NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0489n.06

Case No. 22-6055

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PATRICIO JARA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant-Appellee,

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE

OPINION

Before: McKEAGUE, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. 

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Tennessee State University professor Patricio Jara

was passed over for an appointment as chair of his department. He sued the university, alleging 

that he was improperly denied the promotion based on his national origin. A jury disagreed, 

returning a verdict in the university’s favor. On appeal, Jara asks us to set aside that verdict based 

on the legal insufficiency of the evidence. But he failed to preserve the issue in the district court. 

Alternatively, Jara seeks a new trial to remedy two purported errors in the jury instructions. Yet

those arguments too have procedural defects. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. 

I.

Dr. Patricio Jara is a professor of physics and mathematics in Tennessee State University’s 

College of Life and Physical Sciences. An American citizen originally from Chile, Jara earned his 
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doctorate from Louisiana State University and began teaching at Tennessee State in 2009. 

Throughout his employment at the university, he received multiple salary increases, eventually 

earning academic tenure.

Jara later applied to be the chair of the physics and mathematics department. Ultimately, 

Dr. Nolan McMurray, an external candidate, was selected as the new chair. Unlike Jara, 

McMurray was born in the United States. 

In the wake of his rejection, Jara asserted numerous claims against the university under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). According to Jara,

he experienced discrimination and a hostile work environment based on his national origin. 

Eventually, four claims were at issue at trial: discrimination by failing to appoint Jara department 

chair; discrimination by diminishing Jara’s options for advancement; discrimination by 

withholding pay; and hostile work environment. 

As is standard practice, the parties submitted proposed jury instructions and verdict forms 

to the district court before trial. At trial, Jara moved to amend the jury instructions and verdict 

form. The district court denied this request, finding that the previously agreed upon jury 

instructions and verdict form adequately addressed the issues raised at trial and correctly stated the 

legal standards. 

At the close of trial, the jury returned a verdict in the university’s favor. Following the 

verdict’s announcement, Jara moved orally for “judgment notwithstanding the verdict,” what is 

commonly understood as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) renewed motion for judgment 

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b); see Hanover Am. Ins. Co. v. Tattooed Millionaire Ent., 

LLC, 974 F.3d 767, 779–81 (6th Cir. 2020). The court denied the motion and entered final 
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judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. No further motions practice took place, and Jara 

appealed the judgment to this Court.

II.

A. Jara asks us to “reverse the jury verdict” because “it is against the ‘clear weight of the 

evidence,’” meaning “no reasonable juror could” fail to find that the university’s promotion 

decision was motivated by discrimination on the basis of national origin. Some procedural 

confusion, however, clouds the matter. Recall that, in post-trial proceedings in the district court, 

Jara asked the district court to enter “judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” That is the phrase

previously used by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to describe what is now a Rule 50(b) 

motion—a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Kusens v. Pascal Co., Inc., 448 

F.3d 349, 358 n.10 (6th Cir. 2006). Jara, however, failed to move for judgment as a matter of law 

in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) before the case was submitted to the 

jury, a necessary prerequisite to seeking post-trial relief under Rule 50(b). Hanover, 974 F.3d at 

779–90. And in denying Jara’s motion, the district court seemed, at times, to view the motion as 

one for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. See R. 109 at PageID # 2089–91 (“I 

will deny the motion . . . . [A] reasonable jury could have found that the plaintiff did not meet the 

burden that the plaintiff bears, even though it’s only by a preponderance . . . . [A] reasonable jury 

could have reached the defense verdict it did on each of the four claims here.”); accord Holmes v. 

City of Massillon, Ohio, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047–49 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[S]ince a reasonable juror could 

find for Holmes . . . we reverse the district court’s decision granting a new trial.”). Compounding 

matters, Jara’s principal appellate brief does not specify which rule he raises on appeal—Rule 

50(b) or Rule 59—both of which can be used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. See

Appellant Br. at 10; Hanover, 974 F.3d at 775 n.5.
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Either way, Jara’s failure first to request judgment as a matter of law in accordance with 

Rule 50(a) at the close of the defense case dooms his appeal. Start with a Rule 50(b) motion. If 

Jara intended to move in district court under Rule 50(b) and now seeks appellate review of the 

district court’s denial of a new trial, he has failed to preserve that argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b); 

Hanover, 974 F.3d at 790; see also Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 

399–401, 402 n.4 (2006) (describing interplay between Rules 50(a) and 50(b)); 9 Moore’s Fed.

Prac. Civ. § 50.91 (2023); accord Maher v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 817, 824 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(“A failure to file a pre-judgment motion under Rule 50(a) prevents this court from reviewing the 

sufficiency of a jury verdict.”). 

The preservation requirement ensures that a party opponent is put on notice of the 

purported flaws in its case, allowing the party an opportunity to cure them during trial. A Rule 

50(a) motion “informs the opposing party of the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and 

affords a clear opportunity to provide additional evidence that may be available. [It] also alerts 

the court to the opportunity to simplify the trial by resolving some issues . . . without submission 

to the jury.” Hanover, 974 F.3d at 784 (quoting Note to the 2006 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

50(b)). Employing this framework also reflects the notion that trial judges are better equipped 

than courts of appeals to assess factual issues. Whether a sufficiency of the evidence challenge 

should be granted “calls for the judgment in the first instance of the judge who saw and heard the 

witnesses and has the feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.” Unitherm, 

546 U.S. at 401 (quoting Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947)). 

Much the same is true if we treat Jara’s motion as one under Rule 59(a). The Rule operates 

in a straightforward manner. Within 28 days of the entry of a judgment, a party can move for a 

new trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b). Rule 59(a) allows a district court, on motion, to grant a new trial 
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“for any reason for which a new trial has . . . been granted in an action at law in federal court.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). We have read this instruction to include cases where “[t]he jury’s 

verdict might conflict with the weight of the evidence presented at trial.” Max Rack, Inc. v. Core 

Health & Fitness, LLC, 40 F.4th 454, 468 (6th Cir. 2022); Holmes, 78 F.3d at 1045–46 

(recognizing that a new trial is warranted when “a jury has reached a seriously erroneous result as 

evidenced by . . . the verdict being against the weight of the evidence”) (citation omitted). But “if 

a reasonable juror could reach the challenged verdict, a new trial is improper.” Barnes v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2000). 

In essence, Rule 59(a) permits the losing party to seek a new trial where the evidence so 

demands. But to preserve the issue for appeal, the movant must make a Rule 50(a) motion at trial, 

followed by a Rule 50(b) motion after the verdict, as well as a Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial. 

Hanover, 974 F.3d at 790 n.14; see Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 400–01, 402 n.4; see also Zitzow v. 

Auto-Owners Ins. Co., No. 22-5549, 2023 WL 2033792, at *10 (6th Cir. Feb. 16, 2023) (collecting 

cases). Rule 50(b) reflects the ways in which the motions are tied. It explains that if a court denies 

a Rule 50(a) motion and submits the action to the jury, the movant may file a renewed motion for 

judgment as a matter of law after the entry of judgment “and may include an alternative or joint 

request for a new trial under Rule 59.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). In that sense, “the text of Rule 50(b) 

indicates that the trial court only may order a new trial based on issues raised in a preverdict motion 

when deciding a renewed post-verdict motion.” 9B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 

Federal Practice & Procedure § 2537 (3d ed. 2022). Again, we require that challenges to an 

opening party’s case be raised during trial to deter “a litigant[’s] . . . gamb[ling] on the jury’s 

verdict and then later question[ing] the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.” Id. § 2536 (citations 

omitted). 
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Jara did not follow these settled procedures. He failed to make a pre-verdict motion for 

judgment as a matter of law, which precluded him from renewing a motion post-trial for judgment 

as a matter of law according to Rule 50(b), and, in turn, moving for a new trial to challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence under Rule 59. True, Jara moved for “judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict,” seemingly a Rule 50(b) motion, after the jury returned its verdict and the district court 

inquired about any post-trial motions. The district court did not press Jara on the procedural error 

in making a Rule 50(b) motion without having previously moved under Rule 50(a). Nor did the 

court seek to clarify whether the post-verdict motion was a request for a new trial under Rule 

59(a)(1). Either way, by failing to move pre-verdict under Rule 50(a), Jara did not preserve his 

right to challenge under Rule 59 the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdict.

Hanover, 974 F.3d at 771 (holding a party cannot make a Rule 50(b) motion if it has not previously 

made a Rule 50(a) motion); id. at 790 n.14 (noting a sufficiency of the evidence argument forfeited 

if not preceded by a Rule 50(a) motion at trial followed by a Rule 50(b) motion); Pennington v. 

Western Atlas, Inc., 202 F.3d 902, 911 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the failure to move for a new 

trial under Rule 59 “precludes appellate review” of the argument that the jury’s verdict was against 

the great weight of the evidence); see also Zitzow, 2023 WL 2033792, at *10 (“This Court . . . 

reviews the handling of sufficiency of the evidence claims by the district court . . . . Under Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure 50(a) and 50(b), a litigant must first make a Rule 50(a) motion for 

judgment as a matter of law, and then—if that motion is denied—file a renewed motion for 

judgment as a matter of law or request a new trial under Rule 50(b). If either of these steps are not 

followed, this Court cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence challenge.” (citations omitted)). 

Procedure matters, so much so that it sometimes precludes us from reaching a party’s substantive 

arguments. Today’s case is a paradigmatic example.
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B. Next, Jara faults the district court for two aspects of the jury charge; one, an instruction

that a failure to interview can be viewed as an adverse employment action, and two, an instruction 

that national origin discrimination can be based on either “real or perceived” national origin. Here 

again, Jara’s strategic choices betray him. Case in point, Jara has failed to provide any 

transcription of the actual instructions read to the jury. The docketed appeal transcript merely 

states, “WHEREUPON, the Court read the jury charge and verdict form instructions to the jury. 

Transcription was not requested.” And in response to the university highlighting this omission 

and characterizing it as a failure on Jara’s part to satisfy his duty to provide us with an adequate 

record on appeal, Jara ignored the point. Instead, his reply brief simply turned our attention to 

whether he preserved his objection to the jury instructions at trial. 

As a general rule, the appellant bears the burden of ordering the trial transcript when it is 

necessary to a review of the issues the appealing party raises. Fed. R. App. P. 10(b); see, e.g.,

Ramage v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 520 F. App’x 341, 344 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing 

Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 24 F.3d 814, 821 (6th Cir. 1994)). And, in the context of a challenge 

to the jury instructions, providing a trial transcript that “does not include the actual instructions 

tendered to the jury” serves to waive any challenge to the propriety of those instructions. Ramage, 

520 F. App’x at 344. After all, it is impossible for us to review on appeal the jury instructions if 

we do not know what instructions the jurors were given. Because Jara has failed to provide a trial 

transcript reflecting these instructions, he has waived appellate review of his challenge to the 

instructions. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b); 16A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 3956.1 (5th ed. 2022) (“Challenges to jury instructions will require all 

parts of the transcript that are necessary to apply the relevant legal standard to the challenge.”);
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Coleman v. Shoney’s, Inc., 79 F. App’x 155, 157 (6th Cir. 2003); Herndon v. City of Massillon, 

638 F.2d 963, 965 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 

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We affirm.