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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

__________________________________________ 

) 

NING YE, ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 09-103 (ESH) 

) 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ) 

Attorney General, et al., ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

__________________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is here again on defendant Maria Amato’s motion for dismissal. Plaintiff 

Ning Ye, an attorney proceeding pro se, has sued defendant, who is the general counsel for the 

District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“DOC”), as well as various federal officials for 

various torts and civil rights violations. The Court’s prior Order dismissed all claims against 

Amato except for one defamation claim based upon an email, written in response to an inquiry 

by plaintiff’s colleague David Zapp, in which defendant stated that plaintiff “lied” about giving 

his client some candy when visiting him at the D.C. Jail. See Ning Ye v. Holder, No. 09-CV-103, 

2009 WL 2475169, at *3-*6, *8 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2009). Amato now moves for summary 

judgment on that remaining defamation claim or, in the alternative, to dismiss that claim for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def. Amato’s Mot. for Summ. J. 

(“Mem.”) at 7.) The Court will grant the motion and dismiss the remaining claim against her for 
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lack of jurisdiction.1

A court with original federal jurisdiction over certain claims has supplemental 

jurisdiction over state law claims “that are so related . . . that they form part of the same case or 

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “In order 

for a federal claim and a state-law claim to form part of the ‘same case or controversy,’ the 

claims must derive from a ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’” Taylor v. District of Columbia, 

626 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 

725 (1966)). “If there is almost no factual or legal overlap between the state and federal claims, 

a common nucleus of operative fact does not exist.” Id. Where the federal law claims that 

provide the Court with original jurisdiction over the action have been dismissed, the Court “may 

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(c)(3). 

Here, the only remaining federal claims are those against the federal defendants in 

Counts II, III, IV, and VIII. See Ning Ye, 2009 WL 2475169, at *8. These counts allege 

discrimination on the basis of race or national origin, false arrest and false imprisonment, 

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 Notably, plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s jurisdictional argument. Instead, he only 

requests discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). Because the Court is 

granting the motion on jurisdictional grounds as a matter of law in light of the facts asserted in 

plaintiff’s complaint and accompanying exhibits, the Court denies plaintiff’s request “because 

the discovery sought is not relevant to the Court’s analysis of the issues presented . . . .” 

Mahoney v. District of Columbia, No. 09-CV-105, 2009 WL 3126620, at *10 n.7 (D.D.C. Sept. 

30, 2009). And even if the discovery sought were arguably relevant, plaintiff offers only 

“conclusory assertion[s] without any supporting facts” regarding his belief that further discovery 

would create a triable issue. See Byrd v. E.P.A., 174 F.3d 239, 248 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 

(affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant and finding no abuse of discretion in 

denying Rule 56(f) request for discovery where plaintiff had “merely alleged that ‘there may 

well be knowledge on the part of [the defendant’s] employees or undisclosed documents” that 

would create fact issues). 
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malicious prosecution, and civil fraud, and they arise from plaintiff’s March 18, 2008 altercation 

with U.S. Marshals following a hearing in this courthouse and his subsequent indictment on 

October 23, 2008 for assaulting two Marshals. (See Compl. at 13-16, 18.) By contrast, the sole 

remaining claim against Amato, for common law defamation, arises from two entirely separate 

events: one incident at the D.C. Jail on February 23, 2008, and an October 3, 2008 email to 

Zapp, who had written to Amato on plaintiff’s behalf. See Ning Ye, 2009 WL 2475169, at *5, 

*8. “The events that trigger liability for [Amato] and for the [federal defendants] are completely 

separate . . . .” Taylor, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (dismissing common law tort claims against one 

defendant for lack of jurisdiction where remaining federal claims only alleged constitutional 

violations by other defendants); cf. Singh v. George Washington Univ., 368 F. Supp. 2d 58, 72 

(D.D.C. 2005) (finding no supplemental jurisdiction over state law defamation claim because 

facts needed to prove defamation claim “would offer no insight” into facts needed to prove 

federal discrimination claim), vac’d on other grounds, 508 F.3d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

“Accordingly, the state and federal claims here do not derive from a common nucleus of 

operative fact and the [C]ourt concludes that it should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over the state-law claims alleged against [Amato].” Taylor, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 29.2

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 In the alternative, defendant argues that her statement is not actionable as defamation 

because plaintiff cannot establish it was published to a third party, see Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis 

Group, 494 F.3d 1080, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (setting out third-party publication as defamation 

element), since Zapp was acting as plaintiff’s agent and therefore did not constitute a “third 

party.” (Mem. at 4.) The Court agrees that Zapp was acting as plaintiff’s agent when he wrote 

to Amato; he stated twice he was acting “on behalf” of plaintiff when inquiring how plaintiff 

could regain access to the D.C. Jail. (See Compl., Ex. 3.) 

There is also considerable persuasive authority for defendant’s contention that 

“[p]ublication to an agent of the plaintiff who is acting at plaintiff’s behest and on his behalf is 

tantamount to a publication to the plaintiff himself, and as such does not fulfill the publication 

requirement.” Delval v. PPG Indus., Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Ind. App. 1992). See, e.g., 
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For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant Amato’s motion is 

GRANTED and the remaining claim under Count VII is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. 

SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ 

 ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE 

 United States District Judge 

DATE: November 4, 2009 

 

Restatement 2d Torts § 577, cmt. (e) (“[I]f the [allegedly defamatory] communication is in 

answer to a letter or a request from the other or his agent, the publication may not be actionable 

in defamation.”); Eggleston v. Klemp, 295 F. App’x 233, 234 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Publications 

made to agents of the complaining party will not support an action for defamation when the 

complaining party or his agents induced the publication.”). However, because courts in this 

jurisdiction do not appear to have yet decided this question of law, the Court declines to reach it 

at this time. Cf. Nat’l Disabled Soldiers’ League v. Haan, 4 F.2d 436, 439, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1925) 

(holding that where U.S. senator acted as agent of plaintiff organization by writing defendant to 

inquire about defendant’s supposed mistreatment of organization’s member, and where 

defendant responded to senator by disputing plaintiff’s characterization of events and citing 

plaintiff’s “unsavory” reputation, defendant’s statement was protected by qualified privilege 

because, inter alia, senator was acting on plaintiff’s behalf).