* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 2, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-30847

Summary Calendar

WANDA SANDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

AT&T; METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(2:05-CV-2633)

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Wanda Sanders appeals the summary judgment awarded

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) on her terminationof-benefits claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (She does not appeal the summary

judgment awarded AT&T.)

As an active employee at AT&T, Sanders took medical leave, for

a mental disability, under its short-term-disability benefits plan.

AT&T was the plan administrator; MetLife, the claims administrator.
2

A medical evaluation of Sanders’ case, performed on behalf of

MetLife toward the end of the 52 week period of short-term

benefits, concluded that Sanders was not capable of returning to

work. Based on MetLife’s finding her disabled under the plan,

Sanders was no longer considered an active employee of AT&T upon

expiration of the 52 week period. 

Sanders filed a claim for long-term-disability benefits, which

was granted. Several months later, however, MetLife terminated

those benefits after determining Sanders did not qualify for them.

Sanders unsuccessfully administratively appealed the termination.

In May 2005, Sanders filed this action for, inter alia,

damages against AT&T and MetLife, pursuant to ERISA, claiming,

inter alia, the administrator had abused its discretion in

terminating her benefits. The district court awarded summary

judgment to AT&T and MetLife.

A summary judgment is reviewed de novo, viewing the record in

the light most favorable to the non-movant and applying the same

standards as did the district court. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); e.g.,

Bolton v. City of Dallas, 472 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2006). Such

judgment is proper if the pleadings and discovery on file show

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c);

e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
3

“When[, as here,] ... the language of the plan grants

discretion to an administrator to interpret the plan and determine

eligibility for benefits, a court will reverse an administrator’s

decision only for abuse of discretion.” High v. E-Systems Inc.,

459 F.3d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 2006). “The law requires only that

substantial evidence support a plan fiduciary’s decisions,

including those to deny or to terminate benefits, not that

substantial evidence (or, for that matter, even a preponderance)

exists to support the employee’s claim of disability.” Ellis v.

Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 394 F.3d 262, 273 (5th Cir.

2004). 

Sanders claims MetLife, as claims administrator, conducted

only a limited review of her record, and “cherry picked” it to

justify the termination of benefits. Essentially for the reasons

stated by the district court in its well-reasoned and thorough

opinion, MetLife did not abuse its discretion in terminating

Sanders’ long-term benefits. A plan administrator’s

reconsideration of its prior decision is sufficient to meet ERISA’s

“full and fair review” requirement. Sweatman v. Commercial Union

Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1994). MetLife met this

requirement by reviewing Sanders’ medical files, obtaining

independent medical review, reviewing the claim following appeal,

and obtaining review by physician consultants in addition to the

one who initially reviewed the claim. 
4

Any remaining claims were not raised in district court.

Accordingly, we decline to review them. E.g., Terrell Equip. Co.

Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 343 F.3d 478, 482 n.11 (5th

Cir. 2003).

AFFIRMED