U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

97–200 PDF WASHINGTON : 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

114TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

COMMITTEE

2015 

PRINT 114–B 

FINAL REPORT 

of the 

TASK FORCE ON 

COMBATING TERRORIST AND FOREIGN 

FIGHTER TRAVEL 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

October 2015 

FIRST SESSION 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER 

TRAVEL 

JOHN KATKO, New York, Republican Lead 

WILL HURD, Texas 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Democratic 

Lead 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

MILES TAYLOR, Republican Staff Lead 

NICOLE TISDALE, Democratic Staff Lead 

Special thanks to Committee Staff who contributed to this final report: 

Paul Anstine, Lanier Avant, Kate Bonvechio, Mandy Bowers, Adam Comis, Cate 

Cullen, Moira Bergin, Luke Burke, Alan Carroll, Paige Davies, Steven Giaier, Katy 

Flynn, Laura Fullerton, Hope Goins, Cedric Haynes, Kerry Kinirons, Kyle Klein, 

Vanessa Layne, Tyler Lowe, Kyle McFarland, Jason Miller, John Neal, Ramzi 

Nemo, Leaksmy Norin, Alison Northrop, Joan O’Hara, Jason Olin, Christopher 

Schepis, Brendan Shields, Andrea Thompson, Claire Woolf, and Maseh Zarif. 
(III) 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORIST AND FOREIGN

FIGHTER TRAVEL, 

Washington, DC, October 2015. 

DEAR CHAIRMAN MCCAUL AND RANKING MEMBER THOMPSON: We 

are transmitting to you the final report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel for review. The final 

report is an examination of the Government’s preparedness to respond to the global surge in terrorist travel, in addition to key findings and recommendations for the United States to consider as we 

look to combat the threat at home and abroad. We look forward to 

working across the aisle and with other committees to develop 

much-needed legislation to tackle this issue. 

Sincerely, 

JOHN KATKO, 

Republican Lead, Task Force. 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, 

Democratic Lead, Task Force. 

WILL HURD. 

BARRY LOUDERMILK. 

MARTHA MCSALLY. 

JOHN RATCLIFFE. 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. 

FILEMON VELA. 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 

Executive Summary ......................................................................................... 1 

Threat Environment ................................................................................. 1 

Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel .......... 1 

Results of the Review ................................................................................ 1 

Notes on Methodology ...................................................................................... 2 

The Threat ........................................................................................................ 3 

The Global Surge in Foreign Fighters ..................................................... 5 

The Danger of Foreign Fighters: Recruits, ‘‘Returnees,’’ and Remote 

Radicalization ......................................................................................... 10 

Americans on the Pathway to Terror ...................................................... 15 

Key Findings and Recommendations ..................................................................... 21 

Overview ............................................................................................................ 21 

U.S. Government Strategy and Planning to Combat the Threat .......... 21 

Identifying Terrorists and Foreign Fighters—and Preventing Them 

From Traveling ...................................................................................... 21 

Detecting and Disrupting Terrorists and Foreign Fighters When 

They Travel ............................................................................................ 22 

Overseas Security Gaps ............................................................................ 23 

U.S. Government Strategy and Planning ....................................................... 23 

Identification and Prevention .......................................................................... 28 

Watchlisting ............................................................................................... 29 

Information Sharing .................................................................................. 31 

Prevention Activities ................................................................................. 38 

Detection and Disruption ................................................................................. 47 

Pre-Travel Phase ....................................................................................... 48 

Travel Phase .............................................................................................. 53 

Overseas Gaps .................................................................................................. 56 

Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing .................................... 59 

Traveler Screening .................................................................................... 60 

Counterterrorism Laws and Prosecutions ............................................... 62 

Border Security .......................................................................................... 63 

Appendices ................................................................................................................ 73 

Appendix I: Task Force Activity ...................................................................... 73 

Official Member Briefings ......................................................................... 73 

Official Staff Briefings .............................................................................. 74 

Official Member Travel ............................................................................. 74 

Official Staff Travel ................................................................................... 74 

Other Task Force Meetings and Consultations ...................................... 75 

Appendix II: American Foreign Fighter Aspirants and Recruits ................. 77 

Appendix III: Abbreviations ............................................................................ 79 

(1) 

1 Barbara Starr, ‘‘ ‘A Few Dozen Americans’ in ISIS Ranks,’’ CNN, July 15, 2015, http:// 

www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/politics/isis-american-recruits/. 2 Ibid. 

INTRODUCTION 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THREAT ENVIRONMENT 

Today we are witnessing the largest global convergence of 

jihadists in history, as individuals from more than 100 countries 

have migrated to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq since 2011.1

Some initially flew to the region to join opposition groups seeking 

to oust Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but most are now joining 

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), inspired to become a 

part of the group’s ‘‘caliphate’’ and to expand its repressive society. 

Over 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500 Westerners. More than 250 individuals from the United States have also 

joined or attempted to fight with extremists in the conflict zone.2

These fighters pose a serious threat to the United States and its 

allies. Armed with combat experience and extremist connections, 

many of them are only a plane-flight away from our shores. Even 

if they do not return home to plot attacks, foreign fighters have 

taken the lead in recruiting a new generation of terrorists and are 

seeking to radicalize Westerners online to spread terror back home. 

TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORIST AND FOREIGN FIGHTER TRAVEL 

Responding to the growing threat, the House Committee on 

Homeland Security established the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel in March 2015. Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member Bennie Thompson appointed a 

bipartisan group of eight lawmakers charged with reviewing the 

threat to the United States from foreign fighters, examining the 

Government’s preparedness to respond to a surge in terrorist travel, and providing a final report with findings and recommendations 

to address the challenge. Members and staff also assessed security 

measures in other countries, as U.S. defenses depend partly on 

whether foreign governments are able to interdict extremists before 

they reach our shores. 

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW 

The Task Force makes 32 key findings and provides accompanying recommendations, which can be read in full starting in the 

second part of this report. Among other conclusions reached, the 

Task Force finds that: 

• Despite concerted efforts to stem the flow, we have largely 

failed to stop Americans from traveling overseas to join 

jihadists. Of the hundreds of Americans who have sought to 
2 

travel to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq, authorities have 

only interdicted a fraction of them. Several dozen have also 

managed to make it back into America. • The U.S. Government lacks a National strategy for combating 

terrorist travel and has not produced one in nearly a decade. • The unprecedented speed at which Americans are being 

radicalized by violent extremists is straining Federal law enforcement’s ability to monitor and intercept suspects. • Jihadist recruiters are increasingly using secure websites and 

apps to communicate with Americans, making it harder for law 

enforcement to disrupt plots and terrorist travel. • There is currently no comprehensive global database of foreign 

fighter names. Instead, countries including the United States 

rely on a patchwork system for swapping extremist identities, 

increasing the odds foreign fighters will slip through the 

cracks. • ‘‘Broken travel’’ and other evasive transit tactics are making it 

harder to track foreign fighters. • Few initiatives exist Nation-wide to raise awareness about foreign-fighter recruitment and to assist communities with spotting warning signs. • The Federal Government has failed to develop clear earlyintervention strategies—or ‘‘off-ramps’’ to radicalization—to 

prevent suspects already on law enforcement’s radar from leaving to fight with extremists. • Gaping security weaknesses overseas—especially in Europe— 

are putting the U.S. homeland in danger by making it easier 

for aspiring foreign fighters to migrate to terrorist hotspots 

and for jihadists to return to the West. • Despite improvements since 9/11, foreign partners are still 

sharing information about terrorist suspects in a manner 

which is ad hoc, intermittent, and often incomplete. • Ultimately, severing today’s foreign-fighter flows depends on 

eliminating the problem at the source in Syria and Iraq and, 

in the long run, preventing the emergence of additional terrorist sanctuaries. 

The Task Force’s final report is divided into two primary sections. The Introduction provides background on the foreign fighter 

phenomenon, an assessment of why it is a threat to the United 

States, and an analysis of 58 case studies of Americans who traveled or attempted to travel to fight in Syria and Iraq. 

The Key Findings & Recommendations section outlines the Task 

Force’s main conclusions and is sub-divided into four parts: (1) U.S. 

Government strategy and planning to combat the threat; (2) efforts 

to identify terrorists and foreign fighters—and prevent them from 

traveling; (3) efforts to detect and disrupt terrorists and foreign 

fighters when they travel; and (4) overseas security gaps. 

NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

The Task Force conducted the investigation over a 6-month period. Its final report is based on briefings, meetings, domestic and 

foreign site visits, and analysis of Classified and Unclassified documents. A summary of the group’s activity can be found in Appendix 

I. The Task Force spoke with current and former Federal officials 
3 

3See Key Finding 1. 

4The Committee was given discretion to make technical, grammatical, and other conforming 

changes prior to release. 5Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, ‘‘Junaid Hussain, ISIS Recruiter, Reported Killed in Airstrike,’’ 

The New York Times, August 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/world/ 

Continued 

throughout the National security community and at all relevant departments and agencies. The group also consulted with State and 

local law enforcement, outside experts, and foreign officials on several continents. 

Members and staff did not examine all U.S. Government efforts 

to stop extremists from crossing borders but instead focused on 

those with the most relevance to the foreign fighter threat. Nevertheless, the Task Force’s review is one of the most extensive public 

examinations of U.S. Government efforts to counter terrorist travel 

in the post-9/11 world. The 9/11 Commission gave considerable attention to the subject, but since then Government activity in this 

space has expanded rapidly. The proliferation of these programs, 

projects, and activities is one reason the Task Force urges more 

regular, Government-wide audits of America’s defenses against terrorist travel.3

Where practicable, we have tried to cite publicly-available 

sources, due to the fact that many of the Task Force’s briefings 

were either closed to the public or Classified. Our written analysis 

of U.S. foreign fighter case studies, for instance, relies entirely on 

open sources. However, some material is cited anonymously in 

cases where individuals were assured confidentiality in order to 

discuss issues more freely. 

The Task Force’s final report was submitted to the Chairman 

and the Ranking Member of the House Homeland Security Committee in September 2015 to be considered and prepared for final 

release.4 Prior to publication, it was shared with the White House 

and all departments and agencies that cooperated with the review, 

partly to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. The Committee made technical, conforming, and other edits to 

the report based on agency comments and corrections. 

THE THREAT

The United States and the international community face a grave 

and growing threat from jihadist foreign fighters. These are individuals who leave home, travel abroad to terrorist safe havens, and 

join or assist violent extremist groups. Today’s foreign fighters are 

being lured overseas largely by groups like the Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda’s affiliates to promote a perverse brand of militant Islamism. Not only are they strengthening 

terrorist armies that oppress millions, but some are also plotting 

attacks against the West and radicalizing new generations. 

Foreign fighters have contributed to an alarming rise in global 

terrorism by expanding extremist networks, inciting individuals 

back home to conduct attacks, or by returning to carry out acts of 

terror themselves. For instance, one prominent British foreign 

fighter killed this year in Syria was linked to terrorist plots spanning the globe, from the United Kingdom to Australia, without ever 

having left the Middle East.5 In another case, an American from 
4 

middleeast/junaid-hussain-islamic-state-recruiter-killed.html?lr=0; Mark Schliebs, ‘‘American 

Drone Expunges Aussie-Linked Islamic Terrorist,’’ August 28, 2015, http:// 

www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/american-drone-expunges-aussie-linked-islamic-stateterrorist/story-fnpdbcmu-1227501807553?sv=3c3f680b59882e16aa53c911d5b7047d. 6 John Bacon, ‘‘Ohio Man Accused of Planning U.S. Terror Strike,’’ USA Today, April 16, 2015, 

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/16/ohio-indicted-islamic-state-terrorism/25879443/. 7See ‘‘The Danger of Foreign Fighters’’ subsection of this report for a list of recent returnee 

attacks. 8Ken Dilanian, Zeina Karam, and Bassem Mroue, Associated Press, ‘‘Pummeled in Its Capital, Islamic State Group Still Hanging Tough across Iraq and Syria,’’ U.S. News, July 31, 2015, 

http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2015/07/31/despite-bombing-islamic-state-isno-weaker-than-a-year-ago. 9 Ibid. 

10 U.S. Congress. Majority Staff of the House Homeland Security Committee. Terror Threat 

Snapshot: September 2015, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ 

Complete-September-Terror-Threat-Snapshot.pdf. 11 Ibid. 12 Brian Michael Jenkins, ‘‘When Jihadis Come Marching Home: The Terrorist Threat Posed 

by Westerners Returning from Syria and Iraq,’’ Perspectives. RAND Corporation, 2014, 12–13, 

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE130-1/RANDlPE130- 

1.pdf. 

Ohio was arrested in April after returning from Syria to plan an 

attack on a U.S. military base, where he intended to behead soldiers.6 This case is part of a broader challenge. Indeed, since early 

2014 more than a dozen terrorist plots against Western targets 

have involved so-called ‘‘returnees’’ from terrorist safe havens like 

Syria and Libya.7

Foreign fighters are also the motive power behind the growth of 

ISIS. Despite a year of U.S. and allied airstrikes, the group has 

held most of its territory and continues to replenish its ranks with 

outside recruits.8 Military officials estimate airstrikes have killed 

around 10,000 extremists, but new foreign fighters replace them almost as quickly as they are killed.9 ISIS has also grown from a single terrorist sanctuary to having a direct presence, affiliates, or 

groups pledging support in 18 countries.10 The organization is believed to have inspired or directed nearly 60 terrorist plots or attacks against Western countries, including 15 in the United 

States.11 Some of these were masterminded by foreign fighters 

based in Syria, while others were carried out by returnees themselves or homegrown extremists. 

The foreign fighter phenomenon is not new. For decades, Western citizens have gone to extremist hotspots to fight or train with 

Islamist terror groups, from Afghanistan to Somalia, and many of 

them have returned with nefarious intentions. Since 9/11, dozens 

of Americans extremists have been arrested after coming back 

home from terrorist safe havens, including individuals plotting attacks.12 In 2002, for instance, American citizen Jose Padilla was 

arrested in Chicago for allegedly planning a ‘‘dirty bomb’’ attack; 

he had attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan in 

2000. In another case, Afghan-American Najibullah Zazi traveled 

from New York to Pakistan and was arrested in 2009 after returning home to conduct a suicide attack on the New York City subway 

system. The same year Faisal Shazad went abroad and received 

training from the Pakistani-Taliban; he came back to the United 

States and was arrested after attempting a car bombing in Times 

Square. 

The level of terrorist travel we are seeing today, however, is 

without precedent. The numbers are now so high that Western governments are becoming increasingly worried they will be unable to 
5 

13 House Committee on Homeland Security, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., September 17, 2014, http:// 

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg93367/html/CHRG-113hhrg93367.htm. 14Kareem Fahim and Hwaida Saad, ‘‘A Faceless Teenage Refugee Who Helped Ignite Syria’s 

War,’’ The New York Times, February 08, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/world/ 

middleeast/a-faceless-teenage-refugee-who-helped-ignite-syrias-war.html?lr=2. 15Lucy Rodgers, David Gritten, James Offer, and Patrick Asare, ‘‘Syria: The Story of the Conflict,’’ BBC News, March 12, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868. 

prevent violent extremists from entering their countries undetected. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James 

Comey warned last year that we need to brace ourselves for a 

wider ‘‘terrorist diaspora’’ out of Syria and Iraq.13 Whether directed 

to conduct attacks or not, many of these individuals will return 

with the combat experience, extremist connections, and motivations 

to do so. Indeed, the ripple effect of terror created by foreign fighter 

travel to and from Syria and Iraq, in particular, will pose a threat 

to America for decades to come unless dealt with quickly and decisively. 

THE GLOBAL SURGE IN FOREIGN FIGHTERS 

Today’s explosive growth in foreign fighter travel to Syria and 

Iraq has surpassed other jihadist conflicts in both scope and magnitude. Travelers hail from all corners of the globe, represent an 

array of ethnicities, and span virtually all age ranges. While some 

individuals initially traveled to the region for humanitarian purposes, the overwhelming majority are now headed there because of 

jihadist ideology or to live in the so-called Islamic State. Migration 

to the conflict zone does not appear to have abated, and the threat 

continues to evolve as new safe havens attract additional foreign 

fighters. 

FROM AFAR: FOREIGN RECRUITS AND THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

The foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq has its origins 

in the Syrian civil war. Local protests broke out in Syria in March 

2011 after a group of teenagers were arrested and tortured by Syrian authorities for painting revolutionary slogans on school property.14 Security forces opened fire on the protestors, sparking nationwide demonstrations that shifted from pro-democracy demands 

to calls for the Bashar al-Assad regime’s ouster. By July 2011, hundreds of thousands had taken to the streets as the government 

tried unsuccessfully to crush the rebellion. The opposition soon took 

up arms to expel Assad’s security forces from their local territories.15

The country descended into full-scale civil war by 2012. Rebel 

brigades assembled to fight government forces for control of cities 

and towns across Syria. Several high-level defectors from the regular Syrian Army formed the Free Syrian Army, attracting thousands of recruits. But the conflict devolved further as various nationalist, sectarian, and religious factions, primarily Sunnis, 

emerged to fight Assad’s Shia Alawite government. War volunteers 

trickled into the country from abroad, with some traveling to support the anti-Assad insurgency and others arriving with more radical goals. Jihadist groups capitalized on the chaos and gained influence. 
6 

16Thomas Hegghammer and Aaron Y. Zelin, ‘‘How Syria’s Civil War Became a Holy Crusade,’’ 

Foreign Affairs, October 15, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2013- 

07-03/how-syrias-civil-war-became-holy-crusade. 17 Ibid. 18Thomas Hegghammer, ‘‘Syria’s Foreign Fighters,’’ Foreign Policy, December 9, 2013, http:// 

foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/09/syrias-foreign-fighters/. 19 Ibid. 20 Aaron Y. Zelin, ‘‘Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise among Western Europeans,’’ ICSR Insight, December 17, 2013, http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreignfighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/. 21 Ibid. 22 Eric Schmitt, ‘‘U.S. Says Dozens of Americans Have Sought to Join Rebels in Syria,’’ The 

New York Times, November 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/world/middleeast/ 

us-says-dozens-of-americans-have-sought-to-join-rebels-in-syria.html. 23 Christopher M. Blanchard, Carla E. Humud, Kenneth Katzman, and Matthew C. Weed, The 

‘‘Islamic State’’ Crisis and U.S. Policy (CRS Report No. R43612) (Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, 2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf. 

By 2013, the influx of foreign fighters was growing quickly. Rebel 

fighters on the ground appealed to the world by documenting the 

regime’s atrocities on social media, and prominent Sunni clerics 

called for Muslims to travel to the war-torn country to oust 

Assad.16 By summer, nearly 5,000 foreign fighters from 60 countries had arrived.17 One scholar observed that the numbers ‘‘exceeded that of any previous conflict in the modern history of the 

Muslim world.’’18 Although an estimated 10,000 total fighters came 

to Afghanistan to attack the Soviets in the 1980s, there were likely 

never more than 3,000 to 4,000 at any given period.19

By the end of 2013, analysts estimated more than 8,500 foreign 

fighters had flocked to Syria to fight with the anti-Assad opposition 

or join Sunni jihadist groups.20 Around 70 percent were from the 

Middle East and North Africa, but 2,000 or so were assessed to be 

from Western countries.21 U.S. intelligence and security officials 

grew especially alarmed about the number of extremists entering 

the conflict zone, which was then thought to include ‘‘dozens’’ of 

Americans.22

THE RISE OF ISIS 

One jihadist group in particular saw an opening. The Islamic 

State of Iraq (ISI), a successor organization to al-Qaeda in Iraq 

(AQI), called for sectarian war and the creation of a regional Islamic state.23 AQI was a terrorist group whose leadership had 

pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2004 and which led an 

insurgency against U.S. forces in the country. After the group’s 

leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in a 2006 U.S. airstrike, 

it rebranded as ISI. The terror outfit was weakened by the surge 

of U.S. troops into Iraq, the Anbar awakening, and later the death 

of its two top leaders in 2010. With the eventual withdrawal of 

American forces, however, ISI took advantage of the security vacuum and Sunni disenfranchisement with the central government to 

ramp up attacks. Its new leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, oversaw 

the escalation in violence. 

In April 2013, al-Baghdadi declared the creation of the Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant (hereafter, ISIS). He sought to merge 

his forces with those of al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, but al-Qaeda 

leader Ayman al-Zawahiri rejected the merger, creating a schism 

between the groups. Nevertheless, ISIS expanded its operations in 

northern and eastern Syria, claiming territory and creating tension 
7 

24 Barak Mendelsohn, ‘‘After Disowning ISIS, Al Qaeda Is Back On Top,’’ Foreign Affairs, February 13, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-02-13/after-disowning-isis-al-qaeda-back-top. 25 Brett McGurk, Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence in Iraq: A Threat to U.S. Interests: Hearing before the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee, testimony, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., February 5, 2014, http:// 

www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/221274.htm. 26 ‘‘Isis Rebels Declare ’Islamic State’ in Iraq and Syria,’’ BBC News, June 30, 2014, http:// 

www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28082962. 27Paul Cruickshank, ‘‘Al Qaeda in Yemen Rebukes ISIS—CNN.com,’’ CNN, November 21, 

2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/21/world/meast/al-qaeda-yemen-isis/. 28 U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Public Affairs. Attorney General Holder Urges International Effort to Confront Threat of Syrian Foreign Fighters, July 8, 2014, http:// 

www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-urges-international-effort-confront-threat-syrianforeign-fighters. 29Daniel L. Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, ‘‘Managing the Foreign Fighter Threat,’’ The Brookings Institution, January 14, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/01/ 

14-byman-shapiro-foreign-fighters. 30 U.N. Department of Public Information, ‘‘Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 

Condemning Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Terrorist Fighters,’’ SC/11580, September 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ 

sc11580.doc.htm. 

with other rebel factions. The momentum allowed ISIS to attract 

additional resources, especially more foreign fighters.24

On New Year’s Day 2014, ISIS convoys stormed Falluja and 

Ramadi, Iraqi cities which only a few years earlier had been liberated from extremists by U.S. forces. The Iraqi army crumbled as 

the fighters arrived in convoys of 70–100 trucks, armed with heavy 

weapons and anti-aircraft guns.25 The group’s growing success resonated with Islamist radicals across social media. ISIS launched 

another major offensive in June 2014, capturing Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, and taking control of others towns as it pushed 

south toward Baghdad. 

THE DECLARATION OF THE CALIPHATE AND THE GREAT JIHADI MIGRATION

On June 29, 2014, ISIS declared it was re-establishing the ‘‘caliphate,’’ or Islamic State, on the territory it controlled in Syria and 

Iraq.26 Baghdadi was declared the State’s leader—the caliph—via 

an audio recording posted on-line. In the eyes of ISIS followers, he 

was a successor to the prophet Muhammad and now the self-appointed leader of the Muslim world. ISIS called on Muslims to 

swear allegiance to the caliphate or be branded ‘‘apostates.’’ Mainstream Muslims and even other jihadist groups dismissed the declaration as a stunt and declared the caliphate to be illegitimate.27

For many extremists, however, the announcement was 

groundbreaking. The establishment of an Islamic State had been 

the long-term goal of Osama bin Laden, though he did not believe 

it would happen in his lifetime. The declaration marked the first 

time in 90 years—since Turkish secularist Kemal Ataturk abolished the Ottoman Empire—that an Islamist group claimed dominion over the entire Muslim world. 

A new wave of travelers headed to the region, aspiring to become 

jihadists and to participate in what they saw as a historic movement. Just days after the announcement, U.S. officials put the 

number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq at more than 7,000.28

Within 2 months officials revised the figure upward to between 

12,000 and 15,000.29 The United Nations (UN) assessed militants 

from more than 80 countries had arrived.30 The increase in numbers was partly from greater global awareness; as countries became 

more attuned to the threat, they realized more of their citizens 
8 

31Keith Sullivan and Karla Adam, ‘‘Hoping to Create a New Society, the Islamic State Recruits Entire Families,’’ Washington Post, December 24, 2014, https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hoping-to-create-a-new-homeland-the-islamicstate-recruits-entire-families/2014/12/24/dbffceec-8917-11e4-8ff4-fb93129c9c8blstory.html. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Special Report: Inherent Resolve,’’ Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations Against ISIL Terrorists, accessed September 19, 2015, http:// 

www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814lInherent-Resolve. 35Matthew G. Olsen, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the Committee on 

Homeland Security, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., September 17, 2014, http://docs.house.gov/ 

meetings/HM/HM00/20140917/102616/HHRG-113-HM00-Wstate-OlsenM-20140917.pdf. 36 Jeff Seldin, ‘‘More Foreign Fighters in Iraq, Syria,’’ VOA, December 24, 2014, http:// 

www.voanews.com/content/estimates-rising-of-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-syria/2572994.html. 37 Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror: Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, 114th Cong., 1st sess., February 11, 2015, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/ 

20150211/102901/HHRG-114-HM00-Wstate-RasmussenN-20150211.pdf. 38 Using U.S. Government public estimates, the overall number has risen from 7,000-plus in 

July of last year to 25,000-plus today. 

traveled to the conflict zone and revised official figures accordingly. 

However, much of the growth was from new travelers. 

ISIS militants started a new recruitment campaign to sell their 

society to a wider audience. The group promoted its territory as a 

place not just for fighters but also for families and called for extremists to bring their entire households—mothers, fathers and 

children—to the new Islamic State.31 The group promised religious 

schooling for girls and boys and instruction for children on how to 

dress and maintain a household.32 Women were promised homes with electricity, food, and salaries of up to $1,100 for each family— 

though they were likely not told the homes had come from locals 

who had been thrown out and the salaries looted from banks, oil 

smuggling, and kidnapping ransom.33

Despite using a softer pitch, the group’s strongest appeal was to 

hardcore and aspiring extremists. ISIS promoted videos depicting 

its brutal murder of non-believers and sought to demonstrate its 

leadership of the global jihadist movement by intimidating Western 

countries. In August and September 2014, it released grisly videos 

of the beheading of several American, British, and Australian hostages. 

