COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION

2015

ANNUAL REPORT

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-182
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COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION

2015

ANNUAL REPORT

PATRICK O’REILLY, EDITOR

Computer Security Division

Information Technology Laboratory

CO-EDITORS:

Larry Feldman

Greg Witte

G2, Inc. 

Annapolis Junction, Maryland

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-182

THIS PUBLICATION IS AVAILABLE FREE OF CHARGE FROM

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-182

JULY 2016

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Penny S. Pritzker, Secretary

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY

Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director
COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT | 2015

i

AUTHORITY

This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal 

Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3541 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST 

is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements 

for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems 

without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This 

guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.

Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and 

binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines 

be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of 

the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a 

voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated 

by NIST. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-182

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-182, 120 pages (July 2016)

CODEN: NSPUE2

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-182

REPORTS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 

promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s measurement 

and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, 

and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s 

responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and 

guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal 

information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreach 

efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic 

organizations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | FY 2015

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editor, Patrick O’Reilly of the Computer Security Division, 

wishes to thank his colleagues in the Computer Security Division, 

who provided write-ups on their 2015 project highlights and 

accomplishments for this annual report (their names are mentioned 

after each project write-up). The editor would also like to acknowledge 

Elaine Barker (CSD), Lisa Carnahan (Standards Coordination Office, 

NIST), Greg Witte and Larry Feldman (G2) for reviewing and providing 

valuable feedback for this annual report. 

The editor would also like to acknowledge Kristen Dill of Dill 

and Company, Inc. for designing the cover and inside layout for this 

2015 annual report.

DISCLAIMER

Any mention of commercial products or organizations is for 

informational purposes only; it is not intended to imply recommendation 

or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

nor is it intended to imply that the products identified are necessarily 

the best available for the purpose.

TRADEMARK INFORMATION

All names are trademarks or registered trademarks of their 

respective owners.

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DISCLAIMER ..................................................................................................................................................................................IV

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................................................................................V

TRADEMARK INFORMATION.........................................................................................................................................................V

WELCOME LETTER..........................................................................................................................................................................1

COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION (CSD) ORGANIZATION............................................................................................................ 2

INTRODUCTION TO CSD’S FIVE GROUPS..................................................................................................................................... 3

Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG)................................................................................................................................................................... 4

Security Components and Mechanisms Group (SCMG) .................................................................................................................. 4

Secure Systems and Applications Group (SSAG)..............................................................................................................................5

Security Outreach and Integration Group (SOIG)............................................................................................................................ 6

Security Testing, Validation, and Measurement Group (STVMG)....................................................................................................7

CSD IMPLEMENTS FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT ............................................................................ 8

PROGRAM AND PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS FOR FY 2015 .......................................................................................................... 11

NIST RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636, “IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY”.12

CSD WORK IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS.................................................................................................13

Identity Management Standards within INCITS B10 and ISO JTC1/SC17................................................................................................................................15

Cloud Computing Standards Developed by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 38 Cloud Computing and INCITS Cloud 38................................16

ISO Standardization of Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.............................................................................................16

FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT (FISMA) IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT ...........................................18

BIOMETRIC STANDARDS AND ASSOCIATED CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT TESTING TOOLS .................................................20

SECURITY OF CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS (CPS)..................................................................................................................... 22

FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT (R&D)............................................................................................ 23

SECURITY ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC VOTING.......................................................................................................................... 23

HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY.....................................................................................................................24

SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT (SCRM) FOR INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT)............... 25

NATIONWIDE PUBLIC SAFETY BROADBAND NETWORK (NPSBN) CYBERSECURITY............................................................26

SMART GRID CYBERSECURITY ................................................................................................................................................... 27

CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS, TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND OUTREACH............................................................................ 28

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE)................................................................................................................. 28

Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC).................................................................................................................................. 29

Federal Computer Security Managers’ (FCSM) Forum.................................................................................................................. 29

Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA)...................................................................................30

Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB).......................................................................................................... 33

Small and Medium Size Business (SMB) Cybersecurity Outreach Workshop ............................................................................ 35

CRYPTOGRAPHIC STANDARDS PROGRAM ................................................................................................................................ 36

Hash Algorithms and the Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) Standard (FIPS 202).................................................................. 36

Random Number Generation (RNG)................................................................................................................................................ 36

Block Cipher Modes of Operation .................................................................................................................................................... 37

Key Management ................................................................................................................................................................................ 37

Transport Layer Security.................................................................................................................................................................... 38

Elliptic Curve Cryptography .............................................................................................................................................................. 38

Post-Quantum Cryptography............................................................................................................................................................ 39

Circuit Complexity ..............................................................................................................................................................................40

Cryptography for Constrained Environments..................................................................................................................................41

The NIST Randomness Beacon .........................................................................................................................................................42

Entropy as a Service (EaaS)..............................................................................................................................................................43

Wireless and Mobile Security............................................................................................................................................................44

Authentication.....................................................................................................................................................................................44

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS | FY 2015

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VALIDATION PROGRAMS.............................................................................................................................................................46

Cryptographic System Validation.....................................................................................................................................................46

Cryptographic Programs and Laboratory Accreditation...............................................................................................................46

Automated Security Testing and Test Suite Development............................................................................................................. 51

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Validation Program........................................................................................... 54

IDENTITY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................................................................ 55

NIST Personal Identity Verification Program (NPIVP)................................................................................................................... 55

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) and FIPS 201 Revision Efforts............................................................................................. 56

RESEARCH IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES................................................................................................................................ 57

Secure Development Toolchain Competitions................................................................................................................................ 57

Cloud Computing and Virtualization................................................................................................................................................ 58

CSD Role in the NIST Cloud Computing Program...............................................................................................................................................58

Policy Machine – Leveraging Access Control for Cloud Computing............................................................................................................59

Security for a Virtualized Infrastructure.................................................................................................................................................................60

Cybersecurity for Emerging Technologies ......................................................................................................................................60

Cyber Threat Information Sharing.....................................................................................................................................................61

The Ontology of Authentication....................................................................................................................................................... 62

MOBILE SECURITY .......................................................................................................................................................................63

STRENGTHENING INTERNET SECURITY.....................................................................................................................................63

USGv6: A Technical Infrastructure to Assist IPv6 Adoption ......................................................................................................... 63

ACCESS CONTROL PROJECTS.....................................................................................................................................................64

Access Control and Privilege Management.....................................................................................................................................64

Conformance Verification for Access Control Policies .................................................................................................................. 65

Attribute-Based Access Control .......................................................................................................................................................66

ADVANCED SECURITY TESTING AND MEASUREMENTS ...........................................................................................................68

Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring..........................................................................................................................68

Specification, Standards, and Guidance Development.................................................................................................................................... 68

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP).................................................................................................................................................. 69

Software Asset Management Standards .................................................................................................................................................................71

Development of Security Automation Consensus Standards.........................................................................................................................71

Automation Reference Data.............................................................................................................................................................. 73

National Vulnerability Database (NVD)...................................................................................................................................................................73

National Checklist Program (NCP)............................................................................................................................................................................73

United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) / FDCC Baselines....................................................................................75

Apple OS X Security Configuration...........................................................................................................................................................................75

TECHNICAL SECURITY METRICS................................................................................................................................................. 76

Security Risk Analysis of Enterprise Networks Using Attack Graphs.......................................................................................... 76

Algorithms for Intrusion Measurement............................................................................................................................................ 77

Automated Combinatorial Testing ................................................................................................................................................... 78

Roots of Trust...................................................................................................................................................................................... 78

HONORS AND AWARDS...............................................................................................................................................................80

COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION PUBLICATIONS...................................................................................................................... 85

FY 2015 Computer Security Division Publications ......................................................................................................................... 85

NIST Technical Series Publications − FIPS, SPs, NISTIRs, and ITL Bulletins ............................................................................... 87

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)...............................................................................................................................................91

NIST Special Publications...............................................................................................................................................................................................91

NISTIRs..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................97

Additional Publications by CSD Authors .........................................................................................................................................99

Journal Articles............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 100

Conference Papers.........................................................................................................................................................................................................102

Books and Book Sections ...........................................................................................................................................................................................105

White Papers....................................................................................................................................................................................................................105

ACRONYMS................................................................................................................................................................................. 106

OPPORTUNITIES TO ENGAGE WITH CSD, ACD, AND NIST DURING FY 2016...........................................................................111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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WELCOME LETTER | FY 2015

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CYERSECURITY OF CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS |CPS

 The Computer Security Division (CSD), a division of the Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology (NIST) is responsible for developing cybersecurity standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics for the 

protection of non-national security federal information systems. CSD’s standards, guidelines, tools and references are developed 

in an open, transparent, traceable and collaborative manner that enlists broad expertise from around the world. While developed 

for federal agency use, these resources are voluntarily adopted by other organizations because they are effective and accepted 

globally. 

The need for cybersecurity standards, best practices, tools and references that also address interoperability, usability 

and privacy continue to be critical for the Nation. CSD aligns its resources to enable greater development and application of 

practical, innovative security technologies and methodologies that enhance our ability to address current and future computer 

and information security challenges. Our foundational research and applied cybersecurity programs continue to advance in 

many areas, including cryptography, automation, roots of trust, identity and access management, advanced security testing and 

measurement, Internet of Things (IoT), cyber-physical systems, and public safety networks. 

Trust is crucial to the broad adoption of our standards and guidelines, including our cryptographic standards and guidelines. 

To ensure that our cryptography resources have been developed according the highest standard of inclusiveness, transparency 

and security, NIST conducted an internal and external formal review of our cryptographic standards development efforts in 

2014. We documented and solicited public comment on the principles and rigorous processes we use to engage stakeholders 

and experts in industry, academia, and government to develop and revise these standards. The final report is now published and 

serves as a basis for all CSD’s cryptographic development efforts. 

Increasing the trustworthiness and resilience of the IT infrastructure is a significant undertaking that requires a substantial 

investment in the architectural design and development of our systems and networks. A disciplined and structured set of 

systems security engineering processes that starts with and builds on well-established international standards provides an 

important starting point. Draft Special Publication 800-160, Systems Security Engineering: An Integrated Approach to Building 

Trustworthy Resilient Systems, which was issued in May 2014, helps organizations to develop a more defensible and survivable 

information technology infrastructure. This resource, coupled with other NIST standards and guidelines, contributes to systems 

that are more resilient in the face of cyber attacks and other threats. 

Strong partnerships with diverse stakeholders are vital to the success of our technical programs. In February 2014, NIST 

issued the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity as directed in Executive Order 13636. The Framework, 

created through collaboration between industry and government, consists of standards, guidelines, and practices to promote 

the protection of the critical infrastructure. Its approach helps owners and operators of the critical infrastructure to manage 

cybersecurity-related risk. 

Active engagement with diverse stakeholders continues to be critical to our success. In the federal space, this interaction 

is most prominent in our strengthened collaborations with the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and 

the Committee on National Security Systems to establish a common foundation for information security across the Federal 

Government. Our cybersecurity awareness, training, and education programs also exemplify the importance of engagements 

with academic institutions, federal agencies, small and medium businesses and others to increase awareness and enhance the 

overall cybersecurity posture of the Nation. CSD’s work with Health and Human Services, Department of Transportation, Federal 

Communications Commission and others are all examples of an active and strong engagement, applying security to multiple 

government mission areas. 

For many years, CSD, in collaboration with our global partners across industry, academia, standards bodies, and 

government, has made great contributions to help secure the nation’s critical information and infrastructure. We look forward to 

strengthening these relationships as we lead the development and practical application of scalable and sustainable information 

security standards and practices. 

Matthew Scholl 

Division Chief

WELCOME LETTER

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COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT | 2015

COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION (CSD) ORGANIZATION

GROUP MANAGERS

MATTHEW SCHOLL

Chief, Computer Security Division

Deputy Chief, Computer Security Division and 

Acting Associate Director of Operations, 

National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

LILY CHEN

(Acting Group Manager)

Cryptographic Technology Group

MARK (LEE) 

BADGER

Security Components and 

Mechanisms Group

DAVID 

FERRAIOLO

Secure Systems and 

Applications Group

KEVIN STINE1

Security Outreach and 

Integration Group2

MICHAEL 

COOPER

Security Testing, Validation 

and Measurement Group

** Editor’s Note: 

1: In FY 2016 (starting October 1, 2015), Kevin Stine has been selected to be the division chief for the new division in the Information Technology 

Laboratory (ITL). This new division is the Applied Cybersecurity Division. 

2: During FY 2016, Mr. Jon Boyens will be the Acting Group Manager until a new group manager has been selected.

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The Computer Security Division’s computer scientists, mathematicians, 

IT specialists, support staff and others support CSD’s mission and 

responsibilities through five groups that are described in the following sections:

• Cryptographic Technology Group

• Security Components and Mechanisms Group

• Secure Systems and Applications Group

• Security Outreach and Integration Group

• Security Testing, Validation, and Measurement Group

INTRODUCTION TO CSD’S FIVE GROUPS

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C R Y P T O G R A P H I C 

TECHNOLOGY GROUP (CTG)

MISSION STATEMENT:

Research, develop, engineer, and standardize 

cryptographic algorithms, methods, and protocols.

OVERVIEW:

The Cryptographic Technology Group’s (CTG) work in 

the field of cryptography includes researching, analyzing 

and standardizing cryptographic technology, such as hash 

algorithms, symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic 

techniques, key management, authentication, and random 

number generation. The CTG’s goal is to identify and 

promote methods to protect communications and storage 

through cryptographic technologies, encouraging innovative development and helping technology users to 

manage risk.

In FY 2015, the CTG continued to collaborate with 

national and international government agencies, academic 

and research organizations, industry partners, and standards bodies to develop interoperable security standards 

and guidelines, and to make an impact in the field of 

cryptography. One example is the culmination of an eightyear standardization effort that led to the publication of 

Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 202, SHA3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and ExtendableOutput Functions, announced in the Federal Register on 

August 5, 2015.

The CTG’s cryptographic standards program focuses 

on cryptographic primitives, algorithms, and schemes; the 

developed standards and guidelines are specified in FIPSs, 

NIST Special Publications (SPs), and NIST Interagency or 

Internal Reports (NISTIRs). Such standards and guidelines 

have been considered or adopted by the information 

technology (IT) industry and standards development 

organizations, such as the International Organization for 

Standardization (ISO), the Internet Engineering Task Force 

(IETF), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 

(IEEE), and the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), and have 

been implemented on a variety of platforms.

The CTG is committed to the development of its 

standards using an open and transparent process - 

conducting workshops and requesting input and comments 

from government agencies, private industry, academia and 

the global cryptographic community. The CTG also examines 

each of its standards to determine if they need to be revised, 

withdrawn or re-opened for public comment.

The CTG continues to develop expertise in several 

critical research areas, such as post-quantum cryptography 

(PQC), elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), privacy-enhancing 

cryptography, and lightweight cryptographic schemes for 

constrained environments. It has collaborated with many 

universities internationally and presented research results 

in major cryptography conferences and journals. In addition, 

it organized workshops on PQC, ECC standards, and 

lightweight cryptography to discuss research results and 

develop standardization roadmaps.

The CTG also published several guidelines on cryptographic applications, including key management, public 

key certificate policies, and trusted platforms. The CTG also 

participated in the cybersecurity projects of other CSD 

groups, such as the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

standards, the Federal Cloud Credential Exchange (FCCX), 

the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP), 

and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).

GROUP MANAGER (ACTING):

Dr. Lily Chen

(301) 975-6974

lily.chen@nist.gov

S E C U R I T Y C O M P O N E N T S A N D 

MECHANISMS GROUP (SCMG)

MISSION STATEMENT:

Research, develop, and standardize foundational security 

mechanisms, protocols, and services.

OVERVIEW:

The SCMG’s security research focuses on the development and management of foundational building-block 

security mechanisms and techniques that can be integrated 

into a wide variety of mission-critical U.S. information 

systems. The group’s work spans the spectrum from nearterm hardening and improvement of systems, to the design 

and analysis of next-generation, leap-ahead security 

capabilities. Computer security depends fundamentally on 

the level of trust of computer software and systems. This 

work, therefore, focuses strongly on assurance-building 

activities ranging from the analysis of software configuration 

settings, to advanced trust architectures, and to testing tools 

that identify flaws in software modules. This work also focuses 

significantly on increasing the applicability and effectiveness 

of automated techniques, wherever feasible. The SCMG 

conducts collaborative research with government, industry, 

and academia. Outputs of this research consist of prototype 

systems, software tools, demonstrations, guidelines, and 

other documentary resources.

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Collaborating extensively with government, academia, 

and the private sector, SCMG works on a variety of topics, 

such as: 

• Specifications for the automated exchange of security 

information between systems;

• Threat information sharing guidelines;

• Formulation of high-assurance software configuration 

settings;

• Hardware roots-of-trust for mobile devices;

• Secure Basic Input Output System (BIOS) layers;

• Combinatorial testing techniques;

• Conformity assessment of software implementing 

biometric standards; and 

• Adoption of Internet Protocol Version 6 and Internet 

Protocol security extensions. 

In FY 2015, collaborators and the associated collaborations have included Carnegie Mellon University (test 

development environment), Johns Hopkins Applied Physics 

Lab (the practical application of a combinatorial coverage 

measurement tool), the University of Texas at Arlington 

(a covering array generation algorithm), Mexico’s Centro 

de Investigación y de Estudios Avanzados del Instituto 

Politécnico Nacional (a very large covering array generation 

and its application to hardware malware detection),

Lockheed Martin Corporation (the practical application 

of covering arrays), United States Marine Corps (USMC) 

Camp Pendleton (testing and fault location for the tactical 

data link TADIL-J protocol), University of Texas Dallas and 

East Carolina University (safety-critical systems testing), 

Duke University (analysis of software failures), the National 

Science Foundation (cybersecurity metrics and assurance 

building), the National Security Agency (NSA) Information 

Assurance Directorate (security automation standardization), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Cybersecurity and Communications (security automation 

standardization), and DHS (incident coordination).

SCMG accomplishments include results of a 2.5-year 

study with Lockheed Martin (CRADA) showing 20 % test 

cost reduction with 20 % to 50 % improvement in coverage 

(8 pilot projects), an analysis of Internet resilience to 

connectivity disruption attacks, and release of software to 

test conformance to the newest version of the ANSI/NISTITL 1 Biometric Standard.

GROUP MANAGER:

Mr. Mark (Lee) Badger

(301) 975-3176

lee.badger@nist.gov

S E C U R E S Y S T E M S A N D 

A P P L I C AT I O N S G R O U P 

(SSAG)

MISSION STATEMENT:

Integrate and apply security technologies, standards 

and guidelines for computing platforms and information 

systems.

OVERVIEW:

SSAG’s security research focuses on identifying emerging and high-priority technologies, and on developing 

security solutions that will have a high impact on U.S. 

critical infrastructure. The group conducted research and 

development related to both public and private sector use 

cases. The research considered many aspects of the system’s 

lifecycle from the earliest stages of technology development through proof-of-concept, reference and prototype 

imple-mentations, and demonstrations. In addition, the 

group worked to transfer new technologies to industry; to 

produce new standards and guidance for federal agencies 

and industry; and to develop tests, test methodologies, 

and assurance methods.

SSAG investigated security concerns associated 

with such areas as mobile devices, cloud computing and 

virtualization, identity management, access control and 

authorization management, and software assurance. 

SSAG’s research helps to meet federal information security 

requirements that may not be fully addressed by existing 

technology. The group collaborated extensively with 

government, academia, and private sector entities. 

Example successes from this work include: 

• Tools for access control policy testing;

• New concepts in access control and policy enforcement;

• Several Personal Identity Verification (PIV) documents 

to support interagency use of the PIV Card;

• Methods for architecting a secure cloud ecosystem in a 

capability-oriented approach;

• Guidance and tools for orchestrating a secure cloud 

ecosystem;

• Guidance for secure deployment of virtualized infrastructure components – Hypervisor, Virtual Machines 

(VMs) and Virtual Network;

• Methods for achieving comprehensive policy enforcement and data interoperability across enterprise data 

services; and

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• Test methods for mobile device (smart phone) application security.

In particular, the SSAG led the NIST Security and 

Forensics Working Group that published draft NISTIR 8006, 

NIST Cloud Computing - Security Reference Architecture, 

that aggregates forensics challenges in a cloud ecosystem. 

The working group has been working on developing a draft 

of SP 800-173, Guidance for Applying the Risk Management 

Framework to Federal-based Information Systems (target 

release date: spring/summer 2016). In response to the rapidly emerging use of virtualization in enterprise data 

centers for supporting both in-house mission-critical 

applications and for providing cloud services, two guidance 

documents were published: Draft SP 800-125A, Security 

Recommendations for Hypervisor Deployment, and Draft 

SP 800-125B, Secure Virtual Network Configuration for 

Virtual Machine (VM) Protection. In support of the revised 

FIPS 201, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 

Employees and Contractors, two new PIV-related SP 

800-series were released and five SP 800 documents 

were revised. One of the new publications, SP 800-157, 

Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

Credentials, guides the implementation and deployment 

of PIV credentials for mobile devices. In addition, the PIV 

team participated in the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) cybersecurity Sprint effort with a goal to strengthen 

the cybersecurity of federal networks, systems, and data 

through multi-factor authentication using the PIV Card. To 

improve access to new technologies, the group also chaired, 

edited, and participated in the development of a wide variety 

of national and international security standards.

GROUP MANAGER:

Mr. David Ferraiolo

(301) 975-3046

david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

S E C U R I T Y O U T R E A C H A N D 

INTEGRATION GROUP (SOIG)

MISSION STATEMENT:

Develop, integrate, and promote the mission-specific 

application of information security standards, guidelines, 

best practices, and technologies.

OVERVIEW:

The U.S. economy, citizens, and government rely on 

information technology (IT), so the protection of IT and the 

information infrastructure is critical. SOIG leverages broad 

cybersecurity and risk management expertise to develop, 

integrate, and promote security standards, guidelines, tools, 

technologies, methodologies, tests, and measurements to 

address cybersecurity needs in many areas of national and 

international importance.

The SOIG collaborates with stakeholders to address 

cybersecurity considerations in many diverse program areas, 

including the Information and Communications Technologies 

(ICT) supply chain, Smart Grid, Electronic Voting, Cyber 

Physical and Industrial Control Systems, Health Information 

Technology, and the National Public Safety Broadband 

Network. The group produces standards and guidelines 

through the Federal Information Security Management Act 

(FISMA) implementation program to help federal agencies 

build strong cybersecurity risk management programs. In 

each of these program areas, the group extends outreach 

to stakeholders across federal, state, and local governments; 

industry; academia; small businesses; and the public. The 

SOIG also leads several broad cybersecurity awareness, 

training, education, and outreach efforts, including the 

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), 

the Federal Computer Security Managers’ Forum, and the 

Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association 

(FISSEA).

Key to the group’s success is the ability to interact 

with a broad constituency to ensure that SOIG’s program is 

consistent with national objectives related to or impacted 

by information security. Through open and transparent 

public engagement, collaboration, and cooperation, the 

group works to address critical cybersecurity challenges, 

enable greater U.S. industrial competitiveness, and facilitate 

the practical implementation of scalable and sustainable 

information security standards and practices.

GROUP MANAGER:

Mr. Kevin Stine

(301) 975-4483

kevin.stine@nist.gov

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SECURITY TESTING, VALIDAT I O N , A N D M E A S U R E M E N T 

G R O U P ( S T V M G ) 

MISSION STATEMENT:

Advance information security testing, measurement 

science, and conformance.

OVERVIEW:

Federal agencies, industry, and the public rely on 

cryptography for the protection of the information and 

communications used in electronic commerce, the critical 

infrastructure, and other application areas. The STVMG 

supports the testing and validation of the underlying 

cryptographic modules and cryptographic algorithms 

based upon established standards. These cryptographic 

modules and algorithms enable products and systems to 

provide security services, such as confidentiality, integrity 

protection, and authentication. Although cryptography 

provides security, poor designs or weak algorithms can 

render a product insecure and place highly sensitive 

information at risk. When protecting sensitive data, federal 

agencies require assurance that cryptographic products 

meet established security requirements and use only tested 

and validated cryptographic modules.

STVMG’s testing-focused activities include validating 

cryptographic algorithm implementations, cryptographic 

modules, and Security Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP)-enabled products; developing test suites and test 

methods; providing implementation guidance and technical 

support to industry forums; and conducting education, 

training, and outreach programs.

STVMG’s validation programs work together with 

independent cryptographic and security testing laboratories 

accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory 

Accreditation Program (NVLAP). Based on the independent 

laboratory test report and test evidence, the Validation 

Program validates an implementation under test. NIST 

publishes lists of awarded validations through public 

websites.

GROUP MANAGER:

Mr. Michael Cooper

(301) 975-8077

michael.cooper@nist.gov

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THE COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION

IMPLEMENTS THE FEDERAL INFORMATION

SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT

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C S D I M P L E M E N T S T H E 

F E D E R A L I N F O R M AT I O N 

SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT

The E-Government Act, Public Law 107-347, passed by 

the 107th Congress and signed into law by the President in 

December 2002, recognized the importance of information 

security to the economic and national security interests of 

the United States. Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled 

the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 

of 2002, included the duties and responsibilities for the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information 

Technology Laboratory, Computer Security Division (CSD). 

In December 2014, the 113th Congress updated FISMA as the 

Federal Information Security Modernization Act (Public Law 

113-283). NIST CSD responsibilities were unchanged in the 

update. In 2015, CSD addressed its assignments through the 

following activities:

• One final Federal Information Processing Standard 

(FIPS) was issued: FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, 

which specifies the Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) 

family of functions on binary data. Each of the SHA3 functions is based on an instance of the Keccak

algorithm that NIST selected as the winner of the 

SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition. 

(Note: FIPS 186 4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 

which was published in 2013, was updated in 2015 to 

require the implementation of either FIPS 186 or FIPS 

202 wherever a secure hash algorithm is required for 

Federal applications.)

• Thirty draft and final NIST Special Publications (SP) 

were issued that provide management, operational, 

and technical security guidelines in areas such as trustworthy email, media sanitization, protecting controlled 

unclassified information, supply chain risk management, assessing security and privacy controls, cryptographic algorithms and key lengths, key management systems, cyber threat information sharing, virtual 

machine protection, secure hypervisor deployment, 

random number generation, personal identity verification (PIV) (interfaces, credentials, card application and 

middleware), industrial control systems, the national 

checklist program, vetting the security of mobile applications, a biometric conformance testing methodology 

framework, attribute-based access control, access 

management for electric utilities, and securing electronic health records on mobile devices.

• Eighteen draft and final NIST Interagency/Internal 

Reports (NISTIR) were issued on a variety of topics, 

including the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 

Cyberspace (NSTIC) pilots for catalyzing the identity 

ecosystem, the proceedings of a symposium for cybersecurity for direct digital manufacturing, a summary 

of the executive technical workshop on improving 

cybersecurity and consumer privacy and the next steps 

in the process, risk management for replication devices, 

considerations for identity management in public-safety mobile networks, a summary of a public-safety 

mobile-application security requirements workshop, 

privacy risk management, cardholder authentication 

for the PIV digital signature key, derived PIV credentials proof-of-concept research, an advanced metering 

infrastructure smart meter upgradeability test framework, a report on strategic U.S. Government engagement in international standardization to achieve U.S. 

objectives for cybersecurity, guidelines for the creation 

of interoperable software identification (SWID) tags, a 

security content automation protocol (SCAP) Version 

1.2 content style guide about best practices for creating 

and maintaining SCAP 1.2 content, de-identification 

of personally identifiable information, the security of 

interactive and automated access management using 

secure shell (SSH), a proof-of-concept implementation 

of trusted geolocation in the cloud, and fundamentals 

of small business information security.

• Continued the successful collaboration with the 

Department of Defense (DOD), the Intelligence Community (IC), and the Committee on National Security 

Systems (CNSS), in partnership with the Joint Task 

Force (JTF) Transformation Initiative. Five Special Publications are currently recognized as JTF publications, 

and the JTF partners continue to develop and update 

key cybersecurity guidelines for protecting federal 

information and information systems as part of the 

Unified Information Security Framework through CSD’s 

FISMA Implementation Project. 

• Continued to develop expertise in several critical 

research areas, such as post-quantum cryptography 

(PQC), elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), privacy-enhancing cryptography, and lightweight cryptographic 

schemes for constrained environments.

• Performed research and conducted outreach on standards, practices, and technologies to enable prompt 

and effective threat information sharing, hardware 

roots of trust for mobile devices, Internet of things, 

combinatorial testing techniques, cloud computing and 

virtualization, risk management, identity management, 

access control and authorization management, and 

software assurance. 

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• Supported the joint National Telecommunications and 

Information Administration (NTIA) and NIST Public 

Safety Communications Research (PSCR) program 

with efforts in public-safety mobile-application security, identity management, and enabling cybersecurity 

capabilities on the PSCR 700 MHz LTE network.

• Provided awareness support for the Cybersecurity 

Framework and encouraged its use as a tool to help 

industry sectors and organizations manage cybersecurity risks.

• Conducted workshops, awareness briefings, and outreach to CSD customers to ensure the comprehension 

of standards and guidelines, to share ongoing and 

planned activities, and to aid in scoping guidelines in 

a collaborative, open, and transparent manner. CSD 

public workshops addressed a diverse range of information security and technology topics, including cloud 

and mobile technologies; the cybersecurity framework; 

chain risk management; cybersecurity innovations; 

computer security awareness, training, and education forums and various events; safeguarding health 

information; Special Publications to support FIPS 201-2; 

post-quantum computing; direct digital manufacturing; 

elliptic curve cryptography standards; and lightweight 

cryptography to discuss research results and develop 

standardization roadmaps.

• Engaged with international standards bodies in 

a variety of areas, including promoting a broader 

international adoption of security automation specifications. Additionally, NIST’s CSD continued to lead the 

Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), in 

conjunction with the Government of Canada’s Communications Security Establishment. The Common Criteria 

Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and CMVP 

facilitate the security testing of IT products usable by 

the Federal Government.

• Provided assistance to agencies and the private sector 

through many outreach programs, including the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), the 

Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA), and the Federal Computer Security 

Managers’ Forum.

• Solicited recommendations from the Information 

Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) on draft 

standards and guidelines, and on information security 

and privacy issues.

• The CSD 2015 annual report was produced and released as a NIST SP. CSD annual reports from fiscal 

years 2003 through 2015 are available on the Computer 

Security Resource Center (CSRC) at http://csrc.nist.

gov/publications/PubsTC.html#Annual Reports.

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PROGRAM AND PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015

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P R O G R A M A N D P R O J E C T 

ACHIEVEMENTS FOR FY 2015

In FY 2015, CSD continued to research and develop 

guidance for a broad array of technical areas, including supply 

chain risk management; security analytics; cloud, mobile, 

and privacy-enhancing technologies; hardware-enabled 

security; and cyber-physical and embedded systems. CSD 

staff and guest researchers have collaborated with global 

partners from government, industry, and academia, making 

significant contributions to help secure critical information 

and the infrastructure. The following sections describe CSD’s 

programs and project achievements, including extensive 

research and development for high quality, cost-effective 

security and privacy mechanisms, standards, guidelines, 

tests, and metrics that address current and future computer 

and information security challenges. 

N I S T R E S P O N S I B I L I T I E S 

U N D E R E X E C U T I V E O R D E R 

1 3 6 3 6 , “ I M P R O V I N G 

C R I T I C A L I N F R A S T R U C T U R E 

CYBERSECURITY”

Recognizing that the national and economic security of 

the United States depends on the reliable functioning of its 

critical infrastructure, the President issued Executive Order 

(EO) 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 

in February 2013. This EO directed NIST to work with 

stakeholders to develop a voluntary framework – based on 

existing standards, guidelines, and practices − for reducing 

cybersecurity risks to the critical infrastructure.

The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) that was developed provides a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performancebased, and cost-effective approach to help critical 

infrastructure owners, operators and other interested 

entities identify, assess, and manage cybersecurity-related 

risk, while protecting business confidentiality, individual 

privacy, and civil liberties.

In FY 2015, NIST continued to work with a diverse stakeholder community to support CSF use and understanding. 

This process included:

• Hosting a workshop at the University of South Florida 

in Tampa to share initial CSF experiences;

• Updating the CSF Web site with a catalog of industry 

resources, upcoming NIST speaking events, and an 

extensive frequently-asked-question knowledge base;

• Coordinating with critical infrastructure owners and 

operators, regulators, and other industry organizations 

through a variety of meetings and industry events to 

ensure understanding and use;

• Analyzing various industry work products, such as 

mapping documents, for CSF correctness;

• Consulting with state and local governments, and the 

governments of other nations regarding their alignment with both the principles and the cybersecurity 

outcomes of the CSF;

• Consulting with international organizations and standards bodies to demonstrate and ensure continued 

alignment with voluntary international standards; and

• Working with both industry and regulatory organizations to apply the CSF in ways that bring efficiencies to 

the regulatory process.

Since the release of the Framework, NIST’s primary 

goal has been to raise awareness of the Framework and 

encourage its use as a tool to help industry sectors and 

organizations manage cybersecurity risks. NIST has 

strengthened its collaboration with critical infrastructure 

owners and operators, industry leaders, government 

partners, and other stakeholders, building on previous 

years’ interactions that were crucial to the Framework’s 

development.

In FY 2016, NIST will continue to conduct stakeholder 

outreach and will work collaboratively to further understand 

stakeholder needs regarding tools and resources to enable 

more effective use of the Framework. NIST will also publish 

guidance on how NIST’s Risk Management Framework 

(SP 800-37 revision 1) and the Cybersecurity Framework 

complement each other. Additionally, NIST will formally 

gather stakeholder input about Framework use, evolution, 

and future management through a request for information 

(RFI). Following the RFI, NIST will conduct a public 

workshop at NIST in Gaithersburg, Maryland on April 6

and 7, 2016. Periodic program updates will be provided 

through the Framework website.

For More Information, See: 

http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework

CONTACTS:

Mr. Matt Barrett Mr. Adam Sedgewick

301) 975-6259 (301) 367-4678

matthew.barrett@nist.gov adam.sedgewick@nist.gov

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C S D W O R K I N N AT I O N A L A N D 

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

CSD’s Part in National and 

International ISO Security Standards 

Processes

Figure 1 shows many of the national and international 

standards developing organizations (SDOs) involved in 

cybersecurity standardization. CSD participates in many 

cybersecurity standards’ activities in many of these 

organizations, either in leadership positions or as editors 

and contributors, including the Biometric Application 

Programming Interface (BioAPI) Consortium; the Bluetooth 

Special Interest Group (SIG): Bluetooth Security Expert 

Group (BT-SEG); the International Telecommunications 

Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T); 

various groups within the Institute of Electrical and 

Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the Internet Engineering 

Task Force (IETF); the North American Security Products 

Organization (NASPO); the Trusted Computing Group (TCG); 

and Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. (ASC X9, Inc.) 

(e.g., X9F – Data & Information Security Subcommittee). 

Many of CSD’s publications have been the basis for both 

national and international standards projects.

The following paragraphs discuss, in particular, CSD 

staff activities in conjunction with the InterNational 

Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) 

Technical Committee Cyber Security (CS1), where CSD’s Sal 

Francomacaro served as the CS1 Vice Chair.

The International Organization for 

Standardization (ISO)

The International Organization for Standardization 

(ISO) is a network of the national standards institutes of 

148 countries, with representation by one member per 

country. The scope of ISO covers the standardization in all 

fields except electrical and electronic engineering standards, 

which are the responsibility of the International 

Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

Figure 1: SDOs involved in Cybersecurity

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The IEC prepares and publishes international standards 

for all electrical, electronic, and related technologies, 

including electronics, magnetics and electromagnetics, 

electroacoustics, multimedia, telecommunication, and 

energy production and distribution, as well as associated 

general disciplines, such as terminology and symbols, 

electromagnetic compatibility, measurement and 

performance, dependability, design and development, 

safety, and the environment. (see http://www.iec.ch/about/).

Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1) was formed by ISO 

and IEC to be responsible for international standardization in 

the field of Information Technology (see http://www.iso.org/

iso/jtc1_home.html). JTC 1 develops, maintains, promotes, 

and facilitates the IT standards required by global markets, 

meeting business and user requirements concerning:

• Design and development of IT systems and tools;

• Performance and quality of IT products and systems;

• Security of IT systems and information;

• Portability of application programs;

• Interoperability of IT products and systems;

• Unified tools and environments;

• Harmonized IT vocabulary; and

• User-friendly and ergonomically designed user interfaces.

JTC 1 consists of a number of subcommittees (SCs) and 

working groups that address specific technologies. SCs that 

produce standards relating to IT security include:

• SC 06 - Telecommunications and Information Exchange 

Between Systems;

• SC 17 - Cards and Personal Identification;

• SC 27 - IT Security Techniques; and

• SC 37 – Biometrics (Note: Fernando Podio, NIST CSD, 

served as Chair).

JTC 1 also has:

• Technical Committee 68 – Financial Services;

• SC 2 - Operations and Procedures, including Security;

• SC 4 – Securities;

• SC 6 - Financial Transaction Cards, Related Media and 

Operations;

• SC 7 – Software and Systems Engineering; and

• SC 38 – Distributed application platforms and services 

(DAPS).

The American National Standards 

Institute (ANSI)

The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is a 

private, nonprofit (501(c)(3)) organization that administers 

and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization 

and conformity assessment system, and facilitates the 

development of American National Standards (ANSs) by 

accrediting the procedures of SDOs. 

ANSI promotes the use of U.S. standards internationally, 

advocates U.S. policy and technical positions in international 

and regional standards organizations, and encourages the 

adoption of international standards as national standards 

where they meet the needs of the U.S. user community. 

ANSI is the sole U.S. representative and dues-paying 

member of the two major non-treaty international standards 

organizations: ISO and, via the United States National 

Committee (USNC), the IEC.

INCITS is an ANSI-accredited SDO that serves as 

the ANSI Technical Advisory Group (TAG) for ISO/IEC 

Joint Technical Committee 1. INCITS is sponsored by the 

Information Technology Industry (ITI) Council, a trade 

association representing the leading U.S. providers of 

information technology products and services. 

INCITS is organized into Technical Committees that 

focus on the creation of standards for different technology 

areas. Technical committees that focus on IT security and IT 

security-related technologies, or that may require separate 

security standards include:

• B10 – Identification Cards and Related Devices;

• CS1 – Cyber Security (Dan Benigni, NIST CSD, Chair; Sal 

Francomacaro, NIST CSD, Vice Chair and NIST Principal 

Voting Member);

• E22 – Item Authentication;

• M1 – Biometrics (Fernando Podio, NIST CSD, Chair);

• T3 – Open Distributed Processing (ODP);

• T6 – Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology;

• GIT1 – Governance of IT; and

• DAPS38 – Distributed Application Platforms and Services.

As a technical committee of INCITS, CS1 develops 

national, ANSI-accredited standards in the area of 

cybersecurity. Its scope encompasses:

• Management of information security and systems;

• Management of third-party information security service 

providers;

• Intrusion detection;

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• Network security;

• Cloud computing security;

• Supply-chain risk management;

• Incident handling;

• IT security evaluation and assurance;

• Security assessment of operational systems;

• Security requirements for cryptographic modules;

• Protection profiles;

• Role-based access control;

• Security checklists;

• Security metrics;

• Cryptographic and non-cryptographic techniques and 

mechanisms, including confidentiality, entity authentication, non-repudiation, key management, data 

integrity, message authentication, hash functions, and 

digital signatures;

• Future service and application standards supporting 

the implementation of control objectives and controls, 

as defined in ISO 27001, in the areas of business continuity and outsourcing;

• Identity management, including an identity management framework, role-based access control, and single 

sign-on; and

• Privacy technologies, including a privacy framework, 

privacy reference architecture, privacy infrastructure, 

anonymity and credentials, and specific privacy-enhancing technologies.

Several members of NIST’s CSD staff contribute to 

CS1’s national and international IT security standards efforts 

through its membership in CS1. 

CSD’s Role in Cybersecurity 

Standardization

CSD’s cybersecurity research also plays a direct role 

in the Cybersecurity Standardization efforts of CS1 at the 

national level. The following is a description of the nationallevel progress achieved during FY 2015 by CSD and CS1.

The NIST Policy Machine research and development 

effort has resulted in three ongoing national standards 

projects in CS1 in the early stages of development. They 

include:

• Next Generation Access Control –Functional Architecture (NGAC-FA), project number INCITS 499-2013, was 

published in FY 2013 and is recently beginning an early 

revision. 

