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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 38791

KIRK JULLIARD GOSCH,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

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2012 Opinion No. 47

Filed: September 5, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Benjamin R. Simpson, District Judge. 

Judgment dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, vacated and remanded.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sarah E. Tompkins argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge

Kirk Julliard Gosch appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his petition for 

post-conviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Gosch was found guilty by a jury of manufacturing a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-

2732(a); possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, I.C. § 37-2732(a); and possession of 

marijuana in excess of three ounces, I.C. § 37-2732(e). Gosch filed a petition for post-conviction 

relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel

provided erroneous advice as to the potential consequences of filing an appeal. At an evidentiary 

hearing on this claim, Gosch asserted that he also received ineffective assistance of counsel 

because he asked counsel to file an appeal in his underlying criminal case, but no appeal was 

ever filed. The state did not object to the presentation of this additional claim at the evidentiary
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hearing, the parties argued the merits, and the district court considered the claim. In the district 

court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the judgment dismissing Gosch’s 

petition, the district court determined that Gosch’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

failed. Gosch appeals. 

II.

ANALYSIS

Gosch argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his petition for postconviction relief because he demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

based upon his trial counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal in his underlying criminal case 

despite Gosch’s unequivocal request that counsel do so.1 Thus, Gosch asserts that his case must 

be remanded to the district court for entry of an amended judgment of conviction to allow him to 

perfect a timely appeal. 

Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and therefore the petitioner must prove the 

allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 699-700, 992 

P.2d 144, 148-49 (1999). On review, the appellate court will not disturb the lower court’s factual 

findings unless the factual findings are clearly erroneous. Id. at 700, 992 P.2d at 149. The 

credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be 

drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson 

v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). The appellate court exercises free 

review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to the facts. Dunlap v. State, 141 

Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the postconviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. 

App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show 

that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the 

deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 

313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the 

 

1 Gosch does not challenge the district court’s determination that Gosch’s claim that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel provided erroneous advice as 

to the potential consequences of filing an appeal failed. 
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burden of showing that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish 

prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney’s deficient 

performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. 

The district court found that, after the jury rendered its verdict, Gosch left the courthouse 

with his counsel in a confused and stressful state and informed counsel that he wanted to “appeal 

everything.” The district court also found that, upon making such request, counsel directed 

Gosch to contact counsel’s office the next day by scheduling an appointment because counsel 

wanted to allow Gosch time “to digest the verdict, and more clearly articulate exactly what he 

wanted to appeal.” The district court found that, thereafter, Gosch never scheduled an 

appointment and never spoke with counsel regarding an appeal. Additionally, the district court 

found that counsel made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Gosch following his request to

“appeal everything,” including an attempt to make the public defender’s investigator available to 

Gosch prior to his sentencing. The district court also found that Gosch was notified at 

sentencing of his right to appeal. 

The district court correctly noted that, pursuant to Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 361-

62, 883 P.2d 714, 719-20 (Ct. App. 1994), a defendant who proves that he or she was denied an 

appeal because counsel did not file an appeal as requested states a meritorious claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel because the loss of the right to appeal is sufficient prejudice, in 

and of itself, to support such claim. In that case, Beasley filed a petition for post-conviction 

relief, asserting he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to file an 

appeal from Beasley’s judgment of conviction. Beasley and his trial counsel testified at the 

hearing on his petition. Following the hearing, the district court denied relief and dismissed the 

petition, concluding that Beasley failed on his claim to show deficient performance by counsel or 

prejudice sufficient to satisfy the two-pronged standard for ineffective assistance derived from 

Strickland. Beasley, 126 Idaho at 359, 883 P.2d at 717. 

On appeal, this Court noted that it was undisputed that Beasley advised his counsel of his 

desire to appeal his conviction and that the record clearly showed that counsel understood 

Beasley desired to appeal. We determined that the loss of the opportunity to appeal due to 

counsel’s failure to file an appeal when a criminal defendant requested that counsel do so was 

sufficient prejudice to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Beasley, 126 Idaho at
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362, 883 P.2d at 720. Having determined that Beasley’s counsel either neglected or refused to 

file an appeal despite Beasley’s request, we concluded that deficient performance of counsel 

deprived Beasley of his opportunity to appeal and that prejudice was presumed from such

performance. Id. Accordingly, Beasley’s judgment of conviction had to be vacated and 

reentered so Beasley could perfect a timely appeal. Id. 

Here, at the hearing on Gosch’s petition, the district court stated:

I think this case is distinguishable from Beasley in the sense that Mr. 