UNDETERRED: MILITARY INTERVENTION AND CONTINUED FOREIGN FIGHTER FLOWS

The United States conducted its first series of coordinated airstrikes against ISIS in August 2014. The strikes focused initially 

on curbing ISIS advances in northern Iraq and protecting religious 

minorities but eventually shifted to supporting offensive operations 

against the militant group in both Iraq and its Syrian territory. In 

September, President Obama declared the aim of degrading and ultimately destroying the group. The United States has since conducted more than 5,000 airstrikes against ISIS.34

Airstrikes, however, do not appear to have kept aspiring foreign 

fighters away. When the strikes began, counterterrorism officials 

estimated the total number of extremists was around 15,000.35

However, fighters continued to enter Syria at a rate of about 1,000 

per month. In December 2014, intelligence officials pegged the total 

at more than 18,000,36 and by February 2015 it surpassed 

20,000.37 Today the figure stands at 25,000-plus foreign fighters, 

more than triple the number from just a year ago.38 The majority 

of these fighters still come from the Middle East and North Africa, 
9 

39 Homeland Security Committee. Terror Threat Snapshot: September 2015. 40Dilanian, Karam, and Mroue, AP, ‘‘Islamic State Hanging Tough.’’ 41Laura Smith-Spark and Noisette Martel, ‘‘U.S. Official: 10,000 ISIS Fighters Killed in 9 

Months,’’ CNN, June 3, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/03/middleeast/isis-conflict/. 42 Eric Schmitt and David Kirk Patrick, ‘‘Islamic State Sprouting Limbs Beyond Its Base,’’ The 

New York Times, February 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/world/middleeast/ 

islamic-state-sprouting-limbs-beyond-mideast.html. 43 Ibid. 44 Jack Moore, ‘‘5,000 Foreign Fighters Flock to Libya as ISIS Call for Jihadists,’’ Newsweek, March 3, 2015, http://europe.newsweek.com/5000-foreign-fighters-flock-libya-isis-call-jihadists310948. 45 Ibid. 46 Everett Rosenfeld, ‘‘Fear Grows in Europe as ISIS Comes to Libya,’’ CNBC, February 20, 

2015, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/20/islamic-state-terrorism-fear-grows-in-europe-as-isiscomes-to-libya.html. 47Seth G. Jones, ‘‘Expanding the Caliphate,’’ Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2015, https:// 

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2015-06-11/expanding-caliphate. 

with Tunisia as the most significant source country. But the total 

also includes 4,500 Westerners and more than 250 Americans, figures which have surged since 2014.39

Indeed, foreign fighters have helped ISIS to remain strong. Nearly 10,000 of the group’s foot soldiers have been killed by airstrikes, 

but they have been replaced by new foreign and domestic fighters 

almost as quickly as they are taken off the battlefield.40 There has 

been ‘‘no meaningful degradation in their numbers,’’ according to 

one defense official, as estimates place ISIS’s total fighting force at 

20–30,000—the same as it was last fall.41

NEW SANCTUARIES

While ISIS is focused on holding its territory in Syria and Iraq, 

the group has also declared other ‘‘provinces’’ in places like Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya.42 ISIS recruiters on social media 

have called for followers to travel to these locations if they cannot 

make it to Syria and Iraq, and it appears many have heeded the 

call. The groups has also publicly accepted pledges of allegiance 

from established Islamist terrorist groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria. Unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS does not require a multi-year application process for groups to become a franchise of its terror brand, 

enabling it to grow faster and farther.43

Taking advantage of a post-Qaddafi security vacuum, ISIS has 

reportedly sent two senior foreign fighters to Libya to set up a new 

base of operations, and members of the group have put out recruitment calls for extremists to migrate there.44 In early 2015, Libya’s 

foreign minister estimated that more than 5,000 foreign fighters 

aligned with an array of terrorist groups had arrived in the country.45 ISIS-linked militants trained in Libya are suspected of being 

responsible for devastating terrorist attacks in neighboring Tunisia, and officials fear the group may use Libya as a staging area 

to enter Europe by sea to attack Western countries.46

Foreign fighters pledging allegiance to ISIS have similarly been 

building a base of operations in Afghanistan and have been taking 

advantage of the Taliban’s leadership vacuum to recruit additional 

fighters in the wake of its leader Mullah Omar’s death. ISIS is reported to have amassed hundreds, if not thousands, of fighters in 

the country already.47 Earlier this year Afghan President Ashraf 

Ghani warned of the ‘‘terrible threat’’ from the group, noting that 

it had ‘‘[sent] advance guards to southern and western Afghanistan 
10 

48 Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘‘Taliban Fears over Young Recruits Attracted to Isis in Afghanistan,’’ The Guardian, May 7, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/07/talibanyoung-recruits-isis-afghanistan-jihadis-islamic-state. 49Task Force staff briefing, March 2015. 50Geoff Earle, ‘‘Western ISIS Fighters Are the Most Brutal: Defector,’’ New York Post, September 29, 2014, http://nypost.com/2014/09/29/western-isis-fighters-are-the-most-brutal-defector/. 51Soaud Mekhennet and Adam Goldman, ‘‘ ‘Jihadi John’: Islamic State Killer Is Identified as 

Londoner Mohammed Emwazi,’’ Washington Post, February 26, 2015, https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/jihadi-john-the-islamic-state-killer-behindthe-mask-is-a-young-londoner/2015/02/25/d6dbab16-bc43-11e4-bdfa-b8e8f594e6eelstory.html. 52Omar Wahid, ‘‘Jihadi John—‘I Will Go Back to Britain... and Will Carry on Cutting 

Heads Off’: In a Chilling New Video, Man Said to Be Hooded Butcher Vows to Return... and 

Murder All Unbelievers,’’ Daily Mail Online, August 22, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 

to test for vulnerabilities.’’48 ISIS now claims credit for terrorist attacks across Afghanistan. 

While it is unclear whether any Western, or specifically American, foreign fighters have traveled to other ISIS terror sanctuaries, 

the group’s expansion in these locations nevertheless provides a potential ‘‘menu’’ of options for jihadist travelers. Not only does this 

make it harder to roll back groups like ISIS, but it increases the 

challenges authorities face in tracking their own citizens who try 

to join the extremist movement. 

THE DANGER OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS: RECRUITS, ‘‘RETURNEES,’’ AND 

REMOTE RADICALIZATION 

Foreign fighters represent a three-fold threat to the United 

States and the international community. First, they supply the 

human capital terrorist groups like ISIS need to operate, expand, 

and plot against the West. Second, ‘‘returnees’’ who come back from 

jihadist battlefields are often armed with the training to conduct 

attacks and the extremist connections to build terrorist networks 

at home. Third, even if fighters do not return home, they can engage others on-line from terror safe havens and inspire them to 

radicalize—or worse—to commit acts of violence without ever stepping foot out of the country. 

JIHADISTS WITHOUT BORDERS

Foreign fighters have proven instrumental in fueling Islamist 

terror groups like ISIS. As noted earlier, jihadists from abroad 

have steadily backfilled the group’s losses, preventing thousands of 

U.S. and coalition airstrikes from diminishing its ranks. This of 

course has allowed ISIS to continue its reign of terror and even expand. Indeed, those who arrive in the conflict zone are typically 

willing and ready to participate in the group’s atrocities. ‘‘We believe the hardest fighting people in ISIS are the foreign fighters,’’ 

one official told the Task Force staff.49

Western recruits in particular have ended up at the forefront of 

the violence, and as one ISIS defector noted, they can be even more 

brutal than local jihadists.50 Take the case of 26-year-old British 

citizen Mohammed Emwazi, better known as ‘‘Jihadi John.’’ He is 

believed to have traveled to Syria around 2012 and to have later 

joined ISIS.51 Before long, he had become the group’s most visible 

spokesman and the masked face in its grisly beheading videos. 

After disappearing from public view for months, the British jihadist 

recently released a video pledging to return to Britain and ‘‘carry 

on cutting heads off.’’52
11 

news/article-3207366/Jihadi-John-Britain-carry-cutting-heads-chilling-new-video-man-saidhooded-butcher-beheaded-two-British-hostages-vows-come-home-murder-unbelievers.html. 53Peter Neumann, ‘‘War on Two Fronts: Perceptions on the Fight against the Islamic State,’’ 

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, October 29, 2014, http://www.fiia.fi/en/event/ 

702/warlonltwolfronts/. 54McGurk, Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence in Iraq. 55Peter Bergen, ‘‘The All-American Al Qaeda Suicide Bomber,’’ CNN, July 31, 2014, http:// 

www.cnn.com/2014/07/31/opinion/bergen-american-al-qaeda-suicide-bomber-syria/. 56Meg Wagner, ‘‘Video: American Suicide Bomber in Syria Threatens U.S.,’’ NY Daily News, July 30, 2014, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/american-suicide-bomber-syria-threatens-video-article-1.1885341. 57Suman Varandani, ‘‘About 100 Germans Killed Fighting Alongside ISIS In Iraq And Syria 

Since 2012, German Interior Minister Says,’’ International Business Times, August 24, 2015, 

http://www.ibtimes.com/about-100-germans-killed-fighting-alongside-isis-iraq-syria-2012-german-interior-2064892. 58The study was based on an analysis of Western returnees from 1990 to 2010 who had joined 

insurgencies in places like Afghanistan and Somalia. See: Thomas Hegghammer, ‘‘Should I Stay 

or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,’’ American Political Science Review, February 2013, doi: 10.1017/ 

S0003055412000615. 59 Ibid. 60These arrests are in addition to the dozens of Americans arrested this year either attempting to travel to Syria or engaging in support or plotting inspired by ISIS. 

But Jihadi John is not an exception. Western foreign fighters 

have engaged heavily in the group’s atrocities. Analysts for the 

International Center for the Study of Radicalization say extremists 

in Syria use Westerners for ‘‘excessively brutal operations that 

locals may refuse to be involved in,’’ including suicide bombings, 

beheadings, and torture.53 In fact, U.S. officials estimate most of 

the group’s suicide bombers are from foreign countries.54 One of 

the first Americans to die in the conflict, Moner Mohammad 

Abusalha, was responsible for a suicide bombing attack on a Syrian 

restaurant, the video of which was later distributed by extremists 

on social media.55 In the recording, Abusalha rips up his American 

passport, urges others to travel to the conflict zone, and warns that 

America ‘‘is not safe’’; it ends with him driving an explosive-laden 

truck into the attack site and detonating it.56 In yet another indication Westerners are engaging in serious violence, Germany recently 

estimated that 100 of its 700 citizens who went to Syria had been 

killed while fighting alongside ISIS.57

THE ‘‘RETURNEES’’ 

The biggest fear about those who travel to fight in terrorist 

hotspots is that they will return to plot attacks or to recruit others 

for their extremist networks. A 2013 study found that one out of 

nine Western jihadists conducted attacks when they came back 

from conflict zones.58 While this is only around 10 percent, it is 

still a worrying figure, given the fact that more than 25,000 extremists have gone abroad to become foreign fighters in Syria 

alone. Moreover, unlike many of the jihadists tracked in the study, 

today’s extremists are more plugged into social media, allowing 

them to stay radicalized and engaged long after they have left the 

battlefield. Research also finds attacks conducted by returnees are 

more deadly than those carried out by home-grown extremists.59

These worries have materialized in the United States this year, 

as several American returnees have been arrested and charged by 

authorities.60 In February, the FBI detained an Ohio man, 

Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud, who reportedly came back from 

training with extremists in Syria and planned to attack a U.S. 
12 

61 United States of America v. Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud, April 16, 2015, http:// 

www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/04/16/mohamudlindictment.pdf. 62 Ibid. 63While Nagi is not a Syria returnee—as it does not appear he crossed from Turkey into the 

conflict zone—his case is nevertheless emblematic of radicalized individuals who come back and 

attempt to recruit others to join the group. See: Lou Michel, ‘‘Accused ISIS Recruiter Had 

Threatened to Behead Daughter, Sources Say,’’ The Buffalo News, July 29, 2015, http:// 

www.buffalonews.com/city-region/lackawanna/accused-isis-recruiter-had-threatened-to-beheaddaughter-sources-say-20150729%20. 64The security of the Visa Waiver Program is discussed elsewhere in the Task Force’s report, 

especially in Key Finding 23. 65Gilles De Kerchove et al., ‘‘Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Returning Foreign Terrorist 

Fighters,’’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 23, 2015, http:// 

www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rehabilitation-and-reintegration-of-returningforeign-terrorist-fighters. 66This list is not comprehensive and also does not reflect Islamist terror plots by returnees 

from other jihadist safe havens, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. The Charlie Hebdo 

attacks, for instance, were plotted by suspects alleged to have trained in Yemen. 67 ‘‘Arrested French Jihadist ‘Instructed’ to Attack Concert,’’ France 24, September 18, 2015, 

http://www.france24.com/en/20150918-france-jihadist-arrested-terrorist-attack-plot-concert. 68 ‘‘Suspected Train Gunman ‘known to French Intelligence’,’’ France 24, August 23, 2015, 

http://www.france24.com/en/20150822-france-train-attack-suspected-gunman-known-french-intelligence-syria. 69 Rick Lyman, ‘‘Kosovo Charges 5 People in Plot to Poison Water,’’ The New York Times, July 

12, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/world/europe/kosovo-charges-5-people-in-plotto-poison-water.html. 70 Chris Stephen, ‘‘Tunisia Gunman Trained in Libya at Same Time as Bardo Museum 

Attackers,’’ The Guardian, June 30, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/30/ 

tunisia-beach-attack-seifeddine-rezgui-libya-bardo-museum-attackers. 71 ‘‘Saudi Arabia Arrest 93 Terror Suspects, Foils Car Bomb Plot on U.S. Embassy,’’ Fox News, 

April 29, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/04/29/saudi-arabia-arrest-3-terror-suspects-foils-car-bomb-plot-on-us-embassy/. 

military base and kill soldiers execution-style.61 Mohamud returned after a radical, al-Qaeda-affiliated cleric urged him to conduct an attack in the United States.62 Another suspect, New York 

resident Arafat Nagi, was arrested in July and charged with attempting to recruit for ISIS after coming back from Turkey where 

he had sought to join the group.63

However, American returnees are not the only threat to the 

United States. Other Western citizens in the conflict zone—from 

dozens of countries—can travel easily to U.S. territory without applying for a visa, including most European jihadists.64 European 

security officials estimate 20 to 30 percent of their foreign fighters 

have already departed Syria and Iraq.65

Since early 2014, there has been an alarming global uptick in 

terrorist plots involving foreign-fighter returnees. They include, but 

are not limited to, the following:66

• August 2015 (France).—Plot to attack a concert on French soil; 

suspect allegedly returned from ISIS’ stronghold in Raqqa, 

Syria with instructions to conduct the attack.67

• August 2015 (Belgium).—Attempted mass shooting against 

passengers on a train from Amsterdam to Paris; suspect alleged to have fought in Syria.68

• July 2015 (Kosovo).—Plot to contaminate the capital’s water 

supply; two suspects believed to have fought in Syria.69

• June 2015 (Tunisia).—Mass shooting on resort beach killing 40 

people, mostly Western tourists; while suspect did not travel to 

Syria, he is said to have trained with ISIS in Libya.70

• April 2015 (Saudi Arabia).—Plot to bomb U.S. Embassy in Riyadh; suspects include two Syrian foreign fighters and a Saudi 

citizen.71
13 

72 Bacon, ‘‘Ohio Man Accused of Planning U.S. Terror Strike.’’ 73Duncan Gardham, ‘‘British Double Agent ‘plotted to Kill His MI5 Handler and Attack UK’ 

after Infiltrating Jihadist Group in Syria,’’ Daily Mail Online, March 28, 2015, http:// 

www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3016480/British-double-agent-plotted-kill-MI5-handler-attack-UK-infiltrating-jihadist-group-Syria.html. 74Faith Karimi, Tim Lister, and Greg Botelho, ‘‘2 Suspects in Tunisia Attack Trained in 

Libya,’’ CNN, March 20, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/20/africa/tunisia-museum-attack/. 75Michele Mandel, ‘‘Man Accused of U.S. Consulate/Bay St. Bomb Plot to Be Deported,’’ Ottawa Sun, June 5, 2015, http://www.ottawasun.com/2015/06/05/man-accused-of-usconsulatebay-st-bomb-plot-to-be-deported. 76 Yuksel Temel, ‘‘Intelligence Uncovers ISIS Plot to Attack Consulates,’’ Daily Sabah, January 25, 2015, http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/01/25/intelligence-uncovers-isis-plot-toattack-consulates. 77Matthew Dalton, ‘‘Belgium Antiterror Raid Leaves Two Suspects Dead,’’ The Wall Street 

Journal, January 15, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/belgium-antiterror-raid-leaves-twodead-official-says-1421350264. 78Kevin Rawlinson, ‘‘Jewish Museum Shooting Suspect Is ‘Islamic State Torturer’ ’’ The 

Guardian, September 6, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/jewish-museum-shooting-suspect-islamic-state-torturer-brussels-syria. 79 Ben McPartland, ‘‘Several ‘planned Terrorist Attacks’ Foiled in France,’’ The Local France, 

November 03, 2014, http://www.thelocal.fr/20141103/terrorist-attacks-foiled-in-france. 

• April 2015 (United States).—Plot to attack a U.S. military 

base, as noted above; suspect trained in Syria and was directed 

to return to the United States to conduct attack.72

• March 2015 (United Kingdom).—Plot to conduct mass public 

shooting; suspect was a British MI5 agent who had traveled to 

Syria and reportedly double-crossed his U.K. handlers.73

• March 2015 (Tunisia).—Mass shooting attack killing 19 people 

at the National Bardo Museum in Tunis; two suspects allegedly trained in Libya with ISIS, which claimed credit for the 

attack.74

• March 2015 (Canada).—Plot to bomb U.S. consulate in Canada; suspect who had allegedly trained with extremists in 

Pakistan and Libya.75

• January 2015 (Turkey).—Plot to attack U.S., French, and Belgian consulates in Istanbul; suspects included 17 militants 

from Syria who infiltrated Turkey.76

• January 2015 (Belgium).—Plot to conduct a major attack on 

police; two suspects killed during raid and had reportedly returned from Syria.77

• January 2015 (France).—Shooting attack in Paris against cartoon publication; at least one suspect is believed to have returned from Yemen. • May 2014 (Belgium).—Shooting attack killing four at a Jewish 

museum in Brussels; suspect allegedly was ISIS militant in 

Syria.78

• February 2014 (France).—Plot to bomb a carnival in the 

French Riviera; suspect had traveled to Syria to fight for 

ISIS.79

When they come back, foreign fighters are still a long-term 

threat no matter whether they engage in immediate attack plotting. Peter Neumann, a U.K.-based expert on the phenomenon, outlined the concerns clearly: 

‘‘We don’t know whether they will act today or tomorrow, but what 

we do know is that in five, 10, 15 years, not just next month, they 

will pose a danger. They’ve had military training; they’ve set up 

networks. We’ve seen it with the Afghan Arabs [i.e. the fighters 

who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s]. Many of them 
14 

80Mary Anne Weaver, ‘‘Her Majesty’s Jihadists,’’ The New York Times, April 14, 2015, http:// 

www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/her-majestys-jihadists.html. 81 Jenkins, ‘‘When Jihadis Come Marching Home,’’ 5–6. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 

rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE130-1/RANDlPE130-1.pdf. 82 Aryn Baker, ‘‘How ISIS Is Recruiting Women Around the World,’’ Time Inc., September 6, 

2014, http://time.com/3276567/how-isis-is-recruiting-women-from-around-the-world/. 83 ‘‘Health Care in the [Caliphate],’’ Dabiq, no. 9, 25–26, http://media.clarionproject.org/files/ 

islamic-state/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue%2B9-they-plot-and-allah-plots-sex-slavery.pdf. 84 Ibid. 85 Natalie Andrews and Felicia Schwartz, ‘‘Islamic State Pushes Social-Media Battle With 

West,’’ The Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/isis-pushes-social-media-battle-with-west-1408725614. 86 Ruth Pollard, ‘‘Islamic State Propaganda: What the West Doesn’t Understand’’ The Sydney 

Morning Herald, July 9, 2015, http://www.smh.com.au/world/islamic-state-propaganda-whatthe-west-doesnt-understand-20150708-gi86qu.html. 

subsequently became involved in every conflict of the 1990s: Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya. Others went home to Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and, once there, like the other Afghan Arabs, they became the elite: the leadership of the new jihad.’’80

REMOTE RADICALIZATION

Even if foreign fighters do not return to the West, they still pose 

a threat by radicalizing others on-line. Most of the recruiting by 

groups like ISIS is not done through a central unit; it is performed 

at the grassroots by rank-and-file foreign fighters.81 They have 

taken the lead in seeking new jihadist followers by communicating 

with others back home, documenting their battlefield experiences 

on-line, and distributing extremist propaganda on social media. 

Many Islamist terror groups initially sought to recruit only men 

for the fighting. The approach has shifted, though, and groups like 

ISIS are encouraging women to migrate to its territory. Females 

who have made it to the conflict zone are now actively drafting 

other women. Umm Layth, a 20-year-old British citizen in Syria, 

for example, boasts a large social-media following and advises 

women on traveling to Syria, while others use Tumblr accounts to 

blog about daily ISIS life.82

Foreign jihadists have proven skilled at producing on-line content for each of their target audiences. Gruesome, Hollywood-style 

videos have been directed at recruiting potential martyrs and hardcore fighters. But ISIS has also sought to portray the lighter sides 

of its perceived caliphate to attract a wider following. The ninth 

issue of Dabiq, the group’s on-line magazine, included a feature article on ‘‘Healthcare in the [Caliphate],’’ claiming ISIS provides ‘‘extensive healthcare by running a host of medical facilities including 

hospitals and clinics in all major cities.’’83 The article adds that 

these facilities provide a ‘‘wide range of medical services,’’ from Xrays and complex surgeries to ultrasounds and brain scans.84 ISIS 

foreign fighters have also sought to appeal to those back home by 

emphasizing Western-style comforts. One social media campaign 

showed ISIS supporters posing with jars of Nutella,85 while another documented the caliphate’s ice cream parlors.86

In addition to promoting travel to Syria and Iraq, foreign fighters 

also aim to radicalize Westerners back home to conduct attacks. 

For instance, authorities believe one of the shooters in the May assault on a draw-Mohammad contest in Garland, Texas was 

radicalized and directly encouraged on-line by a known ISIS re-
15 

87 Evan Perez, Pamela Brown, and Jim Sciutto, ‘‘Texas Attacker Had Private Convos with 

Known Terrorists,’’ CNN, May 7, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/07/politics/fbi-warningelton-simpson-cartoon-event-attack/index.html. 88 House Homeland Security Committee. Terror Threat Snapshot: September 2015. 89Starr, ‘‘ ‘A Few Dozen Americans’ in ISIS Ranks.’’ 90The overwhelming majority of individuals reviewed were U.S. person; in other words, they 

were U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Only several cases concerned subjects with other kinds of immigration status, e.g. visa overstays or refugees. 91While we assessed some Classified information related to these cases, we strongly urge the 

administration to conduct a full end-to-end review of all U.S. foreign fighter cases, recommended 

as part of Key Finding 2 in this report. 92Michael Tarm, ‘‘Chicago-area Teen Latest Snared in Website Traps,’’ Yahoo! News, April 23, 

2013, http://news.yahoo.com/chicago-area-teen-latest-snared-website-traps-195908623.html. 93 Ibid. 

cruiter in Syria.87 This approach to supporting attacks—virtually 

reaching out to potential foot soldiers—has allowed the terror 

group to scale-up its violence. At the time of writing, there had 

been nearly twice as many ISIS-linked attack plots against the 

West in 2015 (37) as there were in all of 2014 (20).88

AMERICANS ON THE PATHWAY TO TERROR 

Intelligence officials estimate more than 250 Americans have 

tried or succeeded in getting to Syria and Iraq to fight with militant groups.89 This includes individuals who were stopped before 

traveling, who made it to the conflict zone and are still there, who 

were killed, and others who have come back. Some have been arrested on terror charges, though most have not. Americans are 

being recruited in growing numbers and continue to attempt to migrate to jihadist battlefields in Syria and beyond, posing a serious 

counterterrorism challenge for the United States. 

BY-THE-NUMBERS

The Task Force reviewed 58 cases of Americans who joined or attempted to join Islamist terrorists in Syria and Iraq since the start 

of the Syrian civil war in 2011.90 These individuals are listed in 

Appendix II. We did not review all American foreign fighter cases, 

only those which were publicly available. Some cases are not public 

due to on-going investigations, while data about other suspects is 

often unconfirmed or Classified.91 Nevertheless, the instances we 

reviewed provide a sample of how wide-spread the foreign fighter 

phenomenon has become. 

The majority of aspiring foreign fighters have managed to make 

it out of the United States without being stopped.—Of the 250-plus 

Americans who have joined or tried to join extremists in Syria and 

Iraq, we were able to identify only 28 cases in which U.S. authorities apprehended suspects before they departed for the Middle 

East. A handful of suspects were stopped in other countries, but it 

appears the majority—more than 85 percent—still managed to 

evade American law enforcement on the way to the conflict zone. 

The first suspect authorities seem to have stopped was a 21-yearold Illinois man, Abdella Ahmad Tounsi, whose case is representative of many others. He was flagged after reaching out to an online terrorist recruiter, who was really an undercover FBI agent, 

and searching for ways to fight in Syria.92 Tounsi was arrested in 

2013 at O’Hare Airport where he planned to fly to Turkey and then 

travel into Syria to join al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the country.93
16 

94Schmitt, ‘‘U.S. Says Dozens of Americans Have Sought to Join Rebels in Syria.’’ 95 Reuters, ‘‘Fewer than 100 Americans Probed for Fighting in Syria, Iraq: U.S. Attorney General,’’ Business Insider, July 08, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-fewer-than-100-americans-probed-for-fighting-in-syria-iraq-us-attorney-general-2014-08. 96 Barbara Starr, ‘‘ ‘A Few Dozen Americans’ in ISIS Ranks,’’ CNN, July 15, 2015, http:// 

www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/politics/isis-american-recruits/. 97 ‘‘Arrest Demonstrates Influence of Online Terrorist Materials,’’ Anti-Defamation League 

(Blog), March 20, 2014, http://blog.adl.org/extremism/arrest-demonstrates-influence-of-onlineterrorist-materials. 98Of the aspiring U.S. foreign fighters in our sample, nine (15 percent) were women. If applied to the 250-plus estimate of total Americans who have traveled or attempted to travel, you 

get a prediction of around 38 females. 

Airstrikes have not deterred radicalized Americans, who are attempting to travel to Syria at a growing rate.—Based on the 58 

cases we reviewed, there have been sharp increases in the number 

of Americans trying to travel to Syria each succeeding year (10 percent of known cases occurred in 2013, 40 percent in 2014, and 50 

percent in 2015), indicating that coalition airstrikes in the region 

have not dissuaded travelers. Overall U.S. Government figures confirm the growth: In late 2013, U.S. officials said ‘‘dozens’’ of Americans had sought to join Syrian rebels;94 in July 2014, they estimated the figure to be around 100;95 and by July of this year the 

estimates reached 250-plus.96

Most aspiring fighters are now specifically attempting to join 

ISIS, not other terrorist groups.—Early in the conflict, Americans 

were traveling to enlist with al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat 

al-Nusrah; around 20 percent of those we studied tried or succeeded in joining the group. However, the last known suspect traveled to join al-Nusra in early 2014; the other 80 percent sought to 

join ISIS. In March 2014, the FBI made its first arrest of an American trying to join ISIS when 20-year-old community college student Nicholas Teausant was caught fleeing the country; the suspect 

had broadcast his extremist views widely on Facebook and 

Instagram before setting off for Syria.97 Since then, many U.S. suspects have tread a common path: Espousing their support for ISIS 

on social media and then attempting to leave America, en route to 

the so-called caliphate. 

