Technical Paper 353 LEVE L L•

BATTALION COMMAND GROUP PERF*ORMANCE

'IN, SIMULATED COMBAT

Herbert F. Barber and Ira T. Kaplan

00

o •ARI FIELD UNIT AT FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DD C

_UN 19 1979

'I •U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

March 1979

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
-0'. S, ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR T-HE BEHAVIORAL AND-SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field -Operating, Agency under',the Jurisdiction of, the

Deputy Chief of Staff for PersonnelWILLIAM L. HAUSER

JOSEPH ZEIDNER ,Colonel, U'S Army

Technical Director Commander

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'wkf 'iQ ' a T/Kaplan,

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A IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on wrevee siatde If nacasary and Identify by block number)

Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) Evaluation

Battalion command group Training

Battle simulation Team training

Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS)

2 . 4 S*,*O~ RC C-'us4 n~*,47adietiyb lc ubr

ý The behavior of 27'battalion comftLAnd groups was studied in a simulated

combat environment provided by a computer-driven battle simulator, the Comb-Ined

4 Arms Tactical Training System (CATTS). Of the 61 subtasks described in the'

were evaluated in the CATTS'exercises. Nineteen subtasks were identified as

relatively weak on the basis of their comparatively low performance ratings,

and 23 subtasks were found to be highly correlated with the overall effectiveness ratings. Fourteen subtasks were identified as critical because they ~ DD ,FORW 1473 EDITIO4 oF I NOV865 IS OBSOLETE UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONf OF THIS PAGE (Whien Dadta Entered)
UNCLASSIF-IED

i9CýIRrTY'CLASSiFICATION OF'THIS 0AGE(WhWDataZi1e:d) --

1 0. "CLnt.)-ere 'both- lot rated aiýd highly qdkrelat~dd with c-gerall effectiveness ratings.

Tne, crtia nlddietfi~- ahz-ig lzn, n ds~ ribak 

theg crit i geal plansnsingle fired entify in-,ateing.,O -'itialyzing,.~ and dissema commpptica ine.2igence plnnn frs.-.t iiigteciiclp ce adtie T tng-!Anrs and orders, defeating electrowm.gnetic intelligence

reacting to jam-mang, and doncentrati-ig -dombdt Powe.;, The~se subtasks -were

-relat ed- to m6re bai~c P~rocessesj identified' in .reva.Iious ;esearchiuas important

*determindnts~ of organizational effectiveness, viz., sen.ýxa~g, decisorfia king,

conuimunicAting, and, coping, with changes, in 'the environment.

- The ,critical performance idenitif ied in this. report. can -be - P\,iiýrticular

emnpkiasi. An- the development of command group tkaihing s~;tiitann

-prgas arid informAtion-processing and decision-aiding technologies 4

'The report is written prim~i-ily for the research'-goientist workin Jih

~ -thcornndclson~r; simulation, although -military personne3 will be intere ted~in

Ac~~on For

i'ITI'S Grkd&I

9 - DJC TAB

- ~Unarniouned

Justi' "'ior______

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SECURITY CL ASSIV CATION COF THIS PAGEO*1,en Data Entered)
Technical Paler 3531

BATTALION COMMAND 'GROUP PERFORMANCE

IN SIMULATED COT-BAT

Herbert F. Barber and lra T.,Kaplan.

Submitted~by: t Robert S. Andrews, Chief

ARFFIELD UNiT AT FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Approved By:

J I A, H. Birnbagm, Acting Director

ORGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

RESEARCH' LABORATORY

1~

Jo3eph Zeldner

TECHNICAL DIRECTOR

I U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff- :or Personnel

Department of the Army

_067373March 1979

Army Project Number CommandlControl

A o r do2m763743A773

j•• Approved for public release; distribution unlinrited.
ARI Research Reports and Technicai,,Papaers are -6tended",for sponsors of

R&D0,tasks-and other, research and, military agencies. Any-findinpgsready for

:implementationmat the time of publication are petsen'ted i6ithe'latter part Of.

the Brief, Upon wgmpletion of a major phase of tne task, formal recommen-

'dations for official action normally are conveyed, toappropriate mrilitary

-age6nes by briefing or Disposition Form.

N.4

-_ ,

, I ,

I
V

frThe Fort Leavenworth Field Unit of the U.S. 'Army Research InstItute

tfor •he Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducts research in support of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. The

CAC, includes the CombinedArms Training Development Activity (CATRADA),

the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA), and the Command

and General Staff College (CGSC).

I Two major advances in command and control training being developed

by CATRADA are the command group module of the Army Training and Eva luation Program (ARTEP) and the Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator

(dATTS)? The ARTEP module dessentia the command group taskh m and sub- i •i ta~sks) that are considered essential to mission accomplishment. CATTS

provide training battalion command groups with a simulated battlefield

environment that is more realistic than a command post exercise but is

less demanding of resources than a field training exercise.

This report describes an application of the ARTEP module to the

measurement of command group performance in CATTS: The research identified the ARTEP subtasks that were performed least well and those most

highly correlated with overall measures of effectiveness. The results,

as discussed, will help refine the command group module of the ARTEP

" and further develop command and control, trallning systems.

LTC Richard C. Dickson and the staff of the Operations and Validation Division of the Training Devices and Simulations Directorate of

CATRADA helped adapt the battalion command group module to CATTS and

provided the performance ratings on which this report is based.

0EPtHZtER

chnical Director

"---IJg
BATTALION-CdMM1AND GROUP- PERFORM4ANCE IN SIMULATED COM'BAT

BRIEF

Re.quiftment:

To measure and analyze the critical aspects of commaand'and dntrol

performance of battalion command gkibps in simul,,ted combat, by adapting

the command group module of the Army Tiining and Evaluation phogram

(ARTEP) 't6 a ccmii-ar-driven battle simuiation, the Combined Arms TactiA:l T" jwtnq. Sqimulator (CATTS).

x Procedure:

Data were collected from 2,7 battalion command groups that partici- Spated in a simulated defense or covering force operation and in an attack. The performance of the command groups on the ARTEP subtasks was

evaluated by eight observers, seven of whom were also controllers in the j exercise. Each evaluator observed certain subtasks, rated the command

group's performance on those subtasks, and recorded specific defic.ien- I cies. The evaluators alao rated the overall effectiveness of individual'

4 grOup members and of the command group as a whole.

Findings:

The Qormmand group module of ARTEP was successfully adapted to CATTS

simulation as an alternative training and evaluation method to the conventional command post exercise (CPX) and field training exercise (FTX).

*C 0O the 61 subtasks in the Battalicn Command Group ARTEP, 50 were evaluated in the CATTS exercises. Performance was rated as relatively weak

in 19 subtasks; 23 subtasks were highly correlated with, atings of overall effectiveness. Fourteen subtasks were identified a,71 critical problem areas because they were rated as less satisfactorili, performed but

were among the subtasks highly correlated with overall effectiveness.

Critical subtasks were primarily concerned with intelligence, communica-

-" tions, planning, and concentrating power at the right time and place.

-The critical subtasks are also related to basic processes in organiza-

* tional effectiveness, namtely sensing, decisionmnaking, communicating, and

coping with changes in the environment.

Utilization of Findings:

The measurement techniques developed in this project are now being

used to proqide feedback to command groups trained in CATTS and to
ivstigate-Athe traifiing effectiveness6,f battle.smlton. ý ubtaýW

inboth oninh group, trainihg programs and informiation-pa. ýcessing and

ýdecision-aiding te~chnology. -

'4This report is wr~itten priimarily for the research, scientist intei.ýeated inteeeo~etof comm'and/control simulation,ý although jtr esne ilbetdi hut'
BATTALION, COMMAND GROUP Pl,ýýOJ NCE IN' SIP1qTATED COMBAT

S~ CONTENTS

Page

INTRO•'J•,TION *I

2Background . . . .• . . .• . . . * * * * * • . . . * . * . . 1

Battalion Command Group ARTEP pE.............. 3

dCombined Arms Tactical Training Simulator . . . i * . . . . 6

METHOD q 9 9 • 9 • • 9 9 . 9 e, .... 9 . . . . . . .. 9 9 * • * * 9

Battalion Command Groups ................ , 9

Performance Evaluation • . 9 • . . . . 9 , . . . • . , 1 106 

"Data Analysis * • • . , ......... . • • • • , , • 12

RESULTS • . • ... 9 9•9, 9.... 13

Performance on ARTEP Subtasks . j, • . . . • . .... • 13

Subtasks Related to Overall tqirforn~nce Measures ....... 20 Q

DISCUSSION ** * * * ** 999999S9999 ** 29

ARTEP Refinemet ... ...... s • ... .. 29

Command and Con~rol Problems ................. 30

Generality of Results ........... . .......... 32

Future Research, ....... .. . . . . 32

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS,....,..• •• • 33

APPENDIX A. TASKS, CONDITIONS, AND STANDARDS FOR THE BATTALION I COrtMAND GROUP/SPAFF ARTEP ........ .. , .. 37

B. EXERCISE SCHEDULES ....... • • *, ..... 61

C. PERFORMANCE ON ARTEP S0BTASKS • e 6 63

D0 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SUBTASK RATINGS AND, OVERALL

PERFORMANCE RATINGS FOR MEMBERS OF THE BATTALION

STAFF .. e . . o . . . o .a * o o , # o .* . .o . 81

E. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SUBTASK RATINGS AND RATINGS

OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT . . . . . . . , .. .. 87

F. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SUBTASK RATINGS AND OVERALL

COMMAND GROUP PERFORMANCE ...... . .a. * . 91

SDISTRIBUTION .................. ,.... 97
Page

LIST OF TABLES

Table Battalion command groups .. . 9

'2. Subtasks rated by each controller . . . . . . . 10

3. Mean and standard deviation of subtask ratings .o.... 14

4. Subtasks rated more than one standard deviition

below the mean by one or more raters .......... 16

'5. Intercorrelations among ratings of overall

perforinan e ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 21

6. Subtasks signiiicantl)y correlated with overall

performance of membevs of the b)attalion staff

o} both days 23

, ýSubtasks significantly correated with overall

command group performance ratidq3 on both days by one7or more raters .a . o...... 99. . 27

8. Subtasks rated ac -led cient and identified as most

important for battaii•m cumnand group trainihng . . . 34

C-I. Mean mission ratings .. for . Task . I: Develop plan based on . . . . . . .•• 64

C'-2. Deficiencies identified in Task 1: Develop plan based on mission . .. ................ 67

•-3. Mean ratings for Task 2: Initiate intelligence

preparation of the battlefield . . . . . ........ 68

C-4. Deficiencies identjfied in Task 2: Iinitiate

intelligene- preparation of the battlefield . . . . . . 69

C-5. Mean ratings for Task 3: Prepare and organize the

battlefield ...................... 70

C-6. Deficiencies identified in Task 3: Prepare and

organize the battlefield ....... . ...... 71

C-7. Mean ratings for Task 4: Troop lead before battle . . . 72

C-8. Mean ratings for Task 5: See the battlefield

during the battle ............ 72

C-9. Deficiencies identified in Task 5: See the battlefield during the battle .. ........ ..... 73
1"; Page

- Table C-10'. Mean ratings for Task 6: Control and coordinat,, •-" •,combat operations •... 74 

!,• •C-11. i Mean ratings for Task 7: Employ fires and other

combat support assets .............. 74

C-12., Mean ratings for Task 8: Concentrate/shift

combat power . .75

C-13. Deficiencies i'dentified in Task 8: Concentrate/

shift combat power . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . 0 76

C-14. Mean ratings for ,Task 9: Manage combat servicesupport assets ................... 77

C-15. Deficiencies identified in Task 9: Manage combat

service support assets ............... 77

C-16. Mean ratings for Task 10: Secure and protect the

task force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 78

C-17. Deficiencies identified in Task 10: Secure and

'protect the task force ..........-..... 78

C-18. Mean ratings for Task 11: Troop lead during battle 0 6 79

C-19i Mean iatinqzg Task 12: React to special

situations ..... .... . . . . . 79

C-20. Deficiencies identified in Task 12:. React to

D1. special situations . . ............... 80

SD-I. Correlations between the brigade S1/S4 controller

ratings on ARTEP subtasks and battalion SI and S4

overall performance ratings ..... ....... 82

D-2. Correlations between the brigade S2 controller

I • ratings on ARTEP subtasks and the battalion S2

overall performance rating . . . . . . .... 83

- , D-3. Correlations between the brigade S3 controller

* i ratings on ARTEP subtasks and the battalion S3

overall performance rating ............. 84

D-4. Correlatiuns between thp brigade fire support

controller ratings on ARTEP subtasks and the

battalion fire support coordinator (FSCOORD)

overall performance rating .o............ 86
C -i

Page

Table E-1. Correlations between subtask ratings and ratings

of missior accomplishment ..... . ........ 88

F-I. Correlations between subtask ratings and command

group 'overall performance ratings .(Task 1) ..... 92

F-2c Correlations between subtask ratings and command

group overall performance ratings (Tasks 2, 3,

and 4) . . ... • .. . . . . . .. . . .... . . .. 93

F-3. Correlations between subtask ratings and command

group overall performance ratings (Tasks 5-12) • . 95

5JIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Sequence of steps in the Army Training and Evaluation Pvogram . . ... . . .......... 33. 

2. Flow diagram of the Battalion Command Group ARTEP . . . 5

3. Relationships between controller and player positions in CATTS ................. . 8

4. Proportion of subtasks in each task that were rated

lower than one standard deviation below the mean by

one or more raters on one or both days . .,. . .. . 15

5. Mean correlations between subtask ratings and over- all command group performance, averaged over the

subtasks in each tasks. ......... ..... 25

6. Summary of subtasks evaluated in CATTS . . . . . . . . 33
BATTALION COMMAND GROUP PERFORMANCE IN SlY'LATED COMBAT

I' INTRODUCTION'

Background

Improvements in the mobility and firepower of weapon systems and in

electronic warfare have increased both the capabilities and the problems

of command. These technological advances have created a need for corresponding improvements in command and control training. The U.S. Army

Combined Arms Training Development Activity (USACATRADA) is the proponent for the development of command and control training through the use . of simulation technology and for the development of the Army Training

and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) for senior-level command groups.

The ARTEP, a relatively new approach to unit training, has replaced

the Army Training Test (ATT). To evaluate the complex and dynamic skills j required in team performance, the ATT extrapolated techniques that had

originally been developed to evaluate individual procedural tasks. UnJ fortunately, this extrapolation led to measurement procedures that were

excessively datailed and subjective. The ARTEP attempts to remedy the

weaknesses of the ATT by deemphasizing procedural details in favor of

more comprehensive measures of final outcomes. In addition, the ARTEP

focuses on identifying and correcting specific problems, whereas the

earlier practice put every unit through a preplanned training sequence.

I :The command group modules of the ARTEP are currently being developed

"in conjunction with the new battle simulations in which they will be

implemented.

For many years, senior commanders and their staffs have been trained

in the tactical command and control of their units primarily by means of --- the command post exercise (CPX) and the field training exercise (FTX).

These training methods suffer from certain deficiencies. Specifically,

the CPX has been criticized because it is relatively insensitive to

player input. The CPX scenario is generally written before the play begins, it uses "canned" message inputs; and it follows a relatively predetermined course. Because casualty assessment is often arbitrary and

unrealistic, the player group does not get realistic feedback about the

consequences of their actions in terms of casualties. The FTX, on the

other hand, is usually more realistic, but it is expensive to implement.

In addition, the FTX does not necessarily provide valid battlefield outcomes as feedback to players.

In response to these deficiencies in the CPX and FTX, a new generation of battle simulations is being developed by USACATRADA. These

battle simulations are free play, are responsive to the command group's

actions, and provide realistic battlefield outcomes that show the command group the consequences of their actions.

1
The current development of battle simulations and of the command

group ARTEP has increased the need to explore the capabilitii;s and requirements of command and control training and also to idenfify criteria

to assess command and control effectiveness. The Army Research Institute (ARI) is developing a test bed at the Combined Arms Center (CAC) tc

study command and control processes and their contribution to organizational effectiveness. Part of this program involves research to identify critical command group performance requirements, to develop performance measurement procedures, and to help develop specifications for

more effective command and control training. The systems approach to

training development also requires that the performance of trainees be ,measured and that the, result-ant data be fed back to the training system

to provide information for improving its content and methodology. This

report is part of the feedback process.

S~Purpose h

purpose i project was to measure and analyze the critical

performances of battalion command groups in simulated combat. The list

of subtasks, conditions, and standards from the Battalion Command Group

ARTEP (described below and presented as. Appendix A) provided the basis

for the measurement of command group performance. The combat environment was provided by a computer-driven simulation system, the Combined

Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS) (also described below).

The specific objectives of this project were:

I. To adapt the Battalion Command Group ARTEP to a computerdriven simulation (the CATTS).

2. To identify the ARTEP subtasks on which te performance of

incumbent battalion command groups is compa-atively weak.

3. To describe the specific behaviors that contribute to inadequate performance of subtasks.

4. To measure the relative criticality of each subtask by determining its relation to overall measures of command group

effectiveness.

The results of this project provide information that is useful in

refining the Battalion Command Group ARTEP and in developing command

group training systemms4 Thc results also comprise observational data

that may lead to increased understanding of the components of command

and control.

2
• / Battalion Command Group ARTEP

A The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP 71-2) provides a

I }series of combat missions appiopriate for the various echelons--e.g.,

squad, platoon,, cormpany--of a unit. For each mission, the following are

identified: critical tasks, conditions under which the tasks, must be

performed, and standards against which the unit's performance will be

measured. The ARTEP enables a unit commander to (a) evaluate the combat readiness of-his unit, (b)- identify training needs, (c) develop-a

training program tailored to -correct the identified deficiencies,

(.d) train the unit, and (e) reevaluate. As illustrated in Figure 1,

training and evaluation are integrated into one closed-loop syste.

The major thrust of the program.is,a tkain-to-correct-deficiencies approach at all echelons.

71 EVALUATE PROFICIENCY

AGAINST ARTEP 4 1 STANDARDS

' ' 

/

TRAIN IDENTIFYTRAINING NEEDS

DEVELOP TRAINING

PROGRAM TO I CORRECT DEFICIENCIES

Figure 1. Sequence of steps in the Army Training and

Evaluation Program.

Chapter 10 of tha ARTEP identifies 12 critical tasks that the pommand group of a combinedl /arms task force must be able to accomplish in

combat. This Battalion Command Group ARTEP comnrisds the following- tasks:

Task 1. Develop plan based op mission.

Task 2. Initiate intelligence preparktion of the battlefield.

3
Task 3. Prepare and organize the battlefield. /

Task 4.. Troop lead'.

Task 5. See the battlefield during the battle.

Task 6., Control and coordinate combat operations.

*Task 7. Employ fires and other combat support assets.

Task 8. Concentrate/shift combat power.

Task 9. Manage combat service support assets.

Task 10. Secure and protect the task force.

Task 11. Troop lead during battle.

Task 12. React to situations requiring special actions.

These 12 tasks are categorized into 61 subtasks with their associated conditions and standardsý, (For a complete description of the tasks

and subtasks, see Appendix A,. hich is the command group/staff module of

ARTEP 71-2.) The interrelations among these tasks and their relations

to certain external events or conditions are diagrammed in Figure 2.

Five conditions are listed, from left to right across the top of the

figure, in the temporal sequence of their occurrence. A vertical lineat the left of each condition is alined with the task(s) that the condition initiates. The resources and mission given to the task force (TF) are bhe initial input to the system, and accomplishment of the mission

is the desired final output.

Initially, the command group receives a brigade oral warning and an

operations order (OPORD) which describes the situation of the enemy and

frier.dly forces and the mission of the task force. According to the

firsol ARTEP task, the command group develops a plan that relates the

mission to friendly and enemy capabilities, terrain, time, and weather.

In Figure 2, the arrow from Task 1 to Task 2 represents the- subtask of

identifying critical combat information and intelligence, which is part

.2 of both tasks. The return arrow from Task 2 to Task 1 represents the

updating of the plan as new information is received.

Task 2 (intelligence preparation of the battlefield) begins when

the command• group receives an intelligence summary from the brigade.

The task consists of the identification, collection, analysis, and dissemination of critical combat information and intelligence. The output

from this task feeds into Task 3.

Task 3 (prepare and organize the battlefield) uses the products

c encrated by the first two tasks. It includes making an initial determination of the critical place where the task force combat power should

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be condentrated, selecting a course of action, selecting control measures, and organizing the task force elements into combined arms teams,

Certain components.(subtasks) of Task 3 continue as separate tasks during the battle, .as indicated by the multiple arrows diverging from this

task in Figure 2. Thus, Subtask 3-E, which-updates the fire plan developed'in 'ask 1, leads to Task 7, (employ fii and other combat support

assets). (Although the subtasks discussed ziere do not appear explicitly

in Figure 2, they are listed by number in Appendix A.) Subtasks 3-J and

3-K (provide supplies and mainta:in equipment) continue as Task 9 (manage

combat service support (CSS) assets). Security measures initiated in

Subtask 1-I continue as Task 10 (secure and protect the task force).

