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95–375 2015

S. HRG. 114–83 

THE ECONOMIC EXPOSURE OF FEDERAL CREDIT 

PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 17, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee 

( 
(II) 

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 

[Created pursuant to Sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304, 79th Congress] 

SENATE 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana, Chairman 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

BILL CASSIDY, M.D., Louisiana 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas, Vice Chairman 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Ranking 

JOHN DELANEY, Maryland 

ALMA S. ADAMS, PH.D., North Carolina 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

VIRAJ M. MIRANI, Executive Director 

HARRY GURAL, Democratic Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

OPENING STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS

Hon. Daniel Coats, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Indiana .............................. 1 

Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Ranking Member, a U.S. Representative from 

New York .............................................................................................................. 3 

Hon. Mike Lee, a U.S. Senator from Utah ............................................................ 5 

WITNESSES

Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, President, American Action Forum, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 7 

Mr. Jason Delisle, Director, Federal Education Budget Project, New America, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 8 

Mr. Douglas Elliott, Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC ................. 10 

Dr. Paul Van de Water, Senior Fellow, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, DC .......................................................................................... 12 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Prepared statement of Hon. Daniel Coats ............................................................. 28 

Letter dated June 16, 2015, from the National Education Association to 

Representative Maloney ...................................................................................... 29 

Letter dated June 16, 2015, from the National Association of Home Builders 

to Senator Coats and Representative Maloney .................................................. 31 

Letters for the record submitted by Representative Maloney ............................. 34 

Prepared statement of Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney ................................................. 51 

Prepared statement of Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin .................................................. 53 

Prepared statement of Mr. Jason Delisle .............................................................. 60 

Prepared statement of Mr. Douglas Elliott ........................................................... 71 

Prepared statement of Dr. Paul Van de Water ..................................................... 82 

Questions for the Record submitted by Senator Mike Lee and responses 

from Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Mr. Douglas Elliott ................................... 84 

Question for the Record submitted by Senator Bill Cassidy and response 

from Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin ............................................................................ 90 

Questions for the Record submitted by Congresswoman Alma Adams and 

responses from Dr. Paul Van de Water and Mr. Douglas Elliott ..................... 92 

Letter dated June 17, 2015, from Deborah Lucas to Chairman Coats, Ranking 

Member Maloney, and Members of the JEC ..................................................... 94 

(1) 

THE ECONOMIC EXPOSURE OF FEDERAL 

CREDIT PROGRAMS 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2015 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in Room 216 

of the Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dan Coats, 

Chairman, and Mike Lee, presiding. 

Representatives present: Schweikert, Grothman, Carolyn B. 

Maloney of New York, Delaney, Adams, and Beyer. 

Senators present: Coats, Lee, Cotton, Sasse, Klobuchar, and 

Heinrich. 

Staff present: Connie Foster, Harry Gural, Colleen Healy, 

David Logan, Viraj Mirani, Barry Nolan, Leslie Phillips, Sue 

Sweet, Jim Whitney, and Phoebe Wong. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL COATS, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Chairman Coats. The Committee will come to order. 

The Committee today will examine the economic exposure of Federal credit programs. I would like to thank our witnesses for being 

here. We will be introducing them shortly. 

As I begin, I want to thank Senator Mike Lee for agreeing to 

spearhead this program. He helped with us in terms of putting all 

this together and inviting the witnesses. He will be here very 

shortly. 

I have a conflict and have to be on the Senate floor. I apologize 

to the witnesses and my Committee members here that I have to 

do this, but I will put it in the capable hands of Senator Lee to conduct this hearing. 

He has played a leading role in raising attention to this issue. 

As I have indicated, he and his staff have helped us in putting together the hearing, including identifying some of our witnesses. 

Today we will examine why accounting for our federal assets 

matters, and why inaccurate monitoring can bring economic harm 

to borrowers who pay higher interest rates to cover the defaults of 

others, private lenders who are frozen out of the markets they seek 

to serve, and taxpayers who may be exposed to unqualified losses. 

During my prior service in the Senate, I was one of the nay votes 

for the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. Twenty-five 

years later, I never imagined that I would be chairing a hearing 

to debate the impact of accounting rules passed back then. 
2 

This situation reminds me of an old Yogi Berra quote, ‘‘The future ain’t what it used to be.’’ The 1990 Reconciliation law included 

the Federal Credit Reform Act, accounting rules crafted in reaction 

to the rocky credit history of the 1980s. 

The Resolution Trust Corporation held the assets of failed savings and loans and put the Federal Government in the loan-workout business. Sadly, fraudulent student loans made during the decade, that decade, led to a 20 percent student-loan default rate and 

a loss equal to almost 10 percent of outstanding loans. 

Cash accounting for all these asset changes within a budget year 

presented a volatile picture of the Federal budget that properly 

represented spending trends. Since then, the Federal Government 

has followed the rules of FCRA, recording an annual present-value 

adjusted, quote, ‘‘subsidy cost’’ to account for losses it may incur in 

the future charged against loans it has made directly, as well as 

guarantees it provided for loans made by others. 

It took 10 years to refine the complicated net present value calculations used for FCRA, but by 2002 government accountants calculated that the federal portfolio of $1.3 to $1.4 trillion in loans 

and guarantees generated annual subsidy costs in the range of $5 

to $12 billion. 

This brings us to the financial crisis of 2008 which ballooned the 

government’s loan assets. FCRA’s accounting rules converted loan 

subsidy costs into deficit reducers. Since 2008, government accountants have booked nearly $200 billion in annual subsidy gains while 

the amount of federal loans and guarantees has more than doubled. 

As a result, it is clear that the more credit market exposure the 

government takes on, the more that expectations of future revenue 

rise under the current accounting rules without equal accounting 

for higher risk. 

At the end of September 2014, loans made or fully guaranteed by the Federal Government totaled over $2.9 trillion. This includes 

$1.1 trillion in student loans. The Federal Reserve reported that 

nonmortgage consumer debt totaled $3.3 trillion as of September 

30, 2014, giving the Federal Government a one-third share of the 

U.S. consumer loan market. 

Add that to the 70 percent of the mortgage market that the Federal Government holds through direct loan guarantees and Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac, and the Federal Government is the largest 

consumer lender in the country. 

A lot has changed in those 25 years. So today we must ask ourselves: Do accounting rules passed 25 years ago reflect the complexity of today’s financial world? 

I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Maloney for her 

opening statement, and just before I do I want to hand over this 

gavel. When I first got a gavel in my hand I thought, wow, I can 

get something done here. 

So, Mike, be careful. Don’t take us past the jurisdiction of the 

Committee. It would be tempting, but I am putting this in very capable hands. And thank you for heading up this hearing. But first, 

let us hear from Senator—I mean, Congresswoman Maloney. 

And then after you give your opening statement I would ask you 

to introduce the witnesses and take care of the hearing. 

Senator Lee [presiding]. Right. 
3 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Coats appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 28.] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, 

RANKING MEMBER, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK 

Representative Maloney. Thank you so much, Chairman 

Coats, for holding this hearing. And I thank all of our panelists for 

being here today. 

In this morning’s hearing we will compare two systems for budgeting federal credit programs. The first, the Federal Credit Reform 

Act of 1990—so-called FCRA—was signed into law by George H. W. 

Bush in 1990. It has proven a reliable tool for budgeting federal 

credit programs. 

The second, so-called ‘‘Fair Value Accounting,’’ is a program supported by some of my colleagues in the Republican Party that will 

make federal credit programs seem more expensive. If implemented, this system will necessitate cutting loan programs, or raising interest rates. In my mind, there is nothing fair about ‘‘Fair 

Value Accounting.’’ 

At its root, today’s hearing is about two vastly different philosophical approaches to government. My Republican friends believe 

that the Federal Government, in this case federal lending programs, should operate just like the private sector. But the Federal 

Government is not the private sector. The principal motivation of 

the private sector is to maximize profit. 

The principal role of government is to provide services that the 

private sector cannot or will not provide. These differences are especially clear in federal lending programs. 

Private institutions make loans that they think will be the most 

profitable. But the United States Government sees things differently. 

For example, it lends to a group of individuals with little or no 

income and no credit history. They are known as ‘‘college students.’’ 

And there are more than 20 million of them in the United States 

today. 

The vast majority of student loans are issued or guaranteed by 

the Federal Government. Why does the government take on this 

risk? Because it helps millions of Americans go to college who 

might otherwise not be able to afford to go. 

It also benefits the rest of us by creating a more educated workforce. A better workforce will make our country more competitive, 

and will make our economy stronger and our country stronger. This 

is a social good not recognized by private lenders. 

I want to turn to the specific question of how we measure the 

cost of Federal Government loan programs. How these programs 

are accounted for and how their budget impact is assessed will affect the broader deficit outlook in choices we make as policymakers. 

The current procedure under the Federal Credit Reform Act appropriately calculates the lifetime costs of federal credit programs, 

reflecting both the risk of default and the government’s cost of borrowing. 

