### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 500 -CV

Jo nat han Sc ot t M ic kle th wait , A ppe lla nt

v. Marina K aritz nova Micklethw ait , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- F M- 05- 0064 84 , HO NORAB LE SUZ ANNE COVINGTO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
I n this appeal fr om a final divorc e decr ee, J onathan S. Micklethwa it challeng es the trial court’ s discretion in deter mining the amount of child support pay ment and the division of marital prope rty , and its failure to prohibit J on at h an ’s former spouse, Marina

Kar itz nova M ic k le th w a it , f

r o m d r iv in g w it h th e ir c h il d in th e c a r o r f r o m i n te r n a ti o n a l t r a v e l w it h th e c h il d
. We
a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.

After J onathan a

nd M ar i n a m et o v er

t h e Int ern et i n Oc t o b er

2 0 0 2 an d J o n at h an v i s i t ed Marina’ s home in Russia, Marina moved to Te x as in J anuar y 2004 with he r then six-y ear -old son t o l i v e w i t h J o n at h an . T h e c o u p l e m arri edo n M ar ch 2 8 , 2 0 0 4 , an d a ch i l d wa s b o rn o f t h e m arri age on September 28, 2004. A fter Ma rina traveled to Russia with both children to visit her f amily during the summer of 2005 a

nd returne d to Texas on September 27, Jon at h an fi l ed for divorce on September 29, 2005.2 A benc h trial was he ld on J une 19-20, 2006. The trial court sig ned the f inal divorce decr ee on July

20, 2006, naming J onathan a n d M ar i n a j o int manag ing c onservators. The c ourt order ed, among other things, that J onathan have the exclusive r ight to de signa t e t h e primary
re sid e nc e of

the c hil d b or

n o f t he marr ia g e wi thi n Tr a vis County ; that Ma ri na re c e ive c hil d s up po rt ; that J onathan ha

ve the e x clusive rig ht t o m ak e an d consent to medica l and dental de cisions and tr e a tme nts ; th a t Ma

ri na be e nti tle d to a visit a tio n sch e du le ; tha t Mar ina be re qu ir e d to par tic ipate in an intensive a lcohol treatment prog ram a nd to attend af

terc are as re commended; a nd that the par

ties would provide wr itten notice as specifie d for international trave l. At the reque st of the par ties, the
c ourt ma de fi nd ing s of fa c t a nd c on c lus ion s of law, wh ic h inc lud e d th e fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s o f f a c t:

! That it is in the best interest of the c hild that both pare nts be appointed joint mana g ing c on se rv a tor s and

tha t Jonatha n h a ve the ex clu siv e ri g ht t o d e s i g n a t e t h e c h i l d ’ s p r i m a r y r e s i d e n c e w i t h i n T r a v i s C o u n t y;
! Th a t it

is i n th e be st i nt eres t of the c hil d f or Jonatha n to have the ri g ht t o ma ke medica l decisions involving invasive pr ocedur es and that Marina f ailed to provide and se ek prope r denta l car e for their child and he r other c hild;
! Th a t Ma

ri na su ff e rs fr om alc oholi sm a

nd ha s d e mon str a te d a

n in a bil ity to adequately provide care for a nd protec t the child during extended periods of possession;
! That Marina has complete d a substance abuse e valuation conc luding that no treatment or counseling was re commended, but that a more c omprehe nsive evaluation and participation in an alcohol treatment prog ram, a nd completion of a pa renting prog ram, will ena

ble her to more ade quately car e for the child;
! That the c hild’s visit ation with Marina be limit ed until completion of alcohol tr e a tme nt an d pa re nti ngpr og ra ms w he n it

wi ll b e in t

he c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st to visit with Ma

rina in a ccor dance with the schedule set forth in the standa rd possession order.See Orde r, Mi c k le thw ait v . M ic k le thw ait , No. 03-06-00500- CV (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 1 20, 2006), available at

http:// www.3r dcoa.c ourts.state.tx .us/opinions/ HTML Opinion.asp? Opinion I D=15499. 3 The c ourt made a dditional ex tensive finding s reg ardingtrave l and child support. Marina’s notice
o f a p p e a l w a s d i s m i s s e d

a s u n t i m e l y; Jonatha

n n owtim e ly

br ing s th is a

pp e a l. 1
DI SCU SSIO N Chil d Sup po rt I n his first issue, J onathan c omplains that the court a bused its discretion in awa rding child support pay

ments to Marina e ven thoug h J onathan was named the joint manag ing c onservator wi th t he e xclu siv e ri g ht t o e sta

bli shthe pr ima

ry re sid e nc e of the c hil d. He c on te nd s tha t he s ho uld not ha ve to pa y child support in the amount of $848 per month. The trial cour t fo u n d J o n at h an’s
ne t mo nth ly

inc ome to b e $1 ,7 36 .9 7 a nd or dered a

monthl y c hil d s up po rt

pa y me nt e qu iva le nt t o 49%, computed using the perc entag e g uidelines of the family code. J onathan c halleng es the c ourt’s
a wa rd of c hil d s up po rt

becau se he is the joi nt m a na g ingc on se rv a tor wi th t he e xclu siv e ri g ht t o establish the child’s re sidence and Mar ina’s visitation is li mited until s he completes he r alc ohol and pa re nti ngpr og ra

ms. A trial cour

t’s support order

will not be disturbed on appea l unless the complaining party shows that the orde r constituted a c lear abuse of the cour t’s discretion. W

orford v. Stamper , 801 S.W .2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). A cour t abuses its discretion w h en it acts in an a rbitrar y or
unrea sonable manner or without ref ere nce to guiding r

ules and princ iples. Downer v. Aquam arine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 241-42 (Tex
. 1985). The fac t that a trial cour t may decide a matter4

wi thi n it s dis c re tio na

ry a uth or ity dif

fe re ntl y tha

n a n a pp e llate c ourt do e s n ot d e mon str a te a n a bu se of discre tion, and we may not substitut e our judgme nt for that of the trial court. Id .; se e als o B owi e Mem ’l Hosp. v. W

right , 79 S.W .3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). To deter mine whether

an abuse of discretion occur red, we eng ag e in a two- prong ed inquiry : whether the trial cour t had suffic ient information upon which to exerc ise its discretion and whether the t rial court err ed in its application of discre tion. Ze ifm an v . M ic he ls , 212 S.W .3d 582, 58 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 06 , pe t. d e nie d) . T he tr a dit ion a l su ff ic ie nc y re vie w c ome s in to p lay

wi th
re g a rd to the fi rs t que sti on ; we the n pro c e e d to de te rm ine wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt

ma de a re a so na ble decision base d on the evidenc e. Id
.

The be st interest of the child is the prim ary consideration in deter mining questions of c hil d s up po rt . T e x. Fam. Cod e Ann. § 1 56 .4 02 (b ) ( Wes t 20 02 ); Ho lli fie ld v . H

oll ifi e ld , 925 S.W .2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Austi n 1 9 9 6 , n o writ ). F or purpose s of our a naly sis, “net
re so ur c e s” inc lud e a ll w a g e s and sa lary inc ome, sel f-e mpl oy

me nt i nc ome , a

nd a ll o the r i nc ome actua lly being rec eived. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.062(b) (West 2002)
. The court may order support above or below the g uideline amount if the evidenc e re buts the presumption that application of the g uidelines is in the best interest of the child and justifies a va rianc e fr om the g uidelines. Id. § 154.123(a) (West 2002).

Ba sed upon the e vidence prese nted, the trial court found that the application of the perc entag e g uidelines in this case would be unjust or inappropriate; t h at requiring Ma rina to pay child support to J onathan would be unjust or inappropriate; that Marina ha s no income or r esourc es available ; that J onathan’ s monthly net resource s wer e $1,736.97; and the amount of child supportSe c tio n 1 54 .1 25 sp e c if ie s the pr e su mpt ive sc he du le to be fo llo we d if the ob lig or ’s mon thl y 2 net re source s are $6,000 or less, as they are here
. See Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 154.125 (West 2002). 5 pay ments computed under

the per centa g e g uidelines in section 154.125 of the f ami l y code w as $347.39. I n light of the se finding s, the trial cour t ordere d J o n athan to pay child support in the 2 amount of $848 per

month, which was 49 % o f h is net resourc es. The tr ial court found that even though this allocation varied fr om the perc entag e g uidelines in section 154.125, it was justified be c a us e it w a s in

the be st i nte re st o f t

he c hil d; Ma

ri na is un e mpl oy e d a

nd un a ble to s pe a k E ng lis h
a nd he r e mpl oy

me nt o pp or

tun iti e s are lim ite d b y he r lang ua g e sk ill s; Jonatha n ha s a g re a te r a bil ity to contribute to the child’s support; Mar ina has c ustody of anothe r child for whom she rec eived no child support; Marina will incur e x penses f or the a lcohol prog ram she is re quired to attend; a nd Mari na ha s im mig ratio n s ta tus c on c e rn s th a t ma y a dv e rs e ly

a ff e c t he r abi li ty to l ive a nd wo rk in the Un ite d St a te s.

Al tho ug h Jon a tha

n’ s in c ome is l imi te d, the c ourt fo un d th a t Ma

ri na ha s n o in c ome and her employ ment opportunities are limit ed. Due to her limited lang uag e skills, Marina had worke d as a house keepe r. I t is not clear f rom the testi mony

that Marina w ill be able to provide adequately for her children afte r t he divorce and when she is permitted visitation wit h the child at issue in this divorce
. J onathan’ s pare nts, who are divorce d, testified to substantial contributions they had made to both J onathan and Marina. Mrs. Micklethwait, Jonathan’s mother, re turned to Texas fr om O re g on

to a ssi st Jon a tha

n a nd hi s fam il y ; a ft e r s he le ft Jonatha n, Ma ri na re sid e d w ith Mr. Micklethwa it in New B raunf els, and he assisted her with medical expenses, food, tra nsportation, and living e x penses. B ased on the rec ord befor e this Court, we find that the trial court ha d sufficie nt6

evidenc e upon which to e x erc ise its discretion. Ba sed on the test i m o n y i n a diffic ult case,
we fi nd the tr ia l c ourt ’s d eci sion d oe s n ot d e mon str a te a n a bu se of dis c re tio n. We o ve rr

ule J onathan’ s first issue.
Travel I n his second and third issues, Jonathan complains that the trial c ourt failed ( i) to enter
re str ic tio ns on

Mari na dr ivi ng a ve hic le wi th the c hil d in it be c a us e of he r a

bu se of a lc oh ol a nd (i i) to restrict international travel of the child.

Withre sp e c t to the us e -o f- a lc oh ol iss ue , J on a tha n tes tif ie d tha t, af

te r the bir th of the ir
c hil d, Mari na

a bu se d a lc oh ol. On

on e oc c a sio n, he fo un d h e r p a sse d o ut a nd , o n o the r o c c a sio ns , he suspec ted use a

nd testified that he be lieved she c oncea led her use of a lcohol. J onathan’ s father testified that he be lieved that Mar ina had use d alcohol. A f riend of Ma

rina’s te stified that Marina
was a n excellent mother and that she had never seen Marina use alcohol. The employ er of another friend te stified that Marina ha d visited his house many times to visit her friend, that he had se rved alcohol, but he ha d never seen Ma

rina take a drink. Mar ina also testified tha t s h e did not use alc ohol. Despite her denials and an evaluation by county health authorities that demonstrated Marina ha d no problems with alcohol, the tria l court orde red that she underg o an intensive a lcohol tr e a tme nt p ro g ra

m. I n th is c a se , th e re wa s c on fl ic tin g e vid enc e re g a rd ingMari na ’s us e of a lc oh ol. Jona tha n s ou g ht t o s ho w that sh e a bu se d a lc oh ol; Mar in a de nie d it s u se or a bu se . B a se d u

po n it s evaluation of the conflicting testimony , the trial cour t struck an ap p ro p riate ba lance by order ing Marina to unde rg o alcohol treatment and parenting prog rams. In any event, at trial J onathan did not7

se e k to pr oh ibi t Mari na fr om dr ivi ng wi th the c hil d, a nd he may no t r a ise thi s is su e fo r t

he fi rs t ti me
o n a p p e a l
. T e x. R
. A p p . P
. 3 3
. 1; see also In re B.L.D. , 113 S.W .3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003) (fa ilure to raise c omplaint at trial waives r eview of that complaint on appea l). I n h i s t h i rd issue, Jonathan urg es that, despite f indings on the r isk of international abduction of the child by Marina, the trial court fa iled to prohibit int ernational travel of the child or specify any other limitations on travel except for standa rd n o t i ce provisions. The family code provides that if the court finds cre dible evidenc e of a risk of abduction of the c hild by a par ent, the court may impose abduction pre vention measure s. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.503 ( West S upp. 2006). F or the court to f

ind a cre dible risk of abduc tion, section 153.502 of the fa mily code pr ovides that th e c ourt

may c on sid e r v a ri ou s f

a c tor s, inc lud inge vid e nc e that th e pa re nt: (1) has take n, enticed a way , kept, withheld, or concea led a child in violation of another person’ s rig ht of possession of or a cce ss to t h e child, unless the pare nt p re s ents evidenc e that the pa rent be lieved in g ood faith that the pa re nt’ s c on du c t w a s n e c e ssa ry to a vo id i mmi ne nt h a rm

to t he c hil d; (2 ) ha s p re vio us ly

thr e a te ne d to take , e nti c e a wa y , ke e p, wi thh old , o r c on c e a l a child in violation of another person’s right of possession of or acc ess to the child; (3) lacks fina

ncial re ason to stay in the United States, including e vidence that the pa re nt i s f ina nc ia lly ind e pe nd e nt, is a

ble to w or k o uts ide of

the Un ite d St a te s, or is unemploy ed; (4) has re cently

eng ag ed in planning activities that could fa cilitate t he re moval o f t h e c h i l d

fr o m t h e U n i t edS t at es b y t h e p ar en t , i n cl u d i n g: (A) quitting a job; (B ) selling a

primary residenc e; (C) terminating a lea se;8 (D ) c los ingba

nk a c c ounts ; (E ) liq

uid a tin g oth e r a sse ts; (F ) hid ingor

de str oyingdo c ume nts ; (G) applying f

or a pa ssport or visa for

the par ent or the c hild; or (H) applying to obtain the c hild’s birth certifi cate or school or me dical re c or ds
. Id. § 153.502(a) (West Supp. 2006). The cour t may also consider

evidenc e of a

pare nt’s strong ties to another c ountry

or l ack of ties to the Unit ed States. Id . § 153.502(b). I f the c ourt finds, based on
cr ed i b l e ev i dence , that a risk of a bduction exis ts, it m ay

fashion an a

ppropriate order , including order ing pa ssport and trave l controls. Id. § 153.503.

The c ourt made the following finding s of fact wit h reg ard to the risk of international abduction: the child’s r esidenc e is in the United States; credible e vidence was pre sented that ther e is a po te nti a l r isk

of int e rn a tio na l a

bd uc tio n o f t

he c hil d by Ma

ri na ; Ma ri na ha s str on g tie s to Rus sia and lac ks strong ties to the Unit ed S tates; Marina is underg oing a

chang e in status with the United Sta te s I mmi g ratio n a

nd Natur a lizatio n Se rv ic e that ma y a dv e rs e ly a ff

e c t Ma ri na ’s a bil ity to l e g a lly
rema in in th e U n it e d St a te s ; Jo n a th a n h a s li mi te d f in a n c ia l r e s o u r c e s to p u r s u e th e r e c o very and return of a child abduc ted to Russia; Marina is unemploy ed and la cks financ ial rea sons to stay in the United States; Marina ha s previously threatened to take , entice a way , keep, withhold, or

conce al the
c hil d in vio la tio n o f Jon a tha

n’ s rig ht of po sse ssi on or a c c e ss to the c hil d; a nd Mari na tr a ve le d w ith the child to Russia during the months of J uly , Aug ust, and September 20 0 5 an d re turned to the United States on September 28, 2005, w ith the child as schedule d.9 I n open cour

t, a fter order ing Ma

rina not to remove the child from the U nited States except upon written ag ree ment with J onathan or afte r t he child has reache d the age of six y ear s, the court stated:
Iam ver

y sy mpathetic to the pre dicament t h at Ms. Micklethwait is in. I be lie ve that it mus t be e xtra or din a ri ly ha rd to m ov e to a

ne w c ountr

y , to fi nd y ours e lf in an unhappy

marria g e, to have two y oung children, to be worrie d about money and worrie d about y our ability to work. Ho we ve r, the se we re y our c ho ic e s. Yo u we re n’ t br ou g ht he re . Yo u c ho se to come he re. A nd it’s not true that y ou can’ t s u rv i v e; y o u can. A nd Ihope that y ou will n o t o n ly s u r

v iv e , b u t th r iv e ; a n d a t th e s a me ti me , b e a b e tt e r mo th e r to [ the child] so that he can have a more normal relationship sharing his tim e betwe en the two of y ou.
I n its order, the court fa shioned a dire ctive allowing either pa rent with the c onsent of the oth e r p a re nt t o a

pp ly fo r a pa ssp or t f or the c hil d a

nd to hav e th e ri g ht t o ma int a in p a ssp or ts; requiringeither parent to deliver to the ot her parent the child’s passport upon notice of intent by the pa re nt t o h a ve the c hil d tr a ve l outsi de the Un ite d State s duri ng the pe ri od of po sse ssi on

of the pa re nt;
a llo wi nge xten de d s umm e r p os se ssi on by Mari na ; and

re qu ir ingva

ri ou s o the r t

y pe s of no tic e a s w ith oth e r d ome sti c tr a ve l r e qu ir e me nts
.

Th e re c or d s up po rt s the ba lanc e str uc k b y the tr ia l c ourt

in i ts o rd e r. B oth

pa re nts ’ testimony reve aled a

contentious relationship wit h eac h other that at times focused on the child. But the e viden ce d e mon str a te d th a t, a lth ou g h Jon a tha n c la ime d M a ri na

thr e a te ne d to take the c hil d to Russia and not return, in the onl y instance when she visited her family with the child in the summer
o f 2 0 0 5 , J o n a t h a n e n c o u r a g e d h e r , h e b o u g h tt h e t i c k e t s , a n d s h e r e tu r n e d a s s c h e d u l e d
. T w o d a ys la te r, Jona tha

n f ile d f or div or c e . T he tr ia l c ourt

did no t abus e it s di scr e tio n in re fu sin g to i mpo se10

limit ations on international trave l a part from the notice provisions. We ove rrule J onathan’ s second
a nd thi rd iss ue s.
Se pa ra te Pr op e rty J onathan a lso challeng es the trial court’s awar d of a portion of Jonathan’s retire ment
a c c ount, c la imi ngthat th e po rt ion he ha d the ri g ht to re c e ive a s of the date of his marr ia g e wa s h is separ ate pr operty

and that the communi ty proper ty portion should have be en dete rmined base d upon his pa rt ic ipatio n in

the pr og ra

m fr om t he date of marr ia g e un til the date of div or c e . T hu s, he argue s, the po rt ion a ttr ibuta

ble to the fi rs t nine te e n mont hs pr ior to t he marr ia g e sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d h is
s e p a r a t e p r o p e rt y.

A trial cour

t has no discre tion t o d i v es t titl e to sepa rate proper

ty and aw ard that proper ty to the other spouse in a divorce
. Camero n v. C ameron , 641 S.W .2d 210, 219-20 (Tex. 1982). Howe ver, unde r the fa mily code, a presumption exis ts that property possessed by either spouse during or on the dissolution of the marria g e is c ommunity proper ty
. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3
. 0 0 3 ( W e s t 2 0 0 6 )
. A s p o u s e s e e k i n g t o o v e r c o m e t h i s p r e s u mp t i o n m u s t p r o ve the se pa ra te char acte r of the disputed proper ty by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Id . The spouse must trac e and clea rly identify the prope rty

claimed as s eparate pr operty
. In re Estate of Hanau v . Hanau , 730 S.W .2d 663, 667 (Tex. 1987). Separate prope rty reta ins its charac ter throug h a ser ies of
e xch a ng e s so lon g a s the sp ou se a sse rt ingse pa rate ow ne rs hip ov e rc ome s th e c omm un ity pr op e rt y pr e su mpt ion

by tr a c ingthe a sse ts o n h a nd duri ngthe marr ia g e ba c k to pro pe rt y that, be c a

us e of its time a nd manner of acquisition, is separate in char acte r. Cocke rham v. Cock erham , 527 S.W .2d 162, 167 (Tex. 1975).11 Th e tr ia l c ourt

a c ts a s fa c t f

ind e r i n a be nc h tr ia l and

is the so le jud g e of

the c re dib ili ty of witnesses. Mu rff

v . M ur ff , 615 S.W .2d 696, 700 (Tex. 1981)
. As fac t finder, the tr ial court may consider a ll the fac ts and circ umstances surr ounding e ach w itness and acce pt or reject all or pa rt of that testimony ; an appe llate cour t may not substit ute its judgment for the trial cour

t’s assessment of testimony in a benc h trial. See I

n re W .E.R. , 669 S.W. 2d 71 6, 71 6- 17 (T e x. 19 84 ); Hailey v . Hailey , 176 S.W .3d 374, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

J onathan testified tha

t he was e mploy ed as a

n assistant manager at a M r. Gatti’s Restaura nt. At the time of trial, he ha d been w orking at the re staurant f or four y ear s and h ad a 40 1( K) pl an wi th $10 ,8 00 in i t. F ro m Apr il 2 00 2, wh e n h e sta rt e d w or kin g at Mr . G a tti ’s , unti l Marc h 2004, when he marrie d, any contribution would be considered separate property
. But whe n asked w hen he be g an contr ibuting to the re tirement plan, he responde d, “I would say

may be four or five months afte r starting with them.” Our review of the record doe s not show any other e vidence
c on c e rn ingthe re tir e me nt p lan, a nd Jona tha n d oe s n ot c ite us to a

ny re le va nt r e c or d r e fe re nc e s. Th e c ourt ex pres sed dou bt t hat Jonatha

n h a d c a rr ie d h is b ur de n to e sta bli shhis
se pa rate pr op e rt

y int e re st i n th e pla

n. Th e c ourt th en con clude d th a t “ g ive n th e dis pa ri ty in t he ir
resour ces and [t hat] she is f lat destitute,” it would be fair and equitable to c onsider t h e r et i rement
acc ount as community

proper ty and split equa lly betwee n the parties. J onathan did not object at trial to this allocation.

B a se d u po n th e e vid e nc e be fo re it, the tr ia l c ourt c on c lud e d th a t Jonatha

n f a ile d to
car ry his burden to establish that any portion of the re tirement ac count was se parate prope rty . Given the pauc ity

of testim o n y

and Jonathan’s failure to present c lear and convinc ing e vidence showing12

a ny po rt ion of the re tir e me nt a c c ount t o b e his se pa rate pr op e rt

y , th e trial cou rt’ s a llo c a tio n is supported by

the evidenc e. We find no err or or a buse of discr etion in the trial court’ s awa rd of the
re tir e me nt a c c ount.
CO NC LU SION

Ba sed on the rec ord befor e us, J onathan has not demonstrated that the tr ial court e rre d
or abused its discr etion in a war ding child support, dividing the marital estate, or failing t o further restric t Marina in driving or international travel with the child. Having overr uled J onathan’ s four iss ue s, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: June 27, 2007