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57–174PDF 2010

REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PLAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 26, 2010

Serial No. 111–96

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PETE OLSON, Texas 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

May 26, 2010

Page 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 2

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Chairman, Committee on Science 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 27

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29

Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking Member, 

Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ......... 39

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 41

Prepared Statement by Representative Gabrielle Giffords, Member, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ................. 53

Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Committee 

on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................. 54

Panel I:

Mr. Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 42

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 45

Biography .......................................................................................................... 52

Discussion 

Feasibility of New Budget ................................................................................... 55

Funding a Crew Rescue Vehicle ......................................................................... 56

Glenn Research Center ........................................................................................ 58

Maintaining the International Space Station .................................................... 59

The Search for Extra-Terrestrial Life ................................................................ 60

Fixing Constellation ............................................................................................. 61

Solid Rocket Industry and Workforce ................................................................. 62

Savings From Ares Cancellation ......................................................................... 62

Cost of a Crew Rescue Vehicle ............................................................................ 63

Continuing Work on Constellation ..................................................................... 64

Presidential Visit to the Johnson Space Center ................................................ 66

NASA’s Primary Mission ..................................................................................... 67

Space Communications Networks Service Contract ......................................... 68

Space Tourism ...................................................................................................... 68

Modifying Constellation ....................................................................................... 69

Termination Liability ........................................................................................... 70

Abdicating Leadership in Space .......................................................................... 71

Safety Regulations for Commercial Spaceflight ................................................ 71

Promoting STEM Fields Through NASA ........................................................... 73

Asteroid Mission ................................................................................................... 74

Timeline for Human Rated Commercial Launch Vehicles ............................... 75

Constellation Variations ...................................................................................... 76

Potential Commercial Crew Providers ............................................................... 76

Infrastructure Costs ............................................................................................. 76

Extending the Shuttle Program .......................................................................... 77

Maintaining Space Workforce ............................................................................. 78

Safety Record of Commercial Providers ............................................................. 79

Timeline for Commercial Access to LEO ............................................................ 79

Ceding U.S. Preeminence .................................................................................... 81
Page

IV

Constellation Program Director Reassignment ................................................. 81

Benefits of New Budget ....................................................................................... 82

Termination Liability ........................................................................................... 82

Cost Estimates for Ares Program ....................................................................... 84

Panel II:

Mr. Neil Armstrong, Commander, Apollo 11

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 85

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 87

Captain Eugene A. Cernan, USN (Ret.), Commander, Apollo 17

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 89

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 92

Mr. A. Thomas Young, Lockheed Martin (Ret.) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 96

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 98

Discussion 

Durability of Private Sector Approach ............................................................... 100

Return to the Moon .............................................................................................. 102

Constellation Lite ................................................................................................. 102

Space Shuttle Extension ...................................................................................... 103

NASA Priorities .................................................................................................... 104

NASA Technical Capacity ................................................................................... 105

Value of Return to Moon ..................................................................................... 108

Workforce Morale ................................................................................................. 109

Viability of the President’s Plan ......................................................................... 111

Impact of the Augustine Report .......................................................................... 111

Maintaining American Leadership in Space ...................................................... 112

Investing in Engine Development ....................................................................... 113

More on Maintaining American Leadership in Space ....................................... 114

Impact on National Security ............................................................................... 115

Astronaut Safety Concerns .................................................................................. 116

Technical Share of the Constellation Program .................................................. 118
(1)

REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PLAN 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Gordon 

[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
2

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Review of the Proposed National

Aeronautics and Space Administration

Human Spaceflight Plan 

MAY 26, 2010

10 A.M.–12 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

I. Purpose 

On May 26, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. the Committee on Science and Technology will 

hold a hearing on the proposed National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) Human Spaceflight Plan. The purpose of the hearing is to continue the examination of the proposed NASA human spaceflight plan and to review issues related to the budget, cost, schedule and potential impacts of the plan. 

The hearing will 1) examine the administration’s proposed goals, strategies and 

plans for NASA’s human spaceflight and exploration programs, including the revisions announced by the president on April 15, 2010; 2) the assumptions, basis, feasibility and sustainability of those plans within the FY 2011 budget plan and outyear 

funding plan; 3) the key challenges and risks involved in implementing the proposed 

change of course for NASA; and 4) what outstanding questions and issues need to 

be addressed, and what information is needed as Congress considers the proposed 

future direction for NASA’s human spaceflight and exploration programs.

II. Scheduled Witnesses

Panel I:

Mr. Charles F. Bolden, Jr. 

Administrator 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Panel II:

Mr. Neil A. Armstrong 

Commander, Apollo 11

Captain Eugene A. Cernan, 

USN (ret.) Commander, Apollo 17

Mr. A. Thomas Young 

Lockheed Martin (ret.)

Dr. John P. Holdren, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, was 

invited to testify by the Committee but was unavailable due to another commitment.

III. Background and Issues

Background 

Congress has been presented with the administration’s proposal to make drastic 

changes to the United States human spaceflight and exploration program that has 

been authorized and funded by successive Congresses since 2005. Key components 

of the new plan presented by the president in February and later modified in the 

president’s April 15th speech at the Kennedy Space Center include the following:

• The International Space Station (ISS) will be extended at least through 2020;

• An ISS crew rescue vehicle (potentially but not necessarily based on the 

Orion crew exploration vehicle design) will be developed and flying ‘‘within 

the next few years’’;

• There will be a human mission to an asteroid by 2025;
3

• Astronauts will orbit Mars by the mid-2030s;

• By 2015, NASA will have either finalized the design of a Heavy Lift Vehicle 

(HLV) and be ready to start building [per the president’s April 15th speech], 

have done some design work on an HLV concept [per the OSTP Director’s 

public statements], or have ‘‘defined’’ a Heavy Lift architecture [per NASA 

statements to staff]; NASA will also have either developed or started development of a new liquid hydrocarbon engine and have carried out fundamental 

research on heavy lift propulsion, and will have done all of the above for $3.1 

billion over the five-year period;

• NASA will support/fund the development of multiple [3–4, according to 

NASA] commercial crew transport services by 2016 at a total cost to NASA 

of $6 billion; and

• NASA will invest $7.8 billion in Flagship Technology Demonstrations, $3 billion in Robotic Precursor mission, and $4.9 billion on Space Technology over 

the next few years.

Mr. Norman Augustine, who chaired last year’s Review of U.S. Human 

Spaceflight Plans Committee, has testified that the administration’s proposed plan 

is closest to his panel’s Option 5B—one of the ‘‘flexible path’’ options. According to 

the Augustine committee report, Option 5B ‘‘employs an EELV-heritage commercial 

heavy-lift launcher and assumes a different (and significantly reduced) role for 

NASA . . . [and] would also entail substantial reductions in the NASA workforce 

and closure of facilities to obtain the expected cost reductions.’’

In announcing its proposals, the administration indicated that a new human 

spaceflight plan was needed because the exploration program of record was 

‘‘unexecutable’’ under the projected budgets. 

In the four months since the administration’s proposed plan was announced, a 

number of significant issues have been raised that still have not been satisfactorily 

addressed by administration witnesses. A number of those issues are discussed in 

the following section.

Issues

1. No credible basis has been provided to date to support the claim that 

NASA can successfully execute the proposed plan within the FY 2011 and 

assumed outyear budget profile.

One of the most significant findings of last year’s Augustine committee was that 

‘‘Human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 budget 

guideline.’’ Following the same methodology used by the Aerospace Corporation, 

staff of the Science and Technology Committee analyzed the FY 2011 budget request 

using the same budget categories used in the Aerospace analysis for the Augustine 

committee, namely, Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), Exploration, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) modernization, and exploration-related technology. The 

staff analysis determined that the funding available for human spaceflight/exploration technology in the proposed FY 2011 budget plan is essentially the same as 

was available in the ‘‘not viable’’ FY 2010 budget guidance over the years FY 2010–

2015. In addition, if one compares the FY 2011 budget plan and outyear funding 

profile with that of the Augustine committee’s ‘‘Less Constrained’’ budget, it turns 

out the budget for the administration’s proposed plan through 2025 [the date of the 

asteroid mission] is $47 billion lower than the amount the Augustine committee 

determined would be needed to make any of its exploration options viable over that 

same period. Figure 1 below illustrates the mismatch between the Augustine committee’s budget and both the ‘‘not viable’’ FY 2010 budget guidance and the proposed FY 2011 budget plan. [A spreadsheet comparing the various budgets is included in Appendix A].
4

The addition of an ISS crew rescue development program without a corresponding 

increase in the NASA budget would appear to further weaken the credibility of any 

assertion that the proposed plan is executable. In staff briefings, NASA personnel 

indicated that a preliminary estimate of the cost of developing a crew rescue vehicle 

is on the order of $5–7 billion. Since the administration has stated the goal of flying 

the crew rescue vehicle ‘‘within the next few years,’’ it is reasonable to assume that 

several years of operations would also have to be budgeted for within the FY 2011–

FY 2015 budget. Given the likely need to procure and fly two vehicles per year to 

the ISS, each on an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), the annual operating cost could be estimated at $1+ billion. Thus, the total cost over the five year 

period of the crew rescue vehicle development/operations program could approach 

$10 billion. That is equivalent to a $1–2 billion per year unfunded lien on the NASA 

budget. To put that shortfall into context, if one zeroed the FY 2011 funding for the 

Exploration Technology Demonstrations program, the Robotic Precursor program, 

and the KSC 21st Century Space Launch Complex initiative, it would only cover 

$1.2 billion of the potential shortfall. To cover a $2 billion shortfall, one would also 

have to eliminate the increased funding for Earth Science, Aeronautics, and Space 

Technology. To date, NASA has not identified the planned offsets for the cost of the 

crew rescue vehicle.

2. Lack of credible analysis or data and ensuing uncertainties contribute to 

increased risk of higher costs and longer delays than estimated and increased risk of unavailability of services.

One of the central elements of the administration’s plan is a proposal to rely on 

as-yet-to-be-developed ‘‘commercial crew’’ transport services to low Earth orbit and 

the ISS. 

The administration’s plan assumes that it will support the development and demonstration of up to 3–4 commercial crew systems at a cost of $6 billion over the fiveyear period FY 2011–2015. [That funding is in addition to funding for launch infrastructure to facilitate commercial launches that is proposed as part of the ‘‘21st Century Space Launch Complex’’ initiative.] However, the basis of the $6 billion estimate has not been provided to Congress, despite repeated requests. In addition, the 

administration has been unable to provide the percentage of private sector cost 

sharing assumed in its $6 billion budget estimate. There are several grounds for 

questioning the credibility of the administration’s estimate. The Aerospace Corporation, in its response to questions submitted by Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee 

Chairwoman Giffords, provided its independent analysis of the range of potential 

costs to develop a single crewed capsule/launch abort system of varying degrees of 

complexity/crew-carrying capacity. A chart provided by Aerospace that summarizes 

the analysis is included in Appendix A. For the presently envisioned 2–4 passenger 

commercial crew vehicles, the Aerospace analysis would suggest that the burden of 

proof needs to be put on the administration to demonstrate why the cost to the government has not been underestimated by at least a factor of two or more, even ac-
5

counting for benefits to be accrued by following as yet unspecified ‘‘commercial practices’’ while still ensuring safety standards are met. The $6 billion estimate is further called into question by NASA’s preliminary estimate of the cost to develop a 

single ‘‘simple’’ crew rescue vehicle, with the crew rescue vehicle development cost 

estimate being essentially the same as what the administration estimates could 

fund the development of up to 3–4 different commercial crew transport vehicles with 

launch abort systems. 

In its report, the Augustine committee concluded that: ‘‘While there are many potential benefits of commercial services that transport crew to low Earth orbit, there 

are simply too many risks at the present time not to have a viable fallback option 

for risk mitigation.’’ However, the administration’s proposed plan does not include 

any government backup option. In the absence of a government alternative, NASA 

would presumably have no choice but to cover any increased cost if it is to preserve 

its access to the low Earth orbit. Administrator Bolden, in testimony before Congress said ‘‘I have to look at the possibility that the commercial sector may have difficulty, and we will do everything in my power to facilitate their success.’’

In the absence of a significant non-NASA, truly commercial market, NASA would 

have to assume responsibility for ensuring the continued viability of at least two 

commercial companies [unless the government is willing to accept the existence of 

a commercial monopoly determining its crewed access to space]. However the existence of any significant non-NASA market has not been independently validated. 

Given that, it is instructive to note that at a recent Federal Aviation Administration 

Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee meeting, Administrator 

Bolden noted that destinations other than the ISS would be needed for the commercial providers in order to keep ISS commercial crew costs down, and that NASA 

might have to invest in creating them: ‘‘ ‘We need a destination in low Earth orbit 

to which we can go’, Bolden said ‘So that means that NASA and the commercial enterprises need to partner, maybe with DoD, maybe with the intelligence community. 

I don’t know who. But we need to partner with a lot of people to develop a second 

orbital network of structures or something that act as a destination for people who 

want to make this commercial industry viable.’ ’’ [Aerospace Daily, 5/20/10]. In addition, in an aviationweek.com article dated May 21, 2010, it was stated that ‘‘company 

reps agreed that even with a second destination . . . it will be hard to sustain a commercial market with the two annual ISS flights envisioned. ‘A market like that is 

probably not enough to sustain competition,’ says George Sowers, vice president for 

business development at ULA [United Launch Alliance]. It could sustain two providers, if NASA’s willing to pay extra to have two. It’s kind of like EELV all over 

again.’ ’’

Thus, if one accepts the administration’s assumption that commercial crew providers can be ready to provide operational crew transfer services to the ISS in 

2016—a schedule estimate that has not been independently validated and was made 

without even first having determined what acquisition approach will be followed—

all the would-be commercial providers can assume in terms of a NASA market is 

that they may split a total of 10 trips to the ISS before the end of the planned extension of the ISS in 2020. It is reasonable to assume that in the absence of other 

markets, those providers will expect NASA to assume the great majority of the risk 

and cost—whatever that cost might turn out to be.

3. Lack of detail and continued changes call into question the stability and 

sustainability of the proposed plan

A series of changes to the proposed plan raises questions about the stability of 

the plan and whether further changes will be forthcoming. The budget justification 

was provided to Congress one month after the FY 2011 budget release; few details 

were provided to support the magnitude of the changes being proposed. 

On April 15, 2010, the president announced changes to the plan-a major one being 

the addition of a crew rescue vehicle to the human spaceflight portfolio-and one that 

represents a significant new requirement being levied on the FY 2011 NASA budget 

guideline. There were no details on what the change would entail, how it would be 

funded, and what the impact to other programs would be. In that same speech, the 

president announced that he was committed to ‘‘finalizing a [heavy lift] rocket design no later than 2015 and then begin to build it.’’ Yet, in subsequent discussions 

with NASA, Committee staff were told that primary emphasis was on the development of an engine for the first stage of a heavy launch vehicle and just the ‘‘definition of a heavy lift architecture’’ by 2015. Finally, the president added an explicit 

goal of carrying out the first human mission to a near-Earth asteroid by 2025. 

With respect to the crew rescue vehicle program, Administrator Bolden said in his 

prepared statement for the April 22, 2010 hearing by Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: ‘‘Accommodating 
6

this effort within NASA’s budget will change the amounts requested for the programs 

described below [technology development and demonstrations; heavy-lift and propulsion research and development; robotic exploration precursor]. An update to the 

NASA FY 2011 budget justification will be provided as soon as possible, but in the 

next few weeks.’’

On May 12, 2010, Administrator Bolden testified at a Senate Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation hearing that ‘‘NASA expects to submit a revised FY 2011 budget 

request to Congress in the near future that will identify funding requirements for the 

restructured Orion crew capsule’’. 

Given the number and significance of the changes being made to the initial proposed plan, the lack of details on the scope of programs and how they might change 

to support the addition of a crew rescue vehicle, the variations in the administration’s description of how heavy lift development will proceed, and the lack of an updated budget request that reflects the changes, it may be difficult for Congress to 

have confidence in the stability of the plan that it is being asked to support.

4. Proposed long-term exploration strategy lacks clarity and consistency

The Constellation Program was designed and congressionally-authorized with a 

stepping-stone approach in mind ‘‘to ensure that activities in its lunar exploration 

program shall be designed and implemented in a manner that gives strong consideration to how those activities might also help meet the requirements offuture activities 

beyond the Moon’’ and a range of future destinations ‘‘to expand human and robotic 

presence into the solar system, including the exploration and utilization of the Moon, 

near Earth asteroids, Lagrangian points, and eventually Mars and its moons.’’ [P.L. 

110–422] 

However, in presenting his proposed new plan on April 15th, the president stated 

that with respect to the Moon, ‘‘the simple fact is, we have been there before. There 

is a lot more of space to explore . . ..’’ He announced that the U.S. would send humans to an asteroid by 2025, followed by a human mission to orbit Mars by the mid 

2030s. 

Subsequent to that announcement, NASA continues to include the Moon as a destination but with no timetable, indicating a lunar landing would not occur until 

some time after the asteroid mission. Administrator Bolden’s May 12 prepared 

statement for the Senate Commerce Committee noted that ‘‘under the new plan, we 

will . . . build a technological foundation for sustainable, beyond-LEO exploration, 

with more capable expeditions in lunar space, and human missions to near-Earth 

asteroids, the Moon, Lagrangian points, and, ultimately, Mars.’’ In addition, Administrator Bolden’s prepared statement for the May 12 Senate hearing noted that the 

Exploration Robotic Precursors program would involve ‘‘a lunar lander by 2015’’ and 

the Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration program would involve 

activities ‘‘that will lead to ground and flight demonstrations in lunar volatiles.’’ It 

is not clear whether the Moon is or is not a significant part of the exploration strategy, and if so, what the purpose of lunar exploration would be under the president’s 

plan. If the Moon is not a near-term part of the exploration strategy, it is not apparent why programs to send landers to the Moon and demonstrations in lunar 

volatiles would be needed within the next five years. 

Without a consistent outline of the logical progression for deep space exploration 

beyond low-Earth orbit authorized in law, how the knowledge from each mission 

would build on one another, and when a heavy-lift vehicle and crew capsule would 

be available to support deep space exploration, it is difficult for Congress to have 

a clear understanding of the plan it is being asked to support.

Implications for Congressional Consideration of the FY 2011 NASA Budget Request 

Given the drastic changes being proposed by the administration, including cancellation of the current Constellation Program, the burden of proof has to rest with 

the administration to first demonstrate that its proposed plan is executable. That 

burden of proof includes providing compelling evidence that:

1) The proposed plan is executable within projected budgets;

2) The elements of the plan are sufficiently well defined and analyzed such that 

the risks of higher than estimated costs and schedule delays are minimized;

3) The plan is well thought-out and stable and has taken account of potential 

impacts on other sectors; and

4) The proposed long-term exploration strategy is clear and consistent.

If that burden of proof is met, Congress will still need to determine whether or 

not the measures proposed are in the best interest of the Nation and of the nation’s 

human spaceflight program. However, if the administration is unable to provide 
7

Congress with the confidence that its proposed plan is executable, Congress will 

then need to take steps to develop an alternative that is executable. 

Appendix A of this hearing charter contains additional background on the questions and decisions for Congress that are raised by the administration’s proposed 

plan.
8

Appendix A 

Background: The Questions and Decisions

for Congress on Human Spaceflight and the

Proposed New Strategy

1. What Are the Priorities of the Goals and Objectives of the New Strategy That Congress is Being Asked to Support?

Various statements in the FY 2011 budget request and speeches by NASA and 

other officials state a range of goals and objectives making it difficult to discern the 

priorities of the goals being proposed for the U.S. human spaceflight program.

• The NASA Administrator’s message in the NASA FY 2011 budget request 

stated ‘‘As we invest in the most cutting-edge research and technology to enable 

human exploration beyond Earth, we will also work to cultivate an expanded 

space exploration industry through a commercial crew program that seeks to 

spur competition and innovation in American industry, ultimately resulting in 

commercial human spaceflight services. Once established, these services will 

not only allow astronauts to travel to the International Space Station, they 

will ultimately open space travel to many more people across the globe.’’

• In his April 15, 2010 remarks at Kennedy Space Center, the president stated: 

‘‘Our goal is the capacity for people to work and learn, operate and live safely 

beyond the Earth for extended periods of time, ultimately in ways that are 

more sustainable and even indefinite.’’ He also said: ‘‘Early in the next decade, 

a set of crewed flights will test and prove the systems required for exploration 

beyond low-Earth orbit. And by 2025, we expect new spacecraft designed for 

long journeys to allow us to begin the first-ever crewed missions beyond the 

moon into deep space. We’ll start by sending astronauts to an asteroid for the 

first time in history.’’

While various goals are being presented as part of the administration’s proposed 

human spaceflight program, the realities of fiscal constraints within the U.S. government budget require that Congress understands the priorities for those goals. If 

the administration’s goal is to send humans beyond low-Earth orbit, including to a 

near-Earth asteroid, as a starting point, by 2025, then a set of decisions must be 

made to support that goal. If the goal is to stimulate a space tourism and exploration industry, then certain questions must be asked and decisions must be made 

about the government’s role in enabling the development of a new industry, and the 

advantages and disadvantages to the government and the taxpayer must be considered.

2. Should the Constellation Program be Canceled?

The Constellation Program consists of the Ares I crew launch vehicle and Orion 

crew exploration vehicle, the Ares V heavy-lift launch vehicle, associated ground 

systems and lunar systems. Constellation is the architecture established to deliver 

Americans to the ISS and later to the Moon and other destinations in the solar system following the retirement of the Space Shuttle. The FY 2009 budget request for 

NASA stated that Constellation’s Orion vehicle was also intended to serve as a 

back-up for commercial services being fostered to service the ISS: ‘‘It [Orion] will 

be capable offerrying up to six astronauts (plus additional cargo) to and from the 

International Space Station if commercial transport services are unavailable.’’ Constellation was authorized in both the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 [P.L. 109–

155] and the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L. 110–422]. 

NASA provided the Committee the following status information for the Constellation Program, as of May 2010:

‘‘The following are some of the Orion Project’s key achievements:

• The Orion PDR [Preliminary Design Review] was conducted during the summer of 2009, and completed in August 2009. The PDR was an extensive review 

of Orion’s detailed subsystems and integrated systems designs to date. The 

PDR board unanimously recommended proceeding with detailed designs toward Critical Design Review (CDR) in February 2011.

• In 2009, NASA conducted preliminary capsule recovery tests at both the 

Navy’s Carderock facility in Maryland and in the ocean near Kennedy Space 

Center (KSC) in Florida. Using a mockup of the Orion capsule, these Postlanding Orion Recover Tests involved search and rescue teams simulating sta-
9

bilization and recovery of the Orion capsule in a variety of sea state conditions. 

Results were intended to lead to design features for both the spacecraft and 

recovery equipment, as well as contributing to development of the final recovery procedures.

• Fabrication of the Orion Ground Test Article crew module is progressing at 

the Michoud Assembly Facility in Louisiana. Completion is estimated for the 

fall of 2010, followed by completion of the service module and launch abort 

system ground test article, currently scheduled for 2011. NASA is using a friction stir welding technique on this ground test article, and is hoping to demonstrate the longest continuous friction stir weld ever attempted.

• NASA performed its first developmental flight test of the Orion Launch Abort 

System (LAS) at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The Pad Abort–

1 test, successfully conducted May 6, 2010, was the first integrated firing of 

all three motors in a real flight environment. Orion’s Launch Abort System 

(LAS) includes three newly designed solid rocket motors: 1) abort motor, 2) jettison motor, and 3) attitude control motor. Each motor contributes substantially to the state of the art in solid rocket propulsion technology. All of these 

motors have been successfully demonstrated in full-scale static firings on the 

ground individually.

• Orion project successfully conducted a Software PDR.

• The Orion project successfully completed a formal Integrated Baseline Review 

to assess the adequacy of the integrated project baseline (cost, schedule, risk, 

and technical) following the system PDR.

The following are some of the Ares I Project’s key achievements.

• Having completed its PDR in 2008, the Ares I Project is now working toward 

its CDR, which is scheduled for September 2011.

• In September 2009, NASA and ATK conducted the first successful test of the 

Ares I’s five-segment development motor in Promontory, Utah. Beyond validating the basic performance characteristics of the stage, the test has enhanced 

modeling and understanding of key attributes that have historically been very 

difficult to predict analytically such as erosive burning, thrust oscillations and 

thrust tail off. The next static test, DM–2, is currently scheduled for September 

2010.

• In October 2009, the Ares I–X test flight took place at Kennedy Space Center 

in Florida. Data from more than 700 on-board sensors showed that the vehicle 

was effectively controlled and stable in flight. Thrust oscillation frequencies 

and magnitude data from the Ares I–X flight also were consistent with measurements from recent Shuttle flights that were instrumented, leading us to 

conclude that the oscillation vibration on the Ares I would be within the 

bounds that the Ares I is currently being designed to. In the end, this test 

flight provided tremendous insight into the aerodynamic, acoustic, structural, 

vibration and thermal forces that Ares I would be expected to experience.

• J–2X Test Hardware Status: Having passed its CDR in 2008, development and 

verification testing at the component and subsystem level continues. Current 

planning includes a fully assembled engine, minus the full nozzle extension, 

to be available the end of calendar year 2010, followed by receipt of an additional developmental engine in 2011. Static fire testing for engines is currently 

slated to begin in the February-March 2011 time frame.

The following are some of the recent infrastructure achievements for the Constellation 

Program:

• The Operations and Checkout building at KSC was completed in January 

2009, marking activation of High Bay Facility. When outfitted, the O&C will 

support final assembly of the Orion spacecraft.

• The final 600-foot Lightning Protection Tower at KSC’s Pad B was completed 

in February 2009. This was where the Ares I–X test flight launched from in 

October 2009.

• Workers at KSC topped out the tenth and final segment of the new mobile 

launcher (ML) after it was lifted by crane and lowered onto the ninth segment 

in January 2010. When completed, the tower will be 345 feet tall and have 

multiple platforms for personnel access. Its base was made lighter than Space 

Shuttle mobile launcher platforms so the crawler-transporter can pick up the 

heavier load of the tower and a taller rocket.
10

• A–3 Test Stand at Stennis Space Center in Mississippi. Construction of the 

long duration altitude test stand for the J–2X engine is nearly 75 percent complete. When completed in 2013, the A–3 facility will provide a unique critical 

capability to simulate environments at greater than 100,000 ft altitude necessary to demonstrate altitude starting and perform full-duration hot-fire testing.

• Space Environmental Test Facility (SET) at Glenn Research Center’s Plum 

Brook Station in Ohio: Construction started in 2007 and is about 75 percent 

complete. SET is planned for conducting qualification testing of the fully integrated Orion spacecraft, including vibration, acoustics, and EMI testing.

• Fabrication of the Orion Crew Module mockup for Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory testing and training events. These events are targeted at both the in-space 

EVA aspects on the outside of the vehicle as well as for internal cabin mobility 

within a simulated space gravity environment.

• Fabrication of a partial gravity testing and training facility (Advanced Reduced Gravity Off-Load System). This facility allows for simulations of a nonEarth surface gravity environment (lunar, Mars, etc) for both shirt-sleeve and 

spacesuit testing and training.

As of May 2010, NASA reported that it had spent a total of $10.3 billion on Constellation. 

In addition, the Constellation Program has contributed a number of new technology developments and innovations. A partial list was provided by Mr. Douglas 

Cook, NASA Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, at a March 24, 2010 hearing of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee on 

‘‘Proposed Changes to NASA’s Exploration Programs: What’s Known, What’s Not, 

and What are the Issues for Congress?’’:

• ‘‘Automated rendezvous and docking is one that we are working on the Orion. 

In the upper stage we are making further progress on the technology offriction 

stir welding. We are working on composite structures. We have made some advances in lightning protection on space vehicles, advanced batteries. We are 

using solar arrays on the spacecraft. We are making advances in guidance, 

navigation, and control and other avionic software that will be possible. We 

have actually . . . advanced development work out at Ames . . . in . . . advanced thermal protection systems for spacecraft. We are working on closed life 

support, and we . . . are actually charting some new territory in modeling of 

the environments and characteristics of the spacecraft during launch and entry 

through new modeling techniques and software.’’

The FY 2011 budget proposes to cancel Constellation and includes $1.9 billion in FY 2011 and $600 million in FY 2012 to fund:

• Termination and liability for existing contracts (including severance pay);

• Closeout costs of content and property disposition;

• Costs to render safe facilities no longer in use, mothballed, or targeted for 

demolition;

• Potential environmental remediation of agency direct and support contractor 

facilities no longer in use; and

• Coverage for transitional civil servants as new programs are being initiated.

The April 15, 2010 speech by the president proposed restructuring the Orion crew 

capsule that was an element of the Constellation Program to focus on providing 

crew escape capability for the International Space Station by means of an ‘‘Orion 

Lite’’. A Fact Sheet issued by the Office of Science and Technology Policy described 

the rationale for the scaled-down Orion as ‘‘providing stand-by emergency escape capabilities for astronauts on the Space Station. We will be able to launch this vehicle 

within the next few years, creating an American crew escape capability that will increase the safety of our crews on the Space Station, reduce our dependence on foreign 

providers, and simplify requirements for other commercial crew providers.’’ According 

to the revised plan, this effort will also ‘‘help establish a technological foundation 

for future exploration spacecraft needed for human missions beyond low Earth orbit.’’ 

Last week, NASA officials informed Committee staff that NASA is in discussions 

with OMB and OSTP on several options for pursuing a crew rescue vehicle. Those 

options include 1) restructuring Orion to be developed as a crew rescue vehicle, and 

2) initiating a competition that would be open to new concepts for a crew rescue 

vehicle. A decision to pursue the latter option would necessitate canceling the Orion 

contract and incurring contract termination costs, while also starting a new contract 

competition and development program.
11

Congressional Direction on Limitations on the Use of FY 2010 Appropriations 

In the Statement of Managers accompanying the FY 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, ‘‘The conferees note that the Constellation program is the program for 

which funds have been authorized and appropriated over the last four years, and 

upon which the pending budget request is based. Accordingly, it is premature for the 

conferees to advocate or initiate significant changes to the current program absent 

a bona fide proposal from the Administration and subsequent assessment, consideration and enactment by Congress.’’ The Statement of Managers also states that 

‘‘Funds are not provided herein to initiate any new program, project or activity, not 

otherwise contemplated within the budget request and approved by Congress, consistent with section 505 of this Act, unless otherwise approved by the Congress in a 

subsequent appropriations Act. Funds are also not provided herein to cancel, terminate or significantly modify contracts related to the spacecraft architecture of the current program, unless such changes or modifications have been considered in subsequent appropriations Acts.’’ Similar language was included in the Act itself. According to NASA, the Constellation Program is currently proceeding per the enacted FY 

2010 appropriation. 

According to NASA, all work that is currently under contract for Constellation 

will continue. The Administrator has instructed the Constellation Program to refrain from initiating new work not currently under contract, and also to refrain from 

expanding the scope of any work that currently is under contract. As of March 11, 

2010, NASA had canceled five planned procurements, including planned studies: the 

Exploration Ground Launch Services (EGLS) solicitation at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC); the Vehicle Assembly Building High Bay modification solicitation at KSC; 

the Water Basin construction solicitation at the Langley Research Center; the Altair 

Conceptual Design Contracts solicitation at the Johnson Space Center; and the Ares 

V heavy-lift design trades solicitation at the Marshall Space Flight Center. 

In testimony to the Committee on Science and Technology on February 25, 2010, 

Administrator Bolden stated that: ‘‘in . . . a letter that I sent recently to 27 members 

of the House who questioned what we were doing with the Constellation Program 

. . . I told them . . . we were in compliance with the direction of the 2010 Appropriations Act and that I have directed no cancellations or terminations and that we 

intended to comply with the law.’’

Members of Congress have continued to express concern over NASA’s actions regarding the legislative direction in the FY 2010 Appropriations for NASA. In a May 

10, 2010 letter to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Senator 

Barbara Mikulski, chair of the Senate Commerce, Justice, Science and Related 

Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee that funds NASA wrote:

• ‘‘I am advised that NASA has undertaken a series of steps to direct industry 

to retain certain funds made available in fiscal year 2010 to cover prospective 

termination costs so as not to potentially violate the terms of the Antideficiency 

Act (31 U.S.C. 1341). I am deeply troubled by this approach as it effectively 

seeks to terminate Constellation activities in apparent violation of the terms 

of the Omnibus provision.’’

• In addition, Senator Mikulski wrote: ‘‘I urge you, in conjunction with the Vice 

President and the President’s Chief of Staff to immediately devise a path forward to avoid cancelling contracts in fiscal year 2010 and to avoid invoking 

termination liability set asides from existing contract dollars and activities on 

the Constellation Program.’’

• ‘‘I further urgently request that you review NASA’s budgeting practices regarding termination liability to articulate a clear and appropriate standard to deal 

fairly with industry, provide a schedule to implement this standard and identify the fiscal reserves required to effectively comply with this standard.’’

Senator Richard Shelby, ranking member of the Commerce, Justice, Science and 

Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee, took the step of co-signing a provision to H.R. 4899, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010:

• ‘‘Provided further, That notwithstanding any other provision of law or regulation, funds made available for Constellation in fiscal year 2010 for ‘National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration Exploration’ and from previous appropriations for ‘National Aeronautics and Space Administration Exploration’ 

shall be available to fund continued performance of Constellation contracts, 

and performance of such Constellation contracts may not be terminated for 

convenience by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in fiscal 

year 2010.’’
12

At issue is the appearance that NASA’s actions on Constellation contracts may 

not be following directions in law and the implications that those actions have for 

progress on the Constellation Program—the current program of record that has been 

authorized by Congress and for which Congress has appropriated FY 2010 funds for 

implementation.

Justification and Analytical Basis for Cancellation

• In a September 15, 2009 hearing on the results of the Review of U.S. Human 

Space Flight Plans Committee, Chairman Gordon asked of the Review’s 

Chair, Mr. Norman Augustine, ‘‘we do have a program that has been authorized we have spent billions of dollars on . . . . So are you prepared to say that 

one or all of the other options are substantially better than Constellation and 

worth having a major turn now?’’

Æ Mr. Augustine responded ‘‘I think it would be our view just what you 

said, that there should be a compelling reason to change an existing program, and we believe that the existing program, given adequate funds, is 

executable and would carry out its objectives.’’

• In the Committee’s February 25, 2010 hearing on NASA’s Fiscal Year 2011 

Budget Request, Chairman Gordon noted: ‘‘the justification from moving from 

Constellation to a different approach is expense, and so if we-if it is not going 

to be less expensive, then there has to be a better explanation [of] . . . why this 

move.’’

• Since the FY 2011 budget release, additional details on the justification for 

the proposal to cancel rather than modify or restructure the Constellation 

program have not been provided. In addition, the actual cost to terminate the 

program is still not known.

• To understand the factual analysis that informed the Augustine committee, 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Chairwoman, Gabrielle Giffords sent 

a series of questions to the Aerospace Corporation, which was tasked to support the Augustine committee in its review. Regarding a full assessment of 

Constellation cost and schedule, Aerospace stated ‘‘Aerospace did not perform 

a traditional parametric or grass-roots Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) for 

the Constellation Program or its major elements . . . . Aerospace was tasked 

to perform a high-level schedule assessment of Constellation.’’

Issues Related to the Proposal to Include a Crew Rescue Vehicle 

In addition, in light of the change on April 15th that now includes a crew rescue 

vehicle (which could involve restructuring the Orion vehicle), the Congress will need 

to understand a number of issues including: what that vehicle will be, the acquisition approach that NASA will follow (restructuring the Orion contract or pursuing 

a new vehicle competition and development program), how NASA plans to address 

the cost and schedule for the rescue vehicle, the impacts of those costs on other 

NASA programs, and the plan and timeline for moving forward with a deep space 

crew exploration capsule.

Issues Related to Proposal to Include a Crew Rescue Vehicle

• What are the details of a crew rescue vehicle, including how many crew it will 

accommodate and how will the program be modified to meet the proposed 

timeline of ‘‘the next few years’’?

• What, if any, supporting infrastructure is needed for a crew rescue vehicle and 

what will it cost?

• What are the timeline and plans for deciding on and developing a crew capsule to explore destinations beyond low-Earth orbit and what costs are assumed for that development?

• What are the implications of the decision on a crew rescue vehicle on the civil 

servant and contractor workforce, as well as on the space industrial base?

• If the addition of a NASA funded crew rescue vehicle has reduced the capabilities that commercial crew systems will have to provide, will the $6 billion commercial crew budget be reduced accordingly? If not, why not?

To date, NASA has not provided this information to Congress.

• In his prepared statement for the April 22, 2010 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, NASA Administrator Bolden said: ‘‘Accommodating this effort within NASA’s budget 
13

will change the amounts requested for the programs described below [technology development and demonstration; heavy-lift and propulsion research 

and development; robotic exploration precursor]. An update to the NASA 

budget justification will be provided as soon as possible, but in the next few 

weeks.’’

• On May 12, 2010, Administrator Bolden testified at a Senate Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation hearing that ‘‘NASA expects to submit a revised 

FY 2011 budget request to Congress in the near future that will identify funding requirements for the restructured Orion crew capsule.’’ In addition, Mr. 

Bolden stated during the hearing that the Orion variant will launch on an 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), however there are no details on 

what the EELV would cost, whether design changes would be required, when 

the vehicle could be available and how it would be funded within the FY 2011 

budget plan for NASA.

• Prior to the April 15, 2010 announcement about Orion, Administrator Bolden 

was quoted in a March 30, 2010 article in Aviation Week and Space Technology as expressing his interest in a ‘‘common crew capsule’’ during a Senate 

Appropriations Hearing held on March 23, 2010. ‘‘For his part, Bolden says 

he favors development of a ‘common crew module’ that could fly on several different commercial launch vehicles.’’ According to the article Mr. Bolden also 

stated: ‘‘I would like to help the commercial entities design a single crew module, because it’s good for us to train,’’ he says. ‘‘You don’t have to train crews 

for multiple crew modules, and that can be used interchangeably on any 

launch vehicle.’’ It is not clear whether NASA has discussed this option with 

potential commercial crew providers, whether they have any interest in such 

an approach, and whether it is consistent with a ‘‘commercial’’ approach to 

crew transfer.

3. Is the Proposed ISS Extension Program Funded and Organized to Accommodate 

the Extension?

The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L. 110–422] states that ‘‘The Administrator shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the International Space Station 

remains a viable and productive facility capable of potential United States utilization 

through at least 2020.’’

The NASA FY 2011 budget request includes the proposal to extend use of the ISS 

beyond 2016, likely through 2020 or beyond, in order to utilize the orbiting facility 

as a basic research facility and a test bed for exploration technology development 

and demonstrations. NASA is requesting $2.78 billion in its proposed FY 2011 budget to support these efforts and to initiate activities to increase ISS functionality. 

