J-S17028-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CURTIS VEASLEY,

Appellant No. 1162 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2014,

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0002731-2008

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2015

Curtis Veasley (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on June 30, 2014, after a jury convicted him of burglary and 

terroristic threats, and the trial court convicted him of persons not to 

possess firearms. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

The charges in this matter arose from an incident that 

occurred in the city of Lower Burrell, Westmoreland County, 

Pennsylvania, on December 16, 2007. Sixteen year-old Nick 

Ruffner, a high school student, was sleeping on the couch in the 

living room of his stepgrandparents[’] home that morning when 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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he was awakened by a loud banging on the front door. The front 

door suddenly “busted open,” and “a guy with a gun came in, 

started pointing it at me and demanding where my step-dad 

Sonny was.” (TT 88, 90). This individual told Nick to tell him 

where his step-father was, or he would “pop” him. (TT 90). 

Nick testified that he was familiar with firearms, and described 

the gun as being a shiny chrome or silver pistol. (TT 90-91). 

Nick further related that the man stated that he was looking for 

Sonny because he had his vehicle, and that he kept pointing the 

gun at his head. Nick testified that he felt like he was going to 

die on the couch that day. (TT 92-93, 103). Nick immediately 

reported the incident to his g[r]andmother and the police, and 

he later identified [Appellant] as the individual who came into 

the house with the gun demanding to know where “Sonny” was. 

(TT 135-136). He also identified [Appellant] at trial. (TT 95-

96).

Detective Scott Cardenas of the Lower Burrell Police 

Department testified that he responded to the Smith residence in 

Lower Burrell on December 16, 2007. (TT 122-123). He 

testified that he observed that the front door and door jam[b] 

were broken out as if the door had been forced. (TT 130-131). 

He interviewed Nick Ruffner and entered a description of the 

BOLO (be on the lookout) for an individual meeting the 

description provided to him. The next morning, Det. Cardenas 

was contacted by neighboring New Kensington Police 

Department and was advised that a person matching that 

description was looking for Sonny Smith in New Kensington, that 

a Kay Veasley had filed a report of a stolen vehicle, and that 

[Appellant] was Kay Veasley’s husband. Det. Cardenas then 

prepared a photo lineup that included [Appellant’s] photo, and 

Nick Ruffner later identified [Appellant] as the gun-wielding man 

who broke through the front door of his grandparents[’] house 

on the morning of December 16, 2007. (TT 133-136).

[Appellant’s] attorney suggested that, because [Appellant] 

believed that Sonny Smith had stolen his wife’s car several hours 

before he entered the Smith residence his entry into that 

residence was justified.2 (TT 147-148). Defense counsel argued 

that [Appellant] was searching for Sonny Smith in an attempt to 

recover the vehicle, and that he had no intent to commit a crime 

in the Smith residence or to terrorize Nick Ruffner. 
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2

 [Appellant] elected not to testify at trial; however, 

the fact of the alleged theft of Kay Veasleys’ [sic] 

vehicle and the report that was made to the New 

Kensington Police Department were admitted by 

stipulation. (TT 154-155).

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/14, at 2–4 (footnote 1 omitted).

Following his conviction, Appellant was sentenced to incarceration for 

an aggregate term of five to ten years plus costs and fines. This timely 

appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant presents the following questions for review:

1. Did the trial court err and commit an abuse of discretion 

in refusing to provide a jury instruction on Justification 

pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. 507 (a)(2) in this case?

2. Did the Commonwealth introduce sufficient evidence at 

trial to establish the requisite element of the crime of 

Burglary “with intent to commit a crime therein” to justify 

the conviction and sentencing at that charge, where the 

Defendant forcibly entered the residence of a third party 

who had stolen his vehicle, seeking its return?

3. Did the Commonwealth introduce sufficient evidence at 

trial to establish the requisite element of the crime of 

Terroristic Threats “intent to terrorize” to justify the 

conviction and sentencing at that charge?

4. Did the Commonwealth introduce sufficient evidence at 

trial to establish the requisite elements of the crime of 

Possession of a Firearm by a Convict to justify the 

conviction at that count, where the firearm allegedly used 

in the incident at issue was never found?

5. Was the weight of the evidence in regard to the crimes 

charged, given the facts establishing entrapment, sufficient 

to overcome the Commonwealth’s burden to disprove 

Justification and sustain those convictions?

Appellant’s Brief at 1.
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Appellant’s first question challenges the trial court’s refusal to instruct 

the jury on the use of force in defense of property. “In reviewing a 

challenge to the trial court’s refusal to give a specific jury instruction, it is 

the function of this Court to determine whether the record supports the trial 

court’s decision.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1257 

(Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 904 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation 

and brackets omitted)). “It has long been the rule in this Commonwealth 

that a trial court should not instruct the jury on legal principles which have 

no application to the facts presented at trial.” Id. at 1257 (citing 

Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 656 A.2d 1369, 1374 (Pa. Super. 1995) 

(citation omitted)).

Appellant requested a jury instruction based on 18 Pa.C.S. § 507, 

which reads, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of property.--The 

use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable 

when the actor believes that such force is immediately 

necessary:

* * *

(2) to effect an entry or reentry upon land or to retake 

tangible movable property, if: 

(i) the actor believes that he or the person by whose 

authority he acts or a person from whom he or such 

other person derives title was unlawfully 

dispossessed of such land or movable property and is 

entitled to possession; and 
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(ii) (A) the force is used immediately or on 

fresh pursuit after such dispossession; or 

(B) the actor believes that the person against 

whom he uses force has no claim of right to 

the possession of the property and, in the case 

of land, the circumstances, as the actor 

believes them to be, are of such urgency that 

it would be an exceptional hardship to 

postpone the entry or reentry until a court 

order is obtained.

