[J-100-2014] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.

CHARLES H. CHAMBERLAIN, Appellee

v.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 76 MAP 2014 Appeal from the order of the Commonwealth Court dated January 3, 2014 at No. 604 CD 2013 Reversing the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review dated March 13, 2013 at Appeal No. B-EUC-12-09-F-B648-A, Decision No. B-549177. ARGUED: November 18, 2014

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: April 27, 2015 This appeal presents the issue of whether a claimant sentenced to house arrest is “incarcerated” for purposes of Section 402.6 of the Unem ployment Compensation Law (UC Law), 1 and, thus, is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Mindful of the remedial purpose of the UC Law, the Commonwealth Court held

that a claimant sentenced to house arrest is not “incarce rated” under Section 402.6.

Because the terms and conditions of the claimant’s house a rrest did not otherwise prevent him from satisfying the statutory requirement s for obtaining unemployment compensation benefits, the Commonwealth Court reverse d the denial of benefits. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended , added by the Act of October 30, 1996, P.L. 738, as amended , 43 P.S. § 802.6.[J-100-2014] - 2

For ease of discussion, we begin by examining the perti nent provisions of the UC Law. Significantly, Section 401 sets forth the “[q]ua lifications required to secure compensation.” 43 P.S. § 801. Section 401(d) mandat es that the claimant “[i]s able to work and available for suitable work.” Id. § 801(d)(1 ). 2 Further, Section 401 lists additional qualifications including, inter alia , the receipt of wages for employment for an enumerated period, participation in an active search fo r suitable employment, and submission of a valid application for benefits after hav ing been unemployed for one week. Id. § 801. Section 402.6 (Ineligibility of incarcerated employe) disqualifies a claimant from receiving benefits and provides:

An employe shall not be eligible for payment of unem ployment compensation benefits for any weeks of unemployment du ring which the employe is incarcerated after a conviction. Id., § 802.6. 3 Here, the record establishes that in July of 2012, Cha rles H. Chamberlain (Claimant) was unemployed and was receiving unemployme nt compensation benefits.

2 This Section states: § 801. Qualifications required to secure compensation Compensation shall be payable to any employe who is o r becomes unemployed, and who --

* * * (d)(1) Is able to work and available for suitable work

. . . . 43 P.S. § 801(d)(1). In this opinion, we refer to t his section by both its statutory designation and as the “able and available for work st andard.”

3 Section 402 of the UC Law, 43 P.S. § 802, also sets fo rth ineligibility provisions, which are not at issue here.[J-100-2014] - 3

On October 2, 2012, he pled guilty in Magisterial Di strict Court to the summary offenses of operating a vehicle without a valid inspection, and d riving with a suspended license. Relating to the latter conviction, Claimant was senten ced to sixty days in the Keystone House Arrest Program (from November 1, 2012 to Decemb er 31, 2012) with the condition that if he failed to comply, he would serve sixty days i n the York County Prison. Claimant was also required to attend reemployment eligibility assessment classes via CareerLink.

The terms of Claimant’s house arrest restricted him to th e home of his sister, but permitted him to work, run errands, and Christmas shop. On November 28, 2012, as relevant herein, the local service center of the Office of Unemployment Compensation Benefits issued a notice of d etermination that Claimant’s sentence of house arrest disqualified him from receipt of benefits because he was

“incarcerated after a conviction” under Section 402.6. Claimant appealed the finding of disqualification and, on January 14, 2013, a hearing w as held before a referee for the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (UCBR). A t the hearing, testimony was presented from Judy Will, an investigator for the Inte rnal Audit Division of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry (Depart ment), and Claimant. Will testified that the Department interpreted Section 40 2.6 as disqualifying a claimant who has been convicted of a crime and incarcerated, regardle ss of whether the claimant was under house arrest, in a halfway house, or any other p lace “in lieu of” prison. Claimant testified that during his house arrest, he spent no time in prison or any other state correctional institution, but rather lived at his sister’s residence, and had permission to work, run errands, and shop for Christmas. Indeed, he stated that he actually worked nine of the sixty days while on house ar rest, and reported his work to the local service center. Claimant emphasized that he was sen tenced to intermediate punishment through a county program in lieu of incarce ration, and relied upon provisions[J-100-2014] - 4

of the Sentencing Code, Sections 9721 (sentencing gene rally) and Section 9763 (sentence of county intermediate punishment), 42 Pa.C. S. §§ 9721 and 9763, which define a sentence of county intermediate punishment a s an alternative to a sentence of total or partial confinement in a correctional institu tion, and set forth various conditions a court may attach to a sentence of county intermediate punishment. 4 By decision and order dated January 15, 2013, the ref eree concluded that Claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits duri ng the period he was on house

