U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

94–231 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–29] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES HEARING 

ON

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

STRATEGY AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2016 

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT 

REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL 

BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 25, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

PETER VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

LINDSAY KAVANAUGH, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 2 

Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Bryce, Douglas W., Deputy Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical 

and Biological Defense ......................................................................................... 7 

Burnham, John, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction 

and Arms Control ................................................................................................. 5 

Hassell, Dr. Chris, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and 

Biological Defense ................................................................................................ 4 

Myers, Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency and U.S. 

Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction ..... 6 

Rosenbach, Eric, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 

Global Security ..................................................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bryce, Douglas W. ............................................................................................ 62 

Burnham, John ................................................................................................. 38 

Hassell, Dr. Chris ............................................................................................. 29 

Myers, Kenneth A., III ..................................................................................... 45 

Rosenbach, Eric ................................................................................................ 17 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Ashford ....................................................................................................... 90 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 85 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 89 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 75 

(1) 

COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

STRATEGY AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2016 NATIONAL 

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND 

CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 25, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:34 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABIITIES 

Mr. WILSON. Ladies and gentlemen, I call this hearing of the 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House 

Armed Services Committee to order. I am pleased to welcome everyone here today for this very important and timely hearing on 

countering weapons of mass destruction and the fiscal year 2016 

budget request for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA] 

and the Chemical Biological Defense Program [CBDP]. 

The proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] remain a grave and enduring threat. Indeed, as the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in his recent worldwide threat assessment before Congress said that ‘‘the time when 

only a few states had access to the most dangerous technologies is 

past. Biological and chemical materials and technologies, almost always dual use, move easily in the globalized economy, as do personnel with the scientific expertise to design them.’’ 

And today as we sit at this hearing I am reminded that the unfortunate recent and continued use of chemical weapons in Syria 

shows us that state sponsors of weapons of mass destruction not 

only seek these capabilities, but use these capabilities. 

The entire Department of Defense [DOD] countering weapons of 

mass destruction enterprise has played a central and critical role 

in our national defense over the past year; from the destruction of 

more than 650 tons of Syrian and Libyan chemical weapons and 

the precursors to the mitigation of the Ebola outbreak, which 

began in remote areas of Africa. And even the cleanup and destruction of our own chemical weapons stockpiles in accordance with our 

treaty obligations. 

Despite these successes, we remain increasingly concerned about 

the interconnections between terrorism, non-state actors, and 
2 

weapons of mass destruction technologies and capabilities. Degrading, disrupting, and mitigating these weapons of mass destruction 

pathways and the capabilities at their point of origin further upstream, and far, far away from American shores and our fellow citizens, must be our central strategic aim. 

And while I am pleased to see that the 2014 Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 

[CWMD] places emphasis on this upstream approach, I remain concerned that we have not properly resourced the Department, and 

indeed the entire interagency, amidst dwindling budgets, competing priorities, and the pressures of defense sequestration. 

So today we look forward to discussing the priorities for the Department of Defense to counter weapons of mass destruction for fiscal year 2016. We have before us a panel of five very distinguished 

witnesses. 

Mr. Eric Rosenbach, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Global Security; Dr. Chris Hassell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense; Mr. John Burnham, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction and Arms Control; Mr. Ken Myers, the 

Director of Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and also the Director 

of the Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction; and Mr. Doug Bryce, the Deputy Director of the Joint 

Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense. 

And as so appropriate, and it is just a miracle that he is appearing, but I now get to introduce and put on the spot immediately, 

and giving him time to get to his place, my friend and ranking 

member, Mr. Jim Langevin, from the beautiful State of Rhode Island, for any comments that he would like to make as he is now 

opening his book. But he has already read all this and so he is fully 

prepared. 

[Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And ready to go, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very 

much. And I apologize for the delay. I had a constituent meeting 

in my office that ran over. 

I apologize to our witnesses. But thank you all for being here. It 

is great to see everyone again, familiar faces. And I do want to 

thank you for appearing before the subcommittee today to discuss 

the Department of Defense’s countering weapons of mass destruction strategy and the fiscal year 2016 budget request. 

Now, in May of last year the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

General Dempsey, signed a letter of endorsement for the Department’s updated Strategy for CWMD released in June 2014. And the 

letter began by stating, ‘‘the U.S. faces threats from state and nonstate actors that seek to develop, proliferate, acquire or use WMD.’’ 

Like Chairman Dempsey, I am sure the other members—I am 

sure that the other members of the committee, I believe the proliferation use of weapons of mass destruction threatens our troops 

overseas, our regional partners, and innocent civilians. 
3 

As the Ebola outbreak demonstrated, understanding it was not 

employed by an actor, weapons of mass destruction threaten the 

homeland, too. Preventing acquisition, development, and the use of 

these weapons obviously is crucial. I am therefore pleased that the 

CWMD strategy places greater emphasis on a provocative upstream approach to countering weapons of mass destruction. 

However, CWMD is not just the responsibility of the Department 

of Defense. The Department’s upstream approach will require a 

whole-of-government approach, most specifically regarding the two 

priority objectives of reducing incentives to pursue, possess, and deploy WMD, and increasing barriers to the acquisition, proliferation, 

and the use of WMD. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how the CWMD 

strategy released in June 2014 will coordinate with other strategies, including the Department of State. Additionally I look forward 

to understanding the other components of the CWMD strategy and 

how the fiscal year 2016 budget request supports the priorities and 

objectives. 

As a longtime advocate of STEM [science, technology, engineering, and mathematics] education and our science and technology 

workforce, I am especially interested in how the foundational activity of maintaining and sustaining technical expertise is being executed. 

With that, finally I want to express my appreciation to the witnesses for their work in Syria, Ukraine, Jordan, Lebanon, and 

countless other places around the globe to protect our Nation, our 

partners, and our troops from the destruction caused by WMD. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today’s discussion. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. And we will now proceed. 

Assistant Secretary Rosenbach, we will begin with you. And then 

we will proceed. And we are under like a—when it is a 5-minute 

rule, if it is less that is fine. And a challenge that we have is that 

there could be votes. But hey, we are here. 

We are so appreciative of your being here. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF ERIC ROSENBACH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY 

Mr. ROSENBACH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you, Ranking Member Langevin, and all the other members of the 

subcommittee. We appreciate the opportunity to talk today about 

the strategy we have in place for mitigating the threat of weapons 

of mass destruction. And I am very honored to be with the team 

here from DOD to work on these things. 

I would like also to thank your staff. They have done a good job 

in setting up a constructive hearing and we appreciate that a lot. 

For reasons of time we will all be very short and submit our written testimony for the record. And I would just say a couple things 

very briefly so that we can get down to your questions. 

You know the state of the world today makes it increasingly likely that either a state or a non-state actor could use a weapon of 

mass destruction. When you think about the way the world is 

interconnected, also the ability of these actors to get technology 

that could be very destructive. And so with that in mind, it literally 
4 

is the top priority of DOD and the U.S. Government to try to prevent an attack like this from happening. 

With that in mind, we moved forward with a new strategy to try 

to mitigate the risk of that. And luckily we have already had some 

successes over the past couple years in things related to WMD. So 

as you know, in the strategy we are essentially working on three 

no’s, right. It is a whole-of-government strategy and we want to ensure that there is no additional state that gets—or non-state actors 

that get WMD. 

Those possessing WMD are not able to use them, and if they are 

used, that the effects are not very bad. So it is the three negatives 

that we are looking for to try to mitigate the risk. 

As you mentioned, both of you all in your opening statement, the 

strategy is to try to think more preemptively about this, more upstream. So first we want to try to prevent actors from getting access to weapons of mass destruction. 

Then if they do, we want to be able to contain and reduce the 

threats both to our military and of course to the Nation. And we 

have had some success in this. And finally that we have the ability 

to respond, and Ebola is a good case where something has already 

broken out and we mitigate the risk both to the country and to the 

military for the threat from that. 

So I think at this point, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my statement and pass it on to the other witnesses or be open to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenbach can be found in the 

Appendix on page 17.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Secretary Rosenbach. 

And what we will do is proceed and then go to questions. And 

we are very fortunate that Pete Villano is going to keep the elected 

officials in line and within the 5 minutes. 

Dr. Hassell. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHRIS HASSELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE 

Dr. HASSELL. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Wilson and 

Ranking Member Langevin and all the members of the committee. 

I also appreciate the opportunity to be here and share your passion 

for this issue. 

Maybe just a word about the threats we are facing, if I can just 

say a few words about that. The chemical and biological threats in 

particular, which is what my office has responsibility for, they are 

very dynamic. 

And one of the problems we are facing now is the rapid advancement and proliferation of technologies is making the problem even 

more difficult, and extending the spectrum of plausible actors, 

agents, concepts of use and targets. 

And in addition, the range of the potential agents is very wide. 

And you know we have seen much in the news about some of the 

potential chemical threats, especially for something as simple as 

chlorine, which is ubiquitous, is a major concern. And it ranges all 

the way to very sophisticated nontraditional agents. 
5 

And on the biological side it ranges from common infectious diseases that could be used as a pathogen of concern, all the way to 

possibly engineered organisms. So that the range and the dynamics 

make it a very vexing problem. 

So the research and development [R&D] and acquisition programs are planned for fiscal year 2016 for chemical threats includes detection, protection, decontamination and a sizable portion 

for medical countermeasures, which would include vaccines and 

therapeutics. Those also apply in those same areas for focus for the 

biological threats, same areas for detection and protection, decontamination and medical countermeasures. 

So those are the two main areas of focus. But these remain 

threats to our troops, our allies, civilians around the world. So to 

your point about the interagency interaction, that is something 

that is vital for our success here. 

So I appreciate the continued support of Congress, and especially 

among yourselves, for these important programs. And I look forward to answering any of your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hassell can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Dr. Hassell. 

And we now proceed to Mr. Burnham. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN BURNHAM, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR THREAT REDUCTION AND ARMS 

CONTROL 

Mr. BURNHAM. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, all 

the other members of the subcommittee, I too very much appreciate 

the opportunity to be here. I am the newest member of the team, 

having just joined after 28 years in the military. 

And my time in Naval Special Warfare taught me that working 

whole-of-government interagency is one of the most important 

things that we can do. And this mission area is truly one of the 

most important. So I do look forward to bringing a lot of that experience in as we continue the whole-of-government efforts. 

As you all know, our office, Threat Reduction [and] Arms Control, we have got four primary components. We manage the Department’s nuclear, chemical, biological treaty implementation. We 

have oversight of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile elimination. 

We have oversight of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 

which is executed by Director Myers and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. And we have oversight of the resource management efforts to develop and field a new awareness technology platform for CWMD. 

So a few points on each and how they project out into our efforts 

for fiscal year 2016. 

Our Treaty Management team obviously supports the work of 

the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], ensures that all 

of our Department activities comply with the international arms 

control and nonproliferation agreements. 

Fulfilling our commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention, we are moving forward with the destruction of the remainder of the U.S. chemical stockpile in the two sites: Pueblo, Colorado, and Richmond, Kentucky. In fact, just recently we started de-
6 

struction operations in Pueblo, a major milestone. And we are on 

track to complete construction of the main pilot facility in Kentucky by the end of this year. 

Our Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] program is one of the 

most comprehensive efforts the Department has with partner countries to address WMD threats, anything that can manifest in, transit through, or emanate from their territory. And as we know, the 

nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and materials continues to blur and be of concern. 

We have accomplishments from this past year. Notably, Mr. 

Chairman, as you mentioned, the Cape Ray and the destruction of 

the declared Syrian weapons stockpile, and the efforts to mitigate 

the Ebola outbreak, and the ongoing participation there by DTRA 

and the resource aspects of AT&L [Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics]. 

Finally, our countering WMD systems initiative, we are focusing 

on developing and finding a platform that will increase our situational awareness and information-sharing capability; there is a lot 

of information out in the U.S. Government. There is a lot of good 

work being done across the intell [intelligence] community to bring 

this information together. And our goal across our DOD, U.S. Government, and international partners is to increase that level of 

awareness in the CWMD arena. 

So I have submitted my written testimony for the record. I highlight additional successes in the past year. And I look forward to 

testifying today to talk about our goals for fiscal year 2016. 

Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burnham can be found in the 

Appendix on page 38.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Burnham. 

We now proceed to Mr. Myers. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

Mr. MYERS. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to be here today to share 

with you the work being done to counter the threats posed by proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. 

There are three entities at our facilities at Fort Belvoir. Each has 

different mission areas, authorities, requirements, and funding. 

But they are all located together and intertwined in order to leverage expertise and coordinate efforts. Together, we represent the 

center of our Nation’s countering weapons of mass destruction effort. 

I want to share with the committee our standup of a new directorate that is focused on our support to the nuclear deterrent and 

our stockpile. Our goal is to elevate our nuclear mission so that we 

meet the expectations of the recently completed DOD Nuclear Enterprise Review. It is our top priority. 

We also address important national security priorities like biological and chemical threats. Two of the best examples of the capa-
7 

bilities we provide and the missions that we take on are related to 

our work with Ebola and Syria. 

In both cases we had the expertise to evaluate a serious threat. 

We developed the needed technologies in close coordination with 

the organizations represented at this table. And we provided planning and execution support to all aspects of the operations. 

Now, thankfully, the Ebola cases in West Africa continue to decline and 600 metric tons of Syrian chemical weapons material has 

been destroyed. In addition, we are also currently involved in 

counter-proliferation efforts to assist Ukraine, specifically the 

Ukrainian border guards. Overall, we are scheduled to provide $39 million worth of equipment, including bulldozers, armored trucks, graders, thermal 

imagers, patrol boats, and concertina wire. 

