U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

96–108 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 114–70 

UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT 

OF U.S. POLICY CHANGES ON HUMAN 

RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN CUBA 

AND

U.S. CUBAN RELATIONS— 

THE WAY FORWARD 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY, 

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES 

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

February 3, 2015 and May 20, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 1

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Staff Director

JODI B. HERMAN, Democratic Staff Director

————— 1On April 1, 2015, Senator Menendez temporarily stepped down as the committee’s ranking member; Senator Cardin became ranking member on April 2, 2015. 

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE

TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY,

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES

MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Chairman

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

February 3, 2015 

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator From California, opening statement ........... 2 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee, opening statement ................ 4 

Jacobson, Hon. Roberta S., Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ............................ 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Responses of Roberta S. Jacobson to questions submitted by Senator 

Marco Rubio .................................................................................................. 65 

Leiva, Miriam, human rights activist and independent journalist, Havana, 

Cuba ...................................................................................................................... 43 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

Malinowski, Hon. Tomasz, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Responses of Tomasz Malinowski to questions submitted by Senator 

Marco Rubio .................................................................................................. 73 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey, opening statement ... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Morua, Manuel Cuesta, spokesperson for Progressive Arc and coordinator 

of New Country, Havana, Cuba .......................................................................... 49 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52 

Paya, Rosa Maria, Cuban Christian Liberation Movement and daughter of 

slain dissident, Oswaldo Paya Sardinas ............................................................ 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator From Florida, opening statement ................... 1 

Soler, Berta, president, Cuban Ladies in White, Cuba ........................................ 53 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Resolution N.6/2013 submitted by Berta Soler, President, Cuban Ladies in White, Cuba ............. 100 

Udall, Tom, U.S. Senator From New Mexico, prepared statement ..................... 29 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Internet in Cuba Only for the Rich—Or Resourceful, by Alexandre Grosbois, 

AFP, Business Insider ......................................................................................... 74 

U.S. Products Help Block Mideast Web, by Paul Sonne and Steve Steclow, 

Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2011 ................................................................. 75 

Cuba’s $6B Debt to Americans for Seized Properties Hangs Over U.S. Talks, 

by Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, FoxNews, January 27, 2015 ................................... 78 

Cuba-U.S. Relations, Neo-Castroism, and Regional Authoritarianism, by Antonio G. Rodiles ....................................................................................................... 95 

(III)

Page

IV 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Dec. 17: A Day of Triumph for Cuban Americans, op-ed from the Miami 

Herald, Dec. 29, 2014 ........................................................................................... 80 

Open Letter to President Obama: Support for a New Course on Cuba, multiple signers .......................................................................................................... 82 

Letter submitted by the Committee on International Justice and Peace ........... 85 

White House letter regarding White House staff attendance at committee 

hearings ................................................................................................................ 87 

Statement submitted by Alan P. Gross, U.S. citizen imprisoned in Cuba 

from 2009 until 2014 ............................................................................................ 94 

Letter submitted by Dagoberto Valdes Hernandez, director, Convivencia magazine ...................................................................................................................... 94 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Letter submitted by the State Troopers’ Fraternal Association of New Jersey, 

Inc. ......................................................................................................................... 89 

Resolution by the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police ................... 91 

Letter submitted by Armando B. Fontoura, Sheriff, Essex County, New Jersey .......................................................................................................................... 93 

U.S. Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in China (2013) 104 

——————— 

May 20, 2015 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland, opening statement .. 148 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee, opening statement ................ 147 

Jacobson, Roberta S., Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ......................................... 151 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 152 

Responses of Roberta S. Jacobson and Thomas A. Shannon to questions 

submitted by Senator Marco Rubio ............................................................. 198 

Responses of Roberta S. Jacobson and Thomas A. Shannon to questions 

submitted by Senator David Perdue ........................................................... 203 

Shannon, Hon. Thomas A., Jr., Counselor of The Department, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC .......................................................................... 154 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 156 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Prepared statement of Senator Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from California .. 191 

Statement of Alan P. Gross submitted for the record by Senator Benjamin 

L. Cardin ............................................................................................................... 191 

Daily Beast Article submitted for the record by Senator Robert Menendez ...... 192 

Two letters to Marco Rubio submitted for the record ........................................... 195 

(1) 

UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT 

OF U.S. POLICY CHANGES ON HUMAN 

RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN CUBA 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 

TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Rubio, Corker, Flake, Gardner, Boxer, Menendez, Udall, Cardin, Kaine, and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator RUBIO. This hearing of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues will come to 

order. 

Today’s hearing is titled ‘‘Understanding the Impact of U.S. Policy Changes on Human Rights and Democracy in Cuba.’’ 

And I want to begin by welcoming Assistant Secretary of State 

for the Western Hemisphere, Roberta Jacobson, and Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Tom 

Malinowski. We appreciate your service to our country and your attendance here today. 

I would like to note that the committee invited two other administration witnesses to appear today, the reported negotiators of this 

deal with the Castro government, Mr. Ben Rhodes and Mr. Ricardo 

Zuniga from the National Security Council. Unfortunately, the 

White House Counsel’s Office informed us that they would not be 

allowed to testify at this hearing. And I find this concerning given 

the fact that these are the two individuals who the administration 

put forward in negotiating the deal, but we will move forward from 

there. 

We have two excellent panels today. The first, of course, is the 

official panel that you see seated and ready to go, and then we are 

going to hear from a number of human rights activists, democracy 

activists on the island of Cuba who will talk to us about the 

changes. 

2 

Let me preface this by saying that I believe every member of this 

committee this morning, as I do the vast majority of Americans and 

policymakers, share the goals of democracy and freedom on the island of Cuba. In fact, the administration, in announcing this policy, 

stated that the purpose of this new policy is to support the Cuban 

people to freely determine their own future, to freely determine 

their political future, and by that, I take it to mean democracy, 

which we all share, and also to freely determine their economic future. I would point out that a free Cuban people have a right to 

choose any economic model they want, although there is one that 

I would suggest. It is up to them to choose that future. So this is 

a goal we all share. 

And the question for us here today, as we review these policy 

changes, is how effective will these policy changes be in bringing 

about this shared goal. And so today, we are going to analyze both 

the process by which this arrangement was arrived at, and we are 

also going to talk about how effective these policies may, or may 

not, be in achieving the stated goals. 

I think it is no secret and I have publicly stated that I have deep 

reservations and in many instances direct opposition to many of 

the changes that we are going to review here today for the simple 

reason that I believe that they will not be effective at bringing 

about the sort of political opening on the island of Cuba that all 

of us desire for the Cuban people. 

You know, the Cuban people are the only people in this hemisphere that have not had a free and fair election in the last decade 

and a half. They deserve the right to have that just like any other 

people do. They are no less deserving of freedom and democracy 

than the people of Guatemala, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, 

Haiti, and a host of other nations, all of whom at some point over 

the last decade, have at least once had the ability to freely choose 

their leaders. And the notion that somehow we should be more patient with Cuba than all these other societies is quite frankly unfair and offensive. 

And so the goal of this hearing here today is to understand these 

changes, to understand, first of all, how it came about, what was 

the process by which they were negotiated, and second, how effective could these policies be in effectuating the change that we all 

want for the island of Cuba. 

With that, I recognize the ranking member, Senator Boxer. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this crucial hearing. 

I want to give a warm welcome to our distinguished witnesses, 

some of whom have traveled a very long way to be with us today. 

I am very pleased to see Miriam Leiva, whom I first met on a trip 

to Cuba in 2002. 

President Obama’s announcement in December that the United 

States would begin the process of normalizing relations with Cuba 

will have wide-ranging impacts. But today’s hearing will focus specifically on its impact on human rights and democracy in Cuba. By 

the way, a very legitimate concern. 

3 

For more than 50 years, the United States pursued a sanctions 

policy designed to isolate Cuba. The goal was to undermine the 

Castro regime and promote human rights and democratic reform. 

And I well remember when that policy went into place, and I did 

not have gray hair at that time. That is how long ago it was. 

This policy has failed to achieve any of these goals. In fact, I believe it has done just the opposite. Instead of isolating Cuba, America has isolated itself—alienating regional and international partners. For the past 23 years, the United Nations General Assembly 

has voted to condemn the United States unilateral embargo against 

Cuba. So rather than undermining the Castro regime, America’s 

embargo has helped the Castros maintain authoritarian control 

over Cuba by restricting the free flow of information and contacts 

between Americans and Cuban citizens. And it has given the Castro regime a very convenient scapegoat for the suffering of the 

Cuban people. Far from ushering in democratic change and improved human rights for Cuba’s 11 million citizens, Cuba remains 

a one-party Communist state that continues to restrict the most 

basic rights of its citizens and targets its opponents using intimidation, harassment, surveillance, and arbitrary arrest and detention. 

It is long past time to abandon this failed policy of the past. And 

that is why I strongly support President Obama’s decision to chart 

a new course in United States-Cuba relations. 

Now, it is important to note that President Obama follows in a 

long line of United States leaders who pursued diplomatic breakthroughs after years of isolation and conflict, whether it was President Nixon going to China or President Reagan working toward 

peace with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev or Senator McCain 

and then Senator Kerry working with President Clinton to normalize relations with Vietnam. These breakthroughs did not result 

in immediate change, and even years later, as we speak, these efforts have not brought an end to repression or corruption or human 

rights abuses, but they did provide an opening, a chance for dialogue and real engagement with the people of these nations. 

So I strongly agree with the President that the best way to promote American values and ideals and to empower Cuban citizens, 

as they work toward a free and democratic Cuba, is through a policy of engagement, not isolation. And I believe polls show that the 

American people agree. 

A letter signed by 74 Cuban citizens, including prominent political prisoners, bloggers, independent journalists, clerics, and intellectuals in May 2010 underscores this point. It states that lifting 

U.S. restrictions would allow Americans to, ‘‘first, serve as witnesses to the suffering of the Cuban people; second, be even more 

sensitized to the need for changes in Cuba; and third, offer solidarity and a bridge to facilitate the transition we Cubans so greatly 

desire.’’ 

Now, I know not everybody in Cuba agrees with that, but these 

were 74 Cuban citizens, some of whom are prominent political prisoners and clerics. Independent journalist Lilianne Ruiz recently 

said that, ‘‘This flow of people who are going to come, along with 

the increase in the remittances, means the country’s return to normalcy. The Cuban Government is going to weaken; the only thing 

4 

left is the repression and the restrictions. This will make people 

more accurately identify the origin of our difficulties.’’ 

So as the United States furthers its engagement with the Cuban 

people, we will continue to press leaders in Cuba on human rights 

because all Cubans deserve the right to live without fear of violence or intimidation. That is a right of all people—all people—not 

just the people of Cuba, but certainly the people of Cuba who have 

been so repressed. And we will mobilize our regional and international partners in this effort. 

And we know this policy is not going to change Cuba overnight, 

but we have spent the past five decades pursuing a policy that has 

not worked. I still remember my trip to Cuba in 2002. We would 

approach people to ask them their views. They would literally run 

away from us. They were too afraid to speak to us. How is our Nation well served by a policy that does not even allow us to engage 

with the people we seek to empower? 

Now, in closing, I want to leave you with a thought. There is an 

old saying: ‘‘The definition of insanity is doing the same thing, over 

and over, and expecting a different result.’’ Now, I know no one 

here is insane. We are all quite sane, and we are all working toward the same thing. And I hope we can unite around this. We owe 

it to the Cuban citizens who truly aspire to see a free and democratic Cuba to give this new policy a chance. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Senator Boxer. 

We are joined today by both the chairman and the ranking member of the full Foreign Relations Committee. I wanted to recognize 

them for any comments they might have. 

Mr. Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to thank the leadership of this committee, the chairman and ranking member. I know that we expect 

the subcommittee leadership, which we have outstanding leadership on all of our subcommittees, to have robust hearings, which 

you are doing today. I thank you for the way you framed this. I 

know there are a lot of divergent views on what has happened relative to the administration’s changes in policy on Cuba. And I hope 

that through these hearings we will converge on a policy that is 

good for America. 

Thank you for your leadership. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Menendez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

the hearing along with the ranking member, and thank you for this 

opportunity on an issue that I have followed for some time. 

Let me be as clear today on this issue as I was in December that 

18 months of secret negotiations produced a bad deal, a bad deal 

for the Cuban people while it may have been done with the best 

5 

of intentions, in my view with compromised bedrock principles for 

virtually no concessions. 

And I would just say I do not want to relive 50 years of engagement with China that has brought us forced abortions, prison camp 

labor, one-child policy, ethnic cleansing in Tibet, exile of the Dalai 

Lama, and most recently repression in Hong Kong’s democracy, as 

well as arrests of human rights activists and political dissidents— 

50 years of those engagements. Maybe we can say that we are 

doing business with China, but we cannot really hold up democracy 

and human rights as a great success story of that engagement. If 

that is what we hope for the Cuban people, then it is a sad day. 

At the end of the day, 53 political prisoners were released while 

so many more remain in jail. And the Cuban people, who have suffered most under the regime, still have zero guarantees for any 

basic freedoms. 

I am also concerned that the 53 prisoners were not released unconditionally and continue to force legal hurdles, and that several 

of them have been rearrested, including Marcelino Abreu Bonora, 

who was violently beaten by Cuban security the day after Christmas and detained for 2 weeks. 

I am concerned that the President announced that the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations 

would be granted access in Cuba. Yet, we know from the State Department briefings that they will be allowed to travel to Havana 

but only to discuss prison conditions with regime officials and will 

not be given access to Cuban jails or Cuban prisoners, which does 

nothing to improve human rights conditions in Cuba. 

I am concerned that there was not one substantial step toward 

transparent democratic elections, improved human rights, freedom 

of assembly, or the ability to form independent political parties and 

independent trade unions. Ironically just 2 weeks after the announcement, the regime arrested more than 50 people who tried to 

speak about the hopes for the future of their country. That is all 

they tried to do. 

The deal achieved nothing for Americans whose family members 

have been victims of the Castro regime’s crimes and terrorism or 

for the thousands of United States citizens that hold over $6 billion 

in claims for properties and businesses confiscated by the Castros 

or the Americans that are still waiting for Cuba to settle the $2 

billion in judgments rendered by United States courts against the 

Castro regime. 

I am concerned that we released a Cuban spy convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. He gets to go back to Cuba, and we get 

no movement on the dozens of United States fugitives living under 

asylum in Cuba, including Joanne Chesimard who is still on the 

FBI’s list of most wanted terrorists for killing a New Jersey State 

trooper. Why was her return not part of the deal? 

And I am concerned that on December 17 of this past year, in 

an article in Politico, Congressman James McGovern said that 

Raul Castro admitted to giving the order to shoot down two private 

airplanes with U.S. citizens on board in 1996. Quote. ‘‘He said, ‘I 

gave the order.’ Castro said, ‘I’m the one responsible.’ And yet, this 

is who we are negotiating with.’’ 

6 

And now Raul Castro is demanding the return of Guantanamo, 

a full list of U.S. concessions, including compensation for the impact of the embargo, eliminating our democracy programs, at least 

in today’s press accounts that I was reading. And he concedes nothing. 

So how much more are we willing to give? How much more are 

we willing to do to help the Castro regime fill the coffers of its military monopolies while the Cuban people still struggle to make ends 

meet. 

And that is why, among many other reasons, Mr. Chairman, I 

think this is a bad deal. 

And I ask unanimous consent that the rest of my statement be 

included in the record. 

Senator RUBIO. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Menendez follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. Let me be as clear on this 

issue as I have been since December—18 months of secret negotiations produced a 

bad deal, bad for the Cuban people. While it may have been done with the best of 

intentions, in my view, we’ve compromised bedrock principles for minimal concessions. 

At the end of the day, 53 political prisoners were released while so many more 

remain in jail, and the Cuban people—those who suffered most under the regime— 

still have zero guarantees for any basic freedoms. 

I’m also concerned that the 53 prisoners were not released unconditionally and 

continue to face legal hurdles and that several of them have been re-arrested including Marcelino Abreu Bonora who was violently beaten by Cuban Security the day 

after Christmas and detained for two weeks. 

I’m concerned that the President announced that the International Committee of 

the Red Cross and the United Nations would be granted increased access in Cuba. 

Yet, we know from the State Department briefings that they will be allowed to travel to Havana, but only to discuss prison conditions with regime officials, and won’t 

be given access to Cuban jails or Cuban prisoners, which does nothing to improve 

human rights conditions in Cuba. 

I’m concerned that there was not one substantial step toward transparent democratic elections, improved human rights, freedom of assembly, or the ability to form 

independent political parties and independent trade unions... Ironically, just two 

weeks after the announcement, the regime arrested more than 50 people who tried 

to speak about the hopes for the future of their country. 

The deal achieved nothing for the Americans whose family members have been 

victims of the Castro regime’s crimes and terrorism. Or for the thousands of U.S. 

citizens that hold over $6 billion in claims for properties and businesses confiscated 

by the Castros. Or the Americans that are still waiting for Cuba to settle the $2 

billion in judgments rendered by U.S. courts against the Castro regime. 

I’m concerned that we released a Cuban spy convicted of conspiracy to commit 

murder. He gets to go back to Cuba, and we can get no movement on the dozens 

of U.S. fugitives living under asylum in Cuba, including Joanne Chesimard, who is 

still on the FBI’s list of Most Wanted Terrorists. Why was her return not part of 

the deal? 

And I’m concerned that—in a December 17, 2014 article in Politico—Congressman 

James McGovern said that Raul Castro admitted to giving the order to shoot down 

two private airplanes in 1996. ‘‘I gave the order,’’ Castro said. ‘‘I’m the one responsible.’’ This is who we are negotiating with. 

And now Raul Castro is demanding the return of Guantanamo and a full list of 

U.S concessions including compensation for the impact of the embargo; and yet, he 

will concede nothing. How much more are we willing to give? How much more are 

we willing to do to help the Castro regime fill the coffers of its military monopolies 

while the Cuban people still struggle to make ends meet? 

It was a bad deal, and I will oppose any further changes to U.S. policy, any additional sanctions relief, that are not conditioned on clear, upfront concessions from 

the Castro regime that moves the Cuban people toward a free and open democratic 

government. 

7 

And, Mr. Chairman, on a personal note, I’m amazed when people say: ‘‘Senator, 

you seem so ‘passionate’ about Cuba.’’ Yes, I am passionate. I will always be passionate, but no more passionate than many Irish are passionate about Northern Ireland, no more passionate than Armenians who care about the genocide in Armenia, 

no more passionate than Jewish-Americans about the preservation of the state of 

Israel. Yes, I am passionate about Cuba, and I will remain passionate until the 

Cuban people are free. 

I will insist that there be no concessions to the Castro regime that do not bring 

human rights, freedom of assembly, and transparent democratic elections to the people of Cuba. 

Finally, I would note that a deal like this is what can happen when members of 

Congress are notified about the administration’s policy decisions, rather than consulted as part of a process. I find it incredibly disconcerting that President Obama 

made his announcement on December 17th, and I still have not been granted a private discussion with the White House negotiating team, despite weeks of requests. 

With that, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this subcommittee hearing. I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ views on exactly what additional freedoms the people of Cuba hope to enjoy with the administration’s new Cuba policy. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay, we are ready to move to our testimony. 

And with that, I recognize Secretary Jacobson. Your full statement 

is in the record, and we would ask if you could keep the statement 

to about 5 minutes or so so we can get into the questioning. Thank 

you for being here today. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Boxer, and members of the committee for the opportunity to testify 

today on the new approach to the United States-Cuba policy. 

I appreciate your engagement on issues related to Cuba and to 

the Western Hemisphere, and I know your strong commitment to 

democratic values, human rights, and expanding social and economic opportunity in the Americas. 

I also want to thank this committee for its assistance in welcoming the long overdue return of Alan Gross to his family. Mr. 

Gross’ 5 long years of detention—during that time, the administration worked closely with many Members of Congress from both 

Chambers and both parties to secure his release. As the President 

and the Secretary have said, we are also grateful for the essential 

roles of Canada, Pope Francis, and the Vatican in reaching an 

agreement that made Mr. Gross’ freedom possible. 

On December 17, the President announced the new policy toward 

Cuba. Our previous approach to relations with Cuba over a half a 

century, though rooted in the best of intentions, failed to empower 

the Cuban people. Instead, it isolated us from democratic partners 

in this hemisphere and around the world and was used by the 

Cuban Government as an excuse for restrictions on its citizens. As 

a result, those most deprived were the Cuban people. 

The President’s initiative looks forward, and it is designed to promote changes that support universal human rights and fundamental freedoms for every Cuban. We also seek to promote our 

other national interests. These steps emphasize the value of peopleto-people contact and very specific forms of increased commerce. 

We are already seeing indications that our updated approach gives 

us a greater ability to engage other nations in the hemisphere and 

8 

around the world in promoting respect for fundamental freedoms in 

Cuba. 

From the beginning of this administration, we have sought to 

support the Cuban people in freely determining their own future, 

their own political and their own economic future, because ultimately it will be the Cuban people themselves who drive political 

and economic reforms. That is why we lifted restrictions to make 

it easier for Cuban Americans to travel and send remittances to 

their families in Cuba and opened new pathways for academic, religious, and people-to-people exchanges. And these changes created 

powerful new connections between our two countries. Our new 

steps build on this foundation by increasing authorized travel and 

commerce and the flow of information to, from, and within Cuba. 

The regulatory changes will increase the financial resources to support the Cuban people and the emerging Cuban private sector. 

They will also enable United States companies to expand telecommunications and Internet access into Cuba. United States policy will no longer be a barrier to connectivity in Cuba. 

Two weeks ago, I made a historic trip to Cuba, one that helped 

me understand the burden and hope embodied in this policy when 

average Cubans and Cuba Americans wished me luck or said God 

bless you and encouraged our efforts. During talks, we were clear 

that our governments have both shared interests and sharp differences. On practical issues such as establishing direct mail, counternarcotics cooperation, and oil spill mitigation, among others, we 

agreed to continue dialogue and increase cooperation. 

But this administration is under no illusions about the nature of 

the Cuban Government. I also raised with our Cuban interlocutors 

our concerns about its harassment, use of violence, and arbitrary 

detention of Cuban citizens peacefully expressing their views. I met 

with dissidents, entrepreneurs, and independent media voices to 

talk about what they need from their government and what they 

need from us. 

I raised several elements that presently inhibit the work of our 

U.S. interest section, including travel restrictions on our diplomats, 

limits on staffing and local access to the mission, and problems receiving shipments. The successful resolution of these issues will enable the future U.S. Embassy to provide services commensurate 

with our other diplomatic missions around the world. 

Having just seen our diplomats in Havana in action, I hope you 

will not object if I take this opportunity to salute their tireless 

work to advance U.S. interests on the island. These dedicated public servants have done their jobs under often difficult circumstances. 

We have only just begun the official talks on normalizing relations, which will take considerably longer than this first step of the 

reestablishment of relations. But even while we do so, we will continue to encourage our allies to take every public and private opportunity to support respect for human rights and fundamental 

freedoms in Cuba, and I encourage Members visiting Cuba to expand their engagement with the independent voices in Cuban civil 

society and to engage effectively on human rights and democracy. 

We know there is a diversity of views in the Congress on this 

issue, and we hope we can work together to find common ground 

9 

toward our shared goal of enabling the Cuban people to determine 

their own future. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON

Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today on our new approach to U.S.-Cuba policy. 

I know many of you have a deep interest in U.S. policy toward Cuba and have 

closely followed the President’s announcement on December 17 and subsequent 

events, including my meetings in Havana 2 weeks ago. I appreciate the committee’s 

engagement on issues related to Cuba and the Western Hemisphere and applaud 

your strong commitment to democratic values, human rights, and expanding social 

and economic opportunity in the Americas. 

I also want to thank the committee for its assistance in welcoming the long-overdue return of Alan Gross to his family. During Mr. Gross’ 5 long years of detention, 

the administration worked closely with many Members of Congress—from both 

Chambers and from both parties—to secure his release. As the President and the 

Secretary have said, we are also grateful for the essential roles of Canada, Pope 

Francis, and the Vatican in reaching an agreement that made Mr. Gross’ freedom 

possible. 

Our previous approach to relations with Cuba over a half century, though rooted 

in the best of intentions, failed to empower the Cuban people and isolated us from 

our democratic partners in this hemisphere and around the world. Additionally, the 

Cuban Government has used this policy as a rationale for restrictions on its people. 

As a result, unfortunately and unintentionally, those most deprived were the Cuban 

people. 

The President’s initiatives look forward and are designed to promote changes that 

support universal human rights and fundamental freedoms for every Cuban, as well 

as changes that promote our other national interests. They emphasize the value of 

people-to-people contact and very specific forms of increased commerce. We are 

already seeing indications that our updated approach gives us a greater ability to 

engage other nations in the hemisphere and around the world in promoting respect 

for fundamental freedoms in Cuba. It has also drawn considerably greater attention 

to the actions and policies of the Cuban Government. 

From the beginning of this administration, our approach has been to implement 

policies toward Cuba that support the Cuban people in freely determining their own 

future—their own political and economic future. Because ultimately, it will be the 

Cuban people themselves who drive political and economic reforms. That is why we 

lifted restrictions to make it easier for Cuban Americans to travel and send remittances to their families in Cuba, and opened new pathways for academic, religious, 

and people-to-people exchanges. These changes created powerful new connections 

between our two countries. The steps we are implementing now build on this foundation by increasing travel, authorized commerce, and the flow of information to, 

from, and within Cuba. The regulatory changes we announced will increase the 

financial resources to support the Cuban people and the emerging Cuban private 

sector. They also enable U.S. companies to expand telecommunications and Internet 

access within Cuba. U.S. policy will no longer be a barrier to connectivity in Cuba. 

This administration is under no illusions about the continued barriers to internationally recognized freedoms that remain for the Cuban people, nor are we under 

illusions about the nature of the Cuban Government. When we sat down with our 

counterparts in Havana, we were clear that our governments have both shared 

interests and sharp differences. From mail service to counter narcotics to oil spill 

mitigation, we owe our people a diplomatic relationship that allows an effective pursuit of their interests. On these types of practical issues, we agreed to continue dialogue and increase cooperation. At the same time, I raised with the Cuban Government our concerns about its harassment, use of violence, and arbitrary detention of 

Cuban citizens peacefully expressing their views. I met with dissidents, entrepreneurs, and independent media voices to talk about what they need from their 

government and from us. 

I talked with my Cuban counterpart about several elements that presently inhibit 

the work of our U.S. Interests Section, including travel restrictions on our diplomats, limits on staffing and local access to the mission, and problems receiving 

timely shipments to the mission. The successful resolution of these issues will 

enable a future U.S. Embassy to provide services commensurate with our other diplomatic missions around the world and on a par with the many foreign diplomatic 

10 

missions in Cuba. We began a useful discussion and intend to meet again this 

month. 

Having just seen our U.S. diplomats in Havana in action, I would like to take this 

opportunity to salute their tireless work to advance U.S. interests on the island by 

conducting educational and cultural diplomacy, monitoring significant political and 

economic developments, and promoting respect for democracy and human rights, 

including engaging with Cuba’s independent civil society. These dedicated public 

servants have done their jobs under often very difficult circumstances. Our diplomats unite families through our immigration processing, provide American citizen 

services, and issue visas for qualified visitors to the United States. Our Refugee 

Processing Center provides assistance to victims of political repression. Our public 

diplomacy officers work in partnership with a range of journalists, including those 

from civil society, and provide hundreds of Cubans each week with uncensored 

Internet access through our three Information Resource Centers. Our consular officers issue tens of thousands of travel documents annually to Cubans traveling to 

the United States for the purposes of emigrating or visiting friends and family. 

These efforts will continue and expand once we establish diplomatic relations with 

Cuba. 

We have only begun the official talks on normalizing relations—which will take 

considerably longer than the first step, which is the reestablishment of diplomatic 

relations. But even while we do so, we will continue, both directly and through diplomatic channels, to encourage our allies to take every public and private opportunity to support increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in 

Cuba. We will continue to use funds appropriated by Congress to support the exercise of political and civil liberties in Cuba, facilitate the free flow of information, and 

provide humanitarian assistance. We also look forward to increased engagement to 

empower the Cuban people through authorized contact with Members of Congress, 

U.S. Government officials, and American travelers. We encourage Members visiting 

Cuba to expand their engagement with the independent voices in Cuban civil society 

and, whenever possible, to engage effectively on human rights and democracy with 

the Cuban Government. 

We will continue our discussions with our oversight and appropriations committees as we move toward a new relationship. We appreciate that there is a diversity 

of views in the U.S. Congress on the new direction toward Cuba. However, we hope 

that we can also work together to find common ground toward our shared goal of 

enabling the Cuban people to freely determine their own future. 

We appreciate your attention to these important issues. Thank you and I welcome 

your questions. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Secretary Malinowski. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOMASZ MALINOWSKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Boxer, members, for having us today. 

It is plain from the debate that we are having that people who 

care passionately about the cause of freedom in Cuba can disagree, 

sometimes passionately, about the best way to advance it. I have 

been working on this cause for many years myself, and I believe 

with all my heart that the President made the right decision. I 

have also listened with great respect and care to those who disagree, and I certainly do not dismiss their concerns. 

I want to start, though, by making a few points on which I hope 

we all do agree. 

First of all, all of us agree that human rights and the empowerment of the Cuban people must be the bedrock of our new policy 

toward Cuba, and it will be. As to how we will take our cues from 

the Cuban people, supporting their vision for Cuba’s future, Secretary Kerry has explicitly said that we endorse the objectives that 

Cuban civil society groups have rallied around. 

11 

Second, I trust we all agree that the most immediate result of 

this new policy, the release of 53 activists who are now back with 

their families, able to continue their brave work, is a good thing. 

The released men and women include virtually everybody known to 

my Bureau for having been prosecuted in Cuba for the peaceful exercise of their political views. And I can assure you that we will 

spare absolutely no effort to ensure that everybody in this category 

is free in Cuba, not just from prison but from harassment, threats, 

and restrictions. 

Third, we all agree that the release of these prisoners does not 

change the fundamental nature of a state that tries to stifle everything it does not control. We have no illusions about the current 

leadership’s desire to keep things just as they are, and we fully 

agree that none of this, neither Cuba’s repression, nor its poverty, 

nor its isolation is the fault of the United States or of the embargo. 

The responsibility lies with the Cuban Government. Period. 

At the same time, after 50 years of experience with the embargo, 

we have to face the hard truth that it has not weakened the repressive apparatus of the Castro government or strengthened Cuban 

civil society. The dominant feature of life in Cuba these last 50 

years has been the complete absence of change and of hope day 

after day, year after year. 

I say this as someone who often supports economic sanctions, 

and I totally agree with you, Senator Rubio, when you say that no 

country ever became a democracy simply because of trade or tourists. 

At the same time, we have all seen how the Castro government 

has succeeded around the world in making our embargo a bigger 

issue than its own repression, making it extremely hard to mobilize 

international pressure for human rights on the island. To its own 

people, the government has justified Cuba’s isolation and poverty 

as a product of American hostility. These were terrible excuses. 

They justified nothing. But we have to acknowledge that this has 

worked for the Castros over the years. 

What has changed is that it is not going to work anymore. Every 

country knows now that the United States is not the obstacle to 

Cuba’s integration or prosperity. Every citizen of Cuba knows that 

the United States is willing to have normal relations with their 

country, help them connect with the world. These steps have raised 

the Cuban people’s expectations and shifted the burden for meeting 

those expectations to the Cuban state. 

The state can now respond in one of two ways. It can begin the 

reforms needed for its people to benefit from this opening to the 

United States, in which case the Cuban people will be less dependent on their government and have more power to shape their future, or it can keep resisting those reforms, in which case everyone 

will know who is to blame. 

So that is the opportunity. We now have to work together to try 

to seize it by getting more information to the Cuban people, more 

resources, by urging other countries to join us in pressing the 

Cuban Government on human rights and democracy. I was in Bolivia a couple of weeks ago for the inauguration of the new President there, but I went for the express purpose also of meeting with 

12 

leaders and Foreign Ministers from throughout the hemisphere to 

urge them to do just that. 

We are working to ensure that civil society from Cuba can engage with governments at the Summit of the Americas in Panama. 

The Cuban Government has also proposed government-to-government talks on human rights, and I will lead our delegation to that 

effort. And we will continue our programs that promote the realization of human rights in Cuba just as we do in scores of other countries around the world. 

Now, look, none of us can say what will happen next. Some of 

Cuba’s bravest dissidents, people who we profoundly respect for 

their sacrifices, believe little good is likely to come from these 

changes. Others who have sacrificed for the cause of democracy believe just as strongly that we have done the right thing. There are 

different views because the future is uncertain. 

But I will close by suggesting that this uncertainty after decades 

of absolute depressing certainty that nothing can change in Cuba 

carries with it a sense of possibility. Our task is to seize that opportunity and to realize that possibility. 

And I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to working with you and 

other members to do that in the coming months. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malinowski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TOM P. MALINOWSKI

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify today, and to share my thoughts about how we can best 

stand up for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Cuban people. 

It is plain from the debate that followed the President’s announcement of our new 

policy that people who feel passionately about freedom for the Cuban people can disagree passionately about how best to advance it. I have long been committed to this 

cause, and I believe with all my heart that the President chose the right course. 

I have listened with great care and respect to those who disagree, and while I will 

try to address their concerns today, I want to be clear that I do not dismiss them. 

I want to start by making a few points on which I hope we all agree. 

First, the promotion of universal human rights and the empowerment of all 

Cubans must be the bedrock of our policy toward Cuba. President Obama has made 

clear that it will be. And here, we will take our cues from the Cuban people, supporting their vision for Cuba’s future. As Secretary Kerry has said, we support the 

key points around which Cuban civil society groups have rallied: 

• Cuban ratification and compliance with various U.N. human rights treaties; 

• Recognition of independent civil society; 

• Implementation of constitutional and legal reforms to ensure full respect for 

labor rights, freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and expression, and to allow for free elections; 

• Release of prisoners arrested for political reasons; and 

• An end to government-sponsored harassment of independent civil society. 

Second, the most immediate result of this policy shift—the release from prison of 

53 activists who are now back with their families and able to continue their brave 

work—is unambiguously a good thing. The released men and women included all 

Cubans designated by Amnesty International as ‘‘prisoners of conscience,’’ and many 

known to my Bureau to have been prosecuted for peaceful expression, association, 

and assembly in Cuba. Among them is independent rapper ‘‘El Critico,’’ arrested 

after a government-organized counterprotest retaliated against him for painting 

antigovernment messages on his home and distributing pro-democracy pamphlets; 

Ivan Fernandez Depestre, arrested for the absurd offense of ‘‘precriminal dangerousness,’’ a label the government uses to detain people in anticipation of crimes that 

supposedly are yet to be committed; and Sonia Garro, who can march again on Sundays with her fellow Ladies in White. We will spare no effort to ensure that everyone still detained for simply exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association, or peaceful assembly is free, not just from prison but from harassment, threats 

and restrictions on their movement and their work. 

13 

Third, we agree that the release of these political prisoners does not of itself 

change anything in Cuba. Cuba remains a one-party state that tries to stifle virtually all political, cultural, and economic activity that it does not control. The government continues to crack down on everything from art performances in Havana 

squares, to independent meetings by civil society out in the provinces. It continues 

to employ short-term detentions—at times with violence—to disrupt free expression 

and peaceful assembly, and has used this tactic since President Obama’s announcement, including against recently released political prisoners. No one should have 

any illusions about the nature of this system, or about the determination of the current leadership to keep things just as they are for as long as possible. 

And let’s be clear: none of this, Cuba’s repression, its poverty, its isolation, is the 

fault of the United States or of the embargo. The responsibility lies with the Cuban 

Government, period. 

At the same time, after 50 years of experience with the embargo, we have to face 

the hard truth that it has not weakened the repressive apparatus of the Castro government. It has not strengthened Cuba’s civil society. It has not given us the leverage we need to press for change, or the Cuban people the hope they crave. The Castro government has been happy in its isolation. The Cuban people have not. 

I say this as someone who often supports economic sanctions to leverage progress 

for human rights. I completely agree with Senator Rubio that no country ever 

became a democracy simply because of trade and tourists. 

At the same time, over many years of working on this issue, I have seen how the 

Castro government has turned our policy against us, and how this has helped an 

authoritarian form of government survive so close to our shores long after walls of 

repression from Berlin to Moscow to our own hemisphere came tumbling down. 

For decades, in capitals around the world, the Cuban Government has succeeded 

in making our embargo and its isolation from the United States a bigger issue than 

its own repression, making it difficult to mobilize international pressure to improve 

respect for human rights on the island. To its own people, the government has justified Cuba’s isolation, poverty and lack of democracy as being a result of American 

hostility. These were bad excuses; they justified none of what the Cuban people 

have suffered all these years. But we have to acknowledge that, over the years, 

shifting the blame to America has worked for the Castro government. 

It is not going to work any more. 

Now, every country in Latin America and the Caribbean, and indeed around the 

world, knows that the United States is not the obstacle to Cuba’s integration with 

the hemisphere and its prospects for economic development. Cuban policies are the 

obstacle. Now every citizen of Cuba knows that the United States is willing to have 

improved relations with their country, to support private business on the island, and 

to help connect them to the world. These steps have raised the Cuban people’s 

expectations, and shifted the burden of meeting those expectations back upon the 

Cuban state. 

The Cuban Government can respond in one of two ways. It can begin the reforms 

needed for its people to benefit from the opening to the United States—by allowing 

greater Internet access, for example, and easing restrictions on private businesses, 

on travel, and on civil society—in which case the Cuban people will be less dependent on their government and will have more power to shape their future. This is 

what we hope will happen. Or it can keep resisting those reforms, in which case 

it will further lose domestic and international legitimacy, because Cubans and others in the international community will know exactly who is to blame for their country’s problems. 

Critics of our new policy have argued that we gave away leverage by easing 

restrictions on engagement with Cuba without demanding democratic reforms up 

front. But the Cuban Government did not ask for and is not necessarily eager for 

us to take the steps the President announced, which involve efforts to get more 

information and resources to Cuban civil society and private citizens, and greater 

access to Cuba and its people for our diplomats. It should go without saying that 

the Cuban Government wasn’t going to stop repressing its people in exchange for 

Americans connecting its people to the Internet. These steps were not tradable commodities, but actions we took in our own interest, to help ordinary Cubans, and to 

shift the attention of the world to the embargo that matters—the one the Cuban 

Government has imposed on its own people. 

Our new policy has opened these new opportunities to engage with the Cuban 

people; we will now work energetically to seize them and to advance them. In doing 

so, we will continue to consult with independent Cuban civil society to hear their 

views and plans for the future activities. And we will urge other countries to join 

us in pressing the Cuban Government on human rights and democracy. 

14 

We have reengaged nations throughout our hemisphere on the importance of supporting genuine progress on human rights and democratic principles in Cuba as a 

means to advance meaningful and principled regional integration. Last week, I 

attended the inauguration of Bolivian President Morales where I had the opportunity to meet with leaders and Foreign Ministers from throughout the hemisphere 

to stress the importance of ensuring we speak with a united voice on Cuba. The 

common reaction was that we had taken a giant step for the hemisphere and that 

the time had come to encourage Cuba to do its part. 

We are also working with our friends in the region, and directly with the Government of Panama, to ensure that independent civil society, including independent 

voices from Cuba, can engage meaningfully with governments at the coming Summit of the Americas. I hope to be at the summit and meet with Cuban civil society, 

as well as other civil society representatives, particularly those who find themselves 

threatened by repressive governments. 

We are also deepening our engagement with Europe to encourage partners there 

to push for advances in human rights and democratic principles with their Cuban 

counterparts. We have engaged with European delegations here, and I plan to travel 

to Europe personally to further these discussions. As you know, efforts by the Vatican were critical to the successful negotiation that secured the release of Alan Gross 

and of the 53 imprisoned Cuban activists, and we will continue to work with the 

Vatican to encourage the Cuban Government to follow through on its other commitments. We will also encourage the EU to press for concrete improvements in human 

rights in their discussions with Havana and to support the agenda of independent 

civil society on the island. No government—neither that of the Castros nor those 

of third countries—can credibly make the case that pushing the Cuban Government 

to respect universal human rights is taking sides in a dispute between Cuba and 

the United States. 

We are also looking for new and innovative ways to responsibly support the emergence of a Cuban private sector as a critical component of civil society. We also envision a role for Latin American and European countries to create links between private small businesses in Cuba and the small businesses in their regions. 

Cubans are also entitled to access uncensored information, including through the 

Internet. As Assistant Secretary Jacobson noted, the administration’s regulatory 

changes will help U.S. and international telecommunications companies provide 

Internet service to the island. These regulatory changes respond directly to requests 

made to the administration by civil society to facilitate greater access to telecommunications equipment on the island. The Castro government can no longer argue that 

its failure to provide Internet access to all Cuban citizens is somehow the responsibility of the United States. And we hope Latin American and European companies 

can cooperate in our efforts to promote the free flow of information to, from, and 

within the island. 

We are also asking other countries to encourage the Cuban Government to allow 

greater access by the United Nations and other international organizations. These 

actors will provide much-needed transparency and are widely seen as credible, 

objective observers. Cuban dissidents have emphasized the important role that the 

United Nations can play in advancing human rights in Cuba, and we will use the 

new opportunities presented by our Cuba policy to mobilize others in the U.N. and 

other multilateral fora in support. 

The Cuban Government has proposed bilateral talks on human rights, and I look 

forward to leading the U.S. team to these talks. Our objective in such talks will be 

to develop an agenda of specific reforms that will bring about concrete improvements in compliance with applicable international human rights obligations and 

commitments. The Cuban side will of course raise its usual allegations about problems in the United States, and I will be proud to defend our record. But we are 

not interested in an abstract debate; we will continue such talks only if they chart 

a course for concrete progress on human rights and democratic principles in Cuba. 

And we will insist that the most important dialogue the Cuban Government should 

have on human rights is with its own people. 

President Obama has also made it clear that the U.S. Government will continue 

programs that promote the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms 

such as freedoms of peaceful expression, association, and assembly in Cuba, just as 

we do in 95 countries around the world. These programs are a fundamental part 

of our human rights policy and national security interests around the world. The 

Cuban Government may continue to object to these efforts, and to try to crack down 

on those involved with their implementation. But it will find it harder to treat contacts with the U.S. Government and with international NGOs as criminal when 

Cubans see their own leaders engaging in diplomatic relations with us. In any case, 

we will continue to manage our programs in Cuba with appropriate discretion to 

15 

protect human rights activists from further reprisal, even as we ask the Cuban Government to stop punishing its citizens for activities considered a normal part of life 

in most other countries. We greatly value the input and coordination of this committee on our programs and we look forward to further conversations. 

Of course, none of this will be easy. If I am right, and our new policy succeeds 

in empowering the Cuban people to shape their political destiny, then the Cuban 

Government may respond by cracking down harder in the short run but the Cuban 

people will have the best opportunity in more than half a century to freely determine their own future in the long run. 

None of us can say what will happen next. Some of Cuba’s bravest dissidents— 

voices we profoundly respect—believe that we’ve made a mistake and that nothing 

good is likely to come from these changes. I hope critics of our policy will acknowledge that others in Cuba who have sacrificed for the cause of democracy believe just 

as strongly that we have done the right thing. There are many different views on 

this question, because the future is uncertain. 

I’ll close by suggesting that this sudden uncertainty, after decades of absolute, 

depressing certainty that nothing can change, constitutes progress. It carries with 

it a sense of possibility; an opportunity for debate. This is what most of the Cubans 

we’ve heard from in recent days are saying; they don’t know if the changes we’ve 

announced will bring better days or not, but they feel that something better is at 

least possible now. 

Reinaldo Escobar, a journalist who began his career writing for official Cuban 

Government media and now writes for the independent Cuban news outlet 

14ymedio, summed up this feeling in an essay he titled ‘‘A New Dawn.’’ 

‘‘The entire world,’’ he wrote, ‘‘now has its eyes set on the government of Cuba 

. . . They know it and will have to choose between loosening the repression or letting the world down. I am betting that they will let the world down, but I am hoping to lose the bet. All the signs and accumulated experience clearly say that this 

is only a new maneuver to win some time and to allow them to get away with their 

schemes, but this is also an unprecedented move and things can always turn out 

differently. The most important thing is that the domino game has been shaken up 

and it is time to move the pieces.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, having shaken up the game, we have 

a chance now to help things turn out differently for the Cuban people. I hope we 

can work together to seize that chance. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you both for your testimony. 

We will begin now the first round of questions. My hope is to get 

at least two rounds in. We are going to go 5-minute segments on 

questions, and we will go by seniority on the committee—or 7 minutes I guess; 7 minutes. So let me begin. 

Secretary Jacobson, when did you first learn about these negotiations with regards to a change of policy toward Cuba? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, I knew throughout the period that there 

were efforts underway to secure the release of Alan Gross. 

Senator RUBIO. When did you know about the policy changes 

being negotiated? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I knew about the policy changes that accompanied that effort some weeks—probably about a couple of months 

before they were announced. 

Senator RUBIO. In the 2 months that you knew about it, were 

you involved in the negotiations? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I was not. 

Senator RUBIO. Was anybody in the State Department involved 

in the negotiations? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I cannot speak for the Secretary of State. I know 

that no one in my Bureau was involved. 

Senator RUBIO. Who were the lead negotiators for the United 

States? 

Ms. JACOBSON. To the best of my knowledge, they were the NSC 

personnel that you mentioned at the beginning of the hearing. 

16 

Senator RUBIO. And who were the lead negotiators for the Cuban 

Government? Were they diplomats or members of the military or 

intelligence? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I do not know that. 

Senator RUBIO. Were you consulted or regularly briefed by the 

negotiators for your input on the policy changes? 

Ms. JACOBSON. What I can say is that when we were talking 

about securing the release of Alan Gross, the State Department 

was in the lead on that part of the Gross detention. We were in 

the lead on the conditions of confinement. We were in the lead in 

contacting his family and working with his family. 

Senator RUBIO. But what about the policy changes? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, there had been a process of looking at potential policy changes with Cuba that had been going on throughout the administration that had brought many agencies together. 

Much of that discussion was the basis for the conversation. 

Senator RUBIO. But as the negotiations were ongoing with the 

two individuals that I have identified, who are not here today, were 

you personally contacted? As the person who is now in charge of 

making this come about, were you involved in interaction with the 

negotiators giving them input and advice during the last 2 months? 

Ms. JACOBSON. In the last 2 months, as we were preparing for— 

on the policy changes, I was not. As we were preparing to implement the effect of those changes, I was. 

Senator RUBIO. So it is fair to say that this negotiation occurred 

through NSC personnel. The State Department was not in charge 

or involved—unless the Secretary of State was—in providing advice 

and counsel on negotiating the policy changes. 

Ms. JACOBSON. To the best of my knowledge, most of the preparation on the policy changes had been done through the policy committee that was an interagency policy committee prior to those negotiations, but during that process, we were not. 

Senator RUBIO. Now, Secretary Malinowski, when did you learn 

about these negotiations on the policy changes? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Like Assistant Secretary Jacobson, I was 

aware that there were discussions with respect to Alan Gross, but 

in terms of the policy changes—— 

Senator RUBIO. Did the negotiators reach out to you as someone 

in charge of the human rights portfolio for the State Department 

for a suggestion on who should be on the list of the 53 political 

prisoners? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We were involved in every conversation interagency about political prisoners in Cuba about who—— 

Senator RUBIO. But were you consulted about how the 53 or 

what the list should be and who should be—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. The list was based on inputs that were provided over time by Cuban civil society organizations. 

Senator RUBIO. Were you consulted? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Not personally, but I can tell you that they 

asked for exactly the right people to be released. 

Senator RUBIO. Which civil society groups in Cuba or opposition 

figures were consulted, to the best of your knowledge, about the 

list? 

17 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. There are a number of Cuban civil society organizations, Senator, as you know, who document who is in prison 

in Cuba for the peaceful exercise of their political views. All of 

those lists from a variety of human rights organizations were consulted and incorporated, and the list was exactly the right list. 

Senator RUBIO. So the administration, during these negotiations, 

consulted with civil society in Cuba about who should be on the 

list? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We have been consulting as an administration 

for years with Cuban civil society and human rights groups. 

Senator RUBIO. But specifically with regards to these negotiations, were groups within Cuba consulted and asked who should be 

the people that are on the list, who should we prioritize, what is 

the status of each individual on the list? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Not specifically with respect to the negotiations, which as we all know—— 

Senator RUBIO. Just in general. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. But in general we based our knowledge of who 

is in prison in Cuba on their work. 

Senator RUBIO. Secretary Jacobson, that takes me back to another question. Which civil society groups in Cuba were in the loop, 

so to speak, consulted during the process of this negotiation? I 

know you were not involved, but subsequently you have talked to 

some of them. Which groups within Cuba, which pro-democracy 

groups within Cuba were aware of these negotiations and consulted 

about the subject matter of the negotiations during the negotiations? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think you would probably have to ask some of 

those groups, but to the best of my knowledge, we continued to consult with those groups throughout that period through our interest 

section and through Tom and my work in the Bureau, as we always consult with them. But as part of the negotiations, I do not 

know that any were specifically consulted. The input that we get 

through our interest section and through our own work was certainly known to the negotiators. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. Let us talk about something you are involved in negotiating now. You traveled to Havana last week—the 

week before. The lead negotiator for the Cubans is an individual 

by the name of Josefina Vidal. Correct? You have interacted with 

her in the past. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes. 

Senator RUBIO. Do you find her to be, as you said, a serious person? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes. 

Senator RUBIO. So when she speaks, you take what she says with 

some level of authority and seriousness. I mean, she obviously has 

some level of authority from the government to be at that table and 

speak on their behalf. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes. 

Senator RUBIO. I wanted to ask you about yesterday. She has a 

statement. It says, ‘‘Cuba’s lead negotiator said in an interview 

broadcast on state television that if the United States want free 

movement for its diplomats in Cuba, it must stop using them to 

support the political opposition.’’ This is her quote. 

18 

‘‘The way those diplomats,’’ meaning the United States, ‘‘act 

should change in terms of stimulating, organizing, training, supplying, and financing elements within our country that act against 

the interests of the government of the Cuban people. The total freedom of movement, which the U.S. side is posing, is tied to a change 

in the behavior of its diplomatic mission and its officials.’’ 

Would we accept an embassy in Cuba where our diplomats are 

not allowed to meet with democracy activists on the island? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We would not curtail the activities we are doing 

now, which is meeting with democracy activist and—— 

Senator RUBIO. One of the things that we are trying to negotiate 

is opening an embassy in Cuba. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Correct. 

Senator RUBIO. And she is saying in order for us to open an embassy in Cuba—and as you have said, she is a serious person who 

speaks with authority. She made very clear yesterday that in order 

for us to open an embassy in Cuba and allow our personnel greater 

freedom than they have now, we would have to agree not to allow 

them to interact with democracy activists. Can you categorically 

say today we will never accept that condition on our personnel? 

Ms. JACOBSON. What I can say is that I do not yet know whether 

that is a real condition on their part, but we could not accept that 

condition—— 

Senator RUBIO. What do you mean it is not a real condition? You 

just said she is a serious person who speaks with authority on behalf of the government. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I also think that sometimes things are said in 

public that are not necessarily a position in private, and I do not 

know that they have made that a condition yet. You have to ask 

them. 

Senator RUBIO. But, in fact, that is their position in public today. 

Is it not? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I saw what she said in public. But what I am saying is—— 

Senator RUBIO. But in practice that is their position. 

Ms. JACOBSON [continuing]. We could not accept not meeting 

with democracy activists and with the broadest swath of Cubans 

possible. That is the point of this policy. So, yes. 

Senator RUBIO. My time is up. I want to get to Senator Boxer. 

I guess what I am trying to get today is the following. Can you 

say today to people watching this broadcast and here in the audience and to the members of this committee that under no circumstances will the United States ever agree to limit—agree to 

limit—the ability of our personnel to interact with democracy activists and civil society in Cuba as a condition of expanding our embassy operation? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We want to have the greatest possible ability to 

interact with everybody, including democracy activists all over the 

island. That is the point of our getting the geographic restrictions 

lifted. 

Senator RUBIO. So we will never agree with the Cuban Government that in order to open an embassy, we will agree to limit our 

personnel. 

19 

Ms. JACOBSON. We are going to keep pushing to get those restrictions lifted as part of getting an embassy in Cuba. 

Senator RUBIO. Secretary Jacobson, it is a pretty straightforward 

question. Would we ever agree in a negotiation to the Cubans that 

in order to open an embassy, we will agree not to send our people 

to meet with democracy activists? Yes or no. Will we ever agree to 

that? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I cannot imagine that we would go to the next 

stage of our diplomatic relationship with an agreement not to see 

democracy activists. No. 

Senator RUBIO. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

On this question of the White House staff not coming here, I 

would ask unanimous consent to place in the record a White House 

counsel letter which points out that the administrations of both political parties do not have White House staff at these hearings. I 

would like to put that in the record. 

Senator RUBIO. Without objection. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The document referred to can be found on page 

87.] 

My friend, the ranking member, seems to say—and I do not 

know that he meant to say this—that Nixon going to China and 

normalizing relations was really not a good thing to do. That is 

what I heard him say. And as I said in my opening statement, 

clearly whether it is relations with China or Vietnam or Russia, all 

of which were normalized by Democratic and Republican Presidents, we know human rights abuses are still a heart-wrenching 

problem. And Assistant Secretary Malinowski—I mean, that is his 

middle name, ‘‘human rights.’’ And we know these countries are 

tough. 

And the question really is what about the citizens of those countries. Does it help them to be isolated from Americans, whether it 

is through trade or talking on the street or the ability to interact? 

You know, I think having a policy in which Americans cannot 

interact with the people that we care about is not only, I think, unintelligent but it does not work. And for 50 years, we have seen it 

does not work. And I hope that nobody here is considering revisiting relations we have had with other countries that still have 

human rights abuses. These abuses are a sin against humanity. 

But I believe if we have contact with the people, we give them 

hope. We give them the possibility of being empowered. 

So I have to say with all my heart and deep respect for my ranking member and my subcommittee chairman, whom I congratulate 

on the chair—even though I regret that we lost control, I do think 

he deserves congratulations. The fact of the matter is they represent the status quo and the status quo in Cuba has not worked. 

And I do not think there is anyone who could argue that it has 

worked, although we will probably hear a couple of people suggesting that it continue. 

I think President Obama had courage, just as Nixon had courage 

to go to China, just as Reagan had courage to deal with Gorbachev, 

20 

just as Bill Clinton and John Kerry and John McCain had courage 

to fight for normalization with Vietnam. 

And I ask unanimous consent to place into the record 46 statements by foreign governments in support of this policy change, including Brazil, Mexico, the European Union, and the Vatican. May 

I do that, sir? 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The volume of statements mentioned above was 

too voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be retained 

in the permanent record of the committee.] 

Senator RUBIO. Without objection. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

And so in light of that, can I ask our panel in either order what 

effect has the President’s new Cuba policy had on our relationship 

with other countries in the region, and the world? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator Boxer. 

I think that the reaction to this was immediate and extremely 

positive. We saw, certainly as you have noted, widespread throughout Latin America for the policy change. And frankly, there was 

shock by some of Cuba’s allies in the region, Venezuela and others, 

who were not quite sure what to make of it, and that I think also 

was a very positive thing. My counterpart in the European Union 

reached out to me immediately. They are negotiating with Cuba, 

and he wanted to make sure that we were in sync because he felt 

immediately that we could work more closely together now, including on democracy and human rights issues. 

Senator BOXER. Right. So if I can interrupt you. So our new policy is in line with our allies’ policy. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes, but just as importantly, when I was in Cuba 

2 weeks ago, for the first time when we held a large reception for 

democracy and human rights activists, to which we invited European and Asian and other diplomats, they all came. 

Senator BOXER. Where was this held? 

Ms. JACOBSON. This was at our principal officer’s residence. They 

never came in the past, not wanting to be associated with our policy. 

Senator BOXER. This is in Cuba. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I think that kind of answers the question—— 

Ms. JACOBSON. Having the opportunity to meet dissidents. 

Senator BOXER. Could I hear from you, Mr. Malinowski? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Certainly. And I have had the same experience. As I mentioned, when Assistant Secretary Jacobson was in 

Cuba, I was in La Paz in Bolivia where there was this gathering 

of leaders and ministers from throughout the hemisphere for the 

inauguration. And I met with probably a dozen of them, again for 

the express purpose of talking about human rights in Cuba. And 

I have to say the overwhelming reaction I got was ‘‘you have done 

a great thing for the hemisphere. How can we help?’’ And for the 

first time, I think we were able to have conversations at that level 

about what these countries can do for human rights in Cuba by 

raising key cases, by urging no more harassment of dissidents, by 

urging Cuba to meet the commitments that it has made on allowVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
21 

ing the U.N. and the ICRC, including, to prisons, which I agree 

with you, Senator Rubio, is very, very important. On meeting 

Cuban dissidents themselves, for the first time, we can have a conversation about that without the overhang of the embargo, without 

anyone being able to say it is your policy that is to blame. 

Senator BOXER. Let me just say because I am running out of 

time. To me, one of the most important statements came from the 

Vatican and it said, ‘‘the Holy See will continue to assure its support for initiatives which both nations will undertake to strengthen 

their bilateral relations and promote the well-being of their respective citizens.’’ 

Now, having this statement from the Vatican is a big deal. I am 

just wondering. Were you aware that the Vatican was going to 

make that statement, or was this just a reaction? Was there any 

discussion with the Pope just to get his views on this prior to this 

policy? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, the Vatican’s involvement in this policy 

change was crucial. The support of the Vatican and Pope Francis 

was something that was crucial to both sides. The respect for this 

Pope, because he is Latin American, and his importance in Cuba 

and throughout the hemisphere, I think is part of the reason it is 

so well-respected not just in and of itself, as Tom said, but because 

of the emphasis that the Pope has put behind it. And I do think 

that our work with the Vatican and the Pope has been instrumental in this. 

Senator BOXER. Do you think that the Pope’s strong support for 

this is resonating in Cuba itself? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Absolutely. I heard about it everywhere from Cardinal Ortega and from others in the church, as well as from Cubans I met while I was there, independent private entrepreneurs 

and independent media. This has galvanized them as well. They 

are also encouraged by the fact that the Pope’s continuing involvement and the Vatican’s continuing involvement as a facilitator and 

to some extent as a guarantor gives them greater hope that compliance will be assured. 

Senator BOXER. I will close with this. I think that is critical. And 

I am going to write a letter to Pope Francis thanking him for his 

leadership on this. But he has got to stay involved. And I do not 

think there is any doubt we are going to have problems with the 

government there, just like we do, as my friend pointed out, in 

China. Of course, this is not going to change everything overnight. 

So I think his involvement, calling it the way he sees it, and being 

sincere and honest about what is happening is going to help us 

move forward. 

I just want to thank you both of you very much, and I would conclude. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. Thanks for having this hearing. 

The chairman and I agree on a lot of things in the Senate. We 

even agree on taste in ties apparently. [Laughter.] 

Senator FLAKE. But we do disagree on this subject. 

One of the first pieces of legislation I introduced 14 years ago 

when I entered the House of Representatives was legislation to lift 

22 

the travel ban. I have always felt that we ought to have more 

Americans traveling to Cuba, not fewer. Cuban American families 

in particular ought to be able to visit family members. I was 

pleased to see the President loosen those restrictions a couple of 

years ago and then take the further step of allowing more people 

to travel to Cuba. It is not an acknowledgement that things are 

better in terms of human rights in Cuba or any more democracy. 

It is a recognition, as was said in your testimony, that we hope 

that we can improve the situation. 

So following on that, Ms. Jacobson, you mentioned in your testimony that you differentiate between normalization of relations and 

diplomatic relations. Can you expand on that briefly? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Certainly, Senator. Full normalization of relations is a process that will take years and has to include a range 

of issues—and I want to be very clear here—including the issues 

of claims and expropriations. And that was made very clear to the 

Cuban Government. 

The reestablishment of diplomatic relations is a first step in that 

process in the nearer term and enables us to have the conversations that can get us to a full normalization. And so those two 

things I think really have to be understood because sometimes people talk about normalization and things that they may demand in 

normalization, which is a much longer process than this initial 

step. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

With regard to diplomatic relations, there is some confusion 

about what we have in Cuba right now. Can you describe our mission in Cuba as it stands, what facilities we have, the number of 

personnel? I think a lot of people would be surprised to know what 

a presence that we have had for a while. 

Ms. JACOBSON. We have a U.S. interest section. We are under 

the protection of the Swiss and have been since 1977. The building 

is the same one that we had as an embassy. We have about 360 

people working in that interest section, of whom about 70, 60-something, are Americans. A number of agencies are in that building. 

I believe we are one of the larger diplomatic presences in Havana. 

They do extraordinary work processing refugees to come to the 

United States, obviously, visa processing, protection of Americans 

who travel there, outreach to dissidents and civil society, and general support for the emerging private sector in Cuba. So it is as 

much of a range of activities as we can do within Cuba today. 

Senator FLAKE. So establishing a formal embassy is not so much 

a budget issue as it is a change in policy. 

Ms. JACOBSON. That is correct. It would not be a budget issue in 

changing our presence. Over time, there might be other agencies 

that would be interested in a fuller relationship. It would enable 

us to do more, pursue additional things, for example, in our law enforcement in getting fugitives returned. There might be a need to 

have additional presence. But for now, it would be not a major 

budgetary exercise. 

Senator FLAKE. I was glad to see the chairman raise—we have 

spoken about this previously—that a fully functioning embassy will 

be expected to have the same requirements and protocols that fully 

functioning embassies elsewhere in the world have in terms of a 

23 

diplomatic pouch and being able to travel freely. Those are part of 

the negotiations that you are talking about right now to make sure 

that we have those items. This will be a fully functioning embassy. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Right, absolutely. And there are a number of 

things: that ability to see the entire range of Cuban civil society, 

including democracy activists; also the fact that free access to the 

interest section has been controlled by Cuban security. We request 

security, obviously, to protect our embassy, but that does not mean 

screening, and right now people are, in essence, screened and their 

names are taken. That is a feature that we would undertake in the 

future, as we do in other embassies. But we basically want to ensure that the embassy runs commensurate with embassies all over 

the world. 

Senator FLAKE. Mr. Malinowski, you were talking about the 

issues that obviously still remain in the area of human rights. Do 

you believe that with normalized relations or diplomatic relations 

or improved relations that you can more effectively press on those 

issues than we have been able to over the past couple of decades? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Absolutely, with the strong caveat that we 

have no illusions about this. This is going to be hard. Authoritarian 

regimes do not just give up their power voluntarily. But change 

comes by empowering people to demand change. It comes by making the Cuban people less dependent on the Cuban state for their 

livelihood, for their survival. It comes through information coming 

from the outside and less control by the Cuban state. And it comes 

from international pressure, and we will be able to generate more 

international pressure on the Cuban Government as a result of this 

policy. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Ms. Jacobson, do you view the policy changes that have been 

made as a concession to the Cuban Government? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Absolutely not, Senator. I think that is a really 

important point. There is nothing in the policy that we undertook 

that was not something done in our national interest. Indeed, some 

of these things are things the Cuban Government would not have 

asked for, and certainly we do not see them as concessions. They 

are designed to empower the Cuban people more effectively than 

we have been able to in the past and to enable us to cooperate on 

those areas where our interests and the Cuban Government’s may 

overlap. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. I have seen that for a long time, 

and people see that normalization of relations or allowing Americans to travel to Cuba is somehow a concession to the Cuban regime. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Many regimes do not consider U.S. embassies a 

gift. We are pretty active and pretty outspoken. 

Senator FLAKE. And I would view it the same way in terms of 

travel. We have had various programs. We spend, I think, about 

$20 million a year on democracy programs trying to give more Cubans access to the Internet, for example. And the way I see it, as 

Americans travel freely, more freely, and hopefully ultimately completely freely, that we can do more in a week by just allowing 

Americans to travel than we could spending tens of millions of dolVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
24 

lars in untold resources and trouble with the policy that we have 

had in trying to promote democracy to Cuba. 

So thank you for your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RUBIO. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, you know, based on your answers to the chairman, in which largely, it seems to me, the State Department as an 

institution which is responsible for conducting our Nation’s diplomacy was kept in the dark. And you can imagine that I was particularly concerned when your deputy informed my office that the 

changes to U.S. policy were not used as leverage at the negotiating 

table, that they were not used to secure any concessions from the 

Castro regime, that this was not ‘‘a transactional process.’’ 

Now, I see you made no mention of fugitives in Cuba, no mention of law enforcement issues in your statement, no mention of $6 billion in property rights, no mention of $2 billion in judgments, no 

mention of indictments in Federal courts in the United States of 

Cuban officials for the purposes of committing murder. And the 

same deputy informed my office that the U.S. Government is conducting a review of Cuba’s status as a state sponsor of terror in response to a request from the Castro regime. 

So despite that everything that we have heard from the regime 

and its surrogates here who operate relatively freely in this country 

is that they wanted exactly what you have largely given them. You 

elicited nothing in return. Even your list of 53, 14 of those 53 were 

released before the list was ever composed, and several were rearrested. The Red Cross cannot get into Cuban jails. You know, 

this is my problem in understanding the nature of the decision 

here not to elicit anything at the end of the day. 

So let me ask you, since you are conducting a review at the 

Cuban Government‘s petition as it relates to their being on the 

state sponsor of terrorism, is it not true that the Castro regime provides sanctuary to Joanne Chesimard who is on the FBI’s list of 

most wanted terrorists for murdering a New Jersey State trooper? 

Ms. JACOBSON. It is, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Is it not true that the Castro regime is providing sanctuary to members of organizations that the State Department has named as foreign terrorist organizations? 

Ms. JACOBSON. That has certainly been the case. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Is it not true that the State Department considers a foreign government providing sanctuary to a terrorist that 

has committed a terrorist in another country to be support for 

international terrorism? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Certainly in that past we have used that sanctuary, as that has been clearly noted in our reports on Cuba in our 

terrorist—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. And just beyond that in general, that is a 

standard that you have used, providing sanctuary to a terrorist, because here is what the law says. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes, yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me read from the Export Administration 

Act of 1979, which establishes part of the legal foundation for designating a country as a sponsor of terrorism. It defines the term 

25 

sponsor of terrorism, ‘‘repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism to include the recurring use of any part of the 

territory or the country as a sanctuary for terrorists for terrorist 

organizations as a sanctuary.’’ And that is exactly what we have 

here, among others. 

Now, let me ask you this. The 18-month-long secret negotiations 

began in June 2013. The next month Cuba and North Korea got 

caught smuggling 240 metric tons of weapons through the Panama 

Canal, the single largest violation of U.N. Security Council resolution sanctions to date. Was this issue, to your knowledge, discussed 

during the negotiations? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I do not know if it was discussed. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Has it been discussed since? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Has it been discussed with the Cuban Government? It certainly has been discussed with the Cuban Government, 

since the revelation of that, repeatedly. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But since your engagement. 

Ms. JACOBSON. It has been discussed with other governments 

and then with the U.N. with the Cuba Government. Since my engagement, has it been discussed with them? We have certainly discussed the need to comply with international law and requirements 

of that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, good. I am glad we are talking about 

following international law because in the aftermath of this incident, the United Nations acted forcefully and applied strong sanctions against North Korea—— 

Ms. JACOBSON. Correct. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me finish, Madam Secretary. Against 

North Korea but Cuba got off with nothing more—nothing more— 

than a slap on the wrist. So you wonder if having the Cubans have 

the biggest U.N. Security Council violation of sending Migs and 

missiles and tons of equipment to North Korea—so North Korea 

gets further sanctions and Cuba gets nothing maybe because that 

would have upset the secret negotiations that were taking place. 

Let me ask you this. You talk about connectivity. Is it not true 

that Cuba has had Venezuela lay a fiber optic cable to Cuba, that 

an Italian telecommunications company partnered with ETECSA 

for several years, and yet dissidents on the island still do not have 

access to the Internet and other forms of communication? Because 

even if you think the law allows the investment of U.S. dollars to 

provide the link to the island, there is no guarantee, as we see in 

China and other places, that the Government of Cuba will permit 

such linkages to ultimately take place to the average Cuban. Do 

you have any guarantees of that in your negotiation? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We have no guarantees, but that is why, as Assistant Secretary Malinowski said, it will be clear who is keeping 

the Cuban people from having that connectivity when they can no 

longer blame any barrier on us. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, they do not have a barrier. They already have a fiber optic line directly laid by Venezuela into Cuba. 

They had an Italian company participating with them. And yet, 

there is no connectivity for the Cuban people because the Castro 

regime will not permit that connectivity to take place. If not, I 

would be the first one to say let us go ahead and do that. But at 

26 

the end of the day, you got no concessions from the regime that 

even if you allow the fiber optic or other technological connections 

to take place, that they will allow the Cuban people to have access 

to it. 

So this is replete with challenges that we have in terms of not 

getting anything on behalf of the Cuban people. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to include statements in the 

record by the New Jersey Association of Chiefs of Police, a letter 

to President Obama from the New Jersey State Troopers Fraternal 

Association and by various sheriffs of New Jersey as it relates to 

Joanne Chesimard. 

Senator RUBIO. Without objection. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The submissions referred to can be found beginning on page 89.] 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator Gardner. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary Malinowski and Secretary Jacobson, 

for your attendance today. 

In announcing the policy change, the President stated that this 

is fundamentally about freedom and openness. While I agree with 

the President’s words and vision, I have questions about the Castro 

regime which continues to wield absolute power on the island, and 

I am concerned that they may not see it the same way. 