4 Section 9721 states, in relevant part: (a) General rule. --In determining the sentence to be imposed the court shall, except as provided in subsection (a.1) [relating to mandatory minimum sentences], consider and select one or more of the following alternatives, and may impose them consecutively or concur rently: (1) An order of probation. (2) A determination of guilt without further pe nalty. (3) Partial confinement. (4) Total confinement. (5) A fine. (6) County intermediate punishment. (7) State intermediate punishment. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a). Section 9763 provides that in imposing a sentence of c ounty intermediate punishment, the court shall specify the term, which may not exceed th e maximum term for which the defendant could be confined, and the program to which the defendant is sentenced. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763(a). Section 9763 further lists conditio ns which the court may attach to the defendant’s intermediate punishment sentence includi ng, inter alia , to be devoted to a specific occupation or employment; to participate in a c ommunity service program; to undergo counseling or available medical or psychiatric t reatment; to attend educational or vocational training programs; to reside in a rehabilit ative facility; to not possess a firearm without written permission; to make restitution; to pa y a fine; to participate in drug or alcohol treatment programs; to remain within the prem ises of the defendant's residence during the hours designated by the court; and to be su bject to electronic monitoring. Id. § 9763(b).[J-100-2014] - 5

arrest. Citing no authority for the proposition, the referee interpreted Section 402.6 as rendering a claimant ineligible to receive unemploymen t compensation benefits whenever he is convicted of a crime and “incarcerated,” regardless of where the claimant

serves his “incarceration.” 5 Claimant filed a timely appeal with the UCBR, claim ing that the referee misapplied the law and that the referee’s decision was not supporte d by the record. The UCBR affirmed the referee’s decision, adopting its findings a nd conclusion of law that Claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits under Section 4 02.6. Claimant thereafter appealed to the Commonwealth C ourt, reiterating his claim that house arrest does not constitute “incarceration” fo r purposes of Section 402.6 of the UC Law. Emphasizing that the UC Law was intended to be remedial in nature and liberally construed, Claimant argued that the plain m eaning of “incarcerated” simply does not encompass living at home. Moreover, he again reli ed upon the aforementioned provisions of the Sentencing Code, which provide for va rious sentencing alternatives and categorize a sentence of house arrest differently from a sentence of confinement in prison. Finally, Claimant analogized the term “incarcerated” in Section 402.6 of the UC Law to the term “imprisonment” in former Section 373 1 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(e) (repealed), which this Court had previously i nterpreted as not being equivalent to house arrest for purposes of determining parole eligib ility. See Commonwealth v. Kriston, 588 A.2d 898, 899 (Pa. 1991) (holding that “it would grossly distort the language

5 The referee additionally assessed a five-week fraud over payment of unemployment benefits in the amount of $1,719 based on Claimant’s purported failure to disclose to the local service center that he was incarcerated. The UCBR, however, ultimately reversed the assessment of penalty, concluding that Claimant did not make any intentional misstatement, but rather did not believe that living in his sister’s home constituted “incarceration.” The fraud issue was not appealed, and is no longer in this case.[J-100-2014] - 6

used by the legislature if we were to conclude that the term ‘imprisonment’ means merely ‘staying at home.’ The plain and ordinary meaning o f imprisonment is confinement in a correctional or similar rehabilitative institution, not staying at home.”) (emphasis omitted). In response, the UCBR argued that the phrase “incarcera ted after a conviction” in

Section 402.6 of the UC Law should be construed in the same manner as that phrase has been interpreted in cases involving nearly identical l anguage in the disqualification provision for incarcerated claimants under Section 306(a .1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WC Act), i.e ., to encompass a sentence of house arrest. 6 See Moore v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Babcock & W ilcox Co.), 811 A.2d 631, 634 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (holding that a claimant sente nced to house arrest with work release is “incarcerated after a conviction” and is disqu alified from receiving workers’ compensation benefits under Section 306(a.1) of the W C Act because a claimant on house arrest is in the constructive custody of the Common wealth, his liberty is significantly limited by security measures, and unauthori zed departures may result in criminal sanctions). The UCBR asserted that other workers’ compensation cases have held that “incarceration after a conviction” encompasses more than i mprisonment in a correctional facility. See Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Workers’ Compens ation Appeal Board (Henrie), 776 A.2d 951, 955 (Pa. 2001) (holding that a claiman t who was sentenced to five years’ probation with the condition of involuntarily commitme nt in a psychiatric facility was “incarcerated” for purposes of the WC Act because the priso ner remained confined in the constructive custody of the Commonwealth and was removed from the workforce as a result of his criminal sentence); Brinker’s International , Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation

6 Section 306(a.1) of the WC Act provides that “[n]othi ng in this act shall require payment of compensation . . . for any period during which the employe is incarcerated after a conviction. . .” 77 P.S. § 511.1.[J-100-2014] - 7

Appeal Board (Weissenstein), 721 A.2d 406, 410 (Pa. Cm wlth. 1998) (holding that “incarcerated” in Section 306(a)(2) of the WC Act shoul d not be construed to mean only confinement in jail, but also encompasses a defendant i ncarcerated at a detention and alcohol recovery facility who is eligible for work rele ase).

