Just south of Al Gharraf Captain Frei and his battery advance party of six

vehicles and 34 Marines was traveling to establish a forward battery position. An

Iraqi force ambushed the vehicles from buildings and prepared positions with

automatic weapons, rocket propelled grenades and mortars. An RPG round tore into

the front passenger side door of Captain Frei 's armored HMMWV, instantly severing

his right hand and disabling the vehicle. Captain Frei calmly grabbed a radio

handset and quickly began wrapping it around his arm for a makeshift tourniquet,

and, immediately attempted to organize his Marines in a defensive perimeter to hold

off the attacking dismounted troops. Over the course of the hour-long JIrejIght that

followed, he continued to lead and inspire his Marines until the rapid and sign fIcant

loss of blood rendered him combat ineffective.

First Lieutenant Carroll immediately took charge of the situation, directing the

members of the advance party to dismount and take cover in an irrigation ditch

opposite the enemy positions. He radioed for help from the battery main body, which

was traveling in trace of the advance party, and immediately reported detailed

information about the situation before having to seek cover due to the high volume

and accuracy of enemy fire. Once in the irrigation ditch, 1st Lieutenant Carroll

quickly organized the Marines into a defensive perimeter and directed his Marines to

return fire with crew served weapons and M203s in order to repulse an attack that

was forming in the enemy position.

Lieutenant Carroll moved from the relative safety of the irrigation ditch and manned

his vehicle-mounted radio to call for supporting artillery fires. He called in an

immediate suppression fire mission within 300 meters of his position after using his GPS

and the sounds of enemy fires to accurately estimate the enemy location. Then, he

calmly requested medical evacuation for his commanding officer who was losing blood

from his severed hand and at risk of going into shock.

When a company from 2/23 arrived to relieve the artillerymen, Lieutenant Carroll

loaded the wounded Captain into a light armored vehicle, consolidated and accounted

for his Marines, ensured they all loaded back onto their vehicles, and led them back to

friendly positions.

While Alpha and India Batteries were moving forward, Bravo battery had established firing

positions to the north of An Nasiriyah. From these firing positions, they fired in support of their

fellow Cannon Cockers, the Reconnaissance Battalion, and soon the regimental headquarters as

well. During the engagement in Al Gharraf, the RCT Alpha command group came under attack.

The RCT headquarters had been scouted by suspicious looking 'civilians', and soon armed

fighters began to appear. When it arrived, F Company, 2/23 was ordered up to the Alpha

Command to aid in the extraction of A/ill 1. F Company arrived at the Alpha command group,

was given its marching orders, and moved out. Fox Company had only moved out about 200

meters before they began taking fire. Soon the entire company and the Regimental CP were

under attack by Fedeyeen fighters. All hell broke loose, as the enemy opened up with heavy

machine guns, mortars, and RPGs. The Marines in the RCT CP returned fire, and called for

more forces. The headquarters Marines rallied to the fight, and were soon providing devastating

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return fires on the enemy. Every Marine with a weapon wanted a piece of the action. Bravo

Battery, 1/1 1 continued to provide suppressing fires.

Meanwhile, to the east, Reconnaissance Battalion had made its way to the road they sought,

and were now making their way to the northwest. This road was significantly better than the

trails the Battalion had used before, and they began to make good time toward Al Gharraf. As

they approached the town from the southeast, they clearly surprised the villagers by their

approach. One suspicious taxicab came toward the column, and then sped away, as if it was

monitoring the position of the convoy. The suspicion was confirmed a short time later, when the

Battalion ran into a hasty ambush set up along the dirt road. The battalion returned fire, and was

able to suppress the ambush with direct and indirect fire. Artillery support was called in, and

destroyed the enemy positions with crushing accuracy. The Reconnaissance Battalion continued

their advance toward Al Gharraf, and encountered additional enemy resistance there. Recon

Battalion could now hear the action to the west, where F/2/23 and other elements of RCT- 1 were

engaged. The Reconnaissance Battalion was amazed at the accuracy and responsiveness of the

artillery support provided by 1/11. If they had known the circumstances under which those fires

were provided, they would have been even more impressed.

The situation for the isolated caimoneers became more desperate as the battle raged on. First

Battalion, Marines continued to be attacked by Fedeyeen fighters on the west side of the

road. As their small security forces held off the attack, the rest of the battalion continued to

provide indirect fire support in response to calls from Recon Battalion. The remainder of the

battalion leveled their tubes and engaged the Fedeyeen forces that were using the buildings there

for cover. Providing supporting fires for one unit, while laying the guns in direct fire mode for

their own defense was just another day in the war for the pros from 1/1 1, albeit an exciting one.

Recon Battalion was able to continue to move past the first ambush, and make its way into Al

Gharraf from the southeast. Captain Brian Patterson's Alpha Company had the lead as they

entered the town. They could hear the firing on the other side of town, as the RCT- 1 Alpha

Command, with elements from 1/4 and 2/23, were engaged by the Fedeyeen. Their approach

was a fortuitous flank attack of the enemy forces attacking 1/1 1 and the Regimental CP; as

perfectly executed as it was unplanned. As they attacked across the town, they engaged

Fedeyeen fighters shooting from inside buildings and on rooftops. Captain Patterson pushed

through the town and affected the linkup between the Recon Battalion and RCT- 1. The low

number of casualties from enemy fire was remarkable given the volume of fires received from

the Fedeyeen. The absence of casualties from friendly fire between the two converging Marine

forces was even more so. The unexpected flank attack had taken the wind out of the enemy's

sails, and they retreated, leaving their dead on the field.

The evening of 25 March found 1/4 in a perimeter defense to allow the RCT to close the gap

and continue the attack north. Throughout the evening, the battalion was subjected to probing

attacks as the enemy sized up the Marines knocking on the door of Ash Shattrah. Small arms

and RPGs were ineffectively directed at the battalion. The Marines could see the enemy

mustering at a parking lot in Ash Shattrah, loading into trucks, and heading east into the tree line.

Soon thereafter, CAAT A's Sergeant Smith, the designated TOW Sniper, spotted a 'techiiical', a

3-ton truck with an anti-aircraft gun loaded in the bed, at the parking lot loading men with

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weapons into the flatbed. He gained the proper sight picture with his TOW sight while his

platoon commander confirmed the Iraqis' hostile intent. Receiving clearance to destroy the Iraqi

weapons system, Sergeant Smith unleashed his missile, which traveled 2.1 km before destroying

its intended target. The direct hit validated the 'TOW Sniper' concept.

At 1500Z on the evening of the 25th 2d LAR and Alpha Tanks relieved 1/4's northern

perimeter and formed a two-battalion perimeter defense in preparation for further offensive

operations. To the north, 2d LAR and Alpha Tanks repulsed the enemy's efforts to drive vehicles

into the established defensive line. To the south, PFC Mickey Graff a Javelin gunner attached to

Alpha 1/4, spotted a BTR-60 just over one kilometer from his position, moving with a pickup

truck that was debarking armed personnel as it drove. He sighted in and fired his first missile,

destroying the BTR. After reloading, he fired his second missile and destroyed the pickup truck.

After these two devastating shots, all was quiet on the southern front.

For the Marines and sailors of RCT- 1, the last two days had been exhausting. Fighting

through An Nasiriyah, they continued the attack to Al Gharraf and then north to Ash Shattrah.

As Lieutenant Colonel Parrington, the RCT S-3 put it, "Those two days were a real gut check for

us, but as Marines always do, we excelled, accomplished the mission, and continued to push the

fight."

26 March

The Orange Crush

Back on the Highway 1 corridor, the sun rose with an eerie orange glow. Although the winds

had abated, the suspended dust in the air reduced visibility near the ground and replaced the blue

sky with one of pure orange. The 'Orange Crush' the Marines called it. Under the Orange

Crush, the Division worked to clear the mud from weapons, computers, and engines. The CPs

that had been set up over the last two days looked like a bomb had gone off inside. Mudsmeared maps hung over dirt covered radios, manned by unshaven, red-eyed Marines sipping a

mud-slurry of coffee from filthy canteen cups.

The winds had died down and Marines emerged to assess the damage. The Marine stranded

at the FARP awoke inside the Huey to find the HMMWV he had lost less than 100 meters away.

