To orient the Division to this new topography, the CG directed the G-2 to prepare a southern

Iraq orientation map. This map, created by three lance corporals (Robert Lupi, Aaron Lehn, and

Andrew Sipe) gave a common baseline to every member of the Division, each of whom would

memorize the route names, city names, maneuver corridors and water features of southern Iraq.

The Division shared copies of this product out to supporting units, higher headquarters, and even

the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The place names depicted on this product would soon

have special meaning to the Division, as they would represent the battles fought and won by the

blood and sweat of the Marines in combat, and would be the focus of the many efforts of

thousands of individuals. The familiarity of the Division Marines with the places on this map

would ensure these important places would have strong resonance during the execution of the

battle plan.

The Division focused on the vulnerabilities of the large Iraqi force in order to ensure its

rapid destruction. There were both physical and psychological weaknesses that could be

The 1" Marine Division Southern Iraq orientation map, the 'CG's Special would prove to be a key

familiarization toolfor all the Division Marines.

8
exploited, and striking them became an important element of the Division plan. It was clear

that although large in size, the Iraqi armed forces were poorly trained and equipped. Inadequate

logistics and poor equipment readiness rates severely limited the offensive maneuver capability

of even the best Iraqi units. The motivation and loyalty of the Regular Army (RA) units were

reportedly poor, and their desertion rates high. The Iraqis' ability to command and control

depended heavily on orders from a centralized higher headquarters, a system that would quickly

break down during a fast-paced maneuver conflict. The Iraqi Regime had a reputation for

punishing military commanders who took initiative without consultation. The Regime viewed

effective commanders as a threat, and often transferred, punished, or even executed them. This

heavy-handed treatment of commanders served to hamstring the maneuver capability of the Iraqi

forces almost as much as physical equipment limitations.

Although limited in maneuver, the Iraqis had a robust indirect fires capability, which

included a massive number of artillery systems and multiple rocket launchers. If forward

deployed, many of these systems could range into northern Kuwait, including the assembly areas

the Division would soon occupy. The fires capability of the enemy had its own weaknesses;

however, including an inability to acquire targets, rapidly adjust fires, or logistically re-supply if

deployed out of garrison. Even with these weaknesses, the Division was careful not to lose

respect for the lethality of these Iraqi weapons systems. If the Iraqis used the terrain carefully,

they could mount an effective positional defense and draw Division forces into preplanned

firesacks and ambushes. The Iraqis could cause significant casualties and mount an effective

operational delay by defending in a series of these well-planned tactical positions. Strategically,

the Iraqis could then use this delay to continue efforts through diplomacy, employ WMD, or

revert to a terrorist campaign. The combination of 'untrafficable' terrain and massed indirect

fires might allow even a second-rate Iraqi army to have a strategic impact.

The I MEF Operational Planning Team (OPT), then under Lieutenant General Michael

Hagee's guidance, opted to bypass the positional defenses of enemy units in the South (III and

IV Corps) and avoid urban areas to the degree possible. The MEF would choose to fight terrain

rather than play to the strengths of the Iraqis. The Division viewed this plan as on-target, and a

shared appreciation developed among the MEF's major subordinate commands. With this

appreciation, the Division concentrated on a scheme of maneuver that forced the enemy to

reposition his artillery, and did not allow him adequate time to prepare artillery ambushes and

fire sacks.

The Division G-2's well-presented, factual display of the enemy situation revealed the enemy

vulnerabilities the Division would exploit, and the enemy strengths the Division would avoid. At

the 2002 Division Officer's Ball (held annually to celebrate the Corp's birthday, that year in

Primm, Nevada) General Anthony Zinni was the guest of honor. In a discussion of the Iraq

situation, he jokingly told the assembled commanders that he would 'disown them' if they didn't

handily destroy the enemy's army. These officers understood the Iraqi adversary so well that

they only smiled grimly back at the beloved leader. Victory was never in doubt should the

President call for the 1st Marine Division. Only the challenge of minimizing Marine casualties

and the death of innocent Iraqi citizens gnawed at these men.

