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Technical Paper 370

TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION

TRAINING: A METHOD FOR LEARNING THE

REALITIES OF COMBAT

Robert T. Root and C. Mazie Knerr

U.S. Army Research Institute

and

MAJ Angelo A. Severlno and LTC Larry E. Word

U. S. Army Training Support Center D D c

OCT ?«137S

■■;'

-

ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION TECHNICAL AREA

En;

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Aigutt 1979

Approved for public rtltit«; distribution unlimited.

79 10 ^ 034
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

WILLIAM L. HÄUSER

JOSEPH ZEIDNER Colonel. U S Army

Technical Director Commander

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary diltribution of thii rtport hM UMn mad» by ARI. Pltan addrtn eorr«ipond*nc*

conctrmng diHnbution of rtporii to: U. S. Army Rawarch Imtiiuta for tha Bahavioral and Social Scwncat.

ATTN PERI P, 5001 EiMnhowar Avanue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333.

FINAL DISPOSITION: Thii raport may ba dattroyad whan it It no longar naadad. Piaaaa do not raturn it to

tha U. S. Army Raaaareh Inttituta for tha Bahavioral and Social Scianoat.

NOTE: Tha finding« in thu raport ara not to ba contlruad ai an official Oapartmant of tha Army petition,

uniau to datignatad by other authoritad documantt.

.

— '» ' iugy Jt
Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Dmlm BnlwMQ

Technical Paper^jlTO

E MILE fmt* »ulnllft ~"^S

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.

MILE ( # •uhtUlwf

.CTICAL ENGAGEMENT ^MULATION TRAINING: ^

THOD FORLEABNING^IE REALITffs OF COMBAf^ iß1 : M:A

IA tobert jj^otj«» C^ l^zieWrr, «Bk ^n

i /^verinc^p» Larry ^/Word. Tfrmv Traininp

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t. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333

1 I. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

U.S. Army Training Support Center, TRADOC

Fort Eustis, VA 23604

M. MONITORING AGENCY NAME • ADDRESS^' dHlmtmtl ham Controlling Olllct)

asi

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BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

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n CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf." 7

10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK

LREA » WORK UNIT NUMBERS (1£2Q763743A773

79 /

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IB. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTESL

1». KEY WORDS CConllnu* on rvrart« «Ida If tiMMMir and Idmntlty by block tumbor)

Tactical training Emergent tasks

Unit performance evaluation Task analysis

BEALTRAIN Performance measurement

Simulation techniques Man-ascendant systems

•^

TRACT fCmiOmm «a mvonm «Ma H nuttmomr i I Idoniltr *r Mock numkm)

Training of combat arms units requires a different approach from conventional instructional system development (ISD) practices. From a systems

perspective, unit performance may be more than the sum of individual performances. In battle, subunits interact, and unit and subunit behavior is

contingent on the behavior of an intelligent adversary. Conditions that

initiate complex combat behavior can rarely be specified in advance. <

(Continued)

DO, FORM

JAM 71 1473 CDtTlON OP • MOV SS IS OBk -M.ETt

Unclassified

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF TMIS PAGE p Dmtm Bnlorod)

y-öt OLö j, '

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KCUWITY CL*tllFIC»TIOM OF THIS ^AOtfWhi Dim Snimfd)

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Item 20 (Continued)

•^9 The idea of '•emergentf rather than ''established'' situations provides

a framework for considering situationally determined unit behavior. The

empirical approach called engagement simulation involves the detailed

observation and recording of ^naturally occurring',' tactical behavior in

what military experts agree is a valid, if incomplete, representation of

combat. The simulation procedures provide for data collection and

analysis. —5

^ From the data collection and analysis, critical combat behaviors

should stand out, to be used to describe the full range of tactical behaviors for which training must be provided. The patterns of occurrence

of critical combat behaviors may be useful in explaining how or why a

particular outcome came about in a given situation,

This identification of critical combat behaviorsyin the emergent

situation represented by combat may be able to provide improved specification of trainiryg content (documented in improved Army Training and

Evaluation Programs) , improved training diagnosis, and improved determination of unit readiness.

