DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JANE JEISCHA ALDANA PEREZ,

as Personal Representative of the

ESTATE OF JHOURDAN HERNANDEZ,

Appellant,

v.

GREGORY TONY, as Sheriff of Broward County,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-0377

[April 3, 2024]

Appeal of nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Fabienne Fahnestock, Judge; L.T. Case 

No. CACE22014700.

Eric Rudenberg of Rudenberg & Glasser, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for 

appellant.

Kristin Mackenzie, Assistant General Counsel, Broward County 

Sheriff’s Office, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

MAY, J.

The difference between speculation and probable cause creates the 

issue in this appeal. The personal representative of an estate appeals a 

non-final order denying the decedent’s motion to suppress and finding 

probable cause to support the continued seizure of cash by the Broward 

County Sheriff’s Office (“BSO”).1 She argues the trial court erred in finding 

probable cause existed for the seizure and subsequently denying her 

motion to suppress on those grounds. We agree and reverse.

The BSO alleged the decedent was engaged in a workers’ compensation 

insurance fraud scheme. On the date of the search and seizure, BSO 

officers saw the decedent leaving a check cashing store with what they 

1 The seized property’s original claimant died while this appeal was pending. His 

wife, as personal representative of his estate, was substituted.
2

believed was a backpack full of cash. They stopped the car and seized the 

cash.

The BSO alleged the cash was subject to forfeiture for two reasons: 

first, because the decedent used or attempted use the cash as an 

instrumentality in a suspected insurance fraud scheme under section 

932.701(2)(a)5., Florida Statutes (2022); and second, because the 

decedent used the cash in the course of, derived from, or realized through 

racketeering activity under section 895.05(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2022).

• The Investigation, Stop, and Seizure

According to the probable cause affidavit for the seizure, the BSO 

investigated the decedent between June and September 2022 and 

concluded he was operating a workers’ compensation insurance fraud 

scheme. The detective who wrote the affidavit alleged he was familiar with 

this type of scheme through his “training and experience” as part of the 

BSO’s money laundering task force.

He explained that in a typical scheme, an individual sets up a “shell 

company,” which is generally structured as a limited liability company. 

Then, the individual obtains a workers’ compensation insurance policy 

based on the shell company’s lowly projected payroll expense, thus

securing a correspondingly low premium. The shell company’s owner then 

“rents out” its certificate of insurance to uninsured construction 

companies. Those companies are then able to secure construction 

contracts they would not have been able to lawfully obtain without proof 

of valid workers’ compensation insurance.

The construction company’s customers pay the shell company, as 

identified on the certificate of insurance. The shell company’s owner 

cashes the checks, which the uninsured construction companies then use 

to pay their workers. The shell company’s owner usually cashes the 

checks at check cashing stores to avoid the extensive paper trail which 

traditional banks create. The shell company’s owner then dissolves the 

company and sets up a new one before the insurance company’s annual 

audit.

Here, the decedent incorporated a construction company called JMHA 

Global, LLC (“JMHA”) in October 2021. JMHA obtained a workers’ 

compensation insurance policy in November 2021 based on an expected 

annual payroll of $120,000, which required an annual premium of about 

$16,000.
3

The insurance company cancelled JMHA’s policy in July 2022, allegedly 

because no payroll had been reported. While the policy was in effect from 

November 2021 through July 2022, financial records show the decedent

cashed more than $9 million in checks written to JMHA.

The BSO alleged the decedent used the $9 million for payroll expenses 

which JMHA did not report to its insurance company. The BSO estimated 

JMHA avoided paying more than $1 million in premiums by failing to 

report the additional payroll. Further, the BSO alleged the decedent 

incorporated JMHA “for the sole purpose of defrauding [its] contracted 

insurance company . . . [and] laundering [his] business-to-business 

checks through complicit money service businesses.”

The BSO staged an enforcement action at a check cashing store on 

September 16, 2022. The decedent was witnessed getting out of the 

passenger side of a car and entering the store with a flat black Puma 

backpack. About 18 minutes later, he exited the store wearing a “more 

voluminous” backpack, got back into the passenger side, and the car 

pulled away.

The BSO followed the car and eventually stopped it. The BSO alleged

it had probable cause to believe the occupants of the car were “involved in 

a crime” and in possession of currency obtained through an “organized 

scheme to defraud.” BSO officers searched the car and seized more than 

$170,000 in cash from the decedent’s backpack. However, the BSO never 

arrested or charged the decedent or the driver with any crime related to 

the investigation.

