-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

DIANE HARRIS,

Plaintiff/Third-Party DefendantAppellant,

UNPUBLISHED

October 31, 2017

v No. 331652

Wayne Circuit Court

GREEKTOWN SUPERHOLDINGS, INC., doing 

business as GREEKTOWN CASINO, LLC, and 

CAROLYN SIMANCIK,

LC No. 12-003001-CD

Defendants,

and

BARRY A. SEIFMAN and BARRY A. 

SEIFMAN, PC,

Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v

RAYMOND GUZALL III and RAYMOND 

GUZALL III, PC,

Third-Party Defendants-Appellants.

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and MURPHY and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal involves the distribution of attorney fees associated with plaintiff Diane 

Harris’s employment discrimination action against defendants Greektown Superholdings, Inc., 

and Carolyn Simancik. Harris was represented in the action by third-party defendant Raymond 

Guzall III. The action culminated in a judgment in excess of $600,000 in favor of Harris. 

Guzall’s former law partner, Barry A. Seifman, thereafter claimed an attorney lien against the 

judgment, asserting that Guzall began representing Harris while a member of the now-defunct 

law firm of Seifman & Guzall and that Seifman was entitled to a share of the attorney fees 

generated in the case pursuant to a shareholder agreement between himself and Guzall. Seifman 
-2-

and his current law firm, Barry A. Seifman, PC, were allowed to intervene in the action as thirdparty plaintiffs to pursue his claim against Guzall and his current law firm, Raymond Guzall III, 

PC.

1

 In an earlier appeal by Harris challenging Seifman’s intervention, this Court, while 

concluding that the trial court erred in permitting Seifman to intervene, ruled that the appeal had 

to be dismissed because Harris herself lacked standing to appeal; Guzall was not a party to that

appeal. Harris v Greektown Superholdings, Inc, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of 

Appeals, issued August 20, 2015 (Docket No. 322088). Subsequently, the trial court scheduled 

and began conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine the distribution of attorney fees in the 

action, rejecting numerous arguments posed by Guzall before and during the hearing. With a 

motion to disqualify the trial judge pending, Guzall refused to appear at a scheduled continuation 

of the hearing until the disqualification motion was heard and decided. In response, the trial 

court held Guzall in contempt, striking all of his filings related to the attorney-fee dispute, 

defaulting him for his contemptuous conduct, and releasing the disputed attorney fees, which 

were being held in escrow, to Seifman. Guzall and Harris appeal that order as of right. We 

affirm.

Following two days of an evidentiary hearing on the issue regarding the distribution of 

attorney fees to Seifman, the hearing was adjourned, with a third day of proofs being scheduled 

for February 2, 2016. Guzall then filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge, and a hearing on 

the motion was scheduled for February 19, 2016, i.e., after the date scheduled for the 

continuation of the evidentiary hearing, despite Guzall’s various efforts to have the motion for 

disqualification be heard and decided prior to continuation of the evidentiary hearing. In what 

can only be characterized as a contemptuous act of defiance, Guzall refused to continue 

participating in the evidentiary hearing absent a ruling on the disqualification motion, issuing the 

following written notice or ultimatum to the trial court and all other parties:

Third Party Defendant Diane Harris and her attorney, Raymond Guzall III, 

provides [sic] this notice to the court and all other parties, that Third Party 

Defendant Diane Harris and her attorney, Raymond Guzall III, will not appear at 

any hearing scheduled for the continuation of the evidentiary hearing, until after 

the final determination upon . . . [the] motion to recuse [the trial judge] . . . has 

been entered by the court, or upon an appeal to the chief judge of the court, if 

necessary. 

Guzall did not appear at the continued evidentiary hearing on February 2, 2016, resulting 

in the trial court’s determination that Guzall was in contempt of court, given that he was aware of 

the scheduled hearing and that his failure to appear was willful and deliberate. As punishment 

for the contempt, the trial court struck all of Guzall’s pleadings, motions, and documents related 

to Seifman’s claim, defaulted Guzall, and ordered the release of escrowed attorney fees to 

Seifman.

 1 For ease of reference, we shall use the singular names “Guzall” and “Seifman” to refer 

collectively to each individual party and his respective law practice.
-3-

On appeal, Guzall raises issues regarding the law of the case doctrine, res judicata, as 

connected to an earlier Oakland County case between Guzall and Seifman, attorney-client 

privilege, Guzall’s ability to represent himself and provide narrative testimony, the substance of 

Seifman’s claim, and a host of other matters. We need not reach and resolve these issues, some 

of which may indeed have merit, given that we reject Guzall’s arguments that the trial court 

erred in finding him in contempt, striking his pleadings, and defaulting him, rendering the other 

issues moot. Guzall argues that the trial court erred in holding him in contempt without first 

conducting a show cause hearing. He also contends that his conduct did not justify the contempt 

order or the penalties of default and striking of the pleadings. 

“A trial court's findings in a contempt proceeding are reviewed for clear error and must 

be affirmed on appeal if there is competent evidence to support them.” In re Contempt of Henry, 

282 Mich App 656, 668; 765 NW2d 44 (2009). The ultimate decision to issue a contempt order 

rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, which we review for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 

671. “If the trial court's decision results in an outcome within the range of principled outcomes, 

it has not abused its discretion.” Id.