I am proud of what our team has achieved and believe that we 

are good stewards of the taxpayer’s dollar. As we look forward to 

fiscal year 2016, I am confident we are prepared to address future 

WMD threats around the world. I would be pleased to respond to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Myers. 

Mr. Bryce. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS W. BRYCE, DEPUTY JOINT PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE 

Mr. BRYCE. Congressman Langevin and distinguished members 

of the subcommittee, I am grateful for the opportunity to testify on 

behalf of the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, known as the JPEO–CBD. 

Joined with my partners in the countering WMD community, I 

will discuss my organization’s activities under the June 2014 Department of Defense Strategy for Countering WMD. And I will 

highlight the fiscal year 2016 budget request. 

The JPEO–CBD is the material developer and procurement arm 

of the DOD Chem[ical] Bio[logical] Defense Program. My organization also works closely with the Joint Science and Technology Office within the Department—the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

for the technology efforts that will enhance our future capabilities. 

The JPEO is requesting $279 million for procurement and $506 

million in advanced development in fiscal year 2016. 

Regarding collaboration within the strategy, we participate in 

the interagency forum known as the Public Health Emergency 

Medical Countermeasures Enterprise to ensure our medical programs are coordinated across the Federal Government. 

As to understanding the threat within the strategy, the fiscal 

year 2016 budget request funds sensors and bio-surveillance situational awareness, efforts critical to the warfighter’s ability to identify and respond to the threat. 

With respect to defeating or controlling the threat within the 

strategy, the DOD support for the international response to Syria 

chemical weapons is a great example. The DOD team represented 

at this table produced the Field Deployable Hydrolysis System, and 
8 

deployed the capability aboard a U.S. maritime ship where it successfully destroyed the declared weapons of the Syrian regime. 

On safeguarding the joint force and the homeland, as required by 

the strategy, the fiscal year 2016 budget request funds medical and 

protection programs critical to the warfighter’s ability to survive 

and recover from the global threat. 

We have also supported the DOD Ebola outbreak response by accelerating therapeutics and vaccines, and providing a transport isolation system to bring patients home safely. Our DOD Ebola 

diagnostics assay, and our latest platform to read the assay received emergency use authorization from the FDA [Food and Drug 

Administration], and have become a principal capability in West 

Africa and at home during the crisis. 

The challenges we face countering weapons of mass destruction 

are numerous. But I am optimistic that with the support from Congress we can continue to execute the strategy. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Langevin, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for your leadership. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bryce can be found in the Appendix on page 62.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Bryce. And we have a 

situation that the votes may start soon. 

With that, a question that I have for each of you: Members of 

this committee are trying to convince our colleagues of the negative 

adverse consequence of defense sequestration. If each one of you 

could identify just briefly a specific example of an adverse circumstance which has developed because of defense sequestration, 

beginning with Mr. Rosenbach. 

Mr. ROSENBACH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You 

know the part that is most insidious about sequestration is that it 

doesn’t allow us to develop the most modern force and invest in the 

most modern technologies. 

So in my mind the thing I worry about is that we might not have 

the resources, for example, to develop a capability for a future 

threat like we did for the Cape Ray, that we can pivot a little bit 

and do some innovation and think about a way to solve a very serious problem because we have had to cut back in some of those 

areas. 

I think it is also very important to note, Mr. Chairman, that the 

uncertainty that accompanies the planning process of not knowing 

whether it will be sequestration or not is very difficult for us to do 

planning. And you know in the Department of Defense we plan for 

everything so that we are prepared for the worst things in the 

world. That also has a great impact on our ability to protect the 

country. 

Thank you, sir. 

Dr. HASSELL. Yes, sir. Maybe if I could just give one example, especially on the science and technology, the research end early on. 

As I mentioned, we have a number of medical countermeasures 

programs, the vaccines and drugs that we would use for both chemical and biological threats. 

We have a long list of these things that we are addressing. And 

we have to make some decisions about how we rank order those 

and how we prioritize that work. And we have to draw a line what 
9 

we can fund; just one practical aspect of sequestration is we are 

going to have to draw that line much higher. 

And the specific example might be that we were fortunate that 

Ebola was still above that line. So we did have programs in place 

that were addressing that, along with our colleagues at HHS [Department of Health and Human Services]. Sequestration, I don’t 

mean to overdramatize it but I mean it could have been that that 

line was drawn higher and we would have missed that opportunity. 

So that is just one example of a program that pretty passionate 

about that could have been adversely affected. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Burnham. 

Mr. BURNHAM. I will segue on Dr. Hassell’s point. One of the biggest advantages of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is 

the flexibility we have in the funding the Congress has given us. 

And we can react to opportunities to accelerate some of the undertakings we have with our international partners. 

Sequestration takes a lot of that flexibility away, particularly in 

the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, as an example, or 

to Dr. Hassell’s point, responding to crises and threats, very important for us in that CTR budget line. 

The other thing I would mention is the negative impact it would 

have on our ability to develop and field this operational prototype 

for the CWMD awareness system. 

As the WMD threat globalizes in terms of how information gets 

used and the availability of a platform for us to be able to accelerate that, not being able to develop software and integrate delay 

our authorities to operate and push that timeline out because we 

won’t have the R&D funds because that is the kind of things that 

would probably fall above that line. Thanks. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Myers. 

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, my colleagues have spent some time 

speaking about the impacts on research and development, having 

the Field Deployable Hydrolysis System, having the Ebola therapeutics ready and available and ready to go. 

The impact—another impact that would have a significant degrading effect would be the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s 

support to the warfighter, support to the combatant commands. 

When they encounter a WMD situation, whether it be an incident, 

use, what have you, their first telephone call is to DTRA SCC 

[SCC–WMD, Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction]. 

And the impact of sequestration will make it much more difficult, 

and potentially in some situations impossible for us to respond, to 

have the operational capability, to have the flexibility, to have the 

opportunity to respond and meet those challenges that they are facing on the field of battle, and taking care of our men and women 

in uniform. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I appreciate your concern very much. 

Mr. Bryce. 

Mr. BRYCE. Mr. Chairman, I would also add that it is a personnel 

issue and it is a morale issue within a workforce. We are already 

in a, as my colleagues have mentioned, a constrained fiscal envi-
10 

ronment. So naturally the programs would be reduced or minimized in their process of procuring or developing. But it would also 

affect the morale and even pay of our workforce. 

Mr. WILSON. And I thank each of you. 

And we now proceed to Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thanks to our witnesses for being here and for your testimony. If I could with Mr. Myers, I would like to start. You mentioned the program Constellation in your written testimony. 

And Mr. Burnham, you were just discussing with the chairman, 

were you referring to Constellation, just to clarify? 

Mr. BURNHAM. That is correct. Yes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you for that. 

So I understand that this tool provides situational awareness for 

the U.S. agencies and international partners to exchange real-time 

information on the Ebola outbreak. Mr. Myers, if you could, could 

you please describe this tool in more detail? 

How is Constellation being leveraged for other missions across 

the Department? And what investments are being made in the fiscal year 2016 budget, particularly on how we and the committee 

can be helpful developing this tool. 

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. Thank you. If it is okay, Mr. Burnham and 

I might tag team on this one. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Absolutely. 

Mr. MYERS. I will spend a little bit of time talking about the role 

of the Ebola portal because the Constellation system is currently 

under development. We are the program manager. We are developing the system. 

And the best way to describe it is we are bringing all the different lines of information and—in the world, if you will, from the 

intelligence community, from open sources and the like, and we are 

fusing it together to create a common operating picture. 

So the entire counter WMD community, as well as the combatant 

commands and our leadership, are all operating off of the same information. And that we can be proactive rather than reactive to 

some of these WMD incidents that we are finding ourselves in on 

a relatively regular basis. 

The Ebola portal that you raised was an effort by us to speed up 

Constellation to make it relevant, to get it involved in the Ebola 

crisis and our response to that. So think of it as an offshoot, if you 

will, of our main effort on counter WMD. 

And the Ebola portal brought together the entire U.S. interagency. So we were able to share information. We were able to 

share the latest models, the latest forecasting, the latest updates 

on developments with therapeutics and with various vaccines. 

The work of our laboratories in the various countries and the embassy, it kept us all together. It kept us communicating as one. We 

are on the same song sheet, if you will. 

We were also able to make a portion of it available to some of 

the international organizations that were involved in the Ebola response, specifically the World Health Organization. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. They participated as well. 

Mr. MYERS. Well, they weren’t part of it. The main portion of 

Constellation was for the United States Government to make sure 
11 

we were all on the same page. But it became very clear as we were 

responding to the Ebola threat that this was not something that 

the United States could do alone. 

We needed to engage with our partners abroad. We needed to engage with the international community as well, as well as these— 

the local governments and leadership. So we made part of it, if you 

will, available to our partners so that we also could communicate 

with them on the latest breaking news and get ahead of some of 

these developments. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So let me ask, while I still have my time—to all 

the witnesses. How is the budget request for fiscal year—fiscal year 

2016 support the June 2014 CWMD strategy’s emphasis on upstream or left-of-the-boom approach? Specifically, the two priority 

objectives, reducing incentives to pursue, possess, and deploy 

WMD, and increasing barriers to the acquisition, proliferation, and 

the use of WMD? 

Secretary, if we could start with you. 

Mr. ROSENBACH. Thank you, Congressman Langevin. You know 

this is one of those things where when you look at it in its simplest 

form, you can point to the budget for CTR and the things directly 

related to DTRA that fall into the three components of the strategy. But you have to think even more broadly than that because 

deterrence is an important part of preventing the use of WMD. 

And so when you think about the overall readiness of the force 

that may even extend, for example, to the readiness of the nuclear 

enterprise or other aspects of a force. We want to make sure that 

all of those are there to deter nation-states first and non-state actors from using WMD to begin with. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Thank you. 

Dr. HASSELL. Sir, I would just add my program specifically is 

more focused on the third leg, mitigating the effects if WMD is 

used. We are now going through our whole portfolio and seeing 

which could really be specifically utilized more for those upstream 

issues. 

So in a number of cases they could be some of those specific technologies. And as was mentioned, the deterrence effect of those different technologies. So we are evaluating that as well. 

Mr. BURNHAM. Sir, I think for us inside CTR the balance and engagement program that DTRA executes as another example where 

you are trying to develop some of these scientific collaborations 

that will enhance the bio surveillance and reduce the threat and 

really get to that upstream piece where you are actually deterring 

and influencing partner nations and other actors from going down 

that road in the first place. 

Mr. MYERS. Congressman Langevin, if I could I will expand a little bit on the Nunn-Lugar CTR program. And first and foremost I 

think it is important to remember how much the program has 

evolved. 

Twenty years ago we were focused on large infrastructure-type 

dismantlement programs in the former Soviet Union. We were taking down missile submarines. We were taking down strategic 

bombers, SS–18 and SS–19 intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

The program has evolved to stay one step ahead of the terrorist 

organizations and the extremist groups that are seeking WMD. 
12 

Our projects that we are coordinating now are not one billion dollar 

projects, but they are much smaller security and bio-safety efforts 

and proliferation prevention, border security projects in smaller 

quantities in smaller countries and locations around the world. 

So we have gone from this very large infrastructure-heavy 

projects to much smaller, much more focused efforts. And quite 

frankly there are more of them, but they are not as expensive, 

quite frankly, as the work we were doing in the former Soviet 

Union. 

And I think some of the change that you have seen in our budget 

is the fact that we aren’t carrying out those large projects in Russia 

like we were just a few years before. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know my time is expired. I yield 

back. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

And indeed votes have been called. And so—and due to the different series of votes, we want to thank each of you for being here. 

It is somewhat ironic that the first question I asked about defense sequestration, we are actually going to vote. And good people 

can disagree, but there will be an effort to address defense sequestration. 

And at this time we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 25, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 25, 2015 

(17) 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 25, 2015 

(75) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. The Fiscal Year 2016 Department of Defense Budget Overview notes 

that the Joint Force requires rebalancing to deal with a broad spectrum of conflict, 

including WMD environments. What specific rebalancing does our Joint Force need 

to effectively deal with WMD, and what are our current shortfalls? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. The Department of Defense is continuously evaluating its ability 

to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats while ensuring that the 

Joint Force is properly manned, trained and equipped in the event of a WMD crisis. 

As the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) is finalized, Combatant Commands and Services will conduct internal analysis of their mission and force posture 

to determine if there is a need for any rebalancing. 

In addition, DOD works closely with its partners in the U.S. Government and 

international community in order to adapt to the evolving WMD threat, remain prepared and agile, and maintain readiness to counter the potentially catastrophic consequences. While sequestration challenges will significantly affect our ability to 

structure our forces, build partner capacity, and capitalize in research, science and 

technology, DOD will remain prepared to respond to future conflicts. 

Mr. WILSON. There has been a lot of discussion about the fact that biotechnology 

is widely proliferated now, which could make biothreats much more readily available to terrorist groups or even lone actors, domestically as well as abroad. How 

does this change our strategy to protect against biothreats? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. We are concerned that the diffusion of technology and materials 

worldwide lowers barriers to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including 

dangerous biological materials. It is this increasing accessibility of technology in 

general—not just biotechnology—that influenced the emphasis on prevention and 

containment in our DOD Strategy for Countering WMD. Should prevention and containment fail, we must prudently hedge and continue development of capabilities 

that can be used to detect and identify novel threat agents, as well as protect our 

forces. 

Mr. WILSON. Since U.S. Forces have focused so heavily on counterinsurgency in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, are you concerned that some of the specialized and highly 

technical countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) skills and capabilities 

have eroded? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. After more than 10 years of conflict—and amid budget reductions—the Joint Force’s full spectrum readiness remains a concern. However, conventional and specialized technical forces continue to train and maintain the required capabilities and skills to respond to WMD threats in the homeland and overseas. 

Mr. WILSON. How concerned are we with the proliferation of dual-use technologies 

that could potentially be used for WMD development activities? Do we have good 

tracking mechanisms in place, and what are some of your programmatic and policy 

challenges in this area? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. We agree with Director Clapper’s assessment that access to the 

most dangerous weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies is not as difficult 

to obtain as it was in the past. Biological and chemical materials and technologies, 

almost always dual-use, move more freely in today’s globalized economy, as do the 

actors with the scientific expertise to design and use them. Two key challenges for 

DOD are instituting measures that provide appropriate controls while facilitating 

open commerce and research, and controlling the potentially unwitting proliferation 

of these technologies and materials during the course of normal daily commerce activities. 

To address these challenges, DOD supports the overall U.S. Government effort to 

raise barriers to access for those with illicit intent; strengthen oversight mechanisms and norms of responsibility regarding use and export of dual-use technologies 

and materials; and identify, track, and disrupt proliferation networks. For example, 

we strongly support the Proliferation Security Initiative’s goals to strengthen international norms against the proliferation of WMD, invest in capacity-building programs with partner nations, and increase WMD-related information sharing with 

international partners. 
76 

DOD is a key participant in the four Multilateral Nonproliferation Export Control 

Regimes (Australia Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group), and has been actively involved in interagency 

efforts to update U.S. export controls in support of the President’s Export Control 

Reform Initiative. We are in the process of supporting revisions of U.S. export controls to more effectively control the most sensitive military items and technologies. 

I defer to the Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, and State for information on export enforcement programs. Additionally, DOD is a long-time partner in 

the development and implementation of U.S. policies and regulations regarding 

dual-use research of concern in the life sciences and Biological Select Agents and 

Toxins (BSAT), respectively. The Select Agent Program, which regulates BSAT, requires tracking and inventory controls to ensure proper safeguarding of the agents. 

Mr. WILSON. How would you describe the level of information sharing and cooperation with the Intelligence Community to deal with the proliferation threat? As 

best you can outline in this open forum, what are our gaps? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. The Intelligence Community (IC) continues to provide high quality intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats. This intelligence plays a critical role in early warning, risk assessment, and forecasting—regarding not only the direct effect of an actual event, but also its second and third 

order effects, no matter the source. 

We maintain a close partnership with the IC to ensure success in the CWMD mission area, due to the nature of the extremely sensitive information. Additionally, we 

work with other Federal departments and agencies to enhance cooperation with 

partners on national security and counter-proliferation, ensure accountability for information sharing, and provide wider access to necessary databases when possible. 

I can elaborate on potential gaps in a closed forum. 

Mr. WILSON. Given that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval process for medical countermeasures can be lengthy and unpredictable, what is the risk 

to the Department of Defense in having to wait for FDA approval on a countermeasure? What steps can the DOD take to mitigate that risk? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. The risk in waiting for approval is that our military forces may 

not have a layer of protection in place when needed. We continue to work very closely with the FDA to expedite our access to medical countermeasure by using mechanisms such as the FDA’s amended Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) authorities 

provided under the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act. 

Based on these FDA authorities, DOD can seek an EUA for an anticipated threat, 

or an EUA to support a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) response. This lowers the risk to DOD, and the overall U.S. Government, since that 

short-notice emergency authorization is possible. These authorities have also enabled us to optimize our acquisition strategies for CBRN-related medical countermeasures. 

Mr. WILSON. What is DOD doing to address Biothreats globally? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. In support of the three lines of effort outlined in the DOD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction—prevent acquisition, contain and 

reduce threats, and respond to crises—DOD addresses biothreats globally in a variety of ways. For example, our DOD Cooperative Biological Engagement Program engages partners in Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern 

Europe to establish safe and secure biosurveillance infrastructure to prevent and detect acquisition and use. As another example, DOD supports its interagency partners from the Departments of Commerce and State in advancing treaties and regimes, such as the Biological Weapons Convention and the Australia Group. Many 

DOD activities for addressing biothreats and building partner capacity support 

international efforts, such as the Global Health Security Agenda. 

Mr. WILSON. There appears to be significant overlap in the manufacturing capabilities of medical countermeasures between the DOD and the Department of Health 

and Human Services (DHHS). Is it really necessary that the DOD have independent 

manufacturing capabilities? What steps are you taking to coordinate your efforts 

with these agencies and to avoid duplication of efforts? How much will the DOD be 

able to leverage the DHHS manufacturing capabilities? What else should we be 

doing that we aren’t already doing? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. DHHS and DOD serve different populations and fulfill different 

missions, and therefore have areas of differing health protection needs. Acquisition 

programs that rely on one source can expose our forces to unnecessary risk, especially if that source is compromised. Maintaining these capabilities reduces the risk 

to both Departments, our service members, and the general public; additionally it 

enables both Departments to pursue respective objectives at the pace each requires. 

Mr. WILSON. Once the DOD’s medical countermeasures advanced manufacturing 

facility is completed, will the Department be able to place orders for doses of coun-
77 

termeasures directly from the facility? Or will we still have to issue solicitations and 

competitively bid the work? If we still have to competitively bid the work, what is 

the advantage of the DOD having its own manufacturing facility? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. DOD’s Advanced Development and Manufacturing (ADM) facility 

will provide DOD an advantage due to its flexible and modular design, allowing us 

to obtain a large array of DOD-specific products at lower than commercial quantities. The Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) will continue to work on establishing contracting mechanisms and effective strategies for medical countermeasure 

programs to leverage the ADM’s unique capabilities, and is the best source for more 

specific information. 

Mr. WILSON. What is currently being done in the way of consequence management 

planning and preparedness against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

(CBRNE) attacks both abroad and within the U.S.? 

Dr. HASSELL. USNORTHCOM and USPACOM are responsible for planning, organizing, and executing homeland defense and civil support missions, including response to CBRN events, in their respective areas of responsibility. The CBRN Response Enterprise is available to the commands, whenever necessary, to execute 

missions as ordered by the President or Secretary of Defense. The CBRN Response 

Enterprise includes 57 National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support 

Teams (approximately 1,254 military personnel), 17 National Guard CBRN Response Force Packages (approximately 1,379 military personnel), 10 National Guard 

Homeland Response Forces (approximately 5,770 military personnel), the Defense 

CBRN Response Force (approximately 5,350 military personnel), and two CBRN 

Command and Control Response Elements (approximately 3,000 military personnel). 

Additionally, all installations coordinate response to CBRNE events in their local 

areas. Outside of the U.S., responsibility for planning and executing CBRN responses resides with the appropriate Combatant Commands, using both assigned and attached 

forces. These responses are coordinated with the host nation through the Department of State. 

The Chemical and Biological Defense Program supports these missions by developing and fielding enhanced capabilities to the CBRN Response Enterprise units, 

such as protection, detection, diagnostics, and field analytical equipment. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency provides both planning and technical support to the Combatant Commands for any CBRN response missions, whether in the 

U.S. or abroad. 

Two examples of CBRN response planning and preparedness efforts are; the 

Transatlantic Collaborative Biological Resiliency Demonstration, executed closely 

with DOD, DOS, DHS, and Poland; and the bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea, Able 

Response exercise series, both of which allow us to apply lessons learned to international and homeland response efforts. 

Mr. WILSON. What is currently the Department of Defense’s highest priority program in Chem/Bio? 

Dr. HASSELL. The CBDP utilizes risk and threat assessments to ensure resources 

are allocated to efforts directed at efficiently reducing operational risk to the 

warfighter. No one investment is the highest priority; CBDP resources are applied 

to provide an integrated, layered defense against both current and emerging CB 

threats. Within the FY16 budget request, we have focused our efforts in the areas 

of Non-Traditional Agent defense, Biosurveillance, Medical Countermeasures, and 

Advanced Diagnostics. 

Mr. WILSON. In your view, are Department of Defense resources appropriately allocated according the relative risks of chemical, biological, and nuclear threats? If 

not, what would you change? 

Dr. HASSELL. Yes. Within the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) 

portfolio we are using a rigorous, risk and threat informed approach to develop and 

re-examine our investment strategy. To inform this process, we work closely with 

the Intelligence community, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, etc to evaluate current 

and emerging threats. This analysis informs capability development within the context of planned and future operations. We consider Force Management Risk through 

the lens of modernization, and Institutional Risk through our ability to develop capabilities now and in the future. Through this process, we identify areas within 

CBD that present the most risk to the Warfighter, both now and in the future, and 

then allocate resources to best mitigate those risks through science and technology 

(S&T), systems acquisition, testing, and fielding. We also continually evaluate our 

portfolio to assess ways to mitigate operational risks through a layering of capabilities, such as integrated protection against threats that are difficult to detect using 

currently available technologies. 
78 

Mr. WILSON. Given the emphasis placed on non-traditional agents by the Chem 

Bio Defense Program, how prepared are we to deal with new threats? Are our existing capabilities agile enough to rapidly adapt to deal with agents that have been 

previously unseen? 

Dr. HASSELL. We are more prepared than ever to deal with new threats. DOD provided equipment and training to special purpose forces who are most likely to encounter NTAs during overseas contingency missions and for defense support of civil 

authorities in the homeland. Several programs are currently funded to enhance 

NTA defense capability over the next 5–7 years for special purpose units and general purpose forces. DOD remains committed to developing NTA defense capabilities 

in the priority areas of detection, medical countermeasures, decontamination, and 

protection. DOD’s focus has been on accelerating efforts to counter the potential use 

of NTAs by concentrating first on the set of priority agents deemed most dangerous. 

DOD places great emphasis on assuring that systems developed and fielded are 

flexible enough to address emerging threats. Research and development through 

2021 will focus efforts on fundamental characterization of new agent categories to 

further assess the impact and limitations of currently available defense countermeasures. Mr. WILSON. Given that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval process for medical countermeasures can be lengthy and unpredictable, what is the risk 

to the Department of Defense in having to wait for FDA approval on a countermeasure? What steps can the DOD take to mitigate that risk? 

Dr. HASSELL. While the FDA approval process can be lengthy and unpredictable, 

it remains the best way to ensure that our troops are only given the safest and most 

effective medical countermeasures (MCM) available. The recent Ebola epidemic in 

West Africa has illustrated the need for rapid deployment of MCMs in emergency 

situations, even in the absence of full, formal FDA approval. Fortunately, the FDA 

has alternative mechanisms to enable fielding and use of investigational MCMs in 

emergency and other special situations, such as Emergency Use Authorization 

(EUA), emergency Investigational New Drug (IND) use, and the DOD’s special immunizations program. We have directed our MCM developers to consider these and 

any other available interim fielding mechanisms throughout their developmental 

processes. The DOD will continue to press for strategic pre-preparation of all the 

necessary testing and manufacturing documentation ahead of a biological event to 

allow for rapid acquisition and fielding of MCMs. 

Mr. WILSON. What is DOD doing to address Biothreats globally? 

Dr. HASSELL. The DOD coordinates with the U.S. interagency and international 

partners to achieve the goals and objectives of the DOD Strategy for Countering 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). Specifically, the Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program (CBDP) supports the CWMD Strategy by developing capabilities 

in the areas of protection, detection, biosurveillance, diagnostics, medical countermeasures, and decontamination. The DOD CBDP, Cooperative Threat Reduction, 

and Force Health Protection programs work together to address chemical and biological threats to the Warfighter and U.S. citizens; these activities support international efforts, such as the Global Health Security Agenda. As seen in the recent 

Ebola epidemic in West Africa, capabilities developed to meet DOD-specific requirements can also benefit U.S. civilians and international partners, and as such are 

an important DOD contribution to global health security. 

Mr. WILSON. What are some of your unfunded requirements? Where are your largest gaps in funding? 

Dr. HASSELL. The President’s Budget request provides the Department the necessary funding required to address the chemical and biological threats. If sequestration were to be implemented, the corresponding unfunded efforts would negatively 

impact the CBDP’s ability to research and develop capabilities that are focused on 

current and future threats. We must be prepared to address all threats and ensure 

capabilities are developed that enable the Joint Force to sustainably operate in any 

environment. The most recent example of this critical capability is our ability to accelerate development of Ebola vaccines and therapeutics in response to the West African epidemic. 

Mr. WILSON. How effective are we at providing our troops with the most modern 

protective equipment for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 

threats? How much feedback do we get from the services on their capability gaps, 

and how easy is it for us to respond quickly to fill those gaps? 

Dr. HASSELL. Working with the Services through the Joint Staff’s Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense, we have been very effective at providing our 

Warfighters the specific equipment they need to survive, fight, and win in chemically or biologically contaminated environments. For example, we recently developed, tested, and fielded a holistic protection, detection, and decontamination capa-
79 

bility against Non Traditional Agents in less than two years. This effort was made 

possible by the flexibility of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process and our ability to identify and realign resources for such emerging 

threats. Direct engagement with the troops who utilize and rely on our equipment 

provides unfiltered feedback and gains stakeholder buy-in for Research, Development and Acquisition activities. I have made such direct engagement a priority for 

myself, personally, as well as for the CBDP Enterprise. 

Mr. WILSON. There appears to be significant overlap in the manufacturing capabilities of medical countermeasures between the DOD and the Department of Health 

and Human Services (DHHS). Is it really necessary that the DOD have independent 

manufacturing capabilities? What steps are you taking to coordinate your efforts 

with these agencies and to avoid duplication of efforts? How much will the DOD be 

able to leverage the DHHS manufacturing capabilities? What else should we be 

doing that we aren’t already doing? 

Dr. HASSELL. The DHHS and DOD Advanced Development and Manufacturing 

(ADM) facilities were designed to meet the specific needs of each Department. For 

example, the DOD only needs enough of any single MCM for the military population, while DHHS must be ready to provide enough MCMs for the entire U.S. population; therefore, the DHHS and DOD facilities are designed to function at different production scales. In addition, having a DOD facility ensures that there is 

sufficient production capacity for the MCMs we prioritize. 

