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46–177 CC 1998

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY: DRUG

INTERDICTION EFFORTS IN FLORIDA AND THE

CARIBBEAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 

REFORM AND OVERSIGHT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 17, 1997

Serial No. 105–73

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT 

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois 

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

STEPHEN HORN, California 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia 

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South 

Carolina 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey 

VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas 

BOB BARR, Georgia 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

TOM LANTOS, California 

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia 

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

GARY A. CONDIT, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, 

DC 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

JIM TURNER, Texas 

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine 

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee 

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

(Independent) 

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director 

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director 

WILLIAM MOSCHELLA, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian 

JUDITH MCCOY, Chief Clerk 

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Chairman 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

BOB BARR, Georgia 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia 

GARY A. CONDIT, California 

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

JIM TURNER, Texas 

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

ROBERT CHARLES, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN LITTLEFIELD, Professional Staff Member 

IANTHE SAYLOR, Clerk 

RONALD STROMAN, Minority Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 17, 1997 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of: 

Banks, Samuel, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; James Milford, Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; 

and Rear Adm. Norman Saunders, Commander, Seventh Coast Guard 

District, U.S. Coast Guard ........................................................................... 27

Gingrigh, Hon. Newt, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives ................... 1

Girard, Peter, group supervisor for cargo theft, Miami Seaport, Office 

of Investigations, U.S. Customs Service; Mike Sinclair, Chief, Miami 

Seaport Cargo Inspection Team, U.S. Customs Service; James H. 

Wallwork, commissioner, Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor; 

Edward V. Badolato, chairman, National Cargo Security Council; and 

Arthur Coffey, international vice president, International Longshoremen’s Association .......................................................................................... 90

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: 

Badolato, Edward V., chairman, National Cargo Security Council, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 111

Banks, Samuel, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, prepared 

statement of ................................................................................................... 29

Barrett, Hon. Thomas M., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Wisconsin, prepared statement of ........................................................... 20

Coffey, Arthur, international vice president, International Longshoremen’s Association, prepared statement of ................................................... 119

Gingrigh, Hon. Newt, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, prepared 

statement of ................................................................................................... 5

Goss, Hon. Porter J., a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Florida, prepared statement of .................................................................... 66

Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 86

Hastert, Hon. J. Dennis, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, prepared statement of ................................................................ 13

Milford, James, Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, prepared statement of .................................................................. 40

Ros-Lehtinen, Hon. Ileana, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, prepared statement of ................................................................ 58

Saunders, Rear Adm. Norman, Commander, Seventh Coast Guard District, U.S. Coast Guard, prepared statement of ......................................... 50

Shaw, Hon. E. Clay, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, prepared statement of ................................................................ 63

Thurman, Hon. Karen L., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, prepared statement of ................................................................ 23

Wallwork, James H., commissioner, Waterfront Commission of New York 

Harbor, prepared statement of .................................................................... 96

(1)

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY: DRUG 

INTERDICTION EFFORTS IN FLORIDA AND 

THE CARIBBEAN 

THURSDAY, JULY 17, 1997 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:10 p.m., in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Dennis Hastert 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Hastert, Souder, Mica, LaTourette, 

Barr, Barrett, Cummings and Goss. 

Also present: Representatives Ros-Lehtinen, Diaz-Balart, Goss, 

McCollum, Shaw, Weldon, and Senator Graham. 

Staff present: Robert Charles, staff director and chief counsel; 

Sean Littlefield, professional staff member; Ianthe Saylor, clerk; 

Jean Gosa, minority staff assistant/administrative clerk; and Ron 

Stroman, minority counsel. 

Mr. HASTERT. The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice will now come to order. Before opening statements are delivered, I’d just like to say that we 

have a vote. So I’m going to recess this meeting. I expect to be back 

here in 15 minutes. Then we will proceed. The committee is in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. HASTERT. Ladies and gentlemen, before making opening 

statements and the rest of the delegation here from Florida have 

the opportunity to make their statements, I’d like to recognize 

Speaker Gingrich for his remarks. 

As you know, the drug issue remains one of the top priorities for 

the Speaker and certainly is at the top of his agenda. It’s certainly 

an honor to have him before us here today. Mr. Speaker. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NEWT GINGRIGH, SPEAKER, U.S. HOUSE 

OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, first of all, let me thank you, Chairman 

Hastert, for holding this hearing and for working with the Florida 

delegation and for allowing me to testify. I also want to thank the 

members of the Florida delegation for specifically bringing the 

problems they are facing in fighting drug trafficking before the 

Congress. 

2

Any time a Member of Congress, a committee of Congress, or any 

citizen of America discusses the drug crisis in our country we succeed in building public awareness about this current national crisis. 

The current rate of drug use in this country and the resulting social problems of crime, physical abuse, and lost human potential 

demand immediate and decisive action on our part. 

I have said consistently that I think we can make America virtually drug-free by 2001. To some people that seems an outlandish 

statement. But look at the facts. When I was in high school, less 

than 3 percent of the country used drugs of any kind. There was 

a presumption that you would live in a drug-free neighborhood and 

go to a drug-free school, such a presumption that no one even had 

signs advertising it. 

I believe that we can get back to that kind of America that most 

of us grew up in. And I think that we owe it to our children and 

grandchildren to do that. Can we achieve a virtually drug-free 

America? Yes. Can we achieve a virtually drug-free America with 

a bureaucracy and social policy and intellectual theory that is 

wrong? No. So what is the solution? 

First, we need to build public awareness and support that drug 

abuse in America is out of control and the administration’s meager 

efforts to control the problem have failed miserably. 

We must not confront this crisis with the mind-set of merely controlling the current level of drug use. There is no acceptable number of addicted or dead children. We must approach this crisis with 

one thought in mind—completely eradicating drugs. 

Second, we must have a plan to win. We must channel our country’s outrage into a comprehensive, centralized plan to prevent our 

children from using drugs, help those who are users to quit, and 

attack the pushers of poison that fuel our drug epidemic. 

After a 65 percent decrease in drug use over 14 years, there has 

been a 150 percent increase in drug use since 1992. The decline 

began with Nancy Reagan’s Just Say No program. Getting the message out works. Jim Burke, director of the Partnership for a Drugfree America, will tell you with absolute statistical proof that if 

children see and hear antidrug messages on television and radio, 

in school lessons and in their local community, we can drive down 

drug use by a third.

We simply need a constant bombardment of the message, ‘‘Don’t 

do it.’’ In every school we ought to be talking about drugs. We 

ought to have organizations like the Fellowship of Christian Athletes in every community talking with kids as athletes about 

drugs.We ought to have radio and television advertising communicating our message.

Then we ought to have effective rehabilitation that largely means 

faith-based rehabilitation. We must take Rob Portman’s Drug-free 

Communities Coalitions and help every community start one of 

their own.

We must educate and cure in order to stop the demand for drugs

in America and we must take control of our border, which is what

this hearing is all about today. We will not tolerate drug dealers crossing the American border. 

Senator Lott and I have a bill that says, if we convict you of carryVerDate jul 14 2003 12:53 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 W:\DISC\46177.TXT 46177
3

ing a commercial quantity of illegal drugs into the United States, 

you get automatic life without parole. But if you are convicted of 

having done it more than once as a professional narcotics dealer, 

you get a mandatory death penalty. 

That changes the equation of risk. Malaysia and Singapore are 

places with a very low drug rate. Why? Because they are very 

tough on people who bring drugs into their country. We need better 

coordination and more money at the border. We need the Border 

Patrol, the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, 

the National Guard and Customs to act in concert as one unit. 

But what do we have? We have disconnected strategies, with no 

overall framework to win the war on drugs. While we have directed 

our resources to the Southwest border with initiatives such as Operation Gatekeeper, we have simultaneously disarmed ourselves in 

the Caribbean basin. Funding for interdiction in the Southeast 

dropped 43 percent from 1992 to 1995. There has been a substantial decrease in the number of radar planes and shallow water vessels in the area, resulting in easy maritime access to Florida for 

drug smugglers. Is this the way to win the war? No. We must work 

smarter and exercise consistent leadership at every level. 

But as we examine the enormous scope of this problem, we cannot simply decide to spend more and be satisfied that we have done 

our job. We must figure out what has worked and what hasn’t and 

focus our resources on what has worked. We must untangle the 

Federal agency jurisdictional problems to eliminate overlap. 

I urge today that as you look at the surge of drug trafficking and 

related problems facing the State of Florida, you make recommendations on how best to redirect resources and solve inefficiencies. 

Let me close with this summary thought. We have spent, accord- ing to one estimate, $279 billion at the State, Federal and local 

level on the war on drugs since 1982. And we have done it almost 

precisely like Vietnam. It is an uncoordinated, chaotic, bureaucratic 

mess, with inadequate thought at a strategic level and no centralized command and control. 

We fought World War II by mobilizing the Nation, gathering the 

resources, insisting that responsibility was indivisible and command was singular, ensuring the job got done. 

You will, I know, Mr. Chairman, be, later on this fall, looking at 

reauthorizing the office of the drug advisor. And that’s what he is. 

He’s not a drug czar. He has no power. What I will be urging is 

two things. And I hope all the folks that are here representing very 

important government agencies will take these into account as they 

make their recommendations. We need to set as our goal winning 

by 2001, decisively, clearly. That’s, by the way, a long way off by 

the standards of most of America’s wars. It’s very important to remember. All of World War II on the American side is December 7, 

1941 to the fall of 1945. Less than 4 years to win a global war. 

So we’re not talking about something that’s impossible. We’re the 

most powerful Nation in the world, with the largest economy on 

the planet. We have the most sophisticated communication systems 

and we keep talking as though this is hopeless. 

So, first, let’s set the goal and say to every agency involved, 

‘‘What will it take?’’ Second, we should allow no constraint except 

4

the Constitution to block us. Obviously we want to protect every 

constitutional liberty. Within that framework we should set whatever penalties are needed. We should organize whatever bureaucracies are needed. We should reorganize bureaucracies as they are 

needed. We should set annual goals and targets. We should fire 

people who don’t make those targets. We should hold people accountable. We should win. 

And winning is simple. Winning is children growing up in a 

drug-free neighborhood going to a drug-free school living a drugfree life without drive-by killings. 

And let me just close by pointing out that the groups that have 

the most at stake are the minority communities, who have seen a 

generation of young men go to jail because their country failed to 

protect us from outside sources that were selling us drugs. 

If we’ll be serious on education, on prevention, on rehabilitation, 

and on enforcement at the border, and if we will go after the drug 

dealers at every point, including their money, and do it effectively—and I know the distinguished chairman from Florida, Mr. 

McCollum, is going to be looking on the money laundering issue—

we can win this. But we need to win it the way we won World War 

II—decisively, effectively, thoroughly, and swiftly. Because that’s 

the only way you mobilize the American people. 

I’d be glad to take any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Newt Gingrich follows:] 

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Mr. HASTERT. Any questions for the Speaker? The gentleman 

from Florida. 

Mr. SHAW. I have just a—not a question, but a comment. I want 

to associate myself with the remarks of the Speaker and everything 

he said. I wrote a paper not too long ago called, ‘‘Blueprint for Victory.’’ And it was taking that same position. And that is that there 

is not a resolve in this country, and there never has been through 

several administrations, to actually win the war on drugs. 

And that is something that is obtainable. I quite agree with the 

Speaker when he says that we should stop at nothing short or—

except the possible violation of the Constitution in meeting that objective. 

It is absolutely ridiculous that the strongest country that has 

ever been on the face of this earth is kowtowing to drug producing 

countries, countries that are allowing this to go on within their 

own borders, and that we do not really exert ourselves as the world 

leader and really stop of nothing short of illegalities under the Constitution in seeing that our objectives are carried out. 

That is the greatest threat to the future of this country. I can 

tell you, in these drug-producing countries, if they were producing 

bombs, if they were producing germ warfare, chemical warfare 

weapons, we would be in there taking them out, even though the 

chemical warfare weapons would probably never be used against 

the United States. 

The weapons of drugs are being used in the United States. And 

just one last thing that I think is tremendously important and I 

think everyone should really realize, if these crack sales were going 

on in our upper white middle class neighborhoods, we would have 

a much stronger resolve in this country than we have today. 

And I think that what this is doing, it is destroying a whole generation, particularly of minority populations. We should not allow 

this to happen, and we should see that we will stop at nothing to 

see that we do cure this problem and meet the objectives that the 

Speaker has referred to, and that is by becoming a drug-free Nation in the very early years of the next century. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum. 

Mr. MCCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

commend the Speaker. He knows from my personal conversations 

and working with him on this matter how impressed I am with the 

dedication with which you are serving us on this issue, Mr. Gingrich. 

I want to ask one question for clarification. Assuming that our 

planners involved in the drug war in the administration come forward, as we all hope they do in the next few months, and that we 

join them in a mission to interdict 80 percent of the drugs coming 

to this country before they get here—doing what is necessary on 

the demand and the supply side to win the war on drugs by the 

year 2001—are you prepared as the Speaker to do whatever is necessary to direct the resources that undoubtedly will have to flow to 

accomplish this goal, which obviously is an enormous goal in terms 

of actually winning the war? 

Mr. GINGRICH. We are very committed to meeting the requests 

of this administration to win the war. In fact, we are in—Chairman 

10

Kolbe of the appropriate subcommittee is actually prepared to offer 

more resources, for example, for the TV and radio advertising program than the administration asked for. 

I would say the administration, if you will tell us the specific 

achievements you think can be gained, the size of the resources you 

need, the grant of authority you need and the restructuring of bureaucracy you need, we will do everything we can in the Congress—and I think Senator Lott shares this on the Senate side—

to get through as rapidly as possible, enabling this country to win 

the war and protect our children. Absolutely. 

Mr. SHAW. Well, Mr. Speaker, we’re the front door for the war 

on drugs down in Florida, and we really appreciate that commitment. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTERT. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Goss. 

Mr. GOSS. Thank you, Chairman Hastert. Mr. Speaker, thank 

you very much for taking this initiative and being with us today. 

There are two areas I’d like to followup, if I may, sir. 

One has to do with the question of the commitment of the resources of the U.S. Congress to what I will call intelligence architecture. I think that we all know that with interdiction, if you have 

good information, you have a much better chance of a life-saving, 

cost-saving, successful outcome. 

And I think that is a very important part of this initiative. I 

don’t want it to be overlooked. Because I think if we do have that 

architecture and implement it properly we will have very fine results. That is probably going to take a commitment to rearrange 

some things. 

Second, we have noticed as we have tried to take a look at the 

war on drugs in the past, as you’ve pointed out, it has been less 

than successful. Talking to Bill Bennett, he told me that he had 

testified before 43 separate committees of Congress. I would suggest that means we’re going to have to change a few things on the 

Hill, too. And I would like to know that we have your support for 

recommendations that are going to come along those lines as well. 

Mr. GINGRICH. Yes. Let me say on the first item that I believe 

it is nothing less than a scandal, the degree that we have failed 

to use our capacity to build both an intelligence and an interdiction 

capability, which clearly if this had been the Soviet Union we 

would have done. 

If we had applied assets in a systematic manner over the last 15 

years we would currently have an American-controlled, Americanoperated network throughout all of the drug regions. And we would 

clearly have over the Caribbean, for example, 24-hour-a-day capabilities. We just would not have tolerated it if it was the Soviet 

Union. 

So if this is real war and we are really determined to win we 

have to build an American-controlled, American-operated intelligence capability anywhere we need it. We need to be capable of 

operating in those regions. We need real time 24-hour a day surveillance capabilities to sustain whatever level of interdiction effort 

is required to meet the appropriate goals. 

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, thank you very much for being here. 

The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett. 

11

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the fact 

that you’re here, Mr. Speaker. I’m sorry I wasn’t here for your testimony. As you know, we have two votes going on. But I understand in part of your testimony you indicated that the right way 

to approach this problem is the Nancy Reagan Just Say No approach. 

Mr. GINGRICH. As a part of it. 

Mr. BARRETT. As a part of it. And consistent with that, Gen. 

McCaffrey has indicated his desire to have essentially a widespread 

media campaign, something that I think would be quite effective. 

And I’m wondering whether that is something that you would support. 

Mr. GINGRICH. Yes. I had mentioned I think—I appreciate the 

question—I had mentioned just before you came, I think, that we 

have in the appropriate subcommittee of Appropriations allocated, 

actually, more money than Gen. McCaffrey has asked for, determined to try to ensure that we have more than enough resources. 

I’ve worked very, very close with the Partnership for a Drug-free 

America and Jim Burke in trying to make sure that it was the 

right direction to go in. And I think because of the changing nature 

of television and radio, frankly, that this is the right thing to do 

to reach young people. And we know statistically that it works very 

dramatically. 

Mr. BARRETT. OK. Well, I’m happy to hear that, because I think 

that’s an important part of this program. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. GINGRICH. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTERT. Thank the gentleman from Wisconsin. And to the 

gentleman from Georgia, just let me say that we have the chairman of the Intelligence Committee here, we have the chairman of 

one of the Subcommittees on Crime, and the commitment of Bob 

Barr, who is another member of this committee, to do the money 

laundering issues. 

I think we have a good start. And we really appreciate your leadership in this. And we’ll be working with you very closely. Thank 

you very much for being here. 

Mr. GINGRICH. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTERT. I would like, first off, to welcome all the members 

of the Florida delegation who have joined us here today. These 

members have served as our leaders in the war against illegal 

drugs and it’s because of their leadership that the 105th Congress 

is making genuine progress in the face of our most insidious national security threat. 

Today’s hearing comes at an important time. The citizens of our 

Nation have been shocked in recent years as we continuously see 

the encroachment of drugs, drug related crime and street gangs. No 

longer are any communities insulated from the problems that we 

used to think were confined only to the big cities. 

A year ago on behalf of the U.S. House leadership I began trying 

to pull together Republicans and Democrats committed to finding 

real and lasting solutions to our Nation’s drug problems. One item 

stands out from this. Every aspect of the drug war is interconnected. One aspect hooks onto another like a chain link fence. 

We have to attack every link. And the success or failure of our 

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ures of our policies in all areas. Our committee has worked hard 

in the past year to change Washington’s thinking on this issue. I 

think we’re starting to make a difference. 

One month ago, Congress passed and President Clinton signed 

into law the Community Anti-Drug Coalition Act of 1997. This law, 

which our committee worked hard to pass, will provide millions of 

dollars of desperately needed Federal funding to local antidrug 

groups and communities across America. 

But more importantly, communities and groups who have worked 

to pull themselves up by their own boot straps that have something 

going for it that want to be part of the solution and not part of the 

problem. Community groups will now be able to apply for and receive more resources to aid them in their work—in fact, up to 

$100,000 per community—in antidrug coalition work. 

In the months ahead I hope that the bipartisan cooperation in 

this war will carry forward. As the Congress works, and the White 

House, to develop new comprehensive approaches to fighting and 

winning the war on drugs, our children’s future and our country’s 

hang in the balance. What we discuss here today will help us formulate a winning antidrug strategy. 

And today’s hearing focuses on drug interdiction efforts in Florida and the Caribbean. Over the past few years the drug interdiction focus has been on the Southwest border. I was there this week. 

It’s improving. We’re doing a good job. We need to keep our focus 

there. But we also need to attack the other problems that drugs 

have infested. 

However, we must not lose focus on the creating and maintaining 

a sound overall border policy. And we tend to look at drug control 

efforts in bits and pieces, also. It’s time for both the executive and 

legislative branches to commit ourselves to looking at securing our 

entire southern border and our northern border in one comprehensive and cohesive plan. 

This committee has done a good job. I wouldn’t have been able 

to do it without the bipartisan help and support that we have in 

this committee. This isn’t a Republican issue. It’s not a Democrat 

issue. It’s not a House issue. It’s not a Senate issue. It’s an issue 

that is the very heart and soul of the survival of our future and 

our children. 

So I appreciate the Florida delegation being here today and talking about their specific problems. I also appreciate the gentleman 

from Florida who has been a co-worker in this issue. And I now 

turn over to Mr. Barrett for an opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. J. Dennis Hastert follows:] 

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Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, with 

the demise of the Cali Cartel, new independent drug traffickers in 

Colombia are increasingly using the Caribbean transit zone to 

transport drugs into this country. These Caribbean drug transportation routes flow directly into south Florida, with devastating consequences. 

According to the 1997 Miami High Intensity Drug Trafficking 

Area Threat Assessment, there has been a 30 percent increase in 

cocaine smuggling and a 27 percent increase in marijuana smuggling into the south Florida region this year. 

This increased flow of drugs into south Florida is occurring at a 

time whether, according to the GAO, funding for U.S. drug interdiction efforts has declined, undermining the ability of law enforcement agencies to track and intercept drug traffickers. 

Moreover, many poor Caribbean countries simply do not have the 

resources necessary to effectively combat multi-billion dollar drug 

operations. This is an untenable situation, requiring immediate attention. 

Since Colombian drug traffickers are increasingly using the Caribbean to transport drugs into the United States, additional antidrug resources for south Florida may be required. It is important, 

however, that any additional resources be part of a comprehensive 

regional plan to limit drug trafficking within the Caribbean transit 

zone. 

In this regard, I look forward to hearing the testimony of our expert witnesses regarding the most important components of such a 

plan and what, if any, additional resources may be required. 

In addition, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to quote from a statement 

that I will ask unanimous consent to be read into the record from 

our colleague, Karen Thurman, who was the ranking member of 

this subcommittee last session. And what she said is, ‘‘One of the 

first things that I learned from listening to Gen. McCaffrey, DEA, 

and other experts, is the balloon analogy. When you squeeze one 

part of the balloon, the other part expands.’’

When the United States emphasized interdiction efforts in the 

waters off Florida, drug trafficking shifted to the border with Mexico, so the Bush administration responded by putting more antidrug personnel to the Southwest. Now we see the purveyors of 

death are returning to Florida and the eastern Caribbean with impunity. 

Gone are the small twin engine airplanes. In their place we see 

more and more cocaine in containerized cargo vessels; and their 

ports of entry are in Florida. I am convinced that, once again, the 

American people must respond to this shift in drug trafficking. 

That means that Congress must provide the resources to deal with 

the current influx of illegal drugs—more custom inspectors, more 

and faster vessels for the Coast Guard, more DEA agents, more 

prosecutors. 

As the threat shifts, so must our response. Drug traffickers recognize no law, no boundary, and no political party. In the past, 

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publican administrations. Today, a Republican Congress must ensure that Florida does not again become the focus of illegal drug 

traffickers. I would ask unanimous consent to have Mrs. Thurman’s entire statement read into the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas M. Barrett follows:] 

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Mr. MICA [presiding]. Thank you. And thank you also for your 

commitment to this effort. Without objection, Mrs. Thurman’s complete statement will be made a part of the record. Also, the record 

will remain open for other members of the panel or members of the 

Florida delegation to submit opening statements for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Karen Thurman follows:] 

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Mr. MICA. I will now recognize myself and then yield to members 

of the Florida delegation by prior agreement for any remarks they 

have. I wanted to make a couple of comments as a member of this 

committee. 

First of all, the reason for this hearing today is the request, specifically, of the Florida delegation to examine the status of Federal 

efforts to combat illegal drugs in Florida and the Caribbean region. 

We just heard from the Speaker. Some of you may not know the 

background of his involvement or of the involvement of the chairman of this subcommittee, Denny Hastert. 

This subcommittee is part of the Government Reform and Oversight Committee. And 21⁄2 years ago the Speaker charged the full 

committee and this subcommittee with the responsibility of putting 

all the pieces of the puzzle that make up our war or made up our 

war on our Federal effort on the drug front into a cohesive effort. 

That effort first was led by Bill Zeliff, who chaired this subcommittee. 

The Speaker specifically directed Denny Hastert, who now chairs 

the subcommittee, to be the coordinator, because this is a multi-jurisdictional question, as you heard. There are 20-some agencies and 

almost every cabinet level activity plus numerous committees of 

Congress involved in an effort—the Speaker wanted this effort coordinated. 

Denny helped lead the effort and now he chairs the subcommittee responsible for the effort. They have worked with the 

appropriators and the authorizers to make certain that the resources are there. You can just look at the difference that—in the 

commitment that’s been made by the Congress. 

So I want to compliment the Speaker, who has left us, also Mr. 

Zeliff and our current chair, Mr. Hastert, for their efforts. 

As a member of the subcommittee, I recently visited south Florida and the Bahamas with the staff members of our subcommittee 

and also the Intelligence Committee to examine the status of our 

drug control efforts. 

My visit and the subsequent report to the subcommittee confirmed my worst suspicions—and after meeting with customs, DEA 

officials in the Bahamas—that Florida is in fact experiencing an 

explosion in the volume of drugs coming through that area and 

through the Caribbean. 

In certain instances, valuable assets have been taken from Florida. We have an urgent need for increased assets and manpower 

so that our men and women in the field can address the influx of 

drugs into Florida via maritime cargo and by air. If you’ve attended 

these hearings before you’ve seen my newspaper articles. 

What happens in south Florida or the Caribbean is also reflected 

in my area. I have sort of a parochial interest. This is a headline 

I brought before this committee a number of times in 1996, a year 

ago. July 14, it says, ‘‘Long Out of Sight, Heroin Is Back Killing 

Teens.’’

We’ve had an unprecedented number of deaths of young people 

by heroin in central Florida. This article is from Wednesday, April 

16, a few months ago. Orlando, No. 2 in cocaine deaths. And then 

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ica: Heroin Is Purer.’’ It says that the supply of heroin on the U.S. 

streets has doubled in the past decade, according to DEA. 

In the Orlando area, heroin overdose went from zero in 1993 to 

30 last year. More teens die locally of overdoses than any other 

major U.S. city. In that regard, I asked this week of Barry McCaffrey, our drug czar and head of Office of Drug Policy, to designate 

central Florida as a high intensity drug traffic area. 

I’ve also written the committee of jurisdiction, the Appropriations 

Committee. I hope not to have to use a legislative method to get 

that designation. We see what’s happening in the Caribbean and 

letting our guard down is now affecting us dramatically in my back 

yard, in my district in central Florida. 

Those are basically my opening comments. I do want to say that 

this—echo the comments of the chair, that this is indeed a bipartisan effort and that we try to approach this in a manner that will 

benefit the children of America and those who face this plague that 

is now on the streets of Florida and across our Nation. 

Those are my opening comments. I’d like to yield now to the gentleman from Miami, Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart. Thank you. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I 

am very concerned about what I perceive as this administration not 

confronting the Cuban Government as a major enemy of the effort 

to shield America’s frontiers from the drug threat. 

There is no doubt that the Castro dictatorship allows Cuba to be 

used as a trans-shipment point for drugs. I was deeply disappointed in June 1996 when DEA Administrator Constantine, testifying before the House International Relations Committee, said 

that there is no evidence of the Government of Cuba being 

complicit in the drug smuggling business. 

On the contrary, there is no doubt that the Castro dictatorship 

is in the drug business. Castro and his top aides have worked as 

accomplices for the Colombian drug cartels; Cuba is a key transshipment point. 

In fact, last year—1996—sources in the DEA and/or Customs 

Miami field office stated to the media—and I have a copy of video 

in my office to this effect—that more than 50 percent of the drug 

trafficking detected by the United States in the Caribbean proceeds 

from or through Cuba. 

Now, it’s very worrisome when even you, Mr. Chairman, are told 

by our officials during your trip, as you subsequently told me, that 

this is not the situation. So there is a confrontation. There is a conflict that must be brought to a head at some point between what 

local folks in drug enforcement admit and what our top officials are 

saying and even telling Members of Congress. 

This is a very serious matter, because this can no longer continue. If, for a political reason, as I believe is the case, there has 

been a decision to cover up the participation of the Cuban regime 

in drug trafficking, that is extremely serious. 

So I am very happy that this hearing is taking place, and that 

we will continue with efforts such as this. The reality of the matter 

is, one, because past administrations identified Cuba as a major 

trans-shipment point for narcotics trafficking, it was integrated 

into the larger interdiction effort. By contrast, under the existing 

26

strategy, no aggressive efforts have been made to cutoff this pipeline, despite the growing awareness of its existence. 

In April 1993, the Miami Herald reported that the United States 

attorney for the southern district of Florida had drafted an indictment charging the Cuban Government as a racketeering enterprise 

and Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro as the chief of a 10-year 

conspiracy to send tons of Colombian cartel cocaine through Cuba 

to the United States. 

Fifteen Cuban officials were named as co-conspirators and the 

defense and interior ministries were cited as criminal organizations. This is a draft indictment that exists in the southern district 

of Florida. 

Just last year the prosecution of Jorge Cabrerra, a convicted 

drug dealer, brought to light additional information regarding 

narcotrafficking by the Castro dictatorship. Cabrerra was convicted 

of transporting almost 6,000 pounds into the United States, sentenced to 19 years in prison and fined over $1 million. 

He made repeated specific claims confirming cooperation between 

Cuban officials and the Colombian cartels. His defense counsel has 

publicly stated that Cabrerra offered to arrange a trip under surveillance that would actively implicate the Cuban Government in 

narcotrafficking. 

So evidence such as this exists. For some reason it’s being covered up. And I think it’s about time, Mr. Chairman, that we get 

serious about this matter. And I would hope that the witnesses 

today do not continue to whitewash this issue, ignore this very serious matter, and because of political instructions from above, come 

and ignore a very serious matter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman and thank him for his comments and participation in the panel. We’ve lost some of our participants with votes and other committee meetings, but we do want 

to go ahead and proceed with our next panel. And as they come I’ll 

either let them participate and submit their statements at that 

time or later on. 

I’d like to call our second panel. Our second panel today is Samuel Banks—Samuel Banks is Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs 

Service and Mr. James Milford, Deputy Administrator of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration. Also, we have Rear Adm. Norman 

Saunders, Commander of the 7th Coast Guard District, U.S. Coast 

Guard. 

Gentlemen, this is an investigations and oversight subcommittee 

of Congress. We do swear in our witnesses. If you’ll stand, please, 

and raise your right hands. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. MICA. The witnesses answered in the affirmative. Gentlemen, it’s also the custom of our investigations and oversight subcommittee and panel to allow you 5 minutes to present oral remarks. If you have lengthy statements, we’d be glad to include 

them as part of the official record of this hearing. We will begin 

by recognizing Samuel Banks, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs. Welcome. You are recognized, sir. 

27

STATEMENTS OF SAMUEL BANKS, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, 

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE; JAMES MILFORD, ACTING DEPUTY 

ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION; 

AND REAR ADM. NORMAN SAUNDERS, COMMANDER, SEVENTH COAST GUARD DISTRICT, U.S. COAST GUARD 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. It’s a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the 

U.S. Customs Service efforts to support the national drug control 

strategy by shielding the Nation’s borders from drug trafficking. 

As been mentioned over the last few years, we’ve focused a lot 

of our resources and attention on drug smuggling on the Southwest 

border. To counter that threat, we shifted over 800 enforcement officers and over $150 million in technology and equipment to enhance our intelligence, inspectional and investigative efforts along 

that border. 

While that border continues to warrant our most determined efforts, there is compelling evidence that drug organizations are increasing trafficking through the Caribbean and south Florida. 

Although seizure statistics are only an indicator of trends, in fiscal year 1996 Customs seized over 75,000 pounds of cocaine in 

south Florida and over 24,000 pounds of cocaine in Puerto Rico. 

This was almost a 100 percent increase in cocaine seizures for 

south Florida, and it represented 40 percent of all the cocaine 

seized nationwide. 

In view of this increasing threat in early 1996 we introduced Operation Gateway and began shifting more resources into Puerto 

Rico. And even the Government of Puerto Rico provided $2.5 million, which helped us fund 57 new positions. This year, with congressional support, we had $28 million that we’ve put into Puerto 

Rico to add additional positions, aircraft, vessels, and a variety of 

other support. 

The outcome this year has been a 34 percent increase in cocaine 

seizures. Now I’m also aware that the committee has expressed an 

interest in the internal conspiracy threat at the airports and seaports in the south Florida area. There’s no question that it’s a very 

real and very serious threat. Personnel working for the airlines, 

steamship lines and others involved in the handling of cargo can 

circumvent our normal targeting and security system. It’s estimated that 48 percent of the cocaine seized this year in air cargo 

and aircraft at Miami International involved internal conspiracies. 

Our seaport teams also face similar problems, but we have two 

officers that are going to testify later who can elaborate on that. 

So there is no question that the threat of drug trafficking in the 

Caribbean and in the Southeast is growing. I know that we’re 

being pressed hard to put additional resources down there. The fact 

of the matter is that our budget has virtually remained static, with 

some gains for inflation, over the last 4 years. 

We have substantially increased our enforcement resources in 

the Southwest and Puerto Rico. Most of that has been done by 

shifting, internally, resources to try to deal with the high threat 

areas. There have been some very hard, painful tradeoffs that we 

have made, not just to us but also to the public we serve. 

In lieu of bigger budgets, what we are aggressively pursuing is 

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sion. First, we’re using computers and sophisticated information 

technology to target the high risk shipments. When you get as 

many planes and as many containers and as many people that we 

face every day, you’ve got to be able to pick the ones that are of 

the greatest risk. We also use a vast array of technology to support 

our aviation, marine, inspection, and investigative efforts. 

Second, we are building much better partnerships with other 

Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies. I would say especially DEA and the Coast Guard. We are cooperating on virtually 

every front, from intelligence sharing to combine and coordinated 

deployment of resources and equipment to joint investigative initiatives. 

ONDCP and the DOD is helping us build new technologies, such 

as large x rays for ocean containers. The National Guard is invaluable to boost our inspection and intelligence programs. Even our 

Blue Lightning operation, which ties us with State and local police 

in south Florida, is a textbook example of cooperative law enforcement. 

Third, we are building partnerships with industry. We have over 

3,200 carriers, airlines, steamship lines, truckers that are participating with us in a carrier initiative program to stop dope from 

being put on board commercial conveyances. Working with us and 

law enforcement overseas, these carriers were instrumental in the 

seizure of over 60,000 pounds of narcotics over a 2-year period. 

We are now working with exporters, importers, shippers and others in the United States and in countries like Colombia and Mexico 

to expand this program. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, and subcommittee members, I want to 

thank you for inviting me to talk about the hardworking and dedicated men and women of the Customs Service who are guarding 

our borders. These people were responsible for discovering 82 percent of the heroin, 57 percent of the cocaine, 55 percent of the 

marijuana seized in this country last year—over 1 million pounds 

of illegal drugs. 

We have no more important job than protecting America’s 

schools and America’s communities from the scourge of narcotics. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Banks follows:] 

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Mr. MICA. I thank you, Commissioner Banks, and also for your 

commitment and the service of our Customs officers in this effort. 

Now I’d like to recognize James Milford, Deputy Administrator of 

the Drug Enforcement Administration. Sir, you’re recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. MILFORD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today to discuss drug trafficking in the Caribbean theater and south Florida. First, I’d like to sincerely thank you and 

the other members of the committee for your continued support of 

DEA and its programs, both internationally and on the home front. 

You have seen firsthand the devastation caused by drugs that 

stems from the drug-producing and transit regions of Latin America and impacts the streets of our country. The international drug 

syndicates are far more organized and influential than any organized crime enterprise preceding them. Today’s international crime 

syndicates have at their disposal, an arsenal of technology, weapons and allies, corrupted law enforcement and government officials, 

which enable them to dominate the illegal drug market. 

With the law enforcement pressure placed on the Cali traffickers’ 

operations in south Florida and the Caribbean in the late 1980’s 

and early 1990’s, they turned to established smuggling organizations in Mexico to move cocaine to the United States. However, Colombian traffickers still dominate the movement of cocaine, from 

the jungles of Bolivia and Peru to the large cocaine hydrochloride 

conversion factories in southern Colombia. 

Most of these new groups have returned to the traditional smuggling routes in the Caribbean to transport their cocaine and heroin 

to markets in the United States and along the East Coast. 

Puerto Rico is easily accessible by twin engine aircraft, which can 

haul payloads of 500 to 700 kilos of cocaine. Ocean-going fast boats 

make their cocaine runs in the dead of night to the southern coast 

of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status means that once 

a shipment of cocaine, whether smuggled by maritime, air, or commercial cargo, reaches Puerto Rico, it is not subjected to further 

United States Customs control. 

Today cocaine and heroin traffickers from Colombia have transformed Puerto Rico into the largest staging area in the Caribbean 

for smuggling not only cocaine, but heroin into the United States. 

Dominican immigrant groups have also gained control of a number of Puerto Rico housing projects which they utilize for drug trafficking using violence and intimidation in order to control the markets. In the past, the Dominicans’ role in illegal drug activity was 

limited to participating in pick-up crews and couriers. 

However, the new breed of Dominican traffickers function as 

smuggler, transporter and also wholesaler. Dominican groups trafficking utilize wooden vessels and low profile boats to avoid radar. 

These boats are retrofitted with plastic fuel tanks which enable 

them to make their long range journey. Boat crews also rely on cellular telephone communications to further enhance their security 

measures. 

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duit for Colombian heroin to the large addict populations of New 

York and other parts of the country. 

The Bahamian Islands have also caused us tremendous concern. 

The Bahamas Island chain, which lies northwest of Puerto Rico 

and the Dominican Republic and just northeast of Cuba, has been 

a center for the smuggling of contraband for centuries. To counter 

that threat, the United States Government initiated Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos—OPBAT, as it is known, in 1982. 

This joint Bahamian-DEA-United States Customs interdiction 

operation, headquartered in Nassau, Bahamas, has had enormous 

success over the years. As you know, Mr. Chairman, you just visited that facility and talked with our people at that location. It has 

been a tremendous cooperative effort, particularly utilizing the Bahamian authorities, the United States Customs Service, the United 

States Coast Guard and DEA. 

Traffickers in the northern Caribbean alternate their trafficking 

techniques, using remote air strips and air drops to waiting fast 

boat vessels and maritime scenarios to smuggle cocaine. In October 

1996, 6.5 metric tons of cocaine was seized from on-board the 

freighter Limerick, after Cuban officials searched the vessel at our 

request. 

Again, I might add to what Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart 

mentioned, this case emanated from an investigation which he has 

previously talked about. We targeted a vessel that was using 

Cuban waters, not necessarily the Cuban Government, as a shield. 

Another prominent method being used by the Bahamian and Jamaican transporter groups involves Colombian traffickers air dropping shipments of cocaine off the coast of Jamaica. Jamaican and 

Bahamian transporting groups then use what are known as war 

canoes, to smuggle their payloads of drugs into the Bahamian 

chain. And once they’re into the Bahamian chain, they’re home 

free. 

We’re also very concerned about the new containerized shipping 

port facility in Freeport, Bahamas. The containers are not to be 

opened while in Freeport. However, this gives the traffickers another opportunity to use a port of entry as a staging point for narcotics entering the United States. 

Miami, as we all know, has always been the home of high echelon command and control personnel for organized criminal organizations from Colombia. In the early 1980’s, thugs from the Medellin 

Cartel, known as the cocaine cowboys, brought their indiscriminate 

violence to Miami. 

However, programs such as REDRUM, a joint effort between 

DEA, Metro, and Miami police, convinced the violent traffickers 

from Medellin that they would be methodically hunted down. I 

might add that local and Federal cooperation in the Miami operation had a lot to do with the turning of the tide there. 

I’d just like to end by mentioning heroin. As we all know, heroin, 

as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, is a big concern for the Orlando 

area. Just a few years ago, southeast Asian heroin dominated the 

East Coast. Colombian heroin was nonexistent in 1962. However, 

by 1996, 62 percent of the heroin seized in the United States came 

from Colombia, up from 32 percent the year before. 

39

The average purity in 1996 was 71.9 percent, while some purchases registered as high as 95 percent. From New York to Miami, 

Colombian heroin is widely available and is extremely pure and 

cheap. The organized criminals who control the Colombian heroin 

trade have been able to establish their substantial market share 

through aggressive marketing techniques and cutting the price of 

a kilogram of heroin almost in half, from $150,000 to $90,000. 

The results of the surge of high quality heroin may best be seen 

in Orlando, where there were 31 overdose deaths in 1996, up 500 

percent from 1994. 

In conclusion, 30 years ago we thought that traditional organized 

crime could never be subverted. Now it is a mere shadow of what 

it once was. Five years ago nearly everyone said that Miguel 

Rodriguez Orejuela and his accomplices in Cali were invincible. 

However, we see today that every one of these criminals from the 

Cali Cartel is either in jail or dead. 

We will leave each organization that rises to power the opportunity to move ahead, but we must continue to provide law enforcement assistance to foreign governments, to really counteract all of 

the problems that we have with drug trafficking. 

Thank you, and I’ll answer any questions that you have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Milford follows:] 

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Mr. SOUDER [presiding]. Thank you for your testimony and 

DEA’s efforts. Adm. Saunders, if you’d go ahead and give us your 

testimony. 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members 

of the subcommittee. It’s a pleasure to be here and represent the 

Coast Guard today. As was said earlier, I am the Commander of 

the 7th Coast Guard District, and I have responsibility for Coast 

Guard activities in the Southeast United States and the Caribbean. 

And I’m going to try and approach this from an operators point of 

view rather than from the point of view of somebody inside the 

Beltway. 

I have recently returned to Miami after being absent from an 

operational position for about 6 years. I have some observations 

that I’ll share as I go along. Let me first put up a visual here to 

give you some idea of what the threat is as we see it with regard 

to cocaine. 

We think there are 608 metric tons of cocaine en route to the 

United States—plus or minus—each year. Against a 200 or 300 

metric ton demand. So you can see that if the producers of this poison are successful, there is more than enough cocaine to take care 

of the demand in this country. My colleague from the DEA has spoken of the rising flow of heroin. And, of course, there is still fairly 

robust marijuana trafficking through the Caribbean. 

We think about 63 percent of what comes across the Caribbean 

comes across in noncommercial maritime means, in small fast 

boats, as my colleague from the DEA spoke about, all the way up 

to some of the rather derelict coastal freighters. 

I’m not going to stress the interdiction point I made in my written or submitted oral testimony, but rather, would like to stress 

two other points, the first being that one of the things that I have 

noticed most significantly since being back in south Florida is that 

inter-agency cooperation has increased remarkably in the 6 years 

that I have been away. And I’d like to use perhaps the next slide 

as a rough talking point to illustrate that. 

Mr. Banks talked about some efforts ongoing in Puerto Rico and 

the United States Virgin Islands, as did Mr. Milford. All of us over 

the last 9 months operated under something we call Operation 

Frontier Shield. The Justice Department agency is under the Attorney General’s Caribbean initiative. And the Customs Service, 

under Operation Gateway. We all have, however, focused our efforts under the leadership of the United States Attorney and the 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area [HIDTA] organization in 

Puerto Rico over the last 9 months, specifically, and have begun to 

develop information that helps us as interdictors, stop the flow of 

narcotics into Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, but is also giving 

the investigative agencies, the Federal agencies, the commonwealth 

agencies and the local police agencies in Puerto Rico the information that they need to dismantle the drug smuggling organizations 

and really begin to make them hurt. 

Seizure statistics are interesting. I’m not going to flash them up 

there. Let me say that we use as indicators of success of the pressure that we’ve put on them the reduced number of attempts—they 

haven’t gone away, and this isn’t scientific—but there have been a 

49

reduced number of attempts to smuggle drugs into Puerto Rico and 

the Virgin Islands. 

We’re beginning to see evidence of a shift of drug trafficking 

westward in the Caribbean, all of it, of course, bound for the Southeast United States, as has been suggested. But my point there 

being that the HIDTA agency, the cooperation among the agencies 

and the international cooperation in the eastern Caribbean are absolutely remarkable and are responsible for the success of our efforts. 

The second point I’d like to make hangs right on a hook that Mr. 

Milford hung up there for me. And that is that these smugglers are 

crossing the Caribbean by a variety of means. They are indeed 

using small, fast boats, up to 40 feet, two or three high-powered 

outboard engines. They can make the run over and back to those 

islands, any of the islands, in 24 hours. 

They’re going up the western Caribbean, but they’re going all the 

way up to Mexico in many cases. We can’t detect them. We can’t 

classify them once we find them. And if we do find them, we can’t 

stop them. They are brazen. They absolutely won’t stop even if we 

have jurisdiction to stop them. 

We need to invest in and field the technology that will let our 

folks out there on the water and in the air find these guys, classify 

them and then use some technical means to stop them once we find 

them. 

A final point about technology for the larger vessels. We are seeing an increased number of very sophisticated hidden compartments that take sometimes days for us to locate. The smugglers 

have begun to secrete the drugs in those hidden compartments by 

wrapping cocaine, for example, in plastic, double or triple wrapped 

in plastic, washing those bricks of cocaine in diesel fuel, and then 

putting axle grease around it to eliminate any opportunity for our 

sensitive equipment to detect the residue of those things before 

they put them into the compartment. 

We need to invest in the technology that will help us at sea, help 

the Customs Service at the border find these drugs, which are 

being hidden in much more sophisticated manners. 

The three points I make in my submitted remarks are: Interdiction is critical and must be done in the Caribbean, inter-agency 

and international efforts are working, and we need to continue to 

use technology to help us stay ahead of increasingly sophisticated, 

well-funded entities. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity, and I’d be delighted 

to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Rear Adm. Saunders follows:] 

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you much for your testimony, all of you. Before we move to questions, we’ve been joined again by Ms. RosLehtinen, the distinguished Congresswoman from Miami, who 

would like to make a statement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I want 

to commend you as well as Chairman Hastert for holding this hearing to examine drug interdiction efforts in my home State of Florida and in the Caribbean. 

As residents of south Florida, our delegation and all of us have 

been able to witness firsthand the scourge that drugs can bring to 

our communities. Drugs are responsible for a large part of the 

crime problem in Florida and throughout our great Nation. And 

more importantly, they are responsible for the destruction of many 

young lives who fall to the addiction of drug use. 

For geographic reasons, Florida and the Caribbean continue to be 

the preferred transit points for drugs to the United States. In recent months, we’ve seen, sadly, the evidence of this threat of drug 

trafficking increasing due to new modern technologies that are 

used by drug runners. The new equipment consists of modern maritime vessels, aircraft and modern communication systems that 

make our drug enforcement agents’ interdiction efforts more difficult. 

The DEA and other drug interdictions agencies have to be commended for taking a very active approach to interdict drugs around 

the Caribbean. We want to congratulate them for their ongoing efforts. And much effort has been put into the interdiction of drugs 

in Puerto Rico, which is a favorite stopping point for drugs on their 

way to the mainland United States and other parts of the Caribbean. 

But as we have said many times in this subcommittee, which I 

serve on in other forms as well, the United States must take seriously the role that the dictator Fidel Castro plays in drug trafficking. Because without doing that, taking into serious light, we 

will never really be able to win the interdiction battle in the Caribbean area. 

There is mounting evidence that Castro has for many years and 

continues to be a key player in drug trafficking by allowing Cuba 

to serve as a stopping point for drugs. Over the past two decades, 

Cuba’s involvement in drug trafficking was highlighted by several 

high profile indictments of Cuban officials which the Castro regime 

has refused to turn over for trial. 

In 1982 Cuban Vice Adm. Aldo Santa Maria, two Cuban diplomats as well as a Cuban intelligence officer, were indicted for actively coordinating and protecting drug transshipments to the 

United States. None have faced trial due to the protection provided 

to them by the Castro regime. 

Also in a 1993 Miami Herald article the United States attorney 

for the southern district of Florida has drafted a racketeering indictment against the Cuban regime for its active involvement in 

drug trafficking. And chief among the players in that drug connection were Raul Castro, Cuba’s defense minister, and 15 other 

Cuban officials from the defense and interior ministries. 

Last year, also, some officers of the Drug Enforcement Agency in 

Miami declared that more than 50 percent of the drug trafficking 

57

entering the United States through the Caribbean actually goes 

through Cuba. Additionally, a south Florida TV station, captured 

drug traffickers freely entering Cuban air space and waters to flee 

United States law enforcement agencies. 

In 1987 the United States achieved convictions of drug smugglers 

who used Cuban military facilities and personnel to aid the trafficking of drugs from Colombia. And in other evidence is the convicted drug dealer Jorge Cabrerra who has reportedly told United 

States drug enforcement agencies of Cuban cooperation in drug 

trafficking, and has offered to cooperate in exposing Castro’s role 

in illegal drug transshipment to the United States. 

In our Government Reform Committee, we will be examining the 

allegations that the owner of a charter travel service to Cuba 

sought contributions for the Clinton-Gore reelection campaign from 

this convicted drug trafficker during a meeting that the two supposedly held in a Havana hotel. And this is certainly worrisome, 

because it could mean that our Presidential campaign might have 

been tainted by drug money connected with the Castro regime. 

This is only a sample of much of the evidence over the past decade that clearly signals the Castro dictatorship’s willing participation in illegal drug trafficking. And this evidence combined with 

Castro’s longstanding efforts to harm the United States and his 

desperate need for hard currency defies the administration’s assertion that the Castro regime is a cooperative partner in the war on 

drugs. 

Nothing could be further from the truth. And during the recent 

hostage crisis in Peru, it was revealed that Castro attempted to 

blackmail the Japanese government for millions of dollars in exchange for the tyrant’s agreement to give asylum to the Shining 

Path terrorists who took over the Japanese Embassy. 

If Castro tried to blackmail the Japanese Government during 

this crisis, just imagine how much money he must exert from drug 

traffickers in exchange for the use of Cuban territory to escape the 

United States’s interdiction efforts. I hope that the witnesses here 

today from various drug interdiction agencies will address Cuba’s 

involvement in drug trafficking. And we urge them to take a more 

active approach in exposing Castro’s drug ties. 

I thank the chairman for the time. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen follows:] 

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Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady and would now like to recognize the chairman of the Florida delegation and also chairman of 

the Ways and Means Human Resources Subcommittee, Mr. Shaw 

from Florida. 

Mr. SHAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to express our 

appreciation to you and the Government Reform and Oversight 

Committee and the Speaker for highlighting Florida at this particular hearing today. And I’d also like to apologize to the witnesses 

and our guests for some of the shenanigans that are going on in 

the floor today. 

If you wonder why we’re getting so many buzzers, we’re not usually under siege like this, slave to our voting cards, but there are 

some unhappy Members down on the floor that are creating as 

many votes as they can get in order to get attention to their being 

neglected before the Rules Committee. 

I think that our witnesses at this particular panel have already 

highlighted the problems that we are having. In preparing for this 

hearing, my mind couldn’t help but go back to the early 1980’s, 

when this problem was really building up terribly in Florida and 

came to a head in the early 1980’s. The good people of Miami finally rose up and called on the assistance of then Vice President 

Bush, who came to Miami, down at the Omni Hotel on Biscayne 

Boulevard and met with a capacity crowd and talked about the resolve of the Federal Government to wage war on drugs. 

As a result, over the years, and with the help and putting in 

place the military and the coordination of—recognizing, of course, 

the Coast Guard also as a partial military arm of the government—

but getting the Navy and some of our sophisticated equipment that 

is available to us in place, the implementation of the posse comitatus bill, which we led the way in getting the military involved 

in the war against drugs, we were able to at least curb the tide, 

never really defeat those that would invade our borders with these 

illegal substances. But at least we were able to stem the tide. And 

over the next decade Florida became too hot, so that the drug 

smugglers were looking to other ways of coming into this country. 

That led us to where we are today. We’re very, very concerned 

about what is happening and the enforcement and the intensive 

law enforcement that is going on in other places is making, once 

again, the preferred to coming into the United States through the 

Caribbean in through Puerto Rico and Florida. 

I was very pleased to hear about some of the good results that 

we’re getting in Puerto Rico and some of the other areas and also 

the international cooperation that we’re getting. 

But unfortunately success elsewhere might mean problems for us 

in Florida. You never can take your foot off of the pedal. It’s like 

having your foot on the throat of a snake. You cannot release it 

and then go somewhere to fight another war, because that snake 

is going to rise up and bite you. And that’s exactly what’s happening. 

Some statistics that are tremendously of concern to me. Customs 

cocaine seizures in south Florida have doubled in 1996 to approximately 75,000 pounds. Miami International Airport recently replaced Kennedy International in New York City as the prime seizure spot in America for heroin swallowers and smugglers. 

61

Florida experienced one third of all drug related private aircraft 

incidents in the United States during 1996. Admiral, you spoke of 

some of the equipment we need. That’s not only the Coast Guard, 

but that’s also in Customs and DEA. To give an example, to combat 

the diminution in resources away from Florida, I offered an amendment that passed the Ways and Means Committee as part of the 

Customs authorization bill which the House passed in May, to direct $5 million—just $5 million. 

On the whole scope of things that is not a huge amount to invest 

in funding to bolster the Customs marine effort in south Florida. 

If the funds authorized in my amendment are fully appropriated, 

the marine program in south Florida will return to its 1993 level. 

That’s just returning to the 1993 level. 

We have a terrible problem now with the bad guys having faster 

boats than we have. I think, Admiral, you spoke of the number of 

motors they will put on the back of the boats. They have things 

that can outrun just about anything we have other than our aircraft. And we have got to put the necessary assets in place in order 

to do that. And the personnel is tremendously important. 

The next panel that we’ll have today concerns itself with the internal conspiracies. And I specifically requested a panel to discuss 

this matter because the internal conspiracies are becoming a major 

avenue of bringing illegal drugs into the United States. 

For example, over the past 2 years, at the Port of Miami, there 

have been alarming increases of drug seizures related to internal 

conspiracies among port employees. Of the 53 drug seizures by 

Customs at the Port of Miami during fiscal year 1996, 32 cases involved port employees. 32 cases out of 53. That’s over half. 

And fiscal year 1995—37 of 54 seizures involved port employees. 

Therefore, over those two fiscal years, on an average, over 63 percent of all drug seizures at the Port of Miami involved port employees. 

These internal conspiracies are clever in ways that help the 

smugglers. They have been known to innocently swing a container 

in front of a surveillance camera in order to allow another container filled with drugs to pass through undetected. They also 

know which are the sharper Customs agents that they have to 

avoid. 

I’m going to ask that my full statement be put in the record, but 

I do want to go into——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. SHAW. Thank you, Madam Chairman. But I do want to read 

something that I think is absolutely an outrageous situation, and 

that is the number of port employees with criminal records. 

I asked that I be provided with the arrest records of 38 Port Everglades employees. Of the 38 Port Everglades longshoremen, 19 

persons had arrest records, out of 38. Of those 19 persons, they had 

a total of 73 arrests, including 14 drug arrests. 

Let me just read the record, a rap sheet on three of our port employees who are in sensitive positions. 

Subject No. 1—and this is from the Port of Miami. 

‘‘Arrested for robbery, assault and battery, carrying a concealed 

firearm, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, aggravated 

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assault, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, possession of 

cocaine with intent to sell. 

‘‘Possession of heroin with intent to sell, grand theft, petty theft, 

uttering a forged instrument, forgery of a U.S. Treasury check, possession of cocaine, simple battery, aggravated battery, and petty 

theft.’’

That’s just one of our dock workers. 

Subject 2 is from the Port of Miami. 

‘‘Arrested for immigration violation, cocaine possession, marijuana possession, aggravated assault, battery, loitering, prowling, 

narcotics equipment possession, aggravated assault, possession of a 

firearm in the commission of a felony, resisting arrest, obstructing 

justice, aggravated battery, burglary, and cocaine possession within 

1,000 feet of a school.’’

Subject No. 3 was from Port Everglades. 

‘‘Arrested for armed robbery, assault with intent to commit murder, breaking and entering, disorderly conduct, shoplifting, burglary, dealing in stolen property, possession of cocaine, sale of cocaine, domestic violence.’’

This goes on and on. When we look at the alarming number of 

people that work in the docks in sensitive positions, who are inside 

the ring in which customs is supposed to be directing the traffic out 

of, it is absolutely amazing to me that these ports do not look at 

the rap sheets of those that are working for them, whether it be 

for the smuggling of cocaine or just stealing some of the things that 

are coming into these particular ports. 

I know we’re going to be hearing testimony from a number of 

witnesses on the next panel, and they will be concerning themselves with these particular matters and some of the things that 

other port authorities have done. 

I would certainly hope that the good people in south Florida not 

only would cooperate with us in working to get some of the assets 

directed back to south Florida that Customs needs, that DEA 

needs, and that the Coast Guard needs, and the other law enforcement agencies. 

But also, I would hope that the elected officials in south Florida 

would just use some common sense in doing some screening of people who are in these sensitive positions, that are in a position in 

which it is extremely difficult to detect their smuggling of illegal 

drugs into this country. 

I know there is a vote on the floor, Madam Chairman, so I will 

yield back my time. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. E. Clay Shaw, Jr., follows:] 

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Congressman Shaw. I 

would like to recognize Congressman Goss. 

Mr. GOSS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I was very interested 

in the testimony, and I do have some followup questions. I, too, 

have been captured by the voting on the floor. 

I would like to ask, Madam Chairman, that my full statement be 

included in the record. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Porter J. Goss follows:] 

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Mr. GOSS. I will look forward to the opportunity to come back, 

if I may. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

If I could ask you gentlemen a question before we have to leave 

for voting. 

As I had said in my opening statement, there were some local TV 

station cameras from Miami who captured some drug trafficking 

entering into Cuban waters. They were being pursued by our guys, 

because of the possibility of being involved in drug trafficking and 

then, as soon as those boats and, in other cases, planes, entered 

Cuban territory, we had to turn back. 

Can you share with us any sense of frustration that you have felt 

with this? What other recourse do we have available to us in these 

circumstances? 

Mr. MILFORD. Well, it’s been a tremendous frustration for us to 

have the Cuban shield, so to speak, which is really used by traffickers very effectively, not only for air traffic, but also for maritime drug trafficking. 

What they normally do when they’re coming up through that 

passageway is come up over Cuba to avoid radar. That’s not necessarily saying that there’s any collusion with the Cuban Government in these instances. What it is, is the Cuban Government has 

no way to respond. 

In instance after instance, day after day, we see that. For example, the planes coming up off of the north coast of Cuba, coming 

up to make an air drop at a specific location, will come up over 

Cuba and really just use that. 

The other two areas we have seen is that, a lot of times, with 

vessels that we know are going to make a drop of drugs at a specific location, will often do it right at the 12-mile limit and if, in 

fact, we pursue them at those locations, they will run into Cuban 

waters and, frankly, at this point, there is no way for us to continue on. 

The third, and the admiral alluded to it, the coastal freighters 

that we’re seeing most recently. That is also a concern, because a 

lot of times now, these coastal freighters are seemingly normal vessels with normal cargo coming up out of South America. 

They contain legitimate cargo and stop at many ports. One of the 

ports they stop at is Havana. What they will do, then, is, after they 

drop off their cargo. In fact, Jorge Cabrerra was a perfect instance 

of that; the vessel which he was receiving his cocaine from would 

go into Havana Harbor, drop off its legitimate goods, and then 

come out of the 12-mile limit, up along the coast. The ship would 

actually use an old technique, which we all know in south Florida, 

as the mother ship technique, with boats carrying the drugs off of 

this vessel, onto a smaller vessel, and into the Keys. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Let me ask a followup question 

related to that. Well, Mr. Mica is here, and I’ve got to go vote. 

Mr. MICA [presiding]. I apologize. Someone has got their feathers 

ruffled today, and are going to help us in our exercise program, get 

us in shape here. We haven’t done this for a while. 

I guess that Ms. Ros-Lehtinen was asking questions about the 

Cuba connection. I might ask if you could, was someone going to 

expand on that? 

77

Mr. MILFORD. Sir, I had talked about three areas—the use of 

Cuba as a shield by air traffic, the use of the Cuban waters as a 

haven to go back into if they were being pursued, and the use of 

coastal freighters as a stopoff point prior to actually dropping off 

their drugs. 

Mr. MICA. When I was there several months ago, I went down 

to the—what is it? It’s the last island. Inagua, greater Inagua. Yes. 

And I flew in the Coast Guard helicopter. We went right up to the, 

I guess it’s the 20-mile limit. We did view the freighters and the 

problem of them zigzagging in and out. 

Have the Cubans been cooperating with us when they do enter 

the Cuban waters now? I came back, and my report detailed the 

cooperation with the Limerick, where it was towed in. They did assist our agents. I understand DEA confirmed that. 

But what about these transports that go in and out of those waters? Are they assisting us in pursuing them, or do they have that 

capability? 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. Well, I don’t know, Mr. Chairman, whether they have the capability. When we have information that a vessel is bound for a Cuban port and may have drugs aboard, we pass 

that to the Cuban Government and they regularly report back that 

they have inspected the vessel and have found no drugs. 

Whether they have given it a good, thorough inspection or not, 

we don’t know. 

Mr. MICA. If you report a suspect vessel that is zigzagging or 

seeking haven in Cuban waters from international waters, are you 

getting a response? Are they assisting us? 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. We’re getting an answer from them if the 

vessel is in the vicinity of a major port, like Havana. If it’s in some 

remote area of the Cuban coast, they are generally not able to respond. 

Mr. MICA. They don’t have the capability of responding? 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. No, sir, they don’t have the capability. I 

don’t know whether it’s they don’t have the capability or willingness. 

Mr. MICA. Is that your assessment? That was my next question. 

Is it the willingness or the capability? 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. I don’t have an answer to that question. 

Mr. MICA. Is there any evidence of a coordinated effort to assist 

these traffickers? 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. I have asked that question of our intelligence people, and the Coast Guard has nothing but anecdotal information about any collusion on the part of the Cuban Government. We have no evidence that the Cuban Government is engaged 

in facilitating smuggling drugs. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Milford, what is your intelligence? 

Mr. MILFORD. I was in south Florida, I was the special agent in 

charge of Miami when the case of Jorge Cabrerra went down. I was 

involved with every aspect of that case and was intimately familiar 

with it. 

Mr. Cabrerra initially reported to us that, in fact, there was collusion with the Cuban Government. We were skeptical of that information and, frankly, did an indepth investigation and found 

that, frankly, he was lying and misleading us for his own gain. 

78

We looked at it very thoroughly. In fact, the investigation which 

led to the seizure of the Limerick with 6.5 tons, which the Coast 

Guard and then subsequently the Cuban Government participated 

in, was another aspect of that investigation. 

What we learned in that investigation, and what Mr. Cabrerra 

did was use Cuba as a shield. They used it as a port of entry, seemingly for legitimate cargo, with these coastal freighters. 

Frankly, as Adm. Saunders mentioned earlier, these coastal 

freighters are not the normal mother ships that we can remember 

back from the 1980’s. These are very highly sophisticated freighters, as far as hidden compartments. 

Sometimes, even if we know that drugs are on these vessels, it 

takes us upwards of 2 weeks to locate these compartments, and 

this is exactly what we had in this instance. 

In fact, we seized some drugs off the Limerick, then we seized 

more drugs a couple days later and more after that. So what I’m 

saying to you is that we had a very indepth investigation and, 

based on that investigation, we could see no collusion with the 

Cuban Government. 

Mr. MICA. The other thing that I found, a new technique of the 

drug traffickers, is that some of the cocaine is coming out, now, of 

Jamaica, as a staging area, I guess, from Colombia and points 

south, in what is termed ‘‘Jamaican canoes.’’

I believe they are wooden vessels that are not picked up by radar 

or other means. And then, they have large fuel bladders, I believe, 

and they can bring up to a ton of cocaine into other areas. 

Are they going into Cuba as a refuge area, or primarily the Bahama Islands? 

Mr. MILFORD. Primarily, the Bahama Islands. I might point out 

that these are not the normal canoes which we think of going up 

and down a river in Georgia or the southern part of the United 

States in a very tranquil setting. 

These are high-speed vessels that are as fast as what we know 

as the ‘‘go-fast’’ vessels that are utilized by these traffickers. What 

normally happens is, the drugs are brought in from Colombia, 

staged in Jamaica, and then moved up into the Bahama chain by 

these canoes. 

Mr. MICA. One of the things that concerns me is our capability 

of detecting these craft in the water. It’s my understanding that 

most of the P3 coverage that Customs had has now been removed. 

Is that correct, Mr. Banks? 

Mr. BANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, we fly about 1,800 hours over 

the source area, about 1,400 hours over the transit area, and about 

1,000 hours over the border areas, so it isn’t all removed, but 

there’s no question it’s been reduced. 

Mr. MICA. How does that compare to, say, 1990, 1992? 

Mr. BANKS. Let me put it this way. We took a 25 percent reduction in our aviation program in 1995 and a 50 percent reduction 

in our marine program, so there’s no question it was definitely impacted as a result of that. 

Mr. MICA. So your capability is about cut in half? 

Mr. BANKS. It’s significantly reduced. The other thing that we 

have done most recently, though, is we’ve gotten surplus C–12s, 

79

four surplus C–12s from the military, and we’re equipping them 

with special instruments, primarily for the maritime detection. 

So we are kind of hopeful we are going to see some better production from them. 

Mr. MICA. My next question would be, do you have the adequate 

personnel to man those craft? 

Mr. BANKS. Obviously, we would like to have a lot more flight 

hours and we would like to have, you know, more people out there 

with our marine fleet. 

Mr. MICA. I was told we also had AWACS capability, where we 

had over-flight capability to detect what was going on, and that one 

of those AWACS were moved to Alaska to look at pipeline spills or 

something like that. Can anyone confirm that? 

Mr. BANKS. We have a total of eight P3s. Four of them are 

equipped with radar guns. They are still in place, you know, flying 

primarily with source area. 

Mr. MICA. What about AWACS? Do you know about AWACS? 

Mr. BANKS. That would be military operated with E2s. 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. E2s or E3s. No, sir, Mr. Chairman, I can’t 

answer that with any authority. I can tell you that, 6 years ago, 

when I was there, there was a lot of AWACS coverage over the 

Caribbean itself, and that is not there. 

Mr. MICA. It’s not there. 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. It is not there. 

Mr. MICA. OK. That’s my information, that that has been moved 

to other responsibilities. 

One of the other things that disturbed me, and maybe DEA 

can—who has fixed-wing aircraft, DEA? What do you have? 

Mr. MILFORD. I think we both do. 

Mr. MICA. What do you have, sir? 

Mr. MILFORD. We have several aircraft we have removed. I think 

what you are referring to is the aircraft, because of resource shortages that we had to remove from the Bahamas. 

Mr. MICA. Yes. From the top of the Bahamas down to the bottom 

where I was, was about the size of California. 

Mr. MILFORD. Right. 

Mr. MICA. What capability do you have for over-flight now? 

Mr. MILFORD. What we have now are aircraft that are staged out 

of south Florida, out of Miami airport. 

Mr. MICA. What do you have staged in the Bahamas? 

Mr. MILFORD. We have nothing at this point staged in the Bahamas. 

Mr. MICA. An area the size of California, you have nothing? 

Didn’t I just hear testimony from Mr. Banks that they’re now, instead of going into Cuba, we got into where the drugs are going 

into the islands around the Bahamas; is that correct, Mr. Banks? 

Mr. BANKS. That is correct. 

Mr. MICA. OK. And you have nothing staged from the Bahamas? 

Mr. MILFORD. What we’ve done, Mr. Chairman, is staged the helicopters for fast response from those locations, but we do not have 

any fixed-wing aircraft actually staged in Nassau or in the Bahamas at this point. 

Mr. MICA. They’ve been taken out? 

Mr. MILFORD. Yes. 

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Mr. MICA. OK. Mr. Barrett. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Saunders, in 

his testimony, Speaker Gingrich basically painted a picture of a 

drug policy in disarray. Yet you have stated that inter-agency cooperation has improved dramatically under the leadership of the 

Attorney General and that cooperation is remarkable. 

Maybe you can help some of us who are not as close to it as you 

are to explain why we have such differing opinions. 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. Thank you for that question. There is certainly, from the Speaker’s comments, there is no unity of command, 

as you described in World War II. There is no single person that 

is in charge of the drug war. 

However, in the mid-to-late 1980’s, from my experience, what we 

had was a bunch of independent agencies, each of whom was fairly 

strong in resources and thought they could fight the entire drug 

war alone. 

We have since found that that is not the case. I can’t describe 

for you what has caused the agencies to work more closely together. 

I know that right now, my experience, returning to the field, is 

that I have never seen cooperation at a higher level. There is absolutely no jealousy, there are no barriers with information. Information is freely shared. 

All the agencies have discovered that, by sharing the information, very often they find that the other guy had pieces of the puzzle that they had been trying to put together. 

Those sort of successes have bred further cooperation at the analyst level, at the investigator level, and it is really leading to what 

I think is the foundation for good results against the organization, 

and that is the ability to dismantle the organization, not just to 

interdict the truck drivers who are driving these fast boats. 

That’s important. We need to stop the flow of drugs. But we absolutely need to be able to take their organization apart, get to the 

leadership, get to their money, get to their command and control, 

to the communications. 

And it is this inter-agency cooperation at the analyst level, at the 

information level, that is letting us do that. 

I would ask my colleagues to answer and see if they don’t have 

a different thought. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Milford, do you concur in that? 

Mr. MILFORD. I do concur in that. And, frankly, at this point, the 

cooperation—not only at the Federal level, with the FBI, the Customs, the Coast Guard, and the various agents, but just as important, at the State and local level—is outstanding. 

For example, in south Florida, and throughout Florida, most of 

our investigations, almost 95 percent of our major investigations, 

involve other agencies, and most of the time, State and local officers. 

We have forged task forces together, and because of this cooperative effort, and it benefits everybody. 

Increases manpower—I firmly believe that we don’t only provide 

a service to the local law enforcement agencies, but, we also learn 

a lot from them. 

81

So it is a cooperative effort. We have been able to share resources 

and assets. And I think, in the long run, it is working much better 

than it has in the past. 

That’s a tribute to everybody, I think. We’ve been doing this a 

long time and I believe, at this point, we are getting it right. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Banks. 

Mr. BANKS. Yeah. I would like to totally endorse these remarks. 

I will say that, when you’re in the aviation and the marine environment, the handoffs between agencies are virtually seamless at 

this point. We are totally coordinated in terms of our detection capabilities and the followthrough. 

As Adm. Saunders said, our objective isn’t just bringing it down. 

We want to take it all the way through to the ultimate destination. 

DEA cross-designates 1,350 of our agents. As Mr. Milford has 

said, it is very unusual now to have an investigation that is not a 

multi-agency investigation. I think that there is an incredible level 

of cooperation. 

I think the really good part is, we each have kind of unique talents and skills, and bring a different point of view on some of this, 

and bringing it together actually makes us, I think, operate better, 

as a whole. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Banks, what do you think is the source of the 

charges of rudderlessness or lack of coordination? 

Mr. BANKS. I don’t know. Part of what I attribute this to is the 

lack of assets that we’ve got. We don’t have any choice but to cooperate. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Milford, why do you think the attacks are 

being levied against you and the other agencies? 

Mr. MILFORD. Well, if you look at it at the field level, I think it 

is really coordinated very well. I think a lot of times, when we get 

up here within the Beltway, there’s a lot of different opinions. 

Being a field person and an operations person, I must say that, 

in those venues, we get along extremely well. That’s not to say that 

Sam Banks and I, or Adm. Saunders and I, sitting in Washington, 

don’t understand each other. But sometimes there doesn’t appear 

to be the same type of coordination that there does in the field. 

In the field, it’s hands on, taking care of business. I can remember the days in the early 1970’s where, actually, Customs was on 

one side and we were on the other, pulling a defendant’s arms back 

and forth as far as who was going to arrest him. That, however, 

is in the past. 

Now, we are passing information to each other—we are passing 

information to Customs that leads to seizures, and it’s not credit, 

it’s the right thing to do. 

We are passing information to the Coast Guard that leads to seizures on the high seas. That’s the right thing to do. 

What we are getting back is investigative information which we 

then use to pursue the entire case and take out the command and 

control people that were expecting the drugs. We then develop information which we pass to our counterparts in Colombia, where 

I think they’ve done a fantastic job in using the information which 

we have given them, to go after the heart of some of the mafia 

leadership. 

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Mr. BARRETT. Admiral Saunders, same question, essentially. Do 

you think that the charges of lack of coordination are based on an 

outdated view of what you do, or do you think they are politically 

founded? What is your analysis? 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. I agree with my colleagues that, at the 

field level, things are working very well. If we are guilty of anything at all at the field level, frankly, it’s from time to time, in 

planning something, we forget to include the other agency. That’s 

just in the haste to get something done. 

That’s the only criticism that I would levy against any of us, and 

my organization is certainly very guilty of that. 

Let me suggest, though, that the Speaker painted a picture of a 

nation at war, and we have, for years, characterized this as a drug 

war. 

With all due respect to all the members of the committee, we 

have not declared war on this scourge at all. We are involved in 

a skirmish. We haven’t gotten the national will to put the resources 

out there to sustain a realistic warlike effort in order to stop it. 

We’re not at war. We’re fighting a holding action right now, in 

my opinion. 

Mr. BARRETT. Specifically, where do you think we need more resources? 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. Well, I frankly think we need more resources, in order to have a realistic effort, in the transit zone. I 

think we need to put some more effort into investment in technology to make detection of these things possible. 

I can’t comment at all on any of the demand reduction techniques. I don’t know what is effective. That’s not my ballgame. 

Eventually, we have got to get the cooperation of the countries 

that produce the narcotics. We have to give them some way to have 

a viable economy so that they can substitute for the production of 

these poisons, and have a legitimate economy, so their citizens can 

have some hope, without having to sell cocaine or heroin or marijuana. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you. I think my time has expired. 

Mr. MICA. I thank the ranking member. I would like to yield 

now. We have the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. 

I am going to yield to him for 5 minutes, and then we will be 

joined, also, by a Senator from our State, and we also have the 

chairman of the House Criminal Justice Subcommittee, who wanted to participate. 

You are recognized, Mr. Goss, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It’s very interesting, Admiral, to hear your statement, that we 

are in a skirmish. I think that’s one of the reasons why we aren’t 

doing better, and I think that’s what the Speaker was addressing, 

that he wants a bigger commitment from the Nation and more 

awareness, which is one of the reasons why we’re doing this. 

I agree with your assessment that interagency cooperation in the 

field is better, and I am very pleased to hear it, because I remember it wasn’t too long ago we had the director of one of the agencies 

heavily involved, pointing fingers at another agency involved, on a 

TV tabloid show, one of those ‘‘60 Minutes’’ or something, show, 

saying, ‘‘Oh, wow, these guys are really messing up.’’

83

That’s not helpful and, if it’s true, it needs to be resolved, not 

necessarily on a TV tabloid show. 

So I think you’re right. We’ve come a long way. But I think we’ve 

got a long way to go. 

There are some things that have been said in your testimony 

that I particularly wanted to talk about, because the evidence is 

we’ve got too many of our teens involved in drugs today; the evidence is we have more than we’ve had before. That means we’re 

losing. We have been winning in other areas, but we’ve got to win 

it all. 

The questions that I wanted to talk about—and I’ll stay away 

from the policy questions, because I don’t think that’s your bag 

here today. 

I know there is serious trouble with our friends and allies in Colombia because of a policy problem down there on the certification 

process. I’m not going to ask about that, but I am going to ask 

about the question of information. 

You folks are in the business of interdiction. I know that interdiction is mostly successful when you have good information. When 

you have good information, you put the assets where they need to 

be, you catch the people you want to catch, the time is used wisely, 

the dollars are used wisely, and there is a high achievement rate. 

When you don’t have good information, that is not the case. I 

would guess that most of the busts you’ve had have come from good 

information, rather than random hits. 

My question is this. Do you have the information, the architecture you need to provide the information you need at the time, in 

the amounts and quantities to use the equipment that you’ve got 

and the assets that you’ve got now, and those that we might be 

able to provide you if we do our job here? Do you have enough information? 

I’m going particularly back into the country team area, because 

obviously, we’re dealing with something that’s starting on foreign 

shores, or in other areas. 

I would appreciate any comments you might have. Mr. Milford. 

Mr. MILFORD. Yes, sir. I will use Colombia, since you brought it 

up as an example. 

Colombia is an example where it has taken a long time to develop the kind of a relationship that we have in that country. 

With the partnership that we have developed with General 

Serrano and the Colombian national police, we not only pass information with the certainty that it’s going to be acted upon, in most 

cases—and again, they have had problems, as most countries do—

but we pass information on a daily basis to them, which is acted 

upon and used in investigative techniques. 

That is exactly what happened with the Cali mafia, Gilberto and 

Miguel Rodriguez, Jose Santa Cruz, and so on. 

The most important process in this is, after the investigation in 

Colombia, seeing a return of information that we can use to act 

upon investigations back in the United States and, in some instances, pass to the Coast Guard or pass to the Customs Service. 

Now, unfortunately, that is not happening in every area, as you 

well know. That is what we are striving for. That is the best-case 

scenario. 

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Frankly, I believe very strongly that we need to push these countries in these areas to ensure that they continue to do this. Or we 

have to move to the next step, and I leave that up to the policymakers. 

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Banks. 

Mr. BANKS. Congressman Goss, I doubt that we are ever going 

to get as much information as we want or that we need, in order 

to be able to do this job. 

However, I will say that, in some ways, the information is getting better, in addition to the law enforcement information that we 

get through DEA and with our agents working with confidential informants. 

One, the Title III, the wiretap operations are absolutely vital to 

really succeeding with this effort. 

Two, and probably the biggest surprise to us, is we started building partnerships with industry. I mentioned it in my earlier testimony. We’ve tied in with the airlines. We have 3,200 carriers we’re 

bringing in. 

We just made a trip down to Colombia with support of DEA in 

which we went in and we had sizable meetings with exporters, importers, port authorities, carriers, everybody involved in this transportation process. 

And, one, we’re trying to improve the security of their operations 

and, two, we’re trying to build in an information flow. 

The airlines, steamship lines gave us information—they either 

acted on or gave us information, to us or foreign law enforcement 

authorities, that resulted in 60,000 pounds of narcotics seized in a 

2-year period, 1995 and 1996. 

So there is intelligence and information that can be achieved at 

all levels of this process, and we are trying to push that envelope 

as hard as we can. 

Mr. GOSS. Adm. Saunders. 

Rear ADM. SAUNDERS. Thank you, Mr. Goss. I told you at the 

outset, I take this from the point of view of the operator and, from 

an operator’s point of view, we will never have all the information 

we really want to have. 

We are doing very well right now. From a Coast Guard perspective, in our 1998 budget request, we have a number of additional 

positions for investigative agents to add to the maritime side of the 

investigation. 

I know that the CNC over in CIA is working, and the counternarcotics cell over in CIA is very aware of the shortage of human 

intelligence that we’re all crying for, and they’re working on improving that. 

I think we are getting the support we need there. We are adding 

some things to our pot, and I think we are going to do pretty well. 

Mr. GOSS. Thank you. I would love to have the opportunity to followup. My time has run on this. I’m particularly intrigued about 

what it is you’re going to look for from the intelligence community 

in terms of technology to deal with stopping these 40-footers. I 

would like to hear more on that subject sometime. 

I thank you very much and I appreciate what you gentlemen do, 

and I mean that from the bottom of my heart. 

Mr. MICA. I thank Chairman Goss. 

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Without objection, I ask that a written statement submitted by 

Senator Grassley, chairman of the Senate International Narcotics 

Control Caucus, be submitted for the record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Charles E. Grassley follows:] 

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Mr. MICA. It is my pleasure now to recognize for either a statement or for questions the senior Senator from Florida, the Honorable Bob Graham. Welcome, Senator Graham, and you are recognized. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Congressman. I want to 

express my appreciation to you for organizing this hearing, this opportunity for us to become better informed and share our concerns 

with leaders who have the opportunity to make a positive impact 

on the drug issue in our State of Florida and in our neighborhood 

of the Caribbean. 

I would like to ask, if I could, some questions about the current 

status of the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program. 

There was a great deal of concern, 3 or 4 years ago, about what 

was happening in Puerto Rico and that region of the Caribbean, 

that it had become a new soft underbelly for drug trafficking. 

Based on that concern, a HIDTA was established in Puerto Rico. 

I wonder if you could give us—anyone who would care to comment—an evaluation of what is happening in Puerto Rico and that 

immediate area, and particularly the role that the Puerto Rican 

HIDTA has played. 

Mr. MILFORD. Senator, I think we all could comment on exactly 

what we have done—I think we have put effective programs in 

place. 

First of all, from the Justice agencies, we have developed a coordination mechanism between the FBI and DEA with regard to investigations on the Island of Puerto Rico. 

We have also coordinated and worked our investigations with 

Customs, who has a separate program, as well as with the Coast 

Guard, who has their program down there. These programs really 

interlock and intermesh, and what we have is a coordinated mechanism as a result of the HIDTA approach. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think that, based on that coordinated 

mission, that you have had some impact on suppressing the use of 

that part of the Caribbean for drug trafficking? 

Mr. MILFORD. I think we have. I think we can do much better. 

This is going to take some time. Frankly, if we’re talking about 

with DEA, we are doubling our resources in Puerto Rico over the 

next year-and-a-half. That makes a big difference for us, just as far 

as investigative ability. 

We are putting offices, for example, in Ponce, where we were 

never active before. We are running into some roadblocks, just because of the volume of the traffic. 

But I think, again, that it is making a difference. We are coordinating. We are working very closely with the Attorney General and 

other officials with Treasury and with Transportation, and it is 

working out, and I think it has all the marks of success. 

Mr. BANKS. Yes. Senator Graham, I would like to echo that. I 

think the HIDTA has been very successful, especially the intelligence sharing component. 

The cooperation that we got when we put 77 people—we moved 

77 people into Puerto Rico in the last 2 years—a great deal of that 

was due to the Government of Puerto Rico actually deciding to fund 

more enforcement operations and efforts and personnel for us. 

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The linkage that we got on the coordination end in Puerto Rico 

with JTF and with our DIOC for the air and the marine interdiction, as I was saying earlier, is virtually seamless. 

So we are making progress. We’ve still got a huge threat there. 

Senator GRAHAM. Using that recent experience in Puerto Rico, 

where there was a serious problem, an organized response with the 

HIDTA initiative being a key element of that, and now some indications of success, I would like your comments as to what role a 

HIDTA might play in the central Florida area. 

There have been some distressing statistics that would indicate 

an increase in drug activity in that part of our State. 

Do you believe that the establishment of a HIDTA there or an 

expansion of the existing HIDTA that covers the southern part of 

the State, to also incorporate central Florida or the I–4 corridor, 

would have potential for similar positive results as your recent experience in Puerto Rico? 

Mr. MILFORD. Senator, I think anytime that we can infuse resources into an area that is having the problems at the magnitude 

of Orlando, and the Orlando area, it will make a difference. 

We are looking, over the next year—with the help of this subcommittee—to double the size of our office in Orlando. 

I think with the attention that a HIDTA or any type of coordinated approach, task forces accomplish what they need to, which 

is an infusion of resources into an area. 

We intend to continue to work with not only the other Federal 

agencies in the Orlando area, but also the State and local agencies, 

to turn that tide and to make a difference. 

Mr. BANKS. Senator Graham, I concur with that, and we enjoy 

working in that environment with a HIDTA in middle Florida. 

I would say on that, that I hope when we establish this, we establish it with the necessary funding, because we’re into a situation 

where we’re robbing Peter to pay Paul. We’re having to just move 

resources from a different priority to deal with that. That would be 

my only concern, is for us to be able to support it and support it 

well. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is up. 

I appreciate this opportunity to have participated. 

Mr. CUMMINGS [presiding]. Congressman Barr, did you have 

some questions? 

Mr. BARR. Inevitably. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You might want to wait for the next panel. It’s 

up to you. 

Mr. BARR. Where are we? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. We’re at the end of this panel. 

Mr. BARR. I’ll wait until the next panel. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. We’ll move on to the next panel. Thank 

you very much. 

Will the next panel come forth, please? 

The next panel is Peter Girard, Mike Sinclair, James Wallwork, 

Edward Badolato, and Art Coffey. Our custom is to swear in the 

witnesses. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. Let the record show that 

the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

90

STATEMENTS OF PETER GIRARD, GROUP SUPERVISOR FOR 

CARGO THEFT, MIAMI SEAPORT, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE; MIKE SINCLAIR, CHIEF, 

MIAMI SEAPORT CARGO INSPECTION TEAM, U.S. CUSTOMS 

SERVICE; JAMES H. WALLWORK, COMMISSIONER, WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR; EDWARD V. 

BADOLATO, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL CARGO SECURITY COUNCIL; AND ARTHUR COFFEY, INTERNATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION 

Mr. GIRARD. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I 

thank you for inviting me here to speak before you today. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. First of all, I want to thank you all for being 

here. Because we have a kind of limited time schedule and, as a 

matter of fact, the House is now out, we are trying to get out of 

here by 4 o’clock, so I would just ask you to be kind of brief, if you 

can. Thank you. 

Mr. GIRARD. All right, sir. 

From August 1990 to October 1995, I supervised a group of Customs special agents dedicated to the problem of combatting narcotics smuggling, internal conspiracies at the Port of Miami and 

the Miami International Airport. 

The strategy that we employed was twofold. 

The first was to penetrate existing internal conspiracies in international airlines, shipping companies, and related service industries. 

To accomplish this objective, it was necessary to utilize the services of these groups. We became the drug traffickers that needed 

the ability of the internal conspiracy to smuggle the drugs which 

we provided without Customs intervention. 

We sent shipments of cocaine from foreign countries to destinations in the United States. These shipments were diverted by the 

internal conspirators and delivered to undercover agents in Miami, 

Puerto Rico, New York, and Alabama. 

In one investigation, a source of information was developed that 

led to contact with cruise ship dock workers who offered to remove 

suitcases from cruise ships when they stopped in Miami. 

Contact was made with the government of the Cayman Islands, 

who offered to assist us in arranging for suitcases of sham cocaine 

to be smuggled on board the cruise ship. Two agents then took the 

cruise departing from Miami. 

After a stop in the Caymans, they were contacted by a crew 

member who took the suitcases from their cabin. The suitcases 

were eventually delivered by a dockworker who smuggled them off 

the vessel. 

The crew member, dock worker, and three other accomplices 

were arrested upon the delivery, and convicted in Federal court for 

conspiracy to smuggle cocaine. 

In some investigations, more than one shipment was sent to further the investigation, identify the organizational members, and 

gather evidence. 

These types of investigations, while being very productive, are 

time-consuming and expensive. The violators must, of course, be 

paid for their activity. The cooperation of the host country, where 

the sham load is placed on the international conveyance, be it a 

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ship or aircraft, is necessary. Issues of sovereignty must be dealt 

with, as well as those of interagency cooperation. 

The second objective of our group was to counter the efforts of 

those organizations that actively sought to identify existing internal conspiracies to utilize or to find employees to corrupt. 

In this, we became, in an undercover capacity, the members of 

the internal conspiracy, offering our service to move narcotics 

across the border without Customs interference. For this service, 

we charged a fee. The funds generated from this activity, over $3.4 million, were 

used to offset the expenses from the investigation efforts to penetrate the existing internal conspiracies above. 

During the period I supervised this investigative group, 274 vio- lators were arrested and over $10 million in assets were seized and 

forfeited, in addition to the proceeds generated. 

I am currently the supervisor of an investigative group that targets organized cargo theft and the export of stolen cargo from the 

United States. As previously referenced, the conspiracy situation is 

well evident. 

The Port of Miami has no areas that are considered limited access, and workers there are free to move their personal vehicles to 

all areas of the port. 

The port, unlike Miami International Airport, does not have a 

color-coded identification card system that employees must wear 

when working. This situation has resulted in an environment that 

favors a criminal, whether in drug smuggling or cargo theft. 

The unrestricted access that workers enjoy at the Port of Miami 

enables a corrupt one to operate in a free area, free from surveillance. They are free to load drugs and stolen merchandise into 

their vehicles at any day and at hour of the day or night. 

Many of the workers at the port carry firearms in their vehicles. 

Indeed, it is rare that we do not find many handguns in workers’ 

vehicles during enforcement operations. No rules restrict the unlimited access or prohibit the carrying of firearms onto the port. 

There are no background checks performed as part of pre-employment screening. Many workers at the port have extensive 

criminal backgrounds and have free access to Customs areas. Customs, as an agency, is prohibited from conducting criminal history 

checks on any prospective worker. 

In conclusion, let me say that we are constantly striving to develop new strategies and capabilities to make and keep our port 

safe from the threats of drug smuggling. 

We are in partnership with industry and local government to develop regulatory legislation in regard to port access. I feel that, together, we can make significant progress toward the common goal 

of safeguarding our ports. 

Thank you for allowing me to appear before you in the subcommittee. I’m glad to answer any questions you might have. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Girard. We will now 

recognize Mr. Mike Sinclair, who is the chief of Miami Seaport 

Cargo Inspection Team, U.S. Customs Service. Welcome, Mr. Sinclair. 

Mr. SINCLAIR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I supervise a group of 

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cally for containerized cargo, narcotics concealed in that containerized cargo. 

Over the past 6 years, we’ve seized over 150,000 pounds of cocaine in containerized cargo just at the Port of Miami. These seizures range in weight from less than 10 pounds to over 31,000 

pounds of cocaine concealed in cement posts in 1991. During fiscal 

year 1997, 29 cocaine seizures have been made, totaling over 

11,800 pounds. 

A number of significant factors have combined to challenge our 

interdiction efforts. 

One is the trend of the smugglers to use nonsource countries as 

their method of importing cocaine into the south Florida area. No 

longer can we rely on the source countries as our target. Central 

and South America have become the source of many cocaine seizures at the Port of Miami. 

A second factor has been a recent shift to sending smaller but 

more deeply concealed loads of cocaine. While the number of cocaine seizures affected each year continues to climb, the average 

weight of each seizure has declined. 

The use of container structures to conceal cocaine has also become a major threat. Over 5,000 pounds of cocaine has been concealed in the structures of containers in fiscal year 1997. 

This trend is highlighted by a recent seizure on July 8th of 603 

pounds in a container concealed in a false wall, in which the conspirators had installed a pneumatic door to gain access to the concealment. 

Until recently, the Port of Miami was the primary destination of 

loads of cocaine concealed in containers arriving into south Florida. 

Over the past 2 years, however, the number of narcotic seizures 

in Port Everglades has climbed dramatically and significant loads 

of cocaine have been discovered in Jacksonville and Port Canaveral. It appears that the smugglers are port shopping, in order to 

avoid detection in Miami. 

However, the greatest threat or challenge to our interdiction efforts is the presence of the internal conspiracies operating within 

our ports. These smuggling organizations, which may include any 

individual associated with the port, have accounted for over 60 percent of the total weight of cocaine seized in Miami over the past 

several years. 

These seizures have ranged from 50 pounds in a duffel bag at the 

rear of a container to over 6,000 pounds of cocaine concealed in a 

commercial coffee shipment last August. 

These conspirators often utilize the containers of large volume, 

nationally known companies, to conceal their narcotics without the 

knowledge or participation of the importer, often compromising the 

integrity of the legitimate cargo. 

The use of these major importers serves to thwart some of our 

traditional targeting efforts. The conspirators often discard the legitimate cargo at the docks at the foreign site, where they will 

place the cocaine into the container, notify dock workers at the 

U.S. ports, who are tasked with removing the cocaine prior to Customs detection. 

Inspectors often find duplicate seals attached to the shipments of 

cocaine. This allows the conspirator to seal the container, which 

93

conceals his illegal activity from both law enforcement and the ultimate recipient. 

Significant man hours are devoted to the detection of these internal conspiracies. Working closely with the industry through our 

Carrier Initiative Program, we have instituted several measures 

designed to thwart the efforts of these smuggling groups. 

The development and utilization of new x-ray technology will enhance our interdiction efforts and, hopefully, serve to streamline 

the process of examining cargo at our ports of entry. 

Another invaluable asset to our efforts is Operation Guardian, 

specifically the utilization of full-time National Guard men and 

women to assist inspectors at our ports of entry. 

In conclusion, let me state that it is incumbent upon all parties 

associated with the shipping industry to share in the responsibility 

of addressing the internal conspiracy threat. Federal, State, local 

governments, along with industry representatives and labor 

groups, must meet the challenge collectively. 

Thank you for allowing me to speak. 

Mr. MICA [presiding]. Thank you for your testimony. I would now 

like to recognize James H. Wallwork, commissioner of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor. Sir, you are recognized. 

Mr. WALLWORK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

subcommittee. I’m Jim Wallwork, commissioner of the Waterfront 

Commission of New York Harbor. 

I was asked to give this subcommittee a brief synopsis of the 

Commission’s background, powers, and accomplishments. I’m going 

to hopscotch around a little bit and modify it, because of time, but 

I wanted to underscore a few things that Congressman Clay Shaw 

said. 

Congressman Clay Shaw reported that 63 percent of the port employees in Florida have criminal backgrounds, and they have been 

involved in drug smuggling. 

I’m happy to say, in the Port of New York, with the Waterfront 

Commission, we have various employment applications. Every one 

of our people who work on the docks, whether they be longshoremen, checkers, or whoever, are licensed or they are registered and, 

consequently, we look at their backgrounds. 

Two weeks ago, we removed a port watchman from the employment roles, because that port watchman had stolen five bags of cement. This is probably less than $200, but we removed him, because he is licensed by the Waterfront Commission and, if he is 

going to be stealing, we’re going to send a strong message that we 

will not adhere to that. 

I think a lot of the members here understand that the Waterfront Commission was established some 43 years ago, after there 

were sweeping investigations about crime, corruption, extortion, all 

types of corrupt activities on the waterfront, and that our main job 

then was to clean up the waterfront, per se. 

This pervasive corruption motivated both States, after the legislatures did the investigations, to enter into a compact creating the 

Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, and then this compact was approved by the Congress of the United States and signed 

into law, actually, by President Eisenhower, in August 1953, almost 44 years ago. 

94

The Commission is charged with safeguarding the public interest 

on the waterfront by eradicating both undesirable elements, individuals, and practices. 

The Commission’s jurisdiction is in a 1,500 square mile port district. It includes the piers and the waterfront terminals in Brooklyn, Manhattan, Staten Island, Yonkers, Port Newark, Port Elizabeth, Bayonne, and Jersey City. 

The Commission has broad authority in licensing and in regulatory, investigatory, and law enforcement powers which are exercised through six different divisions. 

Now, our Police Division Detectives really are the eyes and the 

ears on the docks, and they are doing, I believe, great police work. 

They work on cargo theft. They work on drug smuggling. They 

work on loan sharking, extortion, and all types of crime, by organized crime and, frankly, disorganized crime. 

We have also investigative accountants assigned to the Division 

of Audit and Control to scrutinize the books and the records of licensee and potential licensee companies for evidence of criminal activity, and to ensure compliance with Federal and State laws, because we’ve had cases where organized crime infiltrated the stevedoring companies and, of course, that can open up the floodgates 

for drug smuggling and any other kinds of illegal opportunities 

that they might take. 

No public funds, incidentally, are appropriated for our Commission. The employers pay the Commission an assessment not to exceed 2 percent upon the employers’ gross payroll payments. 

I mention this because I know that this testimony is interesting 

to the Florida delegation, because you are considering having a 

similar type of commission, I believe, in the greater Miami area. 

In fiscal year 1997–1998, our current fiscal year, the Commission 

will have a budget of $6.5 million, and we have 92 employees. 

Now, without getting involved in the nuts and the bolts of the 

operation, suffice it to say that we do, as I say, license stevedore 

companies, we license pier superintendents, hiring agents, port 

watchmen. 

They are all licensed, and they have a higher standard than the 

checkers, who are checking equipment going in the ships and the 

cargo going onto the docks, and the telecommunication controllers 

who are actually registered. 

The individuals who load and unload vessels, or perform services 

incidental to such work, are called longshoremen, and there are 

workers who are warehousemen and maintenance people. 

In order for them to obtain a registration, they must be free from 

convictions of certain crimes and of derogatory conduct, which 

would render their presence at piers or waterfront terminals a danger to the public peace or safety. We have—approximately 30 percent, since we’ve been in being, have not been granted licenses or 

registration, even though they have applied to work on the waterfront. Today we have 2,680 longshoremen, and over 75 percent of 

these people have no criminal records. The balance have records, 

but they’re rather minute, and they’re not disqualifying to be a 

longshoreman. 

95

I would like to skip briefly to our powers that we have and go 

into what we have done with licensing—I see my red light is on. 

I did want to cover one item which I think is important here. 

Mr. MICA. If you could take another minute and conclude, we 

would appreciate it. 

Mr. WALLWORK. All right. I was told I had 10 minutes before I 

showed up today and I was prepared for 10 minutes. 

We are dealing with narcotics and we have been involved in narcotics, working with U.S. Customs, DEA. We do have a very good 

relationship with the Federal authorities. 

Operation Tailgunner and Tailgunner II were conducted by the 

Commission with other investigators of DEA and U.S. Customs between 1991 and 1996. This was an operation that we uncovered on 

cocaine and marijuana trafficking in a cargo theft operation. It was 

actually being run out of a wholesale coffee business located in 

Brooklyn near the waterfront. There were a total of 1,700 pounds 

of cocaine and 16,000 pounds of marijuana smuggled into the 

United States in containers of general cargo. As an offshoot of 

these investigations, we solved that and we also solved an open 

double homicide case as well. 

Operation Tailgunner II then came because of this. This was an 

operation where we had co-conspirators working. One was a longshoreman, one was a retired longshoreman, and other people working with the Cali Cartel people. They were bringing in cocaine, over 

9 cases of smuggling, $40 million through the piers. 

Now, every 30 seconds in New York—and I think that this is an 

important statistic—every 30 seconds, 24 hours a day, 365 days a 

year, a cargo container moves through the port of New York-New 

Jersey. It is an overwhelming task to inspect for cargo theft and 

the problems of narcotics. We are working as hard and as well as 

we can. It is a big job, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wallwork follows:] 

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Mr. MICA. I thank you, Mr. Wallwork. Your entire statement, 

without objection, will be made a part of the record. 

Mr. WALLWORK. Yes, thank you. 

Mr. MICA. I would like to recognize now Edward V. Badolato, and 

he is chairman of the National Cargo Security Council. 

You are recognized, sir. I do not know if Mr. Cummings, who was 

in the chair while I was voting, mentioned it, you can summarize 

your entire statement, no matter how lengthy—within reason—will 

be made a part of the record. So, you are recognized. 

Mr. BADOLATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief in 

my oral statement. The National Cargo Security Council has a 25-

year history as a nonprofit government industry organization that 

represents shippers, carriers, insurers, forwarders, security and 

equipment companies dedicated to the safe and secure movement 

of the Nation’s goods and commerce. 

Cargo crime is one of the most serious hidden crimes in the 

United States. We do not know exactly how bad it is, but the best 

estimates of the top experts in the country estimate that we lose 

on an annual basis $10 billion a year in the United States alone. 

International groups such as the International Marine Organization, have said that cargo theft could be as much as $30 billion 

internationally. 

We do know such things as impacting consumers. For example, 

if anyone buys a new Pentium type of computer, the High Tech 

Theft Foundation estimates that you are paying as a consumer an 

additional $150 by virtue of the cargo theft impact on that sale. 

We have no system today to collect data on cargo theft in the 

United States. We do not know what is being stolen and there is 

no nationwide system for reporting these type of thefts. There is no 

Federal focus, no dedicated Federal official who is in charge of 

cargo theft. Of the thousands of Federal officials in all of the agencies, there is not one individual who focuses 8 hours a day soley 

on cargo theft. 

Additionally, I think it is important to understand that we have 

most of the cargo theft in the United States taking place in what 

we call ‘‘the Bermuda Triangle.’’ Most of it takes place in three 

areas, in the Miami-southern Florida area, in New York-New Jersey, and the southern California area. 

Now, cargo crime is cyclic, and we have seen a tremendous rise 

over a 25-year period. With that in mind, we are now presently at 

the apogee of that period. There are five key reasons why we are 

now suffering the worst cargo loss that we have seen in a generation. 

First, we have a new breed of cargo crooks. These individuals are 

smarter, faster, more adaptive and understand how to use transportation. Many come out of the drug trade which helps them to 

use cargo as a means of their criminal activity. 

Second, cargo is a common denominator for most of the criminal 

activities that take place in the country involving drugs, involving 

smuggling, involving diversion of product and, in some cases, terrorism. 

The third key reason for the increase is the internationalization 

and that increase of international criminal organizations. 

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The fourth reason is the overall reluctance to prosecute cargo 

crime as a property crime. We have very high thresholds bordering 

on $150,000 to $200,000 level thefts around the country, which 

means that theft of complete trailer loads when we catch the criminals may not be prosecuted. 

Finally, we have a tremendous change in the transportation industry involving automation, speed, and increases of shipments 

and so forth, with which the cargo criminals are heavily involved. 

Before I end, I would like to take the opportunity to say we have 

six recommendations to correct this tremendous criminal activity 

from the National Cargo Security Council. 

First, we would like to have a program, and we are currently organizing a program, to share best practices with all of the companies that are involved in transportation of cargo. We feel if they 

had standardized and set good security practices we can achieve a 

significant decrease in cargo theft. 

Second, we should support multi-jurisdictional cargo theft task 

forces. We started one in Florida and we hope to have one in New 

York-New Jersey and, also, in California. Also, we want to have a 

cargo theft reporting system. This is urgently needed. We need to 

correct the chronic underfunding of law enforcement agencies involved in cargo theft. The underfunding is not with drugs, but 

cargo theft. 

Additionally, we need to have the government-industry team improve the government aspects of that team. There is not a lot of 

participation from the Federal agencies in cargo theft. It is improving, but we are still not there. 

Finally, in closing, I would like to say that one of the things we 

need to have done is to have more focus and more leverage from 

all the R&D which is going on in the various law enforcement 

agencies in those side issues to cargo theft, i.e., in the drug area, 

smuggling, and so forth. We need to have more R&D focus on cargo 

theft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Badolato follows:] 

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Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony. 

I would like to recognize now Mr. Art Coffey, international vice 

president of the International Longshoremen’s Association. Mr. 

Coffey, you are recognized, thank you. 

Mr. COFFEY. Good afternoon, sir. I am the president of Local 

1922 of the International Longshoremen’s Association in Miami, 

FL. I have been in that local from Miami for 27 years, and the last 

19 years as its president. As a district vice president with the ILA 

South Atlantic-Gulf Coast District and the international vice president of the ILA’s Executive Council, I represent all south Florida 

ports of my union. This includes ports of Miami, Port Everglades 

and all Florida East Coast ports. I thank the Members of Congress 

for allowing the ILA to appear at this subcommittee. 

Today, I speak for the hardworking and law-abiding ILA members and their families who live and work in south Florida region. 

I also speak for tens of thousands of ILA members and their families who work in our Nation’s ports from Searsport, ME, to Brownsville, TX. 

In April 1997, an article appeared in the Miami Herald saying 

in essence that U.S. Customs was failing to combat the illegal flow 

of drugs into this country via south Florida ports and blamed the 

crisis on dock workers at the Port of Miami and other south Florida 

ports. 

What a change. Eight years earlier when the same newspaper, 

the Miami Herald reported on January 18, 1989, the marvelous cooperation between the ILA, ocean carriers, and the U.S. Customs 

to combat illegal drugs flowing drugs into this country. 

With great fanfare the then U.S. Customs Commissioner William 

von Raab announced in south Florida an unprecedented agreement 

with the ILA and carriers would tighten security of America’s seaports. But it has changed in 8 years. The ILA always remained 

ready in its role as active partners with law enforcement agencies 

to halt the illegal drugs at all the Nation’s ports. Our international 

president, John Bowers, even threatened a national boycott shipment from countries who are suspected of supplying illegal drugs 

into this country. Newspapers around the country printed a stirring quote delivered before the U.S. Customs press conference in 

Washington, DC, in 1989 when President Bowers said, ‘‘ILA longshoremen would rather lose their wages than lose their children.’’ 

We were praised by Commissioner von Raab for creating the ILADAD program, Dockers Against Drugs. 

Perhaps it is the U.S. Customs Agency that has failed in its job 

of stopping the flow of illegal drugs into this country. Now, burdened with the shortage of manpower, budget cuts and ineffective 

leadership, Customs wrongly targets their former partners and 

blames ILA longshoremen for their own shortcomings. 

The Honorable John Mica, Member of Congress, traveled to 

south Florida and the Bahamas several weeks ago to examine the 

Federal counter-drug control efforts. The ILA agrees with Congressman Mica, specifically finding that the U.S. Customs should 

increase the number of agents in the Miami and south Florida 

area. We also agree that Congress should appropriate funds to increase and improve surveillance in all U.S. ports. 

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On the recommendation of background checks for our workers, 

the ILA is puzzled as to whom should the background checks and 

just how effective they are. Who specifically are the warehouse 

union mentioned in Congressman Mica’s report? It is not the ILA 

which employs less than 12 warehouse workers on an average day 

in the Port of Miami. The largest employer of personnel and warehouses in south Florida regrettably is not the ILA, but Manpower, 

Inc., another day laborer employee agencies. 

I believe this committee should question the character of these 

employees over the ILA’s since they are usually paid minimum 

wage with no benefits. Are they not more likely to enhance their 

incomes through illegal means? 

The ILA believes that if one of its members is caught engaging 

in illegal activities, he should be punished, but not to burden the 

entire organization with background checks because of the bad behavior of a select few. I hope that it is not this committee’s intent 

to solving the problem. It just will not work. 

In fact, it is ironic to note that background checks have proved 

ineffective to U.S. Customs and Florida law enforcement agencies 

that they want us to have. Within the past year, Customs officials 

in the south Florida area along with Broward County Sheriff’s Department employees were busted for aiding smugglers who were 

transferring drugs through the Ft. Lauderdale Airport. Miami television recently reported that another Customs agent in Miami was 

charged with using a confiscated drug smuggling boat for his own 

personal pleasure. 

Do we condemn the entire Customs Agency or law enforcement 

agency because of these actions? Of course not. We look for a 

tougher law enforcement system, justice system to deal with it as 

it should be. We do not like to infringe on the rights of workers by 

unnecessary background checks. Let me emphasize that the ILA 

does not condone illegal drug trafficking or its use. ILA members’ 

children attend south Florida schools where the illegal drugs are 

sold. We want that stopped. ILA families living in south Florida 

are equally jeopardized by the crimes of robbery, assault and murder associated with the Nation’s illegal drug problems. 

For the past 6 years, our union and its members have negotiated 

one of the toughest drug problems and alcohol abuse rehabilitation 

programs in the history of America. Drug testing of new employees 

is mandatory. Failure to drug test for the third time after rehabilitation means a lifetime ban of working in our industry. 

Instead of the witch hunt against the decent working men and 

women of the ILA, the ILA invites you, again, as partners in the 

Nation’s war against drugs. The ILA, which we like to say stands 

for I Love America, wants the United States of America to be drugfree from illegal drugs. We are willing to do our part to reach that 

goal for our citizens and our Nation. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coffey follows:] 

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Mr. MICA. I thank you for your testimony and also for your indication of support from the ILA to work with us in this mutual effort to combat illegal narcotics. 

I would like to thank our other panelists and now recognize for 

questions Mr. Barr. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I returned, along with several other members of this subcommittee, recently from a trip down to South America. We visited 

Panama, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, from which countries collectively—a vast majority, virtually all of the cocaine which eventually 

finds its way onto the streets of America comes. Since then, we 

have had some hearings with the State Department folks and some 

others. We are going to be having, as I understand it, some additional hearings next week. This one fits very importantly in the 

overall scheme of what we are trying to do in this subcommittee; 

and, that is, to find out specifically why—we know that the war 

against mind-altering drugs in recent years is not working. We 

want to find out why and to fashion some legislative and appropriations tools that help in that regard. 

One of the things that I discovered on the trip is there are, indeed, some countries that are doing it the right way. Not us. Oh, 

and I am talking about an overall drug strategy. There certainly 

are the men and women of Customs, DEA, the other law enforcement agencies are doing an outstanding job putting their lives on 

the line. The problem is we do not have a strategy from above that 

really gives them the backup and the tools that they need to do the 

job. 

I think there are four ‘‘C’s,’’ I call it four ‘‘C’s’’ of a successful 

antidrug effort: It has to be clear. It has to be consistent. It has 

to be coordinated. It has to be—well, heck, that is only three. It has 

to be clear, consistent, coordinated, and there is one more. I will 

think of it in a second. 

There are some countries that are doing that. Peru, for one. We 

have in the past done it in this country, but we are not doing it 

right now. I commend the subcommittee chair, Congress Hastert, 

for putting together this panel today because it brings to bear some 

of the often, as you have said, Mr. Badolato, some of the overlooked 

aspects, some tools that can be very, very effective and some areas 

that we need to look at more carefully than in the past. 

I am somewhat disturbed to see we have somewhat of a dispute. 

I was not aware of this, Mr. Coffey, I just sort of sat up when you 

began your remarks. I hate to see internally within the country 

here that we are sort of going at each other and, hopefully, we can 

get these problems resolved. 

In my experience as a former U.S. attorney, I worked very closely 

with Customs and know firsthand that the vast overwhelming majority of the men and women of the Customs Service, whether they 

serve in Atlanta, where I served as U.S. attorney, or in Miami or 

anywhere else, are very, very honest, dedicated men and women 

who are doing a tremendous job. 

I also know from working with union members, particularly at 

Lockheed-Martin and Marietta in my district that, likewise, the 

vast majority, the overwhelming majority of men and women that 

are union workers in our country are hardworking, honest, patriVerDate jul 14 2003 12:53 Dec 11, 2003 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\46177.TXT 46177
133

otic Americans who want to do their part and are doing their part 

to win the war against drugs by not tolerating any drugs in the 

workplace, not tolerating drugs in schools and families and other 

businesses or anywhere else in our communities. 

So I really do hope that whatever problems that may exist in 

Miami, we can get it straightened out, because the only people that 

benefit if we have disputes between our government agencies and 

our workers or businesses is the drug cartel, the drug traffickers. 

We ought to be doing a great deal more to make their job harder 

rather than creating divisions within our own society where we 

make their job easier. Every time there is a diversion between Federal agencies or between agencies, Federal agencies, and local law 

enforcement or between law enforcement and businesses, that does 

nothing except allow another avenue where the drugs can sneak in. 

So I really do hope that whatever problems there may or may not 

be between Customs and the ILA, that you all can work them out. 

It does not accomplish anything positive if we cannot. 

Mr. Girard, if you could, you know, try and address, if you could 

in just a couple of minutes in a positive, are there some problems 

between you all and ILA and, if so, can we work these out? Or are 

things going OK and we just need to really sort of hunker down, 

as we say in Georgia, and do a little better job? 

Mr. GIRARD. Well, sir, I am not aware of any institionalized problems between Customs and the ILA. As a matter of fact, I know 

meetings have been held between other Customs divisions and the 

ILA to address the problems at the Port of Miami. We are not singling out any particular organization when we talk about internal 

conspiracies. Certainly, there may be ILA members that have been 

involved in them, but there are also many other employees from 

different areas, all the facet of the port that are involved. We welcome their continued cooperation. 

Mr. BARR. Is there, something, Mr. Coffey, that can be done to 

try and resolve whatever problems there are? I do not know that 

there is really much we can do; although, if there is something that 

we can look at from our oversight standpoint, we certainly will. Is 

there anything we can do or is there something that can be done 

to get things back on track if they are somewhat off-track? 

Mr. COFFEY. Well, no, Congressman. I only pointed out that one 

particular incident just to show that drugs hit everybody. It does 

not matter if you had a background check or you did not have a 

background check or whatever it may be. It is not a shot at U.S. 

Customs. U.S. Customs and the ILA in Miami, at least, have been 

very cooperative with each other. 

There is no problems as we have developed a port security committee in the Port of Miami. When the article came out in the 

Miami Herald, I called the chief of security, who is with me today, 

Fred Wong, from the Port of Miami, also the chief of operations. 

I asked them to come with me today. We formed a committee with 

Customs and at that committee, Mr. Sinclair was there, and so 

many other Customs agents, I do not remember, but we were trying to just start on the problem. We wanted to be the solution to 

this situation. There really is no loggerheads or anything of that 

nature or any problems that I am aware of with U.S. Customs. 

134

Mr. BARR. That is good. I certainly had a different impression 

from some of your remarks, but maybe I just misinterpreted them. 

Mr. WALLWORK. Mr. Chairman, could I just make a quick comment that I think is germane to that? In New York-New Jersey, 

of course, with the Waterfront Commission, we license and register, 

as I said, the longshoremen and the other people that work with 

the ILA. 

The overwhelming majority of the ILA people, as I testified, have 

good records. We have a good relationship with the ILA leadership. 

We also have a good relationship with the U.S. Customs. I would 

say in the Port of New York-New Jersey, it is working and it can 

work. 

The other factor is that with our powers, we have removed 99 

corrupt union leaders from the ILA and some of them, at least 4 

of them in the early 1960’s, late 1950’s migrated down to Miami 

into Local 22. 

Mr. BARR. Could I just have 1 more minute? I ask unanimous 

consent just for 1 minute. 

Mr. MICA. Without objection. 

Mr. BARR. Mr. Badolato, who is here, and the National Cargo Security Council I think can play a key role in all of this. I do appreciate the paper and your remarks and some specific solutions. I 

would just ask that as you work through this, if there are specific 

legislative steps that we can make—a couple of them come to my 

mind when I look at your six points here in terms of perhaps focusing on training of law enforcement activities, focusing a little more 

specifically with some of our Federal agencies on cargo theft in particular and how it relates to the problem of drugs coming in. 

There may be some other specific measures we could look at. I 

know we have Mr. McCullum here who chairs the Crime Subcommittee on which I also serve. If there are specific legislative 

measures that you think might be appropriate for us to address, 

whether it is Title 18, the criminal code, if any of our laws regarding cargo theft need to be strengthened or in some other area of 

the United States Code, let me know, please. This I think is an 

area that is very frequently overlooked and, yet, it plays a key role 

because so much of the drugs that we have on our streets come in 

through our ports. I appreciate your being here and would again 

encourage you if there is anything more specifically that we could 

be looking at from a legislative standpoint, I would be very receptive. 

Mr. BADOLATO. Yes, sir, Congressman. We are very pleased and 

look forward to doing that. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WALLWORK. Mr. Chairman, could I make one other comment 

which I think, again, is germane here? We have a good relationship 

with the National Cargo Security Council in the Port of New YorkNew Jersey. I would like to say that in one of our investigations 

in cargo theft we have uncovered a system whereby these people 

that are taking the cargo, stealing the cargo, have a way of opening 

the cargo doors without breaking the seal. So, therefore, they put 

the cargo door back on, the seal is still there and everybody thinks, 

‘‘Hey, nothing has happened.’’

135

Now, specifically in Freeport in the Caribbean it was testified 

earlier that they go in there and they do not open the containers, 

so nothing can be done. Well, you can pop open those container 

doors without breaking the seal, put narcotics in or remove them 

or do whatever they want. I want to make sure that the committee 

understands that through this cargo theft, we have found that certainly can be done. They can get inside without breaking the seal. 

Very important. 

Mr. BARR. Is that a problem of maybe addressing the standards 

for the cargo containers? 

Mr. WALLWORK. Well, there is a way and I can give it to you in 

executive session so that we do not disclose what they are doing 

publicly, but they are breaking in without breaking the seal and 

gaining access to cargo. 

How we uncovered this was there were short loads of clothing 

and other things going to the manufacturers and they would open 

up the door, the seal was still there, and they would maybe have 

$25,000 or $50,000 of shortages and they could never show where 

the shortage occurred because, actually, these cargo theft people 

were involved in a great big ring. 

Mr. MICA. I thank you and I thank the gentleman from Georgia. 

I now recognized the ranking member, Mr. Barrett. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Girard and Mr. Sinclair, I want to make sure that we are—

and Mr. Coffey, for that matter, you would agree what we have 

heard today, that there has been a significant increase in drug 

smuggling in the Port of Miami. Is that your experience or your observation? 

Mr. GIRARD. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Sinclair. 

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Coffey, you would concur with that? 

Mr. COFFEY. I have no knowledge of how those statistics——

Mr. BARRETT. Can you tell me approximately when it began? 

Was there a time when you started noticing a difference? 

Mr. SINCLAIR. The average seizures back in 1990–1991—well, to 

go a little bit further back, most of the drugs in the early 1980’s 

were marijuana. We started seeing significant cocaine seizures in 

1986–1987. Most of them were deeply concealed going to what we 

call a consignee or somebody out in the public who actually ordered 

the drugs and hid them in a container and had no coercion with 

anybody at the port. 

We started to see major loads of internal conspiracy-related cocaine in 1989 and 1990. Colombian coffee was a favorite, with over 

17 seizures in 3 years in Colombian coffee. Significant loads of 

thousand pounds-plus. And this continued up to about 1994. 

In 1995, we saw a significant plunge in the amount of cocaine, 

almost half from 20-something thousand to 11,000. In 1996, we 

were back up to the 22,000 mark, and we are currently at 12,000. 

However, the Port of Port Everglades is seeing 1,000 times what 

they saw before. They are up to like 8,000 or 9,000 this year already. A typical year for them is 2,000; so, there are shifting ports. 

Jacksonville recently got 1,000 pounds of cocaine. So, to say that 

it is just at the Port of Miami, it is increasing—the decrease at the 

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Port of Miami is made up at the increase at the other south Florida 

ports. 

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Sinclair used the phrase, ‘‘internal conspiracy.’’ 

Mr. Girard, I think you used that phrase also, as did Mr. Banks. 

What are you talking about specifically when you are using that 

phrase? 

Mr. GIRARD. Well, sir, what internal conspiracy is, it is a corrupt 

relationship between the smuggling organizations and different employees or ocean shipping lines, airlines, and related service industries, all the cargo handling areas are susceptible. So, what in effect happens is that the people that are supposed to be moving this 

cargo for Customs examination and safeguarding it prior to that 

are actually in collusion with the smuggling organizations. They 

are either taking the drugs out of the cargo before examination or 

diverting the cargo totally out of Customs’ control. 

Mr. BARRETT. How widespread is this? 

Mr. GIRARD. We see an increase. It is periodic. When we started 

targeting consignee loads at the Port of Miami; that is, loads that 

were intended to pass through the Port hoping to avoid Customs 

examination just on sheer luck, when we started targeting those 

through increased intelligence, we created a data bank that improved our targeting ability so that we were picking these loads out 

with increasing frequency. We saw a dramatic change in the internal conspiracy type of smuggling method. It is very telling when 

you open the back of the container and the drug is just piled in the 

back of a container; 1 of 50 coffee containers destined for a legitimate consignee. We know that that internal conspiracies existed 

and we’re going to use it to target that specific container. 

Mr. BARRETT. Have they included Customs workers as well? 

Mr. GIRARD. Not to my knowledge, sir, no. 

Mr. SINCLAIR. Not at the seaport that I am aware of. 

Mr. BARRETT. OK. What is the best way to attack this type of 

criminal enterprise from your standpoint? 

Mr. GIRARD. Well, sir, the way we approached it, from our side, 

from the investigative side is through undercover operations where 

we passed ourselves off as drug traffickers and through sources of 

information located these internal conspiracies in place. We then 

sent sham loads of cocaine from foreign countries into the United 

States and watched them pull what they thought was cocaine from 

the shipping conveyance and deliver it to us, and we arrest them. 

Mr. SINCLAIR. Sir, the way we approach it, if we were looking for 

something that was a normal consignee load, we could target it off 

a manifest and send two or three inspectors and a canine and some 

tools out to look at this particular container. With the internal conspiracies, we do not know what container on that vessel contains 

that load. There may be 150 containers on that vessel. They may 

have used, just to use an example, Walmart may have five containers. They may have decided to use those containers knowing we 

were not going to target Walmart. So, what we have to do, in effect, 

is send out 10 to 12 inspectors and 5 or 6 National Guard, and we 

increase our manpower and we have to control every container that 

comes off that vessel because of this internal conspiracy. 

137

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Coffey, your union, obviously has come under 

some attack in this. What constructive role do you think you are 

playing and what more constructive role can you play? 

Mr. COFFEY. Well, one of the things that has happened over the 

years is the shipping of containers has changed quite a bit. We 

used to get a lot of containers that were discharged from the vessels. When they were discharged from the vessels, they had multiple consignees in them. Those multiple consignees, that container 

was then stripped at the warehouse and then the owner of the 

cargo would come and pick it up. Today, a lot of the—they call it 

intermodalism. An awful lot of the containers now are on ITs, InTransits. They come and take them off the port—I mean when they 

hit the port, they go off the port to different debarking stations or 

NVOCCS, which is a nonvessel operator. I mean it is other places. 

It does not happen there. 

Mike’s group probably takes apart more containers than we ever 

do. We take nothing apart or strip any boxes that come out of the 

Caribbean, Central and South America. We do from the Far East. 

We do about 15 containers a week in that respect, but most of the 

containers that are landed in the Port of Miami are shifted inland. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you. I have no further questions. 

Mr. BARR [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Barrett. 

By the way, my crack staff reminded me that the fourth C of my 

successful antidrug effort, that I had forgotten momentarily, was 

comprehensive: clear, consistent, coordinated, and comprehensive. 

If I could, just very, very briefly, Mr. Girard, Mr. Sinclair, and 

anybody else that might have the background to comment on this. 

Over the course of the last couple of years, have you noticed any 

changes in the type, amount, way in which drugs are coming in, 

where they are coming from? Any trends that you have noticed in 

recent months? 

Mr. SINCLAIR. As I testified earlier, the loads are becoming more 

frequent, but smaller in nature. Some people have speculated that 

some of the breakup of the major cartels over the past 2 or 3 years 

might have set the drug smuggling industry a little bit eschew and 

there are some smaller groups out there that do not have that 

much resources. They are sending smaller loads. 

Mr. BARR. Quality changed? 

Mr. SINCLAIR. I do not know. 

Mr. BARR. The purity? 

Mr. SINCLAIR. No, no. 

Mr. BARR. No. 

Mr. SINCLAIR. They are also much more deeply concealed now. 

Probably the biggest factor is they are coming from everywhere. 

This year, alone, we have over 5,000 pounds of cocaine from Costa 

Rica, which is something that we never had to worry about before. 

And now we have 5,000 pounds of cocaine from Costa Rica, roughly, and it is in the construction of the container, itself. We have to 

worry about the cargo, we have to worry about the container. 

Mr. BARR. Any from Mexico that you see coming in through ports 

in Florida? 

Mr. SINCLAIR. No, sir. We do not have a great volume of cargo 

coming from Mexico into Port Everglades or Miami. 

Mr. BARR. Mr. Girard, anything to add? 

138

Mr. GIRARD. You know, it highlights the lack of adequate intelligence across the ocean, you know, that would provide us with, you 

know, sort of an early warning system to know that all of a sudden 

Costa Rica is starting to really be a transit country that needs special attention. I know that has been talked about with Mr. Banks 

and DEA and the Coast Guard. That is one of our concerns. We 

need to expand our intelligence capabilities. We have to. It is a 

must. 

Mr. BARR. In that vein, do you all deal with the Southern Command at all in terms of the early warning and the tracking the vehicles coming in from South America and Central America into the 

mainland, including Florida? 

Mr. GIRARD. No. I mean we are cargo specialists. So, I mean it 

is a normal route, you know, that cargo is flowing from Costa Rica, 

et cetera. I know that some of the air units, with JADA East, are 

operating with Southern Command, but I cannot answer that directly. 

Mr. BARR. So what you are talking is better civilian intelligence 

as it were from human sources. 

Mr. GIRARD. Right, exactly. 

Mr. BARR. And technical sources? 

Mr. GIRARD. Yes. I mean, we should have the means to notice the 

shift in change of the shipping routes or staging areas, you know, 

throughout Central and South America. 

Mr. BARR. Have we had that capability in the past? Have you 

seen better intelligence in the past or have we never really had it? 

Mr. GIRARD. From my experience, I have never really seen, you 

know, excellent intelligence where we could actually pinpoint. We 

are more reacting to events as we discover them. And then it is 

worked backward. 

Mr. WALLWORK. Mr. Chairman, if I could just interject? In New 

York, approximately 3,000 containers move through the ports in 

New York and New Jersey every day. It is my understanding that 

Customs looks at about 50 of those containers and maybe half of 

them for narcotics, the rest for contraband. This is like looking for 

a needle in a haystack. We are never going, in my judgment, to be 

able to interdict smuggled drugs through looking in containers—

hard as the Customs people and the other people work at it. I have 

been down on the docks. I have seen the dogs. I have seen the National Guard people and I have seen the Customs people sweating 

in 95 degree heat. 

In my opinion, not only do we have to do what we have been discussing here, but I think Speaker Gingrich was 100 percent right 

when he said, ‘‘If you are a big-time drug smuggler, second offense, 

the death penalty.’’ And Mrs. Reagan’s, ‘‘Just say no.’’ I think it is 

an education program that cocaine fries the brain and it is just like 

a stroke to the brain. We have to get the message out to the American people, especially the young people. Otherwise, we can chase 

these containers and we can talk about what Customs and DEA, 

the Waterfront Commission can do, we are never going to solve the 

problem, in my humble judgment. 

Mr. BARR. Have you all, particularly from the Customs standpoint, have you all noticed any particular problem with diplomatic 

shipments coming in? 

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Mr. SINCLAIR. No, sir. 

Mr. BARR. You do not have any way of——

Mr. SINCLAIR. No, sir. 

Mr. BARR. Do you all have any way at all of really tracking those 

or detecting? Are they subject to the same detection attempts, efforts, or devices or procedures that are used for commercial? 

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes, sir, from an inspection standpoint. No. 1, 

there are not very many at seaports. It is mostly an air cargo 

thing. No. 2, if we had some reason to suspect a diplomatic shipment, we would take the proper steps and we can contact embassies and what not and consulates and investigate whether we can 

examine them or not. The volume is not that great down there. 

Mr. BARR. What about cruise lines? Is this a serious problem? Inconsequential? Increasing? How would you characterize the problem with cruise lines? 

Mr. SINCLAIR. I would characterize it as large. The same people 

who are involved in the internal conspiracies at the cargo end of 

it are also the same people that help work vessels, remove bags. 

There are so many—an average ship may have 1,000 crew members. Peter may be able to talk a little more on that as to what our 

crew member end of that is; but these same dock workers are 

working cruise ships, also. 

Mr. BARR. Is there any help that we could provide? Is it simply 

a matter of manpower? Is it a problem of not having sufficient 

technical equipment? Everything from flare radars, cutter sensors, 

various hand-held detectors, x rays, detection machines. Or is it a 

combination of everything that you all do not have enough of? 

Mr. SINCLAIR. I believe it is a combination of everything. Not 

necessarily we do not have enough of it, but as it is coming in, we 

need to keep calling on it. The National Guard program is very important. The technology that we are getting in, ready to receive at 

the Port of Miami over the next 2 years, we are getting ready to 

receive three different total container x-ray systems. We need to 

keep that program going. They are from the DOD. 

Listening to all the testimony here today, we do need some mechanism of limiting access to the port. That is, you know, whether we 

want to pattern it after New York or pattern it after the sealing 

program at our airports, something needs to be done. 

Mr. BARR. You are talking about limiting access from land? 

Mr. SINCLAIR. Limiting access to workers or people who do not 

need to be out there on the port when they are not supposed to be. 

That is basically it. 

Mr. BARR. Would anybody disagree with that from the private 

sector? 

Mr. COFFEY. I do. I do because even, as Mr. Wallwork said, that 

after 40-something years, he just threw somebody off the docks the 

other day. I mean, I am sure there is background checks. I am sure 

all the background checks in the world do not do a world of good. 

Mike and I have discussed access to the cargo area where they 

were going to have a certain area where the longshoremen and the 

workers who worked cargo vessels were going to park their vehicles 

and then get jitneyed or trolleyed into the area. That particular 

program just went down the tubes because they said it cost too 

much. So now, the men go down into that area and they park their 

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cars and now they are being charged with taking drugs or whatever it may be, contraband, off the port in their cars. So we are 

asking for them to put the jitneys in place. We are saying, get the 

parking lot, limit the areas, limit the people. We have no problem 

with things of that nature. 

Mr. BARR. So you all do not have a problem with the concept. We 

just have not found the right way to make it work? 

Mr. COFFEY. Our minds are open. I think we have to really 

brainstorm the whole idea of it and to take a good hard look and 

get some counts of heads of what we are talking about because in 

all my time down there, U.S. Customs or no one really has come 

into my office and said, ‘‘Listen. This is what we have. This man 

did this. This man did that.’’ That has never happened to me. I am 

just finding out all of this within the last couple of weeks as to 

what really is going on. 

I think the Port of Miami is different than the Port of New York. 

I think there are a lot of things that are different there than here. 

I think that if we all really sit down and try to formulate something, which we did and we are doing right now with the port security meetings, and we have been doing this just recently. I think 

we have to keep on doing it. 

Mr. WALLWORK. Mr. Chairman, we in the Waterfront Commission, since the inception of the Waterfront Commission in 1953, 

have revoked or we have suspended approximately 6,000 people 

from working on the dock. That would be because of criminal activity. 

Mr. BARR. OK. I would like to, unless there is any further comments, thank all members of this panel for some very enlightening 

direct testimony as well as answers to questions. If you all have 

anything else further that you would like to submit for the record, 

please do so. Other members of the committee, as well as the 

Crime Subcommittee and from the Florida delegation, we will leave 

the record open so they can submit any additional questions or 

comments for 2 weeks. 

Thank you, gentlemen, very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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