In the briefing material that we received for this hearing, it stated, short-term detentions in Cuba for political reasons have increased significantly over the past several years, a reflection of the 

government’s change of tactics in repressing dissent. The Havanabased Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation reports that there were at least 2,074 such detentions 

in 2010, 4,123 in 2011, 6,602 in 2012, and 6,424 in 2013. For 2014, 

the group reported that there were 8,899 such detentions, almost 

39 percent higher than the previous year. Since the announcement 

of this policy, have those detentions lessened or increased? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Since the announcement, from December to 

January, we have actually seen a significant decrease, but I do not 

want to say that 1 month represents a trend. We want to be very, 

very precise and realistic here, and even a single one of these detentions is too many. We are going to be watching this very, very 

closely. 

Senator GARDNER. Has there been a single detention since the 

announcement of this policy? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. There have been short-term detentions, absolutely, yes. 

Senator GARDNER. How many? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. The number for January—this has not come 

out publicly yet, but I believe it is about 140 or so. 

Senator GARDNER. So since the announcement of this opening, 

this overture, there have been roughly 140 new detentions. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. The nature of the Cuban regime has not 

changed. Absolutely. 

Senator GARDNER. I am sorry. What was that? 

27 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. The nature of the Cuban regime has not 

changed, and we have not claimed so. 

Senator GARDNER. Do you believe that it will change? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I am absolutely confident that the Cuban people who have been fighting for change in Cuba are going to prevail, 

and I think they will be more empowered to prevail as a result of 

this new policy. 

Senator GARDNER. And do you believe the Castro regime will become your partner in that empowerment? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I have no indication that they have any desire 

to become our partner in that. That is not the way this works in 

any authoritarian state. 

Senator GARDNER. Going back to the issue of the political dissidents, Secretary Jacobson, you mentioned that there were divisions with the civil rights community, those people who support the 

changes being made and those people who do not. The people who 

do not support these changes that we have been talking about 

today—why do they not support those changes? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, I hesitate to speak for them, but I certainly listened to them when I was there. And it was very important for me to hear from all sides while I was there. Many believe 

that it was not the right thing to do because they fear that the 

Cuban Government will not respond to our willingness to have a 

dialogue. As Assistant Secretary Malinowski said, the policy is not 

based on the Cuban Government changing or necessarily being our 

partner here. We would like that to happen. We have no illusions 

about whether or not it will. It is based on trying to empower them. 

They also may have felt that we did not get enough in the deal. 

It was not really a deal. It was what was in our national interests. 

It was a policy in which we do not believe we conceded anything 

to the government. 

But there are differing views. I would let them speak for themselves, some in the next panel and elsewhere, to the best of their 

ability. But I heard from them differences in tactics and the way 

we go about this, but not differences in goals or what we are all 

hoping to achieve. And I certainly respected their views enormously 

and learned a great deal from some of them about things we might 

be able to do together going forward. 

Senator GARDNER. Following up on Chairman Rubio’s questions 

on the State Department and the State Department’s role in the 

negotiations. You stated the policy committee is where these policy 

changes came from. Is that correct? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Certainly within an interagency policy committee, 

many of these changes were discussed broadly before the negotiations began. 

Senator GARDNER. And who from the State Department is on 

that policy committee? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, either myself or my deputy who works on 

Cuban affairs or the experts in our Cuba affairs office when we are 

talking about regulatory changes. 

Senator GARDNER. And so are they a part of the conversations 

you—or the two that you mentioned a part of these changes—— 

28 

Ms. JACOBSON. We are certainly part of the interagency policy 

committee when those kind of—yes, when that whole regulatory 

change conversation was taking place. Yes. 

Senator GARDNER. Secretary Jacobson, some critics of the policy 

have stated that the administration, ‘‘threw an economic lifeline to 

the Castro regime, especially as its two top international backers, 

Russia and Venezuela, are struggling financially.’’ Do you agree 

with this assessment? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I know that there is concern over the Cuban Government gaining resources in the future because of this. What I 

can say is that the Cuban Government has been through extremely 

difficult economic times before, one of which they lost 30 percent 

of their GDP. They have survived those. In addition, we strongly 

believe that the benefits of what the Cuban people will gain in resources through this policy outweigh any benefit to the Cuban Government that may be gained in a policy like this, and those will 

be greater, we think, than what the Cuban Government gains. 

Senator GARDNER. How has this affected traditional alliances of 

Cuba? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Their alliances with other countries? 

Senator GARDNER. Right, correct. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, I think that I do not know exactly how it 

will affect their alliances, whether it is with Russia or Venezuela. 

But certainly what our hope is that we can empower the small 

entrepreneurs, the conversation with the emerging entrepreneurial 

class separating from the state, gaining access to information. I 

think that is very powerful. And obviously, the more people who 

are not reliant on the state for their economic future, make their 

own economic decisions, I think politically and economically the 

more it empowers people to think twice about those old alliances. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much, Chairman Rubio and Senator Boxer, and thank you for calling us together in this very important hearing. I really appreciate having the witnesses here. 

For over 50 years, the United States has followed a failed policy 

in Cuba, a policy that has done nothing to lift up the lives of ordinary Cubans. And I think that has been one of the points that has 

been made over and over again, is that our thrust with an embargo 

has hurt the Cuban people while it has probably done more to enrich the Cuban Government. 

I believe President Obama, with his actions in December, has 

taken the courageous step toward true change here by opening up 

the island to Americans, increasing opportunities for business and 

agriculture, and taking the steps needed to improve telecommunications and access to Internet on the island. We will finally be able 

to engage Cuba in a way we have not been able to since the embargo. 

We, of course, need to go further. And I have been pleased to 

work with Senator Flake on his legislation and Senator Leahy and 

others to end the travel ban for Americans. In my mind, the best 

ambassadors we have or the best diplomats we have are the AmerVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
29 

ican people going and directly interacting with Cubans. And that 

is what we would do by ending this travel ban. 

I strongly believe that these new policies will help. A growing 

number of Cuban entrepreneurs can connect with Americans and 

Cuban Americans and support the free market. I met with these 

new business owners last November when I traveled with Senator 

Flake down to Cuba. There is an entrepreneurial spirit there which 

we can help foster through partnerships and interaction with U.S. 

businesses. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask consent to put the rest of my statement in the record. 

Senator RUBIO. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Udall follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TOM UDALL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, thank you for putting this hearing together—to discuss an issue of great importance to this committee. For over 50 years 

the United States has followed a failed policy in Cuba—a policy that has done nothing to lift up the lives of ordinary Cubans. 

President Obama—with his actions in December—has taken the courageous step 

toward true change. By opening up the island to Americans. Increasing opportunities for business and agriculture. And taking the steps needed to improve telecommunications and access to the Internet on the island. We will finally be able to 

engage with Cuba—in a way we have not been able to since before the embargo. 

We, of course, need to go further. I have been pleased to work with Senator Flake 

on legislation to end the travel ban on Americans—so that our best diplomats, U.S. 

citizens, can interact with the Cuban people. 

I strongly believe these new policies will help. A growing number of Cuban entrepreneurs can connect with Americans and Cuban Americans—and support the free 

market. I met with these new businessowners last November when I traveled with 

Senator Flake. There is an entrepreneurial spirit which we can help foster—through 

partnerships and interaction with U.S. businesses. 

We can also help create the tools for ordinary Cubans to communicate with their 

families and the world via the Internet. Even the Cuban Government realizes the 

importance of this. For their economy to be successful—and to attract overseas investment—they have to improve their telecommunications capabilities. Being the 

least wired country in Latin America is a dead end—and fails to help democracy, 

human rights, or a free market economy in the 21st century. 

The President’s regulatory changes take a step in the right direction toward—giving U.S. telecommunications companies the ability to do business in Cuba. But we 

need to make these changes permanent. I hope to work with members interested 

in bringing the Internet to Cuba—by passing such legislation in the future. 

The Embargo has been used as an excuse by the Castro regime for too long. It 

has not helped the Cuban people. Instead, it has left them cut off from the world 

and their families—and prevented change on the island. 

Senator UDALL. And I would ask specifically, with regard to 

these interactions and entrepreneurship down there, what are the 

things that both of you contemplate in terms of interactions between Americans and Cubans in terms of furthering business interests? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, Senator, I think you know that in the regulations that have been announced that were implemented in January and were announced by the President in December, the regulations state that support for private entrepreneurs, this emerging 

class in the 200 or so areas that the Cuban Government permits 

private businesses, small businesses, to exist, are now permitted, 

whether it is building materials or other forms of support. 

I met with a group of about seven private entrepreneurs when 

I was there from restaurateurs to barbers to a woman making 

30 

soap, and their sense of optimism and freedom and independence 

was really quite inspiring. Their difficulty at getting reliable supplies was also clearly the biggest part of their challenge. And so the 

hope is that people can now, whether it is small businesses here 

or corporations or individuals, connect with some of those small 

businesses and try and support their work, whether it is equipment 

or goods, to help them get more reliable supplies. There may be 

foundations and other organizations that can do that as well, but 

it is clear that more people may be able to take advantage of the 

rather Byzantine rules that exist for these entrepreneurs with the 

new regulations. 

And I would also hope—and we have talked about this with some 

of the partners in the hemisphere—that this is an area where others throughout the hemisphere can support this emerging class and 

they are keen to do so. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Let me just add. 

Senator UDALL. Please, go ahead. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. This is important because this gets us back to, 

I think, the central question on the table today, and that is what 

Assistant Secretary Jacobson just described is not anything that 

the Cuban Government wanted or asked for. And this gets us back 

to the issue of leverage. These are steps, the steps that we have 

announced that are designed to get more resources and information 

to the Cuban people. And imagine what would have happened if we 

had gone to the Castro government and said open up your political 

system or else we will not help connect Cuba to the Internet or else 

we will not help these small business people. How much do you 

think we could have gotten for that, even on the question of diplomatic relations? 

As Senator Rubio pointed out, they are now, at least rhetorically, 

trying to put conditions on that. This is not something that they 

themselves are very comfortable with. They are nervous about it 

because it does create these possibilities, not guarantees because 

Senator Menendez is also absolutely right. It now depends on 

them, on their willingness to unleash this stuff, and they may not 

be willing to do that. But it does put the burden on them, and that 

makes them nervous. And that is the point of the strategy. 

Senator UDALL. And the important point here is we are trying 

to empower the Cuban people, and we do that in the business area. 

We do that in a number of areas with these new policies. And I 

think that is the thrust of this policy, and it is a very important 

thrust in terms of moving us forward. 

Ms. JACOBSON. If I could, Senator. The other thing I think is critical is, you know, when we held our press conferences after the 

first round of talks, the Cuban Government held a press conference 

and I did as well at the talks themselves. But Cuban independent 

media were not able to come to that press conference, which is why 

the next day I held a larger one in our principal officer’s residence 

because all of the Cuban independent media that we knew of was 

invited. We made sure they were there. 

But the Cuban Government actually broadcast my press availability in Spanish live for the first time. And so I felt it was important to talk about things like human rights, to talk about things 

like private businesses because they were airing it live. Cuban peoVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
31 

ple were able to hear from an American official for the first time 

live. And then to have Cuban independent media be at the principal officer’s residence to empower them directly that way as well. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Chairman Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to our panelists on both panels and all the members 

of the committee. 

Just a moment of personal privilege. This is a subcommittee on 

the Western Hemisphere, and there was an interesting announcement earlier today from the Vatican that I just wanted to comment 

on. The Vatican has declared Archbishop Oscar Romero’s death a 

martyrdom, a spiritual martyrdom, which is the first step toward 

potential beatification. He was killed by death squads in El Salvador in 1980. I think he was one of the towering figures in human 

rights in the 20th century. I was living in Honduras and El Salvador during this period and came to see the enormous influence 

that he had for good, standing against violence, standing for advocacy for the least of these. And we are here in a Western Hemisphere Subcommittee meeting, and I think it is an important thing 

to acknowledge that this just happened a couple of hours ago. 

This is a very important hearing and a very important debate. 

And I have dear friends who are kind of on both sides of it, and 

it has caused me to grapple both with the United States-Cuba relationship, but also with the whole concept of what do diplomatic relationships mean, what do they stand for, why do we have them. 

You know, I conclude, as I grapple with that question, that diplomatic relationships—they are not a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. They are not a validation as a star student or a gold star 

for good behavior. That is not what they are because we clearly 

have diplomatic relationships with so many nations that we disagree with so strongly about human rights or other issues. They 

are merely a normalized opportunity to create a channel so that we 

can raise issues of importance. 

Recently seven of us took a trip, under the leadership of Senator 

McCain, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, to Saudi 

Arabia, Qatar, and Israel. In Saudi Arabia, we had an opportunity 

to raise a very important human rights issue. Saudi Arabia had 

sentenced a political blogger to a thousand lashes, administered 50 

at a time, 1 day a week for 20 weeks, followed by 10 years in prison for something that in this country, you know, it might annoy us 

what the blogger had to say but would not be punishable in any 

means, especially in any way so barbaric. 

When we arrived in Saudi Arabia, they knew we were going to 

raise this issue. They had done the first day of the flogging, but 

they postponed the second day of the flogging the day that we arrived. And when we sat down with the officials, we raised it and 

we told them that this is an alliance. We are allies in many ways, 

but this is so counter to our culture. This is so counter to standards 

of human rights that we just urge you and encourage you to 

rethink this because it makes the relationship so much more difficult if you do things like this. 

32 

The announcement came on Friday they were postponing the second proposed day of the flogging. That does not mean that they are 

going to not still do it. Just because we raise issues does not mean 

that anybody will do it because we ask. But we have a channel at 

the highest level when we have normalized diplomatic relationships to put on the table the things that really bother us and to 

encourage nations to be better. And whether or not we do, having 

that channel and that ability to push it is something that I think 

is very, very important. 

These human rights in Cuba are very, very severe. There are 

human rights issues. I read Oscar Romero’s statements about the 

level of repression in El Salvador that he was dealing with, and he 

could be talking about El Salvador in 1982. He could be speaking 

about Cuba in 2015. He could be speaking about a lot of places in 

the world. These are very serious issues. 

But I tend to come down on the side that a more normal relationship will give us more angles and levers to play to promote better 

behavior. 

This was alluded to only briefly. Let me ask you this question. 

Senator Boxer put into the record a statement of nations that had 

expressed support. What about the regional reaction? I have worried over time that the United States position vis-a-vis Cuba has 

put sort of a ceiling on our relationships in the region in ways that 

could be a challenge, and whether it is in international institutions 

like the Organization for American States or even in bilateral diplomacy, I think there is so much up-side for more American engagement in the Americas. And we always give the Americas short 

shrift. We always are paying attention to the Middle East or now 

we are going to pivot to Asia. It was about Europe, then about the 

Middle East, and now we are going to pivot to Asia. It seems like 

we are always—always—making the Americas be the caboose on 

this train. 

But I have felt, to some degree, that our Cuba policy has put a 

little bit of a ceiling on our relationships in the region. Maybe I am 

wrong about that. What has been the reaction of regional allies in 

the Americas about this announcement? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think, Senator, the policy toward Cuba had, in 

fact, always been—some have called it an irritant in the Western 

Hemisphere, in our relationships with countries in the Western 

Hemisphere. Some have called it a weight. I think it has been a 

problem. 

We will always stand for our principles, talk about, and promote 

and seek to advance human rights. We are not going to give up on 

that for a moment. And we are going to do that as effectively as 

we can. But the hostility toward the way in which we have done 

it in the past five decades vis-a-vis Cuba was a real problem with 

the countries of this hemisphere. And they sought to distance 

themselves from us in ways that impeded us getting other things 

done with them, getting other things done on Cuba, but also getting other things done on human rights elsewhere in the hemisphere, whether it was press freedom throughout the hemisphere 

or other human rights issues. 

So as Tom said, the biggest reaction we got is this has changed— 

President Santos of Colombia said this has changed the history of 

33 

United States-Latin American relations, that it will be really a 

change throughout the hemisphere. President Roussef in Brazil as 

well. We see it give lift to our policy objectives throughout the 

hemisphere. 

Senator KAINE. Secretary Malinowski, any additional thoughts 

on that? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Sure. You know, let us be clear. There have 

been too many excuses made for Cuba in the hemisphere over too 

many years, and I do not like it. And I do not think they were good 

excuses. To the extent that they used the embargo and our policy 

as an excuse for being silent about human rights abuses in Cuba, 

that was not justified. 

But we have to be ruthlessly disciplined in analyzing what has 

been happening and why. The fact is it has been an excuse that 

has worked for Cuba, and we have now taken that away. 

And I think both Assistant Secretary Jacobson and I have already noted in our interactions with Latin leaders and Foreign 

Ministers over the last few weeks—we talked about that a little bit 

previously—that there is a completely new reaction from those 

folks when we ask them to help us on human rights in Cuba. So 

we are now going to take full advantage of that with your help. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Chairman, if I could just close. Let me just 

read a quick quote to challenge us all, all Americans, all Cubans, 

all over the world from Archbishop Romero. ‘‘Peace is not the product of terror fear. Peace is not the silence of cemeteries. Peace is 

not the silent result of violent repression. Peace is the generous, 

tranquil contribution of all to the good of all. Peace is dynamism. 

Peace is generosity. It is a right and it is a duty.’’ 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

I think we all understand that Cuba is not going to change overnight. We are at the beginning of a process to change the dynamic 

between the two countries but also to change the dynamic between 

the United States and Latin America in general. And Cuba has historically been a centerpiece, a reference point that has been used 

by Latin America in our discussions on many issues. There is no 

question about that. 

Back in the 1980s as the chairman of telecommunications in the 

House of Representatives, I worked extensively on the issue of 

Radio Marti and TV Marti, that was a recognition of the role that 

communications play in opening the minds of Cubans to a world 

that was outside of their boundaries. And it was a central part of 

foreign and diplomatic policy in the United States. 

What heartens me in the new announcement is this initiative 

that can deal with greater access to telecommunications for the 

people of Cuba. Right now, there is only one fiber optic cable coming into Cuba. In the Dominican Republic, a country with almost 

the same population, they have five fiber optic cables coming in. 

So this whole issue of an increase in consumer communications 

devices, software applications, hardware, updating communications 

and Internet services, is something that could play a big role in 

giving information to the ordinary Cuban citizen that right now is 

34 

not available to them. For example, it is $5 an hour in Internet 

cafes in Havana right now for the use of the Internet, and when 

the average income in Cuba is only $20 a month, that does not lend 

itself to the use by ordinary Cubans. 

So could you talk a little bit about that and what your hopes are 

for expanded telecommunications policy in Cuba in terms of the impact that it can have upon that country’s people? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Certainly, Senator. And I think that this is and 

really can be—and I do not know whether it will have the impact 

we all want. I know that Senator Rubio, the chairman, and Senator 

Menendez and I have talked a lot about trying to get more information into Cuba. It has been one of the things we have wanted most. 

You know, it allows telecommunications companies for the first 

time to make commercial sales of things like communications devices, whether that is cell phones or iPads or other forms of equipment, not just to donate them but to make those sales. They can 

also sell—and I do not want to get myself too far into this because 

I will get into Commerce or Treasury’s regulations and get them 

wrong. But they also are able to sell other Internet-related items 

to improve the free flow of information without a license, without 

a specific license, under general license, without a license from the 

Commerce Department. 

They are also allowed to consolidate gift parcels. They are allowed to sell all sorts of things that the private sector can sell in 

terms of equipment and hardware that were not allowed before, 

telecommunications hardware. 

Now, the Cuban Government, including Raul Castro, has said 

they want telecommunications equipment. They want to upgrade 

their infrastructure in telecommunications. They know that they 

need that in order for their economic modernization. I do not know 

whether they really mean that. The point of these regulations is 

that we believe that they need that to offer more access to their 

people. We want to push them on that. They need it for their economic modernization. They need it to get economic progress. With 

that we believe will come an opening of information to more people, 

even if they are not intending that. And if they resist that, we 

want to be in the forefront of having made that offer aggressively. 

Now, telecommunications firms are just looking at this, and we 

have been in touch with quite a few. There are some that have already visited and many more that are now interested, as this plays 

out. So we are optimistic about the interest but not necessarily yet 

about how the Cuban Government will respond. 

Senator MARKEY. And I appreciate that. But I think because we 

are so close to them, because there are economic synergies that 

could be created from a telecommunications perspective between 

our two countries, understanding that it is a threat to an authoritarian regime, you still have this other component where there is 

a natural yearning, especially among young people, no matter 

where they are in the world, to have greater access to this modern 

technology. Americans did not have these devices in their pockets 

going into 1995, but in Africa in 2001, only 12 million had cell 

phones. Today in Africa, 1 billion people have cell phones. 

And so you can see how a huge paradigm shift can occur in a 

very brief period of time with access to these technologies and with 

35 

the change in the access to technologies. It changes the relationship between the people and the government, notwithstanding 

their intents to completely control the people—— 

Ms. JACOBSON. And we have seen that in cell phone. Even 

though Internet penetration is very low, cell phone use has grown 

enormously and potentially could grow even more as an information tool. 

Senator MARKEY. So I think that trying to engage on that one 

issue gives us an opportunity to really make a difference. Actually 

I would add energy as well. There is, I understand, a huge effort 

to move to wind and solar in Cuba at a very significant level, which 

would further reduce their need for imports of oil from other countries that then kind of tie them into agendas in other countries as 

well. 

I know I am running out of time, but I do think that ultimately 

the more that we engage them at the economic level, it tends to 

then change the country in ways that were unanticipatable by the 

political leaders of that country. 

I thank you so much. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

So we still have a second panel that I desperately want to get 

to. It is important that we hear from them. I am going to recognize 

for a second round of questions. I would ask that they be limited 

to 4 minutes. I know not all the members have a question. 

But I wanted to begin basically with the following, and I will 

focus on this. You talk about travel as a key component of this plan 

because you believe the benefits of travel to the island to the 

Cuban people outweigh the benefits to the government. So in Cuba, 

the largest owner of tourist facilities is a group. It is called Grupo 

de Turismo Gaviota. Recently ‘‘Hotel’’ magazine called it the largest 

hotel conglomerate in Latin America. In Cuba, they own well over 

52 hotels and the largest resorts on the island, 19,000 rooms. Their 

revenues are estimated at over $650 million a year. They plan 

47,000 rooms by the year 2017. They also own marinas, car rentals, 

restaurants. You name it. They are the single largest player not 

just in Cuba but in Latin America. 

The CEO of that company is an individual by the name of General Luis Perez Rospide. He is also a general in the armed forces. 

Mr. Malinowski, let me ask you. Is the armed forces of Cuba a 

tool of repression? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Yes. 

Senator RUBIO. So the CEO of this company that owns all these 

hotels on the island is also a general of this repressive government. 

But this company Gaviota is actually owned by a larger company, a holding company by the name of GAESA, G–A–E–S-A. 

GAESA owns various companies including this one, but basically it 

has a monopoly on the island of Cuba on telecommunications, hotels, restaurants, shops, and gas stations. The CEO of the holding 

company that owns all of these hotels is an individual by the name 

of Luis Alberto Rodriguez Lopez Calleja. That is not just an individual with a long name. He is also a general in the repressive 

armed forces. 

Do you know who he is married to, Ms. Jacobson? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I do not. 

36 

Senator RUBIO. He is married to a lady by the name of Debora 

Castro Espin. Do you venture to guess who that is? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I can venture a guess that it is a member of the 

Castro family. 

Senator RUBIO. It is. It is actually Raul Castro’s daughter. So the 

CEO of the monopoly holding company in Cuba that owns all of 

these hotel rooms, the single largest conglomerate in Latin America 

of tourism, is not just a general in the repressive military. He is 

also the son-in-law of the dictator of Cuba. 

So is it not fair to say that if tomorrow an American gets on an 

airplane and travels to Cuba and stays at a hotel and rents a car 

and fills up the tank of their rental car at a gas station and eats 

at a restaurant and shops at his stores, in essence every penny 

they are spending in those facilities are more likely than not to 

wind up in the hands of the repressive Cuban military and its officials? Is that not a fair statement given the facts I have just given 

you here? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Let me try to address that, Senator Rubio. 

I was born in a Communist country, and I have been studying 

these systems all my life. And what you just described is a common 

feature of every repressive, corrupt, Communist or otherwise, totalitarian system in the world. When you actually look at the numbers, you find that these hotels that they run, these businesses 

that they run—they earn hard currency, but they also seep hard 

currency because they run them inefficiently and that is why they 

fail. So we actually do not know—none of us know—exactly what 

the net is. 

Senator RUBIO. But whatever the net is—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. But whatever the net is, in all of my experience advocating human rights and as someone who often supports 

targeted sanctions against the bad guys, I know of no example 

where we have successfully promoted democratic change somewhere by going after travel and tourism, by going after little people 

who travel and interact with each other. When we do go after people with those kinds of measures, we go after people at the top. 

Senator RUBIO. Give me an example of a policy like this that you 

are implementing here today that has led, in the 20th or 21st century, into a reluctant tyranny becoming a democracy. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I cannot think of any policy that we have successfully pursued in which we have gone after remittances and 

travel. There are plenty of situations where we have used diplomatic engagement. Sometimes we use diplomatic engagement plus 

sanctions, as we did in Burma, but we did not do it this way. We 

did it in a smarter way. This is a policy that is modeled—— 

Senator RUBIO. Is there an example of a country in the modern 

era that has gone from a tyranny to a dictatorship because of these 

sorts of economic openings that then have led the government to 

make political changes? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. In many ways, when I look at Cuba today, it 

reminds me of my home country Poland in the 1980s where you 

have a growing black market fed by growing interaction with the 

outside world with a movement at home that was backed by strong, 

moral pressure from the United States and the international community and a state that was increasingly corrupt and shrinking 

37 

and shrinking all of the time because it could not manage any of 

this. So, yes, I think the answer is, yes. 

Senator RUBIO. So Poland is the example. We will examine that 

further at a later date. 

Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

I would ask unanimous consent to place in the record the full 

statement of Alan Gross, an open letter to President Obama from 

78 foreign policy thinkers and leaders, a statement—and I apologize if I do not pronounce this right—Dagoberto Valdes Hernandez, 

Director—can you help me with this magazine? 

Senator RUBIO. Convivencia. 

Senator BOXER. As I was saying, Convivencia magazine. [Laughter.] 

Senator BOXER. I would ask that those be placed in the record, 

along with an op-ed in the Miami Herald, ‘‘December 17, A Day of 

Triumph for Cuban Americans,’’ by Rick Herrero, Executive Director of ‘‘Cuba Now,’’ a letter from Bishop Oscar Cantu, Chair of the 

Committee on International Justice and Peace, U.S. Conference of 

Catholic Bishops. I ask that they go into the record. Is that all 

right? 

Senator RUBIO. Without objection. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The documents referred to can be found beginning on page 80.] 

Senator BOXER. I thank you. 

And I would close with this. I know I want us to get to the panel 

so much. So I will just close with a partial quote from Alan Gross. 

And we have to remember that he was held for 5 long years in 

prison in Cuba. And we are all so glad, no matter what our views 

are on Cuba, that he is out. And he submitted a written statement 

for today’s hearing, and I am going to read this little part of it now 

and put the rest of the statement in the record. 

He says, ‘‘In my opinion’’—remember this is someone who was in 

prison there for 5 years—‘‘In my opinion, access to information is 

itself a fundamental human right and is essential to empowering 

the Cuban people . . . Access to information enables people to 

make better-informed decisions and to give informed consent . . . 

Insufficient access to information is unhealthy for any citizenry and 

it materially impacts human rights issues on all levels . . . Reestablishing diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba is 

only a first step in reestablishing freedom of information for those 

who live on that island. However, it is an essential step. Why 

would anyone not want to take that step?’’ 

And, Mr. Chairman, I so respect all the views. I really do. But 

I just think this sums it up from someone who suffered at the 

hands of this corrupt dictatorship. And I stand with him on his 

views. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Assistant Secretary Jacobson, do we prohibit 

travel to any other country in the world, restrict it in this way? I 

know we discourage travel sometimes, sometimes for security reasons or others. But do we restrict travel to any other country? 

38 

Ms. JACOBSON. I am going to turn to my colleague to make sure, 

but I think the answer is, no. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. No. I mean, there are plenty of dictatorships 

that restrict our travel. North Korea is a good example. 

Ms. JACOBSON. The sanctions on Cuba are harsher than on many 

other countries in the world over the years. 

Senator FLAKE. There is no guarantee that if we completely got 

rid of the travel ban—I know the President went about as far as 

he could statutorily go—correct—in terms of loosening travel, but 

Congress needs to move to—— 

Ms. JACOBSON. Correct. He went as far as he felt he could within 

Executive authority. 

Senator FLAKE. But there is no guarantee that if we throw open 

travel for Americans, allowing them—there is no guarantee that 

the Cuban Government will allow all travel. They still have control. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think that is exactly right. I think being overwhelmed is a big part of their concern. 

Senator FLAKE. They obviously want the revenue that is associated with travel. 

Ms. JACOBSON. They want the revenue associated with many of 

these new measures and are very concerned at how they balance 

that with control. 

Senator FLAKE. I have always said if somebody is going to restrict my travel, it should be a Communist. [Laughter.] 

Senator FLAKE. Not my own government unless there is a compelling national security reason otherwise. 

It would be untrue and it would certainly be a stretch for me to 

say that every travel dollar goes into the hand of an ordinary 

Cuban citizen, a bellhop or a taxi cab driver or somebody else, 

when Americans travel. Certainly some of that money does end up 

in the hands of the Cuban Government. Is that true? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes. 

Senator FLAKE. But it would also not be accurate to say that 

every dollar goes to the Cuban Government, that there is not some 

kind of seepage. I mean, when you, yourself—you have lived in 

these kinds of systems—you take the writings of Hernando de Soto, 

‘‘The Mystery of Capital,’’ and find out how black markets work 

and how the unofficial economy works. There is tremendous seepage that occurs. Is that not right? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Absolutely. This kind of interaction encourages 

the development of a black market in which people, most important, in addition to enriching themselves, become more independent and less dependent on the state. And that is how change 

happens. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, and I think Hernando de Soto’s point was 

of entrepreneurship, that individuals become entrepreneurs if the 

system will not let them do that themselves. 

Senator FLAKE. Precisely. That is another point of this policy in 

some of the changes in unlimited remittances. How much of a 

change has there been on the island just in the last couple of years 

as a result of ordinary citizens having access to some of that capital? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I mean, that has been a huge difference certainly 

in the ability of people to start their own businesses. That is the 

39 

single reason that people have been able to start their own businesses. It is capital from abroad in remittances and in the growth 

of cell phones and the ability of people to get information via SMS 

and other information. And we think that is a crucial part of this, 

which is why we wanted to accelerate those areas. 

Senator FLAKE. We have seen, as you mentioned, a growth in cell phones. The average wage for a Cuban worker is about $20 a 

month. That is not enough to have a cell phone. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Correct, which is why both cell phones and phone 

cards to charge them to get minutes are critical. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you so much. 

Senator RUBIO. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Malinowski, will you commit to this committee that 

human rights and democracy programs in Cuba will not be cut? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We certainly will not cut them and I trust you 

will not. So, yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Secondly, I have here the last human rights 

report for China. It is dozens of pages long. It talks about, among 

so many other things, enforced disappearance, strict house arrests, 

preventing public expression, repression of freedoms against ethnic 

Uighurs and Tibetans, extrajudicial killings, including executions 

without due process, enforced disappearance and incommunicado 

detention, widespread corruption, intense scrutiny and restrictions 

against NGOs, discrimination against women, minorities, persons 

with disabilities, a coercive birth limitation policy, and the list goes 

on and on. So I would like to enter into the record the State Department’s human rights report on China. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The State Department report mentioned above 

can be found beginning on page 104.].] 

Senator RUBIO. Without objection. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And certainly you would not hold that as a 

standard after 43 years of democracy and human rights. Would 

you? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. If Cuba resembles what you just described in 

20 years, we will have failed. At the same time, if I may add, Senator, if I had a choice right now to say that we should not have 

diplomatic relations with China or there should be no Internet in 

China or no private businesses in China, I would certainly not take 

that choice. So the question is the balance of possibilities is on our 

side. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If 43 years from now this reality is China is 

the reality in Cuba—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We will have failed. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. We will have failed. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And I agree with you on that. 

Now, I do not want to join the ‘‘blame America’’ crowd. So can 

you tell me is it not fair to say that the difficulties that the Cuban 

people face is a result of a command and control economy and political repression inside of Cuba? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Absolutely. 

Senator MENENDEZ. It is not because of the United States. 

40 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I explicitly said in my opening statement it is 

not—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Because, you know, the suggestion that the 

embargo has created this problem—Cuba can buy from many 

places in the world. It has been able to do so. It just does not have 

the resources to do so effectively. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I totally agree. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you about this economic freedom 

that we hear all the time. Is it not true, as the chairman referred 

to—just a couple of items—that in Cuba most of the businesses are 

monopolies? It is either a monopoly of the Cuban Government and/ 

or its military or a coowner in most cases. You just do not get to 

have an independent free business, unless it is a small one, of any 

consequence. Is that not a fair statement? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. That is correct, and we are trying to break that 

monopoly. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Oh, yes, but you cannot break a monopoly 

unless the regime allows a monopoly to be broken. Even in the 

former Soviet Union, it was Glasnost and Perestroika, which were 

internal openings that allowed things to break forward. 

Now, you get a dollar from a remittance. And it is true that you 

get that dollar after the government takes a percentage of it for its 

transmission. Is it not also true that if you really want to buy anything of value, you have to go to a dollar store inside of Cuba? 

Ms. JACOBSON. It is certainly true that the dollar stores are 

where the goods are. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And who owns the dollar stores? 

Ms. JACOBSON. The government. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So the ultimate flow of that money ends up 

in the Cuban Government’s hands at that dollar store. 

Now, is it not true that tourism is the second-largest driver of 

Cuba’s economy? 

Ms. JACOBSON. It may be, yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I can assure you it is. 

And so, therefore, when we think about sanctioning any entity in 

the world, we sanction that which ultimately drives the greatest resources to a country to move them in a different direction. 

And finally, the elements of the whole regional reality. Is it not 

true, Mr. Secretary, that, in fact, many countries in the region violate their own human rights and democratic principles and like to 

use that as a cover, using the Cuba situation as a cover for their 

own short-failings? So I would expect then that the democratic 

charter of the OAS, which talks about the commitment of all the 

countries in the Western Hemisphere to human rights and democracy is now going to flourish as a result of us changing this policy. 

Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think we have a much better chance of advancing our human rights objectives in the hemisphere. We will 

continue to stand up for them in Cuba. We will stand up for them 

in Venezuela. You saw yesterday we announced our latest visa ban 

list for Venezuela. We have the wind at our backs today like we 

did not several months ago in part because of these changes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And I look forward to those results. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

41 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

We do have a vote at noon, but I will continue to sit here so our 

second panel’s testimony can be entered into the record. And, of 

course, I will come back after the vote and preside over the questions that we are going to ask them. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much. 

Obviously, the Pope felt very strongly about this. I believe he had 

a discussion with President Obama when he was at the Vatican. 

When Senator Flake and I went down, we talked with Cardinal Ortega. 

Could you tell us a little more about what—I mean, he felt this 

was a moral issue and wanted to speak out—more about what activities he took or Cardinal Ortega took in terms of weighing in on 

this issue? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I cannot tell you too much of the details. I can 

tell you—because I do not know all of the details of the Pope’s involvement. 

What I can tell you is that Cardinal Ortega was important in 

conveying messages from the Vatican and from the Pope to both of 

the leaders, and at crucial moments when it was not clear that this 

was going to be able to work, I think the Vatican’s involvement and 

the trust that both sides place in the Vatican and in this Pope was 

crucial. 

But I also think that the role that the church has played, whether it is stimulating private sector training or education or at the 

time working on human rights issues, whether it was Pope John 

Paul’s visit, which was so electrifying, or subsequently the release 

of 75 political prisoners in 2010, has been a very important fact. 

And it is also important that in the future the church remain engaged and as part of our own civil society engagement with the 

church moving forward. 

The importance of the Pope in the rest of the hemisphere cannot 

also be discounted. The importance of Pope Francis as a figure in 

Latin America just cannot be overstated. Coming from the region, 

his moral support and encouragement for this deal is critically important. 

But I also think that we all now feel an even greater sense of 

obligation to see it through. Certainly we expect that the Cuban 

Government will move forward on the basis of respect for the Pope 

and his imprimatur on this. And that is why we would also like 

to see the human rights groups within Cuba, many of them affiliated with the church—Dagoberto Valdes who was just referred to 

has been very involved in the church movement. Moving forward, 

this is a very important part of civil society and its growth. 

Senator UDALL. Secretary Malinowski, did you have anything to 

say there? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I have nothing to add to that. 

Senator UDALL. Okay, thank you. 

Is it not true that in talking about businesses and small entrepreneurs that there has been dramatic growth in the last 6 or 7 

years in terms of the small entrepreneurs on the island of Cuba? 

Ms. JACOBSON. There has been dramatic growth, but it is from 

a very small base and it is still relatively small. But there are over 

42 

200 professions now authorized for small business. And, Senator 

Menendez, you are right. The government still has a monopoly in 

many, many areas. Small businesses still feel as if they sort of get 

the leftovers, what is left of production or supply. But that is what 

we are trying to expand. If we can help provide inputs for those 

small businesses, they will not always be relying on the state for 

the leftovers because they are authorized to operate. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Senator RUBIO. Senator Kaine, do you have a question? 

Senator KAINE. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RUBIO. All right. Well, thank you both for being here 

today. We are very grateful. We are going to get our second panel 

to come forward. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. 

Senator RUBIO. Before we welcome the second panel of courageous human rights activists and members of the democratic opposition in Cuba, I would like unanimous consent that a statement 

by Mr. Antonio Rodiles be included in the record. The subcommittee has received a statement from Mr. Rodiles, but he could 

not attend the hearing because the Cuban regime denied him his 

travel documents. Without objection, show that entered into the 

record. 

Senator RUBIO. He is a political activist who has achieved international visibility for his work and created a forum in July 2010 

to encourage debate on social, cultural, and political issues in 

Cuba. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.— The statement referred can be found on page 

95.] 

Now, our second panel. As they come forward, I will introduce 

them briefly. Rosa Maria Paya studied physics in Cuba. She was 

forced into exile in 2013 due to threats following the death of her 

husband, Oswaldo Paya Sardinas, and her friend, Harold Cepero, 

in what appears to have been a state security-engineered 

extrajudicial killing. She is a member of the Christian Liberation 

Movement and is dedicated to the struggle for a democratic Cuba. 

Berta Soler is a hospital technician from Havana. Her husband, 

Angel Moya Acosta, is a member of the democratic opposition in 

Cuba and became one of the 75 peaceful activists arrested during 

the March 2013 crackdown, known as the Black Spring. Berta is 

founding member and the current president of the Ladies in White, 

Damas de Blanco. This movement of wives and relatives of the 

Cuban political prisoners demands the immediate release of the 

loved ones and advocates for human rights in Cuba. In 2005, the 

European Parliament awarded the Ladies in White its Sakharov 

Prize for freedom of thought. 

Miriam Leiva is a human rights activist and an independent 

journalist. She is a founding member of the Ladies in White, although she left the organization in 2008 and since then has concentrated on writing as an independent journalist in the defense of 

human rights in Cuba. And we mourned the death of your husband 

in 2003, the late Oscar Espinosa Chepe. 

And lastly I would like to welcome Mr. Manuel Cuesta Morua, 

an anthropologist, philosopher, and historian. He is the secretary 

43 

general of the Socialist Democratic Current, a dissident movement 

in Cuba, and he chairs the progressive Circle Party. 

We welcome your insights. And I will begin with Ms. Leiva. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MIRIAM LEIVA, HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST AND 

INDEPENDENT JOURNALIST, HAVANA, CUBA 

Ms. LEIVA. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators, dear Rosa 

Maria Paya, whose inspiring father was my friend, dear members 

of the peaceful Cuban opposition and dissidents within the island 

nation and abroad, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for granting 

me the opportunity of bringing my voice from Cuba to this important hearing. 

I have been a dissident for over 22 years, and I have been subjected to surveillance, interrogations, harassment, and searches of 

my home. Like my late husband, Oscar Espinosa Chepe, I lost my 

job and right to a pension. 

In 2003, Oscar was imprisoned with 74 other peaceful Cubans 

and was sentenced to 20 years. Our only crimes have been speaking out, writing, and seeking the well-being of the Cuban people. 

For us, that means equal opportunities without discrimination and 

regardless of political opinions and economic prosperity. 

As you well know, we have lived under a totalitarian regime 

since 1959 that brought suffering and exile. 

In the United States, 2 million Cubans found that by working 

hard they could have the opportunity to enjoy the life they were denied in their own country. In return, they have contributed to this 

society, and today in this room we can address prestigious Cuban 

American lawmakers. 

Meanwhile, for 56 years, the government had been hammering 

Cubans’ minds, depriving them of food, clothes, money, entertainment, and Internet and closely watching and repressing. Because 

the regime found in the United States the suitable culprit for all 

its failures, wrongdoings and repression, it said the perils and 

shortages were due to American imperialism and the embargo. 

Despite all this, change has taken place in the minds of the people and not only due to the government’s unfulfilled promises and 

their hopelessness. Since the Obama administration started its 

proactive people-to-people policy in 2009, beginning with Cuban 

Americans, a lot has changed. Remittances from relatives and 

friends help Cubans to survive and even open small businesses. 

More important, Cubans are increasingly empowered as they exchange views with Cuban Americans coming to visit and with other 

Americans on people-to-people programs. The impact on Cubans 

from all walks of life traveling to the United States is overwhelming. Here they discover the opportunities offered by democracy and work. 

It is still hard to describe the amazement Cubans felt on December 17, 2014, when we watched the so-called enemy announcing the 

new measures and read President Obama’s speech published next 

to Raul Castro’s in the newspapers. Now everywhere one goes, 

there is one main issue in conversations and hopeful expectations 

broadly shared. 

44 

Yet, there is more to be done. How could anyone understand that 

you can visit North Korea but not Cuba? The ability of Americans 

to interact with Cubans is impeded by restrictions to travel to our 

country, and this must be ended. 

Raul Castro is stepping down in 3 years, and currently he is paving the way for new leaders. This period is crucial for the transition and the future of Cuba, both for civil society and foreign partners. 

Brazil, Russia, and China are already positioned in Cuba. Yet, 

Americans and Cuban Americans are still prevented by their government from participating in economic and commercial relations 

with Cuba and from contributing to startups in self-employment 

that offer independence from state-owned economy. 

While many dissidents and opponents support the new American 

approach, others do not. Nevertheless, our objectives are the same: 

defense of human rights, democratic values, and friendship and assistance to the Cuban people. 

The path to liberty, respect of human rights, and democracy is 

arduous, and we must always keep in mind that we must not depart from those goals. 

We welcome advice and support from our friends as we explain 

to them how Cuba is now and what can serve it better. I believe 

that is the reason we gather here now. American policy towards 

the Cuban Government has failed for 56 years. So it must be 

changed. The embargo must be lifted to the benefit of our people 

and nations. 

You can only get to know what is going on within the island nation, assist the civil society, and offer expertise of your commercial 

and economic entrepreneurs by being there. 

Reestablishing diplomatic relations will grant a better environment for American diplomats in Cuba to contact the Cuban people 

and the civil society. Normalizing a 56-year-long estrangement will 

take a long time. But there is now a unique opportunity to assist 

the people of Cuba and it must be not wasted. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Leiva follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MIRIAM LEIVA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, dear Rosa Maria Paya, whose inspiring father was my friend, dear members of the peaceful Cuban opposition and 

dissidence within the island-nation and abroad, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for 

granting me the opportunity of bringing my voice from Cuba to this important 

hearing. 

I have been a dissident for over 22 years. I have been subjected to surveillance, 

interrogations, harassment, and searches of my home. Like my late husband, Oscar 

Espinosa Chepe, I lost my job and right to a pension. 

In 2003, Oscar was imprisoned with 74 other peaceful Cubans, and was sentenced 

to 20 years. Our only crimes have been speaking out, writing and seeking the wellbeing of the Cuban people. For us, that means the quest for equal opportunities 

without discrimination and regardless of political opinions, economic prosperity and 

a good quality of life. In short, freedom and democracy, and respect for all human 

rights. 

As you well know, we have lived under a totalitarian regime since 1959 that 

brought suffering and exile. 

In the United States 2 million Cubans found that by working hard they could 

have the opportunity to enjoy the life they were denied in their own country. In 

return, they have contributed to this society, and today, in this room, we can address one of many prestigious Cuban-American lawmakers. 

45 

Meanwhile, 77 percent of Cuba’s population was born after 1959. The utopia 

turned into a nightmare. For 56 years, the government had been hammering 

Cubans’ minds, sending them to trenches through the island-nation and abroad, 

depriving them of food, clothes, money, entertainment and Internet, and closely 

watching and repressing. Because the regime found in the United States the suitable culprit for all its failures, wrongdoings, and repression, it alleged the perils and 

shortages were due to American imperialism and the embargo. 

Despite all of this, change has taken place in the minds of the people, and not 

only due to impoverishment, disbelief in the government’s unfulfilled promises, and 

hopelessness. Since the Obama administration started its proactive people-to-people 

policy in 2009, beginning with Cuban Americans, a lot has changed. 

Remittances from relatives and friends help thousands of Cubans to survive and 

even open small businesses. 

More important, Cubans are increasingly empowered as they exchange views with 

Cuban-Americans coming to visit and with other Americans on cultural, academic, 

scientific, religious, sport, and trade activities. The impact on Cubans from all walks 

of life traveling to the United States is overwhelming; here, they discover the opportunities offered by democracy and work. 

It is still hard to describe the amazement we felt on December 17, 2014. On that 

date, Cubans watched the so-called ‘‘enemy’’ announcing the new measures, and 

read President Obama’s speech published next to Raul Castro’s in the newspapers. 

Now, anywhere one goes there is one main issue in conversations and hopeful expectations broadly shared. 

Yet, there is more to be done. Americans are the best assets in people-to-people 

diplomacy, but we cannot fully benefit from an exchange of ideas, values, and expertise with them. How could anyone understand that you can visit North Korea but 

not Cuba? The ability of Americans to interact with Cubans is impeded by restrictions to travel to our country, and these must end. 

Raul Castro is stepping down in 3 years, and currently is paving the way for the 

new leaders. This period is crucial for the transition and the future of Cuba, both 

for the civil society and foreign partners. 

Mainly, it is Brazil, Russia, and China who are already positioned in Cuba. Yet, 

Americans and Cuban-Americans are still prevented by their government from participating in economic and commercial relations with Cuba, and from contributing 

their know-how and technology to the startups in self-employment that offer independence from the state owned economy. 

President Obama has expressed his unwavering commitment to democracy, 

human rights, and civil society; the continuation of U.S. programs aimed at promoting positive change in Cuba; and the encouragement of reforms in high-level 

engagement with Cuban officials. 

While many dissidents and opponents support the new approach of the American 

administration in the relations with the Cuban government, others do not. Nevertheless, the objective is the same: defense of human rights, democratic values, and 

friendship and assistance to the Cuban people. Likewise in the opposition and 

dissidence, we all seek the well-being and progress of the Cuban people and our 

country. 

The path to liberty, respect of human rights and democracy is arduous, and we 

must always keep in mind that we must not depart from those goals. 

We must also keep on leaving aside personal interests, while we devise programs 

that reflect the needs and aspirations of Cubans to whom we aspire to reach out. 

We welcome advice and support from our friends as we explain to them how Cuba 

is now and what can serve it better. I believe that is the reason we are gathered 

here now. The American policy toward the Cuban government has disserved it for 

56 years, so it must be changed. The embargo must be lifted for the benefit of our 

peoples and nations. 

You can only get to know what is going on within the island-nation, assist civil 

society, bring your values, knowledge, and expertise, and offer your commercial and 

economic entrepreneurs by being there. 

Reestablishing relations will grant a better environment for the American diplomats in Cuba, their contacts with the Cuban population and the civil society, and 

their ability to access a direct channel to the national officials, among other issues. 

Normalizing the 56 years long estrangement will take a long time. But there is now 

a unique opportunity to assist the Cuban people and it must not be wasted. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Just to remind the witnesses as well, your full statements are 

entered into the record. We, obviously, are not going to cut you off, 

46 

but to the extent we can keep to the 5 minutes, which you did— 

it was excellent because it allows us to get all the statements in 

and then the questions. 

The vote will start momentarily. I will stay here obviously. At 

some point, I may have to briefly recess to go vote and then return, 

but we are going to continue until we hear from everyone. 

With that, welcome, Ms. Rosa Maria Paya. 

STATEMENT OF ROSA MARIA PAYA, CUBAN CHRISTIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND DAUGHTER OF SLAIN DISSIDENT, 

OSWALDO PAYA SARDINAS 

Ms. PAYA. Thank you for your invitation and thanks to the whole 

committee for taking their time to listen to my friends and I. 

In recent years, my country has been engaged in a deception. 

The Cuban Government is changing the law, but ignoring the 

rights of the people, which were sequestered over half of a century 

ago. 

More people are allowed to enter and leave the country, but the 

regime decides who can enjoy this privilege. The migratory reform 

was established as a control mechanism. For instance, the government has invalidated the passport of the artist Tania Bruguera just 

for attempting a performance in Havana. 

The Cuban Government has permitted more people to operate 

small businesses, but due to the Cuban laws, entrepreneurs cannot 

be a factor to foster democracy because their existence as private 

owners depends on their submission to the government. There cannot be free markets where there are not free persons. 

The Cuban Government said it would free 53 political prisoners, 

but instead it released them on parole. Meanwhile, many others 

were not freed at all. Yosvani Melchor was transferred to a maximum security prison last December. He was put in prison 4 years 

ago just for being the son of a member of the Christian Liberation 

Movement, who refused to cooperate with state security. 

As my father did 4 months before he was killed, I denounced the 

regime’s attempts to impose a fraudulent change, and I denounced 

the interests that hamper a real transition. My father also denounced the attempt to link groups of exiles to this fraudulent 

change. He said, ‘‘The diaspora is a diaspora because they are 

Cuban exiles to whom the regime denied all rights, as they do to 

all Cubans. In such a context of oppression, without rights and 

without transparency, the insertion of the diaspora would only be 

part of the fraudulent changes.’’ 

As the engagement would be fraudulent, if the United States 

were to accept the rule of the Cuban Government. We have never 

asked our people to be isolated or embargoed, but engagement will 

only be real if it occurs between free peoples. 

We urge you to truly open up to Cuba, but to advance a helping 

hand is essential to solidarity with the Cuban citizenry. It is essential to support the peaceful and legal changes that thousands of 

Cubans have presented to their fellow citizens and to the Cuban 

Parliament, an alternative that allows our people to decide their 

own future. 

There is no respect for the self-determination of the Cuban people when negotiations are a secret deal between elites or when 

47 

there is no mention that Cubans can participate or be represented 

in their own society. 

I know that the U.S. Congress and the administration will do 

what you think is best for this country, which has served as refuge 

for nearly 20 percent of our population. But only a real transition 

to democracy in Cuba can guarantee stability for the hemisphere. 

We, the Cubans, are not the Chinese. We are not Vietnamese, and 

we definitely will not accept a Putin-like model towards despotism. 

The strategy to prevent a mass exodus from Cuba is not by saving the interests of the group now in control. This is an unstable 

equilibrium that could end in more social chaos and violence. In 

fact, this country is already facing a Cuban migratory crisis despite 

the record number of United States visas granted. More than 6,500 

Cubans arrived in the United States via the Mexican border since 

last October, and more than 17,000 did so in the previous year. 

With or without the Cuban Adjustment Act, the situation will get 

worse because of the attempts of those in power in Cuba for selfpreservation of the status quo. 

We Cubans want real changes, to design the prosperous country 

that we deserve and we can build. 

The way that you can promote stability in the region is through 

supporting strategies that engage popular will, to reach the end of 

totalitarianism with dignity for everyone. You have the opportunity 

to support the petition for a constitutional plebiscite in favor of 

multiparty and free elections, already signed by thousands of citizens in the Varela Project. 

The Cuban Government would not have dared to carry out its 

death threat against my father if the U.S. Government and the 

democratic forces of the world had been showing solidarity. If you 

turn your face, impunity rages. While you slept, the regime was 

conceiving their cleansing of pro-democracy leaders to come. While 

you sleep, a second generation of dictators is planning with impunity their next crimes. 

That is why we hope that this Congress demands that the petition for an independent investigation regarding the attack against 

my father be included in the negotiations with the Cuban Government and that we hear publicly what response is given to this 

point. 

Do not turn your backs on Cubans again. Do not earn the distrust of the new actors of our inevitably free future in exchange for 

complicity with a gerontocracy who belongs to the cold war era. 

I want to conclude with the words that my father wrote to President Obama 5 years ago: ‘‘Your government must move forward 

and extend a hand to the people and the Government of Cuba, but 

with the request that the hands of Cuban citizens not be tied. Otherwise, the opening will only be for the Cuban Government and 

will be another episode of an international spectacle for hypocrisy. 

A spectacle that reinforces oppression and plunges the Cuban people deeper into the lie and total defenselessness, seriously damaging the desire of Cubans for the inevitable changes to be 

achieved peacefully. The pursuit of friendship between the United 

States of America and Cuba is inseparable from the pursuit of liberty. We want to be free and be friends.’’ 

Thank you so much. 

48 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Paya follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROSA MARIA PAYA

Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the committee, in 

recent years my country has been engaged in a deception. The Cuban Government 

is changing the Law, but ignoring the rights of the people, which were sequestered 

over half a century ago. 

More people are allowed to enter and leave the country, but the regime decides 

who can enjoy this ‘‘privilege.’’ The migratory reform was established as a control 

mechanism. For example, the government has invalidated the passport of the artist, 

Tania Bruguera, for attempting a performance in Havana. Sonia Garro, a member 

of the Ladies in White, and one of the political prisoners released during the Washington-Havana secret deal, cannot travel abroad and thus she is still a hostage of 

the government, as Alan Gross was for 5 years. The same applies to the former prisoners of the Cause of the 75 from the spring of 2003. 

The Cuban Government has permitted more people to operate small businesses, 

but due to the Cuban laws, entrepreneurs cannot be a factor to foster democracy 

because their existence as ‘‘private’’ owners depends on their submission to the government. There cannot be free markets where there are no free persons. 

The Cuban Government said it would free 53 political prisoners, but instead it 

released them on parole. Meanwhile, many others were not freed at all. Yosvani 

Melchor was transferred to a maximum security prison last December. He was put 

in prison 4 years ago for being the son of a member of the Christian Liberation 

Movement, who refused to cooperate with State Security. The young artist Danilo 

Maldonado, known as El Sexto, was imprisoned after December 17 without committing any crime. The regime turns political prisoners into pieces to be exchanged, 

because they can catch-and-release at will more political prisoners, and democratic 

nations accept this blackmail with innocent citizens. 

As my father did, 4 months before he was killed, I denounce the regime’s attempt 

to impose a fraudulent change, and I denounce the interests that hamper a real 

transition and the recovery of our sovereignty. My father also denounced the 

attempt to link groups of exiles to this fraudulent change. He said, ‘‘The diaspora 

is the diaspora because they are Cuban exiles to whom the regime denied all rights, 

as they do to all Cubans. In such a context of oppression, without rights and without 

transparency, the insertion of the diaspora would only be part of the fraudulent 

changes.’’ 

As the engagement would be fraudulent, if the United States were to accept the 

rule of the Cuban Government. We have never asked our people to be isolated or 

embargoed, but engagement will only be real if it occurs between free peoples. 

We urge you to truly open up to Cuba, but to advance a helping hand is essential 

the solidarity with the Cuban citizenry. It is essential to support the peaceful and 

legal changes that thousands of Cubans have presented to their fellow citizens and 

to the Cuban Parliament, an alternative that allows our people to decide their own 

future. 

There is no respect for the self-determination of the Cuban people when negotiations are a secret pact between elites, or when there is no mention that the Cubans 

can participate or be represented in their own society. 

I know that the U.S. Congress and the administration will do what you think is 

best for this country, which has served as refuge for nearly 20 percent of our population. But only a real transition to democracy in Cuba can guarantee stability for 

the hemisphere. We the Cubans are not Chinese, we are not Vietnamese, and we 

definitely won’t accept a Putin-like model toward despotism. 

The strategy to prevent a mass exodus from Cuba is not by saving the interests 

of the group now in control, this is an unstable equilibrium that could end in more 

social chaos and violence. In fact, this country is already facing a Cuban migratory 

crisis, despite the record numbers of U.S. visas granted. More than 65 hundred 

Cubans arrived in the United States via the Mexican border since last October, and 

more than 17 thousand did so in the previous year. 

With or without the Cuban Adjustment Act, this situation will get worse because 

of the attempts of those in power in Cuba for self-preservation of the status quo. 

We Cubans want real changes, to design the prosperous country that we deserve 

and can build. The only violence here comes from the Cuban military against 

Cubans, that’s way the solution is a peaceful transition, not an appeasement. 

The way that you can promote stability in the region is through supporting strategies that engage the popular will, to reach the end of totalitarianism with dignity 

for everyone. You have the opportunity to support the petition for a constitutional 

49 

plebiscite in favor of multiparty and free elections, already signed by thousands of 

citizens in the Varela Project, as is allowed for the Cuban Constitution. 

There is an active campaign by Cubans from all over the globe, asking for rights 

for all Cubans and the Plebiscite, which is a first vote for the long-lasting changes 

that Cuba needs. 

On 22 July 2012, Cuban State Security detained the car in which my father, 

Oswaldo Paya ́, and my friend Harold Cepero, along with two young European politicians, were traveling. All of them survived, but my father disappeared for hours 

only to reappear dead, in the hospital in which Harold would die without medical 

attention. 

The Cuban Government wouldn’t have dared to carry out its death threats 

against my father if the U.S. Government and the democratic the world had been 

showing solidarity. If you turn your face, impunity rages. While you slept, the regime was conceiving their cleansing of the pro-democracy leaders to come. While you 

sleep, a second generation of dictators is planning with impunity their next crimes. 

That is why we hope that this Congress demands that the petition for an independent investigation, regarding the attack against Oswaldo Paya and Harold 

Cepero, be included in the negotiations with the Cuban Government, and that we 

hear publicly what response is given to this point. Knowing the whole truth is 

essential in any transition process, and to tolerate impunity is to endanger the lifes 

of all Cubans wherever we live. 

Don’t turn your backs on Cubans again; don’t earn the distrust of the new actors 

of our inevitably free future, in exchange for complicity with a gerontocracy who 

belongs to the cold war era. 

I want to conclude with the words my father wrote to President Obama 5 years 

ago: ‘‘Your government must move forward and extend a hand to the people and 

government of Cuba, but with the request that the hands of Cuban citizens not be 

tied. Otherwise, the opening will only be for the Cuban government, and will be 

another episode of an international spectacle full of hypocrisy. A spectacle that reinforces oppression, and plunges the Cuban people deeper into the lie and total 

defenselessness, seriously damaging the desire of Cubans for the inevitable changes 

to be achieved peacefully. The pursuit of friendship between the United States of 

America and Cuba is inseparable from the pursuit of liberty. We want to be free 

and be friends.’’ 

God bless and protect our peoples. Thank you. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

We have 5 minutes left on the vote. So what I think I am going 

to do is briefly recess for 10 minutes, let the members vote because 

they do want to hear your testimony, and then we will continue in 

10 minutes with you, Mr. Morua and Ms. Soler. We will be back 

in 10 minutes. The committee stands adjourned. 

[Recess.] 

Senator RUBIO. The committee will come to order. 

We are expecting our colleagues to return momentarily from 

their vote. And the witnesses are taking their seats. I will give 

them a moment to do that. 

So just by point of process for our witnesses, my colleagues have 

left to take a vote which should have concluded. They are on their 

way back I know. And we are going to continue, out of respect for 

your time, to take your testimony. So if we are ready, Mr. Morua. 

STATEMENT OF MANUEL CUESTA MORUA, SPOKESPERSON 

FOR PROGRESSIVE ARC AND COORDINATOR OF NEW COUNTRY, HAVANA, CUBA 

Mr. MORUA. Thank you all for inviting me to this hearing here 

in the United States. Thank you to Senator Boxer who especially 

invited me here to stay and to share views with you. And especially 

I want to thank Senator Menendez who supported me in a hard 

and difficult moment in Cuba under the oppression of the Cuban 

Government. 

50 

But I am going to continue reading my speech in Spanish because I do not want to see myself smashing the English language. 

So I ask you to open your ears and try to understand my views. 

Mr. MORUA [through the interpreter]. My name is Manuel 

Cuesta Morua. I am a historian and I tried to be a lawyer until 

the regime determined that I could not be one. Imagine why. I am 

52 years old, 24 of which I have dedicated to fighting for democratic change, establishing fundamental liberties, the struggle for 

social equity and also racial equality. I am what in Europe and 

Latin America is called a social democrat. This is someone who believes in liberties, the rule of law, justice, equality, and minority 

rights. Many things to be accomplished in only one life, but I will 

persevere. 

I am, above all, a Cuban. I have faith that things can be accomplished if we fight hard enough and if we act according to our 

moral compass and if we put reason above passion. 

I am also a politician who believes that politics can change 

things and that emotions can destroy the best of intentions. I am 

a politician and I am one in Cuba. Today this means putting the 

Cuban nation above ideological considerations. This means looking 

at what I consider to be in the best interest of my country before 

what I consider to be in the best interest of my party. 

Having said that, I believe that in many ways my compatriots 

here today can have a different focus on how to achieve democracy 

in Cuba but not a different purpose for the nation and the destiny 

we share. We are absolutely united on this. 

My focus after December 17 is the following. The policy change 

announced by the U.S. Government, first of all, allows for fostering 

to make way for political action. That means that all actors are 

obliged to act according to policy and not epics. 

Secondly, this places democratic debate on the main stage in 

Cuba. 

Three, this eliminates the burden of always having the external 

conflict between states trumping internal conflicts for democracy 

within the current framework of international relations. 

Four, this allows the open discussion about citizens’ political sovereignty above the discussion focused on the sovereignty defended 

by states. 

Five, this destroys the narrative that has been peddled by the 

Cuban state to its society, a narrative that has been based pedagogically, on the natural confrontation between Cuba and the 

United States. 

This disarms the Latin American foreign policy that has allowed 

in the hemisphere the democratic debate to be disguised by the 

conflict between north and south. 

Seven, regarding the evasive Cuban state and its bad policies towards its citizens, this makes the public discussion over the error 

and horror of the state more possible. 

Eight, this eliminates the alibi of the failed economic model, if 

such a thing ever existed. 

Nine, this frames the debate over human rights in Cuba on the 

basis of a conflict about values, not a conflict among states. 

Ten, this opens the possibility of the soft power of culture and 

diplomacy and not the hard power of war or civil strife. 

51 

Eleven, hyperventilates a closed regime that has been able thus 

far to control their own dose of oxygen that has allowed it to survive. 

Twelve, opens the way for the legitimization of civil society 

among actors in both Latin America and the United States. 

Thirteen, destroys the Cuban regime’s victim-tormentor ambiguity, clearly exposing it as the tormentor not only of political and 

human rights activists but also of 99 percent of its citizens. 

There is a premise that I would like to share in order to put my 

analysis in perspective: Cuban authoritarianism cannot survive an 

opening the same way that Chinese authoritarianism can and has. 

And, of course, the impact of diplomatic normalization can be debated profusely, which is not the same as normalization among two 

countries, over the structural well-being of the country, which is 

what should matter the most if a clear vision by the state is assumed. 

In this sense, I do not believe that we should confuse economic 

liberty with economic liberalization. We cannot also confuse freedom of expression and information with greater access to information and better technological infrastructure for citizens to be informed, and moreover, we should not hide the economic lack of productivity with the trade deficit that would come with an avalanche 

of corn, soy, rice, oil, chicken, and potatoes from the United States 

to Cuba. However, I believe that it allows the conditions for Cubans to get involved in the struggle for fundamental rights. At the 

end of the day, the force of example goes a long way to push for 

change. 

I do not believe that the change in U.S. policy will bring us freedom, which would be the best outcome. The freedom of Cuba is exclusively a matter for Cubans. But believe me, that new policy will 

give us better options for us to obtain it by ourselves. 

Obviously, one thing is a new policy and the other is what is perceived about that new policy. The way in which the democratic 

community in Cuba learned of the new policy introduced by the administration created the sense that the normalization of diplomatic 

relations between states also supposed an international normalization for the Cuban regime. This immediately led to a new division, 

an artificial one and one in which in my view between those with 

a soft focus and those with a hard one, as if this was the equivalent 

of a division among those who defend human rights and basic freedoms in Cuba. 

I would like to break the news to you that this is not the case. 

My experience in the last few days, together with Cubans on the 

island, in the United States and Puerto Rico is that we walk and 

can walk together precisely thanks to our differences. In the past 

few days, many people have adopted a new mantra: differences enrich nations instead of weakening them. 

Miriam Leiva, Berta Soler, Rosa Maria, and Manuel Cuesta are 

together in the greater goal for democracy and the well-being of 

Cuba, thanks to the fact that they are all different. 

Allow me to make a suggestion. The United States can engage 

the Cuban democratic community with all its plurality and sustain 

a frank, measured, and honest conversation with it. You will see 

that reason prevails. 

52 

Mr. MORUA. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morua follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MANUEL CUESTA MORUA (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) 

My name is Manuel Cuesta Morua. I am a historian and I tried to be a lawyer 

until the regime determined that I could not be one. Imagine why. I am 52 years 

old, 24 of which I have dedicated to fighting for democratic change, establishing fundamental liberties, and the struggle for social and racial equality. I am what Europeans and Latin Americans call a social democrat; which is someone who believes 

in liberties, the rule of law, justice, equality, and minority rights. Many things to 

be accomplished in only one life. But I persevere. 

Yet above all, I am Cuban. With faith in the things that can be accomplished if 

we fight hard enough, if we act according to our moral compass, and if we put reason above passion. 

I am also a politician who believes that politics can change things, and that emotions can destroy the best of intentions. 

I am a politician, and I am one in Cuba. Today this means putting the Cuban 

nation above ideological considerations. 

This means looking at what I consider to be in the best interest of my country, 

before what I consider to be in the best interest of my party. 

Having said that, I believe that in many ways my compatriots here today can 

have a different focus on how to achieve democracy in Cuba, but not a different purpose for the nation and the destiny we share. In that we are absolutely united. 

My focus after December 17 toward that nation that we share is as follows. The 

policy change announced by the United States Government: 

1. Allows for posturing to make way for political action. This means that all actors 

are obligated to act according to policy, not epics. 

2. It places the democratic debate on the main stage: Cuba. 

3. Eliminates the burden of always having the external conflict between states 

trumping internal conflicts for democracy, within the current framework of international relations. 

4. Allows the open discussion about citizens’ political sovereignty above the discussion centered on the sovereignty defended by states. 

5. Destroys the narrative peddled by the Cuban state to its society, a narrative 

that has been based, pedagogically, on the natural confrontation between Cuba and 

the United States. 

6. Disarms the Latin American foreign policy that has allowed the democratic 

debate to be disguised by the conflict between North and South. 

7. Regarding the evasive Cuban state and its bad policies toward its citizens, this 

makes the public discussion over the error and horror of the state more possible. 

8. Eliminates the alibi of the failed economic model, if such a thing ever existed. 

9. Frames the debate over human rights in Cuba on the basis of a conflict about 

values, not a conflict among states. 

10. Opens the possibility of the soft power of culture and diplomacy, and not the 

hard power of war or civil strife. 

11. Hyperventilates a closed regime that has been able thus far to control their 

own dose of oxygen that has allowed it to survive. 

12. Opens the way for the legitimization of civil society among actors in both 

Latin America and the United States themselves. 

13. Destroys the Cuban regime’s victim-tormentor ambiguity, clearly exposing it 

as the tormentor, not only of political and human rights activists, but also of 99 percent of citizens. 

There is a premise that I would like to share in order to put my analysis in perspective: Cuban authoritarianism cannot survive an opening the same way Chinese 

authoritarianism can and has. 

And of course the impact of diplomatic normalization can be debated profusely, 

which is not the same as normalization among two countries, over the structural 

well-being of the country—which is what should matter the most if a clear vision 

by the state is assumed. 

In this sense, I do not believe that we should confuse economic liberty with economic liberalization. We cannot also confuse freedom of expression and information 

with greater access to information and better technological infrastructure for citizens to be informed, and, moreover, we should not hide the economic unproductivity 

with the trade deficit that would come with an avalanche of corn, soy, rice, oil, 

chicken, and potatoes from the United States to Cuba. On the short run, what is 

good for U.S. industry and stomachs on the Island, will probably not be good on the 

53 

long run for our country’s project. However, I believe that it allows the conditions 

for Cubans to get involved in the struggle for fundamental rights. At the end of the 

day, the force of example goes a long way to push for change. 

I do not believe that the change in U.S. policy will bring us freedom, which would 

be the best outcome. The freedom of Cuba is exclusively a matter for Cubans. But 

believe me, that new policy will give us better options for us to obtain it by ourselves. 

Obviously, one thing is a new policy and the other is the way it is percieved. The 

way in which the democratic community in Cuba learned of the new policy introduced by the administration created the sense that the normalization of diplomatic 

relations between states also supposed an international normalization for the Cuban 

regime. This immediately led to a new division—an artificial one in my view— 

between those with a soft focus and those with a hard one, as if this was the equivalent of a division among those who defend human rights and basic freedoms in 

Cuba. 

I should break the news to you that that is not the case. My experience in the 

last few days together with Cubans on the Island, in the United States and Puerto 

Rico is that we walk and can walk together precisely thanks to our differences. In 

the last few days many people have adopted a new mantra: differences enrich 

nations, instead of weakening them. 

Miriam Leyva, Berta Soler, Rosa Maria, and Manuel Cuesta are together in the 

greater goal for democracy and the well-being of Cuba, due to the fact that they are 

different. 

Allow me to make a suggestion: the United States can engage the Cuban democratic community, with all its plurality, and sustain a frank, measured, and honest 

conversation with it. You will see that reason prevails. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

And Ms. Soler. 

STATEMENT OF BERTA SOLER, PRESIDENT, 

CUBAN LADIES IN WHITE, CUBA 

Ms. SOLER [through the interpreter]. Senator Marco Rubio, distinguished Members of the Senate, before all, I want to thank you 

for listening. 

