PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 17-3422

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

VERNEL AUBREY WILLIAMS,

Appellant

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On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands

(D.C. No. 3-14-cr-00035-001)

District Judge: Hon. Curtis V. Gomez

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Argued: December 11, 2018

Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and RESTREPO, 

Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 5, 2019)

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Omodare B. Jupiter [ARGUED]

Office of Federal Public Defender

4094 Diamond Ruby, Suite 5

Christiansted, VI 00820

Kia D. Sears

Office of Federal Public Defender

1336 Beltjen Road

Suite 202, Tunick Building

St. Thomas, VI 00802

Counsel for Appellant
2

Everard E. Potter, I [ARGUED]

Gretchen C.F. Shappert

Office of United States Attorney

5500 Veterans Drive, Suite 260

United States Courthouse

St. Thomas, VI 00802

Counsel for Appellee 

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

Vernel Aubrey Williams appeals his judgment of 

conviction and the sentence imposed by the District Court,

contending that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974,

18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174, were violated. Williams argues that 

the District Court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the 

Indictment, in which he asserted that time had elapsed in 

excess of the seventy-day period during which the Speedy Trial 

Act requires the Government to commence a trial of a 

defendant, and Williams petitions the Court to dismiss the 

Indictment with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we hold 

that Williams’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act were 

violated, and we will reverse the order of the District Court 

denying Williams’s motions to dismiss the Indictment, vacate 

the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed, and remand 

to the District Court with the direction to dismiss the 

Indictment with prejudice.

I.

On January 28, 2014, the Government charged 

Williams, in a five-count Information, with (a) possessing a 

firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(2)(A) and 924(a)(4); (b) discharging a 

firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(3)(A) and 924(a)(4); (c) discharging a 

firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); (d) assault with a deadly 

weapon, in violation of V.I. Code tit. 14, § 295(2); and (e) 
3

possessing, transporting, and carrying a firearm during the 

commission of a crime of violence, in violation of V.I. Code 

tit. 14, § 2253(a). The charges contained in the Information 

arose from Williams’s conduct on December 24, 2013, when 

the Government alleges that Williams shot a store owner on St. 

Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, during an altercation that began 

inside the store owner’s place of business and ended outside of 

a nearby elementary and high school.

Nearly a month after the Government’s filing the 

Information, but before Williams had been arraigned, 

Williams’s counsel filed a motion for a hearing to determine 

Williams’s mental competency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

4241(a). Thereafter, the District Court granted Williams’s

motion, ordering Williams to undergo a psychological 

examination. Williams refused to participate in the courtordered psychological examination, however, and thus the 

District Court neither received a formal report nor held a 

hearing with respect to Williams’s competency. As a result, 

the Government filed its own motion for a hearing to determine 

Williams’s competency, which the District Court granted on 

June 11, 2014. The District Court ordered that Williams be 

transported to the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North 

Carolina (“FMC Butner”), to undergo a psychological 

examination.

The following day—June 12, 2014—a grand jury 

returned a five-count Indictment, charging Williams with (a) 

discharging a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(3)(A) and 924(a)(4); (b) 

possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(2)(A) and 924(a)(4); 

(c) possessing, on a separate occasion, a firearm within 1,000 

feet of a school zone, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(2)(A) 

and 924(a)(4); (d) assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of 

V.I. Code tit. 14, § 297(2); and (e) possessing, transporting, 

and carrying a firearm during the commission of a crime of 

violence, in violation of V.I. Code tit. 14, § 2253(a). Four of 

the counts arose from the same conduct that was the subject of 

the charges contained in the Information; the second count for 

possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone arose 

from Williams’s arrest on December 29, 2013. On June 18, 
4

2014, Williams was arraigned with respect to the charges 

contained in the Indictment.

Pursuant to the District Court’s order dated June 11, 

2014, Williams was transported to FMC Butner to undergo a 

psychological examination, but Williams did not arrive at FMC 

Butner until July 29, 2014. Following an examination of 

Williams, on October 31, 2014, a forensic psychologist 

submitted a formal report to the District Court with respect to 

Williams’s competency. On November 5, 2014, the District 

Court held a hearing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241, to 

determine Williams’s mental competency. The District Court 

determined that Williams lacked the mental competency to 

stand trial and, on November 6, 2014, entered an order 

committing Williams to the custody of the United States 

Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).

