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i 

94–234 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–32] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

COMBAT AVIATION MODERNIZATION 

PROGRAMS AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2016 

BUDGET REQUEST 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 26, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

PAUL COOK, California, Vice Chair 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cook, Hon. Paul, a Representative from California, Vice Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ................................................ 8 

WITNESSES 

Grosklags, VADM Paul A., USN, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), U.S. Navy; 

LtGen Jon M. Davis, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps; and RADM Michael C. Manazir, USN, Director, Air Warfare 

(OPNAV N98), U.S. Navy .................................................................................... 2 

Holmes, Lt Gen James M. ‘‘Mike,’’ USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic 

Plans and Requirements, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force .................................. 4 

Ray, Maj Gen Timothy M., USAF, Director of Global Power Programs, Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Headquarters, 

U.S. Air Force ....................................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Grosklags, VADM Paul A., joint with RADM Michael C. Manazir and 

LtGen Jon M. Davis ...................................................................................... 25 

Pawlikowski, Lt Gen Ellen M., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition, joint with Lt Gen 

James M. ‘‘Mike’’ Holmes ............................................................................. 67 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. McSally ....................................................................................................... 97 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 101 

(1) 

COMBAT AVIATION MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS AND 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 26, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Cook (vice chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL COOK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, VICE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. COOK. The hearing will come to order. The subcommittee 

today meets to receive testimony on the Navy, Marine Corps, and 

Air Force budget requests for combat aircraft programs for fiscal 

year 2016. 

I would like to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses 

today, Vice Admiral Paul Grosklags, Principal Military Deputy to 

the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research Development and 

Acquisition. And we just had a hearing once again. So we are wearing you out, Admiral. Lieutenant General Jon M. Davis, Deputy 

Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation; Rear Admiral Michael C. Manazir, Director of Air Warfare Division for the U.S. 

Navy; Major General Timothy M. Ray, Director, Global Power Programs; and Lieutenant General Mike Holmes, Air Force Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Plans and Requirements. 

First of all, I thank you for all your service and look forward to 

the testimony today. 

As we review the fiscal year budget request for combat aviation 

forces, it is clear the Budget Control Act [BCA] of 2011 continues 

to force the military to make short-time decisions that have longterm consequences on our national security. 

It is clear that the combat aviation programs of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are confronted by tradeoffs in capability, 

capacity, and readiness. Capabilities are those modernization programs that provide the systems necessary to defeat current and future threats. Capacity is the ability to retain sufficient force structure to meet current and future requirements. And readiness is the 

training in these systems. 

The Navy and Marine Corps are facing shortfalls in fighter aircraft for fiscal year 2016. The Navy deferred 16 F–35s in the future 

defense program, trading capability for today’s readiness. The Navy 

has truncated its procurement of F/A–18E/F aircraft, also trading 

capacity for readiness. 
2 

Now the Navy will be 134 aircraft below its requirements of 

fighter aircraft in the 2020 timeframe, with an average of about 

100 aircraft short between now and 2020. If we assume that a 

shortfall of 65 aircraft will be manageable for the Navy, this leaves 

the Navy short about 35 aircraft, or 3 squadrons of strike fighters. 

Last year, the Air Force canceled the F–16’s combat avionics program extension, or CAPES. CAPES would have equipped the block 

40, 42, 50, and 52 fleets with new radars and defense systems that 

increase survivability against emerging threats. This trade was 

made to meet today’s readiness requirements. This year, as it did 

last year, the Air Force is proposing to retire over half of its A– 

10 fleet, reducing fighter capacity below the Air Force’s 2,000-aircraft requirement. 

Increasing the OCO [overseas contingency operations] funding 

request to offset the solution is something that you have seen in 

the papers, on the news. There was a critical vote taken last night. 

I am proud to say I think it went the right way. We didn’t get the 

complete fix that many people, such as myself, wanted. But this is 

a beginning. And, of course, the ideal solution from my standpoint 

is to repeal the sequester. 

But this is not going to happen with the deal. But as I said, we 

did get part of the pie. And we’ve got to continue this. And much 

of your testimony, many of you have been here before. And it is not 

just this committee that has to hear this, it is the rest of Congress. 

I am concerned that this budget request will reduce both capacity 

and, in our strike fighter forces, affect readiness and result in a 

higher risk in achieving military objectives in the future. 

I look forward to our service witness testimony today, which I 

hope will expand on the risks associated with the capacity and capability reductions in our combat aviation forces. 

I was going to turn to Ms. Sanchez. I think she is running a little 

late. But when she is—when she gets here, I will ask her to make 

an opening statement as the ranking member. 

And without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

included in the hearing record. 

Admiral Grosklags, will you please proceed with your opening 

statement, followed by the rest of the panel as we go down. Thank 

you. 

STATEMENT OF VADM PAUL A. GROSKLAGS, USN, PRINCIPAL 

MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION), U.S. 

NAVY; LTGEN JON M. DAVIS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT 

FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND RADM MICHAEL C. 

MANAZIR, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE (OPNAV N98), U.S. 

NAVY 

STATEMENT OF VADM PAUL A. GROSKLAGS 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. We appreciate the opportunity to 

appear before you today to address our Navy and Marine Corps 

aviation programs. 

As you well know, the United States is a maritime nation. We 

have global interests and global responsibilities. Our Navy and Ma-
3 

rine Corps provide the continuously forward-deployed persistent 

presence which ensures our Nation’s global reach, global access, 

and ability to project power, regardless of changing alliances, permissions, or circumstances on the ground. 

We move at will across the world’s oceans, the seas, and the 

littorals, providing our Nation’s leaders with offshore options where 

it matters and when it matters. The aviation component of our 

Navy and Marine Corps team enables our sea-based and expeditionary naval forces to bring simultaneous influence over vast 

stretches of maritime environment, across the shoreline, and deep 

inland. 

As such, it is critical that our aviation forces remain always 

ready and poised to engage in a moment’s notice, with the required 

capacity and capability to influence events and, if necessary, to 

fight and to win. 

Last year, we saw significant advancements in many of our aviation programs: the first P–8 deployment to the Western Pacific; the 

standup of a second Special Purpose MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force] formed around the capabilities of the V–22 and the 

KC–130J; initial qualification of the Joint Strike Fighter onboard 

an aircraft carrier. 

This year, we look forward to a number of additional milestones, 

to include the initial operational capability [IOC] of the F–35B with 

the Marine Corps; initiation of sensor testing on our MQ–4C Triton 

ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] platform; the 

first flight of the Marine Corps CH53K by the end of this year; our 

first deployment of the the E–2D Hawkeye started this month on 

the Theodore Roosevelt. Along with the Air Force, we have declared 

initial operational capability for the AIM–120D and will IOC the 

AIM–9X Block II this month. 

For 2016, our naval aviation budget request is based on a number of central themes: fifth generation fighter and attack capability; 

netted persistent multi-role intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; critical supporting capabilities in electronic attack, maritime patrol, and vertical lift; advanced strike weapons programs; 

readiness recovery; and targeted modernization of the force to ensure continued relevance and sustainability. 

As this subcommittee is well aware, while our security interests 

face an increasing array of threats and demands, our budget position grows ever more challenging. We will continue to prioritize the 

readiness of the forces currently forward deployed over all other investments. However, we must also recognize that those Navy and 

Marine Corps forces this Nation deploys to meet the future threat 

will be dependent upon the modernization and the readiness efforts 

provided by the programs of today. 

Across the Department, our strategies for the development, procurement, and sustainment of both current and future weapon systems are critically dependent upon stable and—excuse me—predictable funding at a level commensurate with our President’s Budget 

2016 [PB16] budget request. 

The alternative has been made clear by our secretaries and our 

service chiefs. A smaller force, a force less forward deployed, a force 

slower to respond in a crisis, and a force which, when it does respond, will be less capable and more vulnerable. 
4 

Mr. Chairman, we request your leadership and the support of 

this subcommittee to provide the resources that enable your Navy 

and Marine Corps to be our Nation’s first responders. We again 

thank you for the opportunity and look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Grosklags, Admiral 

Manazir, and General Davis can be found in the Appendix on page 

25.] 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Davis. 

General DAVIS. Admiral Grosklags spoke for the Department, sir. 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. One statement for the Department, sir. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral MANAZIR. Yes, sir. Same thing. One statement for us. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. General. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN JAMES M. ‘‘MIKE’’ HOLMES, USAF, 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, STRATEGIC PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General HOLMES. Thank you, Chairman Cook, ladies and gentlemen of the committee. Thank you for your continued support to 

your United States Air Force, our airmen, and their families. I 

greatly appreciate the opportunity to address the subcommittee 

today. And I would like to start with a few opening remarks, and 

then we will ask that our full written testimony be placed in the 

record. And thank you for agreeing to that. 

Our Air Force remains the most globally engaged Air Force on 

the planet. And we continue to do our best every day to deliver 

global vigilance, global reach, and global power for America. However, after more than 25 years of sustained combat operations and 

years of constrained budgets, it has become more difficult to 

achieve our mission. 

