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i 

52–827 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–57] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT 

OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY 

DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 13, 2009 
(II) 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

RUDY BARNES, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ZACH STEACY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, May 13, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense 

Activities ............................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, May 13, 2009 ....................................................................................... 29 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 2009 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy ................................................................... 5 

Podonsky, Glenn, Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer, U.S. Department 

of Energy ............................................................................................................... 10 

Triay, Dr. Ine ́s R., Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy ...................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas ................................................................................. 33 

Podonsky, Glenn ............................................................................................... 94 

Triay, Dr. Ine ́s R. .............................................................................................. 86 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 113 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin ..................................................................... 117 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 13, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order. Today we will 

consider the Department of Energy’s (DOE) fiscal year (FY) 2010 

budget request for Atomic Energy Defense Activities. 

Let me begin by welcoming our distinguished witnesses: The 

Honorable Tom D’Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA); Dr. Ine ́s Triay, Acting Assistant 

Secretary for Environmental Management (EM), Department of 

Energy; and Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Chief Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) Officer for the Department of Energy. 

I want to thank each of you for being here today. I also want to 

welcome to the hearing the newest member of the subcommittee, 

Mr. Murphy, of New York, who is not here, but we welcome him 

anyhow, and we are delighted that he is going to be on this subcommittee. 

The fiscal year 2010 budget request for the Department of En- ergy is slightly more than $26 billion. The Armed Services Committee annually authorizes about two-thirds of this total for Atomic 

Energy Defense Activities. For fiscal year 2010, the request of 

$16.4 billion for these programs is an increase of about $147.9 million over the fiscal year 2009 appropriation. 

This committee is a strong supporter of the critical missions embodied in your respective program area: maintaining and ensuring 

the reliability, safety, and security of our nuclear deterrent; conducting the scientific research, engineering, and production activities necessary to support that deterrent; keeping our nuclear weapons and the weapons complex safe from physical, cyber, and other 

threats; see to the government’s international nuclear nonproliferation efforts; and cleaning up the environmental legacy work of decades of nuclear stockpile work. 
2 

We are eager to hear testimony for the fiscal year 2010 budget 

request. I am especially interested in your thoughts about the following issues: first, does the budget adequately fund the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program (SSP)? As the Congressional Commission on 

the Strategic Posture of the United States just wrote in its final report, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has been ‘‘remarkably 

successful.’’ Remarkably successful. 

But its continued success is not something we can take for granted. With world-class experimental tools like the National Ignition 

Facility (NIF), the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test 

(DARHT) Facility, and the Z machine now available to the NNSA, 

the stewardship program is poised for even greater achievement. 

But for that to happen, we must continue to sustain and strengthen the stewardship program. 

That means supporting both the scientific tools and advanced 

computing capabilities that are coming on line, as well as the 

world-class scientists and engineers that use these tools to run the 

stewardship program. In this context, the committee needs to know 

whether the budget adequately funds the exercise of these physical 

and intellectual capabilities. 

Second—and this is a question I ask year after year—does the 

budget properly balance various safety and security priorities? 

What impact will the new Graded Security Protection strategy 

have on your security investment strategy? 

And third, does the budget for Environmental Management support the numerous commitments the Federal Government has 

made? With the approval of more than $5 billion in Defense Environmental Cleanup funds in the 2009 stimulus package, can the 

Department successfully manage three years’ worth of funding in 

two years? 

Finally, this committee continues to be concerned about the relationship between plans for consolidation of special nuclear materials (SNM) and other national security activities, including the 

stockpile stewardship, complex modernization, nonproliferation, 

and environmental cleanup. I hope that you can shed new light on 

the efforts to coordinate materials consolidation and disposition 

among the stakeholder offices within the Department. These are 

the concerns we hope you will address in your statements and during your discussion that will follow your testimony. 

Before I turn to my ranking member, the distinguished gentleman from Ohio, let me welcome our newest member. We are 

happy to have Congressman Murphy with us. 

You bring a special kind of background, as a former investment 

banker, to a former investment banker—a business that is now no 

longer in existence, by and large—I welcome you to the committee. 

It is a very, very interesting committee, and we are happy to have 

you along, Mr. Murphy. Thank you for being here. 

And now I would like to turn to my Ranking Member, the distinguished gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for any comments he 

would like to make. 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to acknowledge that we have our chairman with us pending her confirmation 

by the Senate to an appointment to the State Department. We are 

very glad to have her continued leadership while we are awaiting 

that confirmation. 

I am told that our opening statements are—somewhat echo common themes. I think that shows the bipartisan concern that you 

have on this committee for this issue, and I would also like to welcome Scott Murphy to the committee. We look forward to your 

added thoughts on what really is an important issue for national 

security. 

I would like to welcome back Mr. D’Agostino and Mr. Podonsky, 

and extend a warm welcome to Dr. Triay, who this is her first appearance before the subcommittee. 

As I look at this year’s Atomic Energy Defense Activities budget 

request, I can’t help but think that we are in a state of treading 

water. The science and engineering campaigns are stagnated. Key 

decisions on warhead refurbishment are avoided. A significant 

number of construction projects are halted. We understand that 

many NNSA program decisions are on hold pending the completion 

of the Nuclear Posture Review, the NPR. This review, and the 

stockpile and infrastructure decisions that follow, can not happen 

soon enough. 

Earlier this year, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command testified, ‘‘The most urgent concerns for today’s nuclear enterprise lie with our aging stockpile, infrastructure, and human 

capital.’’ The Chairman of the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, Dr. William Perry, who appeared before this committee 

last week, stated, the key to maintain a credible, safe, secure, and 

reliable nuclear deterrent rests with ‘‘robust, healthy, vigorous 

weapons laboratories, a strong stewardship program, and an effective Life Extension Program.’’ However, the commission observed 

two worrisome trends: The intellectual infrastructure is in serious 

trouble, and lab funding is likely to be reduced by 20 to 30 percent 

in the out-years. 

The fiscal year 2010 budget request substantiates these concerns. 

There is a net decrease in NNSA’s Science and Engineering Campaigns. Four of the five campaigns experience zero growth. The 

fifth campaign, Readiness, decreases by 38 percent. In the FutureYears Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP), these campaigns show 

decreases from 1 to 20 percent in a given year. Has the NNSA 

thought about these trends and their implications? How does 

NNSA continue to meet the demands of the Stockpile Stewardship 

Program with fewer people and decreasing scientific resources? 

Furthermore, there is a serious need to transform the physical 

infrastructure. The commission recognized this and recommends 

that Congress fund NNSA’s complex transformation plan. However, 

this year’s budget request halts a significant amount of construction activities, accounting for a $111 million decrease in Readiness 

in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF). And, top commission priorities—the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement, 
4 

CMMR, facility at Los Alamos, and Uranium Processing Facility, 

UPF, at Y–12—are only modestly funded. 

On the part of some, there appears to be a perception that if the 

stockpile goes down, we don’t need these facilities, and perhaps, the 

NNSA budget can go down as well. Mr. D’Agostino, I would like to 

have your thoughts on this. 

In addition, though the fiscal year 2010 budget request terminates the Reliable Replacement Warhead, RRW, and avoids making substantial decisions on the stockpile, I would like to solicit 

your thoughts on how NNSA is approaching its modernization, or 

as Dr. Schlesinger prefers to call it, ‘‘refurbishment.’’ The commission concluded that the current warhead Life Extension Programs 

(LEPs) could not be counted on indefinitely. They recommend that 

decisions about weapon modernization, or refurbishment, be made 

on a case-by-case basis that included consideration of a spectrum 

of options from component replacement to new design. 

Lastly, it strikes me that balance is the major challenge for 

NNSA in the years ahead—balancing recapitalization and modernization of the infrastructure, human capital, and weapons systems, all within an assumed flat or declining budget scenario. 

Shifting to other areas of the Department of Energy, Dr. Triay, 

I am concerned about the Department’s nuclear material consolidation and storage plans. Can you update us on these plans and also 

discuss the implications of the President’s decision to terminate the 

Yucca Mountain repository? 

Finally, Mr. Podonsky, physical security and the safe transport 

of our nuclear weapons and materials are top priorities for me. 

There is no margin for error. In the past year, the Department has 

replaced its Design Based Threat (DBT) security policy with the 

Graded Security Protection policy. What drove this change in policy, and what is the status of its implementation? 

The budget, and budget strategy, presented before us today may 

work for a single year, but it is not sustainable. Unless the 

placeholders we see in out-year funding are significantly changed 

based on the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review, we risk losing 

our world-class intellectual talent and endangering our ability to 

successfully maintain and certify the stockpile. 

I would like to thank the chairman for calling this important 

hearing, and thank you for your leadership and service. I look forward to the testimony today. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. 

We will begin with Mr. D’Agostino. Since we have received your 

prepared statement, and it has been entered into the record, I 

would like to simply have you summarize, if you can. We would 

welcome that. 

And let me also say that while the Armed Services Committee 

handles NNSA nonproliferation programs at the full committee, 

Chairman Skelton has agreed again this year to allow us to address the budget request for these programs as part of the hearing. 

So if you want to make some remarks about the fiscal year 2010 

request for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NN), we would welcome that, too. 

I just want to let the members know that we are expecting a series of three votes in a few minutes. At that time we will try to 
5 

continue as best we can with our summarization of your testimony, 

and then we will take about a half an hour break and go back to 

the agenda as we have it. 

Mr. D’Agostino, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS D’AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Madam Chair, and members of the 

subcommittee. 

Hi, I am Tom D’Agostino, the Administrator for the NNSA, and 

I am accompanied here by Brigadier General Harencak, who is 

the—potential running defense programs for me, and Ken Baker, 

as well. They are seated behind me, over my left shoulder, and I 

am honored to have them here helping me out—not just here 

today, but running the programs with me. It was a very exciting 

year for us. 

We appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee, and sincerely thank the subcommittee’s support for our 

programs. We think they are quite important. 

The NNSA is critical to ensuring the security of the United 

States and its allies. The President’s fiscal year 2010 budget request for the NNSA is $9.9 billion. It is an increase of 8.9 percent 

over the fiscal year 2009 appropriated level. The budget request 

provides funding to enable the NNSA to leverage science to promote U.S. national security objectives. NNSA programs are on the 

front of lines for the following national security endeavors: Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile and the capabilities 

that support the stockpile; accelerating and expanding our efforts 

here and around the world to reduce the global threat posed by nuclear terrorism, nonproliferation, and unsecured nuclear materials; 

providing the United States Navy with safe, military effective nuclear propulsion; and supporting U.S. leadership in science and 

technology (S&T). 

The President has initiated both steps to put an end to Cold War 

thinking, to lead to a new international effort to enhance global security. The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget request is the first 

step toward implementation of this strategy. 

For our nonproliferation programs, funding increases are requested to expand and respond quickly to opportunities to reduce 

global nuclear threats. Increases are also requested in the Naval 

Reactors Propulsion Program to begin development of reactor and 

propulsion systems for the next-generation submarine along with 

other activities. 

The programs and the Weapons Activities appropriation budget 

strategy is to maintain capabilities and activities at the current 

level until the strategic direction is established in the upcoming 

Nuclear Posture Review. In President Obama’s speech in Prague, 

he indicated his commitment to maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile while pursuing a vision of a world free from the 

threat of nuclear weapons. The NNSA maintains the unique knowledge, capabilities, and skills that are critical to achieving both of 

these objectives which, in many cases, some people think are opposing. Quite the contrary—they are complementary to each other. 
6 

Our nonproliferation programs are focused on securing the key 

ingredients of nuclear weapons, and that is weapons-usable materials and the related equipment and technologies. Supporting 

NNSA’s efforts include the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP), which has been working with Russia to 

shut down Russia’s plutonium production reactors, and the Fissile 

Material Disposition program (FMD), which will provide a disposition pathway to eliminate at least 34 metric tons (MT) each for the 

United States and Russia of weapons-grade plutonium. 

The NNSA is a recognized leader on these and other nonproliferation initiatives to prevent proliferators or terrorists from 

acquiring nuclear weapons. This includes our activities to secure 

and reduce weapons-grade nuclear materials at sites worldwide, 

but also, NNSA’s efforts to detect and intercept Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) or related materials that are in transit. 

In addition, we also worked in fiscal year 2010 to support the 

President’s call to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty, support 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and strengthen 

international safeguards and technologies that support inspections 

that are so important to a future—safer future. To implement this 

comprehensive nonproliferation strategy, we will expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships, and work to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four 

years. NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction program and the International Material Protection and Cooperation (IMPC) program will 

have a major role in this four-year plan. 

The NNSA is actively participating in our national debate over 

our Nation’s nuclear security and nonproliferation strategic framework. This debate is not just about warheads and the size of our 

stockpile. It includes the inescapable obligation to transform our 

Cold War weapons—nuclear weapons complex into a 21st century 

nuclear security enterprise that retains the capabilities necessary 

to meet emerging national security threats. 

In a future with fewer warheads, no nuclear tests, tighter controls on weapons systems and our weapons materials worldwide, 

and effective counteraction of nuclear terrorist threats, the NNSA’s 

science and technology capabilities will play an ever-increasing role 

to address these challenges. We must ensure that our evolving 

strategic posture and our nuclear stockpile, nonproliferation, arms 

control, and counterterrorism programs are melded together into a 

comprehensive strategy that protects America and its allies. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has initiated the Nuclear Posture Review, which is scheduled to culminate to report to Congress 

in early fiscal year 2010. We are actively participating in this review and all of the aspects related to nuclear security. 

As you are well aware, the Commission on the Strategic Posture 

was established by this committee and, in fact, by Congress, to 

identify the basic principles for reestablishing the national consensus on the strategic policy. The commission has examined the 

role of deterrence in the 21st century and assessed the role of 

weapons in our national security strategy. Its final report was 

issued—I have a copy here—and it includes a variety of recommendations. I am familiar with the report and, given the 

breadth and scope of the report, the Secretary and I are actively 
7 

taking a look at the—finding the recommendations and are coming 

to some conclusions. We haven’t quite finished yet, and I expect we 

have an opportunity, maybe, to discuss some of those things today. 

As you know, we have made tremendous progress in reducing the 

size of the stockpile. The stockpile will be less than one quarter of 

what it was at the end of the Cold War—the smallest stockpile in 

50 years. These reductions send the right message to the rest of 

the world that the U.S. is committed to Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which will help create positive momentum 

into the 2010 Review Conference—will be happening next year. 

Each year since this stewardship program was developed, we 

have been able to certify the safety, the security, and the reliability 

of the stockpile with no need to conduct an underground test. Since 

1993, we have acquired a whole suite of capabilities—tools, or facilities, if you will—that are necessary to maintain this effective 

stockpile, and most recently, the National Ignition Facility has 

come on line. We are applying these tools to help solve current 

stockpile reliability issues. 

