No, 1330L 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF' MONTANA 

1976 

THE STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vs - 

JOHN C, SHANNON, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

Honorable Jack Green, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record : 

For Appellant: 

Hirst and Dostal, Missoula, Montana 

John Dostal argued, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, 

Montana 

John F. North argued, Assistant Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

Robert L. Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula, 

Montana 

Edward McLean argued, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, 

Montana 

For Amicus Curiae: 

John Connor, Missoula, Montana 

Submitted : September 1, 1976 

Decided : BEP 2 0 1976 
Mr. Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

John C. Shannon appeals his conviction in the district court, 

Missoula County, on the criminal charge of burglary, a felony as 

specified in section 94-6-204(1), R.C.M. 1947. Defendant was found 

guilty of knowingly entering the trailer portion of a tractortrailer owned by Arden Olsen Trucking of Kalispell, Montana, for 

the purpose of removing approximately 28 cases of beer. At trial, 

defendant admitted that he and two friends entered the trailer 

and removed the beer. Defendant argues these facts are insufficient to constitute the crime of burglary because a trailer 

attached to a semi-truck is not an "occupied structure" within 

the meaning of section 94-6-204(1), R.C.M. 1947, even though, 

as here, the tractor portion has a sleeper-cab in which the operator 

may sleep. He further contends these acts complained of, and 

admitted in court, are sufficient to sustain only a charge of 

criminal trespass to vehicles under section 94-6-202, R.C.M. 

1947 or misdemeanor theft under section 94-6-302(4), R.C.M. 1947. 

The district court found the tractor-trailer was an 

It occupied structure" and a vehicle within the definitions of section 

94-2-lOl(35) and (65), R.C.M. 1947, and that any entry thereto 

with intent to commit theft of the beer was burglary. 

Section 94-2-101(35), R.C.M. 1947, defines "occupied structure" 

"* * * any building, vehicle, or other place suited 

for human occupancy or night lodging of persons or 

for carrying on business, whether or not a person is 

actually present. 9~ * *I1 (Emphasis supplied.) 

The annotation to this definition, Montana Criminal Code, 1973, 

Annotated, Montana Criminal Law Commission, Prof. William F. 

Crowley, p. 55, states: 
"* * * It is important to note that the structure 

need not be occupied to be the subject of arson or 

burglary--under this definition the building need 

only be suited for human habitation." 

The tractor-trailer entered by defendant was a vehicle as 

defined in section 94-2-101(65), R.C.M. 1947, which states: 

"'Vehicle' means any device for transportation by 

land, water or air, or mobile equipment with provision 

for transport of an operator." 

The Montana Criminal Code, 1973, Annotated, p. 86, notes: 

"* * * Included within this definition are all those 

transportation devices defined by the Motor Vehicle 

Code (R.C.M. 1947, 532-2101) as vehicles, including 

automobiles, motorcycles, motor driven cycles, emergency vehicles, buses, bicycles, farm and construction 

equipment, plus numerous vehicles not included within 

the Motor Vehicle Code * * *.I1 

The Motor Vehicle Code, section 32-2102(a), R.C.M. 1947, defines 

"Every device, in, upon, or by which any person or 

property is or may be transported or drawn upon a 

highway * * *.I1 

This definition definitely includes the tra.iler portion of the 

tractor-trailer entered by defendant and his associates. 

The primary gravamen of burglary at common law, and under the 

Montana Criminal Code of 1973, R.C.M. 1947, Title 94, is "the 

threat to person resulting from the wrongful intru~ion * * *If. 

Montana Criminal Code, 1973, Annotated, p. 236. However, the 

drafters of the 1973 criminal code also included language expressly 

intended to protect the structure or vehicle utilized for "carrying 

on business". Section 94-2-101(35), R.C.M. 1947. This burglary 

statute was drafted with both intentions in mind. 

Defendant argues that to so hold will result in his conviction of a felony rather than the lesser offense of criminal trespass 

to vehicles, which under section 94-6-202, R.C.M. 1947, is a misdemeanor offense or of misdemeanor theft under section 94-6-302(4), 

R.C.M. 1947. 

-3- 
* 

This Court in State v. Richter, 152 Mont. 449, 451, 451 P. 

2d 833, stated: 

"It cannot be argued that the legislature does not have 

the power to denominate this type of offense as a burglary 

in order to prevent the apparent evil of breaking into a 

car. Manifestly, making the offense a felony would tend to 

minimize the frequency of such unlawful acts. In construing 

legislative intent, the courts of this state construe criminal 

statutes according to the fair import of their terms with a 

view to effect their object and promote justice. State v. 

Aldahl, 106 Mont. 390, 78 P.2d 935." 

It is clear the drafters of the Montana Criminal Code of 

1973, intended to include such an offense as committed by defendant, and admitted by him in court, within the scope of section 

94-6-204, R.C.M. 1947, Burglary. 

The conviction in the district court is affirmed. 

We Concur: / 

\,J Justices.