tanker support, assets from across the coalition were piling on against the luckless Baghdad RG

Division. From the limited battle damage assessment received, it was clear that the air shaping

was having a crushing effect on the Republican Guard. The artillery regiments of the Baghdad

Division were assessed at less than 45% remaining strength, and additional shaping fires were on

the way. Division Marines eagerly awaited the attack order while applauding the destruction of

the enemy by air fires.

Closer to Baghdad, CFACC shaping was having a similar effect on the artillery of the Al

Nida RG Armored Division. Once 1st Marine Division was successfully across the Tigris, the Al

Nida Division would be the last major force between Blue Diamond and Baghdad. The Iraqis

were now making some attempt to reposition artillery and troops into the gap between the Al

Nida and Baghdad Divisions, but these efforts were rewarded with precision guided munitions

from Coalition aircraft. The Iraqis had lost the opportunity to reposition major elements of their

ground forces now that they were under a deluge of air fires. Out of position, and unable to

move their conventional forces, they found themselves unprepared for the coming ground attack

of the Marines. It was too late for the enemy to close the seam. This was the classic combined

arms effect the Marines had hoped to achieve, and it was working. The Iraqi military leadership

that had not yet run away probably began to appreciate the power of a balanced combined-arms

fight.

28 March

The Waiting Continues

As the Division waited for approval to continue the attack north, all three RCTs continued

aggressive security and ambush patrols to their flanks in their respective 4 km security zones.

Along Highway 1, RCT-5 conducted limited objective attacks and security patrols, and

continued the pressure on the Fedeyeen remnants in Ad Diwaniyah.

RCT-5 began to experience the transition between military operations and civil operations

that was to be a recurring theme throughout the campaign. During the early days of the attack,

operations had been conducted in the

classic manner to which the Marines

had been trained. All reported

mortar attacks or troop

concentrations were responded to

with devastating firepower. As the

Regime presence declined in the

area, however, the Marines had to

make the mental adjustment from

attacker to liberator. The recent

decline of large paramilitary

organizations in zone allowed the

Division to become much more

discriminating in their application of

Embedded media enjoy unprecedented access to Marines and firepower. Counter-battery

commanders during the entire operation. indicators, for example, now had to

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be confirmed by the splash of rounds or observed enemy troop concentrations prior to granting

approval for return fires. Villagers started reporting to the Marine units that were being hurt by

the Marine's artillery fires as the enemy would drive up next to noncombatants, fire mortar

rounds, then drive away (a method termed 'shoot and scoot', designed to draw the Americans

into indiscriminately firing on civilians.) Positive identification of targets had always been the

rule, but now the security situation allowed

the Marines to more deliberately assess the

risks to local civilians before they opened

fire. This extension of the positive

identification ROE saved many

noncombatants from injury or death.

Making this adjustment required a

disciplined force with a strong moral

compass, one of the Division CG's

emphases from the earliest days of

preparation. From the beginning, the

members of the 1st Marine Division had

been taught to be 'No better friend, no worse

enemy.' It was a sliding mental adjustment Tanks from 2 Tank Battalion provide security along

Highway 1. In the flat open terrain, tanks were always the Marines would be required to make in

near the front of the Division advance, both directions until the entirety of southern

Iraq was secure.

The Division continued its security patrols to the south and west of the zone, and closed up

its positions along Highway 1. Two platoons from the I MEF Force Reconnaissance Company,

temporarily assigned to the Division, were given a zone south of the Division's current positions

along Highway 1, and carried out their task with zeal and professionalism. The Division's intent

was quite clear; to kill those who had been attacking the Division and Coalition forces along the

LOCs, using innovative and aggressive techniques. No enemy attacks took place along either of

the Division's columns this day, another clear indicator that the time to resume the attack had

come. The MEF continued to press CFLCC hard to let them unleash the Division, and the

Marines were more than ready.