Gosch was afforded an opportunity to discuss an appeal. He was invited to make 

an appointment to discuss it. And he failed to follow up on multiple opportunities 

to do so. The Court finds that based upon the distinguishing facts that he did not 

make a request after the judgment was filed, he did not make an appointment after 

he was invited to do so, that the Beasley rule doesn’t apply. There was no binding 

request for an appeal to be filed. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

In the written conclusions of law, the district court stated that Beasley was distinguishable from 

Gosch’s case “because Beasley requested an appeal of his conviction, and the record clearly 

showed that trial counsel, and the public defender who assumed representation of Beasley after 

entry of his judgment of conviction, understood that Beasley desired to appeal.” 

Relying upon Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 792 P.2d 964 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. 

Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 718 P.2d 1272 (Ct. App. 1986); and Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 657 

P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1983), the district court properly concluded that its decision should be based 

on whether Gosch’s desire to appeal was adequately communicated to his counsel and whether 

counsel’s failure to file an appeal resulted from deficient performance that deprived Gosch of the 

opportunity to appeal. The district court then reiterated that, in this case, Gosch made a single 

request to “appeal everything” during a time of confusion and stress directly after the jury 

rendered its verdict and before a sentence or judgment had been entered. The district court again 

noted that, while Gosch’s counsel directed him to set up an appointment to discuss a potential 

appeal, Gosch did not thereafter contact counsel or respond to attempted correspondence from

counsel and never again evidenced a desire to appeal. The district court determined that Gosch’s 

request to appeal was not ignored by counsel but, rather, Gosch ignored counsel. The district 

court also determined that it was not counsel’s inaction that caused Gosch to not appeal, but 

Gosch’s own inaction that resulted in failure to file an appeal. Thus, the district court concluded 

that Gosch’s request was not fully and fairly communicated to counsel so as to warrant a 
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conclusion that it was counsel’s ineffective assistance that deprived Gosch of the opportunity to 

appeal. The district court finally concluded that counsel reasonably believed Gosch had 

abandoned any desire to file an appeal because Gosch ignored counsel’s repeated attempts to 

communicate with Gosch regarding an appeal. Accordingly, the district court entered a 

judgment dismissing Gosch’s petition.

It is undisputed that, after the jury rendered its verdict, Gosch requested that counsel

“appeal everything.” It is also undisputed that, thereafter, Gosch’s counsel never filed an appeal. 

We conclude that the district court erred in determining that Gosch’s case is distinguishable from 

Beasley such that Beasely does not apply in this case because Gosch requested that his counsel

“appeal everything” after the jury rendered its verdict as opposed to after sentencing and entry of 

judgment. Specifically, I.C. § 19-2317 provides:

When the verdict given is such as the court may receive, the clerk must 

immediately record it in full upon the minutes, read it to the jury, and inquire of 

them whether it is their verdict. If any juror disagree, the fact must be entered 

upon the minutes and the jury again sent out; but if no disagreement is expressed, 

the verdict is complete, and the jury must be discharged from the case.

A legal conviction occurs when a verdict or plea of guilty is accepted by the court. State v. 

Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 278, 581 P.2d 319, 324 (1978). Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(2) provides 

that a notice of appeal filed from an appealable judgment or order before formal written entry of 

such document shall become valid upon the filing and placing of the stamp of the clerk of the 

court on such appealable judgment or order, without refiling the notice of appeal. Therefore,

Gosch’s attorney could have filed an appeal after the jury rendered its verdict, but before entry of 

judgment, and such appeal would have become valid upon the filing and placing of the stamp of 

the clerk upon such judgment and without refiling. Thus, it is of no consequence that Gosch’s 

request that counsel file an appeal occurred after the jury rendered its verdict as opposed to after 

sentencing and the entry of judgment.2

 

The district court also erred in ruling that Beasley does not apply in this case because the 

record does not show Gosch’s counsel did not understand that Gosch desired to appeal. At the 

hearing on Gosch’s petition, Gosch’s counsel testified that, after the jury rendered its verdict and 

 

2 We do not address a request to appeal a conviction made prior to the jury reaching a 

verdict. 
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counsel left the courthouse with Gosch, he requested that counsel “appeal everything.” Thus, the 

record shows that Gosch’s counsel understood that Gosch desired to appeal. 

