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STATUS OF EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY GULF WAR

SYNDROME: MULTIPLE TOXIC EXPOSURES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 

REFORM AND OVERSIGHT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 26, 1997

Serial No. 105–66

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT 

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois 

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

STEPHEN HORN, California 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia 

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South 

Carolina 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey 

VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas 

BOB BARR, Georgia 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

TOM LANTOS, California 

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia 

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

GARY A. CONDIT, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, 

DC 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

JIM TURNER, Texas 

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine 

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee 

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

(Independent) 

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director 

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director 

WILLIAM MOSCHELLA, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian 

JUDITH MCCOY, Chief Clerk 

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman 

VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey 

STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine 

TOM LANTOS, California 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Ind.) 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel 

ROBERT NEWMAN, Professional Staff Member 

R. JARED CARPENTER, Clerk 

CHERRI BRANSON, Minority Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on June 26, 1997 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of: 

Garthwaite, Thomas, Deputy Under Secretary for Health, Department 

of Veterans’ Affairs, accompanied by John Feussner, Chief Research 

Officer, Department of Veterans’ Affairs; and Frances Murphy, Director 

of Environmental Agents Services, Department of Veterans’ Affairs; 

Bernard Rostker, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Department 

of Defense, accompanied by Gary Christopherson, Acting Principal Deputy for Health Affairs; Col. Hershell Wolfe, Assistant for Occupational 

Health, Assistant Secretary of the Army, ASA, ILNC; and Col. Eric 

Daxon, Radiological Hygiene Staff Officer, AEPI, U.S. Army ................... 158

Metcalf, Hon. Jack, a Representative in Congress from the State of Washington ............................................................................................................. 19

Nicolson, Garth, chief scientific officer, Institute for Molecular Medicine, 

accompanied by Nancy Nicolson, chief executive officer, Institute for 

Molecular Medicine; Leonard Dietz, physicist and research scientist; 

and Asaf Durakovic, former chief, Nuclear Medicine Service, Wilmington, DE .................................................................................................. 92

Roman, Col. Gilbert, retired, Gulf war veteran, Denver, CO; Paul Canterbury, Gulf war veteran, Ashley, OH; Michael Stacy, Gulf war veteran, 

Inola, OK; Staff Sgt. Mark Zeller, Gulf war veteran, Fort Rucker, 

AL ................................................................................................................... 25

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: 

Canterbury, Paul, Gulf war veteran, Ashley, OH, prepared statement 

of ..................................................................................................................... 30

Christopherson, Gary, Acting Principal Deputy for Health Affairs, list 

of members of the Department’s peer review organization ....................... 222

Dietz, Leonard, physicist and research scientist, prepared statement of .... 125

Durakovic, Asaf, former chief, Nuclear Medicine Service, Wilmington, 

DE, prepared statement of ........................................................................... 141

Garthwaite, Thomas, Deputy Under Secretary for Health, Department 

of Veterans’ Affairs: 

Detailed information concerning Dr. Baumzweiger ............................... 225

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 161

Metcalf, Hon. Jack, a Representative in Congress from the State of Washington, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 21

Nicolson, Garth, chief scientific officer, Institute for Molecular Medicine, 

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 96

Roman, Col. Gilbert, retired, Gulf war veteran, Denver, CO, prepared 

statement of ................................................................................................... 42

Rostker, Bernard, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Department 

of Defense: 

Information from the Armed Forces Radiological Research Institute .. 231

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 182

Sanders, Hon. Bernard, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Vermont, letter dated June 20, 1997 ...................................................... 7

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

Stacy, Michael, Gulf war veteran, Inola, OK, prepared statement of .......... 53

Zeller, Staff Sgt. Mark, Gulf war veteran, Fort Rucker, AL, prepared 

statement of ................................................................................................... 71

(1)

STATUS OF EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY GULF 

WAR SYNDROME: MULTIPLE TOXIC EXPOSURES 

THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 1997 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES, 

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Shays, Pappas, Towns, Sanders, and 

Kucinich. 

Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and counsel; 

Robert Newman, professional staff member; R. Jared Carpenter, 

clerk; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk. 

Mr. SHAYS. I welcome our witnesses and our guests, and we will 

begin this hearing. 

In the course of these oversight hearings on Gulf war veterans’ 

illnesses, we have delved deeply into complex scientific, clinical, 

military, and administrative issues. We are likely to do so again 

today as the subcommittee examines the possible synergistic effects 

of exposure to toxic cocktails, including low-level chemical weapons, 

pesticides, smoke from oil well fires, experimental drugs, depleted 

uranium, and biological agents. 

Immersed in a sea of technical details, it is possible to lose sight 

of the larger question that still confronts us as a Nation 6 years 

after the war: Are sick veterans getting better? 

Fortunately, testimony before this subcommittee from the General Accounting Office, GAO, Tuesday cut through the complexity 

and reasserted that simple, yet profound, important question as the 

moral, medical, and operational test of everything this Government 

does in the name of those it serves. 

As directed by Congress last year, GAO evaluated the effectiveness of the clinical care and research programs for six Gulf war 

veterans. They found neither the Veterans’ Affairs Department, 

VA, nor the Defense Department, DOD, can say whether the veterans on their health registries since 1992 are any better or worse 

today than when they were first examined. GAO also found the research effort reactive, predisposed to certain lines of inquiry, and 

highly unlikely to provide conclusive answers regarding the causes 

of Gulf war illnesses, and they found some official conclusions 

2

about Gulf war illnesses by the Presidential Advisory Committee, 

the PAC, weakly supported or premature. 

In short, 6 years after the war, when asked what progress has 

been made healing sick Gulf war veterans, VA and DOD cannot 

say where they have been and may never get where they are supposed to be going. 

Part of the journey from cause to cure runs through the pools, 

clouds, and plumes of toxins in which Gulf war veterans lived and 

fought. It is a leg of the trip DOD and VA have never taken, too 

quickly dismissing the potential health hazards of many known exposures. Just as research into the effects of low-level chemical 

weapons was thwarted for 5 years by denials, inquiries into toxic 

effects of other agents, alone and in combination, have been dismissed or ignored. 

It is simply not acceptable for VA and DOD to declare repeatedly 

‘‘there is no evidence’’ of exposures or effects, when the evidence 

has never been sought. 

Today, we will hear evidence of two ingredients of the toxic soup 

to which many Gulf war veterans were exposed: depleted uranium 

and mycoplasmas. No one claims either agent is the silver bullet 

causing the myriad of Gulf war illnesses, nor should anyone in the 

face of very real symptoms and very real suffering likely dismiss 

their potential for causing, enhancing, or accelerating the health effects of toxic exposures. 

Depleted uranium is a heavy metal, like lead, which is highly 

toxic when ingested or inhaled. Mycoplasma infections may explain 

apparent transmission of illnesses to veterans’ family members. 

We asked VA and DOD witnesses to describe what is known 

about the extent and effects of exposures to these agents and how 

that knowledge is reflected in research, diagnosis, and treatment 

protocols. We also invited researchers familiar with the pathology 

and these agents to describe their work. The subcommittee appreciates the benefit of their views and their expertise. 

The Gulf war veterans testifying today, like those who appeared 

here before, still travel the uncertain road they hope will lead to 

answers, good health, to the home they left to fight our desert battle. We are honored by their presence and we value their testimony. 

Are sick Gulf war veterans getting better? Until the answer is 

yes, our work as a Congress and as a Nation remains unfinished, 

our debt to veterans unpaid. 

At this time, the Chair would like to recognize a partner in this 

effort, Mr. Sanders from Vermont. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. SANDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I continue to applaud you and your staff for the outstanding work that 

you have done for a very long period in keeping this issue before 

the public eye and in trying to bring forth truths which, in fact, 

have been hidden for a number of years. 

Mr. Chairman, within the last week or two, I think two important developments have occurred, which I want to very briefly mention. No. 1 was the release of a GAO report which basically concluded what many of us have been saying for a number of years, 

and that is that neither the Pentagon nor the Veterans’ Administration have been doing a good job in helping us understand the 

cause of the problems or developing a treatment for the some 

70,000 veterans who are hurting today. And that report, of course, 

did not come as a surprise to the members of this committee, because that is exactly the report that we have been making for a 

number of years. 

Second, I submitted for the record a letter that was sent to the 

chairperson of the Presidential Advisory Committee that had the 

names of 86 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and 

basically what that letter said to the Presidential Advisory Committee is that we, Members of Congress, disagree with the conclusion of your December 1996 report which suggests that stress and 

stress alone is the cause of Persian Gulf illnesses. 

And I must tell you that we could have had many more signatures on that letter. I must tell you that it was not a partisan 

issue. Democrats, Republicans, conservatives, progressives all responded, because very few people today in the House of Representatives and, I expect, in the Senate as well and, I expect, within the 

veterans’ community and, I expect, within the United States of 

America today accept the conclusion that only stress was the cause 

of the problems. 

Is stress an important factor? Yes, it is. I happen to believe it 

is. But is it the only factor? No. And I think what we have been 

hearing, month after month after month, testimony before this 

committee is the role that chemicals, in one form or another, and 

the synergistic, the combined effect of chemicals, the role that they 

have played in causing illness, and it is impossible, in my view, to 

deny that conclusion any more. 

Mr. Chairman, very briefly, the concern that I have and what the 

GAO had is the lack of focus and the lack of direction on the part 

of the DOD and the VA. In the letter that we sent to the Presidential Advisory Committee, we briefly summarized a dozen different studies by outstanding and well-known scientists and physicians who, in one way or another, point out the role that chemicals 

have played. 

Interestingly, two of the studies were funded by the DOD itself. 

In 1995, the DOD, in one of their own studies at Fort Detrick, MD, 

concluded that pyridostigmine bromide, combined with DEET and 

pyrimethamine, have a synergistic effect, much more so than the 

additive effect on making rats sick, dying earlier than one would 

have expected, similar to the findings released by a Duke University study. A dozen different studies, and what the GAO is saying, 

where is it all going? In 5 years from now, in 10 years from now, 

6

are we going to have more and more studies? So I would suggest 

this is not an academic exercise. 

Now, the problems are many. 

No. 1, I happen to believe, and I can understand it from a human 

nature point of view, that the DOD is not happy to acknowledge 

that after that smashing military victory in the Persian Gulf, a victory of enormous consequence, much better than anyone dreamed 

possible, that a two-bit despot like Saddam Hussein may have been 

able to cause yet so much damage. People do not want to acknowledge that. 

No. 2: What about the role of pyridostigmine bromide? As we all 

know, the DOD received a waiver from the FDA, and I suspect that 

there is—and I am not here to criticize, in that sense, the DOD. 

We know that they want the best for our troops. We know the VA 

wants the best for our troops, but maybe there is a reluctance to 

investigate the fact that they themselves brought forth 

pyridostigmine bromide, administered it to hundreds of thousands 

of our troops, and maybe that is part of the problem. 

And, No. 3, and maybe most significantly, there is a strong difference of opinion within the medical community; honest physicians, honest scientists disagree about what is called ‘‘multiple 

chemical sensitivity,’’ and you have many physicians, I think, in 

the VA and the DOD who simply do not accept that diagnosis. 

I will be curious to know from the DOD and the VA how many 

scientists they have on board who believe in the synergistic impact 

of chemicals, that chemicals can make us ill. And if you do not believe that, then you can have all the scientists you want peer-reviewing everything, and they are going to think, hey, this is quackery; this does not mean anything. 

So I think those are some of the questions that we will want to 

explore today, and, Mr. Chairman, I simply congratulate you and 

your staff for the outstanding work that you have been doing. 

[The letter referred to follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. At this time, we have a Member of Congress, a distinguished Member of Congress, Jack Metcalf, 

who, while not a member of this committee, has been very active 

on this issue and very involved. We appreciate your involvement, 

and appreciate any testimony or statement that you would like to 

give. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JACK METCALF, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

Mr. METCALF. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your 

work and support and for the opportunity to speak to the subcommittee on this vital issue. I would like to have my entire statement entered in the record. 

Mr. SHAYS. Without objection, so ordered, and I will use your 

point here as an excuse to do two business things and ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted 

to place any opening statement in the record and that the record 

remain open 3 days and without objection, so ordered, and ask 

unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their 

written statement in the record and without objection, so ordered. 

And does the ranking member mind if I just—OK. We welcome 

your statement now. 

Mr. METCALF. Thank you very much. Gulf war illnesses have affected thousands of service personnel, both United States troops 

and those of our allies. In the beginning, the Department of Defense officially refused to recognize the possibility of serious illnesses related to operations in the Gulf that were not clearly the 

result of an identifiable source. However, reluctantly, in the past 

year there has been an increasing acknowledgement of events during the operation that could have potentially exposed troops to 

chemical and biological warfare agents. 

Considering United States shipments of both chemical and biological material to Iraq as well as statements by Retired General 

Schwarzkopf and Secretary of State Albright and others regarding 

Iraq’s development of biological weapons, it is difficult to understand how the Department of Defense can continue to deny the 

possibility that our troops could have been exposed to biologicals. 

Additionally, I have a grave concern that the Government’s unwillingness to seriously consider the cumulative health consequences, cumulative health consequences of exposures to multiple-risk factors has resulted in inadequate care for the sailors, 

soldiers, airmen, and Marines who put their lives on the line when 

their Nation called. 

The most sobering experience I have had since I came to Congress has been to meet the sick young men and women that were 

in excellent health before their service in the Gulf. I have heard 

over and over their stories of multiple-risk-factor exposures. 

Ed, a Marine scout sniper, was in outstanding health before his 

service in the Gulf, as evidenced by the award he received for attaining the maximum score on physical fitness tests. His performance as a Marine was continually commended. His health has 

steadily deteriorated since his return. As he related his story, what 

is clear is the complexity of the potential exposures. 

20

He was seriously ill shortly after arrival in the Gulf, although 

the cause was unknown. He was ordered to take PB tablets and a 

botulinum vaccine. During his experiences, chemical alarms were 

continually sounding and blister agents were being detected. He 

and his team were breathing smoke from oil well fires, as well as 

smoke from burning tanks destroyed by depleted uranium rounds. 

He described a dark, foul rain that came from the north, its cause 

unknown. He was exposed to pesticides and other environmental 

hazards in the field. 

The work done to date to help Ed and thousands like him is woefully deficient. The Department of Defense is quick to point out 

that the Government is funding 91 Gulf war medical research studies. A close look, however, reveals a sobering reality: Of those 91, 

only 3 are looking at issues associated with chemical weapon exposure, and only 2 are examining the health consequences of depleted 

uranium. What is truly amazing is that none of these three chemical weapons studies are even being done in this country. 

Why are not the best and the brightest of our doctors and scientists working to find answers? The young men and women who 

serve this Nation deserve better. 

Finally, I want to thank Dr. Garth Nicolson and Leonard Dietz 

for their testimonies today. When scientists with the stature of 

these researchers speak, we need to be listening. I can only hope 

that the public will do so, that the Pentagon and the public will 

do so. 

We in Congress have a moral obligation to press for truthful answers and to ensure adequate health for our veterans and their 

family members who may be sick as a result of exposures in the 

Gulf. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jack Metcalf follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman for being here for his statement. 

At this time, the Chair would like to recognize Mr. Towns, who 

truly is an equal partner in this process. I may have the gavel, but 

I consider us equal partners, and I particularly appreciate the fact 

that he is busy on the Commerce Committee but spends so much 

time as the ranking member on this subcommittee. Mr. Towns. 

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin 

by first thanking you for your kind words, and let me also thank 

you, as well as the majority staff and the minority staff, for arranging this hearing today on Persian Gulf war illness. 

While I look forward to hearing the testimony of all of our witnesses, I am particularly interested in our treatment of the disorder known as multiple chemical sensitivity. Some people have 

questioned the VA’s reluctance to recognize multiple chemical sensitivity as a compensable injury. However, this criticism ignores 

that the medical community is divided over whether MCS is a bona 

fide disease. The California Medical Association, the American 

Academy of Allergy and Immunology, the American College of Physicians, the American College of Medicine, and the Council on Scientific Affairs of the American Medical Association have all published position papers which question the existence of MCS, its diagnosis, and its treatments. 

Additionally, the legal community is not unified on this issue, either. Courts have been divided over whether MCS is to be considered as an injury under State workers’ compensation laws, and we 

in the Federal Government have not been consistent, either. 

MCS has been classified as a disability under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act. MCS has also been recognized by the U.S. 

Department of Housing and Urban Development as a basis for 

seeking protection under the Federal housing discrimination laws, 

yet the Social Security Administration considers MCS on a case-bycase basis, and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs does not recognize it at all. 

In August 1997, the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry will publish an interim report on MCS. The Agency 

is composed of representatives from the Departments of Defense, 

Energy, Health and Human Services, and Veterans’ Affairs, as well 

as the National Center for Environmental Health, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 

The report is expected to contain findings and recommendations 

which may affect the compensation policies of every Federal agency 

and provide some general agreement in the scientific and medical 

communities, which would lead to Federal recognition and also uniformity. 

Mr. Chairman, I suggest that when the report is released, we 

hold a hearing on its findings. Additionally, I suggest that if the 

situation warrants, we consider legislation to require Federal benefit uniformity for all those who are disabled by multiple chemical 

sensitivity. 

So I look forward to working with you, as I have done in the 

past, and I would like to also applaud you for staying with this 

24

issue, because I think it is important that we do so, and at this 

time I yield back. 

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. In fact, we both are staying 

with this issue, obviously, along with Mr. Sanders. At this time, I 

am inviting to the table, recognizing our four witnesses, Col. Gilbert Roman, retired, Gulf war veteran—oh, I am sorry. Mr. 

Kucinich, I apologize. I did not see you walk in. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be 

brief. I want to thank the Chair for his diligence in pursuing this 

issue over the past few years, and I have had a chance to look at 

testimony that has been presented to this committee, as well as the 

initial report which we received, and it is very apparent that there 

were many shortcomings in the approach that the Department of 

Defense used. 

I would like to think that the United States of America has a Defense Department which is second to none in the world and that 

they really are dedicated to protecting the American people and assuring the security of Americans around the world and making 

sure that Americans’ interests are protected. 

But in this one case I think we have seen where despite perhaps 

some of the best intentions and some of the best people, it is quite 

possible some serious mistakes were made and those mistakes 

were repeated, that people went into the crisis affecting the Gulf 

war veterans with a theoretical forward which did not allow for the 

consideration of other possibilities other than post-traumatic stress 

or psychological conditions which can arise from people being separated from family and being in a certain environment, and the 

analysis was flawed from the beginning. 

And so if we can, in these hearings, find a way to not just admit 

that possibility, but to remedy the injustice which has been done 

to the Gulf war veterans, then we can celebrate the unending possibilities of a democratic tradition which can include error and seek 

to create remedies which can overcome those errors. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the work that you have 

done on this. 

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. At this time, we will recognize our four witnesses and ask them to stand to be sworn in: Col. 

Gilbert Roman, retired, Gulf war veteran, Denver, CO; Mr. Paul 

Canterbury, Gulf war veteran, Ashley, OH; Mr. Michael Stacy, Gulf 

war veteran, Inola, OK; and S/Sgt. Mark Zeller, Gulf war veteran, 

Fort Rucker, AL. 

Gentlemen, we swear in all our witnesses, including Members of 

Congress. Raise your right hands. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Please be seated. I note for the record 

that all four have answered in the affirmative. 

We will begin in the order in which I called you, so we will just 

go right down the table. We are going to have a timer on, but you 

are free to run over the timer. We want to just keep track of how 

we are doing here, so I welcome you, Colonel. 

25

STATEMENTS OF COL. GILBERT ROMAN, RETIRED, GULF WAR 

VETERAN, DENVER, CO; PAUL CANTERBURY, GULF WAR VETERAN, ASHLEY, OH; MICHAEL STACY, GULF WAR VETERAN, 

INOLA, OK; STAFF SGT. MARK ZELLER, GULF WAR VETERAN, 

FORT RUCKER, AL 

Col. ROMAN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, my fellow veterans, I am Gilbert D. 

Roman, Colonel, U.S. Army, retired, Reserve. I thank you for the 

opportunity to be here today. 

I would like to start out with a newspaper item quotation, a very 

brief one, taken from the Army Times, 1994. It says, ‘‘Sick Gulf 

Vets Wary, Wait for Treatment.’’ It goes on to quote, ‘‘We are committed to the treatment of the veterans of the Persian Gulf conflict 

who are experiencing problems as a result of their service,’’ said 

Edwin Dorn, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. ‘‘We are determined to fashion compensation for those who 

are too sick to work.’’ Army Times, March 1994. 

We are still waiting, sir. I am greatly saddened by recent newspaper accounts of what is not occurring in the dialog and discussion on this issue, because I see a continuing pattern of official 

DOD misinformation and negligence tantamount to malfeasance in 

office for ignoring testimony and documentation referring to the 

use or presence of chemicals and other biological agents our reports 

indicate were found in the theater of operations during Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm. 

I arrived in the theater of operations on January 6, 1991—by the 

way, that would happen to be my birthday—after volunteering to 

serve in the Persian Gulf and being brought on active duty in December 1990. My primary responsibility as Colonel, Medical Service 

Corps, was the Deputy Commander of the 311th Evacuation Hospital——

Mr. SHAYS. Colonel, could you just slow down a little bit? We are 

not going to rush you. 

Col. ROMAN. Are you sure? 

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. 

Col. ROMAN. OK. 

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say something to all of you. We learned 

early on that you are voices in the wilderness, with very few people 

listening. 

Col. ROMAN. Thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. SHAYS. And we decided that in almost every instance we 

would begin our hearings listening to those voices. So you are a 

very important voice, and you take your time. 

Col. ROMAN. I took very serious that 5 minutes, though, that we 

were given. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I want to explain to you, we would like you to 

have been aware of the 5 minutes. If you run over, we are just 

going to turn the light back on. 

Col. ROMAN. Thank you, sir. My primary responsibility as Colonel, Medical Service Corps was as the Deputy Commander of the 

311th Evacuation Hospital. I was responsible for operations, logistics, and security. In secondary assignments I was also the public 

affairs officer and liaison to the Ministry of Health in Abu Dhabi, 

United Arab Emirates, where the 311th was physically located. 

26

We were also near Al Dafra and Al Bateen Air Force Bases 

where the United States Air Force flew daily sorties north. Also flying out of Al Bateen were daily air shuttles called the ‘‘Star Shuttle,’’ which were either C–130’s or C–141’s that flew daily shuttles 

to Riyadh, Dharhan, King Khalid Military City, and other points 

in the Gulf operations. 

During several of the official visits to these strategic military cities there were frequent SCUD attacks in SCUD Alley during which 

I often heard the chemical alarms. When I asked if these alarms 

meant chemicals, and I was a colonel, I was told that the chemical 

alarms had malfunctioned. I do not think they malfunctioned that 

often, sir. 

My first time in Riyadh, I became ill. I was treated for nausea, 

headaches, vomiting, diarrhea, and a high temperature. My commander, a physician, was with me and treated me for the symptoms, which appeared to be food poisoning. There was nausea, 

headache, vomiting, and—I am bleeding; and the reason I am 

bleeding, sir, is because I have precancerous polyps—excuse me—

that have not been treated in my nasal passages and colon. But if 

I can continue, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. SHAYS. You may continue, and you may slow down. 

Col. ROMAN. I am slowing down. 

Mr. SHAYS. And we can also go to another witness and then come 

back to you. 

Col. ROMAN. If I can just continue, I will be finished in a few 

minutes. 

Mr. SHAYS. I just want to emphasize to you, though, just feel free 

to slow down. 

Col. ROMAN. OK. 

Mr. SHAYS. We just want to hear every word you have to say. 

Col. ROMAN. Thank you, sir. This nausea, headache, vomiting, 

and flu-like symptoms continued throughout the time I was in the 

Persian Gulf, and I continued to treat it like food poisoning, with 

Immodium and 800 milligrams Motrin, the Army’s blessed answer 

to all pain. 

The rashes I had over my body while I was in the Gulf I thought 

were normal and expected, since I spent most of my days in the 

sand, wind, and the sun with all the attendant fleas, flies, and 

other desert parasites. A calamine lotion-like substance served to 

sooth but not relieve or get rid of the severe rashes that I experienced. 

Life in the theater of operations was a constant adrenalin rush, 

with 3 or 4 hours of sleep in between. Headaches I began to experience attributed to fatigue and the lack of sleep were actually other 

things, as I found out later. 

Upon returning home to the States and my discharge from active 

duty, I returned home, and the symptoms I experienced in the Persian Gulf continued after I got there, and they got progressively 

worse. 

In 1993, I registered myself with the Washington, DC Veterans 

Hospital after receiving an invitation from the VA to come in for 

an examination because I was a Persian Gulf vet. The Washington, 

DC VA noted——

27

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion that we 

allow him to go to the restroom and then return and allow someone 

else to testify and then let him come back and continue? 

Col. ROMAN. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. SHAYS. I think that is a good suggestion. 

Col. ROMAN. I apologize. I just have not been able to stop these 

nosebleeds for a number of years now. 

Mr. SHAYS. You know, you are apologizing to us, and we should 

be apologizing to you. Thank you, Colonel. We will see you back 

here. Mr. Canterbury. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. We welcome your testimony; and, again, I just want 

to say we are in no rush. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. So we welcome your testimony. You may begin. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Thank you. Hello. My name is Paul Canterbury, and I want to thank you for allowing me to come and testify 

before you. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am sorry to interrupt. I want you to move the mic 

a little closer to you, and I want you to bring it down just a speck. 

There you go. Thank you. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. I served in the U.S. Army at Fort Hood, TX 

from 1989 to 1992 in Delta Company, 57th Signal Battalion. I was 

sent to the Middle East as a private from September 1990 to April 

1991. In August 1990, myself and my company went on alert and 

spent over 24 hours painting vehicles with the CARC paint, and I 

remember the fruity smelling odor. For several days after painting 

the battalion’s vehicles, I felt very nauseous. 

We were shipped to King Abdul Aziz Port. I stayed there for 

about 2 to 3 weeks. The facilities were pretty disgusting, filthy. 

There were not enough restrooms and showers to accommodate the 

amount of people who had to utilize them. They were not properly 

cleaned either. 

On the port that I was at, food and water was rationed out to 

us. After a couple of weeks on the port, I began experiencing nausea, headaches, and diarrhea. 

During the convoy to our first site in the desert, my condition became worse, with vomiting, migraines, and diarrhea. While setting 

up camp, I passed out and was taken to a field hospital and treated 

for what was then said as dysentery and dehydration. I was treated with pills and an IV. 

After Christmas, my communication team supported the 18th 

Airborne Corps Main, where we were sent to King Khalid Military 

City, just days before the air campaign. KKMC was where I first 

heard chemical alarms and SCUD alerts. Hours before the air war 

started, we began taking the bromide tablets. During the first 

hours of the air war, we traveled in MOPP–4 at night to a city 

called Rafha, just miles from the Iraqi border. 

I continued to take the bromide tablets for a total period of 8 to 

9 days, three times a day, in front of a noncommissioned officer. 

At Rafha, we experienced many chemical alarms, and after the 

alarms were sounded, my platoon sergeant and my platoon leader 

would call for a private to unmask to see if it was all clear. I was 

one of those privates, and we were told we were expendable. 

28

Sometime during this period, I was driving through Hafa-Albotin 

the day a SCUD landed. A soldier gave us the sign ‘‘GAS, GAS, 

GAS.’’ I noticed a rainbow in the sky, and I questioned what that 

rainbow was caused from. Today, I still do want to know what it 

is, sir. 

A day or two prior to the ground war, I went to Rafha to receive 

a shot. I was handed a piece of paper to sign and release the Army 

or the Government—I am not sure which—of any and all adverse 

side effects. The paper stated it was an experimental drug, which 

I do not remember the name. I was not allowed to refuse the shot. 

I was not allowed to receive the paper, but I was allowed to refuse 

to sign it. 

After the shot was administered, I began noticing heart palpitations and tunnel vision. When the ground war started, we convoyed 

to Iraq and established a site. We were told by our first sergeant 

to turn in all live ammunition, and the only ones allowed to have 

it would be the guard points. Because of my lack of knowledge of 

the dangers of depleted uranium on destroyed tanks, armored vehicles, and bunkers, I did not protect myself with my MOPP gear 

while climbing on and in them. 

In April 1991, I returned to Fort Hood, TX, and numerous times 

I reported to the troop medical clinic, complaining of heart palpitations, migraines, severe diarrhea, and muscle spasms. No tests 

were run, and I was always told to take a couple of days off and 

bed rest. Prior to getting out of the Army and my ETS physical, 

I stated those same problems I went to the TMC for. 

They had me wear a heart monitor, and the results were that my 

heart was beating faster than normal, and I was told that it was 

nothing to worry about. 

After I left the Army in 1992, I moved my family to Ohio. I first 

went to the VA Clinic in Columbus, OH, June 1994, to sign on the 

Persian Gulf Registry Exam. Upon completion of the exam, the attending physician stated to me, and I quote: ‘‘There is nothing 

wrong with you. It is all stress-related.’’

I believed him, and I thought from his opinion and my family’s 

comments that there was nothing wrong with me. I later found out 

from a patient rep that the physician for the Persian Gulf Registry 

Exam had set various appointments for me, which my records indicate a no-show for all set appointments. To the best of my knowledge, I do not remember him setting those appointments for me. 

I was not aware of them. 

As time went on, my symptoms had been increasing in number 

and seemed to be getting worse. I did nothing medically until July 

1996, when I returned to the VA Clinic for another, a second Persian Gulf Registry Examination. After that time, a primary physician was established. She then started setting appointments, lab 

work, CAT scan of head, heart monitor, et cetera. 

The problems I have had with the VA Clinic, outpatient clinic in 

Columbus, OH are numerous. One, not receiving test results. My 

appointments with my primary physician started out at about 

every 2 weeks, then they started going every couple of months. I 

had a problem with my physician personally walking me to the 

mental health clinic like I am a crazy person and I cannot find my 

own way. 

29

I have a problem with a psychologist trying to hypnotize me for 

pain control. Stare at a black dot on the wall and listen to this 

tape. 

On one occasion, after telling my physician my health has gotten 

worse, she told me this: Your lab work is normal. There is nothing 

to treat. There is no diagnosis. I can give you Tylenol or Motrin for 

your pain, but please note, before this time, she had been prescribing me meds such as Solodac and Hyproxin for my pain. 

In November 1996, I admitted myself to the VA Hospital in Chillicothe, OH to get help for my health problems, depression, and suicidal tendencies. They diagnosed me with PTSD and Dysthymic 

Disorder. 

In December 1996, I tried to commit suicide because of my declining health problems, which everyone said there was nothing 

wrong with me, and the breakup of my marriage. I was admitted 

to Knox County Community Hospital’s psych ward for about a 

week. 

In January 1997, I returned to my primary physician again, explaining everything that had happened, and I told her I had not 

worked for quite a while, and she said she could not give me a 

work excuse to turn in; she could not provide me with one. I asked 

for a referral to another medical facility, and she said she could not 

do that, either. 

On my very first appointment with the physical therapist, she diagnosed me with fibromyalgia by having me push my arms this 

way, pull my arms that way, same with my feet. I do not see how 

this is possible. 

In March 1997, I experienced bad blurred and double vision, and 

I went to an optometrist. His diagnosis was hypertropia, large 

vertical muscle imbalance, esophoria at near, accommodative deficiency. And vision therapy was recommended for treatment, prescription sunglasses, and bifocals. 

May 12, 1997, I went to the VA Hospital in Washington, DC, and 

had numerous tests done on me, which I do not have the results 

of as of today. May 12 to 14, 1997, I went to Georgetown University 

Medical Center for further studies. No results as of today. 

I was told that I would be at the VA Hospital in Washington, 

DC, between 10 to 14 days, but I was only there 6, 2 of which were 

on the weekend, and the first day nothing was done. 

When I joined the Army, I signed a contract with the United 

States stating that if anything happened to me in an act of a war, 

peacekeeping process, what have you, if I die, if I become ill during 

my time in service, the United States would take care of me. I fulfilled my portion of that contract; now it is time for you to fulfill 

your portion of the contract. 

In closing, I would like to say, due to the time restraints, I was 

not able to provide you with all the information I have knowledge 

of. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Canterbury follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Canterbury. Mr. Roman. 

Col. ROMAN. Sir, I am ready. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And I am going to emphasize again——

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. The only time restraint we have now 

would be self-imposed by you. 

Col. ROMAN. OK. 

Mr. SHAYS. So I want you to really take it slower. 

Col. ROMAN. Thank you, sir. One of the reasons I started talking 

a little fast was because I felt the blood starting to come, and I was 

trying to get it over with before I start—well, anyway, thank you 

very much. I will continue. If I could pick up right from where I 

left off, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to ask you just to slow down a second and 

tell me where were you. Do we have the same document you have? 

What page are you on? 

Col. ROMAN. I am on page 3——

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Col. ROMAN [continuing]. And I am down at the last paragraph, 

and I am not giving it all; I have cutoff some of it. 

Mr. SHAYS. You cutoff some of the better parts, frankly. 

Col. ROMAN. I was afraid, trying——

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Col. ROMAN. OK. I think what I will do, sir, because I think I 

was bleeding all over myself at the time that I was talking earlier, 

is pick up just at the second paragraph on page 3, if I may. 

Mr. SHAYS. That is fine. 

Col. ROMAN. And say to you that my first time to Riyadh, I became ill, was treated for nausea and headaches and vomiting, diarrhea, and a high temperature. 

My commander, who was a physician, was with me, and he treated me for the symptoms which appear to be like food poisoning. 

