relationship between the Wing and Division had been evident from the first planning sessions in

southern California, and the first socialization of the Opening Gambit plan was naturally with the

Commander and Staff of the 3d MAW. On 28 December, the Wing and Division commanders,

and their combined staffs, assembled at the 3d MAW headquarters at Al Jaber Air Base, Kuwait,

and conducted a detailed review of the timing and objectives of the Opening Gambit. Members

of the I MEF G-3 staff, including Colonel Larry Brown and Colonel Fred Milburn, attended to

provide 'rudder guidance' from the MEF Commander's intent. This meeting proved to be a

pivotal session in the transition of the Opening Gambit from the planning stage to execution.

The respective staffs of the 3d MAW and the Division walked away from this session with a

clear vision and execution guidance, able to immediately begin the detailed operational planning

that made the Opening Gambit a success. This teamwork between Marines of each MSC began

at the highest levels, and bred confidence and trust among the staffs. Eventually, the confidence

shared between the Grunts and the Wingers was to prove a significant force multiplier in combat

operations. Division planners were able to immediately begin the detailed operational planning

which resulted in a 48-page execution matrix that spelled out in detail the movement of forces

across the line of departure and the specific details on how the ground and air forces were to

support operations that would make the Opening Gambit a success. The execution checklist

described the sequence of events that had to take place, but made only indirect reference to event

duration. Commanders would execute their tasks on the timelines allowed by the events on the

ground.

The Division was invited to conduct a similar integrated planning session with the MEF

Commander. The Division and Wing were confident of their ability to accomplish the MEF

taskings. Now it was up to the MEF Commander to decide if the Opening Gambit met his

guidance and intent. On 31 December 2002 the briefing was held at Camp Commando. With

Colonel Toolan orchestrating the brief, Lieutenant Colonels Groen and Smythe presented the

Opening Gambit in detail to the assembled Commanders of I MEF, 1St Marine Division, 3C

MAW, 1st FSSG, MEG, and other elements of the MAGTF. Again, the plan received favorable

reviews. With an approved attack plan in hand, the Division staff spent a quiet New Year's Eve

in Camp Commando, preparing themselves for the transition from a paper plan to steel on target.

Getting the Force to the Fight

In early December, Division representatives attended the MARCENT War Council in

Bahrain. During this session, the fluid nature of planning efforts was noted, as certain basic

decisions had not yet been made at higher levels. The Operation did not, as yet, have defined

tactical objectives, force flow approval, authorization for reserve activation, or other supporting

documentation, making the march to a detailed plan more dependent on assumptions than

desired. It was clear to the Division that even if the detailed plans had not been approved at the

highest levels, combat operations were going to take place in Iraq at some point in the near

future. The Division lobbied for more aggressive force posturing in theater, and the beginning of

the flow of Marine forces to join the significant Army forces that had already been deployed to

Kuwait. This proved to be challenging for many, as some outside the operational chain were not

universally convinced that combat operations would take place. These holdouts were hedging

their support of the Division's preparation efforts with missions elsewhere in the world and in

rhythm with peacetime measures of assignment and procurement. To the Division's good

57
fortune, MARCORSYSCOM, under Brigadier General Bill Catto, did not fall into this category.

They continued to be the Division's strongest advocate for bringing proven capabilities on-line

rapidly, and continued to move aggressively to equip the Division with the latest equipment that

could be brought to theater and integrated prior to crossing the line of departure.

Previously, force flow planning had been based on a specific Operational Plan's (OPLAN)

Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). The careful force flow sequencing for this

OPLAN had been updated over the course of the summer of 2002, providing a master script,

written for a planned force flow sequence under a specific deployment scenario that included a

defense of Kuwait. The Division deployment planners, under Lieutenant Colonel Clarke Lethin,

had built the flexibility into this TPFDD that would allow for its adaptation to a new force flow

sequence. By packaging the TPFDD by force packages consisting of RCTs, supporting arms,

supporting logistics, and a slice of Division C2, the data was made flexible enough to be used in

a variety of force flow scenarios. This foresight now proved invaluable as force flow planning

took a new turn in December. Instead of deploying the planned TPFDD into theater, forces

began to be approved incrementally under the Theater Combatant Commander's RFFs. The

RFFs were centered on a desire for specific combat units, and often did not include the required

supporting packages from the Division, Wing, and FSSG. Also, an ad hoc combination of

modes of transportation would be required. The decision was made to get the MPSRONs in

early, fly in the Marines, and use Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) to carry what would have been the Fly

In Echelon equipment of the RCTs. What looked straightforward on paper would leave a trail of

sleepless nights for logisticians and combat commanders from California to North Carolina to

Kuwait City. The unfortunate consequence of a changed deployment strategy was the partial

disruption of the carefully linked logistics, communications, fires, and maneuver packages that

existed in the OPLAN TPFDD force flow. Under the RFF process, force flow was driven more

by available lift, and much of the careful precision and integration that went into planning the

TPFDD was lost. Marine embarkation planners now talked in terms of the 'Mother of all

Deployment Orders' (MODEP), and the 'Son of MODEP' (SOMODEP), and scrambled to redocument their units force flow requirements for the new modes of transport. The impact of

missing key enablers lost in the REF process would be felt right through the combat phase, with

drivers arriving after their vehicles were offloaded, and some CSS units arriving much later than

required. Additionally, commanders and staffs focused inward on detailed embark plans at a

time when the CG wanted them focused on the enemy and their tactical missions.

On 11 January, the President released the long anticipated Deployment Order, RFF- 177. The

Division's main body began deployment to Kuwait. With the flow of Marine forces approved,

attention was turned to the task of moving more than 20,000 Division Marines and their

equipment to theater. Preparing for their arrival was another significant challenge and the

Division Forward CP immediately turned to the task.

Continuing Mission — Security in the Pacific

Three of the Division's battalions were not included in the deployment roster to Kuwait, as

they were required to fill the Division's responsibilities under the Marine Expeditionary •Unit

(MEU) and Unit Deployment Programs (UDP). A fourth battalion from the Division was

deployed to Kuwait as part of the 15th MEU. Supporting artillery, Light Armored

58
Reconnaissance (LAR), and Assault Amphibian support accompanied these battalions. Under

the LJDP, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (2/4), Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew

Schlaepfer; and 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2/7), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James

Cameron, were deployed to Okinawa. As the planning continued from August 2002 through the

end of the year, the status of these two battalions and their rotation was the subject of keen

interest at MEF and Division levels. As with any potential major deployment, the disruption to

unit rotation cycles under the UDP is significant. In this case, as the months rolled by without a

deployment order to Kuwait, serious consideration had to be given to either leaving these units in

place or replacing them with units from CONUS and sending them straight into combat. By

Christmas Eve, the requirement to rapidly deploy the rest of the Division to Kuwait drove the

decision to freeze UDP units in place. By this time, the advance parties from 2/4 and 2/7 had

already returned to CONUS to coordinate the return of these units home. With the decision to

leave these units in place in Okinawa, the advance parties returned to the Western Pacific,

rejoining their comrades who braced for an extended rotation on the island, fulfilling the

Division's responsibilities in the Pacific theater for the duration of Operation Iraqi Freedom. For

these Marines, a six-month rotation to Okinawa stretched to a deployment of almost a year.

Although disappointed at missing the combat action, these Marines recognized the role they

played in stabilizing another important portion of the globe. With the war on terrorism in full

swing, the efforts of these Marines were vital to the National effort and were never forgotten by

their comrades in the Division.

In addition to these two battalions, the Division would also maintain its support to the Marine

Expeditionary Unit (MEU) program. The 2' Battalion, 1st Marines (2/1) would join the fight in

Iraq, but as a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) under the command and control of the 15thi MEU.

The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) would remain in Camp Pendleton, completing the worku

cycle for the 13th MEU rotation. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines would return from its own lit

MEU assignment, and be turned around in 30 days to redeploy with RCT-i. The Division's

responsibilities across large segments of the globe precluded all elements of the Division from

participation in ground combat in Iraq. As part of the MEU and UDP programs, each of these

battalions would remain a vital part of the Nation's war on terrorism, and accomplished their

assigned missions with pride and professionalism. Between the UDP and the MEU programs, a

full four infantry battalions were unavailable for combat when the Division was called.

In order to provide sufficient infantry for the Division's impending mission in Iraq, 2d

Battalion, 23' Marines was reactivated. This battalion had already served on active duty for nine

months as a post 9-11 domestic US Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Added to RCT- 1's troop list, it

brought that regiment to full strength. Motivated and well-trained, the 2/23 Marines and Sailors

reported back to active duty only weeks after returning to civilian life without a murmur of

discontent. These Marines truly lived up to the highest standards, and their later combat

contributions would be remarkable.

Creation of the Division Administrative Center

In early January 2003, Gunnery Sergeant Marco Rico of the Division G-1 did an

administrative assessment of the personnel receiving process in Kuwait. He realized that

Marines in theater would need more than just accountability, they would need Reporting Unit

59
Code (RUC)-level administrative assistance for pay, promotions, unit diary assistance, legal

assistance, emergency leave, and other administrative support far beyond the capabilities of the

small staff currently located forward. Before the rest of the Division arrived in Kuwait, an

administrative structure needed to be in place. On 30 January, Lieutenant Colonel Powalski and

a small administrative team departed Camp Pendleton to set up a Division Administration Center

(DAC) at Commando Camp in Kuwait. The DAC, comprised of administrators from each RCT,

would handle the bulk of administrative matters in concert with 'reachback' administrative

support to assist every Marine within the Marine Division. Unit administrators from the

RCTs would be co-located, but not consolidated. Using this unique arrangement, unit integrity

and administrative processes consistent with the guidance of their immediate Commanding

Officers would stay intact, but all of the administration Marines would benefit from their mutual

experience and shared workspace in case of a requirement to surge in support of a crisis

situation. The various unit representatives would work together on several issues to meet a

common goal, 100% personnel accountability and administrative support for all Marines

attached to 1st Marine Division, to include attachments from the Army's 1st Field Artillery, 2'

Marine Division units, 4th Marine Division units, and individual augments. Equipment

shortages, especially for computer and communications assets, proved critical shortfalls during

the first few weeks of the DAC's operation, as this equipment arrived later in the force flow.

