-1- NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0423n.06 F iled: July 16, 2008 No. 07-5549 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
STE P HEN MANN, P laintif f-App ellant,
v. MICHAEL HEL MIG , in h is capacity as Sherif f of Boone Coun ty. Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) O N A P P E A L F R O M T H E U N I T ED STA TES DI STR IC T C OU RT F OR THE EA S TE RN D IS TR IC T O F K EN TU CKY

Before: M ARTIN, G IBBO NS, and GRIF F IN, Circ uit Jud ges. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appe llant Stephen M ann appeals the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt to defe ndant-a

ppellee Mic hael He lmig, Sheriff of B oone County . Mann ar g ues that the district cour t erre d in gr anting Helmig’s m o t i o n for summary ju d gm ent on Mann’s § 1983 c laims and denying Ma nn’s motion for summary judgme nt. For the following rea sons, we af

firm the district cour

t’s decision. I. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt re c ounte d the un dis pu te d fa c ts und e rl y ing Ma nn ’s § 198 3 c la im a s f

oll ow s: Plaintiff Stephen M ann ("Mann" ) i s a resident of B urling ton, Kentucky . On or a bout Dec ember

1, 1999, the Kenton County District Court entere d a Domestic V iolence O r d e r ( " D V O " ) a g a i n s tM an nb a s e d o na p e t i t i o nf

i l e d b y M an n ' s s i s t e r , G l a dys-2-

Wagne r. (Exh. 1, Def. M S J ) Among other thing s, the DVO r estraine d Mann fr om p u r c h a s i n g , o w n i n g , o r

p o s s e s s i n g f

i r e ar m s . ( E xh
. 2 , D e f

. M S J) At Wa g n e r ' s r e qu e s t, th e K e n to nCo u n ty D is tr ic t C o u rt e xte n d e d

th e D V O s e v e r al times. I n 2002, Mann petitioned the c ou rt t o am end the DVO to lift the firea rm re str ic tio ns on the g ro un ds that he and Wagne r w e re no t " int imate pa rt ne rs " wi thi n the meaningof 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ). On No ve mbe r 6 , 2 00 2, the Ke nto n Co un ty c ourt is sued

an o pin ion

statin g that it " may ," de pe nd ing on th e re la tio ns hip of the pa rt ie s, be a

vio la tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 9 2 2 ( g ) f o r M an n t o p o s s e s s f

i r e ar m s w h i l e s u

b j e c t t o a D V O
. ( E xh
. 4 , D e f
. M S J) The c ourt furthe r stated that it would "issue a new order of protec tion incorporating the appr opriate state men t o f t h e law into its order and extending the order

for one additional y ear ." ( I d.) The c ourt then ente red a n Amend ed DVO whic h stated: " Pur su ant to 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( g )( 8) , it m ay be a fede ral viol ation to purcha se, re ceive o r p o s s e s s a f i r e ar m o r a m m u n i t i o nw h i l e s u

b j e c tt o t h i s o r d e r . " ( E xh
. 5 , D e f
. M S J) (empha sis added) On Dec ember

1, 2003, the Amende d DVO bearing the s ame langua g e wa s ext ended t h r o u g h D e c e mb e r

1 , 2 0 0 5
. ( E xh
. 6 , D e f

. M S J) On May 16 , 2 00 5, wh ile the Am e nd e d D VO wa s stil l in effect, th e B oo ne County Sheriff' s Depa

rtment rec eived a

call re porting g unshots at [ Mann’s] residenc e. De pu ty Chr is C omb s r e sp on de d to the c a ll. Deputy Combs arrived at [ Mann’s] house and a pproac hed the f

ron t d o o r. [Mann] opened the door and let Combs into the house. Combs tol d [Mann] he had r ece ived a " shots fired" call and a sked if [Mann] was the s o u rc e o f the shots. [Mann] stated t h at h e h adb ee ns h o o t i n g at a t ar get i n h i s b ac ky ar d
. [ M an n ] t h en l edC o mb s t h ro u gh the kitchen, out the ba ck d o o r an d onto the porch, w here he showe d Combs three ri fl e s si tti ng on his pic nic ta ble . Comb s thank e d [Mann] for his c oo pe ra tio n an d le ft
. When he re turned to his car , Deputy Combs rece ived a messag e that the per son who had made the " shots fired" call wa nted t o talk with him. That person was Mar k Mann, [Mann’s] brother, w ho lived next door. Deputy Combs drove next d o o r, where he was a pproac hed by

