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74

Matter of R-C-R-, Respondent

Decided August 31, 2020

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) After an Immigration Judge has set a firm deadline for filing an application for relief, 

the respondent’s opportunity to file the application may be deemed waived, prior to a 

scheduled hearing, if the deadline passes without submission of the application and no good

cause for noncompliance has been shown. 

(2) The respondent failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was deprived of a full 

and fair hearing where he has not shown that conducting the hearing by video conference 

interfered with his communication with the Immigration Judge or otherwise prejudiced him 

as a result of technical problems with the video equipment. 

FOR RESPONDENT: David J. Rozas, Baton Rouge, Louisiana

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Dawn M. Carter, Assistant 

Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: MULLANE, KELLY, and GORMAN, Appellate Immigration 

Judges.

GORMAN, Appellate Immigration Judge: 

In a decision dated December 13, 2019, an Immigration Judge found the 

respondent removable and ordered him removed after determining that he 

failed to timely submit an application for asylum, withholding of removal, 

and protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for 

signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 

197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for 

the United States Apr. 18, 1988) (“Convention Against Torture”). 1 The 

respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed.

 1 Removal proceedings before the Immigration Judge in this matter were completed in 

Richwood, Louisiana, where the respondent was located and the hearing was docketed. 

The Immigration Judge conducted the hearing remotely from the administrative control 

Immigration Court in Batavia, New York, via video conference pursuant to section 

240(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(A)(iii) 

(2018). An administrative control court creates and maintains records of proceedings for 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondent is a native and citizen of Guatemala, who entered the 

United States on March 13, 2019. The Department of Homeland Security 

(“DHS”) detained the respondent and charged him with removability under 

sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and (7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and (7)(A)(i)(I) (2018), as an alien who is 

present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and as one 

who had no valid entry document at the time he applied for admission. 

At a video conference hearing held on November 6, 2019, the respondent, 

who remained detained, appeared without counsel and admitted the factual 

allegations and charges of removal against him.

2 Through an interpreter, he 

indicated that he understood “more Spanish than Mam,” and his proceedings 

continued with interpretation in the Spanish language. The respondent 

indicated his desire to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

under the Convention Against Torture and was given an Application for 

Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (Form I-589) to complete.3

 The 

 

Immigration Courts within an assigned geographical area. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.11 (2020). 

The circuit law applied to proceedings conducted via video conference is the law governing 

the docketed hearing location, as opposed to the location of the administrative control court. 

The docketed hearing location in Richwood, Louisiana, is within the geographic area of 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Therefore, like the Immigration 

Judge, we apply the law of that circuit. See, e.g., Luziga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 937 F.3d 

244, 250 (3d Cir. 2019) (applying Third Circuit law where the Immigration Judge appeared 

by video conference from Arlington, Virginia, (outside the circuit) to preside over 

proceedings in York, Pennsylvania (within the circuit)); Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 

F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that “the law of the circuit where the video 

conference hearing is held is the applicable law” and holding that the docketed hearing 

location does not change merely because an Immigration Judge appears by video 

conference from a different location). But see Chavez-Vasquez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1115, 

1118 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Venue is determined by the location of the immigration court 

rather than the by location from which witnesses appear via teleconference.”); Ramos 

v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 948, 949 (7th Cir. 2004) (denying the Government’s request to 

transfer the proceedings to a different circuit because “the alien may petition for review in 

the circuit where the immigration court is located”).

2 The Immigration Judge gave the respondent the procedural advisals required by the 

regulations, explained the removal charges against him, took pleadings, and found the 

respondent removable as charged. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)–(6), (c) (2020). The 

respondent has not challenged the Immigration Judge’s finding of removability on appeal, 

so that issue is not before us. See, e.g., Matter of A.J. Valdez and Z. Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 

496, 496 n.1, 498 n.3 (BIA 2018) (noting that an issue addressed in an Immigration Judge’s 

decision is waived when a party does not challenge it on appeal).

3 The Immigration Judge gave the following explanation to the respondent: “You must 

fill out that application in the English language, you must answer all the questions truthfully, 
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Immigration Judge explicitly instructed the respondent to submit the 

completed application to the Immigration Court no later than December 6, 

2019, and advised him that his opportunity to file the application would be 

deemed waived if he failed to comply with the deadline.

4

 She also notified 

the respondent that his next hearing would be scheduled for January 14, 

2020.

