Affirmed and Opinion Filed July 31, 2018.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-17-00852-CR

GARY JAMES CUMMINGS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 15th Judicial District Court

Grayson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 06770

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Stoddart

Opinion by Justice Lang

Gary James Cummings appeals the trial court’s final judgment convicting him of evading 

arrest or detention, enhanced by two prior convictions. The jury found Cummings guilty and that 

he used a deadly weapon. The trial court found the enhancements true and assessed his punishment 

at thirty years of imprisonment. 

Cummings raises two issues on appeal, arguing: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support 

the jury’s finding that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the evading arrest or detention

offense; and (2) the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to the admission of evidence 

relating to extraneous conduct and prior convictions. We conclude the evidence is sufficient and, 

even if the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of his extraneous conduct and prior 

convictions, that error was not harmful. The trial court’s final judgment is affirmed.
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT

On November 24, 2016, at approximately 1:45 a.m., Officer Dennis Marshall observed a 

vehicle rapidly approach an intersection and turn so quickly that he could hear the tires squeal. 

When Marshall observed the same vehicle fail to stop at a stop sign, he activated his emergency 

lights and attempted to stop the vehicle. However, the vehicle did not stop. Instead, the driver, 

later identified as Cummings, “disregarded stopping at” another stop sign and proceeded to drive 

in a “very rapid manner.” After making a few turns, the vehicle failed to yield at a caution light1

that permitted drivers in the opposite direction to have the right of way. Marshall observed that a

vehicle, traveling in the opposite direction, “was able to pull over a little bit and slow down” 

avoiding any possibility of a collision.

Marshall continued to follow the vehicle. Then, while the vehicle was still in motion, 

Cummings crawled out the front driver’s-side window and began running away from Marshall’s 

patrol car. After Cummings left the vehicle, Marshall saw that the vehicle “had gone up on the 

curb,” but did not strike another vehicle. Still driving his patrol car, Marshall continued to follow 

Cummings who was on foot. Cummings ran to a residence and attempted to enter it. Marshall 

observed Cummings grab the door knob and put his right shoulder to the door, trying to force it 

open. At this point, Marshall parked his patrol car and began to chase Cummings on foot, shouting 

out numerous, clear commands to Cummings to stop and lay on the ground. Cummings continued 

to run and tried to enter another house. Then, Marshall attempted “to remove [Cummings] from 

the porch of [the second] residence,” but Cummings grabbed onto the handrail and would not let 

go. Marshall heard Cummings say something to the effect that Grayson County was trying to kill 

him. Once Marshall “was able to free [Cummings] from the handrail and get him down into the 

[front] yard” of the residence, they began to wrestle. Eventually, Marshall used his taser, but it 

 

1 The record also refers to the caution light as “blinking red lights.”
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was ineffective. Two additional officers arrived to help. They both heard Cummings yelling,

“Don’t kill me!” After wrestling for a short period of time, the three officers succeeded in 

handcuffing Cummings.

Cummings was indicted for the offense of evading arrest or detention while using a deadly 

weapon. The indictment alleged two prior convictions2for the purpose of enhancing his 

punishment. Cummings asserted the affirmative defense of necessity, based on his claim that he 

was suffering from “medical paranoia.”

3 He testified on his own behalf at trial. The jury found 

Cummings guilty and that he used a deadly weapon. The trial court found the enhancements true 

and assessed his punishment at thirty years of imprisonment.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first issue on appeal, Cummings argues the evidence is insufficient to support the 

jury’s finding that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the evading arrest or detention 

offense. He claims the evidence does not show that an individual was placed in actual danger of 

serious bodily injury or death. Rather, the evidence supports only a hypothetical danger. The 

State responds that Cummings’s “manner of using his motor vehicle posed a danger to pursuing 

officers and other motorists that was more than simply hypothetical.”

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers all of the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the jury was rationally 

justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–

19 (1979); State v. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d 128, 133–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Brooks v. State, 323 

 

2 The two prior convictions alleged in the indictment were for the offenses of: (1) evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle; and (2) 

receiving, possessing, or concealing stolen property.

