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i 

63–158 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–164] 

DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITY AND 

STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 5, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES K. DJOU, Hawaii 

PAUL ARCANGELI, Staff Director 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, May 5, 2010, Developments in Security and Stability in Afghanistan ........................................................................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, May 5, 2010 ......................................................................................... 43 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 2010 

DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le P., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense ............................................................................................. 4 

Paxton, Lt. Gen. John M., Jr., USMC, Director for Operations, J–3, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff ....................................................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le P., joint with Lt. Gen. John M. Paxton, Jr. ........... 52 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 49 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 47 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITY AND STABILITY IN 

AFGHANISTAN 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 5, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Our committee meets today to receive testimony on developments in security and stability in the 

country of Afghanistan. Witnesses, old friends, and thank you for 

coming back: The Honorable Miche`le Flournoy, Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy; Lieutenant General John Paxton, the Director 

for Operations on the Joint Staff. And we appreciate your coming 

back so soon with us. 

Six months ago our President announced the results of a comprehensive review of our policy in Afghanistan, which for many 

years had essentially been nonexistent. During this announcement 

he endorsed a new counterinsurgency [COIN] strategy centered on 

increasing U.S. forces by 30,000 troops, adding U.S. civilian experts, and focusing on protecting the population of Afghanistan 

from the Taliban and their terrorist allies. I endorsed this strategy 

then, and I do so now. As I have said many times, while this new 

strategy cannot guarantee success in Afghanistan, it is most likely 

to end with an Afghanistan that can prevent the return of the 

Taliban and their Al Qaeda terrorist allies. 

Six months into the new policy, it is appropriate for Congress to 

consider how things are going. About 21,000 of the 30,000 troops 

have arrived in that country, and many have been involved in the 

recent successful military operation around Marja. Others will soon 

begin restoring security in Kandahar, an operation that is likely to 

be crucial to our overall success in that country. 

We have seen other clear signs of success in our fight against terrorists. The President’s new strategy helped lead to the capture of 

the Taliban’s second in command, the former Taliban finance minister, and two so-called shadow governors of Afghan provinces, the 

most significant captures of Afghan Taliban leaders since the start 

of the war in Afghanistan. 

Now, while I am pleased with the recent successes in Afghanistan, I anticipate others, many concerns remain. Although we successfully cleared Marja, the Taliban still appears to be able to infil-
2 

trate the town and threaten and kill those who cooperate with 

American and Afghan security forces. This may not be unanticipated. It takes time to build the confidence of a local population. 

But I worry that some of this may point to the weakness of the 

local government which cannot easily deliver the services and cannot deliver the governance needed to help convince the residents of 

Marja to join the right side. 

Now, while we have increased forces in Afghanistan, our allies 

have also begun to send additional troops. To date, they have 

added about 50 percent of the 9,000 new troops they pledged after 

President Obama’s December speech. But serious concerns remain 

about our ability to train the Afghan security forces, who will have 

to assume the burden of providing security and combating terrorism in Afghanistan without more international trainers. I am 

pleased that Secretary Gates has decided to send additional U.S. 

military personnel to fill this gap, but this is a short-term solution 

and is not a long-term fix. 

This concern relates to another. In a recent meeting, NATO [the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization] endorsed a process to transition the lead force security to, in some districts, from U.S. and allied troops to Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. I think all 

of us would like to know more about this process as well as its implications. 

What progress do we have to see in a district before we can transition to Afghan lead? And what does this mean for international 

troops in that district? Are we talking about progress among the 

Afghan security forces, or must the district also need a competent 

and honest government? 

Finally, a quick word of congratulations and one of caution. The 

Department of Defense [DOD] recently delivered a very good and 

on-time report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan. Thank you for that. Unfortunately, a similar, somewhat 

higher-level metrics report filed by the National Security Council 

[NSC] was very disappointing. It is my hope that future reports 

more closely resemble the 1230 report and provide real information. Congress cannot judge progress from glorified press releases. 

Again, thank you for coming before us today. I suspect this will 

not be the last hearing on Afghanistan this committee will hold 

this year. I appreciate you working with us to ensure that Congress 

can conduct its constitutional and appropriate oversight activities. 

We are very pleased with your work and very pleased with your 

appearance. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And now for my good friend, the ranking member, the gentleman from California, Buck McKeon. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this very important hearing on Afghanistan. 
3 

I would also like to welcome back Under Secretary of Defense 

Miche`le Flournoy and Lieutenant General John Paxton. I look forward to your testimonies. 

We are a nation at war. The attempted terrorist attack in New 

York City’s Times Square serves as the most recent reminder that 

we face dangerous enemies who threaten the safety and security of 

our country. The extraordinary men and women of our military and 

their families need no reminding of this threat. They know all too 

well the sacrifices and dedication it takes to keep this fight off our 

shores. 

A lot has happened since the President stood before the American people and made the case for his Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. Over half of the 30,000 forces authorized by the President 

have arrived in country and are conducting operations in southern 

Afghanistan. They are operating with some constraints, both political and operational, and this is where I would like to focus the remainder of my comments and questions. 

In my view, this body, no matter on which side of the aisle you 

reside, and this committee in particular, has the moral responsibility to ensure that this war is not fought with a minimalist 

mindset or with an eye toward the Washington political clock. 

Nearly 18 months ago, Admiral Mike Mullen told this committee, 

and I quote, ‘‘In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do 

what we must.’’ 

When it comes to resourcing our efforts in Afghanistan, I remain 

concerned that we are not doing everything that we must in order 

to ensure that General McChrystal and his commanders on the 

battlefield have the time, space, and resources they need to succeed. 

Let me be clear. I have the utmost confidence that General 

McChrystal and his troops will get the job done. My concern is that 

the minimalist approach being advocated from some in Washington 

raises the risk and increases casualties. The 30,000 troop cap put 

in place by this Administration is sending the wrong signal to our 

commanders and forcing military planners to make difficult tradeoff decisions between combat troops and key enablers. I am particularly concerned that we are underresourcing force protection capabilities. 

It is my understanding that there continues to be a serious indirect fire threat to U.S. and coalition forward-operating bases 

[FOBs] in Afghanistan, yet the current force protection systems 

that protect FOBs in Iraq are not deployed to protect FOBs in Afghanistan. This is disconcerting, especially given the fact that we 

have evidence that such capabilities have saved hundreds of lives 

in Iraq. 

Today I would like our witnesses to explain what modifications 

have been made to the original Joint Urgent Operational Need 

[JUON] for sense, warn, and response capability in Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF] and why these changes were made. Why are 

we addressing this particular force protection shortfall differently 

in Afghanistan than in Iraq? Specifically, why are we deploying 

contractors instead of military personnel? It is my understanding 

that if we had used military personnel like we did in Iraq, this capability would already be over in Afghanistan protecting lives. 
4 

While I have focused on the impact of the troop cap on the fielding of certain key enablers, this cap becomes more problematic 

when you consider that some of our NATO allies are not meeting 

their commitments, and others will be withdrawing their forces 

from southern Afghanistan. 

Further, as Admiral Mullen’s comments suggest, there was a 

time when many thought of the two wars as a struggle for resources resulting in the haves and have-nots. Iraq was the haves, 

and Afghanistan was the have-nots. My suspicion is that the mentality of the have-nots may be impacting how commanders are employing the resources that they do have in Afghanistan. For example, in Iraq, there was a capability called Task Force ODIN—Observe, Detect, Identify and Neutralize. This task force was responsible for killing or capturing over 3,000 insurgents as they were 

trying to put in IEDs, basically turning the IED emplacer into a 

suicide mission. 

In Afghanistan, they are standing up a similar Task Force ODIN 

capability; however, it is my understanding that this capability is 

being used differently than it was in Iraq. Instead of being used to 

specifically go after IED emplacers, it is being incorporated into the 

big picture ISR requirement. I am unclear if this is a tactical decision or the result of the signaling from Washington to operate 

under the ceilings you have been given. 

Lastly, I have raised concerns that the emphasis in our strategy 

appears to be on ending the conflict rather than winning. I wish 

the President would use words like ‘‘victory’’ rather than ‘‘transition’’ and ‘‘redeployment.’’ 

This morning I hope to get a better understanding on what transition actually means. How do you explain the transition to the Afghans, to the enemy, and to our forces on the ground? 

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my entire statement be included for 

the record where I address other concerns and questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. I thank the gentleman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Flournoy, please. 

STATEMENTS OF MICHE` LE P. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, 

distinguished members of the committee, it is good to see you all 

again. Thank you for inviting us here to testify on our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan. 

As you know, the Administration’s core goal in the region is to 

disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and ensure the elimination 

of Al Qaeda safe havens. A critical component of our strategy is a 

stable Afghanistan with the governance and capacity to ensure that 

Afghanistan can no longer be a safe haven for Al Qaeda and insurgents. 

The U.S. and Afghanistan also have shared interests that extend 

far beyond combating violent extremism, and we are working to develop an enduring partnership that will serve both our nations for 

many years to come. 
5 

When I last testified before you on Afghanistan, we faced a pretty bleak situation. Early coalition gains had eroded, the Taliban 

was reascendant, and Afghan confidence in the coalition was in decline. President Obama ordered an immediate strategy review 

when he came into office and added 38,000 troops in the spring of 

2009. After General McChrystal’s assessment last summer and further review, the President decided to deploy an additional 30,000 

troops in December of last year. Today over half of these forces 

have already deployed, and almost all of them will be in place by 

the end of August. More than 9,000 international troops have also 

been pledged. ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] is 

now focused on protecting the Afghan population and partnering 

with the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF] to build their capacity to conduct and lead security operations. 

The civilian surge is also moving forward. We now have three 

times as many U.S. Government civilians in Kabul as we had a 

year ago and over four times as many civilians outside of Kabul. 

The evidence suggests that our shift in approach is beginning to 

produce results. The insurgency is losing momentum. And though 

real challenges and risks remain, we see a number of positive 

trends. Let me highlight a few. 

As you know, we are executing our strategy in close cooperation 

with the Afghan Government, with our coalition allies and other 

partners in the region, particularly Pakistan. Our consultations 

with partners have led to a much greater sense of unity of effort 

and a common strategy. Also, changes in coalition tactics have substantially reduced the percentage of Afghan civilian casualties 

caused by coalition actions to about 20 percent. This has, in turn, 

produced significant positive shifts in Afghan attitudes towards 

both ISAF and Afghan forces. 

Building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces remains a significant challenge, but there are signs of progress. Currently the Afghan National Army [ANA] strength is well above our 

April target, and the Afghan National Police [ANP] are well on 

their way to achieving their growth goals for this fiscal year. 

That said, we continue to face challenges associated with recruiting, training, retention, and attrition in the ANSF, particularly the 

police. ISAF has intensified its partnering with the ANSF at all 

levels, from the ministry down to local units, but shortages of 

trainers and mentors persist. The Afghan Government has undertaken a number of initiatives to address these issues, including 

raising the salaries of ANSF, equalizing pay disparities between 

the army and police, improving the quality of life and training for 

police, and beginning to address corruption. There is, however, 

much more work to be done to develop commensurate rule-of-law 

structures. 

More broadly, our emphasis on using development assistance to 

support sustainable governance similarly appears to be paying off. 

In cleared areas such as the Arghandab Valley in Regional Command South [RC–South], the conditions for implementing governance and development programs at the district level are being created, and we are seeing international and Afghan actors, both military and civilian, working together to effectively empower and legitimize the Afghan Government at the local level. 
6 

Despite challenges like corruption, polls suggest that a majority 

of Afghans, about 59 percent, believe their government is headed 

in the right direction. We have also seen some positive steps taken 

by the Karzai government at the national level. For instance, President Karzai recently issued interim guidance for the execution of 

reintegration programs. He will issue final guidance after the Consultative Peace Jirga later this month, and we expect to be able to 

support the Afghan Reintegration Program Authority by releasing 

funds authorized by this committee and the Congress in the fiscal 

year 2010 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. 

President Karzai and members of his cabinet, as you know, will 

be visiting Washington next week and will highlight the continuing 

support among Afghans for our involvement there and the Afghan 

appreciation for the sacrifices being made by U.S. troops and civilians. During President Karzai’s visit we also expect to discuss the 

nature of our long-term strategic partnership between the U.S. and 

Afghanistan, including longer-term economic development, security 

cooperation, and cooperation in areas such as law enforcement, judicial reform, and educational programs. 

As you know, our military operations in Helmand continue, and 

we are also engaged in planning and shaping efforts for future efforts in Kandahar. I will leave the specifics of that to Lieutenant 

General Paxton, but I do want to emphasize that for ISAF and for 

our Afghan partners, the Helmand operation was our first largescale effort to fundamentally change how we are doing business together. In Helmand, protecting the population has been our top priority along with ensuring that our military operations pave the 

way for Afghan-led governance and development activities. 

Preparation for the Helmand operation included extraordinary 

levels of civil-military planning and engagement with Afghan partners at every level, and we feel that the collaborative operational 

planning process was critical to giving Afghans a sense of ownership and investment in the success of our joint efforts. 

I don’t want to suggest that achieving success in Afghanistan 

will be simple or easy. Far from it. Kandahar, for example, will 

present challenges that are fundamentally different from those that 

we have recently encountered in Helmand. Inevitably we will face 

challenges, possibly setbacks, even as we achieve successes. We 

need to recognize that things may even get harder before they get 

better. We are challenging our adversaries in new ways, and the 

insurgents are intelligent and adaptable. They will find new ways 

to respond. And to maintain our momentum, we will need to continuously refine and adapt our own tactics. But at this point I am 

cautiously optimistic. I believe that we are developing the conditions that are necessary, though not yet sufficient, for success. 