* * *

(c) Limitations on justifiable use of force.--

(1) The use of force is justifiable under this section only if 

the actor first requests the person against whom such 

force is used to desist from his interference with the 

property, unless the actor believes that: 

(i) such request would be useless; 

(ii) it would be dangerous to himself or another 

person to make the request; or 

(iii) substantial harm will be done to the physical 

condition of the property which is sought to be 

protected before the request can effectively be 

made.

18 Pa.C.S. § 507 (emphasis in text supplied).

Appellant argues that a justification jury instruction was appropriate 

because “he only entered the residence at issue to lawfully protect and 

retrieve his motor vehicle that had been stolen.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

Contrarily, the Commonwealth argues, “It is clear from the language of 

§ 507 that an immediate return is contemplated” and that “the immediacy 

and fresh pursuit had staled” in this case. Commonwealth’s Brief at 7 (citing 
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Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273 (Pa. Super. 2006) (instructing 

that there must be evidence of immediate necessity to recover property for 

jury instruction)).

Quoting section 507, the trial court disposed of Appellant’s challenge 

with the following analysis:

Other than the stipulation that a report had been made to the 

New Kensington Police by Kay Veasley regarding the theft of her 

motor vehicle, there was no evidence presented by [Appellant] 

that supported the defense of justification as it related to 

protection of property. Furthermore, [Appellant’s] actions were 

not taken immediately after the alleged theft of the motor 

vehicle by Sonny Smith. That incident was to have occurred at 

approximately 4:30 a.m. on December 16, 2007 in the City of 

New Kensington. [Appellant’s] entry into the Smith residence in 

the City of Lower Burrell occurred after day light on that same 

day, hours after the alleged theft of the motor vehicle. . . . 

Because there was no evidence presented at trial to support the 

defense of justification, it was not error to deny that requested 

instruction. It is also clear, however, that even had [Appellant] 

elected to take the stand and testify as to his version of events, 

the trial court did not err in determining that the proffered 

defense did not meet the criterial necessary to invoke 18 Pa.C.S. 

§507.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/14, at 10–11.

Our review of the record confirms support for the trial court’s refusal 

to instruct the jury on the justification defense. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d at 

1257. The fact that Appellant forcibly entered the Smith residence and 

threatened Nick Ruffner, a juvenile (“the victim”), four hours after the 

alleged theft of Appellant’s wife’s vehicle indicates he did not “believe[] force 

[was] immediately necessary” to retake the stolen vehicle, nor did he use 

the force “immediately or on fresh pursuit” after the vehicle was stolen. 18 
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Pa.C.S. § 507(a)(2)(ii)(A). Thus, we conclude that Appellant’s defense-ofproperty argument lacks merit.

Appellant’s second, third, and fourth questions challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for burglary, terroristic 

threats, and persons not to possess firearms. We reiterate that:

when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and 

all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, 

supports all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt. In making this determination, we consider both direct 

and circumstantial evidence, cognizant that circumstantial 

evidence alone can be sufficient to prove every element of an 

offense. We may not substitute our own judgment for the jury’s, 

as it is the fact-finder’s province to weigh the evidence, 

determine the credibility of witnesses, and believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence submitted.

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.2d 943, 972 (Pa. 2013) (internal 

citations omitted).

With regard to his burglary conviction, Appellant contends that the 

Commonwealth failed to prove the requisite element of intent to commit a 

crime. Appellant’s Brief at 8. The Commonwealth responds that intent can 

be inferred from “the totality of circumstances” and that it was not required 

to “specify which crime [Appellant] intended to commit upon entry.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.

A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied 

structure with intent to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at 

the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter. 18 
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Pa.C.S. § 3502(b)). “Thus, to prevail on a burglary charge, the 

Commonwealth is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

offender entered the premises with the contemporaneous intent of 

committing a crime therein, at a time when he or she was not licensed or 

privileged to enter.” Sanchez, 82 A.2d at 972 (citation omitted).

The trial court disposed of Appellant’s second claim of error with the 

following analysis:

While [Appellant] did not challenge much of the evidence 

presented, he did maintain that the Commonwealth had failed to 

establish an essential element of the charge of Burglary, namely, 

that he entered the Smith residence with the intent to commit a 

crime therein.

* * *

“The specific intent to commit a crime necessary to establish the 

intent element of burglary may be found in a defendant’s words 

or conduct, or from the attendant circumstances together with 

all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Commonwealth v. Eck, 

439 Pa.Super. 530, 540–541, 654 A.2d 1104, 1108–1109 

(Pa.Super. 1995), citing Commonwealth v. Tingle, 275 

Pa.Super. 489, 419 A.2d 6 (1980) and Commonwealth v. 

Madison, 263 Pa.Super. 206, 397 A.2d 818 (1979). Futher,

the Commonwealth is not required to specify what 

crime a defendant, who is charged with burglary (or 

attempted burglary), was intending to commit. 

Commonwealth v. Von Aczel, 295 Pa.Super. 242, 

441 A.2d 750 (1981). Further, the Commonwealth 

need not prove the underlying crime to sustain a 

burglary conviction. Commonwealth v. Lease, 703 

A.2d 506 (Pa.Super. 1997) (burglary conviction 

affirmed where defendant was acquitted of the 

underlying crimes of theft and receiving stolen 

property because the factfinder could have 

determined that the defendant entered the residence 
J-S17028-15

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with the intent to steal but did not consummate the 

theft after entry.) See also, Commonwealth v. 

