J ohn F. Ke enan, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w * York, sitting by

desig nation. 08 -48 27 -cv Doe v . C onst ant 

### UNITE D STA TES C OURT OF AP PEALS

FOR T HE SE COND CIRCU IT 

# SUM MARY O RDE R
RUL I NGS BY S UM M ARY O RDE R DO NOT HAVE PR E CE DE NT I AL E FF E CT . CI T AT I ON TO S UM M ARY ORDE RS FI L E D AF T E R J ANUARY 1, 20 0 7 , I S PE RM I T T E D AND I S GOVE RNE D BY T HI S COURT ’ S L OCAL RUL E 3 2 . 1 AND FED ERA L RU LE O F AP PELLA TE PRO CE DURE 32 . 1. I N A B R I EF O R O TH ER PA PER I N W H I C H A LI TI GA N T CI TES A SU M M A R Y O R D ER , I N EA C H PA R A G R A PH I N W H I C H A C I TA TI O N APPEARS , AT L EAS T O N E C I TA TI O N M U ST E IT H E R B E T O T H E F E D E R A L A P P E N D IX O R B E A C C O M P A N IE D B Y T H E N O T A T IO N : “ (S U M M A R Y O R D E R ).” A PAR TY C I TI N G A S U M M A R Y O R D ER M U ST SERV E A C O PY O F TH A T S U M M A R Y O R D ER TO GETH ER W I TH TH E PAP ER I N W H I C H TH E S U M M A R Y O R D ER I S C I TED O N AN Y PAR T Y NO T REPR ESENTED BY CO U N SEL U N LESS TH E S U M M A R Y O R D ER I S A V A I LAB LE I N AN E L E C TRO N I C DA TAB A SE W H I C H I S PU B LI C LY ACCE S S I B L E W I T HOU T P A Y M E N T O F F E E ( S U C H A S T H E D A T A B A S E A V A I L A B L E AT HT T P : / / W W W . C A 2 . U S C OU R T S . G OV / ) . I F N O C OP Y I S S E R V E D B Y R E A S ON OF T HE A V A I L A B I L I T Y OF T HE OR D E R ON S U C H A D A T A B A S E , T HE C I T A T I ON M U S T I N C L U D E R E F E R E N C E T O T HA T D A T A B A S E A N D T HE DOCK E T NUM BE R OF T HE CA S E I N W HI CH THE ORDE R W AS E NT E RE D.

Ata s ta te d t e r m of t he Uni te d St at e s C our t o f Appe als forth e Se c ond C ir c uit , he ld at the Daniel P atric k Moynih an United S tate s Courthouse, 500 P earl Str eet , in the City of New York, on the 1 day of Dec em ber, two thousan d ni ne. st PRES ENT: RO SEM AR Y S. POO L ER, RI CHARD C. W ESL EY,

Circ uit J ud ge s, J OHN F . KEENAN , *

District J udg e.

__________________________________________ J an e D o e 1 , J an e D o e II, J an e D o e III ,

Plaintif fs-Appellee

s , v. 08-4827-c v Emmanu e l Co ns tant, a/k/ a To to C on sta

nt, Defendant-

Appellant
.

__________________________________________2

FOR DEF ENDAN T-APPEL LANT: E M M A N U EL C ONS TANT , pro s e , Cox sackie , NY. F OR PLAI NT I F F S- APP EL L EE S: D A N I EL G. P AN C OT TI , Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal L L P, New Yor k, NY (on the brief) ; Ivor E. Samso n, Sonne ns c he in N ath & Ros e nth a l L L P, San Fr ancisc o, CA; Natasha F ain, Center f or Jus tice & A ccounta

bility , San Fr ancisc o, CA; J ennife r Gre en, Center

for Constitutional R ights, Ne w York, NY. Appea l from an or der of

the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York (Stein, J. ). UP ON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREB Y ORDERED, ADJUD GED, A ND DECREED that the orde r of the district c ourt be AF F IRM ED
. Def endant- Appellant Emmanue l Constant, pro s e , a pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e 60(b) (4) motion for r elief f rom the cour

t’s entry in August 2006 of a de fault judg ment ag ainst him, finding him liable under the Alien Tort Statute (“ ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the Torture Victim Protection Act (“ TVPA”), 28 U .S.C. § 1350 (note), for
atte mpt e d e xtra

jud ic ia l ki lli ng , to rt

ur e , a nd c ri me s a g a ins t humanit

y , a nd awa rd ingPla int if

fs
Appellee s J ane D oes I , I I , I I I(“Plaintiffs”) $19 milli on in compensatory and punitive damag es. We assume the par

ties’ familiarity

with the underly

ing f acts, the pr ocedur al history of the c ase,
and the iss ue s o n a

pp e a l. As an initial matter, bec ause Constant did not argue bef ore the district court that Plaintiffs failed to a dequate ly

