UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1711

CAROL WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior

District Judge. (1:14-cv-01247-CMH-IDD)

Submitted: March 22, 2016 Decided: April 14, 2016

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Victor M. Glasberg, Maxwelle C. Sokol, VICTOR M. GLASBERG & 

ASSOCIATES, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Michelle R. 

Robl, County Attorney, Megan E. Kelly, Senior Assistant County 

Attorney, Jeffrey R.B. Notz, Assistant County Attorney, Prince 

William, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Carol Williams brought this action against her employer, 

Prince William County, Virginia, alleging she was sexually 

harassed and discriminated and retaliated against, in violation 

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). Challenging only the 

district court’s dismissal of her retaliation claim, Williams 

asserts that the district court erred when it determined she 

failed to state an adverse employment action because the court

applied the wrong standard for assessing adverse employment 

action in the context of a retaliation claim. We agree.

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of App., 

626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). When ruling on such a 

motion, we “must accept as true all of the factual allegations 

contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 

94 (2007) (per curiam). A complaint “need only give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.” Id. at 93 (alteration and internal quotation 

marks omitted). However, “plaintiffs may proceed into the 

litigation process only when their complaints are justified by 

both law and fact.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 

(4th Cir. 2009). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the 

complaint must only “state[] a plausible claim for relief” that 
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“permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 

misconduct” based upon “its judicial experience and common 

sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see Wag 

More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) (“At 

bottom, a plaintiff must nudge [her] claims across the line from 

conceivable to plausible to resist dismissal.” (alteration and 

internal quotation marks omitted)).

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] 

against any of [its] employees . . . because [the employee] has 

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by 

[Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). Because Williams 

presented no direct evidence of retaliation, the district court 

properly analyzed her retaliation claim under the burdenshifting paradigm set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Under this framework, a plaintiff 

establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating 

“(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment 

action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and 

the employment action.” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190.

However, we conclude that the district court applied too 

stringent a standard for determining what constitutes an adverse 

employment action for purposes of stating a Title VII 

retaliation claim. The district court found that Williams 

failed to state an adverse employment action to establish her 
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retaliation claim for the same reasons she failed to state an 

adverse employment action to establish her substantive 

discrimination claim. However, unlike a substantive 

discrimination claim, the adverse action component of Title 

VII’s antiretaliation provision “is not limited to 

discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of 

employment.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 

U.S. 53, 64 (2006). Instead, the adverse action component of 

Title VII’s antiretaliation provision can be satisfied by 

showing that the employer took “materially adverse” action in 

response to an employee engaging in a protected activity, “which 

in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable 

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 

Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In the context of job reassignment allegations, as in this 

case, the Supreme Court has stated that, although a job 

reassignment is “not automatically actionable,” it may be 

“materially adverse depend[ing] upon the circumstances of the 

particular case, and should be judged from the perspective of a 

reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all 

the circumstances.” Id. at 71 (internal quotations marks and 

citations omitted). While changes to the terms, conditions, or 

benefits of the plaintiff’s employment are factors to be 

considered when evaluating “all the circumstances,” the lack of 
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such changes is not dispositive on the adverse action component 

of a retaliation claim. See id. at 64, 71; see also Lettieri v. 

Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern broadened 

the Fourth Circuit’s adverse employment action standard to 

consider injuries and harms beyond the terms and conditions of 

employment). Therefore, all circumstances indicating that an 

action was harmful and materially adverse to the employee should 

be considered. Given Williams’ allegations about the 

unfavorable circumstances she experienced after she filed her 

EEO complaint, we conclude that it was error for the district 

court to summarily dispose of Williams’ retaliation claim for 

the same reasons it disposed of Williams’ discrimination claim.

We also conclude that it was error for the district court 

to analyze only whether Williams’ transfer constituted an 

adverse employment action. Namely, it is undisputed that 

Williams was informed of her transfer before she filed her first 

EEO complaint. Thus, Williams’ transfer could not have been in 

retaliation for her EEO complaints. Contrary to the district 

court’s limitation, however, Williams’ complaint alleged several 

additional actions that occurred after her transfer, and which 

could be construed as adverse employment actions. 

In particular, Williams alleged that she was denied a 

deserved pay increase, had her office and equipment taken away 
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or limited, and was excluded from meetings and given 

unattainable goals in her performance evaluation. It is at 

least plausible that such actions would have dissuaded a 

reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. 

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order to the 

extent it dismissed Williams’ retaliation claim because she 

failed to sufficiently allege an actionable adverse employment 

action, and we remand to the district court for further 

proceedings.* We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

 * By this disposition, we indicate no view as to the merits 

of Williams’ retaliation claim.