Alston, 539 Pa. 202, 651 A.2d 1092, 1095 (1994) 

(Commonwealth is not required to allege or prove 

what particular crime the defendant intended to 

commit after entry into a residence.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 886 A.2d 256, 260 (Pa.Super. 

2005).

In this case, the Commonwealth did not specify what crime 

[Appellant] intended to commit in the Smith residence. It was 

only necessary that the Commonwealth prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he intended to commit some crime. 

Viewing the evidence in its entirety in a light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict winner, it is clear that the 

Commonwealth sustained its burden. [Appellant] suggested that 

Sonny Smith had stolen Kay Veasley’s car earlier that morning 

and that he had no criminal intent in entering the residence, but 

that he was merely trying to retrieve her property. The evidence 

presented at trial . . . and the reasonable inferences therefrom 

was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [Appellant], who broke through the closed and locked 

front door of a private residence of a third party, brandishing a 

firearm, pointing it at the head of a juvenile who had been 

sleeping on a nearby couch, and demanding to see Sonny Smith, 

had the intent to commit a crime within that residence. The 

evidence was therefore sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict of 

guilty as to the charge of burglary.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/14, at 3–5.

Upon review of the record, we discern no error in the trial court’s 

conclusion that the Commonwealth sustained its burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt the intent element of burglary. The record indicates that 

Sonny Smith allegedly stole Appellant’s wife’s vehicle at 4:30 in the morning 

on December 16, 2007. Armed with a pistol, Appellant went to the home of 

Sonny Smith four hours later to recover the vehicle. Appellant forcibly broke 
J-S17028-15

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into the home, brandished a pistol in front of the victim, pointed the weapon 

at the victim’s head, threatened to “pop” him, and then left. The totality of 

these circumstances supports a reasonable inference, if believed by the jury, 

that Appellant entered Smith’s residence with intent to commit a crime 

therein. Exercising its prerogative as the fact finder, the jury chose to 

accept this inference as true. We may not substitute our judgment for the 

jury’s. Sanchez, 82 A.2d at 972. Appellant’s first sufficiency challenge 

lacks merit.

Appellant’s second sufficiency attack is on the intent element of 

terroristic threats. “A person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the 

person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to: (1) commit 

any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2706(a). Given this definition: 

the Commonwealth must prove that 1) the defendant made a 

threat to commit a crime of violence, and 2) the threat was 

communicated with the intent to terrorize another or with 

reckless disregard for the risk of causing terror. The harm 

sought to be avoided is the psychological distress that follows an 

invasion of the victim’s sense of personal security. 

Consequently, neither the defendant’s ability to carry out the 

threat nor the victim’s belief that it will be carried out is an 

essential element of the crime. Moreover, it is unnecessary for 

an individual to specifically articulate the crime of violence which 

he or she intends to commit where the type of crime may be 

inferred from the nature of the statement and the context and 

circumstances surrounding the utterance of the statement.
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Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 976 A.2d 1184, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2009), 

reversed on other grounds, 30 A.3d 1105 (Pa. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted).

According to Appellant, his remark to the victim, “don’t make me pop 

you,” was a spur-of-the-moment threat and not the proper basis for 

conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 8–9 (citing Commonwealth v. Kidd, 442 

A.2d 826 (Pa. Super. 1982), and Commonwealth v. Anneski, 525 A.2d 

373 (Pa. Super. 1987)). Distinguishing Appellant’s case authority, the 

Commonwealth points to the lack of evidence that Appellant and the victim 

were arguing before Appellant made the threat. The Commonwealth 

contends there was no evidence that Appellant’s actions were anything other 

than a threat of homicide or assault if the victim did not cooperate with 

locating Sonny Smith. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10.

Upon consideration of the victim’s testimony, the trial court found 

Appellant’s claim unsustainable:

The evidence presented at trial established that [Appellant] 

broke through the closed and locked front door of a private 

residence of a third party, brandished a firearm, pointed it at a 

juvenile who had been sleeping on a nearby couch, demanded to 

see Sonny Smith and, all the while pointing a handgun at the 

head of the juvenile, told [the victim], “Don’t make me pop you.” 

[The victim] testified that he thought that he was going to die 

that day. This evidence is clearly sufficient to support the 

verdict of guilty as to the charge of terroristic threats.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/14, at 5–6 (citing Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 

A.3d 327 (Pa. Super. 2010)). We agree.
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With regard to Appellant’s assertion that he never intended to evoke 

terror, “we need only look to the language of the statute to discern that a 

defendant need not harbor the specific intent to terrorize his victim—the 

elements of the offense are established so long [as] the evidence shows 

even ‘reckless disregard’ for the risk of causing terror.” Sinnott, 976 A.2d 

at 1188 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(3)). Here, Appellant broke through the 

closed, locked door of a private residence where the victim was sleeping on 

a couch, approached the victim wielding a pistol, pointed the weapon at the 

victim’s head saying, “[T]ell[] me where your step-dad Sonny is or I’m going 

to pop you one.” N.T., 2/5/14, at 90. The victim recalled, “I felt like I was 

going to die on the couch that morning.” Id. at 93. Regardless of whether 

Appellant intended to place his victim in terror, the testimony establishes 

that the victim feared being shot and killed. Thus, Appellant’s conduct could 

and did violate the victim’s “sense of personal security.” Sinnott, 976 A.2d 

at 1188. Even if Appellant did not intend that result, his failure to recognize 

that conduct so extreme would provoke the victim’s obvious fear of injury or 

death can only be characterized as reckless disregard. Accordingly, we 

conclude the evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s intent and 

culpability under the “reckless disregard” standard of section 2706.

