U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

43–668 CC 1997

STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS

AFFAIRS TO IDENTIFY GULF WAR SYNDROME

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT

REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 24, 1997

Serial No. 105–38

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico

CHRISTOPHER COX, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

PETE SESSIONS, Texas

MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey

VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas

BOB BARR, Georgia

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

GARY A. CONDIT, California

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, Tennessee

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JUDITH MCCOY, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Ind.)

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

ROBERT NEWMAN, Professional Staff Member

R. JARED CARPENTER, Clerk

RON STROMAN, Minority Professional Staff

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 24, 1997 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Donnelly, Michael, Major, U.S. Air Force, retired; Susan Sumpter-Loebig,

Sergeant, U.S. Army, retired; and Steven Wood, Sergeant, U.S. Army,

retired ............................................................................................................ 33

Rostker, Bernard, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Department

of Defense; Robert Walpole, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses,

Central Intelligence Agency; and Donald Mancuso, Deputy Inspector

General, Department of Defense ................................................................. 95

Tucker, Jonathan B., director, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies; Thomas Tiedt, researcher and

neuroscientist, Longboat Key, FL; and Satu Somani, professor of

pharmocolgy and toxicology, Southern Illinois University School of

Medicine ......................................................................................................... 261

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Allen, Hon. Thomas H., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maine, prepared statement of .................................................................. 32

Donnelly, Michael, Major, U.S. Air Force, retired, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 39

Mancuso, Donald, Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 233

Rostker, Bernard, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Department

of Defense:

Information concerning research that is now being done by the DOD

or VA ....................................................................................................... 250

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 100

Sanders, Hon. Bernard, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Vermont, prepared statement of .............................................................. 8

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

Somani, Satu, professor of pharmocolgy and toxicology, Southern Illinois

University School of Medicine, prepared statement of .............................. 320

Sumpter-Loebig, Susan, Sergeant, U.S. Army, retired, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 64

Tiedt, Thomas, researcher and neuroscientist, Longboat Key, FL, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 301

Tucker, Jonathan B., director, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, prepared statement of ............................ 264

Walpole, Robert, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Central Intelligence Agency:

Information concerning chemical exposure among Iraqis and Kuwaitis ............................................................................................................ 248

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 129

Wood, Steven, Sergeant, U.S. Army, retired, prepared statement of ........... 48

(1)

STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS

AFFAIRS TO IDENTIFY GULF WAR SYNDROME

THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 1997

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Snowbarger, Gilman, Souder,

Sanders, Kucinich, and Allen.

Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and counsel;

Robert Newman, professional staff member; R. Jared Carpenter,

clerk; Ronald Stroman, minority professional staff; and Ellen

Rayner, minority chief clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. I’d like to welcome our witnesses to this very important hearing, and our guests, and thank everyone for their patience.

Accurate diagnosis and effective treatment of Gulf war veterans’

illnesses requires a complete medical history of illnesses, allergies,

exposures, inoculations, and a great deal more. For too many sick

veterans, their medical history remains incomplete.

Why? Because Gulf war records that might document toxic exposures remain missing or classified. Because detection reports that

could fix the time and place of probable chemical releases are lost

or incomplete. Because sick call rosters and shot records that display adverse drug reactions were destroyed. And because virtually

no effort was made to record who took the anti-nerve agent tablets,

the pyridostigmine bromide [PB].

As a result, sick Gulf war veterans face an uncertain medical future because they lack critical evidence from their military past. In

the absence of the records needed to correlate toxic causes with

symptomatic effect, veterans are being misdiagnosed as stress

cases and treated with ineffective therapies. That is simply unacceptable.

Our purpose today is to access the impact of missing records on

Gulf war veterans’ health. We ask what evidence is available to

corroborate veterans’ recollections of toxic exposures, and what additional information may yet be discovered or declassified in the

course of on-going Defense Department, the DOD, and the Central

Intelligence Agency, the CIA, investigations. We also ask that the

benefit or any doubt caused by missing records goes to the veteran

2

who needs the benefit, as opposed to the military that lost the

records and created the doubt.

While a necessary and constructive step, it is not enough to extend the presumptive period of service-connected benefits eligibility

for undiagnosed Gulf war veterans, too often the presumptive diagnosis is stress, the disability compensation rating low, and the

treatment biased in favor of psychiatric over neurobiologic. That is

also unacceptable.

When it comes to matching cause to effect, diagnosis to treatment, presumptions are no substitute for the facts that are, or

should be, in Gulf war medical, intelligence, and operations

records.

To sick veterans, the missing unit logs, chemical detection reports, PB labeling information, and classified intelligence analysis

are not just military records of the war 6 years ago. They are medical records vital to proper health care today. Every surviving Gulf

war record even remotely connected to veterans’ health claims

must be found. The survival of many of our veterans depends on

it.

As in our past hearings, we begin with testimony from Gulf war

veterans. Theirs is the best intelligence available on the causes and

effects of the mysterious cluster of maladies commonly called ‘‘Gulf

War Syndrome.’’ We are honored by their past service, their continued bravery, and their presence here today. And we welcome them.

DOD and CIA witnesses will testify on the status of their longoverdue efforts to investigate, analyze, declassify and disclose Gulf

war records relevant to the health concerns of veterans.

Our final panel will discuss what is known about low-level chemical exposures and PB use that can fill the gaps created by missing

Gulf war records.

We appreciate their being here, both the second and third panel,

as well, and welcome their testimony, too. At this time I ask the

gentleman, Mr. Sanders, if he has any comments he’d like to make.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

3

4

5

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

congratulate you for your long-standing efforts in trying to get to

the root cause of this problem, your staff members—Bob Newman

and the others—for the outstanding work that they have done, and

the very fine work done by the minority staff. This has truly been

a non-partisan issue. And I commend you for that.

I must tell you that the whole issue of Gulf war syndrome has

preoccupied a great deal of my time and energy. We have hired

new staff—Don Edwards, a former general, National Guard—to

help us with this issue. We’re holding a conference in Vermont focusing on this issue. Mr. Chairman, let me briefly go over some of

the recent Gulf war syndrome history and tell you the conclusions

that I’ve reached and the recommendations that I will be making.

As recent as 1 year ago, in April 1996, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Steven Joseph, stated that there was ‘‘no

indication of a unique illness or a Persian Gulf war syndrome or

a single entity that would account for illness in any large or significant fraction of these people.’’ He was wrong. For years the Defense

Department and the CIA denied that our soldiers were ever exposed to chemical warfare agents. But there is now wide-spread acknowledgement that thousands of soldiers were exposed to these

agents at Khamisiyah. And we will hear evidence today of far

greater exposure. In other words, the DOD and the CIA were

wrong in what they were saying for years, and may well be underestimating the problem today.

The President’s Advisory Commission, relying heavily on the Department of Defense and other Government institutions for help,

concluded, tragically in my view, that stress was the major cause

of Gulf war syndrome. Dr. Jonathan Tucker, a chemical weapons

researcher, was fired from his job with the Presidential Advisory

Commission because he chose to talk to people outside the sphere

of the Pentagon, who might have different opinions than the Pentagon, or the CIA about possible chemical exposures.

I think history will prove that he was moving in the right direction, and they were wrong. In general, the attitude of the DOD, the

CIA, and the VA has been, in the very beginning—No. 1, there is

no problem. It’s all in the heads of the soldiers. No. 2, as time progressed: well, there may be a problem, but it is a stress-related

problem, caused by stress. More time went on; they said, ‘‘Well, no.

None of our soldiers were ever exposed to chemical agents.’’ Well,

we’re sure of that. More time went on: ‘‘Well, yes. Maybe there

were some exposures. But the problem is limited.’’ More time went

on: ‘‘Well, maybe the chemical exposure is not so limited, and we’ll

have to investigate how many tens of thousands of our soldiers

were affected.’’

Now, all of this comes from the DOD, an agency with a budget

of $250 billion. Meanwhile, some 70,000 men and women who

served in the Gulf are suffering from one or another Gulf war

symptom, some of them terribly, terribly serious.

Now, let’s briefly look at some people with far more limited resources than the Pentagon who are seriously trying to address this

horrendous problem. And I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, because your committee has done an outstanding job in bringing some of these people to us and to the American people.

6

In late January, we heard from Dr. Robert W. Haley—the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center. And this is what he

says. He says, ‘‘Persian Gulf war syndrome is real. The syndromes

are due to subtle brain, spinal cord, and nerve damage, but not

stress. The damage was caused by exposure to combinations of low

level chemical nerve agents and other chemicals, including

pyridostigmine bromide in anti-nerve gas tablets, DEET, in a highly concentrated insect repellant, and pesticides and flea collars that

some troops wore.’’

Another serious researcher, Dr. Muhammad Abou-Donia and

Tom Kurt, from the Duke University Medical Center—they also

have done some outstanding work. They study chickens. And the

researchers specifically found that two pesticides—DEET and

permethrin—and the anti-nerve gas agent PB, once again—were

harmless when used alone, but when used in combination the

chemicals caused neurological deficits in the test animals similar to

those reported by some Gulf war veterans.

Doctors Garth and Nancy Nicolson, University of Texas, concluded that some Gulf war veterans have multiple chronic symptoms that may eventually have their diagnoses linked to chemical

exposures in the Persian Gulf such as oil spills and fires, smoke

from military operations, chemicals on clothing, pesticides,

chemoprophylactic agents, chemical weapons and others. Dr. Claudia Miller, a good researcher from Texas, sees a direct relationship

between the problems of our Gulf war veterans and multiple chemical sensitivity. Dr. William Ray, also from Texas, says the same

thing.

Now, let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying this: for whatever reason—and frankly I am not interested in speculating on

that now—we could spend 10 hearings in speculation—I believe

that the Department of Defense and the VA and the other Government agencies—CIA—have not been capable in either diagnosing

or treating Persian Gulf war syndrome, or even fully analyzing the

problem. In my opinion, there is no particular reason to believe

that that is going to change.

We can bring the DOD, the VA and the CIA before us month

after month. We can criticize them. We can berate them. But I

have the sad feeling that it is not going to change, and what we

have seen in the past is going to continue into the future. Mr.

Chairman, you and this committee have done an extraordinary job

in helping to expose many of the problems that currently exist. But

I suggest to you that we must now assume an even greater responsibility.

I believe that this committee should, within the next several

weeks, regroup, come together again, not for a hearing, but to formulate our conclusions. And then having done that, we should introduce a Manhattan Project type of organization which assigns responsibility and adequately funds individuals outside of the DOD

and the VA to solve this problem. Whether those individuals should

be within the civilian sectors of our Government, such as exists

within the NIH, or whether they should be completely outside the

7

Government in a major university or research facility is something

we can discuss. But I think we must reach the fundamental conclusion that the status quo approach is just not working. Thank you

very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Bernard Sanders follows:]

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. I would thank him for his extraordinary dedication to this issue. You spend a great deal of time

on this issue, and have been a major part of this committee’s investigation and have been a tremendous help.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. At this time I would call on Mr. Snowbarger, the vice

chairman of the subcommittee.

Mr. SNOWBARGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really don’t have

a formally prepared statement. I do want to thank you for continuing the hearings on this process, also thank the panel for helping us to try to find the answers to these questions that have long

plagued us. I appreciate the frustration that you have gone

through. We’re frustrated, as well, in trying to get the answers, as

Mr. Sanders has indicated. And I appreciate your being with us

here today. I look forward to your testimony and questioning period.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Gilman, the chairman of

the Foreign Affairs Committee, as I call it.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you

for convening this hearing this morning as part of your series of

ongoing hearings related to the Gulf war syndrome. I believe that

these hearings are important as they help keep the Department of

Defense focused on an uncomfortable issue and remind both officials at the Pentagon and the members of the public as well as

Congress’ determination to address this unfortunate legacy of the

Gulf war.

This morning’s hearing is particularly important, because it goes

to the heart of the matter regarding DOD’s response to this issue.

Along with, I’m sure, many of my colleagues, I’ve heard numerous

allegations from our constituents about the poor initial response to

our veterans’ concerns from both DOD and the VA. And yet when

we in the Congress raise these issues time and time again, our intelligence and the DOD assured Members of both the House and

Senate that there was no evidence that any troops were exposed to

any chemical weapons in the Gulf. Moreover, the VA was eager to

accept these statements. So eager, in fact, that VA officials did not

feel that any exposure to chemical agents even merited consideration when ascertaining the causes behind the symptoms experienced by the affected personnel.

And then, last year, when faced with overwhelming evidence to

the contrary, officials at the Pentagon reversed themselves and

stated that 400 of our troops at the Khamisiyah ammunitionsite

were exposed to chemical agents. This figure later grew to approximately 20,000 of our troops. Since this initial revelation, additional

distressing facts have come out as the CIA and the DOD have engaged in finger-pointing and blame-shifting over what was actually

known at the time and what was communicated. To me, the most

shocking fact is the revelation to this subcommittee last January,

that 80 percent of the nuclear biological chemical logs from the theater of operations—165 pages of a total of 200—are now missing.

For one, I think I’m losing patience with the DOD in this issue.

It’s troubling enough that Pentagon officials were categorically denying troop exposure to chemical agents despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Now, however, we find out that most of the

31

record logs that were intended to track these incidents are classified or missing. The charges of cover-up no longer seem so farfetched. These facts, as they’ve dribbled out over the last 6 years,

point to the following conclusion: simply put, we were not prepared

to handle the contingency of widespread chemical use by the Iraqi

forces during the Gulf war, and that it was only by the grace of

God that Saddam Hussein did not resort to the use of such weapons.

Mr. Chairman, the Congress needs and deserves straight, honest

answers from the DOD. For too long, we’ve been dealing with commanders who apparently were more interested in protecting their

own careers and reputations than in looking out for the welfare of

the personnel under their command. It’s bad enough to discount

the thousands upon thousands of alarms and detections that occurred during the war. But what is far worse is a pattern of deceit

and misrepresentation that’s been waged with the Congress and

the American people. If we had a problem in addressing widespread chemical exposures during the Gulf war, then let’s admit it

and move on. The hand-wringing, double-talk, and the finger-pointing that’s occurred over the last few months is pointless and

counter-productive. More importantly, it does nothing to help our

veterans, who put their lives, both theirs and their families’ health

on the line for our Nation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman for his very fine statement.

Mr. Allen, it’s nice to have you here. You have the floor.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. First

of all, I want to thank you for holding these most important hearings, and to thank all of the panelists who are here to testify. I

would just say this: When we send the young men and women in

our armed services into harm’s way, we have an obligation to do

well by them when they return, and to care for them and to make

sure that we investigate whatever may have happened to them.

The record in this, frankly, appears to be a sorry record. And I

hope that one outcome of these hearings today is that we make

sure that it doesn’t happen again, that we are able to detect illnesses from chemical warfare or biological warfare and deal with

them efficiently.

And it’s not clear to me at all that that’s been the practice over

the last few years. And I am here, as I believe all of you are here,

to try to understand what happened, and make sure it doesn’t happen again. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas H. Allen follows:]

32

33

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Souder. What I would

like to do first is before calling my witnesses, just get some housekeeping out of the way, and ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for

that purpose. And without objection, so ordered. And I ask further

unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their

written statements in the record. And without objection, so ordered.

At this time, the committee will convene the first panel. The

panel consists of three American heroes: Maj. Michael Donnelly,

U.S. Air Force, retired, a Persian Gulf war veteran from South

Windsor, CT. Our second panelist is Sgt. Susan Sumpter-Loebig,

U.S. Army, retired, a Persian Gulf war veteran from Hagerstown,

MD. And our third witness will be Sgt. Steven Wood, U.S. Army,

retired, a Persian Gulf war veteran who presently resides in Germany.

Mr. Donnelly, I understand that you’re in a wheel chair and will

not be able to stand, but I would ask the other two witnesses to

stand, and I’d ask all three of you to raise your right hand. We

swear our witnesses in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Note for the record that all three witnesses have responded in the affirmative. And we will go from Maj.

Donnelly, and then we’ll go to you, Sergeant, and then to you, Sgt.

Wood. But we’ll start with you, Mr. Donnelly. It’s nice to have you

here.

STATEMENTS OF MICHAEL DONNELLY, MAJOR, U.S. AIR

FORCE, RETIRED; SUSAN SUMPTER-LOEBIG, SERGEANT, U.S.

ARMY, RETIRED; AND STEVEN WOOD, SERGEANT, U.S. ARMY,

RETIRED

Maj. DONNELLY. Thank you, Congressman Shays and members of

the committee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here

today.

Mr. SHAYS. Maj. Donnelly, what I’m going to do—it may be a little difficult, but I’m going to ask you to put the mic a little closer

to you.

Maj. DONNELLY. Sure.

Mr. SHAYS. It might mean that your papers have to overlap the—

thank you.

Maj. DONNELLY. OK. How’s that? Better?

Mr. SHAYS. I think it is better. And I’m going to ask you to lift

the mic up just slightly. Thank you. That’s perfect. That’s great.

Thank you very much.

Maj. DONNELLY. As you’ve already stated, my name is Maj. Michael Donnelly. And I am not the enemy. I come to you today to

tell you that I am yet another Gulf war veteran with a chronic illness. I was medically retired in October 1996 after 15 years and

1 month of service in the Air Force as a fighter pilot. At the time

Iraq invaded Kuwait, I was stationed at Hahn Air Base in Germany, flying F–16s.

34

Mr. SHAYS. I’m sorry to interrupt you again. I’d like all witnesses

to just tap their microphones and make sure that they’re—it’s the

one on the stem. I don’t think yours is on, sir.

Maj. DONNELLY. Great.

Mr. SHAYS. Could you check that for us? It’s not really picking

up. We’re going to trade microphones, then, if we can’t get it working.

Maj. DONNELLY. Kind of the way things have been going for me

lately.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Donnelly, this is a good day. I started out and

lost $20. It is a good day. It’s wonderful to have you here, sir. And

it is a very important day to have you testifying. This is a good

day.

Maj. DONNELLY. Great.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Maj. DONNELLY. And I’m happy to be here.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Maj. DONNELLY. As I stated, my name is Maj. Michael Donnelly.

And I am not the enemy. I come before you today to tell you that

I am another Gulf war veteran with a chronic illness. I was medically retired in October 1996 after 15 years and 1 month as a fighter pilot in the U.S. Air Force. At the time Iraq invaded Kuwait, I

was stationed at Hahn Air Base in Germany flying F–16s. My unit

deployed to Abu Dhabi, which is in the United Arab Emirates, on

January 1, 1991, and redeployed back to Germany on May 15,

1991. During the war, I flew 44 combat missions. On those missions I bombed a variety of targets, such as strategic targets to include airfields, production and storage facilities, and missile sites.

I also bombed tactical targets, which included troops, battlefield

equipment and pontoon bridges. I also flew combat air support,

which is troops in combat, and combat air patrol missions. Never

during any of those missions was I ever warned of the threat of any

chemical exposure from chemical or biological weapons. Had I been

warned, there were steps I could have and would have taken to

protect myself. I can tell you that I flew throughout the entire region of Iraq, Kuwait, much of Saudi Arabia, to include in and

around the oil smoke.

Evidence now shows that chemical munitions storage areas and

production facilities that were bombed by us released clouds of fallout that drifted over our troops through the air. I know of other

pilots who do remember a specific incident that later caused them

to become ill. Upon returning from the Gulf, I was reassigned to

McDill Air Force Base in Tampa, FL. That is when I first started

to notice that something was wrong, that I didn’t feel quite right.

By the summer of 1995, I was stationed at Shepperd Air Force

Base in Wichita Falls, TX. It was here that my current illness

started. I began to suspect that it was related to the service in the

Gulf. During the summer, I was exposed several times to malathion, which is a fairly dilute organophosphate-based pesticide used

for mosquito control. The base’s policy there was to spray with a

fogging truck throughout the base housing area, where I lived with

my family. I was exposed to the malathion while jogging in the evenings. I would like to point out something here that I learned later:

35

organic phosphate is the chemical basis for all nerve agents. It is

a poison that kills just like a pesticide does.

It was immediately after my exposure to malathion that I started

to have serious health problems. After this, every time I ran I

would get a schetoma—or blind spot—in front of my eyes and my

heart would beat erratically. I started to have heart palpitations,

night sweats, sleeplessness, trouble concentrating on my work,

trouble remembering, trouble taking a deep breath, frequent urination, and I was extremely tired all the time. It wasn’t until December 1995, that I started to have trouble walking. I had weakness

in my right leg.

It was then that I decided to go and see the doctor. Right after

the holiday season, on January 2, 1996, I went in to the flight surgeon at Shepperd Air Force Base. When I finished explaining my

symptoms to him I mentioned that I had been in the Gulf war. He

immediately started to talk to me about the effects of stress and

delayed stress. He told me that the other problems—heart palpitations, breathing difficulty, sleeplessness—all that, was most definitely stress-related, but we needed to look into why I had weakness in my leg.

I was referred to the neurologist. During the first visit with the

neurologist, it was one of the first times that I heard the line that

I would hear throughout the entire Air Force medical system. And

that line was: ‘‘There has never been any conclusive evidence that

there’s any link between service in the Gulf and any illnesses.’’ Each time I heard this line, it was almost as if the person was

reading from a script.

How can they say that they’re looking for answers when they

deny it’s even possible? How can they say there’s no connection

when they don’t study the individuals who present themselves with

symptoms that might prove that connection. Instead, I got the line,

which proved that no one was looking to see whether there was a

problem with my connection, only to deny that it exists. At one

point a doctor at Wilford Hall Medical Center gave me a 3-minute

dissertation on how my illness absolutely could not be linked to

service in the Gulf.

One thing else I noticed at Wilford Hall during my five or six visits was a room on the neurology labeled Gulf War Syndrome Room.

In none of my visits was the door to this room ever open or the

light on. I started to realize that because the military medical system would not acknowledge that my illness could be related to the

Gulf war, I would not get help. Once I realized that I began to seek

help from civilian doctors, many of whom had already made the

connection between service in the Gulf and the high incidents of

unusual illnesses among Gulf war veterans. Because the military

has not acknowledged this connection, my family and I have been

forced to spend over $40,000 of our own money on this effort.

Our search led us to people around the country with the same

illnesses who were also Gulf war veterans. In the past 12 months

I’ve travelled all over this country and even to Germany looking for

help.

Incredible as it may seem, the Air Force medical system initially

wanted to retire me with 50 percent disability and temporary retirement. Only after we hired a lawyer at our own expense and

36

went to the medical board did we get that changed to 100 percent

and permanent retirement. I chose not to fight over whether my illness was combat-related, because I had already seen the

stonewalling that was going on, and because I wanted to move my

family back home. That was a personal decision made at a time

when I knew I had far greater battles yet to fight.

Upon my retirement from the Air Force, I found myself worked

into the VA medical system. What alternative did I have after 15

years of service? I guess I’m one of the lucky ones, since I was: one,

still on active duty when I got sick; and, two, given a poor prognosis which required them to treat me and compensate me. What

alternative did they have?

The VA bureaucracy is difficult and slow at best. I’m suffering

from a fatal illness where every month matters. I could sit here

today and tell you that despite my situation, which you would

think would warrant expeditious treatment and action, I ran into

a red tape and paperwork nightmare that continues to consume my

life today. However, once I finally got to see them, the medical personnel who have treated me have been very kind and understanding, despite the fact there isn’t much they can do. Maybe if

we hadn’t had 6 years of cover-up there would be something that

they could do.

To this day, no one from the DOD or VA has contacted me personally to involve me in any tests or studies. I, myself, have found

nine other Gulf war veterans, some who have already come before

this committee, who are also suffering from ALS, an unusual illness that rarely strikes individuals under the age of 50. In fact,

with the 10 of us who have ALS, we are certain there are more.

We just can’t find them. The incidence of ALS already far exceeds

the normal incidence, given the number of soldiers who served in

the Gulf. One thing I can tell you: this is not stress. With every

other Gulf war veteran we have found who has ALS, the common

thread has been subsequent exposure to some kind of strong chemical or pesticide, such as malathion, diazinon, and lindane.

Why aren’t the DOD and the VA warning every one else who

served in the Gulf that they may get sick in the future, just as I

got sick 4 years after I returned from the Gulf?

How many other people out there are waiting for that one exposure that’s going to put them over the top? Why is no one putting

the word out? A warning could save the lives and health of many

individuals. I’ll tell you why: because that would take admitting

that something happened in the Gulf that’s making people sick.

I wonder how many flight mishaps or accidents that have happened since the war have involved Gulf war veterans. Those numbers shouldn’t be hard to find. The military keeps records on all of

that. In fact, I’ll wager someone out there already knows the answer to that question and hasn’t shared, whether because of a direct order not to, or because the right people haven’t asked the

question.

How many pilots are still out there flying who don’t feel just

quite right, just as I flew for 4 years after I returned from the

Gulf? How many other pilots fear for their livelihood and the repercussions they know they would encounter were they to speak up

37

because they’ve been told, ‘‘There’s no conclusive evidence that

there’s any link between service in the Gulf and any illness.’’

Imagine my dismay when the DOD announces $12 million to

study the Gulf war illness, and four of those studies are centered

around the effects of stress or post-traumatic stress disorder. You

would think that the DOD and the VA would have an indepth

knowledge of the effects of stress after all the wars that this country has fought, most of them a lot more stressful than the Gulf

war. Why aren’t they taking our illnesses seriously? I’ll tell you

why: because that would take admitting that something happened

in the Gulf war that’s making people sick.

Part of the ongoing cover-up has been to trivialize the illnesses

the Gulf war veterans are suffering from. You hear about skin

rashes and joint aches and insomnia and fatigue, and there’s no

doubt that these are real symptoms and are debilitating in and of

themselves. But what you don’t hear about is the high incidences

of rare cancers and neurological diseases and immune system disorders that are totally debilitating. This is not stress. This is life

and death.

Why is it impossible to get the right answers from the DOD and

the VA about how many veterans are sick or have sought treatment? Why is it more important to protect high-placed Government

officials than to care for veterans who are sick? The national defense issue now is that it’s public knowledge that the DOD mistreats the people who serve. America will have no one else to fight

its wars when people learn this.

The primary goal at this point is not to find out whose fault all

this is, although some day someone will need to investigate that,

and find out what happened and why. The people responsible for

this tragedy should be held responsible and punished.

The top priority now is for all of us to help veterans and their

families get their health and lives back. Or at least that should be

the goal. That should be your goal. It’s obvious now that there has

been a cover-up going on all this time as more and more information gets released or discovered. It’s time for people who know

something—and they do exist—to come forward. Maybe we can

save some lives.

During and after the war we proclaimed to ourselves and the

rest of the world how we learned the lessons of Vietnam and fixed

the military. We learned the lessons of Vietnam and we did it right

this time. Last week, Gen. Powell stated that we suffered only 149

casualties in the Gulf war. I’m here to tell you: the casualty count

is still rising. Just like in Vietnam with Agent Orange, it appears

that we did not learn all the lessons. We still mistreat veterans.

This country has again turned its back on people who fight its

wars: the individuals to whom it owes the most.

I want to thank you for what you are doing for the veterans of

this country, many of whom were squeezed out of the military right

after the war and now find themselves out on the street fighting

the very institution they fought for. Congressman Shays, in the

military, we have a tradition called the salute, and it’s used to

show admiration and respect for an individual who has earned it.

38

I salute you for what you are doing. You go a long way to restoring

this soldier’s waning faith in a country that could so willingly

desert its own. Remember: I am not the enemy. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Maj. Donnelly follows:]

39

40

41

42

43

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Maj. Donnelly. Major, your testimony is

very helpful. We’re going to be hearing from two other veterans

and then we’ll be asking you some questions. Thank you for honoring us with your presence. Sgt. Susan Sumpter-Loebig, if you

would testify now.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

Thank you for taking the time to listen to the ongoing struggle that

I and other Gulf war veterans have been enduring since our return.

I am 29 years old and was a sergeant E–5 in the Army Military

Police Corps. My military occupational specialties are: Victor 5 investigations, senior military customs inspector, nuclear physical security, enemy prisoner of war camps, canine assistant, route reconnaissance specialist. And I’ve worked with CID numerous times.

I was released from active duty on March 18, 1997. January

through April 1991, I was assigned to mortuary escort perimeter

security at Dover Air Force Base. My job was to ensure the safe

transportation of fallen soldiers from Southwest Asia back to the

continental United States. Once processed and identified, I then escorted the remains back to their families and stayed to perform funeral detail. I was also to provide condolences and return any belongings to the families. It was also my responsibility to present

the flag from the coffin to the family members. This done, I then

helped the family finish anything they may have forgotten or left

out.

I was then assigned in April to St. Louis as security for the new

helicopter prototypes being displayed at the stadium. I was there

for 3 weeks and was taken to the Air Force hospital with intestinal

bronchitis the second week. I recovered and then returned home.

Although I still felt bad, I took my annual PT test on April 12,

1991. My scores were 20 push-ups, 53 sit-ups, and I ran a 14:48

on my 2-mile run—a total of 232 points, which is passing for my

age bracket.

