DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

BLOK BUILDERS, LLC d/b/a IKON BUILDERS, a Florida limited 

liability company,

Appellant,

v.

PEDRO KATRYNIOK, MASTEC NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Florida 

corporation, and BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, LLC d/b/a

AT&T FLORIDA,

Appellees.

No. 4D16-1811

[January 31, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Dale Ross, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE10-43490 (08).

Caryn L. Bellus and Barbara E. Fox of Kubicki Draper, P.A., Miami, for 

appellant.

Kimberly Kanoff Berman of McIntosh Sawran & Cartaya, P.A., Fort

Lauderdale, and Michael J. Lynott and Crystal L. Arocha of McIntosh 

Sawran & Cartaya, P.A., Miami, for appellees MasTec North America, Inc. 

and BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC.

WARNER, J.

Blok Builders, LLC, appeals a final judgment determining that Blok 

owes Mastec North America, Inc., and BellSouth Telecommunications, 

LLC, contractual indemnity and a defense in a personal injury action, as 

well as an award of attorney’s fees. Blok contends that its subcontract 

with Mastec, which required Blok to indemnify Mastec for its own 

negligence, did not comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes (2008),

and, thus, its contractual indemnification provisions were unenforceable. 

The statute, however, does not apply to the contract in this case. 

Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that Blok owed Mastec a 

duty to indemnify and defend. The trial court also found that Blok must 

indemnify BellSouth, but neither the contract between Blok and Mastec 

nor the contract between Mastec and BellSouth requires Blok to indemnify 

BellSouth. We therefore reverse the trial court’s final judgment as to 

BellSouth, including its award of attorney’s fees.
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BellSouth sought to improve its telecommunications services by 

accessing and altering its network in a project called “Lightspeed Project.” 

As part of the project, it contracted with Mastec North America, Inc., to 

perform all work necessary to provide access to the underground lines 

located in neighborhood easements. In turn, Mastec then subcontracted 

with Blok Builders (d/b/a Ikon Builders) to perform the excavation work 

necessary for BellSouth to access its previously existing underground 

utility lines.

After Blok performed excavation near the driveway in one of the 

neighborhoods covered by the project, a homeowner was walking down his 

driveway when it suddenly collapsed, causing him to fall and sustain 

permanent serious injuries. The homeowner sued Blok for damages due 

to his injuries and then amended his complaint to add Mastec and 

BellSouth for their own negligence in contributing to the dangerous 

condition.

Mastec and BellSouth crossclaimed against Blok, alleging that Blok 

had agreed to contractually indemnify them through the Subcontract 

between Blok and Mastec. The contract between Blok and Mastec 

contained a provision requiring Blok to indemnify Mastec for its own 

negligence:

16. Indemnification. a) Subcontractor [Blok] agrees to 

indemnify and hold harmless Contractor [Mastec] and its 

directors, officers, employees and agents (collectively the 

“Indemnitees”) and each of them from and against any loss, 

costs, damages, claims, expenses (including attorneys’ fees) or 

liabilities, causes of action, lawsuits, penalties, or demands 

(collectively referred to as “Liabilities”) by reason of any injury 

to or death of any person or damage to or destruction or loss 

of any property arising out of, resulting from, or in connection 

with (i) the performance or nonperformance of the Work 

contemplated by this Agreement which is or is alleged to be 

directly or indirectly caused, in whole or in part, by any act, 

omission, default, negligence (whether active or passive) of 

Subcontractor or its employees, agents or subcontractors, 

regardless of whether it is, or is alleged to be, caused in 

whole or part (whether joint, concurrent, or contributing) 

by any act, omission, default or negligence (whether

active or passive) of the indemnitees, or any of them . . . 

