## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

N O . P D - 0265- 07

G ER A R D O FL O R ES , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS O N A P P E L L A N T ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

FR O M TH E N I N TH C O U R T O F A PPE A LS

ANG ELI NA C OU NTY K ELL ER , P. J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C our t i n w hi c h M E YE RS , W OMACK , K EASLE R , and H ERVEY , J J ., jo in e d . C OCHR AN , J. , f i l ed a concurri ng opi ni on i n w hi c h J OHNS ON , J ., jo in e d . P RI CE , and H OL C OM B , J J ., c onc ur r e d. O P I N I O N Appellant wa s convicted of murdering his preg nant g irlfriend’ s twin fetuses by stepping on her a bdomen, thoug h he maintains that she a lso took measure s to cause the deaths. Appellant ra ises thr e e c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e s t o th e c a pit a l murd e r s ta tut e . We ho ld t hat th e statut e is c on sti tut ion a l. I n addition, appellant conte nds that the court of appea ls erre d in ruling that he was not entitled to a jury instruction on the l esser -included offense of deadly conduct. W e dis ag ree . Thus, we sha ll affirm the cour t of appe als.F LORES – 2

On the other

hand, Dr. J ohnson also testified that Ms. Ba soria re fused to have the fe tuses 1 te ste d f or the ir ri sk of me dic a l c on dit ion s su c h a s D ow n’ s sy nd ro me b ecaus e sh e wa s o pp os e d to abortion. I. BACKG ROUND Appellant and his g irlfriend Erica Basor ia, ag ed 18 and 16 r espec tively , had bee n dating for

over a y ear when Ms. B asoria disc overe d sometime in Feb ruar y 2004 that she wa s preg nant. An ult ra so un d late r s ho we d th a t sh e wa s carr y ing tw ins

. At an Apr il 30 ap po intme nt, Ms. B a so ri a tol d her doc tor, J err

y J ohnson, that she was c onsidering an abor tion. Dr. J ohnson informed he r that the 1 preg nancy

was at such a late stag e that he c ould not perfor m an abor

tion safely

and that no loca l ph y sic ians pe rf

or me d a bo rt ion s. Acc ording to Ms. Basor ia’s testimony , she aske d appellant to hel p her te rminate the preg nancy

by steppin g o n h er ab d omen. He did so on two oc casions: two wee ks and one w eek befor e the pr emature delivery . She had to ask him repe atedly befor e he a g ree d to step on her. Acc ording to a

ppellant’s statement to the police, he used a “ slow, steady press” on her a

bdomen, and stopped pressingonce she asked him to stop. Ms. Ba soria also testified that she took measure s to induce the de aths of the f etuses. She struck her self in the abdome n more than te n times. She beg an eng ag ing in this behavior two wee ks b e f o r e t h e p r e m a tu r e d e l i v e r

y; b y t h e l a s t w e e k o f h e r p r e g n an c y, s h e w a s s t r i k i n g h e r s e l f e v e r y d a y. After Dr. Johnson i nstructed he r to r efr ain from jogg ing and g oing on w alks, she took up jog g ing a nd failed to limit her walking , in a deliberate attempt to endang er the preg nancy . Ms. Ba soria fur ther testified that she ha d violated her doctor’s instruc tions to take pr enata l vitamins, t houg h her me dical

rec ords showed that she had re ported takingthem. On May 7, Ms. B a so ri a

—th e n a pp ro xima te ly

20 to 2 2 w e e ks pr e g na nt— prem atur e lyF LORES – 3

T EX . P EN . C ODE §§ 19.02(b)( 1), 19.03. 2 For example, Dr. Steven Pulsinik, appellant’s expert witness, testified that a ny o f th e s e thr ee 3 mi g h t h a v e b e e n t h e c a

u s e . O n t h e o t h e r h an d , o n e o f t h e S t a t e ’ s e xp e rt w i t n e s s e s n o t e d th a t it is controve rsial in the medica l community whether a g enetic a

bnormality poses a signific ant risk to a preg nancy . Dr. Tommy

J . Br own, who perf

ormed the autopsies, testified that if a f oot were presse d on a pre g nant women’ s abdomen and she were striking herself i n the abdomen, the deaths could be cause d by either one , dependingon which wa s exerting more forc e. Dr. Johnson testified about the nurses’ and his own obs ervations of Ms

