Filed 3/22/24 In re Z.R. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re Z.R., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B331435

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct.

 No. 22CCJP01774A)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Conditionally affirmed

and remanded with directions.

Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

C.R. (father) appeals from the August 31, 2023 order

terminating parental rights to his child (minor) under section 

366.26.

1 We conditionally affirm and remand. 

The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural 

history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for 

publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore 

resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to 

Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and 

consistent with constitutional principles. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 

§ 14 [“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that 

determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis 

v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted 

[three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies 

constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in 

reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the 

reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based, 

[an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by 

counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)

Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court 

and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services (Department) did not comply with their obligations 

under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (§ 224 et seq.). 

According to father, the Department failed to comply with its 

continuing duty to interview extended family members regarding 

ICWA despite having contact with several maternal and paternal 

family members. The Department contends that because mother, 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 
3

father, maternal grandparents, and paternal grandmother all 

denied any Indian ancestry, there is substantial evidence to 

support the juvenile court’s determination that ICWA does not 

apply.

State law imposes on the Department a first-step inquiry 

duty to “interview, among others, extended family members and 

others who had an interest in the child.” (In re H.V. (2022) 

75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438; see § 224.2, subd. (b).) Federal 

regulations explain that the term “[e]xtended family member is 

defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s Tribe or, in the 

absence of such law or custom, is a person who has reached 

age 18 and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, 

brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, 

first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2017).) 

The duty of initial inquiry includes making a meaningful effort to 

interview available relatives. (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 

542, 552–553.) 

We agree with father that the Department failed to comply 

with the inquiry requirements of ICWA and related California 

law. (See In re H.V., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438; In re 

Charles W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 483, 489.) Specifically, the 

record indicates that the Department had contact with paternal 

grandfather, maternal cousin J.R., who was minor’s caregiver,

and other maternal relatives. But there is no indication that 

those reasonably available extended family members were asked 

about the child’s possible Indian ancestry. It therefore appears 

that the Department failed to fulfill its initial duty of inquiry 

under ICWA. We will therefore conditionally affirm and remand 

for further proceedings.
4

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s August 31, 2023 order terminating 

parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 

366.26 is conditionally affirmed and remanded for proceedings 

required by this opinion. The court shall order the Department 

to make reasonable efforts to (1) interview all available extended 

family members about the possibility of the child’s Indian 

ancestry, including those extended family members that the 

Department had previous contact with, namely, the paternal 

grandfather and maternal cousin J.R., as well as other 

reasonably available maternal relatives; and (2) report on the 

results of those efforts. Nothing in this disposition precludes the 

court from ordering the Department to make inquiry of the 

additional family members identified in the record or others who 

may have an interest in the child. Based on the information 

reported, if the court determines that no additional inquiry or 

notice to tribes is necessary, the order terminating parental 

rights is to be reinstated. If additional inquiry or notice is 

warranted, the court shall make all necessary orders to ensure 

compliance with ICWA and related California law.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

I concur:

KIM, J.
In re Z.R.

B331435

BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting

I would affirm because substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 

does not apply. (In re A.C. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 130, 132 (dis. 

opn. of Baker, J.); In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984; In 

re H.V. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 439 (dis. opn. of Baker, J.).) 

The majority does not even mention the controlling deferential 

standard of review in its opinion, and understandably so: on this 

record, where ICWA-related inquiry was made of the parents and 

of extended family members on both the maternal and paternal 

sides of the child’s family, there is no principled basis to conclude 

substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding. 

(See, e.g., In re E.W. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 314, 323 [denials of 

Indian ancestry by the parents and interviews of extended family 

members on both sides of the family “‘reliably answered’” the 

question of whether the children were Indian children].) By all 

appearances then, what is really going on in this appeal is what I 

feared would happen: a court unjustifiably “follow[ing] a new 

unspoken rule[ that requires] interrogat[ing] every person 

contacted in a child welfare investigation about ICWA issues.” 

(H.V., supra, at 442 (dis. opn. of Baker, J.).)

BAKER, Acting P. J.