, 0^'

Al o*

•

ii Unclassified

SCCUHITV CLASSIFICATIOK OF THIS PAOEfWh»»! OaM EMmttö)
Technical Paper 370

TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION

TRAINING: A METHOD FOR LEARNING THE

REALITIES OF COMBAT

Robert T. Root and C. Mazie Knerr

U.S. Army Research Institute

and

MAJ Angelo A. Severlno and LTC Larry E. Word

U. S. Army Training Support Center

Submitted by:

Frank J. Harris, Chief

ENQAQEMENT SIMULATION TECHNICAL AREA

Approved by:

A. H. Birnbaum, Acting Director

ORGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH LABORATORY

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

August 1979

Army Project Number Tactical Skill Acquisition

2Q763743A773 and Retention

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

ill i
ARI Research Reports and Technical Papers are intended for sponsors of

R&D tasks and other research and military agencies. Any findings ready for

implementation at the time of publication are presented in the latter part of

the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, fornal recommendations for official action normally are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

iv
FOREWORD

In 1971 the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences (ARI) initiated research which led to the development of a

training method now known as tactical engagement simulation training.

This method for combat arms units in the infantry, armor, field artillery, and air defense artillery provides an environment for the training of tactical skills for a complete unit. This paper discusses

theoretical background and methor s for determining what tactical behaviors are related to successful mission accomplishment, thus establishing the necessary content of tactical training. An earlier version

was presented at the 1978 annual meeting of the American Educational

Research Association to the Military Education and Training Special

Interest Group. The research was conducted in response to the requirements of Army Project 2Q763743A773 and the TRADOC Systems Manager for

Tactical Engagement Simulation at the U.S. Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, Va.

/VOSEPHSBEIDNER

^ rrechnical Director

11 U'MJW
TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION TRAINING: A METHOD FOR LEARNING

THE REALITIES OF COMBAT

BRIEF

Requirement:

To develop a training system for preparing soldiers in units for

the complex, fluid situations normal to battle.

Procedure:

This paper describes the systems perspective and the idea of

emergent situations which led to the training method called engagement

simulation. Engagement simulation for combat units—infantry, combined arms, armor, and air defense artillery—involves the detailed

observation and recording of "naturally occurring" tactical behavior

in what military experts agree is a valid (but admittedly not complete)

representation of combat. Data collection and analysis procedures required by this approach are described briefly.

Findings:

Over a series of data collection opportunities, critical combat

behaviors should emerge which may be used to describe the full range

of tactical behaviors for which training must be provided. These

critical combat tasks should not be considered as events that will or

must occur for every exercise to assure successful mission accomplishment. The occurrence or pattern of occurrence of these critical combat behaviors can serve to explain how or why a particular outcome

occurred for a given situation.

Utilization of Findings:

The identification of critical combat behaviors in the emergent

situation represented by combat may be used to provide (a) improved

specification of the content of training (documented in improved

ARTEPs using engagement simulation as the training vehicle), (b) improved training diagnosis, and (c) improved unit readiness determination.

vxi

1 ^m&n^Mr-^-
TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION TRAINING: A METHOD FOR LEARNING

THE REALITIES OF COMBAT

CONTENTS

Page

THE TRAINING CHALLENGE 1

THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT 4

TRAINING OBJECTIVE DEFINITION 6

A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 8

SIMULATION OF THE COMBAT SITUATION 10

THE SEARCH FOR A TAXONOMY OF CRITICAL COMBAT BEHAVIORS

IN EMERGENT SITUATIONS 11

SUMMARY 15

REFERENCES 17

DISTRIBUTION 19

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Combined arms meeting engagement 3

ix
TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT SIMULATION TRAINING: A METHOD

FOR LEARNING THE REALITIES OF COMBAT

In the last few years there has been a shift in emphasis in Army

training from the formal school setting to training in the field, and

from individual training to the collective training of crews, teams,

and units. This shift has required new approaches to training, new

procedures for assessing tactical proficiency, and new ideas on how

to determine critical behaviors and behavior patterns required in a

dynamic combat environment.

This paper first describes a method of collective training for combat arms units: infantry, armor, field artillery, and air defense artillery. Known as engagement simulation, this method provides an environment for the training of tactical skills for a complete unit. The

paper, however, primarily discusses a method for empirically determining which tactical behaviors are related to successful mission performance, under which situations they are appropriate, and the relationships among tactical behaviors. This paper will describe a procedure

for using the tactical engagement simulation training environment to

determine critical tactical behaviors and thus to provide the basis

for establishing the necessary content of tactical training.

THE TRAINING CHALLENGE

Combat is a complex environment that requires confident decisions

to be made under extreme pressure. Combat is also a dynamic, constantly

changing environment, and the force demonstrating superior flexibility

in its actions and reactions has the advantage.

