FILED 


JUNE 3, 2014 


In the Office of the Clerk of Court 


W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


In re Post-Sentence Review of: ) No. 31848-6-111 

) 

) 

) PUBLISHED OPINION 

SHUNDRAE CAGE. ) 

) 

LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. - The trial court granted Shundrae Cage a postsentence 

furlough for a medical emergency. The Washington State Department ofCorrections 

(DOC) filed an emergency motion to vacate the furlough, arguing that only DOC has 

authority to grant furloughs. The trial court denied the motion, concluding DOC's 

authority to grant furloughs is not exclusive. In this postsentence review, DOC contends 

the trial court lacked the authority to grant a furlough. We agree with DOC, and therefore 

reverse. 

FACTS 

Shundrae Cage was convicted ofsecond degree assault, domestic violence, and 

sentenced to 13 months of confmement in the custody ofDOC. His early release date 

was September 26,2013, and his planned release date was September 16,2013, pursuant 

to DOC's 10-day early release authority. 
No. 31848-6-111 

In re Postsentence Review ofCage 

On July 31,2013, Mr. Cage filed a motion in Spokane County Superior Court for a 

furlough under RCW 9.94A.782(2). He explained that his wife needed help with their 

other children due to serious pregnancy related complications. A note from his wife's 

doctor stated that she was experiencing pregnancy related heart and kidney issues and that 

she needed Mr. Cage to help at home with their other children. The State objected, 

stating that it had a "longstanding policy in our office of objecting to furloughs in the first 

place." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 8. 

On August 2,2013, the court granted Mr. Cage a temporary furlough to be served 

on electronic home monitoring. The order stated that the furlough was to begin at 

10:00 a.m. on August 5, 2013, and end six weeks after the birth of his child. 

As soon as DOC was aware of the furlough order, it filed an emergency motion to 

vacate it. At the August 9, 2013 hearing, it argued the trial court lacked statutory 

authority to grant a furlough, maintaining, "[ f]urloughs are allowed solely under 

RCW 72.66.012. And that statute applies to the Secretary of the Department of 

Corrections, not to the Court." RP at 16. 

The trial court denied the motion to vacate,stating that RCW 72.66.012, which 

authorizes the secretary of DOC to grant a furlough, does not prohibit a trial court from 

granting a furlough. 

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In re Postsentence Review o/Cage 

DOC filed an emergency motion for accelerated review of the furlough order and a 

motion to stay. On August 22,2013, a commissioner of this court granted the stay and 

the motions to accelerate review and supplement the record. On September 9,2013, the 

case was referred to a panel for a detennination on the merits. 

ANALYSIS 

Discretionary Review ora Moot Case. The issue before us is whether the trial 

court had the authority under the Sentencing Refonn Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A 

RCW, to grant Mr. Cage's postsentence furlough. As an initial matter, we note that Mr. 

Cage's sentence expired in September 2013. The expiration of his maximum tenn 

technically renders this case moot. "A case is moot if a court can no longer provide 

effective relief." In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373,376-77,662 P.2d 828 (1983). However, a 

court may decide an appeal that has otherwise become moot when "matters of continuing 

and substantial public interest are involved." Sorenson v. City o/Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 

547,558,496 P.2d 512 (1972). 

In evaluating whether a technically moot case merits review, courts consider '''the 

desirability of an authoritative detennination for the future guidance of public officers, 

and the likelihood of future recurrence ofthe question. '" In re Pers. Restraint 0/ 

Mattson, 166 Wn.2d 730, 736, 214 P.3d 141 (2009) (quoting Sorenson, 80 Wn.2d at 558). 

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No. 31848-6-III 

In re Postsentence Review ofCage 

" , [M]ost cases in which appellate courts utilized the exception to the mootness doctrine 

involved issues of constitutional or statutory interpretation.'" Mattson, 166 Wn.2d at 736 

(quoting In re Pers. Restraint ofMines, 146 Wn.2d 279,285,45 P.3d 535 (2002». 

Mr. Cage does not address the issue of moot ness, but DOC contends that despite 

technical mootness, we should address the merits ofthe case because the issue of a trial 

court's authority to grant a furlough for inmates is capable of repetition and is likely to 

evade review . We agree. We exercise our discretion and choose to decide whether a trial 

court has inherent authority under the SRA to grant a postsentence furlough. 

A uthority to Grant a Postsentence Furlough. This question raises an issue of 

statutory interpretation, which is a question of law, reviewed de novo. State v. Ammons, 

136 Wn.2d 453,456,963 P.2d 812 (1998). "Statutory interpretation begins with the 

statute's plain meaning." Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass 'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 

243 PJd 1283 (2010). We discern plain meaning "from the ordinary meaning ofthe 

language at issue, the context ofthe statute in which that provision is found, related 

provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572,578, 

210 P .3d 1007 (2009). Only if statutory language is ambiguous do we resort to aids of 

construction. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 PJd 201 (2007). The 

court's primary goal is to construe the statute in a manner consistent with the legislative 

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No. 31848-6-III 

In re Postsentence Review ofCage 

intent. 

Two statutes intersect here. First, RCW 9.94A.728(2) provides, "An offender may 

leave a correctional facility pursuant to an authorized furlough or leave of absence." The 

only statute that authorizes furloughs is RCW 72.66.012, which provides, "The secretary 

may grant a furlough but only if not precluded from doing so under RCW 72.66.014, 

72.66.016, 72.66.018, 72.66.024, 72.66.034, or 72.66.036." A "furlough" is defined as an 

"authorized leave of absence for an eligible resident." RCW 72.66.010(3). 

The statutory language here is not ambiguous. Viewing the interrelationship of the 

two statutory provisions and the statutory language, RCW 72.66.012 expressly applies to 

DOC and gives its secretary the discretion to grant a furlough. Trial courts are not 

mentioned. Under the plain language ofRCW 72.66.012, the sole authority to grant 

furloughs vests with DOC. 

This conclusion is supported by Washington case law. In January v. Porter, our 

Supreme Court noted that after sentencing, the court loses jurisdiction to DOC: 

The judiciary's function ends with either a verdict of acquittal, or the 

revocation ofprobation, or the final entry of a judgment and sentence. 

Upon entry of a final judgment and sentence of imprisonment, legal 

authority over the accused passes by operation of law to the Department of 

Institutions and the Board ofPrison Terms and Paroles and those agencies 

of the executive branch bear full responsibility for executing the judgment 

and sentence or granting parole . . .. The courts have long recognized this 

division ofpower and the transfer ofthe jurisdiction over afinally 

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No. 31848-6-III 

In re Postsentence Review ofCage 

convicted felon from the judicial to the executive branch ofgovernment. 

January v. Porter, 75 Wn.2d 768, 773-74, 453 P.2d 876 (1969) (emphasis added). 

Consistent with Porter, this court has stated, "Once sentenced, felons are under the 

jurisdiction of [DOC], even if serving time in a county jail." State v. Law, 110 Wn. App. 

36,40,38 P.3d 374 (2002). More significantly, Law stated, "Under this chapter [chapter 

72.66 RCW], the Secretary ... grants furloughs." Id. at 41. 

The structure of Washington sentencing laws further supports our interpretation. 

The SRA is structured as a system of determinate sentencing. State v. Shove, 113 Wn.2d 

83, 776 P.2d 132 (1989). This determinate sentence is ascertained at the time of 

sentencing and generally is not subject to later change. Id. at 86. The SRA permits 

modifications of sentences in specific circumstances. RCW 9.94A.728. This "leaves no 

room for inherent authority to be exercised by the sentencing court." State v. Murray, 118 

Wn. App. 518,524, 77 P.3d 1188 (2003). The Shove court emphasized the importance of 

finality in rendered judgments, noting that final judgments may be modified only in 

specific limited circumstances. Shove, 113 Wn.2d at 86. None of these specified 

exceptions apply here. 

Here, Mr. Cage had been sentenced when he asked for a furlough. His judgment 

and sentence provided that on January 7, 2013, he was to begin a 13-month sentence in 

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No. 3 1 848-6-III 

In re Postsentence Review ofCage 

and sentence provided that on January 7, 2013, he was to begin a 13-month sentence in 

the custody of DOC. Under Porter and Law, .legal authority over Mr. Cage was 

transferred from the judiciary to the executive after entry of his judgment and sentence. 

As such, the trial court did not have the authority to grant a furlough. A sentencing court 

has discretion in sentencing only where the SRA so authorizes. Shove, 113 Wn.2d at 89 

n.3. "When a trial court exceeds its sentencing authority under the SRA, it commits 

reversible error." State v. Hale, 94 Wn. App. 46, 53, 971 P.2d 88 (1999). 

In view of the plain meaning ofthe statutes at issue and well-settled case law, we 

conclude that DOC has the exclusive authority to release prisoners for furlough, and that 

the trial court exceeded its authority. 

We reverse. 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

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