[Cite as Reese v. Reese, 2023-Ohio-360.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

George L. Reese, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, :

No. 22AP-309

v. : (C.P.C. No. 13DR-4112)

Acrila L. Reese, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellee. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on February 7, 2023 

On brief: Thomas M. McCash, for appellant. Argued:

Thomas M. McCash.

On brief: Acrila L. Reese, pro se.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,

Division of Domestic Relations

DORRIAN, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, George L. Reese, appeals the May 2, 2022 decision and 

entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,

granting in part Acrila L. Reese's, defendant-appellee, objections to the decision of the 

magistrate filed April 1, 2021, and denying appellant's motion to modify the shared 

parenting plan. Because we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Appellant and appellee were married on July 12, 2003 and had one child born 

on April 25, 2009. On November 5, 2013, appellant filed a complaint for divorce from 

appellee. On June 17, 2014, the parties filed a Shared Parenting Plan ("2014 Shared 

Parenting Plan") for the care and custody of their child. The trial court issued a judgment 

entry-decree of divorce ("Divorce Decree") on September 5, 2014, which adopted the 2014 
No. 22AP-309 2

Shared Parenting Plan. At the time of the trial court's Divorce Decree, both parties resided 

in Franklin County; however, the trial court noted in the Divorce Decree that appellee 

planned to move to Chicago. The 2014 Shared Parenting Plan designated appellee as the 

primary residential parent for school purposes. Additionally, appellant agreed to "assume 

all expenses related to the transportation of the child back and forth between Chicago, IL 

and Columbus, OH." (Divorce Decree at 8.) Upon agreement by both parties, the child 

relocated to Chicago, Illinois with appellee. On May 17, 2017, appellant filed a motion to 

modify child support. In addition to requesting a change in the private health insurance 

orders of the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan, appellant requested his child support be changed 

to $0 based on the costs he incurred traveling back and forth from Columbus to Chicago. 

The motion was referred to a magistrate who found, based on appellant's testimony, a

change of circumstances warranted a modification of the child support orders. On 

February 16, 2018, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision and granted appellant's 

motion and ordered appellant be reimbursed by appellee for one-half of his travel expenses 

necessary to exercise parenting time each month, not to exceed $100 per month.

{¶ 3} Subsequently, on August 6, 2019, appellant filed a motion for emergency 

custody following an incident in the Bahamas which occurred while appellee and the child

were on vacation. Appellee was detained by Bahamian law enforcement authorities for use 

of corporal punishment against the child who was aged ten at the time. The Bahamas 

Department of Social Services contacted appellant, who retrieved the child from the 

Bahamas. On August 8, 2019, appellant filed a motion to modify the 2014 Shared Parenting 

Plan. On August 9, 2019, the trial court filed an interim order which granted appellant's 

emergency custody order and made him the child's temporary residential parent and legal 

custodian. Attorney Necol Russell Washington, who previously had been appointed as the 

child's guardian ad litem ("GAL"), was re-appointed as the child's GAL on August 23, 2019.

On February 26, 2020, the GAL submitted his report which recommended what essentially 

amounted to a role reversal of the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan, to designate appellant as 

the primary residential parent.

{¶ 4} The motion to modify the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan was referred to a

magistrate and the magistrate held a hearing. The magistrate also conducted an in-camera 

interview of the child. On April 1, 2021, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision

which granted appellant's motion to modify the shared parenting plan. The magistrate 
No. 22AP-309 3

determined the incident in the Bahamas amounted to abuse and, as such, constituted a 

change of circumstance. The magistrate's decision designated appellant as primary 

residential parent. Appellee filed timely objections to the decision of the magistrate on 

April 14, 2021.

{¶ 5} The trial court held a hearing on the objections on January 12, 2022.

Subsequently, the trial court conducted an in camera interview of the child on January 18,

2022 in the presence of the GAL. On May 2, 2022, the trial court filed a decision and entry 

which granted in part appellee's objections to the decision of the magistrate and denied

appellant's motion to modify the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 6} Appellant appeals and assigns the following three assignments of error for 

our review:

[I.] THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 

OVERTURNING THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION OF 

APRIL 1, 2021 IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION AND IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY OR 

UNCONSCIONABLE AS THE COURT IGNORED ALL THE 

FACTORS OF R.C. 3109.04, DETERMINED THAT THE 

MAGISTRATE PROPERLY DETERMINED FACTUAL 

ISSUES AND APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE LAW, AND 

SUBSEQUENTLY SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN JUDGMENT 

FOR THAT OF THE MAGISTRATE SOLELY ON THE 

WISHES OF THE CHILD.