We finally—and I would argue for the first time—we finally have 

the right mission, the right strategy, the right leadership team in 

place, and we have marshaled both the international and Afghan 

resources, civilian and military, to support this mission. Afghanistan is our number one priority. General McChrystal knows that 

he can ask for what he needs. The President has given the Secretary of Defense the flexibility to provide for additional forces, particularly for force protection as needed. 
7 

As we move forward, we will continue to refine our approach, 

and I believe we will continue to make progress. 

I want to thank this committee for the support you have provided to our troops and to this mission thus far. I would urge you 

to continue that support in considering our current budget requests 

that are before you. And I know that General Paxton will address 

operational matters in greater detail, and we look forward to your 

questions and comments. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy and General 

Paxton can be found in the Appendix on page 52.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General Paxton. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., 

USMC, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, J–3, JOINT CHIEFS OF 

STAFF 

General PAXTON. Good morning, Chairman Skelton, Ranking 

Member McKeon and distinguished members of the committee. 

Thank you again for your time today. 

This morning I would like to briefly provide an overview of military ops [operations] in Afghanistan. As Secretary Flournoy pointed out, we are starting to see conditions that we believe are necessary for success in Afghanistan. Among the most important of 

these conditions is having the right leadership and strategy in 

place. 

In 2009, after assuming command of ISAF, General McChrystal 

conducted an assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. He developed a campaign plan that was designed to provide a secure environment that would enable an improved governance and development within Afghanistan. At the heart of that campaign plan are 

four requirements: to protect the Afghan people, to enable Afghan 

security forces, to neutralize malign influences, and to support the 

extension of governance. General McChrystal has gone to great 

lengths to ensure that all of our operations in Afghanistan are directly tied to achieving these aims. 

The central tenet of our campaign strategy is to protect the populace. We are fulfilling this tenet by prioritizing our efforts to provide security and to extend governance in high-density population 

areas where the insurgent groups currently operate, and by reducing civilian casualties. The reduction of civilian casualties is another key component of our efforts to protect the people in Afghanistan. General McChrystal has repeatedly emphasized this point at 

every opportunity. In fact, our own force protection is closely related to gaining the respect and support of the Afghan people. 

IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] remain our number one 

killer in Afghanistan, accounting for 60 percent of our total casualties. In some areas over 80 percent of our IED discoveries have 

been a direct result of tips from local nationals. We are convinced 

these tips are a result of the relationships that we are building on 

a daily basis with the local population and the protection that we 

are providing. Clearly, the support of the people of Afghanistan is 

essential and relates directly to our own safety. 

Regional Command–South is currently where the main effort of 

operations is in Afghanistan. We are expanding security zones, en-
8 

hancing freedom of movement, and increasing the confidence of our 

Afghan National Security Forces and partners by the growth of our 

embedded partnering concept. 

The real prize in the south is the key city of Kandahar and its 

environs. Kandahar City is of huge importance nationally and is 

the capital of the south. It has the rich culture and history, and 

is the key economic and trading hub, and is of great importance to 

the Taliban movement, which originated right in Kandahar. The 

insurgents have a degree of freedom, as recent suicide bombings 

have demonstrated, and the local police lack sufficient forces to 

prevent insurgent activity, while government also lacks the capacity, credibility, and resources to operate effectively. The people of 

Kandahar are caught in the middle of this confrontation, and they 

demand better security, economic development, and a government 

that is in touch with and responsive to their needs. 

Our operation in Kandahar is named Hamkari, which in Dari 

means cooperation. It has been planned and will be conducted with 

our Afghan partners in the lead for operations. The focus of 

Hamkari is on providing Kandahar with credible and effective governance that gives the population hope for the future. More effective government will deliver security, basic services, development, 

and employment. If these ends are achieved, the people of 

Kandahar will reject the insurgency and support the government. 

The plans for Hamkari were approved by the President of Afghanistan on 4 April when he visited the city. In time it will deliver the security that the people of Kandahar desire and will drive 

the insurgents from the city and the outlying districts by steadily 

restricting their freedom to operate. A more capable, representative 

and responsive government will be able to bring the economic development and rule of law that the area so badly needs. 

Hamkari is not about highly kinetic military operations. It is 

about applying the combined resources of the Afghan National 

Army, the Afghan National Police, and ISAF in support of the governor to improve security both in the city and in the populated environs. Hamkari will bring the government and the people closer 

together to make for a better future for Kandahar. 

Our recent clearing operations by the Afghan National Security 

Forces, the Marines, and the British in Marja and Nad Ali, Operation Moshtarak, were, in fact, shaping operations for this upcoming event and the operations in and around Kandahar. 

There are several significant differences between Hamkari and 

the Operation Moshtarak in Marja. For a start, the physical size 

and the size of the population are much greater in Kandahar than 

they were in Marja. In Marja and Nad Ali, ISAF forces relied heavily on kinetic operations to clear the insurgents from the populated 

area. In Kandahar, as General McChrystal has recently indicated, 

and I quote, there won’t be a D–Day that is climactic. Instead there 

will be a rising tide of security for the local population. 

Our current assessment is the positive trends in a number of 

areas such as ANSF growth and improved security, governance, 

and development in central Helmand are a result of recent operations and indicate that our campaign is on track and moving in 

the right direction. Previously declining security trends in some 

areas of the country have been arrested, while trends elsewhere 
9 

have been starting to advance in a positive direction. Current 

trends remain tenuous until more permanent and effective governance is established in the areas being secured. Enduring stability 

is dependent on Government of Afghanistan’s ability to deliver 

credible local governance and essential services and to expand economic opportunities for its people. 

Real progress will be confirmed only when the Afghan people believe that lasting security and stability has been established in 

their areas, and this will take time. People’s perceptions typically 

change more slowly and lag behind many of the actions that are 

actually improving the conditions on the ground. 

As I conclude my remarks, I would, as did Secretary Flournoy, 

caution everyone that in spite of recent successes in central 

Helmand, we shouldn’t underestimate the challenges that lie before 

us or that underplay the need for resolve in the days ahead because we continue to fight an intelligent and adaptable enemy. 

I thank you for your time this morning, and, more importantly, 

I thank you for your continued support of our troops, their families 

and our mission. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Paxton and Secretary 

Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 52.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much and again we appreciate 

your being with us and your excellent assessment. 

Both of you, come with me in your mind’s eye, my hometown of 

Lexington, and early in the morning go to a local coffee shop, and 

there are seven or eight of my gentlemen friends sitting around 

drinking coffee and talking about football games and the baseball 

games that are coming up, and I introduce you. Most of them are 

veterans of Vietnam or Korea. And one of them turns to you and 

says, are we achieving success in Afghanistan? Another one turns 

to you and says, when do we declare victory in Afghanistan? And 

I step back, and I let you answer the questions. 

Madam Secretary, two questions. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Chairman Skelton, I believe we are achieving success. We are on the right road for the first time in a long 

time in Afghanistan. So that is the assessment of General 

McChrystal that we hear weekly in our conversations with him. It 

is the assessment of our U.S. Government team on the ground. 

Are we done yet? Absolutely not. Are there more challenges to 

be dealt with? Yes. But we are on the right path, and things are 

starting to move in the right direction. 

In terms of how we define victory, I think that victory is a—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t say define it. The question was—— 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I am sorry, when is victory. 

The CHAIRMAN. My friend didn’t ask you to define it. He asked 

are we achieving it? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think when is victory is based on achieving certain conditions, and that, to me, is making sure that Afghanistan, the Government of Afghanistan, has the capacity to 

exert its sovereignty over its territory, to deny Al Qaeda and its associates safe haven in the country, and to maintain stability so that 

it can continue to develop on the way forward. That is the core— 

that relates to our core goal that we have defined for ourselves in 

this mission. 
10 

The CHAIRMAN. General, two questions. 

General PAXTON. Sir, in terms of success, I, too, believe that we 

are achieving success on the ground. The definition of success— 

well, rather than the definition, the indicators of success, it is true 

that the levels of violence are up right now in some areas, both the 

attacks have been up and the IEDs in particular are up. But as I 

noted earlier, what we are seeing is in some cases up to 80 percent 

of the local population letting us know where the IEDs [improvised 

explosive devices] are, and that contributed to a reduction in the 

number of casualties and increased operational efficiency in 

Moshtarak, in Nad Ali and in Marja. And it is our expectation that 

as we have better partnering, more partnering, more Afghans in 

the lead in the planning and the execution, that we will see those 

trends continue as we move into Kandahar. 

In terms of victory, I believe that the indicators for victory are— 

there is a lag between the execution and the indication, and it is 

indeed very dependent on the demonstration of both capacity and 

credibility of the Afghan people, the security forces and the governance to actually lead and provide security and provide opportunities for the people. But the more that the polls indicate, as they 

currently do, that they believe in the Afghan National Security 

Forces, and they believe in ISAF, and that they believe our current 

operations are generating the potential for a better life for them, 

then we are on the right road, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In my opening comments I stated that Admiral Mullen told this 

committee, in Afghanistan we do what we can, in Iraq we do what 

we must, 18 months ago. Actually that statement was made December of 2007, so I want to correct that for the record. 

As I stated earlier, I am concerned that the 30,000 troop cap for 

Afghanistan forcing difficult decisions to be made when it comes to 

finding certain key enablers, including force protection measures 

for our forward-operating bases. Do we have a troop cap in Afghanistan? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I would tell you we do not have a troop 

cap; 30,000 is the number of forces the President has approved. It 

is not a cap per se. 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. That is based on the assessment on 

the ground, and the assessment is always subject to review both by 

General McChrystal and back here in Washington. And the 30K 

that people commonly refer to is just one component, sir, because 

we have an additional 9- to 10,000 of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization] forces, and then we have what is now en route to 134 

Afghan National Army [ANA] and up to 170-some Afghan National 

Police [ANP]. So you have to look at the composite mix of all of 

those security forces, and we are trying to strike the right balance 

between U.S., coalition force and local/national, sir. 

Mr. MCKEON. So you feel there is no cap, and General 

McChrystal can call on all the resources he felt he needed? 

General PAXTON. Indeed he has, sir. He has come back to ask for 

more and ask for different, and it is a constant series of assessments that I personally get involved with on a weekly basis to take 
11 

a look at the flow of forces and what should go next and what 

should go in addition to. 

Mr. MCKEON. Let me talk a little bit about the enablers in Iraq 

versus Afghanistan. Can you answer the following: Are we addressing force protection on our FOBs [forward operating bases] differently in Afghanistan than Iraq? And if yes, why are we deploying contractors instead of military personnel? 

General PAXTON. Sir, our analysis and assessment of force protection is no different regardless of the theater. And you strike the 

balance between the threat of direct fire, indirect fire, aviation missile, and you take a look about the appropriate indications and 

warnings you would need to identify where that threat would come 

from. 

I would tell you that as we look to increase our footprint and our 

boots-on-the-ground presence in Afghanistan, we also look to bring 

in all what we commonly call the enablers that you need to have 

to provide that force protection. So additional military police, additional combat engineers, additional route clearance, and part and 

parcel of that package thanks to the good efforts of this committee 

and the funding has been our elevated line of sight, which is our 

persistent ground surveillance, some of it on camera and on elevating telescopic poles from the vehicles, some of it tethered balloons, some of it manned, some of it unmanned. So all of our ISR 

[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] Task Force capabilities indeed provide us the eyes and ears that we need to sense the 

environs there. 

And if you look at the source of the fires and the casualties, the 

indirect fire in Afghanistan is not what it was in Iraq. It is the 

IEDs that is the largest component first, and then the small-arms 

fire and things like rocket-propelled grenades second. So it is not 

the indirect fire. But the assessment process in Iraq and Afghanistan are identical, sir. 

Mr. MCKEON. General, why are we not employing Task Force 

ODIN [Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize] in Afghanistan the 

same way we did in Iraq? Or are you saying we did? When I look 

at the breakdown of ISR for Army direct support assets alone, specifically Hunter, Shadow and the ERMP [Extended Range MultiPurpose UAVs] in Iraq, they have approximately 80 UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] in Iraq; they have about 50 in Afghanistan. 

General PAXTON. Again, sir, I think the capabilities that we 

bring and the way that we employ the capabilities are the same in 

Afghanistan as they are in Iraq. We have our ISR Task Force here, 

which is pushing all those assets forward, again manned and unmanned. We have our Task Force Paladin, which is like Task Force 

Troy, which is our IED over there, and we are looking to get both 

full-motion video and then manned and unmanned aerial vehicles 

up there so that we can detect movement of the enemy and movement of perhaps sympathetic local nationals that may be either 

scouting for them or putting in IEDs. So I think our capability is 

there. 

And as I mentioned a minute ago, some of this is just the lag. 

As we increase our footprint on the ground, then we are surging 

with them and bringing behind extra eyes and ears that will do the 

exact same things in Afghanistan that ODIN did in Iraq. 
12 

Mr. MCKEON. Do we have more of these UAVs currently in Iraq 

than in Afghanistan? 

General PAXTON. If I could take that for the record and get back 

with you, sir, because we are drawing down, obviously, in Iraq. We 

are trying to keep a sufficient amount there to cover what will become our six Advise and Assist Brigades that stay behind. And 

there is a difference in the geometry of the battlefield. 