Under the revised April 15th plan there are no changes to extension of the ISS, 

however the revised plan restructures Orion to ‘‘provide stand-by emergency escape 

capabilities for the Space Station.’’ There are several issues on the research and contingency plans to support enhanced utilization and an extension of the ISS that 

have yet to be defined.

Issues That Need to Be Addressed on ISS Extension

• The proposed FY 2011 budget plan does not make clear how much of the increase will be used to support enhanced ISS utilization. Although the budget 

proposes $50 million a year for ISS research as part of the budget for ISS 

operations, there are no details on what the budget would support. NASA has 

indicated to Committee staff that the content of the ISS research budget has 

not yet been defined.

• In addition, the budget request does not identify the proposed budget for 

microgravity research as mandated in Section 204 of the NASA Authorization 

Act of 2005 [P.L. 109–155]: ‘‘Beginning with fiscal year 2006, the Administrator shall allocate at least 15 percent of the funds budgeted for ISS research 

to ground-based, free flyer, and ISS life and microgravity science research that 

is not directly related to supporting the human exploration program.’’ Congress will need to understand the extent to which the budget request will support congressionally-mandated research and enhanced utilization of the ISS.

• Multiple users and stakeholders are discussed with respect to ISS utilization, 

including universities and basic researchers, NASA mission programs, commercial and private entities as well as other Federal agencies that are partners in the ISS National Laboratory. In his prepared statement to the Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in a hearing on U.S. 

Human Spaceflight held on May 12, 2010, Administrator Bolden stated that 
14

‘‘NASA will initiate an independent organization, as recommended by the Augustine Committee and the National Research Council that will support the 

space station research community.’’ Congress will need further details to understand how the priorities for utilization resources will be established among 

these users and stakeholders, the roles and responsibilities of this proposed 

independent organization and how it will be selected and funded.

• The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 directed NASA to develop a contingency 

plan for cargo transportation to and from the ISS should the commercial 

cargo services be delayed, unavailable for extended periods, or experience a 

failure. NASA’s ‘‘Logistics Contingency Plan for the International Space Station’’ transmitted to the Committee in response to the 2008 Authorization direction does not provide a clear contingency plan. The report stated that: 

‘‘Cargo vehicles require 2–3 years of lead time for production and processing, 

and international partner vehicles have a production schedule based on current predicted needs. There is no plan to have additional vehicles in production to cover for delays in commercial cargo services. However, actual cargo 

manifesting can be adjusted closer to the planned flight dates. Therefore, the 

primary contingency plan is to closely monitor on-orbit systems and cargo demands and adjust as needed. This may include not having to fly spares as 

soon as currently predicted, or reducing utilization to meet an emerging need.’’

While the proposed FY 2011 budget plan includes an extension of the ISS to 2020, 

Congress continues to lack several details and plans that are needed to ensure that 

the infrastructure, plans, and resources would be in place to support the ISS extension and utilization.

4. Should Congress Support the Proposal to Develop and then Rely on Commercial 

Cargo and Crew Capability as the Nation’s Access to Low Earth Orbit?

The proposed plan in the FY 2011 budget does not include a U.S. government capability to launch American astronauts and to deliver cargo to the ISS. NASA plans 

to rely on commercially provided cargo transportation services for ISS resupply 

starting in the 2011 timeframe using its Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contract. NASA is currently funding two partners in the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program to develop and demonstrate commercial cargo delivery capability to the ISS—Space Exploration Technologies Corporation and Orbital 

Sciences Corporation. 

When the Space Shuttle is retired, NASA anticipates that crew access to the ISS 

will be provided by acquiring seats on Russian Soyuz spacecraft until the 2016 timeframe. 

Under the president’s proposal, the agency plans to cease using Soyuz spacecraft 

at that time and anticipates using commercially-provided crew transport services instead. Funding in FY 2011 for ISS cargo/crew is about $857 million; a total of $5.77 

billion is projected for the period of FY 2011 through FY 2015. The FY 2011 budget 

requests an additional $312 million—a 62% increase in the cost of the COTS program—to expedite ISS cargo development and to help ensure mission success. According to NASA’s budget justification, ‘‘The Commercial Crew Program will provide 

$6 billion over the next five years to support the development of commercial crew 

transportation providers to whom NASA could competitively award a crew transportation services contract . . .’’ The revised April 15th plan makes no changes to the 

plan to rely on the use of commercial services to deliver cargo and crew to and from 

the ISS, although in adding a crew rescue vehicle, the revised April 15th plan eliminates the crew rescue requirement for potential commercial crew providers.

Does Congress Have the Analytical Basis to Support a Decision on Commercial 

Crew? 

In her opening statement for the March 24, 2010 Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics hearing on NASA’s human spaceflight programs, Chairwoman Giffords 

summarized the status of a series of issues examined at a series of Committee and 

subcommittee hearings held:

‘‘The clock is ticking. It is now almost two months since the Administration’s FY 

2011 budget request for NASA was submitted to Congress, and there are still too 

many unanswered questions surrounding it.’’

‘‘In place of good explanations and solid rationales for such sweeping and frankly 

puzzling changes, we have been given a combination of unpersuasive arguments and 

‘we’re working on the details’ responses.
15

For instance, the commercial crew proposal is lacking all of the basic information 

that a would-be investor would demand before committing funds to a project. For example:

• What’s the proposed cost to the government to develop these systems?

• How much, if any, of the development cost will be shared by the companies?

• How much will it cost NASA to buy these services?

• What else will NASA have to provide to make—and keep—the companies’ operations viable?

• When can we credibly expect these services to be operationally available and 

will they meet our expectation of what is safe enough?

• What recourse will NASA have if the companies fail to meet safety standards, 

cost, schedule and performance?

• Finally, is there any significant non-NASA market for these services; is it a 

viable one; and is it one we should use scarce tax dollars to promote?’’

It is now two months after the March hearing, the Committee still lacks critical 

details and information about the plan.

• It is unclear what the government is buying for the proposed $6 billion to foster the development of commercial crew capability—a capsule, a launch vehicle, or both? The FY 2011 budget request states that ‘‘Unlike the COTS program, which exclusively funded entirely new and integrated systems (launch 

vehicles plus capsules), this program will also be open to a broad range of 

commercial proposals including, but not limited to: human-rating existing 

launch vehicles, developing spacecraft for delivering crew to the ISS that can 

be launched on multiple launch vehicles, or developing new high-reliability 

rocket systems.’’

• NASA has provided no information as to whether the $6 billion requested is 

the government’s total share needed to complete the proposed commercial 

crew demonstrations or whether additional government support would be required for developing commercial crew capability. This information is purportedly to be informed by responses to a Request for Information, which was released on May 21, 2010.

Æ However, this issue takes on greater significance in light of comments reported in a recent issue of Space News by the director of business development for United Launch Alliance (ULA), one of the potential commercial crew transport providers. The April 5, 2010 article says that ‘‘As 

NASA devises its strategy for fostering development of a commercial successor to the space shuttle, the Nation’s primary rocket builder is cautioning the agency not to count on industry for a substantial upfront investment in an endeavor rife with uncertainty.’’

• In response to Chairwoman Giffords’ request noted earlier, the Aerospace 

Corporation stated that it was given the cost to assume in its affordability 

analyses for developing multiple commercial crew systems; it did not independently develop that cost.

• Details on the basis for the budget estimate of $6 billion for developing commercial crew capability are still needed.

Æ The Augustine committee report estimated the DDT&E cost to NASA 

would be $3 billion and would involve two commercial competitors and 

a government-provided rocket. The Aerospace Corporation’s responses to 

Chairwoman Giffords stated that: ‘‘Aerospace did not independently develop the basis for the $3B initial estimate. The Committee did not ask 

Aerospace to independently verb the $3 billion figure. In fact, no 

verification could be performed given the Committee’s statement that this 

dollar amount was simply NASA’s portion of the total cost.’’ The Aerospace responses also noted that ‘‘The Committee’s final estimate of the 

cost of the program to NASA was approximately $5 billion. It was assumed that additional private investment funding would be required to 

complete the DDT&E.’’

Æ NASA officials told Committee staff that NASA plans to use the $6 billion to support developing commercial crew capability in 3–4 companies.

Æ The Aerospace Corporation’s responses to Chairwoman Giffords further 

indicate the approximate cost estimate proposed by the Augustine committee is consistent with the historical cost of developing a single crew 

transportation system to carry 1–2 crew (Figure A.1). However, 
16

Aerospace’s analysis suggests that for a crew of 4, development costs for 

a crew capsule and a launch abort system could be substantially higher. 

When adding a launch vehicle, the costs could increase even more. Aerospace notes that ‘‘Gemini is the closest historical program to the commercial crew capsule. While we have chosen to plot development cost vs. crew 

size, the complexity of the system is a function of human-rating requirements, destination and capability.’’

Æ Indeed, the data plotted in the Aerospace responses give serious grounds 

for concern that the Augustine committee’s assumed cost estimate may 

understate the actual costs of developing commercial crew by at least a 

factor of two or more, especially when the additional cost of providing a 

‘‘suitable version of an existing booster,’’ e.g., human-rating an EELV, is 

added—something that Aerospace has independently estimated could cost 

up to an additional $11 billion, depending on the capsule/launch abort 

system chosen, if ground infrastructure costs are included. It goes without saying that given NASA’s constrained budget, the impact of any such 

cost growth in the proposed commercial crew program would have to be 

absorbed by NASA’s other programs.

Æ Given the lack of independent analysis provided to Congress to justify 

the $6 billion estimate and the Aerospace Corporation’s own analysis of 

potential commercial crew development costs, the credibility of NASA’s 

proposal remains to be demonstrated.

• In addition to the development cost, NASA has provided no independently derived estimates of the potential cost of procuring crew transportation services. 

According to the Aerospace Corporation, ‘‘The Committee provided the commercial crew transportation assumptions that assumed a price of $200M FY 

09 per flight at a rate of 2 flights per year. Using a historical cost growth factor for operational systems, Aerospace increased the cost per flight to $250M 

FY09. The Committee did not define the crew capacity of the commercial crew 

vehicle. Based on the 2 Gemini-class crew module discussed above . . . . the 

cost per seat would be on the order of $125M FY09 but would vary with crew 

size.’’

• The timeline for the availability of commercial crew is also in question. The 

Aerospace Corporation did not independently develop or verify the 2016 esti-
17

mate for the availability of the commercial crew capability. In fact, Aerospace 

was told to assume a date of 2016 for when a commercial capability would 

become available. Aerospace said that ‘‘The Committee provided the schedule 

estimate for the commercial crew scenario as an input assumption, which was 

then used for the subsequent affordability analyses.’’ Aerospace also said that 

it ‘‘has not performed any analysis or assessment of the length of time it would 

take to develop, demonstrate, and contract for an operational commercial crew 

transport service.’’

• Information on when the government will need to contract for crew services 

to meet an anticipated commercial crew timeframe and the cost of crew services is needed to evaluate the government’s complete plan and cost for getting 

American astronauts to the ISS on commercial vehicles.

Æ Aerospace raised questions related to the acquisition steps the government would need to follow to develop and procure commercial crew transport services—steps which Aerospace stated ‘‘typically take on the order 

of many months,’’ but the Augustine committee did not request any analysis of the impact of those steps on the cost or schedule for commercial 

crew—and there is no indication that the impact of those steps was considered when the Administration’s plan was formulated. Indeed, Aerospace said in response to one of Chairwoman Giffords’ questions that 

‘‘This is a critical question. While we raised these questions in the development of our work for the Committee, we were not tasked to develop this 

analysis. Subsequent to the release of the Committee Report, we have met 

with the NASA Administrator and key staff to discuss these issues. To our 

knowledge, NASA is currently evaluating these steps. Based on 

Aerospace’s prior experiences on a wide range of government acquisition 

activities, the acquisition-related steps are numerous, and include such 

steps as described in the Question 4 above. These steps typically take on 

the order of many months.’’

• Details on how development of a crew rescue vehicle for the ISS would ‘‘simplify requirements for other commercial crew providers’’ need to be understood 

in terms of, for example, any changes in the potential cost and schedule estimate for developing commercial crew capability. For example, will the simplification involve a consequent reduction in the $6 billion allocated for developing commercial crew capability?

• Details on which sector—government or commercial—would fund the needed 

supporting infrastructure, including mission control, have not been provided.

Æ In addition, details about programs that would support the commercial 

crew capability and a commercial space market are also needed. For example, the proposed FY 2011 budget also requests $428.6 million in FY 

2011 and $1.9 billion over five years for a 21st Century Space Launch 

Complex, in part to attract new customers, including potential commercial crew companies, to the Florida space range. NASA has not provided 

the requirements for the proposed complex, a detailed plan for the initiative, or a rationale for the funding requested. In addition, the administration has not provided a break-out of how the money would be spent. The 

requirements for the proposed Complex will be derived from a Request 

for Information that NASA plans to issue in the near term, according to 

NASA officials who briefed Committee staff on the status of planning for 

the Complex. Although NASA officials indicate that detailed planning for 

the proposed Complex would involve interaction with the U.S. Air Force, 

which operates the Cape Canaveral Air Station, the Air Force is currently in the process of analyzing its launch enterprise strategy for which 

it has requested $51 million in FY 2011 for launch modernization at 

Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg—a funding level that is almost an 

order-of-magnitude less than is being proposed just for the Cape in 

NASA’s FY 2011 budget request. Without details on the requirements for 

the Space Launch Complex, a detailed plan, a rationale for the level of 

funds requested and further information on how the money would be 

spent, it will be difficult for Congress to evaluate the credibility or urgency of the 21st Century Space Launch Complex initiative.

Another policy issue to be addressed in considering the proposal to turn U.S. astronaut transportation over to the private sector is the extent of the government’s 

role in supporting and sustaining a ‘‘commercial’’ market. 
18

In his opening statement at the Committee’s February 25, 2010 hearing on 

NASA’s Fiscal Year Budget Request, Chairman Gordon posed the following questions:

• ‘‘Do you have concrete evidence that you can provide us that shows that there 

will be sufficient non-NASA commercial crew transport markets to keep these 

companies viable, or is NASA going to be on the hook to do whatever it takes 

to keep them in business since NASA will have no other means of getting into 

orbit?’’ ‘‘That is, will NASA’s actions make these companies ‘‘too important to 

fail’’ despite the lack of any significant existing markets for their proposed 

services—with all of the implications for the American taxpayer inherent in 

that phrase?’’

Æ In response, Administrator Bolden stated: that ‘‘unfortunately, it is not—

we at NASA have not done any market surveys nor have . . . I offered 

to do that or asked to do it, so I am depending upon surveys and information that has come from the industry themselves.’’

According to an unofficial transcript of a hearing that reviewed NASA’s human 

spaceflight plans held by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on May 12, 2010, NASA Administrator Bolden stated:

• ‘‘I have always said, I will do everything in my power to facilitate the success 

of the commercial entities in access to low-Earth orbit. I have to have that.’’ 

He also said, ‘‘You know, I have to look at the possibility that the commercial 

sector may have difficulty, and we will do everything in my power to facilitate 

their success.’’

• Captain Eugene Cernan testified at that same hearing that Mr. Bolden discussed with him his concern about when commercial crew capability might 

become available, had said that NASA might have to subsidize them, and 

that ‘‘it may be a bailout like GM and Chrysler; as a matter of fact, it may 

be the largest bailout in history,’’ according to the unofficial transcript of the 

hearing.

Does Congress Have the Facts and Analysis to Have Confidence in the Safety of Proposed Commercial Crew Services? 

The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics examined several issues related to 

safety and human spaceflight in its December 2009 hearing, ‘‘Ensuring the Safety 

of Human Space Flight.’’ The hearing made clear that establishing and enforcing 

safety standards for the transport of crew on commercially provided orbital crew 

transportation services is in many ways uncharted territory. A process has yet to 

be advanced by the government on how the ‘‘airworthiness’’ of commercial 

spaceflight vehicles used to transport government passengers will be ‘‘certified.’’ Several issues need to be addressed in order for Congress to have the data and analysis 

of how safety will be ensured in proposed commercial human spaceflight systems. 

In her opening statement at that hearing, Chairwoman Giffords said:

• ‘‘As several of the witnesses at today’s hearing will testify, the Constellation 

program strove to respond to the recommendations of the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board in the design of Ares and Orion.

• The result is a system that is calculated to be significantly safer than the 

Space Shuttle, and 2 to 3 times safer than the alternative approaches considered by NASA.

• Given that, I think the burden of proof has to be put on those who would deviate from Constellation program to demonstrate that their alternative crew 

transportation systems will be at least as safe, if not safer than the Ares/Orion 

system.’’

Addressing the latter issue that Chairwoman Giffords raised involves several 

questions and issues:

• What will be required to verify commercial providers’ compliance with future 

government-developed safety standards for human spaceflight?

• Commercial companies are currently developing launch systems that would 

potentially be used to carry crew. What are the implications of implementing 

safety standards after a vehicle has been designed and developed?

• What is needed to develop and implement new safety processes, testing and 

verification procedures?

• What is involved in establishing a new regulatory regime for certification?
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• What training and familiarization with non-NASA crewed spacecraft and 

launch vehicles would astronauts flying on such non-NASA spacecraft and 

launch vehicles need in order to deal with off-nominal conditions, contingency 

operations and emergencies?

• What contingencies would be in place should commercial crew providers experience delays, failures, or be unavailable for an extended period of time?

• How will any differences in safety risk among potential crew transportation 

systems be addressed, even if those systems meet safety standards?

Mr. John Marshall, a member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel who testified at the hearing made a comment in his prepared statement: ‘‘there is no cookiecutter approach to safety in space.’’ Mr. Marshall articulated in his prepared statement several challenges that need to be addressed in ensuring the safety of NASA 

astronauts on commercial crew transportation providers to low-Earth orbit:

Æ ‘‘Establishing detailed safety requirements that NASA deems essential to 

safe flight. These must be in a clear and enforceable form that can be 

placed on contract(s) and tested for compliance.

Æ . . . establishing minimum acceptable safety levels to guide system designs and set the baseline for both NASA and their contractors as to what 

is ‘safe enough’ is critical.

Æ Even with clear safety requirements and levels, much of the inherent safety of complex systems like spacecraft depends upon the design choices and 

decisions where risks are weighed against performance, costs, and of 

course, schedules. An open and effective system has been developed within 

NASA to accomplish this. A similar process needs to be institutionalized 

by any commercial provider as well, whereby all potential hazards are 

properly vetted by both government and contractors. This will not be easy 

and may require more than the ‘hands off’ approach envisions by some.

Æ Establishing disciplined program and process-related checks and balances 

so that NASA can verify that the contractor has evidence of compliance 

with the launch vehicle design requirements in the as-built vehicle and 

successful completion of the activities necessary to demonstrate mission 

readiness.’’

In discussions about safety, there have been repeated references to NASA’s oversight of safety for any commercial crew system. Accordingly, in testimony to the 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation’s May 12, 2010 hearing on the future of U.S. human spaceflight, Dr. John Holdren, Director of the Office 

of Science and Technology Policy said, ‘‘Safety will remain under the oversight of 

NASA. This gentleman on my left was in charge of safety for the Astronaut Corps 

when he was an astronaut. He knows how important that is. While Charlie Bolden 

is Administrator of NASA, there’s going to be no shortfall in the oversight of the private sector in delivering astronauts to Earth orbit in terms of safety. I just wanted 

to make that one point because it has come up from time to time.’’ What ‘‘oversight’’ 

means in terms of NASA’s role and the costs to accomplish the oversight have not 

been discussed and needs to be understood.

5. Should Congress Support NASA’s Advanced Technology Initiatives?

According to NASA, the agency’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 

(ESMD) will manage activities aimed at advancing technologies needed to expand 

human exploration opportunities, reduce mission costs, and contribute NASA innovation to broader national challenges and applications, will be funded in and managed by ESMD. ESMD’s Exploration Technology and Demonstrations activities are 

proposed to be funded at $652.4 million in FY 2011; a total of $7.82 billion is projected for the period of FY 2011 through FY 2015 to develop and carry out flagship 

technology projects. 

ESMD will also lead research and development (R&D) activities related to space 

launch propulsion technologies. The agency proposes in its budget justification that 

this propulsion R&D effort include development of a U.S. first-stage hydrocarbon engine for potential use in future heavy lift (and other) launch systems, as well as 

basic research in areas such as new propellants, advanced propulsion materials 

manufacturing techniques, combustion processes and engine health monitoring. The 

proposed FY 2011 funding level for heavy lift and propulsion technology is $559 million; a total of $3.1 billion is projected for the period of FY 2011 through FY 2015. 

The April 15th plan included a decision date for a heavy lift vehicle by 2015. The 

issues related to heavy lift are described in a later section of the charter. 

In addition, the FY 2011 budget request proposes a program of robotic precursor 

missions to send spacecraft to ‘‘to candidate destinations for human exploration such 
20

as the Moon, Mars and its moons, Lagrange points, and nearby asteroids to scout 

targets for future human activities, and identify hazards and resources that will determine the future course of expanding human civilization into space.’’ The FY 2011 

budget plan proposes an investment of $125 million in FY 2011 and a total of about 

$3 billion for FY 2011- 2015 on the robotic precursor program. The revised April 

15th plan makes no changes to the proposed robotic precursor mission program.

Issues Related to Advanced Technology Initiatives

• In his testimony to the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee hearing on May 12, 2010, Administrator Bolden provided a list of the 

initial technology development projects that will be pursued as part of the advanced technology programs as well as list of the dates by which those 

projects will be completed. His prepared statement, however, cautions that 

the initial plans may change: ‘‘Please note these are preliminary ESMD plans 

that may need to be modified following finalization of Agency plans regarding 

the restructuring of the Orion crew capsule.’’

• A recently released pre-publication version of a report by the National Academies, Capabilities for the Future. An Assessment of NASA Laboratories for 

Basic Research stated that ‘‘The fundamental research community at NASA 

has been severely impacted by the budget reductions that are responsible for 

this decrease in laboratory capabilities, and as a result NASA’s ability to support even NASA’s future goals is in serious jeopardy.’’ The study found that ‘‘Over 80 percent of NASA facilities are more than 40 years old and need significant maintenance and upgrades to preserve safety and continuity of operations for critical missions.’’ The report further stated that ‘‘Deferred mainte- nance grew from $1.77 billion to $2.46 billion from 2004 to 2009, presenting 

a staggering repair and maintenance bill for the future.’’ In addition, ‘‘The 

equipment and facilities at NASA’s fundamental research laboratories are inferior to those . . . at comparable laboratories at DOE, at top-tier universities, 

and at many corporate research institutions.’’ The president’s budget request 

does not appear to contain specific funds to deal with the facilities issues 

raised in the National Academies report.

• In his prepared statement to the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics’ 

hearing held on March 24, 2010, Mr. A. Thomas Young, Lockheed Martin 

(ret.), stated: ‘‘The technology program identified in the proposed budget lacks 

definition and focus.’’

Congress needs the details on the basis and justification for the funding levels 

proposed for the technology programs, an understanding of the priorities for the programs and how they relate to the overall strategy and the implications of the need 

to fund a crew rescue vehicle on the technology initiatives. To date, this information 

has not been provided.

6. Should Congress Support the Plan to Make a Decision on a Heavy-Lift Vehicle 

by 2015?

The Constellation Program includes the Ares V cargo launch vehicle which, according to the FY 2010 budget request for NASA, ‘‘is designed to provide the heavylift capability for the Constellation architecture. The vehicle consists of a 6-engine 

core stage, two five-and-half segment solid rocket boosters, and an Earth departure 

stage (EDS) powered by a restartable J–2X engine. The EDS serves as the vehicle’s 

second stage, and is key to injecting the lunar lander and EDS stack into the low 

Earth orbit staging for rendezvous and dock with Orion. After the EDS performs the 

trans-lunar injection burn for the lander and Orion, it will be jettisoned.’’

The proposed human spaceflight plan does not include development of a heavylift vehicle. Instead the plan focuses on research and development in heavy-lift capabilities that would inform a decision on a launch vehicle. This is a point of departure 

from the Augustine committee report—often referenced as a key input into the proposed new plan—which included the importance of a heavy-lift launch vehicle 

among its principal findings. Mr. Augustine noted in testimony to the Senate Committee on Science, Transportation, and Commerce on May 12, 2010 that a key difference between the Augustine committee’s Option 5B and the administration’s plan 

is that: ‘‘One is that our option went ahead with the development of the heavy-lift 

launch vehicle right away, rather than wait up to 5 years.’’

To demonstrate a concrete timetable and commitment for expanding human exploration further into space, the president announced in his April 15, 2010 remarks 

that, in addition to investing in heavy-lift technologies, NASA would ‘‘finalize a 

rocket design no later than 2015 and then begin to build it. That’s at least two years 

earlier than previously planned . . . .’’ The Office of Science and Technology Fact 
21

Sheet on the president’s April 15th address stated that ‘‘This new rocket would eventually lift future deep-space spacecraft to enable humans to expand our reach toward 

Mars and the rest of the Solar System. This new rocket would take advantage of the 

new technology investments proposed in the budget—primarily a $3.1 billion investment over five years on heavy-lift R&D.’’ That Fact Sheet calls out ‘‘development of 

a U.S. first-stage hydrocarbon engine for potential use in future heavy lift (and other) 

launch systems.’’

While the date of 2015 has been proposed as a decision point on the heavy-lift 

vehicle, it is not clear what that decision point means.

• In his prepared statement for the May 12, 2010 Senate Commerce, Science 

and Transportation hearing on U.S. human spaceflight plans, Dr. John 

Holdren, director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, stated: ‘‘The 

President also directed in his speech that NASA be in a position to select a 

heavy-lift rocket design by no later than 2015 for its future mission beyond 

Earth’s orbit.’’ Dr. Holdren’s statement went on to say that ‘‘It is currently anticipated that this decision would set the general configuration of the vehicle, 

as well as target performance levels and other attributes. A more detailed and 

mature design for this vehicle likely would need to be completed following this 

initial decision, as part of a subsequent development effort.’’

• In his prepared statement for the Senate hearing, Mr. Bolden said, ‘‘the President specifically recognized the need for a heavy lift launch capability to carry 

humans beyond LEO by requiring a decision a vehicle design no later than 

2015. Such a decision would include setting performance goals, identifying lift 

capability and selecting the general vehicle design—work that will ultimately 

lay the path for launching a spacecraft for crewed missions into deep space.’’

By 2015, will NASA be in the position of building a vehicle, having completed 

most of the design and development process, or will NASA be in the position of just 

having defined which type of vehicle to design and develop? What is the return on 

the $3.1 billion investment that Congress is being asked to support? These potentially different decision milestones in 2015 will have significant implications for the 

timeline of developing a heavy-lift vehicle to support exploration beyond low-Earth 

orbit and to achieve the administration’s goal of human travel to a near-Earth asteroid by 2025.

What Additional Information Does the Congress Need Regarding the Proposed Heavy 

Lift Launch Vehicle? 

NASA’s May 2010 Request for Information on ‘‘Heavy Lift Launch System and 

Propulsion Technology’’ requests that industry ‘‘Provide information regarding your 

potential launch or space transportation architectures (expendable, reusable, or a hybrid system) that could meet multiple customer needs (e.g., NASA, DoD, and Commercial).’’ The Request for Information raises a number of questions: What is 

NASA’s strategy for developing heavy-lift capability? Will DOD co-fund the development? Will the system be designed to meet multiple agency requirements, and if so, 

what are the advantages and disadvantages to this approach? How does the involvement of other agencies and the commercial sector affect the timeline and process 

for moving forward on a heavy-lift architecture? 

In addition, according to NASA’s planning timeline, NASA would fund development leading to a hydrocarbon engine demonstration that would occur in the 2015 

timeframe; an operational hydrocarbon engine would be available in the early 

2020s. NASA has not provided a rationale for completing an engine development 

program in parallel with developing a heavy-lift launch architecture that may or 

may not use that engine. Important questions remain regarding how an engine research and development program will proceed and when a heavy-lift vehicle would 

be available to support crewed missions beyond low-Earth orbit. NASA has explained that prior to sending a crewed mission to an asteroid in 2025, several 

crewed precursor flights would be needed including cislunar and circumlunar missions. Without supporting details to establish when the required spacecraft, heavy 

lift vehicle and other required systems will be in place, the timeline for achieving 

a human mission to an asteroid must remain uncertain. 

Congress needs to understand:

• When will a heavy-lift vehicle need to be ready, including an operational new 

engine if one is used, in order to support initial circumlunar and cislunar missions in preparation for a crewed mission to an asteroid in 2025? Is NASA’s 

plan viable?

• What are the estimated costs of developing a new engine and how do they compare to the anticipated long-term cost savings for that engine? How does it 
22

compare to the cost of pursuing evolvable heavy lift capabilities using the Constellation architecture approach?

• When will a crew exploration vehicle for travel beyond low-Earth orbit need 

to be ready to support initial circumlunar and cislunar missions proposed to 

take place prior to 2025? When does a decision on that vehicle and subsequent 

development need to take place to support that timeline? Is NASA’s plan viable?

• Will the success or failure of heavy lift research and development and other 

advanced technologies, such as in-space refueling, dictate where and when 

human exploration missions can be conducted?

• Will the heavy lift vehicle be a government or commercially provided system?

7. To What Extent Can the Plan that Congress is Being Asked to Support Be Executed Within the Proposed Budget?

Among its principal conclusions the Augustine Committee found that:

• The current U.S. human spaceflight program is on an ‘‘unsustainable trajectory,’’

• ‘‘Human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 

budget guideline,’’ and

• ‘‘Meaningful human exploration is possible under a less-constrained budget, 

increasing annual expenditures by approximately $3 billion in real purchasing 

power above the FY 2010 guidance.’’

The goal of a sustainable human spaceflight program is stated as a recurring 

theme of the FY 2011 budget request: ‘‘The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 

(ESMD) will lead the Nation on a course of discovery and innovation that will provide the technologies, capabilities and infrastructure required for sustainable, affordable human presence in space.’’ Following the president’s remarks on revisions to his 

proposed human spaceflight strategy, Presidential Science Advisor, Dr. John 

Holdren characterized the president’s new plan as ‘‘more flexible, more practical, 

more productive, and more affordable, but also more visionary’’ than the existing 

plan. 

According to Mr. Augustine, who spoke at the April 15th Kennedy Space Center 

event, the overall portfolio of the proposed plan is ‘‘very close to’’ the Augustine committee’s proposed option 5B. As described in the Augustine committee report, option 

5B ‘‘employs an EELV-heritage commercial heavy-lift launcher and assumes a different (and significantly reduced) role for NASA. It has an advantage of potentially 

lower operational costs, but requires significant restructuring of NASA . . . . The 

choice between NASA and EELV heritage is driven by potentially lower development 

and operations cost (favoring EELV-heritage systems) is driven by potentially lower 

development and operations cost (favoring the EELV-heritage systems) vs. continuity 

of NASA’s system design, development and mission assurance knowledge and experience, which would provide higher probability of successful and predictable developments (favoring NASA systems). EEL V-heritage launch systems, due to their lower 

payload performance, would require significantly greater launch and mission complexity to achieve the same total mass in orbit. The EELV option would also entail 

substantial reductions in the NASA workforce and closure offacilities necessary to obtain the expected cost reductions.’’

It is worth noting that DOD is reported to be developing plans for replacing its 

existing EELVs due to escalating costs of the EELV program. Furthermore, in the 

near term, DOD has expressed concern about the impact producing a human-rated 

EELV might have on the Air Force. In a recent interview in Defense News, the Air 

Force’s Deputy Undersecretary for Space Programs said: 

‘‘If some commercial company or companies want to use the EELV for human access to the space station, we’d have to look very closely at changes to the rockets’ design in order to accommodate people. And any of those changes we’d have to manage 

very closely so that they don’t ripple in to the Air Force design, which has been very 

successful with 31 successes out of 31 attempts. My view is, if it works, don’t fix it.’’

When it analyzed the integrated options described in its report, including option 

5B, the Augustine committee used two budget scenarios: the FY 2010 budget request for human spaceflight, as directed within the Augustine committee’s charter, 

and a ‘‘less-constrained planning budget’’ that increased ‘‘from the FY 2010 budget 

number to a sum $3 billion higher in 2014, and then rose at an expected inflation 

rate of 2.4 percent thereafter’’. 

Table 1, below, shows the year by year budget figures projected for the Augustine 

committee’s less constrained scenario, the FY 2010 budget request, extended with 

inflation (as prepared by the Aerospace Corporation for the Augustine committee), 
23

and the FY 2011 budget request, also extended with inflation. The budget figures 

for the Augustine committee’s less constrained scenario and the FY 2010 budget request include the Space Shuttle, ISS, total Exploration budgets, and Exploration infrastructure sustainment at KSC. The FY 2011 budget column includes the same 

elements, the 21st Century Launch Complex and half of the Space Technology Program (minus the Innovative Partnership Program budget), with the assumption that 

half of Space Technology investments will be devoted to Science. What becomes 

clear from Table 1 is the growing gap between what the Augustine committee found 

was necessary for ‘‘meaningful human exploration’’ and what is requested within the 

FY 2010 and FY 2011 budgets for NASA’s human spaceflight programs and exploration technology development as one looks at the outyear budget totals. While the 

overall FY 2011 NASA budget includes a $6 billion increase over five years above 

the FY 2010 budget, Table 1 shows a significant gap between the Augustine committee’s less constrained scenario and the FY 2010 and FY 2011 budget projections for 

human spaceflight/ technology programs. Under the administration’s FY 2011 budget request, the new strategy proposed for human spaceflight, while similar to the 

Augustine committee’s Option 5B, would be funded at a level that falls almost $11 

billion below the Augustine committee’s projected resource need for that content 

within the first five years (from FY 2010–FY 2015) of implementation. That gap 

grows to $27 billion over ten years and by FY 2025, the FY 2011 budget guidance 

falls $47 billion short of what the Augustine committee determined would be necessary for a meaningful exploration program. 

As part of its conclusions, the Augustine committee found that there was no ‘‘reasonable exploration program (e.g., with different heavy-lift vehicles, or a different exploration destination) [that] would fit within the FY 2010 budget guidance.’’ In addition, in the chapter on ‘‘Concluding Observations’’ the Augustine committee states 

that ‘‘Perhaps the greatest contributor to risk in the space program, both human and 

financial, is seeking to accomplish extraordinarily difficult tasks with resources inconsistent with the demands on those tasks.’’ Mr. Augustine echoed this guidance in 

his testimony on May 12, 2010 to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation: ‘‘The most important request I would make to this Committee on behalf of my colleagues on the Human Space Flight Committee was that whatever program is approved, that its goals match the budget. Otherwise, I think we’ll all be 

back here ten years from now having this same discussion.’’ The comparisons shown 

in Table 1 do not provide grounds for confidence that the proposed FY 11 strategy 

is sustainable, affordable and matched to the resources requested for it.
24

8. What Will Be the Impacts to the Human Spaceflight Workforce and Industrial 

Base Under the Proposed Human Spaceflight Strategy?

The retirement of the Space Shuttle and the proposed direction for NASA will 

have major implications for the U.S. aerospace workforce and space industrial base. 

In conceiving the Constellation Program, NASA integrated measures to facilitate 

the transition of the Space Shuttle workforce to Constellation; the industrial base 

was also considered. In implementing Constellation, NASA had established a bridge 

so that a number of Shuttle and Space Station employees could devote a portion of 

their time to developing experience and skills that are relevant to the Constellation 

Program and that will facilitate their eventual transition to Constellation. 

The proposed new direction for NASA’s human spaceflight programs raises new 

issues and questions about the critical skills and knowledge of human spaceflight 

operations that will need to be sustained over time, the ability to attract new talent 

to the aerospace workforce and the potential state of the U.S. space industrial base. 

In particular, what are the critical workforce skills and industrial capabilities that 

need to be preserved as national assets, and what are the most effective ways to 

preserve those assets? What would any significant cutback or change in direction 

from the current Constellation Program mean for the aerospace workforce and space 

industrial base? These issues and questions were examined in a Committee on 

Science and Technology hearing on December 10, 2009 on Decisions on the Future 

Direction and Funding for NASA. What Will They Mean for the U.S. Aerospace 

Workforce and Industrial Base? 

As Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Chairwoman Giffords stated in her 

opening remarks:
25

• ‘‘Make no mistake about it. The decisions we collectively make about the future 

of our space program will have a lasting impact on our workforce, our industrial base, and our standing in the world.

• As a result, I want our witnesses to give us their views on what we need to 

consider when making those decisions so that the outcome will inspire our best 

and brightest to pursue careers in aerospace-careers that will be vital to our 

future competitiveness, national security, and quality of life.’’

Witnesses at that hearing commented on the link between the NASA workforce 

and industrial base and national security, how long-term experience affects the success of human spaceflight and the need for continued, engaging participation in inspiring programs to maintain and pass on that experience to the next generation. 

Mr. A. Thomas Young, Lockheed Martin (ret.) stated:

• ‘‘. . . spaceflight is not a typical technological activity. Because of the special 

characteristics of spaceflight . . . a workforce is required that has the culture 

and capabilities aligned with these characteristics. A workforce with the necessary intellectual strengths and possibly even more important, the experience 

and longevity to establish the sensitivity as to what is required for spaceflight 

success. Today in government, universities and industry we have such a workforce. It has evolved over decades of extraordinary successes and tragic failures 

. . . . It is truly a national treasure. Without a challenging and meaningful 

space program, this national capability will atrophy.’’

Ms. Marion Blakey, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Aerospace Industries Association stated:

• ‘‘NASA is linked to the health of our industrial base . . . . we must also view 

these jobs as a national resource critical to our nation’s technological capability and our national security. Aerospace talent lost to other industries may 

be unrecoverable; new workers may take years to train. Additionally, if we lose 

certain facilities that manufacture high-tech technologies, it may take years 

and additional resources to bring them back.’’

• ‘‘this decision [on human spaceflight], has a genuine impact on our national 

security because you must remember that some of these particularly smaller 

companies with unique capabilities and technologies . . . in fact also support 

that fragile national security supply chain.’’

Dr. Richard Aubrecht, Moog Inc. stated:

• ‘‘The people that we had that did the Space Shuttle and did the Apollo program, they are about to retire, and the thing we are looking for the Constellation to be is the transition to the next generation of people and to do the mentoring . . . It goes from person to person. It is not in the drawings.’’

Although the administration has proposed a number of steps to address workforce 

issues, the following section illustrates the immature status of some of those proposals and an overall lack of clarity to date on how the workforce initiatives will 

work in an integrated fashion.

