_____________

No. 95-1803WM

_____________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* On Appeal from the United

v. * States District Court

* for the Western District

* of Missouri.

Regina Rene Dinwiddie, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: November 13, 1995

 Filed: February 16, 1996

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, BRIGHT and FAGG, Circuit

Judges.

___________

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

Regina Rene Dinwiddie appeals from the District Court's order

finding that she violated the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances

Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248 ("FACE"). The order prohibits Mrs.

Dinwiddie from further violating FACE and from engaging in a number

of other activities whenever she is within 500 feet of a facility

that provides reproductive-health services. See United States v.

Dinwiddie, 885 F. Supp. 1286 (W.D. Mo. 1995). We affirm the

District Court's holding that FACE is constitutional and that Mrs.

Dinwiddie violated FACE, but remand to the District Court with

instructions to modify the injunction.
 1

FACE also provides penalties against anyone who:

(2) by force or threat of force or by physical

obstruction, intentionally injures,

intimidates or interferes with or attempts to

injure, intimidate or interfere with any

person lawfully exercising or seeking to

exercise the First Amendment right of

religious freedom at a place of religious

worship; or

(3) intentionally damages or destroys the

property of a facility, or attempts to do so,

because such facility provides reproductive

health services, or intentionally damages or

destroys the property of a place of religious

worship.

18 U.S.C. § 248(a). 

FACE contains the following definitions:

(1) Facility.--The term "facility" includes a

hospital, clinic, physician's office, or other

facility that provides reproductive health

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I.

Regina Rene Dinwiddie is an opponent of abortion who, for many

years, has protested outside of Planned Parenthood of Greater

Kansas City ("Planned Parenthood"), a clinic where abortions are

performed. The government filed a complaint against Mrs.

Dinwiddie, alleging that she violated the Freedom of Access to

Clinic Entrances Act, which provides criminal and civil penalties

against anyone who:

by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction,

intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or

attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any

person because that person is or has been, or in order to

intimidate such person or any other person or any class

of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive

health services.

18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1).1 The District Court concluded that Mrs.
services, and includes the building or

structure in which the facility is located.

(2) Interfere with.--The term "interfere with"

means to restrict a person's freedom of movement.

(3) Intimidate.--The term "intimidate" means to

place a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily

harm to him- or herself or to another.

(4) Physical obstruction.--The term "physical

obstruction" means rendering impassable ingress to

or egress from a facility that provides

reproductive health services or to or from a place

of religious worship, or rendering passage to or

from such a facility or place of religious worship

unreasonably difficult or hazardous.

(5) Reproductive health services.--The term

"reproductive health services" means

reproductive health services provided in a

hospital, clinic, physician's office, or other

facility, and includes medical, surgical,

counselling or referral services relating to

the human reproductive system, including

services relating to pregnancy or the

termination of a pregnancy.

18 U.S.C. § 248(e).

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Dinwiddie violated FACE by obstructing, using physical force

against, and threatening to use physical force against a number of

Planned Parenthood's patients and members of its staff.

The Court found that Mrs. Dinwiddie directed particularly

pointed threats at Dr. Robert Crist, a physician who is the Medical

Director of Planned Parenthood. Over a six- to eight-month period

beginning in mid-1994, the defendant made approximately 50 comments

to Dr. Crist, often through a bullhorn, warning "Robert, remember

Dr. Gunn [a physician who was killed in 1993 by an opponent of

abortion] . . .. This could happen to you . . .. He is not in the

world anymore . . .. Whoever sheds man's blood, by man his blood

shall be shed . . .." 
 2

Mrs. Dinwiddie signed a petition defending Michael Griffin,

who was convicted of killing Dr. David Gunn. In part, the petition

states:

We, the undersigned, declare the justice of taking all

godly action necessary to defend innocent human life

including the use of force. We proclaim that whatever

force is legitimate to defend the life of a born child is

legitimate to defend the life of an unborn child. We

assert that if Michael Griffin did in fact kill David

Gunn, his use of lethal force was justifiable provided it

was carried out for defending the lives of unborn

children.

-4-

The District Court also determined that Mrs. Dinwiddie

threatened and, on one occasion, used physical force against other

members of Planned Parenthood's staff and some of its patients. On

January 28, 1994, the defendant said to Patricia Brous, the

Executive Director of Planned Parenthood, "Patty, you have not seen

violence yet until you see what we do to you." According to Ms.

Brous, whose testimony the Court found credible, "the words that

have been thrown, through the bullhorn or otherwise, at staff and

patients have become much more violent. There is a higher level of

stress. We have had to have counselors deal with stress among the

staff." On July 28, 1994, Mrs. Dinwiddie physically assaulted

Lenard Venable, a Maintenance Supervisor at Planned Parenthood,

with an electric bullhorn. Also, she physically obstructed

potential patients from entering the clinic.

Dr. Crist, Ms. Brous, and other members of Planned

Parenthood's staff testified that Mrs. Dinwiddie's conduct has

caused them to fear for their personal safety. Dr. Crist stated

that because of his fear of the defendant, he now wears a bulletproof vest. Planned Parenthood has responded to Mrs. Dinwiddie by

placing an armed guard at its front door. 

Finally, the District Court noted that Mrs. Dinwiddie is a

well-known advocate of the viewpoint that it is appropriate to use

lethal force to prevent a doctor from performing abortions.2
Mrs. Dinwiddie has expressed similar sentiments on other

occasions. For instance, on a television program, Mrs. Dinwiddie

was asked whether it is "right to be able to kill a doctor to save

that unborn child." She responded: "I think that abortion is a

violent, violent business and that violence begets violence. The

Scriptures say that if you live by the sword, you die by the

sword." Such statements are protected under the First Amendment,

but they may also be relevant to show that other statements could

reasonably be understood as threats of physical harm.

