12146 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 39 / Tuesday, March 2, 2021 / Proposed Rules 

Federal Register. If you want to 

comment on EPA’s proposed approval 

of Virginia’s revisions to its state UST 

program, you must do so at this time. 

DATES: Send written comments by April 

1, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: Submit any comments, 

identified by EPA–R03–UST–2020– 

0291, by one of the following methods: 

1. Federal eRulemaking Portal:

https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

on-line instructions for submitting 

comments. 

2. Email: uybarreta.thomas@epa.gov.

Instructions: Direct your comments to

Docket ID No. EPA–R03–UST–2020– 

0291. EPA’s policy is that all comments 

received will be included in the public 

docket without change and may be 

available online at https://

www.regulations.gov including any 

personal information provided, unless 

the comment includes information 

claimed to be Confidential Business 

Information (CBI) or other information 

whose disclosure is restricted by statute. 

Do not submit information that you 

consider to be CBI or otherwise 

protected through https://

www.regulations.gov, or email. The 

federal website https://

www.regulations.gov, is an ‘‘anonymous 

access’’ system, which means EPA will 

not know your identity or contact 

information unless you provide it in the 

body of your comment. If you send an 

email comment directly to EPA without 

going through https://

www.regulations.gov, your email 

address will be automatically captured 

and included as part of the comment 

that is placed in the public docket and 

made available on the internet. If you 

submit an electronic comment, EPA 

recommends that you include your 

name and other contact information in 

the body of your comment. If EPA 

cannot read your comment due to 

technical difficulties, and cannot 

contact you for clarification, EPA may 

not be able to consider your comment. 

Electronic files should avoid the use of 

special characters, any form of 

encryption, and be free of any defects or 

viruses. EPA encourages electronic 

submittals, but if you are unable to 

submit electronically, please reach out 

to the EPA contact person listed in the 

notice for assistance. If you need 

assistance in a language other than 

English, or you are a person with 

disabilities who needs a reasonable 

accommodation at no cost to you, please 

reach out to the EPA contact person by 

email or phone. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Thomas UyBarreta, (215) 814–2953, 

uybarreta.thomas@epa.gov, RCRA 

Programs Branch; Land, Chemicals, and 

Redevelopment Division; EPA Region 3, 

1650 Arch Street (Mailcode 3LD30), 

Philadelphia, PA 19103–2029. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: EPA has 

explained the reasons for this action in 

the preamble to the direct final rule. For 

additional information, see the direct 

final rule published in the ‘‘Rules and 

Regulations’’ section of this issue of the 

Federal Register. 

Authority: This rule is issued under the 

authority of section 9004 of the Solid Waste 

Disposal Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 

6991c. 

Diana Esher, 

Acting Regional Administrator, EPA Region 

3. 

[FR Doc. 2021–04100 Filed 3–1–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6560–50–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Parts 1 and 27 

[AU Docket No. 20–429; FCC 21–14; FRS 

17455] 

Auction of Flexible-Use Service 

Licenses in the 2.5 GHz Band for NextGeneration Wireless Services; 

Comment Sought on Competitive 

Bidding Procedures for Auction 108 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; proposed auction 

procedures. 

SUMMARY: In this document, the 

Commission announces an auction of 

approximately 8,300 geographic overlay 

licenses in the 2.5 GHz band, designated 

as Auction 108. This document 

proposes and seeks comment on auction 

procedures to be used for Auction 108. 

DATES: Comments are due on or before 

May 3, 2021; and reply comments are 

due on or before May 17, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file 

comments or reply comments in AU 

Docket No. 20–429. Comments may be 

filed using the Commission’s Electronic 

Comment Filing System (ECFS) or by 

filing paper copies. The Commission 

strongly encourages interested parties to 

file comments electronically. 

• Electronic Filers: Comments may be

filed electronically using the internet by 

accessing the ECFS at https://

www.fcc.gov/ecfs/. 

• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to

file by paper must file an original and 

one copy of each filing. 

• Filings in response to the Auction

108 Comment Public Notice can be sent 

by commercial courier or by the U.S. 

Postal Service. All filings must be 

addressed to the Commission’s 

Secretary, Office of the Secretary, 

Federal Communications Commission. 

• Commercial deliveries (other than

U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and 

Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 

Junction Dr., Annapolis Junction, MD 

20701. 

• U.S. Postal Service first-class,

Express, or Priority mail must be 

addressed to 45 L Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20554. 

• Until further notice, the

Commission no longer accepts any hand 

or messenger delivered filings. This is a 

temporary measure taken to help protect 

the health and safety of individuals, and 

to mitigate the transmission of COVID– 

19. 

• Email: We also request that a copy

of all comments and reply comments be 

submitted electronically to the 

following address: auction108@fcc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Auction Legal Questions: Erik Beith, 

(202) 418–0660, Erik.Beith@fcc.gov, or

Daniel Habif, (202) 418–0660,

Daniel.Habif@fcc.gov.

General Auction Questions: (717) 

338–2868. 

2.5 GHz Band Licensing Questions: 

Madelaine Maior, (202) 418–1466, 

Madalaine.Maior@fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Commission’s 

document, Public Notice (Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice), AU Docket No. 

20–429, FCC 21–14, adopted on January 

13, 2021 and released on January 13, 

2021. The complete text of this 

document, including its attachments, is 

available on the Commission’s website 

at www.fcc.gov/auction/108 or by using 

the search function for AU Docket No. 

20–429 on the Commission’s ECFS web 

page at www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Alternative 

formats are available to persons with 

disabilities by sending an email to 

FCC504@fcc.gov or by calling the 

Consumer & Governmental Affairs 

Bureau at (202) 418–0530 (voice), (202) 

418–0432 (TTY). 

I. Introduction

1. By the Auction 108 Comment

Public Notice, the Commission seeks 

comment on the procedures to be used 

for Auction 108, the auction of 

approximately 8,300 geographic overlay 

licenses in the 2.5 GHz band. The 

Commission seeks comment on whether 

to use a single-round auction format 

with user-defined package bidding, or a 

simultaneous multiple-round (SMR) 

auction format. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 39 / Tuesday, March 2, 2021 / Proposed Rules 12147 

II. Licenses To Be Offered in Auction 

108 

2. Auction 108 will offer geographic 

overlay licenses for unassigned 

spectrum in the 2.5 GHz (2496–2690 

MHz) band. With overlay licenses, 

licensees obtain the rights to geographic 

area licenses ‘‘overlaid’’ on top of the 

existing incumbent licenses, 2.5 GHz 

Report and Order, 84 FR 57343, October 

25, 2019. As with an ordinary flexibleuse license, the overlay licensee may 

operate anywhere within its geographic 

area, subject to protecting the licensed 

areas (i.e., circular Geographic Service 

Areas with a 35-mile radius) of 

incumbent licensees. If an incumbent 

licensee in a county cancels or 

terminates its license, then the overlay 

licensee obtains the rights to operate in 

the geographic area and on the channel 

of the cancelled license. An overlay 

licensee may clear its geographic area by 

purchasing the incumbent licenses, but 

it does not have the exclusive right to 

negotiate with the incumbent licensee 

for its spectrum rights or to purchase an 

incumbent license in the geographic 

area in which it has the overlay rights. 

The Commission will offer up to three 

blocks of spectrum—49.5 megahertz, 

50.5 megahertz, and 16.5 megahertz 

blocks, respectively—licensed on a 

county basis. Specifically, the first 

license block will include channels A1– 

A3, B1–B3, C1–C3 (49.5 megahertz); the 

second license block will include 

channels D1–D3, the J channels, and 

channels A4–G4 (50.5 megahertz); and 

the third license block will include 

channels G1–G3 and the relevant K 

channels (16.5 megahertz of contiguous 

spectrum and 1 megahertz of the K 

channels associated with the G channel 

group). New overlay licenses in the 

Educational Broadband Service (EBS) 

portion of the 2.5 GHz band will be 

issued for 10-year, renewable license 

terms. A licensee in this band may 

provide any services permitted under 

terrestrial fixed or mobile allocations, as 

set forth in the non-Federal Government 

column of the Table of Frequency 

Allocations in 47 CFR 2.106. 

3. The specific inventory of overlay 

licenses available in Auction 108 will be 

determined by the results of the Rural 

Tribal Priority Window. During the 

Rural Tribal Priority Window, federally 

recognized Tribes were given the 

opportunity to submit applications to 

acquire new 2.5 GHz licenses for 

currently unassigned white space 

spectrum to provide broadband service 

on rural Tribal lands before the 

remaining unassigned spectrum is made 

generally available through competitive 

bidding. The Rural Tribal Priority 

Window opened on February 2, 2020, 

and the original deadline was extended 

by 30 days to close on September 2, 

2020. The Commission received over 

400 applications through the Rural 

Tribal Priority Window and the 

Wireless Telecommunications Bureau 

(WTB) has already granted over 150 of 

these applications. Based on review of 

applications received in the Rural Tribal 

Priority Window, the Office of 

Economics and Analytics (OEA), in 

conjunction with WTB, will release a 

public notice announcing the final 

inventory of 2.5 GHz band overlay 

licenses to be offered in Auction 108. 

This public notice will be released in 

advance of the deadline for the 

submission of short-form applications to 

bid in Auction 108 so that potential 

applicants can make informed decisions 

about whether to apply in light of 

information as to existing incumbents 

and potential Tribal licensees. 

Commission staff aims to process all 

pending Rural Tribal Priority Window 

applications prior to announcing the 

final auction inventory; however, there 

may be Tribal applications that remain 

pending at the time the auction 

inventory is announced. Potential 

bidders in Auction 108 should continue 

to investigate all factors that may affect 

each license on which they seek to bid 

throughout the auction process, 

including potential encumbrances that 

may result from pending Tribal 

applications. 

4. Concurrent with the release of the 

Auction 108 Comment Public Notice, 

OEA and WTB have made available a 

file listing all county and frequency 

block combinations potentially available 

for Auction 108, subject to the results of 

the ongoing review of applications 

submitted during the Rural Tribal 

Priority Window. This file is listed as an 

‘‘Attachment A’’ file on the Auction 108 

website at www.fcc.gov/auction/108. 

The file listing available county and 

frequency block combinations does not 

include blocks or counties that are fully 

encumbered by existing licenses. 

5. OEA and WTB will also make 

available resources to assist applicants 

in conducting due diligence research 

regarding potential encumbrances in the 

band prior to the release of the public 

notice announcing the final auction 

inventory. In addition to existing 

incumbents in the band, the pending 

Rural Tribal Priority Window 

applications represent the maximum 

potential additional encumbrances that 

may affect the licenses available in the 

auction. These resources will include a 

mapping tool to help identify and view 

existing licenses and Rural Tribal 

Priority Window applications in the 

Commission’s Universal Licensing 

System (ULS) database. The mapping 

tool will be updated to reflect changes 

due to the grant or dismissal of any 

pending Tribal applications prior to the 

auction. Potential applicants are 

reminded, however, that this tool will 

not represent complete licensing 

information; all information should be 

confirmed in ULS for any specific 

license or area. More information about 

Rural Tribal Priority Window 

applications, including a current 

mapping tool to help identify the 

location of pending, accepted for filing, 

and granted applications, is available at 

www.fcc.gov/rural-tribal-windowupdates. The licensing information 

provided on this web page does not 

represent complete licensing 

information. All information should be 

confirmed in ULS for any specific 

license or area. 

6. Notwithstanding Commission 

resources described in the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice, each potential 

bidder is solely responsible for 

investigating and evaluating all 

technical and marketplace factors that 

may have a bearing on the potential uses 

of a license that it may seek in Auction 

108, including the availability of 

unassigned white space in any 

particular market. In addition to the 

typical due diligence considerations 

that the Commission encourages of 

bidders in all auctions, the Commission 

calls particular attention in Auction 108 

to potential encumbrances due to 

existing licenses and the Rural Tribal 

Priority Window issues described 

above, which may impact the licenses 

available in Auction 108. Each applicant 

should closely follow releases from the 

Commission concerning these issues 

and consider carefully the technical and 

economic implications for commercial 

use of the 2.5 GHz band. The 

Commission makes no representations 

or warranties about the use of this 

spectrum for particular services, or 

about the information in Commission 

databases that is furnished by outside 

parties. Each applicant should be aware 

that a Commission auction represents an 

opportunity to become a Commission 

licensee, subject to certain conditions 

and regulations. This includes the 

established authority of the Commission 

to alter the terms of existing licenses by 

rulemaking, which is equally applicable 

to licenses awarded by auction. A 

Commission auction does not constitute 

an endorsement by the Commission of 

any particular service, technology, or 

product, nor does a Commission license 

constitute a guarantee of business 

success. 


