The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. 

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: Final Technical Report Draft: Assessing Police 

Use of Force Policy and Outcomes

Author: William Terrill, Eugene A. Paoline III, Jason 

Ingram

Document No.: 237794

Date Received: February 2012

Award Number: 2005-IJ-CX-0055

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to 

traditional paper copies. 

Opinions or points of view expressed are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice.
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT DRAFT:

ASSESSING POLICE USE OF FORCE POLICY AND OUTCOMES

FUNDED BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

GRANT NUMBER 2005-IJ-CX-0055

William Terrill

Principal Investigator

Michigan State University

Eugene A. Paoline III

Co-Principal Investigator

University of Central Florida

Jason Ingram 

Project Site Director

Illinois State University

May 2011

This report was supported by Award No. 2005-IJ-CX-0055 by the National Institute of Justice,

Office of Justice Programs. U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions

or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily

reflect the views of the Department of Justice. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We owe an enormous amount of gratitude to the many individuals who contributed to our

research efforts. Without their support this project would never have been possible. 

City of Albuquerque 

Chief Ray Schultz, Sergeant Chad Dolan, Lieutenant Paul Feist, Lieutenant Allen Banks, Officer

Jack Coraci, Officer Duane Clark, Jay Davidson, Trey Flint, Erika Wilson, Anthony Simoes,

Veronica Pino, Valerie Jaramillo

City-County of Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

Chief Darrel Stephens, Captain Charles Adkins

City of Colorado Springs 

Chief Richard Myers, Lieutenant Arthur Sapp, Sergeant Mark Stevens, Officer Matthew Tyner,

Scott Haring

City of Columbus 

Chief James Jackson, Commander Kent Shafer, Sergeant Jay Hammer, Officer Jon Gilles

City of Fort Wayne 

Chief Russell York, Captain Lynn Wetmore, Captain Rod Howard, Lieutenant Lisa Williams,

Officer Juan Barrientes, Rick Wurm, Heidi McClain, Terry Wilson

City of Knoxville 

Chief Sterling Owen, IV, Deputy Chief Don Green, Lieutenant Rick Ferguson, John Venn,

Diane Lewis

City of Portland

Chief Roseanne Sizer, Captain Eric Hendricks, Captain Randy Killinger, Sergeant Michael

Marshman, Bruce Cuthbertson, Christy Khalifa, Kristi Brant, Dorothy Brown, Merlyn Muse, 

Leslie Stevens, Derek Reinke, Clair Warnock

City of St. Petersburg 

Deputy Mayor Goliath Davis, Chief Charles Harmon, Major John Thompson, Major Phillip

Beahn, Lieutenant Gregory Totz, Rick Ferner, Beverly Woodall

American University

Dr. Edward Maguire

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Michigan State University

Dr. Edmund McGarrell, Dae-Hoon Kwak, Mike Rossler, Jason Hildebrant, Yi Ting Chua, 

Marcia Williamson, Mike Tapling, Brian Buege, Kristin Bixman, Charles Scheer, Kathy

Harmon, Terri Bulock

Portland State University

Dr. Brian Renauer, Ryan Arnold, Sasha Craft, Shafina Fazal, Michael Hansen, Julie Nehl,

Alyssa Tibbs

University of Central Florida

Dr. Robert Langworthy, Jessica Williams, Jessica Maykrantz, Heidi Bonner, Sara Jane Shipman,

Amy Byrne, Aramis Donell, Scott Gardiner, Jayme Holmes, Ghazal Mehrani, Kendal Tidwell,

Jennifer Wing

University of North Caroline-Charlotte

Dr. Joseph Kuhns, Heather Bersot, Tammatha Clodfelter, Courtney Morrison, Diana Summers

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................ i

CHAPTER I

Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 1

 Literature Review............................................................................................................ 4

 Gap in the Literature........................................................................................................ 8

CHAPTER 2

Project Overview.................................................................................................................. 10

 Research Goals and Objectives........................................................................................ 10

 Research Design............................................................................................................. 11

CHAPTER 3

Phase I................................................................................................................................... 12

 Purpose............................................................................................................................. 12

 Methodology.................................................................................................................... 12

Sampling Frame ....................................................................................................... 12

Sample Selection ...................................................................................................... 13

Survey Distribution and Response............................................................................ 14

 Analyses and Findings..................................................................................................... 15

Continuum Design.................................................................................................... 15

Tactical Placement.................................................................................................... 17

Summary................................................................................................................... 32

CHAPTER 4

Phase II................................................................................................................................. 35

 Purpose............................................................................................................................ 35

 Methodology................................................................................................................... 35

 Agency Qualification and Selection.......................................................................... 36

 Data Collection.......................................................................................................... 38

 Agency Comparisons.................................................................................................. 40

 Policy Descriptions..................................................................................................... 42

 Columbus............................................................................................................... 42

 Charlotte-Mecklenburg.......................................................................................... 43

 Portland.................................................................................................................. 44

 Albuquerque........................................................................................................... 45

 Colorado Springs................................................................................................... 46

 St. Petersburg......................................................................................................... 47

 Fort Wayne............................................................................................................. 48

 Knoxville............................................................................................................... 49

 Data Elements............................................................................................................. 56

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CHAPTER 5 

Patrol Officer Survey Data................................................................................................... 58

 Methodology................................................................................................................... 58

 Survey Population...................................................................................................... 58

 Survey Protocol.......................................................................................................... 59

 Survey Response Rates.............................................................................................. 62

 Analyses and Findings.................................................................................................... 64

 Less Lethal Force Policy Perceptions................................................................ 64

 Summary................................................................................................................ 68

 Outcomes of Less Lethal Force Policy.............................................................. 69

 Summary................................................................................................................ 73

 Training and Less Lethal Force Policy.............................................................. 74

 Summary................................................................................................................ 79

 Background and Demographics................................................................................. 80

 Summary................................................................................................................ 90

CHAPTER 6

Force Report Data................................................................................................................ 91

 Methodology................................................................................................................... 91

 Analyses and Findings.................................................................................................... 94

 Frequency of Force by Workload Measures.............................................................. 94

 Force and Resistance Types....................................................................................... 96

 Bivariate Analyses..................................................................................................... 107

 Summary................................................................................................................ 127

 Multivariate Analyses................................................................................................ 127

 Summary................................................................................................................ 134

 Suspect Injuries and Force......................................................................................... 135

 Officer Injuries and Force.......................................................................................... 139

CHAPTER 7

Citizen Complaint Data........................................................................................................ 145

 Methodology.................................................................................................................... 145

 Analyses and Findings..................................................................................................... 147

 Frequency of Complaints............................................................................................ 147

 Summary................................................................................................................. 149

 Disposition of Complaints.......................................................................................... 151

 Summary................................................................................................................ 154

 Disciplinary Actions................................................................................................... 155

 Summary................................................................................................................. 161

 Frequency of Complaints by Workload Measures...................................................... 161

 Summary................................................................................................................. 166

 Use of Force and Discourtesy Officer Totals............................................................. 167

 Summary................................................................................................................. 170

 Multivariate Analyses................................................................................................. 170

 Summary................................................................................................................ 171

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CHAPTER 8

Civil Litigation Data............................................................................................................. 174

 Methodology................................................................................................................... 174

 Analyses and Findings.................................................................................................... 175

 Summary......................................................................................................................... 179

CHAPTER 9

Project Summary Findings................................................................................................... 180

 Phase I............................................................................................................................. 180

 Force Continuum Policies......................................................................................... 180

 Phase II............................................................................................................................ 181

 Patrol Officer Survey Data......................................................................................... 181

 Less Lethal Force Policy Perceptions............................................................ 182

 Outcomes of Less Lethal Force Policy.......................................................... 186

 Training and Less Lethal Force Policy.......................................................... 188

 Summary................................................................................................................ 191 

 Force Report Data...................................................................................................... 192

 Aggregate Officer Force Usage in Relation to Calls for Service, Reported 

 Crimes, and Arrests................................................................................................ 192

 Aggregate Officer Force......................................................................................... 194

 Aggregate Suspect Resistance................................................................................ 194

 Force Relative to Resistance.................................................................................. 196

 Force and Resistance Comparisons........................................................................ 198

 Suspect Injuries and Force...................................................................................... 199

 Officer Injuries and Force....................................................................................... 200

 Summary................................................................................................................. 202

 Citizen Complaint Data.............................................................................................. 203

 Frequency of Complaints....................................................................................... 203

 Disposition of Complaints..................................................................................... 206

 Disciplinary Actions of Complaints....................................................................... 206

 Complaints in Relation to Calls for Service, Reported Crimes, Arrests, 

 and Force................................................................................................................ 207

 Use of Force and Discourtesy Officer Totals......................................................... 208

 Multivariate Analysis............................................................................................. 210

 Summary................................................................................................................ 211

 Civil Litigation Data.................................................................................................. 212

 Number of Force Related Lawsuits Filed.................................................... 212

 Number of Force Related Lawsuits Settled or Lost..................................... 213

 Monetary Payout for Force Related Lawsuits ............................................. 213

 Summary................................................................................................................ 213

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CHAPTER 10

Discussion............................................................................................................................ 214

 Police Administrators...................................................................................................... 214

 Officer Concerns........................................................................................................ 216

 Citizen Concerns........................................................................................................ 217

 Overall Department Concerns.................................................................................... 218

 Police Researchers........................................................................................................... 219

 Study Challenges........................................................................................................ 219

 Study Limitations....................................................................................................... 221

 Future Research.......................................................................................................... 224

REFERENCES................................................................................................................... 226

APPENDICES.................................................................................................................... 231

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While force continuum policies are frequently discussed in the policing literature by

academics and practitioners alike, little is known concerning how many agencies actually use a

continuum. Moreover, given potential variation in both continuum design (e.g., linear, matrix,

wheel, etc.) and tactical placement (e.g., OC spray, CED, etc.), even less is known with respect

to whether differences in continuum policies matter, and if so, in what way. Within this context,

this project set two separate, but interrelated goals: to identify the extent of variation in use of

force policies being used by police agencies throughout the country, and determine whether

certain types of policies offer more beneficial outcomes to police practitioners. Stated more

directly, the project sought to (1) identify existing variation in use of force policies, particularly

those employing a force continuum approach and (2) determine which types of policies offer

more beneficial outcomes to police practitioners, which are measured in terms of the degree to

which varying policies: (a) provide officers assistance and guidance with respect to force

decision-making, and (b) are associated with less force (i.e., by amount and type), injuries to

suspects and officers, citizen complaints, and lawsuits levied for improper force. To accomplish

these goals the project was divided into two primary phases. 

PHASE 1

In the initial phase, we administered a mail survey to a stratified random sample of police

agencies across the country, based on agency size (i.e., sworn officers) and type (i.e., municipal,

sheriff). The purpose of the survey was to decipher the types of force policies that exist. The

key elements of the survey captured whether an agency had a written policy on non-lethal force,

employed a force continuum approach within their policy, the form or type of continuum used,

i

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
the placement of various tactics within the continuum framework, and report and review

mechanisms. For greater detail see Chapter 3.

Key Findings

< Over 80 percent of the responding agencies use some type of force continuum

policy:

< of these, 73 percent rely on a linear design, followed by matrix/box

designs and circular/wheel designs at 10 percent each. 

< With respect to the tactical placement of force tactics (soft hands, pain

compliance controls, hard hands) and weapons (batons, chemical sprays, CEDs),

and how police agencies rank the order of such in terms of progression, the key

finding uncovered was the amount of variation present:

< In terms of force progression, a total of 123 different permutations were

uncovered, ranging from three to nine different levels (82.0% relied on

five or six levels). 

< In terms of citizen resistance progression, a total of 23 permutations were

uncovered, ranging from three to seven different levels (92.4%, relied on

five or six levels). 

< For departments that use a force continuum and provide officers with explicit

guidance as to the types of force most appropriate given varying types of

resistance (i.e., link citizen resistance to force), it was difficult to identify a

typically used preference:

< The most frequent approach was used by only 20 percent of the

departments, while the second and third most frequently used approaches

were just half of that at 10 percent. 

< The placement of chemical sprays and CEDs offered the greatest challenge for

police administrators as to the proper placement within the force continuum: 

< Roughly 30 percent of the agencies place chemical sprays with pain

compliance techniques, another 30 percent of the departments place

chemical sprays with hard hand tactics, and just over a third of the

agencies place chemical sprays with impact weapons. 

< Compared to chemical sprays, there was somewhat less variation when it

comes to CED placement, but far from a clear consensus. Nearly 60

ii

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
percent of the agencies place CEDs at the impact weapon level, while

another 2.0 percent place it along with deadly force. The remaining

agencies place CEDs with some sort of hands on force (a quarter of the

agencies place CEDs at the same level as hard empty-hand tactics, with

another 13.1 percent placing CEDs with pain compliance techniques). 

Summary

Overall, these findings are interesting given recent discussion within the literature

concerning the potential negatives of force continua in general, and linear designs in particular

(see Aveni, 2003, Peters and Brave, 2006, Petrowski, 2002, Williams, 2002). More specifically,

some have argued against the use of force continua on a number of fronts, such as in relation to

hampering decision making, fear of liability issues, and being more restrictive than the law. 

Nonetheless, what is apparent from the findings presented here is that a large majority of police

agencies do incorporate a force continuum into their policy (80%), and the preferred model is

linear by design (73%).

Moreover, it was difficult to identify a standard practice that is used by police

departments across the country. While some departments are quite restrictive in terms of

allowing officers to use more severe forms of force only on actively aggressive suspects, other

agencies are quite liberal and place a large amount of discretion in officers hands by allowing

them to use nearly all types of force against nearly all types of resistance faced short of extreme

imbalance (e.g., allowing a baton strike to a compliant suspect). The most frequent approach is

used by only 20 percent of the departments, while the second and third most frequently used

approaches are just half of that at 10 percent. In essence, there really is no “commonly” used

means of tactical placement in terms of force continuum policies (i.e., where various forms of

hands on and weapons should be placed in relation to varying forms of suspect resistance). 

iii

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Departments pick and choose, and tweak and adapt, in a multitude of ways - all unfortunately,

with no empirical evidence as to which approach is best or even better than another. 

PHASE 2

Based on results of the agency survey, eight agencies were selected for deeper

exploration as part of the second phase of the project (Columbus, OH, Charlotte-Mecklenburg,

NC, Portland, OR, Albuquerque, NM, Colorado Springs, CO, St. Petersburg, FL, Fort Wayne,

IN, and Knoxville, TN). Agency selection was based on ensuring adequate variation in terms of

differing policy types, but also a degree of comparability based on jurisdictional size, crime rate,

workload, and socioeconomic status. Upon securing agreements with police administrators, the

research team conducted multiple site visits over the course of two years at each agency. Data

collection consisted of a survey to patrol officers to assess their views on the impact of the

agency’s force policy on decision-making. In addition, use of force, citizen complaint, and civil

litigation data, as well as accompanying sources of information (e.g., organizational charts,

rosters, rules and regulation manuals, number of reported crimes, arrests, calls for service) were

collected retrospectively for 24 months. Further, a series of informal interviews were conducted

with officials at the middle and upper management levels. Collectively, these sources of data

served as the basis for the analyses and findings presented in this report. For greater detail see

Chapters 4 through 9.

Key Findings

First, it is important to note the extent of variation in the different policy approaches

(e.g., tactical placement of various forms of physical and weapon based force, and how citizen

resistance is, or is not, linked to force options in each of the eight policies). Two of the

iv

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
departments (i.e., Colombus and Fort Wayne) only offer force progression levels - with no

explicit link to citizen resistance. However, these agencies still vary in terms of force tactical

placement. For instance, Columbus calls for officers to use soft hands/pain compliance,

followed by chemical spray, CED, and then hard hands, all at separate and distinct levels. Fort

Wayne’s approach is slightly altered. First, it places chemical spray at the same level as soft

hands and pain compliance rather than on its own level. Second, the CED is placed at the impact

weapons level, which is after hard hands rather than before. 

Six of the agencies, in one form or another, link force options to varying levels of citizen

resistance. Once again, the degree of variation is evident. Charlotte-Mecklenburg places

chemical sprays, hard hands, and the CED at different levels, while Albuquerque places all these

force types (as well as soft hand tactics and pain compliance) on the same force level. However,

it gets somewhat more complicated when citizen resistance is factored into the equation. In

Charlotte-Mecklenburg, chemical spray is at the defensively resistant level, while impact force

and the CED use requires greater that just defensive resistance suspects. By contrast,

Albuquerque permits soft and hard hand, pain compliance, chemical spray, and CED force on

verbally and defensively resistant suspects, reserving impact force to actively resistant suspects. 

Other variations in the policies are also present. Portland places chemical sprays and the

CED together in the middle of the continuum against defensive citizen resistance, while St.

Petersburg places CEDs near the top of the continuum just prior to deadly force and requiring

active resistence. Knoxville instructs officers to use soft hands and pain compliance on verbal

and passive resisters, and then all other force short of deadly on defensive and active resisters. 

v

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Perhaps one of the more interesting agency approaches is found in Colorado Springs. 

One of the stated reasons for using a wheel, as opposed to a linear, type model is so officers do

not think about force progression in a ladder or step-by-step format. In fact, their wheel design

goes so far as to ensure that no force progression is evident (e.g., lethal force is placed next to

chemical agent on one side and soft control techniques on the other side). Nonetheless, in the

text of the policy citizen resistance is laid out in progression format and explicitly linked to

appropriate force options. 

Below we offer a brief description of each agency model followed by key findings

presented according to how agencies compared to one another according to seven outcomes (see

also summary rankings in Chapter 9 for many additional findings).

1. The extent of force used in relation to workload factors (i.e., calls for service, arrests,

reported crime).

2. The extent to which officers use force proportional to the resistance they encounter:

3. The extent to which citizens are injured during forceful encounters.

4. The extent to which officers are injured during forceful encounters.1

5. The extent to which line level officers have a favorable view toward their agency’s

policy in terms of utility (i.e., assistance, clarity, guidance, restrictiveness, fairness).

6. The extent to which line level officers have a favorable view toward their agency’s

policy in terms of pre- and in-service force training.

7. The extent to which citizens file complaints for improper force/discourtesy in relation

to sworn personnel/workload.

1

 Note that Albuquerque did not capture officer injuries as part of their reporting process.

vi

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Columbus

Columbus used a linear design referred to as the Action-Response to Resistance/

Aggression (Use of Force) model, which did not graphically depict a force continuum but rather

simply laid out eight levels of force (soft hands, chemical spray, electronic devices, hard hands,

impact weapon, canine, less lethal munitions, deadly) (see also Appendix B and agency policy

descriptions in Chapter 4).

More Positive Outcomes2

< Columbus officers used the least amount of force relative to citizen resistance. 

< Columbus had the lowest amount of officer injuries.

< Columbus had the second lowest amount of citizen injuries.

< Columbus officers reported the second highest satisfaction rate in force training.

< Columbus officers reported the fourth highest satisfaction rate in policy utility.

Less Positive Outcomes

< Columbus had the second highest rate of citizen complaints for improper

force/discourtesy.

< Columbus had the third highest rate of force in relation to workload.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg used a linear design, although their policy directive specifically

stated that it is “not designed to be a step by step progression.” The model graphically depicted

six levels of citizen resistance in linear fashion (cooperative, verbal and non verbal, passive,

defensive, active aggression, aggravated active) on a horizontal axis that sits-page43 above

another horizontal axis that depicts seven levels of force in linear fashion (professional presence

and verbal dialogue and commands, soft hands, chemical spray, hard hands, conducted energy

2

 We identify more and less positive outcome categories based on whether the agency was in the upper half or lower

half ranking comparatively. More specifically, each agency was ranked one through eight: classifications for more

positive outcomes meant the agency scored in the top four, while classifications for less positive outcomes meant the

agency scored in the bottom four.

vii

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
devices, impact weapon, and deadly force). These force options, while depicted on a horizontal

axis are also moving vertically as well. Further, there is not a complete overlap between

resistance and force options (e.g., hard hands can be used somewhere between defensive and

active resistance) (see also Appendix B and agency policy descriptions in Chapter 4).

More Positive Outcomes

< Charlotte-Mecklenburg had the second lowest rate of force in relation to

workload.

< Charlotte-Mecklenburg had the third lowest rate of citizen complaints for

improper force/discourtesy.

< Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers reported the fourth highest satisfaction rate in

force training.

Less Positive Outcomes

< Charlotte-Mecklenburg had the highest amount of citizen injuries.

< Charlotte-Mecklenburg had the second highest amount of officer injuries.

< Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers used the fourth highest amount of force relative

to citizen resistance.

< Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers reported the fourth lowest satisfaction rate in

policy utility.

Portland

Portland employed a linear force continuum design that laid out and linked citizen

resistance with force options. This model depicted seven levels of citizen resistance (but not in

graphical format) in linear fashion (compliant, compliant/verbal, passive, physical, physical

aggressive, physical aggressive armed, deadly) in a right hand column, with seven force level

options in linear fashion in a middle column (officer presence, verbal, control holds, chemical

spray and Taser, baton and strikes/kicks, less lethal munitions, firearms), with five force levels

listed in the left hand column (presence, verbal, physical control, impact munitions, deadly) (see

also Appendix B and agency policy descriptions in Chapter 4).

viii

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
More Positive Outcomes

< Portland had the second lowest amount of officer injuries.

Less Positive Outcomes

< Portland officers used the highest amount of force relative to citizen resistance.

< Portland had the second highest rate of force in relation to workload.

< Portland officers reported the second lowest satisfaction rate in policy utility.

< Portland had the fourth highest amount of citizen injuries.

< Portland officers reported the fourth lowest satisfaction rate in force training.

< Portland had the fourth (tie) highest rate of citizen complaints for improper

force/discourtesy.

Albuquerque

Albuquerque employed a linear force continuum design (called the Reactive Control

Model or RCM) that laid out and linked citizen resistance with force options. This model

graphically depicted four levels of citizen resistance in linear fashion (cooperative, noncooperative, unarmed assailant, armed assailant) on a horizontal axis that sites above another

horizontal axis that depicts four levels of force in linear fashion (alert, control, active, survival). 

Within each of the four broad levels there are specific types listed (e.g., under active it instructs

officers to consider anything from verbal commands to the use of an intermediate weapon) (see

also Appendix B and agency policy descriptions in Chapter 4).

More Positive Outcomes

< Albuquerque officers reported the second highest satisfaction rate in policy

utility.

< Albuquerque had the second lowest rate of citizen complaints for improper

force/discourtesy.

< Albuquerque had the third lowest amount of citizen injuries.

< Albuquerque officers reported the third highest satisfaction rate in force training.

< Albuquerque had the fourth lowest rate of force in relation to workload.

ix

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Less Positive Outcomes

< Albuquerque officers used the third highest amount of force relative to citizen

resistance. 

Colorado Springs

Colorado Springs relied on a “Situational Force Model” (alternatively referred to as a

“wheel” model) as its means of a force continuum. This model graphically depicted an officer

standing in the middle of a circle with various force options surrounding him/her. The force

options are placed in random order to indicate there is no natural progression of force (e.g.,

deadly force is placed next to soft hand tactics). There is no graphical depiction of citizen

resistance as to which types of force are most appropriate given different types of resistance

(although the policy narrative/text does make a link to some degree, thereby indicating a degree

of linear progression despite the circular model approach) (see also Appendix B and agency

policy descriptions in Chapter 4).

More Positive Outcomes

< Colorado Springs had the lowest rate of force in relation to workload.

< Colorado Springs officers used the fourth lowest amount of force relative to

citizen resistance.

Less Positive Outcomes

< Colorado Springs had the highest rate of citizen complaints for improper

force/discourtesy.

< Colorado Springs officers reported the lowest (tie) satisfaction rate in force

training.

< Colorado Springs had the third highest amount of citizen injuries.

< Colorado Springs officers reported the third lowest satisfaction rate in policy

utility.

< Colorado Springs had the third highest amount of officer injuries.

x

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
St. Petersburg

St. Petersburg relied on the Response to Resistance (Use of Force) matrix. This model

graphically depicted six levels of citizen resistance in linear fashion on a vertical axis (presence,

verbal, passive physical, active physical, aggressive physical, aggravated physical), with six

force level options in linear fashion on a horizontal axis (officer presence, communication,

physical control, intermediate weapons, incapacitating control, deadly force). The appropriate

force types are then linked to various resistance types by a check mark in boxes (e.g., if a citizen

displays aggressive physical resistance offices can use up to incapacitating control force (see

also Appendix B and agency policy descriptions in Chapter 4).

 More Positive Outcomes

< St. Petersburg had the lowest amount of citizen injuries.

< St. Petersburg had the lowest rate of citizen complaints for improper

force/discourtesy.

< St. Petersburg officers used the third lowest amount of force relative to citizen

resistance.

< St. Petersburg had the third lowest amount of officer injuries.

Less Positive Outcomes

< St. Petersburg officers reported the lowest satisfaction rate in policy utility.

< St. Petersburg officers reported the lowest (tie) satisfaction rate in force training.

< St. Petersburg had the fourth highest rate of force in relation to workload.

Fort Wayne

Fort Wayne employed a linear design, although the model did not graphically depict a

force continuum, but rather simply laid out six levels of force in linear fashion (officer presence,

verbal, soft hand, hard hand, intermediate weapon, deadly) and then partially identified types of

resistance via narrative/text (see also Appendix B and agency policy descriptions in Chapter 4).

xi

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
More Positive Outcomes

< Fort Wayne officers reported the third highest satisfaction rate in policy utility.

< Fort Wayne had the fourth lowest amount of citizen injuries.

< Fort Wayne had the fourth lowest amount of officer injuries.

Less Positive Outcomes

< Fort Wayne had the highest rate of force in relation to workload.

< Fort Wayne officers used the second highest amount of force relative to citizen

resistance.

< Fort Wayne officers reported the third lowest satisfaction rate in force training.

< Fort Wayne had the fourth (tie) highest rate of citizen complaints for improper

force/discourtesy.

Knoxville

Knoxville’s policy graphically depicted five levels of citizen resistance in linear fashion

vertically (compliant, passive, active, aggressive, and assaultive/deadly) on the left side of the

continuum, with five force level options in linear fashion vertically on the right side of the

continuum (officer presence, empty hand soft/baton soft, compliance techniques, defensive

compliance techniques, deadly force), with five situational levels vertically in the middle of the

continuum (strategic, tactical, volatile, harmful, lethal) (see also Appendix B and agency policy

descriptions in Chapter 4). 

More Positive Outcomes

< Knoxville officers reported the highest satisfaction rate in policy utility.

< Knoxville officers reported the highest satisfaction rate in force training.

< Knoxville officers used the second least amount of force relative to citizen

resistance. 

< Knoxville had the third lowest rate of force in relation to workload.

< Knoxville had the fourth lowest rate of citizen complaints for improper

force/discourtesy.

xii

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Less Positive Outcomes

< Knoxville had the highest amount of officer injuries.

< Knoxville had the second highest amount of citizen injuries.

Top Rankings

For those interested in which agencies did the best and worst when considering the

varying outcomes, we list those agencies at the top and bottom of the rankings:

1. The extent of force used in relation to workload factors (i.e., calls for service, arrests,

reported crime):

Best Policies:

1. Colorado Springs 

2. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Worst Policies:

1. Fort Wayne

2. Portland

2. The extent to which officers use force proportional to the resistance they encounter:

Best Policies:

1. Columbus

2. Knoxville

Worst Policies:

1. Portland

2. Fort Wayne

3. The extent to which citizens are injured during forceful encounters:

Best Policies:

1. St. Petersburg

2. Columbus

xiii

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Worst Policies:

1. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

2. Knoxville

4. The extent to which officers are injured during forceful encounters:

Best Policies:

1. Columbus

2. Portland

Worst Policies:

1. Knoxville

2. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

4a. The extent to which citizens and officers are injured, balancing citizen and officer

injuries in terms of lower and higher injuries):

Best Policies:

1. Columbus

2. St. Petersburg

Worst Policies:

1. Knoxville

2. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

4b. The extent to which officers use force proportional to the resistance they encounter,

while also considering the extent to which citizens and officers are injured: 

Best Policies:

1. Columbus

2. Colorado Springs

Worst Policies:

1. Fort Wayne

2-tie. Portland

2-tie. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

xiv

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
5. The extent to which line level officers have a favorable view toward their agency’s policy in

terms of utility (i.e., assistance, clarity, guidance, restrictiveness, fairness):

Best Policies:

1. Knoxville

2. Albuquerque

Worst Policies:

1. St. Petersburg

2. Portland

6. The extent to which line level officers have a favorable view toward their agency’s policy in

terms of pre- and in-service force training:

Best Policies:

1. Knoxville

2. Columbus

Worst Policies:

1. Colorado Springs

2. St. Petersburg

7. The extent to which citizens file complaints for improper force/discourtesy in relation to

sworn personnel/workload:

Best Policies:

1. St. Petersburg

2. Albuquerque

Worst Policies:

1. Colorado Springs

2. Columbus

xv

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Summary

As one reads through this executive summary (and the 200 plus pages of the final report)

undoubtedly, like ourselves, there may be a sense of letdown. Ideally, one would want to walk

away from this study knowing which use of force policy (or policies) is the best and which

policy (or policies) should be avoided. Unfortunately, one of the greatest strengths of the

empirical approach taken (i.e., examining multiple outcomes) is also potentially its greatest

weakness. As such, we cannot unanimously endorse or condemn one use of force policy over

another. 

What is abundantly clear from the many analyses and rankings conducted is that there is

no ideal (or flawed) policy approach across all outcomes. The good news is that we provide

empirical evidence of various strengths and weaknesses across many important police outcomes. 

We leave it to police executives to consider those outcomes most important or relevant to them

and their constituents, and see which policy approaches performed more favorably in those

respects. As just a single example, if one is looking to reduce citizen injuries and complaints as

top policing concerns, St. Petersburg’s approach may be worth considering. However, one has

to also be cognizant that officers generally did not view St. Petersburg’s policy in a favorable

light. A “cop’s cop” police leader may thus prioritize such officer-related concerns and dismiss

St. Petersburg’s policy, and instead endorse Knoxville’s approach that received outstanding

feedback from patrol officers (irrespective of the fact that Knoxville patrol officers were injured

at the highest rate of all cities). Any number of other examples could be given as well with other

cities. In the end, one must weigh the advantages and drawbacks of each policy approach

against various desirable (or undesirable) outcomes. Of course, readers must also use caution

xvi

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
interpreting the findings presented throughout this summary and the full report. Although this is

the most comprehensive less lethal use of force study conducted to date, as one astute reviewer

accurately points out - we have just begun to scratch the surface with respect to how varying

types of policies may influence varying types of outcomes.

xvii

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Society permits the police to use force in the course of their duties. At the same time,

limitations are set defining the extent of coercive power that police may exercise in maintaining

order and enforcing laws. Such restrictions have two interrelated components. The first stems

from the U.S. Supreme Court via Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 86 (1989), which states that force

at arrest must be “...objectively reasonable in view of all the facts and circumstances of each

particular case...” Despite direction from the high court, determining force that is “objectively

reasonable” is not an easy task (Terrill and Paoline, 2010). As a result, police departments rely

on a second component, a use of force policy, to establish parameters for the application of force

and to offer more explicit direction to officers about what may be considered appropriate force.3

Within this context, such policies are sometimes linked to force continuum (Terrill, 2001).4 A

standard force continuum policy ordinally ranks varying levels of force and resistance in terms

of severity, with the explicit purpose of offering officers guidance on how to respond to specific

forms of resistance. Thus, force continuum policies attempt to more readily clarify what may be

considered objectively reasonable force.

Over the years, several variations incorporating the notion of a force continuum have

been proposed. One of the earliest, the linear design, is modeled in the form of a ladder or

hierarchical steps. According to McEwen, this type of “continuum approach is to rely first on

3

 The importance of written policy has long been recognized. The 1967 United States President’s Commission on

Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice Task Force Report went so far as to state that “[p]olicies should

be formulated to bar not only unnecessary force but describe, to the extent possible, the amount of force which is

permissible for making arrests and carrying out other police activities” (p. 183).

4 McEwen notes that force policies incorporating a continuum approach “...are much more likely than other policies

to address the fundamental issue of physical force (open hand control, fists, use of body, etc.)” (1997: p. 50).

1

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
the officer’s presence to quell a situation, and if that fails, to move to increasingly severe types

of force” (1997: p. 49). Another type of a continuum structure is often referred to as a modifiedlinear design, where subject resistance is placed into one of several levels and force options for

escalation (and de-escalation) are presented within each level (see Connor, 1991). Other designs

are laid out in matrix form or depicted by a wheel (see Hoffman et al., 2004). In the matrix

approach, varying forms of suspect resistance are presented along rows while varying police

responses are offered on a horizontal axis. The wheel design is often presented by a series of

concentric circles, with the situation as the core, followed by an intermediate circle of suspect

resistance behaviors, followed by an outer circle displaying varying appropriate forms of police

force given the type of resistance. Regardless of what continuum approach a particular agency

chooses to use (if any), the placement of different forms of force within the continuum structure

can vary. 

While force continuum policies are frequently discussed in the policing literature by

academics and practitioners alike, little is known concerning how many agencies actually use a

continuum of some sort, and if so, what type (e.g., linear, wheel, etc.). Perhaps more

importantly, the extent to which such policies work or result in some tangible beneficial outcome

is unknown. Does a force continuum policy actually guide officers in their force usage? Does a

continuum policy enhance the level of control an officer has on a suspect? What impact does a

continuum policy have on the types of force officers use, injuries, citizen complaints, and

lawsuits for police misbehavior? 

Complicating matters further, as illustrated above, is the fact that there is no ideal or

commonly accepted ranking of force, either by researchers or practitioners (US GAO, 2005). A

2

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
continuum policy in one department can be completely different than a policy in another

department. Some agencies employ a more linear type of force continuum, while others opt for a

wheel type design. Some departments have non-specific types of policies whereby force and

resistance are referred to only in vague terms and not categorized into specific levels, while

others offer very detailed policies that lay out many levels of both force and resistance. 

Relatedly, there is variation as to where specific types of less-lethal technologies should be

placed on the continuum scale. For example, some departments place Conducted Energy

Devices (CED) such as the TASER® low on the continuum (e.g., right after verbal direction),

while other departments place it high on the continuum scale (e.g., just before deadly force) (US

GAO, 2005). Hence, some agencies view CED use as more of a “first resort,” while others

encourage CEDs use as a “last resort,” although there is no empirical evidence available

indicating which approach is used with greater frequency.

To muddy the waters even further, there is also some debate as to whether force

continuum policies actually help or hinder decision-making. There is clearly support for

continuum policies from practitioners (Rogers, 2001), but such support is not universally shared. 

For instance, Petrowski (2002: p. 1) notes “[t]he force continuum purports to provide a

mechanical application when officers should be making a subjective threat assessment” (see also

Aveni, 2003, Peters and Brave, 2006, and Williams, 2002). Hence, while some police agencies

may incorporate a force continuum approach within their policy, there is some debate as to

whether such an approach actually serves to enhance officer decision-making. 

Given the different policy approaches used by police agencies, combined with a lack of

knowledge concerning effectiveness, the present study investigates the extent of variation in use

3

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
of force policies being used by police agencies throughout the country, and whether certain types

of policies offer more beneficial outcomes to police practitioners. Such outcomes include the

extent to which different policies provide officers assistance and guidance with respect to force

decision-making, and the link between varying types of policy approaches and the amount/type

of force used, as well as injury rates (both suspect and officer), citizen complaints, and lawsuits

levied for improper force. In short, we seek to determine if certain types of policies are in effect

better, when considering a wide range of factors. Finally, we believe studies that examine any

particular tactic or less-lethal technology (e.g., TASER®) apart from the broader application of

such tactics within varying policy types unnecessarily limits potential insight. It is the merging

of varying policy types with varying tactics, which include less-lethal technologies, that offers

the most potential and ultimately useful information for policy makers and practitioners.

Literature Review 

Although force continuum policies are specifically designed to provide officers guidance

toward controlling suspects with an appropriate degree of force, previous research has generally

neglected this area of inquiry, and no known study has specifically investigated whether certain

types of continuum policies are more effective than others.5

 A review of the literature

demonstrates just how little is known with respect to the interplay between force continuum

policy approaches and tangible outcomes. The studies that have touched on the notion of force

5 McEwen (1997) offers the best look at use of force policy development in his review of 96 agencies through the

use of a convenience sample.

4

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
continuum frameworks that are most pertinent to the present study can be broken down into two

broad areas and are briefly reviewed below.6

One area of research has focused on the impact of specific force tactics located on a force

continuum scale. These studies are generally most interested in the effect of certain tactics (i.e.,

incapacitative abilities and injuries rates). Chemical irritant sprays such as Oleoresin Capsicum

(OC) have perhaps received the greatest amount of inquiry (see Kaminski et al., 1999). In

general, there is a fair amount of agreement that OC spray offers a moderate to high degree of

incapacitative effect with fairly low concern for long term injuries; however, there is some

debate as to whether the use of OC spray should be used in response to verbal resistance (see

Adang and Mensink, 2004, as well as Smith and Alpert, 2000). 

A more contemporary concern revolves around the use of another technology - CEDs

(e.g., TASER®). Evidence in relation to CEDs, in terms of effectiveness (i.e., high control, low

injury), is currently emerging. Some of the reports illustrate detrimental effects. For example,

Amnesty International (2004) reported that 74 people died in the previous three years after being

shocked by a TASER®. Findings from other studies have reported some beneficial outcomes

associated with CED use. For example, Smith and colleagues (2007) looked at CED use in two

agencies and its effect on suspect and officer injuries. In one of the two agencies the use of

CEDs reduced the number of officer and suspect injuries, as well as the severity of injuries for

suspects. In the second agency the use of CEDs had no effect on injuries, although interestingly

pepper spray did. On the whole, beyond research on the effects of OC spray and the more

6

 A third area of research that incorporates the force continuum involves determining the frequency in which officer

use varying types of force (from low level to more severe forms) and citizen resistance behaviors, as well as

investigating the causes or predictors of police use of force. For example, see Crawford and Burns (1998), Klinger

(1995), and Terrill and Mastrofski (2002).

5

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
limited work on CEDs, evidence concerning the extent to which other types of tactics offer high

control and low injury, including physical forms of control (e.g., pain compliance techniques,

martial art forms) and intermediate or less-lethal weapons (e.g., baton, pepperball, bean bag) has

been lacking.7

A second area of research has focused more on the principles underlying force continuum

policies, rather than the effectiveness of certain types of tactics located within a continuum

structure (e.g., effectiveness of a chemical irritant spray). For instance, in 1997 Alpert and

Dunham proposed the use of “force factor” scores (subtracting the highest level of resistance

from the highest level of force within individual police-suspect encounters) to assess relative

degrees of force in relation to citizen resistance. Applying this approach with official data

gathered from the Miami-Dade, Florida and Eugene/Springfield, Oregon police departments, the

researchers found that officers in Miami-Dade used less force than the level of resistance faced,

compared to officers in Eugene/Springfield who used more force than the level of resistance

faced (on average). Of particular note, this type of pattern mirrored how officers were instructed

and trained to use force. Such a finding provides preliminary evidence that a department’s

policy environment may have an impact on police officer use of force behavior. In addition, this

work demonstrated how agencies may be compared in relation to force, albeit in a limited

fashion (i.e., only two departments).

Using observational data from the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN) study in

Indianapolis and St. Petersburg, Terrill (2001, 2003, 2005), in a series of works, built upon the

idea of force factor scores by assessing not only the highest level of suspect resistance and police

use of force within an individual incident, but all instances of resistance and force that occur, as

7

 For one limited review see Bertomen, 2003. 

6

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
well as other factors present during police-suspect encounters, beyond suspect resistance, that

might account for force usage. In this respect, Terrill was able to move closer to determining if

force usage could be more appropriately labeled “objectively reasonable” given the totality of

circumstances and not just the resistance behavior presented. This early work was the first to

examine how police officers and citizens respond to one another, in a temporally sequenced

manner, within the context of a force continuum approach; and was the first attempt to quantify

and analyze the interactive nature of multiple police-citizen encounters in this type of microoriented process since Sykes and Brent’s (1983) pioneering work. Terrill found that officers did

not leap at the opportunity to apply force on a resistant citizen, but generally went to great

lengths to resolve such encounters in the most non-coercive manner possible (often giving

suspects multiple opportunities to comply). Conversely, the issue of appropriateness was more

problematic when officers dealt with non-resistant suspects, as they were more likely to use

higher forms of force than the resistance posed by suspects. 

Fortunately, other researchers have since offered additional studies that utilize a

somewhat parallel approach. Alpert and Dunham (2004), once again using official data from the

Miami-Dade police department, followed Terrill’s (2001) call for further refinement regarding

an interactive approach and the application of force. Their work offered a second look at how

police officers and citizens respond to one another in terms of force and resistance as policecitizen encounters evolve. One of the findings, according to the authors, was that there was a

greater likelihood of police use of force the longer an encounter lasted, even when dealing with

non-violent citizen resistance. They also reported that “[p]reemptive force seemed to be

effective and produced an overall decrease in the number of incidents involving the use of force. 

7

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Once a cycle of force is initiated, however, there appears to be only a limited opportunity to deescalate the level of force” (Alpert and Dunham, 2004: p. 122). Interesting, Terrill (2001) found

somewhat contradictory results with the POPN data, in that preemptive force led to greater uses

of force later in the encounter and that officers were actually quite skilled at de-escalation when

citizens raised the stakes via resistant behavior. Such findings only lead to an even greater need

for additional research. 

Gap in the Literature

While researchers have looked at the effect of varying types of tactics located on a force

continuum scale, and the nature of police use of force behavior in terms of the underlying

principles of a continuum approach, prior work has not examined the different types of policies

currently being used by police agencies and the broader application of such policies. 

Little is known concerning the extent to which police agencies across the country actually

incorporate a force continuum within their policy, and if so what type.8

 Moreover, given

potential variation in both design (e.g., linear, matrix, wheel, etc.) and tactical placement (e.g.,

OC spray, CED, etc.), even less is known with respect to whether differences in continuum

policies matter, and if so, in what way. For instance, virtually nothing is known about the

connection between force continuum policies and tangible outcomes such as officers’

perceptions of their policy, the types of force used to control citizens, the nature of injuries to

officers and suspects, the rate of complaints generated, or the number of lawsuits filed for

8 According to Alpert and Dunham (2004) the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) conducted a national

survey of police use of force in 1998. The authors report that 72 percent of responding police agencies rely on a

force continuum policy, but do not identify the types of force continuum policies being used either in terms of

frequency or variation.

8

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
allegations of improper force. In essence, previous research has failed to examine the

association between certain types of force continuum policies and beneficial (or detrimental)

outcomes. The present study begins to fill this gap. 

9

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CHAPTER 2

Project Overview

Research Goals and Objectives

The project has two separate, but interrelated goals: to identify the extent of variation in

use of force policies being used by police agencies throughout the country, and determine

whether certain types of policies offer more beneficial outcomes to police practitioners. Stated

more directly, the project seeks to:

(1) identify existing variation in use of force policies, particularly those employing a

force continuum approach;

(2) determine which types of policies offer more beneficial outcomes to police

practitioners, which are measured in terms of the degree to which varying policies:

(a) provide officers assistance and guidance with respect to force decisionmaking, and

(b) are associated with less force (i.e., by amount and type), injuries to suspects 

 and officers, citizen complaints, and lawsuits levied for improper force. 

10

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Research Design

The project was divided into two primary phases in connection with our two stated goals. 

