UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4940

CLARENCE ODELL STANLEY, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

James C. Fox, District Judge.

(CR-97-45-F)

Submitted: March 2, 1999

Decided: April 8, 1999

Before LUTTIG and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

William Arthur Webb, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellant. Thomas B. Murphy, Assistant United States Attorney,

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Clarence Odell Stanley, Jr. appeals his guilty plea conviction for

armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a), (d) (West Supp.

1998). The district court sentenced Stanley to 235 months of incarceration at the top end of his Sentencing Guideline range.1 His attorney

has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967), stating that in his view there are no meritorious grounds

for appeal but raising one issue: whether the district court erred by

refusing to depart on the ground that Stanley's classification as a

career offender over-represented his true criminal history.

We do not address the issue raised by counsel, however, because

Stanley waived his right to appeal his sentence except for a sentence

resulting from an upward departure from the established Guideline

range. The record reveals that Stanley knowingly waived his appellate

rights in a valid plea agreement, see United States v. BroughtonJones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1995), and that the district court

carefully reviewed the provisions of the plea agreement with Stanley

at his sentencing hearing. The transcript of the plea hearing shows

that the district court fully complied with the dictates of Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir.

1991) (holding that if district court fully questions a defendant regarding waiver of his right to appeal during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is both valid and enforceable); United States v.

Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53-54 (4th Cir. 1990). Also, we find none of

the exceptions to the waiver rule are present in this appeal. See generally United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992); United

States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732-33 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus, we find

that Stanley has waived his right to this appeal and we dismiss.2 See

Wiggins, 905 F.2d at 53-54.

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1 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1997).

2 Although the Government did not rely on Stanley's waiver of appeal

rights, this court is not precluded from dismissing the appeal on this

basis. See United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995).

 2
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. This court requires

that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If his client

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy

thereof has been served on his client.

DISMISSED

 3