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12148 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 39 / Tuesday, March 2, 2021 / Proposed Rules 

III. Implementation of Part 1 

Competitive Bidding Procedures 

7. In the 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 

the Commission decided to conduct any 

auction of new 2.5 GHz band licenses in 

conformity with the amended part 1 

rules. The Commission’s part 1 rules 

require each applicant seeking to bid to 

acquire licenses in a spectrum auction 

to provide certain information in a 

short-form application (FCC Form 175), 

including ownership details and 

numerous certifications. Part 1, subpart 

Q’s, competitive bidding rules also 

contain a framework for the 

implementation of a competitive 

bidding design, application and 

certification procedures, reporting 

requirements, and the prohibition of 

certain communications. The rules and 

requirements proposed in this section 

would apply in either a single bidding 

round auction or an SMR auction, 

unless clearly indicated otherwise. 

A. Certification of Notice of Auction 108 

Requirements and Procedures 

8. In addition to the certifications 

already required under 47 CFR 1.2105, 

the Commission proposes to require any 

applicant seeking to participate in 

Auction 108 to certify in its short-form 

application, under penalty of perjury, 

that it has read the public notice 

adopting procedures for Auction 108 

that will be released in advance of the 

short-form deadline, and that it has 

familiarized itself with those procedures 

and the requirements for obtaining a 

license and operating facilities in the 2.5 

GHz band. The Commission believes 

that this requirement would help ensure 

that the applicant has reviewed the 

procedures for participation in the 

auction process and has investigated 

and evaluated those technical and 

marketplace factors that may have a 

bearing on its potential use of any 

licenses won at auction. Consequently, 

this requirement will promote an 

applicant’s successful participation and 

will minimize its risk of defaulting on 

its auction obligations. As with other 

required certifications, an auction 

applicant’s failure to make the required 

certification in its short-form 

application by the applicable filing 

deadline would render its application 

unacceptable for filing, and its 

application would be dismissed with 

prejudice. The Commission seeks 

comment on this proposal. The 

Commission also seeks comment on 

whether there are additional steps it 

should take with respect to the filing of 

short-form applications to further 

ensure and promote auction integrity. 

B. Bidding Credit Caps 

9. Consistent with the Commission’s 

decisions in the Updating Part 1 Report 

and Order, 80 FR 56764, September 18, 

2015, the Commission seeks comment 

on establishing reasonable caps on the 

total bidding credit amount that an 

eligible small business, very small 

business, or rural service provider may 

be awarded for Auction 108. The 

Commission administers its bidding 

credit programs to promote small 

business and rural service provider 

participation in auctions and in the 

provision of spectrum-based services. 

10. Eligibility for the small business 

bidding credit is determined according 

to a tiered schedule of small business 

size definitions that are based on an 

applicant’s average annual gross 

revenues for the relevant preceding 

period, and which determine the size of 

the bidding credit discount. In the 2.5 

GHz Report and Order, the Commission 

determined that eligibility for the small 

business bidding credit in auctions of 

new licenses in the 2.5 GHz band would 

be defined using two of the thresholds 

of the standardized schedule of small 

business sizes. Specifically, the 

Commission determined that an entity 

with average annual gross revenues for 

the preceding five years not exceeding 

$55 million would be designated as a 

‘‘small business’’ eligible for a 15% 

bidding credit, and that an entity with 

average annual gross revenues for the 

preceding five years not exceeding $20 

million would be designated as a ‘‘very 

small business’’ eligible for a 25% 

bidding credit. The Commission further 

determined that entities providing 

commercial communication services to 

a customer base of fewer than 250,000 

combined wireless, wireline, 

broadband, and cable subscribers in 

primarily rural areas would be eligible 

for the 15% rural service provider 

bidding credit. The Commission defined 

‘‘rural area’’ as a county with a 

population density of 100 persons or 

fewer per square mile. 

11. To protect the integrity of the 

bidding credit program and to mitigate 

the incentives for abuse, the 

Commission, in the Updating Part 1 

Report and Order, established a process 

to implement a reasonable cap on the 

total bidding credit amount that an 

eligible small business or rural service 

provider may be awarded in any 

auction, based on an evaluation of the 

expected capital requirements presented 

by the particular service and inventory 

of licenses being auctioned. The 

Commission determined that bidding 

credit caps would be implemented on 

an auction-by-auction basis, but 

resolved that, for any particular auction, 

the total amount of the bidding credit 

cap for small businesses would not be 

less than $25 million, and the bidding 

credit cap for rural service providers 

would not be less than $10 million. For 

Auctions 101–103, 105, and 107, the 

Commission adopted a $25 million cap 

on the total bidding credit amount that 

may be awarded to an eligible small 

business in each auction and a $10 

million cap on rural service provider 

bidding credits in each auction. 

12. The Commission proposes to 

adopt the same bidding credit caps for 

Auction 108. As the Commission did for 

its recent auctions of spectrum for nextgeneration wireless services, it believes 

that the range of potential use cases 

suitable for spectrum in the 2.5 GHz 

band, combined with the relatively 

small geographic areas for new flexibleuse overlay licenses of white space, may 

permit deployment of smaller-scale 

networks with lower total costs. 

Moreover, past auction data suggest that 

the proposed caps will allow the 

substantial majority of eligible 

businesses in the auction to take 

advantage of the bidding credit program. 

The Commission therefore believes that 

its proposed caps will promote the 

statutory goals of providing meaningful 

opportunities for bona fide small 

businesses to participate in the auction 

and in the provision of spectrum-based 

services, without compromising its 

responsibility to prevent unjust 

enrichment and ensure efficient and 

intensive use of spectrum. 

13. Similarly, the Commission 

proposes to adopt a $10 million cap on 

the total bidding credit amount that may 

be awarded to an eligible rural service 

provider in Auction 108. An entity is 

not eligible for a rural service provider 

bidding credit if it has already claimed 

a small business bidding credit. Based 

on its experience with other spectrum 

auctions, the Commission anticipates 

that a $10 million cap on rural service 

provider bidding credits will not 

constrain the ability of any rural service 

provider to participate fully and fairly 

in Auction 108. In addition, to create 

parity in Auction 108 among eligible 

small businesses and rural service 

providers competing against each other 

in smaller markets, the Commission 

proposes a $10 million cap on the 

overall bidding credit amount that any 

winning small business bidder may 

apply to licenses won in counties 

located within any partial economic 

area (PEA) with a population of 500,000 

or less. 

14. The Commission seeks comment 

on these proposed caps. Specifically, do 

the expected capital requirements 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 39 / Tuesday, March 2, 2021 / Proposed Rules 12149 

associated with operating in the 2.5 GHz 

band, the potential number and value of 

new overlay licenses, past auction data, 

or any other considerations justify a 

higher cap for either type of bidding 

credit? Moreover, are there convincing 

reasons for not maintaining parity with 

the bidding credit caps adopted in 

previous auctions of spectrum suitable 

for 5G? Commenters are encouraged to 

identify unique circumstances and 

characteristics of this mid-band auction 

that should guide us in establishing 

bidding credit caps, and to provide 

specific, data-driven arguments in 

support of their proposals. 

15. The Commission reminds 

applicants applying for designated 

entity bidding credits that they should 

take due account of the requirements of 

the Commission’s rules and 

implementing orders regarding de jure 

and de facto control of such applicants. 

These rules include a prohibition, 

which applies to all applicants (whether 

or not they are seeking bidding credits) 

starting at the short-form application 

filing deadline, against changes in 

ownership of the applicant that would 

constitute an assignment or transfer of 

control. Under 47 CFR 1.2107(c), the 

winning bidder must be the entity that 

files the post-auction long-form 

application. Pursuant to 47 CFR 

1.929(a)(2), any substantial change in 

ownership or control of an applicant is 

classified as a major amendment. 

Applicants should not expect to receive 

any opportunities to revise their 

ownership structure after the filing of 

their short- and long-form applications, 

including making revisions to their 

agreements or other arrangements with 

interest holders, lenders, or others in 

order to address potential concerns 

relating to compliance with the 

designated entity bidding credit 

requirements. This policy will help to 

ensure compliance with the 

Commission’s rules applicable to the 

award of bidding credits prior to the 

start of bidding in this auction, which 

will involve competing bids from those 

who do and do not seek bidding credits, 

and thus preserves the integrity of the 

auction process. In furtherance of this 

policy, applicants will not be permitted 

to change their bidding credit type 

selection (i.e., from small business to 

rural service provider, or vice versa) 

after the short-form deadline. The 

Commission also believes that this will 

meet its objectives in awarding licenses 

through the competitive bidding 

process. 

C. Prohibition of Certain 

Communications 

16. Section 1.2105(c)(1) of the 

Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 

1.2105(c)(1), provides that, subject to 

specified exceptions, after the shortform application filing deadline, all 

applicants are prohibited from 

cooperating or collaborating with 

respect to, communicating with or 

disclosing, to each other or any 

nationwide provider of communications 

services that is not an applicant, or, if 

the applicant is a nationwide provider, 

any non-nationwide provider that is not 

an applicant, in any manner the 

substance of their own, or each other’s, 

or any other applicants’ bids or bidding 

strategies (including post-auction 

market structure), or discussing or 

negotiating settlement agreements, until 

after the down payment deadline. 

Section 1.2105(c)(5)(i), 47 CFR 

1.2105(c)(5)(i), defines ‘‘applicant’’ as 

including all officers and directors of 

the entity submitting a short-form 

application to participate in the auction, 

all controlling interests of that entity, as 

well as all holders of partnership and 

other ownership interests and any stock 

interest amounting to 10% or more of 

the entity, or outstanding stock, or 

outstanding voting stock of the entity 

submitting a short-form application. 

17. Nationwide Providers Subject to 

the Prohibition of Certain 

Communications. The operation of the 

rule prohibiting certain communications 

requires that the Commission identify 

each ‘‘nationwide provider’’ for 

purposes of § 1.2105(c)(1) in connection 

with each auction. Accordingly, 

consistent with the procedures adopted 

for prior auctions of flexible-use 

licenses for advanced wireless services, 

the Commission proposes to identify 

AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon as 

‘‘nationwide providers’’ for the purpose 

of implementing its competitive bidding 

rules in Auction 108, including 

§ 1.2105(c), the rule prohibiting certain 

communications. This is consistent with 

the Commission’s identification of 

nationwide providers in the 2020 

Communications Marketplace Report. 

The Commission seeks comment on this 

proposal. 

D. Information Procedures During the 

Auction Process 

18. As an additional safeguard to 

further prevent the sharing of 

information about applicants’ bids and 

bidding strategies and to discourage 

unproductive and anti-competitive 

strategic behavior, the Commission 

proposes to limit information available 

in Auction 108 in order to prevent the 

identification of bidders placing 

particular bids until after the bidding 

has closed. The Commission has 

instituted limited information 

procedures in most recent spectrum 

auctions. While the Commission 

generally makes available to the public 

information provided in each 

applicant’s FCC Form 175 following an 

initial review by Commission staff, it 

proposes to not make public until after 

bidding has closed: (1) The licenses that 

an applicant selects for bidding in its 

FCC Form 175, (2) the amount of any 

upfront payment made by or on behalf 

of an applicant for Auction 108, (3) any 

applicant’s bidding eligibility, and (4) 

any other bidding-related information 

that might reveal the identity of the 

bidder placing a bid. 

19. As in past Commission auctions, 

the Commission will not make public 

during a bidding round any real-time 

information on bidding activity. Bidders 

would have access both during and after 

a round to information related to their 

own bidding activity and eligibility. For 

example, bidders would be able to view 

their own levels of eligibility and 

submitted activity through the FCC 

auction bidding system. 

20. After the close of bidding, bidders’ 

license selections, upfront payment 

amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and 

other bidding-related information would 

be made publicly available. 

21. The Commission seeks comment 

on the above details of its proposal for 

implementing limited information 

procedures, or anonymous bidding, in 

Auction 108. Commenters opposing the 

use of limited information procedures in 

Auction 108 should explain their 

reasoning and propose alternative 

information rules. 

E. Upfront Payments and Bidding 

Eligibility 

22. In keeping with the Commission’s 

usual practice in spectrum license 

auctions, the Commission proposes that 

applicants be required to submit upfront 

payments as a prerequisite to becoming 

qualified to bid. As described below, the 

upfront payment is a refundable deposit 

made by an applicant to establish its 

eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront 

payments protect against frivolous or 

insincere bidding and provide the 

Commission with a source of funds from 

which to collect payments owed at the 

close of bidding. The Commission notes 

that its rules require that any auction 

applicant that, pursuant to 47 CFR 

1.2106(a)(2)(xii), certifies that it is a 

former defaulter must submit an upfront 

payment equal to 50% more than the 

amount that otherwise would be 

required. With these considerations in 


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12150 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 39 / Tuesday, March 2, 2021 / Proposed Rules 

mind, the Commission proposes upfront 

payments based on $0.003 per MHzpop, with a minimum of $500 per 

license. Given the uncertain total 

amount of available white space 

spectrum in each 2.5 GHz band license 

pending resolution of Rural Tribal 

Priority Window applications and other 

factors, the Commission proposes to 

base upfront payments on the total 

potential MHz-pops of each license 

offered in the auction, rather than on 

available white space in each block. For 

the 49.5 megahertz and 50.5 megahertz 

blocks, the Commission proposes to 

base the calculation on 50 megahertz. 