To reach the required high level of combat effectiveness, unit

training must follow a certain progression. When assigned to a unit,

the individual officer or enlisted man must become fully proficient in

his individual duties. He must then learn to work effectively as an

integral member oi a small team (e.g., rifle fire team, tank crew,

battalion staff). Finally, he and the other members of his team must

operate as members of a larger coordinated unit (e.g., rifle squad,

tank platoon, battalion),

In combat, "the generals concentrate the forces, the colonels

direct the battle, and the captainü fight.... The guy with the least

experience, the toughest job, and the most difficult environment is

the captain." (General William DePuy, address to AUSA Convention,

October 1975) This quotation reflects an appreciation for the fact

that the captain, with the least time in service of the commanders

described, has the greatest need for training. The captain's subordinates—first and second lieutenants who have even less time in service—

also must learn relevant tactical skills. Among the enlisted ranks

i
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I

there is the need for effective tactical training which will lead to

coordinated functioning of small tactical elements—a rifle squad or

a tank crew—as part of a larger organizational entity.

Junior officers and their subordinates who do the fighting are

presented with what can only be described as a unique work environment.

What does this environment look like? A description of the "difficult

environment" mentioned by General DePuy will help the reader appreciate the special demands of ground combat.

Figure 1 shows a small (reinforced platoon level) combined arms

team, composed of both infantry and armor elements, involved in a

meeting engagement mission with an enemy unit of similar composition.

The combined arms team in this example is composed of a tank platoon

(20 men and 5 M60A1 tanks) , 2 mechanized infantry squads (11 men and

1 armored personnel carrier (APC) per squad) , and 2 TOW antitank weapons

(mounted on an APC with a crew of 4) . This combined arms team is commanded by a lieutenant.

Once given his mission, and before he leaves his assembly area,

the lieutenant must plan his scheme of maneuver, based upon a knowledge

of his own assets, the best estimate of the enemy's strength and disposition, and known environmental factors (e.g., terrain, weather).

The commander of this team has the responsibility for orchestrating the activities of the 50 men and 9 vehicles under his command

against an intelligent, equally motivated threat force. The team commander has a variety of assets to apply to the mission at hand; he

must decide how to utilize these assets—both men and equipment—most

effectively. Among the decisions the team leader must make for a

given situation are how should he deploy his medium-range antitank

weapon capability (the main gun on the M60 tank and his TOWs) , how

should be deploy his infantry personnel and their weapons, and what

maneuver routes should his tactical elements follow?

Once the commander has issued his order, each subordinate leader

must decide exactly how his element will carry out the commander's

order.

At a prescribed time the unit crosses the line of departure (LD)

and moves to meet the enemy. The figure shows how the unit is deployed after crossing the LD. Also shown is the disposition of the

enemy forces at the same point in time.

Once the enemy is engaged, the team commander and his subordinate

leaders must respond effectively and efficiently to the actions of

;-he enemy. "Hie team commander must be continually aware of the interdependent relationships among unit elements. Coordination of the activities of these assets is the paramount task of the team leader and

his subordinate leaders.

/
U)

"RED"

TEAM

U)

s 4 s

TOWW lOJUi/ TK

TOW

Figure 1. Combined arms meeting engagsment.
During an engagement, all unit personnel are potential decisionmakers, responding appropriately to enemy actions. Even the individual

foot soldier may be a significant factor in the outcome of a battle by

proper employment of his LAW (light antitank weapon) or a well-placed

hand grenade in the open hatch of an enemy tank!

For the unit to be successful in combat, individuals and unit

elements must be able to

• Maximize the effects of available weapons on the enemy,

• Minimize the effects of enemy weapons,

• Achieve effective intra- and inter-unit coordination, and

• Respond adaptively to enemy actions in a dynamic, interactive

environment.

For these skills to be learned, leaders and soldiers within the unit

must have an opportunity to gain tactical experience. This training

experience provides the basis for the decisions made in combat, decisions that are required of each individual facing the enemy regardless of rank or position.

THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

In 1971 the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences (ARI) initiated research which led to development of a tactical training method now known as tactical engagement simulation training. Engagement simulation was designed to elici the same behaviors

as did combat. The cues to which unit members respond in training

are the same as those to which they respond in battle. They have the

opportunity to respond to the situation as they would in combat, with

the situation changing realistically as a result of their actions.

To provide the realism required for two-sided, free-play exercises, a credible means of assessing casualties was needed. Engagement

simulation became a reality with the development of a casualty assessment technique for the basic infantry weapon, the M16 rifle. This

development and the subsequent development of techniques for other

infantry and armor weapons represented the breakthrough necessary to

simulate the tactical environment.