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT IN OVERTURNING THE 

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION REINSTATED THE ORIGINAL 

SHARED PARENTING PLAN AND IGNORED THE 

MODIFICATION THAT WAS ISSUED ON FEBRUARY 16,

2018.

[III.] DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL ARGUED FOR THE COURT 

TO ESSENTIALLY TO INVOKE THE TENDER YEARS 

DOCTRINE AS A BASIS FOR OVERTURNING THE 

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION.

III. Role of the Trial Court in Considering Objections to a Magistrate's 

Decision 

{¶ 7} We begin our discussion focusing on the role of the trial court when 

objections are filed to a magistrate's decision. Civ.R. 53(D)(4) states in relevant part: 
No. 22AP-309 4

(a) Action of court required. A magistrate's decision is not 

effective unless adopted by the court.

(b) Action on magistrate's decision. Whether or not 

objections are timely filed, a court may adopt or reject a 

magistrate's decision in whole or in part, with or without 

modification. A court may hear a previously-referred matter,

take additional evidence, or return a matter to a magistrate.

* * *

(d) Action on objections. If one or more objections to a 

magistrate's decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on 

those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall 

undertake an independent review as to the objected matters 

to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the 

factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Before so 

ruling, the court may hear additional evidence but may refuse 

to do so unless the objecting party demonstrates that the party 

could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that 

evidence for consideration by the magistrate.

IV. Standard of Review

{¶ 8} "When reviewing the propriety of a trial court's determination in a domestic 

relations case, an abuse of discretion standard is used." Pallone v. Pallone, 10th Dist. No. 

17AP-409, 2017-Ohio-9324, ¶ 10. "A trial judge's determination under R.C. 3109.04 that 

warrants a change of custody should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."

Williams v. Sardari, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-761, 2015-Ohio-2495, ¶ 8, citing Davis v. 

Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415 (1997). "The discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody 

matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the 

impact the court's determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned." Miller v. 

Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). "Modifications to a shared parenting plan are likewise 

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Rankin at ¶ 11.

{¶ 9} " 'The term "abuse of discretion" * * * implies that the court's attitude is 

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.' " Williams at ¶ 9, quoting Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

V. Analysis

{¶ 10} Appellant's first and third assignments of error allege the trial court abused 

its discretion in its allocation of parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the minor 
No. 22AP-309 5

child. R.C. 3109.04(E) governs cases where a party is requesting to modify the terms of the 

parties' shared parenting plan. Rankin at ¶ 13. 

{¶ 11} R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) states in relevant part:

The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental 

rights and responsibilities for the care of children unless it 

finds, based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree or 

that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree,

that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child,

the child's residential parent, or either of the parents subject to 

a shared parenting decree, and that the modification is 

necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In applying 

these standards, the court shall retain the residential parent 

designated by the prior decree or the prior shared parenting 

decree, unless a modification is in the best interest of the child 

and one of the following applies:

* * *

(iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of environment 

is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment 

to the child.

{¶ 12} "[The] modification of the designation of residential parent and legal 

custodian in a shared-parenting plan is a modification of the decree allocating parental 

rights and responsibilities, which requires a change-in-circumstances finding under R.C.

3109.04(E)(1)(a)." Bruns v. Green, 163 Ohio St.3d 43, 2020-Ohio-4787, ¶ 19, citing Fisher 

v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, ¶ 26. Furthermore, the party seeking 

modification bears the burden of proof in showing the modification is in the child's best 

interest. Johnson-Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 10th Dist. No. 00AP-1073 (July 26, 2001).