In May, I was assigned to Fort Detrick, MD for the release of

DOD police to take classes and do their training. I was there for

1 month. My duties included patrol, desk officer, gate duty and

general police work. I had a cold most of the time I was there, but

brushed it off as the cost of traveling that I had been doing back

and forth through the country. I returned home 2 days later and

was told that I would be returning to Southwest Asia. In June, I

returned with the 164th Direct Support Maintenance Company. We

were to perform numerous jobs in the few months we were there.

We were stationed at KKMC.

My jobs were as follows: senior customs inspector, arms room,

route reconnaissance, shotgun escort in and out of Dahran and Kuwait City, and general military police duties. Our first duty was to

ship connex’s of equipment, food, supplies, et cetera, back to the

United States. They had to be emptied, inventoried, cleaned, inspected, packed, and sealed for shipment back to the United States.

We were never issued any type of protective gear for this duty. In

August, we received a severely damaged connex of unknown origin.

Upon opening this, myself, Sgt. 1st Class Jattan, Staff Sgt. Henry

Brown, Staff Sgt. Bogden and Sfc. Kevin Knight were drenched in

a noxious, fuming gas that burned.

44

We found later that the contents was DS, CS and super-topical

bleach. The substances mixed with the water that constantly

drenched the tarmac and created this smoke. Everyone who had

been in contact was rushed to the TMC and the rack was shut

down; 2 to 3 days later it was reopened and we returned to duty.

Two weeks after that it was shut down permanently and we were

not permitted anywhere near it.

Upon returning home in December, my symptoms have been severe headaches, nausea, peeling skin, fatigue, rashes, unknown

scarring, dry mouth, weight loss, weight gain, numbness of the

hands and feet, constant colds, the inability to heal well, consistent

bleeding of the rectum, severe acid indigestion, sleeplessness, night

sweats, vivid recurrent memories, unusual movements in the abdominal region, hair loss, slight memory lapses, consistent soreness

of the joints and heart palpitations. I am seriously concerned over

the symptoms and I’m heartily fed up with being told they are a

figment of my imagination, that I’m getting old, or that I’m making

myself ill, because I had been, but my mind is making my body

think that it is unwell.

I have never been anywhere near this ill in my entire life, had

so many frequent colds, or felt so run-down. These symptoms also

change from bad to worse. I get used to feeling bad and then get

worse. And then I get used to that and it changes again. It’s not

getting any better, and I cannot accept that my mind wants to

make these awful things happen to me. Walter Reed Army Medical

Center claims it’s somatiform disorder. The VA is saying PTSD. I

can accept PTSD, purely because I was stationed in a combat zone.

Walter Reed Army Medical Center’s diagnosis is way off-base and

has no merit.

These doctors care nothing about us. They didn’t even want to

hear about what my unit or I went through, or any of the other

soldiers that were stationed there. Somebody has to put a stop to

this. We cannot continue to be treated this way. I’m sorry. We

served our country loyally and without hesitation. We all deserve

better. A GAO study needs to be done on all the facilities, and

records need to be researched. How many of us have been treated

and diagnosed in the same manner? There is a pattern here, and

I’m sure that my testimony will not only help myself but all other

Gulf war veterans who are going through the same uncalled for

treatment.

The thousands of us out here who are suffering along with our

families cannot be mass-hypnotized into thinking that this is in our

heads. Something is seriously wrong, and it needs to be investigated. I’d like to thank you for taking the time to listen to me.

And God bless you.

Mr. SHAYS. Your full testimony will be put in the record. You left

out a good chunk of it, didn’t you?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Yes, I did.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, God bless you. Sgt. Wood.

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee members, my name is Staff Sgt. Steven Wood. I would like to thank you

all for listening to me today. My road to sitting before you today

began some 6 years ago in the desert sands of Iraq. Before I joined

the on-line world 2 years ago, I was alone in my search for anVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:42 Jul 09, 2002 Jkt 080369 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\43668 pfrm04 PsN: 43668
45

swers. I luckily found others on the Internet who are experiencing

the same problems as I am. I stayed in contact with Denise Nichols. Her interest in what my German neurologist found is why I’m

here today to tell you my story and the stories of the other sick veterans. These are the veterans who have been forced to seek medical assistance outside this great country’s borders.

These are my medical records from before I went to the desert.

And these are my military medical records from afterwards. When

I boarded the airplane in Germany that took me to Saudi Arabia

in 1990, I was in perfect health, as these records indicate. Except

for a massive infection in my left leg caused by a burn I received

in combat I came through the Gulf war unscathed. Or so I thought.

I even was awarded a bronze star medal from a unit I was not assigned to. In the Gulf war, my primary job was as a launcher’s support team leader.

My men and I were attached to Alpha Battery 4th Battalion,

27th Field Artillery Regiment, Multiple Launch Rocket System. I

stayed with this unit my entire time in Southwest Asia until returning to Germany a few weeks early in 1991 because of my

health. As a school-trained area nuclear biological and chemical defense NCO, I was also the detachment NBC specialist.

My health problems started some time around the first week of

March 1991. While part of a convoy leaving Kuwait and heading

back into Iraq, my driver and I stumbled across something that I

feel changed our lives. We noticed an artillery round that was

roped off with yellow engineer tape.

Not only was this not normal, seeing as the other rounds in the

same area were not treated this way—but the round itself appeared to be blue. Upon closer examination I saw it was a sort of

a greenish-blue in color, with green and yellow painted bands. I remember thinking to myself how silly it was that someone would

have brought practice rounds to a shooting war. Later that same

day we arrived at our new position on what I believe was highway

8, replacing the 82nd Airborne.

I now had time to look in my manuals for the markings I had

seen earlier on the shell. I was shocked to see it was a perfect

match for a Soviet nerve agent. Later that evening I developed flulike symptoms and massive diarrhea. I submitted an NBC 1 report,

but never heard anything else about the incident.

While in this area bunkers were constantly being destroyed. One

explosion in particular was extremely large. And we were told by

our senior leadership, the engineers had just destroyed the largest

Iraqi ammunition dump. The nearest town to our position was An

Nasiriyha. When I returned to Germany, I continued to seek answers as to why I was not getting better.

For at least 6 months straight I tried to get help and had many,

many tests performed. It was about this same time I discovered

that my medical records from shortly before the war until then had

disappeared. It was at this point I began to suspect something

might be amiss. I continued to get worse, and was sent from doctor

to doctor. I never found anyone in the Army who was serious about

helping me—or anyone else, for that matter. I was told to suck it

up and drive on.

46

And being a good soldier, I did. Unfortunately it got the point

where I could no longer work to the standards of the U.S. Army.

While still on active duty, I never received any real health care. I

was told to quit faking, it’s all in my head, and my all-time favorite: we do not know what’s wrong with you, but you will be better

in 2 weeks.

In October 1995, I was placed on the temporary disabled retired

list at a rate of 30 percent disabled. In April 1996, I was seen by

a German civilian doctor who did more testing in 2 hours than the

Army did in 5 years. He found neurological damage during this

visit. He told my wife and I, it looked to him as if I had been

poisoned, and I might have multiple sclerosis. I took this information to an Army neurologist and was shocked at what I heard. I

was told, ‘‘I do not like you Gulf vets that say you’re sick. I was

there, and I’m not sick.’’

This doctor then proceeded to tell me she felt I had no neurological problems before even examining me and she flatly refused

to even read the German doctor’s findings. I have stayed in Germany along with numerous other veterans for a very good reason:

free unbiased health care. The doctors may not have been able to

fix us yet, but they are at least trying to get to the bottom of this

mystery. Another very important aspect is that we do not have to

deal with actual VA doctors. Every VA examination is done by a

German civilian contractor.

The Army states it is doing all it can for us. I was recently offered permanent retirement at 30 percent from the Army. This follows the Army telling Sen. Strom Thurmond in a letter that I was

healthy and basically slipped through the cracks. Nearly every

military doctor I have seen has stated they think nothing is wrong

before they even examine me. The one military doctor that tried to

help me was forbidden to do so at the last minute.

In light of the hard time I have had with the Army and their attempts to understate what is wrong to me, I must make one thing

clear to all of you: I have been found totally disabled by the Veterans Administration. In 5 days I have a formal Army medical

board to appeal my rating of 30 percent. I am interested in what

happens, since the Army still refuses to acknowledge that my

health problems are Gulf war-related. It will be especially interesting since the VA has decided, ‘‘The veteran was seen as exposed

to an unspecified chemical.’’

Not only do I have to fight the Army for a fair disability rating,

they have even refused to acknowledge my service and have withheld other awards from me. As I mentioned earlier, the VA has

rated me at 100 percent disabled. This is retroactive to November

1, 1995. The VA currently owes me well over $20,000 in back benefits. Since speaking with the Washington regional office when I arrived here Monday, I have found out that Philadelphia did not take

the appropriate actions to release this payment to me. Right now

I have no idea when I will see the money that I was supposed to

have weeks ago.

47

I truly believe that if something had been done sooner to help me

I would not be as bad as I am today. I am a non-commissioned officer. I always took care of my soldiers. We need your help to take

care of the others that can’t get it. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Sgt. Wood follows:]

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Sir, if I may, could I finish my statement?

I think it’s very important.

Mr. SHAYS. I would be happy to have you finish your statement.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Thank you very much. I’m very sorry for

the interruption. This is important to me and important to the two

gentlemen who are here with me and every other veteran in the

United States and anywhere else who is going through this. This

is my experience at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in the Gulf

war program. I was seen there by Col. Raymond Chung on Ward

64—is what they call it. And I started the program in August 1994.

I felt the program hadn’t helped any of the current and past symptoms I have experienced.

Dr. Chung made the statement, ‘‘You have to realize that you’re

getting old, Sgt. Sumpter.’’ This was made in the presence of my

husband. I will be 30 in July. The only answer I’ve been given is

an ultimatum: send in my results to a board now and be awarded

10 to 20 percent of base pay for 1 year as a settlement or go

through a 4-week physical training program designed to help me

learn to cope with my symptoms—which they are describing as

sympathetic and mind-induced—be taught how to be socially active

with the rest of the world, learn how to use PT to forget my mindinduced sympathetic symptoms, and be sent back to duty.

This is regardless if the symptoms are gone or not. We will do

1 to 2 hours of PT in the morning, then for the rest of the day be

seen by numerous psychologists, psychiatrists, nutritionists, family

counsellors, dieticians, and be placed on a certain schedule of

times. The social activation will be trips to Washington to see the

sights and learn how to interact with people. There will not be visitors or family allowed, no mail, and few if any phone calls. The reasoning for this, to Dr. Chung, is that we are being caused undue

stress from our children, spouses, family, friends and strangers

around us every day.

Spouses and children will be allowed a few hours on 1 day near

the end of the program to visit the programs. There will be only

six to eight people at one time allowed through this program. After

this extensive program we are then to go back to our units and dishonestly tell them that we are cured. When I pointed this out I was

told that I would not be lying, and that if I believed this, the program would not work for me because I had a poor attitude.

In January, I had been scheduled to take a psychological test for

6 hours for Dr. Fallensby. It was a battery of questions someone

might be asked to take as a semester final in high school. There

were lots of pictures, and I was asked to look at them and then

later—5 to 10 minutes later—asked to draw what I remembered.

I was given a letter of the alphabet and then asked to write down

as many words as possible in that time that I could think of—and

other such questions of the same nature. Based upon this test Dr.

Fallensby determined that I was severely depressed, suicidal and

angry at the world. This was all told to me by him during a session

in his office during the space of maybe 30 minutes to an hour.

This is a man I had never met and I do not know personally or

even as an acquaintance. I find Dr. Chung’s and Dr. Fallensby’s

comments and diagnoses degrading, unfounded, unprofessional and

totally out of line and character, as do my family and friends, espeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:42 Jul 09, 2002 Jkt 080369 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\43668 pfrm04 PsN: 43668
60

cially the rest of the world. My religious preference all my life has

been Church of God. And the only thing that makes me angry is

the fact that individuals who don’t know me are insinuating that

I could possibility take my own life when it is against my moral

beliefs and understandings.

If this was the case, why have I spent most of my life trying to

help people, bring happiness, and, most of all, have been given a

beautiful child to raise? I have dealt with my symptoms and numerous doctors for nearly 5 years now, and have always been patient and cooperative with everyone. Even through all the red tape

and paperwork, no one could ever claim that I had no patience.

Case in point, I recently found out that I have never been paid for

my dependent.

I have not been paid since December 1994 for monthly incapacitation pay and received only 4 travel voucher checks out of 20 completed and sent in August 1994. The problems all started when

Maj. Cusack from the surgeon’s office at ARPERCEN retired in

February and Capt. Crisp took over his position and was then sent

on TDY for 3 months. This happened before. It’s all been caught

up now. But this had happened in May. And since his departure

a woman named Denise had been working in his place. And she is

a civilian employee.

I had not spoken to any military person within that office in that

period of time. And shortly after he left for TDY, I spoke with Maj.

Block, who was the individual who found my dependent paperwork

on the bottom of my file. All military personnel have been very cordial and helpful since I was first enrolled in this program in January 1992. But this civilian, Denise, has answered all calls in-going

to Maj. Block since and refuses to let me speak with them. When

I have important questions she asks what they are and sometimes

asks Maj. Block and calls back or gives her own advice.

Example: when I call to speak with Maj. Block about the physical

program settlement program option Dr. Chung was proposing, she

said she didn’t understand what the problem was in going through

with the program, that her mother had to go through a similar program and it was very helpful to her. When I inquired whether or

not her mother was a Desert Storm veteran her reply was no, but

it didn’t make a difference, I should be grateful for the program,

finish it and go back to my unit and duty, that complaining about

good military doctors who knew what they were doing was just

plain silly, and to her it sounded as if I did not want to return to

work at all.

She refused to let me speak to Maj. Block about it. And when I

stated that I was not satisfied with her answers, she replied she

was only a civilian and could not or did not know what I needed.

During this phone call I was home in my home town in my brother

and sister-in-law’s house with my fiance and my other brothers

present. They heard the whole conversation. Is this what any veteran deserves? Do we mean nothing to anyone? Are we expected to

be treated like this and not be upset with these programs? If two

doctors—one civilian and one military—have declared that something is wrong and put it in writing, then why are their findings

being dismissed by Walter Reed? Why are we being told to go

through a program that wants us to lie to ourselves and to our

61

unit? Why does this sound so much like a cover-up, not wanting

us to really have an answer to any of this.

What I want out of this is the disability that I think I deserve

and so many veterans who have served in the Gulf. We went over

and put our lives on the line. We were in areas we should have

never been in. This isn’t right. I would like to give you an account

of what happened to me at the physical evaluation board at Walter

Reed. And this was on January 7, 1997 of this year. On January

30, 1996, I was seen at Martinsburg VA, West Virginia for a regional evaluation similar to Walter Reed Army Medical Center’s

Gulf war clinical evaluation. Dr. Bradley Soule, M.D., regional psychiatrist, met me for around 2 hours. His findings stated that I did

not have somatiform disorder, that in his opinion it was quite clear

that I have post-traumatic stress disorder. His explanation for

PTSD hit close to home for me in that it finally gave me some sort

of clue as to why I’m having some of the feelings and problems I

am experiencing mentally in addition to the findings of other physicians concerning and acknowledging my chemical exposure without

my previous admission of being exposed.

This three-page letter of diagnosis was then submitted to Col.

Carr, head of PEBLO, in January 1996 as a rebuttal of their

somatiform diagnosis. Col. Carr’s reply was that it was not admissible, and that Walter Reed Army Medical Center would stand by

their diagnosis from Dr. John Fallensby. As you can imagine, I was

shocked. Walter Reed Army Medical Center told me to seek other

opinions and then told me that they were not acceptable.

Dr. Soule is not the only psychiatrist I have seen and been evaluated by, either. In December 1996, I went back to the VA in Martinsburg to seek further evidence and medical attention. I was seen

by Dr. John Haram, L.C.S.W. and Dr. Ali Asghar, M.D., in mental

hygiene. After almost 2 hours with them they came to the same diagnosis as Dr. Soule. Their opinion was that my PTSD was so regressed and hidden consciously that I am now being counseled at

their vet center every week. On the morning of January 7, 1997 at

the PEB at Walter Reed, I presented the new evidence and the diagnosis of two different psychiatrists. Counsel and I were vying for

the change of diagnosis from somatiform to PTSD.

Capt. Jinny Chen met with the board and presented my offer to

them. They declined it and told her that if I chose to be seen before

them I would be found fit for duty due to my neat and healthylooking appearance. One of the board members saw me and my

husband in the waiting area and made this comment to counsel

after my request had been submitted. I told counsel that I did not

care about the rating or the money involved, I only wanted the diagnosis changed to PTSD from somatiform because of the opinions

that I heard from other physicians and psychiatrists. Below are the

two major reasons that I fought for this change.

The definition of undifferentiated somatiform disorder is characterized by unexplained physical complaints lasting at least 6

months that are below the threshold for a diagnosis of somatization

disorder. Somatization disorder, historically referred to as hysteria

or Briquet’s Syndrome: a poly symptomatic disorder that begins before age 30, extends over a period of years, and is characterized by

a combination of unknown pain, gastrointestinal, sexual, and pseuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:42 Jul 09, 2002 Jkt 080369 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\43668 pfrm04 PsN: 43668
62

do-neurological symptoms. Post-traumatic stress disorder, on the

other hand, is the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct

personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened

death or serious injury or threat to one’s physical integrity or witnessing an event that involves death, injury or a threat to the

physical integrity of another person, or learning about unexpected

or violent serious harm or threat of death or injury experienced by

a family member or other close associate. The person’s response

must involve disorganized agitated behavior. The characteristic

symptoms resulting from the exposure—— Mr. SHAYS. I just need to interrupt you. I’m trying to understand

your point now. I’m losing your point.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m losing your point.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. The point is that the somatiform disorder

is basically they’re telling us that—well, they’re telling me that I’m

a hypochondriac, that there’s nothing wrong with me, that I’m

making myself sick with this somatiform disorder. OK? And if

there is anything mentally wrong with me that has been found that

I can actually believe in, it would be PTSD, purely based on the

fact that I was in a combat zone for a year. That is the only point

I was trying to make.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Is that OK? So I can skip the rest. As you

can see from these definitions, I am thoroughly disgusted with

Walter Reed and their poor excuse for a physical evaluation board.

They know full well that they can throw us out and the VA will

pick up where they leave off. This so-called board is a sham, disgrace, and basically a sold-out jury of three officers who have found

an excellent loophole for the military to escape responsibility to

their used soldiers. This physical evaluation board says that I am

not fit for duty or my civilian job title. But they aren’t going to

admit that there is a problem caused by our Southwest Asia service, because we are no longer of any use to them.

From the moment an ill soldier walks into one of these military

facilities and mentions they were in the Gulf, the decision and diagnosis are already decided upon. To cover themselves, they tell us

to bring in other evidence to dispute their doctor. And when we do

it is dismissed as irrelevant and non-admissible. These boards do

not want to know how we are at home, how we feel, how our families and our friends are coping with what we’re going through,

what we were like before and what we are like now. They bring

down their judgment swiftly and without any thought to our wellbeing.

They didn’t want to hear about the incident at the wash rack,

the injections, the unfriendly fire we received, the contaminated

areas we were assigned to, or any chemical-related incident. They

also did not want to hear how their own physicians never asked

any questions pertaining to my service in the Gulf or even with the

mortuary. Fallensby didn’t even know I was a veteran. He assumed

my husband was the veteran. Something must be done to stop this.

We cannot allow this to be ignored any longer than it already has

been. It isn’t just the soldier who is ill now. It’s also the family

63

members and spouses, children, friends. For once the Government

needs to put an end to the cover-ups. After all, did we learn nothing from the Vietnam war?

Are we going to head down the same path? Every soldier who

has fought in a war for this country has the right to be treated like

a human being and not some machine to be discarded when it can

no longer function. Again, a GAO study needs to be done on the

military hospitals, the physical evaluation process, physical evaluation boards and members, the VA system and members who have

already been through these, and the physicians. Again, I would like

to thank you for your patience in listening to me today.

[The prepared statement of Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig follows:]

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. The military hospitals took a

pretty big hit today. And we’re going to be asking some questions

of all of you just to understand a bit about your experience. We’ll

begin with Mr. Sanders.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

thank all three of our brave veterans who are here today. It’s not

an easy thing to do, and we thank you for coming forward. Let me

start in reverse order with Sgt. Wood.

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SANDERS. Sergeant, I would like to concentrate on

pyridostigmine bromide.

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SANDERS. You indicate that you were given PB tablets—I’m

going to ask you a few questions, and then you respond however

you’re feeling comfortable. And I want to know if you were ever informed as to why you were taking the PB tablets? If you ever received any written material that describes the side effects of PB?

Were you informed that PB had not been approved as a protection

for chemical warfare? Did anyone attempt to monitor your medical

condition after requiring you to take PB? Were you ever asked

about your medical history before requiring you to take PB, and basically what you have learned about PB since your experience? Do

you want to talk a little bit about that?

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir. As a school-trained NBC NCO I was taught

that PB tablets were the treatment to take. They were there. And

it’s what we had to take if we wanted to survive. In the desert

when we took the tablets, we were not told of any side effects. No

record was given of taking PB tablets even whether we demanded

that records be maintained.

Mr. SANDERS. What about the dosages? Were dosages controlled?

Did people——

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir. A formation was held before the war started

and we actually crossed into Iraq. A formation was held, and every

soldier was monitored to take the pills. Once we crossed into Iraq

during the war, every, I believe, 6 or 8 hours, a radio call was put

out and everyone was ordered to take their pills.

Mr. SANDERS. What do you mean by monitored? What I’m trying

to get at, were the pills given out on a pretty strict basis? Were

some people swallowing more, perhaps, than they should have?

Was there supervision?

Sgt. WOOD. There was no supervision, sir. The full dosage was

given—enough for 2 weeks, I do believe. Each soldier had their own

in their blister pack.

Mr. SANDERS. Each soldier had their own?

Sgt. WOOD. Each soldier was issued their own. Yes, sir.

Mr. SANDERS. Might it have been possible that some were gulping down others?

Sgt. WOOD. It’s highly possible that someone that was scared

could have taken more.

Mr. SANDERS. And nobody really checked up on that? Do you

have that impression?

Sgt. WOOD. No, sir. They did not check on it. The only checks

made were: take your pills.

77

Mr. SANDERS. What’s your conclusion? Have you learned or been

thinking about PB since?

Sgt. WOOD. I’ve read much on PB, sir, since then, and it scares

me. It scares me. I’ve learned that PB is designed to protect

against one nerve agent: soman. And from the intelligence I saw

when I was in the desert, soman was not a threat to us.

Mr. SANDERS. Have you talked to any of your comrades who

might have also had problems that might be associated with PB?

Sgt. WOOD. The only incident of PB from people I served with,

sir, are the people who refused to take it, and pretended to take

it, and threw it away instead of swallowing the pills. And not one

of them is sick.

Mr. SANDERS. That’s interesting. You know, Mr. Chairman, we

also know that—if my memory is correct—the French soldiers did

not take PB as well, as opposed to some of the other coalition

forces. And the initial readings that I found is that they may be

doing better. The chairman would like me to ask you, what do you

mean by ordered to take? Talk about that.

Sgt. WOOD. Ordered to take. The pills were issued. The commander or the 1st Sgt. of the unit would come across the radio and

say, ‘‘Take your pills now.’’ Everything that we were given, from

shots to PB tablets, were on threat of court-martial if you did not

take them.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. And you are familiar now with some research

which suggests that the combination of PB combined with exposure

to other types of chemicals and pesticides might be a cause of some

of the problems some of our soldiers are suffering?

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir. I have read the studies that show if you

take PB tablets and are exposed to a common bug spray, that you

can actually force it across your brain membrane and cause the

damage that I have and the other veterans have.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Thank you very much. If I could very briefly

ask Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig, to the best of your knowledge, are women

who served in the Gulf coming down with particular ailments?

Have you been bumping into other women who are suffering problems as well?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. As in female problems that men can’t discuss?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes. Sure.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Symptoms that the men are not having?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Basically, it’s the hair loss and a change

in our cycles.

Mr. SANDERS. Menstrual problems?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Right. The bleeding rectum part of it I

have encountered with very few males that I keep in contact with

from my unit. It’s mostly the females that are having this problem.

And it’s not just certain bowel movements, it’s every movement.

Mr. SANDERS. Sergeant, just out of curiosity, did you take PB as

well?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. We were given the pills by a staff sergeant who just said, ‘‘Here, take these. You’re supposed to take

them. The medics gave us these to take.’’

78

Mr. SANDERS. And do you remember how people—did people take

them on a strict regimen or were they just stuffing them in their

mouths? How did that work?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. He came around every so often.

Mr. SANDERS. Every so often. Yes?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. And just handed us four and five pills.

And said, ‘‘Here. Here’s your medication.’’ Mr. SANDERS. In your various treatments in the hospital, has

anyone talked to you about that or asked you if you’ve taken them?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. No. Never.

Mr. SANDERS. OK.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. The first day I went to Walter Reed was

August 30, 1994. And they took me into this nice little waiting

room. And there was all these little doctors running around.

Mr. SANDERS. I’m going to cut you off. You know why? Because

that yellow light turns red. The chairman is going to be nice to me.

But let me keep moving here.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. OK. They were giving us coffee and stuff,

and they gave us this little nine-page questionnaire. How’s the

treatment here? Did you take any of these pills? And they told us

not to sign it. And then we turned it in to them. That’s the first

things they gave us: to see how the treatment at Walter Reed was.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Thank you. Let me ask the major a question.

Major, did you take PB, by the way?

Maj. DONNELLY. I took PB for about 3 or 4 days at the beginning

of the air war.

Mr. SANDERS. Why only 3 or 4 days?

Maj. DONNELLY. Well, there was some discussion about whether

the stuff was good for you or going to work or whatever. Probably

the highly skeptical pilot crew. The way they gave it to us was, the

flight surgeon just put it out in the little bubble packs, and said,

this is for our protection against nerve agents. We took it for about

3 or 4 days. It seemed like the thing to do at the time. It looked

like the war was going to be over fairly quickly. It was going well.

There was no evidence that he was using the chemicals. Stopped

taking it.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Let me ask you this: I am interested in your

remarks that, as I understand it, your symptoms became worse

when you were out jogging and you were exposed to malathion?

Maj. DONNELLY. Malathion, yes.

Mr. SANDERS. Malathion. I’m sorry. What conclusion do you draw

from that, or do your doctors draw from that? What happened as

a result of that chemical——

Maj. DONNELLY. I believe that the initial incursion that happened to me that made me sick was something in the Gulf war.

Studies on the inoculation for botulism and the anthrax shots we

got, the PB pills, evidence now that we may have undergone lowdose multiple chemical exposures over there, started some problem

in my system that the last rip of the paper or drop in the bucket

or whatever was this organophosphate-based pesticide.

Mr. SANDERS. So, you think that just could have triggered off?

Maj. DONNELLY. Sure.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes. Now, you say something that’s very interesting, and I want to know more about this. You indicate—you have

79

a very serious and rare illness—and you said, ‘‘I myself have found

more than nine other Gulf War veterans, some who have already

come before you, who are also suffering from ALS.’’ You have found

nine soldiers—and you’re understanding, this is a very rare disease—and you obviously do not have the resources of DOD.

Maj. DONNELLY. Right.

Mr. SANDERS. Now, that is a very startling—and this is an unusual disease for people under 50. So statistically——

Maj. DONNELLY. I’ve been to neurologists and doctors all over the

country, and to see how many people actually fought in the war

and the number of people that have this diagnosis, the incidence

is way too high. A lot of them are very interested in trying to find

out the names and medical histories of these people, but the only

people who really know all the names aren’t letting them out. I

know of—you know, I’ve had a doctor from the VA system, I think,

tell my parents—or whatever—that there’s 12 names on the list.

But they won’t give them the names because of patient confidentiality. I don’t know if I’m on the list either. And some of them are

no longer with us.

Mr. SANDERS. You’re guessing, though, that there’s an unusual

cluster?

Maj. DONNELLY. Absolutely.

Mr. SANDERS. OK.

Maj. DONNELLY. If we get the real data out of the DOD or the

VA, I believe that there would be some startling evidence.

Mr. SANDERS. I gather—and it’s the basis of your testimony—but

I’m gathering that you have no doubt in your mind that for somebody your age, somebody who has previously been in good health,

that your condition was caused by your experience?

Maj. DONNELLY. Because of the way that it started and because

of the similarity with the other people that have this disease from

the Gulf war, yes.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Major, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. I want to say up front that not everybody in Congress or even on this committee begins to have the knowledge level

of having gone through all the hearings like the chairman and the

ranking member. And part of the point of this is not only to educate Members of Congress but also America as the information gets

out. And you’re to be commended for coming forth and speaking

openly. Because when people know your patriotism and your commitment to the armed forces it comes across differently. And they

can see it in your testimony than somebody who might be trying

to weaken our military or what we’re trying to do. There’s an honest concern.

And on the surface, as I’ve heard the issue in hearing today, it

is hard to conceive, even if it isn’t an established link, why the lack

of interest in pursuing it isn’t immoral as well as stupid even from

a scientific standpoint. From the military standpoint as long-term.