Infantry exercises are centered around the M16. Each soldier's

weapon is equipped with a 6X telescope, and all participants wear

3-inch-high, black, two-digit numbers on their helmets. These numbers

can be read with the telescope at distances up to 250 meters. Opponents read each other's numbers using the telescope, an action analogous to aligning the rifle sights on a target. When a man on one side
identifies a number, he fires a blank round and reports the number to

a controller.1The controller then radios the number to a controller

with the opposing force, who assesses the man whose number was identified as a casualty. This can be accomplished in 5 to 10 seconds. In

this way both sides can inflict casualties with effective M16 fire in

a manner very similar to combat. For each weapon found in an infantry

unit, there is a similar casualty assessment technique.

For the M60 tank, the controller's telescope is mounted in the

breech of the main gun. When the controller in the tank determines

that the mam gun is centered on a target at the time of simulated impact, he assesses a casualty. The controller then radios the number

of the tank or other vehicle that was hit to the controller on the

other side, who removes the vehicle from action.

Artillery fire is realistically simulated by detonating artillery

simulators at the actual point requested by an artillery forward observer (FO) . When simulated rounds are detonated by artillery throwers,

controllers assess casualties within the "kill radius" of the simulated

artillery round and take them out of action.

To coordinate these diverse elements and integrate them into an

effective combat simulation, control personnel on both sides are in

direct communication with each other and with a Net Control Station

(NCS) . This control network is the lifeline of the exercises. It

carries the communications by which controllers maintain the real-time

responsiveness of the simulation and informs the NCS of events as they

occur. Personnel at the NCS record casualties and significant tactical

events.

An important aspect of engagement simulation training occurs immediately after the exercise. The opposing forces who participated

in am exercise are brought together to conduct a detailed After Action

Review (AAR). During the AAR, casualties are reviewed, based upon the

record of casualties and critical events maintained at the Net Control

Station. Interaction among exercise participants from both sides during the AAR provides extremely effective feedback to reinforce and

extend learning gained from the exercise itself.

Given these casualty assessment techniques and a group of trained

controllers, a wide range of infantry and armor missions can be practiced under realistic conditions. By combining infantry, armor, and

anti-armor techniques, full combined arms exercises cam be staged.

Controllers are administrative personnel accompanying each tactical

element who assess casualties, communicate casualties, and activate

weapon simulation devices.

<i%m-
Engagement simulation training techniques provide an opportunity

for learning tactical skills. Engagement simulation is not a didactic

method of instruction. It does not teach; it facilitates learning.

TRAINING OBJECTIVE DEFINITION

Baker (1976) has correctly noted that "all too often, team training exercises are just exercises—not learning experiences. Wnat is

learned, if anything, is simply not knovm." ARI has undertaken a major

research effort intended to identify, as precisely as possible, what

is learned (i.e., what are the relevant tactical skills), the nature

of skill acquisition and retention for critical tactical skills, and

the procedures that should be followed for the reliable and valid evaluation of unit tactical proficiency.

The Army has always had to train many different types of units.

For many years it made an explicit attempt to identify critical mission

tasKs and to measure tactical proficiency to determine the state of

unit readiness. From World War II to the early 1970s, the Army utilized Army Training Programs (ATP) and Army Training Tests (ATT) for

this purpose. These training programs and evaluation tests were developed for newly mobilized units that were "built from scratch,"

which was the case in World War II. The Army was not concerned with

the continuing training and evaluation of established units.

In the early 1970s, performance-oriented training became the accepted approach for Army training, and the Army adopted an instructional system development (ISD) model for training. Under this model,

training objectives were concerned with real-world behaviors and were

stated in terms of criteria or standards that would define mastery.

The heart of this approach was cask analysis of the operational environment in which a task would be performed.

The success of this approach in the individual training environment led training developers in the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to adapt the notion of criterion-referenced individual

training to unit training and evaluation. This led to the development

of a family of Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs) , which

were intended to delineate the critical missions for each type of Army

unit for which an ARTEP was prepared.

Just as task analysis was the heart of the individual training

ISD model, task analysis of complex unit functions within a given

tactical mission was required for the generation of unit ARTEPs. For

each critical mission, it was necessary to specify the tasks required,

the conditions under which they are performed, and the standards of

performance required. With the ARTEP there was a real attempt to provide for more objective measurement; for each task, the performance

standard was intended to provide a criterion against which to evaluate

a unit's proficiency.
The ISD model, which was adapted for unit training purposes and

relies on task analysis, rests on the following assumptions:

• That through this analytic approach, all critical processes

involved in successful mission accomplishment can be identified;

• That performance standards can be established for each critical process; and

• That, if a unit demonstrates its ability to execute each critical process to performance standards, it would have accomplished

its tactical mission.

A reason for questioning the first assumption i s the complexity of

the behaviors required on the battlefield: the effective integration

of men, weapons, and procedures dynamically responding to the actions

of the enemy. When considering the necessary interactions among unit

elements—and also the effects of terrain, force ratio, and weather—

is it really practical to assume that "all critical processes involved

in successful mission accomplishment" can be identified by the task

analytic process?

