J-S33036-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RAHEEM ROBINSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1870 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 14, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001523-2015

BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 28, 2018

Appellant, Raheem Robinson, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment 

of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after 

a jury convicted him of first-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502, possession of 

an instrument of crime (“PIC”), 18 Pa.C.S. § 907, and abuse of a corpse, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 5510. Sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole for murder in the first degree, a concurrent term of two and one-half 

years for PIC, and a consecutive term of one to two years for abuse of a 

corpse, Appellant raises challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to 

evidentiary rulings of the court. We affirm.

The trial court aptly sets forth relevant facts and procedural history, as 

follows:

At trial, it was established that Defendant [hereinafter 

“Appellant”] and his companion, Sakinah Wyatt, were engaged in 

romantic activities in her bedroom on the second floor of 2533 
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North 11th Street, Philadelphia. Appellant heard noises, went to 

the bedroom door and through a crack in the door observed the 

deceased, Shaquille Hall [hereinafter “Hall”]. Several days before, 

Ms. Wyatt and Hall had met when Hall tried to sell her a cellular 

telephone plan. Because Ms. Wyatt did not have proper 

identification, she told Hall to come to her house and she would 

provide her identification.

Upon seeing Hall, Appellant became angry, pointed a gun at Ms. 

Wyatt and Hall, and [fatally] shot Hall. Appellant went to a 

neighborhood store. He was photographed by a security camera 

as he purchased bleach and other cleaning fluids. Appellant 

returned to the house, cleaned up the blood stains, wrapped Hall’s 

body in a sheet, bound it with duct tape, and left it in an alleyway. 

On May 1, 2014, children discovered the body in the alley behind 

the 2500 block of North 11th Street. The police were called to the 

scene.

Dr. Albert Chu, Deputy Medical Examiner for the City of 

Philadelphia, testified that Hall suffered four gunshot wounds. A 

wound to the head and a wound to the chest were fatal. A third 

wound to the shoulder was potentially fatal. A graze wound to the 

right hand was not immediately life-threatening. (N.T. 1/6/15, at 

41-42).

Fatimot Adekanmbi of the DNA laboratory of the Criminalistics Unit 

of the Office of Forensic Science, testified as an expert. She stated 

that samples taken from the house were tested for DNA and 

compared against DNA samples taken from Appellant, Ms. Wyatt, 

and Hall. The specimens either excluded Appellant or were 

inconclusive as to Appellant’s DNA. (N.T. 1/11/16, at 135-157). 

She explained, “Bleach would definitely kill DNA.” (N.T. 1/11/16, 

at 172).

Appellant testified that he received a telephone call from a person 

named “Money,” who asked him to come to Ms. Wyatt’s residence. 

At the house, Appellant complied with Money’s request to help him 

(Money) dispose of the body. Appellant offered the testimony of 

two character witnesses.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/16/17, at 1-3.
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As noted, above, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and 

related charges, and the trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life 

imprisonment on the same day. This appeal, nunc pro tunc,

1

follows.

Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING SAKINAH 

WYATT TO TESTIFY THAT SHE HAD PREVIOUSLY SEEN 

APPELLANT IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WHEN 

THERE WERE NO SIMILARITIES IN THE FIREARM 

DESCRIBED WHEN COMPARED TO THE FIREARM USED 

TO SHOOT DECEDENT [HALL], WHEN PRIOR 

POSSESSION OF A FIREARM HAD NO PROBATIVE

VALUE, AND WHEN THIS TESTIMONY CAUSED 

IRREPERABLE HARM TO APPELLANT BY EFFECTIVELY 

PORTRAYING HIM AS A VIOLENT, HABITUAL GUNCARRYING INDIVIDUAL?

II. WAS THERE INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN 

APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR MURDER IN THE 

FIRST DEGREE BECAUSE WHEN DECEDENT [HALL] 

WAS SHOT AND KILLED, APPELLANT WAS UNDER THE 

IMPRESSION THAT SAKINAH WYATT HAD JUST HAD 

SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH DECEDENT[,] AND 

APPELANT AND MS. WYATT WERE IN A 

RELATIONSHIP OF SORTS?