Appellant’s assertion that his conduct consisted merely of “spur-of-themoment threats” is also futile. We recognize that “[s]ection 2706 ‘was not 

designed to penalize spur-of-the-moment threats that arise out of anger in 
J-S17028-15

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the course of a dispute.’” Sinnott, 976 A.2d at 1189 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Hudgens, 582 A.2d 1352, 1358 (Pa. Super. 1990) 

(citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706, Official Comment)). “Nevertheless, ‘being angry 

does not render a person incapable of forming the intent to terrorize.’” Id.

(quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 836 A.2d 999, 1001 (Pa. Super. 

2003)). Even if it did, we discern no support in the record for a conclusion 

that Appellant’s actions were, in fact, “spur-of-the-moment.” Indeed, the 

record establishes that Appellant waited four hours before he began 

searching for Sonny Smith, broke into the locked residence brandishing a 

weapon, threatened the victim, and then left. As we observed in Sinnott:

Unlike those cases in which passions ignite in a quick and heated 

exchange of words over deeply emotional matters, see 

Anneski, 525 A.2d at 376 (finding evidence insufficient where 

defendant threatened to shoot victim in response to victim’s 

threat to run over defendant’s children with her car), the record 

here does not establish circumstances sufficient to negate the 

intent to terrorize suggested by [Appellant’s] . . . conduct.

Sinnott, 976 A.2d at 1189. To the extent that Appellant had no legitimate 

quarrel with the victim who had been asleep on a couch, Appellant’s action 

of breaking into a locked private residence early in the morning, pointing a 

weapon at the victim’s head, and stating, “[T]ell[] me where your step-dad 

Sonny is or I’ll pop you one,” provides “a strong circumstantial inference that 

his intent fell squarely within the range prohibited by the statute.” Id. 

Thus, we conclude that Appellant’s second sufficiency challenge lacks merit.
J-S17028-15

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We note Appellant’s passing argument that the terroristic-threat 

charge should be dismissed pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(d). Appellant’s 

Brief at 9. That statute provides that “[a] person may not be sentenced 

both for burglary and for the offense which it was his intent to commit after 

the burglarious entry or for an attempt to commit that offense, unless the 

additional offense constitutes a felony of the first or second degree.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3502(d). In disposing of this claim, we agree with the 

Commonwealth that “[t]he jury was free to find that any crime could have 

served as the basis for the burglary.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. 

Appellant arrived at the Smith residence armed with a pistol, searching for 

Sonny Smith, and determined to recover his wife’s stolen vehicle. 

Appellant’s conduct supports myriad reasonable inferences regarding what 

crime he intended to commit when he broke into the Smith residence. As 

the Commonwealth observed, “Given [Appellant’s] actions on the morning of 

December 16, 2007, the crimes could have ranged from homicide, assault, 

theft, terroristic threats, recklessly endangering another person, and so on.” 

Id. Thus, we reject Appellant’s argument that his burglary conviction should 

be dismissed.

Appellant’s third sufficiency challenge is to the evidence sustaining his 

conviction by the trial court for persons not to possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6105(c)(2). Appellant stipulated at trial—and concedes on appeal—that he 

qualifies as a person not to possess firearms given his prior drug conviction. 
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Appellant’s Brief at 10. He contends, however, that “there is no proof in this 

prosecution that he possessed an actual ‘firearm’ as required by that 

statute.” Id. In response, the Commonwealth asserts that, although “[n]o 

firearm was recovered or entered into evidence,” the victim’s testimony was 

sufficient to establish the only question for the jury: “whether [Appellant] 

was in possession of a firearm on the date of the incident.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 12 (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 817 

A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

According to the trial court:

[the victim] testified credibly that the weapon he saw in 

[Appellant’s] hand “was a pistol.” (TT 90). He also testified that 

he was familiar with guns, and he knew that it was real. (TT 

91). He described the gun as being shiny, either silver or 

chrome. (TT 90). The term “Firearm” has been defined by our 

legislature as “any pistol or revolver with a barrel length less 

than 15 inches, any shotgun with a barrel length less than 18 

inches or any rifle with a barrel length less than 16 inches, or 

any pistol, revolver, rifle or shotgun with an overall length of less 

than 26 inches. The barrel length of a firearm shall be 

determined by measuring from the muzzle of the barrel to the 

face of the closed action, bolt or cylinder, whichever is 

applicable.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102. As is often the case, the 

police did not recover a weapon from [Appellant], nor was the 

weapon left at the scene. However, [the victim] testified that he 

is familiar with firearms and he was sure that what he saw was a 

firearm. (TT 106). The special interrogatory posed to the 

jury,[1] which was phrased as requested by [Appellant], 

____________________________________________

1

 The special interrogatory read as follows:

Regardless of your verdict at Count 1 and/or Count 2, 

please answer the following question:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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specifically included the statutory definition of “firearm.” The 

jury answered in the affirmative.

* * *

The jury having answered the special interrogatory in the 

affirmative, this court then found [Appellant] guilty at Count 3. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence was sufficient to 

sustain the guilty verdict on the Firearms Act violation, 18 

Pa.C.S. §6105(c)(2).