U.S. recruits are young and most are men.—The average age of 

U.S. foreign fighters and aspirants in our sample was 24 years old, 

demonstrating jihadist groups are still primarily catering to a 

young audience. The youngest was 15 years old, while the oldest 

was 47. The majority we studied, 85 percent, were men. However, 

a growing number of women are being drawn to the conflict zone. 

Based on our sample, we estimate more than 30 American women 

have joined or attempted to join ISIS.98

Aspiring foreign fighters come from across America.—We found 

young people from at least 19 U.S. States have sought to become 

foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, with the most in our sample 

coming from Minnesota (26 percent), California (12 percent), and 

the New York/New Jersey area (12 percent). 

On-line propaganda and social media are major factors in U.S. 

recruitment.—In almost 80 percent of cases, we found examples of 

U.S. foreign fighter aspirants downloading extremist propaganda, 

promoting it on-line, or engaging with other extremists on social 

media. Some communicated with ISIS fighters in Syria using secure messaging apps like Surespot or posed questions to overseas 

jihadists via the anonymous website Ask.fm; others promoted 
17 

99 U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Public Affairs. Philadelphia Woman Arrested for Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL, April 3, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 

philadelphia-woman-arrested-attempting-provide-material-support-isil. 100 Evan Perez and Shimon Prokupecz, ‘‘ISIS Arrests Highlight Role of American Recruiter,’’ 

CNN, April 20, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/politics/isis-minnesota-arrests-abdinur/. 101 U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Public Affairs. Columbus, Ohio, Man Charged with 

Providing Material Support to Terrorists, April 16, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 

columbus-ohio-man-charged-providing-material-support-terrorists. 102 Ibid. 103Starr, ‘‘ ‘A Few Dozen Americans’ in ISIS Ranks.’’ 

jihadist content across multiple platforms. Keonna Thomas, a 

Philadelphia mother who was arrested in April before attempting 

to leave the country, did both. She tweeted about becoming a martyr and responded eagerly to an ISIS fighter in Syria who messaged her about whether she would want to join a suicide operation. ‘‘That would be amazing,’’ she responded. ‘‘A girl can only 

wish.’’99

Americans who make it to the conflict zone are reaching back to 

recruit others.—A number of the cases we reviewed involved Americans who made it to Syria and attempted to remotely recruit others 

back home. Abdi Nur, only 20 years old when he left Minnesota for 

Syria last year, is a prime example. Once in the conflict zone, he 

spent months persuading his friends in Minneapolis to join him. 

His peer-to-peer recruiting nearly worked, as six of his friends attempted to leave the United States for Syria; they were arrested 

by the FBI this April.100 In a separate case, Ohio suspect 

Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud was urged by his brother Aden to 

join him overseas. Aden provided detailed instructions and contacts 

for getting from Turkey into the conflict zone.101 Mohamud agreed 

to join him and left the United States for Syria, though his brother 

was later killed in the fighting.102

Roughly 20 percent of aspiring U.S. foreign fighters have been 

killed in Syria.—Twelve of the 58 individuals we reviewed died 

after joining jihadist groups in the terrorist hotspot. Accordingly, 

we estimate nearly 1 in 5 Americans who have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria have been killed in the fighting. U.S. intelligence officials have already indicated more than 20 American 

have been killed.103 Some reportedly died in fighting on the battlefield while others, like Florida resident Moner Abusalha, conducted 

suicide bombings. 

Nearly all of those who have been apprehended are charged with 

‘‘material support,’’ but other charges have also been used.—Ninety 

percent of arrested suspects have been charged with providing or 

attempting to provide ‘‘material support to a foreign terrorist organization’’—usually in the form of trying to provide themselves as 

recruits to an extremist group. Several suspects have been arrested 

on charges of lying to authorities, passport fraud, gun crimes, or 

other infractions. 

Around 10 percent of U.S. returnees have been arrested by authorities.—Intelligence officials have indicated that around 40 

Americans have returned from Syria after engaging with or pledging allegiance to jihadist groups, and our review found five of them 

have been arrested by authorities. Three were charged with providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization for allegedly engaging with al-Nusrah Front while in Syria; two others 
18 

104 U.S. Department of Justice, Columbus, Ohio, Man Charged with Providing Material Support to Terrorists. 105Shimon Prokupecz, ‘‘3 Denver Teens Back Home after Failed Trip to Syria,’’ CNN, October 

23, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/21/us/colorado-teens-syria-odyssey/. 106 Ibid. 107 U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Office of Public Affairs. Six 

Minnesota Men Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to the Islamic State of 

Iraq and the Levant: Four Defendants Arrested in Minneapolis; Two Arrested in San Diego, April 

20, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2015/six-minnesota-men-chargedwith-conspiracy-to-provide-material-support-to-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-the-levant. 108Michael Martinez, Ana Cabrera, and Sara Weisfeldt, ‘‘Colorado Woman Gets 4 Years for 

Wanting to Join ISIS,’’ CNN, January 24, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/us/coloradowoman-isis-sentencing/. 109 Ibid. 

were charged with lying to the FBI, one of which had pledged allegiance to ISIS. One of the returnees was arrested plotting a terrorist attack against a U.S. military base.104

Human intelligence has been critical in stopping suspects.—More 

than 75 percent of U.S. foreign-fighter arrest cases involved a confidential source, informant, family member, or concerned community member who cooperated with or tipped off authorities. In other 

words, private citizens have been key to detecting aspiring travelers. For example, in October 2014 three teenage girls from Denver attempted to join ISIS in Syria, but they were stopped when 

their parents alerted law enforcement.105 The girls were detained 

in Germany and deported back to the United States.106 In another 

case, several suspects were stopped in part because of a community 

member who changed his mind about joining ISIS and decided to 

cooperate with authorities.107

PEER-TO-PEER EXTREMISM: HOW AMERICANS ARE RECRUITED ON-LINE AND LURED

ACROSS BORDERS

Many past foreign-fighter cases involved individuals who were 

radicalized through personal contact with extremists, but that paradigm has changed. Based on our review, we find that the majority 

of U.S. foreign fighter aspirants were radicalized in part on-line, either through Islamist terror propaganda or peer-to-peer recruiting 

on social media. Indeed, as noted above, almost 80 percent of cases 

we studied involved radicalized Americans downloading extremist 

propaganda, promoting it on-line, or engaging with other extremists on Twitter, Facebook, and the like. 

Recruits are motivated to join terrorist groups for a wide array 

of reasons. Many ISIS recruits, for instance, are inspired by 

jihadist ideology and see a historic opportunity to live in the caliphate. Others are motivated by the desire for adventure, to be a part 

of a cause larger than themselves, or for camaraderie and a sense 

of belonging. In almost all cases, though, suspects feel excluded 

from society or think they have failed to live up to expectations. 

These perceptions are often reinforced by a stressor life event, such 

as a drug arrest or school expulsion, that moves them to act. Other 

Americans aspired to travel to the terrorist safe haven believing 

they would find love, such as 19-year-old Shannon Maureen 

Conley, a nurse’s aide from Colorado. She received a 4-year prison 

sentence this year for attempting to join ISIS in Syria, where she 

planned to marry an ISIS fighter she met on-line.108 Conley still 

reportedly signs her letters from jail with the closing ‘‘behind 

enemy lines.’’109
19 

110 Alessandria Masi, ‘‘ISIS Recruiting Westerners: How The ‘Islamic State’ Goes After NonMuslims And Recent Converts In The West,’’ International Business Times, September 08, 2014, 

http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-recruiting-westerners-how-islamic-state-goes-after-non-muslims-recent-converts-west-1680076. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113Dustin Volz, ‘‘FBI Director: ISIS Is Relying on Encryption to Recruit Americans and Order 

Killings,’’ National Journal, July 8, 2015, http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/fbi-directorisis-is-relying-on-encryption-to-recruit-americans-and-order-killings-20150708. 114 Rukmini Callimachi, ‘‘ISIS and the Lonely Young American,’’ The New York Times, June 

27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online-recruiting-american.html?lr=0. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120Michael McCaul, ‘‘Europe Has a Jihadi Superhighway Problem,’’ Time Inc., November 11, 

2014, http://time.com/3578462/european-union-security-gap-foreign-fighters-terrorists/. 

On-line recruiters follow a similar path in trying to seduce Americans and other Westerners. They start by soliciting followers on 

social media, such as Twitter or Ask.fm, and ‘‘field questions about 

joining the Islamic State.’’110 They then subtly proselytize to interested parties, providing ‘‘almost the on-line version of [a] religious 

seminar,’’ observers note.111 Once they spot promising extremists, 

recruiters will communicate with them using direct-message tools 

to determine whether they are serious and to weed out ‘‘spies.’’112

Often extremists move the conversations to secure apps and 

encrypted platforms so they cannot be monitored while giving recruits instructions on traveling to Syria or even attack orders. FBI 

Director James Comey has equated the sophisticated outreach by 

ISIS recruiters to ‘‘a devil on their shoulder all day long saying, 

‘Kill, kill, kill.’ ’’113

One 23-year-old American woman reported that ISIS recruiters 

spent hours each day chatting with her.114 ‘‘I was on my own a lot,’’ 

she explained to The New York Times, ‘‘and they were on-line all 

the time.’’115 One extremist in Syria with whom she communicated 

used methods consistent with a manual written by ISIS’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq: ‘‘A Course in the Art of Recruiting.’’116

The manual recommends recruiters develop a relationship by keeping in regular touch with prospects, spending as much time with 

them as possible, listening to them carefully, and then drawing 

them closer to instill the basics of their ideology.117 The woman’s 

contacts spent months chatting with her, with one eventually urging her to travel to Syria.118 The FBI reportedly interceded in the 

case, but several months later, the Times says the woman was still 

communicating on-line with extremists.119

ROUTES TO THE CONFLICT ZONE: THE ‘‘JIHADI SUPERHIGHWAY’’ AND BEYOND

Most American foreign fighters have traveled—or planned to 

travel—through Europe to get to Syria, according to the results of 

our review. The continent has become a ‘‘jihadi superhighway’’ to 

and from the conflict zone.120 Turkey in particular has served as 

the primary point of entry and exit into Syria. In 55 percent of the 

cases we studied, suspects plotted to travel from America to Turkey, where they then planned to cross into Syria. The country’s porous border has been an ideal gateway for aspiring jihadists seeking to get in and out of the terrorist safe haven. 
20 

121Findings and Recommendations regarding overseas security gaps which have facilitated 

this type of terrorist travel are outlined in the ‘‘Detection & Disruption’’ section of this report. 122Task Force briefing, July 2015. 123 Cheryl K. Chumley, ‘‘U.S. Veteran: Going to Syria to Fight ‘like Booking Flight to Miami 

Beach’,’’ Washington Times, January 2, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/ 

jan/2/us-veteran-going-to-syria-to-fight-like-booking-fl/. 124 Constanze Letsch, ‘‘UK Police Move to Take down Islamic State How-to Guide from Internet,’’ The Guardian, February 25, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/25/ukpolice-islamic-state-travel-guide-hijrah-turkey-syria-ctiru. 125 ‘‘How to Survive in the West: A Mujahid Guide,’’ 2015. 126 Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror, House Committee on Homeland Security: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 1st sess., February 11, 2015, http:// 

homeland.house.gov/hearing/hearing-countering-violent-islamist-extremism-urgent-threat-foreign-fighters-and-homegrown. 127The challenge of ‘‘broken travel’’ is covered further in this report in Key Finding 25. 128 James Dowling, ‘‘Jihadists Urged to Take European Holiday before Joining Islamic State 

to Avoid Raising Suspicion,’’ Herald Sun, June 14, 2015, http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/ 

victoria/jihadists-urged-to-take-european-holiday-before-joining-islamic-state-to-avoid-raisingsuspicion/story-fnpp4dl6-1227397514580. 129 United States of America v. Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud. 130 Alessandria Masi and Hanna Sender, ‘‘How Foreign Fighters Joining ISIS Travel To The 

Islamic State Group’s ‘Caliphate’ ’’ International Business Times, March 03, 2015, http:// 

www.ibtimes.com/how-foreign-fighters-joining-isis-travel-islamic-state-groups-caliphate-1833812. 

While Turkey has begun to crack down on illegal border crossings, foreign fighter flows appear to continue unabated.121 ‘‘This is 

an easy battlefield to get to,’’ an administration official conceded to 

the Task Force.122 One American who traveled to Syria and fought 

on the front lines with rebels echoed the assessment. ‘‘I just went 

on-line and bought a ticket,’’ he explained. ‘‘It was that easy. It was 

like booking a flight to Miami Beach.’’123

Foreign-fighter recruiters have tried to make it simple for Americans to join them abroad. Supporters distribute manuals providing 

plain, English-language advice on getting to the safe haven. In February 2015, ISIS published ‘‘Hijrah to the Islamic State,’’ a how-to 

guide for dealing with border security, planning travel routes, and 

deciding what to pack.124 Another manual, ‘‘How to Survive in the 

West,’’ advises followers on avoiding law enforcement detection and 

instructs them on getting in touch with extremists once they arrive.125 FBI Assistant Director Michael Steinbach said in a February hearing that the support individuals receive as they prepare 

to migrate to the conflict zone has been tough to combat. The problem is ‘‘not even close to being under control,’’ he explained.126

Extremists are also advising travelers to ‘‘break’’ their travel to 

make it more difficult for authorities to catch them.127 ISIS recruiters are urging followers to buy airline tickets to holiday destinations that do not look suspicious and, once there, book onward travel to Turkey.128 Would-be fighters are also using what is popularly 

known as ‘‘hidden city ticketing’’ by booking a flight to a false enddestination and getting off the plane at the connecting stop. One 

of the Americans who made it to Syria used this tactic. He bought 

a one-way flight to Greece with a connection in Istanbul. According 

to the indictment, he never boarded his connecting flight and instead made his way to the battlefield.129

Extremists on no-fly lists or seeking to avoid law enforcement 

scrutiny at airports have opted instead to travel by land or sea. 

Most commonly, these aspiring fighters have driven or taken buses 

through the Balkans to the Bulgarian or Greek border, where they 

then enter Turkey.130 Alternatively, extremists have found they 

can board Turkey-bound ferries and cruise ships from Mediterra-
21 

131 Ibid. 

nean countries, where there is little security and passports are 

often not checked.131

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

OVERVIEW

The Task Force makes 32 Key Findings and associated recommendations to improve America’s security posture—and to ensure foreign countries are doing the same. Below is an abbreviated 

summary with references to the appropriate sections where complete descriptions of each Key Finding can be found. 

U.S. GOVERNMENT STRATEGY AND PLANNING TO COMBAT THE THREAT 

1. The United States lacks a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorist and foreign fighter travel (see p. 24). 

2. Despite concerted efforts to stem the flow, we have largely 

failed to stop Americans from traveling overseas to join 

jihadists (see p. 25). 

3. The growing complexity of the threat may be creating unseen gaps in our defenses, yet it has been years since any 

large-scale ‘‘stress test’’ has been conducted on U.S. defenses 

against terrorist travel (see p. 26). 

4. ISIS operatives are urging followers to travel to the group’s 

other ‘‘provinces’’ in places like Libya, yet it is unclear whether 

agencies are keeping pace with changes in foreign-fighter destinations (see p. 27). 

5. Ultimately, severing foreign fighter flows depends on eliminating the problem at the source (see p. 28). 

IDENTIFYING TERRORISTS AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS—AND PREVENTING 

THEM FROM TRAVELING 

6. Improvements have been made to the terrorist watchlisting 

process, yet no independent review has been done to assess 

them and whether more are needed in light of the evolving 

threat environment (see p. 29). 

7. Individuals can now contest their status on the no-fly list; 

however, more should be done to ensure the new process will 

appropriately balance due process rights with National security concerns (see p. 30). 

8. Despite improvements since 9/11, foreign partners are still 

sharing information about terrorist suspects in a manner 

which is ad hoc, intermittent, and often incomplete (see p. 32). 

9. There is currently no comprehensive global database of foreign fighter names. Instead, countries including the U.S. rely 

on a weak, patchwork system for swapping individual extremist identities (see p. 33). 

10. DHS should continue its efforts to quickly leverage Unclassified data in Classified environments to identify potential foreign fighters (see p. 34). 

11. The DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board has not been 

authorized by Congress nor does its charter reflect recent 
22 

changes to the threat environment, including the rise of the 

foreign fighter threat (see p. 35). 

12. More can be done to incorporate valuable ‘‘financial intelligence’’ into counterterrorism screening and vetting processes 

(see p. 36). 

13. State and local fusion centers are underutilized by Federal 

law enforcement Nation-wide when it comes to combating the 

immediate foreign fighter threat and terrorist travel generally 

(see p. 36). 

14. State and local law enforcement personnel continue to express concern that they are not provided with the appropriate 

security clearances to assist with counterterrorism challenges 

(see p. 38). 

15. The unprecedented speed at which Americans are being 

radicalized by violent extremists is straining Federal law enforcement’s ability to monitor and intercept suspects before it’s 

too late (see p. 39). 

16. Few initiatives exist Nation-wide to raise community 

awareness about foreign-fighter recruitment and to assist communities with spotting warning signs (see p. 39). 

17. The Federal Government has failed to develop clear intervention strategies—or ‘‘off-ramps’’ to radicalization—to prevent 

suspects already on law enforcement’s radar from leaving to 

join extremists (see p. 41). 

18. Jihadist recruiters are increasingly using secure websites 

and apps to communicate with Americans, making it harder 

for law enforcement to disrupt plots and terrorist travel (see p. 

42). 

19. The administration has launched programs to counter-message terrorist propaganda abroad, but little is being done here 

at home (see p. 43). 

20. The United States has not made adequate use of ‘‘jaded 

jihadists’’ to convince others not to join the fight (see p. 44). 

21. Unlike many other governments, U.S. authorities have not 

relied heavily on passport revocation to stop extremists (see p. 

45). 

DETECTING AND DISRUPTING TERRORISTS AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS 

WHEN THEY TRAVEL 

22. While substantial progress has been made since 9/11 to enhance visa security, there may be additional opportunities to 

expand screening to identify potential extremists earlier in the 

process (see p. 48). 

23. The administration has improved the security of the Visa 

Waiver Program, but continuous enhancements must be made 

in light of the changing threat (see p. 50). 

24. U.S. authorities remain concerned about terrorists posing 

as refugees, yet it is unclear to what extent security improvements to the refugee screening process mitigate potential 

vulnerabilities (see p. 52). 

25. ‘‘Broken travel’’ and other evasive tactics are making it 

harder to track foreign fighters (see p. 54). 

26. More could be done to give front-line operators at borders 

and ports better intelligence reach-back capabilities so DHS 
23 

132 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, ‘‘What to do? A Global 

Strategy: Reflecting on a Generational Challenge,’’ chap. 12, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/ 

report/911ReportlCh12.htm. 

can ‘‘connect the dots’’ and uncover previously unidentified terrorists and foreign fighters (see p. 55). 

27. U.S. authorities continue to ‘‘push the border outward’’ by 

deploying homeland security initiatives overseas. Expanding 

these efforts might help detect threats sooner (see p. 55). 

28. Only a fraction of U.S. States have access to INTERPOL 

databases; wider access could help spot wanted foreign fighters 

who have slipped past border security (see p. 56). 

OVERSEAS SECURITY GAPS 

29. Gaping security weaknesses overseas—especially in Europe—are putting the U.S. homeland in danger by making it 

easier for aspiring foreign fighters to migrate to terrorist 

hotspots and for jihadists to return to the West (see p. 57). 

30. Extremists are using fraudulent passports to travel discretely. However, a third of the international community—including major source countries of foreign fighters—still do not 

issue fraud-resistant ‘‘e-passports,’’ and most countries are still 

unable to validate the authenticity of ‘‘e-passports’’ (see p. 67). 

31. Many countries do not consistently add information to 

INTERPOL’s databases, and the majority do not screen against 

INTERPOL databases in real-time at their borders and airports (see p. 68). 

32. U.S. departments and agencies have spent billions of dollars to help foreign partners improve their terror-travel defenses, but the lack of a coordinated strategy for such assistance results in greater risk of overlap, waste, and duplication 

between programs (see p. 71). 

U.S. GOVERNMENT STRATEGY AND PLANNING

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, it was clear America 

needed to take urgent steps to keep terrorists from entering its borders. The 9/11 Commission, for instance, found it was so easy for 

the hijackers to operate within the United States that they traveled ‘‘into, out of, and around the country and complacently [used] 

their real names with little fear of capture.’’132 Since then, the U.S. 

Government has taken extraordinary steps to disrupt terrorists at 

all stages of travel—from fusing real-time intelligence into the border screening process to enhancing travel-document security. These 

measures have made it harder for extremists to cross our borders. 

But the threat environment has evolved, which is why the Task 

Force conducted its review. While post-9/11 reforms focused largely 

on preventing terrorists from infiltrating our country to attack, 

today we need to be equally concerned about keeping Americans 

from exiting our country to join terrorist groups. The latter challenge demands a different set of tools. This is why it is important 

for the Government to be able to adjust its strategies and plans. 

We must adapt to new threats and get resources where they are 

needed. 
24 

133 National Security Intelligence Reform Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, 108th Cong., http:// 

www.dni.gov/files/documents/IRTPA%202004.pdf. 134 National Counterterrorism Center, ‘‘National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel.’’ May 2, 

2006. http://fas.org/irp/threat/travel.pdf. 135The White House, ‘‘National Strategy for Counterterrorism,’’ June 2011, https:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorismlstrategy.pdf. 136 Individual departments and agencies have been tasked to determine how they can improve 

security to defend against the foreign fighter threat, and those reviews have produced notable 

Unfortunately, our country has a surplus of programs for combating terrorist travel but a deficit of strategic guidance to keep 

them aligned with the threat. Agencies must be able to make sense 

of new trends, take stock of existing counterterrorism efforts, and 

pivot to fix weaknesses. Yet the Task Force found there is no clear, 

whole-of-Government system for cataloging the proliferation of terror-travel programs, nor a strategy to ‘‘stitch the seams’’ between 

them. 

The administration has undoubtedly stepped up security to cut 

off foreign fighter flows, as documented throughout this report, but 

more must be done to identify and close potential gaps in our defenses against terrorist travel writ large. 

Key Finding 1.—The U.S. Government lacks a comprehensive 

strategy for combating terrorist and foreign fighter travel and has 

failed to maintain a system for identifying and plugging related 

gaps in America’s defenses. 

It has been nearly a decade since the Executive branch produced 

a whole-of-Government plan to constrain terrorist movements. In 

its 2004 final report, the 9/11 Commission recommended the 

United States develop ‘‘a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.’’ That 

year, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevent Act, which mandated such a plan, required the administration 

to explain how it would be implemented, and called for an assessment of vulnerabilities in U.S. and foreign travel systems that 

could be exploited by extremists.133 The result was the 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel.134 It has not been updated since. 

The 2006 Strategy is woefully outdated. While it provided a thorough overview of U.S. efforts to keep extremists from crossing borders, some of those programs have changed or are now defunct, and 

new ones have been created. The evolving threat environment has 

also made the document obsolete. For instance, the Strategy makes 

no mention of foreign fighters or the challenges associated with extremists’ social media recruiting. 

There appears to be no comprehensive accounting of terroristtravel programs in the U.S. Government or any systematic Government-wide efforts to identify gaps between them. The President’s 

2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism makes little mention 

of the subject aside from noting the United States will work with 

foreign partners to ‘‘identify terrorist operatives and prevent their 

travel... across National borders and within States.’’135 A full 

audit of America’s terror-travel preventative and protective measures should be produced, as the administration has identified ‘‘disrupting the flow of foreign fighters’’ as one of its top priorities in 

the fight against ISIS.136
25 

enhancements in security. This is not the same, however, as producing a Government-wide 

strategy that outlines all relevant programs, identifies gaps, and prioritizes resources. 137See the ‘‘Americans on the Pathway to Terror: By-the-Numbers’’ sub-section of this report. 138See ‘‘Appendix II: American Foreign Fighter Aspirants and Recruits’’ for the public cases 

the Task Force reviewed. 139Michael S. Schmidt and Mark Mazzetti, ‘‘Suicide Bomber From U.S. Came Home Before 

Attack,’’ The New York Times, July 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/us/suicidebomber-from-us-came-home-before-attack.html?lr=0. 

We found that hundreds of programs, projects, and initiatives 

have sprouted up to combat terrorist travel since 9/11, but without 

an overarching strategy to coordinate them, the United States may 

be wasting taxpayer dollars and failing to allocate resources where 

they are needed most. Indeed, lack of a strategy not only increases 

the risk terrorists might exploit weaknesses in the U.S. travel system, but also raises the prospect of waste, overlap, and duplication 

between agencies. 

• Recommendation.—The Executive branch should provide a National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel to Congress. Thereafter, the administration should annually assess the evolving 

terror threat to the United States, catalogue existing U.S. Government programs designed to obstruct terrorist travel, propose areas for reform and the elimination of duplicative programs, identify gaps in our defenses, and prioritize resources 

to fill gaps in a risk-based fashion. The strategy should not 

only take into account the travel into the United States of 

known or suspected terrorists but should also consider foreign 

fighter travel to terrorist safe havens. 

Key Finding 2.—Despite concerted efforts to stem the flow, we 

have largely failed to stop Americans from traveling overseas to 

join jihadists. Of the hundreds of Americans who have sought to 

travel to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq, authorities have only 

interdicted a fraction of them. Several dozen have also managed to 

make it back into America. 

The Task Force was only able to identify 28 cases where U.S. individuals were stopped before leaving the United States—a small 

fraction of the total that have attempted to travel to the conflict 

zone.137 A handful of others were stopped at other stages of the 

journey. The majority appear to have succeeded, despite concerted 

Government efforts to prevent Americans from joining groups like 

ISIS abroad. In fact, around 40 have even made it back to the 

United States, and some individuals have gone back and forth to 

the conflict zone multiple times.138 One suspect from Florida allegedly trained with extremists in Syria and returned to the United 

States for several months before heading back to the conflict zone; 

during that time, he was never on the radar screen of U.S. authorities.139

We believe it is unacceptable that so many Americans have been 

able to make it to the world’s most dangerous terrorist safe haven 

(and back) without being interdicted. While we commend the FBI, 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies 

for a string of successful arrests this year, a great deal can and 

must be learned from instances where we failed, including what 

was known and when about each suspect and whether more could 

have been done to stop them. This may help reveal any systemic 
26 

140 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘‘National Level Exercise 1009 Fact Sheet,’’ 2009, http://www.fema.gov/txt/media/factsheets/2009/ 

ncplnle.txt. 

weaknesses in the security architecture we have built into the U.S. 

travel system since 9/11. 