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Citing this viewpoint and Mrs. Dinwiddie's conduct towards Planned

Parenthood's staff and patients, the Court determined that the

defendant is likely to continue to violate FACE and is an imminent

threat to public safety. 

The District Court issued a permanent injunction that orders

Mrs. Dinwiddie not to violate FACE and "not [to] be physically

located within 500 feet of the entrance of any facility (a `buffer

zone') in the United States that provides reproductive health

services as contemplated by [FACE]." 885 F. Supp. at 1296. There

is an exception to this 500-foot buffer zone. Mrs. Dinwiddie may

be "physically located within 500 feet of the entrance of any

facility in the United States that provides reproductive health

services as contemplated by [FACE] solely for the purpose of

engaging in legitimate personal activity that could not be remotely

construed to violate [FACE]." Ibid. The Court then provided

examples of what constitutes "legitimate personal activity":

Legitimate personal activity would include, for example,

activity such as: (1) acquiring routine personal health

services; (2) accompanying an immediate family member who

is both in need of assistance and is acquiring health

services; (3) receiving personal health services in an

emergency situation; (4) shopping at a retail store or

pharmacy adjacent to a reproductive health facility; (5)

travelling within a buffer zone while engaged in activity

unrelated to any service provided by a reproductive

health facility; (6) peacefully carrying a placard in a

manner that would not constitute intimidation,

interference, or physical obstruction; (7) peacefully

distributing literature in a manner that would not

constitute intimidation, interference, or physical
 3

The District Court subsequently found that Mrs. Dinwiddie

violated the permanent injunction and was guilty of civil contempt

of court. United States v. Dinwiddie, 885 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Mo.

1995). The contempt order is not before us on this appeal.

-6-

obstruction; or (8) unamplified speaking in a manner that

would not constitute intimidation, interference, physical

obstruction, or violation of a local noise ordinance.

Legitimate personal activity would not include, for

example, activity that: (1) is described in part III.A.

[i.e. 885 F. Supp. at 1290-94] of this permanent

injunction; (2) constitutes intimidation, physical

obstruction, interference, force, or threats of force;

(3) involves any use whatsoever of a bullhorn, megaphone,

or other sound or voice amplifying device; (4) brings

defendant in violation of any local noise ordinance; or

(5) brings defendant in violation of laws related, but

not limited, to assault, battery, trespass, harassment,

vandalism, disturbing the peace, destruction of property,

or unlawful possession of weapons, when such activity

also has the effect of violating FACE.

Id. at 1296-97.3

Mrs. Dinwiddie raises several arguments on appeal. First, she

argues that FACE is unconstitutional. Second, Mrs. Dinwiddie

asserts that she did not violate FACE. Finally, she claims that

the permanent injunction is vague and overbroad.

II.

Mrs. Dinwiddie contends that FACE is unconstitutional because

Congress lacked the authority to enact FACE and because FACE

violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. We hold

that FACE is within Congress's commerce power and is not facially

inconsistent with the First Amendment. 

A.

The Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o regulate
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Commerce . . . among the several States . . .." U.S. Const., Art.

I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress may use this commerce power: to regulate

the channels of interstate commerce, to regulate or protect the

instrumentalities of interstate commerce or people or things

involved in interstate commerce, and to regulate conduct that has

a substantial effect on interstate commerce. United States v.

Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995). FACE falls within both the

second and third of these categories of commerce power.

1.

The Commerce Clause permits Congress to "protect . . . persons

or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come

only from intrastate activities." Id. at 1629. See Perez v.

United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (Congress may prohibit

thefts from interstate shipments); United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet.

72, 77 (1838) (Congress may punish conduct that "interferes with,

obstructs or prevents" interstate commerce). Thus, if Planned

Parenthood of Greater Kansas City, its staff, or its patients are

"in interstate commerce," FACE's protection of them from Mrs.

Dinwiddie's disruptive activities is a valid exercise of the

commerce power.

Planned Parenthood has a number of patients and staff who do

not reside in Missouri and who, therefore, engage in interstate

commerce when they obtain or provide reproductive-health services.

Substantial numbers of women travel across state lines to obtain

reproductive-health services. S. Rep. No. 117, 103d Cong., 1st

Sess. 13-14, 31 (1993); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,

113 S. Ct. 753, 792 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (between 20

and 30 per cent. of patients at a Virginia abortion clinic were

from outside Virginia, and a majority of a Maryland clinic's

patients were from outside Maryland); Women's Health Care Services

v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258, 266-67 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd

on other grounds, 24 F.3d 107 (10th Cir. 1994) (between 8 and 10
-8-

per cent. of the patients at one Wichita, Kansas, clinic were from

outside of Kansas, and 44 per cent. from another Wichita clinic

were from out of state). The interstate nature of Planned

Parenthood's clientele is particularly evident because Planned

Parenthood is located in a metropolitan area that encompasses more

than one state. Also, some of Planned Parenthood's staff are not

from Missouri. Dr. Crist, for example, resides in Overland Park,

Kansas. 

In addition to having the power to protect those of Planned

Parenthood's staff and patients who are "in interstate commerce,"

Congress also has the power to protect Planned Parenthood. A

business is in interstate commerce when it "directly engage[s] in

the production, distribution, or acquisition of goods or services

in interstate commerce." United States v. American Building

Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975). See United

States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995) (per curiam) (an

Alaskan gold mine that hired seven out-of-state employees and

purchased equipment from an out-of-state supplier was engaged in

interstate commerce and subject to regulation under RICO, a statute

enacted under Congress's commerce power). Because Planned

Parenthood has out-of-state staff and patients, it is "in

interstate commerce" and is within Congress's power to protect.