The DAC found a stable work area using space gladly donated by the MEF G-2. With the

assistance of their fellow Marines, and by the exceptional efforts of the Division G-6, the G-1

ensured that the DAC had communication capabilities consistent with their needs. 'Reach Back'

and 'Push Forward' administration became a concerted effort daily between the G- 1 Marines in

Iraq, Kuwait and California. The CG's vision of warfighting units having only a small

administrative staff as they moved forward (with the majority of administrative work completed

in the Division Support Area) was achieved.

"Sappers Up" — Combat Engineers Organize For Combat

Operation Iraqi Freedom would see something different when it came to Combat Engineers.

Forward thinking engineers started with a fresh sheet of paper as they figured out the best way to

organize engineer support for the Division. The Marine Corps would combine both 1st and 2(1

Combat Engineer Battalions (CEB5) into a single 'Engineer Battalion'. Contingency planning

between 1st and 2" Combat Engineer Battalion (the two active duty battalions) and 4th Combat

Engineer Battalion (the reserve combat engineer battalion) had begun to take shape in October

2002. The Engineer battalion commanders jointly recommended merging battalion staffs, and

providing reinforced line companies directly to the RCTs to give the fighting units an immediate

and robust combat engineer capability. After presenting this course of action to the

Commanding General of 1st Marine Division, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Cyr, the commanding

officer of 1t CEB, was selected to be the CG's principal engineering advisor as the Division

Engineer, while Lieutenant Colonel Mike Micucci, the commanding officer of 2'' CEB, would

actually command the combined combat engineer battalion.

All agreed that this organization would provide unity of command, best support the RCTs,

place the majority of the Division's engineer capability forward, and at the same time retain a

sizeable engineer capability still in general support of the division. The engineer support

companies held in general support of the division could be used to reinforce one or more RCTs

60
with additional breaching capabilities, be used in Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT),

assist in cutting expedient combat roads and trails, or provide survivability or other combat

support. In addition, engineer sections would be provided to 1st and 3( LAR Battalions and 1st

Reconnaissance Battalion to assist in bridge classification, performing obstacle and minefield

reconnaissance, and other combat engineer support. Engineer support company detachments

reinforcing the RCTs would include at least six M9 Armored Combat Earthmovers (ACE), two

or more bulldozers, three dump trucks, armored HIVIMWVs, a maintenance contact vehicle, and

the operators and mechanics required to provide ample support.

By mid-February 2002, all the engineers were deployed to Kuwait, and their equipment soon

followed. 1t and 2' CEB completed their merger, and a new personnel structure emerged that

would run the combined command. The combat engineer letter companies from both CEBs were

attached to the RCTs. C Company, 2d CEB went to RCT- 1; B Company, 1St CEB went to RCT5; and both C and D Company, 15t CEB went to RCT-7. The Engineer Battalion would retain

one combined Headquarters and Service Company and two separate engineer support companies,

one from each of 1st and 2d CEB. Throughout February, CEB created a staff that would be

divided between CEB forward command post, main command post, and combat train. Having a

forward and main command post would allow the battalion to echelon forward and support

varied and potentially independent missions. By 10 March, all sealift ships supporting the

engineers had arrived, and the combined battalion had sufficient equipment to be combat-ready.

Building a Home for the Division in Kuwait — Camp Matilda

When the Forward CP staff arrived in Kuwait, the expanse of desert that would eventually

become home to the Division's more than 20,000 Marines and Sailors (as well as the growing

number of Soldiers that had joined the Division's ranks in a variety of combat specialties) was

bare ground and blowing sands. The forward Division Engineer, Major Dan Longwell, had

begun the terrain management planning in late summer of 2002, but it had not progressed past

circles drawn on a map by the time the Division Forward CP arrived in country. Raising the

camps would require a significant outlay of funds, and making this commitment was a large step

with strategic overtones. Over the course of three months, the plan for Tactical Assembly Area

(TAA) Coyote would mature into four Life Support Areas (LSAs) that provided food, shelter,

shower, and sanitation facilities to units as they arrived in country. The Division's LSAs were

collectively referred to as 'Camp Matilda'.

The transition was not without challenge. Competing demands, conflicting priorities, terrain

management issues, and bad weather all conspired to slow LSA (Logistical Support Area)

construction. The demands of building camps of sufficient size, and the lack of assets readily

available in Kuwait to accomplish the construction made this a challenge. In the end, a handful

of Marines were successful in applying the social energy and sweat equity needed to give the

Division a home. In days, reminiscent of the 15t Marine Division's training in Australia during

World War II, the Division began to establish itself at Camp ('Waltzing') Matilda in Kuwait for

final combat staging and rehearsal.

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Camp Coyote in central Kuwait was the home of the Division prior to crossing the Line of Departure. II was

near the Udairi training range complex, and the Division c planned Dispersal Areas

The area easily met the Division's needs for training ranges, living areas, and storage space.

Driven by the likelihood that units would arrive in Kuwait and could immediately step off into

the attack, the Commanding General's intent was to live as austerely as possible during the short

time period that units would be there. In November, the plan consisted of circles drawn on a

map within TAA-Coyote and unit names assigned to the circles. A reconnaissance on the ground

of the circles drawn on the map resulted in a modified plan. Coyote was not a vacant stretch of

land as suggested by CFLCC, but contained garrison and training areas of the Kuwaiti Land

Forces (KLF), as well as a large number of Bedouins.

In December, CFLCC released a directive establishing a common living standard for all

forces in Kuwait. The impact to Army forces was minimal, since they billeted in established

camps that easily met the new quality of life standard. For the Division, however, this was a

fundamental shift. The austere TAA that would support units for a short while before crossing

the line of departure were upgraded into a more permanent LSA requiring significantly greater

engineering efforts and financial expenditure than previously planned. The staff commenced

planning to respond to the change. Colonel Toolan and Lieutenant Colonel Broadmeadow joined

Major Longwell in assessing and prioritizing the Division's requirements.

62
Four carefully considered large cantonment areas replaced the circles hastily drawn in the

initial plan. The Commanding General's intent remained tactically focused, and no LSA would

have the elaborate berming or wire obstacles associated with a defensive mindset. LSA

development anticipated the flow of Division forces into theater, so LSA-Ripper, supporting

RCT-7, would be the first LSA to be completed. LSA-Matilda would be built next for the

Division Headquarters Battalion, ll' Marines, and separate battalions. This was followed by the

development of LSA Grizzly for RCT-5, and (eventually) LSA Inchon for RCT- 1. In keeping

with the CFLCC's intent, the Division planned for tents with decking for billeting; electricity for

work and living spaces; showers, portable chemical toilets and dumpsters for hygiene

maintenance; kitchen areas for preparation of hot meals; and gravel laid on main routes

throughout the camps to keep down the dust. Similar initiatives began within the MEF's other

MSCs, including the recently joined 1St UK Division and the 15th MEU (SOC). The re-allotment

of real estate within TAA-Coyote was conducted at strongly argued meetings. In the end, the

UK Division and 15th MEU (SOC) set up near the camp of the 6th Kuwaiti Brigade, east of

Highway 80. The FSSG set up south of the Kuwaiti brigade, east of Highway 80, while the

Division maintained the areas west of Highway 80.

The Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense (MOD), and Ministry of the Interior (MOI) were fully

supportive of the Division and endeavored to help wherever possible. But as it is in most large

bureaucracies, decisions at the top are not rapidly or completely disseminated down to the

execution level. Cutting the berm that runs from the border with Iraq and down Highway 80 to

make entrances into the LSAs was such an instance. On two occasions, contractors cut the berm

into the LSAs only to be stopped by local MOD officials who not only halted their work, but also

made them restore the berm to its original condition. Lacking a translator, Major Longwell

could only rely on a document written by CFLCC in English on one side and Arabic on the

reverse explaining what he was trying to do. Similar situations arose when MOD officials asked

for and then confiscated third country nationals' passports (most of the contract workers were not

Kuwaitis.) Major Longweli spent several nights at MOD Headquarters at Au As Salem

retrieving workers' documents so they could return to work. Once the information and language

obstacles had been breached, MOD and MOl personnel were obliging and enabled work to

continue

From the signing of the first contract to

the first Marine arriving at LSA-7,

contractors had only two weeks to show

results. There was plenty of competition

for scant contractor resources from among

the FSSG, TF Tarawa, and other camps.

While one of the sub-contractors began the

task of road improvement, numerous others

began construction of decking, erection of

tents, installation of electrical generators

and showers, and limited berming around

the LSAs. In an assembly line fashion, as

Lfe Support Area Matilda was one offour Life one project was completed at one LSA, that Support Areas the Division occupied while in central subcontractor moved to the next LSA in

Ku wait.

63
priority and began the process again. The net effect was simultaneous development of the first

three LSAs by multiple sub-contractors under the direction of the Division Engineer. The MPF

offload added further pressure to the situation since the Arrival and Assembly Operations

Echelon (AAOE) area had to be set up in the desert near the LSAs in order to receive the units'

equipment and prepare it for combat. Available funding was severely strained, and workarounds were required. LSA-1 was developed to house RCT-1 but relied on habitability suites

for amenities and LSA-5's showers and chow hall. Soon, MSE representatives were flown in to

supervise the completion of their own LSAs. 4-5 Marine teams began arriving around I February and provided the link between the contractors and the using unit. For their part,

contractors completed portions of LSAs just as Marines scheduled to occupy them arrived. Final

improvements to the route leading to the AAOE area wrapped up as the first truck from the

offload rolled up to the gate.

