J-S29041-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee 

v. 

DENSON MATTHEW QUINN, 

 Appellant 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

 No. 1944 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 12, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000487-2014 

BEFORE: PANELLA, MUNDY, and STRASSBURGER, JJ.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2015 

Denson Matthew Quinn (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered following his conviction for one count of indecent assault. 

After review, we affirm. 

 On February 17, 2014, Appellant was arrested and charged with 

sexually assaulting a female friend earlier that month. On August 5, 2014, 

following a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of indecent assault. On 

November 12, 2014, Appellant was sentenced to a term of 30 to 60 months’ 

incarceration. Additionally, Appellant was classified as a Tier II offender 

pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).1 As 

a result, Appellant was ordered to comply with the registration and reporting 

 

1

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41. 
J-S29041-15 

- 2 - 

requirements of SORNA. This timely appeal followed. Both the trial court 

and Appellant complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant raises three issues on appeal. 

1. Whether the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to 

prove that [Appellant] was guilty of indecent assault? 

2. Is it unconstitutional to require an Appellant to register for a 

lifetime when said registration requirement exceeds the 

statutory maximum penalty for Appellant’s offense? 

3. Is [SORNA] unconstitutional in requiring [] an Appellant to 

register for twenty[-]five (25) years? 

Appellant’s Brief at 7. 

Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence is well-settled. 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the 

fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of 

fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, 

the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the 

evidence. 
J-S29041-15 

- 3 - 

Commonwealth v. Snyder, 870 A.2d 336, 350 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted). 

The statute provides, in relevant part, 

A person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has 

indecent contact with the complainant, causes the complainant 

to have indecent contact with the person or intentionally causes 

the complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine or 

feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or 

the complainant and 

(1) the complainant is unconscious or the person 

knows that the complainant is unaware that the 

indecent contact is occurring[.] 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4). Indecent contact is defined as “any touching of the 

sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or 

gratifying sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101. 

 Appellant contends that his conviction cannot stand because “the 

testimony concerning the crime[] charged was inconsistent and was 

contradicted by the physical and testimonial evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 

13. Specifically, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to 

present evidence that he touched the sexual or intimate parts of the victim. 

Id. at 16. We disagree. 

This Court previously rejected the notion that “the character of an 

indecent assault depends entirely on its degree of success achieved by the 

attacker.” Commonwealth v. Capo, 727 A.2d 1126, 1128 (Pa. Super. 

1999) (stating “[the appellant’s] inability to achieve more intimate contact 
J-S29041-15 

- 4 - 

than was in fact accomplished does not make that assault equivocal or 

lessen its indecency”). 

 At trial, the victim testified that she and Appellant - her temporary 

roommate at the time of the incident - were watching TV in her bedroom. 

N.T., 8/4/2014, at 19. She was lying on her bed; he was sitting at the foot 

of the bed. Id. at 18-19. The victim was wearing a green t-shirt,

sweatpants, a bra, and underwear. Id. at 20. The victim testified that she 

and Appellant were not in a relationship of any sort, and at no point during 

the evening did she attempt to initiate a sexual encounter with Appellant. 

Id. at 19-20. The victim testified that she fell asleep and was awakened by 

Appellant’s tugging on her shirt. Id. at 20. She jumped up and realized that 

her underwear and sweatpants had been removed and that she was naked 

from the waist down. Id. Appellant was fully clothed, lying beside her in 

bed. Id. at 21. At that point, the victim demanded Appellant leave the 

room and he complied. The victim reported the incident to police a few days 

later. Id. She testified that she found her underwear “shoved between the 

bed and the wall” and her sweatpants on the bedroom floor. Id. at 21. 

The evidence presented was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction 

for indecent assault. It is well-established that “the uncorroborated 

testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient to convict a defendant of 

sexual offenses.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 742 A.2d 178, 189 (Pa. 
J-S29041-15 

- 5 - 

Super. 1999). Instantly, the victim’s testimony establishes that Appellant 

had indecent contact with her while she was asleep. See Commonwealth 

v. Vosburg, 574 A.2d 679, 684 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that the 

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Vosburg committed indecent assault on an eight-year-old victim 

by pulling on her underwear while she lay in bed, and specifically rejecting 

Vosburg’s contention that pulling on the victim’s underwear was insufficient 

to establish that the act was for the purpose of arousing sexual desire). As 

such, we find that Appellant’s claim is without merit. 

 Appellant’s final two issues concern the constitutionality of SORNA. 

Appellant’s Brief at 19-21. On multiple occasions, our Courts have 

considered, and rejected, the issues raised by Appellant. These prior 

decisions reason that the imposition of the registration and notification 

requirements does not constitute punishment. See, e.g., Commonwealth 

v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 986 (Pa. 2003) (upholding as non-punitive the 

registration, notification, and counseling provisions of Megan’s Law II); 

Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 836 A.2d 159 (Pa. Super. 2003) (same). More 

recently, this Court upheld the constitutionality of SORNA’s registration 

requirements in Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

Moreover, specific to Appellant’s second argument, in Commonwealth v. 

McDonough, 96 A.3d 1067 (Pa. Super. 2014) this Court rejected the 
J-S29041-15 

- 6 - 

argument that mandating compliance with SORNA by offenders who have 

served their maximum term is unconstitutional. Appellant has failed to 

convince us that another constitutional analysis of SORNA would produce a 

different result. Accordingly, we determine that Appellant is not entitled to 

relief. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 6/30/2015