[Cite as State ex rel. Bradley v. Astrab, 2012-Ohio-4610.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 98529

STATE OF OHIO, EX REL. 

ALBERT BRADLEY

RELATOR 

vs. 

JUDGE MICHAEL ASTRAB

RESPONDENT 

JUDGMENT: 

COMPLAINT DISMISSED

Writ of Mandamus 

Motion No. 456169 

Order No. 458604 

RELEASE DATE: October 1, 2012 
FOR RELATOR

Albert Bradley, pro se 

Inmate No. 0101001 

Cuyahoga County Jail 

P.O. Box 5600 

Cleveland, Ohio 44101 

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: James E. Moss 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

8th Floor Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.: 

{¶1} On June 15, 2012, the relator, Albert Bradley, commenced this mandamus 

action against the respondent, Judge Michael Astrab, to compel the judge to comply with 

Ohio’s speedy trial act, R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73, in the underlying case, State v. 

Bradley, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-559416.1

 On June 20, 2012, the respondent judge filed 

a motion to dismiss, inter alia, on the grounds of procedural defects and adequate remedy 

at law. On June 29, 2012, Bradley filed his objections to the respondent’s dispositive 

motion. On July 6, 2012, Bradley filed two “affidavits” in an effort to cure the 

procedural defects. For the following reasons, this court grants the respondent’s motion to 

dismiss and dismisses the application for a writ of mandamus. 

{¶2} The docket in the underlying case shows that Bradley was arrested on 

February 1, 2012, and charged with felonious assault and domestic violence. The trial 

court set bail at $25,000, but the docket indicates that Bradley never posted bond. The 

 1 Bradley’s demand for judgment in his complaint is not entirely clear. Throughout his 

pleadings, he complains that there were no reasons given for continuances; that his trial date was set 

92 days after his arrest and incarceration; that his counsel did not properly represent him; that he did 

not consent to the continuances; and that the respondent judge did not resolve his speedy trial 

motions. Then, in the demand for judgment, he prays “that this court guides the trial court in the 

proper way to resolve this matter, and that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue immediately 

requiring the respondent to perform the duty imposed on him * * *.” Thus, this court is not certain 

whether Bradley seeks a dismissal of the charges, rulings on his motions, or a statement of the reasons 

for the continuances. 
docket further shows that Bradley requested discovery on March 6, 2012, to which the 

prosecutor replied on March 16, 2012, and that several times the trial judge made journal 

entries that continued pretrials at defendant’s request, but these entries did not specify a 

reason for the continuance. Twice, on April 2 and April 16, 2012, the judge issued 

entries continuing the proceedings at the state’s request; on these occasions, the judge 

specified the reasons — discovery and the unavailability of the prosecutor. 

{¶3} On May 3, 2012, the judge set the trial for July 16, 2012, “at the request of 

the defendant.” On the same day, Bradley filed the first of his motions for speedy trial 

and to discharge for lack of prosecution. On May 7, he filed a “motion to justify 

continuance.” Subsequently, the judge specified reasons for the continuances in his 

journal entries. For example, on July 16, 2012, the judge continued the trial to July 23, 

2012, because the victim appeared for the first time and the medical records were 

incomplete. Bradley filed another motion to dismiss based on speedy trial on July 12, 

2012, and a motion to amend the motion to dismiss on July 19. 

{¶4} On July 23, 2012, the judge, with a court reporter present, called the case for 

trial and conducted a hearing on Bradley’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. 

In his journal entry, the court ruled: 

The parties placed on the record arguments relating to the defendant’s 

motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The court conducted an 

independent review of the docket and made a determination that the 

defendant had 17 days remaining on his speedy trial time, which would give 

the state of Ohio until 8/9/12 to try this defendant. The court did not 

calculate the defendant’s writ of mandamus nor any pro se motions filed by 

the defendant relating to the speedy trial issue into the calculation. As 

such, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. 
In this same order the trial judge also granted Bradley’s motion for a new attorney with 

Bradley’s explicit understanding that such a move would toll the speedy trial time. 

{¶5} In this mandamus action, Bradley seeks to compel the respondent judge to do 

his “duty of complying with Ohio Revised Code 2945.71 through 2945.73.” First, he 

complains that the judge did not set a trial date until 92 days after Bradley’s arrest and 

that he did so without showing the necessity and reasonableness of such action. To show 

the impropriety of this action, Bradley relies on State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 441 

N.E.2d 571 (1982), which held that a “trial court must enter the order of continuance and 

the reasons therefore by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limits prescribed 

in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial.” Id. at 7. 

