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1The OSC also proposed denial of any pending 

application to modify a DEA registration. Because 

there is no evidence in the record of a pending 

application to modify a DEA registration, and 

because the Government made no arguments 

regarding the factors in 21 U.S.C. 823(f), I will not 

address this proposal herein. 

2 I find that service of the OSC was proper. See 

ALJX 4 (Government’s Notice Regarding Service of 

Order to Show Cause and Position on Motion for 

Termination of Proceedings), Attachment 2 (Form 

DEA–12 (8–02) ‘‘Receipt for Cash or Other Items,’’ 

dated November 27, 2018). 

3As the ALJ noted in his decision, the 

Respondent is actually only registered in Schedules 

II–III. RD, at 6; GX 1; GX 2. 

4The fact that a respondent allows his 

registration to expire during the pendency of an 

OSC does not impact my jurisdiction or prerogative 

under the Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter, 

CSA) to adjudicate the OSC to finality. Jeffrey D. 

Olsen, M.D., 84 FR 68474 (2019). 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Ibrahim Al-Qawaqneh, D.D.S.; Decision 

and Order 

On November 20, 2018, the Assistant 

Administrator, Diversion Control 

Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, DEA or 

Government), issued an Order to Show 

Cause to Ibrahim Al-Qawaqneh, D.D.S. 

(hereinafter, Respondent), of Anaheim, 

California. Administrative Law Judge 

Exhibit (ALJX) 1 (Order to Show Cause 

(hereinafter, OSC)), at 1. The OSC 

proposes the revocation of Respondent’s 

Certificate of Registration No. 

BA6641472 and denial of any pending 

application to renew 1 such registration 

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5). 

I. Procedural History 

The OSC alleged that on July 2, 2014, 

Respondent ‘‘entered a plea of nolo 

contendere in the Superior Court of 

California, County of Orange, to a charge 

of Offering Unlawful Medi-Cal 

Remuneration, a felony. . . .’’ OSC, at 

1. The OSC further alleged that as a 

result of Respondent’s conviction, on 

September 30, 2015, the United States 

Department of Health and Human 

Services, Office of Inspector General 

(hereinafter, HHS/OIG), notified 

Respondent ‘‘of [his] mandatory 

exclusion from participation in all 

Federal health care programs for a 

minimum period of five years pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a)’’ (hereinafter, 

Exclusion Letter); and that ‘‘[m]andatory 

exclusion from Medicare is an 

independent ground for revoking a DEA 

registration pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(5).’’ OSC, at 2. 

The OSC notified Respondent of the 

right to either request a hearing on the 

allegations or submit a written 

statement in lieu of exercising the right 

to a hearing, the procedures for electing 

each option, and the consequences for 

failing to elect either option. Id. at 2 

(citing 21 CFR 1301.43). The OSC also 

notified Respondent of the opportunity 

to submit a corrective action plan. OSC, 

at 3 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)). 

By letter dated December 21, 2018, 

Respondent timely requested a hearing.2

ALJX 2 (Request for Hearing), at 1. The 

matter was placed on the docket of the 

Office of Administrative Law Judges and 

was assigned to Administrative Law 

Judge Charles Wm. Dorman (hereinafter, 

the ALJ). On December 28, 2018, the 

ALJ established a schedule for the filing 

of prehearing statements. ALJX 3 (Order 

for Prehearing Statements), at 1. The 

Government filed its prehearing 

statement timely on January 14, 2019. 

ALJX 5 (Government’s Prehearing 

Statement), at 1. Respondent twice 

missed the deadline for filing his 

prehearing statement and was granted 

two extensions. ALJX 6 (Order 

Rescheduling Prehearing Conference 

and Order to Respondent to File 

Prehearing Statement and to Show Good 

Cause Why Case should not be 

Terminated); ALJX 7 (Prehearing 

Ruling). Respondent filed his prehearing 

statement within the extended deadline 

on February 26, 2019, and 

supplemented the prehearing statement 

on March 7, 2019. ALJX 8 (Resp 

Prehearing), ALJX 10 (Resp Supp 

Prehearing). 

On February 28, 2019, the ALJ issued 

a prehearing ruling that, among other 

things, set out four agreed upon 

stipulations and established schedules 

for the remaining prehearing activities 

and for the hearing. ALJX 9 (Second 

Prehearing Ruling). The hearing in this 

matter took place in Los Angeles, 

California, and spanned two days. See 

ALJX 11 (Ruling Regarding Hearing 

Location); ALJX 12 (Notice of Hearing); 

and Transcript of Proceedings in the 

Matter of Ibrahim Al-Qawaqneh, D.D.S. 

(hereinafter, Tr.). The Government filed 

a posthearing brief, but Respondent did 

not. ALJX 16 (Government’s Proposed 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 

and Argument (hereinafter, Govt 

Posthearing)). The ALJ’s Recommended 

Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions 

of Law, and Decision (hereinafter, RD) is 

dated June 21, 2019. See RD. According 

to the ALJ, neither party filed 

exceptions to the RD and the deadline 

for doing so has passed. See Transmittal 

Letter from the ALJ, dated July 15, 2019. 

I have reviewed and agree with the 

procedural rulings of the ALJ during the 

administration of the hearing. 

Having considered the record in its 

entirety, I agree with the ALJ and find 

that the Government established ‘‘that 

HHS mandatorily excluded 

[Respondent] from Federal health care 

programs based on a program-related 

conviction.’’ RD, at 17. I also agree with 

the ALJ that the Respondent failed to 

accept responsibility for his 

misconduct, and that revocation is the 

appropriate sanction. See RD, at 28. I 

make the following findings of fact. 

II. Findings of Fact 

A. Respondent’s DEA Registration 

The parties stipulated that 

Respondent is registered with the DEA 

‘‘as a dentist practitioner in Schedules 

II–V 3 under DEA registration number 

BA6641472 at 1719 W. Romneya Drive, 

Anaheim, California 92801.’’ ALJX 9, at 

1; Government Exhibit (hereinafter, GX) 

1 (Controlled Substance Registration 

Certificate); and GX 2 (Certified 

Registration History of Respondent). 

According to Agency records, 

Respondent did not submit a renewal 

application and his registration expired 

on June 30, 2020.4 See also GX 1, GX 2. 

B. Government’s Case 

The Government’s documentary 

evidence consisted primarily of records 

from the Superior Court of California, 

County of Orange, regarding 

Respondent’s conviction; documents 

regarding the Dental Board of 

California’s accusation against and 

settlement with Respondent; and the 

HHS/OIG exclusion letter notifying 

Respondent of his Medicare and 

Medicaid exclusion. See GX 1–6. 

Additionally, the Government called the 

Diversion Investigator (hereinafter DI) as 

a witness both in the Government’s 

case-in-chief and in rebuttal. Tr. 15–20, 

82–86. 

DI testified regarding his professional 

background and about his involvement 

in the investigation into Respondent. Tr. 

17–18. DI testified that he obtained the 

HHS/OIG exclusion letter regarding 

Respondent’s five-year minimum 

exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid 

as part of his investigation. Id. at 18. He 

also testified that DEA has not received 

any information that the five-year 

minimum exclusion HHS/OIG imposed 

on Respondent has been modified, 

lifted, or otherwise rescinded. Id. at 18– 

19. On rebuttal, DI testified that he 

searched the Controlled Substance 

Utilization Review and Evaluation 

System for the 18 months prior to his 

testimony (approximately November 

2017 to May 7, 2019) and found just one 

controlled substance prescription issued 

by Respondent. Id. at 84–85. Having 

read and analyzed all of the record 


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5 Due to the conviction, on January 13, 2017, the 

Dental Board of California (hereinafter, Board) filed 

an accusation against Respondent. GX 5 

(Accusation from the Board, dated January 13, 

2017), at 1. The parties stipulated that Respondent 

and the Board agreed, ‘‘inter alia, that Respondent’s 

dental license would be revoked; however, the 

revocation was stayed, and Respondent’s dental 

license was placed on probation for three years 

subject to several terms and conditions.’’ ALJX 9, 

at 2; RD, at 6; see also GX 6 (Board Decision and 

Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order). In 

the settlement, Respondent ‘‘admit[ted] the truth of 

each and every charge and allegation in [the 

Board’s] Accusation.’’ GX 6, at 3. 

6The Government argued that Respondent’s 

registration should be revoked because he ‘‘has not 

demonstrated a need for a DEA [registration] in 

order to continue his practice of dentistry.’’ ALJX 

16, at 19; RD, at 26. The ALJ assessed and rejected 

this argument, and I agree. RD, at 26–27. 

Respondent’s need for a registration is not relevant 

to my determination of whether or not Respondent 

can be entrusted with a registration. See infra IV. 

7The ALJ found that this testimony was rebutted 

by DI’s testimony that Respondent had issued only 

one controlled substance prescription in the year 

and a half prior to the hearing. RD, at 4; and see 

supra II.B. Thus, the ALJ did not find Respondent’s 

testimony on this issue to be credible. RD, at 4. 

8Respondent repeatedly testified that Mr. 

Gonzales misunderstood what he had said. He 

testified that ‘‘[t]he conversation was in general 

about just marketing’’ and that Mr. Gonzales put his 

words together in a way that made it seem like 

Respondent was offering to pay for patients. Tr. 78– 

79. Respondent testified that what he really meant 

was: ‘‘when I say I spent $80 on a patient, like if 

you put an ad in the newspaper . . . let’s say you 

spent $1,000, and you got, like, maybe 10 patients 

or 12 patients, roughly, you’re spending about $80 

per patient.’’ Tr. 30. At one point, Respondent 

testified, Mr. Gonzales was ‘‘talking to me and—and 

trying to trick my tongue in saying things like, 

wrong.’’ Tr. 69. I agree with the ALJ that ‘‘[i]n 

comparing [Respondent’s] testimony on direct 

examination about his conversation with the 

undercover agent with the detailed facts contained 

in Government Exhibit 5, I do not find it credible 

that the agent misunderstood what [Respondent] 

had said.’’ RD, at 5. Ultimately, whether 

Respondent intended to get patients from Mr. 

Gonzales for a fee or the conversation was in fact 

a misunderstanding is irrelevant to determining 

whether or not Respondent was excluded from 

participation in Medicare, Medicaid, or other 

Federal health care program. However, the 

mitigation of his crime is relevant to his acceptance 

of responsibility. See infra IV. 

9Respondent’s testimony where he accepted 

responsibility most often was in response to a 

leading question from his attorney. See Tr. 33, 67– 

68, 79, 80–81. 

10When asked by his attorney what caused his 

conviction, Respondent answered ‘‘. . . that talking 

about—offering someone money to refer you 

patients, that’s considered a crime.’’ Tr. 80. 

11 (1) Respondent neglected to mention in his 

testimony that the Board had revoked his dental 

license and then stayed the revocation, but 

Respondent had stipulated to that fact prior to the 

hearing. RD, at 4. (2) Respondent’s testimony 

regarding his continuing education courses was 

evasive. RD, at 4–5. (3) Respondent was reluctant 

to acknowledge that his agreement with the Board 

stated that he was convicted of a felony. RD, at 5. 

(4) Respondent claimed to not understand the ALJ’s 

question when the ALJ asked him why he pled nolo 

contendere instead of guilty. Id. 

12There is evidence in the record that 

Respondent plead nolo contendere to and was 

convicted of a felony, not a misdemeanor. See GX 

5, at 5; Resp Prehearing, at 2; Resp Supp Prehearing, 

at 2. The testimony at the hearing, however, 

clarified that Respondent was originally charged 

with a felony violation, but ultimately plead nolo 

contendere to and was convicted of a misdemeanor. 

Tr. 19, 35. Ultimately whether he was convicted of 

a felony or a misdemeanor is irrelevant to 

determining whether or not Respondent was 

excluded from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, 

or other Federal health care program, which is the 

Continued 

evidence, I agree with the ALJ that DI’s 

testimony was straightforward and 

professional, and I likewise ‘‘give his 

testimony full credit.’’ RD, at 3. 

C. Respondent’s Case 

Respondent’s documentary evidence 

consisted of Respondent’s resume and a 

list of continuing dental education 

courses that Respondent has recently 

taken. Respondent’s Exhibits 

(hereinafter RX), 1–2. Respondent 

testified on his own behalf and 

presented no other testimony in support 

of his case. Respondent testified 

regarding his professional background, 

experience, and education; and 

regarding his dental practice. Tr. 22–28, 

38, 52–54. Respondent testified that he 

has had his dental practice for over 

twenty years, and that he has never had 

any malpractice claims filed against 

him, DEA has not expressed any 

concerns regarding his prescribing 

practices, and that the matters at issue 

in this case resulted in the only time the 

Respondent was ever called before the 

Dental Board of California (hereinafter, 

Board).5 Id. at 22–23, 37–38, 42. 

Respondent also testified that, although 

he does not often prescribe controlled 

substances, he needs his DEA 

registration to be able to provide quality 

care to his patients.6 Id. at 24–26. 

Respondent testified that he might 

prescribe controlled substances three or 

four times a month,7 but that 95 percent 

of his prescriptions are for noncontrolled substances. Id. at 52–53. 

Respondent also testified regarding 

the event that led to his criminal 

conviction. See infra II.D. He testified 

that in December 2013, an undercover 

agent from the Medi-Cal fraud 

department going by the name of Mr. 

Gonzales came to Respondent’s dental 

office to talk to him. Tr. 28–29; RD, at 

9, GX 5, at 5. According to Respondent, 

Mr. Gonzales informed Respondent that 

he did ‘‘marketing’’ and that he could 

bring Respondent a lot of medical 

patients for $90–$120 per patient. Tr. 

29; RD, at 9. Respondent stated, ‘‘I told 

[Mr. Gonzales], that’s a lot. I wouldn’t 

do that. And I won’t pay more than 

$80.’’ 8 Tr. 29. Respondent stated, ‘‘I did 

tell [Mr. Gonzales] that is illegal . . . 

like paying per patient. And I was 

telling him . . . it’s legal to do 

marketing if you get paid like, an hourly 

or salary but not per patient. That’s the 

law.’’ Id. at 29. Respondent testified that 

his conversation with Mr. Gonzales 

lasted approximately fifteen minutes. Id. 

at 30; RD, at 9. Respondent admitted 

that during the conversation he offered 

Mr. Gonzales: $20 for patients who had 

their teeth cleaned; $40 for patients who 

had sealants put on their teeth; $50 for 

patients for who received three to four 

fillings; and $100 for patients who 

received six or more fillings. Tr. 75–78; 

GX 5, at 5; RD, at 9. In addition, 

Respondent warned Mr. Gonzales not to 

tell anyone about getting paid for 

bringing patients. Tr. at 75–78. 

At times, Respondent appeared to 

accept responsibility for his actions and 

acknowledge that what he did was 

wrong.9 Id. at 33, 39, 67–68, 79, 80–81.10

However, more frequently, Respondent 

clearly denied doing anything wrong. 

See id. at 29, 31, 68–69, 76–78. 

I did not do anything. It’s just like talking 

to this person. But I—I felt bad because, you 

know, this happened to me. And I feel like, 

sorry, and it’s really, like, you know, the— 

the judgment on [sic] the Court with the final 

decision will affect my life and my practice 

and my family, you know. But I never gave 

him any money. I never gave any checks. He 

brought no patients to me at all. 

Id. at 31. Respondent also testified that 

he was unfairly charged, that he is 

innocent, and that the judgment was 

unfair. Id. at 56, 68. I agree with the ALJ 

that ‘‘it is obvious that during 

[Respondent’s] testimony on direct 

examination, he was downplaying his 

criminal conduct.’’ RD, at 5. 

Respondent testified that because of 

his conversation with the undercover 

agent he entered a nolo contendere plea 

in state court to a misdemeanor charge 

of offering to pay for patients. Tr. 33, 35; 

RD, at 9–10. Respondent testified that 

he was sentenced to informal probation, 

to perform 40 hours of community 

service, and to pay some minimal fees. 

Tr. 33, 36–37; RD, at 10. He testified that 

he has satisfied the terms of his 

probation. Tr. 37, 74; RD, at 10. 

The ALJ found that Respondent 

generally presented his testimony in a 

clear, candid, and convincing manner, 

but found that Respondent’s testimony 

lacked credibility on two points (see 

supra n.7 and n.8), and was concerning 

or evasive on four other points.11 RD, at 

4–5. I agree with the ALJ and adopt all 

of his credibility findings in this matter. 

D. Respondent’s Exclusion 

The evidence in the record 

demonstrates that on July 2, 2014, 

Respondent signed a Superior Court of 

California, County of Orange, General 

Misdemeanor 12 Guilty Plea Form 


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grounds for revocation under the Controlled 

Substances Act, and the record evidence clearly 

demonstrates that he was so excluded. 

13Respondent, in the opening statement, argued 

that ‘‘he certainly has done everything he could try 

to take responsibility for this. . . .’’ Tr. 14. I 

disagree. 

(hereinafter, Plea Agreement). GX 3, at 

1. In the Plea Agreement, Respondent 

plead nolo contendere to the charge of 

violating Welfare and Institution Code 

14107.2(b) offering unlawful Medi-Cal 

remuneration. GX 3, at 1; Tr. 33; GX 5, 

at 5. Upon his conviction, Respondent’s 

sentencing terms stated: ‘‘imposition 

. . . of sentence is suspended 3 years’’; 

‘‘[i]nformal PROBATION as to Count(s) 

1’’; and ‘‘[p]robation to termination . . . 

upon 18 months no violation.’’ GX 3, at 

4–5. 

The parties stipulated that on 

September 30, 2015, Respondent was 

notified by HHS/OIG of his mandatory 

exclusion from participation in all 

federal health care programs for a 

minimum period of five years pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a). ALJX 9, at 2; 

GX 4 (hereinafter, Exclusion Letter), at 

1. The Exclusion Letter stated, ‘‘[t]his 

exclusion is due to your conviction . . . 

in the Superior Court of California, 

County of Orange, of a criminal offense 

related to the delivery of an item or 

service under the Medicare or a State 

health care program, including the 

performance of management or 

administrative services relating to the 

delivery of items or services, under any 

such program.’’ GX 4, at 1. The 

Exclusion Letter stated that the 

exclusion would become effective 

twenty days from the date of the letter, 

and notified Respondent of his appeal 

rights. Id. 

Accordingly, I find that the HHS/OIG 

excluded Respondent from Medicare, 

Medicaid, and all federal health care 

programs under 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a) for 

a minimum of five years effective 

twenty days after September 30, 2015, 

based on Respondent’s conviction. 

III. Discussion 

Under Section 824(a) of the 

Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter, 

CSA), a registration ‘‘may be suspended 

or revoked’’ upon a finding of one or 

more of five grounds. 21 U.S.C. 824. The 

ground in 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5) requires 

that the registrant ‘‘has been excluded 

(or directed to be excluded) from 

participation in a program pursuant to 

section 1320a–7(a) of Title 42.’’ Id. 42 

U.S.C. 1320a–7(a) provides a list of four 

predicate offenses for which exclusion 

from Medicare, Medicaid, and federal 

health care programs is mandatory and 

sets out mandatory timeframes for such 

exclusion. Id. The undisputed record 

evidence demonstrates that HHS/OIG 

mandatorily excluded Respondent. GX 

4, ALJX 9, at 2; RD, at 6. 

Each subsection of Section 824(a) 

provides an independent and adequate 

ground to impose a sanction on a 

registrant. Arnold E. Feldman, M.D., 82 

FR 39614, 39617 (2017)); see also 

Gilbert L. Franklin, D.D.S., 57 FR 3441 

(1992) (‘‘[M]andatory exclusion from 

participation in the Medicare program 

constitutes an independent ground for 

revocation pursuant to 21 U.S.C. [§ ] 

824(a)(5).’’). 

Further, this Agency has concluded 

repeatedly that the underlying crime 

requiring exclusion from federal health 

care programs under Section 1320a–7(a) 

of Title 42 does not require a nexus to 

controlled substances in order to be 

used as a ground for revocation or 

suspension of a registration. Narciso 

Reyes, M.D., 83 FR 61678, 61681 (2018); 

KK Pharmacy, 64 FR at 49510 

(collecting cases); Melvin N. Seglin, 

M.D., 63 FR 70431, 70433 (1998); 

Stanley Dubin, D.D.S., 61 FR 60727, 

60728 (1996). In this case, HHS/OIG 

excluded Respondent due to his 

conviction in state court related to the 

delivery of an item or service under a 

state health care program, including the 

performance of management or 

administrative services relating to the 

delivery of items or services such as 

offering unlawful Medi-Cal 

remuneration. GX 4, at 1. ‘‘There does 

not need to be a nexus to controlled 

substances to make a connection 

between the activity that caused the 

mandatory exclusion and the potential 

for abuse of a DEA registration.’’ Jeffrey 

Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019). 

Here, the crime of illegal remuneration 

does not have a nexus to controlled 

substances; however the crime occurred 

in the context of Respondent’s medical 

practice, and Respondent knew that 

paying per patient was illegal. 

Respondent’s knowing deceit and 

failure to credibly accept responsibility, 

as discussed below, weigh against my 

ability to entrust Respondent with a 

registration and in favor of revocation. 

IV. Sanction 

There is no dispute in the record that 

Respondent is mandatorily excluded 

pursuant to Section 1320a–7(a) of Title 

42 and, therefore, the Government has 

met its prima facie burden of showing 

that a ground for the revocation or 

suspension of Respondent’s registration 

exists. GX 4, ALJX 9, at 2; RD, at 6. Now, 

the burden shifts to the Respondent to 

show why he can be entrusted with a 

registration. Garrett Howard Smith, 

M.D., 83 FR 18882, 18910 (2018) 

(collecting cases). 

The CSA authorizes the Attorney 

General to ‘‘promulgate and enforce any 

rules, regulations, and procedures 

which he may deem necessary and 

appropriate for the efficient execution of 

his functions under this subchapter.’’ 21 

U.S.C. 871(b). This authority 

specifically relates ‘‘to ‘registration’ and 

‘control,’ and ‘for the efficient execution 

of his functions’ under the statute.’’ 

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 259 

(2006). A clear purpose of this authority 

is to ‘‘bar[ ] doctors from using their 

prescription-writing powers as a means 

to engage in illicit drug dealing and 

trafficking.’’ Id. at 270. 

In efficiently executing the revocation 

and suspension authority delegated to 

me under the CSA for the 

aforementioned purposes, I review the 

evidence and arguments Respondent 

submitted to determine whether or not 

he has presented ‘‘sufficient mitigating 

evidence to assure the Administrator 

that he can be trusted with the 

responsibility carried by such a 

registration.’’ Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 

72 FR 23848, 23853 (2007) (quoting Leo 

R. Miller, M.D., 53 FR 21931, 21932 

(1988)). ‘‘ ‘Moreover, because ‘‘past 

performance is the best predictor of 

future performance,’’ ALRA Labs, Inc. v. 

DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995), 

[the Agency] has repeatedly held that 

where a registrant has committed acts 

inconsistent with the public interest, the 

registrant must accept responsibility for 

[the registrant’s] actions and 

demonstrate that [registrant] will not 

engage in future misconduct.’ ’’ Jayam 

Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR 459, 463 (2009) 

(quoting Medicine Shoppe, 73 FR 364, 

387 (2008)); see also Jackson, 72 FR at 

23853; John H. Kennnedy, M.D., 71 FR 

35705, 35709 (2006); Prince George 

Daniels, D.D.S., 60 FR 62884, 62887 

(1995). 

While there are places in 

Respondent’s testimony where he 

claims to accept responsibility,13 I agree 

with the ALJ’s statement that 

‘‘[Respondent’s] acceptance of 

responsibility was, at best, equivocal.’’ 

RD, at 23. Ultimately I agree with the 

ALJ’s finding ‘‘that [Respondent] has not 

accepted responsibility for offering to 

pay for patients.’’ Id. Respondent 

testified repeatedly that he believed that 

he did not do anything wrong—he was 

just talking to a person. Tr. 29, 31, 68– 

69, 76–78. Respondent also testified that 

he was unfairly charged, that he is 

innocent, and that the judgment was 

unfair. Tr. 56, 68. Moreover, Respondent 

made statements that minimized his 

misconduct, which weighs against 

finding that Respondent accepted 


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14For example, Respondent testified ‘‘I really 

suffered going through these things—something I 

didn’t do . . . [I] lost most—most of my patients, 

lost a lot of PPO insurances. I have to pay a lot of 

employees, and so many things for something that 

happened—someone faking like, you know, 

accusing you of doing something, but there’s no 100 

percent proof.’’ Tr. 68. 

responsibility. See supra II.C; RD, at 21 

(citing Arvinder Singh, M.D., 81 FR 

8247, 8249–51 (2016)); Stein, 84 FR 

46973. Additionally, Respondent plead 

nolo contendere instead of guilty to the 

charge of offering unlawful Medi-Cal 

remuneration. GX 3. ‘‘In general, 

however, a plea of nolo contendere is 

inconsistent with the acceptance of 

responsibility.’’ RD, at 21 (citing United 

States v. Gordon, 979 F. Supp. 337, 342 

(E.D. Pa. 1997) (internal citations 

omitted)). Finding that a respondent has 

failed to accept responsibility is 

warranted where, as here, the 

respondent pled nolo contendere and 

minimized his role in the crime. See 

Jeffery M. Freesemann, M.D., 76 FR 

60873, 60888 (2011); see also RD, at 22. 

Respondent must convince the 

Administrator that his acceptance of 

responsibility and remorse are 

sufficiently credible to demonstrate that 

the misconduct will not recur. 

Respondent, in his opening statement, 

argued that his testimony would show 

‘‘his genuine remorse . . . .’’ Tr. 14. But 

the record indicates that Respondent 

was not remorseful for what he did; 

instead that he regretted the 

consequences that flowed from his 

conviction.14 Id. at 31, 39, 68. This lack 

of remorse goes hand-in-hand with 

Respondent’s failure to accept 

responsibility and further supports the 

revocation of his registration. 

In sanction determinations, the 

Agency has historically considered its 

interest in deterring similar acts, both 

with respect to the respondent in a 

particular case and the community of 

registrants. See Joseph Gaudio, M.D., 74 

FR 10083, 10095 (2009); Singh, 81 FR at 

8248. In this case, the Respondent knew 

at the time that he committed the crime 

that his actions were illegal—he even 

told Mr. Gonzales that the actions were 

illegal and advised him not to tell 

anyone. Deterring such deceit and 

knowing criminal behavior both in 

Respondent and the general registrant 

community is relevant to ensuring 

compliance with the CSA. Although I 

would not characterize Respondent’s 

underlying crime as particularly 

egregious, Respondent has not 

convinced me that he will not repeat 

such deceitful behavior in using his 

CSA registration. 

Respondent has argued, among other 

things, that he can be entrusted with a 

registration because he has seen over 

15,000 patients in twenty years and has 

never had any issues with prescribing, 

he has never had a malpractice 

complaint, he is very mindful of the 

opioid crisis, and he has satisfied the 

terms of his probation. Tr. 13–14, 37, 74. 

Even assuming, arguendo, all of this to 

be true, Respondent needed to present 

evidence of a credible and persuasive 

acceptance of responsibility. 

Respondent has not. 

Based on Respondent’s failure to 

accept responsibility for his criminal 

misconduct and lack of demonstrated 

remorse, I cannot find that Respondent 

can be entrusted with a DEA 

registration; and therefore, I find that 

revocation is the appropriate sanction 

I will therefore order that 

Respondent’s registration be revoked as 

contained in the Order below. 

Order 

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate 

of Registration No. BA6641472 issued to 

Ibrahim Al-Qawaqneh, D.D.S. This 

Order is effective March 22, 2021. 

D. Christopher Evans, 

Acting Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2021–03360 Filed 2–18–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. DEA–793] 

Importer of Controlled Substances 

Application: VHG Labs DBA LGC 

Standards 

AGENCY: Drug Enforcement 

Administration, Justice. 

ACTION: Notice of application. 

SUMMARY: VHG Labs DBA LGC 

Standards has applied to be registered 

as an importer of basic class(es) of 

controlled substance(s). Refer to 

Supplemental Information listed below 

for further drug information. 

DATES: Registered bulk manufacturers of 

the affected basic class(es), and 

applicants therefore, may file written 

comments on or objections to the 

issuance of the proposed registration on 

or before March 22, 2021. Such persons 

may also file a written request for a 

hearing on the application on or before 

March 22, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: Written comments should 

be sent to: Drug Enforcement 

Administration, Attention: DEA Federal 

Register Representative/DPW, 8701 

Morrissette Drive, Springfield, Virginia 

22152. All requests for a hearing must 

be sent to: Drug Enforcement 

Administration, Attn: Administrator, 

8701 Morrissette Drive, Springfield, 

Virginia 22152. All requests for a 

hearing should also be sent to: (1) Drug 

Enforcement Administration, Attn: 

Hearing Clerk/OALJ, 8701 Morrissette 

Drive, Springfield, Virginia 22152; and 

(2) Drug Enforcement Administration, 

Attn: DEA Federal Register 

Representative/DPW, 8701 Morrissette 

Drive, Springfield, Virginia 22152. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In 

accordance with 21 CFR 1301.34(a), this 

is notice that on February 2, 2021, VHG 

Labs DBA LGC Standards, 3 Perimeter 

Road, Manchester, New Hampshire 

03103, applied to be registered as an 

importer of the following basic class(es) 

of controlled substance(s): 

Controlled substance Drug code Schedule 

Cathinone ........................................................................................................................................................................ 1235 I 

Methcathinone ................................................................................................................................................................. 1237 I 

Naphyrone ....................................................................................................................................................................... 1258 I 

N-Ethylamphetamine ....................................................................................................................................................... 1475 I 

JWH-250 (1-Pentyl-3-(2-methoxyphenylacetyl) indole) ................................................................................................... 6250 I 

SR-18 (Also known as RCS-–8) (1-Cyclohexylethyl-3-(2-methoxyphenylacetyl) indole) ............................................... 7008 I 

APINACA and AKB48 N-(1-Adamantyl)-1-pentyl-1H-indazole-3-carboxamide .............................................................. 7048 I 

JWH-081 (1-Pentyl-3-(1-(4-methoxynaphthoyl) indole) ................................................................................................... 7081 I 

SR-19 (Also known as RCS-4) (1-Pentyl-3-[(4-methoxy)-benzoyl] indole ...................................................................... 7104 I 


tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with NOTICES