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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DAMIAN ARENAS, CECILIA DIAZ 

PASCUEL GONZALEZ, 

HEIDILBERTO LINARES, JOSE 

MANUEL CRUZ LINARES, 

MARGARITA LINARES, MARIA 

LINARES, REYNA LINARES, 

TEODORA LINARES, and 

RODOLFO MARTINEZ, 

Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

TRUSELF ENDEAVOR CORP. d/b/a 

GARRET/JUAREZ CLEANING 

SERVICE, and GREG GARRETT, 

Individually, 

Defendants. 

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No. 12 C 5754 

Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The plaintiffs, employees of defendant Truself Endeavor Corporation (“Truself”), 

bring claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Illinois Minimum 

Wage Law (“IMWL”), alleging that Truself failed to pay minimum and overtime wages 

as mandated by state and federal law. In addition, Plaintiff Teodora Linares also brings a 

claim under the Equal Pay Act, alleging that Truself paid her less than her male 

counterparts for equal work. The defendants move for summary judgment under Rule 56, 

arguing that the facts establish that they are not subject to the requirements of the FLSA. 

For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, finding that the plaintiffs are employed in domestic service in one or more 
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households for more than eight hours in a workweek, and therefore that the FLSA 

applies. 

FACTS 

The plaintiffs are current employees of Truself, tasked with performing cleaning 

and janitorial work for residential and commercial customers of Truself.1

 Pls.’ Statement 

of Undisputed Facts (Dkt. 16) ¶ 1. As part of their employment with Truself, the 

plaintiffs were occasionally, but regularly, sent to private residences to perform 

household cleaning. Id. ¶ 2. At these private homes, the plaintiffs were to sweep and mop 

floors, vacuum carpets, dust furniture, wash windows, take out the trash, and clean 

bathrooms. Id. ¶ 3. The plaintiffs worked at least eight hours per week cleaning the 

homes of private individuals on behalf of Truself. Id. ¶ 4. There is no indication that any 

of the private residences the plaintiffs cleaned, however, were the residence of Truself 

executives. 

Besides cleaning private homes, the plaintiffs also cleaned several bars and other 

businesses. Id. ¶¶ 8, 14. At these businesses, the plaintiffs were tasked with, among other 

things, sweeping, mopping, and waxing floors; taking out the trash; and cleaning 

 

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 The facts are taken from the parties’ statements of undisputed material facts submitted 

in accordance with Local Rule 56.1. In addition to the material facts submitted with the 

moving party’s brief, Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) permits additional material facts to be 

provided by the responding party, and Local Rule 56.1(a) then allows the moving party to 

submit a concise reply to those additional facts. Here, the plaintiffs submitted a statement 

of additional material facts (Dkt. 16), but the defendants failed to respond to those facts. 

Therefore, the facts included in the plaintiffs’ statement of additional undisputed facts are 

deemed admitted. See L.R. 56.1(a) (“All material facts set forth in the statement filed 

pursuant to section (b)(3)(C) will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the 

statement of the moving party.”). And the defendants Truself moved for summary 

judgment, the Court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiffs. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir. 

2005). 
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bathrooms. Id. ¶¶ 9, 15. In addition, at one business defendant Arenas occasionally 

replaced light bulbs, and each of the defendants replaced urinal deodorizers at various 

bars on a daily basis. Id. ¶¶ 10, 17. The light bulbs and urinal deodorizers were produced 

or manufactured outside the state of Illinois. Id. ¶¶ 12, 18. The urinal deodorizers were 

purchased by Truself, which then billed each of its customers for these products. Id. ¶ 16. 

And though Truself usually purchased the other products necessary for the plaintiffs’ 

work, on at least two occasions in the three years prior to the complaint being filed, 

plaintiff Arenas purchased Easy Off Oven Cleaner from a store and was reimbursed by 

Truself. Id. ¶ 20. The plaintiffs were required to transport and deliver the cleaning 

supplies, including the urinal deodorizers, to Truself’s clients. Id. ¶ 22. 

