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i 

94–221 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–19] 

CYBER OPERATIONS: IMPROVING THE 

MILITARY CYBERSECURITY POSTURE IN 

AN UNCERTAIN THREAT ENVIRONMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 4, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

KEVIN GATES, Professional Staff Member 

LINDSAY KAVANAUGH, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 2 

Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Cardon, LTG Edward C., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Cyber Command ........ 4 

O’Donohue, MajGen Daniel J., USMC, Commanding General, U.S. Marine 

Corps Forces Cyberspace ..................................................................................... 6 

Rogers, ADM Michael S., USN, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command .................. 3 

Tighe, VADM Jan E., USN, Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 

10th Fleet (FCC/C10F) ........................................................................................ 5 

Wilson, Maj Gen Burke E., USAF, Commander, Air Forces Cyber and 24th 

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cardon, LTG Edward C. .................................................................................. 53 

O’Donohue, MajGen Daniel J. ......................................................................... 79 

Rogers, ADM Michael S. .................................................................................. 35 

Tighe, VADM Jan E. ........................................................................................ 66 

Wilson, Hon. Joe ............................................................................................... 33 

Wilson, Maj Gen Burke E. ............................................................................... 87 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 101 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Ashford ....................................................................................................... 106 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 105 

(1) 

CYBER OPERATIONS: IMPROVING THE MILITARY 

CYBERSECURITY POSTURE IN AN UNCERTAIN 

THREAT ENVIRONMENT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 4, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:33 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Ladies and gentlemen, I call 

this hearing on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee to order. 

I am pleased to welcome everyone here today for the very important hearing of the fiscal year 2016 budget request for cyber operations programs of the Department of Defense [DOD]. 

One need only read the headlines of almost any newspaper on almost any day by way of the media to see the challenges we face 

as a Nation when it comes to hacking and cyber threats. The array 

of threats both from state and non-state actors pose significant 

challenges to our military forces, our economic well-being, and our 

diplomatic activities worldwide. 

The recent government accountability report on the vulnerabilities to our air traffic control networks vividly illustrate the need 

to work across departments, agencies, and even internationally to 

ensure our security. We recognize that the Department of Defense 

capabilities will be critical to those efforts, but must be provided 

the resources and the authorities to be effective. As we look at this 

budget request and as the witnesses describe their plans for how 

they will execute their activities in fiscal year 2016, I ask that you 

address the following questions. What specifically are you requesting in the budget, and what major initiatives do you expect to 

fund? If defense sequestration caps are enforced in the budget request, what impacts do you expect this year? How are you measuring or assessing the cybersecurity posture of the Department of 

Defense networks, and what vulnerabilities do you see? 

Today we have invited a panel that represents the top military 

leadership for cyber operations across the Department of Defense. 

Our witnesses include Admiral Michael Rogers, Commander of the 

U.S. Cyber Command [CYBERCOM]; Lieutenant General Edward 

C. Cardon, Commander, U.S. Army Cyber Command; Vice Admiral 
2 

Jan Tighe, Commander at Navy Fleet Cyber Command, 10th Fleet; 

Major General Daniel J. O’Donohue, Commanding General Marine 

Forces Cyber [MARFORCYBER]; and Major General Burke E. Wilson, Commander, 24th Air Force. 

Now I would like to invite the subcommittee ranking member, 

Mr. Langevin of Rhode Island, to make any comments that he 

might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and I 

look forward to hearing your testimony, and, as always, I thank 

you for the work you are doing on behalf of our country. Thank you 

all for your service. 

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that, and I quote, 

‘‘The importance of cyberspace to the American way of life and to 

the Nation’s security makes cyberspace an attractive target for 

those seeking to challenge our security and economic order,’’ end 

quote. I could not agree more. Last year the Director of National 

Intelligence placed cyber threats number one on the list of strategic 

threats to the United States. 

Most recently, the National Security Strategy cites the danger of 

destruction and even destructive cyber attack is growing. The cyber 

domain is complex. We all understand that. Threats in this space 

continuously evolve based on emerging technologies and techniques 

to counter our efforts. Threats are carried out by a diverse set of 

actors. Securing, defending, and operating freely in this space presents a nontraditional challenge requiring an immediate but 

thoughtful response. 

Since the creation of U.S. Cyber Command, the Department has 

made substantial strides in understanding and enabling freedom of 

action in the cyber domain, as well as understanding and protecting Department of Defense networks. Significant investments 

have been made. In fact, cyberspace is the only area of growth in 

the Department of Defense’s budget in the last few years. I commend the Department’s efforts, and I am proud of what has been 

achieved so far, yet there is still much to be done. Confronting this 

challenge will continue to require dialogue between the Department and Congress on the policies, capabilities, and other resources 

needed to appropriately and successfully operate in the cyber domain. That is why this hearing is so important. 

Together we can build and maintain a ready cyber force for the 

Nation. I look forward to receiving an update from the witnesses 

on the buildout of our cyber capacity and the fiscal year 2016 budget request. I hope the services will provide us an understanding of 

total force requirements for cyber operations, both service-specific 

and for the U.S. Cyber Command to enable the subcommittee to 

better understand all resources needed and provide for a ready 

force. 
3 

Specifically, I am eager to hear about how the services are recruiting and retaining qualified military and civilian personnel, 

managing cyber as a career field, and any challenges associated 

with those fields. I look forward to hearing how the services are incorporating the Reserve Components into the cyber mission forces. 

Additionally, I would like to understand how science and technology investments are being leveraged now and in the future to 

deliver the latest and best capabilities. 

I would also like the witnesses’ perspective on whether the current acquisition process delivers tools in time to meet and stay 

ahead of the threat, which as we know as technology changes so 

quickly, that is a significant challenge on our hands. So there is 

much to discuss on this issue, and in order to allow for dialogue, 

I am going to end my remarks here. 

And again I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before 

the subcommittee and to you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

Before we begin, I would like to remind our witnesses that your 

written statements will be submitted for the record, so we ask that 

you summarize your comments to 5 minutes or less. 

Admiral Rogers, we begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN, COMMANDER, 

U.S. CYBER COMMAND 

Admiral ROGERS. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished 

members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today to discuss our military cybersecurity posture, and I would 

like to thank you for convening this forum. 

I am equally pleased to be sitting alongside my colleagues from 

each of the four service components of the United States Cyber 

Command. It gives me great pride to appear before you today to 

highlight and commend the accomplishments of the uniformed and 

civilian personnel of U.S. Cyber Command and its components, and 

I am both grateful for and humbled by the opportunity that I have 

been given to lead this cyber team. 

The current threat environment is, as you have just described in 

your opening remarks, uncertain. That said, we are certain of one 

particular thing, and that is the pervasive nature of these cyber 

threats and the sophistication of the adversaries we face. Our military networks are probed for vulnerabilities literally thousands of 

times a day. The very assets within our military that provide us 

formidable advantages over adversaries are precisely the reason 

that our enemies seek to map, understand, exploit, and disrupt our 

global network architecture. 

The cyber intruders of today not only want to disrupt our actions, 

but they seek to establish a permanent presence on our networks. 

Quite simply, threats and vulnerabilities are changing and expanding at an accelerating and significant pace. Compounding this 

threat is the fact that we are dependent on cyberspace. Operating 

freely and securely in cyberspace is critical to not only our military 

and our government, but also to the private sector, which is respon-
4 

sible for maintaining much of our Nation’s critical infrastructure to 

including that of key parts of the Department of Defense. 

The bottom line is weakness in cyberspace has the potential to 

hold back our success in every field where our [Nation] is engaged. 

And I would like to focus in our comments today on the progress 

we have made so far, the achievements that we are doing in the 

operational arena, and what I think is the way ahead, and I look 

forward to that discussion. 

With that, I will conclude my opening remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Rogers can be found in the 

Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you very much. 

And General Cardon. 

STATEMENT OF LTG EDWARD C. CARDON, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. ARMY CYBER COMMAND 

General CARDON. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, 

members of the committee, it is an honor to be here on behalf of 

the U.S. Army Cyber Command and Second Army alongside Admiral Rogers and my fellow commanders. 

We appreciate the work of this committee to protect the American people from emerging threats and ensure our military has the 

capabilities we need to defend the Nation. Over the last few years 

we have had tremendous momentum, both within the institution 

and operationalizing cyberspace, but a lot of work remains. For the 

institution, we have consolidated cyberspace under one commander. 

We have created the Cyber Center of Excellence in Fort Gordon, 

Georgia, and the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy. 

The Army is currently establishing the necessary frameworks to 

build capabilities for the Army, and by extension, the Joint Force. 

Operationally, we are making progress with mission-focused approaches supporting Army and combatant commanders. We made 

progress this year developing the Army’s portion of the Cyber Mission Force with 25 of 41 teams on mission now, and we expect to 

have all 41 on mission by the end of fiscal year 2016 as planned. 

In the face of determined adversaries, though, we are employing 

these teams as they reach initial operating capability and will continue to bring forces and capabilities online through 2017. The 

threat, vulnerabilities, and missions set, demand this sense of urgency. This also includes bringing online 21 U.S. Army Reserve 

and Army National Guard Protection Teams that will be trained at 

the same standards as the Active Component cyber force. 

We are going to need more personnel beyond the Cyber Mission 

Force to build out the support required to fully employ the Cyber 

Mission Force and to build capabilities for Army formations. To 

better manage our people, the Army created a cyber branch, and 

we are exploring the creation of a cyber career field for civilian personnel. 

For training, we have a centrally funded joint model for individually training, but we are working to also build collective training 

capabilities and their associated facilities within a joint construct. 

For equipping the forces, we are developing and refining the necessary framework to give us the agility that we will need in pro-
5 

gramming, resourcing, and acquisition for infrastructure platforms 

and tools. And for a more defensible architecture and network, we 

are partnered with the Army’s Chief Information Officer and Defense Information Systems Agency [DISA] in the Air Force for an 

extensive network modernization efforts. 

These are essential for the security, operation, and defense of our 

Department of Defense networks. We have made tremendous 

progress, and with your support we have the necessary program resources to continue our momentum, but we cannot delay for the 

struggle is on us now. 

Thank you, and I will be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Cardon can be found in the 

Appendix on page 53.] 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you very much, General. 

Admiral Tighe. 

STATEMENT OF VADM JAN E. TIGHE, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. 

FLEET CYBER COMMAND/U.S. 10TH FLEET (FCC/C10F) 

Admiral TIGHE. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

your support to our military and the opportunity to appear before 

you today. 

Since my Fleet Cyber Command predecessor, Admiral Mike Rogers, last testified before this subcommittee in July of 2012, the Department of Defense, U.S. Cyber Command, and the service components have significantly matured our operations and cyber operational capabilities. I appreciate the opportunity to outline Navyspecific progress over the past 2 years, where we are headed to address an ever-increasing threat, and how budgetary uncertainty is 

likely to impact our progress and operations. 