We live presently a particularly defining moment for the future 

of our country in the wake of the recent announced reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States. 

I am appearing here as the leader of the Ladies in White, a 

group of women activists who support change toward democracy in 

our country through nonviolent means, inspired by the example of 

women such as Rosa Parks and Coretta King, among others, who 

with courage and determination blazed paths for the full enjoyment 

of civil rights in this country. Now 50 years after the events in 

Selma, AL, and testifying before a subcommittee whose mandate 

includes global women’s issues, it is a great honor and an historic 

opportunity for me to appear before you. 

I also speak on behalf of numerous leaders and activists from 

Cuban civil society who have entrusted me with speaking for them 

before you. It is a civil society that is particularly repressed by the 

intolerance of a government whose exercise of power consists of 

systematic violation of the human rights of the Cuban people. Just 

before I left Cuba in order to prepare for this event, last January 

28th, we celebrated the birth of our founding father, Jose Marti, 

and just before I left Cuba, dozens of activists were arrested in Havana and other provinces for attempting to place offerings of flowers at statues of Jose Marti. In its totalitarian vision, the dictatorship seeks a monopoly on our national identity through the use of 

force against all independent activists. 

54 

The most respected international human rights organizations 

have documented violations of human rights in Cuba. On October 

28, 2013, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued 

an injunction on behalf of members of the Ladies in White to afford 

protection in the face of systematic repression by Cuban authorities. I submit the official Precautionary Measure issued by the commission for these purposes, as well as the report submitted to the 

commission by the Association of Independent Cuban Lawyers, 

Cubalex, which initiated the case before the commission. I request 

that these reports be made part of the record of this hearing as 

documentary evidence of our testimony. 

These documents demonstrate that the subject of political prisoners, one of the most sensitive issues in Cuba today, reaches far 

beyond the occasional or periodic release of some of them. Resolving this matter requires the unconditional freeing of everyone who 

has been jailed for political reasons on the island and the elimination of all legal restrictions used to repress those who think differently from the regime. 

Cuba continues to be a country with a one-party government 

where fundamental freedoms that are an absolute right in North 

American society are crimes against what they regard as state security. Separation of powers does not exist in Cuba. Freedom of expression and association continue to be repressed and the constitution establishes the Communist Party as the driving force for society. The right to strike is regarded as a crime, with workers on and 

off the island subject to conditions of labor slavery which have been 

denounced by international organizations. While these conditions 

prevail, it is not possible to speak of a willingness to change on the 

part of the Castro regime. 

That same January 28, during his appearance before the third 

Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 

States, CELAC, held in San Jose, Costa Rica, the dictator, Raul 

Castro, stated that Cuba will not give up one millimeter. For us, 

this signals the continuation of beatings, jailing, forced exile, discrimination against our children at school, and again, all manner 

of patterns of intimidation we suffer daily for wanting to see a pluralistic society, democratic, and inclusive in Cuba. 

Our aspirations are legitimate because they are undergirded by 

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which Cuba is a 

party, and the signed international pacts on civil and political 

rights which have not been ratified by the dictatorship. Our demands are quite concrete: freedom for political prisoners, recognition of civil society, the elimination of all criminal dispositions that 

penalize freedom of expression and association, and the right of the 

Cuban people to choose their future through free, multiparty elections. 

We believe these demands are just and valid. Even more importantly, for us they represent the most concrete exercise of politics, 

a step in the direction of democratic coexistence. Cuba will change 

when the laws that enable and protect the criminal behavior of the 

forces of repression and corrupt elements that sustain the regime 

change. 

In the name of those who have been executed by firing squads, 

in the name of Cuban political prisoners, in the name of the pilots 

55 

from the humanitarian organization, Brothers to the Rescue, murdered on Fidel Castro’s orders, in the name of the victims from the 

March 13th tugboat, in the name of the victims of Cuba’s Communist regime, Cuba yes, Castro no. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Soler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BERTA SOLER (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) 

Honorable Senator Marco Rubio, chairman of the Subcommittee on Western 

Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights 

and Global Women’s Issues, distinguished members of the subcommittee, above all, 

I want to thank you for listening to me and also to thank all of the people and organizations who have made it possible for me to testify on the human rights situation 

in my country, Cuba. We are presently living through a particularly defining 

moment for the future of our country in the wake of the recent announced reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States. 

I am appearing here as the leader of the Ladies in White, a group of women activists who support change toward democracy in our country through nonviolent 

means, inspired by the example of women such as Rosa Parks and Coretta King, 

among others, who with courage and determination blazed paths for the full enjoyment of civil rights in this country. Now 50 years after the events in Selma, 

Alabama, and testifying before a subcommittee whose mandate includes Global 

Women’s Issues, it is a great honor and an historic opportunity for me to appear 

before you. 

I also speak on behalf of numerous leaders and activists from Cuban civil society 

who have entrusted me with speaking for them before you. It is a civil society that 

is particularly repressed by the intolerance of a government whose exercise of power 

consists of the systematic violation of the human rights of the Cuban people. Just 

before I left Cuba to be here, last January 28th, the day we celebrate the birth of 

our Founding Father Jose Marti, dozens of activists were arrested in Havana and 

other provinces for attempting to place offerings of flowers at statutes of Jose Marti. 

In its totalitarian vision, the dictatorship seeks a monopoly on our national identity 

through the use of force against all independent activists. 

The most respected international human rights organizations have documented 

violations of human rights in Cuba. On October 23, 2013, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued an injunction on behalf of members of the Ladies 

in White, to afford protection in the face of systematic repression by Cuban authorities. I submit the official Precautionary Measure issued by the Commission for these 

purposes, as well as the report submitted to the Commission by the Association of 

Independent Cuban lawyers (Cubalex) which initiated the case before the Commission. I wish also to submit a report prepared by Cubalex on Cuba’s prison system. 

I request that these reports be made a part of the record of this hearing as documentary evidence for our testimony. 

These documents demonstrate that the subject of political prisoners, one of the 

most sensitive issues in Cuba today, reaches far beyond the occasional or periodic 

release of some of them. Resolving this matter requires the unconditional freeing 

of everyone who has been jailed for political reasons on the island and the elimination of all legal restrictions used to repress those who think differently from the 

regime. 

Cuba continues to be a country with a one-party government where fundamental 

freedoms that are an absolute right in North American society are crimes against 

what they regard as ‘‘State Security.’’ Separation of powers does not exist in Cuba, 

freedom of expression and association continue to be repressed and the constitution 

establishes the Community Party as the ‘‘driving force’’ for society. The right to 

strike is regarded as a crime with workers on and off the island subject to conditions 

of labor slavery which have been denounced by international organizations. While 

these conditions prevail, it is not possible to speak of a willingness to change on the 

part of the Castroite regime. 

That same January 28, during his appearance before the third Summit of the 

[Community of Latin American and Caribbean States] (CELAC), held in San Jose, 

Costa Rica, the dictator Raul Castro stated that [Cuba] ‘‘. . . will not give up one 

millimeter . . .’’ of its system of government as negotiations between Cuba and the 

United States begin, and that it would make no sense to demand that he make 

changes to a military, dynastic dictatorship that has been in power for more than 

half a century. For us, this signals the continuation of beatings, jailing, forced exile, 

discrimination against our children at school, and all manner of patterns of intimiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
56 

dation and abuse we suffer daily for wanting to see a pluralistic, democratic, and 

inclusive Cuba. 

Honorable Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the subcommittee, our aspirations are legitimate because they are undergirded by the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights to which Cuba is a party, and the signed international pacts on civil 

and political rights which have not been ratified by the dictatorship. Our demands 

are quite concrete: freedom for political prisoners, recognition of civil society, the 

elimination of all criminal dispositions that penalize freedom of expression and association and the right of the Cuban people to choose their future through free, 

multiparty elections. 

We believe these demands are just and valid. Even more importantly, for us they 

represent the most concrete exercise of politics, a step in the direction of democratic 

coexistence. Cuba will change when the laws that enable and protect the criminal 

behavior of the forces of repression and corrupt elements that sustain the regime 

change. 

In the name of those who have been executed by the firing squads. 

In the name of Cuban political prisoners. 

In the name of the pilots from the humanitarian organization, Brothers to the 

Rescue, murdered on Fidel Castro’s orders. 

In the name of the victims from the ‘‘March 13th’’ tugboat. 

In the name of the victims of Cuba’s Communist regime. 

Cuba yes, Castro no. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, and that last sentenced needed no 

translation. It was well understood. 

Thank you all for being here today. 

I have some questions. I know that my colleagues do as well. So 

let me begin. 

For all four members of the panel, this is in respect to time. If 

you wish to elaborate, of course, you can, but this is a pretty 

straightforward question. No matter how you feel about the new 

policy toward Cuba, do I take it that all four of you agree that it 

would be a mistake to move forward on these policies without direct consultation and step-by-step partnership with civil society 

and the democratic opposition on the island? 

Ms. LEIVA. If I understand you is that if the American Government has to ask to talk with us for each step it takes. Is that what 

you mean? 

Senator RUBIO. No. My question is would it be a mistake to move 

forward on changes with policy toward Cuba without direct and ongoing consultation with civil society and the democratic opposition 

on the island. 

Ms. LEIVA. I still see it the same way. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. Anybody else? 

Ms. PAYA. Yes. If I understand, you are putting the step of talking with us, of consultation with civil society and with the opposition. And I think that, of course, that is important for the future 

of this engagement if this engagement is going to be for the good 

of the Cuban citizens, but not just. What I want to be clear is that 

I think it is important to talk with the civil society, to talk with 

the opposition, and also to put onto the table of negotiations the 

voices of the citizenry. We are not just asking for recognition for 

the civil society and the opposition. This is not a partition scene. 

But the Cuban citizens have very specific demands, which are the 

demands of the Varela Project but are elemental demands that we 

share with the democratic countries. And I hope that the demands 

also be on the table of negotiation. 

Thank you. 

57 

Senator RUBIO. Mr. Morua. 

Mr. MORUA [through the interpreter]. I believe that it is very important to maintain a continuous channel, a systematic approach 

for communication with the Cuban community both within and outside of Cuba in this process. 

Ms. SOLER [through the interpreter]. I believe it is very important to note that really the Government of Cuba is not sovereign 

because it was not elected. It is the people who are the owners or 

the possessors of the sovereignty of the nation. And so it is very 

important that we, the Cuban people, be listened to and heard during this process. 

Senator RUBIO. My second question of the panel is there are 

some in American politics who believe the democracy program and 

aid on behalf of the United States to the opposition in Cuba and 

civil society is an irritant that complicates and poisons the relationship between the United States and Cuba. Do you agree or disagree with my position that these democracy programs are essential to help the civil society and the democratic opposition in Cuba 

flourish and be prepared to take part in what hopefully will be a 

free and democratic Cuba in the future? 

Ms. LEIVA. Well, I think that the programs should be directed directly to the Cuban civil society. The problem is that a great budget has been destined to these goals and most of them, most of the 

money has not gone directly to the opposition. And the problem is 

again that the Cuban Government says that we are mercenaries. 

We are paid by the American imperialists and the American Government, and we have been taken to prison because of that. 

So I think the best is to analyze what would be the best to support, to help the civil society. Listen to us. It is a very wide range. 

I think up to now, the exchange of views, the way we have been 

having relations with the interest section, with the government, 

and with delegations from Senate, Congress, et cetera, and also the 

way the new measures of the administration can take place, can 

be promoted—well, I think it should be the whole idea, not only we 

will send money through channels and maybe some get to you and 

you go to prison. That is what I felt all these years. 

My husband, Oscar Espinosa Chepe, was sentenced to 20 years 

in jail, and some of the crimes he was supposed to be committing 

was receiving money from the American Government, which was 

not true. So that is why I think it is very, very serious. It is a very 

serious matter and it should be very well treated and analyzed. 

Senator RUBIO. Ms. Paya. 

Ms. PAYA. Yes. I think that if the Government of the United 

States were to accept all the repressive rules of the Cuban Government, that is not going to be good for our people. This engagement 

would be another part of the fraudulent changes if the United 

States just said all this repressive and unfair rules that the Cuban 

Government has with their own citizenry. I think that you have the 

opportunity to support the real demands of the citizens, but this 

approach, this engagement only be true, only be good if it is performed between free persons. 

Mr. MORUA [through the interpreter]. I believe that it is very important to maintain global solidarity with regard to helping Cuba 

with this struggle. It is very important to help the people within 

58 

the country and outside of the country. And we see examples of 

how different states do this with programs, et cetera involved with 

the people. 

Senator RUBIO. And my final question for you, Ms. Soler—— 

The INTERPRETER. Excuse me. The interpretation. 

Senator RUBIO. I am sorry. I understood it, but I am sorry. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. SOLER. It is very important that the U.S. Government continues to help Cuba but that the aid be directed to the people, to 

civil society and not to the government because, unfortunately, the 

government uses the resources that are sent to repress the people. 

So this is a problem when the funds go to help the government. 

Things like cell phones and the contributions made by the exiles 

are a very good will and this is helpful. And the information that 

we receive from TV Marti and Radio Marti is wonderful because it 

lets us know what is going on in the world. It helps civil society. 

So it is very important that the resources go directly to the people 

and civil society because in Cuba they will always say that we are 

mercenaries and that we are anti-Communist and anti-imperialist. 

But the truth is I am anti-Communist but not anti-imperialist. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. And what I have told Senator Flake 

is do not worry about the translation. I will let him know later 

what they are saying. [Laughter.] 

Senator RUBIO. My final question, Ms. Soler. You have met 

President Obama before. Correct? 

Ms. SOLER [through the interpreter]. Yes, correct. 

Senator RUBIO. And I believe it was in November of 2013? 

Ms. SOLER [through the interpreter]. Yes, correct. 

Senator RUBIO. At that time, did President Obama indicate to 

you that any changes of policy toward Cuba would first be consulted with groups like yourselves, like the Ladies in White? 

Ms. SOLER [through the interpreter]. No, that is really not the 

way it was. I am actually just another woman, another Cuban 

woman. There is no reason for a government to count on me for 

any type of opinions and things like that. 

The important point is that the Government of Cuba is really not 

sovereign because they are not elected. They are a totalitarian government. They were not elected by the people. And what is important is for the people to be listened to. That is what really needs 

to be happening. And you cannot do business with a tyrant. It just 

does not work that way. And rather than establishing conditions 

from the United States to Cuba, Raul will be establishing conditions for the United States if you let him. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is regretful, the way the time has gone, that so many of our colleagues cannot be here because this is the part of Cuba that members need 

to hear because there is this romanticism but not the harsh reality 

of heroic individuals like these who every day languish inside of 

Cuba to create a greater space for civil society, human rights, and 

democracy. And we sweep that away. And people will say, oh, yes, 

I know there are violations and then we go on to let us do business. 

Let us travel. Let us do everything else. And this needs to have, 

59 

in my mind, the equal stature. And so I appreciate you continuing 

the hearing and making sure all of these people are heard. 

I have a great deal of respect for all of you because it is easier 

to talk about democracy and human rights outside of a country 

that represses it. It is much more difficult to fight and languish inside of a country that ultimately does not allow its citizens their 

basic rights. 

And, Mrs. Leiva, you have my deep condolences on the loss of 

your husband, who I greatly admired. 

Mrs. Paya, you have my condolences on the loss of your father, 

who I also admired. 

And Mr. Cuesta Morua, I appreciate that you acknowledge my 

recognition of what you did in creating a parallel effort in civil society when Central and Latin American leaders were meeting, even 

though your efforts were repressed. But I am really thankful to individuals like you who actually tried to do that under a repressive 

system and tried to create an independent voice for civil society. So 

my thanks go to you, not to me. 

Now, I want to just take a couple of minutes here because those 

of us who follow these issues are deeply immersed in it, but I do 

not know necessarily that others are. 

So, Mrs. Paya, your father led a civil society effort inside of Cuba 

by seeking to petition the government under the existing Cuban 

Constitution for a redress of certain grievances and got thousands 

of signatures. Is that a fair statement? 

Ms. PAYA. Yes, it is. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Basically, what he was trying to do is create 

greater openings for the Cuban people within the context of the 

Cuban constitution. Is that fair to say? 

Ms. PAYA. It would be, yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And can you briefly describe what some of 

those openings that your father was petitioning for were? 

Ms. PAYA. Of course. The most elemental ones. We—when I said 

‘‘we,’’ it is because even when my father was the center of the 

Varela Project, the Varela Project does not belong to my father or 

to the opposition. It belonged to the citizenry, to the Cuban citizens. And more than 25,000 of Cuban citizens in the middle of the 

culture of fear and facing repression dared to put their names, 

their address, and their ID number and asked the Cuban Parliament for ask to the rest of the Cubans in a plebiscite for changing the law, to guarantee free association, free expression, the liberation of the political prisoners, the real right to have free and 

private enterprises, and change the electoral law in order to have 

free, competitive, and multiparty elections. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So 25,000 Cubans signed onto this petition. 

Ms. PAYA. The constitution asks for 10,000 of Cubans and more 

than 25,000 signatures were delivered. 

Senator MENENDEZ. To seek those basic democratic and human 

rights principles that we enjoy here at home and observe throughout most of the world. And he did this with others following him 

under the existing Cuban Constitution. Is that right? 

Ms. PAYA. Yes. We are actually still waiting for the answer of the 

Cuban Parliament. They are obligated by the constitution to answer, and they have not. 

60 

Senator MENENDEZ. And there was an answer in one respect, 

and that was you believe that your father was assassinated. 

Ms. PAYA. I know that my father was assassinated. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And can you say why you believe that? 

Ms. PAYA. Well, we have accumulated a lot of evidence. We have 

talked with the survivors. One of them actually has published a 

book talking about how the state security hit their car and then 

moved the two survivors—first hid the survivors and then moved 

them away. And they just know that my father and Harold Cepero 

were alive and, I think, pretty much uninjured after the car was 

hidden. And 4 hours later, my father was dead and my dear friend, 

Harold Cepero, died in the hospital. We know that it was without 

medical attention. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So that was the regime’s answer. 

Mrs. Soler, the Ladies in White march every Sunday on their 

way to church in a peaceful manner. Is that fair to say? 

Ms. SOLER [through the interpreter]. Yes, correct. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And the purpose of your peaceful march is 

to protest the arrests of your sons or husbands who have been arrested simply because of their political views or statements or activities. 

Ms. SOLER [through the interpreter]. Well, no, that is not exactly 

how it was. The truth is that the Government of Cuba represses 

our right to religious freedom, represses our right to movement, 

freedom of movement and association. Every Sunday the Ladies in 

White are going out to participate in religious activities. 

One example would be on the 18th of January, on Sunday two 

Ladies in White were detained in a patrol car and kept there for 

4 hours without oxygen. The government is constantly repressing 

not only the Ladies in White but many activists who are trying to 

exercise these rights of gathering together to discuss matters of importance to them. 

For example, on December 10, Ladies in White who wanted 

again to exercise their right to freedom of association were thrown 

in jail by the repressive forces of the Cuban Government just because they said ‘‘long live human rights.’’ 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I have one final question if 

I may. 

Mr. Cuesta Morua, this effort at creating a parallel civil discourse of civil society of Cuba, which you tried with the last Latin 

American summit of CELAC—are you going to try to do that at the 

upcoming Summit of the Americas? And how can we be helpful if 

there is any way to be helpful without impinging on it? Because I 

assume even your testimony here today can be considered mercenaries if the Castro regime wants to claim it as such. So that is 

a challenge. But I am interested in your continuous effort to create 

a parallel civil society. The voices of all of you and many others can 

be heard in these discussions in the days ahead. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORUA [through the interpreter]. Yes, of course. 

The Cuban Government does not have much credibility. People 

do not pay much attention to what they say. 

We did try to carry out a parallel summit. 

The INTERPRETER. The interpreter corrects. 

61 

Mr. MORUA [through the interpreter]. We are going to try to 

carry out a parallel summit following the tradition of the time 

when we tried to do the same when CELAC was held in Panama. 

We tried to do the same thing there following that tradition. In 

fact, we are going to attempt to have two parallel summits, one in 

Cuba and the other in Panama. We are working with democratic 

society groups in New Jersey, Miami, Puerto Rico, and other places 

to be able to attend and to have one voice and also to carry out 

a summit, a parallel one, in Havana for those Cubans who cannot 

go to Panama in order to participate as well and have their voices 

heard with the OAS. 

And, of course, we welcome the solidarity of the United States. 

It is welcomed in the manner in which this solidarity can be accomplished. 

Senator MENENDEZ. My admiration to all of you. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this 

hearing. And this has been very enlightening. I wish, as was said, 

that all of our colleagues could hear what you said. I am sure they 

are following it and their staff is as well. 

But I just want to say how much I admire all of you for what 

you are doing. I have traveled to Cuba a number of times and have 

met with Ms. Leiva and your husband in prior years, and I have 

seen what the Ladies in White have done and the work of your father was just inspiring to everyone. And I just cannot say enough 

about what you do and continue to do in the face of very trying circumstances. 

But, Ms. Leiva, in a letter to the ‘‘New York Times,’’ you noted 

that, ‘‘since the Obama administration started people-to-people policy or expanded the people-to-people policy in 2009, encouraging exchanges between Americans and Cubans, a lot has changed and 

that Cubans are feeling empowered by exchanges of views with 

Cuban Americans coming to visit and Americans on cultural, academic, scientific, religious, sports, and other trade trips.’’ 

How do trips like that, particularly since Cuban Americans can 

travel freely back to Cuba—how has that changed things? 

Ms. LEIVA. Well, not only because they have sent remittances or 

they bring presents, but mainly because they talk to the families, 

to the friends of how, working hard, they have great possibilities 

of improving their lives and also helping the Cubans in Cuba. And 

also, these remittances help open the new businesses, the very 

small businesses. It is true. But I think, let us say, the seed for 

a future bigger business in Cuba, and that is what we expect. 

So when somebody has a small business, then he has to hire others or he has to sell. And it is like a web. They get to be independent. And now, after these new measures taken by the President, there is a sense of happiness, of hope in Cuba among the population, most of the people, because there is not going to be this 

atmosphere of confrontation but also because they sense that there 

could be opportunities for everyone. 

Of course, there was a great frustration because the government 

of Raul Castro promised a lot of changes and almost nothing was 

fulfilled. And people said, well, this is the same and we are not 

62 

going to be able to build our future. At present, we are not going 

to have a future. 

So now people see other possibilities. Of course, they know that 

this depends on how the Cuban Government is willing to admit the 

new measures of the United States because you can open for someone to send tools for a new business and maybe in the customs you 

cannot get them in. So, of course, people are afraid and also people 

are afraid that if here in the United States you change the law— 

how do you call it—for coming to Cuba—Cuba to the United 

States—— 

Senator RUBIO. The Cuban Adjustment Act. 

Ms. LEIVA. The Cuban Adjustment Act is changed or if this dry/ 

wet—— 

Senator RUBIO. Wet foot/dry foot. 

Ms. LEIVA [continuing]. Is cancelled, they are afraid that they 

will not be able to get to the United States, those that want to get 

here. So I think that that is one of the causes that is increasing 

the flow of Cubans coming more rapidly since December because 

they are afraid that if it is closed, they would not be able to get 

here. So I think this is also something that should be thought because this could create a tense atmosphere between the governments. And imagine a new flow of Cubans coming to the United 

States, a tough situation in the United States. 

So I think that all this is very complex, I know, and we are hoping that we can help solve all. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. Thank you. 

Mrs. Paya, as I mentioned, I am a huge admirer of your father 

and what he did. I have quoted him often in a piece in the ‘‘New 

York Times’’ in 2003 I think. And then I was fond of a quote that 

ran in the ‘‘Time’’ story on him. It said Paya reiterated his opposition to the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba because he said it 

gave Castro the convenient excuse for his economic failures. I think 

that is something that a lot of us have always believed. But he also 

pointed out. He said I am for all Americans traveling to Cuba, but 

he said please do not think that Cuba will be democratized by people coming to dance salsa and smoke cigars. And so I think that 

is certainly true as well. 

For Americans who are able now—more Americans—to travel to 

Cuba, what would be your advice to how they can help the Cuban 

people? 

Ms. PAYA. Well, with mojitos and Cuba Libres, we are not going 

to free our island. I think that it would be great if there are more 

relations with the real Cubans, with the people that are suffering 

the repression of the Cuban Government, which are all the citizenry. But what is also important to pay attention to is it is not 

the American Government and not the Americans laws, the ones 

who have kidnapped the strides of the citizenry. And there are no 

more opportunities for the Cuban people because the Cubans know 

how things change. 

I think that this new policy—I think that this new dialogue could 

be good if it is addressed with responsibility and with transparency, not more secrets. And I actually hope that the voice of the 

Cuban citizens that has been rising in the past for very specific and 

concrete demands be on that table of negotiation. Otherwise, 

63 

mojitos, Cuba Libres, and salsa—that is just going to be more of 

this long history. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. My time is up. I appreciate this. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you all for your patience today. I know it 

has been a long hearing. We have spent more time today on Cuba 

than we have the 4 years that I have been here, and if there is a 

silver lining in all this, it is that for the first time, certainly in my 

time in the Senate and probably in a decade, when something is 

going on in Cuba now, a human rights abuse, any sort of outrage, 

it now is news in the United States. And I hope that today’s hearing served not just to educate my colleagues but a broader sector 

of the American public about the Cuban reality, what the people 

of Cuba are facing, and hopefully what the opportunities are moving forward. 

But I want to thank all four of you for being here. I recognize 

that being here today—and we take this for granted. We have witnesses before this committee all the time who may something that 

leads them to criticism in a blog or in the press. But appearing 

here today, testifying here today puts many of you in real danger 

of being detained or being harassed and the people who you love, 

the same. In fact, all of you have experienced that in the past as 

well. It is a liberty that sometimes those of us who have been born 

and raised here in this country take for granted. And we should 

not. Just 90 miles from our shores is a place where the sorts of 

things that we do here as a matter of course, disagree in open with 

our Government, with our leaders, is punishable by imprisonment 

and, throughout its history, death on the island of Cuba. 

All of us share the same goal. I do not think that is in dispute. 

Every single member of this committee, I believe the vast majority 

of American people, and this administration, as well as my leadership of my party, all share the goal of a free and democratic Cuba. 

What we are having now is a debate about the best way to bring 

that about, and differences of opinion, as exhibited not just by our 

panel but by those here today on this committee, as to best way 

to achieve it. 

The good thing is that those of us on the American side of the 

debate are able to debate those differences openly, democratically. 

And we hope that in a future Cuba, all of civil society and all Cubans will be able to disagree with their leaders and do so without 

risking imprisonment or jail, but also to be represented by elected 

representatives who will work for you, who are accountable to you 

in the votes that they take and the decisions that they make. I 

hope that in a future Cuba there will be a free press so that you 

can gather news from any sources you want. I hope that in a future 

Cuba, you will be able to organize yourselves into political parties 

if you so choose. I hope that in a future Cuba everyone will be able 

to participate in the future of the country. 

And that is our hope here, to see what we can do with American 

foreign policy to bring that day about soon. It has been a very long 

time. Many generations, many people have seen mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters pass away without being able to be reunited. Many people hope that future will come soon. We have been 

waiting a long time. 

64 

Thank you. God bless all of you for being here. Muchisimas 

gracias. Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

Senator RUBIO. The record will remain open until the close of 

business tomorrow, February 4. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

65 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses of Roberta S. Jacobson to Questions 

Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio 

Question. Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken has committed to provide a list 

of Members of Congress consulted about the negotiations with Cuba. 

♦ What Members of Congress were consulted prior to the President’s announcement on December 17? 

Answer. The administration has and will continue to regularly brief and consult 

with Congress regarding its Cuba policy. 

Prior to the President’s announcement on December 17, the administration 

briefed the congressional leadership, key committees, and other Members. 

We will continue to work closely with Congress in a bipartisan manner to bring 

positive change to Cuba. 

Question. It appears that the administration secured no concessions on key issues 

of interest to the United States. 

♦ What commitments were secured regarding return of fugitives from justice, 

property claims, and political reforms in Cuba? 

♦ Were these issues raised with the Castro regime? What was their response? 

Answer. Reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba is in the U.S. national 

interest. This new approach is not about what the Cuban Government will do for 

us, but rather what we can do for the Cuban and American people. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations, including reopening our Embassy in Havana, will 

allow us to more effectively represent U.S. interests, including property claims, fugitives, human rights, and needed political reforms and increase our engagement with 

the Cuban people. Cuba remains a one party, authoritarian state. We have no illusions about the nature of the Cuban Government. We will continue to condemn any 

example of Cuban Government-sponsored harassment, use of violence, or arbitrary 

detention of Cuban citizens peaceably exercising their freedoms of expression and 

association. 

We proposed to the Cubans starting discussions of outstanding claims, in the 

event we reestablish diplomatic relations. Although reaching agreement on the resolution of outstanding claims is often a lengthy process, the Department is strongly 

committed to advancing this effort. On the issue of fugitives, the Department 

repeatedly raises fugitive cases with the Cuban Government and will continue to 

do so at every appropriate opportunity. We raised several cases with the Cubans 

when we met with them January 22. 

Question. A month after the beginning of the secret negotiations, Cuba was found 

smuggling 240 tons of weapons to North Korea (DPRK) in violation of multiple 

United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

♦ Was this issue discussed during the negotiations? 

♦ Did Cuba agree to halt its illicit relationship with North Korea as part of the 

negotiations? 

♦ Did the U.S. negotiators asked the Cuban Government to do so? 

♦ When the next North Korean ship docks in Havana, carrying weapons or other 

illicit cargo, what action does the United States plan to take? 

♦ Has the United States made any commitments to not interfere in Cuban-North 

Korea relations? 

Answer. The United States remains concerned about attempts by North Korea 

(DPRK) to circumvent international sanctions and strongly condemn, and will continue to condemn, any efforts by states such as Cuba to assist in the illegal evasion 

of binding decisions of the U.N. Security Council. 

At the same time, the administration believes that through a policy of engagement with Cuba, we can more effectively stand up for our values and those shared 

by the international community, promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, 

and help the Cuban people help themselves. 

With respect to the Chong Chon Gang shipment to the DPRK, the administration 

has worked to ensure that those responsible for this egregious violation of U.N. 

sanctions pay a price for their wrongdoing. The United States pushed for the U.N. 

DPRK sanctions committee to designate the Ocean Maritime Management Company, a DPRK entity that played a key role in managing the Chong Chon Gang. 

The committee designated Ocean Maritime Management Company for sanctions last 

year. 

66 

The administration worked to maximize the diplomatic cost to Cuba for its role 

in the incident, including by using meetings of the U.N. Security Council to repeatedly condemn Cuba’s role in the violation. We applauded the U.N. DPRK Sanctions 

Committee’s release of an Implementation Assistance Notice to publicize the facts 

of the case and advise states on how to protect themselves from future arms smuggling attempts. The United States ensured that this Implementation Assistance 

Notice also highlighted Cuba’s role. The international community has unequivocally 

refuted Cuba’s claim that this arms shipment was allowed under U.N. Security 

Council resolutions. 

Question. Since the President’s announcement of his unilateral changes to Cuba 

policy, Gen. Raul Castro has made a series of demands that he believes the United 

States should agree to as part of this ‘‘normalization’’ process. 

♦ Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba changes to U.S. immigration policy, specifically the Cuban Adjustment Act? 

♦ Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba U.S. assistance to Cuban 

dissidents and human rights activists? 

♦ Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba Radio and TV Marti 

broadcasting to Cuba? 

♦ Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba the U.S. immigration 

program that allows Cuban medical personnel forced to work overseas the 

opportunity to emigrate to the United States? 

♦ Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba the lifting the broader 

U.S. embargo of Cuba, which requires an act of Congress? 

♦ Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba the return of the U.S. 

naval facility at Guantanamo Bay? 

♦ Is the administration prepared to negotiate with Cuba the $181 billion in reparations that Castro demanded in 1999 for the claimed ‘‘damages’’ brought by 

the embargo? 

Answer. Reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba will strengthen our 

ability to press the Cuban Government on important issues, including human 

rights, democratic governance, and property claims. Reestablishing diplomatic relations is a first step toward normalization, a long-term process that will address 

long-standing issues that have complicated our bilateral relationship for the last 

half-century. Through a policy of engagement, we can more effectively stand up for 

our values, and those shared by the entire hemisphere, and help the Cuban people 

better help themselves. 

Safe, orderly, and legal migration remains a top policy priority for the United 

States and is also shared by the Government of Cuba. The administration has no 

immediate plans to alter its Cuba migration policy and recognizes that the Cuban 

Adjustment Act is a law that can only be altered by Congress. We support Cuban 

nationals’ ability to freely travel and will continue to monitor how Cuba implements 

its January 2013 migration reforms, specifically with respect to medical professionals and their families as well as peaceful civil society actors. 

We will continue to use U.S. foreign assistance funds to support adherence to 

democratic principles and norms, the promotion and protection of human rights, the 

exercise of political and civil liberties, and the free flow of information to, from, and 

within Cuba, and to provide humanitarian assistance. We will also continue Radio 

and TV Marti broadcasting to provide the Cuban people with the uncensored news 

and information they are denied due to Cuban Government policies. 

As the President said in his State of the Union Address, he believes Congress 

should begin working to lift the embargo. 

Reaching agreement on resolving outstanding claims is often a lengthy process, 

but the Department is committed to pursuing a resolution. We proposed to the 

Cubans starting discussions of outstanding claims once we have established diplomatic relations. In our discussions with the Cubans, we have made it clear that 

there are no plans to alter the existing lease agreement for the Naval Station at 

Guantanamo Bay. 

Question. Raul Castro has been clear about his demands for normalization of relations with the United States. So, what are our demands of this dictator? 

♦ Is the administration demanding free and fair elections of the only country in 

our hemisphere that has not been elected for the last 53 years? 

♦ Is the administration demanding full respect for human rights and that the 

regime honors their obligations under international law? 

♦ Is the administration demanding that the regime release all political prisoners 

and that they furthermore not arrest any further prisoners for exercising their 

basic human rights? 

67 

♦ Is the administration demanding freedom of information, assembly, and expression, and restitution for confiscated American property, and restitution for those 

who have suffered for years at the hands of that oppressive regime? 

♦ Many of these are codified in U.S. law as preconditions for normalization of 

relations. If the administration has not made these demands, why not? 

Answer. The administration fully recognizes that the Cuban people have long 

been deprived of the freedom that they deserve, and the fundamental goal of our 

policy is to advance a Cuba that is democratic, prosperous, and well-governed. We 

also recognize, however, that our previous approach over a half century, though 

rooted in the best of intentions, did not work. Our new approach is not about what 

the Cuban Government would do for us, but rather what we can do for the Cuban 

and American people. Reestablishing diplomatic relations and reopening embassies 

are just the first steps in the complex, long-term process of normalization of 

relations. 

This administration is under no illusions about the continued barriers to internationally recognized freedoms that remain for the Cuban people, but we are convinced that, through a policy of engagement, we can more effectively promote our 

interests and values, and help the Cuban people begin to enjoy more independence 

from the Cuban state. Diplomatic relations will provide us the opportunity to engage 

more effectively on a range of important issues, including claims, fugitives, and 

human rights. Our discussions with the Cuban Government will include promoting 

respect for universal human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

Question. You may be aware that the President of the Fraternal Order of Police 

recently sent a letter to President Obama saying, ‘‘The blood of American law 

enforcement officers doing their job on American soil is too high a price to pay for 

closer ties with the Cuban regime.’’ 

♦ Do you agree with this statement? 

♦ Do you have any qualms about allowing a convicted accessory to murder out of 

prison? 

♦ Are you aware of any other cases where a foreign national convicted by a U.S. 

court and sentenced to life in prison for crimes that led to the murder of American citizens, was traded in a hostage negotiation? 

♦ What steps did the administration take to contact the families of the Americans 

who lost their lives in 1996 at the hands of the Cuban regime before an individual involved in their family member’s murder was set free? 

♦ What steps did the administration take to consult the families of the law 

enforcement officers who were murdered by fugitives currently in Cuba as you 

negotiated with the people harboring those who killed their love ones? 

Answer. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations will allow us to more effectively represent U.S. interests, including pressing for the return of fugitives, and increase our engagement with the Cuban people. The Department repeatedly raises 

fugitive cases with the Cuban Government and will continue to do so at every 

appropriate opportunity. We raised several cases with the Cubans in Havana January 22, and we will continue to press for resolution. Our repeated efforts to address 

fugitive issues with the Cuban Government have met with limited success in recent 

years. Cuba has expelled to the United States at least four U.S.-national fugitives 

since 2011. 

When it is deemed to be in the U.S. national interest, the United States has 

exchanged imprisoned intelligence agents with other countries in the past, including 

those countries where we have historically had difficult or limited relations. In the 

exchange of intelligence agents that took place with Cuba on December 17, the 

United States released three Cuban intelligence agents to secure the release of an 

important intelligence asset, a man that provided key information to the United 

States about systematic Cuban espionage and efforts to penetrate the U.S. Government. In light of his sacrifice on behalf of the United States, securing his release 

from prison after nearly 20 years is fitting closure to this chapter of U.S.-Cuban 

relations. 

Question. The Cuban regime confiscated U.S. private property and owes damages 

exceeding $8 billion in restitution to rightful owners and more than $2 billion in 

judgments awarded in U.S. courts. 

♦ What progress was made on this issue during 18 months of secret negotiations? 

♦ Will you commit to not open an embassy or normalize relations with Cuba until 

a process has been established for these claims to be addressed, as has been 

the case in past instances when the United States restored diplomatic relations 

with countries with outstanding claims, such as Libya? 

68 

♦ If not, why would Cuba have any motivation to settle the claims at all if the 

embargo is already lifted or Americans can freely travel to Cuba and diplomatic 

ties exist? 

♦ Can you cite another instance where the United States normalized relations 

with a country that had billions of dollars in outstanding claims and judgments 

without an agreed process in place for resolution of those claims? 

♦ What protections is the administration willing to provide current American 

citizens who had stolen property in Cuba so that U.S. and foreign entities do 

not exploit and traffic in their stolen property? Would it be fair to allow these 

Americans full access to U.S. courts to prosecute traffickers, foreign and 

domestic? 

♦ As you may know, many licenses granted by OFAC result in the trafficking by 

Americans in the stolen property of other Americans, which includes hotels and 

even the art in Havana’s major museums. Is trafficking not a violation of U.S. 

law, or at least the American moral and ethical principles? Should we allow 

American visitors and business interests to have commercial relations with 

Cuba without any concern that this involves the stolen property, brands and 

trademarks of Americans? Should traffickers be liable for these acts? 

♦ Did you traffic in stolen U.S. property at all when you were in Cuba? If not, 

how are you sure? Has the U.S. Interests section and any diplomats serving 

there ever trafficked in stolen property, even if unintentionally? 

Answer. Following the President’s December 17, 2014, announcement of a new 

course in Cuba policy, Assistant Secretary Jacobson raised the need to resolve outstanding property claims with the Cuban Government during January 22 talks in 

Havana. The Department is committed to pursuing a resolution of claims and firmly 

believes the reestablishment of diplomatic relations will provide the United States 

and Cuba the opportunity to engage more effectively on a range of important issues, 

including claims. 

With Cuba, the discussion of claims will be part of our broader normalization efforts, a long-term process. As in all claims settlement discussions, a range of issues 

will need to be considered. The Cuban Government agreed to begin a dialogue on 

claims in the months following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and reopening of our respective embassies. 

Claims are not necessarily addressed as part of the reestablishment of diplomatic 

relations. In fact, diplomatic relations are generally in place when governments 

embark on claims discussions. We did not resolve claims with Libya or Iraq as part 

of establishing diplomatic relations. In both cases, we already had diplomatic 

relations before we began discussing claims. In Libya, we had not severed diplomatic relations; claims discussions were simply part of normalizing our bilateral 

relationship, along with discussing other pressing matters such as weapons of mass 

destruction. 

Title III of Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 

(Public Law 104–114; 22 U.S.C. 6021–6091) creates a private cause of action and 

authorizes U.S. nationals with claims to confiscated property in Cuba to file suit in 

U.S. courts against persons purported to be trafficking in that property. The President has repeatedly exercised the authority under the act to suspend the lawsuit 

provisions for periods of 6 months, as necessary to the national interest of the 

United States and to expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. At this juncture, 

we continue to believe that claims discussions with the Cuban Government will 

afford the best opportunity to address issues regarding claims for property. 

Question. There have been many press reports in recent weeks about what the 

administration would like to see happen in Cuba as a result of the President’s 

announcement, but very little on how it intends to get there. 

♦ What benchmarks or metrics has the administration developed to determine 

your progress in achieving its objectives with its new Cuba policy? 

♦ In other words, how will the administration determine whether the policy is 

working or not? 

Answer. Our enduring objective remains the emergence of a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba that respects and adheres to human rights norms. The 

President’s new approach to Cuba moves beyond decades of unsuccessful efforts to 

isolate Cuba and is designed to empower the Cuban people. Over time, the success 

of our policy can be judged in terms of its success in empowering the Cuban people 

to determine freely their own future, including in the areas of greater political space 

to express dissent, democratic accountability, access to information, and respect for 

human rights. The intensive discussions between the United States and the Cuban 

Government in January on the reestablishment of diplomatic relations were only 

69 

the initial step in what is likely to be a long and complex process of normalization 

of relations. 

Question. The administration announced that the Cuban Government released 53 

political prisoners as part of the President’s new approach toward Cuba. However, 

according to reports from various independent groups, the Cuban Government has 

jailed over 250 other individuals for peacefully demonstrating against the dictatorship. These include two new long-term political prisoners, Cuban artist Danilo 

Maldonado ‘‘El Sexto’’ and rapper Maikel Oksob ‘‘El Dkano.’’ 

According to news reports and independent organizations, Danilo Maldonado, 

known as El Sexto (the Sixth one, is a satirical reference to the five Cuban spies 

portrayed as heroes by the Cuban Government) was arrested on December 26 as he 

was on his way to Havana’s Central Park to do an art performance with two pigs, 

named Fidel and Raul. The Cuban regime is accusing El Sexto of ‘‘disrespect’’ and 

he has been sent to the Valle Grande prison to await trial. Thus, Cuba is clearly 

refilling its jails to continue using political prisoners as pawns. 

♦ Does the administration believes that the Cuban Government will stop detaining and imprisoning those who advocate for freedom and democracy? 

♦ If not, why did the administration encourage them to continue taking more 

political prisoners as pawns by succumbing to the regime’s coercion? 

♦ A/S Malinowski, the President has signed into law sanctions imposed on human 

rights abusers in Venezuela and we have human rights sanctions against other 

rogue regimes around the world. Would it be appropriate to impose sanctions 

on Cuban officials involved in human rights abuses? If not, why? 

♦ Why did your delegation to the recent normalization talks not include A/S 

Malinowski or someone from his bureau? 

♦ Does the administration plan to raise human rights in any sustained and direct 

way with Cuba in the months to come? 

♦ How will you implement your public commitment to not abandon the Cuban 

opposition when the regime has expressed disapproval of a simple breakfast you 

shared with some of the democratic leaders, and the regime snubbed CODEL 

Leahy because it met with dissidents on its recent trip to Cuba? 

♦ Josefina Vidal says the dissidents do not represent Cuban society. Do you 

agree? 

Answer. The United States is committed to promoting universal human rights 

and democratic reforms in Cuba. We condemn any example of Cuban Governmentsponsored harassment, use of violence, or arbitrary detention of Cuban citizens 

peaceably expressing their views. We continue to call on the Cuban Government to 

end these practices. We have no illusions the Cuban Government will change its behavior overnight. We believe reestablishing diplomatic relations will help remove a 

pretext the Cuban Government has used, for many years, to successfully counter 

pressure from the Cuban people for more freedom, access to information, economic 

prosperity, and other legitimate demands. We encourage all Members of Congress 

to engage all Cubans, including those who may have significant differences with 

their government. 

We expect that Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 

Malinowski will lead the U.S. delegation to the planned bilateral dialogue on human 

rights. Our objective in such talks will be to advance an agenda of specific reforms 

that will bring about concrete improvements consistent with applicable international 

human rights commitments. Regarding targeted sanctions, we are willing to consider those tools that we deem most effective for achieving our national interests. 

Question. Even as you were negotiating in secret with the Cuban regime, that regime stepped up its repression and incarceration of peaceful pro-democracy activists. 

Your Cuban interlocutors have yet to allow an international investigation into the 

murders, at the hands of the Cuban regime, of Oswaldo Paya and Harold Cepero, 

which the Cuban regime has prevented from taking place. By not investigating this 

tragedy, and by not requiring that the Cuban regime allow for such an investigation, we are sending a signal that they can enjoy impunity for these murders, and 

we are endangering the lives of every single pro-democracy activist on the island, 

who tell us that they are at the mercy of that lawless regime. 

♦ Will you pledge to require the regime to allow these international investigations 

to take place, as well as investigations into the mysterious deaths of Laura 

Pollan, founder of the Ladies in White, and Orlando Zapata Tamayo, among 

many other innocent victims of that regime, as pre-conditions for normalization 

of relations with the United States? 

Answer. We have the greatest respect for all democracy activists in Cuba who are 

working to create a better future for the Cuban people. Furthermore, we continue 

70 

to call for an independent and credible investigation into the deaths of Oswaldo 

Paya and Harold Cepero, including giving the Paya family access to the autopsy 

report. An independent investigation would help address concerns about lack of 

transparency and possible involvement of Cuban security officials in their deaths. 

Our policy of engagement and empowerment of the Cuban people is better positioned to help Cubans to develop, over the long term, an independent judicial system that could address in a transparent, impartial manner cases like the ones you 

raise. 

Question. The administration has couched many of its changes in U.S. travel, 

banking, and trade with Cuba as part of an effort to empower the supposed Cuban 

‘‘private sector’’ and ‘‘microentrepreneurs.’’ 

♦ What is the administration’s definition of the ‘‘private sector’’ in Cuba? 

♦ Will it define enterprises run by the Cuban military or operated by the offspring 

of Cuban regime officials to be the ‘‘private sector’’? 

♦ Will it define entities owned by the Cuban Government, but operated by an 

individual with a ‘‘self-employment’’ license to be the ‘‘private sector’’? 

Answer. The policy changes announced December 17, 2014, which build on President Obama’s 2009 and 2011 Cuba policy changes, create new opportunities for 

Cuba’s nascent private sector. These measures are intended to support the ability 

of the Cuban people to gain greater control over their own lives and freely determine their country’s future. 

We consider the private sector in Cuba to encompass economic activity generated 

by private individuals and enterprises for profit as well as nonprofit organizations 

and charities. For example, Cubans who are self-employed, own independent small 

businesses, or form private cooperatives that are not part of Cuba’s state sector are 

included in this category. We do not consider entities owned or operated, in whole 

or in part, by the Cuban Government or military to be part of the private sector. 

Question. Article 18 of the Cuban Constitution states that all foreign trade and 

commerce must be owned and operated by the state. 

♦ How are U.S. exports to benefit the Cuban people if they must all be funneled 

through the state? 

♦ Do you believe the Cuban Government will provide the Cuban people access to 

these goods? 

♦ Did the Cuban regime share the billions worth of goods from the former Soviet 

Union and Venezuela with the Cuban people? 

♦ Why would it act differently now? 

Answer. U.S. exports in authorized areas will benefit the Cuban people. For example, while Cuban Government import agencies and other government owned, operated, or controlled companies and corporations may act as consignees to receive and 

effect delivery of certain eligible items to the private sector, the Cuban Government 

may not be the end user of such items. U.S. exporters would be subject to civil and/ 

or criminal penalties if they were to export, with prior knowledge, ineligible items 

to Cuban Government end users. The Department of Commerce’s new license exception ‘‘Support for the Cuban People (SCP)’’ would not apply to items exported to 

Cuban Government end users, except in the area of telecommunications. Similarly, 

consumer communications devices may be sold to Cuban Government owned, operated, or controlled companies and corporations for resale to the Cuban people. 

While most U.S. exports to Cuba remain prohibited under the embargo, past practice under the Department of Commerce’s licensing exception for agricultural products and the general policy of approval for medicines and medical devices similarly 

permitted Cuban Government entities to import and effect delivery of certain products to the benefit of the Cuban people. In these cases, the Cuban Government did 

provide the Cuban people access to these goods, per the terms and conditions of 

those export authorizations. The Department of Commerce will continue to investigate and take appropriate action against any U.S. exporters that violate the terms 

of their licenses or the Export Administration Regulations. 

Question. The administration has stated a desire to see Cuban residents have access to Internet. The Cuban Government is one of the most oppressive in the world 

and the rate of Internet penetration in Cuba is among the lowest in the world. The 

Internet in Cuba is controlled by a state monopoly, ETECSA. This monopoly has 

clearly shown that the only obstacle to connectivity is the regime’s unwillingness to 

do so. Despite the new fiber optic cables (Venezuela and Jamaica) and investments 

by foreign companies (Telecom Italia and Alcatel), ETECSA has yet to provide more 

access to the Cuban people. The only reason the Cuban people are unable to access 

the Internet is because the Castro regime won’t allow them to. 

71 

♦ What specific commitments has the administration obtained from the Cuban regime about how U.S.-provided telecommunications equipment will be utilized? 

♦ Has the Cuban regime pledged to allow unrestricted access to the Internet as 

a result of this change in U.S. policy? 

♦ If not, what makes you think that even more cables and investments will increase the Cuban people’s connectivity? 

♦ Did Telecom Italia help the Cuban people access the Internet through its investment in ETECSA? 

♦ Has France’s Alcatel-Lucent helped the Cuban people access the Internet? If 

not, why? 

♦ Is the administration willing to move forward with authorizing the provision of 

telecommunications infrastructure in Cuba without the guarantee that the 

Cuban people will have the ability to speak freely over that infrastructure? 

♦ Instead of providing telecommunications infrastructure in ways that will only 

enrich the Cuban regime, why not push for companies like Google to provide 

Internet connectivity via satellite or other programs that circumvent the 

regime? 

Answer. Unrestricted access to information through the Internet and other means 

is a U.S. priority in Cuba and around the world. The President announced in 

December our intention to facilitate telecommunication and Internet development 

and access in Cuba. In January, the Departments of Commerce and Treasury released amended regulations allowing U.S. companies to engage in more activities 

with Cuba to support better communications and access to information for the 

Cuban people. These regulatory changes respond directly to requests made to the 

administration by civil society to enable greater access to telecommunications equipment on the island. 

Internet access in Cuba remains extremely limited, in large part, because the 

Cuban Government has chosen not to offer its public widespread access to a highspeed fiber-optic cable from Venezuela. It is also true that U.S. sanctions made it 

difficult for U.S. telecom companies to engage with Cuba. While we cannot address 

what non-U.S. companies have done on the island, we are encouraging U.S. companies to consider the Cuban market and continuing to work to address their concerns. 

In addition, we will work with Cubans, including civil society actors, to promote uncensored Internet access. 

We are aware that efforts to facilitate access to uncensored information in Cuba 

have been, and will likely continue to be, opposed in various ways, including government censorship of the Internet. In those areas of the world where repressive governments have attempted to restrict Internet freedom, the U.S. Government has 

implemented programs to help promote such freedom. The U.S. Interests Section 

provides free, uncensored access through its Internet Resource Centers. 

The Cuban Government indicated it would like to develop communications and 

Internet on the island. We and our partners will encourage it to follow through. We 

proposed that Ambassador Daniel Sepulveda, U.S. Coordinator for International 

Communications and Information Policy, travel to Cuba to begin a dialogue on 

broadening telecommunications and Internet on the island with the objective of 

advancing unfettered Internet access for the Cuban people. We do not know if the 

Cuban Government will follow through on its stated intention of expanding Internet 

access in Cuba, but we want to be clear that we support and are doing all we can 

to facilitate that access. 

Question. The Cuban regime has been contracting monitoring technologies 

through state-entities, Albet, Xetid, and Datys. These companies have obtained 

lucrative contracts and operate in Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, and 

Nicaragua. 

♦ Why are they able to export software and technology, but not provide basic 

connectivity to their people? 

Answer. Internet access in Cuba is expensive, of very poor quality, and available 

to a small number of people due to deliberate choices of the Cuban Government 

which, among other things, has chosen not to offer its citizens widespread access 

to a high speed fiber-optic cable from Venezuela. It is revealing that Cuba both limits its citizens’ access to the Internet and devotes resources to developing monitoring 

technologies. 

Unrestricted access to information through the Internet and other means is a U.S. 

priority in Cuba and around the world. The United States supports greater 

connectivity for the Cuban people. In January, the Department of Treasury promulgated regulatory changes authorizing transactions incidental to telecommunications 

and Internet linkages between the United States and Cuba, including telecommunications facilities in Cuba under an OFAC general license, as opposed to the more 

72 

restrictive specific license. Under a Department of Commerce license exception, the 

export of items for Cuba’s telecom infrastructure is also permitted under certain 

conditions. Under new policies, U.S. companies may also make commercial sales of 

personal communication devices and software (e.g., telephones, computers, and 

Internet technology/applications) to Cuba, and can also send certain tools, equipment, and supplies to private enterprises in Cuba. These regulatory changes respond directly to requests made to the administration by civil society to enable 

greater access to telecommunications equipment on the island. 

We are encouraging U.S. companies to consider the Cuban market and continuing 

to work to address their concerns. We proposed that Ambassador Daniel Sepulveda, 

U.S. Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy, travel 

to Cuba to begin a dialogue on broadening telecommunications and Internet on the 

island with the objective of advancing unfettered Internet access for the Cuban people. In addition, we will work with Cubans, including civil society actors, to promote 

uncensored Internet access. This is an important part of our efforts to enhance and 

strengthen the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. 

Question. General Castro has launched a public diplomacy campaign with other 

Latin American countries defending his interests in normalizing relations with the 

United States. The administration said it wanted to remove ‘‘the Cuba distraction’’ 

in order to improve relations with the countries of the Western Hemisphere. 

♦ Can you provide a detailed administration strategy to capitalize on its Cuba policy shift as part of its diplomatic engagements in the Western Hemisphere? 

♦ In what specific ways do you expect countries in the Western Hemisphere to 

qualitatively modify their efforts to support political freedom in Cuba, especially 

in the runup to the April Summit of the Americas in Panama? 

♦ What specific commitments has the administration obtained from any government, anywhere in the world, to join the United States in support of greater 

political freedom in Cuba? 

Answer. As was the case before the administration’s change in policy toward 

Cuba, we will continue to engage our hemispheric partners intensively in an effort 

to promote human rights, prosperity, and democracy not only in Cuba, but throughout the region at every appropriate opportunity. We have reinforced with other 

countries in the hemisphere the importance of supporting genuine progress on 

human rights and democratic principles in Cuba as a means to advance meaningful 

and principled regional integration. Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor Malinowski carried this message to Bolivia during his attendance 

at the Presidential inauguration in January, as I did with numerous Foreign Ministers in Brazil at the Presidential inauguration, and indeed the Vice President did 

with heads of state as well. We will continue to engage regional partners at events 

including the Summit of the Americas and the associated Youth, Business, Civil 

Society, and Educators forums in April, the World Economic Forum for Latin America in April, the OAS General Assembly in June, and the Pathways to Prosperity 

Ministerial in October. We are confident our efforts will no longer be blunted by discussions of whether our own Cuba policy is effective. 

We cannot speculate on the diplomatic stance others will take going forward, but 

we have already seen indicators that with our Cuba policy more closely aligned with 

others in the hemisphere, we are in a much better position to seek cooperation from 

our partners both in the Americas and elsewhere. 

Announcing our new policy in December, the President said, ‘‘Through these 

changes, we intend to . . . begin a new chapter among the nations of the Americas.’’ 

The response from partners throughout the region and around the globe has been 

overwhelmingly positive. We are already seeing signs that the updated approach 

will give us a greater ability to engage other nations in the hemisphere and around 

the world to join us in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. Canada, our closest ally and neighbor, said ‘‘the more American values and American capital that are permitted into Cuba, the freer the Cuban people 

will be.’’ The common reaction from leaders at the Brazilian inauguration was that 

the President’s announcement was historic, and changed the nature of U.S.-Latin 

American relations for the better. Many leaders offered strong support and their assistance in advancing our common objectives. The same was heard at the Bolivian 

President’s inauguration, underscoring that the time had come to encourage Cuba 

to do its part. The OAS, along with the Inter-American Commission on Human 

Rights, also expressed support for the updated approach the President announced. 

We appreciate these statements, and look to continued support from the entire 

Inter-American system and community as we implement these historic changes and 

continue to promote democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. 

73 

Question. We are nearing the 1-year anniversary of the political protests in Venezuela and the jailing of opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez. President Obama signed 

the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 on December 

18. 

♦ Why has the administration not yet imposed the financial sanctions authorized 

under the act? 

♦ Now that the administration is engaging the Castro regime, do you plan to pressure the Cuban regime to end its support for the Maduro government and its 

involvement in the ongoing repression of the Venezuelan people? 

Answer. We are expeditiously working with the National Security Council, the 

Department of the Treasury, and other relevant agencies to implement the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014. Fully implementing 

this law is a complex undertaking. A determination to sanction someone under this 

law must be supported by credible information and meet certain legal thresholds. 

Separate from requirements outlined in the sanctions law, the Department took 

steps in February to impose visa restrictions against individuals believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, human rights abuses and public corruption pursuant 

to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. These actions may 

also affect family members of some of these individuals. We will not publicly identify 

these individuals because of U.S. visa confidentiality laws, but we are sending a 

strong message that human rights abusers, those who profit from public corruption, 

and their families are not welcome in the United States. 

We continue to call on the Venezuelan Government to release Leopoldo Lopez, 

Mayor Daniel Ceballos, and others it has unjustly jailed and to improve the climate 

of respect for human rights and democratic norms. We firmly believe the enjoyment 

of fundamental freedoms, such as the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, 

is essential to a functioning democracy and Venezuela must protect these fundamental freedoms. 

In our engagement with countries throughout the region, including Cuba, we 

press governments to live up to the hemisphere’s shared commitment to democracy 

and convey our view that Venezuela is falling short of what is articulated in the 

OAS Charter, the Inter American Democratic Charter, and other fundamental instruments related to democracy and human rights. 

Question. Almost 2 months ago, the United States transferred six detainees from 

Guantanamo Bay to Uruguay. The President of Uruguay has downplayed the backgrounds of these men, raising concerns about how seriously Uruguay takes its 

responsibility to ensure they don’t return to the fight. I have been asking for our 

agreement with the Government of Uruguay governing their acceptance of these 

detainees for several weeks now but the Department has been unresponsive. 

♦ Will you make this document available to interested Members of Congress, especially in light of the news that members of the so-called ‘‘Taliban Five’’ are 

attempting to circumvent the restrictions imposed on them? 

Answer. The Department has consistently informed Congress, and represented to 

U.S. courts, that disclosing foreign government assurances pertaining to Guantanamo detainee transfers outside limited channels within the executive branch would 

likely have a chilling effect on the U.S. Government’s ability to negotiate detainee 

transfers and the willingness of foreign governments to continue cooperating on 

these sensitive matters. As required by the NDAA, each detainee transfer notification letter sent to Congress provides a description of the arrangements to be implemented. 

Responses of Tomasz Malinowski to Questions 

Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio 

Question. It appears that the administration secured few, if any protections for 

the 53 political prisoners who were eventually released. 

♦ (a) A number of the released prisoners have been rearrested and harassed since 

their releases. What commitments did the Cuban regime make regarding treatment of prisoners after their release? 

♦ (b) In your long career working on human rights issues, is it standard for the 

release of political prisoners to be negotiated by the United States that does not 

result in complete freedom of movement and actions after their release? 

Answer. We condemn any conditions or restrictions placed on citizens who peacefully exercise their fundamental freedoms, whether they are recently released political prisoners or not. Neither these 53 individuals, nor other Cubans, should be subVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
74 

jected to harassment, arrest, or violence for simply exercising their universal human 

rights. 

We have no illusions the Cuban Government will change its behavior simply 

because of our new policy approach. The purpose of our new approach is to better 

equip us and Cuban independent civil society to press the Cuban Government for 

real change. We are constantly monitoring reports of arrests of human rights 

defenders. I also said in my statement that we will spare no effort to ensure that 

everyone still detained for simply exercising their rights to freedoms of expression, 

association, or peaceful assembly is free, not just from prison but from harassment, 

threats, and restrictions on their movement and their work. 

When discussing prisoners of concern with repressive governments, we always 

push for full freedom of movement and actions, but those governments often do not 

fulfill that request. In Burma, for example, after the administration succeeded in 

obtaining the release of hundreds of political prisoners, it took months of more work 

for the Burmese Government to issue them passports; and most were released under 

a rule that allowed the government to put them back in jail at any time to finish 

their original sentence if they did anything out of line. Indeed, no one released from 

prison, or any person for that matter, in a country that is not free has complete 

freedom of movement and action. Our goal is to get dissidents out of prison, then 

push for the next step, and the next one after that. 

We will continue to raise prisoners of concern and object to any conditions 

attached to release, and we look forward to working with you and your committee 

to press for the release of all political prisoners in a Cuba that respects human 

rights. 

Question. The Cuban regime has yet to follow through on the other supposed 

human rights concessions—visits by ICRC and U.N. agencies. 

♦ (a) How many ICRC or U.N. visits have occurred, to Cuba, since December 17 

to discuss human rights? 

♦ (b) If none, when will the first visits occur? 

♦ (c) Which prisons will the ICRC be able to visit? 

♦ (d) We have been told by several of the relevant U.N. agencies that in the wake 

of the President’s announcement in December, they engaged the Cuban regime 

and were told that they were not able to visit the island. Can you explain why 

the administration would herald this as a Cuban concession when the Cubans 

appear to deny any agreement on this issue? 

Answer. The Cuban Government agreed to talk to the U.N. and other international organizations. They have not yet agreed to allow them to do all of the 

important work in Cuba we would like to see them carry out on human rights. So 

we need to work to take advantage of this development. The administration, including Assistant Secretary Jacobson during her January 22 visit to Cuba, has urged 

the Cuban Government to provide access to the U.N. and other international organizations. We have urged others to also press them in this regard. We will continue 

to press for greater access—and for the Cuban Government to live up to Raul Castro’s statement that ‘‘Cuba reiterates its willingness to cooperate in multilateral 

bodies, such as the United Nations.’’ 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Internet in Cuba Only for the Rich—or Resourceful, by 

Alexandre Grosbois, AFP, Business Insider 

HAVANA (AFP).—With smartphones and tablet computers, they look much like 

young people anywhere, but Cubans have to go to extremes just to get an Internet 

connection and somehow get around the strict control of the Communist authorities. 

In the capital Havana, clusters of young Cubans can be spotted at weekends in 

groups near hotels, embassies, and business centers in a desperate attempt to get 

online—somehow. 

‘‘Some people capture wireless signals after getting the codes from friends who 

work here, but I know there are others who manage to crack passwords with special 

software,’’ one computer enthusiast said, speaking on condition of anonymity at the 

foot of an office block. 

Lurking down a small street abutting a hotel, another strategy is at work. Several 

youngsters tap away furiously on their devices—they are online thanks to a shared 

connection courtesy of a classmate posted at hotel reception. 

Suffice it to say that in Cuba, wireless signals—or failing that, any Internet connection—are highly coveted. 

75 

They are under strict control, reserved for companies, universities, and institutions. A privileged few—journalists, artists, and doctors, in particular—are entitled 

to a particular connection. And that’s it. 

PROHIBITIVE PRICES

In 2013, only 3.4 percent of Cuban households were connected to the Internet, 

according to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which rates the 

connectivity of countries. 

Since June last year, the Cuban authorities have gone a small way to affording 

the island’s 11.3 million population a rare chance to access the Internet, opening 

about 100 centers for the public to get online. 

But at $4.5 per hour, rates are prohibitively expensive in a country where the 

average monthly wage is around $20. 

Previously, only hotels could offer the Internet to the public, but again with a prohibitive rate of up to $10 an hour that only foreign visitors could afford. 

The state telecommunications service provider, ETECSA, does not offer mobile 

Internet to its customers, while the 3G network is only for foreign visitors using 

roaming and offers often patchy performance. 

ETECSA has now allowed subscribers to access their mail from their 

smartphones, but it only applies to the domain @nauta.cu. The company has also 

opened a service to send pictures from phones to any email address. 

They are minor concessions in a country where foreign-branded smartphones are 

increasingly visible. 

‘‘AMONG MOST RESTRICTIVE’’ 

‘‘Cuba remains one of the most restrictive countries in the world in terms of Internet freedom,’’ Sanja Tatic Kelly, project director for Freedom on the Net, at the 

American NGO Freedom House, told AFP. 

‘‘Rather than relying on the technically sophisticated filtering and blocking used 

by other repressive regimes, the Cuban Government limits users’ access to information primarily via lack of technology and prohibitive costs,’’ she said. 

The Cuban authorities do censor certain websites—press and blogs that are 

against the Castro leadership, pornography, and Skype—but Tatic Kelly noted: ‘‘The 

total number of blocked websites is relatively small when compared to many other 

authoritarian states like China, Iran, or Saudi Arabia.’’ 

The more tech-savvy Cubans have found a way around that too, downloading software that can hide their IP addresses to avoid detection and mislead snooping eyes 

into thinking they are surfing the net in another country. 

For those who are less tech-smart, they can always rely on the ‘‘paquete’’—USB 

sticks packed with pirated films, TV shows, pop music, and games and sold on the 

black market for a few U.S. dollars. 

Cuba’s rulers say they need to keep a tight rein on the Internet to protect the 

island from cyberattacks. 

Over 18 months, Havana has been the victim of cyberattacks from thousands of 

addresses registered in over 150 countries, according to deputy minister of communications Wilfredo Gonzalez. 

That brooks no argument with Tatic Kelly. 

‘‘Cuba does not register as one of the leading countries experiencing cyberattacks,’’ 

she said, citing data from online security experts Kaspersky Lab, which ranks Cuba 

199th in terms of countries hit with counterattacks. 

At number one, the most targeted, is Russia, it says, with the United States third. 

U.S. Products Help Block Mideast Web, by Paul Sonne and Steve 

Stecklow, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 28, 2011 

As Middle East regimes try to stifle dissent by censoring the Internet, the U.S. 

faces an uncomfortable reality: American companies provide much of the technology 

used to block websites. 

McAfee Inc., acquired last month by Intel Corp., has provided content-filtering 

software used by Internet-service providers in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, 

according to interviews with buyers and a regional reseller. Blue Coat Systems Inc. 

of Sunnyvale, Calif., has sold hardware and technology in Bahrain, the United Arab 

Emirates and Qatar that has been used in conjunction with McAfee’s Web-filtering 

software and sometimes to block websites on its own, according to interviews with 

people working at or with ISPs in the region. 

76 

A regulator in Bahrain, which uses McAfee’s SmartFilter product, says the government is planning to switch soon to technology from U.S.-based Palo Alto Networks Inc. It promises to give Bahrain more blocking options and make it harder 

for people to circumvent censoring. 

Netsweeper Inc. of Canada has landed deals in the UAE, Qatar and Yemen, 

according to a company document. 

Websense Inc. of San Diego, Calif., has a policy that states it ‘‘does not sell to 

governments or Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that are engaged in governmentimposed censorship.’’ But it has sold its Web-filtering technology in Yemen, where 

it has been used to block online tools that let people disguise their identities from 

government monitors, according to Harvard University and University of Toronto 

researchers. 

Websense’s general counsel said in a 2009 statement about the incident: ‘‘On rare 

occasion things can slip through the cracks.’’ 

Web-filtering technology has roots in the 1990s, when U.S. companies, schools and 

libraries sought to prevent people from surfing porn, among other things. 

Today, that U.S. technology is now among the tools used in the clampdowns on 

uprisings across the Middle East. In Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and elsewhere, bloggers 

have been jailed and even beaten as governments try to repress online expression. 

In Bahrain, Nabeel Rajab, head of the banned Bahrain Human Rights Center, 

which runs a website the government blocks, says he was briefly thrown in a car 

and roughed up after authorities raided his house last week. The men threatened 

him with a pipe, he says, and slapped him when he refused to say he loved Bahrain’s king and prime minister. 

For the U.S., the role of Western companies in Internet censorship poses a 

dilemma. In a speech last year, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said, 

‘‘Censorship should not be in any way accepted by any company from anywhere. 

And in America, American companies need to take a principled stand.’’ Lately the State Department has spent more than $20 million to fund software 

and technologies that help people in the Middle East circumvent Internet censorship 

that is sustained by Western technology. 

Asked about that policy, a senior State Department official said the U.S. is responding to ‘‘a problem caused by governments abusing U.S. products.’’ When governments repurpose U.S.-made tools ‘‘to filter for political purposes, we are involved 

in producing and distributing software to get around those efforts.’’ 

A Bahrain official defended censorship. ‘‘The culture that we have in the Middle 

East is much more conservative than in the U.S.,’’ says Ahmed Aldoseri, director 

of information and communication technologies at the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. 

Freedom of speech is guaranteed in Bahrain, Mr. Aldoseri says, ‘‘as long as it 

remains within general politeness.’’ 

Makers of Web-filtering technology say they can’t control how customers use their 

products. ‘‘You can add additional websites to the block list,’’ says Joris Evers, a 

McAfee spokesman. ‘‘Obviously what an individual customer would do with a product once they acquire it is beyond our control.’’ A spokesman for Blue Coat made 

similar points. 

There are no special export restrictions on Web-filtering technology. Anti-censorship advocates say there needs to be a way for companies to track how their filtering software is used. 

‘‘They could build into the software something that signals and, in fact, sends 

back to them exactly what kind of filtering is taking place,’’ says Jonathan Zittrain, 

a professor of law and computer science at Harvard Law School. ‘‘There’s no rocket 

science there, it’s just their customer wouldn’t like it.’’ 