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/14, at 6–7.

Upon review, we discern no basis for disturbing the trial court’s 

conclusion. Believing the victim’s testimony, the jury acted within its 

purview to find that Appellant possessed a gun during the burglary. Verdict, 

2/6/14. That finding and Appellant’s prior drug conviction provide sufficient 

evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction of persons not to possess 

firearms. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(2); accord Robinson, 817 A.2d at 1162 

(“[Victim] testified that all three attackers possessed handguns. This is all 

that is necessary. That no gun was found on Appellant a half-hour or more 

after the robbery is not dispositive of the sufficiency of the evidence.”). 

Appellant’s contrary argument fails.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

Defendant possessed a firearm on December 16, 

2007 on Fairview Drive in the City of Lower Burrell?

Verdict Sheet, 2/6/14 (statutory definition of firearm omitted).
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Lastly, Appellant claims he is entitled to a new trial because “the great 

weight of the evidence at trial support[s] a conclusion that [he] entered the 

residence of the car thief Sonny Smith to rightfully retrieve his wife’s stolen 

vehicle.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. In response, the Commonwealth defers to 

the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant has waived this challenge. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 14.

A weight of the evidence claim must be preserved either in a 

post-sentence motion, by a written motion before sentencing, or 

orally prior to sentencing. Failure to properly preserve the claim 

will result in waiver, even if the trial court addresses the issue in 

its opinion.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 490 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa. Super. 

2012)) (internal citations omitted).

The trial court addressed Appellant’s weight claim as follows:

[Appellant] has raised for the first time on appeal a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence.

A weight of the evidence claim must be preserved 

either in a post-sentence motion, by a written 

motion before sentencing, or orally prior to 

sentencing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Commonwealth v. 

Priest, 18 A.3d 1235, 1239 (Pa.Super.2011). 

Failure to properly preserve the claim will result in 

waiver, even if the trial court addresses the issue in 

its opinion. Commonwealth v. Sherwood[,] 603 

Pa. 92, 982 A.2d 483, 494 (Pa. 2009).

Commonwealth v. Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa.Super. 

2012). 

[Appellant] did not file post-sentence motions in this case, 

nor did he raise a challenge to the weight of the evidence orally 
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or in writing prior to sentencing. For these reasons, he has 

waived his right to challenge the weight of the evidence on 

appeal.4

4

[Appellant], through counsel, did raise an oral 

motion for acquittal at the close of the 

Commonwealth’s case, which was denied by this 

court on the record.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/14, at 11–12.

Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s analysis and, adopting it 

as our own, conclude that Appellant’s weight claim is waived.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/24/2015
Circulated 03/12/2015 09:21 AM

'--

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WESTMORELAND COUNTY, 

PENNSYLVANIA - CRIMINAL DIVISION 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ) 

) 

VS. ) 

) No. 2731 C 2008 

CURTIS VEASLEY, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

OPINION OF THE COURT ISSUED PURSUANT TO PA.R,A.P. 1925 

t 

The Defendant, Curtis Veasley, was found guilty of Burglary (18 Pa.C.S. §3502(a» and 

Terroristic Threats (18 Pa.C.S. §2706(a)(I» following a jury trial. He was also found guilty by 

the court of Person Not to Possess a Firearm (18 Pa.C.S. §6105(c)(2». He was sentenced on June 

30, 2014 to a total period of five to ten years incarceration, and related costs and fines. This 

appeal timely followed. 

FACTS: 

The charges in this matter arose from an incident that occurred in the city of Lower 

Burrell, Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, on December 16, 2007. Sixteen year-old Nick 

Ruffiler, a high school student" was sleeping on the couch in the living room of his step· 

grandparents' home that morning when he was awakened by a loud banging on the front door. 

The front door suddenly "busted open," and "a guy with a gun came in, started pointing it at me 

and demanding where my step-dad Sonny was." (TT 88, 90).1 This individual told Nick to tell 

him where his step-father was, or he would "pop" him, (TT 90). Nick testified that he was 

familiar with firearms, and described the gun as being a shiny chrome or silver pistol. (TT 90-

I Numerals in parenthesis preceded by the letters "IT' refer to specific pages of the transcript of the testimony 

presented in the trial of this matter on February 4-6, 2014 before this court, and made a part of the record herein, 

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91). Nick further related that the man stated that he was looking for Sonny because he had his 

vehicle, and that he kept pointing the gun at his head. Nick testified that he felt like he was 

going to die on the couch that day. (IT 92-93, 103). Nick immediately reported the incident to 

his grandmother and the police, and he later identified the defendant Curtis Veasley ("Veasley") 

as the individual who came into the house with the gun demanding to know where "Sonny" was. 

(IT 135-136). He also identified Veasley at trial. (IT 95-96). 

Detective Scott Cardenas of the Lower Burrell Police Department testified that he 

responded to the Smith residence in Lower Burrell on December 16, 2007. (IT 122-123). He 

testified that he observed that the front door and door jam were broken out as if the door had 

been forced. (IT 130-131). He interviewed Nick Ruffner and entered a description of the BOLO 

(be on the lookout) for an individual meeting the description provided to him. The next morning, 

Det. Cardenas was contacted by neighboring New Kensington Police Department and was 

advised that a person matching that description was looking for Sonny Smith in New 

Kensington, . that a Kay Veasley had' filed a report of a stolen vehicle, and that Curtis Veasley 

was Kay Veasley's husband. Det. Cardenas then prepared a photo lineup that included Curtis 

Veasley's photo, and Nick Ruffner later identified Veasley as the gun-wielding man who broke 

through the front door of his grandparents' house on the morning of December 16, 2007. (IT 

133-136). 

Veasley's attorney suggested that, because Veasley believed that Sonny Smith had stolen 

his wife's car several hours before he entered the Smith residence his entry into that residence 

was justified. 2 (IT 147-148). Defense counsel argued that Veasley was searching for Sonny 

2 Veasley elected not to testify at trial; however, the fact of the alleged theft of Kay Veasleys' vehicle and the report 

that was made to the New Kensington Police Department were admitted by stipulation. (IT 154-155). 

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Smith in an attempt to recover the vehicle, and that he had no intent to commit a crime in the 

Smith residence or to terrorize Nick Ruffuer. 

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL: 

1. WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S FINDING OF 

GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF BURGLARY? 

The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is 

whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the 

fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn 

from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the 

above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon 

the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is 

free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298,300 (Pa.Super. 2014)(citations omitted). While Veasley 

did not challenge much of the evidence presented, he did maintain that the Commonwealth had 

failed to establish an essential element of the charge of Burglary, namely, that he entered the 

Smith residence with the intent to commit a crime therein. 

The offense of Burglary is defined, in pertinent part, as follows: 

Offense deflned.--A person commits the offense of burglary if, with the 

intent to commit a crime therein, the person: 

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(I) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or 

occupied portion thereof that is adapted for overnight 

accommodations in which at the time of the offense any person is 

present; 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(I). "The specific intent to commit a crime necessary to establish the 

intent element of burglary may be found in a defendant's words or conduct, or from the attendant 

circumstances together with alI reasonable inferences therefrom." Commonwealth v. Eck, 439 

Pa.Super. 530, 540-541, 654 A.2d 1104, 1108-1109 (pa.Super. 1995), citing Commonwealth v. 

Tingle, 275 Pa.Super. 489, 419 A.2d 6 (1980) and Commonwealth v. Madison, 263 Pa.Super. 

206,397 A.2d 818 (1979). Further, 

the Commonwealth is not required to specify what crime a defendant, 

who is charged with burglary (or attempted burglary), was intending to 

commit. Commonwealth v. Von Aczel, 295 Pa.Super. 242, 441 A.2d 750 

(1981). Further, the Commonwealth need not prove the underlying crime 

to sustain a burglary conviction. Commonwealth v. Lease, 703 A.2d 506 

(Pa.Super.J997) (burglary conviction affirmed where defendant was 

acquitted of the underlying crimes of theft and receiving stolen property 

because the factfinder could have determined that the defendant entered 

the residence with the intent to steal but did not consummate the theft after 

entry.) See a/so, Commonwealth v. AlSton, 539 Pa. 202, 651 A.2d 1092, 

1095 (1994) (Commonwealth is not required to allege or prove what 

particular crime the defendant intended to commit after entry into a 

residence.) 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 886 A.2d 256, 260 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

In this case, the Commonwealth did not specify what crime Veasley intended to commit 

in the Smith residence. It was only necessary that the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he intended to commit some crime. Viewing the evidence in its entirety in a light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, it is clear that the Commonwealth 

sustained its burden. Veasley suggested that Sonny Smith had stolen Kay Veasley's car earlier 

that morning and that he had no criminal intent in entering the residence, but that he was merely 

trying to retrieve her property. The evidence presented at trial has been set forth above, and will 

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not be repeated herein. That evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom was sufficient to 

allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Veasley, who broke through the closed 

and locked front door of a private residence of a third party, brandishing a firearm, pointing it at 

the head of a juvenile who had been sleeping on a nearby couch, and demanding to see Sonny 

Smith, had the intent to commit a crime within that residence. The evidence was therefore 

sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty as to the charge of burglary. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 AJd 327 (pa.Super. 2010). 

2. WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S FINDING OF 

GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF TERRORISTIC THREATS? 

Veasley likewise argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain the 

guilty verdict as to the charge of Terroristic Threats, which is defined, in pertinent part: 

Offense deflned.--A person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the 

person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to: 

(1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another; 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(J). Further, 

To be found guilty of terroristic threats, a person must "threaten [ J to 

commit any crime of violence with [theJ intent to terrorize another or ... in 

reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror .... " 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706. 

" '[NJeither the ability to carry out the threat nor a belief by the person 

threatened that it will be carried out is an essential element of the crime.' " 

Commonwealth v. Hudgens, 400 Pa.Super. 79, 582 A.2d 1352, 1358 

(1990) (quoting Commonwealth v. Anneski, 362 Pa.Super. 580, 525 A.2d 

373, 376 (1987), appeal denied, 516 Pa. 621, 532 A.2d 19 (1987». 

"Rather, the harm sought to be prevented by the statute is the 

psychological distress that follows from an invasion of another's sense of 

personal security." Commonwealth v. Tizer, 454 Pa.Super. 1, 684 A.2d 

597,600 (1996) (citing Hudgens, at 1358). 

Commonwealth v. Fenton, 750 A.2d 863, 865 (pa.Super. 2000). The evidence presented at trial 

established that Veasley broke through the closed and locked front door of a private residence of 

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a third party, brandished a firearm, pointed it at a juvenile who had been sleeping on a nearby 

couch, demanded to see Sonny Smith and, all the while pointing a handgun at the head of the 

juvenile, told Nick Ruffner, "Don't make me pop you." Ruffner testified that he thOUght that he 

was going to die that day. This evidence is clearly sufficient to support the verdict of guilty as 

to the charge of terroristic threats. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kane, IO A.3d 327 (pa.Super. 

2010). 

3. WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDING 

OF GUILTY ON THE CHARGE OF POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A 

CONVICT? 

Veasley also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to sustain the 

verdict of guilty of 18 Pa.C.s. §6105(c)(2) (Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, 

sell or transfer fireanns). Veasley conceded that he had a prior drug conviction that prevented 

him from legally possessing a firearm; however, he argued that the Commonwealth had 

, 

presented insufficient evidence to establish that the firearm allegedly possessed by him met the 

statutory definition of "firearm." 

Nick Ruffner testified credibly that the weapon he saw in Veasley's hand "was a pistol." 

(IT 90). He also testified that he was familiar with guns, and he knew that it was real. (IT 91). 

He described the gun as being shiny, either silver or chrome. (TT 90). The term "Firearm" has 

been defined by our legislature as "any pistol or revolver with a barrel length less than 15 inches, 

any shotgun with a barrel length less than 18 inches or any rifle with a barrel length less than 16 

inches, or any pistol, revolver, rifle or shotgun with an overall length ofless than 26 inches. The 

barrel length of a firearm shall be determined by measuring from the muzzle of the barrel to the 

face of the closed action, bolt or cylinder, whichever is applicable." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102. As is 

often the case, the police did not recover a weapon from Veasley, nor was the weapon left at the 

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scene. However, Ruffner testified that he is familiar with fireanns and he was sure that what he 

saw was a fireann. (TT 106). The special interrogatory posed to the jury, which was phrased as 

requested by the defendant, specifically included the statutory definition of "fireann." The jury 

answered in the affirmative. 3 

When evaluating a sufficiency claim, our standard is whether, viewing all 

the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the factfinder reasonably could have determined that 

each element of the crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt. 

This Court considers all the' evidence admitted, without regard to any 

claim that some of the evidence was wrongly allowed. We do not weigh 

the evidence or make credibility determinations. Moreover, any doubts 

concerning a defendant's guilt were to be resolved by the factfinder unless 

the evidence was so weak and inconclusive that no probability of fact 

could be drawn from that evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 332 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing Commonwealth v. Habay, 

934 A.2d 732, 735 (Pa.Super.2007) (citations omitted). The jury having answered the special 

interrogatory in the affirmative, this court then found Veasley guilty at Count 3. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winrier, the evidence was 

sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict on the Firearms Act violation, 18 Pa.C.S. §6105(c)(2). 

4. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE THE 

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURy INSTRUCTION? 

Veasley next alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested jury 

instruction on the defense of justification. In support of that request, defense counsel relied upon 

l Regardless of your verdict at Count 1 audlor Count 2, please answer tbe foUowing questiou: 

Do you find beyood a reasonable doubt that the Defendant possessed a firearm on December 16, 2007 on Fairview 

Drive in the City of Lower Burrell? A firearm is defined generally as any pistol or revolver With a barrel length less 

than 15 inches, any shotgun with a barrel length less than 18 ioches or any rifle with a barrel length less than 16 

incbes, or any pistol, revolver, rifle or shotgun with an overall length of less than 26 iocbes. The barrel length of a 

fl!earm shall be determined by measuring from the muzzle of the barrel to the face of the closed action, bolt or 

cylioder, whichever is applicable. For purposes of this question only, the term "firearm" shall include any weapons 

which are designed to or may readily be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive, or the frame 

or receiver of any such weapon. YES NO 

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the case of Commonwealth v. Birch, 644 A.2d 759 (Pa.Super. 1994). That case, however, was 

clearly distinguishable from the facts at hand. The evidence presented at trial did not justify the 

use offorce to protect property as is defined in 18 Pa.C.S. §507: 

507. Use of force for the protection of property 

(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of property.--The use of force 

upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor believes 

that such force is immediately necessary: 

(I) to prevent or tenninate an unlawful entry or other trespass upon 

land or a trespass against or the unlawful carrying away of tangible 

movabl e property, if such land or movable property is, or is believed 

by the actor to be, in his possession or in the possession of another 

person for whose protection he acts; or 

(2) to effect an entry or reentry upon land or to retake tangible 

movable property, if: 

(i) the actor believes that he or the person by whose authority he 

acts or a person from whom he or such other person derives title 

was unlawfully dispossessed of such land or movable property and 

is entitled to possession; and 

(ii) (A) the force is used immediately or on fresh pursuit after such 

dispossession; or 

(B) the actor believes that the person against whom he uses 

force has no claim of right to the possession of the property 

and, in the case of land, the circumstances, as the actor believes 

them to be, are of such urgency that it would be an exceptional 

hardship to postpone the entry or reentry until a court order is 

obtained. 

(b) Meaning of possession.--For the purpose of subsection (a) of this 

section: 

(1) A person who has parted with the custody of property to another 

who refuses to restore it to him is no longer in possession, unless the 

property is movable and was and still is located on land in his 

possession. 

(2) A person who has been dispossessed of land does not regain 

possession thereof merely by setting foot thereon. 

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(3) A person who has a license to use .or occupy real property is 

deemed to be in possession thereof except against the licensor acting 

under claim of right. 

(c) Limitations on justifiable use offorce.--

(I) The use of force is justifiable under this section only if the actor 

first requests the person against whom such force is used to desist from 

his interference with the property, unless the actor believes that: 

(i) such request would be useless; 

(ii) it would be dangerous to himself or another person to make the 

request; or 

(iii) substantial harm will be done to the physical condition of the 

property which is sought to be protected before the request can 

effectively be made. 

