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54–381 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–6] 

ADDRESSING U.S. STRATEGY IN IRAQ 

AND AFGHANISTAN: BALANCING 

INTERESTS AND RESOURCES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 12, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, February 12, 2009, Addressing U.S. Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan: Balancing Interests and Resources ........................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, February 12, 2009 ................................................................................. 39 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009 

ADDRESSING U.S. STRATEGY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: 

BALANCING INTERESTS AND RESOURCES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Biddle, Dr. Stephen, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign 

Relations ............................................................................................................... 6 

Cordesman, Dr. Anthony, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies ................................................................... 4 

Keane, Gen. John M., USA (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ........ 9 

St. Laurent, Janet, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office ........................................................... 13 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Biddle, Dr. Stephen .......................................................................................... 63 

Cordesman, Dr. Anthony ................................................................................. 43 

Keane, Gen. John M. ........................................................................................ 80 

St. Laurent, Janet ............................................................................................ 91 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

‘‘Iraq’s Winning Vote,’’ a Washington Post editorial, February 4, 2009 ...... 121 

‘‘The Promise In Iraq’s Rebirth’’ by Samir Sumaida’ie,The Washington 

Post, February 7, 2009 ................................................................................. 119 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................... 125 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 125 

(1) 

ADDRESSING U.S. STRATEGY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BALANCING INTERESTS AND RESOURCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 12, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:33 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Today the House Armed Services 

Committee meets to receive testimony on assessing U.S. strategy in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, balancing interests and resources. 

Our witnesses for today’s hearings: Dr. Anthony Cordesman of 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Stephen Biddle 

of the Council on Foreign Relations; General Jack Keane, former 

Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army; and Janet St. Laurent 

from the Government Accountability Office, GAO. 

So we welcome all of you, and without any objection, any written 

statements you might have will be entered into the record. 

The new Administration has made it clear that they are renewing the focus on America’s other war in Afghanistan. Of course, I 

think it is about time. For too long our country has not paid sufficient attention to the war in Afghanistan, and it doesn’t appear we 

are winning there. Casualties are on the rise. The Taliban is conducting more widespread attacks, including those this week on government buildings in Kabul, which cost at least 20 lives. 

A new strategy was clearly articulated, and achievable goals are 

desperately needed. And I am pleased the Administration is undertaking that review. 

At the same time, Iraq, which has been our major focus for the 

last five years, seems to be trending in the right direction. Violence 

is down significantly, and provincial elections have been conducted. 

This, of course, is a welcome change. But our commanders there 

tell us we are not over the hurdles yet, and the situation in Iraq 

remains potentially unstable and dangerous. 

With the input from those commanders, the President is also 

considering the future of the U.S. presence in Iraq and how fast we 

can draw down our troop presence. This is the context from the 

hearing today. The President will hopefully in the near future announce new strategies for both Iraq and Afghanistan, and we on 

the House Armed Services Committee, together with some of our 

other colleagues, will be charged with evaluating those strategies. 
2 

Today’s hearing is intended to raise those questions and issues that 

will help us do that job. 

We must remember neither strategy can be taken in isolation. 

Troops in Iraq are not available for service in Afghanistan. 

Enablers like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or combat engineers are desperately needed in both theaters, but we don’t have 

enough to fully resource both, at least in the near future. The Administration and the Congress are going to have to balance our interests and risks in each theater and try their best to figure out 

how to spread these limited resources. It is my hope that the witnesses here today will suggest questions and raise issues that will 

help us accomplish this task. 

I turn to my colleague and good friend, the Ranking Member, 

John McHugh for comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If there is any greater 

signal as to the bipartisanship of this committee, it is your opening 

statement. Mine sounds much as yours does, so I will forego reading it formally and ask that it be submitted in its entirety in the 

record. 

But let me say I certainly join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming 

our very distinguished panelists. And at the risk of stating the obvious, this is a critically important hearing. Balancing, it is a 

buzzword of late; it is in the title of the hearing today, as you 

noted, Mr. Chairman. It was also in the headline of Secretary 

Gates’ recently published article in Foreign Affairs that we discussed here in his appearance just a while back, and it fairly characterizes the Pentagon’s national defense strategy. 

I would suggest the word ‘‘balancing’’ is easy, at least to say. And 

what I hope we can come away with here today, Mr. Chairman, is 

the opportunity to pierce the definition in the textbook of the word 

‘‘balancing’’ and begin to cut through the ambiguity of the term and 

try to get through the tough strategic choices and trade-offs that 

come with that effort. 

On Monday, as you and I discussed, Mr. Chairman, I returned 

from my tenth visit to Iraq, my fourth to Afghanistan. Let me state 

our men and women in uniform continue to demonstrate that they 

are the world’s premier fighting force, but I left the two theaters 

with any number of concerns and questions. 

In Iraq the violence, and the recent successful provincial elections, and the relatively smooth implementation of the so-called 

SOFA, the Status of Forces Agreement, have caused many to announce that the war, in their mind, is over. 

Two weeks ago Secretary Gates testified that the successful Iraqi 

elections in June and those of 2009 substantially enhanced the 

prospects for what he called enduring domestic peace in Iraq. Virtually every military leader, including Ambassador Crocker, cautioned us about what they termed as ‘‘precipitous withdrawal.’’ 

Their advice, I think, is important. It sounds to me like a prudent 

wait-and-see approach before we say the phrase ‘‘mission accomplished.’’ 
3 

And I would note, too, Mr. Chairman, a host of accompanying 

questions need to be answered, including under what conditions 

can we reasonably reduce our footprint in Iraq? What type of residual presence will we need in Iraq after 2011 as the Status of Forces 

Agreement (SOFA) calls for our withdrawal? And how do we prevent al Qaeda from again making that nation a central focus on the 

war on terror? And lastly and most critically, how do we prevent 

Iran and the special groups from becoming a spoiler? We need answers to those variables and more as we attempt to balance, balance the interests in resources with Afghanistan. 

In Afghanistan I saw firsthand the need for increased U.S. commitment, particularly in the south where we visited. Our forces, in 

my judgment, lack adequate capabilities, as you said, Mr. Chairman, such as Special Operations Forces; Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and Medical Evacuation 

(Medevac) resources. 

In the coming year it is expected our commanders on the ground 

will finally have the capability to implement a counterinsurgency 

strategy that is tailored for that theater. Even if the key strategic 

questions are answered adequately, logistical issues are paramount 

in this discussion. Surging in Afghanistan from Iraq as we redeploy 

is fraught with challenges. Plans for an increased U.S. commitment 

in Afghanistan have already revealed its limited capacity to host 

added enablers and boots on the ground. These variables need to 

be understood as we adjust our strategic posture towards Afghanistan. 

In my judgment, the message to Congress is clear. The pressures 

of an economic crisis and the need to find dollars for domestic 

spending should not come at a cost of our gains in Iraq or compromise our objectives in Afghanistan. 

In closing, let me say, Mr. Chairman, I returned from Iraq and 

Afghanistan with five key lessons in hand. While the Iraqi war is 

going down in many ways, the fight in Afghanistan is just beginning. In my opinion, the scheduling of troop withdrawals in Iraq 

must be done on conditions on the ground, not political consideration. And with all due respect to then-Senator Obama, he was 

dramatically wrong on his opinion with respect to surge, and I 

would urge President Obama not to build on that mistake. And by 

that I mean very simply the surge, in the military definition of the 

term, is not the simple answer. We have to use the broadest range 

of tools available to us. 

Lastly, the President should remember, as he rightfully acknowledged earlier this week, one of the key answers to the solution of 

the problem in Afghanistan is not found in Afghanistan, but rather 

in Pakistan. The Administration has been handed a list of tools, 

some known, some not, some on the record, some classified, that 

will allow him to more effectively deal with this challenge. In my 

opinion, he must deal and use every tool available to him. 

Lastly, a final word of caution: Uncertainty does not breed security. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back, and I certainly look 

forward to our panelists’ testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman and appreciate your remarks this morning. 
4 

We are truly blessed to have with us the witnesses that we have 

addressing American strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. We couldn’t 

have a better panel, and we appreciate your being here so very, 

very much. And, Tony Cordesman, we lead off with you, sir. 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have already announced any written statements are already in the record, without objection. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. 

BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. CORDESMAN. I would like to take the few minutes I have 

from my oral statement—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Get a little closer, would you, to the microphone. 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Surely, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. The acoustics are not all that good in here, at 

least up here, so get as close as you can. 

Dr. CORDESMAN. I would like to take the few minutes I have for 

my oral statement to concentrate on Afghanistan. The point I 

would like to make is this war is winnable, and that we are losing 

largely because of the failures of the previous administration, the 

U.S. Congress, and indeed, to some extent, the lack of activity by 

the committees dealing with armed services to concentrate on providing the kind of resources that are necessary to win it. 

I fully recognize these failures are scarcely ours alone. They are 

driven by the failures of the Afghan Government, the Pakistani 

military junta, and the divisions in Pakistan that exist today. They 

are driven by the failures of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) allies 

to remove the kinds of caveats that often make their forces and 

their aid personnel ineffective. They are driven by an incompetent 

and corrupt mix of national and international economic aid organizations which do not meet real-world needs, which do not have adequate measurements or management, and which do not really test 

their effectiveness. They are driven by duplicative and ineffective 

command structure and by a mix of coordinating committees in aid 

and other activities that undermine both efforts. 

Let me bring responsibility home. We wouldn’t be where we are 

in Afghanistan if we had accepted the fact that this is primarily 

our war, we had reacted to the growth of the threat, and we had 

provided the resources and leadership we need to win it. 

We wouldn’t be where we are if we had transparency in reporting 

on this war that described the build-up of the threat, the failures 

that were taking place, the problems in the way we have run this 

war, and how that has evolved over the last seven years. We 

wouldn’t be where we are if commanders and ambassadors in Afghanistan had been given the resources that they requested when 

they requested them, and we were not constantly having to react 

to the growth of the threat rather than provide the forces that are 

needed. We wouldn’t be where we are today if we had treated this 

as a war, rather than an exercise in postconflict reconstruction, and 

if we had recognized the fact we have to win that war before we 

can move forward toward any longer-term future for Afghanistan. 

We wouldn’t be where we are if we had recognized the center of 
5 

gravity for al Qaeda and Islamic extremism and terrorism has been 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan, not in Iraq. 

And that said, where do we go from here? I think one of the key 

messages for everyone here is if we cannot salvage this situation 

in 2009 and 2010, there isn’t going to be a mid or long term in Afghanistan. 

How do we do this? I think first you have to have transparency 

and honesty. You have to tell the American people what is really 

required and what is going on. You can’t take a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and bury it, to have it leak in the New York 

Times. You can’t delay a Department of Defense report that has 

negative descriptions of what is happening in the war that is ready 

in October and issue it in January because you have a campaign 

season. You can’t create a Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction and then not fund the office so at best the office will 

begin to function at the end of this calendar year. 

The tools and instruments necessary to win require honesty, 

transparency and communication. The next thing is to focus on 

real-world war goals, not the theory of reconstruction or aid. We 

aren’t going to be able to get to those goals unless we can provide 

the assets to really have a clear, hold and build strategy in the 

field and in the course of the next two years. If we can’t stop a 

growth of the insurgency, which our map shows has been expanding 30 to 50 percent in area coverage per year since 2005, to talk 

about the Afghan compact is an exercise in theory. 

We need to accept the fact that if the resources are going to 

come, they are going to be ours. We recruited our allies for a peacekeeping mission and postconflict reconstruction. They are not going 

to suddenly join us in a serious war at the levels we might like but 

we can’t get. 