Web-blocking companies declined to name their Middle Eastern customers, but 

The Wall Street Journal identified a number of them through interviews with ISPs, 

a reseller and former employees. In addition, OpenNet Initiative, made up of Harvard and University of Toronto researchers who study Internet filtering, identified 

three ISPs in Yemen, Qatar, and the UAE that were using Netsweeper in January. 

ISPs provide Internet access to households and companies. 

A Netsweeper official said the company doesn’t comment on its clients. 

According to a forthcoming report from OpenNet, ISPs in at least nine Middle 

East and North African countries have used ‘‘Western-made tools for the purpose 

of blocking social and political content, effectively blocking a total of over 20 million 

Internet users from accessing such websites.’’ 

Employees at ISPs in the Middle East said in interviews that government ministries give them databases of Internet addresses, including, at times, antigovernment sites, for blocking and that they must comply. The number of requests varies 

by country. 

77 

Mishary Al-Faris, quality assurance manager at Qualitynet in Kuwait, says his 

ISP, which uses SmartFilter, receives several requests a year from the government 

to block content deemed religiously offensive. ‘‘It’s kind of a gentlemanly understanding: ’We’re going to honor your requests,’’’ he says. 

Web filtering isn’t exclusively a tool of Internet censorship. As companies like 

McAfee, Blue Coat, and Netsweeper note, their technology can prevent youngsters 

from encountering pornography and protect ISPs from malicious cyber attacks. 

In recent years, American companies aggressively have sought new customers abroad.The global Web-security market, including filtering, was valued at $1.8 billion in 2010, according to Phil Hochmuth of market-research firm IDC. The Middle 

East and Africa accounted for about $46 million and is growing at about 16 percent 

a year, he says. 

China is considered the king of Web filtering, with its elaborate censorship system 

dubbed the ‘‘Great Firewall.’’ China’s technology remains unclear but its reach is 

vast: Local Chinese sites must be licensed and are required to remove any content 

the government deems objectionable. In addition, some major foreign sites, including 

Facebook, Twitter, and Google Inc.’s YouTube, have been blocked for more than a 

year. 

Middle East Web blocking has some differences. Government licenses for websites 

typically aren’t required. Another difference: In the Middle East the ISP will generally show an explicit notice saying a site has been blocked, whereas in China it 

is often unclear why a site becomes inaccessible. 

Blocking websites can be done with hardware, specialized software or a combination of the two. On a basic level, Web filtering works this way: First, a list is built 

that groups websites into categories such as ‘‘gambling,’’ ‘‘dating’’ or ‘‘violence.’’ 

Netsweeper says it has categorized more than 3.8 billion Web addresses and adds 

15 million a day. Then, a user of the software can use that list to block access to 

specific sites or categories. 

Companies like Websense and Netsweeper can now scan and categorize the 

content of an uncategorized page in real time. They can also block pieces of a site, 

rather than whole pages, if only a certain image or text is considered objectionable. 

The use of filtering to block websites could be seen this month in Bahrain, where 

a group of mostly Shia protesters took aim at the country’s Sunni ruling family and 

met a violent crackdown. Batelco, Bahrain’s main ISP, filters the Web using McAfee 

SmartFilter software and Blue Coat technology, according to Ali AbuRomman, who 

works on the network team. He says the government regularly uploads lists of 

websites to block, including some political sites, to the country’s ISPs. 

In a test on a Batelco connection in Bahrain in recent days, The Wall Street Journal found that online-community forums for Shia villages and the websites of at 

least two human-rights groups were censored. 

‘‘Site blocked,’’ the screen read in English and Arabic when a Journal reporter 

tried to view the sites. ‘‘This website has been blocked for violating regulations and 

laws of Kingdom of Bahrain.’’ 

Since 2009, Bahrain has had the power to order the blocking of websites for 

‘‘transgressing local values and impairing national unity,’’ according to the U.S. 

State Department. 

Also blocked during the Journal test was Malkiya.net, a news site and discussion 

forum for Malkiya, a mostly Shia fishing town that has seen antigovernment protests in recent years. Its owner, Ali Mansoor Abbas, says the site also was blocked 

after it covered protests over the seizure of part of a local beach by a cousin of Bahrain’s king. 

Mr. Aldoseri, the Bahrainian telecom official, says his country plans to switch in 

the next few months from SmartFilter to technology from Palo Alto Networks. It 

can block activities within websites, like video or photo uploading, or Internet tools 

that let users bypass blocking altogether, which are illegal in Bahrain. 

Middle East Web filtering has sparked a cat-and-mouse game to outfox the censors. Website owners like Mr. Abbas of Malkiya.net sometimes create ‘‘mirror’’ sites, 

with slightly different names. 

Walid Al-Saqaf, a graduate student and former journalist from Yemen who now 

lives in Sweden, engineered his own circumvention tool after his news-aggregation 

site, YemenPortal.net, which included antigovernment content, was blocked by the 

country’s filters. Known as Alkasir, the Arabic word for ‘‘circumventor,’’ his free program has attracted at least 16,000 users in Yemen, China, Iran and elsewhere, he 

says. 

Two years ago, OpenNet Initiative researchers found that Yemen was using filtering software from Websense to block privacy tools. In response, the company said 

it stopped providing the ISPs involved with its latest website-block lists since the 

ISPs violated its anticensorship policy. 

78 

The new OpenNet report says Websense tools and services appeared to still be 

used in Yemen as recently as August. The company declined to comment. The report 

also found that in January, new filtering software was being used in Yemen from 

Canadian firm Netsweeper. 

‘‘Filtering decisions are made by the entity that decides to filter,’’ says Scott 

O’Neill, Netsweeper’s director of sales and marketing. ‘‘Much as Ford Motor Co. 

can’t decide how [its customers] are going to drive their cars.’’ 

An informational company document says telecom companies can use Netsweeper 

to ‘‘block inappropriate content using [a] pre-established list of 90+ categories to 

meet government rules and regulations—based on social, religious or political 

ideals.’’ 

Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Co., or Du, one of the UAE’s main ISPs, 

decided last year to switch to Netsweeper from the filtering system it had been 

using with Blue Coat devices, says Abul Hasan Jafery, a technical consultant who 

helped implement Netsweeper’s filtering system there. 

‘‘We block malware, alternative lifestyles, profanity,’’ says Mr. Jafery. ‘‘If something is offensive to the religion, we block it.’’ 

Until recently, Tunisia had some of the most pervasive Internet filtering in the 

world, according to OpenNet. Then, a January popular revolt forced the resignation 

of the country’s president—triggering the wave of protests that have spread across 

the Middle East. 

Tunisia has since pulled the plug on its Web-blocking gear. The new head of the 

Tunisian Internet Agency, Moez Chakchouk, says he was astounded when he 

recently visited a secured room at the state telephone company where the filtering 

equipment was kept. 

The room was full of unfamiliar gear, says the 36-year-old computer engineer, 

who took the job last month. ‘‘I don’t know’’ what it all does, he says. Mr. 

Chakchouk says the Interior Ministry controlled the filtering equipment since 2004, 

and the entire country’s Internet traffic flowed through it. 

For several years, according to Mr. Chakchouk, the Tunisian government used 

SmartFilter, which McAfee acquired in 2008. The McAfee spokesman confirmed the 

product has been sold in Tunisia, but declined to disclose its customers. 

For better or worse, says Mr. Chakchouk, part of the legacy of Tunisia’s former 

regime has been to leave Tunisia with some of the most sophisticated Internetfiltering equipment in the world. ‘‘I had a group of international experts from a 

group here lately, who looked at the equipment and said: ‘The Chinese could come 

here and learn from you.’ ’’ 

Cuba’s $6B Debt to Americans for Seized Properties Hangs Over 

U.S. Talks, by Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, FoxNews, Jan. 27, 2015 

A $6 billion sticking point could create headaches for the U.S.-Cuba talks. 

Though concerns over human rights, press freedoms and U.S. fugitives living free 

on the island have dominated debate over the Obama administration’s negotiations 

on restoring diplomatic ties, the Castro regime also still owes Americans that eyepopping sum. 

The $6 billion figure represents the value of all the assets seized from thousands 

of U.S. citizens and businesses after the Cuban revolution in 1959. With the United 

States pressing forward on normalizing relations with the Communist country, some 

say the talks must resolve these claims. 

‘‘The administration has not provided details about how it will hold the Castro 

regime to account for the more than $6 billion in outstanding claims by American 

citizens and businesses for properties confiscated by the Castros,’’ Sen. Robert 

Menendez, D–Fla., top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote 

in a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry ahead of historic talks in Havana last 

week. 

Menendez urged the U.S. to ‘‘prioritize the interests of American citizens and 

businesses that have suffered at the hands of the Castro regime’’ before moving 

ahead with ‘‘additional economic and political concessions.’’ 

Beginning with Fidel Castro’s takeover of the Cuban Government in 1959, the 

Communist regime nationalized all of Cuba’s utilities and industry, and systematically confiscated private lands to redistribute—under state control—to the Cuban 

population. 

The mass seizure without proper compensation led in part to the U.S. trade 

embargo. 

Over nearly 6,000 claims by American citizens and corporations have been certified by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, totaling $1.9 billion. 

79 

Today, with interest and in today’s dollars, that amount is close to $6 billion. 

U.S. sugar, mineral, telephone and electric company losses were heavy. Oil refineries were taken from energy giants like Texaco and Exxon. Coca-Cola was forced 

to leave bottling plants behind. Goodyear and Firestone lost tire factories, and major 

chains like Hilton handed over once-profitable real estate for nothing in return. 

Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson, after leading the talks in Havana 

last week, did not mention the U.S. property claims at a press briefing. But a State 

Department spokesperson later told FoxNews.com the claims ‘‘were addressed’’ in 

the talks and ‘‘will be subject to future discussions.’’ 

In Dec. 18 remarks, Jacobson said, ‘‘registered claims against the Cuban government’’ would be part of the ‘‘conversation.’’ 

She also noted Cuban claims of monetary losses due to the 50-year-old U.S. 

embargo. 

‘‘We do not believe those things would be resolved before diplomatic relations 

would be restored, but we do believe that they would be part of the conversation,’’ 

she said. ‘‘So this is a process, and it will get started right away, but there’s no real 

timeline of knowing when each part of it will be completed.’’ 

The billions are owed, in part, to an array of major companies. 

U.S. banks ranging from First National City Bank (which became Citibank) to 

Chase Manhattan lost millions in assets. According to the list of claimants, the 

Brothers of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine even lost $7.8 million in real 

estate when they were expelled from the island. 

According to a government study commissioned in 2007, however, some 88 percent 

of the claimants are individual American property and asset owners, many of whom 

would probably like to see some sort of compensation out of the diplomatic dealmaking. 

‘‘I think this is a significant issue and it has more resonance today than it would 

have had 20 years ago,’’ as nationalization has seen a resurgence throughout Latin 

America in recent years, said Robert Muse, a Washington, DC, attorney who has 

represented corporate clients whose assets were seized. ‘‘You have to take seriously 

the notion that a government must support their companies when their [property] 

is expropriated. You have to have some consistency on that.’’ 

Experts who spoke to FoxNews.com agree that fully compensating everyone on the 

list would be a complicated, if not impossible, endeavor. 

First, the Cuban Government, even if it did agree in spirit to pay, probably would 

not be able to afford it. 

Some individual claimants may be long dead. Further, some of the original corporations no longer exist, thanks to mergers, buyouts, and bankruptcies over the 

years. 

Such is the case with the Cuban Electric Company, which has the largest claim— 

$267.6 million in corporate assets (1960 dollars). The company was part of the paper 

and pulp manufacturer, Boise Cascade Company (which also has a claim for $11.7 

million), at the time of the seizures. 

But Boise Cascade has since spun off and the part of it that held a subsidiary 

with a majority stake in Cuban Electric became Office Max—which later merged 

with Office Depot in 2013. Company officials reached by FoxNews.com had no comment on the original Cuban Electric claims. 

Muse and others, like Cuba analyst Elizabeth Newhouse at the Center for International Policy, say that companies that still have an active interest in getting compensated might agree to more creative terms—whether it be for less money, or tax 

breaks or other incentives on future investments if and when the U.S. embargo is 

lifted. 

‘‘My sense is that some corporations are more interested in having a leg up in 

any trade arrangements than they are in getting their money back,’’ Newhouse said. 

Thomas J. Herzfeld, who heads the 20-year-old Herzfeld Caribbean Basin Fund 

which trades shares of firms that would have an interest in Cuba if the embargo 

is lifted, said his life-long goal has been ‘‘to rebuild Cuba.’’ He has approached claimants about taking their claims in exchange for investment shares. He said his fund 

is ‘‘well-prepared’’ for when normalization resumes. 

But others warn about popping the corks too soon, particularly if the Castro regime is unwilling to take the compensation seriously. According to the HelmsBurton Act, which enforces the sanctions, the embargo cannot be lifted until there 

is ‘‘demonstrable progress underway’’ in compensating Americans for their lost property. (Congress also would have to vote to lift the embargo.) 

‘‘This is an issue where they are going to have to put their heads together and 

figure out how to resolve it,’’ Newhouse said. ‘‘I think everyone wants to see it 

resolved.’’ 

80 

Jacobson, at the close of last week’s opening talks, said there was some progress 

on opening up embassies, but there continue to be ‘‘areas of deep disagreement,’’ 

particularly on Cuban human rights and fugitives from U.S. justice in Cuba. 

‘‘Let me conclude,’’ said Jacobson, the highest-ranking U.S. diplomat to visit Cuba 

in more than three decades, ‘‘it was just a first step. 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Dec. 17: A Day of Triumph for Cuban Americans, by Ric Herrero, 

op-ed from the Miami Herald, Dec. 29, 2014 

The most damaging legacy of the Helms-Burton Act is not that it codified the bulk 

of U.S. sanctions into law, but that it codified the way we are supposed to think 

about solving the Cuban puzzle. It zapped our creativity and told us we must consider only one zero-sum, all-or-nothing course of action to foster change in Cuba— 

a course that never had a serious chance of succeeding. 

Far worse, it codified our identity as victims. It denied us the freedom to take 

credit for the ground we’ve gained until the day the Castros are driven from power 

and there is a functional democracy in Cuba. It blinded us to the series of small 

victories that freedom advocates have won in Cuba over the past five years, and 

from recognizing the historic victory that the Cuban-American community won on 

Dec. 17. 

Cuban Americans played a key role in the negotiations 

Some claim that Cubans and Cuban Americans were left out of the negotiations 

between our two countries. While I can’t speak for what may have transpired in 

Havana, on the American side, that is not true. Over the better part of the last two 

years, Obama administration officials sought out the advice of prominent CubanAmerican professional, civic and religious leaders on how to best chart a new course 

on Cuba policy. These talks often included members of distinguished organizations 

such as the Cuba Study Group, Roots of Hope, the Cuban American National Foundation and our own #CubaNow. 

A priority for the White House was that any new measures had to advance the 

cause of human rights in Cuba. To that end, they started meeting with visiting 

Cuban opposition leaders, including Yoani Sanchez and Berta Soler, shortly after 

the Cuban government reformed its migratory policy in February 2013. 

From the beginning it was clear that these officials understood something we all 

knew, but many refused to accept: Our policy wasn’t working. They were particularly receptive to calls for a new approach that advanced three objectives: empower 

the Cuban people so they could become the authors of their own destinies; place the 

right kind of pressure on the Cuban government to improve human-rights conditions; and promote the interests of the United States in the region. 

Those Cuban Americans and visiting Cubans who shared creative and constructive ideas during these talks saw their recommendations reflected to varying 

degrees in the policy changes. Those who called for more of the same received less 

attention. Perhaps if Sens. Marco Rubio and Robert Menendez had spent less time 

defending a failed ‘‘moral’’ policy and more time working with the President to 

develop an effective moral policy, they might have held more sway over the outcome. 

The Cuban government did not set the terms of the prisoner swap 

Others are complaining that the United States allowed the Cuban regime to set 

the terms of the negotiations and received nothing in return. Again, this is wrong. 

For years the Cubans called for a three-for-one prisoner swap as the only option, 

and the United States repeatedly rejected it. This was largely because of pressure 

from the Cuban-American community. While the rest of the country seemed accepting of a three-for-one, our community wouldn’t settle. Some of us instead called for 

a more creative approach, one that went beyond the fates of Alan Gross and the 

Cuban Three—one that called for a larger bargain that would place us on the road 

to better relations. There are more than 50 years of unresolved conflicts, grievances 

and restrictions between our two nations. We said, let’s put some of those on the 

table. 

In the end, the Cubans did not get the deal that they wanted. Instead, they 

agreed to release Gross, plus a CIA spy and 53 political prisoners. They also agreed 

to allow the International Red Cross and United Nations to monitor human rights 

inside the island and to re-establish diplomatic relations, something that must have 

rattled their hardliners as much as it did ours. Had it not been for the pressure 

exerted by Cuban Americans, it is quite possible that the United States might have 

opted for the easy swap to bring Gross home. 

81 

All eyes are now on Cuba 

What Dec. 17 has taught us is that as long as we are willing to recognize when 

something has failed and remain open to exploring new ways of promoting democratic values in Cuba, Cuban Americans will always have a seat at the table. 

It will be increasingly difficult for Havana to explain to the Cuban people—and 

to the rest of the world—why it must maintain or tighten its internal embargo now 

that the United States has opened up. 

Our job as a community is to be flexible, creative and, most of all, strategic. We 

have to explore the wealth of new opportunities presented by this era of diplomatic 

relations and expanded travel, trade and telecommunications flows to help empower 

Cubans. 

Every Cuban who is actively seeking to increase his or her autonomy—from artists and entrepreneurs, to religious groups and democracy advocates—deserves our 

help. As barriers continue to be lifted, let’s do more to contribute to their success. 

In the process, we do not have to trust Cuban officials to get them to take steps 

in the direction we’d like to see. But we must trust that they, too, want a better 

future for their children and that they can recognize a good deal when they see one. 

Our goal has been, and always will be, to facilitate peaceful changes that lead to 

a free and pluralistic Cuba. Let’s be smart about how we seize new opportunities 

to advance this goal. But by all means, let’s not give into despair and let’s shed the 

veil of victimhood, because small victory by small victory, the Cuban-American community is winning. 

Ric Herrero is executive director of #CubaNow. He lives in Miami. 

82 

83 

84 

85 

86 

87 

WHITE HOUSE LETTER REGARDING WHITE HOUSE STAFF

ATTENDANCE AT COMMITTEE HEARINGS

88 

89 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

90 

91 

92 

93 

94 

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY ALAN P. GROSS, U.S. CITIZEN

IMPRISONED IN CUBA FROM 2009 UNTIL 2014 

Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Boxer, and members of the subcommittee, I 

appreciate the opportunity to submit this brief statement for the record. As the 

members of the subcommittee know, I recently concluded 5 years of imprisonment 

in Cuba due to my participation in a USAID-sponsored program authorized and 

funded pursuant to the Helms-Burton Act. Prior to my incarceration, I spent more 

than 30 years in 54 countries working to bring about positive change through 

USAID and other development programs. Much of my work involved increasing the 

availability of information access to populations around the world. Indeed, this was 

the fundamental purpose of the project in Cuba for which I ultimately was forced 

to forfeit 5 years of my life. I fully support what the President is doing to meaningfully improve international relations, particularly with Cuba. My 5 years in Cuba 

did not deter me from wanting to bring about change through development and 

engagement. To the contrary, I believe more strongly than ever that the President’s 

decisive first steps need to be followed by congressional action ultimately repealing 

Helms-Burton and related statutes. 

I understand that this hearing is to focus on Cuba and human rights. In my opinion, access to information is itself a fundamental human right and is essential to 

empowering the Cuban people. 

It bears emphasis that all people are decisionmakers in various ways, even if their 

decision is to do nothing. Decisions are made, correctly or not, on knowledge and 

perceptions derived from information to which individuals have access. Access to 

information enables people to make better-informed decisions and to give informed 

consent. The accuracy of such decisions depends upon the availability of information, and the quality, timeliness, and cost of access to that information. Based on 

my experience, the citizens of Cuba could, and likely would, be more decisive if they 

had better access to information. Information is food for the brain; nothing can 

reach its full capabilities without food. Insufficient access to information is 

unhealthy for any citizenry and it materially impacts human rights issues on all 

levels. 

If access to information is considered a human right, the Govemment of Cuba’s 

legalization of access to the Internet in June of 2013 represented a step forward for 

Cubans in this regard. The Internet, that information highway, is one of the most 

impactful paths an individual can take in order to obtain and communicate information. 

It is probable that the Government of Cuba is finally recognizing that the intellectual and competitive capabilities of its population will be enhanced with less-restrictive practices involving information. It is probable that the Government of Cuba is 

beginning to understand that Cubans cannot compete in world markets without the 

same tools that nearly everyone who competes has at his or her disposal, and that 

Cuba must compete if it is to survive economically. 

By easing Internet restrictions, even if ever so slightly, the Cuban Government 

is beginning to show some new-found respect for the fundamental right of its people 

to access information, even if the Government does not necessarily like it. Reestablishing diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba is only a first step in 

reestablishing freedom of information for those who live on that island. However, 

it is an essential step. Why would anyone not want to take that step? 

LETTER SUBMITTED BY DAGOBERTO VALDES HERNANDEZ, 

DIRECTOR, CONVIVENCIA MAGAZINE

Esteemed Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the United 

States of America. Honorable Senators, my name is Dagoberto Valdes Hernandez 

and for more than 20 years I have led a Civic Education project to prepare citizens 

for democracy in Cuba. I am also the founder and editor of two magazines: Vitral 

and Convivencia (www.convivenciacuba.es). Currently, I live and work in Cuba. 

The purpose of this letter is to convey to you my opinion and that of the 

Convivencia project’s team regarding the current negotiations between the Governments of the United States and Cuba. 

1. Convivencia magazine welcomes the reestablishment of diplomatic relations 

between the Republic of Cuba and the United States of America. 

We hope that this climate of dialogue and negotiation would also be established 

between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and independent Cuban civil sociVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
95 

ety, respecting both unity and diversity, the right to self-determination, and the 

exercise of citizens’ sovereignty. 

2. Convivencia magazine is happy for the liberation of political prisoners and feels 

that all political prisoners should be freed, including those who are free on bail or 

parole in Cuba. 

Similarly, all acts of political repression must stop. The Cuban Government 

should ratify the U.N.’s Human Rights Treaties and the Conventions of the ILO, 

as outlined under the four consensus points identified by a growing and significant 

group of Cuban civil society. 

3. Convivencia magazine is grateful for His Holiness Pope Francis’ mediation 

efforts to reestablish diplomatic relations between the Republic of Cuba and the 

United States of America. 

4. Convivencia magazine believes that the reestablishment of diplomatic relations 

between the Republic of Cuba and the United States of America removes a serious 

obstacle so that the world can clearly see that the fundamental differences exist between the Cuban Government and its citizens, not between Cuba and the United 

States. That way, people will understand that the most important thing for our people is inclusion, civil, political, economic, social, and cultural liberties, and the exercise of an ever more participatory democracy in Cuba. 

5. Convivencia magazine also hopes that this historic milestone, and the lifting 

of all embargos—especially the one that the Cuban Government inflicts upon the 

initiative and entrepreneurial character of its citizens—creates the necessary conditions for the Cuban people to write their own history and that it can lead the entire 

nation, including our compatriots on the island and the diaspora, to a future of 

peace, liberty, progress, and social justice. 

I appreciate your attention to this important matter, and remain respectfully 

yours. 

CUBA-U.S. RELATIONS, NEO-CASTROISM, AND

REGIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM, BY ANTONIO G. RODILES

When the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989, many sociologists 

and analysts shared in the vision of the end of history. It appeared that liberal democracies would triumph over any other system that opposed the modernization of 

nations; 25 years later we see a different reality. 

After a period in which the number of democracies increased on a global scale, 

we have seen a revival of authoritarianism, with some market freedoms, particularly in Latin America. It is not a return to crude military dictatorship, but it is 

a return to the structures that subject fundamental rights and freedoms to the interests of strongmen and populist groups. 

The argument that certain economic freedoms always allow for the development 

of civil and political liberties is false. The use of state institutions to dismantle 

democratic mechanisms has become a very useful and effective machinery. 

In this sense, the situation of Venezuela in our region is most alarming. Unfortunately, the mechanisms that have been tested there have become models for others. 

Electoral processes are now tools that are used to legitimize the power of these 

groups. The use of paramilitary members as a method of ensuring social control permits that the violation of fundamental rights and liberties have no legal consequences for the authorities. 

Furthermore, the formation of regional organizations such as ALBA and CELAC 

provide the necessary international support to said regimes to pressure democratic 

nations to accept these spurious democracies. 

The case of Cuba is very symbolic, as the regime in Havana managed to survive 

the collapse of the Communist bloc. Poor decisions made by the international community and a fragmented society allowed Fidel Castro to manipulate the situation 

and prevent the end of the dictatorship. One of these decisions, made by the Clinton 

administration, facilitated the drainage of all internal pressure through a mass exodus at a moment when Cubans demonstrated a clear sense of being fed up with the 

regime. The subsequent appearance of Hugo Chavez and his oil guaranteed the survival of the Castro regime for the next 15 years, amid a regional context more favorable to dictatorship. 

Twenty years later, Castroism dies. Neo-Castroism, which for some time now has 

been pressing for greater legitimacy, has found a path in President Barack Obama’s 

measures. The presumed family and political heirs of Castro begin to find the urgent legitimacy they need. 

96 

The outlook on the island is complex. The transition from totalitarianism to 

authoritarianism will have to muddle through an already miserable situation, a nation completely de-capitalized, growing social unrest, and widespread corruption. To 

sustain the transfer of power, they utilize repressive bodies trained in impunity, 

judicial power subject to State Security, structures that influence peddling, and social groups prostituted to political power. 

There are other warning signs, such as the significant increase in the human trafficking of Cubans through Mexico in coordination with organized crime, especially 

the Zetas narcotrafficking group. There is strong evidence of a possible connection 

between the Cuban military and intelligence services with a Venezuelan military involved in the growing drug trade. However, suspicions of this link begin to appear, 

above all, due to the great influence that the former group has over these military 

institutions. 

The opposition on the island and in exile has to prevent that the regime achieves 

a transfer of power. Our work is focused on seeking a democratic transition and the 

establishment of the rule of law in the midst of a very complex external and internal 

environment. Internally, we confront a regime that enjoys full impunity in abusing 

its population. Externally, we are in a situation where democratic principles have 

taken a serious hit. 

In the international arena we have made some progress regarding the demand 

that the regime ratify and implement the United Nations’ Covenants on Human 

Rights, especially those on civil and political rights. Such ratification would oblige 

a change in key elements of the judicial and legal system prevailing on the island 

and that violate, even in writing, fundamental freedoms. This demand has already 

been heard by the European bloc that is presently working on a bilateral agreement 

with the regime. 

In the present context, the steps taken by President Obama are not wise and 

prove very dangerous. They grant legitimacy and additional resources to a regime 

that has shown ample capacity to adapt at crucial moments. For this reason we 

have expressed our disagreement with the lack of transparency, the unconditional 

character, and the ignoring of vital players both in the internal opposition and in 

exile during these discussions. 

A change of direction is fundamental in this political process; that concrete demands are made to the regime and that the process involves the active participation 

of indispensable leaders of the opposition. Recently, the ‘‘Forum for Rights and Freedoms’’ was created in Havana and brought together an important assembly of leaders and groups within the island and in exile, who demanded a Roadmap with seven 

points that we consider to be of vital importance. The logic of this document lies 

in the ratification and implementation of the Covenants on Human Rights of the 

United Nations. 

The upcoming Summit of the Americas in April will be a defining moment. Raul 

Castro expects to arrive with the support of all regional allies. His hopes are pinned 

on that President Barack Obama, in a second and symbolic handshake, provides 

him with the necessary support for the new authoritarian monstrosity that has its 

essential core based around his family and political descendants. 

We are convinced that the United States, with its global leadership in the promotion of democracy, will provide great support to those on the island and in exile 

who ask for real and measurable changes toward a true democracy. 

The future of the region will have much to do with the democratization or nondemocratization of Cuba. Prioritizing rights and fundamental freedoms, and promoting the idea that these are key elements in the structuring of our nations, is 

vital at this crucial moment in time. We are debating the next 20 or 30 years as 

a country and region. Taking steps toward the consolidation of Neo-Castroism implies tacit validation of authoritarianism as an alternative to democracy throughout 

the region. 

ATTACHMENT 

FORUM FOR RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

The announcements made by U.S. President Barack Obama and his administration have triggered an intense debate about the Cuban problem. Many of those in 

the opposition and activists from civil society, both inside the island and in exile, 

have lamented, above all, the lack of transparency and unilateral and unconditional 

character of the new measures announced. 

It is indisputable and indispensable that Cubans be primarily responsible for the 

fate of our nation, but we also expect an effective commitment from the democratic 

97 

community for the defense of fundamental freedoms and the establishment of the 

rule of law in Cuba. 

Those of us who experience the abuses of the Cuban regime daily and those in 

exile who suffer and have suffered from the totalitarianism in their home country, 

are vital players in the process of transition. Ignoring many of our voices and acting 

from only one perspective of the problem weakens objectivity and endangers any political dialogue. 

We are faced with two options. First, to accept the transformation of the regime 

to authoritarian capitalism where Cubans will have to settle for meager handouts, 

while the inheritors of Castroism dispose of our rights and wealth. Second, to demand concrete and measurable changes that are conducive to the establishment of 

a true democracy. 

The demand for the restoration of our freedoms is a necessary prerequisite for 

achieving a successful political transition. During these 56 long years of one-party 

dictatorship, activists and the opposition have repeatedly demanded the full exercise 

of freedoms inherent to human beings, often paying a high price for such claims. 

The violation of fundamental rights in our country is validated under the current 

legal system. We therefore believe that the ratification and particularly the legal implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on 

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with their optional protocols, serves as a key 

instrument and roadmap for solving the Cuban problem. Similarly, the guidelines 

of the International Labor Organization will provide us with an accurate idea of how 

to work on the legal system regarding labor issues and trade union freedoms. 

We hope that Latin American countries, the European Union, Canada, the Holy 

See and the United States, as important political actors in the Cuban issue, join us 

in this fair and urgent demand. We have used as a reference the association agreement signed between the EU and Central America in 2012, with a clear emphasis 

on respect for human rights and democracy promotion. 

Upon ratification of these agreements, we propose the following roadmap to ensure the effective and prompt implementation of the commitments made: 

• The immediate release and cancellation of sentences against all prisoners arrested for political reasons (to decree amnesty). • On the Constitution, laws, regulations, procedures and administrative practices: 

the abolition of all articles that violate the International Covenants and restrict 

liberties on freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, conscience 

and religion, economic and cultural rights. To establish full guarantees for the 

exercise of those freedoms. • On the Penal Code: the elimination of the clause of pre-criminal dangerousness, 

as well as all rules that can contribute to arrests, arbitrary detentions and acts 

of harassment that violate the agreements made. • The restoration of constitutional-level judicial guarantees and the right to due 

process. 

• New Law of Association that includes a multiparty system and guarantees for 

freedom of assembly. Concerning trade union rights, standards set by the International Labor Organization should be taken into account. 

• New Media Law guaranteeing freedom of expression and the free flow of information. 

• New Election Law (Restoration of National Sovereignty). 

We believe that every step should be conditioned on the progressive advance of 

the roadmap indicated above, sustained on the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights. 

Our ultimate goal is to move toward becoming a true democracy, with political 

pluralism, judicial independence, freedom and human rights. Where a Cuban, 

through consultations and a process of free and transparent elections, as well as the 

creation of a constitutional assembly, can define the destiny of our nation. 

All genuine actors of the opposition and civil society, through their projects and 

demands both on the island and in exile, must play an active role in any process 

that seeks a solution to the Cuban problem. At stake is the very future of the nation. We exercise this great responsibility which has fallen to us. 

Ada Maria Lopez Canino; Adelma Guerra; Adis Niria Dallet Arguelles; Adnaloy 

Rodriguez Diaz; Adonis Salgado Perez; Adrian Perez Mendoza; Agustin Lopez 

Canino; Aida Norma Roque; Aide Gallardo Salazar; Ailer Gonzalez Mena; Alberto 

Sanchez Martiatu; Alejandro Garcia Arias; Alejandro Raga; Alexander Perez 

Rodriguez; Alexis Jardines; Alexis Perez Lescailles; Alfredo Guillermo Rodriguez; 

Aliette Padron Antigua; Alina Brouwer; Alina de la C Garcia; Aliuska Gomez Garcia; Amelia Suarez Naranjo; Ana Maria Socarras Pinon; Ana Olema; Ana Torricella 

Morales; Anay Penalver Subit; Andres Perez Suarez; Angel De Fana; Angel Luis 

98 

Diaz; Angel Luis Martin; Angel Moya Acosta; Angel Santiesteban Prats; Anislay 

Escalona Polo; Antonio G. Rodiles; Antonio Jose Ponte; Arelis Blanco Coello; Arelis 

Rodriguez Silva; Ariadna Mena Rubio; Ariel Gonzalez Cuevas; Ariobel Castillo 

Villalba; Armando Abascal Serrano; Armando Peraza Hernandez; Barbara 

Rodriguez Vizcaino; Barbara Viera Rodriguez; Benito Fojaco Iser; Berta Soler 

Fernandez; Boris Larramendi; Camilo Ernesto Olivera Peidro; Caridad Ramirez; 

and Caridad Valdes Soriano. 

Carlos Lazaro Tamayo Frias; Carlos M Figueroa Alvarez; Carlos M Hernandez; 

Carlos Manuel Figueroa; Carlos Orlando Olivera Martinez; Carlos Rodriguez Seruto; 

Cecilia Guerra Alfonso; Cesar Reynel Gomez; Ciro Javier Diaz Penedo; Claudio 

Fuentes Madan; Cristina Xiomara Duques; Dairon Moises Torre Paz; Dairy Coello 

Basulto; Daisy Artiles del Sol; Damaris Reve Rodriguez; Damarys Moya Portieles; 

Damian Albert Suviaut; Danai Lopez Perdomo; Danaise Munos Lopez; Dandy Lazo; 

David Aguila Montero; Delises Gonzalez Borrego; Digna Rodriguez Ibanez; Duvier 

Blanco Acosta; Edely Orlando Suarez; Eduardo Gonzalez Molina; Eduardo Marcos 

Pacheco Ortiz; Egberto Angel Escobedo Morales; Elena Larrinaga; Elias Amor; 

Enrico M. Santi; Enrique del Risco; Enrique Diaz Rodriguez; Enrique Martinez 

Marin; Enrique Rafael Valido; Eralidis Frometa Polanco; Ernesto Fonseca Garcia; 

Ernesto Gutierrez; Ernesto Hernandez Busto; Esteban Ajetes Abascal; Eugenia Diaz 

Hernandez; Eugenio Hernandez Hernandez; Evelin Pineda Concepcion; Felix 

Navarro; Felix Perez Palenzuela; Francisco Rangel Manzano; Francisco Valido; 

Frank Calzon; Frank Cosme Valdes; Gisela Sanchez and Banos. 

Gladis Capote Roque; Gloria Samper Oliva; Gorki Aguila; Guillermo Farinas Hernandez; Guillermo Garcia V; Gustavo Garabito Gomez; Haymee Moya Montes de 

Oca; Hugo Damian Prieto Blanco; Igdariz Perez Ponciano; Ignacio Blanco Jimenez; 

Iris Quindelan; Ivan Founier Costa; Ivonne de las Mercedes Abreu; Jaime Suchlicki; 

Jaqueline Bone Hechevarria; Jaqueline Cutino Leite; Jeovani Diaz Lopez; Jeovany 

Jimenez Vega; Jesus Aristides Hernandez Perez; Joel Brito; Jordanca Borquinelis; 

Jorge Enrique Carbonell; Jorge Luis Artiles Montiel; Jorge Luis Garcia Ostia; Jorge 

Luis Romero Becerra; Jorge Luis Trujillo Gonzalez; Jorge Olivera Castillo; Jorge 

Rodriguez Rivero; Jose Agustin Benitez Lopez; Jose Alberto Gutierrez; Jose Azel; 

Jose Diaz Silva; Jose G. Ramon Castillo; Jose Hernandez Lopez; Jose Ignacio Brito; 

Jose Luis Leon Perez; Jose Ramon Polo Borges; Jose Raul Rodriguez Rangel; Juan 

Alberto de la Nuez Ramirez; Juan Antonio Blanco; Juan Carlos Linares Balmaseda; 

Juan Gonzalez Febles; Juan Manuel Lora Vidal; Julia Herrera Roque; Julio Aleaga 

Pesant; Julio Antonio Ramirez; Julio Herrera Roque; Julio Rojas Portal; Kessell 

Rodriguez Rodriguez; and Kirenia Molina. 

Laritza Olivares Dinza; Laudelina Alcalde Garcia; Laura Marante; Laura Marante 

Delgado; Lazara B. Sendina Recalde; Lazara M Borrego Guzman; Lazaro Diaz 

Sanchez; Lazaro Fresneda Fernandez; Lazaro Luis Ruiz Hechevarria; Lazaro Mendoza Garcia; Lazaro R Armenteros Martorel; Lazaro Yosvani Montesino; Lazaro 

Yuri Valle Roca; Leon Padron Azcuy; Lia-Lianelis Villares; Liset Naranjo; Lismeirys 

Quintana Avila; Liu Santiesteban; Livan Serafin; Lourdes Esquivel; Lucia Molina 

Villegas; Lucinda Gonzalez Gomez; Luis Alberto Cruz Silva; Luis Barbaro Ortega 

Avenza; Luis Cino Alvarez; Luis Enrique Labrador Diaz; Luis Jesus Gutierrez 

Campos; Luis Trapaga; Luisa R Toscano; Lupe Busto; Maikel Norton Cordero; 

Mailen Gonzalez Gonzalez; Manuel Aguirre Labarrere; Manuel Zayas Martinez; 

Marcelino Lorenzo Fernandez; Margarita Rodriguez Diaz; Maria Acon Sardinas; 

Maria cristina Labrada Varona; Maria Josefa Sardinas; Maria Rosa Rodriguez 

Molina; Marislaidys Sanchez Vargas; Maritza concepcion Salmiento; Mark Alonso 

Parada; Marta Belquis Rodriguez Gonzalez; Mayelin Pena Bullain; Mayelin 

Santiesteban Lopez; Maylin Gonzalez Gonzalez; Melvia Aguilera; Mercedes Perez; 

and Merenis Herry Garcia. 

Miguel Angel Tamayo Frias; Miguel Daniel Borroto Vazquez; Miguel Farinas 

Quey; Mijail Bonito; Mista Ricardo Torres; Nelson Rodriguez Chartrand; Nilo Gilbert Arencibia; Noelvis Leon Lopez; Normando Hernandez; Odelin Alfonso Torna; 

Olaida del Castillo Trujillo; Olga Lidia Torres Iglesias; Omar Suarez Campo; Orlando Rodriguez Rodriguez; Orlando Villar de Armas; Oscar Luis Milian Reinoso; 

Oslien Noda Fonseca; Osmal Laffita Rojas; Osmani Diaz Cristo; Oylin Hernandez 

Rodriguez; Paquito de Rivera; Paulino Estevez Jimenez; Pedro Fontanal Miranda; 

Pedro Roig; Quirenia Diaz Arguelles; Rachel Gamboa Campos; Rafael Hernandez 

Blanco; Rafael Rodriguez Rivero; Raisel Rodriguez Rivero; Ramon Alejandro Munoz 

Gonzalez; Ramon Jimenez Arencibia; Ramon Mor Hernandez; Ramon Zamoza 

Rodriguez; Raquel Maria Rodriguez Morejon; Raul Borges Alvarez; Regla Rios 

Casado; Reinaldo Figueros; Reinaldo Martinez; Ricardo Almira; Roberto Arsenio 

Lopez Ramos; Roberto Pupo Tejeda; Rogelio Fabio Hurtado Rodriguez; Rolando 

Ferrer Espinosa; Rolando Pulido; Rolando Reyes Rabanal; Rolando Rodriguez 

99 

Rivero; Ronny Gamez Luna; Rosalinda Visiedo Gomez; Roxilene Sotolongo Cruz; and 

Santiago Jordan Rios. 

Saul Gonzalez; Sebastian Arcos; Serafin Moran Santiago; Serafin Moran Santiago; 

Sergio Girat Estrada; Smith Cantillo Perez; Sodrelis Torruella Poncio; Sonia Alvarez 

Campello; Sonia Garro Alfonso; Stewe Maikel Pardo Valdez; Tamara Rodriguez 

Quesada; Ubaldo Herrero Hernandez; Vicente Campanioni; Vicente Sebastian 

Borges; Virgen Coello Basulto; Vladimir Ortiz Suarez; Vladimir Turru Paez; 

Xiomara de las M Cruz Miranda; Yadelys Montano Leon; Yaimel Rodriguez Arroyo; 

Yamile Borges Hurtado; Yamile Garro Alfonso; Yamile Naranjo; Yaneisi Herrera 

Cabrales; Yanisel Bosa Garrido; Yanitza Estrada Liranza; Yasil Fernandez Denis; 

Yasmani Barroso Bergolla; Yasmani Barroso Pergolla; Yasmani Cuesta Gonzalez; 

Yelky Paez Rodriguez; Yeniset Aguilera; Yoan Guzman Diaz; Yoisy Jaramillo 

Sanchez; Yolanda Santana Ayala; Yoraida Pena Padilla; Yosbani Arce Blanco; 

Yuleidis Ortiz; Yuliet Margarita Rodriguez Baez; Yulinne Tamayo Frias; Yuneisis 

Coto Casino; Yuniesqui Gainza; Yuniset Amores Aguilera; Yurineisi Aleman; 

Yurleani Tamayo Martinez; Yuslaidis Balero Concepcion; Zaqueo Baez Guerrero; 

Zenen Daniel Cruz; Zulema Lay; and Ivan Garcia Quintero. 

100 

INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS RESOLUTION N.6/2013, SUBMITTED

BY BERTA SOLER, PRESIDENT, CUBAN LADIES IN WHITE, CUBA

101 

102 

103 

104 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPORT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPORT ON 

HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN CHINA (2013) 

Executive Summary 

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitutionally is the paramount authority. CCP 

members hold almost all top government and security apparatus positions. Ultimate 

authority rests with the 25-member Political Bureau (Politburo) of the CCP and its 

seven-member Standing Committee. China completed its once-in-a-decade leadership transition in March, and Xi Jinping holds the three most powerful positions 

as CCP general secretary, state president, and chairman of the Central Military 

Commission. Civilian authorities generally maintained control of the military and 

internal security forces. Security forces committed human rights abuses. 

Repression and coercion, particularly against organizations and individuals involved in civil and political rights advocacy and public interest issues, ethnic minorities, and law firms that took on sensitive cases, were routine. Increasingly officials 

employed harassment, intimidation, and prosecution of family members and associates to retaliate against rights advocates and defenders. Individuals and groups 

seen as politically sensitive by authorities continued to face tight restrictions on 

their freedom to assemble, practice religion, and travel. Authorities resorted to extralegal measures such as enforced disappearance and strict house arrest, including 

house arrest of family members, to prevent public expression of independent opinions. Authorities implemented new measures to control and censor the internet and 

particularly targeted bloggers with large numbers of followers, leading some to close 

their online accounts. Public-interest law firms continued to face harassment, disbarment of legal staff, and closure. There was severe official repression of the freedoms of speech, religion, association, and assembly of ethnic Uighurs in the Xinjiang 

Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and of ethnic Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous 

Region (TAR) and other Tibetan areas. These minorities also faced harsh restrictions on movement. Abuses peaked around high-profile events, such as the visit of 

foreign officials, national meetings, and commemorations. 

As in previous years, citizens did not have the right to change their government, 

and citizens had limited forms of redress against official abuse. Other human rights 

problems during the year included extrajudicial killings, including executions without due process; enforced disappearance and incommunicado detention, including 

prolonged illegal detentions at unofficial holding facilities known as ‘‘black jails’’; 

torture and coerced confessions of prisoners; detention and harassment of lawyers, 

journalists, writers, bloggers, dissidents, petitioners, and others who sought to exercise peacefully their rights under the law; a lack of due process in judicial proVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRE Soler5.eps

S
105 

ceedings; political control of courts and judges; closed trials; the use of administrative detention; restrictions on freedom to assemble, practice religion, and travel; failure to protect refugees and asylum seekers; pressure on other countries to return 

PRC citizens forcibly; widespread corruption; intense scrutiny of and restrictions on 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); discrimination against women, minorities, 

and persons with disabilities; a coercive birth-limitation policy that in some cases 

resulted in forced abortion (sometimes at advanced stages of pregnancy) or forced 

sterilization; trafficking in persons; prohibitions on independent unions; lack of protection for workers’ right to strike; forced and child labor; and poor enforcement of 

wage, overtime, and occupational safety and health laws. 

Although authorities prosecuted a number of abuses of power, particularly with 

regard to corruption, in many cases the internal disciplinary procedures of the CCP 

were opaque and only selectively applied to senior officials. Citizens who promoted 

efforts to combat corruption were themselves detained and arrested. For example, 

throughout the year, NGO sources reported that authorities arrested at least 29 persons associated with the New Citizens Movement on charges stemming from activities to promote good governance. 

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 

from: 

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life 

During the year security forces reportedly committed arbitrary or unlawful 

killings. In many instances few or no details were available. 

It was not clear to what extent impunity was a problem. Following cases of 

killings by police, there often was an announcement that an investigation was to 

be conducted, but it was not clear whether there were any findings of police malfeasance or any cases in which police were disciplined. 

For example, on October 24, plainclothes police arrested Shanghai petitioner Shen 

Yong for trespassing and, according to media reports, beat him. Hours later police 

returned Shen to his family, and he died shortly thereafter. Shen’s family maintained he died as a result of the police beating. Police asserted he suddenly fell ill 

in their custody. Local media reported that the death was under investigation but 

by year’s end provided no further information. Authorities detained more than 100 

petitioners at a protest following Shen’s death. 

A number of violent incidents in the XUAR resulted in multiple deaths. Official 

accounts of these events generally blamed ‘‘terrorists,’’ ‘‘separatists,’’ and ‘‘religious 

extremists’’ for what were portrayed as violent terrorist attacks on community members and security personnel. Human rights organizations, on the other hand, asserted that security forces often shot at groups of Uighurs in their homes or during 

worship. The government’s control of information coming out of the XUAR, together 

with its increasingly tight security posture there, made it difficult to verify the conflicting reports. (See also the Tibet annex for violent incidents in the TAR and other 

Tibetan areas.) 

For example on April 24, at least 21 persons were killed in a clash in Barchuk 

County, XUAR: nine bystanders, six police, and six Uighurs (described in the official 

press as ‘‘thugs’’). According to the official account, gunfights broke out when police 

entered persons’ homes to search for ‘‘illegal knives.’’ 

In April, Yu Qiyi, a chief engineer at a state-owned enterprise in Wenzhou, died 

after being interrogated for corruption. Authorities arrested six CCP investigators 

and convicted them of intentional assault (see section 1.d.). 

Defendants in criminal proceedings were executed following convictions that 

lacked due process and adequate channels for appeal. 

b. Disappearance 

In September authorities detained Cao Shunli at Beijing Airport as she was attempting to travel to Geneva to attend a training session in advance of China’s Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council. Five weeks after her disappearance, authorities at the Chaoyang District Detention Center confirmed that 

Cao had been criminally detained on charges of unlawful assembly. According to 

various media reports, her family did not received a detention notice in accordance 

with the Criminal Procedure Law. 

At year’s end the government had not provided a comprehensive, credible accounting of all those killed, missing, or detained in connection with the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. It is estimated that fewer than a dozen 

remained in prison, although some accounts suggest the number may be higher. 

Many activists who were involved in the demonstrations continued to suffer from 

official harassment. 

106 

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 

The law prohibits the physical abuse of detainees and forbids prison guards from 

extracting confessions by torture, insulting prisoners’ dignity, and beating or encouraging others to beat prisoners. Amendments to the criminal procedure law that exclude evidence, including confessions, obtained through illegal means, including 

under torture in certain categories of criminal cases, took effect on January 1. 

Numerous former prisoners and detainees reported that they were beaten, subjected to electric shock, forced to sit on stools for hours on end, deprived of sleep, 

and otherwise subjected to physical and psychological abuse. Although ordinary 

prisoners were subjects of abuse, prison authorities singled out political and religious dissidents for particularly harsh treatment. In some instances close relatives 

of dissidents also were singled out for abuse. 

Human Rights Watch reported that police beat and tortured suspected prostitutes. 

According to news reports Xiao Yong, a Guangzhou-based activist detained by police in April 2012 and remanded to two years of re-education through labor (RTL) 

in Shaoyang, Hunan Province, was released in February and allowed to return to 

his home. Authorities charged him with illegal assembly for staging a demonstration 

calling on officials to disclose publicly their financial assets. During his initial detention authorities reportedly prevented Xiao from sleeping for up to five days, causing 

multiple medical complications. 

On May 18, police arrested a group of Fujian activists. Police held petitioner Lin 

Yingqiang for 33 hours, deprived him of food, and chained him to a ‘‘tiger seat,’’ a 

device meant to prevent the prisoner from sleeping during his detention. 

In May authorities in Sichuan Province detained and beat lawyers Tang Jitian 

and Jiang Tianyong as they attempted to visit a black jail in Ziyang that reportedly 

holds followers of the banned Falun Gong movement. 

On June 8, the Dongcheng District People’s Court tried Peng Lanlan in closed 

proceedings. The court’s decision was not available at year’s end. Beijing police arrested Peng in August 2012, charged him with obstructing official business, and tortured him by binding him to a tiger seat. 

There were widespread reports of activists and petitioners being committed to 

mental-health facilities and involuntarily subjected to psychiatric treatment for political reasons. According to Legal Daily (a state-owned newspaper covering legal affairs), the Ministry of Public Security directly administered 24 high-security psychiatric hospitals for the criminally insane (also known as ankang facilities). From 

1998 to May 2010, more than 40,000 persons were committed to ankang hospitals. 

In 2010 an official of the Ministry of Public Security stated that detention in ankang 

facilities was not appropriate for patients who did not demonstrate criminal behavior. Nonetheless, political activists, underground religious adherents, persons who 

repeatedly petitioned the government, members of the banned Chinese Democracy 

Party (CDP), and Falun Gong practitioners were among those housed in these institutions. 

In October 2012 the government passed legislation banning involuntary mental 

health examinations and inpatient treatment except in cases in which patients expressed an intent to harm themselves or others. Critics maintained, however, that 

the law still does not provide meaningful legal protections for persons sent to psychiatric facilities. The March 2012 amendments to the criminal procedure law require a procuratorate (the agency responsible for both prosecution and investigation) 

review and a court decision for the psychiatric commitment of persons who have 

committed serious offenses but are exempt from criminal responsibility under the 

law. The amendments went into effect in April and include a provision for appealing 

compulsory medical treatment decisions. 

On April 7, a new mainland China magazine Lens carried an article reporting 

abuses including torture with electric batons, forced feeding, and prolonged solitary 

confinement at the Masanjia Detention Center in Liaoning Province. 

Advocacy groups continued to report organ harvesting from prisoners. Former vice 

health minister Huang Jiefu, who in March 2012 reportedly pledged to abolish taking organs for transplant from executed prisoners within three to five years, stated 

that organs from executed prisoners accounted for 64 percent of transplants in 2012 

and for 54 percent in mid-2013. 

Prison and Detention Center Conditions 

Conditions in penal institutions for both political prisoners and criminal offenders 

were generally harsh and often degrading. 

107 

Forced labor remained a serious problem in penal institutions (see section 7.b.) 

as well as in RTL facilities. On December 28, the National People’s Congress (NPC) 

Standing Committee passed legislation that formally abolished the RTL system. 

State media announced that all inmates would be released beginning December 30 

and clarified that all pre-abolition penalties would be considered legitimate. On December 17, Amnesty International reported that authorities relabeled many RTL 

camps as ‘‘drug rehabilitation centers’’ and ‘‘legal education centers.’’ 

Physical Conditions: Prisoners and detainees were regularly held in overcrowded 

conditions with poor sanitation. Food often was inadequate and of poor quality, and 

many detainees relied on supplemental food, medicines, and warm clothing provided 

by relatives. Prisoners often reported sleeping on the floor because there were no 

beds or bedding. Adequate, timely medical care for prisoners remained a serious 

problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt medical 

treatment. 

Information on the prison population was not made public. In an April 2012 report to the NPC Standing Committee, the minister of justice stated that the country 

had 681 prisons with 1.64 million inmates. The International Center for Prison 

Studies (ICPS) reported that in 2009, in addition to sentenced prisoners, 650,000 

persons were held in detention centers, and it estimated there were between 

100,000 and 260,000 pretrial detainees. The ICPS reported that in mid-2010 female 

prisoners made up approximately 5.1 percent of the prison population, and in 2005 

juveniles made up 1.4 percent. The law requires juveniles be held separately from 

adults, unless facilities are insufficient, but children were sometimes held with 

adult prisoners and required to work. Political prisoners were held with the general 

prison population and reported being beaten by other prisoners at the instigation 

of guards. Some dissidents were not allowed to receive supplemental food, medicine, 

and warm clothing from relatives. 

The law mandates that a prison shall be ventilated, allow for natural light, and 

be clean and warm. The law further provides that a prison ‘‘shall set up medical, 

living, and sanitary facilities and institute regulations on the life and sanitation of 

prisoners.’’ It also states that the medical and health care of prisoners shall be put 

into the public health and epidemic prevention program of the area in which the 

prison is located. In many cases provisions for sanitation, ventilation, heating, lighting, basic and emergency medical care, and access to potable water were inadequate. 

Conditions in administrative detention facilities, such as RTL camps, were similar 

to those in prisons. Beating deaths occurred in administrative detention and RTL 

facilities. Detainees reported beatings, sexual assaults, lack of proper food, and limited or no access to medical care. 

Administration: It was unclear whether recordkeeping on prisoners was adequate. 

Authorities employed alternatives to incarceration for both violent and nonviolent 

offenders. According to Vice Minister of Justice Zhao Dacheng, more than one million convicts served their sentences in community corrections programs since 2003. 

There were no prison ombudsmen per se, but prisoners and detainees are legally 

entitled to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and request 

investigation of credible allegations of inhuman conditions. The law states that letters from a prisoner to higher authorities of the prison or to the judicial organs shall 

be free from examination, but it was unclear to what extent the law was implemented. While authorities occasionally investigated credible allegations of inhuman 

conditions, the results were not documented in a publicly accessible manner. Many 

prisoners and detainees did not have reasonable access to visitors and could not engage in religious practices. Under Article 52 of the prison law, ‘‘considerations shall 

be given to the special habits and customs of prisoners of minority ethnic groups.’’ 

Article 23 of the Detention Center Regulation has similar requirements. Little information was available about the implementation of these regulations. 

The law requires the government to investigate and monitor prison and detention 

center conditions, and an official from the Prosecutor’s Office is responsible for investigating and monitoring prison and detention center conditions. 

Independent Monitoring: Information about prisons, including associated labor 

camps and factories, was considered a state secret, and the government did not permit independent monitoring of prisons or RTL camps. Prisoners remained inaccessible to local and international human rights organizations and media groups. Authorities did not allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to have access 

to prisoners or perform prison visits in the country. 

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention 

108 

Arbitrary arrest and detention remained serious problems. The law grants police 

broad administrative detention powers and the ability to detain individuals for extended periods without formal arrest or criminal charges. Throughout the year 

human rights activists, journalists, unregistered religious leaders, and former political prisoners and their family members continued to be among those targeted for 

arbitrary detention or arrest. 

In January the official media reported that authorities in Heilongjiang Province 

confined petitioner Chen Qingxia to a deserted mortuary for three years. Chen previously served 18-months’ in RTL, was allegedly paralyzed by repeated beatings, 

and separated from her then 12-year-old son by local authorities. After the media 

report the local government reportedly found a house for Chen and pledged to help 

her look for her son. 

From June 3 to 25, in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, plainclothes police reportedly 

detained prodemocracy activist Jiang Lijun on suspicion of inciting subversion of 

state authority and disturbing the social order. Jiang previously served a four-year 

sentence for ‘‘inciting subversion of the state power.’’ 

In July, Guangdong activist Wu Bin, also known as Xiucai Jianghu, was detained 

for allegedly ‘‘sabotaging electric power equipment.’’ Wu previously filed a lawsuit 

against Shenzhen’s Futian District Public Security Bureau (PSB) for illegally detaining him. He was released on bail in early August, rearrested in Zhejiang Province on September 12, and given 10 days’ administrative detention for ‘‘spreading 

rumors.’’ 

Many activists were subjected to extralegal house arrest, denied travel rights, or 

administratively detained. Shanghai dissidents Feng Zhenghu and Zheng Enchong 

were under unofficial house arrest at their apartments in Shanghai. Both were allowed to move around Shanghai on occasion but were kept under constant surveillance. Outsiders were often prevented from visiting them, and they were not allowed 

to leave Shanghai. Zheng Enchong was denied permission to travel to Hong Kong 

to accept a fellowship teaching law. Authorities also reportedly kept other dissidents 

under unofficial house arrest. Officials sentenced Shanghai activists Wang Kouma 

and Wei Qin to 30 months and 27 months in prison, respectively, for ‘‘creating a 

disturbance’’ related to their lawful petitioning. Mao Hengfeng was released from 

RTL on February 8 and was serving the remainder of her 18-month sentence under 

house arrest. 

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus 

The main domestic security agencies include the Ministry of State Security, the 

Ministry of Public Security, and the People’s Armed Police. The People’s Liberation 

Army is primarily responsible for external security but also has some domestic security responsibilities. Local jurisdictions also frequently used civilian municipal security forces, known as ‘‘urban management’’ officials (chengguan), to enforce administrative measures. The Ministry of Public Security coordinates the country’s civilian 

police force, which is organized into specialized police agencies and local, county, 

and provincial jurisdictions. Procuratorate oversight of the police was limited. Corruption at the local level was widespread. Police and urban management officials 

engaged in extrajudicial detention, extortion, and assault. In 2009 the Supreme People’s Procuratorate acknowledged continuing widespread abuse in law enforcement. 

In 2009 domestic news media reported the convictions of public security officials 

who had beaten to death prisoners or suspects in their custody. 

In May 2012 the Ministry of Supervision, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, and Ministry of Justice jointly issued regulations stating that police 

in prisons and RTL facilities face dismissal if they are found to have beaten, applied 

corporal punishment, abused inmates, or instigated such acts. 

There were several media reports on deaths under the shuanggui system - the 

CCP internal disciplinary system used to investigate party members suspected of 

corruption. In April, Yu Qiyi, a chief engineer at a state-owned enterprise in 

Wenzhou, died after being interrogated for corruption. Authorities charged six investigators from the Communist Party’s Disciplinary Committee in Wenzhou. The BBC 

reported they were sentenced to between four and 14 years in prison. They reportedly appealed their sentence. 

Oversight of civilian municipal security forces was highly localized and ad hoc. By 

law the officials can be criminally prosecuted for abuses of power, but such cases 

were rarely pursued. There were multiple reports of conflicts erupting between 

these officials and street vendors in Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces. For 

example, on June 19, civilian municipal security forces reportedly beat a family of 

fried-chicken vendors in the Beihang night market in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, 

who refused to turn over their equipment. In protest more than one thousand 

109 

Shenyang residents gathered at the scene and blocked traffic, and some reportedly 

retaliated by beating the officials. In some cases mediation resulted in compensation 

being paid to victims of these officials. 

Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees 

Police detention beyond 37 days requires prosecutorial approval of a formal arrest. 

After arrest police are authorized to detain a suspect for up to an additional seven 

months while the case is investigated. 

After the completion of a police investigation, an additional 45 days of detention 

are allowed for the procuratorate to determine whether to file criminal charges. If 

charges are filed authorities can detain a suspect for an additional 45 days before 

beginning judicial proceedings. Police sometimes detained persons beyond the period 

allowed by law, and pretrial detention periods of a year or longer were common. 

The law stipulates that detainees be allowed to meet with defense counsel before 

criminal charges are filed. Some criminal defense attorneys noted that under the 

newly revised criminal procedure law their ability to meet with clients improved significantly. In some cases defense attorneys were able to arrange visits at any time 

and to have private meetings with their clients in detention centers. This generally 

did not apply to cases considered politically sensitive. 

The criminal procedure law requires a court to provide a lawyer to a defendant 

who has not already retained one; who is blind, deaf, mute, or a minor; or who may 

be sentenced to death. Revisions that took effect on January 1 added defendants facing a life sentence or who are mentally ill. This law applies whether or not the defendant is indigent. Courts may also provide lawyers to other criminal defendants 

who cannot afford them, although courts often did not appoint counsel in such circumstances. 

Criminal defendants are entitled to apply for bail (also translated as ‘‘a guarantor 

pending trial’’) while awaiting trial, but the system does not appear to operate effectively and few suspects were released on bail. 

The law requires notification of family members within 24 hours of detention, but 

individuals were often held without notification for significantly longer periods, especially in politically sensitive cases. Under a sweeping exception officials are not 

required to provide notification if doing so would ‘‘hinder the investigation’’ of a 

case. The revised criminal procedure law limits this exception to cases involving 

state security or terrorism. 

The law allows for residential surveillance rather than detention in a formal facility under certain circumstances. Under the revised criminal procedure law, with the 

approval of the next higher-level authorities, officials can enforce ‘‘residential surveillance’’ on a suspect at a designated place of residence (i.e., a place other than 

the suspect’s home) for up to six months, when they suspect crimes of endangering 

state security, terrorism, or serious bribery and believe that surveillance at the suspect’s residence would impede the investigation. Authorities must notify relatives of 

individuals placed under formal arrest or residential surveillance in a designated 

abode within 24 hours, unless notification is impossible. They are not required to 

specify the grounds for or location of the detention. Authorities can also prevent defense lawyers from meeting with suspects in these categories of cases. 

The law provides for the right to petition the government for resolution of grievances, but citizens who traveled to Beijing to petition the central government were 

frequently subjected to arbitrary detention, often by police dispatched from the petitioner’s hometown. Some provincial governments operated facilities in Beijing or in 

other localities where petitioners from their districts were held in extrajudicial detention. Some local governments took steps to restrict petitioning. According to a 

2010 Shanxi provincial government report, the Shanxi Province People’s Congress 

adopted regulations that listed eight types of ‘‘prohibited’’ petitioning, including: ‘‘illegally gathering, encircling, or rushing into government offices or important public 

spaces, stopping cars or hindering public transportation, linking up with others to 

petition,’’ and similar acts. The Shanxi regulations also stated that petitioners suspected of ‘‘misrepresenting facts to frame others’’ could be subject to criminal 

charges. 

Online reports claimed local officials in Zengcheng City, Guangdong Province, 

sealed off two villages in March during the People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) sessions to prevent residents from 

petitioning. 

On April 17, Shenzhen-based lawyer Jiang Yuanmin was arrested and charged 

with ‘‘gathering a crowd to disrupt social order’’ in connection with his work on beVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
110 

half of Hainan farmers’ land rights, according to online reports. Family members 

claimed he was denied medical treatment. 

Fujian petitioner Luo Xianying was reportedly arrested in Beijing in fall 2012 and 

forcibly returned to Sanming in November 2012. At year’s end she was detained in 

a government building, and her family claimed she had not received adequate treatment for her medical problems. 

Before the December 28 NPC Standing Committee decision to abolish RTL, nonjudicial panels, known as ‘‘labor re-education panels,’’ could remand persons to RTL 

camps for up to three years without trial. Labor re-education panels were authorized to extend these administrative sentences for up to one year. Detainees were 

technically allowed to challenge administrative RTL sentences and appeal for sentence reduction or suspension, but appeals were rarely successful. 

Other forms of administrative detention include ‘‘custody and education’’ (for 

women engaged in prostitution and those soliciting prostitution) and ‘‘custody and 

training’’ (for minor criminal offenders). The law establishes a system of ‘‘compulsory isolation for drug rehabilitation.’’ The minimum stay in such centers is two 

years, and the law states that treatment can include labor. Public security organs 

authorize detention in these centers, and it often was meted out as an administrative rather than criminal measure. Authorities used administrative detention to intimidate political activists and prevent public demonstrations. 

Arbitrary Arrest: In February police began detaining and arresting dozens of activists, lawyers, and other citizens in an apparently coordinated crackdown on a 

loose grouping of activists known as the New Citizens Movement. The Beijing Municipality Traffic Security Division detained Beijing University of Post and Telecommunications lecturer and legal scholar Xu Zhiyong on July 16 on suspicion of 

‘‘gathering a crowd to disturb public order.’’ He was formally arrested on August 22 

and formally charged in December. On September 13, authorities detained venture 

capitalist and popular microblogger Wang Gongquan on charges of ‘‘gathering a 

crowd to disturb public order,’’ after he used his microblog to decry Xu’s arrest. 

Other New Citizens Movement associates arrested for peaceful advocacy of good 

governance included Liu Ping, Wei Zhongping, Li Sihua, Yuan Dong, Ma Xinli, 

Zhang Baocheng, Hou Xin, Li Wei, Wang Yonghong, Ding Jiaxi, Sun Hanhui, Zhao 

Changqing, Qi Yueying, Zhang Xiangzhong, Li Gang, Li Huanjun, and Song 

Guangqiang. 

Authorities arrested persons on allegations of revealing state secrets, subversion, 

and other crimes as a means to suppress political dissent and public advocacy. 

These charges - including what constitutes a state secret - remained ill defined. Authorities also detained citizens and foreigners under broad and ambiguous state secrets laws for, among other actions, disclosing information on criminal trials, meetings, commercial activity, and government activity. Authorities sometimes retroactively labeled a particular action as a violation of the state secret laws. According 

to a Radio Free Asia (RFA) report, local officials in Dujiangyan, Sichuan Province, 

detained Zhou Xingrong, whose child died in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, for nine 

hours in April 2012 for allegedly revealing ‘‘state secrets’’ by microblogging about 

efforts by bereaved parents to obtain compensation for their children’s earthquakerelated deaths. According to a western media report, authorities continued to harass 

her during the year. 

Authorities placed numerous dissidents, activists, and petitioners under house arrest during the October National Day holiday period and at other sensitive times, 

such as during the visits of senior foreign government officials or in the period preceding the annual plenary sessions of the NPC and the CPPCC, the anniversary of 

the Tiananmen massacre, and sensitive anniversaries in Tibetan areas and the 

XUAR. 

Conditions faced by those under house arrest varied but sometimes included complete isolation in their homes under police guard. In some instances security officials 

were stationed inside the homes of subjects under house arrest. Others under house 

arrest occasionally were permitted to leave their homes to work or run errands but 

were required to ride in police vehicles. In some cases police or plainclothes security 

officers escorted the children of politically sensitive individuals to and from school. 

When permitted to leave their homes, subjects of house arrest were usually under 

police surveillance. Authorities in the XUAR used house arrest and other forms of 

arbitrary detention against those accused of supporting the ‘‘three evils’’ of religious 

extremism, ‘‘splittism,’’ and terrorism. 

After serving one year at an RTL camp for staging protests calling for political 

reforms and attempting to visit prominent activist Ai Weiwei, Fujian petitioner 

Wang Weizhu was released in July. She went to a foreign embassy compound in 

111 

Beijing after her release to distribute leaflets about her grievances, after which Beijing Police reportedly detained her for five days. 

According to the RFA, in June authorities detained members of the Guizhou 

Human Rights Symposium, including Wu Yuqin, Li Renke, and Mo Jiangang, and 

forced them to leave the provincial capital for the duration of the two-day EU-China 

meeting on human rights there. 

Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detention can last as long as one year. Defendants in 

‘‘sensitive cases’’ reported being subjected to prolonged pretrial detention. 

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial 

The law states that the courts shall exercise judicial power independently, without interference from administrative organs, social organizations, and individuals. 

The judiciary did not exercise judicial power independently. Legal scholars interpreted former president Hu Jintao’s doctrine of the ‘‘Three Supremes’’ as stating 

that the interests of the CCP are above the law. Judges regularly received political 

guidance on pending cases, including instructions on how to rule, from both the government and the CCP, particularly in politically sensitive cases. The CCP Law and 

Politics Committee has the authority to review and influence court operations at all 

levels of the judiciary. 

During the year media sources indicated public security authorities used televised 

confessions of foreign and domestic bloggers, journalists, and business executives in 

an attempt to establish guilt before their criminal trial proceedings began. 

A CCP-controlled committee decides most major cases, and the duty of trial and 

appellate court judges is to craft a legal justification for the committee’s decision. 

‘‘Judicial independence’’ was reportedly one of the off-limit subjects that the CCP 

ordered university professors not to discuss (see section 2.a., Academic Freedom). 

Corruption also influenced court decisions. Safeguards against judicial corruption 

were vague and poorly enforced. Local governments appoint and pay local court 

judges and, as a result, often exerted influence over the rulings of judges in their 

districts. 

Courts are not authorized to rule on the constitutionality of legislation. The law 

permits organizations or individuals to question the constitutionality of laws and 

regulations, but a constitutional challenge can be directed only to the promulgating 

legislative body. Lawyers have little or no opportunity to rely on constitutional 

claims in litigation. 

Trial Procedures 

The criminal justice system was biased toward a presumption of guilt, especially 

in high-profile or politically sensitive cases. According to the Supreme People’s 

Court, in 2011 the combined conviction rate for first- and second-instance criminal 

trials was 99.9 percent. Of 1,051,638 criminal defendants tried in 2011, only 891 

were acquitted. 

In many politically sensitive trials courts handed down guilty verdicts immediately following proceedings with no deliberation. Courts often punished defendants 

who refused to acknowledge guilt with harsher sentences than those who confessed. 

The appeals process rarely reversed convictions. Appeals processes failed to provide 

sufficient avenues for review, and remedies for violations of defendants’ rights were 

inadequate. 

Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court require all trials to be open to the public, with the exceptions of cases involving state secrets, privacy issues, and minors. 