The second assumption may be questioned for much the same reason.

The use of standards (most usually measured in terms of time and accuracy) is entirely appropriate for individual and crew tasks involving

equipment operation. However, in the tactical environment against an

intelligent adversary, predetermined universal standards do not appear

to make a great deal of sense. The manner and speed with which a task

is accomplished—or if it is even required at all—is usually situationally determined. The behavior of the enemy is the main determinant

of appropriate unit behavior, but performance is also influenced by

such external factors as terrain, relative force strength, and weather.

During initial ARTEP development an attempt was made to establish

precise universal objective standards. The futility of this endeavor

was soon seen. Currently, ARTEP "standards" are merely statements of

subtasks for a given task or are such vague standards, such as "does

not sustain excessive casualties." The use of subtasks as standards

rests on the assumption that accomplishments of each subtask will lead

to successful accomplishment of the task; this may or may not be valid

in a combat situation. The second procedure leads to standards which

are so vague as to be meaningless.

The third assumption can only be valid if all relevant processes

have been identified, if performance standards can be established for

each critical process, and if the performance of a prescribed sequence

of activities can be considered to be a valid measure of successful

mission accomplishment. The nature of combat and the complex interrelationships among the elements comprising the meeting of a combat

unit and an enemy force present a dynamic, ever-changing work environment.
In such an environment the appropriate sequence of occurrence of tactical behaviors is usually situationally determined. Even the occurrence

of a given behavior is situationally determined.

The preceding paragraphs hav« tried to indicate some of the problems in trying to apply the task analytic approach to the development

of unit training progreuns. The concern is not with the task analytic

approach but with its application in the design of such progreuns.

A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE

The combat unit may be viewed as a man-machine system. In many

ways it is like other military man-machine systems composed of men,

machines, and procedures. However, when most people think of a military system, they usually think of a complex, computer-based system,

such as an early warning/air defense system receiving inputs from an

array of radars and providing outputs in terms of orders to interceptor

aircraft. Such a system has been described as "machine ascendant,"

where the man is largely an operator following prescribed procedures.

A combat unit, on the other hand, is a "man ascendant" system, in which

the man in the system is less an operator and more a decisionmaker.

In a machine ascendant system, men follow established procedures with

one or, at most, a small number of paths to the required system goal.

In the man ascendant system represented by a combat unit, a number of

routes are possible to the system goal, which is successful mission

accomplishment.

Since the combat unit is a system composed of men, equipment, and

procedures which must interact effectively to adjust to the demands of

the tactical situations, training of the unit should be structured

accordingly. "Most trainers approach team training as though the relationships (among team members) were additive; i.e., they tend to

focus on each individual member and train earh one up to some prescribed

level, then join them together as a team—assuming that a team is really

the sum of its parts" (Baker, 1976). In the complex environment represented by ground combat, the interactions required amor < men at all

levels suggest that adherence to an additive model can 1 ;ad to overlooking important relationships within the human component of the

system.

Considering only the human component of the system, however, can

also lead to overlooking other important relationships. Boguslaw and

Porter (1962), in talking about teams in a complex system, suggest

that the word "team" should connote more than the relationships among

people and should be used to describe the relationships among men,

machines, And work procedures. "Teams are contrived by men to accomplish certain goals. The relationships among men, work procedures,

machines, and machine procedures have meaning for the team only to the

extent that they contribute to or detract from the effective and reliable attainment of the goals" (p. 388).
Viewed from a systems perspective, the military training researcher should be concerned not only with the men to be trained, although

this is where his emphasis is placed; but he must also keep in mind the

equipment (i.e., weapons systems) to be employed on the battlefield and

the work procedures to be followed in their tactical employment.

The combination of men, machines, and procedures into an effective fighting force, going up against a formidable adversary, requires

a new way of thinking about how to describe a unit's performance and

the performance of each subunit. Boguslaw (1961) and Boguslaw and

Porter (1962) describe, for a systems environment, a continuum of situations in which actions can occur. One pole consists of established

situations, the other pole of emergent situations. An established

situation is defined by these authors as one in which (a) all actionrelevant environmental conditions are specifiable and predictable,

(b) all action-relevant states of the system are specifiable and predictable, and (c) available research technology or records are adequate

to provide statements about the probable consequences of alternative

actions. An emergent situation, on the other hand, is defined as one

in which (a) all action-relevant environmental conditions have not

been specified, (b) the state of the system does not correspond to

relied-upon predictions, and (c) analytic solutions are not available,

given the current state of analytic technology.

Established situations are probably best typified by the tasks

required of equipment operators in a machine ascendant system, where

initiating conditions and task outcomes are predictable. In emergent

task situations, task behavior cannot be specified exactly, initiating

conditions may not always be known, and task behavior must be viewed

on the basis of response to an immediate situation.

In their 1962 article, Boguslaw and Porter consider emergent situations in the context of complex, computer-based machine ascendant systems for situations in which a team is nearing or actually experiencing

conditions of information overload or "emergency" situations. When

the system is experiencing an overload or emergency situation, decisions

must be made guickly and under conditions of relative uncertainty.

Combat, however, represents a situation of even greater complexity and

uncertainty than that considered by Boguslaw and Porter. In the emergent situation represented by combat, leader0

and their men respond to

a range of situational cues provided by the enemy. They must evaluate

behavioral options, make decisions, coordinate plans, and then execute

these plans collectively. The appropriateness of the decisions made

can then be judged by subsequent outcomes.

The "enemy" has a primary role in initiating action and reaction.

Combat units must respond appropriately to the oehavior of their adversary; unit leaders must apply available resources effectively to

the particular situation confronting them; and unit personnel must

execute their leaders' orders efficiently. As a combat engagement unfolds, continual adjustments must be made that reflect the dynamic
interplay of the two forces. Unit personnel at all levels must adapt

their behavior to the situation of the moment.

SIMULATION OF THE COMBAT SITUATION

To provide an environment for isolating relevant combat skills,

it is necessary to resort to simulation. Simulation must provide the

opportunity for the full range of combat behaviors to occur in response

to typical combat stimuli. In the environment provided by engagement

simulation, the following are present:

• Unit members are active participants in the situation, not

passive observers.

• The sets of cues to which they respond approximate those encountered in combat.

• The situation changes realistically as a result of participants ' actions.

• Feedback that occurs as a consequence of participants' actions

is immediate and realistic.

In addition, the simulation of the combat environment provided by

engagement simulation permits:

• Collection of a full range of objective performance data,

• Variation of the complexity of the simulated tactical situation,

and

• Simulation of the varied conditions of combat across diffirrences in mission, terrain, visibility, etc.

Although all of the above features of engagement simulation are

important, the one which may be most easily overlooked is the last,

which may be the most important:

The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely

varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce

exactly the same situation twice. Mission, terrain, weather,

dispositions, armament, morale, supply, and comparative

strength are variables whose mutations always combine to

form a new tactical pattern. Thus, in battle, each situation is unique and must be solved on its own merits

("Infantry In Battle," The Infantry Journal, 1939).

This quotation shows clearly why it is necessary to think about emergent task situations and why training opportunities in a simulated

tactical environment must be sufficient in number to insure that

10
soldiers at all levels are proficient enough to solve each unique

combat situation "on its own merits," i.e., adaptively. Engagement

simulation provides this opportunity.

THE SEARCH FOR A TAXONOMY OF CRITICAL COMBAT BEHAVIORS

IN EMERGENT SITUATIONS

It is not enough to say that we must go beyond consideration of

established situations and look at more complex, situationally determined emergent situations. Nor is it sufficient to add that we have

a training environment in which critical combat tasks may be learned.

The training researcher must attempt to understand what is happening

on the tactical battlefield in order to develop a taxonomy of critical combat tasks and to delineate behavioral objectives related to a

given tactical mission goal. We feel that engagement simulation technology provides the opportunity to do this and that the methodology

described below will help achieve this end.

When considering the simulation of a complex system, Boguslaw

and Porter assert that "because of the interactions of the many variables involved, the problems of measurement are characteristically

enormous. Exact replications of experiments become in effect impossible, since many of the specific tasks with which the team must cope are

produced by the consequence of earlier actions. Once a large-scale

simulation exercise has begun, the experimenters have little control

over the events which follow. Often the nature of the research changes

frcw. what would generally be recognized as controlled experimental research into what might best be termed naturalistic observation. This,

in itself, is not necessarily unsound or unscientific" (1962, p. 414).

Another psychologist who recognizes the complexity of real-world

relationships, although in this case not in a systems context, is Lee

Cronbach. In his article entitled "Beyond the Two Disciplines of

Scientific Psychology" (1975), Cronbach admits that in the continuing

study of aptitude-treatment interactions, "interactions eure not confined to the first order; the dimensions of the situation and of the

person enter into complex interactions" (p. 116). Cronbach explains

that the experimental strategy dominant in psychology since 1950 unrealistically restricts the range of situations that can be studied

and thereby conceals important higher order interactions. Experimental

control and systematic correlations answer the formal question stated

in advance; however, Cronbach feels "intensive local observation goes

beywnd discipline to an open-eyed, open-minded appreciation of the

surprises nature deposits in the investigative net" (p. 125) . Intensive local observation, in addition to short-run control, will, according to Cronbach, "help to develop explanatory concepts, concepts that

will help people use their heads .... short-run empiricism takes soundings as one proceeds into unfamiliar waters" (p. 126).