. Ba soria on the day 4 s h e w a s a d m i t t e d

t o t h e h o s p i t a l a f

t e r t h e p r e m a tu r e d e l i v e r

y: Q: What w a s th e nurs e s’ re po rt to you a bo ut t his ? A: They were quite shocke d beca use she ha d a ver

y signific ant amount of delivere d the twins at home

. They wer e still born. Acc ording to the doctor who con d u ct ed t he autopsies, the ca

use of the de aths appe are d to be some sort of “blunt forc e tra uma” that ha d occur

red sometime betwee n May

4 and May 6. The twins had be en dea d in utero for at least one day

befor e they wer e deliver ed. Appellant wa s indicted for capital m urder and murder for intentionally or knowing ly

causing the deaths of “unborn child #1” and “unborn child #2.” Appellant pled not g uilty and filed a

pretria l 2 motion to di smiss t he indictment on the g round s o f d u e proc ess, equa l protection, and the Establishment Clause. The trial c ourt denied the motion, and appellant wa s tried by a jury

. At tr ia l, e xpe rt wi tne sse s te sti fi e d th a t e ith e r a pr e g na nt w oma n s tr iki nghe rs e lf

re pe a te dly or anothe r per son stepping on a preg nant woman’ s a

bdomen could ter

minate a pr eg nancy . There was

no c on se ns us a mon g the wi tne sse s o n w he the r t he str iki ng , th e ste pp ing , o r s o m e g e n e t i c a bn or ma lity

c a us e d th e de a ths

. 3 Dr. Johnson and others who obser ved Ms. B asoria shor

tly afte r the pre matu re de livery ob se rv e d b ru ise s o n h e r u pp e r a rm s, a “sm all ” bruise on

he r f a c e , a nd “ a lin e of purp lis h b ru ise s” roug hly three inches long acr oss her a bdomen. When asked a

bout the bruises, Ms. Ba soria testified 4F LORES – 4

fre sh bruising ove r her

abdomen, f

ace , arm; that she wa s pretty beat up. Q: Okay

. A n d

y o u r

— b a s e d o ny o u r o b s e r v a ti o n s o f

M s . B a s o r ia , what conclusions did y ou come to? A: Well, my

conclusion w as t hat she ha d suffe red a signific ant amount of tr a uma . I t di d n ot a

pp e ar t o b e a

c ar w re c k o r any

thi ng lik e that. S he did

no t e lic it who or what had done a

ny of the bruising or dama g e to her or her babies. Q: Whe n y ou

say “ br uis ing and

dama g e ,” wh a t—c an y ou de sc ri be wh a t it

is y ou saw? A: Reading from my

admission note under the he ading , Ex amination: There was bruising o v er t h e right che ek bone. H er lip wa s cra cked. T here was blood appar ent on both lips. The lips were sw ollen, but I did not see any lace rations or a

ny tear s in the lips. Both uppe r ar

ms had bruising which, in my opinion, appear ed to be c onsistent wi th inj ur ie s f

ro m a fi ng e r g ra sp aro un d th e arm . G e ne ra lly y ou ’l l se e on e c ir c le that’s dar kly bruised a n d t h en a clear are a that’s not involved. And e ach f inge r will—the person wa s g rabbe d with will cause a bruise. And that’s very char acte ristic. That wa s prese nt on both upper ar ms. Her back a nd buttocks had no evidenc e of any trauma. The lef t brea st had an old br u is e . T h e r e w a s n o n e w b r u is in g e v id e n c e o n th e le f t b r e a s t. M o s t o f

her bruising w as over

the abdomen a

nd it was around the level of the umbilicus, or the belly button, from . . . side to side g oing a ll the way acr oss the abdomen. And that would be—r emember , she wa s postpart u m . S he had a lrea dy d el i v er ed