There are challenges, though, and the main challenge for our 

program for the future will really be to make effective use of these 

tools and capabilities. Following completion of the Nuclear Posture 

Review, we will prepare a 5-year plan that recapitalizes our infrastructure, retains our scientific technology and engineering capability and expertise, and really makes full use of the experimental 

and super-computing capabilities that we have invested in so far 

over the last 10 years. 

Madam Chairman, numerous external reviews have identified 

the fragile state of our expertise and capabilities that reside in our 

people. It is very clear to me, people are our most important resource. We need to retain those skills and capabilities and develop 

the next generation of scientists and engineers and technicians 

needed to perform work in nonproliferation; needed to perform 

work in nuclear counterterrorism and forensics; and needed to perform work to maintain our deterrent. We also need these skilled 

people for the foreseeable future, especially when we consider a 

world potentially without underground testing. 

Madam Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be 

pleased to take your questions. 

I do have your comments, Mr. Turner, Madam Chair, and I will 

be glad to address them in the question and answer (Q&A) part of 

the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. D’Agostino can be found in the 

Appendix on page 33.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Tom. 

Dr. Triay, welcome. I believe this is your first appearance before 

the subcommittee, and we welcome you. And the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF DR. INE ́ S R. TRIAY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Dr. TRIAY. Thank you. 

Chairman Tauscher, Congressman Turner, and members of this 

subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today and to address your 
8 

questions regarding the Office of Environmental Management fiscal 

year 2010 budget request. 

The Office of Environmental Management’s mission is to complete the environmental cleanup of the legacy left by the Cold War 

in a safe, secure, and compliant manner. Our goal is to complete 

this mission by keeping our projects on schedule and within budget. We will continue to proactively pursue our cleanup objectives 

and our regulatory compliance commitments. At the same time, we 

will continue to seek out sound business practices in order to maximize cleanup progress. We have put forth this effort to achieve the 

greatest environmental benefit by maximizing risk reduction while 

being good stewards of the taxpayers’ money. 

To best achieve the Office of Environmental Management’s cleanup mission, we have prioritized the cleanup activities that are conducted at the sites. High-priority cleanup activities include requirements necessary to maintain a safe and secure posture at each site: 

radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and disposal; spent 

nuclear fuel (SNF) storage, receipt, and disposition; and special nuclear material consolidation, processing, and disposition. These activities represent the highest risks that the Environmental Management Office faces and make up a large portion of our fiscal year 

2010 budget request. 

In more specific terms, we have made substantial progress in the 

areas of consolidating surplus special nuclear materials and stabilizing plant waste. To date, the Office of Environmental Management has eliminated 11 of the 13 highly secure nuclear material 

locations. 

At the Hanford site, the Office of Environmental Management 

has transferred pumpable radioactive liquid waste from leaking underground single shell tanks to more durable double shell tanks. 

Parallel to that effort, we are also pursuing tank cleanout at Idaho, 

Hanford, and the Savannah River Site (SRS). 

In addition, the Office of Environmental Management has nearly 

completed the transfer of spent nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage. Many of these storage areas were aging basins filled with radioactive water. At the Idaho National Laboratory, these basins 

were located over a groundwater aquifer, and at Hanford, these basins were located within a quarter-mile of the Columbia River. 

We continue to move forward with the design, construction, and 

eventual operation of three large tank waste processing plants. 

These processing plants will treat approximately 88 million gallons 

of radioactive tank waste. The estimated total cost for construction 

of these three plants is $14.3 billion. The Office of Environmental 

Management remains devoted to building the capability for tank 

waste treatment and disposition. The Office of Environmental Management’s fiscal year 2010 budget request fully funds these highpriority activities. 

We are also focusing on technology development in our fiscal 

year 2010 budget request. Technology development is instrumental 

in reducing the technical uncertainties that come with the construction and operating of these unique cleanup facilities. Because 

of these challenges, we have increased technology development and 

deployment funding to $105 million in fiscal year 2010. The Office 

of Environmental Management (EM) will target its science and 
9 

technology investments on solving challenges associated with tank 

waste management and high-risk groundwater remediation. We are 

confident that with an increase in funding, the Environmental 

Management program will be better positioned to address science 

and technology uncertainties associated with these activities. 

The Office of Environmental Management will also continue to 

seek ways to maximize footprint reduction efforts. Footprint reduction activities include the decontamination and decommissioning of 

excess facilities, source and groundwater remediation, and solid 

waste disposition. Each of these activities has proven technologies 

and established regulatory framework. Footprint reduction makes 

laboratory facilities in the Department of Energy and other site infrastructure available for beneficial reuse. In fiscal year 2010, 

many of the footprint-reduction activities would have been deferred 

to fund higher-risk activities. However, because of the American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding provided by Congress, the 

Office of Environmental Management was able to fund many of 

these footprint-reduction activities. 

Now that we have outlined our program priorities, I would like 

to discuss some key cleanup strategies. The Office of Environmental Management continues to have a strong commitment to 

safety first—the safety of our workers, the public, and the environment. Safe operations and cleanup is our overarching goal with 

every activity that is commenced. 

As the committee is aware, the Office of Environmental Management has come under considerable criticism for its execution of 

these projects. Aggressive efforts are underway to transform the 

Environmental Management program into a best-in-class project 

management organization. It will strengthen our project management capability and improve the skill set of our project management teams. This budget request supports 1,674 full-time equivalent employees to assist in this effort. We have added over 300 mission-critical hires since 2007 to support both the best-in-class 

project management initiative and align the program with the 

human capital recommendations made by the National Academy of 

Public Administration. 

With these planned improvements in project management and 

acquisition, the Environmental Management program will move 

forward, will identify and manage the programmatic risks associated with start of construction during the early stages of the design 

phase. We will also integrate safety early in the design phases of 

all projects. We currently are instituting construction project reviews that are modeled after the reviews performed by the Department’s Office of Science that have had great success in delivering 

projects on cost and schedule. These independent reviews will examine all detail aspects of our construction project. This process 

will include expert knowledge and experience of world-class engineers, scientists, and managers. 

With all of these improvements, we are confident that the Environmental Management program can succeed in its mission. 

Chairman Tauscher, Congressman Turner, and members of the 

subcommittee, I look forward to addressing your questions. 
10 

And on a very personal note, within the Department of Energy, 

we really thank Chairman Tauscher. Your leadership has made all 

the difference for our program. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Triay can be found in the Appendix on page 86.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much. Well, I am aided by my 

fabulous colleagues and great staff, so no one ever does anything 

alone, as she so well framed. 

Dr. Triay, thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Podonsky, you are a veteran of appearing before the subcommittee, and we want to welcome you back. The floor is yours. 

We have been called for a vote, so if you could limit your time to 

about five minutes, then we will go take a vote. 

Thank you. The floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GLENN PODONSKY, CHIEF HEALTH, SAFETY, 

AND SECURITY OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. PODONSKY. Thank you, Chairwoman Tauscher, Ranking 

Member Turner, and members of the subcommittee, for inviting me 

to testify today on the fiscal year 2010 budget for the Office of 

Health, Safety, and Security. As you know, we are the Department’s central organization responsible for the health, safety, security, and environment, designing policy, taking closed systems, 

training, and Department-wide enforcement and independent oversight. 

The brevity of my oral statement is not a reflection of our responsibilities, but a reflection of your limited time. So I will simply conclude and say that I look forward to answering your questions that 

you posed in your opening statements, and we look forward to continued support from the Congress, the Department, and our stakeholders, so that we can continue to strengthen the Department’s 

health, safety, and security posture. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky can be found in the 

Appendix on page 94.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That is a true veteran. Thank you. 

Colleagues, we have three votes that will take about a half an 

hour on the clock, but about 40 minutes in real time. So we will 

adjourn for about 40 minutes. We will be back as soon as we can. 

We thank the witnesses for their forbearance, and the subcommittee is temporarily adjourned. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The hearing will resume. I am going to begin our 

questions and our discussion by going back to the science-based 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. The Strategic Posture Commission 

discussed at some length the future of the nuclear security complex 

and the laboratories in particular. 

The commission noted that many of the best veteran scientists 

at the labs are taking early retirement, and many younger scientists are seeking employment elsewhere. The commission noted 

that the problem of maintaining the intellectual expertise necessary to execute the Stockpile Stewardship Program is ‘‘aggravated’’ by budget pressures; pressures that are made worse by the 

need to reduce spending on science and engineering in order to 

fund improvements in the physical infrastructure of the complex. 
11 

But of the greatest concern to me, the commission also found 

that, ‘‘The NNSA expects to reduce the number of laboratory personnel funded by the weapons program by 20 to 30 percent. It is 

doing so without any understanding of what types of expertise to 

seek to retain or reduce. It does not know whether the results will 

be a weapons program too large or too small to meet its required 

purposes.’’ Then, with a remarkable flair for the understatement, 

the commission said, ‘‘This poses several risks.’’ 

Administrator D’Agostino, I want to know whether the NNSA 

has conducted any analysis of the staff reductions that have taken 

place at the nuclear security laboratories over the last two years, 

which total more than 4,000 at Livermore and Los Alamos alone? 

And secondly, do you plan, and does the fiscal year 2010 budget request entail, any additional staff reductions? And thirdly, what 

steps does the NNSA plan to take to ensure that we retain the intellectual capability needed to continue the success of the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. I will answer your questions in order, but 

I will maybe have to start off with a comment. Though I agreed in 

large part with most of the commission’s report, I would argue with 

the details. The statement of a 20 percent—20 to 25 percent reduction in the Weapons Activities account is a true statement, we 

think. 

One of our strategies—we have, actually, four main strategies: 

Change the stockpile, change the infrastructure, change the way 

we do business, and support the science and technology base. So 

those two middle strategies—change the infrastructure and change 

the way we do business—mean, basically, do things more efficiently. And we think we can drive out what I would call kind of 

inefficiencies that have built up over 30 or 40 years of the program, 

and in fact, as the laboratories have—rightfully, they have come 

down 4,000 over the last couple years, and that is a very significant 

number. The majority of those changes happened in areas of what 

I would call administrative, technical support, operations support. 

In a new infrastructure, you don’t need as many maintainers. 

Right now, we have a lot of people taking care of Cold War facilities, and that is very expensive, and we want to get out of that 

business. 

So in effect, this 4,000 reduction was an opportunity—and Director Miller and Anastasio took advantage of it—to shape the workforce for the future. So the short answer to your question, yes, we 

are very aware of—we did do a study; we took a look at the skills 

that we lost. It is never good to lose any skill, but where our focus 

was was to try to retain the skills that mattered the most to the 

core program. 

Second point is, that hasn’t—unfortunately, 4,000 people is a significant part of the workforce, and that sends a signal and it really 

hurts morale. And that is an unfortunate part of reshaping the 

workforce—is there is kind of a spinoff effect, and we have lost a 

few folks. The 2010 budget plan is specifically crafted to avoid 

major changes in workforce. As Mr. Turner correctly pointed out, 

there are a lot of flat-line numbers when you look at our program, 

particularly into the out-years. 
12 

I don’t like the idea of having flat-line numbers in the out-years, 

because it sends a signal to your workforce that the country thinks 

this is just to keep on—it is just a flat program and it has got no 

future. But in reality, we made some changes in the last few 

months to actually add money to science and technologies to ensure 

that we didn’t take any major reductions in that area. So our focus, 

ultimately, with the Weapons Activities account, which includes 

support for not just warheads but, quite frankly, nuclear counterterrorism, and incident response, and things that we think are very 

important for the future—specifically crafted to avoid layoffs. 

Your last question was, how would we put together a program 

to retain people—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Correct. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. And I think it is done probably in 

a couple of fashions. One is, obviously, we need—we have elements 

of our program to fill the pipeline of young folks that are going to 

come in behind and get trained. And there is a program right now 

that we have to get folks from Historically Black Colleges and Universities and other minority institutions, as well as big schools— 

one from Washington—but the focus is to get those folks out into 

the labs. Each laboratory has their own undergraduate, graduate 

degree programs to bring people in. 

I think the best signal to send, quite frankly, will come in the 

form of, you know, a report like this Strategic Posture Commission 

report, whose ultimate aim is to drive this national consensus on 

where our programs are going out into the future; because our scientists and engineers look at these programs, they listen to these 

testimonies, they read the transcripts, they read the conference report language, and they want to get a sense that the country cares 

about this program. 

I care passionately about it. They need to see it in financial 

terms; they need to see it in the words from the Administration; 

and, they need to see it in the words from the Congress. I think 

we are on the way to turning the corner and getting that national 

consensus. In my view, that will send one of the best signals to getting the workforce confident that they are on the right track. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I agree with you. I think that the—one of my 

first meetings with the Strategic Posture Commission, I asked 

them to have—provide us with a narrative, not only with results 

of their hard work, but to provide us with a narrative. And I asked 

them to make it readable and have it produced like the 9/11 book 

was. 

And I think that what that book does is provide every American 

with an opportunity to understand where their investment capital 

is going. And I think it also creates a raison d’eˆtre for the scientific 

community, the innovative community, the technology community—— 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Ms. TAUSCHER [continuing]. The academic community, to see 

that there is a big future for folks that want to go into this line 

of work. And that not only are they going to get rewarded, as everyone does, commensurate with their hard work, but this is a very 

patriotic way to serve your country. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. 
13 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I have one more question. 

Dr. Triay, I would like to ask about the office’s handling of the 

funding provided for the Defense Environmental Cleanup through 

the stimulus, basically, the American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act. In addition to the $5.7 billion appropriated for the Defense Environmental Cleanup for fiscal 2009, the stimulus package provided 

$5.1 billion. The request for these activities for fiscal 2010 is $5.5 

billion. This is essentially three years’ worth of funding in two 

years. 

First of all, do you anticipate any challenges associated with 

finding the contractor workforce to carry the Recovery Act work 

without detracting from EM’s program baseline activities? And second, will you be able to obligate the Recovery Act funding within 

two years and expend it within five years, as required by law? 

Dr. TRIAY. Thank you for the opportunity to talk about the Recovery Act funding for the Environmental Management program. 

We selected the portfolio of the Recovery Act in a very careful manner. Our portfolio is geared toward reducing the footprint of the environmental management legacy cleanup complex and, in particular, disposition of solid waste, decontamination, and decommissioning, and demolition of excess facilities, and in addition to that, 

dealing with soil and groundwater remediation. 

The reason we did that is because we wanted to actually maximize the jobs, while at the same time maximizing the cleanup 

progress that we can make. This area has proven technologies, has 

an established regulatory framework, the contract vehicles are in 

place. And the Environmental Management program, even though 

we have had issues associated mainly with our construction project 

performance management, in these areas associated with footprint 

reduction, we have had a proven track record of good performance. 

In addition to that, we have demonstrated that we can get great 

economies of scale and a substantial return on investments. 