Additionally, when calculating upfront 

payment amounts, the Commission 

proposes to round the results of 

calculations as follows: Results below 

$1,000 will be rounded down to the 

nearest $100; results between $1,000 

and $10,000 will be rounded down to 

the nearest $1,000; results between 

$10,000 and $100,000 will be rounded 

down to the nearest $10,000; and results 

above $100,000 will be rounded down 

to the nearest $100,000. The proposed 

rounding procedures would lessen the 

differences between upfront payment 

amounts for licenses in counties with 

similar population instead of reflecting 

relatively small differences in total 

potential MHz-pops that are not 

necessarily representative of the 

available white space. 

23. The Commission seeks comment 

on these upfront payment amounts, 

which are specified in the Attachment 

A file on the Auction 108 website at 

www.fcc.gov/auction/108. If 

commenters believe that these upfront 

payment amounts are not reasonable 

amounts, they should explain their 

reasoning and suggest an alternative 

approach. 

24. The Commission further proposes 

that the amount of the upfront payment 

submitted by a bidder would determine 

its bidding eligibility in bidding units, 

which are a measure of bidder eligibility 

and bidding activity. The upfront 

payment does not limit the dollar 

amounts of the bids that a bidder may 

submit. The Commission proposes to 

assign each license that is available to 

be assigned a specific number of 

bidding units, equal to one bidding unit 

per $100 of the upfront payment listed 

in the Attachment A file. The number of 

bidding units for a given license is fixed 

and does not change during the auction. 

25. Calculating Upfront Payments in 

the Single-Round Format. To the extent 

that a bidder wishes to bid on multiple 

licenses simultaneously, it would need 

to ensure that its upfront payment 

provides enough eligibility to cover the 

total bidding units associated with the 

licenses that the bidder can win given 

the bids it intends to submit. Under the 

single-round approach, a bidder’s 

upfront payment would not be 

attributed to specific licenses. A bidder 

may place bids on multiple licenses 

consistent with its selections in its FCC 

Form 175, provided that the maximum 

number of bidding units associated with 

the licenses that the bidder can win 

does not exceed its bidding eligibility. 

Thus, in calculating its upfront payment 

amount, and hence its bidding 

eligibility, an applicant must determine 

the maximum number of bidding units 

needed to cover licenses that it may 

wish to win in the auction and submit 

an upfront payment amount covering 

that total number of bidding units. The 

Commission seeks comment on these 

procedures. 

26. Calculating Upfront Payments in 

the SMR Format. If the Commission 

adopts the SMR auction format 

discussed below, a bidder that wishes to 

bid on multiple licenses simultaneously 

similarly would need to ensure that its 

upfront payment provides enough 

eligibility. A bidder would be able to 

place bids on multiple licenses, 

provided that the total number of 

bidding units associated with those 

licenses does not exceed its current 

eligibility. Thus, in calculating its 

upfront payment amount and hence its 

initial bidding eligibility under this 

approach, an applicant must determine 

the maximum number of bidding units 

on which it may wish to bid (or hold 

provisionally winning bids) in any 

single round, and submit an upfront 

payment amount covering that total 

number of bidding units. The 

Commission seeks comment on this 

approach to upfront payments under an 

SMR auction format. 

F. Auction Delay, Suspension, or 

Cancellation 

27. For Auction 108, the Commission 

proposes that, at any time before or 

during the bidding process, OEA, in 

conjunction with WTB, may delay, 

suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 

108 in the event of a natural disaster, 

technical obstacle, network 

interruption, administrative or weather 

necessity, evidence of an auction 

security breach or unlawful bidding 

activity, or for any other reason that 

affects the fair and efficient conduct of 

competitive bidding. In such a case, 

OEA would notify participants of any 

such delay, suspension, or cancellation 

by public notice and/or through the FCC 

auction bidding system’s announcement 

function. If the bidding is delayed or 

suspended, OEA, in its sole discretion, 

may elect to resume the auction starting 

from the beginning of the round, or it 

may cancel the auction in its entirety 

(subject to the scheduling in due course 

of another auction for this spectrum). 

The Commission emphasizes that OEA 

and WTB would exercise the authority 

to delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in 

Auction 108 solely at their discretion. 

The Commission seeks comment on this 

proposal. 

G. Additional Default Payment 

Percentage 

28. Any winning bidder that defaults 

or is disqualified after the close of an 

auction (i.e., fails to remit the required 

down payment by the specified 

deadline, fails to submit a timely longform application, fails to make full and 

timely final payment, or is otherwise 

disqualified) is liable for a default 

payment under 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(2). 

This payment consists of a deficiency 

payment, equal to the difference 

between the amount of the bidder’s 

winning bid and the amount of the 

winning bid the next time a license 

covering the same spectrum is won in 

an auction, plus an additional payment 

equal to a percentage of the defaulter’s 

bid or of the subsequent winning bid, 

whichever is less. 

29. The Commission’s rules provide 

that, in advance of each auction, it will 

establish a percentage between 3% and 

20% of the applicable winning bid to be 

assessed as an additional default 

payment. The level of this additional 

payment in each auction will be based 

on the nature of the service and the 

licenses being offered. 

30. For Auction 108, the Commission 

proposes to establish an additional 

default payment of 15%, which is 

consistent with that adopted for prior 

auctions of spectrum suitable for 5G and 

other advanced wireless services. As 

noted in the Commercial Spectrum 

Enhancement Act (CSEA)/Part 1 Report 

and Order, 71 FR 6214, February 7, 

2006, defaults weaken the integrity of 

the auction process and may impede the 

deployment of service to the public, and 

an additional default payment of up to 

20% will be more effective in deterring 

defaults than the 3% used in some 

earlier auctions. At the same time, the 

Commission does not believe the 

detrimental effects of any defaults in 

Auction 108 are likely to be unusually 

great. In light of these considerations, 

the Commission proposes for Auction 

108 an additional default payment of 

15% of the relevant bid. The 

Commission seeks comment on this 

proposal. 


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IV. Proposed Bidding Procedures 

31. The Commission proposes to 

conduct Auction 108 using either a 

single bidding round, after which the 

auction system will process the bids to 

determine winning bidders, or a 

simultaneous multiple-round ascending 

(SMR) auction format. Under the singleround format, winning bidders would 

pay the amounts of their winning bids 

for the licenses they are awarded (less 

any applicable bidding credit discount). 

The SMR auction format would offer 

every license for bid at the same time 

and consist of successive bidding 

rounds in which bidders may place bids 

on individual licenses. Under this 

format, bidding would remain open on 

all licenses until bidding stops on every 

license. 

32. The procedures the Commission 

proposes for the single-round format on 

which it seeks comment differ from FCC 

spectrum auctions it has held in the past 

because the circumstances for Auction 

108 differ in many respects from more 

typical spectrum auction scenarios. 

However, the Commission also outlines 

and seeks comment on SMR procedures 

that may be more familiar to potential 

auction participants. 

33. The Commission notes the 

delegated authority of OEA to develop 

auctions jointly with WTB and expects 

that OEA and WTB will release a 

technical guide supplementing the 

information in the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice and including 

the mathematical details and algorithms 

of the single-round auction design. The 

corresponding technical information for 

an SMR auction is contained in the 

Auction 108 Comment Public Notice. 

A. Single Bidding Round Auction 

Design 

34. The Commission seeks comment 

on use of a single bidding round that 

would remain open long enough to give 

bidders ample time to submit, review 

and potentially resubmit, and confirm 

their bids. Bids submitted during the 

round would need to meet the activity 

rule. After the round closes, the 

submitted bids would be processed by 

the bidding system to determine the 

winning bids. 

35. While this format departs from the 

multiple-round procedures that the 

Commission typically has used in 

auctioning spectrum licenses, the 

inventory of licenses available in 

Auction 108 will be very large 

(approximately 8,300 licenses) and, as a 

result, a multiple-round auction could 

require a number of months to 

complete. Although a clock auction of 

generic blocks with an assignment 

phase to assign frequency-specific 

licenses can shorten the duration of a 

multiple-round auction relative to the 

Commission’s SMR auction format, a 

clock auction format would not be 

appropriate here because each overlay 

license being offered is unique. Within 

a county, each block has a different 

amount of bandwidth—though not all 

frequency blocks are available in all 

counties—and even where a given 

frequency block is available in a county, 

white space may not be available 

throughout the county due to existing 

incumbent licensee operations. An SMR 

auction could last for months, which 

would require participating bidders to 

monitor the auction consistently, a 

resource commitment that is demanding 

for all bidders, but particularly for 

smaller entities, many of which the 

Commission expects will compete in 

Auction 108. In addition, a longer 

auction entails a longer prohibited 

communications quiet period, in which 

all applicants—including but not 

limited to all officers and directors of 

the entity submitting an application and 

all controlling interests of that entity— 

are subject to the rule prohibiting 

certain discussions of bids or bidding 

strategies. Moreover, smaller entities 

that are seeking only a limited number 

of relatively low value licenses may 

consider such a resource commitment to 

be too onerous and may choose not to 

participate in this auction. In contrast, 

the Commission anticipates that, based 

on estimated processing time, a single 

bidding round giving bidders ample 

time to submit their bids and bid 

processing could be completed within a 

week. 

36. In addition, a single-round auction 

format may help overcome some of the 

inherent advantages of incumbent rights 

holders in the band and increase overall 

competition in the auction. Specifically, 

the Commission seeks comment on 

using a single-round auction format in 

the context of the existing licensing and 

leasing landscape of the 2.5 GHz band 

where a single entity holds a large share 

of the spectrum rights. A multipleround auction will always give a bidder 

an opportunity to outbid its 

competitors, and given that the majority 

license-holder in this band is a 

nationwide service provider and is 

likely to be better funded than many 

other entities that are potentially 

interested in Auction 108, these other, 

smaller entities may feel as though they 

have little chance of winning when 

competing against the larger licenseholder. Moreover, given that the larger 

entity’s interests are geographically 

broad while the smaller entities tend to 

have more localized interests, the larger 

entity would be able to ‘‘cost-average’’ 

by paying more for some licenses than 

its stand-alone valuation would 

otherwise indicate because it would be 

able to leverage savings from other 

licenses that it wins at less than its 

valuation. Other bidders, recognizing 

these advantages, consequently are 

likely to be deterred from participating 

in an auction where they expect that 

they would have little opportunity to 

win. Absent the participation of the 

smaller entities, the advantages to the 

majority license-holding entity would 

be even stronger. As a result of the 

diminished competition in the auction, 

prices may likely be lower than they 

would have been had the smaller 

entities participated. Conversely, in a 

single-round, pay-as-bid auction, the 

weak bidder has a better opportunity to 

win, it is more likely to participate in 

the auction, and prices can therefore be 

expected to be closer to the winning 

bidder’s valuation. The Commission 

asks commenters to consider whether a 

single-round format would encourage 

greater participation in this auction than 

would an SMR auction. Would a smaller 

entity be more likely to participate if 

other, possibly larger entities did not 

always have an opportunity to place a 

higher bid, as is the case in a multipleround ascending auction format? 

37. The Commission recognizes that a 

single-round auction precludes the price 

discovery across licenses that is possible 

in a multiple-round auction. Price 

discovery is intended to help inform a 

bidder’s decision to shift its resources 

across areas as relative prices change 

over the course of the auction, which is 

particularly helpful for a bidder with 

multiple alternative business plans but 

without sufficient resources to pursue 

all of them. The single-round auction on 

which the Commission seeks comment 

considers the potential losses in 

efficiency from the price discovery 

process and, on balance, finds that any 

losses are likely to be less consequential 

in this auction than is generally true for 

spectrum auctions. Based on input in 

the proceeding and the characteristics of 

the licenses offered in Auction 108— 

county-based, with non-uniform and 

occasionally significant encumbrances 

across areas, making them less suitable 

for larger-scale operations—it is the 

Commission’s understanding that the 

majority of potential bidders in Auction 

108 likely will be entities with specific 

local or regional interests, and therefore, 

they will not be hampered significantly 

by a lack of price discovery over 

multiple rounds for alternative areas. To 

determine their bid amounts, bidders 


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can incorporate information from 

significant secondary market activity in 

the 2.5 GHz band, including through 

auction or auction-like processes that 

have been used by incumbents to find 

interested parties and set prices, as well 

as data in ULS, and spectrum values 

from recent mid-band spectrum 

auctions, such as the recentlyconcluded Commission auction of 

Priority Access Licenses in the 3550– 

3650 MHz Band. Moreover, it has been 

suggested that smaller operators may 

have better knowledge of the local 

landscape and may be able to price their 

bids more accurately than larger entities 

without ties to such local rural areas. 