Mark Ma

nn' s wife a

n d an o t h er w oman. Afte r De puty Combs e xpla ine d th a t it

wa s n ot i lle g a l f

or [Mann ] to f

ir e his g un s in his own

ba c k y ard

in that part of the county , the women told Combs that [ Mann] was subject to a DV O. Deputy Combs returned to [Mann’s] property to discuss the DVO with him. By then, [Mann] had re turned to the ba ck y ard a nd resumed f

iring his guns. De puty

Co m bs told [ Mann] to unload and put his weapon down, w hich [ Mann] did. Deputy Combs asked [Mann] if t h er e was a DVO a g ainst him, and [M ann] said y es. [Mann] andAs he make s c le ar i n h is r e ply br ie f, Mann ’s “ c omp la int did no t name She ri ff He lmi g in h is 1 individual capac ity , but only in his official ca

pacity . As such, his ca

use of a ction is ag ainst Boone County .” -3- Deputy Comb s we nt into the house where [Mann] showed Combs a copy of the amende d DVO e ntere d on Dec ember 1, 2003. [Mann] stated that i t did not prevent him from possessing firearms because he was not an "intimate partne r" of the pe rson who took out the DVO. Revie wing the lang uag e of the amende d DVO, howe ver, De pu ty Com bs wa s uns ur e wh e the r i t r e str ic te d [Ma nn ] fr om h a vin g g un s. [Mann] then g ave D eputy Combs the phone number of his attorney who had repr esente d him in conne ction with the DVO. Combs tried to rea ch that attorne y but co u l d n o t
. C o m b s t h en t ri edt o re ac h an at t o rn ey at t h e B o o n e C o u n t y

At t o rn ey 's Offic e but could not do so. Combs then c alled the Commonwea lth Attorney ' s Offic e in Boone County

and spoke to a

n attorney in that office reg ardingthe situation. The attorney told Com bs that [M ann] was not permitted t o p o s s ess fire arms if he was subject to an a ctive DVO
. Deputy Combs then told [ Mann] that he was g oing to take all his f irea rms and aske d wher e they

wer e located. Combs and another deputy who had arr ived re trieved a total of six g un s and a bo x o f a mmunit ion
. Af te r g ivi ng [Mann ] a re c e ipt fo r the we a po ns , the deputies lef

t and took the items to the Boone C ounty Sheriff' s Depa rtment wher e the we a po ns we re log g e d in to t

he pr op e rt

y ro om. Sometime therea fter, the Boone County Sheriff' s office i n fo rm ed [ Mann] that he could come r etrieve his guns, but [Mann] apparently has not done so. Ma nn v . H

e lm ig , 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 23839, at *4-5 (E.D. K y . Marc h 30, 2007). On Aug ust 2, 2005, Mann filed su it ag ainst Boone County Sheriff H elmig in his off icial capa city pursuant t o 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I n his complaint, Mann alleg ed that B oone County had 1 violated his Sec ond, Four th, F ifth, and Four

teenth Amendment rig hts; in addition, Mann adva nced a cla im of conver sion under Ke ntucky law. B oth pa

rties subsequently

filed motions for summary judgme nt. The dist rict court g rante d Helmig ’s motion for summary judgme nt and denied Ma nn’s mot ion fo r su mma

ry jud g me nt, c on c lud ing that “ pla int if f ha s no t sh ow n, a s a

ma tte r o f l aw, that th is single , isolated incident wa s part of any pattern of unconstitutional conduct by Boone County , or that-4-

it was otherwise taken pur suant to any County policy or custom.” Mann , 2 0 0 7 U
. S
. D i s t
. LE X IS 23 83 9, a t *8
. I n tur

n, the dis tr ic t court dis mis se d Mann’ s c la im o f c on ve rs ion , d e c lin ingto e xer c ise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). I I
. We review de novo the gra nt of sum mary judgme nt by a dis trict court. Miller v. Am. H eavy Lift Shipping , 231 F.3d 242, 246 ( 6th Cir. 2000). S ummary judgme nt may

be g rante d only

if there
are no g enuine issues of materia l f act and one party is e ntitled to a judgme nt a s a matter of law. F ed. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ). A d isp ute ov e r a ma te ri a l fa c t cann ot be “ g e nu ine ” un le ss a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld return a verdict for the nonmovingparty
. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). I n revie wing a district c ourt’s dec ision to gra nt summary

judgme nt, we view a ll the fac ts and the infere n ces drawn ther efr om in the light most favora ble to the nonmoving pa

rty
. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). III
. As Mann state s une qu ivo c a lly

