## Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court

Carter v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n

,

2014 IL App (5th) 130151WC

Appellate Court Caption JACK CARTER, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS’

COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Old Ben Coal Co./Horizon Natural Resources, Appellee).

District & No. Fifth District

Docket No. 5-13-0151WC

Filed June 9, 2014

Held

( Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of

the reader. ) In claimant coal miner’s action under the Workers’ Occupational

Diseases Act where the medical evidence showed that claimant was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary diseas e (COPD), the arbitrator’s finding that the claim was barred by t he three-year statute of limitations applicable to diseases other than co al workers’ pneumoconiosis was affirmed, notwithstanding his co ntention that the five-year statute of limitations applicable to coal workers’ pneumoconiosis applied, since applying the five-yea r statute to only claims for coal workers’ pneumoconiosis and not cla ims for COPD arising from exposure to coal dust does not treat “ similarly situated” individuals differently, especially when the condit ions involve different disease processes affecting different par ts of the lung, and the five-year statute did not mention COPD.

Decision Under

Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Randolph County, N o. 11-MR-25; the Hon. Richard A. Brown, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.- 2 -

Counsel on
Appeal Darrell Dunham, of Darrell Dunham & Associates, of Carbondale, for appellant.

Cheryl L. Intravaia, of Feirich/Mager/Green/Ryan, o f Carbondale, for appellee.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hoffman, Hudson, Harris, and Stewart concu rred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 The claimant, Jack Carter, filed a claim against Old Ben Coal Co./Horizon Natural

Resources (the employer) under the Workers’ Occupat ional Diseases Act (the Act) (820 ILCS

310/1 et seq. (West 2008)) alleging coal workers’ pneumoconiosis and claiming a last exposure date of September 24, 2004. Medical eviden ce presented at the hearing indicated that the claimant was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) caused in part by exposure to coal dust but was not diagnosed with coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. The

arbitrator found that the claimant’s claim was time -barred because it was not filed within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to cla ims alleging occupational diseases other than coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. See 820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008).
¶ 2 The claimant appealed the arbitrator’s decision to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation

Commission (the Commission), arguing that the arbit rator erred by applying the Act’s three-year statute of limitations to the claimant’s claim rather than the five-year statute of limitations governing claims for disability caused by “coal miners pneumoconiosis.” The Commission unanimously affirmed the arbitrator’s de cision.
¶ 3 The claimant then sought judicial review of the Co mmission’s decision in the circuit court

of Randolph County, which confirmed the Commission’ s ruling. The claimant filed a motion to reconsider the court’s ruling in which he argued for the first time that the “statutory scheme devised by the Illinois legislature” ( i.e. , the legislature’s enactment of a five-year statut e of limitations for “coal miners pneumoconiosis” and a three-year statute of limitations for other pulmonary conditions like COPD) “violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Illinois

Constitution.” The circuit court denied the claiman t’s motion to reconsider. This appeal

followed.

¶ 4 FACTS
¶ 5 For more than 22 years, the claimant worked for th e employer as a coal miner. Although he

spent one year working above ground, 90% percent of his career with the employer was spent- 3 -

underground. During his employment, the claimant wa s exposed to coal dust both underground and above ground. During the dustiest c onditions he encountered underground, the claimant could only see 10 to 15 feet in front of him. In lighter dust he could see approximately 30 to 40 feet.
¶ 6 The employer’s mine closed on September 24, 2004. That was the claimant’s last day at the

mine and his last exposure to coal dust. Before his last day, the claimant told two foremen that he was having breathing problems. He said that he w as experiencing “congestion.” He did not mention that he thought he had black lung or coal w orkers’ pneumoconiosis.
¶ 7 On September 3, 2008, the claimant filed an applic ation for adjustment of claim with the

Commission seeking benefits under the Act for heart , lung, and breathing problems (including pneumoconiosis) caused by exposure to coal dust, ro ck dust, fumes, and vapor during the course of his employment. On December 15, 2008, the claimant filed a claim under the federal Black Lung Benefits Act (30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2006)).
¶ 8 The claimant’s union recommended that the claimant be evaluated by Dr. William Houser,

who is board certified in internal medicine and pul monary disease. On February 16, 2009, Dr.