" 'The legislature, through R.C. 3109.04, concerning the allocation of parental rights and 

responsibilities for the care of children, or "shared parenting," seems to instruct that once 

allocation is established, whether by decree (declaring that shared parenting shall occur) or 

according to a plan (implementing the decree or order), changing it is presumed to be illadvised unless it can be established foremost that the change will be in the best interest of 

the children.' " Rankin at ¶ 27, quoting Myers v. Wade, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-667, 2017-

Ohio-8833, ¶ 10. In such cases, the best-interest standard applies, requiring the 

examination of circumstance as guided by the non-exclusive best interest factors 

articulated in R.C. 3109.04(F). See Rankin at ¶ 15. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) states:
No. 22AP-309 6

In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this 

section, whether on an original decree allocating parental 

rights and responsibilities for the care of children or a 

modification of a decree allocating those rights and 

responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors,

including, but not limited to:

(a) The wishes of the child's parents regarding the child's care;

(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers 

pursuant to division (B) of this section regarding the child's 

wishes and concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and 

responsibilities concerning the child, the wishes and concerns 

of the child, as expressed to the court;

(c) The child's interaction and interrelationship with the 

child's parents, siblings, and any other person who may 

significantly affect the child's best interest;

(d) The child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and 

community;

(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in 

the situation;

(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate courtapproved parenting time rights or visitation and 

companionship rights;

(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support 

payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that 

parent pursuant to a child support order under which that 

parent is an obligor;

(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of 

either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded 

guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted 

in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether 

either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated 

an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been 

determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful 

act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent 

or any member of the household of either parent previously 

has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 

2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense 

involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the 

offense was a member of the family or household that is the 
No. 22AP-309 7

subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent or 

any member of the household of either parent previously has 

been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense involving a 

victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a 

member of the family or household that is the subject of the 

current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in 

the commission of the offense; and whether there is reason to 

believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a 

child being an abused child or a neglected child;

(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents 

subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and 

willfully denied the other parent's right to parenting time in 

accordance with an order of the court;

(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is 

planning to establish a residence, outside this state.

{¶ 13} In applying R.C. 3109.04(E)(1) and (F)(1), the trial court noted that it largely 

agreed with the magistrate's recitation of the facts, except as to several pertinent findings 

of the magistrates. The trial court did not agree and did not adopt the magistrate's findings 

that the Bahamas incident was tantamount to abuse and exceeded reasonable corporal 

punishment. The court did not adopt the magistrate's finding that the Bahamas incident 

was not the first incident of abuse. Rather, the court noted that in its own in camera 

interview with the child, she indicated she remembered very little about the incident,

"nobody got slapped, hit or anything," that other passengers overreacted, and she was more 

upset by being separated from her mother by the authorities and having to spend the night 

in a Bahamian group home. (Decision at 8.) The trial court did not adopt the magistrate's 

findings that the child expressed only a "slight" preference for residing with her mother. 

(Decision at 10.) Rather, the court noted that its review of the transcript from the 

magistrate's in camera interview with the child revealed the child's clear preference for 

living with her mother and the child expressed she felt "equally safe" with both parents. 

(Decision at 6.) The court further noted that in its own in camera interview with the child,

the child expressed she wished to return to live primarily with her mother. The court noted 

the child expressed that her relationship with her father was fine and they have many "good 

times" together. (Decision at 9.) However, father is now remarried and the household in 

which the child resides with father has expanded with step-mother, step-grandmother, and 

two half-siblings. 
No. 22AP-309 8

{¶ 14} Ultimately, the trial court could not conclude that the Bahamas incident 

represented a change in circumstances. Also, taking into consideration the new living 

situation after father's remarriage, the trial court could not conclude that having the child

permanently live with father was in her best interest. Finally, the court could not conclude 

that "any harm likely to befall [the child] override[s] [her father] continuing to so serve [as 

residential parent]." (Decision at 10.) The court found that "the totality of the circumstances 

in this case in addition to the best interests of the minor child support the conclusion that 

the child should principally reside with her mother ([appellee]) in Chicago and [appellant]

shall enjoy parenting time pursuant to the June 17, 2014 Agreed Shared Parenting Time,

which the Court reinstates, except as modified by the April 1, 2021 Magistrate Decision to 

the extent outlined herein." (Decision at 11.) 

{¶ 15} Appellant argues the trial court ignored the factors of R.C. 3109.04 in its 

decision. However, appellant does not specifically challenge the trial court's determination 

that the incident in the Bahamas did not qualify as a change of circumstance such that the 

trial court could modify the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan incorporated into the Divorce 

Decree. As such, this court need not determine whether the trial court properly considered 

the change of circumstance factor in its decision. 

{¶ 16} Instead, appellant's argument focuses on the trial court's analysis of the 

child's best interest as the basis of his assertion of abuse of discretion. Appellant claims the 

trial court erred by "substitut[ing] its own judgment" for that of the magistrate. 

