Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed January 26, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-1716

Lower Tribunal No. 17-15351

________________

T.R.-B.,

Appellant,

vs.

Department of Children and Families, et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Vivianne del 

Rio, Judge.

Jay & Campbell, PLLC, and Katie Jay (Stuart), for appellant.

Karla Perkins, for appellee Department of Children and Families; Sara 

Elizabeth Goldfarb and Laura J. Lee (Tallahassee), for appellee Guardian 

ad Litem.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and HENDON, and BOKOR, JJ. 

FERNANDEZ, C.J.
2

Appellant/petitioner below T.R-B. (“the petitioner”) appeals the trial 

court’s final order denying her amended motion to intervene as an interested 

party in her minor grandson’s underlying dependency proceeding. Because 

the trial court erred in denying the petitioner’s motion, we reverse the order 

on appeal and remand to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

The petitioner is the maternal grandmother and custodian of D.W., the 

minor child in the underlying dependency case. On May 26, 2017, Florida’s 

Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) sheltered D.W. Immediately, 

the petitioner sought custody of D.W. DCF initially objected to the trial court 

placing D.W. with the petitioner due to the thirty-year-old criminal conviction 

of petitioner’s husband, D.W.’s step-grandfather. Almost thirty years ago, the 

step-grandfather was convicted of grand theft and cocaine 

distribution/possession and served ten years in jail.

On October 22, 2018, D.W.’s mother’s parental rights were terminated, 

and D.W has no legal father. Thereafter, the petitioner obtained a home 

study. The home study was positive and indicated that the step-grandfather 

had lived the past twenty years as an “upstanding citizen.” The home study 

showed that the step-grandfather had a stable and respectable job for the 

last twenty years and was able to financially care for his children with his 
3

wife, the petitioner; he was a role model to his children and society; and D.W. 

was very safe with him and was very well cared for and loved by the stepgrandfather. Thus, the home study found that the step-grandfather’s criminal 

history should not be a deterrent for the adoption to proceed. The home 

study further indicated that D.W. is bonded to the petitioner, his stepgrandfather, and petitioner’s family, namely: the petitioner’s mother (D.W.’s 

great grandmother), the petitioner and her husband’s biological daughter 

who lives with them and is approximately D.W.’s age (D.W.’s aunt), and the 

petitioner and her husband’s biological son who lives with them and is fifteenyear-old (D.W.’s uncle). 

In August 2017, the trial court overruled DCF’s objection and awarded 

custody of D.W. to the petitioner and the petitioner’s mother, C.G., who lives 

with the petitioner and her family. The trial court found it was in D.W.’s best 

interest to be placed in the custody of his grandmother (the petitioner). DCF 

or GALP have never sought to remove D.W. from the petitioner’s home. 

The petitioner then applied to adopt D.W. On August 27, 2020, DCF’s 

Adoption Applicant Review Committee (“AARC”) denied the petitioner’s 

application, mainly due to the petitioner’s husband’s criminal record. The 

AARC also cited an alleged lack of a bond between the petitioner and D.W. 

as another reason for denying the petitioner’s application. Instead, the AARC 
4

approved the application submitted by D.M., a non-relative caregiver of 

D.W.’s infant biological sibling, A.W. D.W. has never resided with D.M.1

The petitioner claims that although DCF was aware that the petitioner 

wanted to adopt D.W., DCF failed to provide her with notice of hearings and 

meetings and/or ask for her input, as is required by section 39.4087, Florida 

Statute (2021). Accordingly, on September 21, 2020, the petitioner filed a 

formal complaint with the Family Resource Center listing the statutory 

violations. 

On December 28, 2020, the petitioner filed her petition in the family 

court division to adopt D.W. In her adoption petition, the petitioner requested 

that, pursuant to section 63.062(7), Florida Statute (2021), the trial court find 

that DCF was unreasonably withholding its consent to her adoption of D.W. 