The fine dust that had once coated everything now accumulated in clumps of mud on every

surface and in every crevice. Marines began maintenance to make vehicles and weapons

operable again. The morning sky was orange with residual dust, and remained that way for the

better part of the day.

The storm was not finished with the Division yet. The Division's C2 aircraft and

MEDEVAC birds had been grounded at the Division Forward CP, and needed to get back up to

the Main CP some distance to the north. The Division Forward Operations Officer and

Intelligence Officer took the opportunity to analyze from the air the ambush location of

Wolfpack and 3/5's encounters two days before. The mud had not been friendly to helicopter

engines either. While circling over the ambush site, the Division Operations Officer's Huey lost

an engine to the accumulated mud and dust, and crashed about 200 meters off the Highway into a

suspected minefield. One crewmember of the destroyed aircraft was badly injured and was

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MEDEVAC'd out by the other

aircraft. The remainder of the

crew and the Division staffers

were left in a perimeter around

the crashed aircraft until a

patrol from 3/7 came along and

relieved them. To the hundreds

who passed the wrecked Huey

just off the Highway, it was a

reminder of the inherent risks

of operating under these

arduous conditions. 3d MAW

was to recover the wreckage

some days later.

RCT-5, as the Division's

main effort, resumed its attack

north to clear Highway 1 in The sandstorm took its toll on machines as well as aircraft This

zone to Highway 27, and UH-1N crashed because of dirt and debris blown into the engine.

positioned itself along the 41

Northing for its planned attack on the Hantush Airstrip the following morning. RCT-7 followed

in trace of RCT-5 as a supporting effort, waiting to be unleashed on the enemy in Al Kut. The

enemy continued to resist in small elements up and down Highway 1, using pre-positioned

weapons caches, civilian clothing, armed sport utility vehicles/pickups, and hit-and-run tactics

focused on headquarters and combat service support units. Both RCT-5 and RCT-7 engaged in

several skirmishes with enemy paramilitary forces over the course of the day.

The Tragic Loss of a Leader

During the height of the horrific storm, tragedy struck 3/5. The Battalion lost their Executive

Officer, Major Kevin G. Nave, to a vehicle

accident, and Gunnery Sergeant Russel S.

Cederburg, the battalion communications chief,

was also severely injured. Major Nave was

struck and killed by a tracked vehicle departing

a refueling point whose driver lost sight of his

ground guide in the night during the storm.

Such a tragic event negatively impacted the

Marines and Sailors of the Battalion

immediately. The Marines mourned the loss of

their leader and 3/S's Chaplain held a memorial

service in remembrance of Major Nave. But

even as they continued grieving, the Marines of RCT-5 continues to move up Highway 1 despite 3/5 were forced to resume the attack north the raging storm. toward Baghdad.

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That afternoon, 3" Battalion 5th Marines Logistic Operations Center arrived at the

position southeast of the town of Ad Diwaniyah near the cloverleaf interchange.

There was still sporadic fighting along the MSR and we immediately began to assess

the battalion 's needs to determine what convoy configuration we should send to

CSSC-115. It became immediately apparent that we were going to have to send a

convoy to pick up critical 8] mm mortar rounds. We set up the convoy just be/öre

dark and hit the road. About a half mile from the battalion's position we were called

back because the CP believed there might be some continued lighting along the MSR.

We went back to the battalion 's position and 1 went to clear our convoy mission south.

Confused, I tracked down our XO, Maj Nave hoping he would have some assessment

of the enemy situation along the MSR. As we spoke I could see his calm resolve that

everything would be all right and that the convoy should proceed as the mortars were

critical to the combat effectiveness of the battalion. The last thing he said to me was,

"Make sure you don't let them take you prisoner." En route to CSSC-1]5 the convoy

came under mortar fire. I remember as I saw the burst of a mortar shell about 30

meters away to our right, promptly telling our driver, LCp1 Borders, to "Drive!"