Some folks would believe that as you draw down the boots on the 

ground, you can draw down all the extra enablers, and that may 

not be the case. I think, as General Odierno and General Petraeus 

have articulated, that you still need extra eyes and ears out there 

because you don’t have the physical presence on the ground. So we 

are trying to strike the balance between how quickly we can draw 

down in Iraq and how much we have built up in Afghanistan. Some 

of it is transitional forces from one theater to the other. In other 

cases, we need them in both. So we are procuring more, as I said, 

thanks to the efforts of the committee here, to go out and buy more 

full-motion video and Electro Optical and IR [Infrared] [EO/IR] and 

different things like that, sir. 

Mr. MCKEON. It just seems to me in Iraq, where we have pulled 

the troops out of the cities, and there are more in reserve positions—right now we are in Afghanistan, we are on the offense. It 

seemed like to me, now—I am not a military expert such as General Petraeus, General McChrystal, yourself, but I would like to see 

those numbers because it seems to me that more of those enablers, 

in my humble opinion, should be where we are on the offense and 

where we have more troops actually in the line of fire right now. 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. And I take that for the record, certainly get you the numbers, sir, and then the actual discussion of 

how many and where they go we could certainly do in closed session if you would like to do that, sir. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Flournoy and 

General Paxton. Thank you so much for being here and providing 

your thoughts on security and stability of Afghanistan. 

A few days ago it was announced that the United States would 

be sending an additional 850 soldiers and marines to train the local 

security forces in Afghanistan for approximately 90 to 120 days. 

These trainers are seen as a stopgap, yet there is still a shortage 

of trainers conducting this critical mission. 

If the way ahead in Afghanistan is to have capable local security 

forces, what is needed to fill this critical shortage of trainers? I 

think this is one of the big problems that we have. And how are 

our allies contributing to fill these critical shortages? And how will 

this shortage of trainers affect the handover to local forces? Maybe 

you can enlighten us a little bit on that. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think the institutional trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces, and then having mentoring teams, 

what we call OMLTs [Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams], for 
13 

the ANA and POMLTs [Police Operational Mentor and Liaison 

Teams] for the ANP out in the field to continue that training and 

leadership development as they actually operate, that really is the 

sort of long pole in the tent of our future success. This is absolutely 

critical to building capacity. 

We have—as we seek to grow the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] and improve its quality, the requirements for those 

training, that training capacity has gone up. We have been pushing 

our allies to step up with us to meet those new requirements, and 

many of them are doing so. It remains a work in progress. We have 

not—we have made progress towards that goal. General Paxton 

may have some of the specific numbers. But we are not all the way 

there yet. 

The deployment of U.S. forces as a bridge is simply to try to meet 

some of the near-term requirements as we continue to recruit our 

NATO allies to step up with additional trainers, but we don’t want 

to lose time, so we wanted to go ahead and plug the near-term gap, 

get General Caldwell, who is the head of NTM–A [NATO Training 

Mission–Afghanistan] and CSTC–A [Combined Security Transition 

Command–Afghanistan], some additional resources to continue the 

momentum in these very important efforts. 

I don’t know if you want to add any comments, General. 

General PAXTON. Thank you, ma’am. 

Yes, sir. Obviously the training of the police and the Afghan National Army are critical functions—not just critical enablers, but 

critical functions—that we have to accomplish. So General Caldwell 

is over there with a NATO training mission, formerly CSTC–A, and 

we have sent additional U.S. forces over to assist him, almost two 

brigade combat teams’ worth, to do training for the army and the 

police. 

NATO has contributions. They have had almost 3- to 4,000 more 

since the President’s announcement in December. But we would 

like to get additional NATO contributions there, and if some of the 

NATO members perhaps relook at their combat footprint, we are 

looking to see if they can change those into trainers and enablers. 

So what we have done and what your comment reflects, sir, is 

the fact that in the short term we still have a pressing need for 

trainers, and we are waiting for long term solutions. So we have 

sent an Army battalion and three increments of Marines over there 

to fill that gap in the short term, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I know that sometime back we had a high ratio of 

AWOLs [Absent Without Leave]. Has that gone down some? Are we 

still having those same problems we had before where they just 

wouldn’t come in? 

General PAXTON. Sir, there has been a marked change since December in terms of both their absenteeism, which has gone down, 

and then their reenlistment and retention rate, which has gone up. 

So it is not only in the short term in terms of showing up for duty, 

but it is in the long term in terms of their commitment. Some of 

this is due to success on the ground; some of it is due to change 

in their pay structure. But we believe these are both good news stories, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. It is encouraging to see that we are beginning to get 

tips from the local citizens as to where to locate some of the IEDs 
14 

and stuff. What about the training camps? Do we have any knowledge? Are we getting any tips on the training camps? Because we 

see that, just like the other day, a naturalized citizen from the 

United States goes down there to train. Is that hard to detect the 

training camp where they are conducting some of this training, the 

enemy? 

General PAXTON. I don’t have some of the tactical specifics at my 

fingertips, sir, but obviously it is—I mean, these are safe havens 

and sanctuaries, and sometimes they are indeed difficult to find. 

The more that you build confidence in the local populace, and the 

more that they tell you routes that you have freedom of movement 

on or areas where you should not go, or they help you detect IEDs, 

eventually you get to the point where you can say, well, who lives 

in this neighborhood? And they will take you to other areas, sir. 

So we watch it very closely, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett, please. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

I want to return for a moment to the chairman’s coffee shop and 

to other coffee shops across the country where two other questions 

are being asked. The first is why is not this Afghanistan war the 

ultimate exercise in futility? Because even if we do what no one 

else has ever done, from Alexander the Great, the British Empire, 

the Soviet Empire, even if we could accomplish what none of them 

have ever accomplished, it won’t make any difference, they say, because the bad guys will simply go into Pakistan. And then if we 

spend I don’t know how many more billions of dollars and how 

many more dead kids and wounded kids to drive them out of there, 

they will go to Somalia and Yemen. 

They say it is quite clear that we cannot deny them sanctuary. 

So why is this not the ultimate exercise in futility? 

It is noted that frequently the citizens there choose the harsh 

rule of the Taliban compared to the corrupt rule of the Karzai government, and our very presence there recruits the enemy. There 

were essentially no Al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI] before we went there. 

Then there were a lot of Al Qaeda there after we were there. I 

asked the State Department, were they imported? Were they de 

novo? They said that most of them were, in fact, de novo. So our 

presence there creates the enemy. 

The second question is why are we following Osama bin Laden’s 

playbook? This is a hugely asymmetric war, Mohammed with a 

rusty artillery shell and a few dollars’ worth of electronics. And just 

one of our responses to that has cost us $40 billion. That is MRAPs 

[Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles]. That is just one platform in response to that. Osama Bin Laden is on the record as saying that they will continue this guerrilla kind of war until they 

bleed us dry. 

So these two questions, please. Why is this not the ultimate exercise in futility? And why are we following Osama bin Laden’s playbook? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Congressman, in response to the first question, I would draw a very sharp distinction between the historical 
15 

experience of many in Afghanistan who were there to conquer 

versus our mission in Afghanistan, which is to enable the development of Afghan capacity to exert sovereignty over their own territory. 

I think your point about Pakistan has informed the fact that we 

have taken a regional strategy. We need to pressure Al Qaeda and 

its associates and deny them safe haven on both sides of the border, and that is exactly what our strategy is designed to do. 

Support for the Taliban in Afghanistan is quite weak, very little 

popular support, and that creates great opportunity for us to help 

develop Afghan institutions and capacity that are a viable alternative for the population. 

And in terms of Osama bin Laden, again, I would just say that 

we don’t have the option of allowing Al Qaeda to have freedom of 

movement and sanctuary given the threat that they pose to our 

homeland and to our vital interests abroad. And I think that if you 

look at the totality of our campaign on both sides of the AfghanPakistan border and globally, we are having tremendous success in 

putting pressure on this network, and disrupting their operations, 

and denying their ability to launch spectacular attacks. 

So I think that we have to take a global perspective, and I think 

the strategy is actually bearing a great deal of fruit at this point. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The questioner notes that in Iraq we actually increased the number of the enemy. Our very presence there did 

that, admitted to by the State Department. And assuming success 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they will simply go to Somalia and 

Yemen. It is clear that we cannot deny them sanctuary. 

So the question still remains why is this not the ultimate exercise in futility, assuming success? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Again, sir, I think the facts suggest that we 

are debilitating the network. We are putting pressure on the network on a global basis, and that denying them sanctuary is critical 

to preventing their ability to attack our homeland and attack our 

interests and our forces and our allies abroad. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The second question, why are we following Osama 

bin Laden’s playbook in this hugely asymmetric war? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I would differ with you. I don’t believe 

we are following his playbook. Actually his playbook isn’t working 

so well in terms of advancing Al Qaeda’s aims right now. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield my 

time to Mr. Murphy and claim his later. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy is recognized. 

Mr. MURPHY OF NEW YORK. Thank you. 

I wanted to look a little bit for direction of where this is all headed. So I was over in Kandahar two months ago on the ground talking to some of the people that were there, very impressed with our 

efforts and what we are trying to do to stabilize the area and to 

provide security there. But one of the things that really jumped out 

at me is where does it go from there? 

I have no doubt that our soldiers can provide security, they can 

get out on the streets, and they can drive Taliban away, but where 
16 

is the next step? And one that really stuck out to me, some of the 

locals said to me, we don’t have any reliable electricity, we don’t 

have an economy, we can’t run our businesses. I can have you meet 

with 20 local businessmen who can’t run their factories because 

there is no electricity. And dug a little deeper, what they told me 

is there are two megawatts of power for the whole city of 

Kandahar. Our base needs 10 to 15 megawatts of power and has 

it to run every day. So we are trying to provide security, and we 

are also at night kind of lighting up this boardwalk of Broadway 

lights, and the people are saying, ‘‘We can’t get any power, but you 

guys have it over there.’’ 

Where is the next step? So we provide the security, but then 

what happens to let people start to function in that environment 

to allow us to get away and to go next? And specifically do we have 

a plan for electricity and for the local economy there? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I would like to come back for the 

record with a more detailed answer on the specifics of electrical 

power generation for Kandahar. 

My understanding, though, is that is part of the larger plan for 

that area. I think the real shift we have seen coming out of the 

strategy review and putting additional civilian resources on the 

ground alongside our soldiers is that we have had much more integrated civil-military planning where we, in designing our counterinsurgency [COIN] campaign for an area, we are actually harnessing the development piece to support the establishment of 

more credible and capable Afghan Government governance at the 

local and provincial level. 

My understanding is there is—that this is a recognized need, 

that it is part of the longer-term plan for that area, but I would 

like to get back to you on the specific details, if I may. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

General PAXTON. And, sir, I will join with the Secretary and get 

back with you on specifics. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

General PAXTON. What there is, as some of you know, Kajaki 

dam, which is in southern Afghanistan. 

Mr. MURPHY OF NEW YORK. It will be three years before the 

power from that is going to impact this is what I was told. 

General PAXTON. I understand, sir, but that is part of the longterm plan. As you get the security in the area better and the governance up, then we can develop areas like Kajaki. 

Mr. MURPHY OF NEW YORK. So is it three years before we think 

the governance is coming? I mean, before there is electricity to 

have an economy, it is hard to imagine that the people are going 

to start saying, ‘‘Well, this government is really working for us.’’ So 

does it mean it is our responsibility for that long? 

General PAXTON. We have already moved some generator capacity into the area, but it is a slow process of actual development, 

and this is what I owe you, the specifics of the time line between 

when we get the generators in, when the infrastructure is place, 

and when the power starts to deliver. 
17 

Mr. MURPHY OF NEW YORK. I use this more as a specific to illustrate where I wanted to get to, a bigger point, which was what I 

also heard from all the Afghan ministers was that we have a catch22. They can’t get the credibility to build popular support behind 

their government until they can deliver for people. We aren’t comfortable letting them deliver any of the development work until 

they stop having the corruption problems they have because we 

say, ‘‘We will not give you the money to do development because 

we think you will steal it;’’ and they say to us, ‘‘That is great, but 

if you guys are here with your military providing security and your 

development folks doing the development, why would anyone turn 

to us?’’ And what I heard on the ground is that the order of operations to where you turn for help in Kandahar was: one, to NATO; 

two, to your local warlords; three, to the Taliban; and, four, to the 

Afghan Government. 

So what I wanted to understand is how are we going to make 

that transition? How are we going to get to the point where the Afghan Government is one on that list and at least two, if not three 

or four? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Two points I would make, sir. They are 

very important issues you are raising. One is to make sure that the 

PRTs’ [Provincial Reconstruction Teams’] priorities in an area are 

more tightly integrated into the overall civil-military campaign 

plan for that area. And I think in Kandahar that integration process is starting to happen more than it has in the past. So I think 

you are going to see a realignment of some of our development efforts to more closely support the security in governance objectives. 

Mr. MURPHY OF NEW YORK. Are we starting to give more of the 

development money to the Afghan Government in the Kandahar region? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. That is the second point. The second point 

is that we are working ministry by ministry to develop internal capacity so that they can receive, account for, track, and be accountable for flowing money through the ministry. So we have set ourselves a series of progressive goals to flow more and more assistance through the key Afghan ministries, but that requires certifying them to be able to handle that in an accountable way. And 

we are in the process of doing that. I think we have done two or 

three, and we will do another two or three in the coming months. 

Mr. MURPHY OF NEW YORK. My time has expired. But if we could 

get the metrics for how that certification, slash, the progress works, 

I am really interested in that because it gets to the corruption, and 

it gets to how we get ourselves out of being the ones doing the nation-building and letting the Afghans build their own nation. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And, Madam Secretary and General Paxton, thank you for being 

here today. 

And I would like to start my points and also my questions by 

reading an e-mail I got recently from a retired general that I have 

tremendous respect for: 

The only real shot we have at any sort of success is to spend 

years strengthening the Afghan Army and Police; work out with 
18 

Pakistan a way to attack on both sides of the border—in parentheses, ‘‘Very tough to do’’; get rid of corruption in the government—again parentheses, ‘‘Good luck on that front’’; do something 

about an economy based on poppy growing—‘‘Not going to happen 

in the Congressman’s lifetime’’; and do all in our power not to drive 

the Taliban into the arms of local population. 

It was a fairly long e-mail that I am not at liberty to say his 

name, but I e-mailed him because I am very concerned about rules 

of engagement [ROE]. 

And I had had a conversation with the father of this marine who 

was killed, John Bernard. And ‘‘Caution Killed My Son: Marine 

Families Blast Suicidal Tactics in Afghanistan.’’ And then I go back 

to another article in Marine Times: ‘‘Left to Die, They Called for 

Help. Negligent Army leadership refused and abandoned them on 

the battlefield.’’ 

I realize that you are trying to win the confidence and the support of the Afghan people, but I go back to Mr. Bartlett’s points and 

really to the coffee shop that the chairman talked about. I hear this 

frequently back home in the Third District of North Carolina, the 

home of Camp Lejeune Marine Base, the home of Seymour Johnson 

Air Force Base. And people are wondering truthfully if you don’t 

have an end point, this is beginning to sound like the previous Administration and Iraq. 

You brief the Congress—and I am not being critical of you. I 

want you to fully understand that. You brief the Congress, and, 

well, you know, we are cautiously optimistic, we are going down 

this road and that road, and, you know, it seems like we are making progress. I am sure we are making some progress; I don’t doubt 

that. But I will tell you that reading this article in Newsweek, 

‘‘Scandal in Afghanistan: The Exclusive Story of How We Have 

Wasted $6 Billion’’—$6 billion—‘‘on a Corrupt and Abusive Police 

Force that May Cost Us the War.’’ 

I really want to try to figure out whoever is sitting in these 

chairs a year, two years, three years, four years, and we still are 

spending billions and trillions in a 14th-century country with corruption that we cannot control, and we have got—some of our people in Congress get indicted over here, so I don’t know how we are 

going to do it in a country where we can’t even speak their language hardly. 

So the point is at what point will you say to this Congress, do 

you believe you can say, ‘‘We are at the point that we have won 

the end point of what we are trying to achieve’’? Because, Madam 

Secretary, I feel for this Administration as well. I made that point. 

This is something they inherited, and we have to fight terrorism 

around the world. But sticking 100,000 of our troops over in Afghanistan and telling them, if they fire at you from the left, you 

shoot back; if they fire at you from the right, you don’t shoot, that 

is not fair to these kids, it is not fair to their parents and their 

wives and their husbands. 

I guess that is a question. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I am going to let General Paxton address the particulars of the rules of engagement because I think he 

is more qualified to do that. 
19 

But let me first take on your concern, which I think is understandable and real, about the challenges of capacity-building and 

also corruption. 

Afghanistan is a country that has been in and out of war for 30 

years. In that kind of environment, corruption tends to take root 

in the society at large. It is a problem for other countries in the 

region as well. I think we are seeing renewed commitment to dealing with this problem on the Afghan side. They have recently established a major crimes task force and indicted key officials, the 

mayor of Kabul, a minister, a police general, trying to signal no one 

is going to be above the rule of law. We are at the beginning of a 

process, but, again, we are moving in the right direction. 

We are trying to change the incentive structures that have motivated corruption in the past. You are right. It used to be that police 

did not make a living wage. So police would make their living wage 

by fleecing the local population. We have changed the pay and benefits, working with the Afghan Government, so they don’t have to 

be corrupt in order to make a living wage. Things like that are 

very, very important. 

We are working with the Afghan ministries on long-term economic development, things like—they are very rich in strategic 

minerals and resources, very rich in agriculture—helping them to 

develop sustainable, long-term sources of income for the nation. 

Those are the longer-term parts of the project. But on the specific 

question of ROEs, I would like to defer to General Paxton if the 

chairman would indulge us with time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed. We have to move along, but go 

ahead. 

General PAXTON. Thank you, sir. 

Congressman Jones, there is absolutely nothing in the tactical directive that prohibits or limits any servicemember, marine, soldier, 

from appropriate self-defense. What is in the directive is the conscious application of close air support and indirect fire to make 

sure that if it is not a fleeting target or something that poses imminent self-defense, that you have done due diligence in terms of assessing collateral damage, whether it is for infrastructure, for children, for noncombatants. But there is nothing in there that prohibits either the commander or the individual soldier from doing 

what he needs to do on the ground, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder, please. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here once again. You are regulars here 

in the last few days. 

I want to talk about resources. Secretary Flournoy, you had 

talked about that earlier. I remember sometime in the last year or 

so, General Jack Keane testified, now retired, that when he was 

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, at the end of 2002, resources began 

being moved out of Afghanistan in anticipation of the March 2003 

invasion of Iraq. His recollection, it was that early. 

Then we began hearing almost privately, I remember the Commandant—I am a former marine—at the Marine Corps breakfast 

made the comment that we have a policy of clear, hold, and build, 

but we only have enough troops to clear. We don’t have enough 

troops to hold and build. Secretary Gates during the Bush Adminis-
20 

tration made some comments at private meetings that he was concerned about the troop strength. 

Mr. McKeon has already referred to the December 2007 statement by Admiral Mullen. My concern is that the continued discussion as if we are still in that mindset. The ranking member’s opening statement refers to a have-nots mentality. Is there a have-nots 

mentality that would be permeating our military commanders’ 

thinking that they don’t have adequate resources? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. That is certainly not my impression. I 

think General McChrystal’s assessment was to tell us what he 

thought he needed to be the priority mission and to get the mission 

right. And I think when you look at the U.S. forces that have been 

put in, the NATO forces that are being committed, the Afghan 

forces that are being grown, he believes he has what he needs to 

do the mission. 

And I think one of the things that my boss Secretary Gates has 

always said is we have to make sure that we balance our approach 

here, that on the one hand you want to make sure you have enough 

forces in Afghanistan to ensure that you don’t fail in the mission. 

On the other hand, you don’t want to go overboard and come to be 

seen as a force of occupation. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. So we have listened to General McChrystal 

very carefully, and what he told Congress in December and what 

he continues to say is that he believes he is getting the resources 

to carry out his mission at this point. 

I don’t know if you have anything to add. 

General PAXTON. And again, part of the assessment there trying 

to figure out what you need both by people and resources, when 

you need it, and then where you need it, and the constant risk assessment. 

I think most members in uniform, if you ask them, ‘‘how much 

do you need,’’ the answer would always be ‘‘more,’’ because the 

more you have, the less risk you have to assume. But we try to constantly assess how many people we have and what types of capability we have, and then does that sufficiently mitigate the risk, 

and is it a most likely or a most dangerous course of action that 

you are going to mitigate against. 

And then secondly, sir, as we look to increase the capability and 

the capacity of the Afghan forces to make sure that, as they shoulder more of the burden, then we can requisite, stand down, and do 

perhaps less. We teach them, we show them, we lead them, and 

then we turn over to them. 

Dr. SNYDER. And I appreciate your sentiment today. The nature 

of war is such that I hope if that were to change 6 months, a year, 

18 months, 2 years from now, that you thought that you did not 

have the resources you needed, I hope that you would express the 

same level of candor. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Turner, please. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank both of you for being here today. I have two questions, 

one concerning the troop cap and one concerning drug trafficking. 

The first question, General Paxton, is directed at you, and it is 

building on Mr. McKeon’s statement and other questions that other 
21 

Members have had during this hearing. People are very concerned 

about our ability to be successful as we are looking at the constraints that you are operating under. So my question is, what 

enablers are the NATO allies and the Afghan Security Forces relying on for the United States to provide? And how has the troop cap 

of 30,000 impacted our ability to support the U.S.-allied forces and 

the Afghans? As ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] coalition adds I believe what is 4,500 out of perhaps 9,000 troops 

pledged in conjunction with the U.S. surge, and as Afghan Security 

Forces grow, how are we ensuring our troops, the allies, and the 

Afghans all have access to the enablers that they need? 

General PAXTON. Thank you, sir. 

We have looked very closely at the enablers. No surprise that 

when the U.S. comes, not only do we bring the preponderance of 

the forces, but we bring the preponderance of the enablers. So we 

have more aviation, be it for lift or for Medevac [medical evacuation]. We have more engineers for route clearance. So you look, 

when you go to our NATO allies and the coalition forces, for them 

to bring a requisite share of those capabilities if they are able. 

Secretary Gates just spoke in Istanbul several weeks ago and offered that we would take a look at our obligations, which this committee rightfully told us to take a look at in Iraq several years ago, 

to make sure that by resourcing allied and coalition partners, we 

don’t necessarily jeopardize U.S. forces first. 

But we are at the point now with the production of MRAPs and 

our equipping on the ground that we can take a look at those capabilities that we could either share with partners, or we could offer 

to sell to them, or we could put in the FMS [Foreign Military Sales] 

program. 

There is an increased capacity and willingness on the part of allies to fund for themselves, to source for themselves, and then we 

also have the capability of sharing with them in areas where we 

are partnered together, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Everyone continues to be concerned about how 

those resources come out of the total resources that are applied, 

and whether or not we have sufficient response to meet our needs. 

Turning to the drug trade. In a December 21, 2006, remark to 

the Atlantic Council, General Jones stated that ‘‘the Achilles heel 

of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem.’’ General Jones suggested 

that the solution has to be broad. It is not one thing. There is no 

recipe for this. It is not just eradication, not crop substitution. It 

is a lot of things that can be combined to begin to wean the economy. 

More specifically, he called for: one, a judicial system that is 

functional; two, police reform; three, involvement of the Afghan 

Government; four, extending the reach of the Afghan Government 

to Pakistan. 

I know that when we look at the issue of the drug trade, we have 

to be concerned about how do we address the issue of the money, 

the cash that flows through the drug trade, the transportation 

routes for drugs themselves, the labs that are producing the drugs, 

the fields themselves where we need to look for an economic shift. 

Part of the problem has been a lack of an assessment of a complete 

to-do list, and then execution of that to-do list. 
22 

According to recent report by the National Security Council 

[NSC], a new U.S. Government counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan has been approved. It is my understanding that the Hill 

has not yet been briefed on this new strategy, and that we don’t 

have that here for our staff. I am very concerned about this. What 

can you tell us about this new strategy? 

And I would like to hold up this chart. This is a CRS [Congressional Research Service] report chart that shows the Afghan drug 

trade. As you can see, the last four years—and if you fold it in half, 

you can see what the normal production of narcotics have been in 

Afghanistan. The last four years have been their own surge, their 

narcotics surge. And that is really, I believe, the root of what we 

have been facing in Afghanistan. As we try to address the issues 

of Afghanistan but don’t address this drug trade, we are going to 

continue to fund and fuel our adversaries. 

What can you add to that discussion, please? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, we did refine our counternarcotics 

strategy as part of the review we conducted late last year, and I 

am happy to invite our interagency partners to come up and brief 

this committee if you have not been adequately briefed. 

Narcotics is a key funding stream for the insurgency. We have 

established a threat finance cell that looks at the nexus of narcotics 

and the insurgency to go after that. We have also helped train Afghan forces that are specifically focused on drug interdiction. We 

have crop-substitution programs under way to try to transition 

farmers to licit crops. We are focusing infrastructure development 

to make sure that once farmers grow licit crops, they can actually 

get them to market and so forth. 

I think in areas where this has come to together, in RC [Regional 

Command] East, for example, you have seen a drop in poppy production. RC South is the new area of focus where we will be putting all of those elements in place to seek to make the same kind 

of progress there. But we would be happy to come back up and 

brief you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Flournoy, you, in answering Mr. Skelton’s question, 

had a definition of victory as the point in which Afghanistan has 

the capacity to exert sovereignty and deny Taliban safe haven, 

which really seems to, in my mind, prioritize the need to get functioning security forces. 

The New York Times yesterday quoted a Pentagon report which 

said that the most significant challenge to fielding qualified Afghan 

Security Forces is the shortage of institutional trainers. I know Mr. 

Ortiz touched on this earlier, but, again, the story listed the fact 

that NATO and the U.S. agreed to 5,200 trainers last January. 

There is 2,700 there today. All but 300 are U.S. And obviously Secretary Gates, I know, has been working hard to try and extract the 

bodies that were committed. But at the same time, we are flowing 

30,000 new forces. And clearly, this is so important to have the 

trainers there. I mean, at some point it seems that we should just 

do it and stop sort of waiting for that commitment to materialize. 

And I just—well, why don’t you comment? 
23 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, the decision to deploy the additional 

U.S. forces as a bridge mechanism is to plug the immediate gap of 

what is needed now. We want to continue to incentivize our partners to step up with additional training contributions, but we—this 

is a priority, and we will plug those gaps. 

