UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) UNITED STATES, ) ) v. ) Crim. No. 07-0152-01 (ESH) ) ANTHONY MAURICE SUGGS, ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, defe ndant Anthony Maurice Suggs h as filed a motion to vacate his conviction. ( See Suggs’ Mot. Under § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sent ence by a Person in Federal Cus tody, Oct. 23, 2013 [ECF No. 323] (“S uggs Mot.”), as supplemented,

see Supplemental Motion Under 28 U .S.C. § 2255 & Supplemental Memo randum in Support, June 26, 2015 [ECF No. 363] (“Suggs Supp.”).) The government o pposes any relief. ( See United States’ Resp., Apr. 1, 2014 [EC F No. 349] (“1st Gov’t Re sp.”); United States’ Resp., Sept. 4, 2015 [ECF No. 370] (“2d Gov’t Resp.”).) For the reaso ns stated herein, the motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND On June 12, 2007, a federal grand j ury indicted Suggs and six c o-defendants, Julian Johnson, James Lawrence Parker, Ernest Milton Glover, 1 Glendale Earl Lee, Helery Price and Ngozi Joy, for conspiracy to di stribute and to possess with int ent to distribute one kilogram or more of phencyclidine (PCP) and also charged Suggs with one cou nt of unlawful possession with

1 As there are several Glovers mentioned in this Memorandum Opin ion, the Court will use their full names throughout.2 intent to distribute (“PWID”) one kilogram or more of PCP, in v iolation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1 )(A)(iv) & 846. ( See Indictment, June 12, 2007 [ECF No. 1].) A superseding indictment against Suggs, Parke r, Ernest Glover, Lee, and Price was filed on October 16, 2007. (Superseding Indictment, Oct . 16, 2007 [ECF No. 65].) Parker e ntered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute one kilogram or more of PCP ( see Plea Agreement, Feb. 11, 2008 [ECF No. 151]), and the remaining defe ndants proceeded to trial. 2 At trial, the government’s evidence included, inter alia , visual and video surveillance of Suggs and others; approximatel y 80 conversations recorded by a wiretap on Suggs’ cell phone, which was active from January 9, 2007 until April 7, 2007; five conversations recorded by a bug installed in alleged co-conspir ator Lonnell Glover’s truck, whi ch was active from March 22, 2007 to June 19, 2007 (the “truck bug”); 3 testimony from FBI Agen t John Bevington, the case agent, who gave his opinion as a la y witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 as to the meaning of some of the recorded c onversations; ev idence that Su ggs was living with Joy at Joy’s house; evidence seized from J oy’s house, including 7.7 kilogram s of PCP; evidence seized from the residences of Parker, Ern est Glover, and Lee; and expert t estimony from a federal drug investigator about modus operandi of PCP distribution operation s in the District of Columbia, two forensic chemists and a fingerprint expert.

2 Defendants proceeded to trial on a “retyped indictment.” In a ddition to the conspiracy count against the remaining defendants and the PWID count against Sug gs, there were two counts of distribution of PCP against Suggs, and one count of PWID PCP ag ainst Ernest Glover. ( See Retyped Indictment, Feb. 11, 2008 [ECF No. 154].) The substant ive counts, other than the PWID count against Suggs, were dismissed by the government befo re the case went to the jury. ( See Minute Entry, Mar. 4, 2008.)
3 Identified as a co-conspirato r by the indictment in the presen t case, Lonnell Glover was separately indicted, along with s everal others, for conspiracy to distribute PCP and heroin. See Indictment, United States v. Lonnell Glover , No. 07-cr-0153 (D.D.C. June 12, 2007).3 The jury found Suggs, Ernest Glover and Price guilty of conspir acy and found Suggs guilty of PWID, in each instance finding that the offense invol ved one kilogram of more of PCP. ( See Verdict Forms, Mar. 13, 2008 [ECF Nos. 171, 172, 173].) The j ury was unable to reach a verdict as to Lee, resulting in a mistrial. (Minute Entry, Mar . 18, 2008.) At his second trial, Lee was acquitted. ( See Judgment of Acquittal, May 8, 2008 [ECF No. 211].) The three convicted defendants were each sentenced to the statutory mandatory minim um: 240 months for Suggs and life imprisonment for Ernest Glover and Price. 4 ( See Judgment, Aug. 11, 2008 [ECF No. 281]; Judgment, Aug. 11, 2008 [ECF N o. 283]; Judgment, Aug. 11, 2008 [ECF No. 277].) On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed all three convictions and sentenc es. See United States v. Ernest
Glover , 681 F.3d 411, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 5 Defendants’ petitions to the Supreme Court seeking writs of certiorari were denied.

