J-A05036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

KALEVELYN CHAVERS 

Appellant

v.

1605 VALLEY CENTER PKY, LP; PENN 

CAP GROUP 3 GP, LLC; PENN CAP 

PROPERTIES PORTFOLIO, LP; AND 

GRUBB & ELLIS MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES, INC.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1045 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Civil Division at No(s): C-48-CV-02016-6041

KALEVELYN CHAVERS 

Appellant

v.

1605 VALLEY CENTER PKY, LP; PENN 

CAP GROUP 3 GP, LLC; PENN CAP 

PROPERTIES PORTFOLIO, LP; AND 

GRUBB & ELLIS MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES, INC.

APPEAL OF: PENN CAP PROPERTIES 

PORTFOLIO, LP

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1183 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Civil Division at No(s): C-48-CV-02016-6041

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
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MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 30, 2023

Kalevelyn Chavers (Appellant) appeals from the $202,814.23 judgment

entered following a jury verdict in her favor, and against 1605 Valley Center 

Pky, LP; Penn Cap Group 3 GP, LLC; and Penn Cap Properties Portfolio, LP 

(PCPP).

1

 PCPP cross-appeals the judgment. Upon careful review, we affirm 

in part, vacate in part, and remand with instructions. 

The trial court summarized:

On July 8, 2016, [Appellant] ... commenced this suit via complaint.

In her complaint, [Appellant] alleged that on July 22, 2014, she 

tripped on exposed wires at her place of employment, Easton 

Hospital [(employer)], causing her to fall and sustain injuries. 

[Appellant] alleged that her injuries occurred due to the 

negligence of [PCPP], which owned and maintained the property....

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 2. In a June 17, 2016, Compromise and 

Release (C&R), Appellant settled her claim against employer and its workers’

compensation carrier for $100,000.00. As a result of the settlement, the 

employer/carrier assigned their subrogation rights to her. C&R, 6/17/16. 

On July 8, 2016, Appellant filed this action against PCPP. The trial court 

explained:

On November 8, 2021, a jury trial commenced in the instant 

matter. On November 12, 2021, the jury returned a verdict in 

favor of [Appellant], finding [PCPP] 100% negligent in causing the 

accident[,] and awarded [Appellant] one hundred sixty thousand 

____________________________________________

1 The parties agreed 1605 Valley Center Pky, LP, and Penn Cap Group 3 GP, 

LLC, “are part of and belong to” PCPP. N.T., 11/12/21, at 275. The parties 

further agreed that Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc., “at all times as 

property manager[,] acted on behalf [of] and at the direction of PCPP.” Id.

We collectively reference the defendants as PCPP. 
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dollars ($160,000.00) in damages. The Civil Prothonotary 

docketed the verdict following the conclusion of the trial. On 

November 17, 2021, [Appellant] filed her motion for delay 

damages. [Appellant] and [PCPP] then filed their respective posttrial motions on November 22, 2021....

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 2. 

The trial court subsequently awarded delay damages and molded the 

verdict. Order, 3/16/22, at 1. The court denied the parties’ remaining posttrial motions. Id. On April 12, 2022, the trial court entered judgment against 

PCPP for $202,814.23. Appellant timely appealed, and PCPP filed a crossappeal. The parties and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse 

[its] discretion by denying the admission of past medical expenses 

and/or the lien for same, allowing the jury to be told that such an 

award would be a double recovery, and by refusing to mold the 

verdict to include past medical expenses of $228,347.10 (plus 

delay damages and post-judgment interest), and/or in failing to 

grant a new trial on damages for the valuation of [Appellant’s]

past recoverable medical expenses?

2. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse 

of discretion by permitting the jury to be advised that [Appellant]

did not have to pay back the indemnity lien due to the assignment 

of the lien to her, depriving [Appellant] of an additional award of 

at least $154,711.66 (plus delay damages and post-judgment 

interest), such that the court should have either molded the 

verdict to include those damages, or grant a new trial concerning 

the valuation of those damages?

3. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse 

its discretion by precluding Dr. [Christopher] Ferrante’s estimate

as to the cost of future medical expenses, such that a new trial on 

future medical expenses should have been ordered?
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4. Did the court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse of 

discretion by refusing to grant a new trial on the Disfigurement 

Claim since the verdict of $0 for disfigurement is clearly against 

the weight of the evidence?

5. Did the court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse of 

discretion by refusing to grant a new trial on the claim for past, 

present, and future pain and suffering, embarrassment and 

humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life, since an award of only 

$25,000 is against the weight of the evidence, and probably the 

result of court error in admitting evidence of employer negligence?

6. Did the court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse of 

discretion in refusing to grant a new trial on the issue of loss of 

past and future household services, for which the jury’s award of 

$0 was clearly against the weight of the evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-6 (capitalization modified).

On cross-appeal, PCPP presents the following issues:

1. Did the trial court err by denying [PCPP’s] motion for judgment

NOV or alternatively for new trial, and underlying motions for

summary judgment, nonsuit and directed verdict, as the evidence

was insufficient to support the verdict and establish that [PCPP]

owed or breached a duty to [Appellant] given the clear terms of

the Lease and as it bore no responsibility for installing and

maintaining the wires [Appellant] tripped over, as the verdict was

also against the weight of the evidence?

2. Is a new trial required due to errors at trial which individually and

cumulatively so prejudiced [PCPP] that the verdict was punitive

and based on sympathy, speculation and confusion, which

included:

a. denying [PCPP’s] proposed verdict slip and accepting

[Appellant’s] version, and submitting and erroneous verdict slip

causing jury confusion; and

b. failing to charge the jury on open and obvious conditions and

rejecting [PCPP’s] proposed instruction?

3. Is [PCPP] entitled to entry of judgment NOV in its favor or a new

trial, as the jury’s finding that [Appellant’s] comparative
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negligence was not a factual cause of harm was against the weight

of the evidence, is not supported by the record evidence, and is

contrary to law, as [Appellant] admitted she knew of the wires for

at least 2 years before the incident but did not advise her

employer or [PCPP], was looking ahead and not where she was

walking, and, could have walked on the right side of her desk

which was free of potential tripping hazards?

4. Did the trial court err by granting [Appellant’s] Motion for Delay

Damages which should have been denied or significantly reduced

based on delay beyond [PCPP’s control], including the Covid

pandemic and judicial emergency?

5. Did the trial court err by denying [PCPP’s] Motion for Remittitur,

and reducing and remitting the damages award to [an] amount

consistent with the weight of the evidence?