Unfortunately, the administration has not called for a formal 

Government-wide examination of these cases. Some agencies have 

done their own ‘‘after-action’’ reviews which have produced useful 

conclusions, but there is yet to be a coordinated and comprehensive 

interagency investigation into why each of these Americans slipped 

through the cracks. Our Task Force has identified some of the security weaknesses highlighted by the foreign fighter phenomenon, 

but only the Executive branch has the time and resources to do the 

comprehensive, deep-dive review that is needed of all of the recent 

American foreign fighter cases. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should launch an endto-end review of all cases involving Americans traveling or attempting to travel to Syria and Iraq to join Islamist terror 

groups-taking into consideration all relevant Classified and 

Unclassified information—to determine what lessons can be 

learned and to prevent additional Americans from traveling to 

overseas terrorist sanctuaries. The final conclusions should be 

presented to Congress, along with any relevant legislative recommendations. 

Key Finding 3.—The growing complexity and changing nature of 

the foreign fighter phenomenon may be creating unseen gaps in 

our defenses, yet it has been years since any large-scale ‘‘stress 

test’’ has been conducted on U.S. Government protection and prevention programs against terrorist travel. 

The last major Government exercise on terrorist travel occurred 

in 2009. That year, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) managed an exercise centered on the ‘‘aftermath of a notional terrorist event outside of the United States’’ and how to prevent ‘‘subsequent efforts by the terrorists to enter the United 

States and carry out additional attacks.’’140 The exercise tested 

how agencies at all levels of Government would respond in such a 

scenario. 

But the threat environment has changed. The 2009 exercise centered on terrorists attempting to enter the country, but as we have 

noted, officials today should be just as concerned about Americans 

leaving the country to train overseas with terrorist groups as foreign fighters. Such individuals can represent a serious security 

threat to the United States, particularly upon their return to the 

country, so preventing them from joining extremists abroad in the 

first place should be a top law enforcement goal. 

• Recommendation.—The White House should lead a Nationallevel exercise series designed around the foreign fighter threat 

to test all phases of extremist planning and travel to determine 

how partners at all levels of Government—and abroad—are 

currently responding to these scenarios. The primary focus of 

the exercises should be to identify weaknesses at home and 

abroad that may be exploited by terrorists and foreign fighters 
27 

141The Task Force is grateful for the work of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, which 

recently put forward a similar recommendation. See: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Homeland Security Advisory Council, ‘‘Foreign Fighter Task Force Interim Report,’’ Spring 2015, 

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS-HSAC-Foreign-Fighter-Task-ForceInterim-Report-May-2015.pdf. 142 House Homeland Security Committee, Terror Threat Snapshot: September 2015. 143SWJ Editors, ‘‘ISIS Publishes Manual on ‘How to Survive in the West’,’’ Small Wars Journal, June 9, 2015, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/isis-publishes-manual-on- 

%E2%80%98how-to-survive-in-the-west%E2%80%99. 144Moore, ‘‘5,000 Foreign Fighters Flock to Libya as ISIS Call for Jihadists’’; Julia Payne, ‘‘Exclusive: Captured Video Appears to Show Foreign Fighters in Nigeria’s Boko Haram,’’ Reuters, 

May 26, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/26/us-nigeria-violence-foreignidUSKBN0OB1RR20150526. 

seeking to travel to and from the United States and overseas 

terrorist sanctuaries.141

Key Finding 4.—In addition to Syria and Iraq, ISIS operatives 

are urging followers to travel to the group’s other ‘‘provinces’’ in 

places like Libya, yet it is unclear to what extent departments and 

agencies are shifting diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, policy, and other resources to keep pace with and track evolving foreign fighter flows to other emerging safe havens. 

ISIS continues to boast to its followers that it has expanded beyond Syria and Iraq. Indeed, the group now has a direct presence, 

affiliates, or groups pledging support in at least 18 countries or territories, including: Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 

Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Palestinian territories, 

Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia (North Caucasus region), Sudan, 

Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.142 The ability for extremists to operate 

openly in many of these areas is tenuous, but several are emerging 

terrorist sanctuaries. 

ISIS operatives have urged followers on social media to head to 

its other provinces. In one on-line handbook popular with extremists, the author writes that ‘‘if the Muslim finds it hard to flee to 

the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria through Turkey, he can escape 

to the Islamic State in Libya, or [Afghanistan/Pakistan], or in Nigeria (under Boko Haram territory).’’143 Thousands of foreign fighters 

appear to be heeding the call in places like Libya, and others have 

reportedly begun to appear in Nigeria.144 It is unclear if there are 

Westerners in these groups, but the trend is disturbing. 

Current U.S. Government efforts to combat the flow of foreign 

fighters are heavily focused on keeping fighters from traveling to 

and from Syria and Iraq, but as we have seen, the terror threat 

environment can change quickly. Radicalized individuals who were 

once intent on traveling to Afghanistan or Somalia are now traveling to Syria, and more may soon begin traveling to new ISIS outposts. We cannot be caught off-guard by changes in terror-travel 

destinations, which is why law enforcement and the intelligence 

community must continue to closely track changes in extremist migration to new terrorist hot spots. 

• Recommendation.—The Intelligence Community should provide 

Congress with regular updates documenting foreign fighter 

flows to other terrorist sanctuaries, in addition to Syria and 

Iraq, and in coordination with interagency partners should provide updates on actions being taken to prevent extremist migration to those locations. 
28 

145Task Force briefing, July 2015. 146 9/11 Commission report, chap. 12, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/ 

911ReportlCh12.htm. 

Key Finding 5.—Ultimately, severing foreign fighter flows to any 

conflict zone depends on eliminating the problem at the source and 

preventing the emergence of terrorist sanctuaries. 

We find that, in the long run, the only truly effective method for 

preventing our citizens from joining terrorist organizations abroad 

is to eliminate the sanctuaries in which those groups thrive. ‘‘We 

are playing defense over here,’’ one senior official told the Task 

Force, ‘‘but what we are doing overseas—the offense—is key.’’145

The ‘‘center of gravity’’ of the current foreign fighter phenomenon 

is still in Syria and Iraq, and as long as the safe haven in that region persists, so will the drive of individuals around the world—including radicalized Americans—to migrate to it. Indeed, the safe 

haven enhances the perceived legitimacy of groups like ISIS, helping to radicalize even more individuals to its cause. 

Terrorist groups thrive in the world’s lawless outposts. We have 

learned this the hard way. If left unaddressed, failing states and 

ungoverned spaces become the playgrounds of fanatics, who exploit 

these areas to expand their influence, solicit recruits, and plot attacks. We have seen this in Syria. We have seen this in Afghanistan. And we have seen this in the Arabian Peninsula and the 

Horn of Africa. Without clear strategies to identify and prevent the 

emergence of extremist sanctuaries, America risks those locations 

becoming new headquarters of terrorist planning against our homeland. 

‘‘Every policy decision we make needs to be seen through this 

lens,’’ the 9/11 Commission wrote more than a decade ago. The 

Commission offered the following warning: ‘‘If, for example, Iraq 

becomes a failed state, it will go to the top of the list of places that 

are breeding grounds for attacks against Americans at home. Similarly, if we are paying insufficient attention to 

Afghanistan... its countryside could once again offer refuge to 

al-Qaeda, or its successor.’’146

• Recommendation.—In the near term, the United States and its 

allies must defeat terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq to keep 

Westerners from being drawn to the region where they are further radicalized and trained by violent extremists. In the long 

run, the U.S. Government must heed the advice of the 9/11 

Commission and ‘‘identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries’’ and develop realistic strategies to prevent 

extremists from taking root within them. 

IDENTIFICATION AND PREVENTION

An effective counterterrorism system must be able to recognize 

extremist suspects in order to prevent them from crossing borders, 

and if they do, authorities must be alerted to their movements so 

they can be stopped. Accordingly, the Task Force categorized four 

phases critical for stopping terrorist and foreign fighter travel: (1) 

Identification, (2) prevention, (3) detection, and (4) disruption. Information sharing is a critical pillar of the identification phase. 

From State and local police to foreign governments, intelligence 
29 

147 Ibid. 148 ‘‘Terrorist Watchlist,’’ U.S. Government Sharing Environment, http://www.ise.gov/ 

terrorist-watchlist. 

must be disseminated quickly and securely to ensure front-line operators are able to spot violent extremists. More robust terrorism 

watch lists, for instance, have allowed U.S. authorities to keep 

thousands of potentially dangerous individuals with terrorist ties 

out of the United States since 9/11. 

However, preventing individuals from traveling out of the country to terrorist safe havens remains a difficult task. In many cases, 

intelligence agencies and police are unaware of an American’s plan 

to travel overseas to link up with terrorists until after he or she 

has already left. When authorities are made aware, in many cases 

it is because of a tip from family, friends, or community members. 

Even then, preventing a suspect’s travel can be difficult. The Task 

Force examined America’s progress in the ‘‘identification and prevention’’ phases of terrorist and foreign fighter travel, and we propose a number of urgent improvements to strengthen our country’s 

defenses. 

WATCHLISTING 

The 9/11 Commission found that before the 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States lacked a single list of suspected terrorists 

and did not distribute a similar document or database to relevant 

departments and agencies.147 This meant even terrorist known to 

authorities might be able to evade screening systems at the border. 

After 2001, the White House and Congress mandated the creation 

an integrated terrorist watch list and required agencies to better 

fuse intelligence information into it. 

The result is that today America boasts the most sophisticated 

watchlisting and screening system in the world. Authorities have 

gone to great lengths to integrate intelligence databases into a centralized clearinghouse of terrorist suspects, which is then used to 

compile the terrorist watch list, known officially as the Terrorist 

Screening Database (TSDB). The TSDB is one of our most effective 

tools for detecting the movement of extremists. For instance, agencies like the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FBI, 

and State and local law enforcement rely on the watch list to identify known or suspected terrorists trying to board aircraft, obtain 

visas, enter the country, or engage in other activities.148

Key Finding 6.—Both the 2009 Christmas Day bombing of a U.S. 

airliner and the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing led to extensive 

improvements in the terrorist watchlisting process. Yet no independent review has been conducted to assess the impact of recent 

changes to the watchlisting process and whether further changes 

are warranted in light of the evolving threat environment. 

On Christmas day 2009, Nigerian citizen Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab—known widely as the ‘‘underwear bomber’’—attempted to detonate explosives on Northwest Airlines Flight 253. 

A subsequent White House review determined that counterterrorism agencies had information that raised red flags about 

Abdulmutallab but failed to connect the dots and place him on the 
30 

149White House. Summary of the White House Review of the December 25, 2009 Attempted 

Terrorist Attack, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/summaryloflwhlre- viewl12-25-09.pdf. 150 U.S. Congress. Committee on Homeland Security. The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism 

Challenges and Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombings, March 2014, 29–35. https:// 

homeland.house.gov/files/documents/Boston-Bombings-Report.pdf. 151 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Report to Congressional Requesters, Terror 

Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of Agency Actions since the December 25, 2009, Attempted 

Attack Could Help Inform Future Efforts, GAO–12–476 (Washington, DC, 2012), http:// 

www.gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf. 

terrorist watch list.149 Doing so may have prevented him from 

boarding the aircraft and may have resulted in additional screening that could have detected his explosives. 

Similarly, following the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, authorities determined that information held by the U.S. Government 

about Tamerlan Tsarnaev was not pieced together comprehensively. A fully consolidated and accurate record for Tsarnaev in the 

terrorist watch list might have led authorities to perform additional screening when he returned from Russia, where he is alleged 

to have met with Islamist militants.150

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the interagency community have made commendable progress in recent 

years to close gaps in the watchlisting process, to ensure critical intelligence information is integrated in near-real-time to our screening systems, and to make sure data from disparate sources is combined to better identify extremists. Multiple revisions to the interagency Watchlisting Guidance have been made in recent years, resulting in a larger (but more accurate) terrorist watch list. Improvements have also led to an array of interagency initiatives to 

ensure authorities on the front lines have the timely information 

they need to stop terrorist movements. 

Nevertheless, no independent review has been conducted of these 

changes to the watchlisting and screening process. In 2012, the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended regular assessments of the watchlisting process were warranted to ensure the 

watch list is achieving its intended outcomes.151 Interagency policy 

reviews have been conducted of this critical counterterrorism tool, 

but we believe it is important for a third-party to ensure security 

deficiencies have been fixed and that policies and procedures are 

keeping pace with an evolving threat environment—especially the 

threat from foreign fighters. 

• Recommendation.—GAO should conduct an independent review to determine whether past weaknesses in the watchlisting 

process have been reconciled and whether additional changes 

are needed to enhance America’s defenses. This includes ensuring that information is being integrated into the terrorist 

watch list from all relevant sources across the Government, 

that it is being done in a timely manner, that agencies are 

equipped to handle increased demands for information to improve the watch list, that the right authorities have the watch 

list access they need, and that individuals who should no 

longer be included on the list are removed appropriately. 

Key Finding 7.—The administration has revised the administrative ‘‘redress’’ process, which allows an individual who has purchased a plane ticket, been denied boarding, and sought redress, to 
31 

contest his or her inclusion on the no-fly list; however, more work 

should be done to ensure that judicial review of such listings appropriately balances due process rights with National security concerns. 

In connection with a number of court cases pending across the 

country where individuals challenged their inclusion on the no-fly 

list, DHS has made significant changes to the redress process by 

which such listings are reviewed. Among other things, U.S. persons 

who purchase a ticket, are denied boarding, and subsequently seek 

to challenge an alleged no-fly listing, are now informed as to 

whether they are on the list and, if they are on the list, given an 

opportunity to request additional information. If the individual 

seeks additional information, DHS then provides a second, more 

detailed response, which will include the applicable no-fly criterion 

and, where possible, additional Unclassified information. This 

change allows affected Americans to have access to more information with which to respond through the administrative process. 

However, issues remain if these matters proceed to courts. Departments and agencies claim there are major challenges in the 

court system with appropriately handling the Classified, privileged, 

or sensitive information on which no-fly listings are often based. 

Current law does not provide a statutory mechanism for addressing 

these issues, and as a result, some cases may not be able to be decided on the merits. We need a system that enables judicial review 

of no-fly list decisions based on the facts and with respect to individual rights, while also establishing effective mechanisms for the 

protection of Classified or otherwise sensitive information. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should provide Congress with a formal plan for reforming the process for review 

of no-fly listings which safeguards civil liberties, due process, 

and national security in line with recent court decisions. This 

plan should include any legislative changes sought by the administration to ensure Classified or otherwise sensitive information is handled appropriately and protected from disclosure 

when no-fly listings are challenged in court. 

INFORMATION SHARING 

It is difficult to overstate how important post-9/11 information 

sharing has been in combating terrorist threats to the United 

States. American lives have been saved and our country is safer because of tectonic shifts in the level of cooperation between agencies 

at home and with foreign partners. When it comes to disrupting 

terrorist travel, information sharing is the backbone of a strong security posture. If one agency identifies a violent extremist and fails 

to notify other partners, the suspect may easily enter our country 

undetected. That is why at all levels of government (international, 

Federal, State, and local) the exchange of terrorist identities has 

become a leading National security objective. 

The foreign fighter threat—whether from Americans seeking to 

join terrorists abroad or returning home from extremist safe havens—presents challenges to our information-sharing environment. 

The sheer volume of jihadist travelers has made it difficult for authorities to keep track of individuals who pose a threat and turn 

attention away from those who do not. In response, the administra-
32 

152 ‘‘France Attack Suspect Unknown to U.S. Authorities,’’ CNN, August 25, 2015, http:// 

www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2015/08/25/new-day-savidge-france-supect-american-heroes-latest.- 

cnn?sr=biob-armfeed. 153GAO also flagged this problem in 2011, but the Task Force believes it persists. See: U.S. 

Government Accountability Office. Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. Visa Waiver Program: DHS Has Implemented the Electronic System 

for Travel Authorization, but Further Steps Needed to Address Potential Program Risks, GAO– 

11–335 (Washington, DC, May 2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11335.pdf. 154 Ibid. 

tion has taken action to ramp up information-sharing activities, 

from improving intelligence exchanges with our allies to sending 

more frequent bulletins to State and local law enforcement. 

We believe even more can be done to ensure Federal, State, and 

local agencies are quickly exchanging information about suspects in 

an environment where radicalization happens far more quickly 

than ever before. And we believe more must be done abroad. Foreign partner information sharing is uneven, leading to gaps in our 

collective knowledge of the individuals who have traveled to dangerous terrorist sanctuaries. 

Key Finding 8.—America relies on foreign partner intelligence information to identify terrorists and foreign fighters, yet many countries still share the names of suspects with the United States in 

a manner that is ad hoc, intermittent, and often incomplete—a 

worrying gap in our defenses against extremist travel. 

Foreign fighters can only be stopped from crossing borders (and 

prevented from conducting attacks) if authorities are aware of 

them. This means countries must share fighter names with the 

United States so those individuals can be appropriately 

watchlisted. Sharing has improved with our partners lately, but 

there are still disturbing weaknesses. For example, European security services reportedly failed to share the name of a suspected extremist who returned from Syria and attempted a mass shooting in 

August on a train from Amsterdam to Paris, even though the assailant was on the radar of European authorities.152 If the suspect 

had attempted instead to travel to America to conduct the attack, 

U.S. authorities likely would not have noticed since the individual 

was not on our watch list. That is why information sharing is so 

important. 

In 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 6 (HSPD–6), which directed U.S. agencies to work with 

foreign governments to exchange terrorist screening information, 

particularly the names and identifiers of known or suspected terrorists. The United States has since signed agreements with more 

than 40 countries to swap terrorist watchlist data, including most 

Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries. Although the United States 

also shares such data through other channels, HSPD–6 agreements 

are seen as enhancing the transparency, frequency, and quality of 

those exchanges. 

However, information-sharing among many of the countries who 

have signed HSPD–6 pacts remains inadequate. Some countries 

signed agreements years ago, but have never used the mechanism 

to share terrorist names with the United States or do so only infrequently.153 Moreover, while some are willing to share the names of 

suspected terrorists and foreign fighters, others are reportedly only 

willing to share the identities of convicted terrorists.154 This cre-
33 

155 Ibid. This concern was first flagged by GAO, but it appears to have persisted. 

ates potentially disturbing gaps in our awareness of extremists who 

may attempt travel to the United States. 

Some countries are also reluctant to share names of their own 

citizens for privacy reasons, even if those individuals are terror 

suspects they are tracking. In these cases, foreign partners will 

presumably share a name if the suspect tries to travel to the 

United States. But in places like Europe where there are few internal border checkpoints, it is difficult to see how authorities would 

know if their citizens were headed to America. A German suspect 

could easily drive to Spain, for instance, to evade German authorities and fly to America undetected. 

It is also unclear to what extent foreign partners are reporting 

all of the ‘‘encounters’’ they have with terrorists from our own 

watch lists that we have warned them about. While some HSPD– 

6 countries let U.S. authorities know when they have run into individuals we have flagged, they are not necessarily required to do so 

in real time or to provide details of those encounters. Moreover, 

there still appears to be no universal case management system for 

foreign partners to report when they have encountered a suspect 

from our watch list.155

Senior officials have acknowledged to the Task Force that until 

recently, the United States has rarely put serious pressure on our 

foreign partners to live up to their HSPD–6 agreements. Only with 

the rise in the foreign fighter threat did U.S. departments and 

agencies begin to push foreign partners to share names more regularly and thoroughly using the process. Sharing reportedly has improved, but there is clearly more to be done to increase participation and accountability. • Recommendation.—The Inspectors General of DHS, the State 

Department, the FBI, and the Intelligence Community should 

conduct a deep-dive review of the U.S. Government’s HSPD–6 

information-sharing agreements, the process for reaching and 

enforcing agreements, compliance with such agreements, possible performance indicators, and related matters to determine 

if more can be done to standardize, streamline, and enhance 

foreign fighter information sharing with partners. The review 

should be provided to Congress. • Recommendation.—DHS, FBI, and the State Department 

should provide a Classified report annually to Congress on 

HSPD–6 information-sharing agreements and compliance, by 

country. The administration should also provide Congress with 

any proposals to adjust the requirements of HSPD–6 information-sharing agreements and to increase foreign partner compliance. • Recommendation.—GAO should complete its on-going review of 

the overall status of information-sharing agreements required 

under the VWP and provide Congress with an overview of any 

identified weaknesses or concerns. 

Key Finding 9.—There is currently no comprehensive global 

database of foreign fighter names. Instead, countries including the 

United States rely on a patchwork system for swapping individual 

extremist identities. This is an inherently weak arrangement that 
34 

156 Currently around 50 member states have joined the initiative. 157 Information provided to Task Force staff by INTERPOL Washington in September 2015. 158Task Force briefing with INTERPOL officials in France, May 2015. 159See related finding from the Homeland Security Advisory Council: ‘‘Foreign Fighter Task 

Force Interim Report,’’ Spring 2015. 

increases the odds a foreign fighter will be able to cross border undetected when traveling to and from a terrorist sanctuary. 

Countries around the globe continue to rely on bilateral and regional information-sharing agreements to exchange terrorist watch 

lists and compare foreign fighter names. The result is that global 

awareness of foreign fighter travel is piecemeal and deeply fragmented. In other words, a foreign fighter leaving Syria might be 

kept out of country X but can travel freely through country Y 

which has not been made aware he is a suspect. 

The closest the international community has come to centrally 

tracking foreign fighters is a through a database created last year 

by INTERPOL. The organization’s ‘‘foreign terrorist fighter’’ analytic file is available on a membership basis to all 190 INTERPOL 

countries, each of which can add to the database and can screen 

against it to detect foreign fighters attempting to enter their territory.156

Unfortunately, only a fraction of INTERPOL countries have participated in it. Indeed, more than 25,000 foreign fighters have gone 

to Syria and Iraq, yet at last count INTERPOL’s database only included around 5,000 names because foreign partners are reluctant 

to share.157 This has to change—and quickly. Thousands of these 

fighters are returning home, and this database has the potential to 

become the global ‘‘tripwire’’ to detect their movements. Even the 

few thousand names already added to the INTERPOL database 

have been useful to the United States, as many of them were previously unknown to us.158

• Recommendation.—The United States must work with international partners to designate INTERPOL as a central repository for foreign fighter identities. The administration must 

strongly urge partners who have shared foreign fighter data 

with U.S. authorities to share the same data, where possible, 

via INTERPOL systems with the rest of the international community. This would enhance U.S. security by ensuring more individuals of concern are stopped well before they reach American borders. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should conduct a Classified review of the foreign fighter names known to the United 

States and determine whether there are any additional identities that can be added to INTERPOL’s foreign fighter database. More broadly, this review should also consider whether 

the process in place for quickly declassifying information to 

place in INTERPOL systems is adequate. 

Key Finding 10.—DHS is seeking to more quickly leverage the 

Unclassified data it collects to identify high-risk individuals—including terrorists and foreign fighters—traveling to, through, and 

from the United States. To do so, the Department requires an interim ability to query Unclassified data in Classified environments.159
35 

160 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Privacy Impact for the DHS Data Framework— 

Interim Process to Address an Emergent Threat, DHS/ALL/PIA–051, April 15, 2015, http:// 

www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-dhswide-dataframework-april-2015- 

.pdf. 161This example is a hypothetical and was not provided by DHS. 

Much of the information the U.S. Government receives from foreign partners is Classified, like the identities of possible terrorists. 

Using that information to screen for suspects must be done on secure systems. DHS has proposed an interim process which will 

allow intelligence analysts to tap Unclassified data sets directly 

from Classified systems and detect extremists who may have entered the country or are attempting to do so.160 For example, a 

DHS analysts might want to search the manifests of planes bound 

for the United States for the name of a certain foreign fighter, but 

the analyst might not be able to do so easily if the name was received from a sensitive source overseas, making it Classified. He or 

she would be unable to type a Classified piece of data into the 

search box unless the system was on a Classified network.161

The Task Force believes a temporary data transfer process 

should be used to address such challenges but only until the longplanned DHS data framework is capable of meeting the mission 

need. DHS should revert to a model with more privacy safeguards 

once the technical capabilities are available. We understand that 

access to this data in the Classified domain will be limited to intelligence analysts, support staff for intelligence analysts, and CBP 

personnel conducting targeting and intelligence analysis. Technical 

personnel will be responsible for loading the data onto the Classified domain and performing system administration functions, but 

they will not have access to the actual data after the uploading is 

complete. • Recommendation.—DHS should expedite efforts to fully develop the DHS Data Framework so that information at all levels of classification can be used for critical counterterrorism 

purposes by DHS and other relevant agencies. The Department 

should report to Congress on its interim use of this capability, 

progress in developing the full framework, and any additional 

resources needed to complete the effort. 

Key Finding 11.—The DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board 

(CTAB) is the Department’s key forum for fusing operations, intelligence, and policy information at a senior level to better mitigate 

terrorist threats; however, the CTAB’s charter has not been authorized by Congress nor does it reflect recent changes to the threat environment, including the rising threat of foreign fighters and homegrown terror. 

Established in 2010, the CTAB brings together top DHS officials 

at the behest of the Secretary of Homeland Security to share information and coordinate counterterrorism activities. By many accounts, the CTAB has improved the Department’s ability to adapt 

to the threat environment and keep policy responses in sync across 

the many DHS components. The CTAB, however, is not currently 

authorized in law, running the risk it could fall into disuse or stray 

from its core counterterrorism mandate. Moreover, its original 

charter does not reflect changes in the threat environment, including the surge in home-grown extremism and the threat from for-
36 

162 Homeland Security Advisory Council, ‘‘Foreign Fighter Task Force Interim Report,’’ Spring 

2015. 163 Ibid. 

eign fighters.162 Authorization in law and updates to the charter 

would keep the CTAB on a strong footing so it can be best used 

by future DHS Secretaries and their lieutenants. 

• Recommendation.—Congress should authorize the activities of 

the CTAB, and in line with the recommendations of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, ensure that its charter is reviewed and revised to reflect ‘‘(1) the current threat environment, (2) any policy changes that have been made since 

issuance, and (3) to align DHS CT activities under the Secretary’s Unity of Effort guidance.’’163

Key Finding 12.—More can be done to incorporate valuable ‘‘financial intelligence’’ into counterterrorism screening and vetting 

processes. This data can be used to detect previously unknown extremists and to identify individuals tied to terrorism attempting to 

transit the United States, among other counterterrorism priorities. 