The Division continued to rely heavily on the P-3 and Pioneer platforms that were flying in

direct support. As the only direct support imagery intelligence collections assets assigned to the

Division, these were the only ones that provided continuous reliable support for the entire

operation. The Division was to have little success in navigating a cumbersome collections

bureaucracy to obtain support from non-directly supporting platforms, but aggressive use of

these two assets provided excellent coverage for what they could range. Between the efforts of

the VMIJ squadrons and the Sailors of Combined Task Force 57 (CTF-57), the Division Marines

had eyes that would have been the envy of their predecessors. As the Division moved north into

Iraq, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) gave its approval for the P-3 to

begin operations north of the Iraqi border. P-3s, began to fly missions in 'safe' killboxes further

north, remaining in step with the Division's movements. The P-3 was invaluable in supporting

the Division's efforts up Route 7, especially in the vicinity of the town of Qalat Sukkar.

Similarly, the Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle continually demonstrated the value of a direct

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support or organic UAV in prosecuting the Division's deep fight and targeting efforts. During

the maneuver pause, intelligence collections contthued apace, and a large number of Iraqi armor

and artillery units were located and struck. On this day, the Pioneer detected a G-5 155mm

howitzer battery just north of the Highway 27 Bridge, enabling the Division to direct precision

guided munitions against the position.

28 March

2/23 Strikes a Blow Against the Baath Party

The town of Al Fajr had been a

hotbed of Regime activity. This

town anchored the eastern end of the

Highway 17 cross route between

Highway 7 and Highway 1, the route

of march for any forces seeking to

travel cross-corridor within the

Division's battlespace. On the

morning of 27 March, 2/23 was

tasked to secure the west side of the

intersection of Highways 7 and 17.

The account of the guarded

cooperation on the part of the local

citizens is telling, as it is Marines used hand-written signs to tell Iraqis to stop at representative of the encounters the checkpoints.

Marines had with the Iraqi people:

After Fox Company killed a driver attempting to run the road block we had established,

one of the battalion 's own Arab speaking Marines, Sergeant Dory Habachy, identJIed several

citizens willing to discuss enemy activities in the town. These informers seemed fearful of

talking to US. forces in the presence of other Iraqis so the battalion arranged to meet with

them several hours later. With the help of these Iraqis and others in the surrounding hamlets,

information suggesting a Baath Party presence in Al Fajr began to come to light. The

informants described the structure of the local Baath party identfying four distinct groups

and their leaders.

This information helped the battalion to further develop the situation and plan for actions

into Al Fajr. To locate the reported Baath party houses, the regiment's Dragon Eye was

launched to fly over named areas of interest within the town and its findings were reported

back to 2/23. At the same time, the scout-sniper platoon began planning for a night insert of

three teams to confirm the presence of armed individuals and air defense weapons at sites on

the west side of the Al Gharraf River.

On 28 March, 2/23 was sent to Al Fajr to clear out the Baath party members that had been

reported in the city. They initially met no resistance, and turned to Civil-military operations in

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the town instead. The Baath party members had wisely chosen to stay out of sight while the

Marines were in town. The local populace was friendly and willingly received the Marines into

the town. From information received from friendly local citizens.

The battalion concluded that

approximately 60 Baath Party loyalists

controlled the town using local schools as

their headquarters and meeting places. The

battalion learned the precise locations of the

four top Baath Party leaders and their weapons

caches in the town. As the rest of the battalion

pulled back just outside of the town, the S-2

assigned objectives for scout snipers that

would allow them to observe these suspected

sites, and perhaps catch the Baath militia (who

were avoiding contact with the Marines) in the Day and night, Marines keep a watchful eye for the

open. enemy.

