Filed 10/15/14 In re Bella C. CA2/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

In re BELLA C., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law. 

 B255287 

 (Los Angeles County 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent. 

 v. 

DAVID C., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 Super. Ct. No. CK93494) 

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Carlos E. 

Vazquez, Judge. Affirmed. 

Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, 

and William D. Thetford, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

 David C. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s February 27, 2014 order 

terminating his parental rights pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.261

over his daughter Bella (born September 2008). Father contends that the juvenile court 

abused its discretion in denying his continuance of the contested section 366.26 hearing 

where he mistakenly failed to appear, and consequently was unable to provide critical 

testimony about his relationship with Bella. Father also argues that the juvenile court 

erred in refusing to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) 

(ICWA) because the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) neglected its 

mandatory duty to collect further information which resulted in only one out of two 

possible “Crow” tribes being given notice. 

 We find no error and affirm the order terminating father’s parental rights. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Family information 

 Bella’s mother, Rebecca H. (mother), is deceased. Mother’s parents, Pamela and 

Larry H. (maternal grandparents) have cared for mother’s 18-year-old daughter, 

Elizabeth, and 13-year-old daughter, Willow, since those children were born. Father is 

the presumed father of mother’s youngest daughter, Bella. Prior to mother’s death, Bella 

lived with mother and father, who were regularly assisted by maternal grandmother and 

maternal grandfather. Bella was placed with Heidi T. (maternal aunt), while the 

investigation into mother’s death continued.2

Prior history with DCFS 

 On May 1, 2006, DCFS received a referral that mother was a long-time heroin 

user who came to maternal grandmother’s home high, attempting to take the children. 

DCFS found that mother made an appropriate plan to have maternal grandparents care for 

the children, and the referral was deemed unfounded. On April 17, 2008, DCFS received 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________	 1

 All further statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless 

otherwise noted. 

2

 Father and DCFS are the only parties to this appeal. 
3

a referral that father punched child Willow in the face, knocking out her teeth. No 

evidence indicated that the child endured any trauma to her face or mouth; hence DCFS 

determined the allegations of physical abuse were unfounded. On December 1, 2010, 

DCFS received a report of severe neglect alleging that father drove Bella while under the 

influence of alcohol. The investigation was found to be untrue, and the referral was 

closed. 

Section 300 petition and detention 

 DCFS received the current referral from the Child Abuse Hotline on May 3, 2012, 

following the death of mother. The caller reported that mother, who had used heroin for 

about the preceding 10 years, died in Pomona Valley Hospital just after a radiologist 

found a syringe in her hand. The caller stated that father, who had a history of alcohol 

abuse, had been arrested the day before by the Pomona Police Department, but did not 

know the reason for the arrest nor when father would be released from jail. The caller 

also noted that the children were safe and staying at maternal grandparents’ home. 

 On April 28, 2012, father had informed maternal grandmother that he was taking 

mother to the hospital to have an abscess removed. Maternal grandmother cared for 

Bella while mother was reportedly in the hospital. Later that day maternal grandmother 

gave father $40 to pay for mother’s medication at his request. On May 4, 2012, father 

called again asking for more money for medicine after having to again take mother to the 

hospital. Wary that they were using the money for illicit drugs, maternal grandfather told 

father to bring him the prescriptions so that he could fill them himself. 

 Mother’s health was not improving. On April 30, 2012, maternal grandmother 

asked father to bring mother to her home. Maternal grandmother called for an ambulance 

after mother continued to complain of serious pain and extreme restlessness throughout 

the night. When the paramedics arrived, one noted that mother’s medications were 

actually for someone named, “Harmony.” Mother was admitted to Pomona Valley 

Hospital and received treatment for sepsis. 

 Mother was able to see all of her children before having emergency surgery on the 

evening of May 5, 2012. After her surgery, father said he was taking Bella home, but 
4

then returned to the hospital around 10:00 p.m., left Bella with a stranger in the lobby, 

and visited mother in the intensive care unit. Maternal grandmother observed it was 

normal for father to leave Bella with almost anyone, which was one of the reasons she 

was so involved in Bella’s life. 