9
Providing Focus

"Everything we do is to be focused on the destruction of the iraqi Army. Everything.

Anything that does not point us to that objective needs to be eliminatetL"

The CG's guidance laid the groundwork for the preparations of the Division, "Everything we

do is to be focused on the destruction of the Iraqi Army. Everything. Anything that does not

point us to that objective needs to be eliminated." This focus meant some immediate changes in

the Division's peacetime posture. The Division recognized that a focus on fighting the Iraqis

would leave some peacetime administrivia by the wayside. Like a turning ship, the Division's

momentum shifted from its peacetime direction to a war footing. One of the first (and most

applauded) actions was the suspension of extraneous inspections, routine reports, and

conferences. Focus meant a renewed emphasis on physical training as well. Every Marine and

Sailor attached to the Division was ordered to conduct a minimum of 12 miles of personal

physical training weekly, and also to participate in weekly NBC training. The main effort,

however, was directed at the minds and spirits of the Marines. The CG's intent was to 'image'

the Marines of the Division through every step of the process. The embarkation, planning,

deployment, and first five days of combat would all be second nature to the members of the

Division, because they would have already 'walked the ground' in their minds. For many of the

Marines this would be their first combat experience. The CG wanted these Marines confident,

comfortable, and aggressive in the face of the enemy. Destruction of the Iraqi Army began with

the construction of a fierce and confident band of warriors in the 1st Marine Division. This

construction was based on a strong foundation of three factors, the innate strength of the

individuals drawn to serve in the Marine Corps, the Corps' strong traditional and advanced

training methods, and the practiced team the previous Division Commander (Major General

James Conway) had turned over to the new CG.

Building teams out of these hardened individual warriors was the next order of business. The

CG advised his commanders, "Look around you. These are the men you will take to war." He

cautioned them to look carefully at their staffs and ensure the team they had assembled was the

team they wanted to take to the fight. The CG's intent was to build a fraternity of warriors that

would break down any unnecessary formality between commanders and staffs, and between

officers and enlisted men of the Division. Rank was respected, but all Marines were accorded

the mutual respect due a professional of arms about to enter harm's way. A warrior code took

hold, with each member of the Division valued for the contribution of his talents rather than the

rank on his collar.

The CG had already inherited and assembled a strong team of officers in the Blue Diamond

Staff. Brigadier General (Select) John Kelly, the Assistant Division Commander, was no

stranger to division-level operations, coming from his latest assignment as the G-3 of 2d Marine

Division. The Division Sergeant Major, Juan Duff was a rock of stability and a key enlisted

advisor. The Staff principals were also all high-caliber individuals in their respective fields, but

many of them were newly joined to the Staff. The no-nonsense Chief of Staff, Colonel Ben

Saylor, until recently the Commander of 1 1th Marines, went to work breaking down staff

10
fiefdoms, and developed the fraternity that would lead to success on the battlefield. The G-3,

Colonel John Toolan, had been the S-3 of 7' Marines when the CG had been its commander, and

had also been a Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion Commander. Colonel Jim

Howcroft, the G-2, had years of experience as a military attaché, and little patience for

intelligence bureaucracies. His experience in the last Gulf War left him with a passionately held

objective of focusing intelligence down to the lowest tactical level. Lieutenant Colonel John

Broadmeadow gave the team a strong G-4, with broad-based expertise in logistics as practiced in

the type of deep-striking operations the Division planned to execute. His recent Task Force 58

experience in Afghanistan would serve the Division well. Colonel Nick Petronzio, one of the

scions of the communications community, and recently the commander of the Division's

Headquarters Battalion, led the G-6. Lieutenant Colonel Cathy Powalski arrived fresh from her

previous assignment as the 3(1 Marine Division G- 1 and picked up 1st Marine Division operations

without missing a beat. The dashing Colonel Jim Lukeman, the G-7 and Division Inspector (and

until recently the commander of 2d Battalion, 5tl Marines) provided an experienced hand and a

trusted agent for the CG for a host of special missions including the rapid fielding of new

equipment and a streamlined inspection process focused on embarkation and NBC readiness.