Fleet Cyber Command directs the operations to secure, operate, 

and defend Navy networks within the Department of Defense Information Network [DODIN]. We operate Navy networks as a warfighting platform which must be aggressively defended from intrusion, exploitation, and attack. The Navy network consists of more 

than 500,000 end user devices, approximately 75,000 network devices, and nearly 45,000 applications and systems across 3 security 

enclaves. 

We have transformed the way we operate and defend over the 

past 2 years based on operational lessons learned. Specifically, beginning in summer of 2013, we, with Admiral Rogers at the helm 

at the time, fought through an adversary intrusion into Navy’s unclassified network. 

Under the named operation known as Operation Rolling Tide, 

Fleet Cyber Command drove out the intruder through exceptional 

collaboration with affected Navy commanders, U.S. Cyber Command, the National Security Agency, the Defense Information Security Agency, and our fellow cyber service components. Although 

any intrusion upon our network is troubling, this operation served 

as a learning opportunity that has both matured the way we operate and defend our networks and simultaneously highlighted gaps 

both in cybersecurity posture and in our defensive operational capabilities. 
6 

As a result of this operation and other cybersecurity initiatives 

inside of the Navy, we have already made, proposed, or planned for 

a nearly $1 billion investment between the years of fiscal year 2014 

and fiscal year 2020 that will greatly reduce the risk of successful 

cyberspace operations against Navy networks. Of course, these investments are built on the premise that our future budgets will not 

be drastically reduced by sequestration. 

Specifically, if budget uncertainty continues, we will have an increasingly difficult time addressing this very real and present danger to our national security and maritime warfighting capabilities. 

Operationally, and on a 24-by-7 and 365 days a year, Fleet Cyber 

Command is focused on configuring and operating layered defense 

in-depth capabilities to prevent malicious actors from gaining access to our Navy networks in collaboration and cooperation with 

our sister services, U.S. Cyber Command, Joint Forces Headquarters-DODIN, DISA, and the National Security Agency. Additionally we are driving towards expanded cyber situational awareness to inform our network maneuvers and reduce risk in this 

space. 

As you know, Navy and other service components are building 

the maneuver elements in the Cyber Mission Force for U.S. Cyber 

Command by manning, training, and certifying teams to the U.S. 

Cyber Command standards. The Navy is currently on track to have 

personnel assigned for all 40 teams, all 40 of the Navy-sourced 

Cyber Mission Force teams in 2016, with full operational capability 

in the following year. 

Additionally, between now and 2018, an additional 298 cyber Reserve billets will also augment the cyber force manning plan. In delivering on both U.S. Cyber Command’s and the U.S. Navy’s requirements in cyberspace, I am fortunate to have these component 

commanders as partners in addition to the many organizations who 

are not represented here but are every bit a member of team cyber. 

Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Tighe can be found in the 

Appendix on page 66.] 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Admiral, very 

much. 

And General O’Donohue. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE, USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES CYBERSPACE 

General O’DONOHUE. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished 

members of this subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you 

today. On behalf of your Marines, our civilian Marines, and their 

families, I thank you for your continued support as we pursue a 

multi-year joint cyberspace strategy. 

Marines have a legacy of operating in any clime or place. Whether at sea with the Navy, or working shoulder to shoulder with our 

joint, interagency, and coalition partners, we are standing ready to 

respond to crises around the globe, bringing to employ combined 

arms across the air, land, and sea domains. We are now entering 
7 

an era of transition where the cyber domain will be fully integrated 

in the same way. 

Our Commandant has laid out a clear vision to increase the capacity and capability of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force to fully 

integrate cyberspace operations. MARFORCYBER [U.S. Marine 

Corps Forces Cyberspace] is leading the effort to ensure that we institutionalize this vision across the Marine Corps, to include by 

participating in over 30 exercises last year. As a service component 

to U.S. Cyber Command, MARFORCYBER in conjunction with its 

service partners, conducts full-spectrum cyberspace operations to 

enable freedom of action across the cyberspace domain and deny 

the same to our adversaries. Additionally, MARFORCYBER provides direct support to United States Special Operations Command’s missions worldwide. 

To support these operations, we are building the Cyber Mission 

Force, and these forces are achieving operational outcomes today. 

These achievements are helping us to shape the vision for the future of cyberspace operations for the Marine Corps, as part of the 

joint, interagency, and combined force. 

Last June, U.S. Cyber Command certified our first Cyber Mission 

Team and our first national Cyber Protection Team. During this 

time our second Cyber Mission Team reached its initial operation 

capability. MARFORCYBER is on track to have over 75 percent of 

its teams resourced by the end of 2015. To expedite this force build, 

the Marine Corps has dedicated 16 percent of its retention bonuses 

for our cyberspace professionals. And based on lessons learned, we 

have streamlined our personnel and training pipeline as we deal 

with the surge requirements of a startup force. 

In addition, we have expanded the opportunities and developed 

procedures for our teams to work with increasing effectiveness 

across the joint and interagency force. This has been a combat multiplier. At the bottom line, we are fielding the cyber forces required 

by our strategy and provided by the President’s budget, ready, on 

time, and with increasing operability in ways that we had not 

imagined. As we build the force, MARFORCYBER is achieving 

operational outcomes in stride by supporting joint, interagency, and 

coalition partners at home and overseas. Every day we are planning cyberspace operations, defending the network, and standing 

ready when directed by U.S. Cyber Command to conduct offensive 

cyberspace operations. Increasingly, combatant commanders and 

special operation forces now see cyberspace operations not as a special staff function, but essential to everything that warfighters do. 

Currently, we are pursuing a considered joint and service strategy for the multi-year development of a unified network that will 

facilitate command and control, provide real-time situational 

awareness, and assist with decision support to commanders at all 

levels. For the Marine Corps, this network will be optimized for 

operational support to forces as they are deployed across the globe 

and as they train for crisis response. In an unstable and unpredictable security environment, the Marines provide a ready, forward, 

expeditionary extension of cyber capability for the joint, interagency, and combined force. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

thank you for your continued support to our national treasure, our 
8 

Marine civilians and their families, I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General O’Donohue can be found in 

the Appendix on page 79.] 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. General, thank you very much. 

And General Wilson. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN BURKE E. WILSON, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCES CYBER AND 24TH AIR FORCE 

General WILSON. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today with my fellow commanders. 

It is an honor to represent the outstanding men and women of 

Air Forces Cyber and 24th Air Force. I am extremely proud of the 

work our airmen, officers, enlisted, and civilians do each and every 

day to field and employ cyber capabilities in support of combatant 

and Air Force commanders. In the interest of time, let me share 

just a few examples to highlight how our airmen are making positive lasting impacts to our Nation. 

Since we last briefed the subcommittee, the Air Force completed 

migration of our unclassified networks from many disparate systems into a single architecture. We transitioned over 644,000 users 

across more than 250 geographic locations to a single network and 

reduced over 100 Internet access points into a more streamlined 16 

gateways. The end result has been a more reliable, affordable, and 

most importantly, defensible network. 

The Air Force has also championed the fielding of next-generation technology by partnering with the Army and Defense Information Systems Agency to support the transition to a Joint Information Environment [JIE]. Together we are implementing Joint Regional Security Stacks and making enhancements to our networks 

in order to achieve a single DOD security architecture. The combined team achieved a critical milestone last September when they 

fielded their first security stack, and we have continued to push 

hard on these efforts, which will benefit the entire Department by 

reducing our network attack surface and increasing network capacity and capabilities. 

Like the other services, we have made significant progress towards fielding and employing our initial Cyber Mission Forces. 

Today, Air Forces Cyber has 15 teams that achieved initial operating capability, and 2 teams have reached full operating capability. In addition to providing unprecedented support to joint and 

coalition combat forces in Afghanistan and Syria, these cyber forces 

are wholly engaged in support of combatant and Air Force commanders around the world, as well as in defense of the Nation. 

I am proud to report our Air Reserve Component is a full partner 

in the Cyber Mission Force build, in addition to our other day-today cyber operations. We are leveraging traditional reservists, Air 

Reserve technicians, and Air National Guardsmen across the command to meet our warfighting commitments. Whether it is commanding and controlling cyber forces from one of our operation centers, deploying as part of our combat communications team, installing cyber infrastructure around the world, or any other task, each 
9 

of our total force members meet the same demanding standards 

and serve alongside our Active Duty counterparts. In my humble 

opinion, it is a tremendous example of total force integration in action. 

The Air Force has also instituted several key initiatives to better 

recruit, develop, and retain our cyber forces. Most recently, we approved a Stripes for Certifications Program which provides the opportunity for candidates to enlist at a higher grade when entering 

the Air Force with desired cyber-related certifications. We have 

also continued our selective reenlistment bonus program to provide 

additional incentives for enlisted members to continue to serve in 

the demanding cyber and intelligence specialties. 

For our officers, we have complemented the cyber warfare operations career track which we established several years ago with a 

new cyber intermediate leadership program. The objective is to 

identify qualified cyber and intelligence officers and provide them 

the right professional growth opportunities. We held our first board 

just recently and competitively selected 83 majors and senior captains from across the cyber fields to serve in key command and 

operational positions, many as integral members of the Cyber Mission Force. 

And finally, we continue to support a host of initiatives aimed at 

improving the outreach to our Nation’s youngest generation. I 

would like to highlight just one that will be culminating here in DC 

on March 12. It is called CyberPatriot and sponsored by the Air 

Force Association in partnership with local high schools and middle 

schools around the country, several industry partners, as well as 

cyber professionals from the Air Force. 

CyberPatriot’s goal is to inspire students to pursue careers in 

cybersecurity or other STEM [science, technology, engineering, and 

mathematics] career fields. At the beginning of the school year in 

September, over 2,100 teams, 2,100 teams, involving nearly 10,000 

students in the U.S., Canada, United Kingdom, and our DOD 

schools overseas, participated in cyber training and competitions. 

We have seen a 40 percent increase in participation this year. As 

I mentioned, CyberPatriot will culminate here locally at the National Harbor with 28 teams competing in the national finals. Students will earn national recognition and scholarships. Without a 

doubt, the program is an exemplar of how public-private partnership can make a real difference. Personally, it has been rewarding 

to see our airmen giving back to our younger generation. 

These are just a handful of examples to share how our airmen 

are pushing hard to increase cyber capability and capacity across 

the command. Believe me, Air Forces Cyber and 24th Air Force are 

all in and fully committed to the mission. 