Since 9/11, significant barriers to intelligence information sharing have been reduced or eliminated across the U.S. Government, 

allowing authorities to connect the dots to spot and interdict violent extremists seeking to do our country harm. Much of this information is leveraged during the travel screening process to screen 

passengers so that law enforcement can catch terrorists and foreign 

fighters while they are on the move. The Task Force spoke with a 

number of officials who have indicated that more can be done to 

integrate financial intelligence into the systems used to screen for 

terrorist travel. We support on-going efforts to bolster this type of 

information sharing between Federal agencies. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should accelerate efforts to better incorporate financial intelligence into vetting 

and screening systems and provide Congress with regular updates on its progress. 

Key Finding 13.—State and local fusion centers are underutilized 

by Federal law enforcement Nation-wide when it comes to combating the immediate foreign fighter threat and terrorist travel 

generally. 

In the wake of 9/11, many States and urban areas around the 

country established fusion centers to enhance sharing of counterterrorism information and criminal intelligence at all levels of government. The National Network of Fusion Centers now includes 78 

separate centers, many of which bring together Federal, State, and 

local law enforcement; emergency responders; public health professionals; private-sector representatives; and others. Most of these 

centers receive Federal assistance, whether through grant dollars 

or the support of Federal intelligence analysts who sit alongside 

their State and local counterparts to share information. 

With the terror threat becoming more diffuse Nationally, fusion 

centers are more important than ever. Federal agencies are 

strained by the workload associated with monitoring the surging 

number of home-grown extremists, aspiring foreign fighters, returnees, and other terrorist targets. State and local partners not 
37 

164This example was shared with the Task Force in April 2015 by Homeland Security officials. 

only can help lighten the load but are also able to provide invaluable on-the-ground assistance to mitigate terror threats. 

Cooperation between fusion centers and Federal law enforcement, including the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) has 

improved considerably in recent years, yet some centers still report 

they are underutilized and not made aware of terrorism-related investigations or activities within their respective areas of responsibility. For example, when a watchlisted individual is stopped for a 

traffic violation or is detected traveling through a U.S. airport, 

there is currently no mechanism to automatically notify the closest 

fusion center, even though law enforcement represented in that 

center may ultimately be called on to respond. The lack of automatic coordination also may deprive authorities of key local insights that could help interdict terror suspects. Similarly, fusion 

centers are not automatically notified when an American foreign 

fighter suspect returns from an overseas extremist sanctuary. 

When fusion centers are used, the benefits are clear. In one recent case, Federal officials received a tip that unidentified Americans from a specific state traveled overseas to fight with Islamist 

militants.164 The fragmentary intelligence was passed down to the 

relevant fusion center. In a matter of weeks, the center pieced together information from local sources and managed to identify the 

suspects. They quickly notified Federal counterterrorism officials, 

who placed the suspects on the terrorist watch list to ensure they 

did not make it back into America undetected. 

• Recommendation.—Federal law enforcement, including the 

FBI’s JTTFs, should better leverage the National Network of 

Fusion Centers for assistance with terrorist-travel related matters. Stronger relationships between the two—and co-location 

where possible—will further enhance information-sharing and 

help Government agencies stop extremists from entering our 

country and keep more Americans from leaving to join terrorist 

groups. 

• Recommendation.—Federal authorities should explore providing notification to fusion centers when there are hits 

against the terrorist watch list of individuals within a given fusion center’s area of operations. Routine notification will give 

State and local partners awareness in case they are called on 

to assist and would create an additional opportunity for those 

partners to connect the dots and provide Federal authorities 

any pertinent information they have on those subjects. 

• Recommendation.—Federal law enforcement should regularly 

notify fusion centers when a ‘‘returnee’’ comes back to their 

area of operations. These individuals, who return from overseas terrorist sanctuaries, pose a potential threat to the homeland. If made aware, fusion centers can serve as a force multiplier and an additional source of information to determine 

whether such individuals are seeking to recruit others to join 

extremist groups, are planning to head back to the conflict 

zone, or are engaged in attack plotting. 
38 

Key Finding 14.—State and local law enforcement personnel continue to express concern that they are not provided with important 

counterterrorism information, whether because of a lack of security 

clearances, insufficient security clearance levels, or delays in security clearance processing. 

State and local law enforcement partners are essential for deterring, detecting, and disrupting terrorist travel. However, the Task 

Force finds there is still frustration among State and locals about 

the security clearance process, which is run by the Federal Government. Some departments with a presence at fusion centers say they 

have too few officers—or none—with security clearances, while others feel hamstrung by the long delays in security clearance processing. 

Security clearance levels are also an issue. Most State and local 

law enforcement personnel who are granted security clearances are 

approved up to the ‘‘Secret’’ level. However, counterterrorism information is often classified at ‘‘Top Secret’’ and above, making it difficult if not impossible for those officers to assist in sensitive cases. 

The Task Force understands that DHS has recently decided to 

streamline its process and make it easier for State and local law 

enforcement to be granted higher clearances, where needed—a welcome development. 

• Recommendation.—DHS, FBI, and the Director of National 

Intelligence’s (DNI) Program Manager for the Information 

Sharing Environment should: (1) Complete a thorough review 

of security clearances held by non-Federal Fusion Center personnel and all State and local law enforcement; and (2) provide 

guidance on expediting clearances to those populations and ensuring partners have the appropriate level of access. 

• Recommendation.—DHS should regularly report to Congress 

on its sponsorship of Top Secret clearances for select State and 

local law enforcement personnel in States and major urban 

areas. 

PREVENTION ACTIVITIES 

Actually ‘‘preventing’’ a known or suspected terrorist from crossing borders typically comes down to blunt law enforcement tactics: 

Interdiction, arrest, and prosecution. If authorities lack enough evidence to detain a suspect on terror charges, they will sometimes 

prevent them from leaving a country by detaining them on lesser 

charges, such as immigration violations or making false statements 

to investigators. 

But the foreign fighter threat has created a different dynamic. 

We cannot simply rely on stopping suspects when they arrive at 

the airport. Many of the hundreds of American who have attempted to travel to Syria and Iraq were not known to law enforcement before they traveled, and some on law enforcement’s radar 

could not be charged without more sufficient evidence they were 

planning to join a foreign terrorist organization overseas. 

As a result, prevention activities are increasingly important. 

These include efforts to help communities spot signs an individual 

may be seeking to join violent extremists overseas and to dissuade 

them from departing the country. Prevention also requires authorities to be nimble in monitoring the wide array of suspects on their 
39 

165 Julia Payne, ‘‘FBI Investigating ISIS Suspects in All 50 States,’’ The Hill, May 26, 2015, 

http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/233832-fbi-investigating-isis-suspects-in-all-50- 

states. 

radar, as a decision to join a group like ISIS is often made quickly 

and discretely. With extremists increasingly engaging Americans 

using secure communications, authorities might not be aware of a 

suspect’s decision to travel to a terrorist hot spot, making it all-themore important for communities to look at developing ‘‘off-ramps’’ 

to radicalization to prevent individuals from falling victim to extremist recruitment in the first place. 

Key Finding 15.—The unprecedented speed at which Americans 

are being radicalized by violent extremists is straining Federal law 

enforcement’s ability to monitor and intercept suspects before it’s 

too late. 

We were told repeatedly throughout our review that never before 

have authorities witnessed such a condensed period of 

radicalization, i.e., the time between an individual’s first encounter 

with extremist propaganda to when they are prepared to act on it. 

Also, no official could point to another period where so many Americans have been inspired to travel overseas to become foreign fighters in a single terror hotspot. 

The scope and magnitude of terrorist recruitment world-wide is 

taking its toll on all law enforcement, including here in the United 

States. Some of our foreign partners have admitted they do not 

have adequate coverage on their terrorist suspects or have been 

forced to limit their focus to counterterrorism at the expense of investigating other criminal matters. While the circumstance are not 

quite as dire here, the threat environment certainly has put strain 

on U.S. authorities, especially at the FBI. The FBI director now 

says the agency is investigating ISIS supporters in all 50 States.165

A diffuse threat environment calls for a distributed response, 

which means better engaging State and local law enforcement 

across the country. Since 9/11, Federal law enforcement has 

brought sheriffs’ offices and police departments into the fold 

through improved information sharing and involvement in counterterrorism investigations. But with the continued surge in the terror 

threat, closer cooperation will be needed. • Recommendation.—Federal law enforcement agencies should 

rely more on State and local partners to help manage the high 

load of counterterrorism cases. Already police departments in 

major cities have reportedly begun to devote more resources to 

helping Federal agencies keep tabs on terrorism suspects, 

whether to keep them from fleeing to link up with other extremists overseas or mobilizing at home. Leaders of Federal departments and agencies must be clear with State and local 

partners about how they can best assist in this new age of terror and should also consider additional training and enhanced 

integration to better leverage law enforcement partners around 

the country. 

Key Finding 16.—The majority of recent disruptions of aspiring 

U.S. foreign fighters occurred because of—or were aided by—warnings to law enforcement, whether from family, friends, informants, 

or the general public. Nevertheless, few initiatives exist Nation- 
40 

166Task Force briefing, July 2015. 167This is a reference to the Drug Abuse Resistance Education program; comments made by 

General Frank Taylor during the following hearing: House Committee on Homeland Security, 

Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown 

Terror, 114 Cong., 1st sess., Doc. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), http:// 

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg94106/html/CHRG-114hhrg94106.htm. 

wide to raise community awareness in order to keep more individuals from being recruited to join overseas terrorist organizations. 

Information from the public is crucial for stopping foreign fighter 

flows. ‘‘A lot of cases we’ve disrupted, it’s because somebody tipped 

us off,’’ explained one senior administration official who spoke with 

the Task Force.166 The FBI, DHS, and other agencies have done 

commendable investigative work to identify extremists, but without 

community engagement their work is considerably more difficult. 

Unfortunately, the administration relies on small initiatives with 

few staff, shoestring budgets, and limited records of success to 

spread awareness about the threat. The ‘‘Community Awareness 

Brief’’ is the Federal Government’s primary domestic outreach effort to address domestic radicalization and inform communities 

about terrorist recruiting. Officials have compared it to a ‘‘D.A.R.E. 

program’’ for counterterrorism,167 but it has only been presented in 

a small number of cities. Usually delivered by a handful of DHS 

and NCTC staffers, the brief is sometimes followed by a Community Resilience Exercise designed to engage participants in mock 

scenarios involving the radicalization of a community member. Unfortunately, resource constraints have kept these initiatives from 

being scaled beyond one-off presentations held intermittently 

around the country. 

Moreover, departments and agencies have not done enough to 

successfully enlist nongovernmental partners in prevention efforts. 

Several NGOs, including the Countering Extremism Project and 

the World Organization for Resource Development and Education 

(WORDE), are involved in this space, but the administration has 

done little to help them mature or accelerate their efforts. Major 

foundations, which could bring resources to bear on the problem, 

have also rarely been contacted by U.S. authorities on the subject. 

• Recommendation.—DHS should use the National Network of 

Fusion Centers to more widely deploy initiatives such as the 

U.S. Government’s Community Awareness Brief and Community Resilience Exercise, designed to increase local understanding of the foreign fighter threat. Training fusion center 

staff around the country to help conduct these briefings could 

help to increase community awareness and buy-in from local 

community participants. 

• Recommendation.—DHS, in consultation with other departments and agencies, should devise new approaches for encouraging community members to report suspicious activity, especially signs an individual is preparing to travel overseas to join 

a foreign terrorist organization. In considering new methods 

for engagement, authorities should also rely on lessons from 

the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Building Communities of 

Trust initiative, recognizing that one of the major barriers to 

cooperation in some communities is distrust of law enforcement. 
41 

168Katie Zavadski, ‘‘Group With No Jihadi Experience Rehabs ISIS Recruit,’’ The Daily Beast, 

August 24, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/24/judge-orders-isis-recruitto-rehab-not-jail.html. 169 Ibid. 

Key Finding 17.—The Federal Government has failed to develop 

clear intervention strategies such as ‘‘off-ramps’’ to radicalization 

as an alternative to detaining individuals seeking to travel to fight 

with extremists overseas. 

Countries around the world have developed programs to address 

radicalization by intervening before a suspect becomes violent or 

enlists with a terrorist group. In some cases, these programs are 

also aimed at rehabilitating foreign fighters who have returned 

from overseas. Some of these efforts are a step too far for the 

United States. For Constitutional and policy reasons, the U.S. Government should be wary about running its own ‘‘de-radicalization’’ 

programs for individuals who, in some cases, may simply be engaging in speech and actions protected by the First Amendment. Family, friends, and community members are often far better suited 

than Government officials to intervene and prevent individuals 

from radicalizing to violence. 

But U.S. authorities are still faced with the reality that every 

day they are investigating suspects who have been radicalized by 

terrorist groups and could suddenly seek to become fighters on foreign battlefields or commit acts of terror here at home. The traditional wait-and-see approach is a blunt and risky one: Suspects are 

either arrested and prosecuted—or they are not. In only a handful 

of recent cases have Federal authorities sought to intervene earlier 

to engage family or community members in dissuading a suspect 

from heading overseas to join ISIS or al-Qaeda. 

We believe more should be done to develop ‘‘off-ramps’’ to 

radicalization, particularly as terrorist groups are increasingly recruiting people under the age of 18. While recognizing that we cannot just look the other way, our only choice should not be to incarcerate teenagers on terror charges when they are preyed upon by 

on-line extremists. Investigators, prosecutors, and judges need additional options so they can tailor their actions to the specifics of 

each case. 

Authorities have made some attempts to pursue alternatives to 

prosecution, but they do not appear to be based on any overarching 

guidance or best practices. In a handful of cases for instance, Federal authorities have engaged with parents when it appears their 

children might be Syria-bound. In a case this year, an 18-year-old 

Minnesota resident accused of attempting to join ISIS was released 

to a halfway house while awaiting trial, instead of being held in 

jail. There he received counseling and courses in civic educationbut from an organization with no prior experience dealing with 

would-be foreign fighters.168 The experiment fell apart when he 

was found with a knife hidden in his room. The accused is now 

back in jail, though still participating in civics lessons.169

So far, these efforts to pursue ‘‘off-ramps’’ have been ad hoc and 

lack a systematic framework. This is a problem. We cannot have 

law enforcement and justice officials developing intervention strategies on-the-fly out in the field, especially when they are swamped 

with counterterrorism cases and ill-equipped to develop such strat-
42 

170Devlin Barrett, ‘‘FBI to Seek Counseling, Not Handcuffs, for Some Islamic State Suspects,’’ 

Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-to-use-counseling-nothandcuffs-for-some-islamic-state-suspects-1438812264. 171 Ibid. 172Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, Countering Violent Extremism in America, report, 

June 2015, https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CVE%20in%20America%20.pdf. 

egies. Instead, policymakers in Washington should take the lead in 

developing baseline policy and legal guidance for appropriate interventions. This includes engaging with NGOs, civil rights groups, 

and civil liberties advocates to ensure intervention guidance is appropriate and methods are effective. 

The FBI recently announced plans to refer more suspects—particularly juveniles—to interventions by involving community leaders, educators, mental health professionals, religious leaders, parents, and peers, depending on the circumstances.170 In these cases, 

the FBI will not necessarily cease its criminal investigation and 

will remain alert to suspects who might become dangerous or plan 

to travel to join extremists overseas.171 We are glad the FBI is taking additional steps to engage communities on interventions, but 

the framework for implementing these efforts remains unclear. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should take immediate 

steps to develop a baseline policy and legal framework for intervening in cases of potential violent radicalization, rather 

than relying on ad hoc interventions. This guidance should be 

produced by DHS, FBI, DOJ, and the NCTC—in consultation 

with other departments and agencies and nongovernmental organizations—distributed to appropriate parties, and incorporated into field training where applicable. This guidance 

must clearly spell out the legal parameters for interveners, 

particularly as they could expose themselves to liability if 

interventions fail.172 Moreover, from this framework, the U.S. 

Government should develop a ‘‘playbook’’ regarding violent extremist cases outlining the array of options available to families, communities, law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges to 

dissuade, deter, or disrupt an individual at different stages 

along the path to violent extremism. 

Key Finding 18.—Aspiring foreign fighters are increasingly being 

radicalized and recruited by extremists overseas via websites and 

apps with secure private messaging features. The result is that law 

enforcement faces greater difficulty accessing extremist communications, making it harder to disrupt violent plots and terrorist 

travel. 

The world is witnessing sweeping changes in extremist tactics, 

not least of which is the concept of crowd-sourced recruiting. As detailed in the ‘‘Threat’’ section of this report, terrorist groups like 

ISIS seek to identify possible recruits by issuing a call to arms to 

their thousands of social media followers, including on Twitter, 

Facebook, YouTube, and beyond. Then they engage promising radicals via direct message, communicating with them privately to determine their willingness to engage in jihad or persuade them to 

travel overseas. Finally, terrorist recruiters direct their subjects to 

use encrypted apps and hidden websites to prevent monitoring of 

their further conversations and plotting. 
43 

173Joint Statement with Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of James B. Comey, Director, 

FBI). 174See the ‘‘Americans on the Pathway to Terror: By-the-Numbers’’ sub-section of this report. 175Task Force briefing, June 2015. 

This last stage is especially concerning. Extremists are using 

freely available communications tools to hide illegal activities, such 

as funneling young operatives to and from terrorist safe havens or 

planning to kill Americans within the homeland. Even faced with 

lawful warrants from the courts to access those communications, 

some companies are unable to comply because of built-in security 

and encryption. In some cases, technology is creating a virtual safe 

haven for terrorists to communicate around the world. The FBI has 

been especially vocal in highlighting these challenges as the terror 

threat level has risen.173

The ‘‘going dark’’ problem has stirred an important debate in this 

country about how technological changes are affecting privacy and 

public safety. We are not satisfied these challenges have been discussed as thoroughly and openly as they should be. Law enforcement and technology companies seem to be talking past each other, 

and no sustained dialogue has been established on the subject between key parties, including Congress, law enforcement, and private industry. American people deserve to see their leaders tackle 

this subject openly and through a robust dialogue. • Recommendation.—A sustained and open dialogue and enhanced cooperation is needed between all relevant parties—including Congress, law enforcement, and private industry—to 

discuss challenges and find concrete solutions to the ‘‘going 

dark’’ problem, with the ultimate goals of maintaining cybersecurity, protecting civil liberties, and ensuring public safety, especially against terrorist threats to the United States. 

Key Finding 19.—The administration has launched public 

counter-messaging efforts at the State Department to push back 

against terrorist propaganda overseas, yet more needs to be done 

domestically. 

Terrorist organizations are recruiting on-line and across borders 

at a level we have never seen before. Thousands of citizens from 

more than 100 countries have already been drawn to fight with extremists in Syria and Iraq without ever meeting an ISIS ‘‘recruiter’’ 

face-to-face. U.S. officials who spoke with our Task Force say many 

if not most of the Americans who have been inspired to join groups 

like ISIS were radicalized on-line, not from someone in their communities, and the case studies we reviewed seem to support that 

claim.174 ‘‘It used to be the assessment of the [Intelligence Community] that you could not go all the way down the path to 

radicalization without personal contact,’’ one official told us. ‘‘But 

that’s all changed.’’175 In an age of peer-to-peer radicalization, the 

new battlespace is on-line, and the United States must work openly 

and aggressively to contest it. 

Overseas, the State Department has launched a counter-messaging campaign to challenge terrorist recruitment and propaganda, especially on social media. The Center for Strategic 

Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) leads the effort and 

says it primarily targets individuals who are ‘‘on the fence’’ about 
44 

176Greg Miller and Scott Higham, ‘‘In a Propaganda War against ISIS, the U.S. Tried to Play 

by the Enemy’s Rules,’’ Washington Post, May 8, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 

world/national-security/in-a-propaganda-war-us-tried-to-play-by-the-enemys-rules/2015/05/08/ 

6eb6b732-e52f-11e4-81ea-0649268f729elstory.html. 177Task Force briefing with CSCC officials, May 2015. 178DHS, the State Department, and other Government agencies routinely interact with 

Facebook, Twitter, Google, and other major social media players. However, other websites that 

are regularly used by extremists to share content, such as Ask.fm, reportedly have not been contacted by U.S. departments and agencies to participate in dialogue about removing terrorist 

propaganda. 

traveling to enlist with extremist groups by using hard facts to expose their deception and the danger of enlisting in their ranks. The 

CSCC has started to engage foreign partners to counter extremist 

misinformation using more organic and credible approaches. Furthermore, the United States can learn from foreign partner governments which have engaged in their own counter-messaging efforts. 

But the CSCC has a staff of only a few dozen, compared to the 

tens of thousands of on-line ISIS followers who amplify the terrorist group’s content. Its efforts have also been pilloried for being 

slow, bureaucratic, and ineffective at combating the viral success of 

ISIS propaganda.176 What is more worrisome is that State Department officials told the Task Force that under existing authorities 

they do not believe they can use the Center’s resources to directly 

engage with Americans on-line.177 In other words, the State Department can discourage foreigners from joining ISIS but not dissuade U.S. citizens. 

We do not believe counter-messaging is solely or even primarily 

the job of the U.S. Government. In fact, tweets and YouTube videos 

with the seal of the United States will likely be discredited by budding extremists. However, the Federal Government can help set 

the tone, share best practices from foreign partners, and most importantly jump-start efforts by non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs) and other private sector partners to push back against terrorist recruitment and propaganda within our borders. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should ramp up 

counter-messaging efforts here at home and urgently develop 

ways to empower nongovernmental organizations to contest the 

propaganda of violent groups seeking to radicalize and recruit 

Americans to travel to overseas terrorist safe havens. As part 

of this effort, the administration should also seek to work with 

non-traditional partners, including universities, the private 

sector, and philanthropic foundations. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should work more 

closely with social media companies-including those who are 

not routinely engaged by Government agencies but whose platforms are often used by extremists178—and urge them to accelerate the removal of violent-extremist content which violates 

their terms of service, whether through tools which make it 

easier for users to flag inappropriate material or by devoting 

greater internal resources to identifying and removing offending content and users. 

Key Finding 20.—Unlike many countries, the U.S. Government 

has made little use of disaffected extremists to dissuade others 

from traveling to fight in terrorist sanctuaries. 
45 

179Task Force briefing, May 2015. 180For an example, see: U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Daesh Defectors: ‘I Was Afraid All the 

Time’ ’’ YouTube, July 24, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j7AJfmpFakI. 181Quilliam Foundation, ‘‘Quilliam Launches #NotAnotherBrother,’’ news release, August 4, 

2015, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/press/quilliam-launches-notanotherbrother/. 

The Task Force found a number of our foreign partners have engaged ‘‘jaded jihadists’’ and returnees from the battlefield to tell 

their stories and convince others not to travel to terrorist safe havens. These individuals are likely viewed by potential extremists as 

more credible voices than governments. Therefore, they stand a 

better chance of dissuading likely or future jihadists from coming 

under the influence of groups like ISIS. 

We were disappointed however to find key U.S. departments and 

agencies have done little to leverage the stories of American returnees or family members of those who have fled to the conflict 

zone. In fact, one counterterrorism official even admitted to the 

Task Force that counter-messaging teams had not reached out to 

DOJ or FBI to see if any disaffected extremists on their radar 

would tell their stories publicly.179 Only very recently does that appear to have changed, though we are unaware of any meaningful 

progress. 

Fortunately, the State Department has begun to shift its content 

in this direction, launching a series of ISIS defector YouTube videos.180 The videos include footage from interviews and news stories 

featuring individuals who were horrified to witness ISIS oppression 

up close. But these testimonials have received relatively little attention when posted from State Department social media accounts. 

One such video only received 500 views despite being posted for 2 

months; by comparison, a recent ISIS execution video received tens 

of thousands of views within hours of going on-line. 

Grassroots messaging has a better chance than Government missives of reaching vulnerable young people, as noted earlier. Accordingly, U.S. authorities must empower nongovernmental and nontraditional partners to do this kind of outreach. For instance, a 

U.K.-based foundation recently sponsored an ISIS counter-messaging campaign—#NotAnotherBrother—which showcases the ‘‘reality of life as a foreign fighter.’’181 The slick, privately-produced 

video has drawn far more attention world-wide when compared 

with similar U.S.-Government-produced content. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should launch a concerted effort to use the testimonials of disaffected ‘‘former’’ foreign fighters, extremists, and their friends and relatives to 

counter the narratives that persuade Americans to travel overseas to fight with extremist groups. Most importantly, the administration should help facilitate and distribute these stories 

through non-Governmental channels where possible and empower non-traditional partners to do the same. Departments 

and agencies should also work with foreign partners to get permission to use narratives which they have produced featuring 

their own citizens. 

Key Finding 21.—Many Western countries have begun to use 

passport revocation as a means to keep aspiring foreign fighters 

from traveling, but the tool has been little-used by U.S. authorities. 
46 

182Graeme Wood, ‘‘What ISIS Really Wants,’’ The Atlantic, February 15, 2015, http:// 

www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/. 183 Revocation or Limitation of Passports, 22 CFR § 51.62 (2014). 184Task Force Briefing with State Department, June 2015. Also see: Kent v. Dulles (June 16, 

1958). 185 United States, Department of State, Passport Revocation—Anwar Nasser Aulaqi, http:// 

images.politico.com/global/2012/11/28/binder1.html. 

A number of Western governments have taken direct action to 

stop suspects by taking away their means of travel: Passports. Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and others have used 

this tool as a last resort when they think extremists might take off 

for the conflict zone but when there is limited ability to prosecute 

them in advance. For example, Australian authorities confiscated 

the passport of a Musa Cerantonio, a vocal ISIS recruiter and 

jihadist preacher, after he reportedly tried to flee to Syria in June 

2014; he made it to the Philippines before being deported back to 

Australia.182

The U.S. Government has the ability under the law to revoke 

passports on a number of different grounds, including for National 

security purposes.183 But unlike some foreign partners, American 

authorities cannot make this decision unilaterally. The Supreme 

Court has ruled that an individual’s right to travel cannot be violated without due process, which has been interpreted to mean an 

American passport cannot be revoked without giving the suspect a 

chance to contest the evidence against him or her.184 There appear 

to be few public cases of passports being revoked on National security grounds, which could be explained by the fact that National security and counterterrorism investigations often involve Classified 

information. Law enforcement agencies face difficult trade-offs 

when deciding whether to use Classified information in court, as 

noted elsewhere in this report. 