Task 4 (troop lead before the battle) flows from Subtask 3-G (communicAte/coordinate plans and orders), and continues as Task 11 (troop lead during the battle), Tasks 4 and 11 represent the supervisory functions

before and during the battle and thus are related to several of the 1 other tasks (5, 9, 10, 12). The special actions comprising Task 12 (react to enemy electronic warfare, chemical or biological attack, nuclear

attacko and loss of a key member of the command group) are all prepared for in Task 3.

The first four tasks are performed before the battle; the rest are

performed while the task force is actively engaged in combat with elements of the enemiy force. Task 6 (control and coordinate combat operations) focuses on the ability of the command group to modify its scheme

of maneuver based on information generated by Task 5 (see the b'ittlefield during the battle). Subtask 6-CA(supervise execution) is an aspect of Subtask 11-A. Task 7 refers to the necessary changes in fire

support and other combat support that result from modifications produced by Task 6. Finally, Task 8 is a special case of the control

function in which the command group concentrates its combat power at , the decisive place and time to destroy the enemy force. The manner in

which the ARTEP tasks, subtasks, and standards were applied to the

measurement of command group performance in CATTS is described in the

Method section of this report.

Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator

The Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator provides a computerdriven exercise to train maneuver-battalion commanders and their staffs

in the control and coordination of combined-arms operations. The CATTS

simulates the actions of units in combat; moves elements on and above

the battlefield; calculates intervisibility and detection between

forces, weapon-to-target ranges, and the effects of weapons employment;

and maintains the status of personnel, equipment, ammunition, and fuel

for friendly and enemy forces. Speed of movement, line of sight, and

weapons effects are affected by changes in weather, terrain contour and

soil type, suppressive f#res, and personnel and equipment status.

The CATTS exercise is conducted in a real-time, free-play node.

Within the prescribed tactical situation, the battalion commander can

6
employ his assets in any manner he deems appropriate. T-ii onYy coijstraints are the assets available: to the battalion and the a(..;ions df

the enemy commander.

Communications System. In this exercise, the command group occ%.r

pied'l simulated tactical operations centec (TOC) provided with-oqamunications equipment normally found in a maneuver battalion. Tbey c(tld

communicate with higher, lower, and adjacent units -in any manner •hsistent with Army procedure and with the simulated location of the ,rrious

-units: face-to-face, by telephone or radio, and by written messcgec

Most communication took place by radio and telephone. The battalion

command group had seven radio nets with appropriate alternate frequencies. The nets included the brigade command, the brigade intelligence,

the brigade administrative iogistics, the battalion command, the fire

" support, and the air support nets. In addition, the command group had

a RATT (radio-teletype) unit and field telephones, when appropl4ate.

Controllers. A permanent, full-time team of controllers mediated

between the computer and the command group (the players). The-control

group included a chief controller who played the role of.brigade commander, a brigade $I/$4 controller who also played the roles of servicesupport-unit commanders and executive officers, a brigade S2/S3 controller, four maneuver- and supporting-unit commanders, a fire support controller, one or two forward observers, a direct air support controller,

and an enemy controller. 1 Figure 3 diagrams the interaction among the controllers, the players, and the computer. Some controllers fed orders from the battalion

nommand group to the computer, using lists displayed on a television

screen. Another controller, working independently, input enemy actions.

The computer then calculated the results of the simulated engagement or

movement and displayed that information to the controllers who -.layed

it to the command group via radio or telephone communication.

An adjunct member of the control group was the TOC monitor, who

observed the command group during the exercise and provided feedback to

the battalion commander during a postgame critique. This position was

rotated among faculty members of the Command and 1eneral Staff College

who had had some experience as battalion commanders or staff members

and held the rank of lieutenant colonel.

In addition to participating in the simulation, seven of the controllers (the Si/S4, the S2/S3, the fire support coordinator, and the

* +four company commanders) and the monitor rated the performance of the

command group on the ARTEP subtasks that they were able to observe.

They also recorded specific criticisms of subtask performance and estimated the overall effectiveness of individual staff members and the command group as a whole. These ratings and observations were analyzed to

answer the following questions:

1. Which subtasks were rated relatively low?

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08
2. What were the specific deficlencies in the low-rated subi.asks?

3. What were the correlations between performance on individual

subtasks and estimates of overall effectiveness?

IME___,_

Battalion Command Gf•s

Data were collected from 19 Active Army and 9 National Guard incumbent battalion command groups from thq continental United Statesi including Alaska and Panama. The 27 battalion command groups were composed of

10 armor, 1.1 mechanized, and 6 infantry-units, as shown in Table 1.

KTable I

Battalion Command Groups

'Type Active Army National Guard

Armor 5 5

Merchanized 9 2

f Infantry 5 1

A command group typically included the battalion commander, S1, S2,

S3, S4, the air liaison officer (ALO), the fire support coordinator

(FSCOORD), the operations sergeant, the.intelligence sergeant, the assistant S3 and/or S3 air, the fire support noncommissioned officer (NCO),

and one or two radio/telephone operators.

Each command group participated in an exercise for 1-1/2 days. The

specific combat c'nrations performed during the exercise depended upon

the type of unit participating. Command groups from mechanized and armor

battalions received a covering force mission on Day 1 and a daylight attack on Day 2. For infantry command groups, the mission on Day 1 was to

defend and on Day 2 to perform a nonsupported, nonilluminated night attack. Differences in mot41ty and probable real-life missions dictated

the different types of operations,. The events scheduled for each type

4 of operation are outlined in Appendix B.

9
Performance Evaluatibn

The evaluation• of specific subtasks was assigned- to individual controllers on the basis of interviews con.ducted at the start of- this exercise. During their interviews, controllers -were asked to indicate which

subtasks they could observe. The subtasks that were- rated by each evaluator are summarized- in Table 2.ý Although the brigade. S2 and the brigade

S3 were played by-the same controller, different subtasks were observable in each role, and these are listed separately in' the table.

Table 2

Subtasks Rated by Each Controller

Controller Subtasks

Si/S4 .3-J, 3-K, 9-A to 9-D

S2 1-B, 2-A to 2-D, 3-F, 5-A to 5-D, 10-A, 12-A

S3 I-C, 1-D, 3-G, 8-A to 8-D, 10-E

Company 1-A, 1I-E to 1-H, 2-B, 3-D, 3-G, 4-B, 5-B, 5-D, 6-B,

commanders (4) 8-A to 8-D, 11-A

Fire support I-I, 1-J, 1-L, 7-A, 7-B, 8-C, 8-D

-i Monitor I-A to 1-L, 2-A to 2-D, 3-A to 3-G, 3-J, 3-K, 4-A,

4-B, 5-A to 5-D, 6-A to 6-D, 7-A to 7-C, 8-A to 8-D,

9-A to 9-D, 11-A,, 12-A

Of the 61 subtasks in the Battalion Command Group ARTEP, 50 were

evaluated in this study; the other 11 were not played. Subtasks 3-H,

3-I, 10-B, and 10-D were not rated, because they involved camouflage

and similar battlefield activities -that were not simulated- in the exercise. Subtask 10-F (detect/impede threats to task force security) was

not evaluated, because it was not clear what unique threats the subtask referred to and• What action was required by the standard.

-Other- conditions that were seldom or never simulated were rehearsals (4-C), liaison with territorial security forces- (10-C), -enemy- air

strikes (10-G), chemical or biological attack (12.;B)-, nuclear attack

(12-C), and loss of a key member of the command group (12-D).

1. 10
The generality of the standards was a problem with many subtasks.

The..ARTEP standards had to be supplemented. by the rater's own judgment

of what constituted effective or appropriate.actiohs.,

All observers were asked to evaluate the command group's performance relative to ARTEP standards by rating on a 3-point scale each subStask that they could observe. The ratings were as follows:

1. Major departure from ARTEP standard. Unsatisfactory.

2. Minor deviation from ARTEP standard.

3. Satisfies ARTEP standard.

As. written, the ARTEP calls.fr' ,a 2-category rating •scale; satisfactory or unsatisfactry. A 3-point scale' was used in -this exercise to

permit greater resolution and to allow evaluators to identify deficiencies without being overly harsh in their ratings.

The observation forms paraphrased the subtasks so as to incorporate the standards: e.g., Subtask 1-A (analyze mission) was stated As:

"Did the Cmd Gp address all necessary specified tasks in the OPORD' or

oral warning order?" The subtasks were i4;ed on both days of the exercise. Space was also provided on the formi for recording key events

that influenced the observer's evaluation.

In addition to rating the subtasks, each observer evaluated the

overall effectiveness of the command group, or of the staff member that

was observed, on a 5-point scale. For the company commanders and the

j• TOC monitor, the question was: "Overall, how well did this Cmd Gp per-

¶ Iform in comparison with previous groups?" Possible answers were these:

T. One of the worst.

2. Worse than average.

3. Average.

4. Better than average.

5. One of the best.

The same scale was used by the monitor to rate the overall performance of the battalion commander, and it was also used by the S$/S4, the

S2/S3, and the fire support controllers to evaluate their counterparts

on the battalion staff.

S1
0A. The monit6r -als6 ainswered the 'questi.ons: "Was the mcission -accoidplished. on, Day 17"'~ azid "Was -the ýmiszion accomplished ,bn Day 2?" The

choic& of answers was

.1. N16

2. Marginally.

'~Yes.

Data Analysis

Identification of performance areas requiring special emphasis is

4oupitant in -any training program. One objectivtt of thisý project was

to identify those ARTEP 6ubtasks on which the performance 'of incumbent

battalion command groups was- relatively weak.- To a-cc6mpU~sh -this objectivef the ratings were categorized by rater arid type of operation (Day t or Day 2), and the following steps were performed for each

category;

1. The subtask ratings were averaged acrosv the 27 battalion command groups.

2. A grand mean was calculated by averaging the means of all subsponingstandard deviations were also calculated.

3.-Thoe~sbtakswhose means were one standard deviation below

thegrad manwere classified as deficient.

Ith raer' comens wrethen examined to ascertain the key events or

speifi beavirs hatinflueiced the low ratings.

Althughtherelative performance of command groups on each subtaskproide infrmaionconcerning areas of training need, it does

notindcat th dereeto which the subtask Influenced overall command

grou efectvenss.Allthe subtasks listed in the Battalion Command

4 Grup ATEP ere udge bymilitary experts to be essential to mission

accmplshmntbuttherelative importance of the subtasks had yet to

be dterine. 1nerfor, asecond objective of this project was to provide an initial indication of the relative criticality of each subtask.

Relative criticality was measured by the degree of relatedness between individual subtask ratings and estimates of overall effectiveness.

This approach is limited, however, by the amount of variability in the

ratings. That is, even though a subtask may be essential to effective

isfrmne at the Snotbe levrelacros allh commrand geaoupeseg, beall cot

isperformane, it mh aye nolevcrelateds wihoeall meaadgrusuresg, bause itm

mngruspromdtesubtask stfaorlTuheetof significe.nt correlations constitutes a list of critical subtasks, but the

li st is not necessarily all inclusive.

12
Ideally,, the quantitative results of the simulated battlefield engagements would provide an objective measure of command group effectivefiess. At present, ,however-, the battlefield outcomes lack sufficient

fidelity to reflect the -performance of the command groups. Consequently,

observer judgments were used as estimates of effectiveness.

RESULTS

The results of this study are divided into two main parts: (a) relative performance on ARTEP subtasks, and (b) relati6nshiýps of subtasks to

overall performance measures. The first part identifies the subtasks on

which incumbent battalion command groups were rated relatively low- and

documents the common deficiencies within those subtasks. The second part

measures the relative criticality of each subtask by~-xamining the correlations between subtask ratings and ratings of ovevaJ.',l command group J effectiveness.

Performance on ARTEP Subtasks

Identification of Low-Rated Subtasks. To identify the subtasks that

were rated relatively low, it was necessary to consider the bias of the

rater: i.e., some raters were more lenient than others. Comparing the

evaluations for those subtasks that were evaluated by more than one observer showed that the monitor generally rated given subtasks higher than

the brigade S2/S3 but slightly lower than the company commanders did.

Table 3 summarizes the means and standard deviations for all the

subtasks evaluated by each observer on each day of the exercise. The S2

and S2 ratings were averaged separately, because they involved different

subtasks, whereas the battalion S1 and S4 worked together on the subtasks

rated by the S1/S4 controller. The four company commanders all rated

the same subtasks, so their ratings were averaged together. These statistics were computed to allow for rater bias when identifying low-rated

subtasks, but they also indicate that there was an improvement in performance from one day to the next.

Improvement in Performance. Comparison of the means in Table 3

shows that the means of subtasks rated by four of the six raters improved

from Day 1 to Day 2. Different t tests (two-tailed) for paired scores,

performed on the subtasks that were rated on both days, showed the increments for the first support controller (t = 2.70, df = 5) were significant at the .05 level, and the increments for the company commanders

(t = 3.77, df = 11) and for the $1/$4 (t = 5.53, df = 5) were significant at the .01 level. The increase in the monitor's ratings was not

statistically significant.

Because the scenario changed from Day I to Day 2, it is not possible to say whether the higher ratings on the second day resulted. from.

the difference in missions or from learning. However: the increase in

13
Table 3

Mean and Standard Deviation of Subtask Ratings

Day 1 2

Ratera Mean SD Mean SD

S1/$4 2.05 .14 2.28 .16

$2 1.99 .18 1.99 .19

-S3 2.23 .26 2.21 .13

CC 2.70 .16 2.80 .15

FS 2.47 .38 2.53 .29

TO( 2.69 .21 2.73 .18

cd = company commander; FS = fire support controller:, TOC = TOO-monitor.

the _1/S4 ratings was by far the largest, perhaps because the SI/S4 controller made a special point of providing detailed corrective feedback

at the end of the first day. This result suggests that CATTS has the

potential for improving performance within the timespan of a 2-day exercise by providing explicit feedback on critical performances during

the exercise.

Common Weaknesses. A level of one standard deviation below the mean

for a given rater on a given day was chosen as the criterion for identifying low-rated subtasks. This value served to identify approximately

the lowest one-third (specifically 38%) of the subtasks as relatively

weak. Of the 50 subtasks evaluated, 19 were more than one standard deViat!ion below the mian for one or more raters on one or both days of the

exercise.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of the low-rated subtasks categorized by AFTEP tasks. In four tasks, more than half the subtasks were

rated low; that is, all four subtasks in Task 2 (initiate intelligence

preparation of the battlefield), three of the four subtasks in Task 5

(see the battlefield during the battle) and in Task 8 (concentrate/shift

combat power), and the one subtask (react to jamming) in Task 12 that

was played in the exercise. Four tasks had one-fourth to one-half of

their subtasks rated low: Task 1 (develop plan based on mission), Task 3

(prepare and organize the battlefield), Task 9 (manage combat service

14
Task

'l. Develop plan

2. Intelligence

3. Organize

"4. Troop lead

5. -See battle

6. Control

7. Employ fires

8. Concentrate

9. Manage CSS

i 10. Secure TF -- ---- _ _ -_ .. ,

1\1. Troop lead

12. React

.1 .2 .3 .4, ,5 .6 .7 .8 .9 lhO

Proportion of Low-Rated Subtas ks,

Figure 4. Proportion of subtasks In each task that were rated lower than

one standard deviation below the mean by one or more raters on

one or both days.

support assets), and Task 10 (secure and protect the task force). The

remaining four tasks contained no low-rated subtasks: troop lead (Tasks

4 and 11), control and coordinate combat operations (Task 6), and employ

fires and other combat support assets (Task 7).

The 19 low-rated subtasks are listed in Table 4. A detailed summary

of the ratings for every subtask and the evaluators' criticisms of the

command groups' performance are given in Appendix C. The following paragraphs outline the subtasks in each task and review the most frequent

criticisms of low-rated subtasks.

Task 1. In developing a plan to accomplish its mission, the command group performs 12 subtasks. It analyzes the mission (1-A) to identify the specified and implied tasks that must be addressed in its own

order. The command group also identifies critical enemy information and

intelligence (1-B) and critical friendly information (1-C) and analyzes

15
Table 4

Subtasks Rated More Than One Standard Deviation

Below the Mean by One or More-Raters

,1 Task/Subtask Description

Task 1 Develop plan based on mission.

1-A Analyze mission.

1-B Identify critical enemy information.

1-I Plan firos..

Task 2 Initiate intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

2-A Identify critical enemy information.

2-B Gather information from all appropriate sources.

2-C Analyze information to predict enemy intentions.

2-D Disseminate information and intelligence.

Task 3 Prepare and organize the battlefield.

3-F Develop communicattkn plan,. including security considerations.

3-G Communicate plans and ordeze.

3-K Maintain equipment.

Task 5 See the battlefield during the battle.

'5-B Gather information from all appropriate sources.

5-C Analyze information to predict enemy intentions.

5-D Disseminate information and intelligence.

Task 8 Concentrate/shift combat power.

8-A Determine critical place and time.

8-B, Concentrate/shift combat power in the attack.

8-C Concentrate/shift combat power in the defense or retrograde.

Task 9 Manage combat service support assets.

9-B -Maintain and repair the weapons systems. 9,

Task 10 Secure and protect the task force*

10-A Defeat or suppress enemy's electromagn&tic #ntelligence effort.

Task 12 React to special situations.

12-A React to enemy jamming.

16
friendly capabilities (1-D),c It- eledts ke~yterrainj control of which

would facilitate accomplishment of the mission(I1-E). Then, depending

on the type of mission, the command group selects avenues of approach

for an attack (1-F), or battle positions- for defense (1-G),,or delay and

covering- force positions (1-H).

The last four subtasks in Task I concern fire support:, planning the

use of organic/attached and nonorganic fires (1-I), determining priority

of fires (O-J) and fire support requirements (1-K),, and conducting the

initial fire support coordination (1-L).

A As shown in Table 4, the three low-rated subtasks in Task 1 were

0 1-A, 1-B, and 1-I. The most common criticisms for Subtask 1-A were that

the command group failed to address the implied task of passage of lines

in its order and that its specification- of the mission was incomplete or

confusing. Under Subtask 1-B, the battalion S2 was cited by the controller counterpart for insufficient awareness of enemy doctrine and force

composition. The fire support plan (1-I) was flawed by inadequate selection of priority targets and poor coordination with forward observers.

The other subtasks were generally satisfactory, although- the selection

of avenues of approach (I-F) was sometimes criticized for not minimizing

the effects of obstacles, and the battle positions (1-G) did not always

¶ maximize task force mobility and reduce vulnerability to air attack.

Task 2. All four subtasks in intelligence preparation of the battlefield were rated low. Subtask 2-A (identify critical enemy information)

-1 is the same as 1-B, and the same criticism applies. The major deficiency

"I •in gathering information (2-B) was assigning every element to report the

same information, instead of just the information it was in a position

A to obtain. Analysis of the enemy Was often incomplete (2-C). The battalion staff did not coordinate all the information available to its individual members, and the S2 was slow in disseminating information to the

brigade and intelligence to the company commanders (2-D).

A Task 3. Preparation and organization of the battlefield requires

the command group to tentatlvely determine the critical place where combat power should be concentrated (3-A), to select a course of action

(3-B), and to organize the task force into combined arms teams (3-C).

The command group also selects control measures which support the scheme

of maneuver (3-D), updates the fire plan (3-E), and develops a communication plan that provides for security (3-F). The preceding activities

lead to plans that are coordinated with appropriate agencies, and orders

that are issued to task force elements (3-G). As stated before, Subtasks 3-H (reinforce terrain) and 3-I (security measures) were not evaluated, -because they involve construction and camouflage that are not

simulated in CATTS. Finally, the cormand group insures that supplies

"are provided (3-J) and that equipment is maintained (3-K).

The weak subtasks were 3-F, 3-G, and 3-K. The communication plan

(3-F) neglected security considerations, which resulted in unnecessarily

long communications and a confused reaction to jamming during the battle.

17
Communi'cating plans and orders. (3-G), one ,of the most critical functions

of' the 'battaliohi- command group, was one of the worst performed. -Of ten

'the operations otder took so long to prepare and to present that the cornpany pqnders .did not have time ,to go through their own, troop-leading

procedur`es. Als&,' in, spite of the time spent on the OPORD, it frequently

omitted importaht information. Instances of inadequate' communication

were failing- to hote the existence of a 60-foot berm (earthen wall) on a

canal,. and- neglecting to tell company commanders about friendly minefields through which they would pass or what to do if communication was

lost. Air defense ,units, Pedeye teams, and 'engineers frequently were not

addressed. Some command groups did not have their Air Force or field

artillery elements brief the ,company commanders, who consequently did not

know how long it would 'take to get air support on station or What kinds

of artillery support they would have.

Little attention was paid to the repair or evacuati.on of nonoperational equipment. However, the apparent neglect of maintenance (3-K) may

have resulted from the difficulty the SI/S4 controller had in providing

realistic details about equipment malfunctions to the battalion S4.