Similarly, the district court erred in ruling that Gosch’s request to file an appeal was not 

fully and fairly communicated to counsel because, after making such request, Gosch did not 

schedule an appointment with counsel as directed and did not respond to counsel’s attempted 

correspondence prior to sentencing to discuss a potential appeal. This case is unlike Sanders

where this Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Sanders’ petition after the district 

court, when faced with conflicting evidence about whether Sanders ever requested an appeal, 

made a credibility determination and concluded that Sanders failed to communicate his desire to 

appeal to counsel. Sanders, 117 Idaho at 940-41, 792 P.2d at 965-66. Here, as noted above, it is 

undisputed that, after the jury rendered its verdict, Gosch requested that his counsel “appeal 

everything” and the record shows that counsel understood that Gosch desired to appeal. 

While the district court concluded that Gosch’s failure to schedule an appointment with 

counsel as directed and failure to respond to correspondence from counsel after he requested that 

counsel “appeal everything” excused counsel from filing an appeal, such conclusion goes against 

this Court’s holding in Beasley. Specifically, we held that if counsel either neglects or refuses to 

file an appeal despite a criminal defendant’s request to do so, counsel is deficient. Beasley, 126 

Idaho at 362, 883 P.2d at 720. Whether counsel was able to make contact with Gosch after the 

jury rendered its verdict and Gosch requested that counsel “appeal everything,” absent an express 

withdrawal of such request, counsel was required to file an appeal.

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The district court’s conclusion that lack of contact with Gosch after he requested that 

counsel “appeal everything” excused counsel from filing an appeal is also contrary to the holding

of the United States Supreme Court that:

We have long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from 

the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally 

unreasonable. See Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S. Ct. 1715, 23 L.

Ed. 2d 340 (1969); cf. Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 28, 119 S. Ct. 961, 

 

3 We also note that Gosch appeared at sentencing with counsel. Gosch’s counsel testified 

at the hearing on Gosch’s petition for post-conviction relief that, just prior to sentencing, counsel 

reviewed the presentence investigation report with Gosch but did not discuss the possibility of an 

appeal. Further, Gosch’s counsel testified that she did not discuss the possibility of an appeal 

with Gosch after sentencing and entry of the judgment of conviction. 
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143 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1999) (“[W]hen counsel fails to file a requested appeal, a 

defendant is entitled to [a new] appeal without showing that his appeal would 

likely have had merit”). This is so because a defendant who instructs counsel to 

initiate an appeal reasonably relies upon counsel to file the necessary notice. 

Counsel’s failure to do so cannot be considered a strategic decision; filing a notice 

of appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to 

the defendant’s wishes. 

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (emphasis added). Additionally, to require that, 

after a defendant makes a specific request that counsel file an appeal after the jury renders its 

verdict, the defendant must schedule an appointment with counsel if directed to do so or respond 

to attempted correspondence from counsel before such request will be honored permits counsel 

to condition the filing of an appeal upon such requirements. This goes against precedent 

indicating that the decision whether to prosecute an appeal rests with the defendant. See Mata v. 

State, 124 Idaho 588, 593, 861 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Ct. App. 1993). 

Again, it is undisputed that in this case, after the jury rendered its verdict in Gosch’s

underlying criminal case, Gosch requested that counsel “appeal everything.” The record shows 

that Gosch’s counsel understood that Gosch desired to appeal and, thereafter, never filed an 

appeal. We hold that, when a defendant makes an unequivocal request that counsel file an 

appeal after the jury renders its verdict, counsel has an obligation to file such appeal unless the 

defendant thereafter expressly communicates to counsel that he or she no longer wishes to pursue 

the appeal. Here, there is no evidence that Gosch did so.

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 Thus, because Gosch’s counsel did 

not file an appeal despite Gosch’s unequivocal request that counsel do so after the jury rendered 

its verdict and Gosch did not expressly withdraw his request, we conclude that deficient 

performance of counsel deprived Gosch of the opportunity to appeal and that prejudice is

presumed from such performance. Therefore, the district court erred by dismissing Gosch’s

petition for post-conviction relief. Gosch’s judgment of conviction must be amended to allow 

Gosch to perfect a timely appeal. 

 

4 We recognize that, after an appeal is filed, an appellant might abandon his or her desire to 

prosecute an appeal and that, presumably, such abandonment could be inferred from conduct 

such as failure to communicate with counsel. We need not decide that question here.
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III.

CONCLUSION

Gosch demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his 

counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal in his underlying criminal case. Accordingly, we 

vacate the district court’s judgment dismissing Gosch’s petition for post-conviction relief and 

remand to the district court for entry of an amended judgment of conviction consistent with this 

opinion. Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Gosch as the prevailing party on appeal. 

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.