SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3133-15T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PIERRE A. DENEUS, a/k/a HARRY

JEAN-PIERRE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted April 26, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Farrington.

On appeal from the Superior Court

of New Jersey, Law Division,

Essex County, Indictment No. 10-06-1382.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney

for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, 

on the brief).

Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor,

attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, Special

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

June 21, 2017
2 A-3133-15T2

Defendant Pierre Deneus appeals from the February 8, 2016 

order of the trial court denying his post-conviction relief (PCR) 

petition on the papers without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

We glean the following facts from the record. Following a 

jury trial, defendant was convicted on February 22, 2011, of second 

degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1) and related charges. He 

was sentenced on September 26, 2011, to an aggregate term of 

twenty-six years with a fifteen-year parole disqualifier subject 

to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The 

charges stemmed from defendant's abduction of a thirteen-year-old 

girl off the street, after which defendant drove her to his home, 

offered her money for sex, and attempted to have sex with her 

before she was able to escape. During defendant's incarceration 

awaiting trial, he offered a fellow inmate $5000 to kill several 

witnesses, including the victim, her mother, and defendant's 

roommate. Defendant testified at trial, denying all the charges 

and offering alternative explanations.

On March 24, 2014, this court affirmed defendant's conviction 

on direct appeal, but "remanded for re-sentencing on counts ten, 

eleven, twelve and thirteen, and for consideration of defendant's 

arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

defendant's conviction for second-degree witness tampering on 

count ten." State v. Pierre Deneus, A-3698-11 (App. Div. March 
3 A-3133-15T2

24, 2014), slip. op. at 24. Our Supreme Court denied defendant's 

petition for certification. State v. Deneus, 220 N.J. 40 (2014). 

Defendant was re-sentenced on May 23, 2016, to an aggregate 

fifteen-year term subject to NERA.

Defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR on November 5, 

2014. With the help of assigned counsel, he later filed an amended 

PCR petition on March 13, 2015. Defendant's petition alleged that 

both trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for 

failing to pursue an intoxication defense, for not raising the 

issue of mistaken identification, and for not attempting to locate 

surveillance cameras on the street where the kidnapping occurred. 

In addition, defendant argued that his constitutional rights were 

violated because the police illegally wiretapped his phone, 

entrapped him, and because the prosecutor committed misconduct at 

trial. 

Oral argument was held before Judge Richard T. Sules on August 

7, 2015. On February 8, 2016, Judge Sules issued a written 

decision and order denying PCR without an evidentiary hearing. In 

his decision, Judge Sules found defendant had failed to set forth 

a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, noting 

there was no evidence of intoxication, no evidence that defendant 

and the victim were of different races to support a claim of crossracial misidentification, and no evidence surveillance cameras 
4 A-3133-15T2

existed on 18th Avenue, in defendant’s home, or in the Essex County 

Jail. 

Judge Sules found trial counsel could have reasonably chosen 

not to pursue an intoxication defense and "[[t]he trial court] 

will not second guess trial counsel's strategy." As to the claim 

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue 

of cross-racial identification, Judge Sules found that defendant 

"failed to substantiate any claim that he and the victim were of 

different races."

Regarding the issue of locating surveillance cameras, Judge 

Sules rejected defendant's argument that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to locate cameras on 18th Avenue that 

petitioner claims would have filmed his initial interaction with 

the victim because "[d]efendant [does] not argue how any 

surveillance video, if any even existed, would have introduced 

reasonable doubt into his case." Judge Sules further noted 

defendant raised this issue with appellate counsel, but defendant 

did not specify where a camera that captured the incident could 

be found, nor how any footage might help his case. Defendant 

simply stated that the footage would "deplict [sic] contrary to 

what's alleged by the victim." Appellate counsel asked for 

clarification on "what [defendant] meant by the cameras," which 

defendant did not provide. 
5 A-3133-15T2

Judge Sules also found there was no evidence of wiretapping 

in the case, nor was there any evidence of entrapment. Finally, 

Judge Sules noted no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, 

specifically, no evidence that the trial prosecutor participated 

in either wiretapping or entrapment. 