How Many New Jobs Will the Proposed Human Spaceflight Plan Create? 

The president’s revised plan for NASA ‘‘leads to more than 2,500 additional jobs 

in Florida’s Kennedy Space Center area by 2012’’ and ‘‘Jumpstarts a new commercial 

space transportation industry to provide safe and efficient crew and cargo transportation to the Space Station . . . projected to create over 10,000 jobs nationally,’’ according to the OSTP Fact Sheet. 

In addition, ‘‘the Administration is launching a $40 million, multi-agency initiative to help the Space Coast transform its economy and prepare its workers for the 

opportunities of tomorrow,’’ according to an OSTP Fact Sheet on Florida’s Space 

Workers and the New Approach to Human Spaceflight. Accordingly, in his remarks 

at the Kennedy Space Center on April 15th, the president proposed ‘‘a $40 million 

initiative—led by a high-level team from the White House, NASA, and other agencies—to develop a plan for regional economic growth and job creation.’’ He directed 

the plan to be delivered to him by August 15, 2010. In his prepared statement for 

the May 12, 2010 Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee hearing 

on NASA’s human spaceflight plans, Mr. Bolden stated that ‘‘The $40 million for 

this initiative will be taken from the funds requested for Constellation transition in 

the original FY 2011 Presidential budget request.’’

On May 3, 2010, The White House established a Task Force on Space Industry 

Workforce and Economic Development ‘‘to develop, in collaboration with local stakeholders, an interagency action plan to facilitate economic development strategies and 
26

plans along the Space Coast and to provide training and other opportunities for affected aerospace workers so they are equipped to contribute to new developments in 

America’s space program and related industries. The Secretary of Commerce and the 

Administrator of NASA shall serve as Co-Chairs of the Task Force.’’ The program 

‘‘shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability 

of appropriations.’’

As part of its functions, the Task Force is directed to ‘‘provide leadership and coordination of Federal Government resources to facilitate workforce and economic development opportunities for aerospace communities and workers affected by new developments in America’s space exploration program.’’ In addition, the Task Force is 

directed to develop a plan that, among other things, ‘‘recommends how best to invest 

$40 million in transition assistance funding to ensure robust workforce and economic 

development in those communities within Florida affected by transitions in America’s 

space exploration program’’. No similar initiatives or funds have been announced for 

other regions affected by the cancellation of Constellation. 

NASA has not provided details on the rationale for the estimated jobs to be created, the types of jobs that will be created, and the extent to which the new jobs 

at the Kennedy Space Center will help offset the workforce decline that will follow 

the Space Shuttle retirement. An April 13, 2010 New York Times article notes that 

a senior administration official pointed to a study conducted by the Tauri Group, 

a consulting firm, and financed by the Commercial Spaceflight Federation, as the 

source of the estimated 10,000 jobs to be created by the commercial space transportation industry. It is not clear whether NASA or the administration has independently verified this estimate as part of its projected level of jobs to be created through 

commercial crew and cargo programs. 

In addition, the proposed new strategy—specifically the cancellation of the Constellation Program—reportedly could have significant implications for the health of 

the solid rocket motor industrial base, which also supports ballistic missile programs. At a February 25, 2010 Committee on Science and Technology hearing on 

‘‘NASA’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request and Issues,’’ the Committee requested 

that the Administrator provide details on the extent to which NASA consulted the 

Department of Defense on the FY 2011 budget plan and the implications it will have 

on the industrial base and with whom in the Defense Department NASA consulted. 

NASA has not yet provided those details.

Questions and Information Needed to Inform Congress’ Decision

• To what extent do the projected commercial-sector jobs preserve the critical 

U.S. knowledge base of human spaceflight operations?

• What types of jobs would the new positions involve and at what skill levels? 

To what extent would those commercial-sector jobs help mitigate the projected 

job losses to be experienced by the retirement of the Space Shuttle and the proposed cancellation of the Constellation program?

• What assumptions, if any, have been made about the geographical locations 

of the projected new commercial-sector jobs?

• Is the Space Industry and Workforce Economic Development initiative expected 

to require funding beyond FY 2011, and if so how much?

• Which agency(ies) will be in charge of implementing this plan?
27

Chairman GORDON. This meeting will come to order, and good 

morning, everyone. 

As our first order of business, I want to remind everyone that 

given the importance of the subject of this hearing, it should come 

as no surprise that we have gotten some interest from members 

outside of this Committee, and it is the intent of us to try to accommodate them the best we can in terms of space and time. I also 

want to remind everyone that the non-Committee members will 

only be recognized after all the Committee members have an opportunity to be recognized, and if necessary, they may have to put 

their statements in the record. So without objection, Mr. Posey, Mr. 

Bishop and Dr. Griffith will be permitted to join us on the dais for 

this hearing. 

Now I would like to yield to Mr. Rohrabacher for a recognition. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to take this opportunity to point out in our audience 

today we have with us Apollo astronaut Rusty Schweickart, and 

Rusty flew in Apollo 9. Rusty, could you stand up and say hello to 

us? Thank you. 

Rusty flew in Apollo 9, testing critical procedures and systems 

which enabled the future success of Apollo programs. He is today 

chairman of the board of the B–612 Foundation, a nonprofit foundation that champions the development and testing of spacecraft 

concepts that are designed to protect the Earth from near-Earth 

objects and asteroid impacts. Thank you very much for being with 

us today. 

And Mr. Chairman, I have a statement by Mr. Schweickart that 

I would like to submit for the record. 

[Information follows prepared statement of Chairman Gordon.] 

Chairman GORDON. With no objection, so ordered. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman GORDON. When the fiscal year 2011 NASA budget request was released almost four months ago, it contained major 

changes to the NASA program that had been authorized and funded by Congress over the past five years. Among those changes, the 

Administration’s request proposed canceling the Constellationbased exploration program on the grounds that it was unexecutable 

under foreseeable budgets. In contrast, the proposed new budget 

for NASA was described as a budget that puts NASA on a sustainable path for space exploration. 

Since that time, this Committee as well as other committees of 

the Congress, have been trying to get the information we need to 

make informed decisions about the Administration’s plan as we 

prepare for authorization and appropriations actions. When we had 

Administrator Bolden before us in February, there was precious little information and analysis that NASA could provide us in support 

of that budget request. When Chairman Giffords had NASA testify 

in March on the proposed new plan for human spaceflight, the outcome was the same: more new questions than answers. 

Then on April 15, the president announced revisions to his NASA 

plan, adding a new crew rescue vehicle development program, a 

human mission to the near-Earth asteroid by 2025, and a decision 

by 2015 on the development of a new heavy lift launch vehicle, in 
28

essence, directing NASA to pursue a program very similar to one 

of the options proposed by the Augustine Committee. 

There are legitimate debates that members can have concerning 

the choices made in the President’s plan about which destinations 

to pursue, the appropriate role of the commercial sector, and what 

type of technology program makes the most sense. Yet those debates ultimately won’t matter unless the Administration’s plan actually is doable under the Administration’s proposed budget. It 

does no good to cancel a program that the Administration characterizes as unexecutable if the program is simply replaced with a 

new plan that can’t be executed either. 

That is the issue before us today, and Administrator Bolden, to 

be blunt, the burden of proof is on your shoulders to make the case 

that you have an executable program. So what we need to hear 

from you, and let me cite three specific issues. As you know, one 

of the most significant findings of the Augustine Committee was, 

and I quote, ‘‘Human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline.’’

We have now taken a close look at your proposed human 

spaceflight plan and technology development budget plan, and this 

is what we have found. Your budget for human spaceflight and 

technology provides about the same amount of funding through fiscal year 2015 as the not viable fiscal year 2010 budget guidance. 

Equally importantly, your budget guidance program through 2025, 

the date of your proposed first human mission to an asteroid, is 

$40 or 50 billion lower than the amount the Augustine panel determined would be needed to implement any of its exploration options. 

Second, in his April 15th speech, the President directed NASA to 

develop a new crew rescue vehicle for the ISS that would be flying 

within the next few years, but he didn’t add any money to your 

budget to do it. And I understand that NASA’s preliminary estimate indicates that it could cost $5 to $10 billion to develop such 

a vehicle, and that the number doesn’t include the annual cost to 

launch it and to operate the vehicle once it is operational. That is 

not to argue that we shouldn’t be developing a spacecraft that can 

provide the basis for exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. One clearly will be needed. But it is another troubling indication that the 

plan that has been sent over to Congress has a great many loose 

ends and unexamined assumptions. 

Third, the fiscal year 2011 budget plan assumes that multiple 

commercial crew systems can be developed over the next five years 

for a total cost of $6 billion. However, analysis done by the Aerospace Corporation and even NASA’s own estimate for the development cost of a simple crew rescue vehicle argue that the proposed 

commercial crew development budget is likely to be low by a factor 

of two or more. 

The burden of proof has to be on you and the White House to 

justify the cost estimate, and so far we have not seen any hard 

analysis from the Administration that would give us confidence 

that it can be done for the amount budgeted. Given your statement 

that you will do what is needed to make the commercial providers 

succeed, the consequences of such an underestimation could be devastating to the rest of NASA’s programs. 
29

We all share the goals of inspiring and innovating and exploring. 

Let me be clear: I have no interest in having to have another Augustine Committee in five years. Your task today is to convince this 

Committee that this is truly well thought out, responsible budget 

with an executable plan. 

Before turning to Ranking Member Hall for his opening remarks, 

I want to note for the record that the Committee also invited OSTP 

Director Holdren to testify at this hearing, but Dr. Holdren was unavailable due to travel plans. 

In addition, I want to inform members that I plan to insert into 

the record for this hearing several items that were submitted to the 

Committee, including a statement by Dr. Buzz Aldrin, a letter from 

Dr. Russell Schweickart, a letter from the Planetary Society, a joint 

statement by several space organizations, and a letter from Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BART GORDON

Good morning. When the Fiscal Year 2011 NASA budget request was released almost four months ago, it contained major changes to the NASA program that had 

been authorized and funded by Congress over the past five years. Among those 

changes, the Administration’s request proposed canceling the Constellation-based 

exploration program on the grounds that it was ‘‘unexecutable’’ under foreseeable 

budgets. 

In contrast, the proposed new budget for NASA was described as a budget that 

puts NASA on a ‘‘sustainable path’’ for space exploration. 

Since that time, this Committee, as well as other Committees of the Congress, 

have been trying to get the information we need to make informed decisions about 

the Administration’s plan as we prepare for authorization and appropriations actions. When we had Administrator Bolden before us in February, there was precious 

little information and analysis that NASA could provide us in support of the budget 

request, and what was provided raised more questions than it answered. When 

Chair Giffords had NASA testify in March on the proposed new plan for human 

space flight, the outcome was the same—more new questions than answers. 

Then on April 15th, the president announced revisions to his NASA plan, adding 

a new crew rescue vehicle development program, a human mission to a Near Earth 

asteroid by 2025, and a decision by 2015 on development of a new Heavy Lift launch 

vehicle—in essence, directing NASA to pursue a program very similar to one of the 

options proposed by the Augustine Committee. 

There are legitimate debates that Members can have concerning the choices made 

in the president’s plan about which destinations to pursue, the appropriate role of 

the commercial sector, and what type of technology program makes the most sense. 

Yet those debates ultimately won’t matter unless the Administration’s plan actually 

is doable under the Administration’s proposed budget—that it actually is ‘‘executable’’ and truly puts NASA on a ‘‘sustainable path’’. It does no good to cancel a program that the Administration characterizes as ‘‘unexecutable’’, if that program is 

simply replaced with a new plan that can’t be executed either. 

That’s the issue before us today, and Administrator Bolden, to be blunt, the burden of proof is on your shoulders to make the case that you have an executable program. 

So what do we need to hear from you? Let me cite three specific issues: 

As you know, one of the most significant findings of the Augustine Committee was 

that ‘‘Human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 

budget guideline.’’

We’ve now taken a close look at your proposed human space flight and technology 

development budget plan, and this is what we’ve found: 

Your budget for human space flight and technology provides about the same 

amount of funding through FY 2015 as the ‘‘not viable’’ FY 2010 budget guidance. 

Equally importantly, your budget guidance through 2025—the date of your proposed first human mission to an asteroid—is $40 to 50 billion lower than the 

amount the Augustine panel determined would be needed to implement any of its 

exploration options. 
30

Second, in his April 15th speech, the president directed NASA to develop a new 

crew rescue vehicle for the ISS that would ‘‘be flying within the next few years’’—

but he didn’t add any money to your budget to do it. 

I understand that NASA’s preliminary estimates indicate that it could cost $5 to 

$7 billion to develop such a vehicle, and that number doesn’t include the annual cost 

to launch it and rotate the vehicles once it is operational. That’s a big unfunded 

mandate to absorb in your budget over the next five years—you’ll need to take a 

billion to two billion dollars per year from elsewhere in your budget over the next 

five years to cover it. 

To put the budgetary impact of that into perspective, if you eliminated all of the 

FY 11 funding for the Exploration Technology Demonstration program, the Robotic 

Precursors program, and the KSC 21st Century Space Launch initiative, you will 

have only covered $1.2 billion of the shortfall. If the annual shortfall over the next 

five years is closer to $2 billion, you would also need to eliminate the FY 11 increases for Space Technology, Aeronautics, and Earth Science. 

That’s not to argue that we shouldn’t be developing a spacecraft that can provide 

the basis for exploration beyond low Earth orbit. One clearly will be needed. But 

it’s another troubling indication that the plan that has been sent over to Congress 

has a great many loose ends and unexamined assumptions that call its credibility 

into question. 

Third, the FY 2011 budget plan assumes that multiple commercial crew systems 

can be developed over the next five years for a total cost of $6 billion. However, 

analyses done by the Aerospace Corporation and even NASA’s own estimates for the 

development cost of a simple crew rescue vehicle argue that the proposed commercial crew development budget is likely to be low by a factor of two or more. 

The burden of proof has to be on you and the White House to justify that cost 

estimate, and so far we have not seen any hard analysis from the Administration 

that would give us confidence that it can be done for the amount budgeted. Given 

your statements that you will do what is needed to make the commercial providers 

succeed, the consequences of such an underestimate could be devastating to the rest 

of NASA’s programs. 

We all share the goals of inspiring and innovating and exploring. Let me be clear. 

I have no interest in having to have another Augustine committee in five years. 

Your task today is to convince this Committee that this is truly a well-thought out, 

responsibly budgeted, executable plan. 

Before turning to Ranking Member Hall for his opening remarks, I want to note 

for the record that the Committee also invited OSTP Director Holdren to testify at 

this hearing, but Dr. Holdren was unavailable due to travel plans. 

In addition, I want to inform Members that I plan to insert into the record of this 

hearing several items that were submitted to the Committee, including:

• A statement by Dr. Buzz Aldrin;

• A letter from Dr. Russell Schweickart;

• A letter from the Planetary Society;

• A Joint Statement by several space organizations;

• And a letter from Governor Bill Richardson of NM.

With that, I now recognize Ranking Member Hall for an opening statement.

[The information follows:]
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Chairman GORDON. With that, I now recognize Ranking Member 

Hall for an opening statement. 

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on 

a very important topic of NASA’s human spaceflight program, and 

I can’t help but point out or reiterate that this room today holds 

in addition to Rusty that was just introduced and our first witness 

holds some of the really true heroes of all time and we are honored 

to have you here, and I hope my questions and my thrust is without acrimony but with great appreciation to each one of you. 

I also want to thank you for assembling such a great panel, Mr. 

Chairman. I certainly welcome Administrator Bolden and I hope he 

can answer some of the many questions we have about the Presi-
40

dent’s proposal, and we had the opportunity to talk with him yesterday. His time has always been available, and I am very appreciative of that. 

I am also pleased to see two space heroes with us today, Neil 

Armstrong and Gene Cernan. These men are legendary astronauts 

and explorers who laid the whole foundation for our Nation’s space 

exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, and I am honored that they 

have agreed to share their knowledge and their commitment and 

their passion with us today. I want to thank Tom Young for once 

again agreeing to testify before this Committee and sharing his 

knowledge and years of experience working with the government 

acquisition process. 

It has now been nearly four months since the Administration 

proposed radical changes to NASA’s human spaceflight and exploration programs. From the very beginning, it was clear that 

NASA’s proposal lacked the sufficient detail that Congress would 

need to determine whether it was a credible plan, yet in spite of 

our best efforts to obtain more information from NASA, this situation has not improved. Indeed, the President’s trip to the Kennedy 

Space Center on April 15th only added to the confusion as he laid 

out more aspirational goals but provided no clear idea of how they 

fit together or how the experts expect to ever pay for all these new 

ventures. 

As such, I still have many basic concerns about our ability to access and use the International Space Station after the shuttle is retired. I remain concerned about the gap in the U.S. access to space, 

and I want to ensure that we can effectively use the enormous research capabilities of the International Space Station. In examining 

the President’s plan, I still do not see a viable way to minimize the 

gap and provide for very exciting research on the International 

Space Station. The President’s most recent decision to send an unmanned lifeboat to the space station at a potential cost of $5 billion 

to $7 billion does absolutely nothing to solve this problem and 

largely duplicates existing services provided by the Russians. 

Although we have already spent nearly $10 billion on the Constellation system and supported by Democrats and Republicans 

alike on this Committee and in this Congress that has achieved 

significant milestones and is well on its way to provided continued 

U.S. access to space, the Administration’s continued decisions to 

cancel Constellation has further stalled development and jeopardizes our undisputed leadership in space. 

As I have said many times before, I am concerned with the proposed commercial crew direction of the Administration. While I 

have long supported the development of commercial cargo operations, I believe it is prudent that we first test cargo capabilities 

before risking the lives of our astronauts on newly developed systems. I have not seen credible data to suggest that there is a viable 

market for commercial crew carriers, and in the absence of that 

data, I fear that we might be setting ourselves up for failure if and 

when the markets do not materialize. Anyone can claim to be able 

to take over commercial crews, and I have read a good bit of the 

ideas of another space hero and a very dear friend of mine, Buzz 

Aldrin, who supports commercial crew, but I am still looking for 

concrete data that they can finish what they start and will not be 
41

coming back to the government for additional money if they take 

over. 

Finally, in examining options beyond low-Earth orbit, I am unclear when we might see the development of a heavy lift system or 

whether NASA still considers the moon as a logical destination. We 

have been told that a new ‘‘game changing’’ technology development program will provide capabilities for accessing the far reaches 

of space but we have very few specifics on mission goals and direction. I hope Administrator Bolden has some of the answers that 

have been lacking up to now. 

In the absence of a defensible, credible plan, I and many of our 

members continue to support the Constellation program as currently authorized and appropriated by successive Congresses. GAO 

will continue investigating whether NASA is improperly withholding funds and improperly applying the Antideficiency Act as a 

means of slowing Constellation work. I believe that Congress has 

been clear that it supports the unhindered continuation of Constellation until it authorizes an alternative program. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you over the next 

several weeks as the Committee begins to reauthorize NASA, and 

we can no longer wait for NASA to provide justification for its radical changes. Time is absolutely running out. 

I want to wish you, Mr. Chairman, the very best and I want to 

thank you and express my gratitude to you for your undying efforts 

to preserve the right thing for us to do, and we all look forward 

to continuing. I look forward to today’s testimony. 

I yield back my time, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RALPH M. HALL

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on the important topic 

of NASA’s human space flight program. 

I also want to thank you for assembling such an extraordinary panel of witnesses 

today. I want to welcome NASA Administrator Bolden, and I hope that he can answer some of the many questions that we have about the President’s proposal. 

I am also pleased to see two space heroes with us today, Neil Armstrong and Gene 

Cernan. Both men are legendary astronauts and explorers who laid the foundation 

for our nation’s space exploration beyond low Earth orbit. I am honored that they 

have agreed to share their knowledge, their commitment, and their passion with us 

today. I also want to thank Tom Young for once again agreeing to testify before this 

committee and share his knowledge and years of experience working with the government acquisition process. 

It has now been nearly four months since the administration proposed radical 

changes to NASA’s human space flight and exploration programs. From the very beginning it was clear that NASA’s proposal lacked the sufficient detail that Congress 

would need to determine whether it was a credible plan. Yet, in spite of our best 

efforts to obtain more information from NASA this situation has not improved. Indeed, the President’s trip to the Kennedy Space Center on April 15th only added 

to the confusion as he laid out more aspirational goals, but provided no clear idea 

of how they fit together or how he expects to pay for these new ventures. 

As such, I still have many basic concerns about our ability to access and use the 

International Space Station after the Shuttle is retired. I remain concerned about 

the ‘‘gap’’ in U.S. access to space, and I want to ensure that we can effectively use 

the enormous research capabilities of the International Space Station. In examining 

the President’s plan, I still do not see a viable way to minimize the ‘‘gap’’ and provide for exciting research on the ISS. 

The President’s most recent decision to send an unmanned ‘‘lifeboat’’ to the Space 

Station at a potential cost of $5–7 billion does nothing to solve this problem and 

largely duplicates existing services provided by the Russians. Although we have already spent nearly $10 billion on the Constellation system that has achieved signifi-
42

cant milestones and is well on its way to providing continued U.S. access to space, 

the Administration’s decision to cancel Constellation has further stalled development and jeopardized our undisputed leadership in space. 

As I have said many times before, I am concerned with the proposed commercial 

crew direction of this Administration. While I have long supported the development 

of commercial cargo operations, I believe that it is prudent that we first test cargo 

capabilities before risking the lives 

of our astronauts on newly developed systems. I also have not seen credible data 

to suggest that there is a viable market for commercial crew carriers, and in the 

absence of that data I fear that we might be setting ourselves up failure if, or when, 

the markets do not materialize. Anyone can claim to be able to take over commercial 

crew, and I have read the good ideas of another space hero, Buzz Aldrin who supports commercial crew, but I am still looking for concrete data that they can finish 

what they start, and will not be coming back to the government for additional 

money if they take over. 

Finally, in examining options beyond low Earth orbit, I am unclear when we 

might see the development of a heavy lift system, or whether NASA still considers 

the Moon as a logical destination. We have been told that a new ‘‘game-changing’’ 

technology development program will provide capabilities for accessing the far 

reaches of space, but we have very few specifics on mission, goals, and direction. 

I hope Administrator Bolden has some of the answers that have been lacking up 

to now. 

In the absence of a defensible, credible plan, I and many of our members continue 

to support the Constellation program as currently authorized and appropriated by 

successive Congresses. GAO will continue investigating whether NASA is improperly withholding funds, and improperly applying the Anti-Deficiency Act as a means 

of slowing Constellation work. I believe that Congress has been clear that it supports the unhindered continuation of Constellation until it authorizes an alternative 

program. 

Mr. Chairman I look forward to working with you over the next several weeks 

as the Committee begins to reauthorize NASA, and we can no longer wait for NASA 

to provide justifications for its radical changes. Time is running out. 

I look forward to today’s testimony, and I yield back my time.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Hall. You are a good partner. 

Our first witness is Mr. Charles F. Bolden, Jr., who is the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 

and Gen. Bolden, you have served your country with distinction in 

and out of uniform. We are glad you could be with us today, and 

I know you can breathe a better sigh of relief that the shuttle landed safely this morning. Congratulations for that. And so you may 

proceed. 

STATEMENTS OF CHARLES F. BOLDEN, JR., ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I want to thank 

you all for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss additional information about the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request for NASA. Following the President’s important speech at the 

NASA Kennedy Space Center in Florida, I also want to comment 

about the outcome of that. 

NASA is grateful for the support and guidance received from this 

Committee through the years and looks forward to working with 

you to implement the President’s bold new direction for our agency. 

Given that you have my detailed written statement, I will try to 

keep my remarks brief this morning so that I leave time for your 

questions. 

First, I would like to acknowledge the incredible contributions of 

my two astronaut colleagues on the next panel. Both Neil and 
43

Gene, the first and last humans to set foot on the moon, have dedicated their lives to the challenging and often-unforgiving pursuit of 

space exploration and in doing so have improved the quality of life 

in America and inspired the next generation of explorations. They 

continue to contribute by remaining engaged and providing their 

remarks on today’s important topic of the future of human space 

exploration. I appreciate their thoughts, and we talk often. It was 

very beneficial to have had the opportunity to discuss their concerns and to present them with a thorough brief on our plans for 

America’s future in human spaceflight several weeks ago. 

However, reasonable people can disagree and so I must respectfully disagree with some of their concerns and their opinions. The 

President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request is good for NASA because it sets the agency on a sustainable path that is tightly linked 

to our Nation’s interests. During his visit to the Kennedy Space 

Center, the President articulated a strong commitment to NASA’s 

mission and the future of human spaceflight exploration. As we 

prepare to end the shuttle era, and we took an important step this 

morning when we successfully bought Atlantis home safely with 

her crew, we all should acknowledge its critical importance as a 

very productive step along America’s path of becoming the preeminent space-faring Nation. 

As my predecessor, Mike Griffin, has written in a draft tribute 

to the space shuttle, and I quote, ‘‘It was an enormous leap in 

human progress. The shuttle wasn’t perfect, and we will make 

more such leaps as we are trying to do through our budget in 

2011.’’ That is my part, my insert. ‘‘But none of them will be perfect either.’’ The programs on which we will embark under the 

guidance provided by President Obama in our proposed fiscal 2011 

budget and his speech at the Kennedy Space Center of April 15th 

of this year will be our new leaps in human progress and they 

won’t be perfect, but we must all understand and be incredibly 

proud that we have an opportunity to create an option for our children and grandchildren to live in a new and richer era of exploration. If we can agree to accept the promise that comes with the 

President’s fiscal year 2011 budget proposal, we will be creating 

the future that we all wanted to see in the eras now passed. 

The President has laid out the goals and strategies for this new 

vision which includes a sequence of deep-space destinations for 

human missions progressing step by step beginning with crewed 

flight tests early next decade of vehicles capable of supporting exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, a human mission to an asteroid 

by 2025 and a human mission to orbit Mars and return safely to 

Earth by the 2030s. 

With respect to the role of heavy lift in the future human 

spaceflight architecture, the fiscal 2011 budget request includes 

funds for NASA to conduct the important R&D and analysis necessary to make an informed decision on a heavy-lift vehicle no later 

than 2015. On May 3rd, we issued a request for information seeking general information regarding potential launch or space transportation architectures that will be used for planning and acquisition strategy development for the current heavy-lift planning activities. And on May 19th, we issued a draft broad agency announcement that will expand on the previous NASA technical as-
44

sessments, address fiscal 2010 planned activities and also contribute to our future plans. 

We have also made progress in developing a plan that supports 

the development of commercial crew transportation providers. On 

May 21st, we issued a request for information to seek industry 

feedback to help us plan the overall strategy for the development 

and demonstration of a commercial crew transportation capability 

and to receive comments on NASA’s commercial human rating 

plan. The RFIs and BAAs are all preliminary planning activities 

for the President’s fiscal year 2011 proposal regarding future 

human spaceflight efforts, and we appreciate that the Government 

Accountability Office’s opinion issued on this past Monday confirming that NASA had not violated the exploration appropriations 

restriction on the use of funding to create or initiate new program 

or project activity. 

Regarding our plans for a restructured Orion, the President directed that NASA build on the good work already completed on the 

Orion crew capsule and focus the efforts to provide a simpler and 

more efficient design, initially for crew emergency escape from the 

space station, evolving in future years to be the advanced spacecraft used in our deep-space missions. This approach will preserve 

a number of critical high-tech-industry jobs in key disciplines needed for our future deep-space exploration program. We have put together a formulation team including headquarters and center personnel to develop a baseline approach that meets these requirements balanced with the other priorities proposed in the President’s fiscal 2011 budget request. The team will report to me next 

week on how best to meet these requirements. 

And finally, on the subject of workforce transition initiatives, the President committed to providing $40 million to aid Florida’s Space 

Coast. The men and women who work in the Space Coast aerospace industry are some of the most talented and highly trained in 

the Nation. It is critical that their skills are tapped as we transform our country and grow the country’s space exploration efforts. 

On May 3rd, the President established a taskforce to develop in collaboration with local stakeholders an interagency action plan to facilitate economic development strategies along the Space Coast and 

to provide training and other opportunities for affected aerospace 

workers. The taskforce, which I co-chair with Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke, will also explore future workforce and economic 

development activities that could be undertaken for affected aerospace communities in other States as appropriate. 

NASA expects to submit a revised 2011 budget request to the 

Congress in the very near future that will identify funding requirements for the restructured Orion crew capsule as well as funding 

requirements for workforce transition. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, Americans and people worldwide 

have turned to NASA for inspiration throughout our history. Our 

work gives people an opportunity to imagine what is barely possible, and we at NASA get to turn these dreams into real achievements for all humankind. This budget gives NASA a roadmap to 

even more historic achievements as it spurs innovation, employs 

Americans in fulfilling jobs and engages people around the world 

as we enter an exciting new era in space. 
45

Thank you very much for your continued support and that of this 

Committee. I look forward to responding to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES BOLDEN, JR. 

Chairman Gordon and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear today to discuss additional information about the President’s FY 2011 

budget request for NASA, following the President’s important speech at the NASA 

Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. NASA is grateful for the support and guidance received from this Committee through the years and looks forward to working 

with you to implement the President’s bold new direction for the Agency. 

The President’s FY 2011 budget request is good for NASA because it sets the 

Agency on a sustainable path that is tightly linked to our Nation’s interests. The 

President recognizes that what is truly needed for beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) exploration are game-changing technologies; making the fundamental investments 

that will provide the foundation for the next half-century of American leadership in 

space exploration. In doing so, the President has put forward what I believe to be 

the most authentically visionary policy for human space exploration that we have 

had since President Kennedy challenged NASA to send humans to the Moon and 

return them safely back to Earth. At the same time, under the new plan, we will 

ensure continuous American presence in space on the International Space Station 

(ISS) throughout this entire decade and likely beyond, re-establish a robust and 

competitive American launch industry, launch more robotic probes into our solar 

system as precursors for human activity, invest in a new heavy lift research and 

development (R&D) program, and build a technological foundation for sustainable, 

beyond-LEO exploration, with more capable expeditions in lunar space, and human 

missions to near-Earth asteroids, the Moon, Lagrange points, and, ultimately, Mars. 

NASA will embark on these transformative initiatives by partnering with the best 

in industry, academia and other government agencies, as well as with our international partners. 

At the request of the Committee, today I will provide additional details about 

pending revisions to the President’s FY 2011 budget request for NASA. I will discuss NASA’s progress in developing plans for the new exploration initiatives included in the FY 2011 budget request, including initial planned program assignments for major programs by Center. Additionally, my testimony will provide additional detail about three significant updates that were announced by the President 

when he visited KSC on April 15, 2010. NASA is working expeditiously to provide 

specific budgetary details to reflect these updates and we will share them with this 

Committee and other Congressional stakeholders as soon as we are able.

President Obama Visits KSC 

During his visit to KSC, the President articulated a strong commitment to 

NASA’s mission and future U.S. human space exploration. The President also outlined an ambitious effort to foster the development of ground-breaking technologies; 

increase the number, scope, and pace of manned and unmanned space missions; 

make human spaceflight safer and more efficient; and help create thousands of new 

jobs. The President directed that NASA proceed to develop a crew rescue vehicle 

based on the Orion space-capsule to support emergency crew return requirements 

on the ISS, and providing a technological foundation for systems that can later take 

us beyond Earth’s orbit. In addition to investing in transformative heavy-lift technologies, the President has called on NASA to select a basic rocket design, no later 

than 2015, and then begin to build it. The President also said that after decades 

of neglect, we will increase investment—right away—in other groundbreaking technologies that are designed to enable astronauts to reach space sooner and more 

often, to travel farther and faster for less cost, and to live and work in space for 

longer periods of time more safely. And, the President laid out the goals and strategies in this new vision for NASA. Fundamentally, the exploration of space will be 

a sequence of deep-space destinations for human missions matched to growing capabilities, progressing step-by-step, beginning with crewed flight tests—perhaps a 

circumlunar mission—early next decade of vehicles capable of supporting exploration beyond LEO, a human mission to an asteroid by 2025, and a human mission 

to orbit Mars and return safely to Earth by the 2030s. Finally, the President committed to providing $40 million for workforce transition initiatives to aid Florida’s 

Space Coast, and I have been appointed to co-Chair—along with Department of 

Commerce Secretary, Gary Locke—a task force to develop a strategy for assisting 

the workforce transition. 
46

NASA expects to submit a revised FY 2011 budget request to the Congress in the 

near future that will identify funding requirements for the restructured Orion crew 

capsule as well as funding requirements and authorization for workforce transition 

for Florida and potentially other locations.

Restructuring the Orion Crew Capsule 

Per the President’s direction, we are going to build on the good work already completed on the Orion crew capsule and focus the effort to provide a simpler and more 

efficient design that would provide crew emergency escape from the ISS and serve 

as part of the technical foundation for advanced spacecraft to be used in future deep 

space missions. This approach also will preserve a number of critical high-tech industry jobs in key disciplines needed for our future deep space exploration program. 

We have put together a formulation team including Headquarters and Center personnel to develop a baseline approach that meets these requirements, balanced with 

the other priorities proposed in the President’s FY 2011 budget request. This team 

will report to me next week on how best to meet these requirements. 

I have directed the team to align this work so that it complements, and does not 

compete with, our commercial crew development effort. This should also reduce the 

pressure on the commercial crew service providers as the restructured Orion module 

serves to fulfill the important safety requirement of emergency escape for astronauts 

on the ISS. I have also directed the formulation team to focus on innovative approaches to oversight, and believe that we can significantly reduce oversight requirements based on lessons learned in previous focused development flight programs. We must accomplish this activity more efficiently and effectively to maintain 

a healthy funding balance across our exploration priorities. This will be done without reducing our commitment to safety for our NASA crews. The crew rescue mission has many fewer requirements than the deep space mission, providing design 

flexibility and reducing the system’s lifecycle cost. Finally, the team must identify 

how this activity will align with the development efforts proposed in the Flagship 

Demonstration program as well as our other technology efforts so that investments 

in these programs can be leveraged to the greatest extent possible. 

The funding for this restructuring will come from within NASA’s top-line request 

released in February. The out year funding requirements will be refined as part of 

the President’s FY 2012 budget submission.

Heavy-Lift Technologies 

During his visit to KSC, the President specifically recognized the need for a heavy 

lift launch capability to carry humans beyond LEO by requiring a decision on a vehicle design no later than 2015. Such a decision would include setting performance 

goals, identifying lift capability and selecting the general vehicle design—work that 

will ultimately lay the path for launching a spacecraft for crewed missions into deep 

space. 

The FY 2011 budget request includes funds for NASA to conduct the important 

R&D and analysis necessary to make an informed decision on a heavy-lift vehicle 

no later than 2015. A primary focus of this effort will be to conduct research and 

development on a U.S. first-stage hydrocarbon engine for potential use in heavy lift 

and other launch systems, as well as basic research in areas such as new propellants, advanced propulsion materials manufacturing techniques, combustion processes, propellant storage and control, and engine health monitoring. Additionally, 

NASA will initiate development and testing of in-space engines. Areas of focus could 

include a liquid oxygen/methane engine and lower-cost liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen engines. This work will build on NASA’s recent R&D experience in this area, 

and the test articles will be viewed as a potential prototype for a subsequent operational engine that would be re-startable and capable of high acceleration and reliability. These technologies will increase our heavy-lift and other space propulsion 

capabilities and is intended to significantly lower costs—with the clear goal of taking us farther and faster into space consistent with safety and mission success criteria. In support of this initiative, NASA will explore cooperative efforts with the 

Department of Defense and also develop a competitive process for allocating a small 

portion of these funds to universities and other non-governmental organizations. 

This research effort along with many of our new technology initiatives will be coordinated with the broader Agency technology initiative led by NASA’s new Chief 

Technologist. 

On May 3, 2010, NASA issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking general 

information regarding potential launch or space transportation architectures (expendable, reusable, or a hybrid system) that could be utilized by multiple customers 

(e.g., NASA, commercial and other Government agencies). The RFI solicits informa-
47

tion regarding propulsion system characteristics; technology challenges for propulsion systems; as well as innovative methods to manage a heavy-lift development 

program to include effective and affordable business practices. The RFI is open to 

the broad space community, including commercial, other Government agencies and 

academia. Information obtained from the RFI will be used for planning and acquisition-strategy development for current heavy-lift planning activities, funded in the 

FY 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111–117). Related to the RFI, on 

May 19, 2010, NASA posted a draft Broad Area Announcement (BAA). This draft 

BAA is soliciting proposals for a Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology Trade study 

and seeks industry input on technical solutions in support of heavy lift system concepts studies. This draft BAA requests offerors to expand upon the previous NASA 

technical assessments and a final BAA solicitation will incorporate information obtained via the RFI as well as inputs from the upcoming Exploration workshop. 

These concept studies will include architecture assessments of a variety of potential 

heavy lift launch vehicles and in-space vehicle architectures employing various propulsion combinations and how they can be deployed to meet multiple mission objectives. Please note, the BAA is addressing FY 2010 planned activities which may also 

contribute to future plans and activities.

Assistance for the Florida Space Coast 

The men and women who work in the Space Coast’s aerospace industry are some 

of the most talented and highly trained in the nation. It is critical that their skills 

are tapped as we transform and grow the country’s space exploration efforts. The 

2004 decision to end the Shuttle means that approximately 6,000 jobs need to be 

transitioned into the new space strategy and related industries. Recognizing the 

concerns of our dedicated Shuttle workforce as they conclude this remarkable program and look forward to transitioning to new work, the President has announced 

a $40 million initiative to develop a plan for regional economic growth and job creation for the Florida Space Coast. On May 3, 2010, the President issued a Memorandum directing the establishment of the Task Force on Space Industry Workforce 

and Economic Development. The task force is charged with developing, in collaboration with local stakeholders, an interagency action plan to facilitate economic development strategies and plans along the Space Coast and to provide training and 

other opportunities for affected aerospace workers so they are equipped to contribute to new developments in America’s space program and related industries. 

They will also explore future workforce and economic development activities that 

could be undertaken for affected aerospace communities in other States, as appropriate. The Secretary of Commerce and I will serve as Co-Chairs. Other team members will include: the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of 

Housing and Urban Development; the Secretary of Transportation; the Secretary of 

Education, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors; the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget; the Administrator of the Small Business Administration; the Director of National Intelligence; the Director of the Office of Science and 

Technology Policy; the Director of the National Economic Council; and the heads of 

other Executive agencies, as needed. As directed, the team will report its recommendations to the President by August 15. The $40 million for this initiative will 

be taken from the funds requested for Constellation transition in the original FY 

2011 Presidential budget request. 

This interagency group’s recommendations will build on the Administration’s ongoing efforts in the KSC region. The Department of Labor is already planning a 

pilot program to better assist the region’s workers, including those highly-skilled 

workers who work in the aerospace industry, through efforts to establish one-stop 

local transition centers for affected workers where they can receive coordinated 

local, state, and Federal workforce assistance tied to economic development efforts; 

and the designation of a single Federal point-of-contact for affected areas. 

