COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Elder 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

CLARENCE LINWOOD BOWEN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1692-97-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 MAY 19, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Dennis J. Smith, Judge 

 Richard E. Gardiner for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Clarence Linwood Bowen contends that the evidence is 

insufficient to support his conviction of a second offense of 

stalking. He argues that Code § 18.2-60.3 requires proof that he 

had actual knowledge that his conduct would place the victim in 

reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily 

injury. Because the trial court misinterpreted the statute, we 

reverse and remand the case. We do not reach the sufficiency of 

the evidence. 

 I. 

 In 1991, the complainant, D.M., ended an abusive 

relationship with Bowen. Bowen was subsequently convicted of 

unlawfully wounding D.M. with a knife. In 1994, he was convicted 

of stalking D.M. and was ordered to have no further contact with 

her. 

 Between March 15 and April 15, 1997, D.M. saw Bowen walking 
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repeatedly on the street in front of her apartment. Bowen 

testified that he was merely walking between his residence and 

the hospital. On April 14, 1997, Bowen tied a scarf on the 

antenna of D.M.'s automobile. The following day, he went to her 

apartment. When she opened her door, she saw him standing there, 

 holding a telephone. She closed the door and called the police. 

 After kicking the door, Bowen left. D.M. testified that Bowen's 

actions, in light of his prior conduct, placed her in fear of 

death or bodily injury. 

 Bowen testified that he did not intend to place D.M. in 

fear, and did not know she was afraid of him. He testified that 

he went to her apartment on April 15 to deliver flowers and a 

telephone. He testified that a friend of D.M.'s had told him 

that D.M. was upset with him because he had not contacted her at 

Easter. He testified that he and D.M. had dined together in the 

fall of 1996. However, D.M. denied having dined with Bowen or 

having invited him to her home since 1991. 

 The trial court tried the case without a jury and convicted 

Bowen of a second offense of stalking. Code § 18.2-60.3. The 

order of conviction, entered June 19, 1997, provided, in 

pertinent part: 

 In consideration of the evidence heard 

and argument of Counsel, the Court found the 

Defendant, CLARENCE LINWOOD BOWEN, guilty of 

STALKING - SECOND OFFENSE, as charged in the 

warrant. 

 The Court further found that the 

Defendant knew, or reasonably should have 

known, that his conduct placed the victim in 
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reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual 

assault, or bodily injury, and that actual 

knowledge was unnecessary. 

We read the second paragraph recited above to set forth the 

predicate for the conviction recited in the first paragraph. 

 On August 5, 1997, the trial court entered the following 

order: 

 It appearing to the Court that, due to 

clerical error, the order entered on June 19, 

1997, stated "that the Defendant knew, or 

reasonably should have known, that his 

conduct placed the victim in reasonable fear 

of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily 

injury" when it should have stated "that the 

Defendant reasonably should have known that 

his conduct placed the victim in reasonable 

fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or 

bodily injury"; therefore 

 The Court ORDERED that the order of June 

19, 1997, be amended to reflect "that the 

Defendant reasonably should have known that 

his conduct placed the victim in reasonable 

fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or 

bodily injury". 

 Read together, the orders of June 19, 1997 and August 5, 

1997 unquestionably bespeak the trial court's determination that 

Code § 18.2-60.3 did not require proof that Bowen had actual 

knowledge that his conduct would place D.M. in reasonable fear of 

death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury, but rather 

required only proof that he "reasonably should have known" that 

such fear would result, and demonstrate plainly that the trial 

court applied the evidence against that standard. This was 

error. 
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Code § 18.2-60.3(A) provides: 

 Any person who on more than one occasion 

engages in conduct directed at another person 

with the intent to place, or with the 

knowledge that the conduct places, that other 

person in reasonable fear of death, criminal 

sexual assault, or bodily injury to that 

person . . . shall be guilty of a Class 2 

misdemeanor. 

 In addition to proving the number and nature of the contacts 

between D.M. and Bowen, the Commonwealth bore the burden of 

proving that Bowen either intended to place D.M. in reasonable 

fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury, or knew 

that such fear would result from his conduct. Parker v. 

Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 681, 685, 485 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1997). 

 This holding is consonant with the strict construction we 

apply to penal statutes, see Mayhew v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 

484, 489, 458 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1995), and our analysis in Parker. 

 In Parker, we upheld the constitutionality of the stalking 

statute, saying: 

 The requirement of specific intent also 

enhances the delineation in Code § 18.2-60.3 

of stalking from otherwise legal conduct. 

Citizens know that they are subject to 

prosecution for causing reasonable fear in 

others only if they intended their conduct to 

have this effect or know that it will have 

this effect. 

24 Va. App. at 689, 485 S.E.2d at 154. Thus, where the 

Commonwealth fails to prove a specific intent to cause fear, 

proof that the defendant actually knew that his conduct would 

place the victim in fear of the enumerated harms is a necessary 
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element of the offense. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the conviction is reversed and 

this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, 

if the Commonwealth be so advised. 

 Reversed and remanded.