The DOD designed its ADM with DHHS input. DHHS and DOD have established 

a governance board to ensure coordination and use of the 4 facilities to support a 

‘‘whole of government approach.’’ We have a DOD representative on the Executive 

Steering Group of DHHS’s ADM Governance Board. Once the DOD ADM is established, the joint DOD/DHHS Governance Board will be in place through which DOD 

and DHHS can further collaborate. 

The Governmental Accountability Office 2014 review (http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-442) of the DOD and DHHS coordination on Medical Countermeasures 

demonstrated the effective implementation of Federal best practices for interagency 

collaboration. 

Mr. WILSON. Once the DOD’s medical countermeasures advanced manufacturing 

facility is completed, will the Department be able to place orders for doses of countermeasures directly from the facility? Or will we still have to issue solicitations and 

competitively bid the work? If we still have to competitively bid the work, what is 

the advantage of the DOD having its own manufacturing facility? 

Dr. HASSELL. There is no specific funding for the Medical Countermeasure (MCM) 

Advanced Development and Manufacturing (ADM) facility in the FY16 budget request; it will be sustained through use by the individual MCM development efforts. 

The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense continues 

to look for innovative and streamlined contracting mechanisms and strategies for 

medical countermeasure programs to leverage the ADM’s capabilities. 

The advantages gained from utilizing the ADM’s capabilities go beyond contracting considerations. The ADM facility will provide a dedicated state-of-the-art 

center of excellence focused on flexible, modular, and single-use manufacturing techniques to meet DOD needs. The flexible nature of the ADM will be able to support 

the large array of DOD-specific products at lower than commercial quantities. The 

facility will continually upgrade based on emerging technologies, and cover a full 

array of development and product services. Utilizing the ADM will also allow the 

implementation of lessons learned across the DOD product portfolio, which has the 

opportunity to shorten the development cycle and eliminate redundancies. 

Mr. WILSON. There has been a lot of discussion about the fact that biotechnology 

is widely proliferated now, which could make biothreats much more readily available to terrorist groups or even lone actors, domestically as well as abroad. How 

does this change our strategy to protect against biothreats? 

Mr. MYERS. Congressman Wilson, you have raised an important issue. As you 

have described, our mission is complicated given the current nature of countering 

weapons of mass destruction. During the Cold War, most of our focus was on nation 

states. We were worried about huge stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological 

materials. While there is no question that some of these stockpiles are still a threat 

today, the more difficult area for us to track and address is terrorist acquisition of 

WMD materials that can be modified, grown, or enhanced for use as a weapon. The 

footprint is smaller in these cases, harder to track and thus harder to find and disrupt. We are not talking about huge factories or facilities in most of these cases; 

sometimes it is a small laboratory that could fit inside a bathroom. Given this reality, no region of the world is impervious to potential threats. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program contributes to the President’s Global Health 

Security Agenda which is working globally to prevent, detect, and respond to infec-
80 

tious disease threats, no matter their source. This includes those biothreats that 

could be spread intentionally through malicious use of biotechnology. 

DTRA/SCC–WMD continues to partner with the U.S. Intelligence Community 

(IC), and the United States Government (USG) as a whole, in order to accurately 

identify and characterize all current and future biothreats. For example, DTRA/ 

SCC–WMD worked closely with Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and 

Biological Defense (JPEO/CBD) to create the Ebola Portal, a secure virtual environment designed to provide situational awareness and facilitate interagency and international collaboration related Ebola Outbreak operations and support in West Africa. Mr. WILSON. What is currently being done in the way of consequence management 

planning and preparedness against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

(CBRNE) attacks both abroad and within the U.S.? 

Mr. MYERS. DTRA is helping the U.S. Government consequence management 

planning and preparedness against CBRNE attacks by researching and developing 

accurate and reliable models, tools and information needed to effectively manage 

post-event responses. 

DTRA’s Technical Reachback is heavily integrated into CBRNE consequence management planning and preparedness. Some of DTRA Reachback’s specific initiatives 

include: • Implementation of a Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership and 

Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Planning (DOTmLPF–P) Change Recommendation (DCR) to ‘‘provide DOD with a singularly focused National Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Technical Reachback Support Enterprise 

to link DOD, Interagency and other national and international technology based 

subject matter experts into a collaborative, net-centric information environment. • Involvement in Jack Rabbit II—a Department of Homeland Security large-scale 

outdoor chlorine release experiment used to validate modeling and analytical 

tools • Training on modeling and analytical tools for our Department of Defense, U.S. 

Government interagency, state, and local first responder partners. • Designation as the Technical Operations Hub for the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center 

which provides first responders with predictions of hazards associated with atmospheric releases to aid the decision making process, and to protect the public 

and the environment • Deployment of Technical Support Teams to provide onsite decision support for 

a wide range of targeting options. • Integration with the United Kingdom’s Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl—UK’s Reachback) and the NATO’s Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Center of Excellence (JCBRN COE—NATO’s Reachback). 

With regard to domestic preparedness for CBRN attacks, DTRA/SCC–WMD provides education and training for DOD entities via the Defense Nuclear Weapons 

School, at Kirtland AFB, NM. Additionally, DTRA/SCC–WMD provides counterWMD contingency planning support, as well as technical advice and crisis planning 

assistance through deployable planning and advisory teams, and maintains 24-hour 

subject matter expert support available through the DTRA/SCC–WMD Joint Operations Center. Additionally, DTRA/SCC–WMD’s Nuclear Accident and Incident Exercise program prepares geographic combatant commands (GCCs) to respond to nuclear incidents involving U.S. stockpile weapons should they occur in CONUS or 

worldwide. Overseas, DTRA/SCC–WMD’s CBRN Preparedness Program (CP2) supports all the GCCs to provide partner nations with skillsets to effectively respond 

to WMD incidents through increased tactical and operational capabilities. The goal 

of this program is to enhance regional and national CBRN response planning and 

capabilities to minimize the impact of WMD events and to decrease reliance on U.S. 

response assets. CP2 executes newly acquired National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) 2014, Section 1204 to train and equip both civil and military first responders within authorized countries to enhance overall their preparedness for CBRN 

events. Lastly, the Foreign CBRNE Exercise Program supports GCCs in exercising 

their capabilities and refining plans to conduct International CBRN response, both 

internally and with foreign partners. 

Mr. WILSON. How concerned are we with the proliferation of dual-use technologies 

that could potentially be used for WMD development activities? Do we have good 

tracking mechanisms in place, and what are some of your programmatic and policy 

challenges in this area? 

Mr. MYERS. The proliferation of WMD-related dual-use technologies, materials, 

components, and equipment to/from state and non-state actors of concern continues 

to pose a significant threat to national, regional, and global security. As the Director 
81 

of National Intelligence notes, ‘‘The time when only a few states had access to the 

most dangerous technologies is past. Biological and chemical materials and technologies, almost always dual-use, move easily in the globalized economy, as do personnel with the scientific expertise to design and use them.’’ Accordingly, DTRA/ 

SCC–WMD participates in a multitude of working groups, analytic exchanges, and 

training evolutions designed to accurately identify and characterize dual-use technologies of concern. In addition, international legal frameworks in the form of treaties, embargoes and sanctions—including those designated by the United Nations 

Security Council, multilateral arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 

the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar 

Arrangement, as well as national export control mechanisms, provide a legal basis 

for regulating transfers of dual-use goods. 

DTRA/SCC–WMD is actively engaged with other elements of the DOD, the U.S. 

interagency, and partner nations to counter WMD-related proliferation through a 

variety of programs designed to build partner capacity through projects and activities designed to enhance border and port security, WMD detection and investigation, 

and counterproliferation interdiction capability. 

In the nuclear arena, we have studies ongoing in our Nuclear Technologies Department to examine the entire threat pathway for the development of nuclear 

weapons in order to determine how the United States Government can most effectively detect and disrupt such activities. From these studies, we expect to find key 

areas where DTRA can develop and transition technologies to help address the proliferation of dual-use technologies. One particular dual-use technology of concern is 

additive manufacturing (commonly known as 3–D printing). Additive manufacturing 

can bypass the large manufacturing base and highly specialized skills previously required and allow an adversary with very limited resources and/or know-how to manufacture many key components of WMD weapon. 

Mr. WILSON. How would you describe the level of information sharing and cooperation with the Intelligence Community to deal with the proliferation threat? As 

best you can outline in this open forum, what are our gaps? 

Mr. MYERS. DTRA/SCC–WMD maintains an important relationship with the Intelligence Community. DTRA/SCC–WMD would be pleased to brief the Committee 

on these matters in a closed forum. 

For information sharing, DTRA/SCC–WMD manages a program called Constellation, which is a DOD program focused on providing and sharing Countering WMD 

Situational Awareness across DOD, the Interagency, and our international partners. 

Constellation is comprised of knowledge-based Information Systems, driven by support cells. DTRA/SCC’s Countering WMD Information Integration Cell (CIIC) provides CWMD situational awareness to the combatant commands and CWMD community by integrating, fusing, and disseminating operations, planning and other 

pertinent information to provide a dynamic picture of the global CWMD steady-state 

operating environment, alerts users to changes requiring action, and provides information to support contingency operations. The Constellation program is sponsored 

by U.S. Strategic Command, and resourced by the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs [OASD(NCB)]. 

Constellation demonstrated a promising level of information sharing and cooperation through the Ebola Portfolio while supporting efforts during the recent Ebola 

outbreak in Western Africa. 

Mr. WILSON. What lessons has DOD learned from the Libya chemical weapons destruction mission? 

Mr. MYERS. From the planning perspective, we’ve learned from the events in 

Syria and Libya and are applying the lessons to our ongoing planning efforts. Specifically, we learned that we need to be prepared for non-traditional Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction missions. These cases required rapid, flexible responses 

aimed at securing and destroying weapons to prevent proliferation. In order to accommodate these new and emerging situations, we have begun the development of 

a series of Regional Plans aimed at shaping the pre-event or pre-crisis strategic environments. These regional plans directly link to our crisis response plans to allow 

us to rapidly transition from shaping, to responding and/or providing support to the 

respective Geographic Combatant Commander or USSOCOM. This new approach allows us to be more efficient in the ways we shape the regional environments, while 

increasing our preparedness and reducing the time it takes to transition to crisis 

or event response. 

Mr. WILSON. What did you learn about the benefits of programmatic flexibility 

and anticipating of emerging threats from the Syria chemical weapon destruction 

mission? 

Mr. MYERS. Congressman Wilson, we found that for this mission the need for a 

process and the equipment to destroy Syrian chemical weapons required rapid de-
82 

velopment and acquisition of a capability tailored to the unique conditions on the 

ground in Syria. The Field Deployable Hydrolysis System (FDHS) is a fast-track acquisition project initiated in February 2013. Amazingly, the first unit was delivered 

on July 1, 2013. Design, procurement, fabrication, testing and training were produced by a government team consisting of DTRA, the Edgewood Chemical Biological 

Center (ECBC), Joint Project Manager for Elimination, the Joint Program Executive 

Office for Chemical and Biological Defense and the U.S. Army Contracting Command. 

An additional significant benefit of programmatic flexibility was the ability to use 

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) funding for many operational requirements. CTR funds allowed us to increase our responsiveness and 

availability to support the destruction mission. 

The removal and destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile was a fluid 

and evolving operation that required the development of alternative courses of action as USG and international decisions were being made. The benefits of programmatic funding flexibility enabled the Syria Chemical Weapons Elimination 

Project to reallocate funding when needed to meet new and emerging requirements. 

Early on, the project faced an unstable set of requirements coupled with a very tight 

destruction timeline. The benefits of notwithstanding authority and the re-notification process enabled the project to move funding from other projects to the Syrian 

Chemical Weapons Elimination project efficiently. This flexibility and the use of 

Economy Act transactions allowed the project team to put money where it was needed, acquire the goods and services required to meet project requirements, and accomplish the mission ahead of schedule. 

Mr. WILSON. What is DOD doing to address Biothreats globally? 

Mr. MYERS. The DOD is committed to the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) 

to accelerate progress toward a world safe and secure from infectious disease threats 

and to promote global health security as an international security priority. In support of the GHSA, the DOD works together with partners around the world to 

prioritize coordinated action and specific, measurable steps focused on: preventing 

epidemics, detecting biological threats early, and rapidly responding to disease outbreaks, whether naturally occurring, intentionally produced, or accidentally caused. 

The DOD actively coordinates these Bio-threat efforts with other departments and 

agencies that also play a role in the GHSA, including the Departments of Health 

and Human Services, Agriculture, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

DTRA develops and transitions technologies to anticipate, detect, analyze, defeat 

and assess biothreats globally. The USSOCOM Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction–Terrorism Support Program develops processes to forecast plausible terrorist WMD threats to aid planning and operations, and to prevent terrorists from 

acquiring WMD. The DTRA Bio-ISR program is developing advanced sensors and 

technologies to enable forces to search for, detect and characterize biological threats 

and processes before release. The DTRA Weapons and Capabilities program continues to develop concepts and technologies to deny access or functionally defeat biothreats. Technology development focuses on the physical or functional defeat of biological threat materials, an adversary’s ability to deliver the same, and the physical 

and non-physical support networks enabling both. 

DTRA has two additional programs aimed at addressing Bio-threats globally: The 

Biosurveillance Ecosystem (BSVE) program and the Field Forward Diagnostics 

(FFDx) program. BSVE is a rapidly emerging capability being developed to bring 

together data, tools and the users in a cloud-based, social, self-sustaining web environment to enable real-time biosurveillance for disease prediction and forecasting, 

similar to the functionality of weather forecasting. FFDx is developing, testing, and 

demonstrating the linkage of ubiquitous, rugged, field-forward diagnostic devices capable of linking wirelessly to the BSVE at various international sites. 

DTRA/SCC–WMD’s Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) and Building Partner Capacity programs are addressing biothreats globally. Both the Threat 

Reduction Engagement Program (CTR) and the International Counterproliferation 

Program (ICP) have held meetings, symposia, and training events around the world 

to bring together experts in counterproliferation and biology to increase the level 

and substance of dialogue concerning the control of biological threats. Furthermore, 

ICP continues to develop and offer new courses related to countering the proliferation of biological threats. The CTR Cooperative Biological Engagement Program 

(CBEP) prevents the proliferation of biological weapons, weapons components, and 

weapons-related military technology and expertise. Included are activities that facilitate detection and reporting of highly pathogenic diseases or diseases that can 

be associated with or utilized as an early warning mechanism for disease outbreaks 
83 

that could impact the armed forces of the United States or allies and partners of 

the United States. 

Mr. WILSON. Can you discuss how current events in the Middle East and Northern Africa are impacting DTRA’s operations and planning? In particular with regards to Syria and Libya. Have you received additional requests for support from 

CENTCOM and AFRICOM? What are some of your largest concerns? 

Mr. MYERS. DTRA is conducting operations and planning future activities in conjunction with USCENTCOM to build partner capabilities and capacity in several 

countries in the Middle East. These activities are being conducted through the 

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and Section 1204 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 2014 authorities. The current events in the 

Middle East with regard to threats from ISIL have limited some of our activities. 

Namely, some planned activities in Iraq were suspended. USCENTCOM has requested that DTRA be prepared to provide support to their campaign against 

DAESH in Syria and Iraq. Our largest concern is the potential for the proliferation 

of WMD materials and/or expertise from and through the areas under the influence 

of DAESH that presents a risk to Allies, U.S. interests and the homeland. 

The events surrounding and related to the security and destruction of Libya’s declared CW directly and indirectly impacted and influenced DTRA’s operations and 

planning. From a contingency/crisis response perspective, we rapidly transitioned to 

crisis response mode and were able to effectively coordinate and synchronize internal as well as external assets. In addition, we were able to redirect funds to support 

this evolving priority requirement. 

From the planning perspective, we’ve learned from the events in Syria and Libya 

and are applying the lessons to our ongoing planning efforts. Specifically, we 

learned that we need to be prepared for non-traditional cooperative threat reduction 

(CTR) missions. These cases required rapid, flexible responses aimed at securing 

and destroying weapons to prevent proliferation. In order to accommodate these new 

and emerging situations, we have begun the development of a series of Regional 

Plans aimed at shaping the pre-event or pre-crisis strategic environments. These regional plans directly link to our crisis response plans to allow us to rapidly transition from shaping, to responding and/or providing support to the respective Geographic Combatant Commander or USSOCOM. This new approach allows us to be 

more efficient in the ways we shape the regional environments, while increasing our 

preparedness and reducing the time it takes to transition to crisis or event response. 

Mr. WILSON. What are some of your unfunded requirements? Where are your largest gaps in funding? 

Mr. MYERS. DTRA’s FY2016 Budget request fully funds DTRA’s mission and 

makes strategic choices to balance mission priorities. 

DTRA’s Budget to Strategy process provides an Agency level prioritization of 

CWMD efforts. Inevitably, there are always trade-offs in scope and schedule to meet 

the Nation’s CWMD requirements. Within the Research and Development portfolio, 

DTRA constantly re-evaluates the portfolio to balance risk with game changing technology and to seek innovation that will meet future WMD threats. While the President’s budget is sufficient to achieve our R&D portfolio, DTRA routinely seeks opportunities to accelerate, modernize, and further innovate. Some of these efforts include: 

Agent Defeat Warfighter Capability: Combatant Commands have expressed the 

need for the capability to destroy facilities containing chemical and biological 

threats without releasing the threat agents into the environment and causing catastrophic collateral damage. Operational planning against such targets is difficult because of the great uncertainty associated with use of current weapons against these 

sorts of targets. 

Missile Defeat Enterprise: Adversaries have made it increasingly difficult to locate 

missiles and missile launch capabilities, for example by developing mobile launch 

platforms. The U.S. requires the capability to locate this class of target, and the 

means to test and validate technologies developed for this purpose. 

Mr. WILSON. What is currently the Department of Defense’s highest priority program in Chem/Bio? 

Mr. BRYCE. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) utilizes a capabilities-based planning process to align resources based on holistic threat-informed, 

risk-based assessments. No single investment is the highest priority as CBDP resources are applied to ensure an integrated, layered defense able to address both 

current and emerging chemical and biological threats. Nonetheless, high-priority efforts include those directly supporting ongoing contingencies as well as those 

strengthening the capacity of allies and partners to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. For example, the CBDP support to the DOD 

response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa has involved accelerating medical 
84 

countermeasure development, providing diagnostics with increased accuracy and 

shorter response times, applying biosurveillance tools, and producing new protection 

capabilities. Meanwhile, to enhance the ability of U.S. Forces Korea and the Republic of Korea to respond to biological threats, the CBDP’s Joint U.S. Forces Korea 

Portal and Integrated Threat Recognition (JUPITR) advanced technology demonstration continues to provide specific detection and analysis capabilities to address the need for biosurveillance on the Korean Peninsula. These kinds of priority 

efforts do not distract us from the CBDP’s core priorities, particularly with respect 

to equipping the force and preventing technological surprise. Rather, I am confident 

that ongoing and recent contingency response activities can inform and improve our 

programs of record and foster innovative approaches within the Defense Acquisition 

Management System to achieving results for the warfighter. 

Mr. WILSON. In your view, are Department of Defense resources appropriately allocated according the relative risks of chemical, biological, and nuclear threats? If 

not, what would you change? 

Mr. BRYCE. In a time of budget constraint, I believe DOD’s limited resources are 

appropriately allocated according to the relative risks of chemical, biological, and 

nuclear threats. The CBDP is accommodating the highest priorities of the Military 

Departments. 

Mr. WILSON. Given the emphasis placed on non-traditional agents by the Chem 

Bio Defense Program, how prepared are we to deal with new threats? Are our existing capabilities agile enough to rapidly adapt to deal with agents that have been 

previously unseen? 

Mr. BRYCE. I believe we are as well-postured as possible for the highest non-traditional agent (NTA) threats, given the dynamic nature of the challenge. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) has accelerated NTA scientific understanding and rapidly fielded interim capabilities, while working on enduring materiel solutions based on Joint Service requirements. The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO–CBD), in coordination with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Joint Science and Technology Office for Chemical 

and Biological Defense (JSTO–CBD), is developing capabilities to counter NTAs 

through an integrated portfolio process, focusing on the enabling science and technology, test and evaluation, and advanced development of detection, medical, decontamination, and individual protection products and systems. The JPEO–CBD collaborates with the other components of the CBDP, the Intelligence Community, and 

industry to maintain a high level of acquisition readiness for this challenge. The 

JPEO–CBD assesses the portfolio of fielded equipment and promising commercially 

available items for effectiveness against NTAs. A continuing emphasis is placed on 

identifying technologies that can be easily adapted to new and emerging threats. 

This work enables us to assess and field improved capability rapidly and to make 

recommendations for adjustments to existing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

(TTPs) to minimize the impact on our forces of a previously unaddressed threat. For 

example, several of the upgrades that are currently being fielded are simply expanded data libraries within fielded detection equipment, providing enhanced capability with minimal disruption to operating procedures. A classified setting would 

be appropriate for a more detailed discussion regarding specific NTA threats. 

Mr. WILSON. How effective are we at providing our troops with the most modern 

protective equipment for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 

threats? How much feedback to we get from the services on their capability gaps, 

and how easy is it for us to respond quickly to fill those gaps? 

Mr. BRYCE. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) has been very 

effective in providing the protective equipment necessary for the warfighter to survive, fight, and win in chemically or biologically contaminated environments. Service 

input into the CBDP Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) planning and programming process is critical to our effectiveness. Regarding planning, 

the Military Departments provide input in the development of CBDP planning documents, which outline near-, mid-, and far-term objectives of RDT&E efforts. The 

Military Departments are active participants in the conduct of operational risk assessments that help to identify capability gaps, while input is solicited from them 

on their priority needs. With respect to programming, the Military Departments remain actively engaged throughout the development of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). All Military Departments review and endorse the POM through the 

Joint Capabilities Board and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The 

JROC-endorsed POM is provided to the Army, as Executive Agent for the CBDP, 

for the final review and approval recommendation. Prior to approval by the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the POM is vetted 

by the CBDP Overarching Integrated Product Team, which includes membership 

from the Military Departments. 
85 

Recent experience with the combatant commands includes several examples of responding quickly to fill capability gaps reflected in urgent operational needs (UONs) 

such as joint urgent operational needs (JUONs) and joint emergent operational 

needs (JEONs). To support the DOD response to the Ebola outbreak, a U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) JEON called for a fielded and sustained capability to conduct aeromedical evacuation of multiple personnel, including exposed 

but asymptomatic, infected, and symptomatic patients. In response, the CBDP developed the Transport Isolation System (TIS) to close this DOD mission-critical gap. 

Meanwhile, a U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) JUON called for a fielded and 

sustained capability to recover, package, transport, and complete final disposition 

for Ebola contaminated human remains (E–CHR) safely. In response, the CBDP developed the E–CHR System, which provides a capability to transport E–CHR. 

Mr. WILSON. How do we prioritize which capability gaps we address, and in what 

order? Do we have adequate resources to fill those gaps? 

Mr. BRYCE. The DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) uses a 

holistic capability-based, threat-informed approach when identifying and prioritizing 

capability gaps. The Military Departments, through the Joint Requirements Office 

for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (JRO–CBRND), inform 

the CBDP leadership of high and significant risk capability gaps through an Integrated Risk Assessment report that informs the development of guidance for the allocation of resources. This JRO–CBRND assessment is built upon the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) risk assessment methodology and explains risk to 

the force and to mission accomplishment. It mirrors the Chairman’s risk assessment 

metrics used in his Risk Assessment Report to Congress, provided annually. The Integrated Risk Assessment report concludes with portfolio risk mitigation package 

recommendations. These risk mitigation packages combine capabilities from the 18 

CBRN defense core capability areas to provide the CBDP leadership with viable and 

flexible courses of action to consider in guiding investment. With respect to the Fiscal Years 2016–2020 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process, all of the 

Military Departments concurred in the CBDP POM recommendation. The Military 

Departments remain concerned about future reductions in funding levels but believe 

the POM adequately addresses their highest priority needs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. Can you talk about the threats being posed to our troops by nontraditional agents (NTAs); that is, emerging and novel chemical technologies and 

agents that we may not be able to protect ourselves from. How are we making sure 

we fully understand these technologies and threats? How do we make sure we are 

developing adequate defensive capabilities? What threats exist to our homeland and 

can our domestic response capabilities handle NTAs? I understand that the Department recently put in place a strategy to synchronize non-traditional agents (NTA) 

defenses; can you please provide a copy of this strategy to the committee and summarize it for us now? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. My office is concerned about the threats posed by non-traditional 

agents (NTAs), both to the Homeland and globally. DOD’s Strategy for Countering 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) provides the overarching guidance to address this threat, complemented by the Chemical and Biological Defense Program’s 

(CBDP) NTA Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Strategy that 

directs specific NTA defense planning and programming actions. My colleagues in 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD AT&L) are the authors of the NTA RDT&E Strategy and can provide 

you a copy. Additionally, DOD continues to work with our interagency partners to 

address the threat posed by emerging or novel chemical agents. 

Mr. FRANKS. Three years ago, according to the Government Accountability Office, 

the Department shifted its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response 

enterprise to eliminate the high-yield explosive element. This is reflected in the 

structure of the domestic response units the Department has been developing. Can 

you provide us with more detail on this and the justification for the change? Does 

this introduce a gap in the Department’s ability to assist civil authorities in countering domestic improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for example, if there is a 

Mumbai-style attack on the homeland that includes multiple IEDs that could overwhelm State and local response capabilities? What mechanisms are in place for the 

Department to share its counter-IED expertise with Federal partners? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. More than five years ago, the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) response enterprise was 

known as the ‘‘chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives 
86 

(CBRNE) response enterprise.’’ However, as the DOD CBRNE response enterprise 

included no ‘‘high-yield explosives element’’ (and the addition of such an element 

was not planned), the name of the enterprise was eventually shifted to the more 

accurate ‘‘CBRN Response Enterprise.’’ 

The CBRN Response Enterprise is specially designed to assist civil authorities in 

saving and sustaining lives in response to the unique threat of a catastrophic CBRN 

incident. DOD’s specialized forces and capabilities to deal with CBRN contaminants 

are unique in the Federal Government and are, therefore, critical to any effective 

response. A response to a high-yield explosive incident does not require the same 

specialized forces and capabilities and DOD’s capabilities in this area are not all 

unique in the Federal Government. Other units and capabilities within DOD are 

available to assist civil authorities in countering the threat of domestic IEDs, consistent with the law and Presidential Policy Directive 17, Countering Improvised 

Explosive Devices. These include Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force explosive ordnance disposal units (which, based on increased demand, grew by almost 72 

percent from about 3,600 personnel in 2002 to about 6,200 in 2012). These units are 

available to provide defense support of civil authorities, as requested by a lead federal agency and approved by the Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. FRANKS. Can you outline for the committee how you interface with each of 

the combatant commands—and in particular, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. 

Pacific Command. For your work with U.S. Northern Command, how do you train 

and synchronize our domestic response efforts, what shortfalls exist, and what challenges are there? For your work with U.S. Pacific Command, how do you prepare 

for contingency operations that may involve weapons of mass destruction as a centerpiece, such as a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, or worse, the collapse of the 

North Korean regime that possesses a considerable arsenal of weapons of mass destruction? How are we ensuring that we have the right capabilities to deal with 

these large-scale, and potentially catastrophic events? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. I develop and oversee Department of Defense (DOD) policies, advise the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense, and 

work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders on homeland defense (HD), defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), 

cyberspace, space, and countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) matters. For 

example, I work closely with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM), on countering WMD matters, with the Commander, U.S. Cyber 

Command (USCYBERCOM), on cyberspace matters, and with the Commanders of 

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 

on HD and DSCA matters. 

Ensuring DOD is prepared to meet this demand to save and protect lives is one 

of my highest priorities. To this end, I develop and oversee implementation of DSCA 

policies and strategic guidance; I work with the Combatant Commanders on their 

DSCA operational plans, training, and exercises; and I advise the Secretary of Defense on how to improve DOD’s posture for supporting civil authorities in responses 

to catastrophic disasters, including those involving weapons of mass destruction. 

Challenges continue to drive DOD to pursue improvements to its ability to harness resources rapidly and effectively to respond quickly to civil support requests 

in the homeland. For example, since Superstorm Sandy in 2012, DOD has worked 

with its Federal partners to explore how best to expedite the interagency requirements generation process. The formal requirements generation process, whereby civilian authorities identify and produce valid requirements for DOD action, can be 

slow—sometimes taking days or weeks. Contingency planning, pre-scripted mission 

assignments, and other measures can help expedite this process. 

Our Countering WMD (CWMD) efforts center on preparing and posturing our 

military to address future challenges that may emerge and escalate quickly, and our 

focus on the U.S. Pacific Command and our partnership with the Republic of Korea 

military forces also remain a priority. We have maintained an increased tempo of 

training and exercises, such as Able Response, KEY RESOLVE, and ULCHI FOCUS 

GUARDIAN, which include CWMD focus areas that enhance the readiness of U.S. 

and Korean personnel. Additionally, we continue to reinforce our partnership and 

alliance through a variety of CWMD coordination and synchronization events, such 

as the Counter Proliferation Working Group, which includes both international partners and U.S. interagency experts. This forum is a venue within which we reinforce 

deterrence and improve capabilities on the Korean Peninsula to counteract an increasingly dangerous and provocative North Korea. We can provide a more detailed 

description of our contingency planning efforts and capabilities in the USPACOM 

Area of Operations in a classified setting. 

Mr. FRANKS. Can you talk about the threats being posed to our troops by nontraditional agents (NTAs); that is, emerging and novel chemical technologies and 
87 

agents that we may not be able to protect ourselves from. How are we making sure 

we fully understand these technologies and threats? How do we make sure we are 

developing adequate defensive capabilities? What threats exist to our homeland and 

can our domestic response capabilities handle NTAs? I understand that the Department recently put in place a strategy to synchronize non-traditional agents (NTA) 

defenses; can you please provide a copy of this strategy to the committee and summarize it for us now? 

Dr. HASSELL. To mitigate the threat of non-traditional agents, DOD has done the 

following: 1) rapidly fielded defensive capabilities to units who are most likely to encounter NTA threats; 2) prioritized agent research and development efforts for the 

most dangerous and most likely agents to be employed against our forces; and 3) 

ensured operational risk and validated threat assessments inform defense capability 

development. DOD participates in numerous Interagency forums to ensure nesting 

of priorities, lessons learned, and policy. Units who received the rapid fielding initiatives include DOD first responders who provide defense support to support civil authorities. 

I will provide the recently published Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

Non-Traditional Agent Defense Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 

(RDT&E) Strategy Fiscal Year 2015 to 2021 for more information on Departmental 

efforts in the areas of detection, medical countermeasures, decontamination, and 

protection as it applies to NTA defense. 

Mr. FRANKS. Can you talk about the threats being posed to our troops by nontraditional agents (NTAs); that is, emerging and novel chemical technologies and 

agents that we may not be able to protect ourselves from. How are we making sure 

we fully understand these technologies and threats? How do we make sure we are 

developing adequate defensive capabilities? What threats exist to our homeland and 

can our domestic response capabilities handle NTAs? I understand that the Department recently put in place a strategy to synchronize non-traditional agents (NTA) 

defenses; can you please provide a copy of this strategy to the committee and summarize it for us now? 

Mr. BURNHAM. Advances in technology have lowered barriers to acquire WMD and 

opened the door for a range of non-traditional agents to be used as weapons against 

the United States and our forces. We believe that the Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Program must continue to be proactive to understand new emerging threats and 

must remain flexible to be able to address them. My colleagues from the Chemical 

and Biological Defense Program have developed the NTA Research, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation Strategy, I will defer to them to provide a more detailed answer to your request. 

Mr. FRANKS. Can you talk about the threats being posed to our troops by nontraditional agents (NTAs); that is, emerging and novel chemical technologies and 

agents that we may not be able to protect ourselves from. How are we making sure 

we fully understand these technologies and threats? How do we make sure we are 

developing adequate defensive capabilities? What threats exist to our homeland and 

can our domestic response capabilities handle NTAs? I understand that the Department recently put in place a strategy to synchronize non-traditional agents (NTA) 

defenses; can you please provide a copy of this strategy to the committee and summarize it for us now? 

Mr. MYERS. DTRA maintains a robust Threat Agent Science program which provides critical properties for chemical and biological agents, including NTAs, required 

to inform CONOPs, Therapeutic Product Profiles (TPP) and countermeasure development. The team managing this effort works with the interagency to prioritize 

threats for assessment. Characterization includes determining physicochemical 

properties, agent fate on/in operational surfaces/environments, estimating toxicity 

(for the safety of warfighter and the lab worker), and other characteristics necessary 

to understand both the threat agent and countermeasure performance. Data is 

shared across relevant stakeholders to use in their programs as needed and incorporated into hazard prediction models. The program is also ‘‘preparing for surprise’’ 

through the development of tools to improve forecasting of threat agents or emerging technologies. This enables novel threat development so that we can establish 

thresholds to inform investment strategies on emerging threats, which may not always require new defensive capabilities. 

Mr. FRANKS. Three years ago, according to the Government Accountability Office, 

the Department shifted its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response 

enterprise to eliminate the high-yield explosive element. This is reflected in the 

structure of the domestic response units the Department has been developing. Can 

you provide us with more detail on this and the justification for the change? Does 

this introduce a gap in the Department’s ability to assist civil authorities in countering domestic improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for example, if there is a 
88 

Mumbai-style attack on the homeland that includes multiple IEDs that could overwhelm State and local response capabilities? What mechanisms are in place for the 

Department to share its counter-IED expertise with Federal partners? 

Mr. MYERS. DTRA supports NORTHCOM and collaborates with the Department 

of Homeland Security to develop technologies to address threats of mutual concern. 

These challenges include development of technologies for threat detection, hazard 

prediction, event modeling, and decision support. With regard to hazard prediction 

and decision support, DTRA supports military and civil authorities through Technical Reachback. DTRA is the operational hub for DHS’s Interagency Modeling and 

Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC). DTRA supports equipping and training 

the National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST). For example, the DTRA-developed 

Mobile Field Kit (MFK) software is a sensor integration and situational awareness 

tool originally developed under DTRA’s Smart Threads Integrated Radiological Sensor Joint Capability Technology Demonstration to be used for nuclear-radiological 

detection. MFK has since been demonstrated to integrate inputs from other CBRNE 

sensors. National Guard CSTs have successfully employed MFK with a variety of 

different communications equipment in numerous high-visibility events, including 

the Super Bowl, Pro Bowl, Boston Marathon, and national holiday celebrations. We 

also have a close relationship with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Additional information about relevant DTRA S&T programs 

can be made available in a classified forum. 

Mr. FRANKS. Can you outline for the committee how you interface with each of 

the combatant commands—and in particular, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. 

Pacific Command. For your work with U.S. Northern Command, how do you train 

and synchronize our domestic response efforts, what shortfalls exist, and what challenges are there? For your work with U.S. Pacific Command, how do you prepare 

for contingency operations that may involve weapons of mass destruction as a centerpiece, such as a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, or worse, the collapse of the 

North Korean regime that possesses a considerable arsenal of weapons of mass destruction? How are we ensuring that we have the right capabilities to deal with 

these large-scale, and potentially catastrophic events? 

Mr. MYERS. We have daily interaction with every Combatant Command on a variety of issues, to include CBRN operational, planning and research and development 

efforts. The USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD synchronizes these efforts 

across all the Commands to ensure we have our ear close to Combatant Command 

demand signals, We also Liaison Officers (LNOs) embedded at each Command. 

Our team works closely with USSNORTHCOM to identify and address their priorities, gaps and shortfalls. Our LNOs facilitate responsiveness, frequency and level 

of support for 5 major areas in R&D, and approximately 25 exercise and training 

events. Additionally DTRA/SCC–WMD supports USNORTHCOM with Requests for 

Assistance and Requests for Information for both real-world and exercise activities. 

In the recent past, this was something as simple as information to mitigate radiation from a stolen medical device in Mexico to assistance in training the Medical 

Support Teams for Homeland Ebola response. 

DTRA has LNO teams at both U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and United 

States Forces Korea (USFK), who facilitate the coordination of DTRA and SCC– 

WMD activities in theater. The LNO teams regularly participate in theater exercise 

planning and execution, and in preparation for potential contingency operations. 

During a crisis scenario, these LNO teams are augmented by additional trained, 

deployable staff, who assist in synchronizing CWMD activities and who provide expertise in specific DTRA/SCC–WMD activities and programs. 

In addition, DTRA engages all Combatant Commands (CCMDs) through the 

CCMD S&T Manager to address their science and technology needs. 

Mr. FRANKS. Can you talk about the threats being posed to our troops by nontraditional agents (NTAs); that is, emerging and novel chemical technologies and 

agents that we may not be able to protect ourselves from. How are we making sure 

we fully understand these technologies and threats? How do we make sure we are 

developing adequate defensive capabilities? What threats exist to our homeland and 

can our domestic response capabilities handle NTAs? I understand that the Department recently put in place a strategy to synchronize non-traditional agents (NTA) 

defenses; can you please provide a copy of this strategy to the committee and summarize it for us now? 

Mr. BRYCE. A detailed discussion of the list of threats would require a classified 

response. In general, the proliferation of non-traditional agent (NTA) capabilities 

and related information present a growing risk to our troops globally but the force 

does possess some defensive capabilities. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) has fielded and is continuing to develop equipment that will provide 

a significantly enhanced level of defense against broad categories of agents. Addi-
89 

tionally, the training our CBRN defense forces receive prepares them to address unknown hazards and respond accordingly. The CBDP collaborates with partners in 

the intelligence, science, engineering, and medical communities to identify, study, 

and prioritize potential emerging threats and their impact on the warfighter. To enable DOD to iteratively assess risk and, when appropriate, revise our mitigation approach, emphasis is placed on understanding NTA threats in terms of their various 

physical states, weaponized forms, and routes of exposure. 

There are no geographic boundaries for many of the chemical threats we may 

face. Many of the dangers to the deployed force are also hazards to the homeland. 

In an effort to establish a domestic defensive capability against NTAs, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO–CBD) and the 

Department of Homeland Security have adopted a collaborative approach toward developing capability sets. We have provided NTA detection, protection, and decontamination capabilities to the 57 National Guard Bureau Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs) located across the United States. Fielding 

of the Domestic Response Capability (DRC) Kits began in July 2012 and was completed in March 2014. Currently, the JPEO–CBD is providing an expanded data library within a fielded identification system, giving the WMD–CSTs an improved analytical, field confirmatory capability. 

The CBDP Non-Traditional Agent (NTA) Defense Research, Development, Test, 

and Evaluation Strategy requires the synchronization of DOD NTA defense efforts 

for fiscal years 2015–2021 to enable the warfighter to counter NTAs as part of a 

layered and integrated defense. Implementation of the Strategy will ensure that the 

CBDP is well postured to meet existing and future NTA defense requirements. The 

Strategy provides a prioritization scheme for the multiple NTA classes, while at the 

same time acknowledging fiscal realities and the need to continue developing and 

delivering capability to address traditional chemical threats. The Strategy establishes an approach for the development of enduring defense solutions and recognizes 

accelerated or interim solutions may be necessary based on risk assessments. A copy 

of the Strategy will be provided to the Committee. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Hassell, RSDL was selected by DOD as the replacement for the 

M–291 carbon powder personnel decon kit in 2007. The Joint Program Executive Office Chemical and Biological Defense initially provided each branch of the U.S. 

Armed Forces with a sufficient quantity of RSDL to meet their Total Service Requirement (TSR). Thereafter, each service was required to replenish their inventories of RSDL (the product has a 5-year shelf-life). I am concerned that the Navy 

has not replenished its inventory of RSDL—allowing a significant portion of its kits 

to expire or not be replaced after being issued to end users. Last July, the Navy 

indicated to another congressional committee looking into this issue that it does not 

intend to replenish any of its RSDL in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. This will result 

in more of the Navy’s RSDL kits passing their expiration dates and the service falling even farther below its TSR for RSDL. Are you aware of this? 

Dr. HASSELL. Yes, it is my understanding that the Navy will not be replenishing 

its stock at this time, rather it will begin procurement during Fiscal Year 2017. 

Mr. HUNTER. The justification documents submitted with the President’s Budget 

Request for FY 2016 indicated plans to ‘‘Initiate Personnel Decontamination hazard 

mitigation projects to develop an alternative to RSDL . . .’’ Can you briefly describe 

the effort? 

Mr. BURNHAM. My understanding from the Joint Program Executive Office for 

Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO–CBD) is that this refers to the Next Generation Personnel Decontamination (NGPDC) program, which is intended to provide 

a broad spectrum chemical and biological skin decontamination capability with low 

logistics footprint (e.g., shelf life and storage conditions) and reduced cost in comparison to the currently fielded skin decontaminant, Reactive Skin Decontamination 

Lotion (RSDL). I understand that a primary objective of the program is to address 

concerns identified by the Military Services regarding the storage requirements (climate control) for and shelf life of RSDL. Included in the Fiscal Year 2016 DOD 

Budget Request, NGPDC is currently projected to achieve Milestone A and enter the 

Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction Phase of the Defense Acquisition Management System in fiscal year 2020. 

Mr. HUNTER. RSDL is the most effective means of removing and neutralizing 

Chemical Warfare Agents, T–2 toxin, and many pesticide-related chemicals, including organophosphates from the skin. Are you aware of any other products that 
90 

would provide our troops with a greater level of protection if they were exposed to 

Chemical Warfare Agents and organophosphate chemicals? 

Mr. BRYCE. I am not aware of any other FDA-cleared products at this time. However, to address concerns identified by the Military Departments regarding the storage requirements for and shelf-life of Reactive Skin Decontamination Lotion 

(RSDL), we are pursuing the Next Generation Personnel Decontamination program 

to provide a broad-spectrum chemical and biological skin decontamination capability 

with a lower logistics footprint and reduced cost. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ASHFORD 

Mr. ASHFORD. Is it possible that filoviruses (Ebola) could be used as a bioweapon? 

What plans have been made for dealing with Ebola virus should it be used as a bioweapon and what type of research activities is DTRA conducting with the university 

affiliated research center for medical countermeasures? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. We know it is possible for a wide variety of bacteria and viruses, 

including the Ebola virus, to be used as a bioweapon. The challenge is accurately 

quantifying the risk, including probability and effects, of such an event. 

The Administration has provided guidance that Federal departments and agencies 

should conduct planning to address the impacts of pandemic influenza on the Federal workforce. DOD has further extended that guidance through development and 

implementation of our Global Campaign Plan for Pandemic Influenza and Infectious 

Disease. This plan provides base guidance to Geographic and Functional Combatant 

Commands to develop plans to address force health protection and provision of assistance to either domestic or international partners during events of pandemic influenza or other high-impact diseases such as Ebola within their areas of responsibility. 

In addition, DOD participated in interagency planning efforts led by FEMA to develop an Ebola specific crisis action plan. The U.S. Government—including DOD— 

undertook concerted efforts to ensure the U.S. public health system, as well as selected elements of the DOD health system, are capable of treating Ebola patients. 

This approach to the domestic response to save lives is the same whether the biological event is intentional or natural. 

I want to emphasize, however, that both preparedness for, and response to, biological threats, no matter the agent, must be conducted through partnership among 

government and civilian sectors. This approach holds true for all hazards, and is reflected in strategic documents and initiatives such as the National Response Framework, the Global Health Security Agenda, and the World Health Organization’s 

International Health Regulations. 

DOD is just one partner in strengthening prevention, preparedness, and response, 

and in most cases we are in a support role. Therefore, investments must be made 

across all sectors of our government, not only for preparation and response in the 

homeland, but also to help build capacity internationally. These investments must 

be long-term commitments as the threat landscape continuously changes. 

Mr. ASHFORD. How effective are our methods for detecting potential exposure of 

military personnel in the field to chemical, biological, and radiological agents? You 

have described for us the EZ–1 test for Ebolavirus; how long does it take for the 

EZ–1 test to provide a result of positive or negative? Are there DTRA funded efforts 

to develop a more rapid test? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. DOD’s chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) response is 

built upon a strategy of ‘‘layered defense.’’ In keeping with this strategy, we have 

multiple layers of detection fielded for CBR agents that encompasses detection and 

diagnostic equipment (such as aerosol detection systems and clinical diagnostic assays); information (such as medical and environmental biosurveillance systems); 

doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures; and trained CBR and medical 

forces. DOD is currently developing updated detection capabilities to enhance our 

ability to detect potential exposure to chemical, biological and radiation threats. 

More detail on this capability, as well as the EZ–1 test, is available from the Office 

of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense 

(within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics). 

Mr. ASHFORD. The DOD has developed a transport module that can be used to 

move up to 6 to 8 infected individuals. What plans and contingencies are in place 

or under consideration for the transportation and subsequent treatment of military 

personnel who are infected? DOD officials have said they anticipate infected military personnel will be treated at the U.S. facilities who have treated the U.S. civilian patients. Which office within the DOD will be establishing the agreements with 
91 

the treating biocontainment unit the procedures and protocols to transport and treat 

military patients infected with Ebola or some other highly infectious disease? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. The Department has a standing agreement with the Department 

of State (DOS) to support DOD requests for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assistance from West Africa using Phoenix Aviation Group (PAG) on an as-needed and 

reimbursable basis. 

In addition, DOD has developed, tested, and fielded a mass evacuation capability 

to meet contingency requirements in support of Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE. 

The Transportation Isolation System (TIS) is built upon a standard Patient Support 

Pallet and provides biocontainment for a combination of up to four to eight asymptomatic patients, including up to eight ambulatory, high-risk contacts or a maximum of four infected, litter-bound patients. In January 2015, this capability 

achieved initial operational capability with three systems available to deploy, but 

has not yet been utilized. Twenty-two additional systems will be procured by DOD 

between April and May 2015. The Department views the TIS as a contingency option in the event of unavailability of the commercial MEDEVAC service offered 

through the DOS contract and as a capacity gap-filler in the event of a large-scale 

MEDEVAC need. 

The Administration has documented its medical evacuation procedures in the 

United States Medical Evacuation Concept of Operations (MEDEVAC CONOPS). 

This CONOPS identifies that four DOD components have responsibilities during a 

MEDEVAC mission, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, 

U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. 

With respect to the subsequent treatment, should a military member become infected, that member would be treated at one of the U.S. civilian biocontainment facilities that have treated the other U.S. civilian patients. The Department has developed a contingency capacity to care for Ebola patients in several medical centers 

within the continental United States, including Walter Reed National Military Medical Center. However, it is the Department’s intent to continue to leverage the collective experience and expertise of the three civilian Ebola treatment centers unless 

that resource becomes overburdened. 

Mr. ASHFORD. DTRA leadership has indicated in previous testimony that there 

are not enough scientists with expertise in CBRN technologies to staff all the services and commands and that DTRA currently addresses this gap by providing its 

expertise in a coordinated manner to all services. What measures are being taken 

to provide a well-trained workforce to address this gap in the future and at the 

same time not train future bioterrorists such as Aafia Siddiqui? 

Mr. ROSENBACH. Maintaining sufficient technical expertise is a foundational activity in our 2014 Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) as 

we and our interagency and international partners rely on the intellectual capital 

provided by the Department’s cadre of CWMD experts, both military and civilian. 

In the context of constrained budgets, we will continue to be challenged to recruit 

and develop the numbers of experts that we need. However, components such as the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) have developed creative ways to provide 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) support, such as through its 

technical reach-back capability. 

One example of precautions we take to prevent insider threat risk, consistent with 

U.S. Select Agent Regulations, is that we require that anyone who works with Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) must be enrolled in a Biological Personnel 

Reliability Program (BPRP). The program provides for a comprehensive review of 

each individual given access to BSAT, be they U.S. citizens or foreigners, and includes assessments such as background security checks, medical reviews for mental 

and physical competence, and personnel records. As we are continuously monitoring 

the threat landscape, my staff will continue to participate in periodic U.S. interagency reviews of the adequacy of personnel reliability and other biosecurity processes. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Is it possible that filoviruses (Ebola) could be used as a bioweapon? 

What plans have been made for dealing with Ebola virus should it be used as a bioweapon and what type of research activities is DTRA conducting with the university 

affiliated research center for medical countermeasures? 

Dr. HASSELL. We know that the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, attempted to obtain the Ebola virus as part of its biological warfare program, although fortunately 

they failed in their attempt. Adversaries could intentionally acquire the disease during an outbreak and, similar to suicide bombers, deliberately spread Ebola to as 

many people as possible before succumbing themselves. For these reasons, 

filoviruses remain a priority on our medical countermeasures (MCMs) list. 

We continue to work to develop MCMs and diagnostic technologies against 

filoviruses. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is working with 
92 

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Institutes of Health 

to conduct clinical trials on CBDP-developed Ebola vaccines and therapeutics. We 

are studying rapid, point-of-care diagnostic technologies that would allow us to diagnose Ebola faster than the currently available assays, as well as technologies with 

the potential to tell whether patients were naturally or intentionally infected. 

Mr. ASHFORD. How effective are our methods for detecting potential exposure of 

military personnel in the field to chemical, biological, and radiological agents? You 

have described for us the EZ–1 test for Ebolavirus; how long does it take for the 

EZ–1 test to provide a result of positive or negative? Are there DTRA funded efforts 

to develop a more rapid test? 

Dr. HASSELL. The Joint Requirements Office Capability gaps assessment highlighted several gaps in our current methods for detecting potential exposure of military personnel in the field to chemical, biological, and radiological agents. These 

gaps are being addressed in the Next Generation Detection System (NGDS), which 

includes additional diagnostic tests for remaining biological pathogens and staged 

development of diagnostic capabilities for toxin, chemical, and radiological/nuclear 

exposures. 

The EZ–1 RT–PCR test takes between 3 and 6 hours, depending on the laboratory 

and the number of samples tested at one time. The Chemical and Biological Defense 

Program (CBDP) has funded efforts to test the diagnostic utility of lateral-flow assays. Although lateral-flow assays can give quick results, they also have a high rate 

of false negatives. The potential for this type of diagnostic in aiding with triage decisions at treatment units is still being explored. Additionally, CBDP continues to 

fund research focusing on the detection and identification of chemical and biological 

threats in near real-time. Future programs focus on the improvement of algorithms, 

excitation sources, and detector elements to increase warning time, reduce false negatives, increase sensitivity, and reduce cost. 

Mr. ASHFORD. The DOD has developed a transport module that can be used to 

move up to 6 to 8 infected individuals. What plans and contingencies are in place 

or under consideration for the transportation and subsequent treatment of military 

personnel who are infected? DOD officials have said they anticipate infected military personnel will be treated at the U.S. facilities who have treated the U.S. civilian patients. Which office within the DOD will be establishing the agreements with 

the treating biocontainment unit the procedures and protocols to transport and treat 

military patients infected with Ebola or some other highly infectious disease? 

Dr. HASSELL. USTRANSCOM is managing all Transportation Isolation System 

(TIS) operational issues and procedures. We continue to support them in development and fielding of the TIS. 

Mr. ASHFORD. DTRA leadership has indicated in previous testimony that there 

are not enough scientists with expertise in CBRN technologies to staff all the services and commands and that DTRA currently addresses this gap by providing its 

expertise in a coordinated manner to all services. What measures are being taken 

to provide a well-trained workforce to address this gap in the future and at the 

same time not train future bioterrorists such as Aafia Siddiqui? 

Dr. HASSELL. DTRA and the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense both have programs to develop the next generation of scientists 

with expertise in CBRN technologies. In doing this, individuals and organizations 

conducting research on behalf of the CBDP are required to follow all Departmental 

and Federal regulations, such as having robust Personnel Reliability Programs for 

individuals working with Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT). While working with BSAT is important to identify and fill capability gaps in order to protect 

the warfighter and the public, the DOD ensures biological security policy is consistent with Federal Select Agent Regulations. We ensure regulatory requirements 

are balanced with important research objectives, and the DOD continues to conduct 

BSAT research in a safe and secure manner to develop protective countermeasures 

critical to national security. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Is it possible that filoviruses (Ebola) could be used as a bioweapon? 

What plans have been made for dealing with Ebola virus should it be used as a bioweapon and what type of research activities is DTRA conducting with the university 

affiliated research center for medical countermeasures? 

Mr. BURNHAM. Yes. Ebola and other filoviruses can be developed into bioweapons. 

This could be done a variety of ways but as an example, someone intentionally 

infecting himself is just one very low-tech way to ‘‘weaponize’’ the Ebola virus or 

other filoviruses. An infected individual can take several days or longer to develop 

symptoms after infection, so it is plausible that the infected individual could travel 

to other parts of the world before they showed symptoms of infection. An outbreak 

of Ebola virus or another filovirus could be an opportunity for someone seeking to 

intentionally infect himself. 
93 

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa was a naturally occurring outbreak, and as 

we saw, travel of infected people back to their home nations constituted a significant 

security threat. That is why preparedness for outbreaks for pathogens of security 

concern—whether intentionally spread, accidentally released from a lab, or naturally occurring—is important. 

Response to an intentional release of Ebola virus would be very similar to the response to a naturally occurring outbreak. In both cases, early detection of the outbreak coupled with an appropriate response is critical to mitigating the effects. The 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program’s Cooperative Biological Engagement Program works with foreign partners to enhance their disease detection capabilities, so 

that when outbreaks of pathogens of security concern occur, like the recent Ebola 

outbreak in West Africa, our partners can react quickly to contain the outbreak before it can spread to the United States. 

My colleagues on the panel from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and from 

the Chemical and Biological Defense Program can provide information on our research and medical countermeasure efforts related to Ebola and other filoviruses. 

Mr. ASHFORD. How effective are our methods for detecting potential exposure of 

military personnel in the field to chemical, biological, and radiological agents? You 

have described for us the EZ–1 test for Ebolavirus; how long does it take for the 

EZ–1 test to provide a result of positive or negative? Are there DTRA funded efforts 

to develop a more rapid test? 

Mr. BURNHAM. My colleagues in the Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

lead the development of a range of detectors and medical countermeasures, including the EZ–1 test. They can provide the specific information you’re requesting. 

