### FILED JUNE 3, 2014 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt W A State Court ofAppeals, Division III
INTHE COURT OFAPPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE Inre Post-Sentence Review of: ) No. 31848-6-111 ) ) ) PUBLISHED OPINION SHUNDRAE CAGE. ) ) LAWRENCE-BERREY, 

### J.

- The trial court granted Shundrae Cage a postsentence furlough for a medical emergency. The Washington StateDepartment ofCorrections (DOC) filed an emergency motionto vacatethe furlough, arguing that only DOC has authority to grant furloughs. Thetrial court denied the motion, concludingDOC's authority togrant furloughs is not exclusive. Inthispostsentencereview, DOC contends the trial court lacked the authority to grant a furlough. We agree with DOC, andtherefore
reverse. FACTS Shundrae Cage was convicted ofsecond degree assault, domestic violence, and sentenced to 13 months ofconfmement in the custody ofDOC. His early release date
was September 26,2013, and hisplanned release date was September 16,2013,pursuant to DOC's 10-day early release authority.No. 31848-6-111 In re Postsentence Review of Cage
On July 31,2013, Mr. Cage filed a motion in Spokane County Superior Court for a furlough under RCW 9.94A.782(2). He explained that his wife needed help with their other children due to serious pregnancy related complications. A note from his wife's doctor stated that she was experiencing pregnancy related heart and kidney issues and that she needed Mr. Cage to help at home with their other children. The State objected, stating that ithad a "longstandingpolicy in our office ofobjecting to furloughs in the first place." Report ofProceedings (RP) at 8. On August 2,2013, the court granted Mr. Cage a temporary furlough to be served
on electronic home monitoring. The order stated that the furlough was to begin at 10:00 a.m. on August 5, 2013, and end six weeks after the birth ofhis child. As soon as DOC was aware ofthe furlough order, it filed an emergency motion to vacate it. At the August 9, 2013 hearing, it argued the trial court lacked statutory authority to grant a furlough, maintaining, "[f]urloughs are allowed solely under RCW 72.66.012. Andthat statute applies to the Secretary ofthe Department of Corrections, not to the Court." RP at 16. The trial court denied the motion to vacate,statingthat RCW 72.66.012, which authorizes the secretary ofDOC to grant a furlough, does notprohibit a trial court from granting a furlough.
2No. 3 I848-6-III In re Postsentence Review o/Cage
DOC filed an emergency motion for accelerated review ofthe furlough order and a motion to stay. On August 22,2013, a commissioner ofthis court granted the stay and the motions to accelerate review and supplement the record. On September 9,2013, the
case was referred to a panel for a detennination on the merits. ANALYSIS DiscretionaryReview oraMoot Case. The issue before us is whetherthe trial courthad the authority under the Sentencing Refonn Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, to grantMr. Cage'spostsentence furlough. As an initial matter, we note that Mr. Cage's sentence expired in September 2013. The expiration ofhis maximum tenn technically renders this case moot. "Acase is moot ifa court can no longerprovide effective relief." In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373,376-77,662 P.2d 828 (1983). However, a court may decide an appeal that has otherwise become moot when "matters ofcontinuing and substantial public interest are involved." Sorenson v. City o/Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547,558,496P.2d 512 (1972). In evaluating whether a technically moot case merits review, courts consider '''the desirability ofan authoritative detennination for the future guidance ofpublic officers, and the likelihood offuture recurrence ofthe question.'" In re Pers. Restraint