To further facilitate these efforts, the Department of Commerce’s Economic Development Administration (EDA) is prepared to support a comprehensive economic adjustment strategy for the Kennedy Space Center economic region. With funding provided through NASA, the EDA will provide both financial and technical assistance 

to start implementing those plans and promote economic development in the region 

through such activities as infrastructure upgrades and improvements, entrepreneurial networks, and skill-training facilities and equipment. The exact mix of activities will depend on the recommendations and request of local entities across the 

region. 

In addition, on April 30, 2010, the Department of Labor announced a $1.2 million 

grant to assist approximately 200 workers affected by layoffs at ATK Launch systems in Corinne, Utah, in connection with the transition of the Space Shuttle and 

Constellation programs.
48

NASA Prepares to Implement the FY 2011 Budget Request 

Pursuant to the President’s proposed new course, NASA has initiated planning activities to be able to effectively and efficiently implement these new activities in a 

timely manner upon Congressional enactment of the FY 2011 budget. In April, 

NASA outlined for the Committee the Agency’s planned major program assignments 

across the Agency’s Centers for new or extended activities proposed as part of the 

President’s FY 2011 budget request. These planned assignments build on the deep 

knowledge and expertise that NASA has built up over five decades, recognize the 

wealth of experience, commitment, and expertise resident at the NASA Centers, and 

expand upon the strengths at each Center. 

I wish to emphasize that establishment of program offices and initiation of effort 

in support of new or extended activities for this proposed new work is contingent 

upon Congressional approval of the President’s FY 2011 request for these activities. 

These planned program assignments will enable NASA to engage workforce at the 

Agency’s Centers in formulation activities for the array of program initiatives in 

Science, Aeronautics, Space Technology, Exploration, and Space Operations reflected 

in the President’s FY 2011 request. While we will be developing details on the specific numbers of employees at our Centers that will be assigned to new program offices and activities, these planned assignments are intended to provide the Committee additional detail regarding the depth and scope of the President’s FY 2011 

proposed budget plan. 

Planned major program assignments for elements contained in the FY 2011 budget, by Center, follow:

• Johnson Space Center, Texas

Æ Exploration/Flagship Technology Demonstrations, Manager

Æ Exploration/Commercial Crew Development, Deputy Program Manager

Æ Exploration/Commercial Cargo Development, Manager

Æ Exploration/Human Research, Manager

Æ ISS, Manager

• Kennedy Space Center, Florida

Æ Exploration/Commercial Crew Development, Manager

Æ Space Operations/21st Century Launch Complex, Manager

Æ Exploration/Flagship Technology Demonstrations, Deputy Program Manager

Æ Space Shuttle/Completion of Manifest, Manager

• Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama

Æ Exploration/Heavy Lift and Propulsion R&D, Manager

Æ Exploration/Robotic Precursor Program, Manager

Æ Space Technology/Crosscutting Capability Demonstrations/Technology 

Demonstration Missions, Manager

Æ Space Technology/Centennial Challenges Program, Manager

• Stennis Space Center, Mississippi

Æ Exploration/Heavy Lift and Propulsion R&D, First Stage and Upper 

Stage Rocket Testing

Æ Exploration/Commercial Crew Development, Engine Testing for Commercial Vehicles

• Glenn Research Center, Ohio

Æ Exploration/Exploration Technology Development and Demonstration, 

Manager

Æ Space Technology/Early Stage Innovation/Research Grants

Æ Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research Program and Aviation Safety Program, support

• Langley Research Center, Virginia

Æ Space Technology/Game Changing Technology/Game Changing Development, Manager

Æ Climate Initiative: SAGE III; CLARREO (managed jointly with Goddard); 

Venture Class

Æ Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research Program and Aviation Safety Program, support

• Dryden Flight Research Center, California
49

Æ Space Technology/Crosscutting Capability Demonstrations/Flight Opportunities, Manager

Æ Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research Program and Aviation Safety Program, support

• Ames Research Center, California

Æ Exploration/Precursor Robotic Missions/Exploration Scouts, Manager

Æ Space Technology/Game Changing Technology/Small Satellite Subsystem 

Technologies, Manager

Æ Space Technology/Crosscutting Capability Demonstrations/Edison Small 

Satellite Demonstrations, Manager

Æ Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research Program and Aviation Safety Program, support

• Goddard Space Flight Center, Maryland

Æ Joint Polar Satellite System (restructuring NPOESS), procurement structure modeled after past successful programs

Æ Climate Initiative: ICESat–2; CLARREO (managed jointly with Langley); 

DESDynI (managed jointly with Jet Propulsion Laboratory); Earth Systematic Missions Program.

• Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California

Æ Climate Initiative: SMAP; DESDynI (managed jointly with Goddard); 

GRACE, OCO–2.

Following the release of the FY 2011 budget request, NASA established study 

teams within the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) to ensure we understand the steps (and the implications of those steps) that would need to be taken 

for an orderly transition of the Constellation Program and to plan for the implementation of the new initiatives in the Exploration program. The work undertaken by 

these teams is a necessary part of that planning. Following is a brief summary of 

the additional details developed for each initiative, as ‘‘point of departure’’ plans to 

support FY 201 1 budget implementation, once the budget is approved. Please note 

these are preliminary ESMD plans that may need to be modified following finalization of Agency plans regarding the restructuring of the Orion crew capsule.

• Flagship Technology Demonstrations: The next generation of capabilities 

key to sustainably exploring deep space will be demonstrated through four 

proposed missions: advanced space propulsion in 2014, in-space propellant 

and fuel transfer in 2015, light weight/inflatable modules in 2016, and aeroassist in 2017. Autonomous operations and advanced life support capabilities 

will also be tested on these missions. Detailed definition of each mission’s content is currently under way.

• Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology: Planned technology investments 

will lead to a demonstration of an in-space engine in 2015, development of 

a First Stage propulsion system by 2020, and maturing other foundational 

propulsion technologies to support a heavy lift vehicle decision in the 2015 

timeframe. NASA’s efforts will be primarily focused on a LOX/RP first stage 

and either a LOX/methane or LOX/hydrogen in-space engine. Additional research will be dedicated to analysis and trades regarding fuel types, performance requirements, and vehicle architectures.

• Exploration Robotic Precursors: A series of annual exploration robotic 

precursor missions is being planned, beginning with launch of a Near-EarthOrbit (NEO) mission in 2014, followed by a lunar lander in 2015, and two 

Mars missions in 2016 and 2018, respectively. In addition, smaller robotic 

scout missions will be launched every 12–18 months to support reconnaissance, evaluate hazards, and develop systems and operations in support of future human exploration.

• Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration: Enabling technology will advance fundamental technologies in 10 portfolio areas that will 

lead to ground and flight demonstrations in lunar volatiles, high power electric propulsion, autonomous precision landing, human exploration tele-robotics, fission power systems, and other areas. The flight demonstrations will be 

done as part of flagship demonstrations, robotic precursor missions, or utilizing the ISS, ground tests and analogs.

• Human Research: Through research and technology development, the goal 

of the Human Research Program is to reduce the highest risks to crew health 

and performance for space exploration missions. Increased investments will 
50

be made in the fields of biomedical technology, space radiation research, and 

behavioral health research. There are also plans to make increased use of the 

ISS facilities.

• Commercial Crew: NASA is continuing to define plans to expedite and improve the robustness of ISS crew and cargo delivery. In addition, NASA is developing a plan that supports the development of commercial crew transportation providers to whom NASA could competitively award crew transportation services. Solicitations for Commercial Crew Transportation (CCT) development will provide opportunities for both established and traditional 

aerospace companies as well as emerging entrepreneurial companies. Related 

to this activity, on May 21, NASA released a Request for Information to seek 

industry feedback to help the Agency plan the overall strategy for the development and demonstration of a CCT capability and to receive comments on 

the Commercial Human-Rating Plan that has been drafted as part of this initiative.

• Constellation Transition: The team is leveraging expertise from across the 

Agency to develop a rapid and cost effective ramp-down plan that will free 

the resources required for new programs. As part of the early characterization 

and integrated planning effort, this team has initiated a broad survey of current workforce, contracts, facilities, property, security, knowledge capture, information technology, and other government agency interface issues to determine what infrastructure and hardware could be used by the new programs 

and projects. The transition plan will outline three phases as part of an action 

plan for initial deliverables: Near-term actions, transitioning of Constellation 

elements, and transition of assets/resources to new Exploration focus areas 

and other NASA programs, where appropriate.

NASA is taking prudent steps to plan for the new initiatives included in the FY 

2011 budget request, including Requests for Information (RFI), workshops, and preliminary studies. NASA is eager to receive external input from industry, academia, 

and other partners, and is accomplishing this via a series of RFIs and industry 

workshops conducted this spring and into the summer. Doing so will ensure that 

NASA receives important feedback from our space partners before it begins to finalize its implementation plans for the new technology demonstrations and human 

spaceflight systems development activities that will be supported by the FY 2011 

budget, once approved by Congress. During CY 2010, NASA plans to issue a series 

of program formulation documents seeking input from the broader space community. The following are tentative timeframes for these activities:

• Flagship Technology Demonstrations: RFI issued May 17, 2010.

• Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology: RFI issued May 3, 2010; Broad 

Agency Announcement (BAA) posted on May 19.

• Exploration Robotic Precursor Missions: RFI issued May 21, 2010.

• Enabling Technology Development: RFI issued May 7, 2010; BAA in 

June/July.

• Human Research Program: BAA in July.

• Commercial Crew Transportation: RFI issued May 21, 2010.

The first major public discussions about NASA’s FY 2011 planned activities are 

occurring at a two-day Exploration Enterprise Workshop, which started yesterday 

and will conclude today in Galveston, Texas. The workshop is bringing together a 

broad community of stakeholders from industry, academia, and the Federal Government to engage in discussions related to strategy building, development, and the implementation of the new plans for human and robotic exploration in space. 

The workshop is focusing on the President’s FY 11 budget request for NASA Exploration. The Agency has completed the initial phase of planning for the new technology and robotic programs and is providing insight into progress to date. The objectives of the workshop are to:

• Describe and discuss the activities planned for inclusion in the new programs

• Discuss NASA Center proposed Program assignments

• Solicit feedback, ideas and suggestions from interested parties

• Prepare for the next steps once the new programs are implemented

In addition, NASA has also established study teams to plan for the implementation of the new initiatives related to the ISS Augmentation, 21st Century Space 

Complex and Space Technology. Additional information on these planning efforts as 

well as planned RFIs, workshops, and preliminary studies are outlined below.
51

• ISS Augmentation: The ISS program is reviewing functionality enhancements that will make the space station more capable and efficient, including: 

upgraded environmental systems and communications, techniques for saving 

space and improving the use of pressurized volume, tools for optimizing flightand ground-crew time, upgrading and expanding payload operations, enhancing EVA and robotics use on Station, and reducing the complexity of international interfaces.

Æ NASA will initiate an independent organization, as recommended by the 

Augustine Committee and the National Research Council that will support the space station research community.

• 21st Century Space Launch Complex: NASA has developed a list of potential project ideas with preliminary estimates to be used as one potential 

source of solutions to customer needs as they are identified. These initial 

focus areas will be adjusted as customer needs are better understood: 1) Expanding capabilities to support commercial launch providers; 2) Environmental remediation; 3) Enhancing payload processing capabilities; and, 4) 

Supporting the modernization of the launch range capabilities.

Æ In late May, NASA will release an RFI to get a first-hand understanding 

of investments that would be most useful in support of launch and related activities in order to help the Agency prioritize near-term projects.

• Space Technology: NASA’s Space Technology initiative under the Office of 

the Chief Technologist (OCT) will develop and demonstrate advanced space 

systems concepts and technologies enabling new approaches to enhance 

NASA’s current mission set and enable future missions. Planning teams continue to make significant progress: an internal technology governance plan 

has been approved; an Agency-level technology road mapping activity is 

planned to begin in July; and, approved technology program plans for Early 

Stage Innovation, Game Changing Technology, and Crosscutting Capability 

Demonstrations will be completed by the end of June.

Æ NASA will issue a Crosscutting Capability Demonstrations RFI in June 

2010. Game Changing Technology Industry Day will occur in late June 

2010. Early Stage Innovation NASA Research Announcements (NRA’s) 

are targeted for late June 2010. An RFI soliciting potential topics for the 

proposed Space Technology Graduate Fellowship program has been released to the NASA Centers and Federal Research Laboratories.

Finally, NASA has established the Human Exploration Framework Team (HEFT) 

to serve as a crossAgency planning activity. The team is being led by the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate and staffed with technical leaders from across 

NASA Centers. The team is focused on developing and reviewing the integrated set 

of requirements and technologies required for future human spaceflight missions to 

many destinations, including Mars. As part of its broad integration charter, HEFT 

will develop implementation recommendations on the performance and pacing requirements for the technologies needed for future human exploration missions using 

‘‘design reference missions,’’ or DRMs. These DRMs will be the basis for validating 

capabilities and missions for 5-, 10-, and 15-year horizons, with milestones including 

crewed missions beyond the Moon into deep space by 2025, sending astronauts to 

an asteroid, and eventually landing on Mars. NASA expects to have initial products 

from the HEFT team this summer.

Extension and Enhanced Use of the International Space Station 

A key element of America’s future in space is the ISS that is due to be completed 

this year. As of May 2009, the ISS is able to support a six-person permanent crew. 

The three major science labs aboard ISS were completed in 2009 with the delivery 

of the Exposed Facility of the Japanese Kibo module. And last week, Space Shuttle 

Atlantis delivered science experiments and a new Russian laboratory to the ISS, 

continuing the transition from assembly to continuous scientific research through 

the end of the decade. The Russian-built Mini Research Module–1, also known as 

Rassvet (dawn in Russian), will host a variety of biotechnology, biological science, 

fluid physics and educational research experiments. Rassvet was attached to the 

bottom port of the ISS’s Zarya module on May 18. 

The ISS represents a unique research capability which the United States and its 

partner nations can use to conduct a wide variety of research in biology, chemistry, 

physics and engineering fields that will help us better understand how to keep astronauts healthy and productive on long-duration space missions. If Congress approves the FY 2011 budget request, NASA will be able to fully utilize the ISS and 

increase its capabilities through upgrades to both ground support and onboard sys-
52

tems. Importantly, this budget extends operations of the ISS, likely to 2020 or beyond. 

ISS research is anticipated to have terrestrial applications in areas such as biotechnology, bioengineering, medicine and therapeutic treatment. The FY 2011 budget request for ISS reflects increased funding to support the ISS as a National Laboratory in which this latter type of research can be conducted. NASA has two MOUs 

with other U.S. government agencies, and five agreements with non-government organizations to conduct research aboard the ISS. NASA intends to continue to expand the community of National Laboratory users of the ISS. 

ISS can also play a key role in the technology demonstrations and engineering 

research associated with exploration. Propellant storage and transfer, life support 

systems, and inflatable technology can all benefit by using the unique research capabilities of ISS. In addition to supporting a variety of research and development 

efforts, the ISS will serve as an incubator for the growth of the low-Earth orbit 

space economy. 

As a tool for expanding knowledge of the world around us; advancing technology; 

serving as an impetus for the development of the commercial space sector; demonstrating the feasibility of a complex, long-term, international effort; providing critical data regarding human long duration spaceflight; and, perhaps most importantly, inspiring the next generation to pursue careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, the ISS is without equal.

Conclusion 

Americans and people worldwide have turned to NASA for inspiration throughout 

our history—our work gives people an opportunity to imagine what is barely possible, and we at NASA get to turn those dreams into real achievements for all humankind. This budget gives NASA a roadmap to even more historic achievements 

as it spurs innovation, employs Americans in fulfilling jobs, and engages people 

around the world as we enter an exciting new era in space. NASA looks forward 

to working with the Committee on implementation of the FY 2011 budget request. 

Chairman Gordon, thank you for your support and that of this Committee. I 

would be pleased to respond to any questions you or the other Members of the Committee may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR CHARLES BOLDEN, JR.

Nominated by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, retired 

Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Charles Frank Bolden, Jr., began his duties as the twelfth 

Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration on July 17, 

2009. As Administrator, he leads the NASA team and manages its resources to advance the agency’s missions and goals. 

Bolden’s confirmation marks the beginning of his second stint with the nation’s 

space agency. His 34-year career with the Marine Corps included 14 years as a 

member of NASA’s Astronaut Office. After joining the office in 1980, he traveled to 

orbit four times aboard the space shuttle between 1986 and 1994, commanding two 

of the missions. His flights included deployment of the Hubble Space Telescope and 

the first joint U.S.-Russian shuttle mission, which featured a cosmonaut as a mem-
53

ber of his crew. Prior to Bolden’s nomination for the NASA Administrator’s job, he 

was employed as the Chief Executive Officer of JACKandPANTHER LLC, a small 

business enterprise providing leadership, military and aerospace consulting, and 

motivational speaking. 

A resident of Houston, Bolden was born Aug. 19, 1946, in Columbia, S.C. He graduated from C. A. Johnson High School in 1964 and received an appointment to the 

U.S. Naval Academy. Bolden earned a bachelor of science degree in electrical science 

in 1968 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps. After 

completing flight training in 1970, he became a naval aviator. Bolden flew more 

than 100 combat missions in North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, while 

stationed in Namphong, Thailand, from 1972–1973. 

After returning to the U.S., Bolden served in a variety of positions in the Marine 

Corps in California and earned a master of science degree in systems management 

from the University of Southern California in 1977. Following graduation, he was 

assigned to the Naval Test Pilot School at Patuxent River, Md., and completed his 

training in 1979. While working at the Naval Air Test Center’s Systems Engineering and Strike Aircraft Test Directorates, he tested a variety of ground attack aircraft until his selection as an astronaut candidate in 1980. 

Bolden’s NASA astronaut career included technical assignments as the Astronaut 

Office Safety Officer; Technical Assistant to the director of Flight Crew Operations; 

Special Assistant to the Director of the Johnson Space Center; Chief of the Safety 

Division at Johnson (overseeing safety efforts for the return to flight after the 1986 

Challenger accident); lead astronaut for vehicle test and checkout at the Kennedy 

Space Center; and Assistant Deputy Administrator at NASA Headquarters. After 

his final space shuttle flight in 1994, he left the agency to return to active duty the 

operating forces in the Marine Corps as the Deputy Commandant of Midshipmen 

at the U.S. Naval Academy. 

Bolden was assigned as the Deputy Commanding General of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in the Pacific in 1997. During the first half of 1998, he served as 

Commanding General of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force Forward in support of 

Operation Desert Thunder in Kuwait. Bolden was promoted to his final rank of 

major general in July 1998 and named Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan. 

He later served as the Commanding General of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar in San Diego, Calif., from 2000 until 2002, before 

retiring from the Marine Corps in 2003. Bolden’s many military decorations include 

the Defense Superior Service Medal and the Distinguished Flying Cross. He was inducted into the U.S. Astronaut Hall of Fame in May 2006. 

Bolden is married to the former Alexis (Jackie) Walker of Columbia, S.C. The couple has two children: Anthony Che, a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps who 

is married to the former Penelope McDougal of Sydney, Australia, and Kelly 

Michelle, a medical doctor now serving a fellowship in plastic surgery.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Administrator Bolden. 

If there are members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statement will be added to the record at this time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Giffords follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GABRIELLE GIFFORDS

Today’s hearing is one of the most important that this Committee will hold this 

year. We will be deliberating on the future of America’s human spaceflight program, 

and in essence we will be deliberating about the future of this great country. The 

stakes are that high. 

As Chair of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, I have been working since 

last year to hold hearings and to conduct oversight to illuminate the issues that 

need to be considered if we are to craft a human exploration program that can be 

successful and worth undertaking. 

There were a number of themes that recurred throughout all of those hearings 

and oversight activities: the need for budgets that are adequate for the tasks to be 

undertaken—you can’t do meaningful exploration ‘‘on the cheap’’; the need to sustain a commitment and not keep constantly changing direction or goals; the need 

to keep safety paramount and not assume that it will be maintained without diligent effort and hard work; and the need to examine the broader national and international context when contemplating any changes to programs. 

I had hoped that the Administration’s FY 2011 budget request would reflect those 

themes. Unfortunately, it does not. Not only does the Administration’s plan not provide a budget plan that would help redress the balance between what NASA is 

asked to do and what it has been provided to date, but it has all the hallmarks of 
54

an ill-conceived mishmash of buzzwords about innovation and inspiration, assumptions based on hope rather than data, and an apparent desire to discard all of the 

work carried out by the previous Administration. 

We are now seeing the consequences of that approach. Nearly four months after 

the initial rollout of the budget and after an addendum by the president on April 

15th, Congress still is unable to get answers to basic questions about the proposed 

plan. Even something as basic as asking how the Administration intends to pay for 

the crew rescue vehicle development program that was added to NASA’s budget 

without any additional funding is beyond their capacity to answer. 

In that case, I think the reason for their unwillingness to answer is clear: the 

needed funding will have to come out of the ‘‘technology and innovation’’ initiatives 

that they touted as hallmarks of their new approach. In short, those new investments that were to compensate Centers for the loss of their work on Constellation 

are illusory and always were. I will not dwell on the other contradictions and shortcomings of the plan in these brief remarks—I believe that the distinguished witnesses we have here today will be able to articulate them quite clearly on their own. 

What I do want to emphasize is that we are now at the point where the lack of 

a credible plan from the Administration means that Congress is going to have consider alternative options that will provide a productive path forward for our human 

space flight program. We may not be able to correct for all the past underfunding 

in a single authorization or appropriation bill, nor can we negate the past actions 

that will lead us to a ‘‘gap’’ in crewed access to space after the Shuttle is retired. 

Yet we can make a start, and at a minimum, we can start by heeding the wisdom 

contained in the classic dictum: ‘‘first do no harm’’. I believe that we would do irreparable harm to our nation’s human space flight program if we were to adopt the 

Administration’s proposals. I intend to work to ensure that we take a better path.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO

Good Morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing to receive 

testimony on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) human 

spaceflight plan proposed in the President’s Fiscal Year 2011 budget. 

The President’s budget is a general departure from the NASA Authorization Act 

of 2008 passed by Congress and signed into law. It proposes major changes to 

NASA’s human spaceflight program, including a shift to commercial crew vehicles, 

a termination of the Constellation Program, and the elimination of the moon as the 

next destination for NASA’s astronauts. In the past three months, these plans and 

goals rapidly have changed and developed, but I am concerned there has been limited communication between Congress and the administration to address concerns 

with the budget and ensure these changes will maintain our leadership in human 

spaceflight for generations to come. 

First, the end of Constellation will result in the loss of tens of thousands of jobs 

at NASA and the companies with whom NASA has contracted out work. With the 

budget’s strong investment in commercial human spaceflight over government-operated programs, there is a chance these jobs could disappear all together. However, 

according to NASA, commercial crew vehicles will create tens of thousands of jobs 

and through new, commercial contracts many of these workers will return to their 

jobs. I would like to hear from our witnesses what impact they believe a shift to 

commercial crew vehicles will have on the aerospace workforce. 

Second, on April 15, 2010, the President announced several changes to his initial 

FY 11 budget, including identifying destinations for human spaceflight by 2025 and 

reinstating NASA’s investment in the design and possible construction of a Heavy 

Lift Launch Vehicle. However, no additional funding was provided for NASA to 

achieve these new goals. In fact, the proposed budget and the outyear projections 

fall short of the Augustine Commission’s recommended budget increases to achieve 

meaningful developments in human spaceflight. I am interested in hearing how the 

President’s new goals and the underlying FY 11 human spaceflight plans may fall 

within the proposed $19 billion budget. If the plans will require additional funding 

or offsets, what steps will NASA take to ensure it stays on schedule and within the 

budget for these new plans. 

Third, the President’s budget makes major investments in research and development within NASA. I strongly support these efforts to develop cutting-edge technology and expand NASA’s discoveries beyond space to address everyday national 

challenges. However, a recent report from the National Research Council found that 

NASA’s laboratories and flight centers were inadequate and could fail to perform 

the research tasks presented by the FY 11 budget. I would like to hear from Admin-
55

istrator Bolden what plans are in place or proposed to address these inadequacies 

and ensure NASA can carry out its research mission. 

Finally, Congress and the administration must have an open dialogue to hear determine all aspects of NASA’s proposed budget. Without these clear lines of communication, we cannot make an informed decision about the direction NASA should 

take with the future of human spaceflight. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. We will now start our questions, and the 

Chair yields to himself for the first question. 

Administrator Bolden, you have heard the concerns I raised in 

my opening statement, a budget that falls below what the Augustine Committee said would be needed for a viable program, the addition of an unfunded crew rescue vehicle program that will put additional stress on the budget, and the lack of someone would call 

credible cost estimates from the commercial crew initiative that 

could wind up adding even more stress. Any one of these would be 

a warning flag, but we have three here, and so make me feel better 

that this budget will accomplish the mission that you have set 

forth. 

FEASIBILITY OF NEW BUDGET

Mr. BOLDEN. Mr. Chairman, very simply, what this budget does, 

is it provides funding for research and development, rejuvenation 

of those activities, whether it is on college and university campuses 

or whether in industry itself. It also provides us with a way to increase the amount that we contribute to technology development 

that will be absolutely necessary if we are going to go beyond lowEarth orbit. What makes this budget different and what makes our 

program, our evolving different from the past is that we are going 

to take incremental steps to leave low-Earth orbit. It is absolutely 

necessary that I facilitate the success of commercial entities to continue to get me to low-Earth orbit because I need the International 

Space Station over the coming ten years and hopefully beyond because that plays an important role in the development of the technologies that will be required to get us beyond low-Earth orbit. 

Very simply, the steps are International Space Station, moon and 

asteroids and eventually to Mars in the 2030s. 

In terms of technology development, new engine technology, new 

structures technology, composites that give us lighter-weight vehicles that require less stress to leave the gravity well of Earth that 

will take us to eventually a heavy-lift launch vehicle by the 2020s, 

in-space propulsion development that will get us beyond low-Earth 

orbit. And then finally, the Crew Rescue Vehicle development that 

the President has authorized me to do that will lead to the development of a deep-space exploration crew module. Crew Rescue Vehicle, while maybe not the ideal thing that we would all like, it gives 

me a phase-zero vehicle that I can use as the technological foundation for building the crew module that I need to get humans beyond low-Earth orbit. 

Chairman GORDON. Are you satisfied that the budget you have 

presented us will fund the crew rescue vehicle including all the 

other things that you have done and that—so you are satisfied 

where you are now? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Mr. Chairman, I am satisfied in one respect. I am 

cognizant of the difficulty of the fiscal environment in which we all 
56

live, and as you and I have said, as a responsible steward of the 

taxpayers’ funds, I understand that I will have to find offsets that 

will enable us to speed up the development of a heavy-lift launch 

vehicle. 

FUNDING A CREW RESCUE VEHICLE

Chairman GORDON. Do you want to suggest some of those today? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Sir, I can tell you things that I am not going to take 

off the table, and you and I have discussed this. Aeronautics and 

science, they are not available for offsets. 

Chairman GORDON. But what does that leave? 

Mr. BOLDEN. It leaves commercial crew and it leaves some of my 

technology development, and I actually think that with prudent 

planning, we can plan what we need to take out of the funds that 

are available for—that the President has set aside for commercial 

crew and we can take some of the funds that I would like to spend 

up front for technology development, put money into those things 

that I absolutely have to have for heavy-lift launch vehicle. 

Chairman GORDON. And when do you plan to present to us—we 

would like to help you with an authorization but we have to see 

your plan, we have to see your numbers before we can do that. And 

we would like for them to add up. 

Mr. BOLDEN. And I assure you, Mr. Chairman, they will add up. 

The amount for the crew return vehicle, we actually have refined 

that and I think it is going to end up being about $4.5 billion, so 

I am going to have to find a place within commercial crew and 

technology development where I can——

Chairman GORDON. When do you expect to present that to us? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Mr. Chairman, I am hoping to refine my numbers 

by next week and I will get them to you as soon as I can, as I 

promised yesterday. I do not want to give you a date certain and 

disappoint you and me. 

Chairman GORDON. Well, again, I don’t want to belabor this. As 

I have said before and I said to you, part of the problem, we are 

in this situation because the Constellation quite frankly for the last 

several years wasn’t funded properly, and kept kicking those bills 

down the road. You inherited them. And so I do not want to start 

that process over again of just kicking it down the road until your 

successor or you have to then really bite the bullet and then we 

say, you know, we have wasted these additional dollars. We have 

been through this with National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, we have been through this with the 

older Constellation program. So I won’t belabor. I look forward to 

getting that from you and having a constructive discussion about 

it, and I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Hall. 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. 

I don’t mind belaboring it a little bit, and Charlie, you know my 

respect for you, but when I hear going to find something or maybe 

next week, you need to be a little more—you know, senior NASA 

program officials in an on-the-record meeting with Committee staff 

stated that the cost of developing an Orion-style crew rescue vehicle would be on the order of $5 billion to $7 billion, and we discussed that figure yesterday. You were kind enough to talk to us 

and give us that information. But word from NASA’s fiscal year 
57

2011 budget, you plan to pay for the capability. Will it come from 

within the exploration program budget or will the science and aeronautics research directorates be taxed as well? And as a follow-up 

question, does NASA hope to have the—when do they hope to have 

the crew rescue vehicle ready for use as an emergency lifeboat on 

the International Space Station? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Representative Hall, my hope is to have the first 

version of Orion available by 2013 to 2015. It is a challenge but I 

think we can do that. The one thing that I can promise you and 

everybody on this Committee is that when we do bring you our 

budget numbers, you will not see bumps above the curve. Nineteen 

billion is my budget for this coming year, and what I do not want 

to do, as Chairman Gordon has said, I don’t want to bring you an 

unexecutable budget and I will not bring you an unexecutable 

budget, so everything will be below the curve, and I can do that. 

My people can do that and we are going to do it. I admit, we are 

late. We started out late. But we are trying to catch up. 

I hate to quote—well, I don’t hate to quote it, but I love quoting 

my predecessor, Mike Griffin. I read something that he wrote in a 

book that we are dedicating to the shuttle when he was talking 

about how, you know, you make decisions. He said, ‘‘Late is ugly 

until you launch. Wrong is ugly forever.’’ And so I do not want to 

give you something that is wrong and I won’t give you something 

that is wrong. I do apologize for it being late but it is going to be 

right so that we don’t—you know, because we are going to have to 

live with it. 

Mr. HALL. The crew rescue vehicle, that fund, the $5 billion to 

$7 billion, is not to be mixed nor funding the escape system. That 

is correct, isn’t it? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, one of the ways that we are going to 

reduce the cost on what is called the crew rescue vehicle—and I 

will be honest, I don’t like that term. I wish we hadn’t used it, but 

we did. The crew rescue vehicle initially, the phase-zero vehicle to 

which I refer, will not be rated for ascent for humans. We will take 

it to orbit without people in it, dock it to the International Space 

Station and so it takes away the requirement for a launch abort 

system, which is a——

Mr. HALL. That answers a different question. Actually the crew escape system is not to be funded by this $5 to $7 billion, is it? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Oh, I am sorry. You are correct, sir. 

Mr. HALL. And you say that you are going to be working and you 

are going to watch it, but as you watch it, you watch it with no 

people in it. It gives us little access, I think, to getting back to the 

success of the old days. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, we will have no people in it when it 

goes to orbit because that would increase the cost up front to 

human-rated for——

Mr. HALL. Who would pay that cost? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I am sorry, sir? 

Mr. HALL. Who would pay that cost up front? 

Mr. BOLDEN. There will be no upfront cost for human rating because we are not going to do that initially. The phase-zero vehicle 

will not be human rated for ascent. It will be human rated for—

it will comply with our visiting vehicle requirements in order to be 
58

docked to the International Space Station for a period of anywhere 

from six months to a year, and then it will be human rated for descent, entry and landing, so that is part of the incremental steps 

that I talk about. 

Mr. HALL. I have some more questions but I am about to run out 

of my time to even say I am about to run out of my time, but lack 

of a fallback option if the commercial crew fails is something that 

really concerns me, that anybody can take over something but we 

need some assurance that you are not just going to take it over but 

you are going to complete it, and if they fall down or falter they 

are not going to turn back and hand us a broken pattern to try to 

fill out where if we stay with where we are going and what Republicans and Democrats alike have voted for for the last five or six 

or seven years, it seems that would be the most likely and the best 

way to solve and keep our international partners, keep that great 

workforce that we have got in place right now that we are going 

to lose. I know you put all that into the computer. Maybe I will get 

to talk to you about it a little more. Thank you, Charlie. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you very much. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I suspect you are 

going to have a chance to talk to him a lot more about that and 

other things. 

Ms. Fudge is recognized. 

GLENN RESEARCH CENTER

Ms. FUDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Administrator Bolden. It is nice to see you again. As you know, I represent 

northeast Ohio. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. FUDGE. Which is home to NASA Glenn. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. FUDGE. So of course, one of my main priorities is what is 

going to happen with NASA Glenn. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. FUDGE. I feel that in much of the discussion around the future of human space exploration, research centers like Glenn have 

not received the same kind of consideration as other NASA centers. 

While I understand that spaceflight centers will be significantly 

impacted by the plan, the truth is that funding for research and 

technology development has been decreasing for years. Glenn Research Center has needs that should be addressed also and I will 

work obviously with the Ohio delegation to ensure that those needs 

are communicated to and understood by your administration. 

With regard to the new plan, on the surface it looks as though 

there will be some large or significant role for NASA Glenn, given 

Glenn’s expertise in aeronautics and space research. However, I am 

concerned that as the plan changes, and it has since we started 

talking about it, Glenn and other research centers stand to lose the 

funding dedicated for technology and development. These concerns 

are already being validated as you stated in April that the revised 

plan to develop an ISS emergency return module would change the 

amounts requested for exploration technology programs. Now, how 

much do you see that these programs are going to be cut and what 

will be the impact on NASA Glenn? And further, should we be ex-
59

pecting more announcements of initiatives that will cut funding for 

technology development? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, as I mentioned before, the amount 

that I would spend on or that I would dedicated to technology development will probably go down by some amount but I just want 

to refer people to the latest Aviation Week and Space Technology 

because I want to make sure that NASA stays in trade magazines 

like this, and there is quite a bit about NASA’s contribution to 

clean aviation and aeronautic development, and we are going to do 

more of that and that is why I told the chairman that one of the 

things that is not eligible to messed with, if I want to use that 

term, is aeronautics. We have an incredible facility in Plum Brook 

at Glenn that has the capability of bringing in large spaceflight. 

Orion, any of the commercial entities can bring them there. Foreign 

partners can bring large spaceflight there. We have got to get out 

and do some work, though, to let people know that we have these 

facilities, that we are credible when we have discussions about aeronautics, and we lost some of our credibility as we stopped spending money in research and development, and I want to restore 

credibility and respect to NASA and the aeronautics community. So 

as I have said to you and the Ohio delegation before, that is something that I promise and I am not backing down on that. 

Ms. FUDGE. Secondly, what do you see as the role for NASA 

Glenn and other centers in working with the commercial space 

transportation industry to accomplish NASA’s human spaceflight 

objectives? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Unless we work with the commercial entities and 

the commercial entities work with us, then everybody’s worst fears 

will be realized. This is a partnership. The tighter we can make the 

partnership between NASA and the commercial entities, just as we 

have done on the International Space Station, it is a model for the 

way that I would love to see our NASA commercial partnership. 

We depend on each other. We can’t survive without each other, and 

that is the way I want the NASA commercial partnership to be. 

They need us and we need them. We have facilities that they can 

use to buy down risk on their vehicles. These are development programs, and they can do it alone, so we are here to help them and 

we are going to do that, and we are going to put demands on them 

because there are certain criteria that they are going to have to 

meet. They are going to have to meet human rating standards. 

They are going to have to comply with safety standards. And so 

those things will not change. I am not putting a human being in 

a commercial spaceflight that does not meet the standards that we 

would do with a NASA vehicle. 

Ms. FUDGE. Thank you, Administrator Bolden. I am warming a 

bit to the plan but I certainly am going to wait until I see the 

budget and hopefully answer some of the questions that have been 

asked today. Again, I thank you for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Smith is recognized. 

MAINTAINING THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
60

Mr. Bolden, the current shuttle manifest was developed at a time 

where the prior Administration had established 2015 as a termination date for the International Space Station. Given that the Administration has now proposed extending its life through 2020, 

which I think is a good idea, what additional needs will the ISS 

have in terms of spare parts, cargo and crew, and how will those 

needs be met with Russian, European or U.S. commercial vehicles. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Sir, the biggest need for International Space Station post this last flight when we put the last big module, the Russian module, is for piece parts, small parts. One of the obligations 

or one of the requirements of the commercial entities is that they 

be able to carry 40 metric tons to orbit. We have a capability of delivering 85 percent of the volume—not the volume but the up mass 

that we had on shuttle with both HGV, the Japanese carrier, and 

ATV, the European carrier. They were both demonstrated and performed flawlessly in the past year. So, you know, we won’t have a 

shuttle to take huge pieces and parts up but there is no requirement for that. We have sufficiently outfitted the station that we 

can service it with——

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Let me ask you a related question, and 

that is, what will the Russian crew services cost and aren’t they 

going to be a lot more expensive now than they were before, and 

I think that is in part because the Russians will have a captive 

market if the shuttle is retired as planned. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, we just——

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Aren’t they going to corner the market and 

therefore the cost will be greater? 

Mr. BOLDEN. They will not have a corner on the market, and 

that is what I am trying to ensure for all of us. When we have commercial vehicles available, and I hope to have more than one carrier, contrary to what everybody thinks, if we stuck with the Constellation program, we would be down to one way to get to orbit 

with the Russians as a backup. When I am successful in facilitating the success of the commercial entities, we hope to have a 

minimum of two commercial carriers backed up by the Russians so 

we will have three ways to get people to orbit, which is one more 

than we would have had with the Constellation program and one 

more than we have today. 

THE SEARCH FOR EXTRA-TERRESTRIAL LIFE

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Mr. Bolden, the last question on a very different subject. What efforts is NASA making to detect life, perhaps 

sentient life, elsewhere in the universe and how important do you 

think that is? 