During the period of Williams’s incompetency, the 

Government filed a motion to involuntarily medicate Williams,

in an attempt to restore his competency. On October 9, 2015, 

the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on the 

Government’s motion. During a recess, a physician employed 

by FMC Butner—who previously recommended that Williams 

be involuntarily medicated—conducted an examination of 

Williams, after which the physician testified that Williams 

indeed was competent to stand trial. Following the testimony 

of the physician, the Government withdrew its motion, and the 

District Court indicated that it promptly would set a date for 

Williams’s trial.

The District Court did not set a trial date, however, and 

neither the Government nor Williams filed any pleadings in the 

case for nearly two months following the evidentiary hearing 

on October 9, 2015. On December 2, 2015, the Government 

ended the fifty-three-day lapse in activity by filing a motion in 

limine (the “Motion in Limine”) to “exclude evidence, 

argument, or questioning regarding [Williams’s] mental health 

or competency.” App. 87.

Rather than filing a brief in opposition to the 

Government’s Motion in Limine, on December 18, 2015, 

Williams filed a motion to dismiss the Indictment (the “First 

Motion to Dismiss”), asserting that his rights under the Speedy 
5

Trial Act had been violated. The Government filed a brief in 

opposition to Williams’s First Motion to Dismiss on December 

31, 2015, and the District Court held an evidentiary hearing 

with respect to Williams’s First Motion to Dismiss on February 

25, 2016. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the 

District Court ordered the Government and Williams to submit 

supplemental briefing on certain issues raised during the 

hearing, which the parties submitted on March 10, 2016. The 

District Court then ordered the Government to reply to the 

arguments raised by Williams in his supplemental brief. The 

Government, with the District Court’s permission, filed an outof-time reply on March 31, 2016.

Following the Government’s submission on March 31, 

2016, approximately three-and-a-half months elapsed, during 

which neither party filed pleadings and during which the 

District Court took no further action with respect to Williams’s 

First Motion to Dismiss. Then, on July 15, 2016, Williams 

filed a second motion to dismiss the Indictment (the “Second 

Motion to Dismiss” and, together with the First Motion to 

Dismiss, the “Motions to Dismiss”), reiterating and 

supplementing his arguments that his rights under the Speedy 

Trial Act had been violated. After nearly three months of 

inaction on the parts of the Government and the District Court 

with respect to his Second Motion to Dismiss, Williams filed a 

writ of mandamus in this Court to compel the District Court to 

rule on the still-pending Motions to Dismiss.

In response to Williams’s filing his writ of mandamus, 

and prior to this Court’s consideration of Williams’s writ of 

mandamus, the District Court took a number of actions. On 

October 24, 2016, the District Court set a trial date for the 

matter and ordered Williams to submit a reply brief with 

respect to the Government’s Motion in Limine, which had been 

pending since December 2, 2015. Two days later, on October 

26, 2016, the District Court, in an order that did not include 
6

written reasons,1 denied Williams’s Second Motion to Dismiss 

and denied Williams’s First Motion to Dismiss as moot.

Pursuant to a plea agreement with the Government, 

Williams subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of 

possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(3)(A) and 924(a)(4), but 

explicitly “reserve[d] the right to appeal [any potential] speedy 

trial violation.” App. 242. The District Court sentenced 

Williams to a term of “time served” and a one-year period of 

supervised release. This appeal followed.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over 

a district court’s interpretation and application of the 

provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, including those related to 

excludable time. United States v. Hamilton, 46 F.3d 271, 273

(3d Cir. 1995).

III.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. 

amend. VI. Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act to give 

effect to this constitutional guarantee “by setting specified time 

limits . . . within which criminal trials must be commenced.” 

United States v. Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 

1988). Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, “the trial of a 

defendant charged in an information or indictment with the 

commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days 

from the filing date (and making public) of the information or 

indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before 

a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, 

whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Thus, 

under the Speedy Trial Act, a seventy-day “clock” begins to 

 

1 The District Court’s three-page order quoted relevant 

statutory and constitutional provisions but provided no 

analytical support for its ruling other than a brief statement that 

“[t]he premises [had been] considered.”
7

run upon the latest of (x) the filing of an information, (y) the 

filing of an indictment, or (z) a defendant’s appearance, and the 

Government must commence a trial of the defendant prior to 

the expiration of the seventy-day clock.2

The Speedy Trial Act provides that certain periods of 

time are “excludable” for purposes of calculating the time 

within which the Government must commence a trial of a 

defendant. See id. § 3161(h). In other words, certain events or 

occurrences “stop” the seventy-day speedy trial clock. Most 

relevant to this appeal,3the Speedy Trial Act provides that the 

following periods of time are excludable:

 

2 The Speedy Trial Act also imposes a separate, thirty-day 

clock that begins to run upon the arrest of the defendant or the 

service of a summons, during which the Government must file 

an information or indictment charging the defendant with an 

offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). In his brief, Williams 

argued that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act also had been 

violated with respect to the thirty-day clock. Because we hold 

that Williams’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated 

with respect to the seventy-day clock, it is unnecessary to 

discuss the separate, thirty-day clock.

3 Williams argues that additional non-excludable time elapsed 

while the Government’s Motion in Limine was pending. 

Because we hold that non-excludable time elapsed in excess of 

the seventy-day period within which the Government must 

have commenced a trial of Williams—namely, during the 

period between October 9, 2015, and December 2, 2015, and 

during all but ten days of the period between the District 

Court’s order directing Williams to be transported to FMC 

Butner and his arrival there—we need not, and do not, reach 

the issues related to the Government’s Motion in Limine, 

including whether the Motion in Limine is a “pretrial motion” 

that stops the seventy-day clock pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(h)(1)(D) or whether the Motion in Limine was “under 

advisement” by the District Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(1)(H).
8

 “delay resulting from any 

proceeding, including any 

examinations, to determine the 

mental competency . . . of the 

defendant,” id. § 3161(h)(1)(A);

and

 “delay resulting from 

transportation of any defendant . . . 

to and from places of examination 

. . . , except that any time 

consumed in excess of ten days 

from the date an order . . . directing 

such transportation, and the 

defendant’s arrival at the 

destination shall be presumed to be 

unreasonable,” id. 

§ 3161(h)(1)(F).

The Government concedes that fifty-three days—the period 

between the evidentiary hearing on October 9, 2015, and the 

Government’s filing its Motion in Limine on December 2, 

2015—elapsed from the seventy-day speedy trial clock. The 

controversy in this appeal centers on whether, or to what 

extent, the time between June 11, 2014—when the District 

Court ordered that Williams be transported to FMC Butner to 

undergo a psychological examination—and July 29, 2014—

when Williams arrived at FMC Butner—is excludable for 

purposes of the seventy-day speedy trial clock.4

This appeal requires us to address, for the first time, the 

interplay between 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A)—which excludes 

periods of delay relating to proceedings to determine a 

defendant’s mental competency—and 18 U.S.C. § 

 

4 Although this case presents issues with respect to the 

determination of the date on which the seventy-day speedy trial 

clock began to run, it is unnecessary to address these issues 

because all non-excludable time in this case occurred after June 

18, 2014—the date of Williams’s first appearance with respect 

to the charges contained in the Indictment—which is the latest

date on which the seventy-day clock could have begun to run

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
9

3161(h)(1)(F)—which excludes certain periods of delay in 

connection with, among other things, transportation of a 

defendant to a psychological examination. In United States v. 

Graves, 722 F.3d 544, 548 (3d Cir. 2013), we held that “the 

period of excludable delay under § 3161(h)(1)(A) begins when 

a party moves for, or the court sua sponte orders, a competency 

determination” and “continues at least until a competency 

hearing is held.” In Graves, however, we did not resolve 

whether an unreasonable period of delay in transporting a 

defendant to a psychological examination is non-excludable 

when that period takes place within the confines of a 

“proceeding” to determine the defendant’s mental competency, 

which period would otherwise be excludable pursuant to 

section 3161(h)(1)(A). See id. at 548 n.6 (“We also need not, 

and do not, resolve the issue of whether an unreasonable delay 

in the transportation of a defendant to a competency 

examination is excludable. That issue has arisen in other cases 

due to § 3161(h)(1)(F). . . . [W]e do not reach the question of 

what impact it may have on delays for competency proceedings 

under § 3161(h)(1)(A).” (citation omitted)). Put differently, 

this appeal requires us to determine whether section

3161(h)(1)(F) places a limitation on the amount of time that 

can be excluded pursuant to section 3161(h)(1)(A) for a 

competency determination.

Several of our sister circuits have considered this 

question. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit has held that any period of delay relating to a 

proceeding to determine a defendant’s mental competency is 

excludable pursuant to section 3161(h)(1)(A), regardless of 

whether the delay is unreasonable or related to the transport of 

the defendant to the site of a psychological examination. See 

United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1990). 

The Second Circuit reasoned that, in its view, the United States 

Supreme Court’s holding in Henderson v. United States, 476 

U.S. 321, 330 (1986), prohibits courts from considering the 

reasonableness of a delay if the relevant subsection of section

3161(h) does not contain an explicit “reasonableness” 

qualifier. Vasquez, 918 F.2d at 333. Thus, the Second Circuit 

held that all time between the filing of a motion for a 

competency determination and a hearing on such motion is 

excludable because the text of section 3161(h)(1)(A) does not 
10

contain any language limiting the applicability of the exclusion 

to only reasonable periods of delay. See id.

The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, 

and Sixth Circuits, however, have taken a contrary position.

Each of those courts has held that “a delay in transporting a 

defendant to a mental competency examination beyond the 

ten[-]day limit imposed by § 3161(h)(1)(F) is presumptively 

unreasonable, and in the absence of rebutting evidence to 

explain the additional delay, this extra time is not excludable.” 

United States v. Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 

2009), aff’d on other grounds, 563 U.S. 647 (2011); accord

United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1990); 

United States v. Castle, 906 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1990). The 

First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits reasoned that reading section

3161(h)(1)(A) to permit the exclusion of an unlimited amount 

of time for the transport of a defendant to the site of a 

psychological examination would render section 3161(h)(1)(F) 

superfluous because the latter subsection specifically states 

that delays of more than ten days in transporting defendants to 

the sites of psychological examinations are presumed to be 

unreasonable. See Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d at 596 (“The only 

way to avoid conflict between § 3161(h)(1)(A) and § 

3161(h)(1)(F) is to read § 3161(h)(1)(F) as a specific exception 

to the general rule announced in § 3161(h)(1)(A): i.e., all 

delays caused by proceedings to determine a defendant’s 

competency are excluded, except for the time during which the 

defendant is supposed to be in transit, which is presumptively 

unreasonable if longer than ten days.”).

We agree with the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, and 

we hold that periods of unreasonable delay of more than ten 

days in the transport of a defendant to the site of a 

psychological examination conducted in the course of a 

proceeding to determine a defendant’s mental competency are 

non-excludable for purposes of computing the time within 

which the Government must commence a trial of a defendant 

under the Speedy Trial Act. A cardinal rule of statutory 

interpretation is that courts should avoid interpreting a statute 

in ways that would render certain language superfluous. TRW 

Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal 

principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon 

the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no 
11

clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 

insignificant.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))); see also 

Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 

199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We assume, for example, that every 

word in a statute has meaning and avoid interpreting one part 

of a statute in a manner that renders another 

part superfluous.”). While we have held that “the period of 

excludable delay under § 3161(h)(1)(A) begins when a party 

moves for, or the court sua sponte orders, a competency 

determination” and “continues at least until a competency 

hearing is held,” Graves, 722 F.3d at 548, interpreting section 

3161(h)(1)(A) to exclude any and all periods of delay in 

transporting a defendant to the site of a psychological

examination—regardless of whether such delay is in excess of 

ten days and otherwise unreasonable—would read section 

3161(h)(1)(F) out of the statute. Put simply, both section

3161(h)(1)(A) and section 3161(h)(1)(F) specifically relate to 

the same “examinations”: section 3161(h)(1)(A) excludes 

periods of delay with respect to examinations,5and section

3161(h)(1)(F) excludes periods of delay in transporting a 

defendant to the site of such examinations and explicitly places

a potential limitation on the amount of time that may be 

excludable for such transport delays.6 Psychological 

examinations that necessitate the transport of defendants from

their places of detention typically occur in the context of the 

competency determinations that are the subject of section

 

5 Section 3161(h)(1)(A) excludes periods of “delay resulting 

from any proceeding, including any examinations, to 

determine the mental competency . . . of the defendant.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 

6 Section 3161(h)(1)(F) applies to periods of “delay resulting 

from transportation of any defendant . . . to and from places of 

examination” and automatically excludes a period of up to ten 

days for a defendant’s transport to the site of a psychological 

examination; “any time consumed in excess of ten days from 

the date an order . . . directing such transportation” to the site 

of a psychological examination “and the defendant’s arrival at 

the destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable.” Id. § 

3161(h)(1)(F) (emphasis added).
12

3161(h)(1)(A)—a defendant would not be transported out of 

his detention facility for a psychological examination in the 

absence of such a court-ordered competency determination. 

Therefore, section 3161(h)(1)(A) cannot be interpreted to 

exclude all periods of delay related to examinations because 

section 3161(h)(1)(F) places a specific limitation on the 

excludability of an unreasonable period of delay in 

transporting a defendant to the site of that very examination. 

To interpret section 3161(h)(1)(A) in such a way would render 

section 3161(h)(1)(F) superfluous because it would never be 

necessary to apply section 3161(h)(1)(F) to determine if a 

period of delay in transporting a defendant to a psychological 

examination is unreasonable and, therefore, non-excludable; 

section 3161(h)(1)(A) would always exclude such period of 

delay, and the limitations contained in section 3161(h)(1)(F) 

would be devoid of meaning.

This interpretation finds support in Henderson, in which 

the Supreme Court counseled parties to read the exclusions 

contained in section 3161(h)(1) “in connection with” each 

other. 476 U.S. at 328. In Henderson, the Supreme Court held 

that “prompt disposition” of a motion—as referred to in the 

predecessor to section 3161(h)(1)(D)—must be interpreted 

with reference to the thirty-day limitation contained in the 

predecessor to section 3161(h)(1)(H), such that “prompt 

disposition” must be interpreted to mean disposition of a 

motion within thirty days of that motion’s being “under 

advisement” by a court. Id. at 329. Thus, in Henderson, the 

Supreme Court held that a period of delay that is excludable 

under one subsection of section 3161(h)(1) may be limited by 

specific language contained in a wholly separate subsection of 

section 3161(h)(1).

In reaching our holding, we simply have used the same 

interpretive approach that the Supreme Court used in 

Henderson. We hold that the period of delay that is excludable 

under section 3161(h)(1)(A) for proceedings to determine the 

mental competency of a defendant, including examinations, is 

limited by the specific language of section 3161(h)(1)(F), 

which explicitly states that a period of delay in transporting a 

defendant to the site of an examination in excess of ten days is 

presumptively unreasonable. Therefore, we hold that the 

period of delay between a party’s filing a motion for a 
13

competency determination and a court’s disposition of that 

motion is excludable, except that only ten days for transport of 

the defendant to the site of a psychological examination are 

automatically excludable; any period of transport delay in 

excess of ten days is presumptively unreasonable and, 

consequently, presumptively non-excludable.

7

IV.

We now must determine the extent to which the period 

of delay in transporting Williams to FMC Butner in 2014 is 

excludable for purposes of the seventy-day speedy trial clock. 

The District Court entered its order directing that Williams be 

transported to FMC Butner for a psychological examination on 

June 11, 2014. Pursuant to section 3161(h)(1)(F), the period 

through June 21, 2014—ten days from the District Court’s 

order directing Williams’s transport—is automatically 

excludable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). The thirty-sevenday period between June 21, 2014, and July 29, 2014—when 

Williams arrived at FMC Butner—is presumptively 

unreasonable and, therefore, presumptively non-excludable. 

See id.

The Government has not overcome the presumption that 

such thirty-seven-day period is non-excludable. The District 

Court held an evidentiary hearing with respect to the reasons 

 

7 Our holding is limited to the impact of section 3161(h)(1)(F) 

on section 3161(h)(1)(A) in particular. We need not, and do 

not, opine on the interplay between section 3161(h)(1)(F) and

other subsections of section 3161(h), including section 

3161(h)(4), which excludes periods of delay resulting from the 

fact that the defendant is actually mentally incompetent. One 

of our sister circuits recently has addressed this issue, holding 

that any period of delay following a court’s determination that 

a defendant is mentally incompetent is excludable under 

section 3161(h)(4) and that section 3161(h)(1)(F) does not 

limit the excludability of such period of delay whatsoever. See 

United States v. Romero, 833 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2016). This 

holding of our sister circuit provides further support for the 

proposition that if section 3161(h)(1)(F) is to have any

meaning, that subsection must relate to section 3161(h)(1)(A) 

and act as a limitation thereon.
14

for the delay in transporting Williams to FMC Butner, and thus 

the record is well developed in this regard. At the evidentiary 

hearing, which was held on February 25, 2016, the District 

Court heard testimony from the representative of the United 

States Marshals Service who was responsible for making 

Williams’s transport arrangements. The only explanation for 

the delay that was offered by the representative of the Marshals 

Service is that the Marshals Service did not receive the District 

Court’s order directing Williams’s transport until July 9, 2014. 

The automatic ten-day transport delay exclusion under section

3161(h)(1)(F), however, begins on “the date of an order . . . 

directing such transportation”; the ten-day period does not 

begin on the date that the Marshals Service receives actual 

notice of such an order. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (emphasis 

added). Thus, delay—beyond ten days—in transporting a 

defendant that is attributable only to negligence on the part of 

the Government or a district court in relaying to the Marshals 

Service the order directing the defendant’s transport is patently 

unreasonable and non-excludable. To hold otherwise would 

require us to ignore the text of section 3161(h)(1)(F)—which 

places the sole focus of the inquiry on the date of a court’s 

order—and would require us to impose a notice requirement 

that the statute otherwise does not contain.

Therefore, the thirty-seven days that elapsed between 

June 21, 2014, and July 29, 2014, are non-excludable because 

the Government has not overcome the presumption that this 

period of delay in transporting Williams to FMC Butner is 

unreasonable. Given that the Government concedes that a 

separate, fifty-three-day period of non-excludable delay 

elapsed between October 9, 2015, and December 2, 2015, a 

total of ninety days of non-excludable time had elapsed prior 

to the commencement of a trial of Williams, in violation of the 

seventy-day clock imposed by the Speedy Trial Act pursuant 

to section 3161(c)(1). Therefore, Williams’s rights under the 

Speedy Trial Act were violated, and the District Court erred in 

denying his Motions to Dismiss.

V.

If the Government does not commence a trial of a 

defendant before the seventy-day speedy trial clock expires, 

“the information or indictment shall be dismissed.” 
15

Id. § 3162(a)(2). Dismissal of an information or indictment is 

mandatory, rather than discretionary, upon a violation of the 

Speedy Trial Act. See United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 

382, 390 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Under section 3162(a)(2) as 

amended, dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”). Section 

3162(a)(2) sets forth factors that courts should consider when 

determining whether to dismiss an information or indictment 

with or without prejudice for a violation of the Speedy Trial 

Act, including “the seriousness of the offense[,] the facts and 

circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal[,] and the 

impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter 

and on the administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).

Under most circumstances, a district court should 

determine, in the first instance, whether an information or 

indictment should be dismissed with or without prejudice. See, 

e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006) (“The 

sanction for a violation of the [Speedy Trial] Act is dismissal, 

but we leave it to the District Court to determine in the first 

instance whether dismissal should be with or without 

prejudice.”); Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d at 390 (remanding to the 

district court “with directions that the court dismiss the 

indictment with or without prejudice, according to its findings 

under section 3162(a)(2)”). 

Our sister circuits are in agreement, however, that 

“[w]hile the decision is generally the trial court’s in the first 

instance, remand for a hearing is not required if the answer is 

so clear that no purpose would be served by a remand.” 

Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d at 600 (alteration in original) (quoting 

United States v. Robinson, 389 F.3d 582, 588 (6th Cir. 2004)); 

accord United States v. Jones, 601 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 

2010) (“When the result of th[e] balancing test [under section 

3162(a)(2)] is so clear that remand constitutes an unnecessary 

expenditure of judicial resources, a court of appeals ought to 

engage the § 3162(a)(2) factors rather than remand on the issue 

of prejudice.”); United States v. Mora, 135 F.3d 1351, 1358 

(10th Cir. 1998) (“The decision whether to dismiss with or 

without prejudice usually belongs to the district court in the 

first instance, unless the answer is so clear that remand is 

unnecessary.”); United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th 

Cir. 1983) (“[T]he district court therefore . . . should make the 

determination [regarding prejudice] unless the answer is so 
16

clear that no purpose would be served by a remand to the 

district court.”). The Sixth Circuit, in Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d at

600–01, held that remand was unnecessary in that case because 

the defendant had served his full sentence, as well as his 

sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. The 

Sixth Circuit reasoned that even though the defendant’s crimes 

were serious in nature and that there was no showing of bad 

faith on the part of the Government, “no purpose would be 

served by retrying [the defendant] for the offenses for which 

he has already been punished in full, [and] there is no reason 

to require the district court to hold a hearing on the issue.” Id.

at 601.

Here, we are presented with the same issue as in 

Tinklenberg. The District Court sentenced Williams, who had

been detained for over three-and-a-half years, to “time served.” 

It also appears from the record that Williams has completed his 

one-year term of supervised release without violating its terms.

Thus, Williams has served the entirety of his sentence, and no 

purpose would be served by retrying Williams for the offenses 

contained in the Indictment. See id. It is clear that dismissal 

without prejudice in this case would be contrary to the 

administration of justice because Williams already has been 

punished in full, and we therefore will remand to the District 

Court with the direction to dismiss the Indictment with 

prejudice.

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 

Court’s denial of Williams’s Motions to Dismiss, vacate the 

judgment of conviction and sentence imposed, and remand to 

the District Court with the direction to dismiss the Indictment 

with prejudice.