• Next Generation Access Control – Generic Operations 

& Abstract Data Structures (NGAC-GOADS). Serban 

Gavrila, NIST CSD, is the editor. The project is assigned 

project number 2195-D, and the document (planned for 

publication in FY 2016) has successfully completed two 

public review periods. 

• Next Generation Access Control -Implementation 

Requirements, Protocols and API Definitions (NGAC-IRPADS). Project number is 2193-D has been assigned.

Sal Francomacaro also served as cybersecurity standards coordinator in CSD.

CONTACT:

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro

(301) 975-6414

salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

Identity Management Standards within 

INCITS B10 and ISO JTC1/SC17

CSD supports identity management standardization 

activities through participation in national and international 

standards bodies and organizations. CSD actively participates in the INCITS B10 committee, which is focused on the 

interoperability of Identification Cards and Related Devices. 

CSD has contributed and provided valuable feedback to 

many INCITS B10 standards during the development process. 

In addition, CSD also actively participates in the B10.8 and 

B10.12 committees. 

The INCITS/B10.8 committee works on International 

Driver’s License standards and serves as the U.S. Technical 

Advisory Group (TAG) to the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17 Working 

Group (WG) 10 efforts on the International Standardization 

of Driver’s License documents. The B10.12 committee 

develops interoperable standards for Integrated Circuit 

Cards with Contacts, and serves as the U.S. TAG for the 

international ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 17 Working Groups 4 and 11. 

During FY 2015, Mr. Francomacaro served as the U.S. Head 

of delegation to ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 17 WG4 and WG11. 

CSD provides technical and editorial support in the 

development of national and international standards. 

Specifically, Mr. Ketan Mehta, a CSD staff member, serves 

as the technical editor of ANSI 504-1, Generic Identity 

Command Set (GICS). GICS enables PIV, PIV-Interoperable 

(PIV-I) and Common Access Card (CAC) applications, and 

others, to be built from a single platform. GICS defines 

an open platform where identity applications can be 

instantiated, deployed, and used in an interoperable way 

between the credential issuers and credential users. During 

FY 2015, an amendment process was started on INCITS 504 

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Parts 1 and 2 to better align them with the new NIST SP 800-

73-4 (PIV) specifications.

CSD staff also provided significant input to the standards 

of major interest to U.S. government agencies and U.S. 

markets. CSD played a role in the development and revision 

of:

• ISO/IEC 7816 (Identification Cards, Integrated Circuit 

Cards);

• ISO/IEC 18013 (Personal Identification, ISO Compliant 

Driving License);

• ISO/IEC 19286 (Identification cards, Privacy-enhancing 

protocols and services);

• Doc 9303-10 LDS 2 (Machine Readable Travel Documents Logical Data Structure for Storage of Data in 

Contactless Interface);

• ISO/IEC 24727 (Identification Cards, Integrated Circuit 

Card Programming Interfaces); and 

• ISO/IEC 24787 (Biometrics “Match On Card” Comparison).

During FY 2016, the INCITS B10 committee, along with 

the active collaboration of CSD staff, plans to: 

• Publish Part 3 of INCITS 504; 

• Complete the amendment process for INCITS 504 Part 

1 and 2;

• Contribute to the publication of several revisions of the 

ISO/IEC 7816 family of standards (all relevant to FIPS 

201 specifications); 

• Pursue the standardization and harmonization of identity standards developed in the U.S.;

• Develop requirements and identify standards gaps for 

Mobile Driving Licenses; 

• Enhance the Machine Readable Travel Documents 

(ePassport) data model to address privacy and security 

concerns; and

• Contribute to the development of privacy-enhanced 

security protocols.

CSD staff will continue to actively support relevant ID 

management standard initiatives, such as ISO/IEC 19286 

(Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) Privacy-enhancing protocols 

and services) and ISO/IEC 18328 (ICC managed Devices).

CSD’s investment in these activities is motivated by new 

technical ideas that emerge from these ISO standards. For 

example, INCITS 504 is an ID platform that leverages the FIPS 

201 infrastructure to support a large number of government 

and enterprise initiatives. In particular, INCITS 504 aims to 

support initiatives such as the National Strategy for Trusted 

Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC). ISO/IEC 24727 aims to 

create an interoperability framework that increases the 

resilience and scalability of identity management solutions 

and to foster domestic and international interoperability.

CONTACTS:

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro Mr. Ketan Mehta

(301) 975-6414 (301) 975-8405

salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov ketan.mehta@nist.gov

Cloud Computing Standards Developed 

by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 38 Cloud 

Computing and INCITS Cloud 38

NIST has been designated by the Federal Chief 

Information Officer (CIO) to accelerate the Federal Government’s secure adoption of cloud computing by leading 

efforts to identify existing standards and guidelines. Where 

international standards are needed, NIST works closely 

with U.S. industry, standards developers, other government 

agencies, and leaders in the global standards community 

to develop standards that will support secure cloud 

computing.

As part of this program, Ms. Annie Sokol, CSD, provides 

technical and editorial representation in the development 

of national and international standards in both SC 27 and 

SC38. She was the convener for ISO/IEC 17788 Information 

technology – Cloud Computing Overview and vocabulary, 

which is the normative reference to other published and 

under-development.

CONTACT:

Ms. Annie Sokol

(301) 975-2006

annie.sokol@nist.gov

ISO Standardization of Security 

Requirements for Cryptographic 

Modules

CSD has contributed to the activities of ISO/IEC JTC 1 

SC/27, which published ISO/IEC 19790, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on March 1, 2006, and 

ISO/IEC 24759, Test Requirements for Cryptographic 

Modules, on July 1, 2008. ISO/IEC 19790 specifies the 

security requirements for a cryptographic module utilized 

within a security system protecting sensitive information 

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in computer and telecommunication systems. These 

efforts bring consistent testing of cryptographic modules 

to the global community by providing ISO-equivalent 

standards representing FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements 

for Cryptographic Modules and Derived Test Requirements 

[DTR] for FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 Working Group (WG) 3 completed 

and published revisions of ISO/IEC 19790:2006 and ISO/

IEC 24759:2008, for which Mr. Randall J. Easter of CSD 

was the principal editor. The revision of ISO/IEC 19790 

was published on August 15, 2012. The revision of ISO/IEC 

24759 was published on January 31, 2014. Both ISO/IEC 

standards were also adopted by the American National 

Standards Institute (ANSI). The two ISO/IEC revisions were 

developed with international support and the collaboration 

of governments, industry and academia. Revised corrections 

of both standards were published on December 15, 2015. 

The revision of ISO/IEC 19790:2012 addresses new 

security areas such as: defined software module boundaries; 

degraded modes of operation; trusted channels; twofactor authentication; software security; mitigation of fault 

induction and side-channel attacks; operational self-tests 

for algorithms; and life-cycle assurance from design to 

end-of-life. Figure 2 is a chart of the ISO/IEC standards, 

as explained above, in which CSD has played a part during 

the development process.

In addition to the aforementioned standards, the 

Technical Standard (TS) ISO/IEC TS 30104:2015, Physical 

Security Attacks, Mitigation Techniques and Security 

Requirements, for which Mr. Easter was the editor, was 

published on May 15, 2015.

Physical security mechanisms are employed by 

cryptographic modules where the protection of the module’s 

sensitive security parameters are desired. ISO/IEC 30104 

addresses how to express security assurance for products 

where the risk of the security environment requires the 

support of such mechanisms. This Technical Specification 

addresses the following topics:

• A survey of physical security attacks directed against 

different types of hardware embodiments, including 

a description of known physical attacks, ranging from 

simple attacks that require minimal skill or resources, to 

complex attacks that require trained, technical people 

and considerable resources;

• Guidance on the principles, best practices and techniques for the design of tamper protection mechanisms 

and methods for the mitigation of those attacks; and

• Guidance on the evaluation or testing of hardware tamper protection mechanisms and references to current 

standards and test programs that address hardware 

tamper evaluation and testing.

Figure 2: Cryptographic Module Testing – ISO Standards

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CSD’s Mr. Easter is also the principal editor or co-editor 

of the following draft ISO/IEC documents: 

• ISO/IEC 17825, Testing methods for the mitigation of 

non-invasive attack classes against cryptographic modules (expected publication January 2016); 

• ISO/IEC 18367, Cryptographic algorithms and security 

mechanisms conformance testing;

• ISO/IEC 19896-1: Competence requirements for information security testers and evaluators — Part 1: Introduction, concepts and general requirements;

• ISO/IEC 19896-2: Competence requirements for 

information security testers and evaluators — Part 2: 

Knowledge, skills and effectiveness requirements for 

ISO/IEC 19790 testers;

• ISO/IEC 20085-1: Test tool requirements and test tool 

calibration methods for use in testing non-invasive 

attack mitigation techniques in cryptographic modules 

— Part 1: Test tools and techniques;

• ISO/IEC 20085-2: Test tool requirements and test tool 

calibration methods for use in testing non-invasive 

attack mitigation techniques in cryptographic modules 

— Part: 2 Test calibration methods and apparatus;

• ISO/IEC 20540: Guidelines for testing cryptographic 

modules in their operational environment; and

• ISO/IEC 20543: Test and analysis methods for random 

bit generators within ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 15408.

CSD’s contributions to the development of these 

international standards create a strong foundation for the 

adoption of and migration from currently used national 

standards. In particular, this adoption will promote 

international harmonization for the implementation and 

testing of cryptographic algorithms and modules, while 

accommodating individual country preferences in the choice 

of approved security functions. CSD published a Federal 

Register notice in August 2015 seeking public comment 

for migrating from FIPS 140-2 to ISO/IEC 19790:2012. The 

comment period ended September 2015 (see https://

federalregister.gov/a/2015-19743). 

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/

CONTACT:

Mr. Randall J. Easter

(301) 975-4641

randall.easter@nist.gov

F E D E R A L I N F O R M AT I O N 

S E C U R I T Y M A N A G E M E N T A C T 

( F I S M A ) I M P L E M E N TAT I O N 

PROJECT

The FISMA Implementation Project focuses on:

• Developing a comprehensive series of standards and 

guidelines to help federal agencies build effective information security programs, defend against increasingly 

sophisticated cyber-attacks, and demonstrate compliance to security requirements set forth in legislation, 

Executive Orders, Homeland Security Directives, and 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policies;

• Building a common understanding and reference 

guides for organizations applying the NIST suite of 

standards and guidelines that support the NIST Risk 

Management Framework (RMF) (see http://csrc.nist.

gov/groups/SMA/fisma/framework.html);

• Developing minimum criteria and guidelines for recognizing security-assessment organization providers as 

capable of assessing information systems consistent 

with NIST standards and guidelines supporting the 

RMF; and

• Conducting FISMA outreach to public and private-sector organizations.

During FY 2015, the CSD FISMA Implementation project 

continued to strengthen collaboration through the Joint Task 

Force (JTF) Transformation Initiative, which includes the 

Department of Defense (DOD), the Intelligence Community 

(IC), and the Committee on National Security Systems 

(CNSS), and other federal agencies. The JTF partners 

continue to develop and update key cybersecurity guidelines 

for protecting federal information and information systems 

as part of the Unified Information Security Framework. 

Previously, the JTF developed common security guidance 

in the critical areas of security controls for information 

systems and organizations, security assessment procedures 

to demonstrate security control effectiveness, security 

authorizations for risk acceptance decisions, and continuous 

monitoring activities to ensure that decision makers receive 

the most up-to-date information on the security state of 

their information systems. In addition, CSD worked with 

the General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Risk 

and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP), a 

government-wide program that provides a standardized 

approach to security assessment, authorization, and 

continuous monitoring for cloud products and services. The 

team developed a high-impact security control baseline 

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overlay for FedRAMP cloud systems in accordance with NIST 

standards and guidelines.

In FY 2015, the CSD FISMA Implementation project staff 

worked on the following initiatives:

• Risk Management Guidelines: SP 800-53 Revision 4, 

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information 

Systems and Organizations, provides organizations 

with the security controls necessary to appropriately 

strengthen their information systems and the environments in which those systems operate, and provides a 

process for selecting the appropriate controls, which 

contributes to systems that are resilient in the face of 

attacks and other threats. This “Build It Right” strategy 

is reinforced with the ongoing work on the Second 

Public Draft of SP 800-160, Systems Security Engineering: An Integrated Approach to Building Trustworthy 

Resilient Systems. The implementation of SPs 800-53 

and 800-160, combined with the implementation of 

SP 800-37, Guide for Applying the Risk Management 

Framework to Federal Information Systems, and SP 

800 137, Information Security Continuous Monitoring 

for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, 

provide organizations with near real-time information 

that is essential for senior leaders making ongoing 

risk-based decisions affecting their critical missions and 

business functions.

• Guidelines for a Role-Based Information Security 

Training Model: SP 800 16, A Role-Based Model for 

Federal Information Technology/Cybersecurity Training, describes a process for developing information 

technology/cybersecurity role-based training. Its primary focus is to provide a comprehensive, yet flexible, 

methodology for the development of training courses 

or modules for personnel who have been identified as 

having significant information technology/cybersecurity responsibilities within agencies. Agencies can use 

SP 800-16 to tailor the Role-Based Security Training to 

meet the needs of their own organization. 

• FISMA Outreach Activity to Public and Private Sector 

Organizations: Cybersecurity outreach briefings were 

conducted and support provided to all levels of government (federal, state and local), as well as private sector 

organizations, on multiple information security topics 

of interest. These include, for example, effective implementation of the NIST RMF, contingency planning, interconnection security agreements, and information security for small businesses. In addition, the CSD FISMA 

implementation project staff conducted outreach activities with academic institutions, providing information 

on NIST’s security standards and guidelines, exploring 

new areas of cybersecurity research and development, 

and serving on cybersecurity advisory panels.

• Collaboration with JTF partners and other federal 

organizations: CSD staff worked closely with JTF partners on continued cooperation and planning to ensure 

that the five JTF publications remain current, and on 

the designation of additional special publications as 

JTF guidance. The CSD FISMA implementation project 

staff also collaborated with DOD, IC, the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO), OMB, GSA, the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Inspector Generals 

(IGs) on multiple projects to ensure consistency with 

FISMA-related guidance and to protect information in a 

way that is commensurate with risk. 

In FY 2015, the CSD FISMA Implementation project staff 

completed the following activities:

• Published the final version of SP 800-53A, Revision 

4, Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal 

Information Systems and Organizations;

• Published both Initial Public Draft (IPD) and final versions of SP 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified 

Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and 

Organizations, to provide guidance to federal agencies 

for the protection of Controlled Unclassified Information when such information is resident in nonfederal 

information systems and organizations;

• Published an errata version of SP 800-53, Revision 4 to 

make necessary clarifications and ensure consistency 

with subsequently published/revised NIST SPs and 

new/updated federal policy requirements;

• Continued collaboration with DHS to develop a multiple-volume Interagency Report on Automation Support 

for Ongoing Assessments, which is based on NIST standards and guidelines; and

• Continued the development of preliminary drafts of SP 

800-18 Revision 2, Guide for Developing Security Plans 

for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

and SP 800-60 Revision 2, Guide for Mapping Types 

of Information and Information Systems to Security 

Categories.

In FY 2016, CSD FISMA Implementation project staff 

intend to:

• Finalize SP 800-160, Systems Security Engineering: An 

Integrated Approach to Building Trustworthy Resilient 

Systems;

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• Finalize SP 800-16, A Role-Based Model for Federal 

Information Technology / Cybersecurity Training;

• Begin the development of SP 800-53, Revision 5, 

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information 

Systems and Organizations;

• Continue to explore ways to use automation to support 

SP 800-53 updates;

• Continue the development of SP 800-60, Revision 2, 

Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories;

• Continue the development of SP 800-18, Revision 2, 

Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems and Organizations;

• Expand cybersecurity outreach to include additional 

state, local, and tribal governments, as well as private 

sector organizations and academic institutions; 

• Continue to support federal agencies in the effective 

implementation of the RMF; and 

• Continue collaboration with JTF partners and other 

federal organizations.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma

CONTACTS:

Dr. Ron Ross Ms. Pat Toth

(301) 975-5390 (301) 975-5140

ron.ross@nist.gov patricia.toth@nist.gov

Ms. Kelley Dempsey Ms. Peggy Himes

(301) 975-2827 (301) 975-2489

kelley.dempsey@nist.gov peggy.himes@nist.gov

B I O M E T R I C S TA N D A R D S A N D 

A S S O C I AT E D C O N F O R M I T Y 

ASSESSMENT TESTING TOOLS

NIST’s CSD supports the development of biometric 

conformance testing methodology standards and other 

conformity-assessment efforts through active technical 

participation in the development of these standards 

and the development of associated conformance test 

software, architectures and test suites. These test tools are 

developed to promote the adoption of these standards 

and to support users that require conformance to selected 

biometric standards, product developers and testing labs. 

CSD’s project team contributes to the development of 

biometric standards and participates in the INCITS Technical 

Committee M1 – Biometrics and ISO/IEC Joint Technical 

Committee (JTC) 1 Subcommittee (SC) 37 – Biometrics

standards bodies. CSD plans to continue this work in FY 2016.

In FY 2015, Biometric Conformance Test Software 

(BioCTS) for ANSI/NIST-ITL (which targets biometric 

transactions based on NIST SP 500-290, and SP 500-290 

Revision 1 - Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, 

Facial & Other Biometric Information) received a substantial 

update. Version 2.0 of the testing software was released and 

added support for testing for the remaining traditionally 

encoded record types not previously supported (+12 for 

ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011, and +18 for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 

Update: 2013). Version 2.0 now supports all traditionally 

encoded biometric record types between the two versions 

of the published ANSI/NIST-ITL standards. Additionally, 

Version 2.0 added many enhanced editing features for 

traditionally encoded biometric transactions – some new 

features include: adding and removing records and fields, 

arranging records and fields, automatically sorting records, 

displaying the biometric sample image, and enhanced 

binary data editing features. In addition to the enhanced 

editing features, BioCTS for ANSI/NIST-ITL received many 

usability enhancements, as well as updates to some core 

software functionality, providing a more usable and robust 

testing tool. 

As illustrated in Figure 3, a new feature of BioCTS is the 

display of the biometric sample, when possible, so that the 

user can get visual feedback on the biometric data that is 

under test. The update provides a rich editing environment 

for binary/traditionally encoded transactions and files, 

which are difficult for humans to read. Version 2.0 provides 

a user-friendly way to see each field within a transaction/

file, associated test results, and allows for the modification 

of data (as shown in Figure 4.) All of the new features are 

detailed in the BioCTS for ANSI/NIST-ITL v2 User Guide (see: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/BiomResCenter/CTA_BETA/

BioCTS_AN_ITL_v2_Guide.pdf).

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Figure 3: BioCTS displays the biometric sample to 

provide visual feedback.

The latest version of BioCTS was released in August 

2015, together with documentation and sample data. The 

BioCTS software installer files, as well the ancillary tools and 

sample data can be downloaded from the NIST Biometrics 

website. (see: http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/

biocta_download.cfm).

Figure 4: BioCTS provides a rich editing environment for 

reviewing and updating records.

A number of technical contributions towards the 

development of ANSI/NIST and international standards 

were submitted. They included technical contributions on 

international biometric data interchange formats and their 

associated conformance testing methodologies, as well 

as on SP 500-290 Revision 1 and the associated National 

Information Exchange Model (NIEM) Extensible Markup 

Language (XML) Schema (see https://tools.niem.gov).

Outreach efforts in FY 2015 in support of biometric 

standards development and conformity assessment 

included test tool contributions for the standards developers 

(in support of ongoing development projects), and 

presentations on ANSI/NIST and international biometric 

standards and related conformity assessment activities. The 

work included the development of technical publications, 

the review of research papers for external publications, 

and participation in conference program committees. CSD 

published NIST Special Publication 500-304, Conformance 

Testing Methodology Framework for ANSI/NIST-ITL 

1-2011 Update: 2013, Data Format for the Interchange of 

Fingerprint, Facial & Other Biometric Information in June 

2015. Additionally, CSD published NIST SP 500-304 Annex 

D: Test Notes and Exceptions for the ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2011 

Update 2013 Conformance Testing Methodology Framework

in July 2015.

For More Information, See: 

BioCTS - Biometric Conformance Test Tool Downloads: 

http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/biocta_download.

cfm

NIST Special Publication 500-304: Conformance Testing 

Methodology Framework for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Update: 

2013, Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial 

& Other Biometric Information:

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.

SP.500-304.pdf 

NIST SP 500-304 Annex D: Test Notes and Exceptions for 

the ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2011 Update 2013 Conformance Testing 

Methodology Framework:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/BiomResCenter/CTA_BETA/

External_Notes_Exceptions_NIST_SP_500_304_with_

Errata.pdf

CONTACT: 

Mr. Dylan Yaga

(301) 975-6004

dylan.yaga@nist.gov

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SECURITY OF CYBERPHYSICAL SYSTEMS (CPS)

CSD’s overall Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) effort 

will provide the next generation of “smart,” co-designed 

and co-engineered interacting networks of physical and 

computational components. Specifically, CSD supports the 

effort by providing cybersecurity and privacy experts who 

help leverage existing resources and address CPS-specific 

cybersecurity and privacy challenges. Such challenges are 

related to personalized health care, emergency response, 

traffic flow management, and electric power generation 

and delivery, and many other emerging technical areas. 

Other phrases that are often referenced along with CPS 

technologies include:

• Internet of Things (IoT);

• Industrial Internet;

• Smart Cities;

• Smart Grid; and

• “Smart” Anything (e.g., Cars, Buildings, Homes, Manufacturing, Hospitals, Appliances) (see http://www.nist.

gov/cps/).

Composed of heterogeneous, potentially distributed 

components and systems, CPS provides a promise of 

increased efficiency and interaction between the digital and 

physical worlds. However, assuring that these emerging and 

evolving systems are reliable, robust, resilient, trustworthy, 

secure, and that they protect the privacy of information 

(to only list a few concerns) poses a unique cybersecurity 

challenge. 

CPS present unique challenges, including the need 

for integration with legacy components and allowance for 

emerging technologies, and real-time response in support of 

extremely high availability, predictability, and reliability.

Cybersecurity is an important crosscutting discipline 

that is critical to the safe and resilient design, development 

and operation of CPS. Addressing the opportunities 

and challenges of CPS requires a broad collaboration to 

develop a common foundation, including a consensus 

definition, vocabulary, reference architecture, and a 

shared understanding of the essential roles of timing, 

cybersecurity and data interoperability. CSD is researching 

the cybersecurity needs of the broader landscape of CPS 

by leveraging CSD’s expertise in cybersecurity in different 

domains and applications of CPS (such as industrial control 

systems, the smart grid, hardware-enabled security, and 

embedded systems).

In June 2014, NIST established the CPS Public Working 

Group (PWG), which is open to all, to foster and capture 

inputs from those involved in CPS, both nationally and 

globally. CSD is working in collaboration with NIST’s 

Engineering Laboratory (EL) Smart Grid and Cyber-Physical 

Systems Program Office, NIST’s Physical Measurement 

Laboratory Time and Frequency Division, ITL’s Software 

and Systems Division and ITL’s Advanced Networking 

Technologies Division to lead a working group of government, academic, and industry stakeholders. The CPS PWG 

consists of five technical subgroups:

• Definition, Vocabulary, and Reference Architecture;

• Use Cases;

• Cybersecurity and Privacy;

• Data Interoperability; and

• Timing and Synchronization.

Each subgroup consists of co-leaders from academia, 

industry and NIST. CSD co-leads the Cybersecurity and 

Privacy subgroup that is focused on identifying strategies 

for cybersecurity and privacy in CPS, and is working 

collaboratively with the other subgroups to ensure that 

cybersecurity is included as a design principle during 

development. 

In September 2015, the CPS PWG published the Draft 

Framework for CPS that includes the work of the five 

technical subgroups. The document reflects more than a 

year’s effort by the CPS PWG, which includes a few hundred 

members drawn primarily from industry, academia and 

government. In 2016, the CPS PWG will collect and analyze 

the comments to the draft and publish the next version of the 

CPS Framework. The CPS PWG deliverables are technology 

and business-model neutral, and freely available online and 

intended for open use by all stakeholders.

Additionally, in 2015, CSD, in conjunction with NIST’s 

Engineering Laboratory, Intelligent Systems Division, 

finalized SP 800-82 Revision 2, Guide to Industrial Control 

Systems Security. CSD will also continue to participate in the 

International Society of Automation (ISA) 99 Committee, 

which develops and establishes standards, recommended 

practices, technical reports, and related information that 

define procedures for implementing electronically secure 

industrial automation and control systems and security 

practices, and for assessing electronic security performance.

For More Information, See: 

http://www.nist.gov/cps/

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F E D E R A L C Y B E R S E C U R I T Y 

R E S E A R C H & D E V E L O P M E N T 

(R&D)

The Networking and Information Technology Research 

and Development (NITRD) program provides a framework 

in which many federal agencies come together to coordinate 

their networking and IT research and development 

(R&D) efforts. CSD remained committed to the value of 

communicating its R&D efforts to other federal colleagues 

and identifying the opportunities to support R&D efforts 

throughout the Federal Government.

In FY 2015, the NITRD Cyber Security and Information 

Assurance (CSIA) Interagency Working Group (IWG) 

monthly meetings provided an opportunity to learn and 

share information about NIST’s ongoing research with 

federal program managers of cybersecurity research (see 

https://www.nitrd.gov/nitrdgroups/index.php?title=Cyber_

Security_and_Information_Assurance_Interagency_

Working_Group_(CSIA_IWG)#title). The Cybersecurity 

Enhancement Act of 2014 requested the development of 

a new federal cybersecurity research and development 

strategic plan, and NIST was a consistent presence at the 

regular development meetings for the new plan that is 

intended for release during the month of February 2016. 

(see Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 https://

www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1353/

text, and see strategic plan https://www.whitehouse.gov/

sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/2016_Federal_

Cybersecurity_Research_and_Development_Stratgeic_

Plan.pdf).

FY 2015 also included the development of a National 

Privacy Research Strategy by the members of the National 

Privacy Research Forum (see https://www.nitrd.gov/

cybersecurity/nationalprivacyresearchstrategy.aspx). 

Naomi Lefkowitz, Senior Privacy Policy Advisor at NIST, and 

Simson Garfinkel, Senior Advisor in the Information Access 

Division, shared NIST’s focus on privacy and brought their 

expertise to the development process for the privacy R&D 

plan that will be published in FY 2016.

NIST regularly attended the NITRD CSIA Senior 

Steering Group meetings to share and stay connected with 

opportunities that supported the development of the new 

strategic plan for cybersecurity R&D and participated in 

panel presentations to which the SSG was invited to describe 

federal directions in cybersecurity R&D at relevant forums 

and conferences (see https://www.nitrd.gov/nitrdgroups/

index.php?title=Cyber_Security_Information_Assurance_

Research_and_Development_Senior_Steering_Group_

(CSIA_R%26D_SSG)#title).

CSD is also a regular participant in the coordination 

activities of the federal Special Cyber Operations 

Research and Engineering (SCORE) Committee. SCORE 

enables technology transfer through the sharing of NIST 

cybersecurity expertise and publications with researchers 

throughout the Federal Government. The SCORE committee 

interacts with federal leaders and reports to the National 

Science & Technology Council’s Committee on Homeland & 

National Security. In FY 2015, NIST expertise in supply chain 

risk management and cryptography was included in SCORE 

reports.

For More Information, See:

http://www.nitrd.gov/

CONTACT:

Mr. Bill Newhouse 

(301) 975-2869 

william.newhouse@nist.gov

S E C U R I T Y A S P E C T S O F 

ELECTRONIC VOTING

In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act 

(HAVA) to encourage the upgrade of voting equipment 

across the United States. HAVA established the Election 

Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Technical Guidelines 

Development Committee (TGDC), chaired by the Director of 

NIST. HAVA directs NIST to provide technical support to the 

EAC and TGDC in efforts related to human factors, security, 

and laboratory accreditation. As part of NIST’s efforts, 

CSD supports the activities of the EAC related to voting 

equipment security.

In the past year, NIST continued to support the EAC 

in finalizing changes to the Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines (VVSG) 1.1. These changes sought to improve 

the auditability of voting systems, provide greater software 

integrity protections, expand and improve access-control 

requirements, and help ensure that cryptographic security 

mechanisms are implemented properly. The EAC approved 

these updates to the VVSG in March 2015. In addition, NIST 

completed a set of draft test assertions for the security 

requirements in the VVSG. This included test assertions in the 

CONTACTS:

Mr. Stephen Quinn Ms. Suzanne Lightman

(301) 975-6967 (301) 975-6442

stephen.quinn@nist.gov suzanne.lightman@nist.gov

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areas of access control, software setup and validation, polling 

place security, and the use of public telecommunications 

networks.

Initial efforts on the next-generation of the VVSG have 

already begun. In February, NIST and the EAC sponsored 

the second Future of Voting Systems Symposium. This 

symposium brought together election officials, voting 

system manufacturers, voting system test laboratories, 

standards developers, academics, and federal, state, and 

local government officials to discuss emerging trends in 

voting. The discussions at this workshop are being used 

to define the scope and priorities for the next-generation 

guidelines.

In FY 2016, NIST and the EAC will establish a set of 

public working groups to inform the development of a new 

version of the VVSG. NIST and EAC goals are to accelerate 

the development and adoption of the VVSG by leading these 

working groups in close consultation with election officials, 

the federal and private sectors, standards bodies and EAC 

committees, academic researchers, and other members 

of the public. These working groups will focus on voting 

system technology areas, including accessibility, usability, 

interoperability, security, and testing and certification. 

For More Information, See: 

http://vote.nist.gov

CONTACTS:

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid Mr. Joshua Franklin

(301) 975-5155 (301) 975-8463

andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov joshua.franklin@nist.gov

H E A LT H I N F O R M AT I O N 

TECHNOLOGY SECURITY

Health Information Technology (HIT) enables better 

patient care through the secure use and sharing of health 

information. HIT leads to improvements in healthcare quality, 

reduced medical errors, increased efficiencies in health care 

delivery and administration, and improved health for the 

general population. Central to reaching these goals is the 

assurance of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 

health information. CSD works with government, industry, 

academia, and others to provide security tools, technologies, 

and methodologies that provide for the security and privacy 

of health information.

NIST CSD continued its HIT security outreach efforts 

in FY 2015. NIST and the Department of Health and Human 

Services’ (DHHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) co-hosted the 

eighth annual Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 

Act (HIPAA) Security Rule conference, Safeguarding Health 

Information: Building Assurance through HIPAA Security, in 

September 2015 in Washington, D.C. The conference offered 

important sessions that focused on broad topics of interest 

to the healthcare and health IT security community. Over 

600 in-person and virtual attendees from federal, state, 

and local governments, academia, HIPAA-covered entities 

and business associates, industry groups, and vendors 

heard from, and interacted with, healthcare, security, and 

privacy experts on technologies and methodologies for 

safeguarding health information and for implementing the 

requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule. Presentations and 

panel discussions covered a variety of security management 

and technical assurance topics, including:

• Collaborative approaches for securing medical devices;

• Vulnerabilities in medical devices and control systems; 

• Business associate liability;

• Information sharing and threat intelligence;

• Data recovery and security plans; and

• Securing electronic health records on mobile devices.

The keynote addresses were delivered by Jocelyn 

Samuels, Director, DHHS/OCR, and Dr. Cris Ewell, Chief 

Information Security Officer at Seattle Children’s Hospital.

In FY 2016, NIST will work with diverse healthcare 

stakeholders, including partners in government and 

industry, to support security capabilities in new areas, 

such as the Precision Medicine Initiative, and identify 

opportunities to strengthen the sector’s cybersecurity risk 

management efforts through the application of the NIST 

Cybersecurity Framework.

For More Information, See: 

http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/security/

CONTACT:

Mr. Kevin Stine

(301) 975-4483

kevin.stine@nist.gov

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Figure 5: Visibility Challenges for Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM)

S U P P LY C H A I N R I S K 

M A N A G E M E N T ( S C R M ) 

F O R I N F O R M AT I O N A N D 

C O M M U N I C AT I O N S 

T E C H N O L O G Y ( I C T ) 

Information and communication technologies have 

rapidly become more numerous and more capable. These 

technologies increasingly rely on a supply-chain ecosystem 

that is long, complex, variable, interconnected, globally 

distributed, and geographically diverse. Outsourcing the 

development, maintenance, management, and disposal of 

data and ICT is increasingly common.

These trends have caused organizations acquiring 

technology to experience a lack of visibility throughout the 

supply chain (see Figure 5). Such organizations need a better 

understanding of how the technology being acquired was 

developed, integrated and deployed. These organizations 

also need to better understand the processes, procedures, 

and practices used to assure the integrity, security, resilience, 

and quality of the products and services being obtained. This 

lack of visibility and understanding, in turn, has decreased 

the acquiring organization’s ability to effectively manage 

risk inherited from the supply chain. 

The Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) program 

seeks to provide organizations with a standardized and 

repeatable toolkit of technical and intelligence resources to 

strategically manage supply-chain risk throughout the entire 

lifecycle of systems, products and services.

In FY 2015, CSD finalized and published NIST SP 800-

161, Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal 

Information Systems and Organizations. This document 

builds on existing NIST guidance to help federal departments 

and agencies identify, assess and mitigate ICT supply-chain 

risk at all organizational levels. 

When NIST researched and developed the Framework 

for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which 

was published in February 2014, cyber supply-chain risk 

management (CSCRM) was identified as an area needing 

further research and guidance (see the NIST Roadmap 

for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, also 

published in February 2014). In FY 2015, CSD initiated a 

project on industry best practices for CSCRM. Initial research 

was developed into company case studies spanning multiple 

business sectors. The studies will be analyzed to support a 

workshop, and a final publication is planned for FY 2016. 

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CSD staff continued to join staff members from 

the Department of Defense in co-chairing a U.S. federal 

interagency working group on SCRM. The working group 

evolved from the White House’s Comprehensive National 

Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) 11, Develop a Multi-Pronged 

Approach for Global Supply Chain Risk Management, which 

ended in 2014. In FY 2015, the co-chairs began the process 

of formalizing the working group under the auspices of the 

CNSS. 

CSD continued working with partners through the 

Software and Supply Chain Assurance (SSCA) Forum, cosponsoring four multi-day workshops. The SSCA Working 

Group (WG) is a key public-private partnership that meets 

quarterly to discuss current projects, tools, resources, and 

lessons learned regarding CSCRM. The SSCA WG is cosponsored by NIST, GSA, DoD and DHS. 

In FY 2016, CSD will:

• Continue working on Industry Best Practices for Cyber 

Supply Chain Management, including hosting a twoday workshop, developing cyber supply-chain standards mappings to the Cybersecurity Framework, as 

well as a strategy to better integrate the supply-chain 

management and information security functions in organizations; the various pieces of the research project 

will culminate in a draft guidance document;

• Continue to co-chair the interagency working group on 

cyber supply-chain risk management;

• Begin research to demonstrate cause and effect relationships between cyber supply-chain capability/maturity levels and organizational performance outcomes 

over time; and

• Research metrics for use in supply chain risk management.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/scrm/

CONTACTS:

ICT SCRM Team email: scrm-nist@nist.gov

Mr. Jon Boyens Ms. Celia Paulsen

Program Lead Technical Lead

(301) 975-5549 (301) 975-5981

jon.boyens@nist.gov celia.paulsen@nist.gov

N AT I O N W I D E P U B L I C 

S A F E T Y B R O A D B A N D 

N E T W O R K ( N P S B N ) 

CYBERSECURITY

In February 2012, Congress 

passed the Middle Class Tax Relief 

and Job Creation Act. One portion 

of this legislation calls for the 

establishment of a nationwide, 

interoperable public-safety broadband network based on the 

3rd Generation Partnership Project’s 

(3GPP) Long-Term Evolution (LTE) 

technology. The network will be 

deployed and operated by the First 

Responder Network Authority 

(FirstNet). The planned NPSBN will 

“create a much needed nationwide interoperable broadband 

network that will help police, firefighters, emergency medical 

service professionals and other public safety officials stay 

safe and do their jobs.” (see http://www.ntia.doc.gov/

category/public-safety). NIST is directed to establish a list 

of certified devices and required components to be used 

by public-safety officials, vendors, and other interested 

parties for interacting with the nationwide network. NIST 

is also directed to conduct research and development 

that supports the acceleration and advancement of the 

nationwide network.

In FY 2015, CSD supported the joint National 

Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 

and NIST Public Safety Communications Research (PSCR) 

program with efforts in public-safety mobile-application 

security, identity management, and enabling cybersecurity 

capabilities on the PSCR 700 MHz LTE network located in 

Boulder, Colorado (see http://www.pscr.gov). In June 2015, 

CSD, in cooperation with the Association of Public-Safety 

Communications Officials (APCO) International and FirstNet, 

held a half-day workshop titled “Identifying and Categorizing 

Data Types for Public Safety Mobile Applications.” The 

outcome of that workshop will be captured in a forthcoming 

NIST publication in FY 2016. At PSCR’s Annual Public Safety 

Broadband Stakeholder Conference, CSD organized a 

panel titled “Applied Public Safety Cybersecurity Research” 

highlighting PSCR’s cybersecurity activities over the previous 

twelve months in the areas of identity management, mobile 

application security, and LTE infrastructure cybersecurity. 

During FY 2015, CSD published NISTIR 8018, Public 

Safety Mobile Application Security Requirements 

Source: http://www.pscr.gov/

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Workshop Summary, and NISTIR 8014, Considerations for 

Identity Management in Public Safety Mobile Networks. In 

addition, CSD developed an informational survey on mobile 

application vetting services titled “Mobile Application 

Vetting Services for Public Safety” and Draft NISTIR 8080, 

Usability and Security Considerations for Public Safety 

Mobile Authentication.

CSD participated in the standards development process 

for LTE technology within the 3GPP, supporting security 

requirements for public safety that are related to Proximity 

Services (ProSe), Group Communication System Enablers 

(GCSE), and Mission Critical Push-To-Talk (MCPTT). In 

addition, CSD broadened its scope within the IETF to include 

efforts related to public safety.

In FY 2016, CSD will continue representing public 

safety in international standardization efforts, such as the 

IETF and 3GPP. CSD will work to implement and exercise 

LTE cybersecurity infrastructure capabilities in the PSCR 

700 MHz LTE network, conduct research into mobile 

authentication solutions to support public-safety, and 

investigate mobile application-security services and 

solutions to support the security requirements of publicsafety mobile applications and devices. CSD will continue 

to engage the public-safety communications community by 

organizing workshops and conferences; and participating 

in events such as APCO’s Annual Meeting, PSRC’s Annual 

Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Conference, and the 

International Wireless Communications Expo (IWCE).

CONTACTS:

Ms. Sheila Frankel Dr. Nelson Hastings

(301) 975-3297 (301) 975-5237

sheila.frankel@nist.gov nelson.hastings@nist.gov

SMART GRID CYBERSECURITY

The major elements of the smart grid are information 

technology, industrial control systems/operational technology and the communications infrastructure. The 

infrastructure is used to send command information across 

the electric grid from generation systems to distribution 

systems, and to exchange usage and billing information 

between utilities and their customers. Key to the successful 

deployment of the smart grid infrastructure is the 

development of the cybersecurity strategy that includes 

cybersecurity as a design consideration for new and 

emerging systems, and an approach to adding cybersecurity 

into existing systems. The electric grid is critical to the 

economic and physical well-being of the nation, and 

emerging cyber threats targeting power systems highlight 

the need to integrate advanced 

security to protect critical assets.

The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) became 

a membership-supported organization in January 2013. The SGIP 

Cybersecurity Working Group (CSWG) was renamed the 

Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee (SGCC), and continues 

to be led by Ms. Suzanne Lightman of the CSD in support of 

responsibilities identified in the Energy Independence and 

Security Act of 2007. The SGCC chair is a voting member of 

the SGIP Technical Committee, and serves as an ex-officio 

Director of the Board. 

During the last year, staff from CSD and ITL’s Software 

and Systems Division (SSD) worked on developing network 

security tools that are specifically designed to support nextgeneration electrical power systems. They concentrated on 

authenticating the provenance of multicast data streams 

from emerging power system sensors, called Phasor 

Measurement Units. By authenticating the sensors to the 

utility, the utility may trust that sensor measurements are 

coming from the correct sensors and have not been hijacked.

Multicast authentication of sensor data is challenging, 

due to the need for low security overhead, tolerance 

of lossy networks, time-criticality, and high data rates. 

Researchers augmented an existing authentication scheme 

to accommodate high-data-rate sensor transmissions that 

are unbounded in length (no session expiration). Using 

dual offset key chains to reduce the authentication delay 

and computational overhead associated with key chain 

commitment, they developed a new protocol called infTESLA that meets the performance requirements imposed 

by the physical dynamics of the power system.

Their key disclosure mechanism, as well as comparative studies showing a cumulative reduction in the 

communication overhead and computational cost over 

existing methods, are outlined in a paper to appear at the 

Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Symposium 

on Applied Computing.

Significant effort was made to integrate their 

authentication protocol into existing network simulation 

software, specifically OPNET, thus providing potential users 

the ability to evaluate the protocol on their own networks 

and for their own applications.

Furthermore, in an effort to address the growing interest 

in co-optimizing cyber and physical components to work 

together as a system, CSD staff developed mathematical 

formalism to tradeoff the sensitivity of a dynamic system 

to attack or perturbation against the authentication 

overhead incurred by their protocol. This formalism was 

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demonstrated on a power system use case showing the 

limiting considerations between authentication overhead 

and stability margins of a wide-area damping controller.

In FY 2016, CSD will coordinate with NIST’s Engineering 

Laboratory (EL) and Smart Grid Program Office on the 

further development of a Cybersecurity Smart Grid Test 

Lab, part of the NIST Smart Grid Testbed Facility now 

under construction. CSD will also collaborate with SSD on 

cybersecurity research in relation to the IEEE 1588, Precision 

Time Protocol, a time synchronization standard that is used 

for the electric grid and other special-purpose industrial 

automation and measurement networks.

For More Information, See: 

http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid

http://www.sgip.org

CONTACTS:

Ms. Suzanne Lightman Ms. Victoria Yan Pillitteri 

(301) 975-6442 (301) 975-8542 

suzanne.lightman@nist.gov victoria.pillitteri@nist.gov

Ms. Tanya Brewer

(301) 975-4534

tbrewer@nist.gov

C Y B E R S E C U R I T Y 

AWA R E N E S S , T R A I N I N G , 

EDUCATION, AND OUTREACH

National Initiative for Cybersecurity 

Education (NICE)

NIST has been the lead for the National Initiative for 

Cybersecurity Education (NICE) since its inception in 2010. 

NICE is responsive to President Obama’s declaration that 

the “cyber threat is one of the most serious economic 

and national security challenges we face as a nation” and 

“America’s economic prosperity in the 21st century will 

depend on cybersecurity.”

The NICE program seeks to foster, energize, and 

promote a robust network and an integrated ecosystem 

of cybersecurity education, training, and workforce 

development.

CSD is leading the NICE program, working from 

the strengths and energy of more than twenty federal 

departments and agencies, leveraging each of their 

relationships with academia and industry sectors to ensure 

coordination, cooperation, focus, public engagement, technology transfer and sustainability. NIST will highlight these 

activities, engage various stakeholder groups and create 

forums for sharing information and leveraging best practices.

The NICE Program Office focuses on the following 

activities:

• Accelerate learning and skills development by invoking 

a sense of urgency in both the public and private sectors to address the shortage of a skilled cybersecurity 

workforce; 

• Nurture a diverse learning community through 

strengthening education and training across a multifarious ecosystem that prioritizes learning, emphasizes 

outcomes, and celebrates diversity; and

• Guide Career Development and Workforce Planning 

that supports job seekers and employers in addressing 

market demands and maximizing talent management.

The NICE Program Office staff promoted NICE activities through contributions to many events, symposia, 

forums, competitions, educational outreach meetings, and 

workshops. The staff continued its leadership to achieve 

the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Cross-Agency 

Priority Goal: “Closing Skills Gaps” for the IT/Cybersecurity 

workforce. The staff focused on reducing cybersecurity 

workforce gaps and supported the goals of the White 

House’s “Ready to Work” initiative. In addition, the staff took 

leadership of the NICE Working Group, a group established 

to provide a mechanism in which public and private sector 

participants can develop concepts, design strategies, and 

pursue actions that advance cybersecurity education, 

training, and workforce development.

In FY 2015, the NICE Program Office announced that 

a grant will be awarded to support the development 

of a visualization tool to show the demand for and 

availability of critical cybersecurity jobs across the nation. 

This cybersecurity jobs “heat map” will be developed 

in partnership with Computing Technology Industry 

Association (CompTIA) and Burning Glass Technologies. 

The map will provide data to help employers, job seekers, 

policy makers, training providers, and guidance counselors 

in order to meet today’s increasing demand for cybersecurity workers. NICE also provided grant support for the 

NICE 2015 Conference and Expo, the inaugural National 

Cybersecurity K-12 Cybersecurity Education Conference, the 

Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) Community Meeting, 

and the NICE Challenge Project. 

In FY 2016, the NICE Program Office will continue to 

promote the coordination of existing and future cybersecurity education, training, and workforce activities. The 

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Sixth annual NICE Workshop will take place on November 

3-4, 2015 in San Diego, CA (see http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/

events.html). NIST will also identify opportunities to extend 

and integrate the NICE focus on the cybersecurity workforce, 

education, and training within NIST Special Publications 

and informational reports, while promoting the value of the 

National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (NCWF) and 

the forthcoming DOD Cyberspace Workforce Strategy as 

resources that address cybersecurity workforce needs. 

For More Information, See: 

http://www.nist.gov/nice/

CONTACTS:

Mr. Rodney Peterson Ms. Danielle Santos

NICE Director NICE Program Manager

(301) 975-8897 (301) 975-5048

rodney@nist.gov danielle.santos@nist.gov

Computer Security Resource Center 

(CSRC)

The CSRC, Computer Security Division’s (CSD) website, 

is one of the most visited websites at NIST. CSRC encourages 

the broad sharing of information security tools and practices, 

provides a resource for information security standards 

and guidelines, and identifies and links key security web 

resources to support industry and government users. CSRC 

is an integral component of all of the work that CSD conducts 

and produces. It is CSD’s repository for anyone wanting to 

access these documents and other valuable security-related 

information. During FY 2015, CSRC had more than 5.9 million 

page views and downloads.

CSRC is the primary gateway for gaining access to NIST 

computer security publications, standards, and guidelines, 

and serves as a vital link to CSD’s customers. Publications 

are organized to help users locate relevant information 

quickly and are arranged by topic, relevant security control 

family, and legal requirements.

In addition to CSRC, CSD maintains a publication 

announcement mailing list. This free e mail list notifies 

subscribers about publications that have been posted to the 

CSRC website, along with announcing new CSD-sponsored 

events and important news and/or announcements. The 

e-mail list is a valuable tool for more than 59,000 subscribers 

from the Federal Government, industry, academia, and 

individuals with a personal interest in IT security worldwide. 

Individuals who are interested in subscribing to this list 

should visit http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/subscribe.html 

for more information.

During FY 2015, the CSRC has been updated on a daily 

basis with new information, such as the publication of draft 

and final documents (FIPS, SPs, NISTIRs and ITL Bulletins) 

and various project and program webpage updates. 

An improvement made to the CSRC homepage was to 

add a new section titled “Draft Publications Request for 

Comments Deadlines”. This section will help our customers 

that are interested in submitting comments to our technical 

publications find the deadline dates for submitting 

comments to certain publications.

The CSRC website is expected to be redesigned during 

FY 2016 to provide an improved and flexible user interface.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov

CONTACTS:

Questions regarding the CSRC website can be sent to the 

CSRC Webmasters at: webmaster-csrc@nist.gov.

Mr. Patrick O’Reilly Ms. Nicole Keller

(301) 975-4751 (301) 975-3648

patrick.oreilly@nist.gov nicole.keller@nist.gov

(Editor Note: Ms. Judy Barnard was part of this project 

team until her recent retirement.)

Federal Computer Security Managers’ 

(FCSM) Forum

The Federal Computer Security Managers’ (FCSM) 

Forum is sponsored by NIST to promote the sharing of 

security-related information among federal agencies. The 

Forum, which serves more than 1,100 members, strives to 

provide an ongoing opportunity for managers of federal 

information security programs to exchange information 

security materials in a timely manner, build upon the 

experiences of other programs, and reduce possible 

duplication of effort. It provides a mechanism for NIST to 

share information directly with federal agency information 

security managers in fulfillment of NIST’s leadership 

mandate under FISMA. It assists NIST in establishing 

and maintaining relationships with other individuals or 

organizations that are actively addressing information 

security issues within the Federal Government. CSD’s Patricia 

Toth serves as the Chairperson and Peggy Himes serves as 

the Secretariat. 

The Forum maintains an extensive email subscription 

service. Participation in the service is only open to Federal 

Government employees who participate in the management 

of their organization’s information system security 

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program. The Forum also holds bimonthly meetings and an 

annual two-day conference to discuss current issues and 

developments of interest to those responsible for protecting 

sensitive (unclassified) federal systems. Events are open to 

federal employees and their designated support contractors.

Topics of discussion at FCSM meetings in FY 2015 

included briefings from various federal agencies on the 

Supply Chain, the Einstein 3 Accelerated (E3A) Reporting 

Tool, implementing privacy controls from Appendix J in 

SP 800-53, the U.S. Government Configuration Baseline 

(USGCB), the National Cybersecurity Center for Excellence 

(NCCoE), and SP 800-88 Revision 1, Guidelines for Media 

Sanitation. 

This year’s annual two-day offsite was held at NIST on 

August 26-27, 2015. Presentations included current technical, operational and management information systems 

security topics and updates on the information system 

security activities of OMB, GAO, the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA), the National Archives 

and Records Administration (NARA), the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), the U.S. Census Bureau, DHS, and NIST. 

Most presentations are available on the FCSM’s website (see 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/), under “Events.” 

• NIST Computer Security Division Update, Matthew 

Scholl, NIST;

• How to Best Protect Against Future Cyber Incidents, 

Trevor H. Rudolph, OMB;

• Implementing TIC E3A in Government and Using the 

XLA Threat Reduction and Correlation Tool (xTractTM), 

Sandra Paul-Blanc, NARA, and Philip Kulp, XLA;

• GAO Information Security Update, Gregory C. Wilshusen, GAO;

• NIST SP 800-163, Vetting the Security of Mobile Applications, Steve Quirolgico, NIST;

• Using Risk Management to Improve Privacy in Information Systems, Ellen Nadeau, NIST;

• Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Matthew Barrett, NIST;

• Mobile Application Security and PIV Derived Credentials, Jane Maples, NASA and Peter Cauwels, NASA;

• Rethinking Cybersecurity from the Inside Out: An Engineering and Life Cycle-Based Approach for Building 

Trustworthy Resilient Systems, Ron Ross, NIST Fellow;

• How FAA Required 50,000+ People to Use PIV Cards in 

2 Months, Myles Roberts, FAA;

• Cloud Assessments, John Connor, NIST;

• The National Vulnerability Database (NVD), Harold 

Booth, NIST;

• Department of Transportation (DOT) Security Program 

Management Subcommittee’s Information Assurance 

Policy Working Group (IAPWG), Kevin Sanchez-Cherry, 

DOT;

• Speak Out - Daniel Wood, Treasury – Term & Topic: PKI 

Landscape, Pat Toth, NIST – Request for topics for FY 

2016 meetings;

• Information Technology (IT) Policy Initiatives Panel, 

Adam Sedgewick, NIST, William Fisher and Tim McBride, National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence 

(NCCoE); Mike Garcia, National Strategy for Trusted 

Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC);

• U.S. Census Bureau Risk Management Program Implementation, Jaime Lynn Noble, U.S. Census Bureau; and

• DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) 

Program Overview, Martin Stanley, DHS.

The Forum plays a valuable role in helping NIST and 

other federal agencies to develop and maintain a strong, 

proactive stance in the identification and resolution of new 

strategic and tactical IT security issues as they emerge. The 

number of members on the email list has grown steadily 

and provides a valuable resource for federal security 

program managers. To join, email your name, affiliation, 

phone number, title, and confirmation that you are a federal 

employee to sec-forum@nist.gov; only .gov and .mil email 

addresses are accepted in the list serve.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/ 

CONTACTS:

Ms. Patricia Toth Ms. Peggy Himes

Chair Administration

(301) 975-5140 (301) 975-2489

ptoth@nist.gov peggy.himes@nist.gov

Federal Information Systems Security 

Educators’ Association (FISSEA)

The Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ 

Association (FISSEA), founded in 1987, is an organization 

hosted by NIST for information system security professionals 

to assist federal agencies in meeting their information 

system’s security awareness, training, and education 

responsibilities. FISSEA strives to elevate the general level 

of information system security knowledge for the Federal 

Government and the federal workforce. It also seeks to assist 

the professional development of its members.

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FISSEA membership is open to information system 

security professionals, professional trainers and educators, 

and managers responsible for information system security 

training programs in federal agencies, as well as contractors 

of these agencies and faculty members of accredited 

educational institutions who are involved in information 

security training and education. Willingness to share 

products, information, and experiences is all that is required 

to become a FISSEA member. A working group meets 

monthly to administer business activities.

FISSEA maintains a website, a mailing list, and 

participates in a social networking site as a means of 

communication for its members. CSD assists FISSEA with 

its operations by providing staff support for several of its 

activities and by being FISSEA’s host agency.

The 28th Annual FISSEA Conference occurred March 24-

25, 2015 at NIST. The FISSEA audience included managers 

responsible for information systems security awareness, 

training, certifications, workforce identification, compliance, 

etc. in federal agencies; contractors providing awareness 

and training support; and faculty members of accredited 

educational institutions who are involved in information 

security training and education. Pat Toth, Peggy Himes, 

and Judy Barnard (NIST), as well as Gretchen Morris (DB 

Consulting/NASA), and other members of the FISSEA 

Working Group, were integral to the effort to support the 

conference. 

This year’s theme was “Changes, Challenges, and 

Collaborations: Effective Cybersecurity Training”. Attendees 

gained new techniques for developing/conducting training, 

cost-effective practices, workforce development, and free 

resources and contacts. Over 200 cybersecurity training 

professionals attended the two-day conference. 

NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) 

Director, Charles Romine, welcomed attendees to the event. 

We were honored to have Dr. Neil Grunberg, Professor 

of Military and Emergency Medicine, Uniformed Services 

University, who provided an inspiring keynote presentation, 

“Information Security System Educators Must be Leaders.” 

His talk addressed the leadership and communication skills 

needed by Cybersecurity Educators

Presenters represented NIST, DHS, the Department of 

State (DoS), the National Security Agency (NSA), private 

industry, and academia. Attendees had an opportunity to 

visit 16 vendors and federal agencies on the second day to 

share and tell about their specific awareness and training 

programs. 

FISSEA conferences include Pecha Kucha (Lightning 

Rounds) sessions. Speakers have 6 minutes 40 seconds for 

their presentations, and the challenge is in limiting one’s 

talk to only 20 slides. It’s challenging to do as a speaker and 

quite fun for the audience to watch, so the Pecha Kucha fastpaced talks proved to be entertaining and educational.

The FISSEA Educator of the Year Award was established 

to recognize and honor a contemporary who is making 

special efforts to create, build, manage, or inspire an 

information systems security awareness, training, or 

education program. Sam Maroon presented the FISSEA 

2014 Educator of the Year posthumously to Shon Harris of 

Logical Security. Mr. Maroon shared Ms. Harris’ contributions 

to the cybersecurity education industry by characterizing 

her contributions in three ways: as a writer, a trainer, and a 

thought leader. Ms. Harris’ friends and colleagues, Michael 

Lester and Hamid Dehghan accepted the plaque on her 

behalf. 

Figure 6: Pecha-Kucha Participants (left to right): 

Art Chantker, Potomac Forum, Frank Cicio Jr, iQ4 

Corporation, Sandy Toner, ICF International, and 

Louis Numkin, FISSEA Life Member

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Other traditional FISSEA conference events include 

announcing the winners of the FISSEA security contest. The 

FISSEA Security Awareness, Training & Education Contest 

includes five categories from one of FISSEA’s three key 

areas of Awareness, Training, and Education. A winner is 

selected from each category and awarded a certificate. The 

categories include: (1) an awareness poster; (2) motivational 

item (e.g., trinkets, pens, stress relief items and t-shirts); (3) 

an awareness website; (4) an awareness newsletter; and (5) 

role-based training & education. 

2015 FISSEA Awareness, Training, and Education Contest 

Winners

Awarded Certificates at the Conference (selected by an 

impartial judging committee prior to the conference):

Poster Winner: Kelly Wright – Veteran Affairs (VA) IT 

Workforce Development;

Website Winner: NASA IT Security Awareness and 

Training Center Team;

Motivational Item Winner: Jane Moser – Employment 

and Social Development Canada (ESDC);

Newsletter Winner: Wendy Andrews, Robert Collins, 

Arnold Ginn, and CDR Steven Miller – Indian Health 

Service; and

Role-Based Training Winner: Jane Moser –ESDC.

Peer’s Choice Awards (selected by peers during the 

conference):

Poster Winner: Kimberly Conway, Sara Fitzgerald, Sean 

Hanion, Dave Stapleton, and Steven VanBrackle, FDA;

Website Winner: Kimberly Conway, Sara Fitzgerald, 

Sean Hanion, Dave Stapleton, and Steven VanBrackle, 

FDA;

Motivational Item Winner: Cindy Dailey, Geisinger 

Health System;

Newsletter Winner: Brenda L. Ellis, NASA; and 

Role-Based Training Winner: Jennifer Young, 

Communication Security Establishment.

Another bonus of attending the 2015 FISSEA conference 

was networking. The conference continues to be a valuable 

forum for individuals from government, industry, and 

academia who are involved with information systems/

cybersecurity workforce development. Attendees gain 

insights regarding information security awareness, training, 

education, certification, and professionalization. Attendees 

also learn of ongoing and planned training and education 

programs and cybersecurity initiatives. It provides NIST 

the opportunity to provide assistance to departments and 

agencies as they work to meet their FISMA responsibilities. 

The FISSEA website provides links to the Conference 

Program, and also links to presentations (http://csrc.nist.

gov/fissea). 

The next conference will be held at NIST on March 15-16, 

2016.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/fissea

CONTACTS:

Ms. Patricia Toth Ms. Peggy Himes

(301) 975-5140 (301) 975-2489

patricia.toth@nist.gov peggy.himes@nist.gov

Information Security and Privacy 

Advisory Board (ISPAB)

Since the inception of this Advisory Board in 1987, the 

Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) 

has successfully renewed its charter with proper authority 

every two years. The Board plays a central and unique role 

in providing the government with expert advice concerning 

information security and privacy issues that may affect 

federal information systems. Title III of the E-Government 

Act of 2002 reaffirmed the need for this Board by giving it 

an additional responsibility: to thoroughly review all of the 

proposed information technology standards and guidelines 

developed under Section 20 of the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) 278g3), as amended.

The ISPAB is a federal advisory committee with specific 

statutory objectives to identify emerging managerial, 

Figure 7: Friends and colleagues accepting the 

FISSEA Educator of the Year on behalf of Ms. Harris

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technical, administrative, and physical safeguard issues 

related to information security and privacy. The Board 

was originally created by the Computer Security Act of 

1987 (P.L. 100-235) as the Computer System Security and 

Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB) within the Department 

of Commerce. The CSSPAB was chartered in May 1988 in 

accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 

as amended. The 2002 FISMA legislation amended the 

statutory authority of the Board and provided its current 

name.

The duties of the Board, as stipulated in FISMA, include:

• Identification of emerging managerial, technical, administrative, and physical safeguard issues relative to 

information security and privacy; 

• Advising NIST and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget on information security and 

privacy issues pertaining to Federal Government 

information systems (including the thorough review of 

proposed standards and guidelines developed under 15 

U.S.C. 278g-3 - Computer Standards Program); and 

• Annually reporting its findings to the Secretary of 

Commerce, the Director of the Office of Management 

and Budget, the Director of NSA, and the appropriate 

committees of Congress.

Congress indicated the long-term need for the Board by 

setting the term of Board members to four years. The charter 

requires that the NIST Director appoint the Chairperson and 

all twelve members of the Board. They are selected for their 

preeminence in the information technology industry or 

related disciplines. 

The 15 U.S.C. 278g-4 charter stipulates that Board 

members be selected from three main categories, with 

each category providing four members. Category 1 includes 

members from outside the Federal Government who are 

eminent in the information technology industry, at least 

one of whom is a representative of small or medium-sized 

companies in such industries. Category 2 also includes 

members from outside the Federal Government who are 

eminent in the field of information technology or related 

disciplines, but who are not employed by or representative 

of a producer of information. Category 3 includes those from 

the Federal Government who are experienced in information 

system management, including those with experience in 

information security and privacy, at least one of whom should 

be from the National Security Agency. The categorization 

of Board members is intended to meet ISPAB’s statutory 

objectives. Federal members bring a detailed understanding 

of the federal processing environment; industry brings 

concerns and experiences regarding product development 

and market formation, while private computer security 

experts are able to bring their experiences of commercial 

cost-effective security measures into Board discussion.

Dr. Peter Weinberger is currently the Chair of ISPAB. 

Dr. Weinberger, a Computer Scientist from Google, joined 

the Board in 2008 and assumed the responsibilities of the 

Chair in January 2015. He is also a Co-Chair of a National 

Academies study on fundamental work in cybersecurity, and 

a member of the National Academies study on Presidential 

Policy Directive (PPD) 28, Signals Intelligence Activities. 

He is well supported by the following Board members (see 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/membership.html):

Figure 8: From Left to Right – Annie Sokol (Designated Federal Officer, CSD, NIST), Greg Garcia, Ed Roback, Toby Levin, 

Jeffrey Greene, John Centafont, Dr. Kevin Fu, Dr. Peter Weinberger (Chair, ISPAB), Matt Scholl (Chief, CSD, NIST)

Members not included in this picture: Chris Boyer, Dr. Ana Anton, David Cullinane, Gale Stone, and J. Daniel Toler

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• Ana (Annie) Antón, Professor and Chair, School of 

Interactive Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology;

• Christopher Boyer, Assistant Vice President, Public 

Policy, AT&T;

• John R. Centafont, NSA Information Assurance and 

Cyber Defense;

• David Cullinane, CEO, TruStar, LLC;

• Dr. Kevin Fu, Associate Professor, The University of 

Michigan;

• Gregory Garcia, Executive Vice President, McBee Strategic;

• Jeffrey Greene, Esq., Director, Government Affairs, 

North America & Senior Policy Counsel, Senior Policy 

Counsel, Cybersecurity and Identity, Symantec Corporation;

• Toby Levin, Retired (formerly Senior Advisor and Director of Privacy Policy, U.S. DHS);

• Edward Roback, Associate Chief Information Officer for 

Cyber Security, U.S. Department of Treasury; and

• Gale Stone, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for 

Audit, Social Security Administration (SSA).

During FY 2014-2015, ISPAB held three meetings, all in 

Washington D.C:

• October 22-24, 2014;

• February 11-13, 2015; and

• June 10-12, 2015.

In keeping with previous practices at the first meeting 

of each fiscal year, the Board established a work plan for 

FY 2015 at the meeting in October 2014. The resulting plan 

included the following areas of focus:

• Cryptography, and specifically NIST R&D;

• Federally funded Research and Development Centers 

(FFRDCs) – internally, externally and control balance;

• Metrics – success measure for security and privacy;

• Trust in NIST (accountability and success);

• Quantum mechanics;

• Identity management (Biometrics);

• Privacy technology – implementation methodology;

• Medical devices – security, privacy and safety, Healthcare IT Security;

• FISMA – Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) 

and Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP);

• CDM – Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council (CSRIC), Trusted Internet Connection (TIC);

• Key ESCROW – history and lessons learned

• Cybersecurity; and 

• Updates of other critical NIST publications.

In aligning with the work-plan focus areas, the Board 

expanded its work to include the following:

• The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 

(PCLOB);

• OMB Circular A130 Revised;

• Acquisition, Supply Chain Security, and Open Source 

trustworthy software;

• Mobile Devices and the Protection of Sensitive Information;

• Intelligence and communication technologies;

• Cryptography and NIST Cryptographic standards 

processes;

• The NIST Cybersecurity Framework; 

• Safeguarding Health Information;

• The Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Program;

• Breach and breach reporting;

• The Federal Information Security Management Act 

(FISMA);

• Emerging Technologies: Cloud Computing, Big Data, 

the Internet of Things, Cyber Physical Systems, Smart 

cities, Drones and Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Medical 

Devices, Transportation Sector and Vehicle-to-Vehicle 

Communication, and relating impacts on security and 

privacy;

• The National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC);

• The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE); and 

• The realignment of the Information Technology Laboratory. 

The presenters at each Board meeting were leaders 

and experts representing private industry, academia, federal 

agency Chief Information Officers (CIOs), Inspector Generals 

(IGs) and Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs).

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Copies of the current list of members and their 

biographies, the Board’s charter and past Board activities 

are located at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab. 

Information on ISPAB Meetings is published in Federal 

Register Notices at least 16 days prior to the meeting. Those 

interested in receiving meeting notices and other notices 

relating to NIST work in information security and privacy 

may email their name, affiliation, and address to Annie Sokol 

at the address below.

For More Information, See:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab

CONTACT:

Ms. Annie Sokol

Designated Federal Officer (DFO), ISPAB

(301) 975-2006

annie.sokol@nist.gov

Small and Medium Size Business (SMB) 

Cybersecurity Workshop Outreach

Small business owners face a broad range of information security issues. A computer failure or system breach 

could jeopardize the company’s reputation and may result 

in significant damage and recovery cost, or going out 

of business. The small business owner who recognizes 

the threat of computer crime and takes steps to deter 

inappropriate activities is less likely to become a victim.

The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) reports 

that over 27 million U.S. companies - more than 99 percent of 

all U.S. businesses - are SMBs of 500 employees or fewer (see 

http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/allprofiles12.pdf). 

While the threats to individual SMBs may not be significantly 

different from those facing larger organizations, an SMB 

frequently has fewer resources available to protect systems, 

detect attacks, or respond to security issues. A vulnerability 

common to a large percentage of SMBs could pose a threat 

to the nation’s information infrastructure and economic 

base.

To help address information security risk, these businesses require assistance with the identification of security 

mechanisms and with practical, cost-effective training. 

Training helps SMB’s use their limited resources most 

effectively to address relevant and serious threats. In 

response to this need, NIST, the SBA, and the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) InfraGard program co-sponsor a series 

of cybersecurity training workshops for small businesses. 

These workshops provide an overview of cybersecurity 

threats, vulnerabilities, and corresponding protective tools 

and techniques, with a special emphasis on information that 

small business personnel can apply directly.

In FY 2015, six SMB outreach workshops were provided 

in Reno, Nevada; Fresno, California; Modesto, California; 

Fairmont, West Virginia; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and 

McHenry, Maryland. Additionally, the SMB Cybersecurity 

Outreach Program was briefed to the InfraGard National 

Congress.

In collaboration with the SBA and the FBI, planning 

is underway to identify locations and plan cybersecurity 

workshops in FY 2016.

For More Information, See:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/sbc/

CONTACT:

Ms. Patricia Toth

301-975-5140

patricia.toth@nist.gov

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C R Y P T O G R A P H I C S TA N D A R D S 

PROGRAM

Hash Algorithms and the Secure Hash 

Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) Standard (FIPS 

202) 

NIST opened a public competition in 2007 to develop 

a new cryptographic hash algorithm, SHA-3, to augment 

the hash algorithms specified in FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash 

Standard (SHS). The competition ended on October 2, 

2012 when NIST announced the selection of Keccak as the 

winning algorithm for standardization as the new SHA3 Standard. NIST consulted with the Keccak designers 

and the cryptographic community, and developed a SHA3 standardization plan that was presented at numerous 

cryptography conferences and posted at the NIST hash 

website, indicated below, for public feedback.

NIST announced Draft FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: 

Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, 

in the Federal Register (79 FR 30549) on May 28, 2014 

and requested comments (see https://federalregister.

gov/a/2014-12336). The announcement also proposed a 

revision of the Applicability Clause of the Announcement 

Section of FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, to allow the 

use of hash functions specified in either FIPS 180-4 or FIPS 

202, modifying the original mandate to use only the hash 

functions specified in FIPS 180-4. The other sections of FIPS 

180-4 remain unchanged. A ninety-day public comment 

period was provided, which ended on August 26, 2014.

NIST received seven comments on Draft FIPS 202 and 

one comment on the Draft Revision of the Applicability 

Clause of FIPS 180-4. All comments received are posted 

at the NIST hash website. None of the comments opposed 

the adoption of the SHA-3 Standard or the revision of the 

Applicability Clause of FIPS 180-4. NIST also received public 

feedback at the 2014 SHA-3 Workshop and afterwards. All 

of the comments were carefully reviewed, and changes were 

made to FIPS 202, where appropriate. NIST made additional 

editorial changes to improve FIPS 202.

FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and 

Extendable-Output Functions, and the revised Applicability 

Clause of FIPS 180-4 were approved by the Secretary of 

Commerce and announced in the Federal Register (80 

FR 46543) on August 5, 2015 (see https://federalregister.

gov/a/2015-19181). FIPS 202 and FIPS 180-4 are available at: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html.

For More Information, See:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/sha-3_

standardization.html

CONTACT:

Ms. Shu-jen Chang

(301) 975-2940

shu-jen.chang@nist.gov

Random Number Generation (RNG)

Random numbers are required for the security for many 

cryptographic algorithms. For example, random numbers 

are used to generate the keys needed for encryption and 

digital signature applications.

In March 2007, CSD published SP 800-90, 

Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using 

Deterministic Random Bit Generators, which contained four 

deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) mechanisms, 

two based on hash functions, one based on the use of block 

cipher algorithms and one based on the use of elliptic curves. 

This recommendation was revised as SP 800-90A in January 

2012 to include additional capabilities and in June 2015 to 

remove the DRBG based on the use of elliptic curves, i.e., 

the DUAL_EC_DRBG, since its security has been in question. 

Two additional documents (SP 800-90B, 

Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random 

Bit Generation, and SP 800-90C, Recommendation for 

Random Bit Generator (RBG) Constructions) are under 

development, and the initial drafts were made available for 

public comment in 2012. 

SP 800-90B addresses the development and testing of 

entropy sources, including descriptions of the tests for NIST’s 

Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program to validate 

candidate entropy sources. An entropy source depends on 

a noise source, which is the root of security for the entropy 

source. During FY 2015, the CTG developed and tested 

additional methods for estimating the amount of entropy 

per noise-source output. An overview of the methodology 

and preliminary results of new estimators, called predictors, 

were presented at ShmooCon in the talk “How Random is 

Your RNG?” Further details and results were published in the 

paper “Predictive Models for Min-Entropy Estimation” at the 

Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES 

2015) workshop. A new draft of SP 800-90B will be provided 

for another public comment period in early FY 2016.

SP 800-90C provides basic guidance on the construction of RBGs from the entropy sources validated against the 

requirements of SP 800-90B and the DRBG mechanisms 

of SP 800-90A. The CTG plans to provide a new version of 

this document for public comment prior to the end of the SP 

800-90B public-comment period.

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A public workshop is planned for FY 2016 to discuss SP 

800-90B and 90C.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/

CONTACTS:

Ms. Elaine Barker Mr. John Kelsey

(301) 975-2911 (301) 975-5101

elaine.barker@nist.gov john.kelsey@nist.gov 

Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan Dr. Kerry McKay

(301) 975-4391 (301) 975-4969

meltem.turan@nist.gov kerry.mckay@nist.gov

Block Cipher Modes of Operation

The engine for many of the techniques in NIST’s 

cryptographic toolkit is a block cipher algorithm, such as 

the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm or the 

Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA). A block cipher 

transforms some fixed-length binary data (i.e., a “block”) 

into seemingly random data of the same length. The 

transformation is determined by the choice of some secret 

data called the “key.” The same key is used to reverse the 

transformation and recover the original block of data. A 

cryptographic technique that is constructed from a block 

cipher is called a mode of operation. Several modes of 

operation have been specified in the SP 800-38 series of 

publications.

The CTG has nearly completed the development of two 

AES modes of operation for format-preserving encryption 

(FPE), based on proposals that were submitted from the 

private sector. A format can be a sequence of decimal digits, 

such as a credit card number or a social security number; 

formats can also be defined for other sets of characters 

besides decimal digits. FPE is expected to facilitate the 

retrofitting of encryption to existing applications. For 

example, FPE could be applied to database systems, so 

that sensitive data could be targeted for encryption without 

disrupting the underlying data fields/pathways.

The two modes of operation for FPE, called FF1 and 

FF3, will be specified in Special Publication 800-38G, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 

Methods for Format-Preserving Encryption, which will be 

completed in FY 2016. 

In the coming year, the CTG plans to consider technical 

changes to two other Special Publications in the 800-38 

series. In particular, the CTG plans: 1) to solicit public comment 

on requirements for the generation of non-repeating IVs 

for the Galois/Counter Mode, specified in SP 800-38D, 

Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 

Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC; and 2) to revisit 

the combinations of encryption and authentication that are 

approved in SP 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher 

Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/

CONTACT:

Dr. Morris Dworkin

(301) 975-2354

morris.dworkin@nist.gov

Key Management

Key management is required for applying numerous 

cryptographic technologies and is considered the most 

critical aspect associated with the use of cryptography. CSD 

began to provide guidance in managing the keys used for 

cryptographic applications in the late 1990s to early 2000s. 

Several guidance and recommendation documents have 

been and continue to be developed in the form of NIST 

Special Publications (SP), which have been periodically 

updated to address new algorithms and handling procedures. 

These documents are coordinated with federal agencies and 

with the cryptographic community, including national and 

international organizations, industry, and academia. During 

FY 2015, the following publications were either created or 

revised.

SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management, 

Part 3: Application-Specific Key Management Guidance, 

was first published in 2009. This document addresses the 

key-management issues of currently available cryptographic 

mechanisms, including the use of Public Key Infrastructures 

(PKI) and several commonly used security protocols and 

applications. A revision of this document was provided for 

public comment in May 2014 that updated the guidance 

provided in the 2009 version, included an additional 

section on the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, and substituted 

a reference to SP 800-52, Revision 1, Guidelines for the 

Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer 

Security (TLS) Implementations, for the TLS section. After 

the comment period, the draft revision was revised, and 

published in January 2015. 

SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management, Part 

1: General, was first published in 2005, and later revised in 

2007 and 2012. Another revision was provided for public 

comment in FY 2015 that includes information on and 

references to recent work performed by CSD; removed 

references to the Dual_EC_DRBG, which was removed 

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from SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number 

Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators; 

revised the security-strength tables; and revised the keystate discussion to provide more clarification. The revision 

was provided for public comment in September 2015 and 

should be completed in early FY 2016.

SP 800-131A, Transitions: Recommendation for 

Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and 

Key Lengths, was originally published in January 2011. This 

document provides specific guidance for transitions to 

the use of stronger cryptographic keys and more robust 

algorithms. An update of SP 800-131A was provided 

for public comment and completed in November 2015. 

This update removes approval for the Dual_EC_DRBG, 

deprecates the use of non-approved key-establishment 

schemes, disallows the use of non-approved key-wrapping 

methods after 2017, and indicates that the use of the SHA-3 

family of hash functions as acceptable.

SP 800-152, A Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic 

Key Management Systems (CKMS), provides guidance 

on the CKMSs to be used by the Federal Government. 

This document provides refinements of the requirements 

for CKMS designers that are specified in SP 800-130, A 

Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management 

Systems. SP 800-152 also provides requirements and 

recommendations for the service providers of CKMSs used 

by federal agencies and their contractors, as well as guidance 

for the federal agencies in selecting a CKMS that supports 

the security and management policies of those agencies. A 

draft of this document was provided for public comment in 

FY 2013, and a workshop was held in March 2013 to discuss 

the draft. A second draft was provided for comment in FY 

2015, and a final version addressing the received comments 

was published in October 2015.

A new NIST publication is under development 

that provides guidance on the security strength of a 

cryptographic key that is used to protect data (i.e., a dataprotection key), given the manner in which the key was 

generated and handled. This document, SP 800-158, Key 

Management: Obtaining a Targeted Security Strength, 

involves a considerable amount of new research, since it 

is an area that has not been fully addressed to date. This 

publication will be available for public comment in FY 2016.

Additional key-management work to be conducted in FY 

2016 includes revision(s) to SP 800-56A, Recommendation 

for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete 

Logarithm Cryptography, and SP 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Integer 

Factorization Cryptography, to allow the use of larger key 

sizes.

For More Information, See:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/key_mgmt

CONTACTS:

Ms. Elaine Barker Dr. Dustin Moody

(301) 975-2911 (301) 975-8136

elaine.barker@nist.gov dustin.moody@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen Mr. Ray Perlner

(301) 975-6974 (301) 975-3357

lily.chen@nist.gov ray.perlner@nist.gov

Mr. Quynh Dang

(301) 975-3610

quynh.dang@nist.gov

Transport Layer Security

SP 800-52, Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, 

and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations, provides recommendations regarding TLS server and 

client implementations. TLS is a widely used cryptographic 

protocol that provides communication security for a variety 

of network applications, such as email, e-commerce, and 

healthcare.

SP 800-52 was first published in 2005, and SP 800-52 

Revision 1 was published in April 2014. Since the revision, CTG 

has been following developments in TLS implementations, 

including updates and attacks. In FY 2016, a second revision 

will be published that considers these developments. 

This second revision will be a minor update to SP 800-52 

Revision 1. 

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is actively 

developing extensions that can be used to add functionality 

to TLS. CSD will continue to review updates and additions to 

the TLS protocol in FY 2016.

CONTACTS:

Dr. Lily Chen Dr. Kerry McKay

(301) 975-6974 (301) 975-4969

lily.chen@nist.gov kerry.mckay@nist.gov

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Elliptic curve cryptography is critical to the adoption 

of strong cryptography as we migrate to higher security 

strengths. NIST has standardized elliptic curve cryptography 

for digital signature algorithms in FIPS 186 and for key 

establishment schemes in SP 800-56A. 

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In FIPS 186-4, NIST recommends fifteen elliptic curves 

of varying security levels for use in these elliptic curve 

cryptographic standards. However, the provenance of the 

curves is not fully specified in the standard, leading to recent 

public concerns that there could be a hidden weakness in 

these curves. NIST is not aware of any vulnerability in these 

curves when they are implemented correctly and used as 

described in NIST standards and guidelines.

However, more than fifteen years have passed since 

these curves were developed, and the community now 

knows more about the security of elliptic curve cryptography 

and practical implementation issues. Advances within the 

cryptographic community have led to the development of 

new elliptic curves and algorithms whose designers claim 

to offer better performance and are easier to implement 

in a secure manner. Some of these curves are under 

consideration in voluntary, consensus-based Standards 

Developing Organizations. 

In June 2015, NIST hosted a workshop on Elliptic Curve 

Cryptography Standards to discuss possible approaches to 

promote the adoption of secure, interoperable and efficient 

elliptic curve mechanisms. Workshop participants expressed 

significant interest in the development, standardization and 

adoption of new elliptic curves. As a result of this input, 

NIST is considering the addition of new elliptic curves to 

the current set of recommended curves in FIPS 186-4. In FY 

2016, NIST will solicit comments on possible improvements 

to FIPS 186-4, which may lead to a workshop held later in 

the year.

CONTACTS:

Email project team: EllipticCurves@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody Dr. Lily Chen

(301) 975-8136 (301) 975-6974

dustin.moody@nist.gov lily.chen@nist.gov

Mr. Andy Regenscheid

(301) 975-5155

andy.regenscheid@nist.gov

Post-Quantum Cryptography

In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of 

research on quantum computers – machines that exploit 

quantum mechanical phenomena to solve problems that are 

difficult or intractable for conventional computers. If largescale quantum computers are ever built, they will be able to 

break the existing infrastructure of public-key cryptography. 

The focus of the Post-Quantum Cryptography project is 

to identify candidate quantum-resistant systems that are 

secure against both quantum and classical computers, as 

well as the impact that such post-quantum algorithms will 

have on current protocols and security infrastructures.

In FY 2015, NIST researchers held regular seminars. The 

presentation topics included the latest published results; a 

synopsis of the security analysis; and status reports in the 

areas of quantum computation, hash-based signatures, 

coding-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, 

and multivariate cryptography. Through these presentations 

and discussions, the team made significant progress in 

understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 

cryptographic schemes in each category. The project team 

is planning to create evaluation criteria for post-quantum 

cryptography schemes for standardization. 

The NIST team continues to be productive in postquantum cryptography research. The results have been 

published at the major conferences, such as PQCrypto 

2014, and Eurocrypt 2015. NIST researchers have given 

presentations at conferences and workshops to increase 

awareness of the upcoming migration. NIST researchers have 

contributed to the European Telecommunications Standards 

Institute (ETSI) whitepaper on quantum-safe cryptography. 

NIST has also sponsored other research, education, and 

research events. 