38. The bidding procedures the 

Commission proposes for the singleround format include several 

mechanisms for ensuring that many 

important benefits of a multiple-round 

auction can be accommodated under the 

single-round format. Importantly, the 

Commission seeks comment on 

procedures to ensure that certain 

potentially critical aggregations of 

licenses can be bid on with an either/ 

or indicator so that a bidder can indicate 

that it wishes to be assigned only one 

of a group of substitutable licenses. This 

procedure offers a useful advantage that 

is not feasible in a multiple-round 

auction where a large number of items 

precludes flexible package bidding. 

With these mechanisms, the 

Commission is confident that bidders 

can simply and effectively represent 

their bidding interests in a single-round 

format. 

39. The Commission seeks comment 

on any specific aspects of this singleround auction with which commenters 

agree or disagree. In particular, do 

potential bidders see the time savings of 

a single-round auction as valuable 

relative to the SMR auction that could 

last for several months? Do commenters 

believe that the single-round format 

would disproportionately favor one 

group of bidders or another? Is there any 

reason to conclude that its 

understanding of the type of entities 

likely to participate in Auction 108 is 

inaccurate or unsupported by the record 

in the Transforming the 2.5 GHz Band 

proceeding, WT Docket No. 18–120? 

40. Prior to the start of Auction 108, 

the Commission would make available 

to bidders various educational 

materials. 

1. Pay-As-Bid Pricing Rule 

41. Under the single-round auction 

format, each winning bidder would pay 

the sum of its winning bid amounts for 

the licenses it is awarded, less any 

applicable bidding credit discount. 

Accordingly, a bidder with bidding 

credits should bid an undiscounted 

(full-price) amount for the licenses it 

wishes to win. 

42. The Commission would use a payas-bid payment rule to give bidders 

more certainty about the cost of their 

winning bids than would a ‘‘second 

price’’ payment rule, in which the 

winning bidder would pay a price 

corresponding to the next best bid or set 

of bids. In the simple case of an 

individual item and no package bids, 

the ‘‘second price’’ would be the 

second-highest bid. In the context of a 

combinatorial winner determination 

process such as the Commission 

proposes here, the bidding system 

would compare the revenue of the 

winning combination of bids with the 

highest revenue possible absent the 

winning bidder’s bid, and subtract the 

difference from the winning bidder’s bid 

to determine the second, or Vickrey, 

price. A pay-as-bid rule may also be 

useful in discouraging undesirable 

strategic behavior. In a second-price 

auction where the highest bidder would 

win but pay only the amount of the 

second-highest bid, a dominant entity 

may overbid on a large group of licenses 

if it anticipates that competing bids for 

most of those licenses would be 

considerably lower, so that expected 

gains would outweigh any losses. In 

contrast, with a pay-as-bid rule, each 

bidder would have to pay the amount of 

its high bid for each license it wins, 

discouraging such aggressive strategies 

by entities with interests in a large 

number of areas. Moreover, given the 

very large inventory of licenses offered 

in Auction 108, the computation of 

‘‘second prices’’ (or Vickrey prices) 

would be exceedingly complex and 

potentially intractable within a 

reasonable amount of processing time. 

The determination of a single Vickrey 

price involves solving an additional 

combinatorial optimization problem, 

which could take a significant amount 

of time to solve. The Commission has 

computed Vickrey prices during the 

assignment phase of several recent 

spectrum clock auctions where, in each 

assignment phase market, the number of 

licenses being assigned was less by 

orders of magnitude and only a 

relatively small number of bidders were 

being assigned licenses. 

43. Might a resource-constrained 

smaller bidder be more inclined to 

compete at auction because it has more 

certainty over the amount it might pay? 

Or might a small entity be more likely 

to participate because a dominant entity 

will have less incentive to strategically 

overbid than in a second-price auction? 

The Commission seeks comment on the 

use of a pay-as-bid payment rule. 

2. Bidding Activity and Eligibility 

44. Consistent with its proposal to 

determine bidding eligibility in bidding 

units based on the amount of a bidder’s 

upfront payment, the Commission 

proposes to determine bidding activity 

in terms of bidding units, as well. Each 

license will be assigned a certain 

number of bidding units. For a single 

round of bidding, the Commission 

would limit a bidder’s total bidding 

activity such that the maximum number 

of bidding units associated with the 

licenses that the bidder can win does 

not exceed its total eligibility in bidding 

units. 

45. To implement this procedure, 

when a bidder uploads a set of bids via 

the internet to the FCC auction bidding 

system, the system would calculate the 

maximum bid amount and the 

maximum number of bidding units 

associated with the bids. If the bids do 

not exceed the bidder’s eligibility and 

otherwise are valid bids, the bidding 

system would accept the bid 

submission. If the submitted bids 

exceed the bidder’s eligibility, the bids 

would be rejected and new bids could 

be submitted before the close of the 

round. In addition, during the bidding 

round, the bidding system would inform 

the bidder of a running total of its 

activity in terms of bidding units and 

the total value of all of its submitted 

bids. The Commission asks for comment 

on these procedures. 

3. Minimum Bids and Reserve Prices 

46. As part of the pre-bidding process 

for each auction, section 309(j) of the 

Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended, mandates that the 

Commission prescribes methods for 

establishing reasonable minimum bid 

amounts for licenses subject to auction 

unless such bid amounts are not in the 

public interest. Accordingly, the 

Commission proposes to establish 

minimum bid amounts for Auction 108. 

47. Given the potential lack of 

accurate information on available white 

space in the 2.5 GHz band, the 

Commission proposes to establish the 

minimum bid amounts in Auction 108 

using the total potential MHz-pops of 

each license offered in the auction, 

rather than on available white space in 

each block. The Commission proposes 

to base these calculations on $0.006 per 

MHz-pop, with a minimum of $500 per 

license. For the 49.5-megahertz and 

50.5-megahertz blocks, the Commission 

proposes to base the calculation on 50 

megahertz. Additionally, when 

calculating minimum bid amounts, the 

Commission proposes to round the 

results of calculations as follows: 


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Results below $1,000 will be rounded 

down to the nearest $100; results 

between $1,000 and $10,000 will be 

rounded down to the nearest $1,000; 

results between $10,000 and $100,000 

will be rounded down to the nearest 

$10,000; and results above $100,000 

will be rounded down to the nearest 

$100,000. The proposed rounding 

procedures would lessen the differences 

between minimum bid amounts for 

licenses in counties with similar 

population instead of reflecting 

relatively small differences in total 

potential MHz-pops that are not 

necessarily representative of the 

available white space. The Commission 

seeks comment on these minimum bid 

amounts, which are specified in the 

Attachment A file on the Auction 108 

website at www.fcc.gov/auction/108. If 

commenters believe that these 

minimum bid amounts would result in 

unsold licenses or are not reasonable 

amounts, they should explain their 

reasoning and propose an alternative 

approach. Commenters should support 

their claims with valuation analyses and 

suggested amounts or formulas for 

minimum bids. The Commission does 

not propose a separate aggregate reserve 

price, below which the auction would 

not conclude, and it seeks comment on 

that proposal. The Commission is not 

aware at this time of circumstances that 

require establishment of an aggregate 

reserve price in the public interest for 

this auction of overlay licenses in the 

2.5 GHz band and propose only the 

minimum bids that it discusses here. 

4. Package Bidding 

48. For the single-round format, the 

Commission proposes a flexible form of 

package bidding, which would allow 

bidders to submit bids for packages of 

multiple licenses within the same 

county or for multiple geographic area 

licenses, i.e., licenses covering multiple 

metropolitan counties within a specified 

geographic region. 

49. Packages of Multiple Blocks 

within a County. For the single-round 

format, the Commission proposes to 

allow a bidder to submit package bids 

for two or three licenses in a single 

county, in order to give the bidder more 

control in this single-round auction over 

the number and combination of licenses 

that it may win. By contrast, in a 

multiple-round auction, a bidder has 

greater ability to shape the combination 

of licenses that it is assigned. The 

Commission proposes these limited 

package bidding procedures for the 

single-round format to address a 

bidder’s need to win at least two or 

three blocks in a county if it wins any 

blocks. This would enable a bidder to 

ensure that if it won any licenses in a 

county, it would win sufficient licenses 

to facilitate high-bandwidth services 

and applications. A package bid would 

consist of a group of licenses and a 

single price that would apply to the 

entire group. The bidding system would 

determine the winning combination of 

licenses taking into account that all or 

none of the licenses in a package bid are 

to be assigned to the bidder. 

50. For example, if a bidder is 

interested in winning any two license 

blocks in a county, but not a single 

license or all three licenses, it could 

submit three package bids for each of 

the two-license block combinations in 

the county. The bidder would be 

ensured of winning two licenses if it 

wins any of them. 

51. Packages of Multiple Metropolitan 

Counties. The Commission proposes 

procedures to permit certain package 

bids that include licenses in multiple 

metropolitan counties, as long as the 

counties in a bid are within a given 

geographic region or area. The 

Commission proposes to define 

‘‘metropolitan’’ for this purpose as those 

counties that are not subject to the 

small-market bidding credit cap. 

Counties located within any PEA with 

a population of 500,000 or less are 

subject to the small-market bidding 

credit cap. Thus, metropolitan counties 

are those located within any PEA with 

a population greater than 500,000. 

52. For the single round format, the 

Commission proposes to limit an 

individual package bid further to 

include licenses only in metropolitan 

counties that lie within the same Major 

Economic Area (MEA). This limitation 

would enable packaging across the 

interdependent counties in a 

metropolitan market, would prevent the 

submission of overly broad packages, 

and recognizes the need to maintain 

bidding and computational 

manageability. There are 51 MEAs 

nationwide; MEAs are intermediate in 

size between Economic Areas (EAs) and 

Regional Economic Area Groupings 

(REAGs). In addition, the Commission 

will license Guam and the Northern 

Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico and the 

U.S. Virgin Islands, and American 

Samoa, which have been assigned 

Commission-created MEA numbers 49– 

51, respectively. Therefore, a single 

package bid could include licenses in 

two or more metropolitan counties in a 

given MEA; the non-metropolitan 

counties in the MEA could be bid for 

only as single counties (but potentially 

as packages of two or three licenses in 

a single county). Finally, for 

computational reasons, the Commission 

proposes that the total number of 

package and/or individual bids that a 

bidder may submit involving 

metropolitan counties in an MEA is 

limited to 250. If the number of 

individual licenses available in the 

metropolitan counties in a single MEA 

exceeds 250, an exception to the limit 

would permit a bidder to submit a bid 

for each individual license. The 

Commission does not propose a limit on 

individual county-level bids, package or 

otherwise, that do not involve 

metropolitan counties. 

53. A package bid would consist of a 

set of licenses in a set of counties and 

a single price applicable to the entire set 

of licenses in those counties. Within the 

proposed limits the Commission sets 

forth here, a bidder could include any 

combination of counties in a package— 

i.e., packages would not be pre-defined. 

54. In proposing these procedures for 

package bidding for the single-round 

format, the Commission aims to balance 

the needs of smaller entities with very 

localized interests with the 

requirements of entities that wish to 

create larger networks. Permitting 

packages of the licenses within a county 

provides a simple mechanism for a 

bidder to guard against winning an 

undesirable combination or number of 

licenses in a single county, which is 

likely to be useful to all bidders. 

Allowing multiple-county packages of 

licenses only for metropolitan areas 

addresses the needs of entities with 

larger networks to ensure that they do 

not win an undesired patchwork of 

more heavily populated areas. In such 

areas, counties of smaller and greater 

competitiveness may make winning 

such patchworks potentially more 

likely. At the same time, limiting the 

scope of multiple-county packages to 

metropolitan counties within a single 

MEA reduces the potential for a bidder 

to leverage a highly-valued aggregation 

in one area in order to win licenses in 

other areas where bidders for individual 

counties may be the more efficient users 

of those licenses. Moreover, limits on 

package bids help reduce complexity for 

the bidder and enhance computational 

feasibility. 