As night fell, two scout-sniper teams conducted their insertion, and by daybreak they were

observing and reporting targets. One of the sniper teams observed enemy forces carrying

Kalashnikov rifles in a crowd of people. The third scout-sniper team began its insertion into a

building when they ran into a group of armed Iraqis. The team immediately broke contact and

fought their way out of the building, bounding back to the link-up point. During the emergency

extraction, a HMMWV hit two members of the response team, tragically killing Staff Sergeant

James Cawley and seriously injuring Captain Harry Porter. This tragedy occurred incident to the

liberation of the fearful citizens of Al Fajr. The Battalion mourned the loss of Staff Sergeant

Cawley, recognizing that the brave Marines who participated in this action played a key role in

removing the Baath militia as a force of oppression on these people, and set the conditions for a

successful attack the next day.

On 29 March, based on this new

information, the battalion staff quickly

completed planning and issued a raid

order on the key sites inside the town.

At 1300Z, a platoon of M1A1s from

RCT-l approached the town from the

east. Citizens of Al Fajr, recognizing

that an attack was imminent, gathered

to see the Baath members receive their

due justice. As the tank platoon

entered the town, the 120 mm guns

fired into the building where the scoutsniper team had been attacked the

previous night. To the rising cheers of

Arab linguist interrogates an Iraqi detainee near the Tigris. the town's civilians, the tanks continued

west over the bridge, remaining on the

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main road to provide over-watch. An Army PsyOps team followed the tanks into town and

broadcast a message for the Baath Party members to surrender. A division of Cobra helicopters

engaged an open truck carrying armed Iraqis and provided forward air support during the raid.

The battalion's CAAT sections led each of the companies through the town to their

objectives and provided local security as the companies cleared their objectives. Fox Company

secured the suspected Baath Party residences while Echo Company assaulted the Baath Party

Headquarters buildings. Each company uncovered large caches of weapons and numerous

documents, which confirmed the extent of Baath Party activities in the vicinity of Al Fajr. Golf

Company movcd rapidly through

Al Fajr and cleared the school on

the north side of town. Iraqi

civilians, eager to help rid

themselves of the former Regime

thugs, pointed out the location of

the Baath Party members. Golf

Company cleared a nearby built-up

area where they located another

large weapons cache and

documents. Marines spotted armed

men burning documents in an

adjacent building and provided

covering fire as another platoon

cleared the building, which yielded Liberated Iraqis everywhere expressed their appreciation for

an even larger cache of documents, Marines.

information, and weapons.

Meanwhile, Weapons Platoon Sergeant,

Staff Sergeant Charles Spence, and the Mortar

Section led by Sergeant Antonio Dominguez,

confronted 12 well-dressed men wearing

traditional Arab robes. As these men were

searched, a patrol found military uniforms and

equipment in nearby bushes beside the road.

These men were detained, as was another

group of men traveling in a tractor-trailer.

The driver discreetly pointed out eight of these

passengers for further search. Underneath

their gowns, they were fully dressed in Iraqi RCT-1 Commander pushes north while

simultaneously transitioning to stabilization military uniforms. . . operations in part of the Regimental zone.

As the raid continued, Marines began looking for opportunities to assist the local citizens.

The town's inhabitants had been instrumental in capturing the Baathist thugs and the Marines

wanted to show their appreciation. Soon after, the battalion began conducting humanitarian

operations in full earnest. Medical supplies were issued and medical assistance was provided to

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both children and adults while other 2/23 Marines distributed humanitarian rations to members

of the town.

29 March

Plans and Re-plans

The Division awaited orders to resume the attack while stabilization operations continued in

the 1st UK Division and TF Tarawa zones in the rear. The Division remained convinced that the

quickest path to stability in the south was a Marine Division astride the single LOC leading there

from Baghdad. The Division noted that it was still possible to drive from Baghdad to Basrah on

major highways controlled by the Regime, a continuous source of weapons, fighters, and Regime

control. The remaining enemy forces to the south of Al Kut had been effectively shaped, and

were powerless to take major offensive action.

The operational pause also gave dangerous time for the planners at higher headquarters to

think, and a number of schemes had been pushed down to the MEF for consideration. A number

of supporting plans were considered and rejected, including a scheme to mount up an RCT from

1st Marine Division on Heavy Equipment Transports, and ship it to the east in order to attack the

10th Armored Division in Al Amarah.