The Commonwealth Court reversed the UCBR’s determina tion that house arrest was equivalent to “incarceration” for purposes of Sectio n 402.6 of the UC Law, and concluded that Claimant was entitled to unemployment co mpensation benefits. Chamberlain v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 83 A.3d 283 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). The court emphasized that the UC Law was intended to b e remedial in nature and protect workers who had suffered a loss of income due to separati on from employment through no fault of their own. Id. at 292 (citing Section 3 of the UC Law (declaration of public policy), 43 P.S. § 752; Preservation Pennsylvania v. U nemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 673 A.2d 1044 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)). The Commonwealth Court distinguished the cases relied u pon by the UCBR, which were governed by the WC Act. It emphasized the different purposes underlying the two statutes -- that under the WC Act, a claimant i s entitled to compensation for a loss of earning power that is caused by a work injury; while under the UC Law, a claimant is generally provided economic security when he is unemploy ed through no fault of his own and is able and available for work. Chamberlain, 83 A.2d at 292. The court found it noteworthy that, unlike in Moore, where the Commonwealth

Court ruled that a claimant sentenced to house arrest w ith work release was ineligible for workers’ compensation benefits because he was “incarcerated” under Section 306(a)(2) of the WC Act, the terms of Claimant’s house arrest pla ced no restrictions on his ability to work. Id. Thus, it concluded, the rationale employed by the Commonwealth Court in Moore and by this Court Henkels & McCoy, Inc., i.e. , that the General Assembly intended[J-100-2014] - 8

to preclude the payment of workers’ compensation benefit s to claimants who have been removed from the work force, is not applicable here whe re Claimant was available for

work while on house arrest. The court further noted t hat it would contravene the remedial purpose of the Act to interpret “incarcerated ” as encompassing house arrest

when this Court in Kriston held that house arrest is not equivalent to incarceration for purposes of sentence credit. Id. Significantly, the Commonwealth Court clarified that it was not holding that an individual sentenced to house arrest is eligible for un employment benefits as a matter of law. Rather, it held only that “house arrest is not ‘ incarceration’ that renders a claimant ineligible for unemployment compensation under [S]ect ion 402.6 of the [UC] Law.” Id. at 292-93 (footnote omitted). The court recognized that a claimant under house arrest may be subject to conditions that disqualify him from benef its under other provisions of the UC Law, but reiterated that the terms of Claimant’s hous e arrest did not impact his ability to go to work. Id. at 293 n.11. Under the facts present ed, the court concluded there was no evidence refuting Claimant’s assertions that he was ge nuinely attached to the labor market. Id. at 293. It stated, “although the Depart ment bore the burden of proof in the proceeding, Claimant was the only party to present evi dence concerning the circumstances of his house arrest, and his unrebutted testi mony and documentary evidence lend no support to the Department’s position. ” Id. This Court granted the UCBR’s petition for allowance of appeal to address whether the Commonwealth Court erred by holding that Section 402.6 of the UC Law did not disqualify Claimant from receiving unemployment compen sation benefits during the period he served his sentence of house arrest. The UC BR, as Appellant, contends that the Commonwealth Court’s holding that house arrest is not “incarceration” for purposes of Section 402.6’s automatic disqualification provision devi ates from appellate court[J-100-2014] - 9

precedent, which defines “incarceration” expansively to include house arrest. Moore, supra (holding that a claimant sentenced to house arre st with work release is “incarcerated after a conviction” and ineligible for b enefits under Section 306(a.1) of the WC Act). As below, it further contends that the Commonwealth Court’s holding is contrary to cases acknowledging that “incarceration” encompasses sentences in addition to those involving confinement in a correctional facility. See Henkels & McCoy, Inc., supra (holding that a claimant who was sentenced to five yea rs’ probation with the condition of involuntarily commitment in a psychiatric facility was “i ncarcerated” for purposes of the WC Act because the prisoner remains confined in the constr uctive custody of the Commonwealth); Brinker’s International, Inc., supra (h olding that “incarcerated” in the disqualification provision of the WC Act should not be co nstrued to mean only confinement in jail, but also encompasses a defendant i ncarcerated at a detention and alcohol facility who is eligible for work release). Additionally, the UCBR asserts that the Commonwealth Court’s holding is inconsistent with precedent that interprets interchangeab ly the incarcerated employee disqualification provisions of the UC Law and the WC Act . See Kroh v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 711 A.2d 1093, 1094 n.4 (Pa. C mwlth. 1998) (in rejecting an equal protection challenge to Section 402.6 of the UC Law ba sed on the disparate treatment of claimants who had been convicted of crimes, the Commonwe alth Court acknowledged that Section 306(a)(2) of the WC Act removed all dou bt concerning the disqualifying effect

that incarceration has on the entitlement to workers’ com pensation benefits). The Commonwealth Court erred in the instant case, th e UCBR submits, by concluding that the enumerated workers’ compensation cases were inapplicable based on distinctions between the WC Act and the UC Law. It maintains that any discrepancy[J-100-2014] - 10

between the two statutory schemes is illusory for purpose s of this case because both statutes: (1) set forth eligibility requirements for the receipt of public benefits; (2) provide, in very similar language, that incarcerated individua ls are disqualified from receiving benefits; and (3) have been applied consistently by appe llate courts. Thus, the UCBR contends, there is no distinction warranting disparate tr eatment between a workers’ compensation case and an unemployment compensation ca se for purposes of determining whether house arrest constitutes “incarcerat ion.” It acknowledges that

house arrest is an alternative sentence to confinement i n prison pursuant to the Sentencing Code, but submits that such distinction is not dispositive of whether house

arrest should be considered “incarceration” under Section 402.6 of the UC Law.