On April 5, 2016, defendant filed a notice of appeal 

of Judge Sules' February 8, 2016, denial of PCR. On 

appeal, defendant abandons his claims as to wiretapping, 

entrapment, and prosecutorial misconduct, and raises the 

following contention:

POINT I

THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON MR. DENEUS'S CLAIM THAT 

TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL RENDERED 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

We review the PCR court's findings of fact under a clear 

error standard and conclusions of law under a de novo standard. 

See State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004), cert. denied, 

545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed. 2d 898 (2005). However, 

where, as in this case, "no evidentiary hearing has been held, we 

'may exercise de novo review over the factual inferences drawn 

from the documentary record by the [PCR judge].'" State v. Reevey, 

417 N.J. Super. 134, 146-47 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Harris, 
6 A-3133-15T2

supra, 181 N.J. at 421), certif. denied, 206 N.J. 64 (2011) 

(alteration in original).

"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the 

federal writ of habeas corpus." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 

459 (1992). Under Rule 3:22-2(a), a criminal defendant is entitled 

to post-conviction relief if there was a "substantial denial in 

the conviction proceedings" of defendant's rights under the 

Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of 

the State of New Jersey. Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 459 

(citations omitted). "A petitioner must establish the right to 

such relief by a preponderance of the credible evidence." Ibid. 

"To sustain that burden, specific facts" that "provide the court 

with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision" must be 

articulated. State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992). It is, 

therefore, only necessary for us to review the facts and legal 

principles that pertain to this issue.

The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the 

defendant to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.

Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999). 

Rather, trial courts should grant evidentiary hearings only if the 

defendant has presented a prima facie claim of ineffective 

assistance, material issues of disputed fact lie outside the 

record, and resolution of the issues necessitate a hearing. R.
7 A-3133-15T2

3:22-10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013). "Rule

3:22-10 recognizes judicial discretion to conduct such hearings." 

State v. Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 462. 

A PCR court deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing 

"should view the facts in the light most favorable to a defendant 

to determine whether a defendant has established a prima facie 

claim." Id. at 462-63. "To establish a prima facie claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate 

the reasonable likelihood of succeeding under the test set forth 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 

2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,698 (1984), and United States v. Cronic, 

466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984), which [our 

Supreme Court adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987)." 

Id. at 463.

Under the Strickland standard, a petitioner must show 

counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. State 

v. Martini, 160 N.J. 248, 264 (1999). The performance of counsel 

is "deficient" if it falls "below an objective standard of 

reasonableness" measured by "prevailing professional norms." 

Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 80 

L. Ed. 2d at 693-94. "This requires showing that counsel made 

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Fritz, supra, 
8 A-3133-15T2

105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 

S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693). Second, "the defendant must 

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. 

"This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as 

to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 

reliable." Ibid. "Unless a defendant makes both showings, it 

cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown 

in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." 

Ibid. 

In determining whether defense counsel's representation was 

deficient "'[j]udicial scrutiny must be highly deferential,' and 

must avoid viewing the performance under the 'distorting effects 

of hindsight.'" State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 37 (1997) (quoting 

Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed.

2d at 694). Because of the inherent difficulties in evaluating a 

defense counsel's tactical decisions from his or her perspective 

during trial, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that 

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland, supra, 

466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. at 694-95 (quoting 
9 A-3133-15T2

Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164, 100 L. 

Ed. 83, 93 (1955)). 

In determining whether defense counsel's alleged deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense, "[i]t is not enough for the 

defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 

the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 693 104 S. Ct. at 2067, 

80 L. Ed. 2d at 697. Rather, defendant bears the burden of showing 

that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694, 

104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698; see also Harris, supra,

181 N.J. at 432.

Judged by these standards, we are convinced that defendant 

failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel within the Strickland/Fritz test warranting an 

evidentiary hearing. There is no basis for concluding that trial

or appellate counsel's performance was deficient. We agree with 

the PCR court that trial counsel's conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance. We further agree 

with the PCR court that defendant failed to put forth any factual 

basis for his contentions regarding his appellate counsel's 

performance. Defendant has failed to articulate a "[s]ubstantial 
10 A-3133-15T2

denial in the conviction proceedings" of his rights under the 

Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of 

the State of New Jersey. State v. Preciose 129 N.J. 451, 459 

(1992). 

Affirmed.