In the initial phase we administered a mail survey to a stratified random sample of 1,083 police

agencies across the country, based on agency size (i.e., sworn officers) and type (i.e., municipal,

sheriff). The purpose of the survey was to decipher the types of force policies that exist. More

directly, the key elements of the survey captured whether an agency employed a force continuum

approach within their policy, the form or type of continuum used, and the placement of various

tactics within the continuum framework. 

Based on results of the agency survey, eight agencies were selected for deeper

exploration as part of the second phase of the project. Agency selection was based on ensuring

adequate variation in terms of differing policy types, but also a degree of comparability based on

jurisdictional size, crime rate, workload, and socioeconomic status. Upon securing agreements

with police administrators, the research team conducted multiple site visits over the course of

two years at each agency. Data collection consisted of a survey to patrol officers to assess their

views on the impact of the agency’s force policy on decision-making. In addition, use of force,

citizen complaint, and civil litigation data, as well as accompanying sources of information (e.g.,

organizational charts, rosters, manpower allocations, rules and regulation manuals, training

records, number of reported crimes, arrests, calls for service) were collected retrospectively for

24 months. Further, a series of informal interviews were conducted with officials at the middle

and upper management levels. Collectively, these data sources served as the basis for the

analyses and findings presented in this report.

11

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CHAPTER 3

Phase I

Purpose

Despite the attention force continuum policies have garnered within the policing

literature (Alpert and Dunham, 1997, 2004; Aveni, 2003; Connor, 1991; Crawford and Burns,

1998; Garner et al., 1995, 2002; Hoffman, et al., 2004; Klinger, 1995; McEwen, 1997;

Petrowski, 2002; Terrill, 2001, 2003, 2005; Williams, 2002), there has only been one known

attempt to determine how many agencies actually incorporate a continuum approach within their

policy (i.e., the 1998 PERF survey). More importantly, not a single study has attempted to

determine the varying types of force continuum policies being used in any systematic manner. 

In fact, with respect to force policy in general, with the exception of reports indicating how many

agencies employ some sort of written policy on less lethal force, and varying forms of report and

review procedures (Alpert and Dunham, 204; Hickman and Reaves, 2003; Pate and Fridell,

1993), there is a substantial void within the empirical literature. Hence, the purpose of Phase I

was to design and administer a national survey to police agencies so as to assess the extent to

which different types of force polices exist, particularly those using a force continuum. 

Methodology

Sampling Frame

As of 2000, there were 17,784 police agencies in the United States according to the

Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies.9

 With the assistance of Edward Maguire,

9

 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Census Of State And Local Law Enforcement Agencies

(CSLLEA), 2000: [U.S.] [Computer File]. Conducted by U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 3rd ICPSR

ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 2003.

12

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
project consultant, our sampling frame was comprised to include 7,306 agencies that (1) have

primary responsibility for policing a residential population, (2) employ 10 or more full-time

police officers, and (3) are a municipal or county agency (see Table 3-1). Selection based on

these three criteria include over 90 percent of all full-time sworn officers in the country

(Weisburd et al., 2000). 

Table 3-1. Sampling Frame by Size and Type of Agency

Type 10-49 50-99 100-249 250-749 750+ Total

Police 4,104 745 378 125 57 5409

Sheriff 1,342 286 174 78 17 1897

Total 5,446 1,031 552 203 74 7306

Sample Selection

Because we lacked sufficient resources to survey the population of agencies meeting our

selection criteria, we needed to draw a representative sample of those agencies. Due to large

differences in the number of agencies in different size categories, we chose a disproportionate

stratified random sampling strategy based on agency size and type. For agency size, we chose

five categories based on number of full-time sworn officers with arrest powers. For agency type,

we established two categories. The first was police, formed by combining municipal, county,

and regional police into one category. The second was sheriff’s organizations. Once these

breakdowns were incorporated, we then selected 5 percent of agencies with 10-49 officers, 25

percent of agencies with 50-99 officers, 50 percent of agencies with 100-249 officers, and all

agencies in the next two size categories of 250-749 and 750 and more. This strategy resulted in

an overall sample size of 1,083 agencies. Table 3-2 shows the sample size within each stratum.

13

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 3-2. Sample Size by Size and Type of Agency

Type 10-49 50-99 100-249 250-749 750+ Total

Police 205 186 189 125 57 762

Sheriff 67 72 87 78 17 321

Total 272 258 276 203 74 1083

Survey Distribution and Response

Relying on well established techniques (see Dillman, 1978), the survey methodology

involved a multi-stage process beginning with pre-testing the instrument on 17 sworn officers

employed by 14 different police agencies located in five different states in January and February

of 2006. Upon receiving comments and making revisions, the final survey instrument was

mailed out to all 1,083 agencies in March of 2006.10 A second wave was distributed to nonresponding agencies in May of 2006, followed by a third wave in September of 2006. In an

attempt to further maximize the response rate, a phone call was made to every non-responding

agency between the second and third waves.11 Upon completion of wave three we had

accumulated a total of 591 responses for a response rate of 54.5 percent (wave 1=273, 25.2%;

wave 2=216, 19.9%; wave 3=102, 9.4%). In a final effort to ensure the greatest possible

response rate, a fourth wave was mailed out to the remaining 492 respondents in February 2007,

which resulted in another 71 responses. In total, we received 662 total responses (a response

rate of 61.1%).

12

10 A personalized cover letter identifying the potential benefits of participation along with human subject protection

information accompanied each survey instrument.

11 In some instances we were asked to fax or mail another copy of the survey.

12 Nine additional surveys were received, but were filled out so minimally (e.g., answered only one or two questions)

or did not include a signature as required by our Institutional Review Boards (IRB), that they were not included in

the final count. In addition, 10 agencies contacted us (via a response letter or phone call/message) indicating that

they either did not wish to participate in our particular survey, or in some cases they do not participate in any survey

14

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
As illustrated in Table 3-3, in terms of agency size, within each of the five group

breakdowns the response rate progressively increases as the size of the agency increases. At the

ends of the spectrum the difference is most pronounced. While just under 40 percent of the

agencies with 10-49 sworn officers responded to the survey (105 responded of 272 surveyed),

over 90 percent of the largest (750 or more sworn officers) agencies responded (67 responded of

74 surveyed). In terms of agency type, police agencies were more likely to respond than sheriff

agencies. Of the 762 police departments surveyed, 494 responded (64.8%). For sheriff agencies,

168 of 321 responded (52.3%). Thus, from a generalizability standpoint, the survey results are

most reflective of mid-to-large sized police agencies.

Table 3-3. Responses by Type and Size of Agency

Type 10-49 50-99 100-249 250-749 750+ Total

Police 82 109 145 107 51 494

Sheriff 23 30 40 59 16 168

Total 105 139 185 166 67 662

Percent 38.6 53.9 67.0 81.7 90.5

Analyses and Findings

Continuum Design

The key aspect of the agency survey was to determine whether agencies use a force

continuum; and if so, the type of continuum design used and placement of tactics/weapons along

the continuum. Thus, we asked respondents if they relied upon a force continuum approach as

part of their less lethal force policy. We offered explicit direction so as to clarify our intent

stating, “[b]y force continuum, we mean a guideline (sometimes depicted graphically) that

research (it was noted that such decisions are sometimes arbitrary, while at other times the result of insufficient

personnel to devote appropriate time allocations).

15

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
officers can use to determine the type of force that may be used in generic situations. Such

guidelines are sometimes (but not always) linked with varying forms of citizen resistance in an

attempt to assist officers in matching the level of force to the level of resistance/threat

encountered. Some examples include linear (e.g., ladder, stair, FLETC), wheel, and matrix/box

designs, although there are many variations of continuum designs besides these few examples.” 

Over 80 percent of the respondents indicated that they did rely on some form of a force

continuum.13 In comparison to the 1998 PERF survey, the percentage uncovered here is

somewhat higher. In that survey of 571 police agencies, according to Alpert and Dunham (2004:

p. 156), “...72 percent were based on a use-of-force continuum.”14

 For those respondents that indicated the use of a continuum, we then asked them to

identify the “type” of force continuum their agency uses. We cautioned that there is no correct

or ideal continuum design in existence, but rather that some agencies simply prefer one design

over an another. To help guide them further we offered basic template examples (as illustrated

in Appendix A) of some of the continuum designs currently in existence. The results are shown

in Table 3-4. By far, the most prevalent response was the use of a linear design “without”

graphic representation (e.g., see Appendix A, question 2a for an illustration). The next most

frequent design was a linear approach “with” a graphic design (e.g., see Appendix A, question

2b for an illustration). Hence, nearly three-quarters of the respondent agencies (73.4%)

indicated the use of a linear design in some form. The next most frequently used designs

reported were a matrix/box approach (e.g., see Appendix A, question 2e for an illustration) and

13 Of the 662 responding agencies, 641 answered this question; of these, 518 indicated they used a force continuum

(80.8%).

14 McEwen (1997) found just 24 of 96 (or 25%) agencies in his review of force policies incorporated a force

continuum (he relied on a convenience sample).

16

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
some sort of circular/wheel approach (e.g., see Appendix A, question 2c and 2d for illustrations),

with both approaches used about 10 percent of the time (10.1% and 9.3% respectively). In sum,

our findings show that a substantial majority of police agencies do rely on a force continuum

structure, and that the most frequently used design type is linear in some fashion.

Table 3-4. Force Designs Frequency*

Continuum Design N %

Linear without Graphic Representation 240 46.5

Linear with Graphic Representation 139 26.9

Matrix/Box 52 10.1

Partial/Full Wheel 48 9.3

Other 37 7.2

*Of the 518 agencies that stated they use a force continuum, 516 indicated the type.

Tactical Placement

In addition to querying agencies about the type of force continuum used, we also asked

respondents to detail their force and citizen resistance progression by prompting them with

“[p]lease identify the progression of citizen resistance and police use of force outlined in your

continuum policy, from the lowest level to the highest level, and indicate the types/levels of

force recommended to officers for each type of resistance/threat they encounter (i.e., the range of

force options available to officers for each type of citizen resistance encountered)” (e.g., see

Appendix A, question 3 for an illustration). Of the 518 agencies that indicated they use a force

continuum as part of their policy, 476 of the respondents provided sufficient enough detail so as

to detail their force progression, while 371 agencies provided sufficient enough detail so as to

detail their resistance progression.

17

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
In an attempt to simplify progression patterns for illustrative purposes we placed the

numerous types of force and resistance into six categories. In relation to force, the categories

were broken into: officer presence/verbal direction, soft empty-hands (e.g., touching, pat down,

firm-grip, simple restraint), pain compliance techniques (e.g., pressure point controls), hard

empty-hands (e.g., hand strikes, punches, kicks, take downs without a weapon), impact weapons

(e.g., baton/ASP/flashlight strikes, pepperball, beanbag), and deadly force (e.g., handgun, rifle). 

In addition to these six categories, chemical sprays (e.g., OC or pepper) and conducted energy

devices (CEDs) were also coded, but distinguished from the other six categories so as to present

the varying types of continuum placements different agencies use. In relation to resistance, the

categories were broken into: compliant, verbal (e.g., refusing verbal direction), passive (e.g.,

failing to respond to an officer/ignoring), physical defensive (e.g., bracing, pulling away,

fleeing), physical active (e.g., hostile and overt physical aggression towards the officer), and

deadly (e.g., attempt or actual attack that could cause death). 

Even with an attempt to consolidate the many force and resistance types into broader

categories, a great deal of variation was uncovered in terms of how police agencies go about

detailing their policy in relation to the number of levels and placement of tactics. For instance,

of the 476 agencies that outlined their force progression, a total of 123 different permutations

were uncovered ranging from three to nine different levels (the vast majority, 390 or 82.0%,

relied on five or six levels).15 Of the 371 agencies that listed citizen resistance progression, a

total of 23 permutations were uncovered ranging from three to seven different levels (the vast

15 The number of permutations is reduced to 59 if one accounts for, or subsumes within, repeated forms of force

taking place at multiple levels. For instance, departments will often call for impact force at more than one level. 

Thus, as an example, one department may place baton strikes at level five followed by an impact munition at level

six. If one counts these types of examples separately the permutation count rises to 123, if these are subsumed into

one level and labeled “impact force,” as is the case in many of the analyses presented here, the number is reduced to

59.

18

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
majority, 343 or 92.4%, relied on five or six levels).16 Within this context, we present the

findings from this section in a multitude of formats so as to depict the most comprehensive

picture of the varying ways to measure and understand how departments across the country

instruct officers via policy.

Excluding the 115 agencies that place chemical sprays (e.g., OC or pepper) and/or CEDs

(e.g., TASER®) on their own distinct level of force, Table 3-5 shows how the remaining 361

detail their force progression.17 First, looking at the ends of the continuum, a large majority of

the departments place both the least and most severe forms of force on their own level. Over 86

percent of the agencies place officer presence/verbal direction on a level by itself, while 97.8

percent place deadly force by itself. Nonetheless, some agencies do not place such rigid

restrictions on force placement at the ends of the continuum. For example, 49 of the agencies

place officer presence/verbal direction on the same level as soft hand tactics, while eight

departments permit a deadly force option along with non-lethal force options. 

16 When repeated forms of resistance (i.e., meaning the same type of resistance types) are accounted for the number

of permutations is reduced from 23 to 15 (see Table 3-9).

17 Of the 59 permutations noted in footnote 14, there were 14 combinations uncovered when excluding agencies that

place chemical sprays and CEDs on their own distinct level. When these two additional force types are included, an

additional 47 permutations resulted across 115 agencies (most permutations obviously were only used by one or two

agencies). Aggregate results from the 115 agencies involving separate level chemical sprays and CEDs, and where

they fell on the continuum, are presented in Table 3-8.

19

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 3-5. Progression of Force

Factor N %

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal

Level 2 - Physical Soft

Level 3 - Pain Compliance, Physical Hard

Level 4 - Impact

Level 5 - Deadly

84 23.3

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal

Level 2 - Physical Soft

Level 3 - Pain Compliance

Level 4 - Physical Hard, Impact

Level 5 - Deadly

75 20.8

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal

Level 2 - Physical Soft, Pain Compliance

Level 3 - Physical Hard

Level 4 - Impact

Level 5 - Deadly

59 16.3

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal

Level 2 - Physical Soft, Pain Compliance, Physical Hard

Level 3 - Impact

Level 4 - Deadly

45 12.5

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal, Physical Soft

Level 2 - Pain Compliance, Physical Hard

Level 3 - Impact

Level 4 - Deadly

24 6.6

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal

Level 2 - Physical Soft, Pain Compliance

Level 3 - Physical Hard, Impact

Level 4 - Deadly

21 5.8

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal, Physical Soft

Level 2 - Pain Compliance

Level 3 - Physical Hard

Level 4 - Impact

Level 5 - Deadly

13 3.6

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal

Level 2 - Physical Soft

Level 3 - Pain Compliance, Physical Hard, Impact

Level 4 - Deadly

12 3.3

20

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Factor N %

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal, Physical Soft

Level 2 - Pain Compliance

Level 3 - Physical Hard, Impact

Level 4 - Deadly

11 3.0

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal

Level 2 - Physical Soft

Level 3 - Pain Compliance

Level 4 - Physical Hard

Level 5 - Impact

Level 6 - Deadly

7 1.9

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal

Level 2 - Physical Soft, Pain Compliance, Physical Hard

Level 3 - Impact, Deadly

7 1.9

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal

Level 2 - Physical Soft

Level 3 - Pain Compliance, Physical Hard, Impact, Deadly

1 0.3

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal

Level 2 - Physical Soft, Pain Compliance, Physical Hard, Impact

Level 3 - Deadly

1 0.3

Level 1 - Presence/Verbal, Physical Soft

Level 2 - Pain Compliance, Physical Hard, Impact

Level 3 - Deadly

1 0.3

Total 361 100.0

Tables 3-6 and 3-7 illustrate where chemical sprays and CED devices are placed when

such force types are found at the same level as one of the six other categories. Chemical sprays

and CEDs are analyzed in this manner because how or where they fit into force continuum

progression has not been entirely clear from past research. The findings presented here show

precisely where on the force continuum such mechanisms fall using a representative nationwide

sample. As shown in Table 3-6, placement of chemical sprays varies widely. Roughly 30

percent of the agencies place chemical sprays with pain compliance techniques, another

21

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
approximate 30 percent of the departments place chemical sprays with hard hand tactics, and just

over a third of the agencies place chemical sprays with impact weapons. A handful of

departments even place chemical sprays as low as empty-hand soft techniques (n=12) and as

high as deadly force (n=6). Such widespread variation indicates a tremendous lack of agreement

by police practitioners as to where chemical sprays should be placed on the force continuum.

Table 3-6. Force Level of Chemical Spray when Shared with Other Force

Factor N %

Physical Soft 12 3.3

Pain Compliance 110 30.5

Physical Hard 105 29.2

Impact 127 35.3

Deadly 6 1.7

Total 360 100.0

Similar to the approach used for chemical sprays, Table 3-7 depicts where CEDs are

placed when embedded with other types of force. Compared to chemical sprays there is

somewhat less variation, but far from a clear consensus. Nearly 60 percent of the agencies place

CEDs at the impact weapon level, with another two percent placing CEDs along with deadly 

force. Thus, just under two-thirds of the departments require some type of hands on force before

resorting to the CED. However, over a third of the agencies place CEDs with some sort of hands

on force. In particular, a quarter of the agencies place CEDs at the same level as hard emptyhand tactics, with another 13.1 percent placing CEDs with pain compliance techniques. 

22

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 3-7. Force Level of CED When Shared with Other Force 

Factor N %

Physical Soft 2 0.8

Pain Compliance 32 13.1

Physical Hard 60 24.6

Impact 145 59.4

Deadly 5 2.0

Total 244 100.0

As noted previously, 115 of the 476 agencies that offered sufficient detail to determine

force progression place chemical sprays and/or CEDs on their own distinct force level. Table 3-

8 shows where these weapons are placed on the continuum. The location of chemical sprays is

much more varied when compared with CEDs. The most frequent location for chemical sprays

is right after pain compliance techniques (36.8%), followed by hard empty-hand hard tactics

(29.4%). Just under 20 percent of the agencies place it prior to any form on hands on force (right

after officer presence/verbal force). With respect to CEDs, most agencies place this weapon near

the top of the continuum. Only one agency places it right after verbal force (and before handson), while 10 of the 13 agencies that place CED on its own level place it after hard hands or

impact. Finally, and somewhat interesting after the CED findings, is the placement of chemical

sprays and CEDs when they are both placed on the same level together, but by themselves on

their own level. In this case, the modal placement location is after pain compliance, but before

physical hard hands (42.1%). Further, over a quarter of the agencies use this placement prior to

pain compliance, and zero agencies after impact.

23

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 3-8. Force Level of Chemical Sprays and CED When Occupying Own Force Level*

Factor

Chemical Spray 

N %

CED

N %

Both

N %

After Presence/Verbal 13 19.1 1 7.7 7 18.4

After Physical Soft 8 11.8 - - 3 7.9

After Pain Compliance 25 36.8 2 15.4 16 42.1

After Physical Hard 20 29.4 5 38.5 12 31.6

After Impact 2 2.9 5 38.5 - -

Total 68 100.0 13 100.0 38 100.0

* 7 agencies placed CED on it’s own level directly after Chemical Sprays (11 agencies had both chemical

spray and CED on their own, but separate levels).

Next, we turned to looking at how citizen resistance progression was laid out by agencies

with respect to the force continuum (see Table 3-9). Recall that 371 agencies listed their

resistance progression in sufficient detail so as to code this information. As shown in Table 3-9,

nearly half (n=179, 48.2%) of all the responding agencies who detailed their citizen resistance

progression use a five level layout in the following order: 1-compliant, 2-verbal/passive

combined, 3-physical defensive, 4-physical active, and 5-deadly. The second most frequently

used approach (n=123, 33.2%) is similar except that verbal and passive resistance are split and

placed on separate levels according to the following: 1-compliant, 2-verbal, 3-passive combined,

4-physical defensive, 5-physical active, and 6-deadly. These two approaches combined to

account for 302 (81.4%) of the 371 agencies. Thus, while there are 12 additional permutations

used, the drop off in frequency is dramatic (e.g., the third most frequently used progression

format only contains 16 departments).

24

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 3-9. Progression of Resistance

Factor N %

Level 1 - Compliant

Level 2 - Verbal, Passive

Level 3 - Physical Defensive

Level 4 - Physical Active

Level 5 - Deadly

179 48.2

Level 1 - Compliant

Level 2 - Verbal

Level 3 - Passive

Level 4 - Physical Defensive

Level 5 - Physical Active

Level 6 - Deadly

123 33.2

Level 1 - Compliant, Verbal

Level 2 - Passive

Level 3 - Physical Defensive

Level 4 - Physical Active

Level 5 - Deadly

16 4.3

Level 1 - Compliant, Verbal

Level 2 - Passive, Physical Defensive

Level 3 - Physical Active

Level 4 - Deadly

12 3.2

Level 1 - Compliant

Level 2 - Verbal, Passive, Physical Defensive

Level 3 - Physical Active, Deadly

9 2.4

Level 1 - Compliant

Level 2 - Verbal, Passive, Physical Defensive

Level 3 - Physical Active

Level 4 - Deadly

7 1.9

Level 1 - Compliant, Verbal, Passive

Level 2 - Physical Defensive

Level 3 - Physical Active

Level 4 - Deadly

6 1.6

Level 1 - Compliant

Level 2 - Verbal

Level 3 - Passive, Physical Defensive

Level 4 - Physical Active

Level 5 - Deadly

6 1.6

25

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Factor N %

Level 1 - Compliant

Level 2 - Verbal, Passive

Level 3 - Physical Defensive, Physical Active

Level 4 - Deadly

4 1.1

Level 1 - Compliant

Level 2 - Verbal

Level 3 - Passive

Level 4 - Physical Defensive

Level 5 - Physical Active, Deadly

2 0.5

Level 1 - Compliant

Level 2 - Verbal

Level 3 - Passive

Level 4 - Physical Defensive, Physical Active

Level 5 - Deadly

2 0.5

Level 1 - Compliant

Level 2 - Passive

Level 3 - Verbal

Level 4 - Physical Defensive

Level 5 - Physical Active

Level 6 - Deadly

2 0.5

Level 1 - Compliant

Level 2 - Verbal, Passive, Physical Defensive, Physical Active

Level 3 - Deadly

1 0.3

Level 1 - Compliant, Verbal, Passive

Level 2 - Physical Defensive, Physical Active

Level 3 - Deadly

1 0.3

Level 1 - Compliant, Verbal, Passive, Physical Defensive

Level 2 - Physical Active

Level 3 - Deadly

1 0.3

Total 371 100.0

We then examined the extent to which police agencies connect varying levels and types

of citizen resistance to varying levels and types of police force. As presented in Table 3-10, of

the 476 agencies indicating that they incorporate a force continuum approach into their policy,

26

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
125 (26.3%) do not instruct officers as to the types (or range) of force to be used in relation to

the resistance faced.18

Table 3-10. Agencies that Link Force to Resistance Via a Continuum

Does Agency Link Force to Resistance? N %

Not Linked 125 26.3

Semi-Linked 15 3.2

Linked 336 70.6

Total 476 100.0

At the other end of the spectrum are those agencies that use both a resistance and force

continua (336, 70.6%). These agencies link specific types of force to specific types of

resistance.19 All apply some sort of “out-clause” in the sense that there is no requirement that

officers “progress” up or down force continuum levels in strict form (e.g., that officers must

exhaust all lower forms of force prior to moving up the continuum), but all do specify the range

of force that should be used given the level of resistance posed by the suspect.20

The top 10 most frequently used approaches are presented in Table 3-11. The top

approach is used by just 20 percent of the departments, and the second and third most frequently

used approaches are half of that at just 10 percent. The fourth approach drops in half again

18 Of these 125, 105 just specify force progression within their policy while 20 specify both resistance and force but

make no connection, or such a vague connection, indicating that force is not linked to resistance levels.

19 Somewhat interesting, 21 of the 48 (or 43.8%) departments that use a partial or full wheel/circular continuum

design indicated a specific connection or link between force and resistance. The presumed reason for adopting a

wheel type approach is often because the agency does not want to “lock-in” officers as to what force to use given a

level of resistance. While such a goal may be accomplished given the graphic depiction of a partial or full wheel

model, in these 21 agencies the policy still makes the connection anyway via the text of the policy.

20 As indicated in Table 3-10, 15 (3.2%) departments were coded as semi-linking force to resistance. These agencies

provide some partial guidance as to the force-resistance relationship, but are loosely coupled (for example, a graphic

illustration in the policy may depict impact weapons most closely connected to active resistance, but also partially

connected to defensive and passive resistance). 

27

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
(n=17, 5.0%). The remaining approaches all have less than 10 agencies using them (over half of

all agencies). This speaks to the enormous amount of variation in existence when it comes to

force policy. Many different agencies are using many different approaches. In essence, there

really is no “commonly” used means of tactical placement in terms of force continuum policies

(i.e., where various forms of hands on and weapons should be placed in relation to varying forms

of suspect resistance). Departments pick and choose, and tweak and adapt, in a multitude of

ways - all unfortunately, with no empirical evidence as to which approach is best or even better

than another. 

28

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 3-11. 10 Most Frequently Used Force Continuum’s

Level Resistance Force N 

12345

CompliantVerbal, PassivePhysical DefensivePhysical ActiveDeadly

Presence/VerbalPhysical SoftPain CompliancePhysical Hard, ImpactDeadly

68 

12345

CompliantVerbal, PassivePhysical DefensivePhysical ActiveDeadly

Presence/VerbalPhysical SoftPain Compliance, Physical Hard ImpactDeadly

35 

123456

CompliantVerbalPassivePhysical DefensivePhysical ActiveDeadly

Presence/VerbalPresence/VerbalPhysical Soft, Pain CompliancePhysical HardImpactDeadly

34 

123456

CompliantVerbalPassivePhysical DefensivePhysical ActiveDeadly

Presence/VerbalPhysical SoftPain Compliance, Physical Hard ImpactImpactImpactDeadly

17 

29

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Level Resistance Force N 

12345

CompliantVerbal, PassivePhysical DefensivePhysical ActiveDeadly

Presence/VerbalPresence/VerbalPhysical Soft, Pain Compliance, Physical Hard ImpactDeadly

9 

12345

CompliantVerbal, PassivePhysical DefensivePhysical ActiveDeadly

Presence/VerbalPhysical Soft, Pain CompliancePhysical Hard ImpactImpactDeadly

9 

12345

Compliant, VerbalPassive, Physical DefensivePassive, Physical DefensivePhysical ActiveDeadly

Presence/Verbal, Physical SoftPain Compliance, Physical Hard ImpactImpactImpactDeadly

9 

12345

Compliant, VerbalPassivePhysical DefensivePhysical ActiveDeadly

Presence/Verbal, Physical SoftPain CompliancePhysical Hard ImpactImpactDeadly

6 

12345

CompliantVerbal, PassivePhysical DefensivePhysical ActiveDeadly

Presence/Verbal, Physical SoftPain CompliancePhysical Hard ImpactImpactDeadly

5 

30

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Level Resistance Force N 

123456

CompliantVerbalPassivePhysical DefensivePhysical ActiveDeadly

Presence/Verbal, Physical SoftPresence/Verbal, Physical SoftPain Compliance, Physical Hard ImpactImpactImpactDeadly

5 

* Percent is calculated based on total number of agencies that link force to resistance in a force continuum format (N=336)

31

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Summary

The agency survey was designed to offer an in-depth look at the extent to which police

agencies incorporate a force continuum into their policy. While there has been limited

information about the extent to which police agencies rely on a force continuum within their

policy approach, until now we knew nothing about the extent of variation in terms of design type

and the tactical placement of verbal and physical force, as well as weapons. What follows is a

summary of the key findings from Phase I of the project.

We found that over 80 percent of agencies reported using some type of continuum. Of

these agencies, the linear design was, by far, the most frequently used (73%), followed by

matrix/box designs and circular/wheel designs, each with roughly 10 percent of the agencies

using them. This finding is somewhat interesting given recent discussion within the literature

concerning the potential negatives of force continua in general, and linear designs in particular

(see Aveni, 2003, Peters and Brave, 2006, Petrowski, 2002, Williams, 2002). More specifically,

some have argued against the use of force continua on a number of fronts, such as in relation to

hampering decision making, fear of liability issues, and being more restrictive than the law.21

Even during our sites visits as part of Phase II of this study we heard concerns from police

officials about the potential down side of using a force continuum. Nonetheless, what is

apparent from the findings presented here is that a large majority of police agencies do

incorporate a force continuum into their policy, and the preferred model is linear by design.

With respect to the tactical placement of force tactics (soft hands, pain compliance

controls, hard hands) and weapons (batons, chemical sprays, CEDs), and how police agencies

21 We even received written comments on some return surveys indicating that the force continuum was not part of

policy for fear of liability concerns, but it was used in training - and apparently in the views of administrators

somehow outside the scope of plaintiffs’ attorneys.

32

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
rank the order of such in terms of progression, the key finding uncovered was the enormous

variation present. Even with an attempt to consolidate the many force and resistance types into

broader categories, a great deal of variation was uncovered in terms of how police agencies go

about detailing their policy in relation to the number of levels and placement of tactics.22 Of the

476 agencies that outlined their force progression, a total of 123 different permutations were

uncovered ranging from three to nine different levels (the vast majority, 390 or 82.0%, relied on

five or six levels). Of the 371 agencies that listed citizen resistance progression, a total of 23

permutations were uncovered ranging from three to seven different levels (the vast majority, 343

or 92.4%, relied on five or six levels). 

When looking at departments that attempt to incorporate a force continuum approach into

their policy, and provide officers with explicit guidance as to the types of force most appropriate

given varying types of resistance (i.e., link citizen resistance to force), it is difficult to identify a

typically used preference. The most frequent approach is used by only 20 percent of the

departments, while the second and third most frequently used approaches are just half of that at

10 percent. This speaks to the enormous amount of variation in existence when it comes to force

policy. Many different agencies are using many different approaches. 

The placement of chemical sprays and CEDs appear to offer the greatest challenge for

police administrators as to the proper placement within the force continuum. Roughly 30

percent of the agencies place chemical sprays with pain compliance techniques, another 30

percent of the departments place chemical sprays with hard hand tactics, and just over a third of

22 Even in states with state level guidelines regarding policy on police use of force (e.g., Florida, Michigan, and New

Jersey) variation was present (i.e., individual agencies would take the state guidelines and tweak them to

accommodate their individual agency preference - such as moving the TASER® from one level to another). 

33

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
the agencies place chemical sprays with impact weapons. A handful of departments even place

chemical sprays as low as empty-hand soft techniques (n=12) and as high as deadly force (n=6). 

Compared to chemical sprays there is somewhat less variation when it comes to CED placement,

but far from a clear consensus. Nearly 60 percent of the agencies place CEDs at the impact

weapon level, while another two percent place it along with deadly force. Thus, just under twothirds of the departments require some type of hands on force before resorting to the CED. 

However, over a third of the agencies place CEDs with some sort of hands on force. In

particular, a quarter of the agencies place CEDs at the same level as hard empty-hand tactics,

with another 13.1 percent placing CEDs with pain compliance techniques. 

In sum, while some departments were quite restrictive in terms of allowing officers to use

more severe forms of force only on actively aggressive suspects, other agencies were quite

liberal and placed a large amount of discretion in officers hands by allowing them to use nearly

all types of force against nearly all types of resistance faced short of extreme imbalance (e.g.,

allowing a baton strike to a compliant suspect). Overall, it is nearly impossible to identify a

standard approach being used by police agencies. In essence, there really is no “commonly”

used means of tactical placement in terms of force continuum policies (i.e., where various forms

of hands on and weapons should be placed in relation to varying forms of suspect resistance). 

Departments pick and choose, and tweak and adapt, in a multitude of ways - all unfortunately,

with no empirical evidence as to which approach is best or even better than another. 

34

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CHAPTER 4

Phase II

Purpose

While prior research has investigated many aspects of police use of force, little effort has

focused on attempting to link policy with outcomes. Thus, the second phase of the project was

designed to examine whether certain types of policies are more advantageous than others; this is

particularly relevant given the many different versions of force policy being used by police

agencies across the country, as illustrated in Phase I. More specifically, we seek to determine

which types of policies offer more beneficial outcomes to police practitioners, which are

measured in terms of the degree to which varying policies (a) provide officers assistance and

guidance with respect to force decision-making, and (b) are associated with less force (i.e., by

amount and type), injuries to suspects and officers, citizen complaints, and lawsuits levied for

improper force. It is our hope that results from this phase of the project will offer insight on

whether varying types of policies actually influence police use of force behavior and provide

practitioners with a guide for policy development by permitting informed decision-making based

on independent empirical assessment. 

Methodology

While it would be ideal to examine force usage in each of the agencies surveyed on force

policies, practical limitations prohibited such an approach. As a result, and based on results from

the agency survey, eight agencies were selected for deeper exploration as part of the second

phase of the project.

35

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Agency Qualification and Selection

Agency qualification was based on several criteria. First, agencies must have engaged in

the regular reporting of force via officer use of force reports.23 This data collection strategy

offers the most promising means of collecting large amounts of data in the most efficient

manner. It is also important to note that a growing number of police agencies presently mandate

use of force reporting (see Terrill et al., 2003).24 Second, agencies must have had a consistent

use of force policy and reporting procedure for two consecutive years, so as to ensure that

instrumentation is not a concern. The inclusion of agencies that have altered their force policy or

reporting procedures would not permit valid comparisons across agencies when attempting to

determine the identified outcomes. Third, we sought agencies that could reasonably be classified

as mid-to-large in size. We did not want agencies that were so small that obtaining a sufficient

number of force incidents would become an issue; and we did not want overly large agencies

(e.g., New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, Philadelphia) whereby generalizability would

become an issue. If these three thresholds were met then the crux of the agency selection

process involved building in variation in terms of force continuum design and tactical placement

on one hand, but also ensuring some degree of agency comparability based on jurisdictional size,

crime rate, and socioeconomic status. 

23 Some agencies do no explicitly use the term “force reports,” but rather some variation thereof such as control of

persons/suspects reports, response to suspect resistance/aggression reports, supervisor control of persons/force/

resistance reports, among others. For our purposes we sought agencies that documented force incidents in some type

of special or separate report outside (or beyond) regular incident or arrest reports. We use the term force report to

generically speak for all such types of reports regardless of what unique name an agency might place on them.

24 The United States President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice dating back to

1967 noted the importance of systematic force reporting, “[s]uch policies can best be enforced if all officers who use

physical force for any reason are required to report in writing the circumstances under which the force was used” (p.

183).

36

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
From a “design” standpoint, our original plan was to select eight total agencies broken

down by two that use a linear approach, two that employ a wheel or circular type approach, two

with a matrix design, and two that use no force continuum within their policy framework. 

However, as illustrated from the agency survey results, while over 80 percent of the agencies

utilize some form of a force continuum within their policy, 73.4 percent of them employ some

type of linear approach, with roughly 10 percent using both a wheel and matrix approach. As a

result, we wanted to over-sample (select) agencies using a linear approach, which more

adequately reflects departmental policies throughout the country rather than imposing an

artificial standard. Hence, we selected six departments using a linear style, one using a matrix

approach one using a wheel design. The only challenge we encountered was the inability to

identify and select at least one agency that incorporated no force continuum in their policy. 

Though 19 percent of the total responding agencies stated they use no continuum, this was

almost universally reserved for the smallest agencies (i.e., those offering an inappropriate match)

and/or those that do not systematically capture force usage (i.e., use of force reports).25

Besides design considerations (e.g., linear, wheel, matrix), we wanted to ensure the eight

agencies varied in terms of “tactical placement.” Once again, as illustrated from the agency

survey results, even though many departments may use a linear type of design, the variation in

how this is depicted, and perhaps even more importantly, the progression of force as to how

officers are instructed, varies greatly. As such, we wanted to build in this variation. 

Finally, we sought jurisdictions that were reasonably comparable from a socioeconomic

perspective. More directly, we paid close attention to attempting to select agencies that did not

25 There were two departments of appropriate size that use no continuum and collect force data, but when contacted

and requests were made for participation they declined.

37

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
differ substantially across measures such as race, unemployment, poverty, or crime rates. In

short, agency selection was based on ensuring adequate variation in terms of differing policy

types, but also a degree of comparability based on jurisdictional size, crime rate, and

socioeconomic status. 

Once all the above considerations were made and tabulations were complete, 16 agencies

were identified and approached to determine possible participation. After numerous discussions

with administrators in these agencies eight participants were selected: Columbus, OH, CharlotteMecklenburg, NC, Portland, OR, Albuquerque, NM, Colorado Springs, CO., St. Petersburg, FL,

Fort Wayne, IN, and Knoxville, TN. 

Data Collection

Upon securing agreements with police administrators, the research team conducted

multiple site visits over the course of two years at each agency. At a minimum, we spent at least

one full month on site at each location. On average, we traveled to each site four times and spent

a week per trip.26 Data collection consisted of a survey to patrol officers to assess their views on

the impact of the agency’s force policy on decision-making (see description below under officer

survey methodology subsection for further detail). In addition, use of force data, complaint data,

and civil litigation data, as well as accompanying sources of information (e.g., organizational

charts, rosters, rules and regulation manuals, number of reported crimes, arrests, calls for

26 Two of the sites (Fort Wayne and St. Petersburg) were within short driving distance from our home universities,

which allowed us to go back and forth more readily and therefore not always requiring full week trips at a time, (the

tradeoff was that we needed to make more than four trips).

38

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
service) were collected retrospectively for 24 months (hence, a two-year study period).27

Further, a series of formal and informal interviews were conducted with officials at the middle

and upper management levels. Collectively, these sources of data serve as the basis for the

analyses and findings presented in this report.

Overall, the data collection process was extremely labor intensive. First, with eight

police agencies involved we had to deal with eight different processes across a number of data

elements. For instance, for force data alone we had to uncover how and when officers file force

reports, how policy and/or training changed or was altered during our study time frame, how

force data are catalogued within the department, and how we would be able to obtain the data. 

Similar types of information had to be gleaned and collected for a host of other data sources as

well, such as complaints, lawsuits, reported crimes, arrests, calls for service, staffing, along with

a number of other elements. In addition, since the project spanned the course of two years there

was some degree of turnover in terms of police personnel. In some cases our primary contact

liaison person within the police department was reassigned during the project, prompting us to

have to start the process anew with someone else that may have been unfamiliar with the project

at the time. In one city there was a change at the police chief level; fortunately, the new chief

allowed us to continue the project and provided resources to do so. In short, in no way was this a

project of minimal effort nor one that asked police departments to simply “send us data.” This is

critically important because ensuring we are comparing “common measures” in relation to force

usage, complaint generating, and the nature of civil litigation, cannot be done by simply asking

27 The exact two-year time frame for each site was as follows: Columbus (2006-2007 calendar years), CharlotteMecklenburg (2006-2007 calendar years), Portland (November 5, 2005-November 4, 2007), Albuquerque (April 13,

2006-April 12, 2008), Colorado Springs (2006-2007 calendar years), St. Petersburg (April 1, 2006-March 31, 2008),

Knoxville (June 1, 2005-May 31, 2007), and Fort Wayne (December 18, 2004-December 17, 2006).

39

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
police agencies to send us data. The onus must be on the researcher, not the police department,

to have any semblance and confidence that the data being used in the analyses that follow are as

clean and comparable as reasonably possible.

Agency Comparisons

Table 4-1 lists the eight study sites and how they compare across a multitude of factors

ranging from design type, to population, to crime rates, to various city characteristics. The size

of the cities in terms of population and number of sworn officers ranged from 733,203 and 1,819

in Columbus to 182,337 and 382 in Knoxville, respectively. Several of the cities are particularly

similar across these two dimensions (e.g., Columbus and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Portland and

Albuquerque, Colorado Springs and St. Petersburg, Fort Wayne and Knoxville). In addition,

many of the socioeconomic indicators are relatively closely situated. For instance, percent nonwhite ranges from 32 percent in Columbus to just under 20 percent in Colorado Springs; poverty

rates range from six percent in Colorado Springs to 14 percent Knoxville. From a comparative

perspective, Rochester, NY, one of the 16 cities originally considered for study, has a non-white

percentage over 50 and a poverty rate of nearly 30; hence, it was not selected as a study city. We

tend to see a little more variation on some other measures. For example, while five of the eight

cities have crime rates per 1,000 population in the 60s and 70s, the high end of the spectrum is

Knoxville just under 82 percent, while Colorado Springs and Fort Wayne are in the mid-to-high

40s.

40

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 4-1. Study Sites 

Columbus Charlotte

Mecklenburg

Portland Albuquerque Colorado

Springs

St.

Petersburg

F

W

 Continuum Design Linear Linear Linear Linear Wheel Matrix/Box Li

City CharacteristicsPopulation 733,203 733,291 538,133 513,124 374,112 248,069 248% Non-White 32.0 36.0 22.1 28.4 19.3 28.6 2% Female Headed 9.3 7.6 6.3 8.0 7.1 7.9 9% Below Poverty 10.8 6.6 8.5 10.0 6.1 9.2 9% Unemployed 3.5 3.7 4.5 3.8 3.1 3.2 4Part I Crimes/1,000 pop. 78.8 79.8 65.5 66.9 49.5 76.6 4Agency CharacteristicsTotal # Sworn Officers 1,819 1,638 989 986 669 520 4 # Officers/1,000 pop. 2.48 2.23 1.84 1.92 1.79 2.10 1

41

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Policy Descriptions

As noted above, we have six agencies that use a linear design, one that uses a wheel

design, and one that uses a matrix approach. The following offers a description of each agency

policy. For additional detail, in terms of how agencies depict the force continuum within their

policy, as well tactical placement of force options, see also Table 4-2 and Appendix B.

Columbus28

Columbus used a linear design referred to as the Action-Response to Resistance/

Aggression (Use of Force) model, which did not graphically depict a force continuum but rather

simply laid out eight levels of force (soft hands, chemical spray, electronic devices, hard hands,

impact weapon, canine, less lethal munitions, deadly) . The policy does not identify or link

resistance types to specific types of force. The Action Response Report form is filled out every

time reportable force is used. There are separate addendums for mace, CEDs, and firearms. For

levels 0-1, the officer completes a use of force form and forwards it to their immediate

supervisor. If the use force level is Level 3 (CED) through 7 (less lethal control), or if someone

is injured (at any level of force), the supervisor conducts an investigation, reviews the use of

force report (initially started by officer), and recommends discipline (if any). EMS is called

every time a CED is used, as they are required to remove the probes. Level 8 – deadly force, the

28 The information used for each of the city/department sections was gathered from a variety of sources over a twoyear period and included formal and informal interviews/meetings with city and agency officials, and a vast array of

written materials from many different sources (e.g., written polices and procedures, agency memos, city websites,

etc.). Some of the written description is taken directly from prior and/or existing documents, while other material is

taken and pieced together from a variety of sources. As a result, we do not always apply traditional quotations

around every direct source and/or quote (admittedly some of the material is that of the city, agency, website, or other

source). Our primary task was to first understand the many processes occurring in each of the eight different cities

before being able to document such processes with the intent to provide a proper context to the analyses in the

report. Our goal was not to create and write a detailed historical and complete contemporary description focusing on

source specificity, but to offer a background setting. Within this context, we apologize to any author or entity whose

material may be presented here without any or full attribution.

42

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
officer essentially hands all of the investigating and report writing over to the immediate

supervisor.