Colonel Robert Knapp was the Division's Headquarters Battalion commander, entrusted with the

deployment readiness of the Division headquarters and the smooth operation of the Division

Command Posts (CPs). He headed a strong team of Military Police (MPs), communicators,

truck drivers, logisticians, and even musicians that would be the backbone of successful Division

operations.

Not satisfied with a cumbersome field headquarters, the Division Staff immediately set to

work on downsizing the Division's CPs. The staff would be small, with no stove-piped experts

in any one field. Aggressive 'Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) officers' manned every

post. "Everyone fills sandbags in this outfit," was the expression most heard around the new CP.

Speed in decision-making and command and control were to be enabled by release from

cumbersome bureaucracies. The intent was to command and control the Division's swift

movement with closely integrated air and logistics support as if it were a much smaller unit. The

members of the Staff were to think more like a brigade than a Division Staff

Strong individuals and strong staff teams were critical enablers, and now the Division's

organization for combat underwent some changes as well. The CG saw habitual relationships as

a conduit for speed on the battlefield, and reorganized the Division into the Regimental Combat

Teams (RCTs) with which it would fight. In combat, several 2' and 4th Marine Division units

would join the Blue Diamond team, and were planned into the RCT organization. RCT-1

('Inchon') was commanded by Colonel Joe Dowdy, who had recently served as the MEF Future

Plans Officer. In addition to 1st Marines, RCT-1 included 2' LAR Battalion, major elements of

4th AA Battalion, and 2 Battalion, 23' Marines, a superb 4th Marine Division battalion. Colonel

Joe Dunford commanded RCT-5 ('Grizzly') consisting of 5th Marines, 1t LAR Battalion, and 2

Tank Battalion. RCT-7 ('Ripper') was commanded by Colonel Steve Hummer, and included 1st

Tank Battalion and 3( LAR Battalion. The 'Cannon Cockers' of l Marines, commanded by

Colonel Mike Marletto, were integrated into the RCT's in habitual direct and general sujport

relationships, as were elements of the Division's 3d AA Battalion (reinforced by 2' and 4 AA

Battalions), 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 2 Combat Engineer Battalion, and 1St

Reconnaissance Battalion. Thanks to the foresight and aggressive initiative of the Force

11
Service Support Group (FSSG) commander, Brigadier General Edward Usher, the FSSG

provided its own task-organized representation, with assigned logistics units providing direct

support down to the regimental level.

Two weeks after the initial orientation, the CG gathered his four regimental commanders,

principal staff, and separate battalion commanders. In a quiet setting at the recently built MEF

Operations Center, the CG continued to build the command team for the Division. This 'sweat

lodge' meeting had the same solemn contemplation, mutual respect, and shared commitment as a

meeting of tribal chieftains joining their tribes for battle. There were clear lines of command, but

the assembled chieftains were there to gain consensus on the Division's vision, each committing

himself to the fight ahead. The fraternity of shared risk and common vision grew. The CG

provided his analysis of the upcoming fight, and imaged the commanders through the

preparations he expected them to undertake. The assembled commanders were entrusted with

the preparation of the Division for war with the final commission, "Gentlemen, we are now in

the province of war. Consider every week your last week of peace, and apply your time

accordingly."

"Gentlemen, we are now in the province of war. Consider every week your last week of

peace, and apply your time accordingly."

Operational Planning

First Marine Division had always played a key role in plans for the defense of the

Arabian Peninsula. Now, however, the Division changed its focus from the defense of the

Arabian Peninsula to the eradication of the Iraqi Regime. August marked the arrival ofa new GSome of the major Routes, Cities, and Waterways that marked the

Division battlespace. These places would become household words by

the time the Division was through with them.