Mr. BOLDEN. That is critical. I am glad you asked that. NASA 

has a number of missions that are flying right now that are looking 

for Earth-like planets around other suns, the millions of suns in 

the universe as we know it. WISE [Wide-Field Infrared Survey Explorer]—I forget what the acronym stands for—is an infrared imaging satellite that we just put on orbit the end of last year. It is imaging the entire universe as we know it and help us identify things 

like asteroids, Earth-like planets and the like. So we are making 

a serious effort to find out if there is other life out there. 
61

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Any new proposed efforts that you are 

planning to suggest in the next couple of years? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Let me get back to you, Congressman Smith. I am 

certain there are, and my science friends are going to be angry that 

I can’t tell you right away but I know there are. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. And there are some nodding heads behind 

you saying yes as well, so I will look forward to that. 

Mr. BOLDEN. They taught me to say I don’t know. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Thank you. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I don’t know, but I will——

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. I will look forward to hearing back from 

you in that regard. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

And Mr. Matheson is recognized for five minutes. 

FIXING CONSTELLATION

Mr. MATHESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bolden, thanks for coming today. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you. 

Mr. MATHESON. Given the many unanswered questions of the 

proposed fiscal year 2011 NASA plan, it seems to me that we ought 

to be careful about writing off all the hard work and investment 

made in the Constellation program, so what I would like to hear 

from you is, have you tasked your NASA team to take a close look 

at the Constellation program to see what changes, what streamlining, what alternative approaches to doing business could be 

taken to lower the cost and speed the development of the Ares and 

Orion and get us started on a heavy-lift launch vehicle sooner? 

Have you had folks tasked to look at that issue? 

Mr. BOLDEN. So we have a number of tiger teams that we have 

discussed in many panels in testimony before that are looking at 

identifying the nuggets in the Constellation program that we want 

to keep for programs going ahead. We have a group that is looking 

at insight and oversight, how do we streamline the amount of oversight that we exercise as we bring the commercial entities on board 

because they will come. Even with the Constellation program, we 

will be bringing commercial entities on board. That was started by 

my predecessor. I didn’t—President Obama and I didn’t start that. 

This has been on the books for some time, just not very well funded. So we are looking at ways to decrease the amount that it costs 

us for oversight without losing emphasis on safety. 

Mr. MATHESON. Maybe I will ask the question a different way, 

though. It sounds like the decision was made not to move ahead 

with this program, and I am suggesting, have we really looked at 

if there are ways to continue the program under a more cost-effective manner? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, the decision has not been made not 

to move ahead with this program. I am prohibited by law from taking that step. The President and I think the proper thing to do, the 

prudent thing to do is stop work on Constellation in 2011, take the 

nuggets from it and proceed with a more viable program, but right 

now we continue to work with all deliberate speed on perfecting 
62

what we have in Constellation. You know, we will do all we can 

until the end of this fiscal year. 

Mr. MATHESON. I just appreciate a concerted effort to make sure 

we examine all the options before we dismiss something that has 

had a lot of effort put into it. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, you may remember that two weeks 

ago we conducted an incredibly successful test that was called PA–

1, Pad Abort 1. That was on a launch abort system for Orion in 

the Constellation program, and I thought, we all thought that was 

essential to get that test behind us because we think that is going 

to be valuable no matter what we go with. 

SOLID ROCKET INDUSTRY AND WORKFORCE

Mr. MATHESON. Let me ask you another question. What do you 

think is going to happen to the unique workforce that our Nation’s 

defense programs rely upon for the future needs in the solid rocket 

motor industry if the proposed cancellation of the Ares program is 

upheld? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, the leadership in the intelligence 

community, the leadership in the Department of Defense and I are 

working diligently together now to identify what the Nation’s need 

is in terms of solid propellant. We are unique. NASA is unique in 

requiring large, segmented, solid rocket motors that right now 

mostly, I think most of the production is done in a facility called 

Baucus in Utah. That industry cannot, I think, afford the infrastructure that it currently has and we are working with them to 

try to entice them to make business decisions that will get that 

under control because I have not given up, you know, on the need 

for solid fuel yet. There is an incredible workforce there, an incredibly talented workforce that we cannot afford to lose so the intelligence community, DOD and NASA are working to try to find a 

way to transition from where we were grossly overcapitalized up 

until now to a more viable market there. 

Mr. MATHESON. Well, I appreciate your acknowledgment of the 

talented workforce that is there. It is also one that is diminishing 

as we speak in terms of layoffs, and I would just ask that as all 

these items are put on the table, we should recognize that this 

workforce capability is not something that once it goes away you 

can just recreate instantaneously. Once it goes away, it will take 

years to put that back together again, and I think that that is an 

important criterion that ought to be front and center as you look 

at these decisions. I appreciate you coming today. Thank you so 

much. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Matheson. And whatever the 

final decisions are, we need certainty so that that workforce will 

know what they are going to be doing or not doing. 

Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized for five minutes. 

SAVINGS FROM ARES CANCELLATION

Mr. ROHRABACHER. General, could you tell us how much money 

was saved that would have been expended for the Constellation 

Ares project had it not been canceled over a number of years? 
63

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, we have not saved any money because we continue to spend on the fiscal 2010 budget profile so the 

savings will come in fiscal 2011 and beyond if we are able to craft 

a budget that is agreeable to this Congress and the President. So 

we are still on the same funding profile with the Constellation program as we always have been. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the cancellation of the Ares rocket was 

not—I mean, I understand we spent almost $10 billion there. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I have not canceled it. We have come 

to the point that we are still planning and looking at future tests 

for an Ares I rocket. I can’t stop that. We did Ares I–X as a demonstration as we had promised, we would do it again. It was incredibly successful. My dilemma, to be quite honest, is, I am obligated to proceed with a program that I really think we need to stop 

in order to be able to fund the types of programs that are needed 

to take us into the 21st century and continue our leadership. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Then let us approach this question in a different way then. If you were able to stop that program, which I was 

under the impression you were in the process of doing——

Mr. BOLDEN. I can’t do that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you for clarifying that for 

me. How much money are we talking about saving? And when we 

say saving, I am not talking about—we are talking about money 

that will be spent in other aerospace endeavors, not things that 

will take away from these jobs and America’s capability but will 

add to it in a different place. How much money are we talking? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, let me get back to you because that 

is a much more complicated question than I am prepared to answer, and it is not simplistic. You know, when I talk about composite tanks and different propulsion systems, I think they represent a cost savings between what we now have with Constellation and what we would have with a new program with a different 

heavy-lift launch vehicle, a modified Orion. So I will get back to 

you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are talking about considerable amounts 

of money. We are talking about——

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I don’t like to use superlatives. I 

know there is a cost savings but let me get back to you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. I am looking forward to that. 

Mr. Chairman, when people are trying to spend money to do everything, they end up not being able to get anything done, and one 

thing I have noticed since I have been in Congress is this inability 

of Congress to prioritize, just total inability to prioritize, and when 

someone does, at that point they are always focused on saying well, 

we are eliminating something rather than realizing that the funds 

for that are now being used in other endeavors that could be very 

justifiable. 

COST OF A CREW RESCUE VEHICLE

Let me ask you in detail while I have the time here. The crew 

return vehicle, what is going to be the total cost for that? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The crew rescue vehicle. 
64

Mr. BOLDEN. I will get you the entire numbers. The cost up front we estimate is $4.5 billion over five years, but let me get you——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So almost $5 billion over five years, and then 

on top of that operational costs, and that will permit us to have a 

rescue system, a lifeboat at the station for how many years? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I have to get back to you on that also. That is an 

operational—that is an issue of operational concept. I would like to 

get out of that business as quick as possible and get the commercial entities to assume that responsibility. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me get to the point because I only have 

a few seconds left. The money that would be spent for us developing that is $5 billion minimum, it looks like, how much would 

it cost us to rent that capability or to hire that capability from the 

Russians and thus freeing that money for us to use in other aerospace endeavors? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, that is one thing I can give you per 

seat, and it is cheaper. Right now, approximately, and this is a 

rough approximation, $50 million to $57 million per seat with the 

Russians. That includes training, transportation, everything. So we 

all need to understand that cheap is not what we are looking for. 

We are looking for domestic capability, and——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, it seems to me that if we are developing a domestic capability at the cost of $5 billion that we could 

actually be doing for considerably cheaper. That means we are denying other aerospace projects that amount of money in order to 

have a crew rescue vehicle on the space station, which we know in 

a few years is going to be obsolete and we are going to fly away 

from that and it will be part of history. Maybe we should be, instead of investing those billions of dollars in something that will be 

history within a short time, maybe we should be investing in future-oriented technology that will make us competitive with the 

Russians in the future, in fact, more competitive than anybody else, 

rather than depending on the Russians in the future as well because we have managed to spend all of our money in the past. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. I don’t mean 

to cut you off but we have a lot of witnesses and we are going to 

try to stick with our five minutes or, you know, shortly thereafter. 

Ms. Giffords, the chair of our Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, is recognized for five minutes. 

CONTINUING WORK ON CONSTELLATION

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member 

Hall. Welcome back to our Committee, General Bolden. 

You earlier referenced the successful launch of that abort system 

test flight, and this was truly a significant milestone for the Constellation program to develop the systems that are going to take us 

back safely to the International Space System and beyond lowEarth orbit. It is a real testimonial to the success of NASA and our 

contractor team, who made it an incredible success. This was a 

three-year development. It cost approximately $220 million, again, 

a credible first step in ensuring the safety of future spacecraft 

crews, and it was really clear after the Challenger accident that in 

order to safely carry the crew, we had to be able to present an escape system that would not harm them during ascent, and again, 
65

this was an important requirement that was a critical part of the 

design for Orion and for Ares I and the inclusion of the launch 

abort system is projected to really make this the safest combination 

to get back to the ISS and beyond. 

I would like to actually show a short video clip if that, if we could 

cue that up, because about 3 weeks ago, and I am not sure all the 

members actually saw this, but NASA and its team of contractors 

showed us how it is done. So let us take a look here. 

[Video playback.] 

The Pad Abort–1, as NASA called it, was the first successful 

U.S.-designed abort system since Apollo, incredible feat, and congratulations to you and your team. But even before the test, Popular Science magazine honored the launch abort system with a 

Best of What Is New Award for 2009 in the aviation and space category, and as you just said, General Bolden, you said this was an 

incredibly successful program and you thought it was essential, a 

valuable tool to wherever we go. Sadly, that hard work and that 

dedication have not been rewarded. Space News reported on the 

eve of the test that one of the contractors warned its subcontractors 

supporting development of this that funding for the effort would 

cease as of April 30th. 

Administrator, Bolden, you and I both know that actions are 

being taken to make it hard for the team to accomplish their work 

during the remainder of this year. It is not a mystery to this Committee and to all of the industry folks out there. All of this is happening despite the efforts of Congress and us saying that work on 

Constellation needs to continue, and based on the lack of Congressional support for the President’s proposed plan, I think it is clear 

that we are going to need the capabilities that we are developing 

under the Constellation program like this Pad Abort system in the 

future. I don’t have a lot of time to spend talking about legal interpretations of termination liabilities and other issues. However, it is 

very clear that there is a lot of uncertainty within your agency and 

in the contractor community about what is going to be done to Constellation this year. There are a lot of rumors floating around about 

termination of high-ranking members of your administration that 

are working to really execute the will of the Congress. So I would 

like to—and I only have a minute left—but just a couple of yes-no 

answers to some simple, direct questions. 

Administrator Bolden, will you give this Committee your assurance that you will take all feasible measures to ensure that NASA 

makes as much progress as possible on Constellation in the remainder of the fiscal year 2010 and will you direct your workforce 

to do the same? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Will you direct your Constellation Orion workforce to give highest priority to carrying out activities that maximize progress on the Orion crew exploration vehicle program and 

not divert efforts in the fiscal year 2010 to the yet-approved crew 

rescue vehicle program? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. And finally, will you ensure that your workforce 

complies with the intent of Congress that work continues on Constellation until such time as the Congress decides otherwise and 
66

that work on all aspects of the Constellation program over the past 

five years shall take precedence over the activities and the programs proposed by the President in his fiscal year 2011 request 

that may wind up never been approved by the United States Congress? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am, and that is the direction I have given 

as late as last week. That was essential the guidance I provided 

to the Constellation program was to do those things that you just 

mentioned. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Administrator, and thank you, 

Mr. Chair. 

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Olson, the ranking member of the Space 

and Aeronautics Subcommittee, is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Administrator, for coming to testify today and thank you for your 

service to our Nation. Thanks again for your phone call yesterday. 

I greatly appreciate that. Please keep that up, because that is one 

of the things I think was lacking when this budget was rolled out, 

and I would like to sort of follow up on my chairwoman, some of 

her comments. 

In your opening statement, you referenced this week’s GAO report on the use of study teams to develop plans for the President’s 

fiscal year 2011 budget, and GAO documented thousands of hours 

devoted by NASA employees planning to implement the President’s 

budget. I would like to caution you that this report was just the 

first response in ongoing GAO investigation. A full report is slated 

to be delivered this summer and will focus more on the more important question of NASA’s compliance with budget impoundment 

laws. The report from this week clearly states that the agency, and 

I quote, ‘‘must be mindful of the appropriations provision on canceling or altering contracts in the current program.’’ I would like 

to reiterate that with you as well. 

And following up on my chairwoman’s comments, I mean the Pad 

Abort was an incredibly successful launching test but there were 

rumors, if you recall, back in January and February that NASA 

was looking to cancel that. Again, NASA does not have that authority with the appropriations language. The President and the 

Administration have a voice in this process but they don’t have the 

ultimate say. We, the United States Congress, has that, and I just 

again caution you not to read too much into that GAO report. We 

will get more details later on. 

PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE JOHNSON SPACE CENTER

One question for you, and you live back in the District as well, 

and one question——

Mr. BOLDEN. Not very much. 

Mr. OLSON. I am similar to you. I am here today and I would 

much rather be back home with my family, but what we are doing 

here is important. But one question I get asked a lot, and I would 

like you to help me answer it, is when is the President going to 

come to the Johnson Space Center and see the home of human 

spaceflight? When is he going to give us some time? I mean, I know 

he went down to Florida and made the speech there and he took 

a tour of one of the commercial operators and gave them a half an 
67

hour. When is he going to come down and give us a couple of hours 

just to see what incredible things are being done there at Houston 

and what is at stake with some of the implications of the budget 

he has proposed? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I am working on that, and unfortunately, I can’t give you a date certain but I am hoping he will let 

my granddaughters come and meet him before he goes to the Johnson Space Center since they are going to be here in about a month. 

Mr. OLSON. Anything you can do to get him down there, because 

again, I get asked that all the time. People don’t understand why 

he won’t come down and see us in Texas or the home of human 

spaceflight. I mean, we had a great mission, as you know, with 

Atlantis today. I was a little sad seeing her land, knowing that that 

is probably the last time that she is going to roll out and is going 

to become a museum piece. 

NASA’S PRIMARY MISSION

One other question just sort of philosophical for you that is kind 

of on my mind. You know, NASA does many, many things, human 

exploration, robotic exploration, research development, technology 

development, climate monitoring, you know, aerospace, aeronautics, but we have a limited budget and we struggle, and that 

is the struggle we are facing today with what has happened here 

with the Constellation program. We haven’t given you the resources you need to do what we have asked you to do as a Nation. 

But as the administrator, if you could pick one thing, one thing for 

NASA, what do you think their primary mission focus should be? 

Should it be human spaceflight exploration, robotic exploration, research and development? I know it is a tough question but I just 

kind of want to see what your thoughts are on that. 

Mr. BOLDEN. It is a pretty easy question for me because they are 

all intertwined. You can’t—human exploration without research 

and development is unexecutable. Research and development without a human exploration program trying to pull that technology is 

useless, and that is really the—the debate we are having and the 

difficulty in my bringing you what I need to bring you is, it is really complex trying to determine—you know, human spaceflight is 

critical. We cannot do it without research and development and development of new technologies as Congressman Rohrabacher said. 

We tried that and it doesn’t work. I don’t have anything in NASA—

we do STEM. We do science, technology, engineering and math 

whether people like it or not, and I know that is an educational 

term but education is also critical in what we do because if I am 

not allowed to do education and expend money and resources, people on that, I am going to have nobody that I can take from a college campus who is an engineer, so I would love to be able to tell 

you all that it is very simplistic. What I love about my job is, it 

is very complex, complicated and nuanced, and that represents an 

incredible challenge. The President is a person who does nuance, 

and I haven’t seen one like that in a while and it is fun to sit and 

talk to somebody who understands that the world is nuanced, it is 

not black and white. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, General, for that answer. I am running 

out of time here. I would just like to sum up that I think if you 
68

ask the American public what does NASA do, they would see those 

astronauts in those blue flight suits down the hall earlier today 

and they do human spaceflight, and that should be our priority. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Mr. Schweickart. 

Mr. OLSON. Rusty Schweickart. We have got Neil Armstrong, 

Gene Cernan. I mean, that is what the American public thinks 

about when you say NASA. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I agree. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Olson. 

And Mr. Miller, the chairman of the I&O Committee is recognized. 

SPACE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS SERVICE CONTRACT

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my first question 

has to do with the work of the I&O Committee. We understand 

that NASA is on the verge of awarding the acquisitions contract for 

the space communications networking, SCNS, contract. It will be 

the third effort. The first two, there were complaints to GAO and 

the GAO found that there were organizational conflicts of interest 

that infected the award process and set the awards aside. We understand that in the early summer, and Monday is Memorial Day, 

NASA will try for a third time. Our subcommittee has been looking 

at the award of the contract, the contract acquisition process. They 

have interviewed 30 people. They have reviewed 20 boxes of documents. They will shortly issue a staff report that I understand will 

be very critical of NASA’s failure to understand the importance of 

dealing with conflicts of interest rather than just something to kind 

of get through a process and make sure it doesn’t get set aside, 

that there is actually a purpose behind the organizational conflict 

of interest. Since you are apparently on the verge, NASA is apparently on the verge of awarding the contract for the third time, we 

are apparently on the verge of issuing a staff report examining the 

contract, will you hold off on awarding the contract until you see 

the result of our staff committee report? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, as much as it pains me to say, I will 

have to get back to you on that because I am familiar with about 

what you speak but not familiar enough to give you an intelligent 

answer, so I will get back to you. 

Mr. MILLER. If you could do it quickly because——

Mr. BOLDEN. I will do it quickly, sir. I can get back to you this 

afternoon. I just don’t—I don’t have the information before me. 

Somebody just slipped me a note, but I always get in trouble when 

I read notes and I don’t know what——

Mr. MILLER. I will look forward to your call. 

SPACE TOURISM

Second, some part of the justification for commercial crews is 

that NASA would not be the only customer. It would make possible 

spaceflight for others, and I have got to say, the idea of taking a 

vacation of going to space does sound massively cool. But it also 

strikes me as probably pretty pricey, and Chairman Gordon asked 

back in February if you had done any kind of market survey to determine just exactly what the market was for space tourism, and 
69

your answer was that NASA had not but that there had been private industry surveys, and we found one. Futron Corporation estimated back in 2002–2003 that the cost would be $20 billion to go. 

They seem to assume that——

Mr. BOLDEN. Million. 

Mr. MILLER. Million to go. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MILLER. And they estimated then that there might be 23 

people who would go on Soyuz flights at that price. They now estimate that the price might come down. If it did come down to $5 

million per ticket, that might make it possible for people with net 

worth as low as $50 million to go by 2021. There is other information that $5 million per ticket is wildly optimistic, that it is probably going to say in the—probably an absolute or more likely price 

tag or ticket price would be $50 million. What part of the justification for commercial crews is space tourism? How much of the $6 

billion, $7 billion a year we are spending for five years is directed 

at what is going to strike a lot of Americans as something that is 

beyond, probably will always be beyond their reach? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, none of our effort is directed at space 

tourism. Our effort is directed at a commercially available option 

to get to low-Earth orbit. What is important to me is to be able to 

get scientists and investigators from Earth to the International 

Space System. You know, that is—I know that we need to be able 

to get people there. If there is a commercial availability to get them 

there, then we can increase the numbers of people who can do research on the International Space System as an example. There are 

other examples that people can cite of hopes for other facilities in 

low-Earth orbit, you know, where a commercial entity to get them 

there would be very good. 

Mr. MILLER. I am sorry. Say that again. 

Mr. BOLDEN. There are other examples that people can cite for 

you if you talk to a company like Bigelow, for example, who have 

inflatable structures. They have a couple that have been on orbit 

for some time now surviving with nobody in them but still surviving as a demonstration. There are entities out there who have 

a need for a way to get to space, and that is the commercial entity 

that I want to facilitate the success for. 

Mr. MILLER. Not space tourism? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Space tourism is fine, but that is someone else’s 

business model. That is not a NASA—that is not something that 

is in my purview. I think that is great. 

Mr. MILLER. My time is expired. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Miller. 

And Mr. Sensenbrenner is recognized for five minutes. 

MODIFYING CONSTELLATION

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much. 

General Bolden, welcome. Let me say I am a little disturbed at 

the President’s budget submission, and 49 years ago when I was 

still a high school student, I remember seeing President Kennedy 

on TV giving an inspirational speech which united Americans and 

talked about putting a man on the moon. And the President’s 

speech at the Kennedy Space Center I think is a U-turn from what 
70

President Kennedy had to say to us, and certainly has deflated the 

hopes of a lot of people in terms of America keeping its edge in 

space technology. Now, so far we have spent $10.3 billion on the Constellation pro- gram, and I guess if it is terminated that is $10.3 billion wasted 

or spent on something that was a dead end. Has NASA or the Administration given any consideration to modifying the program if 

they determine it to be too expensive rather than stopping it altogether? 

Mr. BOLDEN. You are referring to the Constellation program? 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Sir, we are not looking at a way to modify the Constellation program because we feel that the amount of money that 

would be required to bring that program up to a point where it is 

viable is more than the Nation can afford. 

TERMINATION LIABILITY

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. What termination liability does the 

Federal Government have if the Congress approves the President’s 

recommendation? How much money? 

Mr. BOLDEN. The termination liability is a requirement on the 

part—that is a requirement that is laid on the contractor as a part 

of the contract, and we recently went through a lot of deliberation 

on that back and forth with attorneys, but the termination liability 

is something that is a responsibility of the individual contract. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Now, how is that? If the determination to 

terminate the program is made by the Federal Government, that 

seems to be a pretty bad contract. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I am not an attorney and I do not 

know why we introduced that type of clause into contracts but it 

is in most of our NASA contracts——

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, I am an attorney, with all due respect, and if all of a sudden if the Administration and the Congress 

agree to terminate the Constellation program and the contractors 

end up holding the bag, how do you ever expect them to sign another contract with NASA? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, what most businesses do from my 

very limited experience on the outside serving on corporate boards 

is that the board with the management structure of the company 

makes a risk decision that okay, we are going to go into this business because we are not sure that our client, our customer is reliable, we are going to hold back some money just in case he finks 

on us, and people who work with the U.S. government unfortunately are very accustomed to that. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Does NASA want to get a reputation of 

finking on contractors and big programs? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Mr. Chairman, we do not want to get that reputation but I would be lying to you if I didn’t say we haven’t. Everyone 

sitting in this room can line up, you know, we can line that wall 

up with NASA programs that have been canceled and it comes with 

changes of Administration, it comes with changes of mind. One of 

the problems that we have philosophically as a people is we can’t 

see beyond a four-year horizon, and all of you sitting in this room 

are having a very difficult time seeing beyond a two-year horizon, 
71

which comes down to a one-year horizon when you have to run, and 

I don’t——

ABDICATING LEADERSHIP IN SPACE

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Sir, with all due respect, this Committee 

on a bipartisan basis has written and passed into law multiyear 

NASA authorization bills, which are much beyond a two-year horizon minus whatever part of our two-year terms has already 

elapsed. Now, I will be very honest with you, sir, this is a U-turn 

and I think that there are a lot of people who still have the vision 

of President Kennedy who think that the United States is abdicating its leadership in manned spaceflight as a result of the Uturn and they are really puzzled when they see the Administration 

asking for $23 billion to keep laid-off teachers on the payroll but 

they don’t have enough money to follow the $10.3 billion that we 

have already spent in building the Constellation program. If you 

want to look at the future, I would suggest that if it is too expensive, let us modify it, because I have a real bad time justifying to 

my constituents that well, we spent over $10 billion of your money 

and we decided we can’t get anything out of it. And I am not going 

to do that, and I think that if the President and his NASA administrator want to do that, you are going to have a tough time convincing the American people you are right. 

My time is up. Thank you. 

Chairman GORDON. Do you want to give a quick reply? 

Mr. BOLDEN. A quick reply would be to say, I don’t consider it 

a U-turn, I consider it, there are many ways to get where we all 

want to go. We all want to get to Mars. Constellation would not 

have gotten us there. The President’s new program will get us 

there. It will take us—we will go in incremental steps where we 

were trying to go in one big chunk before and we just—we are not 

going to get there. 

Chairman GORDON. And Ms. Woolsey is recognized for five minutes. 

SAFETY REGULATIONS FOR COMMERCIAL SPACEFLIGHT

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator Bolden, hello. Thank you for being here. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. You said a couple of things that made me stop 

and sit up more than once today. One is, you have said in response 

to questions on different issues they won’t be perfect. And then we 

talked about commercial crews and commercial vehicles. So boom, 

I started thinking, well, the safety of the crews, the safety of the 

workers, the safety of human flight being commercial and not 

under NASA as we know it, and as the chairwoman of the Workforce Protection Subcommittee in Labor, I really want to know how 

we are going to make sure that we have safety regulations for 

these commercial flights. We just keep experiencing private industry taking risks, cutting corners, having shortcuts, cost savings, 

timing and then what we have got? With this, we are particularly 

vulnerable, we get people up there in space. So what are you thinking in that regard for NASA? 
72

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, we are modifying, we are looking 

at the way that we exercise our oversight over the work that is 

done by the contractors. I think I spend too much time and effort 

and money on that oversight today, and that is a contributor to the 

increased cost of programs. I don’t need to have 20 NASA people 

overseeing 20 contractors to ensure safety. I can do that in a much 

more streamlined manner. I would—going back to the video that 

Congresswoman Giffords showed, I am glad she showed it because 

I would remind those—I would remind some and I would inform 

others that the integration contractor for everything you saw was 

Orbital, a company out of Dulles, Virginia, and it happens to be the 

same Orbital that is one of the top producers. They are a reputable 

aerospace company that has produced very successful products in 

the past, and as I have said to other people, I refuse to accept the 

contention that an American company cannot do what the Russians 

do through Energia. I refuse to accept the fact or the belief that 

we can’t help our American manufacturers produce an incredibly 

safe vehicle to get humans from Earth to low-Earth orbit and then 

beyond. Boeing is going to be working on—they worked on the 

International Space Station. They will be working on the low-Earth 

orbit vehicle, but Boeing is also probably going to be involved in 

the NASA production of a beyond-LEO vehicle. It is the same company, the same people, and I just cannot accept the fact that they 

will be less capable because they are making money running a 

commercial entity than they are going to be working for me taking 

people beyond low-Earth orbit. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. But working for you, NASA, is responsible for the 

oversight. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I am responsible no matter whether I procure their 

services by buying the vehicle or by leasing the vehicle. The only 

difference is the acquisition strategy. I am not relinquishing my responsibility for guaranteeing safety of crew and cargo just because 

I lease the vehicle. When I lease the vehicle, it belongs to me. You 

know, is it like going to a little airport on the way to Annapolis, 

and I don’t own the airplane—I don’t fly—but my friends don’t own 

the airplane. They lease it and they go fly, but they are responsible 

for that airplane while they are flying it. That is the way I am 

going to be when I fly astronauts and cargo on a commercial entity. 

I lease it; I own it for the time being. The difference is, I don’t have 

to pay the overhead, I don’t have to pay the infrastructure, so there 

is—going back Congressman Rohrabacher’s point, I reduce the 

amount of money that the taxpayer has to pay because the taxpayer is not strapped with infrastructure and operational costs 

when I am not flying that vehicle. It is $2 billion a year if I don’t 

even launch the space shuttle. We can’t afford that. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. So you will have the same safety procedures and 

processes——

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am. I will have the same effect when it 

comes to safety and oversight. What will be different, I can promise 

you, I will not have the same number of people, for example. I will 

not have the same number of boards at the Johnson Space Center 

that has to meet before we give a go to fly a vehicle. When I was 

in the space program, we had a program requirements control 

board and a CCB—I forget what they stand for. When I go to the 
73

Johnson Space Center today, they have grown to 10, 12, I don’t 

know how many boards, and I have still got to get to the top for 

the decision to launch. I don’t need all that. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Bartlett is recognized for five minutes. 

PROMOTING STEM FIELDS THROUGH NASA 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

I want to ask you about your commitment to what I think is the 

most important contribution that NASA can make, and I need to 

put this in context. As the school physiologist at the school of aviation medicine in Pensacola, Florida, in the late 1950s, I was involved in the first suborbital primate flight, monkey Baker and 

monkey Able. Monkey Able was killed by the Army when they gave 

a general anesthetic to take the electrodes out. We didn’t do that 

to our monkey Baker in Pensacola, so she was kind of a star for 

a long time. There were seven astronauts at that time, the first 

seven, and NASA had no facilities. So they were using military facilities. They came to Pensacola to use the human centrifuge and 

the slow rotation room and they came to the naval yard in Philadelphia where I had temporary additional duty to use the altitude 

chamber. Dino Mensanelli, obviously of Italian descent, was the director of that and they were testing one day, and I have heard Dino 

tell this story a number of times. He thought it was very funny. 

They were testing a pressure suit and it was making a noise. The 

air part was making a noise. And he asked the astronaut, I forget 

which one it was, what it sounded like, and he said well, if you will 

excuse me, it sounds like waff, waff, waff. And I heard Dino tell 

that story many times. What happened then, I was much older 

than Sensenbrenner and I was already working as a scientist in a 

career when he was in high school, but I remember that speech of 

the President, and I remember the enormous contribution that that 

made to our country in terms of capturing the imagination of our 

people and inspiring our young people to go into careers in science, 

math and engineering. 

Today we are the world’s premier military power, and I think 

that is largely due to what NASA did during that slightly less than 

a decade that we spent putting a man on the moon because it really did capture the imagination of our people and inspired our young 

people to go into these careers, because I remember a cartoon, a 

bucktoothed, freckled-face kid and he said, you know, six months 

ago I couldn’t even engineer and now I are one. Everybody wanted 

to go into science, math and engineering, and I think that our preeminence today in defense is largely due to that. 

Today we face a huge challenge, as you know, sir. This year the 

Chinese will graduate seven times as many engineers as we graduate. India will graduate three times as many engineers as we 

graduate. The best and brightest of the kids in our country are 

going into what I tell them are potentially destructive pursuits, if 

you will excuse me, that are wanting more and more to become 

lawyers and political scientists. Don’t you think we have enough of 

both of those? We desperately need, sir, something that captures 

the imagination of our people and inspires our young people to go 

into science, math and engineering or we will not retain our pre-
74

mier position as the best, most powerful military force in the world, 

and to say nothing of technology and leading in that area. What 

is NASA going to do that is going to capture the imagination of our 

people and inspire our young people to go into these technical careers? Because, sir, I think that is the most important contribution 

that NASA can make. What are you going to do that is really sexy 

and catches on? 

Mr. BOLDEN. We are going to continue to do some of the work 

that we have been doing and expand it even more through some 

of the—again, I will have to go back to my educational initiatives. 

This summer, through a program called the Summer of Innovation, 

for example, we are going to allow—working with the Massachusetts Space Grant Consortium, we are going to allow middle-school 

kids to write programs that will allow three spheres on the International Space System to maneuver around inside the station, do 

intricate maneuvers that we need to be able to do if we are going 

to be able to rendezvous with a refueling base in space or something. That work is being done right now by doctoral students and 

post-docs at MIT. But this is something that they decided they 

wanted to take all the way down to the middle-school level. There 

is a program that is not a NASA program called First Robotics but 

NASA supports that with 312 teams that we provide mentors for. 

The Nation doesn’t pay a dime for that. That is time that our engineers and scientists dedicate because they think it is important. 

And First Robotics, if you have not seen it, it is absolutely incredible, and that inspires the imagination of kids. 

There are kids—there are more stories from First Robotics about 

former gang leaders who had their lives turned around because 

they got involved in First Robotics, so I am not going to tell those 

stories because the chairman would shoot me for taking all that 

time, but I would recommend that we all take a look at some of 

the things that have been done through NASA, through the National Science Foundation, through other organizations that do inspire kids. You know, they don’t need to see somebody go to the 

moon, it is helpful, but they all realize they can’t go to the moon. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Administrator. 

I just want to suggest that Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Cernan and Mr. 

Young are waiting on our second panel. Everyone certainly has the 

right for their full time, and we are going to continue to go forward, 

but if you don’t feel like you need your full five minutes. don’t feel 

like you have to take it, and Mr. Bolden, you can also, if you have 

got your message across, you can go to the next one also. 

So now, Mrs. Dahlkemper, I don’t mean to put you under the 

spotlight here but you are our next speaker and I recognize you for 

five minutes. 

ASTEROID MISSION

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to 

be very quick. 

Thank you, General Bolden, for being with us, and I have been 

to some of those First Robotics competitions and they are exciting 

and really do inspire me as well as certainly the students. 

I just have a quick question. As the President announced a plan 

for a manned flight to an asteroid, that captures my imagination 
75

actually, and so I just would like you to maybe tell me what we 

have available to us right now to attain that goal. Are we starting 

from scratch on that? Just give me a little bit of background on 

this. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I can give you a quick example. The jet propulsion 

lab and the Johnson Space Center, the Glenn Space Research Center and Marshall, those centers are presently talking about an 

early visit to an asteroid using a lot of off-the-shelf technology, electric engines that we call Hall Thrusters that will enable us to rendezvous with an asteroid perhaps as quickly as 2016 just as a demonstrator. It is a robotic precursor, not a human mission, but it 

gives us an opportunity to demonstrate that we do in fact know 

how to rendezvous with this thing that is orbiting the Sun. That 

is what makes asteroids so challenging. They are not—you know, 

we have ephemeral data on other stuff but we don’t on asteroids. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. So this is unmanned? 

Mr. BOLDEN. This is unmanned. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. And when would you expect that we would 

be able to get manned? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I promised the President that if I get my act together, we will do it in 2025, and I think we can do that. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. And that is pretty exciting. I am anxious to 

see that move forward. So I will end there and yield back. 

Mr. BOLDEN. When a kid sees——

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mrs. Dahlkemper. 

Mr. BOLDEN. —a rendezvous with an asteroid in 2016, let me tell 

you, they are going to be excited. 

Chairman GORDON. And Mr. Smith is recognized for five minutes. 

TIMELINE FOR HUMAN RATED COMMERCIAL LAUNCH

VEHICLES

Mr. SMITH OF NEBRASKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Administrator. If you would lay out NASA’s schedule for developing and 

finalizing a set of human rating requirements for commercial crew 

companies, and once requirements are established, how long do you 

anticipate it would take a company to design, develop and flighttest and certify a capsule and launch system? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Let me get back to you, because we have laid that 

schedule out and I will get back to you with what it is because we 

have a request for information on the street, and I talked about it 

in my opening remarks and we released it sometime this month, 

asking for commercial entities to look at our draft human rating requirements. Most of the commercial entities have told us that if 

you put an RFP on the street and we win, we think we can have 

a vehicle that is human rated in a three-year period of time from 

the time that the award is made. That is what they say. I am one 

who takes one at their word until they demonstrate otherwise. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEBRASKA. Can you give me a rough time on that? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Twenty fifteen, 2016 time frame is what we are 

looking at right now on our schedule. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEBRASKA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 
76

And Lt. Governor Garamendi is recognized for five minutes. 

CONSTELLATION VARIATIONS

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

By now you have probably figured out this Committee is not with 

you. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, sir, I understand. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And I am curious about several things that you 

have said. I am going to do this quickly. You said that you are not 

looking at Constellation Lite, that is, a revamping of the Constellation program. Is that correct? 

Mr. BOLDEN. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you have any authorization to look at any 

other program besides Constellation? 

Mr. BOLDEN. In the 2010 budget, I don’t have any authorization 

to look at anything, and that is why I am not looking at any modification or termination or anything on Constellation. We are working the existing program of record, Constellation——

Mr. GARAMENDI. But yet your testimony here indicated substantial looking at other options. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I am doing planning for the President’s 2011 budget 

proposal which I feel is prudent to do. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will leave it to our lawyers to parse that out. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, sir. They are doing that. 

POTENTIAL COMMERCIAL CREW PROVIDERS

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am sure they are, and they should. You mentioned earlier on the commercialization several companies. Could 

you explicitly tell us what companies you are looking at to do the 

commercial operations that are you are planning for next budget? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Sir, I don’t have any companies that I can say I am 

looking at. I can tell you companies that I know are thinking about 

entering the——

Mr. GARAMENDI. Who are they? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, perhaps ATK Orbital, 

SpaceX, Bigelow. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You mentioned a couple of Japanese and European companies that might be interested in this. 

Mr. BOLDEN. We are not—they are not eligible to compete as a 

prime contractor. They can be involved as a sub to an American 

firm under our present laws. 

INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. You also indicated that the private 

companies would not be burdened with overhead, operational costs, 

continuing operations and the like. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Sir, I did not. That is exactly opposite from what 

I said. I said I will no longer be burdened with the infrastructure 

costs, the overhead and everything else. Private companies will 

incur whatever overhead they normally incur for doing business. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And you don’t think you will have to pay for 

that? 
77

Mr. BOLDEN. We will pay something, as anybody does when they 

buy a service. There is always—the airlines charge me extra because they are inefficient. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. They are private, aren’t they? 

Mr. BOLDEN. And that is what we are talking about. I am talking 

about purchasing a service from a public or private company that 

wants to compete to provide that service in terms of cargo to orbit 

and humans to low-Earth orbit. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And if you think you are not going to pay for 

their inefficiencies, you are mistaken. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I did not say I would not do that. 

That will be figured in—I am certain they will figure it in to their 

price. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am sorry. I don’t want to be too argumentative 

here but it seems to me——

Mr. BOLDEN. I am not arguing. I agree with you. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am, and I don’t want to do that. Just finally, 

I think you are making a serious error in not looking at Constellation Lite. I think you are obligated to do so. I think you are making 

a big mistake in not looking at how that might be modified to 

achieve the goals that you and the President are stating, and to 

simply push it aside and not move forward with a significant modification or useful modification to meet the requirements of manned 

spaceflight, whether done by contractors or leasing the equipment. 

So I will let it go at that. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, if you could get a relief from the 

2010 Joint Appropriations Act that would allow me to——

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Bolden. We have covered 

that topic a few times. 

Dr. Ehlers is recognized. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my judgment that 

all the older and wiser people on this panel have already spoken 

and said everything I would say, so if you don’t object, I will reserve my spot for the next panel. 

Chairman GORDON. You demonstrate your wisdom right there. 