The President’s fiscal year 2016 budget and the budget levels 

there take some steps to improve the situation. But our ability to 

meet the objectives of the national defense strategy is increasingly 

at risk. The President’s budget levels work to maximize the contributions of our total force, Guard, Reserve, and Active; reinforce 

investments in nuclear deterrents and space control operations; 

emphasize global long-range and non-permissive capabilities; and 

preserve the Air Force’s top three procurement programs, the F– 

35, the KC–46, and the long-range strike bomber. 

It also gives us the ability to halt reduction us in total force end 

strength and relieve pressure on our most important weapon, our 

airmen, continue efforts to regain full-spectrum readiness, and lay 

the groundwork for future innovation efforts with seed investments. 

After subtracting pass-through, the Air Force share of the 2016 

defense budget is roughly 22 percent. Within this share of defense 

resources, the Air Force submission attempts to balance risk driven 

by shortfalls in capacity, readiness, and modernization that you describe well, Mr. Chairman, to provide global vigilance, reach, and 

power in support of the defense strategy both today and in the 

future. 
5 

Shortfalls in capacity mean we must accept some risk in our ability to do everything we are expected to do. And the first of many 

difficult capacity decisions is the decision to divest the A–10. There 

is no question that the A–10 has been a steady and stellar performer in recent conflicts. Nevertheless, our current force structure 

is simply unaffordable in today’s fiscal environment. 

Consistent with fiscal year 2015 Department of Defense guidance 

to accept risk in current force structure and favor multi-role aircraft to satisfy Defense Strategic Guidance, the fiscal year 2016 

Presidential budget again reflects the hard choice to divest the A– 

10. Divesting the entire A–10 fleet frees up $4.7 billion across the 

Future Years Defense Program [FYDP], providing funding for priority capacity, capability, and readiness needs. 

Next, budget realities have forced the Air Force to make the decision to reduce the EC–130 Compass Call fleet by nearly half after 

fiscal year 2015, providing a $470 million savings across the FYDP 

that we have applied toward enterprise capability upgrades. 

While the Air Force will maintain essential capabilities to support current combat operations, this decision is not without risk. 

Once the fleet size drops to eight aircraft in fiscal year 2016, we 

will only be able to support our current operational obligations. 

We face another significant capacity challenge in preferred munitions, for 3 years of constrained budgets have left the Air Force 

thousands of weapons short in both air-to-surface and air-to-air 

weapon inventories. To begin to address these munitions capacity 

shortfalls, the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget provides $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2016 and $7.3 billion over the FYDP to increase 

procurement rates. 

As we attempt to balance these capacity demands, we continue 

to face shortfalls in readiness that are the result of previous funding gaps and sustained high operations tempo. The strain on training programs, weapon systems sustainment, and deployed-to-dwell 

rates directly impacts our ability to provide fully mission-ready 

units to the combatant commanders. These readiness shortfalls 

continue to exacerbate the capacity shortfalls. 

In addition to shortfalls in capacity and readiness, the Air Force 

faces shortfalls in critical capabilities. This means potential adversaries are closing the capability gaps that separate the U.S. military from potential foes. And this narrowed capability gap adds future risk to both mission and forces. 

The Air Force’s fighter fleet is approaching an average age of 30 

years, the oldest in the history of the Air Force. The fourth generation F–15s and F–16s that comprise the majority of our fighter 

fleet require upgrades to both extend their lifespan and provide the 

combat capability required to prevail in today’s increasingly contested environments. 

The advanced capabilities of our fifth generation fighters, the F– 

22 and F–35, are critical to ensure our ability to fight and win in 

contested environments. And divesting the A–10 allows us to invest 

$4.9 billion across the FYDP in F–16 and F–15 modernization and 

service life extensions, and $600 million across the FYDP to ensure 

we maintain the operational superiority of the F–22 against rapidly 

improving threats. 
6 

The multi-role F–35A is the centerpiece of our future fighter precision attack capability. It is designed to penetrate air defenses and 

deliver precision-guided munitions in an increasingly contested 

threat environment. The FY16 PB includes $6.7 billion for procurement and development of 44 F–35As. 

Two decades of continual operations, coupled with constrained 

and unstable budgets, have taken their toll on our Air Force and 

our airmen. In anticipation of even greater challenges, we have developed a strategy-driven, resource-informed plan to guide the way 

our service organizes, trains, and equips to prepare for future operations. Our revised strategic planning and programming process 

will look beyond the FYDP, out to 20 years into the future, allowing us to identify and shape decisions in advance to provide agile 

and adaptable weapon systems and processes. 

Our fiscal year 2016 budget takes steps to balance the many 

challenges we face in capacity, capability, and readiness. Any return to sequestration-level funding will directly impact all three 

areas, leaving us smaller, less ready, with less of an advantage 

over our potential adversaries. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of the committee, for your continued support of our Air Force and the opportunity to discuss with you as we work together to face these challenges. 

We look forward to your questions. And with your permission, I 

will yield to my colleague, Major General Ray, for a few comments. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Holmes and General 

Pawlikowski can be found in the Appendix on page 67.] 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN TIMOTHY M. RAY, USAF, DIRECTOR 

OF GLOBAL POWER PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General RAY. Thank you, Chairman Cook, and members of the 

committee. My apologies for General Pawlikowski’s inability to 

make it here today. So I will be testifying on her behalf. 

It is an honor to be here. And I thank you for the opportunity 

to testify before the committee on the subject of aircraft modernization, an area that is critical to the future of our Air Force and our 

Nation. It is also an honor to share the witness table with my fellow airmen—Lieutenant General Holmes, and certainly, my colleagues from the Department of the Navy. 

General Holmes described for you the challenges the Air Force 

faces in achieving our mission with years of constrained budgets. 

He shared with you the choices we made to balance capacity, readiness, and modernization. I would like to focus my remarks on modernization. 

Given the current budget realities, we must make wise fiscal decisions that allow us to remain the premier air force in the world. 

These decisions must include how best to modernize the existing 

fleet, while sustaining our ability to keep the aircraft development 

programs we have on record on track. 

Now more than ever, we must continue investing in the science 

and technology in modernizing our capabilities. Our fiscal year 

2016 budget reflects the Air Force priorities in these areas. Our Air 
7 

Force fighter force modernization continues to place a priority on 

continuing the development of the F–35, and the fiscal year 2016 

budget requests a purchase of 44 aircraft. 

The budget also includes modernization efforts for the F–22 for 

improved air-to-ground capabilities and capabilities to counter the 

advancing threat with improved electronic protection and air-to-air 

missile capabilities. We will also invest approximately $2.2 billion 

across the FYDP for the F–15 fleet. This includes service life extensions, integration of the latest precision weapons, and greater modernizations. For the F–16, we will invest approximately $1 billion 

across the service on the service life extension, operational flight 

program enhancements, and upgrades to the mission processors. 

We have also included recapitalization of the Joint STARS [Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] fleet and continue the combat rescue helicopter. Another focus area is our effort to overcome 

shortfalls in our munitions inventories, as General Holmes mentioned. 

The fiscal year 2016 President’s budget makes important investments in science and technology [S&T]. We continue to focus our 

S&T investments on technologies that will enable us to modernize 

our capabilities while exploring game-changing technologies for the 

future. The current global security environment is more complex, 

dynamic, and uncertain than ever before. Our adversaries are developing technologies and capabilities that attempt to shape and 

deter our Nation. 

We recognize we cannot maintain our edge through technology 

alone. It will require fresh thinking, innovation regarding how we 

acquire and manage our acquisition process. The Air Force strategic vision, ‘‘A Call to the Future,’’ speaks to our need for strategic 

agility, which means our modernization efforts must provide us the 

ability to rapidly act. 

Toward that end, our acquisition enterprise is pursuing agile 

techniques, such as open systems, modularity, designing in resiliency, prototyping and experimentation. In particular, we will capitalize on these techniques in the Joint STARS recap and our new 

trainer, the T–X. 

Finally, we will continue our focus on affordability. Affordable 

systems are critical to providing the right balance between capacity 

and modernization. In conclusion, our modernization efforts are 

critical to the future of the Air Force. We believe that we have 

made prudent investments in modernization, while continuing a 

strong science and technology investment. We must constantly 

strive to be better stewards of taxpayers resources, making every 

dollar count in achieving maximum buying power for our investments. 

We must continue to institute service-wide efficiencies that will 

capitalize on innovative concepts, keep weapon systems on track, 

and build affordability into new systems. 

Mr. Chairman with your committee’s help, working together, we 

will remain the world’s greatest air, space, and cyber force. We look 

forward to your questions. Thank you. 

Mr. COOK. Well, I want to thank the panel very much. 
8 

And at this time, I would like to welcome the ranking member, 

Ms. Sanchez, who has joined us. And she has an opening statement, I believe. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So nice to have a Californian chairing today. I am sorry I was late, gentlemen; I was 

doing the C–SPAN show this morning and didn’t get over in time. 

This year’s budget is up significantly for all three services com- pared to fiscal year 2015. In the Navy, we have a $1.3 billion increase above 2015 levels. In the Air Force, a $3.2 billion increase. 

Of course, this is all going to depend on the whole process that we 

have here in the Congress and where we end up. Also, with respect 

to sequestration, what goes on there. 

In addition to increased funding, the Air Force has deferred the 

potential retirement of a number of intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance aircraft. We see the E–8 Joint STARS, the E–3 

AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System], and the U–2 aircraft have all been postponed until after 2019. 

The Air Force also has increased funding sustainability for MQR 

Reaper unmanned aircraft. But I also want to note to our committee that you—the services also made some difficult choices. I see 

that you are still proposing to retire the A–10 over the next 4-year 

period in an effort to save about $4 billion. And the Navy has not 

requested additional production of the F/A–18 Super Hornets. And 

it has cut 16 F–35C aircraft over its 5-year budget. 

So I look forward to hearing from you how you came to those decisions and what that—whether that really needs to stay in place 

in order for you to get to where you think you need to be. 

Both services have also requested increased amounts of funding 

for aerial munitions of almost all categories; traditional bombs, 

long-range precision-guided missiles, et cetera. I would also like to 

point out that many of these aerial weapons programs are actually 

performing very well. And they are under cost, they are in schedule, and they are on performance targets. So that is a good thing. 

For example the, AIM–120D and the the AIM–9X Block II airto-air missiles have emerged from operational testing with outstanding results. I mean, there is some good news in what you all 

are doing. Both programs are critical to maintaining U.S. air superiority in any future conflicts, so it is important to get them right. 

It is also worth noting that these are joint programs between Air 

Force and Navy. And I also like to see when that happens. Because 

hopefully over time, maintenance and operation is also lowered. 

We are going to have in April a hearing on the F–35 program, 

obviously. It is the big elephant in the room in so many ways. But 

I think it is still relevant to the overall topic today of the budget. 

And while I know that we need the F–35 program, it is the only 

production plane that we have for our future that we have got, 

there are still some concerns about the developing—the development and the timing and the testing of this aircraft. 

I am worried about the serious engine fire that we had last year. 

It is a concern because there is just one engine that we have. And 
9 

so we need to get to the bottom of what happened. Hopefully, it 

was just an isolated incident. But we need to figure that out. 

And secondly, the F–35 is entering one of the—what I think is 

one of the most difficult stages, and that is where we see all the 

software and the integration and everything come together. And 

this fusion is incredibly important and, from what I am hearing, 

may not be going as well as we had hoped. So I hope you will enlighten us a little bit where you can on that. 

So the engine and the software, very, very critical pieces of making sure that we get this aircraft going and online and tested and 

flown and, you know, for the future of not only our services, Mr. 

Chairman, but I have talked to a lot of our international partners 

who have signed up for these aircraft. And they are constantly asking me are we going to get this done. 

So I appreciate the time. And I look forward to the answers 

today. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Ms. Sanchez. 

General Davis, a report on Monday of this week by Bloomberg 

said that flight testing of software essential to delivering the 

plane’s promised capabilities was supposed to be completed last 

month, but now may take until mid June. And that deficiency will 

be fixed later this year and aren’t severe enough to delay the Marine Corps’ declaration. 

General Bogdan is quoted as saying the service understands the 

limitation and has operational workarounds to ensure they have 

the capability they need. What are those limitations, and what is 

the operational impact if the Marine Corps declares its F–35 initial 

operational capability this summer? 

General DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, thanks for letting me answer. 

First off, the F–35 for us, for our Nation, for our Marine Corps, 

is going to give us a fifth-generation, first-day capability, the ability 

to go take off from amphibious ships and also land on 3,000-foot 

ships. So wherever our marines are fighting, they get the—a great 

combat capability. In a lot of ways, more than—a lot more than we 

have today with our legacy fleet. 

I will answer a couple things. And actually, if I could, to Congresswoman Sanchez’s question, as well, on the engine. Because I 

think that is applicable as well. The engine we are seeing right 

now is very reliable. We got 10,000 hours on the motor. We did 

have one problem last summer that we believe we have corrected. 

I talked to the pilots and the squadron commanders who were flying this airplane last night. A very reliable motor from our perspective, to include the lift fan. 

On the fusion capability, we talked about—and the software capability you talked about—we are seeing—we are tracking about 

13 different categories inside our program to make sure that we 

have got this thing on track. From the fusion, in the software, we 

are actually seeing what we need and tracking for what we need 

to declare initial operating capability in July of this year. 

We still have more test points to get. We take it to the ship in 

May. And we won’t declare IOC until we have all those conditions 

met for this airplane. But on the software side, one of the complaint—one of the things is four-ship fusion. We do have some 

issues right now with four-ship fusion. That is four airplanes in the 
10 

missionary data link that would share information together realtime. 

What we don’t have—we found out we do have a problem with 

some latency with the four-ship fusion. But we do not have a problem with two-ship fusion. So right now, ship one and two and ship 

three and four can share information very, very readily. It is something we can’t do today. So it is a combat capability we don’t have 

today that we do have now with this airplane. And we are sharing 

information between the first section and the second section 

through Link 16. That is working very well for us. 

The close air support [CAS] software is actually working very 

well. We are able to, by working through the APG–81 radar, take 

a bomb through the clouds, which we can’t do right now. So doing 

close air support through the clouds. We are able to take voice 

nine-line briefs. And also, with our 2B software on-track for a VMF 

[variable message format] data link to basically take the CAS 

briefs through the VMF. 

The software through the EOTS, which is our Electro-Optical 

Targeting System, is allowing us to actually do night close air support, track moving targets, and also have better fidelity than our 

FLIR [Forward-Looking Infrared radar], than our LITENING Pod 

in our legacy aircraft right now. 

So many—the ALIS [Autonomic Logistics Information System] 

system, we talked about the software as well, again, that is tracking as per what we need for an IOC. With one workaround, which 

is a—requiring a human, a contractor, to use a laptop computer for 

the propulsion system modifications. The mission data files, we will 

know more on that. We just got our first area of responsibility on 

data load now. And we are going to test that this—this month out 

at the weapon school out in Yuma, Arizona. So we are going out 

there. I will be out there tonight. But our pilots will fly for 30 days 

testing that mission data file. 

So on the software side, what we are seeing—and I talked to the 

squadron commanders and the guys that were flying it last night 

in preparation for today’s testimony to give you ground truth with 

the pointy end of the spear. They are very, very comfortable with 

what they have got right now. As good marines, they would always 

want more. But we are seeing actually an improved combat capability from what we have in legacy today, much better. And we 

think we have got a good software load, stable software load for 

this airplane to declare an IOC. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. I was gonna throw it open to the panel, 

whether they wanted to also address the issue of the single engine. 

And Ms. Sanchez also raised some other subjects. So we can break 

it down right now. If anybody wants to jump in right now, feel free. 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Sir, I will talk real briefly about the engine 

and without diving too far—it is on. Yes. I will speak louder. 

I will touch on the engine. But I don’t want to take too much 

time to dive too deeply into the technology piece. But that occurred 

last summer. We had a—we very quickly identified the root cause. 

There was two components rubbing on each other internal in the 

engine, created a lot of heat, and thus a failure. That root cause 

was identified. 
11 

Some restrictions were put on the fleet while we searched for corrections to that. We have essentially two temporary fixes in place 

today that allow the fleet to continue to fly across all type model 

series. Depending on the degree of the correction they have had, 

equates to the amount of flight envelope that they are able to utilize. 

The long-term fix is still being worked with Pratt & Whitney, the 

engine manufacturer. But other than the, I will call it temporary 

disruption to our test program, where we had to basically stop flying for a few days and then bring things back on slowly. As General Davis noted, the aircraft are back flying. They are flying realworld-type training missions. And the engine is performing the way 

we expect it to. 

General HOLMES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think General 

Davis and Admiral Grosklags did a great job of describing the 

progress, both in the software and the engine issue. I would just 

note that the investigation into the engine was something new for 

us as we worked together among the three services and the partners to make sure that everybody knew what was going on, that 

everybody was aware of what we were finding, and that everybody 

was involved in the decision. 

So we did a joint safety board and a joint accident investigation 

board that let us all understand where we were in the process and 

be able to adjust. It has had a little bit of an impact in delay on 

testing program. Because when we temporarily grounded the aircraft and reduced their flight envelope as we worked through the 

issues, it delayed some of the test points. 

The JPO [Joint Project Office] has been dedicated to supporting 

the Marine effort to reach IOC. And we are happy to help with that 

effort. We know that they plan to reach it first, and we have 

worked together with them to do that. And we look forward then 

to progressing toward our IOC sometime next year then. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. Mr. Norcross. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Chairman. Appreciate the time. And 

welcome to the panel. Certainly appreciate your service. 

I was recently down in Pomona near Atlantic City visiting our 

unit there, the Air National Guard, and they are running F–16s 

out of there. And time after time, their fliers and certainly the mechanics were asking me about the potential upgrades to the radar 

system. I am not sure General Ray or Holmes, who is better able 

to address that. 

What is the schedule for that? They certainly are at wits’ end 

waiting for that upgrade, which they had indicated been postponed 

several times. Thank you. 

General HOLMES. So thank you, sir, for that question. With your 

permission, we will both answer a couple of parts of it. 

So we canceled the CAPES program, as the chairman said, because it was unaffordable at our current budget level. We have received, as I am sure you know, a joint urgent operational needs request from USNORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] to take a 

look at how we might rapidly equip the F–16s that defend our Nation with advanced electronically scanned antenna radar, with an 

AESA radar that provides increased capability to those airplanes. 
12 

As we look at that the request, that is important for that organization, but it is also part of an entire kill chain that would have 

to be in place to be able to let it operate. So you need both the sensor on the airplane, and then you need a surveillance system that 

would help you detect the kind of small cross-section threats that 

AESA radar gives you capability for, and you need the command 

and control system to be able to do it. 

Those elements are falling in place here in the National Capital 

Region. And we expect to try to move forward to provide a rapid 

capability there first, and then see how we would expand it across 

the country. And I will ask General Ray to talk about the details 

of that timeline and process. 

General RAY. Good morning, sir. Thank you for the question. 

We are looking very closely at the capabilities that are required. 

We take this mission very seriously, defending the Nation’s skies. 

Looking at the F–16 and the options that we have in front of us, 

we want to make very clear in our minds that we are not limiting 

the capabilities in any efforts that we take on. 

So any of the capabilities that are out there now, existing radars, 

our ability to integrate that completely and to make a complete upgraded aircraft, is a very lengthy period of time. So to meet the 

UON [urgent operational need] timelines, which is in the next 18 

months, we have to look at putting radars on the airplanes. But 

we may lose some capabilities over what we actually have right 

now. So we want to strike the very careful balance between bringing on what we require for this specific mission and not making the 

capabilities of the airplane less. 

Now, we believe that we should have a decision here in the next 

month or two in terms of exactly how we will do that. We are looking at a couple of options in terms of how we would acquire that. 

And certainly, there are several different amounts of capability 

that we can add over time. I believe that we should have a pretty 

good schedule here in the next 1 to 2 months that would describe 

how we will get after this problem. 

I think that, as General Holmes mentions, the National Capital 

Region is the easier part in terms of the entire kill chain. We remain concerned about the coverage for the rest of the country and 

the rest of the F–16 fleet. So I think that makes us focus very close 

here to the Washington, DC, area and what we need to cover this 

area with the follow-on effort to go think through how best we will 

equip those airplanes in the future. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Appreciate your answer. We are trying very 

much to give you your needed predictability. Obviously, yesterday 

was the first step in a process that hopefully at some point before 

the end of this year gives you the predictability you need. I would 

suggest to you that that unit, they need predictability. Obviously, 

you know the area that they cover between New York and DC is 

vital. And certainly, they have a history that they remember very 

much as to the people who live along there. So anything you can 

do to expedite that, we would appreciate. Thank you. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. Yes, Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your time today and your testimony. 

Really appreciate it. 
13 

General Holmes, wanted to follow up on the discussions on the 

A–10. Last cycle you stated—or the Air Force stated—there was a 

savings of $4.2 billion to divest in the A–10. And today you said 

$4.7 billion, and then another time $4.9 billion. Can you just confirm what the number is? 

General HOLMES. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. The number is $4.7 

billion, is what we are bringing this year. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

General HOLMES. $4.2 of that is O&M [operation and mainte- nance] savings and $500 million of it is cost avoidance on wing upgrades. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. Thank you. And can you confirm 

that this is primarily a budget decision, and not a capabilities decision? 

General HOLMES. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. Thank you. And can you, just for 

everybody’s awareness, give a rundown of a typical combat load of 

the F–35, standard combat load? 

General HOLMES. Yes, ma’am. When the F–35 reaches its initial 

operation capability, it will have the capability to carry internally 

two air-to-air weapons and two air-to-grounds weapons. When it— 

it will have the radios and the digital communications to be able 

to communicate with folks on the ground. When it reaches its FOC 

[full operational capability], then it will have the ability to carry 

heavier JDAMs [Joint Direct Attack Munitions], to be able to carry 

the SDB II [Small Diameter Bomb II], to fire its internal gun, and 

be able to carry external ordnance on the wings, as well. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. And so internal and external ordnance on the wings would be a standard combat load at FOC? 

General HOLMES. At FOC, yes, ma’am. It will have that capability depending on the threat. And if the threat allows it to, then 

it can carry ordnance on the outside as well under the wings. 

Ms. MCSALLY. And how many bullets are in the gun? 

General HOLMES. I think it is 250. I would have to—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. I think it is 180, actually. That is one trigger pull 

on the A–10, just so you know. And we got plenty more that—and 

the standard conventional load on the A–10, I am sure you know 

what this is. I mean, we got over 1,150 rounds, plus a variety of 

other weapons that we can carry. 

So if you—I mean, if you had the resources, do you agree that 

there are situations, combat situations on the ground that the A– 

10 would be best suited in order to save lives? 

General HOLMES. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. And then switching to the EC– 

130. So that—you know, the Air Force is divesting in the A–10, 

EC–130, both stationed at Davis-Monthan and both in my district. 

I won’t take that personally. But obviously, I am concerned about— 

concerned about losing that capability. 

So you mentioned in your testimony, but I just want to confirm 

the plan or the desire is to cut the fleet basically in half this fiscal 

year. But can you confirm, is there another capability in our Air 

Force that can do what the EC–130 does? 

General HOLMES. There are areas where the EC–130’s capabilities overlap with other capabilities that are there. But there are 
14 

certainly things that only the EC–130 does or that the EC–130 

does best. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. And the EC–130s right now are deployed 

both to Afghanistan and in the fight against ISIS [Islamic State in 

Iraq and Syria], correct? 

General HOLMES. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. And so we have nothing to replace it for 

some unique capabilities they have. They are deployed at a pretty 

high rate. You know, they have been deployed continuously for a 

long period of time, yet we are going to cut that capability in half. 

Is there anything in development that is going to be replacing 

the EC–130? 

General HOLMES. We are considering some options to do that. As 

you know, we are embarked on a program to upgrade our JSTARS 

and replace the JSTARS aircraft. Depending on how that program 

goes, we think it might offer some options for a re-hosting of the 

EC–130 electronics, as well. We are looking at options where we 

could take the existing electronics from the EC–130 and re-host 

them on another platform that would offer some performance advantages and be cheaper to operate in the future. 

And we will kind of see how that JSTARS program goes, and 

then see if we are able to adapt that approach to some of our other 

weapon systems. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thank you, sir. Do you—can you give me 

the number of what savings you project you would have by cutting 

the EC–130s in half this fiscal year? What is that number, do you 

know? You don’t have to—I mean, if you could just get it to me, 

I don’t need it right now. 

General HOLMES. Yes, ma’am. It is roughly $470 million across 

the FYDP. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great. If you could give me the fiscal year 

2016 number, that would be great. 

General HOLMES. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 97.] 

Ms. MCSALLY. So I am sure you can appreciate that we have said 

there is a unique capability that the EC–130 brings, that we don’t 

have another capability yet. We don’t have anything necessarily 

under development to replace it, yet we are cutting it in half. I 

mean, can you—do you appreciate that that logic is concerning to 

those who want to make sure that we can protect the warfighters 

that are deployed? 

General HOLMES. Yes, ma’am, I do. And our problem is that I 

don’t have enough money to do all the things that I would like to 

provide for warfighters. And I have to make decisions within that. 

There are many areas that I have limits placed on where I can go 

to achieve savings, particularly in capacity, from Congress and 

from the Department. And so I am limited in the places that I can 

go when I have to go to capacity to save money. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
15 

Gentleman, I want to talk about the F–18. So the Navy, its testimony and also provided to this committee information that says by 

2020 you will be short 100 F–18s. And you also said that this number is due to grow because of some particular factors. 

So in looking back at the materials that we have had before this 

committee before, all the way back to 2009, we show a different 

shortfall every program year. For example, in 2009, the projection 

was 125 aircraft. A year later it was 145. In 2011 it was 177. In 

2014 the shortfall was only 18 aircraft. 

So can you—can you tell me the credibility when I see, you know, 

18 to 100—I mean, that is kind of a bit loose and three, four, fivefold difference. Why is that, and what am I not seeing here? Do we 

just think that 90—no, 82—planes will fall out of the sky this year? 

Or where are we going with this? Why are the numbers so dramatically different? Are we guessing, do we really have ways in 

which we are trying to figure this out? 

And it appears to me that the Navy has a—has a throughput 

problem, not a lack of aircraft, in terms of numbers. And as a result, should Congress be focusing on better funding the depot operations, rather than just buying more planes to put through the 

same—rather than to put them through inefficient depot repairs? 

What is going on here? What is the approach we need to be thinking about here? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. And 

it is a great opportunity to be able to address naval aviation here. 

I enjoyed the opportunity to chat with you last year about kind of 

the same topic. 

So I would like to discuss our strike fighter inventory management. From the depot throughput of our F–18A++s and Charlies, 

Bravos and Deltas, through the sustainment and eventual extension of the F–18E/F, which is going to occur in the middle of the 

2020s, to the procurement of F–35C. 

Given that there are two hotlines, the F–18E, F, and G hotline 

in Saint Louis and the F–35A, B, and C hotline for the Department 

of the Navy, that would be the Bravo and the Charlie models down 

in Fort Worth, we have wonderful opportunities to recapitalize our 

force. 

The—certainly, the 2016 President’s budget has increased risk in 

our ability to sustain our inventory managements. But to your 

point about numbers, we have a very, very precise model. And it 

is so precise that when you change an input, it will tell you exactly 

where your shortfall exists and in what year and how many. 

And so since 2009, I have been involved in this process, either 

as part of the solution, but mostly probably part of the problem. 

And as the—in this position as the director of air warfare, we closely manage that inventory shortfall. 