Task 4. Troop leading before the battle involves the supervision

of preparations (4-A), of compliance with the task force order (4-B), and

of rehearsals (4-C). Preparations and compliance were generally satisfactory, and the scenario did not allow sufficient time to conduct

rehearsals.

Task 5. Seeing the battlefield during the battle continues the intelligence processing that begins in Task 2. It comprises the same subtasks, and the performance ratings were nearly as low. The deficiencies

cited for identifying (5-A), analyzing (5-C), and disseminating (5-D) information and intelligence were the same as those cited for the corresponding subtasks of Task 2. The main difference was in gathering information: Subtask 2-B mainly told the units what to look for, and its

defect was telling everyone to report the same information; Subtask 5-B

required active solicitation of information, and its deficiencies were

not querying all available sources and not following up routine reports

with requests for additional information.

J: Task 6. The control and coordination of combat operations require

that the command group modify its scheme of maneuver in response to enemy

actions (6-A), communicate the changes (6-B) and supervise their execution (6-C), and reseed minefields and clear obstacles in support of the

changed plans (6-D). Performance of these subtasks were usually judged

satisfactory.

Task '7. Modification of the fire support plan (7-A) and employment

of other combat support assets (7-C) were performed satisfactorily. The

employment of other combat support assets was usually limited to using

the engineers to put in minefields.

18
• I Task 8. Couicentrating 86mbat power k at thecriti al place-and:t!me

is probably the most -c-rucial -taskýiwn •h•-RTE• Jut itwh 4iot performed

well. The ,command- gr6up6'- aeterminti6h-6f -Ehe- criti6ba1 p,' 4ce And timeý

*(8RA)- was frequently- driticiz-d for inability to appreciate the relative

moveiment of friefidly and-enemy units over the terrain t6 the "time&

di-stance" problem. Concentrating combat power in the attack (8-B) and

in -the-defende or retrograde (8-C) was 6riticized forfailute t6 use all

avail-abl-e- assets, particularly attached and supporting, Anitsi Protecting

thinly.held- areas (8-6b) was not among the olow-rated subtasks.

Task 9., The omanagemenftof -coiba5 service support assets involves providing-weapons systems with ammunition and fuel (9-A); health- preservation programs, troop-subsiotence and replacement (9-C)-; and integrating

the service support assets into the scheme of maneuver (9-D). The only

low-rated subtask was 9-B, where the common deficiency was nwt recovering

nonoperational vehicles.

In all of Task 9, however, the basic problem was that the players

did not understand the magnitude of the tasks required, especially of the

S4, considering the constraints of space-and time. Generally they responded to requests in order of request arrival' instead of in order of

priority: e.g., an S4 who was working on a supply estimate when a request

for ammunition arrived completed the supply estimate before acting on the

more urgent request for amr.unition. This weakness probably results from

insufficient experience in combat or-in simulated combat exercises. The

S1 and ,S4 functions traditionally have not been stressed in CPXs and FTXs.

j Task 10. The only subtasks that were, evaluated under this tack, to

secure and protect the task force, were Subt&sk 10-A (defeat or suppress

the enemy's electromagnetic effort), and Subtask 10-E (reduce vulnerabilj• Ity to enemy mass destruction weapons systems). Subtask 10-A was marred

by violations of communications security: Messages were too long, and

A -coordinates were given in the clear.

Task 11. Troop lead during battle consists of supervising compliance with the task force order (11-A), which was almost always satisfactory.

Task 12. The only situation that required special action within the

scope of this task was to, ieact to enemy jamming, under Subtask 12-A.

Jamming of radio communications was extremely disruptive, and the command

groups often failed to switch to alternate frequenoles and to adequately

report the interference to brigade headquarters.

Summary of Low-Rated Subtasks. In the preceding discussion of command group performance, 19 subtasks were designated as relatively weak

in comparison with the general level of performance on the 5D subtasks

that were evaluated. Table 4 lists the ARTEP subtasks for which ratings

were more than one standard deviation below the mean evaluation of any

observer on either day of the exercise. Eight of these subtasks (I-B,

all of Task 2, and 5-B, 5-C, 5-D) concerned intelligence--identification,

collection, analysis, and dissemination of information about the enemy.

19
The, we) se nitelligence probably contributed to- problems in the

_sse ini.

uti]liýa-ion of assets, ,wherein the ultimate deficiency was the failure

to qonicentrate maxi.mum combat power (8-B, 8-C) at the critical place and,

time (8-A). Predisposing weaknesses in this area were incomplete analysis of the mission (I-A) and an inadequate fire plan (1-1).

In the communication of ,plans and orders. (3-G) and in the dissemination of intelligence (2-D, `5-D), slowness and incompleteness were commqi deficiencies. !Lapses ir F-tcxEity (10-A) and an uncertain reaction

to- enemy jamming (12-A) were other aspects of the communication problem

related to neglect of security considerations in the communication plan (3-F). Equipment maintenance (3-K, 9-B) did not influence the simulated

batte,, and$,as noted earlier, the low ratings in this area may have been"

a-resultof the simulation itself.

Subtasks Related to Overall Performance.Measures

The remainder of this Results section analyzes the relar.ionship between subtask performance ratings and estimates of overall performance,

This analysis esti'ates the relative importance of ea~ch subtask in te-ms

of its correlation with the more comprehensive measures of effectiveness.

Ratings were obtained for nine measures of overall -performance: six

measures for individulpi members of the command group and three measures

'for the command group as a whole. Six members of ý.bs -crmrmand group were

evaluated on their overall performance in comparison w.Lh persons who had

-played the same positions in previous exercises. The battalion S1, S2,

S3, S4, and fire support element were rated by their counterparts on the

control group, and the battalion commander was rated by the TOC monitor.

In addition, the command group was rated as a whole by the company commanders and the monitor. These overall evaluations by the fov'ý company

commanders and the monitor were averaged together to provide a composite

measure of overall performance. The monitor also judged whether the

covering force or defense mission was accomplished on Day 1 and whether

the attack mission was accomplished on Day 2.

Intercorrelations Among Measures of Overall Performance. Before

describing rel-ionships between subtask ratings anrd overall performance

measures, this +section discusses the interrelations among the overall

performance meFsures themselves.

The correlations in Table 5 reflect the interdependence among the

members of the command group. Thus, the rating of the battalion commander (BC) was very highly correlated (r : .92) with the overall performance of the command group (CG). This correlation is consistent with

the dominant role of the commander in the group. Similarly, the Si and

the S4, -who work closely together, received highly correlated ratings

(r = .85) from the SI/S4 controller. The close relationship between the

battalion commander and his S3 was reflected in the high correlation

(r = .78) between their ratings. In fact, the intercorrelations among

20
Table- 5

-. Intrco6rrelations m-Among-RAtings 6f :OV•rall Performaned

4 { Si S2 S3 S4: FS BC 141 M2 C G

1 1 .0 0 SS 

s2 .43* 1.00

S3 .55** .73** 1,00

S4 .85** .53** .58** 1.00

FS .09 .02 .13 .07 1.00

BC .62** .62** .78** .68** -. 38 1.00

MT• .47* .37* .50"* .46* -. 12 .42* 1.00

M2 .15 -. 03 .09 -. 07 .35 .17 .09 ,.00

CG .63** .59** .71** .74** -. 09 .92** .50** .11 1.00

A Note. Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups.

Si, S2, S3, S4 = members of command group; FS = fire support coordinator;

BC = battalion commander; M14 first day's mission; M2 = second day's

mission; CG = command group.

*Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test).

**Sjgnificant at the .01 level (one-tailed test).

the ratings for most members of the command group (SI, S2, S3, S4, and

the commander), the group as a whole, and the first day's mission (MI)

were all significantly greater than zero at the .05 level, most of them

at the .01 level. The only nonsignificant correlations were those involving the fire support coordinator (FS) and the attack mission (M2).

The absence of significant correlations between the fire support

ratings and other performance measures may reflect the independence between field artillery units and maneuver units in the Army. The battalion

fire support coordinator was not organic to the command group but was

attached for the exercise. This lack of previous interaction probably

hindered the integration of the fire support coordinator into the group;

since he was not a regular member of the group, his performance might not

have been correlated with that of the Lest of the command group.

21
The nonsignificant correlations for mission accomplishment on Day 2

resulted foth. low variability in -the ratings for that mission: 79% of

the attack missions~ were accomplished', and the rest were rated marginal.

There- was more -variation -bn Day 1-, when 61% were judged accomplished,

13% marginal, and ?6% not accomplished. Consequently, the underlying

relationships between mission accomplishment and the other performance

measures were -.able to -produce--significant -correlations on Day-1. These

correlations were not as large, however, as the -corresponding correlations with overall command group performance.

Subtasks Related to Overall Performance of Individual Staff Members.

A high correlation between the rating for a particular subtask and an

estimate of overall performance calls attention to that subtask as a potentially important variable. Table 6 lists the subtasks for which ratings were significantly correlated with the overall performance ratings

for the battalion,,S1, S2, S3, S4-, and fire s~ipport officer. The subtasks correlated with the ratings for the battalion commander are:.noct

listed, because they were very similar to those correlated with the com- mantd group tAtings, discussed in a later section. The mean correlations

over the 2 days (and 9ver the SI and S4 ratings) were obtained via transformation-to Fisher's Z. A detailed summary of all the correlations betwbensubtask and 'individual ratings is given in Appendix D.

Eighteen of the szbtasks listed in Table! 6 satisfy the criterion of

being significantly correlated with a staff member's performance at the

.01-level-on-both days of the exercise. Subtasks 7-A and 12-A are represented by one of their subitems. Subtask 8-B is the counterpart oh

Day 2 of 8-C on Day L• Three more subtasks and another subitem Of 12-A

were significantly correlated at the .05 level on-both days. Most of

Tasks 2 and 5, which deal with intelligence, and all of Task 8 (concentrate/shift combat power) were highly correlated with the performance of

individual members of the battalion staff. The list also includes two

or more subtasks of Tasks 1, 3, 9, and 10, which are concerned with planning, organization, combat service support, and security. The tasks not

represented on this list (4, 6, 11) were not evaluated by the three controllers ($1/$4, S2/$3, and fire support) on whose ratings these correlations were based.

The subtasks listed sequentially in Table 6 also can be grouped

according to the staff member with whose overall performance they were

correlated. Thus, four subtasks (3-J, 3-K; 9-A, and 9-D), related to

combat service support and rated by the Sl/S4 controller, were significantly correlated with that controller's ratings of the Si and the S4.

Seven of the intelligence subtasks (1-B; 2-A, 2-B, 2-C; and 5-A, 5-B,

5-C) were significantly correlated with the S2/S3 controller's rating of

the S2's overall performance. Two subtasks related to enemy electronic

warfare (10-A and 12-A) also correlated significantly with the S2 performance rating. Six operations subtasks (3-G; 8-A, 8-B, 8-C, 8-D; and

10-E) were significantly correlated with the overall performance of the

$3 as rated by the S2/S3 controller. Finally, only two of the fire support subtasks (1-I and 7-A, Subitem 1) were significantly correlated

with the ratings of the fire support officer.

22
Table 6

Subtasks Significantly Correlated with Overall Performance

of Membersof the Battalions Staff on Both Days

Subtask Staff Average

not Subtask description member correlation

1-B Identify criticai enemy information. S2 .63**

1-I Plan fires. 'FS .72**

2-A Identify critical enemy information. 52 .63**

2-B Gather information from all appropriate

sources. $2 .469"

2-C Analyze information to predict enemy

intentions. S2 .77)*

3-G Communicate/coordinate plans and

orders. S3

3-K Maintain equipment. Si, $4, .47*

3-J Provide supplies. Si, S4 ,59**

5-A Identify critical enemy information. $2 .72**

5-B Gather information from all appropriate

sources* S2 .44*

5-C Analyze information to predfct enemy intentions. S2 .77**

7-A Modify fire support plan as required by

enemy actions.

1. Communicate new priority of fires to FS .77*

supporting and supported units.

8,A Determine critical place and time. S3 .64**

8-B Concentrate/shift combat power in the

attack. S3 .67**

8-C Concentrate/shift combat power in the

defense or retrograde. S3 .81*

23
Table 6--Continued

Subtask Staff Average

,no. Subtask description member correlation

8-6' Prboect thinly held areas. S3 .70**

9-A Provide weapons systems with ammunition

and fuel. Si, S4 .50*

9-D Transport and deliver supplies. S1, S4 .63**

'10-A Defeat or suppress enemy's electromagnetic intelligence effort. S2 .53**

10-E Reduce vulnerability to enemy mass

destruction weapons systems. S3 '65*

12-A React to enemy jamming.

1, Recognize jamming and continue

operation. S2 •55**

2. Report jamming to higher headquarters. S2 .44*

Note., Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups.

*Significant at the .05 l'evel (one-tailed test). **Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test).

Subtasks Related to Overall Performance of the Command Group. Overall performance of the command group was rated by the four company com-

-• manders and the monitor, whose ratings were averaged to yield a combined

estimate of group effectiveness. The monitor also judged wheeher the

mission was accomplished on Day I and on Day 2. The ratings of mission

accomplishment generally were not significantly correlated with the ratings of subtask performance, but the estimate of command group effectiveness was so correlated. Appendix E contains all the correlations between subtask ratings and ratings of mission accomplishment. All the

correlations of subtask ratings with overall group ,effectiveness ratings

are given in Appendix F, and those having statistical significance are

discussed below.

Mean Correlation for Each Task. Figure 5 presents an overview of

the relationship between performance on the ARTEP tasks and the estimate

of overall command group effectiveness. The mean correlation for each

24
-•. •Task

1. Develop plan

2. Intel]ligence

3. Organize

4. Troop lead,

5. See battle

6, Control

7. Employ fires

8. Concentrate

9. Manage .CSS

10. Secure TF

Jll. Troop lead

12. React

0 .10 .20, .30 .40 .50 .60 .70

Figure 5. Mean correlations between subtask ratings and overall - ' i command group performance, averaged over the subtasks

in each task.

1' task was computed from the r's for each subtask in that task, after converting r to Fisher's Z to correct for the skewness of the r distribution. When a subtask was rated by more than one observer, the highest. correla- tion was used in calculating the mean, on the assumption that it represented the judgment of the best-placed observer. Similarly, when a subtask was subdivided into items, the highest correlation was selected on j- /the assumption that it tapped the most relevant behavior.

Appropriately, the task that seems most directly related to success

on the battlefield--Task 8 (shift/concentrate combat power)--was the one

most highly correlated with overall performance (r = .65). Task 10 - (secure and protect the task force) was also highly correlated with command group effectiveness (r = .62). Tasks 5, 11, and 12 (see the battle- L Ifield during the battle, troop lead during battle, and react to jamming, respectively) had, the same average correlation with overall performance

(r= .53).

25
The nekt six tasks, ranked in order of their mean correlations., show

a gradual decrease in the strength of the relationship -bbtweerg iubtask

ratings and overall performance. The correlation for intelligence,:preparation (Task 2) was .48; combat service support (Task 9, r = .45), plahning (Task T, r = .43), and organizing (Task 3, r= .40) followed close

behind. It seems reasonable that seeing the battlefield during the battle (Task 5) was more closely related to overall performance than 'ias intelligence preparation of the battlefield (Task 2), and that troop lead

during battle (Task 11) was more important than troop lead before battle

(Task 4, r = .37).

On the other hand, to control and coordinate combat operations (Task

6) should be- more important than its low correlation (r = .32) indicates.

A possible explanation of this low correlation is that Task 8 (concentrate/shift ccmbat power) captured the most essential part of the control

function. In other words, by dofining the concentration of combat power

as a. separate task, the ARTEP left the rest of 'control ,(Task 6) a relatively less critical tash.

The task least related to overall performance was Task 7 (employ

fires) (r = .15). This result agrees with the earlier observation that

the fire support -coordinator was seldom well integrated into the command group.

Subtasks Significantly Correlated-with-Group Performance. Part or

all of 17 subtasks significantly correlated with the overall ,:erformance

rating of the battalion command group at -the ,01 level on both days; 11

more subtasks were significant at or beyond the .05 level on both days. Tbjse subtasks are all listed in Table 7. Five subtasks on the list

v ere performed on only 1 of the 2 days, but in a sense they do satisfy

the criterion of being significant on both days, because 1-F is the

counterpart on Day 2 of I-G and 1-H on Day 1, just as 8-B on Day 2 corresponds to 8-C on Day 1. The significant correlations for 1-F and 12-A

are limited to the specific items listed in the table.

All but two of the subtasks (7-A and 10-A) that were significantly

correlated with the performance of individual staff members, as shown in

Table 6, were similarly correlated with the performance of the command

group as a whole. On the othpr hand, Table 7 adds nine subtasks (1-D, i--F, 1I.G, t'-4, 1-J; 3-A; 5-D; 6-B; and 11-A) to those listed in Table 6.

The subtasks most highly correl:ated with overall group performance were

in the areas of concentrating oinbat power (3-A; 8-A, 8!-, 8-C, and 8-D),

planning (1-B, 1-'U, 1-F, 1-G, I-H, 1-I, and 1-J), and intelligence (2-A,

2-B, 2-C; 5.-, 5-B, 5-C, and 5-D). Combat service support (3-J, 3-K;

9-A, and 9-D)c reducing vulnerability to mass destruction weapons (10-E),

and reacting to jamming (12-A) were also important, as were the three related functions of communicating orders (3-G), communicating changes6-B), and supervising compliance (11-A). These are the subtasks identified as most critical in terms of their relationship to overall comri d

group effectiveness.

26
A iTable 7

Subtasks Significantly Correlated with Overall Command Group

Performance Ratings on Both Days by One or More Raters

Subtask Average

no. Subtask description correlation

1-B Identify critical enemy i:formati6n.

1-D Analyze friendly capabilities. .42*

I-F Select routes to objective (attack).

5. (Paximize effectiveness of own weapons. .40,

6. Facilitate control while permitting teams to ideploy/and maneuver. .52**

8. Cap.Ltalize on enfmy vulnerabilities.

•-G Select battle positions (defense).

1 -!H Seleot initial and successive battle positions

(covering ,force). .44*

1 -I Plan fires. .45*

1-J Determine which units receive priority for fire I support. .42*

2-A Identify critical enemy information. .45*

2-B Gather information from all appropriate sources. .42*

* 2-C Analyze information to predict enemy intentions. .53**

3-A Deterndne place where enemy is likely to concentrate. .48*

4 3-G Communicate plans and orders. .44*

3-;J Provide supplies. .63**

3-K Maintain equipment. .45*

5-A Identify critical enemy information. .43*

27
Table 7--Conftinued

Subta•k Average

no. 'Subtask description, correlation

5-B Gather information from all appropriate sources. .52**

5-C Analyze information to'predict enemy intentions. .62**

5-D DiSSeminate information and intelligence. .52**

6-B Communicate changes. .48*

8-A Determine critical place and time. .62**

8-B Concentrate/shift combat power in the attack. .70**

8-C Concentrate/shift combat power in the defense or

retrograde. 68*

8-D Protect thinly held areas. .61**

9-A Provide weapons systems with ammunition and fuel. .58**

9-D Transport and deliver supplies. .57**

I0-E Reduce vulnerability to enemy mass destruction

weapon systems. .65**

11-A Supervise compliance with Task Force Order. .53*

12-A React to enemy jamming.

i. Recognize jamming and continue operation. .53*

2. Report jamming to higher headquarters. .50*

Note. Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups.

*Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test).

**Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test).

28
DIsCUSSIoN

The utility of both CATTS and of the command group module of the.

ARTEP were evident in this investigation., The fact that most ARTEPisubt tasks could.be exercised in CATTS demonstrated the utility of CATTS for

training battalion command groups,. while the value of the ARTEP was, conT

firmed by its usefulness for evaluating command group performance.

With appropriate elaboration, the ARTEP subtasks and standards provideld a useful framework for ev- ,Ating the performance of battalion command grcups in simulated combat, The results yielded three types of informatlon: relative weaknesses in the performance of subtasks, specific

perforrmance deficiencies, and the relative contribution of individual subtasks to overall effectiveness. These data suggest specific refinements

in the ARTEP and identify problem areas in command and control.

ARTEP Refinement

This project demonstrated that the command group module of the ARTEP

could be adapted to a computer-assisted battle simulation. Considerable

planning and interpretation were required, however, before the ARTEP I could be applied. It was necessary to determine which subtasks could be

observed and who was in the best position to observe them. As the standards were very general and rarely specified objective criteria, each

evaluator had to supplement them with subjective judgment. In addition,

a 3-point rather than a 2-category scale was used, to increase the resolution of the ratings. After gaining experience with the 3-point scale,

the raters expressed a desire for even more response alternatives. Accorcdngly, a 5-point scale will be used.in future research.

Performance evaluation would be easier and more reliable if the

number-of subtasks were reduced and if the standards were more specific.