12
3 Plans Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Kennedy (replacing Lieutenant Colonel John Mayer

who assumed command of 1St Battalion, 4' Marines.) He joined an already experienced planning

team including Lieutenant Colonel Mike Groen from intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel (USA)

Gary Smythe from Division fires. Communications, engineer, air, and logistics planners rounded

out the team. The 1st Marine Division, as the major Ground Combat Element (GCE) ofT Marine

Expeditionary Force (I MEF), would fight as part of the ground scheme of maneuver developed

by the CFLCC. The CFLCC was a high-level headquarters that coordinated the land actions of

Marine, Coalition, and US Army ground forces in southern Iraq. The CFLCC commander was

Lieutenant General David McKiernan, and the headquarters was primarily staffed with Army

personnel, although there were a number of Marine representatives and liaison officers. As the

CFLCC plan matured, 1st Marine Division underwent a number of mission changes, often with

short notice. Before crossing the Line of Departure, the Division was to plan and re-plan for

operations against An Nasiriyah, Al Basrah, the South Rumaylah oilfields, Highway 7 to Al Kut,

the Tigris River, Highway 6, and along the unfinished Highway 1 corridor. Planning would

continue with the Diyala River crossing, Baghdad, Baqubah, Tikrit, and Bayji added before

combat operations ceased.

Seemingly every combination of unit and objective was explored, and each of these

Road distances between major cities in southern Iraq generally split the battlespace into

three 100 mile segments between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad. Movement was

restricted to major highways due to canals and irrigation ditches.

13
sequentially proposed scenarios required detailed planning. The staff paid special attention to

the possibility of operations in the former marsh areas between Al Basrah and Al Kut, and noted

the significance of rivers and bridges to every proposed course of action. Although none of the

plans developed during this cycle were executed as written, the staff gained an invaluable

understanding of the factors that would determine success or failure in the Division's coming

fight. Major General Conway, the new I MEF Commander (who relinquished command of the

Division in early August) quoted General 'Ike' Eisenhower on several occasions when referring

to this rapid-fire planning environment, "The plan was useless, but the planning was invaluable."

These words would prove prophetic, as the Division's eventual scheme of maneuver bore only

slight resemblance to any of the original plans. The Division was able to maintain tempo and

flexibility solely by a high degree of situational awareness and a full understanding of the

commander's intent.

The basic CFLCC Scheme of Maneuver called for a 'Two Prong' simultaneous attack on the Regime. With I

MEF conducting a supporting attack from the East, the US V Corps would attack straight into the heart of

Baghdad from the South.

14
Like many armies with rigid centralized control, the Iraqi Army would likely collapse if cut

off from their source of strength, in this case, Baghdad. The limited mobility of the Iraqi forces

made them extremely vulnerable to a campaign of rapid maneuver, and the preplanned Iraqi

defensive positions would only be effective if attacked from the expected direction and with a

slow tempo. The Division planners worked aggressively to identify potential actions, timings,

and routes that would allow the Division to seize its initial objectives and sustain its momentum

to Baghdad, without playing to the enemy's strength. The G-2 assessed that the Iraqi divisions

from III and IV Corps arrayed along the Iran/Iraq border did not pose a significant maneuver

threat and could be safely bypassed. Once cut off from Baghdad, these units would be

marginalized, and would likely surrender. With I MEF as a planned supporting effort to a V

Corps attack to the west, 1st Marine Division could be most effective by defeating the Baghdad

Republican Guard Infantry Division in Al Kut, the enemy's operational Center of Gravity in

southern Iraq. This was forecast to be a fight of some significance, as it would mark the first

engagement between Coalition forces and the Republican Guard. 1st Marine Division intended

The basic premise of the 1" Marine Division's planned maneuverincluded bypassing major urban centers,

and rapidly gaining a bridgehead over the Euphrates River in order to speed the attack on Baghdad, not

getting 'bogged down' in heavy urban fighting.

15
to destroy the Baghdad Division in detail, as an example to the rest of the Republican Guard, and

those remaining loyal to the Iraqi Regime. The Division had met some of these units in combat

during the first Gulf War, and the CG reminded the planners that those Iraqis who had faced 1 SI

Marine Division before "were not eager for a rematch."