NIST held the Workshop on Cybersecurity in a PostQuantum World in March of 2015. The workshop was 

attended by approximately 140 participants from around 

the world. Presentations given at the workshop included 

new proposals for quantum-safe cryptosystems, ideas for 

how to modify protocols (such as TLS) to include these new 

cryptosystems, discussions on how to standardize hashbased signatures and key-management issues, as well as 

new ideas on the cryptanalysis of the many post-quantum 

systems. 

In FY 2016, NIST will continue to explore the security 

and feasibility of purported quantum-resistant technologies, 

with the ultimate goal of uncovering the fundamental 

mechanisms necessary for efficient, trustworthy, and costeffective information assurance in the post-quantum era. 

Upon the successful completion of this phase of the project, 

NIST will be prepared for possible standardization efforts in 

this area. 

For More Information, See:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/post-quantum-crypto/

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CONTACTS:

Email project team: pqc@nist.gov 

Dr. Dustin Moody Dr. Lily Chen

(301) 975-8136 (301) 975-6974

dustin.moody@nist.gov lily.chen@nist.gov

Dr. Yi-Kai Liu

(301) 975-6499

yi-kai.liu@nist.gov

Circuit Complexity

Cryptographic functions, such as encryption, digital 

signatures, and hashing, are implemented as electronic 

circuits for a wide class of applications. In practice, it 

is important to be able to minimize the size of these 

circuits. This problem is closely related to designing small 

combinational circuits. These circuits use only binary AND, 

XOR and NEGATION gates, i.e., multiplication, addition, and 

“+1” in arithmetic modulo 2. A combinational circuit on four 

variables (X1, X2, X3, and X4) using AND and XOR gates is 

depicted in Figure 9. 

The project team has shown that finding optimal 

combinational circuits is MAX-SNP Complete. In practice, this 

means that it is necessary to settle for methods that design 

“good” circuits, as opposed to provably optimal circuits. 

The CTG has developed and implemented new solutions for 

the circuit-minimization problem. Two patents have been 

granted related to this work, the last one in FY 2014. These 

are held jointly between NIST and the University of Southern 

Denmark.

The CTG is also researching circuit-based security 

metrics for cryptographic functions. For a function to be 

secure (in particular, one-way), it must be the case that any 

circuit that implements it is sufficiently complex. In particular, 

a function is insecure if it can be implemented by a circuit 

containing too few Boolean AND gates. This security metric, 

namely the number of AND gates necessary and sufficient 

to implement a function, is referred to as its multiplicative 

complexity. Unfortunately, determining multiplicative 

complexity is extremely hard (very recently, Magnus Find 

proved computational intractability conditioned on the 

existence of one-way functions). Mathematicians attempted 

to determine multiplicative complexity in the 1970s, but the 

effort had been largely abandoned by the 1980s. However, the 

CTG has published circuits that are provably optimal or close 

to optimal (with respect to multiplicative complexity) for 

important classes of functions. In the process, we developed 

tools that have wide applicability for both theoretical and 

applied research in security and cryptography.

Multiparty computation is a technique that allows 

a group of people to compute a function of their inputs 

without revealing the inputs themselves. Examples of this 

are: i) holding an election; ii) conducting closed-bid auctions 

in which only the winning bid is determined; iii) proving to a 

third party that a person’s encrypted attributes satisfy some 

requirement, such as “over 21 and (U.S. citizen or Canadian 

citizen)”. The protocols that solve multiparty computation 

problems often encrypt bits using arithmetic modulo 2. The 

complexity of such protocols largely depends on the number 

of multiplications required. Hence, expressing functions as 

circuit computations with only a few multiplication (AND) 

gates is important. Some of the published circuits are now 

the standard reference for benchmarking tools in multiparty 

computation.

The following is a partial list of new results by our team:

• The smallest known circuits were constructed for multiplication in several small finite fields.

• The smallest known circuits were constructed for 

binary multiplication (i.e., multiplication of polynomials 

of degree n over the Galois Field with two elements). 

This yields important speed increases in elliptic curve 

cryptography.

• Optimal circuits were constructed - with respect to 

multiplicative complexity - for all predicates on four 

bits (see the example below). There are 65,536 such 

predicates. Surprisingly, the multiplicative complexity 

of all these functions turned out to be at most three. 

Additionally, our circuits use no more than seven 

non-linear gates (XOR, XNOR). This is quite hard. Consider the following predicate (arithmetic is modulo 2):

f = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x2x3 +x2x4 + x1x2x3

+ x1x2x4 + x1x2x3x4. 

Computing the last term requires three multiplications. 

So, it is quite surprising that the full expression can be 

Figure 9: Combinational Boolean Circuit

The red nodes are AND gates; the yellow nodes are XOR gates.

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computed using only three multiplications. But, we 

have shown this to be true for f and all other predicates on four bits. The circuit on the previous page 

computes f using three multiplications and six additions.

• A proof was developed that the maximum multiplicative complexity of predicates on five bits (there are 

more than 4 billion such predicates) is four. The proof is 

constructive, meaning that the circuits can actually be 

built. 

• A proof was developed that an explicit function 

requires at least 3.01n gates. This constitutes the only 

improvement on this problem for more than 30 years. 

The result is due to Magnus Find, in collaboration with 

mathematicians from New York University (NYU) and 

from the Steklov Institute, St. Petersburg, Russia. 

Circuits are posted periodically at http://www.cs.yale.edu/

homes/~peralta/CircuitStuff/CMT.html

CONTACT:

Dr. René Peralta

(301) 975-8702

rene.peralta@nist.gov 

Cryptography for Constrained 

Environments

There are several emerging areas in which highly 

constrained devices are interconnected, typically 

communicating wirelessly with one another, and working in 

concert to accomplish some task. Examples of these areas 

include: sensor networks, distributed control systems, the 

Internet of Things, cyber physical systems, and the smart 

grid. Security and privacy can be very important in all of 

these areas. Because the majority of current cryptographic 

algorithms were designed for desktop/server environments, 

implementing many of these algorithms with constrained 

resources can be extremely challenging. If current algorithms 

can be made to fit into the limited resources of constrained 

environments, their performance is typically not acceptable. 

CTG staff are examining applications in constrained 

environments to determine whether NIST should develop 

lightweight cryptographic standards. CTG is communicating 

with industry experts to understand challenges, limitations 

and work from other standardization bodies in this area. In 

FY 2015, CTG organized a NIST workshop on Lightweight 

Cryptography in Gaithersburg, MD, July 20-21, 2015 to 

discuss issues related to the security and resource 

requirements of applications in constrained environments 

and potential future standardization of lightweight primitive 

algorithms. The workshop included two invited talks, twentyfour presentations and a panel discussion. 

In FY 2015, CTG staff further engaged the international 

cryptographic community by providing presentations at 

the Fourth International Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography for Security and Privacy in Bochum, Germany, at 

the Fast Software Encryption Workshop in Istanbul, Turkey 

and at the Lightweight Crypto Day, in Haifa Israel. Project 

summaries and challenges ahead were presented at the 

Cybersecurity Innovation Forum and to ITL’s Cyber-Physical 

Systems (CPS) group.

In FY 2016, CTG will continue to analyze the resource 

requirements and performance characteristics of lightweight 

primitives, and study their use as building blocks to perform 

various cryptographic objectives. Additionally, CTG is 

planning to publish a report that describes the current state 

and challenges in target application areas. 

CONTACTS:

Mr. Lawrence Bassham Dr. Kerry McKay

(301) 975-3292 (301) 975-4969

lawrence.bassham@nist.gov kerry.mckay@nist.gov

Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan

(301) 975-4391

meltem.turan@nist.gov

The NIST Randomness Beacon

NIST has implemented a source of public randomness. 

The service is available at https://beacon.nist.gov/home. It 

uses two independent, commercially available sources of 

randomness, each with an independent hardware entropy 

source and SP 800-90A-approved components. 

The NIST Beacon is designed to provide unpredictability, 

autonomy, and consistency. Unpredictability means that 

users cannot algorithmically predict bits before they are 

made available by the source. Autonomy means that the 

source is resistant to attempts by outside parties to alter the 

distribution of the random bits. Consistency means that a set 

of users can access the source in such a way that they are 

confident of receiving the same random string. 

The NIST Beacon posts bit-strings in blocks of 512 bits 

every 60 seconds. Each such value is time-stamped and 

signed, and includes the hash of the previous value to chain 

the sequence of values together. This prevents all parties, 

even the source, from retroactively changing an output 

packet without being detected. The NIST Beacon keeps 

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all output packets. At any point in time, the full history of 

outputs is available to users. 

Tables of random numbers have probably been used for 

multiple purposes at least since the Industrial Revolution. 

In the digital age, algorithmic pseudorandom number 

generators (PRNGs) have largely replaced these tables. The 

NIST Beacon expands the use of randomness to multiple 

scenarios in which neither tables nor PRNGs can be used. 

The extra functionalities stem mainly from three features. 

First, the Beacon-generated numbers cannot be predicted 

before they are published. Second, the public, time-bound, 

and authenticated nature of the Beacon allows a user 

application to prove to anybody that it used truly random 

numbers not known before a certain point in time. Third, this 

proof can be presented offline and at any point in the future.

Although commercially available physical sources of 

randomness are adequate as entropy sources for currently 

envisioned implementations of the NIST Beacon, we are 

working on developing a source of verifiably random

sequences. In collaboration with NIST physicists from the 

Physical Measurement Laboratory (PML), we aim to use 

quantum non-locality to build an entropy source whose 

unpredictability is guaranteed by the laws of physics. This 

project is funded by NIST’s Innovations in Measurement 

Science (IMS) Program. IMS funds highly competitive 

projects designed to explore high-risk, leading-edge 

research concepts that anticipate the future measurement 

and standards needs of industry and science. For more 

information on this collaboration see http://www.nist.gov/

pml/div684/random_numbers_bell_test.cfm.

As of the end of FY 2015, the NIST Beacon has been 

functioning without interruption for more than two years. 

NIST encourages the community at large to research and 

publish novel ways in which this tool can be used. A few 

examples of applications are unpredictable sampling, 

new authentication mechanisms, and secure multi-party 

computation.

For More Information, See: 

http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/nist_beacon.cfm

CONTACT:

Dr. René Peralta

(301) 975-8702

rene.peralta@nist.gov

Entropy as a Service (EaaS) 

The security of cryptography today depends on having 

strong keys and keeping them secret. The ability to generate 

strong cryptographic keys is directly related to having 

access to unpredictable random data, but generating truly 

unpredictable random data on computing devices is hard 

and unreliable. As a result, weak keys are widely used in 

cryptographic applications compromising the security of 

sensitive data protected by them with potentially disastrous 

consequences.

A primary goal of this project is to provide high-quality, 

truly unpredictable random data to devices on the Internet 

to enable them to generate strong cryptographic keys and 

attest the strength of the keys used to protect data in transit 

or at rest, thereby enabling cryptographic system strength 

attestation. Achieving this goal would provide a solid basis 

for addressing the problems targeted by Cryptographic 

System Validation (see the next section: Validated Programs, 

the first project in this section). 

Random data obtained from sources of true randomness 

that are based on unpredictable physical phenomena, such 

as quantum effects, is much better suited for cryptographic 

applications. CSD is collaborating with the NIST Physical 

Measurement Laboratory (PML) to build a quantum source. 

The aim is to use quantum effects to generate sequences 

that are guaranteed to be unpredictable, even if an attacker 

has access to the random source. For more information on 

this collaboration, see http://www.nist.gov/pml/div684/

random_numbers_bell_test.cfm.

This project aims to develop a system and protocols 

for obtaining random data with high entropy from one or 

more remote sources. The high-level architecture is shown in 

Figure 10 (see next page). The architecture of the Entropy-asa-Service system consists of two main parts: the client-side 

and the server-side. The critical components of the system 

are the quantum device, the EaaS server and a secure device 

in the client systems capable of providing strong isolation 

and protection for the cryptographic keys stored inside the 

device and offering a set of basic cryptographic services.

Client devices mix this data with locally available random 

data to seed random number generators to generate strong 

cryptographic keys and other random values independently 

from the remote sources.

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With system architecture and protocols defined, the 

project team have engaged with industry and academia to 

obtain feedback on the approach and identify possibilities for 

collaborative approaches to solving important cybersecurity 

challenges in the domains of cryptography and supply-chain 

management, e.g., integrated circuit counterfeiting.

The project team have developed a working prototype 

and demonstrated it at high-profile cybersecurity forums 

and academic conferences. The team is continuing to 

develop the system aiming to stand up a publicly accessible 

NIST EaaS instance in the near future. In addition, the team is 

also planning to publish the server and client code on GitHub 

and invite the public to voluntarily adopt it. Related to this, 

the project team is planning to work on developing public 

criteria for reputable EaaS hosts.

Figure 10: High-level architecture of EaaS

CONTACTS:

Dr. Apostol Vassilev Mr. Harold Booth

(301) 975-3221 (301) 975-8441

apostol.vassilev@nist.gov harold.booth@nist.gov

Mr. Robert Staples

(301) 975-4578

robert.staples@nist.gov

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Wireless and Mobile Security

Today, wireless networks often provide connections for 

mobile devices using multiple radio technologies. In such 

a heterogeneous network, a mobile device may switch its 

connection between different wireless technologies, such 

as between cellular and WiFi networks. The procedure for 

conducting such a switch is called a “handover.” Mediaindependent handover (MIH) is a set of services specified 

in IEEE 802.21 to assist the handover. When the services 

provided by the pervasive heterogeneous networks 

are extended to other applications, such as Smart Grid 

applications, the MIH needs to be processed by a group 

of wireless nodes, such as smart meters, for balancing the 

network load and for reliability. In this case, the information 

may need to be delivered to a group of smart meters using a 

multicast message, which is used to deliver the information. 

That is, the multicast message is sent from one point-ofservice (PoS) to multiple wireless nodes. In some of the 

application environments, such as sensor networks, the 

groups are formed dynamically; new nodes can be added 

to the group, and some nodes in the group may need to 

be removed. Such groups are managed through multicast 

signals.

Amendment 2 of IEEE 802.21 provides protection 

mechanisms for unicast messages − mechanisms that 

protect messages between a PoS and a single mobile 

node. In FY 2015, CSD continued work with IEEE 802.21 to 

develop security solutions for group management in Task 

Group D of IEEE 802.21. The solutions, specified in IEEE 

802.21 Amendment 4, include the mechanisms to distribute 

group keys and for the protection of multicast messages. 

Amendment 4 of IEEE 802.21 was published in FY 2015. 

In FY 2016, CSD will continue to contribute to a broader 

scope of IEEE 802 wireless standards.

CONTACT:

Dr. Lily Chen

(301) 975-6974

lily.chen@nist.gov

Authentication

To support OMB Memorandum M-04-04, 

E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies, NIST’s CSD 

developed SP 800-63, Electronic Authentication Guideline. 

The OMB memorandum defines four levels of assurance that 

a federal agency must select, based on a risk assessment 

to determine the impact of an authentication failure. This 

guideline covers the remote authentication of users (such as 

private individuals) interacting with government IT systems 

over the Internet. It defines technical requirements for 

each of the four levels of assurance in the areas of identity 

proofing, tokens, credential binding, management processes, 

authentication protocols and assertion characteristics. Since 

the initial release of SP 800-63, the CSD has released two 

revisions to address changes in modern technology and 

lessons learned from practical implementations by federal 

departments and agencies.

Several recent developments have an impact on the way 

that agencies fulfill their e Authentication requirements:

• Executive Order 13681, Improving the Security of Consumer Financial Transactions, issued by the administration in October 2014, requires “...that all agencies 

making personal data accessible to citizens through 

digital applications require the use of multiple factors 

of authentication and an effective identity proofing 

process, as appropriate.” (see http://www.whitehouse.

gov/the-press-office/2014/10/17/executive-order-improving-security-consumer-financial-transactions)

• CSD published The Framework for Improving Critical 

Infrastructure Cybersecurity in February 2014 in response to Executive Order (EO) 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (for the Framework, 

see http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/; for the 

EO 13636, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity). The accompanying 

roadmap cites the need for NIST to “...conduct identity 

and authentication research complemented by the production of Special Publications that support improved 

authentication practices.” (see http://www.nist.gov/

cyberframework/upload/roadmap-021214.pdf)

• The National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC), which was released in 2011, charts a 

course for both public and private sectors to collaborate to raise the level of trust associated with the identities of individuals, organizations, networks, services, 

and devices involved in online transactions through an 

Identity Ecosystem (see http://www.nist.gov/nstic/). 

NSTIC calls for the Federal Government to “lead by 

example and implement the Identity Ecosystem for the 

services it provides internally and externally.” As the 

Identity Ecosystem starts to take shape, NIST guidelines should reflect and support it.

In addition, market forces have resulted in an inflexion 

point in how departments and agencies authenticate users. 

NIST and our private sector partners have observed that 

some public and private sector identity assurance standards 

have become outdated or have simply not been adopted. 

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Specifically, SP 800-63 was originally written to address an 

online world that is much different than today. Innovation 

has offered new perspectives in how trusted identities 

can be established. Practical implementations of SP 800-

63 have informed us of areas of strengths, weaknesses, 

and techniques not utilized by federal agencies or the 

private sector. In addition, federal agencies are the only 

organizations required to follow NIST SPs. However, as the 

Federal Government evolves to accept credentials offered 

by private sector organizations, the applicability of SP 800-

63 has expanded beyond agency use. NIST has an obligation 

to service the expansion of the original SP 800-63 target.

Therefore, in April of 2015, NIST issued a call for 

comments on the current published version, SP 800-63-2, 

in order to identify specific topics that could be addressed 

in a future revision of SP 800-63 (see http://csrc.nist.gov/

groups/ST/eauthentication/sp800-63-2_call-comments.

html). NIST received over 40 submissions from individuals, 

academia, and the public and private sectors. Over 300 

distinct comments were identified from these submissions. In 

addition to the comments that NIST received, vulnerabilities 

have been discovered in existing online authentication 

services, specifically in the area of remote identity proofing, 

which has warranted an accelerated consideration of 

updated guidance for the Federal Government. 

In FY 2016, CSD expects its authentication work to be 

driven by the needs of the ongoing rapid expansion of online 

service delivery, commercially available authentication 

services, results and metrics from NSTIC pilots, and the 

availability of multi-factor tokens to consumers. Breaches 

of personal information and the relative availability of 

personal information has necessitated that NIST reconsider 

approaches to identity proofing, both in-person and 

remotely. The paradigm where the starting assumption was 

that personal data was hard to find has now changed to one 

where it is acknowledged that this data is readily available 

online; existing guidance needs to be adjusted to offer 

organizations cost-effective, yet secure, identity proofing 

capabilities. The NSTIC pilots have tested innovative 

alternatives to high-assurance remote proofing, necessitating that SP 800-63 be considerate of these advances in the 

marketplace. In addition, commercial advances in physical 

document validation and verification, the proliferation of 

high-resolution video cameras on commodity computing 

devices, including mobile phones, as well as new offerings 

in the delivery of in-person proofing, will influence potential 

updates to requirements at all levels of assurance.

As many types of biometric sensors become ubiquitous 

in personal mobile devices, and more and more individuals 

leverage biometrics in commercial use cases such as 

mobile payment and online authentication to private 

sector services, CSD will re-examine the current position of 

remote, unattended biometric authentication. The existing 

publication does allow local biometric authentication to 

unlock a token – a secure technique currently used by 

popular mobile handset manufacturers. Yet the comments 

CSD received reveal that some believe this is insufficient, 

and that centralized biometric authentication used in 

single- or multi-factor schemes should be allowed in a future 

revision. CSD will pursue detailed research in the security 

of remote biometric authentication, examine the efficacy 

of standardization efforts related to presentation attack 

detection, and contemplate the long-term impacts of the 

en-masse theft of biometrics before expanding the current 

requirements of SP 800-63-2.

The user experience of online authentication will also be 

a significant consideration in a potential update of SP 800-

63. The CSD has observed that the user experience has a 

direct relationship with individual uptake of authentication 

services as well as the overall security of any authentication 

scheme. While CSD does not intend to weaken requirements 

to accommodate a favorable user experience, understanding 

the impact of e-Authentication requirements on the user, 

and to design requirements that do not degrade security but 

upgrade the user experience, is imperative. 

The CSD, therefore, plans to actively consider revisions 

to SP 800-63-2 in response to the issues noted above and 

other issues that can be dealt with in time to assist in the 

intense ongoing efforts to expand online services.

For More Information, See:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/eauthentication/

CONTACT: 

Mr. Paul Grassi 

(703) 786-8275

paul.grassi@nist.gov

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 VALIDATION PROGRAMS

Federal agencies, industry, and the public rely on many 

of the standards and specifications supported by CSD. Poor 

implementations of these standards or specifications may 

render a particular product insecure, potentially placing 

sensitive information at risk. CSD operates several validation 

programs that help provide a level of assurance that products 

meet established security requirements and conform to 

published specifications. To that end, the Security Testing, 

Validation, and Measurement Group (STVMG) develops test 

suites and test methods; provides implementation guidance 

and technical support to industry forums; and conducts 

education, training, and outreach programs.

STVMG’s validation programs work together with 

independent laboratories that are accredited by the National 

Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP). 

Based on the independent laboratory test report and test 

evidence provided by the labs, the validation programs 

described below validate the implementation under test. 

CSD subsequently publishes lists of the validations awarded 

on public websites.

Cryptographic System Validation

Current validation programs focus on providing a known 

level of assurance for cryptographic algorithms and modules. 

These modules are used within the context of a larger system 

to provide cryptographic services as a method of protecting 

the data within the system. As information systems continue 

to become more complex, the methods used to implement 

cryptographic services have also increased in complexity. 

Problems with the use of cryptography are often introduced 

through the interaction of cryptographic components with 

the operating environment. This program seeks to specify 

how cryptographic components are used as part of a defined 

cryptographic system to solve problems with a measureable 

level of assurance, and to introduce automated methods of 

quantifying the level of assurance that has been provided.

In FY 2016, this program will begin the research required 

to define a reference cryptographic systems architecture 

and example use cases where cryptographic systems are 

built from known cryptographic components that cooperate 

through trust relationships to provide a measureable level of 

assurance. The architecture should begin at the lowest level 

with a hardware-based root of trust, and each cryptographic 

component should be added in successive layers to 

provide assurance in a systematic way. This should allow 

the development of tests that would measure the correct 

implementation of cryptographic components as part of a 

larger system.

This program will perform research and experimentation 

in applicable technologies and techniques that will enable 

the efficient testing of the cryptographic capabilities of each 

layer, and enable the continuous monitoring capabilities of 

each cryptographic component, providing the necessary 

interfaces to establish trust relationships with other 

cryptographic components. Techniques could include such 

items as:

• Embedding XML data elements and standard interfaces to query those data elements during the design 

and implementation of cryptographic components that 

would enable automated testing capabilities;

• Using cryptographic techniques to embed values into 

the module that would increase the verifiability and 

assurance that the module provides; and

• Using industry-based secure development techniques 

to increase the level of trust inherent in software modules, starting with design and implementation.

Research into this area of cryptographic system 

validation holds the promise of automating the validation of 

all cryptographic components, providing a higher assurance 

with less manual effort. The program will use an approach 

that was developed for the SCAP product validation effort 

to embed data elements that instrument the test harnesses 

used to validate cryptographic systems. This would also 

provide the instrumentation that could be leveraged to 

enable a greater level of situational awareness and security 

measurement, and potentially, to enable continuous 

monitoring of cryptographic systems.

CONTACT:

Mr. Michael Cooper

(301) 975-8077

michael.cooper@nist.gov

Cryptographic Programs and 

Laboratory Accreditation

The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program 

(CAVP) and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program 

(CMVP) were developed in collaboration between NIST 

and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) of 

Canada to support the respective federal user communities 

for strong, independently tested, and commercially 

available cryptographic algorithms and modules. Through 

these programs, NIST and CSE work with international 

government, public and private sectors as a part of the 

cryptographic community to achieve standards-based 

security and assurance of correct implementation. The 

goal of these programs is to provide federal agencies 

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with a security metric to use in procuring and deploying 

cryptographic modules, and promote the use of validated 

algorithms and modules by industry and the public. The 

testing carried out by independent third-party laboratories 

accredited by NVLAP, and the validations performed by 

the CAVP and CMVP programs provide this metric. Federal 

agencies, industry, and the public can choose cryptographic 

modules and/or products containing cryptographic modules 

from the CMVP Validated Modules List and have confidence 

in the claimed level of security and assurance of correct 

implementation.

Cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic module 

testing and validation are based on published NIST 

standards. Since federal agencies are required to use 

validated cryptographic modules for the protection of 

sensitive unclassified information, the validated modules and 

the validated algorithms that the modules contain represent 

the culmination and delivery of CSD’s cryptography-based 

work to the end user.

The CAVP and the CMVP are separate collaborative 

programs. The CAVP and the CMVP validate algorithms and 

modules, respectively, which are used in a wide variety of 

products, including Internet browsers, radios, smart cards, 

space-based communications, munitions, security tokens, 

mobile phones, network and storage devices, and products 

supporting the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and electronic 

commerce. A module may be a standalone product, such 

as a virtual private network (VPN) or smart card, or it 

could be a module embedded in many products, such as a 

cryptographic-based toolkit. As a result, a small number of 

modules may be incorporated within hundreds of products. 

The CAVP validates cryptographic algorithms that may be 

integrated in one or more cryptographic modules. Figure 11 

provides a flow of the CMVP testing and validation process.

Figure 11: General Flow of FIPS 140-2 Testing and Validation

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The CAVP and CMVP validation programs provide 

documented methodologies for conformance testing 

through defined sets of security requirements. For the 

CAVP, the validation system documents are designed for 

each FIPS-approved or NIST-recommended cryptographic 

algorithm. See the website for a listing (see http://csrc.nist.

gov/groups/STM/cavp/). Security requirements for the 

CMVP are found in FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for 

Cryptographic Modules, and the associated test metrics 

and methods in Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-

2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. 

The four Annexes to FIPS 140-2 reference the underlying 

cryptographic algorithm standards or methods. The CMVPdeveloped Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-2 and the 

Cryptographic Validation Program provides programmatic 

and implementation guidance across all of the referenced 

documents. The information provided in the Derived 

Test Requirements (DTR) and Implementation Guidance 

(IG) documents ensures the repeatability of tests and the 

equivalency of results across the testing laboratories. The IG 

provides clarity, consistency of interpretation, and insight for 

successful conformance testing, validation, and revalidation.

The unique position of the validation programs gives the 

CAVP and CMVP the opportunity to acquire insight during 

the validation review activities and results in practical, timely, 

and up-to-date guidance that is needed by the testing 

laboratories and vendors to move their modules out to the 

user community in a timely and cost-effective manner and 

with the assurance of third-party conformance testing. This 

knowledge and insight provide a foundation for current and 

future standards and tools development.

The CMVP reviews the cryptographic module validation 

requests from the testing laboratories and, as a byproduct 

of the review, is attentive to emerging and/or changing 

technologies. 

Starting with FY 2015, the Security Testing, Validation, 

and Measurement (STVM) group created a research team 

whose mission is to conduct research to assist developers 

of cryptographic modules, testing laboratories, and the 

user community when developing new standards. The 

insights from this research into the evolution of operating 

environments and complex systems allow the CMVP to 

perform research and development on evolving test metrics 

and methods and future requirements for cryptographic 

modules.

The CAVP and the CMVP have stimulated the improved 

quality and security assurance of cryptographic algorithm 

implementations and modules. By the end of FY 2015, the 

CMVP had validated and issued a total of 2,380 cryptographic module validation certificates to more than 475 

domestic and international vendors. As shown in Figure 12, 

the CMVP awarded 197 certificates in FY 2015. The left portion 

of the graphic illustrates the distribution by submission type, 

based upon the modification scenarios described in the 

CMVP Implementation Guidance, including:

• 1SUB - Modifications made to hardware, software or 

firmware components that did not affect any FIPS 140-1 

or FIPS 140-2 security relevant items (e.g., a maintenance activity);

• 3SUB - Modifications that include changes that affect 

some of the FIPS 140-2 security-relevant items and 

require revalidation, but drew upon previous submissions; and,

• 5SUB - Significant changes to hardware, software, or 

firmware components and, therefore, were considered 

a new module requiring full validation testing.

The right portion of the diagram shows the number of 

certificates awarded, based upon each of the four increasing 

levels of security specified in the FIPS that may be satisfied 

by a cryptographic module.

Likewise, to date, the CAVP has issued approximately 

19,578 validations, representing the algorithm validations of 

approximately 17 approved algorithms.

Figure 12: FY 2015 FIPS 140-2 Validations

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Figure 13: CAVP Validation Status by Fiscal Year

Figure 14: CAVP Validation Status for FY 2015

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The CAVP issued approximately 3,372 algorithm 

validations in FY 2015, an increase of over 1,000 validations 

from the previous year. The increase in validations is 

attributed to other outside programs now requiring CAVP 

validated implementations (e.g., NIAP). 

The CMVP issued 197 module validation certificates in 

FY 2015. The number of algorithms and modules submitted 

for validation continues to grow, representing significant 

growth in the number of validations expected to be available 

in the future.

For More Information, See:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM

CMVP Implementation Guidance, G.8

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-

2/FIPS1402IG.pdf

Figure 15: CAVP Validated Implementation Actual Numbers

CMVP CONTACTS: 

Ms. Jennifer Cawthra Dr. Apostol Vassilev

(301) 975-8514 (301) 975-3221

jennifer.cawthra@nist.gov apostol.vassilev@nist.gov

CAVP CONTACT:

Ms. Sharon Keller

(301) 975-2910

sharon.keller@nist.gov

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Automated Security Testing and Test 

Suite Development

The CAVP utilizes the requirements and specifications 

of NIST standards (i.e., FIPS and Special Publications) to 

develop algorithm validation test suites and automated 

security testing. The CAVP is responsible for providing 

assurance that the cryptographic algorithm implementations 

contained in cryptographic modules are implemented 

according to the specifications in the standards. The CAVP 

accomplishes this by designing and developing conformance 

testing specific to each cryptographic algorithm.

The conformance testing consists of a suite of validation 

tests for each approved cryptographic algorithm. These 

validation tests exercise the algorithmic requirements and 

mathematical formulas detailed in the algorithm to assure 

that the detailed specifications are implemented correctly 

and completely. If the implementer deviates from the 

specifications in the standard or excludes any part of these 

specifications or requirements, the validation test will detect 

the deviations and fail. The validation testing will indicate that 

the algorithm implementation does not function properly or 

is incomplete. 

The cryptographic algorithm validation tests designed 

and developed by the CAVP are used by independent thirdparty laboratories accredited by the NVLAP. The laboratory 

works with vendors to validate their cryptographic 

algorithm implementations. The suite of validation tests for 

each algorithm ensures the repeatability of tests and the 

equivalency of results across the testing laboratories. 

There are several types of validation tests, all designed 

to satisfy the testing requirements of the cryptographic 

algorithms and their specifications. These include, but are 

not limited to, Known-Answer Tests, Monte Carlo Tests, 

and Multi-Block Message Tests. The Known-Answer Tests 

are designed to examine the individual components of 

the algorithm by supplying known values to the variables 

and verifying the expected result. Negative testing is also 

performed by supplying known incorrect values to assure 

that the implementation recognizes values that are not 

allowed. The Monte Carlo Test is designed to exercise the 

entire implementation under test (IUT). This test is designed 

to detect the presence of implementation flaws that are not 

detected with the controlled input of the Known-Answer 

Tests. The types of implementation flaws detected by 

this validation test include pointer problems, insufficient 

allocation of space, improper error handling, and incorrect 

behavior of the IUT. The Multi-Block Message Test (MMT) 

is designed to test the ability of the implementation to 

process multi-block messages, which requires the chaining 

of information from one block to the next. 

During the last few years, the CTG has expanded its 

publications to contain not only the algorithm’s specifications, but also requirements for an algorithm’s use. Many 

of these usage requirements do not fall within the scope 

of the CAVP, because the CAVP focuses on the correctness 

of the instructions within the algorithm’s boundary. If these 

additional algorithm usage requirements are not considered 

applicable to the algorithm’s implementation, they cannot 

be tested at the algorithm level by the CAVP, but may be 

tested by the Cryptographic Module Validation Program 

(CMVP) if the requirements are considered applicable to 

the cryptographic module. However, some of these usage 

requirements may be considered to be outside the scope 

of both the algorithm implementation and cryptographic 

module. In this latter case, the fulfillment of the requirements 

is the responsibility of entities using, installing, or configuring 

applications or protocols that use the cryptographic 

algorithms. For example, depending on the design of a 

cryptographic module, it may not be possible for the module 

to determine whether a specific key is used for multiple 

purposes, a situation that is strongly discouraged.

The CAVP currently has algorithm validation testing for 

the following cryptographic algorithms:

TABLE 1: CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS & NIST TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS (FIPS & SPS)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM/COMPONENT

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 

STANDARD (FIPS) OR SPECIAL PUBLICATION 

(SP)

Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES)

SP 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data 

Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, and

SP 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of 

Operation–Methods and Techniques

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption Standard, and

SP 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of 

Operation–Methods and Techniques

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TABLE 1 (CONT.): CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS & NIST TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS (FIPS & SPS)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM/COMPONENT

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 

STANDARD (FIPS) OR SPECIAL PUBLICATION 

(SP)

Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

FIPS 186-2, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), with change 

notice 1

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

FIPS 186-2, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), with change 

notice 1 and ANS X9.62

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), and ANS 

X9.62

RSA algorithm

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

ANS X9.31 and Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) 

#1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard-2002

Hashing algorithms SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, 

SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256 FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS)

Random number generator (RNG) algorithms FIPS 186-2 Appendix 3.1 and 3.2; ANS X9.62 Appendix A.4

Deterministic Random Bit Generators (DRBG) SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number 

Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators

Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) FIPS 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code 

(HMAC)

Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Mode 

for Authentication

SP 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of 

Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication

Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message 

Authentication Code (CCM) Mode

SP 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes 

of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and 

Confidentiality

GCM and GMAC Modes SP 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of 

Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC

XTS-AES Mode

SP 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes 

of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on 

Block-Oriented Storage Devices

Key Wrapping SP 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of 

Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping

DH and MQV Key Agreement Schemes and Key 

Confirmation

SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key 

Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm 

Cryptography, dated March 2007

All of SP 800-56A schemes without the Key Derivation 

Functions (KDF)

SP 800-56A, Key Derivation Functions for Key Agreement 

Schemes: All sections except Section 5.8

All of SP 800-56A schemes without the Key Derivation 

Functions (KDF)

SP 800-56A, Section 5.7.1.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 

Cofactor Diffie-Hellman (ECC CDH) Primitive Testing

Key-Based Key Derivation functions (KBKDF) SP 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation using 

Pseudorandom Functions

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In FY 2016, the CAVP expects to add algorithm validation 

testing for:

• FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash 

and Extendable-Output Functions, August 2015;

• SP 800-56C, Recommendation for Key Derivation 

through Extraction-then-Expansion, November 2011;

• SP 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based 

Key Derivation Part 1: Storage Applications, December 

2010; and

• SP 800-56A Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise 

Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm 

Cryptography, May 2013.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp

CONTACTS:

Ms. Sharon Keller Ms. Elaine Barker

(301) 975-2910 (301) 975-2911

sharon.keller@nist.gov elaine.barker@nist.gov

TABLE 1 (CONT.): CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS & NIST TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS (FIPS & SPS)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM/COMPONENT

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 

STANDARD (FIPS) OR SPECIAL PUBLICATION 

(SP)

Application-Specific Key Derivation functions (ASKDF) 

(includes the KDFs used by IKEv1, IKEv2, TLS, ANS X9.63-

2001, SSH, SRTP, SNMP, and TPM)

SP 800-135 (Revision 1) Recommendation for Existing 

Application Specific key Derivation Functions

Component test – ECDSA Signature Generation of a hash 

value (This component test verifies the signing of a hashsized input. It does not verify the hashing of the original 

message to be signed.)

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), and 

ANS X9.62

Component test – RSA PKCS#1 1.5 Signature Generation 

of encoded message EM (This component test verifies the 

signing of an EM. It does not verify the formatting of the 

EM.)

FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), and 

Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: 

RSA Cryptography Standard-2002

Component test – RSA PKCS#1 PSS Signature Generation 

of encoded message EM (This component test verifies the 

RSASP1 function.)

SP 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key 

Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization 

Cryptography, August 2009, Section 7.1.2

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Security Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP) Validation Program

The SCAP Validation Program performs conformance 

testing to ensure that products correctly implement 

SCAP as defined in SP 800-126 Revision 2, The Technical 

Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP): SCAP Version 1.2. Conformance testing is necessary 

because SCAP is a complex collection of eleven individual 

specifications that work together to support various use 

cases. A single error in product implementation could result 

in undetected vulnerabilities or policy noncompliance within 

an organization’s networks.

Figure 16: SCAP 1.2 Validation Process

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The test requirements for SCAP 1.2 are defined in 

NISTIR 7511, Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) 

Version 1.2 Validation Program Test Requirements. In 

general, vendors may opt for product validation for one or 

more SCAP capabilities or operating systems. Currently, the 

program offers testing on Microsoft Windows and Red Hat 

Enterprise Linux platforms. Figure 16 illustrates the SCAP 

1.2 Validation Process. The validation process starts when 

a vendor voluntarily submits an SCAP-enabled product to 

an NVLAP-accredited laboratory. Once the lab completes 

product testing, the lab submits a test report to the SCAP 

Validation Program at NIST for review. NIST reviews the 

test report and awards a validation if all requirements have 

been met. Once a validation is awarded, the SCAP Validation 

Record is sent to the lab, and the information about the 

newly validated product is posted on the SCAP Validated 

Products web page.

The SCAP Validation Program resources web page 

provides the public with a centralized location for all 

resources and information necessary for preparing products 

for SCAP 1.2 validation. Resources include: documentation, 

a list of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), the SCAP 

validation-test content, and tools for validating and 

processing SCAP data streams. The SCAP validation-test 

content should be used by vendors for quality assurance 

testing prior to entering formal SCAP testing with an 

NVLAP-accredited laboratory. The open-source tools that 

are available for download may be used by SCAP content 

authors for testing SCAP source content. The SCAP Content 

Validation Tool (SCAPVal) may be used to determine if the 

content conforms to the SCAP specification. Open-source 

SCAP reference implementation tools, such as the SCAP 

Reference Implementation Tool, may be used to process 

SCAP data streams.

End users may use information on the SCAP Validation 

web page to learn about SCAP validation and find products 

that have been awarded validations. The validation 

records that are posted on the SCAP Validated Products 

page identify the product versions that were tested in the 

laboratory, along with details about each validation, such as 

the tested platforms, SCAP capabilities, the validation test 

suite version, and the lab that performed the product test.

In FY 2015, five products successfully completed testing 

and were awarded validations, bringing the total number 

of SCAP 1.2-validated products to twelve. This provides 

coverage for 80 percent of the market space. Several 

products are in various stages of validation testing and are 

expected to be awarded validations in FY 2016. The current 

list of SCAP 1.2-validated products may be found on the 

SCAP Validated Products list at https://nvd.nist.gov/SCAPValidated-Tools.

In FY 2016, the SCAP Validation Program plans to 

expand the validation test suite, adding new operating 

system support and introducing module testing. SCAP 

module testing enables the “SCAP Inside” labeling program. 

Products using the “SCAP Inside” label have incorporated an 

SCAP-validated module; however, the consumer product as 

a whole has not completed validation testing by an NVLAP 

accredited laboratory. Additions to the SCAP Validation 

Program will be defined in NISTIR 7511 Revision 4.

For More Information, See:

http://scap.nist.gov/validation

CONTACT:

Ms. Melanie Cook

(301) 975-5259

melanie.cook@nist.gov

IDENTITY MANAGEMENT

NIST Personal Identity Verification 

Program (NPIVP)

The objective of the NIST Personal Identity Verification 

Program (NPIVP) is to validate PIV components for 

conformance to the specifications in FIPS 201, Personal 

Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and 

Contractors, and its companion documents. The two PIV 

components that come under the scope of NPIVP are the 

PIV Smart Card Application and the PIV Middleware. NPIVP 

test facilities that perform the two types of tests are the 

Cryptographic and Security Testing (CST) Laboratories 

that have been accredited by the NVLAP. As of September 

2015, there were nine such facilities (see http://csrc.nist.gov/

groups/SNS/piv/npivp/testing_facilities.html).

The interface specifications for the PIV Smart Card 

Application and PIV Middleware are found in a FIPS 

201-associated document, namely, SP 800-73-4, Interfaces 

for Personal Identity Verification. The conformance tests 

for these specifications are detailed in SP 800-85A-2, PIV 

Card Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines. 