In each LSA, commanders had 60 large tents for billeting Marines, 22 medium tents for

billeting SNCOs and Officers, and 22 smaller tents for other billeting. 15 shower units, 200

portable chemical toilets, 5 generators, 50 dumpsters, and 1 food preparation area completed

each facility. Marines would have to transit to the Udairi Range Complex to fire large caliber

weapons but found room within the TAA to fire small caliber weapons.

Embarkation, Deployment, and Off-load Operations

The ability to get to the fight is a critical element of combat power, and the ability to get a

Marine Division across the globe and into a fight quickly is one of the Nation's most remarkable

capabilities. Critical to all was the adaptation and flexibility displayed by the MEF and its

components in the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of all RFF forces.

Without the benefit of a mature theater logistical command and without sufficient transportation

assets, the components (including the Division with its Forward CP) refocused efforts to bring

these forces in. The Forward CP established convoy security teams, airfield reception teams,

surge drivers for all MPS assets and much more in order to receive and stage personnel and

equipment. The Division staff focused on sequencing the right forces with the right gear into

theater, while the units of the Division focused on packaging, weighing, and marking their

MPF stern offload of an AA Vat ports in . Air Force C-S loading at March Air Reserve Base Kuwait. The preponderance of Division . . . California. Many Marines and some equipment equipment was transported by ship. . . were transported overseas to Kuwait by strategic air.

64
equipment. Conducting strategic mobility exercises in the fall of 2002 was a means to bring the

two efforts together to assess how ready units were to respond to a deployment order. The

Assistant Division Commander (ADC), Colonel John Kelly, and the Deputy G-3, Lieutenant

Colonel Clarke Lethin, became intimately involved in the embarkation preparation of the

Division, lending focused urgency to the process. Through unit briefs they injected discipline

into the embarkation process and ensured unit plans reflected the nature of the fight the Division

was about to undertake — light, lean, lethal — down to the pallet-load. Units laid equipment out

on parade decks in stick order, weighed loads, and measured vehicles. Because of the flexible

nature of RFF deployment, the units had to do double duty to ensure their equipment would fit

on either ships or aircraft (as the means of deployment was not certain.) When DEPORD 1 77A

was released in January, deployment planning and preparation was validated as the Division

departed home stations for Kuwait. Time spent planning and inspecting Unit Line Number

(ULN) serials during the previous months paid off in speed and flexibility of deployment when

the Division deployed by RFF instead of by the timeline of the TPFDD.

Deploying the force by a combination of military and civilian modes of transport proved

challenging. In January, ships from all three MPSRONs sortied to the CENTCOM AOR to

provide the first suites of Marine equipment. U.S. Navy Amphibians, Fast Sealift Ships (FSS),

and contracted civilian carriers followed to provide additional capability. The majority of the

Division's Marines and sailors flew on commercial aircraft of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

(CRAF) while high-value organic equipment flew on military transports. RCT-1 steamed out of

San Diego harbor aboard amphibious ships as part of Amphibious Task Force - West (ATFWest).

In early January, groups of Marines headed to the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and

Kuwait to start the MPSRON offload process. Offload Preparation Party (OPP) Marines linked

up with MPSRON ships in Diego Garcia and Sigonella, Italy to check equipment. They ensured

gear was ready to drive down the ramp when the ships docked in Kuwait. Survey, Liaison, and

Reconnaissance Party (SLRP) Marines flew into Kuwait to ensure Ash Shuaybah Port and the

Kuwait Naval Base (the two ports of debarkation) were ready to receive ships, and Kuwait City

International Airport was ready to receive military aircraft. On 17 January, the advance party of

CSSG-l 1 arrived in Kuwait to support the large MPF offload. In total, eleven ships with over

5,000 pieces of rolling stock and 7,500 of containers were offloaded. Augmented by convoys

from CSSB-10, CSSC-1 15, and CSSC-l 17, the eleven-ship offload was completed in 40 days,

two weeks ahead of schedule.

Division logisticians worked hard to expedite the deployment. The Deputy G-4, Lieutenant

Colonel Jeff Horigan, designed and stood up the Division Operations Center (DOC) at Camp

Pendleton. The DOC became the clearinghouse for force flow information and the link to

ongoing operations in theater. At the unit level, Major Carl Small and the Division Embarkation

team did yeoman's work assisting deploying units in reordering and reconfiguring their

information. From data entry to assistance at the Sea and Aerial Ports of Embarkation

(SIAPOE), Major Small's team maximized available lift to allow the Division to close into

theater as quickly as possible. At Kuwait City International Airport, Gunnery Sergeant Manuel

Johnson became the single point of contact to receive Division units and marry them up with

transportation for movement to their LSAs. Gunnery Sergeant Johnson was one of a number of

65
unsung heroes who scrambled to move mountains of equipment and thousands of vehicles off the

ships and into the hands of the warriors who needed them.

The 7th Marine Regiment was the first Division unit to deploy. As the primary Maritime

Prepositioned Force (MPF) GCE, they planned to link-up with the gear being offloaded from the

MPSRONs. 7th Marines had conducted numerous exercises and inspections to be able to quickly

leave Twenty-nine Palms, fly to an operating area, and marry up with assets from MPF shipping.

In the weeks following 9-il, 7 Marines had conducted a two-ship MPF offload during exercise

Bright Star in Egypt. During the second week of January, the advanced party of 7th Marines

arrived and prepared to offload equipment from the ships of MPSRONs 2 and 3, which had

closed on Kuwait. The first two ships — Motor Vessels (MV) Hauge and Lopez —arrived on 15

January before the Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party (SLRP) had arrived. With typical

can-do spirit, Colonel Toolan assigned Major Andrew Petrucci (the 7th Marines planning liaison

officer to the Division Forward in Kuwait) to the task, With a pickup team of only 15 Marines,

Major Petrucci organized the offload and staging of RCT-7's equipment with a makeshift Arrival

and Assembly Operations Element. There was nowhere near the full complement of drivers

needed to offload the vehicles, either from the ships or from the flatbed trailers on which they

arrived at their desert staging areas. Marines from the Division Forward CP responded to the

call for drivers and were quickly bussed down to the port to assist. 'Cooks, bakers, and

candlestick makers' were all drafted into service to drive Amtracks, MTVRs, and HMMWVs all

over Kuwait. On 20 January, the draftee drivers were returned to Camp Commando when the

remainder of the shore party arrived. By 24 January, 7th Marines added equipment from the MV

Anderson and US Naval Ship (USNS) Stockham. The first main body battalions arrived by air on

24 January. The Marines of 3d Battalion, 1 1th Marines, 1st Tank Battalion, 3d LAR Battalion, 1St

Combat Engineer Battalion, and 3d AA Battalion that combined with 7th1 Marines to form RCT-7

soon followed. By the time the IvfV Button and MVBonnyman completed offload on 27 January,

the bulk of the combat power of RCT-7 was in Theater. On 1 February, Colonel Hummer told

the ADC that RCT-7 had closed the force. It took only two weeks to go from garrison locations

to a combat ready RCT in LSA-7.

The deployment that started as a single RCT in Kuwait, quickly grew to add a second RCT,

and eventually included the entire Division. Fifth Marine Regiment was the next to go. Without

an MPF-focus in daily operations, Marines relied on intensive educational seminars and

strong leadership to successfully get up to speed on MPF operations. The Marines of Grizzly

had taken a crash-course in MPF operations from their comrades in 7th Marines. This training

included a visit to the Biount Island Command, where first hand information on the contents and

offload procedures for specific ships was gained. Chief Warrant Officer Brian Spooner led the

75 Marines from the regimental OPP to Kuwait to accomplish the download of MPSRON- 1.

Their first elements departed Camp San Mateo in late January and joined the Division in Kuwait.

MV Pless and MV Kocak brought in the first loads of what would be over 17,000 items of

equipment offloaded for RCT-5's use in combat. Working closely with the shore party, the OPP

downloaded the MV Obregon and USNS Martin ahead of schedule, finishing up with the MV

Bobo. They received other units from Camp Pendleton, Twenty-nine Palms, and Camp Lejeune

to eventually form RCT-5. By 15 February, RCT-5 was staged with elements of 2d Tank

Battalion, ls LAR Battalion, 1St CEB, and 3" AA Battalion. The RCT had gone from garrison to

66
assembly areas in Kuwait in weeks,

and, with their brethren in RCT- 1 and

RCT-7, would go on to write Marine

Corps history in Baghdad a few

weeks later.

RCT- 1 prepared to load seven

amphibious ships that would take

them half way around the world as

RCT-5 and RCT-7 prepared to fly in

and link up with MPF. With the

release of a naval message on 6

January, Amphibious Task Force

(ATF) West was created. In addition

to the equipment of RCT- 1, 1St LAR

Battalion loaded all but one company

of its LAVs and equipment on the

amphibious ships (15t LAR received Marines from 1/4 conduct live fire training aboard the USS

one company's worth of LAVs from Boxer. The long transit gave RCT-1 time to build habitual

MPSRON shipping, but was required relationships between its organic units and supporting

to ship the rest of the battalion from attachments.

