First LAR secures the Tikrit New Palace. This palace sat on an

All three LAR battalions conducted patrols through ancient site on cliffs overlooking the Tigris River and the city.

the city and surrounding areas.

First LAR occupies the square in the center of TikriL The palace served as a meeting place for coin inanders

and the setting for the Task Force Commander's

meetings with local Sheikhs.

354
14 April

Attack on the Palace Compound and Tikrit Bridge

The next morning, the Task Force resumed the attack. 1st LAR Battalion attacked to seize

the western approaches of the Tikrit bridge and the 'New Palace' complex. The New Palace was

the most recent addition to Saddam's huge palace compound in Tikrit. The acres of the

sprawling palace complex stretched down the west bank of the Tigris for several kilometers

south of the Tikrit bridge. The compound contained dozens of palaces, large and small, around a

series of artificial lakes. The entire compound was surrounded by high walls and guard towers,

effectively isolating those inside from the reality of poverty stricken Iraqis just outside. On the

north edge of the compound, overlooking the Tigris River, the New Palace had recently been

completed as yet another monument to the megalomania and waste of the Saddam Regime. It

was a large fortress-like complex standing on a dominating cliff that dropped off steeply to the

Tigris. The New Palace was clearly built to impress, as it dominated the town from all

directions. No one coming into the town from the east could avoid being intimidated (or perhaps

sickened) by the immense structure on the hill. The statues and paintings were not enough for

Saddam, he wanted his presence to imbue every facet of the Tikriti 's existence. A Marine from

1st LAR recalls the attack to the palace compound:

Early the next morning we kicked off the attack to seize the palace compound and the

Tigris bridge. The temperature was just right and the skies were clear, it was a perfect

morning. That is, until our Company commander's vehicle took a well-aimed round that

flattened one of the tires on his LA V. Without missing a step he jumped out of his vehicle and

in to ours and off we went without delay. A section of AH-1 Cobras checked in with us and

were directed to escort us through our attack. As we moved north then east around the manmade lake Saddam had built for pleasure boating, we encountered more of the same terrain

that was perfect for the enemy ambush sites. It was comforting having the Cobra escort.

They were masters at rooting around the enemy 's potential hiding spots and building our

situational awareness around every corner c'jid further north to the bridge. We gained a deep

respect for the Cobra pilots during the war. They had taken several hard hits throughout

OJF, but they continued to support us in every way. Their devotion to the grunts was

tremendous, and they often put themselves at risk flying low and well forward of our lines to

find the enemy.

As we continued toward the bridge, we were all astonished at the sight of the palace

grounds. The immaculate structures and serene landscape reminded us of a scene right out of

'Lfestyles of the Rich and Famous'. It was all the more striking because it stood in such

stark contrast to the poverty and filth we had seen up to this point. The sweeping, grandiose

compound just added to the disgust we already felt for Saddam and his cronies. They were

living a lfe beyond belief while the majority of the Iraqi people lived as paupers, hopeless

and desolate.

355
First LAR seized the Tikrit

bridge and established a blocking

position on the west side. The

Battalion commander and the

engineers made a quick assessment,

and it was quickly established that

the severely damaged bridge would

not support the weight of a 13-ton

'Light' Armored Vehicle. A

HMMWV could barely pass the

damaged sections by riding with two

wheels on the sidewalk and two on

the four foot wide section of roadbed

still intact. To ensure responsive fire

support to forces guarding the east

side of the bridge, the attached The grounds of the new palace in Tikrit served as the Task

SEALs were assigned an overwatch Force Tripoli Headquarters during operations nearby.

position for snipers on top of one of

the New Palace buildings. The attached Tow Platoon established a traffic control point on the

east side of the Tigris bridge with their HMMWVs. Tripoli now controlled all three main entry

and exit routes to the city of Tikrit, and began a rigorous inspection of all vehicles. All

roadblock positions received orders to continue to search every vehicle and person going into or

out of the city. This was fairly simple in the beginning, as the residents had gone to ground to

escape the fighting. As combat operations began to taper off, the civilian crowds grew larger,

becoming a significant problem over the next few days. Adding to the mayhem, dozens of

vehicles fleeing from the fall of Kirkuk arrived at the bridge with reports of roving gangs of

Kurds moving towards Tikrit, ravaging the countryside along the way. The Task Force pushed

CAAT elements north along the Tikrit-Kirkuk road to the limit of its battle space, 20 km beyond

the Tigris River. No hostile contact was made with the allegedly advancing Kurds. Reports

indicated that the marauding bands of renegades withdrew upon hearing that the Marines were

advancing north. Criminal gangs were to remain a problem throughout the operation.