Our cyber force is more capable than ever before and continues 

to get better every day. None of this would be possible without your 

continued support. As you have heard from my counterparts, the 

need for the support will only increase in importance as we move 

forward. It is clear resource stability in the years ahead will best 

enable our continued success in developing airmen and maturing 

our capabilities to operate in, through, and from the cyberspace domain. Simply put, our cyber warriors truly are professionals in 

every sense of the word, and they deserve our full support. 
10 

Along with my fellow commanders, it is an honor to be here 

today. Thank you again for the opportunity. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Wilson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 87.] 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you very much, General, and that was fascinating to find out about the involvement of 

students. What a great opportunity. And I know it has to be reassuring to the American people, your service, your personnel, the 

families that are supportive of your personnel, and I just thank 

each of you for protecting American families and advancing our national security. 

We will now go into our round of 5 minutes of each member. 

Kevin Gates, who is our professional staff person, will keep the 

time. Members of Congress need timekeepers more than other people, beginning with me. 

And so as we begin, Admiral Rogers, given the increasing and 

evolving cyber threats, what are critical steps that Congress can do 

to enable CYBERCOM accomplish your mission? 

Admiral ROGERS. My first comment would be ensure a steady resource stream here. If you look at sequestration, the implications 

of the Budget Control Act for us, if you executed that, would have 

significant impact on our ability to execute the operational vision 

and would have impact on our ability to defend our own Department’s networks, the expectation from the rest of the Nation that 

the Department of Defense is going to be there to provide capability to defend critical U.S. infrastructure. 

It will slow and in some cases stop our ability to generate teams. 

It will lead us into contractual default issues. For example, we are 

in a MILCON [military construction] project right now that you 

have funded to actually create physical infrastructure for U.S. 

Cyber Command. Because we are new, we have only funded two 

out of the three years of that, so if we have another issue with that 

we will have contractual issues. 

Bottom line, though, our ability to defend the Nation and our Department from a cyber perspective in the world that we are facing, 

with the threats we are facing, is significantly impacted if we can’t 

sustain the resource budget picture that we have developed. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. And I share your concern to 

the point it would be very helpful to me, Admiral, if you could provide a written response to that question which specifically would 

address specific delays and levels of confusion. Our colleagues need 

to know this because it is not as appreciated, I think, as it should 

be. So that would be very helpful. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to is for official use only and retained 

in the committee files.] 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Admiral Tighe, in your testimony you mentioned designing resiliency in programs through 

common standards and protocols. Could you give us an example of 

what you mean by that? 

For the others, how do you think that we will be able to measure 

the resiliency of your programs? 

Admiral TIGHE. Yes, Chairman. 
11 

Our approach to building in resiliency runs the gamut from technological innovation in our networks to the notion of fighting 

through cyber attacks when we are under attack. The people, the 

processes that we have, the method by which we fight through a 

cyber attack, is really a very large part of our warfighting approach 

to how we defend our networks. 

And so when we talk about the technological side, that is about 

getting the capabilities from the boundary of the Internet all the 

way down to our individual host systems in a way that we can 

monitor and understand our own networks, and monitor and understand any threats that may be traversing through our networks. 

And so having that built in, which many of those new capabilities 

are coming in as a result of Operation Rolling Tide, we have 

learned where we had gaps and are instituting some of those defense-in-depth capabilities and standardizing interfaces across systems and networks that talk to each other. 

Beyond our corporate networks that I am responsible for operating and defending, as you know, we have many applications, 

weapons systems, and other types of systems in the Navy that are 

necessary to accomplish our mission that hang off of our networks. 

And so making sure we understand how we are interfacing with 

those networks, how we are extending our protections to them, is 

a big part of our program and budget subnet in building those capabilities in and codifying across all of the acquisition commands 

who build systems for the Navy, building on technology, building 

on operating systems, all coming potentially with cyber vulnerabilities if we haven’t built it into the front end of that acquisition process. 

So in summary, I think the resiliency that we are looking for includes both the technological advances we have planned into our 

system and how we organize and defend with the personnel and 

the analytic capability to understand what is going on in our network so we can respond quickly. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Well, we certainly appreciate 

your professionalism. And this is going to be a really quick question, General Cardon. What is the status of establishing the Cyber 

Command in the district, in the community next door to me at Fort 

Gordon, Georgia? 

General CARDON. Sir, we have a $90 million appropriation that 

should break ground here October, November of this year. So we 

are really excited about that. That will be the focal point for cyber 

for the Army. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Central Savannah area is really looking forward to your presence. 

I now proceed to Congressman Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thanks to all of our witnesses. Admiral Rogers, I would 

like to start with you if I could, on your perspective on initiatives 

become more and more acute in recent years. I don’t think anyone 

would argue that we as a Nation have developed and continue to 

develop some exquisite capabilities in cyberspace. It is without 

question. 

However, I am concerned that we are developing capabilities 

faster than we develop the doctrine and policy that guides their 
12 

use. And, we all would agree that cyber operations obviously are 

critical to how we operate now and in the future, but there appears 

to be a real need for greater definition of legal structures for cyber 

activities and operations in defense of the Nation. 

And there appears to even more of a gray area around support 

of civil authorities when it is not under a Title 10 construct with 

a Title 32, 50, 18 or 5 drill status, or how we utilize our Reserve 

Components and many of the ways that our service men and 

women can interface outside the DOD. 

So my question for you, can you speak to your command’s efforts 

to work through these policy challenges? 

Admiral ROGERS. So, I think you raised some significant issues. 

Clearly they are much broader than just U.S. Cyber Command, although we are an important part of this dialogue, we are an important part of this process. If I could, I will start with the second half 

first and then work my way back. 

In terms of how we make sure that we are maximizing the capabilities that we are building across the total force from the Reserve, 

the Guard, and the Active Component, particularly as you have indicated, when are applying it outside the Title 10 framework, the 

argument, you know, my part of the discussion is, look, we have 

a very competent, mature structure in the form of defense support 

to civil authorities that we currently use already in many other 

mission areas in the Department. 

I think that is a good starting point for us when we look at how 

we are going to apply capability in Title 18, Title 5, Title 52. So 

I think there is a good framework for us to build around, and that 

is kind of the starting position, if you will, that we are taking as 

a Department, broadly speaking. 

The first part of the question that you raised about how do we 

make sure that even as we are generating capability we are also 

thinking about the doctrine and the legal authority, if you will, 

that helps frame how we apply it in a way that maximizes outcomes and it does it in a framework that we are all comfortable 

with. 

I think on the doctrinal side, I am pretty comfortable that we 

have got a broad vision. If you look, we have got publications. We 

have got a broad dialogue about how we are going to do it. I think 

the biggest challenge in some ways that we are still trying to wrestle our way through here is if we are going to generate or apply 

these capabilities outside the DOD framework, let’s say in defending critical U.S. infrastructure, that is an area that we still have 

to work through the details. 

Okay, so what is the legal and policy framework that we are 

going to use? I am comfortable that in a crisis we will work our 

way through it, but the point I am trying to make is we don’t want 

to wait until a crisis to do this. You want to have this all laid out. 

You want the private sector to understand it. You want the rest of 

our governmental partners, because we are going to do this 

teaming with others in the government, DHS [Department of 

Homeland Security], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], other 

partners, and we want to make sure that we have laid that all out 

in advance. 
13 

So there is a variety of steps we are taking between exercises, 

between ongoing policy deliberations, and through the legal frameworks we are trying to create, for example, what the Congress is 

looking at for cyber information-sharing legislation. That is all a 

part of the efforts we are trying to move forward to address the important issue that you have highlighted. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, thank you. I hope we can continue to work 

through those things. And that is something that I want to pay 

particular close attention to. So thank you for where we are right 

now, and I look forward to continuing this dialogue. 

Cybersecurity obviously is an incredibly important field, but it 

also has lots of synergies with other areas of DOD activities, 

SIGINT [signals intelligence], electronic warfare [EW], information 

operations, and many more. 

General, if I could ask you, I know the Army has recognized this 

in particular with their doctrinal recognition of the merging of 

cyber and EW, and certainly the Navy’s Information Dominance 

community is in this as well, as our Navy witnesses know quite 

personally. 

So my question is, are the interactions between cyber and these 

communities clear or ad hoc, and how do training, manning, and 

equipping get balanced across these synergistic investments? Are 

we building cyber in concert with or on the shoulders of these other 

communities? 

General CARDON. In this case we have doctrine, we call it CEMA, 

cyber electromagnetic capabilities. And we built these organizations into our Army service component commands, corps, divisions, 

and brigades. 

Now, the capabilities to deliver all that don’t fully exist yet, because we have recognized this convergence. But, for example, we 

already have experiences using this in some of the war zones, 

former war zones, such as Iraq, where you had CREW [counter 

radio-controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare] devices to protect against IEDs [improvised explosive device], tactical 

SIGINT forces. And it is really how do you organize these in time 

and space to accomplish a specific mission? 

So we are trying to harness what we have learned in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, and what we are learning today and bring that forward. I think this is a journey, and we still have a lot of work to 

do on what are the additional capabilities we need at those levels. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Langevin. 

We now proceed to Navy SEAL [Sea-Air-Land] veteran, Congressman Ryan Zinke of Montana. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

You know, from the perspective of a ground-pounder, you know, 

I was just a frogman, it seems to me when you say your ability to 

defend the Nation, and I am concerned about the chain of command. You know, we have had earlier discussions about, you know, 

what is the difference whether a missile attack is incoming or 

whether it hits a military facility or a piece of our major infrastructure or our banking system, it is an attack. 
14 

And I am concerned that the chain of command doesn’t allow you 

to quickly react to an attack because somehow we have to go 

through and determine whether it is a bank or whether it is a— 

you know, what article it is under. And it seems to me that we 

need to take a fast look at this and so we are not responding to 

a crisis, but preparing for what we will, I think most in this room 

believe, is an eventual attack. 

So I guess my question is are you comfortable with the current— 

your current ability to defend this Nation and the shipyards and 

infrastructure and everything there is, the cyber? And if you are 

not, what are the benefits of looking at streamlining our chain of 

command and so we can have accountability, we can have, you 

know, cost and efficiency? What do you see as the path forward? 

Admiral ROGERS. So if I could, Congressman, let me take a look 

at—give you an initial thought. The positive side, in my mind, is 

we have clearly delineated who has what responsibilities. And I say 

that, if we go back 2, 3 years ago, we literally spent years debating 

about who was going to have what role. And it literally probably 

took us 2 years to generate an internal consensus as to who was 

going to do what. 

The positive side for me—I have now been in command coming 

up on approximately a year. The positive side for me is, hey, we 

have moved beyond a discussion of who ought to do what to, okay, 

now we have clearly identified who has what responsibilities. Now 

let’s roll up our sleeves and focus on how we are going to make this 

work. Clearly we are not where we want to be yet. 

The argument—not the argument—the point I try to make to my 

DHS because the vision as currently constructed is DOD will apply 

its capabilities in a supporting role, if you will, with DHS largely 

being the supported entity within the Federal Government as having the primary responsibility for cybersecurity outside the dot.gov 

domain, if you will, in the broader civilian infrastructure. 

