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i 

94–226 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–24] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES HEARING 

ON

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AN 

UNCERTAIN THREAT ENVIRONMENT: 

A REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2016 

BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S. SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 18, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

PETER VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

LINDSAY KAVANAUGH, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 2 

Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) ...................................................... 3 

Votel, GEN Joseph L., USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command . 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D. .............................................................................. 21 

Votel, GEN Joseph L. ....................................................................................... 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 61 

Mr. Nugent ........................................................................................................ 61 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 80 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 79 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 65 

(1) 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AN UNCERTAIN 

THREAT ENVIRONMENT: A REVIEW OF THE FISCAL 

YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR U.S. SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. WILSON. Ladies and gentlemen, I call this briefing of the 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House 

Armed Services Committee to order. 

I am pleased to welcome everyone here today for this very important hearing, on our special operations forces [SOF] in the United 

States Special Operations Command [SOCOM], as we review the 

fiscal year 2016 budget request. With evolving and persistent 

threats being posted by state and non-state actors, our special operation forces have never been more central, strategic, and sought 

after. Illegal asymmetric enemy combatants not in uniform must be 

stopped overseas. 

From the unconventional hybrid threats of an aggressive Russia, 

to the troubling expansive and clandestine networks of Iran, and 

of course, an evolving Al Qaeda and their affiliates, now the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant known in the region as Daesh, we 

do indeed face an uncertain threat environment. 

Our special operations forces have been engaged in heavy combat 

and direct action for nearly 14 continuous years. It is imperative 

that we properly resource, train, and equip, to now deal equally as 

well with the hybrid and asymmetric threats of tomorrow and do 

so with the looming shadow of defense sequestration. 

Simply put, our national defense and security of American families depends on this. The House Armed Services Committee has 

consistently supported our special operation forces, providing additional authorities when warranted, authorizing additional funds for 

unmet critical requirements, and most recently resourcing important family support and suicide prevention programs to ensure our 

service men and women, our warriors and their families, are taken 

care of and know firsthand that humans are indeed more important than hardware. 
2 

Although our support has been consistent, it has also been accompanied by prudent oversight and robust dialogue to ensure that 

we do all things that are right for the overall defense of our great 

Nation. The commitment and sacrifice of our special operation 

forces is evident to all of us. We examine this budget request to ensure that we in Congress are doing everything that we think is 

right and necessary for those units and their families. 

So, we look forward to discussing today the priorities for the U.S. 

Special Operations Command and our special operations forces for 

fiscal year 2016, and perhaps, more importantly, discussing candidly the challenges that stand before us today. 

We have before us a very distinguished panel of witnesses. The 

Honorable Michael Lumpkin, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and General Joseph 

Votel, the Commanding General of the United States Special Operations Command. I would like now to turn to my longtime friend 

and ranking member Mr. Jim Langevin from Rhode Island for any 

comments he would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today to discuss the Special Operations Command fiscal year 2016 budget request. Although our conventional forces have seen increases in 

dwell time over the last few years as combat operations in the Middle East change in character, special operations forces continue to 

experience a very high operational tempo. 

The demand for SOF is high around the globe due to a variety 

of important missions, including counterterrorism. These operators, 

and the conventional forces that enable them to place their lives on 

the line each and every day far from home in order to keep us safe, 

and we should never lose sight of that sacrifice for which we are 

all very grateful. 

This subcommittee is keenly aware of the threats that we face 

and the importance of SOF missions to national security, and we 

have acted commensurately, both in funding and unique authorities such as those provided under section 1208. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about the importance of these and other unique authorities as well as about authorities that may need to be extended in the National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for fiscal year 2016. If there are any new 

authorities that may be required to combat ISIL or conduct operations in areas outside the Middle East, like European Command, 

I hope that the witnesses will make that case this afternoon. 

Congressional oversight of such authorities as well as SOCOM 

funding is obviously very important. Our SOF personnel operate in 

uncertain, varying, and evolving environments that necessitate 

continuous assessment of the effectiveness and appropriateness of 

authorities granted. Our subcommittee has worked in the past to 

increase oversight through improved reporting, and I want to express my appreciation for the transparency of SOCOM. But internal oversight of SOF operations and SOCOM is just as important. 
3 

Secretary Lumpkin, we recently had the opportunity to discuss 

the oversight council that you established, and I would appreciate 

it if you could provide the subcommittee with an understanding of 

the council, including members, meetings, and issues of focus. 

General Votel, I also look forward to hearing from you as well 

on the Preservation of the Force and Families initiative, among the 

other things under your responsibility, and I appreciate the meeting that you and I had yesterday. 

As I mentioned earlier, special operations forces continue to face 

high operational tempo. The mental health of the operators and 

their families remains a priority both for you, I know, and for Secretary Lumpkin and for this Congress. Last year our subcommittee, 

in conjunction with the personnel subcommittee, increased funding 

for mental health problems for SOF due to increases in suicides. 

Additionally, I sponsored a provision in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA 

to assess the effectiveness of SOCOM’s alternative approach to 

mental and behavioral health in lieu of existing service programs. 

General, I look forward to working with you this year to continue 

to support our SOF members and their families. Our goal on this 

front, taking care of our force and their families, are one and the 

same. 

In closing, I want to express again my gratitude to General Votel 

for his service to our Nation and to Secretary Lumpkin as well for 

all you do for our Nation and the enduring commitment that you 

have to our men and women in uniform. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for convening this hearing 

today, and I look forward to discussion. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Langevin, thank you very much, and we will 

proceed with Secretary Lumpkin. We look forward to your opening 

statements, of each of you, and then following that, we will have 

a 5-minute question period for each member as we alternate. And 

we are very fortunate that Kevin Gates will be maintaining the 

time. He is above reproach. So, we will begin with this Secretary. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW–INTENSITY CONFLICT (ASD/SOLIC) 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you, Chairman Wilson, Ranking 

Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am 

glad to speak about the health and welfare of our Nation’s special 

operations community and our capability to meet our Nation’s most 

pressing national security concerns today and into the future. 

Currently, our special operations force, also known as SOF, work 

within an environment where fiscal uncertainty challenges us to 

think creatively and bridge gaps between resources and U.S. national security objectives. And where the changing nature of the 

threats we face today demands SOF’s attention and engagement 

through agile authorities that enable us to remain ahead of our adversaries. Addressing how SOF will effectively operate within this 

environment, I would like to invite your attention to the following 

three topics. 
4 

Foremost, SOF is navigating a challenging fiscal environment 

through enhanced oversight. As the ‘‘service-like secretary’’ of 

USSOCOM, I provide oversight and supervision of SOF resources, 

develop SOF policies for counterterrorism to counternarcotics, and 

preserve and protect our special operations force. This role becomes 

ever more challenging in a constrained budgetary environment in 

which we must use limited resources efficiently and effectively so 

that SOF is globally postured to support the combatant commands. 

With sequestration-level cuts set for fiscal year 2016 and beyond, 

we continue to strengthen our budget management in order to 

maximize taxpayers’ return on investment in SOF. In addition, we 

look for innovative ways to use existing resources. 

Moving to my second point. SOF is most effective to handle the 

changing nature of threats that we face when agile authorities are 

available. From ISIL to pro-Russian rebel forces in Ukraine, the 

United States and our international partners face a diverse set of 

unconventional threats worldwide. Centered within the physical 

terrain, the human domain, information environment, and financial 

cyberspace. Additionally, our response efforts often require security 

force assistance missions in non-permissive and politically sensitive 

areas, where the host station demands discreet U.S. footprint. Due 

to its unique irregular and unconventional capabilities, SOF routinely becomes the force of choice. To this point, agile authorities 

maximize SOF capabilities helping support SOF operations. 

Support for foreign partners is fundamental to operational success in overseas contingency operations, and U.S. financial and logistic support is necessary to ensure their continued participation. 

With the codification of sections 2282, 1004, and 1022 in title 10 

of the U.S. Code, the Global Security Contingency Fund and the 

new Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, we can assist our partners to address emerging threats and opportunities by building 

their security capacities before those threats exceed their ability to 

effectively respond. 

However, building partner capacity takes time. Our building 

partnership capacity authorities do not accommodate sustainment 

costs, so we work closely with the State Department to ensure partner nations eventually fund and sustain these programs on their 

own. 

Agile unallocated funding enables implementers to rapidly respond to urgent needs of partner nations more expeditiously and 

for a greater length of time than is possible through traditional 

mechanisms. 

And my final point, protection and preservation of SOF is of utmost importance. Our people are the foundation of special operations, and we strive to ensure our force and their families have 

a support system necessary to ensure their long-term prosperity 

and health. Assessing our force structure, operational requirements, and capabilities at various resourcing levels, we have reshaped SOF’s operational units, elements, and platforms so that we 

can meet future operational requirements. 

In addition, we seek to ensure the physical and mental resilience 

of the individuals who make up our force. Continual combat deployments combined with the demanding training regimen needed to 

keep the force sharp, have caused stress on the force and with their 
5 

families. As ASD SO/LIC, I will continue to support enhanced resiliency training currently being conducted through USSOCOM service component programs. 

In closing, throughout the entire Department, we are committed 

to doing everything we can to ensure that our Nation’s SOF have 

the best training, equipment, and overall support that we can possibly provide. We will continue to work closely with Congress and 

senior policymakers across the government to ensure that we have 

the right policies and oversight in place, so that SOF effectively operates within the current and future environments. I thank Congress for its continuing support of our special operation initiatives, 

resourcing, and personnel, and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Lumpkin can be found in 

the Appendix on page 21.] 

Mr. WILSON. Secretary Lumpkin, thank you very much. General 

Votel. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

General VOTEL. Good afternoon, Chairman Wilson, Ranking 

Member Langevin, and other distinguished members of subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to 

discuss the current posture of the United States Special Operations 

Command, or SOCOM, as we call it. I am especially pleased to be 

here with my OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] teammate, 

Assistant Secretary Michael Lumpkin. SOCOM was created by the 

Congress to ensure that we always had ready and capable SOF 

forces to meet the Nation’s challenges. Our ability to address these 

challenges is due in large part to the strong support we get from 

the Congress, from the House Armed Services Committee, and especially from this distinguished subcommittee. Thank you very 

much. 

I would like to start out by commenting on the amazing actions 

made every day by our special operations men and women. Operators, acquirers, logisticians, analysts, and many others, Active and 

Reserve, military and civilian, the total SOF force. Alongside our 

conventional force partners, the 69,000 quiet professionals of 

SOCOM are committed to values-based excellence and service to 

our Nation. They relentlessly pursue mission success, and today, 

roughly 7,500 of them are deployed to over 90 countries worldwide 

supporting geographic combatant commander requirements in 

named operations. 

We are a force that has been heavily deployed over the last 14 

years, and our military members, civilians, and their families have 

paid a significant price physically and emotionally serving our 

country. We are very appreciative of the support we have received 

from Congress to address the visible and invisible challenges, and 

we never forget that for SOCOM, people are our most important resource. 

Today, the United States is faced with many challenges. The 

spread of technology and the diffusion of power are not only being 

used by responsible leaders to better societies, but unfortunately by 

wicked actors to orchestrate terror and violence regionally and 
6 

globally. Non-state actors like Al Qaeda and ISIL and other violent 

extremist organizations, menacing state actors like North Korea, 

and growingly coercive actors like Russia are just a few examples 

of the entities affecting the strategic environment in which we operate. We are equally affected by the growing use of cyber capabilities and social media which make it easy for our adversaries to 

communicate, coordinate, execute, and inspire their actions. 

The fiscal environment is of concern as well. While SOCOM has 

been well supported in recent years, I remain profoundly concerned 

by the impact of another round of sequestration and how it not 

only impacts SOCOM, but more importantly, how it will affect the 

four services upon whom we are absolutely dependent for mission 

support. 

To address the challenging security environment, SOF provides 

a portfolio of options to our national leaders and to the geographic 

combatant commanders. Through small footprint operations and by 

relying on a network of purposeful partnerships, SOF provides a 

comparative advantage through persistent engagement, partner 

enablement, network focus, and discreet rapid response to crisis 

situations. 

While we support military operations across the spectrum, SOF 

capabilities are uniquely suited to operate and succeed in the gray 

zone between normal international competition and open conflict, 

and it is in this area where we see our very best opportunities to 

help shape the future environment. 