In sum, FACE's protection of Planned Parenthood and its staff

and patients is a valid exercise of Congress's power to protect

people and businesses involved in interstate commerce. 

2. 

In addition to empowering Congress to protect persons and

things in interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause also gives

Congress the authority to regulate "those activities that

substantially affect interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at

1630 (citations omitted). Under this power, Congress may regulate
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a class of purely intrastate activity if, in the aggregate, the

activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Ibid.;

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258

(1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). Furthermore,

"[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is

within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power `to

excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class." Perez,

402 U.S. at 154 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193

(1968)).

In determining whether the conduct prohibited by FACE had a

substantial effect on interstate commerce, our scope of review is

limited. We must decide "whether a rational basis existed for

concluding that [the] regulated activity sufficiently affected

interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. The House

Judiciary Committee and the Senate Labor and Human Resources

Committee gathered evidence showing that the blockading of clinics

and the use of violence and threats of violence against clinics'

patients and staff depressed interstate commerce in reproductivehealth services. H.R. Rep. No. 306, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9

(1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 699, 705-

06; S. Rep. No. 117, at 31-32. It is settled law that the Commerce

Clause gives Congress the power to regulate activity that

diminishes interstate commerce in a good or service. See, e.g.,

Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1964) (Congress may

regulate discrimination in restaurant services because, among other

things, this discrimination reduces the amount of food purchased by

restaurants); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29 (the growing of wheat for

home consumption reduces wheat sales and is, therefore, within the

commerce power). Thus, there is a rational basis for concluding

that the conduct prohibited by FACE substantially affects

interstate commerce.

Mrs. Dinwiddie advances two arguments against this line of

reasoning. Her first argument is drawn from United States v.
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Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995), rev'd, No. 95-1871, 1995

WL 765450 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 1995), which, though it has now been

reversed, is the only opinion holding that FACE is not within

Congress's commerce power. In Wilson, the district court reasoned

that FACE is unconstitutional because "FACE does not regulate

commercial entities, but rather regulates private conduct affecting

commercial entities which in turn receive goods that have traveled

in interstate commerce." Id. at 628. We disagree. As the Seventh

Circuit explained, "[t]here is no authority for the proposition

that Congress's power extends only to the regulation of commercial

entities." Wilson, 1995 WL 765450 at *9. See, e.g., National

Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803-06

(1994) (racketeering activity by a non-commercial enterprise can

have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce so as to be

punishable under RICO, a statute based on the Commerce Clause);

Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) (the Hobbs Act,

which provides criminal and civil penalties against anyone who "in

any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the

movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or

extortion . . . or [by] commit[ting] or threaten[ing] physical

violence to any person or property . . .," 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), is

within Congress's commerce power).

Next, Mrs. Dinwiddie asserts that holding FACE to be within

Congress's commerce power would be inconsistent with United States

v. Lopez, the Supreme Court's most recent decision interpreting the

Commerce Clause. In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the GunFree School Zones Act, which prohibited possession of a firearm in

the vicinity of a school, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), was not a

valid exercise of Congress's commerce power. The government had

asserted that the possession of a gun in a school zone leads to

lower national productivity and, thus, less interstate commerce.

The Court rejected this argument, finding that it would require the

Court to "pile inference upon inference" to conclude that the

conduct prohibited by the Gun-Free School Zones Act had a
 4

Accord, Wilson, 1995 WL 765450 at *7-*13; Cheffer v. Reno, 55

F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lucero, 895

F. Supp. 1421, 1423-24 (D. Kan. 1995); United States v. White, 893

F. Supp. 1423, 1432-34 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Because we hold that FACE

is within Congress's commerce power, we need not consider the

government's argument that Congress also had the authority to enact

FACE under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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substantial effect on interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at

1634. 

For two reasons, we believe that Lopez does not call on us to

hold that FACE is beyond Congress's power to regulate activity that

substantially affects interstate commerce. First, unlike the GunFree School Zones Act, FACE prohibits interference with a

commercial activity -- the provision and receipt of reproductivehealth services. Cf. id. at 1633 (education is not a commercial

activity). FACE does not require us to "pile inference upon

inference" to conclude that the conduct that it proscribes affects

interstate commerce. As the House and Senate committee reports

show, the causal link is quite direct --- when people interfere

with a business, the availability of the service provided by that

business declines. Second, in Lopez, the Supreme Court did not

overturn Katzenbach v. McClung, Wickard v. Filburn, or any other

opinion holding that Congress has the power to regulate conduct

that reduces interstate commerce in a good or service. See Lopez,

115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Katzenbach, Wickard,

and other post-New Deal cases "are within the fair ambit of the

Court's practical conception of commercial regulation and are not

called into question by our decision today"). Therefore, Lopez

notwithstanding, FACE is a valid exercise of Congress's power to

regulate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.4

B.

Mrs. Dinwiddie next contends that the Freedom of Access to

Clinic Entrances Act facially violates the Free Speech Clause of
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the First Amendment. She asserts that FACE imposes an

impermissible content-based restriction on speech, and that it is

both vague and overbroad. We hold that FACE is not content based,

and that it easily satisfies the intermediate-scrutiny test that

applies to content-neutral laws that burden expressive conduct. We

also conclude that FACE is neither vague nor overbroad.

1.

A statute that regulates speech or conduct "based on hostility

-- or favoritism -- towards the underlying message expressed" is

content based. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).

Generally, a content-based statute is unconstitutional unless it

survives strict scrutiny, which requires the government to prove

that the statute "`is necessary to serve a compelling state

interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.'"

Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1408 (8th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.