Houser examined the claimant in connection with the claimant’s federal claim for black lung

benefits. The claimant told Dr. Houser that he had smoked 11⁄2 packs of cigarettes per day from age 16 through age 30. Dr. Houser noted that the cl aimant rode his bicycle up to 10 miles per day, 3 times per week in the summertime. An X-ray o f the claimant’s chest was interpreted as negative for coal workers’ pneumoconiosis by Dr. Da niel Whitehead, a B-reader. The claimant’s arterial blood gas testing levels were n ormal. However, a spirometry revealed mild obstruction in the claimant’s airways, primarily in his small airways.
¶ 9 Dr. Houser diagnosed mild COPD and arterial sclero tic heart disease with an “age

indeterminate anteroseptal myocardial infarct.” 1 Dr. Houser opined that the claimant’s COPD was secondary to the inhalation of coal and rock du st during his work as a coal miner and his smoking history. Dr. Houser opined that the claiman t’s arterial sclerotic heart disease was secondary to the claimant’s cigarette smoking and p ossibly also to hereditary factors. Dr. Houser did not diagnose coal workers’ pneumoconiosi s. ¶ 10 On March 23, 2009, the United States Department of Labor (the DOL) issued a “Schedule for Submission of Additional Evidence” (the SSAE) i n connection with the claimant’s federal claim for black lung benefits. The SSAE indicated t hat: (1) the claimant did not have pneumoconiosis caused by exposure to coal mine dust ; and (2) the claimant did not have a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairme nt caused in part by pneumoconiosis. On June 23, 2009, the DOL issued a “Proposed Decision and Order” denying benefits and finding that “the evidence does not show that the [claimant ] has pneumoconiosis (black lung disease).”
¶ 11 In the instant case, the claimant introduced into evidence the expert report of Dr. Lawrence

Mayer, a physician who holds a Ph.D. in epidemiolog y. Dr. Mayer opined that the claimant’s claim should be governed by the Act’s five-year sta tute of limitations for claims involving coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, rather than the three-year statute of limitations for other claims brought under the Act. Dr. Mayer acknowledged that coal workers’ pneumoconiosis and

1 A “myocardial infarction,” commonly known as a hear t attack, is a heart problem where part of the heart muscle dies and scars due to poor blood suppl y. When the patient suffers an “anteroseptal” infarction, the tissue damage is centered around th e anteroseptal wall, the area between the left and right ventricles.- 4 -

COPD affected different parts of the lungs. Specifi cally, he noted that pneumoconiosis involved scarring (fibrosis) on the lung tissue, wh ereas COPD involved damage to the broncho trachea tree. However, Dr. Mayer stated that, like coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, COPD could be caused by long-term exposure to coal dust. He al so noted that both conditions can significantly impair lung function and can result i n death. Dr. Mayer concluded that there was “no evidence to support the suggestion that [coal w orkers’ pneumoconiosis is] a more

destructive disease than COPD.” Based on these conc lusions (which were drawn from Dr. Mayer’s review of the relevant medical literature), Dr. Mayer opined that “from a medical and scientific viewpoint, no distinction should be made legally between a disease process that directly attacks the lung tissue [pneumoconiosis] * ** and one that attacks that part of the lung that permits airflow in and out of the lung [COPD]. ” In other words, Dr. Mayer opined that no distinction should be drawn between coal workers’ p neumoconiosis and COPD for purposes of applying a statute of limitations. He suggested tha t the distinction between the two conditions

reflected in the Act’s statute of limitations “has to be the product of thinking that COPD can never exist in a coal miner unless [there] is evide nce that he or she has [pneumoconiosis],” a belief which, according to Dr. Mayer, has been prov en false.
¶ 12 The arbitrator denied the claimant’s claim as unti mely. The arbitrator noted that the statute

of limitations for claims filed under the Act (820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008)) requires an employee to file his claim within three years of th e last date of exposure or within two years of the last payment of compensation. The arbitrator ob served that “the sole exceptions to [this] statutory requirement are for claims of coal worker s’ pneumoconiosis and radiological exposure, which allow for filing periods of five ye ars and twenty-five years, respectively.” The

arbitrator found that there was no evidence of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis or radiological exposure in this case, and no evidence that the cla imant received any compensation from the employer after September 24, 2004 (the claimant’s l ast date of exposure to coal dust). Accordingly, because the claimant filed his claim m ore than three years after his last date of exposure, the arbitrator found that the claim was t ime-barred under section 6(c) of the Act and found all remaining issues moot.
¶ 13 The claimant appealed the arbitrator’s decision to the Commission, arguing that the