PCPP’s Brief at 6-8. We first address the issues raised by Appellant.

Appellant’s Appeal at 1045 EDA 2022

(1) Whether the trial court committed [a] prejudicial error of law

and/or abuse of discretion by denying admission of past medical

expenses and/or the lien for the same, allowing the jury to be

told that any award of the lien amount would be a double

recovery, and by refusing to mold the verdict to include past

medical expenses of $228,347.10 (plus delay damages and posjudgment interest), and or failing in granting a new trial on

damages for the valuation of [Appellant’s] past recoverable

medical expenses.

Appellant argues the trial court “erred by failing to admit the past

medical expenses and permit recovery of the same[.]” Appellant’s Brief at

17. Appellant claims the trial court improperly deemed her past medical

expenses unrecoverable from PCPP. See id. at 18. According to Appellant,
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she gave up rights under the [Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA)2]

to obtain that lien assignment. The [trial court] summarily

deprived [her] of the benefit of her bargain in favor of pardoning

the responsible tortfeasor.

Id. at 18 n.2 (footnote added). 

Appellant further argues the trial court impermissibly permitted PCPP to

present evidence of

the [subrogation] lien, the fact that all of [Appellant’s] past

medical bills were paid, as well as much of her wage loss as set

forth in the C&R Agreement, that any award to [Appellant] on the

items covered by the lien would be payable to [Appellant], and

therefore are not recoverable ....

Id. at 20. Appellant maintains the subrogation lien should have been

admissible at her option, as established in Nazarak v. Waite, 216 A.3d 1093

(Pa. Super. 2019). Appellant’s Brief at 21. Quoting Nazarak, Appellant

claims she can recover the expenses paid by the workers’ compensation

carrier. Id. at 22. 

Appellant explains the public policy of avoiding a windfall was not

implicated because she “paid for the assignment of the subrogation right.” 

Id. (capitalization modified). Id. Appellant argues, “Because [she] was

assigned the lien for good and valuable consideration, [] the tortfeasor gets

away with paying none of the medical bills it negligently caused [Appellant] to

incur.” Id. at 24. 

____________________________________________

2 See Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-

2710.
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Appellant also claims the preclusion of an award for her past medical

expenses deprived her “of property rights without due process.” Appellant’s

Brief at 26 (capitalization modified). Additionally, Appellant insists the trial

court’s ruling will discourage settlements of workers’ compensation cases and

other cases involving third-party carriers. Id. at 29. According to Appellant,

the trial court should have molded the verdict to include past medical

expenses or award a new trial on damages. Id. at 42, 48. Appellant directs 

our attention to the testimony of her expert, who opined her past medical 

expenses were reasonable and necessary. Id. at 34. Further, Appellant 

points to the amount of the subrogation lien evidences the reasonable value 

of the medical expenses. Id. at 37. Because the jury found PCPP 100% liable

for her injuries, Appellant asks this Court to either mold the verdict or grant a

new trial limited to damages. Id. at 48.

As this Court has explained:

[W]hen analyzing a decision by a trial court to grant or deny a

new trial, the proper standard of review, ultimately, is whether

the trial court abused its discretion.

....

Moreover, our review must be tailored to a well-settled, two-part 

analysis:

We must review the court’s alleged mistake and determine 

whether the court erred and, if so, whether the error resulted in 

prejudice necessitating a new trial. If the alleged mistake

concerned an error of law, we will scrutinize for legal error. Once

we determine whether an error occurred, we must then determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the

request for a new trial.
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Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., 253 A.3d 682, 694 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citations omitted). 

Upon review, the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s claim for past medical

expenses implicates 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141 and the collateral source doctrine. 

Section 6141 provides, in part:

(a) Personal injuries. — Settlement with or any payment made

to an injured person or to others on behalf of such injured person

with the permission of such injured person or to anyone entitled

to recover damages on account of injury or death of such person

shall not constitute an admission of liability by the person making

the payment or on whose behalf the payment was made, unless

the parties to such settlement or payment agree to the contrary.

....

(c) Admissibility in evidence. — Except in an action in which

final settlement and release has been pleaded as a complete

defense, any settlement or payment referred to in

subsections (a) and (b) shall not be admissible in evidence

on the trial of any matter.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141(a), (c) (emphasis added).

“The collateral source rule, which is intended to protect tort victims,

“provides that payments from a collateral source shall not diminish the

damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.” Nazarak, 216

A.3d at 1101-02 (emphasis added, citation omitted). In Nazarak, this Court

concluded evidence of a workers’ compensation settlement was not admissible

in similar circumstances:

[T]here is no dispute that the “settlement” at issue (the workers’

compensation compromise and release) was not made by 

[a]ppellants, and [a]ppellants were not in any way a party to the 
J-A05036-23

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settlement. Rather, the settlement was made between Nazarak 

and his employer/employer’s workers’ compensation carrier, 

Liberty Mutual. Thus, according to the plain language of [42 

Pa.C.S.A. §] 6141(a), while the settlement does not constitute an 

admission of liability by Nazarak’s employer or Liberty Mutual, it 

has no effect on the liability of [a]ppellants (the third party 

tortfeasors). 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903 (indicating words and phrases 

are given their common and approved usage); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921 

(indicating when words are clear and free from ambiguity they 

may not be disregarded).

... Subsection (c) indicates that a settlement referred to in 

Subsection (a) “shall not be admissible in evidence on the trial of

any matter.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141(c). Accordingly, when 

Subsections (a) and (c) are read together, arguably, the 

settlement at issue was not admissible in the instant trial.

Nazarak, 216 A.3d at 1103 (emphasis added). 

Here, the trial court precluded an award for Appellant’s past medical

expenses, stating “allowing [her] to collect trial damages and receive the 

benefit of the workers’ compensation settlement would create a windfall for 

[Appellant].” Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 11. This was error. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 6141(a); Nazarak, 216 A.3d at 1103. Concern over a windfall to

Appellant is overshadowed by the injustice of absolving PCPP of liability for its

negligence. See, e.g., Charles v. Giant Eagle, 522 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. 1992) (in

a case involving a settling co-tortfeasor, “concern over the windfall to the

plaintiff, if appellee were to be required to pay its full pro rat[a] share, is far

overshadowed by the injustice of the result they urge.”).

Because the jury found PCPP 100% negligent for Appellant’s fall, the

trial court erred in precluding Appellant’s claim for her past medical expenses: 
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$228,347.10.