This nausea, headaches, and vomiting-like symptoms continued 

throughout the time I was in the Persian Gulf, and I continued to 

treat it like food poisoning, with Immodium and 800-milligram 

Motrin. As I indicated, it really is the Army’s blessed answer to all 

pain because it works, at least for pain. 

Rashes, I had over my body while I was in the Gulf, I thought 

they were normal and expected, since I spent most of my days in 

the sand and the field, wind and sun, with all the attendant fleas, 

flies, and other desert parasites. I used a calamine lotion-like substance which served to sooth but did not relieve or get rid of the 

severe rashes that I experienced. 

Life in the theater of operations was a constant adrenalin rush, 

with 3 to 4 hours’ sleep in between. Headaches I began to experience, I attributed to fatigue and the lack of sleep. Upon returning 

to the States and my discharge from active duty, I returned home 

like thousands of other United States soldiers, and the symptoms 

I had experienced in the Persian Gulf continued after I returned 

home and got progressively worse, as a matter of fact. 

In 1993, I registered myself into the Washington, DC Veterans 

Hospital after receiving an invitation from the VA to come in for 

an examination if I was a Persian Gulf vet. The Washington, DC 

VA noted a number of problems, including sleep apnea—and shortVerDate Jan 31 2003 11:12 Apr 17, 2003 Jkt 086127 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\45480 45480
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term memory loss, hearing loss, and they recorded all the ailments 

I had indicated to them, including my flu-like symptoms, swelling 

in my hands, knees, and ankles, respiratory problems, and severe 

headaches. 

No treatment was offered. Rather, the VA Hospital billed me for 

my supposed free examination and ended up attaching my next 

year’s meager tax return for money I owed them for an examination that I was offered, which I was requested to take by the VA. 

So I do not know why I was being billed, but I could not fight it 

enough. They kept fighting it back, and they sent it over to the 

IRS, and they took the money out of my return. 

I went back to Denver in 1994 and registered at the Denver VA 

Hospital, where instead of requesting my examination files from 

the Washington, DC VA, I underwent a second complete re-examination, with, I might add, similar results. 

Then, in 1995, the United States Army sent me a letter to report 

to Fitzsimmons Army Medical Center if I was suffering any ill effects from the Persian Gulf war. Once more, I underwent a complete examination, from blood to MRI, and everything in between. 

The results this time were much clearer. The Army doctors found 

out again that I had chronic fatigue, precancerous nasal and colon 

polyps, chronic skin rashes and hives, which have not been tied to 

a cause yet, sleep apnea—respiratory illness of mysterious origin, 

short-term memory loss, flu-like symptoms which would come and 

go, lasted for 6 weeks, and chronic arthritis of the joints. 

The young Army doctors tried to treat me and had scheduled me 

for an operation to remove the polyps from my nose. Had they done 

that, maybe I would not be bleeding, but the colonel in charge of 

the Persian Gulf examinations advised me that they could not treat 

me because it was not determined that I had been injured or had 

received that particular illness in the Persian Gulf. 

To date, although I now have had three official VA and Army examinations since 1993, I still continue to receive requests for more 

and more information from the VA Claims Office in Phoenix, AZ. 

Materials I send them are never acknowledged as received, and the 

telephone numbers that are given are not to any VA-recognized exchange, and the name given for contact is not a true VA employee; 

at least the number that answers at IRS, by the way, is not the 

name of the VA office I have tried to reach. 

Frustration is a word that does not begin to explain the feeling 

of being in the system 4 years now with no real contact from a person, just requests for more and more information. It is particularly 

maddening when I personally sent my records from the VA hospitals and the Army to them for evaluation, yet when I called them 

in the winter of 1997 in Phoenix and left a message via a third 

party to advise me of what records they had, they sent me back a 

written message that said they were requesting my records from 

the VA hospitals in Washington, DC, and in Denver. 

I thought they were evaluating me at that time, but without 

those records, how could they have been evaluating me? 

1996 was not a good year for me. I was hospitalized three times 

and was treated by my private physician for a respiratory ailment. 

I could not walk more than 25 steps without having to stop, out 

of breath and fatigued. This ailment, which was life-threatening, 

40

would not allow me to lie on my back to sleep, as I would begin 

to drown, or at least it would feel like I was drowning, when my 

lungs were filling up with fluid. 

I was forced to sit up to sleep and was constantly fatigued due 

to the lack of sleep and no energy. My cardiologist in Denver, Dr. 

Peter Steele, diagnosed me as having cardiomyopathy with congestive heart failure. The onset of symptoms, he said, ‘‘which would 

suggest that possibility that this was induced by a source in the 

Middle East during the Gulf war.’’ ‘‘What is clear,’’ Dr. Steele stated, is that ‘‘he served in the Middle East and that he has a cardiomyopathy.’’ He goes on to say that I would submit that this may 

well be a part of the Gulf War Syndrome; I attach a letter for your 

convenience from Dr. Steele. 

Last December 1996, I was examined by Dr. William 

Baumzweiger, and I misspelled the name. For the record, it is BA-U-M-Z-W-E-I-G-E-R. He is a neurologist at the Los Angeles Veterans Hospital. After a 3-hour examination, Dr. Baumzweiger advised me that I had suffered severe neurological damage while in 

the Persian Gulf and had, in fact, suffered brain stem damage as 

well. Dr. Baumzweiger further advised me that my neurological 

damage was as severe as he had seen and was, in fact, caused by 

exposure to unknown chemical agents while in the Persian Gulf. 

He also advised me that I probably would not live as long as I 

would have had I not been in the Persian Gulf and that unless I 

took 1 year off to do nothing but recuperate, I would most likely 

be a candidate for a heart transplant within 3 to 5 years. 

Dr. Baumzweiger also concurred with Dr. Peter Steele’s diagnosis of cardiomyopathy caused by my service in the Middle East 

during the war. He suggested that this cardiomyopathy may well 

be a part of the Gulf War Syndrome. 

Incidentally, while I was in Dr. Baumzweier’s office, he was summoned into the chief neurologist’s office. Upon his return, he informed me that he was no longer authorized to treat Persian Gulf 

vets. When I asked him why, he advised me that his findings had 

not coincided with the VA’s on the reasons for Gulf war vets’ illnesses; therefore, he was asked to not treat Persian Gulf vets anymore. 

Mr. SHAYS. Col. Roman, you are under oath right now, and you 

are saying that while you were having this examination, this doctor 

left and then came back, and, to the best of your recollection, this 

is precisely what he said, almost what he said, or maybe something 

like that? 

Col. ROMAN. He advised me exactly what I just said. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Col. ROMAN. And I also saw or happened to see the letter that 

he had from the chief neurologist where he was asked not to treat 

Persian Gulf vets anymore. I just glanced at it. They had it on the 

table there, and I saw it. He was somewhat distressed, by the way, 

at the time. 

The still-too-recent memory of the Vietnam veterans and Agent 

Orange casts a pall on the ongoing denial by the same bureaucracies who continue to deceive Persian Gulf veterans. Didn’t we 

learn anything from the Agent Orange debacle? Must we be conVerDate Jan 31 2003 11:12 Apr 17, 2003 Jkt 086127 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\45480 45480
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demned to remaking the same mistakes with our Persian Gulf veterans? 

Ironically, on November 2, 1994, the President signed a Veterans 

Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Public Law 103–446. This law 

authorized the Department of Veterans’ Affairs to pay service-connected compensation to Persian Gulf veterans who are suffering 

from chronic disabilities resulting from undiagnosed illnesses. And 

I think ‘‘undiagnosed illnesses’’ here is the key, since the precedent 

had already been made to Agent Orange victims who, after many, 

many years a compensatory fund was created for them by the U.S. 

Congress. This occurred after a study by the Centers for Disease 

Control failed to establish a link between Dioxin absorption to any 

serious Vietnam-veteran malady. 

Two and a half years after this law went into effect, the information letter I received from Secretary of Veterans’ Affairs Jessie 

Brown still has not borne fruit for most of my fellow Persian Gulf 

veterans. Lip service and voluminous correspondence from the VA 

is all that has resulted for most of us. 

A bullet from an AK–47, a land mine, a mortar shell, or grenade 

would all cause trauma to the body or death. How different are 

these weapons of war to those invisible, but equally devastating, 

mortar weapons of war in the form of lethal chemicals and biological agents? Answer: There is no difference in the effect; it just 

takes a little longer to cause the casualty. 

I am going to add to you that on the question that you asked me, 

Mr. Chairman, I did have a retired Major, Denise Nichols, fax a 

letter that I wrote on that particular issue to Dr. Baumzweiger, 

and I gave her in writing what had happened on that particular 

day so that I had it on the record. 

I believe that every Gulf war veteran who has suffered the effects of a chemical-biological-warfare weapon should be just as eligible for the Purple Heart as those wounded by conventional weapons. The wounds might look different, but the effect is the same. 

Thank you for allowing me to testify today. 

[The prepared statement of Col. Roman follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Colonel. Colonel, we are going to be asking questions as soon as we hear from Mr. Stacy, who is next, and 

Staff Sgt. Zeller. 

Mr. Stacy. 

Mr. STACY. Thank you. I would like to say it is an honor for me 

to be here today. My name is Michael J. Stacy. I was a loader on 

an M1A1 main battle tank. I was exposed to depleted uranium and 

various other toxins, including possible chemical and biological 

agents. First, I would like to thank God; my wife; daughters, Haskell and Suzanne Dixon; Dan Fahey; the Military Toxins Project; 

and all of our family and friends. 

Before deploying, I was in prime physical condition. I weighed 

185 pounds, served with the 2nd Armored Company. I served with 

Alpha Company, 2nd Armored Division, Forward. I served in the 

Gulf from December 30, 1990 to May 6, 1991. I did get the anthrax 

shot, as well as others. I did take the PB pills three times a day. 

We kept the same chemical suits, even though it was opened 1 

month before the war started. We took our protective gear off before we crossed the border into Iraq. We had the RAD meters. They 

looked like a wrist watch, but only key personnel were issued 

these. 

In a report from the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Lab, dated 

December 1989, test results showed that soldiers who came into 

contact with contaminated vehicles could inhale resuspended depleted uranium dust or ingest depleted uranium via food intake, 

cigarette smoking, et cetera, prior to not washing hands and face. 

It was a very unclean environment over there. 

Also, I have a letter here from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is dated May 30, 1997 and signed by Bernard Rostker. 

Prior to fielding the M1A1 tank and the munitions containing depleted uranium, controlled-burn tests were conducted in the United 

States to determine the hazards of depleted uranium burning at 

high temperatures. Such a high temperature would have to be sufficient to melt steel. 

In the event of such a fire, a small fraction of the material may 

be dispersed into the atmosphere as the depleted uranium oxide 

fume or smoke and hence could be inhaled by the persons situated 

immediately down wind of an accidental fire or explosion involving 

depleted uranium ammunition. We saw tanks that were melted, 

that burned hot enough to melt steel. 

I was involved in more than one friendly fire incident while I 

served in the Gulf. Our tanks had depleted uranium armor. I slept 

on the tank, over the blowout panels. We spent 90 percent of our 

time on the tanks. We were never warned of any health risks of 

depleted uranium. I climbed on and in tanks, trucks, and bunkers 

after they were hit with depleted uranium to inspect damage. We 

were never warned of the health risks. We knew we were shooting 

depleted uranium, but we were never warned of the health risks. 

We went back through the battlefields after the war. I first got 

sick while in the Gulf, with headaches, nausea, chest pains, stomach cramps, and diarrhea. We assumed that it was from the water 

that we were drinking. We were told to go on a 48-hour fast, but 

under the operating conditions, we were unable to do that, so we 

just dealt with our condition. 

52

My wife miscarried soon after returning to the Gulf. At that 

time, we did not know who to go to. She was 1 month pregnant. 

We did not report this incident, to my knowledge. 

We returned to the States. My wife’s health got worse. My health 

got worse. I have been diagnosed with multiple—I have multiple, 

undiagnosed illnesses: chronic fatigue, chest pain, joint pain, swelling of the joints, upper respiratory problems, sinus problems, and 

severe memory loss. 

The VA has denied me for testing of depleted uranium. The VA 

has denied me for further testing. The VA still said all of my problems are from PTSD. We gave the Iraqi POWs when we captured 

them better treatment than the VA provides for myself. I believe 

my declining health is due to the shots taken before and in country, the PB pills, depleted uranium, and possible chemical and biological agents. 

This has been a disgrace to me, my family, my unit, and the soldiers who died over there. Something needs to be done before my 

wife dies, before I die, or any other Gulf war vets die. I would also 

like to say, my wife weighed 127 pounds before I deployed to the 

Gulf. She was an ornery, mean, Oklahoma girl. Since my return, 

she has weighed under 100 pounds. She has dropped under 80 

pounds. We were told by the doctor at the Indian Hospital in 

Claremore, OK, it would be in my best interest to have her committed to an insane asylum. They said they cannot find any reason 

why she is sick. 

My daughter was born before the Gulf. She is displaying some 

symptoms. She has got aching bones and sinus problems. So was 

everybody I was around when I got back. I watched my wife’s 

grandfather. His health severely declined. I believe it was because 

I spent lots of time with him. He passed away this spring—cancer. 

It ate up his whole body. His immune system failed. 

My wife’s mother-in-law; we lived with them when we soon returned from the Gulf. They started developing upper respiratory 

problems, other ailments since. They have moved to Nashville now. 

We are no longer around them. Her health has seemed to improve. 

I feel abandoned. I feel mistreated. My wife has suffered the 

brunt of this illness. My wife sits behind me. She has lost all pride, 

all dignity—but supports and believes in me. I have been told for 

too long that it is all related to stress, and I will not take that any 

longer. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stacy follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Stacy, thank you. I would like to ask you. You 

did not read much of your testimony. On page 2 of the testimony 

I have, I have a typed sheet. Do you have that typed testimony? 

Mr. STACY. No, sir. Sir, I am 40 percent disabled. I receive $467 

a month. I left the Post Office after 3 years. My house payment is 

$500 a month. I do not even have money to drive or put gas in my 

car. We are literally starving to death. We receive no help from nobody. I was unable to get this typed. I was lucky to be able to get 

my written testimony typed and sent to you whenever I did. 

Mr. SHAYS. So the testimony we are looking at, we retyped ourselves. 

Mr. STACY. I believe so, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I just feel inclined to ask you to read what we 

have on page 2, the typed sheet. Do you have it? It starts on January 21. 

Mr. STACY. Talking about on January 21? 

Mr. SHAYS. I would like you to read that page. 

Mr. STACY. On January 21, 1991, which, sir, I would like to say 

every bit of this came from my diary, is true, to the best of my 

knowledge. Some information may be incorrect, but everything 

written in my diary was written at that date. 

‘‘On January 21, 1991’’—also a day I will never forget, my 22nd 

birthday—‘‘we rolled toward Iraq. We prepared for war and waited 

and waited and waited and waited and waited. Then it started, 

February 16, 1991. A company from our brigade made contact. 

They shot a truck and a berm with TOW missiles and had a couple 

of small gun fights. February 17, war hit home, and we lost a Bradley to enemy fire, a rocket-propelled grenade. Two killed, four badly 

wounded. The bombing continued, so heavy at times, you could not 

sleep for days. 

‘‘We crossed the border for good on February 24, 1991. When we 

crossed, we were in MOPP–4; after we crossed, we went to MOPP 

Level 0, and then repackaged our MOPP suits, the same ones we 

opened in base camp back in early January 1991, and had worn on 

numerous training expeditions and had repackaged each time, unaware that they were useless after their initial opening. On the 

same day, February 24, 1991, we came under attack from enemy 

artillery, some of which exploded in the sky over us and created a 

white cloud, which then disintegrated over us. 

‘‘We had thought it was a marker, so we moved. This continued 

all day until our artillery knocked them out for good.’’

Sir, would you like for me to continue? 

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I would like you to continue. 

Mr. STACY. ‘‘February 25, 1991, we started making contact as we 

were moving toward Iran. February 26, 1830 hours, we rolled out 

onto a small battlefield, a place I will never forget. There were 

trucks, tanks, BMPs, and troops. We freely engaged the enemy 

until 4:15 a.m. I heard ‘Cease fire, cease-fire, cease-fire. There are 

friendlies to the front.’ Before the third ‘cease-fire,’ we had already 

engaged them, shooting an American M1A1 from the 3rd Armored 

Division. We shot them six times. We provided rescue efforts, but 

their ammo was cooking off, exploding, so we abandoned any further rescue, backed up 100 meters, set up a perimeter, and waited 

until dawn. 

63

‘‘That night, we lost an M1A1 and a Bradley Fighting Vehicle 

tofriendly fire. Eight buddies from my battalion were dead, and 

wewere responsible for killing them.’’

Would you like me to continue, sir? 

Mr. SHAYS. If you do not mind. This is your testimony, and I just 

hink it is important. 

Mr. STACY. ‘‘The first depleted uranium penetrator we fired was 

on January 27, 1991. We fired Sabot and Heat.’’ ‘‘Sabot’’ is a depleted uranium penetrator, and the ‘‘Heat’’ is high explosive. ‘‘We 

fired three of each to battle sight our main gun. After we fired our 

first Sabot round, we knew then the DU penetrator was the round 

of choice. I think a full combat load for an M1A1 Heavy is 56 

rounds. There is a certain load plan you follow, so many Sabot and 

Heat in your main ammo storage area and so many of each in your 

secondary storage area. I was the loader on my tank, and after we 

fired our first DU penetrator, our platoon switched the ammo. Put 

all DU penetrators in the main storage area, put the heat rounds 

in secondary storage. We were told, I quote: ‘Shoot ’em while you 

got ’em.’ The DU penetrators were so devastating that we used 

them for everything, tanks, trucks, light-armored vehicles, bunkers—everything but the troops. We found out very fast that the depleted uranium penetrators were 1,000 times more devastating 

than we expected. When a bunker was shot with the DU penetrator, just the percussion from the round will kill any troops in the 

area. We wanted to shoot the good stuff and as much as possible. 

‘‘We were at war, with the best equipment out of all the Coalition 

Forces. No law, no rules, engage at will. My Platoon alone,’’ these 

numbers are all estimated; no numbers are exact. I was just a private in the Gulf; I only knew what I was told. ‘‘Fired approximately 

120 DU penetrators, with 4 tanks per Platoon. Thirty penetrators 

fired per tank, plus another 3 penetrators to battle sight our main 

gun, on January 27. Plus another 3 penetrators on January 28, 

1991. That is approximately 36 depleted uranium penetrators each 

tank fired. There are 12 tanks per Company, 4 Companies per Battalion, we had two battalions on line, the 2nd Armored Division 

and 3rd, that is a total of 96 tanks. Plus we were attached to the 

1st Infantry Division. They are a mechanized battalion with unknown numbers of Bradleys, which fired 30-millimeter DU rounds. 

So as you can well expect, we were constantly in contact with this 

ammo.’’

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Stacy. 

Mr. STACY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Is there anything else of your testimony you want to 

read us, or shall we go to Staff Sgt. Zeller? 

Mr. STACY. No, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Sgt. Zeller. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Yes, sir. Gentlepersons, this is about a grunt’s 

life, blood, sweat, and tears. Some of you up here will not understand this. I am not a good speaker, but was blessed with the gift 

of gab. I thank you for the opportunity to speak, and I hope the 

money spent for me coming here will change my present position. 

Possible causation: Service in the Gulf war due to combat in the 

theater. Nuclear radioactive weapons and atomic energy plants. 

Depleted uranium, microwave technology kill zone creating electric 

64

storms. We had electric storms in the desert, sir, that the lightning 

went this way—OK—and that is explainable. 

Destroyed power plant at Quasyr Hammid and Al Anbar Atomic 

Research Space Center. OK? And that is documented. Biological 

weapons: cholera, anthrax, botuluum microtoxin. Chemical weapons: cyclo sarin/sarin, soman, tabun, mustard, blister blood. Prophylactic drugs, serums, and vaccines, malarian drugs. PB 

(pyridostigmine bromide); it causes damage to number 6 chromosome. My children are susceptible at third generation to come 

out being deformed. 

Specific oil-based adjuvants: NTTTP, squalene, Vax Syn, 

Vacinae, Type C Retrovirus, Canary Pox Virus, Glycoprotein 120 

and 160 Antigens; oil fire environmental factors. 

They are now recognizing Exxon Valdez Syndrome, 

leshamenasis, ultraviolet-light overexposure, malaria; Mohammed’s 

Revenge, which is a rare bacterium that is very pathogenic. 

Questions: Plausible denial, true or false? I am it, sir. I have 

been in SOCOM, Special Operations Command. Something is 

wrong when all the resources are spent on history, how we got sick, 

instead of cures for it, if any. Diagnoses have been made, but no 

treatments are being utilized or considered. 

I would like to point out that Congress is being wrongfully 

briefed by the leadership of the investigation. Could agencies in the 

Government utilize national security titles to develop and research 

without notice? Could this national security title provide them protection from within to continue the facade? 

From the registration data base in California to the investigation 

team in Virginia, what is their purpose and command? At the end 

of the command, why is there a logistics expert and not a doctor 

of medicine? Is the data base to cure or to count, sir? Why are they 

not using subject matter experts like us Gulf war sick and wounded to get the most eyewitness accounts? I volunteer for the investigation team. 

Can it be that the truth or the cure is intentionally being ignored 

for the purpose of protocol protection? Are the studies conducted for 

a possible cure to our disease process or for reinventing the intelligence already available? Does research take time, and is this a 

delay so we never find a possible cure or remedy? Can the cure be 

purposely hidden as not to expose the cause of the effect? The cure 

is the effect and will inevitably expose the cause to this Gulf War 

Syndrome. 

Is the cause reflective of some unethical decision or practice? We 

have come back on our word many times in the investigation process. Why not consider the possibilities? Cause: If your word is 

changed several times, either you are lacking knowledge or intentionally diverting the information. Can we hold supposed national 

security in such high degree as to allow our brave soldiers denied 

causation? National security is to protect the Nation. It seems as 

though we are taking individuals’ protection to a new height. 

Will this protection continue until every last vet is dead and 

gone, or will the priorities be recognized? Human life is too precious a resource to be sacrificed for the good of a few men’s securities. What gives the person not in harm’s way the power to make 

65

these decisions? Considerations: If they had done this, it might 

have been better. 

This is brief, due to time limit on testimony. Most Gulf war veterans are not actually interested in cause of illness, just being 

cured or at least being acknowledged as having the physical illness. 

The below items may make the search for a cure more readily 

available. We know a lot of these things about this illness, but 

most of it is considered not conclusive or left at that. We need to 

take restrictions off valuable information and consider it for cause. 

All I want to do is to see my grandchildren grow up, because this 

illness is not over with me. And my five boys at least deserve this. 

Koch’s Postulate: Define the pathology. This is doctor talk, sir, that 

I looked up. Define the pathology. Isolate suspect ideology agent. 

Reintroduce that agent into host. Reproduce the pathology. Naturally, we cannot do this with humans; however, we can back track 

and use information which is out there to build our case. 

Cardinal rule in science: ‘‘Occam’s Razor.’’ Entities should not be 

multiplied unnecessarily, or, more succinctly, the simplest of competing theories be preferred to the more complex. Definitions: What 

is the disease process? Systemic autoimmune disease process; neurological disease process. Environmental illness infectious disease. 

Chemical-characterized disease process. Biological-characterized 

disease process. Radiological characterized disease process. 

What do we know? All forms of immune disease are being recognized. 

Next one. From the central nervous system two peripheral 

neuropathies are being recognized: cholinergic crisis due to PB tablets. That also happens with nerve agent. Oil well smoke and spill 

Exxon-Valdez Sickness is being recognized. The chemicals——

Mr. SHAYS. Sergeant, let me just interrupt a second. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. I want to make sure that I learn from what you are 

saying. I am having a hard time knowing—I got the first part of 

your testimony. I am in left field now in this part of your testimony. Tell me your point in going through this list. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. The point is, sir, on the definitions, for example, like, I went all the way up to Walter Reed——

Mr. SHAYS. Right. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER [continuing]. And they said, well, this sounds 

like lupus, but they did not do anything for it. Well, I went home 

and did my homework, sir, and I read lupus; and what I have 

wrong with me, sir, is to a ‘‘T’’ lupus. And there are ways to test 

for lupus and find out for sure, and why haven’t they done it, sir? 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. It is important for me that you be allowed to 

continue and do what you want to do. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. And then I just need to tell you what I think it will 

be helpful for the committee afterwards, but maybe I could tell that 

to you now as well. We need to know a little bit about your experience in the Gulf because we have others who testify, we are trying 

to see where there are similarities. 

I mean, for instance, the first two witnesses talked about the 

alarms going off. The military has consistently told us the hundreds, if not thousands of times, the alarms went off, they were 

66

false; and yet we have people who will come to this committee, 

sometimes off the record, and say that is simply garbage, that 

those alarms were not false; they detected low-level chemicals. And 

we are building a case, and we need to make sure we are doing 

that. 

It is important for me that you continue because this is important to you, and, therefore, it is important to me. Afterwards, I am 

going to have you come back and describe a little of your experience. OK? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Feel free to continue. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Radiological characterized disease process. 

What do we know? All forms of autoimmune disease are being recognized, from central nervous system to peripheral neuropathies 

are being recognized. Oil well smoke, chemical chiasma, as well as 

isolated reports in theater not considered official are being recognized. Rad Haz Al Anbar, Quasyr Hammid Atomic Power Plant, 

and depleted uranium 235 are now being recognized. 

Quasyr Hamid, sir, was an atomic energy plant that was bombed 

by the Coalition. Cholinergic crisis due to pyridostigmine bromide 

also nerve agent. And it talks about the receptors and how they 

work in motors, causing contractions in the muscles, secretioncausing glands to secrete. I have got all these things, sir. Inhibitory 

causing most organs to become quiescent. Well, sir, this diarrhea 

and stuff that we have that is really gross, well, the intestinal tract 

becomes quiescent, and that is why we have this happening to us. 

And it goes on and goes on, and then final on this, before I get 

to who I am, the chain of command to the Commander-in-Chief, I 

have solicited them, sir, and I thank you so much for letting me 

come here because I have not gotten anything but a wall that I 

cannot climb, sir. 

Another thing, sir, is it talks about this cholinergic crisis, and it 

talks about the body, and I have got military reports, the cover 

sheets for them, and it says that if you take pyridostigmine bromide for more than 8 days constantly, and I took over six packs 

of 22 or 24 in a pack of those pyridostigmine bromides because they 

told us to take them and never told us to stop, so——

Mr. SHAYS. Sergeant, they did not tell you; they ordered you to 

take them. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. They said, you do it, or you 

die, that type of order. The 101st is expecting no mercy, sir. But 

it says here, body will dysfunction; it causes permanent injury 

through the blood-brain barrier, and it says it in the reports. 

Sir, I just want to finish this, and I want to say that this Iraqi 

protection prisoner program, taxpayers’ money, I regret to be treated like the enemy. I watched C–141’s, and I watched Iraqis get on 

the aircraft and come home, here in the United States, sir. OK. 

This is only the beginning of the information out in the field. God 

help us and our families. P.S.: We are like Teenage Mutant Ninja 

Turtles, if you are familiar. I have five boys that teach me about 

them. 

Sir, my name is Mark James Zeller, and I went through basic 

training in 1986, and I got my Aircraft Armament School in 1987. 

I went from there, in February 1988, to Fort Bragg, NC, and was 

67

assigned to 1st SOCOM. I participated in Operation Prime Chance 

I, Prime Chance II, Praying Mantis, and Earnest Will, Persian 

Gulf-Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Security Force. April 1989 to present day, 

Fort Rucker, Delta Company, 2/2nd 229th. I participated in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Desert Calm. 

Sir, these are all in the same geographic area. My involvement 

in this geographic area dates back to the late 1980’s. While assigned at Fort Rucker, NC, we assisted Kuwait and Iraq with their 

oil flow to the rest of the world, because the common enemy was 

Iran. The common enemy, Iran, discontinued their actions after we 

built Iraq up with military might, but Iraq changed their minds 

after defeating Iran. The operations I list above are continuations 

to the present day to include this committee meeting today. 

The Persian Gulf war is not officially over, sir. I do not know if 

you realize that. My tour of duties at Fort Bragg were temporary 

duty missions with 90-day intervals. During this time, I lived off 

the economy and only got sick from Rift Valley Fever from eating 

uncooked lamb meat in a souk, or ancient, mall-like area, downtown. 

I was honestly protected less from the environment during this 

mission because it was all stuff provided by host nations. What I 

mean is USDA and grading of health is not as controlled, and 

green tracers were a fact from the Iranian Government. 

So why do I get only Rift Valley Fever and come home well as 

to be expected? In addition, PTSDs should have surfaced then 

under stress of Special Ops. Why am I now sick as can be with 

Gulf War Syndrome? 

Let me try to explain my maneuvers and experiences now during 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Duty: Aircraft Armament Technician, AH–64 Apaches. Assigned, 2/229th Attack Helicopter Regiment, Fort Rucker, AL, June 1990, aka 2/101st AHR after deployed. OPCON to the commander of 101st Air Assault Division, 

Fort Campbell, KY, August 1990, via deployed to Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia. Arrived, Dhahran International Airport, August 1990. 

Moves—‘‘moves,’’ sir, meaning going from one FOB to another of 

forward operating base. 

Moves, FOB Eagle I or King Fahd International Airport between 

August 1990 to December 1990. Explored the FOB Tranquility 

Area, readied all aircraft for deep attack mission. Key personnel 

got wrist watches with no face on them and strange, smoke-screen 

operation was conducted at King Fahd International Airport. 

Sir, that wrist watch, I do not know this gentleman. I did not 

know him until we got in the hotel, and we just started gabbing. 

A long story short: He has the same claims I have. This wrist 

watch, on the back of it, they are told not to take them off. I peeled 

it back on one of the females that was in our unit, a medic, and 

it said ‘‘PRC Radiac 27’’ on the back. OK? So I know it is a Radiac 

meter. 

And there were people that came along, and they had this, like, 

board thing they put over it, and they were able to register whatever it was, but they never told us what the registrations were, 

what was going on, and so forth and so on. It was the circle with 

the ‘‘A’’ in the middle, Third Army. It was a test-activity group. 

68

Smokescreen operations was conducted at King Fahd International Airport. The wrist watches were Radiac monitors labeled 

on back, and why we needed them, I do not know. They were 

picked up from key personnel, March 1991, and the smoke screen 

is still a mystery to all of us to this day. We were only told it was 

something they were testing. I got really sick after being at FOB 

Tranquility, so for the first time I came back to the airport with 

a 104 fever, sweats, chills, and loose stools, if I may say that, sir. 

It is pretty disgusting. I got a real bad reaction to medicine given 

by a flight surgeon after being seen. 

FOB Tranquility or West Nariya, North AxZil-Fi-Frontier, December 1990. I started taking pyridostigmine pills for the prevention of nerve agent poisoning in the event Iraq chose to use it. I 

was only told it would help me survive, not that it could have side 

effects or kill you and that it was experimental. I took more than 

60 of these pills. 

Sir, I must also add about those pyridostigmine situations, there 

were people dying, dropping dead on Taplin Road, and if you cannot find records of it, I cannot either, but I remember the National 

Guard unit in Florida that had the dolphins on their Blackhawks, 

and whatever that regiment is, you will be able to figure it out, and 

they will be able to tell you about these people. 

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say, that is now part of your testimony. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Roger that, sir. A radio message——

Mr. SHAYS. Sergeant? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir? 

Mr. SHAYS. I do not want you to be casual. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. You were saying ‘‘dropping dead.’’ You just mean collapsing out of fatigue? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Well, cholinergic crisis, sir, causes the 

nerves——

Mr. SHAYS. No, no. That is not what I asked. You made a statement that people walking on the street——

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Their hearts stopped, sir. That is what they 

said. They said their heart stopped, is the way they died. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And you are saying that you know for a fact that 

they were dead? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. How many soldiers are you talking about? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. What I was told, down the Taplin was, like, 

125 people had adverse effects from these PB tablets. 

Mr. SHAYS. What I am going to ask you to do is we are going 

to have a vote, and we are going to have a second vote after. I am 

going to ask you to finish your testimony in the next 3 or 4 minutes, and then we are going to go vote, and then we are going to 

ask questions. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. A radio message came down, go 

to MOPP Level 4, full protective gear; SCUD has been fired in your 

vicinity and is down wind, contaminant to your vicinity. That 

night, a few M–8 alarms went off, but it was told to be all clear. 

I began to leak blood out of my ears on a pillow every morning, just 

spots; nosebleeds; lip began to split. Sir, my lip split all the way 

up to my nose, and the center of my tongue started splitting. I do 

69

not know what it was, sir, but it happened. They tried to say it was 

dehydration, but I do not see how it was dehydration for that to 

be happening. 

Headaches, pounding in the ears, eyes sore. My hair felt like 

something was pulling it out, and I urinated a lot. I hope I am allowed to say that. FOB Eagle II, or King Khalid Military City, Al 

Qaysumah/Hafar Al Batin-Frontier, January 1991. On guard duty 

around midnight to the west of our position SCUD missile is shot 

down. 

Next morning, before stand-to, some more M–8 alarms go off, but 

it was ignored. Also received these injections said to be benefit of 

my health. One was called gamma globulin, and the other two were 

coined ‘‘NUC Juice’’ and ‘‘Bot Tox/Anthrax Vaccine.’’ I stepped up 

to receive my shots with shot records in hand, and only GG was 

annotated, so I objected to the other two shots. The flight surgeon 

took me immediately to the commanding officer, who showed me 

the blue book and told me, ‘‘Take them or be court-martialed.’’