Between 2009, and the date on which this lawsuit was filed (July 23, 2012), 

Truself paid the plaintiffs an hourly rate between $5.50 and $6.50, without regard to the 

location or type of work they performed or whether they had worked more than 40 hours 

per week. Id. ¶ 23-24. Truself has never paid the plaintiffs overtime—meaning, it has not 

at any time paid the plaintiffs one and a half times their usual rate of pay for hours 

worked beyond 40 per week. Id. ¶ 24. 

DISCUSSION 

The FLSA contains provisions requiring certain employers to pay certain 

employees a minimum wage, and to compensate them at one and one-half times their 

regularly hourly rate for any hours worked beyond forty hours per week: 

Minimum Wage 

Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek 

is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is 

employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of 

goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: [the minimum wage]. 

29 U.S.C. § 206(a) 
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Overtime Compensation 

Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ 

any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in 

the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise 

engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a 

workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives 

compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified 

at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is 

employed. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 

Further, an employee engaged in “domestic service” is entitled to both the minimum 

wage and overtime compensation: 

Minimum Wage 

Any employee who in any workweek is employed in domestic service in 

one or more households, and is so employed for more than 8 hours in the 

aggregate, shall be paid wages for such employment in such workweek at 

a rate not less than the [minimum wage]. 29 U.S.C. § 206(f)(2). 

Overtime Compensation 

No employer shall employ any employee in domestic service in one or 

more households for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such 

employee receives compensation for such employment in accordance with 

subsection (a) of this section. 29 U.S.C. § 207(l). 

Essentially, an employee has FLSA rights to a minimum wage and overtime 

compensation if he is either: (1) employed in domestic service in one or more 

households; (2) engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce;2

 or 

(3) employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 

commerce. 

Truself argues that it is not an “enterprise engaged in commerce,” as defined by 

the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii), because its annual revenues are below $500,000. 

The plaintiffs effectively concede this point, admitting that Truself’s annual revenues are 

 

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 The plaintiffs do not allege that either they are, or Truself is, engaged in the production 

of goods for commerce. 
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below $500,000. Pls.’ Response to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (Dkt. 17) ¶¶ 3-

5. Therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to a minimum wage and overtime compensation 

only if they were “engaged in commerce” or employed in “domestic service.” 

I. The Plaintiffs Were Not Engaged in Commerce. 

The plaintiffs argue that they were engaged in interstate commerce because 

Truself purchased cleaning supplies and deodorizers that were manufactured outside of 

the state of Illinois and then required the plaintiffs to deliver those items to Truself’s 

customers. According to the plaintiffs, Truself charged its customers separately for these 

supplies in at least some instances. The plaintiffs maintain that their delivery of products 

manufactured in other states constitutes “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA. 

The test for engaging in commerce under the FLSA is low, but it is not that low. 

Regardless of where the products they delivered were manufactured, the plaintiffs admit 

that “all of the cleaning supplies” they used were purchased by Truself within Illinois. 

Pls.’ Response to Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (Dkt. 17) ¶ 8. This puts the 

plaintiffs squarely on the wrong side of McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 494 (1943), 

which explained that “handlers of goods for a wholesaler who moves them interstate on 

order or to meet the needs of specified customers are in commerce, while those 

employees who handle goods after acquisition by a merchant for general local disposition 

are not.” See also Russell v. Continental Restaurant, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 521, 525 (D. 

Md. 2006) (the “handling [of] goods which were moved in interstate commerce” is 

insufficient to show that an employee was engaged in interstate commerce for purposes 

of the FLSA). 

Here, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, some Illinois 

merchant(s) obtained the cleaning supplies and deodorizers from out of state. Truself then 
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purchased them, from that merchant, in Illinois. Truself then required the plaintiffs to 

handle the goods and to distribute them locally. The plaintiffs’ involvement with the 

goods was purely local and, as McLeod provides, did not require them to engage in 

interstate commerce. Accordingly, the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs’ delivery 

of cleaning supplies does not bring them within the FLSA minimum wage and overtime 

provisions is correct. 