 Maternal grandmother returned to the hospital the next morning to see mother. 

About 15 minutes later, mother “lit up” when father arrived, and asked to speak with him 

in private. Maternal grandmother and the nurse stood at the end of the bed while the two 

whispered to one another. When maternal grandmother asked why they were whispering, 

father responded that mother was just worried about paying rent. This struck maternal 

grandmother as particularly odd because she and maternal grandfather paid the parents’ 

rent for them. She also found it odd that five minutes after the whispering incident, father 

said he needed to use the restroom -- even though he just passed the restrooms when 

entering the hospital. A few minutes later, father returned and leaned over mother’s 

bedside while maternal grandmother spoke with the nurse. 

 Shortly thereafter, father and maternal grandmother were asked to leave the room 

while the radiologist took x-rays. Maternal grandmother and father went around a corner 

where they could not see into mother’s hospital room. Suddenly, “bells and whistles” 

went off and hospital staff began running into mother’s room. Father immediately turned 

to maternal grandmother stating “she has a needle,” and that someone had brought in 

something illegal. At the time, maternal grandmother did not understand. When allowed 

back in mother’s room, they learned that the radiologist found a hypodermic syringe in 

mother’s hand, which appeared to contain black tar heroin. The radiologist stated that 

within seconds of discovering the needle and a needle mark, mother began convulsing 

and died. It was later determined that mother died from “acute morphine (heroin) and 

methadone intoxication” and, pending further investigation, the death was considered an 

accident. 

 Questions remain about how mother obtained the needle and heroin. A nurse 

confirmed that the syringe was not a type used by the hospital. She stated that mother 

had nothing in her hand when her bedding was changed before visitors came into the 
5

room. Maternal grandmother was the first visitor mother had, but the nurse observed 

their interactions and was confident that neither mother nor maternal grandmother had 

anything in their hands. The nurse stated that the only time she was not watching 

mother’s every movement was when father returned from the bathroom, bent his head 

down toward mother, and whispered with mother. Father denied giving mother the 

syringe, even after reviewing the visitor log-in sheets which showed that only he, 

maternal grandmother, and the children had been allowed to see mother since her 

surgery. Father stated that he had been fighting with mother for several years over her 

drug use and believed that one of her friends brought her the heroin. 

The police were notified of the incident. Father was arrested that night on an 

outstanding warrant for driving under the influence. Father agreed to allow maternal 

grandfather to watch Bella while father took care of the warrant. 

Detention hearing 

Bella was initially detained on May 5, 2012, and placed in the care and custody of 

her maternal grandparents. On May 15, 2012, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on 

behalf of Bella. Father, maternal grandparents, and paternal grandparents were present at 

the detention hearing. Although father and maternal grandmother originally denied any 

American Indian heritage, father filed a Parental Notification of Indian Status form at the 

detention hearing, indicating that he was or may be a member of the “Crow tribe.” Next 

to that statement father wrote, “pat [sic] great grandfather, Thomas Crow,” and “PGF 

David Crow.” The juvenile court ordered DCFS to “do a full investigation in regard to 

father’s possible American Indian heritage and notice the tribes if appropriate.” 

The court sustained the petition, finding a prima facie case for detaining Bella and 

ordering that father have monitored visits as often as could be arranged, but at least four 

hours per week. 

Adjudication and dispositional hearing 

The adjudication and dispositional hearing was held on July 2, 2012. Father was 

present to execute a waiver of rights form and plead no contest to the juvenile 

dependency petition being sustained as follows: 
6

“b-1: [Father] has an unresolved history of alcohol use, and the father has a 

criminal conviction of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. The father 

has not completed the court ordered alcohol rehabilitation program which 

places child at risk of harm.” 

