensive risk 

assessment guidance examining the relationships 

among key risk factors including threats, 

vulnerabilities, impact, and likelihood.

(ii) Continuous Monitoring and Configuration 

Management Guidelines: Developed information 

security continuous monitoring guidelines to 

help organizations determine the effectiveness 

of deployed security controls, changes to 

organizational information systems and 

environments of operation, and compliance 

with federal legislation, policies, directives, 

standards, and guidance. Developed security 

configuration management guidelines to ensure 

that organizations employ effective techniques to 

manage information technology components and 

implement required configuration settings within 

information technology products, thereby reducing 

or eliminating classes of threats to organizational 

information systems and organizations.

(iii) FISMA Outreach Activity to Public and Private 

Sector Organizations: Conducted cybersecurity 

outreach briefings and provided support to state 

and local governments as well as private sector 

organizations. Briefings included key cybersecurity 

topics of interest, such as effective implementation 

of the NIST Risk Management Framework. In 

addition, conducted outreach activities with 

academic institutions, providing information 

on NIST’s security standards and guidelines and 

exploring new areas of cybersecurity research and 

development.

In FY2011, CSD completed the following activities in 

cooperation and collaboration with its Joint Task Force 

partners:

• Developed NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-39, 

Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, 

Mission, and Information System View; and

• Developed an initial public draft of SP 800-30, Revision 

1, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments.

In FY2012, CSD intends to: 

• Update SP 800-53, Revision 3, Recommended Security 

Controls for Federal Information Systems and 

Organizations, to Revision 4;

• Finalize SP 800-30, Revision 1, Guide for Conducting 

Risk Assessments; 

• Develop an information system security and 

engineering guideline; and

• Expand cybersecurity outreach program to include 

additional state, local, and tribal governments as 

well as private sector organizations and academic 

institutions.

http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert

Contact:

Dr. Ron Ross

(301) 975-5390

ron.ross@nist.gov

FISMA Implementation Project – Phase II

Phase II of the FISMA Implementation Project focuses 

on building common understanding and reference guides 

for organizations applying the NIST suite of publications 

that support the Risk Management Framework (RMF), and 

for public and private sector organizations that provide 

security assessments of information systems for federal 

agencies. Security assessments determine the extent to 

which the security controls are implemented correctly, 

operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome 

with respect to meeting the security requirements for the 

system. Management, operational, and technical security 

controls, as well as information technology products and 

services used in security control implementation, are 

included in security assessments. 

In FY2011, CSD worked on the following initiatives:

(i) Training: Developed classroom-based and 

web-based training courses, published Quick 

Start Guides (QSGs), and developed Frequently 

Asked Questions (FAQs) for establishing common 

understanding of the NIST standards and guidelines 

supporting the RMF.

(ii) Organizational Security Assessment Capability: 

Defined minimum capability and proficiency 

criteria for public and private sector organizations 

providing security assessment services for federal 

agencies.

Security Management and Assurance Group
6 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

In FY2011, CSD completed the following activities:

• Developed final drafts of web-based and classroombased training courses on the RMF, Applying the RMF 

to Federal Information Systems; 

• Developed draft of web-based training course for the 

Monitor step of the six-step RMF;

• Completed second draft QSGs and FAQs supporting 

the Select step of the six-step RMF (adding to the 

currently available QSGs and FAQs for the Categorize 

and Monitor steps); and

• Developed technical capability requirements and 

proficiency test scenarios for organizations to 

demonstrate their capability in providing security 

assessments of cloud-based information systems 

consistent with FISMA and NIST standards and 

guidelines. The technical capability requirements 

were derived from Draft NIST Interagency Report 

(NISTIR) 7328, Assessment Provider Requirements 

and Customer Responsibilities: Building a Security 

Assessment Credentialing Program for Federal 

Information Systems, and the core set of NIST 

standards and guidelines from Phase I of the FISMA 

Implementation Project that support the RMF. 

CSD is collaborating with the ITL Systems and Software 

Division (SSD) and the NIST Standards Coordination 

Office using the International Standard ISO/IEC 

17020:2008 General criteria for the operation of 

various types of bodies performing inspections, in 

supporting the General Services Administration (GSA) 

for qualifying security assessment organizations 

(SAOs) to conduct security assessments of Cloud 

Service Providers (CSPs) cloud-based information 

systems. 

In FY2012, CSD intends to: 

• Develop final draft QSGs and FAQs for the Implement, 

Assess, and Authorize steps of the six-step RMF; and

• Prototype the proficiency test capability demonstration 

in supporting GSA for qualifying SAOs to conduct security 

assessments of cloud-based information systems.

http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert

Contacts:

Mr. Arnold Johnson Ms. Pat Toth

(301) 975-3247 (301) 975-5140

arnold.johnson@nist.gov patricia.toth@nist.gov

Outreach and Awareness

Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC)

The Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC) is CSD’s 

website and is one of the most visited websites at NIST. 

CSRC encourages broad sharing of information security 

tools and practices, provides a resource for information 

security standards and guidelines, and identifies and 

links key security web resources to support industry and 

government users. CSRC is an integral component of all of 

the work that we conduct and produce. It is our repository 

for anyone, public or private sector, wanting to access our 

documents and other valuable information security-related 

information. During FY2011, our division’s two websites, 

CSRC and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), had 

more than 102.6 million requests combined1. CSRC received 

a little over 54.0 million total requests. The NVD website 

within CSRC received over 48.6 million total requests. 

TOTAL NUMBER OF WEBSITE REQUESTS: CSRC & NVD

CSRC is the primary gateway for gaining access to NIST 

computer security publications, standards, and guidelines, 

and serves as a vital link to our internal and external 

customers. The following documents can be found on 

CSRC: Drafts for public comment, Federal Information 

Processing Standards (FIPS), Special Publications (SPs), 

NIST Interagency Reports (NISTIRs), and ITL Security 

Bulletins.

The URL for the Publications homepage is: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications. Publications are organized 

by Topic, Family categories, and Legal Requirements to help 

users locate relevant information quickly.

1

 These statistics are based from October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2011 time 

frame. The total requests consist of web pages and file downloads.

CSRC NVD CSRC NVD CSRC NVD CSRC NVD
7

During FY2011, the top ten downloaded publications 

were:

1. SP 800-53 Revision 3, Recommended Security 

Controls for Federal Information Systems and 

Organizations;

2. SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for 

Information Technology Systems;

3. SP 800-77, Guide to IPsec VPNs;

4. SP 800-100, Information Security Handbook: A 

Guide for Managers;

5. SP 800-94, Guide to Intrusion Detection and 

Prevention Systems (IDPS);

6. SP 800-61 Revision 1, Computer Security 

Incident Handling Guide;

7. FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for 

Cryptographic Modules;

8. SP 800-53A, Guide for Assessing the Security 

Controls in Federal Information Systems;

9. SP 800-12, An Introduction to Computer 

Security: The NIST Handbook;

10. SP 800-92, Guide to Computer Security Log 

Management.

The CSRC is continuously updated with new information 

on various project pages. Some of the major highlights of 

CSRC during FY2011 were:

• Continuous updates to the National Initiative 

for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) website, 

which includes: 2011 NICE Workshop, the NICE 

Strategic Plan (Draft), and the NICE Framework. 

URL: http://www.nist.gov/nice;

• Creation and updates of new validated products 

and certificate web pages for the Cryptographic 

Module Validation Program (CMVP) and Cryptographic 

Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP);

• Webcasts provided for the ISPAB quarterly meetings; 

and

• Updates made for the Access Control Policy Tool 

(ACPT) web pages, to name a few of the CSRC updates 

performed during FY2011.

In addition to CSRC, CSD maintains a publication 

announcement mailing list. This is a free email list that 

notifies subscribers about publications that have been 

posted to the CSRC website. This email list is a valuable 

tool for more than 12,000 subscribers including federal 

government employees, the private sector, educational 

institutions, and individuals with a personal interest 

in information technology (IT) security. Subscribers 

are notified when CSD releases a publication, posts 

an announcement on CSRC, or when the CSD is hosting 

a security event. Individuals who are interested in 

learning more about this list or subscribing to it should 

visit this web page on CSRC for more information: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/subscribe.html.

Questions on the website should be sent to the 

CSRC Webmaster at: webmaster-csrc@nist.gov. 

Contact:

Mr. Patrick O’Reilly

(301) 975-4751

patrick.oreilly@nist.gov

Federal Computer Security 

Program Managers’ Forum

The Federal Computer Security Program Managers’ Forum 

is a group that is sponsored by NIST to promote the sharing 

of security-related information among federal agencies. 

The Forum, which serves more than 1,042 members, 

strives to provide an ongoing opportunity for managers 

of federal information security programs to exchange 

information security materials in a timely manner, build 

upon the experiences of other programs, and reduce 

possible duplication of effort. It provides a mechanism 

for NIST to share information directly with federal agency 

information security program managers in fulfillment of 

NIST’s leadership mandate under FISMA. It also assists NIST 

in establishing and maintaining relationships with other 

individuals or organizations that are actively addressing 

information security issues within the federal government. 

NIST serves as the Secretariat of the Forum, providing 

necessary administrative and logistical support. Kevin Stine 

serves as the Chairperson for the Forum. Participation in 

Forum meetings is open to federal government employees 

who participate in the management of their organization’s 

information security program. There are no membership 

dues.

The Forum hosts the Federal Agency Security Practices (FASP) 

website, maintains an extensive email list, and holds 

bimonthly meetings and an annual two-day conference to 

discuss current issues and developments of interest to those 

responsible for protecting sensitive (unclassified) federal 

systems. The Forum plays a valuable role in helping NIST 

and other federal agencies develop and maintain a strong, 

proactive stance in the identification and resolution of new 

strategic and tactical IT security issues as they emerge.

Topics of discussion at Forum meetings in FY2011 included 

briefings from various federal agencies on: Federal Virtual 

Security Management and Assurance Group
8 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Training Environment (FedVTE) and Federal Cybersecurity 

Training Exercise (FedCTE), and Supply Chain Risk 

Management; FISMA Annual Reporting Process Report and 

Continuous Monitoring; Security Automation Roadmap 

and Managed Trusted Internet Protocol Service (MTIPS) 

Experience and Lessons Learned; and the NIST Mobile 

Application Security and Department of Justice (DOJ) 

Mobility Program. The April meeting, held at the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Satellite 

Operations Facility, focused on Application Security – A 

Programmer’s Perspective; Integrating Security into the 

Application Development Life Cycle; and Panel Discussion: 

Application Security Realities. 

This year’s annual two-day offsite meeting featured 

updates on the computer security activities of the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), United States 

Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), the 

Department of Homeland Security, and NIST. Technical 

sessions included briefings on Application Security, Basic 

Input/Output System (BIOS) Protection Guidelines, 

Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Initiatives, Information 

Security Continuous Monitoring, Cybersecurity Research 

and Development, Enterprise-wide Risk Management, 

Security Awareness and Training, and the U.S. Government 

Configuration Baseline (USGCB).

The number of members on the email list has grown 

steadily and provides a valuable resource for federal 

security program managers. To join, email your name, 

affiliation, address, phone number, title, and confirmation 

that you are a federal employee to sec-forum@nist.gov.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/

Contacts:

Mr. Kevin Stine, Ms. Peggy Himes, 

Chair Administration

(301) 975-4483 (301) 975-2489

kevin.stine@nist.gov peggy.himes@nist.gov

Federal Information Systems Security 

Educators’ Association (FISSEA)

The Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ 

Association (FISSEA), founded in 1987, is an organization 

run by and for information systems security professionals 

to assist federal agencies in meeting their information 

systems security awareness, training, and education 

responsibilities. During the 2011 conference business 

meeting, it was announced that the NIST Computer 

Security Division will make a deeper commitment to 

FISSEA. The NIST plan includes a graceful transition to a 

NIST program supported by the current Executive Board. 

There will be direct and formal connections with the 

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE). 

FISSEA strives to elevate the general level of information 

systems security knowledge for the federal government 

and the federal workforce. FISSEA serves as a professional 

forum for the exchange of information and improvement 

of information systems security awareness, training, and 

education programs. It also seeks to assist the professional 

development of its members.

FISSEA membership is open to information systems 

security professionals, professional trainers and educators, 

and managers responsible for information systems security 

training programs in federal agencies, as well as contractors 

of these agencies and faculty members of accredited 

educational institutions who are involved in information 

security training and education. There are no membership 

fees to join FISSEA; all that is required is a willingness to 

share products, information, and experiences. Business is 

administered by a working group that meets monthly. 

Each year an award is presented to a candidate selected 

as FISSEA Educator of the Year; this award honors 

distinguished accomplishments in information systems 

security training programs. Jim Wiggins of the Federal IT 

Security Institute was awarded the Educator of the Year for 

2010 at the 2011 FISSEA Conference. Mark Wilson received 

the second FISSEA Life Member Award, for his leadership, 

outreach, and dedication to the FISSEA mission and many 

years of service as the NIST Liaison.

The annual FISSEA Security Awareness, Training and 

Education Contest consists of five categories from one 

of FISSEA’s three key areas of Awareness, Training, and 

Education. The categories are: (1) awareness poster, (2) 

motivational item (aka: trinkets - pens, stress relief items, 

t-shirts, etc.), (3) awareness website, (4) awareness 

newsletter, and (5) role-based training and education. 

Winning entries for the security awareness contest are 

posted to the FISSEA website. The winners for the FY2011 

contest were:

• Terri Cinnamon, Department of Veterans Affairs, had 

the winning motivational item;

• Maureen Moore, Food and Drug Administration, was 

selected for FDA’s security newsletter as well as for 

their security website;

• David Kurtz of the Bureau of the Public Debt won the 

poster contest; and

• Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Science 

Applications International Corporation (SAIC), and 

Carney, Inc., were selected as the role-based training 

exercise winner. 

FISSEA maintains a website, a list serve, and participates 

in a social networking site as a means of improving 

communication for its members. NIST assists FISSEA with 

its operations by providing staff support for several of its 

activities and by being FISSEA’s host agency. 
9

FISSEA membership in 2011 spanned federal agencies, 

industry, military, contractors, state governments, 

academia, the press, and foreign organizations to reach 

over 1,295 members in a total of ten countries. The 700 

federal agency members represent 89 agencies from the 

executive and legislative branches of government. 

On November 5, 2010, FISSEA hosted a workshop, 

Connecting the DOTS – Harmonizing Current Cybersecurity 

Competency Efforts, at NIH. Chris Kelsall, Director of the 

Cyber/IT Workforce, Department of the Navy, moderated 

a panel including Ernest McDuffie, lead for the National 

Initiative for Cybersecurity Education; Jacque Caldwell, 

lead Cybersecurity Competencies Efforts, U.S. Office 

of Personnel Management (OPM); Alan Carswell, Chair 

of the University of Maryland University College (UMUC) 

Cybersecurity Master’s Program; and Dagne Fulcher, 

InfoSec Workforce Development Matrix Project. Attendees 

were able to obtain an overview of several cybersecurity 

workforce development efforts in order to enhance 

integration among past, current, and future endeavors. 

The workshop provided an open forum for discussion 

about how the efforts support, conflict, and/or overlap; 

attendees also shared viewpoints on concrete actions to 

support appropriate standardizing bodies. 

The 2011 FISSEA conference returned to NIST on March 

15-17, 2011, and the theme was “Bridging to the Future – 

Emerging Trends in Cybersecurity.” The theme was chosen 

to reflect current projects, trends, and initiatives that will 

provide pathways to future solutions. Approximately 165 

information systems security professionals and trainers 

attended, primarily from federal agencies, but also from 

academia and industry. Attendees received an update on 

the NICE activities, gained new techniques for developing 

and conducting training, as well as awareness and training 

ideas, resources, and contacts. Presenters represented 

NIST, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the U.S. Department 

of State (DOS), the Department of Energy (DOE), the 

Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 

the National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM), the Bureau of the Public 

Debt (BPD), and the Library of Congress. Presenters also 

represented private industry and academia. Attendees 

had an opportunity to visit 22 vendors on the second day. 

Another bonus of attending the FISSEA conference is social 

networking. The conference continues to be a valuable 

forum in which individuals from government, industry, 

and academia who are involved with information 

systems/cybersecurity workforce development – awareness, 

training, education, certification, and professionalization – may 

learn of ongoing and planned training and education 

programs and initiatives.

FISSEA has coordinated a Working Group to facilitate 

the development of an updated draft of SP 800-16, 

Information Technology Security Training Requirements: A 

Role- and Performance-Based Model. This effort reflects a 

significant commitment from FISSEA to advance Information 

Technology Awareness, Training, and Education.

The 2012 FISSEA conference is being planned for 

March 27-29, 2012 at NIST.

http://csrc.nist.gov/fissea

fisseamembership@nist.gov

Contacts: 

Ms. Patricia Toth Ms. Peggy Himes

(301) 975-5140 (301) 975-2489

patricia.toth@nist.gov peggy.himes@nist.gov

Information Security and Privacy 

Advisory Board (ISPAB)

The Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) 

is a federal advisory committee. It brings together senior 

professionals from industry, government, and academia to 

advise NIST, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 

the Secretary of Commerce, and appropriate committees 

of the U.S. Congress about information security and privacy 

issues pertaining to unclassified federal government 

information systems. 

The ISPAB was originally created by the Computer Security 

Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-35) as the Computer System Security 

and Privacy Advisory Board, and amended by Public Law 

107-347, Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002, the 

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 

2002. The Board’s name was changed as a result of FISMA, 

and its mandate was amended. The scope and objectives 

of the Board are to—

• Identify emerging managerial, technical, 

administrative, and physical safeguard issues relative 

to information security and privacy;

• Advise NIST, the Secretary of Commerce, and the 

Director of OMB on information security and privacy 

issues pertaining to federal government information 

systems, including thorough review of proposed 

standards and guidelines developed by NIST; and

• Annually report the Board’s findings to the Secretary 

of Commerce, the Director of OMB, the Director of 

the National Security Agency, and the appropriate 

committees of the Congress.

The charter (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/

documents/ispab_charter-2012-2014.pdf) defines that the 

Board’s membership should consist of 12 members and a 

Chairperson. The term of office for each board member 

is four years. The Director of NIST approves membership 

Security Management and Assurance Group
10 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

appointments and appoints the Chairperson. During 

FY2011, the ISPAB Board members were:

• Daniel Chenok (Chair), IBM Center for The Business of 

Government; 

• Julie Boughn, Center for Medicare and Medicaid 

Innovation, Department of Human Health and 

Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 

(DHHS/CMS); 

• Brian Gouker, National Security Agency (NSA) - U.S. 

Army War College; 

• Joseph Guirreri, P E Systems, Inc.; 

• Edward Roback, U.S. Department of Treasury; 

• Phyllis Schneck, McAfee, Inc.; 

• Gale Stone, Social Security Administration; 

• Matthew Thomlinson, Microsoft; and 

• Peter Weinberger, Google, Inc. 

The following Board members were nominated to the 

ISPAB Board after September 30, 2011:

• Kevin Fu, University of Massachusetts Amherst; 

• Greg Garcia, Bank of America; and

• Toby Levin, Retired

This advisory board of experienced, dynamic, and 

knowledgeable professionals provides NIST and the federal 

government with a rich, varied pool of people conversant 

with an extraordinary range of topics.

Front row (L-R): Megan St. Clair, Matt Scholl, Phyllis Schneck, Dan Chenok, 

Annie Sokol, Kevin Fu, Brian Gouker, Gale Stone

Back row (L-R): Peter Weinberger, Matt Thomlinson, Joe Guirreri, Toby Levin, 

Greg Garcia, Ed Roback

The Board’s membership draws from experience at all 

levels of information security and privacy work. The 

members’ careers cover government, industry, and 

academia. Members have worked in the executive and 

legislative branches of the federal government, civil service, 

senior executive service, the military, some of the largest 

corporations worldwide, small and medium-size businesses, 

and some of the top universities in the nation. The 

members’ experience, likewise, covers a broad spectrum of 

activities including many different engineering disciplines, 

computer programming, systems analysis, mathematics, 

management, information technology auditing, privacy, and 

law. Members also have an extensive history of professional 

publications, and professional journalism. Members have 

worked (and in many cases, continue to work) on the 

development and evolution of some of the most important 

pieces of information security and privacy legislation in 

the federal government, including the Privacy Act of 1974, 

the Computer Security Act of 1987, the E-Government Act 

(including FISMA), and other e-government services and 

initiatives.

In FY2011, the board lost three longtime members: Lynn 

McNulty, Alexander L. Popowycz, and Fred Schneider. In 

the same period, the Board is pleased to welcome two 

new members, Julie Boughn and Edward Roback. They all 

bring great depth to a field that has an exceptional rate of 

change.

The Board usually meets three times per year and meetings 

are open to the public. NIST provides the Board with its 

Secretariat. The Board has received numerous briefings 

from federal and private sector representatives on a wide 

range of privacy and security topics in the past year. Areas 

of interest that the Board followed in FY2011 were:

• Cloud Computing Security and Privacy;

• Cybersecurity Legislation;

• Health IT, Medical Devices in relation to cybersecurity 

and privacy;

• Access to Classified Information and Cybersecurity;

• Cybersecurity Workforce for Industry and Government 

with focus on SCADA (supervisory control and data 

acquisition) Systems and Security and Reverse 

Engineering;

• Usability and Security;

• Domain Name System Security (DNSSec);

• Legislature and Security;

• Direct Hiring and Cybersecurity education;

• International Standards and Cybersecurity;

• National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) 

Testing and Assurance; and

• Continued Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 

Report and Industrial Control Systems Security;
11

• Federal Initiatives such as:

◦ National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education 

(NICE);

◦ National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 

Cyberspace (NSTIC);

◦ Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) – Security 

Automation and Vulnerability Management;

◦ National Vulnerability Database (NVD);

◦ Federal Risk and Authorization Management 

Pilot program (FedRAMP);

◦ United States Computer Emergency Readiness 

Team (US-CERT);

◦ Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12;

◦ National Cybersecurity and Communications 

Integration Center (NCCIC) and Cyber Storm;

◦ Continuous Monitoring;

◦ FISMA; and

◦ NIST’s outreach, research, and strategies.

http://csrc.nist.gov/ispab/

Contact:

Ms. Annie Sokol

(301) 975-2006

annie.sokol@nist.gov

Small and Medium-Sized 

Business (SMB) Outreach

What do business invoices have in common with email? 

If both are done on the same computer, the business 

owner may want to think more about computer security 

information – payroll records, proprietary information, 

client or employee data – as essential to a business’s 

success. A computer failure or system breach could cost 

a business anything from its reputation to damages and 

recovery costs. The small business owner who recognizes 

the threat of computer crime and takes steps to deter 

inappropriate activities is less likely to become a victim.

The vulnerability of any one small business may not seem 

significant to many people, other than the owner and 

employees of that business. However, over 20 million U.S. 

businesses, comprising more than 95 percent of all U.S. 

businesses, are small and medium-size businesses (SMBs) 

of 500 employees or less (http://www.sba.gov/sites/

default/files/files/us10.pdf ). Therefore, a vulnerability 

common to a large percentage of SMBs could pose a threat 

to the nation’s information infrastructure and economic 

base. SMBs frequently cannot justify the employment 

of an extensive security program or a full-time expert. 

Nonetheless, they confront serious security challenges.

The difficulty for these businesses is to identify security 

mechanisms and training that are practical and costeffective. Such businesses also need to become more 

educated in terms of security so that limited resources are 

well applied to meet the most relevant and serious threats. 

To address this need, NIST, the Small Business Administration 

(SBA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are 

cosponsoring a series of training workshops on computer 

security for small businesses. The purpose of the meetings 

is to provide an overview of information security threats, 

vulnerabilities, and corresponding protective tools and 

techniques, with a special emphasis on providing useful 

information that small business personnel can apply 

directly.

In FY2011, six SMB outreach workshops were provided 

in five cities: Knoxville, Tennessee; Fort Lauderdale, 

Florida; Ruidoso, New Mexico; Orlando, Florida; and 

Gaithersburg, Maryland. In September, the last SMB 

outreach workshop was presented at the NICE (National 

Initiative for Cybersecurity Education) Annual Workshop in 

Gaithersburg, Maryland.

In collaboration with the SBA and the FBI, planning is under 

way to identify locations for small business information 

security workshops in FY2012.

http://sbc.nist.gov

Contact:

Mr. Richard Kissel

(301) 975-5017

richard.kissel@nist.gov

Health Information Technology Security

Health information technology (HIT) makes it possible 

for healthcare providers to better manage patient care 

through secure use and sharing of health information, 

leading to improvements in healthcare quality, reduced 

medical errors, increased efficiencies in care delivery and 

administration, and improved population health. Central to 

reaching these goals is the assurance of the confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability of health information. The CSD 

works actively with government, industry, academia, 

and others to provide security tools, technologies, and 

methodologies that provide for the security and privacy of 

health information.

In FY2011, NIST initiated development of a HIT security 

self-assessment toolkit which is intended to help 

organizations better understand the requirements of 

Security Management and Assurance Group
12 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 

(HIPAA) Security Rule, implement those requirements, 

and assess those implementations in their operational 

environment. This project also enables NIST to leverage 

security automation specifications within the context of 

the healthcare use case. NIST also began development 

of baseline security configurations for common 

operating systems used in electronic health record (EHR) 

implementations to enable greater automation of HIT and 

HIPAA Security Rule technical safeguards.

NIST also continued its HIT security outreach efforts in 

FY2011. NIST and the Department of Health and Human 

Services’ (DHHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) cohosted 

the fourth annual HIPAA Security Rule conference, 

“Safeguarding Health Information: Building Assurance 

through HIPAA Security,” in May 2011 at the Ronald Reagan 

Building and International Trade Center in Washington, 

D.C. Nearly 400 in-person and webcast attendees from 

federal, state, and local governments, academia, 

HIPAA-covered entities and business associates, industry 

groups, and vendors heard from and interacted with 

healthcare, security, and privacy experts on technologies 

and methodologies for safeguarding health information and 

for implementing the requirements of the HIPAA Security 

Rule. Presentations covered a variety of topics including 

updates on OCR’s health information privacy and security 

regulations and enforcement activities; applicability of 

the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace 

(NSTIC) to the healthcare sector; insider threat trends and 

safeguards; medical device security market trends and 

practical security strategies; mobile computing trends 

in healthcare; security automation applications; risk 

analysis in a multisite practice setting; and securing health 

information in the Cloud.

In FY2012, NIST plans to release a HIPAA Security selfassessment toolkit and baseline security configuration 

automation content. NIST also plans to issue a draft 

revision to Special Publication (SP) 800-66, An Introductory 

Resource Guide for Implementing the HIPAA Security Rule. 

As part of its continued outreach efforts, NIST also plans to 

host the fifth annual “Safeguarding Health Information” 

conference.

http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/security/index.cfm

Contacts:

Mr. Kevin Stine Mr. Matthew Scholl

(301) 975-4483 (301) 975-2941

kevin.stine@nist.gov matthew.scholl@nist.gov

National Initiative for 

Cybersecurity Education (NICE)

NIST was designated as the lead for the National Initiative 

for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) in a March 2010 

recommendation of the Information and Communications 

Infrastructure – Interagency Policy Committee (ICI-IPC). 

This recommendation was based on chapter two of the May 

2009 Cyberspace Policy Review titled “Building Capacity 

for a Digital Nation” and is responsive to President 

Obama’s declaration that the “cyber threat is one of the 

most serious economic and national security challenges we 

face as a nation” and that “America’s economic prosperity 

in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity.” 

The goal of NICE is to enhance the overall cybersecurity 

posture of the United States by accelerating the availability 

of educational and training resources designed to improve 

the cyber behavior, skills, and knowledge of every segment 

of the population, enabling a safer cyberspace for all. NICE 

will address this challenging goal by: 

• Raising awareness among the American public about 

the risks of online activities;

• Broadening the pool of skilled workers capable of 

supporting a cyber-secure nation; and

• Developing and maintaining an unrivaled, globally 

competitive cybersecurity workforce.