II. The Plaintiffs were Employees in “Domestic Service.” 

The parties also dispute whether the plaintiffs were “employed in domestic 

service in one or more households” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(f) and 207(l). Truself 

points to 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 to argue that the plaintiffs are not domestic services 

employees because they are employed by Truself rather than being employed directly by 

the households in which they work. 

As used in section 13(a)(15) of the Act,3

 the term domestic service 

employment refers to services of a household nature performed by an 

employee in or about a private home (permanent or temporary) of the 

person by whom he or she is employed. . . . 

29 C.F.R. § 552.3. Based on this regulatory definition of “domestic service employment,” 

Truself argues that individuals employed by a third-party service, such as the plaintiffs, 

 

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 Section 13(a)(15) of the FLSA excludes from coverage those workers who provide 

casual babysitting and companionship services: 

The provisions of section 206 . . . and section 207 of this title shall not 

apply with respect to— 

(15) any employee employed on a casual basis in domestic service 

employment to provide babysitting services or any employee employed in 

domestic service employment to provide companionship services for 

individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for 

themselves; 

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). 
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are not domestic service employees because they are not employed in the “private home 

. . . of the person by whom [they are] employed.” Id. (emphasis added). 

The plaintiffs, however, rely on statutory language and the Department of Labor’s 

interpretation of the regulatory definition to argue that they are domestic service 

employees even though their employer is Truself, rather than the families whose private 

homes they cleaned. Pls.’ Resp. Br. (Dkt. 15) at 4-6; 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(f), 207(l); DOL 

Memo at 6. Surprisingly, it appears to be a question of first impression whether 

employees of a third-party service who perform household services in private homes are 

covered by the FLSA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(f) and 207(l).4

 Upon considering the 

text of the FLSA (as well as its legislative history), regulatory language, the DOL Memo, 

and case law bearing on the definition of domestic services employment in other 

contexts, the Court answers the question in the affirmative. The plaintiffs, though 

employees of a third-party employer, are domestic services employees under the terms of 

the FLSA, and therefore are subject to the FLSA’s protections. 

By its terms, the definition of “domestic service employment” in § 552.3 applies 

only to the term as it is used in the babysitting and companionship exemption. Defendant 

points out, however, that the Department of Labor has stated that it “intended the 

provision to supply a general definition of the term as used throughout the Act.” DOL 

 

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 Many cases discuss whether employees who babysit on a casual basis or who provide 

companionship services, but who are employed by third-parties, are considered domestic 

service employees for the purposes of the companionship services exception to FLSA 

coverage, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 

U.S. 158, 169-72 (2007). But that issue is different than the question in this case—

namely, whether employees of third-party employers who provide household cleaning 

services are provided FLSA protections through the domestic services extension of FLSA 

coverage. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(f) and 207(l). 
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Memo at 8 n. 1. In Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007), a case 

that considered the companionship services exception to the FLSA, the Supreme Court 

discussed whether domestic services employees—in that case, those providing 

companionship services—employed by third parties are covered by the FLSA. The Court 

noted that the regulatory definition of “domestic services employment” in 29 C.F.R. § 

552.3 states that the definition only applies to the companionship services exception, but 

acknowledged that “the rule appears in other ways to have been meant to supply a 

definition . . . for the FLSA as a whole.” Id. at 169. Nevertheless, the Court declined to 

adopt such an interpretation, noting that if that literal definition of domestic services 

employment applied to the FLSA as a whole, “that would place outside the scope of 

FLSA’s wage and hour rules any butlers, chauffeurs, and so forth who are employed by 

any third party,” a result that “seems clearly contrary to Congress’ intent.” Id. (emphasis 

in original). Such an interpretation, the Court observed, would eliminate coverage for “all 

domestic service employees previously covered by the ‘enterprise coverage’ provisions 

of the Act” in direct contravention of Congress’ intent to extend coverage to domestic 

services employees. Id.