—t h e s i z e o f t h e u t er

u s wo u l d b e— t h at wo u l d

b e ab o u tt h e b i gges tb u l ge in where her stomac h would be while the ba bies wer e inside. L eg s and fe et had no . . . evidenc e of tra uma. Ther e wa s no evidenc e of a ny kind of perine al or sexual assault pre sent.
She maintained that he ha d never hit her bef

ore the n and that he was not phy sically abusive 5 toward he r. that a pp e lla nt s tr uc k h e r i n th e fa c e on

the nig ht o f M ay

6, c a us ingthe br

uis e the re . She a lso

5 te sti fi e d th a t th e br

uis e s o n h e r a

rm s r e su lte d w he n s he and a pp e lla nt w e re e ng a g ingin c on se ns ua l, play ful roug hhousing. D r. Stephen Pustilnik, appellant’s expert witness, testified that the bruise on her a bdomen appe are d to be “much more consistent” with the pre g nant woman striking herse lf than with a foot beingpresse d down on the abdome n. Acc ording to appellant’s state ment to the police and Ms. B asoria’ s trial testimony , he st epped above her nave l, where as the bruise s on her a bdomenF LORES – 5

T EX . P EN . C ODE §§ 1.07(a) (26), 1.07( a)( 38), 19.03(a )(8)

. 6 Roe v . W

ade , 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 7 we re be low h er nav el. L ike wi se , M s. B a so ri a te sti fi e d th a t sh e and

no t a pp e lla nt c a us e d th os e br uis e s. To support the theory that Ms. Ba soria wanted t o have the children and was be ing a bused by

a pp e lla nt, the State pr e se nte d an e xpe rt wi tne ss wh o tes tif ie d ab ou t th e dy

namic s th a t are ty

pic a lly prese nt i n an ab u s i v e relationship. He observed that, if the abuser is arre sted or cha

rg ed with a crime, the abused vic tim will commonly defe nd the abuse r, such as by reque sting that the cha rg es be droppe d or re fusi n g t o t es t ify ag ainst him. The State also attempted to impeac h Ms. Ba soria’s

cre dibilit y

by prese nting testimony

of a te ache r who testified that Ms. Basoria showed he r the ultrasound picture s and appe are d happy and excited about the pr ospect of ha ving c hildren. The trial c ourt submitted ju ry instructions on capital murder , injury to a child, and manslaug ht er , but denied appe llant’s reque st for an instruc tion on deadly conduct. The jury convicted a

ppellant of c apital murder and sente nced him to life in prison. On direc t appea l, appellant ra ised constitutional c halleng es to the statute under w hich he wa s ind ic te d a nd a rgue d th a t th e tr ial cou rt e rr e d in de nyinghis re qu e st f

or a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e instruction. The cour

t of appe als aff

irmed his conviction. II. AN AL YSI S A. Due P r oc e ss I n his f irst g round, Appellant argues that the statute is unc onstitut ional beca use it a llows the State to prosecute him for ki lling an “ unborn child.” Appellant cla ims that the statute thus 6 contravenes th e re s trictions announce d in Roe v . W ade and subseque nt abortion dec isions of the 7F LORES – 6

__ S.W .3d __ (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2007). 8 See T EX . P EN . C ODE § 19 .0 6. B e c a us e a pp e lla nt do e s no t sp e c if

y wh e the r this grou nd is 9 under the state or f

eder al constitution, we will address the c laim only under the U.S. Consti tution. See Blac k v . S tat e , 2 6 SW3 d 8 95 , 8 96 n. 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ) ( ho ldi ngthat th e c ourt sh ou ld addre ss only

the federa l constitutional claim i f appe llant offer s no rea son for c onstruing the para llel state constitutional provision as confe rringg reater prote ction). We a re awa re of no other case from any jurisdiction in which a cr iminal defenda nt who has 10 been c onvicted of killing an unborn vic tim challeng es the c onviction on the g rounds that the victim’s mot he r w a s c omp lic it i n th e kil lin g . N o s uc h c a se ha s bee n cit e d in the br ie fs or the c ourt of a pp e a ls opinion. U n it e d St a te s Su

p r e me Co u rt b y

p r o te c ti n g th e li f

e o f a f e tu s b e f o r e th e point of v ia

b il it y . We

rec ently reje cted this claim in Lawr e nc e v . S tat e , and we rea ffirm that holding today

. 8 Ap pe lla nt a lso argue s in

his br ie f t

hat th e statut e is unc on sti tut ion a lly ov e rb ro a d. B e c a us e appellant did not ra ise this argument in his petition for discretionary revie w, i t is not properly befor e us. We overrule appellant’ s first g round for revie w. B. Eq ual Pr otec tion I n his second g round, appe llant argues that the s t at u t e’ s exception for pre g nant women te rm inatin g the ir

ow n p re g na

nc ie s v iol a te s e qu a l pr ote c tio n in thi s c a se by e xemp tin g Ms. B a so ri a from cr iminal prosecution while allowinghim to be pro s ec u t ed

. This argument depends on the 9

unus ua l fa c ts of thi s ca se . B e c a us e Ms. B a so ri a

wa s c oo pe ratin g wi th a

pp e lla nt’ s atte mpt s to kil l 10 the fe tus e s, he argue s, the statut e tr e a te d th e tw o o f t he m di ff e re ntl y e ve n th ou g h th e y

we re bo th eng ag ing in the sa

me behavior. Both we re attempting to cause the deaths, y et only appellant a

nd not Ms. Ba soria could be p rosec uted under the statute, bec ause she was the pr eg nant woman c arr y ing the vic tim s. I n a dv anc ingthi s argume nt, a pp e lla nt ig no re s si g nif

ic ant e vid e nc e that Ms . B a so ri a did no t,F LORES – 7

Th e jur y did no t ma ke a fi nd ingon

c on se nt. 11 We e xpre ss n o o pin ion

tod ay a s to tho se un de rl y ingme ri ts. 12 in f act, consent to a

ppellant’s stepping on her abdomen. She had bruises on he r abdome n, arms, and fac e, and he r lips w ere swollen and bloody

. Appellant admitted to hitting her in the fac e but ar g ues that the other br

uises had innocen t ex p l an at ions—namely , that the bruises on he r abdome n wer e

cause d by her striking herse lf, and the br uises on her a

rms resulted f

rom consensua l roug hhousing be tw e e n th e tw o. Ne ve rt

he le ss, a jur y c ou ld re a so na

bly c re dit the sim

ple r expl anatio n o f t

he br uis e s: that a ll o f t

he m—n ot j us t th e on e on he r fa c e —r e su lte d f ro m a bu siv e a c ts b y

a pp e lla nt. Th e State supported this i n fe renc e throug h testimony on the g ener al tendenc y of the victim in an abusive relationship to try to pr otect the a buser f rom being criminally

prosec uted and c onvicted. F inally , the State pr e se nte d e vid e nc e tha t Ms . B a so ri a

se e me d to be loo kin g fo rw ard to c arry in g t he tw ins to te rm . A rea sonable jury could conclude from the above evidenc e that appellant’ s acts of stepping on her a bdomen wer e simply

abusive rather than pa

rt of a pla n to which she ha d ag ree d. Given that appellant’ s acts mig ht not ha ve been c onsensual, the ve ry predic ate f

or appe llant’s equal pr otection claim—t h at both he and Ms. B asoria w ere eng ag ing in the sa me behavior—nee d not have be en found to be true by

a rational trier of f

act. Only

if the ac ts were consensua l could appellant a rg ue 11 that the statute trea

ted him and Ms. Ba soria unequally by allowing the S tate to prosecute appe llant but not Ms. Basoria

for the sa me ac ts. I n short, appellant soug ht a pre trial dismissal of the prosec ution based on a c laim that, even if it ha d been corr ect on the underlying merits, could have been resolved only by evidenc e adduc ed

a t tr ia l. Th a t is no t th e purp os e of a pr e tr ia l mo tio n s uch as a mo tion t o q ua shthe ind ic tme nt; 12F LORES – 8

W oo ds v . S tat e , 153 S.W .3d 413, 415 (2005). 13 Th e c on c ur

ri ng op ini on ma int a ins that ra isi ng the iss ue a t tria l se rv e s li ttl e purp os e be c a us e 14 t h e t r i a l c o u rt c o u l d h a v e d o n e n o t h i n g m o r e o r l e s s t h an an a p p e l l a t e c o u rt
. O n t h e c o n t r a r y, re qu ir inga

pp e lla nt t o h a ve ra ise d th e iss ue a t tr ia l se rv e s tw o im po rt ant p ur

po se s. F ir st, tim e ly raising the issue would have g iven the trial c ourt a c hance to rule on it, potentially avoiding the nee d to burden the court sy stem with appea ls. Se e Y ou ng v . S tat e , 826 S.W .2d 141, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (Campbell, J ., dissenting) (“[I ]f the issue had been timely raised in the tr ial court, it could have been r esolved ther e, and the parties a nd the public woul d have be en spar ed the e x pense of an appea l.”). Se c on d, a tr ia l c ourt is mor e c a

pa ble of a dd re ssi ng a fa c t- bo un d cla im tha n a n a pp e llate c ourt
. The c oncurr ing opinion itself examines the facts of t his case a nd conclude s that it is unclear whe ther appe l l an t wa s acting in conce rt with Ms. Basor ia or a busing he r. This question would have be en more usef

ully addre ssed by

the jury based on its assessment of witnes s cr ed i b i l i t y

and the like. B e c a us e a pp e lla nt r a ise d th e iss ue on ly be fo re tr ia l and on a pp e a l, t he jur y ne ve r h a d th e op po rt

un ity to m a ke su c h a fi nd ing . E ve n if we we re to a g re e wi th a

pp e lla nt t hat th e Eq

ua l Pr ote c tio n Cl a

us e b ar s a p r o s e c u t i o no f

o n e w h o a c t s i nc o n c e rtw i t h a p r e g n an tw o m ant o t e r

m i n a t e h e r

p r e g n a n c y, the a pp ro pr ia te re me dy wo uld no t be dis mis sa l of the ind ic tme nt, a s the c on c ur re nc e a sse rt s, bu t a new tria l in which the jury could be instructed on the question of Ms. B asoria’ s consent. Appellant waived this re medy

by neg lecting to raise the issue at trial. I n light of the se consider ations, we should not overturn the well-e stablished require ment that appellant must prese rve an “as a pplied” constitutional challeng e by raising it at trial. T EX . R. A PP . P R OC . 3 3. 1; see, e .g. , Cur ry v . S tat e , 9 1 0 S

. W

. 2 d

4 9 0 , 4 9 6 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 5 )( ci t i n g Garcia v. Sta te , 887 S.W .2d 846, 861 (1994)) (holding that an “a s applied” due proce ss ch alleng e is not prese rved f

or appe al if appe llant did not raise a “ specific , timely objection” at trial). T EX . P EN . C ODE § 1.07(a) (26). 15 rathe r, i ts pur

p o s e is to a d dr e s s “ th o s e is s u e s th a t c anb e d e te r mi n e d b e f o r e th e r e is a

tr ia l o nthe g e ne ra l is su e of

the c a se .” Ap pe lla

nt’ s equ a l pro te c tio n ar g ume nt, ba se d o n h is a lle g a tio n th a t Ms

. 13 Ba soria conse nted to the ac ts for which he was being pr osecute d, did not present such a n issue. 14 Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls thu s d id n ot e rr

in a ffirmingthe tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on to d e ny the mot ion

to quash the indictment on this gr ound. We overrule appellant’ s second g round for revie w. C. Est abl ishm e nt Cl aus e I n his thi rd g round, appe llant argues that the provision def ining a n “individual” to include an “u n b o rn chil d” violates the Establishment Clause of the U .S. Const itution by adopting “a 15F LORES – 9

Le m o n v. Kurtzman , 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), c ite d in Ho lbe rg v . S tat e , 38 S.W .3d 16 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Harris v. McR ae , 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (“ Although ne ither a State nor the Fe dera l 17 Gover nment can c onstitut ionally pass laws whic h aid one r elig ion, aid all relig ions, o r p ref er one re lig ion ov e r a no the r, it doe s not fo llo w t hat a statut e vio la te s th e Es ta

bli sh me nt C la

us e be c a us e it happens to c oincide or ha rmonize with the tenets of some or a ll relig ions.” (citations om i t ted)); Ho lbe rg v . S tat e , 38 S.W .3d 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)(“[T]he me re fac t that the statutes are consistent with the tenets of a p ar t i cu l ar faith does not rende r the statutes in violation of the Establishment Clause.”). See M cRae , 448 U.S. at 319. 18 relig ious point of view over a secula r one.” To deter mine whether

a statute violates the E stablishment Cl ause, this Court has a pplied the thr e e -p ro ngte st f

