PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH 

AND OURAY RESERVATION, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

GREGORY D. MCKEE; T & L 

LIVESTOCK, INC.; MCKEE FARMS, 

INC.; GM FERTILIZER, INC., 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 20-4098 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 2:18-CV-00314-HCN)

_________________________________ 

Frances C. Bassett, Patterson Earnhart Real Bird & Wilson LLP, (Jeremy J. Patterson 

with her on the briefs), Louisville, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant 

J. Craig Smith, Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC, (Clark R. Nielsen, Jennie B. Garner, and Devin 

L. Bybee with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees 

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

CARSON, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

Courts serve the important function in our society of dispassionately resolving 

legal disputes. But a court may do so only when its jurisdiction covers the parties 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 27, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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and the subject matter of the dispute. This appeal boils down to whether a tribal 

court has jurisdiction over a dispute between the tribe and a non-Indian about rights 

to water within reservation boundaries but not on Indian land. 

This case arises from a long-running irrigation-water dispute between Plaintiff 

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation and Defendant Gregory 

McKee, who is not a member of the Tribe.1

 Defendant owns non-Indian fee land 

within the Ute reservation’s exterior boundaries and uses water from two irrigation 

canals flowing through his property. Plaintiff claims the water belongs to the United 

States in trust for the Tribe. 

Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Ute tribal court, alleging that Defendant had 

been diverting the Tribe’s water for years, and won. Plaintiff then petitioned the 

district court to recognize and enforce the tribal-court judgment. But the district 

court dismissed the case after holding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to enter 

its judgment. Because we too conclude that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s dispute with a nonmember of the Tribe arising on non-Indian fee lands, we 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

I. 

In the nineteenth century, the federal government entered a treaty with many 

bands of the Ute Indian Tribe to create a tribal reservation. See Treaty with the Ute 

1

 The other defendants, T & L Livestock, Inc., McKee Farms, Inc., and GM 

Fertilizer, Inc., are all businesses owned by Defendant McKee. For clarity, we use 

“Defendant” to refer to both McKee and his businesses. 

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Indians art. 2, March 2, 1868, 15 Stat. 619. In the early twentieth century, under the 

General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 

25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq.), the United States divided the reservation into “allotments,” 

creating individual parcels of land that the government then gave to individual tribe 

members. See Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1069. The government 

then opened any remaining reservation land for settlement by non-Indians. See id. 

Around the same time, Congress authorized the Uintah Indian Irrigation Project 

(“UIIP”) to build canals and ditches to irrigate the Ute Indians’ allotted lands. See 

Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 375. Congress provided that the 

Secretary of the Interior would hold title to the UIIP “in trust for the Indians.” Id. 

In 1923, the United States, as trustee of the Ute Indians, sued many nonIndians in the District of Utah over the use of irrigation water in the UIIP area. See 

United States v. Cedarview Irrigation Co., No. 4427 (D. Utah 1923) (“Cedarview 

Decree”). The court decreed that the Indians had “the first and an exclusive right . . . 

to divert from the Uintah River and its tributaries by certain ditches and canals water 

in certain quantities at certain times and under certain conditions.” Id. at 2. The 

court explained that any rights that the non-Indian defendants had in the water were 

subordinate to the Indians’ rights, so the court permanently enjoined “all persons 

diverting or using water” from the UIIP from “hindering, preventing or interfering” 

with the Ute Indians’ water rights. Id. at 6. 

In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 

984, 987 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101, 5123), ending the allotment of tribal 

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lands and authorizing Indian tribes to adopt constitutions and charters for selfgovernance. The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation adopted a 

constitution and bylaws in 1937, creating a tribal government for its territory. See 

Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1461 (10th Cir. 1994). 

Defendant, who is not a member of the Ute Tribe, owns land that was part of 

the Ute reservation but opened for non-Indian settlement during the allotment period 

of the early twentieth century. Two UIIP canals—the Deep Creek Canal and Lateral 

No. 9—cross Defendant’s property. In 2012, Plaintiff received a report that 

Defendant was diverting water from the Deep Creek Canal and Lateral No. 9 to flood 

irrigate his property. Plaintiff investigated and determined that Defendant was 

unlawfully misappropriating tribal waters in violation of the Cedarview Decree. 

Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Ute tribal court. Defendant moved to dismiss 

the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The tribal court denied the 

motion, holding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction because the Ute Tribe has 

sovereign authority to manage the use of its territory and natural resources by tribe 

members and nonmembers. The tribal court further held that it had subject-matter 

jurisdiction also under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), because the 

Tribe can regulate activities of all non-Indians who enter a consensual relationship 

with the Tribe or whose conduct imperils the Tribe’s political integrity, economic 

security, or health and welfare. Defendant then ceased participating in the litigation. 

After a bench trial, the tribal court found that Plaintiff was the beneficial owner of 

the water in the Deep Creek Canal and Lateral No. 9 and that Defendant 

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misappropriated tribal water to irrigate his property. The tribal court entered 

judgment against Defendant. 

To date, Defendant has satisfied no part of the tribal court’s judgment. In 

April 2018, Plaintiff petitioned the District of Utah to recognize and enforce the 

tribal court’s judgment against Defendant. The parties cross-moved for summary 

judgment. The district court granted Defendant’s motion, holding that the tribalcourt judgment was unenforceable because the tribal court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction, and dismissed the case. The district court also denied Plaintiff’s motion 

for leave to amend because the court determined that the proposed amendment would 

have been futile. Plaintiff appeals. 

II. 

A. 

 Plaintiff first challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 

Defendant. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. US Airways, Inc. v. 

O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). We review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, affirming only if no 

genuine dispute exists about any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Tesone v. Empire Mktg. Strategies, 942 F.3d 979, 994 (10th Cir. 

2019) (citations omitted). We also review de novo any legal questions the district 

court resolved in granting summary judgment. In re MDL 2700 Genentech Herceptin 

(Trastuzumab) Mktg. & Sales Prac. Litig., 960 F.3d 1210, 1224 (10th Cir. 2020) 

(citation omitted). The scope of a tribal court’s jurisdiction is a question of federal 

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law. Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, 762 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 2014) 

(citation omitted). 

Indian tribes are independent communities with many rights and powers of 

self-government, but those powers are limited. Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land 

& Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 327 (2008) (citations omitted). And while tribal 

sovereignty includes the authority to adjudicate disputes in tribal courts, a tribal 

court’s jurisdiction cannot exceed the tribe’s legislative authority. Id. at 330 (citation 

omitted). For example, tribes can generally regulate only their territory and their 

members on the reservation. See id. at 327. And though Indian tribes can exclude 

outsiders from tribal land, they have no general authority over nonmembers of the 

tribe. Id. at 327–28 (citations omitted). That is true even when nonmembers engage 

in activity on the reservation and especially when they do so on “non-Indian fee 

land”—land owned in fee simple by non-Indians. Id. at 328 (citation omitted). 

 The Supreme Court has recognized only two exceptions under which Indian 

tribes can regulate nonmembers. Tribes can regulate the activity of nonmembers who 

enter consensual relationships with them or their members, and they can regulate the 

activity of nonmembers on reservation land—even non-Indian fee land—if that 

activity threatens their political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare. 

Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66 (citations omitted). But these exceptions are narrow, 

and a tribal court presumptively lacks jurisdiction over nonmembers’ activities on 

non-Indian fee land. See Plains Com., 554 U.S. at 330. Thus, Plaintiff bears the 

burden of showing that one of the exceptions applies if it wishes to overcome the 

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presumption that it cannot regulate Defendant’s activities on non-Indian fee land. Id. 

(citation omitted). 

 Plaintiff first argues that it need not resort to the Montana exceptions to 

establish tribal-court jurisdiction because an Indian tribe has inherent sovereign 

authority to exclude nonmembers from its territory. Plaintiff argues that because it is 

the beneficial owner of the exclusive right to use the water in the Deep Creek Canal 

and Lateral No. 9, its inherent authority to exclude others from its territory includes 

the authority to exclude others from using its water. And although Defendant, a 

nonmember of the Tribe, allegedly misappropriated Plaintiff’s water on non-Indian 

fee land, Plaintiff argues that “no rational basis in law or logic” supports treating 

water differently than territory. Thus, Plaintiff argues that we must determine the 

merits of its claim to exclusive rights in the water to know whether the tribal court 

had jurisdiction. 

 The district court, however, determined that the merits of Plaintiff’s claim to 

the water are inapplicable to the jurisdictional question because regardless of the 

extent of Plaintiff’s water rights, the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over a 

nonmember’s water use on nontribal land.2

 We agree with the district court; we need 

not wade into the merits of Plaintiff’s claim to exclusive rights in the disputed water 

because the tribal court lacked jurisdiction. 