3

 We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for

the trial court to mold the verdict to include Appellant’s past medical expenses,

plus delay damages and interest. See Pa.R.C.P. 238(a)(1) (“in all civil cases 

wherein the plaintiff seeks monetary relief for bodily injury, delay damages 

shall be added to compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff against each 

defendant found to be liable by the jury.”). 

(2) Whether the trial court committed prejudicial error of law

and/or abuse of discretion by permitting the jury to be advised

that Appellant did not have to pay back the indemnity lien due

to the assignment of the lien to her, depriving Appellant of an

additional award of at least $154,711.66 (plus delay damages

and post-judgment interest), such that the court should have

either molded the verdict to include those damages, or grant a

new trial concerning the valuation of those damages.

Appellant challenges the jury’s award of $75,000 for her lost past and

future wages. Appellant’s Brief at 59. Appellant argues:

It is clear that the jury subtracted the $154,711.66 [previously

paid by the carrier] from past and future loss of earnings.

[Appellant] was forced to argue that the workers’ compensation

payments only compensated [two-thirds of her] the past wages.

The jury award of the final 1/3rd, $75,000.00 (rounded off), the

jury thought would make the [Appellant] whole on the past wage

loss. The problem is that [Appellant] was entitled to collect the

entire lien[,] plus [the portion of the] wage loss [] not paid by

workers’ compensation, and instead she collected none of the lien.

This must be corrected either by molding the verdict to include

____________________________________________

3 The subrogation lien identifies the past medical expenses paid by the carrier. 

See Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 789 (Pa. 2001)

(“The expenses for which a plaintiff may recover must be such as have been 

actually paid, or such as, in the judgment of the jury, are reasonably 

necessary to be incurred.”), overruled in part by Northbrook Life Ins. v.

Commonwealth, 949 A.2d 333, 337 (Pa. 2008).
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the $154,71166, or by granting a new trial to value the past and

future loss of earnings and earning capacity.

Id. Appellant provides no additional argument. 

Appellant challenges the jury’s verdict as against the weight of the

evidence. 

The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial based upon 

a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is 

within the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, the function 

of an appellate court on appeal is to review the trial court’s 

exercise of discretion based upon a review of the record, rather 

than to consider de novo the underlying question of the weight of 

the evidence. An appellate court may not overturn the trial court’s

decision unless the trial court palpably abused its discretion in 

ruling on the weight claim. Further, in reviewing a challenge to 

the weight of the evidence, a verdict will be overturned only if it 

is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

....

A trial court’s determination that a verdict was not against the

interest of justice is [o]ne of the least assailable reasons for

denying a new trial. A verdict is against the weight of the evidence

where certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore

them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny

justice. 

Tong-Summerford v. Abington Mem’l Hosp. & Radiology Grp. of

Abington, P.C., 190 A.3d 631, 659 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). 

Our Supreme Court explained:

While a jury’s verdict and damages award are generally insulated

from challenge, the grant of a new trial may be required to achieve

justice in those instances where the original trial, because of taint,

unfairness, or error, produces something other than a just and fair

result, which is the principle goal of judicial proceedings. ... [A]

jury verdict may be set aside as inadequate when it appears to
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have been the product of passion, prejudice, partiality, or

corruption, or where it clearly appears from uncontradicted

evidence that the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable

relation to the loss suffered by the plaintiff. Where the jury’s 

verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of 

justice a new trial should be awarded. [The Court] cautioned that 

it was within the province of the jury to assess the worth of the 

testimony and to accept or reject the estimates given by the 

witnesses, and if the verdict bears a reasonable resemblance to 

the proven damages, it is not the function of the court to 

substitute its judgement for the jury’s....

Mader v. Duquesne Light Co., 241 A.3d 600, 612-13 (Pa. 2020) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

Our review shows the trial court properly instructed the jury it could

award Appellant her past lost earnings. N.T., 11/10/21, at 266-67. The trial

court did not instruct the jury to make any deductions from its award. “We 

presume that juries follow the trial court’s instructions.” Renninger v. A&R

Mach. Shop, 163 A.3d 988, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

In denying Appellant relief, the trial court explained: “Considering the 

evidence produced at trial and respecting the jury’s findings of fact, this court 

does not deem it appropriate to disturb the jury’s verdict.” Trial Court Opinion, 

3/16/22, at 14. Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion; the jury’s 

verdict bears a reasonable resemblance to the proven damages. See Mader,

241 A.3d at 613. Appellant’s issue merits no relief. 

(3) The Trial Court committed prejudicial error of law and/or abused 

its discretion by precluding Dr. Ferrante’s estimate as to the cost 

of future medical expenses, such that a new trial on future 

medical expenses should have been ordered.
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Appellant argues the trial court disallowed Dr. Ferrante’s testimony

about “the reasonable value of [Appellant’s] future medical expenses[.]” 

Appellant’s Brief at 60. Appellant claims the absence of this testimony caused

“the jury to speculate on the costs thereof, which resulted in a finding of $0[]

for future medical expenses.” Id. Appellant emphasizes Dr. Ferrante’s

testimony that Appellant’s prosthesis would wear out, and “given her age, she

had about a 50-50 chance of having to have another knee replacement in the

future.” Id. According to Appellant, PCPP objected to Dr. Ferrante’s estimated

future medical expenses of $70,000 - $100,000 as outside the scope of his

expert report. Id. Appellant asserts the trial court improperly sustained the

objection, because

experts can expand on and amplify their pretrial reports, as long

as they do not proffer a new theory or present trial testimony

inconsistent with the fair scope of their report.

Id. (emphasis omitted). 

Appellant contends Dr. Ferrante, who testified as her treating physician,

“was never purely” an expert witness. Id. at 61. Appellant argues that, since

PCPP objected, PCPP had the burden of proving Dr. Ferrante “did not form

those opinions during the course of treatment.” Id. Appellant posits that Dr.

Ferrante’s testimony should have been admitted, “because the opinion was

not acquired or developed with an eye toward litigation.” Id. Appellant

asserts, “given that there was no objection to the testimony that a future

medical procedure may be needed, [] the defense would not have been
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surprised that such procedures cost money.” Id. at 62. Finally, Appellant

maintains the cost of a medical procedure is more a question of fact, not

opinion. Id. 

A plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish a right to 

compensation for future medical damages:

It is well-settled that an item of damage claimed by a plaintiff can 

properly be submitted to the jury only where the burden of 

establishing damages by proper testimony has been met. In the 

context of a claim for future medical expenses, the movant must 

prove, by expert testimony, not only that future medical 

expenses will be incurred, but also the reasonable cost of such 

services.... 

Mendralla v. Weaver Corp., 703 A.2d 480, 485 (Pa. Super. 1997) (en

banc) (emphasis added; citations omitted).

The trial court correctly and concisely disposed of this issue:

A new trial is warranted if the trial court committed a clear abuse

of discretion or an error of law controlling the outcome of the case.

Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2003). “[T]he direct testimony of the expert at the trial may not

be inconsistent with or go beyond the fair scope of his or her

testimony in the discovery proceedings as set forth in the

deposition, answer to an interrogatory, separate report, or

supplement thereto.” Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5(c). Here, at trial, [PCPP]

objected to Dr. Ferrante’s testimony estimating that a future knee

surgery would cost [Appellant] $70,000.00 - $100,000.00

because such testimony is beyond the scope of Dr. Ferrante’s

report. Indeed, Dr. Ferrante’s report did not set forth an

estimate regarding the cost of a potential future knee

replacement. Furthermore, Dr. Ferrante testified that

[Appellant] had a fifty percent chance of requiring another

knee replacement in the future. [Appellant’s] need for a future

surgery is purely hypothetical, and the future damages are not

actual. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

limiting Dr. Ferrante’s testimony.
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Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 12-13 (emphasis added). Whether the

Court committed prejudicial error of law and/or abuse of discretion

by refusing to grant a new trial on the disfigurement claim since the

verdict of $0 for disfigurement is clearly against the weight of the

evidence.

(4) Whether the court committed prejudicial error of law and/or 

abuse of discretion by refusing to grant a new trial on the claim 

for past, present, and future pain and suffering, embarrassment 

and humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life, since an award of 

only $25,000 is against the weight of the evidence, and probably 

the result of Court error in admitting evidence of employer 

negligence.

(5) Whether the court should have granted a new trial on assessing 

value of loss of past and future household services, for which the 

jury’s award of $0 is clearly against the weight of the evidence.

In her fourth, fifth and sixth issues, Appellant claims the verdict is

contrary to the weight of the evidence. In her fourth issue, Appellant

challenges the jury’s award of $0 for knee disfigurement. Appellant’s Brief at

63. Appellant states: “Scarring is a compensable type of disfigurement.” Id.

at 67. Appellant advises she displayed her surgical scar to the jury. Id. at

63. Although she includes photographs of her knee in her brief, Appellant

concedes that no photographs were presented or admitted into evidence at

trial. Id. at 64. Appellant directs our attention to her testimony about the

impact of the scar on her lifestyle and self-esteem. Id. 

Appellant claims: “The fact of scarring ... from the tort is not debatable

given the award of past and future lost income.” Id. at 65. Appellant cites
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Kopytin v. Aschinger, 947 A.2d 739, 743-44 (Pa. Super. 2008), as holding

that

[a j]ury verdict in [a] personal injury case which awarded

damages only to compensate for unreimbursed medical expenses,

contradicted [the] jury’s finding that [the] driver received injuries

of a type that normally involved pain and suffering, and therefore,

reversal of the award and [a] new trial on damages was required.

Appellant’s Brief at 66-67. 

Similarly, in her fifth issue, Appellant claims the jury awarded her a

“grossly inadequate sum” of $25,000.00 for her pain, suffering,

embarrassment, humiliation, and her loss of enjoyment of life. Id. at 73. 

Appellant asserts that, because of the accident, she underwent a partial knee

replacement,

extensive physical therapy, a total knee replacement, a Dural leak

which involved excruciating pain and suffering due to spinal fluid

around her brain and spinal cord being drained during her ...

procedure, a manipulation under anesthesia, and a surgical repair

of her Dural leak, together with lifetime disability, impairment,

and pain and suffering....

Id. Appellant references evidence of her physical abilities prior to the

accident, and her pain following the accident and medical procedures. Id. at

74-77. 

In her sixth issue, Appellant argues the jury’s failure to award damages

for her inability to perform household services is against the weight of the

evidence. Id. at 81. Appellant asserts that her vocational expert placed a

value on these services. Id. According to Appellant, the jury was not free to

disregard this testimony and “simply pretend the damages did not exist.” Id. 
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We are cognizant of our standard and scope of review, stated above. 

See Tong-Summerford, 190 A.3d at 659.

Instantly, the trial court declined to award Appellant a new trial, stating:

Considering the evidence produced at trial and respecting the

jury’s findings of fact, this court does not deem it appropriate to

disturb the jury’s reasonable verdict....

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 13-14. Upon review, we discern no abuse of

discretion. 

“[A] jury is always free to believe all, part, some, or none of the evidence

presented.” Avery v. Cercone, 225 A.3d 873, 879 (Pa. Super. 2019). 

“[G]enerally the determination of whether the pain is severe enough to be 

compensable is left to the jury.” Van Kirk v. O’Toole, 857 A.2d 183, 186 

(Pa. Super. 2004). 

[T]here are injuries to which human experience teaches there is 

accompanying pain. Those injuries are obvious in the most 

ordinary sense: the broken bone, the stretched muscle, twist of 

the skeletal system, injury to a nerve, organ or their function, and 

all the consequences of any injury traceable by medical science 

and common experience as sources of pain and suffering.

Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 542 A.2d 516, 518 (Pa. 1988). The jury, having

seen and heard Appellant’s testimony and that of her doctor and other

witnesses, “is not required to accept everything or anything [they] said, even

if their testimony was uncontradicted.” Bronchak v. Rebmann, 397 A.2d

438, 440 (Pa. Super. 1979). “The “determination of what is a compensable 

injury is uniquely within the purview of the jury.” Majczyk v. Oesch, 789 
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A.2d 717, 725-26 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted); accord Avery, 255 

A.3d at 879. 

At trial, Appellant testified about her scar from her knee replacement

surgery:

[I]t just changed my whole lifestyle. I can’t wear dresses anymore

above or below the knee. They have to be long. Because the

scar, it stems from above my knee past my knee. It’s very thick

and it’s just ugly.

It’s very thick and ugly to look at. So I have developed a

complex of anybody looking at me, if I was to go to the doctor,

anywhere, even if I’m at a family member’s house and I have to

wear – I would undress, say, for my sisters or anyone, I just have

a complex.