Most of the proposals would have

served to shift the momentum away

from the successful advance toward

Baghdad, and back to the south and

east. On 29 March, the Division sent

Operations and Intelligence planners to

the I MEF Headquarters at Jalibah

Airfield in southern Iraq in order to

participate in the planning efforts, and

to drive home the Division's

perspective that chopping the head

from the snake would be the most

effective way of reducing its influence Marines keep a watchful eye on prisoners. in the south.

The media reporting of the day was an interesting study in perceptions. Some media

reported, almost gleefully, that the Coalition attack was falling apart. They implied that the

highest decision makers in Washington were eager to continue the attack, while others were

sounding notes of caution. The media cited 'commanders in the field' as those most opposed to

the continued attack. To the Division poised on the leading edge of the attack, this all came as

somewhat of a surprise. The Division had full ammunition bays, full fuel tanks, and was eager to

get back into the attack. The MEF planners had a similar appreciation of the situation. Some,

outside the operating forces, took the counsel of their fears, playing into the hands of a

sensationalist media that was anxious to exploit any potential negative news. At all echelons,

Marines on the ground were itching to resume the attack.

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Afak Operations

As the Division pressed its advance along two separate axes, the divided RCTs were not

immediately mutually supporting on the tactical level. Although the RCTs were mutually

supporting at an operational level, regaining the ability to provide mutual tactical support and

gain additional maneuver flexibility became a priority for the Division. On 28 March, 3/4 was

ordered to conduct a reconnaissance in force along Highway 17 in order to link up with RCT- 1

Afak and Al Fajr operations called for elements of RCT- 7 and RCT-1 to link-up on Hwy 17 in order to provide

mutual support and a logistics route that connected the two corridors..

east of the Saddam Canal. That evening, Lieutenant Colonel Bryan McCoy issued the order for a

reconnaissance in force, east along Highway 17. "Go in like you own the place," he charged,

"We're gonna kick the beehive and see what comes out." Once the connecting route was open,

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A Battalion huddle gives the commanders of 3/4 a chance to talk through the plan ofattack for Afak.

the two attack corridors of the Division would again be mutually supporting. This route would

become a crucial west-to-east re-supply route for the Division, and serve as the connecting file

between RCT-1 and RCT-7.

Operations in the town of Afak turned out to be representative of the actions that occurred in

each of the towns 3/4 encountered along the route. The pattern had become predictable in the

smaller towns of southern Iraq. In each town, the Iraqis used dismounted paramilitaries

supported by technicals in hastily arranged ambushes and defensive positions. In response, 3/4

used shock action and combined arms. In Afak, CAAT and supporting air blocked the town's

ingress and egress routes. Tanks led into the center of the urban area with rifle companies

following in trace conducting the reconnaissance in force. Once in the city, infantry dismounted

to clear buildings and gain the rooftops. The result was the same in every case; accurate

supporting and direct fires destroyed the paramilitaries and their equipment. Follow-on Marines

swept into the town on the heels of the attack, giving medical attention to the locals, dispensing

humanitarian supplies, and using the HETs to gain intelligence.

By early afternoon, 3/4 approached the last town in the planned zone of action, Al Budayr. A

section of AH- 1W Cobras, uncovered three separate Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) pieces and

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engaged two, under Kilo Company's control. The aircraft dropped smoke on all three sites to aid

follow-on aircraft in locating and destroying the AAA.

Bravo Company (1st Tanks,

attached) established a support by

fire position while CAAT platoons

once again surrounded the town.

Kilo and India Companies, led by

the Battalion Commander, pressed

into the town center. Eerily quiet,

the expectation was that this would

be a much stiffer engagement than

the previous towns. As the units

progressed, however, the town

citizens began to come out in force

to watch the invading forces.