2

 In footnote one of its order, the district court suggested that it was skeptical 

of Plaintiff’s claim to exclusive rights in the disputed water. But the district court 

made clear that it was not deciding the merits of Plaintiff’s claim to the water. We 

also express no opinion on the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. 

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 Plaintiff concedes that Defendant is not a member of the Tribe and that the 

alleged misappropriation of water occurred on non-Indian fee land. Supreme Court 

precedent makes clear then that Plaintiff has no jurisdiction over Defendant’s activity 

unless one of the Montana exceptions applies. See Plains Com., 554 U.S. at 329 

(characterizing the Montana exceptions as the only circumstances where Indian tribes 

can exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land); Strate v. 

A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997) (“Indian tribes lack civil authority over 

the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to [the 

Montana] exceptions . . . .”). Yet Plaintiff urges us to overlook that precedent and 

hold that as long as an Indian tribe claims an interest in a natural resource on 

nontribal land, it may exercise civil jurisdiction over a nonmember’s use of the 

natural resource even if the use does not implicate one of the Montana factors. Thus, 

Plaintiff effectively invites us to create a third exception to the general rule that 

Indian tribes lack jurisdiction over the actions of nonmembers on nontribal land. We 

decline the invitation. 

 To be sure, Indian tribes have inherent sovereign authority to exclude 

nonmembers from their territories. Plains Com., 554 U.S. at 327–28 (citation 

omitted). And that authority extends to regulating nonmembers’ use of tribal 

resources on tribal lands. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 

133, 144 (1982) (holding that an Indian tribe’s power to exclude includes the power 

to tax nonmembers’ severance of oil and gas from tribal land); Montana, 450 U.S. at 

557 (holding that an Indian tribe may prohibit or regulate hunting and fishing by 

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nonmembers on tribal land). But Plaintiff points to no case in which the Supreme 

Court or we have held that an Indian tribe may regulate the use of natural resources 

outside the tribe’s territory. In fact, in Montana, the Supreme Court did the opposite, 

holding that while tribes may regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on tribal 

lands, they may not do so on non-Indian fee land. 450 U.S. at 563. 

When the Supreme Court has upheld tribal authority to regulate nonmembers’ 

use of natural resources, it has done so because the regulations were a condition of 

the nonmembers’ presence on tribal territory. See, e.g., id. at 557 (noting that tribes 

may prohibit hunting and fishing by nonmembers on tribal lands or “condition their 

entry by charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits” (emphasis added)); see 

also Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144–45 (characterizing nonmembers’ payment of a tax for 

the severance of oil and gas from tribal lands as a condition of the nonmembers’ 

continued presence on tribal lands). But the tribal court’s adjudication of the water 

dispute here was not a condition of Defendant’s presence on Plaintiff’s territory—

Defendant used the water only on non-Indian fee land. Thus, the tribal court did not 

have jurisdiction arising from the Tribe’s authority to exclude nonmembers from its 

territory. 

 Nor is Plaintiff’s argument persuasive that water and territory are the same. 

Plaintiff argues that prohibiting the use of water to which it has exclusive rights is 

identical to excluding people from its territory. In support, Plaintiff cites City of 

Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 424 (10th Cir. 1996), in which we upheld the 

United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) authority to enforce an 

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Indian tribe’s water-quality standards upstream from the reservation. But City of 

Albuquerque does not support Plaintiff’s sweeping assertion of tribal jurisdiction. 

First, the Indian tribe in City of Albuquerque had adopted water-quality standards 

under the express authorization of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 418. And second, we 

emphasized that the water-quality standards were enforceable beyond the tribe’s 

territory because the EPA—not the tribe—carried out the enforcement. Id. at 424. 

Here, by contrast, Plaintiff points to no federal statute authorizing Plaintiff’s 

regulation of the disputed water, and Plaintiff claims for itself the authority to 

regulate the use of the water beyond its territory.3

 In short, Plaintiff’s dispute with 

Defendant over Defendant’s use of water on his property is not a matter of tribal selfgovernment, but a matter of the Tribe’s external relations. And tribal sovereignty 

traditionally does not extend to governing external relations with non-Indians.4

 See 

Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. 