“b-5: On numerous occasions in 2012 . . . [father] placed the three year old 

child in a detrimental situation in that the child’s now deceased mother . . . 

was under the influence of heroin while the child was in the mother and 

father’s care. The father should have known of the mother’s heroin 

intoxication, and failed to protect the child. The father’s failure to protect 

the child endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the 

child at risk of harm.” 3

Father’s counsel filed a “Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child,” 

which contained the father’s name, address, birth date, and place of birth, and listed 

“Crow” as the tribe with which father was affiliated; the paternal grandfather’s name, 

birth date, and place of birth; the paternal great-grandfather’s name, and his date and 

place of death. 

The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that there were no 

reasonable means of protecting Bella without removing her from father’s physical 

custody and declared Bella a dependent of the court, placing her in the care of DCFS for 

suitable placement. The court ordered DCFS to provide father reunification services and 

for father to participate in individual counseling, parenting classes, an alcohol abuse 

program, weekly random and on-demand drug and alcohol testing, and a 12-step 

program. Father’s monitored visits were increased to at least six hours per week, with 

DCFS’s discretion to liberalize them. The court further ordered DCFS to submit a 

progress report with a recommendation concerning Bella’s placement, an update on 

father’s visits, and ICWA notices. 

Father appeared at the progress hearing on August 3, 2012. DCFS reported that 

the dependency investigator had asked father if he had made contact with any family 

member that had any additional information regarding his American Indian heritage. 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________	 3

 Counts b-2, b-3, and b-4 were dismissed. 
7

Father responded that he had been unable to contact any relatives that could provide 

additional information and he was unable to provide any additional information. Based 

on this information, DCFS sent an ICWA notice to father, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 

the Secretary of the Interior, and the Crow Tribe of the Crow Reservation of Montana 

later that day. The court ordered that Bella remain a dependent of the court, and placed 

her with maternal aunt. The case was continued for a six-month status review. 

Father was not present at the six-month status review hearing held on December 

21, 2012. In light of the minimal progress father had made towards regaining custody, 

the court found continued jurisdiction necessary to ensure Bella’s wellbeing. DCFS also 

submitted a letter from the Crow Tribe indicating that Bella was not an Indian child. The 

court reviewed the ICWA notices and correspondence, and found that Bella was not an 

Indian child as defined by ICWA. 

Father appeared at the July 1, 2013 hearing, where he submitted a letter indicating 

that he had entered a detoxification program and expected to be discharged by June 29, 

2013. The juvenile court continued the matter to September 4, 2013, for a contested 12-

month review hearing. 

In an interview with DCFS, father stated he had been dealing with a lot of guilt 

and was struggling to find himself. Because he believed it was best for maternal aunt to 

care for Bella, he discontinued contact with Bella for nine months. Bella reportedly 

adjusted well and was in regular contact with her sisters. DCFS recommended 

termination of reunification services and a section 366.26 hearing to terminate parental 

rights. 

Father testified at the contested 12-month review hearing on September 4, 2013. 

The court found by clear and convincing evidence that father’s progress had been 

“partial,” and found by a preponderance of evidence that Bella could not return to father 

without a substantial risk of detriment to her physical or emotional wellbeing. The court 

authorized monitored visits at a minimum of eight hours per month, and terminated 

family reunification services. The court ordered father to return for a section 366.26 
8

hearing on January 6, 2014. Father was personally served with written notice of the 

hearing on October 17, 2013. 

Section 366.26 hearing 

 Father was present at the initial selection and implementation hearing on January 

6, 2014. Father requested an increase in visitation from eight hours per month to a 

minimum of four hours per week, and the court granted DCFS discretion to liberalize 

father’s visits. The court also set the contested section 366.26 hearing for February 27, 

2014, and ordered father to return on that date. Father was advised that, should he fail to 

appear, “the court will have to proceed without [him], and [he] will still be bound by the 

decisions that the court makes in [his] absence.” Father was sent written notice of the 

hearing on January 10, 2014. 

Father was not present for the contested selection and implementation hearing on 

February 27, 2014. His counsel informed the court that both paternal grandmother and 

father thought the hearing was scheduled for the following day, and that father would not 

be able to make it to court because he was at work. Father’s counsel requested a 

continuance so that father could be present, however both DCFS and Bella’s counsel 

objected to the continuance. The court denied the continuance request and proceeded 

with the hearing on the grounds that father was given both verbal notice when he last 

appeared in court, as well as proper written notice. Father’s counsel objected again 

stating: “[T]his is a very serious matter as the court is prepared to terminate his parental 

rights today, and I believe that he did intend to testify on his own behalf.” Father’s 

counsel then argued that because the parental bond between father and Bella was such 

that she would be harmed by termination of parental rights, the section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) parent-child relationship exception applied. According to the 

DCFS status review report, father had been appropriate during his monthly eight hours of 

monitored visits, and “he and [Bella] are affectionate and comfortable with one another.” 

Despite father’s progress in his sober-living treatment, the court found the evidence did 

not support a finding of the parent-child relationship exception, and terminated father’s 
9

parental rights. The court designated maternal aunt as Bella’s prospective adoptive 

parent. 

On March 25, 2014, father filed his notice of appeal from the court’s February 27, 

2014 order terminating his parental rights. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of review 

A juvenile court’s denial of a request for continuance is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 180.) The party challenging a 

ruling on a continuance bears the burden of establishing that the court exceeded the 

bounds of reason, in light of the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Beeler (1995), 9 

Cal.4th 953, 1003; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) “When ruling 

in dependency proceedings, the welfare of the minor is the paramount concern of the 

court. [Citation.]” (Guadalupe A. v. Superior Court (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 100, 106.) 

Because time is of the essence in finding permanent placement for dependent children, 

the juvenile court is afforded particularly broad discretion in determining whether to 

grant a continuance. Continuances are generally discouraged. (In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 

Cal.App.4th 808, 810-811.) 

II. No abuse of discretion in denying father’s continuance request 

 Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his request 

for a one-day continuance of the section 366.26 hearing so that he could be present to 

testify and present evidence on his own behalf. But “‘[i]n dependency cases, as in other 

civil cases, personal appearance by a party is not essential; appearance by an attorney is 

sufficient and equally effective.’ [Citations.]” (In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 

602; In re J. I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 912 [finding that confusion about the 

whereabouts of the client did not establish good cause for a continuance].) Thus, father 

was not required to be present for the hearing, and his erroneous absence was not good 

cause for a continuance. (Jesusa V., at p. 602.) 

Under section 352, subdivision (a), a continuance may be granted “only for that 

period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the 
10

motion for the continuance.” Father argues that only a one-day continuance was 

necessary to accommodate for his scheduling mistake, and there was no legal impediment 

for such slight delay. While the court could have found this to be true, it did not “exceed 

the bounds of reason” in finding otherwise. Here, the record shows that father’s counsel 

simply asked for “a continuance” so that father could be present at the 366.26 hearing. In 

effect, counsel’s vague language was not a request for a one-day continuance. The 

juvenile court’s denial of counsel’s open-ended request was not an abuse of discretion. 

Father relies on In re Hunter W. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1454, in which this court 

reversed the juvenile court’s order denying requests for a two-hour continuance of a 

hearing. In that case, the parents of a dependent child checked into court for the morning 

calendar call, but were not present when the case was called two hours later. The Court 

of Appeal determined that the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to consent 

to a two-hour delay to locate the parents. In the instant case, father was not present at the 

juvenile court on the date of the scheduled section 366.26 hearing. Father’s counsel 

stated that father was at work and was completely unable to appear in court that day. 

Father did not request a brief two-hour continuance; rather he requested a general 

continuance, extending beyond the day of the scheduled hearing. Hunter W. is thus 

distinguishable. 

Father also failed to show good cause for the continuance, beyond stating that his 

absence was an “honest mistake” and counsel’s belief that father intended to testify. 

Inability to appear on the date scheduled for the section 366.26 hearing is not automatic 

grounds for a continuance when one received notice of the hearing and was represented 

by counsel, with whom father had ample opportunity to meet prior to the hearing. (In re 

Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440, 445.) At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, 

father had been given oral notice at the prior hearing, as well as written notice of the 

hearing date and time via mail. Father was specifically advised that the court would 

proceed in his absence and that he would be bound by its decisions. 

Father’s counsel was not certain whether father intended to testify at the section 

366.26 hearing and she made no offer of proof as to what evidence father would present. 
11

On appeal, the method of determining whether a court ruled correctly in a situation such 

as this is to examine the offer of proof made by the party seeking to have the evidence 

admitted. (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).) Such an offer of proof must be specific, setting 

forth the actual evidence to be produced, not merely the facts or issues to be addressed. 

(In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1124.) Father’s possible desire to testify to 

unknown facts without an offer of proof does not constitute good cause, and does not 

mandate a continuance. 

Father also argues that the juvenile court could not properly consider a permanent 

plan without father’s testimony, however there is no reason to conclude that testimony 

from father would have produced evidence reasonably likely to change the outcome of 

the case. Father had abandoned many of his court ordered obligations, and demonstrated 

minimal interest in regaining custody of Bella. He failed to comply with individual, 

grief, parenting, and alcohol counseling; random alcohol testing; and the 12-step 

program. Father had only sporadically visited Bella over the last year, spending as long 

as nine months without contact. Though DCFS had reported that father made “positive 

efforts in the past six months toward his personal sobriety, those efforts [fell] severely 

short of the stability and care required by a five year old.” 

These facts do not reflect a likelihood that father could have offered additional 

information to sufficiently prove that his bond with Bella justified the section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception. Father’s testimony about the nature and substance of 

his visits would not subvert the evidence in the record, and it is unlikely that the court 

would have resurrected his full parental rights. In light of the oral and written notice 

provided to father, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying father’s 

continuance request, and the order terminating parental rights should be affirmed. 

III. ICWA notice 

 A. Standard of review 

The juvenile court’s finding proper ICWA notice is reviewed for substantial 

evidence. This requires evidence that is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. 

(In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115, 120.) Because we review factual findings in the 
12

light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order, when the judgment is supported by 

substantial evidence, it must not be disturbed. (Ibid.) “An appellant seeking reversal for 

lack of proper ICWA notice must show a reasonable probability that he or she would 

have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error. [Citations.]” (In re 

G.L. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 683, 695-696.) 

B. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS 

properly complied with ICWA inquiry and notice requirements 

Father contends that the juvenile court wrongfully terminated father’s parental 

rights without complying with ICWA. He claims that DCFS neglected its duty to further 

inquire into Bella’s Indian heritage, and consequently failed to provide proper ICWA 

notice to the two potentially interested Crow tribes. “Congress enacted ICWA to further 

the federal policy ‘“that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian 

community . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 281.) An Indian child 

is defined as “a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for 

membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. 

[Citation.]” (In re H.B., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 120; 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) ICWA 

promotes the stability of Indian tribes by establishing standards for removal of Indian 

children, minimizing their placement in foster or adoptive homes that do not reflect the 

unique values of Indian culture. In furtherance of these goals, ICWA provides procedural 

and substantive mandates, including inquiry and notice requirements. 

While ICWA does not expressly impose any duty to inquire as to American Indian 

heritage, it allows states to provide a higher standard of protection to the Indian child’s 

parent than provided under ICWA. (In re H.B., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 120.) 

Under California law, formal notice is necessary upon a minimal showing that an Indian 

child is involved. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(1).) When a 

child for whom a section 300 petition was filed, the court, county welfare department, 

and the probation department have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire into a 

dependent child’s Indian heritage to determine if an Indian child is at risk of entering 

foster care. (§ 224.3, subd. (a); accord California Rule of Court, rule 5.481(a).) Once a 
13

parent completes the Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-020), and it is 

determined that the child may hold Indian status, further inquiry is required to properly 

complete the notice forms. In the instant appeal, father does not challenge the initial 

inquiry; rather he challenges the sufficiency of DCFS’s follow-up inquiry to obtain the 

information necessary for the ICWA notice. 

Section 224.3 provides that, as soon as practicable, the social worker must conduct 

this further inquiry by interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended family 

members; contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social 

Services for assistance in identifying information on the tribes; and contacting any other 

person that reasonably can be expected to have information regarding the child’s 

membership status or eligibility. (§ 224.3, subd. (c); California Rule of Court, rule 

5.481(a)(4).) Information required by section 224.2, subdivision (a)(5) includes: 

“(A) The name, birth date, and birthplace of the Indian child, if known. 

“(B) The name of the Indian tribe in which the child is a member or may 

be eligible for membership, if known. 

“(C) All names known of the Indian child’s biological parents, 

grandparents, and great-grandparents . . . as well as their current and former 

addresses, birthdates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment numbers, 

and any other identifying information, if known. 

“[¶] . . . [¶] 

“(F) The location, mailing address, and telephone number of the court and 

all parties notified pursuant to this section.” 

If the tribe’s identity cannot be determined, notice that the child may be an 

Indian child must be given to the Bureau of Indian Affairs so that the appropriate tribe 

can make a determination. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 

460, 470.) “‘A tribe’s determination that the child is or is not a member of or eligible for 

membership in the tribe is conclusive.’ [Citation.]” (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court 

(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 255.) 
14

1. DCFS obtained all possible information for the ICWA notice 

Father complains that after his attorney filed the Notice of Child Custody 

Proceeding for Indian Child form (ICWA-030), DCFS merely asked father if he had been 

able to make contact with any family member that would have pertinent information 

regarding his American Indian heritage. Father contends that this follow-up inquiry was 

inadequate because the social worker should have sought additional information from 

paternal relatives. 

The Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines and section 224.2, subdivision (a)(5) 

requirements are only applicable if the information is known. (In re C.D. (2003) 110 

Cal.App.4th 214, 224-225.) Here, the Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian 

Child form provided no information apart from listing the father’s name, address, birth 

date, and place of birth, and “Crow” as the tribe with which father was affiliated; the 

paternal grandfather’s name, birth date, and place of birth; the paternal greatgrandfather’s name, and his date and place of death. DCFS demonstrated an effort to 

follow-up on the initial inquiry into Bella’s possible Indian heritage by contacting father, 

who told DCFS that he was unable to contact any family member who could provide 

additional information. DCFS’s efforts distinguish the instant case from In re Francisco 

W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695 where the agency completely failed to follow-up with 

individuals who reported Indian heritage and who had pertinent information regarding the 

notice. 

Because the ICWA notices contained all possible information that DCFS could 

obtain, the juvenile court did not err by concluding that additional follow-up inquiry was 

unnecessary, and that the notices were sufficiently complete. (In re C.D., supra, 110 

Cal.App.4th at p. 226.) 

2. DCFS sent notice to the proper Crow tribe 

Father alleges that DCFS failed to comply with the ICWA notice requirements 

because it sent notice to only one of two possible “Crow” tribes. Section 224.2, 

subdivision (a)(3) requires notice to be sent to all tribes to which the child may be linked 

until the court makes a determination as to the child’s tribe. Father does not contend that 
15

DCFS was incorrect in sending ICWA notice to the Crow Tribe of the Crow Reservation 

of Montana; rather he argues that notice should also have been sent to the Crow Creek 

Sioux Tribe of the Crow Creek Reservation, located in South Dakota. The Montana tribe 

to which DCFS sent notice is the only tribe listed in the Federal Register under “Crow,” 

and the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe is listed as a “Sioux Tribe.” (Indian Child Welfare Act; 

Designated Tribal Agents for Service of Notice, 77 Fed.Reg. 45827 (Aug. 1, 2012).)4 

DCFS accordingly sent notice to the only possible “Crow” tribe. 

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS complied 

with the ICWA. 

DISPOSITION 

The order is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. 

 ____________________________, J. 

 CHAVEZ 

We concur: 

__________________________, P. J. 

BOREN 

__________________________, J. 

ASHMANN-GERST 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________	 4

 The California Department of Social Services tribal government listing also 

reflects that the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe is classified as a Sioux tribe. 

(http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/res/pdf/cdsstribes.pdf>.)