It’s hard to fathom the types of stories you’re saying, that you

wouldn’t immediately respond, ‘‘Oh, this is something really important.’’

80

Not only is it fair for you as an individual, but to us as a country,

to understand what’s on here as the times are changing. And it’s

nearly unfathomable for me. It’s also very hard to ask you questions because it is so personally devastating to you, the career

you’ve chosen, the way you feel about your country, the health

problems you’ve had and so on. But there’s a couple that I want

to ask. And understand that I’m trying to learn some of what’s

going on. One is that I was interested on the PB question that Sgt.

Wood, you said that you knew that those who hadn’t taken the pills

didn’t show the symptoms. Is there a data collection process now

going on that? Is that an informal thing that you’ve learned?

Sgt. WOOD. No, sir. It’s just the people I’ve talked to over time

and met with. But the people that aren’t sick aren’t coming forward.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you have any threshold or number of that? Is

that something that—I mean, as we look at pursuing some of this,

how many cases are—when you say that you know personally there

are?

Sgt. WOOD. Highly informal, sir, at least seven or eight that I’ve

bumped into, just from my old unit.

Mr. SOUDER. And several of those didn’t take the pills and they

aren’t showing the symptoms?

Sgt. WOOD. The seven or eight that did not take the pills have

zero symptoms.

Mr. SOUDER. And how many who took the pills are showing some

of the symptoms?

Sgt. WOOD. I’ve met probably three times as many as that from

my old unit.

Mr. SOUDER. I had a similar question for Sgt. Sumpter-Loebig.

You said there were five of you—you gave, I think, five different

names in the specific incident where there was the spillage?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Right. The chemical spill.

Mr. SOUDER. Are the other four showing different symptoms? I

know different people react different ways. Some people aren’t necessarily going to be as forward, some are time delayed. But I’m just

trying to sort through, because you have the advantage of a very

specific incident. What has happened to the others in that incident?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Sgt. Jattan is from North Carolina. He is

having bladder problems, and they’re not getting any better—the

same symptoms that I’m having. Sgt. Dowell in South Carolina has

been diagnosed with cancer. He’s receiving 100 percent from the

VA. He’s not doing well at all. Sgt. Bogden in California cannot get

any treatment from anybody, which I find unusual. He cannot even

get treatment from the VA. So, he hasn’t had any luck at all.

Mr. SOUDER. But he’s showing symptoms, as well?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. He has the same symptoms that we have.

Henry Brown is in Arizona. And his wife is now showing the exact

same symptoms that he is. Although the only different diagnosis

that she has that’s different from his is, there’s something different

with her blood work. I believe it’s diabetes that has suddenly

shown up. But these are individuals—we went through a 2-week

medical test in Fort Dix. We were fit, healthy, PT-tested, stamped

grade-A, good to go. And we come home and this is what we came

81

home like. And it was not that we went over this way. We came

home like this. Because we were perfectly healthy when we went.

But the chemical spill, I think, triggered something more than

that. We were sick when we got there. The entire unit was down

with a flu-like cold after being injected with the shots. And that’s

when it started for all of us. My entire unit—the entire 164th was

sick. We had three medical people there: a spec 4, a PFC, and a

sergeant. And that is it. They took care of us.

Mr. SOUDER. Maj. Donnelly, I have a similar question for you.

You flew through the oil fires and were in several locations.

Maj. DONNELLY. Right.

Mr. SOUDER. And you said some of the people had some of the

different pills. Have you seen other people in your particular unit,

in your area, have similar type things, different? How could you describe some of the correlation of those who were similarly exposed

like yourself?

Maj. DONNELLY. Part of the difficulty in doing that is that my

unit got back to Germany and was immediately disbanded as part

of the draw down. So, you know, 35 to 40 guys in a flying squadron

all went different ways for the most part. In my efforts to try and

track them down—one other guy in my unit that I’ve found has

been having problems with dizzy spells and things like that. I have

run into other Gulf war pilots who were in other aircraft that have

had the same kind of heart palpitations, sweats, trouble concentrating, fatigue, things like that.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, you being here today, hopefully will make

some others in your unit aware if they’re having problems. It would

be helpful, because just from a—let me ask you another question.

Given the fact that at least two of you gave, now, specific instances

with a reasonable sample size, has anybody in the military or in

the VA or any doctor said that they’ve looked at the group as a

whole to look at any commonality?

Because what you tend to see in the media are a lot of randomtype things. But you’ve given us examples that there’s names,

there’s a time, there’s a date, there’s a number of people, there’s

a pattern. You’re saying you’ve seen, at least informally, you’ve got

potentially a sample size of 25–30 there. Those things—why do you

think—well, we can speculate as to why we think there hasn’t

been—do you have anything other than the fear that it might look

bad or monetary? It just seems so strange that somebody wouldn’t

pursue this. Or, like you say, that they have the names and nobody

else can follow it up. Anything else you want to suggest into the

record as to why that’s the case, why, if you were in command, you

wouldn’t do that?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. I know by personal experience that, when

they sent my unit—the 164th—to the KKMC, that that city was

evacuated because it was contaminated and they knew it. And they

sent us there anyway. The water was contaminated. The area was

contaminated. Everything was stripped and gone. And they sent us

in there. Even the Saudis were not there. They were evacuated.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me ask you this question—and this is a really

difficult question—but to some degree, when you go into the military, there’s going to be a certain amount of risk, and you know

that risk. And presumably, you knew there was some risk as you

82

were going through this because they were bringing up the tablets

and some of that. But isn’t one of the presumed things that when

you take the risk, that you’re going to be covered if the risk—in

other words, there are two sides to the risk? And that’s one of the

scary things as a parent and as somebody who is concerned about

how we maintain a volunteer army, is that you, in fact, knew there

was some risk, because you’ve already eluded to the fact that there

was a question of whether he was going to use chemical weapons,

you knew they were giving you pills, you knew that conditions

weren’t always going to be sanitary. But you assumed the good

faith that the military was trying to do what they could, and if it

didn’t work they’d take care of you. Is that a correct assumption?

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir. That’s true. And I’m sure I speak for everyone. When you join the military you fully realize that you’ll go to

war. And when you go to war, you’re fully prepared to give your

life to do what your country asked you to do. But we were all

wounded on the battlefield and then swept under the carpet. Not

one promise was kept to take care of us. I was one of the first participants in the comprehensive clinical evaluation program. I was

not asked one single time what I did in the Gulf war by any member of DOD. Not once.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Then, too, they take us through basic

training, and we train completely throughout our career in the

military using mock gear, know how to use your weapons. Well,

when you get over there and you get into a war like we got into,

we didn’t even get issued any protective gear. There was none to

be issued. There was nothing.

Mr. SOUDER. Once again, thank you for your work for our country. And hopefully, by you coming forth you cannot only help yourselves but others.

Mr. SHAYS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Allen.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you. Your

testimony has had an impact, I know, on me, and I’m sure on every

member of this committee, the people in the audience and across

the country. You’ve done a real service to your country today. I

can’t help but think back to almost 20 years ago when I was representing some people who had been sprayed, whose homes and

gardens had been sprayed with an herbicide.

And many of the symptoms that they complained about were the

same. And I have a question, but first a general comment. What

strikes me about this entire situation is that our medical profession

is able to say, if it’s a virus or a bacteria or a physical cause, we

go after it. But we are not doing a good job, certainly within the

military, and perhaps, to some extent, outside the military. We are

not doing a good job identifying the cause of some—whether it’s

pollution or chemical or biological agents that cannot be easily and

quickly identified, we simply are not doing a good job about that.

And I said earlier, this is a sorry record of performance. And it

needs to be improved. And I really believe that we have to focus

on how to get to the bottom of illnesses that do not affect each individual in exactly the same way, because they are not caused by one

virus or one bacterium. They affect different human beings in different ways. And it strikes me that we have failed at doing that.

Maj. Donnelly, I do have a question for you. This is a hearing about

83

the Gulf war and what happened there. And your testimony, for all

three of you, has been compelling on that ground.

But I was struck by the statement that you made that when you

were at Shepperd Air Force Base in Texas, it was the base’s policy

to spray with a fogging truck throughout the base housing, where

you lived with your family, the chemical malathion. I have some

apple trees. I don’t use malathion, because it’s bad stuff. And Mr.

Chairman, I don’t know if this is appropriate, but I can’t remember

what the malathion label says, but I’d like leave to go down to the

hardware and get a bottle and put the warnings on the label into

this record.

Because I think that that in itself is something that should be

looked at. And, Major, I’d be interested—you said in your testimony

that in talking with other people who have ALS and other Gulf war

veterans, that there seemed to be a common thread. And you described that common thread as some kind of subsequent exposure

to a strong chemical or pesticide. Could you elaborate on that?

Maj. DONNELLY. Sure, Maj. Randy Ebert, U.S. Marine Corps, testified before this committee—I don’t know if you remember, his dad

read his testimony, his wife was there—he came back from the

Gulf and he was doing OK until they sprayed his house for cockroaches. He happened to be in the house and in the garage when

they sprayed it. Immediately after that he started having the same

trouble I did.

Mr. Jeff Tack testified before this committee. He came back from

the Gulf, didn’t feel quite right, but wasn’t having any serious

problems until they treated his whole family and himself with lindane for head lice because the school had been having a problem.

Right after that he started having the same symptoms, and was

subsequently diagnosed with ALS.

Mr. ALLEN. Do you take this to be an indication that exposure

to chemical agents can sensitize human beings to subsequent exposure, so that the kind of exposure to malathion or some other

chemical agent that for most people would not have an effect, for

some people who have been previously exposed would set off all the

alarms or cause health problems or contribute to the accentuation

of health problems that they already have to some degree?

Maj. DONNELLY. Do I feel that’s true?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes.

Maj. DONNELLY. Absolutely. What you said—your opening statement—was right on the head. You nailed it.

Mr. ALLEN. OK.

Maj. DONNELLY. And you’re going to find that some people, I

think, are genetically predisposed. Some people have environmental or exposures prior to, which they are not able to detox and

the body hangs on to. It’s like ripping a piece of paper or filling a

bucket with water: eventually you get the last drop, which, if you

follow that line of reasoning, they should be warning the other people who are out there to say, ‘‘Hey, either you stay away from that

kind of stuff or you’re going to get sick, too.’’ Some may not ever.

Some people may be able to handle it just fine.

Mr. ALLEN. Right.

Maj. DONNELLY. But I don’t want anybody else to have to go

through this.

84

Mr. ALLEN. I don’t want anyone to do that, either.

Maj. DONNELLY. Right.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. SANDERS. Would the gentleman yield briefly for a second?

Mr. ALLEN. I’d be glad to yield.

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Allen touches on almost the definition of what

is now called multiple chemical sensitivity. And that is, the body

has absorbed a significant amount of chemicals and then exposure

to something new and strong occurs; it triggers off a reaction. And

I think the point that the major is making is of extraordinary importance. And that is, we may have hundreds, thousands—we don’t

know—of walking time bombs of young men and women who

served, who, if exposed to a strong chemical, could trigger off a serious problem. And I think your point is an excellent point, Major,

in that to the degree that we understand that, that word should

get out, that if you think you’re sick now, stay away from these

things. And did you want to elaborate on that?

Maj. DONNELLY. That would be preemptively treating people.

Mr. SANDERS. That’s right.

Maj. DONNELLY. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. That’s a very important point.

Mr. ALLEN. I’d be glad to yield the balance of my time.

Mr. SANDERS. I’m fine.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. We don’t have a time problem in this committee.

And, so, we can come back. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Allen. Mr.

Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I want to say first that Chairman Shays, I

know you’ve held numerous hearings on this, and I’m proud to be

on your committee, because you’ve done an excellent job of bringing

this issue to light. When no one else really wanted to, you’d pursued the truth on this. And the facts that are being extracted are

crucial to understand what happened in the Gulf, and also crucial

to helping veterans who have been told too long that their symptoms are psychological.

And as has been pointed out by Representatives Sanders and

Allen, perhaps, to provide some further caution to those who have

not yet been affected by the symptoms but could be. There’s a few

things that are apparent here, Mr. Chairman. And that is that the

Department of Defense failed to properly warn of the dangers, that

the Department of Defense failed to properly diagnose or treat the

veterans, that the Department of Defense is failing to adequately

compensate the people who have been affected, and, based on what

we just heard, that they are failing further to caution in the sense

to provide preemptive treatment.

The question I have to all of these things that are becoming obvious with the testimony is why. Why not inform people if they’re

taking PB that there could be consequences and symptoms based

on the dosage? Or why not inform people that malathion, whether

it’s sprayed in an area that’s safe and in the States or in the field,

could have serious effects? Why not inform people when they’re

being inoculated for these various potential disease encounters that

can have side effects.

85

I’m wondering why—and if it is true that the CIA in fact didn’t

know in 1984 that the—we’re told that the CIA has received numerous warnings starting in 1984 that chemical weapons were

stored in Iraqi munitions bunkers, but failed to alert the United

States military. You know, you, the witnesses here, you did not fail

your country, your country is failing you. And what we need to do

in order that we justify your presence in that war, is to get the answers: what did the CIA know; when did they know it; why didn’t

they communicate it to the Department of Defense or did they communicate it to the Department of Defense; and for some nebulous

idea of national security, nothing was said?

Your presence here cries out for justice, for you personally, for

your fellow servicemen and servicewomen. But it gets into some

deeper issues of national security which have to do with, if we

knew those dangers were out there in the first place and that our

troops could be exposed to chemical weapons in the first place,

what in the world were they doing there? And later on you pay the

price. But, you know, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, there are profound national security interests that were at

stake there. But was the national security best served by sending

people out into an area when the U.S. Government was in the position of information that there were munitions stored there?

And they were in position of information because the CIA received warnings. That’s what we have a CIA for. And they’re supposed to pass that information on so that our men and women out

in the field are not going to be hurt, so that they’re protected. Now,

it’s not enough for the Department of Defense to say that they really didn’t know, and for the CIA to admit that they had received

some warnings but didn’t pass it on. So, this committee, while we

have an obligation to assist you who are testifying here today in

getting vindication, in getting treatment, but not just treatment.

Because from what I hear you’ve all been treated and treated and

treated.

But what we’re not being treated to by the Department of Defense is the truth. It is reprehensible that people who have these

multiple symptoms are just told that it’s all in their minds. I’d like

to know, Major, as a high ranking officer, were you given any indication of the numerous dangers that could lie ahead from your superiors?

Maj. DONNELLY. I knew full well what the dangers were. I knew

they had chemical weapons. I knew they had surface-to-air missiles. I knew they had AAA. I knew what I was getting myself into

when I signed up.

Mr. KUCINICH. Were you told that the chemical weapons were

stored in Iraqi munitions bunkers?

Maj. DONNELLY. I knew that they had storage areas and production facilities. I was told that the way that we bombed them and

the munitions that we used to bomb them would totally eradicate

the material and not release into the atmosphere. Because we were

worried about that, too. But the munitions we used against those

known facilities and the way that we bombed them was supposed

to wipe this stuff out.

Mr. KUCINICH. But that didn’t happen? Or did it?

86

Maj. DONNELLY. Well, I think evidence shows now that it didn’t

happen.

Mr. KUCINICH. And what kind of bombs were you using?

Maj. DONNELLY. My unit specifically?

Mr. KUCINICH. Right.

Maj. DONNELLY. I did not use any—I used regular high explosive

incendiary bombs, some cluster bombs, things like that.

Mr. KUCINICH. Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, one of the most difficult things for our country to assess at

any time is the possibility that we may have brought greater casualties upon ourselves than the enemy did. And the testimony here

leaves so many open questions as to what you were told and what

happened that it not only justifies this hearing but it justifies, I

think, a deeper inquiry. I was listening to the testimony, making

out my own little chart here of exposure symptoms and exposures—and people didn’t have symptoms, and people who weren’t

exposed and showed symptoms, and people who neither had exposure nor showed symptoms.

And you wonder, if I can do that in a few minutes listening to

your testimony, why hasn’t some person in the Department of Defense who has lived with this for years been able to just do a study

which I think would probably demonstrate that people who were

exposed to PB, malathion, inoculations and chemical warfare have

been demonstrating these symptoms, and that people who were exposed and perhaps didn’t have symptoms, and then come up with

an epidemiological study. Mr. Sanders.

Mr. SANDERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KUCINICH. I’ll yield.

Mr. SANDERS. I think you raised the question that I raised in my

opening remarks, in that what is very frustrating for many of us

who have gone to these excellent hearings put together by the

chairman and his staff, is that these same questions come up over

and over again: why not, why not, why not? Now, the good news

is that outside of the Pentagon and the VA some very serious research is being done showing the correlation, the problems of the

synergistic effect of PB and various other chemical exposures. Some

very important findings are taking place. They’re not taking place

within the defense establishment. The conclusion that I have

reached, for whatever reason—I’m not even interested in speculating—is that it isn’t going to happen.

You know, you can knock it and knock it and knock it. But for

whatever reason, it’s not going to happen. Therefore, I think we

owe something to 70,000 veterans who are sick today to say,

‘‘Sorry, the defense industry is not going to do it. The Defense Department is not going—we’re going to have to go where the action

is.’’ And there’s some very fine researchers. And I think we should

bring them together, probably either at a university or in a nonmilitary agency of the U.S. Government, bring the best minds together, develop a Manhattan type project, say we want immediate

analysis, diagnosis, and treatment therapies. I don’t think it’s going

to—I think if we keep going with the DOD and the VA, we’re going

to have this discussion 10 years from now. And I think we’ve got

to recognize that.

87

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman for his perceptive comments. I think we also need to pursue this to make sure that it

doesn’t happen again. Because PB is still being used. Is that—I

would assume. Does anyone have information to the contrary? You

know, there’s still spraying with malathion going on. It’s still—I

don’t think it’s banned. They’re still inoculating people if they’re

going into areas that are potential hazards. And we still have the

threat of chemical warfare. That issue is before the Senate right

now.

So, considering that all those factors are still evident, I guess

part of the challenge here is not only to try to remedy the horrible

pain and suffering that you’ve been through, along with the other

service persons, but also, what can we do to make sure that this

doesn’t happen again? We’re clearly being given plenty of testimony

to suggest that there is a causal relationship here. And if there is,

as your hearings have revealed, Mr. Chairman, then we certainly

are in a position to make recommendations to be certain that more

service men and women are not going to be affected the way that

you have.

Because we’re doubtless going to be ending up in situations in

the future that are similar. How do we stop it from happening

again? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, members of the committee.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. And it’s good to have you on

the committee. I just need to clarify a few points before we go on

to the next panel. All three of you were career servicemen and

women?

Maj. DONNELLY. Yes, sir.

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record all three have responded in the

affirmative. There are many things, as committees learn. And we’re

getting to the point where we’ll be issuing a report and making

some recommendations as well as continuing our hearing. One

thing that is very clear is that there is no one illness, no one symptom, no one cause. That seems fairly clear. Another thing that is

eminently clear is that all of our soldiers who were ill were voices

crying in the wilderness literally. And your treatment with, in

many cases, with military hospitals, and with the VA, were found

wanting in a significant way. That’s very clear.

It’s very clear that nobody wanted to know what you did in the

service. They didn’t want to know how you were exposed. And I

can’t think of anything more heart wrenching when you’re in front

of someone who you’re seeking help from who seems very disinterested. It’s also very clear to me that the military misuses chemicals, workplace chemicals, in ways that we would never allow in

the public sector and in the private sector back home. That is very

clear to me. And with that, I first want to ask you, Ms. Sumpter,

Sergeant, you had experiences of using lindane? Were you involved

with using lindane on the troops, or were you just in an area where

that was happening?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. KKMC was the area where we were bringing any stray enemy prisoners of war in.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

88

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. And there was a containment area. And

while we were guarding this perimeter—it was nothing more than

concertina wire in three different perimeters.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. OK? There was the outside perimeter.

And they had a couple of guards. And then your inside perimeter

was a little more. And then further inside it was more. And then

there was the prisoners. And that’s the only way that we could contain them. And this was out in the open all day and all night. And,

yes. They sprayed them off out there. And with the wind. And

there’s no trees. And the storms. Everything blew back right in our

faces.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So, you weren’t administering the spray, but you

were—— Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. We all were wet with it when we were out

in that area.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And this happened for an hour or so? Or did this

happen for days?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. It depended on how rapidly we were moving the prisoners in through this containment area and then getting them to the hospital.

Mr. SHAYS. So, you were basically, in a sense, managing these— herding people into one room—escorting them, whatever—and so

this happened on a continual basis?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Now, let me just—you had that experience. Lindane, in this country, would be regulated in its use.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. It’s supposed to be regulated.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. But it was being used. These people were

really infested with a lot of little creatures.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. OK. Now, when you came to both the military

hospital and the VA and you maybe explained an experience like

that, was there any interest?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Through the VA?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. There was some interest at the VA when

I was speaking with one of the specialists who was examining the

scars that I received over there.

Mr. SHAYS. How about the military hospital?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. No.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you attempt to explain to them?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Yes, I did.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, you had another experience with the chemical

that—the canister and so on. Would you just very briefly describe

that again to me?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. The chemical wash rack experience?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. We had received a damaged connex that

was brought in. We had no clue where it was, who it belonged to.

When we opened it, these chemicals all came out and hit the water.

We had a standing pool of water like this all the time. We had fire

hoses deconning the inside of these connexes for shipment back to

the United States. Everything had to be cleaned and packed and

89

made sure there was no living animals, no plants, no illegal substances in the containers.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. And in the process of the chemical spilling,

what happened? Was there a fog? Was there a mist? Was there

a——

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. It was a really, really thick—if you want

to call it a mist, a fog. It just turned into this really thick cloud

of smoke.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, when you attempted to explain—because that

was of concern to you, correct?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Pardon me?

Mr. SHAYS. That was of concern to you?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Yes. That was a great concern to me. We

were working on this wash rack. And I’ve been a Customs Inspector for 10 years. And they’re telling me we don’t need any chemical

protective gear out there. We’re using equipment to decon these

containers, but we don’t need any chemical protective gear.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just have a sense, never having served in the

military. If you said, ‘‘There is no way in hell that I am going to

do this, because I think this is dangerous,’’ what would happen?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. That was brought up several times by myself and the other NCOs that were on the wash rack. We were told

to do our jobs, that the wash rack was priority No. 1, and that all

other matters were expendable.

Mr. SHAYS. So, you had concern at the time and wanted to show

more caution, but you were under orders to proceed?

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. We were under orders to proceed. This

was priority No. 1.

Mr. SHAYS. There’s a gentleman in Connecticut who, from New

Britain—Sgt. Dulka—whose job was to spray lindane day in and

day out on the thousands of troops that were caught in his area.

He died of pancreas cancer, I think. And he was in a confined area.

I think he was actually in a tented area with no ventilation for

days in and days out. That would never be allowed in a civilian

population. The Government would go after whoever did that and

prosecute them. In Mr. Dulka’s case, he was under orders. He

would have been court-martialed if he didn’t carry out his orders.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Correct.

Mr. SHAYS. So, one thing is very clear to me. The workplace of

the military, and what soldiers have to do, has to be totally examined by the Defense Department. Anyhow, Mr. Wood, your concern

is that you were—Sergeant. I’m sorry.

Sgt. WOOD. That’s OK.

Mr. SHAYS. Your concern was that you were at Khamisiyah exposed to the plumes, et cetera, from the blowing up of the depo, is

that correct?

Sgt. WOOD. No, sir. I actually was sick before that happened.

Mr. SHAYS. Pardon me?

Sgt. WOOD. I was sick before those explosions occurred, a day or

two before. We went through and ammunition storage area that

had been blown up by the allies. There were chemical rounds laying on the ground that I accidentally stumbled across. And that

was the day I got sick. And that has been attested to by my commander at the time.

90

Mr. SHAYS. Now, again, you didn’t find much sympathy when

you expressed concerns. First off, were you ever required to carry

out an order that you thought was dangerous to your health, like

Sgt. Sumpter; she and her crew expressed concern about it. But

you weren’t in that same kind of circumstance. You weren’t administering chemicals and so on.

Sgt. WOOD. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. But was there anything—did you have protective

gear?

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir. We have protective gear.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you ever go to MOPP4?

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. How many times?

Sgt. WOOD. I can’t even begin to count, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Seriously? More times than you can think of?

Sgt. WOOD. Well, I also have trouble remembering, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Sgt. WOOD. But it was a minimum of 10 times we went to

MOPP4 before we even went into Iraq.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And in every instance, you’re being told that

that was a false alarm?

Sgt. WOOD. Practice.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Sgt. WOOD. Practice, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. It was practice. It was not based on an alarm?

Sgt. WOOD. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So, you never had an alarm go off that said, you

better put on your gear?

Sgt. WOOD. Almost every day during the air war, sir. Almost

every day during the air war our alarms went off. And at times,

the alarms would go off, and they would say, ‘‘It’s OK. Do not put

your gear on. This is practice.’’ I would get into my truck with my

men to go pick up spare parts or deliver a port that had to be

taken somewhere else. And every other unit on the way is in

MOPP4.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Now, but were you also in Khamisiyah, as well?

Sgt. WOOD. We were in the area. We were near An Nasiriyha,

is what we were told. And one explosion, in particular, that I remember, was so huge it actually shook the tent sides. You put sand

on the side of the tent to hold it down, to keep wind from blowing

through. And it knocked the sand off the tents. It was that big of

an explosion. And we were told that we were near An Nasiriyha.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, is it your testimony that your—your wife is

German, is that correct?

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And you live in Germany today?

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Is your testimony that you are there as a convenience

or because you believe that you will get better health attention

there? If health was not an issue, would you be in the United

States today?

Sgt. WOOD. When I was being processed out of the military for

retirement, we had to decide what we wanted to do. We could either stay in the United States or come to Germany. And we

91

weighed all of the possibilities. In the United States our money

would go much further, and we could have so much more in housing and so forth. But I could not get medical care. I could not get

insurance. In Germany, I am covered. I am covered for free. And

the doctors have zero limitations on what they can do. I am in Germany because of health care.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. You’re in Germany because of health care, but

not because it’s free?

Sgt. WOOD. It is free for me, yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. No. But it would not be free for you in the United

States as a retired medically-discharged soldier? I’m not clear

about this.

Sgt. WOOD. Access to the hospital would be free. Yes, sir. Medical

care? I have never seen it.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Sgt. WOOD. In a military facility.

Mr. SHAYS. It is also regarding—I want to be really clear on this.

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And I don’t want to put words in your mouth.

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. So, what I was hearing you imply was that you’re

there because you also think you get better health attention, not

just because it’s free?

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir. To make it more specific. If I walked into

a military hospital today, after speaking with you, I would still

more than likely be told, ‘‘There’s nothing wrong with you,’’ be offered no treatment. But if I go to a German physician, he will do

tests. He will try to do his best to find out what’s wrong and treat

me. Yes, sir. That’s what I’m saying.

Mr. SHAYS. And—does the gentleman need to yield?

Mr. SANDERS. No. I was just—another subject. As an advocate of

a national health care system, which Germany has, I think that

tells us something about the care. But that’s another subject.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, but—and we can get into that—but what I

want to get into is, I just want to know if your testimony today as

an American citizen is that, as someone who I sent with my vote,

to the Persian Gulf, because I have absolute total conviction that

your mission was extraordinary important——

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. And I believe what all three of you did

was not just for the good of the United States and Europe, but for

the entire free world. I believe that with all my heart and soul. I

just want to know if you’re saying to me that you are in Germany

today because you think that doctors in Germany will pay more attention to you and provide better diagnosis and treatment for you,

even though you aren’t even a German citizen, than you would get

in the United States? And that’s what I’m trying to nail down.

Sgt. WOOD. Mr. Chairman, I am American. I love my country.

And it pains me terribly. But, yes, that is what I am saying. I must

live in Germany to get the care I need.

Mr. SHAYS. Would the issue of the nerve pills——

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir?

92

Mr. SHAYS. The military had to go to the FDA and have an informed consent waiver. The pyridostigmine bromide [PB] is used

for treatment of a particular illness.

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And this was being used in a different way. Now, the

military was given permission—allowed to have you all take these

pills. But they were not given permission not to inform you. In

other words, the deal was, you were to be informed.

Sgt. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, all three of you took these pills. And I’m going

to ask each of you. Were you informed that this was, in a sense,

an experimental drug and it could have negative side effects? And

I’m going to ask each of you. Sgt. Wood.

Sgt. WOOD. No, sir.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. No, sir.

Maj. DONNELLY. I don’t recall. I was never given anything in

writing. I don’t recall exactly what the flight surgeon said when he

put them down. I do remember a discussion of, what is this?

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Maj. DONNELLY. Some kind of mistrust of it. But nothing any

specific—— Mr. SHAYS. That’s just because you’re a pilot.

Maj. DONNELLY. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. You’re taught to think that way. You know, and

Major, I was thinking, you flew for almost 15 years.

Maj. DONNELLY. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. And you’re in a wheel chair today. And you want to

be healthy. And you also probably want to fly.