356
The Task Force commander moved to join 1st LAR Battalion at the New Palace. The town

had not yet been cleared of the Fedeyeen and SRG holdouts, and the CG's small escort of three

vehicles was taken under fire at a barricade near the now abandoned SRG barracks. This

happened to be just north of the site of the 'friendly fire' incident between 1st LAR and 2/23 a

few hours before, and the ground remained littered with enemy equipment, uniforms, vehicles,

and weapons. After a brief action, the CG redirected the Jump around the ambush point, and

continued on to the New Palace. The rest of the Tripoli CP, led by Lieutenant Colonel Rory

Talkington, displaced soon thereafter and established the Tripoli CP on the grounds of the New

Palace.

Once established on the high ground just outside the main palace complex, the Task Force

CP established communications and directed the organization of local security within the city.

Through 14 April, elements of the Task Force consolidated their positions in and around Tikrit,

and conducted aggressive security patrolling in zone. Sporadic light contact in the form of

sniping attacks, mortar attacks, and small-unit hit and run ambushes were reported during the

first two days of liberation, but tapered off completely by 16 April. The establishment of

checkpoints in and around the city eventually allowed the LAR battalions to identify and detain

former regime officials, confiscate illegal weapons, and maintain positive contact with local

citizens on a regular basis.

First LAR, conducted

reconnaissance in zone through

all of eastern Tikrit, looking for

enemy, weapons caches, and

sensitive sites. As Charlie

Company cleared a military

hospital on the northeast side of

the city, it uncovered a

weapons cache consisting of

more than 50,000 weapons.

The 'hospital' had apparently

served as a military compound,

with rooms full of uniforms,

NBC equipment, and other

war-fighting gear. Several

hospital buildings were stuffed

floor-to-ceiling with crates of

The Tripoli CG reviews progress with the F' and 3dLAR Battalions at brand new rifles, machineguns,

his new command post and RPGs.

357
The thousands of weapons, and hundreds of fully-functional (but recently abandoned)

artillery pieces, tanks, and SAMs indicated how intense the fight for Tikrit could have been if the

Iraqis had decided to stick with their Tikrit

redoubt strategy. The absence of organized

conventional resistance in and around Tikrit

indicated that these units had collapsed as

expected, and had melted away into the urban

tenain or local countryside upon hearing of Task

Force Tripoli's rapid advance. Information

gained by the direct support HETs indicated that

many of the Iraqi soldiers and officers had

returned to their homes or fled north to an area

close to the Syrian border known as Al-Jazira, or

'the island' in Arabic. Over the course of 14 An abandoned Iraqi missile at theAlSahra

April, organized military resistance ceased in the airfield north of TikriL

city of Tikrit.

One specific report received from an EPW gave significant insight into enemy procedures

that made them vulnerable to the rapid attacks of Task Force Tripoli and the Division at large.

The Iraqi forces were so concerned with Coalition radio direction-finding capability that they

chose to utilize very low-power, short-burst radio transmissions. They established relay stations

at regular intervals to pass messages from south to north. The Iraqi communications relay,

however, was unable to keep up with the rapid movement of Blue Diamond. Conventional Iraqi

military commanders were overwhelmed by the sudden appearance of American forces in

unexpected places and departed their posts. The few soldiers that had not already deserted or

fled followed closely behind.

15 April

Give Sheikh a Chance

On the morning of 15 April, representatives from the tribes in and around Tikrit approached

the Marine checkpoint at the palace and requested a

meeting with the Commanding General. During this

initial contact, several of these tribal she ikhs sought to

establish a tribal leadership council, and identified

significant issues that affected their people. Major

Estepp, the Task Force Civil Affairs officer,

immediately began coordinating for the resumption of

services in Tikrit, as the LAR battalions focused on

establishing local security and weeding out remaining

militia fighters. Gunnery Sergeant Camille Hamadani

(a flawless Arabic linguist), and Captain Ben

Connable (another accomplished linguist and Arabic

FAO) played critical roles in this and subsequent The Tribal Sheikhs were an important negotiations between Brigadier General Kelly and the part of the localpower structure. . local political power structure.

