UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

BRENT POLL, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

JACOB J. LEW, Secretary, Department of 

the Treasury, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 15-4117 

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00090-DBP) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Thirty years after he was terminated from his job with the Internal Revenue 

Service (IRS), Plaintiff Brent Poll, proceeding pro se, filed his third federal 

complaint related to the termination, notwithstanding a 1987 settlement agreement 

resolving all such claims (Settlement Agreement) and a 2008 federal court injunction 

prohibiting him from filing such claims (Injunction). His complaint, alleging 

discriminatory retaliation in violation of Title VII, asserted that his former IRS 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

March 15, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

supervisor, Mr. Higbee, made negative comments in 1984 that delayed his hiring by 

another federal agency, which, in turn, caused him to lose federal retirement benefits. 

The magistrate judge, sitting by consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), 

dismissed the complaint. He ruled Mr. Poll’s cause of action was barred by the 

Injunction. He further ruled the complaint essentially alleged a breach of the 

Settlement Agreement, a claim over which federal courts lack subject matter 

jurisdiction. Mr. Poll appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Termination, Settlement, and Retirement. Mr. Poll was terminated from the 

IRS in 1983 after refusing a reassignment from Ogden, Utah, to Fresno, California. 

While unemployed, he withdrew his retirement contributions with the Civil Service 

Retirement System (CSRS). He applied for a job at another federal agency, the 

Defense Property Disposal Office (DPDO) in Ogden, but Mr. Higbee made negative 

comments about Mr. Poll to DPDO during the application process. DPDO did hire 

Mr. Poll, but he was no longer eligible for CSRS benefits, as federal employees hired 

in 1984 were covered by the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), which 

replaced CSRS. 

Mr. Poll filed claims against the IRS with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC), alleging Mr. Higbee’s negative comments delayed his hiring 

at DPDO, causing him to lose CSRS benefits, and were discriminatory retaliation for 

his actions defending an African-American fellow employee at the IRS. Mr. Poll 
3 

sought reinstatement in CSRS in his EEOC discrimination complaints, arguing he 

could have remained in CSRS had his hiring at DPDO not been delayed because of 

Mr. Higbee’s comments. While his EEOC complaints were pending, he learned he 

was eligible for a retirement option known as CSRS Offset, under which a small 

group of federal employees could receive partial benefits under both CSRS and 

FERS. Mr. Poll enrolled in the CSRS-Offset program and wrote to the EEOC stating 

he no longer saw a “substantive reason to pursue [his EEOC complaints] further” 

because experts informed him there was “no advantage for CSRS over CSRS-Offset.” 

R. Vol. 1, at 22. 

That same day, Mr. Poll and the IRS entered into the Settlement Agreement in 

“full and complete settlement of any and all claims which [Mr. Poll] may have 

against [the IRS], present and former [IRS] employees or agents, and/or the United 

States of America as a result of the incidents or circumstances raised in the [EEOC] 

complaints.” R. Vol. 1, at 39-40. The IRS conceded there had been “no factual 

basis” for Mr. Higbee’s comments, and agreed to state in response to any inquiries 

that Mr. Poll had been “performing his duties in a fully satisfactory matter at the time 

that he was reassigned.” Id. at 39. Both parties agreed the settlement agreement did 

“not constitute an admission by the [IRS] of discrimination and/or other 

wrongdoing.” Id. The Settlement Agreement made no mention of any retirementrelated matters. 
4 

Injunction. Notwithstanding the Settlement Agreement, Mr. Poll continued to 

file numerous complaints related to his termination.1 We imposed sanctions on 

Mr. Poll in his last appeal to this court in 2007 because he raised the same claims 

previously decided against him, and he filed a meritless appeal after the district court 

explained the numerous reasons his claims lacked merit. Poll v. Paulson, 

251 F. App’x 573, 577 (10th Cir. 2007) (sanctioning Mr. Poll jointly and severally 

with his attorney under Rule 11). 

Mr. Poll filed yet another complaint in federal district court, which failed for 

the same reasons articulated in this court’s 2007 appellate decision imposing 

sanctions. As a sanction for his continued frivolous litigation, the district court 

issued the Injunction barring Mr. Poll “from further filings based on his firing from 

the IRS or any events related to that firing.” Poll v. Paulson, No. 1:06-CV-144 TC, 

2008 WL 118076, at *1 (D. Utah Jan. 8, 2008) (unpublished). 

Current Complaint. Mr. Poll now alleges that Mr. Higbee’s retaliatory 

comments caused him to lose all of his federal retirement benefits. In 1991, Mr. Poll 

left federal service and withdrew all of his CSRS-Offset contributions. In 2009, he 

applied for retirement benefits but was told he was ineligible because he had 

 1

 Mr. Poll filed complaints with the Merits Systems Protection Board, the 

Federal Circuit, and federal district courts relating to his IRS discrimination 

allegations. See Poll v. Paulson, 251 F. App’x 573, 575 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting the 

“tortured and convoluted procedural history of Mr. Poll’s efforts to obtain redress for 

what he believes to be a wrongful termination”); Poll v. Snow, No. 1:01-CV-94, 

2006 WL 1767112, at *4 (D. Utah June 22, 2006) (unpublished) (“Mr. Poll has filed 

nine complaints or appeals regarding his removal with four different forums over the 

past two decades. . . .”). 
5 

withdrawn all of his CSRS and CSRS-Offset contributions and could no longer 

redeposit those funds since he was no longer a federal employee. Mr. Poll says he 

received accurate advice at the time that the withdrawals would not affect his 

retirement, but circumstances changed the accuracy of that advice. 