37, 45 (1983)). Mrs. Dinwiddie asserts that FACE is content based

and should be subject to strict scrutiny.

FACE criminalizes three types of activity -- the use of

"force," "threat[s] of force," and "physical obstruction." See 18

U.S.C. § 248(a). Mrs. Dinwiddie does not contest the fact that

both physical obstruction and the use of force are unprotected by

the First Amendment. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194,

2199 (1993) ("[A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the

imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.");

Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 615-17 (1968) (rejecting a First

Amendment challenge to a law that prohibits obstructing access to

a courthouse). Instead, Mrs. Dinwiddie focusses on FACE's

prohibition on using a "threat of force" to "intimidate" a person

because she is obtaining or providing reproductive-health services.

According to the defendant, proscribing threats of force that

"intimidate," which FACE defines as to "place a person in
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reasonable apprehension of bodily harm," 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3),

imposes a content-based restriction on speech because it punishes

the speech based on its communicative impact. 

Mrs. Dinwiddie is correct that "[l]isteners' reaction to

speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation." Forsyth

County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 125, 134 (1992).

See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (a statute

prohibiting flag desecration was content based because it punished

speech based on the "emotive impact of [the] speech on its audience

. . .." (quoting Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). But

this reasoning does not apply to statutes that outlaw threats of

violence. It is "well settled that threats of violence are . . .

unprotected speech." United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 825

(8th Cir. 1994). See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 ("threats of violence

are outside the First Amendment"); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.

705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a statute that

criminalizes threats to the President is constitutional on its face

and distinguishing "a threat . . . from what is constitutionally

protected speech"). Accordingly, we have upheld the facial

validity of a number of statutes that, using language similar to

FACE's, prohibit threats of violence. See, e.g., J.H.H., 22 F.3d

at 824-26 (upholding 42 U.S.C. § 3631, which prohibits "threats of

force" that "intimidate" a person because of his race and because

he is participating in certain housing programs); United States v.

Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1302-04 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (John R.

Gibson, J., concurring) (18 U.S.C. § 241, which prohibits

conspiracies to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate" a person

because he is exercising a federal right, is facially

constitutional and can be applied to conduct that causes a person

"reasonably [to] fear the use of imminent force or violence"),

cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1550 (1994); United States v. Bellrichard,

994 F.2d 1318, 1321-25 (8th Cir.) (18 U.S.C. § 876, which prohibits

mailing a letter that contains a "threat to injure" the addressee,

is constitutional), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 337 (1993). Thus,
 5

Mrs. Dinwiddie also argues that FACE runs afoul of

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), which holds

that the government may punish the advocacy of illegal conduct only

"where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent

lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."

Id. at 447. See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.

886, 928 (1982) (statements advocating violence were protected by

the First Amendment because they were not "directed to inciting or

producing imminent lawless action" and were not "likely to incite

or produce such action"). According to Mrs. Dinwiddie, FACE is

flawed because it does not require that a threat place the listener

in imminent fear of harm. We disagree. The Brandenburg test

applies to laws that forbid inciting someone to use violence

against a third party. It does not apply to statutes, like FACE,

that prohibit someone from directly threatening another person.

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rather than imposing a content-based restriction on speech, FACE's

proscription of "threats of force" that "place a person in

reasonable apprehension of bodily harm" regulates speech that is

not protected by the First Amendment.5 

Next, Mrs. Dinwiddie takes aim at FACE's motive requirement,

which limits the statute's application to those who engage in

proscribed conduct "because [the victim] is or has been, or in

order to intimidate [the victim] from, obtaining or providing

reproductive health services . . .." 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1).

According to the defendant, this motive requirement selects for

punishment abortion-related expressive conduct and, therefore,

transforms FACE into a content-based statute. We disagree.

In order for a statute to be facially content based, it must

discriminate in favor of or against the message conveyed by speech

or conduct. FACE's motive requirement does not discriminate

against speech or conduct that expresses an abortion-related

message. FACE would, for example, apply to anyone who blockades a

clinic to prevent a woman from getting an abortion, regardless of

the message expressed by the blockade. Thus, FACE would prohibit

striking employees from obstructing access to a clinic in order to

stop women from getting abortions, even if the workers were
 6

Indeed, FACE also applies to conduct that interferes with

religious services conducted in a place of worship. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 248(a)(2).

 7Mrs. Dinwiddie contends that motive may be used only as a

sentencing consideration and not as an element in a civil action or

criminal offense. We disagree. If Mrs. Dinwiddie were correct,

Title VII would be unconstitutional. But Title VII is a

constitutional, content-neutral statute. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at

2200.

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carrying signs that said, "We are underpaid!" rather than "Abortion

is wrong!" Cf. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92

(1972) (invalidating a law that banned picketing within 150 feet of

a school but exempted labor picketing).6 

What FACE's motive requirement accomplishes is the perfectly

constitutional task of filtering out conduct that Congress believes

need not be covered by a federal statute. Congress enacted FACE to

prohibit conduct that interferes with the ability of women to

obtain abortions. See H.R. Rep. No. 306, at 12; S. Rep. No. 117,

at 24. FACE's motive requirement targets this conduct while

ensuring that FACE does not federalize a slew of random crimes that

might occur in the vicinity of an abortion clinic. Congress's use

of a motive requirement to single out conduct that "is thought to

inflict greater individual or societal harm," Mitchell, 113 S. Ct.

at 2201, is quite common. For example, Title VII of the 1964 Civil

Rights Act forbids an employer from discriminating against an

employee "because of [the employee's] race, color, religion, sex,

or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See Mitchell, 113

S. Ct. at 2200-01 (discussing the constitutionality of Title VII's

motive requirement and upholding a statute that enhances sentences

for crimes motivated by racial bias).7

Finally, Mrs. Dinwiddie argues that even if FACE appears to be

content neutral, it is, in fact, content based because the vast

majority of people whose conduct it proscribes are opposed to
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abortion. But there is no disparate-impact theory in First

Amendment law. The fact that a statute, whether through a motive

requirement or some other mechanism, disproportionately punishes 

those who hold a certain viewpoint does not "itself render the

[statute] content or viewpoint based." Madsen v. Women's Health

Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (1994). See, e.g., United

States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding a law that

prohibited the destruction of draft cards even though most people

who burned their draft cards were opponents of the Vietnam War).