358
Brigadier General Kelly had some trepidation in dealing with the Sheikhs. Although

nominally empowered with the authority over their tribes, they still represented a hereditary form

of governance that was not representative. The sheikhs had many of the same repressive and

inhibiting tendencies the dictatorship had. The sheikhs competed for influence with Brigadier

General Kelly against another group, the 'technocrats' (educated Iraqis who had traveled

internationally, and actually had the

management skills to restore order to the

daily life of the Iraqis.) On this microscale, the power struggles amongst

competing would-be governors in Tikrit

mirrored the struggles the entire Iraqi

nation would have. Despite the fact that

many of the tribal representatives had

personal connections to the former

regime, the sheikhs were allowed to

form an interim council to support the

restoration of services to Tikrit.

Although not the ideal solution, the

sheikhs offered an existing governmental

Brigadier General Kelly meets with local leaders at the mechanism that could restore order to

palace overlooking the Tigris. the streets quickly.

Brigadier General Kelly took

the opportunity to talk the Iraqi

leadership through a number of

themes that explained the

Marines' presence in the Tikrit

area. First, the Marines were

here to liberate, not to conquer.

The Marines would protect the

lives and property of the people

by conducting a security

mission. Second, the local

leadership and the people had a

responsibility to help hunt down

any remaining Fedeyeen,

criminals, or jihadis who

violently opposed the American General Kelly holds more talks with the T,kr,t Sheikhs. presence or threatened the

citizens. Finally, the Iraqis would bear much of the responsibility for restoring services to

themselves. The people were authorized to take whatever actions were necessary to restore

power, water, food, and medical services. The Americans would help, but it was up to the

sheikhs to identify people and equipment to affect the repairs to these systems.

359
This was not as easily done as said. For decades, the Regime had managed every aspect of

Iraqi life through an entrenched Baath party bureaucracy. The people did not have a tradition of

taking matters into their own hands or solving their own problems. Initiative was not a highly

admired quality. The sheikhs received the message, but it was clear that the local leadership was

much more concerned with establishing their own power position in a new Iraqi authority than

they were about taking care of the needs of their people. The assembled leadership quickly fell

to arguing over which of them would be in charge. They asked Brigadier General Kelly to

establish by-laws for their ruling bureaucracy, and argued endlessly over the composition of their

council. After years of fear and deprivation by the people, the tribal leaders' response was a clear

indicator of the difficulties that lay ahead for the Iraqi people. Reversion to a hereditary tribal

governance to replace the dictatorship might not represent forward progress for the Iraqis.

The first significant contact between the Task Force and the local populace took place on the

Tigris River bridge immediately adjacent to the New Palace complex. The sheikhs had indicated

that up to three-quarters of the Tikrit population had fled at the approach of Task Force Tripoli,

and many had been stranded on the eastern side by the damaged bridge. As the residents of the

city began to lose their fear of the Americans, they returned from hiding places in the

countryside. A large crowd of pedestrians gathered on the eastern bridge abutment. By the end

of the day on 14 April, a considerable crowd had gathered on the eastern side of the bridge. In

keeping with the security mission, the Marines continued with thorough searches of every person

and vehicle that attempted to cross the bridge. On the morning of 15 April, the CG told the

sheikhs that he would relax some of the search requirements and open the bridge to pedestrian

and light vehicle traffic. Searches of vehicles and packages would continue, but individuals

would be allowed to cross with minimal intervention. For safety, the Marines would keep large

civilian trucks off the bridge, and let civilian cars go only one at a time. Weapons Company, 1st

LAR, had set up a blocking

position on the west end of

the bridge the day before

under the command of

Captain David Hudspeth.

After word went out that the

bridge was to be reopened,

the crush of people trying to

get back across the bridge to

protect their property from

looters was overwhelming.

Despite the precarious nature

of the bridge thousands of

locals, by vehicle and foot,

wanted to cross the bridge

and enter Tripoli's security

perimeter. The Marines of

the TOW platoon were

stationed on the eastern side LAR Marines guard the entrance to the Tikrit Palace Compound . of the bridge Just before the

damaged section, and were

360
trying to hold back the sea with their hands. The situation appeared critical, with the hardpressed Marines getting closer to using warning shots to restore order to the crowd that

threatened to surge past them.

