Affirmed and Opinion Filed May 6, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-19-01569-CR

JEREMY LAINE JOHNSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-1630929-H

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Osborne, Pedersen, III, and Nowell

Opinion by Justice Nowell

A jury convicted appellant of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against 

a family member.1 In four issues, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient and 

the trial court erred by overruling his objection made pursuant to Texas Rule of 

Evidence 404(b), denying his motion for mistrial, and denying his requested jury 

instruction on a lesser-included offense. We modify the trial court’s judgment and

affirm as modified.

1 The jury also acquitted appellant of the charge of aggravated assault against a second family member 

on the same day.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant shot Jeffrey Nicola on December 18, 2016. 

Appellant’s father, Walter Johnson, married Cindy Johnson after appellant’s 

mother died.2 Cindy’s daughter, Cassandra Mascarenas, was in a relationship with 

Jeffrey Nicola. In December 2016, Mascarenas, Nicola, and their children were 

staying in Walter and Cindy’s house in Grand Prairie, Texas. Appellant also was 

staying at the house. 

On December 18, 2016, Walter and Cindy were arguing loudly in the kitchen. 

Seeking to avoid the argument, Mascarenas left the kitchen and went into the dining 

room where she saw appellant remove a gun from a bag, insert a clip into the gun, 

and cock the gun. Mascarenas returned to the kitchen to tell Cindy and Walter about 

the gun and, she testified, “that’s when I heard a first initial shot.” After hearing the 

gun shot, Mascarenas and Cindy went into the dining room where they saw Nicola 

had been shot in the stomach. Cindy tried to physically control appellant, and 

appellant shot her in the leg. Walter then entered the room, grabbed appellant, and 

secured the gun. 

Nicola was shot in the lower abdomen, the bullet pierced his bladder, and he 

underwent bladder reconstruction surgery. After returning home, he had 

complications and had to return to the hospital for an additional seven to ten days. 

2 Because appellant, Walter Johnson, and Cindy Johnson have the same last name, we refer to Walter 

and Cindy by their first names. 
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At the time of trial, the bullet remained lodged inside of his body and he was unable 

to work. 

Appellant testified in his defense. Appellant testified he and Cindy did not 

get along. In December 2016, appellant was staying with Walter and Cindy at their 

home in Grand Prairie. When Mascarenas and Nicola arrived in December 2016, 

their four children moved into his bedroom and he slept in the living room. 

Appellant testified he kept to himself and primarily watched television. 

On the morning of December 18, appellant heard commotion and a “thud”

against a wall. He thought someone had thrown something, so he went into the main 

part of the house to investigate. He heard arguing and, as he approached the kitchen, 

Nicola “intercepted me.” Appellant testified he backed away as Nicola charged at 

him. Seeing his father’s gun lying underneath a pouch, appellant grabbed and loaded 

the gun; “[a]nd I told [Nicola] to get the hell away from me.” Despite the warning, 

Nicola continued charging toward appellant and said Nicola “was going to put 

[appellant] in the hospital.” Appellant described Nicola as “[v]ery large” and 

appellant testified he was “in total fear,” he was afraid Nicola would attack him, and 

he felt threatened. Feeling he did not have a means to escape, appellant shot Nicola 

in the stomach. Appellant conceded on cross-examination that Nicola did not touch 

him before the shooting. 
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The jury convicted appellant of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for 

shooting Nicola. The jury acquitted appellant on the charge of aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon for shooting Cindy.

LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support the 

conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and to support the jury’s 

rejection of his self-defense claim. When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979); Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). This 

standard requires the appellate court to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact 

fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw 

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

We determine whether the “necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the 

combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007).

When conducting our review, we consider all the evidence in the record, 

whether admissible or inadmissible. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. 
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Crim. App. 2013). If the record supports conflicting inferences, we must presume 

that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and therefore defer to 

that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Direct and circumstantial evidence 

are treated equally, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a 

conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating evidence is 

sufficient to support the conviction. Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 733. Finally, the 

factfinder is entitled to judge the credibility of witnesses and can choose to believe 

all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 

S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

1. Evidence of Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon

As is relevant here, a person commits the offense of aggravated assault with a 

deadly weapon when the person knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes 

bodily injury to another and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission 

of the assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a). The uncontested evidence shows 

appellant intentionally shot Nicola with a gun, a deadly weapon, and the bullet 

pierced Nicola’s bladder. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict, we conclude any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Appellant argues the State presented no evidence of appellant’s motive to 

shoot Nicola. Motive is not an element of aggravated assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 22.02(a). Accordingly, the State is not required to establish motive to establish the 
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commission of the offense. See Woods v. State, No. 05-18-00444-CR, 2019 WL 

3296977, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 23, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (citing Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1982); Rodriguez v. State, 486 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)).