I felt really sick after the shots, became really tired, and could 

sleep through anything, including allied bombing over the border. 

FOB G–Day, or North Samah/South Al Julaydak-Frontier, January 

1991. This is a rally point for ground convoys to assemble for insertion into Iraq. 

MSR Dakota to Virginia. Many practices were held prior to the 

actual day. We were instructed to go to MOPP Level 4 because we 

will be entering a known contaminated area. A man was seen on 

a fence who died instantly, and animal herds, no flies around, 

alive. SCUD missile found next to road south of Samah. M–8 

alarms connected to vehicles went off and paper was changing colors. Drive on, was the order. I began to get lesions all over my 

body. I told by medical personnel it is because of the lack of hygiene under these conditions. 

FOB Cobra, or North Tukayyid/North Quiban Layyah/South Al 

Busayyah. 

Mr. SHAYS. Sergeant, I am going to ask you to pick the best, 

most important part of what remains because we do need to——

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Yes, sir. Upon arriving in Cobra, we received 

artillery that produced proofs of off-white dust. Air Force A–10 aircraft, 10 foot off deck, flew overhead after calling rear for support 

and leveled a flat-top mountain north of Quiban Layyah. I began 

to have pinkish conjunctivitis, blurred vision, thick spit, tasted 

metal, no hunger, ears, fingernails bled. I slept a lot when not 

working, and hands and feet felt like ants crawling on them. 

I had an incident where I was driving, could see, hear, et cetera, 

but could not move all of a sudden. I ran into a sand ditch, and 

hitting the steering wheel shook me out of it. The prisoners that 

I was able to talk to said they were sick and tired. I was starting 

to worry at this point because it sounded like they had what I had. 

Alarms and paper were turning colors during the whole time. 

Fire Base Viper——

Mr. SHAYS. Sergeant, you are not going to be able to read the 

whole thing through, so just pick the part that you think in the 

end——

Staff SGT. ZELLER. OK. This is Dhahran/Kasmeeyah, and there 

were more dead animals, POWs, very sick ones, I may add, MPs 

70

holding them, with inoperable radio and no water or food, left behind by their unit because movement; MPs told to stay and guard 

them by their commander. We gave them what food and water we 

had and called to the rear National Guard Fills—that means people that were put in their unit were helping out convoy police. On 

the road past that, Tallil, were bunkers with SCUD trucks next to 

them on the left. 

When we were coming back out of the country, sir, at Fire Base 

Cobra, where we came back to the same fire base we came 

from——

Mr. SHAYS. Excuse me. We are going to have to go. We have 3 

minutes before——

Staff SGT. ZELLER. OK, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to interrupt you and just say one last 

point before we go. During Watergate, when Martha Mitchell was 

describing absurd things that were happening, everyone thought 

she was crazy, and everyone around her was sane. When she 

talked about all these crazy things that were happening around 

her, she happened to have been right, and I just say that to some 

of our audience who may hear some things that sound a little 

strange, but may in the end it may be very right. We are going to 

recess. 

[The prepared statement of Staff Sgt. Zeller follows:]

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[Recess.] 

Mr. SHAYS. My hope is that we can have a candid dialog, in 

which we will learn more about your experiences in the hope of 

coming to this ultimate goal of properly diagnosing, effectively 

treating, and fairly you and our other veterans. That is the motive 

of this committee. 

Now, we want to properly diagnose, effectively treat, and fairly 

compensate. Now, some of what I have heard today, I understood; 

some of what I heard, I did not quite understand. One thing, 

though, I will say to you: It wrenches my heart to think that you 

have so little faith in the DOD, the Department of Veterans’ Administration, in the doctors that have looked at you, that you then 

start the process of trying to figure out what is wrong with you because you do not think the doctors are, and that wrenches my 

heart. 

And we have had other veterans who have come and testified. 

When I was going to vote—I have come to this conclusion. I am 

tired of the DOD telling us that the alarms were false alarms. I 

have just come to conclude that I cannot accept that anymore. 

And the reason is that those alarms did not go off basically before the war; they went off during the war. They did not go off 

when they were exposed to all other things, but when the war 

started, these alarms started to go off. I cannot reconcile the loss 

of data, and so your testimony of the alarms going off and so on 

are not unimportant to me. I am not going to accept anymore the 

DOD position that these are false alarms. I just do not accept it. 

Col. ROMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. SHAYS. They are going to have to prove to me that they are 

false before I accept them. I obviously discounted a long time ago 

the DOD’s position that held us back for 4 years, that if you did 

not basically show acute signs of chemical exposure, that if you 

were exposed to low-level exposure that was not, therefore, acute, 

in the end there is no harmful result from that. We know in this 

country, working with chemicals, low-level exposure leads to illness 

and death. So I do not accept that and I did not accept a long time 

ago. 

Now, all of you are heroes, all of you, and you served our country 

with distinction, and I believe your testimony will help us get the 

answers you want. Now, one of the lines of questions that I want 

is, I want to know—again, some of you have said on this record, 

if you were in any area of the operation where the alarms went off, 

and I want to know those experiences, and I want to know how you 

reacted to it. I want to know what you did and how you reacted 

to it. Col. Roman, I will start with you. 

Col. ROMAN. I was in SCUD Alley there in Riyadh the first time 

I saw a SCUD. They trained us to put on our gas mask equipment 

in 14 seconds, from the time you pop it out of your container until 

you put it over your head and tie it real quick. I think the first 

time I saw a SCUD, I had it down to about 7 seconds, maybe shorter than that, and at that point in time the alarm did, in fact, go 

off. After the Patriot struck the SCUD, the chemical alarm started 

going off, and five or six times subsequent to that or after that, 

about the same things happened. 

75

Mr. SHAYS. Was that the first time the alarm went off, after the 

war had begun? 

Col. ROMAN. After the war had begun. 

Mr. SHAYS. So you did not hear alarms before the war. 

Col. ROMAN. Oh, no, sir, only when the SCUDs were in the air. 

Mr. SHAYS. Now, that is conceivable that the alarm went off, 

though, because of the SCUD and not because of a detector. Is that 

correct? 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Col. ROMAN. I did not hear them go off at any other time personally unless there was a SCUD attack. And on one occasion—no, two 

occasions, I heard the alarms go off while I was in the Dhahran, 

but also it was after the SCUD attack. 

Mr. SHAYS. Did you have confidence in the gear that you wore? 

Did you feel that if you were, in fact, exposed to chemicals, that 

the gear would do the job it was required to do? 

Col. ROMAN. That the what, sir? 

Mr. SHAYS. Did you have confidence that the protective gear, 

when you went into MOPP–4, that when you put this protective 

gear on, that it would do the job? 

Col. ROMAN. We were not given that MOPP gear, sir. We had our 

chemical masks with us at all times, but we did not have access 

to the MOPP gear when I was——

Mr. SHAYS. So you just had the masks. 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. No other equipment? 

Col. ROMAN. No, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And did you take PB? 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. For how many days? 

Col. ROMAN. The required number of days and the required number of dosage. 

Mr. SHAYS. Were you warned that it was an experimental drug 

for that purpose? 

Col. ROMAN. No, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Were you asked to take it, requested to take it, or 

what? 

Col. ROMAN. No. It was given to us. In the Army you are given 

something to take like that as part of your equipment or as part 

of your dosage, and you take it without question. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Sir, I remember the first time I experienced 

chemical alarms sounding and SCUD alerts was when just days 

prior to the air campaign starting. I was at King Khalid Military 

City when this occurred, and I remember during those alarms we 

immediately donned our masks, got into protective gear, MOPP–4. 

Mr. SHAYS. So you had protective gear. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. And you put it on. Let me first go back to you, Col. 

Roman. How many times did you end up putting the mask on during the operation before? 

Col. ROMAN. I remember having the mask on only on two occasions. Yes, sir. 

76

Mr. SHAYS. How many times, Mr. Canterbury? 

Mr. CANTERBURY. I am going to guesstimate probably about 

eight, total. 

Mr. SHAYS. So it happened enough times that you are not quite 

sure of the count. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. In any of those experiences of the first two of you did 

you feel, taste, or react to those alarms? Did you see anything, did 

you feel anything, and did you have any effect? Colonel. 

Col. ROMAN. No, sir. I could not say that I felt anything different 

or saw anything different. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. The same, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. I cannot really honestly say. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Stacy. 

Mr. STACY. Sir, to my knowledge, we at one time——

Mr. SHAYS. First off, how many times did you hear an alarm? 

Mr. STACY. Sir, I did not hear an alarm. At one time, the only 

people I saw the whole time I served in the Gulf was the 16 men 

in my company. I am unaware of anybody that was testing for 

chemicals. We did not test for chemicals. We did not have any fear 

of chemicals. As soon as we crossed the border was the last time 

we had our protective gear on. 

Mr. SHAYS. But you had the protective gear with you. 

Mr. STACY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. And you never heard any alarms? 

Mr. STACY. No, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. And in terms of you took the pill, the PB, Mr. Canterbury, you took the prescribed doses? 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Yes, I did, sir. I took it for probably a period 

of 8 to 9 days. 

Mr. SHAYS. Did you take it voluntarily, under order? 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Under order and in the presence of a noncommissioned officer. 

Mr. SHAYS. Now, the purpose of the noncommissioned officer was 

to what? 

Mr. CANTERBURY. To ensure that the younger enlisted were taking those pills. 

Mr. SHAYS. It was not to just help you figure out how to take it; 

it was to make sure you took it. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Were you warned by anyone that it was an experimental drug? 

Mr. CANTERBURY. No, sir, not that drug. 

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Stacy. 

Mr. STACY. Sir, I would like to add, we did go past a blown-up 

ammunition dump, and we did find rounds that were suspected to 

be chemical. We took the pills. I never asked any questions because 

I believed in my chain of command, I believed we were doing the 

right thing, and I wanted to survive in case there was chemicals 

used on us. 

Mr. SHAYS. So you were not warned that it was an experimental 

drug. 

77

Mr. STACY. No, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And since you did not hear any alarm in the 

course of the operations that you were involved in, did you come 

into areas where others had the masks on? 

Mr. STACY. No, sir. We had very little contact with any other 

people. We were in the tanks, so we would not be able to hear any 

alarms if they did go off. The NBC NCO from my unit, I never saw 

him until the war was over and we were ready to deploy back to 

Germany. 

I do not know if they were testing. I know that we did not test. 

There is one tank out of our platoon that is designated to test for 

chemicals and they did not test. I was under the assumption that 

we were trying to either save the materials for testing or that we 

were not in the fear of any chemicals. 

Mr. SHAYS. I know others are going to question you on depleted 

uranium. I am going to come back on that issue. As someone who 

was involved in sending you to Kuwait, we rejoiced in the fact that 

there were so few who lost their lives; and, frankly, much of what 

we heard was the battle from the air and what occurred there. 

You have had very vivid description of the battlefield as it took 

place, and it was something that I do not think enough Americans 

have an appreciation of because there were some units that were 

never really involved in the battle directly to the intensity you 

were. 

Mr. STACY. Sir, that was the only skirmish that we had encountered that was of any significance to myself or any of the other soldiers. To my knowledge, now this engagement, the night engagement I am talking about, first of all, we were on a 200-kilometer 

attack into Iraq, 36 hours nonstop, no sleep. It was at night. We 

were already tired. To my knowledge, we did not even move 5 

miles. We rolled out there at 6:30 p.m., and it was 4 a.m., when 

the friendly fire incident did occur, and we stopped and sat in the 

battlefield until daylight and moved from there. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, we are going to come back, just to talk to you 

about depleted uranium. So you did take the pill. You were not 

warned that it was an experimental drug. 

Mr. STACY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Mr. STACY. Sir, I would like to also say, we did take another pill. 

I did not know what it was. I have been told by another soldier in 

my unit they were malaria pills. I am not sure of that, though. 

Mr. SHAYS. Let me go to Sgt. Zeller. Sgt. Zeller, did you hear any 

alarms go off? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, the ones I admitted to in this testimony, 

and then, like I said before, the ones that were connected to the 

vehicles who were convoying, they just went off all the time. And 

before we did the convoy, we were told to go to MOPP Level 4, and 

do not take it off until you go to the river, and we literally lived 

in them. And, sir, I just want to let you know something, that I 

was a chemical NCO, not fully schooled trained to have the MOS 

but enough trained to be a battalion NCO. 

The long story short is, sir, those cry-backs with the suits in 

them with all the charcoal all over them, that we looked black as 

night after we wore them, those things only last 12 hours, sir, and 

78

the one I testified to when I was up at Eagle, OK, and I was on 

guard duty—no, not guard duty, but in Tranquility, and they said 

SCUD is in the vicinity, we ripped the bags open and wore the 

suits. Twelve hours later, we should have gotten new suits, sir. We 

wore those suits all the way to Basra. We went all the way up to 

Basra and then back, cutting off the Republican Guard. 

Mr. SHAYS. How many days was that? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, that had to be at least 2 months. We 

worked that long, and we sweat our tail feathers off in them. There 

was no more charcoal left with them, but we still had nothing else. 

We had no other skin. 

Mr. SHAYS. I know you have it in your testimony, but I want it 

part of this questioning when we refer back to the record. How 

many times did the alarm go off that you recall? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. While driving all the time, it would just like 

go off, and whoever’s alarm went off, they would stop, and then 

they would go and they would reset it and then we would drive 

along and then keep going. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, let me ask you this. Did you have the alarm 

before when you were driving, and did it go off? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. No, sir. It did not go off while we were on the 

other side of the border. 

Mr. SHAYS. So when you were on the other side of the border 

driving——

Staff SGT. ZELLER. When we crossed——

Mr. SHAYS. Hear my question. Hear my question. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. You had the alarm in this vehicle for a while. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. No, sir. We did not put them on until we were 

entering. 

Mr. SHAYS. You did not turn on the alarm. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. We did not hook them to the vehicles until we 

were entering Iraq——

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER [continuing]. Because they had knowledge of 

contamination. 

Mr. SHAYS. So it would really be pointless for me to make an assumption that the alarm did not go off before because you did not 

have them hooked up. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Well, they were hooked up to a ground point. 

On our perimeter we would set up a camp, and we would have 

them on the outskirts of our perimeter, and each company was at 

the outskirts of the perimeter, and they had responsibility for 

theirs, and they had responsibility for theirs, and it was set up 

strategically so if the wind blew this way and took something, that 

one would go off, and all the message——

Mr. SHAYS. So those alarms did not go off, but when you mounted them on the vehicle——

Staff SGT. ZELLER. They were going off all the time when we 

were driving, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, that would lend argument to the fact that 

they would have been false alarms on the vehicles. It was not like 

you had been driving with them on the vehicle before and not going 

off. 

79

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, I would challenge that for the fact that 

we saw dead animals and so forth. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. And they did not have a bullet in them. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I am going to just end with that, and we are 

going to go. We have plenty of time here. The dead animals; I am 

wondering if this is becoming folklore here. I would like to have 

any of you who saw dead animals, did you see dead animals sometimes with flies and sometimes without? Did you see humans dead 

with flies, without? Can any of you respond? I will start with you 

Sgt. Zeller. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, the flies were like epidemic. 

Mr. SHAYS. They were everywhere. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Everywhere, but when we found these herds, 

they were nowhere to be found, or they would be laying on the animal dead, deader than a door nail. 

Mr. SHAYS. What would be laying on the animal? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. The fly. 

Mr. SHAYS. So if you saw flies on the animal, they were dead 

flies? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Right, sir, on the animal. I mean, why would 

the flies not be there, and they are everywhere else——

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER [continuing]. That might be clean possibly? 

Mr. SHAYS. And then when you saw them, they were dead. That 

is something you saw. Correct? If you saw——

Staff SGT. ZELLER. They were on the side of the road, sir. I mean, 

you would be jogging, and then all of a sudden you would see a 

flock of animals deader than a door nail. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And you did not see gunshot wounds. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. No, sir. No bombs dropped, no nothing. The 

area we went through, sir, was like the 82nd, 24th, and 101st. We 

all went through an area that was called, like, a spearhead move. 

We were not supposed to even be known that we were there. We 

jumped over the top of Taplin Road. We moved up Taplin Road, 

and supposedly Saddam did not know we were going to be there 

because he moved all his men down toward Kuwait. 

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. OK. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. So it was one of those, like, blitzkrieg situations, and we were a part of that. So——

Mr. SHAYS. I hear you. Mr. Stacy, any dead animals without flies 

or dead flies? 

Mr. STACY. Sir, the dead that we saw, we were mounted on the 

tanks. We did not stop and investigate. We just assumed everything that we saw dead as a casualty of the war. 

Mr. SHAYS. And you do not have any story about flies not being 

on them. That was not something——

Mr. STACY. We did not investigate, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. I understand. 

Mr. STACY. Until the war was over with, that is when we started 

going on clearing missions, but at that time we were in a different 

location, and I did not witness any of that. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And when you did the clearing mission at the 

end, you did not witness any of that? 

80

Mr. STACY. Not to my knowledge, sir. I have memory loss, and 

it is hard to recollect some things. 

Mr. SHAYS. Listen, I do not expect you are going to always have 

an answer that you are going to know or that I am going to like; 

I just want it on this record. OK? 

Mr. STACY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just ask the two of you gentlemen, and then 

we will get to Mr. Sanders, did you see dead animals? Did you see 

humans? Were there flies? Weren’t there flies? 

Col. ROMAN. I have no experience, Mr. Chairman, with the dead 

animals. The only flies I saw were on myself usually. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Sir, I experienced both dead sheep and human 

bodies. I, like the sergeant down here, was up near the Taplin, and 

that is where I experienced the sheep, and I did not see any flies 

on those sheep. 

Mr. SHAYS. And at the time did you notice it? Was it that interesting, or was it later on that people—I am just wondering if we 

are reconstructing this later. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. No, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Did you notice it then? 

Mr. CANTERBURY. I remember discussing it with fellow soldiers 

at that point in time. We were just right across the street from the 

Taplin that the sergeant speaks of, and there were a lot of sheep 

herding around that area, and just days prior to ground war is 

when I saw, I personally saw the dead sheep with no flies. As far 

as humans, I saw a lot, but I was in a convoy, and I did not have 

time to look to see. OK? Sir? 

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. There is something that I want to re-emphasize about the chemical alarms. 

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. You asked, what did you do when chemical 

alarms would go off? We would get into our MOPP–4 gear. Something that bothers me a lot is the fact that I was a private over 

there, and I was expendable. I was forced to take my mask off to 

see if it was all clear. It bothers me when this French detection 

team is 2 miles up the road that could come down and check out 

the area to see if it is all clear, but instead, because my lieutenant 

and my platoon sergeant were uncomfortable in their protective 

gear at 100-some-degree temperatures, they would grab a private, 

take off your mask. 

Mr. SHAYS. When they said that, did they keep their mask on? 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Yes. They kept their mask on, and there were 

times when a couple of us privates——

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CANTERBURY [continuing]. Basically said, we are not taking 

our masks off. And they threatened with court martials and threatened to have NCOs come over and take the masks off of you. I had 

my mask removed, and I am going to tell you right now, I took a 

sergeant’s mask off with me. 

Mr. SHAYS. So your testimony before this committee is that you 

were ordered to take off your mask and you did not and then a sergeant attempted to take it off and you took his mask off with you. 

81

Mr. CANTERBURY. Along with it, as he was taking mine off, sir. 

I am sorry. 

Mr. SHAYS. That needs to be part of the record. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. There is no regard for human life there, and 

this is my life he was playing with. 

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to think that that was an unusual experience in the war. We have never had anyone else testify to that, 

but I think it is very important that you made it part of the record. 

Col. ROMAN. I would like to think, sir, that that would have been 

an isolated incident as well because as a member of the officer 

corps and having been a former enlisted person myself, an NCO, 

the men always came first. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Not a private. 

Mr. SHAYS. Pardon me? 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Not a private. 

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Sanders, you have as much time as you would 

like. 

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be reasonably brief. I would just like to ask all of you if you could just respond. 

As you know, or may know, the official position of the Presidential Advisory Committee in trying to understand Persian Gulf 

war illness is that they did not believe that chemicals played a role 

in the illness and believed that the primary cause was stress, that 

stress is the cause of Persian Gulf illness. Could you give me your 

observation on their conclusion? Just, Colonel, if you would start 

and just go down the line. Do you agree with that conclusion? 

Col. ROMAN. I do not. I am not certain how trained medical personnel could come to that conclusion, much less a committee or a 

commission such as has been appointed by the White House to investigate this. I think that everyone who goes to war or who is in 

combat has some form of a trauma or a stress; however, to put the 

blame on trauma or stress like that is ridiculous. 

It goes way beyond, I think, a conclusion that most normal people would have, and it particularly concerns me because it also obliterates the obvious, and that is that, in fact, chemicals and biological warfare weapons were found in the Gulf after the war, and 

that has become a matter of congressional testimony in the Congressional Record, so I cannot understand how they come to that 

conclusion. 

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Sir, my opinion about stress is that I do believe that stress can have a reaction on the human body, but as far 

as it having a reaction the way it is having on me, I doubt it, sir. 

I doubt it very much. There has got to be something more to my 

ailments, my illness, whatever, however you want to put it, sir. 

There has got to be. 

Mr. STACY. Sir, I agree with him also. I have had some anger 

problems, but I would like to say——

Mr. SANDERS. So have we all. 

Mr. STACY. Well, sir, to be honest and to be blunt, we are trained 

killers, defenders of this country. You cannot expect a soldier to 

take his training and to use that training and to come back the 

peaceful man that he once was. The things that you do in combat, 

82

I can only say that it is like hell. That is what hell is going to be 

like. 

Now, I agree, my health is not because of stress. I have tried the 

counseling and everything else. It has not helped any at all. 

Mr. SANDERS. Sergeant. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. Sir, I was in SOCOM before this 

mission. OK? And you are pedigreed. You are taken care of. Your 

every need you ever needed was done. You never had to do anything but get in an aircraft and deploy. When you would come 

back, you would get that same old brief. It is called a ‘‘down brief.’’ 

You are told about zoning. You are told about PTSD, so forth and 

so on. So, sir, I was somewhat educated. OK? And that is why I 

have been so argumentative, all the way up to Walter Reed about 

them trying to say that I have frustration. 

No, I have aggravation, and the aggravation is caused by the 

U.S. military using plausible denial on me to cover the protocol. 

Mr. SANDERS. The bottom line is you do not believe that stress 

is the source of it. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. No, sir, because I was trained on every deployment prior to that. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Let me ask my second question, and that is—

and the chairman has already gone over this a little bit—there 

have been a number of studies, including one from the DOD actually, which suggest that pyridostigmine bromide, in combination 

with other chemicals, can cause perhaps problems. Could you just 

very briefly tell us in your own personal observations with PB reactions that you may have had and what you have heard from your 

comrades about that. Colonel, did you want to start on that? 

Col. ROMAN. Sir, I would love to answer the question if I had 

enough detail or information. I am not qualified to make that. 

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you. If that is the case, that is the answer 

that we want. Private? 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Sir, I did not know about bromide tablets until 

I got into the Persian Gulf region, and I do not know enough about 

it to form an opinion also. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Your own personal observations of what people may or may not have—if you do not know, then that is the answer that we want. We do not want you to say what you do not 

know. Private? 

Mr. STACY. That is the same here, sir. I took the pills, but I cannot recollect any effects I had from them. The shots, I know I had 

gotten sick from one of the shots. There was too many things going 

on to be concerned about the effects of any pills. We were under 

a lot of stress. We were tired, et cetera. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Sergeant? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, I will be happy to give you what I have. 

I knew nothing about them. I will be honest with you. I did not 

get interested in them until some people were talking about them 

having adverse effects. So I studied them and I asked all the right 

people and they gave me this cholinergic crisis. So I can tell you 

now I know all about them, and every one of my symptoms that 

I have can be given to that. I have endocrine problems. I have 

nerve problems. 

83

Mr. SANDERS. But in terms of your observations when you were 

over there in the midst of all this stuff——

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, I did not think nothing of it; I was thinking of my job. I am the gun bunny on helicopters, and it is a tough 

job. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. My next question actually is for Private Stacy; 

and, Private, you indicated to us that right now your family is in 

serious financial straits. Why are you not receiving compensation 

that might be due to you because of your wartime condition? 

Mr. STACY. I have been denied, sir. I have been denied 

undiagnosed illnesses. I have a claim pending for chronic fatigue. 

It has been pending for 2 years. My records are being shuffled back 

and forth from Nashville, TN, to Muskogee. They believe that all 

of my complaints are due to stress. I have a copy of my medical 

records, which I do not have on me now. But the doctor does say 

in my records, I believe the patient is exaggerating symptoms, I believe the patient has been coached, and I believe he is here to try 

to get increased disability. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. My last question, maybe I will start with you, 

Private, again, is you mention memory loss. In my own State of 

Vermont, we have run into folks who are suffering the same problem. Can you talk a little bit about what that is like and how that 

compares to——

Mr. CANTERBURY. Are you addressing me, sir? 

Mr. SANDERS. I was talking to Private Stacy. I want anybody 

who feels comfortable to answer that. Talk to me a little bit 

about——

Mr. STACY. I will answer that, sir. I was unaware I had memory 

loss because I could not remember that I was forgetting. Whenever 

questions are asked me, I can recall incidents. Certain details, I did 

not focus on because I was more concerned about my wife and my 

daughter and coming home. My diary is real sketchy. I was not 

concerned about any of those things. 

I did not realize I had memory loss until my wife started putting 

little notes up and stuff. And it is just little stuff, sir, just little 

things, going back and forth, trying to get something done around 

the house. I go back and forth, forget what I was doing, just little 

things that I am not even aware of. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. And is this different than before you went 

over? 

Mr. STACY. Yes, sir. I have changed. My friends, nobody wants 

to be around me. They think I am crazy. They think I am talking 

about this Gulf war illness, that there is no such illness. It would 

be easier to convince people that I was abducted by aliens than I 

got sick in the Gulf. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Would anybody else like to comment on memory loss? 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir, I would. 

Mr. SANDERS. Colonel. 

Col. ROMAN. In my two VA evaluations and my one U.S. Army 

evaluation of myself at Fitzsimmons, two out of the three doctors 

who examined me who were certified to examine me for that particular question indicated in their notes that I have short-term 

memory loss, and I am not sure, quite frankly, whether it is beVerDate Jan 31 2003 11:12 Apr 17, 2003 Jkt 086127 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\45480 45480
84

cause of my advancing age or because of something that occurred 

in the Gulf, but the neurologist, Dr. Baumzweiger, as I said earlier, 

did indicate that my short-term memory loss, at least a good portion of it, is due to neurological damage, perhaps brain-stem damage. 

Mr. SANDERS. Anybody else want to comment on the issue of 

memory loss? Sergeant. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, I have got, like, I will give you an example that happened here. I forgot to pack my head gear coming here 

or I forget my keys or my wife asks me to do something, and I will 

go through the entire day, get home, and she said, Well, where is 

this? or What did you do with this? or How come you did not do 

that? And I am, like, I forgot. And it is very aggravating, sir. 

Mr. SANDERS. Colonel, let me go back to one point that you just 

made. You indicated that you visited a physician in L.A. at the Veterans——

Col. ROMAN. At the VA, yes, sir. 

Mr. SANDERS [continuing]. Who examined you and concluded 

that you were suffering from nerve damage as a result of chemical 

exposure? 

Col. ROMAN. His exact words, sir, to be for the record would be 

that I had severe, neurological damage as a result of my service in 

the Gulf war. Perhaps chemicals or whatever you contracted over 

there was responsible for your nerve damage, but something occurred over there while you were there. 

Mr. SANDERS. He determined that you had nerve damage as a result of your service. 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SANDERS. And he later indicated to you that the VA no 

longer wanted him to be treating——

Col. ROMAN. At that particular time, he had finished his examination at 12 o’clock. It started at 9. He was summoned by the chief 

neurologist. He came back half an hour later somewhat in distress. 

He indicated that he was no longer authorized or allowed to treat 

Gulf war veterans because—he felt it was because that his conclusions or his findings that he was coming up with were not the same 

or expected findings that the VA expected him to find. 

Mr. SANDERS. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, we have heard that 

tale once or twice before, I think, as well. Mr. Chairman, that is 

the extent of my questions at this time. Thank you. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Just a few more questions, not many. I 

would like to know if each of you are registered in either the VA 

Health Registry and/or the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program. 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir. I am registered with both the VA in DC 

and the VA in Denver and the U.S. Army’s program when they had 

me on their register as well. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am sorry. Mr. Towns, you came back. I am sorry. 

I am going to go right to Mr. Towns. I am used to your being right 

here. 

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to be brief. 

Mr. SHAYS. You can have as much time as you want. 

85

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you. Let me begin by first saying, do any of 

you know whether other people in your units have experienced the 

same symptoms that you have? Colonel. 

Col. ROMAN. Thank you, sir. Sir, I have been in touch with a 

number of people in my unit, a small number, because they are 

scattered throughout the country, and at least three of the people 

that I have been in contact with have registered with the VA; and, 

in fact, a couple of them were being treated at the VA—correction—the Fitzsimmons Army Hospital while I was there back in 

1995, but I have not made any effort to find out what the rest of 

them were doing. There was 400 people I was serving with. 

Mr. STACY. Sir, I have only been in contact with one other member of my unit since I have been out. He in turn states that he has 

been in contact with several other members. He states that he is 

experiencing some of the symptoms that I experienced. He has also 

stated that there are two other members from my unit who have 

been very ill for several years now and have been, the way he described it, on their death bed. They have not been able to come out 

of their bed for a couple of years now. 

Mr. TOWNS. Stacy, you were in a pretty small unit. 

Mr. STACY. Sir, I have heard rumors, but I will stick to fact. Fifty 

percent of the soldiers I have contacted, which I have not contacted 

over 10, are sick. The other 50 percent, which I was in denial for 

years—I believed the VA, I believed the doctors, and it is too hard 

of a battle to go and fight the VA. It is hard to accept the fact that 

this condition is going to ultimately be my end. Denial is a big 

problem with this. 

Mr. TOWNS. Just for the record, let me just make certain. How 

many were in your unit? 

Mr. STACY. Let’s see. There are 12 tanks in a company, 4 men 

per tank. 

Mr. TOWNS. Forty-eight? 

Mr. STACY. Yes, sir. I have only contacted less than 10. A few 

are sick. One soldier lost a kidney. He had his liver patched and 

his spleen due to an accident playing softball. When he goes to the 

VA, they are able to tell him that these problems are because of 

these losses or organs, and he accepts that. Another soldier from 

my unit had a healthy child, to the best of my knowledge, and does 

not want to even speak about anything in the Gulf. He is in denial 

about it. He does not want to hear it. We had two soldiers that left 

the Gulf before combat even started, complaining of health problems. 

Another soldier, I have got another friend that is not sick; still 

he is in the reserves, but he left over a month before we did. Another soldier is sick, and that is about all that I know. 

Mr. TOWNS. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Stacy. Sgt. Zeller. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, I know of an officer that I rode everywhere around the desert with, and I am here to tell you that he 

came down with something where they pumped him full of steroids, 

they pumped him full of this paquenele or whatever, and then the 

last-ditch effort was they finally got off their dukeses after he went 

after the hospital commander to send him to Walter Reed. And he 

had this very strange situation where they did plasma parises on 

86

him and stuck him with several liters of sandaglobulin, which is 

like giving him a brand-new immune system. 

And I have come to some information most recently about autoimmune disorders. That is why I have come up with that as one 

of the things. This guy was suffering from autoimmune symptoms, 

for some unknown reason. He was diagnosed with poly—CDIP—

something poly something-neuropathy, chronic inflammatory polyneuropathy or something like that. 

He was diagnosed with Guillaume-Barre. OK? Guillaume-Barre; 

I looked it up, and the only way you can get that is vaccines. OK? 

He was told at Walter Reed not to ever say anything about his 

problem because it cost beaucoup dollars for him to have anything 

like this done to him and that it would be way too much to do for 

everybody that is in the Army. 

Sir, I am here to tell you that we were everywhere together. We 

drank out of the same water holes. We ate from the same logistics 

points and so forth and so on, and I think I am a little more heartier than he is, but he was sick with this, and I will be more than 

happy to give you his telephone number and let you call him and 

let him tell you his horror story, and it was about money. Walter 

Reed said it was about money. So I can give you a for-real. 

And then the other situation, sir, that is really grave, I was 

drawn out. OK? In September 1995, I was working on a helicopter 

accident that happened at Fort Rucker, and I was investigating it, 

and Bethesda Naval Research Center called me and said I had to 

come forward or else, and I had no choice. I mean, I have been in 

where I was hiding, because I had seen it off in 1991. I had seen 

it when I filled out a DA–4700, demobilize/remobilize work sheet 

for Southwest Asia, and I put down all my problems then. OK? 

That was July 1991. 

The long story short is this form was produced April 1991. Now, 

tell me if someone does not know something is going on. I have this 

form here. I will be happy to show you this form that I filled out. 

It has an NCO that signed me off, so it is official, and if you call 

him up, I am sure he will say, Yes, I did sign this guy off, and I 

did tell him it was only for a data base. We are not interested in 

taking care of you right now. 

So when I started going to sick call and I had doctors telling me 

that you are riding sick call that you are trying to do something, 

so forth and so on, giving me all these ridiculing-type remarks, 

which I am not into, I started hiding. And there are soldiers hiding. 

There are people hiding because they do not want ridicule. They do 

not want to be treated like a second-class citizen for this ailment 

that they have, whatever it might be. It could be several things. 

Mr. TOWNS. Right. Thank you. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. TOWNS. Colonel, do you want to add something? 