Once completed, use of force reports are reviewed by the chain of command, while the

Deputy Chief makes the final determination regarding the findings. As mentioned, the front-line

supervisor plays a major role in the use of force investigation from beginning to end. Force

reporting also includes off-duty incidents involving sworn personnel. Internal Affairs keeps all

records of use of force (above level 1), while all use of force data is stored at the Training

Academy. 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Charlotte-Mecklenburg used a linear design, although their policy directive specifically

stated that it is “not designed to be a step by step progression.” The model graphically depicted

six levels of citizen resistance in linear fashion (cooperative, verbal and non verbal, passive,

defensive, active aggression, aggravated active) on a horizontal axis that sits above another

horizontal axis that depicts seven levels of force in linear fashion (professional presence and

verbal dialogue and commands, soft hands, chemical spray, hard hands, conducted energy

devices, impact weapon, and deadly force). These force options, while depicted on a horizontal

axis are also moving vertically as well. Further, there is not a complete overlap between

resistance and force options (e.g., hard hands can be used somewhere between defensive and

active resistance). A Use of Force Report form is filled out every time reportable force is used. 

When officers use a documented level of force they are required to contact their supervisor

immediately, who conducts an investigation of the incident (Supervisor Investigative Report). 

The supervisor completes the report based on information provided by the officer(s) and

43

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
citizen(s) at the scene (via an investigation). If a CED is employed, a separate “Taser® Data

Download” report is completed. There are also addendums for OC spray and firearms. 

Following the initial investigation of the use of force incident by the officer’s sergeant,

the chain of command (Division Captain, Service Area Major, and Internal Affairs) reviews the

incident, deeming it justified or unjustified use of force. The final disposition comes from the

Service Area Major, while Internal Affairs serves primarily as a check over the process for

consistency and oversight. Electronic tracking is done for each use of force incident, which

documents who reviewed the case, their comments, and for how long. There is a 45 day limit on

investigations of use of force incidents. 

Portland

Portland employed a linear force continuum design that laid out and linked citizen

resistance with force options. This model depicted seven levels of citizen resistance (but not in

graphical format) in linear fashion (compliant, compliant/verbal, passive, physical, physical

aggressive, physical aggressive armed, deadly) in a right hand column, with seven force level

options in linear fashion in a middle column (officer presence, verbal, control holds, chemical

spray and TASER®, baton and strikes/kicks, less lethal munitions, firearms), with five force

levels listed in the left hand column (presence, verbal, physical control, impact munitions,

deadly). Every officer who uses reportable force must complete a Use of Force Report (UFR). 

Primary officers involved in the incident are required to fill out all mandatory reports. 

Narratives of the incident are typically not captured on the primary officer’s UFR because they

are written in the custody/incident reports. Thus, narrative data are not recorded electronically in

the Bureau’s data system (PPDS). The Bureau’s UFR was adopted in July 2004. Prior to this

44

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
time, the CED and less lethal force were captured on separate Bureau forms. Data on Firearm

Discharge incidents are captured on a separate form. Supervisors are not required to go to the

scene of every use of force incident; supervisors are directed to respond to the scene in instances

where a subject has been hit by a less lethal impact weapon or in instances where an officer has

negligently or unintentionally discharged the CED. Officers are required to notify supervisors

immediately whenever the baton, chemical spray, CED, or less lethal weapons are deployed on a

subject. In these cases, supervisors are supposed to document any injuries in an inter-office

memorandum, most often an After-Action Report, which are narratives that describe and

evaluate a police action. These reports, which are ultimately stored in the Chief’s Office, must

be submitted within a week to a Branch Chief who forwards them to Training and Internal

Affairs. Although supervisors are not required to go to the scene in all instances, they are

responsible for reviewing every UFR written by their officers. 

Albuquerque

Albuquerque employed a linear force continuum design (called the Reactive Control

Model or RCM) that laid out and linked citizen resistance with force options. This model

graphically depicted four levels of citizen resistance in linear fashion (cooperative, noncooperative, unarmed assailant, armed assailant) on a horizontal axis that sites above another

horizontal axis that depicts four levels of force in linear fashion (alert, control, active, survival). 

Within each of the four broad levels there are specific types listed (e.g., under active it instructs

officers to consider anything from verbal commands to the use of an intermediate weapon). 

Every officer who uses reportable force must complete a Use of Force Report (UFR)

Bubblesheet (e.g., scantron like form) in addition to an Incident Report (Form 42). It is the

45

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
responsibility of the officer’s supervisor to ensure that the UFR Bubblesheets are filed when

reportable force is used, but they are not required to go to the scene. If an officer does not fill

out the report, the supervisor is responsible for filling it out. It is also the responsibility of the

supervisor to review all subordinate officers UFR Bubblesheet forms. The supervisor must sign

the form and note whether the force used was appropriate or if an investigation is warranted.29

Upon review of the supervisor, a copy of the UFR Bubblesheet and the Incident Report is

submitted for review to the Operations Review Lieutenant within 72 hours of the incident. The

Operations Review Lieutenant then distributes the reports to Internal Affairs, Risk Management,

the Legal Department, Tactical Teams, and the Academy when appropriate. The Operations

Review Lieutenant ensures that the report is reviewed by Legal and forwarded to Internal

Affairs. Finally, it is the Commander’s responsibility to ensure that all supervisors and

subordinates conform to the policy and that all reports are submitted to the appropriate units.

Colorado Springs

Colorado Springs relied on a “Situational Force Model” (alternatively referred to as a

“wheel” model) as its means of a force continuum. This model graphically depicted an officer

standing in the middle of a circle with various force options surrounding him/her. The force

options are placed in random order to indicate there is no natural progression of force (e.g.,

deadly force is placed next to soft hand tactics). There is no graphical depiction of citizen

resistance as to which types of force are most appropriate given different types of resistance

(although the policy narrative/text does make a link to some degree, thereby indicating a degree

of linear progression despite the circular model approach). Every officer who uses reportable

29 According to several department and city officials, prior to mid-2005, officers’ use of force reporting was

somewhat sporadic due to a broader organizational perception that filling them out was not important and that

supervisors had never needed to ensure that they were filled out. 

46

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
force must complete a force report (called a Response To Aggression report or RTA). As part of

the policy, supervisors are required to respond to the scene; however, pending extreme cases

involving injury or some other circumstance a supervisor believes warrants, the supervisor does

not interview officers, witnesses, or the suspect. Rather, they are just present to oversee.

Once completed, the RTA is forwarded to an Administrative Sergeant who is the first to

review it, copy it, and provide a copy for the officer’s file. The RTA is then sent for review

through the chain of command (Shift Lieutenant, Division Commander, Office of Professional

Standards/Inspection Unit). RTA forms are stored with the Office of Professional Standards/

Inspection Unit. 

St. Petersburg

St. Petersburg relied on the Response to Resistance (Use of Force) matrix. This model

graphically depicted six levels of citizen resistance in linear fashion on a vertical axis (presence,

verbal, passive physical, active physical, aggressive physical, aggravated physical), with six

force level options in linear fashion on a horizontal axis (officer presence, communication,

physical control, intermediate weapons, incapacitating control, deadly force). The appropriate

force types are then linked to various resistance types by a check mark in boxes (e.g., if a citizen

displays aggressive physical resistance offices can use up to incapacitating control force). The

CED has its own policy. Officers are required to fill out a Response to Resistance Report form

whenever any reportable force is used. In addition, officers are required to report when they

point their firearm at a suspect. The ASP, chemical sprays, and physical force are reported on

the Response to Resistance Form, but CEDs have their own form (which includes pointing and

accidental discharges. When CEDs are discharged, a supervisor comes to the scene where they

47

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
make sure the officer collects all supplemental information (i.e., CED form, download data, and

take pictures) is included. The supervisor is then required to review and sign off on the form onscene.

Once the Response to Resistance and/or the CED form is complete it, along with the

arrest report, is sent through the chain of command (Sergeant, Lieutenant, Major, Assistant

Chief) for review before it is forwarded to the Internal Affairs Division for final review. Internal

Affairs maintains a copy of force reports, providing a copy to the Training Division and the

original copy to the Records and Identification Division.

Fort Wayne

Fort Wayne employed a linear design, although the model did not graphically depict a

force continuum, but rather simply laid out six levels of force in linear fashion (officer presence,

verbal, soft hand, hard hand, intermediate weapon, deadly) and then partially identified types of

resistance via narrative/text. According to policy, force should be “reasonably necessary” and

used only after “discussion, negotiation, and persuasion have been found to be inappropriate or

ineffective.” Every officer who uses reportable force is required to fill out a use of force report

form in addition to an incident report. CED incidents and Firearm Discharges are reported on a

separate form, and kept with the force report/incident report forms. 

After officers fill out use of force report forms, a sergeant reviews and signs off on them. 

Supervisors are not required to go to the scene when force is used. The use of force report form

is then attached to the incident report and sent to the Office of Professional Standards, who then

sends a copy of the use of force and incident reports to the Training Center. A training

instructor, at the Training Center, reviews the use of force report to ensure that they are being

48

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
filled out by officers appropriately, and also to determine if the force utilized was effective or

not.

 Knoxville

Knoxville’s policy graphically depicted five levels of citizen resistance in linear fashion

vertically (compliant, passive, active, aggressive, and assaultive/deadly) on the left side of the

continuum, with five force level options in linear fashion vertically on the right side of the

continuum (officer presence, empty hand soft/baton soft, compliance techniques, defensive

compliance techniques, deadly force), with five situational levels vertically in the middle of the

continuum (strategic, tactical, volatile, harmful, lethal). Officers are required to fill out a Use of

Force Report form at level two (empty hand soft, baton soft, contact controls, direction controls)

and above or if a suspect has (or complains) of an injury. There are no supplemental forms for

OC spray or the CED (but there are for K-9 and Firearm Discharge). Once force forms are filled

out, they are given to Sergeants for their review.30 CED usage is handled slightly differently, as

officers are required to notify a supervisor immediately31 and summon EMS medical assistance

for probe removal if they are embedded in the suspect’s skin. Supervisors are required to go the

scenes in which deadly force is used by an officer. 

Once a use of force report is filled out (by the end of the shift) it goes through the chain

of command. Signatures are required from the immediate supervisor (who reviews the audio and

video tapes), a lieutenant, and a captain. A formal review of the use of force report is also

conducted by Internal Affairs. Reports are also reviewed by the Deputy Chief of Patrol, the

30 Informally, the department likes to have the supervisor present (not on scene) when the officer is filling out the

report to reduce errors in reporting. 

31 Informally, the department encourages supervisors to go to the scene in CED cases, although it is not explicitly in

the policy.

49

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Chief, the Training Division, and CALEA (when they visit KPD), although signatures are not

required. Use of force reports are stored within the Internal Affairs Unit. 

 Table 4-2 offers a detailed layout of tactical placement and how citizen resistance is (or is

not) linked to force options for each of the eight policies (see also Appendix B for how the

policy is depicted graphically in each agency). As shown, each agency has a different approach

in some manner. Two of the departments (i.e., Colombus and Fort Wayne) only offer force

progression levels - with no explicit link to citizen resistance. However, these agencies still vary

in terms of force tactical placement. For instance, Columbus calls for officers to use soft

hands/pain compliance, followed by chemical spray, CED, and then hard hands, all at separate

and distinct levels. Fort Wayne’s approach is slightly altered. First, it places chemical spray at

the same level as soft hands and pain compliance rather than on its own level. Second, the CED

is placed at the impact weapons level, which is after hard hands rather than before. 

Six of the agencies, in one form or another, link force options to varying levels of citizen

resistance. Once again, the degree of variation is evident. Charlotte-Mecklenburg places

chemical sprays, hard hands, and the CED at different levels, while Albuquerque places all these

force types (as well as soft hand tactics and pain compliance) on the same force level. However,

it gets somewhat more complicated when citizen resistance is factored into the equation. In

Charlotte-Mecklenburg, chemical spray is at the defensively resistant level, while impact force

and the CED use requires greater that just defensive resistance suspects. By contrast,

Albuquerque permits soft and hard hand, pain compliance, chemical spray, and CED force on

verbally and defensively resistant suspects, reserving impact force to actively resistant suspects. 

50

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Other variations in the policies are also present. Portland places chemical sprays and the

CED together in the middle of the continuum against defensive citizen resistance, while St.

Petersburg places CEDs near the top of the continuum just prior to deadly force and requiring

active resistence. Knoxville instructs officers to use soft hands and pain compliance on verbal

and passive resisters, and then all other forms of force short of deadly on defensive and active

resisters. 

Perhaps one of the more interesting agency approaches is found in Colorado Springs. 

One of the stated reasons for using a wheel, as opposed to a linear, type model is so officers do

not think about force progression in a ladder or step-by-step format. Clearly, as shown in

Appendix B, the wheel depiction goes so far as to ensure that no force progression is evident

(e.g., lethal force is placed next to chemical agent on one side and soft control techniques on the

other side). Nonetheless, in the text of the policy citizen resistance is laid out in progression

format and explicitly linked to appropriate force options. For example, for soft hand techniques

the policy states “when the subject fails to respond to verbal direction or resists in a defensive

manner,” and for control and compliance techniques (e.g., pain compliance, chemical spray,

CED) the policy states “the subject has become the aggressor, attacks the officer, or there is fear

for the safety of the officer and others” (CSPD GO 705). However, there is also some degree of

uncertainly found within the policy. For example, the policy section dealing directly with CEDs

states this weapon can be deployed when a person “resists detention and arrest, and other

alternatives for controlling them are not reasonable or available under the circumstances” (CSPD

SOP P1-171).

51

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 4-2. Variation in Tactical Placement (Summary Layout)

Agency Citizen Resistance Force Response

Columbus Does not explicitly lay out

resistance to force

Physical Soft, Pain ComplianceChemical SprayCEDPhysical HardImpact (Baton/Flashlight)Impact (K9)Impact (Munitions)Deadly

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Compliant, Verbal Officer Presence/Verbal

Passive Physical Soft, Pain ComplianceDefensive Chemical SprayDefensive, Active Physical HardActive, Defensive CEDActive ImpactDeadly Deadly

52

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Agency Citizen Resistance Force Response

Portland Compliant Officer Presence

Verbal VerbalPassive Physical Soft, Pain ComplianceDefensive Chemical Spray, CEDActive Physical Hard, Impact (Baton/ASP)Active Impact (Munitions)

Deadly Deadly

Albuquerque Compliant Officer Presence/Verbal

Verbal, Passive, Defensive Physical Soft/Hard, Pain, Chemical S

Active ImpactDeadly Deadly

*Policy specifies CED is equivalent to Chembe used on Passive resister

53

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Agency Citizen Resistance Force Response

Colorado Springs Compliant Officer Presence, Verbal

Verbal, Passive Physical Soft, Pain ComplianceDefensive, Active Chemical Spray, CEDActive Physical Hard, ImpactDeadly Deadly

St. Petersburg Compliant, Verbal Officer Presence, Verbal, Physical S

Passive Pain Compliance

Defensive Physical Hard, Chemical Spray, ImpActive Impact, CEDDeadly Deadly

54

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Agency Citizen Resistance Force Response

Fort Wayne Does not explicitly lay out

resistance to force

Officer PresenceVerbalPhysical Soft, Pain Compliance, ChePhysical HardImpact, CEDDeadly

Knoxville Compliant Officer Presence/Verbal

Verbal, Passive Physical Soft, Pain Compliance

Defensive, Active Physical Hard, Chemical Spray, CEDDeadly Deadly

55

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
There are two additional aspects relevant to force policy that vary. First, in three of the

cities all patrol officers carry a CED (i.e., Portland, Colorado Springs, and Knoxville). In four

cities most, but not all, patrol officers carry a CED (i.e., Columbus, Charlotte-Mecklenburg,

Albuquerque, and St. Petersburg) - meaning that on any given shift there are some officers on

patrol with a CED while other officers do not have a CED. Further, in Fort Wayne, few to none

of the patrol officers have a CED, unless one of the officers is part of the Emergency Response

Team (ERT). Second, while in most of the cities patrol officers themselves are responsible for

documenting their use of force behavior via a force report, two of the cities (Columbus and

Charlotte-Mecklenburg) have a supervisor report system (i.e., a supervisor comes to the scene to

document the force usage).32 In sum, we have eight agencies that vary their force policy

approach in a number of different ways. Below we offer more detail on policy variation for each

agency.

Data Elements

To examine whether certain types of policies offer more beneficial outcomes to police

practitioners we draw on two primary data elements. The first is an officer survey (Chapter 5),

which allows us to examine the extent to which different types of policy approaches provide

officers assistance and guidance with respect to force decision-making. This strategy allows us

to go beyond official policy mandates and administrative rhetoric, and straight to the front-line

workers tasked with carrying out their agency’s policy, to determine if they think it actually

32 All the agencies have some sort of system in place for a supervisor to respond to the scene for severe force

incidents (e.g., cases where a suspect sustained serious or life-threatening injuries). Moreover, CharlotteMecklenburg officials report that supervisor reporting is nearly universal (i.e., supervisor show up to the scene and

do the reporting), while Albuquerque officials report that while “officially” they subscribe to “supervisory

reporting,” in practice patrol officials still document the bulk of the force reporting.

56

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
works. The second set of data elements fall under the broad heading of official data, but is

actually split into three sub-elements in the form of force reports (Chapter 6), citizen complaint

data (Chapter 7), and civil litigation data (Chapter 8). Here we are able to investigate which

policy types are associated with varying degrees of force, injuries to suspects and officers,

citizen complaints, and lawsuits levied for improper force. 

57

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CHAPTER 5

Patrol Officer Survey Data

 Our patrol officer survey (see Appendix C) was designed to glean information regarding

officer attitudes toward their use of force policy (i.e., assistance, restrictiveness, clarity,

guidance, and review fairness), the impact of the policy on a variety of outcomes (i.e., citizen

injuries, officer injuries, citizen complaints, and lawsuits), and the training associated with the

policy. The survey also captured standard demographic information. The survey was pre-tested

on a sample of current and former Michigan and Florida police officers prior to administering

them to our eight agencies. With the exception of one site33, the patrol officer survey was

administered during organizational roll call sessions, by trained project staff, before the start of

the officers’ shifts. This chapter details the administration of the survey, as well as the patrol

officer responses. 

Methodology

Survey Population

We chose to survey a population of police officers assigned to patrol assignments rather

than selecting a sample of officers. This choice was made for a couple of reasons. First, since

we were administering the surveys at roll call meetings, and had ample resources to make visits

to every shift, we aimed to capture the attitudes of all patrol members instead of a select group. 

Moreover, given the sensitive nature of several of the survey topics (i.e., the use of force), we did

not want to raise suspicions among officers as to why they were chosen to participate over

33 Fort Wayne Police Department did not use a roll call system, thus we coordinated with the department’s annual inservice training and administered the survey during these training sessions. 

58

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
others. In fact, our standard introductory read off to each roll call addressed such concerns by

explaining that, as an organization, officers (individually or collectively) were not selected for

study inclusion for something that they failed to do or for something that they did incorrectly. 

Second, since one of our goals was to eventually link attitudinal survey responses with a variety

of behavioral outcomes (e.g., use of force, complaints, lawsuits, etc.), we did not want to

potentially risk missing, through a randomized process, some organizational members that may

be of interest later on (e.g., extremely high or low force users). What follows is a discussion of

the patrol officer survey protocol, as well as the survey results. 

Survey Protocol 

In administering the officer survey, project staff were generally on-site for a week to ten

days, where the goal was to visit every patrol shift, across each geographic location, at least

twice.34 In order to maximize our survey time while on site, we obtained a master roster of all

sworn personnel from each of our eight agencies. The rosters identified the population of patrol

officers, as well as when and where they were assigned. This information was then matched up

with the daily patrol rosters to ensure that the assignment information was correct. Based on this

information, project staff then prepared a survey plan that would enable them to survey each

shift, across the various precincts/districts, two times. In doing so, project staff mapped

proposed visits around officers’ scheduled days off. For example, if Squad B in District I of

Department X had scheduled days off on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, survey staff made sure

34 The following represents the dates that project staff surveyed each agency: 9/10/07 - 9/17/07 (Colorado Springs);

9/26/07, 9/28/07 - 9/30/07 (Knoxville); 10/18/07 - 10/31/07 (Charlotte-Mecklenburg); 11/6/07 - 11/7/07, 11/10/07 -

11/11/07 (Portland); 11/5/07 - 11/10/07, 11/12/ 07 - 11/14/07, 11/16/07 (Fort Wayne); 12/11/07 - 12/17/07

(Albuquerque), 2/17/08 - 2/18/08, 2/20/08 - 2/23/08 (St. Petersburg); and 6/15/08 - 6/23/08 (Columbus). 

59

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
to schedule survey times for this squad on Sunday thru Wednesday. In smaller agencies, like St.

Petersburg, this was rather simple, while in departments like Charlotte-Mecklenburg, this was

more arduous. Before going to each site (approximately a week), we obtained up-to-date daily

patrol rosters from the agency to ensure that no “major” changes occurred in terms of officer

assignments. This allowed survey staff to number (and name) each of the surveys beforehand. 

Prior to the start of our roll call visits, each of our agency contacts distributed either a

hard copy memorandum or an email of our survey schedule to alert command personnel of the

dates and times of when research staff would be surveying officers. This was done in order to

eliminate any element of “surprise” for shift supervisors, as well as legitimizing the survey with

command staff support. 

The amount of time and staff allocated for surveying varied across each of our agencies,

according to size, spatial differentiation (i.e., the number of precincts/divisions), and agency

assistance. For example, the Knoxville Police Department, our smallest and with only two

districts, organized joint roll calls across the districts, enabling us to complete our surveying in

roughly four days. On the other hand, Charlotte-Mecklenburg operated across 13 divisions (with

five to six shifts per division) requiring more survey manpower and approximately 14 days of

surveying. Because of the geographic complexities for two of our sites (Portland and CharlotteMecklenburg), we hired and trained local graduate students to assist in surveying (three from

Portland State University and four from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte,

respectively). These graduate students were all hand picked and recommended from peers of the

project principal investigators. This greatly assisted in efficiently administering the officer

survey across a number of precincts/divisions. 

60

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Our roll call visits started by providing attending officers with a brief overview of the

project, highlighting the fact that agencies were chosen based on their divergent use of force

policies and not for something that the department (or individual officers within the department)

failed to do or did incorrectly. Moreover, we explained issues of informed consent,

confidentiality, and anonymity. That is, survey staff explained that officer participation was

voluntary, and if they chose to participate, per federal and university IRB regulations, we needed

their signed consent (see Officer Consent Form in Appendix D). Our introduction also explained

to officers that their responses to the survey were confidential and no one outside of the project

staff would be viewing their individual surveys. 

Our confidentiality promises had to be distinguished from the lack of anonymity. 

Because we wanted to link attitudinal survey responses with our official data (e.g., use of force,

complaints, lawsuits, etc.), and we wanted to make sure that each officer was accounted for in

the survey process, we needed to identify survey respondents. In doing so, we created a unique

identification number for each officer that was not connected to any official identifying officer

number (e.g., badge number, payroll number, car number, etc). Officers were instructed to alert

us if this happened, and a new identification number would be assigned. Randomly assigned

identification numbers were printed on the last page of the survey, as well as on the consent form

(which was stapled to the front of the survey). On the top of the consent form was the officer’s

name, which was read off in the roll call in order to assure that each officer received a survey. 

No names were on the completed officer survey, as consent forms were detached from the survey

once it was handed in to project staff, and officers were instructed that, if they wished, they

could tear off their printed names on the consent forms. Since we had the same identification

61

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
number for each officer on the consent form and the survey, we were able to match up consent

forms with completed surveys. 

The patrol officer survey generally took anywhere from ten to twenty-five minutes to

complete. Project staff remained the entire time, in the event that officers had questions about

the survey. Officers were instructed to complete their surveys individually, and not to discuss

any of the items. Those who did not take the survey were either physically absent or declined to

participate. Next, we discuss the response rates across each of our agencies. 

Survey Response Rates

Table 5-1 displays our response rates across our eight agencies. Since we were interested

in surveying all police officers with patrol responsibilities, our patrol numbers in the first column

represent the number of officers that were located on the official departmental patrol rosters and

thus assigned to a patrol function. Administrative type assignments, although at the patrol rank,

were not our focus since their likelihood of engaging in the use of force, and thus applying the

less lethal policy, were remote. This column thus represents the number of patrol officers that

were “expected” to be at roll calls when project personnel arrived to conduct the survey. 

The second column, in Table 5-1, represents the number of patrol officers that were

physically present to be surveyed during our roll call visits. Even though we had an a priori plan

in place to survey the population of patrol officers, around their scheduled days off, what we

could not control for were those who took an unscheduled day off, attended court, were injured,

on military duty, suspended, or were not present due to some other circumstance. We found

variation across sites between the number of patrol officers that were assigned (on paper) and

62

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
those that were available for each shift. This variation was usually patterned according to

departmental size, and to a lesser extent by spatial differentiation, as there was a greater fit

between column one and column two (i.e., those expected and those present) for the smaller,

more centralized agencies. 

The third column, in Table 5-1, depicts the number of patrol officers that participated in

the survey. Subtracting this column from the previous one represents the number of patrol

officers that declined to participate in the survey. 

The fourth column, in Table 5-1, indicates the percentage of patrol officers that

participated in our survey relative to the population of officers that we expected at each roll call. 

Cumulatively, across all of our eight agencies, we were successful in surveying just over twothirds of the patrol officers that were officially scheduled to be present. 

The final column, in Table 5-1, illustrates the percentage of patrol officers that were

present at roll calls and participated in the survey. While there is some minor variation across

sites (ranging from 91.50 in St. Petersburg to 99.08 in Albuquerque), the percentages show that

surveyors were very successful in getting officers to take the survey as long as the officers were

physically present. Cumulatively, surveyors were successful in surveying approximately 96.5

percent of the patrol officers that were present at departmental roll calls (and in-service training

in Fort Wayne). Next, we present the results of patrol officer survey. 

63

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 5-1. Patrol Officer Survey Response Rates

Department Patrol # @ Roll Call # Surveyed Patrol % Survey %

 Colorado Springs 317 204 199 62.78 97.55

 Portland 382 263 250 65.45 95.06

Albuquerque 456 328 325 71.27 99.08

 Fort Wayne 221 197 190 85.97 96.45

St. Petersburg 314 247 226 71.97 91.50

Knoxville 176 157 156 88.64 99.36

Charlotte 685 474 466 68.03 98.31

Columbus 910 549 523 57.47 95.26

Total 3461 2419 2335 67.47 96.53

Analyses and Findings

Less Lethal Force Policy Perceptions

A primary component of our survey focused on eliciting officer views of their

departmental less lethal use of force policy. In doing so, we concentrated on asking officers a

series of questions about their overall policy (i.e., assistance, restrictiveness, clarity, guidance,

and review fairness). What follows are the officer responses to each of these questions, all of

which were standard Likert items, enabling the respondent to answer in varying levels of

agreement and disagreement (i.e., “agree strongly,” “agree somewhat,” “disagree somewhat,”

and “disagree strongly”). 

We started by asking officers the degree to which their “policy assists officer decision

making” (see Table 5-2). In varying degrees, the majority of respondents, irrespective of agency

and policy type, agreed that overall their policy assisted their decision making. The most

favorable responses were reported from Knoxville (91.6 agreed and 32.5 agreed “strongly”) and

Albuquerque officers (90.9 agreed and 30.4 agreed “strongly”), while St. Petersburg officers

reported the least amount of overall agreement at approximately 74 percent. 

64

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 5-2. Policy Assists Officer Decision Making

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Agree Strongly 54 35 98 27 38 50 103 116

(27.3) (14.3) (30.4) (14.2) (16.8) (32.5) (22.5) (22.4)

Agree Somewhat 110 160 195 140 129 91 261 319

(55.5) (65.6) (60.5) (73.7) (57.1) (59.1) (57.0) (61.5)

Disagree Somewhat 34 42 24 22 44 13 79 76

(17.2) (17.2) (7.5) (11.6) (19.5) (8.4) (17.2) (14.6)

Disagree Strongly 0 7 5 1 15 0 15 8

(0) (2.9) (1.6) (0.5) (6.6) (0) (3.3) (1.5)

Total 198 244 322 190 226 154 458 519

In assessing policy restrictiveness, we asked officers if they thought the policy was too

restrictive. Table 5-3 displays the results, where there appears to be a good deal of variation

across agencies. The majority of officers from four agencies (i.e., St. Petersburg, 74.6%;

Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 66.4%; Portland, 55.5%; and Columbus, 51.5%) reported that they

agreed that their policy was too restrictive. The majority of the officers from the remaining four

departments disagreed that their policy was too restrictive (i.e., Knoxville, 60.8%; Colorado

Springs, 57.9%; Fort Wayne, 53.7%; and Albuquerque, 51.1%). At the extremes, we found the

least favorable responses among St. Petersburg officers (i.e., the less lethal use of force policy is

too restrictive), while the most favorable responses were found among Knoxville officers. 

65

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 5-3. Policy Too Restrictive

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Agree Strongly 21 29 33 10 53 8 76 61

(10.8) (11.7) (10.3) (5.3) (23.6) (5.2) (16.6) (11.9)

Agree Somewhat 61 108 123 77 115 52 228 203

(31.3) (43.8) (38.6) (41.0) (51.0) (34.0) (49.8) (39.6)

Disagree Somewhat 72 71 103 71 42 50 109 170

(36.9) (28.7) (32.3) (37.7) (18.7) (32.7) (23.8) (33.1)

Disagree Strongly 41 39 60 30 15 43 45 79

(21.0) (15.8) (18.8) (16.0) (6.7) (28.1) (9.8) (15.4)

Total 195 247 319 188 225 153 458 513

Next, we asked officers the degree to which they agreed that their less lethal force 

policy was clear. As Table 5-4 illustrates, the majority of officers, in varying degrees (ranging

from approximately 70% in Portland to roughly 90% in Knoxville) believed that their policy was

clear. Of particular note was the finding that in nearly all agencies (with the exception of

Knoxville) the majority of this agreement was among the “somewhat” category. Once again, the

most favorable less lethal force attitudes were found among Knoxville officers, where

approximately 45 percent of the respondents “agreed strongly” that their policy was clear. 

Table 5-4. Policy is Clear 

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Agree Strongly 56 45 112 42 58 70 150 122

(28.7) (18.4) (35.3) (22.5) (25.8) (45.5) (32.8) (23.6)

Agree Somewhat 100 125 165 108 115 69 236 286

(51.3) (51.2) (52.1) (57.7) (51.1) (44.8) (51.7) (55.3)

Disagree Somewhat 32 58 37 34 43 12 60 97

(16.4) (23.8) (11.7) (18.2) (19.1) (7.8) (13.1) (18.8)

Disagree Strongly 7 16 3 3 9 3 11 12

(3.6) (6.6) (0.9) (1.6) (4.0) (1.9) (2.4) (2.3)

Total 195 244 317 187 225 154 457 517

66

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
We also asked officers about the guidance that their policy provided in terms of “when

force can and can’t be used.” As Table 5-5 reports, the majority of officers across all

departments agreed, although in varying degrees, that their policy provides adequate guidance in

terms of when force can and cannot be used. Also, like the previous guidance question, we

found Knoxville officers to be the most favorable (approximately 44% agreed, and 48% agreed

strongly), while Portland officers were the least favorable of the eight agencies (approximately

52% agreed, and only 18% agreed strongly). Across all departments, with the exception of

Knoxville, the modal response was “agree somewhat.” 

Table 5-5. Policy Provides Adequate Guidance in Terms of 

When Force Can and Can’t Be Used

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Agree Strongly 49 45 112 34 62 74 162 123

(24.9) (18.3) (34.9) (18.0) (27.5) (48.0) (35.4) (23.7)

Agree Somewhat 112 129 178 120 126 68 242 319

(56.9) (52.4) (55.4) (63.5) (56.0) (44.2) (52.8) (61.5)

Disagree Somewhat 32 61 26 32 29 10 49 70

(16.2) (24.8) (8.1) (16.9) (12.9) (6.5) (10.7) (13.5)

Disagree Strongly 4 11 5 3 8 2 5 7

(2.0) (4.5) (1.6) (1.6) (3.6) (1.3) (1.1) (1.3)

Total 197 246 321 189 225 154 458 519

The final policy assessment survey item focused on supervisory review and use of force

reporting. This question asked officers to assess the extent to which they agreed (or disagreed)

that their “policy regarding supervisory of use of force reports is fair.” As Table 5-6 indicates,

the majority of officers, across all agencies, agreed that the supervisory review of use of force

reports is fair. We did find variation in this majority agreement, ranging from 75 percent overall

agreement in Colorado Springs to 95.4 percent in Portland. In terms of intensity of agreement,

67

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Knoxville officers reported the highest percentage of “agree strongly” at 37 percent. While we

found high overall agreement, across all agencies, the bulk of this agreement (and modal

response) was among the “agree somewhat” response category. 

Table 5-6. Policy Regarding Supervisory Review is Fair 

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Agree Strongly 40 39 68 32 45 57 119 109

(20.3) (16.1) (21.3) (17.1) (20.0) (37.0) (26.1) (21.1)

Agree Somewhat 108 153 194 126 125 86 257 328

(54.8) (63.2) (60.5) (67.4) (55.6) (55.9) (56.3) (63.5)

Disagree Somewhat 40 38 52 22 45 8 72 71

(20.3) (15.7) (16.3) (11.8) (20.0) (5.2) (15.8) (13.7)

Disagree Strongly 9 12 6 7 10 3 8 9

(4.6) (5.0) (1.9) (3.7) (4.4) (1.9) (1.8) (1.7)

Total 197 242 320 187 225 154 456 517

Summary

The aim of the first section, reported here, of the patrol officer survey was to assess

officers’ perception of their less lethal use of force policy. Our primary topics focused on

overall policy assistance, restrictiveness, clarity, guidance, and review fairness. 

Across the various facets of attitudes toward respective use of force policies, we find

three patterns that emerge. First, although we found variation in responses within and across

agencies, patrol officers generally expressed favorable views of their less lethal use of force

policy. 

Second, one agency consistently stood out in terms of patrol officers positive attitudes

toward their use of force policy. That department was Knoxville, where officers reported the

positive responses of their policy (at higher percentages) in nearly every table found in this

section (see tables 5-2 through 5-6). 

68

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Third, a few departments (i.e., St. Petersburg, Portland, and Colorado Springs)

consistently distinguished themselves by either reporting the lowest percentage of favorable

responses or by responding unfavorably. For example, St. Petersburg officers reported the

lowest percentage of agreement, across the eight sites, in terms of the policy providing assistance

in general (see Table 5-2). These officers also expressed greater concerns (i.e., majority

agreement) that the policy was too restrictive (see Table 5-3). Portland officers, on the other

hand, noted the least amount of agreement that their policy was clear (see Table 5-4). The same

patterns were found for Portland officers with respect to when force can and cannot be used (see

Table 5-5). Finally, Colorado Springs officers distinguished themselves by reporting the least

overall agreement that the supervisory review of their use of force is fair (see Table 5-6). 

 

Outcomes of Less Lethal Force Policy

The next section of our patrol officer survey queried respondents on a variety of

“outcomes” of their respective force policies. More specifically, we asked officers to assess the

impact that their less lethal use of force policy had on potential citizen injuries, officer injuries,

citizen complaints, and lawsuits. For all items, we asked officers to respond with one of the

following: “increases the likelihood,” “decreases the likelihood,” or “neither increases nor

decreases the likelihood.” 

Table 5-7 displays the results of patrol officers’ perceptions of the effect of their less

lethal use of force policy on potential citizen injuries. The majority of officers, across all

agencies, reported that their policy decreases the likelihood of potential citizen injuries, ranging

from 50.3 percent in Fort Wayne to 69.7 percent in Knoxville. Interestingly, while most

69

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
respondents did not report that their policy increased the likelihood of citizen injuries, over 10

percent of Fort Wayne officers (11.6) did. This contrasts dramatically with Knoxville, where

less than one percent (0.6) perceived that their use of force policy increased the likelihood of

injuries to citizens. 

Table 5-7. Effect of Policy on Potential Citizen Injuries

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Increases the 14 13 12 22 17 1 19 8

Likelihood (7.0) (5.3) (3.8) (11.6) (7.7) (0.6) (4.2) (1.6)

Decreases the 120 142 198 95 147 108 271 295

Likelihood (60.3) (58.2) (61.8) (50.3) (66.2) (69.7) (59.4) (57.3)

Neither Increases 65 89 110 72 58 46 166 211

Nor Decreases the (32.7) (36.5) (34.4) (38.1) (26.1) (29.7) (36.4) (41.1)

Likelihood

Total 199 244 320 189 222 155 456 514

Turning next to the impact of respondents’ use of force policy on patrol officer injuries,

we found contrasting results from that reported for citizen injuries (see Table 5-8). Among all

agencies, we find much more variation across likelihood response categories (“increases,”

“decreases,” or “neither increases or decreases”). At the higher ends, St. Petersburg and

Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers reported that their policy increases the likelihood of officer

injuries (45.7% and 44.2% respectively). Knoxville officers reported the least percentage

(19.4%) of officer injury potential, which was still higher than any agency reported for potential

citizen injuries. Finally, Knoxville officers were the only group where the majority (58%)

reported that their policy actually decreases the likelihood of officer injuries. 

70

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 5-8. Effect of Policy on Potential Officer Injuries

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Increases the 69 88 88 61 101 30 201 143

Likelihood (34.7) (36.1) (27.5) (32.3) (45.7) (19.4) (44.2) (27.8)

Decreases the 96 98 144 69 84 90 138 216

Likelihood (48.2) (40.1) (45.0) (36.5) (38.0) (58.0) (30.3) (42.0)

Neither Increases 34 58 88 59 36 35 116 155

Nor Decreases the (17.1) (23.8) (27.5) (31.2) (16.3) (22.6) (25.5) (30.2)

Likelihood

Total 199 244 320 189 221 155 455 514

Our third assessment of policy outcomes dealt with potential citizen complaints. Again,

like that found in assessing potential officer injuries, we found (see Table 5-9) a good deal of

variation across response categories. Of interest was the fact that officers in six agencies (i.e.,

Colorado Springs, Portland, Albuquerque, Fort Wayne, St. Petersburg, and Columbus) reported

higher percentages that their policy actually increases the likelihood of citizen complaints over

decreases the likelihood. Knoxville and Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers reported higher

percentages (37.4 and 33.2 respectively) that the policy decreases the likelihood over increases

the likelihood. Finally, over a third of all respondents (ranging from 33.5% in St. Petersburg to

42.6% in Knoxville) reported that their policy did not increase or decrease potential citizen

complaints. 

71

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 5-9. Effect of Policy on Potential Citizen Complaints

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Increases the 79 97 121 67 81 31 135 209

Likelihood (39.7) (39.8) (37.8) (35.4) (36.6) (20.0) (29.7) (40.6)

Decreases the 44 49 75 43 66 58 151 93

Likelihood (22.1) (20.1) (23.4) (22.8) (29.9) (37.4) (33.2) (18.1)

Neither Increases 76 98 124 79 74 66 169 213

Nor Decreases the (38.2) (40.1) (38.8) (41.8) (33.5) (42.6) (37.1) (41.3)

Likelihood

Total 199 244 320 189 221 155 455 515

The final outcome item assesses officers’ perceptions of the effect of the less lethal force

policy on potential lawsuits. As Table 5-10 illustrates, the most favorable assessments of the

force policy were found among Knoxville officers, as nearly half of the officers (49.4%) reported

that the policy decreases the likelihood of potential lawsuits. The least favorable assessments of

the policy was found among Portland respondents, who reported the highest percentage (31.3)

that the policy increases potential lawsuits, and the lowest percentage (22.2) that the policy

decreases the likelihood potential lawsuits. Of note, with the exception of St. Petersburg and

Knoxville, across all of the agencies, the modal response was that the policy “neither increases

nor decreases the likelihood” of potential lawsuits. 

72

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 5-10. Effect of Policy on Potential Lawsuits

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Increases the 42 76 91 55 45 7 72 120

Likelihood (21.2) (31.3) (28.4) (29.1) (20.3) (4.5) (15.8) (23.3)

Decreases the 66 54 95 63 91 76 184 169

Likelihood (33.3) (22.2) (29.7) (33.3) (41.0) (49.4) (40.3) (32.8)

Neither Increases 90 113 134 71 86 71 200 226

Nor Decreases the (45.5) (46.5) (41.9) (37.6) (38.7) (46.1) (43.9) (43.9)

Likelihood

Total 198 243 320 189 222 154 456 515

 

Summary

The focus of this section of the patrol officer survey was to assess respondents’ views of

the potential impact of the less lethal use of force policy on a variety of important outcomes. 

That is, we asked officers if they thought that their respective policy increases, decreases, or

neither increases nor decreases the likelihood of potential injuries to citizens and officers, citizen

complains, and lawsuits. 

Across each of these outcomes, there were a few findings that stood out. First, Knoxville

respondents, as a group, once again expressed the most favorable assessments of their policy, as

they reported the highest percentage of responses that their policy decreases the likelihood of

potential citizen and officer injuries, citizen complaints, and potential lawsuits. 

Second, across the outcomes, we found some patterns that emerged, especially with

respect to the degree of variation within and across agencies. In terms of the likelihood of

potential citizen injuries, the majority of respondents in all departments believed that their less

lethal force policy decreased the likelihood, although Fort Wayne comprised the fewest

percentage of officers in this response category. 

73

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
By contrast, with respect to potential officer injuries, we found more division within and

across agencies, although in every department respondents reported more of a likelihood for

increases in officer injuries compared to citizen injuries. While the modal response, across

agencies, was that the policy “decreases the likelihood for officer injuries (except for St.

Petersburg and Charlotte-Mecklenburg where the mode was “increases”), Knoxville was the

only agency where the majority of officers were found in this response category. 

For potential citizen complaints, we found even more variation in responses, although

(with the exception of Knoxville) approximately 30 percent (in Charlotte-Mecklenburg) to 40

percent (in Columbus) of the respondents thought their policy “increases the likelihood” of such

actions, while roughly the same percentages reported “neither increases nor decreases the

likelihood.” 

Finally, for potential lawsuits, the modal response across agencies was either “decreases

the likelihood” (i.e., Knoxville and St. Petersburg) or “neither increases nor decreases the

likelihood” (i.e., all others). Compared to all other agencies, Portland comprised the highest

percentage of officers (31.3%) that believed that their policy “increases the likelihood” for

potential lawsuits. 

Training and Less Lethal Force Policy

Next, we asked respondents to assess the adequacy of their agency’s less lethal academy

and in-service training. Both questions utilized Likert questionnaire survey items with response

categories of “agree strongly,” “agree somewhat,” “disagree somewhat,” and “disagree

strongly.” This section also allowed officers to report areas of academy and in-service training

that they believed could receive more attention. As Table 5-11 illustrates, the majority of

74

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
officers, in varying degrees, agreed that their pre-service less lethal force training was adequate. 

Knoxville and Albuquerque officers were the most favorable (91% and 90.4%, respectively),

while St. Petersburg and Colorado Springs officers were at the lower end of agreement (62.8%

and 65.9%, respectively). While assessments of pre-service less lethal force training, across all

agencies, were more positive than negative, it is important to note that the highest percentage of

agreement (modal response) was found within the “agree somewhat” category. 

