NTIA Report 02-391

Analysis of the RF Threat to

Telecommunications Switching Stations

and Cellular Base Stations

John J. Lemmon

Roger A. Dalke

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Donald L. Evans, Secretary

Nancy J. Victory, Assistant Secretary

for Communications and Information

February 2002

CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT 1

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1

2. METHODS FOR ESTIMATING WORST CASE ELECTROMAGNETIC THREAT

LEVELS INSIDE OF BUILDINGS OR OTHER ENCLOSURES 3

2.1 Infinite Slab Model 3

2.2 Coupling via Apertures 8

2.3 A Method for Estimating the Exterior to Interior Power Loss 11

3. VULNERABILITY OF CELLULAR BASE STATIONS 15

4. ANALYSIS TOOLS 17

4.1 Buildings and Enclosures 18

4.2 Cellular Base Stations 19

5. SUMMARy 20

6. REFERENCES 20

III

ANALYSIS OF THE RF THREAT

TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS SWITCHING STATIONS

AND CELLULAR BASE STATIONS

John 1. Lemmon and Roger A. Dalkel

The objective of this report is to assess the vulnerability of telecommunications

switching stations and cellular base stations to high power electromagnetic radiation

generated by an RF device. Analyses, measurements, and simulations of indoor

propagation and the penetration ofelectromagnetic fields into structuresindicate that

typical buildings provide little, if any, protection for telecommunications switching

stations from high power electromagnetic fields. The front end electronics of cellular

base stations are also vulnerable to damage from high intensity RF fields via front

door coupling through the receive antennas. Tools to provide estimates of power

densities inside of structures and the received power levels in cellular base stations

are developed in this report. More quantitative predictions offield strengths inside

structures require detailed analyses on a case-by-case basis. The techniques to carry

out such analyses are currently available and are briefly discussed.

Key words: critical infrastructure protection, high power RF fields, telecommunications switching

stations, cellular base stations, shielding, vulnerability

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In a previous report [1] it was pointed out that high level electromagnetic fields can upset and

damage electronics, as well as disrupt or disable computer software (see also [2]). High power radio

frequency (RF) fields could therefore pose a threat to critical infrastructuresthat depend on electronic

equipment, such as public and private telecommunications networks. Moreover, RF devices that are

designed to disrupt electronic equipment have been developed and represent an emerging threat to

the telecommunications infrastructure [3,4]. The objective of [1] was to perform a brief assessment

ofthe vulnerability ofpublic and emergency telecommunications systems to high intensity RF fields.

In particular, the following questions were addressed:

Can the loss of a node (or nodes) cascade through the telecommunications network causing

a large-scale system blackout or crash?

1 The authors are with the Institute for Telecommunication Sciences, National Telecommunications and

Information Administration, U.S. Department ofCommerce, Boulder, CO 80305.
Can high intensity RF fields disrupt or disable a node (such as a switching station or a

wireless base station)?

The basic conclusions that were reached are:

The overall public telecommunications network has sufficient redundancy and capacity to

withstand the loss of even multiple nodes. A full nationwide system collapse is not

envisioned as a possible scenario. Loss of equipment or failure of software at a

telecommunications switching station or a wireless base station could lead to a large local

blackout, but is not likely to cascade further within the system

Neither public network switching stations nor cellular base stations are intentionally

hardened against high intensity RF fields, and the shielding provided by concrete and re-bar

construction is negligible for wavelengths on the order of, or smaller than, the re-bar spacing.

A switching station could therefore be disrupted, although the probability of disruption is

difficult to assess due to the variety and complexity of building layouts. Wireless base

stations are higWy vulnerable to high power devices operating within the base station pass

band due to front door antenna coupling.

These conclusions were based on a review of telecommunications networks, discussions with

providers, and basic estimates of the coupling of RF energy into telecommunications systems.

However, to more accurately assess the vulnerability of these systems to high intensity RF fields,

more detailed modeling and measurements are needed. In particular, a model ofthe transfer function

relating a source external to a building and equipment internal to a building needs to be developed.

This would more accurately define the threat to equipment located within buildings.

In this report, tools that can be used to estimate the threat to telecommunications equipment are

presented. The report is organized as follows. In Section2 electromagnetic models ofthe penetration

ofRF energy into structures are discussed. The most basic penetration models, infInite slab models,

are introduced first, and the loss of RF energy as a function of frequency, slab thickness, and

electrical conductivity is discussed for both homogeneous and heterogeneous slab materials. Next,

penetration via apertures in infinite slabs is discussed, with attention given to the different analytical

approximations that are appropriate for the different regimes of aperture dimension relative to a

wavelength Finally, the propagation ofRF energy in the interior of a structure is considered, and a

model ofindoor propagation is developed. It is pointed out that the model predictions are consistent

with measurements and simulations of indoor propagation.

Having discussed the penetration ofRF energy into structures not intended to collect electromagnetic

energy in Section 2, the coupling of energy into cellular base stations via the base station receive

antennas is discussed in Section 3.

In Section 4 the results of Sections 2 and 3 are condensed into analysis tools that can be used to

predict received power levels inside structures that house telecommunications equipment and in

cellular base stations.

Section 5 summarizes the results.

2
2. METHODS FOR ESTIMATING WORST CASE ELECTROMAGNETIC THREAT

LEVELS INSIDE OF BUILDINGS OR OTHER ENCLOSURES

Often, telecommunications equipment that may be subjected to damage fromhigh intensity RF fields

will be inside some type of building or enclosure. Hence, it is important to understand the level of

RF shielding thus provided and the effects of propagation in complicated indoor environments. Due

to the wide variety ofbuilding practices and materials and the complicated nature of electromagnetic

wave interactions, simplified models are needed to estimate inherent shielding due to structures

housing telecommunications equipment. In this section we describe electromagnetic coupling and

propagation models and their utility in estimating the potential RF threat to telecommunications

equipment.

2.1 Infinite Slab Model

Perhaps the simplest model that can be used to estimate the electromagnetic shielding provided by

a building wall is the infmite slab model. With this model, the worst case interior electromagnetic

fields due to a source exterior to a building or structure are estimated by using the transfer function

for a plane wave impinging on an infinite slab offmite conductivity. The slab can be homogeneous

with respect to the wavelengths of interest (e.g., concrete) in which case analytic solutions are

available, or inhomogeneous (e.g., reinforced concrete) in which case numerical or other

approximate techniques are required.

The transfer function for a plane wave nonnally incident on an infmite homogenous slab ofthickness

d in free space is [1]

Etrlllt, = 4e - ikd

Eille (1- k,lk)(I- k/k,)e ik.d + (1 + k,lk)(1 + k/k,)e -ik.d

where k= <a> Jeo~o is the free space propagation constant, k, =V<a>2 e + ia <a> is the propagation

constant for the slab, (a) =2 rr.j is the circular frequency, and the parameters e, ~, and a are the

electromagnetic permittivity, penneability, and conductivity ofthe slab. The transmission coefficient

is obtained by squaring the absolute value of the above expression. The salient features of this

expression can best be described by an example calculation as shown in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure

1, the transmission coefficient as a function of frequency is given for conductivities of 0, 1, and 10

mS/m, a relative permittivity of 6, and d= .2032 m In Figure 2, the transmission coefficient is given

as a function of thickness at a frequency of 1 GHz.

Figure 1 shows that when the conductivity is 1 mS/m or less, at best there is only moderate

attenuation and at worst (when the thickness is an integer number of half wavelengths) there is

essentially no attenuation. It is expected that many common building materials such as concrete,

brick, wood, gypsum, glass, marble, etc., are poor conductors with microwave conductivities of a

few mS/m or less, and hence the shielding over a broad range of frequencies can be considered to

3
-1

co -2

Q)

"0

.-2

c.

-3

-4

"-

- - - - - - - - - - - '- - - - - - -"... , \

, Thickness =.2032 m

10 100 1000

-5 L...-_.L..-........-............................_---'_....................................._ ..........---'---'--'--'.................._ ..................... -'-'

1

Frequency (MHz)

Figure 1. Transmission coefficient as a function offrequency for a slab

20.32 cm thick and 0, 1, and 10 mS/m

be negligible. Figure 2 shows the same results for a single frequency (1 GHz) as a function of wall

thickness. As before, when the thickness is an integer number of half wavelengths the attenuation

is small and even in the best of circumstances, the wall only provides minimal shielding.

Steel reinforcing is often used to augment the strength of building walls. The presence of highly

conducting materialsinotherwise poor conductors, such asreinforced concrete, can provide a degree

ofshielding at various frequencies depending on the structural geometry. In some cases, an infrnite

slab model can be used to obtain an estimate of the electromagnetic shielding provided by such

structures. For example, electromagnetic penetration ofreinforced concrete walls can be estimated

by utilizing an infrnite slab model containing a periodic screen or lattice of perfect conductors

representing the reinforcing structure. Tractable closed form solutions for such models are difficult

to obtain and numerical methods are often required to calculate electromagnetic wave interactions.

Numerical methods have been used to analyze the reflection and transmission coefficient for a plane

wave normally incident on a 2-dimensional periodic rebar lattice embedded in a concrete wall (see

Figure 3) [2]. These results provide a general illustration ofthe electromagnetic field behavior in the

presence of an infrnite slab of reinforced concrete. Figure 4 shows the transmission coefficient for

a periodic rebar lattice in free space. The lattice has a period (2-dimensional) of7.62 cm At low

frequencies, the lattice acts inductively and the transmitted field strength increases with frequency

to a maximum at the frrst resonance where the wavelength is approximately equal to the lattice

period. It should be noted that the shape ofthe curves as well as the wavelength ofthe frrst resonance

are in general a function of the rebar diameter as well as the lattice dimensions.

4
Frequency =1GHz

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

-5 1..-"""'-..........---'"_'---'--..........---'"_"---'---'----"_"'--'---'---''---"--'----'-_'----'

o

Thickness (m)

Figure 2. Transmission coefficient as a function of slab thickness at 1 GHz

and 0, 1, and 10 mS/m

The transmission coefficients for reinforced concrete walls of various thickness are given in Figures

5-7. In these examples, the concrete has a conductivity of 1.95 mS/m and a relative permittivity of

6 (typical for concrete at approximately 1 GHz [3]). The rebar lattice attenuates the low frequencies

as with the free space model. The [rrst peak in the transmission coefficient roughly corresponds to

the frequency ofthe [rrst resonance of a slab without a reinforcing structure (i.e., the wavelength of

the [rrst resonance is about twice the wall thickness). The following peaks are not at even integer

multiples ofthe [rrst resonance (as would be the case in the absence of a reinforcing structure) and

are due to the interaction between the wall and the reinforcing structure. It should be noted that after

the [rrst peak, the reinforced concrete wall has generally larger transmission coefficients than the

rebar lattice alone. Also, the frequency dependence is much more complicated than that of a lattice

in free space.

While actual building practices may utilize reinforcing lattice structures having geometries that are

different from the previous examples, it is expected that the behavior over a broad range of

frequencies will be similar. That is, frequencies with wavelengths that are greater than the

characteristic dimensions ofthe lattice will be attenuated. At higher frequencies, the attenuation will

be a complicated function of frequency ranging from tens of dB to nearly

°dB for resonant

frequencies. Hence, it is expected that such structures will not provide significant protection for

many frequencies with wavelengths that are on the order of or smaller than the characteristic

dimensions of the reinforcing structure.