Maj. DONNELLY. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. There’s the one issue of the misuse of chemicals by

the military. And all military personnel being under orders sometimes to use chemicals that is not appropriate. But you follow orders. That’s what you’re taught. And then there’s the whole issue

of offensive or defensive use of chemicals. In other words, defensive

is when we blew up chemical munitions plants and depos of the

Iraqis, some by plane, some by personnel on the ground. Maj. Donnelly, are you aware whether any of our targets were chemical

plants?

Maj. DONNELLY. I don’t think I bombed specifically a chemical

plant. I bombed some weapons storage areas like Khamisiyah.

When you look at it from the air, it’s a huge complex. I have video

tape from my airplane of Khamisiyah. We used to fly the combat

air patrols over that area after the war was over in the no-fly zone.

So, we would check on those areas daily. I bombed several of those.

Airplanes coming and going inside of the theater. There was an

iron highway of airplanes. There were things blown up all over the

place.

Mr. SHAYS. Is your concern just—we’re going to get to the next

panel here, because I do know that we have to move on. But let

me understand this: Is your concern that you were exposed to

chemicals in flight or at your base, or both?

Maj. DONNELLY. My base was outside of the range of any known

threat like the Scuds. I landed several times at a place called

KKMC. We used to do what we called quick turns out of there.

93

We’d land, get more bombs and fuel, go back up there. I found out

later that KKMC was one of the areas that they found to be contaminated. Sometimes right after an early morning Scud strike

we’d land in there and everybody would be running around talking

about, we just had a Scud come in. Nobody in MOPP gear. Or nobody other than just excited about the fact that a Scud came in.

I don’t have a specific example when I can remember of an event

that happened to me during the war.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. I’ll just tell you, the last thing that I, as chairman, at least, am wrestling with, and the committee in general is

wrestling with, and that is, we have testimony from the VA and

others that medical science doesn’t know how to truly diagnose and

treat chemical exposure. That’s the testimony. And it’s clear to us

that the VA in particular has very few people who have any expertise in chemical exposure. And the goal of this committee is to

properly have you diagnosed, treated, and compensated for your

service. And yet, there are only two countries in the world—Israel

and the Netherlands—that have a specialty, a school that just focuses in on chemical exposure. And my understanding is, our medical institutions don’t really provide much training, except there

are some who are industrial hygienists and environmental toxicologists and so on.

But this is kind of a side issue for the military and the VA. And

it’s conceivable that one of our recommendations will be that we,

like the Netherlands and Israel, have to do this. But all of you— I mean, I know Maj. Donnelly, you spent time in Texas, I believe,

with someone who was trying to get the chemicals out of your body.

Did you feel that was a constructive exercise?

Maj. DONNELLY. I learned a lot that I didn’t know before about

what we deal with in our environment every day. The organophosphates are not testable inside of your body after about 48

hours. So, it was an effort to see, given the options I had, if that

would do any good.

Mr. SHAYS. But the bottom line is, medical science kind of looks,

scans with discredit, at some of the things that you found yourself

wanting to experiment. Is that correct?

Maj. DONNELLY. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. I mean, one was to kind of sweat out the chemicals

from your body. And you did all those kinds of things. Correct?

Maj. DONNELLY. Right.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you have any comment about that?

Maj. DONNELLY. How much time you got?

Mr. SHAYS. We don’t have a lot of time.

Maj. DONNELLY. My main point on that is that I’ve learned a lot

about our medical system with all the doctors that I’ve seen. They

are not open to leading edge investigation of anything. If it’s not

written and published in an AMA journal or JAMA or something,

it does not exist. That’s the problem with treating Gulf war illness,

is that people buy the—they buy the misdirection. They buy the

misinformation coming out of our Government that there is not

Gulf war illness. So, they don’t even look, some of them. There are

some who believe there is something there. You don’t have to look

hard to see. You know, here we are. I’m not a rocket scientist, but

even a pilot can figure that one out.

94

Mr. SANDERS. Let me interrupt you, if I might, Major, because

I think you put your finger—all of you are doing a terrific job, and

I appreciate it. You put your finger right on the issue. I don’t think

that there’s malice. We all believe that the DOD and the VA want

to do the right thing. But what you’re suggesting—you used the

word cutting edge. The VA and the DOD are not cutting edge. Unfortunately, if you guys were shot, they probably are the best doctors in the world. We can do something fantastic things for battlefield injuries. The orb is that what you are suffering from is not

conventional type of wounds and injuries.

You are probably—you know, I’m not a doctor—but evidence that

we have heard before this committee is that you may be suffering

from a synergistic impact of different type of chemicals combined

with the drugs that you took. And you know what? The Major is

absolutely right. There’s virtually no knowledge of that within the

DOD and the VA right now. The point that I’m trying to make is

that we’re going to have to go outside of the system to those cutting

edge people, who may be doing experimental things. Maybe they’re

not right 100 percent of the time. But to do the same old thing

when they’re not making the diagnosis or coming up with the treatment is knocking our heads against the wall. Is that what you’re

saying, Major?

Maj. DONNELLY. Absolutely.

Mr. SANDERS. But what’s troubling is, after World War I, the

general—Dr. Joseph, when he was testifying before us, basically

made the analogy that if they weren’t—and I have to be fair to

him, because I don’t have the record in front of me—but I’ll tell you

my interpretation. My interpretation was that if they weren’t dying

on the battlefield because of chemical exposure, there was no chemical exposure.

Maj. DONNELLY. Right.

Mr. SANDERS. And yet we know in this environment in the United States, that low-level chemical exposure leads to bad health and

ultimately death. We know that. What’s hard for me to reconcile— and I’m saying this, Dr. Rostker, there’s a possibility that you could

respond to it, who will appear in the next panel—what is troubling

me is if in World War I, we knew that some soldiers died on the

battlefield because of nerve agents and so on, others came back

home and died years later, but prematurely because of low-level exposure. We know that happened in World War II, the Korean war.

We do know that with radiation—nuclear radiation—men and

women who were—particularly men who were cleaning the planes,

and others who were exposed to nuclear radiation with Agent Orange—it would seem to me that the Pentagon would have the top

experts with chemical exposures. And it seemed to me the VA

would have it. And we wouldn’t just be great at dealing with a bullet wound or some shrapnel wound. So, that’s what this committee

is wrestling with. You know, we want to have these hearings. We

want to also lead it to some conclusion.

One thing we do know—or at least we’re convinced—you

wouldn’t know about Khamisiyah today if it wasn’t for these hearings. So, we know that there’s some good in that. And the other

thing we do know is that your testimony is very powerful, is absolutely the core of it. You are the most important people that will

95

appear before us today, without any question. And as someone who

played a part in sending you there, I want to play a part in making

sure you get better. So, I thank you—all three of you—for being

here.

Sgt. WOOD. Thank you.

Sgt. SUMPTER-LOEBIG. Thank you.

Maj. DONNELLY. Thank you.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. We will go to our next panel. And we’ll just maybe

take a 2-minute break to exchange the witnesses.

[Recess.]

Mr. SHAYS. I’d like to begin with or second panel: Dr. Bernard

Rostker, the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses at the Department of Defense, Mr. Robert Walpole, Special Assistant for Gulf

War Illnesses for the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Walpole, is

that a new position?

Dr. WALPOLE. Yes, it is.

Mr. SHAYS. And Mr. Donald Mancuso, Deputy Inspector General,

Department of Defense. I think, as you all know, we have a tradition, we swear in all our witnesses, including Members of Congress.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. For the record, our witnesses have responded in the

affirmative. I think we’re going to be able to—do any of you have

time restraints other than Mr. Rostker. I mean, I think we won’t

have any—Dr. Rostker. I’m sorry. Does anyone else have any time

restraint?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. I appreciate the fact that you all three were here for

the testimony of our veterans. And that means a lot to this committee that you were here for their testimony. And also thank you

for not doing what some like to do and say, ‘‘We’re here in official

capacity and would like to be first.’’ So, I also thank you for that.

While I pointed out that the first panel was the first important, it’s

all in degrees. And you are a very important panel, and it’s nice

to have you here. And Dr. Rostker, I think we’ll start with you.

Mr. ROSTKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you for your testimony. It was very helpful.

Mr. SHAYS. Will you lower your mic just a bit?

STATEMENTS OF BERNARD ROSTKER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT

FOR GULF WAR ILLNESSES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;

ROBERT WALPOLE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR GULF WAR ILLNESSES, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND DONALD

MANCUSO, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE

Mr. ROSTKER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee this morning. In previous testimony

presented in January, I outlined the mission of my office and described the full extent of the commitment of the Department of Defense. It is imperative that we find out everything we can to determine the possible causes of illness while providing the best possible

care for those who are ill. We also have an eye toward the future

as we learn from our Gulf experience and make the necessary

96

changes in policy, doctrine, technologies to protect our forces in the

future.

With that as sort of my mission, I would like to comment on this

morning’s testimony which I applaud the committee for, and I personally found very useful. Three points that I think might help you

put the testimony this morning in perspective. First of all, you

know of our significant efforts to understand low-level chemical exposure and Khamisiyah. But that’s not all we’re doing. And we’ve

stood up an environmental team which is explicitly charged to look

at issues such as pesticides.

They are of great concern to us. And we are trying to understand

how they were used in the Gulf and the possible health consequences from their use. We’ve also commissioned a medical review paper that would provide us with state-of-the-art knowledge

about what you’ve talked about as multiple chemical exposures, or

I like to think of the hyper-sensitivity to chemicals, and that those

issues are also part of our focus for new research. So, we share

your concerns for the issues that we raised this morning about pesticides. An issue was raised, also, about incident reporting. And one

of the Members made reference to the fact that there were people

here and there might be a cluster.

We might have seen a unit that had an exposure. And wasn’t

anybody in the Department of Defense looking at that. In fact, we

are. We have a 800 number that is doing exactly that. And it’s

highlighted in this little handout that we give out to veterans, and

has been on armed forces radio and television. The item on the

back says DOD incident reporting line. It focuses on examining incidents which occurred during the Gulf, the hazardous exposures

that may have resulted from these incidents, and the broader implications of such incidents.

So, we are very eager to track down the kind of clusters that we

discussed here this morning, and to try to make sense of them

within the broad pattern. So, the question of was anybody interested in the Defense Department, the answer is, yes. We are very

interested in talking to people that have had these kinds of experiences. As you well know, the only way we’re going to get at what

happened in the Gulf is to talk with and involve the people who

served in the Gulf in our inquiries. And that’s a major focus of

what we have been doing.

Finally, the issue of ALS was raised, and questions were asked

about, well, couldn’t we figure out what the incidents of ALS is. In

fact, we’ve done that. After your hearings in December where somebody with ALS was also a witness, I went back and asked exactly

that question. Currently, the two combined registries—the defense

registry and the VA registry—are carrying nine veterans who have

a diagnosis of ALS. The normal rate of occurrence for ALS within

the general population under 40 per 100,000 of population is between 1.0–1.5. In other words, for the population that served in the

Gulf, we would expect to see roughly between 7 and 11 cases of

ALS. And we’re looking at nine cases of ALS.

I can provide for the record the more specific numbers and the

site for the general population if you’d like, sir. But that doesn’t

take away from the tragic nature of the disease. And our hearts go

out to the Major. And we wish he and his family the best. But

97

those are the basic statistics as we understand them. Having said

that, let me now return and review for you some of the significant

progress we have made since I last appeared before the subcommittee.

We have embarked on a comprehensive research program which

has resulted in many proposals being received to examine the consequences of a number of potential causes for illnesses, but particularly low-level chemical agents. The proposals are undergoing internal and external non-DOD peer review. Awards will be made.

We have eliminated the backlog of calls from veterans who contacted the 800 number that I just referred to. Approximately 90

percent of those who have called have been fully debriefed by a

trained investigator. That’s around 1,600 phone calls.

Our technique is to take the initial call, and then within 72

hours a trained investigator calls back and does a complete debrief,

ensuring that the information is passed to the right analysis team,

assuring that we maintain contact with the veteran. These debriefs

often last for well over an hour, and some over 2 hours. In reality,

it’s not just debriefing on what happened in the Gulf, but talking

to the veteran and often referrals to the VA, and other issues are

raised and we try to deal with them.

But we’ve accomplished over 1,600. In truth, sir, we have more

people working the telephones—the 800 number—than the department had investigating Gulf illnesses before my group was stood

up. We have launched an outreach effort, in January mailing surveys to approximately 20,000 Gulf war veterans who may have

been within 50 kilometers of Khamisiyah. To date, more than 6,000

veterans have responded. Of that number, approximately 300 commented on their illness or health, and approximately 300 provided

information on what they saw in Khamisiyah. And all of these are

in the process of receiving phone calls and being debriefed.

The latter group receives followup calls from the investigation to

try to understand specifically what they may or may not have seen

at Khamisiyah. Our GulfLINK home page is now interactive. Veterans now can e-mail their concerns. And we’ve opened up a twoway dialog with the veterans rather than a static home page. We’ve

also gone to news articles on the home page so that we can communicate to the veterans what we’re doing and what’s going on rather

than just posting transcripts of hearings, although I’m sure, sir,

you appreciate that the transcripts of your hearings are outstanding.

And the veterans need to see that. But there’s more that we’re

doing than just testifying. We have strengthened our relations with

the veterans service organizations and the military service organizations with monthly roundtables on such topics as the chemical

gear used in the Gulf, depleted uranium and the like. And as you

know, I kicked off a nine city town hall tour. Last night I was at

the American Legion post in Atlanta. And tonight I’ll be in Boston.

These meetings are productive, and they provide the front-line contact that is necessary for us to fully appreciate the concerns of our

veterans.

I know the committee has been concerned about the missing portions of the chemical and biological logs. The investigation of the

CENTCOM chem logs has been turned over to the DODIG. My ofVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:42 Jul 09, 2002 Jkt 080369 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\43668 pfrm04 PsN: 43668
98

fice has taken this investigation to a point where the assignment

to the DODIG is quite appropriate to provide the additional resources that her office can provide. Our inquiry, which will be expanded by the DODIG, indicates that the chemical log pages that

survived were extracted from a full set of logs that survived at

least until 1994.

We believe they survived because the specific pages that—the 30-

some odd pages that we still have—we believe they survived because they were used to prepare testimony for the defense science

board. In other words, these were the pages that were actually

taken out of the larger number of pages in the log because they

carried significant chemical events. With the exception of

Khamisiyah, almost every major chemical event we are investigating, such as the Czech-French detections, the Marine breaching operation which was testimony here to your committee, are carried in the chemical logs.

Moreover, we would not expect to see Khamisiyah on these pages

because it was not viewed or reported by the troops on the scent

at the time as a chemical event. It is my best assessment that

these missing pages did not contain information about chemical exposures. In addition, we do have the core situation reports for the

18th Airborne Corps for the specific days around Khamisiyah. And

they do not mention chemical events at Khamisiyah. We also have

the logs for the 82nd Airborne Division, of which the 37th Engineers was a part. And they also do not mention chemicals at

Khamisiyah. They do talk about the explosions that went on at

Khamisiyah, but there was no reporting of chemicals.

There are a number of other collateral efforts underway to obtain

more detailed information which is supportive of the work in my

office. The Army IG is also conducting an investigation of the

events at Khamisiyah. And we are providing them with additional

leads as we gain those leads. So this is an independent effort. But

we are coordinating to make sure that their effort is fully comprehensive to our best knowledge of any supporting events. The assistant to the Secretary of Defense for intelligence oversight is undertaking an independent and further investigation of what the intelligence community, and particularly the defense intelligence

community, knew concerning Khamisiyah before and after the

events at Khamisiyah.

These investigators are well-coordinated and we welcome their

support in this action. Some of the efforts of the investigators involved continued—we continue to search and interview veterans

who were in the Khamisiyah area at the time of the demolitions.

Working with the CIA, we are trying to estimate what is known

as the source term, or how much agent may have been released at

Khamisiyah, and then what the wind patterns were that might

have carried the agent over American troops.

Because our position time data base is frankly so poor, it’s a bottom up data base. We are assembling this month the division commanders and brigade commanders from the 18th Airborne Corps

who were in the Gulf. And we’re using their expertise of their military operations to try to identify any additional troops that might

not have been captured in the official data base of time and location. And we’re also conducting an analysis of participation rates

99

in the combined CCEP and VA registry to see if there is any pattern of participation in those registries that might be correlated

with time and location of Khamisiyah.

All of these efforts are directed toward a single purpose of determining what is causing our veterans to be ill. While doing this, we

are ensuring that Gulf war veterans are receiving the best possible

care. Finally, we then must make certain to apply the lessons

learned for the Gulf to our future deployments. You have my commitment that no effort will be spared to determine that causes of

these illnesses and respond to the health needs of our veterans.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rostker follows:]

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Dr. Rostker. Mr. Walpole.

Mr. WALPOLE. Thank you, Chairman Shays, Congressman Sanders. I appreciate the opportunity, as well, to appear before you

today to discuss CIA’s and the intelligence community’s efforts on

the issue of Gulf war veterans’ illnesses and possible exposure of

some of those veterans to chemical weapons agent. We know how

important this issue is to veterans, and that our intelligence is essential to understanding what occurred during and immediately

after the war.

In fact, I would like to submit for the record a copy of the

Khamisiyah historical perspective paper and the 41 documents that

we released with that, because it helps understand what was

known about Khamisiyah since 1976 on that issue. In response to

President Clinton’s tasking to his advisory committee on Gulf war

veterans illnesses, and after determining that the issue required

additional resources, George Tenet, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, appointed me his Special Assistant. And that was on

February 27.

So, from that point it was a new position. And he asked me to

have a task force running by March 3. Since that time, we have

made efforts to keep the staff of this subcommittee as well as several other committees apprised of our efforts. The purpose of our

efforts is to help find answers as to why the veterans are sick. And

I particularly appreciate the couple of hours spent this morning

with some of those veterans. It helps keep our focus on that purpose. We’re supporting numerous Government efforts on this issue

and are searching for any intelligence we have in our files that can

help answer those questions.

Let me turn first to our mission. Our mission is to provide aggressive, intensive intelligence support to the numerous efforts underway within the Government. We have 50 officers serving on the

task force from across the intelligence community. That’s from the

Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the National Imagery and Mapping

Agency. We also have individuals from Department of Defense’s Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses as well as the

Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence Oversight. The task force

is managing and reviewing all intelligence aspects related to this

issue, with the goal of getting to the bottom of it.

Specifically, the task force provides intelligence support across

several fronts. On the document side, that’s search, declassification

and sharing of those documents. And the 41, I mentioned earlier,

are part of that declassification effort. On modeling support, on

committees with the Department of Defense, the President’s Advisory Committee, you here on the Hill, veterans groups, and others

in the Government.

And, finally, on supportive analysis. This is the first time that

we have fully integrated an analytical component into a task force

on this issue. This gives us an opportunity to run to ground any

threat of information that we find that might be of interest on this

issue, as well as to provide papers that provide analytical context

to the documents that we release. And the historical perspective is

one example of that. Another was released on March 18, in Salt

Lake City in the hearing with the PAC, when we prepared a oneVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:42 Jul 09, 2002 Jkt 080369 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\43668 pfrm04 PsN: 43668
126

page paper telling a little bit about Khamisiyah and the demolition

there.

And we included photographs on this to support that—was to see

if we could get any veterans to come forward that recalled this site

and could provide any further information to us. At that time, we

only had two soldiers that we were able to interview and sort out

what was going on in the pit. And there was a lot of confusion. I’ll

get to that later. In fact, this morning, when we heard Major Donnelly mention that he had a video tape of Khamisiyah from the air.

That could be helpful in our modeling efforts. That could be helpful

in determining what happened. If the tape was either before demolition occurred or after, it could provide significant information for

us on that.

The day after we released that particular document DOD received numerous calls on the 1–800 number. Some recalled having

been at Khamisiyah. Those kinds of efforts have been helpful in

helping this effort move along. I’m aware that this subcommittee

is interested in our modeling efforts. And let me discuss that briefly. Several developments have occurred in this area that I’d like to

elaborate on. To begin with, in the past we were able to model the

demolition events or the bombings at Al Muthanna, Muhammadiyat and Bunker 73, largely because we had ground tests

back in the 60’s that let us know what happened to an agent when

it was destroying inside of a building.

When we turned our efforts to modeling, to the pit, we quickly

realized that the uncertainties were significant, particularly how

the rocket warheads would react in a demolition in an open pit.

We’re also uncertain about the number of events that occurred. We

believed in March, when I testified in Salt Lake City, on the basis

of limited and often contradictory data, that two events were more

likely than one. These data included a military log entry indicating

the March 12 demolition occurred, and then contradictory stories

from two soldiers and an UNSCOM video tape.

CIA and DOD have devised a joint plan to reduce some of those

uncertainties. This plan includes additional soldier interviews and

simulation testing. We’ve conducted several other interviews. In

fact, we’ve more than doubled the number of soldiers that recall

being in the area, and have met with them. And one of the things

that they’ve indicated to us was that the log in question was completed after the fact and that we should not rely on the March 12

date. When we learned that—and questioning that March 12

entry—the only prudent course was to model one event. And so

we’re now back to modeling one event on March 10.

Now, if we receive further information and if the video tape

sheds light on this—that could be some of that further information—of course we’ll modify the approach. We’re also jointly developing tests with the Department of Defense to destroy rockets containing CW agent simulants in an open pit environment. We expect

this to provide us invaluable data on how the agent would react in

that environment, similar to the data we had on earlier testing and

buildings. And then we would plan to publish these modeling results by the end of July.

During our initial efforts on Khamisiyah, we determined that

certain intelligence documents were critical to answering the quesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:42 Jul 09, 2002 Jkt 080369 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\43668 pfrm04 PsN: 43668
127

tions: what did the intelligence community know when, and what

did we do with that information? We began briefing these documents to the Presidential Advisory Committee and appropriate congressional committees. We also began simultaneous efforts to declassify key papers and to search for other material relevant to

these questions. As the work progressed, we determined that an

unclassified paper documenting the historical perspective on this

would be valuable to anyone looking at those documents.

The paper, which was released on April 9, provides details about

the intelligence community’s knowledge before, during and after

the war relative to Khamisiyah. The documents released and the

Khamisiyah paper do not change our judgment that Iraq did not

use chemical weapons during Desert Storm. Nor does it change the

fact of our warnings that Iraq would likely deploy chemical munitions to the theater and would be prepared to use them. Nor that

they did not mark their chemical munitions.

In detailing the historical perspective, the paper and documents

illustrate warnings the intelligence community provided to

CENTCOM elements including J–2, targeting elements, ARCENT,

the U.S. Marine Corps and Air Force representatives prior to the

demolition activities in March 1991. At the same time, however,

the paper illustrates that intelligence support, particularly in the

areas of information sharing and analysis, should have been better.

The task force is preparing recommendations to address these

problems, and will continue to assess how we ensure that they do

not occur in the future.

On other document efforts, we’re continuing document searches

on Iraqi CW sites as well as any intelligence related to potential

biological warfare, radiological exposure and environmental issues.

We’re using the original search criteria that previous task forces

have used, but we have not augmented those criteria by extending

the timeframes and topical search terms. Intelligence that we find

that sheds light on the veterans’ illnesses and will help the Presidential Advisory Committee, Persian Veterans Coordinating Board

and others understand these issues will be identified and declassified.

Any documents that cannot be released for reasons of national

security will be delivered to relevant U.S. Government agencies,

the President’s Advisory Committee and congressional committees

that are following the issue. We also plan to write analytical papers

similar to the one I mentioned here, to help readers put all of the

information into context.

In conclusion, I want to reiterate George Tenet’s commitment,

the commitment in the intelligence community and my personal

commitment to the men and women who served this country in the

Persian Gulf. We owe them a full and accurate accounting of what

happened. To that end, the intelligence material we released on

Khamisiyah gives the veterans and the American citizens a clearer

understanding of what we knew and how we used that material.

Helping relevant agencies determine what is making some of our

Gulf veterans ill is critical and will remain our central focus. We

128

stand behind our contributions to national security, and are working to enhance our support for the future. Thank you.

[Note.—The report entitled, ‘‘Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on Related Intelligence,’’ can be found in subcommittee files.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walpole follows:]

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199

200

201

202

203

204

205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213

214

215

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Walpole. We’ll now hear

from the Deputy Inspector General, Mr. Mancuso.

Mr. MANCUSO. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the effort

now underway by the Office of the Inspector General to find the

logs maintained by the nuclear, biological and chemical desk officers at the United States Central Command in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf war.

As you are aware, the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf

War Illnesses, in its efforts to identify the cases of a number of illnesses being suffered by Gulf war veterans learned that logs that

might contain information of value in this work had been kept in

Central Command J–3 Operations Center in Riyadh. An effort was

begun in January 1997 by that office to find those logs.

On March 3, 1997, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that

the Inspector General take over the inquiry and carry it to conclusion. Specifically, the Deputy Secretary asked that we follow all

leads that can be identified on the location of the original log or

copies in electronic or hard copy versions, gather all originals and

copies that can be located, and, if a full copy of the log cannot be

located, to explain why.

To accomplish this task, we formed a team of five senior criminal

investigators supported by a staff of four auditors and investigative

support personnel. The team’s activities are being closely directed

by senior investigative managers, and is supplemented by additional staff as needed. Initially, our investigative approach focused

on collecting and analyzing the considerable investigative record

created by the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses.

That effort included reviewing numerous detailed transcribed

interviews of officers assigned to the NBC desk during the war,

interviews of other persons who may had access to the logs after

the war, as well as many telephonic and written requests for information from sources throughout the Department of Defense. Based

on our review and analysis, we have identified areas where the coverage provided by the Special Assistant was thorough, and other

areas where we felt that additional professional investigative effort

would be useful.

For example, we are interviewing every available witness who

was directly involved in the creation of the CENTCOM NBC desk

logs in Riyadh, or whom we know was in possession of the logs or

any portion of those logs at Central Command in Tampa, after the

conclusion of the Gulf war. The investigation is now in progress,

and we are receiving the full cooperation and support of all affected

elements of the Department.

As you know, we do not comment on the details of active investigators, both to avoid jeopardizing investigative effort, and to protect the privacy and reputation of parties involved. I can assure

you, however, that we fully recognize the importance of this investigation. We prioritized our efforts in order to complete the work

as thoroughly and as quickly as possible. Upon completion, the results of the investigation will be provided to the Secretary of Defense, the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans

Illnesses, and the Congress. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mancuso follows:]

233

234

235

236

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. Mr. Sanders.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You know,

one of the problems with this whole issue is there are so many aspects of it that my office is rapidly becoming overflowing with papers in a dozen different areas. So, what I want to begin with is

by focusing on health issues. And I want to chat with Dr. Rostker

for a minute. Doctor, first of all, let me begin by saying that since

you’ve been on board—when did you come on board?

Mr. ROSTKER. November 12 as Special Assistant.

Mr. SANDERS. I appreciate your efforts in trying to open up the

process and get quick responses back to people who are asking

questions. I would suggest to the audience that there has been a

significant improvement since you’ve come on board. And I appreciate that.

Mr. ROSTKER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SANDERS. I’m sure the veterans community does, as well.

What I would like to do, though, is to ask you some questions. And

maybe you can help me out. Because I’m starting from the premise

that throughout this country and in the veterans community, there

is a lot of cynicism, to say the least, toward the DOD and the VA

in terms of their response from day 1—well before you were on

board—to this problem. And I would just like to ask you a few

questions.

You heard today—today, after so many years, so many articles,

so much discussion—you heard some of our veterans saying that

even today when they go to speak to medical people within the veterans system, that they’re still told that the problem was in their

head. Would it be fair of me to say that at least at the very beginning this problem was minimized by the DOD? Is that a fair statement?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Is it a fair statement to say that the DOD

minimized the problems of chemical exposure, that the DOD position until not so long ago was, ‘‘Hey, our soldiers were not exposed

to chemicals?’’ Is that a fair statement?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Is it a fair statement—well, let me ask you

this question, as you know, a few months ago, the President’s Advisory Commission did a whole lot of work, and they relied on the

DOD and the CIA and other Government agencies for a lot of their

information, and they came to the conclusion that while there were

a number of other areas that yet remained to be explored, that

they thought that stress was perhaps the major cause of Persian

Gulf syndrome. Am I characterizing them fairly?

Mr. ROSTKER. I believe they drew that conclusion on their own.

I would not characterize—they drew that on their own.

Mr. SANDERS. I didn’t mean to be so hard on you. We haven’t

even begun this yet.

Mr. ROSTKER. And they relied on their own witnesses. We have— we treat stress and all of the other potential causes in an open

way. My office has drawn no conclusion on any of the potential

causes.

Mr. SANDERS. Right. And I’m not for a moment suggesting that

stress is probably not a factor. But my point was—you’re suggestVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:42 Jul 09, 2002 Jkt 080369 PO 00000 Frm 00240 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\43668 pfrm04 PsN: 43668
237

ing that they were independent. But on the other hand, we knew

that they fired Dr. Jonathan Tucker—and I know that’s not your

thing—but he went outside of the usual channels to try to get some

information. Now let me ask you this, if I might: Dr. Robert

Haley—— Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS [continuing]. Is a researcher at the Southwestern

Medical Center at the University of Texas. And he suggests, based

on his studies, that ‘‘the syndromes are due to subtle brain, spinal

cord and nerve damage, but not stress. The damage was caused by

exposure to combinations of low-level chemical nerve agents and

other chemicals including pyridostigmine bromide in anti-nerve gas

tablets, DEET in a highly concentrated insect repellent and pesticides in flea collars that some troops wore.’’ What do you think?