4 Suggs had one prior felony drug convi ction, so his statutory s entencing range was 20 years to life. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (penalty f or a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) involving one kilogram or more of PCP, “[i]f any person commits such a violat ion after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become f inal[,] . . . may not be less t han 20 years and not more than life imprisonment”). Ernest Glover a nd Price both ha d at least two prior felony drug convictions, triggering a mandatory minim um of life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (penalty for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) i nvolving 1 kilogram or more of PCP “after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final” is “a mandatory term of life imprisonment”).
5 On the issues before it, the C ourt of Appeals ruled as follows : (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the Cour t’s decision to deny Price’s motion to se ver his trial from that of his codefendants; (2) the initial wa rrantless entry into Joy’s house did not render inadmissible evidence later seized pursuant to a va lid and independently obtained sea rch warrant; (3) even if the warrant authorizing the search of Joy’s house was lacking in pr obable cause, the evidence seized pursuant to that warrant was properly admitted under United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984); (4) the authorizing judge acted within her discretion i n finding that the statutory necessity requirement was met for the extension of the wiretap of Suggs’ cell phone beyond the initial 30–day period; (5) law en forcement officers’ efforts to minimize the wiretap’s interception of irrelevant conversations from Suggs’ cell phone were reasona ble; (6) any potenti al error in the admission of Price’s statement, which was captured by the wiret ap on Suggs’ cell phone before the call went to co-defendant’s voicemail, was harmless; (7) an y error in the admission of FBI Agent Bevington’s testimony as lay testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 rather than as expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was harmles s because he could have been4 After the appeals in the insta nt case were final, the Court of Appeals considered appeals by defendants in two related cases. See United States v. Hampton , 718 F.3d 978 (D.C. Cir. 2013) and United States v. Lonnell Glover , 736 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The fir st case was an appeal by Jerome Hampton, who had been i ndicted, along with Lonnell Gl over and others, for conspiracy to distribute PCP and heroin ( see supra note 3) and convicted a fter a jury trial. See Judgment, United States v. Jerome Hampton , No. 07-cr-0153 (D.D.C. Aug. 6. 2010). At Hampton’s trial, as at Suggs’ tr ial, the evidence included reco rded conversations accompanied by FBI Agent Bevington’s lay opini on testimony explaining the mean ing of those conversations. Hampton , 718 F.3d at 981. On appeal, the Court concluded that Agent B evington’s testimony had exceeded the scope of lay opinion testimony permitted by Fe deral Rule of Evidence 701 6 when he “interpreted . . . [inter cepted] conversations on the b asis of his listening to all of the calls” (approximately 20,000 in t otal), even though only 100 ca lls were admitted into evidence and available to the jury. Hampton , 718 F.3d at 983. According to the C ourt, “[w]hen an agent, particularly a case agent, provi des interpretations of recorded conversations based on his ‘knowledge of the entire investig ation,’ ‘the risk that he was testifying based upon information not before the jury, including hear say, or at the least, that t he jury would think he had knowledge beyond what was before them, is clear.” Id . at 982-83 (quoting United States v. Grinage , 390

qualified as an exper t; (8) there was no a buse of discretion in the Court’s decision to dismiss a juror, who realized during the tri al that she knew Ernest Glove r’s wife, and to empanel an alternate juror; (9) there w as no abuse of discretion in the Co urt’s decision not to provide a supplemental jury instruction in response to a jury note; and ( 10) the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict agai nst Ernest Glover and Price. See United States v. Glover , 681 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
6 Rule 701 permits lay testimony in t he form of an opinion that is “(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpfu l to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; a nd (c) not based on scientific, t echnical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”5 F.3d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted)). Un der those circumstances, the Court held that “the jury had no way of verifying his inferences or o f independently reaching its own interpretations” and the testimony, “‘rather than being helpful to the jury, . . . usurped the jury’s function.’” Id . at 983 (quoting Grinage , 390 F.3d at 751). Noting that “[t]he government’s evidence consisted la rgely of wiretap inter ceptions and recordi ngs from a listening device” and Agent Bevington’s interpretati on of those recorded conversation s, the Court concluded that the error was not harmless and reversed Hampton’s conviction. Id . at 984. 7 The second case was an appeal by Lonnell Glover from his convi ction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. At his trial , as at Suggs’ trial, the evid ence included conversations recorded by the truck bug. On appeal, the Cour t held that the warrant a uthorizing installation of the truck bug was “facially insufficient” under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq ., and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 8 and therefore, that none of the conve rsations recorded by the truck bug should have been admitted into evidence. See Lonnell Glover , 736 F.3d at 513-14. Noting tha t the truck bug evidence constituted “some of the ‘most incriminating’ and ‘most powerfu l’ evidence at trial,” the Court further held that the error requi red reversal of L onnell’s Glov er’s conviction. Id. at 516 (quoting
United States v. Saro , 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Sub sequently, and for th e same reason, the Court of Appeals granted the government’s unopposed motion to vacate Lonnell

7 On remand, the district court granted the government’s motion to voluntarily dismiss with prejudice the indictment against Hampton. See Order, United States v. Hampton , No. 07-cr0153 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2013).
8 The Court concluded that the wa rrant was facially insufficient because it was issued in the District of Columbia but the bug w as actually installed in the District of Maryland. See United States v. Lonnell Glover , 736 F.3d at 515.6 Glover’s conviction in a separat e case for conspiracy to distri bute PCP and heroin. See Order,
United States v. Lonnell Glover , No. 10-3075 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2014). 9 Suggs has now filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), a sking the Court to vacate his conviction. His two primary claims, which were fully devel oped in a supplemental brief filed by appointed counsel, stem from t he Court of Appeals’ decisions in Hampton and Lonnell
Glover . Relying on those cases, he claims that he was deprived of hi s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel a t trial and on appeal due to h is counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the truck bug record ings and his counsel’s failure to object to the scope of Agent Bevington’s testimony. He has als o adopted the ineffectiveness claims made by his codefendants that apply to him: (1) that appellate counsel was in effective for failing to challenge the Court’s response to a jury note; and (2) that trial and app ellate counsel were ineffective in failing to object to the jury’s e xposure to the odor of PCP fro m containers that were brought into the courtroom. ( See Suggs’ Motion to Adopt, Jun. 26, 2015 [ECF No. 365]; Minute Or der granting Motion to Adopt, June 27, 2015). Finally, Suggs’ pro se motion included two additional claims: (1) that the government committed a Brady violation; and (2) that Agent Bevington impermissibly testifie d as an expert. As these claim s cover a wide range of events, the additional facts underlying each claim will be set forth in the analysis portion of this Memorandum Opinion.
ANALYSIS
LEGAL STANDARD FO R § 2255 MOTION Section 2255(a) provides that:

9 Both cases were remanded for further proceedings and remain pe nding before the Honorable Thomas F. Hogan, who tried the o riginal PCP/heroin conspiracy c ase. ( See supra note 3.)7 A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sent ence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sente nce was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to colla teral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “A district j udge must grant a prompt hea ring under § 2255 unless ‘the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.’” United States v. Pollard , 959 F.2d 1011, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)). “The decision whether to do so is committed to the d istrict court’s discretion.” Id . at 1030-31; see also United States v. Morrison , 98 F.3d 619, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (A “district judge’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearin g before deny ing a § 2255 motion is generally respected as a sound exercise of discretion when the judge deny ing the § 2255 motion also presided over the trial in which the petitioner claims to have been prejudiced.”) “Only where the § 2255 motion raises ‘detailed and specific’ factu al allegation s whose resolution requires information outside of the reco rd or the judge’s ‘personal know ledge or recollection’ must a hearing be held.” Pollard , 959 F.2d at 1131 (quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962)). Here, although the claims made are not insub stantial, their resolution does not call for an evidentiary hearing.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS Suggs raises four claims of ine ffective assistance of counsel. In general, “claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice,” but “an ineffec tive-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could ha ve raised the claim on direct appeal.” Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).8 A. Legal Standard for Ineffective Assistance Claims In order to establish ineffectiv e assistance of counsel in viol ation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant “must show that counsel’s performance wa s deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “An error by counsel, eve n if professionally unreasona ble, does not warra nt setting aside the judgment of a criminal pr oceeding, if the error had no effe ct on the judgment.” Id . at 691. Thus, “[f]ailure to make the re quired showing of either deficie nt performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.” Id . at 700. A counsel’s performance is deficient if it “fell below an objec tive standard of reasonableness” or “prevai ling professional norms.” Id . at 688. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effect s of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id . at 689. As for establishing prejudice, “ [t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id . at 690. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficien t to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id . In assessing prejudice, courts “m ust consider the totality o f the evidence before the judge or jury,” id . at 695, and then determine “if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably li kely have been different absent the errors.” Id . at 696; see also Wong v. Belmontes , 558 U.S. 15, 27 (2009) (“burden [is] on the defendant, not the [government] , to show a reasonable probabili ty that the result would have been different”).9 B. Ineffectiveness Claims Based Upon Failure to Object to Admissio n of Allegedly Inadmissible Evidence Suggs’ first two claims of ineff ectiveness will be considered t ogether as both are based upon counsel’s failure to object t o the admission of allegedly inadmissible evidence. His first claim, relying on the Cour t of Appeals’ decision in Lonnell Glover , is that his counsel should have moved to suppress the five truck bug recordings that were introduced at trial based on the facial insufficiency of the unde rlying warrant. Suggs’s second claim, relying on the Court of Appeals’ decision in Hampton , is that on four occasions his counsel should have objected to Agent Bevington’s testimony about conversations recorded by the cell phone wiretap as exceeding the scope of lay opinion testimony permitted under Fe deral Rule of Evidence 701.
1. Deficient Performance – Truck Bug Claim The government does not dispute th at the truck bug evidence was inadmissible against Suggs 10 or that his counsel’s failure to object to its admission or ra ise the issue on appeal satisfies the “deficient performance” prong of Strickland . ( See 2d Gov’t Resp. at 10-11.) Nor is there any doubt that this evide nce was highly incriminating, so the only issue for resolution is whether defendant suffered prejudi ce, which is addressed in Sec tion B.3, infra

.

10 Under Title III, an “aggrieved p erson” has standing to move to suppress an intercepted conversation on the ground that th e warrant was facially invali d. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). An “aggrieved person” is defi ned as “a person who was a party t o any intercepte d wire, oral, or electronic communication or a pers on against whom the intercept ion was directed.” See id § 2510(11). As a party to three of the five truck bug conversat ions, Suggs clearly has standing to object to their admission. As fo r the remaining two conversati ons, the government has not contested Suggs’ standing.10 2. Deficient Performance – Hampton Claim As for the Hampton claim, the government argues th at none of Agent Bevington’s testimony violated Hampton, and that if it did, counsel’s f ailure to object did not consti tute deficient performance. Moreover, the issue of prejudice must b e resolved. As in Hampton , the number of recorded conversa tions that Agent Bevington lis tened to (approximately 2,500) greatly exc eeded the number introduced in to evidence (approximately 80) ( see 2/19/08pm Tr. at 27, 68), and Agent Bevington was proffered as a lay opinion witness who would be able to explain the mean ing of certain otherwise innoc uous “code words” based on his having listened to all 2,500 inter ceptions and, more generally, knowledge gleaned during the course of the investigation. ( See id . at 5.) However, unlike Hampton , before Agent Bevington ever took the stand, counsel for one of the defendants (Price) raised an objection to allowing Agent Bevington to “base his opi nion not just on the phone call or the phone calls around it but on his overall knowledge of the investigation.” 11 ( Id . at 7.) Although the Cour t overruled the objection, apparently following Jud ge Lamberth’s decision in United States v. Eiland , No. 04-cr0379, 2006 WL 2844921 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2006) , and held that Agen t Bevington could “say I listened to all the tapes and the y used this word consistently” (2/19/08pm Tr. at 7, 14), the Court noted that it had serious reservations about both the utility a nd appropriateness of such testimony. ( See id . (“I don’t like these kind of witn esses one bit to begin with. I think that it crosses the line. If a jury can ’t figure out what people are t alking about on a tape, he doesn’t add anything.”).) It cautioned the gove rnment against “try[ing] to make their case through some police officer who listens to all the tapes” because “[i]f the jury doesn’t listen to the tapes and

11 The objection was on several addi tional occasions by Price’s c ounsel and since all objections were deemed to have been adopted b y all co-defendants unless ex plicitly stated otherwise, Suggs’ counsel joined in the obj ections and cannot be faulted f or failing to object.11 agree with you, Officer Bevingt on isn’t going to make one bit o f difference,” urging them instead to play the recorded conve rsations for the jury and arg ue based on that evidence. ( See id