3

It was Cummings’s theory at trial that he evaded arrest or detention because some prescription medication he was taking caused him to 

become paranoid and believe the police were trying to kill him. It was the State’s theory that, although Cummings was paranoid, the cause of his 

paranoia was methamphetamine use and the defense of “necessity” was inappropriate.
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S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). An appellate court is required to defer to 

the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ 

credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; 

Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. All 

evidence, whether properly or improperly admitted, will be considered when reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence. See McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010) (per curiam); Lockhart 

v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41–42 (1988); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

B. Applicable Law

Section 38.04 of the Texas Penal Code provides a person commits the offense of evading 

arrest or detention if he “intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer or federal 

special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §

38.04(a) (West 2016). Evading arrest or detention can constitute a misdemeanor, a state-jail 

felony, a third-degree felony, or a second-degree felony depending on the manner in which the 

offense is committed. See PENAL § 38.04. If a person uses a vehicle while in flight and has been 

previously convicted of evading arrest or detention, the offense is a third-degree felony. See PENAL 

§ 38.04.

“In any felony offense in which it is ‘shown’ that the defendant “used or exhibited [a]

deadly weapon[,]’ the trial court ‘shall’ enter a deadly weapon finding in the judgment.” Moore 

v. State, 520 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

42A.054(c) (West 2018). “Such a deadly weapon finding impacts a convicted felon’s eligibility 

for community supervision, parole, and mandatory supervision.” Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 908.

4

 

4 See, e.g., CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.054(b)(1) (judge-ordered community supervision does not apply when there is deadly weapon finding); TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 508.145(d) (not eligible for release on parole until inmate’s actual calendar time served, without consideration of good 

conduct time, equals one-half of sentence or 30 calendar years, whichever is less, but in no event is inmate eligible for release on parole in less than 

two calendar years), 508.149(a)(1) (inmate may not be released to mandatory supervision), & 508.151(a)(2) (parole panel may set presumptive 

parole date if inmate never had conviction with affirmative deadly weapon finding) (West Supp. 2017).
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In order to sustain a deadly weapon finding, the evidence must demonstrate that: (1) the 

object meets the definition of a deadly weapon; (2) the deadly weapon was used or exhibited during 

the transaction on which the felony conviction was based; and (3) other people were put in actual 

danger. See Brister v. State, 449 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Drichas v. State, 175 

S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Expert or lay testimony may support a deadly weapon 

finding. See Tucker v. State, 274 S.W.3d 688, 691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

The Texas Penal Code defines a “deadly weapon” as “a firearm or anything manifestly 

designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury” or 

“anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily 

injury.” PENAL § 1.07(a)(17) (West Supp. 2017). An automobile is not a deadly weapon per se as 

it is not manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily 

injury. See Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 908; Pruett v. State, 510 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2017); Brister, 449 S.W.3d at 494; see also PENAL § 1.07(a)(17)(A). However, an automobile 

may, in the manner of its use or intended use, be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. 

See Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 908; Brister, 449 S.W.3d at 494; Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798; see also

PENAL § 1.07(a)(17)(B). 

Appellate courts evaluate the manner in which the defendant used the motor vehicle during 

the felony. See Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 910 (discussing Sierra v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2009)). When evaluating the manner of use, appellate courts consider whether the 

defendant’s driving was reckless or dangerous during the commission of the felony. See Moore, 

520 S.W.3d at 910 (discussing Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 255). No intent to use the automobile as a 

weapon need be shown. See Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 909–10 (discussing Walker v. State, 897 

S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) and Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798).
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To sustain a deadly weapon finding requires evidence that “others” were endangered, and 

not merely a hypothetical potential for danger if others had been present. See Moore, 520 S.W.3d 

at 909. “Others” connotes individuals other than the actor himself, so danger to the actor alone 

does not meet the requisite standard of deadly weapon use. See Brister, 449 S.W.3d at 494. Also, 

evidence may be sufficient to support a deadly weapon finding in the absence of any evidence that 

either death or serious bodily injury occurred. See Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 909 (discussing Mann 

v. State, 58 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).

C. Application of the Law to the Facts

Cummings does not dispute that a motor vehicle can meet the definition of a deadly 

weapon. Accordingly, we will evaluate the manner in which Cummings used the motor vehicle 

during the felony and then, consider whether the evidence shows that other people were put in 

actual danger during the felony.

First, we evaluate the manner in which Cummings used the motor vehicle during the 

felony. See Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 910 (discussing Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 255). Cummings was 

indicted for the offense of evading arrest or detention, while using a motor vehicle. Also, the 

indictment alleged two prior convictions, one of which was for evading arrest. As a result, the 

alleged offense with which he was charged in this case was a third-degree felony offense. See

PENAL § 38.04. To evaluate the manner of Cummings’s use of the motor vehicle, we consider 

whether Cummings’s driving was reckless or dangerous during the commission of the felony. See 

Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 910 (discussing Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 255). 

We begin our analysis by noting that there are things that the record in this case does not 

reveal. See Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 912 (acknowledging what the record does not reveal, but noting 

there is other evidence to support deadly weapon finding). The record does not contain evidence 

of the speed at which Cummings was driving. Marshall admitted that he was not using radar and 
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did not “clock” Cummings’s speed, but stated that Cummings was traveling at an “unsafe speed” 

and “low speed” in an urban area and referred to the events as a “slow speed chase.” The evidence 

shows that Cummings slowed down at the stop signs, but did not stop. However, Marshall believed 

Cummings slowed down only to make a turn at the intersection. 

The record reveals other evidence that the manner in which Cummings used or intended to 

use the motor vehicle was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. See Moore, 520 

S.W.3d at 912. The record shows that Marshall observed Cummings rapidly approach an 

intersection and turn so quickly that he could hear the tires squeal, fail to stop at two stop signs, 

drive in a “very rapid manner,” ignore a caution light, and crawl out the front driver’s-side window 

while the vehicle was still in motion, causing the vehicle to go “up on the curb.” We conclude, 

regardless of whether Cummings intended to use the motor vehicle as a weapon, a reasonable fact 

finder could infer that the manner in which Cummings used the motor vehicle while evading arrest 

or detention was reckless and dangerous. See Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 909–10 (appellate courts 

consider whether defendant’s driving was reckless or dangerous and no intent to use automobile 

as a weapon need be shown).

Second, to sustain the deadly weapon finding, the evidence must show that others were 

endangered, and not merely a hypothetical potential for danger if others had been present. See 

Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 909. Although the record shows that there was no evidence that there were 

other vehicles present at the first and second stop signs that Cummings failed to obey, the record 

reveals evidence that “others” were endangered. See Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 912. The record shows 

that after making a few turns while driving, Cummings ignored a caution light that permitted 

drivers in the opposite direction to have the right of way. Marshall saw that a vehicle traveling on 

the same street as Cummings, but in the opposite direction, was able “to pull over a little bit and 

slow down” avoiding any possibility of a collision. We conclude the record reflects “others” were 
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present and the manner in which Cummings used his motor vehicle placed those “others” in danger 

of death or serious bodily injury. Even though no collision occurred, a reasonable fact finder could 

infer that there was actual danger to the driver and any passengers in the other vehicle. See Moore, 

520 S.W.3d at 909 (discussing Mann, 58 S.W.3d 132) (evidence may be sufficient to support 

deadly weapon finding in absence of any evidence that either death or serious bodily injury 

occurred).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence 

is sufficient to support the jury’s deadly weapon finding. Issue one is decided against Cummings.

III. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND EXTRANEOUS OFFENSES

In issue two, Cummings argues the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to the 

admission of evidence relating to extraneous conduct and prior convictions because: (1) the 

evidence of his methamphetamine use was inadmissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) 

because it was not offered for a permissible purpose or relevant; and (2) the evidence of his prior 

convictions was inadmissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 609 because more than ten years had 

passed since his conviction for some of the offenses and the probative value of his prior convictions 

was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Cummings claims that, although he and the State

disagreed as to the cause of his paranoia, the cause was not relevant to or probative of the elements 

of his necessity defense or the deadly weapon issue. The State responds that the evidence showing 

Cummings’s paranoia was more consistent with methamphetamine use than the prescription 

medications Cummings claimed caused his paranoia was permissible to rebut Cummings’s

defensive theory. Also, the State responds that Cummings’s affirmative defense of necessity relied 

solely on his credibility, so his prior convictions for crimes of moral turpitude were relevant.