11
These two authors agree that in order to understand the world

around us, we may be better served initially by what coald be called

"naturalistic observation" of (simulated) real-world events them by

controlled experiments looking at a limited number of variables and

the interactions amont, them. They advocate observation of naturally

occurring events to isolate those behavioral variables having a relationship to successful attainment of the system goal and to identify

the functional relationships among variables. (Controlled experiments

may then be used to examine variables of special interest.)

In engagement simulation exercises, events occur naturally as

part of the give-and-take between the two adversaries. Simulated engagements continue from initial tactical planning until they reach

their logical conclusion. Thus a series of engagement simulation exercises can provide an opportunity for observing and recording tactical

behaviors in emergent situations.

Engagement simulation control procedures permit the collection of

precise casualty data. At all points during an engagement simulation

exercise, military data collectors can record the observable activities of those involved on both sides of the engagement. Relatively

precise time and location data for all tactical elements can also be

obtained.

ARl's current engagement simulation field research focuses on the

following list of behavioral data elements which we feel are necessary

to describe battlefield activity.

CRITICAL BEHAVIORAL DATA ELEMENTS;

• WHO (vehicle or tactical element identifier)

• WHEN (exercise time)

• WHERE (map position)

• WHAT

- PLANNING (prior to the exercise)

- FIRING

Direct Fire (M16 rifle, tank main gun)

Indirect Fire (artillery, mortar)

Other (hand grenade, mine)

- COMMUNICATING

Ordering/Guiding

Requesting

Reporting

- MOVING

- HALTING

- SEARCHING

- DETECTING

- DISMOUNTING

- MOUNTING

- RECEIVING FIRE

Direct Fire

Indirect Fire

Other

12
To record these behavioral data during engagement simulation exercises, six data collection instruments ^re being used:

• MAP

- Location and time data annotated on a 1:25,000 scale map

• NET CONTROL SHEET

- Target

- Firer

- Time casualty inflicted

• TACTICAL EVENT ACTIVITY RECORD (for each tactical vehicle or

rifle fire team)

• INDIRECT FIRE (ARTILLERY) DATA FORM

• COMMUNICATIONS DATA FORM

- Sender

- Receiver

- Type of i-Kjssage

• LEADER PLANNING RECORD

Also recorded are external conditions having a direct bearing on an

exercise—the tactical mission of each side, relative force strengths,

terrain, weather, and chance events such as vehicle breakdown.

To provide a capability for recording and analyzing the wealth of

objective performance data available from an engagement simulution exercise, ARI, with contractual assistance, has developed an Automated

Tactical Operations Measurement System (ATOMS)• ATOMS is comprised of

data collection instruments, associated data collection and reduction

procedures, and a software package for generating a plot of all tactical movements by time and calculating summary descriptive statistics

from which further, more detailed, analyses may be made.

The first full-scalt tryout of the ATOMS was completed in March

1978, during a 2-week series of combined arms exercises at Fort Carson,

Colo. A detailed analysis of the data will (a) identic rn >se tactical performance variables that describe unit perforance, (I>) identify

functional relationships among performance variables, (c) Llentify and

characterize meaningful "phases" of tactical engagements, and (d) analyze the performance of subunits in relation to that of the unit as a

whole.

In the attempt to determine the critical behavicrz and organizational dynamics of ground combat, the ATOMS data base will be queried

to provide summary data on performance variables such as the following:

13

V
• Range of enemy detections

• Range of successful target engagements

• Casualties as a function of:

- Number of shots fired

- Target type

- Firer type

- Exercise time

• Detections leading to casualties

• Detections reported and subsequent actions taken

• Communication patterns (who talks to whom)

• Communications content (by message type)

• Perceived versus actual subunit status

• Perceived versus actual subunit location

• Vehicle positions at given point in time

• Movement patterns of subunits ^

In all, over 200 questions of this type have been generated by

civilian researchers and military personnel familiar with engagement

simulation exercises. They have probably been able to anticipate the

most critical variables with some accuracy, having observed many instances of good and poor tactical behavior. This experience base will

serve as initial entry points into the wealth of objective performance

data included in *-he ATOMS data base. These data will, in turn, help

to provide answers to more global questions such as:

• What method for employing long-range antitank weapons is most

closely related to mission success?