in h is r e ply

bri ef, hi s c a

us e of a c tio n p ur su ant t o § 19 83 is
a g a ins t Sh e ri ff

He lmi g in h is o ff

ic ia l c a pa c ity . A s a re su lt, Mann ’s c a us e of a c tio n is a

su it a g a ins t Boone County
. Moore v. City of Harriman , 272 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2001) ( en banc ) ( “ [A] su it
a g a ins t a state of fi c ia l in his or he r o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity is no t a su it a g a ins t th e of fi c ia l but r a the r a

su it ag ainst the offic ial' s office
. . . as such, it is no differ ent from a suit ag ainst the State itself.”) ( quoting W ill v. Mich. De

p’t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Pursuant to a § 1983 suit, “A municipal liability claim .
. . must be examined by applying a two-pr ong ed inquiry : (1) Whether the plaintiff has a sserted the deprivation of a constitutional rig ht at all; and (2 ) W h ether the [muni cipality ] i s responsible for that violation.” Doe v . Claiborne-5-

Cou nty , 103 F.3d 495, 505- 06 (6th C i r. 1 9 9 6 ). I n satisfying the second pr ong of this inquiry , “A plaintiff who sues a

municipality

for a constitutional viol ation under § 1983 m u st prove that the municipality ’s policy or custom cause d the alleg ed injury .” El lis v . Cle v e lan d M un . S c h. Di st. , 455 F.3d 690, 700 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (citing Mo ne ll v . D e p't o f So c . S e rv s. , 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978))
. I n o rd e r t o p ro ve the e xiste nc e of a mun ic ipa lity ’s po lic y or c us tom , pla int if fs “ c an lo ok

to (1 ) t he mun ic ipa lity ’s le g isl a tiv e e na c tme nts or of fi c ia l a g e nc y po lic ie s; (2 ) a c tio ns take n b y of fi c ia ls with final dec ision-making a uthority ; (3) a policy

of inade quate t ra i n i ng or super vision; or (4) a custom of tolera

nce or acquie scenc e of fede ral rig hts violations.” Thomas v. City of Chat tanooga , 398 F.3d 426, 429 ( 6th Cir. 2005). I n his appeal , M an n pursues the se cond option, arguing that Deputy Combs confiscated Ma

nn’s fire ar m s an d am m unition pursuant to a policy of the B oone County She ri ff ’s de pa rtme nt. Howeve r,
no t e ve ry de c isi on by mun ic ipa l of fi c e rs a uto ma tic a lly

su bje c ts t he mun ic ipa lity

to § 1983 liability
. Municipal liability attache s only wher e the de cisionmaker posse sses final authority

to establish municipal policy with respec t to the action order ed. The fac t that a par

ticular off

icial – eve n a policy

maki n g officia l – has discre tion in the ex er ci s e of par

ticular func tions does not, without m ore, g ive rise to municipal liability based on a

n exercise of

that discretion. P e m b a u r v . C i t yo f C i n c inn ati , 4 7 5 U. S. 469, 481-82 (1986). Thus, Mann must demonstrate that Deputy Combs acte d pursuant to a poli cy established by an individual who possessed final decisionmakin g a uth or ity and tha t th is p oli c y

c a us e d th e a lle g e d in

jur ie s. As the dis tr ict c ourt c or re c tly
no te d, Mann

c ann ot s a tis fy

thi s r e qu ir e me nt. 1. Th e Sup re me Court

ha s d e fi ne d th e te rm

“ po lic y ” a s a “w or d [tha t] g e ne ra lly imp lie s a c ours e-6-

of action consciously chosen from among various alter natives.” Ok

lah om a Ci ty

v . Tu ttl e , 4 71 U. S. 808, 823 (1985). At diff

ere nt stag es of this litigation, Mann ha s vacillated be tween two dif fer ent arguments as to what policy was the c ause of

his alleg ed constitutional damag es. I n his brief befor e this c ourt, Mann descr ibes what he contends to be the policy that cause d his alleg ed injury : “it was t he poli cy or custom of t he Boone County Sheriff’ s Offic e to follow the advice of the County

or Commonwealth Attorney when a deputy was unsure how deal [si c] with a
cer tain situation.” (Appellant’ s Br . 18-19.) Ma nn repe ats this ch ar ac terization of the policy or
c us tom of wh ic h h e c omp la ins on

a numbe r o f o the r o c c a sio ns : “ B oo ne C ou nt y ’s Cus tom wa s to follow advice of Commonwealth Att o rn ey ” (A ppellant’s B r. 17); “F ollowing the a dvice of the Commonwealth At t o rney was B oone County ’s plan of a ction” (A ppellant’s B r. 19); “[I ]t was the
c u s t o m o f t h e B o o n e C o u n t y S h e r i f f t o a l w ays f

o l l o w t h e d i r e c t i o no f

t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h A t t o r n e y” (Appe llant’s Br . 10); “The decision to confisc ate Ma nn’s fire arms wa s made by Deputy Combs, who had soug ht and followed the advice of a Commonwea lth Attorney
. . . a proc edure that is customary prac tice for

the B oone County Sheriff’ s Offic e.” (J A 139). This argument thus identifies the policy of consulting an attorne y

as the c ause of

Mann’s a lleg ed dama g es. At o ra l ar gu m en t , h o we v er , M an nap p ea re d t o co n t e n d t h at h e w as i nfa ct co n t es t i n g a differ ent po l icy

