IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DAWN DAVIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 12 C 5843

v. )

) Judge Amy J. St. Eve

OFFICER JAEHO JUNG, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) 

ORDER

The Court grants Defendant City of Chicago’s summary judgment motion and dismisses

the unknown police officer as a Defendant to this lawsuit [54].

STATEMENT

On July 24, 2012, Plaintiff Dawn Davis brought a four-count Complaint against

Defendants Chicago police officer Jaeho Jung, an unknown Chicago police officer, and the City

of Chicago1

 alleging Fourth Amendment excessive force and false arrest claims against

Defendant Officer Jung (Counts I and II), a failure to intervene claim against the unknown police

officer (Count III), and a municipal liability claim pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 611 (1978), against the City of

Chicago (Count IV). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Defendant City of Chicago’s

motion for summary judgment brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) in

which the City seeks judgment on the Monell claim as alleged in Count IV and dismissal of the

unknown Chicago police officer as a Defendant to this lawsuit, along with the failure to

intervene claim against him in Count III. For the following reasons, the Court grants the City’s

motion and dismisses the unknown police officer as a Defendant to this lawsuit.2

 The only

claims remaining in this lawsuit are Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force and false

arrest claims against Defendant Officer Jung as alleged in Counts I and II of the Complaint.

1

 Plaintiff names the Chicago Police Department as a Defendant, but in her Complaint

she properly alleges that Defendant is the City of Chicago. (R. 1, Compl. ¶ 5.) Indeed, the

Chicago Police Department is not a suable entity because it does not have a separate legal

existence from the City of Chicago. See Chan v. Wodnicki, 123 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 1997);

Gray v. City of Chicago, 159 F.Supp.2d. 1086, 1089 (N.D. Ill. 2001).

2

 The City is a necessary Defendant to this lawsuit for indemnification purposes. See

745 ILCS 10/9-102.

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BACKGROUND

Because the parties do not present the facts surrounding Plaintiff’s arrest in their Rule

56.1 Statements — but instead focus on Plaintiff’s Monell claim — the Court turns to Plaintiff’s

Complaint to give context to this Order. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on May 19,

2011, Chicago police officers stopped a vehicle in which she was a passenger. (R. 1, Compl. ¶

6.) According to Plaintiff, after the driver produced his driver’s license and proof of insurance,

two Chicago police officers, including Defendant Officer Jung, approached the passenger side of

the vehicle at which time Officer Jung yelled at Plaintiff to get off of her cell phone and get out

of the car. (Id. ¶¶ 7-10.) Plaintiff maintains that while she was finishing her cell phone

conversation and attempting to open the broken car door, Officer Jung yanked the car door open

and forcefully grabbed her arm. (Id. ¶ 11.) Further, Plaintiff asserts that Officer Jung yelled at

her, pushed her head on the car, forced her to spread her legs, and forced one arm behind her

back resulting in an injury to her wrist. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 19.) Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Jung

then placed handcuffs on her causing additional pain. (Id. ¶ 13.) Thereafter, Plaintiff states that

Officer Jung took her to the police station and charged her with obstruction. (Id. ¶ 18.) After

two court appearances, Plaintiff contends that her obstruction charged was dismissed. (Id. ¶ 20.) 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In determining summary judgment

motions, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there

is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167

L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After “a properly supported motion for summary

judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation omitted). “A plaintiff must begin to meet

this burden by submitting admissible, supporting evidence in response to a proper motion for

summary judgment.” Harney v. City of Chicago, 702 F.3d 916, 925 (7th Cir. 2012). 

ANALYSIS

I. Monell Claim

First, the City argues that Plaintiff has failed to present evidence establishing a genuine

dispute as to any material fact underlying her Monell claim. To establish liability against the

City, Plaintiff “must show the existence of an ‘official policy’ or other governmental custom

that not only causes but is the ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation of constitutional rights.” 

Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff can demonstrate this

2

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requirement through: (1) an actual official policy; (2) a practice or custom that, although not

officially authorized, is widespread and well-established; or (3) a deliberate act from a decision

maker with final policy-making authority. See Gonzalez v. Village of West Milwaukee, 671 F.3d

649, 664 (7th Cir. 2012); King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff bases her Monell claim on the City’s alleged failure to discipline Officer Jung

pursuant to City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412

(1989), and its progeny. To establish a failure to discipline claim under Monell, Plaintiff must

provide proof of the City’s deliberate indifference. See Hollins v. City of Milwaukee, 574 F.3d

822, 827 (7th Cir. 2009); Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1029 (7th Cir.

2006). “This proof can take the form of either (1) failure to provide adequate training in light of

foreseeable consequences; or (2) failure to act in response to repeated complaints of

constitutional violations by its officers.” Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1029-30; see also Jenkins v.

Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff attempts to establish the City’s deliberate indifference by arguing that the City

failed to discipline Officer Jung in response to numerous citizen complaints against him. In

support of her argument, Plaintiff relies upon the citizen complaints against Officer Jung as

evidenced by his Chicago Police Department, Five Year Employee Complaint Register History

(“CR File”).3 (R. 62, Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Stmt. Add’l Facts ¶¶ 1-17.) Although Officer Jung’s CR

File reflects that some of the reported incidents were unsustained and unfounded, other

incidences are still active. (See id.; Ex. A.) Nevertheless, Officer Jung’s CR File does not

reference the investigations associated with the complaints, the details concerning the substance

of the complaints, and the reason why the investigations reached certain outcomes. 

Even when viewing this evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, her reliance on Officer Jung’s CR

File does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that there is a widespread custom or policy

pursuant to which the City of Chicago fails to discipline police officers for violating arrestees’

constitutional rights. See Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1029-30. “When a plaintiff chooses to

challenge a municipality’s unconstitutional policy by establishing a widespread practice, proof of

isolated acts of misconduct will not suffice; a series of violations must be presented to lay the

premise of deliberate indifference.” Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir.

2003); see also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 831, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791

(1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“To infer the existence of a

city policy from the isolated misconduct of a single, low-level officer, and then to hold the city

liable on the basis of that policy, would amount to permitting precisely the theory of strict

respondeat superior liability rejected in Monell.”); see, e.g., Montano v. City of Chicago, 535

F.3d 558, 570-71 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiffs’ evidence of deliberate indifference that was limited

to one police officer did not establish widespread practice). Although isolated acts may satisfy

Monell if the acts are attributable to a final policy maker, Plaintiff has not set forth any evidence

3

 Plaintiff also references the lawsuit Anderson v. Chicago, No. 08 C 5763 (N.D. Ill.), in

which Officer Jung is a defendant.

3

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that Officer Jung had any such authority. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123,

108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481,

106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)); Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F.2d 524, 543 (7th Cir. 1990).

Construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, she has failed

to present sufficient evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact for trial that the City had

the requisite “deliberate indifference” to support her Monell failure to discipline claim. See

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” ). The Court

therefore grants Defendant’s summary judgment motion in regard to Count IV.

II. Unknown Officer 

Next, the City argues that the Court should dismiss the unknown police officer as a

Defendant to this lawsuit. Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to identify this officer within the

applicable two-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims. See Gomez v. Randle, 680

F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2012) (“the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in Illinois is two

years”). As the Seventh Circuit teaches, a “potential defendant who has not been named in a

lawsuit by the time the statute of limitations has run is entitled to repose.” Joseph v. Elan

Motorsports Tech. Racing Corp., 638 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 

It is undisputed that the events underlying Plaintiff’s false arrest and excessive force

claims occurred on May 19, 2011, and that Plaintiff has yet to identify the unknown police

officer over two years later. Also, no summons has issued against the unidentified officer, and

therefore, Plaintiff has failed to fulfill the service requirements under Rule 4(m). Plaintiff gives

no explanation why she has not identified the unknown officer or served that officer. In fact,

Plaintiff fails to address the City’s argument in her response brief. See Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d

1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 2007) (absence of discussion amounts to abandonment of claims). As such,

the Court grants the City’s summary judgment motion in this respect and dismisses the unknown

police officer as a Defendant from this lawsuit. The Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s failure to

intervene claim as alleged in Count III of the Complaint against the unknown officer. 

Dated: February 10, 2014 ______________________________

AMY J. ST. EVE

United States District Court Judge 

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