## 0/ Mattson, 166 Wn.2d 730, 736, 214 P.3d 141 (2009) (quoting Sorenson, 80 Wn.2d at 558).
3No. 31848-6-III In re Postsentence Review of Cage " ,[M]ost cases in which appellate courts utilized the exception to the mootness doctrine involved issues ofconstitutional or statutory interpretation.'" Mattson, 166 Wn.2d at 736 (quotingIn re Pers. Restraintof Mines, 146 Wn.2d 279,285,45 P.3d 535 (2002». Mr. Cage does not address the issue ofmoot ness, but DOC contends that despite technical mootness, we should address the merits ofthe casebecause the issue ofa trial court's authority to grant a furlough for inmates is capable ofrepetition and is likely to evade review
. We agree. We exercise our discretion and choose to decide whether a trial court has inherent authority under the SRA to grant a postsentence furlough. Authority to Granta Postsentence Furlough. This question raises an issue of statutory interpretation, which is a question oflaw, reviewed de novo. State v. Ammons, 136 Wn.2d 453,456,963 P.2d 812 (1998). "Statutory interpretation begins with the statute's plain meaning." Lake v. WoodcreekHomeownersAss 'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 PJd 1283 (2010). We discern plain meaning "from the ordinary meaning ofthe language at issue, the context ofthe statute in which thatprovision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572,578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). Only ifstatutory language is ambiguous do we resort to aids of construction. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 PJd201 (2007). The court's primary goal is to construe the statute in a manner consistent with the legislative
4No. 31848-6-III In re Postsentence Review of Cage
intent. Two statutes intersect here. First, RCW 9.94A.728(2) provides, "Anoffender may leave a correctional facility pursuantto an authorized furlough orleave ofabsence." The only statute that authorizes furloughs is RCW 72.66.012, which provides, "The secretary may grant a furlough but only ifnot precluded from doing so under RCW 72.66.014, 72.66.016, 72.66.018, 72.66.024, 72.66.034, or 72.66.036." A "furlough" is defined as an "authorized leave ofabsence for an eligible resident." RCW 72.66.010(3). The statutory language here is not ambiguous. Viewing the interrelationship ofthe two statutoryprovisions and the statutory language, RCW 72.66.012 expressly applies to DOC and gives its secretarythe discretionto grant a furlough. Trial courts are not mentioned. Underthe plain language ofRCW72.66.012, the sole authority to grant furloughs vests with DOC. This conclusion is supported by Washington case law. In January v. Porter, our Supreme Court noted that after sentencing, the court losesjurisdiction to DOC: Thejudiciary's function ends with either a verdict ofacquittal, orthe revocation ofprobation, orthe final entry ofajudgment and sentence. Upon entry ofa finaljudgment and sentence ofimprisonment, legal authority overthe accusedpasses by operation oflaw to the Department of Institutions and the Board ofPrison Terms and Paroles and those agencies ofthe executive branch bear full responsibility for executing thejudgment and sentence or grantingparole
. . .. The courts have long recognizedthis division ofpowerandthe transfer of thejurisdiction overafinally 

### 5No. 31848-6-III In re PostsentenceReview of Cage
convicted felon from thejudicialto the executive branch of government. January v. Porter, 75 Wn.2d 768, 773-74, 453 P.2d 876 (1969) (emphasis added). Consistent with Porter, this court has stated, "Once sentenced, felons are underthe jurisdiction of[DOC], even ifserving time in a countyjail." State v. Law, 110 Wn. App. 36,40,38P.3d 374 (2002). More significantly, Law stated, "Under this chapter [chapter 72.66 RCW], the Secretary
... grants furloughs." Id. at 41. The structure ofWashington sentencing laws further supports our interpretation. The SRA is structured as a system ofdeterminate sentencing. State v. Shove, 113 Wn.2d 83, 776 P.2d 132 (1989). This determinate sentence is ascertained at the time of sentencing and generally is not subjectto later change. Id. at 86. The SRA permits modifications ofsentences in specific circumstances. RCW 9.94A.728. This "leaves no
room for inherent authority to be exercised by the sentencing court." State v. Murray, 118 Wn. App. 518,524, 77 P.3d 1188 (2003). The Shove court emphasizedthe importance of finality in renderedjudgments, noting that finaljudgments may be modified only in specific limited circumstances. Shove, 113 Wn.2d at 86. None ofthese specified exceptions apply here. Here, Mr. Cage had been sentencedwhen he asked for a furlough. Hisjudgment and sentence provided that on January 7, 2013, he was to begin a 13-month sentence in


### 6No. 3 1 848-6-III In re Postsentence Review of Cage
and sentenceprovided that on January 7, 2013, he was to begin a 13-month sentence in the custody ofDOC. UnderPorter andLaw, .legal authority over Mr. Cage was transferred from thejudiciaryto the executive after entry ofhisjudgment and sentence. As such, the trial court did not have the authority to grant a furlough. A sentencing court has discretion in sentencing only where the SRA so authorizes. Shove, 113 Wn.2d at 89 n.3. "When a trial court exceeds its sentencing authority under the SRA, it commits reversible error." State v. Hale, 94 Wn. App. 46, 53, 971 P.2d 88 (1999). 

### In view ofthe plain meaning ofthe statutes at issue and well-settled case law, we conclude that DOC has the exclusive authority to release prisoners for furlough, and that the trial court exceeded its authority. We reverse.
Lawrence-Berrey, J. WE CONCUR:

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