arbitrator erred by applying the Act’s three-year s tatute of limitations to his claim rather than the five-year statute of limitations governing clai ms for disability caused by “coal miners pneumoconiosis.” Citing Dr. Mayer’s opinion, the cl aimant maintained that “the medical literature establishes that COPD caused by exposure to coal dust is a form of *** coal workers’ pneumoconiosis” and that his claim should therefore be governed by the five-year statute of limitations. The Commission rejected this argument. The Commission “view[ed] itself as bound by the specific language of Section 6(c),” wh ich “contains no specific reference to COPD and does not define coal workers’ pneumoconios is so as to include COPD.” Based upon Dr. Houser’s diagnosis and opinions, the Commission found that the claimant’s “occupational disease claim for COPD is governed by the three-yea r statute of limitations and was thus not timely filed.” The Commission denied the claimant’s claim on that basis and found all remaining issues moot.
¶ 14 The claimant then sought judicial review of the Co mmission’s decision in the circuit court

of Randolph County, which confirmed the Commission’ s ruling. The circuit court found that

there was “insufficient evidence” for the court to find that “the [COPD] which the claimant suffers can be considered coal miner’s pneumoconios is.” The claimant subsequently filed a- 5 -

motion to reconsider the court’s ruling in which he argued for the first time that the “statutory scheme devised by the Illinois legislature” ( i.e. , the legislature’s enactment of a five-year statute of limitations for “coal miners pneumoconio sis” and a three-year statute of limitations for other pulmonary conditions like COPD) “violates the Equal Protection Clause of the

Illinois Constitution.” The circuit court held that the evidence to support the claimant’s equal protection claim was “insufficient” and denied the claimant’s motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.

¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 1. The Governing Limitations Period
¶ 17 The claimant argues that the Commission erred in a pplying the Act’s three-year statute of

limitations to his claim, rather than the Act’s fiv e-year limitations period governing claims for disability caused by “coal miners pneumoconiosis.” The claimant contends that the phrase “coal miners pneumoconiosis” in section 6(c) of the Act should be interpreted to include COPD caused by exposure to coal dust. This argument turns on an issue of statutory construction, a question of law which we review de novo

. Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n , 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n

, 324 Ill. App. 3d 961, 965 (2001). 2

¶ 18 The primary rule of statutory construction is to a scertain and give effect to the intent of the

legislature. Gruszeczka , 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12. The language used in the st atute is normally the best indicator of what the legislature intended. Id. Each undefined word in the statute must be given its ordinary and popularly understood meaning

. Id. ; see also Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw , 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). Words and phrases mu st not be viewed in isolation but must be considered in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Gruszeczka

, 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12; Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers , 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320 (2003). If the meaning of an enactment is unclear from the sta tutory language itself, the court may look beyond the language employed and consider the purpo se behind the law and the evils the law was designed to remedy as well as other sources, su ch as legislative history. Gruszeczka , 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12. However, where the statutory langu age is clear, it will be given effect without

resort to other aids for construction. Id. ; see also Hollywood Casino-Aurora, Inc. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n , 2012 IL App (2d) 110426WC, ¶ 16.
¶ 19 Section 6(c) of the Act provides, in relevant part :

2 Although the employer concedes that the “interpreta tion of the statute of limitations found at 820 ILCS 310/6(c)” is subject to de novo review, it argues that we should apply a “clearly e rroneous”

standard of review to the Commission’s “ultimate co nclusion [as] to the facts in this case.” In suppor t of this argument, the employer cites Dodaro v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n , 403 Ill. App. 3d 538, 544-45 (2010). Dodaro involved a two-step analysis which required us to apply two standards of review: first, we reviewed the Commission’s interpr etation of the meaning of a statutory exclusion de

novo ; second, we reviewed the Commission’s application of the statutory exclusion to the facts presented in that case under a more deferential “cl early erroneous” standard. Dodaro is inapposite. Unlike the situation presented in Dodaro , the facts essential to our analysis in this case are undisputed, and the case turns on a pure issue of statutory con struction. Thus, our review is de novo