Despite the mortars, almost being run down by oncoming tanks moving north, the

traffic jam coming back, and the fact that we had no idea where the battalion had

displaced to in the time we were gone, we managed to get back the battalion with the

mortar rounds. By the time we had arrived Major Nave had already been tragically

killed. Regardless of everything that night, it was Major Nave 's insight into the

importance of our mission, his composure in the face of dangei and his willingness to

be a leader that set that convoy in motion. The fact of the matter is that I only knew

Major Nave for a very short time, but it was long enough to make an impression. lie

was the type of Marine who would, "Never let them take him prisoner" and should

always be honored as such.

- SecondLieutenant 0. J. Bayliff

Making Logistics Work up Highway 1

Through force of will, Marines now turned to making Highway 1 into the Division's Main

Supply Route (MSR). Poorly maintained and damaged stretches of the incomplete Highway 1

corridor were repaired from Safwan to Ad Diwaniyah. Engineers worked around the clock to fill

in culverts and reinforce existing bridges to speed the Division's advance. Everywhere along the

route, dust as fine as talcum powder coated men and equipment, and provided a powerful

demonstration of the term 'periods of reduced visibility.' Despite these challenges, sending

more than 3500 of its vehicles up Highway 1 gained tactical surprise for the Division in its attack

to Baghdad.

CSSG-11 sustained the Division's momentum along Highway 1 through intuitive placement

of hasty RRPs, and the CSSG established a hasty RRP (RRP-24) along Highway 1 near the

Division Main CP. Tracked vehicles were using fuel at a much greater rate than originally

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planned, and getting fuel forward

quickly was a critical enabler for

continuing the attack. The

original re-supply efforts were

based on a planning factor of 200

miles per full tank of fuel, but the

Division's tanks and AAVs

required fuel at the 120-150 mile

mark. When the speed of the

Division advance made preplanned RRP locations obsolete,

CSSG-1 1 teams showed great

flexibility in establishing

alternate sites by adjusting on the

move. By staging refueling

vehicles in convoys as 'RRP A CH-46 refuels at a hasty FARP near Highway 1. Due to extremely

Opening Packages' logisticians mucky terrain, roads often offered the only decent groundfor

created flexibility. This refueling operations.

operational agility stood in

contrast to the Logistics Support Area (LSA) sustainment plan that was not designed to

accommodate the Division's rapid advance, and often left the LSAs too far behind the Division

to provide timely support. The success of the logistics effort was due to those dedicated Marines

of CSSG- 11, operating as part of the supported unit, understanding and flexing to the needs of

the commander.

The CSSG-11 Marines shared in the danger with the other elements of the Division. Captain

Toby Dyer of CSSG- 11 recounts his experience at RRP 24:

"We had just received a push of

supplies from the Transportation

Support Group. As they were topping

off our fuel bags at the RRP, a

barrage of mortars impacted at the

RRP. One of our MK-19s suppressed

the mortar position and we kept

working. Luckily, no Marines were

injured and refueling operations

resumed. I remember that night as

one of the darkest of the war; I

couldn 't see a thing as we continued

sustainment operations while

maintaining light discipline. There

wasn 't really time to stop what we Logistics executed tactical refueling operations up and down . were doing. the route and allowed the Division to continue its movemenL

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The Division recognized the requirement to shake a

methodical garrison mentality in the re-supply of repair parts too.

In garrison, authorization for cannibalization was granted only

for combat essential equipment and only after everything had

been done within the system to obtain repair parts. Given the

paucity of spares, however, the CG used his authority to allow

his Marines to do whatever it took to sustain the momentum of

the attack. Marines went to great lengths to keep vehicles

running and weapons firing with little help from an unresponsive

supply system. Innovative solutions again ensured that speed

equaled success, as CSS Marines worked as best they could with

two incompatible logistics systems that were not very

expeditionary. Mechanics became miracle-workers, using skill

and imagination to make up for the dearth of repair parts. In

several cases, repairs were made on vehicles as they were being

towed up the Highway to rejoin their combat units.

Taking advantage of the momentary pause in the relentless The pause after the storm gave drive to the north, the flow of vehicles continued up and down Marines a welcome chance to

the route. The CSSG initiated Class I and III re-supply of RCT- clean weapons and equipment.