Thus, we reject Mrs. Dinwiddie's argument and hold that FACE is a

content-neutral law.

2.

Although FACE is content neutral and, therefore, need not

survive strict scrutiny, it does "incidentally affect some conduct

with protected expressive elements, such as peaceful but

obstructive picketing." American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642,

648 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995). When a

content-neutral law burdens expressive conduct, we must subject the

law to intermediate scrutiny. A statute survives intermediate

scrutiny "if it furthers an important or substantial governmental

interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the

suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction

on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential

to the furtherance of that interest." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.

FACE easily passes this test. 

FACE furthers the government's interest in protecting women

who obtain reproductive-health services and ensuring that

reproductive-health services remain available. See H.R. Rep. No.

306, at 6; S. Rep. No. 117, at 14-17. These interests are

significant, see Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526; Pro-Choice Network of

Western New York v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 387 (2d Cir. 1995) (en

banc), and are not related to restricting free speech. Also, FACE
-17-

regulates only uses of force, threats of force, and physical

obstruction. Thus, it "leaves open ample alternative means for

communication," American Life League, 47 F.3d at 652, and is

narrowly tailored to further the government's interests. The

statute forbids physical interference with people going about their

own lawful private business. It is difficult to conceive of any

such statute that could not survive this level of scrutiny.

3.

We now consider Mrs. Dinwiddie's claim that FACE is overbroad

and vague. A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if "it

reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications." New

York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982). As we have discussed,

FACE prohibits only a limited range of activity. It is not even

close to being overbroad. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,

613 (1973) (invalidating a statute on overbreadth grounds is

"strong medicine" that must be applied "sparingly and only as a

last resort").

To "survive a vagueness challenge, a statute must `give the

person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know

what is prohibited' and `provide explicit standards for those who

apply [the statute].'" Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster,

968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Grayned v. City of

Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). Mrs. Dinwiddie asserts that

FACE is impermissibly vague because it uses the following terms:

"interfere with," "physical obstruction," "intimidate," "force or

threat of force," and "injures."

The meaning of these terms is quite clear. In Cameron v.

Johnson, the Supreme Court rejected a vagueness challenge levelled

against a statute that prohibited engaging in "picketing or mass

demonstrations in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably

interfere with free ingress to or egress from any public
 8

Accord, Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521-22; American Life League, 47

F.3d at 648-53; Lucero, 895 F. Supp. at 1424-25; White, 893 F.

Supp. at 1435-37; Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693, 700-04 (D. Ariz.

1994); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1010-11 (W.D. La. 1994);

Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422, 1426-30

(S.D. Cal. 1994).

-18-

premises . . .." 390 U.S. at 612 n.1 (emphasis added). The

meanings of "interfere with" and "physical obstruction" are even

clearer in FACE because, unlike the statute at issue in Cameron,

FACE provides narrow definitions of these terms. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 248(e)(2) and (4). As for "force or threat of force" and

"injures," they are readily understandable terms that are used in

everyday speech. Finally, considering that FACE defines

"intimidate" as "to place a person in reasonable apprehension of

bodily harm," 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3), "intimidate" is a clear term

that is similar to an element in the crime and tort of assault.

See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.070(3) (a person commits the crime

of third-degree assault if "[h]e purposely places another person in

apprehension of immediate physical injury"); Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 21 (1965) (defining the tort of assault as placing a

person in imminent apprehension of "harmful or offensive contact"

with the intention of doing so).

Therefore, we reject Mrs. Dinwiddie's overbreadth and

vagueness arguments and, like every other court that has considered

the question, conclude that FACE does not violate the First

Amendment.8

 

III.

Having held that FACE is constitutional, we now address Mrs.

Dinwiddie's argument that she did not violate the statute.

Although the District Court found that Mrs. Dinwiddie ran afoul of

FACE in numerous ways, see 885 F. Supp. at 1291-94, it emphasized

Mrs. Dinwiddie's use of "threats of force" to "intimidate" Dr.
-19-

Crist, Planned Parenthood's Medical Director. We therefore begin

by discussing the definition of "threats of force."

A.

Although the government may outlaw threats, see ante at 13-14,

the First Amendment does not permit the government to punish speech

merely because the speech is forceful or aggressive. What is

offensive to some is passionate to others. The First Amendment,

therefore, requires a court (or a jury) that is applying FACE's

prohibition on using "threats of force," to differentiate between

"true threat[s]," Watts, 394 U.S. at 708, and protected speech.

The court must analyze an alleged threat "in the light of [its]

entire factual context," Lee, 6 F.3d at 1306 (Lay, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part), and decide whether the recipient

of the alleged threat could reasonably conclude that it expresses

"a determination or intent to injure presently or in the future."

Martin v. United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 1211 (1983). 

When determining whether statements have constituted threats

of force, we have considered a number of factors: the reaction of

the recipient of the threat and of other listeners, see J.H.H., 22

F.3d at 827; whether the threat was conditional, see Bellrichard,

994 F.2d 1321; whether the threat was communicated directly to its

victim, see ibid.; whether the maker of the threat had made similar

statements to the victim in the past, see United States v.