AThe similarity in both ratings and criticisms for certain subtasks suggests that the subtasks can be combined with little loss of information.

In particular, Tasks 2 and 5, which contain the same subtasks, and Subtask 1-B, -which is the same as 2-A and 5-A, can be combined in a single

4 intelligence task. Supervising compliance with the task force order before (4-B) and during battle (11-A) can be combined. Supply (3-J) and

mn&intenance (3-K) can be incorporated into the corresponding subtasks

(9-A and 9-B) of Task 9. Updating the fire support plan (.3-E) can be

"omitted, because it is already implied in Subtasks 1-I and 1-J. Subtask

10-F (detect/impede threats to security) also can be eliminated, because

it is a vague formulation of more specific subtasks and the raters could

not evaluate it. Further simplification may be indicated by a'plysis of

the intercorrelations among the subtask ratings, but a larger iple

"ize is required for application of multivariate statistical techniques.

Additional refinements of the ARTEP are suggested by the correlations with overall performance ratings and the specific criticisms reviewed briefly below and fully tabulated in the Results section. The

29
subtasks are not equally important. Their relative criticality is estimated by the correlations with overall performance. The vagueness of the

standards can be reduced by incorporating'the specific items identified

as deficiencies ihAppendix C--e.g., the standard for Subtask 3-G merely

states that Orders dcitairf essential information, whereas.Table C-6 lists

specific items that orders frequently omit.

Command and Control Problems

The subtask ratings and specific criticisms of performance indicate fundamental problems in the exercise of command and control. In a more

general context, these problems can be categorized under the basic organizati'onal processes of sensing, decisionmaking, communicating, and coping.

In an investigation of the organizational processes that determine

the effectiveness of battalion command groups, Olmstead, Christensen,

1 and Lackey found that five processes derived from Schein's AdaptiveCoping Cycle 2 were signlficantly correlated with group effectiveness

scores. These processes were defined as follows:

1. Sensing:. the process by which the organization acquires information about the external and internal environments.

2. Communicating information: the process of transmitting information that is sensed to those parts of the organization that

can act upon it.

3. Decisionmaking: the process of making decisions concerning

actions to be taken as a result of sensed information.

4. Communicating implementation: the process of transmitting decisions and decision-related orders and instructions to those

parts of the organization that must implement them.

5. Coping actions: the process of executing actions against an

environment (external or internal) as a consequence-of an organizational decision.

1 In the following discussion of command and control problems, it was

convenient to combine the two communication processes (numbers 2 and 4

above)' into a single category.

'Olmstead, J. A., Christensen, H. E., ,& Lackey, L. L. Components of

Organizational Competence: Test of a Conceptual Framework. HumRRO Technical Report 73-19, August 1973.

2Schein, E. H., Organizational Psychology (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs,

N.T.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972.

30
Sensing involves gathering and analyzing information about events

and conditions in the environment. All the subtasks concerned with

identifying, gathering, and analyzing combat information and intelligence (1-B; 2-A, 2-B, 2-C; 5-A, 5-B, and 5-C) strongly influenced the

overall performance ratings. In addition, all but one of them (5-A) were

among the low-rated subtasks. Raters noted several deficiencies in this

category. A common deficiency was inadequate knowledge of enemy doctrine and force composition. Even more frequently, command groups did

not utilize all potential sources of information (e.g., Air Force, forward observers). Nor did they aggressively gather all appropriate infor- mation from their sources; they usually relied on routine spot reports

and situation reports. These deficiencies contributed to the inability of some groups to adequately predict enemy intentions.

Seven subtasks concerned with decisionmaking were highly correlated

with overall performance ratings. In the planning stage of the exercise,

selecting routes of approach (1-F), defensive positions (1-G), and covezing force positions (1-11) were important, as were two subtasks related to

fire support (1-I and 7-A). During the battle, determining the critical

place and time (8-A) was strongly related to overall performance, Two

of the preceding subtasks were rated relatively low: 1-I for inadequate

target selection and poor coordination with forward observers, and 8-A

for failure to appreciate the relative movement of friendly and enemy

units over the terrain.

Communication of information and orders appeared to give most command groups a great deal of difficulty. Four subtasks concerned with

communication (3-G, 5-D, 10-A, and 12-A) significantly influenced overI j all performance, and all were rated comparatively low. Over two-thirds

of the battalion command groups omitted important information from their

operation orders (OPORDs) and fragmentary operation orders (FRAGOs).

They often failed to provide their company commanders with adequate intelligence, combat support information, and antijamming procedures.

They also relied heavily on their standard operating procedures (SOP) to

supplement the order, even when attached and supporting units were not

familiar with the battalion's SOP. Orders were frequently long, complicated, unclear, and disorganized, and did not allow sufficient time for

the company commanders to go through their troop leading procedures.

Several battalion command groups violated communications security

by broadcasting too long or giving critical information in the clear. Some groups did not recognize enemy jamming or failed to determine whether

all frequencies were jammed. Others did not attempt to override the jamming before switching to an alternate frequency. In addition, jamming

* reports to brigade headquarters were often incomplete or orittted entirely.

Coping is the utilization of assets to contend with changes in the

environment. Combating electromagnetic intelligence (10-A) with jamming

(12-A) are coping actions as well as communications processes. The three

subtasks concerned with supply (3-J, 9-A, and 9-D) were significantly

related to overall performance and were not rated low. Protecting thinly

31
held areas (8-D) was also done well. However, the most important activity in this category--concentratihg combat power to destroy the enemy

force (8-B and 8-6)--was both highly correlated With overall performhance

ratings and comparatively poorly executed. Problems earlier in the sequence of sensing, decisionmaking, and communicating probably contributed

td the weakness in concentrating combat power.

Generality of Results

Several factors limit the generality of the present results. One

consideration is the representativeness of the sample. The data are

based on 27 battalion command groups, only 6 of which were infantry.

Moreover, units from Europe and the Far East were not included. The

pattern of training deficiencies might be different for units stationed

in potential combat areas.

'The exercises were limited to covering force, defense, and attack

missions fought on desert terrain. Idiosyncracies in the simulation and

in the system itself may have influenced the type of subtask that was

identified as critical or deficient, and rater bias also may have influonced that identification. Controller assignments remained essentially

constant during the study; only the TOC monitor changed for each exercise. While this constancy contributed to the stability of the ratings,

it also limited the performance evaluation to the judgment of particular

individuals.

The behaviors evaluated in this study were limited to the subtasks

-'! listed in the Battalion Command Group ARTEP. They were further limited

to those subtasks that occurred in the exercises and could be observed

by the raters. There may be important behaviors, e.g., intragroup coordination, that were not on the subtask list. Some of these limitations

will be overcome by future research.

4)

Future Research

Three steps are planned for the immediate future to extend the generality and the scope of this research:

1. The sample size will be increased, particularly by the addition

of more infantry units, to improve the reliability and representativeness of the data.

2. The measure of mission accomplishment will be refined to include

several dimensions of battlefield outcomes.

3. Multivariate techniques will be employed to identify overlap,

clusters, and factors in the performance variables measured by

"the ARTEP. The larger sample size is necessary to permit the

complete application of these techniques.

32
Over the longer term, it would be desirable to include units stationed outside the'United'St&teq and to colledt data from different

scenarios and other simulations. Data should also'be cdllected oh,6ther

levels of:c6mmand., 'When the CATTS software'has been refined and stabilized, it will be possible to examine the relationships between judgmefital

performance evaluati6ns'cand qualitative outcomes of the simulated battle.

CONCLUSIONS AND 34PLICATIONS

By llocatinj specific subtasks to the individual controllers who

were in A position to observe them, it was possible to evaluate the -'ommand group's performance on most of the subtasks in the ARTEP module

and, "thereby, identify those subtasks that were highly correlated witri

measures of overall performance and those that were relatively weak.

Figure 6-1illustrates the relationships among several sets of subtasks

that were identified in this study. Fifty of the 61 subtasks in the

Battalion Command Group ARTEP were evaluated in CATTS. Of these 50 subtasks, 23 were correlated at the .01 level with overall performance'

measures for the command group and/or individual staff members, and an

61 subtasks in the 5G subtasks battalion command observable in CATTS

group ARTEP

19 subtasks

relatively weak I /

~ 14 subtasks both relatively 23 subtasks highly

weak and highly correlated correlated with

with overall performance overall performance

measures

Figure 6. Summary of subtasks evaluated in CATTS.

33
overla ping set of 19 subtasks was rated relcti~vely low. The intersection of these two sets contained 14 subtasks, summarized in Table 8,

,which were both low rated and highly correlated with overall performance

meas:ures.

Table 8

Subtasks Rated as[Deficient and Identified as Most Important

for Battalion Command Group Training

Task/subtask Description

Task 1 Develop plan based on mission.

I-B Identify critical enemy information.

I-I Plan fires.

Task 2 Initiate intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

2-A Identify critical enemy information.

2-B -Gather information from all appropriate sources.

2-C Analyze information to predict enemy intentions.

Task 3 Prepare and organize the battlefield.

3-G Communicate plans and orders.

Task 5 See the battlefield during the battle.

5-B Gather information from all appropriate sources.

5-C Analyze information to predict enemy intentions.

5-D Disseminate information and intelljgence.

Task 8 Concentrate/shift combat power.

8-A Determine 6ritical place and time.

8-B Concentrate/shift combat power in the attack.

8-C Concentrate/shift combat power in the defense or retrograde.

Task 10 Secure and protect the task force.

10-A Defeat or suppress enemy's electromagnetic intelligence effort.

Task 12 React to special situations.

12-A React to enemy jamming.

The subtasks in Table 8 are concentrated in a few critical areas:

Seven of them concern intelligence (1-B; 2-A, 2-B, 2-C; 5-B, 5-C, and 5-D);

three involve concentrating combat power at the critical place and time

(8-A, 8-B, and 8-C); two concern enemy electronic warfare (10-A and 12-A);

the remaining two are plan fires (i-I) and communicate plans and orders

U 34
(3-G). These subtasks, which were both deficient and decisive, appear to

constitute the essential -core of the Battalion Command Group ARTEP.

The command and control problems identified in this research suggest

requirements for improved training and for the development of information

processing and decisionmaking aids. Difficulties in identifying critical

combat information, analyzing enemy intentions, concentrating combat information, analyzing enemy intentions, and concentrating combat power to

meet the major enemy thrust suggest that current enemy doctrine, force

structure, and weapons characteristics (including movement rates) should

be -stressed in training. Many command groups lack appreciation of timedistance relationships and of the lead time required to shift combat

power. In addition, the underutilization of some task force assets, particularly of attached and supporting'units, indicates the need for increased training in- combined arms operations that emphasize the use of

such assets.

Improved techniques for gathering, processing, and disseminating information are also required. The communications problems encountered

during the exercises indicate that command groups need to dcvelop and

"debug" procedures for controlling the battle while maintaining communiScations- security. This need is especially important in the modern electronic warfare environment. Procedures also must be developed for insuring that plans and orders are complete and clear (which may involve

- going back to the five-part order) and consequently require less radio

communication. Difficulties in intrastaff interaction suggest that coordination among staff members needs greater emphasis in future training

programs and that improved techniques for sharing information within the

command group need to be implemented.

I he results of this investigation provide a starting point for the

development of objectives and strategies for command group training.

They can help individual commanders identify potential problem areas on

9, which to focus during the initial stages of a training program. These

data also have implications for the various service schools. They can

be viewed as feedback to help identify areas that require emphasis in

future curriculum development. Many difficulties identified here can

be alleviated by train..ng, but the information-processing problems may Srequire new techniques •nd devices to overcome human limitations. Information overload can be reduced by reallocating tasks within the command group, by improving message recording, storage, and retrieval procedures and devices; and by developing automated decision aids.

35
APPEN4DIX -A

S. TASKS, CONDITIONS, AND STANDARDS FOR THE

BATTALION COMMAND GROUP/STAFF ARTEP

Ii I •

141

1 37
TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINE

CONTROL AND

•,• UNIT: _ lM O 'n ~ MISSION: COORDINATION OF -P--- A=TpMy;

ID#/TASK CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S U

D p TF is given oral TF command group develops a plan which plan 

based on warning 

which 

and OPORD relates to friendly and oppbaing force

mission. includes, capabilities and vulnerabiliies;

(D-K, LT, opposing 

friendly 

force and range, accuracy, and destructive

CAMMS, 

situa- effects of both friendly and opposing

CATTS) 

tions and a mis- force weapons systems; the relief, sion -which surface conditions, drainage, could normally vegetation, and manmade features be expected in of the terrain; time available; the scenario de- and weather and resources availa- eloped by 'the ble to accomplish the mission. senior evalua- (Evaluator judgment.) tor. The size 

of (NOTE: The estimate procesc is a the opposing continuous one; as new data is force confront- ing the task force produced, updated. the plan is constantly Thus, evaluation of this should be determined task should -take place throughout by the senior 

evaluator. Guidthe unit-s preparation for, and execution of, the given mission;

development 

ance for scenario evaluation should not be completed and until the mission is terminated.) opposing force size can be found in

paragraph 10-5a(4).

10-1-A

*1 Analyze 

mission. Conditions 

10-1 for Task Command group identifies apply. specified/imp]ied tasks; addresses

those tasks in its own orl warn- ing order/frag order/OPORD.

10-1-B 11 Identify Conditions for Task If offense: critical 

combat 

19-1 apply. Command group identifies avenues

informa- of approach to the objective:

tion and type, size, number, and location

I intelli- of opposing maneuver and fire

gence. support units; opposing force

units capable of reinforcing by maneu- ver and fire; location of obstacles and opposing force's ability to attack by air and El capability.

If defense: IfCommand group identifies avenues of approach into defended area; composition and size of attacking force; opposing force's scheme of maneuver and fire

J support; opposing force's ability to attack by air and EW capability.

38 ARTEP 71-Z
al•ý ' .....

"TRAINING-AND EVALUATION OuTLINK

SCONTROL AND

_ _ _ _COORDINATION OF • _UNI•% •,•rnm Whnfi •'• MISSION: .,6PERAT•IjNS-_ ...

•'-:z tID,#/TASK ,CONDITIONS. •TRAINING/,EVALUA~rION, STANDARDS, S U,

.retrograde; 

group identif|ies size, type, and 

number of opposing force units in

contact; opposing force units whicb can

reinforce by fire or maneuver; opposing

force's intention or capability to

exploit; opposing force's reconnaissance;

opposing force's ability to attack by, air and EW capability.

10-1-C

Identify Conditions for Task Command group identifies location statqs

dritical 10-1 apply. and situation of:

friendly 1. TF elements.

informa- 2. Major adjacent units and brigade

tion. reserve.

3. Supporting forces.

10-1-D Analyze Conditions for Task Command group analyzes friendly capafriendly 10-1 apply., bilities in terms of METT and submits

Cap6- requests for additional assets from S•bilities, brigade as appropriate.

1 10-1-c

Select/ Conditions for Task Terrain which facilitates accomplishcontrol 10-1 apply. ment of the TF mission is selected/

key controlled by occupation of fires.

terrain. Terrain which, if captured/controlled

by opposing forces, would facilitate accompiishment of the opposing force

mission is designated key terrain. If

not occupied or controlled, commander

accepts the risk.

10-1-F

Select Conditions for Task Selects avenues of approach which

routes/ 10-1 apply except optimize these considerations:

zones to that mission 1. Provide for mission accomplishobjective assigned to TF is ment.

ARTEP 71-2

39
• TRAININGAND EVALUATION CONTROL OUTLINE AND

•'• COORDINATION OF

UNIT: C(rMMANn Wofup/S1qTAPF MISSION: OPERATIONS.O

ID#/TASK CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUArIO6NSTANDARDS S

AU

either movement to 2. Provide maximum cover and con- contact, hasty cealment.,

attack, or delib- 3., Minim(,ze effects of obstacles.

erate attack. 4. Permit mutual support and over- watch.

5. Permit effective employment of

weapons.

6. Facilitate control while per- mitting teams to deploy and maneu- ver.

7. Maximize TF and tea mnobility. 8. Capitalize on opposing 1.-rce

vulnerabilities.

9. Minimize time for teams to close on objective. 10. Facilitate logist.'..cal operations.

lO-1-G

Select Conditions fqr Task Seleccs battle posit~ons which opti- battle 10-1 apply c,,cept mize these considevarions:

posi- that mission 1. Block most critical avenues of

tions. assigned to TF is approach in(;o the defensive sector.

to defend. 2. Minimize vulnerabilitles to

opposing force's frontal direct fire

weapons and indirec- fire weapons.

3. Maximize capabitities of own * weapons; permit engagement of targets at maximum eflective range.

4. Exploit and reinforce natural

terrain obstacles.

5. Permit mutual support and over- watch.

6. Facilitate control while per- mitting teams to deploy and maneuver. 7. Maximize TF and team mobility;

allows for strong, quick counterattacks.

8. Capitalize on opposing force vulnerabilities.

9. Reduce vulnerability to allow air

attack.

.10. Facilitate logistical operations of subordinate units.

11. Insure continuous communication

while minimizing opposing fnrre EW

capability.

ARTEP 71-Z

40
A 4

"•~~~~~~ TRAINING-AND EVALUATIAN ', ONROL OUTLIN ýAND'..

COORDINATION O0

UNIT:, CwMMANn nROfP/STAFF MISSION: OPERATIONS,

ID#/TASK CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS ýS

Select Conditions for Task Selects initial and successive battle

delay 10-1 appl'y except positions which optimize these con- and that mission dssigned siderations:

?over- to TF is to delay. 1. Block, most critical avenues of ing approach ýinto the delay sector.

force 2. Force opposing force to deploy

posi- and concentrate forces repeatedly. tions. 3. Minimize vulnerability to opposing force long-range observation and,

fires.

4. Maximize effectiveness of own weapons.,

5. Force opposing force to trevel

along exposed approaches.

6. Reinforce natural terraln/

manmade obstacles.

7. Facilitate, as developing situa- tion dictates, transition to limited

attack, defense, or withdrawal.

8. Reduce vulnerability to air

attack.

10-1-I

Plan use Conditions for Task Plan, continuously updated, provides of -10-1 apply. for organic/attached/nonorganic organic/ supporting preplanned fires (to

attacned include final protective fires),

and non- fires against targets of oppor- j organic tunity, suppression, surprise and "fires. de.ception, and air defense coverage

while allowing TF elements to maneu- ver freely.

10-1-3

Determine Conditions for Task Priority of fires, to include air

priority 10-1 apply. defense fires, is given to TF eleof fires. ment(s) to support the scheme of

maneuver. Priorities for counterfires

and suppressive fires are established.

If appropriate, dedicated battery is $ specified.

*

S- -

ARTEP 71-Z

41
TRAINING AND EVALUATION O1UTLINE

CONTROL AND

COORDINATION OF UNIT: -COMN nGn,,P/ MISSION: nQPPATn....

ID#/TASK. CONDITIONS tRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S U

Determine Conditions f6i Task Based on forecasted operations, 'gire sup- 10-1 apply. request additional fire support/•

port re- logistical means if necessary;

cquired. determine priorities for logistical

support of fire support assets.

l0-l-L

,Conduct Conditions for Task. Determine fire support/target

initial 10-1 apply. acquisition assets available;

fire determine fire support coordination

support measures. coordination.

19-2 Initiate TF receives intelli- Command group will develop intelliintelli- gence summary (to gence to determine significant tactigence include terrain and cal indicators, targets (enemy move- prepara- weather factor over- ment, reInforcement, artillery location of lays) from brigade tions, air defense positions, assembly the bat- (senior evaluator) areas, and armor) within tactical

tletield. keyed to the scenario intelligence zone 2 (out to 50 km),

{b•, developed for the and BW, NBC, and CAS capabilities of

CAM;aS, exercise. The sum- opposing forces. (Because battalici,

CATTS) mary should be intelligence assets are not capable ,3f

CATTS) incomplete so as gathering data to the limits of tactlto require the TF cal intelligence zone 2, intelligence

command group to from assets supporting higher headi: initiate action quarters must be requested.)

to gather missing Ai information.

;1

• • l1 .2-A

identify Conditions for Task Standard is the same an that for Task

critical 10-2 apply. 10-1-B.

combat

information and

intelligence.

ARTEP 71-2

42
5 TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINE

CONTROL AND

COORDINATION OF

UNIT-, MISSION: OPERArTONSID#/TASK CQNDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S U

ID-2-D

Gather Conditions for Task Command group determines combat inforcritical 10-2 apply. mati6n and intelligence shortfalls

combat and aggressively gathers dita4from

infor- all ayailable/appropriate resources. mation All assigned, at iched, or DS units

and (ESM, UGS, GSR, Lecon units, and

intel- troops) as well as-higher echelon

ligence. , assets (electromagnetic, imagery, and

himan intelligence) shouldbe considered.