To implement these tests and to generate conformance test 

reports, CSD also developed an integrated toolkit called 

“PIV Interface Test Runner,” which conducts tests on both 

PIV Card Application and PIV Middleware products, and 

provides the toolkit to accredited NPIVP test facilities.

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In addition, NPIVP is closely involved in ensuring that all 

changes in PIV companion documents, such as SP 800-73-4, 

SP 800-76-2, Biometric Specifications for Personal Identity 

Verification, and SP 800-78-4, Cryptographic Algorithms 

and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification, are fully 

reflected in the updated versions of the conformance test 

documents, SP 800-85A-2 and SP 800-85B, as well as in 

the “PIV Interface Test Runner” toolkit. Currently, the NPIVP 

team is guiding the development of the “PIV Interface Test 

Runner” toolkit for validating PIV Card application and PIV 

Middleware products for conformance to the specifications 

in SP 800-73-4, SP 800-76-2 and SP 800-78-4. In FY 

2015, Phase I changes to PIV Interface Test Runner were 

completed, and NPVIP performed acceptance testing. 

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp

CONTACTS:

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo

(301) 975-5013 (301) 975-6972

mouli@nist.gov hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

and FIPS 201 Revision Efforts

In response to Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-12 (HSPD-12), Policy for a Common Identification 

Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, FIPS 201, 

Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees 

and Contractors, was developed and was approved by the 

Secretary of Commerce in February 2005. HSPD-12 called 

for the creation of a new identity credential for federal 

employees and contractors. FIPS 201 is the technical 

specification for both the PIV identity credential and the PIV 

system that produces, manages, and uses the credential. 

Within NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), 

this work is a collaborative effort of the Information Access 

Division (IAD) and CSD. CSD activities in FY 2015 directly 

supported the recently revised FIPS 201-2 by updating 

the relevant publications associated with FIPS 201-2 and 

by developing two new publications. CSD performed the 

following activities during FY 2015 in support of HSPD-12:

• Published SP 800-157, Guidelines for Derived Personal 

Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials, in December 

2014. SP 800-157 defines the technical details for 

implementing and deploying derived PIV credentials 

on mobile devices, such as smart phones and tablets. 

As intended by FIPS 201-2, a derived PIV credential is 

a PIV credential that can be provisioned directly to a 

mobile device to enable remote enterprise access from 

the device. The use of Derived PIV Credentials greatly 

improves the usability of electronic authentication from 

mobile devices to remote IT resources, while at the 

same time maintaining the goals of HSPD-12 for common identification that is secure, reliable, and interoperable government wide.

• Organized and hosted a workshop in March 2015 on 

upcoming Special Publications supporting FIPS 201-2 

(PIV). The event drew over 160 in-person attendees 

and about 75 webcast remote attendees from government, industry, and academia representing a wide 

range of implementers and professionals in cybersecurity and physical security. Topics covered included 

physical access control with the PIV Card, PIV cardholder interagency record exchange, and derived PIV 

credentials.

• Published SP 800-73-4, Interfaces for Personal Identity 

Verification, in June 2015, after two public comment 

periods. The three-part SP details the new, optional PIV 

Card capabilities introduced in FIPS 201-2, including a 

virtual contact interface (VCI), a secure channel protocol, and an on-card biometric comparison mechanism. 

SP 800-73-4 also requires new PIV Cards to enforce a 

minimum PIN length of six digits.

• Published SP 800-78-4, Cryptographic Algorithms and 

Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification, in June 

2015, after two public comment periods. The document 

has been modified to align with SP 800-73-4, and 

Figure 17: Government Employees Use PIV Cards for 

Facility Access

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includes the addition of new algorithms and key sizes 

for the secure messaging protocol. Cryptographic algorithm validation testing requirements were also added.

• Published Draft SP 800-85A-4, PIV Card Application 

and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines (SP 800-73-4 

Compliance), in June 2015, to align the testing requirements with FIPS 201-2, SP 800-73-4, and SP 800-78-4.

• Published NISTIR 7863, Cardholder Authentication for 

the PIV Digital Signature Key, in June 2015. The document provides clarification for the requirement in FIPS 

201-2 that a PIV cardholder perform an explicit user 

action prior to each use of the digital signature key 

stored on the card. NISTIR 7863 clarifies the requirement for “explicit user action” and specifies a range of 

PIN caching options that maintains the goal of “explicit 

user action” while adhering to a consistent and reliable 

level of security.

• Published SP 800-79-2, Guidelines for the Authorization of Personal Identity Verification Card Issuers (PCI) 

and Derived PIV Credential Issuers (DPCI), in July 2015. 

The document incorporates changes required by FIPS 

201-2 to accredit PIV Card Issuers and includes a set of 

issuer controls for Derived PIV Credentials Issuers.

In FY 2016, CSD will continue to focus on updating the 

relevant publications associated with FIPS 201-2, including SP 

800-116, A Recommendation for the Use of PIV Credentials 

in Physical Access Control Systems (PACS), and developing 

two new publications: SP 800-156, Representation of PIV 

Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export, and SP 800-166, 

Guidelines for Testing Derived Personal Identity Verification 

(PIV) Credentials. CSD will also continue to provide technical 

and strategic inputs to the PIV-related initiatives.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/

CONTACTS:

Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo Dr. David Cooper

(301) 975-6972 (301) 975-3194

hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov david.cooper@nist.gov

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli

(301) 975-5013

mouli@nist.gov

R E S E A R C H I N E M E R G I N G 

TECHNOLOGIES

Secure Development Toolchain 

Competitions

Many security weaknesses in federal information 

systems stem from software security vulnerabilities induced 

by software flaws present in current-generation software 

products. CSD tracks software security vulnerabilities (in 

the National Vulnerability Database), seeks techniques for 

the measurement of security vulnerabilities, and also seeks 

techniques to reduce the impact and prevalence of security 

vulnerabilities in newly developed products or in new 

versions of existing products. 

One approach to reducing the number of security 

vulnerabilities in software is to improve the development 

tools that are available. By identifying languages and 

software development tools that support a reduction of 

vulnerabilities and, by stimulating the creation of better 

tools and tool usage techniques, the approach should help 

developers produce applications with fewer vulnerabilities. 

While it is impossible to assure the total absence of security 

vulnerabilities in this way, it might well be possible to rule 

out specific, significant classes of vulnerabilities that today 

provide the basis for many serious exploits.

CSD is developing an empirical, competitive approach 

to finding the most effective and usable combinations of 

tools to produce software systems that are relatively free of 

exploitable vulnerabilities. Multiple competitions are planned 

that will be based on an idea developed during the Designing 

a Secure Systems Engineering Competition Workshop that 

was conducted by National Science Foundation in 2010. The 

workshop proposed a competition for the development of a 

set of tools to help non-security-expert developers to rapidly 

build a significant application with zero vulnerabilities, as 

detected by an extensive public test suite.

The participants in the planned competitions would 

implement software systems to solve challenge problems 

using software development tool chains (“toolchains”) 

of their own choosing, within specified time periods. The 

toolchains may include existing technologies (e.g., existing 

software libraries and frameworks, code generators, reusable 

source code, or bug-finding tools), novel technologies, or 

any combination thereof. Each competition would apply 

a time pressure by simulating a deadline in the software 

development process, increasing the likelihood of an 

introduction of security flaws. The objective of the toolchains 

will be to detect or prevent security flaws while still supporting 

a quick-paced software development of applications with 

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rich feature sets. Through the demonstration of security 

flaw avoidance in a time-constrained setting, CSD seeks to 

show that wide-scale improvements in the overall security 

of software products can be realized without sacrificing 

time-to-market. The competitions, which will be open to 

all interested parties, will aim to provide a level playing field 

for the application and measurement of the full spectrum 

of commercial and research software development, 

composition, and reuse techniques.

In FY 2015, CSD and its contractors developed 8 

challenge problems for the competition. A challenge problem 

is comprised of three parts: 1) a functional specification of a 

program to develop (during the competition), 2) a security 

policy that the program must enforce, typically including 

confidentiality and integrity requirements, and 3) a challengeproblem-specific test suite including 20 fully-automated 

pass/fail functionality tests, 20 fully-automated pass/fail 

security tests, and extensive application of random inputs 

(i.e., fuzz testing). The challenge problems span three initial 

program types: command-line interface programs, mobile 

applications (i.e., cell phone apps), and web applications 

(browser-based apps). In FY 2015, CSD and its contractors 

also developed a testing infrastructure for the competition 

and performed testing to exercise the tools and to assess the 

suitability of the challenge problems.

In FY 2016, CSD plans to re-engineer portions of the 

testing infrastructure in response to issues uncovered by 

testing, to perform a second round of testing, and to publicly 

announce the first toolchain competition.

CONTACTS:

Mr. Lee Badger Mr. Christopher Johnson

(301) 975-3176 (301) 975-3247

lee.badger@nist.gov christopher.johnson@nist.gov

Cloud Computing and Virtualization

The model for Cloud Computing is defined in SP 800-

145, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing. Virtualization 

is a foundational technology that facilitates the use of a 

computing infrastructure for cloud-computing services. At 

the core of a virtualized infrastructure is the virtualized 

host that provides an abstraction of the hardware (e.g., 

CPU, memory) and that enables multiple computing stacks 

(comprised of the operating system, middleware, and 

applications) to be run on a single physical machine, creating 

dynamically provisioned, elastic compute resources. The 

efficiency of such a dynamic and distributed processing 

environment is counter-balanced by the interoperability, 

portability, and security challenges inherent in this 

computing environment. CSD is working in parallel on several 

projects (introduced below) that aim to accelerate the 

Federal Government’s adoption of secure cloud computing. 

CSD subject matter experts collaborate with national and 

international standards setting organizations, and both 

the public and private sectors in developing security, 

interoperability and portability standards and guidance.

CSD Role in the NIST Cloud Computing 

Program

During FY 2015, the NIST Cloud Computing Team 

continued to promote the development of publications, 

national and international standards, and specifications in 

support of the U.S. Government’s (USG) effective and secure 

use of cloud computing, as well as providing technical 

guidance to federal agencies for secure and effective cloudcomputing adoption. CSD supports many of the technical 

standards activities hosted by the NIST Cloud Computing 

Program, with a particular focus on cloud-computing 

security and forensic science. Activities include the leading 

role for the development of the following documents:

• SP 800-173, Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Cloud-based Federal Information 

Systems (draft). This publication provides guidance 

in using the Risk Management Framework described 

in SP 800-37 Revision 1 to issue an authorization to 

operate for cloud-based information systems. The draft 

document will be posted for public comment in the 

first quarter of FY 2016.

• SP 800-174, Security and Privacy Controls for Cloudbased Federal Information Systems (internal draft). 

The document will provide a cloud overlay of the SP 

800-53 Revision 4 security controls for cloud-based 

ecosystems. 

• Define the cloud forensics use cases that address the 

top four challenges identified in NISTIR 8006, NIST 

Cloud Computing Forensic Science Challenges.

CSD staff members organized the security and forensics 

tracks of the eighth NIST Cloud Computing Forum and 

Workshop, which was held in July 2015.

In support of U.S. cloud-computing mandates, CSD 

staff members provided leadership for several public cloud 

working groups operating under the NIST Cloud Computing 

Program. These working groups focus on meeting the 

high-priority requirements described in SP 500-293, U.S. 

Government Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap.

CSD staff chaired or co-chaired several significant cloud 

computing efforts in 2015:

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• Co-Chaired the NIST Cloud Computing Security 

Working Group and led the working group on the 

development of SP 800-173, Guide for Applying the 

Risk Management Framework to Cloud-based Federal 

Information Systems; SP 800-174, Security and Privacy 

Controls for Cloud-based Federal Information Systems 

(both described on previous page); and on researching 

the most suitable approach to a structured representation of the SP 800-53 Revision 4 security and privacy 

controls.

• Co-Chaired the NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science Working Group and led the development of cloud 

forensics use cases that document the top four high 

priority challenges identified in NISTIR 8006.

• Co-Chaired the NIST Cloud Computing Interoperability 

and Portability Working Group and addressed issues 

facing cloud computing with respect to interoperability 

and portability, standards, and common and functional terminologies. The working group’s activities were 

ceased in mid FY 2015.

CSD staff members participated in various standards 

development organizations, all listed in the section of this 

report dedicated to international standards.

In FY 2015, CSD members of the NIST cloud-computing 

team continued research in key areas of cloud security, 

cloud interoperability and portability, cloud metrics, cloud 

services, and cloud Service Level Agreements (SLAs). They 

also presented the results of cloud-computing research and 

development, introduced the standards and specifications 

under development, and provided the status of the NIST 

Cloud-Computing Program in a variety of domestic and 

international conferences and workshops. CSD staff 

continues to engage industry and federal agencies for 

inputs and collaborative work through working groups, 

publications, and networking.

For More Information, See:

http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud

CONTACT:

Dr. Michaela Iorga

(301) 975-8431

michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Policy Machine – Leveraging Access 

Control for Cloud Computing

Figure 18: Policy Machine Operating Environment

In FY 2015, CSD continued the research and development of a virtualization utility for enterprise-wide controlled 

delivery of Cloud data services through Access Control. 

This included the publication of a revised Policy Machine 

specification as NISTIR 7987 Revision 1, Policy Machine: 

Features, Architecture, and Specification, in September 2015. 

NIST and other members of an Ad Hoc INCITS working 

group are developing a three-part Policy Machine standard 

under the title of Next Generation Access Control (NGAC), 

under three sub-projects:

• Project 2193–D: Next Generation Access Control – Implementation Requirements, Protocols and API Definitions;

• Project 2194–D: Next Generation Access Control – 

Functional Architecture; and

• Project 2195–D: Next Generation Access Control – 

Generic Operations & Abstract Data Structures.

The Policy Machine’s architecture was the basis for the 

NGAC work within INCITS. An initial standard from Project 

2194–D was published in 2013 and is now available from the 

ANSI e-standards store as INCITS 499, NGAC Functional 

Architecture (NGAC–FA). The standard resulting from 

Project 2195–D: INCITS 526, NGAC Generic Operations and 

Abstract Data Structures (NGAC-GOADS), is in the approval 

process and is expected to be published in the fall of 2015.

In FY 2016, CSD plans to issue a new version of its opensource distribution to reflect new features and enhanced 

performance, revise INCITS 499, and publish SP 800-178, A 

Comparison of Extensible Access Control Markup Language 

(XACML) and NGAC Attribute Based Access Control 

Standards for Data Services. 

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For More Information: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/pm/

CONTACTS:

Mr. David Ferraiolo Mr. Serban Gavrila

(301) 975-3046 (301) 975-4242

david.ferraiolo@nist.gov serban.gavrila@nist.gov

Security for a Virtualized 

Infrastructure

Several important components of a virtualized 

infrastructure need to be protected, including the 

Hypervisor, the virtual network, the Virtual Machine (VM) 

and data storage. The objective of this project is to analyze 

various configuration options in the deployment of these 

components and to provide guidance in the form of security 

recommendations. The project builds upon previous research 

that included: (a) the identification of security requirements 

for various use cases when a virtualized infrastructure is 

offered for cloud services and (b) the analysis of configuration options for Secure Hypervisor Deployment and 

providing security recommendations.

In FY 2015, the focus of research was the secure 

configuration of virtual networks for the protection of VMs. 

VM Security forms the primary goal in virtual network 

configuration due to the following: (a) VMs are the computeengines of the virtualized infrastructure on which mission 

critical applications of the enterprise run, and (b) VMs are 

the end-nodes of the virtual network. Research included the 

following configuration areas: 

• Network segmentation;

• Network path redundancy;

• Firewall deployment architecture; and 

• VM traffic monitoring.

Research included the analysis of the security 

advantages and disadvantages of various configuration 

options in each of these areas, forming the basis for security 

recommendations. The research resulted in the following 

publications during FY 2015:

• The conference paper entitled, Analysis of Network 

Segmentation Techniques in Cloud Data Centers; and

• Draft SP 800-125B, Secure Virtual Network Configuration for Virtual Machine (VM) Protection.

Cybersecurity for Emerging 

Technologies

Technology is advancing at an amazing rate, with 

rapid technological advances in manufacturing, healthcare, 

nanotechnology, cyber physical systems, and the “Internet 

of things.” This project scans the environment for 

developing technologies that may be currently at risk from a 

cybersecurity perspective, or potentially at risk in the future 

as the technology improves.

In FY 2015, CSD conducted research on cybersecurity 

in the field of additive manufacturing or three-dimensional 

(3D) printing. On February 3, 2015, CSD hosted a symposium 

on Cybersecurity for Direct Digital Manufacturing, which 

involves fabricating physical objects from a data file using 

computer-controlled processes with little to no human 

intervention, such as in additive manufacturing and 3D 

printing. During the symposium, attendees representing 

government, industry, and academic organizations discussed 

relevant cybersecurity risks, challenges, and solutions, as 

well as the implications for information and communications 

technology supply-chain risk management. Attendees 

identified several opportunities in the area and generally 

agreed that the time is right for building cybersecurity into 

these technologies. The proceedings of the symposium 

were published in April 2015 in NISTIR 8041, Proceedings of 

the Cybersecurity for Direct Digital Manufacturing (DDM) 

Symposium.

Along the same lines, CSD researched risk management 

practices for securing a set of technologies called Replication 

Devices (RDs). As a result of this research, CSD published 

NISTIR 8023, Risk Management for Replication Devices, in 

April 2015 to help organizations protect the confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability of information processed, stored, 

or transmitted on RDs. An RD is any device that reproduces 

(e.g., copies, prints, or scans) documents, images, or objects 

from an electronic or physical source. For the purposes 

of NISTIR 8023, RDs include copiers, printers, 3D printers, 

scanners, and 3D scanners, as well as multifunction 

machines when used as a copier, printer, or scanner. RDs in 

use within organizations run the gamut in terms of age and 

functionality, with some devices being relatively simple and 

others quite complex and sophisticated. 

CONTACT:

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli

(301) 975-5013

mouli@nist.gov

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In FY 2016, NIST will continue to scan the environment 

for emerging technologies, such as 3D printers and 

nanotechnology, which may benefit from guidance on how 

to manage, implement, or build-in cybersecurity principles 

and tools.

CONTACT:

Ms. Celia Paulsen

(301) 975-5981

celia.paulsen@nist.gov

Cyber Threat Information Sharing

As cyber attacks increase in both sophistication and 

frequency, it is important to collect and analyze cyber threat 

information from a variety of internal and external sources, 

and use it to develop, enhance, and deploy proactive, 

threat-informed, cyber defense capabilities. Cyber threat 

information includes indicators (i.e., artifacts or observable 

events that suggest that an attack is imminent, that an 

attack is underway, or that a compromise may have already 

occurred); information about the tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTPs) of actors; recommended courses of 

action, and other information that is used to characterize 

threats. Because threat actors often use the same TTPs 

against multiple targets, exchanging cyber threat information allows organizations to leverage the collective 

knowledge, experience, and analysis capabilities of their 

peers, thereby increasing the overall awareness and security 

of an entire sharing community. Through the exchange of 

cyber threat information, organizations can gain a more 

complete understanding of their threat environment by 

correlating their observations with those of others.

When one organization observes an attack that may 

affect or be used against other organizations, information 

sharing and coordination can make it possible to reduce the 

impact of the attack, speed recovery operations, and maintain 

a higher level of operational security. By integrating cyber 

threat information sharing into its existing cybersecurity and 

risk management practices, an organization can reduce the 

likelihood or mitigate the impact of successful cyber attacks, 

more effectively protect its systems, detect and anticipate 

the actions of threat actors, respond to cyber attacks, and 

recover to rapidly deploy effective countermeasures.

In FY 2014, CSD worked with DHS to develop SP 800-

150, Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing (Draft), 

which provides guidance to organizations seeking to 

establish and participate in cyber threat information sharing 

communities. The draft publication was released for public 

comment on October 28, 2014. The goal of this publication 

is to help organizations prepare for an exchange of cyber 

threat information, both consuming cyber threat information 

from external sources and producing information for other 

organizations to use. Because each organization may have 

substantially different capabilities for detecting threats, 

responding to attacks, diagnosing causes, and handling 

sensitive incident-related information, this guidance is 

intended to help organizations collaborate and exchange 

cyber threat information despite these organizational 

differences.

CSD’s cyber threat information sharing initiative is 

focused on providing guidance on how an organization can 

establish information sharing and coordination capabilities 

that enhance or augment their existing cybersecurity 

practices. The guidance covers threat-informed detection, 

protection and response capabilities; data privacy and 

sensitivity; data collection and retention practices; the use of 

open standards for information exchange; de-identification 

and anonymization; and guidance on how an organization 

can establish, participate in, and maintain coordination and 

information sharing relationships. The guidance will help 

incident responders, network defenders, and operations 

personnel consider what information is sharable, the 

circumstances under which sharing is permitted, with whom 

the information may be shared, and how the information 

should be protected.

In early FY 2016, CSD plans to release the second draft 

to Draft SP 800-150, based on the input received during the 

public comment period of the first draft, which was released 

October 2014.

CONTACTS:

Mr. Lee Badger Mr. David Waltermire

(301) 975-3176 (301) 975-3390

lee.badger@nist.gov david.waltermire@nist.gov

Mr. Christopher Johnson

(301) 975-3247

christopher.johnson@nist.gov

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The Ontology of Authentication

Over the past 30 years, NIST has been at the forefront 

of recommending best practices for authentication. 

Recommendations have included the usage of passwords in 

enterprises, biometrics, and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 

solutions. In FY 2015, CSD researched the classification of 

general authentication features. This investigation was 

prompted by the general call to move away from passwords 

towards the growing number of alternative authentication 

methods (e.g. biometrics, smart cards, etc.). In the early part 

of this investigation, it became clear that an ontology of 

authentication was needed. 

A draft taxonomy (see Figure 19) was developed 

to better describe current and emerging authentication 

mechanisms. This taxonomy covers a wide assortment 

of commonly used methods to cover human-machine, 

machine-machine, and attribute attestation. It does not 

address identity management - which typically happens 

before authentication occurs, or access control - which 

typically happens after. 

As a result of this research, several patterns and gaps 

were identified. For example, there are similar technologies 

used to support the various mechanisms. One of the greatest 

challenges is in defining a set of common metrics to assess 

authentication technologies. Two areas identified as needing

metrics include authentication strength and the suitability of 

the method to the environment. The strength measurements 

should include security and usability. This provides a way 

to monitor a common complaint of designers – usability 

being a tradeoff to security. However, security and usability 

is not sufficient to address the suitability of implementing 

a particular authentication mechanism in a particular 

environment. By adding in measures for deployability and 

manageability it should be possible to address the suitability 

of an authentication mechanism.

Figure 19: Draft Authentication Taxonomy

Figure 20: Suitability Framework for Authentication

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In the next few years, NIST CSD will work with the 

community to identify and address common areas of 

authentication requirements to create a framework for 

researching and developing authentication mechanisms 

using this taxonomy. As shown in Figure 20 (previous page), 

this framework will support integration of security with 

deployability, usability and manageability of authentication. 

This work will also be used to better identify the needs 

and dependencies for proper interaction with identity 

management and access control processes.

CONTACT:

Dr. Kim Schaffer

(301) 975-8375

kim.schaffer@nist.gov

MOBILE SECURITY

Smart phones have become both ubiquitous and 

indispensable. Although these mobile devices are relatively 

small and inexpensive, they can be used for voice calls, 

simple text messages, sending and receiving emails, 

browsing the web, online banking and e-commerce, social 

networking, and many functions once limited to laptop 

and desktop computers. Smart phones and tablet devices 

have specialized built-in hardware, such as cameras, 

accelerometers, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, 

and removable media readers. They also employ a wide range 

of wireless interfaces, including infrared, Wireless Fidelity 

(Wi-Fi), Bluetooth, Near Field Communications (NFC), and 

one or more types of cellular interfaces that provide network 

connectivity across the globe. 

Smart phones present new capabilities, but also a 

number of new security and privacy challenges. One such 

challenge concerns securing smartphone applications. To 

address this issue, NIST is conducting research in softwareassurance methodologies for smart phone applications (or 

“apps”) and is working with other government agencies and 

industry to bridge the security gaps present with today’s 

smart phones. For example, NIST developed the AppVet 

mobile app-vetting system and framework for managing 

an organization’s app-vetting process with respect to the 

organization’s security and privacy policies. This system was 

used by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA) to vet apps prior to being deployed on thousands of 

mobile devices for use in Afghanistan, the 2013 Presidential 

Inauguration, and the 2014 Boston Marathon. 

NIST’s work in mobile security has earned the 2014 

Government Computer News (GCN) award for Information 

Technology Excellence and the 2013 U.S. Department of 

Commerce Gold Medal Award. In FY 2016, NIST will be 

transitioning AppVet to the Department of Homeland 

Security as part of their Carwash program, which provides 

government development teams with a continuous 

integration build, testing, source code management, and 

issue tracking system.

CONTACTS:

Dr. Steve Quirolgico Dr. Jeffrey Voas

(301) 975-8426 (301) 975-6622

steveq@nist.gov jeff.voas@nist.gov

S T R E N G T H E N I N G I N T E R N E T 

SECURITY

USGv6: A Technical Infrastructure to 

Assist IPv6 Adoption 

Internet Protocol (IP) Version 6 (IPv6) is an updated 

version of the current Internet Protocol, IPv4. The primary 

motivations for the development of IPv6 were to increase 

the number of unique IP addresses available for use and to 

handle the needs of new Internet applications and devices. 

In addition, IPv6 was designed with the following goals: 

increased ease of network management and configuration, 

expandable IP headers, improved mobility and security, and 

the quality of service controls. IPv6 has been, and continues 

to be, developed and defined by the IETF.

FY 2012 was a significant year for the deployment 

of IPv6 in the United States Government (USG). OMB’s 

Memo of September 10, 2010, Transition to IPv6, required 

all government agencies to “upgrade public/external facing 

servers and services (e.g., web, email, Domain Name System 

(DNS), and Internet Service Provider (ISP) services) to 

operationally use IPv6 by the end of FY 2012.” NIST worked 

with the U.S. Government IPv6 (USGv6) Task Force and with 

individual government agencies to achieve this goal. NIST 

developed an online monitor to demonstrate which highlevel government domains have met this goal with respect 

to Domain Name System (DNS) services, email, web servers, 

and Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). 

In FY 2013, NIST and OMB continued to use this monitor to 

measure USGv6 compliance with OMB’s requirement.

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Additional OMB IPv6 requirements were mandated 

for FY 2014. Agencies were required to “upgrade internal 

client applications that communicate with public Internet 

servers and supporting enterprise networks to operationally 

use IPv6 by the end of FY 2014.” NIST developed online 

diagnostic tools to help agencies verify compliance to this 

requirement.

The NIST IPv6 Test Program, whose goal is to provide 

assurance on IPv6 product conformance and interoperability, 

continues to operate. In FY 2015, NIST continued to manage 

and evolve the USGv6 Test Program and to help federal 

agencies fulfill OMB mandates and monitor compliance to 

those mandates. In FY 2016, NIST is planning to update SP 

500-267, A Profile for IPv6 in the U.S. Government, Version 

1.0. This document is the basis for the USGv6 Test Program 

and for USG IPv6-compliant device evaluation and purchase. 

The NIST program is a collaboration between CSD and the 

ITL Advanced Networking Technology Division.

For More Information, See: 

http://www.nist.gov/itl/antd/usgv6.cfm

CONTACTS:

Ms. Sheila Frankel Mr. Douglas Montgomery

(301) 975-3297 (301) 975-3630

sheila.frankel@nist.gov dougm@nist.gov

ACCESS CONTROL PROJECTS

Access Control and Privilege 

Management Research

With the advance of current computing technologies 

and the diverse environments, access control issues, such 

as situational awareness, trust management, preservation of 

privacy, and privilege-management systems, are becoming 

increasingly complex. Practical and conceptual guidance for 

these topics is needed.

In FY 2015, the following research was accomplished for 

this project:

• Enhanced the unified enforcement mechanism of data 

services for use by a Policy Machine (PM) for an enterprise computing environment;

• Enhanced the capabilities of the Access Control Policy 

Tool (ACPT);

• Enhanced the capabilities of the Access Control Rule 

Logic Circuit Simulation (ACRLC) tool;

• Studied an Attribute Assurance mechanism for access 

authentication and authorization;

•

• Published a conference paper for Big Data Processing 

access control and distributed systems; and

• Studied efficient test case generation methods for 

Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) policy testing.

In FY 2016, CSD will continue the above research. CSD 

expects that this project will:

• Promote (or accelerate) the adoption of community 

computing that utilizes the power of shared resources 

and common trust-management schemes;

• Provide guidance for implementing access control 

models and mechanisms for standalone or network 

systems;

• Increase the security and safety of static (connected) 

distributed systems by applying the testing and verification tool for the AC policies;

• Assist system architects, security administrators, and 

security managers whose expertise is related to access 

control or privilege policy in managing their systems 

and in learning the limitations and practical approaches 

for their applications; and

• Provide accurate and efficient fault detection and 

correction technology for implementing AC rules and 

policies.

Figure 21 illustrates the application of access control and 

privilege management within and among organizations.

Figure 21: Access Control and Privilege Management

CONTACTS:

Dr. Vincent Hu Mr. David Ferraiolo

(301) 975-4975 (301) 975-3046

vhu@nist.gov david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Mr. Rick Kuhn

(301) 975-3337

kuhn@nist.gov

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Conformance Verification for Access

Control Policies

Access control (AC) systems are among the most 

critical network security components. Faulty policies, 

misconfigurations, or flaws in software implementation can 

result in serious vulnerabilities. The specification of access 

control policies is often a challenging problem. Often, a 

system’s privacy and security are compromised due to the 

misconfiguration of access control policies, instead of the 

failure of cryptographic primitives or protocols. This problem 

becomes increasingly severe as software systems become 

more and more complex, and are deployed to manage a large 

amount of sensitive information and resources organized 

into sophisticated structures. Identifying discrepancies 

between policy specifications and their properties (their 

intended function) is crucial because correct implementation 

and enforcement of policies by applications is based on the 

premise that the policy specifications are correct. As a result, 

policy specifications must undergo rigorous verification and 

validation through systematic testing to ensure that the 

policy specifications truly encapsulate the desires of the 

policy authors.

To formally and precisely capture the security properties 

that AC should adhere to, access control models are usually 

written to bridge the rather wide gap in abstraction between 

policy and mechanism. Thus, an access-control model 

provides unambiguous and precise expression, as well as 

a reference for the design and implementation of security 

requirements. Techniques are required for verifying whether 

an access-control model is correctly expressed in the accesscontrol policies, and whether the properties are satisfied in 

the model.

Most research on AC model or policy verification 

techniques is focused on one particular model, and almost 

all of the research is in applied methods, which require the 

completed AC policies as the input for verification or test 

processes to generate fault reports. Even though correct 

verification is achieved, and counter-examples may be 

generated when faults were found, those methods provide 

no information about the source of faults that might allow 

conflicts in privilege assignment, the leakage of privileges, or 

conflict of interest permissions. The difficulty in finding the 

source of faults is increased, especially when the AC rules 

are intricately covering duplicated variables to a degree of 

complexity. The complexity is due to the fact that a fault 

might not be caused by one particular rule. Thus, it requires 

manually analyzing each rule in the policy in order to find the 

correct solution for the fault.

To address the issue, CSD developed the Access Control 

Property Tool (ACPT), shown in Figure 22 (next page), 

which allows a user to compose, verify, test, and generate 

access control policies. CSD also researched the AC Rule 

Logic Circuit Simulation (ACRLCS) technique, which enables 

the AC authors to detect a fault when the fault-causing AC 

rule is added to the policy, so the fix can be implemented in 

real time before adding other rules that further complicate 

the detecting effort, rather than checking by retracing the 

interrelations between rules after the policy is completed.

In FY 2015, CSD accomplished the following:

• Published a conference paper for policy tool evaluation 

and analysis: Evaluating and Capability and Performance of Access Control Policy Verification Tools; 

• Developed verification oracles for policy test benchmarking, which embed policy faults for committee, 

university, hospital, and bank policy test scenarios;

• Developed a Small Business Innovation Research 

(SBIR) solicitation for access control tool development;

• Enhanced the ACRLCS − the Access Control Rule Logic 

Circuit Simulation System;

• Published a conference paper for policy test case generation: Pseudo-exhaustive Testing of Attribute-Based 

Access Control Rules;

• Worked with industrial and academic organizations in 

exploring new capabilities that helped to improve the 

usability of the AC tools (ACPT and ACRLCS), resulting 

in additional usage; ACPT was downloaded by 343 

users and organizations; and,

• Enhanced the capability of ACPT by improving policy 

combination algorithms and adding test oracles for 

basic access control models.

In FY 2016, CSD is planning to conduct further research 

on the new capabilities and enhance the performance of the 

ACPT and ACRLCS.

Figure 22 (next page) shows the system architecture 

of the NIST access control policy tool: ACPT, which allows 

access control policy authors to compose, verify, and test 

access control policy implementation.

This project is expected to:

• Provide a generic paradigm and framework of access 

control model/property conformance testing;

• Provide templates for specifying access control rules 

in popular access control models, such as the Attribute 

Based, Multilevel, and Workflow models;

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• Provide tools or services for checking the security and 

safety of an access control implementation, policy 

combination, and eXtensible Access Control Markup 

Language (XACML) policy generation;

• Promote (or accelerate) the adoption of combinatorial 

testing for large-system testing (such as an access 

control system);

• Promote the concept of detecting AC policy faults in 

real-time AC rule composing;

• Provide an innovative method for specifying AC rules 

formed by Boolean logic expressions operated on variables of AC rules;

• Provide techniques for preventing faults in enforcing 

fundamental security properties, including Cyclic Inheritance, Privilege Escalation, and Separation of Duty; 

and

• Provide new methods for composing standard mandatory AC models, such as Attribute-Based Access 

Control (ABAC) and Multi-Level Security (MLS), as well 

as some fundamental security properties.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acpt/

CONTACTS:

Dr. Vincent Hu Mr. Rick Kuhn

(301) 975-4975 (301) 975-3337

vhu@nist.gov kuhn@nist.gov

Attribute-Based Access Control

Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) is a logical 

access control methodology where an authorization to 

perform a set of operations is determined by evaluating the 

attributes associated with the subject, object, requested 

operations, and, in some cases, environmental conditions 

against policy, rules, or relationships that describe the 

allowable operations for a given set of attributes. ABAC 

represents a point on the spectrum of logical access control, 

from simple access control lists to more capable role-based 

access (RBAC), and finally, to a highly flexible method for 

providing access based on the evaluation of attributes.

Figure 22: Access Control Property Tool (ACPT)

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This research provides information for using ABAC 

to improve information sharing within and among organizations based on the planning, design, implementation, 

and operational considerations. The research also includes 

technologies such as attribute assurance, attribute 

engineering/management, identity system integration, 

attribute federation, situational awareness (real-time or 

contextual) mechanisms, policy management, and naturallanguage policy translation to digital policy. Figure 23 

illustrates the interaction of many of these components. The 

goal of this research is to improve information sharing, while 

maintaining control of that information for federal agencies.

In FY 2015, CSD published two ABAC papers: AttributeBased Access Control for IEEE Computing magazine, and 

Implementing and Managing Policy Rules in AttributeBased Access Control for IEEE International Conference on 

Information Reuse and Integration. CSD also wrote a draft 

Special Publication document for ABAC formal models 

research: A Comparison of XACML and NGAC Attribute 

Based Access Control Standards, which compares the 

characteristics of two ABAC implementation mechanisms: 

XACML and NGAC. CSD continued research on the Attribute 

Assurance of ABAC in partnership with the National 

Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC), and 

the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE). 

CSD developed a draft Special Publication based on the 

mechanism for defining the veracity, security, and readiness 

levels of assurance of ABAC attributes.

In FY 2016, CSD will continue the research of ABAC 

formal models, as well as details and extended topics of 

ABAC capabilities, such as attribute assurance, ABAC 

implementation examples, ABAC mechanisms, and ABAC 

standards. The ABAC project will pursue the following 

objectives:

• Provide readers with the terminology and a basic understanding of ABAC;

• Provide readers with an overview of the current state 

of logical access control, a working definition of ABAC, 

and an explanation of the core and enterprise ABAC 

concepts;

Figure 23: ABAC Access Control Mechanism Chart

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• Assist security policy makers in establishing a business case for ABAC implementation and acquiring an 

interoperable set of capabilities;

• Assist ABAC developers in developing the operational 

requirements and overall enterprise architecture;

• Assist ABAC administrators in establishing or refining 

business processes to support ABAC;

• Promote the adoption of ABAC for a more secure and 

flexible method for information sharing in a standalone 

or enterprise environment; and

• Provide testing methods for ABAC policy and implementations.

For More Information, See:

http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/abac/

CONTACTS:

Dr. Vincent Hu Mr. David Ferraiolo

(301) 975-4975 (301) 975-3046

vhu@nist.gov david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Mr. Rick Kuhn

(301) 975-3337

kuhn@nist.gov

A D VA N C E D S E C U R I T Y 

T E S T I N G A N D 

MEASUREMENTS

Security Automation and Continuous 

Monitoring

IT organizations operate a diverse set of computing 

assets that access, route, store, and process information that 

is critical to the operations of businesses and the missions 

of government agencies. These IT environments are under 

constant threat of attack and are frequently undergoing 

change, with new and updated software being deployed 

along with updated configurations. The wide variety of 

computing products, the dynamic nature of software, the 

speed of configuration change, and the diversity of threats 

require organizations to maintain situational awareness 

over their IT assets and to utilize this information to make 

informed risk-based decisions.

Security automation utilizes standardized data formats 

and transport protocols to enable data to be exchanged 

between business, operational, and security systems that 

support security processes by:

• Identifying IT assets, including hardware, software, and 

data;

• Providing awareness over the operational state of computing devices;

• Enabling security reference data to be collected from 

internal and external sources; and

• Supporting analysis processes that measure the effectiveness of security controls and provide visibility into 

security risks, enabling risk-based decision-making.

Commercial solutions built using security automation 

specifications enable the collection and harmonization of 

vast amounts of operational and security data into coherent, 

comparable information streams to achieve situational 

awareness that allows the timely and active management of 

diverse IT systems. Through the creation of reference data 

and guidance, and the international recognition of flexible, 

open standards, the NIST security automation program 

works to improve the interoperability, broad acceptance, and 

adoption of security automation solutions to address current 

and future security challenges, creating opportunities for 

innovation.

Specification, Standards, and Guidance 

Development

To support the overarching security automation vision, it 

is necessary to have specifications that describe the required 

interactions between systems, standards that document 

international consensus approaches, and guidance that 

informs product developers and implementers. Through 

close work with partners in government, industry, and 

academia, CSD continues to facilitate the definition and 

development of security automation approaches that enable 

organizations to understand and manage IT security risks. 

During FY 2015, CSD has continued to work to build on 

previous security automation work by:

• Identifying and addressing gaps in the current specifications;

• Evolving existing approaches to achieve greater scalability and impact;

• Participating in working groups in standards development organizations to promote international consensus 

around standardized approaches;

• Providing additional guidance on architectural, design, 

and analysis concerns; and

• Developing and maintaining tools and reference implementations.

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CSD is currently working with its partners in various 

standards-development organizations, including ISO, 

IETF, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 

(FIRST), and the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), to 

further mature and broaden the adoption of security 

automation specifications, reference data, and techniques. 

This area of work is focused on evolving security automation 

specifications to integrate with existing transport protocols 

to provide for the secure, interoperable exchange of security 

automation data. Additional work is focused on evolving 

security metrics and providing consensus guidance on 

security automation approaches. Through the definition and 

adoption of security automation standards and guidelines, 

IT vendors will be able to provide standardized security 

solutions to their customers. These solutions support 

continuous monitoring and automated, dynamic network 

defense capabilities, based on the analysis of data from 

operational and security data sources and the collective 

action of security components.

Security automation standardization work has been 

focused in three areas: the evolution and international 

adoption of the Security Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP), the development of software asset management 

standards to support operational and cybersecurity 

use cases, and the development of security automation 

consensus standards. The following sections detail this work.

Security Content Automation Protocol 

(SCAP)

SCAP is a multipurpose protocol that provides an 

automated means to collect and assess the state of devices. 

SCAP supports automated vulnerability checking, verifying 

the installation of patches, checking security configuration 

settings, verifying technical-control compliance, measuring 

security, and examining systems for indicators of a 

compromise. SCAP uses the Extensible Markup Language 

(XML) to standardize the format and nomenclature by which 

security software products communicate information about 

software flaws, security configurations, and other aspects of 

the device state. SCAP enables security automation content, 

also known as “SCAP content,” to be expressed using 

standardized formats, identifiers, and scoring models. This 

content can be used by any tool that is conformant to the 

specifications to collect and evaluate the state of software 

installed on a device.

