COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

WILLIAM J. MARSHALL 

v. Record No. 0359-94-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MAY 2, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Arthur B. Vieregg, Jr., Judge 

 William P. Shea, Jr. (Duvall, Harrigan, Hale & Hassan, 

 P.L.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (James S. 

 Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 William J. Marshall (defendant) was adjudged an habitual 

offender by the trial court pursuant to Code § 46.2-351. On 

appeal, defendant complains that the court erroneously considered a 

1986 DUI conviction as one of three necessary predicate offenses. 

Defendant argues that this conviction was void because it was based 

upon an invalid local ordinance and, therefore, the adjudication 

was unsupported by the evidence. We disagree and affirm the order. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in this case, 

and we recite only those facts necessary to explain our holding. 

 Code § 46.2-351 provides that predicate offenses for an 

habitual offender adjudication include violations "under any valid

county, city, or town ordinance paralleling and substantially 

conforming to" Code § 18.2-266. Code § 46.2-351 (emphasis added). 

 The proceedings are civil in nature, and the Commonwealth has the 

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated 

for publication. 
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suffered the three requisite convictions. Moffitt v. Commonwealth, 

16 Va. App. 983, 986, 434 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1993); see Code 

§ 46.2-351. The Commonwealth establishes a "prima facie

presumption" that the convictions are valid "by introducing the 

certified DMV transcript listing the . . . convictions." Moffitt, 

16 Va. App. at 986, 434 S.E.2d at 687. "Once the Commonwealth has 

established a prima facie case, it is entitled to judgment, unless 

[defendant] goes forward with evidence that refutes an element of 

the Commonwealth's case or rebuts the prima facie presumption." 

Id. (citation omitted). 

 The conviction in dispute was based upon Fairfax City 

Ordinance 1986-31.1 A copy of the ordinance, introduced into 

evidence by defendant without objection, provides, in pertinent 

part, that it "shall become effective immediately upon its 

execution by the Mayor." The copy reflects the following dates: 

"INTRODUCED" June 24, 1986, "PUBLIC HEARING" July 1, 1986, and 

"ADOPTED" July 1, 1986. The Mayor's attested but undated signature 

appears on the face of the ordinance. In an attachment, the City 

Clerk certified that the referenced ordinance "was in effect on 

July 1, 1986." 

 A "statute speaks as of its effective date." Board of 

Supervisors v. Wood, 213 Va. 545, 547, 193 S.E.2d 671, 673 (1973). 

 Thus, "as a general proposition of law . . . until the time 

arrives for a statute to take effect, all acts purporting to have 

 

 1Fairfax City Ordinance 1986-31 incorporates by reference Code 

§ 18.2-266. 
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been done under it are null and void." Burks v. Commonwealth, 126 

Va. 763, 767, 101 S.E. 230, 231 (1919). 

 Defendant contends that the undated Mayor's signature leaves 

the ordinance without an effective date. However, this argument 

overlooks the unchallenged certification of the City Clerk, which 

accompanied the copy of the ordinance into evidence. When this 

evidence is properly considered, the trial court's determination 

"that the ordinance was signed on or around July 1, 1986" is 

supported by the record. 

 Accordingly, defendant failed to rebut the Commonwealth's 

prima facie case that all requisite predicate convictions were 

valid, and the order is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.