This initiative comprises four component areas: National 

Cybersecurity Awareness; Formal Cybersecurity Education; 

Cybersecurity Workforce Structure; and Cybersecurity 

Workforce Training and Professional Development. As the 

designated initiative lead, NIST promotes the coordination 

of existing and future activities in cybersecurity education, 

training, and awareness to enhance and multiply their 

effectiveness.

In FY2011, NIST issued the draft NICE Strategic Plan, 

“Building a Digital Nation.” This plan was developed 

from separate drafts that expressed the views of the four 

component areas into a comprehensive document that will 

be submitted for Cyber IPC approval.

NIST organized and hosted the second annual NICE 

Workshop, “Shaping the Future of Cybersecurity 

Education,” held on September 20-22, 2011. The workshop 

served as a forum for the community to openly discuss 

progress, solutions, challenges, and proposals relating 

to the goals of the NICE program. Over 500 attendees 

from academia, government, and industry joined in the 

workshop, either in person or virtually through webinars/

webcasts. The participation of universities, community 

colleges, high schools, and other training associations, 

including international groups from Canada, Japan, Brazil 
13

and Italy, exceeded expectations. As part of its outreach 

role, the NIST NICE Leadership Team (NNLT) members 

also attended more than 100 events, symposia, forums, 

competitions, educational outreach meetings, and 

workshops to promote the initiative.

In FY2012, NIST plans to finalize the NICE Strategic 

Plan, communications plan, and component-specific 

implementation plans and baseline studies. NIST will also 

continue to improve the NICE website and host the third 

annual NICE workshop.

http://www.nist.gov/nice/

Contacts:

Dr. Ernest McDuffie, Mr. Bill Newhouse

NICE Project Lead (301) 975-2869

(301) 975-8897 william.newhouse@nist.gov

ernest.mcduffie@nist.gov

Ms. Magdalena Benitez Ms. Pat Toth

(301) 975-6182 (301) 975-5140

mbenitez@nist.gov ptoth@nist.gov

Ms. Richard Kissel Ms. Celia Paulsen

(301) 975-5017 (301) 975-5981

richard.kissel@nist.gov celia.paulsen@nist.gov

Smart Grid Cyber Security

The major elements of the Smart Grid are the information 

technology, the industrial control systems, and the 

communications infrastructure used to send command 

information across the electric grid, from generation to 

distribution systems, and to exchange usage and billing 

information between utilities and their customers. Key to 

the successful deployment of the Smart Grid infrastructure 

is the development of the cybersecurity strategy for the 

Smart Grid. In fact, cybersecurity needs to be designed 

into the deploying systems that support Smart Grid, and 

added into existing systems. The electric grid is critical to 

the economic and physical well-being of the nation, and 

emerging cyber threats targeting power systems highlight 

the need to integrate advanced security to protect critical 

assets.

NIST established the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel 

(SGIP) Cyber Security Working Group (CSWG) in support 

of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 to 

address the cross-cutting issue of cybersecurity. The CSWG 

has more than 650 participants worldwide from the private 

sector (including utilities, vendors, and service providers), 

academia, regulatory organizations, state and local 

government, and U.S. federal agencies. Membership in the 

CSWG is free and is open to all. Many members participate 

from around the world by monitoring the minutes and 

email conversations of the subgroups.

The CSWG membership collaborated to deliver the NIST 

Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628, Guidelines for Smart 

Grid Cyber Security, in August 2010. Since then the group 

has focused on specific topics, such as risk management 

processes, key management in the Smart Grid, the 

Smart Grid security architecture, security testing and 

certification, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) 

security, and privacy in the Smart Grid. In addition, 

the group is conducting security reviews of many Smart 

Grid-related standards.

To complete the work, there are seven subgroups that 

focus on specific topics. During the development of 

NISTIR 7628, the subgroups performed detailed technical 

analysis on an array of security-related topics, and then 

documented the research, issues, and guidance in specific 

sections. The approach taken by all subgroups is an open 

and collaborative process in which any CSWG member is 

welcome to participate and contribute.

The CSWG creates and disbands subgroups as needed to 

meet present needs. Since the NISTIR 7628 v1.0 publication, 

some of the CSWG subgroups merged, while others are 

regrouping as they determine their next set of tasks. The 

CSWG currently consists of the following subgroups:

• The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) 

Security subgroup plans to create a set of AMI 

security requirements. 

• The Architecture subgroup focuses on the 

enhancement of the logical security architecture for 

the Smart Grid. This group’s work is used as input to 

the SGIP Architecture Committee.

• The Design Principles subgroup continues the 

work of identifying bottom-up problems and design 

considerations developed by the former Bottom-up, 

Vulnerability, and Cryptography and Key Management 

subgroups.

• The High-Level Requirements subgroup addresses 

the procedural and technical security requirements 

of the Smart Grid to be addressed by stakeholders 

in Smart Grid security. To create the initial set of 

security requirements in NISTIR 7628 v1.0, this 

subgroup adapted industry-accepted security source 

documents for the Smart Grid.

• The Privacy subgroup continues to investigate 

privacy concerns between utilities, consumers, and 

non-utility third parties. 

• The Standards subgroup assesses standards and 

other documents with respect to the cybersecurity 

and privacy requirements from NISTIR 7628. These 

Security Management and Assurance Group
14 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

assessments are performed on the standards 

contained in the SP 1108, Framework and Roadmap 

for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, or in 

support of the Priority Action Plans (PAPs). 

• The Testing and Certification subgroup establishes 

guidance and methodologies for cybersecurity testing 

of Smart Grid systems, subsystems, and components.

Future work includes working with the SGIP — the 

Committees, the Domain Expert Working Groups, and the 

Priority Action Plans — to integrate cybersecurity into 

their work efforts. Collaboration will continue with the 

Department of Energy and the North American Electric 

Reliability Corporation to produce a cybersecurity risk 

management process document for the electricity sector. 

Reviewing and updating NISTIR 7628, if needed, will occur 

in early 2012. Developing a virtual test environment for 

the National Electrical Manufacturers Association’s AMI 

upgradeability standard and creating an assessment guide 

for assessing the high-level cybersecurity requirements 

contained in NISTIR 7628 are also slated for the next year.

http://collaborate.nist.gov/twikisggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/

Contacts:

Ms. Marianne Swanson Ms. Tanya Brewer

(301) 975-3293 (301) 975-4534

marianne.swanson@nist.gov tbrewer@nist.gov

ICT Supply Chain Risk Management

Federal agency information systems and networks are 

increasingly at risk of both intentional and unintentional 

supply chain compromise due to the growing sophistication 

of information and communications technologies (ICT) and 

the growing speed and scale of a complex, distributed global 

supply chain. Federal agencies currently have neither a 

consistent nor comprehensive way of understanding the 

often opaque processes and practices used to create and 

deliver hardware and software products and services that 

are contracted out, especially beyond the prime contractor. 

This lack of understanding, visibility, and control increases 

the risk of exploitation through a variety of means 

including counterfeit materials, malicious software, or 

untrustworthy products, and makes it increasingly difficult 

for federal agencies to understand their exposure and 

manage the associated supply chain risks. 

Figure Above: Components and Contributing Disciplines of ICT SCRM

In 2011, NIST continued to develop NISTIR 7622, Notional 

Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal 

Information Systems. This document discusses the 

following topics:

• Determining which procurements should consider 

supply chain risk;

• Describing the key roles and responsibilities within 

the organization as they relate to supply chain risk 

management;

• Working with the procurement office, legal counsel, 

information system security personnel, and other 

appropriate agency stakeholders to help mitigate 

supply chain risk through the careful selection of 

security and supply chain contractual requirements; 

and

• Mitigating supply chain risk by augmenting the baseline 

of security controls defined for the information 

system through additional practices contained in the 

document.

NIST also issued a grant to the University of Maryland, 

Robert H. Smith School of Business, Supply Chain 

Management Center, to research and inventory existing 

supply chain risk management (SCRM) initiatives in 

industry and government and develop an integrative 

architecture that can understand the contribution and 

reach of each initiative in the context of an end-to-end 

SCRM process model. Current ICT SCRM practices are 

functionally fragmented and vertically stove-piped. This 

research is expected to assist NIST’s development of SCRM 

best practices by helping close existing knowledge and 

data gaps.
15

In 2012, NIST will continue to work with government, 

industry, academia, and others to identify and evaluate 

technologies, tools, techniques, best practices, and 

standards useful in securing the ICT supply chain. NIST 

will use that information to develop SCRM tools and a 

Special Publication on ICT SCRM Best Practices for federal 

information systems.

http://scrm.nist.gov/

Contact:

Mr. Jon Boyens

(301) 975-5549

jon.boyens@nist.gov

Cryptographic Validation Program

Cryptographic Validation Programs

and Laboratory Accreditation

The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) 

and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) 

were developed by NIST to support the needs of the 

user community for strong, independently tested, and 

commercially available cryptographic algorithms and 

modules. Through these programs, NIST works with private 

and governmental sectors and the cryptographic community 

to achieve security, interoperability, and assurance of 

correct implementation. The goal of these programs is to 

promote the use of validated algorithms, modules, and 

products and to provide federal agencies with a security 

metric to use in procuring cryptographic modules. The 

testing carried out by accredited laboratories and the 

validations performed by these two programs provide this 

metric. Federal agencies, industry, and the public can 

choose cryptographic modules and/or products containing 

cryptographic modules from the CMVP Validated Modules 

List and have confidence in the claimed level of security 

and assurance of correct implementation. 

Cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic module 

testing and validation are based on underlying published 

standards and guidance that are developed within the 

Computer Security Division (CSD) in collaboration with 

many other organizations. As federal agencies are required 

to use validated cryptographic modules for the protection 

of sensitive nonclassified information, the validated 

modules and the validated algorithms that the modules 

contain represent the culmination and delivery of the 

division’s cryptography-based work to the end user. 

The CAVP and the CMVP are separate, collaborative 

programs based on a partnership between NIST’s CSD 

and the Communication Security Establishment Canada 

(CSEC). The programs provide federal agencies — in the 

United States and Canada — confidence that a validated 

cryptographic algorithm has been implemented correctly 

and that a validated cryptographic module meets a 

claimed level of security assurance. The CAVP and the 

CMVP validate algorithms and modules used in a wide 

variety of products, including secure Internet browsers, 

secure radios, smart cards, space-based communications, 

munitions, security tokens, storage devices, and products 

supporting Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and electronic 

commerce. A module may be a stand-alone product, such 

General Flow of FIPS 140-2 Testing and Validation

NVLAP Accredited

FIPS 140-2

CST Lab

Cryptographic Module 

Vendor

1

NIST/CSEC

Issue validation

certificate

(via lab to the 

vendor)

CST Test Report to NIST/CSEC for validation;

Module Review Pending

Test for conformance

To FIPS 140-2;

Completes test report

Vendor selects a lab;

Submits module for testing;

Module IUT

Lab submits

questions for

guidance and

clarification

Module’s

Test Report

NIST/CSEC issue

testing and

Implementation

Guidance

FIPS 140-2

List of Validated

Modules

1a

3

2

5a

5 Finalization;

NIST adds module to

validated modules list at

www.nist.gov/cmvp

Reviewer Assigned

Module Under Review

4 Module

Coordination

Cost Recovery Fee

Received Prior to 

Validation

Security Management and Assurance Group
16 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

as a virtual private network (VPN), smart card or toolkit, 

or one module may be used in several products; as a 

result, a small number of modules may be incorporated 

within hundreds of products. Likewise, the CAVP validates 

cryptographic algorithms that may be integrated in one or 

more cryptographic modules.

The two validation programs (the CAVP and CMVP) 

provide documented methodologies for conformance 

testing through defined sets of security requirements. 

Security requirements for the CAVP are found in the 

individual validation system documents containing the 

validation test suites that are required to assure that 

the algorithm has been implemented correctly. The 

validation system documents are designed for each 

FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended cryptographic 

algorithm. Security requirements for the CMVP are found 

in FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic 

Modules, and the associated test metrics and methods in 

Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-2. Annexes to FIPS 

140-2 reference the underlying cryptographic algorithm 

standards or methods. Federal agencies are required to 

use modules that were validated as conforming to the 

provisions of FIPS 140-2. The CMVP developed Derived Test 

Requirements associated with FIPS 140-2 to define the 

security requirements and the test metrics and methods 

to ensure repeatability of tests and equivalency in results 

across the testing laboratories. 

The CMVP reviews the cryptographic modules validation 

requests and, as a byproduct of the review, is attentive to 

emerging and/or changing technologies and the evolution 

of operating environments and complex systems during 

the module validation review activities. Likewise, the 

CAVP reviews the cryptographic algorithm validation 

requests submitted by the accredited laboratories. With 

these insights, the CAVP and CMVP can perform research 

and development of new test metrics and methods as 

they evolve. Based on this research, the CAVP and CMVP 

publish implementation guidance to assist vendors, 

testing laboratories, and the user community in the latest 

programmatic and technical guidance. This guidance 

provides clarity, consistency of interpretation, and insight 

for successful conformance testing, validation, and 

revalidation. 

The unique position of the validation programs gives them 

the opportunity to acquire insight during the validation 

review activities and results in practical, timely, and upto-date guidance that is needed by the testing laboratories 

and vendors to move their modules and products out to the 

user community in a timely and cost-effective manner and 

with the assurance of third-party conformance testing. 

This knowledge and insight provide a foundation for future 

standards development. 

The CAVP and the CMVP have stimulated improved 

quality and security assurance of cryptographic modules. 

The latest set of statistics, which are collected quarterly 

from each of the testing laboratories, show that 8 percent 

of the cryptographic algorithms and 61 percent of the 

cryptographic modules brought in for voluntary testing had 

security flaws that were corrected during testing. Without 

this program, the federal government would have had less 

than a 50 percent chance of buying correctly implemented 

cryptography. To date, over 1,615 cryptographic module 

validation certificates have been issued, representing over 

3,500 modules that were validated by the CMVP. These 

modules have been developed by more than 335 domestic 

and international vendors.

Level 4

Level 3

Level 2

Level 1

FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 Validation

Certificates by Fiscal Year and Level (September 30, 2011)

Projected

Level 4

Level 3

Level 2

Level 1

FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 Validated

Modules by Year and Level (September 30, 2011)
17

The CAVP issued 1,669 algorithm validations and the 

CMVP issued 202 module validation certificates in FY2011. 

The number of algorithms and modules submitted for 

validation continues to grow, representing significant 

growth in the number of validated products expected to 

be available in the future.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM

Contacts:

CMVP Contact: CAVP Contact:

Mr. Randall J. Easter Ms. Sharon Keller

(301) 975-4641 (301) 975-2910

randall.easter@nist.gov sharon.keller@nist.gov

CAVP Validation Status By FYs TDES

SJ

SHA

RSA

RNG

KAS

HMAC

ECDSA

DSA

DRBG

DES

AES

CAVP Validated Implementation Actual Numbers

Updated As Thursday, October 06, 2011

AES

0

0

0

0

0

0

30

66

82

145

131

238

271

373

399

440

2175

DES

2

11

27

30

29

41

44

49

41

54

3

0

0

0

0

0

331

DSA

0

6

9

14

7

15

21

24

17

31

33

63

77

71

70

102

560

ECDSA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

14

19

35

41

33

39

68

249

HMAC

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

115

87

127

158

193

179

201

1060

RNG

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

28

108

91

137

137

142

150

148

941

RSA

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

22

80

63

130

129

143

155

183

905

SHA

0

7

6

12

12

28

59

63

77

122

120

171

191

224

239

255

1586

SJ

0

2

0

1

1

0

6

3

0

2

1

1

0

1

0

0

18

TDES

0

0

0

0

28

51

58

73

70

102

83

136

122

138

142

176

1179

Total

2

26

42

57

77

135

218

278

337

773

631

1038

1130

1344

1410

1669

9167

FiscalYear

FY1996

FY1997

FY1998

FY1999

FY2000

FY2001

FY2002

FY2003

FY2004

FY2005

FY2006

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

Total

KAS

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

6

17

26

DRBG

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

23

31

79

137

Security Management and Assurance Group
18 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Automated Security Testing and 

Test Suite Development

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and 

Special Publications (SPs) define the FIPS-recommended 

and NIST-approved cryptographic algorithms recognized 

by the federal government. The detailed specifications 

of the cryptographic algorithms and how they are to be 

implemented are contained within these documents. 

Automated security testing of these cryptographic 

algorithms provides a uniform way to assure that the 

cryptographic algorithm implementation adheres to 

the detailed specifications. Validation test suites are 

designed and developed by the CAVP. These tests exercise 

the mathematical formulas detailed in the algorithm to 

assure that the detailed specifications are implemented 

correctly and completely. If the implementer deviates 

from these instructions or excludes any part of the 

instructions, the validation test will fail, indicating that 

the algorithm implementation does not function properly 

or is incomplete.

There are several types of validation tests, all designed 

to satisfy the testing requirements of the cryptographic 

algorithms and their specifications. These include, but are 

not limited to, Known Answer Tests, Monte Carlo Tests, and 

Multi-Block Message Tests. The Known Answer Tests are 

designed to test the conformance of the implementation 

under test (IUT) to the various specifications in the 

reference. This involves testing the components of the 

algorithm to assure that they are implemented correctly. 

The Monte Carlo Test is designed to exercise the entire 

IUT. This test is designed to detect the presence of 

implementation flaws that are not detected with the 

controlled input of the Known Answer Tests. The types 

of implementation flaws detected by this validation test 

include pointer problems, insufficient allocation of space, 

improper error handling, and incorrect behavior of the 

IUT. The Multi-Block Message Test (MMT) is designed to test 

the ability of the implementation to process multi-block 

messages, which require the chaining of information from 

one block to the next. 

Automated security testing and test suite development are 

integral components of the CAVP. The CAVP encompasses 

validation testing for FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended 

cryptographic algorithms. Cryptographic algorithm 

validation is a prerequisite to the CMVP. The testing of 

cryptographic algorithm implementations is performed by 

independent third-party laboratories that are accredited 

as Cryptographic and Security Testing (CST) laboratories 

by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation 

Program (NVLAP). The CAVP develops and maintains a 

Cryptographic Algorithm Validation System (CAVS) tool that 

automates the cryptographic algorithm validation testing. 

The CAVS currently has algorithm validation testing for the 

following cryptographic algorithms:

Cryptographic 

Algorithm/Component

Special Publication or FIPS

Triple Data Encryption 

Standard (TDES)

SP 800-67, Recommendation for the 

Triple Data Encryption Algorithm 

(TDEA) Block Cipher, and SP 800-38A, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes 

of Operation – Methods and Techniques

Advanced Encryption 

Standard (AES)

FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption 

Standard, and SP 800-38A

Digital Signature 

Standard (DSS)

FIPS 186-2, Digital Signature 

Standard (DSS,) with change notice 

1, dated October 5, 2001

FIPS 186-3, Digital Signature 

Standard (DSS), dated June 2009

Elliptic Curve 

Digital Signature 

Algorithm (ECDSA)

FIPS 186-2, Digital Signature Standard 

(DSS,) with change notice 1, dated 

October 5, 2001 and ANSI X9.62 

FIPS 186-3, Digital Signature Standard 

(DSS), dated June 2009 and ANSI X9.62

RSA algorithm ANSI X9.31 and Public Key Cryptography 

Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA 

Cryptography Standard-2002

FIPS 186-3, Digital Signature Standard 

(DSS), dated June 2009 and ANSI 

X9.31 and Public Key Cryptography 

Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA 

Cryptography Standard-2002

Hashing algorithms 

SHA-1, SHA-224, 

SHA-256, SHA-384, 

and SHA-512

FIPS 180-3, Secure Hash Standard 

(SHS), dated October 2008

Random number 

generator (RNG) 

algorithms

FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1 and 

3.2; ANSI X9.62 Appendix A.4

Deterministic Random 

Bit Generators (DRBG)

SP 800-90, Recommendation for 

Random Number Generation Using 

Deterministic Random Bit Generators

Keyed-Hash Message 

Authentication 

Code (HMAC)

FIPS 198, The Keyed-Hash Message 

Authentication Code (HMAC)

Counter with Cipher 

Block ChainingMessage Authentication 

Code (CCM) mode

SP 800-38C, Recommendation for 

Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 

the CCM Mode for Authentication 

and Confidentiality
19

Cipher-based Message 

Authentication Code 

(CMAC) Mode for 

Authentication

SP 800-38B, Recommendation for 

Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 

The CMAC Mode for Authentication

Galois/Counter 

Mode (GCM) GMAC 

Mode of Operation

SP 800-38D, Recommendation for 

Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 

Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and 

GMAC, dated November 2007

XTS Mode of Operation SP800-38E, Recommendation for 

Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 

The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality 

on Block-Oriented Storage 

Devices, dated January 2010

Key Agreement 

Schemes and Key 

Confirmation

SP 800-56A, Recommendation 

for Pair-Wise Key Establishment 

Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm 

Cryptography, dated March 2007

All of SP 800-56A 

except KDF

SP 800-56A All sections except 

Section 5.8 Key Derivation Functions 

for Key Agreement Schemes

SP 800-56A Section 

5.7.1.2 ECC CDH 

function

SP 800-56A Section 5.7.1.2 Elliptic 

Curve Cryptography Cofactor DiffieHellman (ECC CDH) Primitive Testing

In FY2012, the CAVP expects to augment the CAVS tool to 

provide algorithm validation testing for:

• SP 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation 

Using Pseudorandom Functions, dated November 

2008;

• SP 800-135, Recommendation for Existing ApplicationSpecific Key Derivation Functions, dated December 

2010; and

• SP 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key 

Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization 

Cryptography, dated August 2009.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp

Contact:

Ms. Sharon Keller

(301) 975-2910

sharon.keller@nist.gov

ISO Standardization of Security 

Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

CSD has contributed to the activities of the 

International Organization for Standardization/International 

Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC), which issued 

ISO/IEC 19790, Security Requirements for Cryptographic 

Modules, on March 1, 2006, and ISO/IEC 24759, Test 

Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on July 1, 2008. 

These efforts bring consistent testing of cryptographic 

modules to the global community.

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 WG 3 has progressed on the revision 

of ISO/IEC 19790 and the revision of ISO/IEC 24759 for 

which Randall J. Easter of CSD is the editor. In June 2011, 

revision 19790 moved to Committee Draft (CD) status and 

circulated for national body comment. It is expected that 

the revision of 19790 will be published in FY2012. The first 

working draft of 24759 was completed in June 2011 and 

circulated for national body comment. 

Work is progressing on a new Technical Report document, 

ISO/IEC 30104 “Physical Security Attacks, Mitigation 

Techniques and Security Requirements,” for which Randall 

J. Easter of CSD is the editor. The second working draft 

of 30104 was completed in June 2011 and circulated for 

national body comment. 

National body comments for the above three documents 

will be addressed at the 43rd SC 27 WG 3 meeting to be 

held in Nairobi, Kenya, in October 2011.

A new work item was proposed at the 42rd SC 27 WG 3 

meeting, which was held in April 2011, to address Testing 

Methods for the Mitigation of Non-invasive Attack 

Classes Against Cryptographic Modules. It was proposed 

that this new document will be referenced by ISO/

IEC rev19790 to define the test metrics to support the 

testing of cryptographic modules that have implemented 

non-invasive mitigation techniques. It is expected to be 

approved as a new work item at the 43rd SC 27 WG 3 with 

Randall J. Easter of CSD appointed as editor.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/

Contact:

Mr. Randall J. Easter

(301) 975-4641

randall.easter@nist.gov

Security Management and Assurance Group
20 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Strategic Goal

Develop and improve mechanisms to protect the 

integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity of federal 

agency information by developing security mechanisms, 

standards, testing methods, and supporting infrastructure 

requirements and procedures.

Overview

The Cryptographic Technology Group’s work in 

cryptographic mechanisms addresses topics such as hash 

algorithms, symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic 

techniques, key management and authentication. The 

Group’s work in hardware roots of trust is designed to 

extend the value of these mechanisms to support reliable 

device authentication and establish new bases for system 

measurement. In cryptographic protocols, focus areas 

include Internet security services, security applications, 

identity management, and smart tokens. The Group 

continued to make an impact in the field of cryptography 

both within and outside the federal government by 

collaborating with national and international agencies, 

academic and research organizations, and standards 

bodies to develop interoperable security standards and 

guidelines. 

Federal agency collaborators include the National Security 

Agency (NSA), the National Telecommunications and 

Information Administration (NTIA), the General Services 

Administration (GSA), the Election Assistance Commission 

(EAC) and the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP). 

International agencies include the Communications 

Security Establishment of Canada, and Australia’s Defense 

Signals Agency and Centrelink. National and international 

standards bodies include the American Standards 

Committee (ASC) X9 (financial industry standards), the 

International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the 

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the 

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the Trusted 

Computing Group (TCG). Industry collaborators include 

Intel, Dell, Hewlett Packard, VeriSign, Certicom, Entrust 

Technologies, Microsoft, Orion Security, RSA Security, 

Voltage Security, Verifone, Juniper, and Cisco. Academic 

collaborators include Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 

George Mason University, Danmarks Tekniske Universitet, 

George Washington University, SDU Odense, UC Davis, 

Malaga University, and Yale University. Academic and 

research organizations include the International Association 

for Cryptologic Research (IACR), the European Network of 

Excellence in Cryptology (ECRYPT) II and the Japanese 

Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees 

(CRYPTREC).

Strong cryptography, developed in part by the Group, can 

be used to improve the security of information systems 

and the information they process. Users can then take 

advantage of the availability of secure applications in the 

marketplace that is made possible by the appropriate use 

of standardized high quality cryptography. This work also 

supports the NIST’s Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

project in response to the Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 12 (HSPD-12); for further details see Personal 

Identity Verification (PIV) section under the Systems and 

Emerging Technologies Security Research Group. 

Cryptographic Standards Toolkit

Hash Algorithms and the Secure Hash 

Standard (SHA)-3 Competition

The Cryptographic Technology Group is responsible for the 

maintenance and development of the Secure Hash Standard

specified in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 

180-3. A hash algorithm processes a message, which can 

be very large, and produces a condensed representation, 

called the message digest. A cryptographic hash algorithm 

is a fundamental component of many cryptographic 

functions, such as digital signature algorithms, key 

derivation functions, keyed-hash message authentication 

codes, or random number generators. Cryptographic hash 

algorithms are frequently used in Internet protocols or in 

other security applications.

In 2005, researchers developed an attack that threatens the 

security of the NIST-approved government hash algorithm 

standard, SHA-1. Since then, researchers at NIST and 

elsewhere have also discovered several generic limitations 

in the basic Merkle-Damgard construct that is used in SHA1 and most other existing hash algorithms. To address 

these vulnerabilities, NIST opened a public competition 

in November 2007 to develop a new cryptographic hash 

algorithm, which will be called “SHA-3” and will augment 

the hash algorithms currently specified in FIPS 180-3. 

Cryptographic Technology Group
21

CSD selected 51 first-round candidates from the 64 entries 

received by the submission deadline of October 31, 2008. 

Submitters of the first-round candidates were invited to 

present their algorithms at the First SHA-3 Candidate 

Conference in Leuven, Belgium, in February 2009. Based 

on the reviews from the international cryptographic 

community, CSD selected 14 second-round candidates 

on July 24, 2009, and allowed submitters of the secondround candidates to make minor adjustments to their 

algorithms by September 15, 2009. The second round of 

the competition started in October 2009. 

CSD held the Second SHA-3 Candidate Conference at 

the University of California, Santa Barbara, in August 

2010 to discuss the security and performance analyses 

of the second-round candidates. CSD received significant 

feedback from the cryptographic community both before 

and after the conference. Some of the research was funded 

by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Based on 

the public feedback and internal review, CSD selected five 

SHA-3 finalists on December 9, 2010, ending the second 

round of the competition. A status report of the second 

round was published on February 16, 2011. 