SCAP has been widely adopted by major software 

and hardware manufacturers and has become a significant 

component of information-security-management and 

governance programs. SCAP-enabled tools are currently 

being used by the U.S. Government, critical-infrastructure 

companies, academia, and other businesses, both 

domestically and internationally. Currently, CSD is leveraging 

SCAP in multiple areas, both to support its own mission 

and to enable other agencies and private-sector entities 

to meet their goals. For CSD, SCAP is a critical component 

of the SCAP Validation Program, the National Vulnerability 

Database (NVD), and the National Checklist Program (NCP).

In September 2012, CSD published SP 800-126 Rev. 2, 

The Technical Specification for the Security Content 

Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP Version 1.2. That 

document describes the 11 component specifications 

composing SCAP. See Table 2 (next page): SCAP 1.2 

Specifications for details.

Since the release of SCAP 1.2, CSD has worked to 

improve guidance around the use of SCAP specifications. In 

FY 2015, CSD released draft NISTIR 8058, Security Content 

Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.2 Content Style 

Guide: Best Practices for Creating and Maintaining SCAP 

1.2 Content, which provides guidance for SCAP 1.2 content 

creators to ensure that stylistic variations in SCAP 1.2 

content are addressed in a way that improves the accuracy 

and consistency of results, avoids performance problems, 

reduces user effort, lowers content maintenance burdens, 

and enables content reuse. To achieve this, the report 

documents best practices for content creation and 

encourages their use by SCAP content authors and 

maintainers. Feedback on this report is welcomed and will 

help CSD to work towards producing a final version of this 

document.

CSD is starting to work on an SCAP 1.3 revision. In 

August 2015, CSD requested comments on the design 

and development of SCAP 1.3. Specific areas of requested 

feedback included:

• Adopting the Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) 5.11.1, which was released in April 2015;

• Adopting the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 

(CVSS) v3, which was released in June 2015;

• Removing support for CVSS v2; and

• Deprecating support for older specification revisions 

and SCAP 1.0.

The received feedback generally favored the adoption 

of OVAL 5.11.1 and CVSS v3. Continued support for CVSS v2, 

in addition to v3, and some reduction in the minimal support 

for older specification revisions were also common themes 

in the feedback. CSD is currently considering this feedback 

while working on a draft revision of SP 800-126 for public 

comment in FY 2016.

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TABLE 2: SCAP 1.2 SPECIFICATIONS

SPECIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION

Languages

Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format 

(XCCDF)

Used for authoring security checklists/benchmarks and 

for reporting results of evaluating them

Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) Used for representing system-configuration information, 

assessing machine state, and reporting assessment results

Open Checklist Interactive Language (OCIL)

Used for representing checks that collect information from 

people or from existing data stores populated by other 

data collection methods

Reporting Formats

Asset Reporting Format (ARF) Used to express information about assets and to define 

the relationships between assets and reports

Asset identification Used to uniquely identify assets based on known 

identifiers and other asset information

Enumerations

Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)

A nomenclature and dictionary of hardware, operating 

systems, and applications; a method to identify 

applicability to platforms

Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE) A nomenclature and dictionary of software-security 

configurations

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) A nomenclature and dictionary of security-related 

software flaws

Measurement and Scoring Systems

Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Used for measuring the relative severity of software flaws

Common Configuration Scoring System (CCSS) Used for measuring the relative severity of device security 

(mis-)configuration issues

Content and Result Integrity

Trust Model for Security Automation Data (TMSAD) Guidance for using digital signatures in a common trust 

model applied to security automation specifications

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Software Asset Management Standards

CSD has been collaborating with industry partners 

to revise the ISO/IEC 19770-2:2009 standard, Information 

technology—Software asset management—Part 2: Software 

identification tag, which establishes a specification for 

tagging software to support identification and management. 

An updated revision of this standard, ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015, 

was published on October 1, 2015. The software identification 

(SWID) data model defined by this standard describes an 

XML format for software publishers to provide authoritative 

identification, categorization, software relationships 

(e.g., dependency, bundling, and patch), executable and 

library footprint details, and other metadata for software. 

This information can be used to support operational 

and cybersecurity use cases around managing software 

deployments, managing software licenses, managing 

software vulnerabilities and related software patches, and 

assessing secure software configurations.

To supplement the requirements in ISO/IEC 19770-

2:2015, CSD has been working with DHS and NSA on the 

development of NISTIR 8060, Guidelines for the Creation 

of Interoperable Software Identification (SWID) Tags. 

NISTIR 8060 provides an overview of the capabilities and 

usage of software identification (SWID) tags as part of a 

comprehensive software lifecycle. This report introduces 

SWID tags in an operational context, provides guidelines for 

the creation of interoperable SWID tags, and highlights key 

usage scenarios for which SWID tags are applicable. Figure 

24 illustrates how SWID tags support multiple elements 

of the software product life cycle, including deployment, 

installation, patching, upgrading and removal. CSD has 

released three public discussion drafts of these guidelines. 

A final public draft will be released in FY 2016, along with a 

subsequent final release of the report.

Additionally, NIST has worked with the TCG to integrate 

SWID tags into the Trusted Network Communications (TNC) 

protocol, through the SCAP Messages for IF-M specification 

that will be discussed below.

The information provided within SWID tags enhances 

the SCAP use cases by providing authoritative information 

that can be used to create Common Platform Enumeration 

(CPE) names, to support the targeting of checklists, and to 

associate software flaws to products, based on a defect in 

a software library or executable. CSD will be working on a 

number of reports in FY 2016 that provide further guidance 

for using SWID tags to address these use cases. 

Development of Security Automation 

Consensus Standards

CSD has been promoting the broad international 

adoption of SCAP by encouraging the integration of SCAP 

into other standards, and by adapting SCAP to address 

specific gaps and challenges. CSD has continued its 

collaboration with industry partners in the IETF Security 

Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) working 

group. This working group provides a venue for advancing 

appropriate SCAP specifications into international standards 

and addressing identified gap areas. The current scope of 

work for SACM includes identifying and/or defining the 

transport protocols and data formats needed to support 

Figure 24: SWID Tags Support the Software Product Lifecycle

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For more information, please refer to: http://datatracker.

ietf.org/wg/sacm/charter/

CSD also worked with government and industry partners 

in the TCG to define a number of specifications related to 

the TNC protocol. The first such publication is the TNC SCAP 

Messages for IF-M specification that supports carrying SCAP 

content and results over the TNC protocols. The second is 

the TNC Enterprise Compliance Profile (ECP) and related 

specifications that support the exchange of SWID data 

over the TNC protocols. The ECP enables the collection of 

SWID data from a device for use by external tools to provide 

software inventory information. SCAP and SWID data 

collected using these mechanisms may be optionally used 

for network access-control decision making, allowing the 

device state to be evaluated when devices connect and on 

an ongoing basis thereafter.

For more information on these specifications, 

please visit: http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/

resources/tnc_scap_messages_for_ifm, and http://www.

trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/tnc_endpoint_

compliance_profile_specification.

Finally, CSD has worked with the FIRST by participating 

in two Special Interest Groups (SIGs). The CVSS SIG (CVSSSIG) is focused on maintaining and improving the CVSS 

scoring model, based on community feedback. The CVSSSIG published CVSS Revision 3 (CVSS v3) in June 2015. The 

second SIG, the Vulnerability Reporting and Data eXchange 

SIG (VRDX-SIG), researches and recommends methods for 

identifying and exchanging vulnerability information across 

disparate vulnerability databases.

For more information, please visit: http://www.first.org/

global/sigs.

Through work with international standards-developing 

organizations (SDOs), SCAP and related security automation 

capabilities are expected to evolve and expand in support of 

the growing need to define and measure effective security 

controls, assess and monitor ongoing aspects of information 

security, remediate noncompliance, and successfully 

manage systems in accordance with the Risk Management 

Framework described in SP 800-37 Revision 1, Guide for 

Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal 

Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach. 

Standards that are developed and published by these SDOs 

will be considered for inclusion in future revisions of SCAP. 

For More Information, See: 

http://scap.nist.gov/

CONTACT:

Mr. David Waltermire

(301) 975-3390

david.waltermire@nist.gov

the collection and evaluation of a device state against 

expected values. Over the past twelve months, the SACM 

working group has been working on identifying use cases, 

requirements, and architectural models to inform decisions 

about existing specifications and standards that can be 

referenced, required modifications or extensions to existing 

specifications and standards, and any gaps that need to 

be addressed. CSD is working with DHS, the Center for 

Internet Security (CIS), and the TCG to bring existing work 

into the IETF SACM working group to include OVAL and 

specifications related to the TNC protocol.

In FY 2015, the SACM use cases were published by the 

IETF as Request for Comments (RFC) 7632.

The working group has been developing the following 

Internet Drafts:

INTERNET DRAFT PURPOSE

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sacmterminology/Definition of the common terminology used within a 

number of working-group documents.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sacmrequirements/Listing architectural and specification requirements for 

SACM specifications.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sacmarchitecture/Definition of the SACM architecture to inform 

development of transports.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sacminformation-model/Definition of the SACM information model to inform 

development of data models.

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Security Automation Reference Data 

Through the NVD and the NCP, NIST is providing relevant 

and important reference data in the areas of vulnerability 

and configuration management. SCAP and the programs 

that leverage it are moving the information assurance 

industry towards being able to standardize communications, 

and towards the collection and storage of relevant data in 

standardized formats, as well as providing automated 

means for the assessment and remediation of systems for 

both vulnerabilities and configuration compliance.

National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

Security automation reference data is currently 

housed within the NVD. The NVD is the U.S. Government 

repository of security automation data based on security 

automation specifications. This data provides a standardsbased foundation for the automation of software asset, 

vulnerability, and security configuration management; 

security measurement; and compliance activities. This data 

supports security automation efforts based on the SCAP. The 

NVD includes databases of security configuration checklists 

for the NCP, listings of publicly known software flaws, 

product names, and impact metrics. A formal validation 

program tests the ability of vendor products to use some 

forms of security automation data, based on a product’s 

conformance in support of specific enterprise capabilities.

SCAP defines the structure of standardized software 

flaws and security configuration reference data, also known 

as SCAP content. This reference data is provided by the NVD 

(http://nvd.nist.gov/).

As of October 2015, the NVD contained the following 

resources:

• Over 72,000 vulnerability advisories, with an average 

of 40 new vulnerabilities added daily;

• 82 SCAP-expressed checklists containing thousands 

of low-level security configuration checks that can be 

used by SCAP-validated security products to perform 

automated evaluations of the system state;

• 248 non-SCAP security checklists (e.g., English prose 

guidance and configuration scripts);

• 249 U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (USCERT) alerts; 4,402 US-CERT vulnerability summaries; 

and 10,286 SCAP machine-readable software flaw 

checks, and;

• A product dictionary with over 106,000 operating system, application, and hardware name entries; and over 

58,000 vulnerability advisories translated into Spanish.

NVD is hosted and maintained by NIST and is sponsored 

by the Department of Homeland Security’s US-CERT.

The use of SCAP data by commercial security products, 

deployed in thousands of organizations worldwide, has 

extended NVD’s effective reach. Increasing demand for NVD 

XML data feeds (i.e., mechanisms that provide updated data 

from data sources) and SCAP-expressed content from the 

NVD website demonstrates an increased adoption of SCAP.

The NVD continues to play a pivotal role in the Payment 

Card Industry (PCI) efforts to mitigate vulnerabilities in credit 

card systems. PCI mandates the use of NVD vulnerability 

severity scores in measuring the risk to payment card 

servers worldwide and for prioritizing vulnerability patching. 

PCI’s use of NVD severity scores helps enhance credit card 

transaction security and protects consumers’ personal 

information.

For More Information, See: 

https://nvd.nist.gov

CONTACTS:

Mr. Harold Booth Mr. Robert Byers

(301) 975-8441 (301) 975-3279

harold.booth@nist.gov robert.byers@nist.gov

National Checklist Program (NCP)

There are many threats to information technology (IT), 

ranging from remotely launched network service exploits to 

malicious code spread through infected emails, websites, 

and downloaded files. Vulnerabilities in IT products are 

discovered daily, and many ready-to-use exploitation 

techniques are widely available on the Internet. Because IT 

products are often intended for a wide variety of audiences, 

restrictive security configuration controls are usually not 

enabled by default. As a result, many out-of-the box IT 

products are immediately vulnerable. In addition, identifying 

a reasonable set of security settings that achieve balanced 

risk management is a complicated, arduous, and timeconsuming task, even for experienced system administrators.

To facilitate the development of security configuration 

checklists for IT products and to make checklists more 

organized and usable, CSD established the National 

Check-list Program (NCP) in furtherance of its statutory 

responsibilities under the Federal Information Security 

Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Public Law 107-347, and 

also under the Cybersecurity Research and Development Act, 

which mandates that NIST “develop, and revise as necessary, 

a checklist setting forth settings and option selections that 

minimize the security risks associated with each computer 

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hardware or software system that is, or is likely to become, 

widely used within the Federal Government.” In February 

2008, revised Part 39 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(FAR) was published. Paragraph (d) of section 39.101 states, 

“In acquiring information technology, agencies shall include 

the appropriate IT security policies and requirements, 

including use of common security configurations available 

from the NIST website at http://checklists.nist.gov. Agency 

contracting officers should consult with the requiring official 

to ensure the appropriate standards are incorporated.”

In Memorandum M-08-22, OMB mandated the use of 

SCAP-validated products for the continuous monitoring of 

Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) compliance. 

The NCP strives to encourage and assist federal agencies 

with these mandates.

The goals of the NCP are to:

• Facilitate the development and sharing of checklists by 

providing a formal framework for checklist developers 

to submit checklists to NIST;

• Provide guidance to developers to help them create 

standardized, high-quality checklists that conform to 

common operation environments;

• Help developers and users by providing guidelines for 

making checklists better documented and more usable;

• Encourage software vendors and other parties to develop checklists;

• Provide a managed process for the review, update, and 

maintenance of checklists;

• Provide an easy-to-use repository of checklists; and

• Encourage the use of automation technologies (e.g., 

SCAP) for checklist application.

NCP added 100 new checklists in FY 2015, bringing the 

number of checklists posted on the website to 353 (see 

http://checklists.nist.gov). Of that total, 153 of the checklists, 

addressing 86 platforms, are SCAP-expressed and can be 

used with SCAP-validated products. This represents a 45 

% increase in the number of SCAP-expressed checklists 

when compared to FY 2014, demonstrating continual use 

and adoption of this automated means of expressing and 

consuming checklist content.

Organizations can use checklists obtained from the 

NCP website for automated security configuration patch 

assessment. The NCP currently hosts SCAP checklists for 

Internet Explorer 9.0, Internet Explorer 10.0, Office 2010, 

Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 

Server 2012, and other products.

To assist users in identifying automated checklist content, 

NCP groups these checklists into tiers, from Tier I to Tier IV. 

The NCP uses the tiers to rank checklists according to their 

automation capability. Tier III and IV checklists include fully 

vetted SCAP content that has successfully demonstrated 

conformance to the requirements outlined in SP 800-126. 

Tier III & IV checklists are considered production-ready and 

are intended for use with SCAP-validated products.

Tier II checklists document recommended security 

settings in a machine-readable, nonstandard format, such 

as a proprietary format or a product-specific configuration 

script. Tier I checklists are prose-based and contain no 

machine-readable content. Users can browse the checklists, 

based on the checklist tier, IT product, IT product category, 

or authority, and through a keyword search that searches the 

checklist name and summary for user specified terms. The 

search results show the detailed checklist metadata and a 

link to any SCAP content for the checklist, as well as links to 

any supporting resources associated with the checklist.

To assist checklist developers, the NCP provides both 

manual and automated interfaces to facilitate the submission 

and maintenance processes. The manual interface consists 

of a web application that guides the submitter through 

the data entry process to ensure that all of the required 

information is submitted. The submission is validated 

upon review, and a report is returned to the submitting 

organization, verifying either acceptance or rejection, based 

on the criteria requirements. For instance, Tier III and Tier 

IV checklists require validation using the SCAP Content 

Validation Tool (this tool is available for download via 

http://scap.nist.gov/revision/1.2/#tools).

The NCP is defined in SP 800-70 Revision 3, National 

Checklist Program for IT Products—Guidelines for Checklist 

Users and Developers, which can be found at http://csrc.nist.

gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.

For More Information, See: 

https://checklists.nist.gov

CONTACT:

Mr. Stephen Quinn

(301) 975-6967

stephen.quinn@nist.gov

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United States Government 

Configuration Baseline (USGCB) / 

FDCC Baselines

The United States Government Configuration Baseline 

(USGCB) initiative creates security configuration baselines 

for information technology (IT) products that are widely 

deployed across the federal agencies. The project originally 

evolved from the Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) 

mandate originally described in a March 2007 memorandum 

from OMB, Memorandum M-07-11. The purpose of the USGCB 

program is to help improve information security and reduce 

overall IT operating costs by providing commonly accepted 

and agreed upon security configurations for major operating 

systems and applications.

Through the NCP described in SP 800-70 Revision 3, 

a baseline submitter may express interest in submitting a 

candidate for use in the USGCB program.

CSD provides ongoing support for the USGCB 

automation content, including periodic updates to the 

existing content, encouraging vendors to submit candidates, 

assisting USGCB users in continuously monitoring and 

assessing security compliance of information systems 

within their environment. This ongoing monitoring element 

supports the Risk Management Framework described in 

SP 800-37 Revision 1. It also supports the Core functions 

of the Cybersecurity Framework, providing USGCB users 

with settings that protect digital assets and supports the 

detection of suspicious activity.

During FY 2016, the USGCB program will continue to 

provide ongoing maintenance of the baseline artifacts and 

to consider additional applicable platforms as authored 

and submitted by the platform vendors, as well as other 

organizations that wish to contribute candidate content. 

For More Information, See: 

http://usgcb.nist.gov

CONTACT:

Team email: usgcb@nist.gov

Mr. Stephen Quinn

(301) 975-6967

stephen.quinn@nist.gov

Apple OS X Security Configuration

CSD is working to develop secure system configuration 

baselines supporting different operational environments for 

Apple OS X Version 10.10, “Yosemite.” These configuration 

guidelines will assist organizations with hardening OS X 

technologies and provide a basis for unified controls and 

settings for OS X workstations and for mobile system 

security configurations for federal agencies.

The configurations are based on a collection of resources, 

including the existing NIST OS X configuration guidance, 

the OS X security configuration guide, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) OS X Recommended Settings, and the 

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) OS X Security 

Technical Implementation Guide (STIG). The project team 

aggregated 400 initial settings, determined which settings 

to include in the configuration baseline, and determined 

appropriate values for each included setting. The desired 

configuration items have been established, and the team is 

continuing to develop shell scripts that apply the settings 

to an OS X 10.10 system. The settings are organized into 

three key baselines, which are appropriate for different 

environments:

• The Enterprise baseline is appropriate for centrally 

managed, networked systems;

• The Small Office Home Office baseline, sometimes 

called Standalone, describes small, informal computer 

installations that are used for home or business purposes; and

• The Specialized Security-Limited Functionality baseline 

is appropriate for systems where security requirements 

are more stringent and where the implementation of 

security safeguards is likely to reduce functionality.

SCAP, defined and discussed in an earlier section of this 

report, will be used to express configuration settings and 

check system configuration compliance.

During FY 2013, CSD provided a block of initial settings 

to Apple and these settings were posted for the Apple 

community on a periodic basis for public review, discussion, 

correction and agreement. Each setting has a designated 

Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE) number, which 

aids in the long-term tracking of the setting. Ultimately, the 

settings will be tested and included in the configuration 

baselines. In addition, CSD started the production of a draft 

guideline, Guide to Securing Apple OS X 10.8 Systems for 

IT Professionals. This guidance, which is similar in structure 

to the SP 800-68, Windows XP Security Guide, focuses on 

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providing detailed information about the security of Apple 

OS X, and providing security configuration guidelines for all 

users of the Apple OS X 10.8 operating system.

During FY 2014, a majority of all proposed settings were 

scripted. The corresponding spreadsheet batches have been 

sent to Apple for feedback; approximately 230 settings are 

now completed. Settings have also been implemented on OS 

X 10.9, when possible. Work on the draft guideline, Guide to 

Securing Apple OS X 10.8 Systems for IT Professionals, was 

temporarily suspended while configuration setting research 

was performed, but was resumed in FY 2015.

In FY 2015, CSD focused on the OS X 10.10 operating 

system for security testing. CSD finalized and tested the 

entire security configuration of 230 settings for OS X 10.10 

and has continued updating the draft publication that was 

started for OS X 10.8 and has now been focused on OS X 

10.10. For several months, one of the script’s three profiles 

was deployed on select CSD systems for extensive testing. 

So far, results have been positive.

In FY 2016, CSD plans to release the draft publication, 

Guide to Securing Apple OS X 10.10 Systems for IT 

Professionals, for at least one public comment period, and 

plans to release a final version after incorporating changes 

from the comment period(s). CSD will continue to refine the 

script and add more settings to the configuration.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/apple-os/

CONTACTS:

Mr. Mark Trapnell Mr. Lee Badger

(301) 975-4091 (301) 975-3176

mark.trapnell@nist.gov lee.badger@nist.gov

Mr. Murugiah Souppaya

(301) 975-4102

murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov

T E C H N I C A L S E C U R I T Y 

METRICS

Security Risk Analysis of Enterprise 

Networks Using Attack Graphs

The protection of computer networks from malicious 

intrusions is critical to the economy and security of the 

nation. Vulnerabilities are regularly discovered in software 

applications that are exploited to stage cyber attacks. 

System administrators need objective metrics to guide and 

justify decision making as they manage the security risk 

of enterprise networks. The objective of this research is to 

develop a standard model for the security risk analysis of 

computer networks. A standard model will enable NIST to 

answer questions such as “Are we more secure now than 

yesterday?” or “How does the security of one network 

configuration compare with another one?” Also, having a 

standard model to measure network security will allow users, 

vendors, and researchers to evaluate methodologies and 

products for network security in a coherent and consistent 

manner.

CSD has approached the challenge of network security 

analysis by capturing vulnerability interdependencies 

and measuring security, based on how real attackers have 

penetrated networks. CSD’s methodology for security risk 

analysis is based on attack graphs. CSD analyzes attack 

paths through a network, providing a probabilistic metric of 

the overall system risk. Through this metric, CSD analyzes 

trade-offs between security costs and security benefits.

Computer systems are vulnerable to both known and 

zero-day attacks. Enterprises have begun to move parts 

of their networks from a traditional infrastructure into 

cloud computing environments. Cloud providers can offer 

virtual servers that can be rented on demand by users. This 

paradigm enables cloud customers to acquire computing 

resources with high efficiency, low cost and great flexibility. 

However, it also introduces many security problems that 

need to be solved.

In FY 2015, CSD attempted to model the problem of 

cloud security using a cloud-level attack graph. An attacker 

can create stealthy bridges (i.e., a covert connection 

between disparate networks that should be isolated) in a 

cloud environment. These stealthy bridges can be created 

using zero day vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by 

vulnerability scanners. The stealthy bridges can be used to 

construct a multi-step attack path and facilitate a subsequent 

intrusion process across enterprise islands in a cloud. CSD 

has developed a new technique to detect potential attacks 

in a Cloud using a probabilistic attack graph model. CSD 

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published a paper, Inferring the Stealthy Bridges Between 

Enterprise Network Islands in Cloud Using Cross Layer 

Bayesian Networks, for the Tenth International Conference 

on Security in Communication Networks, in Beijing, which 

was held October 24-26, 2015.

In FY 2016, CSD plans to develop new techniques and 

metrics to detect attacks on Cloud Computing and for 

network forensics analysis using Bayesian Networks. CSD 

also plans to publish the results as a NIST report and as white 

papers in conferences and journals.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/security-risk-analysisenterprise-networks/

CONTACT:

Dr. Anoop Singhal

(301) 975-4432

anoop.singhal@nist.gov

Algorithms for Intrusion Measurement

The Algorithms for Intrusion Measurement (AIM) 

project furthers measurement science in designing and 

implementing algorithms to both detect attackers and 

limit their ability to intrude into a system. Most of the 

work leverages graph theory (the math of dots and lines) 

and algorithmic complexity analysis (the math around fast 

computation). In performing this work, the AIM project 

seeks to enhance the nation’s ability to defend itself from 

network-borne attacks. 

This scientific research is conducted in partnership 

with the Army Research Laboratory (ARL), the University 

of Maryland, and the Center for Applied Internet Data 

Analysis. ARL’s participation helps focus the work on 

solving immediate critical problems facing U.S. Government 

networks. However, research solutions are made publicly 

available and are designed to be generally applicable to as 

many environments as possible.

In FY 2015, the AIM project completed research in 

several areas: measurements of Internet resilience of 

colluding country attacks, the optimal placement of 

defensive resources in Internet Protocol (IP) v6 networks, 

and circumvention-resistant network scan detection. More 

specifically, the project team accomplished the following:

• The team analyzed the resilience of the Internet with 

respect to countries colluding in using their influence 

over the Internet infrastructure to disconnect two 

countries, isolate a set of countries from the Internet, or 

break the Internet up into non-communicating clusters 

(the research was published in the International Journal 

of Computer Science: Theory and Applications, as well 

as in the proceedings of the Workshop for the Security 

of Emerging Network Technologies).

• The research team showed how to leverage Internet 

Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) network migrations to enhance security capabilities. This was done through an 

evaluation of how to optimize the placement of defensive resources in specially secured IPv6 networks. The 

optimal placements best limit the movement of internal 

attackers to a small set of hosts or else force them to 

penetrate through the special security boundaries (the 

research was published in the journal Data and Applications Security and Privacy). 

• In previous work, the team discovered a critical weakness in the most widely cited Threshold Random Walk 

(TRW) network scan detection algorithm that enabled 

a full circumvention by attackers. To mitigate the problem, we invented a scan detection methodology that 

will detect TRW circumvention activity and that also 

acts as an effective general-purpose scan detection 

algorithm. However, we find that the most effective 

approach is a composite solution that combines our 

approach with TRW (the research was published in the 

journal of Security Informatics).

In FY 2016, the AIM project will work on new methods 

for network anomaly detection, efficient representations 

for attack graphs, efficient computation of access control 

policy to restrict insider attacks, vertex partitioning on 

massive graphs to enable security resiliency analyses, and 

methods for using attack graphs to perform defense-indepth measurements.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/aim/

CONTACT:

Mr. Peter Mell

(301) 975-5572

peter.mell@nist.gov

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Automated Combinatorial Testing

Software developers often encounter failures that result 

from an unexpected interaction between components. NIST 

research has shown that most failures are triggered by one 

or two parameters, and progressively fewer by three, four, or 

more parameters (see Figure 25 below), a relationship that 

is called the Interaction Rule. These results have important 

implications for testing. If all faults in a system can be 

triggered by a combination of n or fewer parameters, then 

testing all n-way combinations of parameters can provide 

very strong fault detection efficiency. These methods are 

being applied to software and hardware testing for reliability, 

safety, and security. CSD’s focus is on empirical results and 

real-world problems.

Project highlights for FY 2015 include the publication of 

a paper on a new method of “oracle-free testing”, a form 

of consistency checking using two-layer covering arrays 

with equivalence classes to automatically detect a large 

class of software faults; invited lectures at conferences and 

universities; leading the fourth International Workshop on 

Combinatorial Testing, held in conjunction with the eighth 

IEEE International Conference on Software Testing; initiating 

research on using combinatorial methods to reduce the cost 

of high assurance for life-critical software, tools and methods 

for locating faults from test results; and analyzing the factors 

involved in different types of software faults. Collaborators 

include researchers from the University of Texas at Arlington, 

the University of Texas at Dallas, East Carolina University, 

and Duke University.

Figure 25: Interaction Rule Graph

Technology transfer activities included the publication 

of a number of technical papers and software distribution; 

publication of the results of a Cooperative R&D (CRADA) 

project with Lockheed Martin; release of enhanced 

combinatorial measurement tools; input modeling and 

fault location tools; a provisional patent application on the 

oracle-free testing method; plus seminars at a number of 

conferences, universities, and federal agencies.

Plans for FY 2016 include combinatorial testing for 

big data software; initiation of a new CRADA project; 

measurement of input model combination coverage of 

security-critical software; a beta release of tools for testing 

to the modified condition decision coverage test criterion 

for life-critical software; developing tools to implement 

oracle-free testing methods; analysis of empirical data 

on failures; further development of methods and tools for 

fault localization; and seminars, workshops, and tutorials at 

professional meetings and research labs. 

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acts/

CONTACTS:

Mr. Rick Kuhn Dr. Raghu Kacker

(301) 975-3337 (301) 975-2109

kuhn@nist.gov raghu.kacker@nist.gov

Roots of Trust

Modern computing devices consist of various hardware, 

firmware, and software components at multiple layers of 

abstraction. Many security and protection mechanisms are 

currently rooted in software that, along with all underlying 

components, must be trusted and not tampered with. A 

vulnerability in any of those components could compromise 

the trustworthiness of the security mechanisms that rely 

upon those components. Stronger security assurances may 

be possible by grounding security mechanisms in roots of 

trust.

Roots of trust are highly reliable and secure hardware, 

firmware, and software components that perform specific, 

critical security functions. Because roots of trust are 

inherently trusted, they must be secure by their design. As 

such, many roots of trust are implemented in hardware or 

protected firmware so that malware cannot tamper with 

the functions they provide. Roots of trust provide a firm 

foundation from which to build security and trust. 

CSD’s work aims to encourage the use of roots of 

trust in computers to provide stronger security assurances. 

A focus area for this work has been securing firmware. 

Previous guidelines by CSD described methods to protect 

boot firmware, commonly known as the Basic Input/Output 

System (BIOS) in PC clients and servers. In FY 2015, the first 

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of these guidelines, SP 800-147, BIOS Protection Guidelines, 

was submitted to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC27 for standardization as 

ISO/IEC 19678:2015.

In FY 2016, CSD will continue to work with the computer 

industry on the use of roots of trust to improve the security 

of BIOS and other firmware. As part of this effort, CSD is 

researching techniques and requirements for securing 

firmware throughout the platform. This effort will consider 

methods to protect this firmware from unauthorized 

changes, detect accidental or malicious corruption, and 

recover from destructive attacks.

For More Information, See: 

http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/root-trust/

CONTACT:

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid

(301) 975-5155

andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

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HONORS AND AWARDS

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Department of Commerce 

Gold Medal Award

Mr. Jon Boyens, Ms. Naomi Lefkovitz, Ms. Suzanne Lightman, 

Ms. Victoria Pillitteri, Mr. Matthew Scholl, and Mr. Kevin Stine 

Computer Security Division; 

Ms. Donna Dodson, and Mr. Adam Sedgewick, Information 

Technology Laboratory Office; and 

Ms. Lisa Carnahan, NIST Standards Coordination Office 

(former ITL team member)

Figure 26: Gold Medal Award Recipients

(left to right): Department of Commerce Deputy Secretary Bruce Andrews, Suzanne Lightman, Kevin 

Stine, Naomi Lefkovitz, Adam Sedgewick, Donna Dodson, Matthew Scholl, Victoria Pillitteri, Jon 

Boyens, and Dr. Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and NIST 

Director (Not Pictured: Lisa Carnahan)

The group is recognized for its exceptional leadership and outstanding technical achievement in 

developing an innovative framework to improve the cybersecurity of our nation’s critical infrastructure. 

In Executive Order 13636, the President directed NIST to create a Cybersecurity Framework to manage 

and reduce cybersecurity risk across the nation’s critical infrastructure sectors. The team convened a 

highly diverse community to achieve consensus on a framework of standards, guidelines, and practices 

to identify, assess, and manage cybersecurity risk.

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Department of Commerce 

Silver Medal Award

Mr. Richard Kuhn, Computer Security Division; and 

Dr. Raghu Kacker, Applied and Computational 

Mathematics Division

Figure 27: Silver Medal Award Recipients

(left to right): Department of Commerce Deputy Secretary Bruce Andrews, Richard Kuhn, 

Dr. Raghu Kacker, and Dr. Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology 

and NIST Director

The group is recognized for outstanding technical accomplishments in the development of the first 

efficient tool for generating high-strength software testing plans, resulting in cost savings and more 

reliable products. The team has developed software tools that use a novel combinatorial testing methodology. This methodology enables software developers to generate the smallest number of test cases 

needed to identify the most critical and elusive software bugs, those caused by interactions among input 

parameters. The team has made their tool, Automated Combinatorial Testing of Software (ACTS), widely 

available, and it is now used by major software companies and many government agencies. 

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Dr. Ari Schwartz Receives Federal 100 Award

Ari Schwartz, ITL’s Senior Internet Policy Advisor, who is on detail to the Executive Office of 

the President as the Senior Director for Cybersecurity, National Security Council, received 

a Federal 100 Award from Federal Computer Week. Dr. Schwartz was recognized for his 

deep knowledge and experience as a “voice of reason” and an advocate for a wide range of 

cybersecurity activities. 

Donna Dodson Named one of D.C.’s Top 50 Women 

in Technology

For the second year in a row, Donna Dodson has been named to D.C.’s Top 50 Women in 

Technology by FedScoop. Each year, FedScoop salutes a selection of D.C.’s Top Women in 

Technology, “whose vibrant energy, determination, imagination and leadership are making a 

monumental difference in the Federal Government IT community.” Other notable recipients this 

year include Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker and former NIST Director Arati Prabhakar.

NIST’s Dr. Ron Ross Wins Three Top Awards 

for Advancing Cybersecurity

Dr. Ron Ross, leader of the Federal Information Security Management 

Act (FISMA) Implementation Project and an international cybersecurity 

ambassador, was recognized by three organizations for contributions to 

the field of cybersecurity:

• Dr. Ross was presented the Samuel J. Heyman Service to America 

Medal in the area of Homeland Security and Law Enforcement. The 

medal, often referred to as the “Sammie” award, is considered the 

“Oscar” award of government service. It highlights excellence in the 

federal workforce and inspires other talented and dedicated individuals 

to enter public service. He received the honor for “instituting a stateof-the-art risk assessment system that has protected federal computer 

networks from cyberattacks and helped secure information critical to 

our national and economic security.”

• Government Computer News (GCN) magazine named Dr. Ross as Government Executive of the Year for his contributions to securing federal 

information systems.

• Dr. Ross was also inducted into the National Cyber Security Hall of Fame. The organization honors innovative individuals and organizations for their vision and leadership in creating foundational building blocks of the cybersecurity 

industry.

As a result of his widely used work, Dr. Ross has been called on by U.S. industry, academia and governments around the 

world to help their efforts to protect information. He has led U.S. cybersecurity teams to Australia, India, Japan, Canada, 

and the European Union, promoting effective information security concepts and best practices.

Credit: NIST Connections staff newsletter and Evelyn Brown, NIST Public Affairs Office

Figure 28: Department of Commerce Deputy Secretary Bruce Andrews (left) presents 

a Sammie Award to Dr. Ross on Oct. 7, 2015 

in Washington, D.C.’s Andrew W. Mellon 

Auditorium.

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Mr. Daniel Benigni Receives INCITS Lifetime Achievement 

Award

The InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) organization 

presented Dan Benigni with a Lifetime Achievement Award in recognition of his continuous and 

outstandingly effective support for the development of standards in his role of managing the 

US Standards Committee on Cybersecurity (CS1). 

This award is presented to only one INCITS participant annually, to a member who has 

demonstrated a long-time commitment to INCITS and its national and international 

standardization activities. The awardee must have demonstrated long-standing participation 

(ten or more years) in national and/or international standards development. Most importantly, 

it reflects the team spirit of the CS1 committee, whose members work together to reach the 

shared goal of promulgating security standards that will benefit U.S. industry and users over the 

long term.

Mr. Randall (Randy) Easter Receives INCITS Technical 

Excellence Award

Mr. Easter was presented with the Technical Excellence Award, also from INCITS. INCITS is the 

primary U.S. forum dedicated to creating technology standards for innovation. This award 

is presented to no more than four participants to recognize visible and significant technical 

contributions to the work of a given national or international technical committee (TC), based 

upon a minimum of three years of TC participation by the awardee.

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DIVISION PUBLICATIONS

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C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y 

DIVISION PUBLICATIONS

During FY 2015, CSD staff authored a significant number 

of computer, cyber, and/or information security-related 

standards, guidelines, recommendations and research 

findings through the NIST technical series, journal articles, 

conference papers, and other published documents.

In an effort to provide greater access to NIST’s broad 

portfolio of security and privacy publications, CSD began 

posting additional Special Publications and NISTIRs on the 

CSRC that were developed by other components at NIST, 

such as the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence 

(NCCoE) and National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 

Cyberspace (NSTIC). For example, CSRC now displays 

publications from the new NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide 

series, SP 1800, authored by the NCCoE staff. The first three 

SP 1800 drafts were posted for public comment, describing 

work that closely relates to CSD standards, guidelines and 

research. 

By posting cybersecurity and privacy draft publications 

from other NIST components on CSRC, CSD aims to provide 

greater visibility during public comment periods and to 

provide a primary resource for stakeholders to access a 

broad range of NIST cybersecurity and privacy publications. 

In FY 2015, CSD posted a substantial number of final 

publications to CSRC, including two FIPS, fifteen Special 

Publications, and seven NISTIRs. The release of FIPS 202, 

SHA-3 Standard, in August 2015 was the culmination of 

many years of effort by the Cryptographic Technology Group 

to develop a next-generation standard for secure hashing. 

FIPS 202 specifies a family of fixed-length hash functions 

and extendable-output functions that complement the 

existing SHA-2 algorithms specified in FIPS 180-4, Secure 

Hash Standard (SHS).

CSD continued to engage the public by posting fifteen 

SPs and thirteen NISTIRs as drafts for public comment. That 

included Draft NISTIR 8060, Guidelines for the Creation 

of Interoperable Software Identification (SWID) Tags, for 

which three iterations were released during short, twoweek public comment periods. Comments were requested 

on three existing publications to determine what changes 

or approaches should be taken, prior to releasing an official 

draft for public comment. Those publications include 

i) SP 800-63-2, Electronic Authentication Guideline, ii) 

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) version 1.3 

and iii) the potential use of ISO/IEC 19790:2012 as the U.S. 

federal standard for cryptographic modules (as a potential 

successor to FIPS 140-2).

Publications are available for download from CSRC 

(http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/), including several NIST 

technical series: 

• FIPS (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html); 

• Special Publications (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/

PubsSPs.html); 

• NISTIRs (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.

html); and 

• ITL Bulletins (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsITLSB.html). 

The following lists summarize some of the top CSD 

publications downloaded in FY 2015:

Top 10 Most-Downloaded CSD 

Publications in NIST Technical Series 

(i.e., FIPS, SP 800s, NISTIRs, and ITL 

Bulletins):

1. SP 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls 

for Federal Information Systems and Organizations;

2. SP 800-61 Revision 2, Computer Security Incident 

Handling Guide; 

3. SP 800-53A Revision 4, Assessing Security and 

Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems 

and Organizations: Building Effective Assessment 

Plans;

4. SP 800-88 Revision 1, Guidelines for Media 

Sanitization;

5. SP 800-37 Revision 1, Guide for Applying the Risk 

Management Framework to Federal Information 

Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach;

6. NISTIR 7298 Revision 2, Glossary of Key Information 

Security Terms;

7. SP 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified 

Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and 

Organizations;

8. SP 800-30 Revision 1, Guide for Conducting Risk 

Assessments;

9. SP 800-63-2, Electronic Authentication Guideline; 

and

10. SP 800-52 Revision 1, Guidelines for the Selection, 

Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security 

(TLS) Implementations.

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Top 3 FIPS:

1. FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based 

Hash and Extendable-Output Functions;

2. FIPS 201-2, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of 

Federal Employees and Contractors; and

3. FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS).

Top 3 NISTIRs:

1. NISTIR 7298 Revision 2, Glossary of Key Information 

Security Terms;

2. NISTIR 7628 Revision 1, Guidelines for Smart Grid 

Cyber Security; and

3. NISTIR 8023, Risk Management for Replication 

Devices.

Top 3 ITL Bulletins:

1. February 2015, NIST Special Publication 800-88 

Revision 1, Guidelines for Media Sanitization;

2. October 2014, Release of NIST Special Publication 

800-147B, BIOS Protection Guidelines for Servers; 

and

3. January 2015, Release of NIST Special Publication 

800-53A, Revision 4, Assessing Security and 

Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems 

and Organizations.