. Dodaro , 403 Ill. App. 3d at 544-45.- 6 - “In any case, other than injury or death caused by exposure to radiological materials or equipment or asbestos, unless application for compe nsation is filed with the Commission within 3 years after the date of the dis ablement, where no compensation has been paid, or within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation, where any has been paid, whichever shall be later, the right to file such application shall be barred.” 820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008).
In 1973, the legislature amended section 6(c) by pr escribing a five-year limitations period “in cases of disability caused by coal miners pneumocon iosis.” 3 As noted, the claimant argues that the phrase “coal miners pneumoconiosis” in section 6(c) should be interpreted to include COPD caused by exposure to coal dust.
¶ 20 We disagree. By its plain terms, the five-year lim itations period prescribed by section 6(c)

applies only to claims for disability caused by “co al miners pneumoconiosis.” It does not reference COPD. Nor does it apply to all disabiliti es or respiratory conditions caused by exposure to coal dust. To the contrary, it applies only to claims for disability caused by one specific medical condition, “coal miners pneumoconi osis.” Had the legislature intended to include claims for COPD within the five-year limita tions period prescribed in section 6(c), it could have explicitly referenced COPD in that provi sion. Alternatively, it could have drafted the provision broadly to include all disabilities o r respiratory conditions caused by “exposure to coal dust,” as it did for other types of occupat ional disease claims. 4 It did neither. Instead, the legislature decided to apply the five-year limi tations period only to claims for disability caused by “coal miners pneumoconiosis.” Accordingly , by its plain language, section 6(c)’s five-year limitations period does not apply to disa bilities caused by any other conditions, not even to other respiratory diseases that can be caus ed in part by exposure to coal dust, like

COPD. 5 It is undisputed that the claimant in this case wa s diagnosed with COPD but was not diagnosed with coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. Thus, the Commission did not err in finding that section 6(c)’s five-year statute of limitation s did not apply to his claim.
¶ 21 The claimant argues that, because “coal miners pne umoconiosis” is not defined in the Act,

we should apply the “ordinary and popularly underst ood meaning” of that term, which, according to the claimant, includes COPD. The claim ant asserts that the medical community

3 Specifically, section 6(c) now provides that claims for disability caused by “coal miners pneumoconiosis” shall be barred unless such claims are filed with the Commission “within 5 years after the employee was last exposed where no compensation has been paid, or within 5 years after the last payment of compensation where any has been paid.” Id. In this case, the claimant’s last exposure was on September 24, 2004, and the employer paid no com pensation after that date.

4 For example, the legislature prescribed a 25-year l imitations period “[i]n cases of disability caused by exposure to radiological materials or equipment or asbestos.” 820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008).

5 The claimant explicitly agreed with this conclusion in his motion for reconsideration before the circuit court. There, the claimant stated that “the legislature promulgated a statute of limitations t hat provides that a coal miner who has sustained damage to his lungs by means of coal dust exposure in the form of fibrosis (scaring [ sic ]) has five years to bring his or her claim,” but “ [a] miner who has sustained damage in the form of emphysema or other form of [COPD] has only three years to file his or her claim.” As Dr. Mayer noted, coal workers’ pneum oconiosis involves fibrosis (or scarring) of the lung tissue caused by exposure to coal dust.- 7 -

recognizes that COPD caused by exposure to coal dus t is a “form of” coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. In support of this assertion, the c laimant cites Dr. Mayer’s opinion. However, contrary to the claimant’s argument, Dr. Mayer did not opine that COPD was a type of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. To the contrary, he expres sly acknowledged that they were different conditions. For example, Dr. Mayer noted that coal workers’ pneumoconiosis is a “restrictive pulmonary impairment” of the lung tiss ue, whereas COPD is an “obstructive impairment” of the broncho trachea tree. Thus, Dr. Mayer acknowledged that the two conditions involve a different disease process and affect “different part[s] of the lung.” Moreover, Dr. Mayer stated that the “strict medical definition of Coal Worker’s Pneumoconiosis requires a finding of fibrosis (scar ing) [ sic ] on the miner’s lung tissue,” and that this scarring “can frequently be seen on a che st x-ray.” By contrast, Dr. Mayer noted that obstructive impairments like COPD are more readily diagnosed by pulmonary function testing and that a “chest x-ray is not a good diagnostic to ol for detecting emphysema” (one of the two types of COPD). The only similarities between COPD and coal workers’ pneumoconiosis noted by Dr. Mayer are that both conditions can ari se from exposure to coal dust and both can result in major pulmonary impairment and death.
¶ 22 Further, one of the stated purposes of Dr. Mayer’s report was to demonstrate that exposure

to coal dust “can and does cause[ ] [COPD] independent of any radiologic or other evidence of the existence of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. ” (Emphasis added.) Thus, Dr. Mayer’s entire report is premised on the assumption that COPD is a different condition than coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. Dr. Mayer’s report reinforces this assumption by providing a detailed history of the current medical and epidemiological consensu s that exposure to coal dust can cause

COPD even in the absence of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis . Accordingly, although Dr. Mayer opined that there was no scientific or medica l reason to apply a different limitations period to claims by coal miners alleging COPD (as o pposed to coal workers’ pneumoconiosis), he never stated or implied that COPD was the same a s coal workers’ pneumoconiosis or that the former was a type of the latter. To the contrar y, his report unequivocally provides that they are two separate conditions. 6

¶ 23 The claimant points to two other legal provisions in support of his argument that “coal

miners pneumoconiosis” includes COPD. First, he rel ies upon section 1(d) of the Act (820 ILCS 310/1(d) (West 2008)). That section provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f a deceased miner was employed for 10 years or more in one or more co al mines and died from a respirable disease there shall, effective July 1, 1973, be a r ebuttable presumption that his or her death was due to pneumoconiosis.” 820 ILCS 310/1(d) (West 200 8). Contrary to the claimant’s argument, this provision does not suggest that COPD is equivalent to (or a type of) coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. It merely suggests that: ( 1) pneumoconiosis is one of multiple types of respirable diseases that can be caused by exposu re to coal dust; (2) if a miner who worked in a coal mine for 10 years or more dies from a respir able disease before he is diagnosed with pneumoconiosis, there will be a presumption that hi s death was caused by pneumoconiosis;

6 Moreover, although we have never addressed the prec ise question presented in this case, our appellate court has treated COPD and coal workers’ pneumoconiosis as separate conditions ( i.e. , we have assumed without deciding that they were differ ent diseases) based on the medical evidence provided in several cases. See, e.g. , Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n , 386 Ill. App. 3d 779 (2008); Shelton v. Industrial Comm’n , 267 Ill. App. 3d 211 (1994).- 8 -

and (3) that presumption may be rebutted by evidenc e that the miner died from some other type of respirable disease, such as COPD.
¶ 24 The presumption cited by the claimant does not app ly in this case, because the claimant is

still alive. But even if there was a rebuttable pre sumption of pneumoconiosis in this case, the presumption was rebutted by Dr. Houser, the claiman t’s own independent medical examination physician, who opined that the claimant did not have pneumoconiosis.
¶ 25 The claimant also relies upon certain regulations promulgated by the DOL pursuant to the

federal Black Lung Benefits Act (Black Lung Act) (3 0 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2006)). For purposes of the Black Lung Act, these regulations d efine “pneumoconiosis” as “a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including res piratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a ) (2009). This definition includes both medical (or “clinical”) pneumoconiosis and statutor y (or “legal”) pneumoconiosis. “Clinical pneumoconiosis” consists of “those diseases recogni zed by the medical community as pneumoconioses, i.e. , the conditions characterized by permanent deposit ion of substantial amounts of particulate matter in the lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that deposition caused by dust exposure in coal mine emp loyment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(1) (2009). “Legal pneumoconiosis” is defined as “any c hronic lung disease or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment,” incl uding “any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease arising out of coal m ine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2) (2009). The regulation defines the phrase “arising out of coal mine employment” as including any chronic pulmonary dise ase or respiratory or pulmonary impairment “significantly related to, or substantia lly aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(b) (2009).
¶ 26 The claimant correctly notes that these federal re gulations define “legal pneumoconiosis”

as including COPD caused by exposure to coal dust. However, this fact does not support the claimant’s argument in this case because the Act do es not define “pneumoconiosis” in a similar manner. Nor does it adopt or reference the federal regulations. As noted above, section 6(c) of the Act leaves the term “coal miners pneumo coniosis” undefined, and nothing in the Act suggests that the legislature intended that ter m to include COPD. In fact, the legislature’s failure to include more expansive language supports the opposite inference, i.e. , that the term includes only diagnosed cases of pneumoconiosis, no t COPD. 7