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN PRECLUDING TRIAL 

COUNSEL FROM ASKING SAKINAH WYATT IF SHE HAD 

LIED UNDER OATH WHEN MS. WYATT STATED THAT 

SHE WAS SCARED TO TELL THE TRUTH AS THIS WAS 

NOT EXCLUSIVELY JURY QUESTION [SIC] AND MS. 

WYATT COULD HAVE TESTIFIED IF SHE 

INTENTIONALLY LIED UNDER OATH?

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1 Appellant’s direct appellate rights were reinstated nunc pro tunc after the 

court granted his petition for such collateral relief.
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IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN PRECLUDING TRIAL 

COUNSEL FROM ASKING SAKINAH WYATT IF THERE 

WAS ANYONE WHO COULD CORROBORATE HER 

WHEREABOUTS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF HER 

TESTIMONY?

V. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN QUASHING A 

SUBPOENA FOR ADA ERIC STRYD WHEN HE WAS 

RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMISSIONS TO DRUG 

TREATMENT COURT, SAKINAH WYATT TESTIFIED 

THAT SHE WAS ADMITTED TO THIS PROGRAM 

DESPITE NOT HAVING A DRUGS [SIC] PROBLEM, AND 

APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO 

FULLY TEST MS. WYATT’S CREDIBILITY AS A RESULT?

Appellant’s brief, at 4-5.

In his first issue, Appellant argues the court erred when it granted the 

Commonwealth’s motion in limine seeking permission to ask Sakinah Wyatt if 

she had ever seen him with a gun before the incident in question. N.T., 

1/5/16, at 25. Appellant does concede evidence of prior gun possession may 

be admissible to show, inter alia, that a defendant has access to firearms, see

Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 656 (Pa.Super. 2013), but he 

nevertheless says that a Pa.R.E. 404 balancing of the evidence at issue shows 

its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Specifically, evidence of 

prior possession suggested he was a “gun toting aggressor” inclined toward 

violence, Appellant maintains, and it supported the notion that he acted not 

under a sudden, uncontrollable passion but, instead, with requisite intent. 

Appellant’s brief, at 9-10.

Appellant’s argument is flawed in two respects. First, although the court 

did permit the Commonwealth to ask Ms. Wyatt if she had previously seen 
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Appellant in possession of a firearm, Ms. Wyatt’s answer benefitted Appellant. 

Specifically, Ms. Wyatt testified that the night of the shooting was the first 

time she had ever seen Appellant with a gun. N.T. 1/6/16, at 94. Therefore, 

as no prejudice befell Appellant from the Commonwealth’s question, 

Appellant’s Rule 404(b) argument is baseless.

Moreover, Appellant’s prejudice argument is disconnected from the 

defense he presented at trial, which was to offer a complete denial of having 

shot Mr. Hall. As such, Appellant’s claim that the question of his prior gun 

possession could have adversely affected a heat of passion defense is purely 

academic and irrelevant where Appellant offered no such defense. Appellant’s 

first issue, therefore, fails.

In his next issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence of 

first-degree murder where he claims the evidence showing he acted under the 

influence of a sudden, intense, and jealousy-fueled passion proved, at most, 

voluntary manslaughter.

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a 

question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the 

verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime 

charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the 

verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to 

human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is 

insufficient as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency 

claim[,] the court is required to view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 160 A.3d 230, 233–34 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000) (internal 

citations omitted)).

Murder of the first degree is an “intentional killing,” which is 

defined, in part, as a “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.” 

18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), (d). However, “if at the time of the killing 

[the defendant] is acting under a sudden and intense passion 

resulting from serious provocation[,]” the defendant is guilty of 

voluntary manslaughter. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(a). In both crimes, 

the actor commits the act with the intent to kill. However, the 

difference between first-degree murder and voluntary 

manslaughter is whether the actor committed the killings under a 

“sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation.” 