FCRA has been very accurate. OMB found that in the more than 

20 years that FCRA has been in place, the initial cost estimates of 

all credit programs differed from their actual costs by less than one 
4 

percent of their face value. As they say: If it ain’t broke, don’t fix 

it. 

But today we are apparently trying to fix a system that already 

works very well. It is part of a broader ideological initiative. In tax 

policy Republicans are trying to change the rules of the game by 

instituting so-called ‘‘dynamic scoring.’’ This would make tax cuts 

seem less expensive than they really are. 

In federal credit policy, Republicans are trying to change the 

rules of the game using an accounting system that will make programs like student loans look more expensive. The result of this socalled fair value accounting will be cuts in federal loan programs. 

For example, less money available for students at higher interest 

rates. 

Under fair value accounting, the cost of federal credit programs, 

which are funded by the purchase of low-interest Treasury Securities, would be evaluated as if they were forced to borrow with an 

additional risk premium demanded by the private sector. 

As the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities put it, fair value 

budgeting requires that the budget, quote, ‘‘reflect amounts that 

the Treasury would never actually pay anyone,’’ end quote. It will 

make federal lending programs appear more costly than they really 

are. 

Millions of Americans have something to lose if proponents of 

this accounting system have their way. I regret that we don’t have 

any of their representatives on the panel today. However, Chairman Coats and I have received letters from a number of organizations that strongly oppose the fair value accounting system. I have 

a stack of them here (indicating), and I have a letter with me right 

now from the National Education Association which states, and I 

quote: 

‘‘NEA opposes the use of fair value accounting in federal credit 

programs, especially student loan programs, because it would artificially raise their costs and make them appear to be more expensive to the Federal Government than they really are.’’ End quote. 

I ask unanimous consent to place this letter into the record. 

Senator Lee. Without objection. 

[The letter appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 

29.] 

A letter from the National Association of Home Builders states, 

and I quote, ‘‘Fair value accounting would artificially raise the 

rates on home loans.’’ And I would also like to enter that letter into 

the record. 

[The letter appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 

31.] 

Other organizations also oppose using fair value accounting for 

budgeting purposes: The National Association of Realtors, the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, The 

Retired Enlisted Association, The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, The Student Aid Alliance, The National Multifamily Housing Council, and many, many others, and I would like 

to place these letters that I just mentioned into the record. 

[The letters appear in the Submissions for the Record on page 

34.] 
5 

Representative Maloney. In conclusion, I ask that we listen to 

both sides of the debate today, but that ultimately we not let ideology trump reality. Fair value budgeting would distort the budget 

process, undercut federal credit programs, and ultimately deprive 

millions of Americans of the financial support that they need to get 

an education, buy a home, or start or operate a small business. 

I look forward to our discussion today, and I thank each of the 

witnesses for appearing before the Committee. And I yield back. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Maloney appears in 

the Submissions for the Record on page 51.] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM UTAH 

Senator Lee. Thank you, Representative Maloney, and the documents you have submitted will be submitted into the record, without objection. 

I want to thank Chairman Coats for calling this hearing, and 

also for his insightful remarks, and for the remarks that we have 

heard so far from Representative Maloney. 

From the early days of our Republic, we have had an ongoing debate about the role to be played by the Federal Government within 

the credit market. The provision of credit to the states and its assumption by the newly formed Federal Government was a topic of 

great debate and discussion during the drafting of the Constitution 

in 1787 and during the early Congresses formed pursuant to that 

document. 

Provision of credit by the Federal Government has a somewhat 

more recent history. As Mr. Elliott, who is one of our witnesses 

today, noted in his book ‘‘Uncle Sam In Pinstripes,’’ the provision 

of federal credit began in the way we are discussing today in the 

early part of the 20th Century. It began with farm programs under 

President Theodore Roosevelt. 

These programs have ballooned over the past century. Today we 

frequently hear about $18 trillion in total outstanding public debt. 

It is far less common to hear about the $3 trillion in Federal Government loan exposure that Journalist Michael Grunwald identified earlier this year. 

This federal credit system has grown over the years at times responding to perceived political needs, and at other times responding to political pressure from special interests, natural mission 

creep, and bureaucratic ambitions. 

This has left us with a system that no one would design. We 

have a housing finance system that leans almost entirely on federal 

backstops in the FHA and VA. 

We have a student loan program administered almost entirely by 

the Federal Government, a program that notably took considerable 

writedowns over recent weeks. 

We have the Export-Import Bank that was founded before exporters could easily fly across the ocean to visit customers, and now 

exists largely to facilitate deals between large corporations and 

large banks, while leaving the taxpayer on the hook. 

From TARP to farm programs, the Federal Credit System is hard 

to think of as a system at all, except for one feature. If things go 
6 

wrong, the Federal Government is on the hook. If things go wrong, 

the taxpayer ends up with the bill. 

It is critically important that Congress debate the wisdom of 

such a system’s existence at all, including the Constitutional and 

prudential justifications for the provision of federal credit. 

Today we look to start that debate by discussing something much 

simpler than this larger discussion. Namely, we are looking to find 

valid means to analyze costs, compare management structures, and 

establish a general rubric to make apples-to-apples comparisons. 

We hope to be able to both compare different credit programs 

against each other, and compare credit programs relative to spending, tax, or regulatory programs designed to accomplish similar 

goals. 

Getting on the same page on these questions will be a key step 

in the process of reforming these programs. 

So I thank the Chairman again for this opportunity and I look 

forward to the testimony that we are going to hear from each of 

our witnesses. 

And with that, I would like to introduce our witnesses before we 

hear from them. We will start on this end of the table and then 

move over. 

Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin is the President of the American Action 

Forum, and most recently was a commissioner on the Congressionally chartered Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. During 2001 to 

2002, he was the Chief Economist of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers. From 2003 to 2005, Dr. Holtz-Eakin was the sixth 

director of the Congressional Budget Office. From 2007 to 2008, he 

was Director of Domestic and Economic Policy for the John McCain 

Presidential Campaign. And following the 2008 election, Dr. HoltzEakin was the President of DHE Consulting. Dr. Holtz-Eakin received his B.A. from Denison University, and his Ph.D. from 

Princeton University. 

Jason Delisle is the Director of the Federal Education Budget 

Project, which is part of the Educational Policy Program at New 

America. Mr. Delisle is a leading expert on the federal student loan 

program, and federal financing for higher education. Before joining 

New America in 2007, Mr. Delisle was a senior analyst on the Republican staff of the United States Senate Budget Committee. Prior 

to that position, he served as a legislative aide in the office of Representative Thomas Petri. Mr. Delisle holds a Masters Degree in 

Public Policy from George Washington University, and a Bachelor’s 

Degree from Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin. 

Douglas Elliott, a Fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings 

Institution, is a member of the Initiative on Business and Public 

Policy. A financial institutions investment banker for two decades, 

principally at J.P.Morgan, he was the founder and principal researcher for the Center on Federal Financial Institutions, a think 

tank devoted to the analysis of federal lending and insurance activities. He recently wrote the book, ‘‘Uncle Sam In Pinstripes,’’ 

evaluating the U.S. federal credit programs, the only comprehensive review of the Federal Government’s credit activities to be written in the last quarter century. Mr. Elliott graduated from Harvard 

College magna cum laude with an A.B. in Sociology in 1981, and 
7 

in 1984 he graduated from Duke University with an M.A. in Computer Science. 

Last but not least, Paul Van de Water is a Senior Fellow at the 

Center on Budget and Policy Priorities where he specializes in 

Medicare, Social Security, and health coverage issues. He is also 

Director of the Center’s Policy Futures Initiative. Previously he 

was Vice President for Health Policy at the National Academy of 

Social Insurance. Van de Water worked for over 18 years at the 

Congressional Budget Office. From 1994 to 1999, he was Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

So with that, why don’t we hear from the witnesses. Let’s hear 

from all of you. If you can try to keep your remarks within about 

five minutes, then we will proceed to questions from there. And we 

will start with you, Dr. Holtz-Eakin. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, Ph.D., PRESIDENT, 

AMERICAN ACTION FORUM, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. Thank you, Senator Lee, Ranking Member 

Maloney, and Members of the Committee, for the chance to be here 

today. 

As has been emphasized in your remarks and Chairman Coats’ 

remarks before that, there is an enormous commitment of taxpayer 

resources to federal loans and loan guarantees. If you look at the 

tables put out most recently by the Office of Management and 

Budget, there are $3.3 trillion since 2014 in such loans and loan 

guarantees outstanding. And in light of the magnitude of this commitment of resources, I applaud the Committee for looking into 

this. I think it is an extremely important topic to understand. 

I will be brief. I will just make three basic points. 

Point number one is that the 1990 Federal Credit Reform Act 

was actually an enormous step forward in that it leveled the playing field between direct federal lending and the guarantee of private loans by the Federal Government. Both have the same economic function; they provide the same credit flow to the ultimate 

consumer; and they are both backed by the taxpayer and are a 

commitment of the taxpayers’ resources. 