plead violations of the law of nations under

the ATS, or that the district court’s de fault judg ment violated his due proc ess rights, we dec line to consider those a rguments. Se eSingle ton v . W

ulf f , 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976) ( rec og nizi ngthe well-e stablished g ener alEven if we considere d these a rguments, they

are unavailing . Constant fails to present 1 any thi ngbut c on c lus or

y a lle g atio ns in s up po rt

of his du e pr oc e ss c la im. As to t he oth e r c la im, Plaintiffs adequately

pleade d violations of the law of nations under the ATS. See Kadic v. Karad zic , 7 0 F .3 d 2 32 , 2 39 (2 d Ci r. 19 95 ) ( c omp la int a lle g ingvio latio ns of

the law o f n atio ns is a de qu ate ly

ple a de d if

“ the de fe nd ant’ s a lle g e d c on du c t vi olate s w e ll- e sta bli sh e d, un ive rs a lly re c ognize d n or

ms o f i nte rn atio na l la

w” (i nte rn a l qu otatio ns omi tte d) ); se eals o S os a v . A lv are

zMa c ha in , 5 4 2 U. S
. 6 9 2 , 7 3 2 (2 0 0 4 ) ( t o rture i s a v i o l at i o no f t h e l aw o f n at i o n s (c i t i n g Filartiga v . P e na -I ra la , 6 30 F .2 d 8 76 , 8 90 (2 d Ci r. 19 80 )) ; Presbyte rian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, I nc. , 582 F.3d 244, 256 ( 2d Cir. 2009) (crimes ag ainst humanity may be asse rted unde r the AT S) ; Flores v. Southern Pe ru Copper Corp. , 414 F.3d 233, 249 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (re cognizi ng that extrajudicial killi ng s “violate c ustomary international law ” – i.e., the la w of nations – and would be ac tionable under the ATS). 3 rule that a court of a

ppeals will g ener ally

not consider a

n issue raised f

or the fir st tim e on
a pp e a l) ; se eals o V

irg ili o v . Ci ty

of N e w York, 407 F.3d 105, 116 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (citing W esti ng ho us eCre dit

Cor p. v . D 'Ur

so , 371 F.3d 96, 103 ( 2d Cir. 2004)). 1 We review de novo the district court’s de nial of a motion to vacate a de fault judg ment
un de r R ule 60 (b )( 4) , r e c ognizi ngthat “ a de fe re nti a l st and ard

of re vie w i s n ot a

pp ro pr iate be c a

us e if the under lying judgment is void, itis a per se a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o nf

o r a d i s tr i c tc o urtt o d e ny a movant’s motion to vacate the judgme nt under Rule 60(b) (4).” Burda Media, Inc . v. Viertel , 417 F. 3 d 2 9 2 , 2 9 8 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Sta teSt. Ba nk &Tru st C

o. v . I nv e rsi on es E

rra zu riz Limitada , 374 F.3d 158, 178 ( 2d Cir. 2004)). Howe ver, to the e x tent the district court’s de nial of a Rule 60(b) (4) motion turns on finding s of fa ct, we r eview those finding s for c lear err or. See Luc k e tt v . B ure , 290 F.3d 493, 496 ( 2d Cir. 2002) (re viewingfac tual finding s for c lear err or, but
re vie wi ngc on c lus ion s o f l aw b a se d o n th os e fi nd ing s de novo ). “ In th e c onte xt of a Rul e 60(b)( 4) motion, a judg ment may be dec lare d void for wa

nt of jurisdiction only

when the c ourt pla inl y us ur pe d ju ri sd ic tio n . . . [i.e ., ] wh e n th e re is a tot a l w ant o f j ur isd ic tio n a nd no argua ble basis on which it could have rested a findingthat it had jurisdiction.” Ce ntral V e rm on t P ub lic Se rv ic eCor

p. v . H e rb e rt , 3 41 F .3 d 1 86 , 1 90 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio ns omi tte d) ; ac c or d4

Nemaizer v. Bak

er , 793 F.2d 58, 65- 66 (2d Cir. 1986). I
. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Constant argues that the district cour t’s judgme nt is void because the court lac ked subjec t
m att e r j ur i s d i c t i o nt o e n t e r

a d e f a u l tj u d g m e n t , g i v e nth at : ( 1 ) P l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i m s w e r e un t i m e l y; (2) Plaintiffs fa iled to exhaust ot her a vailable r emedies; (3) some of Plaintiffs’ cla ims were b ar r e d b y re s ju dic ata ; and (4) Plaintiffs fa iled to present suff icient evidenc e that he a cted unde r color of la

w to rende r him liable under the ATS or the TVPA. How ever , only this last claim of
err or potentially

implicates the district court’ s subject matter jurisdiction, as the f irst three a