55. The Commission seeks comment 

on these procedures to allow bidding for 

packages of multiple licenses within a 

single county and for packages of bids 

for multiple metropolitan counties 

within an MEA. The Commission asks 

commenters to consider how changes 

they suggest to these procedures might 

impact the different needs of the wide 

variety of potential bidders that may be 

interested in Auction 108. In particular, 

the Commission seeks comment on the 

use of MEAs as the relevant ‘‘region’’ for 

limiting the metropolitan counties that 


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can be included in a single package bid. 

Would a smaller aggregation, such as 

EAs, be more appropriate? 

Alternatively, would larger areas, such 

as REAGs be preferable? The 

Commission also asks commenters to 

address the proposed definition of 

‘‘metropolitan.’’ Would an alternative 

definition of more heavily populated 

counties be simple to implement and 

consistent with other definitions used in 

this and other recent Commission 

spectrum auctions? 

5. Either/Or Indicator 

56. Because a single-round auction 

does not give a bidder an opportunity to 

move its bids from one area to another 

as prices change, or from one block to 

another within an area, as does a 

multiple-round auction, the 

Commission proposes to allow a bidder 

to indicate that two or more of its bids 

are to be treated as mutually exclusive 

by the bidding system when assigning 

winning bids. In other words, a bidder 

can indicate that it wants to win only 

one of the bids in a group of bids it 

specifies. For example, if a bidder is 

interested in winning one of the three 

licenses available in a county, it could 

submit separate bids for each of the 

three licenses and indicate that it 

wishes to win only one of them. A 

bidder’s upfront payment amount and 

its activity and eligibility calculations 

would be based on the largest set of bids 

that the bidder can win taking into 

account that some bids may be mutually 

exclusive. 

57. The Commission proposes that a 

bidder may indicate that it wants the 

bidding system to consider the bids in 

a specified group as mutually exclusive 

as long as either all the bids in the group 

involve the same non-metropolitan 

county or all the bids in the group 

involve only metropolitan counties in 

the same MEA. The Commission further 

seeks comment on allowing each bid to 

be included in at most one mutually 

exclusive group of bids. The 

Commission proposes these limits on 

either/or bids to ensure that the 

combinatorial optimization winner 

determination problem is feasible, given 

the extremely large number of potential 

combinations of bids that must be 

considered. A group of mutually 

exclusive bids can include individual 

and/or package bids. 

58. The Commission asks commenters 

to consider whether these procedures to 

allow a bidder to use an either/or 

indicator to instruct the bidding system 

to assign only one of a specified group 

of bids would be helpful in managing 

the bidder’s potential winnings if this 

single-round auction format is adopted. 

6. Bid Processing and Winning Bids 

59. To determine winning bids in the 

single-round format, the Commission 

proposes that after the single bidding 

round, the bidding system would use 

optimization software to determine the 

value-maximizing combination of 

(package and individual) bids, taking 

into account each bidder’s mutually 

exclusive either/or bids. A bid of a 

bidder with a bidding credit would be 

considered in the optimization at its 

undiscounted bid price. In contrast, for 

payment purposes, the bidding credit 

discount for a bidder with a bidding 

credit will be subtracted from the 

bidder’s total winning bids, applying 

any bidding credit caps, to determine its 

net winning bids. 

60. The Commission also seeks 

comment on assigning each individual 

or package bid a pseudo-random 

number upon submission, such that, if 

there are ties among the valuemaximizing combinations of bids, the 

bidding system would determine the 

winning bids by finding the set that 

maximizes the sum of pseudo-random 

numbers. 

61. Because there is a very small but 

positive probability that the 

optimization software would be unable 

to provide an exact solution to the 

problem of determining the valuemaximizing combination of bids within 

a reasonable amount of time, the 

Commission seeks comment on use of 

an ‘‘escape clause.’’ Under the proposed 

escape clause, if the optimization 

software does not yield an exact 

solution within 48 hours, then the 

winning set of bids would be 

determined by the best solution 

identified to that point. Winning 

bidders would pay the amounts of their 

winning bids, consistent with the payas-bid pricing rule. 

62. The Commission seeks comment 

on these proposed bid processing 

procedures for this novel single-round 

auction with package bidding, including 

the tie-breaking mechanism, the escape 

clause generally, and the proposed 48- 

hour computational period. 

B. Simultaneous Multiple-Round 

Auction Design 

63. The Commission also seeks 

comment on using its SMR auction 

format for this auction. This type of 

auction offers every license for bid at 

the same time and consists of successive 

bidding rounds in which bidders may 

place bids on individual licenses. The 

SMR procedures on which the 

Commission seeks comment below are 

consistent with those adopted in prior 

Commission SMR auctions. Typically, 

bidding remains open on all licenses 

until bidding stops on every license. 

This format would not provide for 

package bidding because of the 

significant complexity that this would 

present, for both bidders and the 

bidding system, given that the 2.5 GHz 

band plan has a potential inventory of 

approximately 8,300 licenses. 

64. The Commission has 

predominantly used an SMR format for 

spectrum auctions, and therefore this 

format is familiar to potential bidders 

that have participated in past 

Commission spectrum auctions. An 

SMR format allows price discovery, so 

that a bidder may observe how prices 

differ across areas or frequency blocks, 

and to modify its bidding strategies 

accordingly. In addition, multiple 

rounds of bidding may give a bidder 

more confidence in its bid amounts in 

cases where there is a significant 

‘‘common’’ value element to the licenses 

being auctioned beyond the particular 

value to the bidder in its business plan. 

65. The Commission seeks comment 

on whether using an auction design that 

is familiar to bidders is important in 

helping potential participants feel more 

comfortable with participating in 

Auction 108. The Commission also asks 

whether allowing price discovery 

through a multiple round auction format 

is particularly important in this auction, 

and whether such benefits would 

warrant the additional time required to 

conduct an SMR auction relative to a 

single-round. Would such benefits 

outweigh the potential advantages of a 

single-round format to smaller entities 

discussed above? 

1. Bidding Rounds 

66. Under the SMR format, Auction 

108 would consist of sequential bidding 

rounds, each of which would be 

followed by the release of round results. 

The initial bidding schedule would be 

announced in a public notice to be 

released at least one week before the 

start of bidding. Details on viewing 

round results, including the location 

and format of downloadable results files 

for each round would be included in the 

same public notice. 

67. Under this auction format, the 

Commission would conduct Auction 

108 over the internet using the FCC 

auction bidding system. Bidders would 

have the option of placing bids online 

or by telephone through a dedicated 

auction bidder line. 

68. OEA would retain the discretion 

to change the bidding schedule in order 

to foster an auction pace that reasonably 

balances speed with the bidders’ need to 

study round results and adjust their 

bidding strategies. This would allow 


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OEA to change the amount of time for 

bidding rounds, the amount of time 

between rounds, or the number of 

rounds per day, depending upon 

bidding activity and other factors. The 

large number of licenses available in the 

2.5 GHz band implies that the SMR 

format could involve a large number of 

bidding rounds, potentially lasting 

several months. The Commission seeks 

comment on this approach. Commenters 

on this issue should address the role of 

the bidding schedule in managing the 

pace of the auction, specifically 

discussing the tradeoffs in managing 

auction pace by bidding schedule 

changes, by changing the activity 

requirements or bid amount parameters, 

or by using other means. 

2. Stopping Rule 

69. The Commission has discretion to 

establish stopping rules before or during 

multiple-round auctions in order to 

complete the auction within a 

reasonable time. Under this SMR 

auction format, the Commission would 

employ a simultaneous stopping rule 

approach, which means all licenses 

remain available for bidding until 

bidding stops on every license. 

Specifically, bidding would close on all 

licenses after the first round in which 

no bidder submits any new bids, applies 

a proactive waiver, or withdraws any 

provisionally winning bids (if bid 

withdrawals are permitted). 

Provisionally winning bids are bids that 

would become final winning bids if the 

auction were to close in that given 

round. Under this simultaneous 

stopping rule, bidding would remain 

open on all licenses until bidding stops 

on every license. Consequently, under 

this approach, it is not possible to 

determine in advance precisely how 

long the bidding in Auction 108 would 

last. 

70. Further, OEA would retain the 

discretion to exercise any of the 

following stopping options during 

Auction 108: 

Option 1. The auction would close for 

all licenses after the first round in 

which no bidder applies a waiver, no 

bidder withdraws a provisionally 

winning bid (if withdrawals are 

permitted in Auction 108), or no bidder 

places any new bid on a license for 

which it is not the provisionally 

winning bidder. Thus, absent any other 

bidding activity, a bidder placing a new 

bid on a license for which it is the 

provisionally winning bidder would not 

keep the auction open under this 

modified stopping rule. 

Option 2. The auction would close for 

all licenses after the first round in 

which no bidder applies a waiver, no 

bidder withdraws a provisionally 

winning bid (if withdrawals are 

permitted in Auction 108), or no bidder 

places any new bid on a license that 

already has a provisionally winning bid. 

Thus, absent any other bidding activity, 

a bidder placing a new bid on an FCCheld license (a license that does not 

have a provisionally winning bid) 

would not keep the auction open under 

this modified stopping rule. 

Option 3. The auction would close 

using a modified version of the 

simultaneous stopping rule that 

combines Option 1 and Option 2 above. 

Option 4. The auction would close 

after a specified number of additional 

rounds (special stopping rule) to be 

announced by OEA. If OEA invokes this 

special stopping rule, it would accept 

bids in the specified final round(s), after 

which the auction would close. 

Option 5. The auction would remain 

open even if no bidder places any new 

bid, applies a waiver, or withdraws any 

provisionally winning bids (if 

withdrawals are permitted in Auction 

108). In this event, the effect would be 

the same as if a bidder had applied a 

waiver. The activity rule would apply as 

usual, and a bidder with insufficient 

activity would lose bidding eligibility or 

use a waiver. 

71. Under the SMR format, OEA 

would exercise these options only in 

certain circumstances, for example, 

where the auction is proceeding 

unusually slowly or quickly, there is 

minimal overall bidding activity, or it 

appears likely that the auction will not 

close within a reasonable period of time 

or will close prematurely. Before 

exercising these options, OEA would 

likely attempt to change the pace of 

Auction 108. For example, OEA could 

adjust the pace of bidding by changing 

the number of bidding rounds per day 

and/or the minimum acceptable bids. 

Under this approach, OEA would retain 

continuing discretion to exercise any of 

these options with or without prior 

announcement by OEA during the 

auction. The Commission seeks 

comment on these procedures. 

3. Activity Rule 

72. In order to avoid unduly 

prolonging the length of the auction, an 

activity rule requires bidders to bid 

actively throughout the auction, rather 

than wait until late in the auction before 

participating. The bidding system 

calculates a bidder’s activity in a round 

as the sum of the bidding units 

associated with any licenses upon 

which it places bids during the current 

round and the bidding units associated 

with any licenses for which it holds 

provisionally winning bids. Bidders are 

required to be active on a specific 

percentage of their current bidding 

eligibility during each round of the 

auction. Failure to maintain the 

requisite activity level will result in the 

use of an activity rule waiver, if any 

remain, or a reduction in the bidder’s 

eligibility, possibly curtailing or 

eliminating the bidder’s ability to place 

additional bids in the auction. 

73. Under an SMR auction format, the 

Commission would consider dividing 

the auction into at least two stages, each 

characterized by a different activity 

requirement. For example, in a first 

stage, bidders could be required to be 

active on 80% of their bidding units, 

while in a later stage, they could be 

required to be active on 95% of their 

bidding units. The Commission would 

also consider conducting the auction in 

a single stage, potentially with a 100% 

activity requirement. If the Commission 

does not conduct a single stage, the 

auction would start in Stage One. OEA 

would then have the discretion to 

advance the auction to another stage by 

announcement during the auction. In 

exercising this discretion, the 

Commission anticipates that OEA 

would consider a variety of measures of 

auction activity, including but not 

limited to, the length of the auction, the 

percentage of bidding units associated 

with licenses on which there are new 

bids, the number of new bids, and the 

increase in revenue. For example, when 

monitoring activity for determining 

when to change stages, OEA could 

consider the percentage of bidding units 

of the licenses receiving new 

provisionally winning bids, excluding 

any FCC-held licenses. In past auctions, 

OEA has generally—but not always— 

changed stages when this measure was 

approximately 20% or below for three 

consecutive rounds of bidding. The 

Commission seeks comment on these 

procedures for activity requirements. 

4. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing 

Eligibility 

74. For the SMR auction format, when 

a bidder’s activity in the current round 

is below the required minimum level, it 

could preserve its current level of 

eligibility through an activity rule 

waiver, if available. An activity rule 

waiver applies to an entire round of 

bidding, not to a particular license. 

Activity rule waivers can be either 

proactive or automatic. Activity rule 

waivers are primarily a mechanism for 

a bidder to avoid the loss of bidding 

eligibility in the event that exigent 

circumstances prevent it from bidding 

in a particular round. 