(Appellant's Brief at 9.) However, appellant relies on an incorrect understanding of the 

trial court's role in this matter. By independently reviewing the magistrate's decision and 

exercising independent judgment, the trial court acted as directed by Civ.R. 53.

{¶ 17} Appellant argues the trial court did not afford proper deference to the 

decision of the magistrate. However, the trial court is the trier of fact in the determination 

of parental rights and obligations. See Williams, 2015-Ohio-2495, at ¶ 8. As noted 

previously, "[i]f one or more objections to a magistrate's decision are timely filed, the court 

shall rule on those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an 

independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly 

determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law." (Emphasis added.) 

Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). In fact, this court "has * * * rejected the argument that the trial court 

should act as a deferential reviewing court in addressing objections." Holland v. Holland,
No. 22AP-309 9

10th Dist. No. 97APF08-974 (Jan. 29, 1998). Here, appellant's argument that the trial court 

was "essentially the reviewing court" is inaccurate as it relates to the trial court's role. 

(Appellant's Brief at 21.) The trial court is not an appellate court and is therefore not held 

to the more deferential standard of abuse of discretion. Instead, the trial court 

independently reviews magistrate decisions. " 'Civ.R. 53 contemplates a trial court's 

making an independent analysis of the underlying issues in the [magistrate's decision]. 

Thus, the trial court must undertake the equivalent of a de novo determination, in light of 

any filed objections, when independently assessing the facts and conclusions contained in 

the [magistrate's decision].' " Holland, quoting DeSantis v. Soller, 10th Dist. No. 89AP1374 (Nov. 8, 1990). Here, the trial court agreed with and disagreed with some of the 

magistrate's findings and conclusions. Notably, as to the magistrate's findings and 

conclusions with which the trial court disagreed and did not adopt, the trial court 

determined the facts presented did not show that the incident in the Bahamas indicated a 

change in circumstance, nor would the appointment of appellant as the primary residential 

parent summarily be in the best interest of the child. 

{¶ 18} In mischaracterizing the trial court's role, appellant erroneously asserts the 

magistrate was better situated to make factual findings. However, as the ultimate trier of 

fact, the trial court can fully rely on the record and all evidence, including transcripts, when 

determining judgment. The trial court can also hear additional evidence. "Whether or not 

objections are timely filed, a court may adopt or reject a magistrate's decision in whole or 

in part, with or without modification. A court may hear a previously-referred matter, take 

additional evidence, or return a matter to a magistrate." Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b). In fact, the 

trial court in the present case did hear additional evidence, having conducted an evidentiary 

hearing and another in camera interview of the minor child prior to issuing its decision. 

{¶ 19} The trial court indicated that in addition to applying R.C. 3109.04(E)(1) and 

(F)(1), it applied R.C. 3109.051. R.C. 3109.051(C) states in relevant part: 

In * * * resolving any issues related to the making of any 

determination with respect to parenting time or visitation 

rights or the establishment of any specific parenting time or 

visitation schedule, the court, in its discretion, may interview 

in chambers any or all involved children regarding their 

wishes and concerns.

 Furthermore, R.C. 3109.04(B)(1) states in relevant part: 
No. 22AP-309 10

When making the allocation of the parental rights and 

responsibilities for the care of the children under this section 

in an original proceeding or in any proceeding for 

modification of a prior order of the court making the 

allocation, the court shall take into account that which would 

be in the best interest of the children. In determining the 

child's best interest for purposes of making its allocation of 

the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the child 

and for purposes of resolving any issues related to the making 

of that allocation, the court, in its discretion, may and, upon 

the request of either party, shall interview in chambers any or 

all of the involved children regarding their wishes and 

concerns with respect to the allocation.

The trial court here independently reviewed the transcript from the magistrate's in camera 

interview with the child and also conducted its own in camera interview with the child on 

January 18, 2022, 14 months after the magistrate conducted his in camera interview on 

November 20, 2020. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by making an independent 

determination as to whether modifying the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan was in the child's 

best interest. 

{¶ 20} Appellant's third assignment of error contends appellee erred in urging the 

trial court to rely on the "tender years doctrine." (Appellant's Brief at 24.) The assignment 

of error itself focuses on the arguments made by appellee's counsel, but does not allege the 

trial court relied on the tender years doctrine in making its decision. Rather, appellant 

argues the trial court erred by relying too heavily on the child's word when determining 

what would be in the child's best interest. Appellant argues "[the trial court] concentrates 

primarily on the choice of the minor child and substitutes [its] opinion that a minor child,

a female, should be raised by her Mother because of the minor child[']s current choice and 

that such choice outweighs all other factors, testimony and evidence presented [in] this 

case."