Camp Pendleton.) Marines staged

equipment at Naval Station San

Diego and the National City commercial port. Onload of the USS Bonhomme Richard, USS

Boxer, USS Cleveland, and USS Comstock began on 10 January. With the assistance of the ATF

West Embark Officer, Chief Warrant Officer Mark Ivy, the Cleveland and Comstock were

loaded in two days. Division Marines, ship's crew, and Navy staff began loading the next ship

before the last was finished. The Pearl Harbor, Anchorage, and Dubuque loaded

simultaneously, all finishing at the same time as the Boxer and Bonhomme Richard. ATF West

pulled away from the pier on 17 January as families waved and news crews filmed. During

transit, the RCT-1 Marines continued their combat conditioning by conducting innovative

training that optimized the available space onboard ship. The RCT conducted daily

communications exercises among the units onboard the various ships of the ATF to improve the

regiment's radio and data cormectivity reliability. Several commanders conferences were

conducted to refine ashore training schedules, combat procedures, and image the leadershi

through the initial actions of the Opening Gambit. Reversing the training cycle, 15t Battalion, 4

Marines (1/4) conducted the majority of their live fire, weapons handling, NBC, and physical

cond:itioning training at night. The Marines and Sailors from Weapons Company, 1/4 instructed

the Marines from CSSC-l 11 on weapons handling, individual protective measures, and other

essential combat skills. Their transit would take over a month and include major mechanical

problems with the Bonhomme Richard that delayed its arrival. Commodore Rome and his

Sailors lived up to the great reputation they had with their Marine brothers. These hard-working,

mission-oriented Sailors got their ships to Kuwait despite many challenges. On 25 February, the

first ships pulled pierside at the Kuwait Naval Base and began to offload. In four days the

offload was complete, and by 1 March RCT-1 stood combat ready at LSA-1.

67
Eleventh Marine Regiment and Headquarters Battalion faced unique challenges throughout

the deployment. As the unit responsible for providing artillery support to the maneuver

elements, 1 1th Marines had elements traveling by both air and amphibious shipping, and would

marry up with MPF equipment once there. Deployed by both air and sea, the regiment was

equipped with a combination of MPF and organic equipment. In Kuwait, the regiment gained

(from Marines) a Counter Battery Radar (CBR) Detachment (two Q46A Firefinder radars, a

Target Processing Center (TPC), and 23 Marines) and two cannon batteries (India 3/10 and

Romeo 5/10). Additionally, it attached the 1st Field Artillery Detachment (1st FAD) from the

U.S. Army XVIII Airborne Corps in Fort Bragg, North Carolina (two Q-37 radars, a TPC, and

24 soldiers.) By 13 March, Colonel Marletto informed the CG that 1 ithl Marines had their full

complement of howitzers and counter-battery radars ready for the fight.

For Headquarters Battalion, the challenge lay in maintaining sufficient staffs in CONUS

and Kuwait to command and control units in both locations. As February drew to a close,

Headquarters Battalion re-organized to provide truck detachments to each of the RCTs.

Following this redistribution, they were fully staffed for combat operations. The Soderman

completed download on 13 March and provided the remaining assets the Division needed in the

fight to Baghdad. It was the last of four FSS and seven contracted commercial ships that enabled

the force to close.

In Kuwait, the RSO&I tracking responsibilities fell to Corporal Justin Duplain, who kept the

Forward staff informed about the progress of the TPFDD and arriving forces. His duties

included identifying force flow discrepancies, and communicating this to the DOC at Camp

Pendleton. Corporal Duplain's additional duties included briefing the CG on the daily progress

of RSO&I during staff meetings, as well as serving as the Forward CP's Plans Chief.

Considering the rank of individuals on parallel staffs with similar responsibilities, his weighty

responsibilities were testament to the trust and confidence that the CG put in the young Marine

NCOs who turned plans and ideas into action on the battlefield. Once, when the good Corporal

had missed a few staff meetings because of demanding duties, the CG asked where he had been.

Without skipping a beat, Corporal Duplain answered, "Well, I've been too busy to brief you

General!" He was, and the CG knew it.

Fires Planning

As the Commander of 1 1th Marines, Colonel Marletto was also the Division Fires Support

Coordinator. Going into this operation, Colonel Marletto's guidance to his staff and subordinate

commanders was simple: "We must mass to kill the enemy at every opportunity, no pinpricks."

His intent was equally succinct, and left no doubt with anyone, regardless of rank, as to the 1

Marines purpose, which was to "Protect the Marines and sailors of the 1st Marine Division from

the effects of enemy indirect fire systems." These straightforward words resonated throughout

the 1 1th Marines and were backed up by the regiment's actions during the attacks from northern

Kuwait to Al Kut, Baghdad, and Tikrit.

The members of the G-3 Fires cell that deployed with the Forward CP possessed a breadth

and depth of fire support expertise that represented the Division's commitment to the philosophy

that fire support is enabled by building partnerships. Lieutenant Colonel (USA) Gary Smythe,

68
the Assistant Division Fire Support Coordinator led the team. For an Army Officer, the Marines

of the Division thought Lieutenant Colonel Smythe was all right. He was the single Division

officer with the 1st Marine Division patch on his shoulder, and he carried the serious Fire Support

Coordination responsibilities on his shoulders as well. The Division Target Information Officer

(TIO) was Chief Warrant Officer Quint Avenetti, a targeting expert. He was the first 0803

Target Acquisition Officer to be assigned to the 11th Marines Fire Support Coordination Section

since the Marine Corps restructured the 0803 Military Occupational Specialty career path. The

decision to place greater experience and technical expertise in the TIO billet was deliberate, and

recognized the importance of the relationship between intelligence and fires. The team was soon

joined by Master Sergeant Brad Lee, the Division Observer Liaison Chief, whose years of fire

support experience and knowledge of automated systems would be critical. The Division's Air

Officers rounded out the Fires team, with Lieutenant Colonel "Iron" Shank, Major "Grams"

Grarnuglia, and Captain "Benny" Bennigson. Both "Grams" and "Benny," who had each been

with the Division for over two years, had earned the trust and respect of their comrades over the

months of preparation that had already gone into this fight. These Marines had demonstrated a

thorough knowledge and tactically focused mindset that made them superior in their billets.

Iron's arrival in late 2002 brought another solid member to the team.

The Marines of the Forward Fires team seized the opportunity afforded by the CFLCC

exercises to test the Division's fire support communications nets and automated fire support

coordination systems. They continued this training during a Division Forward CPX and

displacement exercise held in the third week of December. While AFATDS and its companion

PC-based software, Effects Management Tool (EMT) were a focus of training, the Marines also

received instruction by the MEF Information Management Officer (IMO) and contractors in the

use of Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) and Automated Deep Operations

Coordination System (ADOCS). Although not a system of record, ADOCS was used

extensively within CENTCOM to automate the deliberate and reactive targeting processes. This

would be the first war in which fire support coordination was largely digital, and many lessons

would be derived from the experience.

In addition to planning and coordination, the Fires cell was equipped to conduct artillery

reconnaissance and survey. At the request of Lieutenant Colonel Phil Lark, the I MEF Force

Fires Plans Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Smythe and his team conducted an artillery

reconnaissance of Kuwait's Bubiyan Island on 27 December, to determine whether artillery could

be feasibly positioned there in support of an assault on the Al Faw Peninsula (as artillery on

Bubiyan could range across the narrow Khor al Abdulla waterway separating Kuwait from Iraq.)

The Royal Marines planned to conduct the assault early in the campaign, and Brigadier Gregory,

Chief of Royal Artillery, and Commanding General of the 1St UK Armoured Division's Offensive

Support Group (OSG), accompanied the team. They surveyed Bubiyan Island from the shore to

35 km inland and confirmed the suitability of the single bridge to the island for heavy vehicles

and towed artillery. The team determined that the only suitable firing positions from which to

support an assault were the Kuwaiti coastal defense artillery positions. Located at approximately

2 km intervals along the marshy northern shore of the island, each of the built up positions could

accommodate a battery of howitzers. This venture marked the beginning of collaboration

between the Brit gunners and the Cannon Cockers of 1 1th1 Marines, which would be to the

advantage of both during the war.

69
Continuing Collaboration with UK 1st Division

The 1st Marine Division and the UK's 1st

Armoured Division planners met a few days

later to work out a detailed plan for the Relief

in Place (RIP). The swift RIP of the Al Basrah

area would be critical to sustaining the

momentum of the attack. By this time, the

planners expected A-day sometime during the

first week of March, and the British planners

were counting on the arrival of the 7th

Armoured Brigade in time for LD. It was

agreed that the relief would be conducted from

east to west, beginning with RCT-7 and the 7th

Armoured Brigade in the Az Zubayr area. This

was to be followed by RCT-5 and 16th Air UK headquarters and planning elements arrive at

Camp Matilda. Assault Brigade around the GOSPs. To

facilitate close coordination, the UK

Division's tactical command post would co-locate with the 1St Marine Division Forward CP for

the assault. In addition, a Royal Air Force Liaison Officer from the RAF Regiment supporting

the 1St UK Division would move forward with MWSG-37 to assume control of the FARP site at

Safwan Airfield.

The plan for the relief of artillery would remain fluid almost up to G-day. At the time of the

RIP coordination meeting, the British planners believed that only two batteries of the 3d Royal

Horse Artillery (3 RHA) would be ready by G-day, and both would initially be required to

support 3d Commando's assaults on the Al Faw Peninsula and Umm Qasr. Depending how the

fight went in that quarter, there was a chance—rather slim—that the 7th Armoured Brigade might

not have the support of its affiliated artillery regiment when the RIP in RCT-7's zone occurred.