Authorities used the state-secrets provision to keep politically sensitive proceedings 

closed to the public, sometimes even to family members, and to withhold access to 

defense counsel. Court regulations state that foreigners with valid identification 

should be allowed to observe trials under the same criteria as citizens, but foreigners were permitted to attend court proceedings only by invitation. As in past 

years, foreign diplomats and journalists unsuccessfully sought permission to attend 

a number of trials. In some instances the trials were reclassified as ‘‘state secrets’’ 

cases or otherwise closed to the public. During the year foreign diplomats attempted 

to attend nearly one dozen public trials throughout the country. In each instance 

court officials claimed that there were no available seats in the courtroom and that 

foreigners needed prior permission to attend trials. 

Some trials were broadcast, and court proceedings were a regular television feature. A few courts published their verdicts on the internet. 

The revised criminal procedure law makes clear that a criminal suspect may retain a lawyer immediately after an initial police interrogation or after his or her 

freedom has been officially limited. Investigators are required to inform suspects of 

112 

their right to retain counsel. Police must also arrange meetings between a defense 

lawyer and his or her client within 48 hours of a request from defense counsel. 

Individuals facing administrative detention do not have the right to seek legal 

counsel. Criminal defendants were eligible for legal assistance, although more than 

50 percent of criminal defendants went to trial without a lawyer. According to the 

Ministry of Justice, in 2012 there were more than one million legal aid cases. The 

revised criminal procedure law expanded requirements for legal aid to include cases 

that could result in life imprisonment and cases involving individuals suffering from 

mental illness. 

Human rights lawyers reported that authorities did not permit them to defend 

certain clients or threatened them with punishment if they chose to do so. The government suspended or revoked the licenses of lawyers or their firms to stop them 

from taking sensitive cases, such as defending prodemocracy dissidents, housechurch activists, Falun Gong practitioners, or government critics. 

The CCP continued to require law firms with three or more CCP members to form 

a CCP unit within the firm. Firms with one or two CCP members may establish 

joint CCP units with other firms. In smaller counties and cities with few lawyers, 

CCP members may join local Justice Bureau CCP units. This rule also applies to 

private companies and other organizations. 

Some lawyers declined to represent defendants in politically sensitive cases, and 

such defendants frequently found it difficult to find an attorney. 

Authorities detained Guangzhou-based activist Yang Maodong (also known under 

the pen name Guo Feixiong) on August 8 on suspicion of ‘‘gathering a crowd to disrupt order of a public place.’’ According to several Western media sources, officials 

repeatedly denied him access to lawyers. International media speculated he was detained in connection with his participation in protests surrounding the incident in 

January involving censorship of the Guangzhou newspaper Southern Weekend and 

his association with the New Citizens Movement (see section 2, Freedom of Speech 

and Press). 

When defendants were able to retain counsel in politically sensitive cases, government officials sometimes prevented attorneys from organizing an effective defense. 

Tactics employed by court and government officials included unlawful detentions, 

disbarment, harassment and physical intimidation, and denial of access to evidence 

and to clients. 

In April a court in Jiangsu Province placed Beijing rights lawyer Wang 

Quanzhang under a 10-day judicial detention for ‘‘serious violations of court procedure.’’ The violations consisted of using his mobile telephone to copy a set of original 

documents he was submitting to the court during the trial of a Falun Gong practitioner. 

Online reports indicated that on June 25 riot police in Wenchang, Hainan Province, intercepted a group of Guangzhou-based lawyers who had come to represent 

detained dissident Zheng Qiuwu and his wife. The riot police scuffled with the lawyers and forced them to return to the provincial capital of Haikou. 

The annual licensing review process administered by the Beijing Lawyers Association was used to withhold or delay the renewal of professional lawyers’ licenses, 

which restricted the ability of a number of human rights and public interest lawyers 

to practice law. 

Government officials continued to harass lawyers for their involvement in highprofile, rights-related cases. 

Defense attorneys may be held legally responsible if their client commits perjury, 

and prosecutors and judges have wide discretion to decide what constitutes perjury. 

In some sensitive cases lawyers had no pretrial access to their clients, and defendants and lawyers were not allowed to communicate with one another during trials. 

Criminal defendants were frequently not assigned an attorney until a case was 

brought to court. According to a Ministry of Justice official, in 2011 lawyers represented fewer than half of criminal defendants, and in some provincial-level administrative regions, only an estimated 12 percent of criminal suspects had lawyers. 

Mechanisms allowing defendants to confront their accusers were inadequate. Only 

a small percentage of trials involved witnesses, and fewer than 10 percent of subpoenaed witnesses appeared in court. A provision of the revised criminal procedure 

law compels witnesses to appear in court and includes protections for witnesses and 

financial allowances for performing the duties of a witness. In most criminal trials, 

prosecutors read witness statements, which neither the defendants nor their lawyers had an opportunity to rebut. Although the law states that pretrial witness 

statements cannot serve as the sole basis for conviction, prosecutors relied heavily 

113 

on such statements. Defense attorneys had no authority to compel witnesses to testify or to mandate discovery, although they could apply for access to governmentheld evidence relevant to their case. Defense attorneys received minimal pretrial access to information. 

The criminal code contains 55 capital offenses, including nonviolent financial 

crimes such as embezzlement and corruption. There was no publicly available government information on how many defendants were either sentenced to death or executed during the year. Official figures on execution are classified as a state secret. 

An international human rights NGO estimated that 4,000 persons were executed 

annually in recent years, a marked decrease in the years following the 2007 Supreme People’s Court retrieval of its authority to conduct final reviews of death sentences. Lethal injection and shooting were employed as execution methods. 

Chen Youxi, the attorney for street vendor Xia Junfeng, who was convicted of killing two urban management officials in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, and executed 

on September 25, argued that the Supreme People’s Court failed to consider evidence supporting Xia’s claims of self-defense during its review of his sentence. According to a report, the presiding judge refused to admit the testimony of several 

eyewitnesses and relied on the statements of other urban management officials. 

Political Prisoners and Detainees 

Government officials continued to deny holding any political prisoners, asserting 

that authorities detained persons not for their political or religious views but because they violated the law. Authorities, however, continued to imprison citizens for 

reasons related to politics and religion. Tens of thousands of political prisoners remained incarcerated, some in prisons and others in RTL camps or administrative 

detention. The government did not grant international humanitarian organizations 

access to political prisoners. 

Foreign NGOs estimated that several hundred persons remained in prison for 

‘‘counterrevolutionary crimes,’’ which were removed from the criminal code in 1997. 

Thousands of others were serving sentences under state security statutes. The government apparently neither reviewed all cases of those charged before 1997 with 

counterrevolutionary crimes nor released persons jailed for nonviolent offenses 

under repealed provisions of the criminal law. The government maintained that 

prisoners serving sentences for counterrevolutionary crimes and endangering state 

security were eligible to apply for sentence reduction and parole. Political prisoners, 

however, were granted early release at lower rates than other prisoners. Observers 

believed that persons remained in prison for crimes in connection with their involvement in the 1989 Tiananmen prodemocracy movement, although the number was 

unknown because related official statistics were never made public. 

Rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng remained in prison in Xinjiang for allegedly violating 

the terms of a suspended prison sentence. Authorities sharply limited access to him 

and at times concealed his whereabouts. Democracy activist Hada remained in unofficial detention in Inner Mongolia three years after reportedly completing a 15-year 

sentence in 2010. Hada’s wife and sons also faced periods of extralegal house arrest. 

Many political prisoners remained in prison or under other forms of detention at 

year’s end, including rights activists Wang Bingzhang and Liu Xianbin; Ablikim 

Abdureyim, son of Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer; Zhou Yongjun; labor activist Kong 

Youping; Roman Catholic bishop Su Zhimin; and Tibetan Buddhist reincarnate lama 

Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, who was reportedly in poor health. 

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, coauthor of the Charter ‘08 manifesto that 

called for increased political freedoms and human rights, remained in Jinzhou Prison in Liaoning Province. Beijing-based human rights attorney Mo Shaoping, whose 

firm represented Liu, reported that Liu’s wife Liu Xia was allowed to travel from 

Beijing to Jinzhou to see him monthly. She remained under 24-hour surveillance, 

and police escorted her whenever she was allowed to leave her home. Media reports 

in December indicated that Liu Xia might be suffering from depression due to her 

long-term isolation and deprivation of access to books and the internet. 

On August 16, a Beijing court sentenced Liu Hui, Liu Xiaobo’s brother-in-law, to 

11 years’ imprisonment on spurious charges of contract fraud by. Liu Xia was allowed to attend the trial on April 23 and told onlookers outside the court that she 

was not free. 

At year’s end reliable information was not available as to whether the following 

individuals remained in detention: Abdulla Jamal, Uighur activist Dilkex Tilivaldi, 

Feng Xinchun, Gonpo Lhundrub, Gonpo Thar, Jalo, Tselo, and Wang Diangang. 

Criminal punishments continued to include ‘‘deprivation of political rights’’ for a 

fixed period after release from prison, during which time the individual was denied 

114 

rights of free speech, association, and publication. Former prisoners reported that 

their ability to find employment, travel, obtain residence permits, rent residences, 

and access social services was severely restricted. Former political prisoners and 

their families frequently were subjected to police surveillance, telephone wiretaps, 

searches, and other forms of harassment or threats. 

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies 

Courts deciding civil matters faced the same limitations on judicial independence 

as criminal courts. The State Compensation Law provides administrative and judicial remedies for plaintiffs whose rights or interests government agencies or officials 

have infringed. The law also allows compensation for wrongful detention, mental 

trauma, or physical injuries inflicted by detention center or prison officials. Citizens 

seldom applied for state compensation because of the high cost of bringing lawsuits, 

low credibility of courts, and citizens’ lack of awareness of the State Compensation 

Law. Victims’ claims were difficult to assess because of vague definitions in the law 

and difficulties in obtaining evidence of injury or damage. Judges were reluctant to 

accept state compensation cases, and government agencies seldom implemented 

court judgments in favor of plaintiffs. 

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence 

While the law states that the ‘‘freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens 

are protected by law,’’ authorities often did not respect the privacy of citizens. Although the law requires warrants before law enforcement officials can search premises, officials frequently ignored this requirement. The Public Security Bureau and 

prosecutors are authorized to issue search warrants on their own authority without 

judicial review. Cases of forced entry by police officers continued to be reported. 

Authorities monitored telephone conversations, fax transmissions, e-mail, text 

messaging, and internet communications. They also opened and censored domestic 

and international mail. Security services routinely monitored and entered residences 

and offices to gain access to computers, telephones, and fax machines. 

According to foreign media reports, the Ministry of Public Security used tens of 

millions of surveillance cameras in the country. Authorities justified the security 

cameras as a way to improve public safety, crime fighting, traffic management, and 

‘‘social stability.’’ Human rights groups stated authorities increasingly relied on the 

cameras to monitor and intimidate political dissidents, Tibetans, and Uighurs. 

The monitoring and disruption of telephone and internet communications were 

particularly widespread in the XUAR and Tibetan areas. Authorities frequently 

warned dissidents and activists, underground religious figures, and former political 

prisoners throughout the country not to meet with foreign journalists or diplomats, 

especially before sensitive anniversaries, at the time of important government or 

CCP meetings, and during the visits of high-level foreign officials. Security personnel harassed and detained the family members of political prisoners, including 

following them to meetings with foreign reporters and diplomats and urging them 

to remain silent about the cases of their relatives. 

Family members of activists, dissidents, Falun Gong practitioners, journalists, unregistered religious figures, and former political prisoners were targeted for arbitrary arrest, detention, and harassment (see section 1.d.). 

In April four unidentified men forcibly removed 10-year-old Zhang Anni, the 

daughter of prodemocracy activist, Zhang Lin, from school and detained her at the 

Hefei city police station for several hours. Under government pressure, Hupo Elementary School refused to enroll Zhang Anni for seven weeks. 

Chen Kegui, nephew of activist Chen Guangcheng, remained in prison at year’s 

end. In April media reported that Kegui was suffering from an unknown health condition in prison following allegations of torture by prison authorities. Authorities denied his family’s request for medical parole. 

On August 16, Guangzhou police prohibited activist Tang Jingling and his wife 

Wang Yanfang from attending the funeral of well known house church pastor Samuel Lamb. Security officials reportedly put many pastors under house arrest to prevent them from attending the funeral. Guangzhou security personnel had previously 

detained Wang Yanfang for 10 days in December 2011 and January 2012 in connection with protests in the Guangdong village of Wukan. 

On May 31, police in Wenchang, Hainan, arrested dissident Zheng Qiuwu’s wife. 

On June 4, Zhejiang authorities detained Zheng himself and sent him home to Hainan. Both Zheng and his wife reportedly were charged with ‘‘illegal business activity.’’ 

Forced relocation because of urban development continued and in some locations 

increased during the year. Protests over relocation terms or compensation were comVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
115 

mon, and some protest leaders were prosecuted. In rural areas infrastructure and 

commercial development projects resulted in the forced relocation of millions of persons. 

Property-related disputes between citizens and government authorities, which 

often turned violent, were widespread in both urban and rural areas. These disputes 

frequently stemmed from local officials’ collusion with property developers to pay little or no compensation to displaced residents, combined with a lack of effective government oversight or media scrutiny of local officials’ involvement in property transactions, as well as a lack of legal remedies or other dispute resolution mechanisms 

for displaced residents. The problem persisted despite the central government’s efforts to impose stronger controls over illegal land seizures and to standardize compensation. Redevelopment in traditional Uighur neighborhoods in cities throughout 

the XUAR, such as the Old City area in Kashgar, resulted in the destruction of historically or culturally important areas. Some residents voiced opposition to the lack 

of proper compensation provided by the government and coercive measures used to 

obtain their agreement to redevelopment. There were several reports of herders in 

Inner Mongolia complaining of confiscation of traditional pastoral lands for development. 

Foreign media reported that at least 53 persons had self-immolated since 2009 to 

protest destruction of their homes. 

For information on the government’s family planning policies and their consequences, see section 6, Women. 

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: 

a. Freedom of Speech and Press 

The law provides for freedom of speech and press, although authorities generally 

did not respect these rights. Authorities continued to control print, broadcast, and 

electronic media tightly and used them to propagate government views and CCP 

ideology. During the year authorities imposed censorship and manipulated the press 

and the internet, particularly around sensitive anniversaries. 

Freedom of Speech: With significant exceptions, especially speech that challenged 

the government or the CCP, political topics could be discussed privately and in 

small groups without official punishment. During the year some independent think 

tanks, study groups, and seminars reported pressure to cancel some sessions on sensitive topics. Those who made politically sensitive comments in public speeches, academic discussions, and comments to the media remained subject to punitive measures. 

In March the government merged the State Administration of Radio, Film, and 

Television with the General Administration of Press and Publication to create a new 

broadcast and press regulatory body, the General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television. 

On September 9, the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate 

issued a judicial interpretation that made online rumormongering a punishable offense. Under the interpretation the author of a libelous internet post that is reposted more than 500 times or read more than 5,000 times, or of an internet post 

that led to mass protests, instigated ethnic or religious clashes, damaged the country’s image or caused ‘‘a bad international effect,’’ is subject to a maximum of three 

years in prison. By year’s end this interpretation had a chilling effect on online discourse. 

The government frequently monitored gatherings of intellectuals, scholars, and 

dissidents where political or sensitive issues were discussed. In 2008, to commemorate International Human Rights Day, a group of 303 intellectuals and activists released a petition entitled Charter ‘08, calling for the CCP to respect human rights 

and implement democratic reforms. Since then Charter ‘08 signers continued to report official harassment, especially around sensitive dates. 

According to Western media reports, Shenzhen activist Yang Mingyu (also known 

as Yang Lin) was arrested July 19 for ‘‘inciting subversion of state power’’ in connection with his democracy activism, participation in Charter ‘08, and efforts to disclose 

official corruption. 

On August 12, activist Liu Jiacai, who served two years administrative detention 

sentence on a charge of ‘‘inciting subversion of state power’’ in 2002, was detained 

in Hubei Province on criminal charges of ‘‘inciting subversion of state power.’’ Police 

reported that he was detained for posting and disseminating online writings and 

views about legal reform in China. NGO sources reported that the charges stemmed 

from the fact that Liu had gathered activists in Yichang, Hubei Province for dinner 

parties, where they discussed corruption and other sensitive topics. 

116 

Press Freedoms: All books and magazines require state-issued publication numbers, which were expensive and often difficult to obtain. Nearly all print media, 

broadcast media, and book publishers were affiliated with the CCP or a government 

agency. There were a small number of print publications with some private ownership interest but no privately owned television or radio stations. The CCP directed 

the domestic media to refrain from reporting on certain subjects, and all broadcast 

programming required government approval. 

In November the General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and 

Television began requiring news organizations to hold weekly lectures on the CCP’s 

journalistic principles, and journalists applying to renew their media credentials are 

required to take an examination on Marxist journalistic ideals. 

Foreign journalists based in the country found a challenging environment for reporting. According to the annual ‘‘Reporting Conditions’’ survey of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC), ‘‘98 percent of respondents do not think reporting conditions in China meet international standards, and 70 percent feel conditions 

have worsened or stayed the same as the year before.’’ 

On July 8, journalist and documentary filmmaker Du Bin was released from a 

Beijing jail on bail after being detained for five weeks for allegedly ‘‘disturbing order 

at a public place.’’ In May, Du had posted an online documentary about the 

Masanjia Women’s RTL Camp in Liaoning Province (see section 1.c.), and also in 

May a publisher with offices in Hong Kong and New York published his book on 

the Tiananmen massacre. 

Violence and Harassment: On July 15, law enforcement officers in Baita District 

of Liaoyang, Liaoning Province, allegedly beat a Chinese Business Morning View 

journalist who was reporting on a dispute between residents and developers at a 

construction site and destroyed his interview recordings. 

Restrictions on foreign journalists by central and local CCP propaganda departments remained strict, especially during sensitive times and anniversaries. Foreign 

press outlets reported that local employees of foreign news agencies were also subject to official harassment and intimidation. During the year the FCCC ‘‘found 63 

cases in which police officers or unknown persons impeded foreign reporters from 

doing their work, including nine cases in which reporters were manhandled or subjected to physical force.’’ The report adds that while ‘‘this represents a welcome drop 

from last year,’’ such intimidation ‘‘remains unacceptable.’’ 

According to Western media reports, in February a group of unidentified men in 

four vehicles assaulted a German television crew filming in a village near Beijing. 

According to a German correspondent present at the scene, the men ran the crew’s 

minivan off the road and then smashed its windshield with baseball bats. 

In December, Chinese authorities prevented a Western reporter from attending a 

press event with UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Chinese Prime Minister 

Li Keqiang. 

The FCCC reported that, although routine delays in the provision of journalist 

visas appear to have shortened in recent months, 10 percent of survey respondents 

reported difficulties in obtaining official press accreditation or a journalist visa because of their reporting or that of their predecessors. While some reporters who authored particularly controversial news articles ultimately had their visas renewed, 

their news organizations experienced difficulty obtaining visas for new journalists 

and staff, even when these individuals previously held journalist visas for China. 

Additionally, among the correspondents surveyed, 30 percent stated their Chinese 

assistants encountered pressure from officials or experienced harassment. 

The government limited attendance at official press briefings to domestic media. 

Foreign media and diplomats were allowed to attend only briefings conducted by the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a handful of press briefings held around special 

events. 

Authorities continued to enforce tight restrictions on citizens employed by foreign 

news organizations. The code of conduct for Chinese employees of foreign media organizations threatens with dismissal and loss of accreditation Chinese employees 

who engage in ‘‘independent reporting’’ and instructs them to provide their employers information that projects a good image of the country. 

Official guidelines for domestic journalists were often vague, subject to change at 

the discretion of propaganda officials, and enforced retroactively. Propaganda authorities forced newspapers to fire editors and journalists responsible for articles 

deemed inconsistent with official policy and suspended or closed publications. The 

system of postpublication review by propaganda officials encouraged self-censorship 

by editors seeking to avoid the losses associated with penalties for inadvertently 

117 

printing unauthorized content. Officials can be punished for unauthorized contact 

with journalists. 

Government officials used criminal prosecution, civil lawsuits, and other punishments, including violence, detention, and other forms of harassment, to intimidate 

authors and journalists and to prevent the dissemination of controversial writings. 

A domestic journalist can face demotion or job loss for publishing views that challenge the government. 

In January a group of current and former journalists from the Guangzhou newspaper Southern Weekend (also translated as Southern Weekly), part of the Nanfang 

Daily Group, accused provincial propaganda officials of altering the newspaper’s traditional New Year’s message, which called for increased respect for constitutional 

rights. Southern Weekend journalists went on strike January 6 to protest editorial 

censorship, and students and activists began holding supportive demonstrations in 

front of the newspaper offices in Guangzhou. The protests turned into a broader 

public backlash against press censorship and were supported by editors, reporters, 

and social media. An agreement between the newspaper’s staff and party overseers 

ended the strike January 8 and allowed the newspaper to resume publication January 10, but a clampdown on dissent reportedly followed. According to media reports, 

local authorities forcibly dispersed anticensorship protests, detained several activists 

for expressing solidarity with the newspaper, and blocked and deleted all references 

to the controversy from the internet. 

Journalists who remained in prison at year’s end included Yang Tongyan, and 

Dhondup Wangchen. Uighur webmasters Dilshat Perhat and Nijat Azat continued 

to serve sentences for ‘‘endangering state security.’’ Uighur journalist Memetjan 

Abdulla was sentenced to life in prison in 2010, reportedly for transmitting ‘‘subversive’’ information related to the 2009 riots. During the year journalists working in 

traditional and new media were also imprisoned. In December 2012 the Prison Census of the Committee to Protect Journalists reported that, of 32 known journalists 

imprisoned in the country, 12 were ethnic Tibetan, seven were ethnic Uighur, and 

one was ethnic Mongolian. The committee documented two new imprisonment cases 

in 2012. 

Censorship or Content Restrictions: Authorities continued to confiscate ‘‘unauthorized publications.’’ According to the National Office Against Pornographic and Illegal 

Publications, 45 million illegal publications were confiscated and more than 3.7 million pieces of online information involving pornography or other illegal content were 

deleted in 2012. 

Foreign journalists were denied permits to travel to the TAR, except for a very 

few highly controlled, government-organized press visits. Travel to Tibetan areas 

outside the TAR became increasingly difficult for foreign journalists. While foreign 

journalists were allowed access to Urumqi, XUAR, local and provincial authorities 

continued to control strictly the travel, access, and interviews of foreign journalists, 

even forcing them to leave cities in parts of the XUAR. After French news station 

France 24 broadcast journalist Cyril Payen’s documentary about Tibet on May 30, 

Chinese embassy personnel went to the channel’s headquarters in Paris to demand 

the withdrawal of the documentary from the station’s website. The Chinese embassy 

in Bangkok also threatened Payen by telephone, according to Reporters Without 

Borders. 

Media outlets received regular guidance on topics that should not be covered from 

the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department. For example, in April the department 

issued censorship instructions to mainland media prohibiting them from reusing, reporting, and commenting on Lens magazine’s April article on the Masanjia Women’s 

Labor Re-education Camp in Liaoning Province (see section 1.c.). 

Following an October typhoon in Yuyao, Zhejiang Province, that killed 10 persons 

and sparked protests about the government response, the State Council Information 

Office issued instructions to media outlets and internet companies not to report a 

local newspaper’s story about the protests. 

In December 2012 the Central Propaganda Department ordered media outlets to 

adhere strictly to the information provided by authoritative departments when reporting on officials suspected of involvement in graft or bribery. Throughout the 

year the Central Propaganda Department issued similar instructions regarding the 

election of Hong Kong’s chief executive, the self-immolation of Tibetans, and the Bo 

Xilai scandal. The orders included instructions for media outlets not to investigate 

or report on their own. 

Authorities continued to ban books with content they deemed controversial. The 

law permits only government-approved publishing houses to print books. The State 

Press and Publications Administration (PPA) controlled all licenses to publish. 

118 

Newspapers, periodicals, books, audio and video recordings, or electronic publications may not be printed or distributed without the approval of the PPA and relevant provincial publishing authorities. Individuals who attempted to publish without government approval faced imprisonment, fines, confiscation of their books, and 

other sanctions. The CCP exerted control over the publishing industry by preemptively classifying certain topics as state secrets. 

Many intellectuals and scholars exercised self-censorship, anticipating that books 

or papers on political topics would be deemed too sensitive to be published. The censorship process for private and government media also increasingly relied on selfcensorship and, in a few cases, postpublication sanctions. 

The General Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television, 

and the CCP remained active in issuing restrictive regulations and decisions constraining the content of broadcast media. 

Authorities continued to jam, with varying degrees of success, Chinese-, Uighur- 

, and Tibetan-language broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA), the BBC, and 

RFA. English-language broadcasts on the VOA generally were not jammed. Internet 

distribution of streaming radio news and podcasts from these sources often was 

blocked. Despite the jamming of overseas broadcasts, the VOA, the BBC, RFA, 

Deutsche Welle, and Radio France International had large audiences, including 

human rights advocates, ordinary citizens, and government officials. 

Overseas television newscasts, largely restricted to hotels and foreign residence 

compounds, were occasionally subject to censorship. Such censorship of foreign 

broadcasts also occurred around the anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre 

and during the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Individual issues of foreign newspapers and magazines were occasionally banned when they contained articles 

deemed too sensitive. After two U.S. media websites published articles on 

Bloomberg.com and in the New York Times detailing the family wealth of Xi 

Jinping and Wen Jiabao, websites for both media outlets were blocked. 

Politically sensitive coverage in Chinese, and to a lesser extent in English, were 

censored more than coverage in other languages. The government prohibited some 

foreign and domestic films deemed too sensitive or selectively censored parts of films 

before they were released. 

Internet Freedom 

In 2010 the Information Office of the State Council released its first White Paper 

on the internet outlining the government’s endeavors to allow certain freedoms of 

speech on the internet as long as the speech did not endanger state security, subvert 

state power, damage state honor and interests, jeopardize state religious policy, 

propagate heretical or superstitious ideas, or spread rumors and other content forbidden by laws and administrative regulations, among other caveats. The internet 

was widely available and widely used. The China Internet Network Information 

Center (CNNIC) reported that by the end of 2012 the number of internet users 

reached 564 million, including 420 million mobile telephone internet users. The 

CNNIC reported that 50.9 million new users were added in 2012 - a 3.8 percent increase from 2011. The International Telecommunication Union reported that 39 percent of individuals used the internet and 41 percent of households had access to the 

internet by the end of the year. 

The CCP underscored the importance of maintaining security and promoting core 

socialist values on the internet in its official decision adopted at the Sixth Plenum 

of the 17th CCP Congress in October 2011. The document called for developing a 

‘‘healthy and uplifting network culture’’ that entails measures such as ‘‘step[ping] 

up guidance and management over social networks and instant messaging tools, 

standardiz[ing] the transmission order of information on the internet, and 

foster[ing] a civilized and rational network environment.’’ 

The CCP continued to increase efforts to monitor internet use, control content, restrict information, block access to foreign and domestic websites, encourage self-censorship, and punish those who ran afoul of political sensitivities. According to news 

sources, more than 14 government ministries participated in these efforts, resulting 

in the censorship of thousands of domestic and foreign websites, blogs, cell phone 

text messages, social networking services, online chat rooms, online games, and email. These measures were not universally effective. In addition to its own extensive 

system of internet censorship, the government imposed more responsibilities on 

internet companies to implement online censorship and surveillance regimes, and it 

sought to prohibit anonymous expression online. 

A State Council regulation deems personal blogs, computer bulletin boards, and 

cell phone text messages to be part of the news media, which subjects these media 

119 

to state restrictions on content. Internet service providers were instructed to use 

only domestic media news postings, to record information useful for tracking users 

and their viewing habits, to install software capable of copying e-mails, and to end 

immediately transmission of ‘‘subversive material.’’ 

Under guidance from the CCP, the government employed thousands of persons at 

the national, provincial, and local levels to monitor electronic communications. Official monitoring focused on such tools as social networking, microblogging, and videosharing sites. Internet companies also employed thousands of censors to implement 

CCP directives. 

In 2011 central government authorities ordered all public spaces offering free 

wireless internet access to install costly software that would enable police to identify 

users of the service. Authorities warned Beijing cafe and restaurant owners they 

would face a fine of 20,000 renminbi (RMB) ($3,270) if they offered wireless internet 

access without installing the software. In December 2012 the NPC ratified a law requiring persons to give their real names when signing up for internet, fixed telephone line, or mobile telephone services. Providers must also require persons’ names 

when allowing them to post information publicly. 

Major news portals require users to register using their real names and identification numbers to comment on news articles. Individuals using the internet in public 

libraries are required to register using their national identity card, and usage reportedly was monitored at all public library terminals. 

The government consistently blocked access to websites it deemed controversial, 

especially those discussing Taiwan, the Dalai Lama, Tibet, underground religious 

and spiritual organizations, democracy activists, and the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. 

The government also at times blocked access to selected sites operated by foreign 

governments, news outlets, health organizations, educational institutions, NGOs, 

and social networking sites, as well as to search engines that allow rapid communication or organization of users. 

In June 2012, following the publication of an expose on the financial affairs of Xi 

Jinping’s family, the government blocked access to a Western media website. In October 2012 the government blocked access to the English- and Chinese-language 

versions of a U.S. media website after it published an article on Wen Jiabao’s family 

fortunes. At year’s end, several Western media and social media websites were not 

accessible. 

Some websites included images of cartoon police officers that warn users to stay 

away from forbidden content. Operators of web portals, blog-hosting services, and 

other content providers engaged in self-censorship to ensure their servers were free 

from politically sensitive content. Domestic websites that refused to self-censor political content were shut down, and many foreign websites were blocked. Millions of 

citizens had Twitter-like microblogs that circulated some news banned in the national media. The microblogs themselves were censored but often hours or days after 

the posting. 

In July 2012 the State Internet Information Office and the State Administration 

of Radio, Film and Television issued a circular requiring online video content providers to review videos before making them available online and holding them responsible for the content. 

Authorities employed an array of technical measures to block ‘‘sensitive’’ websites 

based in foreign countries. The ability of users to access such sensitive sites varied 

from city to city. The government also automatically censored e-mail and web chats 

based on a list of sensitive key words, such as ‘‘Falun Gong,’’ ‘‘Dalai Lama,’’ and 

‘‘Tibetan independence.’’ While such censorship was effective in keeping casual users 

away from sensitive content, it was defeated through the use of various technologies. Information on proxy servers outside China and software for defeating official censorship was readily available inside the country, but the government increasingly blocked access to the websites and proxy servers of commercial virtual 

private network providers. Despite official monitoring and censorship, dissidents 

and political activists continued to use the internet to call attention to political 

causes such as prisoner advocacy, political reform, ethnic discrimination, and corruption. Internet users spanning the political spectrum complained of censorship. 

Authorities sometimes blocked or closed the blogs of a number of prominent activists, artists, scholars, and university professors during the year. 

There were numerous press reports of purported cyber-attacks against foreign 

websites, foreign journalists, and foreign media organizations that carried information deemed offensive by the government. 

120 

Authorities continued to jail numerous internet writers for peaceful expression of 

political views. 

According to online reports, in June police in Fujian detained an online activist 

for 10 days for her microblog comments about a June 7 bus explosion in Xiamen. 

Police previously detained this same blogger in January 2012 for her comments 

about alleged corruption behind forced home evictions and demolitions in Xiamen’s 

Jimei district. 

The blog of environmental writer Liu Futang remained inaccessible. His blog, 

which exposed environmental problems caused by government-backed projects, was 

shut down in late 2012 after a Hainan Province court found him guilty of illegally 

profiting from self-published books. 

The State Secrets Law obliges internet companies to cooperate with investigations 

of suspected leaks of state secrets, stop the transmission of such information once 

discovered, and report the crime to authorities. Furthermore, the companies must 

comply with authorities’ orders to delete such information from their websites, and 

failure to do so is punishable by relevant departments such as the police and the 

Ministry of Public Security. 

Regulations prohibit a broad range of activities that authorities interpret as subversive or slanderous to the state. 

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events 

The government continued restrictions on academic and artistic freedom, and political and social discourse at colleges, universities, and research institutes. The 

General Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film, and Television and the 

Central Propaganda Department issued restrictive regulations and decisions that 

constrained the flow of ideas and persons. In May the media reported that the CCP 

issued secret instructions to university faculty identifying seven ‘‘off-limits’’ subjects 

including universal values, freedom of the press, civil society, civil rights, an independent judiciary, elite cronyism, and the historical errors of the CCP. Some academics self-censored their publications, faced pressure to reach predetermined research results, or were unable to hold conferences with international participants 

during politically sensitive periods. Peking University economics professor Xia 

Yeliang came under government criticism for calling for public discussion of reform 

among intellectuals, and in October he was dismissed from his university position. 

In December the East China University of Political Science and Law in Shanghai 

dismissed law professor Zhang Xuezhong for criticizing one-party rule in an online 

publication. According to reports, the school administration decided Zhang was unfit 

to teach after he refused to admit any wrongdoing. 

Censorship and self-censorship of artistic works was common, particularly those 

artworks deemed to involve politically sensitive subjects. 

Authorities on a few occasions blocked entry into the country of individuals 

deemed politically sensitive and declined to issue passports to Chinese citizens selected for international exchange programs who were considered ‘‘politically unreliable,’’ singling out ethnic Tibetans and Uighurs and individuals from other minority 

nationality areas. 

A number of other foreign government-sponsored exchange selectees, particularly 

those from minority provinces, encountered difficulties gaining approval to travel to 

participate in their programs. 

The government used political attitudes and affiliations as criteria for selecting 

persons for the few government-sponsored study abroad programs but did not impose such restrictions on privately sponsored students. The government and the 

party controlled the appointment of high-level officials at universities. While CCP 

membership was not always a requirement to obtain a tenured faculty position, 

scholars without CCP affiliation often had fewer chances for promotion. 

Foreign researchers, authors, and academics residing abroad reported they were 

subject to sanctions, including denial of visas, from authorities when their work did 

not meet with official approval. Thirteen foreign academics asserted that they were 

blacklisted and blocked from obtaining visas to travel to China for having contributed scholarly essays to a book on Xinjiang published in 2004. Other scholars continued to be blacklisted or faced difficulties obtaining visas because of their politically sensitive work on China. 

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association Freedom of Assembly 

While the law provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, the government severely 

restricted this right. The law stipulates that such activities may not challenge 

‘‘party leadership’’ or infringe upon the ‘‘interests of the state.’’ Protests against the 

121 

political system or national leaders were prohibited. Authorities denied permits and 

quickly suppressed demonstrations involving expression of dissenting political 

views. 

Citizens continued to gather publicly to protest evictions, relocations, and compensation in locations throughout the country, often resulting in conflict with authorities or other charges (see section 1.f.). 

Guangdong police worked aggressively to curtail free speech and preempt peaceful 

assembly during the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square incident. Authorities ordered 15-day administrative detention for the organizers of one event. Police placed 

other activists under surveillance or house arrest, encouraged some to leave town 

on ‘‘vacation,’’ or invited them to police stations for ‘‘tea’’ and questioning. Police also 

reportedly restricted the freedom of Foshan rights activist Chen Qitang and 

Guangzhou rights activists Wang Aizhong and Tang Jingling in late May and early 

June in advance of and during the anniversary of the Tiananmen incident. 

In January, Guangzhou police detained numerous persons involved in public demonstrations against the provincial propaganda department’s censorship of Southern 

Weekend’s New Year’s greeting. In addition to administrative detentions and formal 

arrests, police reportedly held a number of participants in irregular detention facilities including a movie theater and a military base (see section 2.a.). 

On January 2, police in the Luoxi neighborhood of Guangzhou preemptively detained dozens of activists, including organizer Xu Lin, for planning a musical performance and poetry recitation at a public square to celebrate the New Year. 

On February 23, Liu Yuandong, Sun Desheng, and 12 others were detained in 

Guangdong for their participation in protests directed at North Korea’s nuclear test. 

Most of the protesters were freed or given administrative detentions, but police formally arrested and charged Liu on April 3. According to media reports, police subjected Liu and Sun to mistreatment in custody including sleep deprivation. On April 

12, authorities in Dongguan, Guangdong Province, gave four activists administrative 

detentions after they held up banners calling for Liu’s release. On August 13, authorities in Guangzhou again detained Sun Desheng for the crimes of gathering 

crowds and disrupting public order. 

In May, Chengdu authorities preemptively deployed 170,000 security personnel 

throughout the city on the date of a planned protest against the construction of a 

nearby petrochemical plant and its production of paraxylene. Authorities also detained suspected activists in the days leading up to the planned protest. 

Also in May, Changsha authorities in Hunan Province detained Xiang Yuhan following his organization of a peaceful march of 100 persons in commemoration of the 

International Day Against Homophobia. Xiang was confined for 12 days in administrative detention on a charge of ‘‘illegal protest.’’ 

In February the Nanjing NGO Tianxiagong (Justice for All) won a lawsuit against 

a hotel in Suzhou that in 2012 had canceled its conference reservations at the last 

moment on order from the local PSB. In May another NGO’s legal rights conference 

in Hangzhou faced similar obstructions when hotels canceled reservations. The hotels informed the NGO that Zhejiang and Jiangsu province security officers ordered 

authorities not to permit holding the gathering anywhere in the provinces. 

All concerts, sports events, exercise classes, or other meetings of more than 200 

persons require approval from public security authorities. Although peaceful protests are legal, police rarely granted approval. Despite restrictions there were many 

demonstrations, but those with political or social themes were broken up quickly, 

sometimes with excessive force. The number of ‘‘mass incidents’’ and protests, including some violent protests, against local governments increased during the year. 

According to an international NGO, a former leading member of the CCP’s Politics 

and Law Commission stated that the country experienced 30,000 to 50,000 mass incidents every year. As in past years, the vast majority of demonstrations concerned 

land disputes; housing problems; industrial, environmental, and labor matters; government corruption; taxation; and other economic and social concerns. Others were 

provoked by accidents or were related to personal petitions, administrative litigation, and other legal processes. 

Disputes over land expropriation continued to trigger large-scale clashes between 

police and protesters. 

The law protects an individual’s ability to petition the government, but persons 

petitioning the government faced restrictions on their rights to assemble and raise 

grievances (see section 1.d.). Most petitions addressed grievances about land, housing, entitlements, the environment, or corruption. Most petitioners sought to present 

their complaints at national and provincial ‘‘letters and visits’’ offices. 

122 

Although banned by regulations, retaliation against petitioners reportedly continued. This was partly due to incentives the central government provided to local officials to prevent petitioners from raising complaints to higher levels. Incentives included provincial cadre evaluations based in part on the number of petitions from 

their provinces. This initiative aimed to encourage local and provincial officials to 

resolve legitimate complaints but also resulted in local officials sending security personnel to Beijing and forcibly returning the petitioners to their home provinces to 

prevent them from filing complaints against local officials with the central government. Such detentions often went unrecorded. Rules issued by the General Office 

of the State Council mandate sending officials from Beijing to the provinces to resolve petition problems locally, thereby reducing the number of petitioners entering 

Beijing. The rules also mandate a 60-day response time for petitions and provide 

for a single appeal in each case. 

Petitioners faced harassment, illegal detention, and even more severe forms of 

punishment when attempting to travel to Beijing to present their grievances. 

On January 5, authorities prevented 13 petitioners from Fujian Province from requesting assistance with their petitions from a foreign embassy in Beijing. According to online reports, police detained six of the petitioners for five days and one petitioner for 10 days. 

Freedom of Association 

The law provides for freedom of association, but the government restricted this 

right. CCP policy and government regulations require that all professional, social, 

and economic organizations officially register with, and receive approval from the 

government. These regulations prevented the formation of truly autonomous political, human rights, religious, spiritual, labor, and other organizations that the government believed might challenge its authority. 

The government maintained tight controls over civil society organizations. 

According to regulations issued by the State Administration for Foreign Exchange, 

foreign exchange donations to or by domestic institutions must ‘‘comply with the 

laws and regulations.and shall not go against social morality or damage public interests and the legitimate rights and interests of other citizens.’’ For donations to 

a domestic organization from a foreign NGO, the regulations require all parties and 

the banks to approve additional measures prior to processing a transaction. Application of the regulation varied, with some NGOs successfully navigating the requirements, others identifying other options by which to receive funds, and some severely 

limiting or shutting down operations. 

To register, an NGO must find a government agency to serve as its organizational 

sponsor, have a registered office, and hold a minimum amount of funds. Some organizations with social or educational purposes that previously registered as private 

or for-profit businesses reportedly were requested to find a government sponsor and 

reregister as NGOs during the year. Finding a government sponsor was often very 

difficult, since the government department can be held responsible if the NGO engages in sensitive behavior. In March the NPC announced changes for NGO registration that waived the requirement to find a government sponsor. However, these 

changes only apply to four types of NGOs - industrial associations, charities, community services, and organizations dedicated to the promotion of technology. NGO 

sources reported that the new regulations do not apply to organizations primarily 

focused on advocacy or rights promotion. 

In July the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced the intention to pass legislation 

that would allow international NGOs to register with provincial civil affairs authorities instead of the ministry. By year’s end the legislation had not been promulgated. 

In 2012 Guangdong provincial government officials initiated proposals aimed at 

facilitating the operations and work of many NGOs, including, for example, simplifying registration procedures so that certain categories of NGOs could register directly with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Implementation of regulations associated 

with these proposals was often inconsistent. Although some NGOs perceived to be 

working in nonpolitically sensitive areas enjoyed increased opportunities, others 

continued to face interference from authorities, for example, through increased financial scrutiny. Labor NGOs in Shenzhen continued to face a challenging environment, including registration hurdles and occasional government interference with 

their activities. 

Although registered organizations all came under some degree of government control, some NGOs were able to operate with a greater degree of independence. 

The number of NGOs continued to grow, despite the restrictions and regulations. 

The government used the term ‘‘social organization’’ to categorize social groups 

123 

(shehui tuanti), such as trade and professional associations; civil noncommercial 

units (minban fei qiye danwei), which are the equivalent of nonprofit service providers; and foundations (jijinhui). The last category included two types of foundations: public fundraising and private fundraising foundations. The government continued to impose fundraising limits on private foundations. 

According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, by the end of 2012 there were at least 

one million NGOs either operating without legal status or registered as companies. 

The country had approximately 462,000 legally registered social organizations, including 255,000 social groups, 204,000 civil noncommercial units, and 2,614 foundations. In 2012 an official of the Ministry of Civil Affairs wrote, ‘‘In 2007 China started to use the term ‘social organization’ instead of ‘civil organization’ because ‘civil’ 

contrasts with ‘official’ and reflected the opposing roles of civil society and government in the traditional political order. The 16th and 17th CCP Congresses changed 

the name to ‘social organization.’ NGOs existed under a variety of formal and informal guises, including national mass organizations created and funded by the CCP, 

known as ‘government NGOs.’’’ 

The lack of legal registration created numerous logistical challenges for NGOs, including difficulty opening bank accounts and receiving foreign funding, hiring workers, fundraising, and renting office space. NGOs that opted not to partner with government agencies could register as commercial consulting companies, which allowed 

them to obtain legal recognition at the cost of forgoing tax-free status. Security authorities routinely warned domestic NGOs, regardless of their registration status, 

not to accept donations from the foreign-funded National Endowment for Democracy 

and other international organizations deemed sensitive by the government. 

In July officials from the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau raided, closed, and confiscated materials from the think tank Transition Institute for not registering properly. The institute registered as a business, and its head, Guo Yushan, was associated with the New Citizens Movement and activists such as Chen Guangcheng and 

Xu Zhiyong. 

Authorities supported the growth of some NGOs that focused on social problems 

such as poverty alleviation and disaster relief, but remained concerned that these 

organizations might emerge as a source of political opposition. NGOs working in the 

TAR and other Tibetan areas faced an increasingly difficult operating environment, 

and many were forced to curtail their activities altogether due to travel restrictions, 

official intimidation of staff members, and the failure of local partners to renew 

project agreements. 

No laws or regulations specifically govern the formation of political parties. The 

Chinese Democracy Party remained banned, and the government continued to monitor, detain, and imprison current and former CDP members. 

c. Freedom of Religion 

See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at 

www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/. 

d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons 

The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, 

and repatriation, but the government generally did not respect these rights. While 

seriously restricting its scope of operations, the government occasionally cooperated 

with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which maintained an office in Beijing, to provide protection and assistance to refugees, asylum 

seekers, and other persons of concern. 

Increasingly the government silenced activists by denying them permission to 

travel, both internationally and domestically, or keeping them under unofficial 

house arrest. In the spring officials denied Jiangsu environmental activist Wu 

Lihong a passport to travel abroad to accept a human rights award, although his 

wife and daughter were eventually permitted to travel and accepted the award on 

his behalf. Uighur economist Ilham Tohti was detained at Beijing airport and prevented from traveling abroad to accept a position as a visiting scholar. 

In-country Movement: Authorities heightened restrictions on freedom of movement, particularly to curtail the movement of individuals deemed politically sensitive, before key anniversaries, visits by foreign dignitaries, or major political 

events and to forestall demonstrations. Freedom of movement continued to be very 

limited in the TAR and other Tibetan areas. Police maintained checkpoints in most 

counties and on roads leading into many towns, as well as within major cities such 

as Lhasa. Tibetans from other provinces reported that authorities subjected them 

to onerous documentation requirements to enter the TAR and required Tibetans 

124 

who were not residents of Lhasa to obtain permission to enter the city, often forcing 

them to stay in specially designated accommodations, requirements not imposed on 

Han Chinese visitors to the TAR. 

In 2012 prominent Tibetan poet and blogger Woeser, a Beijing resident, was required to leave Beijing and return to Lhasa for three months before and during the 

18th Party Congress in Beijing. Uighur economics professor Ilham Tohti was also 

required to leave Beijing during the Party Congress. Feng Zhenghu, Mao Hengfeng, 

and other Shanghai activists reported being repeatedly detained upon arrival in Beijing when attempting to visit other activists or petition the national government. 

Although the government maintained restrictions on the freedom to change one’s 

workplace or residence, the national household registration system (hukou) continued to change, and the ability of most citizens to move within the country to work 

and live continued to expand. Rural residents continued to migrate to the cities, 

where the per capita disposable income was more than four times the rural per capita income, but many could not change their official residence or workplace within 

the country. Most cities had annual quotas for the number of new temporary residence permits that could be issued, and all workers, including university graduates, 

had to compete for a limited number of such permits. It was particularly difficult 

for rural residents to obtain household registration in more economically developed 

urban areas. 

The household registration system added to the difficulties rural residents faced 

even after they relocated to urban areas and found employment. According to the 

2012 Statistical Communique of the People’s Republic of China on 2012 National 

Economic and Social Development published in February by the Ministry of Human 

Resources and Social Security, 279 million persons lived outside the jurisdiction of 

their household registration. Of that number, 236 million individuals worked outside their home district. Many migrant workers and their families faced numerous 

obstacles with regard to working conditions and labor rights. Many were unable to 

access public services, such as public education or social insurance, in the cities 

where they lived and worked because they were not legally registered urban residents. Poor treatment and difficulty integrating into local communities contributed 

to increased unrest among migrant workers in the Pearl River Delta. Migrant workers had little recourse when abused by employers and officials. Some major cities 

maintained programs to provide migrant workers and their children access to public 

education and other social services free of charge, but migrants in some locations 

reported difficulty in obtaining these benefits due to the onerous bureaucratic processes involved in obtaining access to urban services. 

Under the ‘‘staying at prison employment’’ system applicable to recidivists incarcerated in RTL camps, authorities denied certain persons permission to return to 

their homes after serving their sentences. Some released or paroled prisoners returned home but were not permitted freedom of movement. 

Foreign Travel: The government permitted legal emigration and foreign travel for 

most citizens. Some academics and activists continued to face travel restrictions, especially around sensitive anniversaries (see section 1.d.). The government exercised 

exit control for departing passengers at airports and other border crossings and utilized this exit control to deny foreign travel to dissidents and persons employed in 

sensitive government posts. Throughout the year lawyers, artists, authors, and 

other activists were at times prevented from freely exiting the country. Border officials and police cited threats to ‘‘national security’’ as the reason for refusing permission to leave the country. Authorities stopped most persons at the airport at the 

time of the attempted travel. Wuxi environmental activist Wu Lihong was prevented 

from traveling abroad to accept a human rights award in July. Shanghai activist 

Zheng Enchong was prevented from accepting a teaching fellowship in Hong Kong 

in August. Shanghai activist Chen Jianfang was prevented from traveling to a UN 

human rights training course in Geneva in September. Well known artist Ai Weiwei 

was denied a passport to attend exhibitions of his work abroad. Other activists also 

reported being blocked from traveling abroad. 

Most citizens could obtain passports, although those government deemed potential 

threats, including religious leaders, political dissidents, petitioners, and ethnic minorities, reported routinely being refused passports or otherwise prevented from 

traveling overseas. 

Ethnic Uighurs, particularly those residing in the XUAR, reported that it was 

very difficult to get a passport application approved at the local level. They were 

frequently denied passports to travel abroad, particularly to Saudi Arabia for the 

haj, other Muslim countries, or Western countries for academic or other purposes. 

125 

Authorities reportedly seized valid passports of some residents of the XUAR and 

other citizens. 

In the TAR and Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces, ethnic 

Tibetans experienced great difficulty acquiring passports. The unwillingness of Chinese authorities in Tibetan areas to issue or renew passports for ethnic Tibetans 

created, in effect, a ban on foreign travel for a large segment of the Tibetan population. Han residents of Tibetan areas did not experience the same difficulties. 

Authorities denied Tibetan blogger and poet Woeser’s passport application, preventing her from receiving the Secretary of State’s International Women of Courage 

award in person. According to an RFA report, in June authorities placed Woeser 

and her husband under house arrest for speaking up about conditions in Tibet 

ahead of a state-sponsored trip by foreign journalists to the TAR. 

Exile: The law neither provides for a citizen’s right to repatriate nor addresses 

exile. The government continued to refuse reentry to numerous Chinese citizens who 

were considered dissidents, Falun Gong activists, or ‘‘troublemakers.’’ Although authorities allowed some dissidents living abroad to return, dissidents released on 

medical parole and allowed to leave the country often were effectively exiled. Authorities imprisoned some activists residing abroad upon their return to the country. 

Emigration and Repatriation: The government continued to try to prevent many 

Tibetans and Uighurs from leaving the country and detained many who were apprehended in flight (see Tibet Annex). During the year 171 Tibetans transited the 

UNHCR reception center in Kathmandu. There also were reports of the forcible return of Uighur asylum seekers from Malaysia in 2012. Of a group of 20 Uighurs 

returned from Cambodia in 2009, three persons, a woman and two children, were 

reportedly freed, and in 2011, 16 others received prison sentences ranging from 16 

years to life. Chinese authorities continued to refuse to provide information regarding the whereabouts of the remaining individual. 

Protection of Refugees 

Access to Asylum: The law does not provide for the granting of refugee or asylee 

status, and the government did not establish a system for providing protection to 

refugees. Although the government does not grant refugee or asylee status, it allowed the UNHCR more latitude in assisting non-North Korean and non-Burmese 

refugees. The UNHCR office in Beijing recognized approximately 100 refugees from 

Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Eritrea and was processing approximately 100 additional individuals who requested refugee status. Because the PRC did not officially 

recognize these individuals as refugees, they remained in the country as illegal immigrants unable to work, with no access to education, and subject to deportation at 

any time. 

Refoulement: The government did not provide protection against the expulsion or 

forcible return of vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers, especially North Korean 

and Kachin refugees, to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened 

on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion. The government continued to consider all North Koreans 

‘‘economic migrants’’ rather than refugees or asylum seekers, and the UNHCR continued to have no access to North Korean or Burmese refugees inside China. The 

lack of access to durable solutions and options, as well as constant fear of forced 

repatriation by authorities, left North Korean refugees vulnerable to human traffickers. Reports of various exploitation schemes targeting North Korean refugees, 

such as forced marriages, forced labor, and prostitution, were common. The government continued to deny the UNHCR permission to operate along its borders with 

North Korea and Burma. 

Some North Koreans who entered diplomatic compounds in the country were permitted to travel to foreign countries after waiting for periods of up to two years. 

On May 27, there were reports that the government of Laos coordinated with the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to deport nine North Korean asylum 

seekers from Laos to China. On June 3, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated 

the nine individuals entered China on May 27 and subsequently left Beijing bound 

for the DPRK holding valid travel documents and visas. 

After two-time North Korean defector and South Korean citizen Kim Kwang-ho 

defected from North Korea to China for the second time, Chinese security officials 

in Yanji, Jilin Province, detained Kim, his wife Kim Ok-sil, and their daughter in 

July and held them until August before allowing them to return to South Korea. 

Chinese authorities reportedly repatriated to North Korea Kim’s North Korean 

brother- and sister-in-law, who defected with him. 

126 

Refugee Abuse: The intensified crackdown begun in 2008 against North Korean 

asylum seekers and refugees reportedly extended to harassment of religious communities along the border. The government arrested and detained individuals who provided food, shelter, transportation, and other assistance to North Koreans. According to reports some activists or brokers detained for assisting North Koreans were 

charged with human smuggling, and in some cases the North Koreans were forcibly 

returned. There were also reports that North Korean agents operated clandestinely 

within the country to repatriate North Korean citizens forcibly. According to press 

reports, some North Koreans detained by Chinese police faced repatriation unless 

they could pay bribes to secure their release. 

Access to Basic Services: Undocumented children of some North Korean asylum 

seekers and of mixed couples (i.e., one Chinese parent and one North Korean parent) did not have access to health care, public education, or other social services due 

to lack of legal status. 

Durable Solutions: The government largely cooperated with the UNHCR when 

dealing with the resettlement of ethnic Han Chinese or ethnic minorities from Vietnam and Laos who resided in the country since the Vietnam War era. During the 

year the government and the UNHCR continued discussions concerning the granting of citizenship to these long-term residents and their children, many of whom 

were born in China. 

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change 

Their Government 

The constitution states that ‘‘all power in the People’s Republic of China belongs 

to the people’’ and that the organs through which the people exercise state power 

are the NPC and the people’s congresses at provincial, district, and local levels. 

While the law provides citizens the right to change their government peacefully, citizens cannot freely choose or change the laws or officials that govern them. In fact 

the CCP controlled virtually all elections and continued to control appointments to 

positions of political power. 

Elections and Political Participation 

Recent Elections: The NPC, composed of up to 3,000 deputies, elects the president 

and vice president, the premier and vice premiers, and the chairman of the State 

Central Military Commission. The NPC Standing Committee, which consisted of 175 

members, oversaw these elections and determined the agenda and procedures for 

the NPC. 

The NPC Standing Committee remained under the direct authority of the CCP, 

and most legislative decisions require the concurrence of the CCP’s seven-member 

Politburo Standing Committee. Despite its broad authority under the state constitution, the NPC did not set policy independently or remove political leaders without 

the CCP’s approval. 

According to Ministry of Civil Affairs statistics, almost all of the country’s more 

than 600,000 villages had implemented direct elections for members of local subgovernmental organizations known as village committees. The direct election of officials by ordinary citizens remained narrow in scope and strictly confined to the local 

level. The government estimated that serious procedural flaws marred one-third of 

all elections. Corruption, vote buying, and interference by township-level and CCP 

officials continued to be problems. The law permits each voter to cast proxy votes 

for up to three other voters. 

The election law governs legislative bodies at all levels, although compliance and 

enforcement was uneven across the country. Under this law citizens have the opportunity every five years to vote for local people’s congress representatives at the 

county level and below, although in most cases higher-level government officials or 

CCP cadres controlled the nomination of candidates in those elections. At higher 

levels legislators selected people’s congress delegates from among their ranks. For 

example, provincial-level people’s congresses selected delegates to the NPC. Local 

CCP secretaries generally served concurrently within the leadership team of the 

local people’s congress, thus strengthening CCP control over legislatures. 

In 2012 the local governments kept most independent candidates - those without 

official government backing - off the ballots despite their meeting nomination criteria. No declared independent candidates won election in 2012. Election officials 

pressured independent candidates to renounce their candidacies, manipulated the 

ballot to exclude independent candidates, refused to disclose electorate information 

to independent candidates, and sometimes adjusted electoral districts to dilute voter 

support for independent candidates. 

127 

In September an independent People’s Congress candidate from Foshan City, 

Guangdong Province, who was detained in 2011 during the People’s Congress representative elections that year on a charge of undermining elections, was tried and 

found guilty of ‘‘disrupting elections.’’ According to open source websites, hundreds 

of her supporters who wanted to observe her trial were denied access to the court. 

Political Parties: Official statements asserted, ‘‘The political party system [that] 

China has adopted is multi-party cooperation and political consultation under’’ CCP 

leadership. The CCP, however, retained a monopoly on political power, and the government forbade the creation of new political parties. The government officially recognized nine parties founded prior to 1949, and parties other than the CCP held 

30 percent of the seats in the NPC. Activists attempting to support unofficial parties 

were arrested, detained, or confined. 

In 2009 in Hunan Province, dissident Xie Changfa, who tried to organize a national meeting of the banned CDP, was sentenced to 13 years in prison. Guo Quan, 

a former Nanjing University professor and founder of the China New Democracy 

Party, remained imprisoned following his 2009 sentence to 10 years in prison and 

three years’ deprivation of political rights for ‘‘subversion of state power.’’ Guo published articles criticizing the country’s one-party system. Other current or former 

CDP members, including Yang Tianshui, remained in prison or in RTL camps for 

their calls for political reform and their affiliation with the CDP. 

Participation of Women and Minorities: While the government placed no special 

restrictions on the participation of women or minority groups in the political process, women held few positions of significant influence in the CCP or government 

structure. Among the 2,987 delegates of the 11th NPC (term 2008-13), 637 were 

women (21 percent). 

Ten women occupied ministerial or higher-ranked positions. 

According to government-provided information, there were more than 230 female 

provincial and ministerial officials, 10 percent of the overall total; 670 female mayors and vice mayors, twice the number from 1995; and one provincial governor, Li 

Bin in Anhui Province (until June). A total of 37 women were members of provincial 

standing committees, constituting 9 percent of standing committee members. Following the 18th Party Congress in November, two women were members of the 

CCP’s 25-member Politburo. There were no women in the Standing Committee of 

the Politburo. There were approximately 15 million female CCP cadres, approximately one-fifth of the party’s membership. 

The government encouraged women to exercise their right to vote in village committee elections and to run in those elections, although only a small fraction of elected members were women. In many locations a seat on the village committee was 

reserved for a woman, who was usually given responsibility for family planning. The 

election law provides a general mandate for quotas for female and ethnic minority 

representatives, but achieving these quotas often required election authorities to 

violate the election procedures specified in the election law. During the 2011-12 local 

people’s congresses elections, many electoral districts in which independent candidates campaigned used these quotas as justification to thwart the independent 

candidacies. 

A total of 411 delegates from 55 ethnic minorities were members of 11th NPC, 

accounting for 14 percent of the total number of delegates. All of the country’s officially recognized minority groups were represented. 

The 18th Communist Party Congress elected 10 members of ethnic minority 

groups as members of the Central Committee. 

The only ministerial-level post held by an ethnic minority member was in the 

State Ethnic Affairs Commission, headed by Yang Jing, an ethnic Mongol from 

Inner Mongolia. Until November 2012 Hui Liangyu of the Hui ethnic group was a 

member of the Politburo. Minorities held few senior CCP or government positions 

of significant influence (see also section 6, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities). 

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government 

Although according to the law officials face criminal penalties for corruption, the 

government did not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged 

in corrupt practices with impunity. Many cases of corruption involved areas heavily 

regulated by the government, such as land-usage rights, real estate, and infrastructure development, which were susceptible to fraud, bribery, and kickbacks. Court 

judgments often could not be enforced against powerful special entities, including 

government departments, state-owned enterprises, military personnel, and some 

members of the CCP. 

128 

While corruption remained a serious problem, there were increasing indications 

that the government recognized the seriousness of the problem. 

In January the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the CCP’s 

leading body for countering corruption among members, reported that it had investigated 155,144 corruption-related cases and closed 153,704 of them and that the 

CCP and government had disciplined 160,718 officials. 

In October the Supreme People’s Procuratorate reported that prosecutors nationwide had investigated 18,283 cases involving bribery and major embezzlement from 

January to August. Among the suspects were 129 officials at the director general 

level and above. 

In December the CCP Central Committee unveiled a five-year plan to punish and 

prevent corruption. On December 26, the CCDI reported it had punished 25,855 individuals for breaches to antibureaucracy and formalism rules during the year, including 6,247 CCP officials. 

In February 2012 the NPC’s Standing Committee amended the criminal law to 

make citizens and companies paying bribes to foreign government officials and officials of international public organizations subject to criminal punishments of up to 

10 years’ imprisonment and a fine. 

In October 2012 the government established a ‘‘frugal working style’’ rule barring 

government officials from spending public money on luxury items such as lavish 

banquets and luxury cars and from accepting expensive gifts. In September the government banned officials from using public money to send mooncakes as gifts and 

in December published regulations that banned dishes containing shark fin, bird 

nests, and wild animal products from official banquets. In December the government 

issued guidelines forbidding officials from chartering planes or flying in private or 

corporate jets overseas. 

In 2012 the Supreme People’s Court urged local courts to ban family members of 

officials and judges from being lawyers under the local court’s jurisdiction. Also in 

2012 the Higher People’s Court of Fujian Province forbade judges from meeting privately with representatives in a case. 

In February 2012 the Supreme People’s Procuratorate announced the availability 

of a national bribery database listing individuals and companies found guilty of certain offenses, including bribing an individual or entity, and facilitating bribery. 

Companies and individuals must apply in writing to have the procuratorate check 

nationwide to determine whether a particular individual or company has been convicted of bribery offenses in the PRC. Companies must provide a copy of their business license. 

In June 2012 the Supreme People’s Procuratorate stated it would strengthen 

measures to recover and freeze illegal assets transferred abroad by corrupt officials. 

Corruption: In numerous cases during the year, public officials and leaders of 

state-owned enterprises, who generally hold high CCP ranks, were investigated for 

corruption. In June the CCDI announced that Guo Yongxiang, a former deputy governor of Sichuan Province, was under investigation for suspected disciplinary violations. 

In July a Beijing court sentenced former railroads minister Liu Zhijun to death, 

with a two-year reprieve. Liu came under scrutiny for his mismanagement of the 

country’s high-speed train network. 

On August 26, the Ministry of Supervision announced that Wang Yongchun, a 

vice president at state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation and the general manager of Daqing oilfield in Heilongjiang Province, was being investigated for 

‘‘severe disciplinary violations.’’ 

In September the Beijing Municipal People’s Procuratorate confirmed that it had 

indicted former Jilin vice governor Tian Xueren on corruption charges but did not 

provide a trial date or information about the specific charges against him. Tian was 

reported to have been stripped of both his party membership and government position for taking bribes. 

In December the CCDI investigated Vice-Minister of Public Security Li 

Dongsheng for ‘‘suspected serious law and discipline violations.’’ 

Notable organizations that worked to address official corruption included the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Ministry of Supervision, the National 

Bureau of Corruption Prevention, the International Association of Anti-Corruption 

Authorities, and the Anti-Corruption and Governance Research Center at Tsinghua 

University. 

129 

Whistleblower Protection: In 1991 the Supreme People’s Procuratorate published 

the Regulation to Protect Citizen’s Whistleblowing Rights. Whistleblowing protections are also included in various criminal and labor laws. Legal experts opined, 

however, that the constellation of laws and regulations did not provide adequate 

protections to whistleblowers. In September the government created an official 

website for citizens to report fraud, graft, and government mismanagement, with 

priority given to those who provide their real names and contact information. The 

government does not provide legal protection for whistleblowers who do not use official channels. 

Financial Disclosure: A 2010 regulation requires officials in government agencies 

or state-owned enterprises at the county level or above to report their ownership 

of property, including that in their spouses’ or children’s names, as well as their 

families’ investments in financial assets and enterprises. According to Article 23 of 

the regulations, the monitoring bodies are the CCDI, the Organization Department 

of the CCP, and the Ministry of Supervision. The regulations do not state that declarations are to be made public. Instead, they are to go to a higher administrative 

level and a human resource department. Punishments for not declaring information 

vary from education on the regulations, warning talks, and adjusting one’s work position to being relieved of one’s position. Regulations further state that officials 

should report all income, including allowances, subsidies and bonuses, as well as income from other jobs such as giving lectures, writing, consulting, reviewing articles, 

painting, and calligraphy. Officials, their spouses, and the children who live with 

them also should report their real estate properties and financial investments. Government officials should report their marriage status, records of private travel 

abroad, marriage status of their children, and whether their spouses are from Hong 

Kong, Taiwan, or a foreign country. They must report whether their children live 

abroad, as well as the work status of their children and grandchildren (including 

those who live abroad). Officials are required to file reports annually and must report changes of personal status within 30 days. 

In December 2012 officials announced that Guangdong Province would pilot a program in select districts requiring all CCP and government officials to report their 

assets publicly, with officials who refuse to do so to be relieved of their posts and 

subjected to further investigations. This program was not put into practice by year’s 

end. 

Public Access to Information: Open-government information regulations allow citizens to request information from the government. The regulations require government authorities to create formal channels for information requests and to include 

an appeal process if requests are rejected or not answered. They stipulate that administrative agencies should reply to requests immediately to the extent possible. 

Otherwise, the administrative agency should provide the information within 15 

working days, with the possibility of a maximum extension of an additional 15 days. 

In cases in which third-party rights and interests are involved, the time needed to 

consult the third party does not count against the time limits. According to the regulations, administrative agencies may collect only cost-based fees (as determined by 

the State Council) for searching, photocopying, postage, and similar expenses when 

disclosing government information on request. Citizens requesting information can 

also apply for a fee reduction or exemption. The regulations include exceptions for 

state secrets, commercial secrets, and individual privacy. 

Publicly released provincial- and national-level statistics for open-government information requests showed wide disparities across localities, levels of government, 

and departments in numbers of requests filed and official documents released in response. 

If information requestors believe that an administrative agency has violated the 

regulations, they can report it to the next higher-level administrative agency, the 

supervision agency, or the department in charge of open-government information. In 

2011 the Supreme People’s Court ruled that citizens can sue any government department that refused to provide unclassified information. Shortly thereafter a 

Tsinghua University graduate student sued three government ministries after her 

requests for information regarding the duties of 14 ministries for use in her thesis 

were denied. A court delayed consideration of her case pending further research, 

and she withdrew her lawsuit after the ministries provided the requested information. 

Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights 

The government sought to maintain control over civil society groups, halt the 

emergence of independent NGOs, hinder the activities of civil society and rights’ acVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00133 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
130 

tivist groups, and prevent what it called the ‘‘Westernization’’ of the country. The 

government did not permit independent domestic NGOs to monitor openly or to 

comment on human rights conditions, and it harassed domestic NGOs. The government tended to be suspicious of independent organizations and scrutinized NGOs 

with financial and other links overseas. Most large NGOs were quasi-governmental, 

and many official NGOs had to be sponsored by government agencies. The NPC introduced new registration procedures in March that allowed certain types of nonadvocacy NGOs to register directly with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (see section 

2.b., Freedom of Association). 

An informal network of activists around the country continued to serve as a credible source of information about human rights violations. The information was disseminated through organizations such as the Hong Kong-based Information Center 

for Human Rights and Democracy, the foreign-based Human Rights in China, and 

Chinese Human Rights Defenders and via the internet. 

The government remained reluctant to accept criticism of its human rights record 

by other nations or international organizations. It criticized reports by international 

human rights monitoring groups, claiming that such reports were inaccurate and 

interfered with the country’s internal affairs. Representatives of some international 

human rights organizations reported that authorities denied their visa requests or 

restricted the length of visas issued to them. The government continued to participate in official diplomatic human rights dialogues with foreign governments although some governments encountered problems scheduling such dialogues. 

Government Human Rights Bodies: The government did not have a human rights 

ombudsman or commission. The government-established China Society for Human 

Rights was an NGO whose mandate is to defend the government’s human rights 

record. The government maintained that each country’s economic, social, cultural, 

and historical conditions influenced its approach to human rights. 

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons 

While there were laws designed to protect women, children, persons with disabilities, and minorities, some discrimination based on ethnicity, sex, disability, and 

other factors persisted. 

Women 

Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape is illegal, and some persons convicted of rape 

were executed. The penalties for rape can range from three years in prison to a 

death sentence with a two-year reprieve and forced labor. The law does not address 

spousal rape. The government did not make available official statistics on rape or 

sexual assault, leaving the scale of sexual violence difficult to determine. Migrant 

female workers were particularly vulnerable to sexual violence. 

Violence against women remained a significant problem. According to reports at 

least a quarter of families suffered from domestic violence, and more than 85 percent of the victims were women. Domestic violence against women included verbal 

and psychological abuse, restrictions on personal freedom, economic control, physical 

violence, and rape. The government supported shelters for victims of domestic violence, and some courts provided protections to victims, including through restraining orders prohibiting a perpetrator of domestic violence from coming near a victim. 

In March, Shaanxi Province designated the Number Two People’s Hospital as an 

antidomestic violence service station to treat victims of domestic violence, the first 

designation of its kind. Nonetheless, official assistance did not always reach victims, 

and public security forces often ignored domestic violence. In 2010 the All China 

Women’s Federation (ACWF) reported that it received 50,000 domestic violence complaints annually. Spousal abuse typically went unreported, and an ACWF study 

found that only 7 percent of rural women who suffered domestic violence sought 

help from police. Almost 30 percent of respondents in a recent study felt that domestic violence should be kept a private matter. 

While domestic violence tended to be more prevalent in rural areas, it also occurred among the highly educated urban population. The ACWF reported that approximately one-quarter of the 400,000 divorces registered each year were the result 

of family violence. 

According to ACWF statistics nationwide in 2008 there were 12,000 special police 

booths for domestic violence complaints, 400 shelters for victims of domestic violence, and 350 examination centers for women claiming injuries from domestic violence. Many domestic violence shelters had inadequate facilities, required extensive 

documentation, or went unused. The government operated most shelters, some with 

NGO participation. In 2012 the government provided 680,000 office spaces in government buildings for women’s resource centers. 

