Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1410-CR-709 | April 30, 2015 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Frederick Vaiana

Voyles Zahn & Paul

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James Currin,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 30, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1410-CR-709

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle, 

Judge

The Honorable Stanley M. Kroh, 

Magistrate

Cause No. 49G03-1405-FB-27808

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] On the afternoon of Memorial Day, 2014, Anthony Moffit was enjoying a 

barbeque at his Indianapolis home with Veronica Alexander, his partner of 

eighteen years and with whom he had three children. Appellant-Defendant 

James Currin drove by with Shante Bowie screaming at Anthony and 

Alexander. When Anthony confronted James, the two began a fistfight that 

lasted two to three minutes, after which all dispersed. 

[2] A short time later, James and Shante returned, accompanied by several others, 

the men in the group armed with two-by-fours and the women with knives. 

Veronica was attacked and was stabbed four times, while Anthony was struck 

in the head with a two-by-four and knocked unconscious. While Anthony was 

on the ground, James kicked and stomped him. The fight continued until 

police arrived, at which point the attackers fled. Anthony suffered a broken jaw 

which had to be wired shut. 

[3] Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana charged James with Class B felony 

aggravated battery and Class D felony battery. Following a bench trial, the trial 

court found James guilty as charged and sentence him to an aggregate sentence 

of eight years with two suspended, one to probation. James contends that the 

State failed to introduce evidence sufficient to sustain his conviction for 

aggravated battery under a theory of accomplice liability. Because we disagree, 

we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History
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[4] In the afternoon of May 26, 2014, Memorial Day, Anthony, Veronica, and 

their children were having a barbeque with family and friends on the porch of 

their family home in Indianapolis. James and Shante, with whom James had 

children, drove by in their grey Kia minivan, yelling profanities at Anthony and 

Veronica’s daughter and throwing something at her as well. When the van 

returned, Anthony ran beside the van and confronted James. When James

emerged, he and Anthony engaged in a fistfight for approximately two to three 

minutes. When police were called, the altercation ended and all returned to 

their homes. 

[5] What occurred next can best be described as a free-for-all. Approximately 

twenty to twenty-five minutes later, James, Shante, Vicky Brooks (Shante’s 

mother), Lamont Brooks (Shante’s uncle), Shawn Patrick Bowie (Shante’s 

brother), Darnell Wilson (Shante’s uncle), Sheila Brooks (Shante’s sister), and 

others approached across a vacant lot. The men were armed with two-by-fours 

and, after the group crossed the street into Anthony and Veronica’s yard, Vicky, 

Shante, and Sheila produced knives and stabbed Veronica four times. 

[6] Meanwhile, Lamont punched Anthony, and James, Shawn, and Darnell began 

to hit Anthony as well. As James and Anthony fought, Shawn “whacked” 

Anthony in the head with a two-by-four. Tr. p. 27. Anthony was knocked 

unconscious and fell to the ground, where Darnell and James continued to hit, 

kick, and stomp him. When Anthony’s eleven-year-old daughter K.A. grabbed

a broom and ran to his aid, James kicked her in the chest. Additionally, Vicky 

stabbed Veronica’s cousin Kenny Brown and one of Shante’s uncles knocked 
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him unconscious, Anthony’s sixteen-year-old son was stabbed in the arm, and 

Darnell hit Anthony’s fourteen-year-old son J.A. in the side with a two-by-four. 

The group dispersed when police arrived. Anthony suffered a broken jaw that 

had to be wired shut. At the time of trial, Anthony was still having trouble with 

his jaw and had had to return to the hospital often. 

[7] On May 30, 2014, the State charged James with Class B felony aggravated 

battery on Anthony and Class A misdemeanor battery on Anthony’s daughter. 

James’s case was tried to the bench on August 27, 2014. While several 

witnesses testified regarding the events of Memorial Day, the trial court stated 

on the record that it found J.A. to be particularly credible. J.A. had testified 

that he saw Anthony being struck with a two-by-four, but could not say by 

whom, only that it was not James. J.A. added that he did not see James

wielding a two-by-four. J.A. did testify that he saw James “stomping” Anthony 

after he was on the ground. Tr. p. 125. At the trial court’s request, the parties 

argued their cases regarding the aggravated battery charge on a theory of 

accomplice liability. The trial court found James guilty as charged. On 

September 9, 2014, the trial court sentenced James to eight years for aggravated 

battery, with one of two suspended years to be spent on probation, and two 

years for battery, the sentences to be served concurrently. 