Submitters of the SHA-3 finalists were allowed to make 

minor adjustments to their algorithms by January 16, 2011, 

and the third (and final) round of the competition began 

on January 31, 2011. A one-year public review period was 

allocated for the finalists. CSD plans to host the Third 

SHA-3 Candidate Conference on March 22-23, 2012, in 

Washington, D.C., where the results of community review 

and analysis of the finalists will be presented. Based on 

this public feedback and internal review, CSD intends to 

select the SHA-3 winner in summer 2012 and complete the 

competition. The then-current Secure Hash Standard will 

be revised to incorporate the winning SHA-3 algorithm.

http://www.nist.gov/hash-competition

Contact:

Ms. Shu-jen Chang

(301) 975-2940

shu-jen.chang@nist.gov

Block Cipher Modes of Operation

The engine for many of the techniques in NIST’s 

cryptographic toolkit is a block cipher algorithm, such 

as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm 

or the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA). A block 

cipher transforms data of a fixed length, called the block 

size, into seemingly random data of the same length. 

There are different methods that feature block ciphers 

to achieve an information service such as confidentiality 

or authentication. Such a method is called a block cipher 

mode of operation, or, simply, a mode. 

In 2010-2011, a previously approved mode was 

augmented, and three publications for new modes were 

in development.

In October 2010, an addendum to SP 800-38A, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 

Methods and Techniques, was published. The addendum 

contained three variants of the Cipher Block Chaining 

(CBC) mode that employ the “ciphertext stealing” padding 

method. Plain CBC mode requires input messages whose 

length is a multiple of the block size; the variants extend 

this domain to messages of any length that is not strictly 

smaller than the block size. With conventional padding 

methods, the length of the ciphertext expands by the 

number of padding bits; the ciphertext stealing variants 

are designed to avoid such expansion.

One set of modes in development was in the area of 

“key wrapping,” i.e., the protection of the confidentiality 

and integrity of cryptographic keys. In August 2011, NIST 

initiated a period of public comment on Draft SP 800-38F, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 

Methods for Key Wrapping. In addition to describing 

existing approved methods, this draft publication specified 

three deterministic authenticated encryption modes: the 

AES Key Wrap (KW) mode, the AES Key Wrap With Padding 

(KWP) mode, and one TDEA mode, called TKW. Final 

publication is expected in the coming year. 

A second set of modes in development is in the area of 

“format preserving encryption” (FPE). A format might be 

a credit card number or a social security number. FPE 

is expected to be very useful for retrofitting encryption 

to applications in a way that targets the sensitive data 

while minimizing the disruption to the data pathways 

in the application. Without FPE, the costs of providing 

confidentiality to sensitive data within an installed base 

can be prohibitive.

In the past couple of years, specifications for three FPE 

modes were submitted to NIST. After receiving acceptable 

Letters of Assurance from the submitters with respect to 

the licensing of potentially relevant patents, NIST initiated 

a period of public comment in June 2011 on a proposal 

to approve two schemes of the FFX (Format-preserving, 

Feistel-based) mode. Public comments supported the 

proposal, including many comments from the payments 

industry. A draft Special Publication for FPE methods is 

expected to be ready for public comment early next year.

A third mode in development is the EAX’ mode for 

authenticated encryption with associated data. EAX’ 

is specified in ANSI C12.22-2008, American National 

Cryptographic Technology Group
22 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Standard Protocol Specification for Interfacing to Data 

Communication Networks. That standard was developed 

by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 

C12 SC17 Committee, for which the National Electrical 

Manufacturers Association (NEMA) is the secretariat. 

EAX’ was developed for Smart Grid. In particular, EAX’ was 

intended to satisfy the requirements of supervisory control 

and data acquisition (SCADA) messaging associated with 

Automated Meter Reading that operate in the context of 

an Advanced Metering Infrastructure. These requirements 

may be applicable to other small embedded devices 

communicating in SCADA environments. More information 

on the Smart Grid Cyber Security project is available on 

page 13. 

In June 2011, NIST initiated a period of public comment 

on a proposal to approve EAX’ and almost every comment 

supported the proposal. A draft SP for EAX’ is expected to 

be ready for public comment next year. 

Contact:

Dr. Morris Dworkin

(301) 975-2354

morris.dworkin@nist.gov

Key Management

NIST continues to address cryptographic key management 

for the federal government, and to coordinate this guidance 

with other national and international organizations, 

industry and academia. This guidance has been published 

as Special Publications (SPs), which are available at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.

To assist agencies and to recognize the speed at which 

the use of cryptography is changing, NIST published SP 

800-131A, Recommendation for the Transitioning of 

Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes. This publication 

provides additional details about the transition plan 

that was originally discussed in the key management 

guidance provided in SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key 

Management, Part 1, discussing the circumstances under 

which a particular algorithm and key length can be used or 

should be discontinued. The CSD has presented this plan 

at various forums and conferences. To help the vendors 

and testers of the cryptographic modules containing 

these algorithms deal with the upcoming transitions, CSD 

prepared a validation transition document that covers, 

from the vendor’s and the testing laboratory’s point of 

view, the affected algorithms.

SP 800-56A specifies approved methods for key 

establishment, using Diffie-Hellman and Menezes-QuVanstone (MQV) schemes. This document, which was first 

published in 2006, is being revised to provide further 

clarification and an additional method for key derivation. 

This new method is specified in SP 800-56C, which was 

provided for public comment in FY2011, and will be 

completed in early FY2012. Another related publication, SP 

800-135, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific 

Key Derivation Functions, was completed in December 

2010; this document approves existing application-specific 

key derivation functions used in protocols. 

SP 800-57, Part 1, which provides general key management 

guidance, was first published in 2005, and later revised 

in 2007. This document is being updated to include 

information on and references to recent work performed 

by CSD; the document was posted for public comment 

in May 2011. SP 800-57, Part 3, which was published in 

2009 and provides application-specific key management 

guidance, is being revised to reflect recent work on the 

applications and protocols discussed in the document and 

to include additional sections on the SSH protocol and the 

use of Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs).

SP 800-130, A Framework for Designing Cryptographic 

Key Management Systems, is being developed to 

provide guidance on the framework of a Cryptographic 

Key Management System (CKMS). The first draft of this 

document was posted for public comment in 2010 and was 

discussed in a subsequent workshop at NIST in late FY2010. 

During FY2011, the document was revised to address those 

comments, and work on a basic profile of the framework for 

the federal government was begun. The profile is intended 

to provide refinements of the framework requirements 

that are appropriate for use in a CKMS used by the federal 

government. See CSD’s FY2010 report (http://csrc.nist.

gov/publications/nistir/ir7751/nistir-7751_2010-csdannual-report.pdf) and http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/

key_mgmt/ for background information on this project.

SP 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key 

Derivation Part 1: Storage Applications, specifies approved 

techniques for the derivation of keys from passwords in 

order to protect electronic data in storage environments 

(e.g., laptop computers). The document was completed in 

December 2010. 

SP 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key 

Generation, which discusses the generation of the keys 

to be managed and used by NIST’s approved cryptographic 

algorithms, was issued for public comment in August 2011. 

It addresses the generation of a key using the output of a 

random bit generator, the derivation of a key from another 

key, the derivation of a key from a password, and keys 

generated during the use of a key-agreement scheme. 
23

Many of these methods are specified in detail in other 

documents; SP 800-133 is intended for use as an overall 

“umbrella” document for key generation.

Below are the proposed plans for FY2012 for this project:

• SP 800-56A revision: Continue to revise and provide 

for public comment;

• SP 800-56B: Begin modifications similar to those for 

SP 800-56A;

• SP 800-56C: Post as a finished document;

• SP 800-57, Part 1 revision: Post as a finished document;

• SP 800-57, Part 3: Provide for public comment and 

post as a finished document;

• SP 800-130 and the federal profile: Provide for 

public comment and host a workshop to discuss the 

documents;

• SP 800-131A: Some of the remaining validation details 

associated with the transitions will be published in 

FY2012; and,

• SP 800-133: Address public comments and post as a 

completed document.

SPs: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html

Key mgmt.: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/key_mgmt/

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Mr. Quynh Dang

(301) 975-2911 (301) 975-3610

ebarker@nist.gov qdang@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan

(301) 975-6974 (301) 975-4391

llchen@nist.gov meltem.turan@nist.gov

Dr. Allen Roginsky

(301) 975-3603

roginsky@nist.gov

Security Guidelines 

Using Approved Hash Algorithms

Draft Federal Information Processing 

Standard (FIPS) 180-4, 

Secure Hash Standard (SHS)

FIPS 180-3, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), specifies secure 

hash algorithms (SHAs) called SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, 

SHA-384 and SHA-512. These algorithms produce 160, 224, 

256, 384, and 512-bit outputs, respectively, which are 

called message digests. Draft FIPS 180-4 provides a general 

procedure for creating an initialization hash value, adds 

two additional secure hash algorithms, SHA-512/224 and 

SHA-512/256, to the standard, and removes a restriction 

that padding must be done before hash computation begins, 

which was required in FIPS 180-3. SHA-512/224 and SHA512/256 may be more efficient alternatives to SHA-224 

and SHA-256 on platforms that are optimized for 64-bit 

operations. Removing the restriction on padding operation 

in the secure hash algorithms will potentially allow more 

flexibility and efficiency in implementing the secure hash 

algorithms in many computer network applications.

On February 11, 2011, NIST published a notice in the 

Federal Register (76 FR 7817) announcing the availability 

of draft FIPS 180–4 and soliciting comments on the 

draft standard. Comments were received and are being 

addressed. FIPS 180-4 is expected to be approved in the 

near future. 

NIST will submit the FIPS to the Secretary of Commerce 

for approval in the first half of FY2012.

NIST Draft (revised) SP 800-107, 

Recommendation for Applications 

Using Approved Hash Algorithms

SP 800-107 provides security guidelines for achieving the 

desired security strengths for cryptographic applications 

that employ the approved cryptographic hash functions 

specified in FIPS 180. The current version of this document 

was published in February 2009. 

Draft FIPS 180-4 added two new hash algorithms: SHA512/224 and SHA-512/256. SP 800-107 was revised 

to address the security properties of these new hash 

algorithms. Additional security information about hash 

message authentication code (HMAC) was added to 

provide stronger security guidance, and the hash-based 

key derivation function section was rewritten to provide 

updated information about approved hash-based key 

derivation functions specified in many other NIST SPs. The 

revised draft SP 800-107 was published in September 2011.

NIST will resolve comments and publish an updated 

version of the document in FY2012.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Mr. Quynh Dang

(301) 975-2911 (301) 975-3610

ebarker@nist.gov qdang@nist.gov

Random Number Generator (RNG)

Random numbers are needed to provide the required 

security for most cryptographic algorithms. For example, 

random numbers are used to generate the keys needed for 

encryption and digital signature applications. 

Cryptographic Technology Group
24 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

In the late 1990s, a project to develop more rigorous 

requirements and specifications for random number 

generation was begun in coordination with the American 

National Standards Institute’s (ANSI) Accredited Standards 

Committee (ASC) X9. The resulting standard (X9.82) is 

being developed in four parts: Part 1 provides general 

information; Part 2 will provide requirements for entropy 

sources; Part 3 provides specifications for deterministic 

random bit generator (DRBG) mechanisms; and Part 4 

will provide guidance on designing random bit generators 

(RBGs) from entropy sources and DRBG mechanisms. Parts 

1 and 3 have been completed; Parts 2 and 4 are nearing 

completion.

In March 2007, NIST published SP 800-90, Recommendation 

for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic 

Random Bit Generators, which contained the DRBG 

mechanisms in Part 3 of X9.82, plus one additional DRBG 

mechanism.

During the development of Part 4 of X9.82, several 

changes for SP 800-90 were identified. In May 2011, a 

revision of SP 800-90 was provided for public comment 

as SP 800-90A that included these changes. Both SP 800-

90 and SP 800-90A are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/

publications/PubsSPs.html. The document number for SP 

800-90 was modified so that two additional documents 

(i.e., SP 800-90B and SP 800-90C) could be included in a 

series on random number generation.

SP 800-90B will address entropy sources, pointing to Part 

2 of X9.82 for design requirements, but also including 

descriptions of the validation tests that will be used by 

NIST’s Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program to 

validate entropy sources. 

SP 800-90C will provide basic guidance on the construction 

of RBGs from entropy sources and DRBG mechanisms, 

pointing to Part 4 of X9.82 for additional constructions and 

examples.

NIST’s standards activities in 2012 will include continued 

participation in ANSI X9 and progression of the different 

parts of SP 800-90. In ANSI, the goal will be completion 

of X9.82, Parts 2 and 4 in preparation for ANSI balloting. 

NIST expects to publish SP 800-90A after incorporating the 

public comments. NIST also plans to publish drafts of SP 

800-90B and SP 800-90C for public comment in 2012.

SP 800-90 and SP 800-90A: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker John Kelsey

(301) 975-2911 (301) 975-5101

ebarker@nist.gov john.kelsey@nist.gov

Quantum Computing

Quantum computing, which uses quantum mechanical 

phenomena to perform operations on data, has the 

potential to become a major disruptive technology 

affecting cryptography and cryptanalysis given the 

potential increase in computing speed and power over 

conventional transistor-based computing. While a scalable 

quantum computing architecture has not been built, the 

physics and mathematics governing what can be done 

by a quantum computer are fairly well understood, 

and several algorithms have already been written for a 

quantum computing platform. Two of these algorithms are 

specifically applicable to cryptanalysis. Grover’s quantum 

algorithm for database search potentially gives a quadratic 

speedup to brute-force cryptanalysis of block ciphers and 

hash functions. Grover’s algorithm may, therefore, have a 

long-term effect on the necessary key lengths and digest 

sizes required for the secure operation of cryptographic 

protocols. 

An even larger threat is presented by Shor’s quantum 

algorithms for discrete logarithms and factorization. Given 

a quantum computer large enough to perform simple 

cryptographic operations, Shor’s algorithm provides a 

practical computational mechanism for solving the two 

ostensibly hard problems that underlie all widely used 

public key cryptographic primitives. In particular, all the 

digital signature algorithms and public key-based key 

establishment schemes that are currently approved by 

NIST would be rendered insecure by the presence of even 

a fairly primitive quantum computer. 

While practical quantum computers are not expected 

to be built in the next decade or so, it seems inevitable 

that they will eventually be built. NIST is responding to 

this eventuality by researching cryptographic algorithms 

for public key-based key agreement and digital signatures 

that are not susceptible to cryptanalysis by quantum 

algorithms. In the event that such algorithms cannot 

be found, NIST intends to draft standards for computer 

security architectures that do not rely on public key 

cryptographic primitives. In addition, NIST will examine 

new approaches, such as quantum key distribution.

On October 27-29, 2010, NIST, along with the University of 

Maryland’s Joint Quantum Institute, held a workshop: “From 

Quantum Information and Complexity to Post Quantum 

Information Security.” The NIST Computer Security 

Division (CSD) invited speakers on a number of apparently 

quantum-resistant technologies, including lattice-based, 

coding-based, and multivariate cryptography. In August 

2011, the results of CSD-funded research on the codingbased McEliece cryptosystem were presented at the 

31st International Cryptology Conference (Crypto 2011). 
25

This research studied the asymptotic performance/security 

trade-off of McEliece and improved upon the best known 

attack using a technique called “ball collision decoding.” 

Towards the end of FY2011, NIST also expanded its 

research program to examine the potential of multivariate 

cryptosystems and to study quantum algorithms. During this 

period, NIST researcher Daniel Smith-Tone published the 

paper, “On the Differential Security of Multivariate Public 

Key Cryptosystems,” to be presented at PQCrypto2011, 

which takes place in Taipei from November 29, 2011 to

December 2, 2011.

NIST will continue to study security technologies that 

may be resistant to attack by quantum computers, 

especially those that have generated some degree of 

commercial impact. If any of these technologies emerge 

as both commercially viable and widely trusted within the 

cryptographic community, NIST hopes to move towards 

standardization.

Contact:

Mr. Ray Perlner

(301) 975-3357

ray.perlner@nist.gov

Authentication

To support the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for 

Federal Agencies, NIST developed SP 800-63, Electronic 

Authentication Guideline. The OMB policy memorandum 

defines four levels of authentication in terms of assurance 

about the validity of an asserted identity. SP 800-63 gives 

technical requirements and examples of authentication 

technologies that work by making individuals demonstrate 

possession and control of a secret for each of the four 

levels. 

NIST is in the process of updating and revising SP 800-

63 and has issued three drafts. Extensive comments have 

been received that reflect the extent to which SP 800-

63 has been adopted by both the U.S. government and 

nonfederal users, including foreign governments and 

international standards bodies. The comments indicate a 

number of applications that were not anticipated in the 

original version or in the draft. The most difficult issues 

involve proposed new methods for reaching the highest 

authentication level, with current technologies. Comments 

on drafts, along with discussions in workshops and 

meetings, raised concerns with the password entropy and 

identity-proofing requirements as well as the relationship 

between SP 800-63 and other NIST identity-related 

activities such as FIPS 201-1, Personal Identity Verification 

(PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, in support of 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) and 

the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace 

(NSTIC). These concerns are being addressed in the final 

publication, expected no later than the first quarter of 

FY2012. 

Through NIST’s identity-related projects and hosting 

the IDTrust Symposium, several areas have emerged as 

key gaps in progressing secure authentication online: 

revocation in complex federated environments and 

biometric authentication in unattended scenarios. In 

federated environments, credential revocation has 

traditionally been managed by the credential issuer. In 

an effort to improve credential revocation mechanisms 

across federations and effectively mitigate credential 

misuse, NIST researchers are exploring the broader scope 

of credential revocation, where all parties contribute 

to and participate in credential revocation. In this 

model, service providers give feedback on a credential 

reliability score based on detected credential misuse. The 

credential holder and Identity Provider, on the other hand, 

receive feedback notification and are able to immediately 

suspend or revoke the credential should the score reach an 

unacceptable level. Lastly, other federated services can 

consult score and status to determine the suitability of a 

presented credential with an associated reliability score.

To address the use of biometrics in authentication 

for transactions online, NIST is considering high-level 

requirements for the use of biometrics in a multi-factor 

authentication framework, such as liveness detection 

(anti-spoofing methods), biometric template protection 

(for revoking and renewing biometric credentials), 

and web services standards for securely and uniformly 

handling biometric data online. Second, NIST is leading the 

development of an international web services standard, 

as well as the first standard on liveness detection. This 

latter will set the foundation for a common understanding 

of techniques, performance evaluation, and common data 

formats.

Contacts:

Dr. Elaine Newton Mr. Ray Perlner

(301) 975-2532 (301) 975-3357

elaine.newton@nist.gov ray.perlner@nist.gov

Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo

(301) 975-6972

hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Cryptographic Technology Group
26 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Security Aspects of Electronic Voting

In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act 

(HAVA) to encourage the upgrade of voting equipment 

across the United States. HAVA established the Election 

Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Technical Guidelines 

Development Committee (TGDC), chaired by the Director 

of NIST. HAVA calls on NIST to provide technical support 

to the EAC and TGDC in efforts related to human factors, 

security, and laboratory accreditation. As part of NIST’s 

efforts, CSD supports the activities of the EAC and the 

TGDC related to voting equipment security.

In the past year, we supported the efforts of the EAC 

and Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) of DoD 

to improve the voting process for citizens under the 

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Act (UOCAVA) by 

leveraging electronic technologies. This work included the 

development of the following documents: NISTIR 7682,

IT Security Best Practices for UOCAVA Supporting Voting 

Systems; NISTIR 7711, Security Best Practices for the 

Electronic Distribution of Election Materials; and NISTIR 

7770, Security Considerations for Remote Electronic 

UOCAVA Voting. We worked with the TDCG’s UOCAVA 

Working Group to develop aspirational high-level goals for 

UOCAVA voting systems, and identified possible pilot voting 

systems for the 2012 and 2014 elections. In addition, we 

supported the EAC in updating the Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines (VVSG), VVSG 1.1, by assisting the EAC with 

resolutions to comments and developing a new draft of 

the guidelines for public comment. Our work on voting 

technologies has also spun off interesting research topics, 

including the Rabin Beacon project that is discussed 

separately in this annual report.

In FY2012, we expect to finalize the VVSG 1.1 and its 

associated security test suites. We will continue to 

support the efforts for the EAC and FVAP to improve the 

voting process for UOCAVA voters. We will continue to 

conduct research on threats to voting systems, innovative 

voting system architectures, and the Rabin Beacon 

project. In addition, we will support the NIST National 

Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) 

efforts to accredit voting system test laboratories by 

developing proficiency tests and testing artifacts. We plan 

to engage voting system manufacturers, voting system test 

laboratories, state election officials, and the academic 

community in exploring ways to increase voting system 

security and transparency. 

http://vote.nist.gov/

Contacts:

Dr. Nelson Hastings Mr. Andrew Regenscheid

(301) 975-5237 (301) 975-5155

nelson.hastings@nist.gov andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

Development of Federal Information 

Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3, Security

Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

The FIPS 140 standard is applicable to all federal agencies 

that use cryptography-based security systems to protect 

sensitive information in computer and telecommunication 

systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 

of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 

1996, Public Law 104-106 and the Federal Information 

Security Management Act of 2002, Public Law 107-347. 

The standard must be used in designing and implementing 

cryptographic modules that federal departments and 

agencies operate or are operated for them under contract.

Draft FIPS 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic 

Modules, provides four increasing qualitative levels 

of security that are intended to cover a wide range of 

potential applications and environments. The security 

requirements cover areas related to the secure design 

and implementation of a cryptographic module. These 

areas include cryptographic module specification; 

cryptographic module physical ports and logical 

interfaces; roles, authentication, and services; software 

security; operational environment; physical security; 

physical security – non-invasive attacks; sensitive security 

parameter management; self-tests; life-cycle assurance; 

and mitigation of other attacks. The standard provides 

users with a specification of security features that are 

required at each of four security levels, flexibility in 

choosing security requirements, a guide to ensuring that 

the cryptographic modules incorporate necessary security 

features, and the assurance that the modules are compliant 

with cryptography-based standards.

The FIPS 140-3 draft is a result of the reexamination and 

reaffirmation of the current standard, FIPS 140-2. The 

draft standard adds new security requirements imposed 

on cryptographic modules to reflect the latest advances in 

technology and security, and to mirror other new or updated 

standards published by NIST in the area of cryptography 

and key management. Additionally, software and firmware 

requirements are addressed in a new area dedicated to 

software and firmware security, while another new area 

specifying requirements to protect against non-invasive 

attacks is also provided.

The development of FIPS 140-3 started in 2005 and 

relies on the preliminary inputs provided by users, testing 

laboratories, and vendors during the September 2004 

NIST-CSE Cryptographic Module Validation Symposium and 

the September 2005 NIST-CSE Physical Security Workshop. 

CSE is the Canadian government’s Communications Security 

Establishment. In 2007, the first draft of the standard 
27

was released for public comment, and NIST received 

over 1,200 comments, which were thoroughly reviewed 

and discussed, and the working group’s resolutions were 

implemented in the second draft of the standard. In 

December 2009, the second draft of the standard was 

released for public comment, and NIST received over 900 

comments, which were analyzed, discussed and addressed 

by the NIST Technical Working Group (TWG) in the latest 

draft (the third) of the standard.

During FY2011, the Federal Register Notice announcing 

the changes made in the third draft of the FIPS 140-3 

standard in response to the public comments received 

on the second draft was prepared and submitted for 

approval. The TWG finalized implementing the resolutions 

to the public comments received on the second draft and 

prepared the standard for a NIST and CSE Canada final 

technical internal review. All comments received from the 

internal reviewers were addressed, and the document was 

then prepared for the management’s review. A Federal 

Register Notice that announces the changes made in 

the third draft is being prepared. The changes include: 

description of the assumed thread models for each 

security level; insertion of missing definitions for terms 

and acronyms; Trusted Channel requirements; removal of 

the Trusted Role; allowing identity-based authentication 

mechanism at Security level (SL) 2; insertion of the selfinitiated cryptographic output capability and of the 

remote control capability; additional integrity techniques 

requirements for software components of a cryptographic; 

and restructuring of the annexes while enhancing the 

requirements for the allowed operator authentication 

mechanisms, the list of the non-invasive attacks methods 

for the security functions, and the requirements for the 

allowed modifiable operating environments.

The Federal Register Notice that announces the changes 

made in the third draft of the FIPS 140-3 standard will be 

finalized and submitted for approval. Following the public 

comments period, the TWG will address all comments 

received and prepare the document for publication.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/FIPS140_3/

Contact:

Dr. Michaela Iorga

(301) 975-8431

michaela.iorga@nist.gov

NIST Beacon – A Prototype Implementation

of a Randomness Beacon 

NIST is implementing a trusted public source of 

randomness, conformant to SP 800-90, Recommendation 

for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic 

Random Bit Generators. The source is designed to 

provide unpredictability, autonomy, and consistency. 

Unpredictability means that users cannot algorithmically 

predict bits before they are made available by the source. 

Autonomy means that the source is resistant to attempts 

by outside parties to alter the distribution of the random 

bits. Consistency means that a set of users can access the 

source in such a way that they are confident that they all 

receive the same random string.

The theoretical community has developed many creative 

cryptographic security protocols over the years for access, 

authentication, privacy, and authorization in networking 

and e-commerce applications. However, except for the 

simplest and most basic protocols, few have been widely 

deployed. A major reason concerns efficiency. Many of 

the more sophisticated security protocols, such as Zero 

Knowledge proof systems, are highly interactive and 

require too many communication rounds to be feasible 

in most situations. Other privacy-preserving protocols 

eliminate the need for many rounds of communication but 

assume the availability of a trusted source of randomness, 

an assumption that is not generally valid at present.

In response, NIST is developing a Secure Randomness 

Beacon that is broadcasting full-entropy bit-strings. We 

plan to post them in blocks of 512 bits every ∆T seconds, 

where ∆T is an adjustable parameter that can vary from one 

second to minutes. Each such value is sequence-numbered, 

time-stamped and signed, and includes the hash of the 

previous value to chain the sequence of values together 

and prevent even the source to retroactively change an 

output package without being detected. The beacon will 

keep all output packets and make them available online.

Cryptographic Technology Group
28 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

The beacon’s engine uses multiple input sources of 

entropy, and the NIST team leveraged recent work done 

on tests to validate an entropy source.

During the next year, NIST will continue working on 

implementing and enhancing the NIST Secure Randomness 

Beacon and provide a publicly available proof-of-concept 

that users can trust. NIST’s Physics Laboratory will assist us 

in enhancing the input sources on entropy to the beacon’s 

engine by adding at least one quantum source.

Contact:

Dr. Michaela Iorga

(301) 975-8431

michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Cryptography for Emerging Technologies

and Applications (CETA) Workshop

The CETA Workshop will provide an opportunity for 

industry, research and academia communities, and 

government sectors to identify cryptographic challenges 

encountered in their development of emerging 

technologies and applications, and to learn about NIST’s 

current cryptographic research, activities, programs, and 

standards development. Technology areas to be addressed 

include sensor and building networks, mobile devices, 

smart objects/Internet of things, and cyber physical 

systems. 

NIST considered the following trends when organizing 

the CETA Workshop: the increasing demand for small 

footprint cryptography for power-constrained devices; the 

emerging desire, from both providers and consumers, for 

trustworthy processes supporting secure communications 

and transactions that maximize integrity and nonrepudiation properties on single end-user devices that 

access many kinds of services and applications, and the 

need for individual users that access the same services 

and applications from multiple platforms; the need for 

much more agile key management on cyberspace; and the 

need for usable and reliable public, enterprise-specific, 

pseudonymous, and anonymous modes of operation from 

the same end-user device. 

In preparation for the workshop, NIST called for the 

submission of abstracts. The abstracts must highlight 

cryptographic challenges identified during the research and 

development of emerging technologies and applications. 