Additionally, CSD shares its ongoing research efforts 

through other publications, such as journal articles, 

conference papers, books and other whitepapers. Although 

available through NIST’s Publications Portal (http://www.

nist.gov/publication-portal.cfm), they can also be accessed 

on CSRC’s Articles page (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/

articles/). During FY 2015, more than 20 such documents 

were published, and are listed in the next section (FY 2015 

Computer Security Division Publications) of this annual 

report.

In FY 2016, CSD plans to release a new version of CSRC 

that uses a content management system. The publications 

interface on the redesigned website will give users 

significantly greater capabilities for browsing, searching, 

downloading and sharing information on NIST’s broad 

collection of computer security and privacy publications.

FY 2015 Computer Security Division 

Publications

The Computer Security Division uses multiple NIST 

Technical Series to promulgate security standards, 

guidelines, recommendations, research, and additional 

background material. Those series include FIPS, SPs, NISTIRs 

and ITL Bulletins. Links to these publications are available at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications. As described earlier, in 

FY 2015, CSD began expanding its publication portfolio on 

CSRC by posting cybersecurity and privacy SPs and NISTIRs 

from other NIST components. In some cases, CSD staff 

contributed to the development of a publication (e.g., Draft SP 

1800-3). Others were developed by other ITL cybersecurity 

components (e.g., NCCoE and NSTIC), documents that are 

closely related to CSD activities (e.g., Draft NISTIR 8062), or 

describe CSD programs and standardization activities within 

a greater context (e.g., Draft NISTIR 8074).

Additionally, each year CSD staff author numerous 

additional publications, including journal articles, conference 

papers, and other papers that are widely disseminated. They 

range from basic research to high-level summaries of CSD 

activities.

NIST Technical Series Publications − 

FIPS, SPs, NISTIRs, and ITL Bulletins

Below are lists of NIST Technical Series publications 

that CSD released on CSRC as draft documents or as 

final publications during FY 2015 (from October 1, 2014 to 

September 30, 2015). Following the lists are abstracts for 

each publication.

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DRAFT PUBLICATIONS

TABLE 3: NO DRAFT FIPS RELEASED DURING FY 2015

TABLE 4: SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS (SPs)

Publication Number Publication Title Draft Released

SP 800-177 Trustworthy Email September 2015

SP 800-171

(2nd Draft)

(1st Draft)

Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal 

Information Systems and Organizations April 2015

November 2014

SP 800-152 A Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management 

Systems (CKMS)

December 2014

SP 800-150 Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing October 2014

SP 800-131A Rev. 1 Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of 

Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths

July 2015

SP 800-125B Secure Virtual Network Configuration for Virtual Machine (VM) 

Protection

September 2015

SP 800-125A Secure Recommendations for Hypervisor Deployment October 2014

SP 800-90A Rev. 1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using 

Deterministic Random Bit Generators

November 2014

SP 800-85A-4 PIV Card Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines 

(SP 800-73-4 Compliance)

June 2015

SP 800-82 Rev. 2 

(2nd Draft)

Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security February 2015

SP 800-70 Rev. 3 National Checklist Program for IT Products: Guidelines for 

Checklist Users and Developers

March 2015

SP 800-57 Part 1 

Rev. 4

Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1: General September 2015

SP 1800-3 Attribute Based Access Control September 2015

SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities August 2015

SP 1800-1 Securing Electronic Health Records on Mobile Devices July 2015

TABLE 5: NIST INTERAGENCY OR INTERNAL REPORTS (NISTIRs)

Publication Number Publication Title Draft Released

NISTIR 8074 Volume 1: Report on Strategic U.S. Government Engagement 

in International Standardization to Achieve U.S. Objectives for 

Cybersecurity;

Volume 2: Supplemental Information

August 2015

NISTIR 8062 Privacy Risk Management for Federal Information Systems May 2015

NISTIR 8060

(3rd Draft)

(2nd Draft)

(1st Draft)

Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable Software 

Identification (SWID) Tags August 2015

July 2015

May 2015

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TABLE 5 (CONT.): NIST INTERAGENCY OR INTERNAL REPORTS (NISTIRs)

Publication Number Publication Title Draft Released

NISTIR 8058 Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 

1.2 Content Style Guide: Best Practices for Creating and 

Maintaining SCAP 1.2 Content

May 2015

NISTIR 8055 Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials (DPC) 

Proof of Concept Research

July 2015

NISTIR 8053 De-Identification of Personally Identifiable Information April 2015

NISTIR 8050 Executive Technical Workshop on Improving Cybersecurity 

and Consumer Privacy: Summary and Next Steps

April 2015

NISTIR 7966

(2nd Draft)

Security of Interactive and Automated Access Management 

Using Secure Shell (SSH)

March 2015

NISTIR 7904 

(2nd Draft)

Trusted Geolocation in the Cloud: Proof of Concept 

Implementation

July 2015

NISTIR 7621 Rev. 1 Small Business Information Security: the Fundamentals December 2014

NISTIR 7511 Rev. 4 Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.2 

Validation Program Test Requirements

September 2015

FINAL APPROVED PUBLICATIONS

TABLE 6: FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS (FIPS)

Publication Number Publication Title Publication Date

FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and ExtendableOutput FunctionsAugust 2015

FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS) 

[updated Applicability section]

August 2015

TABLE 7: SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS (SPs)

Publication Number Publication Title Publication Date

SP 800-176 Computer Security Division 2014 Annual Report August 2015

SP 800-171 Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal 

Information Systems and Organizations

June 2015

SP 800-163 Vetting the Security of Mobile Applications January 2015

SP 800-161 Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal 

Information Systems and Organizations

April 2015

SP 800-157 Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 

Credentials

December 2014

SP 800-90A Rev. 1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using 

Deterministic Random Bit Generators

June 2015

SP 800-88 Rev. 1 Guidelines for Media Sanitization December 2014

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TABLE 7 (CONT.): SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS (SPs)

Publication Number Publication Title Publication Date

SP 800-82 Rev. 2 Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security May 2015

SP 800-79-2 Guidelines for the Authorization of Personal Identity 

Verification Card Issuers (PCI) and Derived PIV Credential 

Issuers (DPCI)

July 2015

SP 800-78-4 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity 

Verification

May 2015

SP 800-73-4 Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification May 2015

SP 800-57 Part 3 

Rev. 1

Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3: ApplicationSpecific Key Management GuidanceJanuary 2015

SP 800-53A

Rev. 4

Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information 

Systems and Organizations: Building Effective Assessment 

Plans

December 2014

SP 800-53 Rev. 4

(Update)

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems 

and Organizations

January 2015

SP 500-304 Conformance Testing Methodology Framework for ANSI/NISTITL 1-2011 

Update: 2013, Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & Other 

Biometric Information

June 2015

TABLE 8: NIST INTERAGENCY OR INTERNAL REPORTS (NISTIRs)

Publication Number Publication Title Publication Date

NISTIR 8054 NSTIC Pilots: Catalyzing the Identity Ecosystem April 2015

NISTIR 8041 Proceedings of the Cybersecurity for Direct Digital 

Manufacturing (DDM) Symposium

April 2015

NISTIR 8023 Risk Management for Replication Devices February 2015

NISTIR 8018 Public Safety Mobile Application Security Requirements 

Workshop Summary

January 2015

NISTIR 8014 Considerations for Identity Management in Public Safety 

Mobile Networks

March 2015

NISTIR 7863 Cardholder Authentication for the PIV Digital Signature Key June 2015

NISTIR 7823 Advanced Metering Infrastructure Smart Meter Upgradeability 

Test Framework

March 2015

TABLE 9: ITL BULLETINS

Publication Date Bulletin Title

September 2015 Additional Secure Hash Algorithm Standards Offer New Opportunities for Data 

Protection

August 2015 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit 

Generators

July 2015 Improved Security and Mobility Through Updated Interfaces for PIV Cards

June 2015 Increasing Visibility and Control of Your ICT Supply Chains

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A B S T R A C T S O F N I S T 

T E C H N I C A L S E R I E S 

P U B L I C AT I O N S R E L E A S E D I N 

FY 2015

The following sections provide abstracts for the draft and 

final FIPS, SPs, and security-related NISTIRs listed in the 

previous section. These publications are available at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 

STANDARDS (FIPS)

FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and 

Extendable-Output Functions

This standard specifies the Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA3) family of functions on binary data. Each of the SHA-3 

functions is based on an instance of the Keccak algorithm 

that NIST selected as the winner of the SHA-3 Cryptographic 

Hash Algorithm Competition. This standard also specifies 

the Keccak-p family of mathematical permutations, 

including the permutation that underlies Keccak, in order to 

facilitate the development of additional permutation-based 

cryptographic functions.

The SHA-3 family consists of four cryptographic hash 

functions, called SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and 

SHA3-512, and two extendable-output functions (XOFs), 

called SHAKE128 and SHAKE256.

Hash functions are components for many important 

information security applications, including 1) the generation 

and verification of digital signatures, 2) key derivation, and 3) 

pseudorandom bit generation. The hash functions specified 

in this standard supplement the SHA-1 hash function and 

the SHA-2 family of hash functions that are specified in FIPS 

180-4, Secure Hash Standard.

Extendable-output functions are different from hash 

functions, but it is possible to use them in similar ways, with 

the flexibility to be adapted directly to the requirements 

of individual applications, subject to additional security 

considerations.

FIPS 180-4 (Updated), Secure Hash Standard (SHS)

This standard specifies SHA-1 and the SHA-2 family of hash 

algorithms that can be used to generate digests of messages. 

The digests are used to detect whether messages have been 

changed since the digests were generated. The Applicability 

Clause of this standard was revised to correspond with the 

release of FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based 

Hash and Extendable-Output Functions (see above). The 

revision to the Applicability Clause approves the use of 

hash functions specified in either FIPS 180-4 or FIPS 202 

when a secure hash function is required for the protection 

of sensitive, unclassified information in federal applications, 

including as a component within other cryptographic 

algorithms and protocols.

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS

DRAFT SP 800-177, Trustworthy Email

This document gives recommendations and guidelines 

for enhancing trust in email. The primary audience 

includes enterprise email administrators, information 

TABLE 9 (CONT.): ITL BULLETINS

Publication Date Bulletin Title

May 2015 Authentication Considerations for Public Safety Mobile Networks

April 2015 Is Your Replication Device Making an Extra Copy for Someone Else?

March 2015 Guidance for Secure Authorization of Mobile Applications in the Corporate 

Environment

February 2015 NIST Special Publication 800-88 Revision 1, Guidelines for Media Sanitization

January 2015 Release of NIST Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 4, Assessing Security and 

Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations

December 2014 Release of NIST Special Publication 800-157, Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity 

Verification (PIV) Credentials

November 2014 Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)

October 2014 Release of NIST Special Publication 800-147B, BIOS Protection Guidelines for Servers

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security specialists and network managers. This guideline 

applies to federal IT systems and will also be useful for 

any small or medium sized organizations. Technologies 

recommended in support of the core Simple Mail Transfer 

Protocol (SMTP) and the Domain Name System (DNS) 

include mechanisms for authenticating a sending domain 

(Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Domain Keys Identified 

Mail (DKIM) and Domain-based Message Authentication), 

Reporting and Conformance (DMARC). Recommendations 

for email transmission security include Transport Layer 

Security (TLS) and associated certificate authentication 

protocols. Email content security is facilitated through the 

encryption and authentication of message content using 

Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) and 

OpenPGP, and associated certificate and key distribution 

protocols.

SP 800-176, Computer Security Division 2014 Annual 

Report

Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002, titled the Federal 

Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 

requires NIST to prepare an annual public report on activities 

undertaken in the previous year and planned for the coming 

year to carry out responsibilities under this law. The primary 

goal of the Computer Security Division, a component of 

NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory, is to provide 

standards and technology that protects information 

systems against threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and 

availability of information and services. During Fiscal Year 

2014, CSD successfully responded to numerous challenges 

and opportunities in fulfilling that mission. This annual report 

highlights the research agenda and activities in which CSD 

was engaged during FY 2014.

SP 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified 

Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and 

Organizations

The protection of Controlled Unclassified Information 

(CUI) while residing in nonfederal information systems 

and organizations is of paramount importance to federal 

agencies and can directly impact the ability of the Federal 

Government to successfully carry out its designated missions 

and business operations. This publication provides federal 

agencies with recommended requirements for protecting 

the confidentiality of CUI: (i) when the CUI is resident in 

nonfederal information systems and organizations; (ii) 

when the information systems where the CUI resides are 

not used or operated by contractors of federal agencies 

or other organizations on behalf of those agencies; and 

(iii) where there are no specific safeguarding requirements 

for protecting the confidentiality of CUI prescribed by the 

authorizing law, regulation, or government-wide policy for 

the CUI category or subcategory listed in the CUI Registry. 

The requirements apply to all components of nonfederal 

information systems and organizations that process, store, 

or transmit CUI, or provide security protection for such 

components. The CUI requirements are intended for use by 

federal agencies in contractual vehicles or other agreements 

established between those agencies and nonfederal 

organizations.

SP 800-163, Vetting the Security of Mobile Applications

Today’s commercially available mobile devices (e.g., 

smartphones and tablets) are handheld computing 

platforms with wireless capabilities, geographic localization 

capabilities, cameras, and microphones. Similar to computing 

platforms such as desktops and laptops, the user experience 

with a mobile device is tied to the software apps and the 

tools and utilities available. The purpose of this document 

is to provide guidance for vetting third party software 

applications (apps) for mobile devices. Mobile app vetting is 

intended to assess a mobile app’s operational characteristics 

of secure behavior and reliability (including performance) so 

that organizations can determine if the app is acceptable for 

use in their expected environment.

SP 800-161, Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for 

Federal Information Systems and Organizations

Federal agencies are concerned about the risks associated 

with information and communications technology (ICT) 

products and services that may contain potentially malicious 

functionality, are counterfeit, or are vulnerable due to 

poor manufacturing and development practices within 

the ICT supply chain. These risks are associated with the 

federal agencies decreased visibility into, understanding 

of, and control over how the technology that they acquire 

is developed, integrated and deployed, as well as the 

processes, procedures, and practices used to assure the 

integrity, security, resilience, and quality of the products and 

services. 

This publication provides guidance to federal agencies on 

identifying, assessing, and mitigating ICT supply chain risks 

at all levels of their organizations. This publication integrates 

ICT supply chain risk management (SCRM) into federal 

agency risk management activities by applying a multitiered, SCRM-specific approach, including guidance on 

supply chain risk assessment and mitigation activities.

SP 800-157, Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity 

Verification (PIV) Credentials

This recommendation provides technical guidelines for 

the implementation of standards-based, secure, reliable, 

interoperable public key infrastructure (PKI)-based identity 

credentials that are issued by federal departments and 

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agencies to individuals who possess and prove control 

over a valid PIV Card. The scope of this document includes 

requirements for initial issuance and maintenance of 

these credentials, certificate policies and cryptographic 

specifications, technical specifications for permitted 

cryptographic token types and the command interfaces 

for the removable implementations of such cryptographic 

tokens.

DRAFT SP 800-152 (Third Draft), A Profile for U.S. 

Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems (CKMS)

This Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management 

Systems (FCKMSs) contains requirements for their design, 

implementation, procurement, installation, configuration, 

management, operation, and use by U.S. federal 

organizations. The Profile is based on SP 800-130, A 

Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management 

Systems (CKMS).

DRAFT SP 800-150, Guide to Cyber Threat Information 

Sharing

In today’s active threat environment, incident detection and 

response is an ongoing challenge for many organizations. 

This publication assists organizations in establishing 

computer security incident response capabilities that 

leverage the collective knowledge, experience, and abilities 

of their partners by actively sharing threat intelligence and 

ongoing coordination. This publication provides guidelines 

for coordinated incident handling, including producing 

and consuming data, participating in information sharing 

communities, and protecting incident-related data.

DRAFT SP 800-131A Revision 1, Transitions: 

Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of 

Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths

At the start of the 21st Century, NIST began the task of 

providing cryptographic key management guidance, 

which includes defining and implementing appropriate key 

management procedures, using algorithms that adequately 

protect sensitive information, and planning ahead for 

possible changes in the use of cryptography because 

of algorithm breaks or the availability of more powerful 

computing techniques. NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 was the first 

document produced in this effort, and includes a general 

approach for transitioning from one algorithm or key length 

to another. This Recommendation (SP 800-131A) provides 

more specific guidance for transitions to the use of stronger 

cryptographic keys and more robust algorithms.

DRAFT SP 800-125A, Secure Recommendations for 

Hypervisor Deployment

The Hypervisor is a piece of software that provides the 

abstraction of all physical resources (such as CPU, Memory, 

Network and Storage) and thus, enables multiple computing 

stacks (consisting of an operating system, Middleware and 

Application programs) called Virtual Machines (VMs) to 

be run on a single physical host. In addition, a hypervisor 

may have the functionality to define a network within a 

single physical host (called a virtual network) to enable 

communication among the VMs resident on that host, as 

well as with physical and virtual machines outside the host. 

With all this functionality, the hypervisor is responsible 

for mediating access to physical resources, providing runtime isolation among resident VMs and enabling a virtual 

network that provides security-preserving communication 

flow among the VMs, and between the VMs and the external 

network. To design a hypervisor with the core functionality 

described above, there are architectural options, with each 

option presenting a different size of Trusted Computing 

Base (TCB) and hence, a different degree of ease in 

providing the required security assurance. Hence, in 

providing security recommendations for the hypervisor, two 

different approaches have been adopted in this document– 

one approach based on architectural options that provide 

more security assurance, and the second approach based on 

configuration choices that form part of its core administrative 

functions, such as the management of VMs, hypervisor host, 

hypervisor software and virtual networks.

DRAFT SP 800-125B, Secure Virtual Network 

Configuration for Virtual Machine (VM) Protection

Virtual Machines (VMs) are key resources to be protected, 

since they are the compute engines hosting mission-critical 

applications. Since VMs are end-nodes of a virtual network, 

the configuration of the virtual network forms an important 

element in the security of VMs and their hosted applications. 

The virtual network configuration areas discussed in this 

document are: Network Segmentation, Network path 

redundancy, firewall deployment architectures and VM Traffic 

Monitoring. The various configuration options under these 

areas are analyzed for their advantages and disadvantages, 

and a set of security recommendations are provided.

SP 800-90A Revision 1, Recommendation for Random 

Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit 

Generators

This Recommendation specifies mechanisms for the 

generation of random bits using deterministic methods. The 

methods provided are based on either hash functions or 

block cipher algorithms.

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SP 800-88 Revision 1, Guidelines for Media Sanitization

Media sanitization refers to a process that renders access 

to target data on the media infeasible for a given level of 

effort. This guide will assist organizations and system 

owners in making practical sanitization decisions, based on 

a categorization of the confidentiality of their information.

DRAFT SP 800-85A-4, PIV Card Application and 

Middleware Interface Test Guidelines (SP 800-73-4 

Compliance)

SP 800-73 contains the technical specifications to interface 

with the smart card to retrieve and use the PIV identity 

credentials. This document, SP 800-85A, contains the 

test assertions and test procedures for testing smart card 

middleware as well as the card application. The tests reflect 

the design goals of interoperability and PIV Card functions.

SP 800-82 Revision 2, Guide to Industrial Control 

Systems (ICS) Security

This document provides guidance on how to secure Industrial 

Control Systems (ICS), including Supervisory Control and 

Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control 

Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations, 

such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), while 

addressing their unique performance, reliability, and safety 

requirements. The document provides an overview of ICS 

and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and 

vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended 

security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks.

SP 800-79-2, Guidelines for the Authorization of Personal 

Identity Verification Card Issuers (PCI) and Derived PIV 

Credential Issuers (DPCI)

The purpose of this SP is to provide appropriate and useful 

guidelines for assessing the reliability of issuers of PIV Cards 

and Derived PIV Credentials. These issuers store personal 

information and issue credentials based on OMB policies 

and on the standards published in response to HSPD-12 

and, therefore, are the primary target of the assessment 

and authorization under this guideline. The reliability of an 

issuer is of utmost importance when one organization (e.g., 

a federal agency) is required to trust the identity credentials 

of individuals that were created and issued by another 

federal agency. This trust will only exist if organizations 

relying on the credentials issued by a given organization 

have the necessary level of assurance that the reliability of 

the issuing organization has been established through a 

formal authorization process.

SP 800-78-4, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for 

Personal Identity Verification

FIPS 201-2 defines requirements for the PIV lifecycle activities, 

including identity proofing, registration, PIV Card issuance, 

and PIV Card usage. FIPS 201-2 also defines the structure of 

an identity credential that includes cryptographic keys. This 

document contains the technical specifications needed for 

the mandatory and optional cryptographic keys specified in 

FIPS 201-2, as well as the supporting infrastructure specified 

in FIPS 201-2 and the related SP 800-73-4, Interfaces for 

Personal Identity Verification, and SP 800-76-2, Biometric 

Specifications for Personal Identity Verification, that rely on 

cryptographic functions.

SP 800-73-4, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification

FIPS 201 defines the requirements and characteristics of a 

government-wide interoperable identity credential. FIPS 201 

also specifies that this identity credential must be stored on a 

smart card. This document, SP 800-73, contains the technical 

specifications to interface with the smart card to retrieve 

and use the PIV identity credentials. The specifications 

reflect the design goals of interoperability and PIV Card 

functions. The goals are addressed by specifying a PIV data 

model, card edge interface, and application programming 

interface. The specifications go further by constraining 

implementers’ interpretations of the normative standards. 

Such restrictions are designed to ease implementation, 

facilitate interoperability, and ensure performance, in a 

manner tailored for PIV applications.

DRAFT SP 800-70 Revision 3, National Checklist Program 

for IT Products: Guidelines for Checklist Users and 

Developers

A security configuration checklist is a document that 

contains instructions or procedures for configuring an 

IT product for an operational environment, for verifying 

that the product has been configured properly, and/or for 

identifying unauthorized changes to the product. Using 

these checklists can minimize the attack surface, reduce 

vulnerabilities, lessen the impact of successful attacks, 

and identify changes that might otherwise go undetected. 

To facilitate the development of checklists and to make 

checklists more organized and usable, NIST established the 

National Checklist Program (NCP). This publication explains 

how to use the NCP to find and retrieve checklists, and it also 

describes the policies, procedures, and general requirements 

for participation in the NCP.

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DRAFT SP 800-57 Part 1 Revision 4, Recommendation for 

Key Management, Part 1: General

SP 800-57 Part 1 contains basic key management guidance. 

The document:

1. Defines the security services that may be provided and 

key types that may be employed in using cryptographic 

mechanisms; 

2. Provides background information regarding the 

cryptographic algorithms that use cryptographic keying 

material;

3. Classifies the different types of keys and other 

cryptographic information according to their functions, 

specifies the protection that each type of information 

requires and identifies methods for providing this 

protection; 

4. Identifies the states in which a cryptographic key may 

exist during its lifetime;

5. Identifies the multitude of functions involved in key 

management; and 

6. Discusses a variety of key management issues related 

to the keying material. Topics discussed include 

key usage, cryptoperiod length, domain-parameter 

validation, public-key validation, accountability, audit, 

key management system survivability, and guidance for 

cryptographic algorithm and key size selection. 

SP 800-57 Part 3 Revision 1, Recommendation for 

Key Management, Part 3: Application-Specific Key 

Management Guidance

SP 800-57 Part 3 is intended primarily to help system 

administrators and system installers adequately secure 

applications, based on product availability and organizational 

needs and to support organizational decisions about future 

procurements. This document also provides information 

for end users regarding application options left under their 

control in normal use of the application. Recommendations 

are given for a select set of applications: Public Key 

Infrastructures (PKI), Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), 

Transport Layer Security (TLS), Secure/Multipurpose 

Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), Kerberos, Over-the-Air 

Rekeying of Digital Radios (OTAR), Domain Name System 

Security Extensions (DNSSEC), Encrypted File Systems 

(EFS), and Secure Shell (SSH).

SP 800-53A Revision 4, Assessing Security and 

Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and 

Organizations: Building Effective Assessment Plans

This publication provides a set of procedures for conducting 

assessments of the security controls and privacy controls 

employed within federal information systems and 

organizations. The assessment procedures, executed at 

various phases of the system development life cycle, are 

consistent with the security and privacy controls in SP 800-

53 Revision 4. The procedures are customizable and can 

be easily tailored to provide organizations with the needed 

flexibility to conduct security control assessments and 

privacy control assessments that support organizational risk 

management processes and that are aligned with the stated 

risk tolerance of the organization. Information on building 

effective security assessment plans and privacy assessment 

plans is also provided, along with guidance on analyzing 

assessment results.

SP 800-53 Rev. 4 (Update), Security and Privacy Controls 

for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

This publication provides a catalog of security and 

privacy controls for federal information systems and 

organizations and a process for selecting controls to protect 

organizational operations (including mission, functions, 

image, and reputation), organizational assets, individuals, 

other organizations, and the Nation from a diverse set of 

threats, including hostile cyber attacks, natural disasters, 

structural failures, and human errors (both intentional 

and unintentional). The security and privacy controls are 

customizable and implemented as part of an organizationwide process that manages information security and privacy 

risk. The controls address a diverse set of security and privacy 

requirements across the Federal Government and critical 

infrastructure that are derived from legislation, Executive 

Orders, policies, directives, regulations, standards, and/or 

mission/business needs. The publication also describes how 

to develop specialized sets of controls, or overlays, that are 

tailored for specific types of missions/business functions, 

technologies, or environments of operation. Finally, the 

catalog of security controls addresses security from both a 

functionality perspective (the strength of security functions 

and mechanisms provided) and an assurance perspective 

(the measures of confidence in the implemented security 

capability). Addressing both security functionality and 

assurance helps to ensure that information technology 

component products and the information systems built from 

those products using sound system and security engineering 

principles are sufficiently trustworthy.

SP 500-304, Conformance Testing Methodology 

Framework for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Update: 2013, Data 

Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & Other 

Biometric Information

Conformance testing measures whether an implementation 

faithfully implements the technical requirements defined 

in a standard. Conformance testing provides developers, 

users, and purchasers with increased levels of confidence in 

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product quality and increases the probability of successful 

interoperability. The CSD developed a conformance testing 

methodology framework for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Update: 

2013, Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, 

Facial & Other Biometric Information (AN-2013). This 

testing methodology framework defines the test assertions 

implemented within CSD’s conformance test tool, which is 

designed to test implementations of AN-2013 transactions 

and promotes biometrics conformity assessment efforts. 

This initial document includes comprehensive tables of AN2013 requirements and test assertions for transaction-wide 

requirements and Record Type 1 (which is required for all 

transactions). The tables of requirements and assertions 

indicate which assertions apply to the traditional encoding 

format, the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM)-

compliant encoding format, or both encoding formats. The 

testing methodology framework defines and makes use of 

a specific test assertion syntax, which clearly defines the 

assertions associated with each requirement.

DRAFT SP 1800-3, Attribute Based Access Control

Enterprises rely upon strong access control mechanisms to 

ensure that corporate resources (e.g., applications, networks, 

systems and data) are not exposed to anyone other than 

an authorized user. As business requirements change, 

enterprises need highly flexible access control mechanisms 

that can adapt. The application of attribute-based policy 

definitions enables enterprises to accommodate a diverse 

set of business cases. This NCCoE practice guide details a 

collaborative effort between the NCCoE and technology 

providers to demonstrate a standards-based approach to 

attribute-based access control (ABAC). 

This guide discusses potential security risks facing 

organizations, benefits that may result from the 

implementation of an ABAC system and the approach that 

the NCCoE took in developing a reference architecture and 

build. Included is a discussion of major architecture design 

considerations, an explanation of security characteristics 

achieved by the reference design and a mapping of security 

characteristics to applicable standards and security control 

families.

For parties interested in adopting all or part of the NCCoE 

reference architecture, this guide includes a detailed 

description of the installation, configuration and integration 

of all components.

DRAFT SP 1800-2, Identity and Access Management for 

Electric Utilities

To protect power generation, transmission, and distribution, 

energy companies need to control physical and logical 

access to their resources, including buildings, equipment, 

information technology, and industrial control systems. 

They must authenticate authorized individuals to the 

devices and facilities to which they are giving access rights 

with a high degree of certainty. In addition, they need to 

enforce access control policies (e.g., allow, deny or inquire 

further) consistently, uniformly, and quickly across all of 

their resources. This project resulted from a direct dialogue 

among NCCoE staff and members of the electricity 

subsector, mainly from electric power companies and those 

who provide equipment and/or services to them. 

The goal of this project is to demonstrate a centralized, 

standards-based technical approach that unifies identity and 

access management (IdAM) functions across operational 

technology (OT) networks, physical access control systems 

(PACS), and information technology systems. These 

networks often operate independently, which can result in 

identity and access information disparity, increased costs, 

inefficiencies, and loss of capacity and service delivery 

capability. This guide describes the collaborative efforts with 

technology providers and electric company stakeholders to 

address the security challenges that energy providers face 

in the core function of IdAM. It offers a technical approach 

to meeting the challenge, and also incorporates a business 

value mind-set by identifying the strategic considerations 

involved in implementing new technologies. 

This Cybersecurity Practice Guide provides a modular, 

open, end-to-end example solution that can be tailored 

and implemented by energy providers of varying sizes and 

sophistication. It shows energy providers how NIST met the 

challenge using open source and commercially available 

tools and technologies that are consistent with cybersecurity 

standards. The use case scenario is based on a normal dayto-day business operational scenario that provides the 

underlying impetus for the functionality presented in the 

guide. While the reference solution was demonstrated with 

a certain suite of products, the guide does not endorse these 

products in particular. Instead, it presents the characteristics 

and capabilities that an organization’s security experts can 

use to identify similar standards-based products that can 

be integrated quickly and cost-effectively with an energy 

provider’s existing tools and infrastructure.

DRAFT SP 1800-1, Securing Electronic Health Records on 

Mobile Devices

Health care providers increasingly use mobile devices 

to receive, store, process, and transmit patient clinical 

information. According to NIST’s risk analysis, discussed 

here, and in the experience of many health care providers, 

mobile devices can present vulnerabilities in a health care 

organization’s networks. At the 2012 Health and Human 

Services Mobile Devices Roundtable, participants stressed 

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that mobile devices are being used by many providers 

for health care delivery before they have implemented 

safeguards for privacy and security. 

This Cybersecurity Practice Guide provides a modular, 

open, end-to-end reference design that can be tailored and 

implemented by health care organizations of varying sizes 

and information technology sophistication. Specifically, the 

guide shows how health care providers, using open source 

and commercially available tools and technologies that are 

consistent with cybersecurity standards, can more securely 

share patient information among caregivers using mobile 

devices. The scenario considered is that of a hypothetical 

primary care physician using her mobile device to perform 

reoccurring activities, such as sending a referral (e.g., 

clinical information) to another physician, or sending an 

electronic prescription to a pharmacy. While the design was 

demonstrated with a certain suite of products, the guide does 

not endorse these products in particular. Instead, it presents 

the characteristics and capabilities that an organization’s 

security experts can use to identify similar standards-based 

products that can be integrated quickly and cost-effectively 

with a health care provider’s existing tools and infrastructure.

NISTIRS

DRAFT NISTIR 8074 (2 VOLUMES):

Volume 1: Report on Strategic U.S. Government 

Engagement in International Standardization to Achieve 

U.S. Objectives for Cybersecurity

Volume 2: Supplemental Information

This report sets out proposed United States Government 

(USG) strategic objectives for pursuing the development 

and use of international standards for cybersecurity and 

makes recommendations to achieve those objectives. 

The recommendations cover interagency coordination, 

collaboration with the U.S. private sector and international 

partners, agency participation in international standards 

development, standards training and education, the use 

of international standards to achieve mission and policy 

objectives, and other issues. NISTIR 8074 Volume 2, 

Supplemental Information for the Report on Strategic U.S. 

Government Engagement in International Standardization 

to Achieve U.S. Objectives for Cybersecurity, provides 

additional background on international cybersecurity 

standardization.

DRAFT NISTIR 8062, Privacy Risk Management for 

Federal Information Systems

This document describes a privacy risk management 

framework for federal information systems. The framework 

provides the basis for the establishment of a common 

vocabulary to facilitate a better understanding of and 

communication about privacy risks and the effective 

implementation of privacy principles in federal information 

systems. This publication focuses on the development of 

two key pillars to support the application of the framework: 

privacy engineering objectives and a privacy risk model.

DRAFT NISTIR 8060 (Three drafts), Guidelines for the 

Creation of Interoperable Software Identification (SWID) 

Tags

This guidance provides an overview of the capabilities 

and usage of Software Identification (SWID) tags as part 

of a comprehensive software life cycle. As instantiated in 

the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/

International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 19770-

2 standard, SWID tags support numerous applications 

for software asset management and information security 

management. This report introduces SWID tags in an 

operational context, provides guidelines for the creation of 

interoperable SWID tags, and highlights key usage scenarios 

for which SWID tags are applicable.

DRAFT NISTIR 8058, Security Content Automation 

Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.2 Content Style Guide: Best 

Practices for Creating and Maintaining SCAP 1.2 Content

The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) is 

a suite of specifications that standardize the format 

and nomenclature by which software flaw and security 

configuration information is communicated, both to 

machines and humans. SCAP version 1.2 requirements are 

defined in SP 800-126 Revision 2. Over time, certain stylistic 

conventions regarding the authoring of SCAP 1.2 content 

have become best practices. While these best practices are 

not required, they improve the quality of the SCAP content in 

several ways, such as improving the accuracy and consistency 

of results, avoiding performance problems, reducing user 

effort, lowering content maintenance burdens, and enabling 

content reuse. This document has been created to capture 

the best practices and encourage their use by SCAP content 

authors and maintainers.

DRAFT NISTIR 8055, Derived Personal Identity 

Verification (PIV) Credentials (DPC) Proof of Concept 

Research

This report documents a proof-of-concept implementation 

for Derived PIV Credentials (DPCs). Smart card-based PIV 

Cards cannot be readily used with most mobile devices, 

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such as smartphones and tablets, but DPCs can be used 

instead to PIV-enable these devices and provide multifactor authentication for mobile device users. This report 

captures existing requirements related to DPCs, proposes 

an architecture that supports these requirements, and 

then demonstrates how such an architecture could be 

implemented and operated.

NISTIR 8054, NSTIC Pilots: Catalyzing the Identity 

Ecosystem

Pilots are an integral part of the National Strategy for Trusted 

Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC), passed by the White 

House in 2011 to encourage enhanced security, privacy, 

interoperability, and ease-of-use for online transactions. This 

document details summaries and outcomes of NSTIC pilots; 

in addition, it explores common themes in the pilots’ work, 

developing and operating innovative identity solutions.

DRAFT NISTIR 8053, De-Identification of Personally 

Identifiable Information

De-identification removes identifying information from a 

dataset so that individual data cannot be linked with specific 

individuals. De-identification can reduce the privacy risk 

associated with collecting, processing, archiving, distributing 

or publishing information. De-identification thus attempts 

to balance the contradictory goals of using and sharing 

personal information, while protecting privacy. Several U.S. 

laws, regulations and policies specify that data should be 

de-identified prior to sharing. In recent years, researchers 

have shown that some de-identified data can sometimes be 

re-identified. Many different kinds of information can be deidentified, including structured information, free format text, 

multimedia, and medical imagery. This document summarizes 

roughly two decades of de-identification research, discusses 

current practices, and presents opportunities for future 

research.

DRAFT NISTIR 8050, Executive Technical Workshop 

on Improving Cybersecurity and Consumer Privacy: 

Summary and Next Steps

Cybersecurity incidents have grown swiftly from conceivable 

to realized risks that regularly threaten the national and 

economic security of the United States. These risks threaten 

the financial security of companies and the public, weaken 

consumer confidence, erode individual privacy protections, 

and damage the brand value and reputation of businesses. 

On February 12, 2015, NIST and Stanford University hosted 

an executive technical workshop, which was held in 

coordination with the White House Summit on Cybersecurity 

and Consumer Protection, to discuss how to increase the 

use of advanced cybersecurity and privacy technologies in 

consumer-facing organizations. This document details the 

discussion and ideas presented at the workshop and serves 

as a platform to receive broader feedback on the relevance 

of projects and suggestions discussed at that event.

NISTIR 8041, Proceedings of the Cybersecurity for Direct 

Digital Manufacturing (DDM) Symposium

Direct Digital Manufacturing (DDM) involves fabricating 

physical objects from a data file using computer-controlled 

processes with little to no human intervention. It includes 

Additive Manufacturing (AM), 3D printing, rapid prototyping, 

etc. The technology is advancing rapidly and has the 

potential to significantly change traditional manufacturing 

and supply chain industries, including information and 

communication technologies (ICT). On February 3, 2015, CSD 

hosted a one-day symposium to explore the cybersecurity 

needed for DDM, to include ensuring the protection of 

intellectual property and the integrity of printers, elements 

being printed, and design data. Speakers and attendees 

from industry, academia, and government discussed the 

state of the industry, cybersecurity risks and solutions, and 

implications for ICT supply chain risk management (SCRM).

NISTIR 8023, Risk Management for Replication Devices

This publication provides guidance on protecting the 

confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information 

processed, stored, or transmitted on replication devices 

(RDs). It suggests appropriate countermeasures in the 

context of the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC). A 

security risk assessment template in table and flowchart 

format is also provided to help organizations determine the 

risk associated with replication devices.

NISTIR 8018, Public Safety Mobile Application Security 

Requirements Workshop Summary

This document captures the input received from the halfday workshop, “Public Safety Mobile Application Security 

Requirements,” organized by the Association of PublicSafety Communications Officials (APCO) International, in 

cooperation with FirstNet and the Department of Commerce 

and held on February 25, 2014. This first-of-its-kind workshop 

was attended by public safety practitioners, mobile 

application developers, industry experts, and government 

officials who contributed their experience and knowledge to 

provide input in identifying security requirements for public 

safety mobile applications.

NISTIR 8014, Considerations for Identity Management in 

Public Safety Mobile Networks

This document analyzes approaches to identity management 

for public safety networks in an effort to assist individuals 

developing technical and policy requirements for public 

safety use. These considerations are scoped into the context 

of their applicability to public safety communications 

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networks, with a particular focus on the nationwide public 

safety broadband network (NPSBN) based on the Long Term 

Evolution (LTE) family of standards. A short background 

on identity management is provided alongside a review of 

applicable federal and industry guidance. Considerations 

are provided for identity proofing, selecting tokens, and the 

authentication process. While specific identity management 

technologies are analyzed, the document does not preclude 

other identity management technologies from being used in 

public safety communications networks.

DRAFT NISTIR 7966 (Second Draft), Security of 

Interactive and Automated Access Management Using 

Secure Shell (SSH)

Users and hosts must be able to access other hosts in an 

interactive or automated fashion, often with very high 

privileges, for a variety of reasons, including file transfers, 

disaster recovery, privileged access management, software 

and patch management, and dynamic cloud provisioning. 

This is often accomplished using the Secure Shell (SSH) 

protocol. The SSH protocol supports several mechanisms 

for interactive and automated authentication. Management 

of this access requires proper provisioning, termination, 

and monitoring processes. However, the security of SSH 

key-based access has been largely ignored to date. This 

publication assists organizations in understanding the basics 

of SSH interactive and automated access management in an 

enterprise, focusing on the management of SSH user keys.

DRAFT NISTIR 7904 (Second Draft), Trusted Geolocation 

in the Cloud: Proof of Concept Implementation

This publication explains selected security challenges 

involving Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud computing 

technologies and geolocation. It then describes a proof-ofconcept implementation that was designed to address those 

challenges. The publication provides sufficient details about 

the proof-of-concept implementation so that organizations 

can reproduce it if desired. The publication is intended to 

be a blueprint or template that can be used by the general 

security community to validate and implement the described 

proof-of-concept implementation.

NISTIR 7863, Cardholder Authentication for the PIV 

Digital Signature Key

FIPS 201-2 requires explicit user action by the PIV cardholder 

as a condition for the use of the digital signature key stored 

on the card. This document clarifies the requirement for 

explicit user action to encourage the development of 

compliant applications and middleware that use the digital 

signature key.

NISTIR 7823, Advanced Metering Infrastructure Smart 

Meter Upgradeability Test Framework

As electric utilities turn to Advanced Metering Infrastructures 

(AMIs) to promote the development and deployment of the 

Smart Grid, one aspect that can benefit from standardization 

is the upgradeability of Smart Meters. The National Electrical 

Manufacturers Association (NEMA) standard SG-AMI 1-2009, 

“Requirements for Smart Meter Upgradeability,” describes 

functional and security requirements for the secure upgrade 

− both local and remote − of Smart Meters. This report 

describes conformance test requirements that may be used 

voluntarily by testers and/or test laboratories to determine 

whether Smart Meters and Upgrade Management Systems 

conform to the requirements of NEMA SG-AMI 1-2009. 