Table 5-11. Pre-Service LTLF Training is Adequate 

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Agree Strongly 32 55 115 46 35 55 159 177

(16.2) (23.2) (35.7) (24.6) (16.1) (35.5) (34.9) (34.3)

Agree Somewhat 98 103 176 100 102 86 212 270

(49.7) (43.5) (54.7) (53.5) (46.7) (55.5) (46.6) (52.4)

Disagree Somewhat 47 46 21 32 51 14 71 60

(23.9) (19.4) (6.5) (17.1) (23.4) (9.0) (15.6) (11.6)

Disagree Strongly 20 33 10 9 30 0 13 9

(10.2) (13.9) (3.1) (4.8) (13.8) (0) (2.9) (1.7)

Total 197 237 322 187 218 155 455 516

In addition to asking about the adequacy of pre-service training on less lethal force, we

also asked officers, in an open-ended format, if any part of the training should receive more

attention. Based on these responses, we coded the following twelve categories: more/continued

training, defensive tactics/controlling techniques, ground fighting/take downs, hand to

hand/hands on, any weapons or deadly force, role playing/scenarios/practical applications,

dealing with verbal or passively resistant citizens, dealing with actively resistant citizens, aspects

of the policy or use of force documentation, officer verbal skills or verbal judo, all aspects of

force, and “other” (e.g., officer survival, situational awareness, decision making, disarming

suspects, when to use or not use force, etc.). Roughly one-fifth to two-fifths of the officers that

75

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
responded to the adequacy of the pre-service training (in Table 5-11 above), followed up by

describing the parts of the training that should receive more attention (see Table 5-12). 

Looking across the three agencies (i.e., St. Petersburg, Colorado Springs, and Portland)

that expressed the least overall agreement that the pre-service training was adequate, we found

that Colorado Springs and Portland both (among other things) believed that more attention

should be paid to “hand to hand/hands on” (25% in Colorado Springs and 14.1% in Portland)

and “weapons/deadly force” (20.2% in Colorado Springs and 15.6% in Portland). St. Petersburg

officers reported that “more/continued” training was needed (14.5%), as well as “defensive

tactics/control techniques” (14.5%) and “scenarios/role playing/practical applications” (17.7%)

instruction. Interestingly, none of the Knoxville officers, who expressed the most favorable

attitudes toward their pre-service training, stated that “more/continued” training was needed,

while 41.4 percent of the officers that did the follow up question noted that more “hand to

hand/hands on” techniques should be conducted. 

76

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 5-12. Pre-Service LTLF Training that Should Receive More Attention 

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

More/Continued 4 7 13 12 9 0 7 1

(4.8) (10.9) (13.7) (25.0) (14.5) (0) (5.3) (1.0)

Defensive Tactics/ 13 6 8 4 9 4 20 4

Control Techniques (15.5) (9.4) (8.4) (8.3) (14.5) (13.8) (15.2) (4.1)

Ground Fighting/ 4 9 7 1 0 1 4 15

Take Downs (4.8) (14.1) (7.4) (2.1) (0) (3.4) (3.0) (15.5)

Hand to Hand/ 21 9 13 4 8 12 18 24

Hands On (25.0) (14.1) (13.7) (8.3) (12.9) (41.4) (13.6) (24.7)

Weapons/ 17 10 12 9 4 2 9 1

Deadly Force (20.2) (15.6) (12.6) (18.8) (6.5) (6.9) (6.8) (1.0)

Scenarios/Role 6 5 12 2 11 1 22 11

Playing/Practical (7.1) (7.8) (12.6) (4.2) (17.7) (3.4) (16.7) (11.3)

Applications

Verbal/Passive 5 4 3 2 2 0 11 12

Resistant (6.0) (6.3) (3.2) (4.2) (3.2) (0) (8.3) (12.4)

Citizens

Active Resistant 122 0 02 2 2

Citizens (1.2) (3.1) (2.1) (0) (0) (6.9) (1.5) (2.1)

Policy/Force 035 4 40 3 4

Documentation (0) (4.7) (5.3) (8.3) (6.5) (0) (2.3) (4.1)

Verbal Skills 025 0 01 3 2

(0) (3.1) (5.3) (0) (0) (3.4) (2.3) (2.1)

All Aspects 122 3 43 9 4

(1.2) (3.1) (2.1) (6.3) (6.5) (10.3) (6.8) (4.1)

Other 12 6 13 7 11 3 24 17

(14.3) (9.4) (13.7) (14.6) (17.7) (10.3) (18.2) (17.5)

Total 84 64 95 48 62 29 132 97

 The last two questions in Section IV of the survey focused on perceptions of inservice less lethal force training. Like that noted for pre-service training, we found variation in

agreement across the eight agencies. As reported in Table 5-13, the lowest percentages of

agreement were found among Fort Wayne (56.1% agreed, and only 13.8% agreed “strongly”)

77

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
and Colorado Springs (59.4% agreed, and only 14.2% agreed “strongly”) respondents. On the

other end of the spectrum were Columbus officers, where 88.5 percent of the officers agreed that

their in-service training was adequate. 

Table 5-13. In-Service LTLF Training is Adequate 

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Agree Strongly 28 55 94 26 48 54 145 161

(14.2) (22.7) (29.3) (13.8) (21.7) (34.8) (31.9) (31.4)

Agree Somewhat 89 113 157 80 92 77 215 293

(45.2) (46.7) (48.9) (42.3) (41.7) (49.7) (47.2) (57.1)

Disagree Somewhat 54 53 51 55 50 20 65 47

(27.4) (21.9) (15.9) (29.1) (22.6) (12.9) (14.3) (9.2)

Disagree Strongly 26 21 19 28 31 4 30 12

(13.2) (8.7) (5.9) (14.8) (14.0) (2.6) (6.6) (2.3)

Total 197 242 321 189 221 155 455 513

When asked to provide information on the areas of in-service training that should receive

more attention (see Table 5-14), 23.5 percent of Fort Wayne and 27 percent of Colorado Springs

officers reported that they believed “more/continued training” should be conducted. A similar

sentiment was also noted, not just among the least favorable in-service training assessment

agencies, but also among Albuquerque (25.9%), St. Petersburg (41.1%), and CharlotteMecklenburg (32.1%) respondents. Among the most favorable perceptions of in-service less

lethal force training, we found that roughly one-fifth of Columbus officers requested more

attention on “ground fighting/take downs,” while 30.4 percent of Knoxville respondents

requested more “hand to hand/hands on” training (which was similar to what they requested for

pre-service training curriculums). 

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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 5-14. In-Service LTLF Training that Should Receive More Attention 

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

More/Continued 24 15 21 16 23 2 36 12

(27.0) (19.2) (25.9) (23.5) (41.1) (8.7) (32.1) (15.6)

Defensive Tactics/ 15 19 6 10 8 5 14 6

Control Techniques (16.9) (24.4) (7.4) (14.7) (14.3) (21.7) (12.5) (7.8)

Ground Fighting/ 6 5 3 0 0 0 1 16

Take Downs (6.7) (6.4) (3.7) (0) (0) (0) (0.9) (20.8)

Hand to Hand/ 11 7 9 7 3 7 14 7

Hands On (12.4) (9.0) (11.1) (10.3) (5.4) (30.4) (12.5) (9.1)

Weapons/ 6 7 13 12 5 2 9 0

Deadly Force (6.7) (9.0) (16.0) (17.6) (8.9) (8.7) (8.0) (0)

Scenarios/Role 572 6 60 6 7

Playing/Practical (5.6) (9.0) (2.5) (8.8) (10.7) (0) (5.4) (9.1)

Applications

Verbal/Passive 223 2 00 6 8

Resistant (2.2) (2.6) (3.7) (2.9) (0) (0) (5.4) (10.4)

Citizens

Active Resistant 220 0 00 2 2

Citizens (2.2) (2.6) (0.0) (0) (0) (0) (1.8) (2.6)

Policy/Force 133 1 30 2 3

Documentation (1.1) (3.8) (3.7) (1.5) (5.4) (0) (1.8) (3.9)

Verbal Skills 012 0 01 3 1

(0) (1.3) (2.5) (0) (0) (4.3) (2.7) (1.3)

All Aspects 511 5 33 4 3

(5.6) (1.3) (1.2) (7.4) (5.4) (13.0) (3.6) (3.9)

Other 12 9 18 9 5 3 15 12

(13.5) (11.5) (22.2) (13.2) (8.9) (13.0) (13.4) (15.6)

Total 89 78 81 68 56 23 112 77

Summary

The goal of this section of the survey was to assess officers’ perceptions of the adequacy

of their pre-service and in-service less lethal use of force training. While the majority of

respondents, from all agencies, agreed that both types of training were adequate, we did find

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
variation within and among departments. First, assessments of pre-service less lethal use of

force training were generally more favorable than in-service training. In terms of pre-service

training, Knoxville and Albuquerque officers were the most favorable, while St. Petersburg,

Colorado Springs, and Portland officers were the least favorable. For in-service training, the

most favorable responses were reported among Columbus officers, while the least favorable

were noted for Fort Wayne and Colorado Springs officers. 

A subset of respondents answered our open-ended questions regarding areas of both

types of training that should receive more attention. Across the agencies with the least favorable

views of the pre-service training, a good deal of St. Petersburg officers, among other things,

wanted more attention paid to “defensive tactics/control techniques,” “scenarios/role

playing/practical applications,” and “more/continued” training, while both Colorado Springs and

Portland officers generally wanted more “hand to hand/hands on” and “weapons/deadly force”

training. In terms of the agencies with the least favorable attitudes toward in-service force

training, among other areas, a fair number of both Fort Wayne and Colorado Springs officers

wanted “more/continued training” (as did many other respondents) as well as “defensive

tactics/control techniques” instruction. 

Background and Demographics

In this final section, we report findings on a variety of respondent background and

demographic factors, as well as future aspirations. While the general patterns (i.e., majority) of

these factors were somewhat similar across agencies, we did find fair amount of variation as

well. As Table 5-15 displays, over three quarters of our respondents from all agencies were

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
males - ranging from 93.2 percent in Fort Wayne to 81 percent in St. Petersburg. For both sex

and race (below), given potential confidentiality concerns by officers, we chose not to ask

respondents on the survey. Instead, in constructing these measures, we utilized official agency

records (as part of our master departmental rosters), linking that data with our unique

identification number for each officer. 

In terms of race, the majority of all respondents were white, although we do find

variation across agencies. With respect to non-White respondents, the fewest were found in

Knoxville (4.4%), while the most were found in Albuquerque (39.1%). Moreover, in five of our

cities, the modal non-white respondent was Black. The modal non-White respondent in

Colorado Springs and Albuquerque was Hispanic, while in Portland the modal non-White

respondent was Asian. 

We also asked officers to report their current marital status. With the exception of St.

Petersburg, the majority of officers, from all agencies, were married (ranging from 79.8% in

Portland to 61.7% in Albuquerque). Overall, roughly one-tenth of the respondents reported that

they were divorced - ranging from 8.5 percent in Knoxville to 14.1 percent in Colorado Springs. 

In an effort to possibly later deduce socializing influences, officers were asked to inform

us as to whether they had a family member that was also in the policing occupation. The

majority of respondents, across all sites, did not have a family member that was a police officer. 

The highest percentage of respondents that did have one (or more) was found in Albuquerque

(38.2%), while the fewest percentage was noted for Charlotte-Mecklenburg (30%). 

In terms of military experience, the majority of all respondents (regardless of

department), did not have any military background. We did find variation in such experience

81

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
across sites, as 44.2 percent of Colorado Springs officers reported a military background, while

only 22.9 percent of Portland officers reported such experience. We followed this question up,

like we did later for college experience, by asking respondents (who responded “yes”) if they

believed that their military experience helped prepare them to be a police officer. With the slight

exception of Knoxville (76.7% responded “yes”), respondents overwhelmingly reported that they

believed that their prior military experience helped them prepare to be a police officer (ranging

from 98.3% in Fort Wayne to 85.5% in Portland). 

With respect to education, we asked officers to report their highest level of formal

education that they completed (i.e., from “less than high school” to “graduate degree”). 

Interestingly, the vast majority of respondents had some form of college experience (ranging

from 79.8% in Albuquerque to 99.2% in Portland). Across this college experience though, we

found variation in levels of completion. For example, the majority of college experience in

Knoxville, St. Petersburg, and Albuquerque is found at the two years or more of college (without

a bachelors degree) and below (56.6%, 53.4%, and 53.4%, respectively). By contrast, 60.6

percent of Portland, 50 percent of Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and 45.9 percent of Colorado Springs

officers completed a bachelors degree. We also find that graduate work (and degrees) was much

less common among respondents in all agencies (ranging from 3.7% in Columbus to 13.8% in

Portland). As evidenced by reported bachelors degrees, graduate work, and graduate degrees,

Portland respondents were the highest educated patrol officers, while the opposite was true of

Knoxville and Albuquerque patrol officers. 

As we did for military background, we asked officers if they believed that their college

experiences (across all levels from “some” college to graduate degree) helped prepare them for

82

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
their occupation as a police officer. Of interest is the fact that we did not find the same degree of

support for college experience helpfulness in policing as we did for those reporting military

experience. Among those with college experience, we found in three agencies only, Colorado

Springs, Portland, and Fort Wayne, where the majority of respondents believed college work

help prepare them to be a police officer. Interestingly, among the two departments with the

fewest percentages of officers with college experience (i.e., Albuquerque and Knoxville) we

found the fewest percentages of respondents (40.4% and 32.3%, respectively) that responded

“yes” that their college experience prepared them for policing. 

Our final three measures (i.e., age, organizational experience, and overall policing

experience), like that for sex and race reported previously, were not asked of respondents, but

instead gleaned from master rosters from each site.35 In terms of age of respondents, we found

some degree of variation across sites. Our oldest respondents (mean of approximately 38 years

old and a median of 36) were found among Colorado Springs and Portland officers. Average age

across the rest of our sites ranged from a mean of 34.3 years old in Albuquerque to 36.7 years

old in Fort Wayne. 

With respect to organizational tenure, the average patrol officer experience ranged from

5.1 years in Albuquerque to 9.1 years in Fort Wayne. The officers with the least amount of

organizational tenure were found in Albuquerque (mean = 5.1, median = 4.0), Knoxville (mean =

6.9, median = 5.0), and St. Petersburg (mean = 7.5, median = 4.0). Our survey also asked if

35 We were able to obtain, in many instances, this same type of information for education, but found that most

agencies did not keep up-to-date, or complete, records for officer education. That is, departments would only record

college degrees (and not college experience with less than a degree) at the time the officer was hired. As such, any

college work done that did not result in a degree, or education while serving as a police officer was usually not

accounted for in departmental records (or updated infrequently). Because of these concerns, we chose to capture this

data, with the level and rigor we deemed as appropriate, on the survey. The same was not true for other officer-level

data that we obtained from our agencies, such as sex, race, date of birth, and hire date, which were generally

extremely accurate. 

83

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
respondents had prior police experience with another police agency, and if so, how much. We

added this time to the organizational tenure to capture overall police experience. This allowed

us to account for instances where an officer transfers with 15 years of experience to one of our

sites, where s/he might have worked for one year, and reports that information to us. While

his/her organizational tenure is accurately captured at one year, this officer’s total experience is

missed, and thus they may not be thinking and processing police information attitudinally like

someone with one year of experience. This measure allowed us to account for such

discrepancies. As Table 5-15 illustrates, in comparing organizational experience to overall

experience, the average years of police experience increased across agencies. The results reveal

similar trends as that noted for organizational experience. That is, the least experienced officers

were still found among Albuquerque (mean = 6.4, median = 4.0), Knoxville (mean = 7.9, median

= 7.0), and St. Petersburg (mean = 8.0, median = 4.0) respondents, while the most experienced

officers were found among Fort Wayne (mean = 10.3, median = 9.0), Portland (mean = 10.3,

median = 9.0), and Colorado Springs (mean = 10.4, median = 8.0) respondents.

84

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 5-15. Background and Demographics

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Sex

Female 21 31 36 13 43 13 56 57

(10.6) (12.8) (11.4) (6.8) (19.0) (8.3) (12.0) (10.9)

Male 178 212 281 177 183 143 410 466

(89.4) (87.2) (88.6) (93.2) (81.0) (91.7) (88.0) (89.1)

Race

White 159 213 192 162 179 149 370 469

(79.9) (87.7) (60.9) (85.2) (79.2) (95.6) (79.4) (89.6)

Black 11 10 7 21 24 4 74 47

(5.5) (4.1) (2.2) (11.1) (10.6) (2.6) (15.9) (9.0)

Hispanic 20 7 113 6 17 0 11 1

(10.1) (2.9) (35.9) (3.2) (7.5) (0) (2.4) (0.2)

Asian 7 12 3 1 0 1 10 1

(3.5) (4.9) (1.0) (0.5) (0) (0.6) (2.1) (0.2)

Native American 210 0 01 1 0

(1.0) (0.4) (0) (0) (0) (0.6) (0.2) (0)

Other 000 0 61 0 5

(0) (0) (0) (0) (2.7) (0.6) (0) (1.0)

Marital Status

Single 28 26 82 20 91 43 113 106

(14.1) (10.7) (25.5) (10.6) (41.0) (28.1) (24.8) (20.6)

Married 138 193 198 144 105 95 288 354

(69.8) (79.8) (61.7) (76.2) (47.2) (62.1) (63.2) (68.7)

Separated 4 1 5 4 1 2 11 6

(2.0) (0.4) (1.6) (2.1) (0.5) (1.3) (2.4) (1.2)

Divorced 28 22 35 20 25 13 44 49

(14.1) (9.1) (10.9) (10.6) (11.3) (8.5) (9.6) (9.5)

Widowed 001 1 00 0 0

(0) (0) (0.3) (0.5) (0) (0) (0) (0)

Family Officers

No 135 165 197 126 146 103 324 328

(68.2) (67.3) (61.8) (66.3) (65.8) (66.5) (70.0) (63.2)

Yes 63 80 122 64 76 52 139 191

(31.8) (32.7) (38.2) (33.7) (34.2) (33.5) (30.0) (36.8)

Military Experience

No 111 189 216 132 167 110 298 367

(55.8) (77.1) (66.9) (69.5) (74.9) (71.9) (64.5) (70.8)

Yes 88 56 107 58 56 43 164 151

(44.2) (22.9) (33.1) (30.5) (25.1) (28.1) (35.5) (29.2)

Help as Officer

No 5 8 9 1 7 10 18 21

(5.7) (14.5) (8.4) (1.7) (12.7) (23.3) (11.1) (13.9)

Yes 83 47 98 57 48 33 144 130

(94.3) (85.5) (91.6) (98.3) (87.3) (76.7) (88.9) (86.1)

85

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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Education 

< High School 010 0 00 1 0

(0) (0.4) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.2) (0)

H.S./GED Diploma 3 1 64 23 7 29 46 81

(1.5) (0.4) (20.2) (12.2) (3.2) (19.1) (10.1) (15.7)

Some Jr. College 14 16 100 36 49 54 73 106

(7.1) (6.5) (31.4) (19.0) (22.2) (35.5) (16.0) (20.6)

Associates Degree 35 13 24 24 37 13 57 73

(17.7) (5.3) (7.5) (12.7) (16.7) (8.6) (12.5) (14.2)

>2 Yrs. College 35 32 46 32 32 19 21 72

(17.7) (13.0) (14.5) (16.9) (14.5) (12.5) (4.6) (14.0)

Bachelors Degree 91 149 61 65 81 28 228 164

(45.9) (60.6) (19.2) (34.5) (36.6) (18.4) (50.0) (31.8)

Graduate School 12 18 17 5 8 2 13 12

(6.1) (7.3) (5.3) (2.6) (3.6) (1.3) (2.9) (2.3)

Graduate Degree 8 16 6 4 7 7 17 7

(4.0) (6.5) (1.9) (2.1) (3.2) (4.6) (3.7) (1.4)

College Help as

Officer

No 87 102 155 73 110 86 219 247

(45.1) (41.6) (59.6) (44.0) (51.4) (67.7) (53.9) (58.4)

Yes 106 143 105 93 104 41 187 176

(54.9) (58.4) (40.4) (56.0) (48.6) (32.3) (46.1) (41.6)

Age

Mean 37.7 37.5 34.3 36.7 34.6 34.9 34.7 35.2

Median 36.0 36.0 33.0 35.5 33.0 34.0 34.0 35.0

SD 8.4 7.8 9.1 7.0 9.0 8.2 7.2 7.4

N 199 241 311 190 226 156 466 523

Range 25-59 24-61 21-70 24-60 21-61 22-60 22-63 22-61

Experience (years)

Organization

Mean 8.7 8.7 5.1 9.1 7.5 6.9 7.8 7.8

Median 7.0 8.0 4.0 7.0 4.0 5.0 7.0 7.0

SD 7.4 5.9 5.2 6.9 8.4 5.8 6.2 6.3

N 199 242 316 190 226 156 466 523

Range 0-33 1-31 0-34 0-31 0-38 1-32 0-28 0-36

Overall

Mean 10.4 10.3 6.4 10.3 8.0 7.9 8.6 8.5

Median 8.0 9.0 4.0 9.0 4.0 7.0 8.0 7.0

SD 7.9 6.8 5.8 6.8 8.5 6.2 6.4 6.6

N 199 242 316 190 226 156 466 523

Range 0-33 1-32 0-38 2-31 0-38 1-32 0-30 0-36

86

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The final table, 5-16, assesses respondents’ occupational aspirations in terms of the

relative importance they placed on being promoted to a higher rank and specialized unit, as well

as their expectations of their highest ranking level when they retire from policing. For the first

two questions, regarding the importance of getting promoted vertically and laterally, we utilized

standard Likert survey items where respondents answered in terms of relative importance (i.e.,

“very unimportant,” “somewhat unimportant,” “somewhat important,” and “very important”). In

terms of promotion to a higher rank, respondents were generally split in agreement, across sites,

as to its overall importance. While the modal response, for every site, was “somewhat

important,” in only three sites (i.e., Knoxville, Albuquerque, and St. Petersburg) did (at least) 60

percent of the respondents believe that getting promoted to a higher rank was important (i.e.,

combining “somewhat” and “very” responses). Of interest, is that in the five other sites, there

was a greater percentage of officers that responded that such a promotion was “very

unimportant” compared to those that believed it was “very important.” 

Whereas respondents were somewhat split in the importance of moving upward in their

occupation, we found much more favorable attitudes toward moving to a specialized unit. In

every agency, but Portland, the majority (and in many cases two-thirds and higher) believed it

was important, in varying degrees, to be promoted laterally. While Knoxville officers placed a

higher importance, of all sites, on vertical promotions (i.e., a higher percentage of respondents

reported it was important overall as well as “very”), St. Petersburg lead the way with respect to

specialized units. In fact, while every agency reported higher percentages of “very important”

responses in moving across the organization, compared to moving up, no agency came close to

the 40.6 percent found among St. Petersburg respondents. Based on these results, it is evident

87

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
that officers are aspiring, at least at this point in time, to moving to a specialized unit over

moving up in rank. 

Finally, as another indicator of their future aspirations, we asked respondents to indicate

which rank they expected to hold when they retired. Given the varying vertical differentiation

found in our agencies, producing varying ranks structures, some of the classifications listed were

relevant for some departments, but not for others. In cases where a given rank did not exist in

that particular agency, an asterisk was placed in the cell.36 We found that roughly one-fifth, in

Fort Wayne, to two-fifths, in Columbus, believed that they would be retiring at the patrol rank. 

At the other end of the spectrum, few respondents (ranging from 1.6% in Columbus to 7.4% in

Knoxville) believed that they would retire at the assistant/deputy chief or chief levels. With the

exception of Portland, who tended to split responses because of their unique “detective” response

option, and Knoxville, the majority of respondents (across all agencies) believed that they would

retire at a middle-level management rank (ranging from 60.9% in Colorado Springs to 50.4% in

Columbus).37 

36 Portland, unlike the rest of our agencies, regarded “criminalists” and “detectives” as advancements in rank. As

such, their officers were the only ones for which we reported their responses to these positions. Each agency’s

survey was tailored, for this question, to reflect the various ranks that existed in that departments. There were some

officers, from other agencies, that responded “other” for this question, and wrote in (as instructed) that they expected

to retire at the rank of detective/investigator. Since these were not officially designated ranks for their agency, and

because all officers were not afforded the same opportunity to express the response of detective/investigator, we left

these responses among the “other” category (found in the last row of Table 5-16). Among other examples of listed

“other” ranks when retired, across sites, were: sheriff, inspector, community coordinator, arrest warrant officer,

firefighter, etc. 

37 Because Charlotte-Mecklenburg was the only agency without a lieutenant rank, and because organizationally their

captains had many of the same duties and responsibilities as lieutenants in other agencies, we added captains and

sergeants together to draw these conclusions regarding middle-level management. 

88

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 5-16. Officer Aspirations

CSPD PPB APD FWPD SPPD KPD CMPD CPD

Higher Rank 

Very Unimportant 43 68 44 23 34 20 86 123

(21.6) (27.5) (13.6) (12.1) (15.2) (12.8) (18.6) (23.7)

Somewhat Unimp. 55 71 81 72 54 32 130 176

(27.6) (28.7) (25.0) (37.9) (24.1) (20.5) (28.1) (34.0)

Somewhat Imp. 71 91 142 76 93 63 179 183

(35.7) (36.9) (43.8) (40.0) (41.5) (40.4) (38.8) (35.4)

Very Important 30 17 57 19 43 41 67 36

(15.1) (6.9) (17.6) (10.0) (19.2) (26.3) (14.5) (6.9)

Specialized Unit

Very Unimportant 24 44 30 24 24 16 58 51

(12.1) (17.8) (9.3) (12.6) (10.7) (10.3) (12.6) (9.8)

Somewhat Unimp. 39 84 61 69 26 25 85 110

(19.6) (34.0) (18.8) (36.4) (11.6) (16.1) (18.5) (21.2)

Somewhat Imp. 88 67 145 66 83 68 203 244

(44.2) (27.1) (44.8) (34.7) (37.1) (43.9) (44.1) (47.0)

Very Important 48 52 88 31 91 46 114 114

(24.1) (21.1) (27.2) (16.3) (40.6) (29.7) (24.8) (22.0)

Expected Rank

When Retire

Patrol Officer 58 68 83 38 73 57 146 194

(29.1) (28.3) (26.0) (20.2) (34.3) (38.5) (32.2) (39.2)

Criminalist * 3 * * * * * *

(1.3)

Detective * 49 * * * * * *

(20.4)

Sergeant 84 56 103 86 72 22 163 138

(42.3) (23.3) (32.3) (45.8) (33.8) (14.9) (36.0) (27.8)

Lieutenant 37 32 88 28 41 19 * 112

(18.6) (13.3) (27.6) (14.9) (19.2) (12.8) (22.6)

Captain * * 20 23 * 18 75 *

(6.3) (12.2) (12.2) (16.6)

Major * * * * 9 * 19 *

(4.2) (4.2)

Precinct Commander *9 * * * * * *

(3.8)

Division Commander 11 * * * * * * 21

(5.5) (4.2)

Assist./Dep. Chief 113 4 14 6 0

(0.5) (0.4) (0.9) (2.1) (0.5) (2.7) (1.3) (0)

Chief 3 10 6 5 8 7 8 8

(1.5) (4.2) (1.9) (2.7) (3.8) (4.7) (1.8) (1.6)

Other 5 12 16 4 9 21 36 23

(2.5) (5.0) (5.0) (2.1) (4.2) (14.2) (7.9) (4.6)

89

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Summary

The purpose of the final section of the patrol officer survey was to capture a variety of

background and demographic factors (some of which were gleaned from other official

organizational data), as well as future aspirations of respondents. Across the various factors, we

found both internal and external variation by site. At the same time, some patterns were

revealed. 

 The majority of all respondents were white, married (with the exception of St.

Petersburg), males, with no military experience, no relatives in policing, and had at least some

college experience. Among the respondents that did have military and/or college backgrounds,

the more powerful experiences (in terms of preparing to be a police officer) were noted for the

military. The average age of respondents was roughly around 35 years old, and the oldest

officers were found among Colorado Springs and Portland respondents. Experience ranged from

less than a year to 38 years, while Albuquerque, Knoxville, and St. Petersburg had the least

experienced (organizationally and overall) respondents. 

In terms of overall police aspirations, officers (across all sites) expressed more of an

interest in moving to a specialized unit over a promotion in rank. Finally, the modal response

indicated that the majority of all respondents believed that they would ultimately retire at some

type of middle management position.

90

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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CHAPTER 6

Force Report Data

In addition to surveying officers about their agency’s use of force policy, a key part of

the second phase of the project involved the collection and analysis of three pieces of official

data: use of force reports, citizen complaints, and lawsuits. In this chapter we examine force

reports to investigate which policy types are associated with varying degrees of force, as well as

injuries to suspects and officers. 

Methodology

At each of the sites we collected 24 months of force report data. The time frame varied

to some degree from site to site to ensure we had a consistent time period with no policy changes

either in substance (i.e., the content or type of policy changed, such as altering tactical

placement) or reporting (i.e., the force report form changed or the threshold for reportable force

was altered)(see footnote 26 for exact timeframe). Some of the research sites coded nearly all

data electronically (i.e., Portland, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Columbus), others only maintained

paper copies (i.e., Colorado Springs, Fort Wayne, Knoxville), and yet others had some sort of

combination between electronic data and paper copies (Albuquerque, St. Petersburg). Cities that

captured use of force behavior solely on paper required us to code the data into electronic

format. Even in cities where some (or most) of the data were already electronically coded, we

often had to go back to the hard copy originals to adequately code all the variables we were

interested in (i.e., parts of the force forms were electronically coded by the agencies, but had to

be supplemented with information from hard copies by project staff). For example, in

91

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Albuquerque, the type of force used was captured in such a way that we were unable to compare

force types with that used in other cities simply due to the way it was coded in their dataset. 

Hence, we had to make copies of paper reports and then match them to the electronic cases to

clarify the type of force used and code into the dataset.

While we were interested in a number of relevant situational and contextual variables

from the force report data, the key variables we wanted to capture involved the types of force

used in response to the types of resistance suspects presented to officers. Importantly, we

wanted to ensure that the types of force being coded from each city were comparable. As such,

we created “common measures” of resistance and force across each of the cities. For citizen

resistance, the following categories were classified. Compliance involved suspect behavior that

responded to officer direction without resistance. Passive resistance was defined as suspect

behaviors that were unresponsive to police verbal communication or direction. Behaviors in this

category must not have been verbalized or involve physical movements in a defensive or

aggressive mode, but rather demonstrated through inactivity (e.g., ignored or disregarded police

attempts at verbal communication or control, went limp, failed to physically respond or move). 

Verbal resistance included a suspect verbally rejecting police verbal communication or direction. 

Suspect behaviors in this category must have been verbal in nature and not physical (e.g., telling

the officer he or she will not comply with police direction, to leave alone, or not to bother him or

her). Defensive resistance was defined as suspect attempts to evade police attempts at control. 

Suspect behaviors in this category must have involved some type of physical behavior in a

defensive mode (e.g., attempts to leave the scene, flee, hide from detection, pull away from

officer’s grasp). Active resistance included the suspect either attempting or actually attacking or

92

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
striking an officer. Suspect behaviors in this category must have involved some type of physical

behavior in an aggressive mode (e.g., lunging toward the police, striking police with hands, fists,

kicks or any instrument that may perceived as a weapon such as a knife, stick, frying pan).

Finally, deadly resistance was classified as attempts or actual attacks that could cause death.

Police use of force behavior was split into weaponless tactics and weapon tactics. For

weaponless tactics, the following categories were classified. First, we coded handcuffing when

it was noted in the dataset or on the use of force report forms. A firm grip involved an officer

grabbing/holding a suspect, which could also involve an escort whereby an officer physically

guides a suspect’s movement (e.g., placed a suspect into a patrol car). This type of force is

simply low level hands on force where the officer is touching or guiding a suspect, but not

struggling or being aggressive with the suspect. Pressure points (i.e., pain compliance

techniques) involved holds that cause pain to a specific body part (e.g., hammerlock, wristlock,

finger grip). Control maneuvers went a step beyond a firm grip or pain compliance technique

and involved an officer using hands on force to attempt to gain control of a suspect (e.g., hands

on struggling to get a suspect’s hands cuffed, an arm bar technique, bear hug, etc.). Takedowns

involved instances when suspects were thrown, pushed, or shoved to the ground, against a wall,

against a car or any other surface. Finally, empty hand strikes with the body included

hitting/striking a suspect with the hands, fists, feet, legs, or any other part of the body (e.g.,

slapping, punching, kicking). For weapon tactics, the following categories, all self-defined, were

classified as chemicals spray, baton, CED, impact munitions (e.g., beanbag), and firearm.38

38 We also coded officer pointing of the firearm when noted on the use of force report form.

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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Analyses and Findings

Frequency of Force by Workload Measures

We begin by examining how often officers used force across the eight cities. In addition,

we examine how often force is used in relation to three workload measures: calls for service,

reported crimes, and arrests. As illustrated in Table 6-1 (bottom row), the range of force usage

over a two year period ranges from 738 in Colorado Springs to 5,787 in Columbus. Comparing

force usage by standardized calls for service we see there is substantial variation across the

cities. Officers in Colorado Springs, for instance, used force 1.4. times for every 1,000 calls for

service. Viewed alternatively, officers used force once for every 729 calls for service. 

Contrasted with Portland (the city with the most frequent force usage in relation to calls for

service) officers used force 9.8 times for every 1,000 calls for service, or once for every 102 calls

for service. In other words, when using calls for service as a comparison point, officers in

Portland used force seven times more frequently than officers in Colorado Springs.

A good deal of variation is also present when comparing cities by the amount of reported

crimes. Here, Charlotte-Mecklenburg used force the least frequently. Officers used force once

for every 87 reported Part I index crimes filed. Conversely, Fort Wayne used force once for

every 12 Part I index crimes. Hence, officers in Fort Wayne used force over seven times more

frequently than officers in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. 

94

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-1. Force Usage Comparison by Calls for Service, Reported Crimes, Arrests39

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Force/Service Calls(1,000)

1.4 9.8 2.2 5.6 5.3 2.1 3.

Force per call 1 of 729 1 of 102 1 of 447 1 of 177 1 of 189 1 of 481 1 of 2Force/Part I Crimes(1,000)

19.0 60.5 20.6 86.1 48.4 34.7 49

Force per crime 1 of 52 1 of 16 1 of 48 1 of 12 1 of 21 1 of 29 1 of Force/Part I Arrests(1,000)

83.3 305.6 231.1 403.6 302.2 154.7 427

Force per arrest 1 of 12.0 1 of 3.2 1 of 4.4 1 of 2.5 1 of 3.3 1 of 6.5 1 of Total Number Force Reports 738 4374 1458 1997 1897 926 578

39 Calls for service, crime, and arrest totals compiled using a variety of sources including annual reports and raw data provided by the p

for service totals (CSPD=538,280, PPB=446,869, APD=652,366, FWPD=354,175, SPPD=357,709, KPD=446,161, CPD=1,528,280, C

crime totals (CSPD=38,793, PPB=72,278, APD=70,683, FWPD=23,196, SPPD=39,181, KPD=26,652, CPD=117,982, CMPD=115,663

(CSPD=8,857, PPB=14,309, APD=6,308, FWPD=4,948, SPPD=6,277, KPD=5,985, CPD=13,528, CMPD=12,060).

95

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Finally, substantial variation was also unveiled when comparing force usage by arrests. 

Similar to calls for service, Colorado Springs used force the least frequently in terms of arrests

(one force report filed per every 12 arrests made). On the other hand, Columbus officers used

force most frequently (one force report filed per every 2.3 arrests made). Thus, officers in

Columbus used force over five times more frequently than officers in Colorado Springs.

Force and Resistance Types

Next, we turn to a breakdown of physical force types (weaponless tactics) as depicted in

Table 6-2. Figures are computed by the type of force used in relation to the total number of

force reports filed per city. Fort Wayne used the most physical force at 91.1 percent. This is not

overly surprising given that this is the only city where everyday patrol officers do not carry a

CED. At the opposite end of the continuum, just over half (53.9%) of the force reports filed by

Colorado Springs officers involved a weaponless tactic. 

In terms of a firm grip, some cities (i.e., St. Petersburg and Charlotte-Mecklenburg)

report using a substantially higher number than others (i.e., Portland and Albuquerque) who

report very few such uses of force. It appears much of this variation is a function more in terms

of reporting procedures than actual differences in force use at this level. According to

departmental officials in St. Petersburg, for instance, officers routinely report this level of hands

on force when using it. In Portland, however, officials report that despite using this form of

force regularly, officers often do not report it when used in conjunction with other more serious

forms of force. 

96

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-2. Frequency of Types of Physical Force (Weaponless) Used

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

AnyPhysical

398

(53.9)

3430

(78.4)

967

(66.3)

1820

(91.1)

1415

(74.6)

804

(86.8)

453

(78.

Firm Grip

39

(5.3)

3

(0.1)

17

(1.2)

167

(8.4)

787

(41.5)

209

(22.6)

64

(11.

PressurePoint

41

(5.6)

367

(8.4)

15

(1.0)

105

(5.3)

108

(5.7)

101

(10.9)

50

(8.8

ControlManeuver

256

(34.7)

2181

(49.9)

493

(33.8)

1092

(54.7)

402

(21.2)

579

(62.5)

228

(39.

TakeDown

172

(23.3)

1796

(41.1)

670

(46.0)

910

(45.6)

786

(41.4)

440

(47.5)

226

(39.

Strike 153

(20.7)

541

(12.4)

242

(16.6)

640

(32.0)

133

(7.0)

183

(19.8)

39

(6.9

Other

0

(0.0)

233

(5.3)

17

(1.2)

0

(0.0)

1

(0.1)

0

(0.0)

18

(0.3

Total 738 4374 1458 1997 1897 926 578

97

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
With respect to other soft hand tactics, Knoxville reports using the most pressure points (10.9%),

while Charlotte-Mecklenburg reports using the most control maneuvers (77.3%) and take down

(55.0%) techniques. Finally, Fort Wayne officers used hard hand striking tactics in nearly one of

every three force reports (32.0%). The city with the next most frequent hard hand strikes is

Colorado Springs with 20.7 percent. Both St. Petersburg and Columbus reported using such

force relatively infrequently (7.0% and 6.9%, respectively).

In Table 6-3 we examine a breakdown of weapon based force types. Once again, figures

are computed by the type of force used in relation to the total number of force reports filed per

city. Colorado Springs used the most weapon force at 62.7 percent, while Fort Wayne used

some form of a weapon in just over 25 percent. When looking at this table as a whole it is

evident that a bulk of the weapon force used are chemical sprays and CEDs. Baton and impact

munitions are relatively infrequent. For example, Albuquerque used the baton most often yet

such force was only used in 2.7 percent of the cases. Looking at chemical sprays, Albuquerque

and Fort Wayne rely on such force in 24.8 percent and 22.1 percent of their force encounters

respectively, but Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Knoxville, and Portland all report roughly four to five

percent.

Perhaps the type of force that stands out most in Table 6-3 is the CED. In particular,

Colorado Springs reported using a CED in half of all force encounters (49.5%). The city with

the next highest frequency of use is Portland at 23.4 percent, or less than half what Colorado

Springs reports. Understandably, Fort Wayne reports very few deployments of a CED (only a

hand full of officers are CED equipped). 

98

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-3. Frequency of Types of Weapons Used

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

AnyWeapon

463

(62.7)

1553

(35.5)

720

(49.4)

511

(25.6)

613

(32.3)

274

(29.6)

167

(29.

ChemicalSpray

91

(12.3)

248

(5.7)

361

(24.8)

442

(22.1)

202

(10.6)

44

(4.8)

104

(18.

Baton 3

(0.4)

37

(0.8)

39

(2.7)

45

(2.3)

3

(0.2)

21

(2.3)

34

(0.6

CED 365

(49.5)

1023

(23.4)

305

(20.9)

9

(0.5)

406

(21.4)

193

(20.8)

60

(10.

ImpactMunitions

0

(0.0)

122

(2.8)

13

(0.9)

12

(0.6)

0

(0.0)

1

(0.1)

0

(0.0

Point 7

(0.9)

351

(8.0)

17

(1.2)

0

(0.0)

32

(1.7)

16

(1.7)

18

(0.3

Deadly 6

(0.8)

18

(0.4)

0

(0.0)

1

(0.1)

6

(0.3)

0

(0.0)

0

(0.0

Other 10

(1.4)

175

(4.0)

48

(3.3)

15

(0.8)

17

(0.9)

30

(3.2)

38

(0.7

Total 738 4374 1458 1997 1897 926 578

99

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Finally, Portland reported a substantially higher use of both firearm pointing and other forms of

force not clearly specified in the force reports. For example, Portland officers reported pointing

their firearms in 8.0 percent of the cases. The next highest city was Charlotte-Mecklenburg at

4.3 percent.

Table 6-4 provides a look at the highest use of force applied. For ease of presentation,

the categories of force have been collapsed into the following categories: soft hands (i.e., firm

grip, pressure points, control maneuver, take downs), hard hands (i.e., empty hand strikes) and

chemical spray, and CED/impact (i.e., CED, baton, munitions). Note that ranking force usage

according to the highest level is a difficult proposition. As the national agency survey results

indicated in Chapter 3, as well as the eight selected cities in Phase II, there is no commonly

accepted ranking of force. Nonetheless, based on the national agency survey results, the most

common ranking used conforms with the ranking used in Table 6-4, and hence the reason for

presenting in this order. As shown in this table, Columbus is most likely to use the lowest form

of force (soft hands, 65.1%); Fort Wayne most likely to use the intermediate level (hard

hands/chemical spray, 47.1%), and Colorado Springs most likely to use the highest level

(CED/impact, 51.3%). There were very few instances of deadly force in any of the cities. 

Conversely, Colorado Springs used the least soft hands (22.0%), Portland the least hard

hands/chemical sprays (14.5%), and Fort Wayne the least CED/impact (4.1%).

100

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-4. Officer Force Types (Highest)

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

SoftHands 

162

(22.0)

2353

(54.5)

533

(36.7)

974

(48.8)

970

(57.5)

498

(54.6)

370

(65.

Hard Hands/Chemical Spray

191

(25.9)

625

(14.5)

524

(36.1)

941

(47.1)

293

(17.4)

177

(19.4)

132

(22.

CED/Impact

378

(51.3)

1318

(30.6)

394

(27.2)

81

(4.1)

418

(22.0)

237

(25.6)

66

(11.

Deadly 6

(0.8)

18

(0.4)

0

(0.0)

1

(0.1)

6

(0.3)

0

(0.0)

0

(0.0

Total 737 4314 1451 1997 1687 912 569

101

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-5 takes a look at citizen resistance.40 Nearly all the cities report high levels of

citizen resistance. With the exception of Portland, all the cities are in the high ninety percent

range or report all cases where citizens resisted in some manner. When looking at the types of

resistance reported, there is a vast degree of variation in failure to comply, with less variation,

although still quite substantial, in relation to defensive and aggressive physical. In terms of

failure to comply (i.e., passive and verbal resistance), Columbus shows that nearly every force

case involved this type of resistance, while Albuquerque and Fort Wayne are in the 30 percent

range. For physically defensive resistance, Colorado Springs, St. Petersburg, Knoxville, and

Charlotte-Mecklenburg are all in the 70 to 80 percent range, while Portland and Albuquerque are

in the 40 percent range. Overall, variation is less evident from a relative perspective for

aggressive physical resistance. With the exception of St. Petersburg, the range of this form of

resistance across the remaining seven cities is 31 to 51 percent. Hence, Knoxville (51.3%)

reports more than two and a half times the amount of aggressive physical resistance compared to

St. Petersburg (20.0%).

40 While Portland captured suspect resistance on their use of force report form, they did so in such a way that we

were unable to create and match up the types of resistance reported with our common measures of resistance. As a

result, we needed to secure hard copies of their incident/investigation reports where the narrative portion of the force

incident was described. However, obtaining these reports, due to sheer volume and departmental workload

limitations, proved difficult. Nonetheless, we were only able to get one year’s worth of reports. From these, we

were then able to code suspect resistance in accordance with our common measures definitions.