Mr. Poll alleges that the IRS’s admission in the Settlement Agreement that 

Mr. Higbee’s comments were not factually correct entitles him to “full relief” for all 

damages caused by Mr. Higbee’s retaliatory-discrimination comments under 

29 U.S.C. § 1614.501 (requiring a federal agency to provide “full relief” if the 

agency or the EEOC makes a finding of discrimination). Mr. Poll contends “fullrelief” in his case means full-retirement benefits, notwithstanding his decision to 

withdraw his retirement contributions. He first presented this claim to the IRS, 

asserting it breached the Settlement Agreement. The IRS found no breach because 

the Settlement Agreement was silent as to any retirement matters. The EEOC 

affirmed, adding that “[t]he fact that [Mr. Poll] relied on two-year old advice to 

withdraw additional funds from his retirement account after leaving federal service 

does not give rise to a breach of agreement.” R. Vol. 1, at 24. 

Mr. Poll then filed his Title VII complaint. The magistrate judge dismissed 

this complaint on two grounds. First, he ruled the allegations related to the timing of 

Mr. Poll’s hiring at DPDO are included within the “events related” portion of the 

Injunction, and thus were barred by the Injunction. Second, because Mr. Poll’s 

complaint could be read to allege a violation of the Settlement Agreement, he 

dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because federal courts 
6 

cannot enforce settlement agreements entered into with a federal agency on an 

employment discrimination claim. 

ANALYSIS

We review the magistrate judge’s dismissal de novo. See Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. 

Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating de novo standard of review 

applies to dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6)). 

Mr. Poll first argues his claims are not barred by the Injunction. He argues the 

Injunction bars only “new or ‘further’ appeals,” which do not cover his complaint 

because he is only seeking the full relief guaranteed to him back in 1987. Opening 

Br. at 10, 19. This is not a credible argument. Again, the Injunction bars him from 

filing any claim “based on his firing . . . or any events related to that firing.” 

Paulson, 2008 WL 118076, at *1. This is a “new” or “further” complaint and it is 

related to that firing. Mr. Poll based his EEOC discrimination complaints on 

Mr. Higbee’s comments, the Settlement Agreement resolved any and all claims 

related to his termination and Mr. Higbee’s post-termination comments, and both his 

prior federal complaints repeated the allegations that Mr. Higbee’s comments delayed 

his hiring at DPDO. We conclude the allegations in Mr. Poll’s current complaint are 

“events related” to his termination and agree with the magistrate judge that Mr. Poll 

has not asserted any claim that is not barred by the Injunction. 

More significantly, the magistrate judge correctly concluded it lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction over Mr. Poll’s claims. A federal district court does not have 

subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement entered into with a 
7 

federal agency on an employment discrimination claim. See Lindstrom v. United 

States, 510 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the relevant regulation, 

29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a), permits only administrative action and appeal to the EEOC 

for breach of discrimination settlement agreement claims, not a suit in federal court, 

thus, Congress has not waived sovereign immunity). Mr. Poll acknowledges this 

precedent, but argues he is not alleging a breach of the Settlement Agreement. He 

notes that his complaint does not allege a breach, or cite to any term or condition, of 

the Settlement Agreement. 

Mr. Poll claims he is challenging only the settlement “process,” not the 

Settlement Agreement. Opening Br. at 15-16. This is a phantom distinction, as the 

Settlement Agreement was in full and complete settlement of all of the issues raised 

during the settlement process, including Mr. Higbee’s comments. Both the legal and 

factual predicates of his current complaint—that Mr. Higbee made retaliatory 

comments and that those comments delayed his hiring at DPDO—are precisely the 

same as in his EEOC complaints and were “full[y] and complete[ly]” resolved by the 

Settlement Agreement. R. Vol. 1, at 39. Mr. Poll argues that the statement in the 

Settlement Agreement that the IRS made no admission of discrimination or other 

wrongdoing was “fraudulent from the beginning” and that he could not agree to this 

untruth. Opening Br. at 16. That argument is simply and clearly an attack on the 

validity of the Settlement Agreement. Mr. Poll has failed to identify any claims in 

his complaint for which the Government has waived sovereign immunity that would 

give the district court subject-matter jurisdiction. 
8 

We admonish Mr. Poll that if he persists in ignoring the Injunction and 

litigating or relitigating issues related to his employment with, or termination by, the 

IRS, including Mr. Higbee’s comments, the timing of his hiring at DPDO, or any

other events related to or resolved by the Settlement Agreement, his filings may be 

summarily dismissed. Further, we may impose sanctions, including damages and 

filing restrictions, as necessary and appropriate to enforce the Injunction, and to 

avoid further repeated litigation and appeals on issues previously addressed by the 

district court and this court. The judgment is affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Mary Beck Briscoe 

Circuit Judge