To enable our efforts, I have established five priorities for the 

command. First, we must ensure SOF readiness by developing the 

right people, skills, and capabilities to meet future—current and future requirements. To this end, we want to ensure effectiveness 

now and into the future with the very best SOF operators and support personnel enabled by the best technology and capabilities we 

can field. Along the way, we want to make the very best use of the 

unique MFP–11 [Major Force Program-11] authority that Congress 

has granted us. 

Second, we must help our Nation win by addressing today’s security challenges. We strive to provide coherent and well-integrated 

SOF forces for the geographic combatant commanders focused on 

optimizing our SOF activities. Nearly everywhere you will find 

SOF forces working alongside and often in support of their conventional force partners, helping accomplish our security objectives. 

Third, we must build purposeful relationships to improve global 

understanding and awareness to create options for our leaders. We 

don’t own the network, but we are an important part of it. In working with our partners, we will always produce the best options for 

our Nation. 

Fourth, we have to prepare for the future security environment 

to ensure that SOF is ready to win in an increasingly complex 

world. Ultimately, our goal is to match exquisite people with cutting-edge capability and the very best ideas to help our Nation succeed against the looming challenges we will face in the future. 

Finally, we must preserve our force and families to ensure their 

long-term wellbeing. It is this area we are especially focused on, 

where we are especially focused on a holistic approach to address 
7 

the invisible challenges of stress and suicide that are affecting our 

service members, civilians, and their family members. 

In closing, I remain honored and humbled by the opportunity to 

command the best special operations forces in the world. I am incredibly proud of each and every one of our team members and 

their families. I look forward to your questions and our dialogue 

today. 

[The prepared statement of General Votel can be found in the 

Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, General Votel, and thank 

both of you for being here this afternoon. We are going to begin 

now the 5-minute round of each member of the subcommittee, and 

each of us will be strictly held to 5 minutes, and Mr. Gates will 

maintain those—the clock. 

My first question for both of you is—deals with the impacts of 

defense sequestration on national security and our military. I notice this has impacted even the special operations forces. And for 

both of you, can you provide specifics of how defense sequestration 

has impacted special operation forces, without a solution to defense 

sequestration, what damage will be done? And I am particularly 

concerned about readiness. And we will begin with the Secretary. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. 

The—well, as General Votel mentioned in his opening statement, 

the reliance of support from the services is where we see the largest impact from where I sit is when we look at what the impacts 

of sequestration would have on USSOCOM. Potential of losing ISR 

[intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] support, impacts on 

modernization of our air fleet, modernization across the board on 

those service-supported surface common items. It will also slow our 

modernization across the board, and so I have real concerns about 

that. 

We have had to, based on where we were in 2014, as we ended 

up divesting ourselves from program growth and combat support 

and combat service support, and I fear that if sequestration were 

to take effect in 2016, the services would divest of the support that 

we are now more reliant on than we would have been before. So, 

I see the impacts, while not direct, would be significant nonetheless. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think where we will 

see some immediate impacts will be in perhaps in some of our key 

investment areas. That would include the procurement and recapitalization of some of our air, ground, and maritime platforms, could 

affect our enhancing of SOF-specific ISR capabilities that have 

been so effective for us, fighting some of the enemies we deal with 

today. It could also affect our communications infrastructure and 

equipment technology upon which we depend to conduct global operations, and so that is the impacts, I think, on SOCOM. 

Beyond that, as I mention, I am very concerned about the impact 

that it has on the services. The lack of availability of air, ground, 

and especially maritime platforms will affect our readiness and our 

training exercises that we count on to be ready to deal with situations that will affect our operational effectiveness when we are conducting operations. 
8 

We depend heavily on service-provided capabilities to support us. 

A good example, of course, is the Navy’s helicopter capability that 

it has provided in the past for us which as it now goes away is a 

lost service-provided capability that we no longer are able to rely 

on. 

Beyond that, we are impacted by SOF—we will be impacted by 

SOF-specific enhancements to service-managed programs, as they 

draw down some of their areas there. That will impact us, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank both of you, and indeed, I believe the 

members of our subcommittee share your concerns. Secretary 

Lumpkin, I am really grateful. I work with the Partners of the 

Americas program in Colombia, and we have had many exchange 

students. Two of my sons went to high school in Cali, Colombia, 

and then I have a very significant Filipino-American population in 

the district that I represent. And in your written statement, you indicate about the strategic engagement in both Colombia and the 

Philippines. What is the status and what is the future of what has 

been so successful in both countries? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you are absolutely correct. Both of those endeavors have been successful. 

They have been—each has been long term. We have been in Colombia since the—and supporting the government there since the mid 

1980s. We developed Plan Colombia. We have invested heavily 

through Plan Colombia itself, and as we are on the cusp of having 

a peace dividend, as the peace accords between the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and ELN [National Liberation 

Army] and the Government of Colombia are being realized, we will 

see some reduction there of our support. 

What does concern me is the ideas of a vacuum that may be created when these insurgent groups are no longer there, and it may 

open itself up to transnational organized crime. So, I think we need 

to continue to engage decisively with the Colombians to make sure 

that we are providing them the support they need, in those areas 

have been controlled by these insurgent groups that criminal activities don’t take over. 

In the Philippines, again, we have had a lengthy relationship 

with our Filipino partners as they work to remove the insurgents 

from the southern part of the country. We have—are transitioning 

that mission now as we built capacity there, but we have to remain 

engaged with them to make sure that we don’t lose the gains that 

we have made. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you. In both countries, I really wish the 

American people knew of the success and that success can be 

achieved against narcoterrorists and the destabilization. We now 

proceed to Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to our 

witnesses. Secretary Lumpkin, if I could start with you. Last year 

you established the Special Operations Oversight Council, and I referred to that in my opening statement, to provide policy oversight 

and guidance to SOCOM. The council was to coordinate special operations related matters across the Office of the Secretary of Defense and service secretary staffs, and address key issues in the 

areas of special operations policies and operational priorities, budg-
9 

et execution, force employment, legislative changes, and required 

capabilities. 

So, what actions in the areas of policy and operational priorities, 

budget execution, force employment, proposed legislative changes, 

and required capabilities has the council reviewed or taken to date, 

and what were the results of the review of any related issues? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you very much for the question, sir. 

When I created the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council, 

it wasn’t to supplant any of the responsibilities that I had as driven by statute as the assistant secretary. Once I assumed office, 

what I quickly realized is that as USSOCOM has grown and become more complex in the nature of their operations and what they 

do, we were on a 20 percent manpower reduction within the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense. So, the scope of the work was getting 

more complex and my staff was shrinking. So, I needed another 

tool to make sure that I had in my tool bag in order to make sure 

I could cut across those issues within the Department, so we created the council. 

We have had numerous meetings of leadership and working 

groups which have proven to be profoundly successful. We have 

tackled three principal issues thus far. We have tackled intertheater airlift, support special operations forces within the different 

geographic combatant commands. When USSOCOM took OPCON, 

Operational Control, of the Theater Special Operations Commands, 

when they started doing these—the JCET [Joint Combined Exchange Training] training, there was issues of who was going to 

pay the bills. We were able to work through that process to make 

sure it was crosscutting within the Department and everybody was 

clear. Unfortunately, this is one of those where USSOCOM got the 

bill, but rightly so, because the JCET is 51 percent of the benefit 

needs to be for the SOF personnel, so that made sense. 

We are also working to establish—the next topic that we took on 

was MILCON [military construction], and it is when should we and 

when should we not use MFP–11 funding for military construction. 

And the final one is coming up with a real definition of what is 

SOF-peculiar so we know where the bill should go with the services 

versus within USSOCOM. 

Those two, we haven’t finalized the results yet. We are still 

working, but it has proven to be very successful and gives me the 

ability to—the other that it really gives me the ability to do is that 

I walk a line at times between providing oversight and advocacy 

for USSOCOM. 

So, what this does when I get a decision that is crosscutting and 

everybody is in agreement and I can clearly shift in everybody’s 

mind from being oversight to advocate, to make sure that everything is done, and it makes it very easy for all to understand the 

building. So for me, that is the real benefit in addition to being 

able to navigate some of these sticky wickets. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you. So, you alluded to this a little 

bit, but how do the roles and responsibilities of the council differ 

from the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, 

SOCOM, or the military department? 
10 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Again, it is a—I look at it as a tool that informs me, that helps me make better decisions, and so I can take 

it to the Under Secretary of Policy, the Deputy Secretary, or the 

Secretary to bring resolution to any conflict. So again, it is just a 

tool for me, and it doesn’t supplant any of my roles or responsibilities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you. 

General Votel, as I noted in my opening statement, global demand for special operations forces obviously continues to be high. 

What impact has the continuous high tempo had on force readiness, training, mental health, and the like, and also, what steps is 

the command taking to ensure the global demand for positioning 

of special operations forces is met today and in the future? 

General VOTEL. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman. So, we 

have continued to pay a lot of attention to our PERSTEMPO [personnel tempo] of our deployed members, and we, over the last couple of years, with the support of Congress, have been able to get 

a good process in place where we can manage our PERSTEMPO 

much better now, so we understand what the deployment tempo of 

our people are, and we put in policies and practices in place that 

allow us to actually control that and manage that and understand 

what the impact is on the force. And so that has helped us manage 

the force better than perhaps we were doing that in the past. 

What that is really translated into is, is our components being 

able to organize their forces in a manner so they could have forces 

that were forward deployed, deployed doing the work of the Nation. 

They could have forces back in recovery and they could have forces 

recovering, so it is kind of one-third, one-third, one-third approach 

is what we strive to do. And while we are not complete there in 

all of our components, we are definitely moving in the right direction to try to control that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, and Mr. Langevin, we now 

proceed to Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for having this 

hearing, and thank you all for being here and for your service. My 

first question has to do with legal authorities and rules of engagement. Given the sensitive nature of the missions that special operation forces conduct and sometimes the fast-moving nature of those 

and lethal nature of those engagements, are you concerned that 

sometimes the need to lawyer up is just so burdensome, or that the 

rules of engagement are so restrictive that you find it difficult to 

carry out the missions properly, and if so, can we help you in that 

regard? 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. The 

answer, from my perspective, is I don’t see that as an impediment 

to our operations right now. I think we have very effectively integrated operational law into our activities, and in—as in my experience, we have had the rules of engagement or we have had the 

process in place that has allowed us to go back and ask for the 

rules of engagement that are required to conduct the operations 

which we have been asked to undertake. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Would you care to add anything to that? 
11 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I agree completely. I haven’t seen an issue 

where we were up against a rules of engagement issue that we 

couldn’t resolve in a very rapid and timely manner. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And to have control and legal authority, is that 

a concern at any time? 

General VOTEL. It is not a concern for us right now. We have 

been well served by the previous AUMF [authorization for use of 

military force], and I am hopeful that future AUMF will—I think 

it gives us what we need. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. And I will just comment on that I don’t 

want to see restrictions on any future AUMF that do tie the hands 

of our military too much, so I would like to see that open-ended as 

much as possible. 

What is the status of—and by the way, I do appreciate the 10th 

Special Forces [Group], which is in my district at Fort Carson and 

Germany, great group of people. I always enjoy visiting them, and 

I enjoyed taking Chairman Thornberry out to see them last August, so. 

What is the status of the Preservation of Force and Families program these days? 

General VOTEL. Thanks. Let me talk about that. I think we are 

making significant progress in this area. The investments that we 

have made over the last several years with the support of Congress, I think, are making a big difference. While I still think the 

force is stressed, I think it is lessened than we have seen in the 

past. So, I have a holistic approach here that addresses the physical, spiritual, the emotional, psychological aspect of this, I think 

is beginning to pay off. 

I think we have got a good strategy in place to address our most 

pressing problems, which I consider to be the invisible challenges, 

the stress that is leading to suicide or suicide ideations, and I think 

we have got a good approach to this. And we are really focused on 

three big objectives. 

One is to empower our people by communicating to them the variety of resources that are available. 

Second, is to enable them by providing as easy of access as we 

can to those resources so that they can take advantage of them. 

And then finally is to encourage them by emphasizing that it is 

absolutely normal to seek care for yourself and your family and 

that we expect that and we encourage it and there is no stigma associated with that. 

And I am—we are beginning to see indicators now that that message is sinking in and that understanding is going down into the 

SOCOM force. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, that is great to hear. I want to thank 

you for your service and for being here today. Mr. Chairman, I 

yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Lamborn. And we now 

proceed to Congressman Jim Cooper of Tennessee. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was not here for the 

opening statements. I will yield to another colleague. 

