J-S10015-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: SHAWN JAMES HAMILTON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1357 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 22, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-MD-0000710-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: MARCH 30, 2020

Shawn James Hamilton appeals, pro se, from the order dismissing his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court treated as a petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm. 

The PCRA court outlines the history of this case as follows: 

On October 24, 2012, [Hamilton] was charged with three counts 

of criminal homicide, one count of criminal attempt to commit 

criminal homicide and four counts of robbery in connection with a 

shooting which occurred on July 7, 2012 in Plymouth Borough, 

Luzerne County. [Hamilton] was subsequently charged with one 

count of criminal homicide on December 13, 2012 in connection 

with a shooting which occurred on July 6, 2012 in the City of 

Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County. Trial was scheduled to commence 

on January 6, 2014 in connection with the October 24, 2012 

incident. The Commonwealth was seeking the death penalty.

On December 20, 2013, [Hamilton] pled guilty to three counts of 

first degree murder and one count of criminal attempt to commit 

criminal homicide on information 3715 of 2012. [Hamilton] also 
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pled guilty to one count of first degree murder on information 99 

of 2013. [Hamilton] waived his right to a pre-sentence 

investigation and proceeded to immediate sentencing. On 

December 20, 2013, [the trial court] imposed four life sentences 

on the first degree murder pleas along with a twenty to forty-year 

sentence on the criminal attempt plea. All sentences were to run 

consecutive.

Although [Hamilton] was advised of his appellate rights, he filed 

no direct appeal. He initially filed a Motion for [PCRA] Relief on 

April 24, 2014. A Supplement to PCRA Petition was filed on 

September 19, 2014 and a second Motion for [PCRA] Relief was 

filed on January 8, 2015, which were denied by the Pennsylvania 

Superior Court. 

On January 18, 2017, [Hamilton] filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus Ad Subjiciendum, which this Court treated as a Motion for 

[PCRA] Relief. On July 22, 2019, this Court denied and dismissed 

[Hamilton]'s Motion for [PCRA] Relief [].

Trial Court Opinion, at 1-2.1 This timely appeal followed. 

On appeal, Hamilton contends the PCRA court erred by denying his 

petition for habeas relief pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, by not 

holding a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. § 108 in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and by failing to issue a notice of intent to dismiss the petition 

without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. § 907. 

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1 The certified record consists mainly of the PCRA court’s opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) and documents filed in a companion civil case. Thus, we 

are unable to verify the factual and procedural history contained in the court’s 

opinion. Nevertheless, our disposition of the case remains the same as, 

although there is no support in the record, the parties do not dispute key 

events, filings, or other procedures. We accept these assertions without 

additional inquiry. 
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Preliminarily, we address our jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. We 

must determine whether the remedy Hamilton is seeking on appeal may be 

addressed under habeas corpus review or if a remedy exists under the PCRA. 

If “a defendant's post-conviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA, the 

common law and statutory remedies now subsumed by the PCRA are not 

separately available to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 

1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted). The PCRA incorporates the remedy 

of habeas corpus if it offers the petitioner a remedy. See Commonwealth v. 

West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). Therefore, regardless of how the 

petition is styled, “a defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his 

motion as a writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 

466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (footnote omitted).

Here, the trial court found Hamilton’s petition to be an untimely PCRA 

petition. We agree. To the best of our ability to decipher Hamilton’s rambling 

and frequently incoherent argument in his petition, he essentially seems to 

challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction to accept his plea and sentence him. 

Jurisdictional questions are squarely within the purview of the PCRA. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(viii) (“To be eligible for relief ... the petitioner must 

plead and prove ... [t]hat the conviction or sentence resulted from ... a 

proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction”). Accordingly, Hamilton’s petition 

is not germane to habeas relief, and we find that the trial court properly 
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addressed his petition under the PCRA. As such, Hamilton’s petition is subject 

to the PCRA’s explicit time limitations. 

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be 

filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of 

sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the 

three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this 

Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of 

the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not 

address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not 

timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA 

petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised 

therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden 

of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three 

exceptions.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

and footnote omitted). 

As Hamilton sought no further review of his judgment of sentence, it 

became final thirty days after sentence was imposed. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. 

Accordingly, his petition, filed approximately three years later, is patently 

untimely. Given his belief that his petition is not subject to the PCRA, Hamilton 

has not asserted that his petition falls within any of the timeliness exceptions 

provided in the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Therefore, 

neither the lower court nor this Court has jurisdiction to consider his request 

for relief. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

We acknowledge that the trial court denied Hamilton’s petition on 

alternative grounds, i.e. pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata rather than 

untimeliness. Nevertheless, we affirm the trial court. “A ruling or decision of 
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a lower court will be affirmed if it can be supported on any basis despite the 

lower court’s assignment of a wrong reason.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 870 

A.2d 864, 870 n.11 (Pa. 2005). 

Further, we find Hamilton’s first issue would be waived, as he failed to 

include his previous PCRA petition in the certified record. It is an appellant’s 

responsibility to ensure that the certified record contains all the items

necessary to review his claims. See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 

955, 963 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016). “When a claim is dependent on materials not 

provided in the certified record, that claim is considered waived.” 

Commonwealth v. Petroll, 696 A.2d 817, 836 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation 

omitted). Without his prior petition for collateral relief, we could not conduct 

a review of his issue challenging the trial court’s conclusion that the issue had 

been previously litigated and decided against Hamilton.

We further recognize the merit to Hamilton’s claim that the trial court 

failed to comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 when it dismissed his petition without 

issuing notice of intent to dismiss. However, where our independent review 

reveals the petition is untimely, failure to issue notice pursuant to Rule 907 

does not require reversal. See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 

917 n.7 (Pa. 2000). Since the trial court was without jurisdiction to reach the 

merits of the untimely petition, we affirm. 

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/30/2020