Whitfield, 31 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 1994); and whether the victim

had reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a propensity

to engage in violence. See ibid. This list is not exhaustive, and

the presence or absence of any one of its elements need not be

dispositive. See, e.g., Bellrichard, 994 F.2d at 1322 ("A threat

may be considered a `true threat' even if it is premised on a

contingency.").
 9

The fact that Mrs. Dinwiddie did not specifically say to Dr.

Crist that she would injure him does not mean that Mrs. Dinwiddie's

comments were not "threats of force." See, e.g., Bellrichard, 994

F.2d at 1319-24 (holding that a number of letters warning their

addressees that God or a third party would kill them were threats).

 10Mrs. Dinwiddie argues that because her comment to Ms. Brous

occurred before May 26, 1994, the date FACE took effect, the

-20-

We will now examine Mrs. Dinwiddie's statements to Dr. Crist.

The District Court found that from mid-1994 through early 1995, the

defendant made approximately 50 comments to Dr. Crist, often

through a bullhorn, warning "Robert, remember Dr. Gunn . . .. This

could happen to you . . .. He is not in the world anymore . . ..

Whoever sheds man's blood, by man his blood shall be shed." We

agree with the District Court that these statements were "threats

of force," and that they violated FACE by "intimidating" Dr. Crist

(i.e., placing Dr. Crist in "reasonable apprehension of bodily

harm").

Although Mrs. Dinwiddie did not specifically say to Dr. Crist,

"I am going to injure you," the manner in which Mrs. Dinwiddie made

her statements, the context in which they were made, and Dr.

Crist's reaction to them all support the conclusion that the

statements were "threats of force" that "intimidated" Dr. Crist.9

Mrs. Dinwiddie made these statements not once or twice, but about

50 times. She communicated them directly to Dr. Crist, who reacted

to them by wearing a bullet-proof vest. Finally, Dr. Crist was

aware that Mrs. Dinwiddie, a well-known advocate of the view that

it is justifiable to use lethal force against doctors who perform

abortions, had attacked Lenard Venable, a Maintenance Supervisor at

Planned Parenthood, physically obstructed potential patients who

were trying to enter Planned Parenthood, and, on January 28, 1994,

told Patty Brous, Planned Parenthood's Executive Director, "Patty,

you have not seen violence yet until you see what we do to you."

These facts gave Dr. Crist reason to believe that Mrs. Dinwiddie

had a propensity to use force.10 
District Court's reliance on it was erroneous. It is true that

Mrs. Dinwiddie cannot be held liable under FACE for conduct that

occurred prior to May 26, 1994. See Section 6 of Pub. L. No. 103-

259, 108 Stat. 694, 697 (1994) (statutory note accompanying FACE).

But that is not what the District Court did. The Court stated,

correctly, that although Mrs. Dinwiddie's pre-May 26, 1994 conduct

and background events not linked directly to Mrs. Dinwiddie "do not

bear directly on the liability of Dinwiddie under FACE, they are

relevant to the definitions in 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)." 885 F. Supp. at

1291. In other words, although Mrs. Dinwiddie's comment to Ms.

Brous does not violate FACE, it can be used as a factor in

determining whether her post-May 26, 1994, comments to Crist were

"threats of force" that "intimidated" Crist by placing him in

"reasonable apprehension of physical harm."

The same reasoning applies to Mrs. Dinwiddie's advocacy of the

view that it is justifiable to use violence against doctors who

perform abortions. Punishing Mrs. Dinwiddie for expressing this

opinion would violate the First Amendment. See Brandenburg, 395

U.S. at 447. But it was appropriate for the District Court to

consider Crist's "awareness of Dinwiddie's well-publicized advocacy

of lethal force," 885 F. Supp. at 1293, in determining whether Mrs.

Dinwiddie intimidated him with threats of force. See Mitchell, 113

S. Ct. at 2201 (the First Amendment "does not prohibit the

evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or

to prove motive or intent").

-21-

Our conclusion that Mrs. Dinwiddie's statements were "threats

of force" that "intimidated" Dr. Crist is supported by Watts v.

United States, a case on which Mrs. Dinwiddie heavily relies. At

issue in Watts was the defendant's statement at a rally that "[i]f

they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my

sights is L.B.J." Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. The Supreme Court

reversed Watts's conviction for threatening the President because

Watts's statement was expressly conditioned on his induction into

the Armed Forces and because the audience responded to Watts by

laughing. See id. at 707-08. In contrast, Mrs. Dinwiddie's

comments were not expressly conditional. Dr. Crist did not laugh

at the defendant's words; he started wearing a bullet-proof vest.

Finally, whereas Watts did not communicate his comment directly to

President Johnson, Mrs. Dinwiddie used a bullhorn to speak directly

to Dr. Crist. In sum, Mrs. Dinwiddie's words were far more
 11Mrs. Dinwiddie also argues that her statements were less

threatening than those of the defendant in Gooding v. Wilson, 405

U.S. 518 (1972), who said to a police officer, "White son of a

bitch, I'll kill you. You son of a bitch, I'll choke you to

death." Id. at 519-20 n.1. That may be true, but it is also

irrelevant. The Supreme Court reversed Wilson's conviction on

overbreadth grounds; it never reached the question of whether his

words constituted threats.

-22-

threatening than Watts's.11

B.

Having concluded that Mrs. Dinwiddie violated FACE by using

threats of force to intimidate Dr. Crist, we need not dwell on her

numerous other violations of FACE. See 885 F. Supp. at 1291-94.

We will, however, discuss one incident the District Court

highlighted.