Mr. WILSON. Then Congressman Rich Nugent all the way from 

Florida. 
12 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

both of you for your service, and we are just up the street from you, 

so we appreciate it. 

General Votel, in the NDAA, I will be asking for a report to explore the future of directed-energy weapons within SOCOM, and I 

am encouraged to see that SOCOM already is looking into directedenergy solutions, and I would just like to emphasize to you that I 

am going to be very, very protective of keeping your flexible and 

relatively agile acquisition system uninhibited if I can. For the subcommittee today, would you just give us some broad strokes of 

what that report would look like. In other words, you know, what 

would SOCOM’s future plans be as relates to directed energy? 

General VOTEL. Congressman, I will take, first of all, I will take 

the question for the record and we will provide you a detailed response, and we will look into the very specific capabilities. 

I thank you for your continued support of our acquisition capability. You know, the advantage, I think, we have is that we can— 

we can very closely link the requirements of the operators to our 

acquisition arm, and unlike the service chiefs that you heard of 

yesterday, I do have a very close relationship with my acquisition 

authority, and because of the great authority that Congress has 

provided us, we are able to respond quickly. 

Broadly, to your question on directed energy, we are always looking at the very best tools that we will require for the future. Certainly directed energy fits into a model that we have been proceeding against for some time which is precision and accuracy in 

the employment of our weapons systems, and I think that directed 

energy offers us a great opportunity in terms of that. So, I look forward to providing you a more detailed response on that for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 61.] 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, General, I appreciate that. Now, in the fiscal 

year 2015 NDAA directs a report on technology roadmap for underseas mobility, and of course, I am very interested in the full details 

of that report later this year, but I want to ask for maybe just a 

preview of just two parts of that dry combat submersible program. 

What requirement drives the development of a dry combat submersible, one, and in an unclassified setting, what do you need a 

dry combat submersible to do, if you could? And I understand this 

is not a classified setting so—— 

General VOTEL. Yeah. Thanks. And again, I think this probably 

would be best discussed in a classified setting, Congressman, but 

in general, what it allows us to do is, it allows us to take the full 

opportunity of the maritime environment to pursue the full range 

of missions that SOCOM does on behalf of the Nation. And that includes those sensitive activities that we do out there, and this really does provide us a very unique capability to—in place our operators or our folks at the right place to pursue the missions that we 

have. 

So, we look forward to kind of laying that out for you in a classified setting, but I do think it allows us to take the full opportunity 

of the maritime environment to accomplish the missions that we 

are assigned. 
13 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate that. I appreciate both your comments, 

though, in regards to what sequestration, while may not directly 

affect you, but the—you know, the services that support you, it will 

affect, and it certainly will have an effect on you in regards to implementing your mission, and I worry about the fact that we are 

going to be limited in regards to being able to project that force 

where we need it in pinpoint accuracy if we continue with sequestration. 

I know the chairman is in agreement with that. Sequestration is 

a cancer that is going to eat and destroy our national security, and 

it is one that we are all very, very invested in trying to turn 

around. 

So, I appreciate your service, both of you. Thank you very much, 

and I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Nugent. We now proceed 

to Congressman John Garamendi of California. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and for the two witnesses, my apologies for not being here. We seem to have three 

Armed Services Committee subcommittees operating at the same 

moment, including the Coast Guard subcommittee, so—just a question. I am going to follow up. I think this is a question that, Mr. 

Lumpkin, you were asked, maybe Mr. Langevin asked this question. And in the operations of the special operation forces, you do 

different things and for different parts of the security—national security. Who winds up paying for the pieces that—where let’s say 

it might be a naval operation or an Army or a Marine operation, 

who winds up paying for these operations? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I think we have two parts of the payment 

issue. One of them is in how we procure equipment and things of 

that nature. If it is a what we call a service common item, then 

the service would pay that requisite bill, and then anything that 

was peculiar to the special operations community, we would use 

MFP–11, that is Major Force Program-11 funds to go ahead and 

pay that, whether it is to modify it or adjust it to make it useful 

for us the way we need it—what we need it to do. 

Operations themselves, I mean, for overseas contingency operations generally come out of the Department’s OCO funding, so we 

have—there is funding. And so what—who is paying for the bill 

really kind of depends on the nature of the operation of whose OCO 

account it would come out of, but I can give you a detailed breakdown of that if you would like. I would be happy to take that for 

the record for you. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes, if you would. I think this—I know that Mr. 

Langevin was interested in that and as am I, but yes, if you would 

please do that. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I will do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 61.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We know that in Iraq and Syria, it is anticipated that the special operations units will be used. Is that going 

to be—how does that get paid for, and what is the extent of that? 

We are going to have to deal with an AUMF here pretty quickly, 

at least we should, and the issue is not just the men and women 

that are going to be deployed, but then how much is it going to cost 
14 

us to deploy them. Mr. Lumpkin, and then, General, if you could 

delve into that. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. And those operations in Iraq and Syria, 

those that are going on today in support of the Iraqi Government 

and such are paid for through OCO, but I mean, that will be part 

of the breakdown that I will get you is the actual dollar figures 

that are being used today. We can do that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It seems to me that one of the important things 

we ought to be considering as we deal with this AUMF is that it 

will be expensive, or have some expense, for the taxpayers of the 

United States. We need to know, at least have some really good 

idea how much this is going to cost us, and we also know that it 

is likely to be expensive for the men and women that are involved, 

quite possibly with death and injury. So, we need to know that 

also. So that is something that is on my mind. I hope it is on the 

rest of my colleagues’ minds also. 

Finally, in the last few moments here, we spend a lot of time in 

other subcommittees dealing with communications. GPS [Global 

Positioning System] is vulnerable. What steps are being taken by 

the special operations that are extensively using that particular 

technology to deal with its interruption? Whichever one of you 

would like to jump into that. 

General VOTEL. Thanks. Thank you for the question, Mr. Congressman. We obviously, as I mention in my opening statement, we 

are very concerned about the cyber environment and these different ways that people can come after our use of technologies, our 

use of the Internet to support us. So, in conjunction with direction 

we have gotten from the chairman and working along with Cyber 

Command, we are very much in the process of addressing our cyber 

protection capability, both reliant on resources that are made available to us from the Cyber Command and by elements that we will 

stand up within SOCOM to get after that particular problem. 

So, we are very alert to the threat that you just outlined right 

here, and certainly GPS is something that is impacted, but certainly all of our communications and communications architecture 

is potentially at risk as well. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Much of the rest of the world is looking at what 

is known as advanced or eLoran systems. I would like to have some 

comment from you on the record about what you may be using in 

that regard, not just within the United States but around the world 

where this is actually being deployed by some people that we are 

very interested in. Thank you. 

General VOTEL. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 62.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Garamendi. We now proceed to Congressman Mo Brooks of Alabama. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you for your service. As you are aware, Capitol Hill is engaged in a significant debate over the budgets. We 

have got the White House budget, we have got the House budget, 

and presumably the Senate is also working on a budget. The President’s proposed budget for national defense is $561 billion, roughly, 

for base defense and another $51 billion, roughly speaking, for 

OCO, for a total, roughly, of $612 billion. The House budget for na-
15 

tional defense is $523 billion for base, that being the amount set 

forth in the Budget Control Act, and roughly $90 billion for OCO. 

To state it a little bit differently, base defense budget, President, $561, which is $38 billion more than permitted under the Budget 

Control Act, and the $523 billion that the House budget, at least 

as of this moment, represents. And on the OCO side, the President’s budget proposes $51 billion while the House is $39 billion 

more, OCO. 

So, we have $612-, $613 billion from the two budgets being spent 

on national defense, but the key issue is, which is better for our 

national defense? For the money to be in the base or the money to 

be in OCO? Can you please share with me your insight on which 

you think is a better place to put the money and how that affects 

our security capabilities, and whoever wants to go first can go first. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Thank you. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the 

question very much. The challenge we have with OCO is it is, you 

know, the money comes that year and you have got the year. You 

don’t have it in the outyears. It is not something I can sit here and 

plan on, so it actually increases my fiscal uncertainty. Because, I 

am going to buy a piece of equipment, for example, and I can’t 

count on I am going to have the sustainment costs in the outyears 

because I—it is kind of like, if I had to give an example, like buying a car and not knowing you can pay the car insurance 2 years 

from now or put gas in it or do the maintenance. And so, while you 

end up with the same dollar figure when it is done for that particular year, and I just don’t know what I have got in the future, 

so it is very difficult for me to plan. 

So as I am looking at programmatics from where I sit, I am frequently figuring what is my exit strategy if I don’t get the funding 

in the future to fix it. Each one will meet a very short-term need, 

but in the outyears, it becomes problematic when we have this reliance on OCO and don’t move it over to your base budget. 

Mr. BROOKS. So, you have got the adverse effect on planning and 

what I might infer as the adverse effect on purchasing capital 

goods. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Exactly. 

Mr. BROOKS. Long term. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Exactly, yes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. Anything else? Any other adverse effect? 

Or—General Votel? 

General VOTEL. I would just—I would add I agree with Secretary 

Lumpkin in his comments that it is better in the base. I think the 

big advantage is that the base funding provides us certainty in a 

time of uncertainty as we continue moving forward in this very 

complex environment. 

And so, I think that helps us plan better, I think it helps us 

make better investments long term, and then of course it gives us 

the best ability to sustain those programs as we move forward. So 

like the Secretary said, both of these will work in the short term. 

The base, I think, helps us for the longer term concerns. 

Mr. BROOKS. Let me focus on the OCO money again for just a 

moment. If the House were to pass a budget that spent roughly $90 

billion on OCO, and giving the planning and spending inhibitions 

that you have just—or problems that you have just described, is all 
16 

that $90 billion have to be spent by the Department of Defense or 

is some of it just not going to be used because you can’t properly 

plan and use it? 

And I don’t know the answer to these questions. That is why I 

am asking them. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. You know, I don’t want to necessarily speculate on—but I would say there is a possibility of that that it may 

not all get used. 

Mr. BROOKS. General Votel. 

General VOTEL. I would agree. I think the disadvantage of singleyear money, which OCO generally is, does create that risk that we 

may not build up, employ large sums of it that way. As it is right 

now, you know, our—we do—part of our budget, we do ask for 

some OCO funding and so we are able to plan for some of that, but 

I—again, I think I would be speculating a little bit here. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I have got roughly 15, 20 seconds left. Anything else you all would like to add that would help me decide how 

to vote on this issue? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I am just of the opinion that if it is important enough to do and it is part of what you should be doing every 

day, it should be in your base budget. 

General VOTEL. I think our people deserve a certainty. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Brooks. And at this time 

if there are any further questions, they can be submitted for the 

record. 

And I would like to thank again, Mr. Secretary, General, for your 

being here today. I am grateful to be serving with Congressman 

Langevin, and at this time we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 18, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 18, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 18, 2015 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT 

General VOTEL. USSOCOM is committed to remaining on the cutting edge of technology to provide the best tools to meet the operational needs of Special Operations 

Forces (SOF). Directed energy (DE) remains a technology of interest for meeting 

these capability needs. DE offers the advantage of ultra-precision and rapid target 

engagement, but has significant systems engineering, platform integration and operational policy challenges. 

USSOCOM has operational requirements in several mission areas where DE capabilities have potential applicability. The June 2012, ‘‘Capability Production Document for AC–130 J,’’ includes an objective key performance parameter that calls for 

the system to provide ‘‘the capability to incorporate future DE weapons, to include 

lethal and non-lethal variations.’’ 

USSOCOM has executed, funded and/or endorsed several development programs 

for DE systems in the last 20 years. Only one classified DE system is currently 

fielded by USSOCOM and being used in SOF operations. The Services have fielded 

laser dazzler systems to some SOF under Service acquisition programs. USSOCOM 

is currently assessing other DE capabilities for SOF operational use. One current 

initiative includes a DE development effort funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) that is being assessed against sensitive 

SOF user requirements and concepts of employment (CONEMP). USSOCOM has 

initiated assessment of the potential use of DE as an operational capability for a 

future upgrade of some AC–130J aircraft. USSOCOM is also assessing DE as a future capability for vehicle- or vessel-mounted systems to address approved operational requirements. These efforts are currently in the technology assessment 

stage, and specific development or acquisition plans or timelines have not yet been 

developed. 

Unfortunately, the majority of USSOCOM’s DE development programs have been 

terminated prior to fielding. For example, USSOCOM recently terminated three 

JIEDDO-funded DE development programs due to insufficient technology maturity. 