– the Commonwealth Attorney ’s ac tual advice to Deputy Combs to s eize Mann’s fi re arm s and a mmunit ion ; and it wa s thi s “ po lic y ” that c a us e d Ma nn ’s c on sti tut ion a l da

ma g e s. Th is
s e c o n d c h ar a c t e r i z a t i o no f

t h e p o l i c y

a l s o a p p e a r s a t l e a s t o n c e i n M an n ’ s b r i e f b e f o r e t h i s c o u rt : “ In the ca se at ba

r . . . the policy

decision at issue wa s in fact unc o n s t i t u t i o n al
. I t should go without saying that the unl awf

ul confiscation of a citizen’s firea rms from his or her own hom e violates the constitution.” (Appe llant’s Br
. 20). Howeve r, reg ardle ss of which char acte rization Mann intends-7-

to pursue in his appea l, his claims lack merit. 2. Mann’s fir st chara cter ization of the Boone County policy – consulti n g an at torney and following his advice when unsure how to proce ed – fa ils because he ca n neither satisfy

the ca usation
e le me nt of a § 19 83 a c tio n, no r pr ov ide su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e of the e xiste nc e of a f a c ia lly constitutional poli cy . I n O k l a h o m a C i t

yv . T u ttl e , 471 U.S. 808 (1985), the Supre me Court explained how the
c a us a tio n e le me nt o f a

§ 1 98 3 c la im f

un c tions wh e n th e po lic y in q ue sti on wa s n ot i tse lf
un c on sti tut ion a l: [S ]om e li mitation must be placed on establishing municipal liability throug h policies that are not the mselves unconstitutional, or the test set out in Monell will become a de a d le tte r. Ob vio us ly , if

on e re tr e a ts f

ar e no ug h f

ro m a c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n s ome m u n i c i p a l “ p o l i c y” c anb e i d e n t i f i e d b e h i n d a l m o s tan y s u c h h ar

m i n f l i c t e d b y a municipal o ff

i ci al ; for example, [the police offic er] would never have killed [the d ef en d an t ’s h u s b an d ] i f O k l ah o m a C i t y d i d n o t h a v e a “p o l i cy ” o f e s t ab l i s h i n g a po lic e fo rc e . B ut Mo ne ll mus t be ta ke n to re qu ir e pr oo f o f a c ity po lic y dif fe re nt i n kind from this latter example befor e a claim can be sent to a jury on the theory

that a particula

r violation wa s “ca

used” by the municipal “policy .” At the ve ry least there must be an aff

irmative link be tween the policy and the particu l ar constitutional violation alleg ed. Id. a t 82 3; see also City of Springfield v. Kibbe , 480 U.S. 257, 267- 268 (1987) ( “In some sense, of
c ours e , a lmo st a

ny inj ur y inf lic te d b y a mun ic ipa l a g e nt o r e mpl oy e e ult imate ly can be tra c e d to
so me mun ic ipa l po lic y . F indin g § 1983 ' s c a us a tio n r e qu ir e me nt s a tis fi e d b y su c h a re mot e
connec tion, however , would evisce rate Mo ne ll 's distinction, based on th e languag e and history of § 1983, betwee n vicar ious liabili ty and liability

predic ated on the municipa lity ' s own constitutional
v i o l a t i o n s . ” ( e mp h a s i s i no r i g i n a l ) )
. T h u s “ [ p ] r o o f m e r e l y t h a t s u c h a p o l i c y o r c u s t o m w a s ‘ l i k e l y’ to cause a par

ticular violati o n i s n ot sufficient; there must be proven at least an ‘a ffirmative link’-8-

betwee n policy

or custom and violation; in tort principle terms, the c ausal c onnection must be ‘proximate,’ not merely