(2) The use offorce to prevent or terminate a trespass is not justifiable 

under this section if the actor knows that the exclusion of the 

trespasser will expose him to substantial danger of serious bodily 

injury. 

(3) The use of force to prevent an entry or reentry upon land or the 

recaption of movable property is not justifiable under this section, 

although the actor believes that such reentry or caption is unlawful, if: 

(i) the reentry or recaption is made by or on behalf of a person who 

was actually dispossessed of the property; and 

(ii) it is otherwise justifiable under subsection (a)(2). 

(4) (i) The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if: 

(A) there has been an entry into the actor's dwelling; 

(B) the actor neither believes nor has reason to believe that the 

entry is lawful; and 

(C) the actor neither believes nor has reason to believe that 

force less than deadly force would be adequate to terminate the 

entry. 

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(ii) If the conditions of justification provided in subparagraph (i) 

have not been met, the use of deadly force is not justifiable under 

this section unless the actor believes that: 

(A) the person against whom the force is used is attempting to 

dispossess him of his dwelling otherwise than under a claim of 

right to its possession; or 

(B) such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a 

felony in the dwelling. 

(d) Use of confmement as protective force.--The justification afforded 

by this section extends to the use of confinement as protective force only 

if the actor takes all reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as 

soon as he knows that he can do so with safety to the property, unless the 

person confmed has been arrested on a charge of crime. 

(e) Use of device to protect property.--The justification afforded by this 

section extends to the use of a device for the· purpose of protecting 

property onI y if: 

(1) the device is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial 

risk of causing death or serious bodily injury; 

(2) the use of the particular device to protect the property from entry or 

trespass is reasonable under the circumstances, as the actor believes 

them to be; and 

(3) the device is one customarily used for such a purpose or reasonable 

care is taken to make known to probable intruders the fact that it is 

used. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 507. Other than the stipUlation that a report had been made to the .New 

Kensington Police by Kay Veasley regarding the theft of her motor vehicle, there was no 

evidence presented by the defendant that supported the defense of justification as it related to 

protection of property. Furthermore, Veasley's actions were not taken immediately after the 

alleged theft of the motor vehicle by Sonny Smith. That incident was to have occurred at 

approximately 4:30 a.m. on December 16,2007 in the City of New Kensington. Veasley's entry 

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into the Smith residence in the City of Lower Burrell. occurred after daylight on that same day, 

hours after the alleged theft of the motor vehicle. 

[W]hen evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, this Court wi11100k 

to the instructions as a whole, and not simply isolated portions, to 

determine if the instructions were improper. We further note that, it is an 

unquestionable maxim of law in this Commonwealth that a trial court has 

broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own 

wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented 

to the jury for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of discretion 

or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error. 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa.Super. 201~) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 200 (Pa.Super.2007) and Commonwealth v. Kerrigan, 920 A.2d 190, 

198 (Pa.Super.2007». Because there was no evidence presented at trial to support the defense of 

justification, it was not error'to deny that requested instruction. It is also clear, however, that 

even had the defendant elected to take the stand and testify as to his version of events, the trial 

court did not err in determining that the proffered defense did not meet the criteria necessary to 

invoke 18 Pa.C.S. §507. 

5. WHETHER THE JURY'S VERDICTS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE? 

The defendant has raised for the first time on appeal a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence. 

[A] weight of the evidence claim must be preserved either in a postsentence motion, by a written motion before sentencing, or orally prior to 

sentencing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Commonwealth v. Priest, 18 A.3d 1235, 

1239 (Pa.Super.201 I). Failure to properly preserve the claim will result in 

waiver~ even if the trial court addresses the issue in its opinion. 

Commonwealth v. Sherwood [603 Pa. 92], 982 A.2d 483, 494 (Pa.2009). 

Commonwealth v. Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270, 1273 (pa.Super. 2012). Veasley did not file postsentence motions in this case, nor did he raise a challenge to the weight of the evidence orally or 

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in writing prior to sentencing. For these reasons, he has waived his right to challenge the weight 

of the evidence on appeal.4 

However, even had Veasley properly preserved this issue for appeal, it is without merit. 

A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is sufficient to 

sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the ground that the evidence 

was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict 

shocks one's sense of justice. 

Commonwealth v. Orie. 88 A.3d 983, 1015 (Pa.Super. 2014), citing Commonwealth v. Lyons, 

_Pa. -' 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (2013). 

A motion for 8 new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A 

new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony 

or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different 

conclusion. Rather, "the role of the trial judge is to determine that 

'notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight 

that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to 

deny justice.' " It has often been stated that "a new trial should be awarded 

When the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's 

sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may 

be given another opportunity to prevail." 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 490 (Pa.Super. 2014), citing Commonwealth v. 

Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 285 (Pa.Super. 2014). The jury's verdict at Counts I and 2, and this court's 

verdict at Count 3, were clearly supported by the weight of the evidence and in no way shocks 

the court's sense of justice. 

4 Veasley, through counsel, did raise an oral motion for acquittal at the close of the Commonwealth's case, which 

was denied by this court on the record. 

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CONCLUSION: 

For the foregoing reasons of fact and of law, the Defendant's issues raised on appeal do 

not merit relief. 

ATTEST: 

Clerk of Courts 

c.c. File 

Leo Ciaramitaro, Esq., Assistant District Attorney 

Timothy P. Dawson, Esq., Counsel for the Defendant 

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