¶ 27 In sum, by its plain terms, the Act’s five-year st atute of limitations applies exclusively to

“coal miners pneumoconiosis,” not to COPD. 820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008). It is undisputed that the claimant was diagnosed with COPD but was n ot diagnosed with coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. The claimant does not argue that se ction 6(c) is ambiguous. Thus, the claimant’s claim for disability caused by COPD coul d be subject to the five-year limitations period only if “pneumoconiosis” is commonly underst ood as including COPD. However, Dr. Mayer’s opinion does not support this conclusion. I n fact, Dr. Mayer’s expert report establishes the contrary proposition, i.e. , that COPD and pneumoconiosis are separate

conditions.

7 Moreover, it should be noted that, applying the mor e expansive definitions of pneumoconiosis contained in the federal regulations, the DOL found that the claimant did not have either medical or legal pneumoconiosis.- 9 - ¶ 28 Relying upon Dr. Mayer’s opinion, the claimant arg ues that there is no medical or

scientific reason for treating COPD and pneumoconio sis differently for purposes of the statute of limitations. However, this is an argument best a ddressed to the legislature. We must apply the Act’s unambiguous statute of limitations as wri tten, and we may not amend the statute under the guise of interpretation. Hines v. Department of Public Aid , 221 Ill. 2d 222, 230 (2006) (“Where, as here, the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must enforce it as written” and “may not annex new provi sions or substitute different ones, or read into the statute exceptions, limitations, or condit ions which the legislature did not express.”); In re Mary Ann P. , 202 Ill. 2d 393, 409 (2002) (ruling that, where t he legislature had not “seen fit to amend” a statute in the fashion advocated by the respondent, the supreme court would not “inject [that] provision into the statute” “under g uise of statutory construction”); see also

Plasters v. Industrial Comm’n , 246 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1993).

¶ 29 2. Equal Protection
¶ 30 The claimant argues that interpreting the five-yea r limitations period under section 6(c) as

applying to claims for coal workers’ pneumoconiosis but not to claims for COPD caused by exposure to coal dust violates the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution because it treats similar classes of claimants differently wit hout a rational basis. The claimant urges us to

construe the statute in a manner that avoids this “ constitutional infirmity” by applying the five-year limitations period to his claim.
¶ 31 We disagree. As an initial matter, the claimant pr esented an equal protection argument for

the first time in a motion for reconsideration befo re the circuit court. Thus, the claimant forfeited the argument by not raising it before the Commission. See, e.g. , Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security , 201 Ill. 2d 351, 397 (2002) (finding constitutional argument waived where it was raised before the circuit court but not before the administrative agency). 8 Although administrative agencies “lack[ ] the auth ority to invalidate a statute on constitutional grounds or to question its validity” ( id. ), it is “ ‘[n]onetheless *** advisable to assert a constitutional challenge on t he record before the administrative tribunal, because administrative review is confined to the pr oof offered before the agency’ ”( id. (quoting McGaw , 182 Ill. 2d at 278-79)). Such a practice avoids p iecemeal litigation and allows opposing parties to present evidence and to build a record in opposition to a constitutional challenge. Carpetland U.S.A. , 201 Ill. 2d at 397; McGaw , 182 Ill. 2d at 279.
¶ 32 We recognize that the rule that issues or defenses not raised before an administrative

agency will be deemed waived and will not be consid ered for the first time on administrative review is “an admonition to the parties, not a limi tation on the court’s jurisdiction,” and that “the waiver rule may be relaxed in order to maintai n a uniform body of precedent or *** where

8 Moreover, the equal protection argument the claiman t raised in the circuit court is different from the equal protection argument he raises on appeal. Before the circuit court, the claimant argued that the “statutory scheme devised by the Illinois legislatu re” in section 6(c) violated the equal protection clause. On appeal, he argues that the Commission’s and the circuit court’s interpretation of that statutory scheme to exclude his claim from the Act’ s five-year limitations period violates the equal protection clause, and he disavows any argument tha t the statute itself is unconstitutional. According ly, the claimant arguably forfeited the argument he mak es on appeal by not raising it before either the