However, having said that, the Federal Credit Reform Act does 

have a glaring hole. If you look in the OMB tables, those $3.3 trillion in loans and loan guarantees are assumed to make a profit, 

a profit, of $22.3 billion, and not be perceived as a cost to the taxpayer. 

That is counter to anyone’s intuition and reveals the flaw with 

the Federal Credit Reform Act, which is it omits an important 

source of risk—the market risks that are associated with credit activities. 

That omission of market risk causes FCRA to underestimate the 

true cost of credit evaluated in that fashion. And it is important 

when Congress is making decisions to not only have a firm handle 

on the benefits of credit programs, but also their actual cost to the 

taxpayers with all kinds of risks involved. 

The big difference between FCRA and fair value accounting is 

fair value accounting incorporates this market risk. It recognizes 

that as the economy fluctuates there is a tendency for loan failures 
8 

to bunch during downturns, and that risk should be involved in the 

calculation of potential losses and any credit activity. 

It also recognizes that the taxpayer has to come up with the 

money to cover those losses at a time when money is especially valuable. During downturns, Americans are less affluent and they do 

not want to have to cover these losses. So fair value accounting 

gets that into the mix. 

The second reason it is pretty obvious that something needs to 

be done is it should not be the case that if you take a loan in the 

private sector and simply drag it across the line between the private sector and government, it should somehow become more valuable or less risky instantaneously because of the label on it. And 

that is exactly what happens under FCRA. 

And indeed we have seen examples of this in recent legislation 

where we have used a government takeover of a private loan portfolio to finance government activities. That is a pure budget gimmick and one of the main reasons I think it is important to examine fair value accounting. 

And the third point is that fair value accounting is not some untested theoretical proposition. When I was the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, we undertook numerous studies of what 

important federal backstops would look like under fair value accounting. We looked at the Pension Guaranty Corporation. We 

looked at the Student Loan Program. We looked at the then-Chrysler bailout from the 1980s. We looked at the guarantees for Air 

West during 2001–2002. We looked at Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac. And in each case, you would see a clear pattern: things that 

looked like they were profitable with the government became a cost 

to the taxpayer; things that were costly to the taxpayer were underestimated and needed to be revised upward. 

Since then, we have actually seen fair value accounting, both in 

resources given to the Housing GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac, and for accounting for the TARP program and the budgeting 

of that intervention. 

So this is not something that is untested. This is not something 

that could not be done, and doing it would give a fair presentation 

of the commitment of taxpayer backstop to the credit programs, 

and I would encourage the Congress to move forward with it. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin appears in 

the Submissions for the Record on page 53.] 

Senator Lee. Mr. Delisle. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JASON DELISLE, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL 

EDUCATION BUDGET PROJECT, NEW AMERICA, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Delisle. Thank you, Senator Lee, Ranking Member 

Maloney, and Members of the Committee. I am glad to have the 

opportunity to testify about the cost of federal credit programs and 

the Federal Student Loan Program in particular. 

The Federal Government’s direct loan program plays a vital role 

in our postsecondary education system and our national economy. 

It guarantees access to credit at favorable terms for millions of 
9 

Americans who pursue credentials that range from short-term certificates to graduate professional degrees. 

And despite the recent backlash against student debt, a government loan is a perfectly logical tool to support postsecondary education. Loans allow students to move some of the future earnings 

that they would gain from an education to the present, and to finance the education itself. 

Moreover, a robust private market for student lending is unlikely 

to develop because of information asymmetries and poor economies 

of scale. And a private market would likely make credit most readily available to those who need it least. It would also restrict credit 

availability in times of economic stress, the point at which demand 

for higher education surges. 

So while the case for a government student loan program is 

strong, so too is the case for knowing what it costs. One point helps 

make that clear. 

The student loan program is quickly set to become the largest government loan program. With $1.2 trillion in debt outstanding, 

it is on the verge of eclipsing mortgage guarantees made through 

the Federal Housing Administration. 

Yet despite the need for reliable information about what this program costs, Congress has actually prevented the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office from doing just that. As a result, we have 

the highly unusual situation of the Congress asking CBO to provide it with the best estimate of what the budget agency believes 

the program costs, while dictating what information the CBO must 

use to construct its estimate. 

In the early 1990s, Congress made important changes to the way 

federal loan programs are treated in the budget with the enactment of the Federal Credit Reform Act, or FCRA. That law put federal loan programs on an accrual basis and was a big improvement 

over measuring loans on a cash-in/cash-out basis. 

But what lawmakers also included was a provision in the law 

that systematically understates the cost of government loan programs. And I am using the words of the Congressional Budget Office there. 

They mandated that budget analysts, including the CBO, discount risky cash flows associated with a loan at a risk-free rate— 

the interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities. Thus, the average 

expected cash flows for government loans are treated as if they 

were financially indistinguishable from those of the U.S. Treasury 

with the same expected performance. 

The CBO has argued that that approach does not provide a comprehensive measure of what federal credit programs actually cost 

the government. Indeed, FCRA suggests that the government can 

earn a profit on student loans even though it provides them at 

terms much more generous than taxpayers would offer voluntarily. 

FCRA’s risk-free discounting can also make it appear, albeit erroneously, that when the government purchases loans at market 

prices it immediately records a financial gain. Worse still, the 

riskier the loan that the government buys, the larger the immediate financial gain. 

The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities warned in 2005 that 

those dubious results created a, quote, ‘‘supposed free lunch,’’ un-
10 

quote. And in response argued fervently that expected returns on 

risky assets must be risk-adjusted, citing the CBO and many 

economists. 

But as I am sure you will hear today, the CBBP now says that 

view was, quote, ‘‘mistaken.’’ The economists at the CBBP cited in 

2005, including the CBO, have not, however, changed their position. 

A better accounting approach, one endorsed by the Congressional 

Budget Office and many financial economists, would discount loan 

cash flows using a market-based rate, one that is higher than a 

U.S. Treasury rate. That approach incorporates a cost for bearing 

market risk, also called ‘‘fair value accounting.’’ 

So at first glance, the support for fair value accounting would 

suggest that Congress should amend FCRA and require that budget estimates for loan programs use a market-based discount rate. 

But I would recommend a different approach. 

Requiring that cost estimates use a specific type of discount rate, 

a U.S. Treasury rate, or a market-based rate for that matter, is a 

highly unusual intrusion on the discretion Congress affords the 

CBO. 

When the CBO develops estimates for other federal programs 

like the Pell Grant Program, Congress does not require it to assume a certain rate of inflation or student enrollment growth; the 

CBO uses whatever it believes is most appropriate. 

In that regard, Congress should simply amend the language of 

FCRA to give budget agencies the freedom to use the discount rate 

they deem will result in the best estimate. This will surely result 

in fair value accounting because the CBO already supports that. 

And that is a great result because it will be an accounting decision 

that is free of Congressional and partisan interference. 

That concludes my testimony today. I look forward to questions 

that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jason Delisle appears in the 

Submissions for the Record on page 60.] 

Senator Lee. Thank you, sir. Mr. Elliott. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DOUGLAS ELLIOTT, FELLOW, BROOKINGS 

INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Elliott. Thank you, Senator. And thank you all for the opportunity to testify today on an area of great interest to me. 

Senator Lee was kind enough to describe my background. I 

founded the Center on Federal Financial Institutions and worked 

at it as a volunteer for three years because I do believe that this 

is a very important and underlooked area, and he was kind enough 

to mention my book as well. 

Given the political nature of so much of the discussion, let me 

note that I am as close to a political neutral as you will find on 

this topic. I do not belong to a political party. I have served in no 

administration. And I am a moderate on the political spectrum. So 

you can factor that in as you listen to me. 

In my book I made a number of recommendations for improving 

the effectiveness and efficiency of the federal credit program. I 

would like to repeat a few of them here. 
11 

Specifically, we should target borrowers more carefully, take 

more account of the relative risks of different loans, use the same 

budget rules for all federal credit programs, use risk-based discount 

rates for federal budget purposes, formalize the process of initiating 

new federal credit programs, create a federal bank to administer 

all of these programs, focus more on optimizing the allocation of 

money between these various programs, spread best practices 

across the programs more effectively, and improve the compensation and training of federal financial workers. 

Now given your interests and the time constraints, I will focus 

on risk-based discount rates. 

Accounting systems such as the federal budget are tools that 

should be designed to meet specific needs and should differ depending on those needs. There is not a ‘‘right’’ moral answer. These are 

tools. 

Our current budget approach for federal credit programs ignores 

the variability of potential results. Given how strongly the budget 

numbers drive decision making, we are effectively acting as if Congress and the taxpayers do not care about risk—which I do not believe to be the case. Instead, I believe subsidy costs in the federal 

budget should reflect this uncertainty for several reasons, which 

mostly come down to how they are likely to change the decision 

making. 