This Court has defined “passion” as:

[A]nger and terror provided they reach a degree of 

intensity sufficient to obscure temporarily the reason 

of the person affected.... Passion, as used in a charge 

defining manslaughter ... means any of the emotions 

of the mind known as anger, rage, sudden resentment 

or terror, rendering the mind incapable of cool 

reflection....

Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1061 (Pa. 2001) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. McCusker, 292 A.2d 286, 289 n. 4 (Pa. 1972)).

The evidence at Appellant’s trial was sufficient to establish that 

Appellant shot Mr. Hall with malice and the specific intent to kill, which are 

requisite elements to a first-degree murder conviction. Specific intent to kill 

can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the 

victim's body. Commonwealth v. Moore, 937 A.2d 1062, 1067 (Pa. 2007) 

(citations omitted). 
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In Moore, the Supreme Court found the evidence was sufficient to 

support the first-degree murder conviction. Id. The Court opined:

The manner in which the victim was killed (two gunshot wounds 

to his back, one of which penetrated his heart) constitutes 

circumstantial evidence of malice and specific intent to kill on [the 

defendant's] part, and various aspects of subsequent conduct on 

[his] part, including his flight ... evidence his consciousness of 

guilt.

Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, “[t]he law does not require a lengthy 

period of premeditation; indeed, the design to kill can be formulated in a 

fraction of a second.” Commonwealth v. Jordan, 65 A.3d 318, 323 (Pa. 

2013).

Appellant maintains that he shot Mr. Hall in a sudden fit of rage, but 

evidence admitted at trial contradicts this position. Initially, we note our 

jurisprudence recognizes the passion defense to first-degree murder when the 

passion is in response to “serious provocation.” See Laich, supra. Here, Ms. 

Wyatt testified Mr. Hall was merely present in her home as an invited guest 

when Appellant shot him multiple times. Viewed in a light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence of Mr. Hall’s mere 

presence did not constitute serious provocation for purposes of the heat of

passion defense to first-degree murder.

Furthermore, testimony described how Appellant pointed the gun at 

both Ms. Wyatt and Mr. Hall before he fired multiple times, but he chose to 

single out Mr. Hall as his victim while sparing Ms. Wyatt’s life. The jury 

reasonably could have construed Appellant’s election in this regard as 
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deliberative and premeditated. Accordingly, we discern no merit to Appellant’s 

sufficiency claim.

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly limited crossexamination of Commonwealth witness, Sakinah Wyatt, when it precluded 

defense counsel from asking her if she lied under oath after she had stated 

she was scared to tell the truth. The record shows Appellant mischaracterizes 

the court’s ruling in this regard.

The trial court has broad discretion regarding “both the 

scope and permissible limits of cross-examination.” 

Commonwealth v. Briggs, 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291, 335 

(2011). “The trial judge's exercise of judgment in setting those 

limits will not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of that 

discretion, or an error of law.” Id.

***

Although the right of cross-examination is a fundamental 

right, it is not absolute. The trial court may place reasonable limits 

on defense counsel's cross-examination of a prosecution witness 

“based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or 

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. “Generally speaking, 

the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective 

cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 

whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” 

Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 

L.Ed.2d 15 (1985).

Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1087, 1088 (Pa.Super. 2016).

The trial court permitted Appellant to cross-examine Ms. Wyatt on 

whether she had been untruthful in one part of her previous day’s testimony. 

Specifically, defense counsel asked Ms. Wyatt the following question:
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DEFENSE COUNSEL: But yesterday, on the issue of why you did 

not go into your home that afternoon, you were scared to tell the 

truth on yesterday; is that right?

MS. WYATT: Yes.

N.T., 1/7/16, at 133. 

Defense counsel then pressed the matter by asking Ms. Wyatt whether 

she “blatantly lied under oath?”, “[was] untruthful before these jurors?”, and 

“was less than candid?” Each question was met with a Commonwealth 

objection for repetitiveness, which the court sustained. We discern no abuse 

of discretion in the court’s ruling sustaining the objections, for the follow-up 

questions were designed solely to elicit the same admission from Ms. Wyatt. 

As Ms. Wyatt had already admitted to testifying falsely in this regard because 

she feared retaliation from Appellant, the follow-up questions were repetitive 

and properly precluded. 

In Appellant’s fourth issue, he challenges the court’s ruling sustaining 

objections to a similar line of questioning, where counsel attempted to ask Ms. 

Wyatt three questions on re-cross examination pertaining to her failure to 

corroborate her whereabouts in the aftermath of the shooting. The court, 

again, deemed the questions argumentative, and informed counsel he was 

free to impeach Ms. Wyatt’s credibility in closing argument by arguing lack of 

corroboration to the jury if the Commonwealth failed to present corroborative 

evidence. We agree and, therefore, discern no abuse of discretion in the 

court’s ruling.
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Finally, Appellant charges error with the court’s decision to quash a 

defense subpoena for the prosecutor responsible for admissions to Drug 

Treatment Court. Appellant sought the prosecutor to explain the criteria for 

acceptance into Drug Treatment Court as a means to impeach Ms. Wyatt’s 

credibility as a witness. Specifically, during Ms. Wyatt’s testimony on redirect 

examination, she denied having a drug problem despite the fact that the court 

granted her permission to enter Drug Treatment Court. N.T., 1/7/16, at 97-

98. When asked to clarify the seeming contradiction, Ms. Wyatt testified she

entered the program only to avoid a felony conviction. Id.

Appellant contends the prosecutor’s testimony was necessary to 

impeach Ms. Wyatt’s credibility and to demonstrate Ms. Wyatt’s motive to 

cooperate with the District Attorney’s Office. The court, however, opines, that 

Ms. Wyatt’s admission already placed her credibility into question, as she 

admitted she lied on an application in order to avoid a felony conviction.

Our review of the record belies the crux of Appellant’s claim, for it shows 

the court indicated it was “willing to give defense counsel the opportunity to 

present what he says he needs to and what I think is fair[]” with respect to 

presenting impeachment evidence on this issue. N.T. 1/12/16 at 132. In 

that regard, the court was referring to defense counsel’s concomitant request 

to admit into evidence the Philadelphia Drug Treatment Court’s website, which 

contained all the court’s criteria, directives, rules, and regulations regarding 

entry into the program. Id. “So, if [defense counsel] wants to present that 
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as part of his case, I’ll permit it. Otherwise, I’m just going to have one of the 

DAs come in [and testify].” Id. 

The prosecution ceded to the court’s suggestion, and, critically, defense 

counsel offered no objection to the court’s determination that the Drug 

Treatment Court website and the subpoenaed prosecutor’s testimony would 

be of equal impeachment value and were, thus, interchangeable. Id.

2

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court, therefore, quashed the defense subpoena only because it permitted 

Appellant to introduce the Drug Treatment Court’s website as a functionally 

equivalent source of proof that the program admitted only those with drug 

abuse problems, contrary to Ms. Wyatt’s testimony. 

The record, therefore, belies Appellant’s claim that the court ultimately

quashed the defense subpoena over defense counsel’s objection. Instead, 

prior to the court’s ruling, defense counsel proposed the use of the Drug 

Treatment Court’s website to accomplish the intended purpose of 

impeachment, and the court indicated its intention to give defense counsel 

what it requested. We also fail to see where, during the extensive discussion 

on the issue, defense counsel argued that the prosecutor’s testimony was 

relevant to show Ms. Wyatt’s motivation to cooperate with the DA’s Office, as 

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2 We may conclude, therefore, that Appellant has waived this issue for review, 

as “the failure to make a timely and specific objection before the trial court at 

the appropriate stage of the proceedings will result in waiver of the issue.” 

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 961 (Pa.Super. 2016). Even if 

we did not deem this issue waived, we would find it unsupported by the record, 

as we observe herein.
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Appellant now argues in his brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in 

the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 

For these reasons, we reject Appellant’s fifth and final claim.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/28/18