The other thing that really makes a difference here is the shift 

in General McChrystal’s strategy to put an emphasis on 

partnering, so that every ANA unit, every Afghan Police unit has 

an ISAF or U.S. partner that is training—continuing the training 

in the field, mentoring, doing the leadership development. And so 

there is the institutional training piece, which is critical with this 

partnering, is where you are really going to further develop your 

force and its competency to really take leadership over time. So 

that is an area of focus, and we are putting about as much energy 

as can possibly be put on this, on closing this gap, sir. 

General PAXTON. And the training is holistic, too. So we are looking to train the ministries as well as the police and the armed 

forces. And within the police, we are looking at local police, the end 

cop. So it is across the board. 

We recognize that, in addition to the training in general and the 

training across the board in specific, there is a unique requirement 

to train leadership. So one of the things we want to do as we get 

both U.S. forces and allied and NATO and coalition forces trainers 

there is to concentrate on NCO [noncommissioned officer] training 

and officer training, too, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Do you question or challenge the Times numbers 

in terms of, again, the commitment that was made and where we 

are today? 

General PAXTON. I don’t have those specific numbers. As I answered for Congressman Reyes, though, we know that there is a 

gap there, sir, between what was pledged and what has shown up. 

And that is why the bridging solution is in there. The 850 that was 

alluded to in either the Post or the Times article on Monday is indeed part of an Army battalion and then an increment of marines 

that are going over there that the Chief of Staff of the Army and 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps have said these are available 

and ready, and these can help as a bridging solution. And some of 

those already have a backfill mechanism, so that if by the end of 

their normal tenure, be it three months, four months, six months, 

if we don’t have sufficient allied contributions, we can backfill 

again. We don’t want to do that. We would like to get solutions 

from the NATO allies, but we can do that, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And I guess I understand your point that we 

want to extract those commitments that are made, that a deal is 

a deal. But on the other hand, I mean, the President’s goal of 2011 

as sort of a turnaround point, and somebody who was over last 

week visiting Connecticut National Guardsmen who were hit by an 

IED Easter Sunday morning, you know, waiting for our NATO allies is just—time is the enemy. And I guess if the training piece 

is so critical to getting to that point that you defined as sort of success, it just seems that we should just do it. We should just move. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, we will come back to you with a more 

full explanation, but we are—the gaps of what General Caldwell 

needs now, we are moving to address those now, and the rest will 
24 

follow over time. But we agree, this is the priority, and we are 

working in ways to address it in ways as quickly as possible. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Mr. Kline, let me address the potential Achilles heel that we have to overcome before we can use 

the word ‘‘success’’ or the word ‘‘victory.’’ And each of these is a serious potential Achilles heel. Pick out, if you would, the one or two 

of the list I give you that are the most serious. 

First, the corruption within the Afghanistan Government. Next, 

bad governance of the Afghan Government. Next, bad military 

strategy in fighting. Next, the Afghanistan Security Forces collapsing. Next, Pakistan refusing to help fight the Al Qaeda and the 

Taliban. Next, the lack of resources to the fighters. Next, the lack 

of resolve with our military and our allies. Next, logistics routes 

being shut down. And, last, the regional countries acting to undermine the Afghan Government and support the Taliban. 

Which of those concerns you the most? Which could lead to defeat in allowing us to use the word either ‘‘success’’ or ‘‘victory’’? 

Madam Secretary. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, when I look at that long list, I think 

that actually we have the right military strategy in place; that the 

development of the ANSF is challenging, but is moving in the right 

direction; that we are seeing Pakistan step up to the fight; that we 

are putting the right level of resourcing against the problem and 

so forth. So I think the ones that really will be the greatest challenges longer term are the involvement of regional—other regional 

stakeholders and ensuring that they do not interfere in or undermine Afghanistan’s progress towards security and stability. And I 

think overcoming decades of war to establish strong and good governance at all levels in Afghanistan, not just at the national level, 

but at the local level where most Afghans actually experience their 

government. 

The CHAIRMAN. General. 

General PAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I wrote down the nine of them, 

and I highlighted the same two that Secretary Flournoy did. They 

are all critical, they are all important, they all sometimes can appear tenuous. But we have both the capability and capacity ourselves, the United States, certainly with our NATO and allied partners, and then growing in capacity and capability with the Afghan—both GIRoA, the Government of Afghanistan, and the Afghan Security Forces. I think we are well on our way to tackling 

five or six of those. 

So my biggest concern would be those that we have the, for lack 

of a better term, the longest flash to bang, the longest lead time 

before we see measures of success. So how they demonstrate good 

governance within the Government of Afghanistan, and then how 

we get cooperation and support from regional actors and neighboring nations are the two that concern me the most, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for joining us again so quickly after your last 

visit. 

I must say that I was surprised and pleased to hear from both 

of you in response to Mr. McKeon’s questions about a cap, a troop 
25 

cap, that there is no troop cap. So I take it to mean from that that 

if General McChrystal, General Petraeus need another 5,000 or 

10,000 U.S. forces, that that is fine. That is something you would 

take up. There is no cap. If they need them, they get them. So I 

am very pleased to hear that. And that relates to a couple of other 

questions that I have. 

One, if—for the record, General, I think this comes from your 

shop. We understand that there are three force packages that are 

deploying to Afghanistan, and they contain combat forces and 

enablers. And if you could get for us a breakdown in those packages of combat forces and enablers. And, sir, I hate to do this to 

you, but we are going to mark up the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] next week. So if you could get that for us this 

week, for the record—I assume you have them already—we would 

like to see that. 

And then, in light of the troop requirement, do we already have 

a plan—either one of you—a plan in place to backfill the Dutch and 

Canadian forces that are leaving in 2010 and 2011? And if you 

have a ready answer for that, I will take it now. If not, I will be 

happy to take it for the record. 

Because I want to get to another issue, again related, I believe, 

to the requirement for forces. It was raised by, I think, the ranking 

member and perhaps some others, and that is the Joint Urgent 

Operational Need [JUON] that came from CENTCOM [United 

States Central Command] originally back in 2009 for sense, warn, 

and response capability. And I want to focus on that and not force 

protection in the large. 

There was this urgent need that was identified back in July of 

2009, and we worked our way up until March of this year when 

General Petraeus told this committee that they were exploring the 

use of contractors to meet some of the requirements contained in 

this JUON. 

And so my question is, has that JUON been modified? And, if so, 

why? And is it true that we are looking at contractors because we 

either don’t have U.S. forces, or a decision has been made not to 

use them? 

And I will tell you why I am really concerned about this is that 

if we were to use the model that we had in Iraq, we would already 

have soldiers with a lot of that capability in place in our FOBs. We 

have got U.S. forces over there in these FOBs. And I have a personal familiarity with that. My son happens to be not only in one 

of those FOBs, but commanding one of them. We ought to be providing them with the security that they deserve. 

So the question is, are we looking at contractors? And, if so, do 

we have a contract in place? And if not, why not? Because we are 

possibly not providing the force protection that we ought to be 

doing. 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. I will start with the JUON, sir, and 

then I will see if we have time, if it permits, to go back to your 

other questions on the Dutch and the Canadians. 

The JUONs is a process. It is obviously requirements-based, and 

General Petraeus did submit it, and it is under review right now. 

Mr. KLINE. General, this is an urgent need. That is the acronym; 

it is an urgent need. And I would think that that would—force pro-
26 

tection would indeed qualify as an urgent need. So I am a little bit 

concerned that this is a process that is dragging out. And, according to our understanding, that is what I am getting at, are we 

still—I hate to use the word ‘‘dithering,’’ but are we still wringing 

our hands over whether or not we are going to use contractors or 

U.S. forces? And are we not getting the contract in place? 

General PAXTON. And with that then, sir, I will take it for the 

record to find out exactly the status of the requirement and in the 

thought process behind who is best equipped, whether it is military 

or civilian, to actually work with the sense and the shoot system, 

sir. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kissell, please. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Madam Secretary and General, for being here 

today. 

Following up a little bit on some of the questions we had before, 

and I want to go back a little bit in time. Over a year ago General 

Fields, Commander SIGAR, Special Inspection General for Afghan 

Reconstruction, was here and talked to us basically about that we 

are making a lot of the same mistakes in Afghanistan that we 

made in Iraq in terms of not working with local people and not 

building what the people needed, projects that were not being properly supervised, so forth and so on. And I invited the general to 

come to my office for an update, and he reiterated a lot of the same 

problems. I invited the general back later on, and he said we had 

made some progress. And the general’s quarterly report came out 

last week. 

I am wondering if you all had looked at that. And where do we 

stand in terms of where the Special Inspector General says we now 

are interacting with the Afghan population? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I would say that one of the things we 

found coming into office was that development efforts in Afghanistan were not fully harnessed to an overall strategy. There was a 

lot of good effort going in, but a lot of different countries contributing in a lot of different ways based on their own national goals 

for Afghanistan. But it wasn’t all pulled together in a strategy. 

I think one of the real changes that we have seen under General 

McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry and with the civilian 

surge is an integration to try to ensure that all of our development 

efforts of the international community are actually fully synchronized with and in support of the governance and security objectives of the counterinsurgency campaign. 

And so that is something that has been happening over the last 

several months. And I think that there are areas where—particularly in the south and the east—where that is coming together in 

a much more integrated fashion. But given where we started, that 

is still a work in progress. But we are very much trying to respond 

to some of the insights and lessons learned that were in the SIGAR 

report. 

Mr. KISSELL. Well, I think that the comment you made earlier 

that most Afghans interact with local government—and this is 
27 

where the report just seemed to show that we weren’t paying attention; that we were building roads that could not be maintained, 

that we had energy projects that they either neither had the diesel 

fuel for, could not afford it, or could not maintain it. And there 

were several—I think it was like 19 out of the 36 governors who 

were saying that we were not asking them their opinion before we 

did things. So we do need to watch that because that is, in my 

mind, a great measure how we will have success with the Afghan 

people as we go. And I will be contacting the inspector general and 

asking him his opinion. 

And I would like to follow up with what Mr. Himes said in terms 

of if we need to be providing more security for our FOBs, then that 

should not be something we are discussing, it should be something 

we are doing. 

With that I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Now, first of all, Secretary Flournoy and General Paxton, thank 

you so much for your service to our country. 

General Paxton, would you agree or argue that the center of 

gravity for the Taliban is its ability to control the civilian population overtly, or covertly through a shadow government, and exact 

revenues from them? 

General PAXTON. I would agree with that, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Then in looking at the operation that we are going 

to do next in Kandahar, which is the basis of the Taliban in terms 

of that is where they originated from, if we were able to deny them 

that, the ability to exercise governance over the Taliban people either through a shadow government or covertly, what does that do 

in terms of—I mean, from an overall perspective in terms of this 

war in Afghanistan and bringing it to a close? 

General PAXTON. The first step, obviously, it denies them—just 

so you have a physical freedom of movement. It denies them the 

emotional, the intellectual, the governance freedom of movement. 

So if they have a populace that they can’t reach, or a populace who 

does not believe their message, or a populace who is unwilling to 

follow them, then the fertile ground that they seek to either control 

physically or to institute some terror, either high-profile attacks, 

murder and intimidation, unquestioning sharia law, so that they 

have lost that opportunity there. So what that does is give both us 

in the short-term and, more importantly, the Government of Afghanistan in the long-term operating room and breathing space so 

they can build loyalty, fidelity; they can get schools going, health 

clinics; they can give them the evidence of social services and infrastructure that the people of Afghanistan need. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I was in Afghanistan in November and met with 

General McChrystal at that time, and asked him prior to the President making his announcement as to a timetable that we would, 

in fact, begin to be able to draw down our forces in 2011 was the 

objective of the President, and that I asked General McChrystal if 

he got the troops that he requested, when could we expect to draw 

down our forces? And he said 2013. Keep in mind that—and I 

asked him, he was referencing the 40,000 at that point. Now, he 

got 30,000 and, I understand, 9,000 from our coalition partners. 
28 

First of all, could you respond as to what the net is in terms of 

coalition partners since some are withdrawing? And, number two, 

to what extent do those coalition partners that will exist going forward have caveats that keep them from participating in certainly 

kinetic operations? 

General PAXTON. At this time, Mr. Coffman, we have 46 troopcontributing nations in Afghanistan, including the United States. It 

is almost a 50/50 split. I think it is 22, 23, and 1, the number that 

are caveat-free, that can do anything. And some of them, while certainly restrictive, are not preemptive. That doesn’t preclude them 

from what they can do. So I know the commanders on the ground 

take a very close look about how they assign battle space and how 

they assign missions to get the maximum use of each of the troopcontributing nations when they get there. 

I would have to take a look at the master plan to see, in the 

aftermath of Kandahar, as we stay there in the days ahead, where 

the laydown of forces may be. And I can get that to you, if you need 

that, sir. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, General Paxton. I appreciate that. 

Secretary Flournoy, I was listening to your statement in defining 

the mission as it exists now under this Administration. And I think 

at one point in time you said it is about keeping Al Qaeda out of 

Afghanistan. And then you qualified that further in terms of Al 

Qaeda and their associates. 

What is the end-state? Is the end-state potentially—since you did 

mention the Taliban, is it a coalition government that would incorporate the Taliban or elements of the Taliban? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think that the key, from our interests’ 

perspective, is to deny any safe haven for Al Qaeda and its associates. I think that, in any situation, a COIN strategy, the military 

dimension takes you so far, and at some point there is a political 

set of outcomes that are reached. We saw this in Iraq. 