First, it is important that federal credit programs be structured 

to minimize risks where possible, while still achieving the overall 

objectives. This is less likely to happen when the budget numbers 

that drive them ignore risk. 

Second, the benefit to borrowers of government loans is higher 

for risky loans, since these would be priced higher by the private 

lenders but are not usually priced higher by the government. Ignoring that risk for federal budgeting has distorting effects on the 

choices that Members of Congress make. In particular, there will 

be a tendency to direct scarce federal dollars to sectors where there 

is more uncertainty in the outcomes since those borrowers will find 

the federal loans more valuable. They will lobby harder for them, 

and they are more likely to apply for and to accept such loans, 

choosing them over private alternatives. 

Third, risk-based pricing, one of my other recommendations, is 

considerably more likely to be implemented if the budget appropriately reflects risk as a cost. The situation today in which a loan 

with a wide range of potential outcomes is treated as costing the 

same as a relatively certain loan discourages political decisions 

that take account of such risk. 

Now there are reasonable counterarguments to moving to riskbased discount rates, although I do not personally find them compelling. The principal one is that the U.S. Government can spread 

any unexpected losses over a very wide tax base and many years 

of time, and therefore does not need to worry about the variability 

of outcomes. However, the way in which federal credit losses are 

ultimately offset is by increasing taxes or decreasing federal expenditures. And it seems very unlikely—sorry, it seems very likely 

that taxpayers would prefer less risk of a big tax increase to more 

risk of one, even if the latter were offset by a potential on the other 

side for unusually good performance and future tax reductions. 
12 

This is especially likely since, as Douglas referred to, credit 

losses are concentrated in those years when the economy is particularly bad and taxpayers are unlikely to feel capable of comfortably 

bearing the resulting tax increases. 

There are also various technical arguments about maintaining 

the consistency of federal credit programs with other programs, 

and of dealing with swings in estimated costs. These are reasonable concerns, but they are outweighed by the fact that Congress 

uses the initial subsidy estimates as by far the most important figure on which to make decisions. As long as these are the critical 

numbers, I believe it is important to incorporate risk appropriately 

into them in order to improve the quality of decisions. Thank you 

very much for your time and consideration. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Douglas Elliott appears in the 

Submissions for the Record on page 71.] 

Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Elliott. Mr. Van de Water. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL VAN de WATER, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Dr. Van de Water. Senator Lee, Ranking Member Maloney, 

Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. The current method of accounting for federal credit programs, as you have heard, fully records on a present-value 

basis all of the cash flows into and out of the Treasury. And that 

fully reflects the risk of default. 

In contrast, fair value accounting would add an extra amount to 

the budgetary cost based on the fact that loan assets are less valuable to the private sector than to the government for several reasons: Businesses must make a profit. They cannot put themselves 

at the head of the line when collecting a debt. They borrow at higher interest rates than the government. And private-sector investors 

are risk-averse. That is, they dislike losses, in this case higher than 

expected loan defaults, more than they like equally likely gains, 

lower defaults. But none of those factors that affect private-sector 

lenders represents an actual cost that the government incurs when 

it makes loans. Fair value accounting is misguided for four reasons. 

First of all, the budget should reflect only the Federal Government’s actual income and outgo, that is, funds that the Treasury 

actually receives or disburses. Including in the budget a cost for 

risk that the government does not actually pay would overstate 

spending, deficits, and debt, making the federal budget a less accurate depiction of the Nation’s fiscal position. 

Second, fair value accounting would treat different federal programs inconsistently because it would not impose a risk version 

penalty on noncredit programs, many of which have costs that are 

at least as uncertain and variable as those of credit programs. Regardless of one’s position on whether a particular credit program 

is worthwhile or not, the budget should put credit programs and 

other programs on a level playing field. Fair value accounting 

would tilt the playing field against credit programs, thereby distorting the process of setting priorities. 

Third, even if one thought that the Federal Government should 

be risk averse on behalf of its citizens, as advocates contend, fair 
13 

value accounting presents an incomplete and misleading picture of 

federal credit programs. Federal loan programs do not necessarily 

increase financial risks for U.S. citizens overall. If the cost of a loan 

program turns out to be higher than originally estimated, taxpayers will indeed eventually have to cover the higher costs. But 

students, farmers, homeowners, or other borrowers will have received more help. Fair value accounting considers only the first 

half of this equation. 

Fourth and finally, cost estimates by themselves are not designed 

to assess whether a federal program is worthwhile, and they should 

not be expected to do so. Deciding whether a federal program or 

project is worth undertaking or expanding entails evaluating many 

factors in addition to its cost to the government, and risk is indeed 

one of those. 

Doug Elliott suggested that leaving risk out of a cost estimate 

suggests that the government does not care about risk. I would 

have to disagree with my friend Doug on that topic. There are a 

lot of things that get left out of cost estimates that are extremely 

important. As an example, building a bridge in a lightly populated 

area is likely to be less valuable and may not be worth doing compared to resurfacing a heavily traveled highway in the Northeast 

corridor. A bill’s cost estimate is never going to reflect all of these 

different factors, and trying to do so is a vain effort. 

My conclusion is the same as that of former CBO Director Robert 

Reischauer who says that fair value accounting, quote, ‘‘represents 

a misguided attempt to mold budget accounting to facilitate a cost/ 

benefit analysis with the result that neither the budget nor the 

cost/benefit analysis would serve their intended purposes well.’’ 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Paul Van De Water appears in 

the Submissions for the Record on page 82.] 

Senator Lee. Thank you very much. Thanks to each of you for 

your testimony. 

Well it seems to me that if we are using accounting methods that 

do not accurately reflect reality, then the fundamental problem 

here is that we are lying to ourselves. We are fooling ourselves. 

And we are fooling ourselves with regard to a very large sum of 

money. 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin, are we making these decisions under flawed accounting rules without a good idea of the relevant tradeoffs? That 

is, if we are analyzing these incorrectly, do we really have the ability accurately to ascertain whether some other program, or no action at all, might be preferable? 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. I do not believe so. I think that, you know, fair 

value accounting would affect a lot of different aspects of the operation of the government. It would affect the analysis of new programs. It would affect the re-estimates that occur each year. It 

would affect the balance sheet presentation. But the most important thing it would affect would be the decision making by the Congress about the relative costs of programs. 

Now the Congress has the right to determine the value of programs. That is what it does. But it should be presented with an 

accurate measure of the costs so that they can make good decisions, 

and they are not right now. 
14 

Senator Lee. And if we are not doing that, then we are fooling 

ourselves. We are not getting accurate information, or we are presented information saying this is worth it, this is making money, 

when in fact it is not; we are not making logical decisions. 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. I think the most important point that Dr. 

Delisle made was that the Congress has precluded the CBO or anyone else from giving a fair representation of the expected cost of 

the programs. That is not in your interest. 

Senator Lee. And, Mr. Delisle, we are not really talking here 

about changing programs; we are talking about analyzing them accurately? Is that correct? 

Mr. Delisle. Right. So we are talking about the cost, and usually 

in these debates we hear a lot about the benefits of the programs. 

Fair value is completely agnostic to the benefits of the program. 

You can have a government program that costs money and provides benefits to people. I think that fact is actually quite intuitive. 

It is credit reform that flips that upside down and suggests that 

you can provide benefits to people and also earn a net return, 

which does not really make much sense. 

Senator Lee. And I would ask both of you, what are the risks 

to the taxpayer when we pretend that programs raise money for 

the government while CBO finds that they lose money under fair 

value? What kind of risk does that present? 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. There are hypothetical answers to that, but I 

will give you a real one. We did an estimate of the taxpayer cost 

of the implicit subsidy in guarantee to Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac. We did it back in 2003 or 2004, when I was CBO Director. 

That number was about $20 billion a year, or $200 billion. 

It was painfully close to what the taxpayer ultimately had to 

shell out in the crisis for the housing GSEs. That is the risk you 

run. You will not budget for real costs that will happen in very bad 

moments. 

Mr. Delisle. Well I would—the sort of, the flaws in the Federal 

Credit Reform Act actually make the entire world of finance appear 

as a gigantic arbitrage opportunity for the Federal Government. To 

show you how distorting that is, you have heard that Greece has 

a bit of a debt problem. And the market is charging them quite a 

high interest rate on their bonds. Under FCRA, if the Federal Government purchased Greece’s debt, it would book an immediate profit. 

I cannot imagine many members of the Committee suggesting 

that that looks right to them. 

Senator Lee. Maybe we should look into that, though? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. Elliott, on the net, examining all federal programs in the aggregate, and all costs and benefits of these programs, does the academic literature indicate that during normal economic times that 

federal credit programs are net negative, or a net positive, for the 

economy? 

Mr. Elliott. We do not know, is the short answer. One reason 

we do not know is there are many judgment calls that have to be 

made. 

I think there are certain programs—student loan programs, for 

example—where it is very clear that there is a market imperfection 
15 

that really cannot be solved other than by having a very significant 

federal role. 

