THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF 9?ExKAs 

AUWIXN. TRXAH W37'11 

March 1, 1973 

Honorable David Finney 

Chairman, State Affairs Committee 

House of Representatives 

Austin, Texas 78711 

Opinion No. II-15 

Rc: Questions concerning 

constitutionality of 

portions of H. B. No. 1, 

a Bill regulating the 

activities of certain 

State officers and State 

employees, etc. 

Dear Representative Finney: 

At the direction of the State Affairs Committee of the House 

of Representatives you have furnished us with a copy of Committee 

Amendment No. 1 to II. B. 1, often referred to as "The Ethics Bill", 

with the request that we examine its provisions, generally, for 

constitutional questions and, particularly, with reference to 

several specific questions you have asked. 

The Bill declares it to be the policy of this State that no 

legislator, elected or appointed state officer, or state employee 

"shall have any interest, financial or otherwise! direct or indirect, 

or engage in any business transaction or professional activity or 

incur any obligation of any nature, which is in substantial conflict 

with the proper discharge of his duties to the public interest," and 

is designed to implement that policy. Its purpose is "to strengthen 

the faith and confidence of the people of Texas in their state government" by assuring that public business is being honestly and 

ethically conducted, a legitimate reason for the exercise of the 

police power. 

Legislative .efforts in that direction, however, must comport 

with the State and Federal Constitutions. To be valid, a law such 

as this must not violate the separation of powers principle; it 

must be reasonable and fair in its application in order to satisfy 

due process, privacy and equal protection righte; its penal provisions must not be vague; and it must not otherwise conflict with 

p. 63 
. I 

Honorable David Finney, page 2 (H-15) 

constitutional provisions. 

A separate right of privacy has recently been given formal 

recognition in Texas, described as the richt to be free from (1) 

s 

suffering, shame or humiliation to a oerson of ordinarv sensibilities. Billings v. Atkinson, 1G Tex.Sup.Ct.Jourl81, J'an. 27, 1973. 

Also see-~~-v7i------~.S. 

tion deci&~~%~----' 

93 S.Ct. 705 (1973), the AborA Cali%rnia eth& law requiring financial disclosure was invalidated by the Supreme Court of that State because 

it infringed too greatly upon such rights. 

Sea v. Young, 

--- City -.----------- of Carmel-by-the- -----. 

-. -. -. -. __. _. _ _ _ 466 P.2d 225 (Cal., 1970). 

It is our opinion that the public does have a legitimate 

interest in the current financial condiET?&' and recent financial 

history of those of its servants who are in positions of authority 

where the temptation to improperly exercise public discretion for 

private gain may coincide with the opportunity to do so, and that 

public inquiries may be searching in their scope so long as they 

are reasonably related to a purpose such as this bill implements. 

See Stein v. Hewlett, 289 D.D.2d 409 (Ill., 1972); Cf. New York 

Tirne??z,-'ii-;-%lEi%, tla-71~~aT,-------. 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed.Zd 686, 84 --------. s.Ct. 

On January 6, 1972, this office issued Opinion M-1039 declaring House Bill 203 (Acts 1971, 62nd Leg., ch. 962, pp. 2906-12), 

amending Article 6252-9, V.T.C.S., (and similar in some respects 

to the bill considered here) to be unconstitutional. At that time, 

the Stein -dpIi'ion caseriiz~,! had not been decided. Gn.the privacy issue, 

principally on the 1970 decision of the California Supreme Court in City-of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 

In the light of the .SEzxn ?%ss------- 

----- 

v--v. , we nowTGll~V&~f~e Cannel -----TSea opinion overbalanced the scales in favor of nrivate 

aii?i that a different shift in the balance will bk found by-the. 

Texas Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court when such 

questions reach them. If certain corrections are made, it is our 

opinion that the Bill could meet all the constitutional tests and, 

if enacted, be held valid. 

I. zsaration ------------------.------ of Powers Generally . 

The separation of governmental powers found in Article 2, 

p. 64 
. . 

Honorable David Finney, page 3 (H-15) 

Sec. 1 of the Constitution of Texas is designed to protect freedom 

and to prevent excesses. It was not intended to make effective 

action impossible, and a constitutional problem arises only when 

one branch of the government interferes with the functioning of 

another branch in a field constitutionally committed to it. State 

Board of Insurance v. 

-m-e-. 