Mr. SHAYS. Could we put on the record, if I might? 

Mr. TOWNS. Sure. 

Mr. SHAYS. The people you suggest who were hiring are active 

military personnel who do not want to have to deal with this within the military system. Is that correct? You are not talking——

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Well, they have seen everybody——

Mr. SHAYS. Listen to my question. 

87

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. What I am asking is, just for the record to make sure 

we know the difference, you are not suggesting that soldiers who 

have left active duty are necessarily hiding. You are talking right 

now, for the purposes of responding to Mr. Towns, you are responding to the fact that active military personnel, some in particular, 

chose to hide rather than come forward within the military system. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Because I do not want to get kicked out, sir. 

I needed my job. 

Mr. SHAYS. I just want the answer. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. And I understand that. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. And I am not critical of it; I just want to understand 

it. 

Col. ROMAN. Fine. Mr. Towns. 

Mr. TOWNS. Good point, Mr. Chairman. Yes. 

Col. ROMAN. Thank you. I think I have been very conservative 

in my responses, and I am very careful in what I say, and so I 

would like to add for the record that to answer your question about 

the former people that I worked with or do I know about anybody 

else who was ill, I would like to answer into the record that Dr. 

Stuart Hiatt, H-I-A-T-T, who is an M.D. of his position, a surgeon, 

who was in top shape and could run 1 mile in about 41⁄2 minutes, 

5 minutes at the age of 50, went to the Gulf war was a volunteer. 

He was my former commander, and he got there, was there 3 or 

4 days, and they had to air lift him out of there. He did not see 

combat. They had to air lift him out of the Gulf. He went back into 

Fitzsimmons for examination, and they kept him 3 or 4 months 

after the war for unknown symptoms, unknown ailments in San 

Antonio. 

I believe if you got his records, as a matter of fact this particular 

committee hearings, that you would be able to find out a whole lot 

more than I know about it at this point in time, but when you get 

a man who is in the prime of his life, and he gets to the Gulf and 

3 days later he is air lifted out for unknown ailments and it is 

nothing to do with his physical fitness, because he is fit, then that 

is a problem. 

Mr. TOWNS. Right. Let me ask you another question. How many 

of you have children? Do all of you have children? 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Yes, sir. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TOWNS. Have you seen any problems with your children? 

Col. ROMAN. I am not, sir. My children are adults, and they have 

children. 

Mr. STACY. Sir, I would like to say, my daughter was born before 

I deployed, and she is having some problems. And I would also like 

to say, my wife and daughter did have a Gulf War Registry Exam 

in Jackson, MS. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Sir, I have three children, one boy, two girls. 

My youngest was conceived after I came home from the Persian 

Gulf. All three of my children complain about their arms and their 

legs and different muscles in their body hurting. My youngest 

88

daughter has respiratory problems, and that is about the extent 

that I am aware of at this point in time, but for them to come to 

me basically every time I see them and complain that their arms 

and their legs hurt, I mean, I know children have growing pains, 

but they should not be complaining about them, almost on a daily 

basis. 

Mr. TOWNS. Yes. Do you want to add? 

Mr. STACY. Sir, these veterans and children, they are casualties 

of this war. Something should be done for them also. 

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much, all of you, for your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman, and I just want to go 

through—some of you responded, but I want all of you to respond 

in this part of the record. 

I started out asking you, Col. Roman, and you told me you were 

registered in both the VA Health Registry and the DOD Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program; you were in both. 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir, both with the VA and with the U.S. Army 

sent out a letter and asked me to be registered. I am. I believe the 

CDC also sent out something to me to fill out as a questionnaire 

type, and I filled that out as well. 

Mr. SHAYS. Very good. Mr. Canterbury. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Sir, I have been registered on the Persian Gulf 

Registry Examination twice. I am registered on the DOD Health 

Registry. 

Mr. SHAYS. Private Stacy. 

Mr. STACY. Sir, I am also on the Gulf War Exam Registry. I did 

an updated data sheet. My doctor told me that they do not know 

what is wrong. They have run all the tests. I did request to go to 

the hospital there in Houston, TX for further tests, and they denied 

me that. As a matter of fact, it is not even in my records that I 

requested that. 

Mr. SHAYS. Sgt. Zeller. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, I have been on it because Bethesda Naval 

Research called me September 1995. Since that time, I have had 

two different incidence, at Seaside, CA, where the registration is, 

where they told me that I was not registered. Somehow the data 

base, they switched computers or something like that, so I have 

had to, like, reapply twice. 

And one of the situations was when I was calling the investigation team and, like, research team, the one you call and you tell 

where you were and what you did and so forth, which is a lot like 

the one I told here, they said in Washington that we have no registry of you. That was the second time this happened, and then I 

called California, and they told me that is crazy; we have you here. 

So, in other words, California sort of lost me once, and then 

Washington was not in the groove with California. And, furthermore, my children and my wife have been on that since November 

or December 1995, when the guys that said tell your story, they 

said it is significant enough to put your whole family on this because there could be a possibility that they might have something 

wrong with them, too. 

89

Well, since 1995, sir, not one of my relatives, until I went off on 

them most recently, was being seen, and the one they took was, 

like, superficially looked at, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Now, all four of you had symptoms during the war. 

Is that correct? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. STACY. Yes, sir. 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. All four of you had it. 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STACY. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. I want to know, in simple terms, what your diagnosis 

was and if any treatment was provided. 

Col. ROMAN. For myself, sir, it occurred when I was in Riyadh 

and I was traveling with my commander at the time, who happened to be a physician. He did not happen to be; he is a good physician. And I got real sick, started vomiting, and——

Mr. SHAYS. Right now, I just want to know what your ultimate 

diagnosis was and what your treatment was. 

Col. ROMAN. He diagnosed it at that point in time as food poisoning; not knowing anything else, that is what it was. 

Mr. SHAYS. But that was onsite. 

Col. ROMAN. Onsite. That is right. 

Mr. SHAYS. But once you went to the VA, what was the diagnosis 

that you were given? 

Col. ROMAN. I have given the VA and Fitzsimmons stool samples, 

when I am in the process of flu-like symptoms, and they have 

never found any kind of parasite or anything else that would cause 

me to have that kind of an illness. 

Mr. SHAYS. You went to the VA. Correct? 

Col. ROMAN. Yes, sir. After the war. 

Mr. SHAYS. And after the war, what was your diagnosis? 

Col. ROMAN. They have not diagnosed it. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Private Canterbury. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Sir, are you asking what the diagnosis was in 

the Gulf or at the VA? 

Mr. SHAYS. At the VA. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. At the VA, I have been diagnosed, as far as I 

know of, with fibromyalgia and migraines. I am not service-connected, and that is it and I have gone through three different hospitals. I cannot get results from tests, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Private Stacy. 

Mr. STACY. Sir, I was undiagnosed also. I would also like to say, 

for the past year I have been pushed and pushed toward mental 

health. I am 30 percent service-connected for PTSD. I would not 

pursue that any further until just here recently because we were 

just starving to death. I would not accept the fact that it was 

PTSD, but all of my symptoms are undiagnosed. 

Mr. SHAYS. So, in other words, for you to get some kind of compensation, that is the one you have to accept. 

Mr. STACY. Yes, sir, and I would not do it. We have been starving 

for 1 year. Our family and friends, if it was not for them and God, 

we would not have made it. 

90

Mr. SHAYS. Sgt. Zeller. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, if I may, I need to say it this way. They 

are trying to do my MEB now because I have caused so much of 

a ruckus. The long story short of it is it all happened when I tried 

to solicit the President, tried to call him and talk to him possibly. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I do not think you are going to accomplish 

much doing that, and that is no disrespect to the President. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Right, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. So I want you to answer my question, then. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Well, the question is, they asked me——

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to interrupt you. I am sorry. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to give you a chance to make your point, 

but I want the answer first, the answer to: what is your diagnosis? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. They did not give me one. They asked me 

what my most significant illnesses are, and that is all they want 

to focus on, sir. I cannot say it any other way. I am confused. I am 

not a doctor. 

Mr. SHAYS. No. I just want to know if they had given you——

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. They have not given me one. 

Mr. SHAYS. I did say I would let you make your point. What is 

the point you want to make? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. The point is that, I mean, they focus on the 

significant illnesses and make them insignificant, and then I wind 

up just like this man here, living in Appalachia with five sons, 

starving to death, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Because you are not being allowed to re-enlist. Your 

worst fear has come true. Your worst fear was that you came forward, you came forward, and you are not being allowed to re-enlist, 

so you are out. You are presently an active member of the Armed 

Services. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. But you will be inactive when? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. As soon as they get the MEB together because 

I am fussing because there is nothing on there like what is happening to me. 

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just conclude by asking, is there any question 

that I should have asked you that you wanted on the record? I will 

start with you, Colonel Roman. Is there any question that you wish 

we had asked or any one that you were prepared to answer that 

we should have asked? 

Col. ROMAN. No, sir. I think you have been quite thorough. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. I cannot think of any at this time, unless you 

could ask me—give me some time to think about that. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, the record will be open, and so you will be allowed to submit additional. 

Mr. STACY. Not at this time also, sir. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, this book right here I think has a lot to 

do with the situation, and I do not know how you can get a copy, 

because I could not get it in any book store, but I think you might 

really want to take a peek at this. I do not know if that is a quesVerDate Jan 31 2003 11:12 Apr 17, 2003 Jkt 086127 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\45480 45480
91

tion, but maybe, Staff Sgt. Zeller, can I look at your book? I would 

be happy to show it to you, sir. 

I am sorry, sir, but this book right here dates back to my original——

Mr. SHAYS. If that is the question you wanted me to ask, Sergeant, may I look at your book? 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Certainly, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I would like to. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Sir, yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. One of the things that we think we can learn is to 

learn what has happened with the civilian population in Iraq. 

When we blew up the 21 to 36 potential sites—that number is classified, but when we blew up whatever number it was, the document 

said that the plumes would go away from the troops, not toward 

them. We know that some of the plumes went toward our troops, 

not away. But we then ask the question, well, if they went away 

from our troops, where did they go? And we suspect some went to 

civilian populations in Iraq. 

The problem the Iraqi people have is they have a leader who is 

not about to admit that his stockpiling—think of this extraordinarily potentially wealthy country that instead of going toward 

war could have gone toward peace and used its resources. They had 

one of the highest educated communities. Women were given tremendous rights, these Arab women, and yet you have a country 

that has many sites that were blown up and had stores of chemicals, potentially biological agents, and we have reason to believe 

that many Iraqi citizens have been impacted. 

And if we could learn what has happened to them, we might 

learn a little bit more about what has happened to all of you. 

I thank all four of you for being here, and your testimony was 

extraordinarily valuable, and I know that there have been one or 

two references to not feeling a sense of pride and the love for your 

country, and you have the greatest country in the world, and you 

are going to see that to be true, if you do not feel it now; but you 

should also feel pride in your service to your country. And I hope 

our paths cross often in the future. 

Col. ROMAN. Sir, I thought for the record I would like to interrupt and say that I did serve in the Gulf, and I served in Honduras 

during the Contras-Nicaragua situation, and I have a lot of pride, 

and I would do it again. I would not hesitate at all. I do not have 

any problem with the Army or the VA, except that we are not 

being treated. Treat us. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. A good way to end. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. STACY. Thank you. 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Thank you. 

Staff SGT. ZELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. We will take our next panel. You are free to go. 

Col. ROMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Now, my understanding is that panel 2, that part of 

panel 2 is not available right now. Dr. Rostker has to go somewhere. OK. Dr. Rostker, why don’t you just tell me what guidance 

you want to provide? 

92

Mr. ROSTKER. I need to be at the Pentagon for about 45 minutes, 

starting at 1:30. 

Mr. SHAYS. I think what we will do is go with panel 3 and then 

come to Panel 2. 

Mr. ROSTKER. And I will come right back as soon as I can, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor, you have been very cooperative with this 

committee, and so we are happy to accommodate you. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. And I appreciate the VA for accommodating Dr. Rostker. We will go with panel 3, and that is Dr. Garth 

Nicolson, the chief scientific officer, Institute of Molecular Medicine; Mr. Leonard Dietz, a physicist and research scientist, retired; 

and Dr. Durakovic—am I saying that correctly? 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. Correct. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, my assistant said it correctly, and I copied 

him. Dr. Durakovic, chief nuclear medicine science (former), Wilmington, DE. 

We are going to ask all four of you to stand up, and we will 

swear you all in. Would you raise your right hands, please? 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. SHAYS. Please be seated. For the record, all four have responded in the affirmative. Can we go in the order in which I 

called you? Basically, we will start with you, Dr. Nicolson, and we 

will work our way down. 

STATEMENTS OF GARTH NICOLSON, CHIEF SCIENTIFIC OFFICER, INSTITUTE FOR MOLECULAR MEDICINE, ACCOMPANIED BY NANCY NICOLSON, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

INSTITUTE FOR MOLECULAR MEDICINE; LEONARD DIETZ, 

PHYSICIST AND RESEARCH SCIENTIST; AND ASAF 

DURAKOVIC, FORMER CHIEF, NUCLEAR MEDICINE SERVICE, 

WILMINGTON, DE 

Mr. NICOLSON. I am Garth Nicolson, the chief scientific officer of 

the Institute for Molecular Medicine, a nonprofit, private institute 

in Irvine, CA. I am also a professor of internal medicine and a professor of pathology and laboratory medicine. I am joined here by 

my wife, Dr. Nancy Nicolson, who is the chief executive officer of 

the Institute for Molecular Medicine. She has degrees in physics 

and molecular biophysics. 

We got involved in this issue when our stepdaughter returned 

from her service in the Gulf. She was a crew chief on a Blackhawk 

helicopter in the 101st Airborne, and she developed the unusual 

signs and symptoms that we know as Gulf War Syndrome, or we 

prefer, Gulf war illnesses, illnesses because we think there are a 

variety of different illnesses that make up this syndrome. In my 

first figure—those of you that have written testimony can follow it; 

the panel, I think, can follow it as well and hopefully they can see 

it—our hypothesis has been all along that our soldiers were exposed to combinations of chemical, radiological, and biological 

agents during their service in the Gulf. 

We are particularly interested in the combinations of multiple 

chemical and biological agents. The reason we are very interested 

in the biological agents, particularly those that cause chronic illnesses, is that this is the only way that you can adequately explain 

93

the illnesses passing to immediate family members, spouses, and 

children. We will come back to this. 

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor, I am going to have you just slow down when 

you talk just a little bit. 

Mr. NICOLSON. All right. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to put the clock on. I will let you go another round. 

Mr. NICOLSON. OK. In this figure are shown the signs and symptoms of Gulf war illnesses. You might notice that it is very complex. It involves 20 to 40 different signs and symptoms, and this, 

I think, has confused the diagnosis of this particular group of illnesses for some time; and as you have heard, many of the soldiers 

that testified before you were given the category of ‘‘undiagnosable 

illnesses,’’ or they were put in the category of ‘‘stress-related illnesses’’ or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 

We do not feel that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is a major 

cause of the Gulf war illnesses. We think that it is caused by combinations of chemical and biological agents that produce these very 

complex signs and symptoms. We do not see how it could be produced any other way. 

Now, in this figure we have compared the 650 soldiers that we 

examined or received information on with civilians who had Chronic Fatigue Syndrome or Fibromyalgia; and as you can see, the signs 

and symptoms shown here in the red bars compared to the lightblue bars are almost identical, meaning that these veterans probably did not have unidentifiable illnesses; they probably had 

Chronic Fatigue Syndrome—Fibromyalgia-like illnesses. 

Now, these illnesses can be caused by a combination of different 

types of exposures, and we found recently with Chronic Fatigue 

Syndrome that biologic agents, such as chronic microorganisms, 

can cause these same illnesses. In fact, of the three candidates of 

microorganisms that are most likely to cause illness like this, viruses, bacteria, and bacteria-like microorganisms called mycoplasmas, we were attracted to the fact that mycoplasmas might be 

underlying at least some of the signs and symptoms of Gulf war 

illness. 

Now, the reason is this type of microorganism can cause virtually 

all of the different signs and symptoms that I showed in the previous figure. In addition, the species of mycoplasma that we found 

predominantly in the Gulf war illness patients is a very unusual 

species of mycoplasma called Mycoplasma fermentans. This particular mycoplasma has the property that it can actually enter 

cells, and when it enters cells, it can cause havoc with the metabolism of the cell and can cause unusual signs and symptoms because 

it can colonize or go into virtually any tissue or organ. 

When it gets in certain locations, like the synovial cells of the 

joints, it can cause an arthritis-like condition. In fact, aching joints 

and joint problems, or arthritic conditions, are very common, probably one of the most common signs and symptoms of Gulf war illness. And the reason that may happen is that as these microorganisms leave the cell, they take a piece of the plasma membrane 

with it, and in doing so they can stimulate an immune response 

against the host antigens that were carried on the mycoplasma as 

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it left the cell. Thus, some of the autoimmune signs and symptoms 

can be explained by this type of microorganism. 

We have developed new diagnostic techniques based on the techniques of molecular biology, and we have been able to diagnose 

Gulf war illness in several hundred patients as due to this type of 

microorganism plus other potential infectious agents as well. We 

have found in our study 45 percent of the veterans that we tested, 

and in some cases their immediate family members were symptomatic, for this type of mycoplasmal infection. 

We have looked now at nondeployed forces, and we find it in less 

than 4 percent of subjects, so there is a significant difference depending on whether they were deployed to the Persian Gulf and 

have the illness. 

Now, the important thing is that this type of illness can be treated. It can be treated with multiple cycles of antibiotics; and, in fact, 

we found five different antibiotics that are effective, and these different antibiotics can be used in different combinations and different sequences of 6 week therapeutic treatments. The whole therapy can take over a year. We are dealing with very slow-growing 

microorganisms that are only moderately sensitive to antibiotics, 

and this is why it takes so long. 

There is some information that I have listed here, nutritional requirements, and other recommendations that I will not go into 

now. We have been working with Dr. Bill Rae in Dallas and Dr. 

Charles Hinshaw in Wichita, and Dr. Jim Privatra in California on 

the nutritional requirements that are important. 

This is what happened when we looked at 170 soldiers with Gulf 

war illness. Seventy-six of these proved to be positive for 

mycoplasmal infections. Seventy-three of them underwent the antibiotic therapy, and as you can see, after the first 6-weeks of therapy none of them recovered. They all relapsed with the usual signs 

and symptoms, but after subsequent therapy some of them recovered so that after five or six cycles of therapy, most of them had 

recovered from the illness. 

Now, when I mean ‘‘recovery,’’ that does not necessarily mean 

they are ‘‘cured,’’ but they could return to active duty and undergo 

the physical requirements of their service. Now, that is with 73 patients, and that represents patients from every service in our 

armed forces except the Coast Guard. 

And, finally, in the last figure that I am going to show and discuss briefly are what are the potential or possible origins of these 

chronic microorganisms. The first source that we have heard already is they could have been in the vaccines as contaminants, for 

example. It is not uncommon that these small, bacteria-like microorganisms like mycoplasmas can contaminate vaccines. 

First, vaccines in the Gulf were given, multiple vaccinations were 

given simultaneously, and this is not the effective way to vaccinate 

someone. By giving all these multiple vaccines at once, you tend to 

immunosuppress an individual, and that could have made them 

susceptible to endogenous agents. Second, agents in the environment that were in the sand or in the water or so on, now mycoplasma can survive for some time in the sand, and Professor Luce 

Montagnier in Paris has indicated that these types of agents can 

persist in the environment. 

95

The third point, which has been brought up, is that the plumes 

from the destruction of chemical-biological-warfare factories and 

bunkers that were destroyed during and after the war could contain these infectious agents, and they could have blown back across 

our lines. I think that this is also very likely. For the SCUDs. Some 

of the units that we have looked at were under repeated SCUD attack, and they now have health problems, and some of these 

SCUDS may have been equipped with CBW warheads or chemical 

or biological warheads to deliver these agents. 

The Iraqis were operating under Soviet War Doctrine. We know 

that. That has been admitted by our intelligence. They would tend 

to mix agents, chemical plus biological together in an offensive attack; and if they did this, then this could explain the complex signs 

and symptoms that we see in Gulf war illnesses. 

I thank you for the chance to address the panel and will be willing to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nicolson follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Dietz. 

Mr. DIETZ. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you 

for inviting me to share with you my concerns about depleted uranium and its possible connection to Gulf War Syndrome. 

I first became concerned about the health consequences of depleted uranium in the fall of 1979, when I worked at the Knolls 

Atomic Power Laboratory in Schenectady, NY. The laboratory was 

operated by the General Electric Co. for the Department of Energy. 

While troubleshooting a radiological problem, my colleagues and I 

accidentally discovered depleted uranium aerosols collected in environmental air filters exposed at the Knolls site. 

The source of the uranium contamination was the National Lead 

Industries Plant in Colonie, 10 miles east of the Knolls site, near 

Albany, NY. National Lead was fabricating depleted uranium 

penetrators for 30-millimeter cannon rounds. We also discovered 

depleted uranium in air filters exposed at the Kesselring site in 

West Milton, NY, where crews for the nuclear Navy are trained, 26 

miles northwest of the National Lead plant. 

This is by no means the maximum fallout distance for uranium 

aerosols. The 26-mile radius surrounding the city of Albany corresponds to more than 2,000 square miles where this fallout was 

occurring. 

In January 1980, I wrote an unclassified report documenting the 

mass spectrometer measurements we made, and it was recently obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, and a photocopy has 

been given to this committee. 

Totally unrelated to the discovery of depleted uranium in Knollssite air filters, in February 1980, a court order by New York State, 

citing public health reasons, shut down National Lead for exceeding a New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 

monthly radioactivity limit of 150 microcuries for airborne emissions. This corresponds to less than 1 pound of depleted uranium 

metal, equivalent to 1.4 of the small penetrators used in aircraft 

30-millimeter cannon rounds. 

New York State health officials understood that exposure of its 

citizens to even small amounts of depleted uranium was harmful; 

therefore, they stopped it. 

Consider what happened in the Gulf war. Uranium metal is 

pyrophoric, and when a high velocity depleted uranium penetrator 

hits a tank, its leading end ignites and burns explosively, forming 

aerosol particles of uranium oxide that are mostly 5 micrometers 

or less in size. By the way, five micrometers equals two-ten-thousandths of an inch. 

These particles become airborne and, like dust, can be spread far 

and wide by wind action. Their fallout range is virtually unlimited. 

Uranium microparticles can be inhaled and ingested easily, and 

that makes them dangerous to human health. Radioactive contamination from depleted uranium is permanent for friend or foe; it 

does not diminish with time. All three uranium isotopes in depleted 

uranium are radioactive and produce alpha particles. Prolonged 

bombardment of lung tissue by alpha particles is known to cause 

cancer. 

During 4 days of ground fighting, at least 300 tons of depleted 

uranium munitions were fired. An army report describing research 

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and hard-target testing states that up to 70 percent of a depleted 

uranium penetrator can become aerosolized when it hits a tank. 

Even if only 2 percent of the uranium burned up, then at least 6 

tons of depleted uranium aerosol particles were generated. This is 

a huge amount, much of which would have become airborne over 

the battlefields. This amount in 4 days is more than 10,000 times 

greater than the maximum airborne emissions of depleted uranium 

allowed in the air over Albany in 1 month. 

In a given region of a battlefield, hundreds of kilograms of micrometer-sized depleted uranium particles were generated suddenly 

by cannon fire from United States airplanes and tanks at formations of Iraqi armor. Thermocolumns from burning tanks and vehicles carried aloft these localized plumes of uranium particles and 

dispersed them far and wide by wind action over the battlefield. 

Then unprotected U.S. service personnel inhaled and ingested 

quantities of depleted uranium particles into their lungs and bodies. They were never told about the health dangers of uranium particles. They were given no means to protect themselves. 

Unprotected medical and other personnel were exposed to inhaling uranium dust from the uniforms of wounded allied and Iraqi 

soldiers. This massive exposure to depleted uranium aerosol particles on the battlefield raises many questions about depleted uranium and how it might have caused at least some of the health 

problems now being experienced by Gulf war veterans. 

‘‘Uranium and all its compounds are highly toxic, both from a 

chemical and a radiological standpoint.’’ This quotation is from the 

Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, which has been a widely used 

reference text for generations of scientists and engineers: Chronic 

exposure to small concentrations of uranium is known to cause kidney failure. Depleted uranium is more than 99 percent Uranium–

238, just a single isotope, and is always accompanied by two decay 

daughters that emit penetrating particles and gamma rays. 

As gamma rays and energetic beta particles become absorbed in 

body tissue, they will traverse hundreds of body cells, potentially 

causing damage to genetic material in the nuclei of living cells. A 

biokinetic model developed by the International Commission on Radiation Protection explains how uranium microparticles can enter 

the body and spread to vital organs. This model shows that an 

acute intake of uranium particles can result in urinary excretions 

of uranium for several years afterwards. 

After the war, many thousands of service personnel entered Iraqi 

tanks and armored vehicles that had been destroyed by depleted 

uranium penetrators, looking for souvenirs. They became contaminated. Others collected spent penetrators and made amulets from 

the dense, heavy-uranium metal. Wearing these amulets about 

their bodies, they unwittingly subjected themselves to penetrating 

gamma radiations from the uranium isotopes and the two decay 

daughters of Uranium–238. 

They were not told that uranium is dangerous to health. After 

the war, 27 soldiers in the 144th Army National Guard and Supply 

Company worked on and in 29 U.S. combat vehicles that had been 

hit by friendly fire and become contaminated with depleted uranium. They worked for 3 weeks without any protective gear before 

being informed that the vehicles were contaminated. 

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In July 1991, the ammunition storage area at the United States 

Army base in Doha, Kuwait caught fire and burned. Four M1A1 

tanks with depleted uranium armor were destroyed, along with 660 

tank rounds and 9,720 35-millimeter, depleted uranium rounds. 

More than 9,000 pounds of depleted uranium burned up in the fire. 

U.S. troops were exposed to depleted uranium during the fire and 

subsequent cleanup operations. They wore no protective clothing or 

masks during or after the fire. 

Approximately 3,500 soldiers were based here. Some of the soldiers reported cleanup consisted of using brooms and their bare 

hands. This is something that would make a qualified radiological 

worker shudder. 

Twenty-two veterans still retain depleted uranium shrapnel in 

their bodies as a result of friendly fire incidents. They have become 

subjects for the first medical studies to assess health risks related 

to depleted uranium. 

The promotion and sale of depleted uranium munitions to the armies and air forces of many nations guarantees that in future conflicts thousands of soldiers on both sides will inhale and ingest 

acute doses of uranium aerosols, and many in tanks or armored vehicles struck by depleted uranium penetrators will receive dangerous amounts of nonremovable uranium shrapnel in their bodies. 

It has been reported in The Nation that the Department of Veterans’ Affairs conducted a Statewide survey of 251 Gulf war veterans’ families in Mississippi. Of their children conceived and born 

since the war, an astonishing 67 percent have illnesses rated severe or have missing eyes, missing ears, blood infections, respiratory problems, and fused fingers. The causes of these birth defects should be investigated. 

The human cost of using depleted uranium munitions in conflicts 

is not worth any short-term advantage if it permanently contaminates the environment and results in irreparable damage to our 

service personnel and causes genetic defects in their offspring. 

Speaking as a World War II veteran, I am troubled about the 

health of Gulf war veterans and the seeming lack of concern shown 

by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs and the Army. They have 

refused to investigate the role of depleted uranium as a possible 

cause of Gulf War Syndrome. 

In concluding, I urge this committee to make it possible for a 

truly independent investigation of depleted uranium to occur, because it was a major chemical and radiological poison that troops 

were exposed to during the Gulf war. Investigations should be undertaken by scientists and medical doctors not associated with the 

Department of Defense and who are knowledgeable about heavy 

metal and radiological poisons and their effects on human health. 

Gulf war veterans must also have a voice in organizing this effort. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dietz follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. Dr. Durakovic, you have the 

floor. 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. Mr. Chairman, I welcome and am grateful for 

this opportunity to testify today. 

I am a doctor of medicine with a specialty in nuclear medicine, 

and I also have a doctorate, Ph.D., in nuclear biophysics. My entire 

scientific and professional life has been dedicated to radioisotope 

toxicology, in which capacity I served the Government of the 

United States for over 17 years, being the head of the Nuclear 

Medicine Department at Walter Reed Hospital, working for the Defense Nuclear Agency, and later for the VA system. 

In 1991, 24 veterans were referred to my clinic in Wilmington, 

DE from the Ventnor Clinic in New Jersey because they were contaminated with uranium in the Persian Gulf. If it was not for my 

clinic that encountered that population of 24 patients, perhaps we 

would not be sitting here discussing medical effects of uranium in 

the Persian Gulf because that was the first referral of the veterans 

who qualified for the Nuclear Medicine Clinic. Most of them in different parts of the country were seen by general practitioners who 

have hardly any expertise in handling internal contamination. 

So due to the lucky circumstances, those patients were seen by 

me at Wilmington VA Hospital, and I took their story very seriously, indeed, because my exposure to uranium contamination previous to that time was only with experimental animals, because I 

did lots of research in the experimental animals dealing with 

transuranium elements, plutonium, americium, and so on. My 

works had been published 25 years ago on uranium and 

transuranium elements. 

These soldiers presented with a host of clinical symptoms, ranging from respiratory ailments to renal disease. Some of those patients underwent several surgical procedures to handle their kidney problems. Their problems also included hepatic, gastrointestinal, and endocrine disease. Therefore, I simply focused my 

attention to the probability of symptomatology related to the endogenous incorporation of uranium in those patients, for which reason 

I took the very simple route of attempting etiological diagnoses in 

those unfortunate patients. 

Out of 24 patients, I dealt directly with 14 of them because 10 

did not show up for my follow-ups. My first line of action was to 

send them for the objective evaluation of the whole-body counting 

of radioactive uranium. Since our facility did not have the capacity 

to deal with the whole-body counting of endogenously incorporated 

radioisotopes, I sent them to the VA Hospital in Boston, where 

there was a whole-body counter, unfortunately outdated and not 

sensitive. 

Those patients underwent the whole-body counting with inconclusive results. I suggested to the doctors of the VA Hospital in 

Boston to improve their methodology by buying more sensitive 

crystal, which they applied to the Department of Defense, and soon 

after, the work was discontinued under unexplained circumstances. 

Since whole-body counting did not yield any information about 

the etiological cause of my patients’ symptomatology, I suggested 

to the VA system that we go for another line of action about etiological diagnosis of their problems. I suggested that the patients be 

139

sent to Sandia National Lab in New Mexico, where I am very familiar with their work of uranium in the lungs. That has never 

been done. 

Furthermore, I suggested that urine samples be sent to the 

Radiochemistry Lab in Aberdeen, MD, and samples were collected, 

but they never reached Maryland, and they never reached Aberdeen Proving Grounds, so urine analysis is nonexistent. In the case 

of my 24 patients, there was only 1 urine sample that was analyzed, with inconclusive evidence. 

So I consider it very mysterious, the disappearance of the samples of the urine, which were very carefully collected and supposedly sent to Aberdeen Proving Grounds by the VA Hospital in 

Wilmington, DE. 

The third action that I proposed to the Veterans’ Administration 

was to do biopsy samples of the bone tissue of those patients because we know that uranium can be easily detected by 

autoradiography or even by visualization of a single atom of uranium, which is a big atom, about one Angstrom in size. It can be 

seen by the specialized microscopic analysis. 

None of my recommendations was ever followed, and not a single 

patient referred to me has been analyzed for the etiological cause 

of their symptoms. Every conceivable road block was put in my line 

of management of those patients. I was ridiculed. There were road 

blocks, and there were obstacles throughout 7 years of my attempt 

to properly analyze the problems of those patients. I have to quote 

to you, although it is not my vocabulary or my dictionary, that the 

chief of staff of my hospital said it is ‘‘half-assed research.’’ And it 

was openly and obviously discouraged that any work done with 

them. 

Nevertheless, there was a Uranium Registry in our hospital, 

which consisted of taking blood pressures, temperatures, and the 

pulse rates, and perhaps in some cases, of the lung x rays, which 

really is far away from proper analysis of the patients for the deeply incorporated uranium. 

My plan of management has failed because of the total absence 

and total lack of interest on the part of the Veterans’ Administration to do anything for those unfortunate patients, to analyze why 

they suffer from the host of the symptoms and what might be the 

role of uranium in the misery of those patients. Why it was done, 

I do not know; but I do know that I received several telephone calls 

from the Department of Defense suggesting to me that this work 

will not yield any meaningful information and should be discontinued. I have telephone numbers of the references if you desire to 

see them. 

Lost records is another thing, because samples of the urine disappeared but also the records of those patients disappeared, and 

they were found much later when pressure was put on the VA Hospital. 

Now, we are facing a big dilemma in the political, scientific, and 

professional environment of the United States of America. Is uranium responsible or a real objective cause of a part of the disease 

of the Persian Gulf veterans, or is it not? The question is very simple, and it can be very simply addressed. 

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The only thing to do is to do a proper, objective, expensive analysis of the samples of those patients, which has to be conducted not 

by the charlatans which are present in the Veterans’ Administration’s offices with the big names of the Gulf veterans uranium 

groups and clinics and so on and which are populated by people 

who have no basic knowledge of radiation toxicology, nuclear medicine, or internal incorporation of radioactive uranium. 

Now, if uranium is analyzed by these objective methods, we will 

be able to say whether those patients are related to uranium in 

their symptomatology or they are not. The studies are very expensive, but I think our country owes it to the veterans who served 

in the Gulf. 