Said indemnity shall include but not be limited to injury or 

damage which is or is alleged to be caused in whole or in part 

by any act, omission, default or negligence of Subcontractor 

or its employees, agents or subcontractors. (emphasis added).
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. . . .

c) Where not specifically prohibited by law, Subcontractor 

further specifically agrees to indemnify and hold harmless 

the Indemnitees from all Liabilities, by reason of any injury, 

death, or damage to any person or property whatsoever, 

caused by, arising from, incident to, or connected with 

the performance or nonperformance of the work 

contemplated by this Agreement which is, or is alleged to 

be, caused in part (whether joint, concurrent, or 

contributing) or in whole by any act, omission, default, or 

negligence (whether active or passive) of the Indemnitees.

(emphasis added). 

The contract further required Blok to defend any claim arising out of 

the performance of the contract and brought against the Indemnitees, as 

well as to pay any costs and attorney’s fees incurred by the Indemnitees 

in defending any action or in enforcing the indemnification agreement.

The agreement between Blok and Mastec incorporated the terms of the 

contract between Mastec and BellSouth. That agreement contained a 

similar indemnification provision requiring Mastec to indemnify BellSouth:

Article 9. Indemnity

The Contractor [Mastec] shall indemnify and hold 

harmless the Company [BellSouth] and its directors, 

officers, employees and agents (collectively the 

“Indemnitees”) and each of them from and against any loss, 

costs, damages, claims, expenses (including attorneys’

fees) or liabilities (collectively referred to as “Liabilities”) by 

reason of any injury to or death of any person or damage to or 

destruction or loss of any property arising out of, resulting 

from, or in connection with (i) the performance or 

nonperformance of the work contemplated by this Contract 

which is or is alleged to be directly or indirectly caused, in 

whole or in part, by any act, omission, default, negligence 

(whether active or passive) of Contractor or its employees, 

agents or subcontractors, regardless of whether it is, or is 

alleged to be, caused in whole or part (whether joint, 

concurrent or contributing) by any act, omission, default or 

negligence (whether active or passive) of the Indemnitees, or 

any of them . . . . (emphasis added).

Blok contended that the indemnification provisions were invalid 

because the contract did not comply with section 725.06, Florida Statutes
4

(2008). The statute applies to certain construction contracts which

obligate the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee for its own negligence. 

Such a contract is unenforceable unless it contains a monetary limitation 

on the extent of such liability. Blok contended that because there was no 

such limitation in the Blok/Mastec contract, the indemnification provision 

was void and unenforceable. Mastec and BellSouth argued that section 

725.06 did not apply to this contract, and in any case, a monetary 

limitation was contained in the BellSouth/Mastec contract which, through 

an incorporation clause, applied to the Blok/Mastec contract.

Both sides moved for summary judgment. Ultimately, the trial court 

entered summary judgment in favor of Mastec and BellSouth, concluding 

that the contracts required Blok to indemnify and defend both Mastec and 

BellSouth in the underlying personal injury lawsuit. It also entered an 

award of attorneys’ fees to both Mastec and BellSouth. Blok appeals this 

final judgment.

We review de novo a summary judgment. Overseas Inv. Group v. Wall 

St. Electronica, Inc., 181 So. 3d 1288, 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citing 

Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 

2000)). De novo review applies to the interpretation of a contract. See 

Royal Palm Hotel Prop., LLC v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Inc., 

133 So. 3d 1108, 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). It also applies to the 

interpretation of a statute. See Toler v. Bank of America, Nat’l Ass’n, 78 

So. 3d 699, 701-02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Blok argues that section 725.06, Florida Statutes, applies to its 

contract, and because the contract contains no monetary limitation on its 

obligation to indemnify Mastec for Mastec’s own negligence, the 

indemnification provision is unenforceable. Based upon the plain wording 

of the statute, however, we conclude that section 725.06 does not apply to 

this contract.

Section 725.06(1) covers contracts for construction as follows:

Any portion of any agreement or contract for or in connection 

with, or any guarantee of or in connection with, any 

construction, alteration, repair, or demolition of a 

building, structure, appurtenance, or appliance, including 

moving and excavating associated therewith . . . shall be 

void and unenforceable unless the contract contains a 

monetary limitation on the extent of the indemnification that 

bears a reasonable commercial relationship to the contract 

and is part of the project specifications or bid documents, if 

any. (emphasis added).
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Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the words of the statute must 

be given their plain and obvious meaning. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 

219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 

1144, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). Further, a court is “without power to 

construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, 

or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To 

do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.” Id. (emphasis removed)

(quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 

777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)).