However, we need not address the merits of Cummings’s complaint. Rather, assuming, 

without deciding, the trial court erred when it overruled Cummings’s objection to the admission 
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of the State’s rebuttal evidence that his paranoia was the result of methamphetamine use, not 

prescription medication, we will review the record to determine whether the alleged error was 

harmful error. See Werner v. State, 412 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (neither 

defendant nor State bears burden of demonstrating harm); Schutz v. State, 63 S.W.3d 442, 444 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (neither the State nor appellant must demonstrate harm when an error has 

occurred; it is appellate court's duty to assess harm); Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 503 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d) (noting parties may suggest how such harm is shown or not 

shown).

A. Non-Constitutional Error

The erroneous admission of evidence is non-constitutional error. See Gonzalez v. State, 

544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2008). Pursuant to rule 44.2(b), “Any other error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not 

affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is 

affected if the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict. See Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373; Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 93–94 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). If the error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect, the error is harmless. 

See Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373; Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 

An appellate court should examine the record as a whole when conducting a harm analysis. See 

Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When conducting a harm 

analysis, an appellate court should consider: (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might 

be considered in connection with other evidence; (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the 

verdict; (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt; and (4) whether the 

State emphasized the complained of error. See Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373 (citing Motilla, 78 

S.W.3d at 356–58).
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B. Affirmative Defense of Necessity

Necessity is a statutory justification defense that is raised for purposes of exonerating a 

person’s otherwise illegal conduct. See PENAL § 9.22 (West 2011); Stefanoff v. State, 78 S.W.3d 

496, 500 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d). Justification defenses, including necessity, are 

based on the confession-and-avoidance doctrine, which requires a defendant to admit the 

conduct—both the act or omission and the requisite culpable mental state—of the charged offense. 

See Juarez v. State, 308 S.W.3d 398, 401–04 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discussing confession-andavoidance doctrine with respect to affirmative defenses of necessity, self-defense, and GoodSamaritan defense). 

Conduct is justified by necessity if:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid 

imminent harm;

(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according 

to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law 

proscribing the conduct; and

(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does 

not otherwise plainly appear.

PENAL § 9.22; see Stefanoff, 78 S.W.3d at 500.

A necessity defense requires that the defendant reasonably believe that his conduct is 

immediately necessary to avoid a greater harm. See PENAL § 9.22; Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 

385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A “reasonable belief” means a belief that would be held by an 

ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances. See PENAL § 1.07(42); Mays, 318 S.W.3d 

at 385; see also Harper v. State, 508 S.W.3d 461, 467–68 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. 

ref’d); Rodriquez v. State, No. 13-16-00396-CR, 2018 WL 2252882, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi May 17, 2018, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). A defendant’s claim 

that his “paranoid ideations” raise a reasonable belief that his actions were justified is not supported 

by “law or common sense.” See Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 385 (“[Defendant’s] claims that ‘his 
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paranoid ideations and psychosis’ raise a ‘reasonable belief’ that his actions were justified is 

supported neither by law nor common sense.”); see also Rodriguez, 2018 WL 2252882, at *5–6. 

Texas law does not recognize the “ordinary and prudent” paranoid for purposes of penal code 

justification defenses. See Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 385; see also Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 

572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (evidence of defendant’s paranoia, presented as excuse for crime, 

simply provides motive for intentional act of murder); Harper v. State, 508 S.W.3d 461, 467–68 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref’d) (defendant’s belief it was necessary to shoot person due 

to generalized fear and confusion after collision, which other evidence showed was due to drug 

use, was unreasonable as matter of law); Rodriguez, 2018 WL 2252882, at **4–6 (trial court did 

not err in excluding testimony of psychologist that defendant suffered from delusional disorder to 

support self-defense and to negate mens rea in murder case); cf. Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 

596–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (expert evidence of defendant’s paranoid delusions admissible as 

it related to defendant’s intent to shoot at police officers, unless otherwise barred by evidentiary 

rules).

