GROVER S~S 

HID 

AU~TXN ,a. TEXAS 

Honorable W. J. Townsend 

County Attorney 

Angellna County 

Lufkin, Texas 

Dear Sir: opinion no. o-6629 

Re: Under the given facts does 

the Commlsslonersl Court of 

., Angellna County have the 

authority to use a portion 

of-the air port funds to 

gravel the road $.n question? 

Your rOqU38t for an opinion on the above question 

read8 a8 f911OW8: 

“i&gOlh COUIIty Voted a iona hiSUe t0 

purchase and establish an airport. With F p!rtion of the proceeda of 8aia bond issue, .~.. 

land vas purchased for the establishment of an 

airport, which airport ha8 been established on 

the land purchased by the county for 8UCh purpose. 

“The airport is located about 3/b ,of a mile 

from the state highway leading to Lufkin, tiiah 

18 a hard eurfaced hlghway. To make the airport 

available for the purpose for which it la built, 

it is necessary that said road leading from-~the 

airport to said highway be graveled or hard aurfaced. Would it be lawful for the Commisaloners~ 

Court to use a portion of the airport fun&s to 

gravel or hard surface the 3/4 of a mile of the 

public road leading from the airport to said 

atate hIghway, to make eaid airport available in 

all kIna of weather?" 

Article 1269h, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, is 

in part 88 fol~ovs: 

"Section 1. A- That the governing body of any 

incorporated city in this State may receive through 

gift or dedication, and is hereby empowered to ac- 
Honorable W. J. Tovnsena, page 2 (o-6629) 

'quire, by purchase without condemnation or by purchase through condemnation proceedings, and thereafter maintain and operate as an airport, or lease, 

or sell, to the Federal Government, tracts of land 

either within or without the corporate limits of 

such city ana vithln the county In which such city 

his 8itUatOd, EUId the cOUlllLt88iOllt3r8' COUI't Of any 

county may likewise acquire, maintain and operate 

for like purpose tracts of land within the limits 

of the county. 

.“. . . , 

“Sec. 2. (a) For the purpose of condemning or 

purchasing, either or both, lands to be U8Od and 

matitalned as provided in Section 1 hereof, ana 

improving and equipping the same for such use, the 

governing body of any oitg or the Commissioners' 

Court of any county, falling vithln the terms of 

8UCh Section, may issue negotiable bonda of the 

city or of the county, as the case may be, and 

levy taxes to provide for the interest anb slnking fUa8.of any such bonds so issuea, the authority hereby _ given - for the issuance of such 

bond8 &Id lOVy and COlleCtiOn of 8uch taxes 

exercised in accordance with the provisions 

Chapter 1 of~Ti.tle 22 of the Revised Civil 

Statutes of 1925. 

" . . . . 

to be 

of 

'Sec. 3. Any air port acquired under and by 

vlrtue,.of the terms of this Act 8htil be under the 

management and control of the governing body of the 

city or the Commisaloners~, Court of the county acquiring the Fame, which is hereby expressly authorized and empowered to Improve, maintain and conduct 

the same as an air port, and for that purpose to 

make ana provide therein all necessary or fit lmprovements and facilities and to fix such reasonable charge8 for the use thereof a8 such governing 

body or CommissIonerat Court shall deem fit, and to 

mslce rules and regulations governing the use thereof. All proceeds from such charge8 Shall be devoted 

exclusively to the maintenance, upkeep, improvement 

and operation of such air port and the facllltles, 

StNCtUI'OS, and improvements therein," .*. . 
Honorable W. J. Tovnsend, page 3, (O-6629) 

Chapter 1, Title 22, of the Revised Civil Statute8 

of Texas, 1925, is in part as follows: 

'Article 701. Shall hold el&.tlon. l%e bonds 

of a county or an Incorporated city or town shall 

never be i88UOd for any purpose unless a proposition for the issuance of such bonds shall have been 

first submitted to the qualified voters who are 

property tax payers of such county, city or town. 

"A&t. 702. Qukstlon submitted; In all cases 

when the governing body of a county, city or town 

shall order an election for the issuance of the 

bonds of the county, city or tovn or of any political 

subdivision or defined district of a county, .such 

body shall at the same time submit the question of 

whether or not a tax shall be levied upon the property of ~such county, city or town, political 8Ub-' 

division or defined district for the purpose of 

paying the interest on the bonds and to create a 

sw funa for the redemption of the bonda. 