1

 (Appellant's Brief at 25.) This assignment of error serves simply to elaborate on the 

first assignment of error alleging again that the trial court abused its discretion.

1 In his reply brief, appellant argues the court did not consider evidence of parental alienation. However, that 

is not the allegation of error in the assignment of error. Nor was such alleged error raised in the merit brief. 

"This court rules on assignments of error, not mere arguments." (Internal quotations omitted.) Jordan v. 

Truelight Church of God in Christ, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-500, 2021-Ohio-2507, ¶ 9, quoting Huntington Natl. 

Bank v. Burda, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-658, 2009-Ohio-1752, ¶ 21, quoting App.R. 12(A)(1)(b); Williams v. 

Barrick, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-133, 2008-Ohio-4592, ¶ 28 (holding appellate courts "rule[] on assignments of 

error only, and will not address mere arguments").
No. 22AP-309 11

{¶ 21} In reviewing the trial court's best-interest determination and the factors on 

which it relied, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion. To reiterate, the trial 

court's charge was to review whether modifying the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan to 

permanently, rather than on an emergency basis, assign appellant, rather than appellee, as 

the primary residential parent was prompted by a change in circumstance that would be in 

the best interest of the child. The trial court expressly considered in its decision the 

Bahamas incident which prompted the emergency motion to modify, the expressed wishes 

of the child made during in camera interviews with the magistrate and trial court, as well 

as the child's new living situation with father as a result of his remarriage. We also note the 

trial court stated "[f]ailure to mention a specific fact, testimony or evidence does not mean 

it was not considered by the Court." (Decision at 5.) 

{¶ 22} The trial court's decision reveals the court's concern with the child's safety. 

First, the trial court pointed out that the Bahamas incident occurred three years prior, in 

2019. Second, the court pointed out that since that time, any restrictions on appellee's time 

with the child had been loosened to the point of non-existence, indicating a lack of concern 

over the child being in the unsupervised presence of appellee. The trial court also took the 

child's age into consideration, concluding that at age 13, the child was able to self-protect 

in case of any emergency. Finally, the trial court did not consider the Bahamas incident 

ongoing, instead finding the emergency which had initiated appellant's motion to modify 

the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan had "long since abated." (Decision at 9.)

{¶ 23} Taking all this into consideration, we cannot find the trial court abused its 

discretion in granting in part appellee's objection to the magistrate's decision and in 

denying appellant's motion to modify the shared parenting plan. Accordingly, we overrule 

the first and third assignments of error. 

{¶ 24} Appellant's second assignment of error asserts the trial court's decision

ignored a February 16, 2018 modification to the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan. This 

argument is not well-taken for several reasons. First, the trial court expressly stated it was 

vacating the magistrate's orders as to transportation costs. Second,the trial court's decision 

explicitly states that "[a]ll prior Court orders not modified herein shall remain in full force 

and effect." (Decision at 11.) Vacating the transportation provision in the magistrate's 
No. 22AP-309 12

order does not modify or terminate a previous order of the trial court. Therefore, the 

February 16, 2018 modification to the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan is still in full force and 

effect: 

Reimbursement for Travel Associated with 

Parenting Time. Father shall be reimbursed for one half of 

his travel expenses necessary to exercise parenting time each 

month, not to exceed $100.00 per month. Within 14 days of 

the completion of father's parenting time, father shall provide 

mother with receipts relating for his travel expenditures,

including but not limited to airfare, gasoline expenses, lodging 

and food. Mother shall reimburse father for one half of his 

travel, not to exceed $100 per month, within 14 days of 

receipts of father's travel expenditures.

{¶ 25} As such, there exists no reason to remand the case back to the trial court. 

Taking all this into consideration, we find, as it pertained specifically to transportation

costs, that the trial court reinstated the original Shared Parenting Plan as modified on 

February 16, 2018. Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.

VI. Conclusion

{¶ 26} For the aforementioned reasons, appellant's three assignments of error are 

overruled and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of 

Domestic Relations, is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. 

BEATTY BLUNT, P.J., and LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concur.