Despite the sometimes-chaotic planning environment (due to uncertain deployment schedules

and operational constructs that changed with the diplomatic situation) the seeds of the Division's

basic operational concept were planted in this initial intelligence assessment. The Optional

Planning Team refined the Division's concept of destroying Iraqi forces where necessary, but

bypassing them where possible. In keeping with General Hagee's guidance, the Division would

fight terrain rather than prepared defensive positions as long as it offered a faster route to

Baghdad. The Division planned to bypass large elements of the Iraqi III and IV Corps, and

quickly get to the north side of the Tigris River. Once the Division was across this strategic

river, the Baghdad RG Infantry Division would be isolated, and ripe for destruction. Cut off

from Baghdad, the remaining defenders in the south could be reduced piecemeal, with fewer

casualties, and at the Division's chosen pace. In a coordinated action with the US Army's 3d

Infantry Division, the 1st Marine Division would threaten to enter Baghdad itself in order to

destroy the Regime's true seat of power.

By late Summer 2002, the Division had formulated a base plan, with the bypass of major

elements of the III and IV RA Corps as a fundamental premise. It was the Division's assessment

that by succeeding in building and maintaining momentum to Baghdad, the Division would

likely defeat large elements of the Iraqi armed forces without engaging them with direct fire.

The plan was to destroy the 5 1St Mechanized Division in the Az Zubayr area, destroy elements of

the 1 Infantry Division in the An Nasiriyah chokepoint (formed by a number of canals,

bridges, and untrafficable terrain) then block the remaining forces to the east while the Division

continued the attack to Al Kut and Baghdad.

The 'hourglass' chokepoint formed at An Nasiriyah was identified as key terrain. All

attacking forces from south of the Euphrates would be forced to trickle through the hourglass to

get to the north side of the River. Passing both V Corps and I MEF forces through this

chokepoint would be difficult under the best of circumstances, and could result in battlefield

friction-induced delays. The Coalition would be presenting a tempting chemical target to the

enemy after breaching one of his key defensive positions (the Euphrates), and careful battlefield

circulation planning would be a critical element in reducing this risk. The planners identified the

unfinished Highway 1 bridge to the west of An Nasiriyah as a preferred route that allowed

movement north of the Euphrates River quickly, and out of the range fans of artillery remaining

in the An Nasiriyah urban area. Fighting through the city of An Nasiriyah (and the enduring

tasks of pacification in the wake of a successful attack) would likely pose a significant drain on

the Division's combat power, and was to be avoided if practicable.

In anticipation of the second stage of the Division attack, the planning team refined their

assessment of the attack routes from An Nasiriyah to Al Kut. The intelligence assessments of

trafficability off the major highways in southern Iraq were quite bleak, presenting challenges for

the attack to destroy the Baghdad Division in Al Kut. The Division's battlespace did not include

the Highway 1 corridor at this time, but the Division recognized the necessity of finding a way to

16
Numerous alternate routes (of dubious quality) were developed to facilitate a means to maneuver the

Division if the primary routes were not viable.

envelop the Al Kut defenders by using fix and bypass tactics. If the Division was constrained to

an attack up Highway 7, it would be forced to attack as a Division in column and play directly

into the Iraqi strengths along an expected avenue of approach. This was an unacceptable scheme

of maneuver. The Division worked aggressively to identify alternatives, and the poor

maneuverability along Highway 7 became a significant catalyst for some of the creative

solutions the Marines crafted to maintain the tempo of the attack. From creative engineering

solutions to KC-130 highway landing strips, the solutions originally developed for the Highway

7 problems were later implemented across the battlespace as a way to gain speed in the attack.