3

 At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel argued that Plaintiff has the authority to 

regulate Defendant’s use of the disputed water only because Defendant’s property is 

within the exterior boundaries of Plaintiff’s reservation. Plaintiff’s counsel conceded 

that if Defendant misappropriated tribal water farther upstream, outside of 

reservation boundaries, then the tribal court would lack jurisdiction. But that 

distinction is without merit. If owning rights to use the water renders the water 

equivalent to territory, then the water’s location would not affect Plaintiff’s plenary 

authority over it. And the Supreme Court has made clear that non-Indian fee land—

like Defendant’s property—is not tribal land. See Plains Com., 554 U.S. at 328. So 

the Tribe could not exercise plenary jurisdiction over the water on Defendant’s 

property if it could not do so on property outside the exterior boundaries of the 

reservation. 

 

4

 The district court also rejected an argument that owning easements in the 

Deep Creek Canal and Lateral No. 9, like owning land in fee simple, gives the Tribe 

inherent sovereign authority to exclude nonmembers. On that point, Plaintiff’s 

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 Because Defendant is not a member of the Tribe and allegedly misappropriated 

tribal water on non-Indian fee land, the tribal court could have jurisdiction only if 

Defendant entered “consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through 

commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements” or if Defendant’s 

conduct “threaten[ed] or ha[d] some direct effect on the political integrity, the 

economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 565–66 (citations 

omitted). The tribal court held, and Plaintiff argues, that the tribal court had 

jurisdiction under both Montana exceptions. 

 As to the first exception, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has agricultural leases 

on Plaintiff’s lands and a farming partnership with a tribe member. Plaintiff argues 

that Defendant’s consensual agreements with both the Tribe and one of its members 

subject Defendant to the tribal court’s jurisdiction under the first Montana exception. 

But an Indian tribe does not gain plenary jurisdiction over all activities of a 

nonmember simply by having some contractual relationship with him—the exercise 

of jurisdiction must have a nexus to the parties’ relationship. See Atkinson Trading 

Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001). The dispute must relate to the parties’ 

contractual relationship such that the nonmember can fairly be said to have consented 

to tribal-court jurisdiction by contracting with the Tribe. See id. at 656–57 (holding 

opening brief merely defines “easement” before stating that Plaintiff’s right to 

exclude stems from its rights to the water rather than any easements in the canals. 

We thus do not consider this issue. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 

(10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not 

raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.”). 

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the first Montana exception inapplicable because a non-Indian could not have 

consented to a tribal regulation by entering an unrelated agreement with the tribe). 

Plaintiff identifies no connection between Defendant’s use of the disputed water on 

non-Indian fee land and Defendant’s agricultural leases on other lands or Defendant’s 

farming partnership. Indeed, this water dispute would be no different even if those 

agreements did not exist. Without a nexus between Defendant’s use of the disputed 

water and any of those agreements, Plaintiff cannot show that through the 

agreements, Defendant consented to tribal-court jurisdiction over his use of irrigation 

water on his non-Indian fee land. Thus, the first Montana exception did not provide 

the tribal court with jurisdiction.5

5

 In its reply brief, Plaintiff asserts that this case involves more than just the 

water dispute. Plaintiff argues that Defendant used his farming partnership with a 

Ute Tribe member to unlawfully harvest crops on tribal land. Considering this a 

trespass on tribal land, the tribal court enjoined Defendant from continuing to harvest 

on those lands. But even so, the dispute about Defendant’s water use on his nonIndian fee land has no nexus to Defendant’s alleged crop harvesting on tribal land 

under his farming partnership. So that agreement did not give the tribal court 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the water dispute. 

And to the extent Plaintiff argues that we should enforce the tribal court’s 

injunction against Defendant’s continued harvest on tribal lands even if the tribal 

court lacked jurisdiction over the water dispute, Plaintiff has waived that argument. 

From the beginning, this lawsuit has focused on enforcing the tribal court’s judgment 

as to the disputed water. The summary-judgment briefing dealt only with the tribal 

court’s jurisdiction over the parties’ water dispute. Plaintiff never argued that the 

district court could enforce the tribal court’s crop-harvesting injunction independent 

of the water dispute. Nor did Plaintiff argue that in its opening brief in this Court. 

The opening brief only mentions in passing when describing Defendant’s farming 

partnership that the tribal court considered Defendant’s crop harvesting a trespass. 

Plaintiff has thus waived any argument that we should enforce the tribal court’s cropharvesting injunction even if the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the parties’ 

water dispute. See Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[A] 

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 Plaintiff argues also that the tribal court had jurisdiction under the second 

Montana exception because Defendant’s use of the disputed water threatens or 

directly affects the Tribe’s political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare. 