Commission or the circuit court.- 10 -

the interests of justice so require.” Daniels v. Industrial Comm’n , 201 Ill. 2d 160, 172 (2002). However, this is not such a case. If we are to cons ider whether it would be unconstitutional to limit the Act’s five-year limitations period to cla ims for coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (as the Commission did in this case), the employer and the Commission should first be given the opportunity to build a record in response to the co nstitutional challenge. See Carpetland

U.S.A. , 201 Ill. 2d at 397. 9

¶ 33 In any event, if we were to address the claimant’s constitutional argument, we would reject

it. The equal protection clause of the Illinois Con stitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2) requires the government to “treat similarly situated individ uals in a similar manner.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Byrd v. Hamer , 408 Ill. App. 3d 467, 490 (2011). It does not pre clude the State from enacting legislation that draws distinctions b etween different categories of people, but it does “prohibit the government from according differ ent treatment to persons who have been placed by a statute into different classes on the b asis of criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation.” Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid , 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). In reviewing a claim that a statute violates equal pro tection, the court applies different levels of scrutiny depending on the nature of the statutory c lassification involved. Id. at 322-23. Classifications based on race, national origin, sex , or illegitimacy, and classifications affecting fundamental rights receive heightened scrutiny. Id. at 323. In all other cases, the court employs only a “rational basis review.” Id. As the claimant correctly notes, rational basis rev iew applies

in this case.
¶ 34 Whether a rational basis exists for a classificati on presents a question of law, which we

consider de novo

. Cutinello v. Whitley , 161 Ill. 2d 409, 417 (1994). Under the rational b asis test, a court’s review of a legislative classificat ion is “limited and generally deferential.”

Jacobson , 171 Ill. 2d at 323. The court simply inquires whe ther the method or means employed in the statute to achieve the stated goal or purpos e of the legislation is rationally related to that goal. Id. at 323-24; see also Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education , 142 Ill. 2d 54, 74 (1990). The legislation “carries a strong presumpti on of constitutionality,” and “if any set of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the cl assification, it must be upheld.” Jacobson

, 171 Ill. 2d at 324.

9 The employer also argues that the claimant violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 19 by failing to serve an appropriate notice of his constitutional c laim on the Attorney General or the Commission’s attorney. Ill. S. Ct. R. 19(a) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006) . We disagree. Supreme Court Rule 19 requires that such notice be provided when the State or the political subdivision, agency, or officer affected by the constitutional challenge “is not already a party” t o the action. Id. The purpose of this notice requirement is “to afford the State *** [or] agency *** the opp ortunity *** to intervene in the cause or proceedin g for the purpose of defending the law or regulation challenged.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 19(c) (eff. Sept. 1, 20 06). Here, the Commission is a named party to the action and has received the claimant’s briefs before the circuit and appellate courts. Thus, Rule 19 does no t require the claimant to provide additional notice to the Commission’s attorney. Moreover, on appeal, the claimant is challenging the constitutionality of

the Commission’s and the circuit court’s interpretation of section 6(c) of the Act (which he deems erroneous), not the constitutionality of the statut e itself. Thus, the claimant does not need to provi de notice of this argument to the Attorney General. Th e claimant arguably should have provided notice to the Attorney General when he challenged the constit utionality of section 6(c) of the Act before the circuit court. However, he has abandoned that chall enge on appeal, so such notice is no longer require d.- 11 - ¶ 35 Interpreting section 6(c)’s five-year statute of l imitations as applying only to claims

involving coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (and not to claims involving COPD caused by exposure to coal dust) does not violate the equal p rotection clause because this interpretation of the statute does not treat “similarly situated” ind ividuals differently. All coal miners diagnosed with coal workers’ pneumoconiosis have five years t o file their claims, and all coal miners diagnosed with COPD (but not pneumoconiosis) have t hree years to file their claims. As noted above, coal workers’ pneumoconiosis and COPD are di fferent conditions which involve different disease processes that affect different p arts of the lung and that are diagnosed through different procedures. Thus, miners suffering from p neumoconiosis are not “similarly situated” to miners suffering from COPD, even where the COPD is caused by exposure to coal dust. Because these miners are not similarly situated, th e government may treat them differently without running afoul of the equal protection claus e.

¶ 36 CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment o f the circuit court of Randolph County,

which confirmed the Commission’s ruling.

¶ 38 Affirmed.