On July 28, 1994, Mrs. Dinwiddie physically assaulted Lenard

Venable, a Maintenance Supervisor at Planned Parenthood, with an

electric bullhorn. At oral argument, Mrs. Dinwiddie asserted that

her attack on Venable did not violate FACE because Venable was not

"providing reproductive health services." 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1).

Mrs. Dinwiddie maintains that a worker at an abortion clinic who

does not perform abortions or counsel pregnant women does not

"provide" reproductive-health services. We decline to adopt this

narrow interpretation of "provide."

A "term appearing in several places in a statutory text is

generally read the same way each time it appears." Ratzlaf v.

United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 660 (1994). Thus, in interpreting

the meaning of "providing reproductive health services," we examine

how the word "provide" is used in 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(3), a section

of FACE that prohibits damaging or destroying a facility because

"such facility provides reproductive health services" (emphasis

added). The phrase "facility [that] provides reproductive health
-23-

services" refers to a type of building. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(1).

Buildings do not perform abortions or counsel pregnant women. The

word "provide" must, then, have a broader meaning than Mrs.

Dinwiddie has suggested. 

A building that houses an abortion clinic "provides"

reproductive-health services because it is an integral part of a

business in which abortions are performed and pregnant women are

counselled. The same logic applies to workers at an abortion

clinic -- Dr. Crist could not do his job without either Planned

Parenthood's "facility" or its workers. Therefore, like Planned

Parenthood's "facility," Venable "provides" reproductive-health

services, and Mrs. Dinwiddie's attack on him violated FACE. 

IV.

After concluding that Mrs. Dinwiddie violated FACE, the

District Court issued a permanent injunction that orders her not to

violate FACE and "not [to] be physically located within 500 feet of

the entrance of any facility (a `buffer zone') in the United States

that provides reproductive health services as contemplated by

[FACE]" except "for the purpose of engaging in legitimate personal

activity that could not be remotely construed to violate 18 U.S.C.

§ 248." 885 F. Supp. at 1296. This "legitimate personal activity"

exception permits Mrs. Dinwiddie, among other things, to carry a

placard, distribute literature, and speak without an amplifier, so

long as she does not intimidate, interfere with, or physically

obstruct anyone or violate a local noise ordinance. But

"legitimate personal activity" does not include "activity

that . . . is described in part III.A." of the District Court's

opinion or "any use whatsoever of a bullhorn, megaphone, or other

sound or voice amplifying device." Id. at 1296-97. Mrs. Dinwiddie

argues that this injunction is unconstitutional because it is vague

and overinclusive. We agree with her, in part, and remand to the

District Court with instructions to modify the injunction.
-24-

A.

For the sake of argument, we will assume (for now) that the

injunction is content neutral. In order to be constitutional, a

content-neutral injunction that imposes time, place, or manner

restrictions on speech or expressive conduct must "burden no more

speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest,"

Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525. The interest advanced by the District

Court's injunction -- protecting the safety of the staff and

patients of Planned Parenthood and other reproductive-health

facilities -- is "quite sufficient to justify an appropriately

tailored injunction . . .." Id. at 2526. Our task, then, is to

decide whether the injunction "burdens no more speech than

necessary" to achieve this objective. 

We begin by examining the injunction's requirement that

whenever Mrs. Dinwiddie is within 500 feet of a reproductive-health

facility, she engage only in "legitimate personal activity that

could not be remotely construed to violate [FACE]." In Brown v.

Polk County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc), we confronted

a similarly worded provision. The administrator of Polk County,

Iowa, ordered that a county employee "immediately cease any

activities that could be considered to be religious proselytizing,

witnessing, or counseling . . .." Id. at 652 (emphasis added). We

held that this mandate violated the employee's rights under the

Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because "[i]t would

seem to require no argument that to forbid speech `that could be

considered' religious is not narrowly tailored to the aim of

prohibiting harassment . . .." Id. at 659. 

What was true in Brown is even more true in this case. Within

500 feet of a reproductive-health facility, the injunction forbids

Mrs. Dinwiddie from doing anything that could be "remotely

construed" to violate FACE or that is not "legitimate personal

activity," a phrase which the District Court never completely
 12This part of the injunction also runs afoul of Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65(d), which requires that "[e]very order granting an

injunction . . . shall be specific in terms [and] shall describe in

reasonable detail . . . the act or acts sought to be

restrained . . .." With its prohibition on activities that can be

"remotely construed" to violate FACE and its lack of a definition

for legitimate personal activity, the injunction violates Rule

65(d) by calling on Mrs. Dinwiddie "to guess at what kind of

conduct" is permissible in the buffer zones. Calvin Klein

Cosmetics v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 669 (8th Cir.

1987).

-25-

defines. Also, to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the District

Court's injunction must burden no more speech than necessary to

further a significant government interest. This standard is

stricter than intermediate scrutiny, the test that we employed in

Brown. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525-26. In sum, this portion of

the injunction is inconsistent with the First Amendment.12

The District Court's order that Mrs. Dinwiddie not engage in

"activity that . . . is described in part III.A. of this permanent

injunction" whenever she is within 500 feet of a reproductivehealth facility is also unconstitutional. Part III.A. contains the

District Court's entire description of Mrs. Dinwiddie's conduct.

It mentions not only Mrs. Dinwiddie's violations of FACE, but also

speech that is protected by the First Amendment. For instance, in

Part III.A., the District Court states:

During one program, Dinwiddie was asked [by a television

reporter] whether it is "right to be able to kill a

doctor to save that unborn child" and responded: "I

think that abortion is a violent, violent business and

that violence begets violence. The Scriptures say that

if you live by the sword, you die by the sword."