--.--.--.- --.. ---------- Bet:?., 308 S.W.Zd 846 (Tex. 1958). 

In determining whether an exercise of power by one branch is 

an unauthorized invasion of the jurisdiction of another, the constitutional relationship of the various departments must be considered. The authority of the State Legislature is plenary, limited only by express or implied restrictions contained in or necessarily arising from the Constitution itself. Government --w-m Services -----. 

----- Insurance Underwriters ------ 

v. Jones, 368 S.W.Zd 5667Tex. I%Jl. The 

exercise%! sovernmen~>ii~~~itv over the svstem established for 

the administration of oublic affairs throuahoirt the state is a 

legislative matter [Perkins v,>ate, 367 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1463)1, 

as is the declaratioii?Z-EiZlic policy. 

The proposed act would apply alike to employees and officers 

of the state, with certain exceptions mentioned hereafter. It has 

three separate spheres of operation: (1)it requires financial disclosures; (2)it establishes directory standards of conduct and 

creates The State Ethics Commission to investigate reported deviations from those standards: and (3)it defines certain types of 

conduct as crimes subject to criminal penalties. We do not think 

the proposed act would unconstitutionally burden the executive or 

judicial departments in its general application. 

In setting standards with which all persons entrusted with 

public responsibility must comply, the Legislature does not encroach upon the constitutional prerogatives of the other branches 

of the government; it acts in their aid, as well as its own, to 

promote public confidence in the integrity of all branches of the 

government. 

So long as the Legislature does not interfere with the discharge by the other branches of their constitutional duties, no 

constitutional problem results. State Board of Insurance v. 

Betts, supra. Requiring ethical iiiii?~~e~~~~ed of 

~~l-&ther public servants can be no-unwarranted burd&. -Nor can 

requiring disclosure of relevant financial matters be condemned 

out of hand. And, it has always been a legislative function to 

define crimes and set punishments. 

p. 65 
. 

Bonorable David'Finney, page 4 (H-15) 

The Bill does not purport to vary the constitutional qualification for any office or position or to provide for the removal 

of officers or employees who fail to meet its standards, though 

a failure to comply may have other serious consequences. In the 

abstract, it creates no impediment to the proper functioning of 

any department of government; it does not on its face and, so far 

as we can see, will not in its operation, violate the separation 

of powers clause. 

II. Application - _-_-----___---_ to Judges _-. 

The Bill does not, in our opinion, conflict with Article 5, 

Section l-a of the Constitution which creates the Judicial Qualifications Commission. Primarily, that Section establishes a retirement system for judges , and provides for censure, involuntary 

retirement or removal from office for certain types of wilful or 

persistent conduct, or for disability. It does not define any 

conduct as criminal. Nor does it provide any punishment. 

The Constitutional Section contains no provision for disclosure of relevant information to the public. To the contrary, papers 

filed with the Judicial Qualifications Commission and its proceedings are required to be held in confidence. Section l-a of Article 

5 of the Constitution cannot be understood as withdrawing from the 

Legislature all power to regulate the conduct of judges. If that 

were the case, penal laws applying to the conduct of judicial officers would be void as to them (for example, see Articles 159, 160, 

184, 185, 196, and 197, Vernon's Texas Penal Code); and the Section 

would violate the Equal Protection provision of the Federal Constitution, inasmuch as it would insulate judges from the criminal 

sanctions to which other similarly situated persons are subject, 

and would seriously impair the system of checks and balances as 

applied to the limitation of judicial power. 

40 Tex. 

Cf. Ku_echler v. Wright, 

600 (1874); -- Ferguson m-m-v. v. Maddox, 263 S.W. 88% -(r&%?~~~~~ -- 

Subsection (13) of Section l-a of Article 5 expressly provides 

that the Section shall not be exclusive in its operation. ExaG. 

_-___.- v. State v.' 

n.r.e.7. 

457 S.W.Zd 72 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1970, writ reE 

Parenthetically, we note that Section 2(2) (B) of the Bill, 

if read literally, would make its provisions applicable to elected 

judges but not to judges appointed to elective positions, as, for 

example, to fill an unexpired term. This might pose a "classification" problem if left unaltered. 

p. 66 
Honorable David Finney, page 5 (H-15) 

It is our opinion that no conflict exists and that the Legislature may make the provisions of the Bill applicable to Judges. 

III. 

--_------- The Disclosure Provisions -------. 

The disclosure provisions of Section 4 of the Bill have "classification" problems which, if left uncorrected, would also affect 

its constitutionality, we believe. 

The Texas Supreme Court has reiterated the strong presumption 

that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the 

needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems 

made manifest by experience , and that its discriminations are 

based on adequate grounds. It is not the function of the Courts 

to judge the wisdom of a legislative enactment. The necessity or 

reasonableness of particular regulations imposed under the police 

power is a matter addressed to the legislative department whose 

determination in the exercise of a sound discretion is conclusive 

upon the Courts. Legislative enactments will not be held unconstitutional and invalid unless it is absolutely necessary to so 

hold. -----_- Texas State Board of Barber Examiners v: Beaumont-Barber -- 

454-S.W.Zd-7987~~~~~~--However;-l~~~l;iiive 

sometimes constitute improper exercises of police 

power and, when they do, they will be declared unconstitutional. 

-----_.---.------------ Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly, 165 S.W.Zd 446 (Tex., 1942). 

To be valid, a classification should be reasonable for the 

purpose of the legislation ,. should be based upon proper and justifiable distinctions (considering the purpose of the law), should 

not be clearly arbitrary, should not be a subterfuge to shield 

one class and unduly burden another, and should not be a cover to 

oppress a class unlawfully in its administration. ergo v. B orgo, 

402 S.W.Zd 143 (Tex. 1966); Buchanan v. State, 480 S.W:ZssaT -+- Tex;. 

Crim. 1972) ; McDonald v. Boa~-~~'-iion-~~~issioners of Chicagg., 

394 U.S. 802,-~~E~-~~a~,-T~~~~~~~-7m-7T~~~~;------------ 

Faced with a "classification" problem in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 

71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.Zd 225 (1971), The S~p~~-~~ii% of the 

United States, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Burger, said: 

"In applying that clause [the Equal Protection 

Clause], this Court has consistently recognized 

that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to 

States the power to treat different classes of 

persons in different ways . . . . The Equal 

p. 67 
. 

Ronorable David Finney, page 6 (H-15) 

Protection Clause of that amendment does 

however, deny to States the power to legjslate that different treatment be accorded to 

persons placed by a statute into different 

classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A 

classification must be reasonable not arbitrary, 

and must rest upon some ground of difference 

having a fair and substantial relation to the 

object of the legislation, so that all persons 

similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' 

Royster Guano Co. 

-.---- ~~5~~~-%:Ld. 989, 990, 

. . . (404 U.S. at 75-6). 

Aside from State officers, the classes recognized by the proposed Bill in its disclosure provisions are (1) employees earning 

state salaries of $15,000.00 or more, 

than that amount. 

and (2) those earning less 

The former must disclose; the latter need not. 

The declared purpose of the legislation is to further a policy 

that no state officer or employee engage in any transaction or 

incur any obligation in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his duties in the public interest. Certainly there is 

reason f?3?aZ?iGi%i~-that state employees commanding salaries above 

some certain high level will be engaged in the discharge of important duties in the public interest and ought to be subject 

to public examination, but it cannot be said with the same certainty 

that those receiving a salary below that figure have a lesser degree 

of public responsibility which does not require surveillance. When 

the State commands disclosure by some, but not all, and makes a 

crime of the failure to disclose, its lines of demarcation must 

meet Fourteenth Amendment tests. Further, its invasions of privacy must not go so far as to leave unbalanced the individual and 

public rights. 

A classification of those required to disclose, based solely 

on salary level, 

proposed. 

is unreasonable for the purpose of the legislation 

We believe the Supreme Court of Texas would overturn 

invasions of the right to privacy if the selection of those whose 

privacy is to be invaded is not based upon the relation of their 

function and authority vis a vis the proper discharge of public 

business and the exercise-d-<Gernmental power. While this does 

not mean the Legislature must become submerged in details, these 

general principals and guidelines must form the basis for the 

classification. The classification may be broad but it must not 

p.68 
. . 

Honorable David Finney, page 7 (H-15) 

be arbitrarily selective on a basis unrelated to the achievement of 

its purpose, and it must not be so vague as to leave its applicability 

to persons, or to groups of persons, in substantial doubt. 

The classification of "disclosable" interests can also involve 

Fourteenth Amendment considerations. Section 5 requires disclosure of some classes of property but not of others. Those discriminations are easier to justify in Fourteenth Amendment terms than 

the salary distinction in the classification of regulated persons. 

All persons required to disclose must disclose information determined by the Legislature to be important for the public to know. 

The choice of reportable information belongs to the Legislature 

and will not be questioned by the courts so long as it is not 

patently arbitrary or capricious. That the Bill may offer opportunities for the deception of the public by those who would appear 

to be open and frank while legally concealing important interests 

is a matter for legislative, not judicial, correction. A weak or 

easily evaded act may nevertheless be constitutional. 

Upon a different matter , classification of interests in property to require the disclosure of property "held" during a certain 

period, in our view, is no more violative of constitutional rights 

than the compelled-disclosure of property "acquired" or "sold" 

during that period. Each may have relevance to the likelihood of 

a person being influenced in his official decisions by considerations 

of private economic advantage to himself or his privi&. 

served in the Stein case 

vant and what ijnmot? 

, supra., who is to say what will 

As obprove releIV. ----------- The Criminal AsEcts -------. of Section 6 

The proposed Bill may not be altogether free from constitutional objection in the prohibitory aspects of Section 6. Subsections (a), (b), (cl ! (d) and (e) may need attention. A statute must 

not expose a potential act or to risk or detriment without giving 

fair warning of the nature of the proscribed conduct. A required 

course of conduct must not be stated in terms that oresent a substantial risk of miscalculation by those whose acts'are to be 

regulated. Texas Lizr Control Board v. Attic Club, 457 S.W.Zd 

41 (Tex., 19rr--- 

---------------- 

Except as modified by Art. 7, V.T.P.C., the rule is that penal 

provisions must be strictly construed. Strict construction of the 

provisions of Section 6 could result in some of them being declared 

invalid or inoperative. 

p.69 
Honorable David Finney, page 8 (H-15) 

Also, though the "salary" mechanism is not used, Section 6 

of the Bill, adopting the definitions of Section 2, has its own 

acute "classification of persons" 

alike to all State employees. 

problem because it does not apply 

We doubt that anyone can legitimately be exempted from acting with integrity when others must do 

so or face criminal punishment. 

V. ---.---.------------I-------~-----I The Section 7 Standards of Conduct 

Section 7 of the Bill concerns standards of conduct prescribed 

for all state officers and state employees covered by the Act. As 

written, the provisions of the Section are only directory. NO 

sanctions are imposed if they are violated. They are intended to 

furnish a salutory guide for official conduct and to furnish criteria which may be used for disciplinary purposes. However, a 

deviation from one or more of the standards is not a deviation 

from binding law, unless some~ other provision of law makes it so. 

VI. --------------------. The State Ethics Commission 

The Bill calls for the creation of the State Ethics Commission, 

the twelve members of which are to be appointed by various state 

officers. The appointive power is usually attached to the executive 

department, [Walker v. Baker, 196 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1946)], but 

Article 4, Se~~~?i-~-~?-~&' Constitution of Texas provides that 

vacancies in State offices, except legislative offices, will be 

filled by the Governor unless otherwise provided bx law. Clearly, -i----r--- ---- ---. 

the Legislature is constitutionally autho?lza-%z- otherwise" 

properly attach such power and, if it does, no unconstitutional 

encroachment results. A judicial office is not involved, (see 

Article 5, Section 2, Constitution of Texas) nor is the discharge 

of any constitutional duty impaired thereby. Cf. State ex rel 

Peden v. Valentine, 198 S.W. 1006 (Tex.Civ.App., Fc-&rth,-I?f17, 

~~rii-~~~,r7-~nrouse Bill No. 537, 256 S.W. 573 (Tex. 1923). 

In our opinion, '---~~~-~~~ssT~~-~~nternplated is a "Board" within 

the meaning of Article 16, Section 30a of the Texas Constitution 

permitting staggered six years term. 

Some of the powers given the Commission call for close examination, The power to issue advisory opinions [Section 10(c)] may 

conflict with the power invested in the Attorney General by Article 

4, Section 22 of the Constitution. A similar provision was ruled 

invalid in --------- Stein v. -----.' Howlett 289 N.E.2d 409 (Ill. 1972). 

Section 11 of the Bill gives the Commission the power to subpoena witnesses and the production of pertinent books, accounts, 

p. 70 
. 

. 

Honorable David Finney, page 9 (H-15) 

records and documents. Subsection (d) of Section 11 commands 

district courts, at the application of the Commission and without notice or hearing, to issue a judicial summons to a recalcitrant witness to appear and give whatever evidence is required 

by the Commission. ae~~~~~a;--. ----- If the witness still fails to give the evidence 

the Court is required to examine him and punish him for 

contempt if the Court finds that he did refuse ijixhout reasonable 

cause or legal excuse to be examined;--' or answer relevant questions, 

or produce pertinent records or documents. The procedure could 

violate the due process clauses of the Texas and Federal Constitutions by making the reluctant witness hazard the deprivation of 

his liberty without an opportunity to first obtain a judicial declaration of his rights. 

In the same vein, the absence of provision for judicial review 

has constitutional connotations. While the Commission has no power 

to exact civil or criminal penalties , or even to prefer charges, its 

fact-finding and reporting functions enable it to destroy reputations. Article 1 Section 13 of the Texas Constitution guarantees 

that ". . . every person, for an injury done him in his . . . 

reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." The Supreme 

Court of Texas recognizes an inherent right of appeal from administrative action where constitutional or property riahts are affected. Houston v. Blackbird, 394 S.W.2d 159 -(Tex: 1965); Board of 

--------, 

Fireme~~s-~~~~~~~-~~~e~nt -.---- --- - Fund Trustees of Texa&s v:, 

&xlton., 3% S.W.ld ~~~~~~-~~~~~F;r,--~~~~~~-~y-very well be 

ai&il%le anyway, but the Bill does not assure it. 

VII. Penalties --- --.--- 

Section 18 apparently relates to the "confidential' part of 

Section 6(a) as well as Section 17. As a result, Section 18 and 

Section 19(b) assess different punishments for the same indiscretion, 

though Section 18 has a wider application. Convictions under neither Section 18 nor Section 20 require a criminal intent. Under 

Section 18 disclosures to persons honestly believed authorized to 

receive the information will still earn the penalty. Under Section 

20(a) the falsity of an allegation is reason enough for punishment, 

under its terms, no matter what be the bona fides of the public 

concern which prompted it. To that extent, Section 20(a) constitutes a forbidden abridgment of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and cannot stand. New York Times Co. 

---.-------- v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Hd.Zd 686, 84 S.i%:-~~~-7~g~~:---' 

Moreover, the remainder of Subsection (a) of Section 20 conflicts 

in its punishment provision with the Penal Ccode. See Articles 1269, 

p. 71 
. . 

Honorable David Finney, page 10 (H-15) 

1270, and 1275, subdivision 5, V.T.P.C. 

Subsection (b) of Section 20 subjects complainants to civil 

penalties even when their allegations are true, if they are shown 

to have acted with mala fides. Short of a security danger or the 

impairment of the discharge of constitutional duties, we do not 

believe the First Amendment will permit any governmental repression, direct or indirect, of ----.--. truthful political information offered by private citizens, no matter what motivates its rcvelation. Also see Article 1 Section 8, Texas Constitution. 

VIII. _I_njunction _---_-. 

The provisions of Section 21 permitting private citizens to 

initiate injunction or mandamus proceedings to enforce the proposed Act do not purport to deprive elected officers of any constitutional authority, and interpreted in that light, we believe 

the provision to be valid. s_ence v.._F_enchler, ----I. 180 S.W. 597 

(Tex. 1915); Scott v. Board of Adjustment, 405 S.W.Zd 55 (Tex. 

1966). 

_-_-_---~-~~~~_----- -----__ 

IX. __._._.__- Severability ---- 

We think the three spheres of the Bill's operation (disclosure; 

standards and Ethics Commission; crimes and punishments) while 

concerning only one subject, are so distinct and independent in 

nature that any invalidity in one of them need not affect the 

validity of the others, except insofar as the Ethics Commission 

is designated the safekeeper of disclosure statements. 

X. _ Specific _,__.__ -_----_----.- Questions Answered ------. 

We believe that the foregoing discussion answers each of your 

questions. However, for ease of reference, we restate the questions and our opinion as follows: 

Question: “Does the public disclosure of financial activity and 

sZi-iii'?gquirred by Sections 4 and 5 of H. B. No. 1, violate a 

constitutionally protected right of privacy or any other constitutionally protected right as to either: 

(1) any one or more classes of persons required to file 

the statement; or 

(2) any one or more items or categories of financial interest or activity required to be disclosed and specifically as to 

p. 72 
Honorable David Finney, page 11 (H-15) 

the provisions in Section 5(a)(2), (3) and (5) in that these sections require the disclosure of certain interests that are held, 

acquired or sold during the reporting period?" 

_.-.-. Answer: -ii-.-. We answer "yes" as respects the classification of persons, 

and no" as respects disclosable interests and activities. 

Question: "Does Section 2(2)(d) of II. B. No. 1 conflict with 

Ar%~cl~-5 Section l-a(6) of the Texas Constitution by the omission 

of certain judges?" 

Answer: NO. Section 2 of the Bill, in defining "State officer" 

iii%i&s elected officers which, in turn, includes, under Section 

2(2) (D) judges of certain enumerated state courts, but does not 

include county and municipal judges, or judges appointed to office, 

all of whom are listed in subsection (6)A of Section l-a of Article 5, of the Constitution as being subject to removal for misconduct. There is no conflict because the Bill does not effect 

removal, but there is a classification problem in impliedly exempting aEp_ointees to elective offices from provisions applicable 

to persok elected to such positions. 

Question: "Do Sections 6 and 7 of the H. B. No. 1 conflict with 

E~~~l~T, Section l-a(6) of the Texas Constitution wherein the 

Constitution states that standards of ethics are to be measured 

by a 'wilful and persistent conduct' standard?" 

Answer: No. --.--.-. 

Question: --.-.-.-- -. 

"DO the provisions for prohibited acts and the statement 

O? standards in Section 6 and 7 of H. B. No. 1 and the standards 

stated in Article 5, Sec. 1-a(6)A of the Texas Constitution impose 

upon judges greater standards and punishments than those applicable 

to other state officials?" 

Answer: ----.--.-. No. 

Question: "Wae the constitutional grant of powers to the Judicial 

~iiiillIiE5kions [Commission] concerning the ethics of judges [a] grant 

which can be added to or changed by the Legislature?" 

Answer: No. But it concerns only retirement removal and official 

-_.-._.--- 

censure. The Legislature could not add to the constitutional grounds 

for removal of a judge. 

p. 73 
Honorable David Finney, page 12 (H-15) 

Question: --.-.- .-.-.--. "With respect to the judges, does the establishment of 

a State Ethics Commission and the provisions concerning its powers 

and procedures conflict with the provisions of Article 5, l-a, 

Sets. (2) through (9) and Sec. (11) of the Texas Constitution 

which creates the Judicial Qualifications Commission and states 

its powers and procedures?" 

Answer: -------.. NO. 

Question: "Does the subjection of judges to the jurisdiction of 

both-x%-State Ethics Commission and the Judicial Qualifications 

Commission, without subjecting other officials to both powers, 

violate the equal protection provisions of the U. S. Constitution?" 

Answer -----.-. : No. 

Question: ---. 

p-GGhment, 

"Does Section 19-b of H. B. No. 1 which imposes felony 

when considered with Article 5, Section l-a(5), (6) 

and (9) of the Texas Constitution which imposes on judges sanctions 

and punishment of enforced retirement, censure or removal from 

office, violate the equal protection provision of the U. S. 

Constitution?" 

Answer: _.-_- -.-. No. 

Question: "Does H. B. No. ~ - - I -. -- -. -,. 

1 conflict with the grant of powers over 

3udges to the Judicial Qualifications Commission?" 

Answer: No. --.-----. 

6 UMMARY 

So long as the classification of person and subjects 

covered is not unreasonable, the Legislature has the power 

to (1)require by ethics legislation that classes of state 

officers and employees in places of authority disclose information concerning relevant aspects of their financial 

life; (2)to provide criminal sanctions for specific unethical conduct (so long as the prohibited conduct is 

described with sufficient definition) ; and (3)to establish 

an Ethics Commission for investigating complaints of unethical conduct on the part of such state officers or 

employees, for making findings on those complaints, and 

for supervising the disclosure provisions. 

p. 74 
7 . 

.- 

,.‘. ,,,. 

ilonorable David Finney, page 13 (H-15) 

The fact that persons subject to the Ethics 

legislation may also be subject to other rules of 

law governing their ethical conduct, does not alone 

render the proposed legislation unconstitutional. 

Very truly yours, 

JOHN L. HILL 

c Attorney General of Texas 

p. 75