UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ KRISTIN SHELTON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commission of the Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee. No. 15-6220 (D.C. No. 5:14- CV-00575-M) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HOLMES , BALDOCK , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Kristin Shelton appeals the distri ct court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner’s denial of her applicati on for disability insu rance benefits and supplemental security income. Exercising jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of la w of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 18, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 B ACKGROUND Shelton applied for benefits in 2009 a lleging she became unable to work in 2008 at age 37 due to bipolar disorder. 1 After a hearing at wh ich she was represented by counsel, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ ) denied her claims. At step two of the five-step evaluation process used to assess social security claims, see Lax v.
Astrue , 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007), the ALJ found Shelton had severe impairments of mood disorder and post-tra umatic stress disorder (PTSD). The ALJ applied the special techniqu e for evaluating the severity of mental impairments by rating Shelton’s impairment in four functional areas. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a (describing special technique). The ALJ determined Shelton had no more than mild limitations in activ ities of daily living; moderate difficulties in the areas of social functioning and of concentration, persistence, and pace; and one to two episodes of decompensation. Based on those determinations and the other record evidence, the ALJ found that Shelton retained the residual functiona l capacity (RFC) to perform work at all exertional levels with the following non-ex ertional limitations: “[s]he must work [1] in relative isolation w ith limited contact with the general public and coworkers; [2] she can work around others but not in a cooperative teamwork context; and [3] she can perform one to two step tasks.” Aplt. App ., Vol. I at 41.

1 We will not recite all of the medical evidence here. The parties are familiar with the evidence and the relevant medi cal evidence is described accurately and thoroughly in the magistrate judge’s 33-page report and recommendation.3 Given this RFC, the ALJ determined at st ep four that Shelton couldn’t perform any of her past relevant work. At step five, considering her RFC, age, education, work experience, and the testimony of a voc ational expert (VE), the ALJ found that Shelton could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Therefore, the ALJ concluded Shelton wasn’t disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, and the district c ourt, adopting the report and recommendation (R&R) of the magistrate judge, affirmed the denial of benefits.
D ISCUSSION On appeal, Shelton argues the RFC isn’ t supported by substantial evidence because it doesn’t account for her anxiety and social limitations. She also argues the ALJ erred in assessing her credibility and th e weight of some medical opinions. We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s fact ual findings and whether the agency applied the correct legal standards. Vigil v. Colvin , 805 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015). But in doing so, we neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgmen t for the agency’s. Id