131 

There was no strong legal mechanism to protect women from domestic abuse. According to the ACWF, laws related to domestic violence were flawed since there was 

no national provision for dealing with offenders. During the year the creation of 

such mechanisms was added to the NPC’s legislative agenda, the fifth time the 

ACWF submitted such a proposal. Both the marriage law and the law on the protection of women’s rights and interests have stipulations that directly prohibit domestic 

violence, but some experts complained that the stipulations were too general, failed 

to define domestic violence, and were difficult to implement. Because of standards 

of evidence, even if certain that domestic violence was occurring, a judge could not 

rule against the abuser without the abuser’s confession. Only 10 percent of accused 

abusers confessed to violent behavior, according to 2009 data from the Institute of 

Applied Laws. The institute reported that, although 40 to 60 percent of marriage 

and family cases involved domestic violence, less than 30 percent were able to supply indirect evidence, including photographs, hospital records, police records, or children’s testimony. Witnesses seldom testified in court. 

Public support increased in the fight against domestic violence. A recent survey 

found that more than 85 percent of respondents believed that further antidomestic 

violence legislation was needed. A high-profile case, Kim Lee’s case against her celebrity husband, Li Yang, led to public outcry when she posted pictures of her injuries on a social networking site. After months of waiting, Lee was granted a civil 

protection order forbidding her husband from approaching within 200 yards of her. 

In February a Beijing court granted Lee a divorce on the grounds of domestic abuse 

and issued a three-month protection order against her former husband. This case 

set a precedent because the court acknowledged domestic violence as grounds for divorce, granted a protection order, and ordered the former husband to pay compensation for the violence she had endured during their marriage. 

Sexual Harassment: The law bans sexual harassment, and the number of sexual 

harassment complaints increased significantly. A 2009 Harvard University study 

showed that 80 percent of working women in the country experienced sexual harassment at some stage of their careers. The same study found that only 30 percent of 

sexual harassment claims by women achieved favorable resolutions. In November an 

NGO published its survey of female manufacturing workers in Guangzhou, which 

indicated that as much as 70 percent of Guangzhou’s female workforce had been 

sexually harassed. Approximately half did not pursue legal or administrative actions, while 15 percent of respondents reported leaving the workplace to escape their 

harasser. 

Sexual harassment was not limited to the workplace. According to a China Youth 

Daily survey reported in September, approximately 14 percent of women had been 

sexually harassed while riding the subway, and 82 percent of those polled believed 

the problem existed. At a Hainan Province festival in 2012, a dozen women were 

pinned down by a crowd of men who mauled the women and stripped off their 

clothes in broad daylight. Police escorted the women away and, according to press 

reports, subsequently detained six suspects in the assault. 

According to information on the ACWF website, the internet and hotlines made 

it easier for women who were sexually harassed to obtain useful information and 

legal service. A Beijing rights lawyer told the ACWF that approximately 

100-200 million women in the country had suffered or were suffering sexual harassment in the workplace but that very few legal service centers provided counseling. 

Reproductive Rights: The government restricted the rights of parents to choose 

the number of children they have. Although national law prohibits the use of physical coercion to compel persons to submit to abortion or sterilization, intense pressure to meet birth-limitation targets set by government regulations resulted in instances of local family-planning officials’ using physical coercion to meet government 

goals. Such practices included the mandatory use of birth control and the abortion 

of unauthorized pregnancies. In the case of families that already had two children, 

one parent was often pressured to undergo sterilization. 

The National Population and Family Planning Commission reported that 13 million women annually underwent abortions caused by unplanned pregnancies. An official news media outlet also reported at least an additional 10 million chemically 

induced abortions or abortions performed in nongovernment facilities. Government 

statistics on the percentage of all abortions that were nonelective was not available. 

According to Health Ministry data released in March 2012, a total of 336 million 

abortions and 222 million sterilizations had been carried out since 1971. 

The national family-planning authorities shifted their emphasis from lowering fertility rates to maintaining low fertility rates and emphasized quality of care in famVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
132 

ily-planning practices. In 2010 a representative of the National Population and 

Family Planning Commission reported that 85 percent of women of childbearing age 

used contraception. Of those, 70 percent used a reversible method. A survey taken 

in September, however, found that only 12 percent of women between the ages of 

20 and 35 had a proper understanding of contraceptive methods. The country’s 

birth-limitation policies retained harshly coercive elements in law and practice. The 

financial and administrative penalties for unauthorized births were strict. 

The 2002 national population and family-planning law standardized the implementation of the government’s birth-limitation policies, although enforcement varied 

significantly. The law grants married couples the right to have one birth and allows 

couples to apply for permission to have a second child if they meet conditions stipulated in local and provincial regulations. The one-child limit was more strictly applied in urban areas, where only couples meeting certain conditions were permitted 

to have a second child (e.g., if both of the would-be parents were an only child). In 

most rural areas couples were permitted to have a second child in cases where their 

first child was a girl. Ethnic minorities were subject to less stringent rules. Nationwide 35 percent of families fell under the one-child restrictions, and more than 60 

percent of families were eligible to have a second child, either outright or if they 

met certain criteria. The remaining 5 percent were eligible to have more than two 

children. According to government statistics, the average fertility rate for women 

nationwide was 1.8, and in the country’s most populous and prosperous city, Shanghai, the fertility rate was 0.8. In December the NPC Standing Committee amended 

the one-child policy to allow couples in which at least one spouse is an only child 

to have two children. 

The National Population and Family Planning Commission reported that all provinces eliminated the birth-approval requirement before a first child is conceived, but 

provinces may still continue to require parents to ‘‘register’’ pregnancies prior to giving birth to their first child. This registration requirement could be used as a de 

facto permit system in some provinces, since some local governments continued to 

mandate abortion for single women who became pregnant. Provinces and localities 

imposed fines of various amounts on unwed mothers. 

Regulations requiring women who violate family-planning policy to terminate 

their pregnancies still exist in Liaoning and Heilongjiang provinces. Other provinces 

- Fujian, Guizhou, Guangdong, Gansu, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Shanxi, and Shaanxi - require unspecified ‘‘remedial measures’’ to deal with unauthorized pregnancies. A 

number of online media reports indicated that migrant women applying for household registration in Guangzhou were required to have an intrauterine contraceptive 

device (IUD) implanted. 

In October, Western media reported that officials from the Shandong Province 

Family Planning Commission forced their way into the home of Liu Xinwen, 

dragged her to a nearby hospital, and injected her with an abortion-inducing drug. 

Shandong officials reportedly forced Liu, who was six months into her pregnancy, 

to sign a document stating that she had agreed to the abortion. 

The government continued to impose ‘‘child-raising fees’’ on violators of the onechild policy. In the first half of the year, for example, Guangzhou City collected 

more than RMB 300 million ($49 million) in such fees without disclosing how the 

money was used. Guangdong Province reportedly refused to disclose the amount of 

fees it had collected from one-child policy violators. Family planning officials in 

Tunchang County, Hainan Province, used fines and terminated employment as punishment for one-child policy violators. 

On December 30, overseas media reported that officials at Nurluq Hospital in 

Keriye County of Xinjiang’s Hotan Prefecture carried out forced abortions on four 

pregnant women. According to the report, the deputy chief of Hotan’s Arish Township confirmed that authorities had carried out four of six planned abortions utilizing abortion-inducing drugs. One woman escaped and another was in the hospital 

awaiting the procedure, the report stated. The head of the township’s Family Planning Department stated the abortions were carried out following orders from higher 

authorities. The husband of one victim stated that his wife had been seven months’ 

pregnant when the procedure was performed and that the baby had been born alive 

before succumbing to the effects of the chemical toxins hours later. 

The law requires each parent of an unapproved child to pay a ‘‘social compensation fee,’’ which can reach 10 times a person’s annual disposable income. 

Social compensation fees were set and assessed at the local level. The law requires family-planning officials to obtain court approval before taking ‘‘forcible’’ action, such as detaining family members or confiscating and destroying property of 

families who refuse to pay social compensation fees. This requirement was not alVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
133 

ways followed, and national authorities remained ineffective at reducing abuses by 

local officials. 

The population control policy relied on education, propaganda, and economic incentives, as well as on more coercive measures. Those who had an unapproved child 

or helped another do so faced disciplinary measures such as social compensation 

fees, job loss or demotion, loss of promotion opportunity, expulsion from the CCP 

(membership is an unofficial requirement for certain jobs), and other administrative 

punishments, including in some cases the destruction of private property. 

It continued to be illegal in almost all provinces for a single woman to have a 

child, with fines levied for violations. The law states that family-planning bureaus 

conduct pregnancy tests on married women and provide them with unspecified ‘‘follow-up’’ services. Some provinces fined women who did not undergo periodic pregnancy tests. 

Officials at all levels remained subject to rewards or penalties based on meeting 

the population goals set by their administrative region. Promotions for local officials 

depended in part on meeting population targets. Linking job promotion with an official’s ability to meet or exceed such targets provided a powerful structural incentive 

for officials to employ coercive measures to meet population goals. An administrative 

reform process initiated pilot programs in some localities that removed this criterion 

for evaluating officials’ performance. 

Although the family-planning law states that officials should not violate citizens’ 

rights in the enforcement of family-planning policy, these rights, as well as penalties 

for violating them, are not clearly defined. By law citizens may sue officials who exceed their authority in implementing birth-planning policy, but few protections for 

whistleblowers against retaliation from local officials exist (see section 4, Whistleblower Protection). The law provides significant and detailed sanctions for officials 

who help persons evade the birth limitations. 

According to online reports, women who registered newborns in Nanhai District, 

Foshan, Guangdong Province, were requested to insert an IUD. Many posted online 

complaints that officials threatened not to register the baby if the mother did not 

comply, even when the newborn was the mother’s only child. Other reports indicated 

that a mother could not enroll her child in school if she was unwilling to insert an 

IUD. 

Discrimination: The constitution states that ‘‘women enjoy equal rights with men 

in all spheres of life.’’ The Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests 

provides for equality in ownership of property, inheritance rights, access to education, and equal pay for equal work. The ACWF was the leading implementer of 

women’s policy for the government, and the State Council’s National Working Committee on Children and Women coordinated women’s policy. Many activists and observers expressed concern that discrimination was increasing. Women continued to 

report that discrimination, sexual harassment, unfair dismissal, demotion, and wage 

discrepancies were significant problems. 

Authorities often did not enforce laws protecting the rights of women. According 

to legal experts, it was difficult to litigate sex-discrimination suits because of vague 

legal definitions. Some observers noted that the agencies tasked with protecting 

women’s rights tended to focus on maternity-related benefits and wrongful termination during maternity leave rather than on sex discrimination, violence against 

women, and sexual harassment. 

Despite government policies mandating nondiscrimination in employment and remuneration, women reportedly earned 66 percent as much as men. The Ministry of 

Human Resources and Social Security and the local labor bureaus are responsible 

for ensuring that enterprises complied with the labor law and the employment promotion law, each of which contains antidiscrimination provisions. 

Many employers preferred to hire men to avoid the expense of maternity leave 

and childcare (paid paternity leave exists for men in some localities, but there is 

no national provision for paternity leave). Work units were allowed to impose an 

earlier mandatory retirement age for women than for men, and some employers lowered the effective retirement age for female workers to 50. In general the official 

retirement age for men was 60 and for women 55. Lower retirement ages also reduced pensions, which generally were based on the number of years worked. Job advertisements for women sometimes specified height and age requirements. 

Women’s rights advocates indicated that in rural areas women often forfeited land 

and property rights to their husbands in divorce proceedings. Rural contract law 

and laws protecting women’s rights stipulate that women enjoy equal rights in cases 

of land management, but experts argued that this was rarely the case due to the 

134 

complexity of the law and difficulties in its implementation. A 2011 interpretation 

of the country’s marriage law by the Supreme People’s Court exacerbated the gender 

wealth gap by stating that, after divorce, marital property belongs solely to the person registered as the homeowner in mortgage and registration documents - in most 

cases the husband. In determining child custody in divorce cases, judges make determinations based on the following guidelines: Children under age two should live 

with their mothers; custody of children two to nine years of age should be determined by who can provide the most stable living arrangement; and children 10 and 

over should be consulted when determining custody. 

A high female suicide rate continued to be a serious problem. There were approximately 590 female suicides per day, according to a report released in September 

2012 by the Chinese Center for Disease and Control and Prevention. This was more 

than the approximately 500 per day reported in 2009. The report noted that the suicide rate for women was three times higher than for men. Many observers believed 

that violence against women and girls, discrimination in education and employment, 

the traditional preference for male children, birth-limitation policies, and other societal factors contributed to the high female suicide rate. Women in rural areas, 

where the suicide rate for women was three to four times higher than for men, were 

especially vulnerable. 

The World Bank reported that in 2009, 99 percent of women between the ages 

of 15 and 24 were literate, with a literacy rate of 91 percent for women above 15 

compared with 97 percent for men above 15. 

Women faced discrimination in higher education. The required score for the National Higher Entrance Exam was lower for men than for women at several universities. According to 2010 Ministry of Education statistics, women accounted for 49.6 

percent of undergraduate students and 50.3 percent of master’s students in 2012 but 

only 35 percent of doctoral students. Women with advanced degrees reported discrimination in the hiring process, since the job distribution system became more 

competitive and market driven. 

Gender-based Sex Selection: According to the 2010 national census, the national 

average male-female sex ratio at birth was 118 to 100. Sex identification and sexselective abortion were prohibited, but the practices continued because of traditional 

preference for male children and the birth-limitation policy. 

Children 

Birth Registration: Citizenship is derived from parents. Parents must register 

their children in compliance with the national household registration system within 

one month of birth. Unregistered children cannot access public services. No data 

was available on the number of unregistered births. 

Education: Although the law provides for nine years of compulsory education for 

children, in economically disadvantaged rural areas many children did not attend 

school for the required period; some never attended. Although public schools were 

not allowed to charge tuition, faced with insufficient local and central government 

funding, many schools continued to charge miscellaneous fees. Such fees and other 

school-related expenses made it difficult for poorer families and some migrant workers to send their children to school. 

In 2010 the official literacy rate for youth (defined as persons between the ages 

of 15 and 24) was 99 percent. The proportion of girls attending school in rural and 

minority areas was reportedly smaller than in cities. In rural areas 61 percent of 

boys and 43 percent of girls completed education at a grade higher than lower middle school. The government reported that nearly 20 million children of migrant laborers followed their parents to urban areas. Denied access to state-run schools, 

most children of migrant workers who attended school did so at unlicensed and 

poorly equipped schools. 

Medical Care: Female babies suffered from a higher mortality rate than male babies, which was contrary to the worldwide norm. State media reported that infant 

mortality rates in rural areas were 27 percent higher for girls than boys and that 

neglect was one factor in their lower survival rate. 

Child Abuse: The physical abuse of children can be grounds for criminal prosecution. Kidnapping, buying, and selling children for adoption increased during the 

past several years, particularly in poor rural areas. There were no reliable estimates 

of the number of children kidnapped, but according to media reports as many as 

20,000 children were kidnapped every year for illegal adoption. Most children kidnapped internally were sold to couples unable to have children. Those convicted of 

buying an abducted child may be sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. In the 

past most children rescued were boys, but increased demand for children reportedly 

135 

drove traffickers to focus on girls as well. The Ministry of Public Security maintained a DNA database of parents of missing children and children recovered in law 

enforcement operations in an effort to reunite families. 

Forced and Early Marriage: The legal minimum age for marriage is 22 for men 

and 20 for women. Child marriage was not known to be a problem, but there were 

reports of babies sold to be future brides. For example, families would adopt and 

raise babies for eventual marriage to their sons. 

Sexual Exploitation of Children: By law those who force young girls under age 14 

into prostitution may be sentenced to 10 years to life in prison, in addition to a fine 

or confiscation of property. If the case is especially serious, violators can receive a 

life sentence or be sentenced to death, in addition to confiscation of property. Those 

inducing girls under age 14 into prostitution can be sentenced to five years or more 

in prison in addition to a fine. Those who visit female prostitutes under age 14 are 

subject to five years or more in prison in addition to paying a fine. 

According to the law the minimum age for consensual sex is 14. 

Pornography of any kind, including child pornography, is illegal. Under the criminal code, those producing, reproducing, publishing, selling, or disseminating obscene 

materials with the purpose of making a profit may be sentenced up to three years 

in prison or put under criminal detention or surveillance in addition to paying a 

fine. Offenders in serious cases may receive prison sentences of three to 10 years 

in addition to paying a fine. In especially serious cases offenders are to be sentenced 

to 10 years or more in prison or given a life sentence in addition to a fine or confiscation of property. Persons found disseminating obscene books, magazines, films, 

audio or video products, pictures, or other kinds of obscene materials, if the case 

is serious, may be sentenced up to two years in prison or put under criminal detention or surveillance. Persons organizing the broadcast of obscene motion pictures or 

other audio or video products may be sentenced up to three years in prison or put 

under criminal detention or surveillance in addition to paying a fine. If the case is 

serious they are to be sentenced to three to 10 years in prison in addition to paying 

a fine. 

Those broadcasting or showing obscene materials to minors less than age 18 are 

to be ‘‘severely punished.’’ 

Infanticide or Infanticide of Children with Disabilities: The Law on the Protection 

of Juveniles forbids infanticide, but there was evidence that the practice continued. 

According to the National Population and Family-planning Commission, a handful 

of doctors were charged with infanticide under this law. Female infanticide, sex-selective abortions, and the abandonment and neglect of baby girls remained problems 

due to the traditional preference for sons and the coercive birth-limitation policy. 

Displaced Children: There were between 150,000 and one million urban street 

children, according to state-run media. This number was even higher if the children 

of migrant workers who spent the day on the streets were included. In 2010 the 

ACWF reported that the number of children in rural areas left behind by their migrant-worker parents totaled 58 million, 40 million under the age of 14. 

Institutionalized Children: The law forbids the mistreatment or abandonment of 

children. The vast majority of children in orphanages were girls, many of whom 

were abandoned. Boys in orphanages were usually disabled or in poor health. Medical professionals sometimes advised parents of children with disabilities to put the 

children into orphanages. 

The government denied that children in orphanages were mistreated or refused 

medical care but acknowledged that the system often was unable to provide adequately for some children, particularly those with serious medical problems. Adopted children were counted under the birth-limitation regulations in most locations. 

As a result, couples who adopted abandoned infant girls were sometimes barred 

from having additional children. 

International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague 

Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. For information 

see the Department of State’s report at travel.state.gov/abduction/resources/ 

congressreport/congressreport—4308.html. 

Anti-Semitism 

There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts during the year. The government does 

not recognize Judaism as an ethnicity or religion. According to information from the 

Jewish Virtual Library, the country’s Jewish population was 2,500 in 2012. 

Trafficking in Persons 

136 

See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/ 

tip/. 

Persons with Disabilities 

The law protects the rights of persons with disabilities and prohibits discrimination, but conditions for such persons lagged far behind legal dictates and failed to 

provide persons with disabilities access to programs intended to assist them. 

According to Article 3 of the Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons, ‘‘disabled 

persons are entitled to enjoyment of equal rights as other citizens in political, economic, cultural and social fields, in family life and other aspects. The rights of disabled persons as citizens and their personal dignity are protected by law. Discrimination against, insult of, and infringement upon disabled persons is prohibited.’’ 

The Ministry of Civil Affairs and the China Disabled Persons Federation (CDPF), 

a government-organized civil association, are the main entities responsible for persons with disabilities. In June the CDPF stated that, based on 2010 census figures, 

85 million persons with disabilities lived in the country. According to government 

statistics, in 2011 there were 5,254 vocational training facilities, which provided 

training for 299,000 persons with disabilities. Of the 32 million persons with disabilities of working age, more than 22 million were employed. Government statistics 

stated that 7.4 million persons with disabilities enjoyed ‘‘minimum-life-guarantee’’ 

stipends, and nearly three million had social insurance. 

The law prohibits discrimination against minors with disabilities and codifies a 

variety of judicial protections for juveniles. In 2007 the Ministry of Education reported that nationwide there were 1,618 schools for children with disabilities. According to NGOs, there were approximately 20 million children with disabilities, 

only 2 percent of whom had access to education that could meet their needs. 

According to the CDPF, in 2010 more than 519,000 school-age children with disabilities received compulsory education, 68 percent of them in inclusive education, 

and 32 percent in 1,705 special schools and 2,775 special classes. NGOs claimed 

that, while the overall school enrollment rate was 99 percent, only 75 percent of 

children with disabilities were enrolled in school. Nationwide, an estimated 243,000 

school-age children with disabilities did not attend school. In 2011 a total of 7,150 

persons with disabilities were admitted to standard colleges and universities. 

Nearly 100,000 organizations existed, mostly in urban areas, to serve those with 

disabilities and protect their legal rights. The government, at times in conjunction 

with NGOs, sponsored programs to integrate persons with disabilities into society. 

Misdiagnosis, inadequate medical care, stigmatization, and abandonment remained common problems. According to reports doctors frequently persuaded parents of children with disabilities to place their children in large government-run institutions where care was often inadequate. Those parents who chose to keep children with disabilities at home generally faced difficulty finding adequate medical 

care, day care, and education for their children. Government statistics showed that 

almost one-quarter of persons with disabilities lived in extreme poverty. 

In part as a result of discrimination, unemployment among adults with disabilities remained a serious problem. The law requires local governments to offer incentives to enterprises that hire persons with disabilities. Regulations in some parts 

of the country also require employers to pay into a national fund for persons with 

disabilities when the employees with disabilities do not make up the statutory minimum percentage of the total workforce. 

Standards adopted for making roads and buildings accessible to persons with disabilities are subject to the Law on the Handicapped, which calls for their ‘‘gradual’’ 

implementation. Compliance with the law was limited. The law permits universities 

to exclude candidates with disabilities who were otherwise qualified. 

The law forbids the marriage of persons with certain mental disabilities, such as 

schizophrenia. If doctors find that a couple is at risk of transmitting congenital disabilities to their children, the couple may marry only if they agree to use birth control or undergo sterilization. The law stipulates that local governments must employ 

such practices to raise the percentage of births of children without disabilities. 

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities 

Most minority groups resided in areas they traditionally inhabited. Government 

policy calls for members of recognized minorities to receive preferential treatment 

in birth planning, university admission, access to loans, and employment. Nonetheless, the substance and implementation of ethnic minority policies remained poor, 

and discrimination against minorities remained widespread. 

137 

Minority groups in border and other regions had less access to education than 

their Han counterparts, faced job discrimination in favor of Han migrants, and 

earned incomes well below those in other parts of the country. Government development programs often disrupted traditional living patterns of minority groups and included, in some cases, the forced relocation of persons. Han Chinese benefited disproportionately from government programs and economic growth. As part of its emphasis on building a ‘‘harmonious society’’ and maintaining social stability, the government downplayed racism and institutional discrimination against minorities, 

which remained the source of deep resentment in the XUAR, the Inner Mongolia 

Autonomous Region (IMAR), the TAR, and other Tibetan areas. 

Ethnic minorities represented approximately 14 percent of delegates to the NPC 

and more than 15 percent of NPC Standing Committee members, according to an 

official report issued in 2011. A 2011 article in the official online news source for 

overseas readers stated that ethnic minorities comprised 41 percent of cadres in the 

Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, 25 percent of cadres in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, and 51 percent of cadres in the XUAR. According to a July 2012 article from the official Xinhua News Agency, 32 percent of cadres in Yunnan Province 

were members of an ethnic minority. A June 5 government report stated that, of 

the 296 civil servants Guangxi Province recruited in 2012, almost 60 percent were 

ethnic minorities. During the year all five of the country’s ethnic minority autonomous regions had chairmen (equivalent to the governor of a province) from minority 

groups. The CCP secretaries of these five autonomous regions were all Han. Han 

officials continued to hold the majority of the most powerful CCP and government 

positions in minority autonomous regions, particularly the XUAR. 

The government’s policy to encourage Han Chinese migration into minority areas 

significantly increased the population of Han in the XUAR. In recent decades the 

Han-Uighur ratio in the capital of Urumqi reversed from 20/80 to 80/20 and continued to be a source of Uighur resentment. Discriminatory hiring practices gave preference to Han and reduced job prospects for ethnic minorities. According to the 2010 

national census, 8.75 million, or 40 percent, of the XUAR’s 21.8 million official residents were Han. Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uighur, and other ethnic minorities constituted approximately 13 million XUAR residents, or 60 percent of the total population. Official statistics understated the Han population, because they did not count 

the tens of thousands of Han Chinese who were long-term ‘‘temporary workers.’’ As 

the government continued to promote Han migration into the XUAR and filled local 

jobs with domestic migrant labor, local officials coerced young Uighur women to participate in a government-sponsored labor transfer program to cities outside the 

XUAR, according to overseas human rights organizations. 

The XUAR government took measures to dilute expressions of Uighur identity, including reducing the use of ethnic minority languages in XUAR schools and instituting Mandarin Chinese language requirements that disadvantaged ethnic-minority teachers. The government continued to apply policies that prioritized standard 

Chinese for instruction in school, thereby reducing or eliminating ethnic-language 

instruction. The dominant use of Mandarin Chinese in government, commerce, and 

academia disadvantaged graduates of minority-language schools who lacked Mandarin Chinese proficiency. 

Authorities continued to implement repressive policies in the XUAR and targeted 

the region’s ethnic Uighur population. Officials in the XUAR continued to implement a pledge to crack down on the government-designated ‘‘three forces’’ of religious extremism, ‘‘splittism,’’ and terrorism, and they outlined efforts to launch a 

concentrated antiseparatist re-education campaign. Some raids, detentions, and judicial punishments ostensibly directed at individuals or organizations suspected of 

promoting the ‘‘three forces’’ appeared to be targeted at groups or individuals peacefully seeking to express their political or religious views. The government continued 

to repress Uighurs expressing peaceful political dissent and independent Muslim religious leaders, often citing counterterrorism as the reason for taking action. 

According to the 2013 China Law Yearbook, authorities in 2012 arrested 1,105 individuals for ‘‘endangering state security,’’ a 19 percent increase from 2011. The 

NGO Dui Hua estimated that arrests from Xinjiang accounted for 75 percent of ‘‘endangering state security’’ charges. 

Uighurs continued to be sentenced to long prison terms, and in some cases executed without due process, on charges of separatism and endangering state security. 

The government pressured foreign countries to repatriate Uighurs, who faced the 

risk of imprisonment and mistreatment upon return. Some Uighurs refouled to 

China have simply disappeared. 

138 

Freedom of assembly was severely limited during the year in the XUAR. For information about violations of religious freedom in Xinjiang, please see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/ 

rpt/. 

Reportedly at year’s end one son of exiled Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, president 

of the World Uighur Conference, whom the government blamed for orchestrating the 

2009 riots in Urumqi, remained in prison. 

Possession of publications or audiovisual materials discussing independence, autonomy, or other sensitive subjects was not permitted. Uighurs who remained in 

prison at year’s end for their peaceful expression of ideas the government found objectionable included Abduhelil Zunun. Reportedly, Uighur poet Nurmuhemmet 

Yasin, originally imprisoned in 2005, died in prison in 2011. 

XUAR and national-level officials defended the campaign against the three forces 

of religious extremism, ‘‘splittism,’’ and terrorism and other policies as necessary to 

maintain public order. Officials continued to use the threat of violence as justification for extreme security measures directed at the local population, journalists, and 

visiting foreigners. 

The law criminalizes discussion of separatism on the internet and prohibits use 

of the internet in any way that undermines national unity. It further bans inciting 

ethnic separatism or ‘‘harming social stability,’’ and requires internet service providers and network operators to set up monitoring systems or to strengthen existing 

ones and report violations of the law. 

Han control of the region’s political and economic institutions also contributed to 

heightened tension. Although government policies continued to allot economic investment in and brought economic improvements to the XUAR, Han residents received a disproportionate share of the benefits. Job advertisements often made clear 

that Uighur applicants would not be considered. 

Reuters News Agency reported that in November police used electric batons to 

prevent approximately 100 ethnic Mongols from attending the trial of six nomadic 

herders charged with sabotaging production and intentionally destroying property. 

Authorities arrested the six herders in June after a confrontation with employees 

of a state-owned forestry company. Protests against land seizures occurred throughout the year across the IMAR, resulting in detentions and police abuse, as the regional government sought to implement Beijing’s policy of resettling China’s nomadic population. 

Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on Sexual 

Orientation and Gender Identity 

No laws criminalize private consensual same-sex activities between adults. Due 

to societal discrimination and pressure to conform to family expectations, most gay, 

lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons refrained from publicly discussing their sexual orientation. Individual activists and organizations working on 

LGBT problems continued to report discrimination and harassment from authorities, similar to other organizations that accept funding from overseas. 

In June 2012 the Beijing LGBT center was notified by property management that 

its lease would be terminated early due to complaints that it was too noisy. Neighbors reportedly pressured management to terminate the lease after learning that it 

was an LGBT organization. The center was able to recoup only less than one-half 

of its investment of RMB 11,000 ($1,800) for the move. 

In September organizers of the China Charity Fair in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, told two gay rights advocacy groups that they could not display their advertisements and informational brochures because they were not registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. One of the advocacy groups attempting to participate reported 

that his organization unsuccessfully sought to register with the ministry for several 

years, despite making dozens of visits to local government offices. 

In contrast with 2012, there reportedly was no government interference with the 

seventh Beijing Queer Film Festival. Organizers kept a low profile. 

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination 

The law prohibits discrimination against persons carrying infectious diseases and 

allows such persons to work as civil servants. The law does not address some common types of discrimination in employment, including discrimination based on 

height, physical appearance, or ethnic identity. 

Despite provisions in the law, discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS and 

hepatitis B carriers (including 20 million chronic carriers) remained widespread in 

many areas, and local governments sometimes tried to suppress their activities. In 

139 

August 2012 a man who was refused employment after it was discovered he had 

hepatitis was awarded RMB 8,000 ($1,310) in damages by a Xi’an court. 

HIV/AIDS activist Wan Yanhai, founder and director of the Beijing-based NGO 

Aizhixing, remained overseas after leaving the country in 2010. The organization 

continued to come under pressure from the government. 

Western media reported that on May 30, Guangxi activist Ye Haiyan, who advocated for the rights of prostitutes and persons infected with HIV/AIDS, was beaten 

in her home by a group of 10 police officers before being detained at the local police 

station in Bobai County. 

While in the past, persons with HIV/AIDS were routinely denied admission to 

hospitals, discrimination was less overt, and some hospitals came up with excuses 

for not being able to treat them. The hospitals feared that, should the general population find out that they were treating HIV/AIDS patients, patients would choose 

to go elsewhere. It was common practice for general hospitals to refer patients to 

specialty hospitals working with infectious diseases 

International involvement in HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment, as well 

as central government pressure on local governments to respond appropriately, 

brought improvements in many localities. Some hospitals that previously refused to 

treat HIV/AIDS patients had active care and treatment programs because domestic 

and international training programs improved the understanding of local healthcare workers and their managers. In Beijing dozens of local community centers encouraged and facilitated HIV/AIDS support groups. 

In March 2012 Zhejiang Province eliminated its mandatory HIV testing for suspects arrested for drug charges, a move seen as a step in protecting the privacy of 

the individuals. 

On July 1, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region implemented new legislation requiring real name registration for HIV testing and obliging individuals who tested 

positive inform their spouses. 

Despite a 2010 nationwide rule banning mandatory hepatitis B virus tests in job 

and school admissions applications, 61 percent of state-run companies in 2011 continued to use hepatitis B testing as a part of their preemployment screen. 

A 2011 report from a Beijing-based NGO stated that 32 percent of kindergartens 

surveyed would refuse to enroll children infected with hepatitis B. 

In July 2012 a widely used public health website for persons infected with hepatitis was blocked within the country. The website had been blocked two times earlier, in 2007 and 2008. The website’s main goal is to eliminate discrimination of hepatitis carriers and provide a social forum to build awareness of the disease. 

In October the Ministry of Commerce posted online for public consultation draft 

regulations that would ban individuals with AIDS from entering public bathhouses. 

The draft regulations stipulated a fine of RMB 30,000 ($4,910) for violators and 

mandated that all spas, hot springs, and bathhouses post anti-HIV/AIDS visitor 

signs on their premises. At year’s end the draft regulations remained under review. 

Section 7. Worker Rights 

a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining 

The law does not provide for freedom of association, and workers are not free to 

organize or join unions of their own choosing. Independent unions are illegal, workers are not free to organize, and the right to strike is not protected in law. 

The Trade Union Law gives the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 

control over all union organizations and activities, including enterprise-level unions. 

The ACFTU is a CCP organ chaired by a member of the Politburo and is tasked 

to ‘‘uphold the leadership of the Communist Party.’’ The ACFTU and its provincial 

and local branches continued aggressively to organize new constituent unions and 

add new members, especially in large, multinational enterprises. According to the 

ACFTU the total trade union membership reached 280 million during the year, 109 

million of whom were rural-urban migrant workers. 

The law provides specific legal protections against antiunion discrimination and 

specifies that union representatives may not be transferred or terminated by enterprise management during their term of office. While there were no publicly available official statistics on the enforcement of these laws, there were periodic domestic 

media reports of courts awarding monetary compensation for wrongful terminations 

of union representatives. 

The Trade Union Law specifically assigns the ACFTU and affiliated unions the 

responsibility to ‘‘coordinate the labor relations and safeguard the labor rights and 

interests of the enterprise employees through equal negotiation and collective conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00143 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
140 

tract system’’ and to represent employees in negotiating and signing collective contracts with enterprises or public institutions. The law states that trade union representatives at each level should be elected. 

The Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law provides for labor dispute resolution through a three-stage process: mediation between the parties, arbitration by 

officially designated arbitrators, and litigation. A key article of this law requires employers to consult with labor unions or employee representatives on matters that 

have a direct bearing on the immediate interests of their workers. 

The Labor Contract Law provides that labor unions ‘‘shall assist and direct the 

employees’’ in establishing ‘‘a collective negotiation mechanism’’ and that collective 

contracts can include ‘‘matters of remuneration, working hours, breaks, vacations, 

work safety and hygiene, insurance, benefits, etc.’’ It further provides that there 

may be industrial or regional collective contracts ‘‘in industries such as construction, 

mining, catering services, etc. in the regions at or below the county level.’’ 

The labor law allows for collective bargaining for workers in all types of enterprises, and collective contract regulations provide protections against discrimination 

and unfair dismissal for employee representatives during collective consultations. 

Regulations require a union to gather input from workers prior to consultation with 

management and to submit collective contracts to workers or their congress for approval. There is no legal obligation for employers to negotiate, and some employers 

refused to do so. 

If collective bargaining negotiations do begin, there is no requirement for employers to bargain in good faith. If no agreement is reached, the employer does not have 

a right to lock out the workers, and the workers do not have a right to strike. While 

work stoppages are not expressly prohibited in law and it is not illegal for workers 

to strike spontaneously, Article 53 of the constitution has been interpreted as a ban 

on labor strikes by obligating all citizens to ‘‘observe labor discipline and public 

order.’’ 

Although the ACFTU, especially at provincial levels, often played an important 

role in advocacy for improved labor protections during 2012, this activism stalled 

during the year, in part due to a lack of clear direction from the Xi Jinping and 

Li Keqiang administration. During the ACFTU’s 16th National Congress in October, 

high-level officials called on participants to improve the lives of workers through 

proactive employment policies, a better social safety net, and attention to safety in 

the workplace. They noted the need for both increased government enforcement and 

supervision and responsibility by trade unions and the public. 

In November the CCP concluded a high-level meeting by issuing a resolution that 

outlined reforms with the potential to affect freedom of association and collective 

bargaining, including expanding the use of employees’ representative committees 

and innovating channels for workers to make appeals. The role of the ACFTU in 

a strike is primarily limited to involvement in investigations and assistance to the 

Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security in resolving disputes. 

ACFTU constituent unions were generally ineffective in representing and protecting the rights and interests of workers. This was particularly true in the case 

of migrant workers, who generally have less interaction with the ACFTU, who tend 

to work in foreign-invested enterprises, and for whom, especially among second-generation migrant workers, expectations of working conditions have increased. The 

ACFTU and the CCP maintain a variety of mechanisms to influence the selection 

of trade union representatives. Although the law states that trade union officers at 

each level should be elected, most factory-level officers were appointed by ACFTUaffiliated unions, often in coordination with employers, and were drawn largely from 

the ranks of management. Direct election by workers of union leaders continued to 

be rare, occurred only at the enterprise level, and was subject to supervision by 

higher levels of the union or the CCP. In enterprises where direct election of union 

officers took place, regional ACFTU officers and local CCP authorities retained control over the selection and approval of candidates. Even in these cases, workers and 

NGOs expressed concern about the sustainability of elections and the knowledge 

and capacity of elected union officials who often lacked collective bargaining skills. 

In March 2012 the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and Apple drafted an action plan 

for remediation at Foxconn supplier facilities. A key component of this action plan 

was the establishment of union elections. In its final report the FLA verified that 

no workplace elections had been conducted in the three facilities (Guanlan, 

Longhua, and Chengdu) since the beginning of the year. 

In a joint open letter to the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) in October, a group of students from nine universities in China outlined their findings in 

five Shenzhen factories at which the SFTU had purportedly adopted direct elections. 

141 

While the elections did occur in many cases, the students found that trade union 

committees were still composed of members of company management. They also 

found that the union continued to fail to protect workers from basic labor law violations. 

Many autonomous regions and municipalities enacted local rules allowing collective wage negotiation, and some limited form of collective bargaining was more or 

less compulsory in 25 of 31 provinces, according to the ACFTU. The Guangdong provincial government guidelines on enterprise collective wage bargaining require employers to give employee representatives information regarding a company’s operations, including employee pay and benefits, to be used in wage bargaining. The 

guidelines also allow the local labor bureau, if requested by the employees and employers, to act as a mediator to help determine wage increases. 

Despite the Labor Contract Law’s provisions for collective consultation related to 

common areas of dispute such as wages, hours, days off, and benefits, noncompliance with this provision, even at the minimum levels required by law, was common. 

Instead, tactics used by management included forcing employees to sign blank contracts and failing to provide workers a copy of their contract. Lack of government 

resources also undermined effective implementation and enforcement of the Labor 

Contract Law. 

The number of labor disputes nationwide continued to rise as workers’ awareness 

of the laws increased. According to figures from the Ministry of Human Resources 

and Social Security, as of September 2012, there were more than 3,000 labor arbitration units and 25,000 labor arbitrators. Through 2011 the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security handled 1.3 million ‘‘labor and personnel disputes.’’ Of 

these, 589,000 were registered arbitration cases, of which 93.9 percent were resolved. Most formal dispute resolution continued to occur between individual workers and employers, rather than managing collective disputes. The relevant regulations and rules address predominantly rights-based, rather than interest-based, disputes. 

Strikes primarily continued to be resolved directly between workers and management without the involvement of the ACFTU or its constituent local trade unions. 

In order to avoid strikes or address minor labor relations disputes, factory management continued to prefer to engage directly with workers via labor-management 

committees, rather than through the legally approved ACFTU-affiliated trade union. 

The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security voiced support for the expansion and establishment of labor-management committees throughout all enterprises. 

Labor NGOs often provided information, training, and legal support to workers on 

collective bargaining and dispute resolution, in lieu of effective support by the 

ACFTU. 

There continued to be reports of workers throughout the country engaging in 

strikes, work stoppages, and other protest actions. Although the government restricted the release of figures for the number of strikes and protests each year, the 

frequency of ‘‘spontaneous’’ strikes remained high, especially in Shenzhen and other 

areas with developed labor markets and large pools of sophisticated, rights-conscious workers. Local government responses to strikes varied, with some jurisdictions showing tolerance for strikes while others continued to treat worker protests 

as illegal demonstrations. 

In January, Hong Kong media reported that thousands of workers from the 

Panzhihua Iron and Steel Group in Chengdu took to the streets to demand wage 

increases. Authorities deployed 1,000 police to suppress the march and to disperse 

the crowd after a confrontation with the protesters. On November 7, police dispersed 

200 striking workers at a Dongguan toy factory. Reports indicated that authorities 

beat and arrested numerous workers. 

Workers engaged in collective action for a number of reasons. In many cases striking workers called attention to wage arrears, insufficient pay, and poor working conditions. New areas of disputes included factory closure or relocation, severance pay 

and other compensation, and benefits such as pensions. Although a large number 

of the major strikes reported in the media occurred in the Pearl River Delta, labor 

unrest was widespread throughout the country. Small-scale worker protests and 

strikes regularly occurred in Shanghai and Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui provinces. 

Workers increasingly went on strike to demand payment of past wages, as an economic downturn led to diminishing profits, more factory closures, and abandoned 

construction projects. On March 6, nearly 1,000 workers at an electronics factory in 

Dongguan, Guangdong Province, protested and blocked roads over compensation 

problems. 

142 

Strikes also occurred in an increasingly broad range of sectors. While many 

strikes occurred in manufacturing, reports increased of strikes in the transport, 

sanitation, and service industries similarly stemming from failure to gain adequate 

compensation. In August a hospital in Guangzhou attempted to impose a management-dictated settlement for unpaid overtime on a group of hospital security guards. 

Despite threats of dismissal, the guards went on strike. Management refused to negotiate with the guards, and local authorities detained them for staging an illegal 

demonstration. 

In August an estimated 3,000 workers at a toy factory in Shenzhen conducted a 

solidarity strike in support of 551 long-term migrant workers also at the factory. 

Despite having employed the workers for well over the 15 years required for pension 

eligibility, the company had failed to make mandatory contributions to their pension 

funds prior to 2008. Facing retirement, these workers were not able to claim the 

pensions to which they were entitled. 

In May informally elected workers’ representatives at Shenzhen Diweixin furniture factory led a protest against their employers over the company’s refusal to 

discuss compensation for a planned relocation. On May 23, authorities detained 

worker leader Wu Guijun after protracted strikes and petitions to the city government to intervene in fruitless negotiations. According to independent labor organizations, Wu was formally charged with ‘‘assembling a crowd to disturb social order’’ 

on September 28, but later reports indicated that the procuratorate refused to accept the charges due to lack of evidence and sent the case back to the public security 

officials for further investigation. Wu remained in detention as of year’s end. 

Other labor activists detained in previous years reportedly remained in detention 

at year’s end, including Chen Yong, Kong Youping, Liu Jian, Liu Jianjun, Memet 

Turghun Abdulla, Wang Miaogen, Xing Shiku, Zhou Decai, Zhu Chengzhi, and Zhu 

Fangming. 

b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor 

The law prohibits forced and compulsory labor, but there were reports that forced 

labor of adults and children occurred (see section 7.c.). 

There were reports that employers withheld wages or required unskilled workers 

to deposit several months’ wages as security against the workers departing early 

from their labor contracts. These practices often prevented workers from exercising 

their right to leave their employment and made them vulnerable to forced labor. Implementation of amended labor laws, along with workers’ increased knowledge of 

their rights under these new laws, continued to reduce these practices. 

International NGOs alleged that provincial and local governments were complicit 

in some cases of forced labor of university students as ‘‘interns’’ at facilities managed by the Taiwanese electronics giant Foxconn. Local governments, in order to encourage Foxconn to establish operations in their cities, promised to help recruit 

workers for Foxconn’s labor-intensive operations. In September the media reported 

that students in Shandong and Jiangsu provinces complained that their universities 

made it mandatory that they serve 45-day internships on assembly lines in Foxconn 

factories to meet Foxconn’s production demands. A December 12 FLA report of 

Foxconn facilities in Guanlan, Longhua, and Chengdu indicated that no student interns had been employed at those sites during the year. 

Forced labor in penal institutions remained a serious problem, according to the 

International Trade Union Confederation. Many prisoners and detainees were required to work, often with no remuneration. Compulsory labor of detainees in RTL 

facilities, who had not been tried and convicted in a competent court, also constituted forced labor. 

In both cases detainees reportedly experienced harsh and exploitative conditions 

of work, including long periods without a rest day and often working more than 10, 

and sometimes 12 or 14, hours per day to meet informal ‘‘quotas’’ imposed by facility 

management. Detainees who did not meet their quota were threatened with physical 

violence and other forms of punishment. 

In addition there were credible allegations that prisoners were forced to work for 

private production facilities associated with prisons. These facilities often operated 

under two different names, a prison name and a commercial enterprise name. No 

effective mechanism prevented the export of goods made under such conditions. 

Goods and materials likely to be produced by forced labor included toys, garments 

and textiles, electronics, bricks, and coal. 

The Ministry of Justice discussed allegations of exported prison-labor goods with 

foreign government officials, but information about prisons, including associated 

labor camps and factories, was tightly controlled. Although the ministry has official 

143 

control over the RTL system, police and other local authorities had a great degree 

of influence on a case-by-case basis. 

In November 2012 a Chongqing court rejected the wrongful imprisonment suit 

brought by Ren Jianyu, who had been released from an RTL center one year into 

his two-year sentence for ‘‘incitement to subvert state power’’ for posting online 

statements critical of the political system. In July, Ren submitted an application to 

the Chongqing RTL committee requesting compensation totaling RMB 167,762 

($27,440) to cover the wages he lost while in the camp and the psychological harm 

he suffered. 

After the Standing Committee of the NPC voted to abolish the RTL system in December (see section 1.d.), media and NGO reports indicated that many of the RTL 

facilities were converted to drug rehabilitation centers or prisons. It is not clear 

whether forced labor continued in these facilities. 

Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at 

www.state.gov/j/tip/. 

c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment 

The law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16. It refers to 

workers between the ages of 16 and 18 as ‘‘juvenile workers’’ and prohibits them 

from engaging in certain forms of dangerous work, including in mines. 

The law specifies administrative review, fines, and revocation of business licenses 

of those businesses that illegally hired minors and provides that underage children 

found working should be returned to their parents or other custodians in their original place of residence. The penalty for employing children under 16 in hazardous 

labor or for excessively long hours ranges from three to seven years’ imprisonment, 

but a significant gap remained between legislation and implementation. 

Child labor remained a problem. Print media and online reports most frequently 

documented the use of child labor in the electronics manufacturing industry, although many reports indicated it occurred in a number of sectors. 

The government does not publish statistics on the extent of child labor, but rising 

wages and a tightening labor market led some companies to seek to hire underage 

workers in violation of the law. Some local authorities also ignored the practice of 

child labor or even facilitated it to prevent employers from moving to other areas. 

Reports of child labor persisted in areas suffering from labor shortages and in 

smaller enterprises that compensated workers on a piece-rate basis. For example, 

in Dongguan, Guangdong Province, a manufacturing hub hit hard by labor shortages and rising wages, local employers admitted that the use of child labor on a 

temporary basis was common. Although Dongguan Bureau of Human Resources and 

Social Security statistics showed an increase in child labor cases, the bureau did not 

have sufficient resources to increase enforcement operations among the thousands 

of small enterprises operating in the area. 

In May a 14-year-old boy working at an electronics factory in Dongguan died suddenly in the factory dormitory. The boy used a false identity card to gain employment, and local officials cited the company for violating child labor laws. 

In an open letter to the Guangdong Province Communist Party secretary posted 

on the internet, the mother of a 15-year-old boy from Henan, burned badly in 2012 

while working in a Zhuhai electronics factory, appealed for help in obtaining compensation for the injury. The employer had refused to pay both the compensation 

sought by the family and the award subsequently determined by the labor arbitration board. Provincial authorities fined the employer and urged the local labor bureau to expedite the case, but compensation for the injury was still pending at year’s 

end. 

On December 27, the Guangzhou-based Southern Metropolis Daily reported that 

approximately 70 underage workers were discovered working at an electronics company in Shenzhen’s Baoan District. The alleged underage workers were all from the 

Yi ethnic minority group, and all were from a remote mountainous region of 

Liangshan, Sichuan Province, the origin of several recent child-labor trafficking 

cases. This followed incidents in 2011 and 2008 involving underage workers from 

the same region. Although in each instance local labor authorities intervened after 

the Southern Metropolis Daily notified them of the underage workers, the three 

similar cases reflect a systemic inability to deter trafficking of underage workers or 

to identify child labor through regular labor inspections. In the most recent case the 

Shenzhen company posted a notice on its website blaming the company’s labor dispatch service provider for providing worker identity cards purporting to show all of 

them to be older than age 16. 

144 

Abuse of the student-worker system continued as well. One international labor 

NGO reported that most students working in domestic companies in the supply 

chains of multinational electronics manufacturers, where there was greater scrutiny, did not have the formal written contracts required by law. After an internal 

audit, one multinational electronics company admitted it had violated the labor law 

after interns between the ages of 14 and 16 were discovered working at its subsidiary in Yantai, Shandong Province. 

As in past years, there continued to be allegations that schools and local officials 

improperly facilitated the supply of student laborers. Some reports indicated that 

schools supplied factories with illegal child labor under the pretext of vocational 

training, in some cases making this labor compulsory for the student. 

d. Acceptable Conditions of Work 

There was no national minimum wage, but the law requires local and provincial 

governments to set their own minimum wage according to standards promulgated 

by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. Average wage levels continued to increase. Monthly minimum wages varied greatly with Shenzhen, 

Guangdong Province, reaching RMB 1,600 ($262) from March 1 and towns in remote 

Ningxia Province the lowest at RMB 750 ($123). During the year the country increased its ‘‘rural poverty level’’ to RMB 192 ($31.40) per month. 

The law mandates a 40-hour standard workweek, excluding overtime, and a 24- 

hour weekly rest period. It also prohibits overtime work in excess of three hours per 

day or 36 hours per month and mandates premium pay for overtime work. 

A regulation states that labor and social security bureaus at or above the county 

level are responsible for enforcement of labor law. The law also provides that where 

the ACFTU finds an employer in violation of the regulation, it shall have the power 

to demand that the relevant local labor bureaus deal with the case. 

Many vulnerable workers, including those older workers laid off as a result of restructuring of state-owned enterprise, as well as many rural-urban migrants, were 

employed in the informal economy. In 2012 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ researchers estimated that the prevalence of informal employment ranged from 20 to 

37 percent overall, based on the definition used, with between 45 and 65 percent 

of migrants employed in the informal sector. UN experts reported that women were 

particularly active in the informal economy, often as domestic workers or petty entrepreneurs. Micro- and small businesses with fewer than seven employees also 

meet the international criteria for informality. Workers in the informal sector often 

lacked coverage under labor contracts, and even with contracts migrant workers in 

particular had less access to benefits, especially social insurance. Workers in the informal sector worked longer hours and earned one-half to two-thirds as much as 

comparable workers in the formal sector. 

The State Administration for Work Safety (SAWS) sets and enforces occupational 

health and safety regulations. The Law on Prevention and Control of Occupational 

Diseases requires employers to provide free health checkups for employees working 

in hazardous conditions and to inform them of the results. Companies that violate 

the regulation have their operations suspended or are deprived of business certificates and licenses. 

Effective May 2012 the SAWS and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued the 

Measures on Incentives for Safe Production Reporting, which authorize cash rewards to whistleblowers reporting companies for violations, such as concealing 

workplace accidents, operating without proper licensing, operating unsafe equipment, or failing to provide workers with adequate safety training. The measures 

warn against false accusations but also stipulate protection under the law for legitimate whistleblowers who report violations. 

While many labor laws and regulations on worker safety were fully compatible 

with international standards, implementation and enforcement were generally poor 

due to a lack of adequate resources. Compliance with the law was weak, and standards were regularly violated. While excessive overtime occurred, in many cases 

workers encouraged noncompliance by requesting greater amounts of overtime to 

counterbalance low base wages and increase their overall wages. Inadequately enforced labor laws, occupational health and safety laws, and regulations continued to 

put workers’ livelihoods, health, and safety at risk. 

Almost all local and provincial governments raised minimum wage levels significantly during the year as a result of changing economic and demographic conditions. 

As the average tenure of workers in the Pearl River Delta increased, their skills improved, adding more upward pressure on wages. Spot shortages of skilled labor, inVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
145 

creased inland investment, and successful strikes led to generally increased wage 

levels for workers in all parts of the country. 

Nonpayment of wages remained a problem in many areas. Governments at various levels continued efforts to prevent arrears and to recover payment of unpaid 

wages and insurance contributions. It remained possible for companies to relocate 

or close on short notice, often leaving employees without adequate recourse for due 

compensation. In some extreme cases, workers who feared that they would be deprived of adequate compensation or severance engaged in actions such as taking 

managers hostage. 

Although creative strategies by some multinational purchasers provided new approaches to reducing the incidence of labor violations in supplier factories, insufficient government oversight of both foreign affiliated and purely domestic supplier 

factories continued to contribute to poor working conditions. Questions related to acceptable working conditions, especially overtime, continued to plague electronics 

manufacturers such as Foxconn. 

On December 12, the FLA released the third and final verification report on conditions at Foxconn facilities in China, tracking progress on that action plan through 

July 1. The report documented that nearly 100 percent of all actions recommended 

by the FLA had been completed at three key facilities in Guanlan, Longhua, and 

Chengdu, resulting in clear changes in company policy. Nonetheless, FLA assessors 

documented numerous violations of domestic law. While some workers received an 

average of one day off per week, others went for a month or more without these 

breaks. In some cases workers worked more than 60 hours per week, and for a sixmonth period, more than one-half of the workers in the Longhua and Guanlan facilities exceeded the legal overtime limit of 36 hours per month. In Chengdu from July 

to October more than 75 percent of workers exceeded this limit. 

Although SAWS reported that the rate of industrial accidents continued to decline, there were several high-profile instances of industrial accidents. On June 3, 

a total of 121 workers died in a fire that swept through a poultry-processing plant 

in the northeastern province of Jilin. In that incident most of the exits at the plant 

had been locked from outside, and none of the 395 employees working at the time 

had received fire safety training. SAWS responded by dispatching teams to assess 

safety standards at factories. Although inspections routinely identified existing problems that increased the risk of industrial accidents, ensuring that companies acted 

on the findings of the inspections remained a challenge. 

Authorities continued to press mines to improve safety measures and mandated 

greater investments in safety. In August 2012 SAWS announced its goal of closing 

hundreds of small coal mines during the year in an attempt to reduce the number 

of deadly accidents. 

Despite consistent reductions in mining deaths, there continued to be many 

coalmine accidents throughout the country. 

In Jilin Province, gas explosions at coalmines on March 29 and April 1 killed 53 

workers. An third explosion on April 21, also in Jilin, killed 18 workers - despite 

an order for all coal mines in the province to suspend operations and undergo safety 

inspections following the earlier two explosions. 

ACFTU occupational disease experts estimated that 200 million workers worked 

in hazardous environments. According to the Chinese Center for Disease Control 

and Prevention, only an estimated 10 percent of eligible employees received regular 

occupational health services. Small- and medium-sized enterprises, the largest employers, often failed to provide the required health services. They also did not provide proper safety equipment that could help prevent disease, and were rarely required to pay compensation to victims and their families. Instances of pneumoconiosis, or black lung disease, remained high. A charitable NGO that helped to 

treat migrant workers estimated the disease affected approximately six million rural 

residents. 

(147) 

U.S. CUBAN RELATIONS—THE WAY FORWARD 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senator Corker, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, Perdue, 

Cardin, Boxer, Menendez, Shaheen, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, and 

Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will 

come to order. Thank you. Thanks for your interest. 

Today, we will hear from the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs on the strategy behind the 

President’s significant shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba. Assistant 

Secretary Jacobson is joined at the witness table by the Counselor 

of the State Department, Ambassador Thomas Shannon. We welcome you both. 

Cuba has been left behind politically and economically, a far cry 

from a time decades ago when it was among the most prosperous 

countries in the region. 

The administration’s Cuba policy initiative has been welcomed in 

Latin America and the Caribbean. But significant differences of 

opinion, which we will hear today, exist in the United States over 

the extent to which this change in policy will advance U.S. interests and improve circumstances for the Cuban people. 

Today, we look forward to our witnesses speaking to how our Nation can best engage strategically with the region and beyond to 

help Cuba rejoin the mainstream of the Americas and offer its citizens the same rights and freedoms enjoyed by citizens of other 

countries in the region. 

To this end, our witnesses can help us understand the administration’s policy goals with regard to Cuba. What do they intend to 

achieve in restoring full diplomatic relations and relaxing sanctions? We would also like to hear their assessment of what the 

Cuban Government’s goals are for engaging in this diplomatic process with the United States. 

Every policy initiative will inevitably come into contact with the 

reality that the Cuban state and, most importantly, the Cuban 

state’s relationship with its own citizens, have not yet changed. In 

148 

truth, we have to define what a normal relationship with Cuba 

looks like bilaterally, but also in the context of our relationship 

with the Americas more broadly. 

Our overall relations with Latin America and the Caribbean 

have evolved significantly over past decades. The last unilateral 

U.S. military intervention in the region occurred more than 20 

years ago in Haiti. 

U.S. trade with Latin America and the Caribbean has more than 

doubled from 2000 to 2012. In the process of opening to increased 

trade with the United States and each other, Latin American countries have taken steps to adopt market reforms and create more 

transparent legal and investment standards. 

The norm in the region is for regular multiparty elections and, 

more broadly, inter-American institutions today reflect the commitment by the region to more democratic, inclusive governments. The 

U.S. relationship with Latin America is very different than it was 

during the Spanish-American War in 1898 or during the cold war 

in 1959. This is the larger strategic context in which the way forward for our relations with Cuba will be defined. 

And we thank you both very much for being here. I look forward 

to the opening comments of our distinguished ranking member, 

Senator Cardin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, certainly, 

welcome our witnesses today. I thank you very much for conducting 

this hearing. 

There is no question that the December 17th speech by President 

Obama marked a watershed moment in our relationship toward 

Cuba. There are members of this committee who believe it went too 

far. There are members of this committee who think it did not go 

far enough. 

But one thing I think is critically important is that we have an 

open committee hearing and discussion on these issues. That is 

why I particularly thank the chairman for bringing forward this 

hearing, so that we can begin a discussion on the new direction 

with Cuba. 

On December 17 we also—we celebrated the long overdue of 

Maryland resident Alan Gross to the United States. 

Mr. Chairman, by consent, I would ask that his statement be included in our record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The Alan Gross written statement mentioned 

above can be found in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the 

Record’’ section at the end of this hearing.] 

Senator CARDIN. We all are interested to hear from our witnesses. Today’s hearing provides an important opportunity to review the advances achieved under the administration’s new Cuba 

policy and to understand the strategy for moving forward. 

Without a doubt, this is a complicated process, and it will take 

time to achieve the progress we all want. 

149 

I want to underscore that there is one issue that I think unites 

us, even though we all may have different views as to where we 

should move with our policy on Cuba. That one area that I think 

unites every member of this committee and the United States Senate is that we all stand together in our aspirations to see the 

Cuban people have the opportunity to build a society where human 

rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, where democratic 

values and political pluralism are tolerated, and where individuals 

can work unobstructed to improve their living conditions. This is 

particularly true with the Afro-Cuban population. 

We also share concerns about critical issues such as the Cuban 

Government’s ongoing human rights abuses and the presence of 

American fugitives in Cuba, especially those wanted for the murder 

of U.S. law enforcement officers. 

But the central question is, how can we best advance these aspirations while also addressing our concerns? Our previous policy did 

not achieve the progress that we wanted to see, so a new approach 

is needed. 

President Obama has laid out a new path based on the belief 

that principled engagement will bring more results. I think that 

this is the right path to follow for the following reasons. 

First, for far too long, the Cuban Government has used U.S. policy as an excuse to justify its shortcomings and the hardships of 

the Cuban people. The Cuban Government has also exploited U.S. 

policy for diplomatic gains, focusing international debate about 

what the U.S. should do rather than about what Cuba needs to do 

to better to provide for its citizens. This has been a particular challenge here in our own hemisphere where governments, including 

some of our closest partners, have long preferred to speak out critically about U.S. policy rather than about the conditions on the island. 

The President’s policy has reset the geopolitical calculus in the 

region and will provide new opportunities for cooperation with our 

Latin American and Caribbean partners. 

The recent Summit of the Americas in Panama showcased this 

point clearly, and both President Obama and the United States 

were praised widely for their leadership. 

In one particularly important development, the Presidents of 

Costa Rica and Uruguay joined President Obama in meeting with 

Cuban dissidents. This was an incredibly important moment in 

what it showed the international community. Seeing Latin American Presidents joining the U.S. President to meet with members 

of the Cuban opposition was unthinkable just 6 months ago. 

I also want to thank Senator Boxer. Senator Boxer and the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee had a chance to hear from Mr. 

Cuesta Morua at that hearing. I think that was an important point 

also. 

Second, despite differences we may have with the government, 

our foreign policy should always endeavor to support the country’s 

people to the greatest degree possible. When President Obama first 

came to office in 2009, he created greater flexibility for CubanAmericans to visit their families in Cuba and to send remittances 

to the island. These early policy changes have provided important 

support to the emerging class of Cuban entrepreneurs that have 

150 

been able to launch new economic initiatives, often working out of 

their own homes. 

While the Cuban Government still limits their activities widely, 

and not all Cubans are able to take advantage of them, U.S. policy 

is directly responsible for helping the Cuban people improve their 

living conditions and achieve a new degree of independence from 

the Cuban Government. 

The President’s December announcement went one step further 

and has made it easier for U.S. citizens to engage in purposeful 

travel to Cuba. Whether for academic, philanthropic or business 

reasons, U.S. citizens will now have greater opportunities to take 

part in people-to-people programs that provide increased interaction with the people of Cuba. 

I have no doubt that the dynamism of American society will 

make a positive contribution to empowering the Cuban people and 

provide them with the information they need to build the future of 

their country. 

While the President’s policies have made important changes to 

U.S. travel regulations, there are some things that only Congress 

can do. For that reason, I am a cosponsor of Senator Flake’s Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act. I think we must do everything we can 

to promote robust ties between the citizens of the United States 

and Cuba, and I hope we will have the opportunity to discuss that 

bill during this hearing. 

Then third, the administration’s new Cuba policy will provide 

U.S. diplomats with new tools to engage directly with the Cuban 

Government, to have principled and frank discussions about the 

issues we disagree about, and how we might work together to resolve these issues. 

Every day, our diplomats around the world demonstrate their 

ability to engage foreign governments and advance U.S. national 

interests. It is not unreasonable to think that we will have a better 

chance to address the outstanding claims held by U.S. citizens for 

property confiscated by the Cuban Government or to secure the return of American fugitives to face justice in the United States if we 

actually engage in direct dialogue with the Cuban Government and 

articulate our demands. 

When it comes to issues of confronting the illicit narcotics trade 

or addressing migration issues, it is in the national interest of both 

the United States and Cuba to have channels of communication between our two governments. Diplomacy will make this possible. 

The President’s Cuba policy puts the United States on the right 

path. But we must remain clear-eyed about several issues, and we 

must continue to speak out about them. 

We cannot ignore the Cuban Government’s record of human 

rights abuses or human trafficking. Every month, there are way too 

many instances where the Cuban Government jails political activists for what they believe, what they say publicly. Human rights 

and freedom of expression must be central to all of our engagements with the Cuban Government. 

I know that Assistant Secretary Tom Malinowski led a human 

rights dialogue with the Cuban Government earlier this year. I 

welcome our witnesses’ comments on this development. 

151 

Mr. Chairman, as I said initially, we do welcome the witnesses 

that are going to testify today. I thank you again for this opportunity for our committee. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Our first witness is the honorable Roberta Jacobson. She is the 

Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Assistant Secretary Jacobson has led the State Department discussions with the Cuban Government regarding establishing diplomatic relations. 

Our second witness is Ambassador Thomas Shannon. He is the 

Counselor of the State Department. Most recently, he served as 

American Ambassador to Brazil. Among his duties, he has also 

served as senior director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council. 

We thank you both for being here. You can keep your comments 

fairly brief, if you wish, and we will accept your written testimony 

into the record. We look forward to the questions. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Member Cardin, for the opportunity to testify on United StatesCuba policy today and your interest in the hemisphere more broadly. 

Let me just underscore this unique moment, I think, in the 

Americas for the United States. It is remarkable to see how U.S. 

relations with countries of the hemisphere are increasingly characterized by mature partnerships and shared values and interests. 

The depth and breadth of the partnerships we have with Canada, 

Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and so many others is extraordinary. I am especially proud of the renewed commitment to 

working with Central America and the Northern Triangle countries, including our $1 billion 2016 request, which we believe will 

strengthen regional security, prosperity, and good governance. 

Since I last appeared before this committee in February, we have 

begun to see the administration’s new approach on Cuba providing 

space for other nations in the hemisphere and around the world to 

focus on promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. 

At the Summit of the Americas in Panama, engagement by the 

President and the Secretary reinvigorated our momentum. Our approach has drawn attention to the potential for greater political 

and economic freedom for the Cuban people and the gap between 

Cuba and other countries in the hemisphere. 

More Americans are traveling to Cuba, meeting Cubans, and 

building shared understanding between our people. We have seen 

practical cooperation in our dialogues with Cuba on issues in our 

national interest, like maritime and aviation security, telecommunications, and environmental cooperation. 

Our future discussions on law enforcement cooperation coupled 

with ongoing migration talks will expand the avenues available to 

seek the return of American fugitives from justice, among other 

issues. 

152 

And we are planning on future talks on human rights and settling American claims for expropriated property. 

Most importantly, the President’s new approach makes clear that 

the United States can no longer be blamed as an obstacle to 

progress on such things as access to information or connecting Cubans to the world. 

Fundamentally, on this issue, I am a realist. And as anyone who 

ever dealt with Cuba knows, being a realist is essential. 

Indeed, as the President made clear prior to his historic meeting 

with Raul Castro at the summit, significant differences remain between our two governments. We continue to raise our concerns regarding democracy, human rights, and freedom of expression. 

The policy is based on a clear-eyed strategy that empowers the 

Cuban people to determine their own future by creating new economic opportunities and increasing their contact with the outside 

world. These changes create new connections between our countries 

and help the nascent private sector in Cuba. 

But comprehensive changes in our economic relationship will require congressional action to lift the embargo, and the President 

has urged Congress to begin that effort. 

The administration’s decision to rescind Cuba’s designation as a 

State Sponsor of Terrorism was a fact-based process, as the President has emphasized. 

While progress has been made in our efforts to reestablish diplomatic relations, we are not there yet. There are still outstanding 

issues that need to be addressed to ensure a future U.S. Embassy 

will be able to function more like other diplomatic missions in Cuba 

and elsewhere in the world. 

But even today under challenging circumstances, our diplomats 

unite families through our immigration processing, provide American citizens services, issue visas, and aid in refugee resettlement. 

They work hard to represent the interests and values of the United 

States. Our engagement with the broadest range of Cubans will expand once we establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. 

And tomorrow we will be holding a new round of talks with our 

Cuban counterparts to advance these objectives. As we move the 

process ahead, we hope we can also work together to find common 

ground toward our shared goal of enabling the Cuban people to 

freely determine their own future. 

Thank you, and I welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today on U.S.-Cuba policy. I know many of you have a deep interest in U.S. policy 

toward Cuba and have closely followed our implementation of the President’s new 

approach to Cuba since December 17. I appreciate the committee’s engagement on 

Western Hemisphere issues and your strong commitment to democratic values, 

human rights, and expanding social and economic opportunity in the Americas. 

Before I move to my remarks on Cuba, I wanted to underscore the unique moment 

that the United States is facing in the Americas. As someone who has spent her 

career working with this region, it is remarkable to see how U.S. relations with the 

countries of the hemisphere are increasingly characterized by mature partnerships 

and shared values and interests. Without at all minimizing the difficulties that we 

have with some countries, and the challenges that remain with regard to the subject 

of the hearing today, the depth and breadth of our partnerships with Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and so many others is extraordinary and conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00156 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
153 

tinues to grow. I am especially proud of our renewed commitment to working with 

the Northern Triangle countries of Central America, including our $1 billion FY 

2016 request that will strengthen regional security through increased investments 

in security, prosperity, and good governance. We have launched the Caribbean 

Energy Security Initiative to help countries to achieve a more sustainable and costeffective energy matrix. And of course, the President’s new direction on Cuba has 

generated enormous good will among all these partners and underscores our desire 

to turn the page on the 20th century and to build a more forward-looking relationship with the region. 

Since I last appeared before this committee in February, we have begun to see 

the administration’s new approach to Cuba providing space for other nations in the 

hemisphere and around the world to focus on promoting respect for human rights 

and fundamental freedoms in Cuba and elsewhere in the region. This was illustrated at the Summit of the Americas in Panama last April. Engagement by the 

President and the Secretary at the summit reinvigorated our momentum on a variety of issues. Our new approach has drawn greater attention to the potential for 

greater political and economic freedom for the Cuban people and the gap between 

Cuba and other countries in the hemisphere. More Americans are traveling to Cuba, 

getting past the rhetoric, meeting Cubans, and building shared understanding 

between our people. We have seen practical cooperation in our official dialogues 

with Cuba on issues in our national interest like maritime and aviation safety, telecommunications, and environmental cooperation. Our future discussions on law 

enforcement cooperation, coupled with the ongoing migration talks, will expand the 

avenues available to seek the return of American fugitives from justice as well as 

the return of Cubans residing illegally in the United States. We are also planning 

future talks on human rights and settling American claims for expropriated properties. Most importantly, the President’s new approach makes clear that the United 

States can no longer be blamed as an obstacle to progress on things such as access 

to information and connecting Cubans to the world. 

Now while I like to think of myself as an optimist, fundamentally I am a realist— 

and as anyone who has ever dealt with Cuba knows, a realistic perspective is a very 

useful one to have. Indeed, as the President made clear prior to his historic meeting 

with Raul Castro at the Summit of the Americas, significant differences remain 

between our two governments. We continue to raise our concerns regarding democracy, human rights, and freedom of expression. And we will seek to engage with all 

Cubans to gain their perspectives on the best way forward for the country. 

While the President’s new direction on Cuba has been welcomed by many Cubans 

and Americans, I know that there are divergent views in the U.S. Congress on the 

policy of engaging the Cuban Government. I appreciate that these views are deeply 

held and based on personal and professional experience with Cuba and with broader 

issues of foreign affairs. 

Our policy toward Cuba is based on a clear-eyed strategy that empowers the 

Cuban people to determine their own future by creating new economic opportunities 

and increasing their contact with the outside world. That is why we made it easier 

for Cuban-Americans to travel and send remittances to their families in Cuba, and 

opened new pathways for academic, religious, and people-to-people exchanges. These 

changes create powerful new connections between our two countries and help the 

nascent private sector in Cuba, which is already creating opportunities on the 

island. The steps we have implemented build on this foundation by increasing 

authorized travel, authorized commerce, and the flow of information to, from, and 

within Cuba. 

Our new approach emphasizes targeted forms of commerce that offer economic 

opportunity to independent Cuban entrepreneurs or, like expanded communications, 

benefit all Cubans. Comprehensive changes in our economic relationship will require 

congressional action to lift the embargo. The President has urged Congress to begin 

that effort. In the meantime, we are using available policy tools to promote a prosperous, democratic, and stable Cuba. 

In a short period of time, we have already started to see U.S. enterprises seizing 

the new opportunities. The regulatory changes we announced are intended to 

increase the financial and material resources available to the Cuban people and the 

emerging Cuban private sector. They also enable U.S. companies to offer expanded 

telecommunications and Internet services in ways that will help all Cubans, including students, academics, entrepreneurs, and members of Cuban civil society, 

advance their aspirations and collectively become more prosperous. 

Regarding the administration’s decision to rescind Cuba’s designation as a State 

Sponsor of Terrorism, as President Obama said, ‘‘throughout this process, our 

emphasis has been on the facts. So we want to make sure that, given that this is 

a powerful tool to isolate those countries that genuinely do support terrorism, that 

154 

when we make those designations we’ve got strong evidence that, in fact, that’s the 

case. And as circumstances change, then that list will change as well.’’ We will continue to have differences with the Cuban Government, but our concerns over a wide 

range of Cuba’s policies and actions do not relate to any of the criteria relevant to 

that designation. 

While progress has been made in our efforts to reestablish diplomatic relations, 

we are not there yet. There are still outstanding issues that need to be addressed 

to ensure a future U.S. Embassy will be able to function more like other diplomatic 

missions in Cuba and elsewhere in the world. Even today, under challenging circumstances, our diplomats do their very best to represent the interests and values 

of the United States, just as we do in hundreds of places around the world. The 

services our Interests Section offers to Cubans are no different than those we offer 

in most other U.S. embassies. Our engagement with the broadest range of Cubans 

will expand once we establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. 

We will continue our discussions with Members of Congress as we move toward 

a new relationship with Cuba. As this process moves ahead, we hope that we can 

also work together to find common ground toward our shared goal of enabling the 

Cuban people to freely determine their own future. 

We appreciate your attention to these important issues. Thank you and I welcome 

your questions. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS A. SHANNON, JR., COUNSELOR 

OF THE DEPARTMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, 

and members of the committee, thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before you. 

As the chairman noted, we have submitted our testimony, so I 

will just hit a few of the high points. I would like to start by saying 

it is a pleasure and honor to appear before you with Assistant Secretary Roberta Jacobson, who has served so ably and successfully 

as our principal diplomat in the Americas. 

My purpose today, along with the Assistant Secretary, is to address the regional context in which our Cuba policy is unfolding 

and to lay out some of the strategic dimensions of our diplomacy. 

The great American theorist of international relations, Hans 

Morgenthau, once wrote, ‘‘Our purpose is not to defend or preserve 

a present or restore a past, it is to create the future.’’ He noted that 

our global engagement, whether it be diplomacy or force of arms, 

has always been meant to defend one kind of future against another kind of future. 

It is in this light that we should understand the President’s policy toward Cuba. The decision to engage with Cuba and seek normalization of our bilateral relationship attempts to create a new 

terrain on which to pursue a future that meets our interests and 

corresponds to our values. 

Our commitment to democracy and human rights, and our desire 

and hope that the Cuban people will know the benefits of liberty 

and become the sovereigns of their own destiny, is no less for our 

action. 

The President has been clear about the commitment in our Cuba 

policy to our enduring fundamental principles of self-government 

and individual liberty. However, he has also been clear about our 

inability to effect significant change in Cuba acting alone across so 

many decades. 

Instead, he determined that our efforts would be more effective 

if we could position Cuba squarely within an inter-American system that recognizes democracy as a right that belongs to all the 

155 

peoples of our hemisphere; that believes that democracy is essential to the political, economic, and social development of our peoples; and has the juridical instruments, treaties, and agreements to 

give shape, form, and weight to these commitments. 

It is our determination that this kind of environment would be 

the most propitious to support the only legitimate agent of peaceful 

and enduring political change in Cuba: the Cuban people. 

To understand this point better, it would be worthwhile to take 

a closer look at what the hemisphere Cuba is a part of looks like 

in the second decade of the 21st century. The Americas and specifically Latin America, has anticipated many of the events that are 

shaping our world today. It is a region that has largely moved from 

authoritarian to democratic government, from closed to open economies, from exclusive to inclusive societies, from autarkical development to regional integration, and from isolation to globalization. 

There are a few points worth making in this regard. 

First, Latin America is the first region in the developing world 

to commit itself to democracy. It was also the first region to establish regional and subregional structures to promote and defend 

human rights and to build subregional institutions and mechanisms for dialogue. 

Because of this, it has also built shared economic understandings, including a commitment to market economies, free 

trade, and regional integration. But perhaps most dramatically, 

Latin America today is pursuing a second generation of change or 

transformation. It is attempting to use democratic governance and 

democratic institutions to build democratic societies and states. 

The great experiment in Latin America today is to show that democracy and markets can deliver economic development and can 

address the social inequities of poverty, inequality, and social exclusion. 

The profound changes unleashed in Latin America show that democracy and markets can deliver economic development. And in effect, Latin America has used democracy and markets to launch a 

peaceful, social revolution that is transforming many countries in 

the region in long-lasting ways. 

Our ability to promote profound and dramatic change in Latin 

America is an example of what the United States can accomplish 

through diplomacy and engagement. If we accomplish such a profound transformation in our hemisphere through engagement, why 

not try the same approach with Cuba? Better yet, why not try it 

in partnership with countries and institutions that are now prepared to work with us because of the President’s new policy? 

Cuba finds itself today part of a dynamic, vibrant region where 

transformative change has been the watchword for several decades. 

And it finds itself in a region where the momentum of that change 

will continue to reshape political, economic, and social landscapes. 

In such an environment that the Cuban people will find many models and partners from which to learn and choose, we should be one 

of those models and partners. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this opportunity to 

speak. We look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shannon follows:] 

156 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. SHANNON

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify before you today on this important topic. 

It is a pleasure and honor to appear before you with Assistant Secretary Roberta 

Jacobson, who has served so ably and successfully as our principal diplomat in the 

Americas. 

She has addressed in her testimony President Obama’s policy toward Cuba, and 

the steps we are taking to implement that policy. She is well placed to respond to 

specific questions you might have about that policy, and is familiar with the reaction around our hemisphere to our policy. 

My purpose today is to address the regional context in which this policy is unfolding, and to lay out some of the strategic dimensions of our diplomacy. 

In starting, I would like to note that in my current assignment as Counselor of 

the Department of State I have had the pleasure to work on key administration priorities around the globe. During my travels throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle 

East, as well as my specific and incidental engagement in the Western Hemisphere, 

I have had many opportunities to see, experience, and reflect on the importance of 

the United States in the world, and the enduring role and relevance of American 

diplomacy. 

The great American theorist of international relations, Hans Morgenthau, once 

wrote, ‘‘Our purpose is not to defend or preserve a present or restore a past, it is 

to create the future.’’ He noted that our global engagement is meant to defend one 

kind of future against another kind of future. 

It is in this light that we should understand the President’s policy toward Cuba. 

The decision to engage with Cuba and seek normalization of our bilateral relationship attempts to create a new terrain on which to pursue a future that meets our 

interests and corresponds to our values. Our commitment to democracy and human 

rights, and our desire and hope that the Cuban people will know the benefits of liberty and become the sovereigns of their own destiny, is no less for our action. 

The President has been clear about the commitment in our Cuba policy to our enduring and fundamental principles of self-government and individual liberty. However, he has also been clear about our inability to effect significant change in Cuba 

acting alone across so many decades. Instead, he determined that our efforts would 

be more effective if we could position Cuba squarely within an inter-American system that recognizes democracy as a right that belongs to all the peoples of our hemisphere, believes that democracy is essential to the political, economic, and social 

development of our peoples, and has the juridical instruments, treaties, and agreements to give shape, form, and weight to these commitments. It was our determination that this kind of environment would be the most propitious to support the only 

legitimate agent of peaceful and enduring political change in Cuba: the Cuban 

people. 

To understand this point better, it would be worthwhile to take a closer look at 

what kind of hemisphere Cuba is a part of in the second decade of the 21st century. 

The Americas, and specifically Latin America, has anticipated many of the events 

that are shaping our world. It is a region that has moved largely from authoritarian 

to democratic government, from closed to open economies, from exclusive to inclusive societies, from autarkical development to regional integration, and from isolation to globalization. 

Latin America is the first developing region of the world to commit itself explicitly 

to democratic governance through the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the first 

to build a democratic model of development, and the first to establish regional structures to promote and protect human rights. 

While creating a broad base of shared political values, Latin America has also 

constructed shared economic understandings and a commitment by many of the 

most successful countries in the hemisphere to market economies and free trade. In 

the process, it has built subregional integration and political dialogue through organizations like the Common Market of the South, the Andean Community, the Union 

of South American Nations, and the Central American Integration System, all the 

while preserving larger hemispheric institutions, such as the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas process, that connect Latin America 

to the Caribbean and North America. 

As Latin America advances into the 21st century, it is undergoing a second generation of change. Politically, it has consolidated democratic government and is 

strengthening democratic states and societies. This has opened up political institutions to new voices and actors, deepening the representativeness of many Latin 

American governments and challenging traditional elites and interests. In some 

countries, weak democratic institutions have not been able to contain the social 

157 

energy unlocked by democratization, leading to populism and political polarization 

as groups struggle for control of the state. As troubling as this phenomenon can be, 

it does not define the democratization of the region but instead presents a challenge 

for the region to show how it can address such incidents through the organizations 

and institutional mechanisms it has created. 

Economically, Latin America is building innovative integration mechanisms such 

as the Pacific Alliance, and reaching into Asia and North America to find new and 

important economic partners. We have FTAs with 12 countries in the hemisphere, 

and the continued globalization of Latin America is driven not only by the regions 

abundant commodities, especially food and energy, but also by growing middle 

classes that have created attractive markets for manufactured goods and services. 

The profound changes unleashed in Latin America show clearly that democracy 

and markets can deliver economic development and address long-standing social 

inequities such as poverty, inequality, and social exclusion. In effect, Latin America 

has used democracy and markets to launch peaceful social revolutions that are 

transforming many countries in important and long lasting ways. Our ability to promote profound and dramatic change in Latin America is an example of what the 

United States can accomplish through diplomacy and engagement. 

If we accomplished such a profound transformation in our hemisphere through engagement, why not try the same approach with Cuba? And better yet, why not try 

it in partnership with countries and institutions that are now prepared to work with 

us because of the President’s new policy? 

Cuba today finds itself part of a dynamic, vibrant region where transformative 

change has been the watchword for several decades. And it finds itself in a region 

where the momentum of that change will continue to reshape political, economic, 

and social landscapes. In such an environment, the Cuban people will find many 

models and partners from which to learn and choose. We should be one of those 

models and partners. 

Hans Morgenthau wrote, ‘‘The world has been conscious of America’s purpose in 

the measure that America is determined to achieve it.’’ The President’s actions in 

regard to Cuba are a clear indication of our determination to achieve our purpose. 

How we achieve that purpose opens a great opportunity for cooperation between the 

executive and legislative branches of government. We hope this hearing deepens the 

dialogue between us on how we can shape our policy and diplomacy to achieve our 

ends while further advancing the integration and well-being of our hemisphere. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both. 

I want to thank the committee for the way that it has handled 

what I think have been some really difficult issues since we began 

this year. And I know there are significant differences of opinion 

relative to the Cuba policy that have been laid out. I am really glad 

we have those differences of opinion represented here. I look forward to a robust Q&A. 

One of the questions that I have had from the very beginning has 

been, what are the specific changes within Cuba that we have negotiated or asked for as it relates to this policy change? It is my 

sense that there have really been none. I wonder if you might expand on that. I think it has been a question that most people have 

asked that have not been following the Cuba situation nearly as 

closely as you, and that is, are there specific things that we expect 

Cuba to do in return for this change in policy toward them? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that as we move forward with this policy, what is important to understand is the majority of the things that the President 

did, he took action on because he believes strongly, we believe, that 

they are in our interests and in the interests of the Cuban people— 

the United States and the Cuban people. They were not negotiated 

with the Cuban Government. 

So the regulatory changes that allow for greater purposeful travel, that allow for support by Americans to the emerging private sector in Cuba, indeed, the normalization itself to pursue engagement—normalization and the reestablishment of diplomatic relaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00161 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
158 

tions, of course, must be worked out mutually with the Cuban Government—but the rest of the measures that were taken to support 

and, indeed, empower the Cuban people, were not things that were 

negotiated with the Cuban Government. They were actions and 

policies taken unilaterally by us. 

We believe that, over time, especially things like support for 

emerging private sector entrepreneurs and, in particular, hopefully 

the increase in telecommunications and information technology in 

Cuba will make a big difference in the ability of Cuban citizens to 

determine their own future. So they were not negotiated with the 

Cuban Government, per se. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Shannon, do you want to expand on 

that any? 

Ambassador SHANNON. I think Roberta covered it well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So let me ask you, I was going to go in 

a different direction, but since you mentioned technology, it was an 

interesting thing to announce that U.S. companies were going to be 

more involved technology-wise. But it is my understanding that the 

Cuban Government does not really allow much access relative to 

the outside world with communications. 

So I am just wondering, we made a big deal out of that announcement, but what is the net effect of it, if the government 

itself does not really allow its citizens to participate in that way? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, I think it is very important that the Cuban 

Government has said, as part of the U.N.’s efforts to open information to citizens around the world that they want to expand access 

for the Cuban people. We are hopeful that that will happen. 

Right now, there is not access for most Cubans. It is very expensive. It is not available. And it is not necessarily something they 

can have in their own homes. 

But the ability of the Cuban Government and Cuba, in general, 

to have a more up-to-date modern infrastructure on telecommunications and information is something that is critical to the modernization of the Cuban economy. And, therefore, we would like 

American companies to be part of bringing better information technology to Cuba, which is why the President felt it was important 

to allow American companies to do so. 

The Cuban Government has not yet made decisions to move forward with that, but there are American companies that are talking 

with the Cuban Government. And there is no doubt that there is 

a desire for greater information by the Cuban people, and we would 

like to do everything we can to enable that. 

The CHAIRMAN. So since we did not negotiate for changes, and 

I understand that, because we thought this was in our interests, 

what is it that you think, on the other hand, will be the response 

by the Cuban Government? In other words, what do you think, 

even though we did not negotiate or even though we did not try 

to leverage in any way, what are the policy changes that will occur 

inside Cuba as a result of these changes? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, there have already been underway in Cuba, 

obviously, some limited economic reforms. The ability of half a million or more entrepreneurs to go into 200 or so approved businesses, business areas in private business, self-employment, that is 

159 

an area I think that is really right for support, that the regulations 

support. 

I would hope there will be many more of these entrepreneurs 

emerging and that they will be able to prosper and expand and be 

agents for change within Cuba. 

There are, obviously, very different views on the political system 

as well as the economic system of Cuba. The President has been 

clear about that. 

We think that engagement with citizens of Cubans by average 

Americans who are going for purposeful travel, which has increased under this policy, and the ability for the private sector to 

increase, and hopefully information to increase—and we are not 

sure what the Cuban Government will do in the face of these 

things. I think they are still absorbing our changes and making 

their own policy decisions. 

But we know from polling that has been done inside Cuba that 

the narrative of the United States being responsible for economic 

privations and other disadvantages of the Cuban people is no 

longer blamed on the United States. That narrative is eroding. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

I have one last question. I want to first thank you for the time 

that both of you spent in my office on another matter. I know we 

talked about the region in general. 

I wonder if, Ambassador Shannon, you might just talk a little bit 

about the effect that this policy announcement has had on our ability in the region to discuss other issues of importance to our country. 

Ambassador SHANNON. Thank you very much, Senator. This is 

an important component of our policy, because we believe that the 

decision to engage with Cuba and to normalize relations removes 

an irritant that has not only limited where we can work with some 

of our partners and others in the region, but it has also, over time, 

degraded some of our most important multilateral institutions, especially in the inter-American system, within the OAS and Summit 

of the America’s process. 

I mentioned in my testimony the region has built a series of subregional mechanisms and institutions to build dialogue. For the 

most part, this has been very positive. 

But in some instances, some of these institutions have been 

built—I am speaking, in particular, of the community of Latin 

America and Caribbean nations—to permit Caribbean and Latin 

American countries to have a conversation among themselves with 

Cuba where we are not present. And this, in the long term, is not 

in our advantage. 

Therefore, by working toward normalization, we actually create 

an opportunity for the inter-American system to reassert itself as 

the premier political, economic, and social institution in the Americas. I believe this is an opportunity that we need to take advantage of. 

But in particular, in regard to Cuba, the region understands and 

knows that Cuba is the only country in the hemisphere that has 

not made an explicit commitment to democracy and has not recognized through the Inter-American Democratic Charter democracy 

as a right of all the peoples of the Americas. 

160 

And although they have taken different approaches, we are really now in a position to be able to press them to work harder on 

democracy and human rights issues inside of Cuba. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Again, thank you both for being here. 

Let me just quote from the most recent State Department human 

rights report, where it has acknowledged that Cuba is an authoritarian state where elections are neither free nor fair. And quoting, 

‘‘The principal human rights abuses were abridgement of the rights 

of citizens to change the government and the use of government 

threats, extrajudicial physical violence, intimidation, mobs, harassment, and detentions to prevent free expression and peaceful assembly. The following additional abuses continued: harsh prison 

conditions, arbitrary arrests, selective prosecutions, and denial of 

fair trials.’’ 

It goes on to say, ‘‘ . . . interfered with privacy, engaging in pervasive monitoring of private communications, do not respect freedom of speech, severely restricted Internet access, monopoly on 

media outlets, circumscribed academic freedoms, maintained significant restrictions on the ability of religious groups, refused to 

recognize independent human rights groups, prevent workers from 

forming unions, exercising their labor rights. 

‘‘Most human rights abuses were official acts committed at the 

direction of the government. Impunity for the perpetrators remained widespread.’’ 

That is the most recent report from the State Department. 

And then the independent human rights organization, the Cuban 

Human Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, has documented in the first 4 months of this year about 

1,600 cases of arbitrary politically motivated detentions, which is 

about the same pace we have seen historically in Cuba over the 

last 3 years. 

I mention that because I want to get specific here for a moment 

as to how you intend to evaluate Cuba’s progress on human rights 

and use our tools at our disposal to advance that. I use as an example the OSCE, which is a consensus organization without enforcement and yet it is known globally for its commitment to advance 

human rights. It has been very successful, the Helsinki Watch, the 

Helsinki groups. 

I am not aware of the OAS having the same type of effectiveness 

in advancing human rights in our own hemisphere. 

So my question to you is, How do you intend to use the OAS? 

How do you intend to use the United Nations now that we have 

removed this obstacle, as you see it, as far as having credibility to 

raise these issues? How do we intend to use United States leadership to advance human rights progress in Cuba? And how can we 

evaluate whether we are making progress in that area? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, thank you. I think there are a couple 

things. 

First, there is no doubt that we will continue to write human 

rights reports that are honest and unflinching in what they describe as going on in Cuba, that there continue to be these shortterm detentions that should not be going on, harassing individual 

161 

human rights activists groups, preventing them from having their 

rights exercised. 

And so there is a range of tools. One of which the President highlighted in terms of speaking out. But we also now have another 

tool at our disposal, which is direct engagement, including the 

human rights dialogue, which will move forward. 

There is no doubt from the preliminary conversations we have 

had that we have very distinct views of human rights and universal, internationally recognized human rights. But we will now 

be able to have that conversation much more directly going forward. 

In addition, in terms of international organizations and our ability to work with others more effectively in those international organizations, as you know, Cuba is suspended from the OAS. They 

have been since 1962. But the questions of looking at human rights 

issues in Cuba, as Ambassador Shannon said, whether they are living up to the commitments that all of the rest of us have made in 

the hemisphere through the Inter-American Democratic Charter, 

through tools like the Inter-American Commission on Human 

Rights, those are tools which we are more able to use, reference, 

and discuss with our partners, who I think are much more engaged 

in having that discussion with us post-policy engagement and opening now that we are more—— 

Senator CARDIN. How will that be reflected? I understand that. 

I said that in my opening comments. How can we know that we 

are making that progress? What specific agenda items do you intend to do? And what allies will we have to hold Cuba accountable 

for adhering to internationally recognized human rights? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Obviously, the best metrics of progress will be on 

the ground in terms of whether it is a reduction in short-term detentions or a growing ability by Cubans of all stripes to be able to 

speak and be able to exercise their democratic rights. 

I think the President was pretty clear on our also understanding 

that change is not going to come to Cuba overnight. As we work 

on this, we have to understand that, in empowering Cubans to take 

their own responsibility for these rights, there will be progress, and 

there will be setbacks. 

We will speak out about those. We will work with other countries 

in the various international organizations. I cannot tell you exactly 

the agenda, where we will talk with other countries. We will, certainly, do so at the OAS. We will do so in the U.N. bodies, whether 

that is the U.N. Human Rights Council or other instruments such 

as those. 

Senator CARDIN. What leverage will we exercise over Cuba in regard to our expectations that they will make progress on these 

internationally recognized human rights standards? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think one of the things that is most important 

is the ability to have embassies and to carry out the functions 

under the Vienna Conventions to travel around Cuba and to be 

able to interact with the widest number of Cuban citizens, which 

we have not been able to do up until now. And that is critical, that 

our diplomats also be the first-person observers of things, which 

has not been the case in the past. That is obviously something we 

are working on right now. 

162 

Senator CARDIN. What countries in our hemisphere do you believe can you work closest with in putting pressure on Cuba to 

comply with international recognized human rights? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think that the Ambassador may have more to 

say about this. My own view is there are many countries in the 

hemisphere that will work with us, whether it is publicly or behind 

the scenes. Countries that have committed are obviously democratic countries committed to human rights, countries around the 

hemisphere such as Costa Rica and Uruguay, and allies like Colombia and Peru and Mexico, which have worked on tough human 

rights issues around the hemisphere and will be in conversations 

with us. 

But many in the region, in the Caribbean, in Central America, 

will be working with us on this, committed to the same principles. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you both for being here. 

Secretary Jacobson, before I get to my questions, I wanted to ask, 

you discussed that we are in these discussions with the Cubans 

and we have distinct views on human rights. I do not mean to say 

this is what you meant, but let us just be clear. These are not two 

distinct views that both are legitimate. This is a view of human 

rights that we have, and a view of human rights they have, which 

under no circumstances fits under any definition of human rights. 

Their views on human rights are not legitimate. They are immoral. The notion you can round up people and arrest them because they disagree with the government, the theory that can you 

send thugs to Panama to beat up on democracy activists, we would 

say this upfront, right, that their view of human rights is not just 

different from ours, they are flat out wrong and immoral in their 

views? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We have said clearly that we do not think those 

views accord with international standards and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

Senator RUBIO. So the Cubans are flat out wrong when it comes 

to human rights? 

Ms. JACOBSON. On repressing people’s rights to free speech and 

assembly, we do not think they are correct. 

Senator RUBIO. There is no moral equivalence between our view 

of human rights and theirs? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I did not say that, and I would not. That is not 

what I was trying to say. 

Senator RUBIO. All right, good. I wanted to get that clear. 

Let me talk about travel. It is a big part of what everyone is 

talking about. The truth is, going from Hotel magazine, Hotel magazine wrote a few years ago that Gaviota S.A., which is owned by 

the Cuban military, and is a prominent subsidiary Grupo GAESA, 

which is the holding company that basically controls the entire 

Cuban economy, it is also the largest hotel conglomerate in Latin 

America and the Caribbean. It has hotel holdings equivalent to the 

Walt Disney Company’s holdings, and it is run by General Luis 

Alberto Rodriguez Lopez-Callejas. That is a long name. He is Raul 

Castro’s son-in-law. 

163 

Let me read you something that McClatchy newspapers wrote a 

few years ago about this network. It wrote, ‘‘Tourists who sleep in 

some of Cuba’s hotels, drive rental cars, fill up their gas tanks, and 

even those riding in taxis, have something in common. They are 

contributing to the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces’ bottom 

line,’’ in essence, recognizing that if you travel to Cuba, if you stay 

in a Cuban hotel, in all likelihood, you are staying in a hotel run 

by the Cuban military. If you rent a car, you are renting it from 

the Cuban military. If you fill up your gas tank, you are filling up 

from the Cuban military. 

And I would add that if you stay at a hotel, you are staying in 

all likelihood in a confiscated property, a land that was taken from 

a previous private owner who was never compensated for it. In essence when you travel to Cuba and stay in one of these hotels, not 

only are you putting money in the hands of the Cuban Government, you are trafficking in stolen goods, because it is property 

that belonged to a private holder, some of them American citizens 

who were never compensated for it. 

So when we talk about increased travel to Cuba and more commerce with Cuba through travel, what we are really talking about 

is increased business ties with the Cuban military, for the most 

part. 

Is that not an accurate assessment at this time? 

Ms. JACOBSON. It is, certainly, accurate that the Cuban state, including the military, runs a large percentage of the hotels and 

other infrastructure. We also now have an increasing number of 

casas particulars, people’s individual homes, which are being used 

as hotels or B&Bs—Airbnb is working on that—and private entrepreneurs moving into spaces to support the purposeful travel. 

Senator RUBIO. So then why would we not limit our opening in 

travel to say that if you travel to Cuba, you can only stay at one 

of these casas particulares or one of these other nongovernmental, 

nonmilitary-owned facilities? Why would we not, as part of our 

opening, say can you travel to Cuba, but you cannot stay in a property that was stolen and you cannot stay in a property owned or 

operated by the Cuban Government, which includes even the foreign-flagged hotels, because they have majority ownership there as 

well. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, our strong belief is though we are aware 

that there will be some financial benefit to the Cuban Government 

by the larger number of Americans going to Cuba, the benefit of 

those larger numbers, which could not be supported only by individual homes, for example, the benefit to the Cuban people of this 

larger number of Americans going far outweighs the increased economic benefit that may accrue to the Cuban Government. 

Senator RUBIO. Just so I understand clearly, and bottom line is 

you agree that if you travel to Cuba, you are staying in all likelihood in a stolen property that is in all likelihood run by the Cuban 

Government. But that said, the fact that there are going to be 

Americans present there, the benefit of having Americans being 

able to travel and interact with Cuba outweighs the economic benefits that are going directly to the Cuban military. 

164 

Ms. JACOBSON. I would say that it is possible those properties are 

confiscated. It is, certainly, the case that many of the properties 

are state-owned. But we do believe that the benefit outweighs—— 

Senator RUBIO. Other than the private homes you talked about, 

which are largely state-owned as well, but at least an individual 

is running it, other than the private homes, which is still a very 

small sector of the economy, which Cuban hotel is not owned or operated by the Cuban Government? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I said that I assume most of them are state-run, 

especially because even joint ventures are majority Cuban. 

Senator RUBIO. They are all state-run. Is there a private-owned 

hotel in Cuba? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I do not know, sir. But I assume there are none. 

But as I say, there are these bed and breakfasts and individual 

homes. 

But again, I think the premise on which we are basing this is 

that the benefits of engagement, purposeful travel, are very, very 

great to the Cuban people, and seen overwhelmingly by the Cuban 

people as of benefit to them, as surveys show. 

Senator RUBIO. I want to talk about the Internet for a moment. 

Cubans, as you said, blamed the United States for lack of access 

to the Internet and so forth. It has been couched as a lack of capacity. In fact, Cubans say, our own President said that. He said, ‘‘Unfortunately, our sanctions on Cuba have denied Cubans access to 

technology that has empowered individuals around the world.’’ 

But I think you know that is not true. For example, there is no 

Japanese embargo on Cuba. There is no South Korean embargo on 

Cuba. And, yet, those technologies are not widely available either. 

Is it not true that at the end of the day access to Internet in 

Cuba is not simply a function of capacity, because there are multiple other countries around the world that do not have an embargo 

on Cuba that can provide cell technology or Internet technology. Is 

it not true that the vast majority of the impediment to access to 

the Internet and technology in Cuba is a result of Cuban Government censorship? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think the denial of access has been both one of 

policy and one, in terms of access to American products, also one 

of polices of the United States. We are taking one of those two 

things away. 

They are now able to have access to U.S. products, which we always believe are the best in the world. And that leaves only policy. 

Senator RUBIO. I understand. But there are still other countries—I have a Samsung. Why is Cuba not awash in Samsungs? All 

these other countries around the world who do not have an embargo on Cuba, why have they not been allowed to come in and offer 

Wi-Fi and all the sorts of things that developed countries have? 

In essence, it is not a capacity issue. The reason why people in 

Cuba do not have access to the Internet ultimately is because the 

Cuban Government will not allow it. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, there is a question of infrastructure that 

needs to be present to utilize the—— 

Senator RUBIO. But other countries could have provided that. 

Ms. JACOBSON. They could have. The Cuban policy is clearly a 

big part of this. And we do not know whether that policy will 

165 

change. They have said they want to modernize their telecommunications sector. 

Senator RUBIO. So why did they not do it with the Japanese, the 

Koreans, the Germans, or any number of countries around the 

world that have Internet and technology capabilities outside of 

United States. capabilities? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I am hoping they want our stuff. 

Senator RUBIO. No, I understand that. 

Ms. JACOBSON. And we will be able to compete well. But we also 

see on the island many Samsung phones, many other cell phone 

technology of the latest make, but it is not connected to anything 

yet. 

Senator RUBIO. It is connected to the Cuban Government telecommunications. 

Ms. JACOBSON. And that will be the question. Can they open to 

something that allows their economic development to enter the 

modern world and connect Cubans to the world? 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator Cardin, as the ranking member on the Latin America 

Subcommittee—Senator Rubio is my chairman—I really appreciate 

the full committee looking at this. 

I do want to pick up on what Senator Rubio said, but in kind of 

a different way. When you listen to my colleague, you would think 

this was the only country in the world that we have relations with 

and we are starting to have relations with where the state owns 

hotels. 

A lot of my colleagues, maybe all my colleagues on the Republican side, I cannot be sure, but I think voted to go ahead with a 

free trade agreement that includes Vietnam, an out and out Communist country that pays a minimum wage of 70 cents and owns 

many of the hotels, trust me. But yet, we still have relations. 

The reason we have relations are geopolitical reasons, that we 

want to work to change these places. So I think my colleague, with 

his line of questioning, has really proven the point, because Russia, 

some Russian hotels are owned by the country, China. 

Are we going to start telling people what hotels to stay in, in 

China and Russia and Vietnam and Cuba? Come on. We do not do 

that. We are not an authoritarian country. 

You know, if people chose to stay in an Airbnb in Cuba, that 

would make me happy. That is a San Francisco-based company. 

I wanted to mention that I am very proud. They are one of the 

first United States businesses to take advantage of new economic 

opportunities in Cuba that my colleagues, some who sit on this 

committee, would take away. 

And in March, a New Jersey-based telecommunications company 

announced an agreement to provide direct international long-distance telephone service between the United States and Cuba, so 

relatives could talk to each other. 

These companies have an opportunity to make an incredible difference in the lives of everyday Cubans by connecting them to outside world. Now, there are plenty of problems and challenges that 

we face. There is no question about that. 

166 

And I was going to ask you, Ambassador or Assistant Secretary 

Jacobson, what have been the greatest areas of progress in the 

talks so far with Cuba? And what can we expect from this upcoming round of talks? If you can be brief and concise, because I have 

a bunch of other questions. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I will. Thanks. 

I think the greatest progress so far is just the acceptance by both 

sides that we do want diplomatic relations, that we want embassies, and our understanding that we will be able to operate in Cuba 

in a way that allows us to engage with more Cuban citizens. That 

is incredibly important, and we see that as really critical to this 

whole engagement process. 

I think in terms of what we will talk about tomorrow, it is really 

getting rest of the agreement for an embassy that operates similar 

to the way we operate in some other countries. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Assistant Secretary, you testified in a subcommittee hearing Senator Rubio and I held in February about the impact of the President’s new policy on human rights and democracy in Cuba. And I 

asked you about the impact of the President’s new Cuba policy on 

United States relations with other countries in the region and the 

world. And you answered then that the reaction was immediate 

and extremely positive. Those are your words. I was very pleased 

about that. 

Now, we also discussed then the importance of engaging regional 

partners on issues related to human rights. Has the administration 

been able to leverage regional and international support for its new 

Cuba policy to increase pressure on the Castro regime for its blatant violations of basic freedoms and systemic repression and abuse 

of its citizens? Has there been any success so far in engaging our 

partners on those issues? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, thank you, Senator. I do think that we have 

had conversations, certainly, with many of our hemispheric partners that have been much more productive than they have been in 

the past. I certainly would second what Senator Cardin said about 

the fact that in Panama the President was able to have a roundtable on civil society with the President Tabare Vazquez of Uruguay and President Solis of Costa Rica, which included two independent Cuban activists, dissidents, as well as 12 or 15 others from 

around the hemisphere. 

That is something very unusual. They would not necessarily 

have sat with the U.S. President to do that before this policy 

change. And the Cuban dissidents who were there were able to connect with colleagues around the hemisphere, which was not possible in the past. 

I also think that the reaction of the Panamanian Government to 

things that happened in Panama, including government-sponsored 

nongovernmental organizations preventing the full exercise of freedom of speech in the civil society forum was very forceful on how 

democracies operate, and that, too, was a change from what we 

have seen sometimes in the past. 

Senator BOXER. I think the fact that our regional partners got to 

actually meet human rights advocates is very important, because 

167 

a lot of times, you know, see no evil, that is it. But having spent 

time with them I think is critical. So that is a very good report. 

Now, Cuban President Raul Castro has said he will step down 

in 2018, following the end of his second term. This means for the 

first time since 1959, Cuba will not be led by one of the Castro 

brothers. 

Reports indicate that President Castro is grooming his first Vice 

President, Miguel Diaz-Canel, to succeed him. Can you talk about 

the importance of this transition of power in Cuba? And could you 

shed a little light on this first Vice President? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I am not sure I can shed that much light in this 

area. What I can say is I do think that a transition that is taking 

place is not just one of a normal or even Cuban election that is taking place in 2018. It is a generational change. And the exit of either of the Castro brothers is very, very significant. 

There are changes in the way that elections are going to be done 

in Cuba. Still not what we would like to see in a free, multiparty 

election, but I do think it is going to be significant. 

Obviously, the Vice President, Diaz-Canel, is the next generation 

of leaders. We have not met with him. I have not met with him, 

but I know many of you have who have gone to Cuba, many of the 

codels have. So there may be more knowledge in the Congress than 

we have. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I will close with this. 

I think this 2018 election is a real test for us, in a way, because 

if we can focus on democracy and freedom and fairness, it is a very 

specific thing we can work on, and I am going to work on that myself. 

In closing, may I put my opening statement in the record? 

CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The statement mentioned above can be found in 

the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section at the 

end of this hearing.] 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. 

Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Jacobson, I want to talk about the legal authority that 

President Obama is using to take his actions. 

In 1996, in reaction to the Cuban downing of two civilian aircraft, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, commonly referred to as the Libertad Act. Its 

purpose is to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom 

and prosperity, as well as enjoying the community of democratic 

countries that are flourishing in the Western Hemisphere. Another 

reason for the act, and I think the primary one, is to provide for 

the continued national security of the United States in the face of 

continuing threats from the Castro government of terrorism and 

theft of property of United States nationals. 

I think what was noteworthy about the act is it codified all restrictions under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations that were 

promulgated by the Treasury Department in 1963, and it codified 

the Cuban embargo. 

168 

What is also noteworthy is this had long-lasting effects on United 

States policy options toward Cuba because the executive branch is 

prevented from lifting the economic embargo without congressional 

concurrence until certain democratic conditions set forth in the law 

are met. 

Let me talk specifically about what those conditions are. In section 203, it says that upon making determination under subsection 

(c)(3) that a democratically elected government in Cuba is in power, 

the President shall, upon determining that a democratically elected 

government of Cuba is in power, submit the determination to the 

appropriate congressional committees. 

So let me first ask, has the President made a determination that 

a democratically elected government in Cuba is now in power? 

Ms. JACOBSON. The President has not taken actions under those 

aspects of the Libertad Act. So he has not invoked that part or any 

of the Libertad Act to take the actions he has taken. 

Senator JOHNSON. So he simply does not feel like he has to refer 

to the Libertad Act? What is he doing, if he is not basically lifting 

the embargo? What is this? How is he skirting it? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think the President has made very clear that 

Congress is the only body that can lift the embargo. And as he said 

in his State of the Union message, he called on Congress to do so. 

Therefore, he has made clear that he does not have the authority 

to lift the embargo. 

Senator JOHNSON. What is he doing? It seems like a lifting of the 

embargo to me. 

Ms. JACOBSON. What he has taken are Executive actions and regulatory changes within the Executive’s purview, with the embargo 

still in place. 

As you know, there were, for years, exceptions and continue to 

be exceptions to the embargo on agriculture. His changes make 

their exceptions on telecommunications and to support the private 

sector in Cuba. Those are the kinds of exceptions to the embargo 

that are within the executive branch’s purview. 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. Do you basically agree with the primary 

purpose of that act, which I read earlier, to ensure the freedom and 

prosperity of the Cuban people and, certainly, to enhance the national security of America? 

Do you think those are the two primary policy goals of this country toward Cuba? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Certainly, the President has made clear that 

what we want is a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba, which 

I think is similar to what is in that act. The question of our own 

national security should always be paramount in our decisionmaking. 

Senator JOHNSON. Ambassador Shannon, I was struck by your 

comments, that democracy and freedom is flourishing in Central 

America. Certainly, we have some good examples in Colombia because of courageous leadership, but I am not seeing a whole lot of 

democracy flourishing in Venezuela or Cuba, from that standpoint. 

Can you help me out in terms of what you are talking about? 

Ambassador SHANNON. There is no doubt that democracy is not 

flourishing in Cuba. And it is part of the President’s effort to purVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00172 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
169 

sue a new approach to see what more we can do to help the Cuban 

people begin their own political opening. 

But as we look back over the last several decades, what is important to remember and acknowledge about our hemisphere, is this 

was a region that was largely ruled by authoritarian governments, 

some military, some not, but which has found through its commitment to human rights and its ability to organize and use interAmerican institutions, like the Inter-American Commission on 

Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to 

develop civil societies around human rights issues and use that to 

build democracy. 

Whether it is Chile in the 1980s; whether it is our work in Central America to face down insurgencies and move military governments to allow elections to take place for civilian government to 

take over; whether it is what we have done in Colombia; whether 

it is transition to civilian and democratic governments in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil—I think this hemisphere has distinguished itself over the past three decades—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. I am running out of time here. 

Seeing as the primary purpose is to provide for the continued national security of America, is anybody going to make the case that 

the Castro regime has been helpful in promoting democracy and 

freedom in the hemisphere? Is it not true that they are supporting 

FARC in Colombia, and supporting the repressive regime in Venezuela? 

Is that not true, Secretary Jacobson? 

Ms. JACOBSON. What the Cuban Government has done and what 

we asserted in the report that we sent to Congress is the support 

for the FARC that we have seen recently is support for the peace 

process that is going on in Cuba between the FARC and the Colombian Government. Obviously, that was not always the case in the 

past, but at this time we think they are playing a constructive role 

in the peace process. 

In Venezuela, it is a different issue. 

But I think in many areas, we do not see Cuba in national security terms. We believe the engagement with Cuba through diplomatic relations will be far better for our interests than the previous 

policy of isolation. 

Senator JOHNSON. In regards to the other purpose, to assist the 

Cuban people to regain their freedom and prosperity, as Senator 

Rubio is pointing out, the United States is basically the only country engaged in embargo. Cuba has been able to trade freely with 

the rest of the world. 

I am not seeing the flourishing of prosperity as a result of that 

engagement. How in the world do we think being able to trade with 

the United States is going to improve their prosperity at all under 

the repressive regime of the Castros? 

Ms. JACOBSON. You are, certainly, right that their economic system has not made them a magnet for the trade and investment 

from other countries that they are able to have. 

In other words, other countries could have invested and been 

trading with them more than they are. But Cuba has to change to 

make that possible. 

170 

But they have been able to promote a narrative of the U.S.’s embargo and isolation from them as the reason for those economic 

problems. We have now taken that excuse away, so it will be obvious that the problems are the lack of movement in their system. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, today is the 113th anniversary of Cuban Independence Day. It is a bittersweet date, given the 

Cuban people’s languishing for more than 55 years under a dictatorship. 

As Assistant Secretary Jacobson reopens negotiations between 

Cuba and the United States tomorrow, let me be frank. I have deep 

concerns that the more these talks progress, the more the administration continues to entertain unilateral concessions without in return getting agreement on fundamental issues that are in our national interests and those of the Cuban people. 

So I know you said in response to another question these are not 

things we negotiated, these are things decided unilaterally. I really 

cannot believe that. 

The Cubans, Castro, said, you want a relationship? You have to 

return the three convicted spies, three convicted spies of the United 

States, including one who was convicted of conspiracy to commit 

murder of three United States citizens in international airspace. 

Check, we gave them the three spies. 

You want a relationship? Take us off the list of State Sponsors 

of Terrorism. Check, we gave them that. 

You want a relationship? Stop or change the democracy programs 

that we do throughout the world because we do not like those democracy programs because they interfere with our totalitarian regime. 

So I wake up to an article from Reuters that says U.S. signals 

it could change pro-democracy programs in Cuba that Havana objects to. Cuba has long objected to the pro-democracy program, 

which includes basic courses, for my friends sitting in the press, in 

basic journalism and information technology to the United States 

diplomatic mission in Havana. Check. 

Bring us to the Summit of the Americas even though Cuba violates the Democratic Charter of the OAS. And one of your people 

says it does not matter who is invited to the table, it is what is 

talked about. Guess what? The Democratic Charter, the message, 

Counselor Shannon, that is sent to the hemisphere is, you can violate the Democratic Charter and still be part of the club. So why 

not go ahead and violate it if you think you are compelled to do 

so? Pretty amazing. 

I have not seen any movement at all toward greater freedom. As 

a matter of fact, I would like to commend the committee’s attention 

to someone inside of Cuba, a Cuban blogger, Yusnaby Perez. 

In The Daily Beast, ‘‘Cuba’s 12 Most Absurd Prohibitions That 

Tourists May Never Notice.’’ I am just going to read a couple, Mr. 

Chairman. Cubans cannot access the Internet from their homes or 

on cell phones, not because, in fact, of technology infrastructure. 

That is not the case. They cannot access because the government 

171 

will not let them because information is a problem. So, yes, they 

want to perfect greater infrastructure, but for them to control it. 

You cannot live in Havana without a permit. The blogger goes 

on to say, can someone from L.A. live in Washington, D.C.? The answer is obviously yes. But you cannot live in Havana without a permit from the government. 

No public demonstrations are allowed. Imagine that. 

No political parties are allowed except the Partido Comunista de 

Cuba, the Cuban Communist Party. 

No investment in medium and large enterprises. 

No inviting a foreigner to spend a night without a permit in your 

own home. 

Among many others, something as absurd as you cannot bring 

from abroad 25 artificial fingernails, in violation of the law. 

I ask unanimous consent that the full article it be included the 

record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The article mentioned above can be found in the 

‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section at the end 

of this hearing.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. So here we are. Human rights abuses continue unabated with more than 1,600 cases of arbitrary political arrests this year alone, only 5 months into the year. 

So, President Obama may have outstretched his hand, but the 

Castros still have their fists real tight. 

You and Secretary Malinowski came before this committee, heralded that there was a downturn. Guess what? We are skyrocketing back up in human rights violations and political dissidents being arrested, including the rearrest of the people who you 

negotiated to ultimately be released, several of them have been rearrested. 

Now, despite the desire to move in a different direction, I see we 

get nothing in return. 

You are taking Cuba off the terrorism list. Well, Joanne 

Chesimard on the FBI’s 10 Most Wanted Terrorists list for murdering New Jersey State Trooper Werner Foerster, Charles Hill 

wanted for killing a New Mexico State Trooper and hijacking a 

United States civilian plane, they are both living in Cuba, protected by the regime. 

The regime says we will talk to you, we will talk to you, even 

though your counterpart has already said she got political asylum 

and she is not going anywhere, but we will talk to you about it. 

We will talk to you about it. We will all talk ad infinitum. 

So I just do not see it. And I hope my colleagues who are so passionate, and I listened to them, about democracy and human rights 

in many parts of the world, in Burma, in Vietnam, in a whole host 

of places in the world, but are almost silent when it comes to Cuba. 

Somehow democracy and human rights there is not as important 

as other places in the world. I hope we can keep the same standard. 

Let me ask you, Madam Secretary, to your knowledge, were you 

or any member of the State Department told not to push for sanctions on Cuba in violation of sending MiGs and missiles to North 

172 

Korea in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, the type of 

missiles that, in fact, were in the hull of a cargo ship full of sugar 

being hidden where the MiG insignias of Cuba were taken off to 

try to hide it? 

Were you told not to push? Or to your knowledge, was any member of the State Department told not to push for sanctions at the 

U.N.? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Not that I know of. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Did the U.N. sanction Cuba? 

Ms. JACOBSON. They did not. 

Senator MENENDEZ. They did not. 

Let me ask you this, in the list of State Sponsor of Terrorism, 

you got a letter that says that, in fact, Cuba has not, never did, 

oddly the Castro regime’s assurances also asserted the Government 

of Cuba has never—this is in their letter, and the State Department quoted it—has never supported any act of international terrorism and that the Cuban territory has never been used to organize, finance, or execute terrorist acts against any country, including the United States. 

Do you intend for members of the committee to believe that the 

Castro regime never supported any acts of international terrorism 

over the last half century? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, I think what is crucial is—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. No, not what is crucial. Answer my question. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Sorry. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you believe, do you want the committee 

to believe the Cuban Government has never sponsored any act of 

terrorism over the last half century? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I cannot say that I would urge you all to believe 

that it has never occurred, no. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I hope you do not mean to suggest that 

the historical examples of providing support to former armed insurgents in the 1980s, including the M–19 in Colombia, the FMLN in 

El Salvador, the FSL in Nicaragua, or the fact that the Cuban military did not shoot unarmed civilian planes carrying American citizens over international waters, for which there are pending indictments from a United States jurisdiction against several individuals 

in Cuba, which I am wondering, are you pursuing that in your negotiations with Cuba about them answering those indictments? 

Ms. JACOBSON. That is why we are going to have the law enforcement conversation for the Justice Department to be able to pursue—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you realize who some of those indictments are against? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And do you think you are going to engage 

in a conversation with them responding to justice? Do you think 

the Castros are going to say, yes, we are going to appear in a 

court? I do not think so. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Understood. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you one last question, if I have 

the chair’s indulgence. 

You know, you all came here and said that, oh, there is a reduction of political arrests in January, as a sign that the administraVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00176 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
173 

tion’s Cuba policy was achieving results. Not surprisingly, these 

numbers climbed dramatically in the ensuing months with more 

than 450 political arrests in February, more than 600 in March, 

more than 1,600 political arrests in total during the first 4 months 

of 2015—1,600 in the first 4 months of 2015. 

Now, as I am sure you know, this past Sunday, more than 100 

activists in Cuba were violently arrested, including 60 members of 

Damas de Blanco, represented there by Bertha Soler, following 

their attendance at a church service. 

So I guess Bertha was right when she said the Cuban Government will only take advantage to strengthen its repressive machinery, because all these women were doing was marching in white 

with a gladiola to church. And result of that is to be beaten and 

thrown into prison. 

That is not success. I do not get it. 

The final thing I will say, Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of other 

questions, but in deference to my colleagues, and I appreciate it, 

is that this is one-sided. I do not know what we have gotten in return. We have gotten nothing in return, but the Cubans have gotten plenty in return. 

If that is our way of negotiating, then we have a real problem 

on our hands. And the message we send in the Western Hemisphere, in Venezuela, where we have—I do not see our partners engaging with us because we have changed our Cuba policy, this 

opens door toward promotion of democracy. We are not seeing very 

much democracy in Venezuela. I am not sure about it happening 

in other places in the hemisphere for which we have challenges as 

well. 

So I think that that is a hollow promise based on what we see. 

I appreciate the chair’s courtesy because of my interest. 

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. Thank you. 

Senator Perdue. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here today. This is an important topic. 

In my career, I have watched and seen the United States strategy of engagement in various parts of the world, China, Vietnam, 

Dominican Republic, Haiti, to mention a few. It has worked in 

some. It has not in others. 

I echo what Senator Menendez just said about Venezuela. We 

buy $32 billion of oil a year. We have not affected their regime one 

iota, that I can see. 

I have three concerns about what we are talking about today 

with regard to changing our relationship with Cuba. One is their 

continued support of terrorism. Two is their human rights record 

that continues today. And, three, is their activity in arms smuggling. We will get to those in a second. 

I have a very short question. I hope you will be brief. 

In 2003, Cuba allowed Iran to operate on their soil. We know 

about the attack on U.S. telecommunications. Cuba is reported to 

have supplied intelligence services to Venezuela recently and its allies. 

Cuba has provided assistance and safe haven to terrorists, including members of FARC and Basque ETA. They continue to harVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:19 Oct 01, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00177 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
174 

bor fugitives wanted in the United States, including a fugitive 

today listed on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists list. 

Cuba has also helped Islamic extremists, including members of 

Hezbollah, slip into North America unnoticed. A Cuban stateowned enterprise provided Venezuela with advanced technology 

they used to provide illicit United States passports, visas, and 

other documentation to 173 individuals from the Middle East between 2008 and 2012. 

That is ancient history, according to the administration. Let us 

talk about recent history. 

Just since President Obama started these secret negotiations 

with the Castro regime, since June 2013, there have been reportedly 15,000 political arrests, 2,500 such arrests just since the President’s speech on United States-Cuban relations in December. 

To make it even worse, between February and March of this year 

alone, Cuba has increased the number of politically motivated arrests by 70 percent. 

As troubling as that is, I am even more troubled by Cuba’s continued nefarious activities with regard to arms smuggling. We 

know about the earlier shipment of 240 tons of military equipment 

confiscated on the way to North Korea, but we are talking about 

February 28 of this year, 2015, a Chinese-flagged vessel, Da Dan 

Xia, was intercepted in Cartagena, with over 100 tons of explosives, 2.6 million detonators, 99 projectile heads, and over 3,000 artillery shells. This was bought from a Chinese arms manufacturer 

named Norinco, on behalf of Tecnoimport, which is a shadow company of the Cuban military. 

The question is, With this type of activity, what assurances can 

you give us? Mr. Ambassador, I would like you it take a shot at 

this first. With this kind of continuing and current activity, why 

should we be optimistic that just by opening up economic relations 

with these people, this regime, that this type of activity will 

change? 

Ambassador SHANNON. Thank you very much, Senator. 

I can assure you that just by opening up economic activity we 

will not necessarily change behavior. It is a longer process in this. 

But in regard to the larger diplomatic environment, and Assistant Secretary Jacobson can address some of the more specific 

issues, in regard to the larger diplomatic environment, the fact that 

these ships were stopped was significant. The fact they were inspected was significant. The fact that these items were found was 

significant and shows an ability to cooperate with our partners in 

the region to control and monitor this kind of activity. 

And this will deepen with time as people understand that the 

broader purpose of our diplomacy is not simply to normalize relations with Cuba and build a relationship with Cuba that will 

change how we try to promote our interests and democratic values, 

but that it is also about how we enhance the integration and cooperation inside the hemisphere. 

And partners who have been leery of working with us around 

Cuba issue, because they do not want to get caught in the vortex 

of a very powerful and historic animosity, are going to be more 

open to engaging with us in this kind of activity. 

175 

So I believe we are actually going to be able to do more in the 

area of security. We are going to be able to do more in the area 

of nonproliferation. We are going to be able to do more in the area 

of fighting drugs because of this. 

Senator PERDUE. Can I ask a followup on that, Mr. Ambassador? 

So to follow up on Senator Menendez, why would we not make that 

a prerequisite, that better behavior would lead to open economic relations? 

Or, Madam Secretary, either one. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think, Senator, if I could, we all want the same 

end. It is a question of how we basically motivate that behavior or 

how effectively we can help support change. 

The President believes firmly that the efforts we made in the 

past, which were, in fact, to say you must change first and then 

we will engage, just did not work to make the changes inside Cuba. 

Senator PERDUE. Can I ask you a question on that? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Certainly. 

Senator PERDUE. We have evidence, though, cause and effect of 

several other countries, Britain, Canada, others, having open trading relations with Cuba. We are the only one really embargoing. 

And yet that engagement really has not changed behavior. 

So what makes us believe today our opening up of economic relations with Cuba will actually have that effect? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I mean, I think that is a fair point. We do not 

know yet what the effect of this policy will be on the Cuban Government. We do see already the beginning of the effect on the 

Cuban people. 

While we decry the detentions of the activists, we know there are 

Cubans benefiting from this new policy in their independent businesses and in their belief that they are going to prosper and have 

a better life because of engagement with the United States. 

The other thing I would say is, I am very engaged with my E.U. 

counterpart and with my counterpart in Spain in working with 

them so that we can now work together. And when we work together, not just with our regional counterparts but with our European counterparts, that is more powerful. I think that could have 

a more galvanizing effect. 

But it will be slow. I do not deny that. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses. 

My colleagues have asked great questions about the particulars 

of the United States-Cuba discussion. I want to talk a little bit 

about the region. 

The Americas and the Caribbean are 35 nations. I guess by the 

general count, nearly 1 billion people. If I do my kind of back-ofthe-envelope math, 35 nations means about 600 bilateral relationships between the nations in the region. Some of the bilateral relationships are strong and friendly. Some are weak. They are warm 

and cold. They change over time. 

Is there any other bilateral relationship in the Americas that 

does not include normal diplomatic relationships, other than the 

176 

United States and Cuba? I am not aware of one, but you guys are 

the experts. 

Ms. JACOBSON. No, sir. 

Senator KAINE. So this is the only one of the 600 bilateral relationships in the Americas that does not involve a normal diplomatic relationship. 

Let me ask you this, I am not aware of any war between nations 

in the Americas, our two continents, right now, between nations, 

am I right about that? 

Ambassador SHANNON. You are correct. 

Senator KAINE. The only civil war, there are security challenges, 

obviously, of many kinds because we are 35 nations and 1 billion 

people, but the only civil war right now in the region is the war 

between the Colombian Government and FARC and another smaller terrorist organization that is currently subject to a negotiation 

that Cuba is hosting, where the United States is playing a role accompanying the Colombian Government, correct? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Right. That is correct. And we are not accompanying but have this special envoy now. It is also the longest running civil conflict in the hemisphere. 

Senator KAINE. I do not want to get ahead of myself, but if that 

negotiation works out positively, and we have the ability to be two 

continents, all Americans, without war, without civil war, without 

war between nations, that would be pretty unusual in the history 

of these two continents, would it not? 

Ambassador SHANNON. It would be a historic achievement. 

Senator KAINE. And it would be pretty unusual on other continents, wars or civil wars in Asia, wars or civil wars in Africa, 

sadly, wars or civil wars in Europe. 

You talked in your opening testimony about increasing trade in 

the Americas. The majority of the American trade agreements are 

with nations in the Americas. There is more trade between the nations in the Americas. There has been a move in the last 30 years 

from governments that have been autocratic or military toward democracy—again, not that there are not challenges, not that there 

are not problem children. We are human beings, after all. There 

are going to be challenges. 

You each have spent your entire professional careers working in 

the Western Hemisphere. It is what you have devoted your professional lives to. Tell us what it means to the United States of America to potentially be the anchor and the leading nation in two continents with no war, no civil war, complete diplomatic relations, 

and an ever-increasing trade and interdependence. 

Talk about what that means to the United States of America. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, I think those are incredibly important 

points. And for me, one of the things that I see in this hemisphere 

is not only the hemisphere’s importance to the United States and 

to our people daily, whether trade, familial ties, the growing influence and culture that we share, and the way in which the values 

in this hemisphere are the same as ours, but I also see this as a 

model with so many flaws that still have to be overcome, and challenges that we all face, and inequalities of systems and democracies even where they exist. 

177 

But remember that in the transition from military to civilian 

government, truth commissions and the process of that was first 

done in this hemisphere with the CONADEP in Argentina, a model 

that then South Africa looked at and Eastern European countries 

looked at and others have looked in the Arab world now. 

Remembering also that the terrible adjustment of the 1990s on 

macroeconomic issues were things that this hemisphere went 

through first. And now with the free trade agreements, the broadening of those economic changes to be greater social inclusion and 

ensure that everybody is included in those benefits is taking root 

here first. 

So I think it is not just what we do for ourselves. It is what we 

are then able to do elsewhere, including working with these partners increasingly capable on global issues that matter to us, from 

climate change to the Middle East to peacekeeping, where Uruguay 

per capita is the largest contributor of peacekeepers in the world. 

So I think it is not just a phenomenon we will be proud of here, 

but one that is in fact projecting outside. 

Ambassador SHANNON. If I could add briefly, as we look out on 

to the globe and see some very demanding and, in some instances, 

some frightening security challenges, to have a strategic enclave in 

our own hemisphere, where we are fighting no wars, facing no significant insurgencies or terrorist groups, and are able to have commerce, both in manufacturing and services, but also in political dialogue, is a remarkable thing and a remarkable accomplishment. 

To have examples of societies that have moved from authoritarian government to democracy, have moved from closed economies to open economies, as I have noted, is a confidence-builder for 

other countries around the world who are facing similar challenges, 

because our hemisphere has shown that democracy is not a status 

quo power structure. It is not about preserving privilege. It is about 

addressing profound social problems and doing so in a peaceful 

way, in a transformative way. 

So I think we have a remarkable platform in the Western Hemisphere from which to engage the rest of the world. As the Assistant 

Secretary noted, and as I noted in my testimony, this is a region 

that is moving from global isolation to global engagement. 

In many ways, one of most interesting stories of the first half of 

the 21st century is not going to be inter-American relations. It is 

going to be how the Americas relate to the rest of the world. The 

fact that we have four of our free-trading partners being part of the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership and looking for ways to transform their 

own economies by reaching across the Pacific into Asia, and doing 

so as democratic countries that support open markets, that support 

free trade, and that support the international institutions that regulate trade, is a dramatic accomplishment, and will have an impact 

on the larger economies in South America that have yet to sign up 

for these kind of larger agreements. 

So we are at a moment of strategic momentum. And if we are 

able to show that this hemisphere can function hemispherically 

around establishing priorities and building approaches to those priorities, and if we can show that through our dialogue we can 

present a consolidated face to the rest of the world, we will have 

done something remarkable. 

178 

Senator KAINE. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 

chairman and ranking minority member for scheduling this hearing. This has been very informative and, obviously, an area where 

there is much interest here. 

I want to thank the witnesses, and I want to thank them particularly for explaining that this new policy is not a reward for good 

behavior on behalf of the Cuban Government. Obviously, there are 

concerns, huge concerns, in terms of human rights that need to be 

addressed. But I appreciate the clear-eyed vision of that, that the 

administration holds. 

And if you could explain, Ms. Jacobson, is it easier to have those 

discussions with regard to human rights or perhaps negotiating for 

fugitives from American justice if we have diplomatic relations or 

a better relationship and better contact than this situation as it 

has been? 

Ms. JACOBSON. It is only possible, really, with a policy of engagement. Those were things we really could not do before. 

Senator FLAKE. All right. Thank you. That is important, I think, 

important in this discussion. We often think, well, you know, is this 

a guarantee now, this greater engagement, that any improvements 

will be in the offing? 

That assumes that we have a good policy now that is yielding 

benefits, and we have not. We have not for about 50 years now. 

And now at least there is a possibility that we might be able to 

make some improvements and see increased freedom for the Cuban 

people. 

So I applaud the administration for taking this position and for 

pursuing this. 

Let us turn to travel for a minute. It was said before that when 

people travel, some do stay in the hotels owned by the government 

and, therefore, revenue will flow to government. There is no doubt 

that will happen. 

But it is significant, as was mentioned by Senator Boxer, that 

companies like Airbnb have gone into Cuba now. This a company 

that has a Web site that books travel, mostly bed and breakfast, 

for people in their private homes. I was just looking at it while we 

were here, if you just scroll down, they have now, I understand, 

more than 2,000 listings in Cuba. 

A bit of perspective, it took them years in some of their other 

markets like San Francisco to get up to 1,000 listings. You have 

2,000 listings. I think this is just, I think, a 1,000 over just about 

50 days. So it is very significant. 

And for the most part or virtually all of these listings are people 

in their homes, people who will benefit from visits by Americans 

and others. And there is less of a chance that money will certainly 

flow through government. Nobody denies that increased travel will 

increase revenue that goes to the Cuban Government, but at what 

cost to the Cuban Government? 

I have always felt that if we lift some of our restrictions, that the 

Cuban Government may seek to impose some of their own, because 

179 

obviously they want revenue but they fear what else, the freedom 

that might come with the increased travel. 

But I have often also said that if somebody is going to limit my 

travel, it should be a Communist. That is what they do. Not our 

own government here. That is not our purview. That is not our prerogative, to limit the travel of Americans. 

So with regard to Cuban-American travel, I think it is significant 

the President lifted some restrictions a few years ago. 

Ms. Jacobson or Ambassador Shannon, can you tell us what has 

happened in that regard in terms of increased travel over the last 

couple of years with the policy changing with regard to CubanAmerican travel? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator, very much. 

I think that it is clear that in the regulatory changes that the 

administration has made over the last few years to increase the 

ability for families to see each other, for Cuban-Americans to go to 

Cuba, as well as the changes most recently in December, there 

have been many more Cuban-Americans traveling. Certainly, it has 

been critical to us I think to ensure that remittance amounts go up, 

and they did dramatically in the most recent regulatory changes, 

because in many ways, they have been the capital that has founded 

some of the most important private sector emergence, and will almost certainly continue to do so, including some of these private 

homes that are serving on Airbnb, people who want to run their 

own businesses who are allowed to in areas that the Cuban Government will permit, but do not have the resources to do so and 

can be helped by folks in the United States. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. As one who has traveled frequently to Cuba over the past 15 years, I can tell you, for several 

years there, it was tough to see any change or progress because the 

Cuban Government, it seemed they would loosen controls when 

they needed to and then tighten them again. But traveling there 

over the past couple of years, there has been a significant difference. And I think it is because of the increased travel, particularly by Cuban-Americans, that you see the type of entrepreneurship that has been allowed but will likely continue now. Much 

tougher to turn and reverse, that, certainly, is the feeling that 

those of us who traveled down more recently have gotten, and I 

think that will only increase with increased American travel. 

Like I said before, there are no guarantees that anything will 

happen, but change is more likely to occur with increased contact 

from the United States. 

Let me touch on diplomatic relations and the appointment, ultimately, of an Ambassador to Cuba. How will that help with regard 

to those who do business legally, Americans who do business legally in Cuba under the new regs, and increased number of Americans who travel? What benefits will they have, if we have full diplomatic relations, that they do not have now? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Obviously, our interest section in Cuba already 

provides some services in both of those areas. But I would say that 

having a U.S. Ambassador, having full diplomatic relations, is always much better in terms of being able to engage with governments at the highest level, the representative of the President, and 

being able to advocate for those U.S. businesses that can operate 

180 

legally, being able to advocate for them against competitors, being 

able to support Americans while they are there. 

It also critical to us that we have sufficient staff to be able to 

support the influx of people and Americans who are going to Cuba 

so we can provide those services. We can only do that with full diplomatic relations. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank the ranking minority member for mentioning the Freedom to Travel Act that has 

sponsorship of the majority of this committee, I think 10 of 19. We 

look forward to pushing that forward. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks for your interest in this issue. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really 

appreciate you holding this hearing, you and Senator Cardin, and 

doing it in such a balanced way. I very much appreciate that. 

I am honored, Senator Flake, to be on your Freedom to Travel 

bill. I think one of the things that is so important is opening Cuba 

up to travel, and there could not be better ambassadors than our 

citizens going down to Cuba and visiting about what we are all 

about in terms of democracy and human rights and those very, 

very important values. 

At the beginning, I just want to say I very much support this policy of normalization. I think we are turning the page on a failed 

policy that has been going on since the early 1960s. We are moving 

to empowering the Cuban people, empowering Cuban entrepreneurs. I really welcome this new chapter of normalized relations. 

It was mentioned earlier, and you were asked several questions—I really appreciate you both being here and all of your hard 

work over the years in this area—about the private sector. And I 

have looked for reports on what is happening down there. 

I think it is fascinating, in terms of the growth, the dramatic 

growth in the private sector. A 2013 Brookings report, and there 

are probably more because that is an old report, is looking at close 

to 1 million classified as private sector. You have 500,000 legally 

registered as self-employed and you have another 570,000 farmers 

who own or lease private plots working solo or in cooperatives. As 

I think is mentioned in your testimony, there is an organic sector 

also working there, organic farming and organic marketing. 

In addition to that, there is another estimated, from this report, 

600,000 to 1 million who are labeled private sector but they are 

considered illegal by the Cuban Government. So there is also a sector there that is growing. 

So you have these two large sectors, which could be in the range 

of 2 million. I think that is what, when we travel down there, when 

we engage down there, with our commerce, these are the folks that 

we are helping. These are the folks that we are helping grow. 

These are the folks that we are empowering. And I think that is 

a very, very good thing. 

Now, one of the areas that I think is critically important is increasing our agriculture interaction with Cuba. So I am also proud 

181 

to be, in addition to Senator Flake, Senator Heitkamp has a bill 

to permit increased agricultural sales, I am on that. 

And this week I am introducing the Cuba Digital and Telecommunications Advancement Act, also known as the Cuba DATA 

Act, with Senator Flake, Senator Durbin, and Senator Enzi. The 

goal of the legislation is very simple: Give U.S. telecommunications 

companies the opening and certainty they need to invest and help 

Cuba open to the world, and give the Cubans the tools they need 

to engage in a 21st century economy and to share information and 

communicate more efficiently with each other and the world. 

Secretary Jacobson, both you and the President emphasized that 

access to the Internet is one of the cornerstones to the new Cuba 

policy. For those who have not been to Cuba, it is one of the least 

wired countries in the Western Hemisphere. Things we take for 

granted, such as email on the phone, are basically nonexistent in 

Cuba. 

What are the major challenges Cubans are facing to access the 

Internet? And what can United States companies and the Congress 

do to open up Cuba to the global Internet? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you so much, Senator. Thank you so much 

for your interest in this and the conversations we have had. 

I think, obviously, a huge part of the obstacles to the Cuban people right now are sheer access to Internet connected devices, 

whether it is computers or whether it is smartphones. When they 

have access, that access is expensive. It is almost prohibitive. Even 

when the cost came down recently for the public to access the 

Internet, it was still extremely expensive. For most Cubans, it was 

about a half month’s wage. 

Then there is a question of whether everything is accessible once 

you get on the Web and whether there are things that are blocked. 

So there are huge challenges for the average Cuban. I think 

there is a combination of reasons for that, but the Cuban Government fundamentally has to make decisions, and we obviously want 

to encourage in every way possible that information and access to 

the Internet be made easier, cheaper, available, and open for the 

Cuban people. That will take a variety of decisions by the government that we are encouraging them to take by encouraging American businesses to have those conversations with them, and these 

are the means to do so. 

Senator UDALL. The goal, as I think you said in your testimony, 

Madam Secretary, of the Cuban Government is to have Internet access for 50 percent of its population by 2020. So they have stated 

this goal, saying we are trying to move there. This is the goal that 

the U.N. has also made for developing countries around the world. 

Is this goal achievable by Cuba? If the United States telecom 

companies were allowed to invest in Cuba, how long would it take 

to completely wire the island? 

Ms. JACOBSON. That is a great question, Senator. I am not the 

best of tech experts, but I will tell you that the tech companies that 

I speak to who had conversations either with Cuba or about Cuba 

believe it is absolutely possible. And in terms of how long it would 

take, a lot depends on what the Cubans decide to do and what kind 

of infrastructure they put in. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much for those answers. 

182 

Mr. Chairman, just a final comment, I know that all of the 

things that have been mentioned here that are problems, that we 

do not agree with, problems and challenges in Cuba, we just have 

different goals to try to go those things changed. 

And as the last note, I would like to express my support for the 

extradition of Charlie Hill. Extradition of criminals, I think, is an 

important part of any normal relations between countries. Charlie 

Hill, who allegedly murdered a New Mexico State Police officer and 

hijacked a plane, must be brought to justice. 

And I know the State Department shares this objective. I hope 

we continue to make this a priority until we get it done. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

My sense is there may be additional questions, and I will defer 

my time for others who may wish to ask additional questions. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. Just a couple points I wanted to 

touch on. This Internet thing is important. 

I have talked about it extensively in the past. As I listen to some 

of this conversation, I think there is still this perception that somehow the reason why there is no Internet infrastructure in Cuba is 

because the United States has not gone into build it. The Cuban 

Government had a joint venture with an Italian company for many 

years. 

By the way, the telecom industry in Cuba is run by the Cuban 

Government, and it is a holding held by GAESA, the holding company run by the son-in-law of Raul Castro. 

The bottom line is virtually every telecom company in the 

world—and there are dozens of advanced telecom companies in the 

world that are not within the territory of the United States—have 

had access to the Cuban market, and they have not been allowed 

to build out or have dropped out of joint ventures. 

The bottom line is the fact that American infrastructure will be 

allowed to come in does not mean the Cubans will allow it. Here 

is why: They do not want the Cuban people to have access to the 

Internet. 

In China, they have something called the Great Firewall. They 

have access to the Internet in China. There is all sorts of infrastructure. China has both nationally owned and private companies 

in China that offer telecommunication infrastructure, yet the people of China do not have access to the Internet the way you and 

I understand it because the government places filters upon it. 

This is a government that will not even allow you to bring certain books onto the island. This is a government that will not allow 

you to read certain newspapers on the island. 

This idea that they are going to somehow allow AT&T and 

Verizon to say, yes, come in, build all of this infrastructure, unfettered access to the Cuban people, is absurd. They cannot survive 

an Internet opening. 

So we can pass all the laws we want. The Cuban Government is 

still going to place filters, and you still have to work through their 

telecommunications company in a joint venture in order to build infrastructure on the island. 

183 

As far as travel is concerned, I think Airbnb, that is fantastic, 

that they are building this up. Here is the point, number one, even 

private operators on the island of Cuba, bed and breakfast, casas 

particulars, whatever you call them, still pay an exorbitant fee to 

the government for the right to be able to provide that service. So 

they even game that system to get their hands on money. 

That being said, the vast majority of people that travel to Cuba 

will not be staying at one of these facilities. They will be staying 

at segregated tourist destinations where tourists are largely 

brought in. They experience that facility, and then they leave. And 

the money is going to the Cuban military. 

I have heard discussion about Vietnam, China. Look, we have 

full travel to China and Vietnam. We have business with them. 

They are not any more democratic than they were when all of this 

started. So I think it actually proves my point, that economic openings do not lead to political openings, by evidence of China and 

Vietnam. 

But here is my point about the Cuban military: In addition to the 

fact that the Castro regime stole 6,000 properties owned by U.S. 

citizens or U.S. companies, of which zero dollars have been compensated, this is the Cuban military that has four, four senior officials, three senior officials indicted, for the murder of four Floridians, indicted in U.S. courts. That is the Cuban military. 

This is the Cuban military that was helping smuggle heavy 

weapons to North Korea without consequence. They were caught, 

no U.N. sanctions, no U.S. sanctions. This is not just the Cuban 

military. This is a Cuban military that uses access to funds to 

carry out this sort of grotesque activity. 

So when we talk about travel to Cuba, business with Cuba, let 

us be very clear. We are not doing business with the Cuban people. 

You may eat at a home somewhere, but this is still a very small 

part of their economy. For the vast and enormous majority of 

Americans that travel there, and that includes congressional 

codels, journalists, diplomats, everyday American citizens, you will 

stay in a government-run facility. Every dollar you spend there will 

wind up in the hands of the Cuban military that sponsors terrorism by smuggling arms to North Korea, that has senior officials 

indicted for the murder of Americans over international airspace, 

and a Cuban military that uses every access it has to funds to enrich themselves and repress the Cuban people. 

So there is no economic opening to Cuba. There is an economic 

opening to GAESA, which is the Cuban military-run holding company. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me very briefly, and then I will yield to Senator Menendez. 

Just in regards to just some responses here, there are 2 million 

cell phone users in Cuba. When I was in China, they do block full 

access to the Internet, although the U.S. Embassy site on air quality is one of the most frequently visited sites by Chinese nationals. 

It is the only reliable information they can get about air quality. 

Our engagement will bring faster connectivity and more quality 

connectivity to the people of Cuba. I am convinced of that. The 

184 

technology is there, as Senator Rubio points out. It is a matter of 

making it available, and the people of Cuba will demand that. 

And let me just also also point out, in regards to the Libertad 

Act, the Libertad Act provides for licensing authority by the administration, which is common in these types of legislation. So there 

are certain authorities included in the act. And I do look forward 

to a robust discussion in our committee. 

Mr. Chairman, I would yield the time to Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I see that Senator Markey is 

here, so I will just wait. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Welcome and thank you for all of the good work, which you have 

done. Over the years, there has been clearly an isolation from our 

country that Cuba has had to live with. And I very much appreciate this administration’s attempts to normalize our relations. I 

think it is important. I think it is a step in the right direction. And 

I think the actions which you are taking are beginning to make it 

possible for us to envision a day where we truly have normalized 

relations with Cuba, but it is not going to happen overnight. And 

clearly, Cuba itself has to deal with behavioral changes that are 

not going to come easy. 

But that said, I think the process has opened, and I think that 

we are going to head in the right direction. 

I know Senator Udall has already talked about this, but I think 

it is important to focus on it, and that is the relationship that exists between information and freedom. I think there is, without 

question, a huge cultural compatibility that we have with Cuba, 

otherwise the Red Sox would not be paying all this money to sign 

Cuban players right now. They have at least mastered that part of 

our culture. 

And hopefully, we will be able to use better relationships to be 

able to broaden that even further. 

Talking about the Internet, talking about telecommunications, 

can you just outline a little bit for me? I may have missed the detail that you gave to Senator Udall. But what is your hope, in the 

terms of the transfer and sale of telecommunications technology 

into the Cuban marketplace? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank so much, Senator. 

Obviously, the regulatory changes are fairly broad in terms of 

what can now be sold and provided to Cuba in the telecommunications and information area. That may be hardware, whether cell 

phones or other forms of computers that can now be sort of not just 

donated as they could be before but sold to Cuba—people in Cuba. 

And it also is services that are providing information, such as the 

phone card and phone service that IDT in New Jersey recently 

signed a contract with the Cuban Government to do, or other forms 

of telecommunications work. 

But I do want to be clear that it is true that all of this takes a 

decision by the Cuban Government to move forward with modernization in their telecom sector. That is, certainly, true. 

American companies can be able to, under our changes, participate in Cuba, but the Cuban Government has already said it wants 

to modernize and said things to the U.N. And we will have to see 

185 

if they really take those steps. But we want to be part of it, if and 

when they do. We want to encourage them to do so. 

I think as others have said, we think the Cuban people want that 

as well. 

Senator MARKEY. I think the more that we have American tourists down there, the more that we have cultural exchanges, the 

more we have students in Cuba, the more normalized to that extent, it is more likely that the Cuban people—Cuban students are 

going to be saying to themselves, why can we not have that technology? 

And it is a resistance, by the way, that existed in our own country. Our own country did not want to move to the digital revolution. Our cable and telephone companies did not move to it. There 

was not one home that had digital in 1996 in America until we 

changed the laws. 

We pretty much had to incentivize those companies. We were 

going nowhere. Same thing with cell phones, until 1994, it was the 

size of a brick and it cost 50 cents a minute, and we did not have 

one, ordinary people. Some wealthy businessman, Gordon Gecko in 

Wall Street, had one, but not ordinary people. 

In 2001, in Africa, only 12 million people had cell phones, wireless devices. Today it is 800 million. 

So we have moved from these devices to these devices very rapidly in America, but they are doing it in Africa as well. The more 

that it insinuates itself into the culture of individual countries, it 

changes the culture. It changes the business relationships. It 

changes the entrepreneurial spirit of a country. And we can see it 

in country after country. It is not uniform. No question about it, 

but you can see it. Where it works, it works big time. 

So I think the same thing is going to be true in Cuba. The more 

we can move these devices in, and the more the people in the country demand they have access to it so they are not the last country 

in the world without access to modern technologies, I think we are 

going to see dramatic telescoping of the changes that we are hoping 

that will happen in that country. 

And so of all of the sectors, that is why Radio Marti and TV 

Marti were always focused on by the Reagan administration. They 

understood the importance of this. 

And the openings, which you are talking about here, kind of puts 

it in the mind of many Cuban ordinary citizens, why not, why not 

us? 

So what is the level of negotiation or discussion that is going on, 

in terms of these telecommunications technologies? Who are we 

speaking to? Who ultimately makes the decision inside Cuba? 

Ms. JACOBSON. All right, thank you, Senator. 

There are basically two tracks, if you will. One is government. 

That is the beginning of conversations with the Cuban Government 

about telecommunications. And the other obviously are many, 

many private sector conversations with the Cuban Government, to 

which we are not a party but we obviously know about, that they 

are taking place. 

On the government side, we had our Ambassador for International Communications Policy Danny Sepulveda who was in Havana about 2 months ago now. That was the first time we had that 

186 

kind of conversation with the Cuban Government at an official 

level, meeting both with their telecommunications ministry as well 

as their telecom provider, which is state-run, ETECSA, to talk 

about sort of what kind of infrastructure they are interested in and 

how we have done things in the United States in terms of the regulation and access issues, as well as obviously many, many United 

States companies have had conversations with the Cuban Government. And they are beginning to think about the solicitations they 

put out, the request for proposals, if you will, of their own telecom 

sector. 

Senator MARKEY. So the quicker we can move them in that direction, the quicker their whole society changes. It has happened all 

over the world. They will not be immune to you. 

Thank you both for your great work. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Without objection, I would like to enter into the record on behalf 

of Senator Rubio a letter to him dated February 18 from the U.S. 

Coast Guard. And if there is no objection, I will put it into the 

record. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The letter mentioned above can be found in the 

‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section at the end 

of this hearing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to clarify a few issues. Again, we talk about telecommunications and say the Cuban Government may not allow 

this, and it is up to them, and we cannot control them, and they 

may not allow it. That is true. They will allow what they will allow. 

But we have had a policy for decades that has not yielded the 

results we want. The question is not this policy or a policy in a perfect world. It is this policy compared to the nonengagement that we 

had before. And we know what nonengagement has yielded. 

The Cuban Government may or may not keep their promise to 

make sure that 50 percent of the Cuban people are wired by a certain time. We have no control of that. 

We have control of what is in our national interest. And I think 

it is more likely that it will occur than under the former policy we 

had. 

Also, with regard to a statement made that whenever an American traveler goes to Cuba, every dollar ends up with the Cuban 

Government, that simply is not the case. That may be said by those 

who have not traveled to Cuba recently. But many Americans travel to Cuba. 

And it is true that you cannot travel to Cuba without some revenue going to government. That is certain. But the notion that 

every dollar spent ends up in the hands of Cuban military simply 

is not the case. 

You have burgeoning entrepreneurship in Cuba that is a testimony to the fact that some money does flow to ordinary Cuban people. That has been particularly the case with the travel of CubanAmericans over the past couple of years. 

187 

I should mention that when that policy was announced a couple 

of years ago, that Cuban-Americans could travel not just once every 

3 years but as often as they like, and remittance levels were increased, there was talk here in Congress about reversing that. ‘‘You 

cannot have that. That is not good for the Cuban people. It is not 

good for America.’’ 

I can tell you there is no serious talk today about reversing that, 

because why? Because when Americans get more freedom, we tend 

to enjoy that and we tend to want more. And I would suggest that 

a year from now, the notion that we would reverse this policy that 

has allowed more Americans to travel to Cuba and to help Cuban 

people have access to more technology, more capital, more values, 

more contact with Americans, will seem as absurd as reversing the 

changes that were made with Cuban-American travel just a couple 

of years ago. 

So again, I applaud you for what you are doing, and I look forward to working with the administration as this policy unfolds. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask you, when a Cuban-American sends or visits their 

relatives in Cuba and gives them a little money, the only place 

really to buy something is the dollar store, is that not true? If you 

want to get something? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I believe, certainly, there is more in those stores 

to buy. 

Senator MENENDEZ. By the way, who owns the dollar stores? 

Ms. JACOBSON. They are state-run. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. The government. 

And so if I want to send a remittance to my relative in Cuba, 

the Cuban Government takes a slice, right? 

Ms. JACOBSON. They do but your relatives probably want their 

part of that anyway. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But the Cuban Government gets a slice. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So let us not deny that the Cuban Government is greatly enriched by all these resources, which is why it has 

been its number one foreign policy objective. 

Now let us talk about what full diplomatic relations are. You are 

going to be having this discussion tomorrow, as I understand it, 

what my colleague Senator Markey said, normalized relations are. 

After the Summit of the Americas, the Washington Post ran a 

story suggesting that the talks to restore diplomatic relations were 

hung up because the Castro regime was unwilling to grant unrestricted travel to our diplomats, unwilling to allow us to send secure shipments to a future embassy, unwilling to allow us to have 

the number of staff necessary to operate a future embassy, and unwilling to remove the military presence around a future embassy. 

So let me ask you, would the State Department actually to agree 

to establish an embassy in Havana if all of our diplomats are not 

able to travel freely throughout Cuba? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, what I can tell you is that we have to 

have an embassy where our diplomats can get out and travel and 

see the country and talk to people. We have restrictions on the way 

188 

our embassy personnel travel, in terms of notification to governments, in many countries around the world that range from 24 

hours to 10 days. 

So we are going to do everything possible to make sure that we 

have the least restrictions possible but our embassy officials—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. So we will accept restrictions that all of our 

diplomats at embassy would be able to travel throughout the country? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We will make sure that the embassy is on a par 

with the way we operate in other places that are restrictive environments. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Would you agree to conditions under which 

we cannot send secure shipments to supply a future embassy without the regime rifling through them? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, Senator, I am not going to necessarily layout all of the negotiations for tomorrow here. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Why not? Wait a minute. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, no, let me—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Are these negotiations secret or do we not 

have, the United States Congress, have the right to understand 

how you are trying to establish diplomatic relations? 

Ms. JACOBSON. You absolutely do. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I think the Nation needs to know under 

what conditions we are going to have or not have relationships. 

Ms. JACOBSON. You absolutely do. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So are you going to allow the Cubans to rifle 

through your diplomatic pouches with impunity or are going to insist you can send anything to the embassy, as we do in other places 

in the world? That is a simple yes or no. 

Ms. JACOBSON. We absolutely believe in the viability of the diplomatic pouch. We also believe that it is critical to resupply a future 

embassy, as we believe it is important to supply the building now 

that has maintenance and upkeep issues. So that is a critical part 

of our discussion. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So will you accept conditions less than that? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We will not accept conditions in which we cannot 

securely supply our facilities. We have to be able—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Would you agree to open an embassy if you 

are not granted the number of staff you need to operate it efficiently? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Not if we cannot have the number of staff we believe we need, no. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Are you willing to open an embassy if the 

Castro regime does not remove its military cordon from around the 

building, which basically is a way to intimidate average Cubans 

from approaching our facility? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We will not open an embassy unless we believe 

that the security outside the embassy is appropriate to protect our 

installation, but we will also make sure that it is welcoming of Cubans into the installation as an embassy, the way we do around the 

world. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you, you agreed with me ultimately that the Castro regime statement as it relates to that they 

have never supported, never supported, any act of international 

189 

terrorism is not true. So if you agree that these statements by the 

Castro regime are categorically false, how can you explain to the 

committee why you would think you can believe any assurances 

about the regime’s current or future conduct, if they bald-face lied 

in the first place? 

Ms. JACOBSON. What I would say, Senator, is that what we were 

looking at in the assurances is not necessarily whether or not their 

assertions on behalf of all recorded history for the Cuban Government, we agree with every statement of the past. What we have 

to look at is what the requirements are under the law, which talk 

about the rejection of international terrorism, which they have 

made, and the lack of support or any evidence for support for international terrorism. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So they can partially lie to you, but not fully 

lie. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, we have differences in what they do not 

believe they have ever supported international terrorism. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But they sent you a letter and the State Department quoted that specific section, which basically means you 

buy into it. It is incredible to believe that that section of the letter 

you buy into. 

Let me ask you this, the Red Cross under the President’s December 17 announcement was supposed to have access to Cuban jails. 

Has that taken place? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We did not say the Red Cross would have access 

to jails. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You announced that they would have—I understand it was access to Cuban jails. What is it that they have access to? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I do not believe we ever said that the Cubans had 

agreed to that. What we said was that we were hoping that international organizations would renew their discussions with the 

Cuban Government about those issues, including the Red Cross 

and U.N. In other words, we—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Has the Red Cross been able to get in freely? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Not that I know. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Not that you know of. Okay. 

Last question, we talk about telecom access. A lot has been discussed here about that. In late February, the First Vice President 

Miguel Diaz-Canel, who Senator Boxer referred to as it looks like 

he would be the next heir in an election. 

First of all, there is no election in 2018. It is a selection. There 

is no election. Can we agree on that? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We can agree that what the Cuban Government 

calls an election is not what we believe meets international standards. 

Senator MENENDEZ. It is the Cuban Communist Party, and that 

is it. So it is not an election. I do not want to anybody to think we 

are working on an election in 2018. 

He gave a long, rambling speech, he is the second highest official 

in the Cuban Government, about the Internet in Cuba. One of the 

most revealing statements was the affirmation that the regime’s 

Internet strategy would be led by the Communist Party. 

190 

Given the Communist Party’s half-century long effort to deprive 

the Cuban people of the most minimal standards of freedom of the 

press and of information, would you have the committee believe 

that the Communist Party will not make every possible effort to 

block access to all content that it deems undesirable, similar to 

what we have seen in other closed societies around the world? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Senator, what I know is that when more people 

have access to the Internet, even if governments try to prevent 

them seeing things they do not want them to, they are remarkably 

inventive in finding ways to do so. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay, good. 

Then let me ask you this. Can we have your assurances that the 

State Department and the United States Government will take all 

possible steps to ensure that the Cuban people have access to circumnavigation technologies that would be able to get around regime censorship? 

If we are going to say we want United States companies to go 

develop this infrastructure in Cuba, surely we can have circumvention technologies so that the Cuban people are truly free to go see 

any site they want, not only that which the regime want them to 

see. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Certainly, I hope that the majority and vast majority or all of the Cuban people will be able to have complete access to the Internet. What I cannot—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Hope is not a policy achievement. 

I am asking you, if we are going to license companies under the 

Libertad Act to go ahead and put infrastructure in Cuba, can we 

not make a condition of that license that they have circumnavigation technologies so Senator Flake and Senator Udall and Senator 

Markey and everybody who wants access to the Internet for the 

Cuban people, which I also want, we are in common cause on that, 

actually can get access to the Internet? What is so difficult about 

insisting on circumvention technology? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I do not know that we can do that, but I also 

know—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. We can put any condition we want as a condition of sale. 

Ms. JACOBSON [continuing]. I also—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I wrote that section of law when I was in 

House of Representatives. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I understand. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I know what it says, and you can put conditions on it. I hope to hear back from you whether you will insist 

on that as an ability to have U.S. companies—if we want access for 

the Cuban people to have the Internet, which I do. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I do as well, Senator, but I also want them to be 

able to have those deals go through and to make it the most effective way that more on the island can have access—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. A deal without full access to the Internet is 

a deal is—— 

Ms. JACOBSON. More than they have now. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. A deal to an end without access 

to the critical information that we think can help liberate the 

Cuban people. 

191 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Any other questions? 

I want to thank the committee again. I know there are a lot of 

diverse views about this proposed new policy, actually a policy that 

is being implemented. 

And I want to thank the witnesses for being here. If you would, 

the record will be open, without objection, until the close of business Thursday. If you would answer promptly, we would appreciate 

it. 

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your service to our country. 

With that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

Chairman Corker, Senator Cardin—thank you for holding this important hearing. 

I would also like to extend a warm welcome to our distinguished witnesses. Thank 

you both for your service to our country. 

Five months ago, President Obama announced that the United States would begin 

the process of normalizing relations with Cuba. 

This historic decision rejects the failed sanctions policy of the past 50 years and 

opens a new chapter in U.S.-Cuban relations that provides an opportunity for dialogue and constructive engagement with the Cuban government and, most importantly, the Cuban people. 

We are already beginning to see the positive effects of this policy change. 

• It has reinvigorated U.S. leadership in Latin America and improved U.S. relations with countries in the region, which had been strained by our unilateral 

sanctions policy. • It has allowed the United States to expand direct support to the Cuban people 

by increasing the amount of remittances that can be sent to Cuban individuals 

and organizations, easing restrictions on travel, expanding exports of goods and 

services to empower Cuban entrepreneurs and small farmers, and improving 

telecommunications and Internet services. • It has led to increased communication between the United States and Cuban 

governments on areas of mutual interest including migration, environmental 

protection, and law enforcement cooperation. • It has opened up new opportunities for American businesses in Cuba. 

Tomorrow, Assistant Secretary Jacobson will host a delegation of Cuban officials 

in Washington, DC, to continue discussions on the normalization of ties between our 

two nations. President Obama’s decision to rescind Cuba’s designation as a State 

Sponsor of Terrorism after a comprehensive technical review is an important step 

forward in this effort. 

As we continue to pursue this new policy of engagement with Cuba, we all know 

there are many issues that will not be resolved overnight—including the Cuban 

Government’s abysmal human rights record. And we will continue to press Cuban 

leaders on these matters. 

But, I agree with President Obama that America’s interests and the interests of 

the Cuban people are best served by dialogue and engagement, not isolation. 

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF ALAN P. GROSS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to submit this brief statement for the record. Some 

phenomena occurring in Cuba right now are acutely apropos to these proceedings. 

This committee should be aware of some tangible outcomes directly correlated with 

U.S.–Cuba policy decisions made since 2009, beginning with President Obama’s 

Executive order that eased restrictions on remittances to Cuba. The following is an 

approximate sequencing of resultant events: 

192 

1. U.S. eases restrictions on remittances from Cuban-Americans to family members living in Cuba, as well as nonfamily remittances. 

2. Cuban Government eases some restrictions on private sector development; 

expresses need to reduce the number of Cuban workers employed in the public sector in order to reduce government deficit. 

3. U.S. remittances to Cuba increase. 

4. Remittances are used to finance private sector business development in Cuba. 

Thousands of private, nongovernment businesses start up. 

5. Cuban Government allows private sector to employ nonfamily members. 

6. More than 500,000 workers are employed in Cuba’s private sector by the end 

of 2014, representing nearly 11 percent of Cuba’s total workforce. 

These changes in Cuba are not anecdotal. In a relatively short period of time 

(compared to over five decades of economic sanctions) positive and constructive 

shifts in U.S. policy toward Cuba have led to notable and meaningful changes for 

the Cuban people. These changes are completely consistent with U.S. interests and 

development objectives worldwide, particularly involving private sector development 

and growth and employment generation. 

As the members of the committee know, I recently concluded 5 years of imprisonment in Cuba due to my participation in a USAID-sponsored program authorized 

and funded pursuant to the Helms-Burton Act. Prior to my incarceration, I spent 

over 30 years working in over 50 countries to bring about positive change through 

development programs funded by private sector clients. These included Fortune 100 

companies, USAID and other international financial and development institutions. 

For the last 15 years much of my work involved increasing the availability of information access to populations around the world. Indeed, this was the fundamental 

purpose of the project in Cuba for which I was ultimately forced to forfeit 5 years 

of my life. 

The principal theme throughout most of my international career has been export 

and investment development as an engine of vital and vibrant economic growth. 

Consequently, the primary focus of my overseas work has been private sector development and growth. And with the advent of new, user-friendly information and communications technologies prospects of closer linkages between producers, consumers 

and the global marketplace have been greatly enhanced. 

Export and investment development in emerging markets is important to U.S. 

interests. In many ways U.S. foreign policy implemented through international 

development work not only serves to improve emerging market business, social and 

political environments, it simultaneously serves as a form of market development 

for U.S. producers and exporters as these markets emerge. 

I fully support what the President is doing to meaningfully improve international 

relations, particularly with Cuba. My 5 years in Cuba did not deter me from wanting to bring about positive change through development and constructive engagement. To the contrary, I believe more strongly than ever that the President’s 

decisive first steps need to be followed by decisive congressional action, including 

repealing Helms-Burton and related statutes. 

My beliefs are not based only on the last 5 years, but also over 30 years of international development experience in more than 50 countries. However, my beliefs are 

not as relevant as the evidence of change on the ground in Cuba that followed the 

Executive order. And while I am totally and personally cognizant of the Cuban Government’s repressive human rights record, I am also experientially (not experimentally) cognizant that improved personal economic security is essential to empowering people—including Cubanos—and that such empowerment is a critical step 

toward improved living conditions overall. 

If we all want to move forward with Cuba, we cannot be looking back. It is in 

our own interests, as well as the interests of the Cuban people, to move forward 

together. 

DAILY BEAST ARTICLE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

[From the Daily Beast, May 15, 2015] 

CUBA’S 12 MOST ABSURD PROHIBITIONS THAT TOURISTS MAY NEVER NOTICE

It’s getting easier to go to Cuba, but not necessarily to live there. Sometimes it’s 

the little things that make you crazy. But, then, there are big things, too. 

HAVANA—Here’s a list of the 12 most absurd prohibitions and limitations that 

we Cubans have to endure in our homeland. It is worth highlighting that the socialist Government of Cuba applies some of them exclusively to Cuban citizens, while 

193 

foreign residents and tourists do not suffer from the bans. A curious double standard, no? And worth remembering if you are planning a visit and discover your new 

Cuban friends can’t join you in the fun. 

1—Cubans can’t access the Internet from their homes or on their 

cellphones. ETECSA is the Cuban state-owned telecommunications monopoly. 

According to its policy, Internet access in private homes is not a service provided 

to Cuban citizens. It is exclusively provided to state-owned and foreign businesses, 

and to foreigners residing in the country, as its website makes clear. 

2—No sailing on tourist boats. There is not an actual law that forbids Cubans 

getting on boats and ships, but authorities have applied this restriction for many 

years. According to Cubatur (a state travel agent) ‘‘Cubans—no matter where they 

live—may not be sold a tourist package that includes a catamaran or a yacht. This 

enjoyment is exclusive to foreign tourists.’’ 

3—No cable TV. The socialist firm Telecable is the only one that provides cable 

TV. This service is exclusive to the tourist infrastructure (mainly hotels), diplomats, 

foreign companies, and foreigners residing in Cuba. Telecable offers a selection of 

international channels such as CNN, Discovery, HBO, ESPN . . . 

The Cuban population, for no other reason than being Cuban, cannot access this 

service and can only consume national state-owned TV channels and Telesur (a socialist Latin American channel). 

4—Can’t live in Havana (without a permit). Can someone from L.A. live in 

Washington, D.C.? The answer is obvious. But in Cuba, can someone from Bayamo 

live in Havana? The answer is NO, unless he or she has a permit. The Decree-Law 

217–1997 on ‘‘Internal migrations regarding the city of Havana’’ dictates that people 

from other provinces may not live in the capital without a ‘‘transitory’’ document; 

that is, an authorization issued by the Ministry of the Interior. This violates the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which says, ‘‘Everyone has the right to 

freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.’’ Not here. 

5—No public demonstrations allowed. The Constitution of Cuba (1976) recognizes the right to demonstrate under certain regulations while the Penal Code, in 

its article 209, warns that ‘‘he who participates in meetings or demonstrations celebrated without respecting the dispositions that regulate this right, is committing a 

felony against public order.’’ But in the 39 years that have gone by since 1976, no 

law has been adopted to regulate the right to demonstrate in Cuba. It’s a Catch22. Not to belabor the point, ‘‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association,’’ according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

6—No Political Parties allowed (except the Partido Comunista de Cuba). 

Even though the Cuban Constitution permits all citizens to run in public elections, 

our magna carta also mentions in its article 62 that, ‘‘None of the recognized freedoms of citizenship may be executed against the Constitution, the laws or the existence or ends of the socialist State, nor the decision of the Cuban people to build 

socialism and communism. Violating this principle will be punished.’’ 

The Constitution also declares that, ‘‘The Communist Party of Cuba . . . the organized vanguard of the Cuban nation, is the superior managing force of society and 

the state, organizing and guiding the common efforts towards the high ends of the 

construction of socialism and advances towards the communist society.’’ Therefore 

one can infer that any political party that is not the Communist Party is forbidden. 

7—No investment in medium and large enterprises. Law 188 on foreign investment regulates investments in Cuba by foreign individuals and legal entities, 

as well as by Cuban legal entities that partner with a foreign party with the objective of investing in Cuba. There is no mention of Cuban individuals or their right 

to invest in Cuba. The only possibility for a Cuban individual who wants to engage 

in private economic activity is to become ‘‘self-employed,’’ but in this case he or she 

is only allowed to work in one of the professions authorized by the government (such 

as restaurants, hair dresser, food vendor on the street, lumberjack, masseur, public 

toilet security, etc.) 

The Cuban police are allowed to fine or even confiscate the vehicle of a Cuban 

citizen if he or she gives a ride to a foreigner. 

8—Can’t import wireless microphones, walkie-talkies and satellite communication devices without authorization. Resolution 10–2006 states in its second section that a person who wishes to import wireless microphones, walkie-talkies 

and satellite communication devices ‘‘needs a specific authorization to introduce the 

equipment into the country and a license for its installation, exploitation and functioning, both issued by the Supervision and Control Agency of the Ministry of Information of Communications.’’ And, in case you are getting your hopes up, it clarifies 

‘‘requesting the authorization does not necessarily imply that it will be granted.’’ 

194 

9—No inviting a foreigner to spend the night without a permit. If the 

police or migratory authorities catch a foreigner sleeping without authorization in 

the home of a Cuban, the owner of the house may face a severe fine. 

10—Freely selling lobster and shrimps is not allowed. Only the state and 

foreigners can sell these delicacies in this Caribbean nation. 

11—If you pick up a foreigner in a private car you may be in trouble. The 

Cuban police are allowed to fine or even confiscate the vehicle of a Cuban citizen 

if he or she gives a ride to a foreigner without a taxi license. There is no explicit 

law that forbids it, but a foreigner in a car privately owned by a Cuban (there are 

not that many, most cars are state-owned) might be interpreted as ‘‘illicit enrichment.’’ 

12—Bringing from abroad 25 artificial fingernails violates the law. The 

Cuban Customs Law establishes exhaustively detailed limits on the goods that can 

be imported from abroad into the island. Sometimes these are ridiculous, especially 

for items that cannot be found in the country. Customs Resolution 206 specifically 

limits the number of artificial nails to 24 units. 

Of course, there are more—many more—bans and prohibitions that Cuba imposes 

on Cuba. This was just a taste. 

195 

TWO LETTERS TO MARCO RUBIO SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

196 

197 

198 

RESPONSES OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON AND THOMAS A. SHANNON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. Since President Obama’s December 17 announcement to establish ties 

with the Castro government, there has been an increase in the number of Cubans 

risking their lives to reach freedom in the United States; well over 2,000 political 

arrests; a dramatic increase in weekly violence against democracy activists, such as 

The Ladies in White; new long-term political prisoners, such as Cuban artist Danilo 

Maldonado ‘‘El Sexto’’ and rapper Maikel Oksobo (known as ‘‘El Dkano’’); the beatings and rearrest of most of the 53 political prisoners who were released as part 

of the December 17th agreement; violence employed against Cuban democracy activists even outside the island, such as the nefarious attacks that took place at the 

Panama summit; and Cuban activists who have been barred from leaving the 

island, like artist Tania Bruguera and democracy leader Antonio Rodiles. 

199 

We’ve also heard multiple anecdotes from Cuban democracy leaders and political 

prisoners who have told us that during the beatings and attacks against them now, 

they are mocked with comments, such as ‘‘this one is courtesy of Obama’’ and ‘‘the 

United States doesn’t care about you.’’ 

Meanwhile, Cuban dictator Raul Castro has since been named for the first time 

as one of Time’s 100 Most Influential People, while foreign dignitaries, such as 

France’s President, and the Japanese and Dutch Foreign Ministers, visit and fawn 

over Fidel and Raul Castro in Havana, but ignore Cuba’s dissident leaders. 

♦ Do these trends, which are obviously aiding the Cuban regime, while undermining the Cuban democracy movement, concern you? 

♦ Are you concerned that the Cuban regime is interpreting President Obama’s 

engagement and unilateral concessions as a carte blanche for its repressive 

tactics? 

♦ Has the State Department communicated to the Cuban regime any potential 

consequences for its continued repressive behavior? 

Answer. We share your deep concern about the Cuban Government’s continued 

use of politically motivated detentions, at times with violence, to prevent Cubans 

from exercising their rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression. The 

Department is constantly monitoring human rights in Cuba, speaking out to defend 

our values, and consulting with other countries. Human rights are central to our 

discussions with the Cuban Government and we continue to press for greater 

respect of fundamental freedoms and an end to these practices in our conversations 

with the Cuban Government. 

Our updated approach is designed to advance human rights over time by empowering the Cuban people. We have no illusions about the intention of the Cuban Government to maintain tight political controls, and we continue to monitor reports of 

arrests of human rights activists. We want to work closely with Congress on such 

arrests and on bringing positive change on human rights in Cuba in general. We 

are convinced that, through a policy of sustained engagement, we can more effectively stand up for our values and help the Cuban people help themselves. 

Question. Ms. Jacobson, a senior State Department official told reporters yesterday that, ‘‘democracy programs . . . have changed over time, and they will continue 

to change over time to reflect a reality, whether that reality is on the ground in 

Cuba or in the United States.’’ This statement was in regards to a question involving Raul Castro’s complaints against these programs, which is apparently another 

precondition it has placed for the establishment of diplomatic relations, in particular 

the training of independent journalists, which he called ‘‘illegal activities.’’ 

♦ Do you believe that independent journalism is an ‘‘illegal activity’’? 

♦ Are you cognizant that U.S. democracy programs toward Cuba are codified in 

law? 

♦ Have you agreed to adjust these programs, despite their codification in law, during your negotiations with the Castro regime? 

♦ Will a potential U.S. Embassy in Cuba continue to execute these democracy programs, as required by law, including the training of independent journalists? 

Answer. We believe that neither independent journalism nor U.S. Government 

training exposing Cubans to how individuals in democratic societies exercise freedom of speech are ‘‘illegal activities.’’ Current Cuban laws criminalizing independent 

journalism undermine human rights contrary to Cuba’s international human rights 

commitments. The work of a free and independent media is essential to a democratic society. And our training falls clearly within the scope of permissible diplomatic activity under international law. 

As Assistant Secretary Malinowski testified before the Senate Foreign Affairs 

Committee in February, we will continue to conduct programs that promote respect 

for human rights and fundamental freedoms such as freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly in Cuba, just as we do for 95 countries around the 

world. The administration requested $20 million in Economic Support Funds for 

FY16 to support the promotion of democracy and human rights in Cuba. 

The Cuban Government likely will continue to object to some of our programs. 

But as stated in my testimony on February 3, ‘‘We will continue to use funds appropriated by Congress to support the exercise of political and civil liberties in Cuba, 

facilitate the free flow of information, and provide humanitarian assistance.’’ As 

President Obama said in April at the Summit of the Americas, ‘‘we are not going 

to stop talking about issues like democracy and human rights and freedom of assembly and freedom of the press.’’ 

Question. Media reports indicate that negotiations regarding the establishment of 

diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba are being stalled by the 

200 

Castro regime’s refusal to allow U.S. diplomats to move around freely on the island. 

The Castro regime also does not want to allow U.S. diplomats the secure passage 

of supplies and materials to upgrade our diplomatic mission. Moreover, the Cuban 

regime places a heavy security cordon around the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, 

in order to vet, harass, and intimidate any Cuban (or anyone else for that matter) 

that wants to approach the diplomatic mission. This is unprecedented in any U.S. 

Embassy throughout the world. And to add insult to injury, last week Raul Castro 

complained about the ‘‘illegal activities’’ the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, such 

as ‘‘the training of independent journalists.’’ That was verbatim. 

♦ Do you believe training independent journalists is an ‘‘illegal activity’’? Will you 

commit that the U.S. mission in Havana will continue training independent 

journalists and supporting democracy efforts on the island? 

♦ Will you commit that the United States will not accept any restrictions on the 

movement of U.S. diplomats anywhere in Cuba as a precondition for establishing diplomatic relations? 

♦ Will you commit that the U.S. will not establish diplomatic relations, so long 

as the Cuban regime insists on maintaining its security cordon around our diplomatic facility? 

Answer. The United States continuously works to promote freedom of expression 

around the world through bilateral engagement, public diplomacy programming, 

and multilateral diplomacy. This includes support for independent journalism, particularly in closed countries where press freedom is lacking or independent journalists are under threat. We do not view independent journalism in Cuba or our training programs as ‘‘illegal activities.’’ 

The United States will continue promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms such as freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly 

in Cuba, just as we do for 95 countries around the world. 

We are making steady progress in our discussions with the Cuban Government 

on certain operational issues to ensure our Embassy, once reopened, will be able to 

carry out the necessary functions to facilitate this evolving U.S.-Cuba relationship 

as well as service the thousands of U.S. citizens visiting Cuba every year to see relatives and engage in other authorized activities. These operational issues include 

those relating to travel restrictions on U.S. diplomats, controls on access by visitors 

to the U.S. facility, and limitations on diplomatic staffing. 

The future U.S. embassy will continue engaging with all Cubans, including those 

promoting the realization of universal human rights. 

Question. Assistant Secretary Jacobson, you stated in an answer to a question for 

the record to this committee that ‘‘the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, 

including reopening our Embassy in Havana, will allow us to more effectively represent U.S. interests, including property claims, fugitives, human rights, and needed 

political reforms and increase our engagement with the Cuban people. We will continue to condemn any example of Cuban Government-sponsored harassment, use of 

violence, or arbitrary detention of Cuban citizens peaceably exercising their freedoms of expression and association. We proposed to the Cubans starting discussions 

of outstanding claims, in the event we reestablish diplomatic relations. On the issue 

of fugitives, the Department repeatedly raises fugitive cases with the Cuban Government and will continue to do so at every appropriate opportunity. We raised several cases with the Cubans when we met with them January 22.’’ 

♦ Since you last raised these issues with the Government of Cuba, what progress 

has been made with regards to the discussions leading to the return of fugitives 

Joanne Chesimard and William Morales to justice; and the unresolved U.S. certified claims which total $8 billion? 

Answer. The Cuban Government has agreed to enter into a law enforcement dialogue with the United States that will include discussions with the aim of resolving 

outstanding fugitive cases. We believe that this is the best method for addressing 

these cases. 

We also proposed discussions of outstanding claims to the Cubans, following the 

reestablishment of diplomatic relations. The Cuban Government has agreed in principle to discuss this issue. Although reaching agreement on the resolution of outstanding claims is often a lengthy process, the Department is strongly committed 

to advancing this effort. 

Question. In a QFR response from the February 3rd hearing on Cuba, you stated 

that there were no plans to alter the existing lease agreement for the Naval Station 

at Guantanamo Bay. Additionally, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter wrote in a letter 

dated February 6, 2015, that ‘‘There are no plans to close Guantanamo Naval Station.’’ 

201 

I would like to enter into the record a letter from Admiral Paul F. Zukunft the 

Commandant of the Coast Guard from February 18, 2015. In this letter, he writes 

about GTMO: ‘‘Its strategic location, airfield, moorings, logistics capabilities, and 

migrant processing facilities make Naval Station GTMO an indispensable resource 

for steady-state and surge events.’’ 

But just yesterday a senior State Department official was quoted as saying that 

‘‘I can’t say what the future may bring on this (Guantanamo Bay), but it’s not on 

the table right now, and I don’t know that there’s a reason to justify having it or 

not having it.’’ 

♦ Can you clarify the statement by the senior official in your Department with 

regards to any future talks on Guantanamo Bay? 

♦ Are there any circumstances in which the administration would modify the 

lease or status of Guantanamo Bay? 

♦ Can you guarantee to this committee that Simon Trinidad will not be released 

from U.S. custody as part of Colombia’s negotiations with the FARC? 

Answer. We have no intention at present to alter the existing lease treaty and 

other arrangements related to the Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay or to discuss 

the issue of the Naval Station with the Cuban Government. 

Colombian officials have raised with us a variety of peace process issues relevant 

to U.S. interests. Simon Trinidad has been convicted of serious crimes against U.S. 

citizens and is serving his sentence in a U.S. prison. We have made clear to the 

Colombian Government that his release is not a matter that we are prepared to 

discuss. 

Question. Assistant Secretary Jacobson, in negotiating a settlement agreement for 

claims, such as American certified claims against Cuba that are worth close to $8 

billion, each country gives the other something the other wants as an exchange. Historically, in these situations, the other country settles and pays what is owed to 

American claimants in exchange for trade and commerce with the U.S. market. 

Each settlement process is unique, but one thing is clear, we do not grant concessions for nothing. 

Libya paid the U.S. claimants before they were removed from the state sponsor 

of terrorism list, and allowed to do business with U.S. oil companies, but they also 

had to renounce terrorism. Vietnam agreed to pay the U.S. claimants in exchange 

for trade and commerce with the U.S. market. Both of those, as in most settlements 

agreements, were done with congressional cooperation. 

Frankly, this is one of the most disconcerting matters of these Cuba talks. Not 

only are we turning U.S. policy on its head, but we then appear to be ignoring the 

primary reason why the sanctions were imposed in the first place. Why are we not 

talking about claims issues, U.S. claims issues? As you know, there are nationals 

from other countries that also have claims, and they are seeking compensation as 

well. Will U.S. taxpayers be left out or put at a disadvantage in this process? 

How do you see this settlement agreement process working with Cuba, if your 

administration appears to be eager to give Cuba everything it wants without getting 

them to pay for the property they took? Or do you plan to just give Cuba things 

you can, while you can, and leave the real claim settlement negotiations for the next 

administration to deal with? 

Is your Bureau responding to title IV investigation requests, if not, why not? Do 

you need more money for policing and enforcement and how can we loop in the 

Treasury Department on these matters, including the Office of Foreign Assets Control as well as the Bureau of Industry and Security at Commerce? 

Answer. The Department is committed to pursuing a resolution of outstanding 

claims against the Cuban Government. We expect that a discussion of property 

claims will follow in the months after diplomatic relations are reestablished. In January, we proposed and the Cuban Government agreed to discuss pending claims following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Although reaching agreement 

resolving outstanding claims likely will be a complex and lengthy process, it will 

nevertheless be greatly facilitated by having better-developed diplomatic ties. 

With respect to title IV of the LIBERTAD Act, there are a number of factors necessary for a determination that trafficking in confiscated property has taken or is 

taking place for purposes of this provision. The Department continues to review 

potential cases and respond in accordance with the statute. 

Question. On February 28, 2015, a Chinese-flagged vessel, the Da Dan Xia, was 

intercepted in Cartagena, Colombia, carrying 15 containers of heavy weaponry hidden as a grain shipment. It consisted of 100 tons of explosives, 2.6 million detonators, 99 projectile heads and around 3,000 artillery shells. The containers marked 

202 

that they originated from Norinco, a Chinese arms manufacturer, on behalf of 

Tecnoimport, a shadow company of the Cuban military. 

This is the second time in 18 months that the Cuban military has been caught 

smuggling weapons internationally. As you are surely aware, last year Cuba was 

found in breach of international sanctions for attempting to smuggle 240 tons of 

weapons to North Korea. Both of these shipments, with false manifests, also threatened the safety and integrity of the Panama Canal. 

♦ Do you find this weapons smuggling by the Cuban military a concerning trend? 

If so, why hasn’t the State Department made any statements about this latest 

incident? 

♦ According to media reports, the Colombian Government will not disclose what 

the vessel was supposed to unload in Cartagena and Barranquilla, its two 

scheduled stops before Havana. Has the State Department looked into whether 

these weapons may have actually been intended for FARC narcoterrorists or 

other rogue groups, particularly as President Obama was preparing to remove 

Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list? 

♦ If weapons sales between China and Cuba are otherwise not sanctioned internationally, why do you think they went to such great lengths to hide this shipment? 

♦ Despite these two recent incidents to deceive the international community, the 

Obama administration was still willing to accept—as part of the ‘‘assurances’’ 

given in its rescission memo to remove Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list—that the Castro regime has ‘‘never’’ supported terrorist activities, 

which we all know is another lie. Do you think accepting lies is wise? 

Answer. We are not aware of any information linking the shipment contents to 

the FARC. The Department believes it would be premature to speculate regarding 

the outcome of Colombia’s investigation of the Chinese-flagged vessel and its captain, who could be charged under Colombian law for illegal transport of military 

materials. 

Our review of Cuba’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation focused on the questions of whether Cuba provided any support for international terrorism during the 

previous 6 months, and whether Cuba provided assurances that it will not support 

acts of international terrorism in the future, consistent with the statutory standard 

for rescission. 

There is no credible evidence that the Government of Cuba has, within the past 

6 months, provided support for international terrorism. The Government of Cuba 

provided us with assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism 

in the future, consistent with the requirements of the relevant statutes. 

Question. There are roughly three transition models from communism, the Chinese model, the Russian model and the East European model. Only in the last one 

has there been a break with the past and true democracy, full civil rights and free 

markets for their citizens. But by recognizing the regime of Raul Castro, you have 

made it easier for the military/technocratic oligarchy that he has put in place over 

the years to move into power once he passes from the scene. They will now be able 

to acquire funds more easily and show the population that they have international 

support. That would be the Russian model or at best the Chinese model. Neither 

of those countries has freedom or democracy. 

♦ Is a free and democratic Cuba the goal of this administration? 

Answer. Our enduring objective remains the emergence of a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba. The goal of our Cuba policy has been, and continues to 

be, to empower the Cuban people to freely determine their own future. Our updated 

approach is designed to promote changes that support Cubans’ universal human 

rights and fundamental freedoms as well as our other national interests. 

Question. The East European countries are also staunch friends of the United 

States. Many of them have indeed become defense and economic treaty allies. That 

is not true of either China or Russia, or of Vietnam or Belarus, which continue to 

be rivals internationally. This administration has been criticized, rightly in my opinion, for not treating traditionally U.S. allies well and for coddling our enemies. 

♦ Does your administration seek a friendly Cuba that sides with us internationally, or do you just seek stability in the region? 

♦ Does having a friendly regime that shares our values matter to this administration? 

Answer. The President’s 2015 National Security Strategy calls for ‘‘promoting a 

prosperous, secure, and democratic Western Hemisphere by expanding integration 

and leveraging a new opening to Cuba to expand our engagement.’’ Our enduring 

203 

objective remains the emergence of a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba. A 

stable neighbor 90 miles from our shores that reflects and upholds the democratic 

values and priorities shared by all countries of the Americas is strongly in our national interest. Our ability to achieve this goal is strengthened by a policy of 

proactive engagement, rather than isolation. 

Question. The President again and again states that our policy of not engaging 

with the Castro dictatorship failed. For decades, Europe, Latin America and Asia 

have traded with Cuba and allowed people to freely travel there. 

♦ Couldn’t we say that their approach failed, too? 

Answer. Our enduring objective remains the emergence of a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba that respects internationally recognized human rights. We 

are convinced that, through a policy of engagement, we can do more to effectively 

promote our interests and values in collaboration with other international partners, 

thereby helping the Cuban people begin to enjoy more independence from the Cuban 

state. 

Cuba is undergoing important changes to its economic, social, and leadership 

landscape, allowing for more options for economic autonomy, loosened restrictions 

on travel, greater connectivity with the rest of the world, and generational changes 

to top leadership. Our policy aims to empower the Cuban people to take advantage 

of these changes—as well as those yet to come—to determine their own future. The 

President’s new approach makes clear that the United States can no longer be 

blamed as an obstacle to progress on issues that are important to the Cuban people. 

Over time, our policy can be judged in terms of its success in empowering the 

Cuban people to determine freely their own future, including respect for universal 

human rights, greater political space to express dissent, democratic accountability, 

and access to information. 

Question. The State Department bureaucracy tried to stop President Reagan’s 

Brandenburg speech in 1987, in which he called for Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down 

the Berlin Wall. State Department officials even called it ‘‘a mediocre speech’’ and 

a ‘‘wasted opportunity’’ and tried to edit out the reference to the wall. Earlier, in 

1983, State also thought the speech in which the President called the Soviet Union 

‘‘an evil empire’’ to be needlessly provocative. Yet, dissidents behind the Iron Curtain, and especially those in the Gulag, took special comfort in knowing that America’s leaders were on their side. Natan Sharansky, in the Gulag at the time, said 

later, ‘‘This was the moment. It was the brightest, most glorious day. Finally a 

spade had been called a spade.’’ 

♦ Would you characterize the nature of the Castro regime for us here, and call 

on him to free the Cuban people? 

♦ Would you ask the President to do so, in a public manner, without caveats? 

Answer. Our annual Human Rights Report has for years characterized Cuba as 

an ‘‘authoritarian state,’’ and has detailed Cuba’s lack of respect for political and 

civil rights. 

The administration fully recognizes, and has stated so publically on numerous 

occasions, that the Cuban people have long been deprived of the fundamental freedoms that they deserve. With this in mind, the fundamental goal of our policy is 

to advance a Cuba that is democratic, prosperous, well-governed, and responsive to 

the rights of its citizens. As President Obama said at the Summit of the Americas 

in April with respect to Cuba, ‘‘Our governments will continue to have differences 

and the United States will continue to stand firmly for universal values and human 

rights.’’ 

RESPONSES OF ROBERTA S. JACOBSON AND THOMAS A. SHANNON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID PERDUE

Question. The Castro regime, time and again, has violated international norms. 

I fear that President Obama’s recent shift in policy toward Cuba is sending the 

wrong message about our democratic values as a nation. Cuba has a long history 

of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and 

Africa. 

In 2003, Cuba allowed Iran to operate on their soil to attack U.S. telecommunications that posed a threat to the Iranian regime’s control and censorship. Cuba is 

reported to have supplied intelligence services to Venezuela and its regional allies. 

Cuba has provided assistance and safe haven to terrorists, including members of the 

FARC and the Basque ETA. And, they continue to harbor fugitives wanted in the 

United States—including a fugitive listed on the FBI’s ‘‘Most Wanted Terrorists’’ 

204 

list. The Cuban Government provides these fugitives with support such as housing, 

food ration books, and medical care. 

A Cuban state-owned enterprise provided Venezuela with advanced technology 

that it used to provide passports, visas, and other documentation to 173 individuals 

from the Middle East between 2008 and 2012. Twice in the past 18 months—most 

recently this February—Cuba has been involved in arms smuggling that’s directly 

in violation of international sanctions. Cuban officials have reportedly been involved 

in the Venezuelan Government’s recent crackdown of pro-democracy demonstrators. 

And since President Obama began his secret negotiations with the Castro regime 

in June 2013, there have been reportedly 15,000 political arrests. There have been 

2,500 such arrests since the President’s speech on U.S.-Cuban relations in December. 

In fact, between February and March of this year, Cuba has increased the number 

of politically motivated arrests by 70 percent. 

♦ How can you prove that Cuba will stop this type of behavior? How can you 

prove that Cuba has stopped supporting terrorism? 

Answer. The Department’s analysis for State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) rescission does not imply that we agree on everything with Cuba or dispute the fact the 

Cuban Government engages in repressive or authoritarian activities. Our new 

approach is not about what the Cuban Government would do for us, but rather what 

we can do for the Cuban and American people. 

In our review of Cuba’s SST designation, we focused on the question of whether 

Cuba provided any support for international terrorism during the 6 months prior 

to providing the statutorily required report to Congress. During that time we had 

no credible information that Cuba supported international terrorism. 

We also obtained the required assurances from the Cuban Government that it will 

not support acts of international terrorism in the future, consistent with the relevant statutes. 

We will continuously monitor available information to determine whether it has 

resumed support for international terrorism and whether an SST designation might 

be appropriate in the future, consistent with the statutory standard. 

Question. What makes you think, that if we normalize relations with Cuba, that 

their behavior will change? 

Answer. Our previous approach to relations with Cuba over a half century, though 

rooted in the best of intentions, failed to empower the Cuban people and isolated 

us from our democratic partners in this hemisphere and around the world. The 

Cuban Government used this policy as a rationale for restrictions on its people. 

Reestablishing diplomatic relations, which is only the first step in the long process 

of normalization, is designed to help empower the social and economic forces in 

Cuba that are demanding change and is in the U.S. national interest. It will give 

our diplomats increased access to the Cuban people and will give the Cuban people 

freer access to our Interests Section in Havana. Our new approach is not about 

what the Cuban Government would do for us, but rather what we can do for the 

Cuban and American people. The fundamental goal of our policy is to advance a 

Cuba that is democratic, prosperous, and well-governed. We are convinced that, 

through a policy of engagement, we can more effectively promote our interests and 

values and enable the Cuban people begin to enjoy more independence from the 

Cuban state. 

Normal diplomatic relations with the Cuban Government will provide us the 

opportunity to engage more effectually on a range of important issues, including 

human rights. Our discussions with the Cuban Government will include promoting 

respect for universal human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

Question. If we do not insist on a demonstrated change in behavior—encompassing human rights, support for terrorism, and compliance with arms embargoes—who is really benefiting here? Whose goals are being met? 

Answer. We will not stop insisting on these changes, and we have not agreed to 

do so as part of normalization. We believe that normalization will give us a better 

platform for expressing these ideas to the Cuban Government. Moreover, normalization helps take the focus off U.S. policies and puts it on the Cuban Government’s 

behavior. 

Question. On February 28, 2015, a Chinese-flagged vessel, the Da Dan Xia, was 

intercepted in Cartagena, Colombia, carrying 15 containers of heavy weaponry hidden as a grain shipment. 

It consisted of 100 tons of explosives, 2.6 million detonators, 99 projectile heads 

and around 3,000 artillery shells. 

205 

The containers marked that they originated from Norinco, a Chinese arms manufacturer, on behalf of Tecnoimport, a shadow company of the Cuban military. 

This is the second time in 18 months that the Cuban military has been caught 

smuggling weapons internationally. 

As you are surely aware, last year Cuba was found in breach of international 

sanctions for attempting to smuggle 240 tons of weapons to North Korea. 

Both of these shipments, with false manifests, also threatened the safety and integrity of the Panama Canal. 

♦ Do you find this weapons smuggling by the Cuban military a concerning trend? 

If so, why hasn’t the State Department made any statements about this latest 

incident? 

Answer. With respect to the March interception of a Chinese ship by Colombian 

authorities, the Department has not made any public statements to date because 

the Colombian investigation is ongoing. We believe it would be premature to speculate on the incident, though we take the matter seriously and continue to consult 

closely with our Colombian partners. 

Regarding the weapons shipment destined for North Korea, the administration 

has worked to ensure that all those responsible for this egregious violation of U.N. 

sanctions pay a price for their wrongdoing. The administration also worked to maximize the diplomatic cost to Cuba for its role in the incident, including by repeatedly 

condemning Cuba’s role in the violation in meetings of the U.N. Security Council. 

We also welcomed the U.N. DPRK Sanctions Committee’s release of an Implementation Assistance Notice to publicize the facts of the case and worked to ensure that 

this Notice made clear Cuba’s role. 

The United States remains concerned about attempts by North Korea to circumvent international sanctions and strongly condemns—and will continue to condemn—any efforts by states such as Cuba to assist in the evasion of binding decisions of the U.N. Security Council. 

Question. Has the State Department looked into whether these weapons may have 

actually been intended for FARC narcoterrorists or other rogue groups, particularly 

as President Obama was preparing to remove Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list? 

Answer. We are not aware of any information linking the shipment contents to 

the FARC. The Department believes it would be premature to speculate regarding 

the outcome of Colombia’s investigation of the Chinese-flagged vessel and its captain, who could be charged under Colombian law for illegal transport of military 

materials. 

Question. If weapons sales between China and Cuba are otherwise not sanctioned 

internationally, why do you think they went to such great lengths to hide this shipment? 

Answer. The Department believes it would be premature to speculate regarding 

the outcome of Colombia’s investigation of the Chinese-flagged vessel and its captain, who could be charged under Colombian law for illegal transport of military 

materials. 

Question. The Washington-based Center for a Secure Free Society reports that a 

Cuban state-owned enterprise provided Venezuela advanced technology that it used 

to provide 173 individuals from the Middle East with identification cards that are 

extremely difficult to trace. 

The Center noted that one of the individuals provided with an identification card 

was Suleiman Ghani Abdul Waked, who is an operative of Hezbollah. 

♦ Can you confirm the Center’s findings? 

Answer. We take any allegations that threaten our national security seriously. We 

share your concern that Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents are 

easy to obtain, making Venezuela a potentially attractive source of documentation 

for terrorists. International authorities remain suspicious of the integrity of Venezuelan documents and their issuance process. 

♦ What risk do these 173 people pose to regional and international security? 

Answer. We remain concerned about Hezbollah’s involvement in a range of destabilizing activities all around the world, including their members and supporters’ 

involvement in criminal activities. Countering these activities remains a priority for 

the United States. Hezbollah receives funding from supporters around the world 

who engage in a host of licit and illicit activities, including drug trafficking and 

money laundering, some of which takes place in the Western Hemisphere. We are 

concerned about any Hezbollah-linked activity in Latin America. 

206 

We remain alert to indications of other activities, particularly operational activity. 

I can provide more information in a classified setting on this issue. 

♦ Can you explain what Cuba’s objective is in providing such sensitive technology 

to Venezuela? 

Answer. Cuba and Venezuela have a long-standing and wide-ranging partnership. 

They cooperate in areas ranging from intelligence services to medical services. Many 

observers have recognized the significant role Cuba has played in Venezuela over 

the past decade, including providing support for sensitive functions like identification documents. 

Our concern is that individuals, regardless of their place of origin, do not enter 

the United States with false documentation. The U.S. Government verifies all documents as necessary. Those who fraudulently or willfully misrepresent material facts 

to procure a visa, admission to the United States, or any other immigration benefit, 

which may include submission of false documents to the U.S. immigration authorities, are ineligible for visas and admission to the United States. 

Question. The most-recent State Department Country Report on Terrorism noted 

that ‘‘The Cuban Government continued to harbor fugitives wanted in the United 

States. The Cuban Government also provided support such as housing, food ration 

books, and medical care for these individuals.’’ 

♦ In total, how many fugitives does Cuba continue to harbor, and for how long 

have these individuals been harbored by Havana? How many of these can be 

described as violent terrorists? What, specifically, are these fugitives wanted 

for? 

Answer. We are concerned about fugitives from the United States in Cuba and 

work closely with the Department of Justice and other agencies to bring those fugitives to justice. This includes fugitives like Joanne Chesimard and William Guillermo Morales as well as those individuals who hijacked planes to Cuba, primarily 

in the 1970s and 1980s. The United States has pressed for the return of fugitives 

with the Cuban Government at every appropriate opportunity, including in the bilateral talks held in January in Havana. Cuba has expelled to the United States 

at least four non-Cuban-national fugitives from U.S. justice since 2011. 

Question. Why did the Obama administration not insist that these individuals be 

returned to U.S. custody as a prerequisite for removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list? 

Answer. The return from Cuba of fugitives from U.S. justice is a priority of the 

U.S. Government. We have consistently and will continue to press the Cuban Government for the return of U.S. fugitives. We work closely with the Department of 

Justice and other agencies to bring those fugitives to justice. The reestablishment 

of diplomatic relations and reopening of the U.S. Embassy will allow the United 

States to more effectively press the Cuban Government on law enforcement issues 

including the return of fugitives. 

The Cuban Government has agreed to enter into a law enforcement dialogue with 

the United States that will include discussions with the aim of resolving outstanding fugitive cases. We believe that this is the best method for addressing these 

cases. 

Question. These fugitives include members of FARC, the terrorist organization 

that has been battling the Colombian Government for the past 50 years. Can you 

likewise describe Cuba’s past and present support for FARC? How many FARC 

members does Cuba currently shelter? 

Answer. Our review process of Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism 

included a comprehensive review of Cuba’s actions during the 6 months prior to submitting our report to Congress, consistent with the statutory standard for rescission. 

There is no credible evidence the Cuban government has, within the past 6 months, 

provided material support, services, or resources to members of the FARC or ELN 

outside of facilitating the internationally recognized peace process between those 

organizations and the Colombian Government. 

The Colombian Government told the United States that it has no evidence Cuba 

has provided any political or material support in recent years to the FARC or ELN 

for terrorist activity in Colombia. Furthermore, the Colombian Government believes 

the Cuban Government plays a constructive role in the peace negotiations with the 

FARC. 

Question. Under the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989, 

a country can only be removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list if ‘‘there 

has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government 

207 

of the country concerned; that government is not supporting acts of international 

terrorism; and that government has provided assurances that it will not support 

acts of international terrorism in the future.’’ 

♦ In light of Havana’s continued harboring of fugitives and terrorists, can you say 

that there has there been a ‘‘fundamental change in the leadership and policies’’ 

of the Castro regime? 

Answer. There are two possible paths to rescission of a State Sponsor of Terrorism 

(SST) designation under the relevant statutes. The first requires the President to 

submit a report to Congress before the proposed rescission would take effect certifying that: (1) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies 

of the government of the country concerned; (2) the government is not supporting 

acts of international terrorism; and (3) the government has provided assurances 

that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. The second 

path requires that the President submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days before the proposed rescission would take effect, justifying the rescission and certifying 

the subject government has not provided any support for international terrorism for 

the preceding 6-month period and has given assurances that it will not support acts 

of international terrorism in the future. 

The rescission of Cuba’s designation was done consistent with the second path. 

We had no credible information that Cuba supported international terrorism in the 

6 months prior to submitting the statutorily required report to Congress and the 

Cuban Government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. While the United States has significant concerns 

and disagreements with a wide range of Cuba’s policies and actions, these fall outside the criteria relevant for determining whether to rescind an SST designation 

pursuant to the second path. 

We will continuously monitor available information to determine whether the 

Cuban Government has resumed support for international terrorism and whether 

an SST designation might be appropriate in the future consistent with the statutory 

standard. 

Question. The State Department’s review of Cuba’s status as a State Sponsor of 

Terrorism focused narrowly only the question of whether or not the Castro regime 

is ‘‘not supporting acts of international terrorism.’’ 

♦ Can you please explain how Cuba’s current sheltering of these fugitives and terrorists does not constitute support for terrorism? 

Answer. Our review of Cuba’s State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation took 

into account all relevant factors. For the purposes of our review of Cuba’s designation and consistent with the statutory standard for rescission, we examined Cuba’s 

actions during the 6 months prior to submitting our report to Congress. During that 

time period we have no credible information that Cuba supported international terrorism. While we continue to have significant concerns and disagreements with a 

wide range of Cuba’s policies and actions, including the possible presence of fugitives from U.S. justice in Cuba, these concerns fall outside the criteria for SST 

designation. 

The return of fugitives from U.S. justice is a priority of the U.S. Government, and 

we have consistently pressed the Cuban Government for the return of U.S. fugitives, 

and will continue to do so. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations and reopening of the U.S. Embassy will allow the United States to more effectively push the 

Cuban Government on law enforcement issues including the return of fugitives from 

U.S. justice. 

The Cuban Government has agreed to enter into a law enforcement dialogue with 

the United States that will include discussions with the aim of resolving outstanding fugitive cases. We believe this is the best method for addressing these 

cases. 

Question. Cuban officials have reportedly been involved in the Venezuelan Government’s recent crackdown of pro-democracy demonstrators. This repression, as 

you know, prompted the Obama administration to issue sanctions against current 

and former Venezuelan officials, citing the ‘‘unusual and extraordinary threat to the 

national security and foreign policy of the United States’’ these actions posed. 

♦ Can you detail how many Cuban agents have previously worked with, and are 

currently working with, Venezuela to suppress domestic opposition and bolster 

their security services? 

Answer. According to Venezuelan Government-associated media, an estimated 

40,000 Cuban advisers and aid workers are in Venezuela, including doctors, teachers, and Cuban military personnel. While both governments have stated the Cuban 

208 

presence in Venezuela is limited to these areas, we are also aware of reports of 

Cuban-Venezuelan cooperation in the intelligence services. 

Media reports assert Cuban security and military advisers played a role in activities against Venezuelan protesters, including training pro-government vigilante 

groups that subsequently attacked peaceful protesters during demonstrations. However, we have seen no further evidence establishing a direct link between Cuban 

advisers and these acts of violence. 

Question. Why did the Obama administration not insist that Cuba cease its support for the Venezuelan regime’s antiopposition activities as a prerequisite for its 

removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list? 

Answer. While the United States has significant concerns and disagreements with 

a wide range of Cuba’s policies and actions, these fall outside the criteria relevant 

for determining whether to rescind a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation. 

Consistent with the statutory standard for recession, we focused on the questions 

of whether Cuba provided any support for international terrorism in the 6 months 

prior to submitting our report to Congress, and whether Cuba has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. 

Question. In light of Havana’s support of the Venezuelan crackdown, can you say 

that there has been a ‘‘fundamental change in the leadership and policies’’ of the 

Castro regime, pursuant to U.S. law? 

Answer. There are two possible paths to rescission of a State Sponsor of Terrorism 

(SST) designation under the relevant statutes. The first requires the President to 

submit a report to Congress before the proposed rescission would take effect certifying that: (1) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies 

of the government of the country concerned; (2) the government is not supporting 

acts of international terrorism; and (3) the government has provided assurances 

that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. The second 

path requires that the President submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days before the proposed rescission would take effect, justifying the rescission and certifying 

the subject government has not provided any support for international terrorism for 

the preceding 6-month period and has given assurances that it will not support acts 

of international terrorism in the future. 

The rescission of Cuba’s designation was done consistent with the second path. 

We had no credible information that Cuba supported international terrorism in the 

6 months prior to submitting the statutorily required report to Congress and the 

Cuban Government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. While the United States has significant concerns 

and disagreements with a wide range of Cuba’s policies and actions, these fall outside the criteria relevant for determining whether to rescind a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation pursuant to the second path. 

Question. The Spanish Government requested in March that the United States 

use the removal of Cuba from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list to help secure the 

return of two leaders of the Basque ETA terrorist group to Madrid. 

♦ Can you confirm for this committee that these ETA leaders remain in Cuba? 

Answer. Cuba and Spain have agreed to a bilateral process to resolve the matter 

of the two ETA members in Cuba for whom Spain has requested extradition. 

♦ How many more members of the ETA are being sheltered by the Castro regime? 

Answer. The Government of Cuba continues to allow approximately two dozen 

members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization (ETA) to remain in 

Cuba. The Cuban Government has provided assurances that it would never permit 

the ETA members living in Cuba to use Cuban territory for that organization’s 

activities against Spain or any other country. We have no information that Cuba 

has allowed any of these ETA members to plan, finance, lead, or commit acts of 

international terrorism while residing in Cuba in the past 6 months. Additionally, 

for those two ETA members for whom Spain has requested extradition, Cuba and 

Spain have agreed to a bilateral process to resolve the matter, which is now underway. 

209 

♦ Why did the United States not assist the Spanish Government with their 

request? 

Answer. The Cuban Government has responded to Spain’s extradition requests 

and a bilateral process is now underway for Spain and Cuba to resolve this matter. 

The Spanish Government has assured the United States that it is satisfied with this 

process and that it has no objection to the rescission of Cuba’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation. 

Question. On Sunday, April 26, nearly 100 members and supporters of the human 

rights group Ladies in White were arrested and suffered abuse at the hands of the 

Cuban police. 

Between February and March of this year, Cuba has increased the number of 

politically motivated arrests by 70 percent. 

There have reportedly been 15,000 political arrests since the administration began 

secret negotiations with the Castro regime in June 2013, and 2,500 since the President’s December speech on U.S.-Cuban relations. 

♦ Can you detail in what ways, if any, the United States has expressed its disapproval of these actions to Cuban officials? 

Answer. We raise human rights regularly during our discussions with the Cuban 

Government, and continue to make human rights observance a fundamental part of 

our policy toward Cuba, as it is with other countries in the hemisphere. 

In March, we raised arbitrary detentions at a planning meeting with the Cuban 

Government to discuss the methodology and structure of future human rights talks. 

We are in the process of determining dates for the first substantive human rights 

talks. 

Our updated approach is designed to promote changes that support Cubans’ universal human rights and fundamental freedoms. We believe that reestablishing normal diplomatic relations, which includes allowing U.S. diplomats more freedom of 

movement in Cuba and allowing Cuban citizens freer access to the U.S Interests 

Section, will help improve the atmosphere for promoting such changes. 

We remain committed to working closely with Congress on human rights in Cuba. 

Question. Would you agree that the administration’s outreach to the Castro regime has thus far had no effect on Havana’s harassment and imprisonment of 

dissidents? 

Answer. We have not yet seen any significant change in the Cuban Government’s 

practice of harassing and detaining dissidents. 

We have no illusions that the Cuban Government will change its behavior overnight. At the same time, we are convinced that, through a policy of sustained 

engagement, we can more effectively stand up for our values and help the Cuban 

people help themselves. 

Our enduring objective remains the emergence of a democratic, prosperous, and 

stable Cuba that respects and adheres to human rights norms. 

Question. In Freedom House’s 2015 ‘‘Freedom in the World’’ and ‘‘Freedom of the 

Press’’ reports, Cuba ranked dismally low. 

Cuba ranks among the 10 worst-rated nations for freedom of the press. And Cuba 

was ranked as ‘‘not free.’’ 

Cuban pro-democracy and human rights activists and civil society groups are calling on the United States to place human rights reforms and free and open space 

for civil society at the center of our ongoing negotiations with Cuba. 

At the same time, the Castro regime is demanding that the United States stop 

providing classes to dissidents in Havana, and that we cease providing Internet 

access. 

♦ How is the United States including democracy and human rights in the negotiations to restore full diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba? 

210 

Answer. Our updated approach to Cuba is designed to advance human rights over 

time by empowering the Cuban people. We believe that reestablishing diplomatic 

relations will help us better promote human rights in Cuba. 

On March 31, we held a planning meeting with the Cuban Government to discuss 

the methodology and structure of future human rights talks. The atmosphere of that 

meeting was professional, and there was broad agreement on the way forward for 

a future substantive dialogue. We are in the process of determining possible dates 

for the first substantive dialogue. 

We are focused on consulting with and empowering independent Cuban civil society. Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Malinowski has 

held two video conferences with on-island Cuban civil society and will continue to 

do so. 

We frequently speak out on human rights issues in Cuba and throughout the 

hemisphere and will continue to do so. 

We will continue to work closely with Congress on bringing about positive change 

on human rights in Cuba. We urge you and your congressional colleagues who may 

visit the island to raise democracy and human rights with the Cuban Government 

and to meet with independent civil society. 

Æ