The DOL Memo makes this same point (though one would not know it from 

reading defendant’s brief). Notwithstanding its view that the § 552.3 definition is not 

confined to the babysitting and companionship exemption, the DOL memo interprets the 

term “domestic services employees” to include domestic services workers employed by 

third parties, stating that to exclude workers employed by third parties would be 

“contrary to Congress’ express intent, and cannot be correct.” DOL Memo at 6. 
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The Department of Labor interprets § 552.3 as only “describing the kinds of work 

that constitute domestic service employment and establishing that such work must be 

performed in a private home, rather than in a place of business.” Id. at 4. That 

interpretation is reasonable, and the Supreme Court endorsed it in Coke. See 551 U.S. at 

170 (“the primary (if not sole) purpose of . . . § 552.3 is to describe the kind of work that 

must be performed by someone to qualify as a ‘domestic service’ employee”) (emphasis 

in original). What is more, the Department of Labor clearly knew how to specifically 

exclude employees of third parties, as demonstrated by the regulation at issue in Coke

removing from FLSA coverage employees providing companionship services “who are 

employed by an employer or agency other than the family or household using their 

services.” 29 C.F.R. § 552.109. That the Department of Labor chose not create an 

exemption for employees of third party employers for all domestic services employees is 

evidence that it did not intend to exclude from coverage all those who work for third 

parties. Therefore, based on the Department of Labor’s interpretation, as endorsed by the 

Supreme Court, § 552.3 provides no basis to exclude the plaintiffs from the minimum 

wage and overtime compensation provisions of the FLSA that apply to domestic service 

employment. 

More importantly, reading the regulatory definition in this manner better 

comports with the language of the statute itself, which does not suggest any requirement 

that an employee must work in the residence of his employer to be considered a domestic 

services employee. 29 U.S.C. § 206(f)(2). To the contrary, as the plaintiffs argue, the 

statute states that any employee working at least 8 hours per week in domestic services 

employment is covered by the FLSA. Id. Further, the statute expressly contemplates that 
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a domestic services employee might perform domestic services in more than one 

household, a possibility that is far more likely to apply to domestic services workers 

employed by a third party (e.g., a cleaning service) than to those employed by private 

parties. Id. 

In the final analysis, Truself’s exegisis of the relevant statutory and regulatory 

provisions yields a result that can only be described as backward. Truself claims that 

Congress and the Department of Labor intended to regulate the employer-employee 

relationship only “in a household, private employment setting,” but that they did not 

intend to regulate third party employers. Reply Br. (Dkt. 18) at 7. That interpretation goes 

against the entire tenor of the FLSA, which generally provides protections to employees 

of large employers while exempting employees working for smaller employers. See, e.g., 

29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii). Why, then, would domestic services employees be protected 

if they work for private families, but remain unprotected if they work for larger thirdparty employers? The defendant offers no rationale for such an approach and it would 

turn the premise of the 1974 amendments to the FLSA upside down to read the regulatory 

definition of “domestic service employment” as the defendant does. The Court sees no 

justification for Truself’s argument, which would place FLSA regulatory burdens on 

individuals personally employing workers within their homes, while at the same time 

exempting companies who employ large numbers of workers providing the very same 

services. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 should not be construed 

to limit the definition of “domestic services employees” to only those employees who 
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work in the homes of their employers. The Court therefore denies the defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment on that basis. 

* * * 

The plaintiffs were not “engaged in commerce,” nor were they “employed in an 

enterprise engaged in commerce.” But the Court finds, drawing all reasonable inferences 

in their favor, that they were “employed in domestic service in one or more households,” 

and therefore they are entitled to FLSA protection. For all of these reasons, the Court 

denies the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

Date: January 23, 2013 

John J. Tharp, Jr. 

United States District Judge