J-S09019-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

TYRONE SALTER, 

 Appellant No. 1017 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 16, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0009421-2012 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES, and ALLEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 05, 2015 

 

Tyrone Salter appeals from the judgment of sentence of two and onehalf to five years incarceration followed by seven years probation, which was 

below the mitigated range of the sentencing guidelines. Sentence was 

imposed after the trial court convicted Appellant of one count of possession 

of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and two counts of possession 

of a controlled substance. We affirm. 

 Appellant’s convictions are premised upon the following evidence 

adduced by the Commonwealth at Appellant’s combined suppression hearing 

and nonjury trial and accepted as true by the trial court. Sheriff’s Detective 

Richard Manning testified as follows. On March 28, 2012, a team of five 

men from one of two Criminal Fugitive Squads of the Allegheny County 

Sheriff’s Office executed a bench warrant for Appellant’s co-defendant, Bruce 
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Lucas, at 1350 Herman Street, Pittsburgh. Lucas was wanted for violating 

his probation on a robbery charge. The team consisted of Detective 

Manning, Detective Richard Venezia, Detective Richard Dwyer, Sergeant 

Clark,1 and Detective Ron Stokes. Detective Stokes covered the rear of the 

address, Detectives Manning and Venezia went to the front door, and the 

two other detectives stayed in front of the house. 

Normally, a member of the squad would announce that they were from 

the sheriff’s office and present to execute a warrant, but, in this case, no 

announcement was made. Detective Manning explained that they dispensed 

with the warning because three to four cameras were pointed at the house 

to detect who was approaching it. In addition, a window to the left of the 

front door was opened, and Detective Manning “could smell a strong 

pungent odor of marijuana. It was a fresh marijuana smell, as we 

approached the door.” N.T. Non-Jury Trial Transcript, 10/30/13, at 23. 

Finally, Lucas was wanted for violating probation in a felony case so the 

sheriffs anticipated that he might attempt to flee. 

Detectives Manning and Venezia knocked loudly and immediately 

“heard a lot of movement within the address.” Id. at 21. After they knocked 

a second time, a male voice asked, “Who is it.” Id. at 26. Detectives 

Manning and Venezia responded, “Sheriff’s Office with a warrant. Answer 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Detective Manning did not provide Sergeant Clark’s first name. N.T. Nonjury Trial Transcript, 10/30/13, at 18. 
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the door.” Id. A few seconds later, Detective Manning heard a metallic 

sound as if someone “was racking a gun, very close to the front door.” Id. 

At that point, the detectives attempted to kick in the front door, but it 

was barricaded. They continued to announce that they were sheriffs with a 

warrant and wanted the door to be opened. The only response was the 

sound of “people running around within the residence.” Id. at 27. Detective 

Stokes radioed Detective Manning that two males had just jumped from the 

back porch of the house and were scrambling down a steep hill in the back 

yard that led to Spring Garden Avenue. Detective Manning left his post at 

the front of the house and observed the two men fleeing down Spring 

Garden Avenue. Detective Manning articulated that, at that point, he 

concluded that the they were engaged in criminal activity. 

Detectives Manning and Venezia entered a vehicle, went to find the 

two fleeing men, and “saw them both walking down Spring Garden Avenue.” 

Id. at 33. The two people, Appellant and his other co-defendant Melvin 

Crew, matched “the individuals [who Detective Manning] saw going down 

the hill in their clothing” as well as a description that had been provided by 

Detective Stokes. Id. Appellant’s clothing was in disarray, grass stained, 

and dirty, and he was not wearing shoes. 

When Detective Venezia started to approach him, Appellant 

immediately started to run. Crew ceased his flight at that point and was 

handcuffed by Detective Manning. Another police officer immediately arrived 
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at the scene, and Detective Manning joined Detective Venezia in the chase. 

As he started to run, Detective Manning heard Detective Venezia yell, “He is 

coming back down to you.” Id. at 38. Detective Manning then observed 

Appellant come towards him and attempt to scale a nearby fence. Detective 

Manning grabbed Appellant and handcuffed him. 

Detective Venezia arrived at the scene shortly thereafter with a purple 

velvet bag used to package Crown Royal liquor. Detective Venezia testified 

that Appellant threw away the bag while the detective was pursuing him. 

N.T. Continued Suppression Hearing, 11/25/13, at 9. The bag contained 

96.7 grams of cocaine and 6.65 grams of marijuana. Appellant was in 

possession of $2,928 while Crew had $2,053. Lucas was located inside 1350 

Herman Street. There was a stipulation that the Commonwealth would have 

presented testimony that the cocaine was possessed with intent to deliver. 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following contention, “Did the trial 

court err by failing to suppress evidence obtained following a warrantless 

search of a bag discarded by [Appellant] due to the unlawful coercive action 

of police, when [Appellant] was arrested without probable cause, and 

officers had opportunity to obtain a search warrant?” Appellant’s brief at 3. 

Herein, the suppression court concluded that Appellant abandoned the 

bag while the detectives were in the process of attempting to effectuate a 

valid investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspicion pursuit to 
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Initially, we outline our standard of 

review in this context: 

An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth 

prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the 

evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for 

the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context 

of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual 

findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound 

by those findings and may reverse only if the court's legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the 

suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the 

conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary 

review. 

Commonwealth v. Garibay, 2014 WL 6910879, 2 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). 

Appellant’s first position is that the detectives needed to secure a 

search warrant before they looked inside the bag to discover its contents. 

As a general principle, the Fourth Amendment requires 

that law officers obtain a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate 

before they intrude into a place of privacy. However, an 

exception to the warrant requirement exists when the property 

seized has been abandoned. In Commonwealth v. Shoatz, 

469 Pa. 545, 366 A.2d 1216 (1976), our Supreme Court 

delineated the test employed to determine whether an 

abandonment has occurred: 

 Abandonment is primarily a question of intent,

and intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts 

done, and other objective facts. All relevant 

circumstances existing at the time of the alleged 
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abandonment should be considered. The issue is not 

abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but

whether the person prejudiced by the search had 

voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise 

relinquished his interest in the property in question 

so that he could no longer retain a reasonable 

expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of 

the search.

Id., 469 Pa. at 553, 366 A.2d at 1220. 

Commonwealth v. Clark, 746 A.2d 1128, 1133-34 (Pa.Super. 2000) 

(emphasis omitted). Thus, if Appellant discarded the bag in question, he 

relinquished his expectation of privacy in that item and cannot contest the 

validity of its search without a warrant. 

Herein, Detective Venezia reported that while he was chasing 

Appellant, Appellant threw away the purple velvet Crown Royal bag and 

continued to flee. Therefore, he abandoned it. Commonwealth v. Byrd, 

987 A.2d 786 (Pa.Super. 2009); Commonwealth v. Riley, 715 A.2d 1131 

(Pa.Super. 1998). As Appellant did not retain a privacy interest in the item 

that he threw away, he cannot contest the validity of its search without a 

warrant. 

Alternatively, Appellant claims that he was forced to abandon the bag 

due to unlawful police action when he was arrested without probable cause. 

If property is discarded as a result of unconstitutional police conduct, then a 

defendant retains the ability to object to its search. Byrd, supra. The 

record establishes that Appellant discarded the bag while he was being 

chased by Detective Venezia and before he was restrained by Detective 
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Manning. Hence, the causative factor in the abandonment was not 

Appellant’s detention while was climbing the fence but his pursuit by 

Detective Venezia. Id. The suppression court viewed this police interaction 

as an attempt at an investigatory detention, and we concur with its 

assessment as well as its conclusion that the interaction was supported by 

reasonable suspicion. 

Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution both 

protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 575 Pa. 203, 836 A.2d 5, 10 (2003) 

(citation omitted). Jurisprudence arising under both charters has 

led to the development of three categories of interactions 

between citizens and police. Id. (citations omitted). The first, a 

“mere encounter,” does not require any level of suspicion or 

carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an 

“investigative detention,” permits the temporary detention of an 

individual if supported by reasonable suspicion. The third is an 

arrest or custodial detention, which must be supported by 

probable cause. Id. (citations omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014). When we examine 

which level of interaction has occurred, we “conduct an objective 

examination of the totality of the surrounding circumstances.” Id. (citation 

omitted). This test focuses “on whether the suspect has in some way been 

restrained by physical force or show of coercive authority.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

Herein, it is evident that, contrary to his position, Appellant was not in 

police custody while he was being chased by Detective Venezia. While his 

course of action was being dictated by the police, he had not been arrested. 
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Hence, we view the interaction, as did the suppression court, as an attempt 

at an investigatory detention. 

 We outlined the test utilized to determine whether police had 

reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory detention in 

Commonwealth v. Carter, 2014 WL 6756271, 3 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en 

banc) (footnote omitted):

 “The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops 

when a law enforcement officer has a particularized and 

objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of 

criminal activity.” Navarette v. California, ––– U.S. ––––, –––

–, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014). It is 

axiomatic that to establish reasonable suspicion, an officer “must 

be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and 

unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” United States v. 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). 

Unlike the other amendments pertaining to criminal proceedings, 

the Fourth Amendment is unique as it has standards built into its 

text, i.e., reasonableness and probable cause. See generally

U.S. Const. amend. IV. However, as the Supreme Court has 

long recognized, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 

L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), is an exception to the textual standard of 

probable cause. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 

1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). A suppression court is required to 

“take into account the totality of the circumstances-the whole 

picture.” Navarette, supra. When conducting a Terry analysis, 

it is incumbent on the suppression court to inquire, based on all 

of the circumstances known to the officer ex ante, whether an 

objective basis for the seizure was present. Adams v. 

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 

(1972). 

 Herein, police had much more than an unparticularized hunch that 

Appellant was engaged in criminal activity. As reported by Detective 

Venezia, and accepted by the suppression court, the conclusion that 

Appellant should be investigated for possible criminal activity was premised 
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upon the following objective facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion: 1) the 

front door of the home was barricaded and its occupants would not open the 

door to permit the sheriffs to execute their warrant; 2) in order to evade 

police at the front door, Appellant jumped from a porch in the back, 

scrambled down a hill, and started to run away; and 3) there was a strong 

odor of raw marijuana emanating from the house which Appellant just fled. 

Based on all of the circumstances known to the detectives, they had an 

objective basis to investigate Appellant. Hence, we affirm the suppression 

court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion was present herein. Since the 

abandonment of the bag was not the result of illegal police conduct, 

Appellant’s claim must fail. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 3/5/2015