Mr. ROSTKER. Dr. Haley’s work was published with an unusual

editorial that accompanied it by the, I believe, the New England

Journal of Medicine, and it was the subject of a number of further

editorials and comments. I believe his research is suggestive. But

the tenor of those comments are that the conclusions are a bit

strong based upon the research. Now, I believe Dr. Haley intends

to extend that research. And I’m sure we support the extension of

that research.

But that actual reports and the actual research are a bit toned

down from the stark conclusions that Dr. Haley has brought forward. And that was the judgment in the editorials that, in the New

England Journal, that accompanied the research at the same time.

I would also point out that Dr. Haley’s research, as best I understand it—and I am not a physician—did not carry with it suggestions for treatment. And that’s one of the major concerns that we

have.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. But quoting Maj. Donnelly before—he made

a very important point—you see, and here’s the problem, and I

want to stay on it for a while. Multiple chemical sensitivity today,

to the best of my knowledge, is not an allowable diagnosis according the American Medical Association.

Mr. ROSTKER. You’re in an area that I’m not—— Mr. SANDERS. OK. And you may not know. I may be wrong. But

I believe that that is a case. In other words, it’s a controversial diagnosis. OK? That’s true. Controversial. Some doctors believe it,

some doctors don’t. And the chairman tells me it’s true. All right.

Mr. SHAYS. That is one thing we can agree on.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Controversial. But here is the problem. And

this is exactly what the problem is and concerns me very much. If

we have 70,000 people who are hurting—is that a fair number? Is

that a good number? It’s the number I’ve heard.

Mr. ROSTKER. We can split the registries into different ways. But

there are about 70,000 or more who have actually been examined.

The vast majority of those people have real diagnoses. And I think

the residual with unknown diagnoses are substantially smaller

than that.

Mr. SANDERS. OK.

Mr. ROSTKER. And we can provide that for the record.

Mr. SANDERS. But hold on. Here’s the problem, you see: the AMA

does not have a diagnosis, the VA does not have a diagnosis, the

238

DOD does not have a diagnosis. But then when people come forward—and I’m a layman, I’m not a medical specialist—with work

that makes some of us believe that they’re moving in the right direction, then people say, ‘‘Hey, you know, where is the peer review?

Give us more.’’ And this is the dilemma that the major, I think,

correctly put his finger on. You are not succeeding. In other words,

if we were—we’re politicians. If we kept running for office every

time we kept losing and getting 2 percent of the vote, we’d have

to re-evaluate. The general consensus is, you’re failing. You are not

solving the problem. And that we should be looking to more, to

quote the Major, cutting edge type research.

Mr. ROSTKER. And I absolutely agree with you. That’s why, in

the construct of my office, we are not just focusing on the possibility of chemical exposures. That’s why we have gone out and commissioned an outside review of the issues of pesticides and multiple

chemical exposures.

Mr. SANDERS. Who have you gone to? Who have you gone to that

knows these subjects?

Mr. ROSTKER. To pull it together, we’ve gone the RAND Corporation, and they, through their health program, are bringing in people who have expertise.

Mr. SANDERS. What kind of expertise? Do they have expertise on

multiple chemical synergy?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. Really?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. You will furnish us those names?

Mr. ROSTKER. I will, sir.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Because this is the problem. And it’s not a

personal criticism of you. You have within the medical community

strong philosophical differences about the validity of multiple

chemical sensitivity. And we can bring the best experts in this

country on multiple chemical sensitivity to most doctors, and you

know what they’ll say: charlatans, quacks, we don’t want to hear

this stuff. And this is my concern. I don’t know that the people that

you’re going to can peer review the work that others are doing.

Mr. ROSTKER. I can only say I share all of your concerns. That’s

why within the construct of what my charter is, we have not drawn

a conclusion. We have thrown it open. We are explicitly looking at

that. We are prepared to, within the dollars allocated for medical

research this year, to carry on research in this whole area. I happen to agree with your concerns.

Mr. SANDERS. All right. Let me go on.

Mr. ROSTKER. But we have to go forward in a structured, reasonable way. And that’s what we’re trying to do.

Mr. SANDERS. I’ve heard that for years. OK. All right. Let me

just ask you another question. Doctors Muhammad Abou-Donia—

I’m probably mispronouncing the name—and Dr. Tom Kurt, Duke

University Medical Center. They used chickens because, I gather,

that the chickens respond similarly to how humans respond. And

they found that two pesticides—DEET and hermathrine—and the

anti-nerve gas agent, PB, were harmless when used alone, but

when in used with combination the chemicals caused neurological

239

problems similar to those reported by some Gulf war veterans. How

does the DOD feel about that research?

Mr. ROSTKER. It goes all into the review we’re making of PB and

the medical aspects of PB.

Mr. SANDERS. Who is making? You see, I’m going to be hard on

you here. Because that’s not a good enough answer.

Mr. ROSTKER. OK.

Mr. SANDERS. I don’t know that you—so, in other words—not a

personal criticism, but I think if, for example, as the chairman was

mentioning before, if your soldiers, God forbid, get injured in the

field of battle, in many, many ways you guys are probably the best

in the world in putting people back together. And I suspect you

perform miracles. I think in this area you’re not doing well.

Mr. ROSTKER. Well, I can only say that we have an ongoing program to extend our frontiers of medical knowledge. I’m sure you

would agree that’s the appropriate thing to do. We’re eager to learn

more about the issues of pesticides, the issues of PB in combination. We have not drawn a conclusion.

Mr. SANDERS. All right. But here’s the point: we’re going to hear

testimony in a few minutes after you’re through, about people who

are going to tell us about PB. And what they’re going to say—at

least one of the gentleman—it’s going to be pretty frightening stuff.

You are interested in learning. Well, we’re all interested in learning. But we have tens of thousands of people who are hurting. Why

are we—tell me what the DOD is doing with regard to PB?

Mr. ROSTKER. Well, as I’ve indicated, we have the existing research. We’re trying to extend the research to better inform ourselves about it. Your hearings here and the information available

to us is important. But we have not yet drawn a conclusion about

PB.

Mr. SANDERS. All right. Here’s my question: you have a budget,

not you personally, I’m sure, of $250 billion. Why does it take two

researchers at Duke University to work with chickens and come up

with their conclusion about the synergistic effect?

Mr. ROSTKER. I have no answer, sir.

Mr. SANDERS. But this is—why should we have confidence in the

DOD when we’re seeing people at Duke with limited budgets making what some of us think are significant breakthroughs?

Mr. ROSTKER. I have no comment.

Mr. SANDERS. Do you have comments on the work done by Dr.

Nicolson at the University of Texas? They have, among other

things, suggested that some of the multiple chronic symptoms may

eventually have their diagnoses linked to chemical exposures in the

Persian Gulf, et cetera. In some cases, such exposure may have resulted in multiple chemical sensitivity. Are we working with those

people?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes. I believe we are.

Mr. SANDERS. All right. Claudia Miller had applied, as I understand it, for a grant from the DOD, and somewhere along the line

it was killed. You want to tell me about that?

Mr. ROSTKER. I will be happy to look into it. I don’t know the

specifics of the case.

Mr. SANDERS. Claudia Miller is one of the experts in multiple

chemical sensitivity in the country. She is, in fact, in a book that

240

is soon to come out, has an entire page, Mr. Chairman—I’ll probably get sued for copyright violation, the book is not out yet—but

it’s comparing the symptoms of veterans with symptoms experienced by multiple chemical sensitive people. See? She has a direct

correlation.

This is my point. And Mr. Chairman, this is the point where I

think we finally have got to say, ‘‘Thank you. Continue your research. We don’t have a lot of confidence in you. We’re going elsewhere, as well.’’ We owe that to the tens of thousands of veterans.

There is, getting back to the Major, who made a very profound

statement, we need cutting edge research. I have the sad feeling,

Mr. Chairman, that in 5 years from now, if I’m still here, Dr.

Rostker—we’ll be still having it. They’re interested in the issue.

They’re going to explore the issue. They’re going to go to the same

conservative doctors that are going to tell the same things. We

need new ideas. And my experience is that the DOD is not bringing

forth those ideas. And I’ll yield back to you. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. Let me just start off with

you, Mr. Walpole. We had testimony previous, from the CIA—Ms.

Sylvia Copeland, who was trying to respond as best she could to

our concerns. And I asked you to look over her testimony and what

she submitted, and response to our questions. Is there anything

that you would qualify in her testimony that would be helpful to

us? Is there anything that you add to her testimony that might be

helpful to us?

Mr. WALPOLE. Congressman, I read the question session of that

testimony while I was preparing my own opening remarks, to look

for any questions that you might have had that we were not able

to answer at the time. And one that stood out to me was the working relationship with the Department of Defense. And I wanted to

make sure I underscored that throughout my opening remarks. In

fact, we have a very close working relationship there.

As you know, I started on February 27. And I have tried to look

forward from that point as what we could do. I was completely

fresh to this issue. But in looking back over the remarks that you

had asked me to look at this morning, what really comes to mind

is that since that time, we have declassified a lot more material,

particularly in the area of Khamisiyah. And we prepared this

paper. More information has been discovered. More information

was released than at the point of that testimony.

I have not evaluated that testimony for some of the questions

you’ve asked. If you’d like us to take that for the record I can. But

I do know that a lot more information is in the Khamisiyah historical paper than at the time of that testimony.

Mr. SHAYS. That’s it? That’s your response? Anything else you

would add to that? Was there any information that was possibly incorrect or that you would qualify that was submitted, some written

document?

Mr. WALPOLE. I honestly did not evaluate it for that purpose.

Now, part of the submission for the record was the paper on the

modeling of the pit, Al Muthanna, Muhammadiyat, and the reiteration that we did not see any evidence that the Iraqis used chemical weapons against us in the war.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

241

Mr. WALPOLE. Those judgments still stand.

Mr. SHAYS. In her testimony she said that U.S. troops were not

interviewed by the CIA, that the CIA depended on the Pentagon.

Your testimony today suggests that you are now talking with U.S.

troops. Is that correct?

Mr. WALPOLE. Absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. The basis for that is what?

Mr. WALPOLE. The basis for talking with the troops? In trying to

do the modeling, for example, we have talked to the soldiers who

were there to try to sort out how to put together a model of what

might have been released when those rockets were destroyed.

Mr. SHAYS. Would we not also be turning to our soldiers to see

if they’ve identified any other sources? Wouldn’t the CIA speaking

to our soldiers to gain information—let me just interrupt myself by

saying it blew my mind that the CIA seemed to depend on foreign

sources and the DOD’s position instead of speaking to the people

who were there: our own soldiers. I lost a lot of respect, frankly,

for the CIA. I thought who better to speak to than the people who

were there: our own soldiers. My gosh, we’d speak to someone who

wasn’t our own soldiers, but, you know. So, is this a change in policy?

Mr. WALPOLE. We have two approaches that I’m aware of at this

point for talking with the soldiers. When we put together the announcement that I mentioned earlier we released in Salt Lake City,

with the photographs of Khamisiyah, we did that in conjunction

with the Department of Defense and included their 1–800 number

at the bottom, so that the information could get into that system,

they would relay the information to us, and we would work that.

When I released the historical perspective paper, before we released in the press briefing, we took it to the veterans organizations. And I think 21 organizations were represented there. Veterans Affairs set that up for us. So they got a pre-briefing. And

during that briefing we gave them our public affairs number, that

if any of them or anybody in their organizations, any veterans they

became aware of, had any information or questions for us on this

or other issues from an intelligence perspective, call that number

and we would get back to them. I have a public affairs person on

my task force for that purpose.

Mr. SHAYS. I think that’s a healthy change in practice. Let me

ask you, if I’m to ask you a question that you can’t answer because

it’s still classified, is your response to me going to be that this information is going to be—what is your response on any information?

Mr. WALPOLE. I would answer that the information is still classified. I was asked that last week and said that same thing.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. That’s the response I would like rather than to

suggest that we don’t have a problem or something. So, the answer

will be—from my understanding—I’ll either get a straight answer

or I’ll get an answer that says it’s classified?

Mr. WALPOLE. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. WALPOLE. And if I don’t know an answer, I’ll certainly tell

you that.

242

Mr. SHAYS. When we did studies—excuse me. When the CIA— I believe it was the CIA—contracted an outside company that had

formerly the CIA Director, Mr. Deutch, and former Defense Secretary, Mr. Perry, on its board—what was the name of the company? SAIC. Their job was to make an analysis through modeling

of what would happen when we blew up certain chemical plants

and other sites, where the plumes would go, and would our troops

be affected or not. Obviously, a very important question. Mr.

Rostker, this is something you’re familiar with as well. My first

question is, we know where the plumes went, correct? Before it was

a model of what would happen. Now we know. Is that not correct?

Mr. WALPOLE. We know—on which site are we talking about, the

pit?

Mr. SHAYS. Any site. We have the pictures. We have the weather.

It’s in effect—it’s an occurrence that’s happened. We know where

the winds went, et cetera.

Mr. WALPOLE. In all cases, we did not know where the winds

went. When we were doing Muhammadiyat and Al Muthanna—— Mr. SHAYS. Now, let me be clear on this.

Mr. WALPOLE. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. What I’m asking is, we did modeling to anticipate

where the winds would take the chemical fallout.

Mr. WALPOLE. OK. I’m with you. You’re talking about before the

war?

Mr. SHAYS. Right. That’s a model. Now we have reality. Reality

is what actually happened. Isn’t it true that we can determine

what happen, and have determined where those prevailing winds

went?

Mr. WALPOLE. In the case of the pit, which is the one we’re modeling right now, just with the weather, the winds, depending on

how long you run the plume extension—and that depends, of

course, on how much agent is released—that’s why we’re doing the

ground testing—the wind changed direction.

Mr. SHAYS. But we monitored the weather 24 hours a day, correct? Mr. Rostker, you want to jump in here a second.

Mr. ROSTKER. Umm.

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor. Believe me, I’m sorry.

Mr. ROSTKER. That’s OK.

Mr. SHAYS. If you went to the trouble to get your doctorate, then

you’ll be called a doctor.

Mr. ROSTKER. I appreciate that, sir. The wind information is very

imprecise. At one point, the CIA was making calculations where

the nearest wind observation was 200 miles away.

Mr. SHAYS. Are you talking modeling or the fact?

Mr. ROSTKER. Fact.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. ROSTKER. The fact. When Deputy Secretary White asked the

Institute for Defense Analysis to stand up an expert panel, it was

largely on the meteorological aspects and the weather. And subsequent to the initial CIA attempt to model the pit, additional weather observations have become available from classified satellite reports, from the Saudis who had withheld weather information because it might have been used by the Iraqis, and from classified

Navy reports, so that the pure data that we have today on the pits

243

has grown exponentially since last November when CIA was initially working on this.

IDA used two different models to look at how one could bring the

weather information to bear. And the CIA has a third model.

Where we are today is not so much worrying about the weather,

but worrying about what was actually released. There’s great uncertainty. In fact, the CIA came to us and asked us to do tests.

We’re blowing up captured 122 millimeter rockets, because there is

tremendous uncertainty of what actually happened.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just interrupt you, Doctor, just so I’m clear

and you don’t use me. Is your testimony before this committee that

while we know the weather we don’t know how much chemical was

released in these sites? Is that the real issue?

Mr. ROSTKER. Right now that’s what we are focusing on, the uncertainty.

Mr. SHAYS. Isn’t it true we know pretty much where the plumes

went based on the actual fact of what the conditions were?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir. Not until you know how much was released into the atmosphere.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m not asking that. That’s not what I’m asking. I’m

asking if we know the direction of where the plumes went. I’m not

asking what level of concentration of chemicals were in the plumes.

Mr. ROSTKER. But we have meteorological weather, today. Isn’t

that right, Bob?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. I’d like a short version answer, not a—— Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. Let me give you a short one. Modeling, theoretically, is in some senses easier than modeling what you’re referring to as the fact. Because theoretically you choose your inputs.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Mr. WALPOLE. We’re trying to determine what the facts are. The

winds changed direction. I don’t remember exactly how many hours

after the event it changed direction. But it changed direction.

That’s why Dr. Rostker is saying the amount of agent in the air

at the time the wind changed direction makes a difference as to

where that plume went. And we don’t that.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Your testimony is that while you have data, you

don’t have all the data, you’re getting the data, and that you still

may never have enough data?

Mr. WALPOLE. We will never have all of the data. We will never

know exactly how many rockets were in each of that stacks.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m not asking about concentration. I’m just talking

weather. The reason I’m getting a little impatient is we’re going to

be here a long time if——

Mr. ROSTKER. We believe we have a set that will accurately allow

us to do the plume analysis.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And so you’re just basically waiting to determine

the concentration of chemicals?

Mr. ROSTKER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. SANDERS. Can I just—on this thing?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. Let me just pick up where the chairman was—and

help me out here. In terms of Khamisiyah, my memory is that

244

originally the authorities, the DOD, claimed that several hundred

people were perhaps exposed. And that number went up to as

many as 20,000?

Mr. ROSTKER. The first accountings were how many were near

the Bunker 73. We then started to focus on the pit. And we extended the potential area to 50 kilometers. We were always working with the same data base. But the original CIA analysis that

was made public last summer had a smaller event. And that’s what

the numbers were that we published then.

Mr. SANDERS. What is your best guess today in terms of the

number of American soldiers that were exposed?

Mr. ROSTKER. Given the data that we have on position and location at the 50 kilometer range, it is 20,000.

Mr. SANDERS. Might that be revised?

Mr. ROSTKER. Absolutely, as we gain more insight.

Mr. SANDERS. What you’re saying is, now—I don’t want to put

words in your mouth—that the 20,000 may be a conservative number. And, in fact, based on more evidence, it is possible that the

number could multiply significantly?

Mr. ROSTKER. That’s correct. The 20,000 also was 360 degrees

around Khamisiyah. So, depending upon where the wind took it, it

might even not have blown over troops. We just have to wait and

see.

Mr. SANDERS. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. We’re going to try to get you out, Doctor, by 15 of.

And Mr. Mancuso, I’m going to just kind of wait. I just have a few

questions for you. But I want to make sure that I am able to deal

with the CIA and the DOD. Do we have any indication that Iraqi

citizens are feeling the effects of chemical exposure, Mr. Walpole?

Mr. WALPOLE. I’m not aware of any information on that. I don’t

know the answer.

Mr. SHAYS. That seems kind of surprising to me. Because it

would strike me that if we want to know how our troops were impacted, that we would want to know how Iraqi citizens were impacted. And if they were in certain areas, large concentrations, it

would be helpful to us. So, I’m a little more than disappointed with

your response. It just doesn’t even seem logical to me.

Mr. WALPOLE. The wind direction from the pit was away from

Iraq.

Mr. SHAYS. My view—and help me out—it either went toward

the soldiers or went toward civilians. And you’re saying there’s another option? It didn’t go toward civilians either? It didn’t go toward the troops. It didn’t go toward civilians. So, it went——

Mr. WALPOLE. No. It went, I think it’s south. I don’t know if it

was directly south. But it did go away from Iraq.

Mr. ROSTKER. Moreover, without knowing how much agent was

released, we would have no basis for knowing who may have been

exposed.

Mr. SHAYS. No. But we’re not even talking about Khamisiyah

now. We’re talking about—I’m sorry, Doctor, but mine was a general question. Do we have any record of Iraqi citizens feeling the

effects of chemical exposure? And it boggles my mind if we don’t.

One, I would make assumptions that they were affected, and, two,

that we would know it. We have no intelligence information that

245

says that some Iraqi soldiers may be affected by chemical exposure?

Mr. WALPOLE. I’m not going to pretend to know all the answers.

I’m not even going to pretend to know all the questions. If we have

information on that. And I will check if we do, then that would obviously be knowable, and I can get that for you.

Mr. SHAYS. The reason why I started out my questioning about

whether you would tell me if it was classified information—is your

response because it’s classified or is your response——

Mr. WALPOLE. No. My response is because I do not know.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I would like to know the answer to that question. If you would get back.

Mr. WALPOLE. Sure.

Mr. SHAYS. And that’s something that we need to followup with.

Isn’t it logical, though, that we would want to know if Iraqi citizens

were affected?

Mr. WALPOLE. Absolutely. If the direction of wind was such that

anybody in the path could have supplied information on that, absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this, isn’t it true that some of these

munitions plants were in urban areas that we blew up by air?

Mr. WALPOLE. The only facility that we have identified where we

have a potential chemical release on the information to date is

Khamisiyah.

Mr. SHAYS. No——

Mr. WALPOLE. Now, some of the sites—yes. The answer to your

question is, yes. Many of the sites are.

Mr. SHAYS. I’ve made an assumption. Dr. Rostker, help me out

here. I made an assumption that we blew up some munitions/chemical munitions plants. I make that assumption based on also what

was news accounts. And my recollection was that that was the

case. Is that your testimony? We didn’t blow up any chemical

plants? I’m asking both of you.

Mr. WALPOLE. No. That’s not——

Mr. SHAYS. I want both of you to respond to this question. Dr.

Rostker, did we blow up——

Mr. ROSTKER. We obviously did. Of course we did.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, my question is, do we have any intelligence information—and I’ll first make sure that we’re clear—Dr. Rostker,

do we have any intelligence information that Iraqi citizens were

impacted by any chemical exposure?

Mr. ROSTKER. There are numerous accounts in the closing days

of the war—I shouldn’t say the war—during the rebellion of the

Shi’ites—that Saddam Hussein had used chemicals on the Shi’ites.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, we know he used them against Iran.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m not talking about Iran.

Mr. ROSTKER. I’m not either, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m talking about what—so we have no information?

I want to be clear that I’m asking the right question so I know how

to evaluate your answer.

246

Mr. ROSTKER. The only accounts that I have seen of Iraqi citizens

complaining of being exposed to chemical agents come in a number

of reports where they presented themselves to United States personnel during the short-lived occupation of Iraq. And they claim direct exposure to mustard gas from Iraqi forces. And that is well

documented in the military logs of the 18th Airborne Corps.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just explain why I want to be a little more

precise. When Mr. Deutch appeared before CBS, he was very clear

to say that there was no offensive use of chemical weapons. And

then, shortly after, which was defensive exposure took place. He

clearly had to know that he was using a very precise work so he

would be safe. So, I just need to know if we’re in this kind of level.

When you say, Dr. Rostker—have you heard?

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. So, your testimony before this committee is that you

are not aware of civilian troops being exposed to chemicals by potentially the blowing up, the destruction of any of the chemical munitions plants in Iraq?

Mr. ROSTKER. That is correct. I’ve seen no reports to that effect.

Mr. SHAYS. Or heard any?

Mr. ROSTKER. Or heard.

Mr. SHAYS. Or aware of any?

Mr. ROSTKER. Or aware of any.

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor——

Mr. WALPOLE. OK. I thought initially you were talking about

Khamisiyah. I do not know the answer to your question. I will go

back and make sure that we check every site that chemicals were

possibly at, and when they were destroyed either by bombing or by

demolition, and see if there’s any intelligence that relates to Iraqis

indicating effects.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Sure.

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, let me just pursue your line of

questioning. Mr. Walpole, one of the things that we’re knocking our

brains out here is to try to figure out to what degree American

troops were exposed to chemical agents. And what the chairman

asked you is—and it seems to be a pretty logical question—is, if

American troops may or may not have been exposed, then what

about the people in the immediate area? What about the Kuwaitis?

What about the Iraqis, themselves? If we bombed, as Dr. Rostker

has told us, and we all knew, chemical plants, chemical weapon

plants in Baghdad or wherever they were, were people in Iraq affected, or people in Kuwait or wherever? It would seem to me that

the CIA would be in the midst of that investigation.

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. Are you suggesting that they are not?

Mr. WALPOLE. I’m saying that I personally do not know. I might

well go back and have the people on my task force that are experts

on this field say, ‘‘Well, Bob, yes. We looked at that quite a while

ago. And here’s the answer.’’ And then, of course, I’ll feel that I

should have known the answer. But it’s a very logical question.

Mr. SANDERS. Will you tell us the answer then?

Mr. WALPOLE. And when I find out the answer to the question,

we’ll make sure you get it.

247

Mr. SANDERS. My question is, has the CIA investigated chemical

exposure among Iraqis and Kuwaitis and other peoples in that region?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. And it’s a legitimate question. If that was

part of the overall question of exposures, then the answer would be

yes. But I don’t know that for certain, and I don’t want to mislead

you.

[The information referred to follows:]

248

249

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor, thank you. And we will followup on that. Dr.

Rostker, tell me how you react and if you want to correct my understanding that the Pentagon went to the FDA to have an informed consent in regards to PB so that it could be administered

to our troops. One, did that happen? Two, do you agree with the

testimony that has been fairly consistent in our committee with all

of the veterans who appeared that they were not warned for the

most part—I say for the most, there may have been one or two. We

know with the Major that there may be something to this. But is

it a fair conclusion on our part that our troops were not warned

about the use of PB?

Mr. ROSTKER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So, what is the Pentagon’s position knowing

that?

Mr. ROSTKER. The new supply of PB—and let me say there is not

definitive statement that we would use it or not use it. It would

have to depend upon the circumstances. But a new supply of PB,

obviously, has been procured. And it comes with a warning and a

statement of side effects.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there any new protocol that’s been issued by the

Secretary instructing a different practice in the future?

Mr. ROSTKER. I don’t know of any. But I would say, as part of

my inquiry on procedures and policy and doctrine, we certainly will

cover this. The testimony that you heard today we hear all the

time on our 800 numbers. There was not adequate warning despite

of the assurances of the FDA. There was poor quality control in

terms of the regimen of PB. In some units it was careful. In other

units it was not careful. We don’t have records that would definitively establish who had PB. It was not done that way any of us

would have liked to have seen it done. There’s no question about

that.

Mr. SANDERS. In your judgment, was the use of PB a mistake?

Mr. ROSTKER. I’m not prepared to say that. There was a concern

that there was a potential for the Iraqis to have soman, which is

a particular type of nerve gas. The normal procedures that we had

for providing our troops protection would not have worked against

soman. It would have been deadly. And the judgment was made at

the time that this was consistent with the testing that had been

done at the time, an appropriate prophylactic. It was the only procedure we had, the only medicine we had that would have provided

any protection to a soman attack.

Mr. SANDERS. Can you tell us again, briefly, exactly the research

that is now being done by the DOD or VA about the synergistic impact of——

Mr. ROSTKER. I’d have to provide that for the record. And I will.

[The information referred to follows:]

250

251

Mr. SANDERS. Do you consider that to be a major issue?

Mr. ROSTKER. Absolutely. Let me just say, I hate to be vague on

this, but when my office was set up we maintained the primacy of

the assistant secretary of health affairs on the medical aspects of

this. And while I have maintained an ongoing interest in oversight,

and we coordinate, I or my office are not the prime people responsible for the health program. And so, if I’m a little vague on an answer, it’s because I’ll have to get that for you for the record.

Mr. SANDERS. You may be vague on this one, as well. But answer

me this: Maj. Donnelly made a very interesting point. He suggested

that he was made ill by exposure to malathion. Is that how it’s pronounced?

Mr. ROSTKER. Malathion.

Mr. SANDERS. And he suggested that other people may have had

similar problems. He raised a very interesting point.

Mr. ROSTKER. And I absolutely agree. And there are examples in

civilian literature of people getting very sick on malathion.

Mr. SANDERS. Exactly.

Mr. ROSTKER. Congressman Allen said, ‘‘Nasty stuff. I wouldn’t

use it.’’ Mr. SANDERS. That’s right.

Mr. ROSTKER. ‘‘My wife won’t let me use it.’’ But, sir, it is still

an approved chemical from—— Mr. SANDERS. I know that. But here’s my point. It may be possible—and, again, I may be over my head, I’m not a scientist—but

it is possible that we have thousands of men and women who are

working around as walking time bombs. Might we at least get the

word out to them to be at least careful, get out some information

to them?

Mr. ROSTKER. I don’t know the cause and effect. The Major was

talking about maybe some exposure in the Gulf has a triggering

event.

Mr. SANDERS. Or PB?

Mr. ROSTKER. Or PB. But maybe his trip to the golf course 2

weeks earlier was a triggering event. I just don’t know. This is

nasty stuff. And that’s why I’ve made a special effort in my inquiry

to make sure we highlight pesticides and insecticides, that we do

a full inquiry. Because I’m as concerned as you are.

Mr. SANDERS. I understand that. But the issue here is that you

may have folks who already have a whole lot of crap in their systems, who might be particularly sensitive. Isn’t it worth while at

least exploring some of the—— Mr. ROSTKER. I would have to leave that to the doctors. It’s a hypothesis. I just can’t draw a conclusion whether, at this point, it

warrants that. And, again, just taking the Major’s testimony. He

had a whole life of exposures to chemicals. I have no idea why he

believes he had a triggering event. And we have no linking between

ALS and even chemical exposures. Those are things we have to research.

Mr. SANDERS. My last question on this round. You’ve been very

patient for allowing me to interrupt you.

Mr. SHAYS. No. That’s fine. I’m just going to followup—— Mr. SANDERS. We’re going to hear in a few minutes from Jonathan Tucker. And he’s going to tell us, quoting from a statement

252

he has presented us, ‘‘DOD has called the Khamisiyah incident a ‘watershed’ in it’s investigation of chemical exposures. At the same

time, however, the Pentagon has discounted dozens of other chemical exposure incidents reported by Gulf war veterans or mentioned

in declassified operational logs. These low-level exposures to chemical weapons appears to have resulted from three sources—’’ He

goes through them. ‘‘Chemical fallout from aerial bombardment, explosive demolitions of munitions bunkers, sporadic and uncoordinated Iraqi use of chemical weapons.’’ My question is, what do you

think about what he is saying, and are you telling us today that

Khamisiyah is all that we should expect to hear about in terms of

chemical exposure, or do you think that tomorrow or next week or

next year we’re going to hear about other facilities or other situations that have resulted?

Mr. ROSTKER. You’ll hear others from us. We’ve provided the

committee with a matrix of our first-round primary inquiries. And

there is a whole range of potential chemical exposures, plus some

cross-cutting papers that we’re producing on FOX vehicles and

other things that cut across. You’re aware that there are concerns

about positive 256 test kit readings and FOX vehicle readings.

Many of those appear in journals. We don’t have the specifics of

people who are associated with that. We’ve developed a post card

campaign. We’ll go to everyone in the unit and ask people if they

can provide information about a specific incident that occurred on

a specific day.

Mr. SANDERS. Bottom line is that it may end up that there were

more chemical exposures?

Mr. ROSTKER. It may well. Because we are looking intensely at

all of the named exposures. And every time we see an exposure or

we get to the point where there’s enough credible evidence to create

a case like we heard today, we will create a case and run that to

ground.

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. He may not be a scientist,

but he looks like one. My sense to what a scientist looks like. No

offense to the scientists out there. Doctor, I’m not letting you go

quite this second here, but you’re getting close.

Mr. ROSTKER. That’s OK.

Mr. SHAYS. You’re going up to Boston? Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTKER. We’re going to Boston for a town hall meeting with

veterans. And I really appreciate the committee’s indulgence. But

reaching out to the veterans and talking to them, I think, is an important activity.

Mr. SHAYS. It’s absolutely essential. And I was going to complement you on that.

Mr. ROSTKER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Just as you are fairly clear on the whole issue informed consent and with the troops and PB, is it possible that you

would recommend a protocol that would make clear that it is a tremendous violation of a soldier’s duty to not warn another soldier

of a case like this. In other words, that that would be part of a protocol that you would suggest. But I’d also like to know, would the

protocol allow a soldier, if this was a harmful chemical, that they

would say, ‘‘Sir, I respectfully decline to take that chemical’’?

253

Mr. ROSTKER. I think we have to come to grips with that. We

have had incidents recently in terms of vaccinations that we need

to establish what our policy is.

Mr. SHAYS. What the policy is informing and what the policy is

for a soldier under orders to say, ‘‘I have the right to exercise my

own judgment on my own body’’ and decline.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And that’s going to be looked into?

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. It also relates to, you said, referring to the chemical

that Mr. Allen was referring to, you paraphrased him perfectly.

The bottom line there is are you going to be looking at protocol and

the use of industrial chemicals in the military? Because we may

find that this is a very big problem.

Mr. ROSTKER. Absolutely. And it goes hand-in-hand. And everything we are trying to do in my organization—there are two

parts—I need to understand what the science is. As imperfect as

it is, I still need to understand that. And then I have to understand

the practices. And it’s putting those two pieces of information together which will help us understand what policies and procedures

we have to change for the future. And, as I said, I’m very concerned

about these issues. I take Congressman Sanders’ concerns very

much to heart.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Some of our military leaders during the

war responded by saying, in essence we didn’t see evidence of

chemical exposure because no one was falling on the battlefield,

which related to testimony that Dr. Joseph made as it regards to

Khamisiyah. And I’m going to be quoting in a second. I just want

to get your reaction. I’m not asking that you repeal the statement.

But I want a reaction to it. He said, ‘‘To date there has been no

evidence found that soldiers located in this area (talking about

Khamisiyah) complained of or presented any symptoms characteristic to acute exposure to chemical agents. However, we are

still searching for additional information.’’ And then he further

said, ‘‘Now, the most important thing that I really have to say

about this is that the current accepted medical knowledge is that

chronic symptoms or physical manifestations do not later develop

among persons exposed to low levels of chemical nerve agents

into—did not first exhibit acute symptoms of toxicity.’’ And then he

said, ‘‘However, this avenue is also being furthered explored by the

department, both looking back at the situation story and research.’’

Now, my sense is, from the work that you’re doing, is that this is

not a show-stopper. In other words, that you are, regardless of

what so-called established medicine has determined, you’re taking

a big look at this issue?

Mr. ROSTKER. Absolutely. And as you will remember, sir, in concert with your staff, we removed from our GulfLINK site a definitive paper on low-level chem, because it was inconsistent with us

then turning around and fostering research, sponsoring research, to

address that very issue. So, I think it has to be up. I would also

say, in terms of the first part of what Dr. Joseph said, that we have

been engaged in a contemporary analysis of participation rates in

the two registries. And we find no correlation with Khamisiyah.

We’re working on the final draft of that. And as soon as it’s ready

254

I’ll make it available to the committee. But certainly the preliminary indications are that those units that are around Khamisiyah

have not experienced a higher participation rate in the two registries than other units in the Gulf.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. I just want to make the point, while he said further research, this to me was a show-stopper in terms of the VA,

that there was an attitude that basically said, just like our generals felt. And it was a mindset that I think carried through both

the DOD and the VA, with all due respect to both organizations.

That hearing, when he testified—this was June 25, 1996. So, a lot

has happened since then.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. You had a comment. And then I’m going to let you

get on your way.

Mr. SANDERS. I know that you have to leave. And let me just say

this. As I indicated earlier, I think that since you have come on,

things are happening better. And I think many people are appreciative of that. I think the basic concern that I have is that what

many of our troops may be exposed to is a new type of problem.

And I think doing things the same old way and going to the same

old guys, who have not come up with the solutions, is the problem.

And I believe we’re going to have to go outside of the DOD and the

VA. Even RAND. I mean, RAND has been working with the DOD

for a million years, right? They’re your right-hand private sector

guys.

Mr. ROSTKER. But I made sure their charter is to make sure they

are tapping the full range of medical opinion.

Mr. SANDERS. Well—— Mr. ROSTKER. And RAND tends to be a very independent type organization, as many of its research products have shown.

Mr. SHAYS. One last question of you, Dr. Rostker. The whole

process of declassification—are you aware of any information that

you will be declassified that will be considered significant?

Mr. ROSTKER. I have a rule that if I see a piece of information

that I feel is significant, before the sun is down I ask for it to be

declassified. And I tell the PAC, the only two pieces that we are

now working on for declassification which I think you will find useful or the complete set of logs for the 18th Airborne Corps and the

complete set of logs that we have for the 82nd Division so that you

can judge the full context. And it helps explain—I think it helps

explain what was going on on the days that there are no logs for

the CENTCOM chem logs. So I’ve asked that those full sets of logs

be declassified for you.

Mr. SHAYS. And I would just make this request to you and then

you’re on your way, that when you are aware of the declassification

that goes on the Internet, that you notify our committee that this

information will be on-line so we don’t discover it 3 days later or

4 days later?

Mr. ROSTKER. We’d be happy to do that. We’re also on—— Mr. SHAYS. I’d like that to be a general practice.

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir. Absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. ROSTKER. And we’re also changing our search engines on

GulfLINK so that they are more user-friendly so that you and your

255

staff and veterans, in general, will have an easier time plowing

through the 38,000 pages that we have on GulfLINK.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank you for being here for so long. Travel safe.

Mr. ROSTKER. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Walpole, thank you. And also, Mr. Mancuso, do

you have any comments? And thank you for your patience sitting

here so long and not being—you’re happy not to talk? OK. Do you

have any comment about the issue of declassification?

Mr. MANCUSO. No. It has not been a problem in our area at all.

The Deputy Secretary made it perfectly clear that we had wide

berth in the department and that anything that could be viewed as

constructive to us or in any area that someone could be helpful to

us, we would get through that. And, in fact, where we’ve needed

access we’ve been able to gain access virtually immediately.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you, if you were to discover something

that you had access to that was classified that you thought was important for the veterans to know for their health, what would be

your response in the course of doing your work? How would you respond to that information?

Mr. MANCUSO. We would seek to immediately make it known to

the—certainly to Dr. Rostker’s office. And if we did not feel that we

had a satisfactory response there, we would seek to go higher than

that.

Mr. SHAYS. So, the bottom line is, you would, if you saw classified information that you thought would be helpful to the health

of the veterans, you would recommend to Dr. Rostker that he seek

to have this declassified?

Mr. MANCUSO. Most definitely. Again, though, Mr. Chairman,

our focus for our investigation as defined by the Deputy Secretary

is quite narrow. It is to find the missing logs.

Mr. SHAYS. I know that.

Mr. MANCUSO. Had we found anything else or had we found any

aspect of a document that would be helpful in the search for what’s

wrong with the veterans we certainly would have done whatever

was needed to be done to make that known.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. I think we’re seeing it the same way. I realize

you have a very limited issue here.

Mr. MANCUSO. Mm-hmm.

Mr. SHAYS. A very important one, but limited. But in the course

of doing your work—we’re trying to develop a culture and encourage a culture within the CIA and the VA and the DOD that says,

this is information. And even if it isn’t someone’s primary responsibility. But if it’s information that’s helpful, we want them to be a

proactive person. Not to release something that’s classified, go

through the channel, but work hard to have that done.

Mr. MANCUSO. Mm-hmm.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you like to—do you have a question?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes. I do. I just wanted to explore—revisit an issue

we talked about a few minutes ago. Is it your judgment, Mr. Walpole, that when the United States bombed the chemical factories in

Iraq that there was no release of chemical agents that might have

impacted civilians or our own troops?

Mr. WALPOLE. In fact, I was just looking at that in the paper

that was released—in the testimony we discussed earlier in DecemVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:42 Jul 09, 2002 Jkt 080369 PO 00000 Frm 00259 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\43668 pfrm04 PsN: 43668
256

ber. In the section under Muhammadiyat and Al Muthanna, there

is the statement, ‘‘Finally we have found no information to suggest

that casualties occurred inside Iraq as a result of this bombing,

probably because they are in remote locations.’’ I have to, from

that, assume that the question we discussed earlier was indeed

looked at for those two sites. So, the answer for those two sites, at

least, is no. There were no casualties. And since I’m assuming they

looked at everything else, no indication because of the remoteness

of those two facilities.

Mr. SANDERS. We’re familiar with what happened at

Khamisiyah. Do you have any evidence that—from the CIA’s perspective—any similar type occurrences occurred in other munitions

depos?

Mr. WALPOLE. No. In fact, we’re doing a search of any potential

site. We have found no other site. But we’re—just like Dr.

Rostker—we’re leaving an open mind for other sites that we may

find intelligence on that would help.

Mr. SANDERS. So your position is the same as Dr. Rostker’s?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. Is that at this point you cannot tell us of any other

sites or occurrences of situations that may have exposed our soldiers to chemical agents?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. We have found no others. But we’re going to

address it with an open mind.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Walpole, the working group that was 24-hour

continuous operation seemed to be a new discovery for those of us

outside the CIA. That wasn’t something that was volunteered to us

when your organization came before us the first time. Explain to

me a little bit about the role of that organization again.

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. In fact I have seen it mentioned in former

testimonies. And I could pull out exactly which ones there are. We

have——

Mr. SHAYS. Former testimonies where?

Mr. WALPOLE. Before committees. I don’t know if it exactly was

your committee. But it was—it was in——

Mr. SHAYS. You have the testimony of our—you’ve seen it?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. The September one. And as I recall it might

have been mentioned in November testimony. I don’t remember

where that was. It’s also mentioned on the first page of our

Khamisiyah historical perspective paper. Now what it was was a

group of seven analysts that were chemical and biological warfare

analysts at CIA—had decided that they wanted to run a 24-hour

operation. Basically, alternate their schedules so that they weren’t

working 15 and 18-hour days.

They, in order to communicate with each other, would enter a

computer file—each of them on their own machine—and then type

in what kinds of things occurred at certain times of the day that

they would pass on to someone else. They titled that a log. And,

in fact, the two entries that related to Khamisiyah were released

as part of this package. It didn’t mention the name Khamisiyah.

In fact, there was a confusion with An Nasiriyha. But we recognized that, and thought that should be released. We have all of

257

those. And we are going through those for any information that is

pertinent to this issue that can be released.

As you can imagine, in notes from one analyst talking to the

next, there’s a lot of completely extraneous information talking

about, no, really we’re not asleep and we got a chance to eat and

things like that. But as we go through that, if there’s information

that is relevant to the veterans’ illnesses that indeed will be released.

Mr. SHAYS. So all seven of those individuals have been interviewed by you?

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. By you?

Mr. WALPOLE. By me.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. WALPOLE. Three of them are currently on the task force. Five

of them are involved in activities along the way over the years related to this issue. But I have talked to all seven of them.

Mr. SHAYS. I would have made an assumption that there were

chemical sites throughout Iraq based on the briefings that were

provided to me as a Member of Congress. So it’s somewhat surprising to me that the CIA wouldn’t have really been very clear

about where these chemicals were and that they would have been

on a wall during the war. I have to tell you—I don’t have to tell,

I want to tell you that I’ve lost some respect for the CIA in the

sense that, if I were there, knowing what I had even been briefed

before the war started, I would have on the wall and in my computer a clear sense of where all those chemicals were located. And

it surprises me that we wouldn’t have known up front that

Khamisiyah had chemicals. Doesn’t it surprise you?

Mr. WALPOLE. Well, I have the value of 20/20 hindsight. Do you

want me to walk through what we knew and didn’t know about

Khamisiyah? It will take a couple of—30 seconds.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I do.

Mr. WALPOLE. OK. And it’s in this paper. That’s why I thought

you might want to include that in the record. In 1977, Khamisiyah

was identified under construction as a conventional ammunition

storage depo. In 1986, we had information—and it was very good

information—it was an official Iraqi document translated—that at

the end of the document—it was on their chemical weapon production plant—indicated that a certain number of Mustard rounds

were stored—a large number, over 3,000—stored at Khamisiyah.

Now, when you have an official Iraqi document you know you’ve

got firm evidence for a chemical connection. Later, in 1986, analysts began to look at that, and they determined that S-shaped

bunkers appeared to be the future for forward deployed storage.

Mr. SHAYS. Of chemicals.

Mr. WALPOLE. Of chemicals. Because that’s how Khamisiyah was

viewed from that 1986 report. It indicated that chemical weapons

were stored there during the Iran-Iraq war, specifically in 1984 and

1985. Analysts began to focus on S-shaped bunkers as the future

forward deployed storage locations. Khamisiyah did not have one

of those bunkers. In 1988, we received a report with the same reliability, same confidence in the report, that indicated that chemical

weapons were stored either at Samarra or Muhammadiyat. And

258

then it mentioned also that there was a temporary storage at

Kirkuk Airfield, which also had an S-shaped bunker. The bottom

line was, in 1988, the same reliability intelligence suggested that

Khamisiyah wasn’t used any more for a storage site.

The focus was on S-shaped bunkers. So, just prior to the war,

Khamisiyah was not on, in the analytical thinking, it wasn’t on our

list of sites, the sites that were included. And they were all suspect.

We didn’t know a lot of things about the storage sites. We knew

where things were produced. We didn’t know the storage sites. So,

it wasn’t on that list. The warnings I talked about in my opening

statement occurred just before the ground war, not before the air

war. So, that’s how it was missed.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. It’s still surprising to me. I just felt that we

would have informants that would be able to track—chemicals are

something that we consider quite a significant weapon. And it’s

just surprising to me that we did not have inside sources that

would have been able to provide that. I’m just going to express

that.

Mr. WALPOLE. Yes. Well, the 1988 information seemed to shift us

away from that. Now, the 20/20 hindsight I referred to—my thinking on this would have been, if they stored chemical munitions

there during the Iran-Iraq war, we should have included it on the

list as a possible site even with the caveat that we don’t know that

anything is there.

Mr. SHAYS. And we didn’t know that they had taken them away

from there. So, it seemed to me that the last time we knew, they

were there.

Mr. WALPOLE. Well, the 1988 report seemed to imply that they

did.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Let me, Mr. Mancuso. This is an issue that was

very narrow. And your statement was so much on target you didn’t

leave a lot of questions in our minds. But what I don’t quite understand is how you go about determining where these logs are with

any kind of certainty. Because—do you have access—do you first

know everyone who potentially would have handled these logs?

Mr. MANCUSO. We believe we do, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. And some are active and some are not active?

Mr. MANCUSO. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. And you are seeking out both active and non-active

and questioning them?

Mr. MANCUSO. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. You question them under oath, or is there no reason

to?

Mr. MANCUSO. They’ve been questioned under different circumstances depending on the interview. I can tell you that we’ve

conducted in the 7 weeks since we took over this investigation approximately 70 interviews. About half of which were re-interviews,

more detailed interviews of people who had been approached during the review conducted by Dr. Rostker.

Mr. SHAYS. Is it against military protocol to have destroyed these

documents? Was someone authorized to? Was there certain protocol

how you would handle documents like this?

Mr. MANCUSO. The documents we’re speaking about were not

technically required to even have been used.

259

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. MANCUSO. In practice they were useful and they were something you would expect from good staff work.

Mr. SHAYS. It’s not like the log on a ship?

Mr. MANCUSO. No.

Mr. SHAYS. No.

Mr. MANCUSO. We’re talking about documents that good staff

people would normally maintain. What we’re trying to do is track

those documents through the system, again, in all media they may

have been in, and to move through the process very deliberately

and determine who actually handled those documents—again, different copies, different medias at different times—in a best effort

following every available lead to locate them.

Mr. SHAYS. So, one hope is to obviously find out what was in

them even if we can’t locate them. In other words, you’re asking

them what they recall seeing in the documents, correct? And the

other is to actually locate the documents.

Mr. MANCUSO. That’s——

Mr. SHAYS. Is there hope that the documents still exist somewhere?

Mr. MANCUSO. That’s why we’re continuing. We will continue

until we believe that we’ve either located everything we need to locate or exhausted all conceivable leads in that regard.

Mr. SHAYS. But maybe I’m making an assumption I shouldn’t.

Are you trying to reconstruct the documents even if you don’t have

them? In other words, are you asking people what they saw, what

they put on them, what others who read it saw?

Mr. MANCUSO. I’d prefer not to go into the interviews, but it is

accurate. As Dr. Rostker said, there are other larger separate

records.

Mr. SHAYS. I just don’t understand why you would prefer not to.

I don’t see why. Was there something significant about—are you

saying that in the process of doing this, you don’t want to disclose

to someone else what you might have asked someone else?

Mr. MANCUSO. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I understand that. Is there anything you want

to add, any point, question that you wished we would have asked

you?

Mr. MANCUSO. I would just add, to follow on on a point you made

about the Inspector General’s office taking on the investigation,

and would we in fact, for instance, act on, for instance, classified

information. I just point out that as an Inspector General’s office

we are, although we are technically a part of the Department,

we’re set up independently by the Inspector General Act, and, have

dual reporting to the Congress and the Secretary. And as in many,

many other matters that we’ve investigated, we’ve shown ourselves

to be independent and not—occasionally not in line with the Department’s preferred thinking.

Mr. SHAYS. I have a sense you’re independent. I just want to

know if you think that’s part of your mandate. And part of your

mandate, it seems to me, if you came across something—and I

think you agree.

Mr. MANCUSO. Absolutely.

260

Mr. SHAYS. I had hoped that the case. I’m happy it is the case.

And I’m happy it’s on the public record.

Mr. MANCUSO. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Walpole, is there anything you wish we had

asked you that we didn’t?

Mr. WALPOLE. I can’t think of anything.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Is there anything I wish I had asked you that

you are happy I didn’t?

Mr. WALPOLE. I would imagine if you had thought of it you

would have asked it.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, I want to be clear. Now, the question you

wished I had asked you is the question you’re happy I didn’t ask

that I wish that I had asked you that I want you to tell me.

Mr. WALPOLE. No. I think we’ve covered everything.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. WALPOLE. If you do get a chance to read the historical perspective, it gives you a good feel for the pluses and the minuses on

this. It was a very honest effort to lay this all out. And one of the

reasons we did it was so the veterans would have something in

hand when they want to try to remind themselves of what might

have occurred, or talk to DOD people on the phone about this. It’s

now unclassified, and there are no bars to talking about it.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Great. One last question, I guess, that my staff

wants me to ask is, is there some classified information left in the

drawer that will be coming out in the near future or that won’t be

coming out that should?

Mr. WALPOLE. Everything classified that we discover, which, of

course, is what we have, we’re ensuring that all the Government

agencies that are cleared, including the Hill, have that. We’re also

working to declassify any and all information that’s pertinent to

this issue. At this point I know of no major surprises.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Rostker would have access, and you would be

making sure he sees classified information. And based on his

pledge to this committee, and frankly what I think his conduct has

been, he would certainly be a voice in asking that it be declassified.

So, if you had some doubts, you’re still going to be sharing it with

Dr. Rostker?

Mr. WALPOLE. Absolutely. And with Walt Jacko, as well. In fact,

I think when—you’ll find some interesting DOD documents in our

package here that came to light just as we were getting ready to

go to print. And Dr. Rostker said, ‘‘Let’s include these in that package,’’ and so on. So, there’s a very close working relationship there.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m just thinking of one last question. The process of

declassifying means, who do you go to? Who has the ability to declassify, in the Dr. Rostker’s case and your case?

Mr. WALPOLE. Well, it depends on the information. Obviously,

George Tenet has the ultimate authority on many of these. But if

it’s foreign source information, then we have to go back to the

owner of that information, the foreign country, and say, ‘‘Can we

use this information.’’ If it’s national technical means derived information then there are certain legal requirements we have to go

through.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Thank you both very much. And we’ll get our

third panel up here.

261

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me invite our third panel, which is Dr. Jonathan

Tucker, director, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of

International Studies. A rough place to live, Doctor, I’ve been there.

And Dr. Tiedt, a research and neuroscientist, Longboat Key, FL. So

far, we’ve got two lovely places to live. And Dr. Satu Somani, Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology, Southern Illinois University

School of Medicine.

It’s nice to have all three of you here. I’m getting a little giddy,

so we better get on with it here. We’ll start in the order that I

called. We’ll just go down the row here. And Dr. Tucker, you’ll

start. I need you to rise and I need to swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. And we’ll note for the record that all three of our witnesses have responded in the affirmative. Again, Dr. Tucker, we’ll

start with you.

STATEMENTS OF JONATHAN B. TUCKER, DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION

PROJECT, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES,

MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; THOMAS TIEDT, RESEARCHER AND NEUROSCIENTIST, LONGBOAT

KEY, FL; AND SATU SOMANI, PROFESSOR OF PHARMOCOLGY

AND TOXICOLOGY, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

Mr. TUCKER. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Sanders, I appreciate

the opportunity to appear before you today. I direct the Chemical

and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the Monterey

Institute of International Studies. Formerly I was senior policy analyst of the staff of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf

War Veterans Illnesses. Before that I was a chemical weapons specialist at the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and served as a biological weapons inspector in Iraq with the

U.N. Special Commission.

Mr. Chairman, the evidence shows that there were multiple

chemical weapons detection and exposure incidents during the Gulf

war that the U.S. Government has not officially acknowledged.

Much attention has been given to the March 1991, incident at

Khamisiyah in which United States combat engineers blew up a

munitions bunker containing 8.5 metric tons of nerve agent. The

Department of Defense has called Khamisiyah a watershed in its

investigation of chemical weapons exposures.

At the same time, however, the Pentagon has discounted dozens

of other exposure incidents reported by Gulf war veterans or mentioned in declassified operations logs. These exposures appear to

have resulted from three sources. First, chemical fallout from the

bombing of Iraqi munitions depots in the war zone. Second, fallout

from the explosive demolition of Iraqi munitions bunkers by United

States troops during and after the ground war. And third, the sporadic and uncoordinated Iraqi use of chemical weapons. In short,

the evidence demonstrates that Khamisiyah was just the tip of the

iceberg.

262

The Department of Defense has stated that Iraq never deployed

large numbers of chemical weapons into the war zone and that the

storage sites in central Iraq were too far away for toxic fallout from

their destruction to have reached United States troops. Yet this position ignores dozens of declassified military intelligence reports

that refer to Iraqi chemical weapons in Kuwait. The Pentagon has

disavowed these intelligence reports, claiming they were never substantiated. But the sheer number and detail of the reports suggests

that Iraqi chemical weapons were indeed present in Kuwait before

the Gulf war.

The CIA, for its part, claims that Iraq deployed chemical weapons into Kuwait during the summer and fall of 1990, but then

withdrew them before the start of the air war in January 1991. Yet

it is not logical that Iraq would renounce a potent weapon in the

face of a major ground invasion, and then tie up its logistics moving thousands of chemical munitions out of Kuwait. No evidence in

the public domain indicates that such a withdrawal took place. On

the contrary, according the Charles Duelfer, deputy chairman of

the U.N. Special Commission, Iraq transported more than 2,000

rockets filled with nerve gas from the production plant at Al

Muthanna in central Iraq to the bunker complex at Khamisiyah

during the second week of January 1991. In other words, Iraq was

moving chemical weapons into the war zone right up to the beginning of hostilities.

Based on the thus-far declassified record, former CIA analyst Pat

Eddington has identified 12 likely Iraqi chemical weapon storage

sites in southeastern Iraq and Kuwait. Many Gulf war veterans

say they encountered Iraqi chemical munitions on the battlefield

during and after the ground war. An official Marine Corps survey

of more than 1,600 chemical defense specialists found that 13 percent reported some contact with or detection of Iraqi chemical

weapons. The investigator, Capt. T.F. Manley, concluded, ‘‘There

are too many stated encounters to categorically dismiss the presence of agents and chemical agent munitions in the Marine Corps

sector.’’

With respect to Iraqi use of chemical weapons, the declassified

operations logs corroborate numerous veteran reports of detecting

low levels of chemical warfare agents during the ground war, including sarin, lewisite, and mustard gas. Many of these detections

were made with analytical methods that are highly reliable and

have a low false alarm rate. Thus, while adverse weather conditions and the speed of the coalition advance precluded the large

scale use of Iraqi chemical weapons, there is strong evidence for

sporadic, uncoordinated use.

In conclusion, evidence in the public domain indicates a larger

number of credible chemical weapons detection and exposure incidents during the Gulf war than either the Pentagon or the CIA

have acknowledged. The implication is that many more American

troops were exposed to low levels of chemical weapons than the estimated 20,000 at Khamisiyah. While medical experts will need to

make the ultimate judgment about the relationship between lowlevel chemical exposures and Gulf war illnesses, such a link cannot

263

be dismissed on the basis of the available evidence. I would be

happy to answer your questions on these and other matters, including my dismissal from the staff of the Presidential Advisory Committee and my recommendations to the subcommittee for further

action. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tucker follows:]

264

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

277

278

279

280

281

282

283

284

285

286

287

288

289

290

291

292

293

294

295

296

297

298

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Doctor. I just want you to note: Dan Miller is a good friend of mine. And I believe your Congressman just

alerted me that you would be coming, and was very happy that you

would be testifying. And I work closely with him on this and some

other issues. So, it’s very nice to have you here.

Mr. TIEDT. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and members

of the subcommittee, there is a 30-year record of scientific evidence

addressing Gulf war syndrome. In view of the two panels previously, I must emphasize it is not as bleak as we were led to believe.

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor, I’m going to have you pull the mic a little toward you now.

Mr. SANDERS. Closer.

Mr. SHAYS. And move it up just a little bit. That’s great. Thank

you.

Mr. TIEDT. Everyone had hoped that the White House Presidential Advisory Committee would have examined the scientific

evidence. But most of the critical evidence was absent from the report that was issued in January of this year. This scientific evidence shows that Gulf war syndrome was easily predictable. The

symptoms of Gulf war syndrome match the toxic effects of PB,

sarin and pesticides, all toxic enzyme inhibitors. The symptoms are

diverse because the affected enzymes have distribution all over the

body in our central nervous system and around our periphery.

Chemical inhibition of the most studied of these enzymes causes

stunning nerve and muscle degeneration moments after a single

dose, as well as an array of hormonal, cardiac and development abnormalities.

Extensive research from various points of view shows that this

toxicity is worsened by activity and stress. One look at the electron

microscope pictures would shock anyone. Not all the damage is reversible. My team’s research at the University of Maryland during

the mid-1970’s was comprehensive. We concluded that enzyme inhibitors are toxic, even in patients with myasthenia gravis. These

patients are less susceptible than healthy and active individuals to

the toxic effects of these agents.

Our work was followed by an explosion of research by DOD during the 1980’s, the most relevant of which was produced by my coauthors and colleagues still at the University of Maryland and at

the Aberdeen Chemical Warfare R&D Center. We have a very active R&D apparatus throughout the United States. I know of at

least 12 very active DOD laboratories. DOD established by the

early 1980’s that PB causes persisting ‘‘counterproductive consequences’’ and that PB is worthless by itself as a chemical warfare

protectant. Moreover, PB reduces the protection provided by effective protective agents.

DOD research also found that at sublethal dosage PB is more

dangerous and more toxic than sarin nerve gas. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were ordered to take PB. Most of them had acute

side effects. There was no benefit to balance the certain and substantial risk. If the goal was to protect our soldiers, DOD used the

wrong drug.

Last year, research added important new findings to the already

large data base: One, stress makes the blood brain barrier leaky to

299

PB and enhances PB’s central nervous system toxicity. Two, behavioral changes begin weeks after PB treatment ends. And three,

Gulf war veterans display objective signs of nerve damage.

PB’s use in the Gulf war was a senseless violation of the

Nuremburg code. So was FDA’s waiver of informed consent for our

soldiers. Not supplying our soldiers with the required brochures describing PB’s side effects was a violation of FDA’s waiver. The PB

experiment adds to the already long record by the military to conduct involuntary, meritless and hazardous experiments on our soldiers.

Extensive scientific evidence also exists about organophosphateinduced neurotoxicity, explaining why EPA and most States have

strict standards for our homes and workplaces. Mr. Chairman, I

hear you touch that point all the time. It’s a very significant point.

In the real world we know these chemicals are very hazardous.

Sarin and pesticides are organophosphates.

Exposure to the nerve gas sarin is sufficiently confirmed. I believe there are tens of thousands of chemical alarms. I believe we

should also replay the press conference by Dr. Rostker last December 5, wherein he testifies at the press conference that at

Khamisiyah there was extensive recognition of chemical warfare

sarin-containing warheads, including the drilling of holes within

those warheads, taking a sample, measuring it, determining and

confirming that it was sarin gas prior to destruction. Of course, we

must ask where are those records.

We know that long-term and delayed onset neurotoxicity can result from exposures not producing acute symptoms. There is extensive DOD research on that. We know our soldiers were exposed to

repeated doses of pesticides and unique high-dose insect repellents.

Some pesticides—malathion comes to mind—are converted to even

more dangerous chemicals by heat in air, just the conditions in the

Gulf war. We know that repeated clothes launderings fails to prevent poisoning from contaminated clothes.

We also know that co-exposure to PB, sarin, pesticides and insect

repellents make each other more dangerous, more toxic. Since

many soldiers reported acute symptoms from these exposures, the

probabilities of long-lasting neurotoxicity and its higher prevalence

are greater.

Several epidemiologic studies of Gulf war veterans confirm what

was easily predicted. A wide range of symptoms are significantly

more prevalent in Gulf war veterans. The three studies in the

Journal of the American Medical Association 3 months ago by Dr.

Robert Haley and his team are very, very important.

They’re also great work. The factor analysis is something to behold. These studies found neuropathy in Gulf war veterans and its

association with exposure to nerve enzyme inhibitors. Psychological

illnesses were ruled out for the observed brain and nerve dysfunction. The authors also noted a 1983 warning that PB would increase the likelihood of occurrence of chemical-induced neuropathy.

This information presented the Presidential Advisory Committee in

300

September 1995 was also absent from the Presidential Advisory

Committee’s report.

There is no doubt that enzyme inhibitors caused toxicity to our

troops. No other explanation has as much relevant and mainstream

evidence or explains as many cases. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tiedt follows:]

301

302

303

304

305

306

307

308

309

310

311

312

313

314

315

316

317

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Dr. Tiedt. Dr. Somani.

Mr. SOMANI. Mr. Chairman Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Somani, I’m going to ask you—I’m sorry, I keep

interrupting. We really want to hear you out. I keep interrupting

everyone here. But if you would lower your mic I think it would

help. Lower this mic. Bring it down. Thank you. That’s great. Can

you still see your page?

Mr. SOMANI. Oh, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Thank you. Good to have you here.

Mr. SOMANI. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. And, again, I should thank all three of you because

you’ve been here since before 10 a.m. And it’s very appreciated you

would sit through this entire hearing. And your testimony is very

valued. Thank you.

Mr. SOMANI. Mr. Chairman Shays and Congressman Sanders, I

thank you for giving me an opportunity to testify before you. I request you to include the entire written testimony for the record.

Mr. SHAYS. That will happen.

Mr. SOMANI. My testimony is based on the premise that the Gulf

war veterans were taking pyridostigmine as a precautionary measure against potential exposure to nerve agents—for example,

sarin—and they were exposed to insecticides and other harmful

chemicals, and that they were also under physical stress which can

modify the effects of such exposure.

The literature suggests that sarin can be responsible for delayed

neurotoxic effects which may not appear until years after a low

level of exposure. Although pyridostigmine is not normally taken

up by the brain, it crosses blood brain barrier under conditions of

physical stress and causes central nervous system effects. Insecticides, insect repellents and other chemicals can also contribute to

neurotoxic effects of nerve agents as sarin, soman, tabun and Vx

and they are important weapons of chemical warfare. Sarin has

been used as a chemical warfare agent since World War II. More

recently, it was used during the Iran-iraq conflict. Sarin was also

used by terrorists as a weapon in Japan.

Reports from the Defense Science Board and Committee on

Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs indicate that the Desert

Storm veterans might have been exposed to a low level of sarin. If

that’s the case, then the veterans may suffer from the delayed neurotoxic effects of the low level of sarin. Although we have a treatment for a single dose toxicity, there is no treatment, however, for

the delayed neurotoxicity. Delayed neurotoxicity was first reported

in the 1950’s.

German personnel exposed to nerve agents during World War II

suffered from neurological problems even 5 to 10 years after their

last exposure. Long-term abnormal neurological and psychiatric

symptoms have also been seen in personnel exposed to sarin in

sarin manufacturing factories. The symptoms of the delayed

neurotoxicity include impaired concentration and memory, depression, fatigue, irritability in those working in factories where nerve

agents were manufactured.

The chronic delayed neurotoxic effects are seen in animal experiments after administration of organophosphates such as sarin.

These effects are difficulty in walking and paralysis. These are due

318

to organophosphate-induced delayed neurotoxicity, what we call

OPIDN. And this OPIDN was attributed to the inhibition of the enzyme, neurotoxic esterase in the nervous system, and also the degeneration of the axon. That means, the message pathway from

nerve cell to nerve cell is impaired. Recently, Haley could explain

the mild impairment of the nervous system functions in the Gulf

war veterans based on their epidemiological studies.

Mr. SHAYS. He’s done what? I’m sorry. Speak a little more slowly.

I’m just missing some of your words. What was the last point you

made?

Mr. SOMANI. Based on their epidemiological studies, they attribute the number of veterans. Similarly, a British study also reported neurological dysfunction in veterans. I wish to take a moment to speak about the pre-treatment drug, pyridostigmine. I did

my Ph.D. on pyridostigmine and sister drug neostigmine. Recently,

I also worked on another drug, physostigmine. These are all the

same sort of drugs, which work in the central nervous system and

the peripheral nervous system.

Pyridostigmine is a charged compound. This is a positively

charged drug which does not enter into the brain. This has been

used for more than 50 years in the treatment of myasthenia gravis

disease. Pyridostigmine is used as a pre-treatment drug against

nerve agents such as sarin. The protective effect is attributed to

the capacity to form a reversible complex with a portion of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, thereby preventing the inhibition of this

enzyme by the nerve agent. Pyridostigmine is metabolized to another charged compound. And both of these are excreted in the

urine.

However, both the drug and its metabolites seems to accumulate

in the muscle and in the cartilage—cartilage tissues, which are

present in the ears and nose and the soft tissues. Since exercise— as we take exercise, our cardiac output increases, the blood flow to

the muscle mass increases 10 times, and the blood flow to the liver

increases. And these drugs are metabolized, are degraded in the

liver. For example, the sister drug, like physostigmine on which we

worked, the half-life of that increased—half-life is the amount of

the time the drug stays in the body—and the clearance—the drug

has to be cleared from the body—the clearance has decreased, indicating that the drug and its metabolites stay in the body for a

longer time, thereby causing more effect.

Recently, Friedman gave doses of pyridostigmine to mice, and

they were subjected to forced swim. That means that the mice were

under stress. This positively charged drug entered the brain and

inhibited acetylcholinesterase, causing more toxicity. This drug,

which is a peripheral drug, has become a central drug, acting

under the central nervous system. In another study, rats were administered with pyridostigmine for 14 days. The rats were also

given physical exercise. The combination of physical exercise and

pyridostigmine caused muscular damage.

In conclusion, based on the recent experimental evidence and the

similarities of the symptoms of the delayed neurotoxicity reported

by workers in the organophosphate industry and also by Desert

Storm veterans, I’m inclined to suggest that the Gulf war syndrome

may be due to low-level exposure to sarin.

319

Mr. SHAYS. Low-level exposure to what? Sarin. OK.

Mr. SOMANI. Yes. By sarin. The symptoms are due to low-level

exposure to sarin. Pyridostigmine in combination with physical exercise can contribute to neurotoxic effects. Finally, the simultaneous exposure to insecticides and other chemicals under physical

stress may have initiated the neurotoxicity.

Mr. SHAYS. Your testimony—are you done?

Mr. SOMANI. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Somani follows:]

320

321

322

323

324

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I didn’t want to interrupt you. Your testimony is extraordinary. The bottom line to you both, Dr. Tiedt and

Dr. Somani, is that we basically poisoned our troops. In essence,

that’s what you’re saying. We poisoned our troops. We basically

gave them a chemical agent, did not warn them of the potential

harm of this agent; we ordered them to take it. And many did, obviously. And some were poisoned because of it. That’s your testimony. And your point about stress was that that just magnified the

problem. I noticed Dr. Somani and Dr. Tiedt, you were both nodding as the other spoke; as best I can understand, they seem to be

very compatible. Dr. Tiedt, do you disagree with any point that was

made by Dr. Somani? Do you want to qualify it any way?

Mr. TIEDT. I guess I think the major thing to emphasize is that

the data base is very, very, very extensive. My testimony has simply 115 of hundreds of references that are directly relevant to Gulf

war syndrome.

You know, if Gulf war syndrome was a positive event, we would

be giving the Nobel Prize to the Department of Defense for the

work that they published during the early 1980’s. It was very clear.

If it was a positive outcome, you know, like for example, I was

very active in the role of aspirin in stroke and heart attack, that

was a positive outcome, and those folks that did that work down

at the University of Texas, et cetera, are hailed as, you know, very

strong scientists now.

The connection with Gulf war syndrome, with inhibitors of enzymes, nerve enzymes, acetylcholinesterase simply being the best

studied, is much tighter. The evidence story is extremely tight. And

the troubling thing is it all really came out of about a dozen of the

DOD and DVA laboratories during the early 1980’s.

Mr. SHAYS. What is troubling to me is that your testimony basically, from your standpoint, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to

know what the problem is.

Yet, Dr. Joseph’s standpoint—and that there’s no current accepted medical knowledge—is that chronic symptoms or physical manifestations are not later developed among persons exposed to low

levels of chemical nerve agents.

Mr. TIEDT. It’s simply false. The Pentagon published, in 1993,

one of my co-authors from my 1970’s work—actually, a chairman

of the department where I did my post-doctoral fellowship at the

University of Maryland—did an amazing study and spends a great

deal of time in the introduction and discussion relating a chronic

organophosphate-induced neurotoxicity, single or just a few exposures, that cause no acute symptoms but, years later—we all know

that—I’m a pilot myself. I’ve been around cropdusters for 20 years.

We all know that cropduster pilots develop some problems, and

there’s literature on that that goes back to the 1960’s. It’s really

tight, the story between nerve enzyme inhibitors.

Really, if you want to know it in a nutshell, what we have in our

bodies, we have protective mechanisms called enzymes, and we

have circulating pools of two enzymes, in particular.

When you take a PB or get exposed to low levels under a repeated basis, or even a single basis, to sarin or malathion or DEET,

et cetera, you start soaking up that capacity of protection, and then

that makes the nerve endings—we’re talking about a 100 million

333

points of toxicity that our bodies, the cholinergic nerve endings. It

is so tight.

That is why the idea of chemical sensitivity comes into play.

That is why some of these things can take a long time. It is wellknown that an enzyme called NTE—neuropathy target esterase— takes a long time to age, and it can take years to display a

neurotoxicity from an exposure to any chemical that inhibits that.

Pesticides and organophosphates are well-known inhibitors.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you disagree with testimony before this committee that we do not know how to properly diagnose or treat

chemical exposure?

Mr. TIEDT. I sure do, and I just ask everybody to look at the

package insert for PB. Actually, look at any textbook of pharmacology and therapeutics, and just simply—if you’re interested, I’ve

already done it for you—just write down the list of side effects from

PB, sarin, DFP—I’ll give you a long list—and write down the symptoms of Gulf war syndrome. It is a fingerprint match.

It does not take a rocket scientist. It only takes a biomedical scientist.

Mr. SHAYS. You have a right to be frustrated.

Dr. Somani, is that your response to the same question? Would

you take issue with testimony before this committee, first, about

the issue, if it wasn’t acute, that you’re not going to see it happen?

If you don’t see acute symptoms, then you don’t have a problem?

Mr. SOMANI. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Second, that we don’t know how to diagnose chemical

exposure and, therefore, we don’t know how to treat it, either?

Mr. SOMANI. Yes. You don’t see the acute symptoms with this low

level. The continuous exposure, you have to wait 10 years, you can

say, because the sarin or organophosphates, they alkylate or

phosphorylate like the enzyme and they also bind to the NTE— neurotoxic esterase—enzyme.

What happens within this delayed period, we still don’t know.

Mr. SHAYS. Do we know how to diagnose? I mean, can you diagnose a patient that has this low-level exposure?

Mr. SOMANI. They cannot be, because there is a delay period they

don’t have the symptoms during that period, and all of a sudden,

they get the symptoms, after some time.

Mr. SHAYS. I need to be clear. I thought maybe you were disagreeing with earlier testimony. So, Dr. Tiedt, you would say it’s

also difficult to diagnose?

Mr. TIEDT. Certain kinds of this toxicity go through an acute incident that may or may not be symptomatic, and then followed by

a period of months or years of totally asymptomatic period, that is

without symptoms, by definition, you can’t see a symptom, and only

to be exposed by itself, by a delayed neurotoxicity, or an exposure

to another incident, like going back to your barracks and they’re

spraying the place with malathion.

Mr. SHAYS. You were talking with your hands, and your voice

was coming out. Dr. Somani was also talking with his hands, but

he wasn’t saying anything. You were his voice.

Mr. TIEDT. Ventriloquism.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m going to get you into this, but I want to call on

Mr. Sanders. But do you have anything to comment on what we’ve

334

asked so far? I’m going to get into some points you raised, but I

did want to make sure. Is there any comment you want to make

in regards to these questions?

Mr. TUCKER. I would not, not being a medical expert, I would not

comment. It sounds plausible to me. The emphasis of my testimony

is that there were multiple low-level chemical exposures which, in

combination with other types of chemicals, could have led to a synergistic effect.

Mr. SHAYS. You have total conviction that there was lots of different troops who were exposed to lots of different chemicals, something I also agree with, and then we have the evidence of what

happened. Dr.—Mr. Sanders.

Mr. SANDERS. No, I’m not a doctor.

Mr. SHAYS. I should have said, he looks like a scientist. He looks

like a mad scientist. [Laughter.]

Mr. SANDERS. I take that as a compliment.

This is a fascinating panel, and each of you are making a very

important contribution. And, Dr. Tucker, be patient. We will get to

you, because I think you have a whole lot to say. But let me get

to the physical scientists, if I might, first.

The chairman asked you, I think, an appropriate question, and

let me go over it again and maybe ask you, Dr. Somani, Dr. Tiedt

makes a statement, and I quote, from the paper that you gave us:

‘‘DOD established by the early 1980’s that, one, PB would be

harmful in healthy individuals; two, PB was worthless, even counterproductive, as a protectant against chemical warfare; three, PB

was more toxic than sublethal doses of chemical warfare agents;

and, four, higher levels of baseline nerve activity produced more

toxicity than lower levels of baseline nerve activities. There was no

demonstrated benefit to balance the certain and substantial risk.’’

Dr. Somani, do you agree with that?

Mr. SOMANI. That time, they didn’t think that the risk was there,

because this drug has been in use for myasthenia gravis for 50

years.

Mr. SANDERS. Right.

Mr. SOMANI. I do not see any literature that this drug could act

as a central acting drug, that it can get into the brain.

Pyridostigmine is a positively charged drug, and it doesn’t get into

the brain.

What they were thinking of when the pyridostigmine is given, it

inhibits up to 20 to 30 percent blood enzyme as to cholinesterase

enzyme, and that would protect against the sarin. But they didn’t

realize that the pyridostigmine, under stress conditions, can get

into the brain. That information was not available.

I also want to make a point here. I don’t know. I wonder as to

how come they didn’t try to use another drug, physostigmine,

which was a centrally acting drug, which I considered was a very

good drug, and that will give us central protection, because that’s

what our goal is, to protect the brain.

Mr. SANDERS. All right. There is a lot to discuss. But basically,

then, you are in agreement with what Dr. Tiedt said? You are basically in agreement with Dr. Tiedt’s statement?

Mr. SOMANI. Yes.

335

Mr. SANDERS. OK. If this was 1990, or just before the war, a

month before the war, and the Pentagon came to you and said,

‘‘We’re concerned about our soldiers being exposed to chemical

agents, and we’re thinking of using PB,’’ now, Dr. Tiedt is saying, ‘‘Hey, you would be crazy. That would be the worst thing in the

world. You would be poisoning our soldiers.’’ What would you have said? Would you have said the same thing?

Mr. SOMANI. No. I tell you, what are our choices? We need a

drug. Right? And we have to use something there to protect our

soldiers. So what are our alternatives? The pyridostigmine is a peripherally acting, and they felt this was the best under those conditions. They could have considered physostigmine, but they did not.

Now, what they did not know at that time, that the

pyridostigmine, under stress conditions, will cross the blood-brain

barrier and get into the brain.

Mr. SANDERS. If you’re going to war, it doesn’t take a genius to

figure out, if I’m sending you to war and I’m giving you a drug

which is going to have a negative impact under stress, war is

stress. Right? Am I missing something here? War is stress.

Mr. SOMANI. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. So anybody who is going into war is going to be

living under stress. Right?

Mr. SOMANI. Yes. But they should have studied that before, but

that work was not done in 1990.

Mr. SANDERS. This is what I’m confused about.

Mr. SOMANI. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. What I’m confused about is, Dr. Tiedt—and I’ll

give it to you now—you’re telling us that the literature was pretty

clear on this, are you not?

Mr. TIEDT. Yes. There is extensive literature, and it really begins, unfortunately, with my research, published in the Journal of

Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, in 1978. Again,

keep in mind where it came from. It came from the primary laboratory of acetylcholinesterase inhibitor toxicity in the world.

We concluded, in our 1978 paper, that treatment of myasthenia

gravis, the actual drugs used to treat these patients, contributes

somewhat to the pathophysiology of the disease. If you compare the

electronic microscope pictures between myasthenia and PB, you’ll

see such similarities.

That was then extended in much more depth by the Pentagon,

and many studies, several studies published in the early 1980’s,

that PB, all by itself, is extremely toxic in healthy——

Mr. SANDERS. OK, but here’s my question. My question is a simple question. Why didn’t they read their own research? What you’re

suggesting is, they themselves demonstrated the potential danger

of this drug. They, themselves, did that, and you’re suggesting to

us that they ignored their own research. Is that what you’re saying?

Mr. TIEDT. I think that’s a generous way of putting it, yes.

Mr. SANDERS. Let me ask you this question.

Mr. TIEDT. See, if you read their—you have to realize, the publication—this is a very critical point about scientific research. A publication is not published in some sort of abstract thing—we had

nothing to do this weekend, so we wrote a paper.

336

We first have to apply for a grant. These grants were applied for,

to the DOD, for funding. In any grant application, you outline, review the relevance, the meaning, the impact, the ramifications of

your research. I assure you that the effect of PB as a nerve chemical warfare agent was completely spelled out in these research

grants prior to the work even being initiated.

Then the work is done. Then the work is eventually published.

I just ask anyone to read any of the papers in my references, and

look at the introduction and the discussion, and you will see conclusions by the DOD scientists that PB was very toxic.

Mr. SANDERS. Let me ask you this. You are a trained pharmacologist; is that your area?

Mr. TIEDT. I received my Ph.D., in pharmacology and therapeutics.

Mr. SANDERS. If we had a dozen pharmacologists up here, welltrained, would they agree with you?

Mr. TIEDT. If they’re aware of the same literature. If we all started on the same page, simply lay out the same literature, yes, we

would come with agreement.

Mr. SANDERS. You’re not giving us some—not to say that we

don’t respect all points of view. But you’re giving us a mainstream

opinion, do you think?

Mr. TIEDT. I’m describing what the literature says, and anyone

that looks at the literature, be it yourselves as nonscientists or scientists would come to the same conclusion. Anybody that reads the

book chapters written by the DOD laboratories that did this work,

it’s obvious. There’s really no debate here.

One has to be aware of the literature. I am very sensitive to the

idea that PB is used in myasthenia gravis. I want to say right up

front that PB should be used in myasthenia gravis, as well as other

similar drugs. But that’s not to say that, in healthy individuals, it

does not have toxicity.

Mr. SANDERS. Dr. Somani, did you want to jump in, in this discussion?

Mr. SOMANI. Yes. We have used for myasthenia gravis this drug.

We gave about 1,080 milligrams of this drug per day to a patient,

and we didn’t see any adverse effect of this drug in the patient. So

the question is, in normal people, maybe it will affect more than

the myasthenic patients.

Now, the question which you are raising really is the use of the

pyridostigmine as a pretreatment drug. If I understand, the British, they claim they want to use pyridostigmine, and then we followed them the same way, because the British are using, so we

also use this. That’s my understanding. Because the question was,

to use between pyridostigmine and physostigmine.

But the British were using because this drug is a tested drug for

the last 50 years, not knowing the effect of the exercise, physical

stress, and what happens to the crossing of the blood-brain barrier.

That information, I don’t think, was available in 1990. It came out

later on, last two——

Mr. SHAYS. Is physostigmine an approved drug? Would they have

been able to get the same waiver from the FDA?

Mr. SOMANI. Physostigmine is an approved drug not for as a

pretreatment drug against organophosphate.

337

Mr. SHAYS. What is it for?

Mr. SOMANI. It is for the eye treatment for some eye diseases.

See, every drug has to be used for particular symptoms.

Mr. SHAYS. Would it have been the same process? Would the

FDA, they would have gone through the same—— Mr. TIEDT. I know why they used PB. The reason they used PB

is, in 1984, they submitted an IND. In the United States, you can

only market a drug or use a drug for an indication approved by

FDA. If you want to use a drug for an indication beyond an FDA

approved labeling, you must get an IND.

The DOD had an IND filed in 1984 for PB. They never filed one,

to my knowledge, on any other drug.

Now, scientifically—let’s take the regulatory thing out of it—scientifically, they could have used physostigmine and, in fact, the

evidence for physostigmine being a protective agent is far superior.

Physostigmine is a superior protective agent.

First of all, we must realize, PB is not protective, it’s actually

harmful. Physostigmine is protective, for two primary reasons. One,

it has better access to the brain. Two, it has a self-limiting toxicity,

because it desensitizes the acetylcholine receptors, and so it kind

of self limits its own toxicity. Those are two big hits why physostigmine would have been a much better use.

Both of these, any of these drugs, actually, the only literature

that shows any of these drugs really work are in combination with

atropine and 2-PAM. So we really needed a cocktail like that, not

the way it was used.

Mr. SHAYS. What we’re going to do, if you don’t mind—do you

have any time restraint, or would you be willing to let us vote and

come back?

Mr. SANDERS. Let me ask Dr. Tiedt this question. What you’re

saying is fairly mindblowing, frankly.

Mr. TIEDT. Yes, it is. That’s why, when I first heard this whole

issue—I was watching the Rockefeller hearings on May 6—I could

not believe, watching the folks raise their right hand and say—and

it really astonished me, and I walked about 20 miles for 2 days,

when they said PB has no known toxicity. Read the package insert,

if you don’t want to read the scientific literature.

It’s really disturbing, when a scientific study is published, it’s no

good anymore. You know, what’s going on today is, we’re spending over $100 million more for scientific studies to answer all the questions that were answered 15 years ago.

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, correct me if I’m wrong, but you

know as much about this as anybody. We have not heard a whole

lot about this, have we?

Mr. SHAYS. Not a lot.

Mr. SANDERS. No, we have not heard a whole lot about this. And

this can be a very important factor and, I think, this whole discussion. I’m hearing that you are in agreement with the studies that

Haley and others have done which talk about the synergistic effect

and the increased impact of stress and exercise and all of this.

We’ll be back. We’re going to vote and we’re going to come back,

because this is important.

Do you have confidence, Dr. Tiedt, given what you have said

today—two questions—that the DOD will do the right thing in

338

terms of coming up with some of the conclusions to what you have

indicated?

Mr. TIEDT. As a scientist, I have to go by the evidence, and the

evidence, the answer is absolutely not.

Mr. SANDERS. Tell us a little about your surprise that information like this did not make it to the Presidential Advisory Commission.

Mr. TIEDT. I’m very surprised. I was called by the White House

in April 1995, asking if I would be interested in being a member—

not a member of the staff, but actually a member—of the Advisory

Panel. Presumably because I’m a mere adjunct professor at a local

community college these days, you know, it’s not right up there in

the fast lane.

So I didn’t hear again, in any serious way, until January 1996.

But I can tell you, in April 1995, I submitted extensive documentation, along with my CV and my interest in participating.

On January 16, I got an emergency phone call from the White

House, asking me what else I knew about PB toxicity. I asked that

person who called me, I said, ‘‘Did you ever do a literature search?’’

Simply go to any library—we happen to be in a city that has the

best libraries. Go to those libraries and just type in the word

‘‘pyridostigmine’’ and watch the couple hundred references that

come out, and then go read those references, and find out who did

all those studies, or most of those studies.

It is shocking. It is shocking. I submitted that four-page bibliography on January 17, 1996. I was asked to send it to Philip

Landrigan, the same day. I did. On October 4, the Presidential Advisory Panel called me, told me they didn’t even know who Philip

Landrigan was. They told me they never received my four-page bibliography. So I sent it again.

I went to the Advisory Panel meeting in Tampa, asking to testify.

I was refused testimony. They said they still did not know of any

of my research.

By some strange coincidence, I was permitted to testify on November 13. Once again, I submitted all of that—all of that——

Mr. SANDERS. Your testimony was similar to what you have stated today?

Mr. TIEDT. Yes. I submitted, you know, my bibliographies again.

None of my articles in the bibliographies—not my articles, the

DOD studies—there’s no DOD study in the Presidential Advisory

Panel from the published peer review literature.

I got an interesting letter 1 month ago from the Presidential Advisory Panel. I asked about input from another scientist to this

panel. They sent me back a two-page bibliography of the DOD

studies that this person was a coauthor of—coauthor of my studies,

by the way, and my name is in those papers—23 published studies

and two private contract studies with the U.S. Army, all done in

the 1980’s. None of those studies appear in the Presidential Panel

Report.

They have actually eliminated any studies that document Gulf

war syndrome. If you read Dr. Haley’s fine print in his JAMA article, he says he presented this information to the Presidential Advisory Panel.

339

If you go to the Presidential Advisory Panel, No. 1, not only do

you not see any references of Dr. Haley; No. 2, he doesn’t even appear on the page-and-a-half of names of people who supplied input.

I think it’s serious. It’s very, very serious.

Mr. SHAYS. It is serious. And we’re going to go vote in 1 second.

But, Dr. Tucker—this is a good segue, in one sense—knowing of

the commission, describe why that event may have happened, these

events. Maybe you can’t see a relationship.

I mean, as he was talking, he was saying, ‘‘I’m not surprised.’’ Were you?

Mr. TUCKER. Well, I can only discuss my personal experience on

the committee staff, which I would be happy to do, and perhaps

you could extrapolate from my experience some more general conclusions. But I was only on the committee staff for 4 months.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. What we’ll do is, we’ll come back and we’ll do

that.

Mr. TUCKER. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. You both don’t mind waiting?

Mr. TUCKER. No.

Mr. SHAYS. We have one vote. I don’t think we have another. It

will probably be about 15 to 20 minutes. The committee stands at

recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. SHAYS. I call this hearing to order. I don’t think we’re going

to be going too much longer, but I did want to tie up some loose

ends.

Dr. Tucker, I would be interested to know—you were working on

the Presidential Advisory Committee—why you think you left, so

we can put that on the record.