The cancelled DE development programs for SOF have failed to meet user requirements for one of the following two reasons: failure to meet technical performance 

thresholds (e.g., power output, operating time, target effects); and/or inadequate systems engineering to allow them to operate under the required CONEMP in SOF 

operational environments (e.g., ruggedization, resiliency, platform integration). 

DE shows promise for a variety of missions and target sets if the technical performance, system engineering and platform integration challenges can be resolved. 

USSOCOM is highly dependent on the Department of Defense research and development communities to address these DE development and systems engineering challenges, as well as foster a robust DE industrial base to provide any future capabilities to SOF. As DE technology matures, additional emphasis needs to be placed on 

the systems engineering challenges it poses for integration into operational platforms for use in combat environments. Given the complexity of integrating DE on 

the platforms listed, it is USSOCOM’s intent to leverage Service/Agency development, and serve as early adopters once the technology and its system engineering 

challenges have matured. [See page 12.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Secretary LUMPKIN. As a general rule for operations, U.S. Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM) funds the deployment and sustainment of its forces. However, for each operation, the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) will normally designate a lead service to provide common logistics support for all other service units participating in the operation, including in the planning and execution 

phases. 

These assignments of responsibility can be for multiple common logistics functions 

and different locations within the area of responsibility. For example, during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, USSOCOM funded deployment, 

temporary duty costs, sustainment, and SOF-peculiar requirements. While the 

Army, as the designated lead service in Afghanistan, provided the necessary com-
62 

mon logistics, service-common communications, and installation support for SOF in 

Afghanistan. These activities are typically funded through the Department’s Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) appropriation when applicable. [See page 13.] 

General VOTEL. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is not 

investigating eLoran (long-range aid to navigation) as a back-up system for flight 

operations in GPS-denied environments. Our aircraft already have navigation system redundancies that allow the aircrew to select from multiple navigation sources 

for both system redundancy, and for operation in denied or degraded environments. 

While eLoran does provide GPS back-up, it does not provide world-wide capability 

in the areas of interest for USSOCOM. Although eLoran may provide a navigational 

back-up capability in the future, the lower fidelity information provided would not 

be sufficient for USSOCOM needs. USSOCOM supports GPS hardening and software architecture fixes to their fleet of aircraft to mitigate our specific GPS vulnerabilities. [See page 14.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 18, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. Many of our potential adversaries have become very adept at manipulating the information environment to radicalize, recruit and gain support their 

cause. That requires a robust, concerted and strategic effort to counter those messages and kill the ideas that drive their extremist movement movements. Do we 

have a strategy for attacking adversarial messaging and propaganda? What tools do 

you have at your disposal to counter those sorts of messages? Where do you see gaps 

in our capabilities that you think we should be trying to address? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Without going into sensitive or classified activities, the Department through the Geographic Combatant Commands executes counter adversarial messaging activities directed at specific threats. The Department’s actions 

support overarching U.S. Government strategies, such as the Strategy to Counter 

ISIL, which includes a specific counter-messaging line of effort. 

A critical DOD influence activity is the employment of Military Information Support Teams to work with U.S. Embassy country teams and partner nations’ militaries in support of Combatant Commanders’ objectives. In these activities, the Department uses the most appropriate technology based upon assessments of common 

mediums for a target audience. 

The main challenge today is the size and pace of communications in social media, 

as the information environment has moved beyond static websites to instantaneously accessible social media. 

A recently completed Joint Staff Capability Based Assessment identified the challenges to influencing adversary and adversary-related audiences in a social mediadominated internet environment. The study outlined requirements for increasing 

DOD’s capability, and directed USSOCOM to develop solutions within its Military 

Information Support Operations (MISO) force. As we identify, develop and demonstrate the effectiveness of new concepts and tools to achieve influence effects, we 

will continue the dialogue with the Committee. 

Mr. WILSON. What role will SOF play in Afghanistan as we withdraw forces, and 

beyond 2015? Can you outline for the committee any resourcing concerns if high 

numbers of SOF are required? Can you provide an update on some of the options 

being discussed and how you are planning for those options? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Over the next 18 months, U.S. SOF will continue prosecuting 

the counterterrorism mission against the remnants of AQ and other terrorists who 

threaten our interests and our people. U.S. SOF will also as contribute to the train, 

advise, and assist mission with the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. 

Through these efforts, our aim is to build durable gains that will contribute to a 

robust, enduring counterterrorism partnership with the Afghans. There are approximately 2,000 U.S. SOF in Afghanistan. This force level will be maintained through 

2015. As the President stated during President Ghani’s visit to the U.S in March, 

the specific trajectory of the 2016 drawdown will be established later this year. We 

are currently reviewing potential SOF requirements for 2016 and in 2017. As part 

of this review, I will work with the Joint Staff and our military commanders to determine future SOF requirements in Afghanistan. 

Mr. WILSON. The fiscal year 2016 budget request continues growth for SOCOM 

to more that 69,900 personnel. With declining budgets, how will you ensure that 

this force will not become hollow? How will you ensure we are not choosing quantity 

over quality? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. USSOCOM’s end strength at approximately 70K represents 

a balanced force to meet special operations requirements. We will not have undermanned or under-equipped units at the FY16 budget request level of funding. However, at the BCA level of funding, we might have to make reductions depending on 

the amount of OCO available, but we will maintain a balanced force. We continually 

review this through USSOCOM readiness reports and during our annual DOD Program Budget Review (PBR). We will continue to apply rigorous selection criteria for 

induction of members into SOF in order to maintain quality capabilities. 

Mr. WILSON. Are you concerned that cuts being made to the Services could impact 

our special operations capabilities? Please outline your largest concerns in this area 

and discuss what is being done to minimize risk. 
66 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Yes, I am concerned over Service reductions because of the 

significant Service-provided capabilities that support Special Operations Forces 

(SOF), especially in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), tactical 

fixed and rotary-wing lift, combat service support, and maritime platforms. Services 

are determining impacts if Budget Control Act (BCA) level of funding becomes a reality, but these impacts are still being evaluated. Any reductions in Service budgets 

will require reliance on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds in order for 

SOF to maintain adequate readiness. SOF readiness is directly linked to and dependent on Service readiness support for training ranges, training facilities, and 

service common equipment maintenance schedules—especially at depot level. In addition, SOF is dependent on the Services for modernization schedules. One of my 

greatest concerns is that the A/MC–130J recapitalization schedule may be delayed 

if Air Force funding is reduced. Another concern is that maritime platforms to support SOF may not be available if the Navy budget is reduced. This could require 

USSOCOM to contract for additional leased vessels. Finally, I have significant reservations that SOF will have adequate ISR support available if Air Force funding 

is reduced. 

Mr. WILSON. How are the roles of women in SOF changing? Can you outline for 

the committee on SOCOM plans for assigning women in previously closed positions? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. (1) Today, women serve in a wide variety of Special Operations career fields such as Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Air Force 

Special Operations aviation. As a requirement of the Women in Service Review 

(WISR), USSOCOM Service Components are reviewing and validating standards for 

SOF occupational specialties. Once these standards are implemented, those who are 

best qualified will serve—including women. 

USSOCOM has made significant progress integrating women into previously 

closed positions and units. Most of this progress has occurred in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command component, because of a previous policy preventing 

women from serving below the brigade level in combat arms. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) is now open to women—all pilot, crew chief, and 

enabler positions opened as of July 23, 2014. The one exception is the Army’s Fire 

Support Specialist Military Occupational Specialty positions that are still closed by 

the Army, pending a review. The first two female pilots graduated from the 160th 

SOAR Selection and Assessment program in September and November 2014, and 

the first female crew chief graduated from the U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation training program in December 2014. 

Congress also approved our latest notification packet on November 18, 2014, to 

open enabler positions down to battalion level in 1st Special Forces Command and 

the Special Warfare Center and School. 

(2) USSOCOM is conducting the WISR effort in three phases. The first phase involved a thorough Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLFP–P) analyses and was completed 

in the spring of 2014. The second phase was a series of cultural and sociological 

studies of unit and social cohesion and combat effectiveness of SOF tactical units 

if females were integrated. These studies are currently under final review. The third 

phase is training standards validation and is currently underway. Each service component is analyzing its training standards to ensure they accurately reflect occupational/mission requirements. Once validated, these standards will be gender-neutral. 

This summer, the USSOCOM commander will collaborate with the services in order 

to decide the best way forward for the SOCOM enterprise. His recommendation will 

go forward to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late September of 2015 

and ultimately to the Secretary of Defense in advance of a January 2016 deadline. 

Mr. WILSON. What does SOF expect to divest—or get rid of—in the FY16 budget 

request and for the next few years? Without divestitures or reductions in some 

areas, how will you ensure that we are not building a hollow force that we cannot 

afford? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. In each program budget cycle, the Department conducts extensive reviews of current and new capability requirements. As part of this analysis, 

it is determined what programs can be divested or reduced in order to support any 

new initiatives or meet emerging threats or trends. We saw this most clearly during 

the FY15 budget review and made some difficult decisions that will carry forward 

through FY 2016. For example, in FY2015 and FY2016, USSOCOM will divest some 

programmed growth in Combat Support, Combat Service Support, and Civil Affairs. 

In addition, in FY2015 and FY2016 we restructured active component Army Special 

Forces Groups to realign manpower and force structure to more effectively meet the 

challenges of a changing security environment. We also are divesting older platforms such as the MC–130P and AC–130H that will be replaced with newer, more 
67 

capable platforms (MC–130J and AC–130J). Finally, we will continue to maintain 

a balanced force and the FY16 budget request support that. 

Mr. WILSON. Special Operations Forces and the Intelligence Community have experienced an unprecedented integration of both operational and analytical activities. 

SOCOM has also considerably expanded its funding of intelligence capabilities and 

activities. While details are classified—can you discuss this integration and are 

there any concerns? Can you discuss how the Department conducts appropriate 

oversight of these sensitive activities? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. We provide oversight of sensitive activities in concert with 

OUSD(I) and the Director of Intelligence Oversight in operational, resource, and acquisition processes. We are continuing to work to strengthen the oversight of those 

processes. For example, working with OUSD(I), we provide a Congressional report 

each quarter that provides detailed information and updates on these activities. 

This year we are working closely in conjunction with OUSD(I) to strengthen that 

process. 

During the Department’s Program Budget Review process, we work closely with 

USSOCOM, OUSD(I) and OUSD(AT&L) to ensure that our efforts complement each 

other and avoid redundancy or unnecessary duplication. We are also in the process 

of identifying gaps and strengthening the SOF requirements process with Joint 

Staff and OUSD(I). 

Details of these oversight processes will be found in the upcoming report by the 

Department on USSOCOM Intelligence in response to Section 1625 of the FY15 

NDAA. 

Mr. WILSON. Looking across the globe and the considering the threat of transnational terrorism—what are your largest concerns? Where are we assuming risk in 

our current strategies? Are we postured to counter these threats? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Since the 2001 attacks we have made considerable gains 

against al-Qa’ida and its affiliates around the world, and there are continuous efforts to disrupt imminent threats to the United States. Nevertheless, the combination of poor governance and the resilience of ideologies that promote violence have 

allowed for the continuous recruitment of fighters and supporters. This, in turn, has 

contributed to political turmoil and deteriorating security conditions in parts of the 

Middle East and Africa. Terrorist groups continue to exploit these conditions to establish sanctuaries, recruit fighters, and plot attacks against the United States, our 

allies, and partners. 

In addition to the emergence of new threats in a rapidly changing security environment, I remain concerned by the ideological appeal of terrorist groups to certain 

segments of society in their local areas and abroad. Defeating these threats will require the efforts of many parts of our government and the international community. 

Our current strategies ensure we do so by aligning military activities, which depend 

on continued investments in capabilities, with the efforts of our inter-agency and 

foreign government partners in law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, military, 

capacity building, and homeland security. 

Mr. WILSON. Do our forces and Geographic Combatant Commanders have the authorities they need to mitigate current and future transnational terrorist threats? 

What changes would you recommend, including potential changes to the AUMF? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. While we have authorities to achieve our counter terrorism 

objectives, the Department continuously reviews existing authorities and resources 

to ensure we are postured to address emergent threats in a rapidly changing security environment. For instance, the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the 

Levant (ISIL) as a regional and transnational threat prompted the President to seek 

a bipartisan Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) specifically tailored 

to address ISIL. We continue support revisions and an eventual repeal of the 2001 

AUMF, but believe our focus and priority is on securing passage of an ISIL-specific 

AUMF. 