I was a commander of the 531st Army Detachment in the time 

of Desert Shield. At that time, when I was deployed for the Desert 

Shield operation, everybody knew my qualification as being an 

international expert for uranium and transuranium elements. Nobody volunteered to me the information that my expertise might be 

needed in the Gulf because of the possible use of depleted uranium 

shells. 

I am not questioning it, but I am just saying that we can easily 

answer the question of the relationship between uranium and the 

Persian Gulf sickness if we take this issue seriously and if we analyze in this country what is the probability of a connection between 

uranium and the symptoms. 

This country has the capacity. It has sophisticated laboratories. 

It has professional people who are at the highest level of expertise, 

and there is absolutely no excuse not to proceed with my method 

of management. 

Total lack of etiological diagnosis, in my opinion, is a shame for 

all of us because I know for a fact that the soldiers of 144th Transportation Company of New Jersey who worked on those tanks in 

Saudi Arabia, they never have been informed about the probability 

of radioactive isotopes in their environment. They never wore protective clothing, never wore the masks, and never wore the 

dosimeters. 

Battle-damage assessment team came in the summer of 1991 to 

Saudi Arabia, and they were dressed like astronauts, having sophisticated detecting instruments and detecting 0.6 to 1 Rad in one 

single measurement in those tanks, which is a very high dose. But 

the veterans were not informed that they were in a radioactive environment. 

I am going to conclude my statement at this point with an emphasis that oppression has been exercised in the Veterans’ Administration system against professionals like myself who wanted to 

come to the end of the story, and I am going to quote President 

Thomas Jefferson, who said: ‘‘I swear upon the altar of God eternal 

hostility toward any oppression over the mind of man.’’

I think we should take heed of the great President Jefferson, and 

try to eliminate obstacles to the proper diagnostic management of 

the Gulf veterans who have been exposed to depleted uranium. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Durakovic follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank all three of our panelists. We have really not 

focused in on, and this is the 10th hearing we have had, on biological agents or depleted uranium for a variety of reasons. So this is 

somewhat new territory for us. 

My understanding of depleted uranium in the theater is that we 

see it in two ways. We see it in the shells, the projectiles. The depleted uranium was almost really the spear on the shell that penetrated the armament and then when it could penetrate through the 

shell itself, would explode and cause the damage. 

And my other understanding is that the depleted uranium is also 

used on the armament, in particular of the tanks and some of the 

other vehicles in the theater. So far, am I on target? 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. Yes. 

Mr. SHAYS. Now, depleted uranium is the term we use. Describe 

to me where we get the depleted uranium. 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. Well, first of all, I really do not deal with terminology like depleted uranium because, as a medical doctor, I deal 

with terminology of uranium. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. All isotopes of uranium, 238, 235——

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to have you slow down. 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. I am sorry. All isotopes of uranium, 238, 234, 

235, are alpha-emitting, radioactive isotopes. ‘‘Depleted’’ really 

means a concentration of Uranium 235 and 234 in the entire bulk 

of uranium, which has to be enriched to the point of utilization in 

nuclear weapons or nuclear reactors. Uranium exists all over the 

planet Earth as uranium ore. As we know, we live in a radioactive 

environment, but that Uranium 238 is not capable of producing 

and sustaining a reaction that would feed reactors for nuclear 

weapons. For that reason, it has to be enriched by Uranium 235 

and 234. 

‘‘Depleted uranium’’ simply means a concentration of highly fissionable Uranium 235 and 234 is diminished to a certain level in 

the specific bulk of uranium, if I can be as simple as I have been. 

Now, we are talking about radioactive isotopes with a long halflife and alpha-particle radiation. Alpha particles are the heaviest 

particle produced in nuclear reaction, and in the case of uranium, 

we deal with an incredible phenomenon that is unique in the history of mankind. 

I am very grateful for your question because it leads us to a better understanding of the problem. Uniqueness of uranium incident 

in the Gulf war is that it is the single, largest mass contamination 

by a single isotope. Hiroshima and Nagasaki was mass contamination with 440 radioisotopes which are produced in a nuclear explosion. We know that Chernobyl is not a nuclear weapon; it is reactor 

producing about 440 radioactive isotopes. So these are mass-contamination scenarios in which many isotopes are implicated. 

The Gulf war is the first case in the history of mankind where 

we have one single isotope responsible for mass contamination. 

What happens in the bodies of the human beings or animals where 

uranium enters? Whatever——

Mr. SHAYS. I do not want you to go that far yet. I just want to 

understand. Mr. Dietz, am I saying your name correctly? Is it 

Dietz? 

145

Mr. DIETZ. Pardon me? 

Mr. SHAYS. Am I saying your name correctly when I refer to you 

as Mr. Dietz? 

Mr. DIETZ. Yes. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am about as big a generalist as you can get. My 

daughter knows more than I know on these issues. I guess that 

should not be surprising; she is a high school student. I just want 

to first understand kind of the framework I am working in. Maybe 

depleted uranium just has—my concept of depleted uranium is basically the uranium that comes out of a nuclear plant after it has 

spent nuclear energy. Now, is that what—I should not be thinking——

Mr. DIETZ. The depleted uranium arises from the gaseous-diffusion plant when the natural uranium, which is also more than 99 

percent Uranium 238, is transformed by chemical action into uranium hexafloride and then passed through barriers; and this is a 

physical process for enriching the U–235. 

Mr. SHAYS. But is depleted uranium that basically exists because 

it was used for something else first? 

Mr. DIETZ. That is right. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. It is a waste material, in a sense, of something 

else. 

Mr. DIETZ. I think a way to picture this visually is to think of 

a stream of uranium hexafloride gas going through the diffusion 

plant. The enriched goes in one direction, and the tails, what is 

called the ‘‘tails,’’ which is the depleted uranium, goes in the opposite direction. 

Mr. SHAYS. That value of depleted uranium, is it is extraordinarily dense? 

Mr. DIETZ. It is 1.7 times as dense as lead. 

Mr. SHAYS. But not as heavy or——

Mr. DIETZ. Well, the density would be the grams per cubic centimeter. 

Mr. SHAYS. So it would be a heavier material. I guess what I am 

getting to—I do not guess; I am—depleted uranium is relatively inexpensive, expensive? 

Mr. DIETZ. We have in storage now I think something like 

600,000 metric tons of depleted uranium in the form of hexafloride. 

Mr. SHAYS. The bottom line is it is very cheap. 

Mr. DIETZ. It is coming out our ears. 

Mr. SHAYS. And the military determined that depleted uranium 

had tremendous strategic value to them in the sense that it was 

a material that could penetrate most of the armament. 

Mr. DIETZ. The uranium is a very dense material. It can be hardened by adding three-quarters-of-a-weight percent of titanium to it 

to make it superhard, made into a long, thin rod fired at very high 

velocity so that when it hits a solid object like a tank armor, which 

is basically mainly iron, it undergoes almost an instant, very high 

rise in temperature, and because of its pyrophoric nature, it starts 

to burn or oxidize extremely rapidly, almost explosively, and when 

that happens, you get these micrometer-sized particles. A 5-micrometer particle can be breathed into your lung and can stay there 

for many, many years. 

146

Mr. SHAYS. But the Army has it in its shells for penetration, but 

it also has it on the vehicles themselves for armament. Correct? 

Mr. DIETZ. Well, it is the optimum penetrator. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. It is a penetrator, but it also is a stronger material for shield. 

Mr. DIETZ. Tungsten is a substitute, but it does not have the 

pyrophoric nature of uranium. What happens is that ‘‘pyrophoric’’ 

means that when it burns, it——

Mr. SHAYS. You are telling me something I am not up to yet. I 

do not want you to get ahead of me here. 

Mr. DIETZ. OK. 

Mr. SHAYS. I just asked a question. The simple question was—

I want to get on to the next one. It is not a big answer. 

Mr. DIETZ. OK. 

Mr. SHAYS. It is used as a shield on our vehicles as well. Correct? 

Mr. DIETZ. Yes. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So you have it used as a penetrator and as a 

shield. Now, in the course—this is your area of expertise. When the 

Army sought to do this, when we moved in this direction and we 

saw the value of it, certainly the issue of safety was looked at then, 

what got by us, if, in fact, depleted uranium is the threat that you 

consider it to be? 

What I am trying to just nail down—see, I guess I am looking 

for motives here, and if I were in the military and I considered this 

an absolute essential use, I might be a little less inclined to see if 

there was a negative associated with it; and if there was a negative 

associated with it, I might want to not just come to grips with it 

because the implications can be quite significant. 

I may be going down a road that I am going to say goes nowhere, 

but I am willing to just consider this for a second. So all I am asking you now—you are both experts in the field. Correct? You knew 

depleted uranium was used for military purposes. Was there a 

group within the scientific community that said this ain’t a good 

idea? 

Mr. DIETZ. I do not think so. I do not know who made the decision to use depleted uranium munitions, because all the bad things 

about uranium from a health standpoint were known long, long before the Gulf war began. I think it is used basically because it——

Mr. SHAYS. I know why it is used. I want to know how it got to 

be used, and I want to know if we went through a process, and you 

are not going to be able to answer that question——

Mr. DIETZ. I do not think I can. 

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. That we went through a process of determining that it was totally safe. I just want to determine whether 

you have the capability on your expertise to answer that question. 

Are you aware of the process that got us to the point where we 

used depleted uranium? If you are——

Mr. DIETZ. I am not aware of the historical——

Mr. SHAYS. OK. That is fine. 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. I am aware of it, and that is one of the reasons 

why we have a free United States of America today. In the 1940’s 

German scientists suggested to Hitler to use uranium for the production of nuclear weapons in their research. Hitler used it because 

he was convinced by his generals that uranium can be used as an 

147

armament in the German tanks, and they, indeed, used uranium 

from the mines of Yoachimstaal in Czechoslovakia in the German 

area, and they used that uranium to reinforce the German shielding of their tanks. 

So, use of uranium in the shielding of the tanks is not new at 

all; it goes back 50 years. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. That is good to know. Are our soldiers—hold on 

1 second. What I think I am going to do is do a little more research 

myself on how we got to where we use it. My antenna goes up 

when I get into an issue like this because the implications of what 

you gentlemen are saying have tremendous consequence. 

If, in fact, our soldiers have been harmed by depleted uranium, 

that potentially says a lot about what we have to look at, and it 

says a lot about protocols within the military. One of the protocols 

we know in the military is that they did not—it is my understanding; I may be corrected later on, but they did not notify our 

soldiers of the consequence of depleted uranium, and now they are, 

but they did not then. And some of this boggles my mind, I mean, 

if that is the case. 

So let us just get a little bit more to your expertise here. Have 

both of you treated or examined Persian Gulf veterans? Mr. Dietz, 

you have not. 

Mr. DIETZ. No. 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. I have examined the veterans; yes, they were my 

patients. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Mr. Dietz, your point was to show us—in your 

testimony you gave us other examples of depleted uranium where 

there was a concentration of it and the consequences of that, and 

your testimony, as I gather, is to say that was bad. What we have 

here in the concentration of depleted uranium in the Persian Gulf 

was even worse. Is that a fair? 

Mr. DIETZ. Yes. It is many orders of magnitude worse than the 

problem at Albany. 

Mr. SHAYS. And that leads you to come to what conclusion? 

Mr. DIETZ. The only conclusion that I can come to is that this 

is a truly wonder weapon. The analogy that can be given is that 

it is as effective against destroying tanks as a machine gun was in 

World War I against infantry soldiers. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. We know that, but we also know it has a negative side effect. 

Mr. DIETZ. I am sorry? 

Mr. SHAYS. We also know there is a negative side effect. 

Mr. DIETZ. Absolutely. There is a negative side, and I think the 

military is overlooking the negative side. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, maybe what I will do is Mr. Sanders will 

get into other areas, and then I will come back. 

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I share your concerns about depleted uranium, and that is a whole, huge issue 

which I think we need to get into, but what I would like to do is 

just speak to the Nicolsons for a moment. 

Dr. Nicolson, one of the interesting aspects of your testimony is 

that you talk about actual treatment, and we have not heard a 

whole lot of that discussion here. Now, as I understood from your 

148

testimony, you said that you have treated several hundred Persian 

Gulf vets. Am I correct in remembering that? 

Mr. NICOLSON. Several hundred have been treated. We do not do 

the treatment ourselves. We are a diagnostic institute. We do the 

diagnosis. We go to the primary-care physicians who then treat the 

patients and we do followups with the primary-care physicians. 

Mr. SANDERS. Based on your diagnosis? 

Mr. NICOLSON. Based on the diagnostic tests that we perform. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. And can you tell us the results of the treatments of the people that you referred to primary physicians, how 

successful or not successful have those treatments been? 

Mr. NICOLSON. I actually showed you some of that data. We have 

in press in a medical journal the results from 170 patients. Seventy-six of the patients were positive——

Mr. SANDERS. ‘‘Positive’’ meaning production of symptoms? 

Mr. NICOLSON. Positive for the infection that we have discovered, 

the mycoplasmal infection. Seventy-three underwent treatment. Of 

the 73 that underwent treatment, 58 are now considered to be recovered and are now back on active duty. They may not be cured 

from this illness, but at least they have recovered to the point 

where they can perform at their level for their job description. 

Mr. SANDERS. So what you are saying is, in terms of the treatment that you have recommended, 58 out of 73 have seen significantly positive results. 

Mr. NICOLSON. That is correct. 

Mr. SANDERS. Now, given the fact that we have an estimated 

70,000 vets who are hurting, that is a pretty interesting and important result. Have those results been confirmed by others? I mean, 

are people going to argue with me and say, no, that that is not the 

case? 

Mr. NICOLSON. The diagnostic results have been confirmed by a 

certified diagnostic laboratory, Immunosciences Laboratories, in 

California. We are in the process or arranging to train DOD scientists to perform the types of tests that we perform. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Now, given the fact that everybody in the 

DOD and the VA is concerned about this problem, what has their 

response been to your approach and the apparent, what you are 

telling us, very strong, positive success that your diagnosis has 

had? Is that being replicated elsewhere now? 

Mr. NICOLSON. I would say they first ignored us or ridiculed us. 

Then I think our success, particularly the patients that went to the 

Walter Reed program and did not recover from their illnesses, but 

began to recover on these multiple cycles of antibiotic therapy. 

They have begun to take a renewed interest, I think, in what we 

are doing, and it is still, I guess, at that point now that they are 

very interested in the types of tests that we are running and the 

types of therapies that are allowing not only the soldiers, the veterans to recover, but their family members who are symptomatic—

we have a large frequency of illness in families of Gulf war veterans as well. 

Mr. SANDERS. After this panel testifies, we are going to be hearing from the VA and the DOD, and I am going to ask them specifically how they have responded to your work. What are they going 

to tell me? 

149

Mr. NICOLSON. Well, I think they will tell you that both Nancy 

and I have addressed the DVA and the DOD in Washington several 

times over the span of a few years. They have taken an interest 

in what we are doing. They are making plans to send individuals 

out to our laboratories to be trained in this, but they have also 

tried to perform some of their own tests, but unfortunately they are 

using 1960’s technology in their own tests that they are performing, and I do not think they are going to come up with anything. This is not the approach that is necessary. 

We want to bring them up to speed to use state-of-the-art, diagnostic procedures for these types of illnesses. They are very difficult 

to diagnose. 

Mr. SANDERS. So am I hearing you say that they are interested 

in the work that you are doing, but they have not in their own labs 

been able to replicate what you have done? 

Mr. NICOLSON. They have not shown up in our laboratories yet. 

When they show up, we can train them, and then we can make 

sure that they replicate the type of data that we are finding routinely. We have trained diagnostic laboratories, and they are replicating our data, so I do not think it could be said that it has not 

been replicated. It has not been replicated by DVA and DOD scientists—that is true—because they have not come to be trained. 

Mr. SANDERS. In your judgment—let me ask you this. Who is 

treating, in this country today, how successful are we in general in 

treating Persian Gulf illness? Is the VA and the DOD successful? 

Do they have any protocol which seems to be working? 

Mr. NICOLSON. I think you will have to ask the DOD and the 

DVA that question. It is my feeling from discussions with various 

physicians who are now treating Persian Gulf war veterans and 

their family members, using the protocols that we have established 

as effective, is that they are gaining ground in this area, but I have 

to again stress that this is a subset of patients. This is not every 

patient, because as you have heard, some patients may have 

radiologic exposure, some may have chemical exposure, some may 

have biologic exposure, or combinations of them. 

And, in fact, some of the veterans who have testified to this committee earlier have come to us, we have tested their blood, and 

they have turned out to be positive and their spouses who are now 

ill have turned out to be positive and their children who are now 

ill have also turned out to be positive. 

Mr. SANDERS. In talking to veterans in Vermont, and I think the 

answer around the country would be the same, what they are saying is that we are hurting, and even if there is not 100-percent 

guarantee that a new type of treatment might work, if it is not 

going to hurt us more we would be willing to gamble. Let us see 

what is going on out there. 

So my first question in that regard is, are there side effects? Is 

your treatment and approach risky? Can it cause additional problems? 

Mr. NICOLSON. The approaches that we have proposed are standard medical procedure for the treatment of chronic infections. They 

are really no different than the treatment of Lyme Disease, for example, and other chronic infection. So I would say that these are 

pretty standard procedures. The antibiotics that we recommend are 

150

pretty standard antibiotics. Not every antibiotic will work, so it is 

not a placebo effect. 

Mr. SANDERS. I mean, we understand not everything works for 

everybody, but if somebody were to say, in response to your treatment, ‘‘Well, we do not want veterans to be guinea pigs. You know, 

we do not want vets to be sent there and come back a lot sicker 

than when they started.’’ How do you respond to that? 

Mr. NICOLSON. Well, I think if they are tested and they are found 

to be positive for these chronic mycoplasmal infections, and they 

have systemic or system-wide infections, they should be treated. 

That is standard medical procedure. 

Mr. SANDERS. And, in your judgment, they are not going to be, 

no matter what the result may be, they are not going to be worse 

off than when they started. 

Mr. NICOLSON. Well, from what we have seen, they slowly recover. 

Mr. SANDERS. Right. But what I am trying to get at is if somebody argued—I mean, there are treatments out there—if somebody 

was dying of AIDS, for example, and we tried a radical therapy, it 

is possible that that might accelerate their death pattern. Correct? 

But one might say, Well, what is the risk? The person was going 

to die anyhow. What I am suggesting is that what I am hearing 

you saying is you do not see that your treatment will make people 

worse off. 

Mr. NICOLSON. No. I mean, the only thing that we see in our 

treatment is that there is a transient worsening of the signs and 

symptoms due to the Herxheimer Response, and this is a very common response when an individual who has a chronic infection is on 

antibiotics, and that usually passes within a few weeks, and then 

they start to slowly recover. But the whole therapy can take up to 

a year. There are multiple cycles of antibiotics required. 

Mr. SANDERS. Can you give me some examples of people or kinds 

of treatments, perhaps other than your own approach, which seem 

to be having some success? 

Mr. NICOLSON. Other than the approach that we are taking? 

Mr. SANDERS. Yes. 

Mr. NICOLSON. Well, for individuals who have their primary 

problem as chemical exposures, there are a number of treatments 

to rid these chemicals from the body. There are a number of treatments to block the effects of the chemicals and so on. For those 

that have biologic exposures, we have to identify what type of 

agent is involved; otherwise, we really do not know the approach 

to use. If we identify a particular microorganism that is involved, 

whether it is virus or a bacteria-like microorganism, then the treatment is really quite different. 

If it is, for example, a mycoplasmal infection, or a bacterial infection, then there are certain antibiotics which are fairly standard 

procedures for use against these types of infection. So we are really 

not talking about anything that is out of mainstream medicine. 

Mr. SANDERS. In your judgment, and I know this may be a little 

bit askance, a little bit aside from your area of expertise, do you 

believe in the concept of multiple chemical sensitivity? 

151

Mr. NICOLSON. Yes, I do, and we have seen examples of that actually; but this is not a concept that is well accepted by everyone 

in the medical profession. 

Mr. SANDERS. Right. We are more than aware of that. 

Mr. NICOLSON. Nancy also wanted to mention something. 

Mr. SANDERS. Nancy, did you want to——

Mrs. NICOLSON. Well, the Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome does not explain the contagion that affects the families. 

Now, it is possible, if family members came in contact with gear 

that was brought back by a veteran and if the family member came 

in contact with such gear, they could develop multiple chemical 

sensitivity, but that does not explain the numbers of soldiers becoming sick. 

So you would have to look for a biological agent, whether it 

would be endogenous to the area in the Middle East, because there 

are probably combinations of agents there, or as a result of some 

of the weapons that we have been told Iraq possessed. And we have 

to deal with the fact that given the mindset of the Iraqi Government at the time, they would have used multiple weapons in combination. 

So it is a horrible concept to have to deal with. I feel that our 

Defense Department has been backed into a corner because this is 

the aftermath of years of cold war policies. What was then the Soviet Union and the other superpowers were engaged in biological 

weapons research. In fact, in the early 1980’s, John Deutch recommended the buildup of biological weapons in the United States. 

So what I am saying now is that we need to get past the cold 

war. We need to acknowledge that there is a strong possibility that 

many governments were involved in weapons research like this and 

that no one is going to win this war unless we are bold enough, 

like the eagle on the flag, to come forward. I believe the United 

States will lead the way, and other countries will follow suit. I 

think it is time to stop blaming the Defense Department of this 

country and other countries, but it is the fear factor, the honor, and 

the embarrassment, and we still have a problem. 

The International Monetary Fund noted last week that there is 

a 20 percent increase in chronic, infectious disease around the 

world. This is going to have economic repercussions. So the 

nitpicking that has gone on in the scientific community has to stop. 

I think the onus is on the scientific community who went ahead 

with ill-advised experiments. I am sure the scientists assured the 

military sector that they could control weapons like the biologicals, 

but the fact is they cannot. Of all the weapons involved, the biological weapon is the most serious. It is difficult to detect, impossible 

to contain. 

So it is my feeling that we can conquer this problem if the Defense Department would be allowed to tell the truth, and that is 

the problem. They are in a very difficult position because of outmoded policies and because of embarrassment. 

Mr. SANDERS. The bottom line, what you are saying is that you 

believe that the increase in infectious diseases is related to the 

work done on biological weapons. 

Mrs. NICOLSON. Partly in relation to testing of biological weapons 

around the world. Those of us in the science community, know who 

152

they are. We know which scientists have done this. They are afraid 

to come forward because they really thought they were doing the 

right thing at the time, but the science community needs to be 

scrutinized. I blame the global science community for this problem 

because they should never have developed these weapons. It is very 

simple. 

You have what was then the Soviet Union, which was actively 

engaged in biological weapons research, it forced us to follow this 

race because no one was thinking. No one was thinking. So I think 

we need better cooperation between the defense science sector and 

the civilian science sector, and I think pointing fingers and assessing blame is not the way to go. We have to take care of our soldiers 

and the people on this planet. 

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, let me just end my line of questioning just by asking the Nicolsons this question. It would seem 

to me, given the fact that so many people are hurting, that we 

would, or that the DOD and the VA would actively be searching 

out and engaging those people who are involved in a variety of 

treatments to see if any of those treatments are successful. And we 

could understand some treatments may not work, but it would 

seem to me so long as these treatments did not do any more harm 

to the patient, that we would want to look at as many people and 

as many ideas as possible. 

Now, I have the impression that that has not been the case. I 

think what I keep hearing from the DOD and the VA is we do not 

know, that this is not peer reviewed; no, that is not good; no, this 

is not good; no, that is not good; but we will continue going along 

the route we are going, even though we do not have any particular 

understanding, and we do not have any particularly effective treatment. 

Am I misstating, do you think, the——

Mr. NICOLSON. No. That is exactly my perception as well. I 

mean, there has been far too much criticism and not enough cooperation. We need to get beyond that point of simply criticizing 

those people that come up with preliminary evidence and so on. We 

were criticized quite extensively initially when we started to get involved in this issue that we did not have extensive data. Well, we 

had absolutely zero support from the Federal Government, so we 

used entirely our own funds to collect the research data that we 

collected. So we had really no financial help whatsoever. 

All of the studies we published, including the medical journal articles were done without any Government support whatsoever. 

Mr. SANDERS. Have you received up until this day any financial 

support from the Federal Government? 

Mr. NICOLSON. Oh, yes. I currently receive financial support. I 

have a grant from the U.S. Army, for example, but it is for breast 

cancer research. 

Mr. SANDERS. No. I am talking about not breast cancer. I am 

talking about this——

Mr. NICOLSON. No, not one nickel. In fact, we put in a proposal 

in 1995 for this type of study, and they cut the budget by 89 percent, and they did not give it a fundable priority; so even if it were 

funded, we could not have done the work on 11 percent of the requested budget. 

153

Mr. SANDERS. Are you aware of many researchers who are looking at alternative approaches beyond stress, for example, who are 

receiving funding? There have been a number of breakthroughs, it 

seems to me, but are those people receiving the help that they need 

from the Government, or are they having to do it with private 

source? Ross Perot, for example. 

Mr. NICOLSON. Well, they are having to do it with private 

sources of funds. For example, James I. Moss, a scientist in Florida, the first one to show that combinations of different chemicals 

could produce neurologic syndrome——

Mr. SANDERS. He was fired from his job at the Department——

Mr. NICOLSON. No, he was not fired from his job. He received 

word the other day that his grant that he put in to DOD would not 

be funded. So they have taken the tactic that they will squeeze us 

to the point that we cannot do the work that we should be doing. 

Mr. SANDERS. Would you be prepared to have your work submitted to significant controls? 

Mr. NICOLSON. We have already agreed to do that. I was at a 

meeting called actually at the behest of Congressman Norman 

Dicks. Major General Leslie Berger, the commanding officer at 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center, convened a meeting on December 23rd of last year. I was at that meeting and spoke to the Persian Gulf War Research Group and the rest of the individuals who 

were interested in this, and at that meeting it was decided that 

they would send scientists and physicians out to our institute to 

learn the techniques that we were doing, and we would set up a 

validation study. Well, we have not heard from them since January. 

Mr. SANDERS. Six months have come and gone. 

Mr. Chairman, we hear this over and over again. I cannot sit 

here in judgment and tell you whether the Nicolsons are right or 

not right. I do not have the background to do that, but it seems 

to me that if people are treating and claiming to have success, that 

the DOD and the VA would be falling all over themselves to try 

to determine whether, in fact, this analysis and proposed treatment 

is working or not, and that we are doing that for everybody in this 

country who is coming up with different ideas. 

So I would just conclude by thanking, and I am sorry to have ignored you. I do not mean to suggest that your work is not significant, but I did want to focus on this aspect of it. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. SHAYS. I think really what we are doing is you are focusing 

on the biological, and I am just going to be focusing a little bit 

more on depleted uranium. 

I want to know the difference between, say, depleted uranium 

fragments that might be in a soldier’s body versus inhaling, digesting the particles, which I would tend to say would be more dust 

almost—not gas because they are still particles, but they are almost invisible in some ways. Describe to me the difference in terms 

of its impact on the health of the soldier. Both of you may do that. 

Mr. DIETZ. I am not a medical doctor, so I really cannot comment 

on that. 

Mr. SHAYS. Why don’t you start, though, by just prescribing me 

the scientific difference between the fragment and the particles? 

154

Dr. DURAKOVIC. The difference between inhalation, for instance, 

ingestion, or embedded particles like shrapnel boils down to the 

same phenomenon in the body, and that is the release of uranium 

from the site of incorporation into the bloodstream. In my opinion, 

it is exceedingly more dangerous to be exposed to uranium in the 

inhalational pathway than by the shrapnel or the embedded particle for several reasons. 

Reason No. 1 is that the embedded particle or shrapnel is protected from the rest of the body fluids by the formation of the fibrous capsule, which is the scar tissue. Scar tissue would contain 

the particle at the place of its incorporation, and the uranium from 

the particle would not have early access to the bloodstream. Subsequently, it would not have an early access to the target organs, 

which are kidneys, liver, and skeleton. 

In the event of inhalation, a high amount in percent of uranium 

is taken to the bloodstream from the lung tissue, and these are 

really invisible bullets. They are invisible bullets consisting of 

alpha particles, two protons and neutrons which are bombarding 

the internal environment of the organism, leading to breakdown of 

the tissue, necrosis or the death of the tissue, malignant changes 

like cancer, leukemia, malignant tumors, and genetic malformations in generations to come. 

My answer to your question, sir, is this. Regardless of the pathway of contamination, the ultimate fate of uranium is going to be 

determined by the organ of incorporation. In the case of embedded 

particles like shrapnel, I believe it is less likely that the 

henomenology of uranium will be as extensive as the inhalational 

pathway because simply more radioactive material will have access 

to the bloodstream through inhalation but not through the ingestion because ingestion is a relatively safe way of being contaminated with uranium, since only a couple of percent of uranium are 

absorbed in the gastrointestinal tract. 

So my conclusion is that the single most important way of adverse effects of uranium would be by the inhalational exposure, 

which was the case in the Persian Gulf. 

Mr. SHAYS. But if the Army were doing studies, and, Mr. Dietz, 

this question I would ask you as well. Mr. Dietz. 

Mr. DIETZ. Yes. 

Mr. SHAYS. The question I am asking, I am interested in knowing, if you were doing a study of its impact, it is one thing to say, 

well, you have this shell, and you have this depleted uranium; here 

it sits. It strikes me that the kind of study that you need to ultimately do is to determine what happens when this shell is exploded, what happens, what is the effect of the heat on the shell. 

Is it in fragment form, or is it in particle form? 

Are either of you aware of any studies—you may not be—that 

the DOD has done in regards to—I asked it before; I am asking it 

again, to be very clear—are either of you aware of any studies that 

DOD has done on depleted uranium by its use? In other words, not 

in its form before use but in its form after its use. 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. I am aware of that. 

Mr. DIETZ. I am not aware of it. 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. I am aware of the study that DOD sponsored 

with the Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute in BeVerDate Jan 31 2003 11:12 Apr 17, 2003 Jkt 086127 PO 00000 Frm 00158 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\45480 45480
155

thesda. There was a study on experimental animals which was presented a couple of months ago at a scientific meeting in the form 

of an abstract where embedded uranium in the form of the shrapnel was incorporated——

Mr. SHAYS. That is fragments. 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. Fragments. That is correct. 

Mr. SHAYS. What about particles? 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. Inhalation pathway. No, I am not aware of any 

study by the DOD or the VA. 

Mr. SHAYS. And, Dr. Nicolson and Nicolson both, what I am 

hearing from your testimony, one of the things I am hearing is that 

the biological agents would be the one way you would explain the 

potential health problems from one family member to another. 

Mr. NICOLSON. We think this is really the only way you can explain it, except for an odd occurrence of someone coming in contact 

with a souvenir or a pack from Desert Storm or something like that 

that was contaminated. 

Mr. SHAYS. That would be the only way basically. Either they 

came in contact with something that may have been contaminated 

by chemicals or by biologic agents. 

Mr. NICOLSON. Predominantly biologic agents would explain the 

illness passing into the family members and health care workers. 

Nancy wanted me to mention the fact that when we looked at a 

nonscientific sample of veterans, nonscientific because we have not 

looked at entire units; a lot of the individuals come to us. But a 

lot of these individuals served behind the lines, either from the 

deep insertions into Iraq, such as the Airborne and Special Forces 

units that we worked extensively with, or the units that were in 

a support role, command and control, transportation, and so on 

back behind the lines that were under SCUD attack and other 

means. 

Except for the Marine Corps, we have not seen a lot of patients 

from the mechanized infantry or armored units. The exception is 

the Marines, and they were in a very contaminated environment in 

Kuwait, and so I feel that they had multiple exposures of chemical, 

radiological, and biological; and, in fact, some of the soldiers I mentioned that testified to this committee previously and those that 

had very severe neurologic signs and symptoms, we have been able 

to show that they are infected with one of these biological agents. 

They are going to be undergoing therapy, and their families are 

also infected with the same agent. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I am just going to end with you, Dr. 

Durakovic. I want to be clear on what the symptoms were from the 

Gulf war veterans that you examined. 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. There were multiple symptoms which really cannot be summarized into any logical picture. The symptoms encountered in my patients were primarily respiratory symptoms, including pharyngitis, tracheobronchitis, and in some cases, pneumonia. 

In endocrine diseases, several patients had thyroid alterations, gastrointestinal symptoms ranging from severe diarrheas to dehydration, vomiting, nausea, hepatic symptoms, and renal symptomatology. Some of my patients underwent several surgical procedures 

because of kidney problems. Prior to the Gulf war they did not 

have any kidney problems. 

156

So, my answer to your question is that there is really no simple 

answer to this question because symptomatology ranged from the 

respiratory to the renal syndrome in very different organic systems. 

Mr. SHAYS. Is there any question that any of you wish we had 

asked that you would want to answer? We will start with you, Dr. 

Nicolson. 

Mrs. NICOLSON. I really do not have one at the moment. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, that is all right. It just would be one that really 

was right at the tip of your tongue. 

Mr. NICOLSON. It will probably come back. We did touch upon a 

subject which I think we need to spend a little bit of time on, and 

that is the family members. This is something that has been avoided and denied officially, that the family members are now actually 

involved with illness. But it is very hard to deny when young children have the diagnosis of failure to thrive, rashes all over their 

bodies, and not doing well because of chronic fatigue, fibromyalgia, 

and other problems. 

It is hard to deny the fact that these people are sick, that 

spouses are sick with this illness and so on. And I think that the 

biggest tragedy that has happened as a result of our experience is 

the denial that this type of illness can spread to family members. 

And, again, there was an official counterattack when we first came 

out and did our study of the veterans’ wives and other family members instead of which we felt would have been the opposite. Here 

is a problem. It is obviously a problem. Let’s try to find the solution 

to this problem, not just attacking the messengers. 

Mrs. NICOLSON. I do have one point. You have asked about the 

problem in the civilian population of countries like Iraq. We have 

received communications on this, and, of course, I am not in the 

intelligence community, so it would be hard for me to provide documentation. But I have many friends in Jordan and in just about 

every country in the Middle East, and they have contacted us from 

various clinics, and told us that there is a problem in the civilian 

populations of Kuwait, where they estimate 15 to 20 percent of the 

adult population is suffering from a variety of signs and symptoms, 

and indirectly we have received communications from people in 

Iraq that there is a major problem there via Jordan, some clinics 

there. 

So that would explain the possible release by a variety of ways 

that we try to cover of an infectious agent, because it is a civilian 

problem. It is like a time bomb. It goes off. It is not an acute problem because I believe our soldiers were covered for the acute 

agents, so there is a problem, and some body, maybe the World 

Health Organization, needs to address it and release the data so 

that we can better deal with it. 

Mr. NICOLSON. In fact, we are on our way to Europe to do just 

that. We will be meeting with representatives from the WHO and 

from several countries that have an interest in seeing this issue resolved. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Dietz, is there any question you wish 

we had asked you? 

Mr. DIETZ. Any question which I would like——

Mr. SHAYS. Is there any question you wish we had asked you 

that you would have liked to have responded to? 

157

Mr. DIETZ. I think we have covered everything quite well, and 

offhand I cannot think of any. 

Mr. SHAYS. I appreciate your testimony as well as the Nicolsons’. 

Doctor, any question you wish we had asked? 

Dr. DURAKOVIC. I only wish to express my thanks for this opportunity. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, it is our opportunity, and we thank all four of 

you for coming to testify. I know you had to wait through the first 

panel, and I appreciate you being there. So all of you are free to 

go, and thank you very much. 

We are really now coming to the second panel. I appreciate in 

particular the Department of Veterans’ Affairs for their willingness 

to have the panels switched. 

We have Dr. Thomas Garthwaite, Deputy Under Secretary for 

Health, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, accompanied by Dr. John 

Fuessner, Chief Research Officer, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 

accompanied by Dr. Frances Murphy, Director of Environmental 

Agents Services, Department of Veterans’ Affairs. And Dr. Bernard 

Rostker, Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Department of 

Defense, is back. I appreciate you being back, and he is accompanied by Dr. Gary Christopherson. And is there anyone else who 

might respond to questions, because if so, I am just going to ask 

them to stand as well. 

What I would like all of the panelists to do is, if they would 

stand, as you know, we swear all our witnesses in, and anyone else 

who might be that is accompanying you, and we will only introduce 

them if they then end up testifying; but if whoever else might be 

potentially responding. Thank you all for your patience. Raise your 

right hands. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Again, I want to thank all of you. First, 

I would like to thank again the Department of Veterans’ Administration for being here for the first panel, listening to our veterans, 

being willing to fit into Dr. Rostker’s schedule. And, Dr. Rostker, 

we appreciate you coming back. 

Dr. ROSTKER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. What we will do, Dr. Garthwaite, I think we will 

start with you. And, again, we have a 5-minute timeframe, but we 

really are more interested in your testimony, and so if you go over, 

I could care less. In other words, I care more that you give the testimony that you want to give, than about the time. 

158

STATEMENTS OF THOMAS GARTHWAITE, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN FUESSNER, CHIEF RESEARCH OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS 

AND FRANCES MURPHY, DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL 

AGENTS SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS; 

BERNARD ROSTKER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR GULF WAR 

ILLNESSES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY 

GARY CHRISTOPHERSON, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY FOR 

HEALTH AFFAIRS; COL. HERSHELL WOLFE, ASSISTANT FOR 

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY, ASA, ILNC; AND COL. ERIC DAXON, RADIOLOGICAL 

HYGIENE STAFF OFFICER, AEPI, U.S. ARMY 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss VA programs for Gulf war veterans. Accompanying me today are Dr. Frances Murphy, who heads our Environmental Agents Service, and Dr. John Fuessner, who heads our 

Research Service. 

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Fuessner, I am sorry I pronounced your name so 

badly. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. As you requested, my focus today is on our efforts to help Gulf war veterans who may have adverse effects as 

a result of exposure to chemical warfare agents, depleted uranium, 

and smoke from oil well fires. While we must learn from the exceptions, it is important to remember the rule as well. 

Since 1991, when we developed the VA Registry Program, more 

than 66,000 Gulf war veterans have completed Registry examinations. We have provided more than 1.8 million ambulatory care visits to about 200,000 unique Gulf war veterans, and more than 

20,000 Gulf war veterans have been hospitalized at VA Medical 

Centers. An additional 400 veterans have been evaluated at our 

specialized referral centers, and more than 75,000 veterans have 

been counseled at our vet centers. The majority of veterans have 

been helped by our efforts. 

With regard to chemical warfare agents, we continue to believe 

that additional research is needed with regard to the effects of lowlevel exposures to chemical warfare agents on human health. The 

VA has been working to advance scientific understanding of this 

area. 

Our recent efforts include the following: 

First, the Research Working Group has intensified its efforts to 

fund research related to health effects of low-level exposures to 

chemical warfare agents. New studies will address exposure to 

nerve agents alone or in combination with other toxins. 

Second, the VA organized and sponsored an international symposium on the health effects of low-level exposure to chemical warfare 

nerve agents. The conference allowed investigators from around the 

world to share research findings and to discuss strategies for future 

research. 

Third, VA funded three new toxicology fellowships and five new 

occupational medicine residency positions. These fellowships begin 

next week. We anticipate that we will be able to increase this number in future years, although concern has been raised by some program directors concerning the market for trainees after the fellowVerDate Jan 31 2003 11:12 Apr 17, 2003 Jkt 086127 PO 00000 Frm 00162 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\45480 45480
159

ship. We anticipate that these actions will increase the interest in 

research on chemical exposures. 

Finally, we have altered our research focus to increase the studies which focus on clinical outcome. 

With regard to depleted uranium, research on the human health 

effects of depleted uranium exposure in military occupations is limited, especially regarding depleted uranium’s potential chemical 

toxicity. Two DOD-sponsored research projects currently under way 

are looking into this. In VA, the VA depleted uranium followup program at the VA Medical Center in Baltimore is a clinical surveillance program for identifying, characterizing, and following individuals who retain depleted uranium fragments from the Gulf war. 

With regard to smoke and other toxins released from oil well 

fires, it is clear the Gulf war troops were exposed to potentially 

harmful environmental hazards during the Gulf war. The most obvious challenge was smoke from hundreds of oil well fires in eastern Kuwait in January 1991 set by retreating Iraqi forces. Some 

of the fires lasted until October 1991. 

A coordinated, concerted effort has been made by the Department of Defense, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of 

Health and Human Services, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to evaluate the health effects from these 

fires. Based on data collected from March through December 1991, 

the concentration of pollutants were within the U.S. air standards 

except for particulates and occasionally sulfur dioxide. Levels 

measured were similar to those in U.S. cities such as Houston and 

Philadelphia. 

No cases of illness resembling those observed in Gulf war veterans were seen among firefighters in Kuwait nor among oil well 

fighters who have spent years experiencing similar exposures. Research efforts investigating the potential health effects of oil well 

fire exposure are ongoing. 

Finally, with regard to enhancing our clinical programs, we continue to aggressively pursue enhancements to our clinical programs 

for Gulf war veterans. For example, we have implemented service 

evaluation and action teams in every one of our health care networks. These teams consist of clinicians, patient representatives, 

and patients who review and act to correct individual and systematic problems for Gulf war veterans. 

While these teams are new, I recently reviewed their first submission of meeting minutes, and I believe that these teams will be 

a positive method to identify and fix many problems as well as an 

excellent way to identify common problems which can be fixed programmatically. 

Second, we have piloted new care models including primary care 

teams, which develop expertise in caring for Gulf war veterans. 

This new model facilitates the education of providers about recent 

developments in Persian Gulf illness, improves the coordination of 

care, and enhances patient satisfaction. 

Third, we have developed a method to oversample Gulf war veterans in our patient satisfaction survey process. This should allow 

us to have statistically valid assessments of the satisfaction with 

care of Gulf war veterans. 

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Fourth, we have had our medical inspector review the adequacy 

of registry examinations. These results have demonstrated a significant improvement in both accuracy and completeness of those 

examinations. 

And, fifth, we believe that health outcomes are an important 

measure for all veterans and will be part of all health care in the 

future. We do not believe that it is done well in the VA or in any 

health care system that we know of. We have developed and tested 

a standard, data-gathering instrument that was originally developed by the Health Care Financing Administration. It is called the 

SF–36. We have tested it already in 32,000 veterans, and we will 

continue to use that into the future. 

As an effort to enhance our understanding of the health of Persian Gulf veterans, we will also oversample Persian Gulf veterans 

with this instrument to see if we can describe better the current 

health status of these individuals. 

In conclusion, we continue to make progress involving our research and clinical programs regarding Gulf war illness. We remain committed to meeting the challenges of understanding the 

causes of Gulf war illness and of providing the most effective treatment to Gulf war veterans. 

We continue to welcome your feedback and advice on how we 

might be more responsive to the veterans we serve, and we will be 

happy to answer any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Garthwaite follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Doctor. Dr. Rostker. You look like you 

were in prayer. Has it been a long day? 

Mr. ROSTKER. It has been a long week, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is my pleasure to 

be here again today and continue our dialog concerning the Department of Defense inquiry into Gulf war illnesses. I have a rather 

long statement, and I would request that it be placed in the record. 

I also sent the committee chairman this morning a letter concerning our ongoing interactions with Dr. Garth Nicolson, and I 

would like to bring that to the Chair’s attention. 

On December 23, 1996, DOD and the Department of Veterans’ 

Affairs representatives met with Dr. Nicolson to discuss the mycoplasma laboratory test verification project in association with members of the National Institutes of Health’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. This meeting was followed by conference calls on January 21 and March 20, 1997 to discuss strawman protocols, several electronic mail communications in a telephone conversation on March 24, 1997 between Dr. Engles and Dr. 

Nicolson. 

At that time, Dr. Nicolson agreed to the project protocol. The 

final protocol has been written and approved by DOD and HHS scientists and Dr. Nicolson. The protocol will use four laboratories 

which will test the agreement for various conventional reaction 

tests and Dr. Nicolson’s nucleoprotein gene tracking. Blood from 30 

Gulf war veterans with unexplained physical symptoms will be 

used for the comparative studies. Veterans’ blood will be used because of the high mycoplasma detection rates reported by Dr. 

Nicolsons in the studies. 

The result from Dr. Nicolson’s laboratories and from the three 

new labs will be statistically compared. This protocol fits the criteria for establishing the validity of a new diagnostic test and the 

ability to produce and replicate results. 

Currently, contracts are being written for the four study laboratories. This process should be completed within 2 weeks. Once contracts are awarded, we anticipate the timeframe for laboratory data 

collection and analysis will be another 6 months. 

In addition, on our Gulflink home page, there is a solicitation by 

Walter Reed for volunteers to participate in this program. The reason for the most recent delay was contracting procedures, and since 

this contract will be a sole-source contract rather than taking the 

time for a competitive contract, certain stand-off protocols had to 

be established until the contract can be awarded. But we understand from the contracting organizations that the contract should 

be awarded within the very near future. 

In terms of my prepared remarks, I would like to summarize 

some major points. As you know, the committee asked me to concentrate my remarks today on three areas of concern: low-level 

chemical exposure, oil well fires, and depleted uranium. 

I am accompanied here today by experts that will be able to augment my testimony if the committee wants to get into further technical details not covered by my remarks, Colonels Wolfe and Daxon 

from the Army and Dr. Jack Heller from Chipham. In addition, 

Gary Christopherson, the Acting Principal Deputy Assistant SecVerDate Jan 31 2003 11:12 Apr 17, 2003 Jkt 086127 PO 00000 Frm 00181 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\45480 45480
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retary of Defense for Health Affairs, is also here if the committee 

wants to discuss the recent GAO report. 

All three areas the committee asked me to discuss today are 

under active and, I might say, continuing investigation by my office. In all areas we are pursuing two lines of inquiry, what does 

science say and what happened in the Gulf. In answering these 

questions, we are building on the research base that the DOD has 

already developed and pushing back the frontiers for our knowledge through new research and analysis. 

Potential exposure to low-level, chemical agents continues to be 

an important area of investigation. One case that has gotten a lot 

of attention for the potential of lower level chem are the detections 

by the Czech and French chemical detection equipment. These detections occurred during January 1991 in northern Saudi Arabia. 

United States technical experts described the principal detection 

claims by the Czechs as credible, although the source of the chemical is still unknown. 

Most importantly, we believe, the Czechs continued to use their 

sensitive equipment throughout the war, but no further detections 

were reported. We are continuing to investigate this case. In fact, 

a team will be visiting France and the Czech Republic this summer 

to discuss these detections and the issue of low-level chem exposures and the sensitivity of the Czech equipment with the Czechs 

this summer. 

A second area of concern has been the results of coalition bombing during the same period of time, January 1991. The CIA published a study in September 1996 that examined the worst possible 

case for fallout reaching U.S. troops. The CIA reports said that the 

analysis and computer models indicate chemical agents released by 

aerial bombing of chemical warfare facilities did not reach United 

States troops in Saudia Arabia. 

To improve our confidence in the results of the original plume 

analysis, DOD is working with new models that will further analyze the possible effects of a bombing campaign. The DOD experts 

in meteorology and modeling from the Navy Research Laboratory 

and the Defense Special Weapons Agency and the Navy Surface 

Warfare Center will continue our look at the bombing campaign. 

Another claim for possible source of low-level chemical contamination to United States troops is the destruction of the ammunition 

supply point at Khamasiyah. I think you know that DOD and CIA 

recently completed a series of small-scale demolition tests designed 

to assist in developing the models to be used to assess the potential 

fallout from Khamasiyah. The questions we are most interested in 

are who may have been exposed to chemical agents in Khamasiyah 

and to what extent they may have been exposed. 

During those tests, we blew up 32 foreign-made, 122-millimeter 

rockets with warheads filled with simulants. The tests provided 

fundamentally new information on what may have been vaporized 

versus what may have been spilled into the ground. Additionally, 

we have undertaken a series of evaporation tests to determine how 

nerve agent disperses in the soil and in the woods of the crates 

that were at the site. This work will be incorporated in our analysis of fallout, which is due in late-July. 

179

Another area of investigation is the Kuwait oil well fires. The 

setting of these fires first were detected on January 24, 1991, and 

the number of fires increased until it reached a daily peak of 730 

in late February. The emission from these fires had the potential 

to cause acute-and-chronic health effects. Our soldiers were exposed to heavy smoke and byproducts. Research thus far has not 

indicated, however, that the exposure to oil well smoke has caused 

acute health impacts to our troops. 

We have also contacted the firefighters that participated in extinguishing the fires, and our conversations with them reveal an absence of symptoms that are reported by our veterans. To date, we 

have found no apparent health problems or long-term effects from 

exposure to the oil well fires in Kuwait. 

Depleted uranium is another area we are investigating. DU is 

approximately half as radioactive as natural uranium found in the 

soil and poses no significant external radiation risk to soldiers. The 

major toxic problem with DU is from its chemical properties. As a 

heavy metal, it can concentrate in the liver, bones, and kidney, as 

does mercury, lead, and tungsten; and tungsten is significant here 

because it is often spoken of as a replacement for DU in munitions. 

The problem basically is DU dust generated when DU burns, and 

it may be ingested and present a health hazard. Soldiers with the 

greatest potential for harmful effects of DU are those who are in 

a vehicle when the vehicle is hit by a DU round. Twenty-nine combat vehicles—15 Bradley, and 14 Abrams tanks—were contaminated in this manner. DU from other Abrams tanks hit all of the 

Bradleys and eight of the Abrams. Five of the Abrams tanks were 

contaminated when DU munitions burned in on-board fires. Its onboard DU emissions contaminated the final Abrams after being hit 

by a Hellfire missile. 

In addition, 50 soldiers were injured in the Doha Ammunition 

Dump incident, and it is unknown how many may have ingested 

DU dust. The Baltimore Veterans’ Affairs Medical Center is conducting health service for individuals who were in U.S. Army vehicles when they were struck by DU rounds. Currently, 33 individuals are being evaluated, including 16 with DU shrapnel in their 

body. The Health Surveillance Program has shown that those who 

have retained shrapnel identified radioactively are excreting increased amounts of uranium, indicating that the metal particles 

are not entirely inert. 

So far, analysis of the first round of examinations has shown no 

evidence of adverse health effects associated with the absorption of 

uranium. 

We recognize that we have been deficient in not properly training 

all soldiers to the risks of DU armor and munitions. The Army has 

developed a three-tier training program to meet the needs of every 

soldier, from the soldier on the battlefield to the technical that 

works with DU. 

There is an axiom that states: On the modern battlefield what 

can be seen can be hit, what can be hit can be killed. That turns 

out to be a good axiom for the United States, but was not an appropriate axiom for the Iraqis, largely because of the use of DU both 

as a penetrator and as a protective shield. U.S. forces using 105-

180

millimeter and 120–DU Sabot rounds routinely obtained firstround kills of Iraqi T–72 tanks at ranges in excess of 2 miles. 

And I think Col. Wolfe has with us a mockup of a Sabot round, 

and I think he is prepared to just talk about that for a moment. 

Mr. SHAYS. Was he sworn in? 

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, he was. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Colonel. I appreciate that. That is the actual size of the——

Mr. WOLFE. Yes, sir. This is the 120-millimeter——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this. Now, we want to make sure the 

transcriber can pick you up. OK. That is good. That is good. Identify yourself for the record. 

Mr. WOLFE. Sir, I am Col. Wolfe, with the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army’s Office. 

Mr. SHAYS. Colonel, it is nice to have you here. 

Mr. WOLFE. Thank you, sir. 

This is the 120-millimeter Sabot round, the Abrams main battle 

tank; and the misconception is that this entire round is the depleted uranium. That is not so. It is primarily the penetrator that 

you see here. We refer to it as the ‘‘dart,’’ and this is what we have 

been talking about all day long, is where depleted uranium goes. 

There is a similar round that has been developed for the Bradley 

Fighting Vehicle, again, with a small depleted uranium dart. 

Mr. SHAYS. How many of those shells are in a tank? That is not 

classified, is it? 

Mr. WOLFE. I cannot answer that, sir. I am not——

Mr. SHAYS. You do not know if it is classified? 

Mr. WOLFE. I am not an armored officer, so I do not know. 

Mr. SHAYS. The size of it is quite interesting. 

Mr. WOLFE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. 

Mr. WOLFE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROSTKER. When the round is fired, part of the casing stays. 

The back part of the casing stays in the tank and is ejected, the 

front casing falls away, and what flies through the air is simply the 

dart. Somebody said we have returned to the arrows of our 

forbearers. 

What this dart does effectively is provide a certain, first-shot kill 

to American gunners, and even in the testimony this morning, 

there was, again, a recounting of the superb performance of the DU 

round. That really does protect our troops by making sure that 

they get that first shot in and that that is an effective first shot. 

Moreover, we use DU as protective armament, and the tanks 

that had the DU presentation, that DU never failed and was always effective against the Iraqi chemical, high-explosive rounds. 

The only thing that can penetrate a DU armor is another DU penetrator. 

Mr. SHAYS. I do not understand when you said ‘‘chemical.’’

Mr. ROSTKER. The normal tank round is a shaped-charge explosive, and it generally went out often as a tandem charge so there 

would be an explosion to defeat the armor and then a second explosion to burn through and hit the turret. But it was a chemical 

round; it was an explosive round. The dart in this DU projectile we 

have talked about is a penetrator. It is known as a ‘‘kinetic round,’’ 

181

meaning it is the force of the projectile, and the round is 1.6 times 

more dense than lead, and it has such penetrating power, that it 

often went into the Iraqi tank and out the other side. 

It flies true, and so with the superior performance of the Abrams 

tank, the M1 tank, it was able to engage T72 tanks at ranges that 

they could not engage, providing a sure, first-short kill. There are 

numerous accounts of the war, however, where Abrams tanks were 

ambushed, where the T72’s got within 400 meters, firing rounds, 

and they did not defeat the Abrams tank providing presentation for 

our troops. There is one account, even in the middle of the summer, 

where an Iraqi tank hid behind an earthen berm, and the DU penetrator went right through the earthen berm, found the tank on the 

other side, and blew the turret off the tank. 

Increasingly, DU, because of its high effectiveness, has been the 

recipient of an Iranian-run disinformation campaign. United States 

intelligence agencies have intercepted message traffic, diplomatic 

message traffic within Iraq or from Iraq directing their diplomats 

to engage in a disinformation campaign concerning DU, and that 

assessment has been declassified and is on Gulflink. 

Mr. SHAYS. Your point in this, so I do not have to come back to 

it, is that it is your sense that the Iraqis want to call into question 

the environmental safety of the uranium in our shells and in our 

protective——

Mr. ROSTKER. And the North Koreans are doing the same now 

also. After the Rico Committee Report, the Iraqi Embassies were 

told to downplay the conclusions concerning low-level chemical exposure, that there was no danger from chemicals, no fallout, no 

persistence, but that the real pollutant on the battlefield and the 

cause for illness was DU. 

Mr. SHAYS. We accept that as part of the record, but I hope you 

understand that this committee will be examining this. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Absolutely, and that is why I have asked and they 

have declassified the assessment, and it is available on Gulflink. 

Mr. Chairman, let me just end by saying the Department of Defense remains committed to providing appropriate care for our veterans, to understanding what occurred in the Gulf, and to make 

the necessary changes to our policies, procedures, equipment, and 

doctrine to protect our current and future force. Thank you very 

much, sir. 

I believe Mr. Christopherson would like to make a statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rostker follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Sure. And let me say, before we begin the questions, 

if those accompanying you just want to make a statement, we are 

happy to hear them. Yes, sir? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. A 

lot of the questions you raised earlier with both panels of witnesses 

had to do more in depth with health. I thought I would just cover 

a couple of brief points, and then we could come back to more questions. 

One is I think it is important to understand, as we have looked 

back at the Gulf war, it has been a very quick recognition mistakes 

were made. Things did not go as well as they could have been, and 

I think it is important for us to understand that that is now clearly 

the position and that is clearly where we see life being at this 

point. 

The second thing I think, which is important for you, is that a 

lot of the lessons have been learned. It is learned from the point 

of view of what we do on the battlefield. It is learned in terms of 

how we approach research and clinical. I would also argue, we are 

still learning as we go along. 

The third thing is that a lot of changes are being made, and we 

could talk more about them as you wish. One is I think the idea 

of the clinical program that both VA and DOD have put into place 

is a program that we intend to have available for future situations 

as well; therefore, to be ready to intervene much earlier than in the 

Gulf war. 

The second thing is what you are seeing now in terms of what 

we deployed in Bosnia and currently in Southwest Asia is again an 

attempt to take surveillance out much earlier, predeployment, during a deployment, and post-deployment kind of work to learn much 

more about what is happening out there, give us better exposure 

data to bring back and better records to bring back. 

I think, with respect to the research, we are working very closely 

with VA have built a better research model for peer review, getting 

it out there, looking at different kinds of treatments. We have done 

a number of things now. We have committed about $27 million to 

research this year, a very multifaceted kind of approach to look at 

issues, low-level chem, environmental hazards, a number of other 

areas. 

With respect to DU, I think I will defer to Bernie on that, other 

than the fact that that is an issue that we obviously also have 

some concern about in terms of what the health consequences may 

be and how much we still do not know yet and need to learn. 

On the low-level chem, we have research in place. We have asked 

the Institute of Medicine to take a look at our clinical programs to 

make sure that if there were more than one chemical on the battlefield, whether or not we would have picked it up in our clinical program, and they have given us positive feedback, saying they believe 

it would have. They have also indicated obviously some things we 

could refine for the future that would make it even stronger. 

On the biological infectious side, as indicated by Dr. Rostker, we 

are clearly looking at the Nicolsons’ work. We will fund that. We 

have our people ready and trained to do so. We are working with 

independent laboratories as well to make sure that there is really 

a good, independent look and not a feeling that we, in quotes, have 

197

done it unfairly in terms of DOD. The area of infectious disease is 

an area that is of high interest on the part of the Department of 

Defense, an area where we are launching a rather major initiative, 

along with the Centers for Disease Control and others as well. 

In ending—just again our assurance that our job here is to take 

care of our troops. We intend to do that. We will do that, both for 

now and into the future. We have a very key obligation. One of the 

great learning experiences out of the Gulf war is how we better 

protect our people in the future and a lot of areas in that as well. 

For that, I will defer for the questions from you. 

Mr. SHAYS. One of the things that we really have not touched on 

is the GAO report. The inside-the-beltway discussion of this was 

that some were eager to have the GAO validate the VA and the 

DOD’s work, and much to the surprise of some, was that it did the 

exact opposite. I guess the question is, one, will you agree with 

some of the criticisms; and, two, if you agree with them, do you feel 

you have changed or no longer are deserving of that criticism? 

One of the criticisms is that too much of the research that is 

done on Gulf war illnesses is devoted to stress and Post-Traumatic 

Stress Disorder, PTSD. Would you explain—my understanding, 

about a third of all research is, in fact, on this area, and would you 

explain why; first, if it is true, and, second, why? 

Mr. FEUSSNER. There are several—I think that there is a major 

emphasis on the research in the context of brain and nervous system disorders, that is, along with general health types of research 

initiatives, that is the major research focus to this date. That includes an array of research that deals with stress and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, deals with issues related to cognitive impairment, deals with issues related to Peripheral Neurological Disease, 

et cetera. 

So, in the sense that all of brain and nervous-system disorders 

are lumped together, that is a major focus. I am not sure that it 

is correct to categorize most of that as relating to stress; however, 

there has been interest in the neurobiological aspects of stress and 

stress as a modulator of various responses to other insults, and 

that kind of research continues. 

Mr. SHAYS. I need to be clear and on the record as to whether 

the VA rejects Dr. Joseph’s point to this committee that there was 

no acute exposure to chemicals and, in essence, low-leverage exposure is not harmful; and, therefore, chemicals exposure should not, 

in essence, be considered of major concern. I want to know how the 

VA basically responds to that. 

His quote was: ‘‘Current accepted medical knowledge is that 

chronic symptoms or physical manifestations do not later develop 

among persons exposed to low levels of chemical nerve agent if 

they did not first exhibit acute symptoms of toxicity.’’ Now, I need 

to know if that is—I am going to be asking DOD if that is the operational use still, and I need to know the VA, if they buy into that 

or if they have finally rejected that. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. I do not think we buy into it. I would think we 

do not know what the risk is, but we are keeping an open mind. 

We do not believe there are any reasonable, valid human studies 

of those kinds of exposures, so to conclude anything, we think, 

would be premature. 

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Mr. SHAYS. OK. I am not making my question clear enough. The 

bottom line to his point was that if you did not see acute manifestations, that you would then not later see chronic effects from 

chemicals. That was a basis for why the VA did not spend time 

looking at chemical exposure, because you accepted the DOD’s view 

that there was no acute exposure, and if there was not acute and 

therefore low level, it would not result in chronic harm later on. 

I want to know if we can take Dr. Joseph, who was the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, if we can put that in the 

trash can and know that that is not a guiding principle of either 

the DOD or the VA. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. I think that is his opinion. We do not believe 

that there is any scientific data on which to base an opinion about 

whether exposure to low levels could lead to a chronic disease or 

not in humans. There is very little data from studies in animals, 

either. 

Mr. SHAYS. Why don’t we forget about any concern of low-level 

exposure in this country? Get rid of OSHA, say, OSHA, you are not 

needed anymore because we do not care about low-level exposure 

to chemicals. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. I am not communicating well. We believe that 

because there is no data, we need to know whether——

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to come back to you, Doctor. 

Mr. ROSTKER. We would not necessarily—that is not our position 

today, as you stated. We are funding research in low-level chem. 

We have not ruled it out. 

Mr. SHAYS. I would like you to say what is not your——

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Let me elaborate on that. 

Mr. SHAYS. I just want to say this to me, is like—before we go 

out—this is something we should be able to discard quickly. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. We have to agree. Let me go back. It is 

a need to understand the context of what you said and what it 

meant, because that is important. 

Mr. SHAYS. And I am willing to be clear on this, but I do not 

want to get into the mind game——

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. No, no, no. 

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. Where Mr. Deutch says publicly that our 

troops were not exposed to offensive use of chemical when he knew 

our troops were exposed to defensive. Because he used that clever 

word of ‘‘offensive,’’ we made an assumption that, therefore, our 

troops were not exposed to chemicals. So——

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Right. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. What his statement was saying was, 

based upon the best scientific knowledge which is out there—it actually still is out there at this moment in time—the conclusion you 

would have is that you do not have chronic without acute in terms 

of the chemical exposure. Now, the key thing is there, and that 

was, by the way, still the best knowledge. It is very thin; that is 

the problem with it. 

That is why we have said, while that is essentially true as a current statement of what the information is, you cannot base longterm judgments on that. That is why we said instead two things. 

199

One, the Institute of Medicine said, help us to figure out in our 

clinical programming in case it is out there, we miss something. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. The second thing, we went out there and 

said, let us go ahead and start to fund some low-level chemical research because we have got to fill in this rather thin body of knowledge. The concern that you are raising back there about and this 

whole issue of why was not low-level chemical picked up a long 

time ago, we sort of put in the context of combinations, I think, of 

things. 

It is not that statement of judgment or anyone else. What it is, 

is a combination of no direct evidence, my understanding is, off the 

battlefield, combined with the fact that the best knowledge that 

was available out there was that you generally have to have an 

acute exposure; and, therefore, people have thought, this does not 

seem to be the most promising lead, and there may be other more 

promising leads. 

Going back to your EPA point, the germ of the point that is made 

there is that you are looking at generally longer term exposures at 

low level as opposed to a short-term exposure. The other assumption is generally that the exposure in the Gulf would be of relatively short duration. 

If you think back, for example, to what the witnesses said this 

morning, they were generally talking about, at the most, there 

would be eight alarms going off, which is generally indicating, even 

if there had been some exposure during that time, it would probably have been over a relatively short period of time, maybe 8 days, 

2 days, and this kind of thing there, which again is very different 

than sort of the pesticide issue, which is something the British especially are focusing on. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to let Mr. Sanders get on this issue before 

we go on to the next one. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Sure. 

Mr. SHAYS. I do not mean to be—I do not want to strain gnats 

and swallow camels here, but when you say this is our best knowledge, the word ‘‘best’’ has such a great sense to it. The best knowledge may have been meaningless because your best knowledge may 

just be absolutely dumb and stupid. And so you can say, ‘‘Of the 

dumb-and-stupid knowledge we have, this is the best, but it is still 

dumb.’’

Mr. ROSTKER. You are reading it as in plain English as quite a 

declarative statement. We would not be happy making that statement as a declarative statement today. 

Mr. SHAYS. The problem is the VA used this statement as a basis 

for a failure to look at low-level exposure. 

Mr. ROSTKER. And I think we are talking about history here, not 

necessarily where we are today. 

Mr. SHAYS. And that is why I want to be certain. I just want to 

make sure that we are not trying to, in a sense, satisfy us, but in 

your heart of hearts, you still buy into this. 

Mr. ROSTKER. It was not the applicable statement today. Today, 

we are funding research to better understand low-level chem. We 

are more modest in our statements in terms of our understanding. 

We have a range of activities going on to better assess what science 

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is telling us and push back the frontiers of science, so that would 

not be—it is not an applicable statement today and not a limiting 

statement for our program today. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. But, again I want to come back. That declarative in nature, which is what you have described, was not the 

case even back then. In the first place, our moving forward on 

funding low-level chemical was under the watch of Dr. Joseph. Our 

movement in that direction was a request to the Institute of Medicine for them to look at our clinical protocol was also to Dr. Joseph. 

That is why I say——

Mr. SHAYS. What about Dr. Joseph? It was what? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Under his tenure. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, by then we had Khamasiyah, and you all on a 

Friday afternoon at 4 o’clock let the world know that maybe we had 

exposure. So I am just not impressed with that comment. 

Let me just go back to the VA, and then I will let you talk. I just 

want to know where the DOD is. I just need to now know where 

the VA is. What I hear you saying, so then you correct me, where 

I start out is may be faulty from your viewpoint. 

I start out from the fact that in my life as an American citizen, 

and as a State legislator, I have been taught to be concerned with 

low-level exposure, and I have been taught that low-level exposure 

leads to chronic illness. In my world as an American citizen and 

as a former State legislator and as a Member of Congress, I pay 

attention to OSHA, and I empower OSHA not to allow American 

citizens to be exposed to—low-level exposure to chemicals. That is 

my world, and what I am hearing you say is, well, that may be 

true, but if it is low level, it has got to be over an extended period 

of time. 

What I totally reject and am comfortable rejecting is that it has 

to be acute and if it is acute, it cannot be chronic, because I have 

never seen anything that would make someone be allowed to make 

that statement. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. I believe the correct thing to say is we agree 

with you, and——

Mr. SHAYS. I want you to state it in your own words. 

Mr. FEUSSNER. Yes. I think what I would similarly agree and 

say, that I think it is clear that we have insufficient information 

to know what the possible long-term sequelae of low-dose exposures 

are, and I think we need to do additional research to explore that. 

I think in some ways we have spoken with our actions when we 

sponsored the international symposium associated with the Society 

of Toxicology meeting in Cincinnati in March. We began planning 

that meeting in September 1996 and invited the international community to help us specifically with the issue of low-level chemical 

agent exposures, and I think we need additional research to explore the sequelae of possible low-level exposures. 