The defendant has the initial burden of producing evidence regarding the necessity defense. 

See PENAL § 2.03(c) (West 2011); Stefanoff, 78 S.W.3d at 500. If the defendant makes this initial 

showing, then the burden shifts to the State to disprove the necessity defense beyond a reasonable

doubt. See PENAL § 2.03(d); Stefanoff, 78 S.W.3d at 500.

C. Application of the Law to the Facts

Because Cummings admitted all of the elements of the evading arrest or detention offense 

by asserting an affirmative defense, the only issues at trial were his defense of necessity and the 

alleged use of a deadly weapon. Also, the record shows that the parties agreed that Cummings 
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was suffering from paranoia during the offense of evading arrest.5 However, the State and 

Cummings disagreed as to the cause of his paranoia. Cummings claimed that he was acting under 

a “medical state of paranoia,” which was a side effect of some legally prescribed medications. 

According to Cummings, he evaded arrest because he believed the police were trying to kill him. 

The State rebutted this evidence with: (1) expert testimony that the specific medications prescribed 

to Cummings were unlikely to cause “delusions or hallucinations”; (2) expert testimony that 

Cummings’s “paranoia” was consistent with methamphetamine use; and (3) evidence that 

Cummings had admitted to using methamphetamine.

The evidence of Cummings’s paranoia may provide a motive for his intentional act of 

evading arrest. See Jackson, 160 S.W.3d at 572 (evidence of paranoia simply provided motive for 

murder and did not provide excuse for intentional act). However, Cummings argues that his 

paranoia raises a “reasonable belief” that his actions were justified is supported “neither by law 

nor common sense.” See Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 385–86 (self-defense based upon “paranoid 

ideations and active psychosis” not recognized defense in Texas); see also Rodriquez, 2018 WL 

2252882, at *4–6 (trial court did not err in excluding testimony of psychologist that defendant 

suffered from delusional disorder as basis for self-defense and to negate mens rea in murder case). 

Necessity based upon paranoia is not a recognized defense in Texas. See Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 

385–86; see also Rodriquez, 2018 WL 2252882, at *4–6. 

We conclude that, even if the trial court erred when it overruled Cummings’s objection to 

the evidence of his extraneous conduct and prior convictions to rebut his affirmative defense of 

necessity, Cummings was not harmed by the error because, as a matter of law, Cummings’s belief 

 

5

 On appeal the State argues that it did not concede Cummings was suffering paranoid delusions at the time of the offense. However, during 

closing argument, the State argued:

The facts of [Cummings’s] behavior that night on 11-24-16 are consistent with methamphetamine use. No doubt about it, [] 

Cummings was in a weird state of mind that night. I’m not disputing that. There was something that wasn’t right with him.

. . . Irrational and paranoid behavior. Irrational and paranoid behavior is a classic symptom of methamphetamine. . . . 

Methamphetamine makes you paranoid and delusional.
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that it was necessary to evade arrest because the police were trying to kill him, allegedly induced 

by prescription medication, does not satisfy the requirement that he reasonably believed his 

conduct was immediately necessary to avoid a greater harm. See Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 385–86; 

see also Harper, 508 S.W.3d at 468; Rodriquez, 2018 WL 2252882, at *4–6.

Issue two is decided against Cummings.

IV. CONCLUSION

The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Cummings used or exhibited a 

deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Even if the trial court erred in admitting the 

evidence of his extraneous conduct and prior convictions, that error was not harmful. 

The trial court’s final judgment is affirmed.

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

170852F.U05

/Douglas S. Lang/

DOUGLAS S. LANG

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

GARY JAMES CUMMINGS, Appellant

No. 05-17-00852-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 15th Judicial District 

Court, Grayson County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 06770.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices 

Myers and Stoddart participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 31st day of July, 2018.