Contempt of court encompasses willful acts, omissions, or statements that tend to impair 

the authority or impede the functioning of a court. In re Contempt of Dudzinski, 257 Mich App 

96, 108; 667 NW2d 68 (2003); In re Contempt of Robertson, 209 Mich App 433, 436; 531 

NW2d 763 (1995). “Courts have inherent independent authority, as well as statutory authority, 

to punish a person for contempt.” Robertson, 209 Mich App at 436. Pursuant to MCL 

600.1701(g), a court is authorized to hold a party or an attorney in contempt of court “for 

disobeying any lawful order, decree, or process of the court.” See also MCL 600.1701(c) (an 

attorney can be held in contempt “for disobedience of any process of the court, or any lawful 

order of the court”). “A party must obey an order entered by a court with proper jurisdiction, 

even if the order is clearly incorrect, or the party must face the risk of being held in contempt and 

possibly being ordered to comply with the order at a later date.” Kirby v Mich High Sch Athletic 

Ass’n, 459 Mich 23, 40; 585 NW2d 290 (1998). The main purpose of a court’s contempt 

authority is to sustain the power and preserve the effectiveness of the court. Dudzinski, 257 

Mich App at 108. Punishment for contempt is proper when necessary to restore order in the 

courtroom or to ensure respect for the judicial process. Id. at 108-109. 

Guzall’s behavior constituted criminal contempt of court, as opposed to civil contempt. 

See In re Contempt of Rochlin, 186 Mich App 639, 644-648; 465 NW2d 388 (1990) (criminal 

contempt concerns punishment for a completed act of disobedience, so as to vindicate the 

authority of the court, whereas civil contempt regards a coercive effort by a court to force a 

noncompliant party to do an act that was commanded by the court). “When any contempt is 

committed other than in the immediate view and presence of the court, the court may punish it . . 

. after proof of the facts charged has been made by affidavit or other method and opportunity has 

been given to defend.” MCL 600.1711(2); see also MCR 3.606(A). On the other hand, “[w]hen 

any contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, the court may 

punish it summarily by fine, or imprisonment, or both.” MCL 600.1711(1).

Guzall’s act of contempt consisted of declaring to the trial court that he would not appear 

for the continued evidentiary hearing until his disqualification motion was first decided and then 

carrying through with his threat by not appearing on the scheduled date of the hearing. This 
-4-

blatantly contemptuous conduct was effectively committed within the immediate view and 

presence of the trial court; therefore, there was no need for or entitlement to a show cause 

hearing or any other opportunity for Guzall to defend himself.2 While we would agree that the 

disqualification motion should have been heard before the evidentiary hearing was continued 

and, as mentioned above, that there may have been problematic rulings issued by the trial court

along the way, Guzall, especially as an officer of the court, was not at liberty to willfully disobey 

the process of the court and impair the authority or impede the functioning of the court. We will 

not reinforce Guzall’s childish behavior in this matter, nor endorse the act of an attorney that 

seeks to dictate to a court when the court must rule on an issue. Punishment for contempt is to 

ensure respect for the judicial process, Dudzinski, 257 Mich App at 108-109, which Guzall did 

not show here, and which must be shown by a party and counsel even in the face of unfavorable 

rulings.3 

Furthermore, the sanctions imposed by the trial court in striking Guzall’s filings and 

entering a default were proper for purposes of punishing Guzall’s contempt of court. See MCR 

2.504(B)(1) (“If a party fails to comply with these rules or a court order, upon motion by an 

opposing party, or sua sponte, the court may enter a default against the noncomplying party or a 

dismissal of the noncomplying party’s actions or claims.”); In re Contempt of Dougherty, 429 

Mich 81, 91-92 n 14; 413 NW2d 392 (1987) (courts have inherent constitutional power to punish 

all contempts of court, which power cannot be abridged or restricted by statute). Given the 

flagrant, offensive, and disrespectfully defiant nature of Guzall’s contemptuous conduct, the 

drastic sanction of defaulting Guzall was not error and served the interests of justice. Grimm v 

Dep’t of Treasury, 291 Mich App 140, 149; 810 NW2d 65 (2010). We also reject Guzall’s 

argument that the default, which led to Seifman obtaining over $200,000 in fees, was in violation 

of MCL 600.1715(1), which only permits a fine of not more than $7,500 for contempt of court. 

Guzall was not “fined” in excess of $200,000; that was simply the amount to which Seifman 

became entitled because of Guzall’s default. There was no violation of MCL 600.1715(1). In 

sum, reversal is unwarranted.4

 2 Guzall is correct that this Court has observed “that an attorney’s failure to appear in court on a 

hearing date is contempt committed outside the presence of the court.” In re Contempt of 

McRipley, 204 Mich App 298, 301; 514 NW2d 219 (1994). However, this is not a case in which 

attorney Guzall, who is also a party, simply failed to appear at a hearing; this is a situation where 

Guzall announced beforehand directly to the court that he would not participate in further 

proceedings unless the court bowed to his demand to rule on the disqualification motion. 

3 Even in earlier proceedings in which Guzall did participate, the trial court chided him for rude 

and disrespectful behavior displayed toward the court, which included rolling his eyes at the 

court. 

4

 Guzall also challenges the trial court’s imposition of a $500 sanction under MCR 2.114(E) for 

filing a frivolous motion for disqualification; however, he fails to address the grounds for 

ordering a sanction under MCR 2.114. Instead, he reiterates arguments that the trial court 

committed numerous legal errors, which demonstrated its bias against Guzall, warranting the 

court’s disqualification. “A party abandons a claim when it fails to make a meaningful argument 
-5-

Affirmed. Having fully prevailed on appeal, Seifman is awarded taxable costs under 

MCR 7.219. 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

in support of its position.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). 

Moreover, given that Guzall’s motion for disqualification was based purely on unfavorable legal 

rulings by the court, which generally do not support disqualification, Armstrong v Ypsilanti 

Charter Twp, 248 Mich App 573, 597; 640 NW2d 321 (2001), the motion was not “warranted by 

existing law,” MCR 2.114(D)(2), and thus there was no error in imposing sanctions under MCR 

2.114(E), Fette v Peters Constr Co, 310 Mich App 535, 549-550; 871 NW2d 877 (2015).