Lieutenant Colonel McCoy called

to report that he was surrounded by

townspeople, and called up the

An 81mm mortar platoon emplaces its mortars to support the HET and security. Kilo had cleared

attack on Afak. through the Baath Party

headquarters and penetrated deeper

into the town. India did likewise, both companies pressing in for a distance, and then

dismounting to clear the nearby city blocks. In all, 3/4 captured 23 detainees, of whom 16 were

ultimately designated EPWs. The logistics effort was significantly helped by the discovery of a

fuel depot, which served to refuel all the tanks in the task-organized battalion. Having completed

its efforts, 3/4 pulled out of the town and consolidated along the road northwest of Al Budayr.

30 March

Regaining the Momentum

The Division remained ready to continue the attack to the north, and had repeated the mantra

in its daily Intentions Message:

The Division Commander flew to Jalibah to join the Division planners and to meet with the

The area around the Division is increasingly secure. Offensive operations on Route 7 and

North on Route] will help set conditions to turn over our rear area to TF Tarawa when we

go across the Tigris. Our current vulnerability to chemical attack and the potential for the

enemy to realize they have a gap in their defenses indicate we should conduct a limited

objective attack soonest to cross the Tigris.

MEF Commander. The MEF planners had agreed that the security situation allowed a limited

objective attack by the Division across the Tigris, and were as eager as the Division to get

moving to Baghdad. The MEF and Division Commanders agreed, and the Division was given

authority to proceed with a limited objective attack across the Tigris to isolate Al Kut. Once

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Blue Diamond was positioned across the River, the MEF and Division would be in position for a

variety of further actions. The CFLCC Commander had mandated a shaping reduction of the

Baghdad outer cordon by 50% before launching an assault on the capitol, but this fight was

several days away. A continuous flow ofjoint air strikes

against the Al Nida RG Division persisted over the next

several days. The Division, who planned to meet the Al

Nida RG face-to-face very soon, greeted the strikes with

enthusiasm.

The CG and his planners flew back to the Division's

positions along Highway 1, and straight to the RCT-5

CP where Colonel Dunford and his staff were briefed on

the plan. The attack would take place tomorrow, and

RCT-5 would lead it. A feint by 3d LAR would press

north along Highway 1 (the avenue of approach

expected by the Iraqis), while RCT-5 would abruptly

attack northeast along Highway 27 through the seam in

the enemy's defenses. Crossing the Saddam Canal and

seizing the Tigris River bridge at An Numaniyah, the

Division would gain a bridgehead and sever southern

Iraq from Baghdad's control. The Division was finally

on the move again. The CG made the rounds and

briefed the plan to all of his RCT commanders. In every

position, the life went back into the faces of the Marines

The commanders and staff of Division as the CG explained his concept. Blue Diamond had

HQgather to receive the plan for waited long enough, and the Marines were more than

crossing the Tigris. ready to go.

Linkup Along Highway 17

Having accomplished the task of reconnaissance in force along Highway 17, 3/4 looked to

complete the link-up with RCT-1 to the southeast. Moving west from Al Fajr, 2/23 had

uncovered Highway 17 from RCT-l's positions to the Saddam Canal. Early on the 30th the linkup between 3/4 and 2/23 was completed when both units made physical contact at the bridge

over the Saddam Canal. The Division was no longer attacking up two isolated corridors, and

now had a viable connecting route. This route would see a great deal of Division traffic over the

next four days, and the welcome flow of supplies through this corridor enabled RCT- 1 to

continue its fixing attack north.

One of the remarkable aspects of the continued success of RCT- 1 up Highway 7 was the

ability of the Marines to continue the attack with minimal resupply. Unsecured LOCs and the

great distance from fixed logistics nodes had precluded ground resupply, and a perceived Surface

to Air Missile (SAM) threat limited the use of aircraft for a few days. Highway 7 through An

Nasiriyah continued to be impassable for resupply convoys. With the linkup on Highway 17

accomplished, Delta Company, 1st Tanks escorted a CSSG convoy up Highway 1 and across

Highway 17 to link up with RCT- 1. After remaining overnight with 3/4, the convoy was

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