As several thousand people massed along the road and against the easternmost checkpoint,

the crowd began yelling and tussling with the Marines. Completely oblivious to the danger the

collapsing bridge posed, the Iraqis grew impatient to cross it with their families, vehicles, and

belongings. Tempers among the

local populace began to flare.

Observing the degrading situation

from the cliff-top CP location,

members of the Task Force

headquarters moved on to the bridge

to reinforce the security company.

Members of the Task Force

headquarters, HET 11, and others ran

to the edge of the crowd and

attempted to restore order. Using the

linguists, PsyOps loudspeakers, and

a small amount of physical

persuasion, the Marines began

The Task Force Tripoli CF occupied key ground overlooking imposing order on the people at the

the Tikrit Bridge. bridge. The HET linguists and some

reinforcing Free Iraqi Force

translators helped calm the crowd. Using humor and calm reassurance, the small group of

Marines slowly regained control of the situation. The press of the crowd had surged halfway

across the bridge, and now the Marines slowly worked them back. The Marines reestablished

the checkpoint, keeping the crowd of people and vehicles off the near-collapse bridge. Captain

Hudspeth set up a structured search and crossing system, and the crowd began to flow across the

bridge in a (somewhat) orderly fashion. The surge of the crowd would take days to dissipate, as

the Marines continued to search vehicles entering the city. Later that day, four Kurdish men,

identified by locals as Peshmerga (the name given to Kurdish fighters), attempted to cross the

bridge in a stolen vehicle. They were identified by former Tikriti police officers as common

criminals, men who had dynamited homes and killed people in the town to the east of the river.

As word passed through the crowd of their identity, several citizens attempted to beat the men,

who attempted to escape by driving through the checkpoint. The individuals were stopped, and

all four men were detained. An AK-47 rifle and explosive devices were discovered in the

vehicle.

As the population started to filter back across the bridge, HET 11 reporting began to indicate

a strong presence of former regime officials in the greater Tikrit area. Although it did not appear

that one central figure was coordinating their efforts, these officials maintained a stranglehold of

fear over the majority of the local residents through intimidation and coercion. The presence of

these former Regime members would continue to influence the willingness of the population to

support the Coalition, even after Task Force Tripoli had been relieved of the battlespace. The

361
'Shadow Regime' as it came to be called was a decisive influence on the people outside of the

areas under direct US control.

With order being restored to the city streets, the Task Force continued aggressive patrolling

into the countryside and in expanding areas within the city itself. Local Iraqis supporting the

Marines identified numerous large weapons caches. The amount of weapons and ammunition

found throughout the town was staggering. The challenge of destroying the weapons in the

midst of the civilian populace was also an exercise in patience for all. The presence of these

weapons had been a severe risk to the civilians, now their destruction would pose an additional

inconvenience. The discovery of the military hospital by 1St LAR was one such. Another

storage facility to the north of town was discovered to contain over 30 warehouses of weapons

and ammunition. The EOD team from 5/11 worked ceaselessly to destroy this massive amount

of munitions, and every thirty minutes another explosion was heard (the Division had established

a policy of conducting EOD operations on the hour and half-hour only, so the Marines would be

able to discern it from incoming fire.) It is always good to have Marines around, but they can

sometimes be rather disruptive neighbors.

16 April

Restoring Civil Control

For the time being, direct combat action between Marine forces and enemy combatants in

Tikrit had ceased. The cessation of hostilities, however, had not yet led to peace for the citizens

living in the greater Tikrit area. Large numbers of automatic weapons and explosive devices

looted from military installations were now in the hands of local troublemakers. In the areas

under direct observation by Task Force Tripoli Marines, there was relative calm and an absence

of violence. Beyond these zones of continuous physical presence of Marines, however, the

situation deteriorated rapidly. The dissolution of the brutal and oppressive police force, although

a short-term boon for Tikritis, left

them without any form of law

enforcement or security apart from the

Marines. Because Tikrit had a

reputation as being one of the

wealthiest cities in Iraq, looters and

criminals from outlying areas made

regular trips into the greater urban area

in order to steal property and conduct

revenge attacks on the citizens. People

within the city limits and in the

immediate countryside continued to

take justice into their own hands by

murdering looters, seizing property at

random, and shooting strangers that

passed through their neighborhoods. Hasty HLZ on Saddam front lawn.

362