Examples of emerging or evolving technology areas 

include:

• Sensor and building networks;

• Mobile devices;

• Smart Objects/Internet of Things; and

• Cyber physical systems.

Examples of cryptographic requirements for emerging 

sectors might include: performance or resource issues; 

cryptographic services (such as anonymous or group 

signatures); or key management challenges.

The workshop on Cryptography for Emerging Technologies 

and Applications (CETA) will be hosted on November 7-8, 

2011 in Gaithersburg, Maryland. Prior to the workshop, all 

submitted abstracts will be posted on NIST’s website, and 

the authors of selected abstracts will be invited to present 

their work during the workshop.

http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/ceta-workshop.cfm

Contact:

Dr. Michaela Iorga

(301) 975-8431

michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Pairing-Based Cryptography

Recently, what are known as pairings on elliptic curves 

have been a very active area of research in cryptography. 

A pairing is a function which maps a pair of points on an 

elliptic curve into a finite field. Their unique properties 

have enabled many new cryptographic protocols that had 

not previously been feasible.

In particular, identity-based encryption (IBE) is a 

pairing-based scheme which has received much attention. 

IBE is the concept of using some form of personal 

identification to generate a public key. This could be 

an email address, for instance. An IBE scheme allows a 

sender to encrypt a message without needing a receiver’s 

public key to have been certified and distributed for 

subsequent use. Such a scenario is quite useful if the 

pre-distribution of public keys is impractical. Besides 

IBE, there are a number of other applications of pairingbased cryptography. These include many other identitybased cryptosystems (including signature schemes), key 

establishment schemes, functional and attribute-based 

encryption, and privacy-enhancing techniques, such as the 

use of anonymous credentials.

In 2008, NIST held a workshop on pairing-based 

cryptography. While the workshop showed that there was 

interest in pairing-based schemes, a common understanding 

was that further study was needed before NIST approved 

any such schemes. Throughout 2011, members of the 

Cryptographic Technology Group conducted an extensive 

study on pairing-based cryptographic schemes. This 

included topics such as: the construction of pairing-friendly 

elliptic curves; a survey of pairing-based cryptographic 
29

schemes; the implementation efficiency with respect to 

the required security; standard activities involving pairingbased schemes; use cases; and practical implications. This 

work is being summarized in a technical report, which will 

be presented in early 2012. 

Contacts: 

Dr. Dustin Moody Dr. Lily Chen

(301) 975-8136 (301) 975-6974

dustin.moody@nist.gov lily.chen@nist.gov

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Test Cards

Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201, 

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees 

and Contractors, was published in February 2005 to 

satisfy policy directives specified in Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12). The majority of 

federal workers now have Personal Identity Verification 

(PIV) cards; however, the PIV card has not yet been 

embraced as a mechanism for logical access to IT resources. 

Unavailability of PIV test cards has been identified as an 

impediment to deployment.

In order to facilitate the development of applications and 

middleware that support the PIV card, CSD is developing 

a reference set of smart cards. This set of test cards will 

include not only examples that are similar to cards that 

are currently issued today, but also examples of cards with 

features that are expected to appear in cards that will be 

issued in the future. For example, while the certificates 

and data objects on most, if not all, cards issued today 

are signed using RSA Public-Key Cryptography Standard 

(PKCS) #1 v1.5, the set of test cards will include examples 

of certificates and data objects that are signed using each 

of the algorithms and key sizes approved for use with PIV 

cards, including the RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme 

(RSASSA-PSS) and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 

Algorithm (ECDSA). Similarly, the infrastructure supporting 

the test cards will provide examples of Certificate 

Revocation Lists (CRLs) and Online Certificate Status 

Protocol (OCSP) responses that are signed using each of 

these signature algorithms. The set of test cards also will 

include certificates with elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) 

subject public keys in addition to RSA subject public keys, 

as is permitted by Table 3-1 of SP 800-78-3, Interfaces 

for Personal Identity Verification. The set of test cards, 

collectively, will also include all of the mandatory and 

optional data objects listed in Section 3 of SP 800-73-3 

Part 1, except for Cardholder Iris Images. Several of the 

cards will include a Key History object along with retired 

key management keys. The certificates that appear on 

the test cards, both the card holders’ certificates and the 

content signers’ certificates, will be issued from a simple 

two-level hierarchy.

During FY2011, CSD developed an initial specification for 

the set of test PIV cards. The initial specification calls for 

the set to include sixteen cards, nine valid cards and seven 

cards that contain invalid data. The valid cards differ in 

terms of the cryptographic algorithms used to sign the 

data objects, the types and sizes of the card holder’s key 

pairs, and in the presence or absence of optional data 

objects. The invalid cards include cards that are expired, 

cards that have certificates that have been revoked, and 

cards with data objects that have invalid signatures.

CSD also extended the capabilities of the PIV Data 

Generator to be able to generate all of the data 

objects associated with the test cards and extended the 

capabilities of the PIV Data Loader to be able to load 

all of the certificates, key pairs, and other data objects 

associated with the test cards onto blank card stock. The 

keys and data for the test cards were generated along with 

the infrastructure needed to support these cards, and one 

set of test cards was generated for use in internal testing.

Early in FY2012, a few sets of test cards will be generated 

based on the initial specification, and these sets of test 

cards will be distributed to organizations that have 

previously volunteered to serve as beta testers. Feedback 

from the beta testers will be used to determine whether 

any changes need to be made to the final specification for 

the sets of test cards. Sets of test cards based on the final 

specification will then be created and made available for 

purchase.

Contacts:

Dr. David Cooper Mr. William Polk

(301) 975-3194 (301) 975-3348

david.cooper@nist.gov william.polk@nist.gov

Test Card 

Affiliation 

Employee 

Cardholder – PIV Test, 

Test 

United States Government 

Agency/Department 

Test Department 

Expires 

2030DEC31 

Color 

Photograph 

Card 1 

Cryptographic Technology Group
30 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

BIOS Security 

Modern computers rely on fundamental system firmware, 

commonly known as the Basic Input/Output System 

(BIOS), to facilitate the hardware initialization process 

and transition control to the operating system. The BIOS 

is a security-critical component because of its unique and 

privileged position within modern computers. A malicious 

BIOS modification could be part of a sophisticated, 

targeted attack on an organization—either a permanent 

denial of service (if the BIOS is corrupted) or a persistent 

malware presence (if the BIOS is implanted with malware). 

As security in operating systems and applications has 

improved, a race to “bare metal” has begun between 

those wishing to attack systems and those responsible 

for protecting them. Attacks on the BIOS are an evolving 

threat area that could become a future battlefront. 

To combat this threat, in FY2011, NIST began a new project 

to secure the BIOS. As the computer industry is currently 

transitioning to BIOS based on the Unified Extensible 

Firmware Interface (UEFI), a recent industry specification 

for system firmware, NIST had the opportunity to influence 

the next generation of systems. For the past year, NIST has 

been working with key members of the computer industry 

on mechanisms to improve the security of the BIOS.

In April 2011, NIST issued SP 800-147, BIOS Protection 

Guidelines, which provides guidance on protecting the 

BIOS in laptop and desktop computers. This document 

provides platform vendors with recommendations and 

guidelines for a secure BIOS update process. Additionally, 

it provides system administrators and information system 

security professionals with recommendations for managing 

the BIOS in an operational environment.

SP 800-147 has already had a major impact due to an 

extraordinary response from hardware and software 

vendors in the computer industry. Within six months of 

publication of the BIOS Protection Guidelines, several 

major computer vendors were already offering products 

intended to meet the guidelines in that document. 

In FY2012, NIST will continue its efforts to secure the 

system BIOS and other critical firmware. We plan to 

develop guidelines for protecting the BIOS in servers and 

boot firmware in computer add-on cards. We also plan 

to develop security requirements for systems designed 

to detect unauthorized changes to the BIOS and its 

configuration settings. These efforts to improve the 

security of the BIOS are intended to lay the foundation 

for secure systems. Future efforts will explore methods to 

extend trust in the security of the BIOS to provide greater 

assurance of the security of the operating system and 

applications.

Contact:

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid

(301) 975-5155

andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

Privacy Enhancing Cryptography Project

Modern cryptography provides powerful tools for 

protecting private information, but current standards are 

often blunt instruments for privacy protection. There are 

many ways we can develop and standardize new methods 

to use cryptography that enhance privacy. For example, 

public-key certificates used for authentication often 

reveal more personally identifiable information about the 

certificate holder than is required for many applications. 

What is often at issue in accessing data or resources is not 

the identity of the customer, but whether the customer is 

a member of the eligible group. Methods that allow a user 

to selectively reveal and prove only a specific property 

(such as age over 21, place of residence, or citizenship, 

etc.), are approaching commercial practicality. 

Other techniques, such as those that will eventually 

allow us to search encrypted databases, are still in the 

research stage. But they are sufficiently advanced that 

it behooves us to take stock of the state of the art at 

this point. Still other techniques, such as those that allow 

us to hold sealed-bid auctions without ever opening the 

bids, are known to be practical, yet have received little 

attention by those that might benefit from them. Such 

applications fall within the scope of what are known as 

secure multiparty computations. 

In FY2011, NIST held meetings with hardware and software 

manufacturers, including Microsoft’s U-Prove team 

and Intel’s Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) team, to discuss 

privacy-enhancing technologies. Future meetings with 

additional organizations are being scheduled. Additionally, 

NIST published Secure Sealed-Bid Online Auctions 

Using Discreet Cryptographic Proofs, which discussed 

privacy-preserving auctions and several other papers on 

technical components of secure multiparty computation.

In December 2011, NIST will hold a workshop on 

Privacy-Enhancing Cryptographic Techniques to explore 

processes, procedures, and potential applications that 

could benefit from the ability to operate on encrypted 

data without decrypting it.

Contact:

Dr. Rene Peralta 

(301) 975-8702

peralta@nist.gov
31

Strategic Goal

Devise advanced security methods, tools, and guidelines 

through conducting near-term and midterm security 

research.

Overview

In our security research, we focus on identifying emerging 

and high-priority technologies, and on developing security 

solutions that will have a high impact on the U.S. critical 

information infrastructure. We conduct research and 

development on behalf of government and industry from the 

earliest stages of technology development through proofof-concept, reference and prototype implementations, 

and demonstrations. We work to transfer new technologies 

to industry, to produce new standards and guidance for 

federal agencies and industry, and to develop tests, test 

methodologies, and assurance methods.

Some of the many topics we investigate include mobile 

device security, security automation, cloud computing, 

identity management, access control and authorization 

management, Internet protocol (IP) security, software 

assurance, and vulnerability analysis. Our research helps 

to meet federal information security requirements that 

may not be fully addressed by existing technology. We 

collaborate extensively with government, academia, and 

private sector entities. In the past year, collaborations 

have included the National Security Agency (NSA), the 

Department of Defense (DoD), the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA), the U.S. Air Force, the 

University of Maryland, George Mason University, Purdue 

University, North Carolina State University, Johns Hopkins 

University Applied Physics Laboratory, Carnegie Mellon 

University, Microsoft Corporation, Intel, Symantec, 

Lockheed Martin, and MITRE.

Example successes from this work include tools for access 

control policy testing; new concepts in access control 

and policy enforcement; protocols, tools, and standards 

for security automation; IPv6 transition guidance; 

interoperability test suites for biometrics; methods 

for analyzing vulnerabilities in networks; operating 

system hardening plus test methods for mobile device 

(smart phone) security; and software assurance through 

combinatorial testing. For the federal government’s cloud 

computing initiatives, we produced use cases, publications, 

and definitions and guidance for cloud users and providers. 

To improve access to new technologies, we also chaired, 

edited, and participated in the development of a wide 

variety of national and international security standards. 

Identity Management

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

and FIPS 201 Revision Efforts

In response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

12 (HSPD-12), Policy for a Common Identification 

Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, Federal 

Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201, Personal 

Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and 

Contractors, was developed and was approved by the 

Secretary of Commerce in February 2005. HSPD-12 calls 

for the creation of a new identity credential for federal 

employees and contractors. FIPS 201 is the technical 

specification of both the new identity credential and the PIV 

system that produces, manages, and uses the credential. 

According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 

as of June 2011, approximately 5 million federal employee 

and contractors (87 percent of the federal workforce) 

have been issued their PIV cards. This work is done in 

collaboration with the Cryptographic Technologies Group.

CSD activities in FY2011 directly supported the revision 

and maintenance of the FIPS 201 standard. CSD performed 

the following activities during FY2011 to revise the 

standard:

• Drafted and published a revision of FIPS 201 on March 

8, 2011. Changes in the revision (i.e., FIPS 201-2) 

include clarifications to existing text, removal of 

conflicting requirements, additional text in cases 

where there were ambiguities, adaptation to changes 

in the marketplace since the publication of FIPS 201-1, 

and specific requests received from agencies and 

implementers. NIST coordinated with OMB and U.S. 

government (USG) stakeholders before incorporating 

changes in the draft FIPS 201-2. NIST also addressed 

business requirements for FIPS 201-2 gathered from 

the meeting on government requirements held in July 

2010. 

Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research Group

Systems and Emerging Technologies Security Research Group
32 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

• Organized and facilitated a workshop to discuss the 

contents of revised FIPS 201. NIST held a two-day 

workshop on April 18-19, 2011, to discuss the contents 

of FIPS 201-2. The workshop was another mechanism 

to reach out to the PIV community, to interact with 

implementers and vendors, to clarify and explain 

new concepts in FIPS 201-2, and to encourage the PIV 

community to provide formal comments to NIST. 

• Processed and analyzed comments received on FIPS 

201-2. NIST started to review and process more than 

1,000 comments received from over 40 organizations. 

• Participated in stakeholder meetings and provided 

technical contributions to the Federal Identity 

Credential Access Management (FICAM) Architecture 

Working Group (AWG). 

• Provided technical security controls to facilitate PIN 

caching for PIV systems in very specific environments.

In FY2012, we will focus on completing the revision of 

FIPS 201-2. We will also continue to provide technical and 

strategic inputs to the PIV-related initiatives. 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv

Contacts:

Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo Mr. William I. MacGregor

(301) 975-6972

hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov

NIST Personal Identity 

Verification Program (PIV)

The objective of the NIST Personal Identity Verification 

Program (NPIVP) is to validate PIV components for 

conformance to specifications in FIPS 201 and its 

companion documents. The two PIV components that 

come under the scope of NPIVP are PIV Smart Card 

Application and PIV Middleware. All of the tests under 

NPIVP are handled by third-party laboratories that are 

accredited as Cryptographic and Security Testing (CST) 

Laboratories by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory 

Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and are called accredited 

NPIVP test facilities. As of September 2011, there are ten 

such facilities.

In prior years, CSD published SP 800-85A, PIV Card 

Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines, to 

facilitate development of PIV Smart Card Application and 

PIV Middleware that conform to interface specifications in 

SP 800-73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. We 

also developed an integrated toolkit called “PIV Interface 

Test Runner” for conducting tests on both PIV Card 

Application and PIV Middleware products, and provided 

the toolkit to accredited NPIVP test facilities. 

In 2010, the third edition of SP 800-73 (numbered as SP 

800-73-3), was published. The same year, we updated 

and published SP 800-85A-1, PIV Card Application and 

Middleware Interface Test Guidelines, to provide test 

guidelines that align with SP 800-73-3. 

In FY2011 and with the release of SP 800-73-3 in the prior 

year, NPIVP identified the necessary updates for the PIV 

Interface Test Runner to align with SP 800-73-3 and the 

revised PIV card interface test guidelines in SP 800-85A2. The PIV Interface Test Runner was updated to perform 

additional tests needed for SP 800-73-3 compliance and 

was distributed to the ten accredited NPIVP test facilities 

in the first quarter of FY2011. With the introduction of the 

new Test Runner, the NPIVP test facilities now base their 

evaluations of PIV Card application and PIV Middleware 

products on the updated PIV Interface Test Runner.

In addition to the interface specification in 

SP 800-73-3, another NIST publication, SP 800-78, 

Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal 

Identity Verification, specifies the PIV Card’s 

cryptographic capability. This publication establishes 

approved cryptographic mechanisms for the PIV card 

and infrastructure. It also proposes sunset dates for 

cryptographic algorithms that are deemed less secure 

after a specific date. By the beginning of January 2011, 

for example, the 2-Key Triple DES algorithms (2TDEA) for 

the PIV card’s optional Card Authentication Key (CAK) was 

discontinued to ensure adequate cryptographic strength 

for the PIV card. Instead of 2TDEA, higher-strength 

cryptographic algorithms are specified in SP 800-78-2, 

such as 3-Key Triple DES algorithms (3TDEA), AES 128, and 

others. In anticipation of the discontinuation of the 2TDEA 

for the affected PIV cards, NPIVP coordinated the upgrade 

to higher strength CAK and CMK, and provided revalidation 

guidelines for affected client products. Fortunately, 

no PIV Card Application products were affected by the 

discontinuation of 2 Key Triple DES, since validated 

PIV cards already had the capability to provide higher 

cryptographic strength for the CAK and CMK. 

In FY2011, eight PIV card application products were 

validated for conformance to SP 800-73-2, three PIV card 

application products were validated for conformance to 

SP 800-73-3, and certificates were issued, bringing the 

total number of NPIVP-validated PIV Card application 

products to 28. The three PIV card application products 

validated for conformance to SP 800-73-3 were originally 

submitted for validation for conformance to SP 800-

73-2 and later submitted for upgrade to SP 800-73-3 

specifications. Three more PIV Middleware products were 
33

validated for conformance to SP 800-73-2 and were issued 

certificates, bringing the total number of NPIVP-validated 

PIV Middleware products that conform to SP 800-73-2 to 4 

and the overall number of PIV Middleware products to 15.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp

Contacts:

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo

(301) 975-5013 (301) 975-6972

chandramouli@nist.gov hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Conformity Assessment Program and 

Qualified Product List (QPL) for Identity 

and Credential Products for DHS/TSA

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), an 

agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has 

a requirement to establish a process to qualify products and 

to maintain a Qualified Products List (QPL) for use within 

the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 

program as well as other DHS and TSA programs such as 

the U.S. Coast Guard that adopts, for their operations, 

identity and credential products conformant to the same 

standards and specifications. 

The DHS has asked NIST to assist with the establishment 

of a conformity assessment framework in support of 

a Qualified Technologies List (QTL) for identity and 

privilege credential products, to be managed by DHS/TSA. 

Additionally, NIST is assisting with the establishment of a 

testing regime for the qualifying products for conformity 

to specified standards and TSA specifications. 

This Conformity Assessment Program will provide 

credentials with heightened assurance at reduced cost. 

Approved credentials can be easily identified and procured 

by government (state, local, tribal), private entities (e.g., 

airports) and TSA grant receivers.

This work builds on ITL’s Core Competency in IT standards 

development and deployment. As new specifications 

emerge, metrics and test methods need to be developed 

to support adoption of these technologies. 

During FY2011, NIST’s team, in collaboration with our 

contractors, finalized the QTL’s Administrative Manual, 

the Approval Procedure, Derived Test Requirements, and 

Test Procedures documents, and developed a tool for 

testing smart card portable and fixed TWIC readers for 

conformance to the TWIC specification published in 2008.

NIST’s team completed the project during FY2011.

Contact:

Dr. Michaela Iorga

(301) 975-8431

michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Biometric Standards and Conformity 

Assessment Activities

The project responds to government, industry, and 

market requirements for open systems standards by: 

(a) accelerating development of formal biometric 

standards; (b) providing effective leadership and technical 

participation in the development of these standards; (c) 

developing Conformance Test Architectures and Test Suites 

designed to test implementations of biometric standards; 

(d) supporting harmonization of biometric, tokens and 

security standards; (e) promoting biometric standards 

adoption; and (f) promoting conformity assessment efforts. 

CSD’s staff continues to work in close partnership with 

government agencies, industry, and academic institutions 

to develop formal national and international biometric 

standards. CSD’s staff actively participates in a number 

of biometric standards development projects, contributes 

to the development of biometric standards, and leads 

national2 and international3 biometric standards bodies. 

This work is planned to continue in FY2012.

We actively participate in the National Science and 

Technology Council Subcommittee on Biometrics and 

Identity Management and its Standards and Conformity 

Assessment Working Group as well as other U.S. government 

(USG) groups, such as DHS’s Biometrics Working Group and 

DoD’s Biometrics Identity Management Agency Biometric 

Standards Working Group.

We develop conformance test architectures (CTAs) and 

conformance test suites (CTSs) to support end-users in USG 

and other organizations, testing laboratories, and system 

integrators as well as product developers interested in 

conforming to biometric standards by using the same 

testing tools available to users4. Related activities and 

conformance test tool releases in previous years were 

discussed in preceding annual reports5.

During FY2011, we released a number of conformance 

test suites (CTSs) designed to test implementations 

of biometric data interchange formats conforming to 

international standards, including two CTS versions of a 

2

 InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Technical 

Committee 1 (M1) - Biometrics - INCITS M1 Public Website: http://standards.incits.

org/a/public/group/m1

3 Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1) of the International Standards Organization 

(ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Subcommittee 

SC 37 - Biometrics - JTC 1/SC 37 Home Page: http://www.iso.org/iso/jtc1_sc37_

home.html

4

 This work is sponsored, in part, by DHS/US-VISIT.

5 CSD "2007 report" (pp. 44-47), CSD "2008 report" (pp. 30–34),CSD "2009 report" 

 (pp. 31-33), and CSD "2010 report" (pp. 28-30). http://csrc.nist.gov/

publications/PubsTC.html#Annual%20Reports

Systems and Emerging Technologies Security Research Group
34 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

tool designed to test implementations of the standardized 

iris image specification for the PIV Card and for off-card use 

of iris images as specified in draft SP 800-76-26. This year 

we initiated support for the ANSI/NIST-ITL standards7. Two 

versions of a CTA/CTS designed to test implementations 

of the ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007 standard8 were released. 

NIST Interagency Report (NISTIR) 77919 includes technical 

information on this test tool.

We are also supporting the development of the 2011 version 

of the ANSI/NIST-ITL standard (AN-2011) and an associated 

conformance testing methodology development. CSD’s 

staff developed tables of requirements and test assertions 

for selected Record Types specified in the standard. 

Over 1,200 assertions were documented. NISTIR 780610

documents the assertions developed and the terms, 

operands, and operators used in defining these assertions. 

Planned work for FY2012 and beyond includes development 

of CTSs to test implementations of international biometric 

data interchange formats under development in JTC 1/SC 37 

(e.g., binary and XML data format encodings). Plans include 

development of advanced CTAs and CTSs to improve 

performance (e.g., multiple-thread implementations), 

6

 DRAFT NIST Special Publication 800-76-2, Biometric Data Specification for 

Personal Identity Verification, NIST/ITL, P. Grother, W. Salamon, and J. Matey, 

April 17, 2011.

7

 ANSI/NIST-ITL standard “Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & 

Other Biometric Information” home page: http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/ansi_standard.cfm

8

 NIST Special Publication 500-271, ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007, American National 

Standard for Information Systems - Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint 

Facial, & Other Biometric Information – Part 1.

9

 NISTIR 7791, Conformance Test Architecture and Test Suite for 

 ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007, F. Podio, D. Yaga, and C. McGinnis, June 2011.

10 NISTIR 7806, ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Requirements and Conformance Test 

Assertions, C. McGinnis, D. Yaga, and F. Podio, September 2011.

usability, and reliability, and provide rich test results 

information. We are also planning to address support for 

rich web services capabilities. The project will evolve 

from web services research, development, and testing to 

implementation. 

We plan to continue supporting the Biometric Consortium 

which is co-chaired by a member of CSD’s staff and a 

member of the National Security Agency’s staff. The 

Biometric Consortium Conference, with participation of 

over 1,500 attendees, was held September 27-29, 2011.

ITL’s Biometric resource Center: 

http://www.nist.gov/biometrics

Conformance Test Tool Downloads: 

http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/

biocta_download.cfm#CTAdownloads

Contact:

Mr. Fernando Podio

(301) 975-2947

fernando.podio@nist.gov

Research in Emerging Technologies

Automated Combinatorial 

Testing for Software

Software developers often encounter failures that result 

from an unexpected interaction between components. NIST 

research has shown that most failures are triggered by one 

or two parameters, and progressively fewer by three, four, 

or more parameters (see graph below), a relationship that 

we call the interaction rule. These results have important 

implications for testing. If all faults in a system can be 

triggered by a combination of n or fewer parameters, then 

testing all n-way combinations of parameters can provide 

very strong fault detection efficiency. These methods 

are being applied to software and hardware testing for 

reliability, safety, and security. Our focus is on empirical 

results and real-world problems.

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

1 2 3 4 5 6

(Kuhn, Wallace, Gallo, 2004)

Interactions

Cumulative percent of software failures

Medical 

Devices

Browser

Server

NASA

Network

Security
35

Technology development highlights for FY2011 included 

a case study demonstrating equivalent fault detection 

using less than five percent of the original number of 

tests for an interoperability standard; development of a 

new mathematical construct, sequence covering arrays, 

(jointly with U.S. Air Force [USAF]) for event sequence 

testing with demonstrations on USAF system testing; and 

development of a new tool for combinatorial coverage 

measurement. 

Tech transfer activities included release of our 

comprehensive text, SP 800-142, Practical Combinatorial 

Testing, which has been downloaded by more than 

11,000 users; publication of five technical papers; plus 

seminars and lectures at Carnegie Mellon University, 

NASA, Fraunhofer Institute, Institute for Defense Analysis, 

Department of Energy, The Technische Universität Berlin 

(T.U. Berlin), Indian Institute of Technology, and several 

conferences. 

Plans for FY2012 include cooperative work with the NASA 

Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Facility 

investigating the effectiveness of combinatorial testing 

for IV&V of space systems; a significant expansion and 

new release of the text, Practical Combinatorial Testing; 

development of methods and tools for fault location; 

lectures at conferences and research labs; and release 

of a report with Cooperative Research and Development 

Agreement (CRADA) partner Lockheed Martin on use of 

these methods for aerospace software testing. 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acts/

Contacts:

Mr. Rick Kuhn Dr. Raghu Kacker

(301) 975-3337 (301) 975-2109

kuhn@nist.gov raghu.kacker@nist.gov

Cloud Computing and Virtualization

Cloud computing offers the possibility of increasing 

efficiency with a decrease in cost. However, as with any 

new technology, there are many questions about security. 

NIST is providing technical guidance and promoting 

standards supporting the effective and secure use of 

cloud computing within government and industry. Our 

first effort was to define cloud computing and its models. 

This guidance assists organizations in making informed 

decisions about procuring cloud services.

According to the NIST cloud computing definition: “Cloud 

computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand 

network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 

resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, 

and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released 

with minimal management effort or service provider 

interaction.” The full extended definition describes five 

essential characteristics, three service models, and four 

deployment models. This definition is available as SP 800-

145, A NIST Definition of Cloud Computing.

The NIST cloud computing team has formulated a 

strategy for facilitating the development of high-quality 

cloud computing standards. The strategy, Standards 

Acceleration to Jumpstart Adoption of Cloud Computing 

(SAJACC), describes a process for formulating cloud 

computing use cases and for judging the extent to which 

cloud system interfaces can satisfy them. An output of 

the SAJACC program is a set of test results about the 

sufficiency of selected cloud interfaces (or parts of their 

interfaces); these results will help standards development 

organizations formulate their standards to achieve the 

central goals of portability, interoperability, and support 

for security. The SAJACC project is distributing results 

using a network-accessible portal that also serves as a 

communication focal point between NIST and the larger 

technical community. The cloud computing project has 

developed an initial set of 24 cloud system use cases, and 

has posted those use cases as working documents on the 

portal (http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud).

In support of SAJACC, CSD built a heterogeneous 

virtualized environment to support some of the use cases by 

implementing a proof of concept for supporting the SP 800-

53 security control requirements for low- and moderateimpact baseline to a cloud computing service model such as 

infrastructure as a service reference implementation; this 

includes typical virtual workloads running on commercial 

hypervisors. A typical use case involves migrating virtual 

workloads from a private cloud to a public or community 

cloud while demonstrating compliance with the security 

and audit requirements such as geographical location.