This does not mean the tool has never been used. The U.S. State 

Department revoked the passport of Anwar al-Awlaki, a top alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader, nearly 6 months before he 

was killed in a drone strike in Yemen. First though, the Department sent a cable to its embassy in Yemen directing that it send 

a message ‘‘to Mr. [Awlaki] informing him that there is an important letter for him at post regarding his U.S. passport.’’185 Presumably if Awlaki had shown up, he would have been served with a 

passport revocation letter and later been given the opportunity to 

contest the charges against him. He never showed, and the passport was revoked. 

Passport revocation is not the only way to make it difficult for 

a suspect to travel. America’s advanced watchlisting system, discussed earlier, allows authorities to flag foreign-fighter suspects in 

a secure database and to be notified when any of them attempt to 

fly out of the country on their passports. Moreover, with enough 

evidence, a watchlisted terror suspect can be upgraded to the nofly list, which automatically prevents them from boarding an aircraft. 

But if an American has already left the United States for Syria, 

adding their name to the watch list may not do much good in keeping them from getting the rest way to the battlefield. The majority 

of Americans who have attempted to fight in Syria and Iraq managed to leave the country before being stopped by U.S. law enforce-
47 

186 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. ‘‘Border in Miles: How Long is the U.S. Border with 

Canada and Mexico?’’ July 30, 2013, https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/alid/578/∼/ 

border-in-miles. 187 9/11 Commission report, chap. 12, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/ 

911ReportlCh12.htm. 

ment; only later did many of them come to the attention of authorities. Many are presumably still able to travel on their passports if 

the documents have not been cancelled, making it easier for them 

to return to the West. On the other hand, when an individual’s 

passport is revoked, a government can alert nearly all other countries via INTERPOL that the document is no longer valid and 

should not be accepted, theoretically constraining a suspect’s international mobility. 

The Task Force is concerned about the gap between passport revocation and watchlisting. The latter is not an equal substitute for 

the former. We must assume suspects dead set on joining a terrorist group in Syria and Iraq could eventually find a way out of 

the United States. In those cases, we need to be able to make it 

more difficult for them to travel the remainder of the way to the 

conflict zone and, ultimately, prevent them from returning to the 

West undetected. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should conduct a review of its passport revocation policies and procedures which 

could be used in cases involving terrorist travel and foreign 

fighters and report to Congress on any changes desired to 

streamline and improve the process while protecting due process rights and civil liberties. This review should consider similar actions undertaken by foreign partners and also propose alternatives to passport revocation which could have a similar effect in slowing or obstructing terrorist travel across borders. 

DETECTION AND DISRUPTION

If terrorists and foreign fighters cannot be deterred from crossing 

borders, then the United States must be able to detect and disrupt 

them when they do. This requires real-time counterterrorism information to be used at border checkpoints, airports, and beyond to 

spot travelers who have been flagged. It also requires shrewd analysis of travel patterns and the identification of suspicious behavior. 

This is no easy task. More than half a billion people cross borders 

into the United States each year, 330 million of which are non-citizens.186 Catching the small number who have ties to terrorism requires close cooperation at all levels of government. 

America failed to adequately integrate counterterrorism information at the borders before 9/11, a vulnerability which allowed extremists to travel back-and-forth to the United States undetected 

by law enforcement. In fact, the 9/11 Commission concluded 15 of 

the 19 hijackers were ‘‘potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities’’ but were not detected because of ‘‘systemic weaknesses’’ in the U.S. border system.187 But extraordinary progress 

has been made since then. Law enforcement agencies now conduct 

National security checks on virtually every traveler—whether they 

are a foreign national applying for a visa or an American returning 

home—before they board flights to ensure they do not have ties to 

terrorism. Moreover, U.S. border officers are deployed to a number 
48 

188 United States, Department of State, Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Visas Issued at Foreign 

Service Posts: Fiscal Years 2010–2014, http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/ 

AnnualReports/FY2014AnnualReport/FY14AnnualReport-TableI.pdf. 189Task Force briefing with DHS and State Department, June 2015. 

of countries overseas to detect threats early by pushing the screening process outward. 

The danger from foreign fighters requires us to reexamine these 

systems to keep suspects from slipping through the cracks. The 

Task Force found several potential weaknesses in U.S. detection 

and disruption efforts. For instance, more could be done to tackle 

the challenge of ‘‘broken travel,’’ where extremists switch planes 

and destinations to avoid law enforcement detection, and authorities could put in place measures to weed out violent extremists earlier in the visa application process. 

PRE-TRAVEL PHASE 

Pre-travel screening allows authorities to conduct advance security checks to identify high-risk individuals who might be connected to violent extremist groups. In some ways, pre-travel security screening is more important than the physical screening of a 

traveler. Most terrorist suspects and foreign fighters are not carrying weapons or explosive when they fly. Authorities are more 

likely to detect them by searching counterterrorism databases than 

by searching duffel bags for illicit materials. We believe additional 

enhancements can be made to detect threats in the pre-travel 

phase and to prevent extremists from taking advantage of legal 

travel routes into our country. 

Key Finding 22.—Substantial progress has been made since 9/11 

to enhance visa security and conduct advance counterterrorism reviews of foreign nationals seeking to visit the United States. The 

Task Force believes there may be additional opportunities to expand screening to identify potential extremists earlier in the process. 

To visit the United States, citizens of most countries must obtain 

visas, which are issued at overseas embassies and consulates by 

the State Department. In 2014, the State Department granted 

nearly 10 million visas to foreigners seeking temporary entry into 

America (and nearly 500,000 immigrant visas for permanent residence).188 This involves submitting an on-line questionnaire, scheduling an interview at a U.S. embassy or consulate, providing biographic and biometric information (such as fingerprints), and 

awaiting a formal decision. The process can take anywhere from a 

few days to a few weeks.189

The visa issuance process represents a critical stage for law enforcement to detect individuals with terrorist ties and prevent them 

from entering the United States. Many of the subjects who have 

been convicted on terrorism charges in the United States since 

9/11 are foreign-born individuals who traveled to America on 

visas—whether on student visas, tourist visas, or for legal permanent residence. Some had potentially detectable terrorist connections beforehand, and others committed visa fraud by providing 

false information. 

All visa applications are screened extensively against criminal 

and counterterrorism databases, though this was not always the 
49 

190 Ibid. 191Written testimony of CBP Office of Field Operations Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner for a House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National 

Security hearing titled ‘‘Border Security Oversight, Part III: Border Crossing Cards and B1/B2 

Visas,’’ 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of John Wagner). 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194Task Force briefing with DHS and the State Department, June 2015. 195 Ibid. 

case. For a number of years before and after 9/11, the State Department only screened an applicant’s basic information and to see 

if he or she matched a name on a terrorist watch list; as a result, 

approximately 2 percent of visa applications were flagged to receive 

a more extensive counterterrorism review.190 If a visa was approved, it was not typically screened against classified databases 

again. Today the State Department forwards 100 percent of visa 

applications to NCTC for deeper, more sophisticated screening to 

uncover possible terrorism connections.191 The Department also 

continuously checks visas against Government databases in case 

new information is discovered tying an individual to terrorist activity.192 These improvements have led to the denial of thousands of 

U.S. visas due to counterterrorism concerns, some of which may 

not otherwise have been detected.193

In higher-risk foreign countries, the U.S. Government has implemented an added defensive measure, the Visa Security Program 

(VSP). VSP is run by DHS in 19 countries and aims to do more indepth counterterrorism screening to keep violent extremists from 

gaining entry into America. At these higher-threat locations, visa 

applications undergo a more rigorous screening process, including 

an immediate National security review when their immigration application is submitted on-line, which allows Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents to flag concerns with an applicant 

even before they show up at the embassy for an interview. The additional time and manpower of Visa Security Units (VSUs) allows 

for suspicious applicants to be vetted more thoroughly. Once DHS 

has made a determination on the applicant, it provides the State 

Department with a recommendation on the individual’s admissibility.194

VSP runs applications through a system called PATRIOT (PreAdjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team) 

well before State Department officers review the applications. PATRIOT culls through public safety, criminal, and National security 

databases and gives analysts in Washington, DC the opportunity to 

do a deeper review to ensure U.S. authorities do not have information on an applicant that would be reason to deny them entry into 

the country. When an application is flagged through the VSP, an 

officer at the relevant U.S. overseas post is assigned to it and can 

do additional work on-the-ground in the host country to resolve any 

concerns.195

The Task Force believes the VSP is a valuable additional layer 

of security. We also recognize the VSP could be expensive to deploy 

globally, given that DHS prefers to have an agent on the ground 

to conduct follow-on reviews after an application is initially 

screened. However, we believe the up-front screening that occurs as 

part of the VSP—an immediate and automatic National security review of each visa application through the PATRIOT system—does 
50 

196Over time, DHS should also examine how to deploy the system to all countries. 

not need to be limited to only the 19 existing VSP countries when 

there are 225 U.S. visa-issuing posts world-wide. 

Over time, PATRIOT screening could be expanded virtually to all 

visa-issuing posts world-wide and provide an extra layer of security 

to help State Department officers decide which individuals should 

be granted entry into the United States and which should not. 

Under the current system, a full counterterrorism review sometimes does not occur until weeks after an application is submitted; 

near-instant security checks would help give the U.S. Government 

additional lead time to do background investigation on applications 

which get flagged, offering more opportunities to uncover previously-unknown terrorist ties. The VSP program has already 

helped identify new terrorist tactics and has provided additional information on known extremists, so we believe finding a way to deploy some elements globally would yield additional National security benefits. • Recommendation.—DHS, in conjunction with the Department 

of State, should strengthen security screening of travelers who 

require a visa by working to deploy virtual elements of the 

VSP globally, specifically through the expanded use of the PATRIOT screening system. PATRIOT is currently used for remote screening; however it only supports locations in which 

VSP units currently exist. DHS should consider expanding the 

use of the system to additional high-risk embassies and consulates where VSP units may not currently have a presence.196

DHS should also explore conducting full VSP reviews using 

more cost-effective means—particularly by training other U.S. 

Government personnel to do the on-the-ground VSP assessments in countries where DHS has a more limited presence. 

Key Finding 23.—The administration has improved the security 

of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), but continuous enhancements 

must be made to keep pace with changing terrorist tactics and to 

detect violent extremists before they board U.S.-bound planes. 

Some critics have labeled the VWP the ‘‘Achilles’ heel’’ of U.S. security out of fear that foreign fighters from those countries will be 

able to slip into the United States undetected. It is true that most 

European jihadists who have fought in Syria are from VWP countries, and although such residents can get into America with greater ease, they are still subjected to security checks. Moreover, their 

home countries must implement travel security enhancements in 

order to participate in the program. 

Citizens of VWP countries can travel to the United States for up 

to 90 days without having to obtain an entry visa; in return, U.S. 

citizens must also be allowed to travel visa-free to the participating 

country. VWP countries tend to be developed economies that are 

viewed as a low security threat to America, and the program brings 

substantial economic benefits to the United States and participating nations. 

In place of a visa, VWP travelers must fill out the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), when booking travel to the 

United States. This on-line form provides key information on each 

traveler to U.S. authorities and is screened against terrorist watch 
51 

197 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Secretary, ‘‘Statement by Secretary 

Johnson on Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program,’’ news release, November 3, 

2014, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/11/03/statement-secretary-johnson-security-enhancements-visa-waiver-program. 198 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of 

John Wagner). 199 U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Visa Waiver Program,’’ http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/ 

english/visit/visa-waiver-program.html. 200 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Secretary, ‘‘Statement by Secretary 

Jeh C. Johnson on Intention to Implement Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program,’’ news release, August 6, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/08/06/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-intention-implement-security-enhancements-visa. 

lists and criminal databases. Due to the heightened concerns about 

foreign fighters, DHS announced in November 2014 that VWP travelers would be required to submit additional information, including 

aliases, citizenships, parents’ names, national identification number, contact information, employment information, and city of 

birth.197 Additional information makes it easier for law enforcement to identify terrorists and to expedite legitimate travel. Moreover, ESTA forms are continuously screened against the watch list 

and other security databases to ensure no new ties to terrorism are 

detected after an individual has been approved.198

There are currently 38 VWP countries, 30 of which are in Europe.199 To participate, the U.S. Government requires that countries meet several standards and implement security improvements, including: (1) Issuing their residents secure, machine-readable passports; (2) having less than a 3 percent visa-refusal rate 

into the United States; (3) reporting lost/stolen passports; (4) sharing information with U.S. authorities on travelers (including criminals and known or suspected terrorists); (5) requiring its residents 

to fill out an on-line authorization form, ESTA, before traveling to 

the United States; and (6) increasing their own airport security requirements. 

Many officials believe the VWP actually enhances rather than 

weakens U.S. security against terrorist travel. In particular, all 

participating countries are required to regularly share information 

that they might not normally provide, including: Intelligence about 

terrorists; biographic, biometric, and criminal data; and information on lost and stolen passports. This data helps to prevent violent 

extremists from entering the United States. DHS also recently announced VWP countries would soon be required to begin issuing 

their citizens fraud-resistant e-passports, to regularly screen 

against INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Document Database, 

and to permit additional Federal air marshals on flights from their 

countries to the United States.200

We believe DHS and the administration have been attentive to 

the need for security improvements to the VWP. But given that the 

threat environment has changed and continues to evolve, we 

strongly urge the Department to remain vigilant and to consider 

additional security measures. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should continuously explore further changes to the process for screening visa-free 

travelers, including additional security improvements to ESTA. 

Elsewhere in this report, the Task Force makes additional recommendations which might improve the overall security of the 

VWP and leverage it to obstruct terrorist and foreign fighter 
52 

201See the ‘‘Border Security’’ section of Key Finding 29 in this report. 

travel overseas, including those detailed under Key Findings 8, 

29, 30, and 31. 

• Recommendation.—The Secretary of Homeland Security, in 

consultation with the Secretary of State, should enforce VWP 

eligibility reviews for certain countries annually rather than 

every 2 years and should provide annual intelligence and 

threat assessments, in consultation with the DNI, of high-risk 

VWP countries. These assessments should include travel 

vulnerabilities which may be exploited by terrorists, as well as 

each country’s overall compliance with VWP obligations. The 

foreign fighter threat has shown how quickly a country deemed 

‘‘low-risk’’ for terrorist travel can quickly become a ‘‘high-risk’’ 

source country for violent extremists. 

• Recommendation.—DHS should work with Congress to give the 

Secretary explicit authority to temporarily suspend a country’s 

VWP status for failure to share counterterrorism information. 

As it currently stands, the Secretary is not granted explicit authority in the law to suspend a country’s status for failing to 

pass along information that is critical for stopping terrorist 

movements, even though countries have agreed to provide such 

information as a condition of participation in the program. If 

the Secretary had clearer suspension authority it would be a 

more credible tool to encourage partners to comply with security requirements. The Secretary should also continue to use 

the current foreign fighter threat as an opportunity to regularly remind participating VWP countries of their obligations 

under the program. 

• Recommendation.—DHS should explore strengthening the security of the ESTA application by introducing mechanisms to 

instantly verify the data provided by applicants. Such tools are 

already standard on many internet-based forms and sign-ups. 

Data validation, for instance, could easily be introduced to confirm an applicant’s email address or mobile phone number 

through a confirmation code to be re-entered on the form. This 

would give authorities greater confidence in the information 

supplied by applicants, particularly individuals who might be 

supplying false information. DHS should also engage with private-sector companies who provide on-line tools capable of ‘‘deception detection’’ on web-based forms. 

Key Finding 24.—U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies 

remain concerned about terrorists posing as refugees. Agencies 

have made improvements to the refugee security screening process, 

but more must be done to mitigate potential vulnerabilities. 

Members of terrorist groups like ISIS have publicly bragged they 

are working to sneak operatives into the West posing as refugees, 

and European officials are worried this is already the case.201 The 

Task Force recognizes terrorist infiltration into the United States 

through the refugee process is less likely than other routes and 

more time intensive for extremists, but these threats must be kept 

in mind during the refugee screening process. Such tactics would 

not be new for terrorist groups, and more than 4 million people 
53 

202 James Meek, Cindy Galli, and Brian Ross, ‘‘Exclusive: U.S. May Have Let ‘Dozens’ of Terrorists Into Country As Refugees,’’ ABC News, November 20, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/ 

Blotter/al-qaeda-kentucky-us-dozens-terrorists-country-refugees/story?id=20931131. 203FBI Assistant Director for Counterterrorism Michael Steinbach made this point in a February hearing before the Committee: House Committee on Homeland Security, Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror, 114th 

Cong., 1st sess., Hrg. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), http://www.gpo.gov/ 

fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg94106/html/CHRG-114hhrg94106.htm. 

have fled the conflict zone in Syria, offering extremists ample opportunity to blend into migrant groups. 

America has a proud tradition of welcoming refugees, especially 

those fleeing war and violence in their home countries. However we 

also must remain vigilant that we do not inadvertently grant admission into our country to violent extremists seeking to do our 

people harm. Fighters belonging to ISIS’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in 

Iraq, successfully slipped into the United States through the refugee resettlement program in 2009, when two terrorist responsible 

for killing U.S. troops in Iraq were granted entry and settled in 

Kentucky. Only later did the FBI and DHS discover this error and 

arrest the suspects after finding their fingerprints matched those 

found on IEDs in Iraq.202

Law enforcement and intelligence officials have expressed concern publicly and privately to Task Force Members that our refugee screening process has inherent vulnerabilities, particularly in 

war-torn countries where we have little intelligence on the ground. 

The lack of information makes it difficult to conduct high-confidence background checks on potential refugees.203 In other words, 

we cannot screen against information we do not have. In these 

cases, departments and agencies should establish clear plans to enhance background reviews and outline how domestic agencies like 

the FBI will be involved in mitigating any risks associated with 

populations of concern which are granted entry. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should provide a report 

to Congress highlighting the refugee routes most vulnerable to 

terrorist exploitation based on intelligence, detailing the state 

of the refugee vetting process for those countries, and outlining 

plans to mitigate any vulnerabilities in the system. 

TRAVEL PHASE 

America has sought to build out a ‘‘layered’’ defense against terrorist travel and has made considerable improvements since the 

early 2000s. Indeed, passengers traveling to, from, and within the 

United States are subject to security screening procedures—some 

seen and some unseen—at virtually every stage in their journey. 

These measures include watch list vetting, automated targeting to 

identify high-risk passengers, physical traveler and baggage 

screening, Federal air marshal protection, and other security layers. 

In the wake of past security breaches, passengers are now vetted 

against counterterrorism databases at multiple stages throughout 

their journey, potentially including after they have booked their 

ticket, when they check in at the airport, once the aircraft departs, 

and—for those headed into the country—at the border and immigration checkpoint. Continuous checks allow law enforcement to 

spot suspicious travel patterns and ensure real-time intelligence 
54 

204Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, House Committee on Homeland Security, Intelligence Sharing and Terrorist Travel, 112th Cong., 1st sess., Hrg. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73736/html/ 

CHRG-112hhrg73736.htm. 205 Carole Landry, ‘‘Foreign Fighters Switching Tactics to Reach Syria, Iraq,’’ Yahoo News, 

May 29, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/us-says-efforts-stop-foreign-fighters-fall-way163730357.html. 206 House Committee on Homeland Security, Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Terror. 207 Ibid. 

can be fused into the process to stop terrorist suspects who are on 

the move.204

Despite improvements, the foreign fighter threat has stressed the 

system. Terrorists are changing their tactics, and authorities are 

having a harder time tracking them. The Task Force commends 

DHS in particular for stepping up efforts to interdict terrorists and 

foreign fighters, but we believe additional steps can be taken to 

tighten security in the travel phase. 

Key Finding 25.—Aspiring foreign fighters are increasingly using 

‘‘broken travel’’ and other evasive tactics, making it difficult for authorities to detect and disrupt their movements. 

Earlier this year, INTERPOL chief Juergen Stock warned the 

U.N. Security Council about ‘‘broken travel,’’ explaining that foreign fighters were increasingly using circuitous routes and middlemen to get to and from the conflict zone.205 For example, an aspiring American foreign fighter might book a round-trip ticket from 

New York to Athens, but skip the return flight and instead drive 

through Turkey to get to Syria. This can make it harder for law 

enforcement to track suspects. ‘‘It is a concern,’’ explained DHS intelligence chief Frank Taylor at a committee hearing this year. 

‘‘People can book a flight to an end-destination . . . and go other 

places.’’206 U.S. officials testifying before the committee in February also emphasized extremists are varying their routes using 

combinations of air, land, and sea transportation.207

We are concerned the international travel system is not well-suited for detecting broken travel and similar approaches used by terrorists and foreign fighters. Spotting such tactics requires close and 

continuous information sharing between countries regarding passenger manifests, screening data, and other information that some 

do not even routinely collect. The problem does not appear to have 

an easy solution, but closer multilateral information exchanges—at 

least in cases of known or suspected terrorists—might help illuminate terror travel routes and result in better tracking of suspects. 

• Recommendation.—U.S. authorities must engage with air carriers and foreign partners to discuss enhancing air passenger 

targeting systems, information sharing, and additional protocols that might make it easier to spot extremists’ broken travel 

tactics. Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies 

should undertake a concerted effort to ensure all relevant travel data is being leveraged to uncover extremists’ evasive transit patterns. Other governments, especially in Europe, can address this challenge by improving collection of passenger data, 

as discussed in the ‘‘Overseas Gaps’’ section of this report, and 

sharing it in counterterrorism cases. 
55 

Key Finding 26.—More could be done to give front-line operators 

better intelligence reach-back capabilities so DHS can ‘‘connect the 

dots’’ and uncover previously unidentified terrorists and foreign 

fighters using information obtained at border checkpoints. 

DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers currently 

have the ability to pass along suspicious information collected at 

the borders for analysts to review. However, the process is not fully 

automated, and it does not take full advantage of the Government’s 

array of criminal-intelligence and travel databases, meaning that 

important connections could be getting missed. 

For example, an officer might interview a suspicious passenger 

in secondary screening and receive a phone number for the place 

the passenger is staying while in the country. While the traveler 

himself might not pop up on a terrorist watch list, the phone number might be connected to a known terrorist facilitator. But even 

if the CBP officer passed along his interview data to analysts, existing systems might not be able to make the terrorism connection. 

Indeed, CBP still does not have full, automated access to some sensitive databases or to certain useful collections of travel data held 

by other departments and agencies. 

The above scenario is a hypothetical. Nevertheless we believe it 

is important for CBP officers to have the ability to easily and 

quickly transmit information gained during inspections to be fully 

vetted for National security reasons. This means the agency must 

have access—or reach-back—to all relevant Unclassified and Classified systems needed to uncover previously-unknown terrorism 

connections, especially when engaging with high-risk subjects. 

• Recommendation.—DHS should work with other relevant agencies to provide Congress with a plan to better integrate intelligence and law enforcement information into CBP’s counterterrorism screening processes. This plan should improve CBP’s 

ability to fully vet discrete pieces of information acquired during inspections. The Department should also consider co-locating of some of its vetting personnel with other agencies to facilitate closer collaboration and information sharing. 

Key Finding 27.—U.S. authorities continue to ‘‘push the border 

outward’’ by deploying homeland security initiatives overseas, like 

CBP’s Preclearance program. Expanding such initiatives could help 

detect threats sooner. 

The Task Force commends DHS for working to increase the use 

of the Preclearance program at overseas airports with flights to the 

United States. In the select locations where it has been established, 

the Preclearance program allows overseas-based CBP officers to 

screen all passengers and luggage before a flight takes off for the 

United States. Officers are able to use the same authorities they 

would have if the inspections were conducted on U.S. soil. 

CBP currently has 15 Preclearance locations in six countries, including Ireland, Aruba, The Bahamas, Bermuda, Canada, and the 

United Arab Emirates. However the foreign fighter threat has 

shown many other locations to be far more vulnerable to terrorist 

travel than those currently covered by the program. We are pleased 

that DHS announced plans earlier this year to seek an expansion 

of preclearance operations to 10 new airports, including to high- 
56 

208 ‘‘DHS Announces Intent to Expand Preclearance to 10 New Airports,’’ The Department of 

Homeland Security, May 29, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/05/29/dhs-announces-intent-expand-preclearance-10-new-airports. 

risk terror transit countries like Turkey.208 The Department should 

keep Congress apprised of these negotiations and continue to refine 

its risk-based methodology for choosing new sites. • Recommendation.—DHS should continue with its efforts to expand preclearance operations, should maintain rigorous riskbased selection criteria, and should provide Congress with a 

clear and continuing justification for selecting additional locations. 

Key Finding 28.—Federal authorities use the International 

Criminal Police Organization’s (INTERPOL) databases frequently 

for counterterrorism purposes, but only a fraction of U.S. States 

have access to INTERPOL’s systems. Expansion to more States 

could help detect wanted foreign fighters who have slipped past 

border security. 

INTERPOL oversees systems—including terrorist and criminal 

databases and a world-wide database of lost and stolen passports— 

that are crucial global tools for combating terrorist and foreign 

fighter travel (for more detail, see Key Finding 31). Currently, all 

travelers entering and exiting the United States are screened 

against these systems. Federal law enforcement agencies also have 

worked in recent years to extend INTERPOL screening beyond the 

border by giving other Government partners access to the system. 

However, we found that fewer than a quarter of U.S. States currently have access to INTERPOL systems. Those which do can use 

the databases to catch wanted international fugitives during law 

enforcement stops or to ensure individuals are not presenting 

fraudulent travel documents to get drivers licenses. These tools 

could help more State and local agencies identify violent extremist 

who may have entered the country undetected or under a different 

alias. 

• Recommendation.—The administration should report to Congress in its next budget request how it will empower 

INTERPOL Washington to work with a broader slate of state 

and local partners to expand access to INTERPOL’s systems, 

especially for counterterrorism purposes. • Recommendation.—The administration should consider granting State and local law enforcement the ability to quickly submit INTERPOL notices for wanted subjects in their jurisdictions. Aspiring foreign fighters often leave for the conflict zone 

with little or no notice, and giving State and local partners the 

ability to expedite notices to INTERPOL’s 190 member states 

could help stop extremists in their tracks on the way to terrorist safe havens, especially in cases where local authorities 

are tipped off to a suspect who was not previously on Federal 

law enforcement’s radar. 

OVERSEAS GAPS

The Task Force’s biggest concern is that foreign governments 

have not done enough to close conspicuous security gaps which are 

susceptible to extremist exploitation. These weaknesses make it 
57 

209 UN Department of Public Information, ‘‘Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 

Condemning Violent Extremism.’’ 210 Ibid. 

easier for Americans to get to jihadist battlefields and increase the 

threat of extremists traveling undetected and reaching U.S. soil. 

Many of our foreign partners remain in a ‘‘pre-9/11’’ counterterrorism posture, with security gaps that mirror our own from 15 

years ago. Barriers between intelligence and police prevent information sharing in some countries, while in others lax counterterrorism screening at airports and border crossings makes it easier 

for extremists to slip through undetected. Additionally, some countries still do not even criminalize participation in international terrorism, making it difficult to jail foreign fighters. 

