1

07

- 34 54

- cv , 07- 34 62

- cv M at her v. W i l l et D ai ry 1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 3 F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT 4 5

____________________________________ 6 7 August Term, 2007 8 9 (Argued: J uly

18, 2008 Dec ided: J uly 30, 2008) 10 11 Docke t Nos. 07-3454-c v(L ), 07-3462- cv(CON) 12 13

____________________________________ 14 15 FRED COON , on behalf of his wife, Pea

rl Coon, dece ased, K

AREN STRECKER, S COTT 16 MATHER and CONN I E MATHER, as Par ents and Natural Gua rdians of S.M., a Minor Child, 17 KENNET H KEPPEL , KAREN KEPPEL , and DAL E MANGAN , 18 19 Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts , 20 21 22 – v. – 23 24 WI L L ET DAI RY, L P, W I L L ET DAI RY, L L C, W I L L ET DAI RY, I NC., 25 DENNI S EL DRED and SCOTT EL DRED, 26 27 De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lle es. 28

____________________________________ 29 30 Be fore : NEWMAN, CAL AB RESI , and B .D. PARKER, Circ uit J ud ge s. 31

____________________________________ 32 33 Appea l from a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Northe rn District of 34 New Y ork (Scullin, J. ) gra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt f

or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s o n a ll o f P la int if fs

35 Appellants’ c laims in a suit alleging , inte r a lia , that Def endants-A

ppellees’ larg e dair

y operation 36 emitted hazardous pollutants in violation of the Clean Water Ac t (CWA). W e hold that 37 Plaintiffs-Appellants wa ived their c laim as to any CW A violations before J uly 1999, that the2 1 CW A per

mit shi eld provision prohibited this action as to any claims betwe en Jul y

1999 and 2 De c e mbe r 2 00 6, a nd that Pla int if

fs -A pp e lla nts ’ R e so ur c e Con se rv atio n a nd Re c ov e ry

Ac t c la ims 3 wer e prohibited unde r that statute’s non- duplication provisions. Additionally , we join other 4 circ uits in concluding that Defe ndants-Appe llees did not need a permit to construct a

stock pond 5 on land alre ady

in use for f

armingunder 33 U .S.C. § 1344(f)(2). A ccor dingly , the judg ment of 6 the Di str ic t Co ur

t g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt o n a ll o f P la int if fs -A pp e lla nts ’ c la ims is 7 AFF I RMED. 8

_____________________________________ 9 1 0 G A RY A

. A B RA H A M , O f f i c e o f G ar y A

. Ab r ah am , A l l e g any, 11 N.Y., ALAN J. KNAUF, K nauf ShawL L P, Rochester, N.Y ., for 12 Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts . 13 14 DAVI D L . COOK, Nixon P eabody L L P, Rochester, N.Y ., for 15 Defendants-A ppellees

. 16

_____________________________________ 17 P ER CURIAM : 18 Plaintiffs-Appellants, a group of ne ighbor s in East Genoa , New Y ork (“ Appellants”) , 19 appea l the decision of the United States District Court for the Nor thern District of N ew Yor k 20 (Scullin, J. ) g rantingDef endants-A

ppellees Willet Dairy

and its owners Scott and D ennis Eldred 21 (collec tively

“Willet Dairy”) summar

y judgme nt on all of Appellants’ c laims. Coon v. W illet 22 Da iry , L P, Nos. 5:02-cv-1195, 5:04-c v-917, 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 51718 (N.D.N.Y. July 17, 2 3 2 0 0 7 ). InAu gu s t2 0 0 4 , Ap p el l an t s b ro u gh ta c i t i z ens u i tp urs u an tt o 3 3 U. S

. C

. § 1 3 6 5 , cl ai m i n g, 24 inte r a lia , that Wil let Dairy violated the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. , by 25 failingto manag e its animal waste a nd silag e lea chate proper ly , and other wise ca using 26 environmenta l and public hea lth hazards. On appe al, Appellants c ontend that summary judgme nt3 1 was improper

beca use (1) Wil let Dairy

operated without a per

mit prior to J uly

1999 in violation 2 of the CWA, (2 ) Wi lle t D a ir y dis c ha rg e d p oll uta

nts int o n avig a

ble wate rw ay s a ft e r Jul y

19 99 in 3 violation of its permit and the CWA, (3) Wil let Dairy ’s oper ations violated the Resourc e 4 Conservation and Rec overy Act of 1976 ( RCRA), a

nd (4) Willet Dairy

diverted Scha eff

er B rook 5 wi th o u ta p erm i ti nv i o l at i o no f t h e C W A. W e c o n s i d er th es e i s s u es i nturn , re v i ew i n g de novo 6 the District Court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt. Ho wle

yv . To wn o

f St ra tfo rd, 217 F.3d 141, 151 7 (2 d Ci r. 20 00 ). In d oin gso , w e re c ognize that th e fi rs t thre e iss ue s c an b e de a lt w ithun de r t his 8 Court ’s e xistin gpr e c e de nts , b ut t hat th e Ap pe lla

nts ’ s tr e am di ve rs ion

c la im r e qu ir e s u s to 9 interpre t, for the f

irst time in our Circuit, 33 U.S.C . § 1344(f) (2) a s it relates to the c onstruction 10 of stock ponds. 11 F ir st, Ap pe lla nts c onte nd

that Will e t D a ir

y vio late d th e CWA b y

op e ra tin ga s a 12 Concentrated Animal Fe edingOper ation (“CAF O”) without a permit befor e Jul y 1999. 13 Appellants, howe ver, f ailed to ra ise this claim properly befor e the District Court, and the ref ore 14 we de em it waived. See M edforms, Inc . v. He althcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc. , 290 F.3d 98, 109 15 (2d. Cir. 2002). More over, e ven if Appe llants had sufficie ntly argued this claim below, Willet 16 Dairy ’s fa ilure to have a per mit before July

1999 is a “wholly

past violation,” which c annot be 17 the subject of a

CW A citizen suit. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeak e Bay Found., Inc. , 18 484 U.S. 49, 57-61 (1987). B eca use Will et Dair

y has had pe rmit covera g e under New Y ork 19 De pa

rtme nt o f E nv ir onme nta l Co ns e rv atio n’ s ( “ DE C” ) g e ne ra l pe rm it s inc e July 19 99 , th e re is 20 no “evide nce f

rom which a

fac tfinder c ould find a likelihood of continuingviolations.” Conn. 21 Coastal Fishermen’ s Ass’n v. Re mington Arms Co. , 989 F.2d 1305, 1312 ( 2d Cir. 1993). 22F or

e xamp le , th e re is n o in dic atio n th at Will e t D a ir y ha d to imp le me nt t

he g e ne ri c re qu ir e me nts 1 in the DEC g ener al per

mit im mediately

. We rec og nize that lim iting citizen suits in this respec t can c ause se rious injury to persons living 2 ne ar e nv ir onme nta l da

ng e rs if the DE C and

oth e r e nv ir onme nta l r e gulator y a g e nc ie s a

re un a ble to monitor and sanction polluters ef fec tively befor e complianc e dea dlines. Given that Will et Dairy had more than seve n y ear s befor e it was re quired to comply fully with its permit, that means no c itiz en could ha ve brought a suit over that entire time for CWA violations. S uch

4 1 Se c on d, the Di str ic t Co ur t c or re c tly fo un d th at Will e t D a ir

y wa s sh ie lde d b y

its “ pe rm it 2 shield” fr om citiz en suits for violations betwee n J uly 1999 and De cembe r 2006. Coon , 2007 3 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 51718 at *8-13. The “ permit shield,” embodied in 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k), 4 protec ts a CWA permit holder from fa cingsuits challeng ing the adequa cy of its permit. At l. 5 States Legal Found., Inc. v . Eastman Kodak Co. , 12 F.3d 353, 357 ( 2d Cir. 1994) (notingthat the 6 Supreme Court found the pur pose of the pe rmit shield was to relieve permit holders fr om having 7 to liti g ate whe ther their pe rmits are suf ficiently strict) (c itation omit ted). That is, compliance 8 with an authorized per mit is deeme d compliance with CW A, so as longas Will et Dair y was 9 actingin acc ordanc e with its permit it could not be liable in a citizen suit for CW A violations. 10 See id. B e c a

us e un de r t

he te rm s o f t

he re ne we d p e rm it, Wille t D a ir y did no t ha ve to b e fu lly 11 compliant with its permit unti l Dece mber 2006 — a fter the lawsuits’ initiation — t he District 12 Court properly

held that there could be no viable CW A citizen suit aga inst W illet Dairy

. 13 There is no indication, as Appellants conte nd, that there wer e any permit requir ements for 14 wh ic h a

c iti zen c ou ld b ri ngsu it b e fo re the date Wille t D a ir y ha d to be in f

ull c omp lia

nc e wi th i ts 15 permit. Fur

ther, thoug h Appellants cor rec tly note that Will et Dair

y was supposed to be on a 1 16 schedule toward c ompliance, they do not offer

particula r evide nce show ing how

Wil let Dairy 17 failed to mee t any specific deadlines. F inally , the per mit provides that the DE C ha s th e a uth or ity 18 to monitor and sanction Will et Dair y befor e its compliance deadline. 2re gulator

y a g e nc ie s ma

y be un a ble to e ns ur e that po llute rs are a c tin gin a c c or da nc e wi th t he ir compliance schedule s, g iven the numer ous violations li kely to occur . Consequently , limit ing the ability of “pr ivate attorne y s g ener al” to bringsuit unti l after compliance deadlines ma y be inadequate for e nsuringthe safe ty of our e nvironment and for protec ting c itiz ens fr om serious injury . But that is the re medy that Congr ess has provide d and to which we are bound. See Alexande r v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Ap pe lla nts argue that th e e xten de d c omp lia nc e de a dli ne do e s n ot a

pp ly to Wi lle t D a ir

y be c a us e 3 of a pr ovision in t he re newe d permit stating: “ Ex isting Permits. Unless otherwise notified by the [DEC] , cover ag e under

this permit does not suspend, revoke , or modify the provisions of any other pe rmit issued by

the Depa rtment.” This provision, howeve r, does not apply to the orig inal g ener al per

mit (GP-99-01), as it wa s, in effe ct, nullified and super cede d by the issuance of the n ew p erm i t(G P -0 4 -0 2 ). Ot h erwi s e, th e e x p re s s l an gu age o f t h e p erm i t— th at“e x i s t i n g L ar ge CA F Os ” have an e xten de d c omp lia nc e de a dli ne — w ou ld b e me anin g le ss a s th e ne w p e rm it could not chang e the de adline for any exis ting CAF Os.

5 1 Be cause the DEC’s re newe d g ener al per mit clearly

extends the compliance de adline for 2 larg e CAF O’s, such a s Wi llet Dairy , until Decembe r 2006, we also reje ct Appellants’ c laim that 3 Wil let Dairy

had to be in full complianc e by J uly 2004. 3 4 Th ir d, we fi nd that th e Di str ic t Co ur

t pr op e rl y g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt o n App e lla

nts ’ 5 RCRA claims. Coon , 2 00 7 U .S. Di st. L EX I S 51 71 8 at *1 4- 17 . T he RCRAe sta bli sh e s a 6 regulatory

scheme for the tr eatment, disposal, and stora g e of solid and ha zardous wastes. See 7 Conn. Coast al , 9 89 F .2 d at 13 13 . T he RCRAa lso pr ov ide s th at “ [n]othin gin t his c ha pte r s ha ll 8 be construe d to apply to . . . any

activity or substance which is subject to the [CW A] . . . ex cept 9 to the extent that such application (or r egulation) is not inconsistent with t he re quirements of [the 10 CW A].” 42 U.S.C. § 6905(a). Appe llants’ RCRA claims ar e base d on the same a ctivities and 11 substances that the CW A cove rs. Ther efor e, pursua nt to Section 6905(a), the RCRA ca nnot 12 apply

to these ac tiviti es and substanc es in this inst ance beca use any such application would be 13 inconsistent with the CW A’s “pe rmit shield.”6 1 L a stl y , w e tur n to Ap pe lla

nts ’ c onte nti on

that Will e t D a ir

y ne e de d a pe rm it b e fo re it 2 diverted Scha eff

er B rook to cre ate a

stock pond, which a lleg edly cause d harm to ponds and 3 streams on Appe llants’ proper ties. This is a new issue for our Circuit and thus we write to clar ify 4 our position. 5 6 Be fore divertinga strea m, the CW A g ener ally

require s that a par

ty obtain a per

mit from 7 the U.S. Army

Corps of Eng ineer s (“the Corps” ), which a dminist ers the se ction of the CWA that 8 g overns discha