Discussion and Decision
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Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither weigh the evidence 

nor resolve questions of credibility. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind.

1995). We look only to the evidence of probative value and the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the verdict. Id. If from that 

viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of 

fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 

we will affirm the conviction. Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ind.

1993). 

[9] If James’s conviction for aggravated battery of Anthony is to be affirmed, it will 

be on an accomplice-liability basis, as the trial court seems to have specifically 

found that James was not the person who struck Anthony in the head with a 

two-by-four. Consequently, the State was required to establish that James was 

an accomplice to “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally inflict[ed] injury 

on a person that create[ed] a substantial risk of death or cause[d] ... serious 

permanent disfigurement [or] protracted loss or impairment of the function of a 

bodily member or organ[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5. “A person who 

knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit 

an offense commits that offense, even if the other person ... has not been 

prosecuted for the offense;... has not been convicted of the offense; or ... has 

been acquitted of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. 

In determining whether there was sufficient evidence for 

purposes of accomplice liability, we consider such factors as: 1) 
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presence at the scene of the crime; 2) companionship with 

another at the scene of the crime; 3) failure to oppose 

commission of the crime; and 4) course of conduct before, 

during, and after occurrence of the crime. [Ind. Code § 35-41-2-

4]. A defendant’s mere presence at the crime scene, or lack of 

opposition to a crime, standing alone, is insufficient to establish 

accomplice liability. Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ind. 

2000). Flight shows consciousness of guilt. State v. Torphy, 217 

Ind. 383, 387-88, 28 N.E.2d 70, 72 (1940).

These factors may be considered in conjunction with a 

defendant’s course of conduct before, during, and after the crime, 

and a defendant’s companionship with the one who commits the 

crime. Id. Furthermore, accomplice liability applies to the 

contemplated offense and all acts that are a probable and natural 

consequence of the concerted action. Wieland v. State, 736 

N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (Ind. 2000). Moreover, an accomplice is 

equally culpable as the one who commits the actual crime. Hauk 

v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind. 2000). Finally, it is not 

necessary for [James] to have participated in every element of the 

crime under a theory of accomplice liability. Bruno v. State, 774 

N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ind. 2002).

Tuggle v. State, 9 N.E.3d 726, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. 

[10] We conclude that the State has produced sufficient evidence to sustain James’s 

conviction for aggravated battery based on accomplice liability. James’s 

presence at the scene of the aggravated battery is supported by the testimony of 

no fewer than seven witnesses and is not seriously in dispute. The State also 

produced ample evidence to establish companionship with others who were 

also participating in the attack. The State produced evidence that James walked 

back to Anthony’s house with several others, almost all of whom were blood 

relatives to Shante, the mother of James’s children. James participated in the 
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initial beating of Anthony, along with Shawn, Darnell, and Lamont. Just 

before Shawn struck Anthony in the head with a two-by-four, James “swung” 

at Anthony with his fists. Tr. p. 122. After Anthony had been felled by 

Shawn’s blow, James proceeded to kick and stomp him. The evidence indicates 

James’s full participation in the group attack on Anthony, from beginning to 

end. 

[11] As for the third factor, the evidence just discussed is more than sufficient to 

establish that James, far from opposing the crime, was an active participant. 

Finally, James’s actions before and after the aggravated battery on Anthony 

support a finding of accomplice liability. The event that ultimately led to the 

pitched battle in Anthony’s yard was the earlier fistfight between James and 

Anthony, which was provoked by James. James told Anthony that he was 

going to “F [him] up” and told Shante that he was going to “beat [Anthony’s] 

a[**].” Tr. pp. 57, 168. After the initial fistfight, James and Shante gathered 

Shante’s family and friends, armed themselves, and returned to Anthony’s as a 

group. After kicking and stomping Anthony as he lay unconscious, James

kicked K.A. in the chest when she attempted to come to Anthony’s aid. James

fled from the scene as police arrived, indicating culpability. See Torphy, 217 

Ind. at 387-88, 28 N.E.2d at 72. 

[12] James’s argument seems to be that an affirmance of his conviction for 

aggravated battery on Anthony would be an absurd result, because he could 

have just as easily been prosecuted and convicted of attacks on the other victims 

under a theory of accomplice liability, but was not. First, the record seems to 
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indicate that James only had significant involvement in the crimes against 

Anthony and K.A., for which he faced charges. Second, the State was free to 

prosecute James in any way it saw fit, and we will not second-guess its decision 

in this regard. James has failed to establish that his conviction for aggravated 

battery is unsupported by sufficient evidence. 

[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.