In programs like that there is no question in my mind that, at 

least properly run, provide a significant economic benefit. Many of 

the other programs, it’s harder to say. In many ways they are more 

redistributional than anything else. It is choosing which segments 

of the population to help, and Congress many have valid reasons 

for helping them, or they may not. 

Senator Lee. Thank you. Okay, I see my time has expired. 

Ranking Member Maloney. 

Representative Maloney. Thank you. 

Mr. Van de Water, changing to fair value budgeting would have 

far-reaching consequences for students, and Veterans, and home 

buyers, and small businesses who benefit from our various federal 

credit programs. Fair value budgeting would not actually make federal credit programs more costly, but it would certainly make them 

all appear more costly than they really are. 

It would do this by assuming banks and governments are somehow alike, and assigning to government credit programs the same 

costs of lending as those faced in the private sector. 

So would increased phantom costs resulting from fair value accounting be passed along to borrowers in the form of higher interest rates and fees? 

Dr. Van de Water. We can only speculate as to what the result 

would be, but certainly by increasing the cost of credit programs 

relative to those of noncredit programs, it would change the incentives, exactly as Doug Elliott has just said, in a way that would 

make it highly likely that the Congress would either reduce the 

scope of the lending programs, or change the terms—that is, increase the interest rates, charge higher origination fees, whatever, 

in ways to make the programs less generous. 

So I think it is clear that changing the accounting method would 

be likely to have real impacts on borrowers. 

Representative Maloney. As the cost of these federal credit 

programs appear to increase, would the federal deficit also increase? 

Dr. Van de Water. That is one of the complications that this introduces. The problem, as I see it, with fair value accounting is 

that it introduces a cost in the budget which is not actually a cashdollar cost that the government ever incurs. 

The good thing about our current accounting system is that we 

actually have a benchmark at the end of the day for figuring out 

whether things actually worked out the way we estimated. Namely, 

we can observe the cash flows. 

But if one starts adding a cost—in this case a cost for risk— 

which is not a cash cost, we lose that ability to track the budget 

to what actually happens. 

And the proposals for fair value accounting, depending on the 

proposal, make various adjustments to make sure the books balance in the end even when you have added this imaginary cost. 

Representative Maloney. And would higher apparent costs for 

federal credit programs disadvantage them relative to other federal 

programs? And if so, how? 
16 

Dr. Van de Water. That is exactly right. As the other witnesses 

have indicated, the essence of fair value accounting is to add to the 

estimated cost of federal credit programs an additional item, a risk 

premium, a risk penalty, to reflect the fact that there is uncertainty in what the disbursements of the credit programs will actually be. 

But the same thing is true for many, many other federal spending programs as well. In advance, we do not know exactly what 

they are going to cost, and we do not know precisely in what years 

they will be incurred. 

So by adding a risk penalty for credit programs but not for other 

federal programs, we are thereby putting the credit programs at a 

disadvantage. 

Representative Maloney. Thank you. 

Mr. Delisle, there are more than 20 million college students now 

in the United States, and many of them rely on student loans provided by or guaranteed by the Federal Government. 

Fair value accounting would likely mean that student loan programs will shrink and/or that interest rates will go up. How would 

you defend fair value accounting to a large meeting of college students? 

Mr. Delisle. Well, I would say, like I said at the beginning of 

my testimony, there is a strong rationale for having a federal student loan program. And it is important to provide subsidized credit 

to them. I am a hundred percent for that. 

But what the program costs should be agnostic to what we think 

the benefits are. Right? Cost/benefit analysis is two parts. You have 

got to get the costs right, and you have got to get the benefits right. 

They are two different things. 

Representative Maloney. And Mr. Elliott, we have received— 

I went through a whole stack of letters from organizations, stakeholders in our country that were basically opposing fair value accounting. To name a few: the National Education Association, the 

National Association of Home Builders. The Retired Enlisted Association, The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, The 

Student Aid Alliance. Many other very active associations, including the National Association of Realtors, have gone on record 

against fair value. 

And if you were advising a Member of Congress on this issue, 

how would you recommend that he or she explain the issue to 

these organizations? 

Mr. Elliott. I think I would argue along the same lines that 

Jason just did, which is essentially we want Congress to be making 

decisions based on the best possible cost numbers, the best possible 

benefit numbers. 

I am not at all surprised that a set of borrowers basically would 

prefer us to use lower discount rates on the theory that that will 

not give us any incentive to increase the rates. So there is nothing 

we can say to them that will change their position. 

Representative Maloney. Well my time has expired. 

Senator Lee. Okay. Next we will recognize Mr. Delaney; then 

after Mr. Delaney, Mr. Schweikert, and then we will proceed from 

there. 
17 

Representative Delaney. Thank you. I want to thank all the 

witnesses for being here today and sharing their testimony. 

Mr. Elliott, you mentioned a concept that I thought was very interesting, which is creating a bank within the government and consolidating all the lending activities out of that bank, which I would 

love to follow up with you more on that. That seems to be a pretty 

interesting idea. You could have consolidated accounting, and credit, and portfolio management, and all those kinds of things, and it 

would make these programs inherently less sloppy, right, because 

there would be more rigor around how they are managed. 

From an accounting standpoint, if that bank had its assets effectively mark-to-market, which is in some ways what this does, 

would you suggest that its liabilities also be mark-to-market? Because my experience with financial institutions, if you mark one 

side of the balance sheet you have to mark the other side, as well. 

How should we think about—a lot of this discussion is about 

marking the assets to market to provide greater transparency. Are 

they priced right? How do they compare to the market? Et cetera. 

Would we then also have to mark the liabilities to market? 

Mr. Elliott. So two parts. First, thank you for your positive comments about the idea of a single federal credit bank. I do think 

there are—there is great potential there for improved efficiency, 

which—— 

Representative Delaney. Right. And we will follow up on that 

later. 

Mr. Elliott. In terms of the question, what the Federal Credit 

Reform Act does is it looks at both the positive and negative cash 

flows out from this point in time forward. 

Representative Delaney. Yes. 

Mr. Elliott. All those, whether positive or negative, at any point 

are discounted back at the same discount rate. 

Representative Delaney. Right. 

Mr. Elliott. So your question then would have to be, to get to 

what you are calling the liability side, is we would have to decide 

how were we funding those. 

Representative Delaney. Yes. 

Mr. Elliott. Which we do not do in the budget. We do not say 

this part is from borrowing; that is from a three-year borrowing; 

that is from a seven-year borrowing—— 

Representative Delaney. But you could, right? If you ran it as 

a bank, you could basically have a relationship with the Treasury 

Department and issue different series of notes to the Treasury that 

they would buy. And you would have a whole liability stack. 

Mr. Elliott. You know, it is an interesting point and not one I 

have seriously considered, to be honest, because it is not—it is so 

far different from how we budget now I have just not given it 

thought. 

Representative Delaney. Because I just think when we talk 

about mark-to-market accounting, which is basically where we are 

going in this discussion, it is like people talk about that with banks 

all the time. They say the banks should mark your assets to market, which most banks do not mark their loans to market. 

But in reality, they then should mark their liabilities to market, 

right? And banks have much better liabilities than nonbanks do. So 
18 

those liabilities would mark up, and you would mark the assets 

down, and you would kind of end up in the same place. 

So I think it is important if we think about mark-to-market accounting for the assets that we also have to have some framework 

for thinking about it for the liabilities so that you do not overcorrect so much. Because in fact the government borrows at a much 

better rate than your average AAA borrower. 

And so in fact the government’s liabilities are worth more, right? 

So just when you would mark these assets down, you would be 

marking the liabilities up. 

But I think there might be a better way to get at some of the 

issues that I agree with you on as to whether we are pricing these 

things right, whether we really understand the cost. And Mr. 

Holtz-Eakin, or Dr. Holtz-Eakin, maybe you could comment on this. 

I have talked about a proposal where, rather than changing the 

accounting we simply require the government on a regular basis to 

sell off 10 percent of all its exposure in all these credit programs. 

Right? So you take all the credit programs, Ex-Im, housing programs, things we do for small businesses, go down the list and say 

on some regular basis you have to sell off 10 percent of your exposure to the market. 

And then we see how the market prices it, right? And that to 

me—because using accounting to figure out if things are priced 

right is theoretical and it is based on assumptions, and people can 

always play with assumptions. But when you actually have to sell 

a piece to the market, you are actually getting real transparency. 

And that information in some programs should maybe dictate how 

they are priced, but other programs we just should know it. 

We should say, hey, we are making loans to startup energy companies that would sell it for 20 cents on the dollar. That is a huge 

subsidy. Should we be using that money elsewhere? 

Would you comment on that proposal? 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. I think that is quite useful. In terms of the 

two things that are going to be affected, the first is, as you mentioned, the mark-to-market on the balance sheet. I am actually less 

concerned about that. 

Representative Delaney. Yes. 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. I am much more concerned about the income 

statement, making sure we get that cost right. 