Mr. WILSON. Do our Special Operations Forces have all of the authorities they 

need to counter the influence of Russian actions and aggression in Eastern Europe, 

or Iranian influence in the Middle East? What specific role do you see Special Operations playing in this area? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Our forces have the authorities necessary to carry out their 

assigned missions. We constantly reevaluate our authorities given the dynamic 

threat environment. Generally, in the context of countering the Russian and Iranian 

influence within their respective regions, Special Operations Forces (SOF) could 

work within a larger whole of government approach to bolster our allies and partners by playing key roles in conducting security force assistance, and building the 

capacity of our partners to resist such aggression. Moreover, SOF are essential in 

helping counter the negative narratives and propaganda of an adversary through information operations, primarily through Military Information Support Teams. If we 
68 

determine we have an authority gap, we will work with Congress to identify possible 

solutions. 

Mr. WILSON. A great deal has been written and said about the relationship between Special Operations Forces and the CIA. What is your opinion of how the CIA 

and SOF should share responsibilities that interlock and overlap, given respective 

strengths and weaknesses? What coordination role does your office (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) play in helping to coordinate and de-conflict CIA– 

DOD operations and activities? What are some areas of improvement? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. With respect to our counterterrorism plans, policies, and operations, the CIA and DOD work in concert within our distinct statutory authorities 

and policy guidance where applicable, to improve the whole of government approach 

in attaining national objectives. Each organization possesses specific strengths that 

can be leveraged to support other organizations. Regular staff interaction facilitates 

the development of solutions to the full suite of issues related to counterterrorism 

plans, policies, and operations. 

SO/LIC conducts oversight of the Department’s special operations activities with 

an understanding that these activities should be complementary, but not duplicative, of efforts taken by the CIA. The division of responsibility varies by issue and 

the dynamics of particular areas of operations; but the Department has the right 

people and policies in place to ensure intelligence and military operations reinforce 

each other. 

The Department continues to seek improvement of cooperation and coordination 

through increased communication and information sharing. Additional information 

sharing and clarity on responsibilities and operations reduces redundancy to preserve our precious resources. 

Mr. WILSON. What changes can you recommend to the present set of Security 

Force Assistance authorities such as 1206 and Global Security Contingency Fund? 

Are these the right types of authorities to satisfy future Geographic Combatant 

Commander requirements to develop partner nation capabilities? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I believe our current Security Force Assistance (SFA) authorities are appropriate for achieving the limited set of objectives for which they were 

designed. The 1206 ‘‘train and equip’’ program, for example, has enabled the Department of Defense to provide partner nations capabilities to conduct counterterrorism 

and stabilization operations. However, we continue to look at ways to accelerate current material solutions to our partnership capacity efforts, which sometimes limit 

Geographic Combatant Commanders’ ability to act expeditiously. 

The Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) has provided additional re- sources and flexibility, and the additional $2.1 billion included in the President’s 

FY16 budget request would enable us to satisfy foreseeable Geographical Combatant 

Command requirements appropriate to the CTPF mission-set. 

I would point out, however, that both 1206 and the Global Security Contingency 

Fund (GSCF) are tailored in their scope, and there may be additional areas in which 

security force assistance is needed that 1206 and GSCF do not adequately address. 

As you know, my responsibilities are focused on special operations and low intensity 

conflict; other elements of the Department are better suited to respond to the adequacy of SFA authorities for the full array of partner nation requirements. 

Mr. WILSON. A recent report on Special Operations Forces by the Council on Foreign Relations suggested that, ‘‘the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict has difficulty fully providing civilian oversight of 

U.S. Special Operations Command’s policy and resources as directed by law.’’ Do you 

agree with this assessment? Can you outline for the committee how that office conducts oversight of policy and resources of SOCOM? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I do not agree with that assertion. We are able to meet our 

statutory oversight responsibilities and we do so. My office has policy oversight of 

USSOCOM budget and resourcing, in accordance with well-established Department 

processes. I have a dedicated directorate within SOLIC to perform these functions. 

I also leverage the subject matter expertise of the Joint Staff and relevant offices 

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as experts in personnel, intelligence, and acquisition matters, to assist me. Moreover, I recognize that many other 

organizations within the Department have an active role to play in the oversight 

of SOCOM. To that end, I created and chair the Special Operations Policy Oversight 

Committee (SOPOC), which brings together all SOCOM stakeholders periodically to 

address key contemporary issues. I am pleased to say that the SOPOC has received 

strong support and participation from the service secretaries, relevant OSD offices, 

the Joint Staff, and SOCOM leaders, and has helped me to continue to meet my 

statutory obligations. 

Mr. WILSON. Many of our potential adversaries have become very adept at manipulating the information environment to radicalize, recruit and gain support their 
69 

cause. That requires a robust, concerted and strategic effort to counter those messages and kill the ideas that drive their extremist movement movements. Do we 

have a strategy for attacking adversarial messaging and propaganda? What tools do 

you have at your disposal to counter those sorts of messages? Where do you see gaps 

in our capabilities that you think we should be trying to address? 

General VOTEL. USSOCOM has not developed its own counter-ISIL messaging 

strategy; it supports activities such as Line of Effort (LOE) #6 ‘‘Expose ISIL’s True 

Nature’’ of the U.S. Government’s (USG) strategy developed by the National Security Council Staff. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has provided influence planning expertise to the Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs and 

Public Diplomacy and the National Counter Terrorism Center, which co-chair the 

implementation of LOE #6. 

Congress has expressed concern with DOD engaging violent extremist propaganda 

on the Internet, except in very limited ways. They tend to view the Internet as a 

strategic platform and efforts to influence civilians outside an area of conflict as 

Public Diplomacy, the responsibility of the Department of State or Broadcasting 

Board of Governors. We believe there is a complimentary role for the Department 

of Defense (DOD) in this space which acknowledges the need for a civilian lead, but 

allows DOD to pursue appropriate missions, such as counter-recruitment and reducing the flow of foreign fighters. This can be done in a coordinated manner as part 

of the whole of government effort without militarizing U.S. foreign policy. An explicit directive from Congress outlining the necessity of DOD to engage in this space 

would greatly enhance our ability to respond. 

USSOCOM’s primary tool for countering adversarial messaging is its Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Soldiers and various activities. These Special 

Operations Forces (SOF)trained Soldiers support Geographic Combatant Commands 

(GCC) with forces specially trained in using information to modify foreign audiences’ 

behavior. Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) deploy to various Embassies 

around the globe to assist in the achievement of GCC Theater Campaign objectives 

as well as advance Chief of Mission goals. The current MISO force structure supports the persistent deployment of about 20–30 MISTs. Additionally, MISO planners 

support all GCCs with the capability to monitor, track, analyze, and provide recommendations for the most effective way of engaging in the extremist debate. Other 

MISO activities include Senior Military Engagement Program (SMEP) which facilitates mil-to-mil engagement via digital and print magazines through discussion of 

strategic issues affecting regional partners within a GCC Area of Responsibility 

(AOR). 

Two substantial gaps exist; one has already been identified in the third paragraph 

regarding elimination of DOD permissions to engage online to counter violent extremists’ narratives and recruitment. Another gap exists in the MISO community’s 

ability to operate on social media and the Internet, due to a lack of organic capability. This shortfall, and the requirement to integrate indigenous language and cultural capability, has necessitated the use of contractors. DOD will reduce, but not 

eliminate, reliance on contracted capabilities through its current efforts to update 

doctrine, expand training and implement technical and material solutions to improve the Department’s ability to effectively operate in the social media and broader 

online information space. 

Finally, the ability to rapidly respond to adversarial messaging and propaganda, 

particularly with offensive cyberspace operations to deny, disrupt, degrade or corrupt those messages, requires an Execute Order (EXORD) and is limited by current 

U.S. government policies. The review and approval process for conducting offensive 

cyberspace operations is lengthy, time consuming and held at the highest levels of 

government. However, a rapid response is frequently required in order to effectively 

counter the message because cyber targets can be fleeting, access is dynamic, and 

attribution can be difficult to determine. Additionally, international standards and 

laws do not exist for defining sovereignty in cyberspace. 

Mr. WILSON. What role will SOF play in Afghanistan as we withdraw forces, and 

beyond 2015? 

General VOTEL. Aligned with Commander Resolute Support’s (COM RS) functionally-based Security Force Assistance (SFA) framework, U.S. and Coalition Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) will continue to advise Afghan Special Security Force 

(ASSF) partners on critical enablers like aviation, logistics, intelligence, and command and control. This functional framework is designed to facilitate a coordinated 

(Afghan and Coalition) problem solving effort and enduring relationships. While the 

overall force draws down, SOF will remain relatively robust in order to advise and 

ensure sustainability of the ASSF. 

The NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan/Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan(NSOCC–A/SOJTF–A) has five (5) Special Oper-
70 

ations Advisory Groups (SOAGs) focused on mentoring and advising our ASSF partners to ensure they can command, control, maintain, and sustain their tactical units 

spread across the country. These special military and police units are our most capable partners in the Counterterrorism (CT) fight. In order to ensure our ASSF 

partners continue to take the fight to our enemies, U.S. SOF must continue advising 

at the tactical level even as we draw down our forces. We must show our continued 

commitment to Afghan security efforts in order to maintain the mutually beneficial 

relationships we need to meet U.S. objectives in the region. 

Mr. WILSON. Can you outline for the committee any resourcing concerns if high 

numbers of SOF are required? 

General VOTEL. There are very limited resourcing concerns from the SOF/Major 

Force Program (MFP) 11 perspective depending on how high the SOF numbers go. 

The only relevant concern is when the number of SOF supporting this effort increases to the extent that the amplified competition for resources in terms of personnel, equipment, and funding is allocated to support other global priorities. 

Another concern specifically applies to equipment. Current resourcing projections 

include funding to continue retrograde, redeployment, and material reduction of 

SOF peculiar equipment. There may be a need for additional resourcing if we are 

required to send equipment back into theater to support higher SOF numbers. The 

concern increases over time in 2016 as a continued reduction in personnel and 

equipment would require additional shipping of equipment in an environment with 

limited reception and distribution capacity and capability. 

More importantly would be a continued conventional force support to SOF. The 

greatest concern going forward is ensuring adequate resourcing and necessary authorities exist to support all of the non-SOF peculiar requirements in theater generated by a larger number of SOF such as basing, fuel and ammunition. 

Mr. WILSON. Can you provide an update on some of the options being discussed 

and how you are planning for those options? 

General VOTEL. The ASSF will be the central mechanism to ensuring ‘‘relative 

stability’’ over the next few years. Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) formations 

are already conducting unilateral security operations and are integrating across the 

Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) enterprise. However, they 

still require continued Special Operations Train, Advise and Assist (SOF TAA), especially in the areas of logistics and command and control. The Afghan Local Police 

(ALP), while not part of the ASSF, are integral to Afghanistan’s enduring layered 

security architecture. They have proven to be the Taliban’s most formidable obstacle 

to regaining influence and power, and merit continued SOF TAA at the ALP headquarters level. Several ASSF development efforts will need to extend beyond 2016. 

Three specific programs that warrant extension due to the critical/unique capabilities they provide: the Special Mission Wing (SMW) PC–12 and Mi-17 program, the 

ASSF Intelligence Enterprise, and Ktah Khas (KKA). 

The continued development of these command and control mechanisms is critical 

and will require continued support at the ministerial and operational levels to ensure appropriate support to and utilization of ASSF. By the end of 2016, we expect 

to make significant improvements to the enabling functions of the ASSF, particularly their abilities to force generate; sustain the force; plan, resource, and execute 

effective security campaigns; and harness intelligence capabilities and processes. 

This is critical to U.S. interests as we will be reliant upon ASSF to conduct missions 

to combat terrorists in Afghanistan and deny them safe haven. 

Thwarting the Taliban is not an ANSF mission alone; this will continue to be a 

collective effort. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) must 

demonstrate to the Afghan people that it is the clear cut, better governing option. 

The Taliban can only be decisively defeated if their popular support is comprehensively eroded away. Therefore, we will continue working with State Department, 

USAID, other U.S. Government (USG) and coalition partners in Afghanistan to legitimize GIRoA. 

Mr. WILSON. The fiscal year 2016 budget request continues growth for SOCOM 

to more that 69,900 personnel. With declining budgets, how will you ensure that 

this force will not become hollow? How will you ensure we are not choosing quantity 

over quality? 