The point I am making with my teammates at DHS and the FBI, 

for example, are my military culture teaches me you got to train, 

you got to exercise, you got to get down to the execution level of 

detail, and you got to do that all before the crisis. You know, as 

you have learned in your own life, discovery learning while moving 

to contact is an incredibly bad way to go about generating insights 

and getting more proficient at the mission. 

What I would suggest is we need to make this current. We need 

to wring this current system out, and before we go back again and 

spend more time on this, and one of the inputs I have provided is, 

hold us accountable for executing what we have created. And if in 

that experience we come to the conclusion that, hey, we made some 

assumptions that turned out to be flawed, then we ought to step 

back and relook at it. But for me at least, I am not there yet. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield the remaining part of my time. 

I look forward to working with you on this and support you in 

any way I can. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Congressman 

Zinke. 

We now proceed to Congressman Joaquin Castro of Texas. 
15 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman, and thank each of you for offering your testimony today. 

Welcome to Washington. I know you all are here frequently. 

A special welcome to Major General Wilson, who is in from San 

Antonio, Texas, Lackland Air Force Base. We are very proud of the 

work you all are doing there. 

Let me ask you all a question about training people in cybersecurity in our country because this issue and the need for that skill 

is only going to become more pronounced in the coming years. 

This Congress is in the process of taking up our big education 

reauthorization bill for example, ESEA [Elementary and Secondary 

Education Act]. What programs in our school should we be expanding or growing, not only in our high schools, but also in our colleges, to prepare more students to take on roles in cybersecurity 

and so that you all have a pipeline of qualified people who can take 

on these jobs, a job that is becoming more in demand not just in 

the military or in government, but also in the private sector? And 

I will open it up. 

Admiral ROGERS. Why don’t you take that first cut because you 

have done some interesting work at the high school level. 

General WILSON. Thank you, sir. 

When you look at the young generation, really it’s a STEM problem we have seen for years, no matter what the mission that we 

need in the DOD. And so when you take a look at it, you have got 

to get young folks excited about cybersecurity in this case. And 

what we find is is they yearn for interaction with people that are 

really doing the job. And it is fascinating to watch them in front 

of young airmen. It would be the same with a soldier, sailor, marine—it wouldn’t make any difference—to be able to share, to put 

an 18-, 19-, 20-year-old in front of them because it is not hard for 

them to project themselves in the roles that we do every day. 

And so what we found, probably the most successful, is this 

CyberPatriot. There is others like it. We have a Troops for Teens 

program there in San Antonio, that you are familiar with, sir. 

When we are able to interact with the schools at the grassroots 

level, seems to be the most effective. I would argue the 

CyberPatriot is very effective because we bring private industry in 

to enable from a funding perspective, so they are able to partner 

in the private—public-private partnership. We find that to be very, 

very powerful. 

So in our case, I am proud to be wearing an Air Force uniform 

and that the Air Force Association sponsors the CyberPatriot program. We think we got a good thing going there. But the feedback 

from the local schools, teachers, mentors that we bring in to work 

with the kids, they just need more mentors. They need more attention. 

And so while we can put more curriculum in place, that is a wonderful thing, to get kids excited, and I will give you just a couple 

of statistics in some of the, you know, studies that we have looked 

at in terms of kids that are coming out of the CyberPatriot program, the national average is typically 9 to 15 percent, depending, 

kids that are interested in cybersecurity or other STEM fields just 

across the student population. 
16 

We are seeing about those numbers when kids come in, but we 

are seeing graduates out of CyberPatriot at the 80, 85 percent rate 

that are interested in cybersecurity or STEM degrees when they go 

off to college. You could argue maybe that is because of the people 

that are joining the program. But I would argue that when you 

look at the caliber and the content of what they know when they 

walk in the door—they don’t know a lot about cybersecurity—and 

when they walk out the door, they know a lot about it. And so it 

is getting them motivated. I think they can see themselves in those 

career fields. And so that exposure—the biggest reason we saw a 

40 percent increase this year is we got into the middle schools. We 

incorporated the middle schools into the CyberPatriot program. 

Next year we are going to take a stab at the upper tiers of the elementary school and get them excited about doing cybersecurity. 

I would argue that all of the services have similar programs, you 

know, and sometimes it is about flying or space out in the Air 

Force. Cyber is one of those. It is an exciting career field, and people see themselves in it. 

And so I think that is the key, is to get our young folks excited 

about what the potential is for them. 

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. 

Admiral TIGHE. Congressman, if I may, I think the point on the 

STEM is really, really important. And as early as we can get the 

STEM, get our young kids motivated in STEM, the better. We need 

them to be comfortable with technology and be comfortable as analysts, if you will. 

We have to connect the dots a lot of time. We need our workforce 

to be able to connect dots, not just understand technology but 

understand what is really happening when you don’t have the full 

picture. 

And so the STEM programs tend to do that for our young people. 

I think at the same time—so puzzles and things of that nature. But 

I think at the same time there are also programs that we have 

been able to leverage sponsored by National Science Foundation 

and others. Scholarships For Service is a program that gets graduate-level education and college education and contributes to that 

education with a stipend, for example, but then they come into the 

Federal service in cyberspace. And so some of those kinds of programs are also, I think, very valuable in exposing our young people 

and our college-age students to cybersecurity challenges, but also 

sort of bringing them into the government as a first job. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Congressman Castro. 

We now proceed to Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would like to build on this theme of education. Admiral 

Rogers, the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs in my district and the Army Reserve just announced a partnership to educate cyber warriors. Is this a good model, and should we support 

it? 

Admiral ROGERS. Well, let me be honest, Congressman, I don’t 

know the details of the model, so I am not in a good position to 

tell you is it good or bad. Having said that, one of my takeaways 
17 

in this area is clearly this is all about partnerships, and those partnerships have to include the private sector but not just the corporate or network owners, if you will, the educational piece, the 

academic piece, the ability to generate insights to go to the doctrine 

and the policy kinds of issues we had talked before. 

I try to remind people, look, this has got to be a broader discussion. Look at, for example, some of the initial work we did in the 

nuclear world when we were first trying to develop deterrence theory that we take for granted now. The academic world played a 

huge role in that if you go back 50, 60 years. I would like to see 

us do the same thing. 

And the other thing that concerns me about the academic world 

is, and one reason why I as a commander, I spend a fair amount 

of time at academic institutions from collegiate level down to I was 

just at a charter school in Harlem yesterday, as a matter of fact, 

as a follow-on to some work I was doing in New York City. As I 

remind them, you are educating our workforce. I have a vested interest in partnering with you to help us do that because the technology we use is important. And clearly, we can’t execute our mission without it, but where we really gain our advantage, our true 

strength, is in the men and women who apply that technology. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. And obviously this is something 

I think we are all really excited about pursuing. 

General Wilson, recently I visited the 561st Network Operations 

Squadron which is in my district at Air Force Base Peterson, and 

they told me that their structure and approach to network cybersecurity could be a model for the other service branches. Is that 

something you would agree with, and if so, why? 

General WILSON. So, sir, I think you were with Lieutenant Colonel Rocky Rockwell and the team of the 561st. 

Mr. LAMBORN. That’s right. 

General WILSON. Thank you for visiting. They really enjoyed the 

visit. 

Sir, what they were referring to was this migration that I hinted 

at, getting the Air Force network, which is part of our larger DOD 

information network, to one centrally managed with a single architecture, which is really an early interim step towards the Joint Information Environment. So we are huge believers in it. 

Many of the lessons that we learned out of the migration actually 

have been incorporated with the Army and with DISA and with all 

the services as we look at the JIE, this Joint Information Environment architecture, and the way that we are transitioning all of our 

networks. And so, it is a model. I think there is a lot of good, hard 

lessons. The team that you met at the 561st, we have a sister unit 

that is the 26th down in Montgomery, Alabama, at Gunter Air 

Force Base, is actually formed, about 40 people are on the joint 

management team that are working to transition with JIE. 

And so we have taken the lessons from the people that have the 

bruises from going through a transition of that magnitude and trying to apply that to the JIE so that we are successful. So I absolutely believe that it is directly applicable, and we are excited 

about moving forward. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I know that there can be value with each 

service branch learning its own lessons and standing something up. 
18 

But on the other hand, there is also on the other side of the balance, why reinvent the wheel? If one of the branches has really 

done forward work, maybe that should be a model for others to follow. 

General WILSON. So, sir, JIE, which we have all bought into in 

terms of the services, is really the next generation beyond where 

we are at today in the Air Force. And so it is really the interim 

step. So we shouldn’t be satisfied with where the Air Force is. We 

need even a more defensible network. It is the best we can do with 

decades-old, 5-year-old technology. We need to move the DOD forward with the newer technologies, the next generation technologies, cloud architectures, single security stacks through our 

gateway, if that makes sense. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. Thank you all for your service. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you very much, Congressman Lamborn. 

We now proceed with Congresswoman Elise Stefanik of New 

York. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all 

of our witnesses here today for your service and the time you took 

to prepare for today’s hearing. 

My question is for Lieutenant General Cardon. Last month at a 

conference you discussed the military’s need for flexibility, it is 

something we hear quite often, and that the traditional top-down 

way of operating is a challenge in its organizational approach, especially as it relates to cybersecurity. Can you explain this further? 

And then I am also interested in how this is applicable to the current mission in Afghanistan. 

General CARDON. So I come at it from an operational approach, 

and so the challenge in operations is what level of a centralization 

do you need, and what level of decentralization do you need. And 

so some operations require a high degree of centralization, and 

some operations work best decentralized. 

The art is figuring out which one is most applicable. And in 

cyber, I think we have a centralized framework with a decentralized execution. But I will go further building on what Admiral Rogers talked about. It is when you start to bring coalition and private, 

because this affects—it affects all of us, so anything that happens 

to any one of us, all of us are talking to each other here, and with 

CYBERCOM it is going wider because everyone could have this 

same problem. 

So you create more like a fusion cell. I describe it as being mission focused, not organizationally focused. So everyone looks at the 

mission, everyone is working on the problem. So when you take an 

example something like Heartbleed, which was a severe vulnerability that affected everyone, not just in the military but in private industry, that is a fusion sort of approach. Looks different inside the military, but everyone was working on this problem across 

the country. 

In Afghanistan, operations are very decentralized. There is a limited amount of capability. It is prioritized by General Campbell, 

and then we use it accordingly. And so the decentralized nature of 

the operations there, often driven by the terrain, has I think been 

pretty effective. 
19 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you very much. 

My second question relates to sequestration and funding at 

Budget Control Act [BCA] levels. Can you talk about what the 

risks are to the Army networks campaign plans, network modernization efforts, should the DOD and the Army have to execute 

funding at BCA levels? 