I think we are, the Afghanistan—we are working with the Afghan Government to try to get a better understanding of the process that they will ultimately lead on both reintegration and reconciliation. I think it is very important to set a set of criteria for 

who will get reintegrated back into Afghan society and how, and 

whether it is disavowing Al Qaeda, laying down their arms, abiding 

by the Constitution, those are the kinds of criteria that the Afghan 

Government will need to articulate as they get to the point of defining what an acceptable political end-state looks like. And we will 

certainly be in deep conversation with them about that. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Heinrich. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman. 

Secretary Flournoy, I hate to beat a dead horse, but since several 

of my colleagues have repeatedly referenced a supposed 30,000 

troop cap, can you give us a one-word answer: Has the Administration imposed a troop cap in Afghanistan? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. No, we have not imposed a troop cap. What 

President Obama did in December was to approve 30,000 troops, 

additional troops, for Afghanistan and a degree of flexibility for the 
29 

Secretary of Defense to authorize further troops in support of force 

protection. 

Mr. HEINRICH. And has General McChrystal requested additional 

troops? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. There have been a couple of cases, such as 

the—— 

General PAXTON. In general, he has not, sir, because we are in 

the process of flowing all three of those force packages. And the obligation would be that he would take a look at how they met the 

mission on the ground before he came back. Within that, we have 

made some adjustments both in terms of combat forces and trainers on the ground. So we have made some modest adjustments in 

the number. 

Mr. HEINRICH. And do you think that General McChrystal would 

continue to feel free to request those kinds of adjustments if he 

feels necessary? 

General PAXTON. Absolutely. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Do you think the Secretary of Defense, the President, or anyone else has ever ordered General McChrystal not to 

make those kinds of requests? 

General PAXTON. No, sir. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you. 

I want to shift real quickly to one more thing before I yield back 

the rest of my time. On the training issue, with the stopgap measures that were mentioned in the New York Times article, how do 

you mitigate the loss of lessons learned in the handover between 

the stopgap folks who are plugging the hole now and the long-term 

training force to make sure that we continue to ramp up and build 

that progress in a way so that we don’t lose those important lessons? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Part of it is they are all teaching to the 

same curriculum. Part of it is ensuring overlaps so that there is actually a handoff from one group to the next. But it is really the establishment of NTM–A and CSTC–A and with General Caldwell as 

sort of the keeper of the knowledge, if you will, for the training efforts. I think there is going to be a lot of continuity on his staff and 

on the people who are training the trainers, if you will. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank both of you for your service, Madam Secretary, and, 

General, thank you. 

And, General, I had the great honor last August to visit with the 

Marines at Camp Leatherneck, Camp Bastion, and it was really inspiring since I represent Parris Island Marine Corps Station, to see 

the dedication of our marines. I particularly appreciate what both 

of you are doing, because I am the co-chair of the Afghan Caucus. 

I have visited the country nine times. I have great respect for 

President Karzai, for the Defense Minister Abdul Wardak. I have 

faith in Ambassador Eikenberry and certainly General McChrystal 

and General Petraeus. I feel like we have got an extraordinary 

team of people there. 

Firsthand, my former National Guard unit, the 218th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the South Carolina National Guard, 
30 

served for a year in Afghanistan, led by General Bob Livingston. 

And I visited with the troops from South Carolina every three 

months, and I found out that there was an extraordinary relationship between the American forces and the people of Afghanistan to 

the point where they identified each other as brothers, American 

and Afghan brothers. So I am hopeful. Perfect, no, but very hopeful. 

With that, the ever-changing situation, what is the status of 

cross-border collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan? And 

have there been significant changes in the past year? 

General PAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

We were here with the committee last week to talk a little bit 

about Pakistan, sir. And there have been positive engagements and 

positive changes on both sides of the border within the last year, 

and this includes a master laydown for some border coordination 

centers (BCCs), some BCCs and JCCs [Joint Coordination Centers]. 

And we have been able to work with both the PAKMIL [Pakistan 

Military] on their side of the border as well as with the Afghan National Security Forces in terms of manning and equipping those 

stations. Two of them are fully operational/capable at this time, 

and we are looking at the location and the manning of the others. 

So all of that demonstrates a degree of trust, a degree of transparency, and a degree of equal procedures, if you will, so that it 

mitigates and lessens the tension on the border. So that is a good 

indication and a very positive one within the last year, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. And I am really hopeful. In my visits to Islamabad 

and other parts of Pakistan, to me it is so clear that it is mutually 

beneficial, the security of both countries. 

It has already been expressed, concern, but in regard to training 

security forces, Secretary Gates last week or recently announced 

850 additional trainers as a stopgap measure to fill vacancies. A 

problem has been our NATO allies fulfilling their obligations. And 

I was very happy working with Congressman Solomon Ortiz, who 

is the co-chair of the Romania Caucus, to find out last week from 

the Ambassador of Romania that they are now increasing their 

participation from 1,200 troops to 1,800 troops. So there are some 

positive stories that really should be told. And I know on a visit 

to Bulgaria, the people of Bulgaria are very proud of their participation and recognition. 

But what is being done to increase participation from our NATO 

allies? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The Secretary has raised this at his ministerial, Secretary Clinton at hers. We have had numerous visits, 

calls, et cetera. And the truth is the majority of our NATO allies 

are stepping up. Since the strategy review was concluded in December, they are offering above and beyond what they had already 

offered. They are offering more trainers. 

The challenge is that the gap is still there, and so we are all asking one another to step up even further. So we will continue that 

process. But I think credit you are right to give. A number of countries have stepped up substantially with institutional trainers, with 

OMLTs and with POMLTs since we have asked. 

Mr. WILSON. And it was encouraging. Last week I had the opportunity to meet with the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, and they are 
31 

so proud of the American bases that are now in their country. And 

they did point out, General, that they would be very happy at such 

training bases such as Novo Selo to provide for advanced training 

for personnel prior to being deployed. And they have got the capability, they have got the bases, and they have got citizen support 

within the community. 

But again, thank you again both of you for your service and what 

you are doing by defeating the terrorists overseas. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ms. Flournoy and General, for being with us. 

For what it is worth, I have also met Mr. Karzai. And for what 

it is worth, my reaction was just the opposite. And if I had been 

present when he threatened to go over to the Taliban, my response 

would have been, ‘‘Don’t let the screen door hit you in the rear 

end,’’ for what it is worth. 

Having said that, Ms. Flournoy, I am reading a book by a Russian infantry officer called The Bear Went Over the Mountain. It is 

mostly about tactics, but what is disturbing about it, it seems to 

be the same ambushes in the same places going over about a 10- 

or 12-year period. And they talk about training up an Afghan 

Army, they talk about training up an Afghan National Police. And 

we know that four years after they left, the puppet government 

they set up was gone. 

Now, I appreciate the general. I mean, he got to be a general by 

being a can-do guy: I am going to make the best of my situation. 

I am going to make it work. And I appreciate you going to work 

in the Department of Defense. But what realistically makes you 

think the outcome is going to be any different this time? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. What makes me think the outcome will be 

different is the fundamental objective of the mission and focus of 

the mission is different. Institutions built under hostile occupation 

don’t tend to have longevity and credibility with the population. Institutions that are built with the support of the population—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ma’am. 

Secretary FLOURNOY [continuing]. Have a lot more chance of succeeding over time, and that is what we are trying to do with this 

ANSF. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And I appreciate you saying that. I have not lived 

in Afghanistan. Rory Stewart did, and he told me after living there 

for years and walking across Afghanistan that the Afghans 

mockingly refer to Karzai as the ‘‘America Bull’’ because once you 

get outside the city, he has absolutely no influence. So how would 

you respond to that? And that is coming from someone who has 

lived in Afghanistan. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Again, I think that, at most, Afghans experience governance at the local level, and building up the credibility 

and capacity of the local institutions, the district level and so forth, 

is where—is going to influence the judgment of the Afghan people. 

And I think that the progress we have seen at that level and, 

frankly, in an increasingly competent national government in 

terms of the cabinet that President Karzai has put together, that 

is changing attitudes. I mean, this poll that says 59 percent believe 
32 

that the government is actually heading in the right direction. I 

don’t think you have ever had a poll in Afghanistan say that before. And that is in response to changes that they are experiencing 

on the ground. 

Are we there yet? Absolutely not. Are we at least starting to go 

in the right direction? Yes. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And how would you respond to an equal perception 

by a majority of the Afghans who think that Karzai’s brother is the 

biggest narcotics dealer in Afghanistan? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I don’t want to focus on individuals. 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is the President’s brother. That is why I think 

we should focus on an individual. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think it is very important to look at the 

governance at all levels and the progress that is being made across 

all—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, that is the President’s family, ma’am. If the 

President of a country can’t tell his brother to get out of the narcotics trade, if someone the United States military is renting property from, if we can’t turn around and as a condition of our lease 

on that property say, and, by the way, you are going to get out of 

the narcotics trade, where does it begin? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. You know, sir, I don’t feel like I am—it is 

appropriate for me or, quite frankly, I am not the person qualified 

to evaluate specific individuals or cases. But what I can say—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ma’am, if you are not, who is? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, let me tell you what I have seen. 

When I just came back from the Arghandab, I have seen a place 

that had no Afghan governance whatsoever for years. And in the 

last six months, after some very difficult fighting on the part of 

international and Afghan forces, we have enabled a district governor who is clean to be put in place, who is working with local 

tribal leaders, who is working with the international community to 

funnel aid to projects that are getting—for benefiting the population, getting their buy-in, and for the first time creating a district 

governor center that is the go-to place for the Afghan population. 

That is the model we are trying to replicate. The fact that it is possible in the Arghandab, which has been called the ‘‘heart of darkness’’ by many authors writing about Afghanistan—the fact that is 

possible there means that it is possible elsewhere in that country. 

And that is what we are trying to achieve. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Madam, how long do you think President Karzai 

would live without the American military protecting him? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I am not in a position to speculate on 

that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, don’t you think that puts us in a position to 

at least dictate some terms of our engagement, like narcotics, like 

honesty in government? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I am sorry. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And in the interest of 

maintaining this enjoyment and fun that you are having, I will go 

ahead and ask a question. 
33 

Walking across the street the day that the health care vote was 

going on, somebody stopped me and said, aren’t you offended that 

the President, during this momentous occasion, is watching the 

basketball game? And I said, no, I am not offended by whatever the 

President is doing this afternoon. What I am offended, though, 

more is the fact that we have had a fight going on in Afghanistan 

for six months that the Marines have been in hammer and tong, 

and not one word about the wonderful success that those men and 

women have been doing coming out of the White House. Now, a lot 

of talk from Gates and others, but nothing out of the White House. 

That offends me, because I couldn’t care less what he spends his 

Sunday afternoon doing, but it does offend me that the White 

House has failed to recognize the hard work that you have just referenced, Ms. Flournoy. So hopefully, on the go-forward basis we 

will get a little more attention to the successes that are coming out 

of there. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I just want to say for the record I don’t 

believe that is accurate. It may not have gotten adequate press coverage, but the President has certainly not been silent. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I look forward to him making sure he gets 

out what he wants to get out, Ms. Flournoy. We can have that tussle, if you would like. That wasn’t my intent. 

And I am blanking on the general’s name. Back in January, we 

got a report from a general that said that the focus on intelligence 

in Afghanistan was overbalanced toward finding bad guys and 

dealing with bad guys, and that it needed to be more of a balanced 

approach so that our company and squad and commanders on the 

ground knew who the players were and who the good guys were, 

who the bad guys were, what the crops were, all the kinds of stuff 

that you would normally need in order for us to do the full-spectrum job that the fight in Afghanistan involves. Killing bad guys 

is front of the list, absolutely. 

General Paxton, your assessment as to rebalancing. Was that the 

case? Or we added new resources to the system so that those company commanders do know what is going on them around them 

with respect to the economy, with respect to everything else that 

it is nonkinetic in reflection of that report from January? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. A COIN fight, when you are doing the 

shape, clear, hold build, it has to be enemy-focused. It is population-focused in terms of the strategy, but the tactics have to be 

focused on who you think the bad guys are, where you think the 

bad guys are, what you know about them. So it is a constant drive 

for more intelligence. And we have tried to strike that balance between intelligence assets, whether it is ISR that is overhead or 

whether it is elevated line of sight, between what is available at 

the strategic level, what is available at the operational level, and 

what is available at the tactical level. And I have a good feeling 

that the flow of forces and the flow of capability is adequately 

meeting the needs or is projected to meet what we think will be 

current gaps in the needs. 

One of the additional responsibilities I have for the Secretary is 

to sit on the Senior Integration Group, what used to be called the 

Counter-IED Task Force. So Dr. Carter and I are taking a look 

about the equipping side and to make sure that we have adequate 
34 

technologies, capabilities, requisite training so that we can identify 

IED materials, as well as safe havens or border-crossing sites 

where they may come from. So we are paying attention to that, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I guess the focus wasn’t so much as on the— 

and, again, the kinetic side is what they are there for. But by the 

same token, if you are trying to understand what will make sure 

that the local folks see us as more of a solution as opposed to just 

the policemen, making sure that those ground-level commanders 

have as much information as they need. And I blanked on the general’s name, and I apologize for that, but it did seem to be a little 

broader than just who the IED guys were and focused on the bad 

guys as opposed to information that the commanders need to know, 

that digging a well over there would be really important versus 

paving a road, or that these are the folks within the community 

who are the opinion leaders and working with them makes sense 

versus others. I mean, that kind of intelligence that is broader than 

just there are three bad guys over there, they have been there for 

an hour and a half, they have done all the stuff, go shoot them. 

But the issue, if it is in counterinsurgency, you have got—I think 

it is broader than just killing bad guys. 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. But I think the development of our 

human intelligence and the way we train our small-unit leaders, 

we are spending adequate time on that at the National Training 

Center in Fort Irwin, at Mojave Viper in Twentynine Palms, at 

home station training at Fort Campbell and Camp Lejeune. 

Mr. CONAWAY. But downrange, they have got the tools they need 

then to exploit that training? 

General PAXTON. Yes, sir. I am convinced that they do, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kratovil, please. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As typical, I have just 

received note I have got votes in just a minute. 

But, Madam Secretary, General, thank you for being here and for 

your service. 

I want to go—a lot of the questions you have been receiving have 

been very specific. I want to go to a couple broader questions. 

Would you agree that our primary goal in Afghanistan is defeating 

Al Qaeda? Start with that. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Defeating Al Qaeda and its associates. Yes. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. And how does the strategy that we are doing in 

Afghanistan that we are doing right now facilitate our goal of not 

just defeating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but worldwide? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Afghanistan and Pakistan, that border region, has been the sort of locus of—sort of heartland, if you will, 

of Al Qaeda for many years. And so I think denying them sanctuary and safe haven there, disrupting them there has a powerful 

impact on the global network. We are also trying to make sure that 

the Afghans and the Pakistanis have their own capability to do 

that denial in the future. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Would they not simply—assuming that happens, 

and we create stability there, would they not simply seek another 

safe haven, Yemen, other places? What prevents that? 
35 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think some of them may. But I think the 

truth is the combination of ethnic, tribal, other ties to this particular region makes it their preferred home, if you will. And other 

places will not be as hospitable to as many or to as robust a network. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. If they did seek safe haven elsewhere, would you 

believe that the strategy that we are taking in Afghanistan would 

be an appropriate one in that location as well? In other words, is 

that a sustainable approach? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I don’t think that—I think that each environment has to be dealt with in its own terms. And to the extent 

we are dealing with the network in other places, we will tailor that 

effort to the local conditions that are allowing a group to gain a 

foothold. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. There have been a number of questions on the allies. Obviously, the President’s request for troops assumed a certain level of commitment from our allies. Where are we in terms 

of achieving that number? And what impact does our failure to 

achieve that number or limitations placed on the allies in terms of 

what they can do affect our ability to succeed? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think our allies have stepped up tremendously, and I think that with allied support we are very—we are 

meeting General McChrystal’s requirements. I think that going 

into the future we will need to work with them to sustain the mix 

of capabilities that we need as the operation continues to unfold. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Did the request for the 30,000 troops assume that 

the 10,000 additional troops from allies, that the use of those 

troops would be limited? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Limiting in what sense? 

Mr. KRATOVIL. In terms of where they go, in terms of what they 

do, in terms of whether they are in safe areas of the country or not. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Again, I think that ISAF has made use of 

allied forces extremely well. I think our focus and concentration 

has been on the south and the east. Many of our allies have focused on the west and the north, with a couple of them also coming 

south with us and east. 

But I think that General McChrystal has been able to take into 

account the various strengths and caveats of some forces to be able 

to handle that. I don’t know if you—— 

General PAXTON. Sir, any time you do your assessment, you try 

and minimize the assumptions because you realize that an assumption that you don’t have ground tooth on, if it unravels, then your 

plan could go. So when General McChrystal submitted the assessment last August, and when the assessment was reviewed and analyzed here in the Washington area for several months there, it was 

based on the facts on the ground, which was the troop-contributing 

nations, who they were, where they were, what their capabilities 

were, what their caveats were, and then what a reasonable expectation was, whether they are going to bring in a replacement force, 

or whether at that time—whether they looked to scale up or scale 

down. So that is why the assessment itself is open-ended, because 

those dynamics could always change with the contributing nations. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Where are we in terms of numbers of allied troops 

in relation to the 10,000 that we assumed? 
36 

General PAXTON. I believe, as I said earlier, we have 9,000 that 

have been pledged since December and a little over—I know 

pledged a little over 4,000 actually on the ground right now, sir. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Does that take into consideration the troops that 

are likely to withdraw, the allied troops that are likely to withdraw? 

General PAXTON. And I will have to take that for the record because we know which ones we anticipate will withdraw. They will 

come back and tell us whether they are to going to replace—— 

Mr. KRATOVIL. Let me rephrase my question. There are 10,000 

troops that were assumed. Of that we have 4,000 on the ground; 

is that right? 

General PAXTON. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. KRATOVIL. And we don’t know whether or not that assumes 

the troops that are about to withdraw. 

General PAXTON. No. It did as of December when we made the 

plan, that is correct, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman Mrs. Davis, please. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you to both of you for being here once again. 

And I wanted to just go back to a concept that I think we have 

all been working hard on, and I really want to commend the Administration on what we see as a much greater interagency collaboration in this effort. We suffered through a number of years when 

we really felt that we weren’t able to bring that together, and that 

is happening, and I appreciate that greatly. However, I think that 

there has also been a number of reports that would suggest that 

we are not doing nearly as good a job as we could on capitalizing 

on popular grievances against the Taliban, and for that to occur, 

we need to have enough resources really devoted to the political 

and economic conditions, and I know that you all have certainly 

recognized that. We look at the report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan [SIGAR], and that would suggest that we are 

falling short in that area. 

And so I am wondering, and in light of last week’s discussion as 

well, until the military and nonmilitary resources that are being 

utilized here—you said probably a good balance in Pakistan, 50 

percent perhaps—what guarantees can we have that we actually, 

I would think, need to go beyond that in terms of nonmilitary in 

Afghanistan now in order to be able to capitalize on those popular 

grievances? Where are we as you look at that issue and the way 

that you described it last week? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I do think that their civilian surge has certainly brought more interagency capacity to Afghanistan, and I 

think the embassy had requested additional growth going into next 

year to fill out and push down that capacity from the provincial 

level to the district levels, particularly in the critical districts 

where we think that will have the greatest impact. So I think that 

those requirements continue to be refined, and they are going up. 

And we are going to resource—I believe our State Department colleagues and others will be seeking support from Congress to resource those additional requirements. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Can you be more specific in terms of where you 

think those resources should actually go? 
37 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think a lot of them will be going to district support teams to—again, to empower governance at that district level, which is the sort of critical interface with a lot of the 

local tribal structures in villages, to harness development assistance in support of that, particularly funding for things like OTI 

[Office of Transition Initiatives] coming out of AID [United States 

Agency for International Development], Agriculture [United States 

Department of Agriculture]. Rule of law is an area where there has 

been a vacuum, and the Taliban has stepped in. Rule-of-law programs at the local level are very important to competing with them 

and displacing them. 

Mrs. DAVIS. In those efforts is it fair to acknowledge that those 

efforts are not necessarily the kind of bottom-up efforts that people 

are asking for that would suggest that we had a pretty good understanding of the people of Afghanistan today? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think what we are doing in each district, 

each critical district, is really starting with a needs assessment. 

What do the people need and want? What do they view as important? What do they prioritize? What do they expect? And what will 

be most meaningful to them? And that is the foundation for a lot 

of the realignment of our assistance. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Some of the articles that are coming out now that 

are suggesting that after eight years we are really not even beginning to do that yet, would you challenge that and feel that, in fact, 

we are, and are there some examples that you could give? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would, and particularly in the critical districts that we have identified as key population centers, key to production, key to lines of communication and so forth, in those areas 

we really are pursuing a much more needs-based, integrated approach. It may be something that hasn’t happened in the past, but 

that is definitely where we have been heading in the last year. 

General PAXTON. And I would just echo what the Secretary said, 

that a lot of the, whether it is the DSTs [District Support Team], 

the OMLTs, the PRTs, although they may be a shell in a nucleus, 

they are tailored, and they are tailored to a needs-based or requirements-driven solution. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I have just a few seconds. 

General, when the chairman mentioned the Achilles heels, and 

you cited two examples that would be—really that are the most difficult, demonstration of good government and the cooperation regionally, could you take a stab at a timeline for when some of those 

things you think might—there might be real evidence that that 

was occurring? 

General PAXTON. In terms of projecting a timeline, I couldn’t, 

ma’am, but I will say we have had positive indications in the last 

year, for example, in Pakistan that there is an increased degree of 

cooperation both with the U.S. and with the nations in the area. 

So I think it is constantly evolving, and we have had some goodnews stories. 

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Mr. McKeon, speaking about a 

good-news story, the—and, Madam Secretary, you mentioned agriculture a few moments ago. Part of the good-news story is the National Guard troops that are assisting in teaching better agri-
38 

culture processes to the Afghan farmers. Of course, there is a little 

parochialism in my comment because a good number of them have 

been Missouri National Guard troops who are farmers, and that is 

what they do. I think it has been highly successful. 

My question is what are we doing right in Afghanistan that we 

did not do right in Iraq? 

Madam Secretary? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. That is a really hard question because a lot 

of what we are doing right in Afghanistan, I think, was informed 

by both mistakes and what we eventually did right in Iraq, as different as the two countries are. 

I think in Afghanistan, given the nature of the society, we are 

doing a lot more bottom up, a lot more building at the local district 

and moving up to provincial level and appreciating the importance 

of incorporating traditional societal structures, the tribes, ethnic 

groups and so forth, and seeking inclusivity, seeking balance that 

will ultimately determine the sustainability of the gains that we 

make. So I think that bottom-up focus, the appreciation for the demographics, the cultural landscape is a really key emphasis in Afghanistan going forward. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General. 

General PAXTON. Mr. Chairman, I think the other thing that we 

are doing correctly is that we have captured the lessons learned 

from Iraq and Afghanistan, and we are doing better at what we 

call ‘‘left seat, right seat’’ in terms of turnover on stations, so that 

you get a chance to have key leader engagements with those individuals that will be significant to coming up with immediate and 

practical solutions in the area. And I think we have modified our 

training continuum at our bases and stations here to reflect the situation on the ground as well as the recent success stories. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the witnesses. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Early on in my statement and then in my questions, I asked 

about the 30,000 cap, and you have both assured me that there is 

no cap. The reason I talked about it and asked questions about it 

is that is the way it has been reported in the press, that—and the 

way Secretary Gates has talked about it, that the President did approve 30,000, and that the Secretary had flexibility of about 10 percent that he could work with on that. 

I would like to go back over a little history, as I remember it, 

in the last couple of years. The President became President in January of 2009, and he approved in I believe it was March an additional 20,000 troops, and came out with his strategy and replaced 

the commanding general, put in General McChrystal and gave him 

time to come up with an implementation of that strategy. He presented that in August. It went up through the chain of command. 

We first saw about it—saw it in The Washington Post, and we have 

been given that. We never did see the numbers that were attached 

to it that he came out with later. There has been lots of talk about 

it, that he had requested from 40,000 up to—I saw reports up to 

100,000. 
39 

The President, after the 90 days, approved the 30,000 surge that 

would be sent to Afghanistan as soon as they could be sent, and 

then they would return—they would begin the drawdown in July 

of 2011, I believe, and be pulled out by December of 2011. Was 

that—there was no—in December of 2010, there would be a review, 

and that drawdown of those 30,000 troops would begin in July of 

2011. 

Am I correct in those statements? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. What I would say a little bit differently is 

July 2011 is the end of the 30,000 surge, if you will, an inflection 

point where we will begin a conditions-based process of looking to 

transition provinces that are ready to Afghan lead, with the associated implications in terms of the potential changes of mission, potential changes in force allocation and some drawdown associated 

with that. 

I think the responsible drawdown model that you have seen in 

Iraq is going to very much inform the approach that you are likely 

to see in Afghanistan. The President has not put a timetable on 

that except to say that by July 2011, we will begin the process, and 

that date was informed by our judgment of conditions across the 

numerous provinces that some would be ready by then. 

Mr. MCKEON. Let me also comment on as one of the things I remember about that is when I met with General McChrystal, he 

said that he felt 30,000 would be sufficient, even though, this is my 

words now, he had requested more based on all the reports we had 

seen. He said 30,000 would be sufficient, but that the mission had 

been changed, I think, was downsized. 

Now, this 1230 report suggests that there are a total of 121 districts of interest, but the Joint Command, ISAF Joint Command, 

feels that their only resource is to conduct operations in 48 of those 

districts. 

Can you discuss this, and what resources are we short? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. First of all, sir, we did—I think General 

McChrystal had the view that you can’t focus everywhere all the 

time. You have to have priorities. You have to focus in key areas 

with your campaign. 

Mr. MCKEON. When he did his assessment in August, I think he 

was basing that on the strategy that the President had given him 

in March. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Right. 

Mr. MCKEON. And then that is when—I think when he was given 

the number 30,000, he had to downsize that. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I don’t think that is quite right. I think 

there has always been an intention to determine where to focus in 

the country that will have the greatest impact on the country as 

a whole, and I think—— 

Mr. MCKEON. If he had received 40- or 50,000 troops, he could 

have probably focused on more of the country. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Do you want to jump in on this? 

General PAXTON. Sir, if I may, when the strategy was developed 

and the assessment was under way, there were main efforts, supporting efforts, and economy-of-force efforts, as there are in any 

campaign. And your ability to prosecute more than one main effort 

or to do a shift from a main effort to a supporting effort and do 
40 

it faster is all driven by the boots on the ground and the amount 

of forces that you have. 