ro m Lemon v. Kurtzman : Fir s t, the statute must have a se cular leg islative purpose; sec ond, its principal or primary eff ect must be one that neit h er ad v an ces nor inhibits relig ion; finally , the statute must not foster an e x cessive g overnme nt entang lement with relig ion. 16 Me re c on sis te nc y be tw e e n a st a tut e and re lig iou s te ne ts, ho we ve r, do e s n ot r e nd e r a statut e unconstitutional. Otherw ise, no law a g ainst the ft o r m u rd er c ould pass constitutional must er, 17 be c a us e tho se laws are c on sis te nt w ithre lig iou s st ri c tur e s su c h a s th e Te n Co mma ndme nts
. 18 Ap pe lla nt h a s n ot m e t hi s b ur de n to ov e rr ide the pr e su m p t i o n t h a t the statut e is c on sti tut ion a l. Hi s argume nt t

hat th e statut e ha s n o s e c ula r p urpo se is b a se d o n th e fa ult y a ssumpt ion

that on ly relig ious views could motivate the leg islature to pr otect a fetus from being killed. Whil e some may ind e e d v ie w a

fe tus a s a

human b e ingou t of

re lig iou s c on vic tio ns , othe rs may re a c h th e same conclusion throug h secula r reasoning or m oral int uition unconnec ted t o relig ion. Moreove r, eve n tho se wh o d o no t vie w the fe tus its e lf a s a pe rs on may sti ll wa nt to pr ote c t fe ta l lif

e sim ply be c a us eF LORES – 10

See R oe , 410 U.S. at 150 (“L og ically , of course, a leg itimate state intere st in thi s are a nee d 19 not stand or fall on acc eptanc e of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth. I n assessing the S tate’s interest, rec og nition may be given to the less rig id claim that as long as at lea st potential life is involved, the State may asser t interests bey ond the protec tion of the pre g nant woman a lone.”)

. Fl or es v . S

tat e , 2 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d

5 2 0 (T ex . Ap p . - B ea u m o n t2 0 0 7 )( ci t i n g Sta dt v . S tat e , 182 20 S.W .3d 360, 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Ro us se au v . S

tat e , 8 5 5 S

. W

. 2 d 6 6 6 , 6 7 2 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 3 )( ci t i n g Ro y ste r v. S tat e , 21 622 S.W .2d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)(opinion on rehe aring )). Rosseau , 8 5 5 S

. W

. 2 d

at 6 7 2 (c i t i n g Royster , 622 S.W .2d 442). 22 it r e pr e se nts po te nti al human life. 19 Ap p l i ca n th as s i m i l ar l y

fa i l edt o s h o w t h at th e s t atu t e v i o l at es ei t h er o f t h e r em ai n i n g p ro n gs of the Lemon te st. He state s in the a bs tr a c t th a t th e statut e ’s e ff e c t is to a dv anc e re lig ion , b ut h e fa ils to s pe c if y ho w i t is that th e statut e do e s so . F ina lly , the statut e do e s no t e nta ng le g ov e rnme nt w ith relig ion mere ly

by evincinga re spect for

feta l life that might find a pproval among ma

ny relig ious adher ents. For

these re asons, we ove rrule a ppellant’s third g round for revie w. D. Le sse r -I nc lude d Offe nse I n his fourth g round, appe llant contends that the trial court erre d in ref using to charg e the jury on the lesser -included of

fense of dea dly

conduct. The court of appea ls held t hat no er ror oc curr ed beca use there was no e vidence that appellant “ failed to pe rce ive the risk involved in his conduct.” 20 A def endant is entitled to a jury char g e on a le sser-inc luded offe nse if two re quirements ar e

me t. F ir s t, th e d e f

e n d an t m u s t r e qu e s t a

nin s tr u c ti o no na

le s s e r - in c lu d e d

o f f e n s e o f th e c h a r g ed offe nse under

Article 37.09 of

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e. S ec o n d , there must be 21 “some e vidence ” that, if the de fenda nt is g uilty , he is g uilty

only of the lesse r-include d offe nse. 22 Unlike the sec ond step, the first step in this analy sis is a pure question of law a nd does not depe ndF LORES – 11

Ha ll v . S tat e , 225 S.W .3d 524, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 23 J ac k so n v . S tat e , 99 2 S.W. 2d 46 9, 47 4- 75 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Tho ma s v. S tat e , 699 24 S.W .2d 845, 845-52 (Te x . Crim. App. 1985). 992 S.W . 2d at 471, 474. 25 Id. at 475. 26 Id. 27 699 S.W .2d 845. 28 Id. at 847. 29 on e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l. 23 A def endant doe s not satisfy

the sec ond prong of the Royster/Rousseau test if the re is evidenc e that he c ommitt ed an off ense that is a lesser- included of the char g ed off ense but g reater than the re quested lesse r-include d offe nse. Fo r i n s tance , in J ac k so n v . S tat e , the def

endant wa s 24 char g ed with ca

pital murder a

nd reque sted a jury

char g e on the lesse r-include d offe nse of a g g ravated assault by rec klessly causing serious bodi ly injury

. The e vidence clea rly showed that the de fenda

nt 25 had ca used not mere ly

serious bodily injury but de ath; the only pertinent fa ctual dispute wa s whether he had a cted r eckle ssly

or intentionally

. Noting that he might have been entit led to an instruction 26 on the lesser -included of

fense of manslaug hter ba sed on the e vidence th a t h e r e c k lessly

cause d de ath , we he ld that he was not entitled to a n instruction on a g g ravated assault for rec klessly

causingmere

s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y. 27 The same principle c ompelled our holding in Tho ma s v . S tat e . Ha vin g be e n ch arg e d w ith 28 murder, the defe ndant in that case prese nted evidenc e of rec klessness that might have supported an instruction on the l esser -included offense of i nvoluntary manslaug hter. Yet the de fenda nt instead 29 reque sted an instruction on the other lesser- included off

ense of crimin a ll y

n e g li g ent homicide, whichF LORES – 12

Id. at 849. 30 Id. at 852. 31 Jack son , 992 S.W . 2d at 475. 32 Gu zm an v . S tat e , 188 S.W .3d 185, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 33 See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 37.09(4) (“A n offe nse is a lesser included off

ense if . . . 34 it consists of an attempt to commit the offense char g ed or a n otherwise inc luded offe nse.”)

. differ s from involuntary manslaug hter only in r equiring a neg lige nt r ather than rec kless m ental state. We held that the def endant wa s not entitled to the requeste d instruction beca use the e vidence 30 relied on raised not mere neg lige nce but r eckle ssness. The a naly ses in Tho ma s and Jack son make 31 clea r that a de fenda

nt is not entit led to a jury

instruction on a

lesser- included off

ense if the evidenc e on which the defenda

nt is rely ing r aises anothe r off ense that “lies betwe en” the reque sted and

c ha rg e d o ff e ns e s. 32 Apply ing the first prongof the Royster/Rousseau test to this case, w e mu s t d e te rmine whe ther the of fe ns e fo r w hic h a

pp e lla nt r e qu e ste d a

n ins tr uc tio n, de a dly c on du c t, i s a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of the char g ed offe nse, capital murder. We ha ve held that deadly conduct is a l es s er -i n cluded offe nse of attempted murder. Attempted m urder is a lesser- included off

ense of capital murde r. 33 34 There fore , deadly

conduct is a le sser-inc luded offe nse of c apital murder

. In a d d i t i o n t o b e i n g c o n s i s t e n tw i t h o u r c a s e l aw , t h i s c o n c l u s i o ni s s u p p o rt e d b y a

c omp ari so n o f t

he e le me nts of the tw o off e ns e s. De a dly

c on du c t di ff

e rs fr om c a

pit a l murd e r i n b oth its culpable mental state and its re sult. For eac h of these e lements, the off ense of deadly conduct would be “e stablished by proof of the same or

less than all the fa cts require d to establish the commission o f” capital murde r, thus constituting a le sser-inc luded offe nse under Article 37.09 ofF LORES – 13

Id. art. 37.09(1)

. 35 T EX . P EN . C ODE § 6.02(d). 36 Id. § 6.02(e)

. 37 Id. § 22.05(a)