The UCBR also refutes the Commonwealth Court’s findi ngs that this case is unlike

Moore because the terms of Claimant’s house arrest did no t impact his ability to go to work and because Claimant was genuinely attached to the labor market while on house arrest. According to the UCBR, these findings are erro neous as Claimant was subjected to virtually the same level of confinement as the claim ant in Moore in that he received prior permission to leave the house for work purposes, and would have been imprisoned had he violated the terms of his house arrest. The UCBR challenges the Commonwealth Court’s mere con sideration of a claimant’s “ability to work” to conclude that he is not “incarcerated,” positing that such construction would render Section 402.6 meaningless becau se the “able and available for work” standard was the governing law for incarcerated cl aimants in Section 401(d)(1) of the UC law before Section 402.6 was adopted, and the Legislature enacted Section 402.6 to remedy the “mischief” resulting from previous case law permitting an incarcerated person on work release to obtain unemployment compensati on benefits. See Greer v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 392 A.2d 918, 920 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978) (holding in a[J-100-2014] - 11

pre-Section 402.6 case that a prisoner on work release co uld, under certain circumstances, be eligible for UC benefits under Section 4 01(d)(1) if a factual inquiry

showed that he was both available for work and attached to the labor market while incarcerated). In support of this contention, the UCBR relies on a com ment made by the proponent of Section 402.6, Representative William L loyd, stating:

I learned to my surprise . . . that it is possible now, if you are convicted and you are in prison and you qualify for work release and your employer does not want you back, you then get unemployment compensa tion. The businessman in my district and the employees in that comp any do not think that is right; I do not think that is right either, an d I think we ought to change the law. Statement of Representative William Lloyd, 1996 Pa. Legis. Journal, House, p. 835 (May 13, 1996). The UCBR interprets the legislative commentary as demo nstrating that Section 402.6 was enacted to deny unemployment compensation b enefits to any claimant who, although “able and available” for work, is nonetheless serving a sentence of confinement after conviction. The UCBR emphasizes that even thoug h Claimant may have been capable of seeking work and leaving the home to earn wa ges, he nonetheless was serving a criminal sentence that entailed restrictions, an d his violation of those restrictions would have resulted in incarceration in the county pr ison. It concludes that under the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation, Section 402.6 wo uld have no real significance other than to duplicate the “able and available” ana lysis of Section 401(d)(1). Finally, the UCBR argues that the Commonwealth Cour t relied inappropriately on this Court’s decision in Kriston, supra, where we held t hat time spent in an electronic home monitoring program is not “imprisonment” for pur poses of crediting a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for driving under th e influence of alcohol. The[J-100-2014] - 12

import of Kriston, the UCBR argues, is that a defendan t may not enjoy the amenities of a

sentence of house arrest and later seek to use such time to satisfy a specified term of “imprisonment.” It submits that such holding does not i ndicate that house arrest is distinct from incarceration for purposes of eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits -- an issue that Kriston does not in any way ad dress. Claimant responds that the Commonwealth Court was corr ect in holding that house arrest does not constitute “incarceration,” which w ould result in automatic disqualification from the receipt of unemployment comp ensation benefits pursuant to 402.6 of the UC Law. Contrary to the UCBR’s contenti ons, he submits, this holding does not conflict with any existing precedent as there is no c ase that interprets “incarcerated” in Section 402.6 as encompassing house arrest. The decisions re lied upon by the UCBR, Claimant asserts, involve an entirely different statute , the WC Act, which is not at issue here, and cannot create binding precedent in unemploym ent compensation cases. To illustrate, Claimant emphasizes that while the UC Law requires the “compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for th e benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own,” 43 P.S. § 752, the purpose of the WC Act is to provide benefits to employees who suffer work-related injuries. He asserts that each statute has different eligibility requirements, and that workers’ compensation benefits, unlike unemployment compensation benefits, are based on an emp loyment relationship, an injury that arose in the course of employment, and the employer’s surrender of their defenses to civil actions in exchange for the claimant’s re linquishment of an action in tort. By contrast, he submits, the UC Law is unconcerned with tort liability or civil causes of action, and is designed as insurance against the burden of indigence resulting from the economic insecurity of involuntary unemployment. Id. Accordingly, Claimant concludes, workers’ compensation and unemployment compensa tion benefits are not so[J-100-2014] - 13

similar that the Commonwealth Court was bound to foll ow the workers’ compensation cases that interpret the term “incarceration.” Even if this Court were to consider the workers’ compensa tion cases as persuasive, Claimant maintains, the instant facts are clea rly distinguishable. First, he argues that Moore (where the Commonwealth Court held expressly that house arrest with