On January 11, 2021, DCF asked the court for unsupervised weekly 

visitation between D.W. and A.W. to be supervised by D.M., the approved 

adoptive applicant, which the trial court granted on January 12, 2021.2

 The 

petitioner alleges neither she nor her counsel were notified. On January 20, 

2021, the petitioner filed her Amended Petition for Adoption by Relative. On 

1 The petitioner filed an administrative appeal of the AARC’s decision, which 

has been stayed since the time the petitioner filed the adoption petition.

2 DCF later agreed to stay the visitation order until the petitioner’s motion to 

intervene could be heard by the court.
5

January 29, 2021, the petitioner filed her “Motion to Intervene as an 

Interested Party and to Stay 01/12/2021 Visitation Order.”

On February 17, 2021, after the petitioner moved to have the family 

adoption case transferred to the juvenile division, the trial court in the family 

division transferred the adoption case to the Unified Children’s Court Division 

and ordered that a “juvenile adoption case” be created and assigned through 

the Office of the Clerk of the Courts, Juvenile Division. 

In March 2021, the petitioner moved to waive DCF’s consent to 

adoption. In preparation for the hearing before the trial court on this motion, 

in April 2021, the petitioner gave notice in the adoption proceeding to the 

GALP for the virtual depositions of the certified guardian ad litem and the 

GALP assistant circuit director. On April 29, 2021, the GALP filed an 

emergency motion to quash notice of taking deposition and motion for 

protective order and requested an emergency hearing. The GALP filed this 

motion in the dependency case, in which the GALP was a party but in which 

the petitioner was not. The GALP argued that the petitioner intended to 

depose the GALP’s employees in the adoption matter to which the GALP 

was not a party but to which the trial court retained exclusive jurisdiction. In 

addition, it argued only parties may take depositions, and the petitioner was 

not a party to the dependency action, only a participant.
6

On May 3, 2021, the petitioner filed her “Emergency Motion to Stay 

Hearing.” The trial court denied the stay. The next day, the trial court held 

the hearing on the GALP’s motion to quash the petitioner’s notice of 

deposition. The trial court acknowledged that on June 8, 2021, it would 

address the issue of whether DCF unreasonably withheld consent for the 

petitioner to adopt D.W., decided to give both parties more time to research 

the deposition issue, and thus rescheduled the hearing to May 18, 2021. 

Over the petitioner’s objection, the trial court directed her to file her response 

in the dependency action to the GALP motion to quash. 

Thereafter, at the May 18, 2021 hearing, the trial court found that 

adoption proceedings initiated under Chapter 39 are exempt from the 

jurisdiction of section 63.087, as that section dealt with the termination of 

parental rights pending adoption, which was not the case here. The court 

found that section 39.812(5) applied. The court stated it was aware a hearing 

was set for June 8, 2021 on the petitioner’s motion as to whether DCF 

unreasonably withheld its consent to the petitioner adopting D.W. The 

petitioner’s attorney corrected the trial court because the June 8 hearing 

was, instead, set as a hearing on the petitioner’s motion to intervene in the 

dependency proceeding. 
7

The GALP reiterated that it requested the protective order because the 

petitioner was not a party to the dependency proceeding. The trial court

asked DCF why it would grant the protective order if the petitioner’s motion 

on DCF unreasonably withholding its consent was going to be heard on June 

8, and the information the petitioner needed to prove her case would be 

obtained by taking the GALP’s deposition. The trial court noted that the 

deposition would assist the petitioner in her presentation of evidence to show 

that DCF unreasonably withheld its consent. DCF replied to the court that 

the petitioner was not a party to the dependency case and thus could not 

depose a party because she was merely a participant. In response, the 

petitioner’s attorney contended that although the petition for adoption was 

filed in the family court, it was transferred to the dependency court in 

February 2021. Thus, the petition was correctly in the juvenile division and 

correctly before this trial court. 

