This opinion is subject to revision before publication



## U NITED 

## S TATES 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

FOR THE 

### A RMED 

### F ORCES

_______________
UNITED STATES Appellee

v.
Henry L. Williams III
, Specialist
United States Army , Appellant

No. 15

- 0140 Crim. App. No. 201 30284

Decided February 2 3 , 2016

Military Judge s : Tara A. Osborn and D avid H. Robertson

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Lozano

, Major Aaron R. Inkenbrandt

, Captain J. David Hammond

, and Captain Heather L. Tregle (on brief) ; Colonel Kevin Boyle, Major Amy E. Nieman, and Captain Michael J.
Millios

. For Appellee: Major A. G. Courie II I, Major Daniel D.
Derner

, and Captain Timothy C. Donahue (on brief).

Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Judge ERDMANN, Judges STUCKY and OHLSON, and Senior Jud ge LAM BERTH

, joined

.

_______________
Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 1

Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas, of failure to go to his appointed place of duty, disobedience of a superior commissioned officer, two specifications of disobedience of a noncommissioned officer, making a false official statement, wrongful u se of marijuana, three specifications of larceny, two specifications of housebreaking, and bigamy in violation of Articles 86, 90, 91, 107, 112a, 121, 130, and 134, Uniform Code of Military

1 Senior Judge Royce C. Lamberth, of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, sat by designation, pursuant to Article 142(f), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 942(f) (2012).United States v. Williams , No. 15

- 0140/AR Opinion of the Court

2 Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 890, 891, 907, 912a, 921, 930, 9 34 (2006). Appellant was convicted, contrary to his pleas, of two specifications of larceny in violation of Article 121, UCMJ, and was sentenced to a bad

- conduct discharge and confinement for eighteen months. Pursuant to a pretrial agreement, the convening authority approved only the bad

conduct discharge and fifteen months of confinement. The convening authority also credited Appellant with 123 days against the sentence.

The United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) affirmed the findings and sen tence. We granted Appellant’s petition to review the following issue:

Whether Appellant committed larcenies of the property of two soldiers by using their debit card information without authority. See United States v. Lubasky , 68 M.J. 260 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
Contrary to the premise underlying the ACCA’s holding, an Article 121, UCMJ, conviction does not turn on identifying the “victims,” “impact,” and “loss” as those terms are commonly used and employed. Rather, it requires, inter alia, that an appellant stea l something from a person who owns it or has a greater possessory interest in it than the appellant. Lubasky , 68 M.J. at 263 (citing Manual for
Courts

- Martial, United States , Analysis of Punitive Articles app. 23 at A23

– 16 (2008 ed.) [hereinafter Drafters’ Analysis]). As the Government concedes, Appellant did not steal anything from Private First Class (PFC) Irvine or Specialist (SPC) Aldrich. Appellant’s convictions for Specification s 1 and 2 of Charge VI, Article 121, UCMJ, are set aside, and these specif ications are dismissed

.

I. FACTS

Appellant lived with PFC Benjamin P. Irvine from December 2011 to February 2012 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In February 2012, a fraud agency notified PFC Irvine that there were suspicious purchases on his checking

acco unt with the Boulder Valley Credit Union (BVCU), including a charge from Verizon Wireless for $2,269.51, charges from various food vendors, and charges from theUnited States v. Williams , No. 15

- 0140/AR Opinion of the Court

3 online sex and dating website Adult FriendFinder. 2 The charges totaled $3,067.70. Appellant was listed as the purchaser of the food on a Pizza Hut receipt, and he later
testified that he had written down PFC Irvine’s debit card number and mistakenly used it to complete all of the purchases, except for the one to Verizon Wireless, which Appellant cla imed his wife made. Once PFC Irvine notified BVCU of the fraudulent charges, BVCU provided PFC Irvine with provisional credit, but also charged him $33 in
overdraft fees.

As a result of the above actions, S pecification 1 of Charge VI, alleged:
In that [ A p pellant], did, at or near Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on divers occasions, between on or about 26 December 2011 and on or about 4 February 2012, steal money, of a value of more than $500 .00 , the property of Private First Class (E

- 3) BI.