Representative Delaney. Yes. 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. One of the practical difficulties people always 

ask is, how do I get the right market risk to do the discounting? 

Representative Delaney. If you sell a piece, you know. 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. This gives you some information. 

Representative Delaney. Right. 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. And I think it is something that is worth exploring. 

Representative Delaney. I talked to the chairman of the Financial Services Committee, House Chairman Hensarling, about 

this, because there is a big debate with Ex-Im right now. Folks at 

Ex-Im say they’re priced to the market. 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. Right. 

Representative Delaney. All these other people come in and 

say they’re undercutting the market. My point is, well we should 
19 

just make them sell off part of their balance sheet every year and 

then we will know. Right? If people pay par, they are pricing it 

right. If they pay at a big discount, then there is a big subsidy. And 

then we can decide, are we okay with that? 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. Right. And you are going to get a maturity 

strip—— 

Representative Delaney. Right. 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin [continuing]. So you can get the estimates 

right. 

Representative Delaney. You would have to do it in a logical 

way. So that is something I also think should be put on the table 

in this discussion as you all think about this. 

Thank you. 

Senator Lee. Okay. We are now going to go to Senator 

Klobuchar, and then to Mr. Schweikert. 

Senator Klobuchar. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate it. 

Thank you to all our witnesses. It is great to see some of you 

back—Dr. Holtz-Eakin—and to be back here at the Joint Economic 

Committee on this important hearing. 

I thought I would start out with veterans’ housing. Since 2001, 

the VA has helped 3.75 million Veterans buy their own homes. 

Mr. Van de Water, how would changing to the fair value or 

added-cost accounting method affect the VA’s Home Loan Program, 

in your view? 

Dr. Van de Water. Senator, the general effect of fair value accounting is to increase the estimated cost of credit programs compared to the way that cost is recorded under the current accounting 

mechanism. 

And while we cannot be sure exactly how Congress would respond to that change with regard to any particular program, including veterans, I think it is highly likely that if the program 

were to appear more expensive that it would fare less well in the 

annual competition for resources, and therefore, it is likely, although not entirely certain, that the Veterans Housing Programs 

would become smaller, or that the loan terms would be changed in 

a way to reduce the subsidies for borrowers. 

Senator Klobuchar. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Elliott, Minnesota 

cares a lot about infrastructure. We are the State that had that 

bridge collapse six blocks from my house, killing 13 people. And as 

you know, we have some issues with infrastructure, everything 

from bridges, roads, rail, and I am a fan of doing something about 

it, and I support a lot of the work that Congressman Delaney and 

others have been doing in this area. 

How would switching from the current financing system using 

the 30-year Treasury rate with credit premium to the fair value or 

added-cost accounting affect investment in infrastructure, in your 

view? Are there other funding mechanisms that we should examine? 

Mr. Elliott. Currently, in my view, we understate the cost of all 

the programs, and therefore Congress would be looking at higher 

costs to do the same thing using the current approach. As would 

Paul, I cannot say what Congress might then choose to do in terms 

of that. Presumably higher costs might make them do less, but who 

knows. 
20 

In terms of other ways of doing it, there are of course things like 

public-private partnerships, but I honestly will confess I am not an 

expert on those. 

Senator Klobuchar. Perhaps, Mr. Delaney, you could ask him. 

No, there’s a lot—Senator Warner will actually be putting our bill 

out today, a bipartisan bill similar to some of the work that Congressman Delaney has done. And so that is part of the answer, but 

clearly not the only answer. 

I just wanted to end on the Ex-Im Bank. We have 170 Minnesota 

businesses that have been helped by the Ex-Im Bank just in one 

year alone. I visit all 87 counties in my State every year, and I 

often visit these small businesses. The topic usually isn’t even ExIm, but then I find out that they are exporting. We are such a big 

export State, we have 17 Fortune 500 companies, and it has 

spawned a lot of the smaller companies that export. But they literally have no expert on Kazakhstan or something, and they use 

the Ex-Im Bank to help them, and help them with financing. 

Mr. Van de Water, does the current system under the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act of 1990 reflect the costs of the Ex-Im Bank to the 

taxpayers? And how would the funds returned to the American taxpayer be accounted for under the new rules? 

Dr. Van de Water. Yes, Senator. The current accounting mechanism fully reflects all of the cash that goes into or out of the Treasury. So in that sense, the current accounting mechanism does reflect the full cost of the Export-Import Bank and other credit programs. 

The difference is that fair value accounting would add to that 

cost, to the recorded cost, an additional sum to reflect risk, which 

is not an actual cash cost to the Treasury or to taxpayers. 

Senator Klobuchar. Okay. Does anyone want to add anything, 

or disagree? 

Mr. Elliott. If I could just add one thing, briefly. 

Senator Klobuchar. Yes. 

Mr. Elliott. One of the issues we sometimes lose sight of is both 

potential approaches are simply ways of trying to summarize a 

long series of future cash outflows and inflows. The human mind 

is not capable of dealing with it, if we were to tell you it was X 

amount this year, X amount this year, you could not usefully do 

that. 

So we have to bring it to a value in today’s dollars. These are 

both reasonable ways of doing it, but what we are arguing about 

is what would be the effects of doing it one way or another in terms 

of how you would make your decisions. 

Senator Klobuchar. Right. Okay. Well I will just make one last 

shameless pitch for the Ex-Im Bank, which is not the subject of 

this hearing but, as has been pointed out, could be affected by the 

way we do accounting and may affect taxpayers and those involved. 

And that is that we have 80 developed nations across the world 

that have similar financing authorities, and we would be the only 

one that didn’t. 

We have China having major financing opportunities for their 

businesses, and I just hope we find a way in the next few weeks 

not to shut the Ex-Im Bank down. You are nodding your head, Dr. 

Holtz-Eakin. Do you agree with me? 
21 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. Perhaps to the chagrin of my fellow conservatives, I am compelled by a theoretical argument that it shouldn’t 

exist. I think if you look at the data, you can make the case that 

Ex-Im should be reformed in some fairly dramatic ways; that its 

exposure cap might actually be restricted until we saw the moment 

where actual exporters could not get financing, and then we would 

know we need it. But I don’t know how you can decide in the absence of that evidence that it shouldn’t be around. 

Senator Klobuchar. Very good. That’s a perfect end to my 

questions. Thank you everyone. 

Senator Lee. Okay. Congressman Schweikert, and then we will 

go to Congressman Beyer. 

Representative Schweikert. Thank you, Senator Lee. 

First off, Mr. Delaney, thank you. That is actually a creative 

idea. You know, part of the discussion here for many of us who are 

sort of fixated on sort of price theory is what’s the actual pricing 

of the value of both the credit risk, the programmatic risk, and how 

do you discover that? To the Democrat witness, all those years in 

those finance classes, I need to go back and get my money back 

from those professors because I have now heard things I have 

never heard before. 

One of my personal fixations here, Mr. Chairman and Dr. HoltzEakin, I would love—because I think you have actually written 

parts about this—is what is the actual value of credit programs? 

And how do you actually value the risk profile of them? 

Because we seem to have a setup today with the massive 

amounts of—most Americans have no concept the amount the Federal Government is on the hook for. I mean, what was it, the Politico article last year, or several months ago, ‘‘The Real Bank of 

America’’ was in the trillions, and trillions, and trillions, and trillions, and trillions of dollars that we were on the hook for. 

You would do more than just the fair value accounting. Wouldn’t 

you ultimately try to develop a risk pricing model for these programs? How would you go about doing that? 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. So a couple of things. First, I would echo what 

my friend, Mr. Delisle, says again and again, which is be very clear 

about what is a cost and what is a benefit. So when you say what 

is the value of a credit program, that sounds like the benefit to 

those who are served by it. There may be some empirical evidence, 

but that is also a judgment call in the end of the policymakers. 

If you are going to measure costs, step number two is to first of 

all quantify all the costs that are actually present in the economic 

environment. And in this instance, for credit programs it is out 

there in markets. We can find out. We can do price discovery the 

way Mr. Delaney suggests, or use other techniques, but, you know, 

take comprehensive measures—— 

Representative Schweikert. If—— 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. Let me finish with one more thing, because 

this is the important point. And the point that Mr. Van de Water 

made earlier was, look, other programs have costs as well. Social 

Security has some risks. Medicare has some risk. We are not quantifying that. 

That actually makes the major point, which is: You cannot pretend the Federal Government is a riskless entity. All it does is 
22 

transmit the risk in the economic environment through it back to 

the taxpayers who are subject to those risks to begin with. 

So measure them comprehensively. Trace them back to the taxpayer, because that is ultimately who is going to pay. 

Representative Schweikert. You may have actually nailed it. 

Forgive me if I mispronounce. Is it Deso? 

Mr. Delisle. De-lyle. 

Representative Schweikert. Delisle. I would not have even 

gotten close. 

Mr. Delisle. That’s all right. 