102

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-5. Suspect Resistance Types (Any)

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

AnyResistance

738

(100.0)

1868

(89.8)

1458

(100.0)

1997

(100.0)

1850

(97.5)

919

(99.2)

570

(96.

Fail toComply 

305

(41.3)

1595

(76.7)

507

(34.8)

749

(37.5)

881

(46.4)

392

(42.3)

563

(97.

DefensivePhysical

568

(77.0)

953

(45.5)

723

(49.6)

1303

(65.2)

1381

(72.8)

734

(79.3)

387

(66.

AggressivePhysical

233

(31.6)

680

(32.7)

707

(48.5)

619

(31.0)

380

(20.0)

475

(51.3)

196

(34.

Deadly 8

(1.1)

0

(0.0)

35

(2.4)

28

(1.4)

24

(1.3)

36

(3.9)

10

(1.8

Total 738 2080 1458 1997 1897 926 578

 * 1-year

103

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Similar to Table 6-4 for the highest level of physical force used, Table 6-6 looks at the

highest level of resistance posed across the eight cities. As shown in this table, Columbus

reported the most failure to comply cases as the highest form of suspect resistance (25.7%); Fort

Wayne was most likely to report defensive physical resistance (64.0%), and Knoxville most

likely to report aggressive physical resistance (48.8%). There were much fewer instances of

deadly resistance in any of the cities, with Knoxville reporting the most (3.9%).

Given the somewhat difficult manner in which to interpret how officers are using force

compared to resistance based on the series of tables thus far, Tables 6-7a and 6-7b offer a more

consolidated way to interpret the highest levels of force and resistance across the eight cities.

Using the ranking of force offered in Table 6-4 (0=soft, 1=hard/chemical, 2=CED/impact,

4=deadly), Table 6-7a shows that Colorado Springs had the highest mean level of force (1.31),

while Columbus had the least (0.47). Similarly, using the ranking of resistance offered in Table

6-6 (0=none, 1=fail to comply, 2=defensive, 3=aggressive, 4=deadly), Table 6-7b shows that

Albuquerque had the highest mean level of resistance (2.53), while Portland had the least (1.92). 

When looking at Tables 6-7a and 6.7b in tandem, one can see that for some of the cities the

ranking of resistance and force are closely similar. For example, Albuquerque officers used the

second most force but faced the most resistant suspects. Moreover, Charlotte-Mecklenburg

ranks fourth on force usage and third in terms of resistance. However, some of the cities show

more of a disconnect between the level of force used in relation to the amount of resistance

faced, at least in the aggregate as depicted here. For instance, Colorado Springs officers used the

highest amount of force, but only encountered the fifth most (i.e., highest level of) resistance. 

104

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-6. Suspect Resistance Types (Highest)

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Fail toComply 

58

(7.9)

414

(19.9)

8

(0.5)

75

(3.8)

336

(17.7)

32

(3.5)

148

(25.

DefensivePhysical

439

(59.5)

774

(37.2)

708

(48.6)

1279

(64.0)

1117

(58.9)

399

(43.1)

221

(38.

AggressivePhysical

233

(31.6)

680

(32.7)

707

(48.5)

615

(30.8)

373

(19.7)

452

(48.8)

190

(32.

Deadly 8

(1.1)

0

(0.0)

35

(2.4)

28

(1.4)

24

(1.3)

36

(3.9)

10

(1.8

Total 738 2080 1458 1997 1897 926 578

 * 1-year

105

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-7a. Aggregate Mean Levels of Force (Highest)

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Mean(Rank)

1.31

(1)

0.77

(3)

0.90

(2)

0.55

(7)

0.68

(6)

0.70

(5)

0.4

(8

Table 6-7b. Aggregate Mean Levels of Resistance (Highest)

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

An(Rank)

2.26

(5)

1.92

(8)

2.53

(1)

2.30

(4)

2.00

(7)

2.52

(2)

2.0

(6

106

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Portland shows a similar degree of disconnect (i.e., using substantially more force than the

resistance faced). Several cities, however, particularly Fort Wayne and Knoxville, exhibit a

reverse pattern. For instance, Knoxville officers report the second highest degree of resistance

from suspects yet only used the fifth highest amount of force. While these comparisons do not

offer a full picture concerning the individual micro-level dynamics of resistance/force, they do

provide a big picture comparison in terms of where cities stand in the aggregate.

Bivariate Analyses

Next we consider how different departments instruct officers (via force policy) on the

type of force that should be used in relation to the type of subject resistance faced so we can dig

a little deeper to examine how officers are using various forms of force within their individual

policy context. Table 6-8 shows the six departments in our study that link resistance to force. 

The other two cities (Fort Wayne and Columbus) do not link resistance to force via their policy,

but rather simply lay out the force continua with no explicit connection to specific types of

resistance. Interestingly, Colorado Springs, who employs a wheel force continuum design for

the stated purpose that they do not want officers to think “linearly,” still connects resistance to

force within the text of their policy.

107

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-8. Allowable Force by Resistance Type41

Resistance

Col. Sp. Port. Char. St. Pete Knox. 

Verbal Soft Verbal Verbal Soft Soft 

Passive Soft Soft Soft Soft Soft 

PhysicalDefensive

Chem

CED

Chem

CED

Chem

Hard

Chem

Hard

Impact

Chem

Hard

CED

Impact

PhysicalAggressive

Hard

Impact

Hard

Impact

CED

Impact

CED Chem

Hard

CED

Impact

41 Of course, lesser forms of force are always permitted as one moves up for the force continuum. For instance, in Colorado Springs ch

are permissible forms of force when officers are faced with physically defensive resistant suspects, but officers may also use a lesser forcase, soft hand force). Similarly, officers facing physically aggressive suspects may use any form of force (soft, chemical spray, CED, 

deadly force.

108

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
We begin by examining how officers in each of the cities responded to those suspects

whose highest level of resistance throughout the encounter was failure to comply (i.e., passive

and verbal resistance). As illustrated in Table 6-9, a majority of these encounters result in

officers using some type of soft hand tactic (i.e., firm grip, control maneuver, pressure points,

take downs). Of the cities that linked force to resistance, only Albuquerque allowed officers to

use anything more coercive than soft hand tactics on suspects who verbally or passively

resisted.42 In other words, Albuquerque allowed officers to use hard hand tactics, chemical

spray, and/or the CED on those who non-physically failed to comply. Despite this, officers in

Albuquerque still relied quite a bit on soft hand tactics.

Table 6-10 also depicts those encounters when officers were faced with suspects who

failed to comply, but in this instance responded with hard hand tactics (i.e., striking the suspects

with hand, fist, feet). Fort Wayne officers were most likely to use hard hand tactics (22.7%) in

these situations, but their policy does not specify that officers are prohibited from such force

(recall their policy does not link resistance and force). Colorado Springs officers used hard hand

strikes in roughly one of every five (19.0%) such encounters, despite their policy restricting such

usage (Table 6-8). Conversely, Albuquerque, whose policy allows such force, only reported

facing eight encounters of this type, but in none of them did officers report using a hard hand

strike.

42 When we refer to agency policies “allowing” or “permitting” various types of force given various types of

resistance, we are assuming that such resistance stands alone (i.e., occurred once during the encounter). However,

we know from prior work (Terrill, 2005) that suspects sometimes resist multiple times with the same resistance type

within the same encounter, which would affect whether an officer is operating within or outside policy parameters. 

For example, an officer may use a hard hand tactic on a suspect whose highest level of resistance never rises above

failure to comply, which would appear to be out of policy (e.g., in Colorado Springs and Portland). However, it is

possible that a given suspect will repeatedly fail to comply prompting an officer to work his/her way up the

continuum to a hard hand tactic, which would in effect be within policy in this scenario. As a result, one must use

caution with interpretation of the findings we present here.

109

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-9. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Fail to Comply

Did Officer Use Soft Hands?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 25

(43.1)

270

(65.2)

5

(62.5)

57

(76.0)

222

(66.1)

24

(75.0)

880

(59.1

No 33

(56.9)

144

(34.8)

3

(37.5)

18

(24.0)

114

(33.9)

8

(25.0)

609

(40.9

Total 58 414 8 336 32 1489 1489 

 * 1-year

Table 6-10. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Fail to Comply

Did Officer Use Hard Hands?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 11

(19.0)

29

(7.0)

0

(0.0)

17

(22.7)

13

(3.9)

2

(6.2)

24

(1.6

No 47

(81.0)

385

(93.0)

8

(100)

58

(77.3)

323

(96.1)

30

(93.8)

1465

(98.4

Total 58 414 8 75 336 32 1489 

 * 1-year

110

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-11 looks at failure to comply with chemical spray usage. Once again, of the

eight cases in Albuquerque, the one city that permits this type of force on this type of resistant

suspect, none resulted. Columbus had 31.4 percent of its cases result in chemical spray use

followed by St. Petersburg at 23.5 percent. For CED use (Table 6-12), Albuquerque officers

used such force in three of its eight cases (37.5%), while Colorado Springs officers used a CED

on 26 of 58 passive or verbally resistant suspects (44.8%). Table (6-13) depicts cases where

suspects failed to comply as their highest form of resistance and shows few instances where

officers used a baton. Knoxville was the highest at 9.4 percent, but this consisted of just 3 of 32

cases. 

Overall, when looking at instances where a suspect’s highest level of resistance was

failure to comply (Tables 6-9 to 6-13), it appears a department’s policy has little effect. For

instance, while the number of cases are low (N=8), we see that Albuquerque officers were not

necessarily using higher forms of force (i.e., hard hands, chemical spray, CED) on such suspects

even though their policy allowed it. Conversely, we see officers in other cities using forms of

force that were restricted from being used on failure to comply suspects. For example, Colorado

Springs officers used a CED on passive or verbally resistant suspects in 44.8 of the cases, while

Knoxville officers used such force in 21.9 of the cases.

111

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-11. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Fail to Comply

Did Officer Use Chemical Spray?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Yes 7

(12.1)

19

(4.6)

0

(0.0)

13

(17.3)

79

(23.5)

0

(0.0)

46

(31

No 51

(87.9)

395

(95.4)

8

(100)

62

(82.7)

257

(76.5)

32

(100)

10

(68

Total 58 414 8 75 336 32 14

 * 1-year

Table 6-12. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Fail to Comply

Did Officer Use CED?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Co

Yes 26

(44.8)

80

(19.3)

3

(37.5)

0

(0.0)

23

(6.8)

7

(21.9)

1

(7

No 32

(55.2)

334

(80.7)

5

(62.5)

75

(100)

313

(93.2)

25

(78.1)

13

(9

Total 58 414 8 75 336 32 14

 * 1-year

112

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-13. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Fail to Comply

Did Officer Use Baton?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 0

(0.0)

1

(0.2)

0

(0.0)

1

(1.3)

0

(0.0)

3

(9.4)

2

(0.1

No 58

(100.0)

413

(99.8)

8

(100.0)

74

(98.7)

336

(100.0)

29

(90.6)

1487

(99.9

Total 58 414 8 75 336 32 1489 

 * 1-year

113

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The next set of tables (6-14 to 6-18) take a similar approach to the last set, but in these

cases the form of resistance is physical defensive (i.e., physical behaviors to evade police

attempts at control such as bracing, pulling away, and/or fleeing from an officer). To consider

the type of force used in relation to the type of resistance faced, it is again important to place the

findings into the context of Table 6-8 showing what each city’s policy permits. For instance,

soft hands are permitted in all the cities for this type of resistance, but other forms of force are

allowed (or not) depending on the city. For example, Colorado Springs and Portland allow

officers to use chemical spray and a CED, but not hard hand strikes nor impact methods (e.g.,

baton blows or munitions). Other cities mix and match different variations for this level of

resistance.

Similar to failure to comply cases previously, a majority of physically defensive

encounters result in officers using some type of soft hand tactics (Table 6-14). Again, Colorado

Springs is the only city in which officers responded to such resistance with soft hand tactics in

less than 50 percent of the cases. When the results are examined for hard hand tactics (Table 6-

15) it is difficult to discern a pattern based on policy differences. For example, in Portland, a

city that does not permit hard hand strikes on defensively resistant suspects, the frequency of use

was 13.0 percent. However, in three of the cities that permit hard hand strikes (Albuquerque,

Knoxville, and Charlotte) the percentages are very similar at 14.7 percent, 15.3 percent, and 14.9

percent, respectively. Colorado Springs, which similar to Portland, restricts hard hand strikes on

defensively resistant suspects, used such force in 22.1 percent of its encounters. The highest

frequency city was Fort Wayne (31.7%), which does not link force to resistance.

114

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-14. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Defensive

Did Officer Use Soft Hands?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 199

(45.3)

607

(78.4)

466

(65.8)

1090

(85.2)

823

(73.7)

327

(82.0)

1848

(83.5

No 240

(54.7)

167

(21.6)

242

(34.2)

189

(14.8)

294

(26.3)

72

(18.0)

365

(16.5

Total 439 774 708 1279 1117 339 2213 

 * 1-year

Table 6-15. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Defensive

Did Officer Use Hard Hands?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Co

Yes 97

(22.1)

101

(13.0)

104

(14.7)

405

(31.7)

70

(6.3)

61

(15.3)

7

(3

No 342

(77.9)

673

(87.0)

604

(85.3)

874

(68.3)

1047

(93.7)

338

(84.7)

21

(9

Total 439 774 708 1279 1117 399 22

 * 1-year

115

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
With the exception of Albuquerque (18.4%) and Fort Wayne (18.1%), the use of

chemical spray was fairly infrequent on physically defensive suspects as shown in Table 6-16. 

Alternatively, CED use (Table 6-17) was more frequent in a number of cities. Colorado Springs

used a CED far more frequently in these circumstances (50.1%) than any of the other cities. 

Interestingly, the two cities that generally restrict the CED (St. Petersburg and CharlotteMecklenburg) actually diverge in terms of how often a CED is used in these types of resistant

cases. St. Petersburg, who instructs officers to use a CED on physically aggressive resistant

suspects (but not physical defensive), relied on such force 23.9 percent of the time. Conversely,

Charlotte-Mecklenburg, who has a similar, although slightly less restrictive, policy used the

CED on just 10.5 percent of the cases. Finally, baton usage, like that on failure to resist

suspects, was rare on defensive resistant suspects as shown in Table 6-18. Fort Wayne was the

highest at just 2.0 percent. Six of the cities had less than 10 such cases of baton use across the

two year period.

116

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-16. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Defensive

Did Officer Use Chemical Spray?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 44

(10.0)

31

(4.0)

130

(18.4)

232

(18.1)

82

(7.3)

10

(2.5)

202

(9.1

No 395

(90.0)

743

(96.0)

578

(81.6)

1047

(81.9)

1035

(92.7)

389

(97.5)

201

(90.9

Total 439 774 708 1279 1117 339 2213 

 * 1-year

Table 6-17. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Defensive

Did Officer Use CED?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 220

(50.1)

172

(22.2)

132

(18.6)

5

(0.4)

267

(23.9)

69

(17.3)

217

(9.8

No 219

(49.9)

602

(77.8)

576

(81.4)

1274

(99.6)

850

(76.1)

330

(82.7)

1996

(90.2

Total 439 774 708 1279 1117 399 2213 

 * 1-year

117

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-18. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Defensive

Did Officer Use Baton

?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 1

(0.2)

1

(0.1)

10

(1.4)

26

(2.0)

2

(0.2)

6

(1.5)

8

(0.4)

No 438

(99.8)

773

(99.9)

698

(98.6)

1253

(98.0)

1115

(99.8)

393

(98.5)

2205

(99.6

Total 439 774 708 1279 1117 399 2213 

 * 1-year

118

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Next, we examine how officers in each of the cities responded to aggressively resistant

suspects (i.e., hostile or overt physical aggression towards and officer such as attempting or

actually striking an officer). Beginning with Table 6-19, we see that in all the cities except

Colorado Springs, a majority of the encounters involved soft hand tactics when dealing with

aggressive suspects. Knoxville had the highest amount at 87.4 percent while Colorado Springs

had the lowest at 39.9 percent. A substantial degree of variation is found when examining hard

hand tactics and aggressive resistance as displayed in Table 6-20. Here, Fort Wayne officers

resorted to hard hand tactics in 35.3 percent of their encounters while Columbus officers used

such force in just 13.9 percent of their encounters.

Moving to the use of weapons, Table 6-21 looks at chemical spray and aggressive

resistance. Albuquerque and Fort Wayne used the most chemical spray in these types of cases

(32.1% and 30.9%, respectively), while Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Knoxville used the least

(6.3% and 7.1 percent, respectively). With respect to CED usage, Table 6-22 shows Colorado

Springs officers were much more likely to resort to a CED when dealing with aggressively

resistant suspects compared to the other cities. Specifically, Colorado Springs officers used

CED force in 51.1 percent of these types of cases. The next closest city was Portland at 33.2

percent. Finally, Table 6-23 examines baton usage and aggressively resistant suspects. As

shown, baton usage on the whole was infrequent. Albuquerque (3.8%) and Fort Wayne (2.6%)

used the baton most, while St. Petersburg (0.3%) and Colorado Springs (0.9%) used it least. 

119

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-19. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Aggressive

Did Officer Use Soft Hands?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 93

(39.9)

439

(64.6)

424

(60.0)

500

(81.3)

292

(78.3)

395

(87.4)

1510

(79.4

No 140

(60.1)

241

(35.4)

283

(40.0)

115

(18.7)

81

(21.7)

57

(12.6)

392

(20.6

Total 233 680 707 615 373 452 1902 

 * 1-year

Table 6-20. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Aggressive

Did Officer Use Hard Hands?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 45

(19.3)

122

(17.9)

137

(19.4)

217

(35.3)

45

(12.1)

107

(23.7)

265

(13.9

No 188

(80.7)

558

(82.1)

570

(80.6)

398

(64.7)

328

(87.9)

345

(76.3)

1637

(86.1

Total 233 680 707 615 373 452 1902 

 * 1-year

120

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-21. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Aggressive

Did Officer Use Chemical Spray?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 40

(17.2)

90

(13.2)

227

(32.1)

190

(30.9)

40

(10.7)

32

(7.1)

337

(17.7

No 193

(82.8)

590

(86.8)

480

(67.9)

425

(69.1)

333

(89.3)

420

(92.9)

1565

(82.3

Total 233 680 707 615 373 452 1902 

 * 1-year

Table 6-22. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Aggressive

Did Officer Use CED?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 119

(51.1)

226

(33.2)

146

(20.7)

2

(0.3)

109

(29.2)

103

(22.8)

247

(13.0

No 114

(48.9)

454

(66.8)

561

(79.3)

613

(99.7)

264

(70.8)

349

(77.2)

1655

(87.0

Total 233 680 707 615 373 452 1902 

 * 1-year

121

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-23. Suspects Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Aggressive

Did Officer Use Baton?

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colum

Yes 2

(0.9)

14

(2.1)

27

(3.8)

16

(2.6)

1

(0.3)

11

(2.4)

20

(1.1

No 231

(99.1)

666

(97.9)

680

(96.2)

680

(96.2)

372

(99.7)

441

(97.6)

1882

(98.9

Total 233 680 707 615 373 452 1902 

 * 1-year

122

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Given the voluminous nature concerning the number of tables examining force use by

resistance type (Table 6-9 through 6-23), the next three tables offer a more consolidated look. 

Table 6-24 combines Tables 6-9 through 6-13 in terms of the various types of force used in

relation to suspect encounters where the highest level of suspect resistance is failure to comply. 

Tables 6-25 and 6-26 follow similar logic by combining physical defensive resistance (Tables 6-

14 through 6-18) and physical aggressive resistance (Tables 6-19 through 6-23). Looking at

these three tables as a collective whole several themes emerge. 

First, Columbus used the most soft hand tactics with all three types of resistance. 

Second, Fort Wayne used the most hard hand tactics when dealing with all three types of

resistance. One explanation for this latter finding may be the fact that patrol officers in Fort

Wayne are not equipped with CEDs. Another explanation is that their policy may be considered

less restrictive than the six agencies that link resistance to force. However, Columbus also does

not link resistance to force and we do not find a similar result in that city. Third, Colorado

Springs CEDs most often when dealing with all three types of resistance. Perhaps the wheel

design helps explain such a finding, although from the text of the policy it seems rather apparent

that officers are discouraged from using a CED on a passive or verbally resistant suspect. 

Fourth, Albuquerque was most reliant on chemical sprays when dealing with both

physically defensive and aggressive suspects. Fifth, Columbus officers were most likely to use

chemical sprays on failure to comply suspects, which would seem in accordance with their

policy (chemical sprays are placed low on the continuum policy). Sixth, Knoxville had the

highest baton usage on failure to comply suspects (9.4%), despite the fact that its use is restricted

within their policy.

123

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-24. Force Usage when Highest Level of Resistance was Failure to Comply

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

SoftHands

25

(43.1)

270

(65.2)

5

(62.5)

57

(76.0)

222

(66.1)

24

(75.0)

88

(59.

HardHands 

11

(19.0)

29

(7.0)

0

(0.0)

17

(22.7)

13

(3.9)

2

(6.2)

24

(1.6

ChemicalSpray

7

(12.1)

19

(4.6)

0

(0.0)

13

(17.3)

79

(23.5)

0

(0.0)

46

(31.

CED 26

(44.8)

80

(19.3)

3

(37.5)

0

(0.0)

23

(6.8)

7

(21.9)

11

(7.4

Baton

0

(0.0)

1

(0.2)

0

(0.0)

1

(1.3)

0

(0.0)

3

(9.4)

2

(0.

Total 58 414 8 75 336 32 148

 * 1-year

124

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-25. Force Usage when Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Defensive

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

SoftHands

199

(45.3)

607

(78.4)

466

(65.8)

1090

(85.2)

823

(73.7)

327

(82.0)

184

(83.

HardHands 

97

(22.1)

101

(13.0)

104

(14.7)

405

(31.7)

70

(6.3)

61

(15.3)

77

(3.5

ChemicalSpray

44

(10.0)

31

(4.0)

130

(18.4)

232

(18.1)

82

(7.3)

10

(2.5)

20

(9.

CED 220

(50.1)

172

(22.2)

132

(18.6)

5

(0.4)

267

(23.9)

69

(17.3)

21

(9.8

Baton 1

(0.2)

1

(0.1)

10

(1.4)

26

(2.0)

2

(0.2)

6

(1.5)

8

(0.4

Total 439 774 708 1279 1117 399 221

 * 1-year

125

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-26. Force Usage when Highest Level of Resistance was Physical Aggressive

Col. Sp. Port.* Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

SoftHands

93

(39.9)

439

(64.6)

424

(60.0)

500

(81.3)

292

(78.3)

395

(87.4)

151

(79.

HardHands 

45

(19.3)

122

(17.9)

137

(19.4)

217

(35.3)

45

(12.1)

107

(23.7)

26

(13.

ChemicalSpray

40

(17.2)

90

(13.2)

227

(32.1)

190

(30.9)

40

(10.7)

32

(7.1)

33

(17.

CED 119

(51.1)

226

(33.2)

146

(20.7)

2

(0.3)

109

(29.2)

103

(22.8)

24

(13.

Baton

2

(0.9)

14

(2.1)

27

(3.8)

16

(2.6)

1

(0.3)

11

(2.4)

20

(1.

Total 23 680 707 615 373 452 190

 * 1-year

126

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Summary

From this set of analyses it is difficult to state apparent policy effects. For instance,

Colorado Springs’ high frequency use of a CED, or Knoxville’s high frequency use of a baton,

on passive and verbally defensive suspects despite their policies advising against such usage; or

the extent to which Portland officers used hard hand tactics on defensively resistant suspects.

However, there are other findings that seem to be in line with an agency’s policy and the type of

force used in relation to the type of suspect resistance faced, as many of the force types used by

officers across all the cities fall in line or within the framework of what is permitted.

Multivariate Analyses

In addition to examining various forms of force in relation to suspect resistance in a

bivariate manner, we also wanted to look more globally at the severity of force officers use while

controlling for suspect resistance levels and other factors that may account for why officers use

force. As a result, we ran two multivariate models (ordered logit) with the highest level of force

as the dependent variable (0=soft hands, 1=hard hands and chemical spray, 2=CED and impact

weapons, 3=deadly force).43

Table 6-27 provides an overview of how the independent variables were defined, along

with hypothesized relationships to force. Table 6-28 provides descriptive statistics for the

43 Even with multivariate analyses, it is important to note the difficulty of isolating or pinpointing a so-called “policy

effect.” Relying on force reports for data analyses ultimately limits the amount of control. While the multivariate

approach allows us to control for numerous alternative factors that may cause officers to use certain types of force,

one cannot control all factors. For instance, we cannot control for multiple uses of the same resistance type within

the same encounter as noted in footnote 43. Nonetheless, our concerns are somewhat mitigated when we are

comparing cities. More specifically, one would have to assume that multiple instances of the same type of resistance

operates differently across cities for this to be a concern. Hence, if one city is found to be using significantly more

force, we can make a reasonable assumption it is a true effect rather than one attributed to multiple instances of the

same resistance. For the converse to be true, one would have to suspect that citizen resistance is somehow unique to

a given city.

127

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
dependent and each of the independent variables.44 The models include variables that have been

found to influence (or posited to influence) police use of force behavior in prior research

(Paoline and Terrill, 2004; Paoline and Terrill, 2007; Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill,

Paoline, and Manning, 2003).45 For example, one would expect that officers may resort to force,

irrespective of explicit resistance, if a suspect has a weapon. Similarly, prior research has shown

suspect characteristics such as sex and race influence police behavior. Perhaps the key variables

in each of the models are the dummy variables reflecting the cities. By incorporating these

measures, we are most closely able to isolate policy effects across the cities. 

44 Columbus did not capture suspect race as part of their force reporting system and is thus excluded from the

analyses. 

45 We were somewhat limited with respect to the situational independent variables that could be used in the analyses

given that the official reports did not reliably capture numerous measures (e.g., suspect demeanor, suspect

wealth/class, or number of bystanders/officers present).

128

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-27. Description of Independent Variables

Variable Hypothesized Effect Definition

Suspect Resistance + 4=deadly, 3=physical aggressive,

2=physical defensive, 1=failure to

comply, 0=none

Suspect Sex + 1=male, 0=female

Suspect Race + 1=non-white, 0=white

Suspect Age + Years

Suspect Drug + 1=Suspect shows behavioral effects of

drug/alcohol, 0=all other

Suspect Mental + 1=Suspect shows behavioral effects of

mental impairment, 0=all other

Suspect Weapon + 1=Suspect has weapon, 0=all other

Colorado Springs +/- 1=Colorado Springs, 0=all other

Charlotte-Mecklenburg +/- 1=Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 0=all other

Portland +/- 1=Portland, 0=all other

St. Petersburg +/- 1=St. Petersburg, 0=all other

Knoxville +/- 1=Knoxville, 0=all other

Albuquerque +/- 1=Albuquerque, 0=all other

Fort Wayne +/- 1=Fort Wayne, 0=all other

129

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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-28. Descriptive Statistics for Multivariate Models

Variable Range Mean Std. Dev.

Dependent

 Highest level of force

 Soft Hands

 Hard Hands/Chemical Spray

 CED/Impact Weapons

 Deadly

 0-3 .76 .833

Independent

 Suspect Resistance 0-4 2.23 .739

 Suspect Sex 0-1 .86 .345

 Suspect Race 0-1 .61 .488

 Suspect Age 8-84 30.42 11.150

 Suspect Drug 0-1 .47 .499

 Suspect Mental 0-1 .09 .292

 Suspect Weapon 0-1 .10 .302

 Colorado Springs 0-1 .07 .308

 Charlotte-Mecklenburg 0-1 .13 .334

 Portland 0-1 .20 .400

 St. Petersburg 0-1 .18 .386

 Knoxville 0-1 .09 .284

 Albuquerque 0-1 .14 .347

 Fort Wayne 0-1 .19 .394

130

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
We begin by examining the highest level of force, as illustrated in Table 6-29. In this

model, we use Albuquerque as the reference category since their policy may be considered less

restrictive than the other cities as outlined in Table 6-8 (e.g., with the exception of impact force,

all other forms of force are located at the bottom of the continuum); consequently we would

expect Albuquerque officers to use more force. Thus, we posit than officers in each of the cities

in the model will use less force than Albuquerque officers.

With the exception of Colorado Springs, the results show, as posited, that officers in each

of the cities are all less likely to use higher forms of force compared to Albuquerque officers. Of

these, only Portland fails to reach statistical significance. Conversely, Colorado Springs officers

were significantly more likely to use higher levels of force, compared to Albuquerque, most

likely the result of such high CED use as indicated in previous analyses. In general, such

findings lend some degree of support in terms of a policy effect (i.e., the policy translates to

behavioral differences). 

131

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Table 6-29. Ordered Logit Estimates of Highest Force (N = 10,428)

Reference Category: Albuquerque

Variable B S.E. Sig.

Suspect Resistance .557 .029 .000

Suspect Sex 1.105 .064 .000

Suspect Race .047 .043 .279

Suspect Age .006 .002 .000

Suspect Drug - .151 .042 .000

Suspect Mental .261 .069 .000

Suspect Weapon .639 .065 .000

Colorado Springs 1.089 .091 .000

Charlotte-Mecklenburg - .482 .073 .000

Portland - .120 .069 .082

St. Petersburg - .297 .071 .000

Knoxville - .492 .084 .000

Fort Wayne - .591 .069 .000

Chi Square 1239.514

- 2 Log Likelihood 13160.279 

Pseudo R square .118

132

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-30. Ordered Logit Estimates of Highest Force (N = 10,428)

Reference Category: Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Variable B S.E. Sig.

Suspect Resistance .557 .029 .000

Suspect Sex 1.105 .064 .000

Suspect Race .047 .043 .279

Suspect Age .006 .002 .000

Suspect Drug - .151 .042 .000

Suspect Mental .261 .069 .000

Suspect Weapon .639 .065 .000

Colorado Springs 1.571 .094 .000

Albuquerque .482 .073 .000

Portland .362 .072 .000

St. Petersburg .184 .074 .012

Knoxville - .011 .086 .901

Fort Wayne - .109 .072 .127

Chi Square 1239.514

- 2 Log Likelihood 13160.279 

Pseudo R square .118

133

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

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Table 6-30 also examines the highest level of force. In this model we use CharlotteMecklenburg as the reference category since their policy may be considered more restrictive

than the other cities as outlined in Table 6-8 (e.g., CED and impact force are located at the top of

the continuum); consequently we would expect Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers to use less force. 

Thus, we posit than officers in each of the cities in the model will use more force than CharlotteMecklenburg officers.

Here we find that officers in Colorado Springs, Albuquerque, Portland, and St.

Petersburg all use significantly more force than Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers. However, no

statistically significant differences were found between Knoxville, Fort Wayne, and CharlotteMecklenburg officers. As result, we once again find some partial support in terms of a policy

effect (i.e., the policy translates to behavioral differences). 

Summary

Much like our summary assessment from the bivariate analyses, the multivariate analyses

indicate that it is difficult to pinpoint any sort of consistent policy effects. In some cases we find

officers operating along the lines that one might expect given the varying policy approaches,

while in other instances we do not. What appears most evident is that Colorado Springs officers

are using the highest levels of force net of policy and other controls (e.g., suspect resistance,

suspect having a weapon, suspect demographics).

134

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Suspect Injuries and Force

In this section we examine the extent to which officers reported suspects being injured. 

In particular, we want to examine whether any differences in injuries may be related to the

varying types of force policies used by our eight agencies. We begin with Table 6-31. Figures

are computed with respect to the frequency of injury in relation to the total number of force

reports filed per city. As illustrated, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, by far, reported the highest number

of suspect injuries at 73.5 percent. This is followed by Knoxville (45.9%) and Colorado Springs

(37.1%). The next four cities (Fort Wayne, Portland, Albuquerque, and Columbus) all reported

in the 26 to 27 percent range. Finally, St. Petersburg reported the least amount of injuries at 15.9

percent. 

Table 6-32 looks at the types of injuries suspects sustained. Note that no percentages are

offered for Colorado Springs nor Albuquerque since this information was not reliably captured

on their use of force report form. As shown, Fort Wayne had the most bruises (17.4%), Portland

the most abrasions (50.4%), Knoxville the most lacerations (49.2%), Fort Wayne the most

broken bones (2.2% , although we offer caution since the number of cases are so few) and Fort

Wayne the most “other” injuries.46 Interestingly, in three of the five categories Fort Wayne

ranked at the top. Further, the city with the most suspect injuries (Charlotte-Mecklenburg) did

not rank at the top in any individual injury type category.

46 Precisely how these categories were defined across all the cities is unknown. In some cities (e.g., Portland), these

five categories were pre-labeled on the force report form without definition and were simply circled by the officer. 

In other cities (e.g., Columbus, Fort Wayne, St. Petersburg), an empty fill-in box was presented to the officer to

identify the injury. If the research team had to make a determination of injury type, we used the following

definitions: bruises (any mention of “bruise” by the officer or reporting of black and blue skin conditions), abrasions

(any mention of “abrasion” by the officer or reporting of scraps/surface to the skin marks), lacerations (any mention

of “laceration” by the officer or reporting of cuts to the skin), broken bones (any mention of “broken bone” by the

officer or reporting of a fracture).

135

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-31. Was Suspect Injured?

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Yes 274

(37.1%)

1206

(27.6%)

392

(26.9%)

542

(27.1%)

302

(15.9%)

425

(45.9%)

153

(26.4

No 464

(62.9%)

3168

(72.4%)

1066

(73.1%)

1455

(72.9%)

1595

(84.1%)

501

(54.1%)

425

(73.6

Total 738 4374 1458 1997 1897 926 578

136

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Table 6-32. Suspect Injury Types

Col. Sp. Portl. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Bruises - 158

(13.1%)

- 93

(17.4%)

15

(5.0%)

18

(4.3%)

64

(4.4%

Abrasions - 608

(50.4%)

- 139

(26.0%)

140

(47.0%)

150

(35.5%)

467

(32.1

Lacerations - 195

(16.2%)

- 126

(23.6%)

93

(31.2%)

208

(49.2%)

674

(46.3

Broken Bones - 6

(0.5%)

- 12

(2.2%)

5

(1.7%)

8

(1.9%)

18

(1.2%

Other - 239

(19.8%)

- 165

(30.8%)

45

(15.1%)

39

(9.2%)

231

(16.0

Total - 1206 - 535 298 423 145

137

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Several interesting points of reference emerge. First, Charlotte-Mecklenburg and St.

Petersburg both restrict CED use to aggressively resistant suspects (high on the continuum), yet

they fall on opposite ends in terms of suspect injuries (Charlotte-Mecklenburg reported the most

injuries while St. Petersburg the least). Moreover, Colorado Springs officers used a CED far

more often than officers in all the other cities, yet they have the third highest percentage of

injuries. Second, arguably the three cities with the least restrictive policies (Fort Wayne and

Columbus because they do not link resistance to force, and Albuquerque because they are

permitted to use any form of force on any form of resistance with the exception of impact force

on failure to comply suspects) all fall in the middle to low range on suspect injuries. One may

posit that less policy restriction may lead to more injuries (i.e., because officers will have more

freedom), but in fact we find that such policies were related with less injuries comparatively. 

Third, Knoxville and Colorado Springs resulted in the second and third highest

percentage of injuries. However, their policies are substantially different. Colorado Springs

employs a wheel design and reserves hard hand tactics and impact force to aggressive resistant

suspects, while Knoxville allows officers to use not only hard hands tactics and impact methods

on defensively resistant suspects, but also chemical spray and a CED. Fourth, if suspect injuries

are ranked in terms of most injuries to least injuries and then compared to suspect resistance

levels (see Table 6-7b) there is a fair amount of similarity found. For example, St. Petersburg

reports the lowest mean level of resistance and the lowest percentage of suspects being injured. 

The biggest difference when making this type of comparison is found in Albuquerque, which

ranks highest in terms of resistance levels, but just sixth in injuries.

138

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Fifth, if suspect injuries are ranked in terms of most injuries to least and then compared

to officer force levels (see Table 6-7a), there is less similarity found than when compared to

resistance levels. For instance, Charlotte-Mecklenburg had the most injuries but only the fourth

highest level of force, while Albuquerque had just the sixth most injuries but the second highest

level of force.

Officer Injuries and Force

In this section we examine the extent to which officers reported receiving injuries during

their force encounters with suspects. According to the 2007 Federal Bureau of Investigation’s

publication of Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 57 officers across the United

States were killed by citizens, and 59,201 were assaulted (rate of 11.4 per 100 officers), of which

5,479 resulted in a documental injury (rate of 3.0 per 100 officers). Our figures are computed

with respect to the frequency of injury in relation to the total number of force reports filed per

city. Note that no percentages are offered for Albuquerque since this information was not

reliably captured on their use of force report form. As shown in Table 6-33, Knoxville reported

the highest number of officer injuries (14.8%), followed by Charlotte-Mecklenburg (13.4%),

Colorado Springs (12.7%), Fort Wayne (12.2%), St. Petersburg (9.3%), Portland (9.0%), and

Columbus (8.1%). 

Table 6-34 looks at the types of injuries officers sustained. No percentages are offered

for Colorado Springs nor Albuquerque as this information was not reliably captured on their

force report form. As shown, Portland had the most bruises (16.5%), Charlotte-Mecklenburg the

most abrasions (43.8%), Knoxville the most lacerations (33.6%) and broken bones (2.9% ,

139

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
although we offer caution since the number of cases are so few), and Columbus the most “other”

injuries.47 Interestingly, in two of the five categories Knoxville ranked at the top.

47 Similar to suspect injuries, precisely how these categories were defined across all the cities is unknown. In some

cities these categories were pre-labeled on the force report. If the research team had to make a determination,we

used the following: bruises (any mention of “bruise” or reporting of black and blue skin conditions), abrasions (any

mention of “abrasion” or reporting of scraps/surface to the skin marks), lacerations (any mention of “laceration” or

reporting of cuts to the skin), broken bones (any mention of “broken bone” or reporting of a fracture).

140

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-33. Was Officer Injured?

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Yes 94

(12.7%)

393

(9.0%)

- 243

(12.2%)

177

(9.3%)

137

(14.8%)

467

(8.1%

No 644

(87.3%)

3981

(91.0%)

- 1754

(87.8%)

1720

(90.7%)

789

(85.2%)

532

(91.9

Total 738 4374 - 1997 1897 926 578

141

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 6-34. Officer Injury Types 

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Bruises - 65

(16.5%)

- 38

(15.8%)

24

(13.8%)

16

(11.7%)

30

(6.8%

Abrasions - 170

(43.3%)

- 82

(34.0%)

64

(36.8%)

35

(25.5%)

110

(24.9

Lacerations - 55

(14.0%)

- 53

(22.0%)

37

(21.3%)

46

(33.6%)

126

(28.5

Broken Bones - 6

(1.5%)

- 3

(1.2%)

2

(1.1%)

4

(2.9%)

5

(1.1%

Other - 97

(24.7%)

- 65

(27.0%)

47

(27.0%)

36

(26.3%)

171

(38.7

Total - 393 - 241 174 137 442 

142

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Several interesting points of reference emerge. First, the percentages of officer injuries

are much lower on average than that of suspect injuries. In fact, the city with the highest

percentage of officer injuries (Knoxville, 14.8%), was still lower than the city with the lowest

percentage of suspect injuries (St. Petersburg, 15.9%). Thus, the extent to which officers are

injured, across all cities, is substantially lower than the extent to which suspected are injured.

Second, there is not a great deal of variation found across officer injuries when compared to

suspect injuries. The small range of injuries goes from 8.1 percent in Columbus up to just 14.8

percent in Knoxville. Recall that the range for suspect injuries was 15.9 percent in St.

Petersburg up to 73.5 percent in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Third, Charlotte-Mecklenburg and St.

Petersburg both restrict CED use to aggressively resistant suspects (high on the force

continuum), yet Charlotte-Mecklenburg reported the second highest percentage of officer

injuries, while St. Petersburg reported just the fifth highest percentage out of seven cities. 

Moreover, Colorado Springs officers used a CED far more frequently than officers in all the

other cities, yet this city still had the third highest percentage of officer injuries.

Fourth, two of the cities with arguably the least restrictive policies (Fort Wayne and

Columbus because they do not link resistance to force) fall in the middle to low range on officer

injuries. One may posit that less restrictive policies may lead to more injuries (i.e., because

officers will have more freedom), but in fact we find that such policies were related to less

injuries comparatively. Fifth, Knoxville and Charlotte-Mecklenburg resulted in the first and

second highest percentage of injuries. However, their policies are substantially different. In

particular, officers in Charlotte-Mecklenburg are restricted from using a CED or impact force on

suspects unless they are aggressively resistance. Knoxville’s policy is less restrictive with the

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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
use of a CED and impact weapons, permitting such force to be used on suspects who display just

defensive resistance. Sixth, if officer injuries are ranked in terms of most injuries to least

injuries and then compared to suspect resistance levels (see Table 6-7b) there is a fair amount of

similarity found. For example, Knoxville reports the second highest mean level of resistance and

the highest percentage of officers being injured. Other cities show similarities in terms of degree

(i.e., the more resistance posed by suspects the more officers reported being injured).

144

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
CHAPTER 7

Citizen Complaint Data

As with force reports, a key part of the second phase of the project involved the

collection of complaint data. In this chapter we examine complaints to investigate the

relationship between policy types and the number, types, and outcomes of citizen complaints.

Methodology

The data collection process for complaints mirrored that of the force data and consisted

of the same 24 month periods for each city. These time frames ensured that there was a

consistent two-year period with no changes in substance or reporting with respect to each site’s

use of force policies. Much like the force report data, some of the research sites coded all

complaint data electronically (i.e., Columbus, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Colorado Springs, and

Portland), others only maintained paper files (i.e., Fort Wayne, Knoxville, and St. Petersburg),

and the others had a combination of electronic and paper data (i.e., Albuquerque). Sites that only

kept paper files of complaint cases required coding into electronic format. Even in sites that kept

data electronically, the research team had to refer to hard copies of the complaint files in order to

obtain the necessary information (e.g., dispositions and discipline). In some instances, this

meant having to gather the data from multiple, external sources. For example, in Albuquerque,

much of the complaint information was recorded and stored electronically by Internal Affairs. 

However, certain key variables, such as the demographic information of complainants, were

better collected by the city’s Independent Review Office, the office that oversaw complaint

investigations. Thus, we had to collect complaint data from each source in order to adequately

capture all of the variables necessary for comparing complaints across each of the eight sites.

145

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
We wanted to ensure that the complaint data collected were comparable across sites. 

This proved to be challenging because the complaint processes for each site varied. For

example, complaints were investigated solely by Internal Affairs in some sites (i.e., Fort Wayne),

by a combination of Internal Affairs and officers’ chain of command in other sites (i.e.,

Columbus, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Colorado Springs, St. Petersburg, and Knoxville), or by a

combination of departmental entities and external oversight agencies in the remaining sites (i.e.,

Portland and Albuquerque). Furthermore, the process by which complaints were evaluated for

investigative merit also varied. In order to ensure that we were including similar types of

complaints across sites, only complaints that were investigated by some type of department or

external entity were included for analysis. As such, complaints that were rejected, declined,

inactivated, not deemed to be a violation of policy, mediated, withdrawn, resolved at intake, or

cancelled for cause were not included in the study.

We focused our attention on citizen complaints against officers. Our aim was to gain a

better understanding of the types, numbers, and outcomes of complaints filed in each

department. In all, we were able to collect all investigated citizen complaints for our eight sites. 