In that case, the Americans would leave a general support artillery battalion and counterbattery

radar behind to continue to engage enemy artillery in the Al Basra area under the tactical

command of the British division. This was offered in good faith, since the Marines could not

hand over the counterbattery fight if the UK Division lacked a capability to match whatever

indirect fire threat remained in Az Zubayr and Al Basrah. Teamwork between the two divisions

was so strong that neither would consider any activity that did not work to the benefit of the

other. The two divisions shared remarkably similar perspectives on almost every issue, and

mutual admiration and trust were the order of the day.

On the other hand, the British fire suporters had indicated from the beginning that they were

eager to attach the light gun batteries of 7 Para Royal Horse Artillery (7 RHA) to the US for the

Opening Gambit. They explained that 16th Air Assault Brigade would not be committed until the

RIP, and artillery should not be kept in reserve. In a first meeting between the two artillery

commanders, Brigadier Gregory confirmed this intention to Colonel Marletto, even though there

70
was some question at the time whether London would permit cross-attachment of units below the

brigade level. From the standpoint of facilitating the RIP, however, attaching 7 RHA to the 2d

Battalion, 1 1th Marines (2/11) made sense, especially if it came with the British weapons locating

radar. If the plan was approved, 16th Air Assault Battalion's affiliated artillery regiment would

already be in place when it came up to relieve RCT-5, and the British radar—having been

integrated into the counterbattery fight—would have built up its target lists and situational

awareness.

The US planners coveted 3 RHA's self-propelled AS-90s with their long-range ammunition.

In the end, the timeline for G-day would slip enough to prevent all four of 3 RHA's batteries

from arriving in time for the fight. Thus, the 3d Battalion, 1 1th Marines (3/1 1) would cross the

Line of Departure (LD) with only two batteries of the AS-90s attached, while 2/11 was

reinforced by two batteries of light guns. As 3 RHA's remaining batteries were freed from the

fight on Al Faw and Umm Qasr, they would move up to join the British command element with

3/11. This would get the 1st UK Division's artillery and radar into position—and into the fight—

ahead of the British maneuver brigades, allowing the RIP to proceed seamlessly from the

standpoint of fire support. Meanwhile, the American artillery would be free to lean toward the

Division's upcoming fight in the west. Sierra Battery 5/11, with the MEU, would support 3 d Commando's assault on the Al Faw Peninsula from Bubiyan Island. Collaboration between

Marine artillerymen and Brit gunners would be a hallmark of the Coalition under I MEF.

Intelligence Planning

The G-2 continued to spend a great deal of

time and effort negotiating the composition,

command relationships, and force flow

requirements of supporting intelligence

attachments. What the Division was

attempting to create (through the attachment

of supporting intelligence capabilities) was a

full complement of systems, all directly

responsive to Division influence. This

included secure communications, topographic

systems, and a host of '-INT's (Intelligence

specialties such as Signals, Imagery, and

Human intelligence, SIGINT, IMINT, and The Trojan Spirit II special communications system

HUMINT, respectively.) Through these provided critical access to Intelligence products to each

systems, the Division would be self-sufficient RCT and the Division CP.

enough to satisfy its own intelligence needs through organic collections while remaining

plugged-in to the higher intelligence architecture. This proved to be a tremendous success, as the

Division relied on its own intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination during most of the

fast-paced operations that were to follow.

The Division's five deployable Trojan Spirit II (TS II) satellite data communications systems

provided critical secure connectivity to each RCT, enabling instant access to all supporting

intelligence information from anywhere on the battlefield. Against a host of obstacles, I MEF's

71
Intelligence Systems Officer, Major Mike Scheiern, had fought successfully for the assignment

of TS ITs down to the RCT level. The planned fast-paced maneuver of the RCTs made a fast

moving, flexible secure communications system like the TS II an important requirement. The

Division's allowance, however, was for a single TSII, and there were not many in the Marine

Corps. With key support from 1St Radio Battalion, I MEF crafted a TS II distribution plan that

borrowed assets from 1st Radio Battalion, 3d MAW, MARCENT, and 2d Radio Battalion.

Pushing digital data to the RCTs at up to Top Secret (TS) and special classification levels was

required, and the Trojan Spirits would be critical as both a data and voice capability during the

fight. For SIGLNT, the Division had the collection capabilities of nine attached SIGINT Support

Teams, three Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System (MEWSS) vehicles (LAY-mounted

SIGINT collectors) and four Operational Control Elements that provided connectivity and

analysis for Theater and National SIGINT collectors. For imagery, the Division could reach

back through the SIPRNET to archived imagery located in Imagery Product Libraries at

CENTCOM, CFACC, CFLCC, and the St Intelligence Battalion. With its two organic imagery

interpreters, the Division also had a minimal capability to do U2 wet-film exploitation using a

deployable field light table. Additionally, the Division had direct feed of both Predator and

Pioneer video downlinks through the Global Broadcast System (GBS) at Division Headquarters,

and three Remote Receive Terminals (RRTs) from the VIVIIU squadrons. Communications with

the UAV pilots and mission planners was typically conducted via SIPRNET chatroom,

supplemented by formal post-mission reports from the UAV squadron. The Division would have

seven attached Human Intelligence Exploitation Teams (HETs) providing interrogator and

translator support, as well as a small control element at the Division Headquarters. Because of

the limited utility of the Marine Corps' obsolete unattended ground sensor equipment, the

Division had no sensor support for this operation. The Division's own organic MOS 0261

Topographic Marines and equipment provided critical topographic support.

Arranging for this wide array of systems from a variety of supporting units proved

exceedingly difficult, as each supporting attachment had to be individually sought-out,

negotiated, or coordinated. Each supporting unit seemed to have unique command and control

relationships, making their integration a challenge. Major Scheiern, working with the Division's

Major Tim Oliver, enabled the Division to get the assets it needed to be self-sufficient. His

assistance in pushing these assets even further down to the RCTs also had an exceptional impact.

it became clear in subsequent operations that having intelligence support organic or under

tactical control of the Division was critical, as intelligence support by a centralized higher

headquarters became very tenuous once combat operations began. The Division demonstrated

the requirement for an integrated organic UAV capability, access to theater and national imagery

collections, SIGINT reporting, HUMINT reporting, local 3-D battlespace visualization

capability, and access to the analysis products of higher headquarters through a high-speed

circuit such as the Trojan Spirit.

Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) was to prove another significant preparation effort. The

national intelligence community had identified a multi-tiered listing of potential hide-sites for

chemical, biological, nuclear, or missile activity. These listings included sites that ranged from

active research centers to sites of possible historical storage of prohibited items as far back as the

Iran-Iraq war. A separate listing of potential war-crime evidence, mass graves, or leadership

locations was also developed. CFLCC had established an exploitation methodology that

72
Division riders join the crew of this

P3-A IF aircraft to conduct battlefield

surveillance and reconnaissance

during the build-up phase of the

operation.

included Mobile Exploitation Teams of experts that could properly investigate and exploit a

sensitive site. The Division G-2 worked to identify and prepare objective folders on the sites in

zone that were most likely to contain WMD-related materials.

The Division enjoyed the support of an additional intelligence collection capability beginning

in December 2002. The P-3 aircraft was being used in a surveillance role of maritime targets

adjacent to and inside the Division zone. The P-3 Anti-surface warfare Improvement Program P3 (AlP) had fitted the aircraft with sensors that were tremendously helpful in giving commanders

situational awareness of their battlespace. Many of the Division staff had recent experience with

the P-3 (AlP) in Afghanistan as part of Task Force 58. Exploiting the lessons learned from that

recent experience, a program of Division riders on the P-3 aircraft was begun. Coordination with

the squadron to utilize Al Jaber or Au al Salem (AAS) in Kuwait allowed for them to pick up

Division riders in country and observe targets of interest to the Division while flying routes that

supported the P-3's primarily naval mission. Thanks to Major General Amos' support, ramp

space and other 3d MAW support to the P-3s was forthcoming at AAS. The Division liaisons

worked directly with the Commander of Combined Task Force 57 elements operating out of

Bahrain. CTF-57 and the VP squadrons in Bahrain were to prove essential partners in the

success of this program. The teamwork extended to such an extent that the CTF-57 arranged for

the basing of a large P-3 detachment at Ali al Salem Air Base in Kuwait to more readily support

the Division. This forward basing gave the aircraft tremendous loiter time over the target areas.

The Division rider team, under Colonel Jim Lukeman, served as 'Guardian Angels' for Division

forces moving to contact, providing critical indications and warnings to maneuver commanders

in real time. The value of this aircraft as a collection platform in support of Marine operations

was clearly demonstrated as ground operations pushed beyond the littoral area. The P-3 was able

to push ever deeper into Iraq to provide day or night coverage for the GCE. To some extent, the

Division suffered from the success of the P-3 as a surveillance platform and its Division rider

program. As word of the capabilities of this platform began to get out, competition for access

increased. The 1st UK Division, NSW elements, Force Reconnaissance, and even the Army's 3C

Infantry Division all vied for the attention of a limited number of aircraft and crew. In another

example of superb cooperation among the units making up the Coalition, the asset was shared by

all, and soon teams of riders were aloft every time the P-3 was available. Throughout, the

initiative and commitment of the Sailors of CTF-57 under Commander Robert Lally were

commendable and in the finest traditions of the Navy-Marine team. Vice Admiral Keating, the

73
Coalition Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) provided his total support,

enabling this critical combat multiplier to make its influence felt. The P-3's technical

capabilities, coupled with Colonel Lukeman's intimate knowledge of the Division's scheme of

maneuver, was a confidence-building combination that increased the speed of tactical decisionmaking and maneuver against the enemy.

With the Division's expected tasking to attack up the Highway 7 corridor, the Division G-2

requested high-volume production of detailed urban IPB products for the small towns along

Route 7. These requirements were negotiated with the MEF's Intelligence Battalion. Noting the

lack of a comprehensive map-based obstacle overlay product for the opening attacks, the

Division G-2 also initiated action to develop a comprehensive map product that included

pipelines, power lines, oil wells, and

agricultural areas. In a strong display of

support, CFLCC quickly adopted this

product development effort as their own, and

developed a complete 'Attack Corridor

Study.' The 'Attack Corridor Study' was

eventually to prove one of the most useful

and highly desired intelligence products for

the entire operation.

Third MAW had also recently received

the imagery pods of the Advanced Tactical

Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS). This

imagery system was fitted into the F/A-18D A

3d MA WF/A-18D with an ATARS imagerypod

to provide a tactical photoreconnaissance installed. This aircraft provided imagery in support

capability, one that had been lacking in the of the MEF's targeting effort.

Marine Corps since the retirement of the RF4B. The G-2 began to integrate ATARS

imagery collection into the Division's intelligence architecture. Because of the very recent

fielding of this capability to 3d MAW, the promise and capabilities of this platform were not

fully realized due to a number of platform, data connectivity, and exploitation constraints.

Because of the multi-role nature of the F/A-i 8D, every ATARS photoreconnaissance mission

came at the expense of a deep strike, FAC (A), or CAS sortie. Achieving intelligence collection

coverage of GCE maneuver and Intelligence targets required cost/benefit analysis within the

MEF. Many ATARS sorties were also required to support 3d MAW targeting assessment.

Noone appreciated 3d MAW's targeting efforts more than the grunts in the Division, but this left

very few sorties to collect intelligence to meet Division requirements. A number of the

remaining sorties were passed up to the CFACC for tasking, forcing the Division to compete

within the larger Coalition environment to receive ATARS support from assets organic to the

MEF. Few targets of primary interest to the GCE were exploited and disseminated, but the

future potential for this platform was clearly demonstrated.

On 13 January, the Division attached an eight-man Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition

Radar System (JSTARS) Common Ground Station (CGS) team from the Army's 513th Military

Intelligence Brigade. These soldiers, led by Staff Sergeant Adrian Flores, were to have a

74
significant impact on the Division's combat operations, and were a welcome addition to the

Division team. The CGS maintained data connectivity with an airborne sensor platform, and

provided real-time Moving Target Indicators (MTIs) and Synthetic Aperture Radar imagery

directly to the Division G-2. This data would be used at critical junctures of planning and

combat operations to determine trafficability of routes, detect condition of key bridges, analyze

terrain to find mobility corridors, and detect large unit movements. From the outset, Staff

Sergeant Flores and his team proved they possessed the same fighting spirit and can-do attitude

of the Marines they were supporting. These soldiers would serve with distinction through the

entire campaign, and would be commended by the Division CG after the fighting was over.

Visit By the Red Cell

On 21 January, I MEF provided the Division staff the opportunity to sit down with an MCIAsponsored 'Red Cell', led by Colonel Dave Larson. The Red Cell team combined Iraq experts

from across the Intelligence Community and brought them to Kuwait to review the Division's

plan from the enemy's perspective. The Division Forward Staff had the opportunity to discuss

the capabilities of the enemy with this team, and gained significant understanding of the nature

of the Regime and the capabilities they would likely employ on the battlefield. The Red Cell's

review of the Division Scheme of Maneuver contained no significant surprises. The Red Cell

noted the likely Iraqi use of humanitarian disaster, tactical inundation, and an urban-centric

defense by conventional and paramilitary forces. The picture they painted was of a highly

capable and increasingly challenging enemy as the Division advanced closer to Baghdad.

According to the Red Cell, this enemy would allegedly use integrated fires, flooding, and

chemical weapons to add to the challenges already posed by the difficult terrain. This reinforced

the Division's expectation for a tough conventional fight, especially closer to Baghdad.

The Red Cell and the Division staff agreed that an asymmetric defense would be the

Regime's best strategy, and their most likely recourse. Paramilitary forces, non-traditional

defenses in the urban areas, a 'scorched earth' policy beginning with the Rumaylah oilfields and

the use of chemical weapons might each be attempted. The group noted that isolated attacks

could probably not be stopped, but the Regime would have a difficult time sustaining a

coordinated asymmetric defense. Sustaining such an effort would require a well-trained force

and sophisticated orchestration of effort, capabilities that the Iraqis did not have. The Division's

'No better friend, no worse enemy' policy would also seek to remove the motivation for

resistance once segments of the population came under Division control.

Iraqi units were infiltrated and controlled by Regime overseers, and would not likely

capitulate or surrender before US forces were closing on their positions on the ground. For the

Iraqi soldiers, it was only when the balance of fear shifted from what the SSO would do to them

to what the firepower of the Americans might do to them that surrender became an option. This

same concept of a 'tipping point' with the civilian population was also discussed. The US had

not intervened when the Shias rose against Saddam in 1991, and thousands were murdered by the

Regime. Even though the Iraqi populace was vehemently anti-Regime, they were not likely to

begin to aid the Coalition attack until it was clear that the US was committed to absolute Regime

removal on the ground, and had the upper hand.

75
One final topic of discussion was the personality of

Saddam Hussein. Saddam had kept himself in power by

keeping his options open, then making brash decisions

when he felt cornered or thought he saw an opportunity.

The early use of chemicals would remove his flexibility.

Saddam would likely recognize his inability to mass

chemical fires for an 'area denial' effect, making them

most effective as a weapon of terror. On the world stage

given to Saddam by the international media, the

threatened escalation to the use of chemical weapons

was probably as effective as the weapons themselves.

On the battlefield, these weapons would have limited

effectiveness against well-trained US Marines. The

Division G-2's line of reasoning led to the assessment

that it was unlikely that Saddam would use chemical

weapons in the opening days of the fight. This was

contrary to some other assessments that predicted the

use of chemical weapons 'early and often'. Regardless The unstable personality of Iraq's

dictator Saddam Hussein made it of the assessment, prudence would dictate that the i difficult to predict his actions. Marine Division be on guard against this eventuality

throughout the campaign.

Teaming with the Vt UK Armoured Division

One of the rewarding opportunities of the Operation was the close linkage between the 1st

UK Division and the i5t Marine Division.The 1st UK Division, led by Major General Robin

Brimms, had a shared understanding with the Division about what tasks existed, and the general

order to complete them. Major General Brimms preferred not to push fragments of his combat

power into the fight piecemeal under the Marine Division control. Rather, 1st UK Division

planned to keep them ready to relieve the Division as rapidly and coherently as possible. This

would enable the Marine Division to quickly disperse to the west, allowing not only preserved

momentum and speed, but also a reduced chemical target. The Marine Division CG agreed fully

with this concept. The Brits sent over one of their finest officers, Major John Brookings as a

liaison to the lS Marine Division CP. The quick-witted Major Brookings, with true Marine-like

irreverence and humor, soon made himself a welcome and valued member of the Division team.

At the Division's regimental command posts Major Andrew Flay (UK 7th Armour Brigade)

joined RCT-7, Major Cameron Day (Royal Artillery) joined l Marines, and Major Frasier (l6th UK Air Assault Brigade) joined RCT-5.

The Brits planned to have 3 Commando (with the US 15th MEU TACON) operating on the

Al Faw peninsula, the 7 Armoured Brigade relieving RCT-7 in the Zubayr area, and the 161h Air

Assault Brigade relieving RCT-5 in the Rumaylah area. Because UK forces were deploying to

Kuwait on their own timeline, during planning there was little certainty about what the UK

Division would consist of when it actually came time for a RIP to be conducted. In fact, forces

would still be flowing into Theater when the Division crossed the Line of Departure. A possible

problem might arise if most of the 'Desert Rats' of the UK 7th Armoured Brigade were not

76
available to relieve the Division in time. In this case, the Marine Division would have to destroy

all vestiges of the 51st Mechanized Division and close off all the bridges over the Shatt al Basrah

waterway. These were tasks that the Division would have otherwise handed off to the 7th

Armoured Brigade once the South Rumaylah oil field infrastructure was secure. As it turned out,

the Desert Rats would be sufficiently closed to commence the RIP on schedule within 24 hours

of the Marines crossing LD, even attacking in concert near Umm Qasr, and handily finishing off

those elements of the 51St Mechanized Division that the Division left undestroyed.

Coordination with the Kuwaiti Land Forces

The Division also began coordination with the Kuwaitis soon after the arrival of the Forward

CP. Colonel Toolan made contact with the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense (KMOD), Kuwait Land

Forces (KLF) and the Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait (OMC-K) to discuss cross obstacle

breaching, maneuver training areas, terrain walks of the border area, and potential pre-assault

preparation tasks. These early discussions set the tone for follow on planning and set the

Division up for success during future combat operations. Major Clark Watson served as the

Division's liaison to the KLF 35th Brigade. In between dinners of fresh lamb and cold drinks, he

was to play an important role (Major Watson took a good deal of ribbing from his Division

comrades, subsisting on Meals Ready to Eat (MIREs).) His efforts were instrumental in the

working relationship that was established with the KLF, and led to a mutual understanding of the

Division's desires and movement plans while in Kuwait.

In order for the Division to occupy Attack Positions near the border, it was necessary to

conduct a Forward Passage of Lines (FPOL) with the two Kuwaiti Brigades that had

responsibility for border security in the Division's zone. The Kuwaiti Land Forces, especially

the 6th and 35th Brigades were proud units, who wanted to assist the Americans and carry out

their missions as full partners. The Division understood the strong national pride of the Kuwaiti

people, and worked eagerly with the KLF to find ways to achieve the mutual goal of a rapid and

safe FPOL.