General CARDON. So General Wilson just talked about the Air 

Force collapsing their networks, and the Army has not yet done 

that, and that is why we are partnered with the Air Force to do 

that. 

So the Army would take about a $6 billion reduction off the top. 

That is going to affect training. It is going to affect our network 

modernization. It is going to affect our installation support, and it 

is going to affect the procurement of weapon systems. More importantly, it is the software upgrades that we need to do to those 

weapons systems to reduce cyber vulnerabilities. 

If the cuts stay, the Army is also going to have to cut force structure. That is estimated to be 30,000. And while cyber is still ranked 

very high in the Department of the Army, I think it is fair to say 

that cyber will be part of that discussion. So this is very concerning. It is still very, very highly ranked in the departments, and 

it is a very high priority. But the nature of those two things together makes a very difficult problem for us. 

Admiral ROGERS. Can I make one other comment on the sequestration piece? The other thing that concerns me is the longer term 

implication. I watched the way at U.S. Cyber Command, particularly our civilian workforce, reacted to the government shutdown in 

the beginning of fiscal year 2014. And as we said to them, trust us. 

We want you to stay with us, this is a burp. And now I watch us 

repeat this kind of scenario where this time it is just significant 

funding cuts. 

One of my concerns is, does our workforce start to believe, you 

know, I am not so sure that there is this long-term commitment, 

and given the skills that I have and the fact that I could make 

more money going elsewhere on the outside. The other concern I 

have, quite frankly, is that we are going to start to see elements 

of our workforce, civilian and potential military, start to walk 

away. And as I said, the technology is incredibly powerful, but the 

greatest edge that we have is our men and women. And when we 

lose them, we have got real problems. 

Ms. STEFANIK. I agree with you, Admiral, and I also share your 

concerns. Particularly from my perspective representing New 

York’s 21st District, home of Fort Drum, but we are also home to 

not only members of the military and service men and women, but 

many Federal employees in the district. So I share your concerns, 

and we are working very hard on this committee to address the 

negative implications of sequestration and these cuts which are so 

devastating to our readiness. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. And thank you very much, 

Congresswoman Stefanik. And Congresswoman Stefanik has been 

a real leader trying to address the issue of defense sequestration. 

We appreciate her extraordinary service. 
20 

Additionally, we appreciate your extraordinary service. And the 

issues that you are dealing with are so important we have another 

round for anyone who would like to participate. 

And for each of you, in your testimony, the military and civilian 

personnel needed for the Cyber Mission Forces were discussed, but 

are there enablers out there in other communities not included in 

the workforce numbers which you rely on significantly? 

How are these enablers faring in the budget? What impact would 

you expect, again, with defense sequestration on these forces? 

And we can begin with the Admiral and proceed. 

Admiral ROGERS. So one of my comments—and I, in fact, just 

raised this to the Joint Chiefs of Staff last week—was to remember 

cyber is much more than just the maneuver elements, the teams, 

if you will, that we are creating, that like every other mission set, 

cyber counts on a core set of enablers that we often tend to take 

for granted. 

So rather than take a lot of time, I will highlight one area to you, 

and that, for example, is the power of intelligence, the fact that we 

rely on a broader intelligence structure to generate knowledge and 

insight about what is going on in our cyber environment and we 

use that insight then to apply this capability we’re generating. 

Without that kind of insight, we have real challenges, as we do 

in every other domain, about how do you maximize the effectiveness of the resources and the capabilities we have generated in this 

maneuver force. 

So I constantly try to remind the broader set of partners that we 

work with in and outside the Department to it is more than just 

this cyber maneuver force here that we need to be thinking about. 

General CARDON. Sir, enablers are really important. Often they 

are in high demand, low density in the Department. There is a lot 

of structures in place to work to prioritization. But it is truly combined arms. But I don’t think we fully understand what we need 

yet. 

And here is what I mean. When I took command, we had two 

teams. Today we have 25. By summer, we will have 41. The demands are growing. And how to best organize the enablers to meet 

all the demands that the teams are generating as the teams grow, 

we are working. We know we need more. To put a finite number 

on that yet I think is a little premature, but it is not what it is 

today. 

Admiral TIGHE. Chairman, I would say that, from the Navy perspective, we are building the teams just like the other service components at places where I have already got commands. So I have 

a command structure where we are growing teams, and there are 

enabling functions associated with growing a large number of military people, you know, personnel, inside of a command, and civilians. 

And so some of those kinds of enabling functions have not, you 

know, really been thought through in terms of how many career 

counselors do you need, how many SAPR [Sexual Assault Prevention and Response] counselors and victim advocates and those kind 

of things. And so certainly, when we added the Cyber Mission 

Force, it was all about that maneuver element. 
21 

But, in some cases, we have placed burdens on commands that 

may not have had sufficient capacity to deal with that growth. And 

so that is an area that we are definitely looking at, where we go 

from here in terms of both the enabling and, as Admiral Rogers 

said, the command and control parts of it. 

General O’DONOHUE. Sir, from the Marine perspective, you 

know, enabling the whole force really is what cyber is. You have 

a certain amount of expertise represented in the specialized skills. 

We have folks down here with the ability of the force to train and 

exercise. 

This comes from the resiliency aspect of it and the idea that 

down to the network operator level or down to the end user, he is 

able to operate in a contested and degraded environment, in fact, 

compromised, and every level of command is integrated at cyber 

less [audio unclear] and not just what is specifically designated as 

a cyber force. 

So one aspect of that is the training exercises that gets a whole 

force and also provides an enabler to the specialists, who are the 

catalysts. But it has to be seen as a comprehensive capability 

across the force and integrated like any other combined arms. 

One help for that is a persistent training environment. This 

helps realistically fight a network without an adversary and enable 

to test the force and build resiliency. Also, it has another effect in 

terms of acquisitions, which is another area, not so much money, 

certainly an acquisition program that is tailored to this new capability that we are developing. 

Within the persistent training environment, you can get the collective skills across the force, but also you can test the vulnerabilities of things that we are going to acquire and bring into it in the 

overall operational context. 

General WILSON. Sir, I would just echo a couple of things and 

add a few. 

One is integrated command and control has been key. We have 

seen that today at the tactical level, if we are able to integrate our 

command and control elements. That has been a challenge because 

we have been resourcing the maneuver element. We have not 

resourced the command and control. So that has been a bit of a 

challenge. But we see that as a key enabler tactically. 

In addition, similar to the Navy, some of the support structure 

was not put in because of some of the sequestration cuts, if that 

stays. And so we have got those laid in in our current budget. So 

if we move back to BCA levels, that may put some stress on the 

support structure. 

The couple things I would add is we see tremendous leverage 

with a Reserve Component. So our Guard and Reserve partners— 

they are conducting the mission every day for a couple of reasons. 

One, we see tremendous talent and unique skill sets that come 

in the door that complement the training that we give them and 

the types of operations we are doing. It also offers our Active Duty 

members that make a decision to leave the service some options on 

continuing to serve by wearing a uniform and coming back in the 

door on a bit limited basis from just a time perspective. But we get 

to retain that talent and the experience. 
22 

So that has been a key enabler for us. We have been doing that 

for years. But we are seeing that magnified in the CMF, the Cyber 

Mission Force. 

I would echo also we really are going through a culture change. 

We have a very—it is a contested, degraded, and potentially operational limited environment. And so that culture of having to operate through that kind of environment is different. And so moving 

the whole force—not just the cyber experts, but everyone—into that 

and through those training exercises and exposing them to that is 

key. 

And then, finally, I would add it is quickly becoming a commander’s business. Just like in industry, we are seeing in a C-suite 

business—CEOs [Chief Executive Officer], COOs [Chief Operating 

Officer], et cetera—it is not just the CIO’s [Chief Information Officer] problem anymore. This is key. To have mission success, this 

has got be to a commander’s business. 

So it is not just the commanders sitting here representing the 

cyber talent, if you will, in each of the services, but the operational 

commanders, and getting them involved in the decision process. 

What we are seeing in the Air Force is my counterparts in the 

other combat-numbered Air Forces are very interested and want to 

understand and want to be part of the solutions. And so we see 

that as a key enabler. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Well, I thank each of you. 

And we now proceed to Congressman Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, thanks to our witnesses. 

I have got a couple of questions. I am hoping to get to at least 

a couple of them. I can’t get through all of them. So I am going 

to go as quickly as I can. 

But going back to, if I could, retaining and recruiting qualified 

military and civilian personnel, obviously, it is critical to addressing the threat. 

So my question is: What challenges do you face in recruitment 

and retention? And, more specifically, how are these challenges 

being addressed? Are special authorities needed? 

For example, are enlistment bonuses, civilian hiring authorities, 

required to address shortfalls in recruitment and retention? And 

what incentives or methods have been used so far effectively to recruit and retain? 

Admiral ROGERS. Let me start and then I will turn it over to my 

counterparts, because the services actually generate the capability, 

if you will, the workforce. 

When I looked across the entire Cyber Mission Force, the positive side to date is that both accessions, input, if you will, across 

all the services is meeting target and retention—knock on wood— 

is actually higher in some ways than we had originally anticipated. 

I think that is because—the thing I try to remind people is we 

are not going to compete on the basis of money. Where we are 

going to compete is the idea of ethos, culture, that, ‘‘You are doing 

something that matters, that you are doing something in the service of the Nation, and that we are going to give you the opportunity 

to do some really interesting and amazing things.’’ I think that is 

how we are going to compete. 
23 

And then I would turn it over to my service teammates for the 

specifics they are running into. 

General CARDON. Sir, to echo Admiral Rogers, we have not experienced problems with recruitment. For example, for our high-end 

operators, we recruited 75 percent of the year in the first quarter 

with no waivers and no bonuses. So there is a tremendous drive 

on this. 

The challenge will be retention. So if I could go down, officers—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How is that going so far on the retention side, 

just broadly. 

General CARDON. Well, we are headed into our first big bow wave 

because we started this about 3, 4 years ago and they are entering 

into the first window. I would say right now it is still unknown. 

But a few indicators gave us the idea that we have to manage 

this as a separate branch, because before we did not count cyber. 

You were part of another branch and you were selected for promotion or leader development opportunities based on your expertise on that branch, not in cyber. Now you will do this with a cyber 

focus. 

We have also recognized we need this same thing for our civilian 

workforce. For the civilian workforce, there is no cyber portion of 

this. So to advance in those, you have to advance where you were 

hired into as opposed to a cyber focus. So we think those will really 

help. We have the right tools with bonuses and all that right now 

to offer them, and the Army is very aggressive on this at this time. 

Admiral TIGHE. I would say that the Navy is in a similarly situated position. As it pertains to recruiting, we have not been having 

any trouble recruiting to the numbers that we needed for all of our 

cyber-type missions. And on the retention side, we are doing very 

well, both officer and enlisted, in retaining the talent that we need. 