885 F. Supp. at 1293. In the context of answering the reporter's

question, her remarks were pure speech. Enjoining Mrs. Dinwiddie

from voicing this opinion to a reporter (or from signing a petition

expressing this view), not only "burdens more speech than

necessary," but is also an unconstitutional viewpoint-based
-26-

restriction on speech. The First Amendment, therefore, does not

permit the injunction to incorporate Part III.A. of the District

Court's opinion.

B.

Part III.A. does describe a number of activities, such as Mrs.

Dinwiddie's use of threats of force to intimidate Dr. Crist and her

attack on Venable, which it was certainly appropriate for the

District Court to enjoin. The remainder of the injunction helps to

ensure that Mrs. Dinwiddie does not repeat this conduct.

Specifically, the injunction orders Mrs. Dinwiddie not to violate

FACE and, within 500 feet of any reproductive-health facility in

the United States, not to engage in activity that:

(2) constitutes intimidation, physical obstruction,

interference, force, or threats of force; (3) involves

any use whatsoever of a bullhorn, megaphone, or other

sound or voice amplifying device; (4) brings defendant in

violation of any local noise ordinance; or (5) brings

defendant in violation of laws related, but not limited,

to assault, battery, trespass, harassment, vandalism,

disturbing the peace, destruction of property, or

unlawful possession of weapons, when such activity also

has the effect of violating FACE.

885 F. Supp. at 1297. 

We believe that an injunction limited to these provisions

would not violate the First Amendment. Like FACE, such an

injunction would be content neutral; it would limit the manner in

which Mrs. Dinwiddie may express herself "without reference to the

content" of the message she conveys. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523

(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)

(internal quotations omitted)). Moreover, the injunction would

burden no more speech than necessary to protect the staff and

patients of Planned Parenthood and other reproductive-health

facilities.
-27-

The types of activity that the injunction would proscribe are

quite narrow. Ordering Mrs. Dinwiddie to stop violating FACE, a

statute that prohibits a limited range of disruptive conduct, would

have a de minimis effect on her ability to express herself. Two of

the injunction's other mandates -- that, within 500 feet of a

reproductive-health facility, Mrs. Dinwiddie not engage in activity

that "constitutes intimidation, physical obstruction, interference,

force, or threats of force," or that violates a number of state

laws "when such activity also has the effect of violating FACE" --

are subsets of the conduct prohibited by FACE. Accordingly, these

provisions would be constitutional, as well.

The injunction's restrictions on using sound- or voiceamplifying devices and on violating local noise ordinances would

also be consistent with the First Amendment. As the District Court

noted, Mrs. Dinwiddie's "use of threats and intimidation in

violation of FACE have been facilitated by the use of her bullhorn.

Defendant has used her bullhorn not only to threaten and intimidate

persons at Planned Parenthood, but also to assault physically

workers such as Venable." 885 F. Supp. at 1297. These

restrictions would help to ensure that Mrs. Dinwiddie does not

repeat this or similar illegal conduct, while allowing her to carry

signs, distribute literature, and speak at a reasonable volume even

when she is within 500 feet of an abortion clinic. 

Moreover, the radius of the 500-foot buffer zones does not

violate the First Amendment. In Madsen, the Supreme Court

invalidated an injunction's requirement that, within 300 feet of an

abortion clinic, protestors refrain from physically approaching any

person seeking services at the clinic. The Court explained that

"[a]bsent evidence that the protestors' speech is independently

proscribable (i.e., `fighting words' or threats), or is so infused

with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical

harm, this provision cannot stand." 114 S. Ct. at 2529. Here,

Mrs. Dinwiddie's speech was "independently proscribable" -- she
-28-

threatened Dr. Crist. See also id. at 2528 (upholding an

injunction's prohibition on "singing, chanting, whistling,

shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns [or] sound equipment . . .

within earshot of the patients inside [an abortion clinic]" during

certain hours of the day).

Finally, the nationwide scope of the injunction is

constitutional, as well. The government has a significant interest

not only in safeguarding Dr. Crist and Planned Parenthood's

patients, but also in protecting the staff and patients of other

reproductive-health facilities. We agree with the District Court

that a geographically narrow injunction would be insufficient to

advance this interest:

If the permanent injunction encompassed only Planned

Parenthood or the Western District of Missouri, then this

Court would jeopardize the lives and safety of providers

and recipients of reproductive health services who are

protected by FACE. Defendant could easily frustrate the

purpose and spirit of the permanent injunction simply by

stepping over state lines and engaging in similar

activity at another reproductive health facility.

885 F. Supp. at 1296. Furthermore, in light of the narrow range of

conduct prohibited by the injunction (as we have modified it) and

Mrs. Dinwiddie's "consistent, repetitious, and flagrant

unwillingness or inability to comply" with FACE, id. at 1295, a

nationwide injunction would burden no more speech than necessary to

protect the staff and patients of reproductive-health facilities.

See United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1184-85 & n.10 (2d Cir.

1995) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to an injunction that

prohibits Carson, a former union officer who had engaged in

racketeering, from "participating in any way in the affairs of or

having any dealing, directly or indirectly, with . . . any labor

organization . . ."); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hunt, 591

F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1979) ("When the violation has been

founded on systematic wrongdoing, rather than an isolated
-29-

occurrence, a court should be more willing to enjoin future

misconduct.").

We conclude that an injunction limited to the terms discussed

in Part IV.B. of this opinion would adequately protect the staff

and patients of reproductive-health facilities and would be

consistent with the First Amendment.

V.

For these reasons, we affirm the District Court's holding that

the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act is constitutional and

that Mrs. Dinwiddie violated FACE. We remand this case to the

District Court with instructions to modify the injunction in a

manner consistent with Part IV of this opinion.

It is so ordered.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.