. Determination of Severe Impairments. Shelton argues the ALJ erred in not finding her anxiety disorder to be a severe impairment at step two. The argument fails both as a matter of law and on the evidence. “[T]he mere presence of a condition is not sufficient to make a step-two showing.” Williamson v. Barnhart , 350 F.3d 1097, 1100 (10th Cir. 2003). A “mental impairment must be of a nature and degree of severity sufficient to justify its consideration as the cause of failure to obtain any substantial gainful work.” Id . (internal quotation marks and emphasis4 omitted). As a matter of law, an ALJ need find only one severe impairment; “the failure to find a particular im pairment severe at step two is not reversible error when the ALJ finds that at least one other impairment is severe.” Allman v. Colvin , 813 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Ci r. 2016). Here, the ALJ found Shelton suffered from two severe impairments: mood disorder and PTSD. Moreover, despite Shelton’s assertion that she has anxiety or panic attacks, she fails to cite any medical evid ence in the record to suppor t her claim. And our review of the record confirms the R&R’s conclu sion that the record contains neither a diagnosis of anxiety disorder nor evidence that Shelton suffered from anxiety attacks or the symptoms associated with such attacks. St ate agency psychologists Drs. Hartley and Gerrity didn't find her to have any anxiet y-related disorders; nor did consultative psychologist Dr. Repanshek. Her treating ph ysician, Dr. Gutierrez, opined that she had PTSD, an anxiety-rela ted disorder, but desc ribed her as having only a slightly anxious or depressed mood or affect. Shelton asserts her anxiety causes extreme limitations in her concentration and attention but no medical evidence supports her assertion. She also claims that her anxiety cau ses her headaches, a work-related limitation, but again, no ev idence in the medical record links her headaches to any anxiety attacks or anxiet y disorder. Accordingly, we find no error in the ALJ’s omission of anxiet y disorder at step two. Further, to the extent that Shelton ar gues the ALJ’s RFC determination didn’t adequately account for her general complaints of feeling anxious, she doesn’t identify any anxiety-related symptoms. And the AL J included in his RFC determination the5 only potentially relevant a nxiety-related symptom identif ied in the record—Shelton’s inability to work around people. In additi on, the limitation to one-to-two-step tasks accommodates Shelton’s allegations of feeli ng anxious. We concl ude that in making the RFC determination, the ALJ recogni zed his obligation to consider all impairments. See Wilson v. Astrue , 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating ALJ must consider limiting effects of all impairments, even those found not disabling at step two). RFC Limitations. The ALJ found that Shelton had moderate difficulties with social functioning, and in his RFC assess ment, limited her to working “in relative isolation with limited contact with th e general public and coworkers” and to “work[ing] around others but not in a coop erative teamwork cont ext.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 41. Shelton contends the findi ng she could have limited contact with the public is not supported by the record , arguing the ALJ ignored evidence from Dr. Hartley, a state agency psychologist, w ho stated she “cannot relate to the general public.” Id. , Vol. II at 386. She asserts the ALJ’s RFC should have limited her to no contact with the public. We disagree. First, as noted in the R&R, Shelt on’s focus on the “limited contact” RFC limitation ignores the other limi tations in the RFC that she work in relative isolation and not in a teamwork context. Second, she ignores the remainder of Dr. Hartley’s opinion, which also found that she “can adapt to a work situation” and isn’t significantly limited either in her abi lity to get along with co-workers without exhibiting behavioral extremes or her abilit y to respond appropriatel y to supervisors.6 Id. at 385-86. Moreover, Shelton’s activitie s of daily living included spending time with her father and stepmother, shopping, going to dinner, and talking to friends on the phone. Dr. Hartley’s stat ement that she can’t relate to the ge neral public doesn’t overwhelm the substantial evid ence in the record that the ALJ identified and relied upon to conclude Shelton could work in re lative isolation in a non-teamwork context with limited public contact. Without supporting authority, 2 Shelton characterizes th e “relative isolation” limitation as insufficiently sp ecific for purposes of the AL J’s hypothetical question to the VE. But the ALJ properl y translated the medical ev idence regarding Shelton’s limited ability to interact with the general public into a clear restriction that she work in relative isolation, with the further expl anation that she have limited contact with the general public. We are satisfied that both the ALJ’s RFC assessment and his hypothetical question to the VE “relate[ d] with precision a ll of [Shelton’s] impairments.” Hargis v. Sullivan , 945 F.2d 1482, 1492 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted).

2 Shelton asserts, without citation, that an ALJ can’t use “nonspecific qualifying terms” because th ey don’t convey the extent of a claimant’s maximum capabilities. But this language derives from the Soci al Security Administration’s Program Operations Manual (P OMS), which states that medical consultants should not, in preparing a section III narrative of a mental RFC assessment, include any “nonspecific qualifying terms (e.g., modera te, moderately severe) to describe limitations” because “[s]uch terms do not descri be function and do not usefully convey the extent of [a] capacity li mitation.” POMS DI 24510.065.B.1.c., http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.ns f/lnx/0424510065 (empha sis omitted) (visited 9/30/2016).7 Shelton argues the evidence that she’ s been terminated from many jobs demonstrates that she can’t work with the public, but as the ALJ noted, many of her jobs required that Sheldon work with peopl e on a continuous basis, unlike the jobs identified by the VE. All of the jobs identified by the VE require interaction with people only in the context of taking inst ruction and involve insignificant or no interaction with the general public. Given the lack of any actua l conflict between the limitation Sheldon seeks of no interac tion with the general public, and the requirements of the jobs id entified by the VE’s testimony, any error by the ALJ is harmless. See Allen v. Barnhart , 357 F.3d 1140, 1145 ( 10th Cir. 2004) (finding harmless error when we can “confidently say that no reasonable administrative factfinder, following the correct analysis, could have reso lved the factual matter in any other way”). 3
The ALJ also found that Sh elton had moderate difficu lties with concentration, persistence, and pace. Shelton argues th e ALJ’s RFC determination that she can perform “one to two step ta sks” fails to incorporate th ese limitations. But a finding of moderate difficulties in concentrati on, persistence, or pace doesn’t, by itself require the ALJ to assess Shelton’s RFC as more restricted than would permit her to perform one or two step tasks. In Vigil , we held that an RFC limiting the claimant to