. at 9 (“I have an inbred dislike of having a government agent tr ying to tell the jury what a tape means. You can tell them what it means based on the tapes. Th at’s what argument is.”).) Perhaps in light of this coll oquy, for many of the recorded con versations played for the jury, the government only asked A gent Bevington to identify the participants a nd the date and time of the conversation. Indee d, out of a trial that lasted n ine days, during which Agent Bevington took the stand on eight s eparate occasions to introdu ce approximately 80 recordings from Suggs’ cell phone, Suggs has identified only f our specific instances 12 where he claims that Agent Bevington’s testimony violated Hampton. After a careful review of the challenged testimony, the underly ing recorded conversation, and the entire trial record, the Court is convinced that as two of the four instances no Hampton

12 Suggs identifies a fifth occasion, but in that instance Agent Bevington’s testimony concerned a truck bug recording and was thus ina dmissible on other grounds.12 error occurred, 13 and for the remaining two the qu estion is at best debatable. 14 Given the minimal nature of any transgressi on, it follows that counsel’s failure to specifically object to the

13 Suggs challenges Agent Bevington’s testimony that the word “tr ay,” was a “code word” for “three thousand,” and “piano” was a code word for a “thousand d ollars, like a grand piano, a grand.” ( See 2/21/08pm Tr. at 7-8 (Activati on 2227).) However, there is no reason to believe that Agent Bevington’s understa nding of these words comes from this particular investigation rather than his knowledge of gene ric drug slang drawn from his experience as a federal drug investigator. See, e.g ., United States v. Ernest Glover , 681 F.3d at 422 (expert testimony included testimony about the “m eaning of slang terms used by de fendant in the wiretapped conversations – terms such as ‘wat er’ (PCP), ‘boat’ (marijuana laced with PCP), ‘16th Street’ (16 ounces) and ‘32nd street’ (32 ou nces)” along with testimony about “where PCP is manufactured, in what quantitie s it is sold, and a t what price” ). As such, Agent Bevington’s testimony may have strayed into th e realm of expert testimony, but there was no Hampton error. Suggs also challenges Agent Bev ington’s testimony that Suggs’ u se of the phrase “apartment available” is code for hi s having PCP for sale. ( See 2/27/08pm Tr. at 11-12 (Activation 2093).) At trial, though, Agent Bevington e xplained that his opinion wa s based on the fact that “during the course of the investigati on there was neve r any indication that Mr. Suggs was renting apartments or owned property.” ( Id . at 12.). Under these circumstances, there is no Hampton error because the jury was informed of the specific basis for A gent Bevington’s opinion, giving it all the information that it needed to decide whether to accept or reject his interpretation.
14 Suggs challenges Agent Bevingt on’s testimony that the inquiry “you dead now” really means “does that mean you don’t have any PCP.” (2/19/08pm Tr. at 52 -55 (Activation 89).) Initially, Agent Bevington explained tha t he based his opinion on “a littl e bit of common sense and a little bit of hearing these calls and c ontext,” which sounds like a po ssible Hampton violation. But then Agent Bevington went on to analogize this phrase to when defend ants would say things like “stand still, laying on a call,” wh ich are other “things that i ndicate that they’re waiting or they don’t have what the other pers on is looking for at that particu lar time.” ( Id . at 55) Then, during cross-examination, Agent Bevingt on explained that the “context” he was referring to was “the part [of the call] t hat precedes it.” ( Id . at 80-81.) Given this additi onal information about the basis for Agent Bevington’s opi nion, there is no valid basis fo r arguing that his testimony was based on information that wa s not before the jury. Finally, Suggs challenges Agen t Bevington’s testimony that a se ries of calls between Suggs and Ernest Glover on January 12, 2007, w here they appear to be talk ing about women ( see Activations 199, 200, 248) are really about PCP, specifically t he PCP that Suggs sold Ernest Glover the day before, which Ern est Glover resold to two other customers, one of whom had complaints about the quality. ( See 2/21/08am at 78.) Although it is possible that Agent Bevington’s opinion is based on evide nce that was before the ju ry, it is certainl y not clear that is the case. In addition, any possibl e error was mitigated when, on cross-examination, defense counsel made the point that give n the actual words used, these conversations could well have been about women and not drugs, givi ng the jury the information it needed to reach its own conclusion. ( See 2/21/08pm Tr. at 23-24.)13 testimony about those two conversa tions did not constitute defi cient performance. ( See also

supra note 14.) This conclusion al one would be enough to defeat thi s claim of ineffectiveness. However, as explained infra , even if Agent Bevington’s challenged testimony should not hav e been admitted, this claim would no netheless fail because its ad mission was not prejudicial.
3. Prejudice To find prejudice based on the err oneous admission of the truck bug evidence and Agent Bevington’s testimony, the Court must be persuaded that there i s a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a diffe rent result in the absence o f that evidence. See United States