And let me say by any standard asking for 30,000 more troops 

for all the tensions and problems that creates within the U.S. military and in dealing with Iraq is almost an absolute minimum of 

what it might take to provide any ability to deal with the threat 

in this area. 

We need to make a serious, sustained, well-funded effort to create Afghan security forces, not have massive swings in funding. We 

need to stop trying to create a conventional police force in midwar 

and concentrate on creating forces that can actually win. We need 

to actually provide the kind of strength that is required in terms 

of U.S. advisors. 

The latest reports indicate we will go through 2010 with less 

than 40 percent of the U.S. military trainers that are needed and 

less than 40 percent of the allied trainers. And the training situation for the police force will be substantially worse. We need to understand that we can’t fix this through the Afghan central government. As in Iraq, we need to have people in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) or Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(EPRTs) who can deal with the local government that can deal 

with the provincial government in the absence of Afghan capabilities. 

We need to address the fact that one of our key tools, the foreign 

aid program, has become corrupt and ineffective. No one has precise figures, because there are no audits, no measures of effective-
6 

ness, no numbers anyone can trust. Afghans estimate that as much 

as 40 percent of the aid money does not really move into the Afghan economy. The U.N. effort is divided; it is repeating a pattern 

of ineffectiveness and corruption. I think this committee could obtain from the World Bank studies that show that none of the implementing U.N. agencies has performed a proper audit in its 

funds, much less measured its effectiveness. 

There are far too many allied and NGO efforts which start things 

they can’t finish. And when we look at our own effort, the key here 

are the PRTs. The latest Department of Defense report shows we 

have over 1,000 U.S. military in our PRTs and less than 40 qualified civilians. As long as that happens, to talk about smart or soft 

power is an exercise in theory for which there can’t be substance. 

We will have to use U.S. military as aid personnel, because they 

are the only people we can bring to the task and the only people 

who can protect themselves. And for many of our allies, it will be 

the same. 

As you have already suggested, this war has to involve Pakistan; 

it has to involve pressure on the Pakistani Government. We have 

to, if we can, find ways to bring this Special Forces training teams 

into some kind of working relationship with the Pakistani military, 

something we have now been waiting on for three to four years. 

Legislation that is pending to provide aid to Pakistan for the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchi areas is 

potentially very rewarding, but if anyone can explain to me where 

the people are coming who can ensure that aid is used honestly, 

and who will provide the aid in the field, I will be much more reassured than I am at the present. 

We need to treat counternarcotics in war terms. This is a noble 

goal after we have reversed the military situation. So far our counternarcotics efforts has done a superb job of moving narcotics south 

and funding the Taliban. The net result is to have no impact on 

street price and demand, and a major impact in aiding the enemy. 

So let me close with these points. In my full testimony I make 

the point that one of the iron laws of governments is there are no 

good intentions, there are only successful actions. We have seven 

years of history of not taking those actions at the level we need to 

take them. I understand that the argument can be this is too hard 

in a Washington environment. Some of you who have been in Afghanistan may see it differently. Too hard here can be too dead in 

the field. And quite frankly, if the choice is one between bureaucracy and body bags, I would hope that we understand. You either 

provide the resources, or you don’t. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cordesman can be found in the 

Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Stephen Biddle. 

STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN BIDDLE, SENIOR FELLOW FOR 

DEFENSE POLICY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Dr. BIDDLE. I would like to start by thanking the committee for 

the chance to speak to you on probably what is the single most important issue in U.S. strategy today, which is how we interrelate 

two ongoing wartime theaters. My sense is that there is pretty 
7 

widespread agreement that in the broad, withdrawals from Iraq 

and reinforcements for Afghanistan are the right way to go, but the 

relative pace of that movement, however, strikes me as much less 

a matter of agreement. 

It seems to me this is probably the most important unresolved 

issue of the moment. I am going to spend my initial statement addressing mostly that. The written submission deals with a wider 

range of issues. 

It seems to me that from the standpoint of stability and U.S. interests in both Iraq and in Afghanistan, slower may very well be 

better in terms of the pace of the transfer out of the Iraq and into 

Afghanistan. We have very important U.S. national strategic interests in both of these theaters, there were important and continuing 

challenges to our interests in both of those theaters, and both of 

these theaters have very important requirements for U.S. resources, and especially troops which cannot simultaneously be in 

both of these theaters. 

What that taken together means is that something has to give. 

We cannot simultaneously get everything we want. We are going 

to have to sacrifice something that is important and something that 

is valuable. And it seems to me that the way to think about where, 

if we have to sacrifice something, is the least dangerous place to 

sacrifice, the issue is not just security trends in each of those theaters at the moment. I think there is general agreement that the 

trend is flat or up in Iraq, but clearly down and importantly so in 

Afghanistan. It seems to me that the key question that one has to 

resolve in assessing the relative pace of pulling troops out of Iraq 

and into Afghanistan is, in fact, the question of where the point of 

no return lies. 

If we are going to have to give something up, in which of these 

two theaters for which pace of withdrawals do we give up something that we cannot recover from as opposed to giving up something that hurts us, but at the end of the day isn’t fatal, or is less 

fatal relative to the risk posed in the other theater? 

Now, I posed this question to the ISAF Command in Afghanistan 

in a recent trip there in November. I asked repeatedly, if the reinforcements don’t come or come too slowly, what is the downside 

risk? What would happen? Not are they desirable. Of course they 

are. Not are they necessary in order to succeed. Of course they are. 

But if, because of demands in another theater, they were slower 

than we like, what would be the consequence? And the answer I 

got was stalemate. The assessment in the theater command was we 

would fail to make progress at the rate that we could. There are 

actually some people in the headquarters who believed that some 

rate of progress was possible through reforms, in several of the 

things, for example, that Dr. Cordesman was talking about, if reinforcements were slower than they would prefer. 

Stalemate is not a good outcome. Many have suggested that insurgents win by not losing, which is another way of saying that 

stalemate hurts the government, and it hurts our side of the war, 

which clearly it does. Stalemate, on the other hand, is a different 

thing from defeat in the near term. And my sense is that the view 

in the theater is that the prospect of defeat in the near term is not 

as great as it might be. It can’t be ruled out. The risk is not as 
8 

great as it might be, not because we are doing brilliantly well and, 

Heaven knows, because the Karzai government is doing brilliantly 

well, but because we are blessed by the fact of a very flawed 

enemy; that the Afghan population at large knows the Taliban 

pretty well at this point, and they don’t like what they saw. Therefore, the Taliban is fighting, in a sense, uphill against the degree 

of drag from a public that doesn’t want that form of government 

if they think there is a meaningful alternative available to them. 

The Taliban is also not a unified military actor. They are a coalition that in some ways has equal or greater problems with divisiveness and lack of unity of command as those we encounter. They 

have a great deal of difficulty coordinating military activities, given 

the lack of unity of command among factions, warlords and other 

components of their alliance, that we do. 

This combination of difficulties on the other side in the view of 

the theater limits their ability to exploit an opening that has been 

handed to them by misgovernance, especially on the part of the 

Karzai government and by an underresourced troop count in the 

theater at the moment. And what we have been seeing is a response in which frustration and in many cases anger with the corruption, the ineptitude, and the inability to deliver basic governmental services on the part of Karzai government is catalyzed by 

perceptions of reducing security to create an opening that the 

Taliban has managed to exploit, but that there are limits on how 

rapidly they can exploit it. 

Perhaps more importantly what this suggests, however, is an opportunity for what David Kilcullen has called a political surge. We 

have serious constraints in our troop count global in our ability to 

transfer them from Iraq to Afghanistan without incurring costs in 

Iraq in the process. There are a variety of important things that 

we can do in the nearer term, however, in trying to reform governance within Afghanistan that do not necessarily impose the same 

opportunity costs on the resources we have committed and continue 

to require in Iraq. 

If we convey to the Karzai government that our assistance is conditional, and if we insist on things like the removal and prosecution 

of corrupt government officials, it may be possible to, at least to a 

degree, address in the near term some of the causes for the precipitous decline in support for the Afghan Government that we have 

seen over the last year at a relatively modest cost in the prospects 

in Iraq. 

Let me say just a brief word or two about the prospects in Iraq 

to set this situation in Afghanistan in context, and then I will stop. 

The situation we face in Iraq at the moment is, in an important 

sense, the early stages of a negotiated settlement to a very intense 

ethnosectarian civil war as had essentially set in in Iraq by 2006. 

The early stages of negotiated settlements to wars of this kind are 

notoriously unstable. Sometimes the peace holds, sometimes the 

peace does not. And in many cases the difference between holding 

and failing is the presence of an outside party; not one of the indigenous former combatants who tend to fear one another’s intentions, 

bordering on the genocidal, but a party who may not be loved, but 

at least not suspected of genocidal intent, that can stabilize an initially unstable cease-fire relationship among former combatants 
9 

while their expectations of one another gradually begin to shift, 

and thus the situation comes to be less on a hair triggering than 

it is in the immediate aftermath of the cease fires that end the violence. 

As expectations change, this outside presence can very often be 

thinned out and reduced without a return to violence. If it happens 

too quickly, on the other hand, the risk of a return to violence in 

Iraq on a 2006 scale or greater is quite significant. And for now the 

only outside party in any plausible position to perform this function 

is the United States. Although we may not be loved by Iraqis, we 

are generally not suspected to be a threat of genocide, as many of 

their internal rivals are seen to be. 

That is the heart of the conflict between Iraq and Afghanistan 

with respect to resource levels. The importance to U.S. national security interests of having Iraq not lapse back into violence and create in the process the risk of destabilizing the Persian Gulf, a region terribly important to vital U.S. national security interests, inheres in our ability to maintain the stability of a cease-fire under 

conditions which in other places elsewhere have often proved to be 

hard to maintain. The presence of U.S. troops to act as peacekeepers is an important contribution to that. That is what poses 

the key trade-off with respect to Afghanistan. 

My sense is that other things being equal, although we need to 

transfer resources, maintaining them in Iraq as long as we can, 

doing what we can in the near term politically in Afghanistan, in 

addition to relatively modest near-term reinforcement may be a 

better way to go than the alternative. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Biddle. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Biddle can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General Jack Keane. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER 

VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General KEANE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority 

Member and members of the committee, for inviting me to testify. 

I have had an enduring relationship with the committee, and I always value the opportunity to share viewpoints on issues vital to 

the national security. 

I am honored to be here with my distinguished colleagues, and 

I associate myself with much of what Steve Biddle just had to say. 

And I harken back to two-and-a-half years ago when the both of 

us were in the White House presenting an alternative strategy to 

the President of the United States on Iraq, and we both agreed 

then. So it is good to see you back talking the same language 

again. 

Let me begin by discussing the key issues on achieving the right 

balance as we shift our priorities from Iraq to Afghanistan. And in 

doing so, I would like to focus my remarks around the following 

issues: sustaining the gains in Iraq, and what is needed to win in 

Afghanistan. 

Sustaining the gains in Iraq. We just observed at the end of last 

month a seminal event, provincial elections in Iraq, which will for-
10 

ever change the political landscape of Iraq and, as a result, will 

have profound impact on the future stability of the region. 

After having won a hard-fought victory over two foreign interventions in Iraq, the al Qaeda, who, in my mind, have been operationally defeated for the last 12 months, and the Iranians, who suffered 

a major setback in March of 2008, and having defeated the mainstream Sunni insurgency, political reconciliation is unfolding right 

before our eyes. 

After three years of a failed strategy in Iraq, from 2003 to 2006, 

we as a Nation finally recognized an undeniable fact: That security 

was a necessary precondition for political progress and economic 

development. As such, a counteroffensive was launched in 2007, 

which in 18 months stabilized the nation sufficiently to permit 17 

of the 18 legislative benchmarks to pass the Iraqi Council of Representatives; amnesty to be granted the Sunni insurgents; an historic strategic framework to be achieved between the Government 

of Iraq and the United States Government; and a framework for 

district, provincial and national elections. 

While the United States and Iraqi troops were critical to achieve 

the stability, they are as critical to maintain it. What is not understood very well is what a large role our forces play in assisting with 

not only security, but political stability and economic development. 

Our brigade combat teams are the glue that has held the political 

reconciliation process together, and they are needed in sufficient 

numbers to assist with the following in 2009: district and subdistrict elections, the disputed boundary issue regarding Kirkuk, a referendum on the Status of Forces Agreement, and national elections 

in December 2009. This is a very full plate in the political developments of Iraq. 

Many of our commanders believe we can draw down troop brigades in 2009 from 14 to 12, with the possibility of a third if this 

momentum continues, followed by a more dramatic reduction in 

2010, and then completing our reduction in 2011. It is our success 

in Iraq which is permitting units who were destined for Iraq to deploy to Afghanistan in 2009. It will take to 2011, in my view, to 

complete the shift in our priorities from Iraq to Afghanistan. 

Can we shift our priorities to Afghanistan and win without 

squandering the gains we have made in Iraq? The answer is a resounding yes, if we have the patience to succeed in Iraq and the 

courage and wisdom to transition properly to Afghanistan. 

What is needed to win in Afghanistan? I am not going to redefine 

the problems that we have in Afghanistan and which you are familiar with and why we have those problems. The essential reason 

is certainly that it has always been a secondary effort for the 

United States government. The primary effort has been Iraq. There 

are other reasons that have contributed to it, and Tony certainly 

outlined those, and I agree with those. I am not going to discuss 

regional issues here; I will focus right in on what we need to do 

to help turn this around. 

First and foremost, and what caused us more setbacks in Iraq 

than any single thing, is to formulate the right strategy. This strategy for Afghanistan defines our objectives and end states, understands the nature and character of the war we are fighting, and 

sets the stage for the application of resources. Remember, we threw 
11 

resources at the problem for three years in Iraq with the wrong 

strategy, and we nearly lost. Our strategy is informed by our national interest in Afghanistan and the region, and it can run the 

full spectrum from total democratic nation building on one end to 

simply denying a terrorist sanctuary on the other. 

Regardless of how comprehensive or limited our overall strategy 

is, we must recognize that we cannot limit proven counterinsurgency practices in our attempt to defeat the insurgency. We should 

not confuse the political and economic end state for Afghanistan, 

particularly if it is limited in scope with what is needed to defeat 

a complicated, entrenched insurgency. 

Secondly, we need a campaign plan, which we do not currently 

have, to provide a much-needed unity of effort. This took many 

weeks to develop in Iraq, and I am certain with the added complexity of a NATO Command, it will take longer. This is very hard 

work because it must be comprehensive, and it involves tough 

choices which have profound consequences. The plan can only be 

formulated by General McKiernan’s headquarters, which is significantly undermanned, to write the plan and to drive the execution. 

The staff should be augmented quickly. 

The centerpiece of the campaign plan will be a counterinsurgency 

effort to defeat the insurgency. As we know, while the military effort receives most of the attention, the plan is largely nonmilitary, 

focusing on political and economic development as security begins 

to be achieved. Therefore, our civilian capacity is needed to match 

the military increase, particularly in provincial reconstruction 

teams, economic development and governance. Equally important, 

and I agree with what Tony Cordesman said, is that necessary financial support to sustain the efforts already mentioned. 

An important point to be made is we should avoid the appeal of 

a shortcut solution by simply focusing on counterterrorist operations; that is, killing and capturing terrorist leaders and targeting 

terrorist networks, which we do. Failure to use counterinsurgency 

operations to protect the population will doom our efforts in Afghanistan. We tried the former in Iraq through 2006 with our Special Operations Forces in the lead against al Qaeda and 150,000 

conventional troops in support, and despite killing Saddam Hussein’s two sons, capturing Saddam Hussein, killing Zarqawi and 

hundreds of other leaders, and literally capturing thousands, we 

nearly lost. Finally, after applying counterinsurgency practices, we 

succeeded. This is the key to breaking the will of the insurgency. 

Now, I am not suggesting that Afghanistan is Iraq. It is not. The 

insurgencies are quite different. But proven counterinsurgency 

practices applied to the uniqueness of Afghanistan is the answer. 

As we develop counterinsurgency practices, the obvious issue is we 

are fighting a rural insurgency versus the urban insurgency we 

had in Iraq, with less tolerance in Afghanistan for physical presence or occupation of towns, villages and cities. Nevertheless, we 

must protect the population by securing and serving the people. As 

General Petraeus phrases it, we become ‘‘good neighbors.’’ 

Once the population knows that allied Afghan forces are staying, 

it opens up the opportunity for more success against the insurgence, and as such, we pursue the enemy relentlessly, never giving 

them an opportunity to reset. Some will lose their will and want 
12 

to reconcile, and we must not only be open to it, but encouraging 

it. 

Critical to the unity of effort of the counterinsurgency plan is an 

operational headquarters to coordinate and supervise the tactical 

operational fight. What is needed is a three-star operational headquarters, either a Corps headquarters from the Army or a threestar Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) headquarters from the 

Marines. This frees up General McKiernan’s headquarters to focus 

on the nonmilitary line of operation so critical to success, as well 

as the training of the Afghan National Security Forces. 

Of course, we must not only rely on our allies in Afghanistan, but 

particularly on the Afghan National Army, which should grow beyond the 130,000 planned, which I believe the command is considering, in my mind, to some 300,000. This requires more trainers; 

more embedded training teams; more military enablers to assist 

them, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, more military police, more engineers, logistics, and more 

Special Operations Forces and civil affairs units to defeat the insurgency. 

I pause here as a reminder. In 2007 alone, we put 125,000 Iraqi 

soldiers on the streets adequately trained to deal with the counteroffensive that we were in the middle of. So when people say it is 

too hard, not true. We can do this with the trainers and also with 

the financial resources to assist. 

We know the Karzai government is ineffective, deeply corrupt, 

and losing the support of the Afghan people. Elections will be held 

in August. It may be in our interest to encourage some significant 

alternative candidates, or, at a minimum, if we are reluctant to do 

that, in exchange for our continued support to insist that Karzai 

makes the necessary changes with our assistance. The status quo 

with this government is unacceptable. The thought of five more 

years with this government is intimidating. 

The key is to develop local solutions that are connected to the 

central government, but not necessarily completely controlled by it. 

As I see it, we should spend 2009 getting our strategy right in Afghanistan, which must be vetted with our allies, then formulating 

a campaign plan based on that strategy, and then setting the conditions for a military counteroffensive in 2010 based on the above. 

I recognize that we are rushing some forces to Afghanistan in 2009, 

and I believe we will continue to put forces there in 2010 and in 

2011, but we need to use the time now to set the proper conditions 

for the introduction of our forces, which will grow in size over the 

next two to three years. 

A large part of our success depends on convincing the enemy and 

all of our stakeholders that we are dead serious about winning and 

are committed to see it through. Anything less encourages the 

enemy, weakens the resolve of our allies, to include Pakistan, and 

undermines the support of the American people. 

Public support for our effort cannot be overstated, and protracted 

counterinsurgencies test the resolve of the most committed nations. 

As such, it is crucial that the President and national leaders communicate our strategy, why it is important, and in general what 

are our plans, and do that to the American people. We must educate and inform them on the nature of the war and why thousands 
13 

of insurgents who are lightly armed can challenge a larger, much 

better armed and trained force, and as such, why it takes as much 

time as it does to win. 

Most insurgencies are, in fact, defeated, but almost all take considerable time. Steady progress, despite occasional setbacks, with 

forthright and frank assessments is key to our public support. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane can be found in the 

Appendix on page 80.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Janet St. Laurent. 

STATEMENT OF JANET ST. LAURENT, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity. 

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Get a little closer. 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity 

to be here today to talk about the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO’s) perspective on a number of operational considerations 

that will have to be factored into the development and execution 

of strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan. 

As you know, GAO has done considerable work looking at the 

military operation in Iraq, and also Iraq reconstruction as well as 

Afghanistan reconstruction, and based on this work I would like to 

provide a few observations on strategy issues, but also then discuss 

several of the nuts-and-bolts operations issues that need to be considered in terms of the pace and timing of reposturing. 

First, from our perspective, it is very important that improvements are needed to ensure that U.S. strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan is developed using a governmentwide approach that supports 

ongoing coordination. Our work in both countries continues to highlight situations in which the Department of Defense (DOD), the 

U.S. Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have not fully coordinated their efforts. For example, we have reported that DOD had not fully coordinated its effort to reconstruct roads in Afghanistan with 

USAID. Also, DOD and State have not developed a unified, comprehensive plan to guide U.S. efforts to develop the capacity of Afghan National Security Forces. Those are just a couple of examples 

from our work. 

Second, revised strategies will need to balance the specific goals, 

measures and time frames with the available resources. This 

means that DOD will need to carefully consider the availability of 

forces, equipment and transportation assets when developing plans 

for Afghanistan, given the stress on the force during the past several years and DOD’s large footprint in Iraq. 

Third, attention will be needed to ensure that U.S. efforts are executed in a manner that places priority on using resources effectively and efficiently in order to minimize waste and mismanagement. Congress has appropriated over $800 billion for Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to 

date, and billions more will be required to support a new strategy. 
14 

It will be especially important in light of competing demands on 

the Federal budget that DOD make a concerted effort to avoid numerous problems with contractors that have occurred in Iraq, and 

carefully screen urgent requirements for procuring new types of 

equipment that might be needed in Afghanistan given the different 

nature of the terrain. 

Regarding Iraq, one major issue confronting the new Administration will be to determine whether the pace of the drawdown should 

be calendar driven in light of the terms of the new SOFA agreement, or based on achieving certain goals and conditions. Until 

now, the planning the DOD has done for a drawdown has been 

based on a conditions-based approach. However, until the new Administration unveils a new strategy, the way ahead is somewhat 

uncertain. 

Second, developing plans to manage a potential drawdown of up 

to 140,000 military personnel, numerous contractors and vast 

stocks of equipment will be a daunting task. For example, closing 

up to 300 facilities in Iraq will be a complex, time-consuming and 

costly process, especially at places like Balad Air Force Base, which 

has over 24,000 people. Army officials estimate that a facility of 

that size might take about 18 months to turn over to the Iraqis or 

close. 

DOD will also need to coordinate the movement and retrograde 

of hundreds of thousands of pieces of equipment and establish a 

clear chain of command to manage that effort. The pace of the 

drawdown will also be affected by the capacity of facilities in neighboring countries such as Kuwait, as well as by the limited availability of certain equipment such as heavy transports. 

Finally, DOD will need a well-thought-out plan to manage the 

drawdown of up to 150,000 contractors. While DOD planners have 

begun to develop these plans, much work remains to be done, and 

some initial planing assumptions may need to be revisited depending on the new strategy. 

In Afghanistan, U.S. strategists and DOD planners will need to 

consider a more wide-ranging set of factors given the austere state 

of Afghanistan’s infrastructure and mountainous terrain. Regarding military forces’ demands, certain types of skill sets and ranks, 

such as civil affairs, transportation, engineers, trainers, which require large numbers of midgrade officers and senior noncommissioned officers, will be challenging to fill given the already high 

pace of operations for these skills and ranks. 

Equipment needs may also be difficult to fill quickly, given that 

DOD has the equivalent of 47 brigades’ worth of equipment in Iraq 

as of last year and has already drawn on some prepositioned equipment. Unlike in Iraq, the Afghanistan theater of operation lacks 

large stocks of theater-provided equipment. This will make it more 

difficult to fully equip and transport new units deploying from the 

United States, many of which have significant equipment shortages. These issues can be addressed over time, but it is a matter 

of the pacing and considering the operation tempo of personnel. 

Transportation using both air/land and overland supply routes, 

airlift and overland supply routes are also likely to pose a number 

of challenges with regard to both security issues, distance and access to neighboring countries. 
15 

Finally, DOD may also have to manage and build up a contract 

workforce in Afghanistan to help support a growing military presence and will need to adequately train military commanders to do 

effective contractor oversight. 

So, in conclusion, planners will need to consider Afghanistan’s 

unique nature, but apply lessons learned over the years from Iraq 

when appropriate. Also, U.S. strategies for both countries will need 

to be integrated and synchronized to ensure competing resources 

are prioritized effectively, and that DOD retains the residual capability to meet the needs of other combatant commanders. Thank 

you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. St. Laurent can be found in the 

Appendix on page 91.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General Keane, in your statement you say the 

public support for our effort cannot be overstated, and projected 

counterinsurgencies test the resolve of most committed nations. 

If we look back to 9/11, at that time we fully realized that the 

genesis of our problems stemmed from the al Qaeda in Afghanistan. You stressed the fact we need the support of the American 

people in this insurgency in Afghanistan. 

Let us lay Iraq aside right now. How do we at this stage of the 

game, after these years, obviously with no successful strategic 

thought being given to that effort, how do we at this stage of the 

game get the full support of the American people that is needed? 

General KEANE. I think that is a great question because it is so 

essential for success. There are many strategic reviews that are 

taking place right now. The White House, the National Security 

Council is involved in one, and certainly General Petraeus in the 

theater, and I’m sure special envoy Ambassador Richard Holbrooke 

is making an assessment. 

I think what will come out of that is a strategy and decisions associated with that. And then I would hope that we will craft a campaign plan in support of that. But then once we decide on what the 

way ahead is in Afghanistan, with a new President here, it is an 

opportunity, a dramatic transition of power like this—it gives this 

President the opportunity to connect with the American people on 

this issue. And I think you communicate very directly to the American people about what the strategy is, what we are trying to accomplish, and the general sense of—without getting into specifics 

of our plans—but what the character of our operations are going 

to be like. 

And I think this is the beginning of an education process that the 

President and other national leaders like yourselves stay in contact 

with the American people on this. We will have our setbacks. I 

think if you sort of report out to the American people on a regular 

basis, three or four times a year on the war and what is working 

and what is not working, and they get a sense of it, our credibility 

stays intact with the American people as national leaders. Because 

it is not always going to work. The enemy has a vote all the time 

in war. They will do some things and will have opportunities to expose some of our vulnerabilities, as they always do. And when that 

happens, we are just very forthright about it. We will miscalculate 

at times, and when it happens, let us be honest about it, but stay 
16 

focused on what we are trying to achieve. At times we will have 

to rheostat the mission a little bit. We will change because the 

enemy is changing and adjust and keep the American people informed. 

I think continuous discussion about what the strategy is, what 

the results of it are in terms of our performance, what is working 

and not working, the adjustments we are making. We are not insulting the American people; the collective wisdom is extraordinary. And I think there is an opportunity for them to stay connected with us as a result as national leaders go forward and our 

forces and our effort goes forward. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. 

Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Editorial content, as I said, we just came back on Monday with 

respect to what General Keane said. The thing our commanders 

seem somewhat concerned about, understandably from their perspective, is that the American people had best be advised that 

when we add troops, and we go in, particularly in the south into 

the poppy-growing regions, there is going to be a damn tough war, 

and there will be casualties, and there will be losses. So I think it 

really underscores what General Keane said is that it is the responsibility of those of us across the spectrum, including here in 

Congress, to ensure that the American people understand the urgency of this fight. Editorial content to the questions. 

I would like to read a passage from Dr. Cordesman’s testimony 

that I had the opportunity to read last evening. And he is talking 

about some of the evaluation data that we are looking at with respect to Afghanistan, about increases in military clashes, direct fire 

incidences, et cetera. And in commenting on those data, he said, 

‘‘Second’’—second of a point he made—‘‘they,’’ the data, ‘‘show 

that...‘post-conflict reconstruction’ is little more than a sick joke. To 

get to the mid and long term, we have to survive and dominate the 

present. If we succeed, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan 

will be so different by 2011 that we will have to reshape almost 

every aspect of our aid and development plans to set far more realistic and modest goals based on the art of the possible and Afghan 

and Pakistani desires, rather than our efforts to design model 

countries in our own image. If we fail, there will be no mid and 

long term in any sense that makes current plans even mildly relevant.’’ 

That is a pretty profound paragraph. Interestingly, it plays off 

what General McKiernan said to us when we talked about sustainability of the Afghan Government over the longer term. He said, 

‘‘Well, to get to that point you have got to win the fight.’’ 

I would ask all four of you, how would you define winning in Afghanistan? And if you would like to contrast that to Iraq, of course 

please feel free to do so. 

But I think that is the key challenge right now. What does success in Afghanistan look like, or hopefully what will it look like? 

And Dr. Cordesman, because I quoted you, I would ask you to kind 

of lead that off. 
17 

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think in Iraq the phrase is, ‘‘Is Iraq good 

enough?’’ And in Afghanistan and Pakistan it is, ‘‘Is Afghanistan 

and Pakistan good enough?’’ 

We are not going to create model democratic governments. We 

are not going to move them toward sustained economic development. We are not going to restructure all of the cultural, tribal 

and—values that some people once saw as a goal. And I think Secretary Gates made this point quite validly for Afghanistan. 

But what you do have to do is move toward a level of stability 

where you can begin to honestly talk about post-conflict reconstruction. You need to create successful Afghan and Pakistani forces 

which can take over the mission. You need to have aid that meets 

what people need, a country that is 70 percent agricultural and is 

getting about 14 percent of the aid flow into agricultural areas. 

These are the kinds of things which we might be able to achieve 

over the next few years. But to get there, the real issue right now 

is to have stability and to reverse the trends. 

And here I have to frankly disagree very flatly with Dr. Biddle 

and to some extent with General Keane. I haven’t seen any of these 

trends that indicate we are headed toward a stalemate. What I 

have seen is just the reverse. In the NATO/ISAF data, the U.N. 

data, the data that I see come out of other groups assessing this 

is that we suffered major reversals throughout this year both in the 

rise in violence and in the loss of areas which are under Taliban, 

Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and Haqqani influence. 

Now, one answer to your question is, whatever happens, we cannot emerge from this and call it victory if there are still al Qaeda, 

Taliban and extremist sanctuaries inside Pakistan. And we can’t 

emerge out of this and call it ‘‘victory’’ if we win the kinetic events, 

as we tend to, but we see the area under Taliban and other influence increase by 30 to 50 percent a year, as we have continuously 

since 2005. 

And if I may just briefly close, Mr. Chairman, it is interesting 

to talk about the Taliban being unpopular. There has been a major 

shift towards acceptance of the Taliban. And, in contrast, in a recent ABC poll—and I think it is borne out by U.N. and U.S. polls— 

the number of people who feel the United States has performed 

well in Afghanistan in Afghanistan has been cut in half in the last 

3 years. 

It has gone from 68 percent in 2005 to 32 percent now. The number of supporters of the NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan fell 

from 67 percent in 2006 to 37 percent this year. The number of 

people who justify attacks on NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan 

rose from 13 percent to 25 percent over that same period of time. 

And when you look at the reaction to NATO’s current force structure in Afghanistan, you see that because of the need to rely so 

much on air power, we can almost map by district where NATO is 

actually present and using air power in the unpopularity of NATO 

forces and NATO capabilities in the region. 

The other last point I guess I should make: I am not sure we disagree that much about troop levels. But where I think we do need 

to focus much more is not on what General McKiernan is being 

given by way of total troops, but the fact that we don’t have advisers; we are not having civilians put in the field, you have stopped 
18 

funding for many aspects of aid in the course of this year, and you 

have massively cut the amount of money going for Afghan force development. That isn’t a matter of balance in troop levels; it is a 

matter of funding what you need to do in Afghanistan. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Doctor. 

Dr. Biddle. 

Dr. BIDDLE. Let me begin by responding to your question, and 

then if I may, I will respond briefly to Dr. Cordesman as well. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I would appreciate that. 

Dr. BIDDLE. Ultimately, war is about political aims. So defining 

whether or not you win or lose is in reference to the aims for which 

you are fighting. And I think there is some degree of consensus 

that there are two really central U.S. aims in Afghanistan: that Afghanistan not become a haven for al Qaeda, as it was prior to 2001; 

but also—and I would argue, more importantly—that Afghanistan 

not become a haven for destabilizing Pakistan. Because the objective threat to U.S. national interests in Pakistan is in many ways 

much greater than it is in Afghanistan. 

Al Qaeda has many potential havens. Afghanistan is one. It is 

not necessarily even the best. In many ways, Pakistan is a much 

more serious problem, but it is a problem over which we have very 

limited leverage. If we have a serious problem which there are limited things we can do to improve—there are some and we should 

do them and we haven’t been, but at the end of the day, our leverage in Pakistan is not what it is in some other places. 

Arguably, we should at least obey the Hippocratic Oath and do 

no harm. And should Afghanistan collapse into chaos or return to 

Taliban rule, it would then become an important haven for destabilizing Pakistan. Those are our two primary interests. 

Given that, the way that I would define ‘‘victory’’ is, we have secured those two interests. At the end of the process, Afghanistan 

is not a plausible terrorist haven for attacks on the continental 

United States, and it is not a plausible threat to the stability of its 

neighbor across the border. 

The kind of government domestically in Kabul that achieves 

those two ends I am quite agnostic with respect to. Other things 

being equal, I would prefer for Afghanistan the things I would prefer for any Nation in the world: a degree of representative government, prosperity, liberty, many, many other things; and surely at 

some level we should seek those for Afghanistan. I am not willing 

to wage war for all of the things that I would like to see in Afghanistan. 

In terms of the waging of war and the U.S. vital national interests at stake that should guide the definition of victory and defeat 

in the conduct of a war, I would limit those to the presence of base 

camps and the threat to its neighbor. 

I suspect at the end of the day that some degree of legitimacy 

in Kabul or somewhere within the Government of Pakistan will be 

necessary in order to achieve those ends. But I tend to view the 

question of how Afghanistan should be governed as a means and 

not an end. Any form of government in Afghanistan that at the end 

of the day is sufficient to deny its use as a haven I am prepared 

to settle for. And I suspect that something a good deal less Jeffersonian in Kabul will probably suffice to that end. 
19 

Let me now turn briefly to the question of prognosis, if you will, 

in Afghanistan. And heaven knows, I would have no disagreement 

with the gravity of the situation and the negative nature of current 

trends. I think there is universal agreement that the war has not 

been going well. The question is not what the current trend is and 

what has happened over the last year. The question is the projection forward from that trend; and this is a much, much dicier business on which available evidence gives us a weaker basis. 

If we had the ability to devote now the entirety of the resources 

that will ultimately be required to secure those two strategic interests I mentioned a moment ago, of course we should, and we take 

risks by not doing that. The problem is, of course we can’t. We have 

other demands for the same resources. And given that, you have 

to make a choice not about what you would like to do, but about 

how much disadvantage, in which of these two theaters you think 

you can survive. 

And especially given another point of agreement that I have with 

Dr. Cordesman, which is the importance of nontroop contributions 

to both the decline in our fortunes in Afghanistan recently and the 

requirements there to improve, many of which we have less requirement for in Iraq, I would like to see a political surge, a more 

well-coordinated, all-of-government approach to dealing with the 

problem in Afghanistan, a more systematic integration of our aid 

effort with a political strategy with a military strategy that I agree 

needs substantial development. All of that can be done much more 

quickly and can help reduce the odds—it can never eliminate them, 

but can help reduce the odds—that we get so deeply into failure 

and lack of progress in Afghanistan that we cannot then dig ourselves out, once we develop the ability to transfer the troops to add 

the military piece of the puzzle that is stabilizing the country. 

Mr. MCHUGH. General. 

General KEANE. Yes. I also agree that our number one national 

interest in the region is Pakistan. And the relationship of Afghanistan to Pakistan is significant, so what we are trying to do in Afghanistan is very important to the future stability of Pakistan. 

That said, in my own mind our strategy and goals should be 

somewhat limited in terms of an end state in Afghanistan. And by 

that I mean, we clearly—to win and what does it look like, we have 

to defeat the insurgency. 

Now, when is an insurgency defeated? Well, it leaves the battlefield and chooses not to engage is one form of defeat. Or, as in Iraq, 

which is the best of all answers, it comes into the political process 

because it has some desire and some expectation that this political 

process will reward them, though they will not be able to seek 

those rewards using guns, because that failed. 

So that is the way that would manifest itself. And I would think 

it would be the latter in Afghanistan, as it is in Iraq. Reconcilables 

will come into the political process; irreconcilables will not, and 

they will go away. 

Secondly, the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National 

Security Forces themselves must have the capacity to provide for 

their own internal security. And we can measure that, as we are 

measuring it in Iraq. So that is another indicator of what is taking 

place. And some form of representative government that has to 
20 

connect to the people at the local level with some form of control, 

but not completely control in those outcomes. 

And I don’t think we need to be prescriptive about this. I think 

we should try to guide it so the—and guide away from the significant amount of corruption we now have with this very weak, inept 

central government. 

But some of the things on the margin here, just trying to be honest about this: It is a relatively uneducated class in Afghanistan 

and high illiteracy rates. It is a significantly impoverished nation 

that depends on an opium trade to help it survive. Twenty years 

from now most of those conditions will still be there; we have to 

be honest about this. And how far, how far do we extend American 

lives to change those major challenges? 

I don’t think we extend them to that distance. I think we do 

what we said: We take the threat away, the insurgency. And we 

have the means to do that; we know how to do this. And we can 

stand up a military that is capable of protecting its people. And I 

think we can influence a government to be better than what it currently is. This will take resources, and most importantly, this will 

take time. And, of course, it will take the blood of our troops as 

well to achieve this. 

Another point, and I said this in the statement, and it is an important point for me because I think we fall prey to this. If we are 

going to have a limited strategic objective, say close to something 

Steve and I have discussed, that doesn’t mean that you limit the 

resources that you are applying to achieve that limited objective. 

Quite the contrary, if we are going to defeat the insurgency, it has 

to be all in with political resources, with governance resources, and 

with economic resources in addition to the obvious, a sufficient 

amount of troops to be able to do that. 

So I think this will have an appeal to some if we are going to 

limit the strategy and outcomes; therefore, we don’t have to pay as 

much of a price even to get a limited outcome. And we should be 

very careful about that because defeating an insurgency does require a significant price. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Ms. St. Laurent. 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Our work speaks generally to the kinds of key 

elements that will need to be included in a broad, comprehensive 

strategy, that being an integrated approach that does reflect the 

contributions of civilians and AID and State, as well as DOD, and 

the identification of the kinds of resources that are going to be required and, also, measures to assess progress along the way. 

Having said that, I think clearly elements of those plans that are 

likely to be developed by the new Administration will need to focus 

on ways to improve security—certainly, an additional emphasis on 

training up of Afghan security forces, and then an emphasis on an 

absence of terrorist safe havens in the region. 

But one key thing, as we continue to do work in Afghanistan, 

that we will be focusing on and looking at is whether or not, again, 

these resources are being applied effectively. And to date, we have 

seen a number of problems in those areas. For example, in terms 

of control over weapons, we have a report that will be coming out 

this morning that focuses on weapons being given to Afghan security forces that DOD has not maintained adequate control and ac-
21 

counting for those weapons. And we certainly don’t want to create 

conditions in which problems could emerge by the failure to sort of 

administer any additional assistance that we are providing effectively. 

And also, with regard to the Afghan security forces, I think a key 

issue for DOD is going to be how to come up with the additional 

forces to do that training and assistance to develop those units. 

DOD does not have the existing force structure where we have 

these training units. We put them together for Iraq, and now the 

demands to do that in Afghanistan are most likely going to increase. 

So I think it is an issue that perhaps will need to be examined 

in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review, and as the Administration again develops its strategy for Afghanistan. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I started on an editorial comment; let me please 

end with one. And I apologize for taking so much time. 

Let me first say that I couldn’t agree with General Keane more. 

Because we redefine success in Afghanistan in somewhat a more 

modest way, a different way than Iraq, that doesn’t mean we can 

do it in a way that is less taxing, less expensive, and less burdensome across the spectrum. 

The second thing I would say is a word of caution. And with respect to Ms. St. Laurent’s comments, we can’t do this alone. This 

is a NATO mission. This is not officially a U.S. mission, and we 

have to rely upon our NATO partners, whether it is the carabiniere 

or whoever, who did a very admirable job in Iraq training up the 

national police and stepping forward. And I think the American 

people must be advised as well. 

In my judgment, at the end of the day, after we create a sufficient Afghan National Police, a sufficient Afghan National Army, 

and security forces across the board that can do the things we want 

to have done in that theater, it is unlikely the Afghan national 

economy can support that. 

We are going to have to make a very long-term commitment to 

this. There is no way to do it on the cheap. And I just think in the 

spirit of what several of you said of being open and honest to the 

American people, it should be said here as well. 

Thank you all for being here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

We are now under the five-minute rule. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I want to thank our panel for being here. 

I think it is accurate to say that the surge worked. It is also accurate to say that simultaneous to the surge, the Marines in Anbar 

came to the conclusion that they could pay the Sheiks to pay their 

tribesmen to not only stop shooting at Americans, but to start protecting Americans. 

In the beginning it was American money that made this accommodation work. Now I am told that Iraqi oil money, through a 

power-sharing agreement that looks, in my opinion, more like the 

Magna Carta than a Jeffersonian democracy, is taking place, but 

at least it appears that some sort of a power-sharing agreement 
22 

with the Sheiks has been made, and they are shooting at a lot 

fewer Americans. I consider that a good thing. 

Using that model and using what General Keane just said 

about—I am told the Afghans refer to Karzai as ‘‘The American 

Bull,’’ mockingly—that really is a tribal society. 

General, is it your opinion that our military is now trying to 

focus more on an accommodation with the different tribal warlords 

than trying to create some sort of a central government? 

I am not of the opinion that there ever was a strong central government in Kabul, and I really don’t see how the American presence can create something that has never really existed in that 

country. Maybe our goals, as you said, we ought to be shooting for 

a little bit higher standard. But I am just—again, I am hearing— 

I am in agreement with what I am hearing from you. I am just curious if the American military is going to step to, which is a direct 

accommodation with the different tribal leaders around that country. 

General KEANE. Yes. I think one of the things that should inform 

us, and some things that happened in Iraq, you know, at least can 

help educate us where there are some similarities. And there are 

some similarities here. 

But one of the things I learned in being intimately involved in 

the situation in Iraq is, to change behavior, you have to break the 

will of your opponent. And—Sun Tzu always said this, and it reminded me of what we did in Iraq again. 

I can remember one of the Sheiks who was also an insurgent 

leader. We talked to many of them. He said, You know, after America occupied Baghdad—and I never thought of it in that way, but 

from his perspective it is true—we knew we couldn’t win. So what 

he was doing then is negotiating with us for the best deal he could 

get. Initially it started out to be financial for the Sons of Iraq program, but then he is in the political process now, which is fascinating. 

So we have to deal with that issue first. You can’t sit down with 

the Taliban now and reconcile. Why would they reconcile? They are 

winning. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, if I may, it is my understanding that—I 

am separating the tribal warlords from the Taliban. I don’t think 

they are one and the same. 

General KEANE. I understand. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Correct me if I am wrong. 

General KEANE. Tribal leaders and Taliban, particularly in the 

south, a lot of that is one and the same, much as it was in Iraq. 

You are talking to a Sheik, an insurgent leader in Iraq, you are 

also—they are one and the same. 

In the south, it is not unanimous, but you are dealing with the 

same kinds of people. So we have to change that behavior. Many 

of them, I think, are reconcilable, but that takes time for them to 

recognize they cannot achieve their goals in the manner that they 

are currently trying to achieve them and that there are opportunities for them. 

But that is not going to be done overnight, and certainly it is not 

the power of persuasion that does that at all. It is the harsh realities on the ground that do that. 
23 

But the people are a major factor in this as well. I mean, they 

really do have influence. It is not just the leaders themselves. 

Mr. TAYLOR. How do you fund it? In Iraq you had oil to fund everything. How do you fund it in Afghanistan? 

General KEANE. In Afghanistan it will have to be largely our resources and NATO resources. I mean, that is one of the problems 

we are dealing with here. There is no wealth to speak of. And the 

funding, as Congressman—the ranking minority mentioned, Congressman McHugh—one of the reluctances, one of the reasons why 

we are sitting at 80,000 Afghan National Security Forces now, and 

going to 130,000 when we should be at least twice all of that, is 

because of the sustainment costs for that. 

We would have to provide the sustainment costs, which is not 

true in Iraq. They are paying for it themselves. And that is why 

we are at the numbers we are at now. And out of the 80,000, probably 40-, 50,000 is what is really effective. So we have to get over 

this in terms of resources or we are going to protract our stay, and 

then eventually we will walk away; and that is not the answer. 

But to get back to your point, I am convinced in my own mind 

that there is much that could be done with the tribal leaders, less 

so with these warlords that are well known. I do think we will continue to have a weak central government even if we have a new 

leader. But the important thing is some representation at the local 

level that is connected to the people and understands their needs, 

at least so that resources can be funneled to them and there is a 

connection there. I think we can assist with some of this. 

We can’t remake their whole governance issue in Afghanistan, 

nor should we try, as I have said before. But I think we can make 

some reasonable progress here. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

I hope that you can help me frame an answer to a question for 

which I do not have a good answer. 

I understand that when the Soviets were going into Afghanistan 

they were asked if they had seen all those rocks in Afghanistan. 

Yes. Well, have you noticed all the British blood on those rocks in 

Afghanistan? If you would like Soviet blood on those rocks in Afghanistan, just try to do what the British could not do. 

I know that one may argue that this is different because now we 

are not fighting against the central government, we are fighting 

with the central government. But then the response is, Gee, the 

central government is just terribly weak. The areas where the bad 

guys are the federal government has very little control. And if, in 

fact, we are able to do, they ask me, what the Soviets and the British could not do, and stabilize Afghanistan so that the bad guys are 

no longer there, they will just have gone across the border into 

Pakistan, where they are not unwelcomed. 

So the question is, why are we not engaged in an exercise in futility? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. If I may make a first stab at this, Congressman, 

I think that if we were to repeat the Russian or the British experience, we would have an exercise in futility. But I think, as there 
24 

is some agreement in this panel, if the focus is to create successful 

Afghan security forces, if it is to move from what has been sort of 

tactical clashes to a, ‘‘clear, hold, build,’’ strategy where you are 

also developing capabilities for local governance and stability in the 

fields which are Afghan rather than ours, then I think it isn’t an 

exercise in futility. And I think we would be much further along 

in demonstrating that, much less dependent on U.S. troops, if we 

had recognized this and funded it early on. 

Right now, we have 1,000 of the 3,000 U.S. advisers, all of whom 

are not trained, necessary to deal with the Afghan Army. NATO 

has less than a third of its teams. When it comes down to the Afghan police, which is a critical aspect of substituting for us, we 

have all of 800 of the 2,400 people to deal with the current force. 

And where the Congress once peaked this effort at $7.3 billion in 

fiscal 2007, you are funding it at two billion this year; and you 

have just nearly doubled the goal for the Afghan Army. 

So it isn’t an exercise in futility if you provide the resources. But 

this is not just troop levels. And one thing we have to do is start 

talking numbers and hard facts and real options, not concepts. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Sir, but then they tell me, So what? Even if we 

are able to accomplish this, and the bad guys have simply gone 

across the border into Pakistan, where they are not unwelcome, 

what have we accomplished with the enormous investment of 

American blood and treasure? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think if you are talking the bad guys in very 

limited numbers pushed across the border, if you are talking the 

kind of programs I have seen to provide aid to Pakistan, if we were 

able to implement—and it is hard to get into details here—options 

for using Special Operations Forces to help train the Pakistanis, 

who ultimately are not going to allow these bad guys to stay there 

indefinitely because they threaten Pakistan, not just Afghanistan, 

you have options. 

Can anybody promise success? I don’t think anybody can. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Does Pakistan have any more control over these 

border areas or have much more control than Afghanistan does? 

They are fairly autonomous, are they not? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Well, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

are not autonomous at all. What they are is under control of the 

Pakistani military, because they have never been fully integrated 

into the Pakistani Government structure. If the Pakistani military 

chooses to deal with that region, it is completely different from 

having an episodic Pakistani presence, where often you have divisions within the Pakistani military. 

We have not pressured them hard. In the Baluchi area we have 

the same problem. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Snyder, please. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this discussion today. The phrase ‘‘exercise in futility,’’ I 

would say our discussion today is an exercise in realism. And I appreciate you-all’s contribution to that kind of discussion as we look 

forward. 
25 

I have two questions, one for you, General Keane, and then one 

for Dr. Cordesman, which means you have got to answer in about 

two minutes, General Keane, so I can get on to my second question 

with Dr. Cordesman. 

On page five of your written statement you say the following, 

quote, ‘‘Can we shift our priorities to Afghanistan and win without 

squandering the gains we have made in Iraq? The answer is a resounding ‘yes,’ if we have the patience to succeed in Iraq and the 

courage and wisdom to transition properly to Afghanistan.’’ That is 

a quote from your written statement. 

You retired in December of 2003. If we go back to mid-2002 and 

I phrased that question differently and said, ‘‘Now,’’ mid-2002, in 

the run-up to the invasion in Iraq, ‘‘can we shift our priorities to 

Iraq and win without squandering the gains we have made in Afghanistan?’’ I think today we would conclude—this is no longer 

your quote—that the answer turns out to have been a resounding 

‘‘no,’’ that as we shifted our focus and priorities and personnel, we 

did squander the gains we had made in Afghanistan. 

How can you so solidly say today that the answer is a resounding 

‘‘yes’’? And also did that kind of discussion occur in 2002? Was that 

question you asked so well, eloquently there today, was that question discussed in 2002? 

General KEANE. That is hard to answer in two minutes. But I 

was there when this issue arose. There were some of us who expressed concern about moving away from Afghanistan and putting 

the priority on Iraq, particularly at this time. The first time that 

issue arose was around Thanksgiving, December of 2001, so weeks 

after we toppled the Taliban. 

Dr. SNYDER. You mean the first time the issue—— 

General KEANE. The issue of Iraq arose as an objective. 

And our concerns were, at that time, Why, why would we do that 

now, given the fact that we have just brought the Taliban down, 

we have the al Qaeda on the run, we have got to stay after these 

guys? 

After all, we went there for two reasons. One is the host, the 

Taliban, for the sanctuary, we had to take the host away, and we 

also had to eliminate the sanctuary, which was al Qaeda. So now 

we were after the sanctuary, and we were running after them. And 

we had Special Operations doing it, and we had lots of platforms 

doing it, and we had a limited amount of forces doing it. We should 

have had a lot more doing it. We lost that argument as well. So— 

yes, that is true. 

And clearly, the priorities in Iraq enabled the resurgence—we 

did eliminate the sanctuary. It did go away. But it did permit the 

reemergence of the Taliban. And I also think it caused the Pakistanis—and this is crucial. It caused Musharraf himself—I believe 

when we made the overture to NATO and asked them to come in 

and take over in Afghanistan, I think Musharraf believed at that 

moment the U.S. was not committed to Afghanistan, and he started 

working both sides of this issue as a hedge against the possible return of the Taliban in the future. And it is the reason why those 

sanctuaries are still there today. And I am talking about the Afghan sanctuary in Pakistan. 
26 

Dr. SNYDER. I am going to interrupt you, General Keane, but I 

appreciate what you have outlined, because what you are saying is, 

we are older and wiser now, and we have learned from that experience and what can happen. 

Dr. Cordesman, I want to read a statement from your written 

statement. I don’t understand the sentence very well. I think there 

is a whole lot on page 13. 

You say, quote, ‘‘The State Department, AID, and Department of 

Defense have failed to develop an integrated aid plan, budget request, and provide the personnel and funding needed for urgent 

warfighting needs.’’ Then you say, ‘‘This needs to be forced upon 

the executive branch, and the senior officials involved need to be 

held personally accountable on a regular basis.’’ 

I am not sure what you are saying there. Are you saying, I take 

it the State Department needs to provide the personnel and funding needed for urgent warfighting needs? I don’t think the State 

Department sees that as their goal. Are you saying they need an 

integrated budget request, that we should just have one glob of 

money, the State Department, Department of Defense together? 

I just don’t understand that sentence or what you are trying to 

get at there. 

Dr. CORDESMAN. First, we have a vast amount of U.S. money 

going in there that never gets into the field, into the districts, 

where it is vital to providing governance, economic stability, the 

‘‘build’’ side of ‘‘clear and hold.’’ And that basically is the function, 

that there is no one really in charge of the various aid programs 

that tie together things like Commanders’ Emergency Response 

Program (CERP), what comes out of the PRTs, and the overall aid 

program. 

AID is not in charge of aid, the State Department doesn’t provide 

a coherent plan, the Department of Defense doesn’t integrate its 

aid activities; and as a result, the money flows in very interesting 

ways, but doesn’t get out into the field. 

It is also, I think, very clear when we talk about one basic metric. It is nice to call for civilians for the aid program, but after 

seven years, you have got over 1,000 U.S. military in the PRTs, 

and 40, less than 40, U.S. civilians, according to a Department of 

Defense report issued this month. 

So when you talk about the sheer lack of any coherent effort, it 

is critical. 

Dr. SNYDER. I agree. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Randy Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the 

chairman and ranking member for having this hearing, and thank 

all of you for being here. 

In the five minutes I have, General Keane, I would like to ask 

you a question. It is based on the testimony that I have heard 

today. 

You have indicated that it is important that we sustain the gains 

that we have in Iraq and that we win in Afghanistan. I heard Dr. 

Cordesman talk about one of the reasons that we are not winning 

is because this committee and Congress and previous administration has not put the resources forward that we needed to win. I 
27 

heard Dr. Biddle talk about the need to move in transferring assets 

slower rather than more rapidly from Iraq to Afghanistan. And I 

also heard the words from Dr. Cordesman about transparency. 

Sometimes actions that we take have ripple effects that keep us 

from taking actions down the road. In about 24 hours, we are going 

to vote on this stimulus package that many of us have not had an 

opportunity to fully read and look at—not a lot of transparency. 

But assuming it is fine, assuming it is the direction we are going 

to go, in my estimation, voting for that stimulus package is just as 

surely voting to reduce defense expenditures down the road as the 

vote we will take when that comes around for this reason. Just the 

interest carry on the bailouts that we have done so far and this 

stimulus package, just the interest carry alone would cover the full 

budgets for NASA, the National Science Foundation, Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, including the FBI, the Army 

Corps of Engineers, all the operations of the White House, all the 

operations of Congress, and the Department of Transportation combined. 

It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out, when we go to do 

those budgets and we have lost expenditures on all these budgets, 

we are going to have to cut costs somewhere. And my question to 

you is, do you think that a reduced defense budget will support 

what we need to do in Afghanistan and Iraq? And can we achieve 

victory if we have significant reductions to defense spending? 

General KEANE. Well, having spent a lot of time with that budget 

as the vice chief of staff and all the vagaries in it, I think the answer for us is, I don’t believe—it is not so much the Defense budget 

as—what we have tried to lay out here is what are our goals and 

objectives and the strategy and support of that, and then apply the 

resources that are necessary. 

If you set a goal and an objective to have a positive outcome— 

I like to use the words that are important, like ‘‘win,’’ words that 

American people can understand, and what does that mean—then 

the resources have to go with that. That mission then is given to 

the Department of Defense, and they have choices that they have 

to make with the amount of money that is going to be available to 

them. 

And having been involved in a lot of that myself, I think the resources for the operational requirements where troops are on the 

line, those resources will be met, particularly with the energy of a 

new President behind the strategy and goals he wants to achieve, 

assuming that is there. 

The choices will be this. They will not—I don’t believe operational dollars will get cut, what we call ‘‘operational maintenance’’; and I think the money in the supplement to support those 

activities, I would believe would be funded. 

Where the rub will come from for Secretary Gates is, and where 

he has discretion—he has discretion in operational accounts, as we 

are describing; I don’t think he would cut them, because we are 

fighting two wars. The other discretion he has is in his investment 

capital accounts, which is where all the programs are for the new 

equipment and the modernization programs; and I believe that is 

where they will go to live within the budget that is assigned, given 
28 

the economic crisis that we are in. And then they will make the 

choices within there and make the best possible choices they can. 

It would make no sense to set a goal to win in Afghanistan with 

a new strategy in support of it, even if it is a limited one, and then 

not provide the resources to accomplish that goal. I mean, that 

would be obvious to any of the execution people that those resources aren’t there for them. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I have two documents that the 

gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, asked, without objection, be placed in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they are. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses 

very much. 

General Keane, I think you made an incredibly penetrating point 

a few minutes ago. Correct me if I misphrase it. One of the proximate causes of the resurgence of the Taliban in the FATA and in 

Afghanistan was that General Musharraf hedged his bets as a result of his perception that we might be deemphasizing our emphasis on Afghanistan in the 2002–2003 window. Did I state your point 

correctly? 

If that is the case—I agree with it completely—what signal could 

we send to the Pakistani leadership today that would tell them 

that we are reaffirming an unshakeable commitment to victory in 

Afghanistan over the radical elements who attacked us on 9/11? 

What would be the remedy that would say to the present Pakistani 

leadership, we are lethally serious about being successful here? 

General KEANE. It is a critical point, as I tried to say in the 

statement, that our commitment is truly an issue here if we are 

going to have a favorable outcome. And it is sort of an ‘‘all-in’’ proposition in terms of commitment. 

The enemy will look at this, and if we are not committed, they 

will read weaknesses and they will be encouraged by it. And all the 

stakeholders—the people in the region are stakeholders in this, 

and the most serious stakeholder certainly in the region is Pakistan. And they have to clearly understand—and they will judge us 

by what we are doing and less by what we are saying. I mean, we 

will have the rhetoric to back it up, but what will they look at? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. What are the actions? 

General KEANE. They are going to look at level of force increase. 

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you think that—— 

Mr. MCKEON. Number of forces. 

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you think it ought to be? 

General KEANE. I don’t know what it should be because I haven’t 

done the detailed analysis to tell you that. But our commanders 

will know what that is. 

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the second element? 

General KEANE. So the level of that commitment is number one. 
29 

And then the other is the resource package it takes to sustain 

this effort. Some of that is largely financial. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

General KEANE. Because we have to pay for the Afghan National 

Army’s growth, which must be significant. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

General KEANE. Then they have to see the resources that Tony 

has tried to point out that are so necessary. It is not just money 

to grow an army. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

General KEANE. We need the trainers to grow that army, and we 

are not putting them in there. 

They will look at all of that. And many of the people that are advising that new government in Pakistan are military professionals 

themselves. They will be able to make adequate judgments about 

our level of commitment based on the resources that we are providing, and also, you know, the rhetoric in support of that and the 

political risk, I think, that national leaders are taking associated 

with that decision. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask a related question, which goes to 

something you said, General, and Dr. Biddle said, and Dr. 

Cordesman said also. 

Are we dancing with the right partner in Afghanistan? I think 

one of the reasons that Iraq had some success in Anbar clearly was 

that we did business with the tribal leaders in Anbar, as Mr. Taylor talked about earlier, not with the central government in Baghdad. And the alliance that led to the victory in Anbar was the alliance between the sheik leaders in Anbar and us. 

There is a range of options here. We could try to strike similar 

regional accords with tribal leaders throughout Afghanistan. We 

could reject such accords and deal only with the central government. We could do something in between. 

What should we do? Who should we be trying to ally with here 

to create the kind of legitimacy and stability in Afghanistan that 

is necessary? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Could I, Congressman? 

There was an auxiliary Afghan National Police. It had about 100 

percent desertion rate, and virtually all of its weapons can’t be accounted for. 

What I think we are trying do in the field is create local security 

forces tied to advisers—again, ‘‘clear, hold and build’’—which can 

then be related to the provincial government and related to the 

central government, but really are supported and advised from the 

outside. 

There aren’t tribal confederations in Afghanistan. I have seen 

some of the detailed mapping of tribal differences by valley and 

area. You can work with them, but there is no solid base, as you 

had for the Sons of Iraq. And so I think what we are trying to do, 

and General McKiernan and others are trying to do, is the right 

approach, but it still relies on the Afghan National Army and the 

Afghan National Police. 

Dr. BIDDLE. We have to get better performance out of the government in Kabul, but I think the issue is less who the person is than 

how we deal with them. The next person, if Karzai is replaced with 
30 

someone else, will face a lot of the same structural incentives that 

Karzai does. My guess is those incentives will shape similar behavior unless we change behavior. And I think, centrally we have to 

think about using leverage to get the change in behavior that we 

need; and one of our central forms of leverage is conditionality. 

We cannot write blank checks. We have to make it clear that the 

assistance they need is conditioned on the behavior that we need. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

It is a pleasure to call upon Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel. 

First thing, Mr. Cordesman said that the approval rating of the 

U.S., NATO mission is at 37 percent. And I would note that that 

is higher than this Congress’s approval rating. I don’t know what 

that says about them or us. 

I am glad to hear you all concur that we have success in Iraq. 

I think that is important. I served two tours over there as a U.S. 

Marine, and I appreciate that. It is a tenuous victory, but it is a 

victory; and if we can hold that, that is important. And I hope that 

this Congress, this committee, and you will let that be known, that 

we do have victory; and the men and women that have served have 

achieved that for us. 

Going on to Mr. McHugh’s note that a rise in violence does not 

necessarily mean that we are losing, is there conflict in that in this 

panel, meaning, as we send in Marines, we are going to see the violence go up? Because in RC–South we had had ISAF there; they 

didn’t do anything. We can all agree that ISAF is relatively not— 

it is not worthless, but it is not going to do that hard-hitting combat role that the Marines will do. And as we send Marines in, we 

are going to see more violence, just like we did in the Iraqi surge. 

Violence spiked and then went down. 

Dr. CORDESMAN. Well, Congressman, I think you can have access 

to maps very similar to what I think you saw in Iraq, which were 

maps not simply of kinetic violence, but areas of influence for al 

Qaeda and for the threat from the Mahdi Army. 

The problem you have is, if you look only at the NATO/ISAF 

maps of kinetic events or violence, you see one pattern. If you look 

at the areas of increased Taliban, Haqqani and HIG support area— 

areas of influence and presence, those areas have expanded much 

more quickly in Afghanistan than the NATO/ISAF maps of the 

areas of violence, although the NATO/ISAF maps have been revised rather strikingly upwards in terms of levels of violence and 

location, in area of violence in the last 3 months. 

General KEANE. Congressman, I think you are absolutely right. 

In military terms, the Taliban and their supporters have offensive 

momentum, and we are on the defensive. And what the command 

will do is put together a counteroffensive, much as Normandy was 

a counteroffensive, the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific during World War II, Inchon in Korea, and countless others in Vietnam that no one remembers the numbers of, and also the counteroffensive that just took place in Iraq. 

In all of those cases, because of the nature of that, the enemy is 

on the offense and you are trying to take it away from them. And 

there is an offensive clash in doing that: casualties go up, violence 
31 

goes up. And that is what we have to be very clear to the American 

people about, that these casualties will go up for American forces, 

as they will for NATO forces who are in the fight. 

But—and we had this discussion with the President of the 

United States over the counteroffensive in Iraq—if we have it right, 

then the casualties can come down rather dramatically and the net 

overall, in time, will be less casualties, not more, despite the 

spike—that is, if it works according to our plan in terms of what 

the commanders will put together. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you. 

And switching now, we talked about Congress here—Dr. 

Cordesman did—being partly responsible for what is going on right 

now in Afghanistan. I would ask you if the warfighter is asking for 

the right things and Congress is trying to provide them with the 

right things. Is the choke point not in the Department of Defense 

and Secretary Gates, not this Congress and not the warfighter, but 

that choke point in between? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. We have four major threats in this problem: the 

Taliban, the Haqqani network, Hekmatyar, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). And I think if you were to look at requests made to OMB versus the flow out of OMB, you would see 

that commanders have had two problems. They haven’t gotten 

what they wanted; neither have the ambassadors. And they have 

taken the position that at least on the funding levels, their requests have to be limited to what they think they can get. 

General KEANE. I think clearly most of this is largely due to the 

priority of effort that Iraq required, not just in terms of resources, 

but in terms of intellectual capital, in terms of people’s energy, 

their time. 

The entire effort was focused on that reality, and now we are 

shifting priorities. Right before our eyes it is taking place where 

this is becoming the priority. And I think it will get a spotlight, it 

will get examined, it will get looked at. 

Let’s get all the requirements on the table; there will be leaders 

saying that. Let’s make sure we get this right this time. We know 

we have been half-stepping here for a number of years because of 

the problems and challenges we had in Iraq. 

Those requests will be made, and I am hopeful that the requirements will get put on the table so that we can get after this thing 

the way it should be. 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. If I could just add a comment on that point 

also. 

My comment would be that the discussion has been largely 

around the numbers of forces that might be required, whereas I 

think there clearly needs to be a detailed examination and discussion about the types of capabilities that are needed. I mean, we 

have talked about some of those today—the trainers, the specific 

civil affairs and other skills that might be needed, and certainly 

some combat forces. But also, in talking about numbers, you have 

to figure in the whole logistics tail and additional support capabilities that you are going to need there to manage a large, overall 

military presence. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Davis, please. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
32 

Thank you all for being here. I am sure the chairman would remember as well, I think we sat here with Admiral Mullen when he 

said, ‘‘In Afghanistan we do what we can, and in Iraq we do what 

we must.’’ And that was, I think, one of the first statements, after 

a lot of prying from up here, about how this is going. 

I wonder if you could just switch talking about NATO and 

NATO’s role and how we can, I think, either articulate or reach out 

better. I happened to return with a few colleagues recently, just a 

few days ago, talking with folks in Brussels about the Afghanistan 

mission. And it is clear that people talk about a civilian surge 

there, but it is also not clear that we have the coordination. We 

have tried to build that; it is obviously not working. 

What do you think it is going to take? And what is the message 

that you would suggest to President Obama as he goes to Munich 

and works and tries to bring more of the NATO countries in? We 

understand their public opinion is worse than ours when it comes 

to how we can engage this mission. What are your thoughts? 

Dr. BIDDLE. Well, I think a key underlying issue here is a common understanding of the purpose of the undertaking. Many Europeans do not believe that this is a war. And they also believe that 

if it is a war, they don’t want any part of it. They don’t see it as 

a war worth waging. 

General McKiernan makes it a point regularly in his interactions 

with NATO officials to use the word ‘‘counterinsurgency,’’ which 

had not until fairly recently been part of the vocabulary of the conversation about this undertaking in NATO. 

If there are significant parts of the NATO alliance that view this 

as essentially an armed humanitarian undertaking rather than a 

war against a resourceful and violent enemy, even if they provide 

more resources, they are going to be resources that can’t be integrated into the larger plan in a sensible way. We end up with, you 

know, parts of the country doing things that are at loggerheads 

with what we are trying to do elsewhere and are very poorly coordinated. 

So I think the underlying political requirement vis-a`-vis NATO 

is to forge some degree of common understanding about what our 

purpose there is; and the heart of that, I think, has to be making 

the point that this is indeed now, for better or worse, a war. 

Dr. CORDESMAN. I think if I may add a point, we need to identify 

and perhaps make public the level of national caveats. We keep 

using the word ‘‘NATO,’’ but most of the problems lie with individual countries. 

I will leave it to General Keane to talk about how many threestars we really need in the NATO chain of command and whether 

they really at this point are effective. You will hear a lot of reactions out there about them. 

But I think the other key point is, in all honesty you are not 

going to get that many more troops. You may lose some. And you 

are not going to get that many more civilians. 

One of the things you have to understand is, we will come away 

from that meeting without getting anything like what we want. 

What we might be able to do is free up forces from a few countries 

to be more flexible. We might get PRTs from some of those countries to stop staying in a narrow area of access, where they are pro-
33 

tected by troops doing demo projects, to actually start functioning 

on a broader level. 

But the honest answer, Congresswoman, is we are not going to 

get much from here. 

Mrs. DAVIS. General Keane. 

General KEANE. I echo that. We have a fundamental problem 

with many of the NATO countries; and it lies on the fact that many 

of their national leaders can no longer ask their people to sacrifice. 

And fortunately, here in the United States we can, because of our 

global interests and the American people understand how vital 

those are so those national leaders are very challenged. But I also 

believe this, if NATO is going to live on, it has to succeed in Afghanistan. It cannot fail this test, if there is going to continue to 

be a NATO, maybe there is not. But I think we have to be smart 

about how we can look for them to succeed here within some of the 

limitations that they have. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you believe that there is any risk in the size of 

our footprint as we go into Afghanistan that sends a different message to NATO that we are going to send in 30,000 troops and it 

is okay, we don’t need any help anymore? 