• Under what tactical conditions are infantry resources (rifle

and iu?chine gun teams) most effectively employed?

• What defense posture is most related to success in a defensive

mission?

• What is the relationship of mission success to a leader's

knowledge of the status and location of assets under his

control?

• What is the relationship between tactical plans and their

effective execution?

It will also be possible to display graphically for each e^tercise

the position and status of all tactical elements on both sides atfc. any

given point in time. A sequence of such "snapshots" may be used to

help interpret the tactical dynamics as they unfolded during on exercise. A leader's deployment of his subunits relative to the position

of the opposition at a given time may be evaluated against a subsequent

"snapshot" displaying the consequences of his actions.

14
As the ATOMS data base grows—with engagement simulation exercise

data collected during different field tests, for different tactical

missions, at different locations, and under different environmental

and terrain conditions—the specificity or universality of appropriate

tactical behaviors or behavioral patterns can be determined. In this

manner it should be possible to derive a taxonomy of critical combat

tasks for emergent tactical situations.

With these data in hand, it should also be possible to separate

system effects directly related to the tactical proficiency of the

human component, as well as the external factors which can exert a major

influence on total system performeuice: tactical mission, relative

strength of opposing forces (force ratio), terrain, weather, and

"change events."

SUMMARY

We have argued that the training of combat arms units requires a

break from certain conventional ISD practices. A systems perspective

that considers the complex interactions of men, machines, and procedures

leads one to question the notion that unit performance is the sum of

the individual performances of the unit members. Combat is too complex

to be described by an "additive" model. Interactions among subunits,

each with its own mission, must be considered. And of primary importance is the fact that unit and subunit behavior is contingent upon

the behavior of an intelligent adversary in the give-and-take of battle.

Initiating conditions for complex combat behavior can rarely be specified »xactly in advance. In addition, "the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice."

The notion of "emergent situations"—as contrasted with "established" situations—helps to provide a basic framework for looking at

unit behavior which must be considered situationally determined. We

argued that conventional task analytic techniques are not sufficient

to describe the complexities of combat. We proposed an alternative.

This empirical approach involves the detailed observation and recording of "naturally occurring" tactical behavior in what military experts

agree is a valid (but admittedly incomplete) representacion of combat.

We briefly described the data collection and analysis procedures require! by this approach.

Over a series of data collection opportunities, critical combat

behaviors should emerge which may be used to describe the full reuige

of tactical behaviors for which training must be provided. In whatever

way these critical combat tasks are documented (e.g., in an engagement

simulation-based AKTEP), they should not be considered as events that

will or must occur for every exercise to assure successful mission accomplishment. In the emergent situation represented by combat, their

occurrence is situation-dependent. The occurrence or pattern of

15
occurrence of these critical combat behaviors can serve to explain how

or why a particular outcome occurred for a given situation.

It is too early to tell how successful this empirical approach to

the specification of critical combat behaviors or tasks will be. However, it should provide a more penetrating insight into the dynamics

of combat and lead to a more comprehensive delineation of critical

combat tasks.

If this approach is successful, the identification of critical

combat behaviors in the emergent situation represented by combat may

be used to provide improved specification of the content of training

(as documented in improved ARTEPs, using engagement simulation as the

training vehicle); improved training diagnosis; and improved unit readiness determination.

This paper does not attempt to carry this approach further into a

discussion of how improved combat unit training programs can be developed nor does it discuss procedures for training diagnosis and unit

evaluation. We have attempted only to propose the concept of "emergent" situations viewed from a systems perspective as a more appx.^ i

rate way of thinking about complex tactical behavior, and to descr

an empirical procedure which may be useful for developing a more comprehensive taxonomy of critical combat tasks than do current analytic

procedures.

!

I
"'"'. WHWMW «»

4

REFERENCES

Baker, J. D. The training effectiveness of simulation. In Volume IV,

Proceedings of the First International Learning Technology Congress

and Exposition on Applied Learning Technology. 21-2 3 July, 1976,

Washington, D.C.

Boguslaw, R. Situation analysis and the problem of action. Social

Problems, 1961, 3, 212-219.

Boguslaw, R. , & Porter, E. H. Team functions and training. In Gagne,

R. M. (Ed.), Psychological principles in system development. N.Y.:

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962.

Cronbach, L. J. Beyond the two disciplines of scientific psychology.

American Psychologist, February 1975, 116-127.

DePuy, W. Address to Associates of the United States Army, Washington,

D.C, October 1975.

"Infantry in Battle." The Infantry Journal, 1939.

17
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