75. Under an SMR auction format, 

each bidder in Auction 108 would be 


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provided with three activity rule 

waivers that could be used as set forth 

at the bidder’s discretion during the 

course of the auction. The FCC auction 

bidding system would assume that a 

bidder that does not meet the activity 

requirement would prefer to use an 

activity rule waiver (if available) rather 

than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, 

the system would automatically apply a 

waiver at the end of any bidding round 

in which a bidder’s activity level is 

below the minimum required unless: (1) 

The bidder has no activity rule waivers 

remaining; or (2) the bidder overrides 

the automatic application of a waiver by 

reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the 

activity requirement. If a bidder has no 

waivers remaining and does not satisfy 

the required activity level, the bidder’s 

current eligibility would be 

permanently reduced, possibly 

curtailing or eliminating the ability to 

place additional bids in the auction. 

76. A bidder with insufficient activity 

might wish to reduce its bidding 

eligibility rather than use an activity 

rule waiver. If so, then the bidder 

affirmatively would have to override the 

automatic waiver mechanism during the 

bidding round by using the reduce 

eligibility function in the FCC auction 

bidding system. In this case, the 

bidder’s eligibility would be 

permanently reduced to bring it into 

compliance with the activity rule 

described above. Reducing eligibility is 

an irreversible action; once eligibility 

has been reduced, a bidder could not 

regain its lost bidding eligibility. 

77. Under the simultaneous stopping 

rule for this auction format, a bidder 

would be permitted to apply an activity 

rule waiver proactively as a means to 

keep the auction open without placing 

a bid. If a bidder proactively were to 

apply an activity rule waiver (using the 

proactive waiver function in the FCC 

auction bidding system) during a 

bidding round in which no bids are 

placed or withdrawn (if bid withdrawals 

are permitted in Auction 108), the 

auction would remain open and the 

bidder’s eligibility would be preserved. 

An automatic waiver applied by the 

FCC auction bidding system in a round 

in which there is no new bid, no bid 

withdrawal (if bid withdrawals are 

permitted in Auction 108), or no 

proactive waiver would not keep the 

auction open. The Commission seeks 

comment on this approach. 

5. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening 

Bids 

78. If the Commission adopts an SMR 

auction format, then it would also 

establish minimum opening bid 

amounts. The bidding system would not 

accept bids lower than these amounts. 

79. The Commission would calculate 

minimum opening bid amounts on a 

license-by-license basis using the same 

calculations outlined for the single 

bidding round auction design based on 

$0.006 per MHz-pop. The Commission 

seeks comment on these minimum 

opening bid amounts, which are 

specified in Attachment A to the 

Auction 108 Comment Public Notice. If 

commenters believe that these 

minimum opening bid amounts would 

result in unsold licenses or are not 

reasonable amounts under an SMR 

format, they should explain why this is 

so. Commenters should support their 

claims with valuation analyses and 

suggested amounts or formulas for 

minimum opening bids for this auction 

design. 

80. In establishing minimum opening 

bid amounts under the SMR format, the 

Commission particularly seeks comment 

on factors that reasonably could have an 

impact on bidders’ valuation of the 

spectrum, including the type of service 

offered, market size, population covered 

by the proposed facility, and any other 

relevant factors. 

81. Commenters may also wish to 

address the general role of minimum 

opening bids in managing the pace of 

the auction. For example, commenters 

could compare using minimum opening 

bids—e.g., by setting higher minimum 

opening bids to reduce the number of 

rounds it takes licenses to reach their 

final prices—to other means of 

controlling auction pace, such as 

changes to bidding schedules or activity 

requirements. 

82. The Commission would not 

establish any aggregate reserve price for 

licenses offered through an SMR auction 

format. The Commission is not aware at 

this time of circumstances that require 

establishment of an aggregate reserve 

price in the public interest for this 

auction of overlay licenses in the 2.5 

GHz band and seek comment only on 

the per license minimum opening bids 

that it discusses here. The Commission 

seeks comment on this issue. If 

commenters believe the Commission 

should establish an aggregate reserve 

price, they should explain why and 

support their claims with valuation 

analyses and suggested amounts or 

formulas for reserve prices. 

6. Bid Amounts 

83. Under an SMR auction format, an 

eligible bidder with sufficient eligibility, 

in each round, would be able to place 

a bid on a given license in any of up to 

nine different amounts—the minimum 

acceptable bid amounts and additional 

bid amounts discussed below. Under 

this approach, the FCC auction bidding 

system would list the acceptable bid 

amounts for each license. 

84. Minimum Acceptable Bid 

Amounts. The first of the acceptable bid 

amounts is called the minimum 

acceptable bid amount. The minimum 

acceptable bid amount for a license 

would be equal to its minimum opening 

bid amount until there is a provisionally 

winning bid on the license. Once there 

is a provisionally winning bid for a 

license, the minimum acceptable bid 

amount for that license would be equal 

to the amount of the provisionally 

winning bid plus a percentage of that 

bid amount calculated using the 

activity-based formula described below. 

In general, the percentage would be 

higher for a license receiving many bids 

than for a license receiving few bids. In 

the case of a license for which the 

provisionally winning bid has been 

withdrawn (if withdrawals are allowed 

in Auction 108), the minimum 

acceptable bid amount would equal the 

second highest bid received for the 

license. 

85. The percentage of the 

provisionally winning bid used to 

establish the minimum acceptable bid 

amount (the additional percentage) 

would be calculated based on an 

activity index at the end of each round. 

The activity index is a weighted average 

of (a) the number of distinct bidders 

placing a bid on the license in that 

round, and (b) the activity index from 

the prior round. Specifically, the 

activity index is equal to a weighting 

factor times the number of bidders 

placing a bid covering the license in the 

most recent bidding round plus one 

minus the weighting factor times the 

activity index from the prior round. For 

Round 1 calculations, because there is 

no prior round (i.e., no round 0), the 

activity index from the prior round 

would be set at 0. The additional 

percentage is determined as one plus 

the activity index times a minimum 

percentage amount, with the result not 

to exceed a given maximum. The 

additional percentage is then multiplied 

by the provisionally winning bid 

amount to obtain the minimum 

acceptable bid for the next round. The 

result will be rounded using the 

Commission’s standard rounding 

procedures for auctions: Results above 

$10,000 are rounded to the nearest 

$1,000; results below $10,000 but above 

$1,000 are rounded to the nearest $100; 

and results below $1,000 are rounded to 

the nearest $10. Under the SMR auction 

format, the weighting factor would be 

set initially at 0.5, the minimum 

percentage at 0.1 (10%), and the 


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maximum percentage at 0.2 (20%). 

Hence, at these initial settings, the 

minimum acceptable bid for a license 

would be between 10% and 20% higher 

than the provisionally winning bid, 

depending upon the bidding activity for 

the license. Equations and examples are 

shown in Attachment B to the Auction 

108 Comment Public Notice. The 

Commission seeks comment on whether 

to use this activity-based formula or a 

different approach for the SMR auction 

format. In particular, the Commission 

asks whether it should set the maximum 

percentage at a higher amount, for 

example 30% or more, in light of 

concerns over the large number of 

rounds that may be required for this 

auction. 

86. Additional Bid Amounts. The FCC 

auction bidding system would calculate 

any additional bid amounts using the 

minimum acceptable bid amount and an 

additional bid increment percentage. 

The minimum acceptable bid amount 

would be multiplied by the additional 

bid increment percentage, and that 

result (rounded) would be the 

additional increment amount. The first 

additional acceptable bid amount would 

equal the minimum acceptable bid 

amount plus the additional increment 

amount. The second additional 

acceptable bid amount would equal the 

minimum acceptable bid amount plus 

two times the additional increment 

amount; the third additional acceptable 

bid amount would be the minimum 

acceptable bid amount plus three times 

the additional increment amount; etc. 

The Commission would set the 

additional bid increment percentage at 

5% initially. Hence, the calculation of 

the additional increment amount would 

be (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 

(0.05), rounded. The Commission seeks 

comment on this approach. 

87. Bid Amount Changes. Under this 

auction format, OEA would retain the 

discretion to change the minimum 

acceptable bid amounts, the additional 

bid amounts, the number of acceptable 

bid amounts, and the parameters of the 

formulas used to calculate minimum 

acceptable bid amounts and additional 

bid amounts if OEA determines that 

circumstances so dictate. Further, OEA 

would retain the discretion to do so on 

a license-by-license basis. Commenters 

should address the size of changes in 

the bid amounts, in particular, the 

additional percentage. Should the 

Commission increase the size of the 

minimum acceptable bid amounts in 

order to manage expeditiously the pace 

of an SMR auction with approximately 

8,300 licenses? At what size do changes 

in bid amounts make it too difficult for 

bidders to align their bid amounts with 

their budgets and willingness to pay? 

OEA would also retain the discretion to 

limit (a) the amount by which a 

minimum acceptable bid for a license 

may increase compared with the 

corresponding provisionally winning 

bid, and (b) the amount by which an 

additional bid amount may increase 

compared with the immediately 

preceding acceptable bid amount. For 

example, OEA could set a limit on 

increases in minimum acceptable bid 

amounts over provisionally winning 

bids. Thus, if calculating a minimum 

acceptable bid using the activity-based 

formula results in a minimum 

acceptable bid amount that exceeds the 

provisionally winning bid on a license 

by more than the limit, the minimum 

acceptable bid amount would instead be 

capped at the provisionally winning bid 

plus the amount of the limit. The 

Commission seeks comment on the 

circumstances under which OEA should 

employ such a limit, factors OEA should 

consider when determining the dollar 

amount of the limit, and the tradeoffs in 

setting such a limit or changing other 

parameters—such as the minimum and 

maximum percentages of the activitybased formula. If OEA were to exercise 

this discretion, it would alert bidders by 

announcement in the FCC auction 

bidding system. The Commission seeks 

comment on these procedures. 

88. The Commission seeks comment 

on the above procedures for the SMR 

auction format, including whether to 

use the activity-based formula to 

establish the additional percentage or a 

different approach. If commenters 

disagree with beginning the auction 

with nine acceptable bid amounts per 

license as described above, they should 

suggest an alternative number of 

acceptable bid amounts to use at the 

beginning of the auction and an 

alternative number to use later in the 

auction. Commenters may wish to 

address the role of the minimum 

acceptable bids and the number of 

acceptable bid amounts in managing the 

pace of the auction and the tradeoffs in 

managing auction pace by changing the 

bidding schedule, activity requirements, 

or bid amounts, or by using other 

means. 

7. Provisionally Winning Bids 

89. Under an SMR auction format, the 

FCC auction bidding system would 

determine provisionally winning bids 

consistent with practices in past 

auctions. At the end of each bidding 

round, the bidding system would 

determine a provisionally winning bid 

for each license based on the highest bid 

amount received for the license. A 

provisionally winning bid would 

remain the provisionally winning bid 

until there is a higher bid on the same 

license at the close of a subsequent 

round. Provisionally winning bids at the 

end of the auction would become the 

winning bids. 

90. If identical high bid amounts were 

submitted on a license in any given 

round (i.e., tied bids), the FCC auction 

bidding system would use a pseudorandom number generator to select a 

single provisionally winning bid from 

among the tied bids. The auction 

bidding system would assign a pseudorandom number to each bid when the 

bid is entered. The tied bid with the 

highest pseudo-random number would 

become the provisionally winning bid. 

The remaining bidders, as well as the 

provisionally winning bidder, would be 

permitted to submit higher bids in 

subsequent rounds. However, if the 

auction were to end with no other bids 

being placed, the winning bidder would 

be the one that placed the provisionally 

winning bid. If the license received any 

bids in a subsequent round, the 

provisionally winning bid again would 

be determined by the highest bid 

amount received for the license 

91. A provisionally winning bid 

would be retained until there is a higher 

bid on the license at the close of a 

subsequent round, unless the 

provisionally winning bid is withdrawn 

(if bid withdrawals are permitted in 

Auction 108). Under the SMR auction 

design, provisionally winning bids 

would count toward activity for 

purposes of the activity rule. 

8. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal 

92. The FCC auction bidding system 

would allow each bidder to remove any 

of the bids it placed in a round before 

the close of that round. By removing a 

bid placed within a round, a bidder 

would effectively ‘‘unsubmit’’ the bid. 

In contrast to the bid withdrawal 

provisions described below, a bidder 

removing a bid placed in the same 

round would not be subject to a 

withdrawal payment. Once a round 

closes, a bidder would no longer be 

permitted to remove a bid. 

93. The Commission seeks comment 

on whether bid withdrawals should be 

permitted should it adopt an SMR 

auction format for Auction 108. When 

permitted in an auction, bid 

withdrawals provide a bidder with the 

option of withdrawing bids placed in 

prior rounds that have become 

provisionally winning bids. A bidder 

would be able to withdraw its 

provisionally winning bids using the 

withdraw function in the FCC auction 

bidding system. 