General VOTEL. USSOCOM’s end strength at approximately 70K represents a balanced force to meet special operations requirements. We will not have undermanned or under-equipped units at the FY16 budget request level of funding. However, at the Budget Control Act (BCA) level of funding, we might have to make some 

reductions depending on the amount of OCO available, but we will maintain a balanced force. We continually review this through USSOCOM readiness reports and 

during the annual Department Program Budget Review (PBR). We will continue to 
71 

apply rigorous selection criteria for induction of members into Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) to maintain quality personnel. 

Mr. WILSON. Are you concerned that cuts being made to the Services could impact 

our special operations capabilities? Please outline your largest concerns in this area 

and discuss what is being done to minimize risk. 

General VOTEL. There are many potential impacts that would affect Special Operations Capabilities including personnel, training, schooling, equipment and deployments. Specific examples follow: 

Naval Special Warfare (NSW): There will be reductions in service provided by air 

mobility. Budget reductions will impact NSW’s ability to conduct Seal Deliver Vehicle (SDV) training at the unit level and certification-to-deploy training at off-island 

training sites. Training at these sites is required as a result of limited on-island 

training in Hawaii and the unavailability of cold-water training environments to 

certify a SDV Platoon in accordance with mission essential tasks. NSW is currently 

conducting MFP–11 FYDP planning to address long-term reductions. 

U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC): A shortfall in Military Training Specific Allotment (MTSA) will curtail mandatory education and adversely impact the morale, professional development and career advancement of our officers 

and enlisted force. USASOC will not be able to meet the requirements to train Army 

Special Forces Soldiers as directed by Department of the Army. Duty position-required training and TDY en-route to meet readiness requirements will not be met. 

Authorized training to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, HQDA 

will cease due to the reductions. USASOC will compete for available resources during HQDA budget office mid-year review data call. 

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC): At the end of FY13 and beginning of FY14 the furlough and sequestration actions had some measurable negative 

affect on AFSOC C–130 aircraft program. Because of that, AFSOC C–130 aircrafts 

were being pushed 45–60 days behind at the depot for maintenance, which is past 

the 16 month requirement and the deliveries were late by 30 days. The lateness continues because the maintainers are not allowed to work overtime due to no funding. 

Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC): The unforeseen impacts 

would affect the use of the USMC ranges due to lack of funding for the range operators and support personnel. 

Rotary Wing Support: In recent years, U.S. Navy (USN) provided dedicated Rotary Wing support to Special Operations Forces (SOF) through a USN–SOCOM 

memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that provided for the employment of two Navy 

Reserve H–60 squadrons. Specifically, the squadrons supported both our Components and Theater Special Operations Command (TSOCs) in operational and training support. As a result of Service budget cuts concerning these two Reserve Squadrons, the Navy requested no funds for FY–16, with divestiture to be completed by 

the end of the fiscal year. 

Contract support to SOF enterprise. Contracting support is one of the key logistics 

enablers that SOF relies on the Services to provide. Due to the force reductions tied 

to the current budget reductions the Army is targeting to increase the number of 

Soldiers filling Contracting Military Occupation Specialties (MOSs). Contracting 

support is a critical operational need that is expected to grow with Campaign PlanGlobal Special Operations (CP–GSO) expanded persistent presence in support of Geographic Combatant Commands’ SOF requirements. 

Mr. WILSON. How are the roles of women in SOF changing? Can you outline for 

the committee on SOCOM plans for assigning women in previously closed positions? 

General VOTEL. (1) Women serve in a wide variety of operations and in career 

fields such as Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and 

Air Force Special Operations aviation. As part of the Women in Service Review 

(WISR), USSOCOM Components are reviewing and validating standards of SOF occupational specialties to ensure they are operationally relevant, occupational specific 

and applied in a gender-neutral manner. Once these standards are implemented, 

those who are best qualified will serve—including women. 

USSOCOM has made significant progress integrating women into previously 

closed positions and units. Since Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) rescinded the Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule (DGCAR) in January 2013, USSOCOM, in coordination with the Services, has opened over 7000 position to include the 160th 

Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). Most of this progress has occurred 

in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command component because of DCAR which 

prevented women from serving below the brigade level in combat arms and Service 

assignment policies. Army Directive 2015–08 (Expanding Positions in Open Occupations for the Assignment of Female Soldiers within U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command) opened the majority of the positions within U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The entire 160th Special Operations Aviation Regi-
72 

ment is now open—all pilot, crew chief, and enabler positions opened as of July 23, 

2014 (except 13F which is still a closed MOS in the Army). Currently there are 

three female pilots and one female crew chief serving in the 160th SOAR. 

Congress approved our latest notification packet on November 18, 2014 to open 

enabler positions down to battalion level in 1st Special Forces Command and the 

Special Warfare Center and School. The remaining positions closed to women in 

SOF are in closed occupations such as SEAL, Special Forces (18 series), the 75th 

Ranger Regiment, and enabler positions attached to SOF tactical units or that require an additional skill identifier from a closed school such as Army Ranger School. 

(2) USSOCOM is conducting the WISR effort in three phases. The first phase involved a thorough Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLFP–P) analysis and was completed in the 

spring of 2014. The second phase consists of cultural and sociological studies focusing on unit, social and task cohesion in SOF tactical units. The studies were conducted by RAND, Joint Special Operations University and Kansas University. The 

third phase is training standards validation and is currently underway. Each service component analyzes training standards to ensure they accurately reflect occupational/mission requirements, which includes third party support (Naval Health and 

Research Center, Office of Personnel Management) to provide non-biased job analysis and scientific data to ensure standards are operationally valid and occupational 

specific. Once validated, the standards will be implemented in a gender neutral 

manner. Lastly, the USSOCOM commander will collaborate with the services in 

order to decide the best way forward for the SOCOM enterprise. His recommendation will go forward to the SECDEF, in coordination with the Services, in September 

2015. Assignment of women to newly opened positions will be accomplished through 

coordination with the Services and in accordance with Service assignment policies 

and procedures. 

Mr. WILSON. What does SOF expect to divest—or get rid of—in the FY16 budget 

request and for the next few years? Without divestitures or reductions in some 

areas, how will you ensure that we are not building a hollow force that we cannot 

afford? 

General VOTEL. United States Special Operations Command remains committed 

to maintaining a balanced, capable force. Capability requirements, both current and 

new, are subjected to comprehensive reviews and analysis. As part of these reviews, 

it is determined what programs can be divested or reduced in order to support any 

new initiative. In addition to exploring potential divestitures or reductions, we are 

also recapitalizing older platforms such as the MC–130P and AC–130H in a onefor-one replacement with newer, more capable platforms (MC–130J and AC–130J). 

Other reductions and divestitures from previous years will be continue to be evident 

in the FY16 budget request. These include the planned divestiture of MQ–1 Predators from 24–10 by the end of FY16, the reduction of C–145A (M–28) platforms from 

16 to 5 while retaining pilot proficiency and currency at the Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID) squadrons, and continuing realignment of U.S. Army Special 

Operations Command (USASOC) forces from Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA) 

to smaller Operational Detachment Golfs (ODG) and supporting detachments to better meet evolving Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) requirements. These 

recapitalizations, divestitures, reductions and realignments in the FY16 budget request ensure we continue to maintain a capable and balanced force ready to protect 

the Nation’s vital interests. 

Mr. WILSON. Special Operations Forces and the Intelligence Community have experienced an unprecedented integration of both operational and analytical activities. 

SOCOM has also considerably expanded its funding of intelligence capabilities and 

activities. While details are classified—can you discuss this integration and are 

there any concerns? Can you discuss how the Department conducts appropriate 

oversight of these sensitive activities? 

General VOTEL. At current, we do not have concerns with the level of integration 

between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the intelligence community (IC). Our 

interagency relationships are strong and we, in the SOF community, are always interested in opportunities to improve communication, coordination, collaboration, and 

integration with our IC partners. 

USSOCOM and the greater SOF enterprise places an emphasis on communicating, coordinating, collaborating, and, where applicable, integrating with our Intelligence Community partners both in our operational and analytical activities. 

These partnerships allow us to share the burden of managing conflicts and enhancing capabilities that allow us all to formulate and implement a better whole-of-government response. 

At the operational to strategic level, the preponderance of intelligence consumed 

by Special Operations units is collected, processed, exploited and disseminated by 
73 

other U.S. Government (USG)/Department of Defense (DOD) elements across the 

IC. SOF intelligence analysts communicate and coordinate daily with IC partners 

on all aspects of intelligence collection, analysis, and production to mitigate and 

avoid duplication of effort and ensure compliance with established IC directives. 

Additionally, to further reduce duplicity and redundancy, USSOCOM maintains 

a team of interagency liaisons throughout the SOF enterprise and provides SOF liaisons to many interagency headquarters. These relationships help facilitate better 

de-confliction and synchronization of intelligence in support of SOF operations, and 

assists in providing situational awareness of overseas events and activities. The 

main focus is to ensure the most efficient and effective use of intelligence professionals, systems, and resources in order to deliver timely information to SOF. 

Only when the pre-existing IC data is exhausted, the intelligence and operational 

requirements are SOF niche, or compressed timelines associated with special operations will SOF solely rely on our dedicated tactical organic collection and analysis. 

However, even in these cases, SOF intelligence operations and analysis is coordinated fully with the necessary IC partners. 

Oversight of SOF intelligence and intelligence-related capabilities is shared by the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), and the recently re-designated Department of Defense Senior Intelligence Oversight Official 

(DOD SIOO). 

Federal law and Executive Order (EO) assigned specific oversight requirements 

to the USD(I), the ASD(SO/LIC), and the SIOO regarding the employment of SOF. 

These requirements are amplified by DOD policies. The below chart (Figure 1) identifies both policy and funding responsibilities. 

Because the House Rule X(j)(1)(c) definition of intelligence activities includes 

‘‘clandestine activities’’ and spans both intelligence and Special Operations traditional military sensitive activities, the USD(I), the ASD(SO/LIC), and the SIOO each 

exercise oversight of special operations organizations based on the activities that 

these operational elements conduct. 

The following chart outlines the key questions that enables USD(I), ASD(SO/LIC), 

and SIOO to understand the activity and how the elements were funded and developed. This chart (Figure 2) also frames how USD(I), ASD(SO/LIC), and SIOO cooperate to ensure oversight between all three entities. 
74 

Mr. WILSON. Given the nature of diminishing resources and budget constraints, 

what is the current and future status of the Command’s Global SOF Network initiative? 

General VOTEL. In an era of constrained budgets, pursuing an international network approach is more important than ever. When Admiral McRaven initially described his vision for a ‘‘global SOF network’’ in January 2013, he based it on analysis of national strategic guidance, and it encompassed three distinct objectives: 

— Strengthen the global network of SOF, U.S. government partners, and partner 

nations 

— Provide Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and Chiefs of Mission 

with improved special operations capacity, and 

— Align structures, processes, and authorities to enable that network. 

USSOCOM described this network approach and the function of each node in a 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which was endorsed by the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council (JROC) in October 2013. 

As national security challenges and threats are increasingly global and interconnected, USSOCOM continues to prioritize a globally networked approach to addressing them. That is why in my posture statement designated ‘‘building relationships’’ as one of my top priorities. While moving away from the terminology ‘‘global 

SOF network,’’ USSOCOM is continuing to build relationships and strengthen its 

international network, through sustained security cooperation, expanded communication architectures and liaison activities. 

Below are some updates on initiatives related to building relationships. These initiatives do not entail requests for additional resources, but rather shift existing resources. At its core, the international approach is a way of doing business. 

• USSOCOM now has SOF representatives from 13 different nations working at 

its headquarters. Liaison/exchange positions are established upon completion of 

a Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and each individual 

country, as authorized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

USSOCOM currently hosts special operations international liaison and exchange officers from: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great 

Britain, Jordan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and 

Sweden. Officers from Italy, Singapore, and Poland are expected to be assigned 

within the coming months. 

• These partner nation SOF representatives work in a section of the headquarters 

specifically modified to ensure security of information while enabling multi-national collaboration, the J3-International (J3–I) Division. The J3–I offices are 

collocated within the headquarters in close proximity to other J3 office spaces. 

The space was renovated in 2014 to ensure that there was a purpose-built area 

in full compliance with applicable U.S. law, policy, and intelligence community 

directives for international coordination. 