The chairman correctly described the manageable shortfall of 65 

airplanes. In the United States Navy, we tier our readiness. We 

don’t keep our readiness at the top level. That means we don’t need 

all of the airplanes all of the time. We only support the deployed 

units at the top level. So we can manage with 65. 

When we have a shortage over the next 5 years of about 100 aircraft, that tracks to the CNO’s [Chief of Naval Operations’] statement that he would like to have two to three squadrons to reduce 
16 

the risk in our inventory management of F–18s, because that is an 

additional 35 aircraft to the hundred you talked about. 

When you look at the strike fighter inventory management piece, 

use the word ‘‘shortfall,’’ that is a conclusive word that says I know 

what the supply is, I know what the demand is, and I know what 

my usage rate is; therefore, the formula says I have a shortfall and 

it is 135. That is if you leave everything identical. You don’t change 

the supply, i.e., depot throughput in the near-term. 

So let’s talk about that for a second. I want to make the depot 

more efficient. When we started to project the work that needed to 

be done to extend the service life of the F–18C from 6,000 hours 

inspected to 8,000 hours of service life and now going to 10,000 

hours, a 67 percent increase, we expected to do structural work on 

the airplane. What we did not expect is the amount of corrosion we 

found inside the airplanes, deep inside the airplanes, that were 

from years and years of use in austere environments on land, and 

then also in the salt air environment on the carriers. 

That corrosion control work was not having to be accomplished 

if we stopped flying the airplane at 6,000 hours. That also added 

work to the depots. We used a lean process in manufacturing to get 

the work done based on programmed work. The problem is that 

corrosion added unplanned work. And so the depots have now had 

to go to a theory of constraints. And they are very good at looking 

at the capacity we have in the depots. Use a theory of constraints 

method called critical chain project management. 

In FRC [Fleet Readiness Center] Southeast in Jacksonville, Florida, and in FRC Southwest at North Island, Coronado, California, 

they are putting a new process in place. Such that, for instance, we 

looked at our depot throughput and it was noted that our depot 

throughput needs to improve, we assumed that the depot, with all 

of its resources, you can put 17 airplanes through the depot at any 

one time. So you have 17 airplanes that work. An analysis using 

theory of constraints—— 

Mr. COOK. Gentlemen, I don’t mean to interrupt. But I am going 

to ask that you kind of shorten your answers, because we had a 

quorum called and then 15 minutes and then we are going to have 

to have votes. So everyone else, if you could kind of make it shorter. Okay? As I said, I apologize and I—— 

Admiral MANAZIR [continuing]. Strike-fighter inventory management is very complex. Difficult short answer. Let me just do this. 

We got a new process in place. It is going to be more efficient. We 

are going to turn this around and get those airplanes. Then we are 

going extend to Es and Fs. And we still have the opportunity with 

two hotlines to be able to use that to reduce the risk. 

Procurement of F–35C is the other end. As we discussed, the 

Navy and the Marine Corps have to get the F–35C to win. I hope 

that answers part of the question. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, we will discuss it out of committee. Thank 

you. 

Mr. COOK. There is going to be a test after this. We will see if 

you pass. 

Mr. Knight. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try and keep my 

comments a little brief and just allow you to answer. To the Navy, 
17 

I haven’t heard anything about the Growler program. Are we on 

stage there, are we needing more Growlers, especially as the F–35 

comes online a Growler is going to be a very useful tool with the 

F–35. 

Admiral MANAZIR. Yes, sir. As the Department of Defense’s only 

airborne electronic attack airplane, that is true. Very useful. We integrate our capabilities with the stealth characteristics of the F– 

35C and the electronic capabilities of the Growler. We get a very, 

very good integrated piece. 

We have 153 Growlers. That is satisfactory for the Navy mission. 

We are embarking on a study, as the Chief of Naval Operations 

said, to evaluate the number we need for the joint mission going 

forward. The line still being open in Saint Louis keeps our options 

open. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Good, good. Thank you, sir. 

To the Air Force. You know, we are in a stage where it is not 

first-sight, first-kill, it is actually first-shot, first-kill with the fifth 

generation fighters. 

And with the Aerospace Innovation Initiative and of the change 

to the X-plane, oh, platforms over the last 20 years, do you see us 

still moving into an era we are going to—we are going to fly the 

wings off a fighter for the next 50 years, and then try and go on 

to the next generation and then fly the wings off it for 50 years, 

instead of moving more toward bringing in today’s technology about 

every 15 years, as we used to do? 

General RAY. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. The short answer is that we have realized how difficult it is to make these very 

lengthy aircraft programs, just as you mentioned. We have done a 

lot of thinking about this. And we do believe that there is a very 

clear need to move to a capabilities-based development. 

Recent efforts in the Air Force have been chartered by the Secretary and the Chief to allow us to take a very bold look at how 

we maintain air superiority in 2030. And the mindset there will be 

to build a learning campaign on how to aggregate the capabilities 

that we have and to put the technologies in play that will keep the 

air-to-air kill chain resilient in 2030 and beyond. 

We think that there is a tremendous amount of learning, experimentation, and prototyping that has to happen to make that a reality. Mr. Kendall’s aircraft innovation initiative is a piece of that. 

That is a touch point for both the Navy and the Air Force. 

But for the Air Force’s role in that particular piece, we are going 

to take a much broader look at how we do this as an Air Force, 

as an enterprise, as a family of systems. Certainly, there will be 

something that flies, something that will be in the battlespace. Exactly how we do that is not defined. 

But we know we need to bring the technologies that we are going 

to have to play, not the technologies that we want. So it will take 

a great deal of collaboration and learning to do that in time. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, sir. And I will say one compliment to 

the F–35. It is doing very well at Edwards Air Force Base and hitting—hitting its test points. And almost overachieving in many of 

the areas that they didn’t think it would. 

So—but my last question, Mr. Chair, with your indulgence is—— 

Mr. COOK. Quick. 
18 

Mr. KNIGHT. We are going into an era where the airframe is 

going to be the biggest deal. It is not going to be the speed and the 

armament. It is going to be the airframe. And you can’t change the 

airframe. So if we keep that airframe for 40 or 50 years, we are 

stuck with it. And that is the change to innovation of how we see 

the aircraft, how the aircraft can get into enemy lines. And that 

will be my continued question as we move through this process. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want—— 

Mr. COOK. And they have counted—called votes. 

Mr. VEASEY. Oh, they have called votes. Okay. I will be just really quick. 

I just wanted to ask particularly about the inventory, the Joint 

Strike Fighter inventory. I know that we have heard testimony 

about the strike fighter shortfall of two to three squadrons, is two 

to three squadrons worth of aircraft. And is the Navy strike fighter 

inventory sufficient to support operational demand? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Sir, thank you. I will refer to the answer I 

gave to ranking minority member as for the inventory management. 

The F–35C numbers that the Navy and the Marine Corps needs 

are not being procured in the numbers that we need to go into the 

future. The President’s budget from the United States Navy and 

United States Naval Aviation had to defer 16 F–35Cs out of it for 

fiscal reasons and priorities of the Department. 

We use 35 to 39 strike fighters a year just in utilization/attrition. 

If you are not replacing 35 to 39 aircraft a year, you cannot sustain 

your inventory into the future. We are looking very closely at that. 

And we look forward to working with Congress on acquiring 

enough airplanes to meet our strike fighter needs. 

Mr. VEASEY. Lieutenant General Holmes, last question for me. 

Can the F–35 provide the ground cover that is needed? I know 

there has been a lot of talk about, you know, the A–10 and the 

ground cover that it provides. But do you—can the F–35 provide 

sufficient ground cover in the theater that troops will need without 

having an A–10 type plane? 

General HOLMES. You know, thank you, sir. You heard General 

Davis talk about how the Marines feel about the F–35’s ability to 

provide close air support. And I think they are comfortable it will 

be able to do so. I think we are, too. And I think the whole Air 

Force is involved in the close air support mission and the support 

of ground commanders. So the F–35 will play a role in that. But 

it won’t just be the F–35. It will be the F–35, the F–15, the F–16, 

and the whole Air Force enterprise can be devoted to that resource. 

And yes, sir, we feel confident we can continue to provide that mission. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. 

General DAVIS. If I could, sir, just to follow up on that from the 

Marine Corps side. On our inventory, we are replacing F–18s and 

Harriers that have performed exceptionally well in combat, but 

they are nearing the end of their service life. So the F–35B and the 

C—but the F–35B in large numbers for the Marine Corps—is keep-
19 

ing that aircraft on-ramp and keeping that in production is really 

important to us. 

On the—on how we will support the marines on the ground, we 

got our first-day fight, first 5 days’ fight with fifth generation. So 

we can support a marine in a contested environment, which we 

can’t do as well with our legacy airplanes right now. 

The other thing, if I—when I go to Block 3 software, I can actually load 14,000 pounds of external ordnance on the airplane. That 

is 3,000 pounds more than I could put on my F–18 today. So, great. 

Taking a lot of ordnance to the marines and soldiers, sailors, where 

and when they need them. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. Mr. Graves, last question. 

Mr. GRAVES. Real quickly. And Admiral Manazir, you talked 

about the shortfall. And I am very concerned about this. When we 

have fewer airframes out there to do the job, we put a lot of operational fatigue on those airplanes. And you talked about this. 

And just for the record again, and so I can start working to rectify this, how many airplanes do you need, how many Super Hornets do you need to eliminate that shortfall? How many do you 

need to procure? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Sir, we need to get the F–35Cs at 20 F–35Cs 

a year in 2020. But the CNO has already testified two to three 

squadrons of Super Hornets will reduce the risk to a manageable 

level. That would be 24 to 36 airplanes. And he has already testified to that, sir. I support that number. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you very much. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. You know, I just want to thank 

the panel. I had to speed up things because of the votes and everything. I had a few questions. They were not five-syllable-word questions. Since I am an infantry officer they were all going to be onesyllable ones. But I am sure I am going to see you again. 

And I do, once again, want to thank you very much. We were 

constrained. We had a lot of people, other committees. And I know 

you come over here and as I said, I appreciate your patience and 

indulgence, but most of all for your professionalism and for doing 

what you do. So stay safe, keep the troops safe, and we all thank 

you so much. 

This meeting is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 9:59 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 26, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 26, 2015 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. McSALLY 

General HOLMES. Ma’am, we project to save $75.1 million in Fiscal Year 2016 by 

divesting the seven EC–130 aircraft. [See page 14.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 26, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. There has been a tremendous amount of discussion over the last 6– 

9 months in regard to acquisition reform. Can you shed some light on how the Congress could help make the DOD acquisition process more effective and efficient? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Good acquisition outcomes are more probable when the Department can manage to a plan with a foundation of stable requirements, technical 

baselines, and budgets. Perpetual instability, as we have experienced over multiple 

budget cycles, produces a repeatable cycle of spiraling, self-fulfilling cost growth and 

program delays. Uncertainties as manifested in Sequestration, Continuing Resolutions, and other frequent changes to budgets through the annual authorization and 

appropriations process are counter to our efforts to effectively execute to a plan. A 

timely, predictable defense budget (ultimately, a multiple year budget) would directly increase the productivity of Defense acquisition; provide needed stability to 

the industrial base; and improve both government and industry’s ability to manage 

outlay risk and invest in research and development, facilities, and people. Stable 

budgets also reduce government deadline pressures to meet artificial obligations or 

expenditure benchmarks that impact effective contract negotiations. Reducing these 

pressures would then allow the time necessary to achieve the best deal for the Department and the taxpayer. The DoN also recommends that Congress work with the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in his current 

effort to identify and roll back legislation that has produced unnecessary and redundant regulatory and reporting burdens to all of our acquisition programs. 

Mr. TURNER. Last year the Navy launched another effort to develop a replacement 

helicopter to support the Presidential Executive Lift mission requirements. How is 

the Navy acquisition strategy for the VH–92 different from the previously cancelled 

VH–101 program and why should Congress and the taxpayer believe the results will 

be different? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. The acquisition strategy for the VH–92 is fundamentally different from the previously canceled VH–71 program. The VH–71 was an extensively 

modified derivative of the EH–101. Changes included an entirely new power train, 

making the program essentially a new development effort with the inherent cost uncertainty that entails. Additionally, requirements were not clearly understood or 

communicated between the Navy, the prime contractor, and the principal sub-contractor, which resulted in extensive delays and cost growth. This was mainly due 

to not having a formal process in place to review requirements and address potential trade-offs or proposed changes. 

The Navy has worked extensively to incorporate the lessons learned from the terminated VH–71 program into VH–92. Specific examples include: 

• Requirements: The Navy, working in concert with the White House Military Office and the USMC, thoroughly reviewed all requirements and made appropriate trade-offs among cost, schedule and performance to ensure affordability 

while still meeting the requirement to provide safe and reliable transportation 

for the President. This process will remain in place during EMD as a mechanism to control requirement growth. 

• Acquisition Strategy: Developing new technology is not part of the VH–92 acquisition strategy. Instead, a low-risk technical approach will reduce procurement 

costs as well as cost uncertainty. The VH–92 program will integrate mature 

government defined mission systems into an existing in-production helicopter. 

In addition, the VH–92 aircraft will retain its existing FAA certification instead 

of expending resources to obtain a military certification. 

• Procurement Strategy: The VH–92 EMD contract is a Fixed Price Incentive type 

contract as compared to the Cost Plus type contract of VH–71. The VH–92 EMD 

contract includes ‘‘not to exceed’’ priced options for the production aircraft. 

• Affordability: Affordability targets were incorporated into the RFP and were reflected in the offeror’s proposal. Current program estimate represents a reduction of over 50% from the VH–71 program at time of termination. 

In summary, the Department of Navy’s VH–92 acquisition strategy emphasizes a 

low-risk technical approach and a focus on affordability in balance with delivering 

the capabilities that meet the needs of the Office of the President. 
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Mr. TURNER. What are some of the key impacts to the Department of the Navy 

planning and program execution process should the Budget Control Act of 2011 be 

implemented this year (or in future years)? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. A return to sequestration funding levels in Fiscal Year 2016 

would require the Department to revisit the overall U.S Military Strategy as sequestration would significantly impact the Department’s ability to fully implement the 

President’s National Security Strategy. As the Chief of Naval Operations testified, 

a sequestered Navy of 2020 would be unable to execute two mission sets: ‘‘Deter and 

Defeat Aggression’’ and ‘‘Project Power in an Anti-Access/Area Denial’’ environment. 

Any additional reductions driven by sequestration would further exacerbate capability gaps; delay or forego the development and delivery of critical warfighting capabilities; further reduce strike weapons capability and capacity; and further reduce 

overall force readiness. 

Mr. TURNER. Readiness of the Armed Forces has been a much talked about topic 

over the past few weeks. The Commandant testified just last week in front of the 

HASC and stated that the Marine Corps is being forced to prioritize the readiness 

of its deployed and next-to-deploy units to the detriment of its home station units. 

How has this affected Marine Corps Aviation? 

General DAVIS. Marine Aviation is balancing risk in today’s capacity to obtain tomorrow’s capability, but we have only been able to maintain the near-term readiness of our deploying squadrons at the cost of our next-to-deploy and non-deployed 

squadrons. Our ‘‘bench’’ is barely able to meet training requirements ‘‘just in time’’ 

for deployment. Most of our squadrons do not possess the required number of aircraft, down more than 150 aircraft (20%) from our wartime inventory. Our squadrons have the right number of Marines, but not enough of them are trained due to 

high operational tempo and lack of aircraft. 

Marine Corps operational commitments have increased while the overall numbers 

of Marine aircraft available for tasking and training have decreased. In 2003, at the 

outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Marine Aviation had 58 Active Component 

(AC) squadrons (maintaining T–2.0 readiness at an average of 1:3 deployment to 

dwell) and 12 Reserve Component (RC) squadrons for a total of 70. Today the Marine Corps has 55 AC and 4.5 RC squadrons, more than 10 fewer, with an average 

T-rating of 2.7 and many communities deploying at greater than 1:2 deployment to 

dwell. Marine Corps Aviation squadrons are surging in order to meet the new 

steady-state demand creating a ready bench that is too shallow and unable to recover. Our FA–18s and Harriers are wearing out faster than we can replace them 

with F–35s because of its shallow procurement ramp. We have reduced our squadron inventory of CH–53Es from 16 to 12 because we simply do not have the aircraft 

anymore and cannot build the CH–53K fast enough. After years of underfunding 

readiness accounts, we are surging our old gear to fight the nation’s battles and 

have not been able to buy the new machines as quickly as we need to replace them. 

Ultimately, Marine Aviation is still able to meet all of its operational commitments, 

but we have reached a point of diminishing returns and readiness will track in a 

negative direction unless we change the way and degree to which we fund our readiness accounts. 

Mr. TURNER. General, you have been one of the most vocal advocates for the F– 

35 program. Why do you see the F–35 as so important to the Marine Corps and 

where do you see it fitting into your overall aviation picture? 

General DAVIS. The F–35B is the future of Marine Corps TACAIR. At IOC, scheduled for this summer, it will bring immediate capability advancement to the Marine 

Air Ground Task Force. The F–35’s ability to see and be seen, or not be seen, as 

the case may be, has exceeded the Key Performance Parameters requirements. Included in the F–35’s ability to see, is its ability to use its next generation radar to 

produce photo quality targeting images of the ground through the weather. Immediately upon IOC we can operate and support the warfighter on the ground in contested environments and our targeting capabilities will not be inhibited by bad 

weather. Both the stealth design and advanced radar, allowing targeting through 

the weather, are not capabilities of our legacy aircraft today. From IOC onward, the 

jet will only continue to improve, as has always been the plan. Some examples of 

these are: sensor fusion improvement, weapons capability improvement, pilot work 

load decrease, which improves situational awareness and reduces training time, a 

significant cost benefit to the taxpayer. The F–35 will represent a transformation 

for the Marine Air Ground Task Force because it provides electronic attack, disseminates battle space information over data link, the MAGTF’s server in the sky, and 

once we reduce the threat to the point where stealth is not required, it can carry 

external ordinance. The F–35 becomes a 4th generation bomb truck carrying 14,000 

pounds of ordnance, far more than both the Marine Corps legacy Harrier and Hornet. In essence, the F–35 is the only TACAIR platform that can transition from 5th 
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generation to 4th generation capabilities and then back again. I can’t make a 4th 

generation aircraft a 5th generation one. This aircraft will replace the AV–8B Harrier, F/A–18 Hornet, and EA–6B Prowler, the entirety of the Marine Corps TACAIR 

legacy fleet. This will dramatically increase our capability now and give us a platform that will only continue to improve over time. It cannot be overemphasized how 

critical this aircraft is for our modernization and readiness efforts as we only see 

an increase in demand for Marines around the globe. 

Mr. TURNER. The CH–53K was one program that the Commandant chose to break 

out in his testimony over the past several weeks. Why do you see this as a key Marine Corps Aviation program? 

General DAVIS. The CH–53K is urgently needed for the modernization and readiness initiatives the Marine Corps is implementing. We have seen a sustained and 

unprecedented operational demand for our legacy heavy lift assault CH–53E fleet, 

which has prematurely aged an airframe that is on average 26.8 years old, making 

it ever more challenging to maintain. There are currently 149 CH–53Es in the 

USMC inventory, 47 aircraft short of the requirement to sustain the fleet until 

2030, directly decreasing our readiness. Capable of operating from land and sea 

bases, the CH–53K will provide the USMC and DOD with the only heavy lift rotorcraft in the Joint Force. It will contribute directly to the increased agility and 

lethality of the MAGTF and Joint Force. The CH–53K will transport 27,000 pounds 

of external cargo out to a range of 110 nautical miles, nearly tripling the CH–53E’s 

lift capability under high/hot environmental conditions, while fitting into the same 

shipboard footprint. The CH–53K will also provide unparalleled lift capability, 

greatly expanding the commander’s operational reach. The atrophy of the CH–53E’s 

heavy lift capability and readiness, the limited CH–53E inventory and the rising 

cost of CH–53E flight hours clearly underscores the importance of its replacement, 

the CH–53K King Stallion. 

Mr. TURNER. It is well publicized that the F–18 has had numerous issues with 

delays in depot level maintenance. What do you see as the way forward to remedying the Marine Corps strike fighter shortfalls? How are you doing in this regard 

with your other Marine aviation platforms? 

General DAVIS. The Marine Corps is taking a dual pronged approach to this very 

serious issue. It’s absolutely critical that we maintain the F–35B and F–35C aircraft 

procurement ramp to transition the USMC TACAIR force on timeline and thereby 

eliminating the USMC long term strike fighter shortfall. Our next F/A–18 squadron 

to transition to the F–35B is VMFA–122. In addition to increase our current readiness and decrease the near term flight line gap, the Marine Corps is deeply integrated within the Naval Aviation Enterprise to increase depot throughput via hiring 

artisans, leveraging Original Engineering Manufacturer (OEM) maintenance and 

engineering, and increasing material solutions. 

On this note, the Fiscal Year 2016 President’s Budget request provides funding 

to align F/A–18 depot throughput to projected capacity and continues to fund the 

procurement of F–35s for the Marine Corps. 

In 2014, DON leadership incorporated a multifaceted strategy to improve F/A–18 

depot efficiency and throughput. The current constraints to the Hornet line are both 

manpower and material related. The strategy addresses these issues with an aggressive hiring and training plan for artisans and engineers, kitting of materials for 

the high flight hour (HFH) events based on common repair requirements, and the 

implementation of an enterprise-wide improvement to production flow using a theory of constraints method called critical chain project management. Additionally, the 

DON has collaborated with Boeing in identifying several areas to improve overall 

depot throughput, such as employing Boeing Engineering Support and incorporating 

the use of its Cecil Field facility. The strategy is proving successful as depot production levels are improving. With the requested funding, and under this plan, the Department anticipates continued improvement in depot throughput to meet annual 

production requirements by FY17 and full recovery by FY19. 

A return to sequestration in FY16 is also a recurring concern. The Department 

requires a stable budget to meet these objectives. Sequestration and the compound 

effects of the 2013 government shutdown drove manning shortfalls for both artisans 

and engineers and hampered the DON’s ability to respond to unplanned work found 

during HFH inspections. Sequestration and subsequent manpower shortfalls in 

turn, exacerbated the F/A–18’s depot aircraft backlog. 

Any further reductions in the depot maintenance, engineering and contractor support budgets below requested levels will impede the depot throughput improvement 

strategy. A return to sequestration would have a compounding effect that will further increase risk in our strike fighter inventory management strategy and reduce 

the availability of warfighting assets. 
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Mr. TURNER. The Marine Corps is said to be our Nation’s air-ground force in readiness. What can you tell us about the overall readiness of Marine Aviation? 

General DAVIS. Marine Aviation does not have the numbers of ready aircraft required for training and warfighting (106 and 158 short, respectively) or the numbers 

of trained and qualified personnel to fill out our structure. Of our 56.5 Active and 

Reserve Component Squadrons, we only have enough aircraft and qualified personnel to field 46 squadrons. We have only been able to maintain the near-term 

readiness of our deploying squadrons at the cost of our next-to-deploy and non-deployed squadrons. Our ‘‘bench’’ is barely able to meet training requirements ‘‘just 

in time’’ for deployment. We have embarked on a comprehensive readiness recovery 

effort in Marine Aviation. That effort, while relying on a predictable and steady recapitalization of our new aircraft, attacks the readiness problems of our legacy fleet 

aggressively. Our readiness shortfall, 158 combat aircraft shy of the requirement, 

a mix of every type, model, series we fly, can be rectified in a four year timeframe 

provided our readiness accounts are fully funded. 

Mr. TURNER. The CNO has testified you have a strike fighter shortfall of 2–3 

squadrons’ worth of aircraft. Is the Navy strike fighter inventory sufficient to support operational demand? 

Admiral MANAZIR. The Department of the Navy actively manages the strike fighter inventory to support operational demand. We remain challenged with end of life 

planning for F/A–18 aircraft that reach the end of their service life before replacement aircraft (F–35B/C) are delivered into service. Consequently, strike fighter inventory management risk increases with the Fiscal Year 2016 President’s budget 

submission, further increasing the gap between aircraft supply and the Department’s Master Aviation Plan demand. 

The Department’s strike fighter inventory management strategy should be viewed 

in two separate and distinct phases. The near-term (2015–2020) challenge is a result of reduced strike fighter aircraft procurement, higher than planned TACAIR 

utilization rates, and F/A–18A–D depot production falling short of the 2013 and 

2014 required output. In 2014, aggressive efforts were instituted across the Department to improve depot productivity and return more aircraft back to service. As a 

result, aviation depots are expected to improve throughput to meet annual production requirements by FY 2017 and fully recover by FY 2019, at which time the 

workload will begin including F/A–18E/F service life extension efforts. In the farterm (2020–2035), strike fighter inventory management is predominantly affected 

by new aircraft procurement, specifically the F/A–18E/F and F–35. Far-term inventory risk will remain high as COCOM-driven operations and Fleet Response Training Plan training and readiness requirements continue to place excessive demand 

on the inventory, resulting in strike fighter utilization rates that exceed the projected requirement. 

Mr. TURNER. The Navy has delayed procurement of 49 F–35C over the past 2 

years. Is the Navy still committed to the JSF? 

Admiral MANAZIR. The Navy remains fully committed to the F–35C. The aircraft 

is critical to the success of our future carrier air wing by providing a 5th generation 

strike fighter capability that includes low observable technology and data fused sensors to outpace future threats, assure access, and improve responsiveness. The program is on-track to achieve initial operating capability (IOC) as scheduled in August 

2018 and recently completed a highly successful developmental test period (DT–1) 

aboard USS NIMITZ in November 2014, meeting all scheduled test objectives. The 

Fiscal Year 2016 President’s budget request (PB16) enables System Design and Development (SDD), Developmental and Operational Test and Evaluation, and procures low rate initial production aircraft to support Fleet Replacement Squadron 

(FRS) standup. PB16 increases FY16 procurement from two to four aircraft, but accepts long-term risk in F–35C capacity due to fiscal constraints. 

Mr. TURNER. We have heard the CNO testify that he has accepted risk in weapons procurement with the FY 16 budget request. Is the Navy maintaining sufficient 

aviation weapons to satisfy operational requirements? 

Admiral MANAZIR. The Navy accepted risk in weapons procurement levels to focus 

efforts on the development of future capabilities at the expense of inventory capacity. Under the current constraints, the Fleet maintains a sufficient inventory to 

meet operational requirements, but the overall ordnance capacity contributes to increased risk in accomplishing two primary Defense Strategic Guidance missions: 

Deter and Defeat Aggression and Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial 

(A2/AD) Challenges. Furthermore, the decision assumes risk in training weapons inventory capacity to satisfy operational requirements. 

Mr. TURNER. We have noted that the Navy plans to recapitalize the carrier onboard delivery (COD) mission with a variant of the V–22. What was the rationale 

behind this decision? 
105 

Admiral MANAZIR. The 35 remaining C–2A aircraft are nearing the end of their 

service life and becoming increasingly more expensive to operate. Accordingly, the 

Navy identified the need for a solution to the future Carrier Onboard Delivery 

(COD) mission capability. 

Between 2004 and 2013, the Navy performed a series of analyses that identified 

the COD capability as a critical force enabler requiring a material solution. They 

concluded that a manned carrier-based logistics aircraft was the preferred material 

concept, and that ‘‘off-the-shelf’’ solutions were available. The analyses also found 

that a force structure of 44 C–2 or V–22 class aircraft is required to conduct the 

COD mission into the future. Additionally, the latest analysis determined that a 

COD mission solution is required no later than 2026. 