. 38 Id. § 19.02(b)( 1). 39 Stadt , 182 S.W .3d at 363. 40 the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e. 35 First, dea dly

conduct r equire s a re ckless mental s t at e, wherea s capital murde r re quires knowledg e or intent. I ntent is a highe r deg ree of culpa bility than re cklessness. The Te x as Penal 36 Code states, “P ro o f o f a h ighe r deg ree of culpa bility than that cha

rg ed constitutes proof of the

c ulp a bil ity c ha rg e d. ” Th e re fo re , p ro of of int e nt wo uld , as a ma tte r of law, e sta bli shre c kle ssn e ss 37

a s w e ll. Second, the r esult require d for de adly conduct is “pla c[ing] another in imminent dang er of serious bodily

injury ,” wher eas the result re quired for capital murde r is “ca

us[i ng ] t he death of an 38 individual.” Any

proof that would have esta blished that appellant ha d cause d the deaths of the 39 fetuses w ould have a lso established, a fo rti or i , that he had pla ced them in immi nent dang er of serious bodily

injury . Be cause a c o m p ar i s on of the e lements of the two of fense s, as well as our

case law, demonstrates that deadly conduct is a lesser-inc luded offe nse of c apital murder , appellant has satisfied the f

irst of the two prong s of the Royster/Rousseau test. The ne x t ste p in this analy sis is t o deter mine whether

there is some evidence that, if appe llant is guilty , he is g uilty

only of dea dly

conduct, a

nd not capital mur d er . Appellant ar g ues that he 40

me e ts this re qu ir e me nt b e c a us e the re wa s e vid e nc e that he did no t c a us e the tw ins ’ d e a ths

.F LORES – 14

Dea dly conduct is a le sser-inc luded offe nse of attempted murder, see G uzman , 188 S.W .3d 41 at 190, which is, in turn, a lesser- included offe nse of c apital murder , see T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt
. 37.09(1), ( 4). Appe llant did not request a jury instruction on attempted murder

. Appellant is corr ect that ther e was some evidenc e that the de aths wer e ac tually cause d by their own mother. Ms. B asoria testified that she repe atedly struck herse lf in the abdomen, a nd expert witnesses testified that these blows might have cause d the deaths. Moreover , the autopsy showing that the ca

use of de aths occ urre d one t o three day s befor e the pr emature delivery supported the defe nse’s theor

y that the deaths wer e caused by her striking her self (w hich she c laimed to have done

ever y day during the last wee k of the pre g nancy ) rather than by h i s stepping on her ( which she claimed he last did one wee k befor e the pr emature d el i v er y ). Also, there w as testimony that the deaths c ould have be en ca used by a g enetic dise ase. This evidence co u l d have c onvinced a rational jury

that appellant did not ca

use the de aths b u t m e r e l y i n t e n d e d t o d o s o . Y e t a p p e l l an t h a s n o t p r e s e n t e d an y e v i d e n c e t h a t h e a c te d me re ly

re c kle ssl y ra the r t han in ten ti on a lly . Ind e e d, a pp e lla nt’ s o wn state me nt t o th e po lic e and Ms. Ba soria’s testimony

indicate that he committed the acts in question in a conscious attempt to end the lives of the fe tuses. By

marshalingevidenc e that he mig ht not have caus ed t h e deaths, without disputing the e vidence that he acte d intentionally , appellant might have raised, and been e ntitled to,

ani n s t r u c t i o n o n a no f

f e n s e t h a tl i e s b e t w e e nt h e r e qu e s t e d an d c h ar g e d o f f e n s e s

— n a m e l y,

a tte mpt e d mu

rd e r. Deadly

c on du c t di ff

e rs fr om a

tte mpt e d mu

rd e r o nly in r e qu ir inga

re c kle ss 41 rathe r than intentional m ental st ate. Be cause appellant has prese nted no evidenc e that his ac ts were

rec kless rathe r than intentional, there is no evidence raising deadly conduct. W h i le appe llant has satisfied the f irst prong of the Royster/Rousseau t e s t , h e h a s f a ile d to

satis fy the se c on d p ro ng be c a

us e he ha s no t pr e se nte d so me e vid e nc e that, if he is guil ty , h e is guil tyF LORES – 15

on ly of the re qu e ste d le sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e of de a dly c on du c t. A

pp e lla nt w a s thus no t e nti tle d to an instruction on dea dly

conduct. I n light of this ana ly sis, we conclude t hat t he court of appeals di d not err in holding that the tr ia l c ourt did no t er r in re fu sin g to i ns tr

uc t th e jur y on de a dly c on du c t. C on se qu e ntl y , w e ov e rr ule appellant’ s fourth g round for revie w. III . C ON CL USI ON We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls. Filed: F ebrua

ry 13, 2008 Publis h