COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Decker, Russell and Senior Judge Felton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

CHARLES JAYSON BECK, S/K/A 

 CHARLES JASON BECK 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0997-15-1 JUDGE WESLEY G. RUSSELL, JR. 

 APRIL 26, 2016 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge 

 Ben Pavek, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 

 Aaron J. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Appellant, Charles Jayson Beck, was convicted in a bench trial of breaking and entering in 

violation of Code § 18.2-91, grand larceny in violation of Code § 18.2-95, and obtaining money by 

false pretenses in violation of Code § 18.2-178.1

 On appeal, appellant first argues the evidence is 

insufficient to prove a burglary because the evidence showed appellant broke within a dwelling 

rather than broke into a dwelling. In the alternative, appellant argues the trial court erred in 

convicting him of burglary because the evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt whether 

the offense occurred during the daytime or during the nighttime. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm appellant’s burglary conviction. 

 1

 Appellant did not appeal his conviction for obtaining money by false pretenses. He did 

appeal his conviction for grand larceny; however, this Court did not grant his petition for appeal 

as it relates to that conviction. 

PUBLISHED 
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BACKGROUND 

 “Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we consider the evidence presented at 

trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Smallwood 

v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 625, 629, 688 S.E.2d 154, 156 (2009) (quoting Bolden v. 

Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008)). This principle requires us to 

“discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as 

true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn 

therefrom.” Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980) (emphasis, 

citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Colleen Shook (“Shook”) lived with her son in a single family home in Hampton. 

Previously, to provide a place for her mother to live, Shook converted three bedrooms within the 

house into what she described as a separate apartment, comprised of its own living quarters, 

including a kitchen containing a refrigerator, stove, and dishwasher. 

 Although the apartment was initially intended for use by Shook’s mother, Shook made it 

available for rent once her mother no longer used the apartment. Appellant and his mother were 

tenants in the apartment in September of 2013. 

 The apartment has its own entrance and is connected to the Shooks’ living quarters by a 

utility room that houses laundry facilities. The utility room has three doors—one leading to the 

apartment, one to the Shooks’ living quarters, and the third to the garage. The utility room is the 

sole passageway between the apartment and the Shooks’ living quarters. 

 Shook testified the appellant never had permission to enter her side of the home, although 

there were times when he was there by invitation. The door from the Shooks’ living quarters to 

the laundry room was always closed. It is undisputed that appellant had permission to use the 

utility room and that, in at least some circumstances, he had permission to access the garage. 
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 On September 20, 2013, Shook discovered that two guitars and thirty pieces of jewelry 

were missing from the Shooks’ living quarters. On September 23, 2013, appellant pawned one 

of the guitars at a local pawn shop. At trial, appellant admitted to pawning the guitar, but 

claimed that he had permission to do so. 

 At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, appellant made a motion to strike. In 

denying the motion, the trial court, recognizing the garage and utility room as common areas, stated 

that “the evidence that is presented . . . established that Mrs. Shook had separated or created a 

separate place by the renovation project. . . . [H]er mother had a separate apartment . . . .” At the 

close of all the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court ruled that appellant’s apartment was 

“separate and distinct from where the Shooks were living . . . ,” and, accordingly, found appellant 

guilty of burglary. 

 This appeal follows. 

ANALYSIS 

 “[A]t common law, [burglary was] primarily an offense against the security of the 

habitation, and that is still the general conception of it.” Compton v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 

48, 55, 55 S.E.2d 446, 449 (1949). Although the burglary statutes contain varied elements, their 

unifying purpose is 

based primarily upon a recognition of the dangers to personal 

safety created by the usual burglary situation—the danger that the 

intruder will harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the 

intended crime or to escape and the danger that the occupants will 

in anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby inviting 

more violence. 

Rash v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 22, 25, 383 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1989) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

 Appellant was convicted of burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91. In pertinent part, the 

statute provides that “[i]f any person commits any of the acts mentioned in § 18.2-90 with intent to 
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commit larceny . . . he shall be guilty of statutory burglary.” Code § 18.2-90 includes the acts of 

either entering a dwelling house in the nighttime or breaking and entering into a dwelling house in 

the daytime. See also Grimes v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 314, 317, 764 S.E.2d 262, 264 (2014) 

(“Code § 18.2-90 includes the act of breaking and entering into a dwelling house in the 

daytime.”). 

 Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of statutory 

burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91. First, he argues that, at most, the evidence showed that any 

breaking occurred within a single residence, and thus, the evidence did not establish the necessary 

entry into a dwelling.2

 Second, he argues that the evidence did not establish that he either entered a 

dwelling during the nighttime or that he broke and entered into a dwelling in the daytime. 

 Because appellant is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we, as noted above, 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party 

below, and grant it all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Parks, 221 Va. at 498, 270 

S.E.2d at 759. We “will reverse a judgment of the circuit court only upon a showing that it is 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Singleton v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 542, 

548, 685 S.E.2d 668, 671 (2009) (citation omitted); see also Code § 8.01-680. 

I. The evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court to conclude that the Shooks’ living 

quarters and appellant’s apartment were separate dwellings that share common areas 

 Relying heavily on our decisions in Hitt v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 473, 598 S.E.2d 

783 (2004), and Lacey v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 32, 675 S.E.2d 846 (2009), appellant argues 

that the Shooks’ living quarters, the utility room, the attached garage, and appellant’s apartment are 

 2

 Appellant consistently has maintained that he neither broke nor entered the Shooks’ 

living quarters and that he did not commit larceny therein; however, he recognizes that, by 

convicting him of the larceny, the trial court necessarily found that he did enter the Shooks’ 

living quarters. 
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all parts of the same dwelling, and therefore, appellant cannot be convicted of burglary. He reasons 

that instead of breaking into a dwelling, the evidence, at most, shows he broke within a dwelling. 

 Appellant correctly notes that, in Hitt, we held that the burglary statutes required breaking 

and/or entering into a dwelling as opposed to within a dwelling. 43 Va. App. at 483, 598 S.E.2d at 

788. Specifically, we adopted Hitt’s argument that he could not have committed a statutory 

burglary of a locked bedroom in a house where he was otherwise authorized to be because the 

locked bedroom and the remainder of the house were all part of one “dwelling.” Id. at 479, 598 

S.E.2d at 786. 

Although appellant correctly has stated its general rule, Hitt does not provide the rule of 

decision in the instant case. Rather, it simply frames the question: Did the evidence necessarily 

establish that the Shooks’ living quarters were part of the same “dwelling” as appellant’s 

apartment or other areas of the structure where he was authorized to be? 

Appellant argues that our decision in Lacey compels that this question be answered in the 

affirmative. In Lacey, we concluded that the attached garage was part of the same dwelling as 

the rooms where the larceny had occurred. Specifically, referencing the particular facts in the 

case, we concluded that 

the attached garage was part of the dwelling house for purposes of 

the burglary statute. Photos of the house introduced at trial plainly 

show the garage is an integrated part of the whole house. The 

garage shares a roof and wall with the other portions of the house. 

The garage also connects interiorly with other portions of the 

house. Lacey took advantage of this to enter the open garage, pass 

into the utility room, steal money from [the victim’s] bedroom, and 

then exit the garage again. Furthermore, [the victim] uses the 

garage for ordinary household functions. He testified he stored the 

tree pruner in the garage and that he was preparing to sharpen it in 

the garage when he first noticed Lacey. Under such circumstances, 

the attached garage represented another room of the dwelling. 

54 Va. App. at 43, 675 S.E.2d at 852 (footnote omitted); see also Grimes, 288 Va. at 318-19, 764 

S.E.2d at 265 (holding that because the crawlspace at issue was “structurally part of the house,” 
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it fell “within the plain meaning of the term ‘dwelling house’” for the purposes of statutory 

burglary).3

 Appellant correctly points out that the garage (and by extension, the utility room) in this 

case shares many characteristics with the garage in Lacey. In both cases, the garages were under 

a single roof, shared walls with the remainder of the structure, were utilized by the residents for 

multiple purposes, were connected by doors that could and were used for ingress and egress, and, 

as originally constructed, functioned as part of a single-family home. 

 While the similarities between the garages are many, there is a significant difference. 

Although, as originally constructed, both garages served single-family homes that were 

unquestionably part of an undivided whole, the garage in this case no longer does. The law has 

long recognized that joint access to common areas in a multi-unit apartment complex or rooming 

house does not render it impossible for a resident of that complex or rooming house to burglarize 

other units within the complex or rooming house. See generally Clarke v. Commonwealth, 66 

Va. (25 Gratt.) 908, 919 (1874) (recognizing that, although a person cannot burglarize his own 

room/residence in a multi-person rooming house, he may commit a burglary as to rooms rented 

by others). As a modern commentator has noted, 

[i]f several people occupy the same dwelling, none may commit a 

burglary thereto as it is not the property of another. However, if a 

portion of the structure has been set aside for one resident, as in 

letting an apartment, any of the others (including the owner) could 

commit a burglary into that portion of the dwelling. 

 3

 Whether a garage, crawlspace or other area constitutes part of a dwelling is, by 

necessity, a fact-driven inquiry. The conclusions of the Virginia Supreme Court in Grimes and 

this Court in Lacey were expressly tied to the particular facts and circumstances of those cases. 

See Grimes, 288 Va. at 319, 764 S.E.2d at 265 (holding that, “[b]ased on the facts here, the 

crawl space falls within the plain meaning of the term ‘dwelling house’” (emphasis added)); 

Lacey, 54 Va. App. at 43, 675 S.E.2d at 852 (tying the resolution of the issue to the particular 

“circumstances”). 
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Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 21.1(c), at 214 (2nd ed. 2003) (footnotes 

omitted). Thus, if the factfinder reasonably could conclude that the garage and utility room were 

common areas between separate apartments, appellant’s argument fails. 

 On this record, the factfinder reasonably could and, in fact, did conclude that the Shooks’ 

living quarters and the apartment were separate dwellings and that the garage and utility room 

constituted common areas. The trial court noted that, in undertaking the construction of the 

apartment for her mother, Shook “created a separate place” that constituted “a separate 

apartment.” Based on all of the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that the 

apartment was “separate and distinct from where the Shooks were living” is plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. Accordingly, we must affirm the trial court’s conclusion in this 

regard. Kelley v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 463, 468, 771 S.E.2d 672, 674 (2015). 

 In reaching this conclusion, we note that we examine a factfinder’s conclusions “with the 

highest degree of appellate deference.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 605, 608, 633 

S.E.2d 229, 231 (2006). “An appellate court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the 

evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 

278 Va. 190, 193, 677 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

318-19 (1979)). Instead, the only “relevant question is, after reviewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 

Va. 672, 676, 701 S.E.2d 61, 63 (2010) (emphasis added). Here, for the reasons stated, we 

cannot say that the trial court was irrational when it concluded that the garage and utility room 

represented common areas shared by two separate apartments within one complex. 
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II. The evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court to conclude that appellant 

committed a breaking when he entered the Shooks’ living quarters 

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that he 

committed a breaking to gain entry to the Shooks’ living quarters. Specifically, he argues that there 

was evidence that the garage door occasionally was left open, and therefore, he or another person 

could have entered the garage without committing a breaking.4

 Coupling this premise with his 

argument that the garage and the Shooks’ living quarters are part of the same dwelling, he reasons 

that the Commonwealth did not and could not prove the breaking necessary to support the charge of 

statutory burglary. We disagree. 

To establish a breaking for the purposes of burglary, the Commonwealth need only show 

the application of some force, slight though it may be, whereby the 

entrance is [achieved]. Merely pushing open a door, turning the 

key, lifting the latch, or resort to other slight physical force is 

sufficient to constitute this element of [burglary], so long as those 

acts resulted in an entrance contrary to the will of the occupier of 

the [property]. 

Finney v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 83, 88, 671 S.E.2d 169, 172 (2009) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Here, Shook testified that the door from the 

utility room into the Shooks’ living quarters was always closed. Accordingly, the trial court 

reasonably could and, in fact, did conclude that appellant committed a breaking when he gained 

access to the Shooks’ living quarters by opening the closed door. 

 Appellant argues that, even if this is so, breaking and entering has still not been proven 

because entry to the structure could have been through an open garage, which he contends is part 

 4

 Code § 18.2-90 provides that entering a dwelling at nighttime is statutory burglary even 

in the absence of a breaking. The Commonwealth concedes that there was insufficient evidence 

adduced as to whether entry to the dwelling occurred during the daytime or at night. Although 

not bound by the concession, Epps v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 687, 703, 626 S.E.2d 912, 

919 (2006) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 273 Va. 410, 641 S.E.2d 77 (2007), we find it 

appropriate to adopt it here. Accordingly, the burden was on the Commonwealth to demonstrate 

that entry into the Shooks’ living quarters was accomplished by way of a breaking. 
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of the same dwelling as the Shooks’ living quarters. In short, he revives his argument that the 

factfinder could not conclude that the garage and the utility room were common areas shared by 

separate apartments. Because this amounts to nothing more than a restatement of the same 

argument that underpinned his first assignment of error, we reject it for the reasons stated above. 

CONCLUSION 

 Based on the evidence presented, a factfinder reasonably could conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the Shooks’ living quarters and the apartment constituted separate dwellings 

and that appellant committed a breaking when he entered the Shooks’ living quarters and committed 

larceny. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction for statutory burglary in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-91. 

Affirmed.