Mr. TUCKER. I would be happy to. From August to December

1995, I served on the staff of the Presidential Advisory Committee

as the senior policy analyst responsible for investigating chemical

and biological weapons exposures.

During my tenure, I received briefings from CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Army Chemical School, and the Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command. In each case, I heard categorical denials that Iraqi chemical weapons were present in the

war zone, that United States troops were exposed to fallout from

bombed chemical weapons bunkers, or that Iraq used chemical

weapons.

I was puzzled by the fact that the United States Government’s

position on all these issues was at odds with the eyewitness testimony of Gulf war veterans, as well as detections by Czech chemical

defense units in northern Saudi Arabia of low levels of chemical

weapons, which the Pentagon acknowledged were valid. So there

seemed to be a disconnect.

To address these discrepancies, I decided to investigate a wide

range of views, both within and outside Government, including the

leaders of Gulf war veteran advocacy groups and Pat and Robin

Eddington, the CIA analysts, who differed strongly with the position of their agency that chemical weapons had not been used in

the Gulf war.

I believed that only by obtaining information from the full range

of informed sources could the committee come to a reasoned judgVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:42 Jul 09, 2002 Jkt 080369 PO 00000 Frm 00343 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\43668 pfrm04 PsN: 43668
340

ment about the incidence of exposures. I also believed that we had

the moral and professional responsibility to obtain all such relevant

information and that it was unethical, as well as unscientific, to ignore it.

Shortly after I began this effort, however, certain committee senior staff ordered me verbally and by e-mail not to seek documents

or unofficial briefings from so-called ‘‘unofficial’’ sources.

I became concerned that the Presidential Advisory Committee’s

dependence on the people and institutions it was investigating was

creating problems for my investigation. The committee lacked subpoena power and relied for information on the voluntary cooperation of the Pentagon, the CIA, and the VA, whose activities it was

supposed to oversee.

Mr. SHAYS. Excuse me. Just to clarify, the Presidential Advisory

Committee does not have the ability to subpoena?

Mr. TUCKER. That’s correct. I feared that certain committee senior staff wished to avoid alienating agency officials by being

complicit in the suppression of dissenting views. I personally refused to accept these constraints on my investigation, believing

they would prevent me from fulfilling the President’s mandate to

leave no stone unturned in exploring possible causes of Gulf war

illness, and would violate our ethical, scientific, and legal responsibilities.

On December 1, 1995, without prior warning, I was dismissed

from the committee staff and given 1 hour to clean out my desk

and leave the building. Before that time, I had never received a

negative performance review. Despite repeated requests, I was

never given grounds for my termination.

In response to press inquiries, the Advisory Committee spokesman has stated repeatedly and falsely that I resigned voluntarily.

I received, in fact, a formal termination memo, a copy of which is

appended to my written testimony.

The credibility of a committee like the Presidential Advisory

Committee on large matters, such as whether Gulf war illness was

caused or linked to chemical exposures, suffers when its spokesman

lies about small matters, such as my termination.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. My understanding is that the gentleman

who replaced you—what is his name?

Mr. TUCKER. James Turner. I do not know him personally.

Mr. SHAYS. But my understanding is that he is—the implication

was that you were reaching out beyond—you suspect you were terminated because?

Mr. TUCKER. I am speculating about the possible reason for my

termination. Despite repeated requests, I was not given grounds for

my termination.

Mr. SHAYS. You’re allowed to speculate, if you haven’t been given

grounds. So what is your speculation?

Mr. TUCKER. As I said, I believe that the reason was that I was

pursuing my investigation too aggressively, and that senior Committee staff—and perhaps members of the panel itself, I just don’t

know—were concerned that this would jeopardize the Committee’s

access to information voluntarily provided by the agencies we were

investigating.

341

Mr. SHAYS. Your point is that the Committee itself, it needs the

cooperation of the very people it’s investigating?

Mr. TUCKER. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Without that cooperation, the willingness to provide

information, they don’t get the information?

Mr. TUCKER. That’s correct, they don’t have subpoena power.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Tiedt, I would like to be clear as to what hearing

you were watching when you found yourself ethically upset with

the fact that people were testifying in a way that you wondered

how they could—that’s a long question.

The bottom line is, you felt people at what hearing were testifying and testifying falsely?

Mr. TIEDT. I believe it was—I know it was May 6, and I believe

it was a Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee hearing by——

Mr. SHAYS. What year?

Mr. TIEDT. 1994.

Mr. SHAYS. 1994. OK. We’re going back a ways. 1994, you recall

a hearing where people testified about PB?

Mr. TIEDT. That’s right.

Mr. SHAYS. And said it was not toxic?

Mr. TIEDT. There was no known toxic effects from PB.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. What I would like to do—and then, Bernie, we’ll

come back to your line, as well, of questioning—I need to clarify

the fine points of difference. I thought, when you were testifying,

Dr. Tiedt, that you were agreeing with Dr. Somani. And then later,

I’m seeing some differences, and they may be subtle differences, although they may be significant. I need to know that.

The testimony I think I’m hearing from you, Dr. Tiedt, is that

basically our troops were given what, in essence, is a drug, an experimental drug that caused more harm than good. In fact, not

more harm than good—it caused harm, period. That’s your testimony. And the imagery I have is that we were basically poisoning

our troops.

Mr. TIEDT. That’s correct.

Mr. SHAYS. And you feel pretty comfortable with that statement.

I got the sense, Dr. Somani, that you were nodding your head, but

you wanted to qualify that. Do you disagree with that, or agree

with it with qualifications?

Mr. SOMANI. I need to give a little explanation.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. SOMANI. If you are giving pyridostigmine, it will cause the

acute effects right away. We know those effects are diarrhea,

hypersalivation, nausea, abdominal pain, muscle weakness, fatigue,

blurred vision, all of those, urinary problems—we know those.

But my question comes, then, they are taking the drug now; 2

years, 3 years, 4 or 5 years, will those—those effects are still causing some problems?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Mr. SOMANI. I don’t think so. That’s all my point is. The effects

of the Gulf war syndrome, everything, it’s because of the

organophosphates. Because we know that caused the delayed

neurotoxicity, but I don’t know whether pyridostigmine causes the

delayed neurotoxicity.

342

And another thing. There are some troops, like Czechoslovakian

troops, they didn’t take pyridostigmine, still they have the same

symptoms. How and why?

Mr. SHAYS. What is your response to that, Dr. Tiedt?

Mr. TIEDT. What, about the Czech Republic troops?

Mr. SHAYS. Just his response. How do you react to what Dr.

Somani said?

Mr. TIEDT. I can only report what the studies have found. The

studies have found that a few exposures to cholinesterase inhibitors—like PB, like physostigmine, like neostigmine, et cetera— cause ultrastructural and electrophysical effects that last months.

I don’t have any evidence that anything lasts years, in terms of a

controlled scientific study. However, if you look at the effects that

are lasting months, and the exquisite physiology that’s at play

here, it’s not hard to predict.

I do agree with one thing that Dr. Somani is saying, and that

is that organophosphate co-exposures can be very, very important.

The thing to emphasize here is that PB can shift. Let’s say

you’ve given a dose of PB, and then subsequently given a dose of

sarin. You will be blocking the binding sites for sarin, and shift

those to the central nervous system in a preferential fashion.

That is all very well explained and described by Dr. Haley’s reports.

Mr. SANDERS. If you were listening to my line of questioning to

Dr. Rostker, what I was concerned about is that conventional medicine is not looking at the synergistic approach that might, in fact,

be affecting many of our troops. Let me ask you this question, and

that’s for either Dr. Somani or Dr. Tiedt.

That is, is there a standard diagnostic code for delayed

neurotoxicity, or delayed neuropathy? Is the diagnosis accepted and

recognized widely in clinical practice?

Mr. TIEDT. I believe the OPIDP essentially is. Now, when you

say ‘‘in clinical practice,’’ we are a large country with a couple hundred thousand physicians. Many physicians probably are not tuned

in to the scientific literature, and I have no doubt that those physicians have no idea about all of this.

Mr. SANDERS. But, for example, are you familiar with the diagnosis of multiple chemical sensitivity?

Mr. TIEDT. Somewhat.

Mr. SANDERS. I mean, that is a diagnosis among which, to the

best of my knowledge, the AMA does not agree. Some physicians

believe it very strongly, some do not. The concern that I had with

the DOD is, we’re going to keep going around in circles, because

many of their doctors just may not believe this. Is that a reasonable ground for concern?

Mr. TIEDT. Yes, it is.

Mr. SANDERS. Do you believe it?

Mr. SHAYS. Do you believe in multiple chemical sensitivity as a

concept, and would you describe, how it fits into mainstream

science?

Mr. TIEDT. You know, I think Representative Sanders outlined

basically the pathophysiology of MCS so eloquently, and how can

anyone not buy into that? That’s exactly what is at play here. You

are sensitizing to future events.

343

We know that, in the real world, we know that, from an EPA

point of view.

Mr. SHAYS. The workplace.

Mr. TIEDT. Workplace, and home place. Look what is happening

in Mississippi.

Right now, as we speak, a couple of folks in a pesticide company

used excessive pesticide levels in motels, in homes, and they have

all been condemned and closed down, and they’re about ready, if

it hasn’t been done already, to be bulldozed over, simply like another Love Canal. Dioxin. Isn’t that Love Canal? Isn’t that an inhibitor of these same enzymes?

We know that. We know there’s chemical sensitivity in life. But

just because I say that sentence, it’s also true that our standards

of medical practice and scientific research, in every single borough

and country and city in this country is not the same.

That is a problem, getting the word out. Unfortunately, you

know, it must be said. I know it makes it a long sentence. But it

must be said that we live in a world that we’re barraged with information.

We have a real technology problem of what information is the

highest priority stuff to know. It’s a problem.

Mr. SANDERS. Dr. Somani, did you want to comment?

Mr. SOMANI. Yes. I do believe in multiple chemical sensitivity,

because it does cause the effect, and the effect prolongs for a longer

time.

Mr. SANDERS. Do you believe that Persian Gulf syndrome is connected to multiple chemical sensitivity?

Mr. SOMANI. Yes, definitely. It has exaggerated more. A single

component caused it, but, in the presence of others, it has amplified

or potentiated the effects.

Mr. SANDERS. What we heard from Maj. Donnelly earlier today

would be a classic situation?

Mr. SOMANI. Yes. But primarily, that is due to organophosphates,

insecticides, and those.

Mr. SANDERS. Was I wrong in suggesting that, if we have hundreds of thousands of young men and women walking around perhaps with a lot of stuff, nasty stuff, in their bodies, that they might

be more sensitive when somebody sprays their home for cockroaches, and that could trigger off a problem with them? Is that a

legitimate concern?

Dr. Somani, why don’t you start?

Mr. SOMANI. That is a concern. But we also have a good enzymatic system in the body to get rid of that. Otherwise, we will be

really——

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor, I’m sorry. I couldn’t understand your words.

Just say it a little more slowly, because I value what you’re saying

here.

Mr. SOMANI. OK. See, our body is capable of getting rid of those

compounds. Even though we are exposed every day—you and me

are eating about 1.5 milligrams of insecticides, OK, which are

sprayed; through a lifespan of time, they can accumulate in the

body—but we have a good enzymatic system in the body, which can

detoxify these compounds.

344

Mr. SANDERS. But you would agree that, for some people, it may

be better than for other people?

Mr. SOMANI. Yes. Yes. That is the genetic effects, OK? That is

where the environmental factor plays the role. But they can be

more sensitized. Some people are more sensitive, some people are

less sensitive.

Mr. SANDERS. Right.

Mr. SOMANI. In a situation like Gulf war syndrome, that is not

the one factor; it is a combination of the factors.

Mr. SANDERS. Is it fair to say that, understanding people are different in genetic composition——

Mr. SOMANI. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS [continuing]. But that we would have reason to believe that, for the men and women who were over there, they have

come back and are in a condition that we might say somebody who

worked in a pesticide company or somebody who was spraying, that

they have been exposed; is that a fair statement?

Mr. SOMANI. If they are exposed, they will be more sensitive.

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, that’s my only point.

Mr. SOMANI. Yes.

Mr. TIEDT. And that’s what you mean by MCS, isn’t it?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, that is what I mean.

I’m interested, Dr. Tiedt, again, I was disappointed, to be frank

with you, in the Presidential Advisory Commission. Some of hoped

for a little bit more. The emphasis on stress, I thought, was unfortunate.

Do you want to elaborate a little bit on why you think that more

evidence concerning the chemical factors was not included in that

report? That’s what you’ve said. Anything more that you want to

add to that?

Mr. TIEDT. Certainly, let me just restate it, so at least I can start

with something solid there. That’s how you left your question.

The fact exists that hundreds of relevant studies—directly relevant, not by some stretch of an imagination—done prior to the

Gulf war, were not included in the Presidential Panel Final Report,

‘‘final,’’ because some of us prevailed a little bit, and they were

asked to go back to work for a little bit, so we’ll get a Final No.

2.

That’s a fact; and they knew it. It’s not like, well, they didn’t go

to the literature and do it. They certainly had it from me and many

others, it turns out, submitted to them on many, many occasions,

and it’s simply not there.

The issue is the motivation. Why would they not include it?

Mr. SANDERS. Let me take that one. I’ll ask that to you and to

Dr. Tucker. Do you think that there was a built-in bias of wanting

to conclude that it was more stress-related than chemical-related?

Mr. TIEDT. Yes, I do. Yes I do. The reason is that I think that

has been a catch-all, and don’t we all know that it’s been a catchall, for years. Quite frankly, Dr. Joseph, he blamed Gulf war syndrome—he has had three different explanations.

His first explanation was on psychosomatic freeloaders. His second explanation was on stress. That changed last December when

Dr. Friedman’s study came out. Of course, anybody would have

345

known that stress was a major factor, if you just read the literature

from the 1960’s and 1970’s.

Then, finally, about 3 weeks ago, when he announced his resignation, and traveling around the world in a boat called the

Moonraker, he said, no, now he blames Gulf war syndrome on society. It’s something with the fabric of our consciousness, that we are

just susceptible to hearing, you know, that the Government is to

blame for things.

That’s basically his three answers to Gulf war syndrome. So I basically have to disagree, because the evidence prior to the Gulf war

shows that it was at least predictable.

Mr. SANDERS. And, Dr. Tucker, you were interested from another

point of view in pursuing the possible chemical exposures. You got

fired? I mean, do you think that there was a built-in bias there,

that they didn’t want to look at this stuff?

Mr. TUCKER. All I can say is that information within the Presidential Advisory Committee staff was extremely tightly held. The

senior staff controlled the flow of information not only to the outside world and to the panel, but to the members of the staff itself

who were working on this issue. So we were working under very

tight constraints.

The reasons for those constraints, as I speculated earlier, may

have been related to concern about access to information from the

agencies that were supposed to supply it to the committee.

Mr. SANDERS. That you might have, by going outside it, upset

some of the people in the DOD or the VA?

Mr. TUCKER. Right, particularly dealing directly with whistleblowers or dissenters within those agencies.

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Your bottom line is that you believe that there

has been more chemical exposure than we have been led to believe?

Mr. TUCKER. That’s correct.

Mr. SANDERS. A lot of what you say makes sense in terms of Iraq

having a history of using these weapons, the unlikeliness of them

in the midst of a terrible defeat, after they had brought these

weapons to the theater, then taking them away, right?

Mr. TUCKER. Right. Well, the CIA has testified, in particular, Dr.

Gordon Oehler from the Non-Proliferation Center testified before

Congress that CIA had assessed that Iraq had deployed chemical

munitions into the Kuwait Theater of Operations in the summer

and fall 1990, before the beginning of the air war, and then had

withdrawn them shortly before the war began on January 16, 1991.

But the CIA did not provide any information to substantiate the

theory that the weapons had been withdrawn. There is considerable evidence on GulfLINK and in documents released under the

Freedom of Information Act, many produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as CIA, that refer to the presence of chemical munitions in the Kuwait Theater of Operations, right up to the

beginning of hostilities.

Mr. SANDERS. You believe, as I understand it, that one of the

possible areas of exposure was when these bunkers were blown up,

that it was not just Khamisiyah, but other bunkers, as well?

Mr. TUCKER. Right. I believe that Khamisiyah was one of many

incidents in which bunkers were explosively demolished, releasing

low levels of chemical agent.

346

Mr. SANDERS. And your judgment about whether or not the

Iraqis, from an offensive point of view, used chemical or biological

weapons?

Mr. TUCKER. Those are based on reports of detections, for example, during the breaching operations by the Marine Corps, during

the invasion of Kuwait. There were detections with FOX reconnaissance vehicles, which have a very reliable detection system called

a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer.

There were multiple detections with the so-called M256 kit,

which is a highly reliable way of confirming initial chemical

alarms. There was also a device called a RASCAL, which can detect

clouds of chemical agent at a distance.

All of these systems detected a number of different chemical

agents during the ground war, including lewisite and mustard,

which are blister agents, and sarin, which is a nerve agent.

Mr. SANDERS. So your conclusion, as I recall from your testimony, is that there was not a massive attack?

Mr. TUCKER. Clearly, people were not falling like flies, which one

would expect from a massive use of chemical agent. But, for example, there may have been chemical mines. There may have been occasional use of artillery shells.

I believe what happened is that there was some delegation of authority from Iraqi senior command levels to front-line units to actually use these weapons, and that there was some uncoordinated

use. But because of the speed of the war and the fact that the

weather conditions were adverse, there was no coordinated use, no

effective use of chemical weapons.

Mr. SANDERS. Am I hearing you correctly? Obviously, one has to

know what is true and what is not true, and we can speculate all

we want. But, in terms of speculation, they have a history of using

it. They used it right after the war. You’re suggesting that the stuff

was there?

Mr. TUCKER. Yes.

Mr. SANDERS. And you’re suggesting that maybe permission was

given to some of their front-line people to use it, and you’re arguing, given all of that, it shouldn’t shock you that some of that was

used?

Mr. TUCKER. Because, for example, there are communications

intercepts, where we intercepted Iraqi military communications,

and there were indicators that they had issued an order, that senior command levels had issued an order to front-line troops to use

the weapons if needed against Coalition forces.

Mr. SANDERS. Do you also suggest that, in terms of the burning

oil wells, that that might have been an area where some——

Mr. TUCKER. Well, there’s one document that is suggestive of the

possibility. When a number of Iraqi units were ordered to sabotage

the Kuwaiti oil wells, they were also ordered to—I forget the exact

term, but there was a reference to ‘‘chemical preparations.’’ The

troops themselves were ordered to wear chemical protective gear

and to set up decontaminationsites. So that is suggestive.

I’m not saying this is conclusive evidence by any means, but it

is suggestive of the possibility that some of the oil well fires were

deliberately contaminated with chemical weapons.

347

Mr. SANDERS. I mean, the bottom line of what you’re saying is,

given all of these factors, you would be surprised if our troops were

not exposed to more than Khamisiyah?

Mr. TUCKER. Right. I think the CIA and the Pentagon have made

an effort to fence in the problem by focusing on Khamisiyah, while

ignoring a number of other incidents of this type.

Mr. SANDERS. Are you confident, when Dr. Rostker tells that

they are now exploring a whole lot of other areas? Do you think

we may see something?

Mr. TUCKER. I was encouraged to hear that they have an open

mind that there may have been other incidents of this type. When

I was on the committee staff, they were completely categorical that

there had been no exposures. So there has been a kind of paradigm

shift since Khamisiyah and now they are more open to the possibility.

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. We’re ready to close up here. I just need to have a

sense of direct dose versus low level.

First, I’m just going to say to you that one of the things that has

troubled me throughout our hearings, and this is the eighth hearing we’ve had, as a State legislator, I got involved in environmental

issues and safety in the workplace and, for me, it was like lesson

No. 1, certain chemicals in the workplace cause harm, illness, and

potential death.

It seems to me like the Army hasn’t learned that lesson yet. It

does surprise me that people that have your views somehow aren’t

at the VA and aren’t at the DOD. I would like to understand, just

appreciate that a little bit more. Is the kind of science that you’re

in, and your expertise, not the kind of science that doctors get into

in terms of financial remuneration?

What got you into this field, and why aren’t there more people

in your field? Why am I not seeing more people of your expertise

in the VA? When we had one member from the VA testify, they

really couldn’t think of people that had your expertise, except for

one or two, really a handful.

Mr. TIEDT. I’d rather not even speculate on that. Let me give you

the realities. Simply consult my reference list, look at all the authors, and look at their affiliations. The DOD and the DVA have

lots of scientists that know lots about low-level nerve gas, organophosphate exposures, and the toxicities of PB and like chemicals.

Matter of fact, that’s where most of the funding and the research

comes from—the DOD-funded laboratories.

Mr. SHAYS. I thought you were a little unfair to Dr. Joseph, because I’m not sure that he would have publicly stated—it may have

been your sense of his three levels of what he—the growth of his

sense of what Gulf war syndrome was.

Therefore, because I thought you were a little unfair, I was trying to find the exact quote that I recalled. The sense I had from

it was that there have been very few low-level studies of exposure

to chemicals, that basically, his view, high-level exposure, acute illness, we know we have a problem; low-level, we don’t really have

any proof that this is a health care problem.

348

Yet you seem to be implying that there are a number of studies

that may, in fact, even be low-level studies. There certainly are, in

the private sector, in the workplace.

Are you aware that there are DOD studies that can verify and

could have alerted the DOD to the seriousness of low-level exposure to chemicals?

Mr. TIEDT. Yes, I am. I mean, for example, one of the best DOD

studies out, I think it was published in 1985, the lead author is

Meshul—M-e-s-h-u-l.

He finds that he was able to give a dose of sarin, that it caused

no acute toxicity, none. But then he goes in and pulls the muscles

out, and he finds all kinds of, you know, neuromuscular junction

problems, and it’s going to be long-lasting neuromuscular junction

problems.

That’s not even tapping into the NTE, the other enzyme, which

is more of a long-term, you know, delayed neuropathy sort of thing.

Certainly, there is evidence out there, and before and after the

Gulf war. It’s not bleak. It is simply not bleak. I just ask folks to

really look at the reference list. It’s not my interpretation. It’s really the DOD determinations.

Keep in mind some of the procedures about things. I’m not sure

if anybody has published a study. When you publish a study and

it’s paid for by somebody, quite often you have to get endorsement.

For example, that just recently came out on generic Synthroid.

They had to get an endorsement.

Being a pharmaceutical executive in clinical research, I am

aware of the confidentiality agreements that I’ve asked a variety

of investigators to sign.

I believe it’s a certainty that any study that is going to be postured in the scientific literature as a DOD-funded study, done by

DOD employees, particularly at the Aberdeen Chemical Warfare

R&D facility, is going to be approved up the chain of command and

finally get an endorsement to get out into the published literature.

Now, these studies are not done by low-level scientists running

amok up in Aberdeen.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, your testimony raises whole levels of new inquiry for us. I had accepted as reality that, as foolish as it seemed

to me to be, the DOD wasn’t into doing much work in low-level exposure and, as a result, I was critical of them, because I couldn’t

justify it in my own mind.

You’re saying—and we’re going to go back and examine the

record—you’re saying that’s not so. You’ve also basically testified

that people under oath in 1994, in your judgment, were really contradicting a scientific fact.

Mr. TIEDT. DOD and the FDA said, May 6—I didn’t bring the

testimony with me.

Mr. SHAYS. It’s right here.

Mr. TIEDT. 1994.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Mr. TIEDT. That was the context. And, you know, actually, said,

you know, ‘‘We agreed to keep medical records; we agreed to give

folks PB brochures outlining the side effects and the things to be

cautious of. We agreed to do that.’’ Well, they didn’t do it.

349

Mr. SHAYS. We are going to be having a hearing on May 8, 1997,

whose topic is going to be bioethics and informed consent, so we’re

going to be getting into that whole issue.

Your testimony has been really quite excellent. It has been a

very interesting day.

Dr. Tucker, we didn’t get as much into your area, but we have

in the past. Is there anything that you would want to close with?

Mr. TUCKER. OK. I would like to make a remark relevant to the

topic we were just discussing.

Historically, U.S. chemical defense doctrine has—— Mr. SHAYS. Let me interrupt you and say that I also understand

you have some recommendations to make?

Mr. TUCKER. Yes, that’s right.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Why don’t you do that, as well?

Mr. TUCKER. OK. Thank you.

Historically, U.S. chemical defense doctrine has discounted the

possibility of harm from doses of chemical warfare agents that are

too low to produce immediate acute effects.

Much of the research on low-dose exposures has dealt with occupational exposures—for example, people who work at Army depots

where chemical agents are stored and who work day in and day out

with very low level, whole-body exposures. I think there has been

a disconnect between the chemical defense doctrine for the battlefield and the development of occupational safety and health measures for depot workers. That might be part of the explanation.

In general, the goal of chemical-defense doctrine has been to minimize the impact of an enemy’s use of chemical weapons on the

tempo and effectiveness of U.S. military operations. They have

done this by setting up the so-called MOPP scale—mission-oriented

protective posture—which refers to the ensemble of protective gear

that U.S. troops wear—gas mask, poncho, and protective garments.

The idea is to calibrate the level of protection to the assessed

chemical threat, because when people are in MOPP–4, the full ensemble, they are almost incapacitated. They cannot fight efficiently,

particularly under hot weather conditions. They have poor vision.

They can’t communicate well. They are under a higher level of

stress.

To deal with this problem, the Army has sought to minimize the

level of protection that troops wear in combat, and calibrate it to

the assessed level of threat.

As a result, there has been a kind of all-or-nothing mindset that

has viewed chemical weapons exposures as either severe if they

produce acute effects or, if they’re sub-acute, they’re just discounted, they’re viewed as harmless.

Commanders during the Gulf war generally disregarded reports

of low-level chemical detections and exposures because of this allor-nothing mindset. I believe that, later on, after the war, when

large numbers of troops began getting sick, the same commanders

wished to avoid accountability for serious errors of judgment, such

as blowing up bunkers that may have contained chemical weapons.

They refused to acknowledge the problem, hoping it would simply

go away.

In my view, regardless of who was at fault—that’s really no

longer important—the critical issue is to get to the truth, so that

350

we can make sure that future soldiers are better protected against

these low-level threats and better treated by their Government if

they are exposed.

In terms of my recommendations, I strongly believe that the executive branch’s failure to deal forthrightly with this issue from the

beginning has seriously eroded public confidence, not only in the

Department of Defense but in Government in general. I think only

a full disclosure of the facts and acceptance of official responsibility

where it is due can restore the relationship of trust between Government and the people that is the essence of our democracy.

To this end, I would offer two recommendations.

First, a crucial untapped source of information about possible

toxic exposures during the Gulf war is the large volume of environmental and biomedical samples that U.S. technical intelligence

teams collected throughout the war zone during and after Desert

Storm. A memo describing this sampling operation in detail is attached to my written testimony. It was coordinated by a rather

shadowy unit called the JCMEC, based on Dhahran.

Despite requests under the Freedom of Information Act, the results of these analyses have never been made public. I would,

therefore, urge the subcommittee to request these records from the

Department of Defense and, if the request is denied, to issue a subpoena for their release.

Second, I would agree with Mr. Sanders that the Pentagon has

suffered a significant loss of credibility and that the future investigation of chemical exposure incident should be entrusted to an objective and disinterested body that can regain the confidence of the

American people.

My suggestion would be for Congress to establish a bipartisan select committee of both houses to conduct an independent investigation of the exposures issue. This committee should have full subpoena power and access to the full range of classified information

on the Gulf war.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Dr. Tiedt or Dr. Somani, do you have any

closing comments?

Mr. TIEDT. I would add, regarding the recommendation to get additional information, I’m aware, because I’ve received a couple copies, of unpublished DOD studies that are internally completed and

have signoffs, but they simply did not, you know, fit the need to

get published.

It seems to me that, undoubtedly, there are many, many others—

unpublished studies, finished, but just not ready for prime time

publication—and I would recommend that those get requested, as

well.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Dr. Somani.

Mr. SOMANI. Yes. My recommendation would be that, as Dr.

Rostker already pointed out, that they have announced about the

grants for the low-level studies, and hopefully, they will continue

that, because the future problem is with the low-level studies.

Mr. SHAYS. One problem with studies for me right now is that

I’m not prepared to recommend that we have a lot more studies.

I’m not prepared to recommend we have a lot more studies. I feel

like we’re all studied out, and I want to see some action.

351

Obviously, we need to continue studies, but I don’t want to wait

for action.

Mr. SOMANI. Effective of a low level of the organophosphate, the

nerve agents. OK.

No. 2 will be, we know that there should be other pretreatment

drugs besides pyridostigmine, like physostigmine, and I’m sure

they should be looking into it. In fact, in the last symposium, they

did say that they will be looking into physostigmine as a pretreatment drug.

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to thank you gentlemen. The third panel

has the most difficult job, because we’ve been here a while. You

were very stimulating and informative, all three of you.

This was a day well spent. I’m very grateful to all of you. I thank

those of you who have stayed to listen to the testimony of our witnesses, and I thank the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, because

I do know we have officials from there who have been here—most

of the day, or all of the day? All of the day. For the record, that

is very appreciated. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

361