For each relevant requirement in NEMA SG-AMI 1-2009, 

the document identifies the information to be provided 

by the vendor to facilitate testing, and the high-level test 

procedures to be conducted by the tester/laboratory to 

determine conformance.

DRAFT NISTIR 7621 Revision 1, Small Business 

Information Security: the Fundamentals

NIST, as a partner with the Small Business Administration 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an information 

security awareness outreach to the small business 

community, developed this NISTIR as a reference guideline 

for small businesses. This document is intended to present 

the fundamentals of a small business information security 

program in non-technical language.

DRAFT NISTIR 7511 Revision 4, Security Content 

Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.2 Validation 

Program Test Requirements

This report defines the requirements and associated test 

procedures necessary for products or modules to achieve 

one or more Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) 

validations. Validation is awarded, based on a defined set 

of SCAP capabilities by independent laboratories that have 

been accredited for SCAP testing by the NIST National 

Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP).

A D D I T I O N A L P U B L I C AT I O N S 

BY CSD AUTHORS

CSD authors actively contribute to the security community 

by authoring articles in scholarly literature, participating in 

technical conferences, contributing to encyclopedias and 

other books, and publishing other “white papers” that fall 

outside the scope of NIST Technical Series publications 

described above.

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The following documents were published during FY 2015. 

For conference papers, the contributions listed below were 

either i) accepted for a conference held during FY 2015, or 

ii) accepted for a conference held prior to FY 2015, with a 

final proceeding published in FY 2015 (and not listed in an 

earlier CSD Annual Report). All NIST authors (as listed for an 

individual publication) are identified using italics.

Links to the preprints and/or final publications of the 

documents below are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/

publications/articles.

Journal Articles

E. Andreeva, C. Bouillaguet, O. Dunkelman, P.-A. Fouque, J. 

Hoch, J. Kelsey, A. Shamir, and S. Zimmer, “New SecondPreimage Attacks on Hash Functions,” Journal of Cryptology,

40 pp. (June 23, 2015). doi: 10.1007/s00145-015-9206-4.

In this work, we present several new generic secondpreimage attacks on hash functions. Our first attack 

is based on the herding attack and applies to various 

Merkle–Damgård-based iterative hash functions. 

Compared to the previously known long-message 

second-preimage attacks, our attack offers more 

flexibility in choosing the second-preimage message 

at the cost of a small computational overhead. More 

concretely, our attack allows the adversary to replace 

only a few blocks in the original target message to 

obtain the second preimage. As a result, our new attack 

is applicable to constructions previously believed to 

be immune to such second-preimage attacks. Among 

others, these include the dithered hash proposal of 

Rivest, Shoup’s UOWHF, and the ROX constructions. In 

addition, we also suggest several time-memory-data 

tradeoff attack variants, allowing for a faster online 

phase, and even finding second preimages for shorter 

messages. We further extend our attack to sequences 

stronger than the ones suggested in Rivest’s proposal. 

To this end, we introduce the kite generator as a 

new tool to attack any dithering sequence over a 

small alphabet. Additionally, we analyze the secondpreimage security of the basic tree hash construction. 

We also propose several second-preimage attacks 

and their time-memory-data tradeoff variants. Finally, 

we show how both our new and the previous secondpreimage attacks can be applied even more efficiently 

when multiple short messages, rather than a single 

long target message, are available.

M. Chang, D. R. Kuhn and T. Weil, “IT Security,” IT Professional

17(1), 14-15 (January/February 2015). doi: 10.1109/MITP.2015.10.

How can IT professionals adapt to ever-changing 

security challenges quickly and without draining 

their organizations’ resources? Articles in this issue 

highlight emerging trends and suggest ways to 

approach and address cybersecurity challenges.

J. Hagar, T. Wissink, D. R. Kuhn and R. Kacker, “Introducing 

Combinatorial Testing in a Large Organization,” Computer 

(IEEE Computer) 48(4), 64-72 (April 2015). doi: 10.1109/

MC.2015.114.

A two-year study of eight pilot projects to introduce 

combinatorial testing in a large aerospace corporation 

found that the new methods were practical, 

significantly lowered development costs, and 

improved test coverage by 20 to 50 percent.

R. Harang and P. M. Mell, “Evasion-Resistant Network Scan 

Detection,” Security Informatics 4(4), 1-10 (May 2015). doi: 

10.1186/s13388-015-0019-7. 

Popular network scan detection algorithms operate 

through evaluating external sources for unusual 

connection patterns and traffic rates. Research has 

revealed evasive tactics that enable full circumvention 

of existing approaches (specifically the widely cited 

Threshold Random Walk algorithm). To prevent the 

use of these circumvention techniques, we propose 

a novel approach to network scan detection that 

evaluates the behavior of internal network nodes, 

and combine it with other established techniques of 

scan detection. By itself, our algorithm is an efficient, 

protocol-agnostic, completely unsupervised method 

that requires no a priori knowledge of the network 

being defended beyond which hosts are internal 

and which hosts are external to the network, and is 

capable of detecting network scanning attempts, 

regardless of the rate of the scan (working even 

with connectionless protocols). We demonstrate the 

effectiveness of our method on both live data from 

an enterprise-scale network and on simulated scan 

data, finding a false positive rate of just 0.000034 % 

with respect to the number of inbound flows. When 

combined with both Threshold Random Walk and 

simple rate-limiting detection, we achieve an overall 

detection rate of 94.44 %. 

D. R. Kuhn, R. Kacker and Y. Lei, “Combinatorial Coverage as 

an Aspect of Test Quality,” Crosstalk (Hill AFB): the Journal 

of Defense Software Engineering 28(2), 19-23 (March/April 

2015).

There are relatively few good methods for evaluating 

test set quality after ensuring basic requirements 

traceability. Structural coverage, mutation testing, 

and related methods can be used if source code is 

available, but these approaches may entail significant 

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cost in time and resources. This paper introduces 

an alternative measure of test quality that is directly 

related to fault detection, simple to compute, and can 

be applied prior to the execution of the system under 

test. As such, it provides an inexpensive complement 

to current approaches for evaluating test quality. 

J. Luna, N. Suri, M. Iorga and A. Karmel, “Leveraging the 

Potential of Cloud Security Service-Level Agreements 

through Standards,” IEEE Cloud Computing 2(3), 32-40 

(May-June 2015). doi: 10.1109/MCC.2015.52.

Despite the undisputed advantages of cloud 

computing, customers − in particular, small and 

medium enterprises − still need a meaningful 

understanding of the security and risk-management 

changes that the cloud entails so that they can assess 

whether this new computing paradigm meets their 

security requirements. This article presents a fresh 

view on this problem by surveying and analyzing, from 

the standardization and risk assessment perspective, 

the specification of security in cloud service-level 

agreements as a promising approach to empower 

customers in assessing and understanding cloud 

security. Apart from analyzing the proposed riskbased approach and surveying the relevant landscape, 

this article presents a real-world scenario to support 

the creation and adoption of service-level agreements 

as enablers for negotiating, assessing, and monitoring 

the achieved security levels in cloud services.

P. M. Mell, R. Harang and A. Gueye, “Measuring Limits on 

the Ability of Colluding Countries to Partition the Internet,” 

International Journal of Computer Science: Theory and 

Application 3(3), 60-73 (2015).

We show that the strength of the Internet-based 

network interconnectivity of countries is increasing 

over time. We then evaluate bounds on the extent 

to which a group of colluding countries can disrupt 

this connectivity. We evaluate the degree to which 

a group of countries can disconnect two other 

countries, isolate a set of countries from the Internet, 

or even break the Internet up into non-communicative 

clusters. To do this, we create an interconnectivity map 

of the worldwide Internet routing infrastructure at a 

country-level of abstraction. We then examine how 

groups of countries may use their pieces of routing 

infrastructure to filter out the traffic of other countries 

(or to block entire routes). Overall, bounds analysis 

indicates that the ability of countries to perform 

such disruptions to connectivity has diminished 

significantly between 2008 and 2013. However, we 

show that the majority of the gains in robustness go 

to countries that had already displayed significant 

robustness to the types of attacks that we consider. 

The countries that displayed higher initial vulnerability 

to such attacks did not become significantly more 

robust over the time period of analysis.

D. Moody, R. Peralta, R. Perlner, A. Regenscheid, A. Roginsky

and L. Chen, “Report on Pairing-based Cryptography,” 

Journal of Research of the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology 120, 11-27 (2015). doi: 10.6028/jres.120.002. 

This report summarizes study results on pairing-based 

cryptography. The main purpose of the study is to form 

NIST’s position on standardizing and recommending 

the pairing-based cryptographic schemes currently 

published in research literature and standardized 

in other standards development organizations. The 

report reviews the mathematical background of 

pairings. This includes topics such as pairing-friendly 

elliptic curves and how to compute various pairings. 

The report includes a brief introduction on existing 

identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes and other 

cryptographic schemes using pairing technology. The 

report provides a complete study of the current status 

of standards activities on pairing-based cryptographic 

schemes and explores different application scenarios 

for pairing-based cryptographic schemes. As an 

important aspect of adopting pairing-based schemes, 

the report also considers the challenges inherent in 

CAVP and CMVP testing for FIPS 140 validation. Based 

on the study, the report suggests an approach for 

including pairing-based cryptographic schemes in the 

NIST cryptographic toolkit. The report also outlines 

several questions that will require further study if this 

approach is followed. 

D. Moody and D. Shumow, “Analogues of Vélu’s Formulas 

for Isogenies on Alternate Models of Elliptic Curves,” 

Mathematics of Computation, 23 pp. (September 9, 2015). 

doi: 10.1090/mcom/3036.

Isogenies are the morphisms between elliptic curves 

and are, accordingly, a topic of interest in the subject. 

As such, they have been well studied, and have been 

used in several cryptographic applications. Vélu’s 

formulas show how to explicitly evaluate an isogeny, 

given a specification of the kernel as a list of points. 

However, Vélu’s formulas only work for elliptic curves 

specified by a Weierstrass equation. This paper 

presents formulas similar to Vélu’s that can be used 

to evaluate isogenies on Edwards curves and Huff 

curves, which are normal forms of elliptic curves that 

provide an alternative to the traditional Weierstrass 

form. Our formulas are not simply compositions 

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of Vélu’s formulas with mappings to and from 

Weierstrass form. Our alternate derivation yields 

efficient formulas for isogenies with lower algebraic 

complexity than such compositions. In fact, these 

formulas have lower algebraic complexity than Vélu’s 

formulas on Weierstrass curves.

D. Moody, D. Smith-Tone and S. Paul, “Improved 

Indifferentiability Security Bound for the JH Mode,” Designs, 

Codes and Cryptography 74(3), 23 pp. (February 2015). doi: 

10.1007/s10623-015-0047-9.

Indifferentiability security of a hash mode of operation 

guarantees the mode’s resistance against all generic 

attacks. It is also useful to establish the security 

of protocols that use hash functions as random 

functions. The JH hash function was one of the five 

finalists in NIST’s SHA-3 hash function competition. 

Despite several years of analysis, the indifferentiability 

security of the JH mode has remained remarkably 

low, only at n/3 bits, while the two finalist modes 

Keccak and Grøstl offer a security guarantee of n/2 

bits. Note that all these three modes operate with an 

n-bit digest and 2n-bit permutations. In this paper, we 

improve the indifferentiability security bound for the 

JH mode to n/2 bits (e.g., from approximately 171 to 

256 bits when n = 512). To put this into perspective, 

our result guarantees the absence of (non-trivial) 

attacks on both the JH-256 and JH-512 hash functions 

with time less than approximately 2256 computations 

of the underlying 1024-bit permutation, under the 

assumption that the underlying permutations can 

be modeled as an ideal permutation. Our bounds are 

optimal for JH-256, and the best-known bound for JH512. We obtain this improved bound by establishing 

an isomorphism of certain query-response graphs 

through a careful design of the simulators and bad 

events. Our experimental data strongly supports the 

theoretically obtained results.

A.T. Vassilev and C. Celi, “Avoiding Cyberspace Catastrophes 

through Smarter Testing,” Computer (IEEE Computer)

47(10), 102-106 (October 2014). doi: 10.1109/MC.2014.47.

The Heartbleed bug highlighted a critical problem in 

the software industry: inadequately tested software 

results in serious security vulnerabilities. Available 

testing technologies, combined with emerging 

standards, can help tech companies meet increasing 

consumer demand for greater Internet security.

Conference Papers

J. Boyar and M. Find, “Constructive Relationships Between 

Algebraic Thickness and Normality,” 20th International 

Symposium on Fundamentals of Computation Theory (FCT 

2015), Gdańsk, Poland, August 17-19, 2015. In Lecture Notes 

in Computer Science 9210, Fundamentals of Computation 

Theory, A. Kosowski and I. Walukiewicz, eds., Berlin: Springer 

International, 2015, pp. 106-117. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-22177-

9_9.

We study the relationship between two measures 

of Boolean functions; “algebraic thickness” and 

“normality”. For a function f, the algebraic thickness 

is a variant of the “sparsity”, the number of nonzero 

coefficients in the unique F2 polynomial representing 

f, and the normality is the largest dimension of an 

affine subspace on which f is constant. We show that 

for 0 <ε< 2, any function with algebraic thickness 

n 3-ε is constant on some affine subspace of dimension

Ω(n

ε

/2). Furthermore, we give an algorithm for finding 

such a subspace. This is at most a factor of Θ(√n)

from the best guaranteed, and when restricted to the 

technique used, is at most a factor of Θ(√logn) from 

the best guaranteed. We also show that a concrete 

function, majority, has algebraic thickness Ω(2n1/6).

R. Chandramouli, “Analysis of Network Segmentation 

Techniques in Cloud Data Centers,” 2015 International 

Conference on Grid & Cloud Computing and Applications 

(GCA ‘15), Las Vegas, Nevada, United States, July 27-30, 

2015, pp. 64-70.

Cloud Data centers are predominantly made up of 

Virtualized hosts. The networking infrastructure in a 

cloud (virtualized) data center, therefore, consists of 

the combination of a physical IP network (data center 

fabric) and the virtual network residing in virtualized 

hosts. Network Segmentation (Isolation), Traffic flow 

control using firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems 

/ Intrusion Protection Systems (IDS/IPS) IDS/IPS form 

the primary network-based security techniques, with 

the first one as the foundation for the other two. In this 

paper, we describe and analyze three generations of 

network segmentation techniques—Virtual Switches 

and Physical NIC-based, VLAN-based and Overlaybased. We take a detailed look at the overlay-based 

virtual network segmentation and its characteristics, 

such as scalability and ease of configuration.

R. Chandramouli, “Deployment-driven Security Configuration 

for Virtual Networks,” 6th International Conference on 

Networks & Communications (NETCOM 2014), Chennai, India, 

December 27-28, 2014, pp. 1-13. doi: 10.5121/csit.2014.41301.

Virtualized Infrastructures are increasingly deployed 

in many data centers. One of the key components of 

this virtualized infrastructure is the virtual network 

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– a software-defined communication fabric that 

links together the various Virtual Machines (VMs) 

to each other and to the physical host on which 

the VMs reside. Because of its key role in providing 

connectivity among VMs and the applications hosted 

on them, Virtual Networks have to be securely 

configured to provide the foundation for the overall 

security of the virtualized infrastructure in any 

deployment scenario. The objective of this paper is 

to illustrate a deployment-driven methodology for 

deriving a security configuration for Virtual Networks. 

The methodology outlines two typical deployment 

scenarios, identifies use cases and their associated 

security requirements, discusses the security solutions 

to meet those requirements and the virtual network 

security configuration to implement each security 

solution, and then analyzes the pros and cons of each 

security solution. 

D. R. Kuhn, R. N. Kacker, Y. Lei and J. Torres-Jimenez, 

“Equivalence Class Verification and Oracle-Free Testing 

Using Two-layer Covering Arrays,” Fourth International 

Workshop on Combinatorial Testing (IWCT 2015) in 

Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Eighth International 

Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation 

Workshops (ICSTW), Graz, Austria, April 13-17, 2015, 4 pp. 

doi: 10.1109/ICSTW.2015.7107445.

This short paper introduces a method for verifying 

equivalence classes for module/unit testing. This is 

achieved using a two-layer covering array in which 

some or all values of a primary covering array represent 

equivalence classes. A second-layer covering array 

of the equivalence class values is computed, and its 

values substituted for the equivalence class names 

in the primary array. It is shown that this method can 

detect certain classes of errors without a conventional 

test oracle, and an illustrative example is given.

P. M. Mell and R. Harang, “Lightweight Packing of Log Files for 

Improved Compression in Mobile Tactical Networks,” Military 

Communications Conference (MILCOM 2014), Baltimore, 

Maryland, United States, October 6-8, 2014, pp. 192-197. doi: 

10.1109/MILCOM.2014.37.

Devices in mobile tactical edge networks are often 

resource constrained, due to their lightweight and 

mobile nature, and often have limited access to 

bandwidth. In order to maintain situational awareness 

in the cyber domain, security logs from these devices 

must be transmitted to command and control sites. 

We present a lightweight packing step that takes 

advantage of the restricted semantics and regular 

format of certain kinds of log files to render them 

substantially more amenable to compression with 

standard algorithms (especially Lempel-Ziv variants). 

We demonstrate that we can reduce compressed 

file sizes to as little as 21 % of that of the maximally 

compressed file without packing. We can also reduce 

overall compression times up to 64 % in our data sets. 

Our packing step permits a lossless transmission of 

larger log files across the same network transmission 

medium, as well as permitting existing sets of logs 

to be transmitted within smaller network availability 

windows.

P. M. Mell, R. Harang and A. Gueye, “The Resilience of 

the Internet to Colluding Country Induced Connectivity 

Disruptions,” Security of Emerging Networking Technologies 

(SENT) Workshop at the 2015 Network and Distributed 

System Security Symposium (NDSS ‘15), San Diego, 

California, United States, February 8-11, 2015, 10 pp. doi: 

10.14722/sent.2015.23007.

We show that the strength of Internet-based 

network interconnectivity of countries is increasing 

over time. We then evaluate bounds on the extent 

to which a group of colluding countries can disrupt 

this connectivity. We evaluate the degree to which 

a group of countries can disconnect two other 

countries, isolate a set of countries from the Internet, 

or even break the Internet up into non-communicative 

clusters. To do this, we create an interconnectivity map 

of the worldwide Internet routing infrastructure at a 

country-level of abstraction. We then examine how 

groups of countries may use their pieces of routing 

infrastructure to filter out the traffic of other countries 

(or to block entire routes). Overall, bounds analysis 

indicates that the ability of countries to perform 

such disruptions to connectivity has diminished 

significantly between 2008 and 2013. However, we 

show that the majority of the gains in robustness go 

to countries that had already displayed significant 

robustness to the types of attacks that we consider. 

The countries that displayed higher initial vulnerability 

to such attacks did not become significantly more 

robust over the time period of analysis.

D. Moody, R. Perlner and D. Smith-Tone, “An Asymptotically 

Optimal Structural Attack on the ABC Multivariate Encryption 

Scheme,” 6th International Workshop on Post-Quantum 

Cryptography (PQCrypto 2014), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 

October 1-3, 2014. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science 

8772, Post-Quantum Cryptography, M. Mosca, ed., Berlin: 

Springer International, 2014, pp. 180-196. doi: 10.1007/978-3-

319-11659-4_11.

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Historically, multivariate public key cryptography 

has been less than successful at offering encryption 

schemes that are both secure and efficient. At 

PQCRYPTO ‘13 in Limoges, Tao, Diene, Tang, and Ding 

introduced a promising new multivariate encryption 

algorithm based on a fundamentally new idea: hiding 

the structure of a large matrix algebra over a finite 

field. We present an attack based on the subspace 

differential invariants inherent to this methodology. 

The attack is a structural key recovery attack that 

is asymptotically optimal among all known attacks 

(including algebraic attacks) on the original scheme 

and its generalizations.

A. Nelson and S. Garfinkel, “Measuring Systematic and 

Random Error in Digital Forensics” [abstract], International 

Symposium on Forensic Science Error Management: 

Detection, Measurement and Mitigation, Arlington, Virginia, 

United States, July 21-24, 2015, 1 p.

Recognized sources of error in digital forensics include 

systematic errors arising from implementation errors, 

and random errors resulting from faulty equipment. 

But as digital forensic techniques expand to include 

statistical machine learning, another source of error 

will be statistical errors that arise because of chance 

disagreements between a statistical model and subject 

systems examined with that model. We consider two 

digital forensics systems with these different types of 

measurable error. 

First, we show a mechanism for comparing the 

numerous and nuanced results of parsing a file system. 

Multiple storage system parsers were designed for or 

adapted to analyze a game console with a custom file 

system. However, it was initially unknown whether 

any of the parsers would produce a perspective of 

the storage system that was correct in reporting the 

files present and their characteristics. We adapted 

the parsers to produce an in-common, machinedifferentiable format, and used a storage differencing 

algorithm to measure the relative incorrectness of 

each of the parsers. Discrepancies summarize errors 

in implementation or specification, an important 

report when any reverse-engineering is necessary. 

We discuss advantages and challenges in adopting 

this practice. 

Second, we show how to construct a classifier using 

the hard drive from a multi-user computer that can 

determine the user responsible for creating a file. 

The classifier is constructed using allocated files and 

its accuracy determined with take-one-out crossvalidation. Once created, the classifier can be used to 

predict the creator of files that can only be recovered 

with carving.

R. Perlner, “Optimizing Information Set Decoding Algorithms 

to Attack Cyclosymmetric MDPC Codes,” 6th International 

Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 

2014), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, October 1-3, 2014. In 

Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8772, Post-Quantum 

Cryptography, M. Mosca, ed., Berlin: Springer International, 

2014, pp. 220-228. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-11659-4_13.

Recently, several promising approaches have been 

proposed to reduce key sizes for code-based 

cryptography using structured, but non-algebraic 

codes, such as quasi-cyclic (QC) Moderate Density 

Parity Check (MDPC) codes. Biasi et al. propose further 

reducing the key sizes of code-based schemes using 

cyclosymmetric (CS) codes. While Biasi et al. analyze 

the complexity of attacking their scheme using 

standard information-set-decoding algorithms, the 

research presented here shows that information set 

decoding algorithms can be improved, by choosing 

the columns of the information set in a way that takes 

advantage of the added symmetry. The result is an 

attack that significantly reduces the security of the 

proposed CS-MDPC schemes to the point that they 

no longer offer an advantage in key size over QCMDPC schemes of the same security level. QC-MDPC 

schemes are not affected by this paper’s result.

M. Sönmez Turan and J. Kelsey, “How Random is Your RNG?” 

Shmoocon 2015, Washington, DC, United States, January 16-

18, 2015, 4 pp.

Cryptographic primitives need random numbers to 

protect your data. Random numbers are used for 

generating secret keys, nonces, random paddings, 

initialization vectors, salts, etc. Deterministic 

pseudorandom number generators are useful, but 

they still need truly random seeds generated by 

entropy sources in order to produce random numbers. 

Researchers have shown examples of deployed 

systems that did not have enough randomness in their 

entropy sources, and as a result, cryptographic keys 

were compromised. So how do you know how much 

entropy is in your entropy source? Estimating entropy 

is a difficult (if not impossible) problem, and we’ve 

been working to create usable guidance that will give 

conservative estimates on the amount of entropy in an 

entropy source. From our research, we shared some 

of the challenges and proposed methods. In addition, 

we discussed some of the new directions that we are 

investigating, and present results of our estimation 

methods on simulated entropy sources.

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Books and Book Sections

F. Herr, and F. L. Podio, “Common Biometric Exchange 

Formats Framework Standardization,” in Encyclopedia of 

Biometrics, 2nd ed. Edited by S. Z. Li and A. Jain. New York: 

Springer Reference, 2015.

The Common Biometric Exchange Formats 

Framework (CBEFF) provides a standardized set 

of definitions and procedures that support the 

interchange of biometric data in standard data 

structures called CBEFF biometric information 

records (BIRs). CBEFF permits considerable flexibility 

regarding BIR structures and biometric data content, 

but does so in a way that makes it easy for biometric 

applications to evaluate their interest in processing a 

particular BIR. At their conceptually simplest, standard 

CBEFF data structures promote the interoperability 

of biometric-based application programs and 

systems by specifying a standardized wrapper for 

describing, at a high level, the format and certain 

attributes of the content of a BIR. The initial versions 

of CBEFF were developed by NIST and the Biometric 

Consortium. The CBEFF specification published by 

NIST in April 2004 (NISTIR 6529-A) was proposed as 

the basis for the development of formal national and 

international CBEFF standards. Since then, American 

National Standards and International Standards (ISO/

IEC) have been published. Development continues 

at the international level on a new generation of 

CBEFF standards. The paper describes the main 

characteristics of CBEFF, emphasizing the value 

of CBEFF data structures in open and complex 

biometric systems, especially in cases where the 

system must cope with a wide variety of biometric 

data records, some of which may even be encrypted. 

It provides adoption examples of CBEFF data 

structures by national and international organizations 

and programs, and discusses early work on CBEFF 

standardization. Recent and current standardization 

efforts are addressed.

D. J. Yaga, J. Campbell and G. Zekster, “Conformance Testing 

Methodologies for Biometric Data Interchange Formats, 

Standardization of,” in Encyclopedia of Biometrics, 2nd ed. 

Edited by S. Z. Li and A. Jain. New York: SpringerReference, 

2015.

Conformance testing is the method that is used to 

determine if a product, process or system (known 

as an implementation under test) satisfies the 

requirements specified in the base standard. The goal 

of conformance testing is to capture enough of the 

requirements of the base standard and test them 

under enough conditions that any implementation 

under test that passes the conformance test is likely 

to be conformant. Conformance testing provides 

developers, users, and purchasers with increased levels 

of confidence in product quality and increases the 

probability of successful interoperability. Conformance 

testing methodology standards for data interchange 

formats identify a language to define the context of 

conformance testing and conformance claims. These 

standards include the set of requirements specified in 

the base standards and one or more conformance test 

assertions per requirement. There are several efforts in 

biometric conformance test standardization, including 

U.S. national organizations, such as International 

Committee for Information Technology Standards 

Technical Committee M1-Biometrics and NIST, who is 

responsible for the development of the ANSI/NISTITL standards; and international organizations, such 

as the International Organization for Standardization 

(ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission 

(IEC) Joint Technical Commission 1, Subcommittee 

37 - Biometrics. The paper includes a description 

of the different national and international efforts 

that have taken place in the last few years in the 

development of conformance testing methodologies 

for biometric data interchange formats developed by 

the organizations mentioned above. The content of 

these standards (for both published standards and 

ongoing projects) are addressed.

White Papers

M. Dworkin and R. Perlner, “Analysis of VAES3 (FF2),” 

Cryptology ePrint Archive [Website], Report 2015/306, April 

2, 2015. Available at: http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/306.

This note describes a theoretical chosen-plaintext 

attack on the VAES3 mode for format-preserving 

encryption. VAES3 was specified under the name FF2 

in Draft National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) Special Publication 800-38G, Recommendation 

for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for 

Format-Preserving Encryption.

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ACRONYMS

3D Three-Dimensional

3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project 

ABAC Attribute Based Access Control

AC Access Control

ACD Applied Cybersecurity Division

ACM Association for Computing Machinery 

ACPT Access Control Policy Tool 

ACRLCS AC Rule Logic Circuit Simulation 

ACTS Advanced Combinatorial Testing System 

AES Advanced Encryption Standard 

AIM Algorithms for Intrusion Measurement

AM Additive Manufacturing

AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure

ANSs American National Standards 

ANSI American National Standards Institute

APCO Association of Public-Safety 

Communications Officials 

API Application Programming Interface 

ARF Asset Reporting Format 

ARL Army Research Laboratory 

ASC Accredited Standards Committee

ASC X9, Inc. Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc.

ASKDF Application-Specific Key Derivation 

functions 

BioAPI Biometric Application Programming 

Interface 

BioCTS Biometric Conformance Test Software 

BIOS Basic Input/Output System

BIRs biometric information records

BT-SEG Bluetooth Security Expert Group 

CAC Common Access Card

CAE Centers of Academic Excellence 

CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation 

Program

CBEFF Common Biometric Exchange Formats 

Framework 

CCE Common Configuration Enumeration 

CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation 

Scheme

CCM Counter with Cipher Block ChainingMessage Authentication Code 

CCSS Common Configuration Scoring System

CDH Confactor Diffie-Hellman

CDM Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation 

CERT Computer Emergency Readiness Team 

CHES Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded 

Systems 

CIO Chief Information Officer

CIS Center for Internet Security

CISO Chief Information Security Officer 

CKMS Cryptographic Key Management System 

CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication 

Code 

CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program 

CNCI Comprehensive National Cybersecurity 

Initiative 

CNSS Committee on National Security Systems

CompTIA Computing Technology Industry 

Association 

COV Committee of Visitors 

CPE Common Platform Enumeration 

CPS Cyber-Physical Systems

CPU Central Processing Unit 

CRADA Cooperative Research and Development 

Agreement 

CS1 Cyber Security 1 

CSCRM Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management 

CSD Computer Security Division

CSE Communications Security Establishment 

CSF Cybersecurity Framework 

CSIA Cyber Security and Information Assurance 

CSRC Computer Security Resource Center

CSRIC Communications Security, Reliability and 

Interoperability Council

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CSSPAB Computer System Security and Privacy 

Advisory Board 

CST Cryptographic and Security Testing 

CSWG Cybersecurity Working Group 

CTG Cryptographic Technology Group 

CUI Controlled Unclassified Information 

CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 

CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System 

DAPS Distributed application platforms and 

services

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency 

DCS Distributed Control Systems

DDM Direct Digital Manufacturing

DFO Designated Federal Officer 

DH Diffie-Hellman 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services

DKIM Domain Keys Identified Mail

DMARC Domain based Message Authentication, 

Reporting and Conformance 

DNS Domain Name System

DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions 

DOD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State

DOT Department of Transportation

DPC Derived PIV Credentials

DPCI Derived PIV Credential Issuers 

DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator 

DSS Digital Signature Standard

DTR Derived Test Requirements 

EAC Election Assistance Commission

EaaS Entropy as a Service 

ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography 

ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 

ECP Enterprise Compliance Profile 

EL Engineering Laboratory

EM Encoded Message 

EO Executive Order

ESDC Employment and Social Development 

Canada 

ETSI European Telecommunications Standards 

Institute 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAQ Frequently Asked Questions 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCCX Federal Cloud Credential Exchange

FCKMSs Federal Cryptographic Key Management 

Systems 

FCSM Federal Computer Security Managers

FDA Federal Drug Administration 

FDCC Federal Desktop Core Configuration 

FedRAMP Federal Risk and Authorization 

Management Program

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FFRDCs Federally Funded Research and 

Development Centers

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard 

FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security 

Teams 

FirstNet First Responder Network Authority 

FISMA Federal Information Security Management 

Act 

FISSEA Federal Information Systems Security 

Educators’ Association

FPE Format-Preserving Encryption 

FR Federal Register 

FY Fiscal Year

GAO Government Accountability Office

GCM Galois/Counter Mode 

GCN Government Computer News 

GCSE Group Communication System Enablers 

GICS Generic Identity Command Set

GPS Global Positioning System 

GSA General Services Administration 

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HAVA Help America Vote Act

HIT Health information technology

HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act 

HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code 

HSPD-12 Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-12 

IaaS Infrastructure as a Service 

IAD Information Access Division 

IAPWG Information Assurance Policy Working 

Group

IBE Identity-based Encryption

IC Intelligence Community

ICC Integrated Circuit Card 

ICS Industrial Control Systems

ICSTW International Conference on Software 

Testing, Verification and Validation 

Workshops 

ICT Information and Communications 

Technology

IdAM Identity and Access Management 

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics 

Engineers 

IETF Internet Engineering Task Force

IG Implementation Guidance

IGs Inspector Generals

IKE Internet Key Exchange

IMS Innovation in Measurement Science 

INCITS InterNational Committee for Information 

Technology Standards 

IP Internet Protocol

IPD Initial Public Draft 

IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6

ISA International Society of Automation

ISO International Organization for 

Standardization 

ISP Internet Service Provider 

ISPAB Information Security and Privacy Advisory 

Board 

IT Information Technology 

ITI Information Technology Industry 

ITL Information Technology Laboratory

ITU-T International Telecommunications Union 

– Telecommunication Standardization 

Sector 

IUT Implementation under test 

IWCE International Wireless Communications 

Expo 

IWG Interagency Working Group 

JTF Joint Task Force

JTC 1 Joint Technical Committee 1

KBKDF Key-Based Key Derivation functions 

KDF Key Derivation Functions 

LDS Logical Data Structure

LTE Long-Term Evolution 

MCPTT Mission Critical Push-To-Talk

MILCOM Military Communications Conference

MIH Media-Independent Handover 

MLS Multi-Level Security

MMT Multi-Block Message Test 

MQV Menezes-Qu-Vanstone 

NARA National Archives and Records 

Administration

NASA National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

NASPO North American Security Products 

Organization 

NCCoE National Cybersecurity Center of 

Excellence 

NCP National Checklist Program

NCWF National Cybersecurity Workforce 

Framework

NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers 

Association 

NFC Near Field Communications 

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NGAC Next Generation Access Control

NGAC-FA Next Generation Access Control –

Functional Architecture 

NGAC- Next Generation Access Control – Generic

GOADS Operations & Abstract Data Structures 

NGAC- Next Generation Access Control

IRPADS Implementation Requirements, Protocols 

and API Definitions 

NICE National Initiative for Cybersecurity 

Education 

NIEM National Information Exchange Model 

NISTIR NIST Interagency Report 

NITRD Networking and Information Technology 

Research and Development

NPIVP NIST Personal Identity Verification 

Program 

NPSBN National Public Safety Broadband Network 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSTIC National Strategy for Trusted Identities in 

Cyberspace 

NTIA National Telecommunications and 

Information Administration 

NVD National Vulnerability Database 

NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory 

Accreditation Program

NYU New York University 

OCIL Open Checklist Interactive Language 

OCR Office for Civil Rights 

ODNI Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence 

ODP Open Distributed Processing 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPM Office of Personnel Management

OT Operational Technology 

OVAL Open Vulnerability and Assessment 

Language 

PACS Physical Access Control Systems

PCI Payment Card Industry

PCLOB Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board

PIN Personal Identification Number 

PIV Personal Identity Verification 

PIV-I PIV-Interoperable

PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards 

PKI Public Key Infrastructure 

P.L. Public Law 

PLC Programmable Logic Controllers 

PM Policy Machine 

PML Physical Measurement Laboratory 

PoS Point of Service

PPD Presidential Policy Directive 

PQC Post-Quantum Cryptography

PRNGs Pseudorandom Number Generators

ProSe Proximity Services 

PSCR Public Safety Communications Research

PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme

PUB Publication

PWG Public Working Group 

RBAC Role-Based Access Control 

RBG Random Bit Generator

RD Replication Device 

R&D Research and Development

RFC Request for Comments

RFI Request for Information 

RFID Radio Frequency Identification 

RMF Risk Management Framework 

RNG Random Number Generation 

RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman 

SACM Security Automation and Continuous 

Monitoring 

SBA Small Business Administration

SBIR Small Business Innovation Research 

SC Subcommittee 

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 

SCAP Security Content Automation Protocol 

SCAPVal SCAP Content Validation Tool 

SCMG Security Components and Mechanisms 

Group 

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COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT | 2015

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SCORE Special Cyber Operations Research and 

Engineering 

SCRM Supply Chain Risk Management

SDLC System Development Life Cycle 

SDO Standards Developing Organizations

SENT Security of Emerging Networking 

Technologies

SGCC Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee 

SGIP Smart Grid Interoperability Panel

SHA Secure Hash Algorithm

SHS Secure Hash Standard 

SIG Special Interest Group

SLAs Service Level Agreements

SMB Small and Medium-size Business

SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises

S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail 

Extensions

SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 

SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol 

SOIG Security Outreach and Integration Group 

SP Special Publications

SPF Sender Policy Framework 

SRTP Secure Real-time Transport Protocol 

SSA Social Security Administration

SSAG Secure Systems and Applications Group

SSCA Software and Supply Chain Assurance

SSD Software and Systems Division

SSH Secure Shell 

STVM Security Testing, Validation, and 

Measurement

STVMG Security Testing, Validation, and 

Measurement Group 

SWID Software Identification 

TAG Technical Advisory Group 

TCG Trusted Computing Group 

TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm

TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard 

TGDC Technical Guidelines Development 

Committee 

TIC Trusted Internet Connection 

TLS Transport Layer Security 

TMSAD Trust Model for Security Automation Data 

TNC Trusted Network Communications

TPM Trusted Platform Module

TRW Threshold Random Walk 

TS Technical Standard

TTPs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

U.S.C. U.S. Code 

US-CERT U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness 

Team 

USG U.S. Government 

USGCB United States Government Configuration 

Baseline

USGv6 U.S. Government IPv6 

USNC United States National Committee

UX User experience 

VA Veteran Affairs 

VCAT Visiting Committee on Advanced 

Technology 

VCI Virtual Contact Interface 

VM Virtual Machine 

VPN Virtual Private Network 

VRDX-SIG Vulnerability Reporting and Data 

eXchange SIG 

VVSG Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 

WG Working Group

Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity 

XACML eXtensible Access Control Markup 

Language 

XCCDF Extensible Configuration Checklist 

Description Format 

XML Extensible Markup Language

XOFs Extendable-Output Functions

xTract Threat Reduction and Correlation Tool

XTS XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with 

Ciphertext Stealing 

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OPPORTUNITIES TO ENGAGE WITH CSD, ACD, AND NIST | FY 2015

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O P P O R T U N I T I E S T O E N G A G E 

WITH CSD, ACD, AND NIST

Guest Research Internships at NIST

Opportunities are available at NIST for 6- to 24-month 

internships within the Computer Security Division (CSD) 

and the Applied Cybersecurity Division (ACD). Qualified 

individuals should contact CSD and/or ACD, provide a 

statement of qualifications, and indicate the area of work 

that is of interest. The salary costs are generally borne by 

the sponsoring institution; however, in some cases, these 

guest research internships carry a small monthly stipend 

paid by NIST. For further information, contact:

CSD Contact: ACD Contact:

Mr. Matthew Scholl Mr. Kevin Stine

(301) 975-2941 (301) 975-4483

matthew.scholl@nist.gov kevin.stine@nist.gov

Details at NIST for Government or 

Military Personnel

Opportunities are available at NIST for 6- to 24-month 

details at NIST in CSD and/or ACD. Qualified individuals 

should contact CSD and/or ACD, provide a statement 

of qualifications, and indicate the area of work that is of 

interest. Generally speaking, the salary costs are borne by 

the sponsoring agency; however, in some cases, agency 

salary costs may be reimbursed by NIST. For further 

information, contact:

CSD Contact: ACD Contact:

Mr. Matthew Scholl Mr. Kevin Stine

(301) 975-2941 (301) 975-4483

matthew.scholl@nist.gov kevin.stine@nist.gov

Federal Computer Security Managers’ 

(FCSM) Forum

The FCSM Forum is covered in detail in the Outreach 

section of this report. Membership is free and open to 

federal employees. For further information, contact:

Ms. Patricia Toth

(301) 975-5140

ptoth@nist.gov or sec-forum@nist.gov

Visit the FCSM Forum website:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/membership.html

Security Research

NIST occasionally undertakes security work, primarily in the 

area of research, funded by other agencies. Such sponsored 

work is accepted by NIST when it can cost-effectively 

further the goals of NIST and the sponsoring institution. For 

further information, contact:

CSD Contact: ACD Contact:

Mr. Matthew Scholl Mr. Kevin Stine

(301) 975-2941 (301) 975-4483

matthew.scholl@nist.gov kevin.stine@nist.gov

Funding Opportunities at NIST

NIST funds industrial and academic research in a variety 

of ways. The Small Business Innovation Research Program 

funds R&D proposals from small businesses; see 

http:// www.nist.gov/sbir. NIST also offers other grants to 

encourage work in specific fields: precision measurement, 

fire research, and materials science. Grants/awards 

supporting research at industry, academia, and other 

institutions are available on a competitive basis through 

several different Institute offices.

For general information on NIST grants programs, please 

contact:

Mr. Christopher Hunton

(301) 975-5718

christopher.hunton@nist.gov

Funding opportunity information: 

http://www.nist.gov/director/ocfo/grants/grants.cfm

T H I S P U B L I C AT I O N I S AVA I L A B L E F R E E O F C H A R G E F R O M : 

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