Finally, it should be noted that, for the following analyses, only external complaints lodged

against sworn officers were included. As such, complaints against non-sworn police personnel

were not included in the study.

Across each of our research sites, a number of characteristics related to the complaint

incident, the citizens who filed the complaint, and the officers receiving the complaint were

collected. For the current purpose, however, the key variable that allows for comparisons to be

made across sites, and allows for the findings to be related back to each site’s force policy, was

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
the type of alleged misconduct lodged against officers. Specifically, our focus centered on two

types of allegations that prior research has identified as important indicators when examining

complaints in relation to use of force: force and discourtesy allegations (Terrill and McCluskey,

2002). Across each site, each allegation of force and each allegation of discourtesy was coded

from the complaint data. 

In addition to coding force and discourtesy complaints, common measures of the

investigation findings were coded as well. Four primary findings were coded from the data and

classified as sustained, exonerated, not sustained, or unfounded. Finally, common measures of

disciplinary actions were also created. Disciplinary actions were coded as none, supervisory

actions, command counseling, written reprimand, suspension, termination, or “other.” The

“other” category reflected actions taken infrequently, such as demotions or actions that were

pending at the time the data was collected.

Analyses and Findings

Frequency of Complaints 

Our analysis begins by examining the frequency of citizen complaints across the eight

departments. Table 7-1 presents the frequencies and percentages of all citizen complaints across

each site. It should be noted that the analyses presented in this chapter focus on the number of

complaint allegations made against officers in the eight departments. In some cases, multiple

complaint allegations may have been made against officers in a single incident, while in other

instances multiple complaint allegations may have been made against multiple officers in an

147

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and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
incident. We treat each individual allegation of misconduct as an outcome of interest. In other

words, complaints refer to each separate allegation of misconduct filed against officers.

Based on Table 7-1, the total number of citizen complaints ranged from 94 in Fort Wayne

to 2,542 in Columbus for the two year period. Based on the total number of citizen complaints

filed, Fort Wayne, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and Knoxville had the highest percentages of use of

force allegations. For example, of the 94 citizen complaints in Fort Wayne, 43 percent were for

use of force. Furthermore, just over a third of all external complaints were for use of force in

Charlotte-Mecklenburg, while almost one-quarter of all external complaints were for force in

Knoxville. St. Petersburg and Albuquerque were the two sites with the lowest number of

external force complaints with only 8.2 and 14.5 percent, respectively. Similar results were

found for external discourtesy complaints, Fort Wayne and Knoxville had the highest

percentages, while Albuquerque and St. Petersburg had the lowest percentages.

An interesting finding emerges when combining the total number of external force and

discourtesy complaints and examining them in relation to the total number of all external

complaints for each site. In Fort Wayne, 88 of the 94 (93.6%) external complaints were either

for alleged force or discourtesy violations. This is substantially higher than the next highest

departments, Knoxville (55%) and Charlotte-Mecklenburg (53%). Although Fort Wayne had the

lowest number of citizen complaints, the vast majority of these were for force or discourtesy

violations.

148

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Summary

The aim of this introductory section was to report the total number of citizen complaints

(i.e., allegations), as well as the number (and percentage of overall total) of use of force and

discourtesy allegations. While we find substantial variation (especially in totals) across our

cities, a couple of clear patterns emerge. First, in relation to the total citizen complaints levied

across our agencies, the percentage of use of force and discourtesy complaints was, by far, the

highest in Fort Wayne, and to a lesser extent in Knoxville and Charlotte-Mecklenburg (see Table

7-1). Second, on the other end of the spectrum, we found both St. Petersburg and Albuquerque -

which reported the lowest percentage of force and discourtesy complaints, when compared to all

citizen complaints. 

149

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 7-1. Citizen Complaint Allegations: Overall, Use of Force, and Discourtesy

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. C

Total CitizenComplaints

848 1350 962 94 245 158 

Total Citizen Use of Force Complaints

192

(22.6%)

274

(20.3%)

139

(14.5%)

40

(42.5%)

20

(8.2%)

37

(23.4%)

(3

Total CitizenDiscourtesyComplaints

197

(23.2%)

244

(18.1%)

77

 (8.0%)

48

(51.1%)

39

(15.9%)

50

(31.6%)

(1

150

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Dispositions of Complaints 

In addition to the types and frequencies of complaints levied against the eight

departments, we also collected data on complaint findings. Although allegations of misconduct

themselves, especially excessive/improper force, present serious problems for police

departments, accusations do not necessarily mean that the misconduct occurred. That is, even

though all complaints were deemed to have investigative merit by departments, complaints are

often difficult to substantiate (Lersch and Mieczkowski, 2000). Therefore, it is also important to

examine the dispositions of complaints to determine how often complaints, particularly those for

excessive/improper force and discourtesy, were substantiated across each department over the

two year period.

Our analysis of complaint dispositions starts with the total number of dispositions for all

types of citizen complaints investigated by departments. Table 7-2 presents the frequencies and

percentages for the four common measures of dispositions across departments: sustained (i.e.,

the misconduct occurred), not sustained (i.e., the misconduct could not be proven or disproven),

exonerated (i.e., the conduct in question was proper), or unfounded (the allegation of misconduct

was found to be false).48 These numbers provide a baseline for the results of complaint

investigations across departments. 

48 Column totals in Table 7-2 may not add to 100 percent. This is due to the fact that there may have been findings

other than the four presented across sites. These were findings that were unique and often used infrequently by

departments or findings that were still pending at the time of the study. Also, findings in Portland are unique which

makes it difficult to make comparisons to the other seven sites. For example, almost 25 percent of complaint

dispositions in Portland were still pending at the time of the study. In addition, almost 45 percent of findings were

disposed of as service complaints, or “minor rule violations resolved by a supervisor.” This was unique to Portland

in the sense that service complaints were treated as dispositions, while in other sites these types of complaints would

have been addressed by the type of actions taken as a result of the investigation (e.g., disciplinary actions). These

aspects should be kept in mind when interpreting dispositions for Portland. 

151

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 7-2. Total Investigated Citizen Complaint Dispositions

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. C

Total CitizenComplaints

848 1350 962 94 245 158 

Sustained 89 (10.5%) 29 

(2.1%)

170

(17.7%)

9 

(9.6%)

72 

(29.4%)

22 

(13.9%)

(1

Not Sustained 108

(12.7%)

55

(4.1%)

217

(22.6%)

61 

(64.9%)

106 

(43.3%)

21

 (13.3%)

(7

Exonerated 273

(32.2%)

146

(10.8%)

431

(44.8%)

1

(1.1%)

15

(6.1%)

51

 (32.3%)

(7

Unfounded 355

(41.9%)

91

(6.7%)

144

(15.0%)

10 

(10.6%)

35

(14.3%)

64

(40.5%)

(

152

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 7-3. Use of Force and Discourtesy Investigated Citizen Complaint Dispositions

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. C

Use of ForceComplaints

192 274 139 40 20 37 

Sustained 1

(0.5%)

4

(1.5%)

7

(5.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

1

(2.7%)

(3

Not Sustained 22

(11.5%)

12

(4.4%)

25

(18.0%)

29

(72.5%)

6

(30.0%)

6

(16.2%)

(8

Exonerated 88

(45.8%)

72

(26.3%)

96

(69.1%)

1

(2.5%)

4

(20.0%)

23

(62.2%)

(

Unfounded 76

(39.6%)

21

(7.7%)

11

(7.9%)

3

(7.5%)

4

(20.0%)

7

(8.9%)

(4

Discourtesy Complaints

197 244 77 48 39 50 

Sustained 16

(8.1%)

5

(2.0%)

11

(14.3%)

6

(12.5%)

7

(17.9%)

14

(28.0%)

(1

Not Sustained 39

(19.8%)

12

(4.9%)

36

(46.8%)

29

(60.4%)

28

(71.8%)

8

(16.0%)

(7

Exonerated 48

(24.4%)

8

(3.3%)

13

(16.9%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

11

(22.0%)

(

Unfounded 92

(46.7%)

11

(4.5%)

17

(22.1%)

7

(14.6%)

4

(10.3%)

17

(34.0%)

(

153

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Although the results in Table 7-2 display frequencies and percentages for each finding category,

the current discussion focuses on the number of sustained citizen complaints across each site. 

Based on the total number of citizen complaints, the number of sustained dispositions ranged

from approximately 10 percent, of the total number of complaints, in Fort Wayne to almost 30

percent in St. Petersburg. 

Table 7-3 presents dispositions for citizen complaints for the use of force and

discourtesy. Recall from Table 7-1 that the frequency of force complaints roughly ranged

between 8 and 43 percent of the total number of citizen complaints lodged across departments. 

Based upon the results in Table 7-3, relatively few of these force complaints are sustained

against officers from any of the eight sites. In fact, the percentage of external force complaints

sustained ranged from zero (in Fort Wayne and St. Petersburg) to only 5 percent (in

Albuquerque). 

Table 7-3 also displays dispositions for discourtesy complaints. When compared to use

of force dispositions, sustained dispositions for discourtesy were found to be much more

frequent. Recall from Table 7-1 that roughly 8 (Albuquerque) to 51 (Fort Wayne) percent of

departments’ complaints were for discourtesy. The total number of sustained discourtesy

complaints ranged from approximately 8 (Colorado Springs) to 28 (Knoxville) percent.49

Summary

The focus of this section was to assess complaint dispositions (i.e., sustained versus all

others) across our eight cities. As we examine overall, use of force, and discourtesy allegations,

a few interesting findings emerge. First, with respect to all citizen complaints combined, St.

Petersburg (29.4) and Albuquerque (17.7) had the highest percentages of sustained complaints,

49 Again, this discussion excludes Portland due to the nature of their findings.

154

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
while Fort Wayne (9.6) and Columbus (8.9) had the lowest percentage. Recall that there were

difficulties in comparing Portland’s percentages to the rest of the cities. 

In examining use of force and discourtesy allegations, it is clear that a much smaller

percentage of force complaints are sustained. In illustrating this point, we found that the highest

percentage of total sustained use of force complaints were found in Albuquerque (5.0%) and

Charlotte-Mecklenburg (3.8%). So, at the high end, we find that only one out of every twenty

use of force complaints is sustained. On the other hand, a higher percentage of sustained

complaints were found for discourtesy allegations. Knoxville was found to have the highest

percentage of sustained allegations, while Columbus had the fewest. 

Disciplinary Actions 

We also examined, across the eight cities, the types of actions taken against officers

accused of misconduct. These results are presented in Tables 7-4 through 7-6. We begin by

examining the various actions taken across all types of citizen complaints for each city, which is

reported in Table 7-4. The first row indicates the total number of actions taken for all complaint

types. Two aspects should be noted about the coding of disciplinary actions. First, the total

number of actions could exceed the total number of complaints. This is due to the fact that

multiple actions could be taken for a single complaint. For example, an officer could receive a

written reprimand and a suspension for a single complaint. Furthermore, actions may have been

taken even if complaints were not found to be substantiated. Second, disciplinary actions were

usually administered based on the entire complaint investigation, meaning that in cases where

multiple allegations were made against officers, discipline was based upon the totality of the

155

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
circumstances of the complaint case. Since our analyses focus on each separate complaint

allegation, the same disciplinary action was coded for each separate complaint allegation. Thus,

some of the frequencies presented may initially appear rather high. For example, there were 20

suspensions coded in Albuquerque over the two year period. This was due to the fact that the

same disciplinary action would have been coded for each allegation associated with the

complaint incident. These two issues should be kept in mind when assessing discipline across

each city.

Most citizen complaints resulted in no disciplinary action being taken. Across cities,

roughly 71 (in Colorado Springs and St. Petersburg) to 92 (in Columbus) percent of complaints

resulted in no action. This is not surprising given that the majority of complaints against officers

were not substantiated. Across cities, there were five primary types of actions taken. 

Supervisory actions consisted of counseling and training at the officers’ direct supervisory level. 

Supervisory actions were considered to be informal and most cities did not consider these to be

disciplinary in nature. The remaining actions were formal actions that consisted of command

counseling, written reprimands, suspensions, and terminations. One way to make comparisons is

to examine the nature of discipline for complaints where at least one type of action was taken. 

Although we present all types of actions, discussion is focused on comparisons across cities for

the formal disciplinary actions of written reprimands, suspensions, and terminations.50

For all complaint types, the results in Table 7-4 indicated that when at least some type of

action was taken, more formal forms of discipline were taken in St. Petersburg and Charlotte50 We restrict discussion to these three categories for two primary reasons. First, supervisory actions were not

considered to be formal discipline. Second, it was difficult to identify the nature of command counseling for some

cities. For example, in Colorado Springs, counseling was considered to be an informal supervisory action. The

nature of counseling in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, on the other hand (i.e., formal or informal discipline), was not as

discernable. To ensure we are making consistent comparisons for similar types of disciplinary actions, we focus on

written reprimands, suspensions, and terminations, all of which were treated the same across sites.

156

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Mecklenburg. For example, in St. Petersburg some type of disciplinary action was taken in 72

out of the 245 total actions.51 Approximately 53 percent of these 72 actions were formal

disciplinary measures consisting of written reprimands, suspensions, or terminations. For

Charlotte-Mecklenburg 51 percent of their actions were formal in nature. On the other hand, the

results in Table 7-4 indicate that Colorado Springs and Portland relied on more informal actions

when examining all types of citizen complaints.

With respect to disciplinary actions for use of force citizen complaints, a few patterns

emerge. As Table 7-5 illustrates, once again, formal actions were extremely infrequent and this

is due to the fact that few use of force citizen complaints were substantiated across sites. Once

again, Portland and Colorado Springs relied on informal actions more often than the other cities. 

In terms of formal disciplinary actions, Charlotte-Mecklenburg (3.1) and Knoxville (2.7)

recorded the highest percentages. 

Turning next to disciplinary actions for discourtesy complaints (see Table 7-6), formal

actions were taken infrequently, but at consistently higher amounts compared to the use of force

complaints. Portland, Colorado Springs, and Knoxville relied on informal actions to address

discourtesy complaints more than the other five cities. On the other hand, CharlotteMecklenburg had the highest percentage of formal actions and suspensions for discourtesy,

while Columbus did not take a single formal action for any discourtesy citizen complaint. 

51 Calculated by subtracting the no action taken row from the total number of disciplinary action row.

157

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 7-4. Investigated Citizen Complaint Disciplinary Actions: All Complaints

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. C

Disciplinary Actions forAll Citizen Complaints

919 1350 996 94 245 159 

No Action Taken

649

(70.6%)

236

(17.5%)

790

(79.3%)

82

(87.2%)

173

(70.6%)

133

(83.6%)

(8

SupervisoryAction

204

(22.2%)

711

(52.7%)

111

(11.1%)

1 

(1.1%)

0

(0.0%)

17

(10.7%)

(0

CommandCounseling

N/A 2

(0.1%)

N/A N/A 32

 (13.1%)

N/A 

(8

Written Reprimand

19

(2.1%)

8

(0.6%)

36 

(3.6%)

4 

(4.3%)

22 

(9.0%)

1

(0.6%)

(4

Suspension 3 

(0.3%)

5

(0.4%)

20 

(2.0%)

1 

(1.1%)

12

 (4.9%)

7

(4.4%)

(5

Termination 3 

(0.3%)

0

(0.0%)

3 

(0.3%)

0

(0.0%)

4 

(1.6%)

0

 (0.0%)

 (

Other 41

(4.5%)

388

(28.7%)

36 

(3.6%)

6

(6.4%)

2 

(0.8%)

1

(0.6%)

 (

158

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 7-5. Investigated Citizen Complaint Disciplinary Actions: Use of Force Complain

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. C

Disciplinary Actions forUse of ForceComplaints

199 274 139 40 20 37 

No Action Taken

159

(79.9%)

84

(30.7%)

130

(93.5%)

39

(97.5%)

20

(100.0%)

36

(97.3%)

(9

SupervisoryAction

35

(17.6%)

68

(24.8%)

4

(2.9%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

(0

CommandCounseling

N/A 2

(0.7%)

N/A N/A 0

(0.0%)

N/A 

(0

Written Reprimand

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

(2

Suspension 0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

1

(2.7%)

(0

Termination 0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

1

(0.7%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

(0

Other

5

(2.5%)

120

(43.8%)

4

(2.9%)

1

(2.5%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

(0

159

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 7-6. Investigated Citizen Complaint Disciplinary Actions: Discourtesy Complain

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. C

Disciplinary Actions forDiscourtesy Complaints

218 244 77 48 39 51 

No Action Taken

157

(72.0%)

24

(9.8%)

65

(84.4%)

40

(83.3%)

32

(82.1%)

35

(68.6%)

(7

SupervisoryAction

54

(24.8%)

155

(63.5%)

4

(5.2%)

1

(2.1%)

0

(0.0%)

12

(23.5%)

(0

CommandCounseling

N/A 0

(0.0%)

N/A N/A 3

(7.7%)

N/A 

(1

Written Reprimand

3

(1.4%)

3

(1.2%)

6

(7.8%)

3

(6.2%)

2

(5.1%)

1

(2.0%)

(4

Suspension 0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

1

(1.3%)

1

(2.1%)

1

(2.6%)

2

(3.9%)

(7

Termination 0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

1

(1.3%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

0

(0.0%)

(0

Other

4

(1.8%)

62

(25.4%)

0

(0.0%)

3

(6.2%)

1

(2.6%)

1

(2.0%)

(0

160

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Summary

The goal of this section was to shed light on the disciplinary actions across total

citizen complaints, as well as those for use of force and discourtesy. One thing that is

abundantly clear is that formal disciplinary action (i.e., written reprimands, suspensions, and

terminations), across all types of complaints, is the exception rather than the norm. When we

compare across the cities, we find a few common tendencies. More specifically, across all

allegations, and those for force and discourtesy, Colorado Springs and Portland (and Knoxville

for discourtesy complaints only) consistently relied on formal disciplinary actions less frequently

than all other cities. The cities that did lead the way, in terms of formal disciplinary actions

across complaint types, were St. Petersburg (for all citizen complaints combined), Albuquerque

(for discourtesy allegations) and Charlotte-Mecklenburg (for all complaints combined as well as

use of force and discourtesy allegations). 

Frequency of Complaints by Workload Measures

While the preceding sections were concerned with describing the frequency of force and

discourtesy complaints (and subsequent outcomes) across cities, in making comparisons to

overall complaint totals, the remaining sections focus on more in-depth analyses of our primary

areas of concern - use of force and discourtesy allegations. We begin this discussion by

examining how often external use of force and discourtesy complaints were made against the

eight cities in relation to four department workload measures: calls for service, reported crimes,

arrests, and use of force reports. Table 7-7 reports these results for use of force complaints,

while Table 7-8 presents the results for discourtesy complaints. Comparing use of force

161

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
complaints by calls for service, we find substantial variation across the eight cities. For example,

in Portland, citizens filed one force complaint for every 1,631 calls for service. In contrast, use

of force complaints in St. Petersburg were filed by citizens once for every 17,885 calls for

service. Thus, when using calls for service as a baseline, Portland received roughly ten times

more force complaints than officers in St. Petersburg. With respect to discourtesy complaints,

similar patterns were found for Portland and Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Portland had a

substantially higher discourtesy complaint rate per 1,000 calls for service then the other seven

cities. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, on the other hand, had the lowest rate: one discourtesy complaint

for every 10,663 calls for service.

Variation was also present when comparing each city’s complaint rates by Part I reported

crimes. Colorado Springs had the highest rates of force and discourtesy complaints per 1,000

Part I crimes across the eight cities. Citizens filed use of force complaints for every 202 Part I

crimes and filed discourtesy complaints for every 197 Part I crimes. On the other hand, St.

Petersburg had use of force and discourtesy complaints filed once for every 1,959 and 1,004 Part

I crimes, respectively. In the context of the amount of crime, officers in Colorado Springs

received use of force complaints approximately ten times more frequently, and discourtesy

complaints roughly five times more frequently, than officers in St. Petersburg.

When looking at the frequency of use of force and discourtesy complaints in relation to

the number of arrests for Part I crimes, officers in Columbus had the highest rates. Columbus

had a use of force complaint filed for every 27 arrests and a discourtesy complaint filed for every

23 arrests. Once again, St. Petersburg had the lowest complaint rates in relation to arrests. St.

Petersburg had a use of force complaint filed for every 314 arrests and a discourtesy complaint

162

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
filed for every 161 arrests. In the context of the number of arrests, officers in Columbus received

external complaints approximately twelve (use of force) and seven (discourtesy) times more

frequently than officers in St. Petersburg.

Finally, we examined the frequency of use of force and discourtesy complaints in relation

to the number of use of force reports filed in each city over the two year period. When

examining the results in Tables 7-7 and 7-8, several interesting patterns were found. For five of

the eight cities, the number of force and discourtesy complaints per force report was calculated

to be one complaint for approximately every 10 to 25 force reports filed. Two cities, however,

had much lower complaint rates. First, Fort Wayne had one force complaint for every 50 force

reports filed, and one discourtesy complaint for every 42 force complaints filed. Second, St.

Petersburg had one force complaint for every 95 force reports filed, and one discourtesy

complaint for every 49 force reports filed. On the other hand, Colorado Springs had higher

complaint rates than the other cities. In Colorado Springs, citizens filed one use of force

complaint for every four force reports. This was also the same for discourtesy complaints, one

complaint for every four force reports filed. Thus, Colorado Springs had approximately use of

force complaints filed almost 24 times more frequently and discourtesy complaints filed almost

12 times more frequently than St. Petersburg (the city with the lowest rate).

163

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 7-7. External Use of Force Complaint Comparison by

Calls for Service, Reported Crimes, Arrests, and Force Reports

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. C

Complaint/ServiceCalls (1,000)

0.35 0.61 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.08 0

Complaint per call 1 of 2,803 1 of 1,631 1 of 4,693 1 of 8,854 1 of 17,885 1 of 12,058 1 of Complaint/Part ICrimes (1,000)

4.94 3.79 1.97 1.72 0.51 1.39 1

Complaint per crime 1 of 202 1 of 264 1 of 508 1 of 580 1 of 1,959 1 of 720 1 oComplaint/Part IArrests (1,000)

21.70 19.10 22.00 8.08 3.18 6.18 1

Complaint per arrest 1 of 46 1 of 52 1 of 45 1 of 124 1 of 314 1 of 162 1 Complaint/ForceReport (100)

26.01 6.26 9.50 2.00 1.05 3.99 9

Complaint per forcereport

1 of 4 1 of 16 1 of 10 1 of 50 1 of 95 1 of 25 1 

Total Number External ForceComplaints

192 274 139 40 20 37 

164

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 7-8. External Discourtesy Allegation Comparison by

Calls for Service, Reported Crimes, Arrests, and Force Reports 

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. C

Complaint/ServiceCalls (1,000)

0.36 0.55 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.11 

Complaint per call 1 of 2,732 1 of 1,831 1 of 8,472 1 of 7,378 1 of 9,172 1 of 8,923 1 of Complaint/Part ICrimes (1,000)

5.07 3.37 1.09 2.07 0.99 1.88 

Complaint per crime 1 of 197 1 of 296 1 of 918 1 of 483 1 of 1,004 1 of 533 1 oComplaint/Part IArrests (1,000)

22.24 17.05 12.21 9.70 6.21 8.35 

Complaint per arrest 1 of 45 1 of 59 1 of 82 1 of 103 1 of 161 1 of 120 1 Complaint/ForceReport (100)

26.69 5.58 5.28 2.40 2.06 5.40 

Complaint per forcereport

1 of 4 1 of 18 1 of 19 1 of 42 1 of 49 1 of 18 1 

Total NumberExternal DiscourtesyComplaints

197 244 77 48 39 50 

165

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Summary

The focus of this section was to compare external complaints for the use of force and

discourtesy against a set of important departmental workload measures (please see Chapter Six

for a similar set of analyses for the use of force). In doing so, a few cities distinguished

themselves from the rest. 

In terms of beneficial outcomes, two departments were ahead of the rest. That is, St.

Petersburg, by far, had the fewest use of force citizen complaints per citizen call for service,

crime, arrest, and force report. With respect to discourtesy citizen complaints, St. Petersburg had

the fewest per arrest and force report, and the second fewest per call and crime. CharlotteMecklenburg also distinguished themselves, as they had the fewest discourtesy citizen

complaints per call and crime, while they had the second fewest discourtesy complaints per

arrest. 

On the opposite end of the spectrum, three departments, across the four measures, were

found to exhibit the least beneficial comparisons. That is, Colorado Springs officers had the

most force and discourtesy citizen complaints per use of force report and crime (tied with

Columbus). Portland officers were found to have the most force and discourtesy citizen

complaints per citizen call. Finally, Columbus officers had the most force and discourtesy

citizen complaints per arrest, and tied with Colorado Springs for the most discourtesy citizen

complaints per crime. 

166

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Use of Force and Discourtesy Officer Totals

The next analysis extends the examination of citizen complaints for the use of force and

discourtesy to the officer level. That is, we examine, across the eight cities, the distribution of

such complaints across officers, in shedding light on the range of complaint totals (per officer),

mean complaint amounts across officers, and the percentage of sworn personnel with a force

and/or discourtesy citizen complaint. In doing so, we restrict our analyses to citizen complaints

for the use of force and discourtesy where an individual officer (either by name or badge

number) was identified. This decision was based on the fact that we did not want to

misrepresent individual level totals by including unnamed officers. For example, in Columbus

there were 242 complaints made against the “Division of Police” as a whole, and if we included

these allegations, it would appear that a single officer had this many complaints over the twoyear study period. As such, we excluded such cases and our external complaints for the use of

force and discourtesy totals differ from that cited previously in Table 7-1.52 

Table 7-9 displays a variety of officer-level totals regarding external complaints for the

use of force and discourtesy. We begin by presenting the number of officers (in our columns)

that received x number of complaints. As we examine the distribution of citizen complaints

across our cities, we find that two-year totals range from one complaint (in every city) to

fourteen (in Columbus). It is apparent, that in some cities (e.g., St. Petersburg and Fort Wayne)

there is a much tighter clustering in terms of the number of complaints per officer (at the lower

end) than that found in others (e.g., Columbus and Portland), where officer totals are more

dispersed (and at higher levels). 

52 The following represents the total number of complaints, per city, that did not name an individual officer (and thus

were excluded): Colorado Springs (2), Portland (13), Albuquerque (1), Fort Wayne (0), St. Petersburg (0), Knoxville

(0). Charlotte-Mecklenburg (0), and Columbus (242). 

167

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Beneath these totals we also present the total number of citizen complaints for force and

discourtesy (where an officer was named), mean totals that represent the average number of

complaints per officer53, as well standard deviations. It is apparent that there is a degree of

variation across our cities. For example, Fort Wayne, St. Petersburg, Knoxville, and CharlotteMecklenburg averaged approximately one and a quarter complaint, while Columbus and

Portland averaged close to two complaints per officer. 

The last three rows in Table 7-9 represent the number of officers that made up the

complaint totals (per city), the total number of sworn personnel in each department (as a

potential pool of officers that could receive a citizen complaint), and the percentage of sworn

personnel that were in the pool of officers with a complaint. For example, 231 officers in

Colorado Springs comprised the 387 total citizen complaints for force and discourtesy, while

roughly 35% of their sworn personnel had at least one of these complaints. Across the cities, we

found that St. Petersburg and Charlotte-Mecklenburg had the fewest percentage of sworn

personnel with a citizen complaint for force and/or discourtesy (9.2 and 10.3, respectively),

while Colorado Springs (34.5%) and Portland (26.7%) were at the other end of the spectrum. 

53 Note that these means do not include organizational members that did not receive any complaints. As such, these

figures represent the average number of complaints among those officers that had at least one (over the two year

period). 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 7-9. External Complaints for Force or Discourtesy: Officer Totals

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Char. Colum.

Number of 

Complaints

1 146 150 91 63 40 57 136 244

2 50 60 33 8 7 10 26 101

3 16 22 7 1 0 2 5 51

4 7 17 4 0 0 1 0 15

5 8 7 3 0 1 0 1 11

6 321 1 0 0 0 3

7 110 0 0 0 0 9

8 020 0 0 0 0 3

9 000 0 0 0 0 1

10 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1

11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1

12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

N Complaints 387 505 215 88 59 87 208 863

Mean 1.68 1.91 1.55 1.21 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.96

S.D. 1.16 1.56 0.97 0.87 0.66 0.58 0.56 1.63

N Officers 231 264 139 73 48 70 168 441

Total # Sworn 669 989 986 457 520 382 1638 1819

Complaint Officers/ 34.53 26.69 14.10 15.97 9.23 18.32 10.26 24.24

Sworn

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Summary

The purpose of this section of this chapter was to extend the analyses of citizen

complaints for the use of force and discourtesy to the officer level. In doing so, we presented

(per agency) the number (and averages) of citizen complaints officers received, as well as

comparisons to the overall population of sworn personnel. The results revealed some interesting

comparisons. First, the range of complaints per officer, across sites, varied from one to 14. In

addition, the average total complaints (among officers identified by the citizen) was the lowest

for Fort Wayne, St. Petersburg, Knoxville, and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, while the highest was

found in Columbus and Portland. Second, in examining the percentage of departmental sworn

personnel with at least one citizen complaint, we found variation across cities. The fewest

percentage of sworn personnel with a citizen complaint for force and/or discourtesy was found in

St. Petersburg and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, with the highest in Colorado Springs. 

 

Multivariate Analyses

The final analysis extends the preceding work by examining external use of force and

discourtesy complaints from a multivariate framework. The purpose here is to determine if some

cities have a higher probability of receiving complaints for force and discourtesy, while

controlling for theoretically relevant factors. For this analytical model, we include three

characteristics of the citizen (i.e., sex, race, and age) who filed the complaint. Citizen sex and

gender are binary variables where male complainants and non-white complainants were coded as

one. Citizen age reflects the complainant’s age in years at the time the complaint was filed. In

170

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
addition, we include dummy variables which measure the city where the complaint was filed.54

Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the multivariate analysis is provided in Table 7-10. 

Table 7-11 presents the logistic regression results predicting external use of force and

discourtesy complaints. When controlling for citizen characteristics, every city had a

significantly less likelihood of receiving a force or discourtesy complaint when compared to Fort

Wayne. Although all effects were substantial, Albuquerque and St. Petersburg were the cities

with the most pronounced differences. Officers in both of these cities were least likely, than the

rest of the cities, to have force or discourtesy complaints made against them than officers in Fort

Wayne. Finally, we found that none of the citizen characteristics were statistically significant. 

Summary

The primary aim of this section was to utilize a multivariate approach to predict use of

force and discourtesy citizen complaints. In doing so, we were able to isolate the independent

effects of each city, controlling for the other cities as well as theoretically relevant citizen

controls (i.e., sex, race, and age). In terms of comparing cities, we found in every instance that

our seven research sites had a significantly lower likelihood of receiving a use of force or

discourtesy citizen complaint than our reference category - Fort Wayne. The most pronounced

differences, from Fort Wayne, were found for Albuquerque and St. Petersburg. In terms of our

citizen controls, none were statistically distinguishable in our multivariate model. 

54 A series of multivariate models were run to determine which site would best serve as the reference category for

the final model. Since there were few theoretical reasons to choose one site over the other, multivariate comparisons

were made using each site as the reference category. In the end, the results for Fort Wayne provided the most

consistent results across all models. That is, in nearly every case, Fort Wayne was found to have significantly more

complaints than each of the other seven sites. Given this information, as well as the extremely high percentage of

external use of force and discourtesy complaints (per all complaints) noted in Table 7-1, we use Fort Wayne as the

reference category in our analytical model. 

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Table 7-10. Descriptive Statistics for Multivariate Model

Variable Range Mean Std. Dev.

Dependent

 Use of Force Complaint 0-1 .20 .40

 Discourtesy Complaint 0-1 .20 .40

 Combined Complaint 0-1 .41 .49

Independent

 Citizen Sex 0-1 .56 .49

 Citizen Race 0-1 .54 .50

 Citizen Age 11-79 36.2 12.49

 Colorado Springs 0-1 .13 .34

 Portland 0-1 .20 .40

 Albuquerque 0-1 .15 .36

 Fort Wayne 0-1 .01 .18

 St. Petersburg 0-1 .04 .19

 Knoxville 0-1 .02 .15

 Charlotte-Mecklenburg 0-1 .06 .24

 Columbus 0-1 .38 .49

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Table 7-11. Logistic Regression Predicting Citizen Complaints

Reference Category: Fort Wayne

Variable B S.E. Sig. Exp(B)

Citizen Sex .09 .07 .170 1.10

Citizen Race .00 .07 .956 1.00

Citizen Age .00 .00 .223 1.00

Colorado Springs -2.74 .43 .000 .06

Portland -3.20 .43 .000 .04

Albuquerque -3.86 .44 .000 .02

St. Petersburg -3.84 .45 .000 .02

Knoxville -3.10 .49 .000 .05

Charlotte-Mecklenburg -2.50 .45 .000 .08

Columbus -2.85 .43 .000 .06

Constant 2.74 .44 .000 15.53

Chi Square 262.10

- 2 Log Likelihood 5239.32

Pseudo R square .084

N=4,060

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CHAPTER 8 

Civil Litigation Data

The final piece of the second phase of the project involved the collection and analysis of

civil litigation data. In this chapter, we examine these data to investigate how often citizens

alleged police misconduct (particularly the misuse of force), the outcome or dispositions of such

allegations, and the monetary payout cities have made.

Methodology

Similar to use of force and complaint data, at each of the sites we collected 24 months of

data within the same timeframe as noted in Chapters 6 and 7. By far, attempting to gather civil

litigation data proved more challenging than any other aspect of the project; and even in those

cities where we were successful the substance of the information collected was often limited. 

Many of the difficulties we experienced have been discussed by previous scholars (Cheh, 1995,

Fyfe, 1986, Worrell, 2001), but perhaps best summarized by Archbold and Maguire (2002) with

respect to insufficient departmental data collection protocols and/or a department or city’s

reluctance to release such information to researchers. 

In Albuquerque and Columbus the city attorney to the police department chose not to

make these data available to our research team. In Albuquerque we were continually promised

that the data would be disclosed without success. A somewhat similar scenario played out in

Columbus.55 Hence, Albuquerque and Columbus failed to submit the requested data. We leave

it to the reader to draw conclusions as to why this may be the case, and the implications failure to

55 The city attorney for the police department in Columbus initially released cursory information on lawsuits filed,

but failed to respond to any future requests detailing the specifics of these lawsuits; in Albuquerque the city attorney

for the police failed to release any information at any time.

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disclose the data may have on the findings. In Charlotte-Mecklenburg, police department

officials were willing to collect and disclose the data, but in the end we were unable to obtain

and analyze it prior to the conclusion of the project. Finally, Knoxville provided us with civil

litigation data, but the format was insufficient for our purposes so as to draw any substantive

conclusions. 

The remaining four cities were willing and able to disclose civil litigation data in a

format that we could use to compare cities. We caution, however, that the information provided

is still limited in scope. Specifically, the only information we were fully and confidently able to

glean included the number of lawsuits filed during our two-year study period, the outcome or

dispositions of these cases, and the extent of monetary payout. As a result, these data are what

we were able to rely on for the following analyses.

Analyses and Findings

Given the relatively few civil litigation cases filed (in comparison with force or

complaints), we do not place the number of lawsuits within the context of calls for service,

reported crimes, or arrests. Rather, we examine the findings as illustrated in Table 8-1. 

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Table 8-1. Lawsuits Filed, Outcomes, and Monetary Payouts

Col. Sp. Port. Ft. Wy. St. Pete

# All

Lawsuits

17 75 91 22

# Force

Lawsuits

3

(17.6%)

48

(64.0%)

51

(56.0%)

3

(13.6%)

All

Lawsuits

Outcome

Dismissed=10 

Pending=3

Settled=4

Dismissed=15

Pending=27

Arbitration-win=1

Arbitration-loss=1

Settled=31

Dismissed=7

Pending=11

Denied=43

Settled=22

Loss=8

Dismissed=4

Pending=6

Settled=11

Loss=1

Force

Lawsuits

Outcome

Dismissed=2

Pending=1

Dismissed=7

Pending=20

Arbitration-win=1

Arbitration-loss=1

Settled=19

Dismissed=3

Pending=7

Denied=21

Settled=14

Loss=6

Dismissed=1

Settled=2

All

Lawsuits

Monetary

Payout

$5,259,32656 $1,292,649 $113,89957 $145,89958

Force

Lawsuits

Monetary

Payout

$0 $967,656 $54,67459 $5,500

56 $5,250,000 of this amount was paid as part of one settlement.

57 This figure computed based on 20 of the 30 settled/loss cases. Monetary figures were not reported for the

remaining 10 cases. 

58 This figure computed based on the 11 settled cases. The one case the city lost was being appealed.

59 This figure computed based on 11 of the 20 settled/loss cases. Monetary figures were not reported for the

remaining 9 cases. 

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The top two rows indicate both the total number of lawsuits filed during the two-year

study period as well as the number and percentage of the total that allege some form of improper

force usage. As shown, there is a fairly clear distinction between the two cities with the most

lawsuits filed (i.e., Fort Wayne and Portland) and the two cities with the least lawsuits filed (i.e.,

St. Petersburg and Colorado Springs). Fort Wayne experienced the most suits filed overall

(n=91), as well as for force (n=51). Portland had the second highest frequency of lawsuits filed

overall (n=75), as well as for force (n=48). These two cities also had a relatively high

percentage of their overall lawsuits involve allegations of improper force (56.0% in Fort Wayne

and 64.0% in Portland). St. Petersburg and Colorado Springs were at the other end of the

spectrum. St. Petersburg received 22 lawsuits with three (13.6%) being for force, while

Colorado Springs received 17 lawsuits with three (17.6%) being for force.

The middle two rows in Table 8-1 indicate the case dispositions of all the lawsuits filed

as well as the case dispositions for those cases involving force. As illustrated, while there are

some similarities as to how the cities label various types of disposition outcomes (i.e., dismissed,

pending, settled, loss), there are also some unique categorizations within some cities. In

particular, Portland had two cases “arbitrated” (one for a win and one for a loss), while Fort

Wayne had a substantial number of claims (n=43) “denied” (i.e., cases that failed to meet

minimal evidence of wrongdoing to move forward in the civil system). 

Perhaps the best way to glean meaningful substance from these outcomes is to compute

the percentage of cases where the city either lost or settled the case in relation to the total

number of lawsuits filed. Using this strategy and beginning with the all lawsuits filed row, St.

Petersburg lost/settled the highest percentage of cases at 54.5 percent (i.e., 12 of the 22 cases). 

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This is followed by Portland, which settled/lost 32 of their 75 cases for a percentage of 42.7. 

Fort Wayne had the next highest percentage at 33.0 (30 of 91 cases). Finally, Colorado Springs

fared the best with losing or settling just 23.5 percent of the time (4 of 17 cases). 

Applying a similar strategy for force dispositions (i.e., row 4), we see that St. Petersburg

lost/settled the highest percentage of cases at 66. percent (i.e., 2 of the 3 force cases). This is

followed by Portland, which settled/lost 20 of their 48 cases for a percentage of 41.7. Fort

Wayne had the next highest percentage at 39.2 (20 of 51 cases). Finally, Colorado Springs fared

the best losing or settling none of their three force cases.

Finally, the last two rows of Table 8-1 depicts the monetary payout the cities made in

regard to their lawsuits during the two-year study period. As shown, Colorado Springs had the

highest payout of the four cities at $5,259,326. However, it is important to note that nearly all of

this figure ($5,250,000) resulted from one case involving a number of officers over a dispute

involving the city pay structure, including overtime. Moreover, none of the cases involving

force involved a monetary payout. Portland had the next highest payout at $1,292,649 for all

lawsuits and $967,656 for lawsuits involving force. The remaining two cities had substantially

less payout. St. Petersburg ended up paying $145,899, but only $5,500 of the total amount was

for force cases. Fort Wayne paid out a little less overall for their lost/settled cases at $113,899,

but more in terms of force cases ($54,674). A degree of caution should be noted when

interpreting the monetary payouts as indicated in the footnotes at the bottom of Table 8-1 - as the

figures are reported based on the available information.

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Summary

Although we were only able to collect and analyze a limited amount of information

pertaining to civil litigation across four of our cities several important findings emerge. 

Colorado Springs faired extremely well. Over the course of the two-year study period, only

three lawsuits pertaining to the misuse of force were filed. Of these, two were dismissed and one

was still pending at the conclusion of the project. Viewed alternatively, Colorado Springs had

no misuse of force cases settled or lost during the study and subsequently paid out no money. 

Not far behind Colorado Springs was St. Petersburg which settled just two cases. Moreover, the

payout for these two cases cost just $5,500 in total. 

Conversely, both Portland and Fort Wayne had 20 cases that involved the improper use

of force that were either settled or lost during the study period. However, the monetary payout

between the two cities was substantial as Portland paid nearly one million dollars for these

lawsuits, while Fort Wayne ended up paying just over $50,000. One has to be cognizant though

to the fact that monetary figures were not reported in nine of the 20 Fort Wayne cases, which

could increase their payout significantly and bring it more on par with Portland. 

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CHAPTER 9

Project Summary Findings

Phase I 

In Chapter 3 we presented results of a national mail survey designed to assess the various

types of written use of force policies police agencies use throughout the country, particularly

those that incorporate the use of a force continuum. What follows is a summary of the key

findings:

Force Continuum Policies

< Over 80 percent of the responding agencies use some type of force continuum

policy. Of these agencies, the linear design was the most frequently used (73%),

followed by matrix/box designs and circular/wheel designs, each with roughly 10

percent of the agencies using them. 

< With respect to the tactical placement of force tactics (soft hands, pain

compliance controls, hard hands) and weapons (batons, chemical sprays, CEDs),

and how police agencies rank the order of such in terms of progression, the key

finding uncovered was the enormous variation present.

< Of the 476 agencies that outlined their force progression, a total of 123

different permutations were uncovered, ranging from three to nine

different levels (the vast majority, 390 or 82.0%, relied on five or six

levels). 

< Of the 371 agencies that listed citizen resistance progression, a total of 23

permutations were uncovered, ranging from three to seven different levels

(the vast majority, 343 or 92.4%, relied on five or six levels). 

< For departments that attempt to incorporate a force continuum approach into their

policy and provide officers with explicit guidance as to the types of force most

appropriate given varying types of resistance (i.e., link citizen resistance to force),

it was difficult to identify a typically used preference. 

< The most frequent approach was used by only 20 percent of the

departments, while the second and third most frequently used approaches

were just half of that at 10 percent. 

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< The placement of chemical sprays and CEDs appear to offer the greatest

challenge for police administrators as to the proper placement within the force

continuum. 

< Roughly 30 percent of the agencies place chemical sprays with pain

compliance techniques, another 30 percent of the departments place

chemical sprays with hard hand tactics, and just over a third of the

agencies place chemical sprays with impact weapons. A handful of

departments even place chemical sprays as low as empty-hand soft

techniques (n=12) and as high as deadly force (n=6). 

< Compared to chemical sprays, there was somewhat less variation when it

comes to CED placement, but far from a clear consensus. Nearly 60

percent of the agencies place CEDs at the impact weapon level, while

another 2.0 percent place it along with deadly force. The remaining

agencies place CEDs with some sort of hands on force (a quarter of the

agencies place CEDs at the same level as hard empty-hand tactics, with

another 13.1 percent placing CEDs with pain compliance techniques). 

Phase II

In the second phase of the project we selected eight police agencies for in-depth study on

use of force policies and practices. Each agency had a different policy approach with respect to

instructing officers on the application of force, and we sought to determine which types of

policies offer more beneficial outcomes to police practitioners. To do so, we relied on four

primary sources of data: a patrol officer survey, use of force report data, complaint data, and

civil litigation data. Here we present the key findings gleaned from each of these sources of

data.