SPC John C. Aldrich worked with Appellant in the summer of 2011 while they were both stationed in Iraq at Contingency Operating Site Warrior. In July of that year, SPC Aldrich noticed two unauthorized charges on his checking account with BB&T Bank totaling $755.10. The charg es were related to attempted equipment purchases from computergeeks.com. Computergeeks.com never shipped the computer equipment because it flagged the purchases as
fraudulent.

2 W hile we are reversing this specification on the ground that nothing was stolen from PFC Irvine, we clarify one point. To the extent that the Government’s theory at trial involved theft of

serv ices, such as those that Appellant may have purchased from Verizon Wireless and the sex and dating website, these services are, unlike goods, not “tangible and capable of being possessed,” United States v. Mervine , 26 M.J. 482, 483 (C.M.A. 1988), and thus not the proper object of larceny under Article 121, UCMJ. M anual for Courts

- Martial, United States pt. IV, para. 78.c. (2012 ed.) ( MCM ) (contrasting the Article 134 offense of obtaining services under false pretenses with larceny and wrongful appropriation

, which pertain to stealing money, personal property, or articles of value).United States v. Williams , No. 15

- 0140/AR Opinion of the Court

4 Appellant used SPC Aldrich’s debit card information to attempt to make the ab ove purchases without authority, though his defense was that his use was accidental. The computers were never shipped, but BB&T Bank charged him $70 in overdraft fees and put a hold on SPC Aldrich’s account for $755.10, which caused SPC Aldrich to be unabl e to make his car payment on time.

Consequently, Specification 1 of Charge VI, related to the above actions, alleged:
In that [Appellant], did, at or near Contingency Operating Site Warrior, Iraq, on divers occasions, between on or about 30 June 2011 and or about 7 July 2011, steal money, of a value of more than $500 .00 , the property of Specialist (E

- 4) JA.

At trial, Appellant moved under Rule for Courts

- Martial (R.C.M.) 917 for a finding of not guilty due to insufficient evidence to sustain a larceny c onviction. Citing this Court’s
decision in Lubasky , Appellant argued that PFC Irvine and SPC Aldrich were the “wrong victim[s]” of the larcenies, and
that the merchants or the banks should have been named as the victims in the specifications. The military judge denied
the motion.

II. ACCA DECISION

On appeal, Appellant claimed, inter alia, that the evidence of his larceny convictions was legally insufficient because the two checking account holders, PFC Irvine and SPC Aldrich, were not the “correct victims. ” United States v. Williams , No. ACM 20130284, 2014 CCA LEXIS 665, at *11, 2014 WL 7228945, at *4 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2014) (unpublished). The ACCA held that the evidence was legally sufficient. 2014 CCA LEXIS 665, at *1 1

– 14, 2014 WL 7228945, at * 4

– 5. Citing MCM pt. IV, para. 46.c.(1)(h)(vi), the ACCA recognized that larceny via the unauthorized use of another’s debit card “is usually a larceny of those goods from the merchant offering them.” Williams , 2014 CCA LEXIS 665, at *12, 2014 WL 7228945, at *4. It nonetheless determined that an alternative charging theory was appropriate in this case because PFC Irvine and SPC Aldrich were the “actual victims in this case. AppellantUnited States v. Williams , No. 15

- 0140/AR Opinion of the Court

5 caused the movement of [PFC Irvine ’s and SPC Aldrich’s] money from their con trol, intending to permanently deprive them and actually depriving them of its use and benefit.” 2014 CCA LEXIS 665, at *13, 2014 WL 7228945, at *5 (citing United States v. Cimball Sharpton , 73 M.J. 299 (C.A.A.F. 2014)).

III. DISCUSSION

A.