v. Wood, 879 F.2d 927, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (defendant must show a “rea sonable possibility that the verdict would have been differe nt absent the excludable evi dence”); see also United States v. Weaver, 234 F.3d 42, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (no prejudice where “strength of the government’s evidence . . . would remain virtua lly unchanged” even setting a side testimony tainted by alleged deficiency). A “reasonable proba bility” means that “[t]he like lihood of a different result must be substantial, not jus t conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86 (2011). The fact that the wrongfully admitted evidence was incriminating is not determina tive. Nor does it matter if the government, as it did in this case ( see, e.g ., 2/19/08am Tr. at 14; 3/5/08am Tr. at 21), relied on the inadmissible evidence in mak ing its arguments to the jury. See Morrison , 98 F.3d at 625 (“But the simple fact that the gov ernment used evidence in its closing argument does not prove that the jury found the eviden ce compelling or determinative.”) . Rather, it is the totality of the admissible evidence that the Court must consider. After carefully reviewing the trial record and having presided over the trial, the Court is persuaded the strength of the ot her evidence against Suggs was such that there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result in the absence of the truck bug14 evidence and Agent’s Bevingt on’s challenged testimony. In part icular, the Court is persuaded that the following evidence, all of which predated the truck bu g and none of which is subject to challenge herein, would be more th an sufficient to cause the ju ry to convict. Controlled Buy from Co-Conspirator Parker : On January 4, 2007, an FBI agent set up and completed a controlled buy of PCP from Parker using a coope rator. (2/20/08pm Tr. at 35, 74.) The cooperator paid $3,500 a nd received in exchange an ei ght ounce bottle that later tested positive for PCP. ( Id . at 47.) During their meeting (wh ich was taped), Parker told the cooperator that he needed to make a call. ( Id . at 45.) Pen register evidence establishe d that the call was to Suggs. 15 ( Id . at 49-50.) Recorded Conversations Regarding Drugs w ith Parker, Ernest Glover, Johnson, and Price from Wiretap of Suggs’ Cell Phone : The government began i ntercepting calls from Suggs’ cell phone on Januar y 9, 2007, and continued to do so un til April 7, 2007. (2/19/08pm Tr. at 24.) At trial, approximate ly 80 of these calls were int roduced into evidence. As the administrative agent for this w iretap, Agent Bevington reviewed all of the interceptions, introduced the calls into evidence and, on occasion, testified about the content of a particular call. ( Id . at 27.) Although the admissibi lity of his testimony regardin g a handful of these calls has been challenged ( see supra notes 13-14), the vast majori ty has not. Thus, the evidence properly before the jury from the wiretap on Suggs’ cell phone included the following conversations with Parker, Ern est Glover, Johnson, and Price:
Calls with Parker : On January 11, 2007, Parker le ft a voicemail left on Suggs’ phone telling him “I definitely you know want my order to get off. Y ou know what I’m saying?”

15 From January through June 2007, the government had a pen regis ter on Suggs’ phones, tracking all of his incoming and outgoing phone numbers. ( See 2/19/08pm Tr. at 74-75.)15 (2/21/08am Tr. at 31-32 (Ac tivation 193).) On January 17, 2007 , Parker told Suggs, “I told you I need to holler,” and Suggs rep lied, “I know it, I ain’t gonna b e able to get to you until later on tonight though.” ( Id . at 32-33 (Activation 712 ).) A little later that same day, Pa rker told Suggs, “I’ll be up there later on a nd holler at you a little later on though.” ( Id . at 33 (Activation 1467).)
Calls with Johnson : On January 11, 2007, Johnson told S uggs that he was “waiting on you to slide back,” and that he “thought you would have my litt le luggage with you or something.” (2/19/08pm Tr. at 58 (Activation 181).) On Januar y 21, 2007, the government intercepted a call between Suggs and Johnson during which, acco rding to Agent Bevington, the references to “16th Street” and “ 32nd Street” wer e actually ref erences to a previous sale of 32 ounces of PCP from Suggs to Johns on and the fact that Suggs pre sently had 16 ounces for him. 16 ( See id . at 59-60 (Activ ation 1054).)
Calls with Ernest Glover : On January 13, 2007, Ernest Glover told Suggs, “just hit me in the morning or something, you know.” (2/21/08am Tr. at 78 (Act ivation 292).) On January 22, 2007, Suggs told Glover he’s “wai ting on cuz to hit me back,” a nd that he was “just laying on him. He said he was gonna come holler at me . . . .” (2/21/08 pm Tr. at 6 (Activation 1135).) On January 30, 2007, Ernest Glover as ked Suggs, “Cuz ain’t call yo u back yet,” and Suggs responded that he was “still layi ng” and that he was “frustrate d as a mother***.” ( Id . (Activation 1800).) On February 10, 2007, Ernes t again asked Suggs, “old c ousin though ain’t got back at you? What’s up with old cuz though ma n?” Suggs replied “mothe r*** just got us laying.” ( Id

. at 8 (Activation 2545).)

16 On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Agent Bevington’s te stimony about the meaning of slang terms such as “16th Stree t” and “32nd Street” was expert, not lay, opinion testimony. Ernest Glover , 681 F.3d at 422.16 Calls with Price : On January 12, 2007, Price told S uggs “give me a sample of t hat book man. I got a somebody want, a *** might want to holler and loo k at the book man.” (2/27/08am Tr. at 94 (Activation 205).) S uggs responded: ‘I’m gonna just hit you as soon as I get off.” ( Id .) On January 15, 2007, Price asked Suggs, “you got that informati on I wanted you us, I wanted somebody to look at?” Suggs responded: “Yeah, I have it for yo u later on Fool, I’m just doing some moving around. Yeah, but yeah I already put that to the s ide though.” ( Id . at 98-99 (Activation 534).) Agent Bevingt on testified as to this exchan ge that: “I believe that [Price] wants to know if Mr. Suggs has the drugs he was looking for.” ( Id .) He then explained that he came to this opinion because: For several days they’ve bee n talking back and forth. And orig inally, Mr. Price had asked for a sample of tha t book. Then when Mr. Suggs calle d him back later, he made references to a Sister Sister magazine. And now, it’s information, and it’s in that series of conversat ions. They’ve changed the code multiple times. But they’re clearly not talking about or using the same words to ta lk about what they’re talking about. ( Id . at 99.) Finally, he explaine d that the reference to putting something “on the side” helped form his opinion because “it doesn’t make sense that you put in formation to the side. . . . It sounds more like something, a quantity of something that you wo uld set aside or hold onto for him.” ( Id .) On January 16, 2007, there was a s eries of calls between Su ggs and Price, all about trying to set up a meeting. ( See 2/27/08pm at 6 (Activations 596, 606, 621, 623).) In the firs t call, Price told Suggs he was “just waiting on you,” and Suggs responded “give me about 30 minutes. I’ll hit you right bac k then.” The government was li stening to the calls in real time and tried to set up surveillance . But, during the next call, Suggs told Price: “that other car just pulled back up man. You better be careful d own there at that spot man .” ( Id . at 8 (Activation 628).) Suggs also said to Price: “di d you look at the antenna on the b ack of the joint” and “I just don’t like that look down there man.” P rice initially said it was “n othing,” but then he told Suggs,17 “Might got to get anot her venue then.” ( Id .) After hearing all this, the government decided to discontinue its surveillance. ( Id . at 9.) A few d ays later, on January 18, 2007, Suggs told Pri ce “I just ain’t like that look the other day, though, you know.” ( Id . (Activation 843).) On January 19, 2007, Suggs told Price that he’s still “waiting,” that he’s “laying on,” but “[t[hey gonna hit me tonight I’m just waiting on my call,” and then “as soon as h e hits me I gonna hit you.” ( Id . at 10-11 (Activation 943).) On J anuary 22, 2007, Price told Suggs , “Man mother*** pressing me baby that’s all, you know,” and Suggs responded, “Yeah. They s till got us at a stand still though champ you know.” (2/27/08pm Tr. at 11 (Activation 1121).) Pri ce then told Suggs, “I thought maybe you got spooked or something.” ( Id .) Recorded Conversations and Meetings with Lonnell Glover : On January 18, 2007, the government intercepted a call between Suggs and Lonnell Glover, and as a result, they conducted surveillance of a m eeting between the two. (2/19/08pm Tr. at 4 6-48 (Activation 825).) On January 20, 2007, the government int ercepted another call betwe en Suggs and Lonnell Glover, which again led it to conduct vi deo surveillanc e of a meeting b etween the two later that same day. ( Id . at 48 (Activation 971).) Thereaf ter, the government used a c ooperating witness to make a controlled purchase of PCP from Suggs. ( Id .at 50.) Recorded Conversations with Ngozi Joy, Search of Suggs and Joy’s Residence and Evidence Seized Therein : But perhaps most damning of all to the defendant is the exte nsive evidence relating to his calls w ith his girlfriend, Ngozi Joy, and the government’s seizure of large quantities of PCP from their residence. On March 27, 200 7, the government intercepted a call from Joy to Suggs during which s he told him that there was a strong odor coming out of their house that could be smelled from the sidewalk. ( See 2/19/08pm Tr. at 65 (Activation 5773) (“I could smell it when I got out of the car.”).) Suggs tells Joy that he’ll “get something.” ( Id .)18 Later that same night, the governme nt executed a search warran t at their home. ( See 2/20/08am Tr. at 9.) As a result of that search, the governmen t seized and introduced the following as evidence at tria l: $7,000 in currency found in the pocket of a jacket belonging to Suggs, which was identified by the ATM cash withdrawal receipts also found in the jacket; thirteen bottles of PCP, wei ghing a total of 7.7 kilograms; fou r buckets, one of which later tested positive for PCP residue; air fresheners; and a measuring cup a nd funnel. ( See 2/20/08am Tr. at 15, 18-20, 23, 27, 44; 2/26/08am Tr. at 64, 76-78, 85-88; 2/27/ 08am Tr. at 12-13.) Suggs’ fingerprint was identified on one of the buckets. (2/25/08am T r. at 77-78, 87.) On March 28, 2007, the day after the search, Joy asked Suggs i f he had been to see the lawyer, and he said he “got him with me now”; Suggs then told J oy, “I’m going to take the beef, I mean it’s my beef.” (2/20/ 08am Tr. at 64 (Activation 5812).) On March 30, 2007, Suggs told Joy, after talking about her ha ving gotten a lawyer, “I’m not t rying to take you with me like I said I’m responsible for this.” ( Id. at 70 (Activation 5916).)
* * * This evidence provided the ju ry with compelling untainted evide nce of Suggs’ guilt on both counts. Suggs’ phone calls w ith Joy before and after the search along with the 7.7 kilograms of PCP seized during t he search of the house where he resided provided ample evidence of guilt on th e PWID count. As for the conspiracy cou nt, this same evidence, especially the massive amount of PCP discovered during the sear ch, in conjunction with the recorded conversations, contro lled buys and surveillance that p roved that Suggs was a distributor of PCP, was more than enough to de monstrate Suggs’ guilt and to convince the Court that the19 jury would have reached the same verdict without the truck bug evidence and Agent Bevington’s challenged testimony. 17 Thus, Suggs cannot carry his burden of showing prejudice.
C. Ineffectiveness Claim Based on A ppellate Counsel’s Failure to C hallenge the Court’s Response to a Jury Note Suggs’ third claim of ineffective assistance is based upon appe llate counsel’s failure to challenge the Court’s re sponse to a jury note. The note in question read: “Is a co-conspirator responsible for the total amount of PCP of all co-conspirators even if the c o-conspirator in question did not know all of the co-conspirators and did not know the specific amounts each co-conspirator posse ssed?” (Jury Note, Mar. 12, 2008 [ECF No. 169].) After discussi ng the matter with counsel, and over the objection of codefendant Price’s counsel ( see Price Mot. at 29 (citing 3/12/08am Tr. at 7-9)), the Court adv ised counsel that it would respond to t he jury’s question by “referr ing them to the whole instruction on [conspiracy.] I will read the whole instruction and all the instruction in c ontext but I’m not undertaking to define the words yet until they ask another ques tion.” (3/12/08am Tr. at 13).) The Court then called the jur y into the courtroom and basically reread its prior instruction about

17 When it comes to the question of prejudice, the present case i s materially different from either Lonnell Glover or Hampton . In both of Lonnell Glover’s trial s, the inadmissible truck b ug evidence constituted the bulk of the evidence against him. At Hampton’s trial, “[a]part from the recorded conversations, the gove rnment’s other major source of evidence was the testimony of [a single witness,” whose credib ility the jury had reasons to doub t, and the government “was unable to point to any money, drugs, weapon s, or other evidence seized by law-enforcement personnel that could be tied to Hampton’s alleged role in the conspiracy. Hampton , 718 F.3d at 984. By contrast, although the truck bug e vidence and Agent Bevingto n’s testimony were certainly incriminating, they were not cr itical to establishing Suggs’ gu ilt on either count. A more analogous precedent in the Court’s view is United States v. Miller , where the Court held that the admission of testimony by FBI Agents that violated Hampton was harmless because there was more than sufficient evidence of appellants’ guilt, including f our kilograms of cocaine seized from another defendant’s car, whi ch the untainted evidence at t rial clearly tied to appellants. 738 F.3d at 374.20 how to determine quantity in a c onspiracy. The Court, however, opted not to reread the part of the instruction that went through the specific quantity finding s that the jury would be asked to make on the verdict form, instead p araphrasing that portion and telling the jury that the instruction “asks you for determin ations, unanimous determinati ons about quantities, the range.” 18 (3/12/08am Tr. at 15.) Suggs now claims that appellate c ounsel should have challenged the Court’s failure to reread the conspiracy ins truction in its entirety. 19 According to Price’s motion, “[b]y omitting any reference to the different r anges,” the jury “could have fe lt required to find [a defendant] guilty if it concluded that he possessed only a detectable amou nt, regardless of what the verdict