5 and RCT-7. Convoys from CSSB-l0 and CSSB-12 arrived

with 128 pallets of MREs, 17,000 gallons water, 200,000+ gallons of fuel, and 520 short tons of

ammunition to be delivered to RRP-24. These impressive figures made a big impact, but only a

momentary one, as the Division's daily requirement of 120 pallets of MREs and 50,000 gallons

of fuel continued to burn continuously. The Division looked forward to the seizure of the

Hantush Airstrip, which would reduce the need for road bound logistics and provide a

maintenance and repair collection point.

The Open Western Flank

The open western flank between As Samawah and Ad Diwaniyah was a continuous source of

insecurity in the Division's zone. Ad Diwaniyah had been shaping-up as a hub for paramilitary

activity across the south, and the Iraqis still controlled the major roads in the area to the west of

the Division zone. South of Ad Diwaniyah, Highway 8 offered the Iraqi paramilitary fighters a

high-speed route on which they could travel up and down the Division's western flank with

impunity. This road was in the V Corps battlespace, but was not being used or controlled by the

Army. The enemy found sanctuary there, and exploited the seam between the two US forces.

For the combat forces of the Division, this was not really a problem. For support convoys full of

ammunition trucks and refuelers, this presented a significant risk.

The Division took every opportunity to aggressively hunt down and kill the remaining

paramilitary fighters in zone. The Diwaniyah area, which was a reported command and control

hub for the paramilitaries, would receive the Division's special attention. In addition, the

Division considered ways to close down the Highway 8 flank road and eliminate the risk coming

from the seam between Marine and Army forces. The Division began to employ a number of

methods to tighten the security in zone and to reduce the threat of ambush from the flanks. The

stretch of Highway 1 south of the Division to An Nasiriyah, which would have to be traversed by

210
supply convoys, was assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Chris Conlin's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

1/7 proved adept at the MSR security mission, and was particularly successful when they

captured an Iraqi patrol:

"On morning of 26 March, as the Battalion was occupying a TAA, Bravo Company spotted

four men in civilian clothing walking north-to-south west of their lines. The Battalion had

recently received several Intel reports to be on the lookout for infiltrators trying to get into An

Nasiriyah to help resist the US forces in that area. According to the report the men typically

wore civilian clothing and carried bags with uniforms in them. Based on the report, Bravo sent

out a patrol to intercept these individuals. As the patrol approached, the individuals began to

run, but the Bravo Marines were able to chase them down. Immediately the individuals were

turned over to the HET Shortly afier HET began the interrogation, it was determined that these

men were Iraqi intelligence officers. Much valuable information was gained, none more

important than the location of an American POW."

Interrogation of the Iraqis captured by the patrol led to the location of Private First Class

Jessica Lynch, an Army soldier who had been captured earlier in An Nasiriyah, gaining her the

infatuation of the media. Her location in the Saddam Hospital in An Nasiriyah was passed to

higher headquarters, eventually resulting in her recovery by other US forces, including Division

Marines from 2/1 that were part of the 15th MEU (now reassigned from the 1st UK Division to

TF Tarawa.)

Because securing the entire

Highway 1 corridor would have

seriously drained the Division's

combat power, the Division chose

to assign combat units as escorts to

mission critical re-supply convoys,

and leave rear area route security

to roving patrols made up of Navy

Special Warfare (NSW) SEALS

and Force Reconnaissance

Company Marines. Fourth LAR

was assigned to the TMCC to

ensure the secure movement of 50

The Highway 1 muck claims a new 7-ton MTVR. Extricating refueler trucks from south of the

vehicles from the muck was a full time job. Euphrates up to the hastily

established RRP-24. After meeting

with the Division planners, the G-3 also directed the RCTs to conduct limited objective missions

in their zones on either side of the Highway, killing any enemy discovered in an effort to provide

a more secure LOC. The units were to clear 4km on either side of the MSR and ensure the:re

were no Saddam Fedeyeen or other militia close enough to the road to interdict convoys. Tile

reports of continued mortar attacks and sniping incidents along the length of Highway 1 served

as a reminder of the open flanks of the Division, and pointed out the need for aggressive action.

As the Division continued to 'throw elbows' at the remaining Fedeyeen along Highway 1, 3d

MAW began to take advantage of the clearing skies. The Wing commenced hammering both the

211