work release constitutes “incarceration” under the WC Act’s disqualification provision) is distinguishable because the liberty of the individual se eking benefits in that case was much more restricted than the instant case, where Claima nt actually worked nine days and was permitted excursions from home with prior appro val, such as running errands and going Christmas shopping. Claimant further points out that in Henkels & McCoy Inc., the only authority of this Court relied upon by the UCBR, the claimant was denied workers’ compensation benefits because his probationary sen tence subjected him to involuntarily commitment to a psychiatric hospital, and , thus, his loss of earnings did not result from injury, but rather from his criminal senten ce. Here, Claimant was not institutionalized, but was subject to house arrest, the terms of which did not hamper his ability to work. Further, Claimant contends, the legislative remarks reli ed upon by the UCBR do not suggest that “incarceration” in Section 402.6 was in tended to include house arrest as they reflected a concern over the receipt of unemployme nt compensation benefits by incarcerated prisoners on work release. An individual i ncarcerated in prison, but permitted to leave for designated hours to work, Clai mant maintains, is far different from one not in prison at all, but rather confined to his h ome and permitted to leave for various reasons, including work. He submits there are no legislat ive comments indicating that Section 402.6 was intended to apply to a claimant on h ouse arrest. Claimant further discounts the UCBR’s argument that Section 402.6 was a l egislative response to the[J-100-2014] - 14

Commonwealth Court’s holding in Greer (the pre-Sectio n 402.6 case that permitted an incarcerated claimant on work release to obtain unemploy ment compensation benefits) as the Legislature’s adoption of Section 402.6 occurred 1 8 years after Greer had been

decided. In Claimant’s view, the UCBR’s interpretation of “in carcerated” would defeat the remedial purpose of the UC Law, which is to provide benefits to those who become unemployed through no fault of their own and who re main realistically attached to the workforce. The UCBR’s position, Claimant asserts, further blurs the distinctions in the sentencing alternatives of total confinement, partial confinement and intermediate punishment, which the General Assembly created in Sectio n 9721 of the Sentencing Code, set forth at n.4, supra. Finally, Claimant argues, the Commonwealth Court was correct in relying on this Court’s decision in Kriston, which held that the term “i mprisonment” did not include house arrest with electronic monitoring for purposes of deter mining credit for time served, but rather implies confinement in a correctional or similar rehabilitative institution. He finds our holding in Kriston significant as this Court gave a common sense meaning to a word synonymous to the undefined statutory term at issue here in. 7

7 In its reply brief, the UCBR argues that Claimant f ocuses mistakenly on the Section 401(d) standard of whether he was “available for emp loyment,” rather than the Section 402.6 standard of whether he was “incarcerated after a conviction.” It also clarifies that it is not contending that the workers’ compensation cases are binding in this unemployment compensation case, but only that they are persuasive be cause the disqualification provisions in the WC Act and the UC Law are virtually identical. The UCBR also responds that Claimant’s view of the Legislative comment s on Section 402.6 is unduly restrictive, and disputes his contention that the concerns were limited only to incarcerated prisoners on work release. It submits there is little dist inction between an individual confined in a prison who is eligible for work release an d one confined in a home with electronic monitoring who is permitted to leave for wo rk. Finally, the UCBR argues that the general provision declaring the remedial purpose o f the UC Law should not govern the specific provision disqualifying incarcerated claimant s from receiving benefits.[J-100-2014] - 15

Because the inquiry before us is exclusively one of statu tory interpretation, we begin our analysis by examining the canons of statutory construction. 8 In interpreting a statute, our primary goal is "to ascertain and effectuat e the intention of the General Assembly." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). "When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Id. § 1921(b). We must interpret words in a statute a ccording to their "common and approved usage." Id. § 1903. Additionally, we constr ue every statute "if possible, to give effect to all its provisions." Id. § 1921(a); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2) ("the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain”). When the words of a statute are not explicit, we may a scertain the intent of the General Assembly by considering the occasion and necessity fo r the statute; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained by the legislation; the former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular interp retation; the contemporaneous legislative history of the provision; and the legislati ve and administrative interpretations of the statute. Id. § 1921(c). Keeping in mind these canons, we return to the langua ge of Section 402.6, which, as noted, states:

8 In our review of unemployment compensation cases, we must consider "whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence a nd whether there was a violation of the constitution or agency procedure or an error of law." Diehl v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (ESAB Group, Inc.), 57 A.3d 1209 , 1216 (Pa. 2012) (citing Temple University v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 772 A.2d 416, 418 n.1 (Pa. 2001)). As with any question of statutory interpretation, our standard of review is de novo , and our scope of review is plenary. SEIU Healthcare Pa. v. Com monwealth, 104 A.3d 495, 506 (Pa. 2014).[J-100-2014] - 16

An employe shall not be eligible for payment of unem ployment compensation benefits for any weeks of unemployment du ring which the employe is incarcerated after a conviction. 43 Pa.C.S. § 802.6. Upon review of the parties’ arguments, we agree wit h Claimant that his sentence of house arrest following his conviction of driving with a suspended license did not render him “incarcerated” pursuant to Section 402.6, and, ther efore, he was not precluded from obtaining unemployment compensation benefits on tha t ground. Initially, we deem the issue one of first impression as no appellate court decisio n has examined whether house arrest constitutes incarceration for purposes of Section 4 02.6 of the UC Law.

Because the term “incarcerated” is not defined in that statute, it must be construed in accordance with its common and ordinary meaning. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). It is well-established that the common and approved meaning of a word may be ascertained from an examination of its dictionary definition. Se e Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898, 909 (Pa. 2011). The common definition of the t erm “incarcerate” means “[t]o put in into jail,” or “[t]o shut in; confine.” The American Heritage College Dictionary at 431 (4 th Ed. 2004); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 760 (defining incarceration as “[i]mprisonment; confinement in a jail or penitentia ry”). Because “incarceration” could be commonly understood to mean either imprisonment or the more broad definition of confinement, we conclude that the word is ambiguous, and proceed to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly in enacting Section 402 .6. See Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 776 A.2d at 955 (recognizing that the undefined term “incarceration” is commonly defined to include both “imprisonment” and “confinement,” and that confinement need not be limited to a jail or penitentiary). Accepting, for purposes of argument, that an individu al could be “incarcerated” in an institution other than a county or state correctional facility, the precise question presented here is whether the legislature intended the automatic disqualification[J-100-2014] - 17

provision to apply to individuals who, following a con viction, have been sentenced to home confinement with work release. In determining wh ether the Legislature intended for the disqualification provision in Section 402.6 to extend to home confinement circumstances such as house arrest, we consider first the occa sion and necessity for the

UC Law and the mischief that Section 402.6 was intended to remedy.

The UC Law was enacted to alleviate the economic insecu rity resulting from unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health , morals and welfare of Pennsylvania citizens. 43 P.S. § 752 (Declaration of p ublic policy). The statute requires “the compulsory setting aside of unemployment r eserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of the ir own.” Id. “[T]he provisions of the [UC Law] must be liberally construed to provide th e broadest possible benefits to those who experienced forced unemployment.” Renne v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 453 A.2d 318, 321 n.4 (Pa. 1982). Prior to the enactment of Section 402.6 in 1996, th ere was no specific provision in the UC Law disqualifying an incarcerated employee from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Under these circumstances, eligib ility determinations were made by adhering to Section 401(d)’s requirement that the claimant is able and available for suitable work. In Greer v. Unemployment Comp. Bd . of Review, 392 A.2d 918 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978), a case which predated the adoption of Section 402.6 by eighteen years, the claimant had been receiving unemployment compensati on benefits when he was incarcerated for violation of a support order. The sen tencing order placed the claimant in the prison work release program and conditioned his rel ease upon his either obtaining employment or paying the support arrearages in full. While the claimant was free to leave prison to go to work, he had to be accompanied by prison officials for purposes of seeking a job.[J-100-2014] - 18

Both the referee and the UCBR ruled that the claima nt was ineligible for benefits under Section 401(d)’s “able and available for suitab le work” standard, finding that he was not free to seek employment because he could not lea ve the prison alone for purposes of obtaining work and, thus, was not realistically attached to the labor force. The Commonwealth Court in Greer reversed, finding that t he claimant was receiving benefits at the time of his incarceration, had no restrictions on his availability to work, and made every effort to find a job, but was unsuccessful. It em phasized that the claimant’s release from prison was expressly conditioned upon his obt aining employment, and the mere fact that the claimant was required to be accompani ed by a prison official when he left the prison to find work did not warrant the deni al of benefits. The court explained that each case must be examined on its own facts, as not all pr isoners in work release programs would be eligible for unemployment compensat ion benefits. Accordingly, the status of the law prior to the enactment of Section 402 .6 was that an employee incarcerated in prison and on work release could be eligi ble for unemployment compensation benefits if he was, inter alia , able and available for work. While the General Assembly did not act expeditiously after the Commonwealth Court’s 1978 pronouncement in Greer, it ultimately cha nged the legal landscape by amending the UC Law in 1996 to per se disqualify from benefits those claimants who were “incarcerated after a conviction.” The proponent of the legislation, Representative William Lloyd, made the following illustrative commen t when he offered the amendment

for a vote.

Mr. Speaker, this amendment would put into the Unem ployment Compensation Law a prohibition which is similar to one which we inserted into the workers’ compensation law in 1993. Specifically , this amendment says that someone who is incarcerated after a conviction do es not receive unemployment benefits.[J-100-2014] - 19

I learned to my surprise a month or so ago from a bu siness in my district that it is possible now, if you are convicted and you are in prison and you qualify for work release and your employer does no t want you back, you then get unemployment compensation. This businessman in my district and the other employees in that company do not think that is right; I do not think that is right either, and I think we ought to cha nge the law. Statement of Representative William Lloyd, 1996 Pa. Legis. Journal, House, p. 835 (May 13, 1996). This comment suggests that Section 402.6 was enacted to ch ange the law originally established by the Commonwealth Court’s deci sion in Greer by precluding unemployment compensation benefits to those claimants who are incarcerated in prison and eligible for work release. See Kroh, 711 A.2d at 1096 n.7 (noting that it could be argued that the General Assembly’s enactment of Sectio n 402.6 of the UC Law “overruled” judicial decisions such as the Commonwealth Co urt’s decision in Greer, which permitted a claimant incarcerated in prison and particip ating in the work release program to obtain unemployment compensation benefits). There is no evidence to suggest that Section 402.6 w as intended to disqualify claimants who were not incarcerated in a prison or an a lternative institutional setting, but rather were sentenced to the less severe sanction of ho me confinement. Pennsylvania’s criminal justice system is premised upon graduated punishme nt dependent upon the severity of the crime, and, generally, it is fair to a ssume that a defendant sentenced to

house arrest with work release has committed a less serio us offense than an individual

incarcerated after a criminal conviction. Absent clear l anguage or legislative intent to disqualify claimants sentenced to home confinement, and considering the remedial purposes underlying the UC Law, we hold that Section 402.6’s preclusion of benefits does not apply to claimants on house arrest. 9

9 As emphasized infra, even if a claimant’s criminal sente nce does not per se disqualify him from benefits under Section 402.6, his sentence may contain restrictions that render (continuedQ)[J-100-2014] - 20

We reach this conclusion in light of precedent of thi s Court acknowledging the

stark differences between incarceration and home confine ment. As relied upon by Claimant and the Commonwealth Court below, this Cour t in Kriston, supra, construed the term “imprisonment,” which is a synonym and accepted dict ionary definition of “incarceration,” as used in Section 402.6. The issue i n Kriston was whether, for purposes of parole eligibility, a defendant’s time spe nt in an electronic home monitoring program should be credited towards his mandatory minimu m sentence for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) under former 75 Pa.C. S. § 3731, which had required a minimum term of “imprisonment” of thirty days if the defendant had a prior DUI conviction. Because the term “imprisonment” was not defined in the statute, we looked to its common and ordinary meaning. Finding that “it would grossly distort the language u sed by the legislature if we were to conclude that the term ‘imprisonment’ means merely ‘ staying at home,’” 588 A.2d at 899, this Court held that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of imprisonment is confinement

in a correctional or similar rehabilitative institution , not staying at home.” Id. (emphasis in original). We reasoned that the “qualitative differ ences” between one confined in an

institution and one confined in his home “are too num erous and obvious to require elaboration,” id. (footnote omitted), and that the General Assembly would not have intended for the term “imprisonment” to be “so dilut ed in effect as to encompass home monitoring programs.” Id. at 900. We further cited provisions of the Sentencing Code, w hich demonstrated a legislative intent that, unlike home confinement, sent ences of imprisonment or incarceration are to be served in institutional setting s. See e.g. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9755(a) (Qcontinued) him unable or unavailable to work, thereby precluding him from unemployment compensation benefits under Section 401(d).[J-100-2014] - 21

(directing that a court imposing a sentence of partial confinement shall specify “whether

the confinement shall commence in a correctional or othe r appropriate institution”); id. § 9755(c) (permitting a court imposing a sentence of part ial confinement to grant the privilege of leaving the “institution” for various re asons including employment and education); and id. § 9756(a) (directing a court impo sing a sentence of total confinement to specify “whether the sentence shall commence in a co rrectional or other appropriate institution”). This Court concluded in Kriston that if the General Assembly had intended for one convicted of a second DUI offense to stay at home , it would not have employed the word “‘imprisonment,’ which, by its plain and ordi nary meaning and by legislative references to confinement found in the Sentencing Cod e, must be taken to mean confinement in an institution.” Id., at 900-01. 10 This Court has also recognized the differences between incarceration and home confinement in subsequent cases. See Commonwealth v. Ky le, 874 A.2d 12, 22 (Pa. 2005) (holding that because of the differences between incarceration and home confinement as set forth in Kriston, a defendant confine d to his home is not in “custody,” thus, time spent subject to an electronic home monitorin g bail program is not time spent in “custody” for purposes of credit under 42 Pa.C.S. § 976 0); Commonwealth v. Wegley, 829 A.2d 1148, at 1151-52 n.8 (Pa. 2003) (while concl uding that a sentence of home monitoring constituted “official detention” for purpose s of the escape statute, the Court nevertheless acknowledged the differences between confin ement at home and incarceration, noting that only a person sentenced to ho me confinement enjoys

10 Although irrelevant to the legal issue presented her ein, notwithstanding the Kriston Court’s interpretation of “imprisonment,” we ultimate ly granted the defendant in Kriston credit for time served in an electronic home monitoring program on equitable grounds because, prior to entering the program, prison author ities assured him that he would receive credit for such time.[J-100-2014] - 22

unrestricted freedom of activity, movement, and associat ion, and can eat, sleep, make phone calls, watch television and entertain guests at hi s leisure). Accordingly, based on the aforementioned precedent, we conclude that house ar rest is sufficiently distinguishable from “incarceration” so as to render Sect ion 402.6’s ineligibility provision inapplicable here. The particular cases relied upon by the UCBR, which in volve the similarly-phrased disqualification provision for incarcerated employees un der the WC Act, do not command a different result. In Henkels & McCoy Inc., supra, this Court examined Section 306(a)(2) of the WC Act, which, at the time stated tha t “[n]othing in [the WC Act] shall require payment of compensation for any period durin g which the employe is incarcerated after a conviction.” 77 P.S. § 511(2). 11 The issue on appeal was whether the claimant was “incarcerated after a conviction” when he was serving a sentence of probation with the special condition of involuntary commitment to a st ate psychiatric hospital. Similar to our analysis in the instant case, we reco gnized that “incarceration” is commonly defined to include both “imprisonment” and “co nfinement,” and found that such definitions do not limit the confinement to a jail o r penitentiary. 776 A.2d at 955. We held that a criminal sentence of involuntary commitment to a psychiatric institution

constituted “incarceration” because the claimant remained in the custody of the Commonwealth and because it was the criminal sentence ( and not the work injury) that

removed the claimant from the work force. We found in structive the decision in Brinker’s International Inc., supra (also relied upon by UCBR), where the Commonwealth Court held that “incarceration after a conviction,” as set fort h in the WC Act’s disqualification provision, should not be limited to a claimant incarcer ated 100 percent of the time, but

11 This provision was later amended, employing nearly id entical language, and now appears at 77 P.S. § 511.1.[J-100-2014] - 23

also applied where the claimant was in a work release pr ogram while incarcerated in a detention and alcohol recovery facility. Thus, pursuant to Henkels & McCoy, Inc., and Brinker’s’ In ternational, Inc., one convicted of a crime and sentenced to incarceration in an institution (such as a psychiatric hospital or alcohol rehabilitation facility) is “confine d” or “imprisoned” to such an extent so as to be “incarcerated” for purposes of eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits. That level of confinement in this unemployment compen sation case is absent, where Claimant was not sentenced to incarceration in any type of institution, but rather was confined to a home, a sentencing alternative that we h ave already concluded is far

different from incarceration or confinement in a corre ctional facility or other institutional setting. The Commonwealth Court’s decision in Moore, while dist inguishable on the ground that it was interpreting the WC Act and not th e UC Law, is more factually similar to the instant case than Henkels & McCoy, Inc. and Brinker’s I nternational, Inc. as it, like the instant case, involved a claimant sentenced to house arre st with work release. In Moore, the claimant’s employer unilaterally ceased paying wo rkers’ compensation benefits on the ground that the claimant was “incarcerated after a conviction” pursuant to Section 306(a.1) of the WC Act. The claimant sought reinstatem ent of his workers’ compensation benefits, contending that house arrest wi th work release did not constitute “incarceration.” Claimant was denied reinstatement of benefits, and th e Commonwealth Court affirmed based on Henkels & McCoy, Inc. and Brinker’s I nternational, Inc. The Commonwealth Court in Moore held that “[l]ike those c onfined to residential inpatient rehabilitation facilities and psychiatric hospitals, an individual on house arrest is in constructive custody.” Id., 811 A.2d at 634. The court emphasized that the claimant’s[J-100-2014] - 24

liberty and movements were significantly limited by secu rity measures and that unauthorized departure from the home may result in cr iminal sanctions of contempt. Id. We recognize there are distinctions between the Common wealth Court’s decision in Moore and the instant case, particularly, as noted, t hat Moore is interpreting the WC Act, and not the UC Law at issue here. Accordingly, we decline to consider the

soundness of the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Moore until such time as the issue is squarely before us. 12 In conclusion, we emphasize the same clarification as did the Commonwealth Court at the end of its opinion below, i.e. , that we are not holding that all claimants on house arrest are eligible for unemployment compensati on benefits. Instead, we merely

rule that house arrest does not constitute “incarceratio n” for purposes of the disqualification provision set forth in Section 402.6 o f the UC Law. The Commonwealth Court concluded that Claimant’s unrebutted testimony an d documentary evidence demonstrated that, under the terms and conditions of Claimant’s sentence of house arrest, he was able and available to work, and that he , in fact, worked nine days during the period he served his sentence of house arrest. Thus, Cl aimant’s sentence of house arrest did not prevent him from otherwise satisfying the requisites for obtaining unemployment compensation benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court, which reversed the

denial of benefits.

Former Chief Justice Castille did not participate in the decision of this case.

12 The Commonwealth Court below held that Moore was di stinguishable because the terms of Claimant’s house arrest placed no restrictions on his ability to work and Claimant was not removed from the work force. While we acknowled ge that the claimant in Moore was also on house arrest with work release, as noted, we l eave for another day the consideration of these arguments in the context of the WC Act.[J-100-2014] - 25

Mr. Chief Justice Saylor, Mr. Justice Eakin and Madame Justi ce Todd join the opinion. Mr. Justice Stevens files a dissenting opinion