Patrol Officer Survey Data

In Chapter 5, our patrol officer survey, we captured information on perceptions of the

overall less lethal use of force policy, relevant outcomes of the policy, as well as the training

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associated with the policy. What follows is a summary of key findings of each of these primary

sections.

Less Lethal Force Policy Perceptions

In assessing officers’ perceptions of their less lethal use of force policy, we utilized

responses from survey items that focused on policy assistance, restrictiveness, clarity, guidance,

and review fairness. In doing so, we rank order cities based on their overall agreement and

disagreement (i.e., combining “strongly” and “somewhat” responses) with each of the relevant

survey items. At the end of this section, we present cumulative rank ordering across the

following five major policy perception areas. For all rankings in this section, lower scores

indicate more positive or favorable perceptions. 

Assistance

We begin by ranking each department in terms of their agreement with the survey

question that their less lethal force policy “assists officer decision making.” In terms of

assistance, Knoxville officers expressed the most positive assessments, while St. Petersburg

expressed the least favorable evaluations. 

< Rankings:

1-Knoxville, 2-Albuquerque, 3-Fort Wayne, 4-Columbus, 

5-Colorado Springs, 6-Portland, 7-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 8-St. Petersburg.

Restrictiveness

In a similar manner, we also rank each department in terms of their disagreement with the

survey question that their less lethal force policy “is too restrictive.” St. Petersburg officers

expressed the strongest beliefs that their policy was restrictive, while Knoxville officers were at

the other end of the spectrum (i.e., policy is not too restrictive). 

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< Rankings:

1-Knoxville, 2-Colorado Springs, 3-Fort Wayne, 4-Albuquerque, 

5-Columbus, 6-Portland, 7-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 8-St. Petersburg.

Clarity

Next, we present the rank ordering of departments in terms officers’ agreement that their

less lethal use of force policy “is clear.” The most favorable assessments of policy clarity come

from Knoxville, while Portland officers held the least positive perceptions that their policy is

clear. 

< Rankings:

1-Knoxville, 2-Albuquerque, 3-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 4-Fort Wayne, 

5-Colorado Springs, 6-Columbus, 7-St. Petersburg, 8-Portland.

Guidance

In ranking departments in terms of guidance, we utilized agreement levels across the

survey item that asked officers the extent to which their policy provides guidance in terms of

“when force can and cannot be used.” Across departments, Portland ranked last in their

agreement that the policy provides them with adequate guidance. On the other hand, Knoxville,

as they did for assistance and clarity, held the strongest positive attitudes that their policy

adequately guides their use of force. 

< Rankings:

1-Knoxville, 2-Albuquerque, 3-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 4-Columbus, 

5-St. Petersburg, 6-Colorado Springs, 7-Fort Wayne, 8-Portland.

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Review Fairness

Our final topic, in assessing overall less lethal force policy perceptions, departs from the

previous four areas that focused on policy interpretation and utilization, and instead deals with

the review process after use of force is used. Below, we present the departmental ranking of

assessments that the “supervisory review of use of force reports is fair.” The most positive

attitudes in supervisory review fairness were found among Portland officers, while the least

positive attitudes were found in Colorado Springs. 

< Rankings:

1-Portland, 2-Knoxville, 3-Columbus, 4-Fort Wayne, 

5-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 6-Albuquerque, 7-St. Petersburg, 8-Colorado Springs.

Summary

While this section illuminated differences across departments in ranking their perceptions

of core areas of their use of force policy individually, one might also wonder how departments

ordered in terms of these dimensions cumulatively. Table 9-1 does just that by combining the

ranking results from the previous five sub-sections to give a more global characterization of

departmental ranking of their less lethal use of force policy in general. Not surprisingly,

Knoxville, leads all departments, by far, in their overall assessment of their force policy, while

St. Petersburg is last. 

< Rankings:

1-Knoxville, 2-Albuquerque, 3-Fort Wayne, 4-Columbus,5-CharlotteMecklenburg, 6-Colorado Springs, 7-Portland, 8-St. Petersburg.

184

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Table 9-1. Perceptions of LTLF Policy Comparison Rank: Cumulative Results.

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Cha

Assistance Rank

56 2 3 8 1 7 

RestrictivenessRank

26 4 3 8 1 7 

ClarityRank

58 2 4 7 1 3 

GuidanceRank

68 2 7 5 1 3 

SupervisoryReview Rank

81 6 4 7 2 5 

Total 26 29 16 21 35 6 25 Overall Rank 67 2 3 8 1 5 

 *Lower ranks indicate more favorable perceptions of the policy

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Outcomes of Less Lethal Force Policy

In addition to evaluating agencies in terms of the use of force policy in general, we were

also interested in assessing views of the policy in terms of important outcomes, all of which have

been studied behaviorally as part of this project. That is, we asked officers what impact, in their

estimation, the less lethal use of force policy had on potential citizen injuries (studied

behaviorally in Chapter 6), officer injuries (studied behaviorally in Chapter 6), citizen

complaints (studied behaviorally in Chapter 7), and lawsuits (studied behaviorally in Chapter 8). 

Officers were asked to respond to these questions with one of the following categories:

“increases the likelihood,” “decreases the likelihood,” or “neither increases nor decreases the

likelihood.” 

Potential Citizen Injuries

In terms of citizen injuries, the modal response by patrol officers from all departments

was that their agency’s force policy decreases the likelihood of potential citizen injuries. 

Variation in these modal responses allow us to rank order agencies with lower values indicating

more positive assessments (i.e., highest percentage of respondents reporting that the policy

decreases the likelihood). As was the case for overall views of the force policy, Knoxville

ranked first. On the other end of the spectrum was Fort Wayne, which had the fewest percentage

of respondents that reported that the policy decreased the likelihood for potential citizen injuries.

< Rankings:

1-Knoxville, 2-St. Petersburg, 3-Albuquerque, 4-Colorado Springs, 

5-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 6-Portland, 7-Columbus, 8-Fort Wayne.

186

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Potential Officer Injuries

When asked what the effect of the force policy has on potential officer injuries, six of the

agencies’ modal responses was “decreases the likelihood,” while St. Petersburg and CharlotteMecklenburg were divergent, and both had a modal response that their policy actually increases

officer injury potential. Given that the latter would suggest negative assessments (more so than

the lowest percentage of responses found for “decreases the likelihood”), we still rank order

departments from most to least positive. Once again, Knoxville held the most favorable policy

attitudes, while St. Petersburg held the least positive assessments of their policy (i.e., in terms of

the likelihood of officer injuries).

< Rankings:

1-Knoxville, 2-Colorado Springs, 3-Albuquerque, 4-Columbus, 

5-Portland, 6-Fort Wayne, 7-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 8-St. Petersburg.

Potential Citizen Complaints

Assessing attitudes regarding force policy and citizen complaints was more problematic

than the previous two outcomes. While approximately a third of all respondents, across all

departments, indicated that the policy increased the likelihood of citizen complaints, the modal

response in six of our eight departments was that officers believed that their policy neither

increases nor decreases the likelihood of potential citizen complaints, while Colorado Springs

and St. Petersburg had modal responses which indicated that officers believed that the policy

increases the potential for citizen complaints. Because responses of “neither increases nor

decreases the likelihood” suggest no impact, departments were unable to be scored against one

another.

187

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Potential Lawsuits

Like that for the outcome of citizen complaints, views of the force policy’s effect on

potential lawsuits, with a stronger intensity, were generally negligible across most departments

(and thus not ranked). The modal response in six of our eight department was that officers

believed that their policy neither increases nor decreases the likelihood of potential lawsuits,

while St. Petersburg and Knoxville’s modal response indicated that officers believed that the

policy decreases lawsuit potential. 

Summary

In shedding light on officers’ views of the potential impact of the force policy on a

variety of outcomes, modal responses suggest that rank ordering agencies was less problematic

for assessing citizen and officer injuries. Knoxville held the most favorable assessments of the

policy’s effect on both citizen and officer injuries. The least positive evaluations of the policy

were found for Fort Wayne (for citizen injuries) and St. Petersburg (for officer injuries). On the

other hand, beliefs regarding citizen complaints and lawsuits, for most departments, were

negligible.

Training and Less Lethal Force Policy

Our final assessment of officer perceptions of less lethal force has to do with the training

that police receive, which presumably incorporates aspects of the agency’s policy. While the

majority of patrol officers, from all departments, agreed that their training was adequate, we

found substantial variation across sites. What follows is a ranking of departments for pre-service

and in-service training separately, as well as cumulatively (in adding up rank totals across the

two dimensions). 

188

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Pre-Service Training

In terms of academy (or pre-service) training on less lethal force, the most favorable

assessments were found in Knoxville (see Table 9-2). On the other end of the spectrum were St.

Petersburg officers, who reported the least positive views of pre-service force training. 

< Rankings:

1-Knoxville, 2-Albuquerque, 3-Columbus, 4-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 

5-Fort Wayne, 6-Portland, 7-Colorado Springs, 8-St. Petersburg.

In-Service Training

With respect to in-service force training, we also found substantial variation across

departments, and also generally less positive attitudes than those noted for pre-service training. 

The most favorable views of in-service force training were found in Columbus, while the least

favorable were among Fort Wayne patrol officers.

< Rankings:

1-Columbus, 2-Knoxville, 3-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 4-Albuquerque, 

5-Portland, 6-St. Petersburg, 7-Colorado Springs, 8-Fort Wayne.

Summary

The last row in Table 9-2 reports the overall ranking by combining departmental

positions noted for pre-service and in-service training. As was the case for overall policy

perceptions, Knoxville led the rest of the departments in their positive assessments of training. 

The least positive views of overall force training was found in Colorado Springs and St.

Petersburg.

< Rankings:

1-Knoxville, 2-Columbus, 3-Albuquerque, 4-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 

5-Portland, 6-Fort Wayne, 7-Colorado Springs, 7-St. Petersburg.

189

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 9-2. Perceptions of LTLF Pre-Service and In-Service Training Comparison Ran

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Cha

LTLF PreService Rank 7625814LTLF InService Rank 7548623Total 14 11 6 13 14 3 7 Overall Rank 7536714

 *Lower ranks indicate more positive assessments

190

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Summary 

Finally, in an effort to summarize agency rankings further, we assessed the combined

rankings of officers’ perceptions of the overall policy (from Table 9-1), the policy impact on

potential citizen and officer injuries (see pages 185-186), and pre-service and in-service training

associated with the policy (from Table 9-2). These three rankings were added together to come

up with an overall assessment across cities. As such, the city with the most favorable

perceptions, across the board, was Knoxville, while the least favorable cumulative assessments

were found in St. Petersburg and, to a lesser extent, Portland and Fort Wayne. 

Overall Policy Citizen/Officer Injury

Ranking Ranking

1-Knoxville 1-Knoxville

2-Albuquerque 2-Colorado Springs

3-Fort Wayne 2-Albuquerque

4-Columbus 4-St. Petersburg

5-Charlotte-Mecklenburg 5-Portland

6-Colorado Springs 5-Columbus

7-Portland 7-Charlotte-Mecklenburg

8-St. Petersburg 8-Fort Wayne

Training Combined Policy Perceptions

Ranking Ranking

1-Knoxville 1-Knoxville

2-Columbus 2-Albuquerque

3-Albuquerque 3-Columbus

4-Charlotte-Mecklenburg 4-Colorado Springs

5-Portland 5-Charlotte-Mecklenburg

6-Fort Wayne 6-Portland

7-Colorado Springs 6-Fort Wayne

7-St. Petersburg 8-St. Petersburg

191

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Force Report Data

In Chapter 6, we looked at a multitude of ways to compare cities in relation to how

officers use force, the nature of resistance officers face, and the combination of the two. In

addition, we examined suspect and officer injuries. Here we attempt to summarize key findings,

and more importantly, place the findings into a meaningful context so readers can more easily

assess the merits/drawbacks of the various policy approaches.

Aggregate Officer Force Usage in Relation to Calls for Service, Reported Crimes,

and Arrests

Table 9-3 ranks each of the cities with respect to how their force usage varies when

placed within the context of calls for service, reported crimes, and arrests.60 Depicted across

each of the rows is where the cities ranked relative to the indicator (i.e., calls, crimes, arrests). 

Lower numbers indicate less force, while higher numbers indicate more force. These ranks are

then summed up for a composite ranking across all three indicators. As shown, Colorado

Springs faired the best (i.e., officers used the least amount of force), while Fort Wayne fell on the

opposite end of the spectrum.(i.e., officers used the most amount of force). 

< Rankings:

1-Colorado Springs, 2-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 3-Knoxville, 4-Albuquerque, 5-St.

Petersburg, 6-Columbus, 7-Portland, 8-Fort Wayne.

60 The summary tables depicted here draw on more detailed tables that were presented in Chapter 6. 

192

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 9-3. Force Comparison Rank for Calls for Service, Reported Crimes, and Arrests

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

CallsCrimesArrests

121

876

334

7 

87

655

243

468

Total 4 21 10 22 16918 Rank 1748536

Table 9-4. Force Comparison Rank to by Force Type

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Weaponless Soft Hands Hard Hands

17

43

25

68

52

76

31

Weapon Chemical Baton CED Impact Point Deadly Other

5281374

3478867

8857416

7616142

4161553

2644515

6321211

Total 38 50 46 41 32 40 20 Rank 3865241

 *Lower ranks indicate less force, higher ranks indicated more force

193

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Aggregate Officer Force

Table 9-4 incorporates a similar ranking system to Table 9-3 for tallying and ranking

force, but in this instance examines the amount of force used by various types. Examining force

in this manner shows that Columbus officers, by far, used the least amount of force. Conversely,

Portland officers used the most force overall. 

< Rankings:

1-Columbus, 2-St. Petersburg, 3-Colorado Springs, 4-Knoxville,

5-Fort Wayne, 6-Albuquerque, 7-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 8-Portland.

Aggregate Suspect Resistance

Table 9-5 follows the same approach by ranking the amount of suspect resistance officers

faced by type. The difference here is that the rankings are opposite. In these cases, lower

numbers indicate more resistance, while higher numbers indicate less resistance. Hence,

Knoxville officers faced the most challenging suspects (i.e., those who resist the most), while

Fort Wayne officers faced the least challenging suspects (i.e., those who resist the least).

< Rankings:

1-Knoxville, 2-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 3-Columbus, 4-Albuquerque,

5-Colorado Springs, 6-St. Petersburg, 7-Portland, 8-Fort Wayne.

194

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 9-5. Resistance Comparison Rank for Resistance Types

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Fail to ComplyDefensiveAggressiveDeadly

6367

2858

8722

7675

4486

5211

1543

Total 22 23 19 25 22 9 13 Rank

* 5748513

*Lower ranks indicate more resistance, higher ranks indicated less resistance

195

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Force Relative to Resistance

The primary reason for reversing the ranking system between Tables 9-4 and 9-5 is to

compare “relative” force to resistance as depicted in Table 9-6. For instance, a city ranking 8th

on force and 8th on resistance (summing to 16) indicates a city where officers use a lot of force,

but face little resistance, relatively. Conversely, a city ranking 1st on force and 1st on resistance

(summing to 2) indicates a city where officers use little force, but face a lot of resistance,

relatively. Those cities that have a lot of force and resistance, or little force and resistance are

treated equally. For example, a city ranking 8th on force and 1st on resistance (i.e., a lot of force

and resistance) would sum to 9, and rank identical to a city ranking 1st on force and 8th resistance

(i.e., a little force and resistance). Thus, a higher number and rank indicates a city where officers

are using relatively more force than the resistance faced, while a lower number and rank

indicates a city where officers face relatively more resistance than the force used. Within this

context, Table 9-6 shows that Columbus officers used the least amount of force relative to

resistance faced. Conversely, Portland officers used a relatively high amount of force compared

to the level of resistance faced. 

< Rankings:

1-Columbus, 2-Knoxville, 3-St. Petersburg, 4-Colorado Springs,

5-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 6-Albuquerque, 7-Fort Wayne, 8-Portland.

196

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 9-6. Force Relative to Resistance Comparison Rank

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Force Rank

3865241

ResistanceRank

5748513

Total 8 15 10 137 5 4 Overall Rank 4867321

Table 9-7. Force Ranking Results from Table 9-3 and Table 9-6

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Colu

Table 9-3 Rank

1748536

Table 9-6Rank

4867321

Total 5 15 10 158 5 7 Overall Rank 1767513

 *Lower ranks indicate less force, higher ranks indicated more force

197

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Summary

Taking the aggregate levels findings from Table 9-3 and incorporating them with the

findings presented in Table 9-6 allows us to make a more definitive assessment as to which cities

fare better in terms of how frequently they use force, while also accounting for the nature of

suspect resistance. As Table 9-7 shows, when summing and comparing the rankings, Colorado

Springs and Knoxville fare relatively well; Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Columbus, St. Petersburg,

and Albuquerque fall in the middle range; and Portland and Fort Wayne fare relatively poorly.

< Rankings:

1-Colorado Springs, 1-Knoxville, 3-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 3-Columbus,

5-St. Petersburg, 6-Albuquerque, 7-Fort Wayne, 7-Portland.

Force and Resistance Comparisons

After looking at force and resistance in an aggregate manner, we turned to bivariate and

multivariate examinations. In particular, we looked at how officers responded (i.e, the types of

force they used) to specific types of resistance (i.e., failure to comply, defensive physical,

aggressive physical). In addition, we looked at the highest level of force officers use across the

cities controlling for alternative factors than may prompt force. The key findings are as follows:

< Colorado Springs, Columbus, and St. Petersburg officers used various forms of

hard hand tactics, chemical sprays, and CEDs on suspects who displayed just

failure to comply resistance, despite their policy advising against such force.

< Meanwhile, Albuquerque’ policy permitted the use of CEDs on verbally

resistant suspects but rarely did officers use it.

< Portland’s policy advises officers against the use of hard hand tactics on

defensively resistant suspects, while Albuquerque, Knoxville, and CharlotteMecklenburg’s policy permits such force. Yet, officers is all four cities used this

form of force similarly.

198

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
< Moreover, Colorado Springs policy, similar to Portland, advises against

hard hand tactics on defensively resistant suspect, yet Colorado Springs

officers used such force more frequently than any of the other cities.

< St. Petersburg and Charlotte-Mecklenburg generally restrict use of the CED to

instances where suspects are aggressively resistant, yet officers in these two cities

used this type of force much differently despite the similarity in policy (i.e., St.

Petersburg officers used the CED frequently, while Charlotte-Mecklenburg used

the CED infrequently).

< Consistent with our bivariate analyses, the multivariate analyses indicated that it

is difficult to pinpoint any sort of consistent policy effects. In some cases we

found officers operating along the lines that one might expect given the varying

policy approaches, while in other instances we do not. 

Summary

From this set of analyses, we were unable to find a distinct link in terms of officer

behavior operating within the realm of policy - in fact, we often found officers using force on

suspects that appeared to fall outside the policy. Such behavior was not restricted to a certain

city or policy approach. While the findings call into question the connection between policy and

behavior, the reader should interpret this with a degree of caution. First, there are certainly

instances, as illustrated in Chapter 6, where officer behavior falls within the realm of their policy

mandate. Second, mainly of the were bivariate in nature and do not permit control of other rival

causal factors that may explain the reasons officers used the force they did, and thus justify that

the behavior was actually within policy rather than what appears outside of policy (see also

footnotes 43 and 44). 

Suspect Injuries and Force

Drawing on data derived from the force reports we also examined suspect injuries. More

specifically, we computed suspect injury rates with respect to the frequency of injuries in

199

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
relation to the total number of force reports filed per city. The following ranks how cities fared

from the city with the least suspect injuries (i.e., St. Petersburg) to the city with the most suspect

injuries (i.e., Charlotte-Mecklenburg).

< Rankings:

1-St. Petersburg, 2-Columbus, 3-Albuquerque, 4-Fort Wayne,

5-Portland, 6-Colorado Springs, 7-Knoxville, 8-Charlotte-Mecklenburg.

From a policy perspective, we note several interesting findings:

< The range of injuries across cities varies widely: from 15.9 percent in St.

Petersburg to 73.5 percent in Charlotte-Mecklenburg.

< Charlotte-Mecklenburg and St. Petersburg both restrict CED use to aggressively

resistant suspects, yet they fall on opposite ends in terms of suspect injuries

(Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers had the most injuries, St. Petersburg the least). 

< Moreover, Colorado Springs officers used a CED far more frequently than

officers in other cities, yet they had just the third highest percentage of

injuries.

< Arguably, the three cities with the least restrictive policies (Fort Wayne and

Columbus do not link resistance to force, and Albuquerque permits all types of

force on verbally resistant suspects) all fall in the middle to low range on suspect

injuries. 

< Knoxville and Colorado Springs resulted in the second and third highest

percentage of injuries. However, their policies are substantially different.

Colorado Springs employs a wheel design and reserves hard hand tactics and

impact force to aggressive resistant suspects, while Knoxville allows officers to

use not only hard hands tactics and impact methods on defensively resistant

suspects, but also chemical spray and a CED. 

Officer Injuries and Force

Drawing on data derived from the force reports we also examined officer injuries. More

specifically, we computed officer injury rates with respect to the frequency of injuries in relation

to the total number of force reports filed per city. The following ranks how cities fared from the

200

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
city with the least officer injuries (i.e., Columbus) to the city with the most officer injuries (i.e.,

Knoxville).61

< Rankings:

1-Columbus, 2-Portland, 3-St. Petersburg, 4-Fort Wayne, 

5-Colorado Springs, 6-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 7-Knoxville.

From a policy perspective, we note several interesting findings:

< There is little variation across cities with respect to officer injuries when

compared to suspect injuries. 

< The small range of injuries goes from 8.1 percent in Columbus up to just

14.8 percent in Knoxville. 

< Officer injury rates are much lower on average than that of suspect injuries. 

< The city with the highest percentage of officer injuries (Knoxville,

14.8%), was still lower than the city with the lowest percentage of suspect

injuries (St. Petersburg, 15.9%). 

< Charlotte-Mecklenburg and St. Petersburg both restrict CED use to aggressive

resistance, yet Charlotte-Mecklenburg reported the second highest percentage of

officer injuries, while St. Petersburg reported just the fifth highest percentage. 

< Moreover, Colorado Springs officers used a CED far more frequently than

officers in all the other cities, yet this city still had just the third highest

percentage of officer injuries.

< Two of the cities with the least restrictive policies (Fort Wayne and Columbus)

fall in the middle to low range on officer injuries. One may posit that less policy

restriction may lead to more injuries (i.e., because officers will have more

freedom), but we find that such policies were related to less injuries. 

< Knoxville and Charlotte-Mecklenburg had the highest percentage of injuries, yet 

their policies are substantially different. In particular, officers in CharlotteMecklenburg are restricted from using a CED or impact force on suspects unless

they are aggressively resistant. Knoxville’s policy is less restrictive with the use

of a CED and impact weapons, permitting such force to be used on suspects who

display just defensive resistance.

61 Recall that Albuquerque did not report officer injuries.

201

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Summary

Finally, in an attempt to summarize agency rankings further we assessed the frequency of

force usage (while also accounting for the nature of suspect resistance - see page 197) as

displayed in column one below, along with a combined ranking of how agencies fared in terms

of suspect injuries (see page 199) and officer injuries (see page 200), as displayed in column two

below, to come up with an overall ranking of how cities compare as displayed in column three

below. Hence, using these multiple indicators gleaned from the use of force report data, we

found that Columbus fared the best in their application of force.

Force Usage Suspect/Officer Injury Combined Force and Injury

Ranking Ranking62 Ranking63

1-Colorado Springs 1-Columbus 1-Columbus

1-Knoxville 2-St. Petersburg 2-Colorado Springs

3-Charlotte-Mecklenburg 3-Albuquerque 2-St. Petersburg

3-Columbus 3-Portland 4-Knoxville

5-St. Petersburg 5-Fort Wayne 5-Albuquerque

6-Albuquerque 6-Colorado Springs 6-Charlotte-Mecklenburg

7-Fort Wayne 7-Charlotte-Mecklenburg 6-Portland

7-Portland 7-Knoxville 8-Fort Wayne

62 For this ranking order we simply summed the ranking of suspect injuries with that of officer injuries. Given that

officer injury data were not captured on the Albuquerque use of force report form, we used an average ranking of 4

(i.e., the middle of the range of 1-8) for officer injuries and then summed to their ranking for suspect injuries. 

63 For this ranking order we simply summed the ranking in the force usage column with that of the suspect/officer

injuries column.

202

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Citizen Complaint Data

In Chapter 7 we examined citizen complaint data in order to assess the different use of

force policy approaches utilized by the eight agencies. In doing so, we analyzed external

complaints, with a focus on two complaint types that relate most to the use of force (i.e.,

discourtesy and use of force allegations). Our analyses, across our sites, focused on explaining

complaint frequencies, dispositions, discipline, comparisons to workload measures (i.e., calls for

service, reported crimes, arrests, and force), totals across officers, and multivariate comparisons. 

What follows is a summary of the key findings from each of these sections. 

Frequency of Complaints 

We begin by comparing cities’ frequency of complaints for the use of force and

discourtesy. What follows is how cities ranked in terms of the percentage of citizen complaints

for use of force and discourtesy (compared to all external complaints). Summary rankings are

based on more detailed tables presented prior in our citizen complaint Chapter 7. 

Use of Force Complaints

Across our two-year study period of citizen complaints that were reported and

investigated across our eight cities, St. Petersburg had the fewest for the use of force. 

Conversely, we find the highest percentage of citizen complaints for the use of force (of all

external complaints) in Fort Wayne. For these rankings, and the remaining in this section, lower

numbers reflect more positive outcomes (i.e., less complaints), while the opposite is true for

higher rankings. 

203

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
< Rankings:

1-St. Petersburg, 2-Albuquerque, 3-Columbus, 4-Portland, 

5-Colorado Springs, 6-Knoxville, 7-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 8-Fort Wayne.

Discourtesy Complaints

In terms of the percentage of external complaints for discourtesy, Albuquerque had the

lowest ranking of the eight cities. Once again, Fort Wayne had the highest ranking based on

their percentage of external complaints that were for discourtesy, and thus the least positive

outcome. 

< Rankings:

1-Albuquerque, 2. St. Petersburg, 3-Portland, 4-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 

5-Colorado Springs, 6-Columbus, 7-Knoxville, 8-Fort Wayne.

Summary

In an attempt to summarize use of force and discourtesy amounts, as indicated by the

percentage of all external complaints, Table 9-8 adds the previous two rankings in this section

together. This allowed us to assess how cities fared cumulatively, compared to one another, in

terms of one of our primary policy outcomes - frequency of complaints. Not surprisingly, Fort

Wayne ranked the poorest of all cities. On the other end of the spectrum was Albuquerque and

St. Petersburg, both of whom fared the best (i.e., lowest) with respect to citizen use of force and

discourtesy complaints. 

< Rankings:

1-Albuquerque, 1-St. Petersburg, 3-Portland, 4-Columbus, 

5-Colorado Springs, 6-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 7-Knoxville, 8-Fort Wayne.

204

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Table 9-8. Total Use of Force and Discourtesy Citizen Complaints Comparison Rank 

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Cha

Complaint Type Use of Force Discourtesy

55

43

21

88

12

67

74

Total 10 7 3 16 3 13 11 Rank 53 1 8 1 7 6 

*Lower ranks indicate less complaints, higher ranks indicated more complaints

205

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Disposition of Complaints 

After detailing the frequency of complaints, we then turned to examinations of

dispositions. Across the cities, dispositions were categorized as “sustained,” “not sustained,”

“exonerated,” or “unfounded.” Of particular concern was comparing cities in terms of the

percentage of sustained allegations, which we noted was the exception rather than the norm. The

key findings are as follows: 

< In terms of all citizen complaints combined, we found that in no city did the

sustained amount reach 30 percent. That said, the most sustained complaints (i.e.,

the highest percentage) were found in St. Petersburg, while the fewest were found

in Columbus. 

< For use of force allegations, the percentage of sustained complaints was extremely

low, ranging from zero (in Fort Wayne and St. Petersburg) to roughly five percent

(in Albuquerque). 

< With respect to discourtesy allegations, we found that sustained dispositions were

much more likely than for the use of force (over five times the amount at the high

end). Columbus had the fewest percentage of sustained discourtesy complaints,

while Knoxville had the highest.

Disciplinary Actions of Complaints 

Next, we examined disciplinary actions of citizen complaint allegations. In comparing

cities, we focused on formal discipline (i.e., written reprimands, suspensions, and terminations)

over less formal (i.e., supervisory action, command counseling, and “other”) or no sanctions. 

Across all cities, we noted that formal discipline of citizen complaints was very rare. The key

findings are as follows: 

 < In terms of all citizen complaints, it was not too surprising to see formal

discipline was rather infrequent (ranging from roughly two percent in Columbus

to 16 percent in St. Petersburg), given the relatively low levels of sustained

complaints.

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< The percentage of use of force allegations that resulted in some form of formal

discipline was extremely low. Across cities, Colorado Springs, Fort Wayne, and

St. Petersburg did not have a single force complaint that resulted in formal

discipline. On the high end, although just over one out of every thirty allegations,

was Charlotte-Mecklenburg. 

< Like the pattern noted for sustained complaints, the percentage of allegations for

discourtesy resulted in higher amounts (in nearly every city) of formal discipline

when compared to the use of force. As was the case for all allegations, Columbus

had the fewest percentage of their discourtesy complaints result in some form of

formal action, while Charlotte-Mecklenburg (as they did for use of force

allegations) had the most. 

Complaints in Relation to Calls for Service, Reported Crimes, Arrests, and Force

Besides explaining frequencies (and percentages) of the complaint process from overall

totals to formal discipline, across cities, we also placed complaints within the context of a variety

of agency workload measures (as we did previously in this chapter for the use of force). That is,

we examined citizen complaints for the use of force and discourtesy in relation to calls for

service, reported crime, arrest, and use of force. 

Use of Force Complaints 

In assessing use of force citizen complaints, in relation to our workload measures (see

Table 9-9), the most favorable city was St. Petersburg, who ranked first across average

complaints per 1,000 calls for service, per 1,000 Part I Index crimes, per 1,000 arrests, and per

100 use of force reports. On the other end of the spectrum, and thus ranking last, was Colorado

Springs with the highest cumulative score. 

< Rankings:

1-St. Petersburg, 2-Knoxville, 3-Fort Wayne, 4-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 

5-Portland, 5-Albuquerque, 7-Columbus, 8-Colorado Springs.

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Discourtesy Complaints

Comparisons of discourtesy citizen complaints, per workload measures (see Table 9-10),

revealed once again that St. Petersburg fared the best. On the other hand, Columbus

cumulatively fared the poorest of all cities.

< Rankings:

1-St. Petersburg, 2-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 3-Knoxville, 4-Albuquerque, 

5-Portland, 6-Fort Wayne, 7-Colorado Springs, 8-Columbus.

Summary

In summarizing external complaints for the use of force and discourtesy, per calls for

service, reported crime, arrests, and use of force, in both cases, St. Petersburg ranked the best of

all cities. The two cities that ranked the least positive were Colorado Springs and Columbus,

both of which were more likely to receive external use of force and discourtesy complaints,

based on the citizen-based workload measures. 

Use of Force and Discourtesy Officer Totals

Our next analysis extended the examination of citizen complaints for force and

discourtesy to the officer level. As such, we examined the number of officers that comprised the

combined total number of citizen force and discourtesy complaints per city. We also calculated

the average number of complaints per officer. For both sections, we restricted our analysis to

instances where an individual officer was identified. 

Complaints per Sworn Personnel

In deducing complaints per sworn personnel, we divided the number of individual

officers that comprised the total number of external force and discourtesy allegations (over the

two-year period) by the total number of sworn personnel. 

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Table 9-9. External Use of Force Complaint Rank to Calls for Service, Reported Crime, Arrests and 

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Cha

CallsCrimesArrestsForce Reports

7868

8654

5576

3432

1111

2323

4247

Total 29 23 23 12 4 10 17 Rank 8553124

*Lower ranks indicate less external force complaints, higher ranks indicated more force complaints

Table 9-10. External Discourtesy Complaint Rank to Calls for Service, Reported Crime, Arrests and 

Col. Sp. Port. Albq. Ft. Wy. St. Pete Knox. Cha

CallsCrimesArrestsForce Reports

6778

8665

4353

5542

2211

2434

1126

Total 28 25 15 26 6 13 10 Rank 7546132

*Lower ranks indicate less discourtesy complaints, higher ranks indicated more discourtesy complaints

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This revealed rather substantial variation across cities. The fewest overall percentage of sworn

personnel with a citizen complaint for force or discourtesy was found in St. Petersburg, while the

most (i.e., least favorable) was found in Colorado Springs. 

< Rankings:

1-St. Petersburg, 2-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 3-Albuquerque, 4-Fort Wayne, 

5-Knoxville, 6-Columbus, 7-Portland, 8-Colorado Springs.

Officer Complaint Averages

We extended the officer analysis to compare the average number of citizen complaints

for force and discourtesy, where an officer was named, across the officers that had at least one 

complaint. The city that fared the best (i.e., fewest average complaint totals) was Fort Wayne,

which is interesting given that they had the highest percentage of their external complaints for

force and discourtesy. The highest average complaint totals for force and discourtesy was found

in Columbus, and thus faring the poorest of all cities in this respect. 

< Rankings:

1-Fort Wayne, 2-St. Petersburg, 3-Knoxville, 3-Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 

5-Albuquerque, 6-Colorado Springs, 7-Portland, 8-Columbus.

Multivariate Analysis

Our final examination of external complaints for the use of force and discourtesy, utilized

a multivariate approach to explain both types of complaints, while controlling for citizen factors

(i.e., sex, race, and age). In doing so, our primary aim was to isolate the independent effects of

each city. Our analytical model, which combined citizen complaints for force and discourtesy

(as we did in the preceding section) used Fort Wayne as the reference category, given their

aggregate findings regarding citizen complaints (see Table 9-8). Our analysis revealed:

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< While the likelihood of receiving a complaint was statistically lower than Fort

Wayne in all cities, Albuquerque and St. Petersburg represented the cities that

contrasted Fort Wayne the most. In terms of our citizen controls, none were

statistically distinguishable in our model.

Summary 

Finally, in an effort to summarize several analyses, we combine rankings from three

separate examinations of citizen complaints to reveal a cumulative ordering across cities. More

specifically, we add the following city rankings: total citizen force and discourtesy (from Table

9-8) , the two workload rankings (combining results from Tables 9-9 and 9-10), and the external

force and discourtesy complaints per sworn personnel (from page 209). Our combined rankings

reveal that St. Petersburg fared the most positive (i.e., combined score of 3), with respect to

citizen complaints for force and discourtesy, while Colorado Springs cumulatively fared the

poorest (i.e., combined score of 20). 

 Total Citizen Force/Discourtesy Combined Workload Measures

Ranking Ranking

1-Albuquerque 1-St. Petersburg

1-St. Petersburg 2-Knoxville

3-Portland 3-Charlotte-Mecklenburg

4-Columbus 4-Albuquerque

5-Colorado Springs 4-Fort Wayne

6-Charlotte-Mecklenburg 6-Portland

7-Knoxville 7-Colorado Springs

8-Fort Wayne 7-Columbus

Citizen Force/Discourtesy per Sworn Combined Citizen Force/Discourtesy

Ranking Ranking

1-St. Petersburg 1-St. Petersburg

2-Charlotte-Mecklenburg 2-Albuquerque

3-Albuquerque 3-Charlotte-Mecklenburg

4-Fort Wayne 4-Knoxville

5-Knoxville 5-Portland

6-Columbus 5-Fort Wayne

7-Portland 7-Columbus

8-Colorado Springs 8-Colorado Springs

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Civil Litigation Data

In Chapter 8 we examined civil litigation data to assess how these data may reflect on the

different policy approaches used by our eight agencies. This enterprise proved to be challenging

with respect to insufficient departmental data collection protocols and/or a city’s reluctance to

release such information to researchers.64 In fact, only four cities provided useable data (i.e.,

Colorado Springs, Portland, Fort Wayne, and St. Petersburg). In two of the cities (i.e., Knoxville

and Charlotte-Mecklenburg), officials attempted to provide us the requested data, but we could

not find a format that we sought. In the remaining two cities (i.e., Albuquerque and Columbus),

the city attorney declined to provide these data despite repeated requests over the course of more

than one year. We leave it to the reader to draw conclusions as to why this may be the case and

the implications the failure to disclose such data may have on the findings relating to where these

cities may have ranked. 

Number of Force Related Lawsuits Filed

Colorado Springs and St. Petersburg had the least number of force related lawsuits filed,

during our two year study period, while Fort Wayne had the most. The city rankings are as

follows (total number of force related lawsuits filed in parentheses) : 

< Rankings:

1-Colorado Springs (N=3), 1-St. Petersburg (N=3), 

3-Portland (N=48), 4-Fort Wayne (N=51).

64 See Archbold and Maguire (2002) for an excellent discussion concerning the challenges of civil litigation data

collection.

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Number of Force Related Lawsuits Settled or Lost

Colorado Springs had the least number of force related lawsuits settled or lost during our

two year study period, while Portland and Fort Wayne had the most. The city rankings are as

follows (total number of force related lawsuits settled or lost in parentheses) : 

< Rankings:

1-Colorado Springs (N=0), 2-St. Petersburg (N=2), 

3-Fort Wayne (N=20), 3-Portland (N=20).

Monetary Payout for Force Related Lawsuits

Colorado Springs had the least amount of monetary payout for force related lawsuits,

during our two year study period, while Portland had the most. The city rankings are as follows

(monetary payout in parentheses) : 

< Rankings:

1-Colorado Springs ($0), 2-Fort Wayne ($113,899), 

3-St. Petersburg ($145,899), 4-Portland ($967,656).

Summary

Finally, if we compare how each of the four agencies ranked cumulatively across the

three civil litigation indicators listed above (force lawsuits filed, force lawsuits settled/lost, and

force lawsuits monetary payout), we found that Colorado Springs fared the best.

Combined Civil Litigation Ranking65

1-Colorado Springs

2-St. Petersburg

3-Fort Wayne

4-Portland

65 For this ranking order we simply summed the ranking for force lawsuits filed, force lawsuits settled/lost, and force

lawsuits monetary payout.

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CHAPTER 10

Discussion

When we undertook this project, we sought to answer a couple of vast empirical

questions. At the simplest level, we wanted to decipher what kinds of use of force policies were

operating across the United States, and which of these policies provide more beneficial

outcomes. With this is mind, we gear this final chapter toward both the practitioner and research

community.

Police Administrators

Results from our national mail survey showed the extent to which force continua are

incorporated into written use of force policies. Two predominant findings emerged from this

research. First, a large majority of police agencies still use a force continuum approach, mostly a

linear continuum. Second, there is no commonly used means of tactical placement on the

continuum (i.e., where agencies place various hands on and weapons force).

Police administrators of agencies that currently use a force continuum, or those thinking

about adopting a force continuum approach, should take solace in the fact that most of their

colleagues across the country view the use of a force continuum as a guide to better decision

making. Articles appearing mainly in trade journal outlets (see Aveni, 2003, Peters and Brave,

2006, Petrowski, 2002, and Williams, 2002) attempting to cause alarm concerning the potential

negative effects of using a continuum have not led many agencies to abandon the use of such. 

Unfortunately, where agencies place the different force options on the continuum is

tremendously varied, especially in relation to chemical sprays and electronic devices. 

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In answering the second overarching empirical question (i.e., which use of force policies

provide more beneficial outcomes?), we relied on data gleaned from in-depth study of eight

police agencies. Deciphering which of the differing policies was better (or best) was multidimensional, as outlined in the details of Chapters 5 through 9. In the end, we found that some

of the policies, across our departments, were better than others for certain outcomes, while for

other outcomes they may not have fared as well. 

Going back to the seminal work of James Q. Wilson (1968), police chiefs consider

various audiences when running their organizations. Some chiefs prioritize officer concerns, and

thus would be interested in our outcome findings that relate more toward things of interest to

officers such as their perceptions of policy assistance, clarity, and guidance, as well as injuries

they may receive when engaged in forceful encounters with citizens. This approach, which may

endear chiefs to officers who view him/her as a “cop’s cop,” is more in line with what McGregor

(1960) views as Theory Y management. On the other hand, some chiefs might view citizen

needs as most salient in considering the best policy and practices, and thus would regard

outcomes such as frequency of force against citizens, citizen injuries, and force/discourtesy

citizen complaints as the primary outcomes. Finally, some chiefs may prioritize the operation

and functioning of the department as a whole, placing officer and citizen concerns secondary. 

Such an approach would be more in line with McGregor’s view of Theory X management, and

might value such organizational outcomes as complaints across sworn personnel, use of force

policy compliance, and lawsuits. What follows is a discussion of each of these concerns that

chiefs may consider,66 as they relate to our findings. 

66 In no way is this to imply that priorities are mutually exclusive, as chiefs undoubtedly consider all of these arenas. 

Instead, we suggest that chiefs may prioritize, or accentuate one over the other, as a function of their style. 

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Officer Concerns67

A police executive management style that places primary importance on officers’ views

and beliefs may be particularly interested in our findings from the patrol officer survey. For

instance, we found that officers in some agencies believe their use of force policy impacts the

likelihood of citizen/officer injuries, complaints, and lawsuits. Officers in Knoxville,

Albuquerque, and Colorado Springs were more likely than officers in other agencies to believe

that their policy approach helps decrease citizen/officer injuries. Conversely, modal survey

responses indicated that St. Petersburg and Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers believe their use of

force policy actually increases the likelihood of officer injuries. Interestingly, officers in both of

these agencies also felt that their policy was overly restrictive when compared to officer views in

our other agencies. Thus, St. Petersburg and Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers may feel that an

unduly restrictive policy leads to an enhanced risk of injuries. 

Police administrators may also draw on our analysis involving the actual reported number

of officer injuries in relation to the total number of force reports filed in each agency over the

course of our two year study period. In this case, we found that Columbus and Portland fared

best (i.e, had the least officer injuries), while Knoxville and Charlotte-Mecklenburg fared worse

(i.e., had the most officer injuries). If these actual officer injury rates are considered in tandem

with the survey findings on officer views of injuries, officials in Charlotte-Mecklenburg may

wish to re-evaluate their policy approach. In short, patrol officers in this city not only believe

their policy subjects them to more injuries, the statistical analysis on the amount of injuries bears

this perception out in reality. On the other hand, while St. Petersburg officers felt their policy

67 For the officer, citizen, and departmental concerns that follow, we provide illustrative (but not exhaustive)

examples of administrator considerations throughout. For a more detailed discussion of these outcomes, we refer the

reader back to the individual chapters (i.e., five through eight), as well as the project summary findings in Chapter 9.

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leads to more injuries, our analyses does find this to be the case. In fact, St. Peterburg had the

third lowest rate of injuries. In this case, officials may simply want to meet with officers to call

attention to this disconnect and reassure them that their rate of injuries is actually relatively low.

Citizen Concerns

Police managers primarily concerned with how citizens perceive police use of force

behavior may be less interested in patrol officer perceptions and injuries, and more interested in

some of our other indicators. For example, both Colorado Springs and Knoxville fared well

when considering how often officers used force in relation to a combination of various workload

measures (i.e., calls for service, reported crimes, and arrests). In other words, officers in these

cities, in general, relied on less force to accomplish their means.68 However, Portland and Fort

Wayne officers were at the opposite end of the spectrum. Officers in these cities tended to rely

on more coercive means during their encounters with citizens. As a result, police executives

more sensitive to potential citizen concerns, with respect to the frequency with which officers

use force, may wish to consider policies that mirror those of Colorado Springs and Knoxville,

and shy away from the approach taken in Portland and Fort Wayne.