The probable cause affidavit for the seizure stated the cash was seized 

pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, sections 932.701–

7062, Florida Statutes (2022) (“the Forfeiture Act”). The BSO specifically 

alleged the cash was subject to forfeiture under section 932.701(2)(a)5.

because it “was used or was attempted to be used as an instrumentality 

in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of,” any 

of the following felonies:

(1) organized fraud, in violation of section 817.034(4)(a)1., 

Florida Statutes (2022);

(2) workers’ compensation insurance fraud, or conspiracy to 

commit that fraud, in violation of section 440.105(4)(f)3., 

Florida Statutes (2022);
4

(3) first-degree grand theft, or conspiracy to commit that 

theft, in violation of section 812.014(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes

(2022);

(4) operating an unlicensed money service business, in 

violation of section 560.125(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2022);

(5) money laundering, in violation of section 896.101(5)(c), 

Florida Statutes (2022); or

(6) racketeering and/or conspiracy to commit racketeering, in 

violation of section 895.03(1) and/or (4), Florida Statutes

(2022).

The BSO alleged the cash was also subject to forfeiture under the 

Florida RICO Act, sections 895.01–.06, Florida Statutes (2022) (“the RICO 

Act”), because it was “used in the course of, derived from, or realized 

through” conduct in violation of the Act. See § 895.05(2)(a), Fla. Stat.

(2022).

• The Motion to Suppress and Adversarial Preliminary Hearing

The decedent moved to suppress the cash as evidence and requested 

an adversarial preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause

existed to support its continued seizure. See generally § 932.703(3)(a), 

(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2022); Golon v. Jenne, 739 So. 2d 659, 661 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1999).

The motion to suppress argued the cash was inadmissible because the

BSO did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify the 

stop of the driver’s car. Further, the BSO lacked evidence of the “core 

element” of the alleged workers’ compensation insurance fraud scheme—

i.e., evidence the decedent had misrepresented JMHA’s payroll expenses

to its insurance company.

The decedent argued cashing a large volume of checks is not illegal and 

the BSO had no evidence he used any of the $9 million on unreported 

payroll. The decedent suggested the cash could have been used to pay for 

JMHA’s equipment, supplies, rent, or subcontractors who carried their 

own workers’ compensation insurance.

The BSO responded the stop was justified under the “automobile 

exception” because the officers had probable cause to believe the car 
5

contained evidence of criminal activity, specifically workers’ compensation 

insurance fraud and money laundering.

The court heard the motion to suppress at the adversarial preliminary 

hearing. There, the BSO presented testimony from the detective who led 

the investigation and wrote the probable cause affidavit.

The detective testified he first noticed the decedent when he was 

conducting surveillance of another subject at a check cashing store in 

June 2022. That day, the detective observed the decedent go into the store 

carrying a black backpack that appeared “very light and flat” and then exit

with the backpack that was “obvious[ly]” heavier and “more voluminous.” 

The detective saw the decedent go into the check cashing store about thirty

more times between June and July 2022.

The detective then determined, through law enforcement databases, the 

decedent had cashed more than $9 million in checks written to JMHA 

between November 2021 and June 2022. He confirmed JMHA had a 

workers’ compensation insurance policy with an effective start date in 

November 2021 based on an expected payroll of $120,000 and would have 

paid more than $1 million in additional premiums if it had reported a 

payroll of $9 million. The detective believed the insurance company had 

cancelled the policy in July 2022 because JMHA had not reported any 

payroll.

The detective personally believed JMHA was a shell company primarily 

because it was registered at a residential address and failed to report any 

legitimate payroll. He also testified he had never seen the decedent go to 

an actual construction site.

After JMHA’s insurance policy was cancelled, the detective saw the 

decedent going into the check cashing store about forty more times

between July and September 2022. But during that time, the decedent no 

longer cashed checks written to JMHA. Instead, the detective believed the 

decedent was cashing checks written to two different entities, both of

which the detective believed were “additional shell companies engaged in 

the same type of fraud.”

The detective testified the decedent’s personal banking records 

substantiated this belief by showing transfers to and from those entities. 

Other records showed the checks written to those entities had been cashed 

when the decedent had been at the check cashing store.
6

The detective testified this type of activity is “typical” of a workers’ 

compensation insurance fraud scheme. He testified that on the day of the 

stop, he observed the decedent enter the check cashing store and come

out with a backpack that “appeared hefty.” That was when he decided to 

stop the car. He believed the cash in the decedent’s backpack was 

“supposed to be for payroll,” based on his experience with workers’ 

compensation insurance fraud cases.

On cross-examination, however, the detective admitted he had no 

evidence the decedent had “lent out” JMHA’s certificate of insurance. He 

admitted he had no specific evidence to show how the decedent had used 

the money from cashing the checks. He also admitted the decedent could 

have used the cash to make large purchases or pay its subcontractors, 

which would not have constituted a payroll expense if the subcontractors 

had their own workers’ compensation insurance. And although the 

detective testified he had seen the decedent on one occasion leaving the 

check cashing store and giving “the bag” to a person in a Jeep, he also 

conceded he could not rule out that person was a subcontractor with its

own insurance.2

In short, the detective admitted his belief the decedent was involved in 

workers’ compensation insurance fraud was based solely on his general 

training and experience. His investigation was limited to the decedent’s

“illegal[] cashing [of] checks at a Check Cashing Store,” and the detective

did not have any specific evidence of how the decedent had used the cash.

• The Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court found 

the stop of the car was lawful under the automobile exception because the 

BSO had probable cause to believe the decedent had committed several 

crimes and the car contained evidence of those crimes. The trial court 

made no findings regarding probable cause to support the continued 

seizure of the cash. The decedent moved for reconsideration, which the 

court failed to rule on.

The decedent, and now his Estate, appeals from the trial court’s order.

2 The detective also relied on the driver’s statements made in an interview 

following the stop, but those statements are not relevant to whether probable 

cause existed to justify the stop. See Baptiste v. State, 995 So. 2d 285, 293–95 

(Fla. 2008) (explaining that an anonymous tip by itself is not enough for an officer 

to have probable cause).
7

• The Appeal

The decedent raises two arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred 

in denying his motion to suppress because the BSO lacked probable cause 

for the stop; and (2) the trial court erred in finding probable cause to 

support the continued seizure because the BSO failed to demonstrate 

probable cause the cash was an instrumentality in the commission of a 

felony. We agree the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress

and reverse.

We apply a mixed standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion 

to suppress: the trial court’s findings of fact are entitled to deference, but 

its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Lowery v. State, 201 So. 3d 

791, 793 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

Here, the trial court denied the decedent’s motion to suppress because 

it agreed with the BSO that the stop was lawful under the automobile 

exception to the warrant requirement. Under the automobile exception, 

law enforcement may stop and search a car without a warrant if an officer 

has probable cause to believe the car contains evidence of a crime. State 

v. Betz, 815 So. 2d 627, 631 (Fla. 2002) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 

U.S. 132, 149 (1925)). This right, however, is not absolute, and if an officer 

has probable cause only for the trunk, then that officer can search only 

the trunk. See id.; see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) 

(“The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no 

narrower-and no broader-than the scope of a search authorized by a 

warrant supported by probable cause.”).

Probable cause only exists where “the facts and circumstances within 

[the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 

information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 

caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Betz, 

815 So. 2d at 631 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–

76 (1949)).

Here, the BSO argued, and the trial court ultimately found, BSO

detectives had probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of 

workers’ compensation insurance fraud and money laundering.3

3 The reliance on money laundering may have been misplaced because the 

detective who wrote the probable cause affidavit alleged a belief the decedent had 

committed only workers’ compensation insurance fraud.
8

The crime of workers’ compensation insurance fraud, as alleged in this 

case, requires proof the decedent knowingly assisted, conspired with, or 

urged another to knowingly make a false, fraudulent, or misleading 

statement, or to knowingly omit, or conceal, material information required 

by section 440.381, Florida Statutes (2022), for the purpose of diminishing 

JMHA’s workers’ compensation insurance premiums. § 440.105(4)(b)4.,

(b)5., Fla. Stat. (2022).

The crime of money laundering, as alleged in this case, requires proof 

the decedent knowingly conducted or attempted to conduct a financial 

transaction involving the proceeds of “specified unlawful activity,” for the 

purpose of either (1) concealing or disguising the nature, location, source, 

ownership, or control of proceeds, or (2) avoiding a transaction reporting 

requirement. § 896.101(3)(a)2.a.–b., Fla. Stat. (2022).

Thus, both crimes alleged require evidence the decedent knowingly 

made a false statement or material omission to JMHA’s insurance 

company as to its expected payroll expenses. See § 440.105(4)(b)4., (b)5., 

Fla. Stat. (2022); § 440.381(1), Fla. Stat. (2022); § 896.101(3)(a)2., Fla. 

Stat. (2022).

But these are the only facts which the BSO’s officers knew at the time 

of the stop. First, the decedent incorporated JMHA in October 2021 and 

registered it at a residential address. Second, JMHA obtained a workers’ 

compensation insurance policy in November 2021 based on an expected 

annual payroll of $120,000. Third, the decedent used a check cashing 

store to cash more than $9 million in checks to JMHA between November 

2021 and July 2022. Fourth, JMHA’s insurance policy was cancelled in 

July 2022 because it never reported any payroll.

Last, the decedent was repeatedly observed going into a check cashing

store between June and September 2022. Each time, he was seen entering 

the store with an empty backpack and leaving with a “more voluminous” 

one. He was also seen delivering cash to an unidentified person on at least 

one occasion. On the date of the stop, he was seen leaving a check cashing 

store with a black backpack that appeared heavy.

The detective who led the investigation and drafted the probable cause 

affidavit testified about Florida’s “typical” workers’ compensation 

insurance fraud scheme. He admitted, however, the BSO did not have any 

evidence the decedent had allowed anyone else to use JMHA’s certificate 

of insurance. He also admitted the BSO did not have any evidence as to 

how the decedent had spent the money from JMHA’s cashed checks.
9

The detective testified the money was “supposed to be for payroll,” but 

admitted this belief was based solely on his experience with Florida’s 

“typical” workers’ compensation insurance fraud scheme, not case-specific 

evidence. He also admitted the decedent could have used the money for 

any number of things other than payroll.

The decedent now argues on appeal the stop was unlawful, because 

without evidence he had used the money from cashing the checks written 

to JMHA for payroll, the BSO lacked probable cause to believe he had made 

a false statement or material omission to JMHA’s insurance company 

about its expected payroll. See § 440.105(4)(b)4., (b)5., Fla. Stat. (2022); 

§ 440.381(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2022); § 896.101(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2022).

The decedent also argues the BSO did not have probable cause to 

believe the car contained evidence of the alleged crimes. JMHA’s 

insurance policy had been cancelled by the time of the stop, and the 

detective testified the decedent was no longer cashing checks written to 

JMHA. Thus, there was “no logical way” the car could have contained

evidence of JMHA’s alleged insurance fraud scheme.

Although the detective testified he had suspected the decedent had 

been cashing checks made out to two other shell companies around the 

time of the stop, the BSO did not present any evidence of who wrote the 

check(s) cashed immediately before the stop was made. Nor did the BSO 

allege either of the two additional shell companies had obtained a workers’ 

compensation insurance policy based on misrepresented payroll expenses.

We hold the trial court erred in denying the decedent’s motion to 

suppress. The BSO’s reliance on the automobile exception to justify the 

stop of the car is unavailing as it lacked probable cause to believe the car 

contained evidence of workers’ compensation insurance fraud or money 

laundering. The BSO did not and cannot point to any specific information 

justifying its belief the cash in the decedent’s backpack came from cashing 

a check written to any company with a workers’ compensation insurance 

policy based on a false statement or material omission as to the company’s 

payroll expenses. See § 440.105(4)(b)5., Fla. Stat. (2022); § 440.381(1), 

Fla. Stat. (2022); § 896.101(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2022).

The detective may have had an educated “hunch” based on his training 

and experience that the decedent had been engaged in a “typical” workers’ 

compensation insurance fraud scheme. But his “hunch” or “mere 

suspicion” does not equate to probable cause to justify the stop of the car. 

See Ray v. State, 40 So. 3d 95, 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding an officer’s 
10

narcotics sale training does not compensate for a lack of other factors that 

would support probable cause).

Because we conclude the trial court erred in denying the motion to 

suppress, we need not address whether the trial court erred in finding 

probable cause to support the continued seizure of the cash. On remand, 

the trial court shall order the BSO to return the seized cash to the 

decedent’s estate.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

CIKLIN and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.