re
mere ly aff irmative def

enses. Se eUn ite d S

tates v . W als h , 700 F.2d 846, 855- 56 (2d Cir. 1983) (timeliness under a

statute of limitations i s not jurisdictional, but i s an af firmative de fense that
may be fo rf e ite d o r w a ive d) ; Jean v . Dorelien , 431 F.3d 776, 781 ( 11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
e xha us tio n r e qu ir e me nt p ur su ant t o th e TV PA i s a n a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e .” ); Sc he re r v . E qu ita ble LifeAs su ra nc eSo c ie ty

of t heUn ite d S

tates, 347 F.3d 394, 398 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (holdingthat, as an aff irmative def

ense, res judicata does not – except in rar e cir cumstance s not applicable he re – aff ect a court’s jurisdiction). In Kad ic , this Court held that the ATS “confe rs fe dera l subject-matter jurisdiction when the fo llo wi ngthr e e c on dit ion s are satis fi e d: ( 1) an a lie n s ue s ( 2) fo r a tor t ( 3) c omm itt e d in vio latio n o f t

he law o f n atio ns ( i.e. , international law ).” Kad ic , 7 0 F .3 d at 23 8. Con sta nt o nly ch al l en ges th e t h i rdp ro n g o f t h i s s t an d ar d – n am el y , th atP l ai n t i ff

s fa i l edt o s u ff

i ci en t l y al l ege that his actions wer e committed under color of la

w; the other two pr ong s are not in disput e. Howeve r, this argument fails. A re view of Plaintiffs’ c omplaint indicates that Plaintiffs alleg ed
su ff ic ie nt f a c ts t o d e mon str ate that, f or purp os e s o f e sta

bli sh ingjurisd ic tio n und e r t he AT S,5

Con sta nt’ s a c tio ns we re su ff

ic ie ntl y int e rt wi ne d w iththo se of

the Ha iti an g ov e rnme nt t o constitute state ac tion. See id. at 24 5 ( “ Th e ‘c olo r o f l aw’ jurisp ru de nc e of 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 is a rele vant guide to whether a def endant ha s eng ag ed in offic ial action for purposes of jur isdiction under the Alien Tort Ac t.”); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (h old ingthat an in div idu a l a c ts und e r c olo r o f l aw und e r § 19 83 wh e re sh e a c ts w ithstate officia ls or with significa nt state aid). Her e, Plaintiffs alleg ed that Constant founded the Front Revolutionnaire Pour L’ Av an c e me nt e t leProg

re s d ’H ait i(“F RAPH”) in 1993, and wor ked in conc ert with the Ha itian mil ita ry to t e rr or ize and

re pr e ss t he c ivi lia n p op ulatio n. Pla int if

fs fu rt he r a lle g e d th at F RA PH members r ece ived wea

pons, training , and fina

ncial support fr om the Haitian military , and that, at the time Plaintiffs were victimiz ed by FRAPH troops, Constant exercised c ommand and contr ol over F RAPH force s, which oper ated a s an extension of the Haitian a rmed for ces a

nd under the auspice s of the Ha itian politi cal police , the latter of which re ported dire ctly

to the commander

of the Ha iti an a

rm e d f or c e s. Ad dit ion a lly , th e dis tr ic t c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t c on fi rm e d th e se
a lle g atio ns . B a se d o n te sti mony fr om t he e vid e nti ary

he ari ng , th e dis tr ic t c ourt c on c lud e d th at: (1 ) “ Con sta

nt w a s at a ll t ime s th e de fa c to l e a de r o f F RA PH a nd wa s a c tiv e in i ts d a ily operations”; (2) “[h]e communicated re gularly with top commanders in the a rmed for ces, a

nd
rec eived f unding f rom the military

to support FRAPH ac tiviti es”; a nd (3) “ [FRAPH] exacted widespre ad violence ag ainst opponents of the military reg ime, including . . . pla intiffs J ane D oes I , I I , and I I I. . . [by ] raid[ ing] neighborhoods populated by Aristide supporter s, rapingand abductingits targ ets.” B ased on the se alleg ations, Plainti ffs c lear ly pled suffic ient fac ts to satisfy the color of

law re quirement unde r the ATS to vest the district cour t with subject matter6

jurisdiction over their c laims. F or sim ila r r e a so ns , Pl a int if

fs a lso a lle g e d s uf

fi c ie nt f a c ts t o v e st t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

wi th
su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r t he ir TV PA c la ims . Unli ke the AT S, the TV PA e xpre ssl y “re nders liable only

those individuals who have c ommitt ed torture or extrajudicial killing ‘unde r actua l or appa

rent a uthority , or color of

law, of a ny fore ign na

tion.’” Kad

ic , 70 F.3d at 245 (quotingTVPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note) § 2(a )). How ever , like under the ATS, “in construing the term[] . . . ‘color of