5
Huygen

Surface ----....

'"Huygen Surface

Figure 3. Reinforced concrete wall structure used to calculate

transmission coefficients shown in Figures 4-7.

0

-10

-20

lil

Q)

"0 -30

0.

E

<l:

-40

-50

-60

0

Reflection Coefficient

Transmission Coefficient

2 3 4 5

Frequency (GHz)

Figure 4. Transmission coefficient for a 2-dimensionallattice in free space

(P=7.62 cm and D=1.91 cm).

6
0...--....-=----.-7"'"""1.........,..-,,...-.,..--.......- .........---..--,...--....----.----.----,

-10

co -20

(])

"C

C.

-30 , , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ..

-40 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , , ... - .. - - -

2000 4000 6000

-50 L...-_-'--_--'-_---'-__'--_-'--_-'-_......._---''--_-'--_-'-_---'-_---I

o

Frequency (MHz)

Figure 5. Transmission coefficient for a reinforced concrete wall (P=15.24 cm,

D=1.91 cm, and W=20.32 cm).

O.----.....---....---:--.::----.-----r----,....--.....----r--........---.----.----,

-10

Cil -20

(])

"C

:e

c.

E -30 «

-40

, , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - -

2000 4000 6000

-50 I.-_-'-_-'-_---'__.L.-_-'-_-'-_---'-__.L.-_-'--_-'-_---'-_---J

o

Frequency (MHz)

Figure 6. Transmission coefficient for a reinforced concrete wall (P=7.62 cm,

D=1.91 cm, and W=20.32 cm).

7
O.---T'"""":"--r::---.---...---..........-~--.---r----r----.---.-----,

-10 -

, , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

co -20 - - - - - - :;::;.

Q)

"C

:e

c.

-30

-40 - - - - - - - - - - - - - ; - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2000 4000 6000

-50 L-_"--_"'--_""""-_..L-_""""--_........._-'-_-..I-_--'-_---'-_--'-_---'

o

Frequency (MHz)

Figure 7. Transmission coefficient for a reinforced concrete wall (P=15.24 cm,

D=5.08 cm, and W=20.32 cm).

Various wall attenuationmeasurements have been reported in the literature; however, each particular

measurement only applies to the specific frequency, construction materials, and geometry used in

the experiment. As noted in [4], exact models for penetration are difficult to determine, as only a

limited number of experiments have been published. For the worst case scenario, the models

presented above suffice to show that in general, it should be assumed that very little protection is

afforded when the building materials are comprised primarily ofpoorly conducting materials and the

RF threat covers a broad range offrequencies.

2.2 Coupling via Apertures

The results presented above show that walls constructed ofmaterials with poor conductivities (a few

mS/m or less) may allow considerable electromagnetic wave penetration at various microwave

frequencies. Since buildings constructed of such materials do not provide much shielding, the

presence of windows, doors, open access holes, cracks, seams, etc., is not a significant issue. Such

wall penetrations become important, however, when the building construction includes intentional

shielding, in which case a significant contribution to the interior electromagnetic field levels can be

due to aperture penetration. The following discussion is intended to provide an overview ofmethods

that can be used to estimate the transmission of electromagnetic radiation via apertures. As before,

the shielding properties of walls with apertures may be estimated by examining the more tractable

problem of an electromagnetic wave impinging on an infmite perfectly conducting sheet containing

an aperture.

8
The aperture diffraction problem is divided into two regimes depending on the distances from the

source and observation points to the aperture. When the source and observation points are at

distances that are much greater than the ratio of the square of the largest aperture dimension to the

wavelength of the incident field, the Fresnel-Kirchoff diffraction integral is greatly simplified. This

regime is known as Fraunhoffer diffraction [9]. The converse case is known as Fresnel diffraction.

The Fresnel diffraction problem is much more difficult with few analytic solutions. Various

algorithms have recently been developed for solving the Fresnel diffraction problem [10] including

a formulation using Feynman path integrals [11].

When the aperture opening is large compared to a wavelength (i.e., electrically large), the main part

of the wave passes through the opening in the manner of geometrical optics and only slight

diffraction effects occur. Ifthe aperture is on the order of a wavelength, numerical methods will most

likely be required to obtain an accurate estimate of the field intensity for the case of Fresnel

diffraction. It is expected that in most cases where buildings or other structures are designed with

intentional shielding, aperture sizes will likely be much smaller than the shortest wavelength for

which the shielding was designed. In any event, a reasonable worst case estimate for aperture

dimensions on the order of or greater than a wavelength can be made by assuming that the

electromagnetic waves pass through the aperture unperturbed.

When the dimensions of the aperture are much less than the smallest RF threat wavelength (i.e.,

electrically small), the radiated fields that penetrate the aperture can be approximated as those due

to equivalent electric p and magnetic Iii dipoles [12, 13]. The equivalent dipoles are calculated using

short circuit electric E(lc) and magnetic JJ(8C) fields (i.e., fields at the surface of an infinite perfectly

conducting plane without an aperture) and geometrical factors known as polarizabilities.

The electric dipole moment is normal to the aperture, and hence the electric polarizability, yE, is a

scalar quantity. The magnetic dipole is in the plane of the aperture and in general, the magnetic

polarizability, yM, is a 2x2 tensor. The magnetic tensor can be diagonalized by choosing the

appropriate principal axes for the aperture geometry. There are thus three polarizabilities (one

electric and two magnetic). The equivalent dipole sources can be written

p= eyEE(8C)

M n.(8C) mil, =L- YII,~ •

Polarizabilities for a wide variety of shapes are given in [13]. For a circular aperture, the

polarizabilities are

9
E -d3

Y =-

6

where d is the diameter of the aperture. The radiated fields due to the electric dipole are

_ (a) 2 _

H=-lfr nxp 41t c

and the fields due to the magnetic dipole are

H=-nxE - 1 -

110

where c is the speed of light in a vacuum, 110 is the free space impedance, lfr =eikX/X, n=X/X,

X= IXI, and Xis the vector from the source to the observation point.

As an example, consider a linearly polarized plane wave normally incident on a conducting sheet

with an electrically small circular hole. The magnitudes of the equivalent dipoles are Iftl =0,

IIii I=21 Hinc Id 3/3 where d is the diameter ofthe aperture and Hinc is the incident magnetic field.

The interior fields are equivalent to the fields radiated from a magnetic dipole located at the aperture

with the magnetic dipole moment vector in the plane ofthe conducting sheet. At distances of a few

wavelengths from the aperture, only the dipole far field terms are important. The power transferred

by the small aperture (i.e., ratio of the time averaged power due to the equivalent dipole in the

radiation zone to the incident power density) is

2

10
In decibels and units of wavelength A, this expression reduces to

For this expression, small aperture theory requires dlA< 1, and in the radiation zone, XIA> 1.

Polarizabilities for a variety of other shapes have been calculated [13]. In most cases, the

polarizabilities are not significantly different from that of a circular aperture of equal area.

The previous result shows that for small aperture Fraunhaufer diffraction, the transmitted power loss

is substantial when the aperture is electrically small. This is not the case when, for example, a small

aperture is backed by conducting materials that in effect form a resonant cavity [14, 15, 16, 17 ].

Analytical transmission line models have been used to calculate the shielding effectiveness SE of

a rectangular metallic enclosure with a rectangular aperture. SE is defined as

E - SE= - 2010g (X)

10 Eo(X)

where it is the electric field at the observation point Jl inside ofthe enclosure and ito is the electric

field at the observation point assuming free space propagation. Measurements presented in [16] show

that for a slot aperture with dimensions 100x5 nnnin a rectangular box ofdimensions 300x120x300

:rrnn, the measured SE drops to only a few dB above 0 at 650 MHz and the analytical model predicts

worst case SE values of -40 dB at around 700 MHz. Hence, apertures in "small" enclosures, and/or

circumstances where metallic objects are near the aperture will require special analysis to determine

ifresonant behavior will result in significant field enhancements (over the small aperture theory) at

frequencies within the threat range.

2.3 A Method for Estimating the Exterior to Interior Power Loss

The results presented above show that electromagnetic radiation can readily penetrate typical

building walls that are poor conductors (i.e., suffering at most only a few dB of attenuation) and/or

electrically large apertures such as doors and windows at various frequencies in the microwave band.

The frequencies that exhibit worst case (i.e., maximum) penetration will depend on the materials and

construction methods. While the infinite slab model is an idealization of a building wall, it is

expected that the existence of wall boundaries, edges, comers, etc. will probably not reduce worst

case penetration levels over a broad range of frequencies. However, such features will likely alter

the frequency dependence ofthe transmittedpower. In general, for typicalmasonry, wood, reinforced

concrete, and similar structures made ofmaterials with conductivities of a few IDS/m or less, there

will likely be significant penetration at several microwave frequencies, and hence the possibility of

strong electromagnetic coupling into most structures should be anticipated. In what follows, we

develop a statisticalmodel that can be used to estimate worst case power levels that may exist within

a cluttered room that has been penetrated by a narrow band of microwave radiation.

11
Once electromagnetic radiation penetrates a room, the fields are scattered, reflected, and diffracted

by a variety of objects (equipment, furnishings, walls, etc.) inside of the room The interior field

structure can be very complicated and performing a detailed analysis ofthe power levels throughout

a room is at best a difficult task. Since we are concerned here with estimating the worst case threat

potential, a more practical approach is to use a statistical characterization ofthe indoor propagation

channel for narrowband RF signals. The subject ofindoor propagation at microwave frequencies has

been studied by researchers for many years (see e.g., [18, 19]).

The model described here is applicable to situations where the interior ofthe building is loaded with

many scattering objects, thus creating a strong multipath environment. The premise of the model is

that when large areas of a building wall are illuminated by an RF device, the resulting signal within

a roomcan be treated as originating from elemental sources over the illuminated wall area. In strong

multipath environments, the signal from each source is subjected to random scattering. The phase

of each signal is random and therefore each source can be considered as independent, in which case

the total signal power is the sum ofthe signal power from each elemental source.

Following [20], the power level at a location inside of a room due to an elemental source within the

room is modeled as the superposition of two processes: a multipath (small scale or fast) fading

process superimposed upon a power (large scale or slow) fading process which can vary depending

on a host of factors such as building construction and geometry, room characteristics and use, RF

device type, deployment, etc. In situations where there are manymultipath componentsthat are about

the same size, as would be expected in a room loaded with a variety of scatterers, the fast fading

component is modeled as a multiplicative process that follows a Rayleigh Law. There are numerous

studies that provide an empirical justification for modeling indoor fast fading as Rayleigh (see e.g.,

[21-24]). In cases where there is a strong direct signal, the fast fading component would consist of

a direct plus a Rayleigh distributed signal which is characterized by Nakagami-Rice statistics.

In decibels relative to a unit ofpower (e.g., dBm), the power (or amplitude) at some point within the

room can be written as

where Wo is a smoothed version of Wand the residual R represents small scale variations due to

interactions with the room and its contents. The variable R=R(t,x,f) is in general a random

function of time t , position x, and frequency f, and has a median value of 0 dB. The addition of

quantiles in decibels implies a multiplicative relationship between the corresponding amplitudes

indicating that the randomfunction R acts as a frequency transfer function as would be expected for

a severe multipath environment. As described in [20], the first-order statistics of R are given by

12
which is referred to as the Rayleigh decibel distribution. This distribution has no parameters, a mean

of0.92 dB, a standard deviation of5.57 dB, and an interdecile range of 13.40 dB. Note that with this

model, the more general case of multipath plus a strong direct signal can readily be approximated

using a Weibull distribution for R as described in [20].

Following [20] the quantity Wo can also be treated as a random variable depending on a parameter

loosely described as situation. Here, the term situation is used to cover circumstances for which the

contributions to the variability are significant, but difficult or impossible to quantify. It is envisioned

that situation could apply to room-to-room variations, building type, construction, and use, and a

variety of source parameters such as RF device type and deployment.

Published statistics based on indoor propagation measurements in factories and offices [21, 25] at

UHF frequencies show that depending on the situation, Rayleigh or Nakagami-Rice statistics provide

a reasonable approximation to indoor propagation measurements. In [21], it was found that the

cumulative distribution of many small scale fading measurements in factory environments justify

the assumption of a Rayleigh law. In both environments, small scale fading was best approximated

by Nakagami-Rice statistics when the line-of-sight path was not obstructed and there was only light

to moderate clutter. Nakagami-Rice distributions are typically characterized by the ratio ofthe direct

to scattered signal power, usually denoted in decibels as K. K values of 6-10 dB have been

measured in a variety ofindoor environmentsreported as having line-of-sight propagation paths with

light to moderate clutter [21, 25, 26].

More recently, a numerical analysis software tool was used to calculate indoor propagation statistics

for a Hertzian dipole source emitting a 2.4 GHz signal into a room loaded with many scattering

objects and surfaces [27]. The primary purpose of this effort was to evaluate the efficacy of using

the tool in predicting field strength variations for indoor environments. In particular, the software

tool was used to simulate electromagnetic fields in a laboratory described as a harsh multipath

environment with concrete exterior walls, glass windows, various partitions consisting ofsheetrock

over metal studs, concrete reinforced columns, and furnishings and equipment consistent with the

function of the laboratory. The results of this study are useful for our purposes since they give

detailed statistical data and show that severe multipath can result in significant field enhancements

(relative to free space propagation) within a room

The results of [27] are given in terms of a random variable called room gain which is defmed as the

ratio ofthe calculated electric field amplitude (using the software tool) to the electric field amplitude

that would be present at the same location assuming free space propagation. In terms of our model,

the median room gain can be associated with Wo (relative to the power based on a free space

propagation law) and the variations relative to the median would correspond to R. Room gain

statistics are given for several transmitter locations, both near walls and in the center of the room

Depending on the transmitter location, the mean value ofroom gain is reported to be 4-8 dB above

free space with standard deviations of 4.9-5.2 dB. It is interesting to note that while the mean value

changes by several dB depending on antenna location, the standard deviation changes only slightly

as would be expected with the Rayleigh small scale fading model described earlier. Furthermore, the

13
reported standard deviation is reasonably close to the expected 5.57 dB for Rayleigh fading. While

the data in [27] were fitted with lognormal distributions, it appears that the Rayleigh decibel

distribution would also provide a reasonable fit. Also, statistics resulting from measurements of

several different indoor paths [26] show that obstructed paths typically have standard deviations of

5.0-5.6 dB and mean values of 1-2 dB as would be expected for a Rayleigh distribution. Given these

data and the physical basis for Rayleigh fading in a severe multipath environment, the assumption

ofRayleigh fast fading appears to be justified.

2.3.1 Estimation of Exterior to Interior Power Loss

For equipment located near the illuminated wall or along a line-of-sight path with light to moderate

clutter, the narrowband signal power can be characterized by Nakagarni-Rice statistics withK values

of about 6-10 dB. In such cases, the mean signal power at a point within the room will be roughly

equal to power transmitted less free-space propagation losses (from the RF device to a point inside

ofthe building) and any exterior wall attenuation. For equipment located farther into the roomwhere

the direct signal is very weak and multipath dominates, we will use the concepts described above to

estimate worst case signal amplitudes.

To this end, the illuminated portion of the wall is divided into elemental isotropic radiators each

occupying an area dA with power equal to sedA/aw' where se is the power density at the exterior

of the building wall and aw is the wall attenuation. The power density at a location x within the

room due to a point source at x,is

where gr". is the room gain (described above).We now assume that because ofmultipath, the signals

received from each elemental source are essentially uncorrelated and hence the power density at x

due to all sources is obtained by summing over the illuminated area Ao

Since we are interested in worst case estimates we assume that the illuminated area is circular with

radius 70 and we need only calculate the threat along a line from the RF device through the center

ofthe illuminated area. With these simplifying assumptions, the integral can readily be evaluated for

interior locations along this line. Using cylindrical coordinates, where the z-axis is normal to the

center ofthe illuminated circular area and z denotes the distance to an observation point within the

14
room we have

Using upper case letters to denote quantities in decibels, the interior power density is written as

S= Grm +Se -Aw +H.

Figure 8 shows H as a function of r;Iz 2 . The quantity S has small scale variations that follow a

Rayleigh law and large scale variations that depend on what was previously described as situation.

The mean power loss from the exterior illuminated area to the interior of the room is

A=S-S=A-G e w rm -H

where the bar above the symbol denotes average.

As an example, consider the case where the RF beam covers the entire exterior wall (i.e., r 0 is equal

to half of the height of the exterior room wall). If the severe multipath assumption applies for

z~ro/2we have H =-4 dB at z= ro/2, and then decreasing with distance into the room as shown

in Figure 8. For the situation described in [27], Grm :::: 6 dB, and hence, the worst case (i.e., smallest)

mean power loss for obstructed portions of the room is

A=Aw . -2

Hence if the wall loss is nominally 2 dB or less at some frequencies over the bandwidth of the RF

device, little if any shielding can be expected even in areas where the direct path is obstructed, and

in fact, power enhancements are probable.

3~ VULNERABILITY OF CELLULAR BASE STATIONS

An overview of cellular base stations is given in [1]. Briefly, a base station consists of an antenna

(or array of antennas), an elevated mount (tower, rooftop, hilltop), an equipment enclosure (box,

shed, building), a cable connection between the antenna and equipment enclosure, and either a cable,

fiber, or microwave link to a mobile telephone switching office. As explained in [1], expected entry

15
o _ _ _ _ -' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ '- _ _ _ _ -' - - - - - - - - - I I I , I

- - - - ,- - - - - - 1- - - - - i - - - - - ,- - - - - -, - - - - - r - - - -

___' _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 oJ , , L _

0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00

, I I I I I ,

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I I I I I I 1

I , I I , I I

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - -I - - - - - -, - - - - - - - - I - - - - - - - - - I , - - - - - - - - I - - - - I

-4

co

"C -6

-8

-10

-12

-14

Figure 8. H as a function of distance from the illuminated wall relative to

the radius ofthe illuminated portion ofthe wall.

points for RF radiation are the antenna, the connecting cable, and the equipment enclosure. Because

antennas are intentional receivers ofRF energy, the direct antenna coupling (or front door coupling)

is expected to dominate the cable coupling and equipment enclosure coupling (back door couplings).

These latter couplings depend on the shielding properties of the cable and enclosure, whereas the

front door coupling depends on the antenna pattern.

Base stations are equipped with some form of lightning protection in the form of low-impedance

ground paths that shunt transient currents away from the antennas, cables, and RF equipment.

Protective measures generally take the form of grounding of exposed components and the use of

surge protectorsin cables. Although the base station grounding systemmay provide some protection

against currents induced by high intensity RF fields, it is expected that in worst case scenarios, the

signals generated by RF devices will follow the same path as the desired signals, and the grounding

system will offer little protection. Thus, the primary threat to the base station is RF energy that is

collected by the antenna and flows into the RF equipment.

Cellular base station antenna patterns are typically sectoral in the horizontal plane, with 3-dB

beamwidths of 80 to 90 degrees in azimuth. In elevation the 3-dB beamwidths are typically 71h to

15 degrees. A nominal antenna gain is 16 dBi. Antennas consist of metallic elements that are not

expected to be affected by high intensity RF fields. Proper impedancematching between the antenna

and its load (typically 50 ohm RF equipment) is necessary to achieve maxllnum power transfer.

Since most matching circuits are passive devices, they are also expected to be unaffected by high

intensity RF fields. Cellular base station antennas are therefore not expected to be damaged by high

incident field levels.

16
As explained above, the main RF tlrreat to base stations is direct coupling via the antennas. Since _

the antennas themselves are not expected to be vulnerable, it is the RF power that can damage (or

degrade the perfonnance of) the RF equipment that will be the detennining factor for base station

vulnerability. The signals received by a base station from mobile units are often very weak, and low

noise amplifiers (LNAs) are therefore placed between the antennas and the receiver circuits. These

amplifiers can be damaged (or suffer a loss of linearity and therefore experience degraded

perfonnance) if overloaded.

Loss of linearity is normally specified in terms of the I-dB compression point (the point at which

the amplifier gain as a function of input power deviates from linearity by 1 dB), referenced to the

power at the amplifier output. A typical LNA has a I-dB compression point of approximately 20

dBm and a gain of approximately 30 dB, so that the amplifier perfonnance is degraded at an input

power of approximately -10 dBm One expects physical damage (burnout) at power levels of 20 to

40 dB greater than the I-dB compression point, or an input power of approximately 10 to 30 dBm

These numbers are based on discussions with service providers, and may vary somewhat with

different equipment fromvarious manufacturers. However, it is worth noting that a study ofthe high

power microwave vulnerability of electronic components commonly used in weapons systems

yielded comparable numbers [28].

Overloading of the LNAs is avoided under normal conditions by limiting the power output of the

mobile users and by placing narrowband RF filters between the antennas and the amplifiers. These

front-end filters limit the out-of-band power received by the antenna from unintended sources. The

fIlters accomplish this by acting as resonant cavities that can be tuned to the desired frequency band.

Such fIlters function as duplexers; that is, they fIlter both transmitted and received signals. Since the

transmitted power levels are much higher than the received power, the overload tlrresholds for these

filters are specified in terms of transmit power, and are typically on the order of 1 kW. Thus, it is

expected that the front-end fIlters will remain intact at power levels that will damage the LNAs.

The numbers cited above are all based on in-band power levels. The bandwidths for cellular and pes

services vary from approximately 5 MHz to 45 MHz, which are relatively narrowband for carrier

frequencies in the 900- and 1800-MHz bands. On the other hand, some RF devices transmit

ultrawideband signals [3,4], which may cause one to question the relevance of narrowband numbers

for vulnerability assessments. However, because the front-end fIlters are expected to remain intact

at power levels that will damage the front-end electronics, this damage will occur as a result of inband power. It is therefore appropriate to use these in-band specifications to assess vulnerability to

high power fields, including those generated by ultrawideband devices.

4. ANALYSIS TOOLS

In Sections 2 and 3, models of the transfer of RF energy into structures and cellular base stations

were described. These models will now be used to develop tools that can be used to assess the

vulnerability of telecommunications equipment to RF devices.

17
4.1 Buildings and Enclosures

In the case oftelecommunications equipment housed inside a building or other enclosure, RF energy

is not intentionally being collected (there is no receive antenna). One therefore cannot defme a

received power, which requires an effective antenna aperture and antenna gain. The penetration of

RF energy into a structure will therefore be described in terms ofpower density (power per unit area)

at a point inside the structure.

As described in Section 2, when RF energy propagates inside a structure, multipath propagation is

expected to occur due to diffraction, reflections, and scattering (due to walls and objects inside of

the structure). Thus, the RF power at a point inside the structure will in general consist of a

combination of power from the direct path (from the source to the equipment) and power from

multipath. One can therefore distinguish two different cases, depending on whether there is a direct

path or whether the direct path is obstructed.

In the first case there is a direct path, which could occur, for example, when equipment is located

near an exterior wall that is illuminated by RF energy. In this case, one expects that the power

density at points inside the structure is a random function of position that obeys Rice-Nakagarni

statistics. The probability density function for the amplitude ofsuch a process can be written as [29]

where a is the amplitude, w". is the power in the multipath component, K is the so-called Ricean

K -factor, defmed as the ratio of the power in the direct component to the power in the multipath

component, and 10 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind of order zero.

The mean power of this process is the sum of the powers in the direct and multipath components.

Thus, relative to the power density of the direct component, the total mean power density of the

random process is 1 + 1/K. This can be viewed as a room gain Knit' because it is the ratio of the

actual power density at a point to the power density that would be observed if the structure were

absent. Using upper case letters to denote quantities in decibels, one can therefore express the power

density at points inside the structure as

where the quantities S, Se' and Aw have the same meanings as in Section 2, and

18
The power density seat the exterior of the building wall is the power of the source (RF device)

divided by the cross-sectional area of the RF beam. Equivalently, if the power transmitted by the

device is p, then

pgt

s=--

e 41t ~2

where is the distance from the device to the exterior wall of the building and gt is the directive

gain of the device.

From this point of view, the second case, in which the direct path is obstructed, corresponds to a

singular limit. In this limit, the power in the direct component tends to zero, the K-factor vanishes,

and the roomgain tends to infinity. The power observed at a point inside the structure can therefore

be viewed as the product of a vanishing direct power and an infrite room gain. The value of this

limit can be defined by the analysis at the end of Section 2, that is,

where G",. is now the room gain that follows from the Rayleigh decibel distribution, as discussed

above.

These expressions can be used to estimate the power density inside of a structure, in terms of the

power of the RF device and its distance from the structure. However, as pointed out above, for

typical building materials and RF frequencies, there may be essentially no shielding, whether or not

the direct path is obstructed.

4.2 Cellular Base Stations

The vulnerability of cellular base stations can be analyzed in terms of the power delivered to the

LNA via front door coupling through the receive antenna. This received power, denoted by Pr, can

be determined using

Ptgrg/).,

Pr = (41tCf

19
where P is the power transmitted by the RF device, gt and gr are the transmit and receive antenna t 

gains, , is the antenna separation, and l is the free space wavelength. term,.., of decibels, tbis 

be written as 

This expression :indicates that base stations are quite vulnerable to devices. For example, 

a nominal gain of 16 dBi for the receive antemla, tbis expression nnlPllf;S that even a 1 k W device 

with no directive at a distance of 100 m and a frequency of 1 would seriously overload an 

LNA with a I-dB compression point of 10 at the input. 

SUMMARY 

The analyses presented above indicate that stlllctures made out of typical building materials offer 

little, if any, protection frombigh intensity fields. In some instances the presence of the stlllcture 

may actually increase field strengths due to multipath effects. Cellular base stations are vulnerable 

to RF devices via front door coupling through the receive antenna. 

Expressions have been derived that enable one to estimate the worst case power densities inside 

structures and the received power levels in cellular base stations. More quantitative predictions of 

field strengths can be made, but require detailed analyses on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 

frequency, the precise location of equipment inside a building, details of the stlllcture, etc. The tools 

required for such analyses, including both analytical and numerical techniques, are currently 

available. These techniques have been briefly discussed in the report and are cited in the references. 

6. REFERENCES 

[1] P. Wilson, Haakinson and Dalke, "Vulnerability of wireline and cellular 

telecommupications networks to bigh power radio frequency fields," Report 01-382, Nov. 

2000. 

[2] M. Wik, R. Gardner and W. Radasky, "Electromagnetic terrorism and adverse effects of high 

power electromagnetic environments," in Proc. 13th Intl. Zurich Symp. and Techn. Exhb. on EMC," 

Zurich, Switzerland, 1999, pp. 181-185. 

[3] R. Schweitzer and T. McCune, "Radio frequency weapons: The emerging threat and policy 

implications," report provided to Joint Program for Special Technology Countelmeasures by 

Eagan, McAllister Associates, Inc. under Contract No. N39986-97-M-7184, Oct. 1998. 

20 

[4] 1. Linder, W. Graham, M. Hewitt and T. Skucas, "Radio frequency, electromagnetic pulse, and 

high-power microwave weapons - threats, risks, and technology: An open-source assessment," report 

provided to Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countenneasures by National Security 

Research under Contract No. N39986-97-M-7241, Aug. 1997. 

[5] J. Stratton, Electromagnetic Theory, New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1941, pp. 51 

513. 

[6] R. A Dalke, et al., "Effects of reinforced concrete structures on RF connnunications," IEEE 

Trans. on EMC, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 486-496, Nov. 2000. 

[7] c. L. Holloway, M. G. Cotton, andP. McKenna, "A model for predicting the power delay profile 

characteristics inside a room," IEEE Trans. on Veh. Technol., vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 1110-1120, JuI. 

1999. 

[8] 1. B. Andersen, T. S. Rappaport, and S. Yoshida, "Propagationl11easurements and models for 

wireless communication channels," IEEE Communications 1\fagazine, pp. 42-49, Jan. 1995. 

[9] M. Born and E. Wolf, Physical Optics, New York: Pergamon Press, 1959, ch. 8. 

[10] K. D. Mielenz, "Algorithms for Fresnel diffraction at rectangular and circular apertures," 

Journal ofResearch ofthe Nationallnstitute ofStandards and Technology, vol. 103, no. 5, pp. 497­

509, Sep.-Oct. 1998. 

[11] D. E. Dauger, "Simulation and study of Fresnel diffraction for arbitrary two-dimensional 

apertures," Computers in Physics, vol. 10, no. 6, pp 591-604, Nov. IDee. 1996. 

[12] H. Bethe, "Theory ofdiffraction by small holes," Phys. Rev., vol. 66, pp. 163-182, Oct. 1944. 

[13] K. S. H. Lee, Ed., EMP Interaction: Principles, Techniques, and Reference Data, New York: 

Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1968, pp. 436-454. 

[14] M. P. Robinson, et al., "Analytical fomlulation for the shielding effectiveness of enclosures with 

apertures," IEEE Trans. on Electmagn. Compat. voL 40, no. 3, pp. 240-248, Aug. 1998. 

[15J H. H. Park, et aL, "FDTD analysis of electromagnetic penetration into a rectangular enclosure 

with multiple rectangular apertures,"Microwave and Optical Technology Letters, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 

288-191, Aug. 1999. 

[16] R. Azaro, et al., "Evaluation of the e±1'ects of an extemal incident electromagnetic wave on 

metallic enclosures with rectangular apertures," Microwave and Optical Technology Letters, vol. 28, 

no. 5, pp. 288-191, Mar. 2001. 

21 
[17] K. Y. Kabalan, et al., "Electromagnetic coupling to conducting objects behind apertures in a

conducting body," Radio Science, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 881-898, May-Jun. 1997.

[18] O. Hashemi, "The indoor radio propagation channel," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 81, no. 7,

pp. 943-968, Jul. 1993.

[19] A. F. Toledo and A. M. D. Turkmani, "Propagation into and within buildings at 900, 1800, and

2300 MHz," in Proc. ofthe IEEE vehicular technology society 42nd VTS conference, vol. 2, Denver,

Co., May 10-13, pp. 633-636.

[20] G. Hufford, "A general model for signal level variability," IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in

Communications, vol. SAC-5, no. 2, pp. 299-301, Feb. 1987.

[21] T. S. Rappaport and C. D. McGillem, "UHF fading in factories," IEEE Journal on Selected

Areas in Communications, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 40-48, Jan. 1989.

[22] P. Yegani and C. D. McGillem, "A statistical model for line-of-sight (LOS) factory radio

channels," in Proc. Vehicular Techn. Con! VTC'89, San Francisco, May 1989, pp. 496-503.

[23] H. H. Hoffman and D.C. Cox, "Attenuation of900 MHz radio waves propagating into a metal

building," IEEE Trans. Antennas Propagt., vol. AP-30, no. 4, pp. 808-811, Jul. 1982.

[24] S. T. S. Chia and A. Baran, "900 MHz attenuation and bit error ratio measurements inside a

modem office building," in Proc. lEE Fifth Int. Con! Mobile Radio Personal Commun., Warick,

u.K., Dec. 1989 pp. 33-37.

[25] R. J. Bultitude, S. A. Mahmoud, and W. A. Sullivan, "A comparison of indoor radio

propagation characteristics at 910 MHz and 1.75 GHz," IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in

Communications, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 20-30, Jan. 1989.

[26] R. Valenzuela, O. Landron, andD. L. Jacobs, "Estimating local mean signal strength ofindoor

multipath propagation,"IEEE Trans. on Veh. Technol., vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 203-212, Feb. 1997.

[27] I. Bolanis, "Prediction· of wireless connnunications systems performance in indoor

applications," Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Dec. 2000.

[28] R. Antinone and W. Ng, ''RPM testing of electronic components," Technical Report UCID21687, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and BDM Corporation, May 1989.

[29] R. Janaswamy, Radiowave Propagation and Smart Antennasfor Wireless Communications,

Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, ch. 4.

22
FORM NTIA-29 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

(4-80) NAT'L. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

1. PUBLICATION NO. 2. Gov't Accession No. 3. Recipient's Accession No.

NTIA 02-391

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. Publication Date

ANALYSIS OF THE RF THREAT TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS

SWITCHING STATIONS AND CELLULAR BASE STATIONS 6. Performing Organization Code

NTIA/ITS.T

7. AUTHOR(Sj 9. ProjecVTasklWork Unit No.

John J. Lemmon and Ro~er A. Dalke

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

NTIA/ITS

325 Broadway 10. ContracVGrant No.

Boulder, CO 80305-3328

11. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address 12. Type of Report and Period Covered

NTIA

Herbert C. Hoover Building

1401 Constitution AVe. NW 13.

Washington, DC 20230

14. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

15. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or less factual summary of most significant information. If document includes a significant bibliography or literature

survey, mention it here.)

The objective of this report is to assess the bulnerability of telecommunicationE

switching stations and cellular base stations to high power electromagnetic

radiation generated by an RF device. Analyses, measurements, and simulations

of indoor propagation and the penetration of electromagnetic fields into

structures indicate that typical buildigns provide little, if any, protection

for telecommunications switching stations from high power electromagnetic

fields. The front end electronics of cellular base stations are also vulnerable

to damage from high intensity RF fields via front door coupling through the

receive antennas. Tools to provide estimates of power densities inside of

structures and the received power levels in cellular base stations are developed

in this report. More quantitative predictions of field strengths inside

structures require detailed analyses on a case-by-case basis. The techniques

to carry out such analyses are currently available and are briefly discussed.

16. Key Words (Alphabetical order, separated by semicolons)

critical infrastructure protection, high power RF fields, telecommunications

switching stations, cellular base stations, shielding, vulnerability

17. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 18. Security Class. (This report) 20. Number of pages

0 UNLIMITED.

19. Security Class. (This page) 21. Price:

0 FOR OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION.

*u.s. GPO 2002-0-773-018/40205
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