“The test for l egal sufficiency is whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
reasonable factfinder could have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lubasky , 68 M.J. at 263 (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U .S. 307, 319 (1979)). The elements of larceny are, in relevant part:
(a) That the accused wrongfully took, obtained, or withheld certain property from the possession of the owner or of any other person;
(b) That the property belonged to a cert ain

person ;

... ; and
(d) That the taking

... by the accused was with the intent permanently to deprive

... another person of the use and benefit of the property

.... MCM pt. IV, para. 46.b. (1) (2012 ed.). 3

As discussed at length in both Lubasky and Cimball Sharpton , Article 121, UCMJ, sought to consolidate the various means of stealing

— by larceny, false pretense, and
embezzlement

— under the single rubric of “larceny.” Lubasky , 68 M.J. at 263; Cimball Sharpton , 73 M.J. at 301;
MCM pt. IV, para . 46.c.(1)(a). In one sense, then, ‘ “the particular means of acquisition of the property became relatively unimportant. ’ ” Lubasky , 68 M.J . at 263 (quoting
United States v. Aldridge , 2 C.M.A. 330, 331

– 32, 8 C.M.R. 130, 131

– 32 (1953)). While this remains the case, the person stolen from is important, and it is evident to this Court that

3 The relevant portions of the 2008 and 2012 editions of the MCM are identical.United States v. Williams , No. 15

- 0140/AR Opinion of the Court

6 charging authorities and lower courts continue to flounder and misstep when it comes to the elemental requirement “that the accused wrongfully obtain money or goods

... from

a p erson or entity with a superior possessory interest

. ” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Drafters’ Analysis app. 23 at A23

- 16 (2008 ed.) ); see , e.g. , United States v. Gaskill , 73 M.J. 207 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (per curiam) (summary disposition); United
States v. Ends ley , 74 M.J. 216 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (summary disposition)

. 4 The relevant question in determining the

person 5 to name in a larceny specification is whom did the
accused steal the goods or money from ?

The MCM is instructive on this point. When a n accused engages in a wrongful “credit [or] debit” transaction, she has “usually” stolen from the merchant offering the purchased goods or “the entity presenting the money.” MCM pt. IV, para. 46.c.(1)(i)(vi). That is, typically, when larceny is by means of a wrong ful credit or debit transaction, the money or goods were wrongfully obtained from the merchant or bank, making them the person stolen from. The goods or money at issue belong to the merchant or banks, see Burton
v. United States , 196 U.S. 283, 302 (1905), and the defendant merely uses the credit or debit card, falsely representing herself as the cardholder, as a means to commit the larceny. See

, e.g. , United States v. Sierra , 62 M.J. 539, 542 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2005), aff’d , 64 M.J. 179 (C.A.A.F. 2006). Whi le it is true that the credit or debit cardholder may also suffer a consequence

— such as a bank
fee or loss of access to funds in an account

— the defendant nonetheless did not obtain money or goods from the
cardholder.

By way of example, in Lubasky , wit h respect to the specifications involving the appellant’s use of the widow

4 As noted infra p p

. 9

– 10 , we don’t doubt this is attributable in part to the unfortunate choice of language used to explain this Court’s decision in Cimball Sharpton

.

5 As explained in the MCM , “[p]erson” can refer both to a natural person and to “a government, a corporation, an association, an organization, and an estate. Such a person need not be a legal entity.” MCM pt. IV, para. 46.c.(1)(c)(iv).United States v. Williams , No. 15

- 0140/AR Opinion of the Court

7 Shirley’s credit cards, we found the convictions legally insufficient because the “[a]ppellant did not obtain anything from Shirley. Rather, he obtained those things from other
enti ties. For these reasons, the proper subject of the credit

card

- transaction larcenies in this case was not Shirley.” Lubasky , 68 M.J. at 263. Shirley, the account holder, simply did not own the goods that the appellant obtained from the
merchants or the fun ds the card

- issuing bank used to pay
for them. Id. The appellant obtained nothing from Shirley when he used her credit cards. Thus, despite the fact that Shirley was, intuitively, likely inconvenienced and, by any definition, a “victim,” nothing was stolen from her in these specifications, and she was the wrong person to name in
them. Id.

We reiterate, in the usual case of a credit card or debit card larceny, the “person” who should be alleged in the specification is a person from whom something was
obtain ed , whether it is goods or money. Id. (citing Drafter’s Analysis app. 23 at A23

– 16 (2008 ed.) ).