As a minimum, collection efforts should

focus on identifying obstacles, avenues

of approach, and opposing force

positione; insuritig accuracy of map

charts; trafficability sttigies; and

determining the most likely positions for

artillery, air defense, and antitank

elements. These 'data should then be

reduced to overlays,

S~ 10-2-C

AnalyQ e Some of tho lnfor- Command group, baned on an.understanding

oppos-5 mation. requestfd of known opposing force tactics and

ing by TP in th4 doctrine, will compare that with combat

Sfore, prev'ous sub- information and intelligence received

task is furnished to predict opposing force intentions.

to TP by senior

evaluator. Information should be

in accordance

with the exercise

scý'pario.

10-2-D

Dissemi- information of vary- Combat informat.on and intelligence disnate Ing degrees of criti- seminated should be event-oriented,

critical cality is provided rather than in periodic intelligence

combat to the TF by the reports and summaries. Only combat

informa- senior evaluator information and intelligence usable to

tion and at frequent but the recipient (TP elements and higher,

intell:- random intervals adjacent, and supporting units) should

gence. and will represent be disseminated.

information from

TF elements and

adjacent, support-

*-ng, and hiqher

units.

ARTEP 71-2
TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINE

CONTROL AND

-COORDINATION OF UNIT; c nfwin nRnyp. 40p MISSION: OPPRATN. ...

_ID#/TASK 'CONDITIONS TRAINING/FVALUATION STANDARDS IS U

S• Pepare General c6naitions Command group prepares and organizes the

and for Tasks 10-1"and battlefield in such a way as to maximize

orga- 10-2 apply. Com- chances for mission accomplishment and

nize mand group uses survivability, of the task force.

-thb results genebattle- raied in'Tasks

field. 10-1 and 10-2

CAMiIS, (LM, as input for this task.

CAITS)

10-3-A

Determine Preceding conditions Based op information available before the

critleal apply. bautlei, the command group determines the

place, place n the ,battlefield where the TP

combat ýower should be concentrated.

(NOTEi This determination of critical

place is only for planning purposes and

initial execution of the battle plan. It

will be necessary for the command group 'to make new determinations once the

battle is joined and the situation

develops.)

l0r3-B Select a Preceding conditions Based on the command group's analysis of course apply. the situation and mission, the results .1 of of the combat information and the

action. intelligence provided or gathered, and

the recommendations of the command group, the commander selects a course of action

which will facilitate mission

accomplishment.

10-3-C

Organize Preceding conditions Command group task organizes the task

tor com- apply. force into company teams.

oat. (NOTE: Unusual situations may support

the employment of pure rifle or tank

companies without cross-reinforcing.)

Support (organic and nonorganic) and

priorities are developed. TF elements

are deployed and a scheme of maneuver is

developed. The result should be a plan which will apply maximum combat power at

the critical place determined in Task

10-3-A.

!m

ARTEP 71-2

44
TRAINING TR INN.ADCONTROL AND EVALUATION OUTLINE AND

COORDINATION OF

UNIT: f........P.PA.. . MISSION: 0pORRATTnpo.

IDI#/TASK CONDITIONS. -.TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S Uý

10-3-D u

Select ,Preceding conditions Command group selects control measures

control apply. which support the scneme of maneuver,

measures. facilitate Lie and movement by the task,

force, and permit rapid changes as the

battle develops.

10-3an

Plan Preceding conditions Fire plan is updated; standards shown

organic, apply. for Tasks 10-1-I and 10-1-3 apply. attachede

-ano non- organic

auppQrting

fires

and dotermine

priority.

10-3-F

Develop Preceding conditions Command group develops a communication

a com- apply. plan Whiqh satisfies the communication

munica- requirements of the specific mission,

tion provides for COMSEC, specifies alterplan. nate means of communication (elecklan. icn visual, pyrotechnic), and insures - opatieon o6.t Ni. plan.

10-3-G

Communi- Preceding conditions Orders are coordinated with appropriate

cate/ ajply. agencies. Orders are issued, usually

coorai- orally, so as to allow TF elements

nate maximum time to go through troop-leading

4 plans proc~dures. Orders are appropriate,

and clear, and concise and contain esential

orders, information.

1;

S10-3-fl

Rein- Preceding conditions Command group establishes priorities ana

force apply. tasks TF elements and supporting engineer

terrain, units to accomplish any or all of the

following tasks which support the TF

mission/scheme of maneuver:

ARTEP 71--

45
TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINE

CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF

UNIT,: 'CMnmmN 'nrRpQ 1/.qP- A MISSION: OPERATIONS. - ; I [. .ii -

ID#/TASKI CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATiON STANDARDS S U

construct/iW;tall obstacles;

construct/emplace brid.es; coisruct

vehicle qdfilades; construct figh•iing

positiops/protective bunkers; construct

aircraft facilities; construct/improve

tacttcal routes; camouflage critical

facilities; clear fields of fire;

construct essential CSS facilities.

Plan/ Preceding conditions Opposing forces in TF areas of influence/

employ apply. interest are unable to determine TF

active/ strength, task organization, disposipassive tiohs, vulnerabilities, capabilities, or

security scheme of maneuver. TF vulnerability to

measures opposing force's mass destruction weapons

{?.g•, is minimized. Threats to TF security are

'cmou- detected/impeded. Deceptive measures r l• effectively deceive enemy as to TF intenELSEC, tions. TF radar is operated only when

'COMSEC, required for surveillance,

dummy positions of

equipment,

inoperative

equipment

real istically

positioned

and camouflaged.

S++ ,10-3-J

Provide Preceding conditions Coordinate with supporting supply elesupplies, apply. ments to insure that adequate supplies

(priority to critical items) are immediately available and issued to accomplish

the mission and any subsequent missions.

10-3-K

Maintain Preceding conditions Command group determines status of equipequip- apply. ment and directs repair/evacuation of

ment. nonoperational equipment critical to

mission accomplishment.

ARTEP 71-2

46
TRAINING AND EYALUATION OUTLINE

CONTROL-.AND

UNIT: COORDINATION OF " UNIT: rnlMMM~fl flfW/ 3 MISSION: nRRP•mToI.

iZTb ASK , CONDITIONS, TRAINING/EVALUATION'STANDARDS S _V

10-4 '

Battalion TF warn- Command group supervises preparation Siroop for

lead. ing/frag/OPORD and executi6n of a~tions by TF elements

( LT, has been given to required to accomplish the TF mission.'

CAMMS, TF elements. (TF

CATTS) elements are represented by the con- trollers in CPX,

TEWT, or slmulation modes.)

10-4-A

Supervise Preceding conditions Commana group inspects prepar~ations by iprepara- apply. TF elements, making corrections where

tions. necessary.

144-

Supervise Preceding conditions Reaction to TF order by TF elements, • coI- 40ply, to include supporting units, is characpliance terized by compliance, timeliness, effec-

;with TF tiveness, and lack of confusion.

order.

• ;! 10-4-C

Conauct Preceding conditions If time permits, require TP elements to

rehear- apply. renearse their missions where increased

sals. proficiency can be gained through repetition.

10-5

See the The TF is actively Command group-will continue to process battle- engaged in combat and update combat information and -iela with elements of intelligence to determine significant

during the opposing force, tactical indicators and targets (oppos- the The command group ing force movement, reinforcement,

battle, receives sporadic, artillery locations, air defense pos4- (D-K, event-oriented tions, assembly areas, and armor) within CAMNS, information from tactical intelligence zone 2 (out to 50

CATTS) subordinate, km). adjacent, and

higher commands (played by senior

evaluator).

ART-EP, ti-?

-: 47
^I

TRAININGAND EVALUATION OUTLINE

CONTROL AND

COORDINATION OF

UNIT: COMMANa (OgouP/STAFF MISSION: OPERATIONSS..

ID#/TASK, - CONDITIONS TRAINING/EYALUATION STANDARDS S U

Identify Preceding conditions Command group identifies those areas critical apply- specified i, -the standard for Task

combat 10-1-B, plus any other areas Which will

intorma- give an indication of opposing force,

tion and intentions.

intelligence.

10-5-B

Gather Preceding conditions Command group determines combat informacritical apply. tion and intdlligence shortfalls and , combat gathers data from all availinforma- able/appropriate resources. All

S-tion anu assigned, attached, or DS units (ESH,

intelli- UGS, GSR, recon units, and troops) as gence. well as higher echelon assets (electromagnetic, imagery, and human

intelligence) should be consiaered. As a minimum, collection efforts should focus

on determining opposing force intentions

in responge to the developing situation;

whether he will reinforce or withdraw;

movement of units, especially armor;

relocations of artillery and air defense

positions.

10-5-C

Analyze Some of the infor- Command group, based on an understanding

opposing mation requested of known opposing force tactics and docforce, by the command trine, and of the developing situation,

group in the pre- will compare that with tae information

vious subtask is and intelligence receive'd to predict

furnished to the opposing force intentioi:s.

TF by senior

evaluator. Infor- f

mation should be

in accordance with

the exercise

scenario.

A RTEP 71-2

48
-TRAINING AND EVAxLATION OUTLINE

CONTROL AND

COORDINATION .OF

UNIT:, __dC,•wn -rnqD ./vA'pP, -MISSION: .OP.. AVTsID#ITASK Tý CONDITIONS, TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S U

10-5-D

Dissemi- Even'-oriented Combat information and intelligence disnate combat infor- Iseminated by the command gro,)p should be

critical mation and event7oriented and be usable by the

combat intelligence recipient(s). Combat information and

infer- is provided intelligence should be accurate and dismation to the command seminated within a time frame which perand group by the mits the recipient to react.

Sintelli- tenior eval- fence.' uator, representing information from

TF elements

and adjacent,

supporting,

and higher

units.

10-.6

Control General condi- Based on an analysis of combat informaand tions for Task tion and intelligence generated in Tasks

coorui- 10-5 apply. 10-2 and 10-5 and an analysis of the

nate developing situation, command group combat determines whether to modify its scheme

opera- of maneuver. tions.

(LT, CANNlS,

CATTSS)

10-6-A Nodify Opposing forces, Command group (in time to react)

scheme by direction of reassesbeg the developing situation

of senior evaluator, and determines a new course of maneu- deploy or maneu- action which optiimizes cover, conceal- ver. ver in such a way ment, suppression, 4nd teamwork. as to cause the

TF to modify its

scheme of maneuver. The opposing force may

reinforce, withdraw, attack an exposed flank,

conduct an airmobile assault

* to the TF rear,

etc.

I I

49 ARTEP 7 1-2
TRAINING AND EVALUATION, OUTLINE

CON2 Roy AND

COORDINATION OF

UNIT: r MMlaJn rROUP/STAFF " MISSION:, OPERATIONS.

ID#/TASK CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S U

'10-6-B

Coordi- TF commander has -Command group makes essential coordinanate/! approv4d the -new Lion; if the hew course of-action com- course of action. involves a change in the TF mission,

muhicate it must be approved by brigade. changes. Change is then communicated to TF elements. (Brigade notifies supporting and

adjacent units.) Changes are communicated orally as a frag order and include

changed objectives, control measurqs, and

scheme of maneuver.

10,-6-C Supervise Changes have been Command group monitors the developing

execution. communicated. battle, insuring that TF elements and

supporting units comply with the changes.

In heavy combat, the TF-commander

participates directly in control of

combat operations. Ile deals personally with proolems of cover, concealment,

suppression, and teamwork. For best

results, the commander does not remain in

the TF TOC but moves about the

battlefield to personally supervise

execution. (In exercises involving

simulations, the commander's direct

participation in battle can be simulated

by requiring the commander to move from

the TOC to a remote location which has

radio commo with the TOC.)

l0-6-D

daintain 1 Preceding condi- Command group tasks TF elements and supthe tions apply. poirting engineer units to accomplish any Sbattle- or all of the following tasks which sup- fiela, port the TF mission/new course of action:

repair damaged roads, bridges, aircraft

facilities, POL, ammo, and water supply

facilities, protective shelters, and

camouflage systems; re-seed minefields;

clear or breach opposing force obstacles

and friendly obstacles that hinder

changed plans.

ARTEP 71-Z

50
TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINE

CONTROL AND

COORDINATION OF'

UNIT: OfniiP/,TAiF, 1CflMMAJn MISSION: I nPPQ•rT a -

-U iD#/TASK CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S, U

10-7

Employ .Conditions for Task 'Command group directs the employment fires 10-6 apply, of aillorganig/attached/nonorganic sup- fand porting weapoq(s and other CS assets to

other concentrate combat power at "he critical

combat place and time and to suppres-' caemy support weapons 9ýstems which inter fi~ewith

assets. the accomplishment of the TF mission. (D-K, Command group requests additional

LT, resources if necessary.

CAMMS,

CATTS)

-10-7-A

Midify Opposing forces, by Priority of fires which supports the new fire direction of senior scheme of maneuver is communicated to

support evaluator, deploy or supporting and supported units.

plan. maneuver in such a Requests for immediate fire supway as to cause the port are received and assigned to appro- TF to modify its priate fire support agencies. Missions

fire support-plan. are assigned which support anticipated The opprsing force developments.

may reinforce,

4 ithdraw, attack an exposed flank,

conduct an airmobile

assault to the TF

rear, etc.

i 10-7-B

'AEmploy Preceding conditions Fire support:

(to apply. (1) Is characterized by compatibility of include weapons capabilities with targets serorganic/ viced.

attached (2) Is applied at maximum range.

weapons (3) Concentrates maximum number of fire

systems support assets at critical point and

and sup- time.

porting (4) Results in suppression of opposing j• artillery, force fires (direct, indirect, and air

Sair de- defense), maneuver, and control capaflense, TAC bility. (NOTE: Smoke can be used to

Sair, and suppress some of the opposing force's 5• •attack weapons systems).

heli- (5) Degrades opposing force's capability

Scopters), to reinforce, counterattack,, maneuver, or :. Pc n o t s resupply.

(6) Is aggressively and violently

applied.

-- ARTEP 71 -2

|5
TRAINING AND EVALUATI NR9UM7INE

COORDINATION OF

UNIT: r•,,wn (Mnr)p/STAFF MISSION: OPERATIONS.

ID#/TASK CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S U

(7) Results in efficient expenditure of S tank, ATGM: and mortar ammo. Ammo constraints ar~e imposed to insure adequate

supply for contingency missions as appropriate.

10-7-C

Employ Preceding conditions (1) Army and/or USAF electronic warfare

other apply. units are requested to jam enemy com- combat mand and control communications, air

support defense radars, and weapons systems

assets, which rely on electronic guidance or

control.

(2) Supporting combat engineers are

tasked to:

(Offense) Breach and clear minefields,

obstacles, and fortified positions;

assist in river-crossing operations;

assist in forward movement of fuel and

ammunition; lay mines and create

obstacles to protect exposed flanks.

(Defense, Retrograde) Create obstacles

and minefields to reinforce defensive

advantages of the terrain, block avenues

of approach, and delay opposing forces in

the fields of fire of TF weapons systems; provide protective shelter; ma.intain

supply and tactical routes.

10-8

Concen- Opposing forcei, The command group concentrates/shifts

trate/ directed by senior its combat power at the decisive

shift evaluator, maneu- place and time to destroy the opposing

combat ver in such a way force. 1 power. as to present a

(D-K, serious threat to

LT, the TF or a tarCAbiNS, get with vulneraCATTS) bilities the TF

should exploit.

2 ARTEP 71-2
TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINE

S..... CONTROL: AND C05DIýAýý16 OF

UNIT: "om"Ao" cprun/,sPA• MISSION: OPERA'TON• - ... - -

SID#/TASK CONDITIONS TRAINING/_EVALUATIONSTANDARDS S u

10-8-A :

Preceding conditions Command g~ouo SDetermine reads the battlefield

Scritical apply, and determines the precise place

place saod, -aimewhie maxmum combat -power

and should 'be deployed; (0OTE: This

time. determination can bcst'be evaldated by "analyzing ,the extent of bpposing force

casualties and the outcome of the

battle.)

t I l0-8-B

Concen- The opposing. force, ( Command group concentrates at the point

'trate/ directed by senior where the opposing force is weak; it

shift evaluator, has moves forces to the critical point,

combat maneuvered in such while achieving surprise by careful

.power a way that it is use of ierzain, camouflage, movement

in the vulnerable to during periods of reduced visibility,

attack. exploitation-by decoys, electronic countermeasures, etc.

the TF. Suppressive 'fires, supporting attacks, "and close air support are intensified.

Pressure is maintained on the opposing

force. Once opposing force forward

combat elements have been penetrated, the command group directs TF elements to seek

out the enemy rear. The concentration of

combat power, usually under the personal

supervision of the TF commander, should

be rapiW, aggressive, and violent.

10-8-C '1 1 Concen- Opposing force, Command group concentrates its organic/

trate/ directed by senior attached/DS assets according to their

J shift evaluator, has weapons capabilities and the movement

combat maneuvered in such of the opposing force. Artillery!

power a way that his mortar fires are increased to destroy/ in the force ratio is button up tanks and preclude opposinq

defense greater than 3:1 force infantry from dismounting. Commana or and poses a serious group requests attack helicopter and

retro- threat to the close air support; repositions forces, to

graae. security of the TF. include dismounted antitank guided mis-

¶ .sile teams; and, if necessary, requests

additional units from the brigade reserve. As reinforcements arrive,

command group organizes them for combat

and assigns'battle positions and

missions.

ILI- I

ARTEP 71-2

53
TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINE

CONTROL AND

COORDINATION OF- ",UNIT:o CAMMM~T) R• P/STAFP MISSION. bPERAmTON.s

'ID#/TASK ,'CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S U

Protect In concehtrating Command group directs organic/supporting thinly co6bat power at the foices to condu6ý cconomy-of;force field critical, point, the -operations in the thinly-held areas. areas. command group requests

reduced combat additional assets, such as scout or power in othbr, attack 'helicopters, to assist. Modi- areas. fies fire support plan and deception plan.

10-9 Manage General conditions The command group orients the TF's CSC combat for Task 10-5 apply. assets to the weapons systems Insuring service that the CSS effort is dedicated to arm- support ing, fueling, and fixing the systems and assetsý supporting the troops who operate the

systems. Evaluation of performance

should be determined in terms of

percentage of functioning equipment and

weapons in the TF and in terms of the

actions taken by the battalion command

gioup to obtain maintenance assistance from the appropriate higher levels of

maintenance support.

10-9-A

Arm and Preceding conditions Ammunition, POL, equipment, and other fuel the apply. Evaluator supplies critical to the capability, of systems, personnel input pre- the TF weapons systems are availaole programed requests and utilized. Command group informs for supplies and TF elements oC the controlled supply equipment from TF rate (CSR). Requests for supplies/ elements, equipment are handled expeditiously

A IAW SOP. Delivery to TF elements is

made as far forward as deemed prudent.

rn

ARTEP 71-4

54
TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINE

CONTROL AND

UNIT: CmnMfNf GROiP/sTAPF MISSION: OPERATIONS.

""D#TASK CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATION"STANDARDS , SU

10-9-B

Fix the Preceding conditions Command group directs m•intenance and

systems. apply. Evaluator repair of its systems by organic

personnel input pre- assets. When maintenance is beyona TF

programed requests' capabilitiesj command group requests

for maintenance contact teams for repair of specific

assistance from PF systems as far forward as the situation

elements, permits. Battlefield cannibalization, if

appropriate, is directed. When a system

cannot be repaired on the battlefield,

arrangements are made for recovery and

evacuation or destructi6n.

Support Preceding conditions Command group supervises 'implementation

the apply. Evaluator of health preservation programs, managetioops, personnel input ment of troop subsistence, and control

various prepro- and expeditious movement of replacements

gramed requests to points where .chey are needed.

for assistance

from TF elements.

IiO-9"D

Inte- Preceding conditions Command group maneuvers CSS resources

9;ate apply. assigned to the TF, keeping support units

_ CSS into in proximity to the weapon 'ystems they

s~heme support, commensurate with the risk

of involved. supplies are delivered tacti-

' maneu- cally. Transportation assets are used

v~r. to fit movement of CSS resources to the

scheme of maneuver.

I

S• '• • 10-10

"Secure Conditions for Task Command group supervises TF operations

and 10-5 apply. to insure the opposing force's intelliprotect gence collection effort is suppressed.

the TF. (NOTE: Evaluation of performance of

(LT, this task is best determined by analyzCA1uiS, ing results of the opposing force's

CATTS) intelligence collection effort. Optimally, opposing force is unable to

determine TF strength, task organization,

dispositions, vulnerabilities,

capabilities, or intentions.)

ARTEP 71-2

55
2 TRAINING ( ANDWEVALUATIONMOUTLINE

CONTROL AND 'UNIT, romwan COORDINATION-,OF UNIT - •ISSION: OPERATIONS:

-•:10•1l0-A

JID#/TASK CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUAnION STANDARDS "SU

SDeafeat Preceding conditions Communications and 61ectroniclsecurity° =•• o u• app-ly, measures aie'e "igidly,-6dhered _'o through- •,•press out the TF. , • opposing,

-force's

el ctiomagnetic

intelligence

effort.