Blok contends that because it entered into a contract for excavation, 

the statute governs. Excavation, however, must be associated with the 

“construction, alteration, repair or demolition of a building, structure, 

appurtenance, or appliance . . . .” § 725.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2008)

(emphasis added). The project in this case did not involve such 

construction. The master contract between BellSouth and Mastec involved 

the laying and maintenance of utility lines. The contract does not involve 

a building, structure, appurtenance,1 or appliance. Therefore, given its

plain and ordinary meaning, the statute does not govern the contractual 

provisions. 

Blok cites several cases in which section 725.06 has been applied, but 

all involve either the construction of a building or structure. It relies most 

heavily on Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Paul N. Howard Co., 721 So. 2d 

1254 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), in which the statute was applied to the 

construction of concrete tunnels. But it is clear from the opinion that the 

court considered the concrete tunnel to be a “structure,” and thus, the 

statute was applicable. Similarly, in Griswold Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. 

Reddick, 134 So. 3d 985, 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), the statute was applied 

to a contract for a lease of a concrete pump truck, as the truck was being 

used in the laying of a foundation of a building, which type of contract is

covered by the statute.

Mastec suggests that section 725.06 does not apply to utility contracts, 

which are quasi-governmental. In particular, it cites to Church & Tower of 

Fla., Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 936 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006),

which involved a contract with a similar indemnity provision as in this 

case. The contract in question provided for the installation of utility poles, 

and the court enforced the indemnity provision but never addressed 

section 725.06. Mastec and BellSouth suggest that this is because it is a 

 

1 “Appurtenances are things belonging to another thing as principal and which 

pass as incident to the principal thing.” Chackal v. Staples, 991 So. 2d 949, 955

(Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Trask v. Moore, 24 Cal. 2d 365, 368, 149 P.2d 854,

856 (1944)).
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utility contract, and section 725.06 does not apply to utility contracts. We 

instead conclude that the statute would not have applied in Church &

Tower, because the installation of utility poles does not involve a building, 

structure, appurtenance or appliance. It is not the fact that the contract 

involved a utility, but that it did not involve a building or structure, which 

made the statute inapplicable. If the utility contract had called for the 

construction of a structure, the statute would have been applicable. In 

this case, no building or structure was involved, and the court correctly 

granted summary judgment to Mastec.

As to BellSouth, we conclude that the court erred in determining that 

Blok owed a duty of indemnity and a duty to defend BellSouth. Under the 

Blok/Mastec contract, Blok agreed to indemnify Mastec and its directors, 

officers, and agents. Nowhere does it require Blok to indemnify BellSouth. 

And, although the subcontract incorporated the provisions of the 

BellSouth/Mastec contract, that contractual indemnification provision 

required that Mastec, not its subcontractors, indemnify BellSouth. Where 

a contract is clear and unambiguous, “courts cannot indulge in 

construction or interpretation of its plain meaning.” BMW of North 

America, Inc. v. Krathen, 471 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (quoting 

Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1980)). And when a 

contract is silent on a matter, the court cannot impose contractual rights 

and duties under the guise of construction. Id. Thus, the court erred in 

declaring that Blok had a duty to indemnify and to defend BellSouth.

Because Blok had no contractual duty to indemnify or defend Bell 

South, we also reverse the award of attorney’s fees and costs as to 

BellSouth. We find no merit in Blok’s challenge to the award of attorney’s 

fees to Mastec.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s final judgment 

determining Blok’s duty to indemnify and defend Mastec and the award of 

attorney’s fees to Mastec. We reverse the final judgment as to BellSouth 

in all respects.

LEVINE, J., and BUCHANAN, LAURIE E., Associate Judge, concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.