B.
“Alternative charging theories are also available,” as long as “the accused wrongfully obtained goods or money” from someone “with a superior possessory interest.” Drafters’ Analysis app. 23 at A23

– 1 7 (2012 ed.). Such alternative theories are the exception , and not, as the ACCA assumed,
the rule. Again, Lubasky is instructive as to when such alternative theories are warranted, since in the usual case of debit card theft, an accused obtains nothing from the cardholder through an unauthorized use of the cards

. See generally , Benjamin M. Owens

- Filice, “Where’s the Money
Lebowski?”

– Charging Credit and Debit Card Larcenies Under Article 121, UCMJ

, A rmy Law., Nov. 2014, at 9 (explaining why cardholders do not own the money in the related account). Lubasky was no t, however, the “usual case” when it came to the larceny specifications involving the Union Planters Bank (UPB) checking account.

What made Lubasky different with respect to the UPB checking account was the appellant’s status as a joint account holder, whi ch he obtained by misrepresenting to Shirley and the bank representative that he would onlyUnited States v. Williams , No. 15

- 0140/AR Opinion of the Court

8 make withdrawals for her benefit, intending all the while to
make withdrawals for his own benefit. Lubasky , 68 M.J. at

262

– 63, 265. While we disliked regressing to fixation upon a particular theory of theft, given the purpose of creating Article 121, UCMJ, in the first instance, MCM pt. IV, para. 46.c

. (1)(a), it was apparent the person from whom Lubasky stole was Shirley by becoming a joint account holder under
false pretenses, removing money purportedly for her benefit by virtue of those false pretenses, and keeping it for himself. Lubasky , 68 M.J. at 263

– 64. It was the fiduciary account relationship obtained through fraud, combined with Lubasky’s joint account holde r status, that made an “alternative charging theory” not only available but viable and necessary with respect to the UPB checking account
funds. See id. at 264 n.4 (citing Leffew v. Mayes , 685 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) ) ; State v. Lavigne , 57 A.3d 332, 339

– 40 (Conn. 2012) (holding that “in the case of a joint holder who has not herself contributed any of the funds to the joint account in which she claims an ownership interest, the factual question is whether the other joint holder and
sole cont ributor of the funds, by creation of the joint account, intended to effect an immediate, inter vivos transfer or gift of the funds to the noncontributing joint holder”).

Cimball Sharpton was another case where the appellant challenged the legal sufficienc y of the evidence on the grounds that the wrong “person” was alleged in the specification. Cimball Sharpton , 73 M.J. at 300

– 01. The question in that case was not whether an alternative object of the larceny could be alleged, but rather whether the Air
Forc e was precluded from being the person charged in the specification because the appellant obtained nothing from it.
See id. at 301

– 02

.
In Cimball Sharpton , the Air Force issued the appellant a General Purchase Card (GPC) in her name to purchase medical supp lies for the Air Force. Id. at 299. The Air Force was the account holder; the appellant was its agent. Id. at
299

– 300. While the agency agreement between the appellant and the Air Force was that the card could only be used for government purchases of medic al supplies, id. at 299, there was an additional factual twist: the issuing bank, U.S. Bank, had an agreement with the Air Force that charges “thatUnited States v. Williams , No. 15

- 0140/AR Opinion of the Court

9 involve misuse or abuse by the cardholder are not disputable
with the Bank

.... and the government is obligated to make payment for the transaction.” Id. at 301 n.2.

The appellant, while aware of the limits on her authority, exceeded that authority and misused the GPC to purchase items for herself. Id. at 299

– 300. By doing so, she induced the Air Force to make pay ments to U.S. Bank. Id. at 300. Indeed, she stipulated that the Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS) paid for all charges with appropriated funds. Id. In the usual case under the MCM

, the thefts would have been charged as larceny from the
merchants fr om whom the goods were obtained or from U.S. Bank, which held the GPC account. Id. at 301 (citing MCM pt. IV, para. 46.c.(1)( h )(vi). What made the Air Force an object of the larceny was not that it was the only one who
“suffered the financial loss.” See Cimball Sharpton , 73 M.J. at 299, 301

– 02

. It is irrelevant, for purposes of larceny, that a merchant is later paid for goods that are wrongfully obtained or a bank repaid for moneys expended to those
merchants. Id. at 301

– 02; see also MCM pt. IV, para.