S10-10-B

Defeat or Preceding conditions An effective program of cover, c6n- suppress apply. cealment, and camouflage discipline opposing is enforced.

fore,'s

imagi'v

intelligence

effort.

10-10-C Defeat or. Preceding conditions Appropriate and precise liaison is con- suppress apply. ductea with territorial security forces. -- • °opposing

force's

human

inteilligence

effort.

10-10-D Deceive Preceding conditions Opposing force is deceived by imple- the apply. menting any or all of the following: opposing (1) Dummy equipment/positions are force, realistically sited and camouflaged.

(2) 'Actual damaged equipment (not recoverable) is realistically sited and camouflaged.

(3) Phantom radio nets are operated by trained intelligence units (requested of and approved by higher headquarters).

ARTEP 71-2

56
TAMNIMNG AN]) EVALUATIPoNNTOUTLINE"

TRAIN4GRAN ANDCOORDINATIbN,'OF

kUNIT:. COMMAND GiOUP/S'iAFF MISSION:_ OPERATIONS.-

ID#/TASK CONDITIONS TINiNGOEVALUATION STANDARN3 S U

iReduce, Preceoing conditions Except when required by mission or siua- tivnerat applya tio'n to concentrate, TF elements sho.ild

aybe dispersed to the extent feasibleas

-0tOf dictated by terrain and situation.

opposing

force

"amass destrucastfon

waeponsn e s

i I10-IlDetect/ Precending f tions Command group recognizes and assesses the |impede apply. Opposing o>pposing force and takes necessary

threats dorces (as directed action to co elmter eit. q o

to TF by senisor evaluator) 1security. maneuver in such a

.• way aA to present a

threat to TF security.

Detect/ opposing force air- Command group establishes AD priorities

defeat craft attack the ahd organizes AD assets. Directs air

opposing TF. defense fires if those fires are not

force already being delivered. Repositions AD

air assets to protect critical positions/

assets. facilities on the battlefield. Assesses

ci,

CAViIS,

CATTS) SI0-II

ARTEP 71-2

57
".-TRAINING AND, EVALUATION OUTLINE

COORDINATION OF

UNITi COMMA9N GROUP/STAFF MISSION: OPERATIONS.

#/TSKDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S U

S10711-Aý Supevise Preceding conditions command group supervises the execution, of

E . compli- apply. the TForder by TF elements and supporta nce, ing units, making corrections as~neceswftni IF' sary. TF cohmander moves about the

oicer. battlefield,' erionally directing the

battle at the critical time ýnd place.

(In exercises involvingýsimulations, the

commander's direct participation in

battle can be simulated by requiring the

commander to move from the TOC to a

remote louation which has radio commo

with the TOC.)

React The situations listed TF cbntinues operations with a,minimum

to below are designed to of confusion and disruption.

situa- be lnterjected at

t' ons vri6o times during

requir- the play of an exering cise. The senior

special evaluator determines

actions. ho4 often these

(LTi situations should

CAtMS, be used and when.

,CATTS) This precludes

player personnel

from anticipating

the situationsi the

element of surprise

enhances realism.

React to TF is performing Command group recognizes opposing

opposing assigned mission. force jamming activities anm continues

force Opposing force operation ,1thoot revealing effectiveelec- jams TF nets and ness of the jamming activity. Reports

tronic sends imitativ'e are sent to higher headquarters using

warfare. messages to various secure means of communication, if availTF stations, able. Directs switch to spare frequency as a last resort measure, using

proper authentication techniques. (NOTE: Evaluators may i 'nter-ject other conditions

requiring frequency shift, e.g., lost

CEOI, lost radio.) Command group detects

imitative messages and insures that no TF "elements cespond to them. TF contindes mission.

ARTEP 71-2

58
TRAINING AND EVALUATION. OUTLINE

CONTROL AND

COORDINATION OF

UNIT: CroMMAM GROpP/STAFF M43SION: OPERATIONS.

ID#/TASK CONDITIONS TRAINING/EVALUATION STANDARDS S U

10-12-B

React to TF is perfoiming Command group receives/verifies reports.

chemical assigned mission. Sounds alarm and directs the imple:aentaor bio- TF elements tion of NBC defensive measures IAYI SOP.

logical report an attack Relays report of attack to adjacent, supattack, by a chemical or porting, and higher headquarters.

biological agent. Directs continuous monitoring, decon- tamination, and marking of contaminated areas. Submits appropriate reports.

Command group wears protective equipment

(if in affected area) until unit NBC

teams (simulated) determine it is safe to

unmask.

10-12-C

React to TP is performing All personnel take cover. Command

nuclear assigned mission, group collects burst data and reports

attack. TF elements report IAW SOP. Directs continuous monitora nuclear burst, ing, reports data, arranges evacuation

of casualties, and directs damage

assessment and emergency decortamination.

Continues performance of mission under

radiological hazard conditions.

I

10-12-D

React to Senior evaluator Command group continues to operate effecloss of designates one or tively in performance of iiss!on.

key more members of Adjustments made to command group orgamember command group nization and responsibilities. Higher

of com- (commander, S3, headquarters notified.

mand s2, etc.) a casgroup. ualty.

I

NOTE, TAB A, next page, contains sugmA gested support requirements.

"ARTEP T-71Z

59
APPENDIX ýB

EXERCISE SCHEDULES

The armor and mechanized infantry battalion command groups had the

f611owing schedult of activities:

Day 1--Covering Force Operation

Time Event

0700 Players arrive, receive administrative briefing.

0730 Battalion receives reconnaissance report.

0745 Brigade updates battalion on present situation and mission.

0830 Battalion OPORD briefing to company commanders.

0930 Battalion starts moving toward canal where enemy is expected to

attack.

1030 Enemy begins moving toward canal.

1100 Battalion arrives at canal.

1130 Enemy arrives at canal, attacks, and begins to cross canal.

1300 Enemy completes canal crossing and delay begins.

1430 Battalion command groups break contact and.make passage of

lines into main battle area (MBA).

Day 2--Attack

Time Event

0700 Players arrive.

0730 Brigade fragmentary order given.

0830 Battalion gives fragmentary order to company commanders. f 1130 Brigade reaches objective.

"1200 Lunch.

1300 Critique.

1400 Systems briefing. PM 0•EDI(C 1AGE B a,,,

1430 Players released.

61
The following is the schedule of-activities for the light infantry

battalion command groups:

Day 1--Defense

Time Event

0700 Players arrive, receive administrative briefing.

0730 Reconnaissance report given to battalion command group.

0745 Brigade updates enemy situation.

0830 Battalion OPORD briefing to company commanders.

0930 Battalion arrives at starting/landing zone.

1100 Battalion elemehts in battle positions.

1115 Covering force units begin passage of lines through player

battalion.

1245 Enemy attacks forward battle positions.

1315 Enemy attacks main battle area.

1630 Enemy breaks contact.

Day 2--Nonilluminated Night Attack

Time Event:

0700 Players arrive, brigade gives FRAGO order.

0800 Battalion FRAGO order briefing to company commanders.

0930 Company commanders reach line of departure (LD).

1130 Battalion achieves objective.

1200 Lunch.

1300 Critique.

1400 Systems briefing.

1430 Players released.

Since this is a free-play exercise, the times listed above are approximate and varied slightly from one exercise to another according to the

actions of each command group.

62
APPENDIX C

PERFORMANCE ON ARTEP SUBTASKS

Task 1: Develop Plan Based on Mission

This task-comprises 12 subtasks, 3 of which were problem areas:

analyze mission, identify enemy information, and plan fires. The subtasks and their mean ratings are summarized in Table C-i. Sevený,observers rated the command group's perf6rmance on various parts of Task 1:

the four company commander controllers (whose averaged ratings are shown

in the column labeled CC), the $2/$3 controller, the fire support con-

"troller, and the TOC monitor. The three problem subtasks are indicated

by asterisks, which mark the ratings that were more than one standard

deviation below the meanof all ratings by the designatedirater on the

given day.

Performance .on the planning function was, generally not observable as'

it occurred but was evaluated on the basis of the operations order. Subtask 1-A (analyze mission) was rated relatively low by the company commanders on Day 1, because the operations order occasionally omitted part

of the mission--especially the implied task of making a passage of lines

near the end of the covering force operation. The mean company commander

rating of 2.6 for this subtask on Day 1 is not low in absolute terms,

but it is low in comparison with the other subtasks rated by the company

commanders.

Table C-2 summarizes the common deficiencies in the three problem

subtasks of Task 1, together with the proportion of command groups of the

total 27 in which each deficiency was reported. The proportions of deficiencies in this and subsequent tables are low estimates, because the

I controllers did'not always write comments on the observation forms to

explain their low ratings.

Subtask I-B was rated relatively low (2.5) by the TOO monitor compared with his other ratings on Day 1. It was rated even lower (2.1 on

both days) in absolute terms by the S2 controller. The major deficiency

in this subtask (identify critical combat information and intelligence)

was insufficient knowledge of enemy tactics and force-structure.

Subtask 1-I (plan use of organic/attached and nonorganic fires) was

rated very low by the fire support controller, who was in a better position to evaluate it than the TOC monitor. The fire support controller

rated this subtask unsatisfactory for more than half the command groups

on Day 1 and for more than one-third of the groups on Day 2. Common

criticisms were too many and poorly selected priority targets, insufficient coordination with forward observers, and lack of coordination between the fire plan and the maneuver plan.

The remaining subtasks of Task 1 generally were performed satisfactorily. Subtasks 1-C and 1-D, dealing with friendly information and

63
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CM a ( M Zý-P Q S ) (U=5 ) U

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Table C-2

Deficiencies Identified in Task 1: Develop Plan Based on Mission

Proportion

1A. Analyze mission: identify tasks

. Command group failedto address implied task ofpassage .30 14' of lines

Incomplete or confusing specification of mission .22

. Left out part of mission. or gave incorrect mission .07

1B. Identify critical enemy information

. S2 not aware of enemy doctrine and force composition .25

. S2 unable to analyze the threat opposing the task force .'07

II. Plan fires

Poor or inadequate selection of priority targets .33

. Poor coordination with forward observers .30

Fire plan not prepared in conjunction with maneuver plan .19

. Too many priority targets .19

:1 ' Note. Each proportion represents the number of battalion command groups (out of 27) that exhibited the specified deficiency.

capabilities, were usually done well, although adjacent units sometimes received slight attention;. Subtasks I-E, 1-F, and 1-G were broken down into more specific items for the company commanders. Most of these items wer(i rated satisfactory. The three exceptions were Subitem 3 under Subtask 1-F, and Subitems 7 and 9 under Subtask 1-G. Subtask 1-L was divided into two subitems for the fire support controller. The ratings for these

four subtasks in Table C-i are the means of the ratings for the several items (listed below the subtask) into which each subtask was categorized.

Task 2: Initiate Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

All four subtasks of Task 2 were rated consistently low. As indcated in Table C-3, the monitor's ratings for all subtasks were more than

67
Table C-3

Mean Ratings for Task 2: Initiate Intelligence

Preparation of the Battlefield

Rater

_ _ __ _ S2 Cc TOc

'Subtask 'Day Day 2 Day I Day' 2 Day I Day

2A. Identify critical enemy informa- 2.1 2.1 2.4* 2.4*

tion

2B.,Gather information from all 1.8* 1.9 2,5* 2.,7" 2.3* 2.3*

appropriate sources

2C. Analyze information to predict 2.2 2.2 2.3* 2.3*

enemy intentions

2D. Disseminate information and 2.1 2.1 2.3* 2.4*

intelligence

*More than one standard deviation below the mean

one standard deviation below the mean, and so were the company commanders' ratings for Subtask 2-B. The S2's ratings were also quite low;

only one of them is starred because most of the S2's ratings were uniformly low.

The common deficiencies are listed in Table C-4, which shows that

A the most frequent shortcoming was the failure in 2-B to assign each task

force element to report the specific information it was best able to

obtain. Instead, everyone was usually assigned tQ report everything,

whether it was observable or not. Subtasks 2-A (which is the same as

1-B) and 2-C both suffered from inadequate knowledge of threat doctrine

and capabilities. Intelligence dissemination (2-D) tended to be slow

"* and incomplete. The incompleteness resulted partly from the individual

* staff members not pooling the information they received from their respective sources.

68
Table C-4

Deficiencies Identified in Task 2: Initiate Intelligence

Preparation of the Battlefield

Subtask Proportion

j2A. Identify critical enemy information

. S2 not aware of enemy doctrine and force composition .25

S S2 unable to analyze the threat opposing the task force .07

2B. Gather information from all appropriate sources

. All combat elements, scouts, and GSR (ground surveillance .85

radar) were tasked to report the same information

2C. Analyze information to predict enemy intentions

. S2 did not fully comprehend the battlefield activity .l1

. Primarily based on intelligence from brigade, and not on .11

information from front-line units.

$ S2 not fully aware of threat doctrine, tactics, and force .11

structure.

2D. Disseminate information and intelligence

• Slow in disseminating intelligence to company commanders .33

or passing information up

Battalion staff not coordinating among themselves .30

Most spotreps and sitreps were incomplete .15

. Could have passed-nmore intelligence up and down the chain .11

Note. Each proportion represents the number of battalion command groups

(out of 27) that exhibited the specified deficiency.

Task 3: Prepare and Organize the Battlefield

Three of the nine subtasks that were evaluated under Task 3 were

rated relatively low, as shown in Table C-5. Subtask 3-H (reinforce terrain) was not rated, because it requires construction activities that

were not simulated in CATTS, and Subtask 3-I (plan/employ active/passive

J• security measures) was not evaluated, because it involves camouflage,

also not simulated.

69
>) Q04 0 co co r l. r- I 00 6)

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M z oQ coi a~l co4 'oi toj o C

0'1 O C O C4 LA

0

4J M

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* In (MN

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1.4 um 0 0~

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9: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l *t-a u i E t

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qiO 0 0u ýO 4-) (a1 4-)

4-9ý 4- u CLU rt =(

a)I- 3 4/) 0 a)/~+ t S- e- u' C..o V) cv 

As o $. E '* .1 i r ) ( 0 

a S- LL ) LL D CL 0 4. 4- (V 41 4J S- 0 u n ~ :3 en) ( c

a) ( - S -- -)v a70
Weaknesses in the communication plan (3-F) listed in Table C-6 resulted in deficiencies in communi'cations security "(10-A) during battle

and in reaction to jamming (12-A).

Table C-6

SDeficiencies Identified in Task 3: Prepare and

Organize the Battlefield

Proportion

3F. Develop communication plan, including security considerations

, No or inadequate provisions for procedures to be followed .30

in case of lost communication due to jamming

No mention of the requirements for radio listening silence .19

or for alternate frequency . No mention of the need for brevityof communication ,15

3G. Disseminate plans and coordinate with appr)priate agencies

Important information omitted from OPORD (e.g., fire sup- .67

port, minefields, berm, enemy organization, conibat

support, march order/routes, prepositioned ammo,

action if jammed, alternate frequency). Also, the

battalion relied on its SOP (Standard Operating Precedure) to supplement the operations order, even with

"attached and supporting units which may not have been

familiar with the battalion's SOP.

Order took too long to prepare and present. Did not allow .37

enough time for company commanders to go through troop- leading procedures.

r Order too complicated, not clear, disorganized. .25

Warning order not given .25

" 3K. Maintain equipment

) )'Little . attempt to repair/evacuate non-operational equipment .30

Note. Each proportion represents the number of battalion command groups (o ut of 27) that exhibited the specified deficiency.

"71

'-
Task 4: Troop Le.d before Battle

As shown in Table C-7, supervision of preparation (4-A) and of execution (4-B) were usually judged satisfactory. The scenario dip not allow

sufficient tim *to conduct rehearsals (4-C).

Table C-7

Mean Ratings for Task 4: Tzoop Lead Before Battle

Rater

cc TOC

Subtask Day 1 Day 2 Day I Da2

4A. Supervise preparation of TF elements 2.8 2.9

4B. ,Supirvise compliance with plan 2.9 3.0 2,9 3.0

Task,5: See the Battlefield during the Battle

Task 5, a continuation, of Task 2, compris:ei the same subtaski, iThe

ratings in Table C-8 identify three subtasks (5-B, 5-P,, and 5-D) as relatively lowi The comxon criticisms (-Table C-9) of identifying, analyzing,

and d"Csseminating Intelligence are simjlar to those for the corresponding

Table C-8

Mean Rati.-xgs for Task 5: Soe the Battlefield During the Battle

Rater

S2 CC TOC

Subtask aDay 1 DayZ Day I Day 2 Day 1

5A. Identify critical enemy informa- 2.1 2.1 .2.5ý 2.6

5B. Gather informat~on from all 2.0 2.0 2.5* 2.7* 2.4* 2.6

appropriate sourcs

K 5C. Ana~lyze inforination to predict 2.1 2.1 2.2* 2.4*

enemy intentions

5D. bisseminate information and '2.1 2.1 2.5* 2.5* 2.4* 2.5*

intell igence I I

*More than one standard deviatior belcd the mean.

72
Table C-9

Deficiencies Identified in Task 5: See the Battlefield

During the Battle

Proportion

5A. Identify critical enemy information

. S2 not aware of enemy doctrine and force composition .25

. S2 unable-to analyze the threat opposing the Task Force .07

• Relied mainly on brigade .04

5B. Gather information from all available sources

. Did not use all assets .52

• Asked only for routine spotreps and sitreps. Did not seek

additional information. .19

5C. Analyze information to predict enemy intentions

S $2 not aware of enemy doctrine and force composition .19

.Relied primarily on intelligence from brigade, and. did not

analyze information from front-line units .07

. Had difficulty determining the intentions of the enemy .07

5D. Disseminate information and intelligence

J Slow in disseminating intelligence to company commanders or .33

passing information up

. Battalion staff not coordinating among themselves .30

. Most spotreps and sitreps were incomplete .19

Limited intelligence sent down .04

Note. Each proportion represents the number of battalion command groups

(-out of 27) that exhibited the pecified deficiency.

subtasks of Task 2. The major difference in the patterrn if deficiencies

was the change from not tasking individual units to report what they were

actually in a position to observe (2-B) to not actively collecting information from every element during the battle (5-B).

Task 6: Control and Coordinate Combat Operations

All four subtasks were generally rated satisfactory, as shown in

- Table C-10.

*} 73
Table C-10

Mean Ratings for Task 6: Control and Coordinate Combat Operations

c Rater TOC

Subtask Day I Day I Day 2

6A. Modify plan as required by enemy actions. 2.7 C,9

6B. Communicate changes 2.7 2.9 2.7' 2.6

6C. Supervise execution of changes 2.8 2.8

6D. Direct combat ,engineers to support changed 2.8 2,8

plan,

Task 7: Employ Fires and Other Combat Support Assets

This task was rated satisfactory by the fire support controller and

the monitor (Table C-l1). The fire support controller's rating for modification of the-fire support plan (7-A) is the mean of his evaluations of

two subitems:

1. Communicating new priorities, and

* 12. Assigning requests for fire support.

Table C-11

Mean Raktings for Task 7: Employ Fires and Other Combat Support Assets

• • Rater

S FS TOC

Subtask .Day 1 Day 2 Day 1 Day.2

7A. Modify fire support plan as required by enemy 2,7 2.7 2.9 2.9

actions

1. Communicat- new priority of fires to sup- 2.4 2.4

porting and supported units

2. Assign requests for fire support to 2.9 2.9

appropriate units

7B. Employ fire support assets appropriately 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7

7C. Employ other combat support assets 2.9 3.0

' 174
Employment of fires (7-B) which is played extensively in CATTS, was

done well by most command groups. Subtask 7-C had little content, ber

cause (a) electronic warfare units were hot played and (b) few combat

engineer activities were simulated.

Task 8: Concentrate/Shift Combat Power

Three of the four subtasks were rated low by one or more observers

(Table C-12) for the reasons summarized in Table C-13. Most of the command groups did not determine the precise piac-e and time to concentrate

combat power (8-A) during covering force operation on Day I because they

did not appreciate how quickly both friendiy and enemy units moved across

the terrain. Concentrating cofbat power during the attack on Day 2 was

criticized for being too slowý for keeping too big a reserve, and for not

bringing all available assets to bear at the critical point. Concentrating combat power in the defense or retrograde was rated low by the S3 and

the monitor and was criticized frequently for failure to use all available assets (especially attached and supporting units) and• for becoming

decisively engaged during the covering force operation.

Table C-12

Mean Ratings for Task 8: Concentrate/Shift Combat Power

S Rater__

__S3 CC FS TOC Subtask Dy I Day 2 Day I Day 2 Day 1j Day I DaY 2

8A. Determine critical 2.1 2.2 2.6* 2.8 2.5 2.7

place and time 2

8B. Concen'trate/shift 2.0* 2.8 2.7

combat power in the

attack

8C. Concentrate/shift 1.9* 2.7 2.9 2.4*

combat power in the

defense or retrograde

8D. Protect thinly held 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.8

areas

*More than one standard deviation below the mean.

75
TableC-13

,ekiciencies Iaentifed in Task 8:. Concentrate/Shift dombatPower

Proportion

j 8A. Determine critical place and time-.

Did not,appreciate time-distance problems (inability .85

to determine speed of enemy, speed of friendly units,

trafficabi.lity of terrain)

8B. Concentrate/shift combat power in the attack

. Rbacted too slowly to affect battle .15

". Reserve was tQo big/not utilized .11

• Did not make use of all available forces .11

8C, Concentrate/shift combat power in defense or retrograde

, Inadequate use of attached and supporting units (Cav, .78

TOW, Scouts, Vulcans)

• Failed to use available assets (reserves, air, artillery, .59

and smoke) . Became decisively engaced during the covering force .19

operation

Note. Each proportionirepresents the number of battalion command groups

(out of 27) that exhibited the specified deficiency.

Task 9: Manage Combat Service Support 5sbets

The S1/$4 controller-was more critical of the performance of the subtasks than the monitor, as shown in Table C-14. Since the brigade S1/S4

controller interacted-with counterparts on the battalion staff, the S1/S4

may have been in a better position to make the judgment. The only subtask in Task 9 that was rated more than one standard deviation below the

mean for either day was 9-B, which is concerned with maintenance and re-

"pair,, As in the corresponding subtask (3-K) before the battle, this weakness may have resulted from a lack of realistic information about equipment malfunctions in the simulation. The common deficiency was in not

recovering non-operational vehicles (Table C-15).

76
Table, C-14

Mean Ratings for Task 9: Manage Combat Service Support Assets

Rater ,_ _ _ _ _ __Sl/S4 I TOC I

" Subtask . Day 1 Day 2 Day 1 Day- 21

9A. Provide weaponssystems with ammunition and 2.1 2.4 2.9 2.-8

fuel

9B. Maintain,4nd repair weapons systems 1.9* 2.1* 3.0 2.9

,9C. Provide health pireservation ,programs, sub- 2.0 2.2 2.9 3.0

sistence, and replacements

9D. Transport and'deliver supplies 2.3 2.4 27 26

*More than one standard deviation below the mean.

Table' C-15

Deficiencies Identified in Task 9: Manage Combat

Service Support Assets

Proportion

9B. Maintain and repair weapons systems

: No effort made to recover non-operational vehicles .33

j Note. Each proportion represents the number of battalion command groups

(out of 27) that exhibited the specified deficiency.

Task 10: Secure and Protect the Task Force

The principal weakness (Table C-16) was in ignoring the enemy's

electrom&znetic intelligence efforts (10-A). Camouflage (10-B), human

inteliigence (10-C), deception (10-D), and enemy airstrikes (10-G) were

not simulated. Subtask 10-F (detect, impede threats to task force

security) was not evaluated because it had no distinctive content apart - from Subtasks 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 8-C, and the other subtasks of Task 10. The

elements of the task force were usually dispersed to reduce vulnerability

to enemy mass destructiou weapons (10-E), accoT6ing to the S3 controller.

77
Table C-16

Mean Ratings for Task '10: Secure and Protect the Task Force

Rater

Subtask' Day 1 Day 2 Day 1 Day 2

10A. Defeat or suppress enemy's electromagnetic 1.8* 1.7*

intelligence effort.

10[. Reduce vulnerability to enemy mass destruc- 2.3 2.3

tion weapong systems-

*More than one standard deviation below the mean.

The brigade S2 controller criticized commutications security (10-A)

for giving locations and coordinates in the clear and for having overlong

transmissions that miight be detected by the enemy (Table C-17).

Table C-17i

Defi-jencies Identified in' Task 10: Secure and Protect

the Task Force

Proportion

10A. Defeat or suppress enemy's electromagnetic intelligence effort

• Violated communications security.' (Location and .25

coordinates in clear, communications too long.)

Broke radio silence .07

Note. Each proportion represents the number of battalion command groups (out of 27) that exhibited the specified deficiency.

Task 11: Troop Lead during Battle

Like Subtask 4-B which it continues, and 6-C which continues or

parallels it, Subtask 11-A (Table C-18) was nearly always rated as satisfactory by the company commanders and the monitor.

78
Table C-ieq,

Mean Ratings for Task 11: Tro6p Lead During Battle

q Rater,

Subtask Day l Day 2 Day 1 Day 2

11A. Supervise compliance with TF order 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9

Task 12: React to Special Situations

SThe only part of this task that was simulated was enemy jamming

(12-A). The enemy did not send Imitative messages in 12-A. There were

no chemical or~biological attacks (12-B) or nuclear attacks (12-C). With

a few minor exceptions late on the second-day, no key member of the command group was lost (12-D). The reaction to jamming was severely criticized by the S2 controller, who was able to observe it more closely than

the monitor. The S2's rating for this task in Table C-19 is the mean of

the scores for the three subitems that he evaluated.

Table C-19

Mean Ratings for Task 12: React to Special Situations

S~Rater

•S2 TOC ..

Day IDay 2Subtask 2 Day 1 Day 2

12A. React to enemy jamming 1.8* 11.7* 2.6 2.5*

1. Recognize jamming and continue operation 1.8* ' l. -.

2. Report jamming to higher headquarters 2.1 11.8* -

3. Switch to spare frequency 1.5" 1.5*

*More than one standard deviation below the mean.

.he S2's most frequent criticisms (Table C-20) were for failure to

switch to alternate frequency as a last resort and for inadequate reports

of jamming to brigade headquarters. Other deficiencies were (a) not rec- I ognizing jamming, (b) not determining whether all frequencies were jammed,

and (c) not trying to communicate through the jamming~before changing to

an alternate frequency.

79
>- ,Table C-20

Deficiencies Identified in Task 12:: React to Special Situations

Proportion

12A. React to enemy jamming

. Did not switch to alternate frequency .63

• Jamming report incomplete or omitted, .44 ( . Failed to recognize jamming .22

• Did not determine whether all frequencies were jammed .15

. Did not attempt to override, jamming before changingto .11

alternate frequency

Note. Each proportion represents the number of battalion command groups

"(out of 27) that exhibited the specified deficiency.

80
APPENDIX D

)CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SUBTASK RATINGS AND OVERALL PERFOPMANCE

-RATI1GS FOR MM BERS OF 'THE BATTALION STAFF

Three controllers interacted with and evaluated their counterparts

on the battalion staff: The S1/S4 controller rated the battalion SI and

S4, the S2/S3 controller rated the S2 and S3, and the fire support coptroller rated the battalion fire support coordinator. The correlation

between the ratings for a specific subtask and the overall performance

ratings for each staff member is a measure of the weight that the controller gave to that subtask in his evaluation of the player. A high

correlation indicates that the subtask is an important function of the

person who performs it. The 83 correlations in the next four tables

range from .06 to .83. Of those, 46 are significant at the .01 level,

and an additional 12 at the .05 level.

S1 and S4 Performance Ratings

The battalion SI and S4 worked closely together. As reported in

Table 5 of this report, there was high correlation between their overall performance katings (r = .85). Thus, the correlations between

overall performance and the ratings for specific subtasks should be

similar for the Si and S4. This expectation is confirmed in Table D-I,

although all the subtasks except 9-C (troop support) are primarily S4

functions. Subtask 9-D--which requires integrating combat service support resources into the scheme of maneuver and keeping support units

near the weapons systems they support--was the subtask most highly correlated with overall performance. Providing supplies before the battle (3-J) was a close second.

At the other extreme, the subtask least correlated with overall

performance was 9-C. Subtask 9-B also was not significantly correlated

with overall performance, which is consistent with the earlier observation that the maintenance and repair of weapons systems were not realistically simulated during the exercise.

S2 Performance Ratings

The subtask most highly correlated with overall performance of the

battalion S2 (both ratings provided by the brigade S2 controller) was

analyzing combat information and intelligence to predict enemy Antentions.

This subtask is designated 2-C when it occurs during intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and 5-C when it is part of seeing the battlefield during the battle. The second highest set of correlations in Table

D-2 is for identifying critical combat information and intelligence,

designated I-B, 2-A, and 5-A during successive phases of the exercise.

Two variables that were correlated with the battalion S2's overall

performance were not the S2's particular responsibility: defeating the

81
C a b e Table D-1

Correlations between the biB4ade S1/4 Controller Ratings

on ARTEP Subtasks> and Battalion Si ,and S4

Overall Perfo-rmance Ratings

Bn Si Bn S4

Overall 'Overall

Performance Performance

Rating Ratin_

Subtask' '. -Day I ,Dy 2 Day 1 Day 2

TASK 3. Prepare and organize the battlefield

3J. Provide supplies .59** .57** .57** .61**

3K. Maintain equipment .40* "57** .36* .52**

TASK 9. Manage combat service support assets

9A. Provide weapons systems with ammuni- .37* .55** .49** .58**

tion and fuel

9B. Maintain and repair weapons systems .24 .31 .21 .27

9C. Provide health preservation programs, .13 .06 .09 .08

subsistence and replacements

9D. Transport and deliver supplies .58** .65** .64** .65**

Note. Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups.

*Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)

**Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

enemy's electromagnetic intelligence effort (10-A) and recognizing jamming (12-A, Subitem 1) are the concern of anyone who communicates over

the radio. Functions of the battalion S2 that were legs highly correlated with the rating of his overall performance were gathering information (2-B and 5-B), submitting a report of jamming to higher headquarters (12-A, Subitem 2), disseminating intelligence (2-D and 5-D),

and developing a communication plan, including security considerations

(3-F).

S~82
Table D-2

C6rrelations between the Brigade S2 Controller Ratings onARTEP

Subtasks and the Battalion S2 Overall Performance'Rating

Bn S2

Overall

Performance

ubs Rating

" ___Subtask Day !I kDay 2

TASK I. Develop Plan Based on Mission

lB. Identify critical enemy information .61** .65**

TASK 2. Initiate Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

2A. Identify critical enemy information .61** .65**

28. Gather information from all appropriate sources .47** .46**

2C. Analyze information to predict enemy intentions .69** .83**

2D. Disseminate information and intelligence .40* .27

TASK 3. 'Prepare and Organize the Battlefield

3F., Develop communication plan, including security .36* .27

considerations

TASK 5. See, the Battlefield During the -Battle

5A. Identify critical enemy information .71** ,73** 5B. Gather information from all appropriate sources .44* .44*

5C. Analyze information to predict enemy intentions .74** .80**

5D. Disseminate information and intelligence .38* .31

TASK 10. Secure and Protect the Task ForCe

IOA. Defeat or suppress enemy's electromagnetic .56** .50**

intelligence effort

TASK 12. React to Special Situations

12A. React to enemy jamming

1. Recognize jamming and continue operation .57' , 2. Report jamming to higher headquarters .42- .X

3. Switch to spare frequency 1.07 1.10

Note. Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups.

*Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)

**Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

83
533 Performiance Ratings

The subtasks listed in Table D-3 are functions with which the battalion MS3 assists the battalion commander. All four subtasks that comprise Task 8 (concenitrate/shift combat power) were highly correlated

SWith the overall evaluation of the battalion S3 by the brigade S3 con- troller. Subtasks 10-E (dispersing the task force elements, when possible, to reduce vulnerability to mass destruction weapons) and 3-G

(briefing the company commanders) were also significantly correlated

with- the rating of the $3'. Subtasks 1-C and 1-D (identifying and analyzing friendly information) were the least strongly related to S3 overall

performance.

Table D-3

Correlations between the Brigaide S3 Controller Ratings on ARTEP

Subtasks apd the Battalion S3 Overall Performance Rating

Bn S3

Overall

Performance Rating

Subtask Day I Day 2

TASK 1. Develop Plan Based on Mission

1C. Identify critical friendly information .30 .31

ID. Analyze friendly capabilities .31 .44*

TASK 3. Prepare and Or'ganize the Battlefield

3G. Coimmunicate/coordinate plans and orders ,64** .53**

TASK-8. Determine critical place and time

8A. Determine, critical place and time .56** .70**

8B. Concentrate/shift combat power in the attack .67*

8C. Concentrate/shift combat power in the defense or .81**

retrograde

8D. Protect thinly held areas .67** .72**

TASK 10. Secure and Protect the Task Force

IOE. Reduce vulnerability to enemy mass destruction .65** *

weapons systems

Note. Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups.

*Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)

**Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

84
Fire Support Performance Ratings

The two items that were most highly correlated with overa-ll performance of the battalion fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) both involved

planning (see Table D-4). -Developing the initial fire support plan (1-I)

and communicating the new priority of fires when the plan was modified

(7-A, Subitem 1) were correlated with oVekall performance at the .01 level on both• days of the exercise. Protet~ing thinly held areas with

fire support (8-D) was less highly correlated on both days, whereas determining which units receive priority (1-J) andh employing assets appropriately (7-B) were correlated on one day but not on the other. The remaining items (1-L, Subitems 1 and 2; 7-A, Subitem2; andz8-C) rated by

the brigade fire support controller were not significantly correlated

'with his evaluation of the battalion FSCOORD.

2j1

a , 85
Table D-4

Correlations ,betwveen ,the Brigade Fire Support Controller, Ratings'

on, ARTEP Subtasks and the Battalion Fire Support

Coordinator (FSCOORD) Overall Performance Rating

:4 Bn FSCOORD

Overall

SPerformance

Ratinj - Subtask DayI-Iay2

TASK 1. Develop Plan Based on Mission

HI. 'Plan fires 74*k 69**

iU. Dete-mine which units receive priority for fire .65** 31

support

IL. Determine fire support coordination-measures

1. Determine fire support/target acquisition assets .32 .34

available

2. Determine fire support coordination measures .27 .10

TASK 7. Employ Fires and Other Combat Support Assets

7A. Modify fire support plan as required by enemy

actions

1. Communicate new priority of fires to supporting ,182** .72-*

2. and supp"rVted. uit s1uo to a 1

2. Assign requests for fire support to appropriate .19 19

units

7B. Employ fire support assets appropriately .29 .67**

TASK 8. Concentrate/Shift Combat Power

8C. Concentrate/shift combat power (fire support assets) .

in defense or retrograde

8D. Protect thinly held areas (with fire support) .46* .60**

Note. Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups.

*Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)

**Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

86
APPEl'NDIX:E

~~.~~1 ORRELATiONS BETWEEM, SUBTASK RATINGS AND

RATINGS OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

Srehad Accomplished'its mi'ssion. The questionnaire did not specify

the-response alterndtives, but the answers fell into three-categories:

no, m~arginally, and yes. These responses were assigned the numerical

values:. 1,'2, a 'nd 3, respectively, for the purpose of computin§ Pearson

2 coefficients of correlat-ion'between ratings of mission- accomplishment

~ j and 'ratings of subtask 'pertormance.

- I Table Eý-1 summarizes the correlations between the. monitor's ratihg

C-f mission accomplishment and' the subtask ratings provided by the -conI ~trollers and by the monitor. Compa~ratively few -correlations' were -statistically significant, and' there was little 'consistiency in the correlaitions fok a-given subtask,.either among raters or between Day 1 and-Diay

21. Thus, it appears that mi~ssion accomplishment was not e' reliable

meýasure of overall perfo'rir~ance, perhaps because there -was'a different

monitor for every exercise and judgments were not based on- co'asistent

-criteria.

T
Table E-I

Correlations between Subtask Ratings and Ratings of Mission Accomplishment

Rater

SI/S4. S2 S XCC FS TOC Moni*tor

Subtask Dy Day 2 ka~l Day 2 Da iD.LI Day Th a 2 Da Day 2 Day 2

STASK 1 26 05

IA 2 , I62**

I1 B .10 .04 1.25 - .57

C .27 .18 27 .51*

"14 .0- .23- .3

IE " .40EA NV , - TT10,_ 6

-1 j

4, 3 • - .48*... ..

" ___-_____.____.26. . .. - -

9 ... .5F*-

'IG 'I . .. £

2 . NV

3 NV 4 NV _

; 5 NV

6 -.- NV

o7 -..... NV

8 NV

'_ 9__ NV

IfH .06 E , il. . .. .02

:• 2 "_'-.24

4 -. 03

5 -. 05

6 _____.16 ,7 .31 _--IT - - .12 -. 20 .10 9

IJ _-- T" .23 A02 -.12

IK ". 1 .06 .02 __ _..20 .09 ___ 1 .20 -. 29

NV - j _____ -_ _ .03 1.03 . . .

Note. Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups.

*Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)

**Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

NV - No correlation, because there was no variability.

88
Table E-1--Contintied

•:.•, Rater

o SI/S4' ]. S~1 : 1. $ Rtr FS Monitor

Subtask a aiDay n 2 Da Day Day

TASK,. 2 - .a_ _

_.2A0 alw J O9' - 04 10- f

'2T - .0 . -. - .22 ,.17 .05 6I4 " -, "C 7/ '. 1 9 , " ', O l., 9 - .0 1 - .-3 - ,7 0.

TAK 3 _.W - - iT - T

3A I 59** .19 "_3B " 00 .45*

XK ~ -ý - -- -

3D 1C .6 z .36

1 .3.2 .3.3 1 21 .34 .20 , , 31 ... 40* .06

3F M0- r6 - -- .06 W4

3G 1ý.41* -.07 ."34- 1.14 *49* 1.13 Ij -2- - C2.3**

3 .45* .33 -- .29 .67*

S•-•A.59* NV

B_.30 ."14- .33 N

TASK5 .-.- . ....

58iUO.26 .6 .03 - -327 .39

5C .... - .38 .46

__0 .25 . .5-2"-F- .47' -7/7--

TASK 61 _

.6A " 1 - -'*.43* I6I 5 -- F- 3 .19

D7A .31 .30 TASK7 -

;! - - -- .. ... _ ~.09W " .07 .3

2 1.22 -.16 ___78 -. 26 -A38 20 5-* ,_____ _ ... _22 _ -. NV

• Note. Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups.

*Significant at the OS level (one-tailed test)

* *Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

NV - No correlation, because there was no variability.

89
•i•:' ", Tab1&, '-1--;Continued. •

Rater

l1 S/4 S2 S3 CC FS TOC Monitor

z Subt'ask Da I.Day,'2 Day 1 Ra Da - 2 Tay2D I Day 2Da. Da 2a 2 Day2I

' TASK, 11 . .23 , .1 

8A 40 . 27 24 -23 .2 _______8B - 1 • • i, - • 1,5- * !; , ., .18 4 .04 ___5"_

8D., 74-77 .23 ,7- ,14 '42* -3 .77**

TASK9, .26 _ .... _ K - 0

T9c .12 .02 6

9D'ý N5Fk 46* - - - - NT- Q 7*

9C_- -I---- -- -1 - - , V 9D V .50** .40" .3 F 3• ",.7-' 

" ]'~ASK 10.r. . TA-AlOA .'16' .'22.' . .. , -

J fOE A .62k .03 ' TASK _" ___ _. IT ........ . ' .. .. "A I I P*-_

TASK 12'. - ., -_-2A -01"T

2 -.24 .05 -

Note. Correlations based on 27 battalion com~iand groups.

*Significant-at -the .05 level (one-tailed test)

**Significant at ,tihe .01 level (one-tailei test)

NV,- No-correlat-ion, because there was no' variability.

J '9

S~.

,,',,90
APPENDIX F

CORRELITIONS -BETWEEN SUBTASK, RATINGS AND

OVERALL, C QMAND GROUP PERFORMANCE

The correlations between the subtasks and the estimate of overall

command group performance were examined as an additional indication of

the importance of eachs6ubtask. As stated previously, the overall esti- j mate was• the average of five, ratings of command group performance from

the four company commanders and the TOC monitor. To simplify the fol-

'lowing discussion, the tasks and subtasks in the Battalion Command Group/'

1, Staff ARTEP ai6e grouped into three phases: ('a) the planning ihase consisting'of Task 1; (b) the preparation and organization phase consisting I of Tasks 2, 3, and,4; and. (c),-the execution phase consisting of Tasks 5

through 12. Tables F-i, F-2, and Fr3:present the cor)relations between subtask ratings' from each observer and the average rating of orgerall command group performance listed by phase.

I Planning: Task 1

correlations between' subtask ratings for Task 1 and overall 

command group ratings are presented in Table F-i. Examination of the

table indicates that the S2/s3 controller's rating of Subtask I-B

U(dentify enemy information) was significantly correlated with the

overall rating on both days. so were the S2/S3 controller'srating and

the monitor's rating of 1-D (analyze friendly capabilitiei'). Other

subtasks significantly correlated on both days were 1-I (ptan fires)

and'1-J (determine which units receive priority for fire suipport), as

rated by the monitor.

'4 1 Subtasks 1-F (select avenues of approach) and 1-11 (select delay and

covering force positions) were played on only 1 of the 2 days. Some

• ,elements of each of these subtasks were correlated with overall perfor-

-•mance, as waF the monitor's rating for 1-G (select battle positions) and

1-H. Several high correlations for elements of 1-G were not significant

because of the small number of groups that played the defense mission.

4i I

Preparation and Organization: Tasks 2-4

The correlations between subtask and overall ratings for Tasks 2,

S3, and 4 are given in Table F-2. Most of the ratings for intelligence

preparation of the battlefield (Task 2) were significantly correlated

with command group overall performance. Identification (2-A), collec-

- ,tion (2-B), and analysis (2-C) of intelligence were correlated on both

dayo for two raters.

Task 3 (prepare and organize the battlefield) had several subtasks

that correlated significantly with overall performance. The monitor's

ratings of 3-A (determine where tho enemy is likely to concentrate) were

significant on both days, as were the company commanders' ratings of 3-G

91
Table F-i

Co'rrelations between Subtask Ratpngs And Command Group Overall Performance Ratings (Task 1)

4r Rater

tSIYS4 S2 S3 CC FS TOQQMonitorl Subtask RI a 2n 1 a -Da 1 Da :Da __ I Daj

TASK 1I

4 PA 136B 18.6 ,", *4**• - JC7- ., .23 -3 ",.30, . .IE:39 .* " '4"•- ..48•* .6-2 " ,-" •

".32 -- 719

-I . . . .26

2 .21

8 1-6

.1.40

"-G 71.071 - - -- -...- -

62

79 "2 1

8 -- .79O..-..

__4 5 NV"i9 6 ,91"- ' 

IH IZI -Iu .... , - .4 -"

3 

I

3 .36

4. 47* 5 .39

6 .43*

7 . . .26 ,53** .36*

K.. 6 .08 .42* .42*

-1 L 1 7 " - . 2

- - - - - - - - - -- --.. 03 3--

Note. Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups. *Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test) **Significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test) NV - No correlation, because there was no variability.

92
'S

Table F-2

Correlations between Subtask Ratings and-Cofaand Group

Overall ,eiff6rmance 'Ratings (Tas).s 2,, Tr and 4)

Rater

S1/S4 S2 S3 CC S TOC Mitor

Subtask Da 1 2 2 D a 2 DayTa 2 Dy ' Da -_1 _

TASK2 2 .

"2A W-__ ,,tL.**4.*

7 2C -- : '• ------- -

_T__ 117 __0*0

3tY 7)3-3F; T _ Fi

3D5 - _7 0-KW

____ 'A• T • .. -- '-----

.3 3

°;; Not___e. Correlations based on 27 battalion command groups.

•i '*Signifijcant at the .05 level (one-tailed testj **Sjgnificant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)

!!!i,, ,NV - NoI correlation, because there was no variability.

t

I
(disseminate plans and-orders). Irovide supplies (3-J) ahd maintainequipment (3-K)-were correlated wheira ted by the S1/S4 but not whenrated by the monitor. This discrepancy suggests that the monitor •ias

not in as good a p6sition ,to observe these subtasks -as the S1/$4 rontroller, who was directly involved in their-performance.

Subtasks 3-B (select a course of action), 3-D (.olect control measures),, and 4-B (supervise compliance with plan) correla I-qnifiiantly

on Day 1 but riot 6n;Day 2. it is -possible that these, subtasks were more

-' •critical on the first day than on the second. On the other hand, it is

also likely that the first day's ratings were more highly correlated

with overall performance than the second day's, because the exercise was

twice as long on Day 1.

Execution: Tasks 5-12

The, correlations for Tasks 5-12 are summarized in Table F-3. Like

•nk 2, of which it is a continor:n, Task 5 (see "battlefield duringthe battle") was generally corrolated with overall performance. All

four subtasks• dealing with identification, collection, analysis, and

dissemination of intelligence, were correlated for one or more raters

on both days.

-Some subtasks wore significantly correlated with overall performance

when rated by the controllers but not when rated by the monitor. Subtasks 6-B (communicate changes), 9-A (provide ammunition and supplies),

9-D (transport and deliver supplies), 11-A (supervise compliance with

task force order), 12-A (react to jamming), and all of Task 8 (concentrate/shift combat power) fall into that category, which probably means

that the controllers, who were directly involved in the performance of

those subtasks, were in a better position to evaluate them than was the

monitor.

Subtask 10-E (reduce vulnerability to mass destruction weapons) was

also significantly correlated in the overall performance on both days.

bNone of the fire support correlations was significant, however. That

result is consistent with the lack of significance found earlier (Table

5 of this-report) between the overall -fire support rating and all the

other ratings of overall performance.

94
Table F-3

Cor='ei- ons, between Subtask Ratings and Commanc Group

Ove.--Al Performancd'Ratings (Tasks 5ý'12)

Rater

1b/-4q S2 S3 cTOC FS Monitor

Subtask TLd. Dy2 ayjDaT2Da 2_ IDayT 2 Da ___ ___FDa ha2aIDaa 

TASK 5..

5 A7 .. 2ý. 43. . ...

5B 64C* .40* _____ - . .19

SK - -0 ......

TASK6 ' .-- -- * ,_, - -... 

8A ,50* .* 7227* 5F'* _ 77.3 W 754W- .233

6C- - - .23 .19 6D 3T-T .3-0

TASK 7 --

,:" "7A .09-- .6-*.10- • 7.-8-•; 3 --

I9 8-A .34 310.... . . -.

" 0"3 . . . . .. 7- t.

-- "•)-'- T .65"w •' .?66 h*

TASK 8.--

T A 10 - .37w" -0 - 8C 0 '-;A" ý . . .. ... 3-* ....... .65* . . .. -1 .,)8 . 7. .0 

TA 95,

iqA .622.0*39*A 

TA SK ii1111 -

-_E__t

NTe. Cdg

Note Correlations becaused n2 bthe asion no vaiblt mn .

95
tB rIN

1) AIII Distribution List,

I I3ASI) (M.&fA) 2 HUjSACDEC. Ft Olsd, ATTN. Library

2 IIDA (DAMI.CSZ) I IIOUSAC"'kC, Ft I id, ATrN. ATEC-EX-E-Ihins Factors

Vi FIODA (DAPE.PIIR 2 USAEEC, Ft Benjinpsin tiprison. ATTN, Liboty

i -1-1A4 IAMA*Alil 1 USAPACDC, Ft flcniirrln Htrrison, ATTM. ATCt'-HR

I n (DAPE*51fE.PO) I U$ACoim-F.Irct Sch, F Monmouth. ATTO~: ATSN-EA

AIHODA (DAMI-OOT.C) -uiý Ft Mrnninouiti~A1TTI4 AMSEL-PA-1P

IHODA (0APMMIZ-Al I USAEC, Ft Monmoruth, ATTN, AMEt...S[.CB1 IHODA (DACI-U*1PP7A) 1 'USAEC, Ft Mloomnouti), AIITN. G,16cl flov Br

I HODA (0APE*HliE) 1 USA Mattrials Sys Arsu Agcy, AbardeP1 4,I~TN: AM>XSY-P

I HdDA (DAPE-hMP0.CI 1 Erlgewood ArsCnal, Abord~cn, ATTN: SAHiEA-8lL-If

I HOIIA JUAPC-DW) '1 UJSA Ord Ctr & Sc!,, At-jrcken. ATTN; All SL-WTN-C

JHODA 2 USA Hrns Engr Lab), Abordoon. ATTN, llsraryl~is

VHODA (DAPE.VSI S Conibat Alms Trog Eld, Ft Boennlr., ATTN- Ard Supervisor

I HODA (DAFDVF-Al I USA anfery Hurt Ksvc Unit, Ft Benolng, A",TN: Chief

] 1 IIODA (DAflA'ýS M , I USA Iroianry R~d, Ft Ptennitng, ATTN. STE80-TE-T

1iiODA IDAPC-PAS*A) I USASMA, Ft fl~ls% ATTN!-ATSS-LRC

I HODA DUSA.0R) I USA Ali Oct SchiF, rA 01m, ATTN: ATSA-CTD-ME

'I HODA (DAMOROrn I USA Air Dqf Sch, Ft Bliss; ATTM:Tech Lib

1 HQDA (PASS) I USA PIr Pef R~d, Ft B~liss, ATTN: FILES

1 lHOQA CI)AMPI) 1 UISA Air 00deOr, Ft Btliss, ATTN. STEIIQ.PO

ICn[41, Consult 0Wv JDA-OTSG), Adelphl,.MD I USA Cmd & Genorel SO~ 03~k~a, Ft Leavenwowt,, ATTfN Libs

i;MI ss: Hm CD R,,ODDI&, E&L)I USA Crsd& Ge4neral Sft Collr~o, Ft L,;ýsworth, ATTN, ATW-SE-t

1 140 USACAL. APO Sas1le. ATTN: ARA(1P4 I USA Crnd Oviire. at S'! C'41tV.e, rt Lceevnweotth,,AT-IN: dAn.

I 1IOFirst Ainsy, ATtiN: AFKA-01--ri 1 USA Corsbln;d Arms Cribt Vov Act. Ft L aewnkvi fll, ATTN. DvPiCd,

2 HOI Fifeh Army. Fý Sam Houstona I USA Cornbsinos Arnis Cmtjt Dtv Act, Ft Leav.'roworth, ATTN. CC$

CI P. Armiy Sit Studics Oie, A' YN. , 0AVCSA (DSP) I , C4 'ImiOd Auntl Cmht Deq Act, rt Loovenrwil, ATTU: ATQAS.'

ci IQ~cChif o Stf StdecOfc 4.1 1 LV A Cvji Wo0~ Arms Cwb~t 0ev Act, Ft Leaveonworth, ATTN;

IDCSPF;R, ATTN: CPSIOCP I W5A Combilnii Aims rmbt Div A~t Ft I em-v~1vorth, ATTN. ATCACC -C

I Tha Army 11lb. Per~tigon. ATTU:. RSl3 Chief 1 U00rCOM, Nl-ýht Vigiolo Lab, Ft Belooir, ATTN',; AMSEL-INV.-St>

I~" Tho Army Lib, Pient~os, ATTN-, ANRAL 3 Wit/ Consputtr Sys Cn.ý% 1-1 0ldvolt, ATTN: I rels Lbibuy

1 Ocl, Asst Sect of the Army IR&D) I USAMF.I1C, Ft vel,'1 STSFII-DO

1 rerlh Suppor t Ole. OJCS 1 USA Eng Sch, Ft Delvoir. AW7N, 1,lsary

1 USASA, Artooton, ATTrN: 1AR0.T 1 UISA Tuspocprhic Lab. Ft Celt%,4i. AlT111 ETL-7D-,S

1 USA Bich OfDuie. iam, ATTN. Lit5 Sciences Dir I USA Topographic Lab, Ft Sqvlo,f, AflN:-:TINFO Ceniter

2 USARIEM.N, atimcil, ATTN: SGfiD.UV.CA I USA Topo.2aphic Lab, Ft (teoi~r, ATTN., VITL'-(zý

I USAT7C, rt Clayton, AT-N; STETC. MO A ,~I USA Intelligence Cir & S~b, Ft Hoaclruca, ATTN, CTD-'*ý

I USSAWM 5 A, Ft1 Bragg, ATTNý AM TU r.o~i 1 USA Inteli,~rnce Ctr & $ch. Ft vowb~uca. AITN: ATS- TO-. 'S

1 UlStMA, Ft rivg, AW-N: hionauit Llb I USA Inte~lgence Ctr & Sdi, F1 kHu~chucz. AT-TN. ATSI-TE

I US %AC Cir& $0, Ft A&Cclelari, Al~l J Lib I USA Intoll~gence Ctr & SOF: Huschuca, AT-T",ATSI-TE-X-Gb

IUS WIAC Cir & $ch. Ft McClellan, A`1TN; Tog~ M~ I USA Intellig.=a Ctr & Sch, 1-t luselsuca, Afl-N: ATSI-CTS-OR

IUSA Qiiem.trSc!'. Ft Wc. ATTN: ATS1M1Til I USA Intellir.rz-w Ct. A Scsii Ft llu~chuca. ATTN: A'.SI.-CTD-DT

I MazcoiaI Dev Ole, rVL. Ft Ii ~tat (d I LISA Intelligenct Ctr & Sclh, Ft Flsiaciseica, ATTN: ATSI-CTD-CS

I USAS S ciý~xfi, FtGordo~n, ATTN; ATSOE1A I USA Int-v1lgencc Ctr te Sc", Ft fluachuca, ATTN: DAS/SRD

1 USA Criapfain Ct, t so,, rt Ildmilton. ATTIP ATSC-TE-FlD 1 USA Intei~ijence Cti & Sch, Ft Huachuca, ATTN, ATSt-7fhi

I USATSCIH. Ft Eustis, A',.N- Educ Advisor I USA lInteiligence Ctr & Scls. Ft Hoachuca, AT7I14. Library

I W~A We Coltc, Cdolisle Bk~zksAlTW: Lib 1 CDRl. HOt Ft Humcbuca, ATTN- Tech R-.t Divo

2 VflAIiI, N~uzopasychiatry Div 2 CDR, USA Electrenik N'rv Gid. ATTN-. STEEiP-M~T-S

I DLI, SPA. Monterey I HQ, TCAT'A. ATTN; Tech Llbra~y

1 USA Concept, Anal Aqcy, flollosda, ATTN: 4tOCA.MRl I 1110, TCATA, AT TN. Al CAT-OP.Q, F1 Hood

I USA Concept Anal Aqcy, Dotncsda, ATTNt V10-. 4f USA Recruiting Crud, Ft Sherldon, ATTN: USARCPM.P

I USA Arctic l'cst CMr APO Seattte, ATTN: 51 CAC-i'. It I Senior Arm~y Ady., USAPAGODITAC, Li91n AF Aux Fid NO. 9

IUSA Arctic Ti':t Cir. APO Seattle, ATTN: ANISTE-PL-TS I HQ USARPAC. DC$PER, APO SF 655B. ATTm: GPPk-LF

1 USA Armament Cmd, ERestona Arsenal, ATTN. ATS&A.7 Chi '*mson Ibta Acaidemy ot Healith ScItinces, rt Sam Houston

I USA Armament Cmd, flock Island. ATTN: A.MSAR.TrDC Ma,~Corps Inst.. ATTN: Dz~an-IACI

zI FAA-NAFEC. Atlantic City. ATTN: Llccrary IHQUSlvc., Commandant. ATTN: Code MATMT

I FAA-NAFEC. Attbntic City, ATTN: Humn Engr Or I I-QVSMC, C~ommanldant, ATTNs Code I-PI.20-28

I FAA A-Von3.,cttcal Ct,. Oktshon~ji City, ATTN. AAC-A4 D 2 USCG Acadlemy, New London. AT TN. Admission

2 USA Fid Arty S4h, Ft Slill, ATTN: Library 2 USCO Aca(!emy1, New London, ATTN: I.Ibrary

LI USA Armor Sch, Ft Knox, A17 N: Library I USCCQ Training ClIr, NY. ATTN: CO

I US~A Acmror Sees, Ft Kn.ox. ATTFN: ATS6.OI.E I USCG.TrairkIng Ctr, NY, ATTNs Educ Lye Qi

I USA ArmorrSch. Ft Knox, AT r: ATStI.OT-TP I USCO, Psychol Rts Or, DC, ATTN: GP 1(62

I~~~~~~~~~~~ nx US T~ Aro TBCA ~,F IQ Mild-flange Dr. MC Dat, Quarifco, ATTN: M9 5 Div

97

1=01MhI P.&OGE £~MA~MNOT ~Ii)
1 US Ma'rinc Corps ialision Ofc, AMC, Alexcandria, ATTN: AMCGS-TF 1 Del & C611l Inst of Enviro Medicine, Cana"t

IUSATR4ADOC, Ft Monroe, ATTN: ATR' E I AIR CRESS, Kensington, ATTN: Info Sys Sr6 USATRADOC, Ft Monroe, ATTN: ATPR-AD I Mlllteerrasykologisk Tjorieste, Copehagen

1,,tUSATRADOC, Ft Monroe, ATTN, ATTS-EA I Military Attache, Ffenc Embassy, ATTN: Do6 Sec

I USA Forces Cmd, Ft McPherson, ATTN: Library 1 Medecin Chef; C.E.R.P.A.-Arsenal, ToulonINavil France

2 USA Aviation Test Sid. Ft Rucker, ATTN: STESG-PO 1 Prin Scientific Off, Appl Hum Enrq Rsch Dlv, Ministry

1 USA Apcy for Aviation Safety, Ft Rucker, .TTN: LI1hriry of Defense, New Dutltr

IUý-A Agey for Aviation Safety, Ft Rucker,ý ATTN: Educ Advisor I Pers Rich Ofc ,Library, AKA.ýsrail Defense F~rces

1, USA Aviation Sch. Ft Rucker, ATTN: PO Drawer 0 1 Ministerls van Deferisie, DOL,,I/KL Afd Socia'l,

'I'HOUSA Aviation Sys Crnd, St Louis, ATTN;,AMSAV-ZDR 'Psycliologlache Zaken, The Hague, Nethirlands"

2 USA Avatfori Sys Tst~Act., Edwards AFB, ATTN: SAVTE-T

IUSA AirD~lqh, Ft Bliss, AIIM ATSA TEM

1AUSA Air Mobility Risch &,Dev Lab, Moffett Fid, ATTN; SAVDL-AS

IUSA Aviation Sch, Ret T6i Mot, Ft Rucker, ATTN: ATST-T.-RTM

1USA'Avlato fth, OFtRceAT.TS D

HO, DAR COM, Alexandria, ATTN:, AMX GO-TL

I1,0, ARCOM, Alexandria, ATTN: CDR

I UIS MlitaryAtademy, WosfPolnt, ATTN: Serials Unit

1 US Mill'ticry Acidemy, West Point, ATTN: Ofc of Milt Ldrahp

I US Milltary'Acadensy, West Po'int, ATTN: MAOR

I USA Standardization Op. UK, FPO NX, ATTN. MASE-GC

I 0(c of Naval Rich, Arlington, ATTN, Code 462,,

3 Ore of Navil'R$h, Arlington, ATTN: Code 458

1 Ole of Naval Rich, Arlington, ATTN: Code 450

1 Ofc of Naval litch, Arlington, ATTN: Code 441

1, Navai Aerospc Med Res Lab, Penescola, ATTN: Acous Sch Div

1 Naval Aefospc Med Res Lab, Pensacola, ATTN: Code L51-

1 Naval Aeiospc Med R~es Lab, Pensacola, ATTN: Code 15

1 Chief of NayPert, ATTN: PersOR

1 NAVAIRSTA, Norfolk, ATN- Sifety Ctr

I Nay Oceanographic, DC, ATTN: Code 6251, Charts &Tech

I Center of Ný4vaI AnaI, AUN: Doc Ctr

1 NavAirSysCom, ATTN: At R-5313C

I Nay buMed, ATTN: 713

1 NavHolicopterSubSqua 2, FP( SF 06601

I AFHRL (FT) William AFB

-1 AFIIRI (TT) Lowry AFB

I AFHR L (AS) WPAFB, OH

2 AFHnL iDjOJZ) Broots AF13

1 AFHR L (DOJN) Lackland AFC 1 1 aQUSAr (INYSD)

'4 1 Ai-Yi6 (6wDt'Rrue_-!0. AFB

3 AMRtjE 142i Wý C!

2 AF Inst of Tech. WVPAFB, 0)1,ii, i 0 'Z

I ATC (XPTD) Randolph AFS

1 USAF AeroMed Lib, 6rooks AFB (SUL-41ýATTN: DQC SEC

1 AFOSR (NL), Arlington

1 AF Log Cmd, McClallarý AFS, ATTN: ALCIDPCRI3

1 Air Force Academy. CO, ATTN. Dept of Bet Sent

5 NayPers & Dev Ctr, San Diegi

2 Navy Med Neuropsyclsiatric Rsch Unit, San Diego

I Nov Ele ctronic Lab, San Diego, ATTN: Res Lab

1 Nay TrnoCen, San Diego, ATTN: Code 9000-Lib

1 NavPostGraSch, Monterey, ATTN: Code 65Aa

1 NavPostGraScb, Monterey. ATTMW: Code 2124'

I NavTlngEqjuipCti, Orlando, ATTN: Tech Lib

1 US Dept of Labor, DC, ATTN: Manpower Admin

I US5 Dept of Justice, DC, ATTN: Drug Enforce Admin

I Nat Bur of Standards, DC. ATTN: Computer Info Section

1 Niat Clearing House for MH-lnfo, Rockvitle

I Denver Federal Ctr, Lakewood, ATTN: BLM

12)Lvefense Documentation Center

4 Dir Psych. Army Hq, Russell Ofcs, Canberra

1 Scierstific Advsr, Mil Sd, Army Hq, Russell Ofcs, Canberra

1 Mil and Air Attache, Austrian Embassy

I Centre d) Recherche Dts Fartours, Humaine de la Defense

Nationale, Brussels

2 Canadian Joint Staff Washington

I C/Air Staff, Royal Canadian AF, ATTN: Pets Std Anal Br

3 Chief, Canadian Oaf Rsch Staff, ATTN: C/CRDS(W)

4 British Def Staff, British Embass, Washington 9 E>