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94. The Commission has recognized 

that bid withdrawals may be a helpful 

tool for bidders seeking to efficiently 

aggregate licenses or implement backup 

strategies in certain auctions. The 

Commission has also acknowledged that 

allowing bid withdrawals may 

encourage insincere bidding or increase 

opportunities for undesirable strategic 

bidding in certain circumstances. 

95. Applying this reasoning to 

Auction 108, each bidder would be 

allowed to withdraw provisionally 

winning bids in no more than two 

rounds during the course of the auction. 

To permit a bidder to withdraw bids in 

more than two rounds may encourage 

insincere bidding or the use of 

withdrawals for undesirable strategic 

bidding purposes. The two rounds in 

which a bidder may withdraw 

provisionally winning bids would be at 

the bidder’s discretion, and there would 

be no limit on the number of 

provisionally winning bids that a bidder 

may withdraw in either of the rounds in 

which it withdraws bids. Withdrawals 

must be in accordance with the 

Commission’s rules, including the bid 

withdrawal payment provisions 

specified in 47 CFR 1.2104(g). 

96. A bidder that withdraws its 

provisionally winning bid(s), if 

permitted, is subject to the bid 

withdrawal payment provisions of the 

Commission’s rules. The Commission 

proposes the interim bid withdrawal 

payment be set at 15% of the withdrawn 

bid for the purposes of an SMR auction. 

A bidder that withdraws a bid during an 

auction is subject to a withdrawal 

payment equal to the difference between 

the amount of the withdrawn bid and 

the amount of the winning bid in the 

same or a subsequent auction. The 

withdrawal payment amount is 

deducted from any upfront payments or 

down payments that the withdrawing 

bidder has deposited with the 

Commission. No withdrawal payment is 

assessed for a withdrawn bid if either 

the subsequent winning bid or any of 

the intervening subsequent withdrawn 

bids equals or exceeds that withdrawn 

bid. However, if a license for which a 

bid had been withdrawn does not 

receive a subsequent higher bid or 

winning bid in the same auction, the 

FCC cannot calculate the final 

withdrawal payment until that license 

receives a higher bid or winning bid in 

a subsequent auction. In such cases, 

when that final withdrawal payment 

cannot yet be calculated, the FCC 

imposes on the bidder responsible for 

the withdrawn bid an interim bid 

withdrawal payment, which will be 

applied toward any final bid withdrawal 

payment that is ultimately assessed. 

97. The amount of the interim bid 

withdrawal payment is established in 

advance of bidding in each auction and 

may range from 3% to 20% of the 

withdrawn bid amount. The 

Commission has determined that the 

level of the interim withdrawal payment 

in a particular auction will be based on 

the nature of the service and the 

inventory of the licenses being offered. 

The Commission noted specifically that 

a higher interim withdrawal payment 

percentage is warranted to deter the 

anti-competitive use of withdrawals 

when, for example, bidders will not 

need to aggregate the licenses being 

offered in the auction or when there are 

few synergies to be captured by 

combining licenses. With respect to the 

flexible-use 2.5 GHz band licenses being 

offered in Auction 108, the service rules 

permit a variety of advanced spectrumbased services, some of which may best 

be offered by combining licenses on 

adjacent frequencies or in adjacent 

areas. Balancing the potential need for 

bidders to use withdrawals to avoid 

winning incomplete combinations of 

licenses with the Commission’s interest 

in deterring undesirable strategic use of 

withdrawals, the Commission proposes 

to establish an interim bid withdrawal 

payment of 15% of the withdrawn bid 

for Auction 108, should it adopt an SMR 

auction format. 

98. The Commission seeks comment 

on allowing bid withdrawals and an 

interim bid withdrawal payment of 15% 

of the withdrawn bid under a potential 

SMR auction design. If commenters 

disagree, then the Commission asks 

them to support their arguments by 

taking into account the licenses 

available, the impact on auction 

dynamics and the pricing mechanism, 

and the effects on the bidding strategies 

of other bidders. 

V. Tutorials and Additional 

Information for Applicants 

99. The Commission intends to 

provide additional information on the 

bidding system and to offer 

demonstrations and other educational 

opportunities for applicants in Auction 

108 to familiarize themselves with the 

FCC auction application system and the 

auction bidding system. 

100. In addition, OEA and WTB will 

make available an interactive mapping 

tool to identify and assess potential 

encumbrances in the band, including as 

a result of pending Rural Tribal Priority 

Window applications. Potential 

applicants are again reminded, however, 

that this tool will not represent 

complete licensing information; all 

information should be confirmed in 

ULS for any specific license or area. 

VI. Procedural Matters 

A. Supplemental Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis 

101. As required by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 

(RFA), the Commission has prepared 

this Supplemental Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental 

IRFA) of the possible significant 

economic impact on small entities of the 

policies and rules addressed in the 

Auction 108 Comment Public Notice to 

supplement the Commission’s Initial 

and Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses completed in the 2.5 GHz 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), 

83 FR 26396, June 7, 2018, and 2.5 GHz 

Report and Order, and other 

Commission orders pursuant to which 

Auction 108 will be conducted. Written 

public comments are requested on this 

Supplemental IRFA. Comments must be 

identified as responses to the 

Supplemental IRFA and must be filed 

by the same deadline for comments 

specified on the first page of the Auction 

108 Comment Public Notice. The 

Commission will send a copy of the 

Auction 108 Comment Public Notice, 

including this Supplemental IRFA, to 

the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 

Small Business Administration (SBA). 

In addition, the Auction 108 Comment 

Public Notice and Supplemental IRFA 

(or summaries thereof) will be 

published in the Federal Register. 

102. Need for, and Objectives of, the 

Proposed Rules. The Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice sets forth the 

proposed auction procedures for those 

entities that seek to bid to acquire 

licenses in Auction 108. The Auction 

108 Comment Public Notice seeks 

comment on proposed procedural rules 

to govern Auction 108, which will 

auction geographic overlay licenses of 

unlicensed spectrum in the 2.5 GHz 

band (2496–2690 MHz). The specific 

overlay licenses available in Auction 

108 will be determined by the results of 

the Rural Tribal Priority Window, 

which gave federally recognized Tribes 

the opportunity to submit applications 

to acquire new 2.5 GHz band overlay 

licenses to provide broadband service 

on rural Tribal lands before the 

remaining unassigned spectrum is made 

generally available to all entities 

through competitive bidding. The Rural 

Tribal Priority Window closed on 

September 2, 2020. Based on review of 

applications received in the Rural Tribal 

Priority Window, OEA, in conjunction 

with WTB, will release a public notice 

announcing the final inventory of 2.5 

GHz band overlay licenses to be offered 

in Auction 108. This public notice will 

be released in advance of the deadline 


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for the submission of short-form 

applications to bid in Auction 108 so 

that potential applicants can make 

informed decisions about whether to 

apply. OEA and WTB will also make 

available resources to assist applicants 

in conducting due diligence research 

regarding potential encumbrances in the 

band prior to the release of the public 

notice announcing the final auction 

inventory. 

103. The Auction 108 Comment 

Public Notice and process is intended to 

provide notice of and adequate time for 

potential applicants to comment on 

proposed auction procedures. To 

promote the efficient and fair 

administration of the competitive 

bidding process for all Auction 108 

participants, the Commission seeks 

comment on the following procedures 

that would apply to Auction 108 under 

either the single-round auction format 

or the SMR auction format: 

• Requirement of an additional 

certification by each applicant in its 

short-form application, under penalty of 

perjury, that it has read the public 

notice adopting procedures for Auction 

108 and that it has familiarized itself 

with those procedures and the 

requirements for obtaining a license and 

operating facilities in the 2.5 GHz band; 

• use of limited information 

procedures under which the 

Commission will not make public until 

after the bidding has closed: (1) The 

licenses that an applicant selects for 

bidding in its auction application (FCC 

Form 175); (2) the amount of any 

upfront payment made by or on behalf 

of an applicant for Auction 108; (3) an 

applicant’s bidding eligibility; and (4) 

any other bidding-related information 

that might reveal the identity of the 

bidder placing a bid; 

• establishment of bidding credit caps 

for eligible small businesses and rural 

service providers in Auction 108; 

• provision of discretionary authority 

to OEA, in conjunction with WTB, to 

delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in 

Auction 108 for any reason that affects 

the ability of the competitive bidding 

process to be conducted fairly and 

efficiently; 

• a specific upfront payment amount 

for each license available in Auction 

108; 

• establishment of an additional 

default payment of 15% under 

§ 1.2104(g)(2) of the rules in the event 

that a winning bidder defaults or is 

disqualified after the auction. 

104. The Auction 108 Comment 

Public Notice also seeks comment on 

the following procedures under the 

single-round auction format: 

• Use of a single-round auction 

format for Auction 108 with limited 

package bidding; 

• use of a pay-as-bid pricing rule 

whereby each winning bidder will pay 

the sum of its winning bid amounts for 

the licenses it is awarded, less any 

applicable bidding credit discount; 

• establishment of a bidder’s bidding 

eligibility in bidding units based on that 

bidder’s upfront payment through 

assignment of a specific number of 

bidding units for each license; 

• establishment of a minimum bid 

amount for each license available in 

Auction 108 based on each license’s 

potential MHz-pops; 

• use of an either/or indicator to 

allow a bidder to indicate that two or 

more of its bids are to be treated as 

mutually exclusive by the bidding 

system when assigning winning bids; 

and 

• a methodology for processing bids. 

105. In addition, the Auction 108 

Comment Public Notice seeks comment 

on the following procedures under the 

SMR auction format: 

• Use of a simultaneous multipleround auction format for Auction 108, 

consisting of sequential bidding rounds 

with a simultaneous stopping rule (with 

discretion by OEA to exercise 

alternative stopping rules under certain 

circumstances); 

• use of an activity rule that would 

require bidders to bid actively during 

the auction rather than waiting until late 

in the auction before participating; 

• an auction with one or more stages, 

in which, for example, a bidder is 

required to be active on 80% of its 

bidding eligibility in each round of the 

first stage, and on 95% of its bidding 

eligibility in each round of the second 

stage; 

• provision of three activity rule 

waivers for each bidder to allow it to 

preserve eligibility during the course of 

the auction; 

• use of minimum acceptable bid 

amounts and additional bid increments, 

along with a methodology for 

calculating such amounts, with OEA 

retaining discretion to change its 

methodology if circumstances dictate; 

• a procedure for breaking ties if 

identical high bid amounts are 

submitted on a license in a given round; 

• bid removal procedures; 

• whether to permit bid withdrawals; 

and 

• establishment of an interim bid 

withdrawal percentage of 15% of the 

withdrawn bid if the Commission were 

to allow bid withdrawals in Auction 

108. 

106. The proposed procedures for the 

conduct of Auction 108 constitute the 

more specific implementation of the 

competitive bidding rules contemplated 

by parts 1 and 27 of the Commission’s 

rules, the 2.5 GHz Report and Order, 

and relevant competitive bidding 

orders, and are fully consistent 

therewith. 

107. Legal Basis. The Commission’s 

statutory obligations to small businesses 

under the Communications Act of 1934, 

as amended, are found in 47 U.S.C. 

309(j)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(4)(D). 

The statutory basis for the Commission’s 

competitive bidding rules is found in 

various provisions of the 

Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended, including 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 

301, 302, 303(e), 303(f), 303(r), 304, 307, 

and 309(j). The Commission has 

established a framework of competitive 

bidding rules, updated most recently in 

2015, pursuant to which it has 

conducted auctions since the inception 

of the auctions program in 1994 and 

would conduct Auction 108. In 

promulgating those rules, the 

Commission conducted numerous RFA 

analyses to consider the possible impact 

of those rules on small businesses that 

might seek to participate in Commission 

auctions. In addition, a Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) was 

included in the 2.5 GHz Report and 

Order that adopted rule provisions 

relevant to this notification. 

108. Description and Estimate of the 

Number of Small Entities to Which the 

Proposed Rules Will Apply. The RFA 

directs agencies to provide a description 

of, and, where feasible, an estimate of 

the number of small entities that may be 

affected by the proposed rules and 

policies, if adopted. The RFA generally 

defines the term ‘‘small entity’’ as 

having the same meaning as the terms 

‘‘small business,’’ ‘‘small organization,’’ 

and ‘‘small governmental jurisdiction.’’ 

In addition, the term ‘‘small business’’ 

has the same meaning as the term 

‘‘small business concern’’ under the 

Small Business Act. A ‘‘small business 

concern’’ is one which: (1) Is 

independently owned and operated; (2) 

is not dominant in its field of operation; 

and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 

established by the SBA. 