We have the tools that everyone else uses in the Navy to 

incentivize any particular ratings that are low on numbers, in particular, pay grades and things like that. We use that. But I agree 

with Admiral Rogers that, in this mission set, it is not about the 

money. It is about the mission. 

And so the best thing that we can do to improve retention in this 

space is give them the training and the tools and put them on mission because they—you know, what I am seeing in our young people and our workforce is very motivated, enthusiastic for the mission. And getting them on mission is the most important thing we 

can do. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am going to hold the—General O’Donohue and 

General Wilson, if you can perhaps respond in writing, especially 

if there is something different that you are experiencing. But I 

wanted to get to the acquisition part. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 102.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me ask: Is the current acquisition model 

adaptive and flexible enough to support cyber technology innovation and rapid utilization of cyberspace capabilities? As you may 

know, the committee is working on acquisition reform right now. 

And do you have recommendations on how to ensure the process 

allows for innovation and rapid acquisition capabilities? 
24 

My other question, which you probably won’t be able to get to, 

is going to be for Admiral Rogers. Are you reviewing allocation of 

resources in terms of—to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements? How do you allocate the resources you need for these Cyber 

Mission Teams? So we can probably do that one for the record. But 

on acquisition. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 101.] 

Admiral ROGERS. So let me start on acquisition. The short answer is no. My argument is we have to change the model we are 

using. The rate of change is such that, within the cyber arena, we 

have got to account for the fact that, as we are developing and acquiring capabilities in the Department, we have got to build into 

that process the idea of regular and recurring update and revision, 

that a set of capabilities that we lock into place and then build to 

over time—let’s say, if you look at what it takes to put a satellite 

into orbit, if you look at what it takes to build a major warship, 

for example, I mean, we are talking 5 to 10 years. And the rate 

of change in the cyber dynamic in 5 to 10 years is just amazing 

to me. 

So we have to build into that program the idea that there will 

be a recurring refreshment rate required. We don’t do that right 

now in the model at all. That is not the way we do business. But 

I think we have to get to that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. We are going through acquisition reform right 

now, and now would be a good time to help us to get this right. 

I know my time has expired. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

And we will proceed now to Congressman Ryan Zinke. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess, as I watch the fleet numbers go down, I get concerned. 

I think we are all concerned. But, also, when the fleet numbers go 

down, we are asking our fleet to do more with less and it is much 

easier for our adversaries to target individual platforms. 

I guess the bottom line is, if further cuts occur, do you feel that 

those cuts could, in fact, put our ships and our fleet that are in 

harm’s way at further risk being unable to detect and defend a 

cyber attack, particularly in the western theater? 

Admiral TIGHE. Congressman, I believe that all of our maritime 

missions, particularly those that are forward, you know, projecting 

power around the globe, are critically dependent on our cyber capabilities. 

And we have spent the last 2 years building programs around 

closing the gaps in vulnerabilities and increasing our operational 

capabilities to assure missions around the globe that maritime 

commanders have to be able to do. 

And so certainly what the actual CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] said during his budget testimony is, if we are held at the 

BCA levels, he would be hard-pressed to recommend to the Secretary that we reduce any of those investments that we have already identified and made as a commitment to our mission assurance based on the cyberspace capabilities. 

But I think, as mentioned earlier, another key aspect of that is 

all of the modernization programs that we have across the board— 
25 

aircraft, submarines, ships, all of those modernization programs— 

tend to upgrade systems that are dependent on operating systems. 

And when things like sequestration hits or we have a late budget, you know, getting to our acquisitions system, it ends up throwing a monkey wrench in the modernization plans. Those modernization plans are very critical to closing vulnerabilities. 

So even beyond what we would call strict cyber investments, our 

acquisition process and focus on ensuring that our programs are 

not delivering vulnerable systems across the board—not just networks, but across the board—is contingent on those modernization 

programs going forward. So, yes, it certainly puts at risk not just 

the capability, but the overall mission, command and control, of 

Navy capabilities around the globe. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Congressman 

Zinke. 

We now proceed to Congressman Jim Cooper of Tennessee. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Within the last 2 weeks, I think it was publicized that Lenovo 

computer company shipped laptops already equipped with malware 

called Spear Phishing or something. 

Isn’t that kind of amazing, that a brand-new laptop would already be essentially booby-trapped that way? 

Admiral ROGERS. Quite frankly, no. 

Mr. COOPER. That is not amazing? 

Admiral ROGERS. Again, because what I generally find over time 

is—for example, most of the equipments and the capabilities that 

we will bring onboard as a Department, we don’t automatically assume that it is perfectly secure. We have a series of tests and processes that we go through. 

I am not trying to imply it is for nefarious reasons. Many times 

we will find that, from the time it takes to actually generate and 

build the capacity to the time it is actually fielded, for example, you 

will find vulnerabilities. 

For example, if you have look at Heartbleed, probably the largest 

vulnerability we had over the course of the summer, was based on 

coding from the 1980s. You find these challenges. This is not 

unique to the nature of the cyber arena, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. Someone estimated—and I hope it is unduly pessimistic—that almost 95 percent of government IT [information technology] acquisitions were flawed or deeply flawed in some way. 

Are you able at NSA [National Security Agency] to make sure 

you have clean equipment when you buy it? 

Admiral ROGERS. NSA is part of a broader team that helps work 

information assurance for the Department. Having said that, the 

service has the overall responsibility for the manned, trained, and 

equipped functions for their service and broadly for the Department. But we do it as part of a broader team. 

Mr. COOPER. But for your own NSA operation, you are able to 

make sure that all your computers are clean? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. We spend a lot of time—as every organization does, we spend a lot of time making sure that we don’t have 
26 

vulnerabilities in the systems that we are counting on to execute 

our mission. 

Mr. COOPER. That would include system administrators like Mr. 

Snowden? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. Clearly it is not a perfect system. You will 

never hear me say that, if that is the point we are trying to make. 

You will never hear me say that. 

Mr. COOPER. What is good enough for government work? What 

is clean enough to be safe? 

Admiral ROGERS. I don’t know that there is a particular number 

that I could give you. It all boils down to what is the level of risk 

that we are comfortable with, what are the different processes that 

we can put in place to try to mitigate that. There is no single silver 

bullet here, as it were. 

Mr. COOPER. It is risk for virtually every chip to be made overseas? 

Admiral ROGERS. There is clearly an aspect of risk to it. I think 

that is a fair statement. 

Mr. COOPER. Is it worth mitigating that risk by having more domestic manufacturers? 

Admiral ROGERS. You know, clearly within the Department, we 

try to take a look at that. One of the ways we do it is we try to 

tier some of our systems, if you will. And the standard, for example, that we will use within the nuclear infrastructure is different 

than the infrastructure we will use for the systems we use for morale, welfare, and recreation functions within the Department. 

Mr. COOPER. But a back door can come in from virtually anywhere. The Target hack was mainly the HVAC [heating, ventilation, air conditioning] contractor. Right? 

Admiral ROGERS. So is it possible? Yes. There is no doubt about 

that. 

Mr. COOPER. I don’t know how many transistors are in a phone 

like this or chips or whatever like that, but it is surely a large 

number. 

Admiral ROGERS. It is a complex operating system. 

Mr. COOPER. So since everyone carries their own supercomputer 

with them, is anyone smart enough to figure out the hardware/software interface, even assuming that the hardware is perfect and 

clean and inviolable or—— 

Admiral ROGERS. Well, the way I put it is, hey, if it is designed 

by man, man is a flawed individual. And the idea that you are 

going to create something perfect in which you guarantee that 

there is no ability to penetrate is highly unlikely, which is why in 

the Department we do things like defense in depth, multiple looks 

at the same piece of gear many times. 

We try to account for the fact that a single solution—whether it 

be technical, ‘‘Hey, I can create the perfect system,’’ whether it is, 

‘‘Hey, I can control my workforce and guarantee I am not going to 

have any issues,’’ we try to use multiple layers. 

Mr. COOPER. I guess I am still trying to get at the question of 

good enough for government work. When are we safe? When have 

we done enough of that? Do you have to red-team everything? Do 

you have to practice your operation without using computers? How 

do we—— 
27 

Admiral ROGERS. I think the answer is yes, we try to do all of 

that. You have heard today already we talk about the idea about, 

for example, how are we going to operate hurt within the Department. 

I think the reality of the world around us is, at least on the military dimension, it is not in our best interest to assume we will always have perfect connectivity, that we will never have any issues, 

we will never have any degradation. Far from it. I think quite the 

opposite, given the nature of the world that we are dealing with 

today. We have to think about how we are going to fight through 

things. 

Mr. COOPER. Should the Defense Committee be doing more to 

help? 

Admiral ROGERS. Well, I can use all the partners that we can get 

in this. Because no one single entity here is going to have all the 

answers to this, which is one reason why, if you look at the resource piece that the Congress holds here, the legal frameworks 

that we talk about, you clearly have an important role to play in 

all this. It won’t be just us. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, I hope you won’t be shy about asking. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

As we conclude, I want to thank each of you. And it has to be 

reassuring to the American people to see such dedicated personnel. 

So thank you very much for your service on behalf of our country. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 4, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 4, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 4, 2015 

(101) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Admiral ROGERS. In December 2012, the Department determined its initial set of 

resources required to man, train and equip of Cyber Mission Forces (CMF) based 

on operational requirements defined by the Joint Staff in coordination with the 

Combatant Commands and U. S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Based on those 

requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated a major investment in its 

cyber personnel and technologies for the Cyber Mission Force in 2013. 

From the initial 2012 assessment, the Services were required to meet the man, 

train and equip 133 teams with various levels of involvement using the traditional 

equitable allocation model (Army 30%, Air Force 30%, Navy 30%, Marine Corps 

10%) with all teams being fully resourced by Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Specifically, 

Army is to provide 41 teams, Air Force is to provide 39 teams, Navy is to provide 

40 teams, and Marine Corps is to provide 13 teams. The Department also included 

integration of Reserve and National Guard personnel in the Cyber Mission Force 

(primarily as protection forces and surge support) as described in its August 29, 

2014 report to Congress in response to FY14 NDAA Section 933 (d). USCYBERCOM 

looks forward to completion of the Department’s effort to fully resource the required 

command and control structure approved in 2013 by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. 

Based on Combatant Commanders’ requirements expressed in approved plans and 

prioritized effects lists, the initial mission assessment included distribution of combat mission teams to Combatant Commands (CCMDs) under each of the Service allocations. The initial distribution was re-examined in late 2013 and an alignment 

adjustment was made to two teams to account for certain increased cyber activity 

within the 133 team ceiling. Current plans are to complete the build out of the CMF 

and, once the 133 teams have reached full operational capability (FOC), reassess the 

force structure to determine what (if anything) should be adjusted based on lessons 

learned. Additionally, as described in The DOD Cyber Strategy, USCYBERCOM 

continues to work with Joint Staff to integrate cyber requirements into combatant 

command plans and may reassess allocation of the CMF based on the results of 

these activities. 