At the end of the hearing, the court found that the petitioner at that 

point in time was not a party. The court found that the petitioner could 

become a party on June 8 if the court found at that hearing that DCF 

unreasonably withheld its consent to adoption. Thus, the court granted the 

GALP’s motion for protective order because the petitioner was not a party 

who could conduct discovery. The court stated it was relying on section 
8

39.812(5) because DCF’s consent was required once a TPR was entered. 

In addition, the trial court ruled that D.W. and his sibling, A.W., would have 

weekly visitation. That same day, the petitioner voluntarily dismissed her 

adoption petition because the trial court had ruled that the juvenile rules 

applied to adoption proceedings arising from dependency proceedings.

Thus, the petitioner had no way to amend her petition because the juvenile 

rules did not provide for amendments. 

Thereafter, the petitioner filed her “Verified Petition for Adoption of 

Minor Child” on June 1, 2021, adding DCF and the GALP as parties. In the 

petition, the petitioner asked the court to find that DCF had abused its 

discretion by withholding its consent to the adoption of D.W. On June 3, 

2021, the petitioner filed her amended motion to intervene as an interested 

party and to stay the January 12, 2021 visitation order. 

On June 4, 2021, the GALP filed its “Motion to Review the 

Appropriateness of the Department’s Adoptive Selection and Memorandum 

of Law in Support of the Maternal Grandmother’s Motion to Waive the 

Department’s Consent.” The GALP now supported the petitioner’s adoption 

and stated it was in D.W.’s best interest that the petitioner adopt D.W. The 

GALP also stated it was in the best interest of the child that the court waive 

DCF’s consent, as it was being unreasonably withheld. It argued this was 
9

because the AARC denial was largely based on the petitioner’s husband’s 

criminal history. The GALP contended that although his criminal history 

might have been a statutory disqualifier under section 39.0138(3), according 

to section 39.0138(8)(b), placement could be appropriate if the person 

showed they had been rehabilitated. The GALP contended that the stepgrandfather’s offense was almost thirty years old, and since then, he served 

his time, met conditions of probation, started a family, maintained 

employment, and served as a positive role model in the lives of his children 

and was an upstanding member of society. In addition, the GALP asserted 

that D.W. had been in the petitioner and her husband’s home for the past 

three years, and nobody from DCF had expressed to the court or any person 

that the step-grandfather posed any danger to D.W., based on the stepgrandfather’s criminal history. The GALP argued that DCF had not moved to 

modify the child’s placement and instead waited while D.W. remained with 

the petitioner, and the bond with cousins and caregivers was strengthened. 

The GALP argued that DCF’s withhold of consent penalized the family and 

D.W., whose best interest would not be served if he was not adopted by his 

grandmother, the only family he had known.

On June 8, 2021, the trial court heard the petitioner’s amended motion 

to intervene. The petitioner argued that she had the ability to seek 
10

intervention for status in the dependency case. The petitioner argued that 

pursuant to I.B. v Department of Children and Families, 876 So. 2d 581, 584 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2004), and Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So. 2d 28, 33 (Fla. 2004), 

the legal test to seek party status is whether the interested person has an 

interest in the underlying subject matter of the case and whether that 

interested person is going to lose or gain, here, because of the ruling in the 

underlying dependency case. The petitioner stated that she met the I.B. test 

because I.B. made it clear that when there is a corresponding adoption 

petition that has been filed, the dependency court can allow an interested 

person to intervene. In addition, the petitioner argued that she had a 

fundamental liberty interest in maintaining her family, thus she should be 

permitted to intervene. 

The court denied the motion, finding that the petitioner was a 

participant but did not grant the petitioner party status in the dependency 

case. The court later entered its order on July 21, 2021 denying the 

petitioner’s amended motion to intervene. In addition, the court did not hold 

a hearing on the petitioner’s motion on whether DCF’s consent was 

unreasonably withheld because the petitioner withdrew the motion. The 

petitioner has now appealed the denial of her motion to intervene.
11

The petitioner contends, in part, that the trial court erred in concluding 

she may not intervene in D.W.’s dependency proceeding.3 We agree with 

the petitioner.