The breaching of the Kuwaiti border obstacles became a central topic of discussion between

the KLF and the Division. The Division requested that the Kuwaiti allies create twelve 300 - 500

meter lanes through the southern and northern obstacle belts. After coordination between

CFLCC and the KMOD, the Kuwaitis hired a contractor to do the job. A Kuwaiti contractor

diminished all border obstacles along the Kuwait-Iraq border in 1st Marine Division's zone,

including the Southern berm and tank ditch, an electrified wire obstacle, and a northern berm and

ditch. The Kuwaiti contractor opened all lanes in the southern berm obstacle by creating a hole

in the berm and filling/compacting the ditch. The contractor made lanes in the wire obstacle at

the breach sites by pre-cutting and preparing the fence. This method left the fence in place, with

the appearance of being intact, yet the Marines would be able to easily open the fence by hand

when the time came. The Kuwaiti contractor opened the northern berm and ditch obstacles in

the same manner as the southern set.

The biggest impediment to early opening of the berm lanes by the Kuwaitis was the late

closure of our forces and the danger of alarming the Iraqis who could observe the berm cut

locations from their Observation Posts on Jabal Sanam. If they reacted to the berm cuts by

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commencing destruction of the oilfields before the Division had sufficient forces to attack, the

key oil infrastructure could be lost.

Major Hassan — A Combat Multiplier

Few individuals had a greater impact on

the success of the Division's preparations

than Major Hassan of the Kuwaiti Ministry

of the Interior. This imposing figure had

worked the murderous Kuwait/Iraq border

area for over a decade, and was one of the

most knowledgeable advisors the Division

was to gain. Major Hassan was introduced

to the Division Commander as a Kuwaiti

Border Guard officer, who could discuss the

activities of the Iraqis, Kuwaitis, and the UN

along the border. It soon became clear that

Major Hassan had tremendous insight into

the situation along the border area. With a

charming personality and an unveiled Major Hassan - Senior Kuwaiti Liaison Officer to the . . UN Border observer mission and to Coalition forces. passion to assist the Marines in taking out

He was to play a key role in building the Division the Saddam Regime, he soon was

situational awareness prior to the start of combat considered a friend by many members of

operations, the Division. Over the course of months,

Major Hassan was to provide access to

sensitive border areas to enable the

Division's attack route planning and

leader's reconnaissance. He provided key

intelligence of Iraqi patterns of activity in

the border area, and described the plight of

the poor Iraqi people oppressed in southern

Iraq. With Major Hassan as a guide, many

of the Division's commanders and key staff

members got a close look at the border

obstacles, and routes that would take them

the initial steps in the march to remove

Saddam. Major Hassan proved a true

friend of the 1St Marine Division, and an

important agent for the liberation of the Iraqi people. In August 2003, he received a

commendation from the Division CG for his invaluable advice and coordination. More

importantly, he earned the fondness and respect of the Marines who served alongside him.

Force Protection and the Atmosphere in Kuwait

Even in the friendly country of Kuwait, the Marines maintained a very strong force

protection posture. The Division Marines were tough, and already tough to kill. If terrorist

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elements were to infiltrate into Kuwait and attack the Division prior to crossing the Line of

Departure, they would have to get past a series of alert Marine sentries and Guardian Angels

with weapons ready.

The vast majority of Kuwaitis were supportive of the US presence in their country and

understood the mission and the reasons for it. The entire Middle East region, however, retained

political, religious, and anti-western discontent for a vocal and violent few, largely focused on

the Israel-Palestine issue. US forces in the region were a naturally high-profile target for these

groups, and the Division continued to present a hard-target for terrorists.

There were a number of incidents that influenced the Division's careful approach to force

protection. Even before the arrival of the Division Forward CP in Kuwait, one Division Marine,

Corporal Antonio J. Sledd from Battalion Landing Team 3/1 (3( Battalion, 1st Marines) was

killed, and another wounded, by a terrorist attack. This attack occurred during an 1 1th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (MEU) training exercise on Fayhlaka Island, Kuwait. The incident brought

to light the critical importance of Force Protection while deployed in Theater, and reminded

Division Marines of the importance of having Guardian Angels even while operating in an allied

country. Although difficult to see at the time of his death, Corporal Sledd's sacrifice would have

a significant impact on setting the conditions for keeping his fellow Marines alive during

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Another contemporary incident in theater involved soldiers from the

101st Airborne Division arriving in Kandahar, Afghanistan on strategic lift aircraft. Because the

soldiers were not permitted to carry ammunition on the military aircraft, they were left

defenseless when they came under fire upon arrival. The Division raised these concerns to

higher headquarters, and insisted that Marines deploying into this elevated force protection risk

area must be equipped to defend themselves. With CFLCC's assistance, travel regulations were

modified to allow the Marines of the Division to travel with their T/O weapons and selfprotection ammunition, including on civilian contracted carriers.

Incidents continued after the Marines arrived in Kuwait. Another shooting incident

involving two US Army soldiers and a deranged Kuwaiti policeman occurred in November, and

two US civilian contractors were killed near the entrance to Camp Doha in January. These

incidents justified the Division's alert policy of multiple vehicle convoys with armed Marines for

all travel. Convoy drills, immediate action drills, and counter ambush techniques were rehearsed

by all Division Marines.

In addition to the number of isolated shooting incidents, there were other suspected terrorists

incidents. The Iraqi Intelligence Services (uS) were known to attempt operations in Kuwait. In

February it was discovered that the ITS had aggressively solicited food service workers of

contract food providers as a possible way to introduce toxic or lethal diseases to large numbers of

Marines. These incidents would give pause to advocates of cutting food service Marines, given

the potential mischief to food supplies posed by contract workers with close access. Bomb

threats were routine, and all vehicles entering Camp Commando and the TAA were carefully

searched.

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Logistics Planning and Rehearsal

As units received weapons and vehicles from MPF shipping and their own equipment via

strategic airlift, modifications and upgrades that began in garrison continued in the field. The

Division Ordnance Readiness team, led by Major Greg Frich, was instrumental in working with

USMC and theater agencies to source assets that enhanced both the Division's lethality and

survivability. After establishing close liaison with the CFLCC at Camp Doha, Chief Warrant

Officer Rod Fiene procured nearly 4,000 Combat Identification and Thermal Identification

Panels (CIPs and TIPs, respectively) for the Division. Marines from 1st and 2d Tank Battalions

attached CIPs to their M1A1s to identify the tank and reduce the chances of fratricide.

Remaining Division units attached TIPs to wheeled vehicles for the same purpose. Similar

initiatives were pursued in the design, development, and installation of the Blue Force Tracker

and Mobile Data Automated Communications Terminal (MDACT) systems. Working in

collaboration with Major Thad Trapp of MARCORSYSCOM and the USMC weapons station in

Crane, Indiana, Major Frich was responsible for coordinating the modification of the Division's

Shoulder-launched Multi-purpose Assault Weapon (SMAW) systems. In total, technicians

ruggedized the sighting systems of over 720 SMAWs to allow them to better withstand combat

and to accommodate firing of the Novel Explosive (NE) round (a thermobaric blast warhead with

tremendous explosive power.) On this and numerous other issues, the staff of

MARCORSYSCOM worked tirelessly in support of the Division and its Marines, ceasing only

when units moved to Dispersal Areas (DA), and Attack Positions (AP). From the earliest days of

planning through the Division's movement into its final positions for the attack,

MARCORSYSCOM's unstinting support was felt daily. The CG and staff of

MARCORSYSCOM earned the Division's gratitude many times over.

With equipment on hand and modifications ongoing, providing the units with resources for

training and combat was the next order of business. The meticulous and comprehensive

planning efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Kiel Gentry, the 1 1th Marine Regiment S-4 Officer, and

Captain Tim Collins, the Division Ammunition Officer would prove crucial to the artillery

regiment and RCTs' success during combat. These Marines developed a plan that sequentially

staged, drew and fired ammunition by lot number in order to provide the greatest accuracy for

the Regiment's seventy-five M198 howitzers. Working with all of the Division's units and 1St

FSSG ammunition technicians, the G-4 ammunition section designed and pre-staged numerous

ammunition re-supply packages, each tailored to a particular mission.

The Division G-4 sourced Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs) and distributed two cases to

each vehicle in the Division. At their discretion, commanders would distribute the HDRs to

alleviate food shortages or as a demonstration of goodwill to Iraqis caught up in the war and in

need. The Marines intended to give the Iraqi people an introduction to a different kind of army,

one that bore no resemblance to Saddam's oppressors.

In keeping with the Commanding General's intent to be the most air-centric Division in

history, and the CG, 3d MAW's intent to rapidly open Forward Arming and Refueling Points

(FARPs) in the Division's wake, the G-4 initiated planning with Marine Wing Support Group -

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37 (MWSG-37), commanded by Colonel Mike Anderson. The quick thinking planners at

MWSG designed Rotary Wing FARP-opening packages designed to extend time on station of

the Hueys and Cobras. The Division's G-4 Plans Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Moyer, and

A logistics convoy moves across the open desert of northern Ku wail prior to the Division

movement to Dispersal Areas. Planning for logistics support over limited routes was a

sign jficant challenge to the Division planners.

the MWSG-37 Operations Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Fred Blish, worked to integrate these

FARP packages into the tactical columns of the RCTs, allowing for quick set up and extending

the reach of the Divisions air arm. FARPs would be placed as far forward as possible, primarily

to provide fuel and ammunition to rotary wing aircraft flying in support of maneuver elements.

As the Division continued to push further north toward Baghdad, extending the tenuous lines of

communication to Kuwait, FARPs would take on the secondary mission of providing a node into

which critical classes of supply could be flown.

CSSG Planning and Rehearsal

BSSG-1 officially became CSSG-11 on 10 December 2002, marking the initiation of an

integrated CSS element within the Division. In less then one month CSSG- 11 grew from a cadre

planning staff of 32 Marines to over 1800. Planning and training continued to focus on the

requirement for speed over the long distances necessary to sustain the 1st Marine Division.