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Sanders. 

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

all very much for coming, and I apologize for having to miss some 

of your testimony. 

Let me ask for some rather specific responses to my questions. 

In December 1996, in the final report of the Presidential Advisory 

Committee on Gulf War Illness, the following statement is made, 

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and I quote: ‘‘Current scientific evidence does not support a causal 

link between Gulf veterans’ illnesses and exposures while in the 

Gulf region to the following environmental risk factors assessed by 

the Committee: pesticides, chemical and biological warfare agents, 

vaccines, pyridostigmine bromide, infectious diseases, depleted uranium, oil well fires, and smoke and petroleum products.’’

That is from the Presidential Advisory Committee. Today, in late 

June 1997, do you agree with that finding, or do you find that incomplete and inaccurate? Dr. Rostker, or if anybody else wants to 

respond. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Well, as you know, we have discussed several 

times my inquiries are looking at what science says, and I have 

great respect for the PAC and the process they went through. I certainly am considering that, but in my organization I am reserving 

judgment, final judgment on all of these. I have research going on 

on every one of the issues that you have raised, and that research 

continues. I wish it was completed so I could be definitive in my 

answer. I can only tell you that the research continues in my organization. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. In so many words, what the PAC was saying 

is that we see no substantial scientific evidence to suggest that 

there is an environmental factor in Persian Gulf illness. Rather, we 

believe, bottom line, that it is stress related. That is not the conclusion? Dr. Murphy, I can continue reading, but I believe that that 

is—but, please, if you disagree with me, I have got the document 

here. 

Dr. MURPHY. Let me try to restate it because I think that the 

words that I used have a different meaning to scientists than they 

might to the general public. They said that there was no current 

evidence of a causal relationship. That is probably the highest scientific standard that we would meet in discussing that, so there is 

no evidence that those agents at this point caused the illnesses to 

Persian Gulf veterans. 

Mr. SANDERS. That is correct. That is what they said. 

Dr. MURPHY. They have not ruled out doing further research. 

Mr. SANDERS. I know, but let me ask you, can you respond to 

that? Do you agree with that? Do you believe that there is no current scientific evidence which sees a causal relationship between 

environmental——

Dr. MURPHY. There is no rigorous, scientific——

Mr. SANDERS. No rigorous. All right. 

Dr. MURPHY [continuing]. Investigation that proves a cause-andeffect relationship between the illnesses of Persian Gulf veterans 

and those agents. That does not mean that the VA has not given 

them very serious consideration and does not believe that the investigations need to continue at this point. We are trying to develop the scientific evidence that would allow us to make that scientific, causal link. 

Mr. SANDERS. What I have concerns with, Dr. Murphy and everyone else, is when you will finally begin to accept evidence. I am not 

a scientist. I have other things to do other than research Persian 

Gulf illness, but I sent a letter out to Dr. Lashoff of the Presidential Advisory Committee, listing a dozen, separate studies 

which show a link. If you would like, I can list them for you, alVerDate Jan 31 2003 11:12 Apr 17, 2003 Jkt 086127 PO 00000 Frm 00205 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\45480 45480
202

though I suspect that you are familiar with them, including two 

studies funded by the DOD itself. 

Now, the concern that I have, and let me jump right to the GAO 

report, and this comes from the summary of it by the New York 

Times. The GAO report found that the program announced by the 

Pentagon lacks a coherent approach, and because of flaws in methodology and focus ‘‘is not likely to identify the potential causes of 

the illness.’’

In other words, what they are saying is there are a dozen different studies here which would respectfully disagree with you, Dr. 

Murphy. They suggest that there is a causal link. When is enough 

enough? When do we begin to say, yes, there may be something 

there; we want to develop treatment based on these studies? I am 

amazed. Let me give you just two examples, Mr. Chairman, of 

things which really fascinate me. 

The New York Times, April 17, 1996, headline: ‘‘Chemical Mix 

May Be Cause of Illness in Gulf War.’’ What the article primarily 

deals with is the work that you are familiar with done by Dr. 

Haley and Dr. Abodonia from Duke, and Haley is from the University of Texas. OK? They describe it, and they say, well, these investigators have suggested that there is a synergistic effect between 

pyridostigmine bromide, et cetera. 

Then they go to a comment from the Department of Defense. The 

Department of Defense said that the new report raised ‘‘some interesting hypotheses,’’ but the Department had ‘‘no direct knowledge 

of the details of the work.’’ Do you know what amazed me? What 

amazed me is less than a year before, the Department of Defense 

had done research which came up with exactly the same conclusion 

at Fort Detrick on rats. Is that true? I hope you know that. That 

is your own research. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Yes. What you have got there, there is—

and, again, this research, as you know, has been funded—there is 

research looking right now at the synergistic effects. There are 

early suggested results that say, in fact, those things do occur. The 

problem is that what you have seen there, if I may finish for a second here, is it is the first step, and it has to do with how you do 

sort of the first researchers say, ‘‘OK. Could there possibly be 

under the most severe of circumstances there?’’ That is Step 1. Step 

2 then comes down to initial funding researchers say, ‘‘Does it 

occur under real-life situation?’’ That is the additional funding and 

research we need to do. 

What you have got then, kind of going back to Dr. Murphy’s 

point there, is there are a number of areas that we are looking at 

right now which are suggestive of potentials of relationship to Gulf 

war illnesses. They do not yet stand the rigor of tests yet, so they 

are suggestive we need to pursue——

Mr. SANDERS. All right, but 1 second. I understand that, but you 

see, that is always the argument. Let me just pick up, Mr. Chairman, because I found this absolutely fascinating. 

New York Times, Wednesday, May 14th, headline: ‘‘Study Links 

Memory Loss to Nerve Gases in Gulf.’’ Do you know who paid for 

the study? We did. OK? First paragraph: The Defense Department 

said today the Pentagon-sponsored research have produced ‘‘important results’’ suggesting that exposure to low levels of nerve gas, 

203

Mr. Chairman, and some pesticides can lead to memory loss, a 

common complaint among veterans of the 1991 Persian Gulf war. 

This is your study. 

Now, what really fascinated me about this article, if you go down 

three-quarters of the article, and it said: In its statement today, the 

DOD said, ‘‘These initial findings require replication of the species, 

including nonhuman primates, before it could be possible to draw 

larger conclusions, the experiments, et cetera, on nonprimates laboratory, et cetera. The Pentagon also questioned whether the experiments in which the rats were injected with the chemicals over 

a 2-week period offered many clues to the health problems of the 

veterans. This route of administration and duration of exposure 

does not parallel any known human exposure to troops.’’

That is what the DOD said. Do you know what the researchers 

said? Dr. Pendergast is on your payroll. You know what he said. 

He said, I do not think it is too early to draw conclusions. ‘‘The 

type of exposure regime that we employed in the animals and the 

type of exposures that are troops experienced in the Gulf are analogous, and they types of memory deficits that we have seen in the 

animals and those reported in Gulf war patients are extremely 

similar.’’

In other words, you are almost disowning or separating yourself 

or minimizing the result that your own researchers got. 

Here is the point: The GAO says that there is no focus. It would 

seem to me that if I had a dozen different studies all over the country done by reputable scientists, including some of your own, that 

suggest that there is a chemical link, I would be jumping on the 

stuff, I would be funding the stuff, I would be funding the stuff, 

I would be bringing these people together, and I would be working 

with a sense of urgency. I would not be going along, da-da-da. 

There may have been some major breakthroughs. Am I qualified 

enough to tell you whether these breakthroughs are substantial? I 

am not, and I certainly agree with you. But what really upsets me 

is that I read you a quote where a study done paralleled your own 

study, and you do not even acknowledge and say, ‘‘Yeah, that parallels what we did a year ago, and we are really working frantically 

hard because we have 70,000 veterans who are hurting, and we are 

going to leave no stone unturned.’’

Do you have a sense or urgency? Are you really going after these 

issues? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Yes. Mr. Congressman, absolutely yes. Let 

me be very clear. It is extremely important to us. We have the doctors and nurses and the researchers, as part of what we fund here 

in Health Affairs, and the rest of the Department take this extremely seriously and have since day one. We have clearly been 

very active, especially in the last 2 years. Should we have started 

earlier? That is a different question. Yes, we should have. We already admitted that that is a shortcoming of the whole thing. 

It is clear we are funding research as fast as much money as we 

have to do so——

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor, you are starting to talk as fast as this guy. 

Because he is a Congressman, I did not want to ask him——

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. I can probably outdistance him. 

204

Mr. SHAYS. I did not want to tell him to slow down, though I was 

tempted, but if you would slow down. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. I will slow down. What we are doing right 

now is we are pushing—you have got to remember, by the way, 

there are a lot of different theories out there we are all trying to 

work through simultaneously. A lot of things have promise, whether it is the plasma kind of issue there, whether it is the issues 

around the combinations and, therefore, you might go down that 

road, leave no doubt that there is a serious commitment to try and 

find the answer. 

There are two reasons for this. One is because the Gulf war veterans who are trying to figure out how to take care of them today. 

I heard the same tragic stories you heard a few hours ago in terms 

of their—we take these to heart, and leave no doubt about that. 

The second thing, we have got to be worried. We have got future 

deployments to worry about, and we have got to figure out what 

we are going to do there, and we need to know what we need to 

change, if anything, to make sure that is better there. What we 

have got to do now is we also owe it to the troops to do two things: 

Pursue aggressively and make sure it is good research. What we 

cannot afford to do is go down wrong paths, start doing treatments 

that do not make sense. On the other hand, if it makes sense, we 

cannot afford not to do it, and that is the fine line we keep moving 

down as we move forward very aggressively. But no doubt, we are the ones who pushed forward the $27 million and pushed the research out. 

Mr. SANDERS. All right. Let me just ask you. Let me quote from Dr. Rostker’s prepared statements. Currently over $2.5 million has 

been allocated to research involving health effects of low-level 

chemical warfare agents, et cetera. All current projects will be completed in the year 2000. 

I mean, you know, is that a sense or urgency, in the year 2000, 

3 more years? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. I think what you run into, we unfortunately are living within some of the rules and regulations unfortunately of how you do grants. We are not happy with it either. 

Mr. SANDERS. Then break the rules. You know, one of the problems that we have right now—let me finish. All right? And I would 

like some answers to this question, too. My understanding is that 

around this time you are releasing about $8 million in grants. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Correct. 

Mr. SANDERS. You are going to announce who is not getting it. 

I do not know who is getting it. By the time you have announced 

requests for proposals and you have peer reviewed and you are getting the money out, in my estimate it is going to be a good year. 

Is that a fair estimate or more than that? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. It is probably in that range, yeah. It takes 

that time to get it out, unfortunately. 

Mr. SANDERS. But why? In other words, the point that I am getting and why I myself no longer believe, in all due respect, that the 

DOD and the VA should be given this responsibility, is it should 

not take that long if we are dealing with a sense or urgency. 

All right. Let me ask you this question. 

205

Mr. SHAYS. Do you want to just respond, though? 

Mr. SANDERS. Why does it take a year when you have 70,000 

people who are hurting? Why can’t you move it faster? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. The issue—we are caught between two 

pressure points, and Congress is part of that, where it is part of 

our own two pressure points. On the one hand, we are told to move 

forward as fast we can, which we would like to. We are also told 

to make sure you are doing peer-reviewed research that is going 

through—we are caught between two things, and then also make 

sure——

Mr. SANDERS. The chairman is much more polite than I am when 

he says I should be patient. He is right. I love the word ‘‘peer review.’’ You know why I like the word ‘‘peer review’’? I will tell you 

why. As you know, and as Ed Towns, I think, appropriately mentioned before, the whole issue of multiple chemical sensitivity is 

highly controversial. You have honest and good people on both 

sides of the issue. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Yes. 

Mr. SANDERS. I am not here to denigrate anybody. I happen to 

believe in it; honest, sincere people do not. Who do you have who 

is peer reviewing these proposals who believes and knows something about multiple chemical sensitivity? Give me the names of 

the experts. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. I cannot. In the first place, I do not get 

down that deep into that part of it there. We use the American Institute of Biological Science as our peer-review organization that 

what goes out there and does that. 

Mr. SANDERS. Well, here is the problem, you see. I do not mean 

to be facetious about it. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. I understand. I understand. We get along 

well, and we are working together on this issue. Do you agree? We 

have disagreements on other issues, Republican, independent, so 

forth and so on. In the world people look at issues in a different 

way. I read the response of your folks to one of the proposals that 

came through, and it was absolutely insulting to the fellow who 

wrote the proposal. 

In other words, if you do not have people on your staff who understand and believe in multiple chemical sensitivity, that every 

approach that is brought forth will never get peer reviewed, in 

some cases these researchers will be seen as quacks or frauds. 

Right? I am arguing and have seen from the beginning, from day 

one, we do not have people who believe in multiple chemical sensitivity, and I am not even blaming you. There is a whole segment 

of medicine that does not believe in it. 

I think you do not believe in it, and that is fair enough. But 

there are people who do believe in it who believe that you are way 

behind the time, who are desperate for solutions, and who want to 

see some attention given to those folks who do believe in the concept, and I do not think you have the capability of doing it. 

I am sure you have wonderful scientists, but tell me the name 

of one of those scientists who has developed a treatment that is effective for Persian Gulf illness so that he or she can stand in a position of peer reviewing of the research. Who are the people who 

206

have developed the treatment and the understanding? Can you 

give me the names? You do not have anybody. Is that right? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Again, this external peer-reviewed stuff. 

This is not—we are not talking about inside-the-shop kind of thing. 

The American Institute of Biological Science, which we run this 

through, is designed to be impartial to a wide range of theories. 

They are not to be either against or for multiple chemical sensitivity. It really is meant to be a neutral place out there to look at 

these issues and to be open on the question of what may make good 

sense, either from researching causes or researching treatments. 

The difficulty is, and correct me if I am wrong, that the issue of 

multiple chemical sensitivity is hotly debated. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Correct. 

Mr. SANDERS. I have spoken before—it must have been 500 doctors in a room in Texas, and you know what? Every one of them 

believed and works with the concept of multiple chemical sensitivity. And I have met doctors who have said that these people are 

frauds, that what they are doing is absolutely outrageous, and we 

have nothing to do with them. Both groups of people, I suspect, are 

honest. 

I think that the VA and the DOD have sided with those groups 

of people who do not believe in multiple chemical sensitivity, so I 

am asking you—for example, I would mention that Dr. Claudia 

Miller, who does believe in multiple chemical sensitivity—I do not 

want to speak for her. She applied for a grant. She went way up 

the bureaucratic ladder. The DOD awarded her the grant, and lo 

and behold, she never got the money; it was called back. 

Dr. Mya Shayevetz, who worked for the VA in Northampton, MA, 

went along the bureaucratic ladder. She treated people based on 

multiple chemical sensitivity. Suddenly, she did not get any money 

as well. 

Who do you have that is key on your staff who believes in multiple chemical sensitivity? Please answer that. 

Mr. Chairman, I do not hear much of a response. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. I cannot point to someone who is a believer in there. What I will indicate to you is that I am being neutral on it. I do not have a strong feeling one way or the other. I 

do not have an opinion one way or the other in that process there. 

But if the issue is, as you said, there is a very sharp debate out 

there——

Mr. SANDERS. Yes. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON [continuing]. And that debate continues. It 

has been part of our discussion. We have talked about the Institute 

of Medicine. We have added special sessions talking about that because we are open and trying to look at what makes sense, as long 

as they are good science, and that is the key issue. 

Mr. SANDERS. But that is the problem, and you know it, and I 

know it, that there are many people who say that the whole issue 

of multiple chemical sensitivity is bad science. Right, Dr. Murphy? 

Aren’t there some people who are saying that? 

Dr. MURPHY. There are people who say that. 

Mr. SANDERS. I think I have heard people say that. OK? Maybe 

some people in this room have said that. What about Dr. Haley? 

207

Is his work important? Is he going to work with you? Is he going 

to get funding from you? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Dr. Haley is important to us, as both we 

and Dr. Phil Landrigan, who reviewed his piece there, consider his 

work important. He has identified a number of key areas to look 

at. The question is, it has to be taken some next steps to figure out 

where——

Mr. SANDERS. Is he going to get funding to get research? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. I do not know at this point. Again, the 

funding part, I cannot speak to. 

Mr. SANDERS. Who can speak? Again, when the GAO talks about 

lack of focus, that is what they are talking. You cannot talk to 

funding. You are telling us that you are going to do research, but 

you cannot tell us what line of research is going to get funding. Dr. 

Rostker, do you want to help us out here? 

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes. I think in the process you are talking about 

specific researchers—in the peer review process——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me say this. One thing is very important. I do 

not want you to leave without feeling you get to answer a question. 

Mr. SANDERS. Absolutely. 

Mr. SHAYS. So he is really a nice guy, and you can tell him you 

want to respond to it. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. In the peer-review process it would really 

be appropriate as policy and senior people to get down and dictate 

which researcher is being funded and which is not, and I might say 

that the intervention that we have done in the case of Dr. 

Nicolson’s research is somewhat unique. 

But I look at the focus issue in broader terms, and we went out 

in this year’s allocation of funds through the interagency organization we have with the VA and explicitly went out to fund research 

in the area of low-level chem because we felt that this had been 

neglected and that we needed more answers. And so I look at that 

in terms of the broad focus of the research as distinct from picking 

the individual research topics. 

Mr. SANDERS. Let me respectfully disagree with you. What we 

are involved in, and please tell me if you disagree with me, is a 

major controversy over the causation of illness. I happen to believe—I have seen it; I work with people—I believe in the concept 

of multiple chemical sensitivity. There are many people who do not. 

What I am suggesting, and I think there is no question about 

this, that unless you have scientists and physicians who believe in 

that concept, that every single time a research grant comes forward 

based on a diagnosis of multiple chemical sensitivity, the result is 

going to be, sorry, these people at best do not know very much; at 

worst, they are frauds. 

It cannot be otherwise, and I would say that the evidence indicates up until this point that you have not been sympathetic to the 

concept of multiple chemical sensitivity. I have asked you if you 

could tell me—I know the names of some of these people, and I 

would like you to tell me that they are on board. Is Dr. Miller playing a key role as a peer reviewer? I do not think so. 

Dr. MURPHY. Dr. Miller is on the VA Federal Advisory Committee. She is on our Persian Gulf Expert Scientific Committee, 

and we solicit her advice through that mechanism. 

208

Mr. SANDERS. Yes. Believe me, I do know that, and I do know 

that her grant was rejected. Can you give me the name of any 

major researcher who believes in multiple chemical sensitivity who 

has gotten help from either VA or DOD? Is there any? 

Dr. MURPHY. Yes. East Orange Environmental Hazards Research 

Center has a project ongoing, looking at the issue of multiple chemical sensitivity, and the researchers from East Orange are actively 

involved in the investigation of MCS in Gulf war veterans at this 

point. 

Mr. SANDERS. Do you know some of the names offhand? 

Dr. MURPHY. Howard Kipen. Dr. Howard Kipen is the principal 

investigator. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. My last question gets down to Dr. Nicolson, 

and then I am going to get the mic over there. As I heard him—

Mr. Chairman, correct me if I misheard him—he indicated he had 

not been hearing from you guys for a number of months, that originally there was some contact. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes. I put that in the record. We had a number 

of interactions through March. In March, the protocols were agreed 

upon, and because this was going to be a sole-source contract, the 

DOD rep was advised that what we needed to do was work through 

the paper work. We have made sure that the money is there——

Mr. SANDERS. Right. 

Mr. ROSTKER [continuing]. And that we expect a contract to be 

awarded to the four laboratories within the next 2 weeks, and 

those laboratories then will be—and I went over the protocol roughly. Those laboratories then will be trained. Three hundred samples 

will be drawn. We have already put out a public announcement 

seeking volunteers to provide blood samples for this research, and 

we are looking for the research to take about 3 months, which the 

majority of the time would be training and certifying the labs in 

the three techniques. 

Mr. SANDERS. And what is Nicolson’s relationship to this work? 

Mr. ROSTKER. He will be contracted with to supervisor the instruction and certification of the labs in his technique. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. And also he will be involved in also training people in his technique——

Mr. SANDERS. OK. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON [continuing]. So they will understand what 

he has got, and then they will go back. 

Mr. SANDERS. So he will on day one write off and say these guys 

are trained, they are doing the work——

Mr. ROSTKER. That is correct. 

Mr. SANDERS [continuing]. And we feel good about this, and then 

we will see the results of that work. 

Mr. ROSTKER. And then the independent lab, we are going to 

have one of our labs and an independent lab both to look at this. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. A given sample will be sent to several 

labs. In some cases a sample may be sent several times to a lab, 

and they will see if there is corroboration between the techniques 

and between different labs using the same technique. 

Mr. SANDERS. I yield, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Just to give you an idea, I do believe we 

will get you out of here before 4, just to give you a sense. 

209

I just want to, because there was an interruption—not an interruption, but we went in a slightly different direction, I am going 

to say that I am not interested when you all appear before me in 

the future to know what your view is on Dr. Joseph. I am basically 

accepting on the statement in terms of low-level exposure and what 

it means and does it ultimately lead to acute symptoms or chronic 

symptoms—excuse me. 

I am going to basically go under the assumption, unless you tell 

me differently, that you are taking a position of neutrality on that 

issue. You are basically saying you would either say yes or no, or 

are you going to say that you believe that low-level exposure can 

lead to chronic conditions in the future? I would like to have you 

just tell me where you are on that level, but I at least know you 

are rejecting that it does not. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. To be clear, we are open on the issue. We 

are at this point essentially about as neutral as you can get, given 

sort of the weighing of information, enough so that we are willing 

to go out and fund research in this area, enough so that we are 

willing to ask some very tough questions of our clinical program. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. I think the same. 

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Rostker, how many sites were there in Kuwait—

excuse me—in Iraq and the Kuwait theater that we suspected had 

either biological and chemicals in them, be they manufacturing or 

depots? 

Mr. ROSTKER. There were many bombing lists, and targets came 

on and off the bombing lists based upon the latest information and 

in some cases the latest fad because things like the shape of a 

bunker became an indicator to the intelligence analysts of whether 

or not there may or may not have been chemicals in there. I think 

the maximum number was something like 34 if you took the intersection of all the lists. About 34 was the maximum number that 

DIA carried. 

Mr. SHAYS. And how many of those were blown up? 

Mr. ROSTKER. The manufacturing plants were blown up. The 

chemical and biological sites were targeted, but it is not clear what 

was blown up. What we clearly understood after the war was a 

great deal of the munitions were not in the bunkers but were out 

on the desert. In fact, the majority of the munitions at Khamasiyah 

were not at Bunker 73, but were either in the pit or the 6,000 

chemical rounds that were simply out in the desert under a tarp, 

so that what was attacked, whether we hit or did not hit the bunker, was no indication of the amount of chemical munitions we 

would have detonated. 

And, in fact, after the war, when we were able to get into some 

of these sites because we had occupied that area, like Telio and 

Ananzarea, the bunkers we thought had chemical munitions did 

not have chemical munitions. 

Mr. SHAYS. Has the U.N. completed site visits of all——

Mr. ROSTKER. The U.N. has done site visits, but the U.N.’s purpose of doing site visits——

Mr. SHAYS. You interrupted me. 

Mr. ROSTKER. I am sorry, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. Of all these sites? 

210

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir. The U.N.’s purpose of doing site visits is 

to investigate the Iraqi claims in their declaration statements. 

There are a few places where the Iraqis, based upon their own intelligence—excuse me—the UNSCOM, based upon their own intelligence, asked to be taken, and, to the best of my knowledge, they 

turned out in each case to be a conventional site. And, again, they 

were looking for S-shaped bunkers or 12-frame bunkers and the 

like. Khamasiyah and Ananzerea were two of the sites that were 

declared to UNSCOM——

Mr. SHAYS. Both sites were in the Kuwait theater? 

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes. The Kuwaiti theater——

Mr. SHAYS. Our soldiers were in both sites. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, but the Kuwaiti theater is sometimes confused with Kuwait, which it is not; it extends past Kuwait, precisely. 

Mr. SHAYS. The theater where our troops were? 

Mr. ROSTKER. The Kuwaiti theater was a map reference before 

the war which included southern Iraq, and it had no relationship 

to where the troops finally went. So some people get hung up on 

whether it was in or not in the Kuwaiti theater. That is really a 

technicality. We are talking about Iraq and Kuwait. The area we 

have absolute knowledge on is Kuwait because that is where we 

stayed after the war. 

Mr. SHAYS. Does the DOD and do you, either one, have knowledge of any sites still being called hot sites that you cannot visit? 

Mr. ROSTKER. Not that I know of, no. 

Mr. SHAYS. It is your testimony that you have no knowledge of 

any site being still considered a hot site. 

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir, either by us or by UNSCOM. 

Mr. SHAYS. Are you aware of any classified material that either 

speaks to—let me see how I can ask this question. Are there classified reports about these sites, any of the 34 sites? 

Mr. ROSTKER. That are outstanding. No, I do not. 

Mr. SHAYS. Have you seen every classified report——

Mr. ROSTKER. I believe so, and there is another check to this, if 

I might, Mr. Chairman. A totally independent group under the direction of Walt Yako, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, has been carrying out a parallel 

intelligence investigation of Khamasiyah and any other similar 

sites in Iraq, and I have reviewed their preliminary reports, which 

had full access to our data and CIA’s data, and there were no other 

sites that were, as you would call, ‘‘hot.’’

Mr. SHAYS. Are there any, to your knowledge, Inspector General 

reports or reports by the GAO that call into question or review the 

protective gear that our troops used in Kuwait—excuse me—used 

in that battle? 

Mr. ROSTKER. The protective gear? 

Mr. SHAYS. Masks? 

Mr. ROSTKER. Say that again, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Masks? 

Mr. ROSTKER. There were concerns about masks fitting, and we 

have gone to a new, universal mask. 

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Mr. SHAYS. Have you seen any classified reports that cannot be 

released to the public that discuss the validity and integrity of either the M–40 or M–17? 

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Have you seen any reports? 

Mr. ROSTKER. No, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Do you know of any reports existing that discuss 

them? 

Mr. ROSTKER. No. In fact, we just made a report to the President’s Advisory Committee on MOPP gear, and those issues, they 

were not in our data base, and we saw none of that. Now, we were 

focusing on the war, but, to the best of my knowledge, no, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Rostker, it is my sense that you are being given 

an opportunity to look at that which is classified. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Oh, absolutely. 

Mr. SHAYS. And it is your testimony before this committee that 

you have not seen or are not aware of any Inspector General’s reports discussing the integrity of the masks used by our soldiers. 

Mr. ROSTKER. I am not, but I certainly will poll my staff and provide a clarification of that if I am in error, and that would include 

anything that we would have seen, either classified or unclassified. 

Mr. SHAYS. Let me get into this issue of the GAO report that 

deals with the health and treatment of our soldiers. I get a sense 

that basically we are not able to properly diagnose and, therefore, 

effectively treat our soldiers because we do not really know yet 

what ails them as far as the VA is concerned and as far as the 

DOD is concerned. Is that correct? And nodding a head is not going 

to get in the transcript. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Certainly, for the undiagnosed diseases. 

Mr. SHAYS. But bottom line is there are tens of thousands of soldiers who have an undiagnosed disease or illness. Is that correct? 

Dr. MURPHY. The treatment approach that we have taken is the 

approach that civilian doctors in VA and DOD doctors would take 

across the country, there are lots of nonveterans who have 

undiagnosed symptoms also——

Mr. SHAYS. Lots of what? 

Dr. MURPHY. Unexplained symptoms. 

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Murphy, I am going to interrupt you a second, 

and then I am going to let you answer the question. But I just 

want to make sure, in the course of you answering the question, 

I forget what my question was, and my question was, I thought, 

fairly simple, that is basically is it true that we have—well, I will 

say it differently now because I forgot how I asked it, but it is my 

sense that we have tens of thousands of soldiers who have illnesses 

who the VA and the DOD, in the case of those who are active servicemen, who have no diagnosis. Is this correct? I just want to know 

the answer to that. 

Dr. MURPHY. Yes. 

Mr. SHAYS. It is correct. OK. Now, Dr. Murphy, if you want to 

tell me there are people in the private sector as well who have 

undiagnosed illnesses, I concede that. Is that your point you want 

to make? 

Dr. MURPHY. The point that I was trying to get to, sir, and I 

apologize for being so wordy, was that we often treat symptoms, 

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and we do have very effective treatments for many of the common 

symptoms of Gulf war veterans. I will admit that there are groups 

of symptoms, people who have Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and 

fibromyalgia, where some of our currently used therapies are not 

as effective as we would like them to be, and one of the approaches 

that we need to take is to improve some of the therapeutic approaches. 

Mr. SHAYS. Hasn’t it been the testimony of the VA and maybe 

the DOD that it is very difficult to diagnose chemical exposure and 

difficult to——

Dr. MURPHY. Yes. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Yes, it is. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So, I mean, we have a lot of soldiers, men and 

women, who feel that they are sick and are very frustrated that the 

VA is not treating them, though your testimony, Dr. Murphy, is 

you are attempting to treat whatever symptoms you see. And this 

really gets to areas that Representative Sanders was involved in 

his questioning of you. 

I am trying to put myself in the mind of a veteran. It is 6 years 

after the war, and we are not into treatments, except maybe for 

some symptoms. We are still into raw, general kinds of research, 

and we are into research that may not come to fruition until 2002 

and beyond. That would scare the hell out of me if I was a veteran, 

and so I want to get into the concept of how are you treating our 

soldiers. One way is to try to treat the symptoms. 

Do you monitor the health of our veterans? A veteran comes in 

and they are sick and they have this level, you ask them to come 

in 6 months later and say, ‘‘We wanted to see if you are getting 

better or worse’’? 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. Sure. I think that individual physicians and individual care givers monitor the health of the individuals they are 

treating, and their followup examinations are based on what they 

think that is. Other than research studies, I know of no systematic 

approach to studying health outcomes of all patients on a continuous basis as a health care system, per se, other than the research 

studies. As indicated in my testimony at the beginning——

Mr. SHAYS. Can I interrupt you there? This may be basic to you, 

but it is not basic to me. If I am a doctor and I am trying to get 

at what their problem is, and to me it is still a big mystery and 

to them it is frightening as can be, why would it have to be a research project? Why couldn’t it just be the VA saying, ‘‘Hey, we 

want to know how you are doing’’? 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. We do do that. Each provider does that. If I am 

your doctor and you come to me for your diabetes, say, and I see 

you, then I will write your prescription for insulin, educate you 

how——

Mr. SHAYS. But you have identified——

Dr. GARTHWAITE [continuing]. And you will come back to see me, 

and I will——

Mr. SHAYS. No, no, no. I am interrupting you only because there 

you identified an illness and a treatment. I am talking about the 

people that are ill but you cannot identify quite what the problem 

is, and I am interested to know, are you saying, well, are you getting sicker, or are you getting better? 

213

Dr. GARTHWAITE. Or identify an illness or not. 

Mr. SHAYS. Listen, do I make an assumption that the VA, if they 

cannot diagnose their problem, says they are not sick? 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. I do not believe we do. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So it is right for me to say, OK, you acknowledge 

they are sick. You do not quite know what it is. You might think 

it is, you know, something in their head, but they are sick, and it 

has had a manifestation on them. 

What I am trying to get to is, though, I thought one of the points 

the GAO was making in their study was that you are really not 

monitoring the health of the veteran. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. But we cannot go to a computer data base and 

say, for all Persian Gulf veterans they had X amount of health, 

whatever the measure is, 4 years ago, and today they have Y 

health. 

Mr. SHAYS. Bernie is a veteran that comes to see you. If he is 

not well, do you call him in 6 months later? You have told him you 

do not know what his problem is. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. Sure. Individually, yes, yes. 

Mr. SHAYS. Do you have a protocol that does that? 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. We—now 75 percent of all of our veterans are 

enrolled in primary care, which means they have an assigned doctor doing proactive——

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Garthwaite, do you have a protocol that gets 

these veterans back in? I just want to know. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. No, no protocol. 

Dr. MURPHY. We do not have a protocol, and the reason we do 

not have a protocol is that the therapy and the followup needs to 

be tailored to the individual veteran. Clearly, there are some people 

who need to be seen every couple of weeks or every month. Some 

might be seen every 3 months, some every 6 months, depending on 

the severity of their illness and how well they are responding 

to——

Mr. SHAYS. But the problem is you may not know how——

Dr. MURPHY [continuing]. The treatments they are being given. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am sorry. The problem is you may not know how 

well they are 6 months later because you have not seen them, and 

they may say, ‘‘Why the heck am I going to go back to the VA? 

They tell me it is in my head, or they say they simply do not 

know.’’

What big incentive is there for them to go back unless you 

proactively—I mean, this is maybe a poor analogy, but when we do 

case work for someone, we are trying to institute a process where 

we do not have the answer for Mr. Brown—I am not talking about 

health—something that is bothering him—it might be the IRS or 

something else. We then try to just maybe call them up a little 

later and say, ‘‘How are you doing?’’ and in the process, they say, 

well, we got a letter from the IRS that we did not get, and we know 

things have gone along better, or we got three more letters from 

the IRS, and we say, ‘‘Why didn’t you call us back?’’ They said, 

‘‘Well, we did not know if you could really be helpful’’ or whatever. 

But there is not active, proactive protocol that——

Dr. GARTHWAITE. I think that is somewhat individual. We do 

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signed, like I say, 70-some percent of our patients, probably more 

than that because we are about to do another survey, but of our 

patients in primary care they have teams, they know who their 

providers are, and they know how they can get in touch with their 

principle physicians and other health-care providers. 

So I think we do that on an individual basis. I think the GAO’s 

criticism was: do we have it on a systematic basis and can we statistically show that to them. 

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Rostker, the GAO’s recent report recommends 

that clinical progress of veterans should be monitored to promote 

better treatments and provide direction to research agenda. It also 

recommends that the diagnosis for stress and PTSD be refined. 

First, I will ask you, Dr. Garthwaite, do you agree with that recommendation? 

Mr. ROSTKER. Let me ask my colleague from Health Affairs to respond. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Why not start with you? I am sorry. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. I missed the last part of it. 

Mr. SHAYS. Because I said to Dr. Rostker—I am sorry. I would 

like both of you to answer. The GAO’s report recommends that clinical progress of veterans should be monitored to promote better 

treatment and provide direction to the research agenda. It also recommends that the diagnoses for stress and PTSD be refined. What 

do you think of that recommendation? 

Mr. FEUSSNER. Yes. I would agree with that recommendation, 

and last fall the Cooperative Studies Program in VA funded a trial 

on trauma-related PTSD, a treatment trial involving approximately 

350 veterans. Last fall, we funded another study, a multi-site study 

looking at seeing if we cannot come up with a computerized 

neurodiagnostic scheme—‘‘protocol’’ is the word I want—that would 

allow these diagnostic methods to not only be made efficient, more 

straightforward, but also make them be useful in a computerized 

fashion. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So the recent GAO report recommends that the 

VA and the DOD monitor the treatment outcomes of sick Gulf war 

veterans. Are you saying you are doing this, you intend to do this, 

or you do not know quite how to do it? 

Mr. FEUSSNER. I am sorry. I thought your question was about 

PTSD. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, that was the second part of it. 

Mr. FEUSSNER. We plan to monitor——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say this to you. If you do not have the 

resources, that is an issue. There are certain limits that you have. 

Mr. FEUSSNER. Yes. 

Mr. SHAYS. But in the end, I want to know the answer to the 

question. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. I would just say, as I have stated in my initial 

testimony, we believe that we should be monitoring health outcomes for all veterans. We believe all health-care systems should 

do it. We believe that insurance companies are asking all healthcare systems to do it. We do not know of any health-care systems 

that do it in a systematic fashion. We have surveyed 32,000 veterans, using a form and a questionnaire that we think gets at 

health status. We plan to implement that——

215

Mr. SHAYS. Is this an unrealistic recommendation? 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. No. We do not know that it is unrealistic or 

not. We believe that we need the information for all veterans, and 

we need it especially for Persian Gulf veterans, so we are going to 

pursue it, irregardless. 

We will not get a 100-percent sample because of the large numbers we deal with, but we will get a significant sample, and we will 

aim to better understand what the functional status of veterans are 

over time. We have a goal of improving that over time as well, and 

we are holding our managers accountable. 

Mr. SHAYS. The bottom line is that some veterans may be getting 

sicker, and we do not know it, and they may just choose to not 

come back to the VA. 

Let me just ask you as well, Dr. Christopherson. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Let me do the latter point first, on the 

issue of the PTSD. That was a report which was requested and 

funded by us by the Institute of Medicine to look at our programs 

there. We do agree with it. We already indicated to ILM we agreed 

to it and that we are proceeding down that road to fix it. 

The second thing, on the issue of the monitoring, it is difficult 

to do, as Dr. Garthwaite has indicated there. We are committed to 

trying out some processes. We have already gone out looking for 

some people to fund to, in quotes, help us to look at a monitoring 

process. Essentially what you would be looking at is to run some 

samples down through some particular kinds of—to look at, for example, a particular set of illnesses, for example, some of the 

undiagnosed or difficult-to-diagnose kind of categories, and see 

whether we see some progress in those kinds of areas. 

It is difficult to do. I think no one should sort of preclude it is 

not, but we are committed to doing that. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Let me just do one area, and then Mr. Sanders 

is going to come back, and that is the issue of depleted uranium. 

Dr. Rostker, are you aware of any studies that call into question 

or raise questions about the health consequences of depleted uranium? 

Mr. ROSTKER. Let me refer to Dr. Daxon, who is really quite an 

expert on that. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And if you get into anything classified——

Mr. ROSTKER. I understand. 

Col. DAXON. Between the DOD and the DOE, we have been 

studying the health effects of uranium since we started the Manhattan Project in 1945. There is a wealth of information, both on 

inhalation toxicology and general toxicology of acute exposures to 

uranium. 

Mr. SHAYS. So this is not new stuff here. 

Col. DAXON. No. 

Mr. SHAYS. If that is the case, how come we have not warned our 

soldiers about the negative consequences of depleted uranium? 

Col. DAXON. Sir, I think the GAO report was accurate when it 

talked about what happened after the Persian Gulf war. We were 

relatively good about telling the people that actually touched the 

weapons or touched the tanks. That was relatively good. What we 

missed was in an actual combat situation, depleted uranium was 

going to be ‘‘touched’’ by a whole range of different soldiers. That 

216

population, we missed, and that is the population we are trying to 

train now. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, let me just say this to you. I think you even 

missed the people who were handling the shells and so on, because 

they jumped into blown-out tanks and so on. So I guess I call into 

question whether you have even done that. 

What do you have now to notify our soldiers? You have a video 

of some kind. Do you want to describe that? 

Col. DAXON. Yes, sir. I cannot describe it. I am not the person 

that put it together or saw it, but it is basically a tier-1 training 

video that describes general procedures and precautions that are 

required that we are recommending currently for entering vehicles 

and dealing with vehicles that are contaminated with depleted uranium. 

Mr. ROSTKER. We shared the video with your staff earlier, and 

if I might be so bold, it is a very informative video. I think it is 

very well put together, and I would encourage you to see it. 

Mr. SHAYS. So the bottom line is, though, that is something we 

are doing now, but we did not do earlier. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes. In fact, just now, and it needs to be promulgated through the field, and I will take the responsibility to make 

sure that those recommendations go not only to the Army, but to 

the Marine Corps and the other services. 

The problem here, as I understand it, is not dealing with the 

shells as we showed them to you; they are quite safe. The issue is 

when they potentially can vaporize, and then the uranium dust, 

that dust——

Mr. SHAYS. Well, we know they vaporize. We know that 70 percent of it vaporizes. 

Mr. ROSTKER. That is right. And the dust does not travel far because it is so heavy, but as you climb over the vehicles and the like, 

more precautions should be taken to a wider population than we 

appreciated. 

Mr. SHAYS. That contrasts a little bit with Mr. Dietz, who suggests that it travels quite far, and his testimony was that this was 

a tremendous, high concentration. You were here for his testimony. 

Could you respond to it? 

Col. DAXON. Yes, sir, I was. 

Mr. SHAYS. And, sir, again, I just did not catch your name. 

Col. DAXON. It is Col. Eric Daxon. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Colonel. 

Col. DAXON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I guess the issue is it would not go for hundreds 

of miles, but will it last for hundreds of years, the concentration. 

But let me ask you to respond to Mr. Dietz’s comments in particular, his testimony, how you reacted to his testimony? 

Col. DAXON. Sir, the key thing with the toxicity of anything, to 

include radiation, is not only was it there, but how much was 

there. The Army has done a great deal of studying in determining 

how much of these aerosols are present at what distance from tank 

impacts, DU fires, and those sorts of things. 

These studies started in the early 1970’s. There were two National Materials Board studies that were done that are independent 

217

of DOD. The first was done in the early 1970’s that basically gave 

the green light to using depleted uranium. 

Mr. SHAYS. Right. 

Col. DAXON. Then there was a second—the DOD conducted a 

study, and then there was a second National Materials Science 

Board and two other studies. They all addressed the issue of 

aerosolization and how far the aerosols go when a tank is struck 

or when several tanks are struck. 

Mr. SHAYS. Colonel, I want to say for the record, we may even 

decide that it can be quite dangerous, but still decide that we need 

it, because the alternative is worse. 

Col. DAXON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. If I am a soldier and I am in a tank, I want a shell 

that I know is going to do the job, but I just want to know the negative consequences. The more we have gotten into this, the more 

I have come to realize that if you are a soldier, you have shortened 

your life, even if you come back. No, I do not mean just on this; 

I mean on all the challenges that you face in warfare. I believe that 

in the serving of your country you also put yourself at tremendous 

health risk, some of it tremendously unavoidable. 

But are those studies based on fragments or particles? 

Col. DAXON. Sir, the early studies that were done were primarily 

looking at particulates, and there is a wealth of data on inhalation 

of uranium particulates. We have done it with the actual uraniummilling industry. There are a lot of studies that have been done on 

that. 

Mr. SHAYS. Would that be available for us to give to others to 

look at? 

Col. DAXON. Yes, sir. Absolutely. This is available in the open literature. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Then let me just—is there any—because I do not 

want to get off this—were there any studies that suggested that 

the depleted uranium could be harmful to our troops? 

Col. DAXON. Sir, the key thing is, for all of this stuff, both with 

radiation and chemical toxicity, the key thing is the amount, the 

chemical form, and where it came in. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. But I am going to ask my question, unless it is 

classified information. 

Col. DAXON. No, sir. I will answer it directly. In the AEPI report 

that we put together there is a significant hazard for people that 

are inside a vehicle while the penetrator is being penetrated, while 

the tank is being penetrated by a DU penetrator. 

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. Well, it is also going to blow up as well. 

Col. DAXON. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. But in terms of the——

Mr. SHAYS. That is the least of their problems at that moment. 

Col. DAXON. Yes, sir. But we have studied this because we wanted to be careful. In terms of the amount of uranium that would be 

inhaled, you can get milligram quantities if you are inside the vehicle while it is being penetrated by a DU penetrator. 

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I thank you. 

Mr. Sanders, thank you for your patience. 

Mr. SANDERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start off with Dr. Rostker, but anyone else can jump in. 

We had a conference in Vermont last month, and I met with a 

218

number of veterans who are hurting, and if they asked me how 

they should conclude the performance of the VA and DOD after 6 

years in terms of diagnosing the problem and treating the problem, 

Dr. Rostker, what would we say? And I am sure that you do not 

have all the money that you want, but you have got a few million 

bucks there. You have a lot of researchers. What would we say 

after 6 years? What is the grade that we give the VA and the DOD 

on this? 

Mr. ROSTKER. I think that is a very difficult question to answer 

in one. To a veteran who has an unknown diagnosis, I can be quite 

certain, because I saw the same people on my 11-city swing, that 

they clearly are unhappy and angry and would give us a failing 

grade. 

The question is, what can we do about improving that, particularly for the veteran that we truly do not have a diagnosis? I am 

reminded of one of the angry veterans on television who said that 

if he were in charge, he would lock up all the admirals and generals and would not let them out of the room until they gave the 

answer of why he is sick. 

We do not have that answer. I am not sure we will ever get the 

answer for the individual, but we certainly are trying to understand what happened in the Gulf and to apply and push back the 

frontiers of science so we can, to the best of our ability, treat them. 

Mr. SANDERS. Dr. Rostker, actually I was on a radio show today, 

and somebody was a little bit harsher. He suggested hanging, but 

not just putting them in jails. 

Let me ask you this. Without for 1 second impugning the sincerity and the hard work and the patriotism and your desire, there 

is no reason that I can possibly believe that everybody up there in 

the entire DOD and VA want the answer to this question as much 

as Chris and I and everybody else on this committee. Right? We 

all do. 

But sometimes we reach a conclusion that for whatever reason—

maybe it is the system; maybe it is your bureaucracy; maybe that 

somebody can move, and it takes you a year to get out a grant—

that is the system. We all have to work under systems. Is it possible that you guys are not going to be the agency to do it and that 

maybe we want to look outside of the VA and the DOD based on 

6 years of not particularly effective work, without impugning anyone’s sincerity? You know, businesses make these decisions every 

day, politicians. 

Mr. ROSTKER. I think there are a lot of parts to the problem, and 

one would be the medical. Are we funding the right medical 

projects? You have raised some concerns. Remember that we put 

out RFPs, we go through standard practices, et cetera. 

The same claims have been made, can we be trusted to assess 

what happened in the Gulf, and let me address that because that 

is really the primary concern of my office. We have an absolutely 

vital stake in that. Moreover, we have the expertise in that in ways 

that no other organization can possibly have. You cannot put an organization that starts and will have a clean slate on DU and then 

not have the kind of expertise that I have behind me, if you will. 

I think, in terms of the investigations that went on in the Gulf, 

some of the same questions you asked today of the veterans, that 

219

we are doing a job that is, I hope, credible but certainly expansive. 

We are not limited by funding. I am not limited largely by the bureaucracy within DOD, and we are truly leaving no stone unturned 

to try to understand what happened in the Gulf. 

Now, that is only part of providing the problem, but it is an important part as seen by even your own methodology here in the 

way you are approaching the problem. You are asking questions 

about, as you did today, correctly so, about what the soldiers saw 

in the Gulf and what happened in the Gulf. Very important, and 

it is critical for the future; and so in that regard, I think DOD is 

the only organization that can do that portion of the research. 

Mr. SANDERS. I would just suggest, I mean, clearly the function 

of the Department of Defense is to win wars, and, for example, 

most people observe and believe that in the Persian Gulf, the Department of Defense functioned very well. They achieved a major 

victory in a short period of time. Whether that same agency is designed to come up with a solution and treatment for a strange disease, I have my doubts about that. I think those are two separate 

things. Let me ask you——

Mr. ROSTKER. Congressman, may I respond? 

Mr. SANDERS. Sure. 

Mr. ROSTKER. A couple of things you have to keep in mind. In 

the first place is when this is all said and done, when the Gulf war 

and where maybe history down there, DOD, and I would argue, VA 

health side, have got to be able to answer the questions. 

They have got to do two things. They have got to show they can 

take care of people. We have 6 million beneficiaries-plus, about 8 

million eligibles we take care of every day through our whole system, families, retirees, active duty. This is not just a test around 

the Gulf war illness issue; this is a test of whether we can take 

care of people generally. 

We have unique situations here with the Gulf war, especially—

and, again, you have got to parse this out a little bit. If you are 

looking for are we doing a good job in dealing with the cancers and 

the heart and the other kinds of problems there—by the way, a lot 

of what the illnesses are, by the way, are in those categories. It is 

the illnesses that are hard to figure out that is the issue here. 

I think what we have always said from day one is we have never 

claimed any exclusive club in terms of trying to find the answer. 

We believe we have been part of it. I think that is what it is. We 

have always been welcome to other parties, and that is why we 

pulled in ILM and a lot of other parties to help us figure some of 

these things out. 

It is also why when we go out in the research side of life—in the 

early days, we did a lot of research intramural, I mean, inside the 

building, using our people, because we had to get something started, going fairly quickly. We have now turned on that. We have 

said, no, let’s go outside. Let’s poll people from the outside. 

Mr. SANDERS. You lead me to my next question. 

Mr. FEUSSNER. Before—may I answer your other question? 

Mr. SANDERS. Yes. 

Mr. FEUSSNER. I would just like to have three points to make. 

The first is that we have had inputs from the National Institutes 

of Health, the Institute of Medicine, the international research 

220

community, Federal and non-Federal investigators, so we have 

asked and involved almost anyone on the planet that can inform 

the process. 

The second issue is that we do have some additional expertise in 

patient-centered research. A large part of our research is patient 

centered, not exclusively laboratory based. 

And then the third issue is the tradeoff between the time that 

might be lost by getting up to speed again or making a transition. 

Mr. SANDERS. Let me just, actually taking off from both of your 

responses, you recently made grants—I believe there was a pool of 

some $8 million. Is my memory correct? 

Mr. FEUSSNER. Correct. 

Mr. SANDERS. When will that be made public? We have tried to 

find out who received the grants. I was curious. I did not have success. 

Mr. FEUSSNER. What is happening right now, and there are a 

couple of sets of grants, by the way, that are in process, each on 

different points. One point is that in the final negotiations with the 

people who have won the grants to sort of work through the contracting procedures, and that is a close hold until that process is 

done, so that is coming out. That should be out, I think—Fran, you 

may know better than I when our research——

Dr. MURPHY. The AIBS has reviewed the proposals to review for 

scientific merit. They have been prioritized by the Persian Gulf 

Veterans Coordinating Board, and it is really now in the hands of 

the people who award the grants. 

Mr. SANDERS. When will we know who received the grants? 

Dr. MURPHY. Several months. 

Mr. FEUSSNER. Yes. The last set is——

Mr. SANDERS. Several months, did you say, Doctor? 

Mr. FEUSSNER. Right. Within the next 2 months. The reason is 

because it does take time to get through there. We have got to sort 

out—again, if we are going to do this right, 2 months it does take. 

We are committed to getting this money out this summer, and we 

will get it out this summer. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Apparently you have notified some people that 

they have not received grants. 

Mr. SHAYS. I am just going to interrupt the gentleman a second 

to say that he has as much time as he wants. I just need to say 

I was a little off on my time before, but I do not have more questions, and if you——

Mr. SANDERS. I will be finished in a few minutes. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. You have as much time as you want, but it will 

be helpful to——

Mr. SANDERS. So I am hearing that we will not know for sure 

who received the grants, Dr. Murphy, not until a couple of months. 

Is that what I am hearing? 

Dr. MURPHY. Yes. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. There are a couple of sets of grants coming through. That is why the people you may be referring to may 

be in one of the earlier grant phases as opposed to the current one 

we just talked about. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. 

221

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. There are two grant sets, and the earlier 

set, those probably would be knowing by now that they had, but 

I am talking about the latest set where they would not yet know 

that. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Would you be so kind as to send me, for both 

sets of grants, who the peer reviewers are? Is that public information? 

Dr. MURPHY. The peer review is done by the American Institute 

of Biologic Science [AIBS] under a contract to the DOD, and they 

would hold those lists. 

Mr. SANDERS. They would hold those lists? 

Dr. MURPHY. Yes. DOD could request that information from 

them. 

Mr. SANDERS. Come on, I should think that the U.S. Congress 

and the public has a right to know who reviewed the grants. Am 

I missing something here? That is very public knowledge. I would 

like—Mr. Chairman, I think this is an issue here of concern to me, 

because I want to make sure that the people who are reviewing 

these grants have an open mind with regard to multiple chemical 

sensitivity. 

Mr. SHAYS. Sure, sure. 

Mr. SANDERS. And if I am going to find that they are all hostile, 

then I think that we have a very bad process. I would like to know 

who they are. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. My hesitancy was only because this is 

not—I have not been involved in that part of the process. I am just 

not sure. I want to make sure I do not give you an incorrect answer. We will get back to you very quickly. 

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. If we could have it be part of the record, and 

you can get——

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. One way or the other, we will get back to 

you. If we can make it available, if there is not some reason, awfully good reason not to, we will get it back to you. 

Mr. SANDERS. Yes. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. The answer is yes, if at all possible. 

Mr. SHAYS. When would you be getting back to us? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. This is the issue of——

Mr. SHAYS. I said ‘‘when.’’ When would you be getting——

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. I forget the answer to the question. I just 

do not know the answer. 

Mr. SHAYS. I understand you do not have the answer. 

Dr. MURPHY. This should not take a long period of time. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. No, no. 

Mr. SHAYS. What is that? 

Dr. MURPHY. It should not take a long period of time. 

Mr. SHAYS. So by next Wednesday you could get back to us? 

Dr. MURPHY. Yes. 

Mr. SANDERS. Good. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. That is reasonable. 

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Mr. SANDERS. The next question is, Col. Roman, when he was 

testifying, mentioned a Dr. Baumzweiger at the L.A. VA Hospital, 

and he indicated that that gentleman was not asked—the physician was not asked to continue treating Gulf war veterans, and 

that physician had made a diagnosis that Col. Roman suffered 

nerve damage which may have occurred at the Persian Gulf. Does 

anybody know anything about that, or can you get us some information on that? 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. We can give you more information. Dr. 

Baumzweiger was a neurology fellow who was working under the 

supervision of a staff neurologist at a particular medical center 

within the UCLA program, so there is some confusion in, I think, 

the patients and so forth, but we can give you lots of detailed information if you would like. 

Mr. SANDERS. Can you get that information to this committee? 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. Sure. 

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Mr. SANDERS. OK. Let me ask you a question while we are on 

nerve damage. There are at least two studies that have been done, 

one by Jamal Hanson, and others, I believe, done in Great Britain, 

and one by Dr. Haley which suggest that there is actual brain damage—not brain damage, nerve damage for certain Gulf war veterans. 

Do you have a thought on that, and have you done any research 

which suggests that there is actual nerve damage, which then 

would take us out of the realm of the theoretical, and we would 

have some very concrete answers to some of the problems our vets 

are facing? 

Dr. MURPHY. The tests that they used were standard, neurologic 

tests, and if you look at the results of both Dr. Haley’s research 

and Dr. Jamal’s research, the results were within the normal range 

for those individual patients, and only by grouping the results and 

doing a statistical analysis was there any abnormality found. In 

fact, very few patients were examined with those techniques by Dr. 

Haley’s group. It was less than a half dozen, and there were total 

a total number of 14 patients in Dr. Jamal’s study. 

Individual veterans evaluated, using either the DOD or the VA 

protocol, have had similar tests, and a small number of them have 

shown abnormalities, but as a group, that is not a consistent finding. 

Mr. SANDERS. Is this an area of research that you are exploring? 

Dr. MURPHY. There are currently ongoing research studies looking at both nerve muscle and brain function that are being funded. 

The GAO report and also our annual report on research lists those 

for you. 

Mr. SANDERS. But what I am hearing you saying is that based 

on the evidence that you have put together so far, you have not 

seen any abnormal numbers of people. Is that what I hear you, or 

did I not hear you say that? 

Dr. MURPHY. There has been no consistently found objective abnormality on neurophysiologic testing. In small numbers of patients during clinical evaluations we have found evidence of abnormality. 

Mr. SANDERS. I am not exactly sure what that means. You have 

found something, but you think it is not statistically relevant. Is 

that——

Dr. MURPHY. We have not been able to tie the abnormal results 

from our clinical tests to any specific exposure or to their Gulf service, and we do not believe that the research at this point conclusively shows that there are any objective, neurologic tests that are 

indicative of Gulf war illnesses. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Mr. Chairman, my last question deals with 

pyridostigmine bromide. At, I believe, our last hearing, there was 

a gentleman—what was his name, the pharmacologist from Maryland? Dr. Tom Teidt, who is a pharmacologist from the University 

of Maryland? OK. Was at the University of Maryland, now lives in 

Florida, sat exactly where you are sitting now, Dr. Murphy, and 

gave us a very frightening description of what he believed to be the 

dangers associated with PB and its use in a hot climate where 

there is stress and so forth. 

227

I do not know if you are familiar with his testimony. Is he off 

the wall, is he right, and what work are you doing on that issue? 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. The issue of PB and stress, and some of 

the issues that are raised around there are a concern of us as well. 

We are looking at that research. We are looking at other research 

as well that raises a question about whether stress, for example, 

can exacerbate and create additional problems there. Again, the 

data is not clear, but, again, it is worth looking at because, again, 

PB has been very important, obviously especially when you are 

dealing with exposure to nerve gas or potential exposure there. 

What we are doing right now is—so the answer is, yes, we are 

concerned about it; yes, we are taking a look at it. So far, it is not 

anything that tells us that for sure we should stop doing it, but it 

says we need to think about it as part of the total equation. 

Here is an important point, I think, when you look at the PB 

issue. It is true about PB and what we know or do not know yet 

today on it, and the issue comes down to the following, which is, 

in the first place, you do not want to do any kind of treatments, 

pretreatments, vaccinations you do not have to. PB is clearly in 

that category there. 

When you look at PB and how we used it in the Gulf war or how 

we might use it in the future in terms of there—it will be a very 

tough test, by the way, should we ever use it again in the future 

there—it is going to come down to you had better make sure you 

know which nerve gas you think is going to occur there; and, second, you are going to weigh these ‘‘relative risks’’ between the two 

things, and it is going to be a very tough discussion the next time 

we face this issue as to am I more worried about the soman, what 

is in PB, or am I more worried about the relative risks in terms 

of that, and we do not yet know all the answers. 

Mr. SANDERS. But my point was, and somebody correct me if I 

am wrong, I think he almost used the expression ‘‘poisoning our 

own,’’ in other words—and I am not saying that he is right or not. 

Mr. ROSTKER. What my colleague is saying, in plain terms, is 

that we are a learning organization and that we are not as sanguine about PB as being as benign as we thought it was 6 years 

ago. 

We are very interested in the research of PB, whoever funds it. 

We are pulling together a reassessment. That is one of the things 

that my office is doing. There are very important doctrinal issues. 

Clearly, in a soman environment, PB has a unique capability. We 

have to think through the risks here and the warning, and we are 

gaining knowledge about PB that is not falling on deaf ears. 

Mr. SANDERS. In other words, and he was very somber, and, 

frankly, very scary, and what I am hearing you say is you are not 

dismissing his statement. 

Mr. ROSTKER. No. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Absolutely not. 

Mr. ROSTKER. This is very serious. This is like the DU in terms 

of there is an advantage, but there is a cost. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Correct. 

Mr. ROSTKER. This is a different kind. DU may be of a smaller 

magnitude, frankly——

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Correct. 

228

Mr. ROSTKER [continuing]. But this is clearly stuff we want to 

know a lot more about——

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Correct. 

Mr. ROSTKER [continuing]. And we want to make sure we know 

it now rather than face a decision in another Gulf. 

Mr. SANDERS. Well, not only in another Gulf, but in understanding the problem that we have today. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROSTKER. Absolutely. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Correct. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Now, some of that is independent on the issue of 

treatment and diagnosis and the like, but we are very much trying 

to understand better than we had the issue of pyridostigmine bromide. And I might say we are bringing in data and experiences not 

only from our country, but from other countries that have done 

this, particularly the Brits in some earlier testing they did with 

chemical agents in people. 

Mr. SANDERS. So what I am hearing you saying, and I do not 

want to put words in your mouth—you said it—is that you are very 

concerned and regard it as a very——

Mr. ROSTKER. We have not drawn a conclusion, but we are actively putting the pieces together to put us in a position to be better informed and draw some conclusions. 

Mr. SANDERS. And some of the very serious concerns raised by 

others——

Mr. ROSTKER. Absolutely. 

Mr. SANDERS [continuing]. Are thoughts that you are taking seriously. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Absolutely. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. Correct. 

Mr. SANDERS. Did anyone else want to comment on PB? 

Mr. FEUSSNER. Yes. I would like to echo that. I think one of the 

intriguing observations that the new research is producing is the 

effect that stress can have on presentation of——

Mr. ROSTKER [continuing]. The brain area. 

Mr. FEUSSNER. Yes. And, again, when some folks think of stress, 

they think of psychological stress, but stress has neurotransmitter 

and neuroendocrine sequelae, and this is actually an example of 

how stress can perhaps create a problem that might not otherwise 

have occurred. 

Mr. SANDERS. If my memory is correct, and somebody up here 

can correct me if I am wrong, I mean, it was almost like a macabre 

joke that PB, under stress, and God knows, everybody at war is in 

stress, and in heat can bring forth a negative reaction; and on top 

of that, if PB is administered after one is exposed to chemical warfare agents, it could be a very bad effect. Does that make——

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. But I think the key thing that has 

changed in this equation, which is what we have all been referring 

to here, is the issue of the blood-brain barrier and the question 

under stress you can cross there. That was a new piece of information. That is what has caused people to go back and take another 

look at this. 

Now, we are still not sure what it means because while it says 

it can happen, it still does not tell you what the effects might be. 

Mr. SANDERS. Right. 

229

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. And we have got to figure that out because, again, it is not like the issue is, well, we will just stop using 

PB and that is the end of the question. You still have this relativerisk issue you have to sort of work through, and we are doing that. 

Mr. SANDERS. OK. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank all of 

you. 

Mr. SHAYS. I just have one last question, because I looked at my 

notes and realized that we had information that the Armed Forces 

Radiological Research Institute, AFRRI, conducted a study in fiscal 

year 1994 for about $1.7 million, and in fiscal year 1995 less than 

$1 million, on the hazards of DU. The results were that it was a 

threat to our troops. The research stopped in fiscal year 1995 and 

the results were not released. 

Colonel, it is a matter of public record, and we would love you 

just to quash it or sustain it, one or the other. First off, is my information accurate about the study being conducted? 

Col. DAXON. Yes, it is. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Col. DAXON. I actually put the study together. 

Mr. SHAYS. Oh, good. Then you are the man to ask. 

Col. DAXON. Yes, sir. I am no longer there, but the study is still 

ongoing. It is addressing all aspects, and we are focusing on the 

imbedded fragments because that is where we have some doubts 

still. The research is being published in the open literature. As we 

speak, the research is still being continued. 

Mr. SHAYS. So there was no result of that it was a threat to our 

troops. 

Col. DAXON. The research is not done yet, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Col. DAXON. I hate to draw conclusions when the experiment is 

not finished. 

Mr. SHAYS. There were no conclusions drawn that it was a threat 

to our troops. 

Col. DAXON. At this point, no, sir, none that I am aware of. 

Mr. SHAYS. Let me thank all of you because you have been tremendously patient. I guess I should give you the same privileges——

Col. DAXON. Sir, could I? 

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, sir. Do you want to say something? 

Col. DAXON. Yes, sir, I do. The position of AFRRI and the DOD 

is not that DU doesn’t present a hazard. AFRRI at this point has 

not found any hazards that were not expected at this juncture. It 

is not our position that there are no hazards associated with DU. 

Mr. SHAYS. No. I think we all agree there are hazards, but you 

did not come to a preliminary finding that it was a threat to our 

troops. 

Col. DAXON. No, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. 

Col. DAXON. I can check that and get with the director of AFRRI 

to make sure that is still current.

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Mr. SHAYS. I think it would be good to have you—in fact, we 

would like an answer one way or the other, not just no answer. We 

would like you to either confirm your statement, which is on the 

record, or disqualify it, and get back to us by Wednesday. 

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Col. DAXON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Let me say that is there a question that we 

should have asked that you would have liked us to have asked? 

Yes. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Two points. On the issue of the MOPP gear, you 

asked specific questions about specific reports that I do not know 

of, and I will check; but let me say there was critical assessments 

of every piece of the MOPP gear and that we have moved substantially over time to a new mask. There was testimony today about 

the layer of carbon, the newest overgarments following the British 

have the carbon integrated into the fiber. It lasts longer. The issue 

today about it lasting only 12 hours was 12 hours in a saturated 

environment. The garment itself can last for a much longer period 

of time. 

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Rostker, I need to say on the record that I am 

aware of two reports that are classified that I would like to talk 

to you about. 

Mr. ROSTKER. OK. 

Mr. SHAYS. And, Dr. Murphy. 

Mr. ROSTKER. I have one additional thing, if I might. You also 

raised the question of the alarms. 

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROSTKER. And we just put together a small briefing for the 

PAC that we gave them earlier this week on the M–8 alarm, and 

I would like to make that available to you. 

Mr. SHAYS. What is the bottom line? 

Mr. ROSTKER. The bottom line is that a known interferant that 

would set off the alarms and provide false positives includes gasoline vapors and diesel-fuel exhaust. So the description of them 

turning it on on the trucks in a convoy and the alarms going off 

all the time is absolutely predictable, given the known interference. 

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say, though, Dr. Rostker, that we have 

testimony that far more of them occurred after the war than before 

and that there was no noticeable difference in terms of environment. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Except for the oil fires and the like, which also 

were involved. The proper procedure is to, if an M–8 goes off and 

they MOPP’d as they described, is then to do an all-clear based 

upon a 256 kit. We are investigating all of the 256-kit positives 

that we can find. 

Mr. SHAYS. I feel that I need to state on the record that individuals have contacted this committee who will—I guess I cannot say 

that; they have not done it yet. Let’s just leave this issue open. 

OK? We will leave it like that. 

Mr. ROSTKER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Garthwaite. 

Dr. GARTHWAITE. Sir, just a couple of things. To the veterans out 

there, I would urge them to get a Persian Gulf Exam if they have 

not gotten one; and in relation to their frustration, I will remind 

all of us that we declared war on cancer, and although we have 

won some skirmishes, that is an ongoing war, and it has been 

going on for many years. 

The science is very difficult, very complex, and not a simple process, and it is not for lack of trying. And we are all frustrated. I 

381

think many of us in medicine are in medicine because we hope to 

be able to make a difference and to get some answers for some of 

these diseases. 

Second, I think, we appear before you with a great sense of humility. When I went to medical school, ulcers were definitely 

caused by too much acid. Today, we can tell you that they are definitely caused by bacteria. So what is very clear today may not be 

as clear in the future. 

And the third thing is about peer review. I would just like to say 

that it is human beings doing the best they can to judge other 

human beings, and I think that the point that was made, that 

there may be somewhat of a systemic bias of peer review for new 

and more radical ideas is very possible and plausible, and we 

should take that into account as we think about peer review. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Thank you. Let me just thank our court 

reporter, Ted Fambro. Also, I would like to thank Denise Nichols 

for taking care of our veterans, picking them up—the four of them 

did not live here—and making sure they had a square meal last 

night. 

I would also like to thank my director of this committee, Larry 

Halloran, and Bob Newman, who staffs and deals with Gulf war illnesses; also, Mr. Sanders’ staff, Don Edwards and Cynthia 

Welgess; and also the minority staff, Cherri Branson; and to say 

to the witnesses you have been very helpful. You have been extraordinarily patient and tolerant, and it certainly speaks well for 

your concern about this issue, and we do appreciate that very 

much. 

With that, we will call this hearing adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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