rg es of dr edg ed or f

ill material. See33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a),(d) . In Dec ember 1999, 9 Wil let Dairy

diverted the upstream r eac h of the Scha eff er B rook without contac ting the Corps. 10 After

complaints about the diversion, Willet Dairy soug ht a jurisdictional deter mination from the 11 Corps on whether it needed a

permit. The Corps then inspec ted, and its answe r wa s no. 12 The Corps’s de cision that it did nothave jur isdiction over the pond proje ct stemmed fr om 13 an exception to Section 1344(a) that allows a pa rty to proce ed without a per

mit if diverting the 14 navig able wa

ter is “f or the purpose of construc tion or maintenanc e of f arm or stoc k ponds . . . .” 15 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1) (C); 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a) (3). The re is an e x ception to this ex emption, 16 howeve r, ca lled the “r eca pture provision,” which re quires a pe rmit if the diversion projec t is for 17 the purpose of

bring ing a

n are a “into a use to which it was not previously subject.” 33 U .S.C. § 18 1344(f) (2). Appe llants contend that bec ause Willet Dairy was c onstructinga ne w pond, it was 19 using the are a for a ne w use, so the ac tivity falls within the rec apture provision. 20 Other c ourts have, how ever , interpre ted the re captur e provision to mean that a party needs 21 a pe rm it o nly

wh e n it is s tart inga

ne w f arm ingop e ratio n, no t whe n it is b uil din ga

ne w p on d to 22 support an existi ngfar ming ope ration. See Conant v. U nited States , 7 86 F .2 d 1 00 8, 10 10 (1 1th 23 Cir . 1 98 6) (p e r c ur iam) (“ Th e pla in p ur po se of the statut e and

re gulatio ns is t o a llo w p e op le toAppellants attempt to distinguish the fa cts of their c ase f rom those of Carsten , n oti ngthat in 4 Carsten the fa

rm dr e dg e d a

sh a llo w m ars h th at w a s a lr e a dy be ingus e d a s a

wate ri ngho le to cre ate a pond for its livestock. In re Carsten , 2 11 B .R. at 72 1. Th is o bs e rv atio n is ir re le va nt, howeve r, bec ause w e find that the c reation of an entire ly new f arm pond, e ven whe re no similar feature e x isted befor e, is permissible under the re captur e provision as longas it is constructed on an existi ngfar

m operation. 7 1 bu ild

po nd s in c onne c tio n w itha

pr e vio us ly

e sta bli sh e d f arm ingop e ratio n. ” ); In re Carsten , 211 2 B.R. 719, 736 (B ankr. D . Mont. 1997) (“Conseque ntly , as applied to such c onstruction the ‘ne w 3 use’ pr ovision of § 1344(f)( 2) ca nnot mean . . . that if a

far m pond did not in t he past e x ist, then 4 the construc tion of such constitute a ne w use suff icient to invoke the re captur e provision. Ag ain, 5 such an inter

pretation would impermissi bly rende r the pond c onstruction exemption a mere 6 superf

luity .”). We ag ree for substantially the re asons stated by

these c ourts. 4 7 Any

oth e r r e a din gwo uld

make the statut e inc oh e re nt. Gi ve n th at Se c tio n 1 34 4( f) (1 )( C) 8 provides a pe rmit ex emption for the c onstruction of a stock pond, which is by definition new, 9 that section would be r ender ed mea ningle ss by

an interpr etation of the r eca pture provision that 10 re qu ir e d p e rm its fo r a ll n e w u se s, inc lud ingne w p on ds . M or e ov e r, e ve n if the re wa s ambi guit

y 11 over the scope of the re captur e provision, we w ould give defe renc e to the ag ency interpre tation 12 that the re captur e provision did not apply in this i nstance . Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc . v. Natural 13 Res. De

f. Council, Inc. , 4 67 U. S. 8 37 (1 98 4) . Wil le t D a ir y , th e re fo re , d id n ot n e e d a pe rm it t o 14 divert Schae ffe r B rook to construc t the stock pond, and summary judgme nt on this claim was 15 proper . 16 17 We have c are fully considere d all of Appe llants’ claims, and we find them to be without 18 merit. Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the District Court is AFF I RMED.