109. As noted above, Regulatory 

Flexibility Analyses were incorporated 

into the 2.5 GHz NPRM and the 2.5 GHz 

Report and Order. In those analyses, the 

Commission described in detail the 

small entities that might be significantly 

affected. In the Auction 108 Comment 

Public Notice, the Commission adopts 

by reference the descriptions and 

estimates of the number of small entities 

from the previous Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses in the 2.5 GHz NPRM and the 

2.5 GHz Report and Order. 


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110. Description of Projected 

Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 

Compliance Requirements for Small 

Entities. The Commission designed the 

auction application process itself to 

minimize reporting and compliance 

requirements for applicants, including 

small entity applicants. In the first part 

of the Commission’s two-phased auction 

application process, parties desiring to 

participate in an auction file 

streamlined, short-form applications in 

which they certify under penalty of 

perjury as to their qualifications. 

Eligibility to participate in bidding is 

based on an applicant’s short-form 

application and certifications, as well as 

its upfront payment. In the second 

phase of the process, winning bidders 

file a more comprehensive long-form 

application. Thus, an applicant which 

fails to become a winning bidder does 

not need to file a long-form application 

and provide the additional showings 

and more detailed demonstrations 

required of a winning bidder. 

111. The Commission does not expect 

the processes and procedures proposed 

in the Auction 108 Comment Public 

Notice will require small entities to hire 

attorneys, engineers, consultants, or 

other professionals to participate in 

Auction 108 and comply with the 

procedures it ultimately adopts because 

of the information, resources, and 

guidance the Commission makes 

available to potential and actual 

participants. For example, the 

Commission intends to release an online 

tutorial that will help applicants 

understand the procedures for filing of 

the auction short-form application (FCC 

Form 175). The Commission also 

intends to make information on the 

bidding system available and offer 

demonstrations and other educational 

opportunities for applicants in Auction 

108 to familiarize themselves with the 

FCC auction application system and the 

auction bidding system. By providing 

these resources as well as the resources 

discussed below, the Commission 

expects small entities that use the 

available resources to experience lower 

participation and compliance costs. 

Nevertheless, while the Commission 

cannot quantify the cost of compliance 

with the proposed procedures, it does 

not believe that the costs of compliance 

will unduly burden small entities that 

choose to participate in the auction 

because the proposals for Auction 108 

are similar in many respects to the 

procedures in recent auctions 

conducted by the Commission. 

112. Steps Taken to Minimize the 

Significant Economic Impact on Small 

Entities, and Significant Alternatives 

Considered. The RFA requires an 

agency to describe any significant, 

specifically small business, alternatives 

that it has considered in reaching its 

proposed approach, which may include 

the following four alternatives (among 

others): (1) The establishment of 

differing compliance or reporting 

requirements or timetables that take into 

account the resources available to small 

entities; (2) the clarification, 

consolidation, or simplification of 

compliance and reporting requirements 

under the rule for such small entities; 

(3) the use of performance rather than 

design standards; and (4) an exemption 

from coverage of the rule, or any part 

thereof, for such small entities. 

113. The Commission has taken steps 

to minimize any economic impact of its 

auction procedures on small entities 

through, among other things, the 

Commission’s potential use of a single 

bidding round and a pay-as-bid pricing 

rule. The Commission expects that 

many small entities will bid in Auction 

108 and the use of a single-round 

auction would significantly reduce the 

time and resource commitment required 

for participation, if adopted. Due to the 

large inventory of licenses that will be 

available in Auction 108, the multipleround auction format that the 

Commission has typically used in 

auctioning spectrum licenses could 

require several months to complete and 

require participating bidders to expend 

resources to consistently monitor the 

auction during that time. In contrast, the 

Commission anticipates that with a 

single bidding round, bid processing for 

Auction 108 could be completed within 

a week. In addition, the use of a pay-asbid pricing rule, which requires each 

winning bidder to pay the sum of its 

winning bid amounts for the licenses it 

is awarded, less any applicable bidding 

credit discount, should also benefit 

small entities by giving them more 

certainty about the costs of their 

winning bids. 

114. In the event the Commission 

adopts the SMR auction format, it has 

also taken steps to minimize any 

economic impact of its auction 

procedures on small entities through, 

among other things, the many resources 

the Commission provides potential 

auction participants. OEA and WTB 

propose to make resources available to 

assist applicants in conducting due 

diligence research regarding potential 

encumbrances in the band prior to the 

release of the public notice announcing 

the final auction inventory. Small 

entities and other auction participants 

may seek clarification of or guidance on 

complying with competitive bidding 

rules and procedures, reporting 

requirements, and the FCC’s auction 

bidding system. An FCC Auctions 

Hotline provides access to Commission 

staff for information about the auction 

process and procedures. The FCC 

Auctions Technical Support Hotline is 

another resource which provides 

technical assistance to applicants, 

including small entities, on issues such 

as access to or navigation within the 

electronic FCC Form 175 and use of the 

FCC’s auction bidding system. Small 

entities may also use the web-based, 

interactive online tutorial produced by 

Commission staff to familiarize 

themselves with auction procedures, 

filing requirements, bidding procedures, 

and other matters related to an auction. 

115. The Commission also makes 

various databases and other sources of 

information, including the Auctions 

program websites and copies of 

Commission decisions, available to the 

public without charge, providing a lowcost mechanism for small entities to 

conduct research prior to and 

throughout the auction. Prior to and at 

the close of Auction 108, the 

Commission will post public notices on 

the Auctions website, which articulate 

the procedures and deadlines for the 

auction. The Commission makes this 

information easily accessible and 

without charge to benefit all Auction 

108 applicants, including small entities, 

thereby lowering their administrative 

costs to comply with the Commission’s 

competitive bidding rules. 

116. Prior to the start of bidding, the 

Commission also proposes to make 

available to bidders various educational 

materials. Eligible bidders will be given 

an opportunity to become familiar with 

auction procedures and the bidding 

system by participating in a mock 

auction. Further, the Commission 

intends to conduct Auction 108 

electronically over the internet using a 

web-based auction system that 

eliminates the need for bidders to be 

physically present in a specific location. 

Qualified bidders also have the option 

to place bids by telephone. These 

mechanisms are made available to 

facilitate participation in Auction 108 

by all eligible bidders and may result in 

significant cost savings for small entities 

that use these alternatives. Moreover, 

the adoption of bidding procedures in 

advance of the auction, consistent with 

statutory directive, is designed to ensure 

that the auction will be administered 

predictably and fairly for all 

participants, including small entities. 

117. For Auction 108, the 

Commission proposes a $25 million cap 

on the total bidding credit amount that 

may be awarded to an eligible small 

business and a $10 million cap on the 

total bidding credit amount that may be 


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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 39 / Tuesday, March 2, 2021 / Proposed Rules 12161 

awarded to a rural service provider. In 

addition, the Commission proposes a 

$10 million cap on the overall amount 

of bidding credits that any winning 

small business bidder may apply to 

licenses won in counties located within 

any PEA with a population of 500,000 

or less. Based on the technical 

characteristics of the 2.5 GHz band and 

its analysis of past auction data, the 

Commission anticipates that its 

proposed caps will allow the majority of 

small businesses to take full advantage 

of the bidding credit program, thereby 

lowering the relative costs of 

participation for small businesses. 

118. These proposed procedures for 

the conduct of Auction 108 constitute 

the more specific implementation of the 

competitive bidding rules contemplated 

by parts 1 and 30 of the Commission’s 

rules, 47 CFR parts 1 and 30, the 2.5 

GHz Report and Order, and relevant 

competitive bidding orders, and are 

fully consistent therewith. 

119. Federal Rules that May 

Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict with the 

Proposed Rules. None. 

B. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis 

120. The Auction 108 Comment 

Public Notice contains proposed new 

information collection requirements. 

The Commission, as part of its 

continuing effort to reduce paperwork 

burdens, invites the general public and 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) to comment on the information 

collection requirements contained in 

this document, as required by the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 

Public Law 104–13. In addition, 

pursuant to the Small Business 

Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public 

Law 107–198, 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), the 

Commission seeks specific comment on 

how it might further reduce the 

information collection burden for small 

business concerns with fewer than 25 

employees. 

C. Deadlines and Filing Procedures 

121. Pursuant to 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, 

interested parties may file comments or 

reply comments on or before the dates 

indicated on the first page of the 

Auction 108 Comment Public Notice in 

AU Docket No. 20–429. Comments may 

be filed using the Commission’s 

Electronic Comment Filing System 

(ECFS) or by filing paper copies. 

122. Ex Parte Requirements. This 

proceeding has been designated as a 

‘‘permit-but-disclose’’ proceeding in 

accordance with the Commission’s ex 

parte rules. Persons making oral ex parte 

presentations must file a copy of any 

written presentations or memoranda 

summarizing any oral presentation 

within two business days after the 

presentation (unless a different deadline 

applicable to the Sunshine Period 

applies). Persons making oral ex parte 

presentations are reminded that 

memoranda summarizing the 

presentations must (1) list all persons 

attending or otherwise participating in 

the meeting at which the ex parte 

presentation was made, and (2) 

summarize all data presented and 

arguments made during the 

presentation. If the presentation 

consisted in whole or in part of the 

presentation of data or arguments 

already reflected in the presenter’s 

written comments, memoranda, or other 

filings in the proceeding, the presenter 

may provide citations to such data or 

arguments in his or her prior comments, 

memoranda, or other filings (specifying 

the relevant page and/or paragraph 

numbers where such data or arguments 

can be found) in lieu of summarizing 

them in the memorandum. Documents 

shown or given to the Commission staff 

during ex parte meetings are deemed to 

be written ex parte presentations and 

must be filed consistent with 47 CFR 

1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by 

47 CFR 1.49(f) or for which the 

Commission has made available a 

method of electronic filing, written ex 

parte presentations and memoranda 

summarizing oral ex parte 

presentations, and all attachments 

thereto, must be filed through the 

electronic comment filing system 

available for that proceeding, and must 

be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, 

.xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants 

in this proceeding should familiarize 

themselves with the Commission’s ex 

parte rules. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene Dortch, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2021–03442 Filed 3–1–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Part 73 

[MB Docket No. 21–55; RM–11880; DA 21– 

164; FR ID 17509] 

Television Broadcasting Services 

Kearney, Nebraska 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The Commission has before it 

a petition for rulemaking (Petition) filed 

by KHGI Licensee, LLC, (Licensee), 

licensee of KHGI–TV, channel 13, 

Kearney, Nebraska (KHGI or Station), 

requesting the substitution of channel 

18 for channel 13 at Kearney in the DTV 

Table of Allotments. Licensee states that 

the proposed channel substitution for 

KHGI from VHF channel 13 to UHF 

channel 18 would allow KHGI to 

significantly improve its over-the-air 

service to the Station’s viewers in the 

Kearney, Nebraska, area. Licensee states 

that the proposed channel change from 

channel 13 to channel 18 would result 

a substantial increase in signal 

receivability for KHGI’s core viewers 

and enable viewers to receive the 

Station’s signal with a significantly 

smaller antenna. Licensee maintains 

that KHGI, as a VHF channel station, 

has had a long history of dealing with 

severe reception problems exacerbated 

by the analog to digital conversion. The 

proposed migration of KHGI from 

channel 13 to channel 18, Licensee 

contends, will be a favorable 

arrangement of allotments based on the 

enhanced signal levels that will be 

delivered to a large percentage of the 

Station’s population without any 

predicted loss of coverage. Further, 

Licensee maintains that the change will 

result in an predicted increase of more 

than 37,000 persons in the Station’s 

overall population and the staff has 

determined there is no loss of service. 

Licensee concludes by saying that the 

public interest would be best served by 

promptly granting its Petition with the 

specifications set forth therein so that 

Kearney-area viewers may benefit from 

substantially improved over-the-air 

broadcast television service as soon as 

possible. 

DATES: Comments must be filed on or 

before April 1, 2021 and reply 

comments on or before April 16, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications 

Commission, Office of the Secretary, 45 

L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. In 

addition to filing comments with the 

FCC, interested parties should serve 

counsel for petitioner as follows: Paul 

A. Cicelski, Esq., Lerman Senter PLLC, 

2001 L Street NW, Suite 400, 

Washington, DC 20036. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Shaun Maher, Media Bureau, at (202) 

418–2324; or Shaun.Maher@fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

synopsis of the Commission’s Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking, MB Docket No. 

21–55; RM–11880; DA 21–164, adopted 

February 12, 2021, and released 

February 12, 2021. The full text of this 

document is available for download at 

https://www.fcc.gov/edocs. To request 

materials in accessible formats (braille, 

large print, computer diskettes, or audio 

recordings), please send an email to 


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