18 The omitted part of the instruction read: Specifically, the verdict form a sks you to decide whether the a mount of PCP was: 1. 1 kilogram or more of a mixtu re or substance containing a detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP) . If you are unable to unanimousl y find that the drug quantity was within this range , then consider whether it w as; 2. 100 grams or more of a mixtu re or substance containing a d etectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP) . If you are unable to unanimousl y find that the drug quantity was within this range , then consider whether it w as; 3. A mixture or substance cont aining a detectable amount of phe ncyclidine (PCP). Your decision as to whether one of these three drug quantity ra nges has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt must be unanimous. (Jury Instruction 34.)
19 The government’s argument that this claim is precluded because it has already been ruled on by the Court of Appeals is not persuasive. As noted supra note 5, appellate counsel challenged the Court’s refusal to give a s upplemental instruction in respo nse to the jury note, not the content of the response actually given.21 form said.” (Price Mem. in S upport of Mot. Under § 2255 to Vac ate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody at 30, Oct. 25, 2013 [E CF No. 329-1].) There are two ways to read t his argument, but neither has meri t. First, if the claim is that the jury should not have found Suggs guilty of conspiracy if it concluded that he possessed only a detectable amount of PCP , that is not the law. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Second, if the claim is that the jury could have bee n misled by the Court’s omission into finding defendant responsible for one kilogram of PCP while actually believing hi m only responsible for a “detectable amount,” the recor d offers no support for that clai m. Both the jury instructions and the verdict form clearly requi red the jury to first determine w hether defendant was guilty of conspiracy and then to make a se parate determination of drug qu antity. ( See Jury Instruction 34; Verdict Form, Mar. 13, 2008 [ECF No. 171].) The only case cited to support defendant’s argument, United States v. Mouling , 557 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Henderson v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 1121 (2013), has significantl y different facts. In Mouling , the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for possession of “50 gram s or more of cocaine base” where the jury was only instructed “that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] possessed a ‘detectable amount’ of cocaine base” and the verdict form, alth ough it reflected that defendant was actually charged and convict ed of possessing “50 grams or m ore,” did not require a separate finding on quantity. The Court of App eals held that “[i]ncludi ng the quantity in the verdict form cannot cure the omission from the jury instructions.” Id . at 665. In the instant case, by contrast, there was no discrepancy betwee n the jury instructions and the verdict form and no reason to think that the Cour t’s decision not to reread the specific drug quantity por tion of the instructions in response to the jury’s note created a Mouling -type problem, especially given that the verdict22 form in the present case require d the jury to first find whethe r a defendant was guilty of “conspiracy to distribute and posse ss with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of [PCP]” and then, if the jury found him gui lty, asked the jury to make a separate finding as to the am ount of drugs he was responsible f or. As there was no error in the C ourt’s decision to paraphrase th e drug quantity portion of the conspiracy instruction in r esponding to the jury’s note, th e failure of appellate counsel to raise this issue on appeal cannot constitute deficient performa nce. See United States v. Stubblefield , 931 F. Supp. 2d 118, 127 (D.D.C. 2013). Accordingly, this cl aim of ineffective assistance is without merit.
D. Ineffectiveness Claim Based on F ailure to Move for a Mistrial B ased on Exposing the Jury to the Odor of PCP Suggs’ fourth claim of ineffec tive assistance is based upon his trial counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial af ter the jury was exposed to the “highly p otent smell of PCP.” During its examination of a forensic chemist at the Drug Enforc ement Administration (“DEA”), the government brought thr ee containers of PCP into th e courtroom. (2/26/08pm Tr. at 88.) After the witness was unable to positively identify the t hree containers as the PCP that she had analyzed, the Court ordered them removed. (2/26/08pm Tr. a t 89.) Later that day, after the jury had been excused, Ernest Glover’s trial counsel suggested that the government had known it could not get this evidence admitted through that witness, but that it had brought the containers in anyway to expose the jury t o the very distinct and unpleasan t smell of PCP. (2/26/08pm Tr. at 90.) After further discussion, though, it was established that the g overnment would be able to put on a witness to “tie up” the l oose end in the chain of cust ody and, furthermore, that once it did so, the Court would admit the containers into evidence. (2 /26/08pm Tr. at 90-95.) At that point, and with the understanding th at the containers would not be brought back into the23 courtroom or sent back to the jur y room during deliberations, d efense counsel dropped any objection to admitting the containers into evidence. (2/26/08p m Tr. at 94-95.) Suggs now claims that trial counsel should have moved for a mi strial on the ground that “the highly potent smell of P CP . . . was highly inflammatory” and “caused irrevocable prejudice.” (Ernest Glover’s Supp. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, at 33-34, June 26, 2015 [ECF No. 364].) Although the Court obviously agrees that the smell of PCP is potent ( see, e.g ., 2/26/08pm Tr. at 92), counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial on this ground would constitute deficient performance only if there were a possibility that such a motion would have been granted, which there was not. “‘A mistrial is a severe remedy-a step to be avoided whenever p ossible, and one to be taken only in circumstances manifesting a necessity therefor.’” United States v. Foster , 557 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting McLendon, 378 F.3d at 1112 (quoting United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 270(D.C.Cir.1994))). The “most important conside ration in ruling on a motion for a mistrial is the extent to which the defendant was unfairly prejudiced.” Id. There is no authority cited to support the claim that the “high ly potent” smell of a drug could be prejudicial. Nor does the Court believe that the odor of PCP, as offensive as it is, would be likely to prejudice a jury toward a finding of guilt. Accor dingly, the Court concludes that a motion for mistrial would not have succeeded and, therefore, th at counsel was not deficient in failing to make such a motion.
OTHER CLAIMS Suggs raises two other claims in addition to his ineffective as sistance claims, as well as a cumulative error claim.24 A. Newly Discovered Evidence / “Brady” Claim Suggs claims that there is “newly discovered evidence” about on e of the members of the investigating task force that t he government should have turned over to him under Brady v. Maryland and that its failure to do so enti tles him to a new trial. In seeking evidence to support this claim, he asks the Court t o order discovery. As explained herein, this claim can be denied based on the existing record. Reginald Jones, formerly a membe r of the Metropolitan Police De partment, was a member of the task force whose i nvestigation led to the arrest and prosecution of Suggs. He was also present for and participat ed in the search of Suggs’ home on March 27, 2007. Jones did not testify at trial, but his role in the search was described by a nother MPD officer, Officer Robert Edelen. (2/20/08am Tr. at 9-10.) During cross-examination, Su ggs’ counsel asked Edelen about the $7,000 found by Jones in the pocket of a coat belonging to Suggs, suggesting that the fact that there were bank withdrawal s lips in the coat showing withd rawals totaling $15,000 meant that $8,000 was unaccounted for. ( Id . at 42.) On or about December 15, 2009, Jones was arrested and charged with felony murder for his participation i n an unrelated conspi racy to rob a drug deal er which resulte d in a fatal shooting. He entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Suggs now claims that the government violated its obligation un der Brady v. Maryland because [T]he crimes committed by Jones were ongoing while he was invol ved in the search of Petitioner’s residen ce that led to Petitioner[‘s] arr est and conviction in the instant case. The government knew or should have known tha t the investigation and conviction wer e tainted by Jones’ criminal mi sconduct during the instant case. Moreover, t he government had an obligation u nder Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) to di sclose the investigation that led to Jones’ conviction of serious crimes.25 (Suggs Mot. at 6.) To support this claim, Suggs has made a req uest for discovery, asking the Court to order the government “to produce all documents in conn ection to the Conviction and Sentence of Officer Reginald Jone s of the D.C. Police, who was a member of the Task force and Prosecution Team in the case at bar” and “[a]ll documentation a s to Metropolitan Police detective Robert Ede l[e]n’s involvement with Officer Jones crim inal activity.” (Suggs Discovery Mot. at 1.) The Supreme Court held in Brady that the Due Process Clause imposes upon the prosecution an obligation to disclo se “evidence favorable to an accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. In Giglio v. United States and United States v. Bagley, the Court held that “[i]mpeachment evidence, . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.” Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). The fatal flaw in Suggs’ Brady claim is that the events that led to Officer Jones’ prosecution and conviction t ook place on December 1, 2009, long after the end of the investigation that le d to Suggs’ prosecuti on and conviction. T hus, Suggs’ allegation that there was an ongoing investigation into J ones’ “criminal misconduct” back in 2007 is pure speculation. Nor is Suggs entitle d to discovery simply in the hope of finding evidence to support his claim. Discovery in a § 2255 proceeding is allowed, but th e party seeking discovery bears the burden of showing “good cause,” which requires making speci fic allegations that give the Court reason to believe that if the facts are fully developed, defendant will be able to demonstrate a right to relief . Suggs has not met this standard . He has suggested no reason to believe that even if Officer J ones were engaged in the criminal misconduct that Suggs suspects ( i.e ., stealing some of the money found during the search of Suggs’ house) such evidence could26 have been used to impeach or to exc ulpate or could have affecte d the outcome of Suggs’ trial. As the Supreme Court has explained, a “true Brady violation” has three components: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either beca use it is exculpato ry, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the S tate, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. at 281-82 (“strictly speaking, there is never a real ‘ Brady violation’ unless the nondis closure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evid ence would have produced a different verdict”); see also United States v. Andrews , 532 F.3d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 2008). As Suggs has not plausibly alleged a Brady violation, this claim i s rejected.
B. Expert Testimony by FBI Agent Bevington Suggs also claims that the trial court committed error by allow ing Agent Bevington to proffer expert testimony wit hout being qualified as an expert. However, as noted ( see supra note 5), this claim was raised in the direct appeal, and the Court o f Appeals ruled that there had been error, but the erro r was harmless. See Ernest Glover , 681 F.3d at 422.
C. Cumulative Error Suggs’ final claim is that the cumulative effect of individual errors caused a denial of his right to due process. See Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Having already extensively addressed the lack of prejudi ce from both the truck bug evidenc e and Agent Bevington’s potentially impermissible tes timony and having concluded that t here was no error in the Court’s response to the jury note, no prej udice from exposing the jury to the odor of PCP, and no Brady violation, Suggs cannot prevail on a cumulative error theory.27 CONCLUSION For the reasons sta ted above, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant Anthony Maurice Suggs’ motion to vacate his convi ction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is DENIED

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/s/ Ellen Segal Huvelle ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE United States District Judge

Date: November 24, 2015