Repeatedly, terrain experts told the Division that any maneuver off Highway 7 was not

possible, thus a frontal attack or localized envelopment of Al Kut appeared to be the only

feasible schemes of maneuver. Because of the responsive high-quality support the Division

experienced from the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) in the past, the Division turned

to them again for an analysis of alternatives for routes to the north. The product was a 'route

finding' study vice a 'mobility analysis', and took as a precondition that some route through the

challenging terrain existed. An MCIA team led by Mr. Art Kohler and Captain Sean Braziel

conducted the route finding analysis and presented the results to the Division. Together, the

Division and MCIA were able to identify three potential bypass routes using combinations of

canal roads, farm roads, and limited segments of cross-country movement. Although not suitable

for large convoys or Combat Service Support (CSS) elements, these bypass routes offered some

limited maneuver options. The Division still assessed that it could defeat the Baghdad RG

17
Infantry Division by cutting them off from the capitol, leading to their rapid collapse. The

MCIA identified routes were critical to this concept, and the Division planning effort continued

using these limited bypass opportunities as the planned basic maneuver routes for the Al Kut

fight.

There was the usual competition of tactical concepts among the Major Subordinate

Commands (MSCs) of the MEF. One of these planning issues faced by the Division was the

requirement to secure a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW)

aircraft and 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG) sustainment forces. The MEF chose Qalat

Sikar as the site for this FOB. The Division was concerned that it lay 30 km to the east of

Highway 7. Using this airfield for sustainment required a round trip excursion from Highway 7

of over 60 km, along a single access road into and out of the airfield. The momentum of this

sustainment would be due east, opposite the northwesterly direction of the Division's attack.

This airfield, well to the east of Highway 7, was also in the direction of the Iraqi 10th Armored

Division in Al Amarah, the operational reserve for the III and IV Corps. From its position to the

north of the major river obstacles, this potentially pivotal Iraqi force could move to reinforce the

defenses at Al Qurnah, An Nasiriyah, Highwa 7, or even Al Kut. The MAGTF Staff Training

Program (MSTP) Red Cell had moved the lot Armor Division in this fashion during the April

2002 MEFEX. More troublesome, the 10th Armor Division could readily move to interdict an

FOB located at Qalat Sikar. Given its material limitations, the ability of the 10th Armor Division

to mount a long distance maneuver was questionab1e, but the proposed FOB site lay nearby, and

right on one of the primary routes the lO Division could take to move to the west. Even with a

limited maneuver threat, the vulnerability and importance of a FOB at Qalat Sikar demanded a

combat force sufficient to deter or defeat the 10th Division should it sortie west. To address this

issue, the Division's scheme of maneuver incorporated the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion in an

unconventional 'economy of force' role. Instead of being used in the standard 'team operations'

role in front of the Division's advance, Recon Battalion was prepared to fight in larger units,

forming a 'picket line' to the east of Qalat Sikar, observing each of the possible routes the 10th

Armored Division could take in a potential attack into the Division's east flank. Recon

Battalion's elements were augmented with additional Forward Air Controllers (FACs)

to ensure that any sortie attempt of the 10th Armored Division would meet a swift and deadly

response by 3d MAW.

Preparing for the multiple wet and dry gap crossings that the Division's scheme of maneuver

entailed was a major element of the plan, and one that cut across multiple lines of responsibility.

The Division planning team hosted a 'River Crossing OPT' that brought together elements of

intelligence, maneuver, engineering and logistics from across the MEF. 1st Combat Engineer

Battalion (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Cyr), 8th Engineer Support Battalion

(commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rick Nelson), and the MEF Engineer Group (commanded

by Admiral Charles Kubic) all participated. The Division planners drove this OPT as a way to

'jump start' engineer planning by providing them with a nominal ground scheme ofmaneuver as

a base plan. A detailed assessment of potential gap crossings revealed over 220 bridge or culvert

crossings on Highway 7 alone. An additional 55 or more were on each of the MCJA bypass

routes. From an enemy perspective, each of these served as a potential ambush and delay point,

the very sort of asymmetric tactic that a second-rate military might use to level the playing field.

The use of captured Iraqi bridging equipment was even considered as a way to reduce the

18
Division's dependency on bridging assets. The OPT served as an extremely useful review of the

potential engineering requirements, and was a valuable tool to assess likely enemy actions to the

attack north from An Nasiriyah.