With regards to training, USCYBERCOM published the joint training and certification standards for the Services to follow to ensure consistent training of individuals and teams. While the Department works to develop an enduring Persistent 

Training Environment (PTE) for the cyber force, USCYBERCOM expanded its joint 

training exercises (e.g. Cyber Knight, Cyber Guard, and Cyber Flag) to increase certain capability and capacity to help Service personnel and teams obtain the training 

required and complete the exercises needed for teams to reach FOC. 

USCYBERCOM will continue to monitor the readiness of the Cyber Mission Force 

as the Department integrates the CMF into its overall planning and force development activities to recruit, retain, and provide appropriately trained cyber personnel. 

When it comes to equipping the force, CMF team needs are based on operational 

requirements that were initially established at the beginning of the team build outs 

and continue to evolve or expand as current real world involvement dictates. As described in The DOD Cyber Strategy, USCYBERCOM is working with the Department to develop a Unified Platform that will integrate and establish interoperability 

between disparate platforms. The Unified Platform will enable the CMF to conduct 

full-spectrum cyberspace operations in support of national requirements. As cyberspace requirements evolve and expand, the pace to equip the CMF is constrained 

by the deliberate processes within the acquisition system. The speed in which 

USCYBERCOM needs the CMF to be equipped with certain capabilities continues 

to stress the Department’s acquisition system built primarily to reduce risks in developing aircraft, ships, and land vehicles and/or oversee major enterprise-wide Information Technology programs where acquisitions occur over a period of years. The 

pace in which cyber events unfold and adversaries adapt their cyber actions require 

an agile acquisition system and related acquisition authorities that enable rapid development and fielding of military cyberspace capabilities where USCYBERCOM 

and combatant command requirements are met in a period of days, weeks, or 

months. [See page 24.] 
102 

General O’DONOHUE. The Air Force continues to meet all accession requirements 

within the cyber community with highly qualified individuals. To assist with recruiting highly qualified candidates within the cyber community, the Air Force offers Initial Enlistment Bonuses for members enlisting in one of four cyber specialty 

fields. The member must possess Security+ and/or A+ certification prior to enlistment and enlist for 6 years to be eligible for the bonus and receive an advance promotion to Airman First Class upon completion of specialty training. 

In terms of retention, our legacy enlisted cyber support specialties retain slightly 

better than the Air Force average. However, given the relative infancy of some of 

our core cyber operations specialties (half of our enlisted specialties are less than 

five years old and we created a separate officer sub-specialty within the past year), 

we lack sufficient retention history in cyber operations. As first tour enlistments 

continue to expire over the next couple of years, we will have a better understanding of longer-term Airmen retention behavior. 

Regardless of retention, we continue to be challenged in our newer cyber specialties due to the rapid growth in requirements, which exceeds our trained personnel 

inventory. It is crucial that we retain our cyber professionals to help close the current manning gaps. As noted, on the enlisted side, we have made concerted efforts 

to increase accessions and pay retention bonuses where these challenges are most 

acute. For officers, we are currently exploring how we can leverage the Critical 

Skills Retention Bonus to retain cyber leaders. Continued Congressional support for 

all of our special and incentive pays aimed at recruiting and retaining cyber operations airmen is appreciated. We will continue to monitor and assess but it is clear 

that retaining these professionals is essential. [See page 23.] 

General WILSON. Currently, we are not experiencing any major issues in recruiting or retention. While we are competing within DOD, as well as within industry, 

for top talent, we have a number of advantages. Some of these advantages will only 

appeal to a small segment of people, but that is all we need. Each Service, or industry for that matter, has advantages and many of these will only appeal to certain 

people, and that diversity helps us all. Our civilian salary and annual bonuses may 

not measure up to what industry can offer for a more skilled and highly trained 

individual. For the civilian Information Technology (IT) personnel, we have limited 

monetary incentives that can be offered. What we see more than often is our cyber 

civilian positions offer a way for talented Marines that have trained and grown up 

in this domain, with hands on experience, but are leaving the service for various 

reasons; from family, to career, to retirement, a way to stay associated with the Marine Corps. They continue to be a part of the Marine Corps team and gain the stability (in terms of position and PCS moves) or flexibility that can be offered by a 

civilian position, and so these Marines apply for and earn these positions. We have 

a number of civilian personnel from other services as well, they too leave their service for some of the same reasons and apply to our civilian positions for similar reasons, and they are still associated with the military, but get to choose where they 

live and work. Sometimes our applicants have a desire to serve the military, but 

for various reasons were unable to in the past or now cannot be in the active duty 

component, so they apply to our positions. As for the Active Duty Marines, especially some of our younger Marines, see cyberspace as a new and exciting domain. 

We generally have more Marines wanting to come to MARFORCYBER than we 

have space. The younger Marines have been raised in this domain more than the 

past generations and for them, continuing to fight our enemies in a domain they 

are already comfortable with is something they are seeking. Additionally, once they 

arrive, they receive advanced training and the hands on experience that goes with 

work. The Marines see cyberspace as the future and want to be a part of it. Some 

will decide to get out, and as we stated above, some will get out but want to come 

back on as a civilian. Some go to industry and wish to keep that link to the Marine 

Corps, so they transition to the reserve component, bringing their industry experience back to the Marine Corps when it is needed and continue to build that knowledge and experience in both realms. Others will stay as long as the service allows 

them to continue to see this domain grow and mature. [See page 23.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 4, 2015 

(105) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. Several of you mentioned in your testimony something called Unified 

Platform? What is Unified Platform, and what capabilities will it provide for you? 

Will there be service-unique capabilities that you believe will be integrated in? From 

an acquisition perspective, how do you plan to proceed? Do you need any special acquisition authority or a special acquisition process in order to develop Unified Platform in a timeframe that will be useful for the cyber mission forces? How are you 

working with your service laboratories and program offices to develop the capabilities you will need as part of this initiative? 

Admiral ROGERS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WILSON. What role, if any, do you see the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center playing in your day to day operations? 

Admiral ROGERS. [The information referred to is for official use only and retained 

in the committee files.] 

Mr. WILSON. Do you have adequate all-source and multi-intelligence fusion and 

analysis capabilities for cyber to support the cyber mission teams we are building? 

Admiral ROGERS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. WILSON. Several of you mentioned in your testimony something called Unified 

Platform? What is Unified Platform, and what capabilities will it provide for you? 

Will there be service-unique capabilities that you believe will be integrated in? How 

are you working with your service laboratories and program offices to develop the 

capabilities you will need as part of this initiative? From an acquisition perspective, 

how do you plan to proceed? Do you need any special acquisition authority or a special acquisition process in order to develop Unified Platform in a timeframe that will 

be useful for the cyber mission forces? 

General CARDON. The Unified Platform (UP) is USCYBERCOM’s joint, unifying 

vision for full-spectrum cyberspace operations that in concept will provide the Cyber 

Mission Force the ability to seamlessly integrate defensive and offensive operations. 

In its essence UP is a network of computers, servers, data storage, and analytic capabilities leveraged to maneuver in and out of red space (adversary assets), and an 

access capability to enter the desired red space. It provides a suite of capabilities 

to actively defend our network and to project power in and through cyberspace if 

called upon to do so. While inherently Joint, the intent is that Service presented 

capabilities can be integrated into a common framework for Joint C2 and execution. 

While USCYBERCOM’s UP vision is driving current and future investments within 

the service laboratories and program offices, several ongoing pilot efforts are further 

refining the development of specific requirements. Additionally, through the distribution of a small amount of USCC RDT&E funding we have been able to further 

the development of emerging technologies and concepts critical to what the Army 

would present in a Unified Platform construct. These efforts are informing the development of requirements in line with the agile requirements validation and acquisition models currently afforded by updated JCIDS and Defense Acquisition System. 

Mr. WILSON. Several of you mentioned in your testimony something called Unified 

Platform? What is Unified Platform, and what capabilities will it provide for you? 

Will there be service-unique capabilities that you believe will be integrated in? From 

an acquisition perspective, how do you plan to proceed? Do you need any special acquisition authority or a special acquisition process in order to develop Unified Platform in a timeframe that will be useful for the cyber mission forces? How are you 

working with your service laboratories and program offices to develop the capabilities you will need as part of this initiative? 

Admiral TIGHE. The Unified Platform is a planned Department of Defense cyberspace operations platform that will enable the Cyber Mission Force to conduct full 

spectrum Cyberspace operations. The Unified Platform is important in enabling 

Cyberspace operations approved by the President and directed by the Secretary of 

Defense to support National and Department of Defense policy objectives in disrupting and denying adversary operations that threaten U.S. interests. It will provide the Navy Cyber Mission Forces an integrated capability that is synchronized 

with Joint combat operations across multiple geographic Combatant Commanders’ 

AORs. Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. TENTH Fleet, through its re-
106 

search and development arm, the Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group, is coordinating development and acquisition with service laboratories, industry, and 

Commander, U.S. Cyber Command. 

Mr. WILSON. Several of you mentioned in your testimony something called Unified 

Platform? What is Unified Platform, and what capabilities will it provide for you? 

Will there be service-unique capabilities that you believe will be integrated in? From 

an acquisition perspective, how do you plan to proceed? Do you need any special acquisition authority or a special acquisition process in order to develop Unified Platform in a timeframe that will be useful for the cyber mission forces? How are you 

working with your service laboratories and program offices to develop the capabilities you will need as part of this initiative? 

General O’DONOHUE. Unified Platform is expected to be an operationally responsive infrastructure designed to improve information fusion into an effective, integrated approach that leverages developing cohesive solutions, a single architecture, 

and reduced infrastructure. 

A more detailed explanation will be provided to the Committee by separate correspondence. 

Mr. WILSON. Several of you mentioned in your testimony something called Unified 

Platform? What is Unified Platform, and what capabilities will it provide for you? 

Will there be service-unique capabilities that you believe will be integrated in? From 

an acquisition perspective, how do you plan to proceed? Do you need any special acquisition authority or a special acquisition process in order to develop Unified Platform in a timeframe that will be useful for the cyber mission forces? How are you 

working with your service laboratories and program offices to develop the capabilities you will need as part of this initiative? 

General WILSON. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ASHFORD 

Mr. ASHFORD. Is there a role for USCYBERCOM in combating Islamic extremist 

propaganda and online recruiting? 

Admiral ROGERS. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ASHFORD. What role does the Reserve Component have in CYBERCOM’s 

manning construct? 