I don’t want anybody to look at it. I will cover it up, you

know. Or pajamas. I don’t wear the nightgown anymore if I am

sleeping over. I just wear pajama pants.

Id. at 153. As stated above, Appellant showed her scar to the jury. Id. at

154. 

It is undisputed Appellant had knee replacement surgery following the

accident, which resulted in pain and suffering and a scar. However, the jury

also heard evidence that Appellant had significant knee issues predating her

July 22, 2014, workplace injury. Appellant acknowledged seeing her doctor

on January 12, 2009, for left knee pain. N.T., 11/9/21, at 121. At that time,

Appellant’s x-rays showed a significant lesion on her medial femoral condyle

in her left knee. Id. at 122. Appellant again complained of left leg and back

pain on May 14, 2009. Id. at 124. On September 23, 2012, Appellant visited

an emergency care center because she felt a “pop” in her left knee. Id. 
J-A05036-23

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On May 28, 2013, Appellant had an arthroscopic surgery on her left

knee. Id. at 126. On August 2, 2013, Appellant informed her doctor she had

swelling in her left knee, but no pain. Id. at 127. Appellant received steroid

injections in her left knee on February 2, 2014, March 3, 2014, and March 10,

2014. Id. at 128-29. 

On May 9, 2014, Appellant visited her doctor for pain in both knees. Id.

at 132-33. Appellant told her doctor that she continued to have knee pain. 

Id. at 133-34. Appellant’s x-rays at the time showed sclerosis and narrowing

of the left knee, with large spur formation. Id. at 136. Appellant

acknowledged the x-rays showed moderate to advanced arthritis in both

knees. Id. at 137. 

Appellant presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Ferrante, an

orthopedic surgeon with Lehigh Valley Health Network. See N.T. (Trial),

11/10/21, at 168. Dr. Ferrante testified that, in preparing his expert report,

he reviewed Appellant’s prior medical records and her history of treatment for

left knee pain. N.T., (Deposition), 11/3/21, at 28-30. Regarding knee

swelling before and after her injury, Dr. Ferrante opined:

The perfect situation would be to have an MRI before the trauma

and an MRI after the trauma to see, which we don’t have. But

[Appellant] seemed to be functioning very well from her report[]

to me long after this [and] she was functioning pretty well, so she

probably didn’t have the edema before the injury.

Id. at 54-55. Dr. Ferrante saw Appellant on January 6

th and 28th

, 2016, and

ultimately performed a total knee replacement. Id. at 61.
J-A05036-23

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In sum, the jury heard extensive evidence concerning Appellant’s 

disfigurement, the lost value of her household services, and her pain and 

suffering. Ultimately, the jury chose to award nothing for disfigurement or 

the lost value of Appellant’s household services, and awarded $25,000 for 

Appellant’s pain and suffering. Regarding the first two types of damages, this 

Court has recognized that not all injuries are “serious enough to warrant 

compensation.” Gold v. Rosen, 135 A.3d 1039, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted). The jury was free to conclude that Appellant’s 

disfigurement and lost household services were not caused by PCPP’s 

negligence or “the sort of transient rub of life for which compensation is not

warranted.” Id.

Regarding the alleged inadequacy of the pain and suffering award, our 

Supreme Court has stated that a reversal of a jury verdict on the grounds of 

inadequacy is appropriate “only where the injustice of the verdict stands forth 

like a beacon.” Davis v. Mullen, 773 A.2d 764, 766 (Pa. 2001) (citation and 

brackets omitted). Here, the trial court, which oversaw the presentation of 

evidence first-hand, concluded that the jury verdict with respect to these three

types of damages did not warrant relief. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, 

at 14 (“Considering the evidence produced at trial and respecting the jury’s 

findings of fact, this court does not deem it appropriate to disturb the jury’s, 

reasonable verdict.”). Appellant has not convinced us that the trial court 

abused its discretion. As such, Appellant’s challenges do not merit relief. 
J-A05036-23

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Appeal of PCPP: No. 1183 EDA 2022

(1) Whether the trial court erred by denying PCPP’s motion for

Judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, as the

evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and establish

that PCPP owed or breached a duty to Appellant, and the verdict

was also against the weight of the evidence. 

PCPP first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the

verdict. PCPP’s Brief at 44. PCPP argues, “The evidence at trial was

insufficient to establish [PCPP] was negligent, i.e., owed or breached a duty

of care to [Appellant] ....” Id. at 45. PCPP asserts the trial court erred by not

granting a nonsuit, a directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the

verdict. Id. According to PCPP:

[PCPP’s] duties with regard to the property are unambiguously set

forth in the Lease and Property Management Agreement

[(Lease)], and were solely to manage the property, maintain

common areas, and to provide the IT network and infrastructure. 

[Employer] installed the equipment and wires, not [PCPP], and

[PCPP] did not provide credit card machines or computers to its

tenants. There was no evidence that [PCPP] bore any

responsibility for the condition of the wires or manner in which

they were left on, or taped to the floor, or to install and maintain

the wires. The Lease specifically excluded telecommunications

wiring, outlets and equipment from [PCPP’s] duties....

Id. at 46 (emphasis in original). PCPP further asserts that Appellant’s own

expert “admitted and acknowledged that under the lease[,]

telecommunications wires are excluded[.]” Id.

PCPP points out that employer installed the equipment and wires, not

PCPP. Id. PCPP argues:

The record is devoid of any evidence that [PCPP] was advised of,

or had notice of a hazardous wire condition, and it had no duty of
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inspection here. The lease required [employer] to keep the

premises in a neat and orderly condition and comply with all laws

(including the [Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 

12101 et seq.]), ordinances, notices, orders, rules, regulations

and requirements regulating the subject property.

Id. (citations omitted). 

PCPP additionally challenges the jury’s finding it was 100% liable for

Appellant’s injury. PCPP’s Brief at 47. PCPP argues, “The evidence at trial

overwhelmingly established that [PCPP] did not owe or breach a duty of care

to [Appellant].” Id. at 48. PCPP cites for support the testimony of its expert

mechanical engineer, Dr. Jason Kiddy. Id. According to PCPP, Dr. Kiddy

opined that PCPP

had no responsibility for, and did not contribute to [Appellant’s]

trip and fall; that [PCPP] did not obstruct a means of egress from

[Appellant’s] desk in regard to the wires; and [employer] bore the

duty to maintain the space where the incident occurred, not

[PCPP].