The Supreme Court has stated that for this exception to apply, the challenged conduct 

cannot merely injure the tribe but must be “catastrophic for tribal self-government.” 

Plains Com., 554 U.S. at 341 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The 

district court, finding no evidence that Defendant’s use of the disputed water had 

been catastrophic for the Tribe, determined that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction 

over the dispute. 

 Plaintiff does not argue that Defendant’s use of the disputed water has been 

“catastrophic for tribal self-government.” Instead, Plaintiff argues that the 

“catastrophic” requirement is dictum we should decline to follow. We disagree. In 

Plains Commerce, the Supreme Court held that a tribal court lacked jurisdiction to 

adjudicate a dispute about the sale of non-Indian fee land in part because the second 

Montana exception did not apply. Id. According to the Court, the exception did not 

apply because the sale of non-Indian fee land “cannot fairly be called catastrophic for 

tribal self-government” even if the sale disappoints the tribe. Id. (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the Court held that the second 

Montana exception did not apply because the challenged conduct was not 

catastrophic to tribal self-government. Thus, it was not dictum, and it binds us here. 

party waives issues and arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” 

(quotation omitted)). 

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 Although Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s use of the disputed water inflicts 

more than a minor injury on the Tribe, Plaintiff does not attempt to meet its burden to 

show that Defendant’s use of the disputed water is catastrophic for tribal selfgovernment. And Plaintiff could not easily do so on this record. Defendant has 

allegedly been using the disputed water for over sixteen years with no apparent effect 

on Plaintiff’s “project of tribal self-government.” See Plains Com., 554 U.S. at 341 

(noting that the sale of land to a non-Indian could not be catastrophic for tribal selfgovernment because the land had been owned by non-Indians for fifty years and “the 

project of tribal self-government ha[d] proceeded without interruption”). Defendant 

purportedly had been using the disputed water for almost thirteen years before the 

Tribe ever learned of it—and only then because someone reported it. That such a 

large amount of time passed does not necessarily mean that Defendant’s use of the 

water was lawful or that Plaintiff cannot seek a remedy in an appropriate forum. But 

it means that the dispute does not sufficiently jeopardize tribal self-government to 

vest tribal courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate it. 

 Because neither Montana exception applies to Defendant’s alleged conduct, 

the district court correctly determined that the tribal court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the parties’ water dispute. 

B. 

 Plaintiff challenges also the district court’s dismissal with prejudice and denial 

of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. The district court denied leave to amend 

because it determined that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment would be futile. We 

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usually review the denial of leave to amend for an abuse of discretion, but when the 

reason for the denial was that amendment would be futile, we review the futility 

determination de novo. Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 579 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation 

omitted). 

 Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint remained a “complaint for 

recognition, registration, and enforcement of a tribal court judgment.” Plaintiff 

argues that the proposed amended complaint also sought redress directly under the 

1923 Cedarview Decree. But nowhere did Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint 

assert a standalone claim arising from the Cedarview Decree. The allegations in 

Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint centered on the tribal-court litigation and 

judgment. Plaintiff proposed that it would request an injunction requiring Defendant 

to comply with the Cedarview Decree only as part of its relief to enforce the tribalcourt judgment—not as relief for an independent claim based on the Decree. 

Because Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint asserted only a claim to recognize 

and enforce the tribal-court judgment, the district court correctly determined that the 

amendment would be futile. 

 As for the district court’s dismissal with prejudice, Plaintiff argues that the 

district court erred because dismissals for lack of jurisdiction should be without 

prejudice. But the district court did not dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. The 

district court dismissed on the merits Plaintiff’s claim to enforce the tribal-court 

judgment because the tribal court lacked jurisdiction. In other words, Plaintiff 

sought enforcement of a tribal-court judgment, and the district court made the merits 

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determination that the tribal-court judgment is unenforceable. And to the extent 

Plaintiff believes a dismissal with prejudice in this case means it cannot seek a 

decision on the merits in another forum, Plaintiff is mistaken. Dismissal with 

prejudice bars Plaintiff only from bringing another claim to enforce the tribal-court 

judgment. It does not bar Plaintiff from pursuing any other claims arising from its 

water dispute with Defendant. The district court did not err in dismissing with 

prejudice the claim to enforce the tribal-court judgment. 

AFFIRMED. 

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