In 2005, the Environmental Management program had an an- nual budget of $7.3 billion. Since 2008, our budget—annual budget—has not exceeded, essentially, $6 billion. So the Recovery Act 

funding actually addresses some deferred activities in these areas 

associated with footprint reduction, fully funds underfunded contracts that we already had for these three areas, and improves the 

compliance posture of the Environmental Management complex. 

In addition to that, it deals with some of the high-risk activities 

associated with the excess facilities not only in the Environmental 

Management program, but in NNSA, in Science, and in Nuclear 

Energy. In January of 2009, the Environmental Management program was required by Congress to send a progress report of the 

cleanup progress, and in that report and in a previous report, we 

delineated that there are 340 excess facilities and materials in 

NNSA, Science, and Nuclear Energy that were not part of the Environmental Management portfolio, that would increase the 

lifecycle cost of the Environmental Management program by $3 billion to $9 billion. 

So the Recovery Act fund has not only assisted us in dealing with 

those deferred activities already in the EM portfolio, but also deal 

with some of the high-risk excess facilities in other programs. In 

particular, for instance, in Y–12, as you know, there has been a sig-
14 

nificant issue with respect to the deterioration of some of those facilities, and this—substantial amount of this funding is utilized for 

programs in addition to EM. 

With respect to your question about whether we were going to 

utilize the entire five years that the Recovery Act delineates for 

execution of this program, our target—our goal—is to obligate the 

funds by the end of 2009 and finish our portion of the Recovery Act 

activities by the end of 2011. That is our goal, and the reason for 

that is, again, because we wanted to maximize the jobs that would 

be created. 

Chairman Tauscher, I have to tell you that at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Washington State, South Carolina, when we have job fairs, 

we have on the order of 5 to 10 times the number of individuals 

showing up for jobs as the jobs that we have to give out. The Environmental Management program has very rigorous training processes to train workers that were previously construction workers to 

do work in decontamination and decommissioning; using very rigorous processes for handling radioactivity. So, we are confident that 

we can find the workforce and that we can train it appropriately 

and we can do this work safely. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Dr. Triay. 

I have some questions for Glenn Podonsky, but I am going to 

wait until the second round. And I am going to yield time, now, to 

the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Turner, of Ohio. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. D’Agostino, you, in your comments, acknowledged the President’s statement of desiring to have a world free of nuclear weapons, and that is a very laudable goal. The Strategic Posture Commission, in their report, indicated that it would take political transformation unlike what is expected or foreseen in order for that to 

be accomplished. And then they go on to indicate that a significant 

investment needs to be maintained in order to ensure that we have 

our strategic deterrent. 

One of the interim steps, obviously, to the laudable goal, is stockpile reduction, and a recognition that, perhaps, the strategic deterrent can be satisfied with a lower number of weapons overall. As 

we do that—there are many who would like to see the goal of no 

nuclear weapons—I think even those who would support or desire 

the United States to have no nuclear weapons would want, and understand that the United States needs to have, nuclear capability, 

we need to have the conditions of an infrastructure that is capable, 

and that we need to engage in activities, research and development 

that can encourage the type of ingenuity that could perhaps lead 

us to even other greater discoveries. 

I know that you have a concern that as we look to reducing our 

stockpile, that there might be a misunderstanding that that would 

reduce, correspondingly, our overall costs in having nuclear capability—our labs, our infrastructure that supports the know-how and 

the weapons that we maintain. So, if you could speak for a moment 

about the size of the stockpile and the level of capability needed, 

size of facilities needed, and also discuss the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility at Los Alamos, the Uranium 

Processing Facility at Y–12—your thoughts about how stockpile re-
15 

duction relates to savings, and also the issue of how do we ensure 

that we maintain our investment? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir. 

Absolutely, in my view there is a false view out—kind of out 

there—that says if you reduce your stockpile by half, you can reduce your budget by half, or your program by half, and consequently, your facilities by half, and just keep reducing everything 

by half or even smaller, quite frankly. 

But I think most people that spend time and ultimately have the 

responsibility for—and we are in positions of responsibility here on 

the committee, as well as in the Executive Branch—to making sure 

that the country’s national security is maintained not only today, 

but more importantly, out into the future, because the future is uncertain. We don’t know what that future holds. 

But one thing we do know is that we have been quite fortunate 

to have invested the amount of effort we have in the people and 

in the facilities that we currently have right now, because they are 

dealing with problems that 10 years ago, we would never have 

imagined we can deal with. So it is this question of capability 

versus capacity. And when we took a look at what we had called 

‘‘transformation from a nuclear weapons complex to a 21st century 

national security enterprise,’’ we took a look at it with exactly that 

in mind: What capabilities do we need to maintain out in the future? When we look at reducing the size of the stockpile, what impacts does it have on our facilities? 

And what we found out is, we are at that point where we are at 

that bottom plateau. As you start reducing your—how much work 

you have to do, we are down at reducing—we think we are going 

to take our infrastructure to a point where it will either produce 

one of or up to a small number of what we think the country might 

need out in the future. For pits, for example, we are shooting at 

this 50 to 80 number, so a fifth per year. Not because we were 

going to plan on building 50 to 80 weapons per year, but because 

the Nation needs the capability to do that in this uncertain future. 

I liken it to a garage that exists in the neighborhood. You know, 

the garage has a lift—most of them have two lifts—it has a mechanic, and it has a set of tools. And that garage can take care of 

1 automobile for the whole year, or it can take care of X number, 

maybe 100 or something like that, for the whole year. But it provides you a range of capability. And that is where we are. That is 

where our plan is right now, is to do that. And to take care of that 

capability requires resources. 

With respect to CMRR, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Replacement facility, that facility is designed—again, as I mentioned to the 

chairman earlier, we are trying to change the way we do business 

and have a much less expensive infrastructure and much smaller 

infrastructure, one that is sized for the future. That capability that 

we would like to bring there will allow us to reduce the number 

of plutonium facilities in our infrastructure from nine down to two. 

Now, that is cheaper. That allows me to take that money I save 

there and invest it in scientists and engineers, and actually have 

them work in a facility that is designed with the future in mind, 

unlike the facilities we had built during the Cold War. So there is 

a lot of money to be drawn out of the program by consolidating. 
16 

The Uranium Processing Facility at Y–12—building that structure 

will allow me to shift from 150 acres of security footprint in very 

old Cold War facilities, to 15 acres of security footprint in modern 

21st century capabilities that allow me to drive my security costs 

way down. In fact, we think we can save over $200 million a year 

at Y–12 alone. This is in a separate audit we did just on the basis 

of building that facility. That is almost a facility that builds itself— 

that pays for itself over a 15-year or less time period. 

So, my goal is, ultimately, when the—as we work the Nuclear 

Posture Review, which is actually happening today, and it has happened yesterday, and it is going to be happening very intently over 

the next three months or so—getting that output and having that 

shape this program in a cohesive manner for five years get a—and 

then send that right signal to our workforce that there is a future 

in doing nuclear security work. And when I say nuclear security, 

certainly the deterrent is in that, but also nuclear counterterrorism, nonproliferation, forensics, intelligence analysis, incident 

response, and that whole suite of things that I believe the country 

needs. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

The Strategic Posture Commission also spoke a lot about our 

aging stockpile using the words—it concerns issues of modernization, or as Dr. Schlesinger says, refurbishment of our stockpile. 

Could you please tell us—give us a picture of trends that we are 

facing with our nuclear stockpile and what types of issues we are 

going to be facing with weapons capabilities and performance? 

What are we going to need to do? Even if we reduce our stockpile, 

with those that are left, what is ahead of us? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. By reducing the stockpile, which is something 

that is clearly—that we are trying to do in this Administration, and 

not only reducing, but taking the warheads apart, ultimately, and 

dealing with the material that we have left, we have to—because 

we will have smaller numbers of warheads and because we still 

have an extended deterrent that we extend out to 30 of our allies 

in other nations, it places a real premium on the warheads that 

you have and on our desire to make absolutely sure we know exactly what is going on with those warheads. 

General Chilton has once called these warheads chemistry experiments kind of in action. That is a great way to describe that. 

You have got radioactive material radiating various organic materials and causing them to change over time. Many of these warheads have been out there for 20, 30 years or so. So what we are 

seeing is, from a trend standpoint, is that the aging—we are seeing 

problems that we did not expect to see. When we started the Stockpile Stewardship Program 10 years ago, we expected to see certain 

problems, and what we found out is that we aren’t always that 

great at predicting the future. We have been able to address all the 

problems we have found, and there are problems that came up we 

didn’t expect to see. 

But what is clear is that things are changing. I am very confident in the Significant Finding Investigation process and the accountability we have in there, and my briefs to the Secretary and 

tracking on the specifics. But if we don’t change into a—what has 

been termed ‘‘the spectrum of activities,’’ which I think is right— 
17 

we don’t look at changing the way we modernize, we are going to 

continue to run into more and more problems. And ultimately, my 

job is to make sure that we have a stockpile that will never need 

an underground test for the Nation. 

And so that is why I completely agree with the commission saying that these have to be done on a case-by-case basis, because 

every warhead is different. And I am very pleased to see that despite a—I mean, they have spent a lot of time looking at this topic. 

They came to the same conclusion that we in the—to a similar conclusion that we in the program have looked at over the last number 

of years. 

Mr. TURNER. Very good. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Rhode 

Island, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I thank the panel for testifying today, and if we could maybe continue on that line of questioning, looking at the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 

Can you talk about your highest priorities and areas of emphasis 

for NNSA science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, and do 

you have the tools and the capabilities in place that you need, and 

what are the gaps, if any? And if you could also—mindful that we 

are in open session—could you also give examples of the challenges 

the stewardship program will confront in the coming years? And 

could you indicate the time outlines involved with those challenges? 

For example, when the challenges—when will the challenges manifest themselves? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir. My highest priority, quite 

frankly—well, probably kind of look at it in two ways. There is a 

tactical priority that I have right now, which are the people—sending the signal to the people in this infrastructure and program that 

the work they do is important, and making sure that message gets 

out. I think we have gone through, over the last few years, a pretty 

rough period, quite frankly, of lots of pressures from an infrastructure standpoint, uncertainty on where the program is going, and 

not so discreet trends with respect to investments in science and 

technology. 

I see that tactical problem landscape changing a little bit, from 

a challenge standpoint, because we are getting a bit closer, with 

the Nuclear Posture Review and with this report that we have, toward getting that consensus. So that will take care of that part of 

the tactical problem. I see us taking well over $100 million—about $130 million a 

show out of our infrastructure investments, so that creates another 

problem. But bringing it back in to support programs in computing 

and in high-energy density physics that are important for the future. So, we are dealing with that near-term tactical problem. 

The more strategic challenge I think we face after we get this national consensus is putting together an integrated program that 

deals with fully utilizing these tools that we are bringing onboard, 

that we have brought onboard. I am talking about the National Ignition Facility, the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydro Test facility at 
18 

Los Alamos, the Z machine at Sandia, the Joint Actinide Shock 

Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) facility, which is a Livermore facility but it is at the Nevada Test Site. In other words, now 

that we have invested a lot of the money here, well, let us get the 

experimental data out of that, and then let us make sure we have 

the scientists and engineers that can analyze that information to 

send us in the right direction out in the future. 

And we will have to reinvest in our infrastructure, and ultimately all those things are going to require additional resources. 

And it comes down to money, but I can’t ask for the money unless 

I have the strategic context to put those resources in. And that is 

why I am anxious, quite frankly, to get past—I mean, the consensus and the strategy phase is the right thing. I am anxious to 

get past that and to get into developing that program, and that is 

what, in essence, we will be doing this summer. 

Timelines involved, I think, was the last part of that question. 

As we go through this next upcoming decade, there will be a few— 

if we can get the infrastructure facilities that we—Mr. Turner 

talked about, the UPF, or Uranium Processing Facility, and our 

plutonium capability back up to speed, I think we are going to start 

seeing some significant—it will allow me to shift some significant 

resources into the S&T program without changing the bottom line 

of the program. And that will happen mid to end of next decade. 

These are very complicated facilities to build. 

We have gotten a lot of use out of these Cold War facilities. We 

need to get our people out of them. That is one way we show respect, quite frankly, to the workforces: Put them in facilities so I 

don’t have my good friend, Glenn Podonsky, you know, rightfully 

saying, ‘‘Hey, we might have some safety problems here, Tom,’’ or, 

‘‘We might have some security problems here.’’ 

So I am anxious. I think there is a great opportunity that we 

have over the next few years to shape this program the right way. 

I see it. My job ultimately is to put together that program for you, 

for the President, and ultimately to bring it here to you and explain it to you in more detail. And in effect, we are in a kind of 

a one-year budget scenario. We have put together a program to 

stop things from getting worse while we define what that better future is going to be. It is a little different than normal, unfortunately. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from New 

Mexico, Mr. Heinrich. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Thank you all for being here today. I am going to jump right into 

a number of sort of specifics, and they deal with this issue that you 

have already alluded to of the general strategic context. And some 

of that I will infer from comments and speeches that the President 

has made regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 

the potential for additional negotiations in strategic arms reduction, and the need that you articulated to be able to have the adequate science and the adequate capacity to make sure we support 

the capabilities doing those things. 
19 

I am very concerned with the proposed budget for Sandia’s 

science and inertial confinement fusion campaigns. The NNSA’s fiscal 2010 budget request represents a $19 million cut from fiscal 

year 2009—I think that is about 35 percent. And at the newly refurbished Z machine, your budget will cut the annual shot rate 

from 200 in 2009 to around 130 in 2010, even though the weapons 

in high-energy density physics user community have an operational 

requirement of over 400 shots, I believe. At a time when we are 

reducing the stockpile and must increase our investment in 

science-based Stockpile Stewardship Programs, aren’t you concerned with such a dramatic cut to the operations of science facilities, for example, the Z machine and Sandia? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. The answer to your question is, I am very 

concerned. The 400 shots that we had previously were kind of a 

two-shift operation, in effect, for the Z machine. We are down to 

about 80 percent of a one-shift—fully loaded one-shift operation. 

What we focused on doing were making sure that we had a minimal—I would say, is a minimal set of shots we needed to support 

the primary mission of the Z machine, which is the stockpile itself, 

and we are confident we have a program that does that. 

There is absolutely a lot more work we could do with the Z machine. You know, in the aggregate the Sandia budget is, in effect, 

flat, and there are decisions that we had to make—that my staff 

had to make—with respect to how much should go in this versus 

how much should go in that one. And we felt when we balanced 

across all of this, that keeping the lab—not hurting the lab population, doing some reprioritizations with respect to what we need 

to do in the future, was the right thing to do. 

It ended up having an impact on the Z machine. It is ultimately 

my responsibility. It is a decision that I made. With more money, 

we would have definitely put it there, but we definitely are in a situation where we are potentially—the term Mr. Turner used was 

‘‘treading water,’’ I think was the term you used, sir, which is kind 

of where we are at. 

Mr. HEINRICH. So do I understand you to say, sort of, that this 

is sort of the wait and see year? We develop a grander vision of 

what the strategic context is and maybe adjust in the following 

budget year? Is that what you are—— 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely. I mean, I do think, you know, 

whether we call it a ‘‘wait and see year’’ or a ‘‘treading water year,’’ 

I mean, the focus was, you know—priority number one for me, because many of you are aware that this budget was developed kind 

of fairly quickly in the last days of January and into the month of 

February. So what we ended up doing is saying, the priority is, we 

are going to focus on not having any reductions in staff across the 

complex in the aggregate. Try to preserve as much as possible the 

people and the program while the Administration gets its hands 

around what it wants its nuclear security posture to be. 

And, you know, because it is—in fact, it still isn’t done yet. We 

are developing that posture. And so my expectations—I mean, I 

have spent a lot of time in this program; I know a lot of the people, 

I know Keith Matheson quite—very well, out at Sandia, running 

the Z machine. My expectation is that in order to drive this program into the future that supports the visions on CTBT and Stra-
20 

tegic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), that we absolutely have to 

have a fairly significant increase in the science and technology in 

this program in the out-years. It just can’t happen any other way. 

We have to have support for facilities upgrades out into the future. 

It just can’t happen any other way. We have to send the signal that 

this is a nuclear security program, not a nuclear weapons program, 

because in fact, that is exactly what it is. It is a nuclear security 

program, not a nuclear weapons program—not completely a nuclear weapons program. 

And those messages have to get sent out by the Administration 

in an integrated five-year program that will look different than— 

I didn’t bring a budget book with me, but it will look different than 

what we have in front of us today. So it is a one-year program right 

now. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Jumping on to sort of the next thing in response 

to that is the Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities accounts. 

And sort of given the 16 percent decrease in Operations of Facilities, 28.6 percent in Program Readiness from fiscal year 2009 levels, how are some of those things going to play into this broader 

picture that you are talking about? I mean, those seem to be— 

those are kind of bread and butter sustainment—— 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Mr. HEINRICH [continuing]. Accounts. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. The Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities and Program Readiness accounts are accounts that fund 

what we call our fixed costs—in effect, you know, lights burning, 

you know, roads working, roofs maintained, and that kind of thing. 

In parallel with what we have right now, which is a fairly—like it 

was said earlier—flat-budget scenario for the Weapons Activities 

account, we are driving changes in the way we do business. 

Probably the best example—and I have got numerous examples— 

but the best example is what we called ‘‘supply chain management 

center.’’ Something we started about a year and a half ago, it is to 

centralize procurement of commodities-type products. Every laboratory, every production site needs paper, paper clips, it needs a variety of commodity-type products, and they were all being purchased 

separately, and we felt that there was an opportunity to leverage 

our purchasing—you know, operate as an integrated organization 

instead of eight—seven separate sites, and in fact, there is opportunity, and we took advantage of it, and we have demonstrated $32 

million worth of savings. That is one example. 

Another example is doing the same type of concepts with replacing roofs across the concept, and we saved money there. So a lot 

of the pressure—the negative budget pressure—you see in those 

fixed-cost accounts are due to our driving our lab directors individually, and the enterprise as a whole, toward being more efficient. 

Just one last point and I will stop, and that is, we have—about 

two years ago I chartered a group, and it is only contractor employees—lab—senior from each lab or production site—when we develop a Nuclear Security Enterprise Integration Council, and this 

integration council was set up so that I would put, potentially, 

operational efficiency pressure, and I say, ‘‘You guys run this place. 

You are Management and Operations (M&O) contractors. You tell 
21 

us what is a more efficient way to operate, and I would like to see 

specific results.’’ 

And that group meets, in fact, they met yesterday here in Washington, and they have a very well prioritized list of activities. In 

the essence of saving time, I would be happy to provide, if I could, 

to the committee examples of those types of projects and where 

they produce savings. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 113.] 

Mr. HEINRICH. That would be helpful, I think. I wasn’t surprised 

so much with the cuts as with the scale. You know 28.6 percent 

is a lot of paper cuts and bruises. 

I am sure there is capacity there. I just thought—I mean, that 

is substantial. So I would be curious to look at some of those programs and see how they match up with the scale of the reductions 

that we are seeing. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Be glad to show you that, sir. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. Podonsky, I wanted to go back to the one question I have. 

It is an issue that we discussed about a year ago. When HSS was 

established it was structured so that you were not responsible for 

any operational elements, with one exception: the DOE headquarters security. This exception, which gives your organization responsibilities for an operational unit, appears to represent what we 

considered, at the time, a conflict of interest. 

Last year, you agreed, and said that you were working with the 

past Administration to address the issue. But since then, I understand your office has conducted an oversight inspection of the security operations at the headquarters facilities, and we still think 

that is a conflict. 

Why don’t you tell us where you think you are with this right 

now, and can you provide the subcommittee with an update on 

what you have done over the past year to address the concern we 

have? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. And it 

is true, at the hearing that I testified last year that we talked 

about the inherent conflict for my office to be responsible for environment, safety, and health safeguards to security, cyber, emergency management, policy oversight enforcement, and then to have 

an operational arm; it has proven to be quite a challenge. 

We just had a vigorous inspection, as I mentioned, last year that 

we would conduct, and my operation did very poorly. And so I put 

myself on report and went to then-Secretary Bodman and talked 

about the corrective actions in the same way I would expect when 

I go to inspect any of my colleagues’ to my right, here, operations. 

We did the corrective actions at the headquarters to make the 

improvements, but the Administration—the previous Administration at the time—did not want to make any wholesale changes because we were so close to the changeover with the upcoming election. Now, where we are, that we have all the corrective actions 

fixed, in place, we await the current Administration for what they 

are referring to as a resetting of the DOE organizational structure. 

So my recommendation will be to Secretary Chu and the Deputy 

Secretary designate that when they look at the restructuring of the 
22 

Department, as they intend to do, my recommendation will be that 

even though we have taken every precaution to avoid any conflicts, 

the fact of the matter is that they exist. And quite honestly, I don’t 

want to have to put myself on report again for poor performance. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, we don’t want you to either, so we are 

going to—I think that the subcommittee will write to Secretary 

Chu and we will ask exactly what the plan is to reset the organization and to take you out of that situation. 

Mr. Turner, do you have any further questions? I want to go to 

Mr. Thornberry. 

I am happy to go to Mr. Thornberry for five minutes. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. And I apologize for being in and 

out during the testimony. 

Mr. D’Agostino, I know you said that you all are still digesting 

the commission report that came out last week, but as I have read 

that report and now I look at the future year budgets for Weapons 

Activities, seems to me the two things don’t fit together. I mean, 

the Weapons Activities budgets go down, not even counting inflation under this budget, and it just seems to me, when you look at 

the challenges with people, facilities, the other things that were 

talked about in that report, this isn’t all fitting together. Am I 

missing something here? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. No, sir, you are not. They don’t match up. Our 

focus, recognizing the report just recently came out—of course, I 

have been working this program for a number of years—and that 

what we have got, in essence, is inconsistency. 

In fact, you know, the report will inform—in fact, is informing— 

the Nuclear Posture Review groups that are meeting. I am one of 

those people that are on that group. The report helps me out, quite 

frankly, quite a bit in defining what I believe is the right path for 

the program. 

The out-year numbers for this program do not reflect what I 

think are important to do to maintain a stockpile, to do a CTBT, 

to take care of a variety of challenges we have coming forward. 

And, you know, granted—I mean, somewhere buried in the narrative of the actual President’s budget submission, I do make it 

clear that what we are trying to do is first, do no harm and not 

reduce significantly the program between 2009 and 2010; and second, set us up—you know, it is kind of like a—getting yourself 

ready for that next pitch that has to happen, getting the program 

set up so that it can move out smartly, given a strategic direction. 

The report actually sets the right tone, in my view, of where programs need to go. It endorses things that the committee has looked 

at for a number of years now with respect to stockpile, so—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, my concern, among others, is that if we 

have this idea we are going to negotiate further reduction with the 

Russians, that means we can spend less money, and—when, in 

fact, that even puts greater necessity on making sure what the 

other things we do are done well, or else—and articulating that 

risk of not funding those other things well is something that does 

concern—— 

Let me ask, on another topic: I know that you and Mr. Podonsky 

have, I believe, written a memo on the issue about whether the 

guard force should become federal employees or not. And my im-
23 

pression is that you are both in agreement that that is not a good 

idea. Could you briefly, each of you, tell me why? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I can start, and I would ask Glenn, maybe, to— 

because in essence there is a policy piece, and Glenn has that responsibility. My sense is, just as a program lead, that we can spend 

a lot of time and effort, I call it reorganizing, or making fairly significant strategic shifts. It has been my observation in the past in 

running programs that there is—the devil is in the details on many 

of these things—that the guard force may have a certain view that, 

‘‘hey, being a federal employee is a great thing because you get 

this, that, and the other,’’ and actually there are some unintended 

consequences. 

So in my view, unless there is a hugely obvious benefit that 

seems to override a variety of things, reorganizing or restructuring 

are things that should only be done with very careful deliberation. 

I know Glenn has done the spade work on this, and I will ask you 

to follow up. 

Mr. PODONSKY. If you will indulge me, Congressman, this actually stems with a conversation that started with former Secretary 

Spence Abraham, former Deputy Secretary Frank Blake, General 

John Gordon, myself, and Clay Sell was in on the conversation at 

one point, and what it was is, Secretary Abraham, at the time, said 

he wanted to take a look at how to improve security posture of the 

Department of Energy in a post-9/11 environment. This was 2003. 

And I had put on the table the option of looking at federalization 

of the guard force. And I put it on the table for the Department 

to take a serious look to see whether or not security posture of the 

Department would be improved by federalizing the force. And there 

were a number of joint studies done by both contractors in the 

field, managers, staff, and our staff at headquarters, and the conclusion was that security posture would not be improved. 

And the guard force unions, who I work with closely, saw this as 

an opportunity, and rightfully so, to create a career path for themselves, so as they got older they had a place to go, because maybe 

they were not any longer in physical condition to meet the standards of a security officer. So the conclusion that Under Secretary 

D’Agostino and I came with is that the federalization was not the 

answer. 

Well, what we have done is I have started another group to 

evolve the guard unions across the complex to involve my policy 

people, my overseers, to find the alternatives that would meet the 

challenge of improving the Guard security for their own job security, and also meet the challenge that we originally had in 2003 to 

improve the security posture. 

One of the things we did was come up with what we called a ‘‘security elite force,’’ so that would help improve the security posture. 

But the federalization as a whole, our conclusion was that it would 

not improve the posture for the amount of money that would be 

spent to change the entire construct of the Department. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 
24 

Mr. Podonsky, I don’t think there has been a hearing where you 

have been present where I have been here where I haven’t said 

something about my concern for security, but for our facilities and 

our weapons, so I just wanted to turn to that. I appreciate your 

diligence and your commitment, but I remain concerned and I 

would appreciate your continued efforts to keep us informed of 

ways that we can close any gaps that may exist. I know you are 

transitioning from a Design Based Threat security policy to a Graded Security Protection policy, and should in the future learn more 

of that, and also ways in which we can make a difference, because, 

as I said in my opening statement, we do not have a margin of 

error in the issue of security. And Mr. D’Agostino and I have also 

had that conversation, so thank you for your efforts there. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 

We are going to go ahead and finish at 4:30, and I just wanted 

to see if Mr. Langevin or Mr. Heinrich had another round of questions. 

Mr. Langevin for five minutes? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Sure. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Langevin for five minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Going back on the stewardship program, if I could, one of the 

questions I wanted to get to was, would our ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty change any of the current plans for the 

program? If so, could you describe how? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Sure. Certainly. Yes, it would change our plans. 

It would, in fact, reinforce the fact that we need to bring our 

science and technology infrastructure, if you will, which—people facilities, experimental tools—actually start using our tools in the 

way they were meant to be used. Mr. Heinrich talked about the— 

we are doing about 80 percent of what we could do on one shift on 

the Z machine; we would want to do, quite frankly, two shifts’ 

worth of shots on Z to get that experimental data out. 

If ratification of CTBT comes forward as we expect, we will be 

putting forward a program that will fully utilize these machines. 

So it will be increased effort. That will present some technical challenges because, you know, we are now going to be shifting from a 

‘‘build the capability’’ to actually ‘‘use the capability.’’ and then the 

next step is analyze the results of that data and get ourselves down 

into this ability to do what has been termed ‘‘predictive science,’’ 

which is an art right now, and not quite yet at the science level. 

So—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I guess you kind of lost me. But why wouldn’t you 

do that absent ratification of the treaty? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Well, what we are doing right now is, we would 

need to do that absent because right now we have to maintain that 

policy of no underground testing, but we are not getting—in other 

words, without the—the problem that we have had in the past, 

quite frankly, is this national consensus, you know, an agreement, 

in effect, between the Administration, the Executive Branch, the 

international community, and, you know, what I call nongovernmental organizations—that national consensus. And frankly, it 

goes to a global consensus in some respects, and the national consensus on our strategic posture. 
25 

And not having that has made running this program very dif- ficult. We have had greater than $600 million shifts, you know, as 

that program of record to submit up and gets debated in Congress, 

and whenever you have that kind of shift and you have those kind 

of deltas, it makes it very hard for the program to be successful. 

I think we have a real opportunity, frankly, to get to this national 

consensus. We are not quite there yet. I think we are on the cusp 

of it. 

I mean, there will be debates whether or not we took the stockpile size down too much or not enough, or whether our reserve capability on warheads is too big or too small, or whether we have 

too many scientists or engineers or not, and some people will debate that. But I go back to kind of the legwork that has happened 

here on this document, as it informs the Nuclear Posture Review, 

that will clearly demonstrate the need for reinvestment in our facilities and in our people and to fully utilize that. 

And I guess maybe I have been—I am going to call it stymied— 

in the past on getting these increases, but I see this as kind of like 

a running back. You know, a fullback—block fullback—in front, 

making sure that all issues are out on the table for us to debate, 

and then once the debaters are done then we move out, because 

frankly, the people, as we talked about earlier, are getting older; 

they are getting mixed signals. They are getting mixed signals. 

And they end up wondering, you know, ‘‘What are we doing here?’’ 

It strains budget, from that standpoint. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Before my time runs out, can you tell me—look 

into Russia, what is NNSA doing to ensure that as it expands the 

scope of its nonproliferation programs, existing programs with Russia remain a cooperative endeavor, and the U.S.-Russia nonproliferation partnership continues to address our remaining work 

in Russia and other possible opportunities for nonproliferation cooperation? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. We are doing a lot in that area, sir. Mr. Baker, 

who is here behind me, just came back recently from a trip to reinforce, talk to his counterparts. We have a whole series of deputy 

directors. And we are also—Tom, in the Russian and customs service and in the military, where we have ongoing problems, to do security upgrades, do vulnerability assessments, to do sustainability 

projects. We are identifying not only those—making sure that those 

partnerships are—continue on, but we are looking at opportunities 

to develop new areas for work with Russia. 

I will give you some examples here on the research reactor conversion. Russia has a number of research reactors in country that 

have highly enriched uranium (HEU), so we are looking at a joint 

partnership where both U.S. and Russia have a domestic reactor 

conversion effort to take advantage of the fact that if we are going 

to have the rest of the world convert to research reactors from 

HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), we ought to be doing the 

same thing. 

So in fact, I see expanded work with Russia out into the future, 

and I see our programs shifting a little bit toward not just the U.S. 

paying, but a cost-share approach. And we have examples of where 

Russia, in certain parts of our program, has picked up the load, 

quite frankly, on sustainability. Once we have done the upgrade, 
26 

they have picked up the responsibility for doing the sustainability, 

or carrying it out for the future, and we get to check and see how 

they are doing. So I see a lot more work, sir, in that area. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Thornberry, do you have a second round? 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, may I follow up? 

I was a little confused in your testimony. At one point it says 

that the U.S. and Russia have reached agreement on disposition of 

excess plutonium; in another point, it kind of sounds to me like it 

is still in negotiations and expect to complete negotiations this 

summer. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. We may have made it confusing, unfortunately. There is a joint technical statement where we have agreed 

in principle—I think it was in end of 2007 that—where we basically said, we agree on the—this is the 34 metric tons question—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Right. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. And we agreed in principle on how 

each country was going to do it, but what we needed to do was upgrade what is known as the Plutonium Disposition Management 

Agreement, or, Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement. 

That agreement is one of the elements of what Mr. Baker’s trip 

was to work out the exact words that the two presidents can sign 

in July. 

And so there is the technical piece of the program, where everybody that actually does the work says, ‘‘It is a done deal. We are 

ready to go.’’ We want the two presidents to sign the agreement in 

July, and then that actually commits both countries, frankly, to 

now let us follow up and do it. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. And are we paying for their plutonium 

disposition? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The commitment on behalf of the United States 

is, if appropriated, $400 million. This is money that was appropriated in the past. I think about $200 million or so that was appropriated in the past, most of that was retracted last year. But 

we are only paying for a portion of it, quite frankly, because the 

plutonium—they are going to have to do a lot—put out a lot more 

of their own capital to do it, and they are planning on doing it via 

their fast reactor disposition programs. 

So the $400 million the U.S. would be committed to would help 

but would not take it all the way. And frankly, I am okay with that 

because, you know, Russia is a different country now than it was 

10 years ago when the agreement was—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. We have been dealing with this for 10 years, 

so that is why I have—so the $400 million is a cap—— 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The $400 million—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY [continuing]. On how much we would pay? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The $400 million is the amount we would pay, 

yes, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Heinrich for five minutes. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to go to the B61, which I think was touched on a little 

bit in the report. But even given the uncertainties in our overall 
27 

strategic posture, it seems like some sort of Life Extension Program or refurbishment program for that should be a priority. How 

does that fit into the next year’s budget? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The way it fits in is to finish—it does fit in the 

next year’s budget, for one. Two is, our focus in next year’s budget 

is to do—I will use this term—it is called a ‘‘phase 2–A study,’’ 

which is a cost, scope, and schedule study on exactly what we are 

going to do by when and how much is it going to cost. 

It is actually the completion of an effort we started in 2009, and 

on the—you know, again, when the strategic posture review comes 

out—the Nuclear Posture Review comes out, I am sorry—I am hoping that it has enough definition with respect to the B61, because 

General Chilton and I believe that this warhead—you know, 

whether ultimately, 15 years from now, it goes away, it is not on 

the good path between zero and 15 years. I mean, I don’t—you 

know, we have to do work on that warhead. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Right. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. And so the question will be, okay, let us say it 

goes away in 15 or 20 years, then that helps inform the study to 

say, ‘‘Well, let us just do enough work to get us through that time 

phase, period.’’ That is why we need to do the study in 2010. 

Once the study is completed—— 

Mr. HEINRICH. That will be done this fiscal year? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. It will be done into the next fiscal year, because 

what we are going to be looking at is, you know, whether we just 

do a nonnuclear replenishment—just change out those nonnuclear 

parts—or whether we actually have to get into the nuclear package 

itself because of aging of components and other things. And there 

is also the desire, I think, on the part—certainly on my part, and 

I believe on the part of the subcommittee and others—that where 

we can insert improved safety and security without substantially 

changing, that we ought to take advantage of that opportunity. 

And in fact, that is where Sandia comes in, is it provides the details there. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Right. Thank you. 

Dr. Triay, I want to ask you a quick question. I don’t know if you 

remember us meeting in Santa Fe a few years ago—— 

Dr. TRIAY. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. HEINRICH [continuing]. But I wanted to ask what you are 

doing to address the natural resource damage issues at DOE and 

NNSA facilities like Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)? 

Dr. TRIAY. I have been working closely with NNSA on this particular issue, and the reason is that—matter, I feel that while the 

cleanup is going on, to the extent that we can address some of the 

issues, that ultimately we will come out of assessing the damages 

after the cleanup is done, we actually can do a lot better. So I firmly believe that we have to work—NNSA and the Environmental 

Management program—need to work together to ensure that anything that can be identified while we are in the cleanup phase, that 

we work in partnership with the Tribal Nations, the state, so that 

we can get ahead of, ultimately, having to assess the damages at 

the end. 
28 

So you have my commitment that, in my case, if confirmed, I will 

continue to work in a very close manner with NNSA on the Los Alamos issue. 

Mr. HEINRICH. So you are saying you understand the advantage 

of a parallel track as opposed to a Rocky Flats situation where you 

do one and then try to figure out how you figure out the other one 

when you have changed the data and—— 

Dr. TRIAY. Absolutely, sir. I definitely do understand that, and I 

am very committed to that approach. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Great. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much. We are about to be called 

for three votes—the last votes of the day. 

I want to thank our witnesses, Dr. Triay, Administrator 

D’Agostino, Mr. Podonsky, thank you very much, and the people 

behind you who do such great work for this country, and the people 

behind them, and the people behind them. [Laughter.] 

Thank you for your service. Thank you for informing the committee as well as you have, and we will look forward to talking to 

you again soon. 

Hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MAY 13, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MAY 13, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MAY 13, 2009 

(113) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Nuclear Security Enterprise—Integration Council (NSE-IC) 

is a team of senior weapons contractor managers from the eight NNSA sites established to work on difficult projects/assignments that require more than one site to 

accomplish. The Council was chartered in August of 2006. The following are some 

of the accomplishments achieved during the last three years of operation: 

• Successfully completed 90% of the Multi-site Targets identified by NNSA as 

critical mission essential milestones for the Stockpile Stewardship Program in 

fiscal year (FY) 2007, 100% in FY 2008 and expect to complete 90% in FY 2009; 

• Each year the council has identified initiatives that are not incentivized that 

enable additional collaboration and resultant improvements between sites. 

Some examples are: 

Æ Establishing a ‘‘Code Blue’’ process across all sites to enable forming teams 

to address/solve difficult problems quickly; 

Æ Performing a ‘‘Macro-Baseline Benchmarking’’ of each of NNSA’s site management and operations contractors to enable identification of improvement 

opportunities at sites; 

• During FY 2009, completed additional scope projects beyond those planned 

through increased efficiency of nearly $100M across the Nuclear Security Enterprise; and 

• Chartered in FY 2009, the Nuclear Security Enterprise’s Field Council, was 

built upon lessons learned from the NSE-IC to further enable changes/improvements. This Field Council has a chairman and the members are the eight 

NNSA Site Office Managers. These two councils have met several times to date 

and are jointly working to increase the overall operational efficiency and effectiveness of NNSA. 

[See page 21.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MAY 13, 2009 

(117) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER AND MR. LANGEVIN 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. How would you characterize your confidence 

in the safety, security and reliability of the United States’ nuclear stockpile? Please 

describe any issues that might erode that confidence over time. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Overall NNSA’s confidence in the safety, security, and reliability 

of the stockpile is adequate, but faces challenges as mentioned in the Annual Assessments to the President from the National Laboratory Directors and Commander, 

USSTRATCOM. Most of the stockpile weapons have greatly exceeded their originally expected in-stockpile lifetimes of 20 years. NNSA applies knowledge gained 

through surveillance and weapon assessments to identify issues and judge the stockpile’s ability to meet the mission without nuclear testing. 

Safety and security features of the weapons continue to meet their original designed requirements. However, technological advances and less stringent military 

requirements since the end of the cold war have created opportunities to introduce 

safety enhancements into the weapons such as those recommended by the Drell 

Commission. The DoD and NNSA continue to maintain our highest standards of 

procedural safeguard to supplement each weapon’s particular safety features. Security of nuclear weapons is confronted with an ever-evolving threat and capabilities 

that ever-improving technologies offer potential adversaries. The DoD and NNSA 

continuously respond by upgrading our site, facility, and transportation safeguards 

to counter the potential threat capabilities. However, upgrading the internal weapon 

safety and security features requires redesign and production of certain weapon 

components. The most effective safety and security implementation can be achieved 

through a comprehensive redesign. 

Many of our nuclear weapons have small performance margins as a legacy of the 

Cold War drive to maximize yield and minimize weight. This weapon design margin 

degrades with time. Furthermore, uncertainty in the reliability of components grows 

with time. This combination reduces our confidence in stockpile performance over 

time and can impose performance limitations. The DoD and NNSA work together 

to procedurally alleviate, to the extent possible, any resulting performance limitations until a warhead condition can be corrected by a weapon repair, alteration, or 

refurbishment. NNSA has put greater emphasis on the evaluation of aging-related 

degradation to performance margins; however, there remain many investment opportunities for new diagnostic capabilities to identify, characterize, and monitor the 

aging trends. Surveillance is essential to prevent uncertainty from eroding our ability to remain confident in the assessed health of the stockpile today and our ability 

to predict issues that would prevent a positive assessment in the future. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. What steps does NNSA plan to pursue to 

maintain the safety, security and reliability of current stockpile? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The change in the global security environment and the manner 

in which nuclear weapons fulfill their deterrence role promotes introducing enhanced weapons safety, security, and reliability not possible during the Cold-War 

era. Rather than simply duplicate the manufacturing of the weapon as it was originally designed in the 1970s and 1980s, NNSA will seek to build a consensus with 

national leadership that investments in nuclear weapon safety and surety enhancements are in the best interests of national policy and the public. The 2009 Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR) will provide the most immediate opportunity to reflect this 

consensus. The weapons program budgets for that portion of the stockpile recommended for retention, which should also reflect this consensus. In addition, 

NNSA will continuously assess the health of the stockpile and identify critical performance parameters and knowledge gaps that require resolution. NNSA must 

make commensurate investments in science, engineering, and manufacturing to better understand these parameters and gaps and to implement design solutions when 

aging issues arise—ultimately producing the tools and capabilities to maintain the 

stockpile as it ages. 

As long as the United States requires a nuclear deterrent, we must maintain the 

capabilities required to sustain our deterrent. We need to recruit and sustain the 

skilled scientists, engineers, and technicians required to solve the key challenges in 

science-based stewardship, and we need to maintain the stockpile in a manner that 
118 

ensures our ability to support the deterrent without testing. Life extension programs (LEPs) ensure confidence in long-term stockpile effectiveness (reliability and 

performance) and provide opportunities to increase weapon margin and incorporate 

enhanced safety and security features into warheads. Life extension activities will 

not create new military capabilities, do not require nuclear testing, do not require 

new production of fissile materials, and do not add impetus to others’ proliferation. 

Our ability to enhance the margin, safety, and security of the stockpile, however, 

is limited by restricting LEP work to only warhead refurbishment. LEPs should be 

considered on a case-by-case basis as recommended by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Effective stockpile management 

could allow policy makers to further reduce the size of the stockpile, particularly 

those warheads maintained in reserve as a hedge against risk. We must base each 

LEP on technical considerations regarding the best approach to meet stated objectives including assured long-term reliability and enhancing America’s nuclear security. Furthermore, to meet these objectives, NNSA must recapitalize the infrastructure to provide modern, safe, secure, and efficient facilities. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there limits on Stockpile Life Extension 

Programs in terms of their scope, and ability to meet military requirements? Are 

these technical, operational, regulatory, statutory, or a combination? Please give examples. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Life extension programs (LEPs) ensure confidence in long-term 

stockpile effectiveness (reliability and performance) and provide opportunities to increase weapon margin and incorporate enhanced safety and security features into 

warheads. Life extension activities will not create new military capabilities, do not 

require nuclear testing, do not require new production of fissile materials, and do 

not add impetus to others’ proliferation. Our ability to enhance the margin, safety, 

and security of the stockpile is limited by restricting LEP work to only warhead refurbishment. 

The current approach to legacy stockpile sustainment through refurbishment is 

focused on minimum excursions from the original design which imposes technical 

limits on what can be done to the weapons during refurbishment. A fundamental 

objective of the refurbishment approach is to meet the original military requirements that were established with the DoD. Most of the legacy warheads were highly 

optimized systems, trading margin for more yield and reduced weight, and all were 

validated by nuclear testing. 

Refurbishments are becoming increasingly more difficult and costly in order to 

replicate materials and outdated or non-operational processes and technologies that 

were used to meet original warhead specifications. In some instances, regulatory 

limits affect the LEP approach. Some materials or processes have been eliminated 

because they were hazardous and are not available in industry due to increased regulatory constraints and costs. Each refurbishment introduces changes that take the 

designs further from the tested configurations, with increases in uncertainty. As 

these designs continue to evolve, NNSA’s ability to ensure confidence in the legacy 

stockpile’s safety and reliability over the long-term will depend even more on a robust and successful stockpile stewardship program and a viable peer-review process. 

Some specific challenges include eliminating the use of beryllium due to health 

and environmental concerns and moving toward the use of insensitive high explosives or other safety enhancements. These provide significant technical challenges 

that will require considerable weapon redesign. Furthermore, replacing archaic electronics and other sunset technologies will inherently improve performance for certain components. Opponents of the nuclear weapons program have characterized 

these changes, which are essential to sustaining nuclear security, as new military 

capability even though the weapon continues to fulfill the same mission need. This 

further highlights the need for a national consensus on maintaining credible deterrent and improving nuclear security as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The NNSA has said it will rely on initiatives 

such as facility and staffing reduction and new business practices to pay for transformation of the existing nuclear security complex. In its final report, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States expressed doubt 

that complex transformation could be funded without budget increases. The commission further argued that additional staffing reductions in the laboratories could 

erode the core competencies of the labs and the complex overall. 

To what extent do you believe that cost savings from facility and staffing reduction, business process improvements, and materials consolidation can help pay for 

complex modernization? If such reductions will pay only for part of modernization, 

from where will NNSA draw the remainder of the required funds? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NNSA originally planned to implement transformation within our budget projections, assuming that savings from early transformation actions 
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(e.g., supply chain management improvements, special nuclear material (SNM) consolidation, non-nuclear production transformation at our Kansas City Plant, and 

test facility consolidation) were available to be reinvested. This approach included 

paying for transformation through a combination of the following: 

• Infrastructure savings through major footprint reductions, replacement of buildings that are long past their economic lifetimes, and updated cost-sharing models for work-for-others customers; 

• Reduced overhead costs through contract reforms, improved risk management 

strategies, greater business practice uniformity, improvements in product assurance processes, and commodity purchase savings through a supply chain management center; and, 

• Reductions in staff supporting weapons activities through attrition and possibly 

through reassignment to other national security missions. 

The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture articulates the current 

complex transformation funding condition in their report. The report states, ‘‘The 

physical infrastructure is in serious need of transformation and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has a reasonable plan to do so but lacks the 

needed funding.’’ Due to continued flat budgets (20% loss of buying power since 

2005). 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The NNSA has said it will rely on initiatives 

such as facility and staffing reductions and new business practices to pay for transformation of the existing nuclear security complex. In its final report, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States expressed doubt 

that complex transformation could be funded without budget increases. The commission further argued that additional staffing reductions in the laboratories could 

erode the core competencies of the labs and the complex overall. 

To what extent are the design specifications for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) facility dependent on the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The CMRR and UPF facilities are designed to house the minimum equipment necessary to perform plutonium and uranium processes. Both facilities are ‘‘capability based designs’’. The size of the facilities and the amount of 

equipment is driven by the number of unique processing steps, operations and missions required, not by the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The same tools and 

equipment needed to make a single CSA in UPF, for example, could be used to 

make up to the planned number of CSAs per year and meet the non-production missions assigned to UPF. For CMRR, the same process equipment provides the scientific support functions for fabricating pits at the rate specified in the requirements for the facility. For both facilities, any reduction in this equipment would disable the ability to conduct some or all of the missions. CMRR and UPF also support 

other defense missions, such as weapons surveillance, certification, and quality assurance as well as non-weapons programs such as providing feedstock for making 

naval fuel and for supporting disassembly and disposition of highly enriched uranium for non-proliferation missions. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2008 requires the GAO and then the NNSA to examine alternatives for 

managing protective forces at all NNSA and Department sites with special nuclear 

material. The committee understands that the NNSA has concluded that federalizing protective forces is not desirable. 

What steps does the NNSA plan to take to improve and make more consistent 

the management of protective forces throughout the nuclear security complex? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. On March 31, 2009, the Office of Health, Safety and Security 

(HSS) commissioned a study to examine realistic and reasonable options for improving the career opportunities and retirement prospects of protective force members 

while maintaining, within current and anticipated budgetary constraints, a robust 

and effective security posture. The Protective Force Career Options Initiative Study 

Group consisted of senior representatives from HSS, the Office of Defense Nuclear 

Security (DNS), and other Departmental organizations. The goal of this group was 

to find ways to overcome problems that prevent protective force members from 

working to a normal retirement age, and accruing reasonable retirement benefits. 

The study identified 29 recommendations for consideration that the Department is 

currently evaluating. These recommendations addressed issues ranging from the 

classification of Security Police Officers (as ‘‘offensive’’ or ‘‘defensive’’ combatants), 

through the implementation of current physical and medical requirements, to proposals for a large-scale revamping of the retirement structure for both disability and 

age-related retirements. The recommendations included a number of measures 
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aimed at increasing the employment options available for protective force members, 

who through age or injury, are confronted by a premature end to their protective 

force careers. The study also addressed a variety of ‘‘quality of life’’ issues for protective force members, including arrest authority, uniforms, and equipment. The first 

14 recommendations were viewed by the Study Group as being appropriate to existing budgets and structures, and the last 15 will require additional resources, change 

in governance, or both. A central theme emerged from the study: the expectations 

placed upon protective force personnel should be clearly related to job requirements, 

and wherever demands are placed upon an individual’s tactical skills and physical 

capabilities, those demands should be matched by training opportunities sufficient 

to support the maintenance of those capabilities. The anticipated contribution of 

these recommendations will improve the longevity and career potential of individual 

protective force members and enhance the potential contribution to the Department 

and its programs. Every positive step toward improving the career environment of 

protective force members improves morale; and contributes to making our forces 

more efficient and effective. By creating incentives for individuals to enter a protective force career and then remain in the Department’s security community for a lifetime of service, the Department minimizes the significant costs associated with hiring, vetting, and training protective force members. 

Additionally, DNS initiated a Zero-Based Security Review (ZBSR) of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) physical security and management oversight programs, in partnership with HSS. The pilot effort of this review was conducted from July 7 through July 24, 2009, at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

The purpose of the ZBSR is to determine how NNSA meets its security obligations, 

with an emphasis on improving cost-efficiency while simultaneously maintaining an 

effective security posture that incorporates sound principles of risk management. 

The protective force portion of the ZBSR focuses on improving the implementation 

of Federal management and contractor oversight requirements. It also focuses on 

developing a solid methodology for driving cost and activity transparency, cross-site 

consistency, and comparability among the diverse sites throughout the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) that have similar protection missions. This will lead to increased consistency and more effective management of protective force operations, 

as well as more effective allocation of the limited budgetary resources available to 

the safeguards and security (S&S) program. By balancing funding with performance 

expectations, DNS will improve the consistency, effectiveness, and efficiency of its 

security program in general, and within the protective force program in particular. 

The result will be a set of recommendations to improve the quality of oversight 

management functions and/or to realign oversight activities to achieve better balance of Federal responsibilities and contractor authority for execution of the NNSA 

site security program. Additionally, DNS will develop supplemental guidance to assist NNSA sites in implementing S&S directives in a cost-efficient and effective 

manner. DNS is also pursuing alternative ways to enhance and improve protective force 

operational efficiency and effectiveness, including: 

• Enterprise-wide standardization of select S&S equipment 

• Establishing a common sourcing and procurement mechanism to acquire protective force items 

NNSA is utilizing the Kansas City Plant’s Supply Chain Management Center 

(SCMC), operated by Honeywell FM&T, which is a strategic sourcing organization 

that leverages NNSA’s purchasing power across its contractor sites to obtain reduced pricing, better delivery, increased quality, and improved service. The objective 

of the SCMC is to transform the Management and Operating contractors’ acquisition process to a strategically integrated function that ensures maximum value for 

every acquisition and will assist in protective force equipment standardization 

throughout the NSE. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The FY 2008 NDAA also directed NNSA to 

conduct an assessment of the physical and cyber security risks posed to the nuclear 

weapons complex and the security technologies employed against those threats, and 

prepare a report identifying the manner in which it prioritizes investments in physical and cyber security of the weapons complex. The report would be included in the 

annual Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP). 

Is the NNSA working on this assessment and report? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has completed a Physical Security Technology Management Plan that is in final coordination with DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS). This plan was developed to address the physical security portion of the NDAA amendment. It describes 

the defined processes currently used by NNSA to identify, deploy, and sustain phys-
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ical security technologies, along with supporting rationale for the physical security 

technology-related budget requests in the FYNSP submittal to Congress. The plan 

identifies existing physical security technologies currently deployed at NNSA sites; 

describes the prioritization process used by NNSA sites to request new or replacement technologies; and specifies the funding strategy to address the requests. 

The Cyber Security Technology Management Plan has been completed and is currently under review by NNSA leadership, HSS, and the DOE Chief, Information Officer. The plan was developed to address the cyber security section of the FY 2009 

NDAA amendment. The content of the plan provides an overview of the current 

processes for the deployment and sustainment of cyber security technologies. The 

plan also provides information on future program technology enhancements which 

are requested as part of the FYNSP submittal to Congress. The plan covers existing 

and future cyber technologies, the prioritization of processes and procedures used 

by NNSA sites for the development, and enhancement of technologies and the funding strategy to address the requests. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. What are NNSA’s highest nonproliferation priorities? What are the primary areas of progress and the main challenges facing 

NNSA nonproliferation efforts? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. What are our highest priorities? The overarching mission of 

NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is to prevent the proliferation or 

use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including the necessary materials, technology and expertise. NNSA’s comprehensive nonproliferation programs help to 

deny unauthorized access to fissile materials and nuclear weapons technology. Specific efforts include ensuring adequate nuclear material control and accounting, and 

physical protection, at nuclear sites worldwide, strengthening international safeguards and tightening controls on international transfers, and programs for removing, dispositioning, and monitoring excess nuclear materials. 

We have made much progress meeting these priorities through the cooperative 

partnerships that NNSA has developed with over 130 country partners across the 

globe that work in 19 specialized nuclear security activities. We have completed material protection, control and accounting upgrades at 93% of Russian nuclear material and warhead sites of concern; converted or shutdown 64 reactors in 32 countries 

from the use of highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium; and returned 

over 910 kgs of Russian-origin nuclear material and over 1,215 kgs of U.S.-origin 

nuclear materials; and secured vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials at over 

570 buildings worldwide. 

A primary challenge now will be ensuring the necessary resources, staff, and 

international partnerships required to help implement the President’s nonproliferation strategy, including securing all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 

four years, as outlined in the President’s April 5, 2009 speech in Prague. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. NNSA plans for fissile materials disposition 

have slowed in recent years, first as a liability dispute between the U.S. and Russia 

delayed work, and later as Congress expressed reservations about proceeding with 

construction of the U.S. MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site. 

Most recently, the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act reduced funding for the 

MOX facility and transferred funding for the facility from NNSA’s Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation program to the Office of Nuclear Energy. However, the FY 2010 

budget request restores funding for the MOX facility and reflects a transfer of all 

funding for the facility back to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. What is the current status of construction of the MOX facility and what is the timeline for completion? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Overall the project is 35% complete and construction is 18% 

complete. Design, procurement and construction activities are proceeding on schedule and within budget. Eight of the seventeen auxiliary buildings needed to support 

construction and operation of the MOX facility have been finished, including the recently completed MOX Administration Building. At the MOX Process Building, more 

than 53,000 cubic yards of reinforced concrete, 50,000 cubic yards of unreinforced 

concrete, and 11,000 tons of rebar have been installed. Operations are scheduled to 

begin at the MOX facility in 2016. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. What is the status of outstanding issues with 

Russia relating to the Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program, and 

what are the plans to move the program forward in a manner that is consistent 

with the program’s nonproliferation objectives? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The United States and Russia reached agreement in principle 

on the text of a Protocol to amend the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition 

Agreement (PMDA). While this would update the PMDA for both sides’ programs, 

the major change is that Russia’s program will now be entirely (instead of partially) 

based on the use of ‘‘fast’’ reactors. This is the only program consistent with Russia’s 
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nuclear energy strategy, and the amendment accordingly adds appropriate nonproliferation conditions (e.g., that the BN–800 is operated as a plutonium burner 

and the plutonium breeding blanket is removed from the BN–600). The text of the 

Protocol is currently being confirmed and reviewed by both governments. No significant substantive issues have been raised to date, and both sides are seeking to complete approval for signature early this fall. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. In recent years, the committee has emphasized 

its strong concern with the use of fast reactors under the Russian Surplus Fissile 

Materials Disposition program and has conveyed its expectation that NNSA pursue 

a disposition path for Russia’s surplus weapons-grade plutonium which ensures that 

any reactors used under the program do not produce plutonium and include necessary monitoring and inspection controls. What is the status of NNSA’s efforts in 

this regard? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. As part of the agreement in principle on the text of a Protocol 

to amend the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), 

Russia will dispose of all of its surplus weapon-grade plutonium in fast reactors 

with certain nonproliferation conditions. These conditions include: the removal of 

the plutonium breeding blanket in the BN–600 fast reactor; the operation of the 

BN–800 fast reactor with a breeding ratio of less than one and; restrictions on reprocessing disposed plutonium and prohibition on creation of new stockpiles of separated weapons-grade plutonium from any other materials that will be irradiated in 

the reactors that will be used for disposition. With regard to monitoring and inspections (M&I), the United States and Russia have agreed in principle on the key elements of a PMDA M&I regime. Among other things, the M&I regime will confirm 

that each country is disposing of 34 metric tons (MT) of weapon-grade plutonium 

and that none of the 34 MT is being reprocessed during the disposition period or 

thereafter unless under agreed international monitoring. Once the M&I key elements have been approved by the governments, U.S. and Russian experts will begin 

consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency about its willingness to 

participate in such a regime. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. In recent years, the committee has conducted 

vigorous oversight of the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program. The GIPP program’s engagement activities with former WMD scientists clearly serve important U.S. nonproliferation interests by helping to impede the transfer 

of WMD expertise and know-how to states of concern or terrorist entities. But the 

program has also been criticized in past years for contributing to national security 

risks involving Iran. In response, NNSA reports that it has taken various actions 

to strengthen the management, implementation and oversight of the program. 

Please elaborate on these recent actions. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. As set forth in former Secretary Samuel Bodman’s letter of October 2, 2008, DOE/NNSA conducted a thorough review of all project payments since 

GIPP’s inception in 1994 and determined that the program has operated in conformance with U.S. law and policy and that there is no basis for the assertion that it 

has contributed to national security risks involving Iran. Furthermore, new management controls and new and strengthened interagency review procedures are now in 

place. 

In direct response to concerns raised by Congress, the U.S. interagency established a committee to review nuclear and missile technology-related scientist engagement proposals and projects under the guidance of the National Security Council. Chaired by the Department of State, the committee includes representatives of 

the Departments of Energy and Defense as well as the intelligence community. The 

committee establishes a unified policy for U.S. scientist engagement activities and 

is intended to prevent any work from being funded that is inconsistent with U.S. 

policy. 

With headquarters and national laboratory oversight, GIPP assesses each project 

for proliferation potential and monitors projects throughout their lifecycle in order 

to maintain project and program integrity. Moreover, the program has hired an additional national laboratory specialist specifically to enhance the review process for 

participating scientists and to improve documentation of the reviews. 

As the GIPP Report to Congress required by Section 3116 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 details, GIPP has refined its overall programmatic approach to: (1) focus on scientists at facilities rated as high priority, 

based on an interagency assessment of proliferation risk; (2) develop multiple avenues for scientist engagement, such as industry partnerships that foster sustainability and leverage private sector resources as well as cooperative research and development programs and training efforts, and (3) pursue cost-sharing activities for 

new projects in Russia. GIPP is also pursuing potential cost-sharing opportunities 
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with Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan for projects on nonproliferation nuclear 

forensics. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. This committee has expressed its concerns regarding the proliferation risks associated with the NNSA’s Global Nuclear Energy 

Partnership, or GNEP. What is the current status of this program? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. DOE is no longer pursuing a domestic GNEP program that includes consideration of near-term demonstrations and GNEP facility construction. 

We have restructured GNEP-related research and development (R&D) work into a 

long-term, science-based R&D program within the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. 

And, for FY 2010 we are proposing to incorporate this R&D under the Fuel Cycle 

R&D program. 

The United States continues to support the objectives of the international component of GNEP, which is comprised of 25 member countries and is dedicated to the 

use of civil nuclear energy in ways that advance safety, security and nonproliferation. The Department continues to participate in the GNEP international meetings 

while the subject of how best to achieve GNEP-international objectives undergoes 

interagency review. We believe that proliferation issues should be a priority in any 

discussions about the expanded use of civil nuclear energy and, in particular, in discussions that relate to development, deployment and operation of advanced fuel 

cycle technologies. Thus, the Department remains engaged in international meetings and activities that focus on developing strategies to ensure reliable nuclear fuel 

services and to provide management options for spent fuel in a manner that minimizes proliferation concerns. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. How much more does NNSA need to do to secure and reduce all known and unsecured weapons-grade nuclear and radiological 

material around the world, and what is the cost of the remaining effort in this area? 

Please also submit something for the record on this in classified form if necessary. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has made great 

strides in its threat reduction activities and continues to focus attention on locking 

down or removing vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials as quickly as possible. To this end, GTRI is working to: 

• convert or shut down 200 research reactors by 2020 (32% completed to date— 

57 converted and 7 shut down) 

• remove 4610 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by 2016 (50% completed to date—2,300 kilograms of HEU removed to date); and 

• complete security upgrades for 3,950 buildings with vulnerable nuclear and radiological material by 2019 (14% completed to date—573 high-priority nuclear 

and radiological buildings) 

An additional $126.5 million above the current Future-Years Nuclear Security 

Program (FYNSP) would allow acceleration of removal efforts and support the President’s goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four 

years. 

The MPC&A Program has completed upgrades at all 73 Russian nuclear warhead 

sites, and has completed upgrades at 87% of buildings containing nuclear material 

in Russia and in several former Soviet states. We expect to complete upgrades to 

the remaining buildings by the end of 2012. The costs for the planned work are reflected in our out-year budget profile. Additional upgrade needs may arise should 

gaps in the protection strategies be identified or if new areas of cooperation are proposed by the Russian side. Cost estimates would be formulated subsequent to these 

circumstances. 

The MPC&A Program has limited cooperation with countries outside of the former 

Soviet Union. Since 2004, we have had a series of exchanges with China on best 

practices for securing nuclear material. The MPC&A Program is pursuing cooperation with India, but efforts to engage the Government of India on this subject have 

generated little interest to date. Given the uncertainty over whether cooperation 

will occur and its scope, it is very difficult to estimate the costs at this time. 

Canada is contributing to this effort by providing resources for secure transportation of nuclear materials in Russia. Germany and Great Britain are also working 

with Russia on physical protection of nuclear material at select sites. Finally, Russia 

is contributing directly to this effort by sharing the cost of securing their nuclear 

sites and committing to sustain those upgrades for the long term. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. What is NNSA doing to expand and strengthen 

the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the International Nuclear Materials Protection & Cooperation (MPC&A) programs? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA is accelerating work where possible and reaching out to 

new and existing international partners. 
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GTRI is accelerating the removal and disposition of spent HEU fuel in cases 

where there is no other reasonable disposition pathway. Approval of a Revised 

Record of Decision will allow GTRI to return up to 1,000 kilograms of HEU spent 

fuel not currently covered by other GTRI removal programs. 

In addition, GTRI has enhanced its ability to accelerate nuclear material removal 

by expanding its methods of transporting Russian-origin HEU spent nuclear fuel by 

air. Removal can now be accomplished by using a combination of air, land, and sea 

transport. 

The MPC&A Program has completed upgrades at approximately 80% of sites in 

Russia containing vulnerable weapons-grade nuclear material and at 12 sites in 

seven other former Soviet states. Additional upgrades are underway or planned at 

a number of sites that improve security further and address the evolving threat environment. Additionally, the program continues to focus on ensuring that these security upgrades will be sustained in the long-term through increased cooperation on 

nuclear security training, encouraging effective nuclear security culture, continuing 

education and regulatory development. 

To address concerns about the security of weapons-grade nuclear material in 

other parts of the world, the MPC&A Program has expanded its engagement to include other declared and undeclared nuclear weapons states on nuclear security best 

practices. Since 2004, the MPC&A Program has cooperated with China to discuss 

nuclear security best practices at civilian nuclear facilities to provide a first line of 

defense against nuclear material theft and diversion. The MPC&A Program is also 

pursuing MPC&A cooperation with India, but attempts to engage on this subject 

have thus far generated little interest from the Government of India. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program offers opportunities for robust activity on major current WMD 

proliferation concerns, including: activities to address proliferation concerns in Iran; 

engagement on nonproliferation with Russia, China, India and other states; interagency participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); assistance to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); cooperation on international safeguards and export controls in South Asia and the Middle East; efforts to strengthen 

U.S. commitments to international agreements and regimes; and the establishment 

of a contingency fund for opportunities to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism 

that may arise. What is NNSA doing to expand and strengthen this critical program? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The President’s Prague speech outlined three key arms control 

and nonproliferation objectives: (1) a world free of nuclear weapons; (2) strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and (3) ensuring that terrorists are denied the materials, technology, and expertise required to build a nuclear device. The 

NIS program is making critical contributions to each of these areas: 

NIS is directly involved in the negotiation of the START follow-on treaty as it will 

be in talks on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. We also are supporting 

Administration efforts to achieve U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear 

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by ensuring a safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons 

stockpile in the absence of testing and supporting the elements necessary to monitor 

compliance with the treaty. 

• NIS is working to develop mechanisms to provide reliable access to nuclear fuel 

as a way to allow countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 

without increasing the risks of nuclear proliferation associated with the spread 

of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. 

• NIS is responsible for implementing a variety of programs that work in concert 

to reduce the threat of terrorists obtaining the materials, technologies or knowhow necessary to develop nuclear weapons: 

Æ NIS provides technical assessments of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, supports 

interdiction efforts by reviewing foreign procurements and maintaining 

‘‘watch lists’’ of sensitive items, supports public diplomacy efforts through targeted briefings, and develops tools and methods to strengthen international 

safeguards. 

Æ NIS launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) in 2008 to 

develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as it 

evolves to meet new challenges over the next 25 years. 

Æ NIS is working within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to strengthen its 

guidelines for transfers of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies 

based on a strong, criteria-based approach that would only allow transfers to 

states with impeccable nonproliferation credentials. 
125 

Æ NIS contributes technical expertise and reach back capabilities both to Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises and to possible interdiction cases. 

Æ NIS supports the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security by providing physical protection training and guidance development for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities worldwide. NIS is leading the USG efforts supporting revision of IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. 

Æ The NIS International Nonproliferation Export Control Program recently initiated new engagements with 10 countries and 4 international organizations 

to promote improved export control implementation, including the first-ever 

region-wide effort to support implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 priorities on a regional basis. 

Æ The International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) partners with approximately 20 countries globally, as well as with regional organizations such as the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control 

of Nuclear Material (ABACC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 

(EURATOM) on (1) civilian nuclear infrastructure arrangements that emphasize safeguards and other nuclear security and nonproliferation obligations of 

a nuclear aspirant and (2) cooperative activities intended to strengthen the 

international safeguards system. In 2010, the program plans to initiate safeguards cooperation discussions with the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, 

and South Africa, among others. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. What is the status of NNSA’s contributions to 

dismantlement efforts in North Korea given the pause in Six-Party Talks? What 

specifically is NNSA doing to prepare for dismantlement and verification activities? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Despite the current pause in the Six-Party Talks, DOE/NNSA 

continues to contribute to the USG process to evaluate future dismantlement and 

verification activities in North Korea. DOE/NNSA provides technically informed policy advice to USG decision makers in terms of the feasibility and appropriateness 

of various denuclearization options under consideration. 

DOE/NNSA also is continuing to develop tools and technologies and plans and assessments for the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula not only for 

the verification of past DPRK nuclear activities but also for any future dismantlement of nuclear facilities. 

In order to be able to respond quickly to future denuclearization opportunities in 

North Korea, DOE/NNSA is continuing to work during this pause in the Six-Party 

process to further develop and refine our response capabilities to undertake this important national security objective. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The Nonproliferation and Verification Research 

and Development (R&D) program is the sole remaining U.S. government capability 

for long-term nuclear nonproliferation research and development and other critical 

work that helps keep the U.S. on the cutting edge of technology. The program has 

also been thinly staffed in recent years and supports many U.S. government entities 

outside of NNSA. What is NNSA doing to expand and strengthen this program, with 

a particular focus on increasing the qualified scientific workforce in this area and 

developing the capacity to direct nuclear material origin and uranium enrichment 

and plutonium reprocessing? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In the last year, we strengthened this program by making the 

following staffing additions: we created new programs for addressing emerging requirements for global nuclear safeguards and radiological source replacement, and 

designated a full-time federal program manager for these tasks; we created a new 

forensics program and hired a full-time federal program manager and a full-time 

federal supervisor for integrating proliferation detection programs; we took advantage of using fellows from the Nonproliferation Graduate Program; and we created 

a Chief Scientist position for better integration of efforts across the program. Our 

cutting-edge, fundamental research at the national laboratories attracts both experienced and new researchers, thus enhancing the qualified scientific workforce in this 

area. Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The risk of terrorism involving WMD is certainly not limited to the United States, and the success of U.S. efforts is dependent 

in large part on whether our international partners share a common recognition of 

the threat and willingness to combat it. How is NNSA working with international 

partners to address these risks? How are our international partners contributing to 

our shared nonproliferation goals? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA works to build self-sustaining indigenous capabilities. For 

example, the International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) works 

with over 50 countries to combat illicit trafficking through strengthened export controls and has successfully transferred indigenous Commodity Identification Training 
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capabilities and responsibility to approximately 20 countries, which are now conducting a state of the art training program on a self-sustaining basis. 

Additionally, we continue to support multilateral efforts, e.g., working with international partners to build capacities to support their obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and other international agreements and arrangements; exchanging nuclear security best practices with Russia, the United 

Kingdom and China; and working with the IAEA to develop robust standards for 

‘‘appropriate and effective’’ material control and physical protection of nuclear materials. NNSA’s Office of Material Protection and Cooperation contributed $1.2M as 

a voluntary contribution in fiscal year 2009 to the International Atomic Energy 

Agency’s (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund (NSF). The funding supports the continued 

development and implementation of the IAEA’s efforts to mitigate insider related 

threats and address sustainability of nuclear materials security programs. 

The purpose of NNSA’s cooperative engagement with the IAEA’s NSF is to give 

impetus to the role that material control and accounting plays in protecting nuclear 

material from insider diversion. The funding will support activities such as establishment of a joint working group on material control and accounting (MC&A), establishment of an informal exchange on sustainability best practices, an ‘Insider 

Mitigation’ course, and other technical projects. 

Another venue for exchanging best practices will be through the World Institute 

for Nuclear Security (WINS). The goal of this effort, initiated by the Nuclear Threat 

Initiative (NTI), in partnership with the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), is to improve the security of nuclear materials through the establishment of a new organization for the exchange of information on and promulgation 

of ‘‘best practices’’ for the security of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities and for 

nuclear materials during transportation. 

The MPC&A Program is also promoting nuclear security through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. By committing to the Global Initiative, the 

United States and sixty-six other countries are urged to ‘‘develop, if necessary, and 

improve accounting, control and physical protection systems for nuclear and other 

radioactive materials and substances.’’ 

The success of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program depends upon a common recognition of the threat of nuclear terrorism and a mutual commitment to long 

term successful operation of the systems provided. Under the SLD Core program, 

DOE/NNSA provides radiation detection equipment and training at border crossings, airports and feeder seaports in countries of the FSU, East Europe and Central 

Asia. Many countries with which the Core Program works do not have sufficient 

funds to purchase or install equipment. However, in Russia, the Federal Customs 

Service is funding the installation of radiation systems at approximately half of all 

crossing points, and SLD is funding installation at the other half. In Slovakia, SLD 

has provided equipment, and the Slovakians have paid for most installation costs. 

All countries bear the cost of manning and operating the equipment SLD has installed. 

Under the SLD Megaports Initiative, DOE/NNSA provides radiation detection 

equipment and training at major seaports throughout the world and employs cost 

sharing in the implementation process wherever feasible and appropriate. An important result from cost-sharing is often increased buy-in from the host government 

and terminal operator, which offsets potential cost sharing risks related to schedule 

and quality. Although no set formula for cost sharing is available, the terminal operator or port authority often pays for design, construction, engineering, installation, 

or a combination of those costs. Cost sharing arrangements are site specific and negotiated differently for each port. 

The best example of Megaports cost sharing to date is demonstrated by Dutch 

Customs in the Netherlands. In 2004, the Megaports Initiative installed four RPMs 

at the European Container Terminal (ECT) Delta Terminal at the Port of Rotterdam 

as part of a pilot demonstration for Dutch Customs to demonstrate the feasibility 

of monitoring container cargo. In 2007, Dutch Customs replaced the U.S. RPMs and 

installed 40 sets of RPMs to monitor all import and export containers at the Port 

of Rotterdam. This $40M Dutch investment demonstrates the proof of concept for 

successful cost-sharing and is the model for which the program is striving. This cost 

sharing model has also proven successful in Belgium, Colombia, Panama, Mexico 

and Israel, and is now underway at two ports in Spain. 

In addition, several international partners have made monetary contributions to 

DOE/NNSA to support ongoing SLD projects in several countries. Through FY 09, 

DOE/NNSA has received over $10M (US) from international partners to support 

projects to deploy radiation detection systems in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Canada, 

the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea have all contributed 

to SLD activities. 
127 

NNSA programs continue to enjoy financial support of international partners (see 

chart of international donations below). International partners have contributed $59 

million to date. NNSA increasingly relies on cost-sharing. For example, the Second 

of Line of Defense Program has cost-shared with Panama, Colombia, Mexico, Belgium, Spain and Israel to install radiation detection equipment. Cost-sharing can 

increase a partner country’s buy-in and strengthen their commitment as well as the 

longer term sustainability of nonproliferation efforts. 

The Chart below lists all international contributions to these programs. 
128 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. With Russia’s economic growth, has it taken 

on more responsibility in funding nonproliferation programs within its borders? How 

is NNSA working with our Russian partners to move them toward ‘‘cost sharing’’ 

models? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. At every opportunity we encourage cost sharing of new projects 

with our Russian counterparts, and have a long list of successful examples. Furthermore, we recently developed a Joint Transition Plan with Rosatom that identifies 

specific timelines for each site to take over financial responsibility for sustainabilityrelated activities such as human resources development, regulations development, 

performance testing and training. 

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) informed us that it will take over full financial 

responsibility for sustaining permanent warhead sites (11 sites with DOE-funded 

upgrades, 18 sites with DOD-funded upgrades), and that the Kremlin has promised 

necessary funds will be made available. 

Despite these positive developments, we can’t be certain that Russia’s nuclear security budget is increasing as a result of declining U.S. support because this budget 

is classified. Facilities may be asked to allocate additional funds to compensate for 

reduced U.S. support. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. What is NNSA doing to address issues of limited staff capacity, capabilities and resources, which have created challenges for implementation of critical nonproliferation programs in past years? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) has generally been able to maintain staffing at roughly 90 percent of its authorized manpower ceiling. DNN has also economized a bit on travel expenditures toward the end 

of the fiscal year. However, NNSA has also given priority to personnel hiring in the 

nonproliferation area, and has also provided additional funding for international 

travel when required. The Nonproliferation Graduate Program internships have provided an important pipeline of new Federal employees that are well-versed in international relations and national security studies, foreign languages and cross-cultural communications, international negotiations, program management and interagency coordination. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. Some NNSA nonproliferation programs have 

carried relatively large uncosted and/or unobligated balances in past years. Do you 

expect any NNSA nonproliferation programs to have significant uncosted unobligated balances in FY 2009? If so, please describe the factors contributing to such 

balances. Please also describe any progress by NNSA to limit uncosted unobligated 

balances for nonproliferation programs and the rationale, if any, for maintaining a 

certain level of such balances for these programs. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Due to the fact that DNN works in 120 countries around the 

world, there are some unique budgeting requirements. DNN signs international contracts that typically take 18 to 24 months to complete. In order to ensure proper 

oversight, DNN does not settle invoices on international work until it has verified 

that the work has been satisfactorily completed. Even with this rigorous evaluation 

of completed work scope, at the end of FY 2008, the uncommitted balance for DNN 

Programs was 13%, which is consistent with the Department’s threshold for 

uncosted balances. This positive trend is expected to continue for FY 2009. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. In a January 2007 report to this committee, 

GAO found that among other security challenges at LANL, the Los Alamos Site Office lacked the security staff required to conduct oversight of the LANL contractor, 

and that in many cases site officials lacked proper training. From your perspective 

as Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer for all of DOE, does the Los Alamos 

Site Office have an adequate number of properly trained security officers? 

Mr. PODONSKY. The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) conducts periodic 

inspections to determine the status of safeguards and security programs at DOE 

and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sites. During the conduct of 

these inspections, the HSS Office of Independent Oversight does not generally focus 

on the specific number of authorized staff but rather on the performance resulting 

from the utilization of available staff at the sites. This is especially true in regard 

to the assessment of Federal oversight of contractor performance in specific sub-topical areas. 

HSS Office of Independent Oversight reports in 2003 and 2007 did, however, point 

out shortfalls in the Los Alamos Site Office’s (LASO) ability to effectively carry out 

its line management oversight responsibilities due to unfilled LASO vacancies. For 

example, staffing constraints played a large part in LASO’s inability to conduct a 

required annual safeguards and security site survey, which is a key line management oversight mechanism for monitoring and driving improvements in contractor 

performance. These inspection results, coupled with the information provided to 
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your committee by the 2007 GAO report, suggest the LASO security function has 

been chronically understaffed. 

A special follow-up review conducted by the HSS Office of Independent Oversight 

in February 2008 found that LASO had taken action to improve its line management oversight function, which included hiring a senior federal employee to serve 

as the manager of the security oversight function, reporting directly to the LASO 

Manager. LASO was also acting to expand its cyber security staff by hiring two 

Cyber Security Operations Mangers and by adding three cyber security support contractors. 

NNSA is conducting an exhaustive Federal Oversight Zero-Based Security Review 

to indentify where the consistency and quality of Federal oversight functions can be 

improved. The review was held at LANL and benchmarked LASO during its evaluation of Federal oversight. A team of subject matter experts from the NNSA Service 

Center, HSS, and several NNSA sites was formed to conduct the review. The team 

evaluated four topical areas: Oversight, Staffing, Communications, and Program 

Management. An evaluation of staffing resulted in an important recommendation 

that NNSA ‘‘Determine and right size the Safeguards and Security staffing with appropriate number and capability/skill mix.’’ In addition, NNSA has recognized the 

need to augment site office staff with additional technical resources and has responded by forming a Field Augmentation Cadre (FAC). The FAC provides the site 

offices with access to security experts to assist in conducting surveys of contractor 

operations and other assessment and benchmarking services. HSS believes that 

NNSA is currently directing sufficient attention toward resolving this longstanding 

deficiency at LASO and across the NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization 

Act requires the GAO and then the NNSA to examine alternatives for managing 

protective forces at all Department sites with special nuclear material. Has the GAO 

contacted the Department about this review? Will the Department conduct a concurrent review, or wait for the GAO review, as the NDAA allows? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Mr. Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director, GAO, conducted an entrance briefing concerning the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (GAO 

Engagement 360953) on June 10, 2008. Mr. Gill and his team have been in frequent 

contact with the Department since then, and have conducted several field visits and 

conferences with the NNSA program offices and other key stakeholders. The Department is awaiting completion of the GAO review in accordance with the FY 2008 

NDAA and will not conduct a concurrent review. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The committee understands NNSA has established a new security policy—the Graded Security Protection policy—to replace the 

Design Basis Threat (DBT). What prompted this change in policy and how is it 

being implemented? 

Mr. PODONSKY. The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), in coordination 

with the Department of Energy (DOE) Program Office and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), established the Graded Security Protection (GSP) 

policy to replace the Design Basis Threat (DBT) policy. Two critical factors influenced the revision: the intelligence community’s reassessment of the threat, and the 

need to analyze and base protection postures on a broad array of possible adversary 

attack scenarios as opposed to a focus on a single worst-case scenario. The collaborative annual DBT policy review highlighted the need to update the policy in terms 

of the risk management considerations, which include factors such as the consequence posed by the loss, theft, and/or unauthorized use of an asset; intelligence 

pertaining to the current and future objectives and characteristics of adversaries; 

and the effectiveness of the Department’s and, collectively, the Government’s security and intelligence programs relative to thwarting, providing early warning, and/ 

or mitigating an attack. 

DOE/NNSA sites are currently analyzing their robust protection postures against 

the GSP policy to evaluate the security measures instituted at each site and identify 

any additional enhancements or changes in protection postures necessary to appropriately implement the 2008 GSP. These detailed analyses will provide the basis for 

developing site-specific implementations plans. These GSP implementation plans 

will require the review and approval of the respective Program Office to ensure that 

each plan reflects the Department’s commitment to developing protection postures 

that minimize the ‘‘footprint’’ of nuclear material holdings, minimize recurring costs; 

maximize security technologies; and provide for a highly survivable and dynamic 

tactical response force. 

BACKGROUND 

• The DBT adversary planning numbers were strongly influenced by a single data 

point and did not reflect improvements in the Intelligence Community’s anal-
130 

ysis, detection, and reporting. Intelligence products supporting the DBT were no 

longer current based on observed terrorist activity. Therefore, the GSP restructures the adversary numbers based on intelligence and maintains a ‘‘graded’’ security program on the basis of material attractiveness/consequence considerations. 

• Interpretation of the Adversary Capability’s List (ACL) led sites to include ‘‘all’’ 

capabilities from the ACL into a single attack scenario. These scenarios exceeded any known or anticipated terrorist threat. The binning (‘‘representative’’ and 

‘‘sensitive’’) of adversary capabilities to reflect reasonable aggregate threats 

proved a viable solution. 

• The lack of a specific policy or guidance requiring performance against intelligence reporting did not ensure that sites consider intelligence reporting (i.e., 

adversary Tactics, Techniques and Procedures [TTPs]). The GSP counters this 

by incorporating TTPs as intelligence-related ‘‘tasks,’’ with each site continuing 

to develop its own site-specific scenarios which demonstrate performance 

against adversary TTPs. 

• The DBT allowed for compilation of capabilities and focused on a single ‘‘worstcase’’ scenario, which resulted in significantly over-designed protection postures. 

This was demonstrated by force-on-force exercises that indicated a potential significant weakness in the protective force response (i.e. ‘‘looking/leaning in one 

direction’’). To redress this weakness, the GSP requires sites to develop and 

analyze against a range of scenarios, evaluate the various elements of the protection posture (with appropriate credit for security technology), facilitate a dynamic tactical response force, and vary scenarios in terms of adversary TTPs, 

knowledge, role of the insider, pathway and threat objectives. 

• The DBT did not incorporate the results of recent nuclear material technical 

studies and therefore required a denial strategy for all Category I special nuclear material quantities. With the integration of specific technical studies, a 

‘‘graded’’ protection strategies approach is utilized. 

• Inconsistent interpretation and application of the DBT led to sites with like assets protecting to different standards. The GSP includes the Scenario Development Review Team (SDRT) process, which provides consistent application of the 

GSP, ACL, and Threat Guidance; site-specific scoping agreements based on defensible standards; utilization of credible representative scenarios to evaluate 

system effectiveness; and increased confidence in vulnerability assessment (VA) 

results. The cognizant program office provides oversight of the SDRT reviews, 

which are conducted by diverse teams comprised of complex-wide VA analysts, 

subject matter experts, HSS and site office security representatives. VA analyst(s) from other sites being reviewed also observe and participate in the 

SDRT. 

• The title DBT conveys threat assessment, rather than a security planning policy 

document. Therefore, the document was re-titled, ‘‘Graded Security Protection’’ 

policy to better delineate the scope and purpose of the policy. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization 

Act directed NNSA—in consultation with your office—to conduct an assessment of 

the physical and cyber security risks posed to the nuclear weapons complex and the 

security technologies employed against those threats, and prepare a report identifying the manner in which it prioritizes investments in physical and cyber security 

of the weapons complex. The report would be included in the annual Future Years 

Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP). Is the NNSA working with your office in conducting this assessment and report? 

Mr. PODONSKY. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has indeed 

been working with the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) on initiatives 

that respond to the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 

direction. In the case of physical security, the HSS Office of Security Technology and 

Assistance has reviewed and provided comments on an NNSA Physical Security 

Technology Management Plan. This plan addresses the items in the NDAA direction. NNSA has also sent a representative, tasked with writing the report, to interview the Office of Security Technology and Assistance staff and obtain additional 

input and clarification of the comments HSS provided. NNSA is preparing a similar 

plan that addresses issues related to cyber security, and we expect that similar coordination will take place not only with HSS, but also with the Office of the Chief 

Information Officer. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization 

Act directed NNSA—in consultation with your office—to conduct an assessment of 

the physical and cyber security risks posed to the nuclear weapons complex and the 
131 

security technologies employed against those threats, and prepare a report identifying the manner in which it prioritizes investments in physical and cyber security 

of the weapons complex. The report would be included in the annual Future Years 

Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP). 

How does the Department prioritize investments among physical and cyber security? 

Mr. PODONSKY. National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) physical and 

cyber security are two separate subprograms within the Safeguards and Security 

Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Unit and managed separately by 

NNSA’s Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security and the NNSA’s 

Chief Information Officer. Prioritization of investments for program and budget formulation is accomplished first by the individual program managers with respect to 

DOE, including NNSA, program guidance and multi-year program plans. Integrated 

corporate priorities are established in the annual programming phase of NNSA’s 

Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation process in which all NNSA program priorities are evaluated and balanced within our five year funding targets. 

Using a risk management approach, NNSA makes its investment decisions on the 

basis of the potential adverse consequences associated with threats to the assets 

being protected. This ‘‘graded’’ approach works to ensure those assets with the highest adverse consequences, such as the loss of control of a nuclear weapon, receive 

the highest priority for resource allocation. While mitigation of adverse consequences has been the backbone of our prioritization approach, NNSA continues to 

balance the risks to information and cyber security against the heavy demands of 

physically protecting nuclear assets. This balanced approach provides the necessary 

funding, even at the expense of other missions, to ensure NNSA security programs 

provide an acceptable level of security in accordance with risk management principles. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. Your office is the central DOE organization responsible for health, safety and security policy development, assistance, oversight 

and enforcement. What is the extent of your office’s authority in establishing DOE 

security policies? 

Mr. PODONSKY. The basis for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) authority to establish security policies arises from the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, which 

established the Atomic Energy Commission, DOE’s predecessor agency. Section 

161.b of the AEA states: 

‘‘establish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards and instructions to govern the possession and use of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material as the omission may deem necessary or desirable to promote 

the common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to 

life or property; in addition, the Commission shall prescribe such regulations or 

orders as may be necessary or desirable to promote the Nation’s common defense and security . . .’’ 

Today, the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) has the responsibility to 

develop health, safety, and security policies for DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration. Safeguards and security policies promulgated by HSS include 

regulations and directives in the topical areas of: Program Planning and Management, Physical Protection, Protective Forces, Information Security, Personnel Security, and Material Control and Accountability. It should be noted that the responsibility for cyber security policy resides in the Office of the Chief Information Officer. 

The development of all safeguards and security policy is achieved through collaboration and coordination with Program Offices, the National Laboratories, and field 

sites. The DOE’s directive development and review process, as prescribed in DOE 

Order 251.1C, Departmental Directives Program, ensures that proposed directives 

are reviewed and receive concurrence by the Headquarters Program Offices having 

responsibility for the Laboratories and field sites. A similar process is followed for 

regulations prior to the public comment period. 

Ms. TAUSCHER and Mr. LANGEVIN. Your office is the central DOE organization responsible for health, safety and security policy development, assistance, oversight 

and enforcement. Does your office have the necessary authorities to execute its oversight mission? 

Mr. PODONSKY. The DOE Office of Independent Oversight, within the Office of 

Health, Safety and Security (HSS), derives its oversight authorities from DOE 

Order 470.2B, entitled Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance. This 

DOE Order, which applies to all DOE elements, including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), identifies the Office of Independent Oversight as the 

focal point for independent evaluation of DOE sites, facilities, organizations, and operations in the areas of safeguards and security; cyber security; emergency manage-
132 

ment; and environment, safety, and health. The DOE Order also delineates the requirements for inspected entities to provide comprehensive corrective action plans 

for all findings issued by the Office of Independent Oversight. 

The authorities granted to the HSS Office of Independent Oversight through this 

DOE Order are not founded in legislation and are advisory in nature. Independent 

Oversight’s role is to provide information to DOE senior managers and contractor 

line managers. Decisions about accepting findings, correcting deficiencies, and managing risk are ultimately up to the responsible DOE line managers. As such, the 

Independent Oversight program complements the HSS Office of Enforcement, which 

derives its authorities for enforcement activities associated with worker safety and 

health, nuclear safety, and classified information security through 10 CFR Parts 

851, 820, and 824, respectively. Historically, Independent Oversight has received a 

high level of support from DOE senior management; its findings have been widely 

accepted by DOE line management, and its oversight programs have contributed 

significantly to improvements in DOE security, cyber security, emergency management, and environment, safety, and health programs for more than 25 years. 

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