• As a complement to integrating SOF representatives into USSOCOM headquarters, USSOCOM assigns U.S. officers as Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) to key SOF partners across the globe. Currently, there are 15 

SOLOs assigned to U.S. Embassies abroad with locations in every geographic 
75 

area of responsibility. The intent of the SOLO program is to maintain enduring 

presence with select partner nation SOF in order to support the development 

of key SOF partners, prepare for future contingencies, and build mutually beneficial relationships in support of Geographic Combatant Command priorities. • A communications infrastructure is imperative in supporting the international 

network and partnership initiatives. USSOCOM is capitalizing on the capabilities provided by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD–I) through 

its U.S. Battlefield Information Collaboration and Exploitation System (US 

BICES) for SECRET Releasable collaboration and the Defense Information Support Agency’s (DISA) All Partner Access Network (APAN) for unclassified collaboration. Enterprise systems like APAN and BICES ensure broad collaboration and information exchange capabilities are available to USSOCOM and accredited partner nations to enable the global network approach to function effectively. NOTE: Additional unclassified capabilities are required to address 

USSOCOM and GCC’s requirements to collaborate and communicate sensitive, 

but unclassified information at an enterprise level. USSOCOM is actively working through multiple OSD agencies to ensure these requirements are met in a 

timely manner. 

These initiatives have demonstrated value and return on investment, most recently exemplified by the rapid employment of partner nation SOF to support U.S. 

Central Command’s Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. 

Through this networked approach, USSOCOM can support partners in a region 

where they may be better positioned to achieve shared desired outcomes, due to historic, political, or geographic relationships. By enabling and working with SOF partners, USSOCOM can share the burden of managing conflicts and work together to 

increase capabilities of regional partners, to provide security solutions to meet 

threats at their origin. 

This is the network approach in action—providing national decision-makers the 

opportunity to pursue multinational, tailored efforts that best meet the specific 

problem set, context, and preference of regional partners. Not to mention, this approach enables the U.S. to collectively shoulder resource requirements with partners 

in an era of constrained defense budgets. 

Mr. WILSON. The February 2013 Unified Campaign Plan assigned theater special 

operations commands as sub-unified commands to SOCOM rather than the geographic combatant commands. Please explain why the UCP was changed. a. Do you 

plan to expand the theater special-operations commands and, if so, how much and 

for what purposes? b. How will you coordinate future activities with the geographic 

combatant commands? 

General VOTEL. The proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) will 

improve USSOCOM’s ability to prioritize, deploy and balance global Special Operation Forces (SOF) requirements in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). It will allow USSOCOM to shift SOF, with the concurrence of the 

GCC Commanders, globally to meet rapidly evolving requirements. 

The UCP establishes the missions, responsibilities, and force structure for unified 

combatant commands, delineates Area of Responsibility (AOR) boundaries for GCCs, 

and specifies responsibilities for Functional Combatant Commands (FCCs). The 

UCP currently states ‘‘Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

(CDRUSSOCOM) is responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations 

against terrorist networks. . . .’’ The changes we seek broadens USSOCOM’s role to 

include synchronizing the employment of global SOF operations; the proposed language reads ‘‘CDRUSSOCOM is responsible for synchronizing the planning and employment of special operations globally, and will do so in coordination with other 

combatant commands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate U.S. Government 

agencies.’’ This change will improve our ability to prioritize, deploy and balance SOF 

requirements and will codify how we posture SOF to meet requirements within and 

across GCCs. 

The Secretary of Defense uses the ‘‘Forces For’’ Memorandum and Unified Command Assignment Tables to assign and allocate forces to GCCs and FCCs. The 

changes reflected in the February 11, 2013 memorandum formally assigned 

USSOCOM combatant command (COCOM) authority of the Theater Special Operation Commands (TSOCs) and forward stationed SOF, making USSOCOM responsible for the readiness and training of all SOF regardless of assignment location. 

However, having COCOM of the TSOCs does not change the Operational Command 

(OPCON) relationships between the GCCs and SOF assigned to their AORs. The 

GCCs retain OPCON authority of the TSOCS and remain the Supported Command 

with USSOCOM as the Supporting Command. 

To support and implement the ‘‘Forces For’’ memorandum, the Department transferred baseline TSOC Headquarters (HQ) resources from the GCC/Service Major 
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Force Program (MFP–2) accounts to USSOCOM (MFP–11) during the Fiscal Year 

(FY) 2016 budget cycle. This transfer included funding and manpower associated 

with TSOC training, mission support and planning, communications/IT, personnel, 

headquarters management, and command and control (C2) activities. 

USSOCOM’s FY 2016 Budget Request also includes additional resource and manpower adjustments that will better enable the TSOCs to optimize their ability to address GCC requirements. Additional manpower, critical Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I), and other operational support will improve TSOC structure, C2 capabilities, and provide flexibility to meet emerging requirements. These enhancements support USSOCOM’s intent to provide an equally 

capable TSOC to each GCC. Manpower adjustments include the internal realignment of over 800 military and civilian positions (across FY14–20), from Headquarters USSOCOM and its Service Components, to the TSOCs to provide command 

and control and other operational support activities. In FY 2016, additional O&M 

was provided to enable these personnel to support the TSOC mission. 

The proposed changes to the UCP regarding USSOCOM synchronizer responsibilities and the assignment of COCOM authority to USSOCOM in the Forces For 

memorandum does not change USSOCOM’s obligation and commitment to support 

the GCCs by providing them a SOF capabilities through the TSOCs. However, it 

does enhance USSOCOM’s ability to support the GCCs by tailoring SOF capability 

and capacity of the TSOCs to meet the operational demands of the GCC commanders in their Area of Responsibility (AOR). To balance global special operation 

activities, USSOCOM is implementing a synchronization and prioritization framework to develop recommendations for DOD-level decisions that prioritize special operations, actions, and activities such that GCCs/TSOCs—who will be active participants in the process—understand how USSOCOM will address priorities for SOF; 

where and why USSOCOM intends to recommend allocation of special operation resources; and what resources GCCs can reasonably expect for planning. 

Mr. WILSON. U.S. Northern Command recently established Special Operations 

Command North (SOCNORTH). Please discuss how SOCOM has helped resource 

this command and how SOCOM is working with this particular theater special operations command (TSOC). Are there any issues with Special Operations Forces working within a domestic framework? 

General VOTEL. SOCOM has helped resourcing this command by: Total ‘‘start-up’’ funding obligated for SOCNORTH is $6.1M (MFP–2) and $3.8M 

(MFP–11) from both FY 2013 and FY 2014. Additionally, SOCOM has budgeted 

$250K in MFP–11 O&M funding to support SOCNORTH in FY15. The Air Force, at the behest of SOCOM, funded a $6.1M renovation (less C4I 

costs) of Hangar 104 to provide SOCNORTH an interim facility. SOCNORTH’s anticipated move-in date is late April/early May 2015. 

USSOCOM has actively engaged with USNORTHCOM and SOCNORTH to obtain 

Air Force military construction funding for a new, permanent $58 million operations 

facility. This project, requested for FY 2018, will support SOCNORTH’s permanent 

bed-down at Peterson AFB, Colorado. 

SOCNORTH has been designated by Commander, USNORTHCOM as the supported command for all counter terrorism related activities, and specialized support 

of federal law enforcement within the USNORTHCOM AOR. 

SOCNORTH will support federal law enforcement agencies tasked to provide the 

capacity, expertise, and the global focus against threat networks supporting 

USNORTHCOM plans. 

SOCNORTH continues to thicken its network of partners, improving its understanding and building relationships, while establishing processes with the U.S. 

interagency and other partners through engagements and exercises. 

Mr. WILSON. Can you outline some of the more difficult advanced technology requirements that SOF needs in order to maintain an edge on the battlefield? a. As 

we withdraw from major combat in Afghanistan, will the need for non-lethal weapons and directed energy weapons increase? b. How are you managing to stay ahead 

in research and development while your budget in this area has steadily declined 

over the past several fiscal years? c. What role does the Combating Terrorism and 

Technical Support Office (CTTSO) play in filling SOF technology requirements? 

General VOTEL. a. The withdraw of General Purpose Forces from major combat 

in Afghanistan will not increase the need for non-lethal (NL) or directed energy 

(DE) weapons for SOF. SOF operations outside of declared areas of armed conflict 

(ODTAAC) are typically politically sensitive and require ultra-precision for target 

engagement and direct action. All types of NL and lethal technologies that enable 

ultra-precision for SOF target engagement and direct action will be needed. These 

technologies include focused and tailored effects for kinetic weapons, as well as NL 

and DE weapons. NL weapons include a variety of technologies that produce specific 
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types of target effects. DE is a type of weapons technology that can produce lethal 

or non-lethal target effects, depending on the DE parameters and target vulnerabilities. DE weapons offer the advantage of ultra-precision and rapid target engagement, but have significant systems engineering, platform integration, and operational policy challenges. NL weapons may offer advantages for use in politically 

sensitive offensive operations that limit or restrict the use of lethal force, or when 

U.S. forces, non-combatants and/or hostages may in close proximity to enemy targets. 

b. USSOCOM will continue to leverage Service, Agency, and Department of Energy technology development investments, limiting Major Force Program Eleven 

(MFP–11) resources on SOF-unique development and system modification efforts. 

Through a deliberate campaign to share SOF capability needs, we have been able 

to influence and benefit greatly from the work already being done. For some technologies, such as precision munitions and DE, USSOCOM is highly reliant on larger 

Service development investments. Because of the technological challenges with NL 

and DE weapons, USSOCOM’s intent is to leverage Service/Agency development 

and serve as early adaptors once the technologies and system engineering challenges mature. 

More emphasis for longer-range airborne, ground and maritime NL weapons capabilities to support offensive operations is needed to support SOF capability needs. 

More emphasis on systems engineering early in the development process is needed 

for DE weapons to make them more viable options for SOF. Other advanced technologies of interest to SOF include: advanced seekers for munitions to improve the 

probability of kill against fast, erratically maneuvering targets; non-lethal personnel 

immobilization; signature reduction technologies (multispectral, acoustic); strength 

and endurance enhancement; night vision; unbreakable/unjammable, encrypted, low 

probability to detect/low probability of intercept communications; long-range non-lethal vehicle stopping; clandestine non-lethal vessel stopping; clandestine non-lethal 

equipment and facility disablement/defeat; full spectrum threat platform defense 

(aircraft, vehicle, vessel); combined effects weapons; advanced offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; tethered sensors for target detection, identification and engagement in all weather conditions; clandestine tagging, tracking, and locating; intelligence data trend detection, extraction and display; weapons of mass destruction 

render safe; chemical and biological agent defeat. 

c. The CTTSO has funded technology development projects and established Memoranda of Agreement with Partner Nations for technology development information 

sharing to support SOF counterterrorism (CT) capability needs. CTTSO plays an important role in taking operational needs from our SOF components and rapidly producing usable prototypes to help refine requirements for SOF operators. CTTSO 

hosts yearly reviews to identify user needs that are able to be addressed through 

mature technologies typically within 12–18 months. The CTTSO also offers a viable 

program to support weapons technology development for SOF CT operations that 

falls outside the criteria for the Joint NL Weapons Program. Recent changes in 

DOD NL weapons policy limits the NL weapons definition to only weapons that 

have immediate, predictable target effects that are intended to be relatively reversible and return the target to its pre-engagement function. CTTSO offers USSOCOM 

an avenue to pursue legal, treaty-compliant weapons technologies that are neither 

intended to produce relatively reversible nor lethal target effects. 

Mr. WILSON. Can you update the committee on SOCOM’s intelligence functions, 

requirements, and initiatives? What specific intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements do you have? 

General VOTEL. a. USSOCOM’s Intelligence Functions: Geographic Combatant 

Commanders (GCCs) assign specific tasks and missions to allocated Special Operations Forces (SOF); in turn, SOF conduct activities that are different from conventional military missions. These activities and missions have unique intelligence requirements that require special capabilities for collection. Where conventional forces 

are often most focused on the operational to strategic level of intelligence, special 

operations require the most precise and specific level of detailed tactical information 

possible in order to ensure mission success. A distinct analytic capability, based on 

unique SOF collection requirements, is required to ensure SOF receive tailored, detailed, and timely intelligence. In order to execute DOD’s mandate as part of national strategy and policy, SOF mist assess current and future threats within each 

GCC’s area of responsibility and posture to minimize of defeat those threats. This 

requires a deeper level and finer resolution of analysis covering social networks, 

human identity, political environment, economics/business and organizational networks. 

b. USSOCOM’s Intelligence Requirements: Since 2011, operational requirements 

for SOF ISR and Service ISR support to SOF have grown between 10% and 14% 
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per year while available ISR sourcing solutions have declined, with the sharpest decrease (36%) from FY14 to FY15. While we cannot accurately predict the growth of 

SOF ISR requirements over time, it is apparent that the global demand for SOF 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities will continue to 

grow over the next several years. 

c. USSOCOM’s Intelligence Initiatives: 

1. Continued Interagency Coordination: USSOCOM maintains a close-knit relationship with the U.S. Government partners in the Intelligence Community (IC). 

