[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10327

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CEDRIC B. BOYKIN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00022-LAG-TQL-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10327

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Cedric Boykin appeals his sentence of 12 months and one 

day followed by five years’ supervised release imposed after he 

pleaded guilty to one count of failure to register as a sex offender, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). He argues that the district 

court abused its discretion in imposing polygraph testing as a 

special condition of his supervised release because it is a greater 

deprivation of liberty than necessary and is not reasonably related 

to his offense or his personal history and characteristics. After 

review, we affirm. 

I. Background 

In 2003, Boykin was convicted in a jury trial in 

Pennsylvania of involuntary deviant sexual intercourse, unlawful 

contact with a minor, statutory sexual assault, indecent assault, 

and corrupting a minor. As part of his sentence, he was required 

to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration 

and Notification Act (SORNA). He was required to update his 

registration annually and to notify Pennsylvania authorities with 

any change in residence or employment. 

Boykin was released from state custody in 2010 and 

between 2010 and 2020, he complied with the annual registration 

requirements. But in 2021, he moved from Pennsylvania to 

Georgia and failed to notify authorities or update his registration. 

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22-10327 Opinion of the Court 3

In May 2021, an anonymous source reported to local authorities 

in Georgia that they observed him peeking through the window 

of another apartment in his complex and had looked Boykin up 

online and determined that he was a sex offender. Local 

authorities determined that Boykin was a sex offender and had 

relocated to Georgia without providing the required notification 

or updating his registration, and a warrant was issued for his 

arrest. 

A grand jury charged Boykin with failing to register as a sex 

offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Boykin pleaded 

guilty. His guidelines range was 12 to 18 months’ imprisonment 

and a term of supervised release of five years to life. The United 

States Probation Office recommended several special conditions 

of supervised release, including, but not limited to, (1) that Boykin 

participate in a mental health treatment program and a sex 

offender treatment program, (2) that he not have contact with 

minors unless another adult is present; (3) that his person, home, 

vehicle, and electronic devices were subject to search; (4) that he 

submit to polygraph testing to determine if he was in compliance 

with the conditions of supervision and/or his treatment 

programs; and (5) that he comply with SORNA requirements. 

Boykin objected to the special conditions, arguing that the 

failure to register as a sex offender is not a sex offense and 

therefore the special conditions were not reasonably related to 

the offense, his history or characteristics, and involved a greater 

deprivation of liberty than is necessary to accomplish the goals of 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10327

the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He also 

noted that he previously completed a sex offender treatment 

program. As it related to polygraph testing, he argued that the 

condition did not relate to any of the relevant sentencing factors, 

was a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary, 

and was inappropriate because failing to register as a sex offender 

is not a sex offense. 

The probation office responded that:

Polygraph testing is integral to providing effective 

treatment and supervision strategies to ensure the 

defendant’s rehabilitation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(D). The Guide to Judiciary Policy, 

Volume 8, Part I, indicates criminal justice 

supervision and sex offender specific treatment 

interventions are only effective when used alongside 

polygraph testing. Polygraph examinations provide 

a continued incentive for an offender to be truthful 

with the probation officer and treatment provider. 

The results allow for an informed and effective 

treatment plan to be generated because the officer 

and provider have full knowledge of the offender’s 

problems, current and historical. The Eleventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals upheld polygraph testing as 

it “helps ensure compliance with the conditions of 

supervised release because probationers fear that 

any false denials of violations will be detected.” U.S. 

v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). 

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22-10327 Opinion of the Court 5

At sentencing, Boykin argued that sex offender treatment 

was inappropriate because failing to register as a sex offender was 

not a sex offense, and he had already completed a sex offender 

treatment program and the treatment provider had not 

recommended additional treatment. Boykin argued that the 

polygraph testing requirement was related to sex offender 

treatment, and if he did not need sex offender treatment then the 

polygraph testing requirement was inappropriate. The 

government declined to respond to Boykin’s objections, stating it

was “leav[ing] it with the Court.” 

The district court imposed a sentence of 12 months and 

one day followed by five years’ supervised release. In light of 

Boykin’s previous completion of a sex offender treatment 

program, the district court ordered that Boykin should undergo 

an assessment to determine whether additional treatment was 

appropriate, as well as an assessment to determine whether 

mental health treatment was appropriate. The district court 

concluded that the polygraph testing condition was appropriate 

“monitoring to make sure that we’re staying on the right path.” 

Boykin now appeals the sentence, challenging only the polygraph 

testing special condition of his supervised release.

II. Discussion 

Boykin argues that the polygraph testing requirement is 

greater than necessary to achieve the goals of § 3553(a) and is not 

reasonably related to his conviction for a non-sex offense or his 

history and characteristics. He maintains that there were other 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10327

conditions in place to ensure that he would comply with the 

requirements of his supervised release, such as the sex offender 

and mental health assessments—and assuming treatment was 

deemed appropriate, the probation office could work with the 

providers to ensure he was complying with the supervision 

conditions.1

“[W]e review the imposition of special conditions of 

supervised release for abuse of discretion.” United States v. 

Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation 

omitted). 

[U]nder the abuse of discretion standard of review 

there will be occasions in which we affirm the 

district court even though we would have gone the 

1 Boykin also argues for the first time on appeal that the polygraph testing 

condition is “overbroad and vague . . . and allows for arbitrary and 

discriminatory enforcement by the probation office.” “Where a defendant 

fails to clearly state the grounds for an objection in the district court, 

however, he waives the objection on appeal and we are limited to reviewing 

for plain error.” See United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). A defendant must “articulate the specific 

nature of his objection to a condition of supervised release so that the district 

court may reasonably have an opportunity to consider it.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). Because Boykin failed to make this specific argument in the district 

court, we review only for plain error. Id. Boykin fails to cite any authority 

to support his argument. Accordingly, he cannot satisfy the plain error 

standard. See United States v. Lejarde–Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 

2003) (stating that, when the explicit language of a statute or rule does not 

specifically resolve an issue, plain error cannot exist in absence of precedent 

from the Supreme Court or our Court directly resolving the issue). 

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22-10327 Opinion of the Court 7

other way had it been our call. . . . As we have 

stated previously, the abuse of discretion standard 

allows a range of choice for the district court, so 

long as that choice does not constitute a clear error 

of judgment.

United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en 

banc) (quotation omitted). Thus, “[w]e will reverse only if we 

have a definite and firm conviction that the district court 

committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it 

reached.” United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 

2009) (quotation omitted).

The district court has the discretion to order special 

conditions of supervised release that it deems appropriate

provided that the condition: “(1) is reasonably related to” the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, history and 

characteristics of the defendant, the need for adequate deterrence, 

the need to protect the public, and the need to provide the 

defendant with needed training, medical care, or correctional 

treatment in the most effective manner; “(2) involves no greater 

deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve the 

purposes of the § 3553(a) factors; and “(3) is consistent with any 

pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583; see also United States v. Zinn, 

321 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003). The weight given to any 

§ 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the discretion of the 

district court. See United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 

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(11th Cir. 2008). “[I]t is not necessary for a special condition to be 

supported by each factor enumerated in § 3553(a). Rather, each is 

an independent consideration to be weighed.” Zinn, 321 F.3d at 

1089. 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing the polygraph testing condition. This condition was 

reasonably related to Boykin’s history and characteristics and the 

nature and circumstances of his offense and promoted the goals of 

deterrence and protecting the public. Although Boykin is correct 

that the failure to register as a sex offender is not a sex offense, it 

still “has everything to do with sex” because it is his sex offender 

status that caused him to have to register in the first place. See 

United States v. Barcus, 892 F.3d 228, 236 (6th Cir. 2018); see also 

United States v. Hohag, 893 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(“SORNA exists, in part, to address the concern that, when a sex 

offender fails to register or to update his or her registry, the 

offender may have done so as part of an effort, conscious or not, 

to re-offend.”). Boykin was convicted in 2003 of several sexual 

offenses related to a minor. Although he did not have any issues 

after his release from custody in 2010, after his failure to register 

in 2021, law enforcement received an allegation that he was 

behaving inappropriately in his neighborhood. Given his criminal 

history, his recent disregard for the registration requirements and 

failure to notify authorities when he moved, and the recent 

allegation of inappropriate behavior, we cannot say that the 

district court committed a “clear error of judgment” in imposing 

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22-10327 Opinion of the Court 9

polygraph testing to ensure Boykin’s compliance with the 

conditions of his supervised release—including that he avoid 

contact with minors except in the presence of another adult. 

The fact that some of Boykin’s special conditions may be 

repetitive in that they could serve the same function of ensuring 

his compliance with the supervised release conditions does not 

establish that the district court’s decision was a clear error of 

judgment. And to the extent that Boykin argues that polygraph 

testing per se deprives him of his liberty interests, we have 

rejected that argument. United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 

1284 (11th Cir. 2003); Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1090. 

Furthermore, although we have never addressed in a 

published opinion the propriety of polygraph testing as a special 

condition for a failure-to-register conviction, we have upheld sex 

offender conditions for non-sex offenses. For example, in Moran, 

the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, and we upheld as special conditions of his supervised 

release the requirements that he participate in mental health 

treatment for sex offenders, register as a sex offender, and have 

limited contact with minors, reasoning that those conditions were 

appropriate given his prior sex offense conviction and his history 

and characteristics. 573 F.3d at 1135, 1139–40. We also note that

two of our sister circuits have upheld as reasonable polygraph 

testing conditions for a failure-to-register conviction. See Barcus, 

892 F.3d at 237; United States v. Pabon, 819 F.3d 26, 30–33 (1st 

Cir. 2016).

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Consequently, we are not left with a “definite and firm 

conviction that the district court committed a clear error of 

judgment in the conclusion it reached.” Moran, 573 F.3d at 1137

(quotation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

 

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