Another indicator a pro-citizen police administrator may consider is citizen complaints. 

When we compared citizen complaints for use of force and discourtesy, in relation to

documented use of force, St. Petersburg and Fort Wayne fared the best. As such, administrators

who might prioritize citizen complaints, per use of force encounters with the public, might

68 This is to not say that certain forms of force that some may consider to be fairly coercive in nature were always

used infrequently. For example, Colorado Springs reported using a CED in half of all their police-suspect force

encounters (49.5%). The agency with the next highest frequency of use was Portland at 23.4 percent, or less than

half what Colorado Springs reported. Nonetheless, when workload measures, and the extent to which Colorado

Springs officers faced resistant suspects, are factored into the equation, the frequency of force usage is actually

rather low compared to officers in the other cities.

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consider adopting policies found in these two cities, while they might be more critical of

approaches endorsed by Colorado Springs and Charlotte-Mecklenburg - both of whom fared

poorly on this outcome. Of interest, is the perception-behavior accuracy and disconnect noted

among two of the aforementioned agencies. That is, St. Petersburg and Colorado Springs were

the only two agencies where the modal response by officers was that their use of force policy

increases the potential for citizen complaints. The behavioral data on complaints revealed that

Colorado Springs officers were accurately perceiving their policy’s influence, while St.

Petersburg was not. 

 

Overall Departmental Concerns

Just as some chiefs may prioritize officer or citizen concerns, in defining their

management style, others might view the functioning of the department as a whole as their

primary concern. Should this be the case, one outcome of concern may be the percentage of

citizen complaints for force and discourtesy in relation to the total number of sworn officers in a

department. St. Petersburg and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, with approximately 10 percent of their

personnel named in a complaint, ranked the most favorably, while Portland and Colorado

Springs, with over two and a half times the amount, fared the worst. As a model for police

chiefs, the policy approaches by St. Petersburg and Charlotte-Mecklenburg would appear to be

the more exemplary, than the rest, for this outcome. 

Another outcome, for executives with a management style that focuses on the concerns of

the organization as a whole, is our analysis of lawsuits. While these data are limited to half of

our agencies, Colorado Springs fared the best across the board (i.e., number of force lawsuits

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filed, settled/lost, and payouts). With respect to two indicators of primary importance for police

leaders (i.e., lawsuits settled/lost and payouts), Portland fared the worst. In connecting lawsuits

to use of force, it might be of interest to police chiefs that Colorado Springs and Portland were

on the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of force, per our workload measures. As such, the

organization that fared the best in terms of lawsuits generally relied on force less often to

accomplish their goals, while the department that fared the worst with respect to lawsuits,

generally used force more readily. 

Police Researchers

Besides police administrators, another primary audience of this study is the research

community. Across the four years of this project, we experienced a number of challenges and

lessons. Below we highlight a few, which might assist those who evaluate this work and/or plan

on undertaking a similar research endeavor. We also explain some of the limitations of our

project, as well as what we would like to see in terms of future use of force research.

Study Challenges

Throughout the course of the past four years we faced a number of challenges. Here we

offer some reflections in reference to these challenges. Our primary intent is to offer the reader a

better sense surrounding the “nuts and bolts” of this type research endeavor; but we also hope

that other researchers may glean something from these challenges that may assist in their studies.

Our initial challenge occurred during the transitional stage between Phases I and II. 

Because we wanted to select eight agencies for in-depth examination, based on the most

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frequently used policy approaches nationally, we were unable to identify and secure these

agencies until Phase I of the project (i.e., the agency survey) was completed. This created a time

lag between the two phases. In addition, we also had stringent agency selection criteria that

slowed the process. While a convenience sample of agencies would have been much easier (i.e.,

selecting local agencies or departments we worked with in the past), we feel the approach taken

offers more empirically valid and reliable results. 

Once the eight agencies were selected, we were faced with a host of additional

challenges. We highlight but a few of them here. First, since we were in the field for two years,

personnel turnover was sometimes an issue. In one of our cities, the police chief who originally

agreed to the study stepped down, and we had to seek approval with the new incoming chief to

ensure continued participation. Relatedly, our key agency contacts or liaisons assigned to us

were sometimes reassigned during the project, requiring us to begin anew with their

replacements.

Second, because of the numerous data elements involved in the project, we sometimes

had trouble identifying (or finding) the “right person” in reference to certain pieces of

information we sought. At times, this person (on paper) was not the one you would have thought

could help you obtain the data that you wanted. The key here is moving around, when

applicable, and going beyond departmental listings of personnel to get in touch with the person

who has access to (and can get) the data needed. 

Third, because we wanted to survey the population of police officers assigned to patrol

assignments, rather than selecting a sample of officers, this part of the project required a great

deal of time and effort. This meant that project staff was generally on-site for a week to ten days

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so as to visit every patrol shift, across each geographic location, at least twice. In some cases,

we attended five different roll call sessions a day. While such an effort was certainly laborious,

we feel the strengths gained (i.e., valid and reliable data, extremely high response rates) far

outmatch some of the other survey methods used by others (e.g., dropping surveys off to have

agency personnel distribute, internet surveys, etc.).

Finally, it was imperative that we develop “common measures” of officer force and

subject resistance (as a foundation of this grant) because the agencies did not always use the

same definitions or terminology. This often required us to have to go back and re-code these

measures based on the descriptions offered in the force reports. In some cases, we had to request

hard copies even when much of the data were already captured electronically. This slowed the

project, but once again should reflect the confidence we have in our findings. 

Study Limitations

While the present study has many strengths, as demonstrated throughout this report, there

are also a number of limitations. For example, two of our primary data sources were surveys

(i.e., agency and patrol officer). Given that use of force inquiries at both levels of analysis are

rare, we were without established measures to apply to our study. As such, in several instances,

we constructed our own questions, and even though they were pre-tested on a number of police

personnel from various agencies, our confidence in these measures will be enhanced once they

are replicated across other research sites. 

In addition to the limitations faced with our two surveys, the use of official records

(which provided us with the bulk of our project data) also came with a number of drawbacks. 

First, official records are documented by an “interested party” with a stake in the outcome. For

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instance, officers filling out use of force reports may do so in a manner that illustrates favorable

behavior on their part or ex post facto justifications for behavior (e.g., CYA), while the same

holds for the citizen who recalls events that occur between themselves and the police. So,

whether it be the officer documenting the force used against a citizen or the citizen filling out a

complaint against an officer, the varying perspectives of official documentation per each actor

suggests that the truth of how police-citizen encounters occur probably lies somewhere between

the officer’s account of the event and the citizen’s version. 

At the same time, as social scientists, we have to consider that police who are

documenting behavioral documentation are not as concerned as researchers might be in the

completeness of the data. For example, in cases where officers were afforded, per the official

use of force report form, a series of boxes to check for each type of force utilized (e.g., firm grip,

escort, pressure point, take down, punch, kick, etc) it is conceivable that in instances where

higher levels of physical force (e.g., kick) were displayed along with a lower level of force (e.g.,

firm grip) that only the higher level of force was checked off and documented. 

In a similar vein, instances in official documentation (e.g., use of force, officer injury,

citizen injury, etc.) where officers were provided a response category of “other,” which could

include a host of behaviors, we found that sometimes there was further explanation in an open

ended fashion and at other times the box was just checked “other.” The latter approach did not

provide us the opportunity to recode the “other” into a discrete classification of behavior. 

Another limitation involved determining the temporal ordering of force and resistance within

individual encounters, an issue discussed in previous works (Terrill, 2001, Terrill and

Mastrofski, 2002). The level of detail provided by officers in their narrative descriptions

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sometimes left us uncertain as to the specific sequencing of resistance and force behaviors. 

Thus, as indicated in Chapter 6, the reader is cautioned as per our description of officers using

force within the context of policy. 

Similarly, citizens filing complaints do so through their own perspective, and like

officers, without the cental concern of establishing quality official data. For example, there were

instances where citizens filed a complaint against the police in general, without a specific officer

named, which affected our ability to calculate precise officer-level totals. This forced us to

exclude these complaints (which in one of our sites was fairly substantial) from our analyses in

Chapter 7. 

Additional data limitations were a function of various organizational layers beyond patrol

officer and citizen documentation. In some cases the availability of official records was absent

or so lacking that we could not conduct a comprehensive data analyses. For instance, none of

the cities captured suspect wealth or demeanor, both of which have been shown to be fairly

consistent predictors of police use of force behavior. One of our research sites also failed to

capture citizen race on their use of force forms, another correlate of police use of force. Further,

as illustrated in Chapter 8, the civil litigation data were only provided and usable in four of the

eight cities.

Finally, while we believe that the eight mid-to-large sized agencies in the present study

offer a nice degree of generalizability, our findings may not translate to all types of police

departments. That is, the results of this project may not be generalizable to smaller rural

agencies or very large urban deparments where the dynamics of use of force policies and

outcomes may be operating in a different manner.

223

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Future Research

We conclude with a few recommendations for future research. First, researchers should

continue to examine which policies appear to work best. As documented throughout this report,

what works best really depends on what perspective one comes from and the indicator one

considers. Thus, future research should determine whether the findings reported here are

replicated in other settings. Moreover, researchers may develop their own approaches for how to

rank agencies based on a multitude of different indicators. 

Second, we found that most agencies use a force continuum within their written policy

and that they overwhelming select a linear design. This begs for further inquiry. For instance,

one may query police executives as to “why” they so often incorporate such an approach and the

perceived benefits and drawbacks. Alternatively, one may examine why the placement of

chemical sprays and CEDs seem to pose the greatest difficulty in terms of tactical placement.

Third, researchers need to be ever conscience as to the difficulty of measuring and coding

use of force behavior via the use of official records, especially use of force reports. We created

common measures of both officer force and citizen resistance and would strongly advise future

researchers to consider some form of a similar approach. Without the use of common measures,

the ability to compare across agencies becomes a seriously challenging, if not impossible, task.

Finally, with regard to collecting data, especially from police departments, researchers

should not be afraid to “get dirty.” Data that are easy to collect is always a bonus, but in some

circumstances may not provide the most reliable and valid information. Thus, a good researcher

is often faced with a balancing act between getting the highest quality data and not burning out. 

From the agency mail survey (i.e., individually calling departments), to picking comparable (but

224

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
different) agencies to study, to convincing departments that certain data did not need to be

redacted, to surveying a population of line officers about their policy, to photo copying and

coding (by hand) from hard copy files, to sitting with data analysts and trying to figure out how

to get “data fields” into individual data, to coming up with like measures for comparisons, there

were certainly more convenient ways for us to go at various points over the past four years. 

Much of this research had to be done in the field and during site visits that required sustained

and substantive periods of work! Too often, in our experiences, researchers get side tracked with

finding out how to easily get the data (e.g., often incomplete electronic data), having dinner with

the police chief, or engaging in politics in an attempt to secure the next consulting contract. 

Simply put, we implore our research colleagues to go the extra mile to obtain the best data

possible.

225

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
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Police-Suspect Encounter.” Police Quarterly 6 (1): 51-83.

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107-138.

Terrill, W. and S. D. Mastrofski (2002). “Situational and Officer Based Determinants of Police 

Coercion.” Justice Quarterly 19: 215-248.

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Officer Behavior.” Journal of Criminal Justice 30: 143-155.

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Around the World: Police Use of Force, Firearms, and Non-Lethal Weapons (pp. 6-13).

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229

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
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Evaluating Police Use of Force: An Application of the Force Factor.” Police Quarterly 6

(2): 150-171.

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Attitudes Toward Abuse of Authority: Findings From a National Study.” National

Institute of Justice Research in Brief (May).

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Law Enforcement Bulletin (June).

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Communities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

230

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Appendix A 

NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AGENCIES: 

Examining Force Policy Types 

Conducted by:

Dr. William Terrill 

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 

School of Criminal Justice

and

Dr. Eugene A. Paoline III 

UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA 

Department of Criminal Justice 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
2

General Project Information 

In the Fall of 2005, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded researchers from Michigan 

State University and the University of Central Florida to conduct a study examining the varying 

types of less-than-lethal force policies currently being used throughout the country. The study 

seeks to identify the extent of variation in force policies. Your participation in this study will 

provide valuable insight regarding the manner in which most police officers are instructed on the 

use of force and lead to informed policy understanding and development. 

We seek your cooperation in gathering this information by completing the survey, which is 

expected to take approximately 15 minutes. Your participation is voluntary and your answers 

are strictly confidential. Your confidentiality will be protected to the maximum extent allowable 

by law as guaranteed by federal statue (42 United States Code 3789g). You may choose not to 

participate at all, refuse to participate in certain procedures or answer certain questions, or 

discontinue participation at any time without penalty. 

There are no known risks associated with participation in this study. Only the research team will 

see your responses and the survey will be destroyed upon completion of the project at the end 

of 2007. The identification number on the back of the survey is used solely to remove your 

agency from the mailing list to avoid future mailings. The information collected will be compiled, 

analyzed, and presented only in grouped form with no individual agency identified. 

If you have any questions about this study please contact the principal investigators, Professor 

William Terrill, Michigan State University, School of Criminal Justice, 532 Baker Hall, East 

Lansing, MI 48824, 517-353-9752 (phone), 517-432-1787 (fax), terrillw@msu.edu (email) or

Professor Eugene A. Paoline III, University of Central Florida, P.O. Box 161600, Orlando, FL 

32816, 407-823-4946 (phone), 407-823-5360 (fax), epaoline@mail.ucf.edu (email). If you have 

questions or concerns regarding your rights as a study participant, or are dissatisfied at any time 

with any aspect of this study, you may contact (anonymously, if you wish) Peter Vasilenko, 

Ph.D., Chair of the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects, 202 Olds 

Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824, 517-355-2180 (phone), 517-432-4503 (fax), ucrihs@msu.edu 

(email) or Barbara Ward, Institutional Review Board (IRB), University of Central Florida, 12443 

Research Parkway, Suite 302, Orlando, FL 32826, 407-823-2901 (phone), 407-823-3299 (fax), 

bkward@mail.ucf.edu (email). 

You indicate your voluntary agreement to participate in this research and have your answers 

included in the data set by signing below and completing the survey. Thank you for your 

assistance in this effort to enhance policy understanding and development. 

PLEASE SIGN HEREÆ _________________________ ________________ 

 Respondent Signature Date 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
3

SECTION I. In this section we would like to learn about your agency’s less-thanlethal force policy, including the types of force permitted or allocated and the 

existence of specific written directives. We ask that you circle your response. 

 

1. Does your agency have a written policy on the use of less-than-lethal force? 

 [1] Yes 

 [2] No (please go to Section III on page 8) 

2. Please identify the varying forms of force that your agency permits or allocates 

AND whether there are specific written directives in your use of force policy 

detailing how and/or when to use such force. By specific written directives, we 

mean that your policy directly discusses the application of individual force types. 

 

 Agency Permits Covered in 

 Force Type or Allocates Written Policy

Officer presence........................................... Yes No Yes No 

Verbal direction, other than commands/threats.... Yes No Yes No 

 (for example - questioning) 

 

 Verbal commands/threats............................... Yes No Yes No 

 (for example - orders, threats) 

Soft-empty hand techniques............................ Yes No Yes No 

 (for example - grabbing, shoving) 

Pain compliance techniques............................ Yes No Yes No 

 (for example - pressure point control) 

 Hard-empty hand techniques........................... Yes No Yes No 

 (for example - striking with fists) 

Handcuffing.................................................. Yes No Yes No 

Other forms of cuffing..................................... Yes No Yes No 

 (for example - legs) 

 

 Flashlight..................................................... Yes No Yes No 

 Baton.......................................................... Yes No Yes No 

 (for example - ASP) 

Chemical-irritant sprays.................................. Yes No Yes No 

 (for example - oleoresin capsicum) 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
4

 Agency Permits Covered in 

 Force Type or Allocates Written Policy

 

K9............................................................... Yes No Yes No 

TASER......................................................... Yes No Yes No 

 Electronic devices.......................................... Yes No Yes No 

 (other than TASER) 

Projectile launchers........................................ Yes No Yes No 

 (for example - beanbag) 

Shotgun or automatic rifle................................ Yes No Yes No 

 Handgun...................................................... Yes No Yes No 

 Other (please list all the other types of force that are permitted or allocated 

and/or for which there is specific written direction concerning such force): 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 

SECTION II. In this section we would like to learn whether your agency’s lessthan-lethal force policy involves the use of a “force continuum,” and if so, about 

the type of continuum approach used, how the varying forms of resistance/force 

are ranked on the continuum from least to most severe, and how your continuum 

links corresponding force options to varying levels of citizen resistance. 

1. Is a “force continuum” approach used in your policy on less-than-lethal force? 

By force continuum, we mean a guideline (sometimes depicted graphically) that 

officers can use to determine the type of force that may be used in generic 

situations. Such guidelines are sometimes (but not always) linked with varying 

forms of citizen resistance in an attempt to assist officers in matching the level of 

force to the level of resistance/threat encountered. Some examples include linear 

(e.g., ladder, stair, FLETC), wheel, and matrix/box designs, although there are 

many variations of continuum designs besides these few examples. 

 

 [1] Yes, this agency uses some form of a force continuum. 

[2] No, this agency does not use a force continuum (please go to Section III on 

page 8). 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
5

2. Identify the “type” of force continuum your agency uses. Please understand that 

there is no correct or ideal continuum design in existence. Rather, agencies 

across the country simply prefer one design rather than another. To help guide 

you, we offer basic examples of some of the continuum designs currently in 

existence, but we would expect your agency’s continuum to vary to some extent 

(for example, in terms of the number and location of resistance/force options). 

With this in mind, please circle ONE of the following five continuum designs (A-E) 

that is similar (but may not necessarily be an exact match) to your agency’s 

continuum. If your agency’s continuum design is not similar to one of the five 

examples, we ask that you circle F and assist us in understanding your policy. 

[A] Linear design (e.g., step, ladder, stair) WITHOUT graphic representation 

For example: 

 Citizen Resistance/Threat Level Corresponding Officer Force

 Assaultive (deadly) Deadly force 

 Assaultive (non-deadly) Striking maneuvers, electrical devises 

 Active Pain compliance, chemical sprays 

Passive Verbal commands, soft-empty hand 

 Compliant Presence, verbal direction 

[B] Linear design (e.g., step, ladder, FLETC model) WITH graphic representation 

For example: 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
6

[C] Partial Wheel/Circular design 

For example: 

 

[D] Full Wheel/Circular design 

For example: 

 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
7

[E] Matrix/Box design 

For example:

[F] Other - my agency uses another type of continuum design (please describe 

here below and offer a graphic example if applicable): 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
8

3. Please identify the progression of citizen resistance and police use of force 

outlined in your continuum policy, from the lowest level to the highest level, and 

indicate the types/levels of force recommended to officers for each type of 

resistance/threat they encounter (i.e., the range of force options available to 

officers for each type of citizen resistance encountered). For example: 

Citizen Resistance/Threat Level Corresponding Officer Force

Assaultive – deadly Deadly force 

Assaultive - non-deadly Striking maneuvers, electrical devices 

 (e.g., punching, kicking) (e.g., hand strike, baton, TASER) 

Active Pain compliance, chemical sprays 

 (e.g., fleeing, pulling away) (e.g., wristlock, OC spray) 

Passive Verbal threats, soft-empty hand 

 (e.g., ignoring, refusing order) (e.g., firm grip) 

Compliant Presence, verbal direction 

Please list below how your agency ranks and links resistance/force: 

Citizen Resistance/Threat Level Corresponding Officer Force

 _______________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________ 

 _______________________________________________________________ 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
9

4. Does your continuum policy “specifically” take into consideration any factors 

other than citizen resistance (for example - suspect height/weight, perceived 

mental state, drug/alcohol use, seriousness of offense, presence of weapon, 

etc.)? If so, please state what factors are considered: 

 ____________________________________________________ 

 ____________________________________________________ 

 ____________________________________________________ 

 ____________________________________________________ 

 ____________________________________________________ 

 ____________________________________________________ 

 

SECTION III. In this section we would like to learn about your policies on use of 

force reporting.

1. Does your agency currently require officers or supervisors to file a “use of force 

report” (or other similar report such as a “control persons” or “supervisor control 

persons” report) when officers use force or citizens complain of injury? 

 [1] Yes 

 [2] No (please go to Section IV on page 10) 

2. Who is primarily responsible for completing the report? 

 [1] Officer 

 [2] Supervisor 

 [3] Other personnel (please identify________________________) 

3. At what level of force is an officer or supervisor required to file a force report? 

For example, some agencies require officers to file a force report for any type of 

physical force (including simple restraint, handcuffing, and come-alongs). Other 

agencies require a force report only when officers use a level of force that goes 

above and beyond simple restraint. Yet, other agencies use different reporting 

requirements. Please identify at what level of force your agency requires officers 

file a force report: 

________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
10

4. Is an officer or supervisor required to file a force report whenever a citizen 

complains of injury, regardless of the level of force the officer used? 

 [1] Yes 

 [2] No 

5. As part of your reporting system, is a supervisor required to go to the scene? 

 [1] Yes 

 [2] No (please skip go to question 7) 

6. Is the supervisor required to interview concerned parties (for example - victim, 

witnesses, officers)? 

 [1] Yes 

 [2] No 

7. Are force reports routinely reviewed by an immediate or shift supervisor (for 

example - a shift Sergeant or Lieutenant conducting a review of the report prior to 

the end of the shift)? 

 [1] Yes 

 [2] No 

8. Are force reports routinely reviewed beyond the immediate or shift supervisor (for 

example - Internal Affairs or the Training Unit conducting a monthly review of 

force reports)? 

 [1] Yes 

 [2] No 

9. Did your agency require officers or supervisors to fill out a “use of force report” in 

2005 and 2004? 

 [1] Yes 

 [2] No 

10. Has your agency altered/changed it’s policy on use of force reporting (for 

example, changing the criteria for when officers are required to fill out a form) 

within the past two full calendar years (i.e., 2005 or 2004)? 

 [1] Yes (please list the approximate date the change occurred_____________) 

 [2] No 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
11

SECTION IV. In this section we would like to learn a little about your organization 

and workload measures, which will help us to accurately report results with those 

from similar types of agencies.

1. Number of sworn officers (as of today): __________________ 

2. Number of civilians (as of today):__________________ 

3. Please indicate the number of “calls for service” your agency received during the 

2004 calendar year: 

Total number of calls for service: ____________ 

4. Please indicate the number of “reported crimes” your agency received during the 

2004 calendar year for each of the following categories: 

 Violent Crimes # of crimes during the 2004 calendar year

 Homicide _____________ 

 Rape _____________ 

 Robbery _____________ 

 Aggravated Assault _____________ 

 Property Crimes # of crimes during the 2004 calendar year

 Burglary _____________ 

 Larceny Theft _____________ 

 Motor Vehicle Theft _____________ 

 Arson _____________ 

SECTION V. Please offer any other information on your use of force policy that 

you believe may be helpful.

Comments on use of force policy: 

 

________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

 ________________________________________________________________ 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
12

In conclusion, we ask that you PLEASE include 1) a copy of your less-than-lethal force 

policy when returning this survey, and 2) a business card (or list contact information 

below) of the person who filled out the survey. We seek this information for clarification 

purposes only. As mandated by federal law (42 United States Code 3789g), we are 

prohibited from releasing such information to anyone outside the research team. These 

materials will be securely discarded upon the completion of the project. 

 

Name_________________________________________________________________ 

Rank/Title______________________________________________________________ 

Agency________________________________________________________________ 

Address_______________________________________________________________ 

City____________________________ State_______ Zip________________________ 

Phone_____________________________________ Fax________________________ 

Email_________________________________________________________________ 

In your estimation, how receptive would your agency be toward being included in a 

more in-depth analysis of less-than-lethal force policy and practice, as part of a select 

pool of contemporary American police agencies? 

[1] Very receptive 

[2] Somewhat receptive 

[3] Not sure 

[4] Somewhat unreceptive 

[5] Very unreceptive 

Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Your input will help shed light on 

existing policy approaches. If you have not signed the consent form on page 1, we 

ask that you please do so now in order for us to comply with federal research 

regulations. As previously noted, the identification number below is used solely to 

remove your agency from the mailing list so as to avoid future mailings. Your answers 

are strictly confidential as ensured by federal law. 

Please return survey to: 

Dr. William Terrill, 

Michigan State University, 

School of Criminal Justice, 

532 Baker Hall, 

East Lansing, MI 48824

ID #: 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Appendix B

Columbus

Action-Response Levels of Control:Level 1: Empty hand control, pressure points, grounding techn

and joint manipulations

Level 2: Use of chemical sprayLevel 3: Use of electronic device (electronic custody belt or taseLevel 4: Hard empty hand control (strike/punch/kick)Level 5: Use of impact weapon (baton/flashlight)Level 6: Police K-9 biteLevel 7: Less lethal weapons (beanbag/multiple baton rounds/stLevel 8: Deadly force

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This repo

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the aand do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Jus
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This repo

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the aand do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Jus
Portland

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This repo

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the aand do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Jus
Albuquerque

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This repo

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the aand do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Jus
Colorado Springs

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This repo

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the aand do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Jus
St. Petersburg

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This repo

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the aand do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Jus
Fort Wayne

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This repo

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the aand do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Jus
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This repo

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the aand do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Jus
Appendix C 

NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE OFFICERS: 

Examining Less than Lethal Force Policies 

Conducted by:

Dr. William Terrill

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 

School of Criminal Justice

and

Dr. Eugene A. Paoline III

UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA 

Department of Criminal Justice

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
SECTION I – We are interested in your views regarding XXPD’s OVERALL less-than-lethal force policy. 

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements, by circling the number 

which best represents your opinion of the policy. 

Agree Agree Disagree Disagree

 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly

1 XXPD’s policy assists officer decision making. 1 2 3 4 

2 XXPD’s policy hinders officer decision making. 1 2 3 4 

3 XXPD’s policy is not restrictive enough. 1 2 3 4 

 

4 XXPD’s policy is too restrictive. 1 2 3 4 

 

5 XXPD’s policy is clear. 1 2 3 4 

6 XXPD’s policy regarding supervisory review 1 2 3 4 

of use of force reports is fair. 

7 XXPD’s policy provides adequate guidance 1 2 3 4 

in terms of how to apply force. 

8 XXPD’s policy provides adequate guidance 1 2 3 4 

in terms of when force can and cannot be used. 

9 XXPD’s policy provides adequate guidance 1 2 3 4 

in terms of when a force report should be completed. 

SECTION II – We are interested in your views regarding SPECIFIC COMPONENTS of XXPD’s less-thanlethal force policy as it relates to dealing with resistant citizens. Please indicate the extent to which you agree 

or disagree with the following statements, by circling the number which best represents your opinion of the 

policy. 

Agree Agree Disagree Disagree

 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly

1 XXPD’s policy assists officer decision making 

when dealing with citizens who are: 

[A] non-resistant or compliant 1 2 3 4 

[B] passively resistant 1 2 3 4 

[C] verbally resistant 1 2 3 4 

[D] physically resistant in a non-assaultive nature 1 2 3 4 

[E] physically resistant in an assaultive manner 1 2 3 4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree

 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly

2 XXPD’s policy hinders officer decision making 

when dealing with citizens who are: 

[A] non-resistant or compliant 1 2 3 4 

[B] passively resistant 1 2 3 4 

[C] verbally resistant 1 2 3 4 

[D] physically resistant in a non-assaultive nature 1 2 3 4 

[E] physically resistant in an assaultive manner 1 2 3 4 

 

3 XXPD’s policy is not restrictive enough 

 when dealing with citizens who are:

[A] non-resistant or compliant 1 2 3 4 

[B] passively resistant 1 2 3 4 

[C] verbally resistant 1 2 3 4 

[D] physically resistant in a non-assaultive nature 1 2 3 4 

[E] physically resistant in an assaultive manner 1 2 3 4 

4 XXPD’s policy is too restrictive when dealing

 with citizens who are:

 

[A] non-resistant or compliant 1 2 3 4 

[B] passively resistant 1 2 3 4 

[C] verbally resistant 1 2 3 4 

[D] physically resistant in a non-assaultive nature 1 2 3 4 

[E] physically resistant in an assaultive manner 1 2 3 4 

 

5 XXPD’s policy is clear in terms of how to deal with

citizens who are:

[A] non-resistant or compliant 1 2 3 4 

[B] passively resistant 1 2 3 4 

[C] verbally resistant 1 2 3 4 

[D] physically resistant in a non-assaultive nature 1 2 3 4 

[E] physically resistant in an assaultive manner 1 2 3 4 

6 XXPD’s policy provides adequate guidance in terms

of how to apply force on citizens who are:

[A] non-resistant or compliant 1 2 3 4 

[B] passively resistant 1 2 3 4 

[C] verbally resistant 1 2 3 4 

[D] physically resistant in a non-assaultive nature 1 2 3 4 

[E] physically resistant in an assaultive manner 1 2 3 4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree

 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly

7 XXPD’s policy provides adequate guidance in terms 

of when force can and cannot be used on citizens 

who are:

[A] non-resistant or compliant 1 2 3 4 

[B] passively resistant 1 2 3 4 

[C] verbally resistant 1 2 3 4 

[D] physically resistant in a non-assaultive nature 1 2 3 4 

[E] physically resistant in an assaultive manner 1 2 3 4 

SECTION III – We are interested in your views regarding outcomes of XXPD’s less-than-lethal force policy. 

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements, by circling the number 

which best represents your opinion of the policy. 

 Increases Decreases Neither Increases

 the likelihood the likelihood nor Decreases

 the likelihood

 

1 What effect does XXPD’s policy have 1 2 3 

on potential citizen injuries?

2 What effect does XXPD’s policy have 1 2 3 

on potential officer injuries?

3 What effect does XXPD’s policy have 1 2 3 

on potential citizen complaints? 

 

4 What effect does XXPD’s policy have 1 2 3 

on potential lawsuits? 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
SECTION IV – We are interested in your views regarding XXPD’s training with respect to less-than-lethal force. 

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements, by circling the number 

which best represents your opinion. 

Agree Agree Disagree Disagree

 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly

1 The pre-service Academy training that I have 1 2 3 4 

received on less-than-lethal force is adequate.

 1a. What, if any, part of this training should receive 

more attention _______________________________________________________________

2 The In-service training that I have received on 1 2 3 4 

less-than-lethal force is adequate.

 

 2a. What, if any, part of this training should receive 

more attention _______________________________________________________________

 

SECTION V – In terms of dealing with the following types of resistant citizens, please indicate which of the 

following responses YOU believe are appropriate, irrespective of what XXPD’s policy states, by placing

a check (√) next to ALL THAT APPLY. 

1 Which is/are appropriate when faced with a non-resistant/compliant citizen: 

__ Verbal direction, other than commands/threats (for example – questioning)

__ Verbal commands/threats

__ Soft-empty hand techniques (for example – grabbing, shoving)

__ Pain compliance techniques (for example – pressure point control)

__ Hard-empty hand techniques (for example – striking with fists)

__ Cuffing (hands, legs)

__ Flashlight

__ Baton (for example – ASP)

__ Chemical-irritant sprays (for example – oleoresin capsicum)

__ Electronic devices (for example – TASER)

__ Projectile launchers (for example – beanbag)

__ Deadly Force

2 Which is/are appropriate when faced with a passively resistant citizen: 

__ Verbal direction, other than commands/threats (for example – questioning)

__ Verbal commands/threats

__ Soft-empty hand techniques (for example – grabbing, shoving)

__ Pain compliance techniques (for example – pressure point control)

__ Hard-empty hand techniques (for example – striking with fists)

__ Cuffing (hands, legs)

__ Flashlight

__ Baton (for example – ASP)

__ Chemical-irritant sprays (for example – oleoresin capsicum)

__ Electronic devices (for example – TASER)

__ Projectile launchers (for example – beanbag)

__ Deadly Force

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
3 Which is/are appropriate when faced with a verbally resistant citizen: 

__ Verbal direction, other than commands/threats (for example – questioning)

__ Verbal commands/threats

__ Soft-empty hand techniques (for example – grabbing, shoving)

__ Pain compliance techniques (for example – pressure point control)

__ Hard-empty hand techniques (for example – striking with fists)

__ Cuffing (hands, legs)

__ Flashlight

__ Baton (for example – ASP)

__ Chemical-irritant sprays (for example – oleoresin capsicum)

__ Electronic devices (for example – TASER)

__ Projectile launchers (for example – beanbag)

__ Deadly Force

4 Which is/are appropriate when faced with a physically non-assaultive citizen: 

__ Verbal direction, other than commands/threats (for example – questioning)

__ Verbal commands/threats

__ Soft-empty hand techniques (for example – grabbing, shoving)

__ Pain compliance techniques (for example – pressure point control)

__ Hard-empty hand techniques (for example – striking with fists)

__ Cuffing (hands, legs)

__ Flashlight

__ Baton (for example – ASP)

__ Chemical-irritant sprays (for example – oleoresin capsicum)

__ Electronic devices (for example – TASER)

__ Projectile launchers (for example – beanbag)

__ Deadly Force

5 Which is/are appropriate when faced with a physically assaultive citizen: 

__ Verbal direction, other than commands/threats (for example – questioning)

__ Verbal commands/threats

__ Soft-empty hand techniques (for example – grabbing, shoving)

__ Pain compliance techniques (for example – pressure point control)

__ Hard-empty hand techniques (for example – striking with fists)

__ Cuffing (hands, legs)

__ Flashlight

__ Baton (for example – ASP)

__ Chemical-irritant sprays (for example – oleoresin capsicum)

__ Electronic devices (for example – TASER)

__ Projectile launchers (for example – beanbag)

__ Deadly Force

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
SECTION VI – We are interested in your views regarding various components of police work. Please indicate 

the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements, by circling the number which best 

represents your opinion. 

Agree Agree Disagree Disagree

 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly

1 I work in a dangerous job. 1 2 3 4 

2 A good police officer takes charge of encounters 1 2 3 4 

with citizens.

3 Most people have no idea how difficult a police 1 2 3 4 

officer's job is. 

4 I would not consider taking another job. 1 2 3 4 

5 When I started my policing career, other officers 1 2 3 4 

were a valuable source of information on how to 

perform as an officer. 

6 There are clear, planned goals and objectives for 1 2 3 4 

my job.

7 Enforcing the law is by far a patrol officer=s most 1 2 3 4 

important responsibility.

8 When I first arrive on a scene or during any 1 2 3 4 

interaction with a citizen, I size up the situation 

in order to establish and maintain control.

9 The code of silence is an essential part of the 1 2 3 4 

mutual trust necessary to good policing.

10 A good police officer is one who patrols 1 2 3 4 

aggressively by stopping cars, checking out 

people, running license checks, and so forth.

11 I’m usually calm and at ease when I’m working. 1 2 3 4 

12 My supervisor looks out for the personal welfare 1 2 3 4 

of his/her subordinates.

13 My supervisor=s approach tends to discourage 1 2 3 4 

me from giving extra effort.

14 My supervisor will support me when I am wrong, 1 2 3 4 

even if it makes things difficult for him or her.

15 Police officers have reason to be suspicious 1 2 3 4 

of most citizens.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Agree Agree Disagree Disagree

 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly

16 In my job, a person stands a good chance 1 2 3 4 

of getting hurt.

17 Police should not have to handle calls that involve 1 2 3 4 

social or personal problems where no crime is 

involved.

18 When an officer does a particularly good job, top 1 2 3 4 

management will publicly recognize his or her 

performance.

19 When an officer gets written up for minor violations 1 2 3 4 

of the rules, he or she will be treated fairly by 

top management. 

20 When an officer contributes to a team effort rather 1 2 3 4 

than look good individually top management here 

will recognize it.

21 In order to remain effective, the police officer 1 2 3 4 

should remain detached from the community.

22 I try to teach younger officers how to perform their 1 2 3 4 

duties as an officer.

23 I know what is exactly expected of me. 1 2 3 4 

24 When I’m at work I often feel tense or uptight. 1 2 3 4 

25 I like my job better than the average police 1 2 3 4 

officer does.

26 Given my choice, when off-duty, I would rather hang 1 2 3 4 

around with non-police than other police officers.

27 Law enforcement officers should be required to do 1 2 3 4 

something about - public nuisances (e.g., loud 

parties, barking dogs, etc).

28 Law enforcement officers should be required to do 1 2 3 4 

something about - neighbor disputes. 

29 Law enforcement officers should be required to do 1 2 3 4 

something about - family disputes. 

30 Law enforcement officers should be required to do 1 2 3 4 

something about - litter and trash. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
 Agree Agree Disagree Disagree

 Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly

31 Law enforcement officers should be required to do 1 2 3 4 

something about - parents who don’t control their kids. 

32 Law enforcement officers should be required to do 1 2 3 4 

something about - nuisance businesses that cause

lots of problems for neighbors. 

33 There is a camaraderie and bond among police 1 2 3 4 

officers that those outside of policing would not 

understand.

34 Police officers have reason to be distrustful of 1 2 3 4 

most citizens.

35 An officer is more effective when s/he patrols for 1 2 3 4 

serious felony violations rather than stopping people 

for minor traffic violations and misdemeanors. 

36 Most law enforcement officers have to spend too 1 2 3 4 

much of their time handling unimportant, non-crime 

calls for service. 

37 Most of what I know about policing was learned 1 2 3 4 

 “on the job”. 

38 I know what my responsibilities are. 1 2 3 4 

39 My job is a lot more dangerous than other 1 2 3 4 

kinds of jobs.

40 A lot of time my job makes me very frustrated 1 2 3 4 

or angry.

41 I find real enjoyment in my job. 1 2 3 4 

42 When I am on the street, protecting a fellow officer 1 2 3 4 

is one of my highest priorities.

 

SECTION VII – In this last section, we have a few background questions. Please circle your responses. 

1 Did you work as a sworn officer for any other police department before XXPD? 

 [1] No

 [2] Yes (if yes, for how many years?______________________)

2 What is your currently assigned division? _________________________

2a How long have you been assigned to your current division? _______years ________months 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
 

3 Within your division, please identify the response area you are assigned to or patrol most often. 

Response Area: _______________

3a How long have you worked this response area? _______years ________months

4 What was your pre-service Training Academy recruit class number?____________________

 

5 Do you have any military experience?

 [1] No

 [2] Yes (if yes, do you believe that your military experience helped prepare you to be a police officer?) 

1. No

2. Yes

6 Are/were any of your family member’s police officers?

 [1] No

 [2] Yes (if yes, please identify their relationship [e.g., father, sister, uncle, etc.] ________________)

7 Marital status: 

 [1] Single 

 [2] Married 

 [3] Separated 

 [4] Divorced 

 [5] Widowed

8 Would you say that, for you personally, getting promoted to a higher rank is:

 [1] Very important

 [2] Somewhat important

 [3] Somewhat unimportant

 [4] Very unimportant 

9 Would you say that, for you personally, moving to a specialized unit is:

 [1] Very important

 [2] Somewhat important

 [3] Somewhat unimportant

 [4] Very unimportant 

10 What is your current assignment? 

 [1] Patrol Officer [5] School Resource Officer (SRO)

 [2] Bikes [6] K-9 

 [3] H.I.T.S. [7] Other (please, identify) ________________________ 

 [4] Street Crimes Task Force

11 What rank do you expect to have when you retire?

 [1] Patrol Officer [5] Deputy Chief

 [2] Sergeant [6] Chief

 [3] Captain [7] Other (please, identify) ________________________ 

 [4] Major 

 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
12 What is the highest level of formal education that you completed? 

 [1] Less than high school (please skip to Question 13) 

 [2] High school diploma or GED (please skip to Question 13) 

 [3] Some junior college, but did not earn a degree

 [4] Associates degree (AA)

 [5] More than two years of college, but did not earn a bachelors degree

 [6] Bachelors degree 

 DEGREE MAJOR___________________________

 DEGREE OBTAINED ____ before police employment

 ____ while employed with XXPD

 

 [7] Some graduate courses, but did not earn a graduate degree

 [8] Graduate degree

 DEGREE MAJOR___________________________

 DEGREE OBTAINED ____ before police employment

 ____ while employed with XXPD

 

 12a.Do you believe that your college experiences helped prepare you to be a police 

 officer?

1. No

 2. Yes 

13 If you were not a police officer, what do you think your occupation would be? 

_________________________________________________________________________________

14 Which of the following best captures XXPD’s less-than-lethal force policy:

[1] Linear Design (for example, step, ladder, stair, PPCT, FLETC model) - often presented in the form 

of a ladder or hierarchical steps of subject resistance and police force options.

[2] Wheel/Half-Wheel Design – often presented in the form of a series of concentric circles/half-circles 

of subject resistance and police force options.

[3] Matrix/Box Design – often presented in the form of subject resistance and police force options 

along a vertical and horizontal axis.

[4] Other (please specify) ____________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

Finally, what (if any) part of XXPD’s less-than-lethal force policy do you think should be changed? 

_______________________________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________________________

I.D. #_______

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Appendix D 

Assessing Police Use of Force Policy and Outcomes

In the Fall of 2005, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded researchers from Michigan State 

University and the University of Central Florida to conduct a study examining varying types of 

nonlethal force policies. As part of this study, we wish to learn how policies are understood and 

viewed by front line personnel. In particular, we are interested in your view as to the extent to 

which your agency’s policy offers guidance and the ability to control suspects. Your participation 

in this study will help lead to informed policy understanding and development. 

We seek your cooperation in gathering this information by completing the survey, which is 

expected to take 15 minutes. Your participation is voluntary and your answers are strictly 

confidential. Your confidentiality will be protected to the maximum extent allowable by law as 

guaranteed by federal statue (42 United States Code 3789g). You may choose not to participate at 

all, refuse to participate in certain procedures or answer certain questions, or discontinue 

participation at any time without penalty.

There are no known risks associated with participation in this study. Only the research team will 

see your responses and the survey will be destroyed upon completion of the project at the end of 

2008. The identification number at the bottom of the page is used solely to remove you from the 

survey list. The information collected will be compiled, analyzed, and presented only in grouped 

form with no individual agency identified. 

If you have any questions about this study please contact the principal investigator, Professor 

William Terrill, Michigan State University, School of Criminal Justice, 532 Baker Hall, East 

Lansing, MI 48864, 517-353-9752 (phone), 517-432-1787 (fax), terrillw@msu.edu (email) or

Professor Eugene A. Paoline III, University of Central Florida, P.O. Box 161600, Orlando, Fl. 

32816, 407-823-4946 (phone), 407-823-5360 (fax) epaoline@mail.ucf.edu. If you have any 

questions or concerns regarding your rights as a study participant, or are dissatisfied at any time 

with any aspect of this study, you may contact - anonymously, if you wish, Peter Vasilenko, Ph.D., 

Director of the Human Research Protection Programs (HRPP) at Michigan State University: (517) 

355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, email: irb@msu.edu, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, 

MI 48824, or Barbara Ward, Institutional Review Board (IRB), University of Central Florida, 

12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL., 32826-3246, 407-823-2901. 

You indicate your voluntary agreement to participate in this research and have your answers 

included in the data set by signing below and completing the survey. Thank you for your assistance 

in this effort to enhance policy understanding and development. 

___________________________ __________ 

Officer Signature Date

Respectfully,

_____________________ ________________________ 

Professor William Terrill Professor Eugene A. Paoline III 

Michigan State University University of Central Florida 

 I.D. #_______ 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.