Ms. Kosmas is recognized for five minutes. 

EXTENDING THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM

Ms. KOSMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Administrator Bolden, for being here. I do think it 

is appropriate to mention that we actually had a successful and 

flawless return of Atlantis this morning at 8:48 a.m. and I think 

it is a great opportunity for us to congratulate both the crew and 

the workforce once again for the great work done by those folks. 

I have a number of different questions. I am going to try to be 

as brief as I can. I want to talk to you a little bit about a comment 

that you made that said it is important for us to get scientists to 

the International Space Station. You also talked about spares and 

payloads. I want to make a comment. It is my understanding that 

NASA has completed all the requirements suggested by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and then some, and that recertification of the orbiters for flights beyond 2010 is essential done. I believe that you would agree that NASA’s implementation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations on shuttle 
78

and human spaceflight has been successful and that the shuttle’s 

current safety record and the efforts by the shuttle team ensure 

that all safety risks are addressed for each flight. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KOSMAS. So would you then agree that flying beyond 2010 

into 2011 and perhaps into 2012 is not a safety issue but rather 

a cost issue? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, it is not a safety issue. There are 

still safety considerations but it is not a safety concern. 

Ms. KOSMAS. There would be safety issues with any——

Mr. BOLDEN. There are safety issues with—any time I put a 

human in a vehicle——

Ms. KOSMAS. So if it is not a—I am sorry to interrupt you. If it 

is not a safety issue but a cost issue, and the reason I bring it up 

is, I believe that manifesting the Launch on Need mission, the 

STS–135, would provide a more manageable draw-down and may 

help to retain the skills that we need for a future program and it 

would also be extremely useful in our ability to deliver spares to 

the space station and to bring down parts that we could conduct 

engineering analyses on, and I am asking whether you would agree 

that this would be helpful to us since we have no other American 

vehicle——

Mr. BOLDEN. I agree that that may be helpful. 

Ms. KOSMAS. —to get there. And for the record, do you see any 

technical or logistical roadblocks to flying the space shuttle twice 

a year through 2012? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, ma’am. There is——

Ms. KOSMAS. Besides the cost factor. 

Mr. BOLDEN. No, no, no. There is a significant logistics issue, and 

once I fly the Launch on the Need vehicle, then the closest I can 

fly another vehicle is two years after that because I don’t have tank 

sets that are prepared. So there would be a two-year gap between——

Ms. KOSMAS. So you suggest that that is a technical or logistical 

roadblock? 

Mr. BOLDEN. It is a logistical roadblock. 

Ms. KOSMAS. All right. As was stated by my colleague, I don’t 

want to be argumentative either, but I do believe that we have the 

ability to make something happen if we have the decision in place 

to make it happen. 

MAINTAINING SPACE WORKFORCE

I want to go on to another question, which has to do with the 

workforce. In my area, as you know, Kennedy Space Center, the 

President was there, which we appreciated and he stated in his 

speech that the Administration’s proposal would mean 2,500 more 

jobs than under the program of record for my community at the 

Space Coast in Florida, and despite repeated requests, we have not 

received any further and specific information related to the workforce and the skills that would be required that would be helpful 

to me at the Space Coast to properly plan for the transition, not 

me but me and the folks I am working with in the area to plan 

for transition. I know that there are efforts in the works to try to 

work with the Administration at the Cabinet level to implement 
79

the $40 million workforce and economic development initiative proposed by the President but again, we don’t have any details as to 

the specifics of the jobs that are intended to be created and therefore we have no way to match skills with that workforce that we 

so desperately want to retain. Do you have any details on the transition strategy that would help me to look at that workforce transition? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congresswoman, at this point I don’t. As I sat 

down, we were having the third meeting of the taskforce or a sub 

piece of it, and the types of information that you want will probably 

not be available before mid-July when the taskforce starts to look 

at the draft report that we are going to give to the President. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Okay. Thank you. Do you plan to relocate DOD or 

other Federal projects to Florida? Are you looking at opportunities 

to do that? 

Mr. BOLDEN. No, ma’am, and I don’t think Secretary Gates would 

appreciate my intervening in his responsibility. I understand what 

you are saying. 

Ms. KOSMAS. As part of the transition, however, working 

with——

Mr. BOLDEN. In fact, DOD—every secretariat has representation 

on the task force that is being chaired by Secretary Locke and me, 

so we are looking across the board trying to see what we can do 

for the Space Coast. 

SAFETY RECORD OF COMMERCIAL PROVIDERS

Ms. KOSMAS. Okay. I think my time is about to expire, but I just 

wanted to ask you one question and it has to do with your reliance 

emphasis on commercial. We know that Falcon-9 is getting ready 

to undergo its first test launch, and of course we wish it success. 

There is a great deal of pressure on it. However, we should also 

remember that ULA has been flying reliably and safely from Florida 40 launches in 40 months. Do you agree that this represents 

a solid record upon which we could build a commercial capability 

for access to low-Earth orbit for crew and cargo from both a cost 

and schedule standpoint? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I agree that it represents a potential source of provision of commercial access to low-Earth orbit. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Bolden, and Mr. Wu is recognized. 

TIMELINE FOR COMMERCIAL ACCESS TO LEO 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator Bolden, I heard you say in answer to Mr. Smith’s 

question that you expect the new vehicle to be flying three years 

after it is put out to bid. 

Mr. BOLDEN. I made the statement that what the commercial 

providers have said to me is that once they get a contract, they will 

have a vehicle that can comply with the human rating standards 

and be ready to fly in three years. That is a—I just related a statement. 
80

Mr. WU. Right, right, and that is a very, very important distinction, and I want to focus on that for a second. What is your confidence level that what they have said is accurate or true? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Based on the fact that I told the President that I 

can do the same thing with an Orion vehicle that I would have 

ready three years from now, I think my confidence in their ability 

to do that is pretty good. 

Mr. WU. And what is your basis for that belief? 

Mr. BOLDEN. The basis for my belief is confidence in my workforce and confidence in the leadership of NASA that has worked 

this issue and has given me a draft timeline and schedule. 

Mr. WU. Now, that is an existing workforce. Do the private companies which may bid have similar workforces in place today? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Every private entity that may bid, to my knowledge, has a viable, existing workforce, whether it is Boeing or 

SpaceX. 

Mr. WU. Which can match NASA’s? 

Mr. BOLDEN. My workforce is the commercial industry. That is 

my workforce. 

Mr. WU. So do you——

Mr. BOLDEN. I mean, I have 18,000 civil servants in NASA and 

hundreds of thousands of employees for whom I am responsible but 

I don’t write their check. They work for Boeing, Lockheed, ATK, 

Orbital, Sierra Nevada, all these companies that say they can continue to do what they have been doing for us for 50 years. I am 

just asking them to do it and not make me buy the vehicle, let me 

lease it from them. It is a different in—I just have to go back. It 

is a difference in acquisition strategy that I want to try. Is it risky? 

Yes. 

Mr. WU. So it is the same workforce that will transpose over, if 

you will, to whichever private bidder ultimately wins the contract. 

If that is the case, how does the Administration make the case that 

this will be done for less money or any less money that Orion could 

be done? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Because the private entities or the commercial entities are telling me that they have learned through the years ways 

to be more efficient in their operations. They have in place programs like LEAN and 6 Sigma and other kinds of programs that 

have proven to be effective in bringing down cost. That is the way 

they make money. 

Mr. WU. Now, I am a little confused and maybe I didn’t properly 

track the prior conversation about potential inefficiencies in the 

private sector. Can you reconcile that for me? 

Mr. BOLDEN. My comment about inefficiencies in the private sector? Congressman, I would have to go back and review what I said. 

I don’t recall saying that. Everything has inefficiencies in it. We 

are trying to drive those inefficiencies by programs like LEAN, you 

know, 6 Sigma and other programs. So you may be referring to 

where I said is it going to be perfect, no, because we don’t know 

how to do that yet. 

Mr. WU. Very good. Thank you very much, Mr. Bolden. I appreciate it. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Davis is recognized. 
81

CEDING U.S. PREEMINENCE

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I have a brief 

comment, and then I will yield to Ms. Giffords. 

Thirty years ago, we endeavored, I think in, not in political visionary, but in the ideological politics, it has given us a debt increase of $1 trillion dollars, over $12 trillion today. I look at the 

Gulf of Mexico, and I, it makes me feel like I live in a Third World 

country, when we cannot stop oil from oozing out into the Gulf. 

John Kennedy said we will send a man to the Moon and return 

him safely by the end of this decade. We had a decade to plan to 

go to the Moon, and we came back. I want to know your plans, you 

don’t have to answer my question, I want to know the plans of 

NASA. How are we going to have a manned vehicle that will guarantee America will not be in a Third World category in space 

flight? That is all I am asking, and I will support the program. 

I yield to Ms. Giffords. 

CONSTELLATION PROGRAM DIRECTOR REASSIGNMENT

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Davis, Mr. Chair, Administrator 

Bolden. 

Recently, we just received word that the Constellation program 

manager was removed from his position. Is that correct? 

Mr. BOLDEN. That is probably correct, ma’am. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Well, you would know. It is a pretty important position. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Well, I did not, it was not an action that I took or 

directed. It would be an action that would be taken by the Exploration Mission Directorate head, Doug Cooke, and the Johnson 

Space Center Director, Mike Coats. I have been in consultation 

with them about that, but, and my understanding was that they 

were going to get together with him this morning. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Bolden, my concern is, you know, particularly 

considering the news that we had last week, that the Program 

Manager was actually working hard to try to make the program 

work, given the constraints of the budget. But again, from where 

we sit, you know, his work to restructure and potentially save the 

parts of Constellation that need to be saved. By removing him from 

his position, I think it, again, it demonstrates to us that the question I asked you earlier, whether or not you would give this committee your assurance that you were doing everything that you 

can, as the NASA Administrator, to make progress with Constellation for the remainder of the fiscal year 2010, when the Constellation manager is removed from his position, it frankly makes me 

personally very dubious that that is, in fact, happening. 

So, you know, I am just, I am wondering, you know, again, the 

assurance that you can give to us in the United States Congress, 

that you are actually carrying this out, and whether or not the program will carry forward, and whether or not you were planning on 

replacing him with someone who is competent, and replacing him 

with someone expeditiously. 

Mr. BOLDEN. We would replace him with someone who is incredibly competent. I don’t think I have anyone in the, you know, in 

the hierarchy of the Constellation Program or anywhere, that is not 
82

competent and has my confidence. And Jeff Hanley is not leaving 

NASA. Jeff Hanley is moving up to become the Deputy Director of 

the Johnson Space Center for Strategic Studies and Strategic 

Plans. He is an incredibly talented individual, and you know, Jeff 

and I have spoken for quite some time, since I became the NASA 

Administrator, about his future. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Bolden. And——

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, because we 

have this very complex program, that demands a tremendous 

amount of oversight and management, again, it is of great concern 

to us that you take the manager out of his position and reassign 

him to another position. And I just want to let you know that I am 

very concerned by that. 

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hill is recognized. 

Mr. HILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Bolden, for 

being here. 

I think by and large, most of us, or a lot of us believe that the 

image of NASA has been a success program. I mean, our second 

panel today is going to be, consist of men who have walked on the 

Moon. That is pretty impressive. And so, in the last, you know, 50 

years or so, we have been very proud of the American efforts in 

outer space. And it has become a very patriotic thing. 

BENEFITS OF NEW BUDGET

Now, you mentioned a few minutes ago that what you are wanting to do is risky. And of course, there is no risk, there is no rewards. Convince us, because I think a lot of us are skeptical. Even 

as we have listened to your testimony today, that the rewards to 

be derived because of this risky thing that you are talking about 

doing, can you tell us what those rewards are going to be? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Sir, it is going to be maintenance of American preeminence in space, continuance of our leadership as the acknowledged leader in human space flight and exploration. 

Mr. HILL. Well, I guess that is an answer. Perhaps a little bit 

simplistic. Why do you believe that we cannot do that under the 

present program? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Because it is unaffordable. 

Mr. HILL. And what you are wanting to do is affordable. 

Mr. BOLDEN. As I promised the chairman, I am going to bring him a budget and a program that will fit under a $19 billion budget for 2011, or I won’t bring him a program. And I am going to 

bring that to him, to this committee. 

Mr. HILL. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman GORDON. And Ms. Edwards is recognized. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your 

testimony, Administrator Bolden. 

TERMINATION LIABILITY

I just want to go back to the termination liability, and I know 

we have been over this, but a couple of things really just don’t 

make sense to me. One is that the, these letters were asking for 

termination costs were sent, basically seven, eight months into the 

fiscal year. And that would mean about three quarters of the budg-
83

et had been spent for that year, and so, you put the contractors in 

a position of being almost three quarters into a fiscal year, and 

then having to make adjustments to accommodate having to preserve the termination liability costs within their current contracts. 

How again is that fair to them, and didn’t they have the benefit 

of a bargain at the outset, if that was going to be the requirement 

at the beginning of the year, to know that, so that they could accommodate their personnel and other costs accordingly? What I 

worry about is, so, for example, at one company, there is a young 

professional who is going to lose from the Constellation Program, 

is a 25 year old aerospace engineer, a graduate from the University 

of Michigan, transferred across the country to work on the program 

a year ago. And made the transfer, because he wanted to work on 

vehicles that would carry humans into low Earth orbit. Another 

young professional, a young Hispanic woman, a graduate from the 

University of Texas, degree in mechanical engineering, supported 

the program for two years, and she is assessing requirements and 

supporting development of test articles. 

These people and their capacity will be lost, because the only 

way for the contractors to whom you have sent these letters, the 

only choice that they have, really, is to let people go, because for 

them to eat the costs of, you know, a couple of hundred million dollars, on the off chance that somehow, they are going to end up competing successfully in commercial competition, and retain their talented workforce, I just think that is too much to expect of these 

contractors. 

We are going to lose these people. We are not going to lose them 

for a year or two years, or whatever it is down the line, when the 

competition finally comes into being and hiring starts. We will lose 

them permanently, because they will be off doing something else, 

someplace else. They may be in some other international space program, working, because they can’t find that kind of work here. And 

so, or in some other sector of the industry entirely. 

And so, my concern is that it seems to me that you are operating 

really, one, outside of your authority. I mean, this Congress could 

not have been clearer in saying to the Administration, all breaks, 

hold, while we figure this out together. And the Administration, it 

seems to me, is going its own direction, irrespective of what the 

United States Congress wants, and that is just not acceptable. 

I want to add into the record a letter from Senator Mikulski to 

Peter Orzag, asking specifically about this, expecting a response, 

my understanding is by May 25. This committee deserves a response as well, because I think that the burden that you have now 

placed on your contractors is tremendous and cannot be met reasonably without, you know, at a time when we are actually struggling to create jobs in this country, and we are sending out these 

termination liability letters that inevitably result in the loss of 

highly skilled workers, a workforce that is completely demoralized. 

I mean, I am demoralized just looking at it. 

And I don’t think that is really acceptable for the Administration 

that says that it cares about science and technology and research 

in the Twenty First Century. And if we are going to say to these 

young people like I described, sorry folks, go find something else 

to do for a couple of years, while we just figure it out, we will lose 
84

them. We will lose talent. This workforce will lose talent, and the 

United States will lose its preeminence, and I think that, I know 

I, for one, on this committee, don’t intend to stand for it. 

And so, I look forward to a response from the Administration to 

Senator Mikulski’s letter about these terminations, and I fully expect that NASA is going to comply with the law, and with the direction from this Congress to stop it. And I don’t know that it can 

be said in any other plain language than that. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. And as our second 

panel starts to move along, Mr. Bishop, if you have one quick question, we will let you go for it. 

COST ESTIMATES FOR ARES PROGRAM

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your courtesy, and even the ranking member, your fairness in this process. 

I appreciate that. I had just a couple of quick questions from——

Chairman GORDON. You got one quick question here. And we got 

to get on to the next panel, sorry. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. Let me go with the one quick question from 

General Bolden. And we have got to quit meeting like this, but 

there is only one way that is going to happen. 

There is almost an urban legend coming out of NASA and from 

press clippings as to the cost of the Ares rocket. You have received 

a letter from one of your fellow travelers, Charlie Precourt, that 

challenges that number, saying the actual cost is about half of 

what you are talking about, and subsequent flights would be in the 

range of $60 million. 

The question I have is, have you seen that letter, a response to 

it, and also, were you, when you came up with your calculations, 

realizing that in the Defense Authorization bill, the language will 

state that defense officials have estimated that the cost of propulsion systems could increase 40 to 100 percent because of infrastructure costs currently shared by the Department of Defense and 

NASA, and they would be passed on to the Department of Defense. 

Finally, the committee believes that the health and long-term viability of the solid rocket motor industrial base is a governmentwide challenge. Am I correct on the assumption that the potential 

cost to Defense by the change in the program that NASA is recommending was not part of the original cost estimates for what Ares, 

Ares I or Ares V would be? 

So, have you seen the letter? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I think I have seen the letter to which you refer, 

from Charlie Precourt. 

Mr. BISHOP. Has there been a response to his analysis? 

Mr. BOLDEN. I don’t, I would have to find out, sir. I don’t think 

we have responded to his letter yet. But I will——

Mr. BISHOP. Was cost to the Defense system that will be shared 

by taxpayers part of the original analysis of costs for running Ares? 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I will have to get back to you on 

that. I don’t know the answer to that. 

Mr. BISHOP. Can I help if I give you the answer? 

Mr. BOLDEN. You can. 

Mr. BISHOP. No. All right. 
85

And with that, I do appreciate it. Some time, I just want to talk 

to you about this guy. This is the face of the people, who is celebrating his one week firing from this process, and I hope that at 

some time, I can tell him that the loss of his job was because either 

the government was going to save money, or come up with a program that was safer for astronauts, or it was in the public good, 

or the exigencies of the struggle, not simply because we decided to 

pick winners or losers within the free market system. 

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate it. 

Chairman GORDON. And Mr. Bolden, thank you for your last two 

hours. We have enjoyed being with you. I hope you have enjoyed 

being with us. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Congressman, I have. I appreciate it. I appreciate 

the opportunity to address this committee and hear your concerns. 

Chairman GORDON. Well, you are going to get another opportunity. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman GORDON. And you are excused. And we will move now 

to our second panel. 

Mr. BOLDEN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman GORDON. Our second panel has arrived, and I thank 

you for your patience. And I am sure you have had an opportunity 

to hear the earlier. 

So, at this time, I will introduce our witnesses. First of all is Mr. 

Neil Armstrong, who really needs no introduction to anyone in this 

room. Was the commander of the Apollo 11 mission, and was the 

first person ever to set foot on the Moon. He also has a distinction, 

a distinguished career as an engineer, test pilot, professor, and is 

Vice President, or Vice Chairman of the Presidential Commission 

on the Space Shuttle Challenger accident. 

Next is Captain Eugene Cernan, who was the commander of 

Apollo 17 mission, and the last person to visit the Moon, almost 38 

years ago—was it 38 years ago?—in 1972. He had a distinguished 

career at NASA, and also has had a significant leadership experience in the commercial sector. 

And finally, Mr. A. Thomas Young, who was the Executive Vice 

President of Lockheed Martin corporation, former President of 

Martin Marietta. Mr. Young has provided significant service to the 

Nation over the years, by leading independent reviews of major 

civil and military space programs, including most recently, the 

NPOESS Program. What a mess that was. We could do, if we could 

have that money back, we could do all these things. 

He has been an invaluable resource for this committee, and we 

look forward to hearing his testimony today. 

So welcome, and Mr. Armstrong, you may proceed. 

STATEMENTS OF NEIL ARMSTRONG, COMMANDER, APOLLO 11

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. I very 

much appreciate your invitation to allow me to present my assessments of the new NASA plan based on the President’s 2011 budget 

submittal. 

If one of the goals of government is to motivate its citizenry, and 

to be the best it can be, few government agencies will surpass 
86

NASA in that function. I have met countless now middle-aged 

adults who credit NASA’s human space programs for inspiring 

them to study hard in order to master and excel in their chosen 

field. And they are not just in aerospace, but in education, and astronomy, and computer science, and engineering, and medicine. 

Some question why America should return to the Moon. After all, 

they say, we have already been there. I find that mystifying. It is 

as if 16th century monarchs proclaimed that we need not go to the 

New World. We have already been there. Or if President Thomas 

Jefferson announced in 1808 that Americans not need, need not go 

west of the Mississippi, because Lewis and Clark have already 

been there. 

Americans have visited and examined six locations on Luna, 

varying in size from a suburban lot to a small township. That 

leaves more than 14 million square miles yet to be explored. And 

there is much to be learned on Luna. Learning to survive in the 

lunar environment, investigating many science opportunities, determining the practicality of extracting helium-3 from the lunar 

regolith, prospecting for platinum group metals, meeting challenges 

not yet identified. 

The lunar vicinity is an exceptional location to learn about traveling to different, difficult, distant places. Largely removed from 

Earth gravity and Earth’s magnetosphere, it provides many of the 

challenges of flying far from Earth. But communication delays with 

Earth are less than two seconds, permitting mission control on 

Earth to play an important and timely role in flight operations. 

In the case of severe emergencies, such as Jim Lovell’s Apollo 13, 

Earth is only three days travel time away. The long communication 

delays to destinations beyond the Moon may mandate new techniques and procedures for spacecraft operations. Mission control 

cannot provide a Mars crew their normal helpful advice if the landing trajectory is nine minutes long, but the time delay of radar, 

communications, and telemetry back to Earth is 19 minutes. 

Flight experience at lunar distance can provide valuable insights 

into practical solutions for handling such challenges. I am persuaded that a return to the Moon would be a most productive path 

to expanding the human presence in the Solar System. 

Mr. Chairman, you asked that I present my priorities for the 

human space program, and I suggest that first, we maintain American leadership. Second, we guarantee American access to space. 

And third, we continue to explore the Solar System. Leadership, access, exploration. Those are my priorities. 

The issue facing this meeting has produced substantial turmoil 

among space advocates, so many normally knowledgeable people 

were completely astounded by the President’s proposal. Had the 

announcement been preceded by a more typical review, analysis, 

and discussion among the executive branch, the agency, this Congress, and all the other interested and knowledgeable parties, no 

Member of this Committee would have been surprised by the announcement of a new plan. 

In this case, a normally collegial sector of society was split in 

many fragments. Some focused on contracts and money, some on 

workforce and jobs, some on technical choices. All because a few 

planners, with little or no space operations experience, attempted 
87

an end-run on the normal planning process. And it has been painful to watch. 

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that the Members of this Committee, and all others involved in this process, will work openly together to provide a plan which will be the best choice for our country. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NEIL ARMSTRONG

Mr. Chairman and Members, I appreciate your invitation to present my assessments on the new NASA plan based on the President’s 2011 Budget Submittal. 

I am, admittedly, an aerospace enthusiast, having spent 17 years at NASA and 

its predecessor agency, NACA, prior to joining a university faculty to teach aerospace engineering. I was a member of the National Commission on Space and Vice 

Chairman of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. I finished my active career in a company manufacturing a wide variety of 

highly engineered aerospace products and, more recently, served on the NASA Advisory Council. I still get excited about great new ideas. 

If one of the goals of government is to motivate its citizenry to ‘be the best that 

they can be’, few government agencies will surpass NASA in that function. I have 

met countless now middle aged adults who credit NASA’s human space programs 

for inspiring them to study hard in order to master and excel in their chosen field. 

And they are not just in aerospace, but in education, astronomy, computer science, 

medicine, and engineering. 

The motivating quality of NASA programs and people is, I believe, due to its success in achieving leadership status in space travel and exploration, and to its enduring tenacity in exploring the frontiers of the cosmos. That is one reason why maintaining that leadership position is so important to our country. But it is certainly 

not the only reason. Success in expanding our understanding of the universe that 

surrounds us, and sharing that information with others around the globe, engenders 

respect and admiration from people and governments around the world. Discoveries 

and developments at technology’s edge produce new theories, new products, new 

systems, and ultimately, new ways of living. Who, at the time of Sputnik, would 

have suspected that, two generations later, golfers would be determining their distance to the flagstick using a Satellite based GPS? Or that we could measure the 

rate at which the moon is moving away from Earth (currently about 1.5 inches/

year)? 

Management gurus have written endless analyses of push versus pull strategies. 

The applications are ubiquitous: marketing, advertising, manufacturing, development, etc. The new NASA plan includes technology push funding for research and 

the hope of ‘breakthroughs’ to hasten our success in developing craft to carry humans to distant cosmic destinations. Some have compared this approach to that of 

the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), the predecessor of NASA, 

whose only work was research and only product was reports. Some have assumed 

that NACA was completely a technology push agency. 

As one of the small and ever diminishing number of NACA alumni, I can confirm 

that NACA did, in fact, conduct some technology push projects, such as the NACA 

airfoil series, the NACA engine cowl and supersonic boundary layer heat transfer. 

On the other hand, most research efforts were ‘pull’ projects, identified by the aeronautical industry and the military as problems that required solutions, and NACA 

help was requested. Examples are stability requirements for aircraft at supersonic 

speeds, understanding and solutions for transonic ‘tuck’, pitch-up, and roll coupling, 

practical variable sweep wings, and supersonic drogue chute development. 

That work was exciting and fascinating. It was, day by day, perhaps the most 

genuinely satisfying work of my life. But it was not motivating to the general public. 

Rarely was the general public even aware of the remarkable research work that was 

going on in the NACA laboratories and flight tests. My experience in both pull and 

push operations leads me to conclude that pull research attached to an operational 

space exploration program would be substantially more likely to produce usable results in a timely manner. 

Project selection and budgeting in the new NASA plan appears to have been heavily dependent on the observations and options presented in Seeking a Human 

Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation (HSP), familiarly known as the Augustine Committee report. It is interesting to review the constraints under which the 
88

Augustine Committee operated, and the effects that those constraints imposed on 

their findings. 

The committee was ‘‘asked to provide two options that fit within the 2010 budget 

profile’’ (HSP p. 15). The two options selected were the ‘‘Constellation Program of 

record’’ and the ‘‘ISS and Lunar Exploration’’. The funding available for Constellation under the 2010 Presidential Budget Submittal was more than $1.5 billion per 

year below the 2009 Budget and about $3 billion per year below the original funding 

plan based on the Exploration Systems Architecture Study The Committee quite 

properly concluded that the program would be delayed and cost more and Ares and 

Orion would be too late to serve the International Space Station, scheduled for termination in 2015. They found that ‘‘human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is 

not viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline’’ (HSP p. 96). 

It is improper to conclude that Constellation was beyond help. Constellation managers believe they would have been in reasonable shape had NASA been provided 

the funding of the 2009 President’s Budget Submittal or even the 2011 Budget. Indeed, Mr. Augustine in his testimony to this committee last September said: ‘‘. . . 

we believe that the existing program, given adequate funds, is executable and would 

carry out its objectives.’’

In determining the reasonableness of competing concepts to be compared, the 

Aerospace Corporation (Aerospace) was engaged by the Augustine Committee to provide estimates on cost and schedule. Your Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, 

thoughtfully, saw fit to ask Aerospace to provide details of that process. 

Aerospace projected the development costs for a 4 person commercial spacecraft with launch abort system at 12 billion 2009 dollars plus $8 billion for the launch 

rocket. Similarly, costs for a 6 person spacecraft would be $17 billion (spacecraft + 

LAS) plus $10 billion (launcher) respectively. The Committee assumed NASA would 

contribute 3 billion dollars to this project, which Aerospace, using historical growth 

and other factors, raised to 5 billion dollars (HSF, p. 70). The contribution remaining for the commercial provider is a very substantial investment and, if accurate, 

raises questions about the ability and willingness of a public or private company to 

accept that financial risk. Aerospace stated their assumption was that three competitors would bid and two would be selected. They further assumed that NASA 

would need two flights per year to the ISS. A reasonable business case supporting 

this proposal is elusive. 

Some question why America should return to the moon. ‘‘After all’’, they say, ‘‘we 

have already been there.’’ I find that mystifying. It would be as if 16th century monarchs proclaimed that ‘‘we need not go to the New World, we have already been 

there.’’ Or as if President Thomas Jefferson announced in 1808 that Americans 

‘‘need not go west of the Mississippi, the Lewis and Clark expedition has already 

been there.’’

Americans have visited and examined 6 locations on Luna, varying in size from 

a suburban lot to a small township. That leaves more than 14 million square miles 

yet to explore. There is much to be learned on Luna, learning to survive in the lunar 

environment, investigating many science opportunities, determining the practicality 

of extracting Helium 3 from the lunar regolith, prospecting for palladium group metals, and meeting challenges not yet identified. 

The lunar vicinity is an exceptional location to learn about traveling to more distant places. Largely removed from Earth gravity, and Earth’s magnetosphere, it provides many of the challenges of flying far from Earth. But communication delays 

with Earth are less than 2 seconds permitting Mission Control on Earth to play an 

important and timely role in flight operations. In the case of a severe emergency, 

such as Jim Lovell’s Apollo 13, Earth is only 3 days travel time away. 

Learning how to fly to, and remain at, Earth-Moon Lagrangian points would be 

a superb precursor to flying to and remaining at, the much farther distant EarthSun Lagrangian points. 

And flying to further away destinations from lunar orbit or Lunar Lagrangian 

points could have substantial advantages in flight time and/or propellant requirements as compared with departures from Earth orbit. And flying in the lunar vicinity would typically provide lower radiation exposures than those expected in interplanetary flight. 

The long communication delays to destinations beyond the moon mandate new 

techniques and procedures for spacecraft operations. Mission Control cannot provide 

a Mars crew their normal helpful advice if the landing trajectory is 9 minutes long 

but the time delay of the radar, communication and telemetry back to Earth is 19 

minutes. Flight experience at lunar distance can provide valuable insights into practical solutions for handling such challenges. I am persuaded that a return to the 

moon would be the most productive path to expanding the human presence in the 

Solar System. 
89

Mr. Chairman, you asked that I present my priorities for the human space program. I suggest that:

1) We maintain American leadership

2) We guarantee American access

3) We continue to explore the Solar System

Leadership, access, and exploration are my priorities. 

This issue facing this meeting has produced substantial turmoil among space advocates. So many normally knowledgeable people were completely astounded by the 

President’s proposal. Had the announcement been preceded by the typical review, 

analysis and discussion among the Executive branch, the agency, the congress, and 

all the other interested and knowledgeable parties, no Member of this Committee 

would have been surprised by the announcement of a new plan. 

In this case, a normally collegial sector of society was split in many fragments, 

some focused on contracts and money, some on work force and jobs, some on technical choices. All because a few planners, with little or no space operations experience, attempted an end run on the normal process. It has been painful to watch. 

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope the members of this Committee, and all the others 

involved in this process, will work openly together to provide a plan which will be 

the best choice for our country.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Armstrong, and I hope you 

will be a part of that with us, as we have this transparency. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Cernan is recognized. You want to hit 

your microphone. 

STATEMENTS OF CAPTAIN EUGENE A. CERNAN, USN (RET.), 

COMMANDER, APOLLO 17

Captain CERNAN. Excuse me. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also 

sincerely appreciate the opportunity to express my personal views 

concerning the Administration’s ‘‘game changing proposal for the 

future of America’s role in human exploration of space.’’

In my written testimony, I have gone into significant detail in 

what I consider the most critical aspects of the President’s proposal, so in the interest of time, I will focus primarily on those 

items that you had put in the invitation to be here today. 

Several weeks ago, we became aware of the Administration’s 

plan for our Nation’s role in the future of space exploration. Neil 

Armstrong, Jim Lovell, and myself felt compelled to voice our concern, and did so in an opinion paper signed by the three of us. We 

spent a great deal of time writing and refining our document, 

choosing our words very, very carefully. Words such as ‘‘devastating,’’ ‘‘slide to mediocrity,’’ and ‘‘third-rate stature,’’ so that the 

intent of our message would neither be misinterpreted nor our deep 

concern about the future direction of human space flight as outlined in the President’s proposal, be misunderstood. 

We particularly wanted to avoid any political overtones, because 

since its beginning, America’s role in space has traditionally transcended political and partisan differences. We have recently heard 

a lot of eloquent verbiage about exploration of space, landing on an 

asteroid, circling Mars, and at some time in the future, perhaps 

even landing on the Red Planet. 

There is talk about a decision yet to come of building a large 

booster, which might ultimately take us almost anywhere we want 

to go in the far reaches of the universe. There are, however, no details, no specific challenge, and no commitment as to where or, specifically, when this exploration might come to pass. 
90

And when one comes to examine the details of the 2011 budget 

proposal, nowhere, nowhere can be found, not one penny, allocated 

to support space exploration. Yes, there has been much rhetoric 

about transformative technology, heavy lift propulsion research, 

robotic precursor missions, as well as other worthwhile endeavors 

in their own right. Yet nowhere do we find any mention of human 

exploration of space, and nowhere do we find a commitment in dollars to support this all important endeavor. 

We, Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell, and myself, have come to the 

unanimous conclusion that this budget proposal presents no challenges, has no focus, and is, in fact, a blueprint for a mission to 

nowhere. In this proposal budget, we find several billions of dollars 

allocated and allotted to developing commercial human access to 

low Earth orbit, based upon the assumption, the sole assumptions 

and claims by those competing for this exclusive contract, who say 

they can achieve this goal in a little bit more than three years, and 

do it for something less than $5 billion. 

Even the Administration has shown some concern over these 

claims, by admitting a willingness, if necessary, to subsidize commercial, the commercial enterprise, until it ultimately, whenever 

that may be, becomes successful, calculated by some to be as long 

as a decade or more, with costs raising by at least a factor of three. 

This assumes they have the capability in hand to design, to 

build, to flight-test and develop, a man-rated, man-rated spacecraft 

and booster architecture meeting the stringent requirements for 

safety, along with the infrastructure that is required for such a 

venture. 

While I strongly support the goals and ideals of commercial access to space, the folks who proposed such a limited architecture 

do not yet know what they don’t know, and that can lead to dangerous and costly consequences. 

Based upon my own personal background and experience, I submit to this committee and to the Congress of the United States, 

and I do support the view that it will take the private sector as 

long as ten years to access low Earth orbit safely and cost-effectively. A prominent Russian academician is quoted as saying: In 

order to bring a craft to the standard of quality and safety for piloted flight, the United States will be dependent upon Russia at 

least until 2020. Such a commercial venture, should such a commercial venture run into insurmountable technical problems, business venture concerns, or God forbid, a catastrophic failure, it 

would leave the United States without a fallback program, unable 

to access even low Earth orbit for some indeterminate time in the 

future. 

And without an extension of the Space Shuttle on the front end 

and viable access to low Earth orbit on the far end, the gap, as we 

call it, the period when America would be grounded, could extend 

indefinitely. 

The sole reliance on the commercial sector, without a concurrent 

or backup approach, could very well lead to the abandonment of 

our $100 billion Space Station, $100 billion and 25 year investment 

in the Space Station, a default on our commitments to our international partners, and will ultimately close the, cost the American 

taxpayer billions of unallocated dollars, and surely lengthen the 
91

gap from Shuttle retirement until the day we can once again access 

low Earth orbit, leaving us hostage to foreign powers. 

Is this one of the potential grand challenges of the 21st century? 

The United States, through NASA, has spent half a century learning what we didn’t know, finding answers to questions we weren’t 

smart enough to ask at the time, developing technology that was 

needed to meet a challenge, to get the job done. 

We came from Alan Shepard’s flight in 1961 to the Shuttle and 

Space Station today, with a side trip or two to the Moon along the 

way. The evolution of this learning process was not without its 

costs, not just in dollars, but in the lives of our friends and colleagues. It took the courage, the effort, the dedication, and the selfsacrifice of thousands of Americans to bring us this far this quickly. 

And although we paid dearly for our mistakes, it is a testimonial 

to their commitment, and to American ingenuity, that everyone 

who went to the Moon came home. 

Therein is a lesson we cannot afford to ignore. Mr. Chairman, is 

this the NASA we want to transform? Constellation is an architecture that, over a five year period, has gone through several detailed 

reviews, and has been vetted by every government agency from the 

OMB to the DoD, and certainly by NASA, by every agency that has 

an ownership interest in a technical scientific budget, or other benefit to be derived from human space exploration. 

In additional, an arsenal of the best engineers and scientists that 

you have to offer, Mr. Young, and management experts in the aerospace community added their knowledge and expertise to the review of the proposed Constellation architecture before it ever even 

was considered to be worthy of moving forward. 

Constellation follows the von Braun model of the evolution of the 

Saturn V. We are in the development of the Ares V, or excuse me, 

we are in the development of the Ares I, is the embryo for the development of the heavy lift Ares V. The shared DNA, with commonality of critical components throughout, leads to greater cost effectiveness, a higher degree of confidence and safety, and provides 

the first elements of a heavy lift booster now. 

It is not unlike the Boeing family of jetliners, where the technology built into the 787 evolved from that of the 707. Embedded 

in the Constellation architecture is a culture of a long range building block that can not only service the ISS, extend the life of the 

Hubble, meet other national security priorities in low Earth orbit, 

but additionally, can carry us back to the Moon and on to Mars. 

In doing so, it makes use of existing hardware and facilities, 

while developing new technologies with a purpose, with a direction. 

Exploration is what drives technology innovation, not the reverse. 

It is unknown how much time and thought was put into the existing budget for 2011, or by whom the proposal was generated, but 

it is common knowledge that very few, if any of those government 

agencies referred to above were asked to participate. Nor, significant note, was the DoD or the engineering management expertise 

that exists throughout NASA today, with no transparency, no 

transparency, one can only conclude that this proposal was most 

likely formulated in haste by a very few within the Offices of Management and Budget, or the Science and Technology Policy, with 

alleged involvement of the NASA Deputy Administrator and, by his 
92

own admission, with little or no support input from the NASA Administrator himself. 

Neither did NASA Center Directors, nor senior NASA management throughout the agency, nor program managers have any 

input. If that is, indeed, the case, the originators quite likely were 

promoting their own agenda, rather than that of NASA and America’s commitment to human space exploration. And effectively leads 

NASA to becoming nothing more than a research facility. 

My personal belief is that this proposal, Mr. Chairman, is a travesty, which flows against the grain of over 200 years of our history, 

and today, against the will of the majority of Americans. The space 

program has never been an entitlement. It is an investment. It is 

an investment in the future, an investment in technology, in jobs, 

in international respect, in geopolitical leadership, and perhaps 

most importantly, which has been stated here very well by Neil, 

perhaps most importantly, the inspiration and the education of our 

youth. 

Those best and brightest minds at NASA and throughout the 

multitudes of the private contractors, large and small, did not join 

the team to design windmills or to redesign gas pedals, but to live 

their dreams of once again taking us where no man has gone before. 