Over the past decade, the U.S. Government has provided billions 

of dollars in counterterrorism assistance to foreign partners, especially to disrupt terrorist travel. For example, the State Department and DHS have helped other governments screen passengers 

against terrorist watch lists and strengthen border security. Similarly, DOJ has deployed its legal experts world-wide to advise foreign officials on crafting and enforcing counterterrorism laws. In 

many places these efforts have been successful, but the Task Force 

is concerned assistance efforts have been uncoordinated and lack 

overarching strategic guidance. 

Recognizing overseas gaps, the Obama administration pushed 

the U.N. Security Council last year to pass Resolution 2178, which 

required U.N. member states to detain and prosecute foreign fighters crossing their borders.209 The resolution also pressured members to accelerate counterterrorism information sharing and tighten 

border controls through more secure travel documents and suspicious-passenger targeting systems.210 Some countries are making 

progress, but we believe many have a long way to go. 

Key Finding 29.—U.S. defenses against terrorist travel are weakened by glaring and persistent security gaps in foreign countries. 

This includes insufficient intelligence collection, poor information 

sharing, lax screening of travelers, inadequate laws for prosecuting 

terrorists and foreign fighters, and weak border security. We are 

particularly concerned about gaps in Europe, which has become a 

major transit pathway for jihadists. 

America cannot stop threats if it cannot see them coming. In the 

case of terrorist travel, when foreign governments are unable to 

identify extremists within their own borders or do not share information about them, it increases the odds they will evade our own 

security systems. Unfortunately, a number of our foreign partners 

have invested too little in border management and counterterrorism tools, missing critical opportunities to stop the movement of 

extremists and increasing the risk to the rest of the international 

community. 

When assessing overseas gaps, the Task Force focused primarily 

on problems in Europe for two reasons. First, most of the Westerners who have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq—including the 

Americans—transited Europe at some point, with the most common 

entry point into Syria being Turkey, which straddles Europe and 

Asia. Second, thousands of Europeans have gone to fight with 
58 

211Lauren Frayer, ‘‘In Spanish Barrio, Residents Recall Train Attack Suspect Charged in 

France,’’ Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fgspain-france-train-attack-suspect-20150827-story.html. 212 Hijrah to the Islamic State, 2015. 213Kim Willsher, ‘‘Islamic State Magazine Interviews Hayat Boumeddiene,’’ The Guardian, 

February 12, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/12/islamic-state-magazineinterviews-hayat-boumeddiene. 

jihadists, and it is easier for them to travel to the United States 

on their passports than it is for citizens on most other continents. 

Thus, European foreign fighters represent a somewhat higher terror travel threat to the United States. 

Europe’s 26-country Schengen Area is ground zero for the continent’s terrorist travel woes. Members of the area have abolished 

border checkpoints and passport controls to allow anyone inside it 

to move effortlessly between the many countries. But in addition 

to helping tourists, the wide-open area has become a boon for terrorists. The European Union (EU) does not have common police or 

intelligence services, making it easy for violent extremists and foreign fighters to change locations and keep authorities from catching onto them. The assailant behind an attempted terrorist attack 

in August on a high-speed train from Amsterdam to Paris—Ayoub 

El Khazzani—is the perfect example. He is suspected of having 

traveled to link up with extremists in Syria and despite being on 

several European countries’ watch lists, traveled easily between 

France, Belgium, Austria, and Germany before launching his attack.211

Jihadists are well-aware of Europe’s security loopholes. An ISIS 

e-book published this year advises aspiring fighters to start their 

travel to Syria in tourist hotspots like Spain and Greece—‘‘or any 

European country’’—because authorities are less likely to detect 

them.212 Jihadi John, the masked British ISIS fighter responsible 

for gruesome public beheading videos, reportedly traveled freely 

through Europe despite being on a terrorist watch list. Similarly 

Hayat Boumeddiene, an associate of the Charlie Hebdo terrorists, 

was known to French police but avoided detection by leaving the 

country, driving to Spain, and boarding a flight for Turkey. ‘‘I had 

no difficulty getting here,’’ she bragged from Syria in an ISIS-published interview.213

The larger concern is that some European extremists might be 

able to make it to the United States undetected once they have left 

the battlefield. We have no doubt that European authorities have 

failed to identify a sizeable number of their citizens who have migrated to Syria and Iraq because there are so many of them and 

their movements are hard to track in a place like the Schengen 

Area, with its lax counterterrorism policies. As a result, such individuals are probably not on E.U. or American terrorist watch lists, 

allowing them to return to the West under-the-radar. 

Many of our foreign partners in Europe, such as the United 

Kingdom, have sophisticated efforts in place to stop terrorist travel, 

while others are starting to take more serious action. Terrorist attacks in the streets of Brussels and Paris were a wake-up call, and 

European authorities are disrupting plots every month, some of 

which have been planned by returning jihadists. The heightened 

threat environment has led to a flurry of E.U.-wide activity to improve security. But we remain concerned some of our partners are 
59 

214Due to the sensitivities of outlining intelligence and information-sharing gaps, the Task 

Force declines to identify specific partner countries by name, except where noted by public 

sources. 215Maya Vidon-White and John Dyer, Special for USA TODAY, ‘‘Europe Shifts Policy in Escalating War on Terror,’’ USA Today, January 25, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 

world/2015/01/25/european-civil-liberties/22117007/. 

not moving quickly enough, allowing terrorist and foreign fighter 

travel to continue in both directions. 

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND INFORMATION SHARING 

Much of Europe has slashed defense and intelligence budgets in 

the decades since the Cold War ended. Those cuts, combined with 

a surge in cases involving terrorists and home-grown violent extremists, have put serious strain on security services across the 

continent. Indeed, the Task Force consistently heard concerns that 

a number of our foreign partners do not have sufficient capabilities 

needed to identify and track the rising number of terrorists and 

home-grown violent extremists.214 This is a real problem. If European security services cannot identify extremists in the first place, 

then they will be unable to share their biographic information with 

partners like the United States, and most importantly, detect them 

when they travel. 

A deteriorating threat picture has motivated some countries to 

take action. In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, for instance, 

French Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared the country’s ‘‘No. 1 

priority, the No. 1 requirement’’ would be ‘‘to further reinforce the 

human and technical resources of intelligence services’’; the government has since announced plans for an additional 3,000 counterterrorism professionals.215 But this does not solve the problem of 

intra-European cooperation, which is essential when terrorist can 

so easily move between European countries. 

The Task Force found barriers to information sharing to be a 

problem—within countries, between them, and with the United 

States. A number of European governments are stymied by legacy 

bureaucratic stovepipes, turf battles, or strict data privacy laws 

that prevent collaboration between agencies. Even in major West 

European capitals, security agencies are often still not well-integrated with border authorities and do not freely share information. 

We found one top U.S. ally, for instance, did not regularly include 

border officials in its National security policymaking process, despite serious counterterrorism threats at the country’s borders. 

E.U. security officials also expressed concern to the Task Force 

that continent’s intelligence and security services are not always 

exchanging information with one another. In the 26-country 

Schengen Area, for example, Country X might share its foreign 

fighter names with Country Y but not with neighboring Country Z. 

This creates a security gap since an individual can travel freely 

anywhere inside the area. E.U.-wide watchlists were supposed to 

solve this problem, but officials say member states have been reluctant to place all of their suspects in those databases. 

In short, information about foreign fighters is crossing borders 

less quickly than the extremists themselves. Turkey is an illustrative example. Despite the fact that it is the main transit point 

into Syria for Westerners, several European countries were still 

hesitant to share their watch lists of suspected foreign fighters 
60 

216Task Force staff meeting with Turkish officials, July 2015. 217Dave Keating, ‘‘EU Leaders to Call for Revision of Schengen Border Code,’’ Politico, February 12, 2015, http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-to-call-for-revision-of-schengen-bordercode/. Fortunately, this is not true for non-E.U. persons, who are typically screened against terrorist and criminal databases when they enter and exit the European Union. 218 Ibid. 219 European leaders are aware of this security gap and have put forward measures to do more 

checks ‘‘on the basis of a risk assessment,’’ e.g. on individuals traveling from higher-risk locations. The Task Force believes such half-measures are woefully inadequate and that all E.U. 

nationals should be screened against terrorism watch lists when traveling to and from the continent. 

with Turkey, whether for privacy, security, or political reasons. The 

result is that the Turkish government says it is unable to identify 

and stop many individuals who might be headed to or from the conflict zone. 

U.S. officials have reportedly begun to urge their counterparts in 

Europe to share all the data they can with Turkish authorities. 

Some progress has been made. In 2011, Turkey’s ‘‘no-entry’’ watch 

list only had 280 names; as of July, it contained more than 14,000 

names from 94 countries, thanks in large part to information provided by foreign intelligence and security agencies.216 But with the 

number of known foreign fighters getting close to 30,000, Turkey 

is clearly still missing a substantial number of names, some of 

which foreign partners likely possess but may not have shared. 

As far as transatlantic information sharing goes, we believe 

counterterrorism exchanges between the United States and Europe 

have improved considerably in recent years, but some of our partners are still not living up to their obligations, as detailed in Key 

Finding 8. 

TRAVELER SCREENING 

We are deeply concerned our European allies are not conducting 

sufficient counterterrorism checks at their borders and airports. 

Many countries have failed to implement comprehensive 

watchlisting and screening procedures or do not conduct suspicious 

traveler ‘‘targeting’’ to find previously unidentified extremists based 

on travel patterns and other data. These tools are critical tripwires 

needed to prevent the cross-border movement of violent extremists. 

Most alarming is the failure of European states to screen their 

own citizens against terrorist watch lists when they travel. E.U. 

rules forbids blanket screening of citizens, meaning most Europeans are not checked for terror ties when they fly into and out of 

the continent.217 Border guards are permitted to vet specific individuals who seem suspicious against counterterrorism databases, 

but only on a ‘‘non-systematic’’ bases.218 With so many Europeans 

traveling to fight in Syria, we believe this is a dangerous weakness, 

which could allow extremists to easily make it back home without 

being flagged.219 By comparison, anyone traveling to and from the 

United States, including U.S. citizens, are screened against 

counterterrorism databases at multiple points in the journey, from 

ticket purchase to takeoff. 

We are also concerned even more basic screening measures, such 

as full passport checks, are not happening at European airports 

and external border crossing. Border guards reportedly screen only 

30 percent of E.U. passports for fraud when citizens depart from 
61 

220 Adrian Croft and Barbara Lewis, ‘‘EU Leaders Urge Stricter Border Checks in Counterterror Drive,’’ Reuters UK, February 12, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/02/12/uk-eusecurity-leaders-idUKKBN0LG01H20150212. 221 As a result, the bulk of European passports do not get checked against INTERPOL’s global 

Stolen and Lost Travel Document Database, a process which happens for anyone entering or 

exiting the United States. 222 E.U. officials are reportedly beginning to require more thorough inspections of E.U. passports in light of security concerns, but knowledgeable observers have reported to the Task Force 

that such changes do not appear to have widely taken effect. 223Foreign Terrorist Fighters—Application of the Schengen Border Code—Follow-up—Update 

on Progress on the Preparation of Risk Indicators, report (Brussels: Council of the European 

Union, 2015), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/may/eu-council-ff-sbc-risk-indicators8741-15.pdf. 224 Advance Passenger Information (API) data typically includes a passenger’s flight information as well as information received by a passenger at the time of check-in on government-issued 

travel documents, including name and date of birth. Passenger Name Record (PNR) data is more 

detailed and is received by authorities earlier; it includes the information customers provide to 

airlines when they buy their tickets, including booking and payment details. This information 

is then used by law enforcement to screen passengers and assign risk profiles. 225 As of this writing, E.U. leaders are still in negotiations over an E.U.-wide PNR system. 

The issue has been debated within the European Parliament since 2011 but has been held up 

by member states over data privacy concerns. 

or return to the Schengen Area.220 Most of the time they simply 

do a quick visual inspections before waiving E.U. citizens past the 

checkpoint.221 This lax security practice is an open invitation to 

fraud and a glaring security loophole which makes it easier for extremists to sneak into the West on false documents.222 European 

leaders pledged at the beginning of this year to do more, but a May 

report indicated there was no agreement between countries on 

doing systematic checks on traveler documents; indeed, only one 

country was doing so.223

European authorities have also failed to develop a system for collecting data on air passengers flying into and out of the continent. 

The combination of airplane manifests and booking informationknown as Passenger Name Record (PNR) data224—would allow border officers to spot suspicious individuals before they arrive at the 

airport. U.S. authorities say such tools have been essential for 

helping them identify previously unknown terrorist suspects and 

for deciding in a risk-based manner which travelers to send to secondary screening before they even land. 

The European Union is currently considering a PNR system 

which, like the United States, would require airlines to share data 

on passengers entering or exiting the European Union for counterterrorism purposes. However, the Task Force is worried such a system will not be approved and fully implemented for years because 

of the European Union’s slow bureaucratic movement on the 

issue.225 Currently a handful of E.U. states have developed their 

own ‘‘pilot’’ PNR systems, but a patchwork of different national systems is a weak substitute for a regional system. Without an E.U.- 

wide capability, more violent extremists will slip through the 

cracks. This, in turn, affects America’s security as well. 

The lack of a PNR system is not just a European problem. In 

fact, most countries not only lack PNR systems but do not collect 

even more basic Advanced Passenger Information (API). While 

PNR data is more detailed and can be received by authorities when 

a ticket is purchased, API data is what a passenger submits at 

check-in, including name, date of birth, and basic flight information. According to a U.N. report, only one-fourth of countries in the 

world collect and screen API data before flights in order to identify 
62 

226 ‘‘UN Urges Greater Use of Advance Passenger Information to Stem Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters,’’ U.N. News Center, June 11, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/ 

story.asp?NewsID=51128#.VdPQTbJVikp. 227 Ibid. 228 ‘‘Country Reports: Europe Overview,’’ U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/j/ 

ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm. 

threats, a serious global gap in efforts to stem terrorist travel.226

And only 12 of the United Nations’ 193 member states have API 

systems which can do passenger risk assessments in near-real-time 

to alert border authorities to terror suspects and potential foreign 

fighters who may be headed their way.227

Turkey, which is not a member of the European Union, has grappled with many of the same issues. We are pleased to see Turkish 

authorities have begun to toughen watchlist screening, including 

adding thousands of names to its no-entry list in recent months 

and placing ‘‘Risk Analysis Units’’ (RAUs) at airports and bus stations to detect suspicious travelers. Turkey says these efforts have 

helped it deport more than 1,300 suspects since the Syrian civil 

war began, including individuals who have tried multiple times to 

enter Turkey on the way to join ISIS. 

The Task Force is concerned however that other countries may 

not always be notified by Turkish police when one of their own citizens is turned away at the Turkish border for counterterrorism 

reasons. Notification is important, as it tips off authorities from the 

origin country to investigate suspicious individuals once they return. Moreover, even though the RAUs are a step in the right direction, some have questioned whether they are analytically rigorous and whether the officers doing the manual targeting have the 

tools to conduct effective, risk-based searches of passengers. 

We are also concerned that Turkey may not be comprehensively 

screening all outbound air passengers against national and international terrorist databases and watch lists, as well as travelers at 

locations like seaports and land border crossings which extremists 

leaving Syria are increasingly using to avoid scrutiny. Additionally, 

Turkey still has not implemented its own API/PNR systems. Such 

capabilities are urgently needed to spot arriving and departing foreign fighters, especially since Turkey is the main transit country 

to the ISIS safe haven. Officials say they are working on one, but 

the time line for implementation is unclear. Despite these areas for 

improvement, Turkey has come a long way in the past year and is 

clearly taking steps to tighten security. 

COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS AND PROSECUTIONS 

We found a number of foreign partners have been slow to update 

their counterterrorism laws to keep pace with the threat, including 

several key countries in Europe. Turkey is the most concerning example. Turkish law does not criminalize participation in international terrorism; instead it focuses more narrowly on defining 

terrorism as a crime against the Turkish state or its people.228 The 

State Department believes this ‘‘can be an impediment to operational and legal cooperation against global terrorist network,’’ and 

with thousands of foreign fighters transiting Turkey’s territory, the 

Task Force believes it is indeed an impediment. 

Legal inconsistencies on the continent are a systemic problem. 

Countries like France have made it a crime to join a terrorist group 
63 

229 John Thor Dahleburg, ‘‘European Nations Unify Laws to Prevent Foreign Fighters,’’ Yahoo 

News, May 19, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/european-nations-streamline-laws-prevent-foreignfighters-135730408.html. 230 However, the Swedish government has pledged to tighten its laws in the coming months 

to close gaps. See: Simon Johnson and Dominic Evans, ‘‘Sweden to Tighten Anti-terrorism 

Laws,’’ Reuters UK, August 28, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/28/uk-sweden-security-idUKKCN0QX0QP20150828. 231 Ibid. 232Task Force briefing with State Department, July 2015. 233 Alexandra Farone, ‘‘Bulgaria Justice Ministry Proposes Criminal Code Changes to Fight 

Terrorism,’’ JURIST, March 10, 2015, http://jurist.org/paperchase/2015/03/bulgaria-justiceministry-proposes-criminal-code-changes-to-fight-terrorism.php. 234DOJ, Attorney General Holder Urges International Effort to Confront Threat of Syrian Foreign Fighters. 235 ‘‘Country Reports: Europe Overview,’’ U.S. Department of State. 236Mark Rivett-Carnac, ‘‘U.N.: 850,000 Refugees Are Expected to Reach Europe During 2015 

and 2016,’’ Time, September 9, 2015, http://time.com/4026046/refugees-migrants-europe-unitednations-crisis-greece-germany/. 

abroad. In contrast, some Nordic countries have not made the law 

as clear and, therefore, lack the legal tools to prosecute citizens for 

attempting to become foreign fighters.229 Sweden, for example, can 

prosecute individuals for preparing to commit acts of terrorism but 

does not criminalize the act of training with terrorists or waging 

war on behalf of a terrorist group.230 European officials signed a 

pact in May to synchronize their counterterrorism laws in light of 

the foreign fighter threat, but it is unclear whether states will treat 

the move as merely symbolic or act on it decisively.231

Some countries in the international community have made legislative improvements since the passage of U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 2178, which urged all U.N. member states to combat 

foreign fighter travel. Nearly two dozen have updated their laws to 

better prosecute aspiring and returning foreign fighters, and others 

are working to do the same.232 In Europe, Bulgaria is a noteworthy 

case. The State Department warned last year that Bulgaria 

‘‘lack[ed] a comprehensive counterterrorism legal framework,’’ but 

this year the country put forward major terror-related legislation, 

citing Resolution 2178.233

Even with counterterrorism laws on the books, governments have 

struggled to prosecute extremists, especially when their lawyers 

have limited experience with terrorism crimes. DOJ has worked to 

deploy legal experts to some of these countries, such as in the Balkans, where states are less equipped to prosecute such cases.234

However, in other places the problem is making litigation ‘‘stick’’ 

on appeal. In Sweden for instance, several counterterrorism cases 

were thrown out last year when judges found the evidence was insufficient to prove suspects would have carried out their plots had 

they not been intercepted.235 This is a recurring theme in parts of 

Europe where judges are less accustomed to hearing terrorism 

cases or where vague laws make it difficult to prosecute them. 

BORDER SECURITY 

We are also worried a weak European border security posture is 

increasing the risk of extremists infiltrating the West undetected. 

The continent faces an unprecedented immigration crisis. In fact, 

Europe is on track to see nearly double the number of illegal migrants this year than it did in 2014. By year’s end, the United Nations estimates more than 400,000 will have arrived.236 Most are 

fleeing the conflict in Syria or instability in North Africa, and they 
64 

237 Jack Crone, ‘‘ISIS Plotting Trojan Horse Campaign by Smuggling Militants into Western 

Europe Disguised as Refugees ,’’ Mail Online, October 06, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 

news/article-2782625/ISIS-plotting-Trojan-Horse-campaign-smuggling-militants-western-Europe-disguised-refugees.html. 238 ‘‘Islamic State Militants ‘smuggled to Europe’—BBC News,’’ BBC News, May 17, 2015, 

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32770390. 239 John Thor Dahleburg, ‘‘EU Official: Migrant Boats Also Carrying IS Fighters,’’ The Big 

Story, July 6, 2015, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/29599fc513b8443085e63c60fbf11c3c/eu-official-terrorists-could-cross-mediterranean-europe. 240The Associated Press, ‘‘Tunisia Museum Terror Attack Suspect Arrested in Italy,’’ NY 

Daily News, May 20, 2015, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/tunisia-museum-terrorattack-suspect-arrested-italy-article-1.2229062. 241 Harald Doornbos and Jenan Moussa, ‘‘Italy Opens the Door to Disaster,’’ Foreign Policy, 

April 13, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/13/italy-islamic-state-syria-refugees/. 

are slipping across land borders or transiting the Mediterranean by 

boat to reach European border states like Greece or Italy. Once in 

mainland Europe—and inside the Schengen Area—these refugees 

can travel freely to the country of their choice to seek asylum. 

ISIS has boasted for months that it is using migrant boats as a 

Trojan Horse to plant operatives into the West,237 and the European Union’s border control agency, Frontex, warned this year it 

was possible extremists were doing so.238 Not long ago a top E.U. 

official confirmed there was information suggesting militants had 

successfully been smuggled in on these illegal routes.239 Terrorist 

exploitation of refugee pathways is not a hypothetical. In May of 

this year, Italian police arrested a Moroccan man for helping organize the ISIS-linked terrorist attack on Tunisia’s Bardo Museum, 

which resulted in the deaths of more than a dozen Western tourists. The man is believed to have arrived in Italy on a smuggler’s 

boat.240

Unfortunately, the European countries where migrants land are 

not inclined to thoroughly vet them. Under European law, refugees 

must stay in the country where they arrive and are registered. Yet 

many Mediterranean states are already overburdened by large migrant populations drawing on social services and do not want the 

new arrivals to stay. As a result, border states have an incentive 

to ‘‘look the other way’’ and let unregistered migrants make their 

way into the rest of the continent to become another country’s 

problem. 

‘‘Nobody checked us upon reaching Italy,’’ one Syrian migrant 

named Muhammad reported. ‘‘No coast guard, no policeman ever 

asked if we had papers. Nobody registered us, nobody took a photo 

of us, nobody took our fingerprints, no one asked us who we 

were.’’241 The Task Force was disturbed to find such cases were alltoo-common—even the norm—in European border states overwhelmed by refugee arrivals. 

Some refugees are screened against counterterrorism databases, 

but the Task Force was told the majority of arrivals are not. Extremists who blend in with these asylum-seekers and make their 

way onto the continent could easily obtain European passports 

within a few short years and have visa-free access to the United 

States. While the scenario is not the likeliest route for terrorist 

travel, it is certainly possible, especially since terrorist groups have 

vowed to exploit weaknesses in refugee routes. 

The refugee quoted above, Muhammed, is now settled in Germany but warns that others could follow his same path to commit 

acts of terror. ‘‘Any ISIS terrorist could have entered Italy and 
65 

242 Ibid. 

traveled further into Europe without any problem,’’ he explained. 

‘‘ISIS members can take their guns and hand grenades with them, 

because the Italians even never checked any of the luggage.’’242

Italian authorities have taken steps to mitigate the danger of terrorist exploitation at their borders, but the system for screening 

new arrivals is still nowhere near secure. 

Governments throughout the region have criticized Mediterranean countries for not showing leadership to tackle the migrant crisis. But Mediterranean states are quick to note they are overwhelmed by the influx of refugees and need more assistance from 

the rest of Europe, arguing border security should be a shared burden and not just the job of those at the continent’s frontiers. Whatever the case, Europe’s halting response to the crisis at its borders 

is a golden opportunity for terrorists and a ticking time-bomb for 

the West. 

As noted above, the Task Force focused primarily on security 

weaknesses in Europe because of the routes American foreign fighters have taken to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq, as well as 

how easy it is for potential European extremists to travel to the 

United States on their passports. We do not mean to suggest our 

European partners are failing to confront terrorism and the foreign 

fighter threat overall, but rather that foundational problems remain and must be addressed with greater urgency. Many countries 

face steeper challenges when it comes to combating terrorist travel, 

especially in North Africa and the Middle East. More must be done 

globally to shine a light on these security deficiencies and collaborate to reconcile them. • Recommendation.—The State Department and DHS, in consultation with the intelligence community, should produce a 

regular report card highlighting the progress of foreign partners in fulfilling their obligations under U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 2178 on foreign fighters and underscore areas 

where partners need improvement. Such reports should be provided to Congress in Classified and Unclassified form, with the 

latter being made public. Moreover, they should assess the 

progress of foreign partners in areas including, but not limited 

to, intelligence collection, information sharing, traveler screening, legal frameworks, and border security; where possible, 

these assessments should also incorporate any similar insights 

on foreign partner capacity released by the U.N.’s Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force Office. 

• Recommendation.—The administration must continue pressing 

foreign partners, especially in Europe, to end the patchwork 

approach to information sharing by including more terrorist 

and foreign fighter names in regional and international terrorist watch lists—rather than conducting exchanges on a selective, bilateral basis. We understand there are sometimes 

sensitivities to such sharing, but to the furthest extent possible 

these partners must move toward universal situational awareness to combat the growing and dynamic terrorist threat. Additionally, the administration should continue its efforts to make 
66 

sure foreign governments are sharing appropriate information 

with Turkish authorities, who are on the front lines of the foreign fighter migration. 

• Recommendation.—The United States must increase pressure 

on European partners to begin universally and systematically 

screening E.U.-citizen travelers against terrorist watch lists. 

Moreover, officials should encourage states outside of the European Union, especially Turkey, to screen both inbound and outbound travelers against national and international counterterrorism databases to detect possible foreign fighters—at airports, land border crossings, and sea ports. 

• Recommendation.—The European Union must quickly approve 

and implement a regional air passenger targeting system to 

collect and analyze Passenger Name Record data for counterterrorism purposes. The United States should continue to encourage the European Union to move in this direction and, in 

the meantime, should consider how to provide expanded assistance to E.U. countries looking to develop their own individual 

PNR systems, which are a crucial tool for counterterrorism investigations and uncovering previously unidentified extremists. 

DHS and State Department should also explore tying VWP 

participation to a country’s ability to conduct PNR vetting. 

• Recommendation.—U.S. authorities should engage in a highlevel dialogue with the U.N., E.U., and relevant non-E.U. countries on establishing a better systematic process for vetting refugees fleeing North Africa and the conflict in Syria. Regional 

authorities must be able to ensure the biographic and biometric information of migrants is screened against counterterrorism databases to weed out potential extremists attempting 

to infiltrate the West. 

