Opinion issued February 23, 2023

 In The

Court of Appeals 

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-22-00485-CR

____________

CRYSTAL RENA WEBER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 149th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 92699-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
2

Appellant Crystal Rena Weber pleaded guilty to the offense of possession of a 

controlled substance weighing less than one gram. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 481.115(b). The trial court deferred an adjudication of guilt and placed Weber 

under community supervision for two years. The State then filed a motion to revoke 

deferred adjudication. 

At the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke deferred adjudication, Weber 

pleaded “true” to all the allegations in the State’s motion. The trial court found the 

allegations “true,” adjudicated appellant’s guilt, and assessed punishment at 15

months’ confinement. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Weber’s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw with a brief 

stating that the record presents no reversible error, that the appeal is without merit,

and is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

Counsel’s brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional 

evaluation of the record and supplying us with references to the record and legal 

authority. 386 U.S. at 744; see also High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1978). Counsel indicates that he has thoroughly reviewed the record and is 

unable to advance any grounds of error that warrant reversal. See Anders, 386 U.S. 

at 744; Mitchell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, 

no pet.).
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Counsel has advised Weber of her right to access the record and has provided 

her with a form motion for access to the record. Counsel further advised Weber of 

her right to file a pro se response to the Anders brief. Weber has done neither. 

We have independently reviewed the entire record in this appeal. Based on 

that review, we conclude that no error to reverse Weber’s conviction exists in the 

record, that there are no arguable grounds for review, and that the appeal from her 

conviction is frivolous.1 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (emphasizing that reviewing 

court—and not counsel—determines, after full examination of proceedings, whether 

appeal is wholly frivolous).

2

Weber’s counsel further contends that because Weber is indigent, the 

assessment of $900 in attorney’s fees in the final judgment should be deleted. We 

agree. 

A trial court’s authority to order a defendant to repay the cost of courtappointed legal counsel is expressly conditioned on the court determining that the 

defendant has the financial resources and ability to pay. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 

1 We note that an appellant may challenge a holding that there are no arguable grounds 

for appeal by filing a petition for discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 & n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

2 See also Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (reviewing 

court must determine whether arguable grounds for review exist); Bledsoe, 178 

S.W.3d at 826–27 (same); Mitchell, 193 S.W.3d at 155 (reviewing court determines 

whether arguable grounds exist by reviewing entire record).
4

26.05(g); see Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (observing 

that “the defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay are explicit critical 

elements in the trial court's determination of the propriety of ordering reimbursement 

of costs and fees [of legal services provided]” (quoting Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 

552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010))).

Here, the record shows that the trial court found Weber to be indigent and 

appointed counsel to represent her before she was placed on deferred-adjudication 

probation. The trial court again found Weber to be indigent when the State moved to 

revoke her deferred-adjudication probation, and again on appeal. 

Because the trial court found Weber to be indigent, she is presumed to remain 

indigent absent proof of a material change in her circumstances. See TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04(p); Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 557. Nothing in the record indicates 

a change in Weber’s financial circumstances. The record also contains no 

determination by the trial court that Weber could pay $900 in attorney’s fees—and 

we find no factual basis in the record to support such a determination. 

As a result, we conclude that the trial court erroneously assessed attorney’s 

fees against Weber for court-appointed counsel. We therefore modify the judgment 

to delete the $900 fee for “Attorney Fees.” See Byrd v. State, No. 01–12–00930–CR, 

2013 WL 5947975, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 5, 2013, no pet.)
5

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying judgment by deleting 

appointed attorney’s fees and affirming judgment as modified in Anders appeal).

3

Weber’s counsel additionally maintains that we should delete a $60 

“reimbursement fee” that is included in the judgment. Article 102.011 of the Texas 

Code of Criminal Procedure permits a $50 fee for “executing or processing an issued 

arrest warrant, capias, or capias pro fine[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 

102.011(a)(2). In reviewing reimbursement costs, “the standard for upholding the 

imposition of a cost under 102.011 is whether there is a basis for that cost, and not 

whether sufficient evidence supports its imposition. Martinez v. State, 510 S.W.3d 

206, 209 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). 

The record shows that a capias was issued on January 27, 2022. Thus, there is 

a basis in the record for $50 of the $60 fine. However, we are unable to determine 

from the record whether there is a basis for the remaining $10 of the “reimbursement 

costs.” As a result, we further modify the judgment to reduce the “reimbursement 

costs” to $50. 

3

 See also Navarro v. State, No. 01–12–00415–CR, 2013 WL 2456799, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 6, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (same); see also Hubbard v. State, No. 02–13–00300–CR, 2014 WL 

1767475, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (“We have the authority to reform a judgment in an 

Anders appeal and to affirm that judgment as reformed.”).
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As so modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and grant counsel’s 

motion to withdraw. Attorney Perry Stevens must immediately send Weber the 

required notice and file a copy of the notice with the Clerk of this Court. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 6.5(c). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Kelly and Goodman.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).