‘but-for ’ ca

usation-in-fa ct.” Spell v. Mc Daniel , 8 24 F .2 d 13 80 , 1 38 8 ( 4th Cir. 1987); see also Kneipp v. Tedde r , 9 5 F.3 d 11 99 , 1213 (3 d Ci r. 19 96 ) ( “ A p la int if f m us t a lso establish that the g overnme nt policy or custom was the proxim ate c ause of the injuries sustained.”) ; Ki n g v . Massarweh , 782 F .2 d 8 25 , 8 28 (9 th C ir . 1 98 6) (n oti ngthat th e inq uir y un de r § 19 83 is wh e the r the a c tio ns in que sti on “ pr oximate ly

c a us e d” the a lle g e d d a ma g e s) ; Francis v. Barlow , 2006 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 30394, at *11 (W.D. K y . May 16, 2006) (“ A § 1983 complaint must alleg e that specific conduct by

the def endant wa s the proxim ate c ause of the constitutional injury .”). Whil e Mann

is s ome wh a t un c le ar o n h is t he or y of c a us ati on , it woul d s e e m th a t hi s c la im require s the following argum en t : t h e policy of “f ollow[ ing] the advic e of the County or Commonwealth Attorney when a deputy was unsure how dea l [ sic] with a ce rtain situation” was the proxi mate ca

use of Ma nn’s alleg ed injuries. This theory of causation seems to be of the prec ise ty pe the Supreme Court soug ht to forec lose in Tut tle . Ind e e d, on e c an a lw ay s “ re tr e a t [] fa r e no ug h” to find a poli cy that “ca

used” the alleg ed constitutional violation. Se e Tut tle , 471 U.S. at 823. But the proxi mate ca

use of Mann’s alleg ed constit utional injuries was e ither the ambiguity of his DVO, the
err oneous advic e of the Commonwealth Attorney , or, less direc tly , the inability of De puty Combs to contact Ma

nn’s attorne y . There simply is too tenuous a connec t i o n b etwee n the policy of contac ting a

nd following the a dvice of the county

or Commonwealth Attorney and the injuries sustained by

Mann. Thus, it cannot be said that there is an affirmative link betwee n the “policy” and the conf iscation of Mann’ s firea

rms and ammunition. I n turn, Mann has not satisfied the causation element of

his § 1983 claim, a conc lusion that just ifies the dis trict court’s gr ant of Helmig’s motion for summary

judgme nt.-9-

Moreove r, Mann pr ovides proof of only one incident a s the basis fo r his claim that there
e xists a c ounty po lic y that c a us e d his a lle g e d d a ma g e s. Mann do e s c or re c tly no te tha t in so me c a se s, pr oo f o f a sin g le inc ide nt w he re a

mun ic ipa l of

fi cia l cau se d c on sti tut ion a l in jur ie s is su ff

ic ie nt t o demonstrate the exis tence of an unconstitutional policy or custom: “ The Supreme Court has stated that, u nd e r a pp ro pr ia te c ir c umstan ces, lia bil ity may be imp os e d u

po n a mun ic ipa lity

fo r a sin g le decision by

a policy maker .” Mo nis te re v . City of M e mp his , 115 F. App’ x 845, 851 (6th Cir. 2004) (c i t i n g Pembaur , 475 U.S. at 480). Howeve r, g iven the policy of which Ma

nn complains, this is not the ca se: “whe re the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, c onsiderably more proof

than the sing le incident will be nec essar y in ever y case to establish both the requisite fault on the pa rt of the municipality , and the c ausal c onnection betwe en the ‘policy ’ and the constitutional deprivation.” Tut tle , 4 71 U. S. at 82 4; accord Bills v. Ase ltine , 958 F.2d 697, 708 ( 6th Cir. 1992). I n the instant case , the policy of consulting with the C ommonwealth Att orney is clear ly not itself unconstitutional. Thus to survive summary judgme nt, Mann ca

nn o t s im p ly rely on one incident to satisfy his burden. F or the se re a so ns , Mann’ s cla ims , ba se d upo n his fir st ch ara c te ri zat ion of the B oo ne County po lic y , f a il. 3. The sec ond char acte rization of Mann’s ar g ument, offe red at oral ar g ument and at one point in h is b ri e f ( Ap pe lla

nt’ s B r. 20 ), is that the a tto rn e y ’s de c isi on to t e ll D e pu ty Com bs to c on fi sc a te Mann’s we apons wa s the policy causinghis constituti onal injuries. Th e ob vio us dif

fi c ult y wi th t his argument is tha

t Ma nn did no t su e the Com monwe a lth Attorney or hi s age n t s, and thus their dec isions cannot be cha lleng ed her e. Certa inly , there is no-10-

basis in this record f

o r co n cluding that the Commonwealth Attorney cre ates policy

for B oone County , the on ly

de fe nd ant i n th is c a se . T his ite ratio n o f M ann ’s argume nt f are s n o b e tte r t

ha n h is first version. I V. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt.