Opinion issued April 16, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00358-CR

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JOSE ALVARO SANCHEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 230th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1289396

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Jose Alvaro Sanchez, pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated 

assault on a family member.

1 The trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed 

 1 See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.01(b-1) (West Supp. 2014).
2

appellant on community supervision for a period of three years.

Subsequently, the State moved to adjudicate guilt. Appellant pleaded true to 

the State’s allegations and executed a waiver of his right to appeal in exchange for 

the State’s recommendation that punishment be assessed at confinement in the 

Institutional Division of Texas Department of Criminal Justice for twelve years 

and a fine of $200.00. The trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision 

and, in accordance with the State’s recommendation, assessed punishment at 

confinement for twelve years and a $200.00 fine. Appellant filed a pro se notice of 

appeal. We dismiss the appeal.

An appeal must be dismissed if a certification showing that the defendant 

has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.2 TEX. R. APP. P. 

25.2(d); Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trial 

court’s certification, which is included in the record on appeal, states that appellant 

has no right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a).

 2 The certification of appellant’s right of appeal indicates that this “is a plea-bargain 

case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” Because appellant is appealing 

from his plea of true to a motion to adjudicate his guilt and not from a plea of 

guilty or nolo contendere to the original charge, appellant could not have entered 

into a “plea bargain” and the certification is incorrect. See Hargesheimer v. State, 

182 S.W.3d 906, 912–13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Gutierrez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 

304, 309–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Nevertheless, because appellant waived his 

right to appeal in exchange for the State’s recommendation on punishment, the 

trial court’s certification correctly states that appellant has no right of appeal and

we do not need to abate the case to correct the certification. See infra.
3

A valid waiver of appeal prevents a defendant from appealing without the 

trial court’s consent. Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2003). The record reflects that appellant swore to a stipulation of evidence, 

pleading “true” to the allegations in the State’s motion to adjudicate his guilt. The 

document contains an agreement that the State would recommend that appellant be 

adjudicated guilty and punishment at confinement for twelve years. The document 

also includes a “Waiver of Appeal,” stating that, “As part of my agreement with 

the prosecutor to plead true, I AGREE TO WAIVE any right to appeal I may have 

concerning any issue or claim in this case, including my plea [of] true or admission 

of guilt.” Appellant separately initialed the waiver of appeal. The trial court found 

the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty of the underlying offense, and 

assessed punishment in accordance with the recommendation.

When a defendant waives his right of appeal in exchange for consideration 

from the State, his waiver is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and he 

may not appeal any matters unless the trial court first grants permission. See Ex 

parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that 

defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive appeal without sentencing 

agreement when consideration is given by State for waiver); Blanco v. State, 18 

S.W.3d 218, 219–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The record shows that appellant 

waived his right to appeal, as partial consideration, along with his plea of true, for 
4

the State’s recommendation on punishment and that the trial court did not give its 

permission to appeal.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Menefee v. 

State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 12 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 613. 

We dismiss all pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Brown and Lloyd.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).