2. Evidence of Self-Defense

Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s 

rejection of his self-defense claim. A person is justified in using force against 

another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is 

immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use 

of unlawful force. TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(a). A “reasonable belief” is one that an 

ordinary and prudent man would hold in the same circumstances as the actor. Id. 

§ 1.07(a)(42).

A defendant has the burden of producing some evidence to support a claim of 

self-defense. London v. State, 325 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. 

ref’d); see also McAlister v. State, No. 05-19-00704-CR, 2020 WL 7767936, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). The State has the burden of persuasion in disproving self-defense. 

London, 325 S.W.3d at 202. Self-defense is an issue of fact to be determined by the 

jury. Id. A jury’s guilty verdict is an implicit finding rejecting the defendant’s selfdefense theory. Id.
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Because the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove self-defense by 

establishing its case beyond a reasonable doubt, we review legal sufficiency 

challenges to the jury’s rejection of such a defense under the Jackson v. Virginia

standard. McAlister, 2020 WL 7767936, at *3. In resolving the sufficiency of the 

evidence issue, we look not to whether the State presented evidence which refuted 

appellant’s self-defense testimony, but rather we determine whether after viewing 

all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact would have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt and also would have found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2018).

The jury heard appellant’s testimony that Nicola charged at him and 

threatened to “put [appellant] in the hospital” so that appellant was “in total fear,”

felt threatened, and felt backed against the wall. However, he also testified Nicola 

never touched him. Mascarenastestified she did not expect anything to happen when 

she saw appellant remove a gun from his bag because “we weren’t in a situation that 

called for a gun to be pulled out. There just wasn’t that situation, not at all.” 

Likewise, when Nicola was asked for any reason why appellant shot him, he 

responded: “I have no idea” and stated there was not any reason for appellant to 

shoot him that day. 
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The jury essentially heard two versions of the events of December 18, 2016. 

The jury then considered all of the evidence presented, including appellant’s 

testimony about what occurred. The jury, as the judge of witness credibility, was 

free to believe or disbelieve any witness, including appellant. Based on the evidence 

in the record, we conclude the jury rationally could have rejected appellant’s claim 

of self-defense. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

B. Rule 404(b) Objection

In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by overruling his 

objection to the admission of evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b). On 

cross-examination, the State asked appellant whether he recalled being at Walter and 

Cindy’s house on Thanksgiving Day in 2015. Appellant replied he did not. When 

asked whether he recalled the police “had to come out because you stabbed [Cindy’s] 

tires after you were asked to leave the home because of an argument,” appellant 

stated that event did not occur. Rather, he testified, “I never went there. I was in 

Balch Springs” where he lived. On re-direct, appellant testified he remembered 

“very little about Thanksgiving” and he was not charged with any crime from 

November 2015. Appellant argues the trial court erred by allowing this line of 

questioning.

Pursuant to rule of evidence 404(b)(1), “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other 

act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 

particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” TEX.R.EVID. 
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404(b)(1). Exceptions to this rule include admission of the evidence “for another 

purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. 404(b)(2). We review a trial 

court’s decision admitting or excluding evidence for an abuse of discretion. 

Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under that 

standard, we uphold the trial court’s ruling so long as it is within the zone of 

reasonable disagreement. Cameron v. State, 241 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007).

Appellant was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for 

shooting Nicola and, separately, for shooting Cindy. The two cases were tried 

together. Before asking appellant about the alleged incident at Thanksgiving 2015, 

a hearing on the admissibility was held outside the presence of the jury. At the end 

of the hearing, the trial court concluded: “Well, regarding the testimony that he has 

made regarding the shooting of Cindy Johnson, I do believe that 404(b)(2) is 

triggered, so I’m going to allow the State to get into that.” After the jury returned to 

the courtroom, the State questioned appellant about the Thanksgiving 2015 incident. 

Based on this record, we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion by 

determining evidence about appellant stabbing Cindy’s tires one year before the 

shootings was admissible to show appellant’s “motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident” with 
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respect to the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for shooting Cindy. 

TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). We overrule appellant’s second issue. 

C. Motion for Mistrial

In his third issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion 

for mistrial. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of 

discretion. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A mistrial 

is an appropriate remedy in extreme circumstances for a narrow class of highly 

prejudicial and incurable errors. Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2004). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling, considering only those arguments before the court at the time of the ruling. 

Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 

Because it is an extreme remedy, a mistrial should be granted “only when 

residual prejudice remains” after less drastic alternatives are explored. Ocon, 284 

S.W.3d at 884–85 (quoting Barnett v. State, 161 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005)). Though requesting lesser remedies is not a prerequisite to a motion for 

mistrial, when the movant does not first request a lesser remedy, we will not reverse 

the court’s judgment if the problem could have been cured by the less drastic 

alternative. Id.

The State called Cindy as a rebuttal witness and the following exchange 

occurred when appellant’s counsel cross-examined her: 
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Q. Okay. And you’ve never stated that Cassandra was - -

was, you know, the target or that Jeremy - -

A. No. Actually, I’ve been the target for ten years.

Q. Gotcha.

MR. EDWARDS: I’ll pass the witness. 

A. He had a bulletproof vest and everything in that house.

Appellant’s counsel objected to Cindy’s unsolicited statement that appellant “had a 

bulletproof vest and everything in that house,” and the trial court sustained the 

objection. Appellant’s counsel then asked that the statement be stricken from the 

record, and the trial court stated “[p]lease strike that last bit from the record.” When 

appellant moved for a mistrial, the trial court denied the motion. 

On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for 

mistrial because Cindy’s unsolicited statement was a comment on his post-arrest 

silence by the State. The State responds that Cindy did not comment on appellant’s 

post-arrest silence, the State did not comment on appellant’s post-arrest silence, and 

the proper remedy was a motion to strike and a request the jury be instructed to 

disregard the statement. We disagree with appellant that Cindy’s unsolicited 

statement was a comment on his post-arrest silence. We also disagree with appellant 

that Cindy’s statement was a comment by the State. 

Cindy’s statement could be viewed as implying appellant prepared for the

shooting because he had a bulletproof vest “and everything else” at the house. 

However, any prejudice caused by Cindy’s unsolicited statement could have been 

cured by striking the testimony and instructing the jury to disregard Cindy’s last 
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statement. Appellant did not request the trial court instruct the jury to disregard

Cindy’s comment. Because the problem could have been cured by a less drastic 

alternative and appellant did not pursue that remedy, we will not reverse the trial 

court’s judgment on this basis. Additionally, we cannot conclude the trial court 

abused its discretion by concluding Cindy’s statement did not fall into the category 

of extreme circumstances for a narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable 

errors for which a mistrial is warranted. We overrule appellant’s third issue. 

D. Lesser-Included Offense

In his fourth issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his request

for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of deadly conduct. A person 

commits the offense of deadly conduct if he recklessly engaged in conduct that 

places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE

22.05(a). A “person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances 

surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 

consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 

exist or the result will occur.” Id. § 6.03(c).

A trial court’s decision to submit or deny a lesser-included offense instruction 

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Treadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 666 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2004); Bueno v. State, No. 05-18-00940-CR, 2019 WL 3212151, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Dallas July 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 

We apply a two-step test to determine whether an instruction on a lesser-included 
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offense should have been given to the jury. Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 382 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Bueno, 2019 WL 3212151, at *3. First, we determine if the 

proof necessary to establish the charged offense also includes the lesser offense. 

Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 382; Bueno, 2019 WL 3212151, at *3. If so, in the second 

step we review the record for some evidence that would permit a jury to rationally 

find that, if the appellant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense. Cavazos, 

382 S.W.3d at 382; Bueno, 2019 WL 3212151, at *3. 

As to the first step, the State concedes the offense of deadly conduct is a lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in this case. This Court 

previously concluded deadly conduct may be a lesser-included offense of aggravated 

assault with a deadly weapon. See Bueno, 2019 WL 3212151, at *4. The remaining 

question, then, is whether there is some evidence that appellant, if guilty, is guilty 

only of the lesser-included offense of deadly conduct. See Campbell v. State, 149 

S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (en banc). Satisfying the second step 

“requires affirmative evidence that both raises the lesser-included offense and rebuts 

or negates an element of the greater offense.” Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 385.

At trial, appellant testified he intentionally shot Nicola because Nicola was 

charging at him and he had no other means of escape. Nicola’s and Mascarenas’s 

testimony also showed appellant intentionally shot Nicola. There was no evidence 

indicating appellant was aware of but “consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.” TEX. PENAL 
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CODE § 6.03(c). Because the evidence would not support a finding that appellant 

had the requisite mental state at the time he fired the gun, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by denying appellant’s request for the inclusion of an instruction on 

deadly conduct.

E. Modifications to Judgment

We have the power to modify the trial court’s judgment when we have the 

necessary information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 

S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–

30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Here, the judgment states appellant waived 

a jury trial and he pleaded guilty to the offense. However, the record reflects 

appellant did not waive his right to a jury trial and he pleaded not guilty. 

Accordingly, we modify the judgment to reflect this was a jury trial and appellant 

pleaded not guilty to the charged offense.

CONCLUSION

We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm as modified.

191569f.u05

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

/Erin A. Nowell//

ERIN A. NOWELL

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

JEREMY LAINE JOHNSON, 

Appellant

No. 05-19-01569-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District 

Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-1630929-H.

Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell. 

Justices Osborne and Pedersen, III 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

MODIFIED as follows:

We STRIKE the words “Waiver of Jury Trial” from the heading of the 

judgment.

Under the heading “Plea to Offense,” we STRIKE the word “Guilty” and 

ADD the words “NOT GUILTY.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 6th day of May, 2021.