• Recommendation.—DHS and the State Department should explore accelerated expansion of their off-the-shelf interdiction 

capabilities to high-risk countries. Both departments currently 

offer ready-made hardware and software to help foreign partners conduct watchlisting, screening, and targeting of terrorists and foreign fighters, including the State Department’s Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System 

(PISCES) and CBP’s Automated Targeting System Global 

(ATS–G). The provision of these tools should be better coordinated between the two departments, and in the long run such 

assistance should be provided consistent with priorities established under the Foreign Partner Engagement Plan, a tool the 

Task Force calls for under Key Finding 32. 

• Recommendation.—For countries unwilling to accept U.S. border screening tools and assistance, DHS and the State Department should consider releasing ‘‘open-source’’ software based 

on their watchlisting, screening, and targeting tools. This software could be provided to a neutral organization like 

INTERPOL for distribution and would offer a more limited set 

of the capabilities than the technology provided directly by the 

U.S. Government. Even with fewer capabilities, an open-source 

platform would give countries a powerful starting point for developing and deploying their own terrorist interdiction systems 
67 

243The 9/11 Commission Report, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. 244For instance, see: Tom Rayner, ‘‘Foreign IS Recruits Using Fake Syrian Passports,’’ Sky 

News, February 25, 2015, http://news.sky.com/story/1433658/foreign-is-recruits-using-fake-syrian-passports. 245Dipesh Gadher and Richard Kerbaj, ‘‘Islamic Militants Faking Deaths to Get Home, Say 

Security Sources,’’ The Australian, June 22, 2014, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/ 

world/islamic-militants-faking-deaths-to-get-home-say-security-sources/story-fnb64oi6-12269- 

62867588. 246 U.N. Department of Public Information, ‘‘Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 

Condemning Violent Extremism.’’ 247Passport Control Mechanisms: The Most Significant Challenges, publication, 1st ed., vol. 

10 (International Civil Aviation Organization), http://www.icao.int/publications/ 

journalsreports/2014/MRTDlReportlVol10lNo1.pdf. 248Tom Shiel, ‘‘Islamic State: Where Do Its Fighters Come From?,’’ The Telegraph, June 8, 

2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11660487/Islamic-State-oneyear-on-Where-do-its-fighters-come-from.html. 

at border checkpoints. The administration should provide Congress with details on how it would implement such a program. 

Key Finding 30.—Extremists are using fraudulent passports to 

travel discretely. However, a third of the international community—including major source countries of foreign fighters—still do 

not issue fraud-resistant ‘‘e-passports,’’ and most countries are still 

unable to validate the authenticity of ‘‘e-passports.’’ 

It is no secret why passport security is critical in the fight 

against terrorist travel. ‘‘For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons,’’ the 9/11 Commission noted in its final report.243 Unsurprisingly, a number of recent foreign fighter suspects 

have been found using altered passports, fake passports, and even 

travel documents belonging to siblings in order to sneak into Syria 

or travel home.244 Some are even faking their deaths on the battlefield to avoid scrutiny,245 increasing concerns that fighters might 

try to come home with a different identity. Responding to concerns, 

the United Nations reminded member states last fall that preventing the forgery of identity papers was a key aspect of preventing ‘‘the movement of terrorists.’’246

Fraud-resistant ‘‘e-passports’’ are a useful counterterrorism tool, 

and adoption of them has grown world-wide in recent years, according to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). These 

documents are considered more secure because they incorporate a 

passenger’s biometric information, typically via smart card containing the passenger’s face, fingerprint, or iris scan data. However, having an e-passport is not enough; the country reading it 

must be able to confirm it is authentic, too, which is done through 

ICAO’s ‘‘public key directory’’ program. This allows authorities to 

validate, for instance, that a traveler’s fingerprint matches the 

traveler’s passport. 

The Task Force was disappointed to find many countries around 

the world still do not issue e-passports, including key source countries for foreign fighters. In fact, at least 70 governments—or onethird of the international community—do not issue their citizens epassports.247 Tunisia is one of the laggards, which is disturbing 

considering it is the top source country for foreign fighters headed 

to Syria and Iraq.248 Without a secure passport requirement, it is 

easier for Tunisian jihadists to fake their identities, disguise their 

travel to the conflict zone, or more easily pose as refugees when 

trying to enter the West. Other countries of concern which lack e- 
68 

249 Ibid. 250 Ibid. 251 Ibid. 252Mike Giglio and Munzer Al-Awad, ‘‘How An American Tourist Lost His Passport In 

Istanbul And Was Sucked Into Syria’s War,’’ BuzzFeed, May 28, 2015, http:// 

www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/stolen-passports-and-isis-fighters#.qox7z1Myy. 

passports include Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and more.249

Perhaps more worrisome is the fact that the majority of governments in the world cannot definitively read and authenticate epassports. This is good news for terrorists and foreign fighters traveling on fraudulent documents. Fewer than 25 percent of countries 

participate in the ICAO system that allows authorities to confirm 

an e-passport belongs to its holder. Running the document through 

the system also confirms it was issued by a legitimate authority, 

has not been altered, and has not been flagged in the lost or stolen 

passport system.250 But key transit countries for Western foreign 

fighters—including Turkey, Greece, and most of the Balkans 

states—are not part of the ICAO’s program and therefore do not 

have a reliable system to spot falsified e-passports.251

• Recommendation.—DHS should consider requiring all VWP 

countries to develop the means to validate fraud-resistant epassports at their borders and airports. This includes participation in ICAO’s ‘‘public key directory program’’ which helps 

border officers confirm a passport belongs to the person holding 

it. VWP countries will soon be required to issue their citizens 

e-passports if they are headed to the United States, but that 

does not mean those countries can actually authenticate such 

documents at their own border checkpoints. Requiring our 

partners to do so would make it harder for terrorists and foreign fighters to use fake documents to cross borders—and 

could keep them further from our own. 

• Recommendation.—DHS, in conjunction with the State Department, should identify other points of leverage to require or encourage non-VWP countries to issue e-passports and to develop 

the means to read them at their borders and airports, including providing expanded technical assistance to foreign partners 

to do so. 

Key Finding 31.—Many countries do not consistently add information to INTERPOL’s databases, and the majority do not screen 

against INTERPOL databases in real-time at their borders and airports. This is a clear gap in global defenses against terrorist and 

foreign fighter travel. 

In December 2014, American medical student Sam Neher traveled to Turkey as a tourist and, while on vacation in Istanbul, his 

passport was stolen. Neher visited the U.S. Consulate, reported the 

incident, and received a temporary ID, according to a news report.252 Little did he know, his passport made its way into a secretive trade in fraudulent documents that is thriving in Turkey and 

Syria. American and European passports are in high demand because travelers holding them can access many countries without a 

visa. According to the report, Neher’s passport wound up in the 
69 

253 Ibid. 254Task Force staff site visit to INTERPOL Washington, June 30, 2015. 255 In 2012, INTERPOL’s chief blasted countries for failing to use the system. See: Associated 

Press, ‘‘Interpol Chief: Countries Not Using Databases,’’ Fox News, January 19, 2012, http:// 

www.foxnews.com/world/2012/01/19/interpol-chief-countries-not-using-databases/. 256Task Force briefing with INTERPOL Washington, June 4, 2015. 257 Ibid. 258 Elisha Fieldstadt and Becky Bratu, ‘‘Missing Passport Databases Not Routinely Checked: 

Interpol—NBC News,’’ NBC News, March 14, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ 

missing-jet/missing-passport-databases-not-routinely-checked-interpol-n48261. 259Task Force briefing with INTERPOL Washington, June 4, 2015. 

hands of ISIS in Syria, a potential tool for the group to send a 

jihadist abroad.253

Stolen passports like Neher’s are supposed to be reported to 

INTERPOL, which maintains a Stolen and Lost Travel Document 

Database used to keep terrorists and criminals from traveling on 

stolen IDs. But the Task Force found the system is deeply fragmented. Many governments are inconsistent in reporting their citizens’ missing passports to INTERPOL. Even when they do, other 

countries must screen against the database to see whether a traveler is using the document illegally. Sadly, the majority of countries 

in the international community have not connected INTERPOL 

systems to their border posts for agents to screen against them in 

real-time.254

INTERPOL is a voluntary international police organization made 

up of 190 participating countries, each of which has its own locallyrun office connected to INTERPOL systems, known as a National 

Central Bureau (NCB). Like most countries, America’s NCB is 

based in the Nation’s capital and is run by DHS and DOJ, which 

manage U.S. access to the organization’s extensive criminal and 

terrorism databases, as well as its lost and stolen passport database. 

INTERPOL officials have been pushing member countries for 

years to use its systems out in the field, especially at border checkpoints.255 The United States began doing so in the mid-2000s by 

screening inbound passengers against the police organization’s 

data. The screening was so useful that U.S. authorities extended 

it Nation-wide and began using it to screen outbound passenger, 

visa applicants, and more. The United States now screens more 

than 400 million people against INTERPOL’s databases annually 

and gets 35,000 ‘‘hits’’ on the system, helping law enforcement 

catch wanted criminals and spot fake passports.256 The organization’s data has also helped U.S. law enforcement identify hundreds 

of previously-unknown terrorist suspects and foreign fighters, 

which have been added to watch lists to ensure they do not enter 

the United States.257

But far too few countries are using these systems at the border. 

In fact, INTERPOL officials have lamented that ‘‘only a handful of 

countries’’ are checking its lost and stolen passport database before 

passengers board flights.258 By some estimates, fewer than 25 percent of INTERPOL members have set up real-time access to its 

datasets beyond their NCBs.259 The reasons are varied. Some governments lack the resources to establish connectivity with disparate border posts. Others are held back by internal policy challenges, where the law enforcement agencies with access to 

INTERPOL do not provide it to the country’s immigration agencies. 
70 

260The Task Force heard these concerns from multiple officials while examining security 

screening measures in Europe. 261 Associated Press, ‘‘Man Arrested in Tunisia Museum Attack Came to Italy on Migrant 

Boat,’’ Fox News, May 20, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/05/20/italian-policemake-arrest-in-connection-with-tunisia-museum-attack/. 

But the result is the same: Lackluster use of the system allows 

more criminals and extremists to travel the world under the radar. 

INTERPOL member states are also not consistent in submitting 

information to the organization’s databases. While the United 

States adds stolen passport numbers in near-real-time to 

INTERPOL’s records, some governments wait days or weeks before 

uploading a new batch of lost passport numbers, a window which 

could allow terrorists and smugglers to cross borders with fraudulent IDs. Even some close U.S. allies with sophisticated security 

screening have had lapses in their reporting to the system.260 But 

when reports are made in a timely manner, it can make all the difference. One of the suspects arrested in connection with a terrorist 

attack this year on tourists in Tunisia was detained in Italy in part 

because his mother reported her son’s passport missing immediately after the attack.261

It is especially important for countries close to terrorist safe havens to use INTERPOL’s databases. The Task Force found a number of countries along foreign fighter routes to and from the conflict 

zone have actually improved their use of the system. Bulgaria, for 

instance, now screens against the organization’s databases at the 

borders, which has allowed it to detect wanted foreign fighters attempting to cross into its territory. Turkey, however, appears to be 

inconsistent in its use of INTERPOL to screen travelers, an issue 

which the Task Force hopes the Turkish government will address 

expeditiously. 

• Recommendation.—The U.S. Government should make it a top 

diplomatic priority to ramp up foreign partner use of 

INTERPOL systems, including the regular provision of information to the organization’s databases, and as a screening 

mechanism at borders and ports of entry, especially for 

counterterrorism purposes. The State Department should regularly assess foreign partner use of INTERPOL systems and 

share its findings with INTERPOL Washington in order to 

identify avenues for promoting and enhancing the utilization of 

these systems. 

• Recommendation.—INTERPOL Washington should be further 

empowered to deliver assistance to foreign partners who are 

not fully utilizing the system, whether independently or 

through a program established out of INTERPOL’s headquarters in France. Specifically, INTERPOL Washington 

should focus on transferring its knowledge, expertise, and systems to high-risk terror-transit countries. The administration 

should submit a proposal to Congress to enable INTERPOL 

Washington to deliver this more robust capacity-building assistance among select member countries, as identified in consultation with interagency partners and with respect to a Government-wide Foreign Partner Engagement Plan (see the recommendation under Key Finding 32). 
71 

262The Department recently announced plans to begin requiring VWP countries to screen 

against INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Document Database. See: ‘‘Statement by Secretary 

Jeh C. Johnson on Intention to Implement Security Enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program,’’ news release, August 6, 2015, The Department of Homeland Security, http:// 

www.dhs.gov/news/2015/08/06/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-intention-implement-securityenhancements-visa. 263 ‘‘Programs and Initiatives,’’ U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/ 

programs/index.htm#TSI.; ‘‘Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP),’’ U.S. Department of State, 

http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/12676.htm. 

• Recommendation.—DHS should require VWP countries to 

screen travelers crossing their borders against all INTERPOL 

systems, including the Lost and Stolen Passport Database and 

notices of wanted individuals, including terrorist and foreign 

fighter suspects.262 A number of VWP countries—whose citizens can travel easily to our country—do not use these tools in 

real-time at their borders or airports, a security loophole which 

makes it easier for extremists to travel and increases the 

chances they could get to the United States undetected. • Recommendation.—In conjunction with the State Department, 

DHS and DOJ should identify other forms of assistance which 

might be leveraged to require non-VWP countries to use 

INTERPOL more comprehensively. 

Key Finding 32.—U.S. departments and agencies have spent billions of dollars to help foreign partners improve their terror-travel 

defenses, but there is no strategy to make sure assistance is coordinated and goes to the highest-risk countries. The lack of a Government-wide engagement plan results in greater risk of overlap, 

waste, and duplication between programs. 

In the years since 9/11, the United States has spent considerable 

time and money to help our allies build the capacity to stop terrorist travel. We have done this by sharing our expertise and best 

practices. In some cases we have provided travel screening equipment and systems directly to our partners. These efforts have been 

designed to push our defenses outward and to stop threats earlier. 

Multiple U.S. departments and agencies work with foreign partners on these issues. The State Department, for instance, runs the 

Terrorist Interdiction Program which provides border control hardware and software—including watchlisting tools—to other countries. Around 200 border checkpoints around the world are now 

tied to the program, which has helped successfully catch terrorists 

trying to cross borders.263 DHS’s Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) provides a similar tool to foreign partners called Automated 

Targeting System—Global (ATS–G), which can be used to conduct 

passenger risk assessments in advance of arriving flights to weed 

out terrorist suspects and foreign fighters. Agencies also provide 

their expertise. For example, DOJ’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) program assists prosecutors and judicial personnel in foreign countries with strengthening 

counterterrorism laws and prosecuting violent extremists. 

The Task Force found however that the proliferation of assistance programs has increased the potential for overlap, waste, and 

duplication among agencies. GAO highlighted similar concerns in 

2011. For example, they discovered that seven different offices or 

components across the Federal Government were providing training to foreign officials on how to recognize fraudulent travel docu-
72 

264 ‘‘Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Foreign Partners’ Capacity to 

Prevent Terrorist Travel,’’ U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 30, 2011, http:// 

www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-637. 265 Ibid. 

ments.264 In one instance, two U.S. Government agencies in Pakistan even scheduled fraud-detection training sessions in the same 

month without knowing it. One had ample funding but no Pakistani officials had enrolled in the class; the other had a full student 

roster but lacked necessary funding.265

We are concerned departments and agencies are still not adequately coordinating their efforts. For instance, the Task Force 

spoke to two separate agencies providing counterterrorism screening systems to foreign partners, yet neither could readily identify 

the countries in which the other operated. We were also unable to 

find overarching strategic guidance for coordinating U.S. assistance 

to combat terrorist travel. One agency claimed to be using a riskbased priority list, ranking countries that needed assistance the 

most because of security gaps. But those efforts were only begun 

recently and officials declined to provide supporting data. More 

than other types of aid, the lack of a high-level strategy for terrorist interdiction assistance is concerning given the urgency of the 

problem. • Recommendation.—The administration should produce an annual Foreign Partner Engagement Plan as part of a National 

Strategy to Combat Terror Travel (see Key Finding 1, where 

the Task Force calls for the Strategy). The Plan should be coordinated with all relevant agencies and must prioritize engagement and assistance based on—among other criteria—foreign partner intelligence capabilities, information-sharing, 

travel screening, border security, counterterrorism laws, prosecutorial capacity, and related areas. As part of the development of the Plan, agencies should conduct an audit of current 

initiatives and spending on terrorist-travel related assistance 

to foreign partners to identify areas for adjustment to align 

with risk-based priorities. Moreover, the Plan should be provided in conjunction with the President’s Budget submission to 

Congress to ensure priorities are aligned with resource requests. 
(73) 

266This briefing was hosted by the Full Committee, rather than the Task Force. 267 Ibid. 

APPENDIX I: TASK FORCE ACTIVITY 

This list includes activities conducted by Members and/or staff of 

the Task Force; however, the listing is partial and does not include 

all activities, meetings, and other consultations conducted during 

the course of the Task Force’s review. 

OFFICIAL MEMBER BRIEFINGS

Terrorist Watchlisting and Foreign Fighters (March 2015) 

Briefers: National Counterterrorism Center 

Foreign Partner Information Sharing and Watchlist Enhancements (April 2015) 

Briefers: Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center 

Interagency Programs to Counter Domestic Radicalization (April 2015) 

Briefers: Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center 

Site Visit: National Counterterrorism Center (April 2015) 

Briefers: National Counterterrorism Center 

Site Visit: Washington Regional Threat Analysis Center (April 2015) 

Briefers: Center leadership and State and local law enforcement 

Counter-Messaging Terrorist Propaganda (May 2015) 

Briefers: Department of State 

INTERPOL Efforts to Counter Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel (June 2015) 

Briefers: INTERPOL Washington 

Preventing Terrorist Exploitation of Visa-Free Travel Routes to America (June 

2015) 

Briefers: Department of Homeland Security, Department of State 

On-line Counterterrorism Operations (June 2015)266

Briefers: Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Extremists’ Use of ‘‘Dark Space’’ (June 2014)267

Briefers: Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Immigration Screening and Passport Revocations to Stop Terrorist Travel (June 

2015) 

Briefers: Department of Homeland Security, Department of State 

Intelligence Information Sharing (June 2015) 

Briefers: Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Site Visit: Joint Terrorism Task Force—Washington (June 2015) 

Briefers: Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Homeland Security Advisory Council: Interim Report on Foreign Fighters (July 

2015) 

Briefers: Homeland Security Advisory Council 

Overseas U.S. Diplomatic Efforts to Obstruct Foreign Fighter Flows (July 2015) 

Briefers: Department of State 

Arrest and Prosecution of U.S. Foreign Fighter Suspects (July 2015) 

Briefers: Department of Justice 
74 

OFFICIAL STAFF BRIEFINGS

Department of Defense (1) 

Department of Homeland Security (6) 

Department of Justice (2) 

Department of State (2) 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (5) 

Government Accountability Office (7) 

INTERPOL Washington (2) 

National Counterterrorism Center (1) 

Other Intelligence Community (3) 

OFFICIAL MEMBER TRAVEL

IRAQ 

U.S. Embassy 

Meeting with Prime Minister Abadi 

Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Zebari 

Meeting with Speaker Jabouri 

ISRAEL 

U.S. Embassy 

Meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu 

Meeting with Defense Minister Yaalon 

Meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Hanegbi 

TURKEY 

U.S. Embassy 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Ministry of Interior 

Hollings Center for International Dialogue 

Istanbul Airport Security Brief 

GERMANY 

U.S. Embassy 

Ministry of Interior 

Interior Committee, Bundestag 

BELGIUM 

U.S. Embassy and Mission to the European Union (European Union) 

Meeting with Interior Minister Jambon 

E.U. Counterterrorism Officials 

NATO Headquarters 

Transatlantic Policy Network 

FRANCE 

U.S. Embassy 

French Counterterrorism Officials 

INTERPOL 

OFFICIAL STAFF TRAVEL

GREECE 

U.S. Embassy 

Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection 

Civil Aviation Authority 

Hellenic Coast Guard 

Hellenic Police 

TURKEY 

U.S. Embassy 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
75 

NATO 

Izmir Port Security 

E.U. Counterterrorism Officials 

Turkish National Police 

ITALY 

U.S. Embassy 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Ministry of Interior 

Catania Refugee Processing Center 

International Organization for Migration 

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 

OTHER TASK FORCE MEETINGS AND CONSULTATIONS

Members and staff also met with State and local representatives, 

former Government officials, think tanks, academics, professional 

organizations, and other individuals during the course of the review. Though they are not listed by name, the Task Force is grateful for the valuable input it received and the contributions of these 

individuals and organizations. 

(77) 

APPENDIX II: AMERICAN FOREIGN FIGHTER ASPIRANTS 

AND RECRUITS 

Name Age 268 Gender State 

Abdella Ahmad Tounisi ......................................... 21 ............ M .......... IL 

Abdi Nur ................................................................. 20 ............ M .......... MN 

Abdifatah Aden ...................................................... .................. M .......... OH 

Abdirahmaan Muhumed ....................................... 29 ............ M .......... MN 

Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud ............................... 23 ............ M .......... OH 

Abdirahman Yasin Daud ....................................... 21 ............ M .......... MN 

Abdullah Ramo Pazara .......................................... .................. M .......... MO 

Abdullahi Yusuf ..................................................... 18 ............ M .......... MN 

Abdurasul Juraboev ............................................... 23 ............ M .......... NY 

Adam Dandach ....................................................... 20 ............ M .......... CA 

Adnan Abdihamid Farah ....................................... 19 ............ M .......... MN 

Ahmad Abousamra ................................................ 32 ............ M .......... MA 

Akba Jihad Jordan ................................................. 22 ............ M .......... NC 

Akhror Saidakhmetov ............................................ 19 ............ M .......... NY 

Amir Farouq Ibrahim ............................................ 32 ............ M .......... PA 

Arafat Nagi ............................................................. 44 ............ M .......... NY 

Asher Abid Khan ................................................... 20 ............ M .......... TX 

Avin Marsalis Brown ............................................. 21 ............ M .......... NC 

Basit Javed ............................................................. 29 ............ M .......... NC 

Bilal Abood ............................................................. 37 ............ M .......... TX 

Colorado Teenager #1 ............................................ 15 ............ F ........... CO 

Colorado Teenager #2 ............................................ 15 ............ F ........... CO 

Colorado Teenager #3 ............................................ 17 ............ F ........... CO 

Donald Ray Morgan ............................................... 44 ............ M .......... NC 

Douglas McArthur McCain ................................... 33 ............ M .......... CA 

Eric Harroun .......................................................... 30 ............ M .......... AZ 

Guled Ali Omar ...................................................... 20 ............ M .......... MN 

‘‘H.M.’’ ..................................................................... .................. M .......... MN 

Hamza Naj Ahmed ................................................. 19 ............ M .......... MN 

Hanad Abdullahi Mohallim ................................... 18 ............ M .......... MN 

Hanad Mustafe Musse ........................................... 19 ............ M .......... MN 

Hasan Edmonds ..................................................... 22 ............ M .......... IL 

Hoda ........................................................................ 20 ............ F ........... AL 

Jaelyn Delshaun Young ......................................... 20 ............ F ........... MS 

Joshua Van Haften ................................................ 34 ............ M .......... WI 

Keonna Thomas ..................................................... 30 ............ F ........... PA 

Leon Nathan Davis ................................................ 37 ............ M .......... GA 

Michael Wolfe ......................................................... 23 ............ M .......... TX 

Mohamad Saeed Kodaimati .................................. 24 ............ M .......... CA 

Mohamed Abdihamid Farah ................................. 21 ............ M .......... MN 

Mohammad Hamzah Khan ................................... 19 ............ M .......... IL 

Mohamud Mohamed Mohamud ............................ 20 ............ M .......... MN 

Moner Abu-Salha ................................................... 22 ............ M .......... FL 

Muhammad Oda Dakhlalla ................................... 22 ............ M .......... MS 

Muhanad Badawi ................................................... 24 ............ M .......... CA 

Nader Elhuzayel .................................................... 24 ............ M .......... CA 

Nader Saadeh ......................................................... 20 ............ M .......... NJ 

Nicholas Teausant ................................................. 20 ............ M .......... CA 

Nicole Lynn Mansfield ........................................... 33 ............ F ........... MI 

Nihad Rosic ............................................................ 26 ............ M .......... NY 

‘‘S.R.G.’’ ................................................................... .................. M .......... TX 

Samuel Rahamin Topaz ........................................ 21 ............ M .......... NJ 
78 

Name Age 268 Gender State 

Shannon Maureen Conley ..................................... 19 ............ F ........... CO 

Sinh Vinh Ngo Nguyen .......................................... 24 ............ M .......... CA 

Tairod Nathan Webster Pugh ............................... 47 ............ M .......... NJ 

Yusra Ismail ........................................................... 20 ............ F ........... MN 

Yusuf Jama ............................................................. 21 ............ M .......... MN 

Zacharia Yusuf Abdurahman ................................ 19 ............ M .......... MN 

268This includes the age of the suspect at arrest, time of death, or other relevant incident. In 

some cases, the exact age is an estimate based on publicly-available data. 
(79) 

APPENDIX III: ABBREVIATIONS 

Abbreviation Definition 

API ................ Advanced Passenger Information 

AQI ................ al-Qaeda in Iraq 

ATS–G ........... U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Automated Targeting System 

Global 

CBP ............... U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CSCC ............. Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications 

CTAB ............ Department of Homeland Security’s Counterterrorism Advisory 

Board 

DHS ............... Department of Homeland Security 

DNI ............... Director of National Intelligence 

DOJ ............... Department of Justice 

ESTA ............. Electronic System for Travel Authorization 

EU ................. European Union 

FBI ................ Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEMA ............ Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GAO .............. Government Accountability Office 

HSPD–6 ........ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 

ICAO ............. International Civil Aviation Organization 

ICE ................ Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

ISIS ............... Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (also Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant) 

INTERPOL ... International Criminal Police Organization 

JTTF ............. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force 

NCB .............. National Central Bureau 

NCTC ............ National Counterterrorism Center 

NGO .............. Non-Governmental Organization 

OPDAT .......... The Department of Justice’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development 

Assistance and Training 

PATRIOT ...... Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations 

Team 

PISCES ......... Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System 

PNR ............... Passenger Name Record 

RAU .............. Risk Analysis Unit 

TSA ............... Transportation Security Administration 

TSDB ............. Terrorist Screening Database 

UN ................. United Nations 

VSP ............... Visa Security Program 

VSU ............... Visa Security Unit 

VWP .............. Visa Waiver Program 

WORDE ........ World Organization for Resource Development and Education 

Æ