During FY2011, the cloud computing team, in collaboration 

with other NIST divisions, supported a large expansion of the 

scope of the NIST Cloud Computing Program. This extended 

scope included the formation of a NIST working group for 

the SAJACC effort; the formation of a NIST working group 

for studying security in cloud computing; the formation 

of a working group for standards in cloud computing; the 

initiation of the Federal Cloud Computing Standards and 

Technology Working Group; and the development of the 

U.S. Government Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap, 

which was released in November 2011.

During FY2011, the cloud computing team supported two 

Cloud Computing Forums held in Gaithersburg, Maryland, 

one in November 2010 and one in April 2011. As part of 

the SAJACC effort, the cloud computing team developed 

software implementations of six out of the 24 NIST 

Systems and Emerging Technologies Security Research Group
36 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

technical cloud computing use cases; the implementations 

are available at: http://collaborate.nist.gov/twikicloud-computing/bin/view/CloudComputing/SAJACC. 

As part of the NIST standards working group effort, the 

cloud computing team contributed to Draft SP 500-291, 

NIST Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap. As part of the 

NIST security working group, the cloud computing team 

drafted the “Cloud Computing Security Impediments and 

Mitigations List”; this working document is available at: 

http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-cloud-computing/

bin/view/CloudComputing/CloudSecurity. The cloud 

computing team furthermore developed two Draft SPs 

and one final SP. These publications are: Draft SP 800-

144, Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud 

Computing Draft SP 800-146, Cloud Computing Synopsis 

and Recommendations, and SP 800-145, The NIST Definition 

of Cloud Computing.

In FY2011, the cloud computing team also presented the 

findings and status of the cloud computing program in a 

variety of conferences and workshops.

The NIST cloud computing project is also supporting the 

cloud computing groups under the Federal CIO Council. 

This includes providing technical advice to the Cloud 

Computing Executive Steering Committee, the Cloud 

Computing Advisory Council, and the Information Security 

and Identity Management Committee’s Web 2.0 working 

group.

http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud

Contact:

Mr. Lee Badger

(301) 975-3176

lee.badger@nist.gov

Security Ontologies for Risk Assessment

In the course of time, computer security has become a 

diversified field of research. It has become increasingly 

difficult for experts of different domains to understand 

each other and to use a precisely defined terminology. 

Therefore, there is a need for a security ontology that 

can clearly define security related concepts and their 

relationships, which can then be used to do quantitative 

risk analysis for enterprise information systems. The main 

goal of our research in this project is to develop an ontology 

that “knows” which threats endanger which assets and 

which security controls can reduce the probability of 

attacks. In addition each asset and each countermeasure 

in the ontology can be annotated with various types of 

cost and benefits. By comparing various scenarios during 

a quantitative risk analysis, organizations can choose 

which security controls are more effective. The ontology 

will help to ensure a shared and accurate knowledge of 

threats and countermeasures, and will provide objective 

data for decision making about which countermeasures, if 

implemented, will be most effective.

In FY2011, we developed a security ontology that describes 

entities such as threats, vulnerabilities, countermeasures, 

assets and security objectives. We have implemented this 

ontology using Protégé and have a description of these 

entities in Resource Description Framework (RDF) and Web 

Ontology Language (OWL). In FY2012, we plan to develop 

graphical tools for a user to visualize ontologies and to 

generate reports about enterprise level security metrics.

Contact:

Dr. Anoop Singhal

(301) 975-4432

anoop.singhal@nist.gov

Mobile Device Security

Smart phones have become both ubiquitous and 

indispensable for consumers and business people 

alike. Although these devices are relatively small and 

inexpensive, they can be used not only for voice calls and 

simple text messages, but also for many functions once 

limited to laptop and desktop computers. Smart phones 

and tablet devices have specialized built-in hardware, such 

as photographic cameras, video cameras, accelerometers, 

Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, and removablemedia readers. Furthermore, they employ a range of 

wireless interfaces, including infrared, Wireless Fidelity 

(Wi-Fi), Bluetooth, Near Field Communications (NFC), 

and one or more types of cellular interfaces that provide 

network connectivity across the globe. Although small in 

terms of form-factor, they can be used for sending and 

receiving email, browsing the web, online banking and 

commerce, social networking, storing and modifying 

documents, remotely accessing data, recording audio and 

video, and as navigation aids. Naturally, just as consumers 

and business people can realize productivity gains from 

these technologies, so can government agencies.

Like any new technology, smart phones present new 

capabilities, but also a number of new security challenges. 

Moreover, as the pace of the technology life cycles continues 

to increase, our current Information Assurance standards 

and processes must be updated and new technologies 

developed to transition from the use of specialized 

Government Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) products to Commercial 

Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products to allow government users 

to use the latest and greatest technologies that consumers 

can use without sacrificing any privacy and security.
37

NIST is working with Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop open source FIPS140-2 validated cryptographic algorithms, to develop new 

testing methodologies for smart phone software (apps), to 

provide updated security guidance for government users, 

and is working with industry to bridge the security gaps 

present on today’s smart phones.

NIST analyzed Android apps using commercial and open 

source static analysis tools, designed an App Testing 

Portal (ATP), and implemented a proof-of-concept ATP. 

NIST worked closely with DARPA and the George Mason 

University to develop an encrypted file system using FIPS140-2-validated open source cryptographic modules.

NIST will have a prototype smart phone app testing 

portal and associated documentation available at the 

end of FY2012. NIST will also publish updated guidance 

documents on smart phone security.

Contacts:

Dr. Steve Quirolgico Dr. Jeffrey Voas

(301) 975-8426 (301) 975-6622

stephen.quirolgico@nist.gov jeff.voas@nist.gov

Dr. Tom Karygiannis

301-975-4728

karygiannis@nist.gov

Access Control and Privilege Management 

Access Control and Privilege 

Management Research

With the advance of current computing technologies 

and the multifaceted environments the technologies are 

applied to, security issues such as situation awareness, 

trust management, privacy control for access control, 

and privilege management systems are becoming more 

complex. However, the research available on these topics 

is generally targeted to a specific system, is incomplete, 

makes assumptions, or is ambiguous regarding critical 

elements. Thus, practical and conceptual general guidance 

for these topics is needed. 

In FY2011, we investigated trust management frameworks 

and the situation awareness feature of access control 

mechanisms. We held two research seminars: Automatic 

Extraction and Validation of Security Policies from Natural 

Language Documents and Government Open Source Access 

Control—Next Generation (GOSAC-N). We developed 

an evaluation metric for access control systems. The 

evaluation metric will define and describe access control 

properties, which will then be used in the metric as 

factors for the evaluation or comparison of access control 

mechanisms/products. We worked on research of the 

unified enforcement technology for data services through 

Policy Machine (PM). During FY2011, we worked on a draft 

NIST Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7815, Access Control for 

Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Systems, for the Policy 

Evaluation Testbed (PET) project, which enables the 

automatic privacy access control for Suspicious Activity 

Report systems. This draft NISTIR should be made publicly 

available sometime in the first half of FY2012.

In FY2012, we will complete the writing of a draft SP, 

Guidelines for Access Control System Evaluation Metrics; 

research unified enforcement mechanism of data services 

from Policy Machine (PM) for Enterprise Computing 

environment; enhance the capabilities of the Access 

Control Policy Tool (ACPT); and research algorithms for 

conflict resolution when combining and extending access 

control modes, rules, and policies. 

We expect that this project will:

• Promote (or accelerate) the adoption of community 

computing that utilizes the power of shared resources 

and common trust management schemes;

• Provide a standard evaluation metric in evaluating 

or comparing access control mechanisms for 

implementing access control applications;

• Increase security and safety of static (connected) 

distributed systems by applying the testing and 

verification tool for the access control polices; and

• Assist system architects, security administrators, 

and security managers whose expertise is related to 

access control or privilege policy in managing their 

systems, and in learning the limitations and practical 

approaches for their applications.

Contacts:

Dr. Vincent Hu Mr. David Ferraiolo

(301) 975-4975 (301) 975-3046

vhu@nist.gov david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Mr. Rick Kuhn

(301) 975-3337

kuhn@nist.gov

Systems and Emerging Technologies Security Research Group
38 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Conformance Verification for 

Access Control Policies

Access control systems are among the most critical 

network security components. Faulty policies, 

misconfigurations, or flaws in software implementation can 

result in serious vulnerabilities. The specification of access 

control policies is often a challenging problem. Often a 

system’s privacy and security are compromised due to 

the misconfiguration of access control policies instead of 

the failure of cryptographic primitives or protocols. This 

problem becomes increasingly severe as software systems 

become more and more complex, and are deployed 

to manage a large amount of sensitive information 

and resources organized into sophisticated structures. 

Identifying discrepancies between policy specifications 

and their properties (intended function) is crucial because 

correct implementation and enforcement of policies 

by applications is based on the premise that the policy 

specifications are correct. As a result, policy specifications 

must undergo rigorous verification and validation through 

systematic testing to ensure that the policy specifications 

truly encapsulate the desires of the policy authors.

To formally and precisely capture the security properties 

that access control should adhere to, access control 

models are usually written to bridge the rather wide 

gap in abstraction between policy and mechanism. Thus, 

an access control model provides unambiguous and 

precise expression as well as reference for design and 

implementation of security requirements. Techniques are 

required for verifying whether an access control model 

is correctly expressed in the access controls policies and 

whether the properties are satisfied in the model. In 

practice, the same access control policies may express 

multiple access control models or express a single model 

in addition to extra access control constraints outside of 

the model. Ensuring the conformance of access control 

models and policies is a nontrivial and critical task.

Started in 2009, we developed a prototype system, 

Access Control Property Tool (ACPT), which allows a user 

to compose, verify, test, and generate access control 

policies. 

During FY2011, in addition to continuing research, we 

enhanced the capability of ACPT by adding flexible states 

and classes for Workflow and Multilevel access control 

models, as well as performing Alpha and Beta testing 

for the tool. We also made ACPT available from the CSD 

website for public download. 

In FY2012, we will continue Beta testing, enhance 

the capability of ACPT by adding new policy combine 

algorithms, apply more stringent and practical user cases 

to test ACPT’s performance, and research an additional 

modeling method that is more flexible than the current 

one used. We will also produce a new user manual that 

contains examples and detail information of ACPT. 

This project is expected to:

• Provide generic paradigm and framework of access 

control model/property conformance testing;

• Provide templates for specifying access control rules 

in popular access control models such as Attribute 

Based, Multilevel, and Workflow models;

• Provide tools or services for checking the security 

and safety of access control implementation, policy 

combination, and XACML policy generation;

• Promote (or accelerate) the adoption of combinatorial 

testing for large-system (such as access control 

system) testing; and

• Assist system architects, security administrators, 

and security managers whose expertise is related 

to access control in managing their systems, and to 

learn the limitations and practical approaches for 

their applications.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acpt/

Contacts:

Dr. Vincent Hu Mr. Rick Kuhn

(301) 975-4975 (301) 975-3337

vhu@nist.gov kuhn@nist.gov

Metrics for Evaluation of 

Access Control Systems

Access control (AC) systems come with a wide variety 

of features and administrative capabilities, and the 

operational impact can be significant. In particular, 

this impact can pertain to administrative and user 

productivity, as well as to the organization’s ability to 

perform its mission. Therefore, it is reasonable to use a 

quality metric to verify the mechanical properties of AC 

systems. Features that influence the development of this 

metric are: 1) administration is the main consideration of 

cost; 2) enforcement capabilities are the requirements for 

AC applications; 3) the performance is the major factor 

for the AC usability; and 4) support functions allow an 

AC system to utilize and connect to relate technologies 

so as to enable more efficient integration with network 

and host service functions. This project provides a metric 

for the evaluation of AC systems based on the features of 

administration, enforcement, performance, and support 

of AC properties.
39

The ability of an organization to enforce its access 

policies determines the degree to which its data may 

be protected and shared among its user community. The 

focus on sharing and protecting information is becoming 

increasingly acute for many organizations. Unfortunately, 

when it comes to AC systems, one size does not fit all. 

The quality of administrative capabilities has an impact on 

administrative cost, user downtime between administrative 

events, and the abilities of users to perform their duties, 

as well as the overall security posture of the enterprise. 

Currently no well-accepted metrics exist for measuring 

the effectiveness or functional quality of an AC system. 

The purpose of this project is to provide federal agencies 

with background information on access control properties, 

and to help agencies improve the evaluation of their 

AC systems. This project provides information of the 

administration, enforcement, performance, and support 

properties of AC mechanisms that are embedded in each 

AC system. Properties discussed in this project extend 

to the information in NISTIR 7316, Assessment of Access 

Control Systems, which demonstrates the fundamental 

concept of policy, models, and mechanisms of AC systems. 

In FY2011, we started working on a draft SP, Guidelines for 

Access Control System Evaluation Metrics (will be released 

during FY2012), which includes detailed items for AC system 

properties, as well as examples to demonstrate how to use 

the metric in evaluating and comparing capabilities for AC 

systems, which can be applied to application or research 

environments.

In FY2012, we will complete the writing of the SP, 

Guidelines for Access Control System Evaluation Metrics, 

and make it available for public comment. We will revise 

the document based on the research for more properties 

and items including those for the Privilege Management.

We expect that this project will:

• Provide detailed information on the evaluation of AC 

systems, including policies, models, and mechanism 

for AC system researchers;

• Help security policy makers and system administrators 

in planning and improving their current and extended 

future AC systems;

• Provide information for AC system developers in the 

consideration of architecture, requirements, and 

performance of an AC system; and

• Provide reference information for AC system-related 

standards.

Contacts:

Dr. Vincent Hu Mr. David Ferraiolo

(301) 975-4975 (391) 975-3046

vhu@nist.gov david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Mr. Rick Kuhn

(301) 975-3337

kuhn@nist.gov

Policy Machine

In the early days of shared computing, access control 

and the policies it supports pertained to who could read 

and write what files - all within the confines of a single 

and largely isolated system. Since that period, however, 

computing has become increasingly distributed, and 

applications have simultaneously become sophisticated 

and interdependent. Today, policies need to be enforced 

within and across a multitude of heterogeneous file 

management systems, and across such applications as 

email, workflow, and records management. Associated 

with these data services are specific operations and 

resource types over which policy needs to be enforced. 

As such, policy enforcement today needs to contend 

with a large variety of operation types to include read/

write, send, review, approve, insert, and copy/cut-paste. 

In addition, these operation types are applied to a large 

variety of data types such as files, messages, attachments, 

work items, records, fields, and clipboards. Further, these 

operations are performed under the control of a multitude 

of systems and applications often running simultaneously 

and with great interdependence. 

The existing approach to access control and computing 

has been traditionally a source of great frustration on 

the part of users and administrators alike and source of 

serious security operational vulnerabilities. Administrators 

must mange a multitude of user accounts for each 

user, independently manage privileges, and attempt to 

coordinate access policy across different data services 

through different interfaces. Users must authenticate 

to a multitude of different data services in order to 

exercise legitimate capabilities, potentially through 

different authentication schemes. And, access control and 

other security mechanisms must be implemented within 

applications leading to greater exposure to attack and 

bypass. 

The Policy Machine (PM) research effort is focused 

on solving these and other security issues. The PM is a 

redefinition of access control and data services in terms 

of what is believed to be their underlying elements, 

relations, and functions. The PM is a first step towards the 

notion of an “Enterprise Operating System.” Through its 

configuration alone, the PM both enables the capabilities 

of a wide variety of data services and comprehensively 

enforces enterprise specific access control policies over 

user executions of those capabilities. 

Although applicable to a variety of situations, the PM is 

ideal for rapid formation of ad hoc collaborations that 

emphasize sharing of sensitive data. 

Systems and Emerging Technologies Security Research Group
40 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Although the PM is amenable to a verity of deployments, 

in FY2011 we began its implementation in a cloud/

virtualized computing environment, where data services, 

users, data objects, and access control policies can be 

easily provisioned and managed in meeting the mission 

needs of the subscriber. It fills an important void with 

cloud computing. That is, it provides subscribers with a 

great deal of control in specifying access control policies 

that are comprehensively enforced over data services.

Also in FY2011, NIST and other members of an Ad Hoc 

International Committee for Information Technology 

Standards (INCITS) working group continued development 

of a three-part PM standard under the title of “Next 

Generation Access Control” (NGAC). This work was 

conducted under three sub-projects:

• Project 2193-D: Next Generation Access Control –

Implementation Requirements, Protocols and API 

Definitions;

• Project 2194-D: Next Generation Access Control – 

Functional Architecture; and

• Project 2195-D: Next Generation Access Control - 

Generic Operations & Abstract Data Structures.

In the coming year, we anticipate conducting a 

demonstration of the Cloud PM implementation, and 

bringing parts of the NGAC proposed standard to ballot by 

INCITS.

We expect that this project will:

• Offer users capabilities of a variety of services 

achieved through configuration of PM data alone, 

such as file management, email, workflow, and forms 

and records management, rather than managing 

overlapping user accounts, and potentially different 

authentication schemes for each data service, 

through a single authenticated session;

• Deliver to select users, through the policy machine, 

select capabilities (of different services) under 

combinations of arbitrary, but mission-tailored 

forms of discretionary, mandatory, and history-based 

access controls, rather than deploying and managing 

different access control schemes for different data 

services; 

• Provide an inherent property of the PM, the 

comprehensive nature in which data services 

interplay. For instance, a user can attach a record, 

created under a relational database management 

service, to an email message and send that record to 

any chosen individual. This property is not achieved 

through interoperability features, but rather through 

the underlying framework of the PM that inherently 

provides a foundational basis for interoperability; and 

• Provide another inherent property of the PM, the 

comprehensive nature in which data is protected 

across data services. For example, regardless of the 

recipient of the message, any user who opens the 

attached record would only be able to read and/or 

write fields for which the user is authorized.

Contacts:

Mr. David Ferraiolo Mr. Serban Gavrila

(301) 975-3046 (301) 975-4343

david.ferraiolo@nist.gov serban.gavrila@nist.gov

Automated Vulnerability Management

Security Automation

Security automation harmonizes the vast amount of 

IT product data into coherent, comparable information 

streams to achieve situational awareness that informs 

timely and active management of diverse IT systems. 

Through the creation of flexible, open standards and 

international recognition, security automation will result 

in IT infrastructure interoperability, broad acceptance, 

and adoption, and will create opportunities for innovation.

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)

To support the overarching security automation vision, 

it is necessary to have both trusted information and a 

standardized means to store and share it. Through close 

work with its government and industry partners, NIST 

has developed the Security Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP) to provide the standardized technical mechanisms 

to share information between systems. Through the 

National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and the National 

Checklist Program (NCP), NIST is providing relevant and 

important information in the areas of vulnerability and 

configuration management. Combined, SCAP and the 

programs that leverage it are moving the information 

assurance industry towards being able to standardize 

communications, collect and store relevant data in 

standardized formats, and provide automated means 

for the assessment and remediation of systems for both 

vulnerabilities and configuration compliance. 

SCAP is a suite of specifications that use eXtensible 

Markup Language (XML) to standardize the format and 

nomenclature by which security software products 

communicate information about software flaws and 

security configurations. SCAP includes software flaw 

and security configuration standard reference data, also 

known as SCAP content. This reference data is provided by 

the NVD (http://nvd.nist.gov/).
41

SCAP is a multipurpose protocol that supports automated 

vulnerability checking, technical control compliance 

activities, and security measurement. The U.S. 

government, in cooperation with academia and private 

industry, is adopting SCAP and encourages its use in support 

of security automation activities and initiatives.

At the end of September 2011, draft SP 800-126 Revision 

2, The Technical Specification for the Security Content 

Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP Version 1.2;, was 

approved as final and is the SCAP technical specification 

(http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-126-

rev2/SP800-126r2.pdf). This document describes the 11 

component specifications comprising SCAP:

• Languages:

◦ Extensible Configuration Checklist Description 

Format (XCCDF), a language for authoring 

security checklists/benchmarks and for reporting 

results of evaluating them;

◦ Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language 

(OVAL), a language for representing system 

configuration information, assessing machine 

state, and reporting assessment results; and

◦ Open Checklist Interactive Language (OCIL), a 

language for representing checks that collect 

information from people or from existing data 

stores made by other data collection efforts;

• Reporting Formats:

◦ Asset Reporting Format (ARF), a format for 

expressing the transport format of information 

about assets and the relationships between 

assets and reports; and

◦ Asset Identification (AI), a format for uniquely 

identifying assets based on known identifiers 

and/or known information about the assets;

• Enumerations:

◦ Common Platform Enumeration (CPE), a 

nomenclature and dictionary of hardware, 

operating systems, and applications;

◦ Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE), 

a nomenclature and dictionary of software 

security configurations; and

◦ Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), a 

nomenclature and dictionary of security-related 

software flaws;

• Mesurement and Scoring Systems:

◦ Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), a 

specification for measuring the relative severity 

of software flaw vulnerabilities; and

◦ Common Configuration Scoring System (CCSS), a 

specification for measuring the relative severity 

of system security configuration issues; and

• Integrity:

◦ Trust Model for Security Automation Data 

(TMSAD), a specification for using digital 

signatures in a common trust model applied to 

security automation specifications.

SCAP is being widely adopted by major software and 

hardware manufacturers and has become a significant 

component of information security management and 

governance programs. The protocol is expected to evolve 

and expand in support of the growing need to define and 

measure effective security controls; assess and monitor 

ongoing aspects of information security; remediate 

noncompliance; and successfully manage systems in 

accordance with the Risk Management Framework 

described in SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls 

for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, 

available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/. 

Currently, CSD is leveraging SCAP in multiple areas, both 

to support our own mission and to enable other agencies 

and private sector entities to meet their goals. For CSD, 

SCAP is a critical component of the SCAP Validation 

Program, the NVD, and the National Checklist Program.

Contact:

Mr. Dave Waltermire

(301) 975-3390

david.waltermire@nist.gov

National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is the U.S. 

government repository of standards-based vulnerability 

management reference data. The NVD provides information 

regarding security vulnerabilities and configuration 

settings, vulnerability impact metrics, technical assessment 

methods, and references to remediation assistance and 

IT product identification data. The NVD reference data 

supports security automation efforts based on the Security 

Content Automation Protocol (SCAP). As of September 

2011, the NVD contained the following resources:

• Over 47,000 vulnerability advisories with an average 

of 8 new vulnerabilities added daily;

• 36 SCAP-expressed checklists containing thousands of 

low-level security configuration checks that can be 

used by SCAP-validated security products to perform 

automated evaluations of system state;

• 159 non-SCAP security checklists (e.g., English prose 

guidance and configuration scripts);

Systems and Emerging Technologies Security Research Group
42 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

• 212 U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (USCERT) alerts, 2,529 US-CERT vulnerability summaries, 

and 6,854 SCAP machine-readable software flaw 

checks;

• Product dictionary with 35,222 operating system, 

application, and hardware name entries; and 

• 32,084 vulnerability advisories translated into 

Spanish.

NVD is sponsored by the Department of Homeland 

Security’s National Cyber Security Division. 

NVD’s effective reach has been extended by the use of 

NVD SCAP data by commercial security products deployed 

in thousands of organizations worldwide. Increased 

adoption of SCAP is evidenced by the increasing demand 

for NVD XML data feeds and SCAP-expressed content from 

the NVD website. Concerted outreach efforts over the last 

year have resulted in an increase in the number of vendors 

providing SCAP-expressed content.

NVD continues to play a pivotal role in the payment card 

industry (PCI) efforts to mitigate vulnerabilities in credit 

card systems. PCI mandates the use of NVD vulnerability 

severity scores in measuring the risk to payment card 

servers worldwide and for prioritizing vulnerability 

patching. PCI’s use of NVD severity scores helps enhance 

credit card transaction security and protects consumers’ 

personal information.

Throughout FY2011, NVD continued to provide access to 

vulnerability reference data and security checklists. NVD 

deployed an enhanced checklist submission web interface 

and a web service checklist submission capability. 

Additionally, the NVD now hosts a SCAP Content Validation 

Tool that can be used by creators of SCAP content to 

ensure that their SCAP content packages conform to SP 

800-126, The Technical Specification for the Security 

Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP Version 1.2, 

guidelines. Finally, NVD now supports automated SCAP 

content generation from the Common Vulnerabilities 

and Exposures (CVE) vulnerability data feed. NVD data 

is a fundamental component of our security automation 

infrastructure and is substantially increasing the security 

of networks worldwide. CSD plans to expand and improve 

the NVD in FY2012.

http://nvd.nist.gov

Contacts:

Mr. John Banghart Mr. Harold Booth

(301) 975-8514 (301) 975-8441

john.banghart@nist.gov harold.booth@nist.gov

National Checklist Program

There are many threats to information technology (IT), 

ranging from remotely launched network service exploits to 

malicious code spread through infected emails, websites, 

and downloaded files. Vulnerabilities in IT products 

are discovered daily, and many ready-to-use exploitation 

techniques are widely available on the Internet. Because 

IT products are often intended for a wide variety of 

audiences, restrictive security configuration controls are 

usually not enabled by default. As a result, many outof-the-box IT products are immediately vulnerable. In 

addition, identifying a reasonable set of security settings 

that achieve balanced risk management is a complicated, 

arduous, and time-consuming task, even for experienced 

system administrators.

To facilitate development of security configuration 

checklists for IT products and to make checklists more 

organized and usable, NIST established the National 

Checklist Program (NCP) in furtherance of its statutory 

responsibilities under the Federal Information Security 

Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Public Law 107-347, 

and also under the Cyber Security Act, which tasks NIST 

to “develop, and revise as necessary, a checklist setting 

forth settings and option selections that minimize the 

security risks associated with each computer hardware 

or software system that is, or is likely to become widely 

used within the federal government.” In February 2008, 

revised Part 39 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 

was published. Paragraph (d) of section 39.101 states, “In 

acquiring information technology, agencies shall include 

the appropriate IT security policies and requirements, 

including use of common security configurations available 

from the NIST website at http://checklists.nist.gov. 

Agency contracting officers should consult with the 

requiring official to ensure the appropriate standards 

are incorporated.” In Memorandum M08-22, Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) mandated the use of 

SCAP-validated products for continuous monitoring of 

Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) compliance. 

The NCP strives to encourage and make simple agencies’ 

compliance with these mandates. 

The goals of the NCP are to:

• Facilitate development and sharing of checklists by 

providing a formal framework for checklist developers 

to submit checklists to NIST;

• Provide guidance to developers to help them create 

standardized, high-quality checklists that conform to 

common operations environments;

• Help developers and users by providing guidelines 

for making checklists better documented and more 

usable;

• Encourage software vendors and other parties to 

develop checklists;
43

• Provide a managed process for the review, update, 

and maintenance of checklists;

• Provide an easy-to-use repository of checklists; and,

• Encourage the use of automation technologies for 

checklist application such as SCAP.

There are 195 checklists posted on the website; 36 of 

the checklists are SCAP-expressed (see section on SCAP 

above) and can be used with SCAP-validated products. 

It is anticipated that a minimum of several more 

SCAP-expressed checklists will be added in FY2012 as 

contributions come from other federal agencies and 

product vendors. Organizations can use checklists obtained 

from the NCP website (http://checklists.nist.gov) for 

automated security configuration patch assessment. NCP 

currently hosts SCAP checklists for Internet Explorer 7.0, 

Internet Explorer 8.0, Office 2007, Red Hat Enterprise 

Linux, Windows 7, Windows Vista, Windows XP, and other 

products.