General KEANE. Frankly, I believe they don’t want to lose in Afghanistan because they made a contribution whether it is a training contribution or a combat contribution, I think they will more 

than welcome the United States making a sizable commitment to 

see this thing through to success. It is in their interest. But I also 

think that we should not give up on these NATO countries. We do 

have an opportunity here with the transition of leadership to try 

to get more trainers, to try to get more resources. 

There is going to be limits on combat troops, that is for sure. But 

there is plenty of our things that we need and I think we should 

not give up fighting for those. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I ask Mr. Wittman, let me ask the General again, in your opinion, unless there is success in Afghanistan, 

NATO is in real trouble? 

General KEANE. Well, this is the first excursion of NATO outside 

of Europe. I think they put a lot of their credibility on the line here 

in doing this. There is a lot of discussion right now about the weaknesses of NATO itself. And certainly, any failure in Afghanistan 

would be partially attributed to that organization, that is for sure, 

as it rightfully should be. So I think it would certainly weaken it, 

rather significantly, whether it actually is a catalyst for its change 

in its role completely, I can’t say. But I would say that it would 

be detrimental to it for sure. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to members 

of the panel for being here. 

General Keane, in your testimony, you eloquently lay out what 

you think it will take to win Afghanistan all the way from making 

sure we have a clear strategy to a robust counterinsurgency effort 

to make sure there is strong governance there for public support. 

Can you though drill down and talk about what you think would 

be the goals of those eight elements that you outlined? And then 

what you think the resources might be needed in order to be successful along those lines? 
34 

General KEANE. Well, the fundamental goal that I tried to lay 

out deals with something we have already said and that is we do 

not want a sanctuary in Afghanistan and we want to contribute to 

the stability of Pakistan. And some form of a representative government and that is connected to a people and with an Afghan national Army that is capable or an Afghan national security forces 

that is capable of providing internal security to do that, to fundamentally do that we have to defeat the insurgency. 

Central to the campaign plan would be using counterinsurgency 

doctrine and practices to do that. So some of that is taking place 

now in the south on a limited scale. This will take place on a much 

more dramatic scale as we are able to put more combat troops in. 

There is an interesting dimension in Afghanistan dealing with 

the people themselves. While the Iraqis had very high toleration for 

the war being fought in urban centers while they are living there, 

in some cases had catastrophic affects to them and their families, 

the Afghans do not. This pressure not to occupy, not to be present 

and certainly not to fight in those towns, villages and cities. All 

that said, they are still the issue, those people. So we have to be 

very clever in terms of how we deal with their concerns, but also, 

meet our military concerns. The Afghan National Army and their 

security forces are part of that solution. And it is not always the 

Afghan National Army is the solution, because to be quite frank 

about it, we can absorb the heat a little bit better, given who we 

are as outsiders than that Army can. 

I am just speaking about Afghanistan now, I am not trying to 

compare it to Iraq. So the application of a counterinsurgency on the 

ground in Afghanistan will be dramatically different than what it 

was in Iraq for sure. Nonetheless, the key issue protecting the people and isolating the insurgents themselves or the Taliban who are 

not a homogenous group, as you well know. And then we go after 

them relentlessly and tenaciously to get them. And we know how 

to do this. Those things have to be done simultaneously. And then 

we must do something about the sanctuaries themselves in Pakistan. We cannot continue to let them operate out of there with impunity. 

I can’t tell you how many brigades that would take. I haven’t 

done the detailed analysis. I don’t have a good sense of the enemy 

situation. If I had a clarity on the enemy situation better than I 

do, I would be able to do an analysis similar to what we did in Iraq 

to determine what the forces are. But look at—we have a completely different problem here in Afghanistan. We don’t have military leaders in Afghanistan who are whetted to an old strategy. 

They are welcoming new thinking, their minds are open. They 

want to succeed here. And they have a wide aperture. So we don’t 

have this inflexibility and rigidness and whetted to the past policies. We have people who are intellectually engaged. 

Look, we have the preeminent counterinsurgency general in the 

military overseeing this, Dave Petraeus. We have the best guy in 

the world who does this kind of work. He has his head on this and 

he is focused on this. I am absolutely confident that they will come 

up with the necessary campaign plan. Not he, but McKiernan, an 

assisted coach as delicately as we can say it here, so that the necessary tools will be there. 
35 

Most of this, remember, is not just resources. We threw lots of 

resources at the problem in Iraq. Our resources are crucial, I am 

not diminishing them, but it is how we use the resources and how 

we employ the troops. We had 150,000 troops and we were employing them the wrong way in Iraq, that is why for three years we 

were failing. So once we changed their employment and gave them 

more resources, we got a completely different result. I am convinced that will happen here and we have the leaders here that understand that, they know what to do. And they’ll need some resources to do it that they do not have. 

But most importantly when they get a plan put together that 

gives them unity of effort. Military people talk about this a lot, because in any complex situation like fighting a war, you cannot succeed unless you have the unity of effort. You have to get everybody 

on the same page. What does that for you? A campaign plan. And 

then you hold people accountable for their portion of it. Everybody 

gets by and then you have oversight and you assess performance 

and you get the whole team moving together. We don’t have that. 

We have got to get it and they know they have got to get it and 

they are going to do it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the good news is I 

am the low man on the totem pole as I sit down here at the kids’ 

table for Thanksgiving dinner. It is good to sit this close, because 

I have been paying attention for a long time to what you have been 

saying and somebody who got off active duty four years ago, General, it is an honor to sit here and listen to you speak. I really appreciate your leadership, especially when it comes to your commitment and your optimism. 

However, that being said, I recently read a book by a guy named 

Marcus Luttrell, who was a Navy SEAL in Afghanistan, called 

Lone Survivor. Had he a little advice for those of us who work up 

here in D.C., this I don’t think I will ever forget. It was basically 

that we should never send our men and women to fight in wars if 

we are not willing to do whenever it takes to win. 

And with regard to the funding issue, Dr. Cordesman, and even 

General Keane, I am not getting sort of the sense that right now 

we are willing to do whatever it takes to win, but since we have 

heard that, I am just curious what Ms. St. Laurent’s opinion is on 

that after reading your testimony. In your opinion, first of all, is 

Marcus Luttrell, right? And second of all, in your opinion, do you 

think that we are going to do whatever it takes to win with regard 

to resources in Afghanistan? 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Thank you very much. First of all, I think the 

point is we need to see when the key strategy is and what the goals 

are. I think the key point of my statement is the ends, ways and 

means have to be balanced. And certainly the whole economic environment will be a factor that will determine how well and whether 

both the Administration and Congress and the amount of funds 

they will put forward toward the strategy. 

The first piece really does depend on what the goals are and the 

mix of those goals between the Department of Defense and the 

other civilian agencies. We said almost a year ago now we don’t 

have an updated campaign plan for Iraq. We clearly need one for 
36 

Afghanistan as well. There will be, I think, costs associated with 

the drawdown that are not been talked about explicitly at this 

point just to manage that very significant effort that will be associated with pulling all that equipment and forces out there, as well 

as continuing to support operations there. 

We have been funding a lot of those costs through supplemental 

budget requests that come up, and that may continue to happen for 

a while and that may also be a way to deal with some of the another term costs associated with the strategy for Afghanistan. But 

I think the long-term pressure is on the defense budget are going 

to be there. I agree with the assessment that what may happen is 

putting more pressure on the investment accounts. And hopefully, 

there will be the appropriate funding that will much up with whenever the new goals are that are going to be established. 

General KEANE. Just going down the line, first of all, Congressman, thank you for your service and also thank you for continuing 

to provide public service. It is nice to have someone like you who 

has had some experience in the military serving in this great institution. 

These are difficult choices that are about to be made by the 

President of the United States. He will be presented with a range 

of options in front of him. And I am convinced when he selects the 

strategy to move forward, he will believe in his mind that he is selecting the strategy to win, just as President Bush was selecting a 

strategy after the invasion, when he was being briefed on it and 

told what we were going to do. I am convinced for all those three 

years that we had the wrong strategy, there is no doubt in my 

mind that President Bush wanted to win. He thought he had the 

team in place to give him that victory and he thought he had the 

plans in place to do it. But we found out over time that that was 

not the case. Some knew it almost immediately, I was not one of 

those by the way. It took me a while to understand how wrong the 

strategy was. 

So these choices that we make, and we are about to make here 

in the next number of weeks about the strategy and what going 

forward means and what is winning is crucial, make no mistake 

about it. But out of that, I am convinced that the President will 

make a decision that he believes is going to give him that definition 

of win in terms of our goals and objectives. But he may find out, 

as President Bush did, as we go down the road that we have got 

to adjust this thing. When we see it, we have to have that kind of 

institutional flexibility to make adjustments if it is not right. Or if 

we miscalculated the resources. And we need to do more of it. We 

may need to ask more sacrifice to make that kind of adjustment. 

I hope we have that kind of flexibility. The things that drives 

that is very honest and objective oversight of what we are doing. 

So we really have the granularity and truth of what is taking 

place. I think it is crucial. So we don’t let years go by before we 

make the necessary adjustments. I make no mistake about it, I 

think the President will make the decision that he believes is going 

to give him his definition of win. But it may turn out that that is 

not exactly working to the degree that we want it to work. And 

then we have to make the necessary adjustments to it. That is because we are dealing with war. As much as we try to be predict-
37 

able, organize it, the enemy has a vote here. And they can still exploit our weaknesses and we have them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else? Anyone else care to answer Mr. 

Rooney? 

Thank you very, very much. To the panel, we express deep appreciation. This has been an excellent hearing and it is certainly 

good of you to share your thoughts with us. It is one of the best 

hearings I believe we have had. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 12, 2009 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 12, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 12, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I have seen recent initiatives by the Defense Secretary to increase Afghan National Army forces to 122,000 troops and the Afghan National Police to 82,000 troops for a total of 204,000 Afghan National Security Forces. The cost 

of this force will be approximately $3.5 Billion dollars a year when Afghanistan has 

an estimated revenue of about $670 Million dollars. If Afghanistan experienced 9% 

real economic growth per year and revenue extraction doubled to 12%, both completely unrealistic forecasts, it would take ten years for the Afghan Government to 

take in $2.5 billion dollars; a one billion dollar shortfall after a decade. Is the U.S. 

proposing an unfeasible strategy for Afghan security? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are the original wartime goals we have set for the U.S. in Afghanistan too unrealistic and not achievable? If unachievable, what should the new 

end state goals be? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. 1st Lieutenant Jonathan Brostrum, a constituent of mine, and 

eight other American Soldiers were killed at the battle of Wanat battling over 200 

Taliban Insurgents. A force of about 40 Americans were at that remote outpost. A 

shortage of engineers, Forward Operating Base force protection, ISR assets and long 

flight times for Attack and MEDEVAC helicopters to get to the scene exposed significant risk to an isolated platoon. The reality is there will be significant shortfalls 

in these enabling forces in both theatres. Isn’t the new strategy to surge 30,000 

more troops only going to increase the risk to many more of our Soldiers and Marines? 

General KEANE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What should be done to attempt to separate Islamist movements like the Taliban from al Qaeda instead of casting them in a monolithic framework? 

General KEANE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. HEINRICH. Many observers believe that there is a critical shortage of enablers, 

particularly ISR assets. In the short term, how can we balance the need to increase 

ISR assets in Afghanistan while maintaining a high level in Iraq? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. HEINRICH. What shortfalls, in terms of soft power, are present in Afghanistan 

and what specific, successful methods do you think can be adopted from Iraq? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. HEINRICH. Quick Reaction Funds have shown to have some success for PRTs 

in Iraq; do you feel this strategy can be replicated in Afghanistan to increase their 

effectiveness? 

Dr. CORDESMAN. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

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