[Cite as State v. Shelton, 2019-Ohio-1694.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

ANTHONY SHELTON 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 18CA011368 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 18CR097694 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: May 6, 2019 

 

HENSAL, Judge. 

{¶1} Anthony Shelton appeals his sentence for aggravated robbery in the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} Along with two others, Mr. Shelton participated in the armed robbery of a gas 

station convenience store. Following his arrest, Mr. Shelton pleaded guilty to one count of 

aggravated robbery. After the State requested that the court sentence Mr. Shelton to at least four 

years imprisonment, it sentenced him to five. Mr. Shelton has appealed, challenging his 

sentence. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER ITS SENTENCE 

UTILIZED THE MINIMUM SANCTIONS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH 

THE GOALS OF SENTENCING WITHOUT UNNECESSARILY 

BURDENING GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCES. 
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{¶3} Mr. Shelton argues that the trial court failed to consider whether the sentence it 

imposed was the minimum necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. He notes that he 

accepted responsibility for his participation in the robbery. He also notes that the court indicated 

that, if he does well in prison, it would look very favorably on a motion for judicial release. He 

notes that, because his sentence is five years, he is not eligible for judicial release until he serves 

four years. If the court had sentenced him to four years, however, he would be eligible for 

judicial release after 180 days. According to Mr. Shelton, a sentence of four years, as the State 

suggested, would have provided the court with more flexibility about when he was rehabilitated 

enough to be released. 

{¶4} In reviewing a felony sentence, “[t]he appellate court’s standard for review is not 

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “[A]n appellate court 

may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing 

evidence” that: (1) “the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant 

statutes[,]” or (2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 

516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “which will produce in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” 

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶5} A sentencing court has “full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the 

statutory range” and is not “required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing * * * 

more than the minimum sentence[ ].” State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 

paragraph seven of the syllabus. 

[N]evertheless, in exercising its discretion, the court must carefully consider the 

statutes that apply to every felony case. Those include R.C. 2929.11, which 

specifies the purposes of sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, which provides guidance 
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in considering factors relating to the seriousness of the offense and recidivism of 

the offender. 

 

State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38. 

{¶6} Mr. Shelton argues that the trial court failed to properly consider Revised Code 

Section 2929.11(A), which provides that the purpose of felony sentencing is to “protect the 

public from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the 

effective rehabilitation of the offender[.]” It also provides that the sentencing court should use 

“the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing 

an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). Mr. Shelton 

acknowledges that the trial court stated that it had considered Section 2929.11, but questions 

whether it followed the section’s directives. 

{¶7} Upon review of the appellate record, we note that the presentence investigation 

(PSI) report that was discussed during the sentencing hearing has not been made part of the 

record. “It is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that the record on appeal contains all 

matters necessary to allow this Court to resolve the issues on appeal.” State v. Yuncker, 9th Dist. 

Medina No. 14CA0068-M, 2015-Ohio-3933, ¶ 17, citing App.R. 9. “[If] an appellant does not 

provide a complete record to facilitate our review, we must presume regularity in the trial court’s 

proceedings and affirm.” State v. McGowan, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27092, 2014-Ohio-2630, ¶ 6, 

quoting State v. Taylor, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 13CA010366, 13CA010367, 13CA010368, 

13CA010369, 2014-Ohio-2001, ¶ 6. 

{¶8} The information contained in the PSI report would have directly influenced the 

court’s assessment of the minimum sentence required to fulfill the purposes of felony sentencing. 

Accordingly, without the context that the PSI report might provide, we cannot conclude that 
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there is clear and convincing evidence in the record that Mr. Shelton’s sentence is contrary to 

law. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Mr. Shelton’s assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶9} Mr. Shelton’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JENNIFER HENSAL 

 FOR THE COURT 
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CARR, P. J. 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

GERALD M. SMITH, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.