Representative Schweikert. All right. So a bifurcation of this 

argument is in some ways that I almost am hearing that I don’t 

want to know the real pricing because it may take away my policy 

optionality over here because we might not do this. 

How do I mentally get my fellow Members of Congress to sort of 

bifurcate this thing? We need to know the real cost of what we are 

doing, and then on this side deal with the policy side of it? Because 

when many of us start to really dig into the unfunded liabilities, 

it is stunning. We are seeing some in academia saying we are well 

over a couple hundred trillion in the 75-year window of unfunded 

liabilities. Yet, if you were to share that with fellow Members of 

Congress they would just stare at you. 

How do we do that education? 

Mr. Delisle. You do it exactly the same way you do it for every 

other federal program, which is, you say to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office: Do your best. Tell me what you think it 

costs. But don’t tell me what you think we should do after you’ve 

given us that information; we will handle that. 

Loans are different because it is the only place that I know of 

where Congress has told the CBO to use a certain set of assumptions in its estimate. So the CBO can’t do that. And that is why 

we are here today. 

If there were no provision requiring the CBO to use a certain 

kind of discount rate in its estimate, we would not be here. Mr. 

Schweikert. So, Doctor—— 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. If I could add something, there is another big 

difference between these credit programs and those other, quote, 

‘‘unfunded liabilities.’’ 

Credit programs are a contract. You have to honor it. Once that 

loan is issued, that is a loan contract and the taxpayer is on the 

hook. 

The so-called, quote, ‘‘unfunded liabilities’’ are not liabilities; they 

are programmatic decisions made by Congress and can be changed. 

There is settled law on that fact. And the term ‘‘unfunded’’ I dislike 

intensely because it suggests the only need is to fund them, and 

there is not enough taxes out there to do that. 

So this is about the decision making for the structure of those 

programs. 

Representative Schweikert. Well the simple reality—I have 

been here five years, and I think I have never been able to have 

a rational vote on mandatory spending. And in four years, 76 percent of all of our spending will be programmatic. 

So it is the clash of math and policy, and it is collapsing very fast 

around us. 
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With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Senator Lee. Mr. Beyer. 

Representative Beyer. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Elliott, if the current FCRA regulation takes the present 

value of the long-term cash flow out and the long-term cash flow 

in, doesn’t this already reflect the likelihood of default of some of 

these loans? And doesn’t this methodology then already build the 

risk into the portfolio? 

On top of that, how do you—how do you answer the objection 

over the past two decades that FCRA has proven to be extremely 

accurate in projecting the actual cash flow of all these federal credit loan programs? 

Mr. Elliott. There is a confusion with the term ‘‘risk.’’ If you 

mean ‘‘risk’’ the potential for losing, the expectation of losing 

money—that is, some loans will not pay you back— FCRA does a 

good job of taking that into account. 

What we are talking about here is, when you enter into a program some of them—there is a high likelihood you will end up 

where you expect to be. And there are other programs with a much 

wider range of possibilities. 

And so the question is: Do you as a Member of Congress want 

a budget number to reflect the difference between very certain results and very uncertain results? Or do you not? 

Representative Beyer. It seems to me that one of the issues 

here is that we are trying to compare the Federal Government’s 

credit to that of a major financial institution, a bank, a profit-making institution. And clearly we are involved in this as a federal government because we are making loans that banks would not 

make—student loans being the best example. 

And we are doing that because we have a larger social purpose. 

So, Dr. Van de Water sort of reminds me of the asymmetric warfare, that fair value takes societal costs but not societal benefits. 

It is like the dynamic scoring, which my dear friend Congressman 

Delaney has written about very well in various op eds in The Post, 

that dynamic scoring takes in all the benefits of a tax cut but absolutely none of the benefits of investing in education, and health 

care, and housing, and the like. 

I got an e-mail from the University of Virginia that asked: Would 

a move to fair value accounting capture both the values of pursuing 

higher education and the monetary and nonmonetary positive 

externalities of having a highly educated populace that has access 

to federal student loans? 

Dr. Van de Water. Well the answer to that is, of course not. 

And we wouldn’t expect that a federal budget cost estimate would 

include things like that because many of those things are benefits 

to the individual students. They are extremely important benefits. 

Some of them have carryover benefits for the economy as a whole. 

But that is a perfect example, that there are a lot of costs and 

benefits that are never going to show up in a cost estimate that are 

essential for the Congress to evaluate in deciding whether to go 

ahead with a program, or to expand it. But for accounting, I have 

been arguing that we should retain as a benchmark cash actually 

going into and out of the government. 
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And you should not expect a cost estimate to contain anything 

beyond that. 

Representative Beyer. And my suggestion is, when you have 

risk, things that cannot be assessed down the line, that can also 

be offset by the societal benefits that we are also choosing not to 

mention. 

Dr. Van de Water. Exactly. Because while a loan program, a 

student loan program, for example, increases risks for taxpayers, 

it is reducing the risks for the student borrowers. And at the same 

time, if the defaults turn out to be higher than expected, it means, 

as I said in my testimony, that taxpayers will be bearing a higher 

cost, but it also means that the student borrowers will be receiving 

a higher benefit. 

Those are both very important facts, but neither one of them belongs in the cost estimate, in my view. 

Representative Beyer. Thank you. Mr. Delisle, one slightly 

tongue-in-cheek question, which is: Why would we ever buy Greek 

debt? And then the more serious one is: 

Given that we don’t have a profit motive as the government in 

our federal credit, the market risk premium represents an opportunity cost that is not tied to cash flow. Doesn’t the cash flow make 

much more sense than an opportunity cost that may never be realized? Especially when the historical data suggests that in fact we 

are doing just fine? 

Mr. Delisle. Do you believe that the average expected cash flow, 

as CBO estimates it from a student loan, is guaranteed to occur exactly the way they project it to occur? If so, FCRA is your model. 

If you do not think average expected cash flows are guaranteed 

to occur the way they are estimated, then fair value is your model. 

In terms of why would we ever buy Greek debt? FCRA tells you 

there is absolutely no budget reason not to do so. 

Representative Beyer. Except that we have the larger social 

purposes. We have put these things in place because we are trying 

to build a better America, a better economy. I am not sure that 

buying Greek debt is on that list. 

Mr. Delisle. But it does not cost you anything. FCRA says you 

make money doing it, immediately. So why wouldn’t you do it, if 

you make money and you help out—you solve a financial crisis. 

There is no budgetary reason not to do it. But I am very delighted 

that you are having problems with sort of the notion that there is 

no budget reason not to do that. 

But I should say, on the issue of measuring the benefits, you are 

holding fair value accounting to a higher standard than all the 

other ways we do cost estimates. None of them—not cash accounting, not FCRA—none of them factor in the benefits. 

When you do the estimate for a highway project, it does not include the value of the benefits. None of the approaches do. So this 

isn’t a flaw with fair value. You are simply asking more of fair 

value than you are asking of any of the other accounting methods. 

Representative Beyer. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator Lee. Senator Cotton. 

Senator Cotton. Thank you. I apologize if we’ve been over this 

ground. I am just coming from presiding over the Senate. 
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I would like to start, Dr. Holtz-Eakin, with you. Could you outline any real challenges or risks to simply using fair value accounting as one source of knowledge, even if it is not mandated for use, 

even if it is not something that we put in the statute but it is something that informs our policy judgments? 

Dr. Holtz-Eakin. I see no downside to that. Indeed, some of that 

happens now. We have seen CBO put out estimates of the budgetary impact of various credit programs under both FCRA accounting and what they would look like under fair value, so that Congress has some notion—the Ex-Im Bank being a notable example. 

Senator Cotton. Okay. Tell you what, why don’t we just go 

down the panel and hear responses to that. 

Mr. Delisle. I’m sorry? The question again was? 

Senator Cotton. So is there any risk or drawback of using fair 

value accounting as at least one source of information to inform 

policy judgments, even if we don’t amend FCRA and make that the 

method of accounting? 

Mr. Delisle. Well I think that the risks in using fair value are 

the same as they are in using other accounting methods; that, you 

know, the information you know today ends up not being perfect, 

and so something changes in the future to make your original estimate different, or off. Those exist in all the forms. 

I should point out though that there has been some conversation 

about how the Federal Government is different from private entities. I think that that is a perfectly valid argument if the Federal 

Government had its own money. It doesn’t have its own money. It 

has our money, and it has to use our value for the price of risk. 

That’s only fair. And where do we go to assess our collective value 

for risk? We look at the market prices. Because you have a massive 

voting system on what something is worth, and I think that is the 

appropriate place to go to figure out what these loans actually cost. 

Senator Cotton. Could I ask you to say more about the conversation you cited about the differences between the Federal Government and businesses? I hear that, and I hear my thinking that 

says, yes, the Federal Government is different. It is not a for-profit 

enterprise. Therefore, it makes decisions not based on market or financial signals, but on political decisions oftentimes. And frequently, whereas market-based institutions pick winners and losers 

which is in the nature of a capitalist society, the government tends 

to pick losers. Because if they were winners, they would have gotten financing in the private marketplace. 