law,’ c ourts are instructed to look to . . . jurisprudence under 42 U .S.C. § 1983.” Id. Acc ording ly , beca use Plaintiffs pled suffic ient fac ts to demonstrate that Constant acte d under c olor of law f or purpose s of the ATS, they also satisfied this require ment under the TV PA, and

thu s th e dis tr ic t c ourt

ha d s ub je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n to c on sid e r P la int if fs ’ c la ims
un de r b oth

statut e s. I I
. Personal Jurisdi ction Con sta nt’ s argume nt t

hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

la c ke d p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n to e nte r a de fa ult judgme nt is withoutmerit. As a g ener al matter, the re is no dispute that Constant rec eived persona l service of the summons and complaint in J anuar y 2005, and ther efor e had a ctual notice of the district cour

t proce eding s; his only

argument is that service was improper beca use the
summo ns mis state d th e fu ll n ame of the F RA PH a

nd inc or re c tly ind ic ate d th at he wa s a “commande r” of

the group. Howe ver, Rule 4( a)( 1)(B ) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure pr ov ide s o nly

that a summo ns “ be dir e c te d to the de fe nd ant, ” and thi s r ule is “ to b e lib e ra lly construed, to f

urther the purpose of

findingpersona l jurisdiction in cases in which the pa rty has
rec eived a ctual notice.” Gramme nos v. Lemos , 4 57 F .2 d 1 06 7, 10 70 (2 d Ci r. 19 72 ); se eals o Mc Ga nn v . S

tateof N e w York, 77 F.3d 672, 674 ( 2d Cir. 1996). Thus, bec ause Constant re ceive d7

a c tua l no tic e , a

nd be c a us e any de fe c ts i n th e summo ns we re pure ly c le ri c a l, s e rv ic e of

pr oc e ss was suff icient to vest the district court with per sonal jurisdiction. As a fina l matter, Constant argues that the district cour t should have construe d his moti on as brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) and, as c onstrued, grante d the motion on the basis of “extraordinar

y circ umstances” – namely , that he wa s incarc erated when the defa ult judgment wa s
e nte re d, and

that hi s atto rn e y

wa s a lle g e dly

“ g ro ssl y ne g lig e nt” in f

a ili ngto r e sp on d to Pla int if fs ’ summons and complaint. Neither of these a rguments have me rit. “[A] Rule 60(b)(6) motion require s ext raor dinary

circ umstances whic h ty

pically do not usually

exis t where the applica

nt fails to more for

relief promptly .” G ra c ev . B a n k L e u m iT r u s t C o . o f N
. Y. , 443 F.3d 180, 190 n.8 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). Here , Constant did not fil e his motion unti l more than a year afte r the district cour

t entere d defa

ult judgment, and, de spite his assertion of attorne y misconduct, he pre sented no e vidence in support of this basis for re lief apa rt from the c onclusory alleg ation that his counsel fa iled to file a notice of appe ara nce in the district c ourt. Moreove r,
a lth ou g h h e a sse rt s th at hi s in c arc e ra tio n s ho uld

have be e n c on sid e re d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt , Constant was not in prison at the time he re ceive d service of proc ess; indeed, Constant did not enter prison until J uly

2006, more than a

y ear and a ha lf afte r ser

vice wa s made, a

nd less than a
month b e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d a de fa ult jud g me nt. Th e re fo re , Co ns tant f a ile d to demonstrate e x traordina

ry circ umstances, a

nd, to the extent his motion could have bee n construed a s brought under Rule 60(b) (6), the district c ourt’s re fusal to grant the motion was not an abuse of discre tion. Se eAc ze l v . La bo nia , 584 F.3d 52, 61 ( 2d Cir. 2009) (“Amotion seeking [Rule 60 (b )( 6) ] re lie f i s a dd re sse d to the so un d d isc re tio n o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

wi th a pp e llate
re v i ew l i m i t edt o d et erm i n i n g wh et h er th atd i s cr et i o nh as b ee nab u s ed
. ” ( q u o t i n g Nemaizer , 7938

F.2d at 61-62)). Acc ording ly , in light of the a bove, it cannot be said that the district court “ plainly usurped [its] j ur isd ic tio n” by

e nte ri nga

de fa ult jud g me nt, and

the c ourt ’s de nia l of

Con sta nt’ s Ru le 60 (b )( 4) mot ion

wa s th e re fo re c or

re c t. We have c onsidered a ll of Constant’s remainingclaims of er ror a nd found them to be without merit. Accor dingly , there is no basis on which to challeng e the judgment of the district court. F o r

th e f o r e g o i n gr e a s o n s , th e o r d e r o f th e d i s tr i c tc o urti s h e r e b y AF F IRM ED
.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O ’Ha g an Wolfe, Clerk By :__________________________