If this budget proposal becomes the law of the land, these technicians, these engineers, scientists, and a generation removed from 

Apollo, yet re-inspired by the prospect of going back to the Moon 

and onto Mars, will be gone. Where, I don’t know, but they will be 

gone. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, history has shown that America’s 

human space flight program has, for over half a century, risen 

above, excuse me, above partisan differences. From Eisenhower to 

Kennedy, to the present day, the challenges and accomplishments 

of the past were those of a Nation, never a political party, nor of 

any individual agenda. 

Those flags which fly today on the surface of the Moon are not 

blue flags and are not red flags. They are American flags. We are 

at a crossroad. If we abdicate our leadership in space today, not 

only is human space flight and space exploration at risk, but I believe the future of our country is at risk, and thus, the future of 

our children and our grandchildren, as well. 

Now is the time, Mr. Chairman, for wiser heads, in the Congress 

of the United States, to prevail. Now is the time to overrule this 

Administration’s pledge to mediocrity. Now is the time to be bold, 

to be innovative and wise in how we invest in the future of America. Now is the time to reestablish our Nation’s commitment to excellence. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Members of this Committee, 

for allowing me to share my concern and my passion for the future 

of this country. 

[The prepared statement of Captain Cernan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EUGENE CERNAN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity today to express my personal views concerning The Administration’s ‘‘game-changing’’ proposal for the future of America’s role in Human Exploration in Space. 
93

Some weeks ago when we became aware of The Administration’s plan for our nation’s role in the future of space exploration, Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell and I felt 

compelled to voice our concern and did so in an opinion paper signed by the three 

of us. We spent a great deal of time writing and refining our document, choosing 

our words very carefully, words such as ‘‘devastating’’, ‘‘slide to mediocrity’’, and 

‘‘third rate stature’’, so that the intent of our message would neither be misinterpreted nor would our deep concern about the future direction of human space flight 

as outlined in the President’s proposal be misunderstood. We particularly wanted 

to avoid any political overtones because the support of America’s role in space since 

its beginning has traditionally transcended partisan politics. 

It was determined after the Columbia accident that NASA should return to its 

core values, focusing its resources once again on space exploration while continuing 

its space exploitation through the Space Shuttle support of the International Space 

Station (ISS) and other national priorities of Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The Congress 

supported such a focus with a near-unanimous bipartisan approval in both the 2005 

and 2008 NASA Authorization Acts. 

We have recently heard a lot of eloquent verbage about the exploration of space—

landing on an asteroid, circling Mars, and at some time in the future perhaps landing on the Red Planet. There is talk about a decision yet to come of building a large 

booster which might ultimately take us almost anywhere we want to go into the far 

reaches of the universe. There are, however, no details, no specific challenge, and 

no commitment as to where or specifically when this exploration might come to 

pass. My personal definition of space exploration, in contrast to exploitation, is 

‘‘going where no man has gone before, doing what has never been done before, doing 

what others couldn’t do, wouldn’t do, or perhaps were afraid to do.’’

And, when one examines details of the FY 2011 budget proposal, nowhere is there 

to be found one penny allocated to support space exploration. Yes, there has been 

much rhetoric on transformative technology, heavy lift propulsion research, robotic 

precursor missions, significant investment in commercial crew and cargo capabilities, pursuit of cross-cutting space technology capabilities, climate change research, 

aeronautics R&D, and education initiatives, all worthwhile endeavors in their own 

right. Yet nowhere do we find any mention of the Human Exploration of Space and 

nowhere do we find a commitment in dollars to support this all important national 

endeavor. We (Armstrong, Lovell and I) have come to the unanimous conclusion that 

this budget proposal presents no challenges, has no focus, and in fact is a blueprint 

for a mission to ‘‘nowhere.’’

In this proposed budget we find several billions of dollars allotted to developing 

commercial human access to low Earth orbit, based upon the assumptions and 

claims by those competing for this exclusive contract who say that they can achieve 

this goal in little more than three years, and that it can be done for something less 

than 5 billion dollars. Even The Administration has shown some concern over these 

claims by admitting a willingness to subsidize the commercial enterprise until it ultimately becomes successful, calculated by some to be as long as a decade or more 

with costs rising by a factor of three. (These are the same entrepreneurs who are 

well over a year late delivering the first unmanned cargo to LEO.) This assumes 

they have the capability in hand to design, build, flight test, and develop a manrated spacecraft and booster architecture meeting the stringent requirements for 

safety along with the infrastructure required for such a venture. Infrastructure such 

as redesigning the requirements of mission control, developing and supporting training simulators, writing technical manuals for ground and crew training including 

all onboard procedures, developing the synergy between a worldwide tracking network and the uniqueness of a newly designed space vehicle along with an emergency recovery force standing by to handle this new space architecture. These are 

only a few of the development and support requirements necessary to put any new 

manned system into space. Although I strongly support the goals and ideals of commercial access to space, the folks who propose such a limited architecture ‘‘do not 

yet know what they don’t know’’, and that can lead to dangerous and costly consequences. There are a myriad of technical challenges in their future yet to be overcome, perhaps of greatest importance are safety considerations which cannot be, nor 

will be, compromised as well as a business plan and investors that will have to be 

satisfied. For example, it took over a year and a half of review and redesign of the 

Apollo I hatch prior to ever getting Apollo 7 off the ground, before operational and 

safety requirements were fully satisfied. 

Based upon my background and experience, I submit to this Committee and do 

support the view that it will take the private sector as long as ten years to access 

LEO safely and cost-effectively. A prominent Russian academician is quoted as saying in order to bring a craft to the standard of quality and safety for piloted flight, 

the United States will be dependent on Russia until at least 2020. The Aerospace 
94

Corporation, although directed not to examine the data submitted on cost and 

schedule by the commercial sector, estimates an initial cost of 10–12 billion dollars, 

plus the added cost of modifications required to launch vehicle ground systems. 

Should such a commercial venture run into insurmountable technical problems, 

business venture concerns, or—God forbid—a catastrophic failure, it would leave the 

United States without a fallback program, unable to access even low Earth orbit for 

some indeterminate time in the future. Without an extension of the Shuttle on the 

front end and viable access to LEO on the far end, ‘‘the gap’’, or the period of time 

when America is grounded, could very well be extended indefinitely. 

The sole reliance on the commercial sector without a concurrent or back-up approach could very well lead to the abandonment of our 100 billion dollar, 25 year 

investment in the ISS, default on our commitments to international partners, and 

will ultimately cost the American taxpayer billions of unallocated dollars and surely 

lengthen ‘‘the gap’’ from Shuttle retirement until the day we can once again access 

low Earth orbit leaving our nation hostage to foreign powers. Moreover, for a variety 

of reasons, a ‘‘Going Out of Business’’ sign hanging on the door is always a possibility in any high dollar-high risk investment. Is this one of our ‘‘Potential Grand 

Challenges’’ of the 21st century?

The United States, through NASA, has spent a half-century learning what we 

didn’t know, finding answers to questions we weren’t smart enough to ask at the 

time, developing technology that was needed to meet the challenge and get the job 

done. We came from Alan Shepard’s flight in 1961 to the Shuttle and Space Station 

today with a side trip or two to the moon along the way. The evolution of this learning process was not without its cost—not just in dollars, but also in the lives of our 

friends and colleagues. It took the courage, effort, dedication and self-sacrifice of 

thousands of Americans who allowed us to come this far this quickly. And, although 

we paid dearly for our mistakes, it is a testimonial to their commitment and American ingenuity that everyone who went to the moon came home. Therein is a lesson 

we cannot afford to ignore. Is this the NASA we want to transform?

Additionally, The President’s proposal suggests we develop ‘‘game-changing’’ technology for the future. The technology we enjoy today, 40 years after Apollo, is technology that evolved from a purpose, from the acceptance of a challenge and from 

a commitment to a goal. It was technology with a focus, with a mission. To simply 

put the best and the brightest in a room and tell them to develop breakthrough 

technology that could or might or may be useful in the future is a naive proposition. 

Exploration drives technology innovation—not the reverse. Also in the proposal is the possibility that maybe, at some time, perhaps as far 

down the road as 2015, the United States might decide to develop a heavy lift booster. This is a very vague proposition, one that will likely never be funded to fruition. 

Coincidentally, Constellation has a heavy lift booster, Ares V, not only on the drawing boards but in component test today. Do we need a decision in 2015 for one already made today? 

A late addition to the Administration’s proposal, and one very obviously not well 

thought out, was a provision to build an ‘‘Orion Lite’’ spacecraft as a rescue vehicle 

on the ISS. Although we have never had need for a rescue vehicle, we have today 

under contract with Russia two Soyuz continuously stationed on the ISS capable of 

carrying as many as six people to safety should the need arise, with a provision for 

a third Soyuz were the crew complement ever to increase to as many as nine—

which is highly unlikely. An ‘‘Orion Lite’’, before it is qualified to transport human 

beings to safety from the ISS, certainly would have to be man-rated. To man-rate 

a spacecraft and its ride into orbit requires a great deal more than following a list 

of safety requirements and protocol instructions included in its development. The 

‘‘Orion Lite’’ would have to go through an extensive development, test and evaluation phase before being qualified to carry humans. It sounds very similar to what 

the existing Ares I/Orion development proposal is all about and would most likely 

cost as much, and require the same amount of time to bring it to man-rated flight 

status, yet leave us with half the capability of a full up Orion. 

Constellation itself is an architecture that over a five-year period has gone 

through several detailed reviews and has been vetted by every government agency 

from the OMB to the DOD, and certainly by NASA—by every agency that has an 

ownership interest in any technical, scientific, budget or benefit to be derived from 

Human Space Exploration. In addition, an arsenal of the best engineers, scientists 

and management experts in America’s aerospace community added their knowledge 

and expertise to the review of the proposed Constellation architecture before it ever 

became an official program worthy of consideration. Constellation follows the Von 

Braun model in the evolution of the Saturn V, wherein the development of the Ares 

I is the embryo for the development of the heavy-lift Ares V. This shared DNA, with 

commonality of critical components throughout, leads to greater cost effectiveness, 
95

a higher degree of confidence and safety, and provides the first elements of a heavy 

lift booster. It is not unlike the Boeing family of jetliners wherein the technology 

built into the 787 evolved from that of the original 707. 

Embedded in the Constellation architecture is the culture of a long-range building 

block that cannot only service the ISS, extend the life of the Hubble, meet other 

national priorities in LEO, but additionally can carry us back to the moon and on 

to Mars. In doing so, it makes use of existing hardware and facilities while developing new technologies with a purpose. Appropriately under the law, both Houses 

of the Congress of the United States with overwhelmingly bipartisan support, approved and agreed that Constellation should go forward. 

In contrast to the five-year review of the overall Constellation architecture plus 

the carefully monitored program development, the Augustine Committee was required to provide their report in 90 days. The report contained several suggestions 

and alternatives to Constellation, few of which were included in the FY 2011 budget, but ultimately the Committee came to the conclusion that Constellation’s architecture had been well managed and is indeed executable, providing it has the appropriate funding that had been denied for several years. Important to note is that the 

Committee was directed to base their conclusions and recommendations not on the 

FY 2009 budget, but rather on the FY 2010 budget from which tens of billions of 

dollars had already been removed between 2010 and 2020. Additionally, their conclusions were based upon a 2015, not 2020, life span for the ISS and did not take 

into account ongoing requirements for access to LEO at other inclinations. Naturally, the Augustine Committee concluded that Constellation was not doable within 

the constraints of The Administration’s mandated guidelines and budget restrictions. Under these constraints, one might have expected the conclusions to be predetermined. More importantly, however, the funding proposed for FY 2011, if prudently administered, is more than adequate to continue the development of Constellation. 

It is unknown how much time and thought was put into the existing budget proposal for FY 2011, or by whom this proposal was generated, but it is common knowledge that few if any of those government agencies referred to above were asked to 

participate, nor, of significant note, was the DOD or the engineering or management 

expertise that exists throughout NASA today. With no transparency, one can only 

conclude that this proposal was most likely formulated in haste by a very few within 

the Offices of Management and Budget (OMB) and Science and Technology Policy 

(OSTP), with the alleged involvement of the NASA Deputy Administrator, and by 

his own admission, with little or no input from the NASA Administrator himself 

Neither did NASA’s Center Directors, nor senior NASA management throughout the 

agency, nor program managers have any input. If that is indeed the case, the originators quite likely were promoting their own agenda rather than that of NASA and 

America’s commitment to Human Space Exploration as directed by Congress in the 

Authorization Bills of 2005 and 2008. 

With the submission of FY 2011 budget, The Administration and the originators 

of this proposal were either misinformed or showing extreme naivete, or I can only 

conclude, are willing to take accountability for a calculated plan to dismantle America’s leadership in the world of Human Space Exploration resulting in NASA becoming nothing more than a research facility. In either case, I believe this proposal is 

a travesty which flows against the grain of over 200 years of our history and, today, 

against the will of the majority of Americans. 

The space program has never been an entitlement, it’s an investment in the future—an investment in technology, jobs, international respect and geo-political leadership, and perhaps most importantly in the inspiration and education of our youth. 

Those best and brightest minds at NASA and throughout the multitudes of private 

contractors, large and small, did not join the team to design windmills or redesign 

gas pedals, but to live their dreams of once again taking us where no man has gone 

before. If this budget proposal becomes the law of the land, these technicians, engineers, scientists, a generation removed from Apollo, yet re-inspired by the prospect 

of going back to the moon and on to Mars, will be gone—where I don’t know—but 

gone. 

America’s human space flight program has for a half century risen above partisan 

differences from Eisenhower to Kennedy to the present day. The challenges and accomplishments of the past were those of a nation—never of a political party or of 

any individual agenda. Those flags that fly on the moon today are neither blue flags 

nor are they red flags—they are American Flags. We are at a cross road. If we abdicate our leadership in space today, not only is human spaceflight and space exploration at risk, but I believe the future of this country and thus the future of our 

children and grandchildren as well. Now is the time for wiser heads in the Congress 

of the United States to prevail. Now is the time to overrule this Administration’s 
96

pledge to mediocrity. Now is the time to be bold, innovative and wise in how we invest in the future of America. Now is the time to re-establish our nation’s commitment to excellence. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee for this opportunity to 

share my concern and passion for that which means most—the future of our country!

Sincerely, and with respect,

Eugene A. Cernan 

Commander, Apollo XVII

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Captain. I think you are ready 

to suit up again. Mr. Young, you are recognized. 

STATEMENTS OF A. THOMAS YOUNG, LOCKHEED MARTIN 

(RET.) 

Mr. YOUNG. Chairman Gordon, Mr. Hall, and Committee members, I am pleased to have the opportunity to present my views on 

the proposed United States human space flight program. 

My judgment is that implementation of the proposed human 

space flight program will be devastating to NASA, human space 

flight, and the United States space program. For five decades, the 

United States robotic and human exploration program had remarkable successes that have filled our books of knowledge, explored 

new worlds, enhanced our international reputation, and given pride 

and inspiration to our fellow Americans. 

We have also had disappointing failures. We have developed a 

mission success methodology that maximizes the probability of success, a methodology that has evolved over the life of the space program, and continues to improve with the experience gained with 

the execution of each new project. 

A hallmark of the methodology is the recognition that space 

flight is a one strike and you are out business. Thousands of individuals can do everything perfectly, and one human error can result in mission catastrophe. While minimizing human errors is certainly an objective, human errors cannot be totally eliminated. The 

challenge is to prevent a human error from becoming a mission 

failure. Experience has shown that this is accomplished by test as 

you fly, and fly as you test, in combination with independent review and analysis, appropriate technical and management debate, 

and experienced leadership. For five decades, we have invested billions of dollars and the expertise of our best and brightest in NASA 

and industry, to evolve our current mission success methodology. 

NASA has the continuity of human space expertise that is 

unique in our country and competitive with the best that exists 

globally. Our space industry is second to none in the ability to implement complex projects. It is the marriage of NASA’s continuity 

of expertise with the implementation capability of industry that results in our proven mission success methodology, which maximizes 

the probability of success. 

The Space Shuttle and International Space Station are products 

of this methodology. The Air Force and the Aerospace Corporation, 

in combination with their industrial partners, used this methodology to produce the highly successful EELV. NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory uses this methodology in implementing the Challenge and Planetary Exploration Program. And I might add that 
97

the video that you saw earlier is a product of this methodology 

being applied in the success that was demonstrated in the video. 

A fundamental flaw in the proposed human space flight program 

is a commercial crew initiative which abandons the proven methodology I have described. NASA’s role is reduced to defining safety requirements and general oversight. An argument for pursuing this 

new human space flight approach is that the proven methodology 

is too expensive. 

The same rationale caused the Air Force and NASA to try similar approaches in the 1990s. The Air Force implemented a program 

called acquisition reform. System responsibility for national security space programs was ceded to industry. And Air Force and NRO 

project managers were told to step back, not to interfere, and let 

industry have total responsibility. Additionally, the Air Force and 

NRO essentially eliminated their systems engineering capabilities, 

since the responsibility would reside with industry. 

The results were devastating, and the adverse impact is still 

with us today. Good project managers and program management 

personnel left, and an exceptional systems engineering capability 

was eliminated. Projects were a disaster, and the approach was 

judged by all to be a total failure. 

Problems were not isolated to one project or to one company. The 

impact was systemic. As an example, Future Imagery Architecture, 

managed by Boeing, was canceled after the expenditure of about 

$10 billion. SIBRS High [Space-based Infrared System High], managed by Lockheed Martin, has been referred to as ‘‘a case study in 

how not to execute a space program.’’ National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, managed by NorthropGrumman, is a story that is still evolving. 

On average, programs implemented using this approach resulted 

in half the intended program for twice the cost, and they were six 

years late, on average. NASA implemented a similar approach, 

called faster, better, cheaper. Mars ’98 is the most significant example of this approach. Mars ’98 was a total failure, with the loss 

of an orbiter, a lander, and two probes. The orbiter, managed by 

Lockheed Martin under contract to JPL, failed because of a confusion between metric and English units. This confusion resulted in 

errors large enough, during Mars orbit insertion, to cause the 

spacecraft to enter the atmosphere and be destroyed. 

These same errors were prevalent during midcourse corrections 

implemented on the trip from Earth to Mars without a cause being 

determined. Had the JPL institutional navigation capability been 

applied to understand these midcourse errors, I believe they most 

likely would have found the cause, and implemented corrections to 

prevent the failure. They were excluded from the management of 

Mars ’98 because of the give the contractor the responsibility concept. This is an example of how NASA’s continuity of expertise 

could have been applied to an important and challenging project. 

I cannot conceive that the United States will abandon a methodology developed over decades, with enormous human and financial 

investment, for a concept that has been tried in the 1990s, resulting in massive failure. Why would we put NASA human space 

flight at such risk by employing an unproven commercial crew concept? 
98

Commercial crew is a risk too high. It is not a responsible course, 

and it should not be approved. Continuation of the international 

space program is an area of apparent consensus. A launch vehicle 

and crew capsule for transportation to and from the Space Station 

are required. I believe the most appropriate option is Ares I and 

Orion. 

NASA should be directed to develop a plan for transporting humans to and from Earth orbit. Ares I and Orion elements of Constellation should not be canceled. The results of the NASA plan development may suggest changes to Constellation. A disappointing 

truth in the proposed NASA Fiscal Year 2011 budget, in my opinion, is not adequate to support a credible, implementable Space 

Station program and a credible, implementable beyond Earth orbit 

exploration program. A credible Space Station program without 

commercial crew needs to be defined. An exploration program with 

a heavy lift launch capability and exploration capsule, a focused 

technology program, and an exploration concept with destinations 

and dates also needs to be determined. 

Cost estimates, with substantive, independent systems engineering, and end to end cost estimating need to be developed. Timely 

completion of these proposed actions is necessary to allow resolution of current human space flight uncertainties. Only then can 

credible decisions be made as to the future of human space flight. 

In summary, do not approve commercial crew. Continue the Ares 

I and Orion programs. And do the necessary in depth analysis and 

study that was absent from the proposed Fiscal Year 2011 budget, 

to define the human exploration program worthy of a great Nation. 

Only then can the value of the program be judged against credible 

plans and budget. 

Above all else, do not approve a human space flight program 

without adequate resources to assure success. We have traveled 

that road too many times with the same unsuccessful result. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF A. THOMAS YOUNG

Chairman Gordon, Mr. Hall and Committee members, I am pleased to have the 

opportunity to present my views on the proposed U.S. human spaceflight program. 

My judgment is that implementation of the proposed human spaceflight program 

will be devastating to NASA, human spaceflight and the U.S. space program. For 

five decades the U.S. robotic and human spaceflight programs have had remarkable 

successes that have filled our books of knowledge, explored new worlds, enhanced 

our international reputation and given pride and inspiration to our fellow Americans. We have also had disappointing failures. 

We have developed a mission success methodology that maximizes the probability 

of success, a methodology that has evolved over the life of the space program and 

continues to improve with the experience gained with the execution of each new 

project. A hallmark of the methodology is the recognition that spaceflight is a ‘‘onestrike-and-you-are-out’’ business. Thousands of individuals can do everything perfectly and one human error can result in a mission catastrophe. While minimizing 

human errors is certainly an objective, human errors cannot be totally eliminated. 

The challenge is to prevent a human error from causing a mission failure. Experience has shown this is accomplished by test-as-you-fly and flying-as-you-test in combination with independent review and analysis, appropate technical and management debate and experienced leadership. For five decades we have invested billions 

of dollars and the expertise of our best and brightest in NASA and industry to 

evolve our current mission success methodology. NASA has the continuity of human 

spaceflight expertise that is unique in our country and competitive with the best 

that exists globally. Our space industry is second to none in the ability to implement 
99

complex projects. It is the marriage of NASA’s continuity of expertise with the implementation capability of industry that results in our proven mission success methodology which maximizes the probability of success. Space Shuttle and International 

Space Station are products of this methodology. The Air Force and the Aerospace 

Corporation in combination with their industrial partners use this methodology to 

produce the highly successful EELV. NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory uses this 

methodology in implementing the challenging planetary exploration program. 

A fundamental flaw in the proposed human spaceflight program is a commercial 

crew initiative which abandons the proven methodology I have described. NASA’s 

role is reduced to defining safety requirements and general oversight. An argument 

for pursuing this new human spaceflight approach is that the proven methodology 

is too expensive. 

This same rationale caused the Air Force and NASA to try similar approaches in 

the 1990s.The Air force implemented a program called ‘‘Acquisition Reform.’’ System 

responsibility for national security space programs was ceded to industry. Air Force 

and NRO project managers were told to step back, not to interfere and to let industry have total responsibility. Additionally, the Air Force and NRO essentially eliminated their systems engineering capabilities since the responsibility would reside 

with industry. 

The results were devastating and the adverse impact is still with us today. Good 

project managers and project management personnel left and an exceptional systems engineering capability was eliminated. Projects were a disaster and the approach was judged by all to be a total failure. 

Problems were not isolated to one project or to one company, the impact was systemic. As examples, FIA managed by Boeing was cancelled after the expenditure of 

about 10B$. SIBRS High, managed by Lockheed Martin, has been referred to as ‘‘a 

case study in how not to execute a space program.’’ NPOESS, managed by NorthropGrumman, is a story that is still evolving. On average, programs implemented using 

this approach resulted in half the intended program for twice the cost and six were 

years late. NASA implemented a similar approach called ‘‘Faster-Better-Cheaper.’’ 

Mars ’98 is the most significant example of this approach. Mars ’98 was a total failure with the loss of an orbiter, lander and two probes. The orbiter managed by 

Lockheed Martin, under contract to JPL, failed because of confusion between metric 

and English units. This confusion resulted in errors large enough during Mars orbit 

insertion to cause the spacecraft to enter the atmosphere and be destroyed. These 

same errors were prevalent during midcourse corrections implemented on the trip 

from Earth to Mars without a cause being determined. Had the JPL institutional 

navigation capability been applied to understand these midcourse errors, I believe 

they most likely would have found the cause and implemented corrections to prevent the failure. They were excluded from the management of Mars ’98 because of 

the ‘‘give the contractor the responsibility’’ concept. This is an example of how 

NASA’s continuity of expertise could have been applied to an important and challenging project. 

I cannot conceive that the U.S. will abandon a methodology developed over decades with enormous human and financial investment for a concept that when tried 

in the 1990s resulted in massive failure. Why would we put NASA human 

spaceflight at such risk by employing an unproven commercial crew concept? 

Commercial crew is a risk too high, not a responsible course and should not be 

approved. 

Continuation of the International Space Station is an area of apparent consensus. 

A launch vehicle and crew capsule for transportation to and from the Space Station 

are required. I believe the most appropriate option is Ares 1 and Orion. NASA 

should be directed to develop a plan for transporting humans to and from Earth 

orbit. The Ares 1 and Orion elements of Constellation should not be cancelled. The 

results of the NASA plan development may suggest changes to Constellation. 

A disappointing truth is the proposed NASA FY 2011 budget, in my opinion, is 

not adequate to support a credible, implementable Space Station Program and a 

credible, implementable beyond-Earth-orbit exploration program. 

A credible Space Station program, without commercial crew, needs to be defined. 

An exploration program with a heavy lift launch capability, an exploration capsule, 

a focused technology program and an exploration concept with destinations and 

dates also needs to be determined. Cost estimates, with substantive independent 

systems engineering and independent cost assessment, need to be developed. Timely 

completion of these proposed actions is necessary to allow resolution of current 

human spaceflight uncertainties. Only then can credible decisions be made as to the 

future of human spaceflight. 

In summary, do not approve commercial crew, continue the Ares 1 and Orion programs and do the necessary in depth analysis and study that was absent from the 
100

proposed FY 2011 budget to define the human exploration program worthy of a 

great nation. Only then can the value of the program be judged against credible 

plans and budget. Above all else, do not approve a human spaceflight program without adequate resources to assure success. We have traveled that road too many 

times with the same unsuccessful result.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Young, for your usual bluntness. You got to the point there. 

I know that this panel, and I am sorry you had to wait so long 

to come forth. I know you have some back end commitments, so we 

will be limited. So, I am going to yield my time to Mr. Wu. 

DURABILITY OF PRIVATE SECTOR APPROACH

Mr. WU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate that. 

We have a number of Members of this Committee who represent 

districts that have a lot of space activity, and quite frankly, they 

may be more knowledgeable than I, and they have a lot of questions to ask. 

Oregon has very little, if any space activity. I think that is a 

shame. My interest, my very strong interest in this topic is driven 

by my concern for the future of technology in this Nation, and the 

future of American leadership. 

My prior questions to Administrator Bolden brought forth some 

answers that the infrastructure currently used by NASA, the employees and so on, would be substantially transferred to the new 

effort, and I am concerned about whether that would be true or 

not, but for purposes of this question, if that is to occur, I have 

some, there is a significant doubt about what, where the cost savings would come from. Why would it be cheaper in the private sector? 

Now, I have been in this town long enough to kind of see a political process, or a policy process play out, which is you have program number one, it runs into tough territory, whether for timing 

or cost purposes, so you cancel program number one, and you kick 

the can down the road, by saying we are going to start program 

number two, in this case, kick it to the private sector. And if, indeed, there are not cost savings to be had, I am concerned that a 

future Administration and a future Congress would be faced with 

the prospect of either canceling human space flight by Americans 

or paying the same kind of cost increases, or maybe larger, because 

it is further on down the line. 

I would like to ask all three of you to comment on that concern 

about this potentially being a cancellation of American space flight 

in a two step process. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Congressman Wu, I think that is an excellent 

point. 

There is always difficulty when programs are extended, and the 

motivation and the intensity and the passion for the project disintegrates with time, and they become, at the time they exceed 

their budget by substantial amounts, and then the budgets are cut, 

then usually, the programs are redefined into a less aggressive program, and perhaps eventually into an R&D program, and then, 

each step along the way, they are more subject to cancellation. So, 
101

it is kind of a self-fulfilling prophecy that such activities are swimming upstream. 

Mr. WU. Mr. Armstrong, thank you. I have never been told by 

the first man to walk on the Moon that I have made an excellent 

point. Thank you. Captain Cernan. 

Chairman GORDON. You might not be again, either, David. 

Mr. WU. I will take that one. Captain. 

Captain CERNAN. My feeling, in support of what Tom Young, and 

I know what Neil believes, in support of the Constellation program, 

is we should take it in steps and bounds, leading ultimately to 

what I am a guru on, is space exploration. That is where I want 

to go. I want to see us go to Mars. 

But I think we first have to look at our problems today, and I 

think if we take a good, hard look, and review what Ares I, Constellation itself, and re-review it, perhaps, and figure out, can we 

really get airborne in 2015 or ’16 or ’17, and pick it. We know we 

can perform, and we know what funds we are going to have available. Hopefully, they will still be available. And say we can produce 

a program in 2015. We won’t have to start, or 2016, we will have 

something that will access Earth orbit. 

Of course, we have a problem in the front end, as I said, and that 

is Shuttle. Quite frankly, I happen to be one of those believers who 

said how can we terminate the most phenomenal, capable flying 

machine the world has ever seen, that we have ever designed, 

built, and flown, and it is just getting into its state of maturity, 

being able to do the job well, and obviously, extremely safely at this 

point in time, from what we have learned. How could we terminate 

that? We ought to extend into that period of time that we think 

Constellation will come on board, and take Shuttle out to 2015, if 

that is what is necessary. 

Now, I don’t have control of the funds, Mr. Chairman, so you 

know, I know there is a problem there. But to keep us in the space 

game, to keep us in the air, if you will, and then along the way, 

we can decide where we go from there with space exploration, the 

evolution of Ares V as it comes from the success of Ares I. And it 

is not, to me, it is not so important when we get there, but what 

is important is that we have, for future generations, a commitment. 

The direction we take is far more important, to me, than when we 

get there. 

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Wu’s time has expired, but Mr. Young, 

did you want to add something? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yeah, I would like just to add a little bit. 

First off, this is a people-intensive industry, enterprise, and if we 

save money in a particular area, you can only save money by eliminating people. I mean, that is where it comes from. And if, in our 

commercial crew focus, we fundamentally save the money that is 

talked about, we will eliminate NASA workforce, as well as some 

industry workforce. That workforce will never come back. You 

know, that will be gone forever. 

So, there are a lot of consequences that need to be carefully 

thought about, as your question suggests, and I would offer that. 

My only other comment is, early in my life, a previous NASA Administrator actually said to me: ‘‘Be cautious. That green grass 

sometimes is poison ivy.’’
102

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Young. Mr. Hall is recognized. 

RETURN TO THE MOON

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I won’t take a lot of time. I am glad 

Lewis and Clark didn’t stop at the Mississippi. Glad they went on 

to El Paso. I guess I am glad they went to Phoenix and maybe to 

well, I don’t know about seeing the Pacific shore. That was on November 15, 1805, and my kids think I remember that day. But we 

wouldn’t have had Rohrabacher if they hadn’t gone on to the oceanside, though, so we have got a lot to be thankful for. 

I have one brief question here, and first, my opening statement, 

I adopt what all three of these gentlemen have said, every sentence, every dash, and every quote. It is the greatest testimony I 

have heard in the 30 years I have been up here, and I thank you 

for it. 

I want to ask, if I might, from Mr. Armstrong. During the, his 

appearance at the Kennedy Space Center, I am sure you heard 

that, or have observed it. The President discounted the idea of 

going back to the Moon, and instead, spoke about going to other 

destinations, but from your perspective, if the goal is to take a 

stepping stone approach to deep space, as both of you, as each of 

you have alluded to, is the Moon a nice to have, or a need to have? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It is both. It is both, sir. It is hard to explain 

that there are good reasons to return the Moon, from a variety of 

perspectives. And it is a wonderful place to learn the elements of 

deep space, space flight with. It is a relatively safe and convenient 

place that uses, is able to use the best of the technologies we have 

developed over the last four or five decades, and I think that it 

should, indeed, be included in our plans for deep space exploration. 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Cernan, do you agree to that? Don’t you? You 

have——

Captain CERNAN. Yes, sir. I adamantly agree with it, and there 

is a whole host of other good reasons we don’t have time to talk 

about here today. 

Mr. HALL. Well, like the Administrator, you can send me a copy 

of those, can’t you? I thank all three of you. I yield back my time, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GORDON. Governor Garamendi is recognized for five 

minutes. 

CONSTELLATION LITE

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much. Captain Cernan, you 

talked about Ares I, a progressive program. I would like you to expand on that. In the testimony we heard earlier from the administrator, he said no, he is not even going to think about Constellation 

Lite, or some sort of a progressive program, but I would like to 

have you to expand on your vision on how that might proceed so 

that the administrator might be informed about the potential possibilities. 

Captain CERNAN. Well as I understand it, the entire Constellation was programmed with the idea that it could be built upon, 

step by step, ultimately reaching for the Moon. The initial require-
103

ment was to get into Earth orbit. Initial requirement was to service 

the space station. Initial requirement was to have American access, 

not dependent upon foreign powers to get us back up there, as 

quickly as humanly can. Orion was developed not as, you know, 

this Orion Lite is a whole different ballgame, and that would cost 

just as much money and take as much time, I am sure, as a full 

up Orion. But Orion was designed to evolve from the same vehicle. 

You reconfigure the interior and so forth, the navigation system, 

what was required to mature into a deep space vehicle from—one 

that could go into low Earth orbit. The Ares I was designed, and 

has been tested—the component testing on the Ares I, the solids 

that have already been tested on the first Ares I test flight, are 

part of the Ares V. The J–2X engine, by the way, is an upgrade, 

as best I understand it, from the J–2 that we used to go to the 

Moon. So it—we know what kind of hardware we are dealing with. 

We know what kind of facilities we got. The facilities that are 

being—already being set up on Pad B down at Kennedy are facilities that can support Orion and be—correction, Ares I and be upgraded to support the larger Ares V vehicle. So it is a—there is an 

inherent culture in Constellation to take us from Earth orbit to the 

Moon, or to asteroids, or to Mars, or to anywhere we want to go. 

SPACE SHUTTLE EXTENSION

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you for that. I assume that the men and 

women that are working for the administrator understand, or 

heard what you said. If not, I am sure they will get a tape of that. 

Secondly, you talked about the interim period before the Constellation Ares program is capable of delivering supplies to the Space 

Station. I think that really needs to be explored and expanded. I 

couldn’t agree with you more, with regard to the shuttles and their 

longevity. Your use of the maturing is a valuable word, I think, for 

most of us here who have reached that point. If you could expand 

on that just a bit in the two minutes that I have left? 

Captain CERNAN. Mature means you know a lot more than you 

used to know, I guess, and that is—we know——

Mr. GARAMENDI. You are wiser about those things——

Captain CERNAN. You know, we have been through some tragic 

catastrophes with Shuttle. We have learned something. As I said, 

we spent 50 years learning that which we didn’t even—weren’t 

even smart enough to ask the questions about. But it—the shuttle 

was designed for 100 flights, with a factor of—safety factor of four. 

And I don’t know the exact number on the shuttle vehicles—the 

three shuttle vehicles left, but I know it is down in the 20s and 30s 

right now. So we have a fleet—we have the only real capability to 

get into Earth orbit. And compared to the Soviets and what the 

Chinese are putting in orbit, they don’t hold a candle to what the 

shuttle can do. And why in the world do we want to just quit? Not 

only—if we had something sitting on the pad ready to take its 

place, that is one thing, but we don’t. We are abdicating our role 

in space. We are abdicating our capability to go to the space station 

by not being able to get there. And commercial space is not going 

to get there I mean, I—give me ten years, and I want to see them 

mature, and then they can take over the program, but not until 

then. And I am not going to be around. What I am worried about 
104

is what happens in the near future. So I think we have got to close 

that gap with the shuttle, and the only way—it is just not extending the shuttle. We have got to—it is, you know, just not stretching 

out the flights. We have got to get some more shuttle flights. We 

have got to keep this thing flying—2015. Pick out a date. Pick out 

a date when you think Ares is going to be ready to take over. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Captain, thank you very much for your knowledge and your passion, and I think Mr. Young would agree with 

at least part of what you said, if not all of what you said about—

wait a minute, commercial has a history also, and not a good one. 

Thank you very much. 

Captain CERNAN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Ehlers is recognized for five minutes. 

NASA PRIORITIES

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I listen with extreme interest because of the 

many times we have had hearings, we have rarely had people who 

had the conviction that you had, and also the background that you 

had. I might add that I am a scientist. I was horrified to be reminded once again about the error with the metric system and the 

English system. I tried to introduce a bill immediately after that 

happened to require the metric system on everything that NASA 

did. I was promised by the then administrator of NASA that if I 

would withdraw the bill he would take care of it, and, of course, 

didn’t. So we are very slow to learn. That is just a side issue at 

this point. What I am really interested in is your—the reference 

made, repeated by each of you, is the need for exploration. And I 

happen to agree with that, as a scientist. We have much more to 

explore. I am not—it is not quite clear to me why—how we are to 

pick the topics to be explored. Clearly the moon is still of interest. 

Mars is of even greater interest, but extremely difficult, unless we 

find enough volunteers who want to make a one way trip. But the 

difficulty of landing, replenishing the fuel supply and coming back 

is very formidable. I am not saying it is impossible, but very formidable. But what—I guess I am most interested in the process. You 

know, I have never been involved in an experiment where we didn’t 

know precisely ahead of time how we were going to proceed, what 

we were searching for, what we were exploring for. It is not that 

we didn’t find surprises along the way, but you really have to decide very clearly ahead of time what you are trying to achieve. And 

that, to me, is what has been lacking here, and I appreciate, Mr. 

Armstrong, your delineation of why it is important to go to the 

moon. It is sad to say that that is the first time I really heard a 

good explanation from the hearing table about that point. So—I—

it, you know, maybe one answer is to have a president who is a 

scientist. That would probably help. But—and I am not applying 

for the job, although I am in the process of trying to renew my pilot’s license, so maybe I can work on the other end. The—what are 

we really trying to achieve, and—I—can you give me any clarification, any one of you? What are we trying to explore? What are we 

trying to achieve? What do we hope to get out of it? And I recognize 

you can’t predict these things in advance, but I wonder if you could 
105

just quickly each run through what you would say in response to 

that question if the president called you in and asked you. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you. First, exploration is the principle 

ingredient in the charter of NASA. 

