1

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Urban Fragility and Security in Africa

BY STEPHEN COMMINS

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ Unprecedented rates of urban migration over the past decade have contributed to a dramatic expansion 

in the size of urban slums and higher levels of poverty, violence, and instability in Africa’s cities.

◆ The drivers of violence associated with urban fragility are primarily related to weak and illegitimate 

governance, inequitable development, limited livelihood opportunities, and legal structures that inhibit 

land tenure and new business start-up.

◆ Solutions to Africa’s urban fragility cannot be addressed solely through security structures but must 

be part of a broader development strategy.

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 12 / APRIL 2011

zones for state security forces. And as urbanization accelerates, the security problems are likely 

to grow worse.

Urban fragility is a form of state fragility—a 

context of deteriorating governance and prolonged 

political crisis or conflict—with a locus in urban 

areas. Fragile governments lack either the will or 

capacity to deliver basic services to and provide security for their citizens. Grievances around this lack 

of essential services, coupled with increased insecurity, crime, and lawlessness, contribute to greater 

levels of urban violence.

Urban centers, especially capitals and regional 

cities, are also typically seats of government and 

therefore sites of intense competition for political 

power and resources. As African urban areas are 

frequently represented by all of the major ethnic 

Africa’s rapid urbanization is a new and underappreciated driver of state fragility. Fostered by 

prospects of economic opportunity, conflict-related 

displacement, and environmental pressures in rural 

areas, Africa’s cities are growing by an estimated 15 

to 18 million people each year.1 With more than 40 

percent of Africans below the age of 15, many of 

them destitute, Africa’s cities have become densely 

concentrated centers of unemployed young men. 

This is a combustible mix that can intensify violent crime, gang activity, illicit trafficking, links 

to transnational organized criminal syndicates, 

and political instability. The repercussions affect 

virtually every country on the continent. The 

slums of Kibera (Nairobi), Karu (Abuja), Soweto 

(Johannesburg), Camp Luka (Kinshasa), Bonaberi 

(Douala), and elsewhere are already largely no-go 
2

groups in a society, they are also arenas for defining 

national identity and testing the state’s capacity to 

balance the demands of competing political communities. The high population densities of urban 

areas, moreover, facilitate political mobilization and 

challenges to national power. The resulting political unrest poses a direct threat to the stability of 

African states.

The security ramifications of urban poverty 

are of growing importance since, by 2025, the majority of the poor in Africa will live in urban as 

opposed to rural areas—reversing a longstanding 

pattern. In many countries, moreover, the poorest 

20 percent in urban slums have worse human development indicators than the poorest 20 percent 

in rural areas.2 This, in turn, amplifies susceptibility to poverty-induced instability, including the 

spread of disease and food shortages. It is estimated 

that 300 million urban Africans will be without 

sanitation by 2020. Roughly 225 million will not 

have access to potable water. These risks were illustrated in the 2007–2008 urban riots in Burkina 

Faso, Cameroon, Senegal, and Mauritania, among 

other African countries, which broke out in response to rising prices of food, clothes, and gasoline. In the process, government buildings were 

destroyed and many people injured. With food 

prices once again rising rapidly, these tensions are 

likely to resurface.

Despite these mounting stresses, national and 

international actors have invested relatively little 

in urban development, livelihoods, governance, or 

programs to help stem the volume of urban migration. These changing demographics, however, will 

fundamentally reshape the African security environment for decades to come.

CURRENT URBANIZATION TRENDS

Africa is in a historic period of demographic 

change. In the early 1990s, two-thirds of all Africans 

lived in rural areas. By 2025, more than half of the 

African population will live in urban areas. And during the next quarter century, the urban population 

will grow almost twice as fast as the general population, increasing by more than half a billion from 

1990 levels.

Worldwide, urban population levels of roughly 

3.3 billion are projected to double by 2050. The 

African urban population, however, is expected to 

more than double its current level of 373 million 

by 2030 (see figure 1.1). That is, by 2030 there 

will be 760 million African urban dwellers, more 

than the total number of city dwellers in the entire 

Western hemisphere today. The East Africa region 

has the world’s shortest projected urban population 

doubling time at less than 9 years: from 50.6 million today to an estimated 106.7 million by 2017 

(see figure 1.2).