Force Deployment Planning

An experienced deployment team was assembled under the deputy G-3, Lieutenant Colonel

Clarke Lethin, and the Plans Chief, Gunnery Sergeant Timothy Brimhali. This team looked at all

possible ways to get forces into theater to support the new operational construct. Gunnery

Sergeant Brimhall implemented a plan to reassign Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 05 us

(MAGTF planners) from the G-3 Plans section down to the regimental level to decentralize the

enormous task of building the Division's Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). The

Marine Corps' assignment of 051 is to the Division and subsequently by the Division down to

the regimental staff allowed the Division to quickly produce solid deployment plans for

forwarding to the MEF.

Early planning began for the employment of two of the Division's RCTs: one using gear from

the Maritime Prepositioned Ship Squadron (MPSRON), and the other using amphibious

shipping. This plan called for an offload of MPSRON-2 by RCT-7 (with MPSRON-1 by an RCT

Units were to deploy to Kuwait from both East and West Coast ports, bases and air stations

19
from the 2d Marine Division) followed by the arrival of the amphibious RCT (or MEB) some

weeks later. Getting a desired two additional RCTs into theater required additional lift, and a

variety of methods were explored to avoid placing the bulk of this requirement on strategic air.

Teams of logisticians explored options as diverse as extending the deployment window, using

contracted cruise ships, and massing amphibious shipping to support the deployment of

additional brigades. With the switch from a reactive 'defensive' force to an 'offensive' force, the

nature and composition requirements changed.

Continued updates to the force deployment plan occurred. Eventually, the first two RCTs of

the force would both come from 1st Marine Division (instead of one each from 1st and 2' Marine

Divisions) and take advantage of the two Maritime Prepositioned Ship Squadrons (MPSRON5)

for the bulk of their equipment, utilizing strategic and commercial air to transport personnel and

other specialized equipment not contained on the MPS shipping. The force flow planning was

updated to reflect MPSRON-1 gear supporting RCT-5 and 2d Tank Battalion. The Division

needed to make the total force as mobile as possible, and requested all available AAV

companies, both active and reserve, from throughout the Marine Corps. Planners also applied all

available truck companies to the TPFDD, and updated the plan as refinements continued. The

last RCT from the Division to arrive in theater would travel by amphibious shipping. By the

original timeline, the first RCT would arrive and be ready for combat in fifteen days from the

order, with the rest of the Division completely closed within 30 days.

The continuously changing mission, size, and deployment windows for 1St Marine Division

forces were a significant challenge to the force-flow and operational planning processes. Since

most of the information related to operational planning was 'Originator Controlled' (ORCON),

only selected individuals could be 'read-in' to portions of the plan. As a result, eager Marines

from across the Division built deployment plans based on only broad generalized guidance of

what to take and what to leave behind. No mention of mission specific tasking was possible, and

what was understood often changed rapidly. Strong leadership, social energy, and patience on

the behalf of the entire Division team allowed for the building of a solid TPFDD despite these

challenges. Planners at I MEF worked throughout this period to clarify basic decisions, but the

MSCs had to remain highly flexible. It was clearly time to get the staffs of the Division's RCTs

read in to the plan. In September 2002, the CG assembled a briefing team, and brought all

battalion and regimental commanders assigned to the Division into the information exchange.

The briefing sequence included an 'Intelligence Roadshow' brief, an operational overview, and a

discussion of the CG's intent. This briefing had a tremendous impact on building situational

awareness among the Division's commanders and staffs, during a time when this information

was still very closely held

As the plan evolved, there were no less than seven TPFDD planning conferences at the US

Transportation Command, at Scott Air Force Base (AFB) near Belleville, Illinois. Here, the

assembled experts put together a global transportation plan that would take men and machines

around the globe in massive numbers. Close by Scott AFB, the people of Belleville were the

manufacturers of the most prolific transportation means the Division would use in the coming

fight, the new desert combat boot. In just one example of the strong mutual pride between the

American people and their Marines, the Division planners were welcomed with open arms to a

tour of the factory.