Detailed attention was given to the logistical footprint each CSSC would require to support their

assigned RCT's. The CSSC's and CSSB-l0's organization were designed with the correct

equipment to support sustainment. Also, specific attention was given to calculating exact

requirements and developing capabilities sets for each class of supply. CSSG-11's staff

coordinated with each Battalion to develop re-supply blocks which included medical supplies,

repair parts, battery blocks, ammunition, and emergency repair parts. This eliminated the

requirement for a line-by-line supply request that consumed valuable time. The ammunition

81
technician's emergency re-supply packages were pre-built and pre-staged to fly in at a moments

notice.

Working with the Division G-4, CSSG-1i developed a Logistic Tasking Order (LTO) to

streamline the logistics request and tasking effort. The LTO was designed to take rapid requests,

consolidate requirements, and then produce an order that would lead to mission accomplishment.

To reduce the number of requests that had to be submitted by the battalions, the LTO took

recurring requests such as food, chow, and water then automatically inserted the requests into the

system. The LTO would be distributed to each of the CSSCs, the CSSB, and to Division G-4 to

allow all units to know in advance where and when their supplies would arrive.

On 27 January, the CSSG-11 main body landed, hitting the deck running. They provided

immediate CSS to RCT-7 and the Division headquarters within the first five days of arrival. An

Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) was constructed immediately to receive, hold and distribute

ammunition to Division units. The ASP ran around the clock up until a few days prior to

crossing the border, making sure that there was no shortage of steel when the targets presented

themselves.

Internally, CSSG- 11 began intensive unit training for its over 1,800 Marines from 8 different

USMC units, the USMC Reserves, the US Navy, and the US Army. The intensive training

program culminated with an abbreviated Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE)

for each unit. The MCCRE scenario was designed to rehearse the first 96 hours of the war and

focused on establishing and disestablishing RRPs, convoy operations, night movements, actions

on enemy contact, force protection, long range communications, and integration with supported

units.

82
In Medical Services, the Forward Resuscitative Surgery System (FRSS), pioneered by Navy

Captain H.R. Bohman and Lieutenant Commander T.R. Bilski, had come of age after initial

conception in 1997. After limited use in Bright Star and in Afghanistan with TF-58, the full

capabilities of the mobile surgical system were about to get the first major test in battle. Prior to

departing CONIJS, two FRSS teams spent a month at Los Angeles County Hospital (Navy

Training Trauma Center) sharpening skills that would save lives in the months to come. After

arriving in country with two full teams, the staff of the FRSS spent the month of February

training medical augments and reservists to form an additional four teams. Over 200 hours of

intensive training were devoted to lectures and hands-on training on new equipment. In addition,

six Care Teams were trained to accompany critical medevac patients using ground and air

transportation. Designed to provide initial life saving surgical care, the FRSS would become the

most significant medical innovation to be validated during the war.

The role of CSSG-11, hastily formed and cutting new doctrinal ground, would be critical

during the fighting. The habitual relationship between the CSSG elements and the Division it

supported was to be a combat multiplier that connected the Marine Logistics Command effort in

Kuwait to the Division's design to push deep and fast into Iraq. Its success was a testimonial to

the vision of Brigadier General Ed Usher and Colonel J.J. Pomfret; and the commitment of their

Marines and Sailors to support the 1St Marine Division.

Command and Control

The first major effort for the G-6 was to negotiate the allocation of the Marine Expeditionary

Brigade Command Element equipment on board the ships of MPSRON 1 and 2. The Division

needed the unallocated gear (there were no MEB command elements) to provide redundant, long

line communications over extended distances and multiple camps. The Deputy G-6, Lieutenant

Colonel Brian Barton, attended the conference and was able to have 26 additional

communications vehicles assigned to the Division, overcoming many of the most critical

communications deficiencies. This war proved what the Division's communicators had known

for years, that a Marine Division's peacetime equipment allowance would not support Divisionlevel combat operations. The requirement to support multiple CPs, a Division Support Area,

LSAs, CONUS-based forces, liaison officers, and other add-on communications requirements

aggravated an already tenuous communications equipage and manning situation.

As communication requirements were refined, it was clear that the G-6 and the Headquarters

Battalion's Communications Company manning levels were not adequate either. It was

necessary to support the CG's Jump CP, Division Forward CP, Division Main CP, and the

Division Support Area (DSA), while also having personnel support at Camp Pendleton to

support reach-back capabilities. With the superb assistance of the G- 1, the G-6 began the

process of identifying reserve augmentation requirements, to include personnel and equipment

support from the 4th Marine Division's Communications Company. Concurrently the process of

requesting augmentation for some key specialty personnel was begun. Despite the G- l's

constant efforts, it was not until 15 February that Major Tom Sobey was temporarily assigned to

the Division as the data officer. Unfortunately, a data chief and technical controllers were never

assigned. Had it not been for the last minute augmentation by the 4th Marine Division

Communication Company's personnel and equipment, the Division communicators would not

83
have been able to support many of the Division's communications requirements in combat. As

always, the Reserve Marines came through like champions once the system finally authorized

their mobilization and deployment.

The Division received a number of new communications technologies just prior to deploying

for combat. These systems, though appreciated, arrived at the Division with little training,

logistics, or employment concepts. Some arrived only days before the Division crossed the Line

of Departure, leaving barely enough time to find room on already packed vehicles, and scant

time for integration.

The MDACT and the Army's Blue Force Tracker were two new technologies that provided

Position Location Information (PLI). This was an operational assist in order to provide friendly

'blue' tracking on C2PC, which provided commanders a Common Operational Picture (COP).

These two systems automatically provide 10-digit position information to the COP from vehicles

with the equipment installed. The MDACT used the line of sight EPLRS radio for the

communications path while the Blue Force Tracker was a satellite-based system that supported

PU without terrain or distance concerns. The Blue Force Tracker became the system of choice

throughout the Division, not only for the PLI provided, but equally because it provided a

capability to send pre-formatted and free text messages. Both systems were successful in finally

allowing for real time automated input to the COP vice having the Division staff 'fat finger' the

positions of friendly units based upon out-of-date unit position reports. The Division received

and distributed 319 MDACT and 104 Blue Force Trackers. Installation of systems into the

Division's vehicles and the training of Marines on both systems continued until the end of

February.

The Global Broadcast System (GBS) was a receive-only satellite system that was fielded to

the Division only one month prior to deploying from Camp Pendleton. This new capability

allowed for receipt of CONUS-based cable network news services (CNN, and Fox News) as they

broadcast, which meant that the Division could receive real time news services at its deployed

location. This proved to be a good source of

intelligence, and kept the Division's situational

awareness high. The GBS was augmented with

additional decryption equipment that allowed

receipt of Predator UAV real time imagery.

Two Division Marines were trained in the basic

setup and operations of the GBS ground station

equipment, but the Division required the

augmentation of Corporal Nathan Dutton from

9th Communications Battalion to ensure that both

the GBS and decryption equipment remained

operational. As with all new systems that were

pushed to the Division, the training of Marines

to install, operate, and maintain it was key to Mobile DigitalAutomaled Computer Terminal. . . . . ensuring the reliability of the equipment. This equipment was installed in vehicles

throughout the Division to provide immediate Gaining the required expertise on these systems

position reporting of friendly forces as well as often fell to the motivation and intellect of the

rapid transmission offree-text messages.

84
individual Marine, as training opportunities were limited. Without the trained personnel

borrowed from 9' Communications Battalion, GBS (and other new systems) would not have

been such a success.

Use of commercial videophones and video teleconferencing suites became more the norm

than the exception for both the Division Main and Forward CPs. Despite receiving the new

equipment just prior to deploying, and having limited training opportunities, it functioned very

well. The Voice Over Internet Protocol (V0IP) Phone was used far more than the video

teleconferencing suite and provided reliable voice conferencing

service for up to nine locations simultaneously. Since the VoIP

phone transmission path was via dedicated SIPRNET bandwidth, it

allowed for reliable connectivity over hundreds of miles in support

of the geographically separated CPs, although at the expense of the

rest of the users on the network. This new technology set a new

standard for supporting commander and staff interaction.

For over a year prior to deploying, the Division G-6 had begun

the process of procuring and activating Iridium phones for use

throughout the Division. Initially the focus was to provide each

Commander with an Iridium phone. With the flexibility and

reliability of these phones it became apparent that many more were

desired to provide an alternative means of voice communication

throughout the Division. Starting with seventeen, the Division's

appetite for Iridium phones grew until there were nearly 100

phones activated and supporting the Division. At a total cost of

more than three hundred and fifty thousand dollars for these

phones (to include the secure calling capability) this represented a

significant investment in communications by

commanders throughout the Division. The

investment was well worth it when considering the

successful use of these phones to prop-up the

Division's aged tactical radio communications

capabilities.

The CG directed the Division Information Management Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Norm

Cooling, to eliminate all unnecessary reports required from subordinate commands and to

streamline the remaining reporting requirements. To aid in this process, a web-based strategy

was employed to increase the availability of information to all of the Division's units. In

conjunction with the IMO, the G-6 Information Systems section led by Major Chris Nelson, 1St

Lieutenant Spence Hanneman, and Staff Sergeant Bradley Hall developed a plan for the

activation of the first ever deployed lS Marine Division secure World Wide Web site. The

efforts put forth to procure the necessary hardware, train personnel, and coordinate the

communications connectivity at the DSA was instrumental to the Division's success in activating

the site by 24 February.

85

Commercial satellite telephones, like this

Iridium phone, were a valuable addition to

organic systems for tactical communications

redundancy.