Africa’s three giant urban agglomerations, Cairo, 

Kinshasa, and Lagos, continue to rise rapidly in their 

ranking among the world’s largest metropolitan regions. In 2007, the urban metropolis of Cairo had 

11.9 million inhabitants, Lagos 9.6 million, and Kinshasa 7.8 million. In 2015, Cairo will have 13.4 million, Lagos 12.4 million, and Kinshasa 11.3 million 

inhabitants—ranking 11th, 17th, and 19th, respectively, 

among the world’s largest metropolitan regions. Projections show that Kinshasa, with 16.7 million inhabitants, will be Africa’s largest urban agglomeration 

in 2025.3

While Africa has the world’s highest rate of 

urbanization, it also has among the lowest rates of 

urban economic growth. Accordingly, urbanization 

in Africa has differed from other regions of the world 

in important respects. In other regions, urbanization followed jobs—created as a result of increased 

investment and economic activity generated from 

the agriculture sector. In Africa, there has been consistent underinvestment in agriculture leading to low 

productivity gains. This has limited the availability 

Dr. Stephen Commins is a Lecturer in the Department 

of Urban Planning at the University of California, Los 

Angeles, School of Public Affairs. 

“the security ramifications of urban 

poverty are of growing importance 

since, by 2025, the majority of the 

poor in Africa will live in urban as 

opposed to rural areas”
3

of assets that could be invested in off-farm economic 

activities in urban areas. The combination of growing 

economic globalization and expanded industrialized 

country agricultural subsidies, by constricting markets 

for Africa’s agricultural exports, has worsened this 

predicament in the past decade. Consequently, unlike 

all other regions of the world, urbanization in Africa 

has not contributed, through economies of scale and 

value-adding production chains, to overall growth in 

gross domestic product.4

A notable aspect of urbanization in Africa, then, 

is that it has not, by and large, led to improvements 

in basic well being. This runs counter to the general 

theory that urbanization provides greater access to 

jobs, basic services, and social safety nets. Rather, 

the percentage of people with access to services in 

many African countries has not kept pace with the 

rise in urbanization. In other words, while African 

countries are “late urbanizers,” they host some of 

the most deprived and volatile slums in the world. 

These tensions have been exacerbated by inadequate 

government capacity and unaccountable governance 

structures that restrict opportunities for citizens to 

articulate grievances.

T H E D Y N A M I C S O F U R B A N F R A G I L I T Y 

The poor in urban areas face a distinctive set 

of risks that accentuate fragility compared to the 

rural poor. Poor people in urban settings have a 

greater dependence on cash income and markets, 

including for food. They are therefore more vulnerable to fluctuations in food prices. In contrast, 

most rural households can produce some of the 

food they need at times of economic shocks and 

price increases. Accordingly, when there are steep 

price increases in food or other basic daily necessities, Africa’s urban dwellers immediately feel the 

pinch. Urban unrest under these circumstances 

becomes much more likely.

Urban areas are also more exposed to pollution, poor sanitation, and water shortages.5

 The 

approach to slums by many governments is to view 

them as illegal settlements. Governments are reluctant to bestow such settlements with legal rights 

given the financial costs involved in providing infrastructure and services. Politicians, meanwhile, 

gain limited political benefits for assisting slum 

“unlike all other regions of the 

world, urbanization in Africa 

has not contributed, through 

economies of scale and valueadding production chains, to 

overall growth in GDP”

RISING POPULATION GROWTH IN AFRICA’S CITIES

Source: United Nations Human Settlements Programme
4

dwellers. Rather, many municipal administrations 

prefer to direct their funding toward “tangible” and 

politically visible infrastructure projects and investments outside of slum areas.

Urban poverty is also often understated statistically 

and thus not likely to be addressed in its full dimensions. 

National poverty lines are often defined as household 

consumption under $1 or $2 a day. Yet these thresholds 

do not take into account a wide range of costs and hazards that urban residents face. For example, while rural 

residents can typically collect fuels, building materials, 

some foods, water, and so forth from their environs, urban residents must pay for almost all of these.

Vulnerability in urban areas is further exacerbated because of higher rates of violence and generally 

weaker community ties. Moreover, social safety nets, 

whether they come from neighbors and relatives or 

programs implemented by governments or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), tend to be less present in urban settings. For children and youth living 

in these cities, educational programs are frequently 

underfinanced, limiting opportunities to learn and 

gain the skills needed for long-term employment. In 

addition, personal insecurity in urban areas frequently 

inhibits families from sending children to school.

These challenges require difficult policy decisions, such as: What types of social services are 

likely to have the most immediate impact on urban 

fragility? How best to build local government capacity to effectively and accountably provide social 

services, after years of economic malaise, political 

breakdown, or general neglect? What potential synergies exist between rebuilding local government 

capacity and enhancing mechanisms of cooperation 

with civil society?

C O N N E C T I O N S B E T W E E N U R B A N 

FRAGILITY AND SECURITY RISKS

Does rapid urban growth contribute to urban 

violence and fragility? Not by itself. Violence, 

insecurity, and urban fragility are linked to weak 

local and national institutions, and limited or 

unequal access to economic opportunities. There 

are also diverse contextual drivers, such as narcotics trafficking in West Africa, political and economic cross-border migrants in Southern Africa, 

or climate change and resource scarcity leading to 

ethnic conflict in East Africa. Overall, this fragility is a manifestation of low levels of legitimacy, 

repressive government institutions, and insecurity 

at the local level that feed wider alienation and 

mistrust of the police and government agencies. 

Large wealth disparities are reinforced by political 

clientelism that directs government resources to 

ethnic and religious allies and further exacerbates 

these tensions. Indeed, this challenge affects much 

of Africa, from the national level to small villages. 

Yet as urban populations persistently expand amid 

limited economic opportunities, increased insecurity, and perceptions that the government is either 

disinterested or hostile, the potential for political 

fragility and violence escalates.

Research on the links between urban growth and 

violence in Organization for Economic Co-operation 

and Development countries has indicated a weak relationship. In Africa, however, other factors are at 

play, such as greater economic instability, conflict 

over resources, weak governance, and weak states—

and hence a lack of ability to address grievances. 

The lack of government capacity means that even 

when better policies are designed, they are difficult 

to implement at the scale necessary. Furthermore, 

the resources needed to provide adequate investment 

in improving urban living conditions are either not 

available or not a priority.

Urbanization and insecurity are thus connected by national and municipal governments’ 

inability to address grievances, combined with 

the resulting growing strains on housing, infrastructure, basic services, and livelihoods. Still, by 

themselves, these factors do not necessarily trigger violent conflict or political unrest. Qualifying 

variables include the willingness of elites to compromise, relative strength of civic organizations to 

promote political dialogue, and degree of political 

stability in neighboring countries.

“the poor in urban areas face 

a distinctive set of risks that 

accentuate fragility compared to 

the rural poor”
5

ADDRESSING URBAN FRAGILITY

The neglect of political and power relations in 

discussions of African urban development has hindered the development of effective policies to guide 

the current rapid population influx into Africa’s urban areas. Moreover, it misses a potential opportunity 

to enhance development and political empowerment 

initiatives in densely populated areas. Governments 

and international actors need to look at urban policy 

needs from a wider lens.

Recognize urban fragility as a development 

and security problem. Basic services delivered effectively can improve perceptions of local government. Yet attention must be given to delivering services to meet immediate needs while strengthening 

public institutions over the longer term to ensure 

sustainability and equitable coverage. For national 

governments, this will require crafting creative and 

flexible policies that encourage the complementary 

strengths of local governments and civic organizations. These need not be either/or choices. With 

limited resources for urban development strategies, 

governments will need to determine by specific city 

and sector context the type, level, and delivery 

mechanisms that are most appropriate. While the 

local government may have serious institutional 

problems, experience in fragile states indicates 

that, except for the most egregiously corrupt governments, it is essential to find some pathways for 

building up government capacity. Priority focus areas include strengthening local initiatives in water 

and sanitation systems, encouraging civic participation in municipal budgets and monitoring government expenditures, and training local government 

officials in basic financial and project management. 

Programs to build capacity also provide national 

governments with mechanisms both to invest in 

local government and work with civic organizations.

While rising levels of violence, crime, fear, and 

insecurity in urban centers have focused attention 

on the need to address urban fragility, it should be 

remembered that these are symptoms of underlying 

problems. Accordingly, governments should incorporate policies aimed at reducing urban fragility into 

development planning. In this way, they are integrated within broader efforts to strengthen weak infrastructure and expand livelihoods for slum dwellers. This perspective also recognizes that it is critical 

to sustain initiatives to address urban fragility over 

time if they are to be effective. Approaching urban 

fragility solely as a security problem often leads to 

short-term instruments that are disconnected from 

underlying causes of insecurity and fragility. Poor 

people frequently report the value that they place 

on security, but this includes security of tenure and 

livelihoods as well as physical security. Investments 

in community policing are particularly important in 

providing the foundation for other forms of security. 

This presents a major challenge to governments, 

as developing effective policing is an undervalued 

skill among national governments and international 

actors alike.

Improve local government capacity and accountability. Good urban governance is probably 

the most important factor in enhancing stability. 

Broad and sustainable urban development depends 

on political leadership that is committed to a democratic and equitable vision of urban society. In most 

cases, this requires strengthening and empowering 

local governments, both elected authorities and local 

branches of national ministries.

This encompasses decentralization of power and 

resources to local authorities, and a thorough reframing of central government functions and policy 

frameworks in the areas of governance, policy reform, security, equal rights, and the economy. Examples of institutionalized channels for connecting 

decentralization and civic engagement are public 

hearings and consultations, community development committees, and participatory district planning councils. Such decentralization approaches 

enhance security by reducing “zero sum” or “winner-take-all” competition between different identity groups at the national level and allow for more 

“the lack of government capacity 

means that even when better 

policies are designed, they are 

difficult to implement at the 

scale necessary”
6

transparent distribution of resources. Decentralization by itself, however, does not necessarily reduce 

corruption or elite capture, which is why national 

governments and international actors must also invest in civil society capacities.

The participation of civil society is considered 

a prerequisite of good governance, as it enhances 

government transparency and accountability. The 

same holds true for the adoption of legislation 

that enhances the protection of human rights, 

particularly with respect to the poor and vulnerable. Mechanisms to support positive civil society 

engagement include:

◆ legal standing for nongovernmental observers within institutions of public sector 

oversight

◆ systematic inclusion of these observers 

throughout the process of a given agency’s 

work

◆ well-defined forums to facilitate exchanges 

between citizens and public-sector actors

◆ structured access to official documentary 

information to enable informed oversight

◆ the right of observers to issue dissenting reports directly to legislative bodies and independent media.

Improvements in accountability and transparency of local authorities are needed to facilitate citizen engagement and improve service delivery. In the 

past, local officials may have been more accustomed 

to operating behind the scenes (in some cases pursuing narrow personal benefit at the expense of the general public). There are a range of tools that have been 

developed to enhance citizen oversight and participation over the past decade, from Balanced Scorecards 

that report on the delivery of services to participatory budgeting, citizens charters, integrity pacts, and 

Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys, among others. 

Such initiatives have generated positive track records 

for urban systems across several continents.

Livelihoods. Governments and international 

actors need to invest in livelihood opportunities 

at an adequate scale to address the large number 

of unemployed. This includes expanding rural opportunities to slow the pace of migration and programs for out-of-school youth so as to diminish 

recruitment into gangs, criminal networks, or extremist groups. Mini-grants for innovative community-based organizations can provide the seeds for 

dozens of small initiatives. Programs can connect 

income-generating activities and permanent land 

leases with construction of adequate housing, safety 

and security, electricity, street lighting, and formal 

schooling. Local- and national-level NGOs can 

work on boosting skills and incomes through training, credit programs, and the formation of savings 

organizations. Children’s programs can enable adults 

to seek employment. And community groups can 

contribute to security by impeding criminal activities, such as trafficking, drugs, robberies, smuggling, 

and kidnapping. This, in turn, will reduce residents’ 

fear of leaving the household. Livelihood protection can also include policies to reduce the shocks 

of food price increases through short-term voucher 

or food coupon programs.

Governments and international actors, however, must avoid trying to select one or two “perfect” models. Instead, they should allow different 

approaches to flourish or flounder in practice and 

support promising citizen initiatives that only require additional support in order to scale up rather 

than always seek to start programs from scratch. Programs should build on what the urban poor have as 

existing assets, rather than focusing on what they do 

not have. The more assets urban households have, 

the less vulnerable they are. This recognizes that 

poor people are managers of complex asset portfolios, and their capacity to manage these assets shapes 

their ability to survive.

“poor people frequently report the 

value that they place on security, 

but this includes security of 

tenure and livelihoods as well as 

physical security”
7

Land tenure. Another key lesson learned from 

urbanization in other regions is that poverty allevia-

tion is most effective in projects that deliver secure, 

marketable instruments of land tenure to slum resi-

dents. In many African countries, the urban poor are 

still granted only temporary tenure, like occupancy 

permits, that are not fully bankable and do not pro-

mote the emergence of real property markets and 

corresponding property tax systems that can sustain 

local government operations. Thus, central govern-

ments should work to grant clear titles or other du-

rable tenure instruments. Among the countries that 

have changed laws and regulations to improve tenure 

security with some apparent success are Mozambique, 

Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. 

CONCLUSION

Urban fragility is likely to become an increas-

ingly greater focus of African security interests in the 

coming years. Conventional security approaches, by 

themselves, will prove ineffective in addressing these 

challenges and will, in fact, just treat the symptoms. 

Rather, determined efforts are needed to build Africa’s local governance capacity and opportunities 

for urban unemployed youth, while increasing slum 

dwellers’ stake in society.

NOTES 1

 United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN–

HABITAT), The State of African Cities: A Framework for Addressing 

Urban Challenges in Africa (Nairobi: UN–HABITAT, 2008). 2

 David Satterthwaite, “The Underestimation of Urban 

Poverty in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” International 

Institute for Environment and Development, 2004. 3

 UN–HABITAT.

4

 Diana Mitlin McGranahan et al., “Africa’s Urban Transi-

tion and the Role of Regional Collaboration,” Institute for Inter-

national Economics and Development, 2009. 5

 Lesli Bull-Kamanga, “From Everyday Hazards to Disasters: 

The Accumulation of Risk in Urban Areas,” Environment and Ur-

banization 15, no. 1 (April 2003). “governments and donors must 

avoid trying to select one or two 

‘perfect’ models”
8

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AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

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Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

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