20
Ships from all three USMC Maritime Prepositioned

Ship Squadrons (MPSRONS) supported ft Marine

Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom by

delivering the vital equipment and vehicles that were

pre-staged throughout the globe.

Fire Support Planning and Preparation

Regardless of which route the Division took, the CG' s guidance made the role of fire support

in the coming fight clear. The enemy's tactical center of gravity was his indirect fire weapon

systems; artillery, rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface missile systems. The mission of Fires

was their destruction. The BM-21 mobile rocket launchers, elusive, easily camouflaged, and

capable of firing in seconds a salvo that could saturate a grid square, would be relentlessly

hunted down. The batteries of G-5 and GHIN-45 howitzers, capable of outranging the Division's

own M198s, and other medium range artillery would be located, identified, and attacked. The

ideal prosecution of these targets was by 3d MAW aircraft before the Division closed within their

range, but many would survive the air strikes, hidden in palm groves or withdrawn into urban

centers for concealment and protection. For those, retribution by reactive counterfire would be

swift and certain. The Iraqi Regime's FROG-7, Astros, and Ababil missile launchers topped the

list of priority targets due to their ability to range the Division's Tactical Assembly Areas

(TAA5), breach sites, and bridges from extreme standoff ranges. All of these systems were also

capable of delivering WMD.

Hostile artillery is the natural enemy of artillerymen. The Division Fire Support Coordinator,

Colonel Mike Marletto, and the fire supporters of the 1 1th Marines had been preparing for this

fight for years. While the Division's organic artillery would remain the workhorse of the

counterbattery fight, the fires planners knew they would have to leverage the capabilities of

Army Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and Marine Air. Speed, again, would be the

measure of effectiveness and the Division would stack the full capabilities of combined arms in

its favor. The goal was to prepare the way for the RCTs to advance unimpeded, so that the

momentum and combat power of the Division could be sustained all the way to Baghdad. This

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would be accomplished by an aggressive Division deep fight, destroying artillery and maneuver

formations before the RCTs ever closed with them.

The Division G-3 Fires and Air sections, together with 1 1th Marines, had invested

considerable time and effort in the development of techniques for controlling the Division's

general support fires with airborne controllers, but the work remained in its infancy. The

Division had also begun experimenting with a 'quickfire' capability to bring air fires against

counterbattery targets. The wholehearted support of Major General James Amos, Commanding

General of 3C MAW, now energized the dialogue between Wing and Division planners. Captain

Rylan C. Bennigson of the Division G-3 Air Section, Captain Joe Deigan, the lltI Marines Air

Officer, and Chief Warrant Officer Dave Thomas, the 1 1th Marines Radar Officer, were chief

among the authors of the Division's new quickfire procedure. The quickfire procedure

developed used the 1 Marines Target Processing Center (TPC) to provide radar data to the

Direct Air Support Center (DASC), Division Air, and to the Division Fire Support Coordination

Center (FSCC). In order to ensure redundant lines of communication and to expedite target

processing, an Air Support Liaison Team (ASLT) was assigned to the 1 1th Marines CP. Captain

Mark Halverson, 11th Marines S-6, and Major Roger Stanfield of the Division Communications

Company engineered the critical communications link between the counterfire headquarters and

the DASC. Automated fire support technology and training with the new systems progressed to

the point where a hostile weapon, detected by counterbattery radar and selected for attack by the

TPC, could be engaged by air within minutes. If within range, surface artillery could respond

immediately to provide suppressive fires while aircraft from the stack were pushed to attack the

target.

The full support and cooperation of 3d MAW ensured that assets required to validate the

concept were available. In November, 11th Marines, the Division FSCC, and Marine Air Control

Squadron Three (MACS-3) cooperated in the first live-fire rehearsal of the quickfire procedure at

Camp Pendleton's Zulu and Whiskey Impact Areas. This exercise validated the concept, with

artillery response times and the aviation targeting cycle gradually going faster as the procedure

was practiced.

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