Id. at 48-49 (citations omitted). Upon review, we are not persuaded by

PCPP’s argument.

We have explained:

Our standard[s] of review when considering the motions for a 

directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict [JNOV] 

are identical. We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a 

[directed verdict or JNOV] only when we find an abuse of 

discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the 

case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the 

same as that for a trial court.

There are two bases upon which a [directed verdict or JNOV] can 

be entered; one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable 

minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered 
J-A05036-23

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in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record

and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided

adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in

[its] favor. Whereas with the second, the court reviews the

evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that

a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.

Hall v. Episcopal Long Term Care, 54 A.3d 381, 395 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citations omitted). 

The trial court explained:

[PCPP] argues [Appellant] was not owed a duty, and therefore, 

[PCPP] could not have breached a duty that resulted in

[Appellant’s] injuries; [PCPP] contend[s] that all of [its] duties and 

obligations relating to the property are defined in the contract 

documents. [PCPP] state[s] that the duties discussed in the 

contract include managing the property, maintaining the common 

areas, and providing the IT network and infrastructure. The 

contract excludes from [PCPP’s] duties telecommunication wiring, 

outlets, equipment, and any associated wires connecting to those 

items. [PCPP] reason[s ... it was] not responsible for maintaining 

the wires [Appellant] tripped over and [is] entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.

[Appellant], however, argued [PCPP] indeed owed her a duty. 

[Appellant] asserted [PCPP] retained sufficient control over the 

premises to impose a duty to protect [Appellant] from foreseeable 

harm. [PCPP’s] control over the property was evidenced by the 

lease agreement, building rules, [PCPP’s] exclusive right to service 

the property, [PCPP’s] maintenance and janitorial responsibilities, 

and inspections of the property. Certainly, genuine issues of 

material fact existed regarding the issue of duty. As such, the 

issue of duty was property submitted to the jury, and the trial 

court did not err in denying [PCPP’s] pre-trial motion[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 16.

The record supports the trial court’s findings, and we discern no error. 

See, e.g., N.T., 11/8/21, at 167, 176-77 (PCPP’s president, Lisa Pektor, 

testifying employer paid a maintenance fee), 177 (Pektor testifying employer 
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can put in a work order for, inter alia, exposed wires), 177-78 (Pektor

testifying PCPP personnel are instructed to notify PCPP of dangerous 

conditions). Because the testimony showed a question of fact existed 

regarding PCPP’s responsibilities, relief is not warranted.

(2) Whether a new trial is required due to the errors at trial which

individually and cumulatively so prejudiced PCPP that the

verdict was punitive and based on sympathy, speculation, and

confusion. 

(a) Whether the trial court erred by denying PCPP’s proposed

verdict sheet and accepting Appellant’s verdict slip, and

submitting an error-filled verdict slip, which caused jury

confusion.

PCPP argues the trial court erred in denying its proposed verdict slip and

accepting Appellant’s proposed slip. PCPP’s Brief at 50. PCPP asserts it asked

to list on the slip only the actual owner of the property – PCPP. Id. However,

the trial court accepted Appellant’s proposed slip listing each defendant

individually. Id. According to PCPP, 

[l]isting all four Defendants individually by name, instead of just 

Defendant property owner [PCPP], was clearly prejudicial, as the 

jury was unable to properly consider and contrast the alleged 

negligence of [PCPP] against [Appellant’s] contributory

negligence, and fairly assess the percentage of negligence to 

each.... 

Id. (emphasis in original).

PCPP further argues that the verdict slip erroneously listed damages 

previously excluded by the trial court, including past medical expenses. Id.

at 52. Notwithstanding, PCPP acknowledges the line item for past medical 
J-A05036-23

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expenses was crossed off on the verdict slip. Id. PCPP asserts it “should have 

been left off the verdict sheet altogether.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 

Our standard of review regarding a trial court’s denial of a motion for a

new trial is limited: “The power to grant a new trial lies inherently with the

trial court and we will not reverse its decision absent a clear abuse of discretion

or an error of law[,] which controls the outcome of the case.” Maya v.

Johnson & Johnson & McNeil-PPC, Inc. (In re McNeill-PPC, Inc.), 97

A.3d 1203, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2014). In conducting review, we employ a twopart analysis: First, we determine if an error occurred. If so, we ascertain

“whether the error resulted in prejudice necessitating a new trial.” Czimmer

v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., 122 A.3d 1043, 1051 (Pa. Super. 2015). Under

the second aspect of this analysis, the “consideration of all new trial claims is

grounded firmly in the harmless error doctrine[.]” Knowles v. Levan, 15

A.3d 504, 507 (Pa. Super. 2011). The error in question must have affected 

the verdict. Id.

The trial court rejected PCPP’s claim regarding the verdict slip:

[PCPP] argue[s] that the court instead accepted [Appellant’s] 

verdict sheet. However, this is not entirely accurate. The final 

verdict sheet that the court submitted to the jury was a 

compromise between [Appellant’s] and [PCPP’s] proposed verdict 

slips. At [PCPP’s] request and over [Appellant’s] objection, the 

court removed any reference to past medical expenses from 

[Appellant’s] proposed verdict slip. The final verdict slip

considered [Appellant’s] and [PCPP’s] respective positions, and 

the court edited the verdict slip accordingly.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/22, at 16. 
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We discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court. The verdict 

slip’s line item for past medical expenses was crossed out. See id. Further, 

the trial court instructed the jury as to damages it could award:

[Appellant] is claiming the following damages: She’s claiming 

future medical expenses. She’s claiming past and future loss of 

earnings and earning capacity. She’s claiming loss of household 

services and past and future services. She’s claiming past, 

present and future pain and suffering. And she’s also claiming 

embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life.

If you find in favor of [Appellant], you should consider these 

damages and then return a verdict in a single lump sum that will 

be added at the bottom. 

Future medical expenses are all medical expenses that you find 

[Appellant] will incur in the future for the diagnosis and treatment 

of her injuries if that was proven here in court. Future medical 

expenses include compensable medical expenses, example, 

physician services, hospital care, nursing care, drug costs and 

rehabilitation. To recover future medical expenses, she must 

prove that the medical care would be reasonably required and that 

the amount of expenses claimed reasonable.

N.T., 11/12/22, at 266. The trial court additionally explained the verdict slip 

allowed the jury to award damages for

Future medical expenses, past loss earnings, future loss earning 

capacity, loss of household services, past and future -- past, 

present and future pain and suffering, embarrassment, 

humiliation and loss of enjoyment of life. That’s all one category 

in the paragraph []. And [the next item] is disfigurement. If you 

find those damages, itemize it and add up the total.

Id. at 281. Again, “we presume that juries follow the trial court’s 

instructions.” Renninger, 163 A.3d at 1000. 

Finally, our review discloses PCPP cites no authority for its position that 

listing all defendants on a verdict slip constitutes error. As such, PCPP’s claim 
J-A05036-23

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merits no relief. See Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (“We need not reach the merits of this issue because 

the argument section of [the a]ppellant’s brief merely consists of general 

statements unsupported by any discussion and analysis of relevant legal 

authority.”); In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“[I]t is an 

appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our 

review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with 

references to the record and with citations to legal authorities.”) (citation 

omitted, emphasis added).

4

(b) Whether the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on 

open and obvious conditions and rejecting PCPP’s proposed 

instruction and instead charging the jury under Pennsylvania 

Suggested Standard Jury Instruction § 13.180 (Civil) 

Plaintiff’s Comparative Negligence. 

PCPP argues the trial court improperly used Suggested Standard Jury 

Instruction § 13.180 (Plaintiff’s Comparative Negligence), instead of its 

proposed instruction on open and obvious conditions. PCPP’s Brief at 54. PCPP 

asserts the evidence supported its theory/defense that

the wire condition was “open and obvious” and that [Appellant] 

was comparatively negligent, and a charge on this principle was 

critical to its case....

____________________________________________

4 Nevertheless, our review discloses the trial court correctly instructed the 

jury, “1605 Valley Center Parkway, LP, and Penn Cap Group 3GP, LLC, are 

part [of] and belong to Penn Cap Properties Portfolio, LP.” N.T., 11/12/21, at 

276. 
J-A05036-23

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Id. PCPP maintains Appellant knew of and walked over the wires for at least 

two years and did not advise anyone of the condition. Id. Further, PCPP 

claims Appellant was looking ahead, and not where she was walking, when 

she tripped. Id. According to PCPP, Appellant also “could have walked on the 

right side of her desk which was free of the potential tripping hazards posed 

by the wires.” Id. PCPP insists that because Appellant’s negligence was not 

in dispute, the trial court was required to address “any theory or defense that 

has support in the evidence.” Id. at 54-55 (quoting McLintock v. Works, 

716 A.2d 1262, 1265 (Pa. Super. 1998)). PCPP challenges the trial court’s 

conclusion that the standard jury instruction covered this area of law. Id. at 

55. 

We recognize:

Our standard of review regarding jury instructions is limited to 

determining whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of 

discretion or error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. 

Error in a charge occurs when the charge as a whole is inadequate 

or not clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse rather than 

clarify a material issue. Conversely, “[a] jury instruction will be 

upheld if it accurately reflects the law and is sufficient to guide the 

jury in its deliberations.”

The proper test is not whether certain portions or isolated excerpts 

taken out of context appear erroneous. We look to the charge in

its entirety, against the background of the evidence in the

particular case, to determine whether or not error was committed

and whether that error was prejudicial to the complaining party. 

In other words, there is no right to have any particular form of

instruction given; it is enough that the charge clearly and

accurately explains the relevant law.
J-A05036-23

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Krepps v. Snyder, 112 A.3d 1246, 1256 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and

some quotation marks omitted). Further, “[w]hile ... [Pennsylvania Standard

Jury Instructions] are not binding on trial courts, [they] are nonetheless

instructive.” Gorman v. Costello, 929 A.2d 1208, 1213 (Pa. Super. 2007).

In rejecting this claim, the trial court stated:

This court did not err in not instructing the jury on “open 

and obvious conditions.” Similar to the compromises made in 

arriving at a final verdict slip, the court held a conference with 

counsel to determine the charges that the court should read to the 

jury. See Transcript Vol. III pp. 193-96. [PCPP] argue[s] that 

excluding a charge relating to “open and obvious” conditions is 

reversible error. This court maintains that it is not. The requested 

instruction read as follows:

The law of Pennsylvania does not impose liability upon the 

Defendant if it was reasonable for the Defendant to believe 

that a dangerous condition would be obvious and discovered 

by Plaintiff. A danger is deemed to be “obvious” when the 

condition creating the alleged danger is apparent and would 

be recognized by reasonable persons in the position of the 

invitee exercising normal perception, intelligence and 

judgment.

Skalos v. Higgins, 449 A.2d 601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); 

Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120 ([Pa.] 1983). [PCPP’s]

requested charge is essentially an in depth comparative 

negligence charge derived from case law. This court deemed it 

more appropriate to use Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury 

Instruction § 13.180 (Civ) Plaintiff’s Comparative Negligence. The 

court read the following instruction to the jury at trial:

As a defense, [PCPP] claim[s] that [Appellant’s] own 

negligence was a factual cause of her injury. [PCPP] ha[s]

the burden to prove both of the following: that [Appellant]

was negligent; and that [Appellant’s] negligence was a 

factual cause of her injury. If you find [Appellant’s]

percentage of negligence is greater than fifty percent, 

[Appellant] cannot recover her damages.
J-A05036-23

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Transcript Vol. III pp. 265-66. This instruction explained the 

relevant law to the jury in an adequate manner....

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 17-18. 

Viewing the charge in its entirety, against the background of the

evidence presented, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial

court. See id.; see also Krepps, 112 A.3d at 1256. This issue does not

warrant relief.

(3) PCPP is entitled to judgment in its favor or a new trial as the 

jury’s finding that Appellant’s comparative negligence was not a 

factual cause of harm was against the weight of the evidence, 

and is contrary to law, as Appellant admitted she knew of the 

wires for at least 2 years before the incident.

PCPP challenges the jury’s finding that Appellant’s comparative 

negligence was not a factual cause of her harm. PCPP’s Brief at 57. PCPP 

cites Appellant’s testimony that the condition of the wires had existed “[a]s 

long as I worked out there,” which “was a [c]ouple of years.” Id. (citation 

omitted). PCPP further points to Appellant’s admission that she was looking 

forward, and not at the ground, when she tripped. Id. PCPP additionally cites

evidence that Appellant failed to notify anyone about the wires. Id. at 58. 

PCPP argues:

Under Pennsylvania law, [Appellant] had a duty to look where she 

was going and a duty to avoid a condition that was open and 

obvious, but failed to do so by her own testimony.

Id. PCPP further emphasizes Dr. Kiddy’s opinion that a reasonable person 

would identify loose wires on the floor as a potentially hazardous condition. 

Id. at 59. PCPP contends:
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[A] jury is entitled to reject any and all evidence up until the point 

at which the verdict is so disproportionate to the uncontested 

evidence as to defy common sense and logic....

Id.

Again, the trial court explained its rejection of PCPP’s claim:

The jury’s finding that [Appellant] was not comparatively 

negligent is not against the weight of the evidence. ... The issue 

of comparative negligence was an issue for the jury to decide as 

the finder of fact. Based on the consideration of the evidence 

produced during trial, the jury found [Appellant] was not 

comparatively negligent. Such a finding does not shock one’s 

sense of justice, and the court will not disturb the jury’s findings 

of fact....

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 18. Mindful of our standard of review, we 

discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in rejecting this issue 

challenging the jury’s verdict. See Womack, 877 A.2d at 1283. 

(4) Whether the trial court erred by granting Appellant’s motion for 

delay damages, which should have been denied or significantly 

reduced based on delay beyond PCPP’s control.

PCPP argues the trial court should have denied or reduced the award of 

delay damages. PCPP’s Brief at 60. PCPP claims “the mere length of time 

between the starting date and the verdict is not the sole criterion” for 

calculating delay damages. Id. at 61. PCPP points out the continuance 

requested by Appellant because of the COVID epidemic, and the Supreme 

Court’s declaration of a judicial emergency. Id. at 63-64. 

Pa.R.C.P. 238 provides, in relevant part:

(1) At the request of the plaintiff in a civil action seeking monetary

relief for bodily injury, ... damages for delay shall be added to the

amount of compensatory damages awarded against each
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defendant or additional defendant found to be liable to the plaintiff

in the verdict of a jury ....

(2) Damages for delay shall be awarded for the period of time

from a date one year after the date original process was first

served in the action up to the date of the award, verdict or

decision.

Pa.R.C.P. 238(a)(1)-(2). 

This Court addressed the impact of the COVID judicial emergency on 

delay damages in Getting v. Mark Sales & Leasing, Inc., 274 A.3d 1251

(Pa. Super. 2022):

This issue requires us to interpret and apply the Supreme Court’s

Order and [Pa.R.C.P.] 238. Thus, it presents us with a pure

question of law. ”As with all questions of law, the appellate

standard of review is de novo, and the appellate scope of review

is plenary.” In re Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 218 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Sitting en banc, this Court explained the drafters of Rule 238

“specified two, and only two, periods of time to be excluded from

the calculation of delay damages ....” King v. SEPTA, 383 Pa.

Super. 420, 557 A.2d 11, 12-13 (Pa. Super. 1989) (en banc). 

Those two excluded periods are “(1) any periods of time after

which the defendant has made a written offer of settlement, the

offer is continued in effect for at least ninety days or until the

commencement of trial, whichever first occurs, the offer is

rejected by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff does not recover more

than 125 percent of the offer; and (2) any periods of time during

which the plaintiff caused delay of the trial.” Id. (quoting Miller

v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 381 Pa. Super. 236, 553 A.2d 443,

446 (Pa. Super. 1989)). Thus, we concluded that Rule 238 has

“not allowed for the exclusion of periods of delay not caused by

either party.” Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).

....

COVID-19 and the judicial emergency it created did not diminish 

the rights of plaintiffs to be made whole, nor did they prohibit 

defendants from engaging in settlement negotiations or making 

reasonable offers to help alleviate court dockets. ... [S]imply 
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because the flow of cases had temporary stopped, it does not 

follow that all legal practice had also ceased. [The defendant] was 

free at all times during the judicial emergency to increase its offer 

to induce the [plaintiffs] to settle and thereby to avoid delay 

damages.

... We do not read the March 18, 2020 Order of the Supreme

Court as permitting tortfeasors to reap unjust windfalls from a

five[-]month delay that was clearly beyond the control of their

victims. ... [T]he [defendant] must compensate the [plaintiffs] for 

using their money during the judicial emergency to the fullest 

extent of Pa.R.C.P. 238.

Getting, 274 A.3d at 1261-62 (emphasis omitted). Consequently, we are

unpersuaded by PCPP’s claim that the trial court erred in granting delay

damages encompassing the COVID judicial emergency. See id.

To the extent PCPP challenges the award of delay damages during

discovery delays, we reference the comment to Rule 238:

With respect to delay of the trial, not every procedural delay is 

relevant to the issue of delay damages, but only such 

occurrences as actually cause delay of the trial. For 

example, failure by the plaintiff to answer interrogatories within 

thirty days should not affect the award of damages for delay 

unless the trial was delayed as a result. Otherwise, the 

introduction of the fault concept and its attendant hearing would 

create a large new field of court hearings revolving around 

evidence of dilatory compliance with discovery procedures, the 

evidence of which would consist almost entirely of the attorneys 

testifying against each other and could be years old before the 

hearing. It is felt that present Rule 4019 provides a vehicle, 

although little used at present, which can timely dispose of delay 

due to discovery noncompliance regardless of whether or not it 

delays the trial. The note under proposed Rule 238(b)(2) is a 

reminder of this alternative remedy to halt delay damages and to 

expedite preparation of the case for trial.

Pa.R.C.P. 238, comment (emphasis added). Our review discloses no error by 

the trial court in declining to exclude discovery delays in calculating delay 
J-A05036-23

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damages. See id. PCPP’s challenge to the award of delay damages warrants 

no relief. 

(5) Whether the trial court erred in denying PCPP’s motion for 

remittitur.

Finally, PCPP argues the trial court erred in denying a remittitur. PCPP’s 

Brief at 65. PCPP argues the jury’s award of $160,000 is against the weight 

of the evidence “regarding [Appellant’s] contributory negligence.” Id. Again, 

PCPP challenges the jury’s failure to find Appellant negligent. Id.

Our review discloses PCPP failed to preserve this issue in its Pa.R.C.P. 

227.1 post-trial motion. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/22, at 2. Accordingly, 

it is waived. See id.; see also Chaulkey v. Roush, 805 A.2d 491, 494 (Pa. 

2002) (recognizing the purpose of Rule 227.1 “is to provide the trial court with 

an opportunity to correct errors in its ruling and avert the need for appellate 

review.”).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand 

for molding of the verdict consistent with this memorandum. 

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded with 

instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/30/2023