Mr. EHLERS. Yeah. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Because I was—I remember because I was one 

of the few people around that was in NASA on its first day after 

the Act was passed. And as I said in responding to the Chairman’s 

question, my priorities were leadership first, access second, and 

third, exploration. Leadership, I think, is critically important because it affects our nation, and—in so many ways. It affects the 

viewpoint of others—other citizens and other countries around the 

world about our country in a very meaningful way. I would just 

give one example, if I might? We were—Gene, Jim Lovell and myself were in a Mideast trip a couple of months ago, thanking the 

troops for their service, and while at Incirlik Base in Turkey, near 

the Syrian border, the State Department requested that we go over 

and visit a local university named Cukurova, the third largest university in Turkey, one that had continued to have been requesting 

information on NASA’s space program but never had been able to 

get a speaker. So we were in the area, and they shanghaied us into 

that job. Unfortunately, the timing was imperfect. Two days before 

that resolution on the genocide matter of Turkey of a century ago 

was passed, and the day before we arrived, the Turkish ambassador was recalled to Turkey, and so now we are going into a big 

presentation with all the press looking at us, expecting us to explain this international crisis, from their point of view. As it happened, our welcome was remarkable. There were probably four or 

five times as many people came to hear our presentation than they 

had seats in the auditorium. They set up loudspeakers outside so 

they could hear. They gave us a marvelous welcome, warm reception, and asked a lot of questions, so rigorously that the journalists 

there never could ask—have the opportunity to ask their questions 

about the international disagreement. I would just point out that—

by way of explaining, from the point of view of a foreign national, 

this—what we do in space seems to be far more important to them 

that it is—than matters about international differences. It just illustrates the importance of leadership. My second point was access, 

and, of course, we can’t do anything in space without access. That 

is why the second point was what it was. And third was exploration, because our business is getting out to the boundaries of 

human knowledge and finding out new things which will inspire 

people to believe that the human race can do more than it is now 

doing, and they can do it better. And it will be important—it—not 

only to our own citizens, but to people around the world, and for 

that reason I pick exploration without saying specifically what, and 

in what order. Exploration, by nature, is what we should be doing. 

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Ehlers’s time has expired, and Ms. Edwards is recognized. 

NASA TECHNICAL CAPACITY

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen. It is so wonderful to see you here today. I mean, you, both 

in your testimony and in your life’s work, just really continue to 
106

inspire me, and I think inspire this nation, and really are the best 

reflection of why it is that we make an investment in space. Not 

for what we know today, but what we might know tomorrow. I was 

just thinking back that—I know when I was in grade school, 

watching that black and white television, I thought then that a 

geek with glasses, horrible eyesight, that I could actually be an astronaut. Never happened, but I do think it speaks to the role that 

the agency and the work that goes on has played in inspiring 

young people to do all kinds of things that really don’t have any—

may not have anything to do with space. I wanted to focus particularly on a part of your testimony, Mr. Young, in which you say it 

is the marriage of NASA’s continuity of expertise with the implementation capability of industry that results in our proven mission 

success methodology, which maximizes the probability of success. 

And the reason is because my recollection in my work at Goddard 

Space Flight Center is that, as skilled and capable engineers, systems engineers, software engineers, hardware engineers, internal 

to NASA, there were partners in—on the private sector side. And 

it was because of that kind of relationship and partnership and expertise internal to NASA that enabled, I think, our work to proceed 

in a much more professional and scientific way. And so I wonder 

if you would comment about what it means to NASA’s internal capacity and expertise when you shunt the bulk—all—virtually all of 

the human space flight capacity to the commercial sector? Because, 

in my view, NASA’s always worked alongside private industry, the 

question is what kind of relationship has there been between the 

agency and its contractor community with that internal expertise? 

And so I wonder if you would comment about what that will mean 

on—in the long run to NASA’s internal technical and scientific capacity? 

Mr. YOUNG. That is really a very thoughtful question. Let me 

comment. As you describe, we really have learned how to do these 

things. Not without risk, and not without an occasional failure, but 

we basically know how to do them. And we do them by integrating 

just an extraordinary capability, both in the government, or NASA, 

side and the—and in the industry side. If we decide what we are 

going to do is cede all of this responsibility basically to industry—

and this is not a—industry. It is just that they don’t have the—

what I call continuity of expertise capability that I am describing 

in NASA. What will happen, in my view, is the good people in 

NASA, and there really are good people, they are not going to be 

satisfied with sitting in the back of the room and not, you know, 

asking questions, or not participating. NASA’s a value added organization. When I was a young engineer, it is why I went, because 

I could contribute when—it—was my belief. So good people are not 

going to go do that, they are going to go look for other opportunities. The one thing that I really underline is good people always 

have a choice. I mean, they always have an opportunity choice, so 

good people will go to other organizations. That will kind of be the 

beginning of what I would say will be the atrophy—atrophying of 

the NASA workforce. I think that what will happen, if I take Gene 

Cernan’s scenario, which I personally subscribe to, I don’t know exactly, when, but we will find out what I believe to be the deficiencies in the commercial crew somewhere downstream. They will 
107

manifest themselves either in some development failures, significant cost growth, significant delays, industry not willing to continue to invest, but they are in our future. Then, when we turn 

around for this workforce that you are talking about to bail us out, 

using that term, they won’t be there. These good people will be off, 

I don’t know doing exactly what, but they—you—this is not a capability that can respond to an off/on switch. I mean, we built this 

with a lot of investment, and so there are a lot of ramifications of 

the decisions that is facing you all, but one of which is the quality 

of this workforce as we go forward. And I don’t think there is any 

question in my mind that, you know, if implemented as proposed, 

the workforce will atrophy to the point that we will not have the 

ability to come to the rescue when the rescue is called for. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, gentlemen. And I know we don’t have 

time for it now, but at some point it well be helpful for you all also 

to reflect on the lessons learned, as I recall them, from both Challenger and Columbia, with regard to NASA’s internal capability of 

providing the kind of oversight that is needed to head off catastrophes like that. Thank you. 

Chairman GORDON. Gentlelady’s time has expired, and Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized for five minutes. Before Mr. Rohrabacher, let 

me say that I am being called to another committee, and I guess—

I think Chairlady Giffords, who is the chairman of the space—are 

you able to——

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Chair, I just have to leave in 30 minutes, so 

if the meeting is going to go over, we should have someone else 

carry the meeting. 

Chairman GORDON. Okay. I think 30 minutes should—our 

friends on this panel have got to leave before that time anyway. So, 

with that, Mr.—and let me thank you very much. I know that you 

came here today not because it is fun, but because it was—you felt 

it was a part of your mission, and thank you for your—again, for 

your contribution, and for your patriotism. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, before you leave, just one 

point I would like to make before you leave, because it concerns 

this hearing. This has been a great panel, and it has been a great 

hearing, but it is not—and—it has not been a balanced hearing. We 

have not received both sides of this issue at all from this presentation, and I would hope that before we go to an authorization that 

we would have a panel presented to us that could give both sides 

of the issue. And I am not complaining about their position at all, 

I am just saying there is another side—Rusty Schweickart was 

there. 

Chairman GORDON. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Buzz Aldrin, other people who are expert in 

this area, and they have not been given their chance to present an 

alternate point of view. And I would hope, before we go to an authorization, that we could at least have——

Chairman GORDON. If the gentleman would yield, first of all, Mr. 

Bolden took two hours of—putting forth, you know, an opposition, 

or a different position. John Holdren was invited to enhance that. 

Unfortunately, he was not able to come. But you can be well assured that we are not one hearing away from an authorization. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 
108

Chairman GORDON. And there will be additional time. I talked 

to Governor Richardson yesterday. He would like to come also 

and——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good. 

Chairman GORDON. So we wouldn’t—there will be transparency, 

there will be balance, and that is what it is going to take to get 

a good bipartisan authorization. That is what we want to do. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Chairman GORDON. I didn’t say unanimous, but at least—I 

would like to see that, though. 

VALUE OF RETURN TO MOON

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you 

very much, and I will proceed now with my five minutes. It seems 

to me that what we have here are three major issues, and that—

one is the viability of depending on commercial space companies 

versus government employees in providing access and transportation related to space. Another question is going back to the moon, 

whether or not that is worth the price that we will pay, and the 

funding of other space projects that will be de-funded because we 

no longer have the money for those space projects. And number 

three, what about the Constellation and the Ares rocket system? 

Was that system worth the price, and was that a right decision to 

move forward—or the administration’s thinking about moving forward to cancel that. First of all, just one note. I certainly do not 

believe that keeping around a NASA workforce because it will disappear if a commercial company is given a contract is right thinking. I will have to suggest that people go to those private companies, and those private companies are developing workforces of 

their own. And I think that quite often the private sector has been 

able to do things in our history that government employees have 

not been able to do. I would—I will study up the history of 

NPOESS. I do not necessarily believe that all of the problems at 

NPOESS were caused by the private companies, namely Northrop 

Grumman. I cannot—I will go back and look at that to see if that 

was the genesis of the problems with NPOESS, instead of—versus 

changing demands and goals by the government bureaucracies that 

were overseeing and micromanaging the NPOESS project. So I will 

take a look and see if you have got a point there, Mr. Young. And 

you are more of an expert on this than I am, you have spent more 

time at it, but I would like to look at that particular assertion a 

little closer. And that especially is magnified when I realize that 

what we are talking about here is, you know, not relying on private 

companies and moving forward with spending billions of dollars on 

a crew rescue vehicle, but it seems to me billions of dollars for a 

crew rescue vehicle that will be in place just prior to the space station being retired, spending billions of dollars when we could cut 

that cost dramatically by—and using those dollars elsewhere, and 

contract with the Russians in the meantime. Isn’t—there are billions of dollars that we don’t have for our space program. So when 

we have those kinds of decisions being made, it gives me a little 

bit more faith in the private sector to be rational, and commercial 

companies, rather than just government employees who don’t have 

to prioritize about spending. So let us get to the first issue, return-
109

ing to the moon in terms of—as a use of our—a better use of our 

space dollars. Mr. Cernan, let me ask you about that. Would not—

and by the way, I am not opposed to going back to the moon. I 

think that we need to look at it and really study this to see if this 

is the wisest use of our money. But it will cost a lot of money for 

us to go back to the moon. Would it not be better, if we were aiming to deep space and Mars, to use that money developing, for example, a space refueling system that would permit us to refuel our 

rockets in space, and then go on to further exploration? 

Captain CERNAN. Sir, when you go back far enough, when President Kennedy said, we are going to go to the moon, 50 years ago, 

he was asking us to do the impossible. He was asking us to do 

what couldn’t be done. Now, going to Mars today is not necessarily 

impossible, but it is one gigantic leap for mankind, if I may use 

Neil’s words, beyond going to the moon. And there are so many 

ramifications with—about going that far for that long that we have 

no hint about, and the—the moon is a natural satellite. It—is it 

thereby coincidence—it is there. It is a useful tool for us to demonstrate our capabilities to, you know, you can go into the scientific 

side of it, put up telescopes and so forth. We can demonstrate our 

capabilities to able to go deeper into space, plus we can go, you 

know, is there water on the moon, and where did it come from? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Captain CERNAN. South Pole, Helium 3. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And getting to the moon, now, does this require . . . 

Ms. GIFFORDS. [Presiding] Mr. Rohrabacher, I just want to 

also——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. —just let you know that we—because we are running out of time, and all members——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. —haven’t had a chance to speak yet, and I hate 

to cut you——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. And—no, you are absolutely correct. 

There are many questions we should have. Thank you so much, 

and I really admire our panel, all of our panel, including Mr. 

Young. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Young? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yeah, if I could—if—after that, I have got to say 

something. No, in all comments—the comment that we are talking 

about commercial companies versus the government is, with all due 

respect, is kind of missing the whole point we are trying to make. 

It is not commercial versus government. It is commercial versus a 

team of government and commercial. Second item is I did chair the 

NPOESS review, and I would be delighted to come by and tell you 

more about what we found, if you would like to——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

WORKFORCE MORALE

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you. Gentlemen, again, welcome. We are 

very honored to have the three of you before our committee today. 

I believe that you saw the video of the pad abort demonstration 

flight that I played during the first panel. And, again, it was ex-
110

traordinarily successful, and a real test to the engineering—the capability of this country. All of you have decades of experience in 

very demanding aerospace undertakings, and I just—in continuity 

with the comments made by Mr. Rohrabacher, I would like to talk 

about the importance of program continuity and stability, since the 

three of you have tremendous experience in this area. What did it 

really take to make these successful flights possible? As you know, 

Congress has directed NASA to continue to work on Constellation. 

We heard that from Administrator Bolden himself this morning. 

Yet, at the same time, the workforce is being told that the—by the 

agency that Constellation is dead. So can you talk specifically, the 

three of you, about the morale and the motivation and what happens to the workforce when you hear those conflicting messages? 

And I would like to start with you, Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. My information 

in this subject is largely anecdotal. I have received e-mails from a 

variety of sources within NASA and different NASA centers talking 

about the problems that the uncertainty of current planning confirmation has engendered among the workforce there. And my 

sense from the number of such reports are universally on the side 

that morale has been degraded substantially, and indeed people 

are looking for jobs outside the NASA centers. I had the pleasure 

of talking with the recent shuttle crew this morning, and we asked 

them that question, and they seemed to think morale was reasonably good in the area. They—there are possibilities, from their perspective, in the months ahead where—that they could train to be 

on the space station, ISS, or they could go into some other managerial positions in NASA, or, if they were military, they could go back 

to the military. That probably is not the best choices they would 

like to have for their future, but I would yield to others who have 

maybe more definite information than I have available. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you. Mr. Cernan? 

Captain CERNAN. Well, I think they were being too kind if they 

said the morale is good. You know, you talk about the astronaut 

corps, and these guys are all—these are young men and young 

women. They are scientists, they are engineers. They are just not 

pilots. They are just not young men and women running around in 

blue suits. They get down and dirty with the—with Mr. Young’s engineers out there, and helping design, develop, test 24/7 the spacecraft that they are eventually going to fly. And, you know, I asked 

a lady who works for NASA, who is an engineer, whose husband 

happens to be an astronaut. I said, you know, he just came back 

here a few months ago, and is he still on flight status? And she 

said, what flight status? You know, where does he go? Where does 

this young talent, the best of the best, where do they go and what 

do they do? So it is hard for me to—I put myself in their place, 

and, you know, I was sorted in a way after Apollo 17. We were 

going to wait five years for the shuttle to become operational. And 

I said—well, I was fortunate. I had flown three times. I had done 

my thing, and I wasn’t sure I wanted to wait five years, so I went 

somewhere else. And you are going to find all those non-astronauts, 

all those engineers, all those technicians and support people, how 

can they not? I know Kennedy—the morale at Kennedy’s not very 

good right now, and I can tell you Johnson is not much better. 
111

They are out looking to get ahead of the job hunting game, because 

if this proposal goes forward, they are out of business. They are 

out—at least they are out of the kind of work they would want to 

be into. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Young? 

Mr. YOUNG. I think the comments you have heard really are 

right on. I will take a little different perspective. I have had the 

privilege of leading some large organizations, both within NASA 

and within the industry. The fundamental challenge of somebody 

leading such a large organization is providing, one, stability, and 

two, an honest appraisal of the situation to a workforce. People—

and, you know, mostly it has been associated with technology, 

space, national security activities. People don’t look at that as a, 

you know, a five day a week, eight hour a day job. You know, it 

is remarkable what people will do, but they need to have an understanding. They need to have stability, and most of all they need to 

have challenging work, where what they do makes a difference. 

When you are in a job where what you do makes a difference, there 

is no limit as to what you apply. But if you are in a job where what 

you do might have no benefit tomorrow, such as a program being 

cancelled, or you might not have a job tomorrow, that is when the 

time around the water fountain becomes the dominant time. So I 

can’t overemphasize how important—I think the video that you 

showed, you know, probably is a demonstration of that. Probably—

I mentioned it earlier, but I didn’t really come back, knowing a little bit about how that came to be, that was the best of NASA and 

best of industry working together to make what happened in there 

successful. 

VIABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN

Ms. GIFFORDS. Just a quick follow up, just a yes or no answer 

from the three of you. I know that you have had a chance to testify 

in the Senate, and you have had a chance to hear our panel earlier 

asking questions to Administrator Bolden. At this point, do you believe that the President’s plan as proposed is executable? Mr. 

Young? 

Mr. YOUNG. No. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Cernan? 

Captain CERNAN. Absolutely no, and—extremely——

Ms. GIFFORDS. Yeah. And Mr. Armstrong? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. If the question is would they be able to spend 

the money, my——

Ms. GIFFORDS. Your microphone, sir. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. If the question is would they be able to spend 

the money, the answer is yes. If the question is, could they receive 

value from it, I would say highly unlikely. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, gentlemen. Next up we are going to 

hear Mr. Olson, Ranking Member Olson. 

IMPACT OF THE AUGUSTINE REPORT

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you Mr. 

Armstrong, Captain Cernan, Mr. Young, for coming here today, for 

giving us your expertise, and most importantly, for your service to 
112

our great nation. Again, we thank you very much. My first question 

is for Mr. Armstrong. I know, Mr. Armstrong, you have been—had 

some concerns about how the Augustine report has been utilized by 

the administration, and for those who believe that the Augustine 

report is—as the basis for calling the Constellation program 

unexecutable, I kind of want to get your thoughts on that, because 

I don’t believe it is, and I want to get your thoughts. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you. I remember hearing that 

unexecutable very early, and so I looked at—I couldn’t find it in 

any of my dictionaries, so I just tried to guess what it might mean, 

and—it mean no execute. That could be it can’t be performed, or 

it could mean it can’t be killed. I don’t know which—it seems to 

me, in studying the report—which—and I think the report was a 

very good one, considering the fact that they had a small number 

of members on the committee, admittedly assisted by NASA people 

and others, and a very short time to judge new programs, which 

were largely undefined, against the—what they called the program 

of record, I think. And that is—was developed over—as this committee knows well, over a long time period of money—many years, 

with hundreds or thousands of people looking at it. So it is a very 

difficult for—job for them. The second part, that they were obliged 

to look at the program of record as limited by the 2010 budget, 

which was substantially below the 2009 budget, and indeed significantly below the 2011 budget. My expectation is, had the ground 

rules been different, they—their findings would have been different. So—they had a built-in barrier toward making a—what I 

would call an equitable judgment. Having said that, I do think they 

did a credible job with the report, and it is well written. 

MAINTAINING AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN SPACE

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much—my former boss, Phil 

Graham, might agree with you, with your deducting of non-executable as something you can’t kill. He believed that the hardest thing 

to kill in the world is a government program once it gets enacted 

into law. So thank you for your answers. Captain Cernan, real simple for you. Given where we are, what would you do going forward 

to keep us on that path and maintain our leadership in human 

space flight and keep our exploration capabilities the greatest in 

the world? 

Captain CERNAN. Well, very quickly, I think I alluded to that in 

answer to an earlier question. I would find out what the real capability of getting Ares—the real timeframe for getting Ares, Orion—

full up Orion into Earth orbit is, and I am just making an assumption it is 2015. And I would fill that gap with the shuttle for all 

the reasons I mentioned earlier. The gap is going to be so significant to us if we don’t close it, and we need to close it from both 

the front end and the back end. And the only thing on the front 

end is what we have got flying today, which is the shuttle. What 

we have got on the back end, that can do it as quickly or quicker 

than anything else, is Ares I, Orion. And during that period of 

time, as Ares I evolves into a heavy lift booster, we can then decide 

and make plans for space exploration to follow. Now, if that means 

we can do a fly-by to an asteroid or a fly-by of the moon, why, we 

are then moving forward step by step to develop Altair a lunar 
113

landing capability, that is fine. But what I said earlier, we need to 

say from this point on is that is the destination. That is where we 

are going. Whether we get there in 2020, 2018, 2028, I don’t care. 

And for all those kids out there, we—they need to know what their 

future has for store for them, in terms of, you know, let me just 

say this. Space and aviation has been a romance for over 100 years, 

and that is why we are here today, and that is why a lot of people 

perhaps are on this committee. And the legacy of the Wright Brothers is not the—we can higher, faster and further than anyone else 

has ever flown in the world before, but the legacy is the dreams 

that they inspired in the hearts of all of those who followed in their 

footsteps. And that is what I’m talking about when we need to provide a destination, a plan, a future for these young kids out there. 

My grandkids—I am selfish. I am concerned about them. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much, and I yield back the balance 

of my time. Thank you. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Ms. Kosmas. 

INVESTING IN ENGINE DEVELOPMENT

Ms. KOSMAS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you all for 

being here. I represent the Kennedy Space Center, so obviously my 

concerns with regard to the workforce and the gap that you just described are great, but I would like to start by thanking you for 

what you all do. You exemplify and articulate, I think, the imagination, the inspiration, the innovation, the expertise, that we all 

want to maintain, and we want to ensure that America’s future 

rests on that kind of inspiration. And so I thank you for your service, and also for being here today, and to describe to us your positions on these issues in a way that is very clear, and gives us a 

great deal of food for thought going forward. I had a couple of specific questions. Captain Cernan, first of all, your answer to the previous question was interesting to me, specifically because you 

talked about filling the gap with the shuttle, and I had a conversation earlier with Administrator Bolden about the feasibility of that. 

And while he accepted that the additional one flight was doable, he 

was not quite as clear on whether he thought additional flights to 

fill the gap could be done. Essentially he agreed that the shuttle 

is safe, that the re-certification has been done, and that it is safe, 

but logistics, as he called it, were the difficulty. I think we can 

work around that, perhaps, if it is decided that the shuttle would 

be the vehicle, since it is the vehicle we have now that would give 

us the access to the International Space Station for payloads, for 

spare parts, and also, obviously, for crew, and the only vehicle that 

we have at the moment that will do that. So I appreciate your suggestion there very much. I wanted to ask a question about—to all 

of you about the President’s proposal, as it calls for a significant 

investment in technology, specifically for the development of a 

heavy lift vehicle. And I guess the question begins with this, are 

any of you aware of a substantial technology gap or technical issue 

that warrants our spending this large investment, or do we already 

have this technology available to us? And the—to compound that 

question, NASA’s RFI for heavy lift launch system and propulsion 

technology states that affordability—this is a quote ‘‘affordability 

and load development and recurring costs are some of the guiding 
114

principles.’’ And so I am asking what are the tradeoffs of investing 

in engine development to achieve lower costs versus saving time by 

using or modifying existing engines? That would be open to all of 

you. Mr. Armstrong? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you. We know an awful lot about rocket 

engines. I have flown on 13 different kinds. We know what the specific impulse is for almost any combination of propellants. We know 

what expansion ratios do. We know what material costs of case—

and weights of material cases for liquid and solid rockets, and that 

doesn’t mean there won’t be advances, but—because there will, and 

what—with additional research. Nonetheless, we know pretty well 

right now how to build a big rocket, or a middle sized rocket, or 

a little rocket, and we know what the tradeoffs are for different 

component configurations that we can choose from. So while I 

think there are small increments to be gained by additional research in rocketry, my guess is that we can today build a pretty 

decent rocket in almost any size range that you designate. So I suspect that the decisions that were made as a result of the—choosing 

the Constellation program, which largely were based on schedule 

and affordability, would not be changed much by more research. 

We might find that certain other combinations have slight advantages and disadvantages, but I don’t think there would be any 

game changing kinds of decisions from that. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Mr. Young, did you want to comment? 

Mr. YOUNG. Yeah, I would. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Thank you. 

Mr. YOUNG. I think, first off, NASA does need a focused space 

technology program, so my comment doesn’t need to be—answer 

that. But the only prerequisite we need to get in—heavy enough 

launch vehicle is funding. I mean, we have the ability today to proceed with a heavy lift launch capability. We will probably develop 

some technology work as we go along in the implement of the program, but getting on with it is not being paced, in my view, by our 

ability to do it or our need for technology. It is only paced by funding. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Could you answer the question as to what kind of 

funding it would take to accelerate that? 

Mr. YOUNG. I don’t know that I can really answer your question. 

You know, what I would really like to say in response to that is 

that—that is why we have a NASA, and NASA has extraordinary 

capability to answer, you know, questions like that, if they are 

given the opportunity to do so. So I would, you know, I personally 

would be quite comfortable with NASA being given the assignment 

of what resources would it take to do a heavy lift, and how soon 

can we really get on with it? 

Ms. KOSMAS. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Ms. Kosmas. Mr. McCaul? 

MORE ON MAINTAINING AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN SPACE

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank the distinguished panel. Mr. Armstrong, I must say, it is a real honor to 

be in your presence here today. I think we were talking before, 

1,000 years from now, no one in this room will be remembered, no 

one in this town will be remembered, except for you. And that is—
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it is a great honor. On the wall behind me it says, ‘‘Where there 

is no vision, the people perish.’’ President Kennedy, I think, had 

that vision, and it landed you on the moon. I am concerned that 

this President doesn’t have that vision in his decision to cut the 

Constellation program. I was compelled by your testimony that the 

priorities are American leadership in space, access to space, and 

exploration, and I agree with you on that, and also your comments 

that you were astounded by the President’s proposal and that it 

was painful to watch. And then, finally, in response to the question, can the President’s plan be executed, we had a no, no, and a 

highly unlikely. That is very powerful. I mean, you are the experts. 

And the morale is another issue, but my question is, by cutting the 

Constellation program, what damage will that do to our superiority 

in space, to our national security? And the idea that we can somehow hand this off to commercial space flight, which maybe down 

the road could happen, my concern is that the handoff, it is not an 

appropriate handoff. They can’t pick up the ball and run with it 

right now. And my concern is what is going to happen is we are 

going to have a gap in our superiority in space, and we are going 

to lose to the Chinese and the Russians. And so, with that, Mr. 

Armstrong, can you give me your thoughts on that? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, sir. I certainly agree that if, for the 

next decade, we have no access to space, we will be viewed by people around the world as being has-been, and that—I would find 

that extremely uncomfortable with the enormous investment in resources and people’s time over the past half century that we have 

expended in order to gain the position of leadership that we have 

enjoyed in recent years. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Gentlemen, you——

Captain CERNAN. May I add something very quick to that? If we 

are viewed by other nations, other people around the world, as 

being willing to give—to abdicate our leadership in space, what 

else do they believe we are willing to dismantle without reason? 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is very powerful, and I couldn’t agree with 

you more. Mr. Young, do you have a response? 

Mr. YOUNG. The only comment I would make is I think the reason all three of us advocate Ares I, Orion, the elements of Constellation, is that it is our view that, given where we are today, it 

is the best way to get an assured access to low Earth orbit. I mean, 

it is the fundamental underlying view for why we are advocates of 

that solution. 

IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. MCCAUL. Captain Cernan, if I could just follow up? You had 

responded, what else would they be willing to give up? This—the 

backdrop to the space program has always been national security 

as well, and that is one of my main concerns with this decision by 

the President. Can you comment on that? 

Captain CERNAN. I am sorry? 

Mr. MCCAUL. In—what impact will this have on our national security? 

Captain CERNAN. Oh, I think it will have significant effect. We 

won’t have for some—well, you know, if the shuttle—if we give up 

on the shuttle today—the shuttle doesn’t just service the space sta-
116

tion. It is an asset for national security. We can access any—probably almost anywhere in lower Earth orbit we need to be to do anything we want to do. Repair, recover, replace satellites. We can—

scientific missions, like the Hubble. I think it affects our international security because we don’t have access. We don’t have the 

capability to be there when we need to be there. We are hostage—

literally hostages, I say, to other nations. And it also implies, subjectively, that we no longer care. We no longer—we, you know, 

something happens in some other place in the world, don’t worry 

about it, they don’t care. They are not going to come to our rescue. 

They are not going to protect freedom around the world, which is 

something, I guess, for the last 200 and some odd years we have 

been destined to do. So there is—there are subjective reasons, as 

well as a physical capability to access a plateau that—it, you know, 

above the Earth, you know, to do things that could never have been 

done there before, from a national security point of view. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you for your testimony. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Mr. Grayson, you are recognized. 

ASTRONAUT SAFETY CONCERNS

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you. I want to thank you very much for the 

inspiration that you gave to me when I was younger. I want to 

thank you for inviting me to re-think what is capable for human 

beings to do. And I want to thank you both for what you have done 

not just for me, but for millions of people just like me. So, thank 

you. One of the pleasant parts of this job is the chance to meet people like you and to give you my thanks. I remember your mission. 

I remember your mission. I do remember a mission in between that 

didn’t go as well, and I wanted to ask you a little bit about that. 

I told the NASA Administrator recently that my sense is that if a 

commercial enterprise, in running the space program at the time 

of Apollo 13, then all of those hundreds of engineers, mechanics 

and other astronauts who worked so hard to make sure the three 

men returned to Earth safely would have been replaced by one 20-

year-old in a Grateful Dead t-shirt working on a laptop. I am concerned that replacing NASA at the head of the manned space program with some TBD commercial enterprise will, in fact, dramatically compromise the safety of the astronauts, and I would like you 

all to address that point, staring with Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. The two gentlemen to my right are the most qualified to say that. I think it would go even well beyond that. I think 

it would jeopardize the safety of the United States human space 

flight program. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Because one failure would have such dramatic repercussions? 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, yeah, but, see, my definition of failure is—it 

could be a flight failure, or it could be just a massive overrun, or 

it could be just a massive schedule delay, which we have seen a 

few of, or it could be the failure to be able to complete a program, 

which we have also seen. So I think failure can be any of those, 

you know, of those circumstances. And so either one of those, I 
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think, would have just a devastating impact on not only NASA, but 

the United States human space—United States space program. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Captain Cernan? 

Captain CERNAN. Many years ago I worked on Apollo—we 

learned about the Russian program we never knew, and sometimes 

it is as important to know what they didn’t know as much as what 

we didn’t know. And the Russian cosmonauts would play volleyball 

and swim and had requirements to stay physically in shape and do 

a little homework on the physics and geometry of the world, and 

they would send them down to Baikonur and open up a hatch and 

put them in and off they would go. I said earlier, and I don’t want 

to spend too much—we lived, 24/7, from the day we got involved 

with our spacecraft, whether it was Gemini program, Apollo or 

whatever it is, we lived, we owned, we knew the people who were 

building it. They dedicated their lives to putting the screws in the 

heat shield so that it wouldn’t come apart when we re-entered the 

Earth. This is the kind of culture we grew up and we lived in. Now, 

if it went to the commercial sector, as an astronaut, I have got to 

believe we would have to—we would have to recreate that culture, 

or I am not getting in it. I mean, I didn’t go to the moon not to 

come home. I mean, I planned to come home all along, but I knew 

I was coming home, because of those people, and because of the 

culture that we worked within at NASA. 

Mr. GRAYSON. And last, but for sure not least, Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I included in my written testimony some comments regarding commercial—first, I say I am very much in favor 

of the commercial activity and their—and I am very hopeful that 

they will have the progress that they hoped for. Nevertheless, they 

face a very difficult business case. It is—the market is extremely 

thin, and they—the investor contribution to that project is going to 

be—must be substantially larger than the government contribution, 

by their business plan, and that business plan looks highly suspect. 

I recall recently reading an article by Brewster Shaw, former astronaut and now working a responsible position in space for Boeing, 

and he was trying to explain to the readers the difficulty he faced 

in convincing his boss to—that that was a good business to get—

there is a good enough chance for that to be a business success that 

they should get in it. He said, it will be a hard sell, but, he said, 

I am hopeful. And it is going to be equally difficult for any other 

commercial space provider to make that case to their investors 

without the developed market. And I think that is a serious impediment that they just—we need to recognize, and they need to 

overcome. And I hope they can, and I hope that market develops, 

but right now it is very difficult to see that it will. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Thank you. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Pleasure and an honor——

Mr. YOUNG. Could I just——

Mr. GRAYSON. —meet you all. 

Mr. YOUNG. Could I just add briefly to that? 

Ms. KOSMAS. Okay. Yes. 

Mr. YOUNG. Neil’s comments and Gene’s reminded me of this, 

but the, you know, there are extra steps that make these things 

successful. When Apollo was being developed, I was actually at 
118

NASA’s Langley Research Center, and I was working on a program 

called Viking, where we land a couple spacecraft on Mars. Langley 

actually built something that looked like a big saw bench that a 1/

6 G simulator. You could fly—flights at 1/6 G, equivalent to the 

moon. And I used to drive home late at night and ride by when the 

lights went on, and Neil Armstrong was in there flying that test 

vehicle, practicing for going to the moon. They are kind of—they 

are the extra things that make these things happen, Langley building that facility, you know, Neil coming up from JSC to fly it, the 

industry people being evolved. You know, it is just an example, but 

you reminded me of it. That is the kind of partnership that makes 

these things happen. You don’t write that in a safety requirements 

document. You probably would never write in there, if you are not 

doing anything on Friday night, why don’t you come up and fly the 

1/6 G simulator? So they are the—it is no special ingredients. That 

is why this business, which is a one strike and you are out business, has been as successful as it has been. Thank you. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Thank you very much. Mr. Griffith, recognized for 

five minutes. 

TECHNICAL SHARE OF THE CONSTELLATION PROGRAM

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate you all 

being here. I am from Marshall Space Flight, Huntsville, Alabama, 

retired physician who take care of many of the pioneers there, and 

I can say that, without a doubt, even in their most ill moments, 

their culture, manned space flight culture, always came through. 

And I think the culture, and seeing the Saturn, seeing and talking 

to people who hand soldered and who put it together and who gave 

their lives for it, when I hear someone say that these individuals 

can find a job somewhere else, this was never a job. This was a 

calling, and so we see that over and over again, those of us who 

were involved in communities with the space flight. The thing that 

I am concerned about, as the discussions are framed, is—I keep 

hearing budget, and I don’t think we are talking about money here. 

I think we are talking about commitment. I think if America can 

do a $787 billion stimulus, bail out AIG, and other things that we 

have done in the last 18 months, and we can’t find $12 billion to 

finish Ares I, our heavy lift vehicle, Ares V, which will eventually 

be the very soul of America to the rest of the world, is a lack of 

commitment, and it is alluring of the President’s suggestion on 

April the 15th that we were not in competition globally for space 

and exploration and science, I think was a misstatement, either 

through naivete, or he is ill informed. We are, in fact, in a competition. And when I hear Mr. Augustine say over and over again all 

Ares—all the Constellation project needs is money, I believe he is 

right. And I don’t think it is a budgetary concept. I think it is a 

commitment concept that we have not made, that we need to make, 

and I think that is why the Obama administration is running into 

a stone wall here. So I have listened to the comments, and I think 

my only question to you is do you agree with Mr. Augustine, that 

our technology is there, that our Ares I, our Ares V solutions are 

sound, and that, if we were—had committed the proper funding to 

it, we would not be having this discussion? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I believe that to be true, sir. 
119

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you. 

Captain CERNAN. Yeah, I don’t think there is a flaw in the program, except lack of funding. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you. 

Mr. YOUNG. There is no one I respect more than Norm Augustine, and I agree with that. There is also data that provides additional support and information, and for Ares I and for Orion we 

have completed preliminary design reviews, you know, that—the 

assessments that I have read, and have heard people actually testifying about, is, from a technical standpoint, this program has proceeded in a very successful manner. So I think that—I have not 

heard anyone who has said there is any issue with Ares I, Orion, 

other than insufficient funding to meet schedules. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thanks. My other question would be that—it 

would appear to me that, with the successful completion of the 

Constellation project, that our ability to commercialize space would 

be—would have much more potential. It would be much safer, it 

would be much quicker, than the way—the suggestions are that we 

are going to put something out for competitive bids. We put out the 

tanker project for—in 2001. We don’t have a tanker yet. We are not 

refueling anything. We put space out, which is a national security 

issue, for competitive bids, we are basically saying to China and 

Russia, we are walking off the court, the game is yours. And so I 

concur in that, and I appreciate so much you all being here. The 

soul of my district is—are the rocket scientists, so thank you so 

much. 

Mr. YOUNG. If I might comment, we actually have an endeavor 

to pursue the commercialization of space, and that is commercial 

cargo, as you are well aware. And while I think commercial cargo 

is not without risk, it is an opportunity to grow and to demonstrate 

a capability. And on the other hand, if the unfortunate happens 

and it is not successful, in my view, it fails soft. There is other 

ways to do it. Commercial crew fails hard, and that is the fundamental difference. I guess the other comment I would make also 

is—and maybe I am not the right person to do this, but having 

spent a little bit of time in industry, we should not set up this commercial endeavor to fail. Don’t make the bar so high. You know, 

have a responsible bar that can be achieved, and if achieved, then 

there is an opportunity to raise the bar. But don’t try on the first 

jump, you know, to set a world’s record. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thanks. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Griffith. Before we bring the hearing to a close, I want——

Ms. WOOLSEY. Wait a minute. 

Ms. KOSMAS. I am sorry. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. I asked to be on the—back on the list quite a 

while ago. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Oh, I beg your pardon. I am sorry. The Chair——

Ms. WOOLSEY. Okay. 

Ms. KOSMAS. The Chair recognizes Representative Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you. I stepped out of—I was the second 

person, and I thought, no, I am just going to listen. But, you know, 

your testimony brought up so many memories, and I am the perfect 

clean-up batter, besides our Chairwoman here. Commander Arm-
120

strong, my kids were, all four of them, four, six, seven and eight 

when you took that step on the moon, and we sat there spellbound, 

our entire family. It is a day that I can still remember the colors 

of their t-shirts. I mean, that—it is one of those days. I remember 

that one of my sons had a loose tooth. I mean, we don’t forget that. 

And my career was wrapped totally around the technology that 

came from the space movement. I was part of a startup telecom 

company. So it was very clear to me that—and we all knew that 

that company would not have been able to spin off from Bell Labs 

without the science from the space industry. So I have been questioning, while we have been sitting here, why I—and my—well, 

there aren’t enough of us here to—but my colleagues will tell you, 

I have been very nonplussed about the space program, and I am 

on this committee, and blah, blah, blah. That is because I see so 

many needs in this country and in this world that I—but there is 

another because. I never ever thought the space industry would not 

be vital in our country. I took it for granted, and I had to go do 

other things that I thought were important also, until it became 

clear to me that our leadership is willing to let other nations 

send—transport our astronauts out—into space. And all of my competitive juices just got going. It was, like, no way. We are not going 

to pay another country and depend on them to take care of what 

we need in the United States of America. So you have reminded 

me today of exactly how important the space industry has been, because you have been so important in the past. You are important 

today, and you will be important in our future. So your stories, 

your message, has to get out there. We will help you. You will help 

us. You really will. This has been a very important day, and when 

it woke me up, I realized we have got a lot of people in this country 

that think our space industry is there, it is solid, it will be there 

forever, we don’t have to worry about it. So now we have got to remind people that we have got decisions to make, and we want to 

make the right ones. Thank you very much. 

Ms. KOSMAS. Thank you, Ms. Woolsey. Before we bring the hearing to a close now, I want to thank our witnesses. I think you have 

been properly thanked by many of the members, but I personally 

would like to thank you as well for testifying before the committee 

today. And, for the record, the record will remain open for two 

weeks for additional statements from the members and for answers 

to any follow-up questions the committee may ask of the witnesses. 

So the witnesses are now excused, and the hearing is now adjourned. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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