### IN THE UNI TED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCUIT

No. 11-10562 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. WELLIE ELISHA WOODSON, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:08-CR-100-1

Before WIENER, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * After Defendant-Appellant Wellie Elisha Wood s on admitted violating conditions of his supervised release, the district court sentenced Woodson to two consecutive 18-month terms of imprisonment, for a total of 36 months, to be followed by two concurrent 24-month term s of supervised release. Woodson claims that his above-guidelines revocation sent ence is substantively unreasonable because it represents a clear error of ju d g m e nt i n balancing the sentencing factors. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Februa ry 24 , 20 12 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court hasd ete rm inedthat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

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To preserve the issue, Woodson asserts that revocation sentences should be reviewed for “reasonableness.” In fact, we review revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4)’s “plainly unreasonable” s t a n d ar d

. United States v. Miller , 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir.), cert. de n ied , 132 S. Ct. 496 ( 2011). Under this standard, we first consider “whether th e district court procedurally erred before we cons i d e r the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion sta n d a r d

. ” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see als o G a l l v . United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we “take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance fr o m th e Guidelines range . . . but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall , 552 U.S. at 51. Woodson asserts that he was sentenced to three years in prison for twice using marijuana, making an insufficient effort to find a job, falling behind on restitution, missing f o u r counseling sessions, and skipping one urine test. Woodson claims that his three year sentence is (1) considerably higher than the terms of imprisonment imposed for his original, m ore serious crimes of conviction, bank robbery and using a firearm during that crime; (2) considerably higher than the advisory guidelines r a nge for his violations of supervised release; and (3) the type of sentence a person in criminal history category I could have received at original sentencing for offenses such as, inter alia, involuntary manslaughter, aggravate d a s s a ult involving the discharge of a firearm and bodily injury, and distribution of 80 kilograms of marijuana. He also contends th at thi s s e ntence ignores important mitigating information, such a s hi s “ s ucc e s s
on supervised release for more than a year before his last revocation, a fact that surely predicts a higher chance of successful reintegration to society,” and “his serious efforts to find employment, even well below his experience level, before his revocation.”
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These arguments ignore that Woodson admitted that he vio l ated the conditions of his second chance at supervised release by twice testing positive for the use of marijuana, skipping drug testing and treatment sessions, quitting his job and failing to submit job search log s a s instructed by his probation officer, failing to make restitution payments, and failing to contact his probation officer

as instructed after failing his drug test. The district co u rt considered that this

was Woodson’s second failed attempt at supervised release and th a t h i s 18 months in prison following his first revocation did not serve as a “wake-up call” to Woodson. Because Woodson’s conduct violated specific conditions of his release for a second time under supervision, the severity of his conduct compared to that of others not in his position is of no moment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Similarly, his comparison of his second revocation sentence to original sentences for other crimes is misplaced. See Miller , 634 F

. 3 d a t 8 4 3. The district co u rt considered the advisory guidelines range suggested by the relevant policy statements, which it rejected because it di d n ot believe that the range adequately addressed the § 3553(a) factors it should consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). None of Woodson’s arguments shows that th e district co u rt abused its discretion in its consideration of the relevant sentencing factors. In light of all of the circum s t a n c e s a nd the due deference owed to the district co u rt, we hold that the sentence imposed is not substantively unreasonable. See Gall , 552 U.S. at 51. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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