Despite the Immigration Judge’s explicit instructions, the respondent did 

not file an application for relief from removal by the December 6, 2019, 

deadline. After an additional week had passed, the Immigration Judge issued 

a written order on December 13, 2019, finding that the respondent had 

waived his opportunity to file the application and ordering him removed.

On appeal, the respondent argues that the Immigration Judge erred in 

finding that he had waived his right to apply for relief and in ordering his 

removal prior to the hearing scheduled for January 14, 2020. The respondent 

claims that the Immigration Judge violated his right to due process by 

requiring him to file the application a month before the next hearing, not 

allowing him to file an application at that hearing, and not letting him explain 

the reasons for missing the deadline. The respondent further contends that 

because he was not given an opportunity to appear at the next scheduled 

hearing, the record is incomplete and not subject to meaningful review.

Additionally, the respondent argues that he was denied a full and fair 

hearing because his removal proceedings were conducted via a video 

conference at which he was unrepresented, detained, and had a Spanish 

translator. According to the respondent, he “might easily have been 

confused” about the nature and purpose of the second hearing as a result of 

these conditions. We review these questions of law de novo. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2020).

 

and if there’s any papers or documents that you’d like to attach to that asylum application, 

regarding your fear of return to Guatemala, if those papers or documents are in the Spanish 

language, they must be translated to the English language and there must be a certificate of 

translation which establishes that the person who performed the translation was qualified 

to do so. Do you understand?” The respondent indicated that he understood.

4 The Immigration Judge specifically advised the respondent as follows: “I’m going to 

reset your case to another date to give you time to prepare that application and submit it to 

the Court. My next date is going to be January 14th, 2020 at 10:00 a.m. I’m going to 

require that you submit the asylum application to the Court on or before December 6th, 

2019. If the Court does not and has not received your application on or before that date, 

I am going to find that you have abandoned your request for relief. So, it’s very, very 

important that you submit the asylum application to the Court as well as a copy to the 

Government no later than December 6th, 2019. Do you understand?” The respondent 

replied, “Yes.” The Immigration Judge then suggested that he get a lawyer for his removal 

proceedings to help him fill out the application. When asked again if he understood, the 

respondent said, “Yes.” 
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II. ANALYSIS

An alien who faces removal is entitled to a full and fair removal hearing 

under both the Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 

See Santos-Alvarado v. Barr, 967 F.3d 428, 439 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The 

Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects individuals in removal 

proceedings.” (citation omitted)); Vetcher v. Barr, 953 F.3d 361, 370 (5th 

Cir. 2020) (stating that “removal proceedings must be conducted according 

to standards of fundamental fairness”), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 26, 

2020) (No. 19-1437); Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 474, 479 (BIA 2011) 

(“Included in the rights that the Due Process Clause requires in removal 

proceedings is the right to a full and fair hearing.”); see also section 

240(b)(4)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2020) (providing that 

“the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence 

against the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s own behalf, and to 

cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government”).

To establish that his due process rights were violated, the respondent must 

prove that there was a deficiency or violation and that he was prejudiced by 

it. See Okpala v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 965, 971 (5th Cir. 2018) (“To prevail 

on a claim regarding an alleged denial of due process rights, an alien must 

make an initial showing of substantial prejudice.”); Matter of D-, 20 I&N 

Dec. 827, 831 (BIA 1994) (per curiam) (noting that an alien has been denied 

a fair hearing “only if he has been prejudiced by some deficiency so as to 

deprive him of due process”); Matter of Santos, 19 I&N Dec. 105, 107 (BIA

1984) (stating that “an alien must demonstrate that he has been prejudiced by 

a violation of a procedural rule or regulation before his deportation 

proceeding will be invalidated”). The respondent has not shown that his 

rights were violated or that he suffered prejudice in his removal proceedings.

A. Waiver of an Application for Relief From Removal

The Immigration Judge did not err in requiring the respondent to file an 

application a month prior to his next scheduled hearing, rather than allowing 

him to submit it at that hearing. “Immigration Judges have broad discretion 

to conduct and control immigration proceedings and to admit and consider 

relevant and probative evidence.” Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. 

264, 265 (BIA 2010); see also section 240(b)(1) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1003.36, 1240.1(c), 1240.7(a) (2020). Immigration Judges also “have 

authority to set filing deadlines for applications and related documents.” 