An appellate court reviews an order on a motion to intervene under an 

abuse of discretion standard. Merrick Park, LLC v. Garcia, 299 So. 3d 1096, 

1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). In Florida, adoptions after a termination of parental 

rights proceed under Chapter 63, Florida’s adoption statute, and section 

39.812, Florida Statutes (2021), relating to adoptions after parental rights 

have been terminated. Section 63.037, Florida Statutes (2021), exempts 

these adoptions after the parental rights of each parent have been 

terminated from certain provisions in chapter 63, but not all. In addition, 

section 39.812 gives the dependency court continuing jurisdiction over the 

minor child until the child is adopted. § 39.812(4), Fla. Stat. (2021). “The 

petition for adoption must be filed in the division of the circuit court which 

3 The petitioner’s remaining points on appeal are meritless. First, with respect 

to the petitioner’s point referencing the May 18, 2021 trial court order that 

granted the GALP’s motion for protective order, DCF and GALP are correct 

that this order is not within the scope of this Court’s review, as this Court’s 

review is limited to the order on appeal, which is the trial court’s final order 

denying petitioner’s amended motion to intervene. Second, the petitioner 

contends that the trial court erred in consolidating the adoption case with the 

dependency case. However, there is no order in the record consolidating the 

adoption proceeding with the dependency proceeding. The adoption 

proceeding was correctly transferred to the dependency court, as the 

petitioner requested, thus there is no merit to this point on appeal.
12

entered the judgment terminating parental rights, . . . .” § 39.812(5), Fla. Stat. 

(2021). A copy of the supporting home study and a “copy of the consent 

executed by the department must be attached to the petition, unless waived 

pursuant to section 63.062(7).” See also § 39.812(5). The court shall waive 

DCF’s consent “upon a determination by the court that such consent is being 

unreasonably withheld and if the petitioner has filed with the court a favorable 

preliminary adoptive home study.” § 63.062(7), Fla. Stat. (2021).

Rule 8.535(d) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, although not 

giving much guidance to the court on how to conduct a withhold of consent 

hearing, provides the following:

(d) Withholding Consent to Adopt.

(1) When a petition for adoption and a favorable home study 

under section 39.812(5), Florida Statutes, have been filed and 

the department's consent has not been filed, the court shall 

conduct a hearing to determine if the department has 

unreasonably withheld consent.

(2) In reviewing whether the department unreasonably withheld 

its consent to adopt, the court shall determine whether the 

department abused its discretion by withholding consent to the 

adoption by the petitioner. In making this determination, the court 

shall consider all relevant information, including information 

obtained or otherwise used by the department in selecting the 

adoptive family, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 

65C.

(3) If the court determines that the department unreasonably 

withheld consent to adopt, and the petitioner has filed with the 

court a favorable home study as required by law, the court shall 
13

incorporate its findings into a written order with specific findings 

of fact as to how the department abused its discretion in 

withholding its consent to adopt, and the consent of the 

department shall be waived.

Under Rule 8.535(d), the petitioner in the case before this Court was required 

to file a petition for adoption and a favorable home study to obtain a hearing 

on DCF’s withhold of her consent to adopt D.W. She complied with these 

requirements. Although she filed the petition for adoption in the circuit court 

family division, on February 17, 2021, the petitioner’s adoption case was 

transferred to the juvenile division where the dependency action was being

heard and was assigned to the same judge hearing the dependency action. 

Thus, all statutory requirements were met for the petitioner to have the 

consent issue addressed by the trial court.

The petitioner contends that to prepare for the hearing before the trial 

court on the petitioner’s motion to determine if DCF unreasonably withheld 

its consent to her adopting D.W., the petitioner wanted to depose two GALP 

employees. The GALP moved for a protective order contending that the 

petitioner was not a party to the dependency proceeding. The trial court 

agreed and granted the GALP’s motion. The petitioner then filed her motion 

to intervene in the dependency proceeding to be able to depose the GALP 

employees, but the trial court denied this motion. 
14

DCF and GALP argue that the trial court had no legal authority to grant 

the petitioner’s motion to intervene, thus it did not err in denying the motion. 

However, as the petitioner contends, Florida law indicates otherwise. 

First, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide that a party “shall 

include the petitioner, the child, the parent(s) of the child, the department, 

and the guardian ad litem . . . when the program has been appointed.” Fla. 

R. Juv. P. 8.210(a); see also § 39.01(58), Fla. Stat. (2021). Participants are 

defined as “any person who is not a party but who should receive notice of 

hearings involving the child.” Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(b); see also § 39.01(57), 

Fla. Stat. (2021) (participants in a shelter proceeding, dependency 

proceeding, or termination of parental rights proceeding include foster 

parents, the child’s legal custodian, identified prospective parents, actual 

custodians of the child, “and any other person whose participation may be in 

the best interest of the child.”).

Further, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 provides that “[a]nyone 

claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to 

assert a right by intervention, . . . .” In general, the intervention rule should 

be liberally construed. Grimes v. Walton Ct., 591 So. 2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla. 

1st DCA 1992). Intervention is a matter of the trial court’s discretion. De 

Sousa v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., 170 So. 3d 928, 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
15

The petitioner contends that pursuant to I.B. v Department of Children 

and Families, 876 So. 2d 581, 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) and Sullivan v. Sapp, 

866 So. 2d 28, 33 (Fla. 2004), the legal test in order to seek party status is 

that it “ ‘must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate 

character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal 

operation and effect of the judgment.’ ” I.B., 876 So. 2d at 584 (quoting 

Sullivan, 866 So. 2d at 33). The petitioner here meets that test.

In I.B., DCF sought to declare the minor child dependent after he and 

his mother tested positive for cocaine. Id. at 582. The child was placed with 

the appellants/foster parents, who were planning to adopt the child. DCF also 

contacted the mother’s cousin who lived in Tennessee and was also 

interested in adopting the child. Id. DCF requested that Tennessee conduct 

a home study on the mother’s cousin. Id. The guardian submitted a positive 

report on the foster parents. Id. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order 

terminating parental rights to the child and ordered DCF to proceed with the 

goal of adoption. Id.

DCF then moved to change placement from the foster parents to the 

Tennessee relatives. Id. at 583. A few days later, the foster parents filed their 

petition to adopt the child. The foster parents did not have DCF’s consent for 

this adoption. Id. After a hearing, the trial court denied DCF’s motion for a 
16

change of placement, noting the child had had only one contact with the 

Tennessee relatives. The trial court ordered DCF to provide visitation for the 

relatives and the child. Id. Afterwards, DCF filed its case plan update and 

noted that the adoption applications from both the foster parents and the 

relatives had been submitted to its adoption review committee and a decision 

was pending. DCF’s adoption review committee then selected the 

Tennessee relatives as the adoptive parents. Id.

The foster parents moved to intervene in the dependency action. Id. 

At the hearing on the foster parents’ motion, the trial court denied the 

intervention. Id. The trial court ruled that the decision to select the suitable 

adoptive parents was one for DCF, not for the trial court, and that the foster 

parents lacked standing to challenge DCF’s decision. Id. at 584. The trial 

court did not take any evidence at this hearing, did not hear from the foster 

parents or the guardian, and did not consider the child's best interests in 

removing him from his home with the foster parents where he had lived for 

sixteen months. Id. at 583-84. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal 

reversed. The Court stated:

As a threshold matter, we conclude the foster parents clearly 

have standing to intervene in these proceedings.FN1. The nature 

of the interest that entitles a party to intervene “must be in the 

matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character 

that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal 
17

operation and effect of the judgment.” Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So. 

2d 28, 33 (Fla.2004).

Here “the matter in litigation” was the placement for adoption of 

the foster parents' child, the child they wanted to adopt and had 

cared for the past sixteen months. The foster parents would 

directly gain or lose by the court's rulings. Thus, the foster 

parents have sufficient interest to warrant intervention in the 

litigation. See In the Interest of Z.J.S., 787 So.2d 875 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2001); In the Interest of C.G., 612 So.2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1992).

Even if the foster parents were not properly intervenors in these 

proceedings, they were already “participants” under Florida Rule 

of Juvenile Procedure 8.210(b) since they were the child's foster 

parents. Under this rule, participants may be granted leave by 

the court to be heard without the necessity of filing a motion to 

intervene. See N.S. v. Department of Children and Families, 857 

So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

Id. at 584-85 (footnote 1 cited to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230). 

Thus, I.B. makes it clear that under the facts of petitioner’s case, when there 

is a corresponding adoption petition that has been filed, the dependency 

court can allow the adoption petitioner to intervene because she has a clear 

interest in the underlying subject matter of the dependency case. 

Further, the petitioner also has a “sufficient interest to warrant 

intervention in the litigation.” I.B., 876 So. 2d at 584. The petitioner is the 

maternal grandmother of D.W., has had custody of D.W. for four years, thus 

he has lived with them over half of his life. In addition, there is an ongoing 

adoption petition, and the parental rights of the minor child have been 
18

terminated, just as in I.B. The “matter in litigation” in the case before us is 

the placement for adoption of D.W., who is the child the petitioner wants to 

adopt and has cared for the past four years. The petitioner will directly gain 

or lose by the trial court’s denial of her motion to intervene. Thus, the trial 

court in the dependency proceeding had jurisdiction to grant the motion to 

intervene so the petitioner could present her case on DCF’s unreasonable 

withhold of consent and participate in a meaningful way. See also Berenyi v. 

Department of Children and Families, 257 So. 3d 1182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)

(noncustodial grandparents who filed petition to adopt their minor grandson 

were granted intervenor status in dependency action, as well as in the foster 

parents’ adoption action, after grandparents filed motion to intervene in the 

dependency case; this Court found that “the Grandparents were ‘legally

interested parties’ entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding 

the [foster parents’] petition to adopt the Child.”; this Court further found that 

the grandparents had “established their interest in adopting the Child, 

including their submission of a home study attached to their own verified 

petition to adopt the Child.”); B.B. v. Department of Children and Families, 

854 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (paternal grandmother of minor twins 

granted custody of the twins and the minor children lived with the 

grandmother for three months; the parental rights of the twins’ parents were 
19

terminated, and court ordered that a cousin of the twins be considered as

suitable to adopt the twins, and if she could not, then DCF was to give the 

grandmother the chance to adopt the minor children; thereafter, the cousin 

was unable to adopt the twins. DCF did not take action to allow the 

grandmother to obtain custody of the twins, so appellant filed a motion to 

intervene in the dependency proceeding, which was denied as premature by 

the trial court. The grandmother then filed an adoption petition, which was 

also denied by the trial court, stating it lacked jurisdiction, DCF had identified 

another adoptive home for the twins; and DCF had not consented to 

appellant’s adoption of the twins. The appellate court held that “[t]he 

dependency court never loses jurisdiction after a TPR trial, and continues to 

retain exclusive jurisdiction throughout the adoption process...”; the court 

further stated that a circuit court has “ ‘inherent and continuing jurisdiction to 

entertain matters pertaining to child custody and to enter any order 

appropriate to a child's welfare.’ ” Thus, the court held that at the hearings 

on both the motion to intervene and petition for adoption, the trial court had 

jurisdiction to allow appellant to “participate in a meaningful way in 

proceedings involving the ultimate placement of her grandchildren.” The 

appellate court reversed and remanded the case, instructing the court that 

the grandmother be allowed to adopt if certain safety conditions were met.); 
20

Hausmann ex rel. Doe v. L.M., 806 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) 

(grandparents would be allowed to intervene in adoption proceedings of their 

daughter's minor child, where the grandparents filed their own adoption 

petition before that of the prospective adoptive parents, the grandparents 

had custody of the child for a period of time (less than six months), and the 

grandparents challenged whether consents given by the child's parents were 

invalid because of abandonment).