So could you say a little bit more about that? 

Mr. Delisle. So my first response is, nonprofit credit unions are 

nonprofit. They also can borrow at a very low rate because they 

have a government guarantee on their deposits. Even they don’t 

make loans at terms as generous as the Federal Government because they don’t think it is worth it. So there is clearly something 

more going on than your profit motive. I also think that, you know, 

the same could be true for pension funds, right? Pensions funds are 

nonprofit. But they assign a value to assets at the market price. 

And I think that is the fairest value, regardless of your intentions 

and your motivations. 
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Senator Cotton. All right. Mr. Elliott, any real risk of at least 

using fair value accounting as a way to inform our decision making? 

Mr. Elliott. I think it would be a step forward, very clearly. The 

one risk is, there is an argument that having two sets of numbers 

makes it a little harder for people to— there is a danger of talking 

past each other. But I would still rather have the extra information. 

Senator Cotton. Okay. 

Dr. Van de Water. I see no objection to providing additional information of that sort. 

Senator Cotton. It sort of sounds like we are all in agreement, 

it is worthwhile and should inform our policymaking. 

Okay. Thank you all. Thank you. 

Senator Lee. I want to thank our Committee members, and I 

want to thank our witnesses especially for coming and providing 

the insightful testimony. 

Your testimony has been very helpful. The hearing record will remain open for three business days for those members who may 

wish to submit questions for the record. 

We will be adjourned. 

(Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., Wednesday, June 17, 2015, the hearing was adjourned.) 
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SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAN COATS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT ECONOMIC

COMMITTEE

The committee will come to order. 

The committee today will examine the economic exposure of federal credit programs. I’d like to thank our witnesses for being here. 

Today, we will examine why accounting for our federal assets matters, and why 

inaccurate monitoring could bring harm to: 

• Borrowers who pay higher interest rates to cover the defaults of others; 

• Private lenders who are frozen out of markets they seek to serve; and, 

• Taxpayers, who may be exposed to unquantified losses. 

During my prior service in the Senate, I was one of the ‘‘Nay’’ votes for the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. Twenty-five years later, I never imagined 

that I would be chairing a hearing to debate the impact of accounting rules passed 

back then. This situation reminds me of an old Yogi Berra quote, ‘‘The future ain’t 

what it used to be.’’ 

The 1990 reconciliation law included the Federal Credit Reform Act, accounting 

rules crafted in reaction to the rocky credit history of the 1980s. The Resolution 

Trust Corporation held the assets of failed savings & loans and put the federal government in the ‘‘loan workout’’ business. Sadly, fraudulent student loans made during the decade led to a 20% student loan default rate and a loss equal to almost 

10% of outstanding loans. Cash accounting for all these asset changes within a 

budget year presented a volatile picture of the federal budget that properly represents spending trends. 

Since then, the federal government has followed the rules of FCRA, recording an 

annual present-value adjusted ‘‘subsidy cost’’ to account for losses it may incur in 

the future charged against loans it has made directly, as well as guarantees it provided for loans made by others. It took 10 years to refine the complicated net 

present value calculations used for FCRA, but by 2002, government accountants calculated that the federal portfolio of $1.3–1.4 trillion in loans and guarantees generated annual subsidy costs in the range of $5 to $12 billion, no small chunk of 

change. 

This brings us to the financial crisis of 2008, which ballooned the government’s 

loan assets. FCRA’s accounting rules converted loan subsidy costs into deficit reducers. Since 2008, government accountants have booked nearly $200 billion in annual 

subsidy gains while the amount of federal loans and guarantees has more than doubled. As a result, it is clear that the more credit market exposure the government 

takes on, the more that expectations of future revenue rise under current accounting 

rules, without equal accounting for higher risk. 

At the end of September 2014, loans made or fully guaranteed by the federal government totaled over $2.9 trillion. This includes $1.1 trillion in student loans. Additionally, the Federal Reserve reported that nonmortgage consumer debt totaled $3.3 

trillion as of September 30, 2014, giving the federal government a one-third share 

of the U.S. consumer loan market. 

Add to that the 70 percent of the mortgage market that the federal government 

holds through direct loans, guarantees, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the 

federal government is the largest consumer lender in the United States. 

A lot has changed in twenty-five years. So today, we must ask ourselves, do accounting rules passed twenty-five years ago reflect the complexity of today’s financial world? 

I’d now like to recognize Ranking Member Maloney for her opening statement. 
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, RANKING MEMBER, JOINT

ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

Thank you Chairman Coats for holding today’s hearing. 

In this morning’s hearing, we will compare two systems for budgeting federal 

credit programs. 

The first, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA), was signed into law by 

George H.W. Bush in 1990. It has proven a reliable tool for budgeting federal credit 

programs. 

The second, so-called ‘‘fair value’’ accounting, is a program supported by some of 

my colleagues in the Republican Party that will make federal credit programs seem 

more expensive. If implemented, this system will necessitate cutting loan programs 

or raising interest rates. 

In my mind, there is nothing fair about ‘‘fair value’’ accounting. 

At its root, today’s hearing is about two vastly different philosophical approaches 

to government. 

My Republican friends believe that the federal government—in this case federal 

lending programs—should operate just like the private sector. 

But the federal government is not the private sector. 

The principal motivation of the private sector is to maximize profit. 

The principal goal of government is to provide services that the private sector cannot or will not provide. 

These differences are especially clear in federal lending programs. Private institutions make loans that they think will be the most profitable. 

But the United States government sees thing differently. 

For example, it lends to a group of individuals with little or no income and no 

credit history. They are known as ‘‘college students,’’ and there are more than 20 

million of them in the United States today. The vast majority of student loans are 

issued by or guaranteed by the government. 

Why does the government take on this risk? Because it helps millions of Americans go to college who might otherwise not be able to afford to go. It also benefits 

the rest of us by creating a more educated workforce. A better workforce will make 

our country more competitive and our economy stronger. 

This is a social good not recognized by private lenders. 

I want to turn to the specific question of how we measure the costs of federal government loan programs. 

How these programs are accounted for—and how their budget impact is assessed—will affect the broader deficit outlook and choices we make as policymakers. 

The current procedure under the Federal Credit Reform Act appropriately calculates the lifetime cost of federal credit programs reflecting both the risk of default 

and the government’s cost of borrowing. 

FCRA has been very accurate. OMB found that since in the more than 20 years 

FCRA has been in place, the initial cost estimates of all credit programs differed 

from their actual cost by less than one percent. 

As they say—if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. 

But today we’re apparently trying to ‘‘fix’’ a system that already works well. 

It is part of a broader ideological initiative. 

In tax policy, Republicans are trying to change the rules of the game by instituting so-called ‘‘dynamic scoring.’’ This would make tax cuts seem less expensive 

than they really are. 

In federal credit policy, Republicans are trying to change the rules of the game 

using an accounting system that will make programs like student loans look more 

expensive. 

The result of this so-called ‘‘fair value’’ accounting will be cuts in federal loans 

programs—for example, less money available for students at higher rates. 

Under ‘‘fair value’’ accounting, the cost of federal credit programs, which are funded by the purchase of low-interest Treasury securities, would be evaluated as if 

these governments were forced to borrow with an additional ‘‘risk premium’’ demanded by the private market. 

As the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities put it, fair value budgeting requires 

that the budget ‘‘reflect amounts that the Treasury would never actually pay anyone.’’ 

It will make federal lending programs appear more costly than they really are. 

Millions of Americans have something to lose if proponents of this accounting system have their way. I regret that we don’t have any of their representatives on this 

panel today. 

However, Chairman Coats and I have received letters from a number of organizations strongly opposed to ‘‘fair value’’ accounting. 
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A letter from the National Education Association states that, quote: ‘‘NEA opposes 

the use of fair value accounting in federal credit programs, especially student loan 

programs, because it would artificially raise their costs and make them appear to 

be more expensive to the federal government than they really are.’’ 

I ask unanimous consent to enter this letter into the record. 

A letter from the National Association of Homebuilders states that ‘‘fair value accounting’’ would artificially raise the rates on home loans. I also would like to enter 

that letter into the record. 

Other noted organizations also oppose using ‘‘fair value accounting’’ for budgeting 

purposes: 

• The National Association of Realtors 

• The National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities 

• The Retired Enlisted Association 

• The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 

• The Student Aid Alliance 

• The National Multifamily Housing Council 

• And many others . . . 

I would like to place letters from several of these organizations into the record. 

In conclusion, I ask that we listen to both sides of the debate today—but that, 

ultimately, we not let ideology trump reality. 

Fair value budgeting would distort the budget process, undercut federal credit 

programs, and, ultimately, deprive millions of Americans of the financial support 

they need to get an education, buy a home, or start or operate a small business. 

I look forward to our discussion this morning and thank each of the witnesses for 

appearing before the Committee. 
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