*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 96-31074

Summary Calendar

_____________________

CLIFFORD EUGENE DAVIS, JR. and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiffs,

JOHNNIE A. JONES,

Movant-Appellant,

versus

EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH 

SCHOOL BOARD, a Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Louisiana

(56-CV-1662)

_______________________________________________________

September 10, 1997

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Johnnie Jones appeals an order denying his request for over

$1.2 million in attorney’s fees for his work in this decades-old

desegregation suit, over which the district court has retained
2

jurisdiction. We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction

under the collateral order doctrine, see Walker v. U.S. Dept. of

Housing and Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 766-67 (5th Cir. 1996), and

affirm.

In 1981 Jones filed a similar request for fees. The

district court denied the motion, reasoning that Jones had not

complied with the requirements of Johnson v. Georgia Highway

Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), and related cases. 

Jones appealed the order and we affirmed in an unpublished

opinion. Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., No. 81-

3287 (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 1983). We agreed with the district court

that his fee application was “totally inadequate” under Johnson. 

Davis, supra, at 3.

In 1996 Jones filed a motion for attorney’s fees which is

the subject of the present appeal. The district court properly

denied the motion, since both the district court and this court

are bound by the prior appellate decision under the law of the

case doctrine. That doctrine “precludes reexamination of issues

decided on appeal, either by the district court on remand or by

the appellate court itself upon a subsequent appeal.” Quest

Medical, Inc. v. Apprill, 90 F.3d 1080, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Recognized exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are

that “evidence in the subsequent trial is substantially

different, the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would
3

work manifest injustice, or controlling authority has in the

interim made a contrary rule of law applicable.” Id. The only

conceivable exception which might apply here is that Jones has

somehow augmented his fee request with additional evidence.

The renewed fee request, however, remains totally inadequate

to support an award. We noted in the prior appeal that Jones

“does not even list his clients, although they are the ‘parties’

who must recover attorneys’ fees.” Davis, supra, at 3. In his

renewed motion for fees, Jones again fails to list which

plaintiffs he represented, fails to move for fees on their

behalf, and instead requests fees as “movant in proper person.” 

The fee request fails to delineate, among other Johnson factors, 

the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented in the

case, whether the fee agreement with the clients was fixed or

contingent, or the results obtained. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at

718. 

While, unlike the first fee request, Jones breaks down his

work into various dated entries in an affidavit, those entries

are implausible on their face. Many of the entries indicate that

Jones worked more than 24 hours in a single day. By way of

example, Jones claims he spent 157.5 hours on July 23, 1970 (at a

requested rate of $250 an hour) on a “memorandum opinion and

order.” Further, the only work Jones claims to have done after

April 16, 1981, the date of his first fee motion, involved his
4

unsuccessful quest for attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we follow

our prior decision. 

AFFIRMED.