Admiral ROGERS. As part of its USCYBERCOM Cyber Mission Force (CMF), in 

addition to Air Force Reserve Cyber Personnel that support various staffs and units, 

the Air Force has tasked the Air National Guard to fulfill the requirements for two 

full time Cyber Protection Teams and the cyber operations element of one National 

Mission Team. These teams will be mobilized from fifteen Cyber Operations Squadrons either already in existence or being stood up. The Navy and Marine Reserves 

participation is based on individual augmentation to shortfalls in their parent service. Army Reserve Component teams are being built to support Army Service capability apart from USCYBERCOM’s CMF. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Do we need more cyber capacity in Guard and Reserve units? Do 

you believe we need to have cyber-focused units in each of the States? 

Admiral ROGERS.The question of whether or not to have capability within each 

State is a resourcing issue. The current resources allocated to USCYBERCOM require them to continue to be focused on training the nearly 6,200 Cyber warriors 

assigned to the Cyber Mission Force. Cyber Security is a team effort. Although it 

might be beneficial to have a DOD Cyber trained capability within each State, in 

today’s fiscal environment, difficult fiscal conditions have USCYBERCOM focusing 

on building the approved 133 teams. 

Mr. ASHFORD. What role does the Reserve Component have in CYBERCOM’s 

manning construct? 

General CARDON. The Army and Army Cyber Command, as the Army’s service 

component to U.S. Cyber Command, continue to build a Total Army approach for 

our cyber forces that will include 21 Reserve Component Cyber Protection Teams. 

These teams will be trained to the same joint standards as the Active Component 

cyber force. The Army’s plan includes one Army National Guard cyber protection 

team currently serving on Active Status, 10 Army National Guard cyber protection 

teams and 10 United States Army Reserve cyber protection teams that are essential 

components of the Total Army cyber force. 

The Army Reserve Cyber Operations Group conducts Defensive Cyberspace Operations support and provides Department of Defense Information Network operations 

and Computer Network Defense Service Provider support to the Southwest Asia 

Cyber Center. 
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United States Army Reserve provides U.S. Cyber Command with cyberspace planners, an intelligence fusion cell, and joint personnel. 

The Virginia Army National Guard Data Processing Unit conducts cyberspace operations in support of U.S. Cyber Command. 

The United States Army Reserve Military Intelligence Readiness Command, 

which will transition to the Army Reserve Intelligence Support to Cyberspace Operations Element, provides intelligence support and analysis products to U.S. Cyber 

Command. 

United States Army Reserve personnel serve within the Army’s Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber to execute joint cyberspace operations for U.S. Cyber Command. 

The United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are integral to 

the Total Army approach to cyberspace operations. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Do we need more cyber capacity in Guard and Reserve units? Do 

you believe we need to have cyber-focused units in each of the States? 

General CARDON. Approximately 2,000 Army National Guard (ARNG) and United 

States Army Reserve (USAR) personnel are or will be trained and equipped to the 

same joint standards as the Active Component cyber force. Army Cyber Command 

and Second Army assess that the plan for 11 Army National Guard and 10 United 

States Army Cyber Protection Teams, and the current and planned additional Reserve Component Cyber elements (which include the Army Reserve cyber Operations Group, Military Intelligence Readiness Command/Army Reserve Intelligence 

Support to Cyberspace Operations Element, Virginia Army National Guard Data 

Processing Unit, U.S. Cyber Command Army Reserve Element, and the Army Joint 

Force Headquarters-Cyber Reserve Component augmentation) do and will provide 

adequate Cyberspace capacity to the Total Cyber force through FY 2018. 

As these United States Army Reserve and Army National Guard units become 

fully manned, trained, and equipped, we will continue our assessment to determine 

the right number and mix of cyber capacity for the United States Army Reserve, 

Army National Guard, and Active units. 

Mr. ASHFORD. What role does the Reserve Component have in CYBERCOM’s 

manning construct? 

Admiral TIGHE. Navy has realigned 298 enlisted Reserve billets that will be 

phased in between FY2015 and FY2018 to directly support Navy Cyber Mission 

Forces. Of the 298 billets, 280 are assigned seven each to the Navy’s 40 CMF teams, 

with the remaining 18 assigned directly to the Joint Forces Headquarters-Fleet 

Cyber staff at U.S. Fleet Cyber Command. The seven billets assigned to each team 

serve in an augmentation role allowing the teams to capitalize on the specific cyberrelated expertise of individuals in these billets. Under this construct, the Navy CMF 

teams are afforded an opportunity to maximize their operational capabilities 

through the employment of Reserve cyber experts, many of whom possess very specific skillsets and knowledge via their civilian careers and training. This ‘‘augmentation’’ construct further allows the Navy to efficiently secure a highly proficient and 

flexible CMF cadre irrespective of budgetary limits and the constraints of the normal Active Component CMF training pipeline. 

Seven enlisted Reserve billets have been realigned to Navy Information Dominance Forces (NAVIDFOR) Command to support its cyber inspection requirements. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Do we need more cyber capacity in Guard and Reserve units? Do 

you believe we need to have cyber-focused units in each of the States? 

Admiral TIGHE. Through ongoing mission analysis of the Navy Total Force Integration Strategy, we developed a Reserve Cyber Mission Force (CMF) Integration 

Strategy that leverages our Reserve Sailors’ skill sets and expertise to maximize the 

Reserve Component’s support to the full spectrum of Cyber mission areas. Within 

this strategy, the 298 Reserve billets, which are phasing into service from FY15 

through FY18, will be individually aligned to Active Duty CMF teams and the Joint 

Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ–C). Accordingly, each Navy Reservist assigned to 

a CMF billet provides operational support to the team’s respective operational commander, including Fleet Commanders, US Pacific Command, US Southern Command, US Cyber Command, and DOD/Defense Information Security Agency. As the 

Navy builds its Reserve CMF support structure, Fleet Cyber Command and TENTH 

Fleet conduct ongoing assessments to maximize the Reserve Force’s support to CMF 

operational objectives. 

These ongoing assessments look at both the size as well as the location within 

the Navy’s geographic footprint. Navy Reserve cyber assets (CMF billets), which are 

governed under Title 10 authorities, are located with their respective Active Component team. They are currently assigned to eight of the Navy Information Operations 

Command (NIOC) centers, which are located in Maryland, Norfolk, Georgia, Florida, 

Texas, California, Hawaii and Japan. (The Navy does not possess any Title 32 authorities or personnel.) 
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Mr. ASHFORD. What role does the Reserve Component have in CYBERCOM’s 

manning construct? 

General O’DONOHUE. For the Marine Corps we currently provide reserve component augmentation to the MARFORCYBER headquarters and to the Marine Corps 

Network Operations and Support Center. There is the potential to use the reserve 

component in less time-sensitive roles to augment the active component. We do not 

currently have plans for a reserve component role in the cyber mission force in the 

near term. We are reviewing options for individual augmentation where appropriate; however few in the reserve component possess the required high demand/low 

density military occupational specialties which limits options for any degree of incorporation into the teams. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Do we need more cyber capacity in Guard and Reserve units? Do 

you believe we need to have cyber-focused units in each of the States? 

General O’DONOHUE. The Marine Corps has not identified a surge capacity required for the role of reserve augmentation to the active component beyond the current augmentation levels. Additionally, maintaining the required skills that are required would be difficult given the limited time to train available to the reserve 

component. We do not provide Guard units. 

Mr. ASHFORD. What role does the Reserve Component have in CYBERCOM’s 

manning construct? 

General WILSON. The reserve component manning within USCYBERCOM is currently limited to Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) in support of the subunified command mission. 

AFCYBER/24 AF/JFHQ–C is has fully partnered with the Air Reserve Component 

as part of its current and future build-up of cyber operations, to support the Air 

Force’s cyber mission and the DOD’s Cyber Mission Force (CMF). 

From the outset, the Air Reserve Component, in support of AFCYBER, has been 

integrated into the Cyber Mission Force build-up of 39 teams. To meet the demand 

signal of the CMF construct, the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) is standing 

up one Classic Associate Unit in FY16, integrating into a Regular Air Force Cyber 

Protection Team (CPT) squadron, providing steady-state capacity of one CPT or 30% 

day-to-day mission share. If mobilized, it will be able to provide manning for three 

CPTs in a surge capacity. 

In addition to the team build in the CMF, the AFRC supports numerous other 

cyber missions under the 960th Cyberspace Operations Group. The 960 CyOG is 

comprised of nine squadrons. These units defend the Air Force Networks and key 

mission systems, train personnel, develop new weapon systems and tools, and provide command and control of cyber operations. In addition to the 960 CyOG, there 

are Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) under the AFCYBER/24 AF/JFHQ– 

C that support various cyber missions. 

Between FY16–FY18, the Air National Guard (ANG) is building 12 unit-equipped 

squadrons to sustain two steady-state CPTs, with each organized into the 30/70 fulltime/part-time ratio. The ANG is also standing up a National Mission Team (NMT) 

unit in FY16. These units will align under two ANG Cyberspace Operations Groups. 

In addition to the build-up within the CMF Teams, the Air National Guard support to cyber operations includes five cyber units. These units support Defensive 

Cyber Operations and Command & Control. Additionally, the Air Guard has one of 

only three of the Network Operations Squadrons in the Air Force. 

Finally, the Air Reserve Component plays a significant role in our Engineering 

and Installation and Combat Communications. There are 38 AFRC and ANG units 

supporting these missions and in the last 2 years the Air Reserve Component deployed over 800 personnel supporting the warfighter with these capabilities. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Do we need more cyber capacity in Guard and Reserve units? Do 

you believe we need to have cyber-focused units in each of the States? 

General WILSON. TThe Air Force is wholly committed to Total Force Integration 

across the full spectrum of cyberspace operations. The Air Reserve Component is a 

full partner in the Cyber Mission Force build in addition to our other day-to-day 

cyber operations. We are leveraging Traditional Reservists, Air Reserve Technicians 

and Air National Guardsmen throughout the command to meet our warfighting 

commitments. Whether it’s commanding and controlling cyber forces from one of our 

operations centers, deploying as part of our Combat Communications team, installing cyber infrastructure around the world, or any other task, each of our Total Force 

members meets the same demanding standards and serve alongside their Active 

Duty counterparts. 

Today, the Air Reserve Component provides approximately 9,000 personnel to 

support the Air Force’s cyber missions. The majority of the personnel support the 

Combat Communications and Engineering & Installation missions. An additional 

1,300 will be added to support the DOD’s Cyber Mission Force. We believe growth 
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in the Air Reserve Component is an effective and efficient option to reduce risk and 

meet Combatant and Air Component Commander’s requirements as the demand for 

cyber capabilities increases. 

It’s important to remember operations in the cyberspace domain are not constrained by physical geography. Similar to traditional air operations, the Air Force 

has few needs that demand a force distribution model across the 54 states and territories. Cyber missions are a case in point. We understand the National Guard Bureau is also considering the cyber requirement for each of the Governors. One of the 

force structure strategies under consideration is the alignment of Army and Air National Guard units by FEMA region with the appropriate inter-state support agreements. 

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