However, SOF niche requirements and the compressed timelines associated with 

special operations do require dedicated tactical organic collection and analysis as 

part of the SOF enterprise. Extensive coordination is done between agencies and indepth research accomplished to ensure compliance with established procedures. SOF 

intelligence analysts communicate daily with IC partners on all aspects of intelligence production to mitigate and avoid duplication of effort in the production cycle. 

2. USSOCOM ISR Roadmap: The ISR Roadmap outlines analysis of the command’s overarching plan for ISR. It compares projected requirements against programmed resources, identifying investment strategies and characterizing gaps between SOF and service plans. The fundamental pillar of this roadmap is the shift 

in ISR terminology, which characterizes varying levels of capability across the four 

legs of the ISR pyramid: platforms, sensors, data transport, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED). This differentiation between levels of ISR capability is critical to the Roadmap as it enables commanders to better articulate what 

they need. This refined terminology enables USSOCOM to make better resourcing 

and acquisition decisions. 

Mr. WILSON. What manned and unmanned ISR systems are you investing in, and 

why? How do you coordinate with the Services in these areas? 

General VOTEL. a. USSOCOM ISR Investments: 

1. Airborne ISR (AISR) manned and unmanned platforms have been operating in 

mostly permissive threat environments and good weather conditions. Manned platforms have been used to help mitigate the impacts of poor weather to effective ISR, 

but come with limited endurance. SOF’s global mission and emerging threats dictate 

that SOF AISR must be able to operate in non-permissive, hostile, or sensitive areas 

where our current platform inventory cannot operate without risk of compromise. 

2. Through analysis supporting the development of the ISR Roadmap, shortfalls 

in tactical/organic capability were identified to support theater SOF missions. In response to those gaps, two distinctly different UAS capabilities are being pursued to 

provide a collection capability for the Theater Special Operations Commands 

(TSOCs); the Multi-Mission Tactical UAS and the Army Group III UAS. These two 

systems will provide an unmanned option to meet TSOC collection requirements. 

Following the decision to retain the U–28, USSOCOM initiated a Next Generation 

AISR study as part of the development of an Initial Capabilities Document identifying the requirements of the manned AISR platform to replace the U–28. 

b. USSOCOM-Service ISR Coordination: Coordination with the Services is conducted through a variety of opportunities including individual Key Leader Engagements, SOCOM-Service Warfighter Talks, submission of Integrated Priority Lists, 

participation in OSD and Joint Staff Battlespace Awareness meetings and integration forums, and review and coordination of Joint Capability Integration Development System requirement documentation. 

Mr. WILSON. What role does your J2 (Intelligence) Director play in identifying and 

filling those unique requirements? 

General VOTEL. a. Within USSOCOM J2, the J24 Intelligence Capabilities and 

Requirements Division oversees the Intelligence Portfolio and manages J2 responsibilities for the identification, evaluation, and validation of SOF-peculiar intelligence related requirements as well as providing resourcing advocacy on behalf of 

the SOF intelligence network. The J2 utilizes data calls, Defense Readiness Reporting System, and integrated priority lists (IPL) submissions in addition to leading 

multiple requirements forums, including the SOF ISR Council, to conduct planning, 

analysis, development, and implementation of TSOC and Component intelligence requirements in accordance with Special Operations Forces Capability Integration Development (SOFCIDS) Authority. Additionally, the J2 oversees critical intelligence 

capability initiatives that require formal documentation and validation through the 

SOFCIDS and Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board 

(SOCREB) processes. 

b. USSOCOM, as authorized by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC), is designated the Joint Capabilities Board and has delegation of authority 

to approve and pursue Special Operations Capabilities. This authority is recognized 

by the Joint Staff and the Services and supported by the Department. When 
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USSOCOM validates its Requirements it does so with the authority of the JS and 

JROC. 

c. Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Memorandum 179–09 (dtd: 2 

Nov 09) approved USSOCOM’s SOCREB designation as the Special Operations 

Joint Capabilities Board (JCB). The SOCREB manages and approves all Special Operations-Peculiar capability documents designated below the Joint Staffing Designator (JSD) of JROC Interest. Having the authorities to approve Special OperationsPeculiar capability documents also gives SOCOM the responsibility for certifications 

and/or endorsements of all documents designated JCB Interest and below. 

d. In the cases where the Joint Staff has responsibility (JROC Interest) for certification and endorsements, and the JROC has validation authority, USSOCOM documents will be endorsed by the SOCREB, the Joint Staff organization will certify, 

endorse, or waive each item, and provide an associated memo to the Joint Staff 

Gatekeeper to support staffing and validation. 

Mr. WILSON. How is SOCOM working to resource Theater Special Operations 

Command intelligence requirements? 

General VOTEL. a. Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) intelligence requirements are resourced in accordance with authoritative guidance outlined in 

DODD 5100.03, Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), USSOCOM Capabilities and 

Planning Guidance (CPG), and Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Preparation 

Instructions (PPI). TSOC’s intelligence requirements are assessed to ensure they are 

SOF-peculiar, supported by validated requirements, and satisfy USSOCOM’s highest priorities. 

b. TSOCs intelligence requirements appropriate for DIA MIP funding are submitting through the Intelligence POM (IPOM) process, whereas TSOC intelligence requirements that meet SOF current and future mission requirements are submitted 

through the POM process are resourced with MFP–11 and MFP–3. Validated TSOC 

intelligence priority shortfalls may be supported and resourced through annual unfunded requirement (UFR) process. 

Mr. WILSON. What role is SOCOM playing in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 

new Defense Clandestine Service? 

General VOTEL. USSOCOM’s relationship to DIA/DCS is similar to that of the 

military services. Specific details were provided at a classified level in response to 

House Appropriations Committee–Defense (HAC–D) requests for information (RFIs) 

on 27 Aug 2014 by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

USSOCOM provided additional information in response to RFIs from the House Appropriations Committee on Surveys and Investigations (HAC S&I). 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. General Votel, I’m aware that almost every Army Special Operations unit under your command is requesting a commercially available product to 

fill capability gaps in their intelligence requirements. These units are saying that 

the current program of record does not meet their operational needs. Given this information and the obvious failure of DCGS-SOF to provide this capability, how do 

you plan to hold program managers and staff accountable to the tax payer and the 

men and women under your command that expect a working system? 

General VOTEL. Special operations personnel have always had a high demand for 

advanced analytical capabilities to understand and target enemy networks. During 

the course of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, some special operations units 

relied on capabilities provided by Palantir to meet these requirements. In 2009 

USSOCOM directed that Palantir be used as an interim solution for advanced analytics. To date, USSOCOM has invested over $30M in fielding Palantir for Special 

Operations Forces (SOF). This interim solution continues to deliver advanced analytic capabilities to our operators and intelligence personnel and makes a difference 

on the battlefield. 

USSOCOM continues to field Palantir to units supporting counter-ISIL operations 

in Iraq and Syria. However, the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act directed all DCGS programs to openly compete requirements for commercial solutions. 

Therefore, USSOCOM released an All-Source Analytic Environment (ASAE) Request for Proposal to industry to create a long-term program of record solution to 

address these requirements. USSOCOM is currently in vendor source selection for 

this program, and will look to employ the best solution as part of DCGS–SOF. 

DCGS–SOF continues to provide Full Motion Video Processing, Exploitation and 

Dissemination (FMV PED) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) enablers to SOF. 

These capabilities are fully fielded and employed every day. Deployed operators and 
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intelligence personnel don’t need to request the DCGS–SOF Enterprise SOF Data 

Layer, because it is already there providing access to key information. 

The program manager and the entire DCGS–SOF team are keenly aware of the 

need to deliver capability to the operator and value to the taxpayer. Since 2008, the 

DCGS–SOF team has been providing exceptional capability to the SOF operator 

supporting the FMV PED and SIGINT missions. Over the long term, the team is 

committed to maintaining an advanced analytic capability that delivers on targeting 

enemy networks. DCGS–SOF will remain the overarching program we use to deliver 

outstanding intelligence capability to our special operators around the globe. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. What is the status of FY15 Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund 

(CTPF) execution? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. First, thank you for making the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) available to the Department of Defense to provide additional 

support and assistance to partner nation security forces for counterterrorism and 

crisis response activities. Since my designation as the Department’s fund manager 

in February of this year, I have been overseeing the development of an implementation strategy that provides support in an efficient and effective manner. 

On February 24, 2015, and March 16, 2015, the Department of Defense notified 

Congress of its intent to transfer $220.5 million and $279.5 million, respectively, 

from the fund to Operation and Maintenance accounts to provide immediate assistance to vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrians and groups for the remainder of fiscal year (FY) 2015. The Syria Train and 

Equip program consists of four inter-related efforts to train and equip, sustain, and 

increase the numbers of appropriately vetted Syrian opposition forces. 

Additionally, the Department has developed partnership concepts for five regions 

in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command 

(USAFRICOM) areas of responsibility: the Levant, Yemen, the Lake Chad Basin, 

Sahel-Maghreb, and East Africa. Interagency review of these papers was completed 

on Friday, April 3. The concepts will serve as the strategic foundation for the development of program-level proposals to support counterterrorism and crisis response 

activities in each of the five regions. These activities may include partner nation capacity building, U.S. forces enabling support, and other activities authorized under 

a number of different authorities available to the Department. 

USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM planners have begun developing program-level 

proposals to support each of the five partnership concepts. These proposals are currently being reviewed to identify which can be executed in FY 2015, and which 

should be scheduled for execution in FY 2016. Programs to support the partnership 

concept for Yemen will be delayed until the security and political situation there improves sufficiently. 

Mr. BROOKS. What are the Department’s priorities and the process for allies and 

the Services to request FY15 CTPF funding? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. In determining Department of Defense (DOD) priorities for 

Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) funding that are consistent with the 

new authority, we have worked closely with an interagency counterterrorism board 

in developing a governance mechanism that uses the National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism Tier Focus Areas as a foundation for our effort. We determined 

that these focus areas, that are used to inform regional and functional CT strategies, would be appropriate in developing strategies and programs to be funded 

under the CTPF. Additionally, we excluded Tier Focus Areas that are already wellfunded; for example, Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Using the Tier Focus Areas as a starting point, SOLIC leadership oversaw the development of strategic-level partnership concepts for five regions in the U.S. Central 

Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) areas of responsibility: the Levant, Yemen, the Lake Chad Basin, Sahel-Maghreb, and East Africa. These concepts were developed in close coordination with USAFRICOM, 

USCENTCOM, the Joint Staff, relevant regional and functional offices within OSD 

Policy, and DOD Comptroller. They were subsequently reviewed by other departments and agencies through an NSC-led interagency review process that concluded 

on April 3, 2015. 

Now that these concepts are finalized, they will serve as the strategic foundation 

for the development of program-level proposals to support CT and crisis response 

activities in each of the five regions. Country teams have been working closely with 

partner nation militaries to identify capability gaps and assess current and future 

absorptive capacity. Based on that information, USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM 
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will submit program-level proposals to support each of the five partnership concepts. 

These program-level proposals will be analyzed and prioritized based on their urgency and executability. 

Mr. BROOKS. When will the committee receive the Department’s reprogramming 

requests for use of FY15 CTPF? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. On February 24, 2015, and March 16, 2015, the Department 

notified Congress of its intent to transfer $220.5 million and $279.5 million, respectively, from the fund to Operation and Maintenance accounts to continue to provide 

immediate assistance to vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups for the remainder of fiscal year (FY) 2015. 

I anticipate that the Department will submit other reprogramming requests within the next 60 days to fund other programs of assistance identified to support partner and U.S. counterterrorism and crisis response activities, as program-level proposals are approved. As part of the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) 

proposal review process, CTPF stakeholders are determining which proposals can be 

executed in FY 2015, and which should be scheduled for execution in FY 2016. 

Mr. BROOKS. Has the Department released the detailed FY16 CTPF budget justification material? If not, does it plan to release the FY16 CTPF justification details? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. The Department of Defense released the fiscal year 2016 

Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund budget justification material on Monday, April 

6, 2015. 

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