In 2012, an update to the 2005 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) focused on the cost 

estimates for the six most likely alternatives. The analysis concluded in part that 

transferring the COD mission to the V–22 as part of the existing Program of Record 

was a viable and cost-effective option that provided the Navy the ‘‘best value’’ solution. This funding was validated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE) in December 2012. Following validation, an underway Military Utility Assessment (MUA) was performed in June 

2013 onboard the USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75). This assessment demonstrated that the V–22 is an effective, flexible and safe platform to conduct the 

COD mission from an aircraft carrier. 

Based on in-depth analysis and demonstrated capability, the Department of the 

Navy selected a variant of the V–22 as the solution to recapitalize the COD mission 

aircraft. This decision includes an acquisition strategy which funds the existing V– 

22 Program of Record to procure 44 COD mission aircraft. This approach takes advantage of an existing full-rate production line, captures potential multiyear procurement savings and capitalizes on the benefits of operating a common joint-service 

aircraft. Overall, this decision is the most affordable solution with the least risk to 

meeting Navy requirements. 

Mr. TURNER. Does the Navy have enough EA–18G aircraft to satisfy Navy and 

Joint requirements? 

Admiral MANAZIR. The Navy has the inventory of EA–18G aircraft we need to 

support current Navy Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) mission requirements. 

There is a study in progress to identify Joint warfighting requirements, Concept 

of Employment (CONEMPS) and future mission sets. The results of this study are 

expected to be released this summer and will provide insight that will allow the Department to determine the necessary force structure to meet all DOD requirements 

for Airborne Electronic Attack rather than just those requirements unique to the 

Navy. 

Mr. TURNER. Is the Air Force considering a philosophical shift toward a joint acquisition approach to procuring ‘‘capabilities-based platforms’’ instead of ‘‘platformbased capabilities’’? 

General RAY. Yes, the Air Force is exploring a more ‘‘capabilities-based’’ development planning process that includes multiple mission areas and functional domains 

vice a specific core function. As the AF leadership has stated, we can no longer afford to develop weapon systems based on traditional linear acquisition processes. Instead, we will focus first on developing strategic, enterprise-wide Air Force capabilities before establishing formal programs. Conducting strong and effective cross-core 

function, multi-domain development planning gives the best opportunity to leverage 

emerging technologies. 

To that end, the AF has chartered an Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team 

(ECCT) to deliver a capability development plan for our future Air Superiority capability needs—a plan that prescribes an agile and adaptive way forward to solve our 

toughest enterprise-wide challenges. This is intended not to be another bureaucratic 

‘‘process improvement’’ or re-organization effort but is expected to focus and consolidate the AF’s current efforts and processes to develop game-changing technologies 

that deliver enterprise-wide effects. While these improved processes have a joint 

foundation and include joint threat assessments in the planning, they are not always intended to produce a joint solution—one design/derivative solution for multiple services. 

The AF is starting with Air Superiority 2030 as our first endeavor however the 

AF leadership plans to apply this approach to other AF strategic challenges to ensure we are agile and adaptive and maintain our status as the World’s most capable 

Air Force. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you have any concerns about the aerospace industrial base in the 

United States in regards to them being able to meet our current and future national 

security requirements? 
106 

General RAY. Since the great industrial mobilization for World War II, the nation 

has benefitted from a robust industrial base supported by sustained public and private investments. Today’s aerospace industrial base underpins the Air Force’s ability to provide Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power for the nation and 

our allies. The Air Force and the nation have been fortunate in that many advances 

in civil and military aerospace technologies are mutually beneficial. For example, 

advances in turbine engine technology enable commercial aircraft to fly longer 

routes while these same advances extend the combat radius of tactical aircraft. 

There are similar examples in other areas such as electronics, metallurgy, and composite materials. The result of the sustained pattern of public and private investment is a robust aerospace industrial base, with a favorable trade balance of over 

$60 billion, fully capable of meeting current national security requirements. 

Looking ahead, there are areas for concern. While today’s Air Force is the smallest and oldest in our history; it is fully committed around the globe. As the Air 

Force has become smaller over time, our demands on the industrial base have lessened. In response, industrial capacity has fallen, potentially leading to the loss of 

industrial capability. Quite simply, no company can afford to keep empty facilities 

or a workforce with no work to do. Our ability to make informed judgments over 

the potential ability of the aerospace industrial base to support future national security requirements is clouded by fiscal uncertainties, resulting in part from the Budget Control Act. 

While the Air Force and the Department of Defense can lessen the risk through 

programs such as Aviation Innovation Initiative and the Adaptive Engine Technology Development effort, these do not fully address the national commitment required to sustain this nation’s role as the global technical leader in military aerospace. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you have any concerns about the intellectual pool of scientists 

and researchers that make the United States their home, and have historically contributed so much to our national defense? 

General RAY. Yes, the Air Force is concerned about recruiting and retaining scientists, researchers and engineers. The domestic scientist and engineering workforce 

has been sustained by research, development, test, and engineering (RDT&E) funding from the government, private industry, and academia. This pool of skilled workers have historically contributed to our National Defense through in-house efforts 

as well as the ‘‘spin-in’’ of commercial technology and talents into military applications and the ‘‘spin-out’’ of military technology and personnel into the commercial 

sector. Retaining and refreshing the science and engineering workforce has enabled 

the military to maintain its technological edge and sustain an intellectual and industrial base to innovate, design, field, and maintain systems for the warfighter. 

Uncertain federal budgets coupled with alternatives to traditional employment 

present many challenges for recruiting and refreshing the Air Force science and engineering workforce. Internet, social media, and other new industries with limited 

or no application to military applications are attracting S&E graduates. Both industry and government continue to have challenges attracting and retaining experienced scientists and engineers. The Air Force addresses these challenges by conducting science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) outreach around 

Air Force base communities. The Air Force conducts over 150 STEM outreach 

events per year, leveraging local, state and federal organizations to reach over 

100,000 students and teachers. The Air Force has successfully leveraged the 

Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation scholarship for service program to build its STEM workforce across the Air Force. In addition, the Air Force 

research community actively engages academia in numerous research partnerships 

to tackle Air Force priorities; to include providing grants to applicants for higher 

education in vital research domains through the National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellowship program. Furthermore, the Air Force has codified its 

STEM workforce goals in Bright Horizons 2.0, the Air Force STEM Workforce Strategy. Bright Horizons 2.0 outlines strategic goals to institutionalize STEM workforce 

planning and force management to build and maintain a highly competent, diversified and agile workforce. 

Mr. TURNER. We understand that just this past week that the Air Force has released requirements for a replacement to the T–38 pilot training aircraft, called the 

T–X. There is a bow-wave of acquisition costs that seem to be piling up at once. How 

is the Air Force going to control costs and execute a successful T–X acquisition program among others and avoid a repeat of previous programs where the Air Force 

was overly optimistic concerning cost, schedule, and performance? 

General RAY. T–X is at the forefront of implementing the acquisition improvements known as Better Buying Power, Strategic Agility, and Bending the Cost 

Curve. These initiatives will ensure the Air Force gets the best value system solu-
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tion while replacing its aging fleet of T–38 aircraft and associated Ground Based 

Training Systems (GBTS). From program inception, the Air Force has actively communicated with industry to identify TX system requirements utilizing mature technology to provide a realistic training experience for the pilots of 4th and 5th generation fighter aircraft. The combination of training system maturity, early requirement definition, and the number and variety of offerings expected will help maximize competition and reduce government cost. Applying the principles of Strategic 

Agility during the acquisition will ensure the Air Force retains the flexibility to upgrade training systems technology as pilot training requirements evolve over the life 

of the system. 

Mr. TURNER. If the Air Force had the money, would it retain A–10s in the inventory? If Congress provides funds for retaining the A–10, what are the advantages 

of retaining A–10s in the Air Force inventory from a capability and capacity perspective? 

General HOLMES. If Congress provided additional funds above the FY2016 President’s Budget request, the Air Force would use these funds to address higher priority challenges including fighter force recapitalization and modernization required 

to meet the demands of new, more capable threats, along with weapons capacity and 

readiness shortfalls that would enable us to implement the Defense Strategic Guidance at lower risk. Retaining the A–10 fleet would provide some operational tempo 

relief to other close air support-capable aircraft in our inventory. However, continuing to operate and maintain the A–10 fleet limits our ability to address existing 

capability and readiness challenges. 

Mr. TURNER. We understand that the Commander of First Air Force has submitted an urgent operational need, or UON, for new radars on the F–16 fleet that 

conducts the aerospace control alert mission, and that this UON is now being evaluated by the Joint Staff. Does the Air Force have a plan to upgrade radars for the 

aerospace control alert F–16 aircraft? 

General HOLMES. Yes, the Air Force is working with the Joint Staff to get a fully 

approved Joint Urgent Operational Need for F–16 Active Electronically Scanned 

Array (AESA) radars for a portion of our fleet. The initial fielding will focus on units 

protecting the National Capital region; additionally, the Air Force is exploring options to expand the AESA deployment to other units performing the aerospace control alert mission. 

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