46. c.(1)(f)(iii)(C). Rather, it was the Air Force’s agreement with U.S. Bank that it would pay all charges that raised the issue of whether the appellant’s actions could also be theft from the Air Force. In effect, the agreement between the Air
Force and U.S. Bank meant that U.S. Bank (and hence the merchants) would honor any charges made either with apparent or actual authority, and that any wrongful use of the GPC by the appellant would wrongfully induce payment by the Air Force.

Unfortunately, the langua ge we used focused on the Air Force as “the victim,” and the one who “suffered the
financial loss.” Cimball Sharpton , 73 M.J. at 299, 301

– 02. More accurately, it should have stated that the Air Force was an appropriate person to allege in the larceny speci fication because it was an entity from whom the appellant wrongfully obtained goods or money. 6 See MCM

6 The issue granted in Cimball Sharpton focused on whether the larceny could be from the Air Force, not on what was stolen,
and not on whether only the Air Force was stolen from. While there is precedent supporting the theory, under a legal sufficiencyUnited States v. Williams , No. 15

- 0140/AR Opinion of the Court

10 pt. IV, para. 46.c.(1)(i)(vi). The appellant

— the Air Force’s
agent

— exceeded her authority and abused her role as an agent by either obtaining money f rom the Air Force by wrongfully inducing it to pay funds to U.S. Bank as if the charges were, in fact, authorized purchases, or by wrongfully obtaining goods from the Air Force by keeping goods that she purchased without authority but that, in fact, belong ed
to the Air Force

. See Cimball Sharpton , 73 M.J

. at 300. Once again, Cimball Sharpton was not the usual case. To the extent it can be read to suggest that in a larceny specification the government may name as the object of the larceny any person who suff ered a loss or experienced other harm, we clarify that the government should instead name the person or entity from whom the accused actually obtained the goods or money.

C

. The instant case is not an unusual case

— there were no agency relationships, no joint accounts, and no contracts. Our unfortunate choice of language in Cimball Sharpton does not change the law, and we urge the G overnment to cleave to the rule set forth in the MCM in the “usual case.”
See MCM pt. IV, para. 46.c.(1)(h)(vi). This is such a case: Appellant’s actions constituted a garden

- variety larceny by unauthorized use of debit card information, and the usual
rule

— that the person who was stolen from, or, in the case of computergeeks.com, fro m whom larceny was attempted, was the merchant from whom the goods were obtained or the bank from whom money was obtained

— applies. The account holders here did not own either the goods or the bank funds available to satisfy the debit card purchases.

Whi le it is both intuitively and objectively true that PFC
Irvine and SPC Aldrich were “victims” and “suffered the
finan cial loss [ es ]

, ” see Cimball Sharpton , 73 M.J. at 299,

analysis, that what the appellant stole from the Air Force was

money, see United States v. Ragins , 11 M.J. 42, 46 (C.M.A. 1981),
it seems the better charging theory would have been that she stole the particular items by exceeding her actual authority and keeping the items that were in effect purchased by the Air Force for herself.United States v. Williams , No. 15

- 0140/AR Opinion of the Court

11 301

– 02

, because of Appellant, he neither took nor obtained nor withheld anything from them. Though he was the but

for cause of their financial problems, that does not constitute larceny from them. If a defendant did not steal from the person the g overnment names in the larceny specification, the conviction is legally insufficient. See Luba sky , 68 M.J. at 263, 265.

IV. JUDGMENT

The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed as to Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge VI and the sentence. The findings of guilty as to Specifications 1 and 2 of Charge VI are set aside, and those specifications are dismissed. The remaining findings of guilty are affirmed. T he record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals for reassessment of the sentence,
or for a reheari ng on sentence, if necessary.