In opposition, DCF cites to J.L. v. G.M., 687 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1997). In J.L., the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt and uncle were 

not allowed to intervene in the dependency proceeding. Id. at 977. The case 

does not provide facts on whether the maternal grandmother and maternal 

aunt and uncle had filed a petition for adoption. The appellate court found 

that granting party status to those relatives was “contrary to Florida's strong 

public policy against unwarranted interference with the parenting decisions 

of an intact family unit.” Id. at 978. Thus, it appears the child in that case was 

not living with the relatives who had moved to intervene, the relatives were 

not the custodians of the minor child, and the minor child’s parents’ parental 

rights had not yet been terminated. Id. These are critical facts distinguishable 

from facts in the case now before this Court.
21

DCF also cites In Interest of J.S., 404 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), 

for the proposition that Chapter 39 does not provide the authority to allow a 

grandparent to enter an ongoing dependency action solely in their capacity 

as a grandparent. Id. at 1146. In that case, the grandparent was not the 

custodian of the minor child. In addition, the child’s mother in that case still 

had her parental rights; there had been no TPR. Id. Thus, we find In Interest 

of J.S. to be inapplicable here. 

It is true that the initial placement of D.W. with the petitioner was initially 

over the objection of DCF and GALP. However, for four years, DCF did 

nothing and left D.W. in the petitioner’s home with the step-grandfather. 

Thus, the bonds between D.W. and his grandparents grew stronger over the 

four years, over half D.W.’s life, as the petitioner points out. The GALP 

currently supports the petitioner adopting D.W. and agrees with her that 

DCF’s consent was unreasonable withheld. 

The petitioner contends the child’s best interest is of foremost concern 

in adoption proceedings. She further argues the trial court’s best interest 

determination will be hindered if she is not meaningfully heard on the matter. 

The petitioner’s point is well-taken as she will not have the ability to 

adequately advocate her position on whether DCF unreasonably withheld its 

consent if she is not a party in the dependency proceeding and cannot 
22

conduct discovery to gather information to support her case. Being a 

participant alone does not give her that ability. There is a need here for 

intervention because the petitioner argues the AARC lacks transparency and 

due process.

In construing sections 39.812(5) and 63.082(7), courts must avoid 

construing a statute in a manner that would achieve an unreasonable result. 

See In Interest of J.A., 561 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (construing 

Chapter 39 to “ ‘avoid any construction that would produce an unreasonable

... consequence.’ ”); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (“[A] literal 

interpretation of the language of a statute need not be given when to do so 

would lead to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion.”). Here, to accept 

DCF and the GALP’s argument on appeal would lead to an unreasonable 

result because it would mean that the petitioner is not able to present 

evidence to the trial court to support her motion that the court find that DCF 

unreasonably withheld its request for her to adopt D.W. Without the ability to 

depose GALP employees, the petitioner would not have the evidence she 

needs to support her arguments. 

As D.W.’s custodial caregiver for over the last four years, as the child’s 

maternal grandmother, and as the petitioner in the adoption petition, the 

petitioner has shown that she has a direct and immediate interest and will 
23

either gain or lose by the dependency court orders. Thus, the trial court 

abused its discretion in not granting the petitioner’s amended motion to 

intervene. We reverse the order denying the petitioner’s amended motion to 

intervene and remand to the trial court with instructions to grant the 

petitioner’s motion to intervene, giving the petitioner party status in the 

dependency proceeding for the purposes previously articulated herein.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.