Mr. ASHFORD. The DOD has developed a transport module that can be used to 

move up to 6 to 8 infected individuals. What plans and contingencies are in place 

or under consideration for the transportation and subsequent treatment of military 

personnel who are infected? DOD officials have said they anticipate infected military personnel will be treated at the U.S. facilities who have treated the U.S. civilian patients. Which office within the DOD will be establishing the agreements with 

the treating biocontainment unit the procedures and protocols to transport and treat 

military patients infected with Ebola or some other highly infectious disease? 

Mr. BURNHAM. The DOD has an agreement with the Department of State to provide medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) services as needed for military personnel. The 

Chemical and Biological Defense Program led the development of the Transport Isolation System (TIS). This system is viewed as a contingency supplement to these 

MEDEVAC services in the event of a large-scale MEDEVAC need. My colleagues 

on the panel from the Chemical and Biological Defense Program and the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency will provide more specifics on the capabilities of the TIS. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, USNORTHCOM, and 

USTRANSCOM are responsible for developing agreements, protocols, and procedures related to MEDEVAC for the DOD as outlined in the United States Medical 

Evacuation Concept of Operations. 

Mr. ASHFORD. DTRA leadership has indicated in previous testimony that there 

are not enough scientists with expertise in CBRN technologies to staff all the services and commands and that DTRA currently addresses this gap by providing its 

expertise in a coordinated manner to all services. What measures are being taken 

to provide a well-trained workforce to address this gap in the future and at the 

same time not train future bioterrorists such as Aafia Siddiqui? 

Mr. BURNHAM. We recognize the need to have access to scientific expertise to address technical issues related to CBRN technologies. My office has addressed this 

challenge by actively recruiting U.S. scientists with backgrounds in the physical and 

biological sciences and interest in counter proliferation/counter WMD issues to provide technical advice on CBRN technologies. 

One of the original goals of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was to redirect Soviet weapons scientists to peaceful purposes after the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. In part because of these efforts, there are fewer weapons scientists today. 

Our biological threat reduction program, the Cooperative Biological Engagement 

Program (CBEP), continues to work with foreign scientists. We train them to help 

improve their nations’ disease detection capabilities, so that outbreaks of pathogens 

of security concern can be contained before they spread. As part of this work, CBEP 

reinforces a culture of safety and responsibility in the conduct of life science research. We also support the integration of foreign scientists into the global research 

community where their work is subject to peer review from the international scientific community. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Is it possible that filoviruses (Ebola) could be used as a bioweapon? 

What plans have been made for dealing with Ebola virus should it be used as a bio-
94 

weapon and what type of research activities is DTRA conducting with the university 

affiliated research center for medical countermeasures? 

Mr. MYERS. Ebola is recognized by the U.S. government as a potential biological 

warfare agent. It is a Tier 1 agent on the Center for Disease Control’s Select Agent 

List and it is a threat as a BW agent to U.S. forces. Studies show that filoviruses 

can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person; result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health impact; and might cause 

public panic and social disruption. All of these factors make filoviruses appealing 

to threat actors. In response to this threat, and the threat of naturally occurring 

filoviruses, DTRA continues to research effective therapeutics and vaccines to protect U.S. military members against a biological warfare attack involving Ebola as 

a threat agent. 

Mr. ASHFORD. The DOD has developed a transport module that can be used to 

move up to 6 to 8 infected individuals. What plans and contingencies are in place 

or under consideration for the transportation and subsequent treatment of military 

personnel who are infected? DOD officials have said they anticipate infected military personnel will be treated at the U.S. facilities who have treated the U.S. civilian patients. Which office within the DOD will be establishing the agreements with 

the treating biocontainment unit the procedures and protocols to transport and treat 

military patients infected with Ebola or some other highly infectious disease? 

Mr. MYERS. DTRA developed and tested the Transportation Isolation System prototype systems and the Joint Program Execution Office (JPEO) procured and delivered the first 3 systems to USTRANSCOM during January of 2015. USTRANSCOM 

is managing all Transportation Isolation System operational issues and procedures 

for DOD. Responsibility for coordinating transportation and treatment of infected 

patients falls to the Departments of State, Health and Human Services, and the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

Mr. ASHFORD. DTRA leadership has indicated in previous testimony that there 

are not enough scientists with expertise in CBRN technologies to staff all the services and commands and that DTRA currently addresses this gap by providing its 

expertise in a coordinated manner to all services. What measures are being taken 

to provide a well-trained workforce to address this gap in the future and at the 

same time not train future bioterrorists such as Aafia Siddiqui? 

Mr. MYERS. DTRA’s Nuclear Science and Engineering Research Center (NSERC) 

partners the Agency with DOD degree-granting institutions and labs in order introduce future military leaders and CBRN experts to current C–WMD problems. Current NSERC outreach efforts span multiple technical and non-technical disciplines 

including nuclear engineering, chemical and biological technologies, network 

sciences, systems engineering, and defense strategic studies. All research topics are 

continually refined to remain relevant to DTRA research objectives, and all performers are thoroughly vetted by their parent organizations prior to receiving fiscal 

support. 

DTRA executes a basic research program, primarily through university engagement. One of this program’s two primary goals is to promote the development of the 

next generation science and technology workforce for countering WMD. As such, 

DTRA provides opportunities for and engages with students by supporting basic research grants, expanding postdoctoral research, and encouraging joint laboratoryuniversity basic research. The basic research program has over 160 active awards 

supporting more than 200 Principal Investigators (PIs) and Co-PIs, and training 

more than 600 students and post-doctoral researchers. 

Additionally DTRA has several other methods to mitigate the skills gap. Besides 

external recruitment of qualified individuals, there are internal instructional techniques such as on-the-job training and mentoring facilitated by the Science and 

Technology Functional Community. Functional skills-enhancing curriculums are 

documented in Workforce Development Guides. The Science and Technology Guide 

identifies competency-based training and supports the development of long-term career roadmaps. Cross training is another method used to provide opportunities for 

junior employees to develop their skills to help meet the future needs of the organization. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Is it possible that filoviruses (Ebola) could be used as a bioweapon? 

What plans have been made for dealing with Ebola virus should it be used as a bioweapon and what type of research activities is DTRA conducting with the university 

affiliated research center for medical countermeasures? 

Mr. BRYCE. Yes, it is conceivable that filoviruses could be used as weapons. 

Filoviruses can be disseminated via aerosols, have a low infectious dose, and have 

high morbidity and mortality rates—all important elements for bioweapons. In response to this threat, and the threat of naturally occurring filoviruses, the Joint 

Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO–CBD) is pur-
95 

suing development of a filovirus vaccine. The intent is to field an FDA-licensed trivalent human vaccine to protect the warfighter against aerosolized exposure to the 

Ebola Zaire, Ebola Sudan, and Marburg hemorrhagic fever viruses. The objective 

end-product would protect against all three viruses in a single vaccine formulation 

and would protect against both the bioweapon and the naturally occurring threat. 

For Fiscal Year 2016, the JPEO–CBD is requesting an investment of $37M to complete non-clinical efficacy studies and pilot scale production, as well as to continue 

Phase I clinical trials for competitive prototypes. DTRA’s Joint Science and Technology Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JSTO–CBD) has contributed to 

this effort by transitioning several potential vaccine technology approaches against 

filoviruses to the JPEO–CBD in Fiscal Year 2014. 

The JPEO–CBD leverages the University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC), 

U.S. Government laboratories, and industry for the development of medical countermeasures. JPEO–CBD has leveraged the formulation expertise at one of the UARCs 

at the University of Nebraska for filovirus vaccine development efforts. With respect 

to overall plans for dealing with Ebola virus should it be used as a bioweapon, I 

will defer to Mr. Eric Rosenbach, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense 

and Global Security. 

Mr. ASHFORD. How effective are our methods for detecting potential exposure of 

military personnel in the field to chemical, biological, and radiological agents? You 

have described for us the EZ–1 test for Ebolavirus; how long does it take for the 

EZ–1 test to provide a result of positive or negative? Are there DTRA funded efforts 

to develop a more rapid test? 

Mr. BRYCE. It is important to distinguish capabilities that detect agents in the environment from capabilities that diagnose diseases in a medical setting. Environmental detection affects force protection and offers the opportunity to put on individual protection (suits, boots, masks, and gloves) or to avoid exposures entirely. If 

exposures cannot be avoided, medical countermeasures, including vaccines, pretreatments, diagnostics, and therapeutics, offer the next lines of defense. Medical diagnostic capabilities are critical for effective patient treatment and in containing 

communicable threats. DOD diagnostic tests for chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear (CBRN) threats are subject to the same high standards as commercial 

diagnostic tests developed for routine health care. Once the FDA verifies that diagnostic methods are effective and safe, tests become ‘‘cleared’’ for use. 

This practice ensures that the best available diagnostic technologies are available 

to meet DOD’s needs. The most recent Ebola outbreak illustrates this process. Both 

the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS) and the 

Next Generation Diagnostics System Increment 1 (NGDS Inc 1) supported the Ebola 

response. The EZ–1 test used to support Operation United Assistance was made 

available through Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) and is authorized for EUA 

use on three high-throughput diagnostic platforms, including the fielded JBAIDS 

system and two commercial platforms commonly used at DOD laboratories. Once a 

sample is taken, the EZ–1 test takes between 3 and 6 hours, depending on the laboratory and the number of samples tested at one time. The assay developed for the 

NGDS Inc 1 (BioThreat-Ebola test), also authorized under an EUA, can return results in seventy (70) minutes. The NGDS Inc 1 platform and Ebola test kits were 

made available to support Operation United Assistance under an urgent materiel 

release. 

Finally, there are several efforts funded within the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency seeking to ensure a robust developmental pipeline in the areas of medical diagnostic capability and environmental detection devices. The JPEO–CBD will continue to coordinate with these 

and other developmental efforts. 

Mr. ASHFORD. The DOD has developed a transport module that can be used to 

move up to 6 to 8 infected individuals. What plans and contingencies are in place 

or under consideration for the transportation and subsequent treatment of military 

personnel who are infected? DOD officials have said they anticipate infected military personnel will be treated at the U.S. facilities who have treated the U.S. civilian patients. Which office within the DOD will be establishing the agreements with 

the treating biocontainment unit the procedures and protocols to transport and treat 

military patients infected with Ebola or some other highly infectious disease? 

Mr. BRYCE. DOD has an agreement with the Department of State (DOS) to support requests for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assistance from West Africa. If 

DOS were to become overburdened with requests to fly patients to the United 

States, DOS could request DOD support to transport patients. Meanwhile, DOD has 

developed, tested, and fielded a mass evacuation capability to meet contingency requirements in support of Operation United Assistance. The Transportation Isolation 

System (TIS) is built upon a standard Patient Support Pallet and provides bio-
96 

containment for multiple patients. In January 2015, this system achieved initial 

operational capability with three systems available to deploy. Additional systems 

will be procured by DOD during the remainder of Fiscal Year 2015. 

The Administration has documented its medical evacuation procedures in the 

United States Medical Evacuation Concept of Operations (MEDEVAC CONOPS). 

This CONOPS identifies that four DOD components have responsibilities during a 

MEDEVAC mission, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, 

U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. 

Were they to become infected, service members would be treated at one of the 

U.S. civilian biocontainment facilities that have treated the other U.S. civilian patients. DOD has developed a contingency capacity to care for Ebola patients in several medical centers within the continental United States, including Walter Reed 

National Military Medical Center. However, it is DOD’s intent to continue to leverage the collective experience and expertise of the three civilian Ebola treatment centers unless those resources become overburdened. 

Mr. ASHFORD. DTRA leadership has indicated in previous testimony that there 

are not enough scientists with expertise in CBRN technologies to staff all the services and commands and that DTRA currently addresses this gap by providing its 

expertise in a coordinated manner to all services. What measures are being taken 

to provide a well-trained workforce to address this gap in the future and at the 

same time not train future bioterrorists such as Aafia Siddiqui? 

Mr. BRYCE. My organization, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and 

Biological Defense (JPEO–CBD), located on the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving 

Ground (APG), works with our U.S. Army APG partners to support science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) events throughout the community. Activities 

include supporting the Aberdeen Proving Ground STEM Exposition, providing mentors for the Cecil County STEM Academy, and participating in local science fairs 

and engineering competitions. We support Federal and DOD STEM strategic plans 

by advocating effective approaches for improving STEM teaching and learning, and 

by promoting STEM education experiences that feature hands-on learning to generate student engagement and interest in the STEM fields. 

With respect to maintaining a well-trained workforce, recruitment and retention 

will likely be more challenging should the fiscal uncertainty that has overshadowed 

DOD operations continue into Fiscal Year 2016 and beyond. If sequestration impacts resume in full, attracting and keeping the scientists, engineers, and program 

managers we need will likely become more difficult than it already is in the competitive human capital environment. The furlough days taken, as well as those remaining as possibilities, have impacted morale. 

On a more positive note, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Joint Science and 

Technology Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JSTO–CBD) has started a 

program called ‘‘Scientists in Foxholes’’ which will familiarize JSTO–CBD personnel 

with the equipment and operating environments encountered by the warfighter. 

This will help the Military Departments to understand the art of the possible and 

the scientists understand the warfighter’s mission. 

Regarding the protection of DOD programs from access by dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals, I believe the best course of action available to DOD is 

rigorous enforcement of its Personnel Reliability Programs such as maintaining 

strong Biological Personnel Reliability Programs, the participation in which is required for individuals to work with Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) for 

DOD. There are numerous requirements for personnel within a Biological Personnel 

Reliability Program, including: a security background investigation, drug testing, 

medical records review, personnel records review, a legitimate need for access to 

material, approval of access to BSAT by a certifying official, and good social adjustment. 

Æ