To assist users in identifying automated checklist 

content, NCP groups checklists into tiers, from Tier I to 

Tier IV. NCP uses the tiers to rank checklists according 

to their automation capability. Tier III and IV checklists 

are considered production-ready and have been validated 

by the SCAP content validation tool as conforming to 

the requirements outlined in SP 800-126, The Technical 

Specification for the Security Content Automation 

Protocol (SCAP). Tier IV checklists are used in the SCAP 

Validation Program (see following section for details) 

when validating SCAP products. Tier III checklists are not 

presently used in the SCAP Validation Program; however, 

Tier III checklists should be compatible with SCAP-validated 

products. Tier II checklists document recommended 

security settings in a machine-readable, nonstandard 

format, such as a proprietary format or a product-specific 

configuration script. Tier I checklists are prose-based and 

contain no machine-readable content. Users can browse 

the checklists based on the checklist tier, IT product, IT 

product category, or authority, and also through a keyword 

search that searches the checklist name and summary for 

user-specified terms. The search results show the detailed 

checklist metadata and a link to any SCAP content for 

the checklist, as well as links to any supporting resources 

associated with the checklist.

The NCP is defined in SP 800-70 Revision 2, National 

Checklist Program for IT Products—Guidelines for 

Checklist Users and Developers, which can be found at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/.

http://checklists.nist.gov

Contact:

Mr. Stephen Quinn

(301) 975-6967

stephen.quinn@nist.gov

Security Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP) Validation Program

The SCAP Validation Program performs conformance 

testing to ensure that products correctly implement SCAP 

as defined in SP 800-126. Conformance testing is necessary 

because SCAP is a complex specification consisting of 

eleven individual specifications that work together to meet 

various use cases. A single error in product implementation 

could result in undetected vulnerabilities or policy 

noncompliance within agency and industry networks. 

The SCAP Validation Program was created by request of 

the OMB to support the Federal Desktop Core Configuration 

(FDCC) and United States Government Configuration 

Baseline (USGCB). The program coordinates its work with 

the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation 

Program (NVLAP) to set up independent conformance 

testing laboratories that conduct the testing based on 

draft NISTIR 7511 Revision 3, Security Content Automation 

Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.2 Validation Program Test 

Requirements. When testing is completed, the laboratory 

submits a test report to CSD for review and approval. SCAP 

validation testing has been designed to be inexpensive, yet 

effective. The SCAP conformance tests are either easily 

human-verifiable or automated through NIST-provided 

reference tools. To date, the program has eight accredited 

independent laboratories and has validated 43 products 

from 32 different vendors.

The SCAP Validation Program will expand in FY2012 to 

include additional capabilities, provide enhanced testing 

support, and evolve to include new technologies as SCAP 

itself matures. Current expansion includes support for the 

U.S. Government Configuration Baseline initiative, which 

plans to release configuration baselines for Microsoft 

Windows 7/IE8 and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.

http://scap.nist.gov/validation/

Contact:

Mr. John Banghart

(301) 975-8514

john.banghart@nist.gov

Systems and Emerging Technologies Security Research Group
44 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Technical Security Metrics

Measurement is the key to making major advancements in 

any scientific field, and computer security is no exception. 

Measures give us a standardized way of expressing and 

quantifying security characteristics. Because of the everincreasing complexity of threats, vulnerabilities, and 

mitigation strategies, there is a particularly strong need 

for additional research on attack, vulnerability, and 

security control measurements. Improved measurement 

capabilities in these areas would allow organizations to 

make scientifically sound decisions when planning, 

implementing, and configuring security controls. This 

would improve the effectiveness of security controls, while 

reducing costs by eliminating unnecessary and ineffective 

controls. In FY2011, CSD continued its long-term research 

efforts on technical security metrics. The first stage of this 

work involved developing specifications for measuring and 

scoring individual vulnerabilities and configurations, and 

researching how vulnerabilities from multiple hosts can 

be used in sequence to compromise particular targets. A 

summary of these efforts from the past year is presented 

below.

Vulnerability Measurement and Scoring

The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an 

industry standard that enables the security community 

to calculate the relative severity of software flaw 

vulnerabilities within information technology systems 

through sets of security metrics and formulas. During the 

past year, NIST security staff continued to provide technical 

leadership in determining how CVSS could be adapted for 

use with other types of vulnerabilities besides software 

flaws. This work has involved evaluating and refining the 

following draft specifications:

The Common Configuration Scoring System (CCSS), which 

was originally proposed in draft NISTIR 7502, The Common 

Configuration Scoring System (CCSS): Metrics for Software 

Security Configuration Vulnerabilities. CCSS is based 

on CVSS and the Common Misuse Scoring System (CMSS) 

but has been customized for use with software security 

configuration-related vulnerabilities.

This completes the first stage of CSD’s technical security 

metrics research. The second stage of the work is expected 

to involve supporting the implementation of these 

specifications, such as creating standardized reference 

data for CCSS, and researching how these specifications 

can be used together to better conceptualize and quantify 

the security posture of systems.

Contact: 

Mr. John Banghart

(301) 975-8514

john.banghart@nist.gov

Security Risk Analysis of Enterprise 

Networks Using Attack Graphs

At present, computer networks constitute the core 

component of information technology infrastructures in 

areas such as power grids, financial data systems, and 

emergency communication systems. Protection of these 

networks from malicious intrusions is critical to the 

economy and security of our nation. Vulnerabilities are 

regularly discovered in software applications which are 

exploited to stage cyber attacks. Currently, management 

of security risk of an enterprise network is more an art 

than a science. System administrators operate by instinct 

and experience rather than relying on objective metrics 

to guide and justify decision making. The objective of this 

research is to develop a standard model for measuring 

security of computer networks. A standard model will 

enable us to answer questions such as “Are we more 

secure now than yesterday?” or “How does the security 

of one network configuration compare with another one?” 

Also, having a standard model to measure network security 

will allow users, vendors, and researchers to evaluate 

methodologies and products for network security in a 

coherent and consistent manner.

CSD has approached the challenge of network security 

analysis by capturing vulnerability interdependencies and 

measuring security in the exact way that real attackers 

penetrate the network. Our methodology for security 

risk analysis is based on the model of attack graphs. We 

analyze all attack paths through a network, providing a 

probabilistic metric of the overall system risk. Through 

this metric, we analyze trade-offs between security costs 

and security benefits. 

In FY2011, we worked on validating our approach for 

realistic networks. We used a real network as a test bed 

to demonstrate the utility of this approach. The results of 

our experiments were published as a paper “An Empirical 

Study of Vulnerability Aggregation Method” in proceedings 

of the 2011 World Congress in Computer Science, Special 

Track on Security and Mission Assurance. In FY2012, we 

plan to integrate our techniques into existing attack graphbased security tools. We also plan to publish our results as 

a NIST report and as a paper in conferences and journals.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/security-risk-analysisenterprise-networks/

Contact:

Dr. Anoop Singhal

(301) 975-4432

anoop.singhal@nist.gov
45

Infrastructure Services, 

 Protocols, and Applications

Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) and 

Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)

Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) is an updated version 

of the current Internet Protocol, IPv4. The primary 

motivations for the development of IPv6 were to increase 

the number of unique IP addresses and to handle the needs 

of new Internet applications and devices. In addition, IPv6 

was designed with the following goals: increased ease 

of network management and configuration; expandable 

IP headers; improved mobility and security; and quality 

of service controls. IPv6 has been, and continues to be, 

developed and defined by the Internet Engineering Task 

Force (IETF). 

This year was a significant year for the deployment of IPv6. 

In January 2011, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 

(IANA) distributed the last five blocks of globally unique 

IPv4 addresses to the five Regional Internet Registries 

(RIRs). Once these IPv4 addresses are assigned for use, any 

organizations needing additional global IP addresses will 

be required to use IPv6. 

The NIST IPv6 Test Program, whose goal is to provide 

assurance on IPv6 conformance and interoperability of 

products, continued to operate. Additional tests were 

added: the Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity (SDOC), 

the vehicle used to enable vendors of IPv6 products to 

report the details of their products that have successfully 

executed the United States Government IPv6 (USGv6) 

tests, was improved, and a draft version of the USGv6 

Buyers’ Guide was published. 

SP 800-119, Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of 

IPv6, was published in FY2011. This document describes 

and analyzes the numerous protocols that comprise 

IPv6, including addressing, domain name system (DNS), 

routing, mobility, quality of service, multihoming, IPsec, 

etc. For each component, there is a detailed analysis 

of the differences between IPv4 and IPv6, the security 

ramifications, and any unknown aspects. It characterizes 

new security threats posed by the transition to IPv6 

and provides guidelines on IPv6 deployment, including 

transition, integration, configuration, and testing. It also 

addresses more recent significant changes in the approach 

to IPv6 transition.

As a result of both the IPv4 address depletion and the 

publication of SP 800-119, Guidelines for the Secure 

Deployment of IPv6, NIST personnel were in demand for 

interviews (press and radio) and also for presentations 

on IPv6 deployment and security (including the First 

IPv6 World Congress, the Fourth Annual IPv6 Technology 

Conference, the Information Systems Security Association, 

and numerous others).

In FY2012, NIST will continue to manage and evolve the 

USGv6 Test Program; the NIST IPv6 Profile will also be 

updated.

http://www.antd.nist.gov/usgv6

Contacts:

Ms. Sheila Frankel Mr. Douglas Montgomery

(301) 975-3297 (301) 975-3630

sheila.frankel@nist.gov dougm@nist.gov

Securing the Domain Name System (DNS)

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a global distributed 

system in which Internet addresses in mnemonic form, 

such as http://csrc.nist.gov; are converted into the 

equivalent numeric Internet Protocol (IP) addresses such 

as 129.6.13.39. Certain servers throughout the world 

maintain the databases needed, as well as perform the 

translations. A DNS server that is performing a translation 

may communicate with other Internet DNS servers if it 

does not have the data needed to translate the address 

itself.

As with other Internet-based systems, DNS is subject 

to several threats. To counter these threats, the 

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) developed a set 

of specifications for securing DNS called DNS Security 

Extensions (DNSSEC) to provide origin authentication and 

data integrity for all responses from the DNS. In partnership 

with the Department of Homeland (DHS) Security, NIST has 

been actively involved in promoting the deployment of 

DNSSEC since 2004. 

The significant achievements in FY2011 are as follows: 

• Co-Chaired the DNSSEC and Email Authentication Tiger 

Team set up by DHS and the Federal CIO Council. The goal 

of the Tiger Team was to promote DNSSEC deployment 

and work on a process of continuous monitoring of DNS 

health within the .gov;

• Worked with GSA on developing new policy for the 

.gov top-level domain (TLD);

• Continued the Secure Naming Infrastructure Pilot 

(SNIP) operations in 2011. The SNIP is a distributed 

test bed to help U.S. Government DNS administrators 

deploy DNSSEC and test new DNSSEC implementations. 

The new SNIP monitor incorporates other DNSSEC 

scanner technologies (DNSViz) for error visualization 

for administrators; and

Systems and Emerging Technologies Security Research Group
46 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

• Hosted a session in FOSE 2011 consisting of 

presentations and question and answer sessions for 

assisting agencies with DNSSEC deployments. 

Contacts:

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli Mr. Scott Rose 

(301) 975-5013 (301) 975-8439

mouli@nist.gov scott.rose@nist.gov

CSD’s Part in National and International 

ISO Security Standards Processes

Figure 1 below shows the many national and international 

standards-developing organizations (SDOs) involved in 

cybersecurity standardization. NIST CSD staff participates 

in many cybersecurity standards activities in many of 

these organizations, either in leadership positions or as 

editors and contributors. Many of CSD’s publications 

have been the basis for both national and international 

standards projects. This section of the annual report 

primarily concerns CSD standards activities in conjunction 

with INCITS Technical Committee CS1, where Dan Benigni 

serves as Chair and U.S. Head of Delegation to SC 27. 

The International Organization 

for Standardization

The International Organization for Standardization 

(ISO) is a network of the national standards institutes of 

148 countries, with the representation of one member 

per country. The scope of ISO covers standardization in 

all fields except electrical and electronic engineering 

standards, which are the responsibility of the International 

Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

The IEC prepares and publishes international standards 

for all electrical, electronic, and related technologies, 

including electronics, magnetics and electromagnetics, 

electroacoustics, multimedia, telecommunication, and 

energy production and distribution, as well as associated 

general disciplines such as terminology and symbols, 

electromagnetic compatibility, measurement and 

performance, dependability, design and development, 

safety, and the environment.

Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC1) was formed by ISO 

and IEC to be responsible for international standardization 

in the field of Information Technology. It develops, 

maintains, promotes, and facilitates IT standards required 

by global markets, meeting business and user requirements 

concerning—

 CYBER SECURITY STANDARDS DEVELOPERS
47

• Design and development of IT systems and tools;

• Performance and quality of IT products and systems;

• Security of IT systems and information;

• Portability of application programs;

• Interoperability of IT products and systems;

• Unified tools and environments;

• Harmonized IT vocabulary; and

• User-friendly and ergonomically designed user 

interfaces.

JTC1 consists of a number of subcommittees (SCs) and 

working groups that address specific technologies. SCs that 

produce standards relating to IT security include:

• SC 06 - Telecommunications and Information Exchange 

Between Systems;

• SC 17 - Cards and Personal Identification;

• SC 27 - IT Security Techniques; and

• SC 37 – Biometrics (Fernando Podio of NIST serves as 

Chair).

JTC1 also has—

• Technical Committee 68 – Financial Services;

• SC 2 - Operations and Procedures including Security;

• SC 4 – Securities;

• SC 6 - Financial Transaction Cards, Related Media and 

Operations; and

• SC 7 – Software and Systems Engineering.

The American National Standards Institute

The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is a 

private, nonprofit organization (501(c)(3)) that administers 

and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization and 

conformity assessment system.

ANSI facilitates the development of American National 

Standards (ANSs) by accrediting the procedures of 

standards-developing organizations (SDOs). The 

InterNational Committee for Information Technology 

Standards (INCITS) is accredited by ANSI.

ANSI promotes the use of U.S. standards internationally, 

advocates U.S. policy and technical positions in 

international and regional standards organizations, and 

encourages the adoption of international standards as 

national standards where they meet the needs of the user 

community.

ANSI is the sole U.S. representative and dues-paying 

member of the two major non-treaty international 

standards organizations, ISO and, via the United States 

National Committee (USNC), the IEC.

INCITS serves as the ANSI Technical Advisory Group 

(TAG) for ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1. INCITS is 

sponsored by the Information Technology Industry (ITI) 

Council, a trade association representing the leading U.S. 

providers of information technology products and services. 

INCITS currently has more than 800 published standards.

INCITS is organized into Technical Committees that focus 

on the creation of standards for different technology 

areas. Technical committees that focus on IT security and 

IT security-related technologies, or may require separate 

security standards include:

• B10 – Identification Cards and Related Devices (Sal 

Francomacaro chairs Task Group B10.12, Integrated 

Circuit Cards with Contacts);

• CS1 – Cyber Security (Dan Benigni, Chair and Richard 

Kissel, NIST Principal voting member);

• E22 – Item Authentication;

• M1 – Biometrics (Fernando Podio, Chair);

• T3 – Open Distributed Processing (ODP);

• T6 – Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology;

• CGIT1 – Corporate Governance of IT (Richard Kissel, 

NIST Principal voting member and International 

Representative); and 

• DAPS38 – Distributed Application Platforms and 

Services.

As a technical committee of INCITS, CS1 develops United 

States, national, ANSI-accredited standards in the area of 

cybersecurity. Its scope encompasses—

• Management of information security and systems;

• Management of third-party information security 

service providers;

• Intrusion detection;

• Network security;

• Incident handling;

• IT security evaluation and assurance;

• Security assessment of operational systems;

• Security requirements for cryptographic modules;

• Protection profiles;

• Role-based access control;

• Security checklists;

Systems and Emerging Technologies Security Research Group
48 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

• Security metrics;

• Cryptographic and non-cryptographic techniques and 

mechanisms including:

◦ confidentiality,

◦ entity authentication,

◦ non-repudiation,

◦ key management,

◦ data integrity,

◦ message authentication,

◦ hash functions, and

◦ digital signatures;

• Future service and applications standards supporting 

the implementation of control objectives and controls 

as defined in ISO 27001, in the areas of—

◦ business continuity, and

◦ outsourcing;

• Identity management, including:

◦ identity management framework,

◦ role-based access control, and

◦ single sign-on;

• Privacy technologies, including:

◦ privacy framework,

◦ privacy reference architecture,

◦ privacy infrastructure,

◦ anonymity and credentials, and

◦ specific privacy-enhancing technologies.

The scope of CS1 explicitly excludes the areas of work 

on cybersecurity standardization presently under way in 

INCITS B10, M1, T3, T10 and T11, as well as other standard 

groups, such as the Alliance for Telecommunications 

Industry Solutions, the Institute of Electrical and 

Electronics Engineers, Inc., the Internet Engineering Task 

Force, the Travel Industry Association of America, and 

Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9. The CS1 scope 

of work includes standardization in most of the same 

cybersecurity areas as are covered in the NIST CSD.

As the U.S. TAG to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, CS1 contributes 

to the SC 27 program of work on IT Security Techniques in 

terms of comments and contributions on SC 27 standards 

projects; votes on SC 27 standards documents at various 

stages of development; and identifies U.S. experts to 

work on various SC 27 projects or to serve in various SC 27 

leadership positions. Currently a number of CS1 members 

are serving as SC 27 document editors or co-editors on 

various standards projects, including Randy Easter, Erika 

McCallister, and Richard Kissel (all of NIST).

All input from CS1 is processed through INCITS to ANSI, 

then to SC 27. It is also a conduit for getting U.S.-

based new work item proposals and U.S.-developed 

national standards into the international SC 27 standards 

development process. In its international efforts, CS1 has 

consistently, efficiently, and in a timely manner responded 

to all calls for contributions on all international security 

standards projects in ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 27. 

Through its membership on CS1, where Dan Benigni 

serves as the nonvoting chair and Richard Kissel is the NIST 

Principal voting member, NIST contributes to many of CS1’s 

national and international IT security standards efforts. 

Internationally, there are over 90 published standards, and 

almost all have been adopted as U.S. national standards. 

There are more than 85 current international standards 

projects. 

CSD’s Role in Cybersecurity Standardization

CSD’s cybersecurity research also plays a direct role in 

the Cybersecurity Standardization efforts of CS1 at the 

national level. During FY2011:

1. The CS1 Task Group CS1.1 Role-Based Access 

Control (RBAC) published the national standard 

titled “Requirements for the Implementation 

and Interoperability of Role Based Access 

Control.” In addition, the task group started 

work on the revision of INCITS 359 – 2004, 

“Role Based Access Control (RBAC),” as well 

as INCITS Project: 2215-D, “Information 

technology -- Role Based Access Control – Policy 

Enhanced” and Project 2214-D, “Process for 

Defining Roles for Role Based Access Control.” 

NIST originally authored RBAC, and Rick Kuhn 

is the NIST Principal voting member.

2. The NIST Policy Machine research and 

development has resulted in three ongoing 

national standards projects in CS1 in the early 

stages of development. They include:

a. Next Generation Access Control - 

Implementation Requirements, Protocols 

and API Definitions (NGAC-IRPADS). Its 

assigned project number is 2193-D, and 

Roger Cummings of Symantec is the editor; 

b. Next Generation Access Control – 

Functional Architecture (NGAC-FA). Its 

assigned project number is 2194-D, and 

David Ferraiolo of NIST is the editor; and
49

c. Next Generation Access Control - Generic 

Operations & Abstract Data Structures 

(NGAC-GOADS). Its assigned project 

number is 2195-D, and Serban Gavrila of 

NIST is the editor.

Within CS1, liaisons are maintained with nearly 

20 organizations. They include the following: 

• Open Group;

• IEEE P1700 and P1619;

• Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 

(FIRST);

• American Bar Association (ABA), section on Science 

and Technology;

• ABA Federated Identity Management Legal (IdM Legal) 

Task Force;

• INCITS T11, M1, CGIT1, DAPS38 and PL22;

• Financial Services Technology Consortium (FSTC);

• Internet Security Alliance;

• Trusted Computing Group;

• Kantara Initiative Identity Assurance Working Group 

(IAWG); 

• Cloud Computing Alliance; 

• SC 7 TAG;

• Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE); 

• ITU-T Q4/17 and Q10/17; and

• The Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA). 

In FY2012, Dan Benigni will be the standards coordinator 

in CSD’s division office.

Contact:

Mr. Daniel Benigni

(301) 975-3279

benigni@nist.gov

Systems and Emerging Technologies Security Research Group
50 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Department of Commerce Gold Medal

Marianne Swanson, CSD, and;

Nada Golmie (Advanced Network 

Technologies Division [ANTD], ITL)

Citation: For developing a globally 

recognized Smart Grid standards 

framework enabling transition to a clean 

energy economy and increased United 

States competitiveness.

Department of Commerce Gold Medal

William (Tim) Polk, CSD;

Scott Rose and Douglas Montgomery both from ANTD, ITL

Citation: For the successful deployment of DNSSEC at 

the authoritative root zone that mitigates fundamental 

vulnerabilities and secures the Internet DNS.

Top Ten Government Infosec Leaders in 2011

Marianne Swanson 

GovInfoSecurity.com Top Ten Government 

Infosec Leaders in 2011. The award 

spotlights the most influential people 

in government cybersecurity for 2011. 

Those on the list contain a combination of 

position and know-how and demonstrated 

the ability to lead and collaborate. This 

year’s winners also consisted of a few 

behind-the-scenes individuals who aren’t 

as well known as others on the list, but 

have enormous sway in the government 

cybersecurity.

InterNational Committee for Information

Technology Standards Award

Fernando Podio

Fernando received the InterNational Committee for 

Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Award 

for Exceptional International Leadership for 2011 in 

recognition of numerous contributions to INCITS M1 and 

JTC 1/SC 37 and for having “proved to be an effective 

leader and diplomat in the domestic and international 

biometrics standardization activities.”

Honors & Awards
51

Federal 100 Award Winner

Donna Dodson

The Federal 100 Awards program recognized Donna 

Dodson, Chief of the Computer Security Division, for 

her leadership skills and her untiring efforts to improve 

the secure implementation, management and use of 

information technology (IT) by the federal government. 

The Federal 100 recognize government and industry leaders 

who have played pivotal roles in the federal government 

IT community and who have gone above and beyond their 

daily responsibilities to make a difference and to affect 

change. The winners are nominated by readers of Federal 

Computer Week and selected by an independent panel of 

judges. 

Donna’s creativity and her ability to work with members of 

the White House staff, intelligence agencies and industry 

on cybersecurity helped to bring these diverse communities 

together, and to use NIST’s security policies, best practices 

and tools more effectively. She was cited as one of the 

most trusted government advisers on cybersecurity.

Federal CIO 50 Award

Dr. Ron Ross

The InformationWeek Federal CIO 

50 Award recognizes a select number 

of individuals within federal, state, 

and local government based on their 

technology vision, influence among peers 

in other agencies, and an ability to show 

tangible, measurable results in the field 

of information technology.

INCITS Service Award for 2011

Dan Benigni

INCITS would like to recognize Dan Benigni’s many 

contributions. As INCITS/CS1 Chairman, his management 

skills and willingness to accept responsibilities are one of 

the major contributing factors for the successful and timely 

development of standards nationally and internationally 

within ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27. Dan’s knowledge and 

dedication on important issues reflect his commitment to 

standardization efforts. Without question, Dan Benigni 

has earned this award, and INCITS would like to recognize 

his contributions to INCITS.

V. Lee Conyers Award

Dr. Ron Ross

The V. Lee Conyers Award was created by 

the ISACA®-National Capital Area Chapter 

(NCAC-ISACA) to honor and remember V. 

Lee Conyers, a distinguished member of 

the chapter. The award recognizes an 

outstanding chapter member in the field 

of IT Audit, Security, and Control.

Honors and Awards
DRAFT PUBLICATIONS

Type & Number Publication Title Draft Released 

Date

Finalized in FY2011?

If Yes, date final 

was released

FIPS 201-2 Personal Identity Verification of Federal Employees and Contractors March 2011 No

FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) February 2011 No

SP 800-153 Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) September 2011 No

SP 800-147 BIOS Protection Guidelines February 2011 Yes = April 2011

SP 800-146 Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations May 2011 No

SP 800-145 A NIST Definition of Cloud Computing January 2011 Yes = September 2011

SP 800-144 Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing January 2011 No

SP 800-133 Recommendations for Cryptographic Key Generation August 2011 No

SP 800-131B Transitions: Validation of Transitioning Cryptographic Algorithm and Key 

Lengths

February 2011 No

SP 800-131C Transitions: Validating the Transition from FIPS 186-2 to FIPS 186-3 February 2011 No

SP 800-126 Revision 2 The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP): SCAP Version 1.2

July 2011 Yes = September 2011

SP 800-121 Revision 1 Guide to Bluetooth Security September 2011 No

SP 800-107 Revision 1 Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms September 2011 No

SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic 

Random Bit Generators

May 2011 No

SP 800-76-2 Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification April 2011 No

SP 800-67 Revision 1 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher July 2011 No

SP 800-63 Revision 1

(Third Draft)

Electronic Authentication Guideline June 2011 No

SP 800-57 Part 1 Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1: General May 2011 No

SP 800-56C (Second Draft) Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion July 2011 No

SP 800-53 Appendix J Privacy Control Catalog July 2011 No

SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key 

Wrapping

August 2011 No

SP 800-30 Revision 1 Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments September 2011 No

NISTIR 7802 Trust Model for Security Automation Data (TMSAD) Version 1.0 July 2011 Yes = September 2011

NISTIR 7756 CAESARS Framework Extension: An Enterprise Continuous Monitoring 

Technical Reference Architecture

February 2011 No

NISTIR 7698 Common Platform Enumeration: Applicability Language Specification 

Version 2.3

June 2011 Yes = August 2011

NISTIR 7697 Common Platform Enumeration: Dictionary Specification Version 2.3 June 2011 Yes = August 2011

NISTIR 7696 Common Platform Enumeration: Name Matching Specification Version 2.3 April 2011 Yes = August 2011

Key to Publications:

FIPS = Federal Information Processing Standards

SPs = Special Publications

NISTIRs = NIST Interagency Reports

ITL = Information Technology Laboratory

52 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Computer Security Division Publications

Released in FY2011 & Abstracts
Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011 53

DRAFT PUBLICATIONS

Type & Number Publication Title Draft Released 

Date

Finalized in FY2011?

If Yes, date final 

was released

NISTIR 7695 Common Platform Enumeration: Naming Specification Version 2.3 April 2011 Yes = August 2011

NISTIR 7670 Proposed Open Specifications for an Enterprise Remediation Automation 

Framework

February 2011 No

NISTIR 7511 Revision 2 Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.0 Validation Program 

Test Requirements

February 2011 No

NISTIR 7275 Revision 4 Specification for the Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format 

(XCCDF) Version 1.2

July 2011 Yes = September 2011

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS (FIPS)

None: There were no final approved FIPS during FY2011.

SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS (SPs)

SP Number Title Approval Date

SP 800-147 Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) Protection Guidelines April 2011

SP 800-145 The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing September 2011

SP 800-142 Practical Combinatorial Testing October 2010

SP 800-137 Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) for Federal Information Systems and 

Organizations

September 2011

SP 800-135 Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions December 2010

SP 800-132 Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation Part 1: Storage Applications December 2010

SP 800-131 A Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and 

Key Lengths

January 2011

SP 800-128 Guide for Security-Focused Configuration Management of Information Systems August 2011

SP 800-126 Revision 2 The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): 

SCAP Version 1.2

September 2011

SP 800-126 Revision 1 The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): 

SCAP Version 1.1

February 2011

SP 800-125 Guide to Security for Full Virtualization Technologies January 2011

SP 800-119 Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6 December 2010

SP 800-82 Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security June 2011

SP 800-78-3 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification December 2010

SP 800-70 Revision 2 National Checklist Program for IT Products Guidelines for Checklist Users and Developers February 2011

SP 800-51 Revision 1 Guide to Using Vulnerability Naming Schemes February 2011

SP 800-39 Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View February 2011

SP 800-38 A – Addendum Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing 

for CBC Mode

October 2010

NIST INTERAGENCY REPORTS (NISTIRS)

NIST IR Number Title Approval Date

NISTIR 7806 ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Requirements and Conformance Test Assertions September 2011

NISTIR 7802 Trust Model for Security Automation Data (TMSAD) Version 1.0 September 2011

NISTIR 7791 Conformance Test Architecture and Test Suite for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007 June 2011
NIST INTERAGENCY REPORTS (NISTIRS)

NIST IR Number Title Approval Date

NISTIR 7773 ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Requirements and Conformance Test Assertions February 2011

NISTIR 7771 Conformance Test Architecture for Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Version Beta 2.0 March 2011

NISTIR 7770 Security Considerations for Remote Electronic UOCAVA Voting February 2011

NISTIR 7764 Status Report on the Second Round of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition February 2011

NISTIR 7751 2010 Annual Report, Computer Security Division May 2011

NISTIR 7711 Security Best Practices for the Electronic Transmission of Election Materials for UOCAVA Voters August 2011

NISTIR 7698 Common Platform Enumeration: Applicability Language Specification Version 2.3 August 2011

NISTIR 7697 Common Platform Enumeration: Dictionary Specification Version 2.3 August 2011

NISTIR 7696 Common Platform Enumeration: Name Matching Specification Version 2.3 August 2011

NISTIR 7695 Common Platform Enumeration: Naming Specification Version 2.3 August 2011

NISTIR 7694 Specification for the Asset Reporting Format 1.1 June 2011

NISTIR 7693 Specification for Asset Identification 1.1 May 2011

NISTIR 7692 Specification for the Open Checklist Interactive Language (OCIL) Version 2.0 April 2011

NISTIR 7682 Information System Security Best Practices for UOCAVA-Supporting Systems August 2011

NISTIR 7298 Revision 1 Glossary of Key Information Security Terms February 2011

NISTIR 7275 Revision 4 Specification for the Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) Version 1.2 September 2011

ITL SECURITY BULLETINS

Release Date Title

September 2011 Managing the Configuration of Information Systems with a Focus on Security

August 2011 Protecting Industrial Control Systems – Key Components of our Nation’s Critical Infrastructures

June 2011 Guidelines for Protecting Basic Input/Output System (Bios) Firmware

May 2011 Using Security Configuration Checklists and the National Checklist Program

April 2011 Full Virtualization Technologies: Guidelines for Secure Implementation and Management

March 2011 Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission and Information System View

January 2011 Internet Protocol Version 6 (Ipv6): NIST Guidelines Help Organizations Manage the Secure Deployment of the New 

Network Protocol

December 2010 Securing WiMAX Wireless Communications

November 2010 The Exchange of Health Information: Designing a Security Architecture to Provide Information Security and Privacy

October 2010 Cyber Security Strategies for the Smart Grid: Protecting the Advanced Digital Infrastructure for Electric Power

54 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011
Special Publications (SP)

SP 800-153 (DRAFT): Guidelines for Securing Wireless 

Local Area Networks (WLANs) 

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

The purpose of this publication is to provide organizations 

with recommendations for improving the security 

configuration and monitoring of their IEEE 802.11 wireless 

local area networks (WLANs) and their devices connecting 

to those networks.

This publication supplements other NIST publications by 

consolidating and strengthening their key recommendations, 

and it points readers to the appropriate NIST publications 

for additional information (see Appendix C for the full list 

of references and Appendix A for a list of major security 

controls relevant for WLAN security). The publication 

does not eliminate the need to follow recommendations 

in other NIST publications, such as [SP800-48] and [SP800-

97]. If there is a conflict between recommendations in 

this publication and another NIST wireless publication, the 

recommendation in this publication takes precedence.

Contact:

Mr. Murugiah Souppaya

murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov

SP 800-147: Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) 

Protection Guidelines

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This document provides guidelines for preventing the 

unauthorized modification of BIOS firmware on PC client 

systems. Unauthorized modification of BIOS firmware by 

malicious software constitutes a significant threat because 

of the BIOS’s unique and privileged position within the PC 

architecture. A malicious BIOS modification can result in 

installation of an advanced persistent threat (APT)—either 

a permanent denial of service (if the BIOS is corrupted) or 

a persistent malware presence (if the BIOS is implanted 

with malware).

Contacts:

Mr. David Cooper Mr. William (Tim) Polk

david.cooper@nist.gov william.polk@nist.gov

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid Mr. Murugiah Souppaya

andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov

Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011 565

2011 Standards and Guidelines Abstracts

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)

FIPS 201-2 (DRAFT): Personal Identity Verification of 

Federal Employees and Contractors

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This standard specifies the architecture and technical 

requirements for a common identification standard for 

federal employees and contractors. The overall goal is 

to achieve appropriate security assurance for multiple 

applications by efficiently verifying the claimed identity of 

individuals seeking physical access to federally controlled 

government facilities and electronic access to government 

information systems.

The standard contains the minimum requirements for a 

federal personal identity verification system that meets 

the control and security objectives of Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 12, including identity proofing, 

registration, and issuance. The standard also provides 

detailed specifications that will support technical 

interoperability among PIV systems of federal departments 

and agencies. It describes the card elements, system 

interfaces, and security controls required to securely 

store, process, and retrieve identity credentials from the 

card. 

Contacts:

Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo Mr. William MacGregor

hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov

FIPS 180-4 (DRAFT): Secure Hash Standard (SHS)

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This standard specifies hash algorithms that can be used 

to generate digests of messages. The digests are used to 

detect whether messages have been changed since the 

digests were generated.

Contact:

Ms. Shu-jen Chang

shu-jen.chang@nist.gov
SP 800-146 (DRAFT): Cloud Computing Synopsis and 

Recommendations

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

The purpose of this document is to provide 

recommendations for information technology decision 

makers, and to explain the cloud computing technology 

area in plain terms.

Cloud computing is a developing area, and its ultimate 

strengths and weaknesses are not yet fully researched, 

documented, and tested. This document presents what is 

known, gives recommendations on how and when cloud 

computing is an appropriate tool, and indicates the limits 

of current knowledge and areas for future analysis.

Contacts:

Mr. Lee Badger Mr. Tim Grance

mark.badger@nist.gov grance@nist.gov

Mr. Jeff Voas

jeff.voas@nist.gov

SP 800-145: The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

Cloud computing is an evolving paradigm. The NIST 

definition characterizes important aspects of cloud 

computing and is intended to serve as a means for broad 

comparisons of cloud services and deployment strategies, 

and to provide a baseline for discussion from what is 

cloud computing to how to best use cloud computing. The 

service and deployment models defined form a simple 

taxonomy that is not intended to prescribe or constrain 

any particular method of deployment, service delivery, or 

business operation.

Contacts:

Mr. Peter Mell Mr. Tim Grance

peter.mell@nist.gov grance@nist.gov

SP 800-144 (DRAFT): Guidelines on Security 

and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

The purpose of this document is to provide an overview 

of public cloud computing and the security and privacy 

challenges involved. The document discusses the 

threats, technology risks, and safeguards for public 

cloud environments, and provides the insight needed to 

make informed information technology decisions on their 

treatment.

Contact:

Mr. Tim Grance

grance@nist.gov

SP 800-142: Practical Combinatorial Testing

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This publication introduces combinatorial testing and 

explains how to use it effectively for system and software 

assurance.

Contact:

Mr. Richard Kuhn

rkuhn@nist.gov

SP 800-137: Information Security Continuous 

Monitoring (ISCM) for Federal Information Systems 

and Organizations

Group: Security Management and Assurance

The purpose of this guideline is to assist organizations in 

the development of a continuous monitoring strategy and 

the implementation of a continuous monitoring program 

providing visibility into organizational assets, awareness 

of threats and vulnerabilities, and visibility into the 

effectiveness of deployed security controls. It provides 

ongoing assurance that planned and implemented security 

controls are aligned with organizational risk tolerance 

as well as the information needed to respond to risk in 

a timely manner should observations indicate that the 

security controls are inadequate. 

Contacts:

Ms. Kelley Dempsey Mr. Arnold Johnson

kelley.dempsey@nist.gov arnold.johnson@nist.gov

Mr. Kevin Stine Mr. Matthew Scholl

kevin.stine@nist.gov matthew.scholl@nist.gov

56 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011
SP 800-135: Recommendation for Existing 

Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions

Group: Cryptographic Technology

Cryptographic keys are vital to the security of Internet 

security applications and protocols. Many widely used 

Internet security protocols have their own applicationspecific Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) that are used 

to generate the cryptographic keys required for their 

cryptographic functions. This recommendation provides 

security requirements for those KDFs.

Contact:

Mr. Quynh Dang

quynh.dang@nist.gov

SP 800-133 (DRAFT): Recommendations for 

Cryptographic Key Generation

Group: Cryptographic Technology

Cryptography is often used in an information technology 

security environment to protect data that is sensitive, has 

a high value, or is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure 

or undetected modification during transmission or while in 

storage. Cryptography relies upon two basic components: 

an algorithm (or cryptographic methodology) and a 

cryptographic key. This recommendation discusses the 

generation of the keys to be managed and used by the 

approved cryptographic algorithms.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Mr. Allen Roginsky

elaine.barker@nist.gov allen.roginsky@nist.gov

SP 800-132: Recommendation for Password-Based Key 

Derivation Part 1: Storage Applications

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This recommendation specifies techniques for the 

derivation of master keys from passwords or passphrases 

to protect stored electronic data or data protection keys.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Ms. Lily Chen

elaine.barker@nist.gov lily.chen@nist.gov

SP 800-131A: Transitions: Recommendation for 

Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms 

and Key Lengths

Group: Cryptographic Technology

At the start of the 21st century, the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology (NIST) began the task of 

providing cryptographic key management guidance, 

which includes defining and implementing appropriate 

key management procedures, using algorithms that 

adequately protect sensitive information, and planning 

ahead for possible changes in the use of cryptography 

because of algorithm breaks or the availability of more 

powerful computing techniques. NIST Special Publication 

(SP) 800-57, Part 1 was the first document produced in this 

effort, and includes a general approach for transitioning 

from one algorithm or key length to another. SP 800-131A 

provides more specific guidance for transitions to the use 

of stronger cryptographic keys and more robust algorithms.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Mr. Allen Roginsky

elaine.barker@nist.gov allen.roginsky@nist.gov

SP 800-131B (DRAFT): Transitions: Validation of 

Transitioning Cryptographic Algorithm and Key 

Lengths

Group: Cryptographic Technology

At the start of the 21st century, NIST began the task 

of providing cryptographic key management guidance, 

which includes defining and implementing appropriate key 

management procedures, using algorithms that adequately 

protect sensitive information, and planning ahead for 

possible changes in the use of cryptography because of 

algorithm breaks or the availability of more powerful 

computing techniques. SP 800-57, Part 1, was the first 

document produced in this effort and includes a general 

approach for transitioning from one algorithm or key length 

to another. SP 800-131A provided more specific guidance 

for transitions to the use of stronger cryptographic keys 

and more robust algorithms. This document (SP 800-131B) 

is intended to provide more detail about the validation of 

the cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic modules 

in transition, as specified in SP 800-131A.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Mr. Allen Roginsky

elaine.barker@nist.gov allen.roginsky@nist.gov

Mr. Randy Easter Ms. Sharon Keller

randall.easter@nist.gov sharon.keller@nist.gov

Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011 57
SP 800-131C (DRAFT): Transitions: Validating the 

Transition from FIPS 186-2 to FIPS 186-3

Group: Cryptographic Technology

Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-3, 

Digital Signature Standard, was approved in June 2009 

to replace FIPS 186-2. This transition plan addresses 

both the cryptographic algorithm validations and the 

cryptographic module validations that are conducted by 

the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) 

and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), 

respectively.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Mr. Allen Roginsky

elaine.barker@nist.gov allen.roginsky@nist.gov

Mr. Randy Easter Ms. Sharon Keller

randall.easter@nist.gov sharon.keller@nist.gov

SP 800-128: Guide for Security-Focused Configuration 

Management of Information Systems

Group: Security Management and Assurance

An information system is typically in a constant state 

of change in response to new or enhanced hardware 

and software capability, patches for correcting errors 

to existing components, new security threats, changing 

business functions, etc. Implementing information system 

changes almost always results in some adjustment to 

the system information security configuration baseline. 

To ensure that adjustments to the system configuration 

do not adversely affect the security of the information 

system, a well-defined security configuration management 

process is needed. This publication provides guidelines for 

organizations responsible for managing changes to security 

configurations of federal information system computing 

environments. This publication also provides supporting 

guidance for implementation of the Configuration 

Management (CM) family of security controls defined in 

SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal 

Information Systems and Organizations. 

Contacts:

Mr. Arnold Johnson Ms. Kelley Dempsey

arnold.johnson@nist.gov kelley.dempsey@nist.gov

SP 800-126 Revision 2: The Technical Specification for 

the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP 

Version 1.2

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This document provides the definitive technical 

specification for Version 1.1 of the Security Content 

Automation Protocol (SCAP). SCAP (pronounced ess-cap) 

consists of a suite of specifications for standardizing the 

format and nomenclature by which security software 

communicates information about software flaws 

and security configurations. The document defines 

requirements for creating and processing SCAP 

content. These requirements build on the requirements 

defined within the individual SCAP component 

specifications. Each new requirement pertains either to 

using multiple component specifications together or to 

further constraining one of the individual component 

specifications. The requirements within the individual 

component specifications are not repeated in this 

document; see those specifications to access their 

requirements.

Contact:

Mr. David Waltermire Mr. Stephen Quinn

david.waltermire@nist.gov stephen.quinn@nist.gov

SP 800-126 Revision 1: The Technical Specification 

for the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): 

SCAP Version 1.2

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

Refer to abstract above (SP 800-126 Revision 2). Revision 

1 was released in February 2011. There were some highpriority updates that needed to take place, hence leading 

to Revision 2, which was released in September 2011.

SP 800-125: Guide to Security for Full Virtualization 

Technologies

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

The purpose of SP 800-125 is to discuss the security 

concerns associated with full virtualization technologies 

for server and desktop virtualization, and to provide 

recommendations for addressing these concerns. Full 

virtualization technologies run one or more operating 

systems and their applications on top of virtual hardware. 

Full virtualization is used for operational efficiency, such 

as in cloud computing, and for allowing users to run 

applications for multiple operating systems on a single 

computer.

58 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011
Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011 

Contact:

Mr. Murugiah Souppaya

murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov

SP 800-121 Revision 1 (DRAFT): Guide to Bluetooth 

Security

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

The purpose of this document is to provide information 

to organizations on the security capabilities of Bluetooth 

and provide recommendations to organizations employing 

Bluetooth technologies on securing them effectively. The 

Bluetooth versions within the scope of this publication are 

versions 1.1, 1.2, 2.0 + Enhanced Data Rate (EDR), 2.1 + 

EDR, 3.0 + High Speed (HS), and 4.0 Low Energy (LE).

Contact:

Mr. David Ferraiolo

david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

SP 800-119: Guidelines for the Secure 

Deployment of IPv6

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

The purpose of Guidelines for the Secure Deployment 

of IPv6 is to provide information security guidance 

to organizations that are planning to deploy IPv6 

technologies or are simply seeking a better understanding 

of IPv6. The scope of this document encompasses the IPv6 

protocol and related protocol specifications. IPv6-related 

security considerations are discussed with emphasis on 

deployment-related security concerns. The document also 

includes general guidance on secure IPv6 deployment and 

integration planning.

Contact:

Ms. Sheila Frankel

sheila.frankel@nist.gov

SP 800-107 Revision 1 (DRAFT): Recommendation for 

Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms

Group: Cryptographic Technology

Cryptographic hash functions that compute a fixedlength message digest from arbitrary length messages are 

widely used for many purposes in information security. 

This document provides security guidelines for achieving 

the required or desired security strengths when using 

cryptographic applications that employ the approved 

cryptographic hash functions specified in Federal 

Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 180-4. These 

include functions such as digital signature applications, 

Keyed-hash Message Authentication Codes (HMACs), and 

Hash-based Key Derivation Functions (Hash-based KDFs).

Contact:

Mr. Quynh Dang

quynh.dang@nist.gov

SP 800-90A (DRAFT): Recommendation for Random 

Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit 

Generators

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This recommendation specifies mechanisms for the 

generation of random bits using deterministic methods. 

The methods provided are based on hash functions, 

block cipher algorithms, or number theoretic problems.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Mr. John Kelsey

elaine.barker@nist.gov john.kelsey@nist.gov

SP 800-82: Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) 

Security

Group: Security Management and Assurance

SP 800-82, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) 

Security, provides guidance on how to secure Industrial 

Control Systems (ICS), including Supervisory Control and 

Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control 

Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations 

such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), while 

addressing their unique performance, reliability, and 

safety requirements. SP 800-82 provides an overview 

of ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical 

threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides 

recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the 

associated risks.

Contacts:

Mr. Keith Stouffer Dr. Ron Ross

keith.stouffer@nist.gov rross@nist.gov

59
SP 800-78-3: Cryptographic Algorithms and Key 

Sizes for Personal Identity Verification

Group: Cryptographic Technology

The scope of this recommendation encompasses the PIV 

Card, infrastructure components that support issuance 

and management of the PIV Card, and applications that 

rely on the credentials supported by the PIV Card to 

provide security services. The recommendation identifies 

acceptable symmetric and asymmetric encryption 

algorithms, digital signature algorithms, key establishment 

schemes, and message digest algorithms, and specifies 

mechanisms to identify the algorithms associated with PIV 

keys or digital signatures.

Algorithms and key sizes have been selected for 

consistency with applicable federal standards and to ensure 

adequate cryptographic strength for PIV applications. All 

cryptographic algorithms employed in this specification 

provide at least 80 bits of security strength. For detailed 

guidance on the strength of cryptographic algorithms, see 

[SP800-57(1)], Recommendation on Key Management – 

Part 1: General.

Contacts:

Mr. William Polk Mr. David Cooper

william.polk@nist.gov david.cooper@nist.gov

Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo

hferraiolo@nist.gov

SP 800-76-2 (DRAFT): Biometric Data Specification 

for Personal Identity Verification

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

FIPS 201, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) for Federal 

Employees and Contractors, defines procedures for 

the PIV life-cycle activities including identity proofing, 

registration, PIV Card issuance and re-issuance, chain-oftrust operations, and PIV Card usage. FIPS 201 also defines 

the structure of an identity credential which includes 

biometric data. Requirements on interfaces are described 

in SP 800-73. Those on cryptographic protection of the 

biometric data are described in FIPS 201 and in SP 800-78.

This document contains technical specifications for 

biometric data mandated or allowed in FIPS 201. These 

specifications reflect the design goals of interoperability, 

performance, and security of the PIV Card and PIV 

processes. This specification addresses image acquisition 

to support the background check, fingerprint template 

creation, retention, and authentication. The goals are 

addressed by normatively citing biometric standards and 

by enumerating requirements where the standards include 

options and branches. In such cases, a biometric profile 

can be used to declare what content is required and what 

is optional. This document goes further by constraining 

implementers’ interpretation of the standards. Such 

restrictions are designed to ease implementation, 

assure conformity, facilitate interoperability, and ensure 

performance, in a manner tailored for PIV applications.

Contacts:

Mr. Patrick Grother Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo

patrick.grother@nist.gov hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov

SP 800-70 Revision 2: National Checklist Program 

for IT Products Guidelines for Checklist Users and 

Developers

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This document describes security configuration checklists 

and their benefits, and explains how to use the NIST 

National Checklist Program (NCP) to find and retrieve 

checklists. The document also describes the policies, 

procedures, and general requirements for participation in 

the NCP.

Contacts:

Mr. Stephen Quinn Mr. Murugiah Souppaya

stephen.quinn@nist.gov murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov

SP 800-67 Revision 1 (DRAFT): Recommendation for 

the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block 

Cipher

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This publication specifies the Triple Data Encryption 

Algorithm (TDEA), including its primary component 

cryptographic engine, the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA). 

When implemented in an SP 800-38 series-compliant mode 

of operation and in a FIPS 140-2-compliant cryptographic 

module, TDEA may be used by federal organizations to 

protect sensitive unclassified data. Protection of data 

during transmission or while in storage may be necessary to 

maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the information 

represented by the data. This recommendation defines 

the mathematical steps required to cryptographically 

protect data using TDEA and to subsequently process 

such protected data. The TDEA is made available for use 

by federal agencies within the context of a total security 

program consisting of physical security procedures, good 

information management practices, and computer system/

network access controls.

60 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011
Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011 

Contact:

Ms. Elaine Barker

elaine.barker@nist.gov

SP 800-63, Revision 1 (Third DRAFT): Electronic 

Authentication Guideline

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This recommendation provides technical guidelines for 

federal agencies implementing electronic authentication, 

and it is not intended to constrict the development or use 

of standards outside of this purpose. The recommendation 

covers remote authentication of users over open networks. 

It defines technical requirements for each of four levels of 

assurance in the areas of identity proofing, registration, 

tokens, management processes, authentication protocols, 

and related assertions.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Newton Mr. Ray Perlner

elaine.newton@nist.gov ray.perlner@nist.gov

Mr. Tim Polk

william.polk@nist.gov

SP 800-57, Part 1 (DRAFT): Recommendation for Key 

Management: Part 1: General

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This recommendation provides cryptographic key 

management guidance. It consists of three parts. Part 

1 provides general guidance and best practices for the 

management of cryptographic keying material. Part 

2 provides guidance on policy and security planning 

requirements for U.S. government agencies. Finally, Part 3 

provides guidance when using the cryptographic features 

of current systems.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker Mr. William Polk

elaine.barker@nist.gov william.polk@nist.gov

SP 800-56C (Second DRAFT): Recommendation for Key 

Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This recommendation specifies techniques for the 

derivation of keying material from a shared secret 

established during a key establishment scheme defined 

in SPs 800-56A or 800-56B through an extraction-thenexpansion procedure.

Contact:

Ms. Lily Chen

lily.chen@nist.gov

SP 800-53 Appendix J (DRAFT): Privacy Control 

Catalog

Group: Security Management and Assurance

Appendix J, Privacy Control Catalog, is a new addition 

to NIST’s family of standards and guidelines that will be 

incorporated into the 2011 update to Special Publication 

800-53, Revision 4, projected for release in December 

2011. Due to the importance and special nature of the 

material in this Appendix, it is being publicly vetted 

separately from the other changes to the publication 

which will be released later this year. The objectives of 

the Privacy Appendix are fourfold:

• Provide a structured set of privacy controls, based on 

international standards and best practices, that help 

organizations enforce requirements deriving from 

federal privacy legislation, policies, regulations, 

directives, standards, and guidance;

• Establish a linkage and relationship between privacy 

and security controls for purposes of enforcing 

respective privacy and security requirements which 

may overlap in concept and in implementation 

within federal information systems, programs, and 

organizations;

• Demonstrate the applicability of the NIST 

Risk Management Framework in the selection, 

implementation, assessment, and monitoring of 

privacy controls deployed in federal information 

systems, programs, and organizations; and

• Promote closer cooperation between privacy and 

security officials within the federal government 

to help achieve the objectives of senior leaders/

executives in enforcing the requirements in federal 

privacy legislation, policies, regulations, directives, 

standards, and guidance.

Contact:

Dr. Ron Ross

rross@nist.gov

61
SP 800-51 Revision 1: Guide to Using Vulnerability 

Naming Schemes

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This publication provides recommendations for using two 

vulnerability naming schemes: Common Vulnerabilities and 

Exposures (CVE) and Common Configuration Enumeration 

(CCE). Draft SP 800-51 Revision 1 gives an introduction to 

both naming schemes and makes recommendations for enduser organizations on using their names. The publication 

also presents recommendations for software and service 

vendors on how they should use vulnerability names and 

naming schemes in their product and service offerings.

Contact:

Mr. David Waltermire

david.waltermire@nist.gov

SP 800-39: Managing Information Security Risk: 

Organization, Mission, and Information System View

Group: Security Management and Assurance

SP 800-39 is the flagship document in the series of 

information security standards and guidelines developed 

by NIST in response to FISMA. The purpose of Special 

Publication 800-39 is to provide guidance for an integrated, 

organization-wide program for managing information 

security risk to organizational operations (i.e., mission, 

functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets, 

individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting 

from the operation and use of federal information systems. 

Special Publication 800-39 provides a structured, yet 

flexible approach for managing risk that is intentionally 

broad-based, with the specific details of assessing, 

responding to, and monitoring risk on an ongoing basis 

provided by other supporting NIST security standards and 

guidelines. The guidance provided in this publication is 

not intended to replace or subsume other risk-related 

activities, programs, processes, or approaches that 

organizations have implemented or intend to implement 

addressing areas of risk management covered by other 

legislation, directives, policies, programmatic initiatives, 

or mission/business requirements. Rather, the risk 

management guidance described herein is complementary 

to and should be used as part of a more comprehensive 

Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) program.

Contacts:

Dr. Ron Ross Mr. Arnold Johnson

rross@nist.gov arnold.johnson@nist.gov

Ms. Marianne Swanson

marianne.swanson@nist.gov

SP 800-38 A – Addendum: Recommendation for 

Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants 

of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode

Group: Cryptographic Technology

A limitation to Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, as 

specified in SP 800-38A, Ref. [1], is that the plaintext 

input must consist of a sequence of blocks. (In the rest of 

this publication, a block is called a “complete block” to 

emphasize the contrast with a “partial block” whose bit 

length is smaller than the block size.) Although Appendix 

A of Ref. [1] describes how padding methods can be used 

to meet this requirement, in such cases, the length of 

the resulting ciphertext expands over the length of the 

unpadded plaintext by the number of padding bits.

This addendum to Ref. [1] specifies three variants of CBC 

mode that accept any plaintext input whose bit length is 

greater than or equal to the block size, whether or not the 

length is a multiple of the block size. Unlike the padding 

methods discussed in Ref. [1], these variants avoid 

ciphertext expansion.

Contact:

Mr. Morris Dworkin

morris.dworkin@nist.gov

SP 800-38F (DRAFT): Recommendation for Block Cipher 

Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This publication is the sixth part in a series of 

recommendations regarding the modes of operation of 

block cipher algorithms. The purpose of this part is to 

provide approved methods for key wrapping, i.e., the 

protection of cryptographic keys.

This publication describes cryptographic methods that 

are approved for “key wrapping,” i.e., the protection of 

the confidentiality and integrity of cryptographic keys. In 

addition to describing existing methods, this publication 

specifies two new deterministic authenticated encryption 

modes of operation of the Advanced Encryption Standard 

(AES) algorithm: the AES Key Wrap (KW) mode and the AES 

Key Wrap With Padding (KWP) mode. The analogous mode 

with the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) as the 

underlying block cipher, called TKW, is also specified, to 

support legacy applications.

Contact:

Mr. Morris Dworkin

morris.dworkin@nist.gov

62 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011
Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011 

SP 800-30 Revision 1 (DRAFT): Guide for Conducting 

Risk Assessments

Group: Security Management and Assurance

The purpose of Special Publication 800-30 is to provide 

guidance for conducting risk assessments of federal 

information systems and organizations. Risk assessments, 

carried out at all three tiers in the risk management 

hierarchy, are part of an overall risk management process—

providing senior leaders/executives with the information 

needed to determine appropriate courses of action to take 

in response to identified risks. In particular, this document 

provides practitioners with practical guidance for carrying 

out each of the three steps in the risk assessment process 

(i.e., prepare for the assessment, conduct the assessment, 

and maintain the assessment) and how risk assessments 

and other organizational risk management processes 

complement and inform each other. Special Publication 

800-30 also provides guidance on identifying risk factors 

to monitor on an ongoing basis, so that organizations 

can determine whether levels of risk have increased to 

unacceptable levels (i.e., exceeding organizational risk 

tolerance) and different courses of action should be taken.

Contacts:

Dr. Ron Ross Mr. Arnold Johnson

rross@nist.gov arnold.johnson@nist.gov

Ms. Kelley Dempsey

kelley.dempsey@nist.gov

NIST Interagency Reports (NIST IRs)

NISTIR 7806: ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Requirements 

and Conformance Test Assertions

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

The current version of the ANSI/NIST-ITL standard 

“Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial 

& Other Biometric Information” is specified in two parts. 

Part 1, ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007, specifies the traditional 

format, and Part 2, ANSI/NIST-ITL 2-2008, specifies a 

NIEM-conformant XML format. Both parts have been 

combined into one document, which is being revised and 

augmented. The Computer Security Division (CSD) of NIST/

ITL has developed a set of test assertions based on the 

requirements specified in the 4th draft of the new ANSI/

NIST-ITL standard. Over 1,200 test assertions have been 

identified and organized into a set of tables to assist in 

the development of a conformance test tool designed 

to test implementations of the new version of the 

ANSI/NIST-ITL standard for selected record types. These 

tables were contributed to the Conformance Testing 

Methodology (CTM) Working Group which was recently 

established by NIST/ITL to develop a CTM for the new 

version of the ANSI/NIST-ITL (AN-2011) standard. A ballot 

was conducted on a revised draft (5th draft) of the AN2011 standard. A new draft will be developed based on 

the comments received as a result of this ballot. As the 

technical content of the AN-2011 draft standard evolves 

towards approval and publication, and comments on the 

assertion tables in this document are received, revised 

versions of these tables will be developed until they 

fully address the requirements of the approved AN-2011 

standard. This publication documents the assertions 

developed and the terms, operands, and operators used 

in defining these assertions. Brief information on previous 

and ongoing conformance test tools development within 

NIST/ITL CSD is included.

Contacts:

Mr. Fernando Podio Mr. Dylan Yaga

fernando.podio@nist.gov dylan.yaga@nist.gov

NISTIR 7802: Trust Model for Security Automation 

Data 1.0 (TMSAD) 

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This report defines the Trust Model for Security 

Automation Data 1.0 (TMSAD), which permits users to 

establish integrity, authentication, and traceability for 

security automation data. Since security automation 

data is primarily stored and exchanged using Extensible 

Markup Language (XML) documents, the focus of the trust 

model is on the processing of XML documents. The trust 

model is composed of recommendations on how to use 

existing specifications to represent signatures, hashes, key 

information, and identity information in the context of an 

XML document within the security automation domain.

Contact

Mr. Harold Booth

harold.booth@nist.gov

63
NISTIR 7791: Conformance Test Architecture and 

Test Suite for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

The Computer Security Division of NIST/ITL supports 

the development of biometric conformance testing 

methodology standards and other conformity assessment 

efforts through active technical participation in the 

development of these standards and the associated 

conformance test architectures and test suites. The 

ANSI/NIST-ITL standard “Data Format for the Interchange 

of Fingerprint, Facial & Other Biometric Information” 

is used by law enforcement, intelligence, military, and 

homeland security organizations throughout the world. 

The current version specified in its Traditional Format, 

is Part 1: ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007. Although a revised and 

augmented version of the standard is under development, 

the 2007 version is still widely used. The Conformance Test 

Architecture and Test Suite described in this publication 

are designed to test implementations of ANSI/NIST 

ITL 1-2007. The code (Beta 0.4) is currently designed to 

support testing of selected record types of the standard 

but can be extended to support other record types as 

required. A high-level overview of the architecture and test 

suite as well as software details and the code structure are 

provided. A quick-start user guide and a comprehensive 

table of the standard’s requirements and the associated 

implemented conformance test assertions (over 530) are 

included.

Contacts:

Mr. Fernando Podio Mr. Dylan Yaga

fernando.podio@nist.gov dylan.yaga@nist.gov

NISTIR 7788: Security Risk Analysis of Enterprise 

Networks Using Probabilistic Attack Graphs

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

Today’s information systems face sophisticated attackers 

who combine multiple vulnerabilities to penetrate 

networks with devastating impact. The overall security 

of an enterprise network cannot be determined by simply 

counting the number of vulnerabilities. To accurately 

assess the security of enterprise systems, one must 

understand how vulnerabilities can be combined to stage 

an attack. We model such composition of vulnerabilities 

through probabilistic attack graphs, which show all paths 

of attacks that allow incremental network penetration. 

We propagate attack likelihoods through the attack graph, 

yielding a novel way to measure the security risk of 

enterprise systems. We use this metric for risk mitigation 

analysis to maximize the security of enterprise systems. 

We believe that our methodology based on probabilistic 

attack graphs can be used to evaluate and strengthen the 

overall security of enterprise networks.

Contact:

Dr. Anoop Singhal

anoop.singhal@nist.gov

NISTIR 7773: An Application of Combinatorial 

Methods to Conformance Testing for Document 

Object Model Events

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This report describes the use of combinatorial test 

methods to reduce the cost of testing for the Document 

Object Model Events standard while maintaining an 

equivalent level of assurance. More than 36,000 tests – all 

possible combinations of equivalence class values –were 

reduced by approximately a factor of 20 with no reduction 

in error detection effectiveness.

Contact:

Mr. Richard Kuhn

rkuhn@nist.gov

NISTIR 7771: Conformance Test Architecture for 

Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Version Beta 2.0

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

The success of biometric applications is particularly 

dependent on the interoperability of biometric systems. 

Deploying these systems requires a comprehensive 

portfolio of biometric standards developed in support of 

interoperability and data interchange. A number of these 

domestic and international standards have been published 

and others are under development. The existence of 

these standards alone is not enough to demonstrate that 

products meet the technical requirements specified in the 

standards. Conformance testing captures the technical 

description of a specification and measures whether an 

implementation faithfully implements the specification. 

The Computer Security Division of NIST/ITL supports 

conformity assessment efforts through active technical 

64 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011
Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011 

participation in the development of conformance 

testing methodology standards and the development of 

associated conformance test architectures (CTAs) and 

test suites (CTSs). This NISTIR discusses the technological 

characteristics of the recently released CTA Beta 2.0. 

This architecture supports CTSs such as those designed to 

test implementations of biometric data interchange data 

formats. The information provided includes CTA module 

communication methods, key CTA features and highlevel sequence diagrams such as testing and decoding 

operations. It also addresses an introduction to testing 

binary data, structure testing by groups of fields, and a 

discussion on test cases. Ongoing work on related tools 

development is also presented.

Contacts:

Mr. Fernando Podio Mr. Dylan Yaga

fernando.podio@nist.gov dylan.yaga@nist.gov

NISTIR 7770: Security Considerations for Remote 

Electronic UOCAVA Voting

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This document outlines the basic process for the 

distribution of election material including registration 

material and blank ballots to the Uniformed and Oversea 

Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) voters. It describes 

the technologies that can be used to support the electronic 

dissemination of election material along with security 

techniques – both technical and procedural – that can 

protect this transfer. The purpose of the document is to 

inform Election Officials about the current technologies 

and techniques that can be used to improve the delivery of 

election material for UOCAVA voters. This document is part 

of a series of documents that address the UOCAVA voting. 

The first NIST publication on UOCAVA voting, NISTIR 7551, 

A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems, was released 

in December 2008. In addition to NISTIR 7551, NIST has 

released NISTIR 7770, Security Considerations for Remote 

Electronic UOCAVA Voting, Accessibility and Usability 

Considerations for Remote Electronic UOCAVA Voting, and 

NISTIR 7682, Information Systems Security Best Practices 

for UOCAVA-Supporting Systems.

Contact:

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid

andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

NISTIR 7764: Status Report on the Second Round of the 

SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition

Group: Cryptographic Technology

NIST opened a public competition on November 2, 2007, 

to develop a new cryptographic hash algorithm - SHA3, which will augment the hash algorithms currently 

specified in Federal Information Processing Standard 

(FIPS) 180-3, Secure Hash Standard. The competition was 

NIST’s response to advances in the cryptanalysis of hash 

algorithms. NIST received 64 submissions in October 2008, 

and selected 51 candidate algorithms as the first-round 

candidates on December 10, 2008, and 14 as the secondround candidates on July 24, 2009. One year was allocated 

for the public review of the second-round candidates. On 

December 9, 2010, NIST announced five SHA-3 finalists to 

advance to the third (and final) round of the competition. 

This report summarized the evaluation and selection of 

the five finalists - BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Keccak, and Skein.

Contacts:

Ms. Shu-jen Chang Mr. Ray Perlner

shu-jen.chang@nist.gov ray.perlner@nist.gov

Mr. Larry Bassham Mr. Morris Dworkin

lawrence.bassham@nist.gov morris.dworkin@nist.gov

Mr. John Kelsey Mr. Rene Peralta

john.kelsey@nist.gov rene.peralta@nist.gov

NISTIR 7756 (DRAFT): CAESARS Framework 

Extension: An Enterprise Continuous Monitoring 

Technical Reference Architecture

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies

Security Research

This publication and its supporting documents present 

an enterprise continuous monitoring technical reference 

model that extends the framework provided by the 

DHS Federal Network Security CAESARS architecture. 

This extension enables added functionality, defines 

each subsystem in more detail, and further leverages 

security automation standards. It also extends CAESARS 

to allow for large implementations that need a multitier architecture and focuses on the necessary intertier communications. The goal of this document is to 

facilitate enterprise continuous monitoring by presenting 

a reference model that enables organizations to aggregate 

collected data from across a diverse set of security tools, 

analyze that data, perform scoring, enable user queries, 

and provide overall situational awareness. The model 

design is focused on enabling organizations to realize this 

65
capability by leveraging their existing security tools and 

thus avoiding complicated and resource-intensive custom 

tool integration efforts.

Contacts:

Mr. David Waltermire Mr. Peter Mell

david.waltermire@nist.gov peter.mell@nist.gov

Mr. Harold Booth

harold.booth@nist.gov

NISTIR 7751: 2010 Annual Report, Computer 

Security Division

Group: Security Management and Assurance

This annual report covers the work conducted within the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Computer 

Security Division during Fiscal Year 2010 (October 1, 

2009 to September 30, 2010). It discusses all projects 

and programs within the division, staff highlights, and 

publications.

Contacts:

Mr. Patrick O’Reilly Mr. Kevin Stine

patrick.oreilly@nist.gov kevin.stine@nist.gov

NISTIR 7711: Security Best Practices for the Electronic 

Transmission of Election Materials for UOCAVA Voters

Group: Cryptographic Technology

This document outlines the basic process for the 

distribution of election material including registration 

material and blank ballots to UOCAVA voters. It describes 

the technologies that can be used to support the electronic 

dissemination of election material along with security 

techniques – both technical and procedural – that can 

protect this transfer. The purpose of the document is to 

inform Election Officials about the current technologies 

and techniques that can be used to improve the delivery of 

election material for UOCAVA voters. This document is part 

of a series of documents that address the UOCAVA voting. 

The first NIST publication on UOCAVA voting, entitled 

NISTIR 7551, A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems, 

was released in December 2008. In addition to NISTIR 7551, 

NIST has released NISTIR 7770, Security Considerations 

for Remote Electronic UOCAVA Voting, Accessibility and 

Usability Considerations for Remote Electronic UOCAVA 

Voting, and NISTIR 7682, Information Systems Security 

Best Practices for UOCAVA-Supporting Systems.

Contact:

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid

andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

NISTIR 7698: Common Platform Enumeration: 

Applicability Language Specification Version 2.3

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This report defines the Common Platform Enumeration 

(CPE) Applicability Language version 2.3 specification. The 

CPE Applicability Language specification is part of a stack 

of CPE specifications that support a variety of use cases 

relating to IT product description and naming. The CPE 

Applicability Language data model builds on top of other 

CPE specifications to provide the functionality required 

to allow CPE users to construct complex groupings of 

CPE names to describe IT platforms. These groupings are 

referred to as applicability statements because they are 

used to designate which platforms particular guidance, 

policies, etc., apply to. This report defines the semantics 

of the CPE Applicability Language data model and the 

requirements that IT products and CPE Applicability 

Language documents must meet for conformance with the 

CPE Applicability Language version 2.3 specification.

Contacts:

Mr. David Waltermire Mr. Paul Cichonski

david.waltermire@nist.gov paul.cichonski@nist.gov

NISTIR 7697: Common Platform Enumeration: 

Dictionary Specification Version 2.3

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This report defines the Common Platform Enumeration 

(CPE) Dictionary version 2.3 specification. The CPE 

Dictionary Specification is a part of a stack of CPE 

specifications that support a variety of use cases relating 

to IT product description and naming. An individual CPE 

dictionary is a repository of IT product names, with 

each name in the repository identifying a unique class 

of IT product in the world. This specification defines the 

semantics of the CPE Dictionary data model and the rules 

associated with CPE dictionary creation and management. 

The report also defines and explains the requirements that 

IT products and services, including CPE dictionaries, must 

meet for conformance with the CPE Dictionary version 2.3 

specification.

Contacts:

Mr. David Waltermire Mr. Paul Cichonski

david.waltermire@nist.gov paul.cichonski@nist.gov

66 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011
Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011 

NISTIR 7696: Common Platform Enumeration: Name 

Matching Specification Version 2.3

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This report defines the Common Platform Enumeration 

(CPE) Name Matching version 2.3 specification. The CPE 

Name Matching specification is part of a stack of CPE 

specifications that support a variety of use cases relating 

to IT product description and naming. The CPE Name 

Matching specification provides a method for conducting 

a one-to-one comparison of a source CPE name to a target 

CPE name. In addition to defining the specification, the 

report also defines and explains the requirements that IT 

products must meet for conformance with the CPE Name 

Matching version 2.3 specification.

Contacts:

Mr. David Waltermire Mr. Harold Booth

david.waltermire@nist.gov harold.booth@nist.gov

NISTIR 7695: Common Platform Enumeration: Naming 

Specification Version 2.3

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This report defines the Common Platform Enumeration 

(CPE) Naming version 2.3 specification. The CPE Naming 

specification is a part of a stack of CPE specifications 

that support a variety of use cases relating to IT product 

description and naming. The CPE Naming specification 

defines the logical structure of names for IT product classes 

and the procedures for binding and unbinding these names 

to and from machine-readable encodings. The report also 

defines and explains the requirements that IT products 

must meet for conformance with the CPE Naming version 

2.3 specification.

Contact:

Mr. David Waltermire

david.waltermire@nist.gov

NISTIR 7694: Specification for the Asset Reporting 

Format 1.1

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This specification describes the Asset Reporting Format 

(ARF), a data model for expressing the transport format 

of information about assets and the relationships 

between assets and reports. The standardized data model 

facilitates the reporting, correlating, and fusing of asset 

information throughout and between organizations. 

ARF is vendor- and technology-neutral, flexible, and 

suited for a wide variety of reporting applications. The 

intent of ARF is to provide a uniform foundation for the 

expression of reporting results, fostering more widespread 

application of sound IT management practices. ARF 

can be used for any type of asset, not just IT assets.

Contact:

Mr. David Waltermire

david.waltermire@nist.gov

NISTIR 7693: Specification for Asset Identification 1.1

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

Asset identification plays an important role in an 

organization’s ability to quickly correlate different sets 

of information about assets. This specification provides 

the necessary constructs to uniquely identify assets 

based on known identifiers and/or known information 

about the assets. The specification describes the purpose 

of asset identification, a data model for identifying 

assets, methods for identifying assets, and guidance 

on how to use asset identification. It also identifies a 

number of known use cases for asset identification.

Contact:

Mr. David Waltermire

david.waltermire@nist.gov

67
NISTIR 7692: Specification for the Open Checklist 

Interactive Language (OCIL) Version 2.0

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies

Security Research

This report defines version 2.0 of the Open Checklist 

Interactive Language (OCIL). The intent of OCIL is to 

provide a standardized basis for expressing questionnaires 

and related information, such as answers to questions 

and final questionnaire results, so that the questionnaires 

can use a standardized, machine-readable approach to 

interacting with humans and using information stored 

during previous data collection efforts. OCIL documents 

are Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based. The report 

defines and explains the requirements that IT products and 

OCIL documents asserting conformance with the OCIL 2.0 

specification must meet.

Contact:

Mr. David Waltermire

david.waltermire@nist.gov

NISTIR 7682: Information System Security 

Best Practices for UOCAVA-Supporting Systems

Group: Cryptographic Technology

IT systems used to support UOCAVA voting face a variety 

of threats. If IT systems are not selected, configured, and 

managed using security practices commensurate with the 

importance of the services they provide and the sensitivity 

of the data they handle, a security compromise could 

carry consequences for the integrity of the election and 

the confidentiality of sensitive voter information. Failure 

to adequately address threats to these systems could 

prevent voters from casting ballots, expose individuals 

to identity fraud, or even compromise the results of an 

election. This document offers procedural and technical 

guidance, along with references to additional resources, 

to assist jurisdictions with the secure deployment of these 

systems.

Contact:

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid

andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

NISTIR 7670 (DRAFT): Proposed Open Specifications 

for an Enterprise Remediation Automation Framework

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

The success of SCAP in automated system assessment has 

fostered research related to the development of similar 

open specifications in support of enterprise remediation. 

Enterprise remediation is focused on delivering capabilities 

that allow organizations to identify, describe and implement 

desired system changes across the enterprise. Remediation 

actions can include changes to the configuration of an 

operating system or application, installation of a software 

patch, or the installation or removal of applications and 

libraries. This report examines technical use cases for 

enterprise remediation, identifies high-level requirements 

for these use cases, and proposes a set of emerging 

specifications that satisfy those requirements.

This report is a product of ongoing collaboration between 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 

the US Department of Defense, and the MITRE Corporation. 

Participation from a broader community of interested 

parties is actively sought to help define, refine and mature 

proposed remediation standards.

Contact:

Mr. David Waltermire

david.waltermire@nist.gov

NISTIR 7511 Revision 2: Security Content 

Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.0 

Validation Program Test Requirements

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This report defines the requirements and associated test 

procedures necessary for products to achieve one or more 

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) validations. 

Validation is awarded based on a defined set of SCAP 

capabilities by independent laboratories that have been 

accredited for SCAP testing by the NIST National Voluntary 

Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP).

Contacts:

Mr. David Waltermire Mr. John Banghart

david.waltermire@nist.gov john.banghart@nist.gov

Mr. Stephen Quinn

stephen.quinn@nist.gov

68 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011
Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011 

NISTIR 7298 Revision 1: Glossary of Key 

Information Security Terms

Group: Security Management and Assurance

This glossary of key information security terms has been 

extracted from Federal Information Processing Standards 

(FIPS), Special Publication (SP) 800 series, NIST Interagency 

Report (NISTIR) series, and the Committee for National 

Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 4009 (Information 

Assurance Glossary). The terms included are not allinclusive of terms found in these publications, but are a 

subset of those most frequently used. The purpose of this 

glossary is to provide a central resource of definitions most 

commonly used in NIST and CNSS publications. Each entry 

in the glossary points to one or more source NIST or CNSS 

publications, and in addition, other supplemental sources 

where appropriate. As we are continually refreshing out 

publication site, terms included in the glossary come from 

our more recent publications.

Contact:

Mr. Richard Kissel

richard.kissel@nist.gov

NISTIR 7275 Revision 4: Specification for the 

Extensible Configuration Checklist Description 

Format (XCCDF) Version 1.2

Group: Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research

This report specifies the data model and Extensible 

Markup Language (XML) representation for the Extensible 

Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) Version 

1.2. An XCCDF document is a structured collection of 

security configuration rules for some set of target systems. 

The XCCDF specification is designed to support information 

interchange, document generation, organizational and 

situational tailoring, automated compliance testing, and 

scoring. The specification also defines a data model and 

format for storing results of security guidance or checklist 

testing. The intent of XCCDF is to provide a uniform 

foundation for expression of security checklists and 

other configuration guidance, and thereby foster more 

widespread application of good security practices.

Contact:

Mr. Stephen Quinn

stephen.quinn@nist.gov

69
Guest Research Internships at NIST

Opportunities are available at NIST for 6- to 24-month 

internships within CSD. Qualified individuals should contact 

CSD, provide a statement of qualifications, and indicate 

the area of work that is of interest. Generally speaking, 

the salary costs are borne by the sponsoring institution; 

however, in some cases, these guest research internships 

carry a small monthly stipend paid by NIST. For further 

information, contact:

Ms. Donna Dodson, (301) 975-8443, 

donna.dodson@nist.gov or

Mr. Matthew Scholl, (301) 975-2941, 

matthew.scholl@nist.gov

Details at NIST for Government or 

Military Personnel

Opportunities are available at NIST for 6- to 24-month 

details at NIST in CSD. Qualified individuals should contact 

CSD, provide a statement of qualifications, and indicate 

the area of work that is of interest. Generally speaking, the 

salary costs are borne by the sponsoring agency; however, 

in some cases, agency salary costs may be reimbursed by 

NIST. For further information, contact: 

Ms. Donna Dodson, (301) 975-8443, 

donna.dodson@nist.gov or 

Mr. Matthew Scholl, (301) 975-2941, 

matthew.scholl@nist.gov

Federal Computer Security Program 

Managers’ Forum (FCSPM)

The FCSPM Forum is covered in detail in the Outreach 

section of this report. Membership is free and open to 

federal employees. For further information, contact:

Mr. Kevin Stine, (301) 975-4483, kevin.stine@nist.gov

or visit the FCSPM Forum website at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/

forum/membership.html

Security Research

NIST occasionally undertakes security work, primarily 

in the area of research, funded by other agencies. 

Such sponsored work is accepted by NIST when it can 

cost-effectively further the goals of NIST and the sponsoring 

institution. For further information, contact:

Donna Dodson, Chief, 

Computer Security Division, donna.dodson@nist.gov

Funding Opportunities at NIST

NIST funds industrial and academic research in a 

variety of ways. The Small Business Innovation Research 

Program funds R&D proposals from small businesses; see 

www.nist.gov/sbir. We also offer other grants to encourage 

work in specific fields: precision measurement, fire 

research, and materials science. Grants/awards supporting 

research at industry, academia, and other institutions are 

available on a competitive basis through several different 

Institute offices:

For general information on NIST grants programs, 

please contact:

Christopher Hunton at (301) 975-5718 

or christopher.hunton@nist.gov.

Further details on funding opportunities may be found on 

http://www.nist.gov/director/ocfo/grants/grants.cfm

70 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Ways to Engage Our Division and NIST
Summer Undergraduate Research 

Fellowship (SURF)

Curious about physics, electronics, manufacturing, 

chemistry, materials science, or structural 

engineering? Intrigued by nanotechnology, fire 

research, information technology, or robotics? 

Tickled by biotechnology or biometrics? Have an 

intellectual fancy for superconductors or perhaps 

semiconductors?

Here’s your chance to satisfy that curiosity, 

by spending part of your summer working 

elbow-to-elbow with researchers at NIST, one 

of the world’s leading research organizations 

and home to three Nobel Prize winners. Gain 

valuable hands-on experience, work with 

cutting-edge technology, and sample the Washington, 

D.C., area. And get paid while you’re learning. 

Applications must be submitted by an academic 

institution (e.g., by the chair of an academic 

department or by appropriate administrative staff).

SURF is a partnership, supported by NIST, the 

National Science Foundation, and the participating 

colleges and universities. Additional information on 

student eligibility criteria, plan of operation, and 

contacts can be found through the website:

http://www.nist.gov/itl/itl-surf-program.cfm

or contact:

NIST SURF Program

100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8400

Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8499

Ways to Engage Our Division and NIST 71
Acknowledgements

The editor, Patrick O’Reilly of the Computer Security Division, wishes to thank his colleagues in the Computer Security 

Division, who provided write-ups on their 2011 project highlights and accomplishments for this annual report (their names 

are mentioned after each project write-up). The editor would also like to acknowledge Shirley Radack, Elizabeth Lennon, 

Lisa Carnahan, Kevin Stine, and Judy Barnard (all of NIST) for reviewing and providing feedback for this annual report.

72 Computer Security Division Annual Report - 2011

Acknowledgements
Table of Contents 

Welcome ................................................................. 1

Division Organization ................................................. 2

The Computer Security Division Implements

the Federal Information Security Management

Act of 2002.............................................................. 3

Security Management and Assurance Group......................4

Strategic Goal & Overview: .................................................... 4

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA Project)

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 

 Implementation Project – Phase I ..................................................4

Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 

 Implementation Project – Phase II..................................................5

Outreach and Awareness........................................................ 6

Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC).........................................6

Federal Computer Security Program Managers’ Forum............................7

Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA).........8

Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) .........................9

Small and Medium-Sized Business (SMB) Outreach............................... 11

Health Information Technology Security ....................................11

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) ...................12

Smart Grid Cyber Security.....................................................13

ICT Supply Chain Risk Management ..........................................14

CAVP & CMVP Program..........................................................14

Cryptographic Validation Programs and Laboratory Accreditation............. 15

Automated Security Testing and Test Suite Development....................... 18

ISO Standardization of Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules... 19

Cryptographic Technology Group ................................. 20

Strategic Goal & Overview ....................................................20

Cryptographic Standards Toolkit..............................................20

Hash Algorithms and the Secure Hash Standard (SHA)-3 

 Competition ......................................................................... 20

Block Cipher Modes of Operation ................................................... 21

Key Management ...................................................................... 22

Security Guidelines Using Approved Hash Algorithms .....................23

Draft Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 180-4, 

 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)....................................................... 23

Random Number Generator (RNG).................................................. 23

Quantum Computing .................................................................. 24

Authentication......................................................................... 25

Security Aspects of Electronic Voting .............................................. 26

Development of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3

 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules ............................ 26

NIST Beacon – A Prototype Implementation of a Randomness Beacon ........ 27

Cryptography for Emerging Technologies and Applications (CETA) 

 Workshop............................................................................. 28

Pairing-Based Cryptography ......................................................... 28

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Test Cards.................................... 29

BIOS Security .......................................................................... 30

Privacy Enhancing Cryptography Project .......................................... 30

Systems and Emerging Technologies 

Security Research Group ........................................... 31

Strategic Goal & Overview ....................................................31

Identity Management...........................................................31

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) and FIPS 201 Revision Efforts ............. 31

NIST Personal Identity Verification Program (PIV)................................ 32

Conformity Assessment Program and Qualified Product List (QPL) 

 for Identity and Credential Products for DHS/TSA............................. 33

Biometric Standards and Conformity Assessment Activities .................... 33

Research in Emerging Technologies ..........................................34

Automated Combinatorial Testing for Software .................................. 34

Cloud Computing and Virtualization................................................ 35

Security Ontologies for Risk Assessment........................................... 36

Mobile Device Security ............................................................... 36

Access Control and Privilege Management .................................37

Access Control and Privilege Management Research............................. 37

Conformance Verification for Access Control Policies ........................... 38

Metrics for Evaluation of Access Control Systems ................................ 38

Policy Machine ......................................................................... 39

Automated Vulnerability Management.......................................40

Security Automation .................................................................. 40

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP).................................... 40

National Vulnerability Database (NVD)............................................. 41

National Checklist Program .......................................................... 42

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Validation Program ............ 43

Technical Security Metrics .....................................................44

Vulnerability Measurement and Scoring ........................................... 44

Security Risk Analysis of Enterprise Networks Using Attack Graphs ........... 44

Infrastructure Services, Protocols, and Applications ......................45

Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) and Internet Protocol Security (IPsec).... 45

Securing the Domain Name System (DNS) ......................................... 45

CSD’s Part in National and ISO (Organization for Standardization)

 Security Standards Processes ...............................................46

Honors and Awards .................................................. 50

Computer Security Division Standards & Guidelines (Publications)

Released in FY2011 ............................................................52

Draft Publications ..................................................................52-53

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)................................. 53

Special Publications (SPs)............................................................ 53

NIST Interagency Reports (NISTIRS)..............................................53-54

ITL Security Bulletins ................................................................. 54

Computer Security Division Publications Released in FY2011........ 55-69

Ways to Engage Our Division and NIST.......................70-71

Acknowledgements .................................................. 72