So we have not deviated from General McChrystal’s assessment 

in terms of where he saw the main effort, and then, as he moved 

from what was the supporting effort and brought it into the main 

effort, how he thought the campaign would unfold. So it was focused on the freedom of movement of the Taliban in the south to 

start with. 

Mr. MCKEON. Do we have agreement on one thing? If he had 

been given 60,000 additional troops, he could have done more faster? 

General PAXTON. It is a reasonable assessment. Any time you get 

more—it is not a given, it is not a linear equation, but when you 

get more, you can do more. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The one thing I will say that certainly influenced the President’s decision on this was the force flow. When 

he was presented with some of numbers at the higher end of the 

range that General McChrystal put on the table, the force flow 

meant that all of those forces would not be in place at one time. 

And one of the things the President said is, what approach will get 

me the greatest number of forces fastest? And that was very much 

informed—informed the ultimate decision. 

The other thing I would say about the 48 districts, just to be 

clear, is that is based on the forces available, U.S. forces, our coalition forces, and Afghan forces, who are able to partner. The idea 

is to focus on 48 this year and then grow that number next year 

and so forth. So that again it is trying to ensure that you have 

enough both military, Afghan, and civilian resources to really fully 

deliver in those districts over time. 

Mr. MCKEON. It is the first time I have heard the comment that 

you made that all of those 30,000 troops would be there by July 

of 2011. I had always assumed—— 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Oh, the 30,000 will be by the end of August, this August. I am sorry, the flow of forces you are talking 

about. 

Mr. MCKEON. By 2010? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. All of the 30,000 that the President ordered 

in December, except for one headquarters that McChrystal doesn’t 

need until the fall, will be there by the end of August. 

Mr. MCKEON. This year. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes. This year. That influenced the President’s decision. 

General PAXTON. Originally it had been a slower arrival, sir, and 

that was accelerated given the sequence of Ramadan and the Afghan elections, and it was to get maximum value there. And as the 

Secretary said, there were two significant caveats when we looked 

at the assessment. One was the absorption rate and what you could 

actually put on the ground in terms of infrastructure, basing. And 

the second one, as is always the case, is the enablers. You can get 

the troops there to do the mission, but they may not have the 

ground mobility or the engineering support. 

Mr. MCKEON. I appreciate that. I misunderstood what you said 

earlier that they would all be in place by July. I was thinking you 

were talking about July 2011. 
41 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think now a year-long tour takes you to 

July. 

Mr. MCKEON. That is the way I always understood it. I appreciate that. I just misunderstood. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

If there are no further questions, let me ask, what do you need 

from Congress that you are not receiving now? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, as I said in my opening statement, 

sir, we appreciate the support of Congress in general, but in this 

committee in particular I think the things that we have before you 

now, which are both our fiscal year 2011 request and our supplemental request, your support for those two things would give us 

the resources we need to fully implement General McChrystal’s 

plan and resource the mission as envisioned. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything to add, General? 

General PAXTON. Sir, I thank the committee and Congress for 

their support of the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, the 

training before they go, the equipping and enabling while they are 

there, and for those who bear the brunt of the battle and are injured and wounded when they come back. And as we mentioned 

last week in the Pakistan hearing, sir, I thank you also for the latitude with multiyear money, which gives us more flexibility. So 

thank you for that, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your appearance and your testimony. 

If there is no further discussion, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MAY 5, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MAY 5, 2010 

(47) 

Statement of Chairman Ike Skelton 

Developments in Security and Stability in Afghanistan 

May 5, 2010 

Today, the committee meets to receive testimony on developments in security and stability in Afghanistan. Our witnesses, both 

old friends of the committee, are: the Honorable Miche`le Flournoy, 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Lieutenant General 

John Paxton, the Director for Operations on the Joint Staff. Welcome, both of you. 

Six months ago, President Obama announced the results of a 

comprehensive review of our policy in Afghanistan, which for many 

years had essentially been non-existent. During this announcement, he endorsed a new counterinsurgency strategy centered on 

increasing U.S. forces by 30,000 troops, adding U.S. civilian experts, and focusing on protecting the population of Afghanistan 

from the Taliban and their terrorist allies. 

I endorsed this strategy then, and I do so now. As I have said 

many times, while this new strategy cannot guarantee success in 

Afghanistan, it is the most likely to end with an Afghanistan that 

can prevent the return of the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies. 

Six months into the new policy, it is appropriate for Congress to 

consider how things are going. About 21,000 of the 30,000 troops 

have arrived in country, and many have been involved in the recent successful military operation in Marja. Others will soon begin 

restoring security in Kandahar, an operation that is likely to be 

crucial to our overall success in Afghanistan. 

We have seen other clear signs of success in our fight against terrorists. The President’s new strategy helped lead to the capture of 

the Taliban’s second-in-command, a former Taliban finance minister, and two ‘‘shadow governors’’ of Afghan provinces, the most 

significant captures of Afghan Taliban leaders since the start of the 

war in Afghanistan. 

While I am pleased with the recent successes in Afghanistan, 

and I anticipate others, many concerns remain. Although we successfully cleared Marja, the Taliban still appears to be able to infiltrate the town and threaten and kill those who cooperate with U.S. 

and Afghan security forces. This may not be unanticipated. It takes 

time to build the confidence of a local population. But I worry that 

some of this may point to the weakness of the local government, 

which cannot easily deliver the services and governance needed to 

help convince the residents of Marja to join the right side. 

While we have increased forces in Afghanistan, our allies have 

also begun to send additional troops. To date, they have added 

about 50 percent of the 9000 new troops they pledged after President Obama’s December speech. But serious concerns remain about 
48 

our ability to train the Afghan security forces who will have to assume the burden of providing security and combating terrorism in 

Afghanistan without more international trainers. I am pleased that 

Secretary Gates has decided to send additional U.S. military personnel to fill this gap, but this is a short-term solution and not a 

long-term fix. 

This concern relates to another. In a recent meeting, NATO endorsed a process to transition the lead for security in some districts 

from U.S. and allied troops to Afghan National Security Forces. I 

think all of us would like to know more about this process and its 

implications-what progress do we have to see in a district before it 

can transition to Afghan lead, and what does this mean for the 

international troops in that district? Are we talking about progress 

among the Afghan security forces or must the district also need a 

competent and honest government? 

Finally, a quick word of congratulations and one of caution. The 

Department of Defense recently delivered a very good, and for once 

on-time, ‘‘Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.’’ Thank you for that. Unfortunately, a similar, somewhat higher level metrics report filed by the National Security 

Council was very disappointing. It is my hope that future reports 

will more closely resemble the 1230 report and provide real information. Congress cannot judge progress from glorified press releases. 

Again, thank you for coming before us today. I suspect this will 

not be the last hearing on Afghanistan this committee holds this 

year, and I appreciate you working with us to ensure that Congress 

can conduct its Constitutional and appropriate oversight activities. 
49 

Statement of Ranking Member Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Developments in Security and Stability in Afghanistan 

May 5, 2010 

We are a nation at war. The attempted terrorist attack in New 

York City’s Times Square serves as the most recent reminder that 

we face dangerous enemies who threaten the safety and security of 

our country. The extraordinary men and women of our military, 

and their families, need no reminding of this threat. They know all 

too well the sacrifices and dedication it takes to keep this fight off 

our shores. Our troops understand why they are in Afghanistan: Al 

Qaeda, operating from safe havens provided by the repressive 

Taliban, planned and launched attacks on our homeland. 

A lot has happened since the President stood before the American people and made the case for his Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. Over half of the 30,000 forces authorized by the President 

have arrived in country. Our marines and soldiers are working 

side-by-side with their Afghan and coalition partners—facing snipers, improvised explosive devices, and a skeptical Afghan population—to defeat the Taliban insurgency. They are operating with 

some constraints—both political and operational. This is where I 

would like to focus the remainder of my comments and questions. 

In my view, this body—no matter on which side of the aisle you 

reside—and this committee in particular—has the moral responsibility to ensure that this war is not fought with a minimalist mindset, or with an eye toward the Washington political clock. I continue to support the President’s decision to surge in Afghanistan. 

As we are seeing in Helmand, the additional forces are having an 

impact and demonstrating that we can win this conflict. 

In 2007, Admiral Mike Mullen told this committee that ‘‘In Afghanistan, we do what we can, in Iraq, we do what we must.’’ 

When it comes to resourcing our efforts in Afghanistan, I remain 

concerned that we are not doing everything we must in order to ensure that General McChrystal and his commanders on the battlefield have the time, space and resources they need to succeed. 

Let me be clear, I have the utmost confidence that General 

McChrystal and his troops will get the mission done. My concern 

is that the minimalist approach being advocated from some in 

Washington raises the risk and increases casualties. 

The ‘‘30,000 troop cap’’ put in place by this Administration was 

a decision based on political considerations—not mission calculus. 

The unfortunate result is that it is sending the wrong signal to our 

commanders and forcing military planners to make difficult tradeoff decisions between combat troops and key enablers. I am particularly concerned that we are underresourcing force protection capabilities. These lifesaving combat enablers—and others—were already underresourced prior to the President’s troop surge. 

It is my understanding that there continues to be a serious indirect fire threat to U.S. and coalition Forward Operating Bases 

(FOBs) in Afghanistan, yet the current force protection systems 

that protect FOBs in Iraq are not deployed to protect FOBs in Afghanistan. This is disconcerting, especially given the fact that we 

have evidence that such capabilities have saved hundreds of lives 
50 

in Iraq. In March, I raised similar concerns to General Petraeus 

during the CENTCOM posture hearing. 

As I understand it, the timeline looks something like this: 

• In July 2009—CENTCOM validated Joint Urgent Operational 

Need (JUON) for Sense, Warn, and Response capability for Operation Enduring Freedom; • In August 2009—the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed 

the Army to act on the JUON; • In October 2009—Congress approved reprogramming action in 

direct support of the JUON; and • In March 2010—General Petraeus told this committee that 

they were exploring the use of contractors to meet some of the 

requirements included in the JUON. 

Today, I’d like our witnesses to explain what modifications have 

been made to the original JUON and why these changes were 

made. Why are we addressing this particular force protection shortfall differently in Afghanistan than in Iraq? Specifically, why are 

we deploying contractors instead of military personnel? It has been 

almost a year since the JUON was validated? Is there even a contract in place yet to field this capability? It is my understanding 

that if we would have used military personnel like we did in Iraq, 

this capability would already be over in Afghanistan protecting 

lives. 

While I have focused on the impact of the ‘‘troop cap’’ on the 

fielding of certain key enablers, this ‘‘cap’’ becomes more problematic when you consider that some of our NATO allies are not meeting their commitments and others will be withdrawing their forces 

from southern Afghanistan. I would like our witnesses to address 

the statement made in the 1230 report that the redeployment of 

Dutch and Canadian forces in 2010 and 2011 will create demands 

for additional forces in the near future. How will we mitigate this 

4,700 gap in southern Afghanistan if there is a ‘‘cap’’? Yesterday, 

it was announced that the U.S. will be deploying 850 more soldiers 

as a stopgap measure to fill vacancies for training security forces. 

What other gaps exist? 

Further, as Admiral Mullen’s comments suggest, there was a 

time when many thought of the two wars as a struggle for resources, resulting in the ‘‘haves’’ and ‘‘have nots’’—Iraq was the 

‘‘haves’’ and Afghanistan was the ‘‘have nots.’’ My suspicion is that 

the mentality of the ‘‘have nots’’ may be impacting how commanders are employing the resources that they do have in Afghanistan. For example, in Iraq, there was a capability called Task Force 

ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize). This task force was 

responsible for killing or capturing over 3,000 insurgents as they 

were trying to put in IEDs. Basically, turning the job of emplacing 

of IEDs into a suicide mission. 

In Afghanistan, they are standing up a similar Task Force ODIN 

capability. However, it is my understanding that this capability is 

being used differently than it was in Iraq. Instead of being used 

specifically to go after IED emplacers, it is being incorporated into 

the ‘‘big picture’’ ISR requirement. I would like to hear from our 

witnesses why we are not adopting the lessons we learned and employing Task Force ODIN in Afghanistan in the same way that we 

used it in Iraq. As we know, IED attacks are a significant threat 
51 

to our forces in Afghanistan, causing the most civilian and military 

casualties in Afghanistan. Is the approach in Afghanistan a result 

of the tactical decisions being made by the commanders or is it the 

result of the issue of the ‘‘have nots’’ mentality and signaling from 

Washington to operate under the ceilings you’ve been given. 

Lastly, I have raised concerns that the emphasis in our strategy 

appears to be on ending the conflict—rather than winning. With all 

of the President’s major domestic policy announcements, speeches 

and events, he has a pretty straightforward formula he uses to win 

over public support. When it comes to Afghanistan, I wish he would 

do the same and would use words like ‘‘victory’’ and ‘‘winning’’ 

more rather than ‘‘transition’’ and ‘‘redeployment.’’ With that said, 

it is not clear to me that this Administration has defined the conditions or criteria for transition. I hope to get a better understanding 

today on what ‘‘transition’’ exactly means. How do you explain the 

transition to the Afghans, to the enemy, and to our forces on the 

ground? What conditions have to exist and what criteria will be 

used to conclude that a district is ready for it to transition to the 

Afghans for security responsibility? 
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