UArt. 703. SUbmiSSiOn of proposition. The 

proposition to be submitted shall di8tinCtly specify: 

1. The purpose for vhzich the bond8 are to be iSSUed; 

2. The amount thereof; 

3. &he rate of Interest; 

4. he levy of taxes 8Uff$Cient to Pay ihe =ual 

interest and provide a sinking Arid to pay the 

bond8 at maturity; 

5. The maturity date, or that the bond8 may.be 

issuea to mature serially within any given nuniber of years not to exceed forty." 

h the case Of CarrOll vs. WilliamS, COUnty TIwaSUrOr, 

et al, 202 9. W. 504, the Supreme Court had under consideration the power of the Commiaslonera * Court to transfer rolrey 

from one.fund to another. while the fasts in that case are 

somewhat different from those here being considered, the 

principle of law Is, In our opinion, the same. In that case 

the Comm18sloner8t Court of Jefferson County, as part of a 

gocoral scheme for exacting from tarpayers and expending on 

road8 ana bridges more money than the ConstitutAon of this 

State permits to be rsised by taxation and emended for that 
-1 

Honorable W. J. Tovnsend, Page 4, (O-6629) 

purpose, deliberately 8nd purposesly levied, for various 

other purposes defined by said Constitution, which were known 

by that Court at the time of such levies thereof, to be much 

greater in amounts than were required to meet the current expenditures for such other purposea, and afterwards transferred such excesses in such funds to the Road and Bridge 

Fund, and expended same accordingly. in holding such practice to be unlawful., the Court laid down the following 

principles of law which sre applicable here: 

~"Going to the real gist of the main issue before 

us, section 9 of article 8 of our state Constitution, 

supra, inhibits any and all transfers of tax money 

from one to another of the several classes of funds 

therein authorized, and, as a sequence, the expenditure, Por one purpose therein defined, of tax money 

raised ostensibly for another such purpose. The 

immediate purpose in so prescribing a separate maximum tax rate for each of the classes of purposes 

there enumerated is, no doubt, to limit, accordingly, 

the amount of taxes which may be raised from the 

people, by taxation, declaredly for those several 

purposes or classes of purposes, respectively. But 

that is not all; The ultimate and practical and obvious design and purpose and legal effect is to 

inhibit excessive expenditures for any such purpose 

or class of purposes. By necessary implication said 

provisions of section 9 of article 8 were desIgned, 

not merely to limit the tax rate for certain therein 

designated purposes, but to require that any and all 

money raised by taxation for any such purpose shall 

be applied, faithfully, to that particular purpose, 

as needed therefor', and not to any other purpose or 

use whatsoever. Those constitutional provlslons control, not only the raising, but al80 the application, 

of all such funds; and such is the legal effect of 

articles 2242.and 7357, aupra, when properly construed 

and applied. 

"True, the COn8titUtiOn do08 not 889, in 80 many 

Words, that money raised by a county, city or town, 

by taxation for one such purpose shall never ,be expended for any other purpose - not even for another 

of the,five general classes of purposes defined and 

.approved in said section 9 - but that, we thin&, is 

its plain and certain meaning and legal effect. The 

very definitions of those several classes of purposea, a@ the declaration of authority to~tax the 

people therefor, respectively, coupled, as they are, 

in each instance, with a limitation of the tax rate 

for that class, must have been predicated upon the 
Honorable W. J. Townsend, page 5~ (O-6629) 

expectation and intent that, as a matter of common 

honesty and fair dealing, tax money taken from the 

pOOplO 08ten8ibly for one such specified purpose 

shall be expended, as needed, for that purpose 

alone, as veil aa that the tax rate for that particubr class, in any one year shall not exceed 

the prescribed maximum." 

In the aase of Moore, County Judge, et al vs. 

Coffman, et al, 200 3. W. 374, the Supreme Court was considering vhether the Commissioners l Court of Knox County could use 

the proceeds of bond8 voted forbuilding a bridge acroaa the 

Brazes River'at a designated place for building a bridge at 

another place.' In holding that the proceeds~ of said bonds 

must be used for the purpose stated, the Court held as follows : 

"It vaa the duty of the Commissioners* Court 

.ukder the statute (art. 606), in statingthe proposltion to be voted on in the bona eleotlon, to specify, 

both in its order for the election and in the notice 

of the election, the purpose for vhioh the bonds were 

to be iaaued. The rosa09 of this requirement is that 

the voter8 in 8Uoh an election are entitled to know, 

beforehand, the specific use to which their taxes 

levied in virtue of the election are'to'be put. The 

design of the statute 18 that the purpose of the bonds 

shall-be. stated in such way as to fairly and fully 

apprise the voter8 of it. Ro particular form is prescribed for it8 statement, and the way in vhlch it 

shall be stated 80 as to accord with the apirlt of 

the statute Is neaessarily left to the Commissioners* 

court. In this instance, the oourt in defining the 

proposition in respect to the purpose of the bond8 

saw fit to declare that it was not only to construct 

these two bridges, but to construct them at certain 

designatea locations. Stating the purpose in this 

manner contravened no law% hence the court was 

privileged to thus announce it. Since the aourt by 

deliberate action made the location of the bridges 

a part Of the proposition submitted, it i8 fair to 

conclude that their erection at the .locationa named 

constituted in the court13 mind an essential part of 

the purpose of the bonds. If so, it must have intended that the'voters in the election should uuder8tand that included in such purpose Was the building 

of the bridg& at these particular places. That the 

voters did so understand can hardly be denied. 
._ 

. 

I 

Honorable W. J. Townsend, Page 6, (O-6629) ,~ 

"If it was within the lavful power of the 

court to so declare the purpose of the bonds; if 

It intended that the voters should understand 

their purpose to be the erection of the bridges 

at these particular crossings; and the voter8 

cast their ballots accordingly, we think that is 

an end of the question. It then becomes simply a 

matter of keeping faith with those whose will the 

election expressed. 

,"To say., as is urged, thatthe incorporation 

of the location of the bridge8 in the Commissioners1 

.Courtls statement of the purpose of these bonds was 

surplusage and Is therefore of no effect, 18 to deny 

to those courts the power of 80 declaring the purpose 

of a bona issue of this character as a means of fully 

acquainting the property owning voters of a county 

with then exact use intended to be made of the bonds. 

For if the court had the power to include in its 

definition of the purpose of the bonds 80 material 

.a matter a8 the prOPO8Od locations of the bridges, 

that part of the stated purpose cannot be regarded 

a8 mere surplusage. It csn be 80 treated only upon 

Ahe theory that the court in 80 including it trsn- 

-8cended Its authority, ma for that reaaon 18 not 

bound by it. We decline to so hold. The specific 

use .to which It is intended by public officials that 

.public moneys shall be applied is always of concern 

to those upon whom tsxation rests the burden of the 

expenditure. In the matter of bond issues authorized 

by ,the vote of.the citizenshlp affected, in the submission of the proposltlon the law encourages, rather 

than frowns upon, a full and definite statement of 

their purpose. The location of an expensive public 

Improvement dependent upon such bond issues is frequently 0f:as prime importance as~its construction. 

In such cases,it is 6nly fair to the voters in the 

electioncalled to determine the matter to inform 

.them in advance of the intended~,location, 80 that 

the actual merits of the given proposal, into,vhich 

the question ~of location may largely enter, ~shall 

decide the contest. When this is done, the location 

is a part of the vote~ana is entitled to an equivalent 

'protection. Wee can perceive nothing in such a courae 

that elther.trenches upon or exceeds the authority 

possessed in these matters by Commissioners* Courts 

or municipal bOdiO8,~ or that amoUntS, a8 18 contended 

to's surrender of their duty into other hands." 
_-- . . _.. 

Honorable W. J. ToWnsend, Page 7, (C-6629) 

In the a880 of Levis et dl v8i City of Fort Worth et 

al, 89 3. W. (26,) 975, the Supreme Court was considering 

whether or not the City Counail had authority to use the proCOed8 Of the 88&I Of oOrt8in bonds for VEdOUS named pUrpO808, 

8nd the Court, in holding that 8UOh purposss were not foreign 

to the purposes for vhioh said bond8 verb voted, laid down the 

following general rule of law: 

"It 18 elementary that the proceeds of bond8 

voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for vhioh they were voted." 

Angelina County having voted bond8 for the purpose of 

purohasing and 08t8bli8hiIlg an air port, it i8 our opinions 

that the prooeeds of said bonds oannot be U8Oa to gravel or 

hard 8XU'f8CO the pub110 road leading from said air port to 

the State Highway, 88 that would be using the proceeds Of 

SSid bond8 for 8 purpose different from that for vhluh raid 

bonds were voted and V0ula be in violation of the above rule8 

Of 18V. 

we tlTlSt that this 88ti8f88tOrily 8ll6VOrO yOUr ill@l'y. 

Your6 very truly, 

JWBrLJ:EAC 

ATTORJEY gElfEW& OF Tw;as 

By /8/ Jas. W. Bassett 

JaS W; Bassett 

..ABsistant 

.-._ 

APPROVED J-C-N 26 1945 APPROVED 

- . . ..- OPmIoN 

IS/ Oar106 G, Ashley COIdMITTEF. 

BYBWB.'