United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1797

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Craig R. Green

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: December 8, 2014

 Filed: January 23, 2015

[Unpublished] 

____________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

The district court revoked Craig Green’s term of supervised release and

1

sentenced himto thirty-three months’ imprisonment after finding that he had violated

The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Missouri.
the conditions of his release by committing, among other violations, another crime. 

We affirm.

Green was on supervised release after a period of incarceration for armed bank

robbery. On February 27, 2014, Green’s probation officer petitioned to revoke his

supervised release, noting multiple violations of the conditions of release, including

that of committing another crime.

At the time of the revocation hearing, Green had been arrested for, but not

charged with, first-degree assault. Green conceded at the hearing that he had violated

various conditions of release, but he claimed that he had not committed another

crime. The government offered the testimony of seventeen-year-old A.J. and a

detective. A.J. testified that she and C.L. were walking after school when C.L. was

accosted by several individuals, including two of Green’s sons. According to A.J.,

when C.L. tried to flee, a silver car traveling at least twenty miles an hour hit him,

then drove off. A.J. ran, then heard a gunshot. She then returned to assist C.L., who

had been shot in the head. A.J. later identified Green in a photo lineup as the driver

of the car that had hit C.L. before the shooting. After the detective showed A.J. a

picture of a Buick that Green and his wife jointly owned, A.J. confirmed that it was

the vehicle that had hit C.L. The detective testified that the vehicle was “tannishsilver” or “tan.” Green’s wife testified that the car was “goldish-tan,” that she was

home for most of the day on which the incident took place, and thatshe never noticed

the car leaving the driveway. The district court found by a preponderance of the

evidence that Green had committed either first- or second-degree assault and

sentenced him to the lower end of the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(Guidelines) range of thirty-three to thirty-six months.

Green argues that the government did not establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that he had committed another crime. Green claims that the police used

suggestive methods to elicit A.J.’s identification of his vehicle as the one that hit

-2-
C.L., and he also cites inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony regarding the color

of the vehicle. 

We review the district court’s underlying factfinding for clear error. United

States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003). The court’s credibility

determinations are virtually unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Hernandez, 281

F.3d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 2002). The inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony

regarding the color of the vehicle involved in the incident were for the factfinder to

resolve. See Dodd v. Nix, 48 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 1995). The district court

found that A.J.’s testimony was credible, and it was entitled to credit her testimony

over that of Green’s wife. Moreover, that A.J. was shown a picture of only the Buick

and not, as Green styles them, “placebo photos” of other vehicles did not render

suspect her identification of the car that had hit C.L. See Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d

926, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that “line-ups” are not required for identification of

physical evidence such as vehicles). In sum, we conclude that the district court did

not commit clear error in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Green had

committed another crime.

Green also argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We

review the substantive reasonableness of a revocation sentence under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard, and we presume that a sentence within the advisory Guidelines

range is reasonable. United States v. Petreikis, 551 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2009). 

Green does not challenge the calculation of the Guidelines range, and in light of the

factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Green’s history and the seriousness

of the crime he was found to have committed, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in sentencing Green to thirty-three months’ incarceration.

The judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

-3-