3 For the first time on a ppeal, Shelton argues the phr ase “relative isolation” should be interpreted to requi re that she work in comp lete physical isolation from others—a limitation she assert s is inconsistent with the jobs identified by the VE. But Shelton forfeited this issue by failing to raise it below. See Allman , 813 F.3d at 1330.8 unskilled work adequately addressed th e claimant’s modera te problems with concentration, persistence, and pace. 805 F.3d at 1204; see also Smith v. Colvin , 821 F.3d 1264, 1268-69, 1268 n.1 (10th Cir. 2016) (rejec ting similar argument and noting that psychologist’s nota tions of moderate limitations serve only as an aid to the ALJ’s RFC assessment). Shelton doesn’t explai n why, consistent with Vigil , the ALJ’s RFC’s limitations don’t adequately address her moderate problems with concentration, persistence, and pace. Consideration of Medical Opinion. Shelton argues that the ALJ failed to properly analyze the medical opinions of tr eating physician Dr. Gutierrez in reaching his RFC determination. The ALJ gave so me weight to Dr. Gutierrez’s statements concerning Shelton’s symptomology and no we ight to his opinion that she is unable to engage in work. Shelton says the AL J failed to cite the specific evidence from Dr. Gutierrez he gave some we ight to. We disagree. “[A]n ALJ must give good reasons fo r the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion [and] [t]he reasons must be sufficiently specific to ma ke clear to any subsequent reviewers th e weight the adjudicator ga ve to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reason for that weight.” Allman , 813 F.3d at 1332 (ellipses, citation and internal quotati on marks omitted). As thorou ghly discussed in the R&R, the ALJ detailed the evidence provided by Dr. Gutierrez and provided clear reasons for assigning some weight to the sympto mology evidence. Further, the ALJ sufficiently linked his findings to the eviden ce to enable our review, and substantial9 evidence supports those findings. We find no error in the ALJ’s assessment of the medical-source evidence. 4 Credibility. Shelton assert s the ALJ improperly analy zed her credibility. We disagree. Credibility determin ations are the province of the factfinder, and we will not upset them if they are supp orted by substantial evidence. Wilson , 602 F.3d at 1144. Findings “should be closely and affirmativ ely linked to substantial evidence.” Id . (internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ found Shelton’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only partially credible, listing ten specific reas ons, linked to the evid ence, for discounting her allegations. In particular, the AL J relied upon the inconsistency between Shelton’s allegations a nd the medical record. See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5 (July 2, 1996) (“One st rong indication of the cred ibility of an individual’s statements is their consistenc y, both internally and with other information in the case record.”) (superseded by SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (e ffective Mar. 28, 2016)). As to Shelton’s mental impairments, the ALJ noted there were no findings of disordered mentation, abnormalities of t hought, or evidence of side effects from medication; noted the evidence that Sh elton had no more than moderate psychological limitations and her primary mental limitati on was an inability to get along with others; and noted th e evidence that Shelton had an intact ability to engage

4 Shelton also briefly questions the AL J’s assessment of counselor Rodgers’ evidence (a one-paragraph letter), but as she properly concedes, Rodgers didn’t qualify as an acceptable medica l source. Thus his eviden ce wasn’t entitled to any weight.10 in abstract reasoning and aver age intellectual functioning, a nd an ability to carry out activities of daily living. Shelton doesn’t challenge a ny of the ALJ’s findings as to the inconsistencies between her allegations and the medical ev idence. Rather, sh e argues the reasons given by the ALJ don’t relate to concepts such as candor, honest y, integrity, or truthfulness, and thus his reas ons were improper. But contra ry to Shelton’s assertion, the ALJ’s findings as to the credibility of the claimant’s statements can’t be based on “intangible or intuitive notion[s]” of the claimant’s credibility. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (July 2, 1996). Instead, the reasons for the credibility finding “must be grounded in the evidence and articulated in the determination or decision.” Id. 5 Shelton also asserts the ALJ imprope rly relied on activities of daily living (ADL) in assessing her credib ility. However, the ALJ didn’ t rely on her ADLs as the sole basis for finding Shelton not fully cred ible. Instead, the ALJ properly identified this evidence as one of ten reasons s upporting his adverse credibility finding. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i) (stating th at an ALJ may consider ADLs as part of credibility evaluation); Wilson , 602 F.3d at 1146 (considering ALJ’s reliance on ADLs as permissible part of substantial evidence supporting credibility evaluation). We conclude the ALJ properl y considered the relevant factors and

5 Indeed, SSR 96-7p has been resci nded and replaced with SSR 16-3p, effective March 28, 2016 (after the ALJ’s decision here), in order to “clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an ex amination of an individual’s character,” and to “eliminat[e] the use of the term ‘credibility.’” 20 16 WL 1119029, at *10 (“In evaluating an individual’s sy mptoms, our adjudicators will not assess an individual’s overall character or tr uthfulness. . . .”).11 specifically set forth reco rd evidence relied upon in making his credibility determination. See Qualls v. Apfel , 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence supports the AL J’s decision and we discern no legal error. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge