*

This successive appeal has been submitted to the same panel that heard the

original appeal. See Operating Procedure 6(b). After examination of the briefs and

the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal

is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 6, 2006*

Decided March 6, 2007

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 06-2294

MICHAEL L. KATHREIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL P. MONAR,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division

No. 04 C 7324

David H. Coar, 

Judge.

O R D E R

For a fourth time Michael Lee Kathrein asks us to get involved in matters

arising from the juvenile antics he has inflicted upon his ex-wife’s current husband,

Michael Monar. See Kathrein v. McGrath, 166 F.App’x 858 (7th Cir. 2006)

(unpublished order) (detailing Kathrein’s conduct and three prior appeals). 

Kathrein now appeals from the district court’s post-judgment order granting Rule

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-2294 Page 2

11 sanctions against him. Because the district court properly determined that

sanctions were appropriate but did not properly calculate the amount of the award,

we affirm the imposition of sanctions but vacate the award and remand to the

district court for recomputation.

The matter before us is a holdover from one of Kathrein’s prior appeals. In

2004 Kathrein filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Monar, Monar’s

attorneys, and the Illinois judges assigned to Monar’s state-court action against

Kathrein conspired to deprive him of his right to a fair trial in the state-court

proceedings. Monar moved to dismiss the suit and also moved for sanctions. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. In his Rule 11 motion, Monar claimed that: “the real reason for

[Kathrein’s] action is to harass Monar, unreasonably increase his litigation costs

and to avoid unfavorable decisions before the state court judge who was then

assigned to his case.” He pointed to Kathrein’s litigiousness—at that time Kathrein

had filed three lawsuits against him, including the § 1983 suit—and the fact that

Kathrein had filed the federal action three days prior to a hearing on Monar’s

motion for sanctions against Kathrein in the state-court proceeding. Monar said

that the timing of Kathrein’s filing was designed to delay the proceedings in state

court and avoid further ruling from Brigid McGrath, the first state-court judge that

Kathrein named as a defendant in the federal suit. Indeed, as a result of the

allegations, Judge McGrath recused herself. Monar’s state-court case was

reassigned to another judge, Paddy McNamara, who subsequently held Kathrein in

contempt of court and sanctioned him. In response, Kathrein promptly amended

his complaint in the federal action to add Judge McNamara as a defendant. The

district court denied Monar’s motion for sanctions without prejudice pending its

decision on the defendants’ motions to dismiss.

After the district court dismissed Kathrein’s § 1983 claim as to all defendants

but before we rendered our decision in Kathrein, 166 F.App’x 858, Monar renewed

his Rule 11 motion, requesting over $62,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. This time

the district court granted Monar’s motion. The court first noted that Kathrein’s

federal suit was “just another chapter in an ongoing saga” between Kathrein and

Monar. The court then found that Kathrein had admitted to Monar’s attorney that

the purpose of his federal suit was to run up Monar’s legal fees. The court also

determined that Kathrein had used the federal courts to harass his opponents as

evidenced by his repeated requests that Judge McNamara recuse herself after he

named her as a defendant in the federal suit. As a sanction, the district court

ordered Kathrein to pay Monar’s attorneys’ fees and costs of $56,858.15, explaining

that it had reduced the award to account for charges unrelated to the federal

litigation.

On appeal Kathrein challenges both the district court’s decision to impose

sanctions as well as the amount of the award. We review all aspects of the district
No. 06-2294 Page 3

court’s award of Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v.

Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc’y v. Office & Prof’l

Employees Int’l Union, Local 39, 443 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2006).

Rule 11 permits a district court to impose sanctions on litigants who present

pleadings to the court “for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b)(1); Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2003). In exercising its

discretion under Rule 11, the district court focused on Kathrein’s statement to

Monar’s attorney that he initiated the federal suit to increase Monar’s legal fees. 

Although Kathrein now denies making that statement, he did not do so in the

district court even though he filed over 30 pages of documents contesting Monar’s

Rule 11 motion. He therefore waived this point. See Williams v. REP Corp., 302

F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it granted sanctions in Monar’s favor. See Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., 319 F.3d

307, 314 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that district court generally abuses its

discretion only “when no reasonable person could have taken the same view it

adopted”).

The district court erred, however, in determining the amount of the award. 

Rule 11 authorizes the district court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees as a

sanction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); Divane, 319 F.3d at 320. We have instructed that

a court asked to award sanctions must consider not only the reasonableness of the

requested fee but the reasonableness of the time expended on the litigation by the

prevailing party. See Szopa v. United States, 460 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2006);

Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Consol. Equity LLC, 428 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir.

2005). So counsel must correlate “his response, in terms of hours and funds

expended, to the merit of the claims.” Dubisky v. Owens, 849 F.2d 1034, 1037 (7th

Cir. 1988).

The time expended by Monar’s attorneys, Schuyler, Roche & Zwirner (SRZ),

on this litigation was not reasonable. SRZ expended approximately 200 hours at

over $300 an hour on a case that was dismissed on the pleadings. For that effort,

they prepared seven filings: a motion for extension of time to answer or otherwise

plead, two nearly identical motions to dismiss, a response to Kathrein’s opposition

to the motions to dismiss, a motion for sanctions, a renewed motion for sanctions,

and a petition for fees and costs. According to SRZ, it took 74.7 hours, or $19,481,

to prepare the documents responsive to Kathrein’s complaint and 116.3 hours, or

$34,310, to prepare the motions for sanctions and fee petition. We have instructed

that 57.5 hours, or $8,000, to defend a frivolous suit (albeit on appeal) is

unreasonable, see Szopa, 460 F.3d at 887, and 13.7 hours, or $4,354, to prepare a

single filing is “too high,” see Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 428 F.3d at 718. If 13.7

hours is too much for one filing then 191 hours is too much for seven. 
No. 06-2294 Page 4

Although we have not articulated a clear rule for determining an award of

attorneys’ fees under Rule 11, it is clear that the fees claimed by SRZ are beyond

any amount that we have said is reasonable. See, e.g., Divane, 319 F.3d at 320

(finding 64.25 hours at $150 an hour, or $9,637, reasonable for preparing fee

petition stemming from protracted litigation). Thus even though the district court

properly reduced SRZ’s fees to account for time not devoted to the federal action, see

Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., 200 F.3d 1020, 1030 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that

award of attorneys’ fees is limited to those fees that “directly result from a party or

attorney’s sanctionable conduct”), it still must fashion an award based upon an

appropriate amount of time to defend Monar against Kathrein’s federal suit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court to impose sanctions. But

because we find the amount of the sanction inappropriate, we VACATE the award

of attorneys’ fees and costs and REMAND to the district court to reconsider the

amount of the sanction. 

Finally, we note that we have once before addressed the remaining issue

raised by Kathrein in this appeal, see Kathrein, 166 F.App’x at 863-64 (advising

that argument concerning entitlement to present criminal allegations to grand jury

is frivolous), and warn him that if he continues to pursue that issue before this

court he will face sanctions here as well.