Matter of Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. at 265; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c)

(2020) (providing authority for Immigration Judges to “set and extend 

time limits for the filing of applications and related documents”). The 
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Immigration Judge gave the respondent explicit instructions regarding the 

filing date and clearly warned him that his application for relief would be 

deemed waived if it was not timely filed.

According to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c), if an application “is not filed within 

the time set by the Immigration Judge, the opportunity to file that application 

. . . shall be deemed waived.” See also Choge v. Lynch, 806 F.3d 438, 

440 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) “clearly states 

the [Immigration Judge] has the authority to deem applications waived 

when submitted after the set deadlines” (citation omitted)); Matter of 

Interiano-Rosa, 25 I&N Dec. at 265) (“An application or document that is 

not filed within the time established by the Immigration Judge may be 

deemed waived.”). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 

in whose jurisdiction this case arises, found in an unpublished decision that 

an Immigration Judge properly determined that an alien’s application for 

relief was deemed waived because it was not presented within the set 

deadline. Mathita v. Lynch, 631 F. App’x 251, 252 (5th Cir. 2016) (per 

curiam).

The respondent has not explained his failure to comply with the 

Immigration Judge’s application deadline or identified any difficulties he 

may have encountered that prevented his compliance. If the respondent 

required more than the allotted month to complete his application prior to the 

December 6, 2019, deadline, he could have filed a motion requesting that the 

Immigration Judge extend the deadline for submitting his application. 

See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(a), 1003.31(c) (2020). See generally 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1003.29, 1240.6 (2020) (stating that an Immigration Judge may grant a 

motion or application for continuance where good cause is shown). Had the 

respondent established good cause for extending the application deadline, 

approval of that request would likely have been appropriate. Cf. Matter of 

L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405, 413 (A.G. 2018) (stating that “the good-cause 

standard . . . requires consideration and balancing of all relevant factors in 

assessing a motion for continuance to accommodate a collateral matter”). 

However, the respondent made no such request.

Once the application deadline had passed and the Immigration Judge 

issued her decision, the respondent could have filed a motion asking her to 

reconsider the pretermission of his application and submitted a completed 

application with an explanation for his untimely filing. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.23(b)(1)–(2). Alternatively, he could have filed a motion to reopen, 

along with his completed application, and requested that it be considered by 

the Immigration Judge. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(b)(1), (3), 1208.4(b)(3)(ii) 

(2020). Had the respondent filed either type of motion and provided good 

cause for missing the deadline, reconsideration or reopening by the 

Immigration Judge would likely have been appropriate. However, the
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respondent made no attempt to file such a motion with a completed 

application at any time after the deadline had passed.

The respondent is also required to explain on appeal why he missed the 

application deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b) (2020). He contends that he 

“never had the opportunity to present evidence or show cause for the missed 

deadline.” However, he has not provided any explanation or a good cause 

justification for missing the application deadline, despite being represented 

by counsel on appeal.5

 Moreover, the respondent has not submitted a motion 

to remand, along with a completed application, at any time during the 

pendency of his appeal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(b)(1), (c)(4), 1208.4(b)(4)

(2020). Nor has he alleged facts on appeal that would constitute a prima 

facie claim for any form of relief. Had the respondent done so and shown 

good cause for missing the deadline, a remand may have been appropriate.

The respondent was clearly warned that his application for relief could be 

deemed waived if he failed to meet the filing deadline set by the Immigration 

Judge. He has presented no reasonable explanation to the Immigration 

Judge, or to this Board, to excuse his failure to file the application within the 

month allotted by the Immigration Judge. Because the respondent did not 

timely file a completed application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture as instructed, we agree with 

the Immigration Judge that he waived the right to apply for that relief and 

protection from removal. See Matter of R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. 547, 549 (BIA 

1992) (stating that “applications for benefits under the Act are properly 

denied as abandoned when the alien fails to timely file them”); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.31(c). 

B. Full and Fair Hearing

We are unpersuaded by the respondent’s argument that his video 

conference hearing, at which he was unrepresented, detained, and had a 

Spanish translator, denied him of his due process right to a full and fair 

hearing. 

The respondent has not explained how he was prejudiced as a result of 

the conditions of his hearing. He indicated that he understood the Spanish 

 5 The respondent has not claimed that he was prevented from timely filing an application 

because he was unrepresented. He was advised of his privilege to be represented in 

removal proceedings and was given a list of free and low-cost attorneys and legal service 

organizations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)–(2) (2020). The respondent hired an attorney 

to represent him in bond proceedings, and there is no indication that he was deprived of 

the privilege of being represented by an attorney in removal proceedings or in helping him 

complete an application for relief.
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language best, so he was provided a Spanish interpreter.6 Our review of the 

transcript shows no lack of understanding or confusion on the respondent’s 

part. He made no claim at any time during the hearing that he could not 

understand the interpreter or the Immigration Judge and, on appeal, he has 

not identified any portion of the hearing where he had such difficulty. See

Matter of K-L-, 20 I&N Dec. 654, 660 (BIA 1993) (rejecting a due process 

claim where the alien showed no prejudice because he claimed to speak 

English, did not request an interpreter, and “failed to specify any portion of 

the hearing that he did not understand”). He was responsive to the questions 

asked of him and was able to fully communicate with the Immigration Judge. 

Consequently, we are not persuaded that the respondent was prejudiced as a 

result of the Spanish interpretation. See Matter of D-, 20 I&N Dec. at 832 

(finding there was no showing of “prejudice resulting from a deficiency” in 

hearings that were conducted in English without an interpreter where the 

alien indicated he spoke English, did not request an interpreter for himself, 

and was able to meaningfully participate in the proceedings).

We also find no support for the respondent’s contention that his due 

process rights were violated merely because the Immigration Judge 

conducted his hearing by video conference. The Act and its implementing 

regulations specifically provide for hearings via video conference. See 

section 240(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act (providing that a removal “proceeding 

may take place . . . through video conference”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(c) (2020) 

(“An Immigration may conduct hearings through video conference to the 

same extent as he or she may conduct hearings in person.”). This authority 

has been consistently recognized by the courts of appeals. See Vilchez 

v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that video 

conference hearings are explicitly authorized by statute); Aslam v. Mukasey, 

537 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (acknowledging that the 

statutory authority accorded to Immigration Judges to conduct hearings via 

video conference includes taking the testimony of witnesses); Rapheal 

v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 531 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that “Congress 

specifically authorized proceedings by means of a video conference” and 

rejecting the alien’s challenge to the constitutionality of the implementing 

regulation).

 6 An alien has a fundamental right to participate meaningfully in the removal proceedings 

by having them competently interpreted into a language he or she can understand. See

Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The right of a person facing deportation 

to participate meaningfully in the deportation proceedings by having them competently 

translated into a language he or she can understand is fundamental.”); Matter of Tomas, 

19 I&N Dec. 464, 465 (BIA 1987) (“The presence of a competent interpreter is important 

to the fundamental fairness of a hearing if the alien cannot speak English fluently.”).
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Immigration Judges “must conduct immigration hearings in accord with 

due process standards of fundamental fairness.” Bouchikhi v. Holder, 676 

F.3d 173, 180 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1234 

(5th Cir. 1992)). Due process requires that respondents in immigration 

proceedings must be given an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 

and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 

(1976) (citation omitted); see also Aslam, 537 F.3d at 114 (recognizing the 

applicability of the due process requirements set out by Mathews). However, 

to prove a due process violation, an alien must demonstrate substantial 

prejudice. See Okpala, 908 F.3d at 971.

Removal proceedings conducted by video conference do not per se

violate due process. See Vilchez, 682 F.3d at 1199 (stating that “a hearing 

by video conference does not necessarily deny due process”). In fact, the 

courts have generally found that such proceedings afford aliens a full and fair 

hearing. See, e.g., Aslam, 537 F.3d at 115 (holding that the alien’s “due 

process rights were not violated at the immigration hearing when a key 

witness was permitted to provide testimony via videoconference”).

The Fifth Circuit has not yet published a decision on this issue. However,

in two unpublished decisions, the court has found the use of video conference 

hearings to be fundamentally fair. See Jinquan Liu v. Holder, 566 F. App’x 

333, 334 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (holding that the alien did not 

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the video conference hearing, which 

was “fundamentally fair and did not result in a due process violation”); Deng 

Ming Li v. Holder, 478 F. App’x 884, 887 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) 

(finding that the alien “failed to show that he was prejudiced by the use of 

the video-conferencing format, because he did not establish that he was 

precluded from meaningfully presenting his case”).

However, the potential for a video conference hearing to violate the right 

to a full and fair hearing has been recognized in some circumstances. See

Vilchez, 682 F.3d at 1199 (acknowledging that “in a particular case video 

conferencing may violate due process or the right to a fair hearing”); Rusu 

v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 321–24 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that an alien’s video 

conference hearing on an asylum claim may be unfair if the fact-finder has 

difficulty gauging demeanor for a credibility determination, counsel is 

unable to privately confer with and advise the alien, or there are 

insurmountable technological problems with the sound or video quality). 

For example, a new hearing was required where the alien was unable to 

review a document that was used to find her not credible and “the lack of a 

fair hearing ‘actually had the potential for affecting the outcome’ of the 

proceedings.” Rapheal, 533 F.3d at 531–33 (citation omitted). “Whether a 

particular video-conference hearing violates due process must be determined 

on a case-by-case basis, depending on the degree of interference with the full 
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and fair presentation of [the alien’s] case caused by the video conference, 

and on the degree of prejudice suffered by the [alien].” Vilchez, 682 F.3d at 

1199–1200.

An alien who claims that removal proceedings conducted via video 

conference violated due process has the burden to show that he or she was

prejudiced and denied a full and fair hearing. See id. at 1200 (holding that 

the alien failed to establish that the outcome of his hearing was affected 

where his claim that his credibility was compromised because of his

nervousness about testifying on video was undermined by the fact that the 

Immigration Judge did not make an adverse credibility finding); Rusu, 296 

F.3d at 324 (“To prevail on his contention that the video conferencing 

procedures violated due process, [the alien] must show that better procedures 

are likely to have made a difference in the outcome of his hearing.”). For 

instance, a denial of due process has not been established where there is 

insufficient evidence that the video conference equipment was unreliable or 

defective. See Garza-Moreno v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 239, 241 (6th Cir. 

2007); see also Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 382–83 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(finding no prejudice where the alien did not explain how the video 

conference format prevented the Immigration Judge from considering the 

evidence in support of his claim, including his physical attributes).

The respondent has not clearly explained how having his hearing via 

video conference interfered with his communication with the Immigration 

Judge or otherwise prejudiced him. At the hearing, the respondent was 

advised of his procedural rights. The Immigration Judge noted that he had a 

lawyer for his bond hearing but told him that he also had a right to be 

represented in his removal proceedings. The respondent indicated that he 

understood and did not have any questions of the Immigration Judge. He 

similarly acknowledged that he had a right to appeal any decision of the 

Immigration Judge. 

The Immigration Judge then explained the removal charges, and the 

respondent indicated his understanding. Having explained each allegation in 

the notice to appear, the Immigration Judge took pleadings from the 

respondent. The respondent was responsive to each question, was asked 

whether each allegation was true or false, and did not seek clarification or 

otherwise indicate any confusion. Based on the respondent’s answers, the 

Immigration Judge concluded that he was removable as charged in the notice 

to appear.

There are no indicia in the transcript that the respondent and the 

Immigration Judge were unable to hear or see one another. Moreover, the 

respondent has not claimed that the video equipment was malfunctioning or 

defective, and nothing in the transcript suggests that there were any technical 

problems with the equipment. Absent technical deficiencies or other 
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examples of error, we find no prejudice to the respondent. Consequently, we 

conclude that the respondent has not met his burden of establishing that he 

was denied a full and fair hearing as a result of the use of video conferencing. 

III. CONCLUSION

After an Immigration Judge has set a firm deadline for filing an 

application for relief, the respondent’s opportunity to file the application may 

be deemed waived, prior to a scheduled hearing, if the deadline passes 

without submission of the application and no good cause for noncompliance 

has been shown. The respondent has not explained his failure to comply 

with the Immigration Judge’s application deadline. Nor has he provided 

good cause to justify his failure, so as to undermine the pretermission of 

his application. Further, the respondent has not submitted a completed 

application or alleged facts on appeal that would constitute a prima facie 

claim for any form of relief. We therefore conclude that the respondent 

waived the right to apply for relief from removal.

Although the respondent was detained, appeared pro se, and used a 

Spanish interpreter at his video conference hearing, none of these factors,

standing alone or taken together, constitute a denial of due process. The 

respondent failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was deprived of

a full and fair hearing where he has not shown that conducting the hearing 

by video conference interfered with his communication with the Immigration 

Judge or otherwise prejudiced him as a result of technical problems with the 

video equipment. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and 

willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the 

order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents 

necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the 

time and place required for removal by the DHS, or conspires to or takes any 

action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to 

the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary 

penalty of up to $813 for each day the respondent is in violation. See Section 

274D of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2020).