{¶6} Bradley then complains that the other orders continuing the proceedings did 

not specify the reasons as required for a valid continuance. State v. Siler, 57 Ohio St.2d 1, 

384 N.E.2d 710 (1979). He also questions why his defense counsel assented to such 

apparent improper orders, especially when he did not consent to such actions. Finally, 

Bradley states that he asked these questions “to no avail” in his various motions. Bradley 

finishes by demanding “that this court guides [sic] the trial court in the proper way to 

resolve this matter, and that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue immediately requiring 

the respondent to preform [sic] the duty imposed on him * * *.” 

{¶7} The requisites for mandamus are well established: (1) the relator must have a 

clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondent must have a clear legal duty to 

perform the requested relief, and (3) there must be no adequate remedy at law. 
Additionally, although mandamus may be used to compel a court to exercise judgment or 

to discharge a function, it may not control judicial discretion, even if that discretion is 

grossly abused. State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus, 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 515 N.E.2d 914 (1987). 

 Furthermore, mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. State ex rel. Keenan v. 

Calabrese, 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 631 N.E.2d 119 (1994); and State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. 

Comm. of Ohio, 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967), paragraph three of the 

syllabus. Thus, mandamus does not lie to correct errors and procedural irregularities in 

the course of a case. State ex rel. Jerninghan v. Gaughan, 8th Dist. No. 67787, 1994 

Ohio App. LEXIS 6227 (Sept. 26, 1994). Moreover, mandamus is an extraordinary 

remedy that is to be exercised with caution and only when the right is clear. It should not 

issue in doubtful cases. State ex rel. Taylor v. Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d 165, 364 N.E.2d 1 

(1977); and State ex rel. Connole v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 87 Ohio App.3d 43, 621 

N.E.2d 850 (8th Dist.1993). 

{¶8} In Pressley, paragraph seven of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio 

ruled that “in considering the allowance or denial of the writ of mandamus on the merits, 

[the court] will exercise sound, legal and judicial discretion based upon all the facts and 

circumstances in the individual case and the justice to be done.” The court elaborated 

that, in exercising that discretion, the court should consider 

the exigency which calls for the exercise of such discretion, the nature and 

extent of the wrong or injury which would follow a refusal of the writ, and 

other facts which have a bearing on the particular case. * * * Among the 

facts and circumstances which the court will consider are the applicant’s 

rights, the interests of third persons, the importance or unimportance of the 

case, the applicant’s conduct, the equity and justice of the relator’s case, 
public policy and the public’s interest, whether the performance of the act 

by the respondent would give the relator any effective relief, and whether 

such act would be impossible, illegal, or useless. 

Pressley at 161-162. 

{¶9} In the present case, mandamus will not issue because appeal is the proper 

remedy for addressing speedy trial issues. State ex rel. Dix v. Angelotta, 18 Ohio St.3d 

115, 480 N.E.2d 407 (1985); and State ex rel. Hamilton v. Brunner, 105 Ohio St.3d 304, 

2005-Ohio-1735, 825 N.E.2d 607. Furthermore, Bradley’s own authorities, such as 

Mincy and Siler, support this principle. In those cases, the courts addressed the speedy 

trial issues, not through an extraordinary writ, but on appeal. 

{¶10} To the extent that Bradley seeks rulings on his motions, this court notes that 

the respondent judge conducted a hearing on the speedy trial motions and denied the 

motion to dismiss. This court further notes that, since the filing of the mandamus action, 

the judge has been stating reasons for the continuances. Thus, it appears that the trial 

court has considered and resolved the outstanding motions, even if it has not issued an 

explicit ruling on each motion. Thus, this court declines to issue a writ of mandamus to 

compel the judge to resolve matters he has already considered. Additionally, this court 

further declines to issue a writ of mandamus to compel explicit rulings on certain motions 

when the vagueness of the demand makes it uncertain that the relator is seeking such 

relief. 

{¶11} Additionally, the relator failed to support his complaint with an affidavit 

“specifying the details of the claim,” as required by Loc.App.R. 45(B)(1)(a). State ex 
rel. Leon v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 123 Ohio St.3d 124, 

2009-Ohio-4688, 914 N.E.2d 402. Bradley tried to submit such an affidavit in his last 

filing, but it was not notarized. The failure to notarize rendered the affidavit ineffective. 

Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 2001-Ohio-49, 744 N.E.2d 763. 

{¶12} Similarly, Bradley submitted a notarized affidavit to fulfill his requirements 

under R.C. 2969.25 for the prior lawsuit affidavit and a proper poverty affidavit with a 

cashier’s statement. However, he did not file those at the commencement of his lawsuit. 

A subsequent filing does not cure the defect, and the case is subject to dismissal. Hazel 

v. Knab, 130 Ohio St.3d 22, 2011-Ohio-4608, 955 N.E.2d 378. 

{¶13} Accordingly, the court grants the respondent’s motion to dismiss. Relator to 

pay costs. This court directs the clerk of court to serve all parties notice of this judgment 

and its date of entry on the journal. Civ.R. 58(B). 

{¶14} Complaint dismissed. 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE 

MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., and 

JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR