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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

111TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

S. PRT. 

2010

111–51 

HAITI AT A CROSSROADS 

A REPORT 

TO THE MEMBERS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 22, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


seneagle
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director 

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 

Ten Critical Issues for Haiti’s Rebuilding ............................................................. 2 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 4 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 8 

Appendix ................................................................................................................... 9 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, June 22, 2010. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: This report by the committee majority staff 

is part of an ongoing examination of the effectiveness of the relief 

and recovery effort in Haiti in response to the January 12, 2010, 

earthquake. 

On May 25, 2010, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

passed the Kerry-Corker Haiti Empowerment, Assistance and 

Rebuilding Act of 2010, S. 3317. This bill authorizes $2 billion over 

2 years to support the sustainable recovery and long-term rebuilding of Haiti. The legislation establishes a policy framework that 

emphasizes just, democratic and competent governance and investments in people, particularly women and children. It tasks the U.S. 

Agency for International Development to put together a comprehensive rebuilding and development strategy for Haiti. And it 

establishes a senior Haiti policy coordinator responsible for advising and coordinating U.S. policy toward Haiti. 

The committee takes seriously its responsibility to oversee the 

expenditure of the funds that the U.S. Government has pledged 

and spent in Haiti, and to ensure that the administration has the 

policy, personnel, and processes in place for effective use of funds 

within the strategy. While any sustainable strategy for rebuilding 

Haiti must be Haitian-led, given the dire circumstances in Haiti 

and the decimation of Haiti’s civil service, the United States and 

other donors must take an active role in guiding the reconstruction 

process. This report highlights 10 critical issues for Haiti’s rebuilding that require urgent attention by the Government of Haiti and 

the Obama administration. 

The report is based on extensive staff interviews with State 

Department, USAID, Haitian civil society and NGOs, U.N. officials, 

Haitian Government ministries, as well as site visits to hospitals, 

health clinics, schools, temporary settlement camps and emergency 

relocation camps. 

Five months after the earthquake, Haiti is at a crossroads. The 

Haitian Government is faced with daunting challenges in many 

areas—infrastructure, resettlement, job creation, education, health, 

justice and security—and it must confront these challenges with 

reduced capacity. It is essential that the United States and the 

international donor community improve their coordination and help 

an under-resourced Haitian Government make important policy 

decisions and address key rebuilding challenges before any more 

time passes. 

Sincerely, 

JOHN F. KERRY, Chairman. 

(V)

(1) 

HAITI AT A CROSSROADS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti needs to be rebuilt in a sustainable way that considers the 

long-term future of the country and the people. This needs to be 

a Haitian-owned process, led by the Government of Haiti, but circumstances demand strong and strategic support from the donor 

community. 

Five months after a devastating earthquake struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, leading to the deaths of approximately 230,000 people and the displacement of millions, there are worrisome signs 

that the rebuilding process in Haiti has stalled. Haiti is at a significant crossroads, with limited time to enact key policies and programs that will allow the country to build a more sustainable and 

prosperous future. As the sense of immediate crisis has subsided, 

so has the sense of urgency to undertake bold action—the ‘‘reimagination’’ of Haiti hoped for months ago—and the commitment to 

prevent a return to the dysfunctional, unsustainable ways of life 

past. 

The donor community, working with a devastated and often overwhelmed Government, has done a remarkable job in the relief 

phase, forestalling potentially disastrous humanitarian consequences, and providing consistent access to food, water, medical 

supplies, shelter and other basic services. The U.S. Government 

response in particular has contributed to the overall success of 

international humanitarian efforts—it is important to acknowledge 

the tremendous time, effort, and energy expended getting people 

into safer conditions in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. 

However, the reconstruction remains uncertain. Rubble is still 

strewn all over the streets, the majority of buildings are damaged 

if not collapsed, and informal tent settlements—in penurious conditions—have sprouted everywhere. Emblematic of the stalled rebuilding effort is the Presidential Palace, which remains conspicuously in ruins, without any signs of scaffolding or construction. 

Plans for moving the displaced population out of tent cities and 

into more durable shelter, not to mention permanent housing, remain in early draft form. This is particularly alarming given the 

onset of the hurricane season. Even a modest hurricane could kill 

many thousands. The current rainy season also threatens lives by 

increasing the spread of communicable diseases, particularly in the 

squalor of the camps. 

Even before the earthquake, Haiti faced significant developmental challenges. Fewer than 30 percent of Haitians had access 

to electricity, with roughly half of users tapping into the national 

grid illegally. There were longstanding problems with garbage and 

solid waste removal. Clogged canals presented serious and recurVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:26 Jun 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\HAITI-R.TXT MIKEB
2 

ring risks of flooding. As one official noted, it is hard to separate 

what is due to the poverty levels that predated the earthquake and 

what is due to the earthquake itself, in a country where approximately 80 percent of the country lived on less than $2 a day, even 

before the earthquake. 

The enormous difficulties that confronted Haiti for decades have 

only been compounded by the devastation of the earthquake, adding urgency to the critical issues that have the potential to derail 

the effort to rebuild the country if they are not adequately 

addressed in the coming weeks. 

TEN CRITICAL ISSUES FOR HAITI’S REBUILDING

• Establish a feasible, comprehensive rebuilding strategy. While 

the Haitian Government’s Action Plan for National Recovery 

and Development in Haiti represented a good start, much more 

work is needed to translate broad concepts into implementable 

programs that will catalyze and guide the rebuilding process. 

Haitians are waiting for more concrete guidance on everything 

from where displaced persons can resettle and how the education system will be rebuilt to plans for economic decentralization and private sector investment. Fundamentally, Haitians want to know how they are going to be able to earn a 

living and send their children to school. Right now these questions remain unanswered. The lack of a plan and the failure 

to build political support for one makes even small obstacles 

seem difficult. • Build leadership and capacity in the Government of Haiti. The 

Government of Haiti was decimated by the earthquake, losing 

civil servants, senior leaders, the Presidential Palace and most 

of the ministry buildings. Haiti and its leaders remain in shock 

and mourning, and there is a sense of national exhaustion and 

frustration caused by the fact that the earthquake hit just as 

certain positive trends were developing. It is understandable 

that having lost so many of its own personnel in the earthquake, the Government of Haiti has limited capacity, but Haitians need to be reassured that their Government is resolutely 

leading the rebuilding process and is executing a well-thoughtout plan. Likewise, the donor community needs a viable partner who will lay out priorities, appropriately guide reconstruction activities, and make the political commitment necessary 

for success. 

• Empower the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission. While many 

details still need to be sorted out about how the IHRC will 

function, this should not be an excuse for delaying its full establishment and allowing it to become fully operational. The 

IHRC represents perhaps the country’s best near-term prospect 

for driving rebuilding. While an acting executive director has 

been designated for the short term, a search is ongoing for a 

permanent executive director, and the Commission needs to be 

staffed up as soon as possible with technical and administrative experts. Further, donors need to line up behind the IHRC 

and quickly achieve consensus on how it will operate. The 

Commission represents an opportunity to change the way of 

doing business in Haiti—an expertise-based approach that 

3 

builds political consensus—and it is essential that it operate 

with focus, discipline, and decisiveness. • Address the resettlement issue. Addressing the hundreds of 

thousands of Haitians trapped in temporary or informal settlements is the major recovery issue. This already is an emergency situation, and it threatens to get much worse. Everyone 

recognizes that the status quo is unacceptable and 

unsustainable, yet key land-policy decisions have been 

inexplicably delayed. Solutions need to be offered for moving 

displaced people out of the dozens of tent cities that have 

cropped up. There is land available, but land tenure issues 

must be resolved. The longer Haitians continue to live in 

makeshift camps, the harder it will be to reintegrate them into 

communities and take down the camps. Security challenges in 

the camps have been manageable because people have hope for 

a better future, but risks will increase if a sense of desperation 

sets in. • Hold elections expeditiously. It is imperative that Haiti’s fragile 

democracy is not imperiled further by the January earthquake, 

or by the necessary postponement of parliamentary elections 

originally scheduled for last February. A Presidential decree 

formally initiating a process for Presidential and parliamentary elections in November is apparently imminent, but the 

tasks ahead are immense, including registering voters in a 

country where so many government records were lost. A legitimate and democratically elected government is an essential 

precondition for laying a strong, sustainable foundation for 

Haiti’s future. • Donors need to speak with one voice and improve coordination. There is too much fragmentation in the donor community and 

too much disagreement. Conflicting messages are going to 

President Pre ́val and the Government, leading to confusion 

and mixed signals on important issues. The donor community 

needs a unified and consistent voice to represent its interests 

with the authority to make necessary decisions to push the 

process forward. Many agree that the U.N. Special Envoy, 

former President Bill Clinton, may be in the best position to 

assume this role. The donor community also needs to confront 

significant coordination problems and determine the best way 

to align its priorities within an overall rebuilding framework. 

Current donor efforts are marked by excessive fragmentation 

and a proliferation of approaches and strategies that are undercutting recovery and rebuilding. 

• Coordinate U.S. assistance efforts with the Government of Haiti 

and other donors. As the U.S. Government puts together its development strategy and begins to program money for different 

rebuilding priorities, it is important that our efforts complement other donors and support the Government of Haiti’s 

development framework. In other contexts, there has been a 

tendency to operate outside the main development framework, 

leading to redundancies and overlap. Because the United 

States is such a big player in Haiti’s rebuilding, it is important 

that U.S. efforts are well-coordinated internally (this includes 

imminently naming an overall coordinator for assistance to 

4 

Haiti), and that we continue to provide vital leadership to the 

donor community and support to the Government of Haiti. • Rebuild Haiti’s decimated civil service. Haiti’s bureaucracy and 

civil service suffered a triple blow from the earthquake. Almost 

all the ministry buildings were damaged or destroyed due to 

their proximity to the epicenter of the quake, immediately killing a huge number of civil servants and shattering the backbone of Haiti’s Government. As of today, most ministries are 

operating out of makeshift offices, including basic tents. Computer systems are not functioning, electricity is threadbare, 

and basic supplies are hard to come by. Moreover, most civil 

servants have yet to receive any salaries since the earthquake 

struck. There is a significant risk that many will begin leaving 

the government and searching for alternate sources of income 

if salaries are not restored soon, further diluting the government’s capacity. Stabilizing Haiti’s public sector must be a top 

priority, and donors should work with the Government of Haiti 

to get payments flowing again to the civil service, including to 

critical personnel such as doctors, nurses, and teachers, many 

of whom have not been paid since before the earthquake. • Maintain security gains. The successes of the U.N. security 

mission and police training programs have been widely recognized. Right before the earthquake struck, security was one of 

the success stories in the country, with neighborhoods such as 

Cite ́ Soleil having gained significant stability. The challenge of 

maintaining security has become more difficult and an increase 

in gang violence has been noted in recent months. It is vital 

that the Government and international community continue to 

build the capacity of the Haitian National Police and that key 

justice sector reforms are pushed forward. These include addressing indefinite pretrial detentions and confronting alleged 

prison and human rights abuses. Continued international support for the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 

is essential, though the international community must ensure 

that MINUSTAH’s mandate is not stretched beyond an achievable and definable set of objectives. • Bring the broader Haitian community into the rebuilding process. While many look to the Government of Haiti to provide 

guidance and leadership for rebuilding, it is equally important 

that Haitian civil society and others outside the government 

participate in the reconstruction. Rebuilding the country 

should not be politicized, but should be an inclusive process 

that attempts to build a functional, equal, and responsible society. The Government of Haiti must embrace civil society, Haitian nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector as 

it rebuilds; without broader inclusion of Haitian stakeholders, 

the formation of a ‘‘reimagined’’ Haiti will be difficult to 

achieve. 

DISCUSSION

The following provides a longer discussion of the issues raised 

above, based on a series of meetings, interviews, and several committee staff visits to Haiti, both before and after the January earthquake. 

5 

What is the rebuilding strategy for Haiti? At the March 2010 

donors conference, the Government presented its ‘‘Action Plan for 

National Recovery and Development in Haiti’’ (http://www.haiti 

conference.org/HaitilActionlPlanlENG.pdf), which delineated 

four broad areas of priority for rebuilding: territorial (roads, watershed, infrastructure, urban redevelopment), economic (agriculture, 

private sector investment, electricity), social (housing, education, 

health), and institutional (democratic governance, justice and security, public administration). This represented an important step 

forward at the time and provided a good blueprint for guiding implementation and more specific programming. Unfortunately, 

progress on planning seems to have stalled since then, and specific 

plans to move forward on implementation of these four priority 

areas have not yet been issued. As a result, key decisions remain 

in flux and critical humanitarian issues related to shelter and 

resettlement are not resolved. Even if longer term rebuilding issues 

require additional time and deliberation, short-term imperatives 

should be acted upon with greater urgency. We advise the following: 

• Work from the Government of Haiti’s Action Plan to flesh out 

specific implementation details. There is an agreed upon development framework for Haiti rebuilding. The Government of 

Haiti, donors, and NGOs now need to come together and determine specific details of this plan in order to begin implementing key priorities. While most agree on broader principles 

of rebuilding, the success or failure of rebuilding ultimately 

rests on specific programs, activities and projects. 

• Agree upon a timetable and hold stakeholders accountable. 

Key stakeholders need to come together and decide on an 

implementation timetable—i.e., by a certain date a full resettlement strategy will be agreed upon and by a subsequent 

date, the Government will promulgate necessary land policy 

regulations to allow camp inhabitants to transition back to permanent housing and permanent communities. 

• Come up with a short-term priority list and enforce a rigid implementation schedule. Even while longer term issues require 

further thought and deliberation, there is consensus on some 

key issues that need to move forward in the next 3–6 months, 

especially with regard to resettlement. These issues need to be 

expedited and resolved as soon as possible. 

Capacity of the Government of Haiti. The ability of the Haitian 

Government to lead an effective, credible and legitimate rebuilding 

process has been debated extensively. Some interlocutors believe 

that Haiti’s national leaders lack the political will to lead, but all 

observers readily concede that the Government lacks the human, 

financial, and technical resources to take a decisive role in shaping 

recovery and development efforts—and it clearly needs international help. There are many factors behind this: 

• Presidential leadership. The effort to rebuild Haiti must be led 

by Haiti’s Government, starting with President Pre ́val. To 

date, the Government has not done an effective job of communicating to Haitians that it is in charge and ready to lead the 

rebuilding effort. President Pre ́val should take a more visible 

6 

and active role, despite the difficulties confronting his government. One of the President’s main priorities has been to 

remove the informal Champs de Mars settlement, which sits in 

front of the ruined Presidential Palace and sprang up after the 

earthquake. His leadership and commitment to tackle a broader array of priorities in the near future is crucial. • Key Government deputies are not empowered. President Pre ́val 

can help enormously by providing vital support to deputies assigned to lead the Government rebuilding efforts. It is important that the President empower his lieutenants to make key 

development decisions about where to permanently house displaced citizens, where to allocate resources, and how to 

prioritize rebuilding. As a result of the current consolidation of 

decisionmaking power, many parts of the process have been 

beset by paralysis because donors do not have the green light 

to move forward on critical issues and their government counterparts do not feel empowered by President Pre ́val to sign off 

on important tasks and decisions. 

Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC). The IHRC is touted 

by many in Haiti as the best near-term solution for galvanizing the 

rebuilding process and moving things forward. The idea behind 

IHRC is to create an efficient mechanism separate from the bureaucracy of Haiti’s line ministries that will sit key donors together 

with government officials and allow for swift decisions and implementation of development priorities. As the President’s top economic advisor indicated, an executive director of the IHRC would 

work with a technical team of 60 people (including Haitian, expatriate and international experts and advisors) to vet donor and 

NGO proposals as they come in, as well as to fill in the specifics 

behind the Government’s rebuilding framework. The executive director would be the first screen for approving projects forward or 

declining to advance them. The executive director’s recommendations would then be forwarded to either the full IHRC board (which 

is chaired by Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and U.N. Special 

Envoy Bill Clinton, and comprised of an even balance of donor representatives and Haitian representatives from the government, 

parliament, and civil society) or to a partial board for projects requiring less money. If the projects were independently funded, then 

the process would conclude. If the projects required funding from 

the multidonor trust fund, then they would be screened by its 

board before funds were finally released and the project approved. 

There are several concerns with this setup and the general evolution of the IHRC: 

• Is it overly bureaucratic? Multiple checks are essential for 

transparency and accountability, but this must also be balanced with efficiency. The outlined process has the potential to 

dramatically slow things down through cumbersome bureaucratic obstacles at a time when Haiti cannot afford to delay its 

rebuilding. At a certain point, one questions if the added value 

of yet another board signoff is worth the delay in time. It is 

strongly recommended that key stakeholders involved in the 

IHRC, particularly the Government of Haiti and donors, consider streamlining and consolidating boards into a single approval process, and that specific fast-track authority for smallVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:26 Jun 22, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\HAITI-R.TXT MIKEB
7 

er projects be given to the executive director and a core ‘‘advisory board’’ to speed up the process. This is an area in which 

breaking with past Haitian practice is absolutely essential. 

• Who is in charge? Since the March donors conference, which 

established the IHRC structure, it is still unclear what resources the IHRC has at its disposal to start moving resources 

in support of key development priorities, and who is empowered to make the necessary leadership decisions. While President Pre ́val and former President Clinton have supported 

Gabriel Verret as the acting executive director of the IHRC, a 

formal search process is underway to find a more permanent 

executive director. Until an executive director is officially 

named, the acting executive director has very little authority 

to actually implement critical time-sensitive decisions. 

• Donor disagreements. There are clear disagreements among 

donors about how the IHRC approval structure should work, 

which entity has ultimate sign-off for disbursement of funds 

from the multidonor trust fund, and how much discretion 

should be given to the IHRC secretariat. If not resolved, these 

disagreements threaten to slow funding. It is difficult to pressure the Government of Haiti to move expeditiously when donors themselves lack consensus about the structure of the 

IHRC. 

Constructively addressing the resettlement issue. Adequately 

addressing the hundreds of thousands of Haitians residing in temporary or informal settlements has arisen as the major recovery 

issue for the country, and the paralysis in decision-making bodes 

poorly for speedy resolution. Moreover, the longer Haitians continue to reside in makeshift camps, the harder it will be to reintegrate citizens into communities and take down the camps. 

Experts estimate that 200,000 Haitians could move back into 

homes labeled ‘‘green’’ (deemed to be safe from collapse) right 

away, and that another 125,000 could be housed in semi-permanent transitional shelters (‘‘T-shelters’’) in the next month. Unfortunately, this resettlement is delayed because of several factors, including lack of clarity on land policy (i.e., whether displaced persons owe full back rent to landlords despite not living in leased 

houses for the last 5 months), as well as significant customs delays 

for getting essential construction and building material into the 

country. Meanwhile, in the camps, there is a reluctance to improve 

services—to provide more latrines, better security, food assistance, 

and access to schools—due to the concern that more Haitians will 

be drawn from their communities and move into the camps in order 

to get these services (however unpleasant and dangerous conditions 

may be). The land policy stalemate must be overcome as soon as 

possible to encourage Haitians to move out of the camps en masse 

and rebuild their lives in regular communities. In the longer term, 

the Government needs to consider more permanent solutions to the 

problems that plague Port-au-Prince, including land scarcity, overcrowding, and an unsustainable strain on services. In particular, 

this means seriously considering the concept of ‘‘decentralization,’’ 

and whether to invest significant resources into developing alternate economic centers away from the Port-au-Prince. 

8 

CONCLUSION

Haiti is at a critical crossroads five months after the earthquake. 

The United States and the international community are faced with 

tough choices about how best to support the Haitian Government 

to rebuild the country and provide desperately needed services to 

the Haitian people. While many immediate humanitarian relief priorities appear to have been met, there are troubling signs that the 

recovery and longer term rebuilding activities are flagging. With 

the rainy season well underway and the hurricane season rapidly 

approaching, time is running short on a host of critical policy decisions, ranging from resettlement to infrastructure rehabilitation. 

The Government of Haiti, led by President Pre ́val and Prime 

Minister Bellerive, faced difficult odds even before the earthquake, 

and restoring government capacity will be a long-term effort. Operational capabilities aside, however, the Haitian nation desperately 

needs the leadership and vision that the President and Prime Minister were elected to provide. The government needs to assertively 

guide the next phase of Haiti’s rebuilding, implement a viable 

development strategy, and take decisive steps to move Haiti onto 

a more sustainable reconstruction path. 

Likewise, international donors have an important role to play in 

supporting the rebuilding effort and helping to stand up the IHRC 

by providing critical technical and administrative capabilities. The 

donor community must minimize fragmentation and speak in a 

more cohesive and unified fashion. The last thing Haiti can afford 

is a donor community beset by disagreements and cacophony of 

approaches. 

Key decisions must not be delayed while the Haitian Government 

reorganizes itself; time is of the essence, and getting the IHRC up 

and running should be an immediate priority. 

Ultimately, this must be a Haitian-owned process, and the success or failure of rebuilding lies with the citizens of the country, 

from the community level up through the national government. 

But, given the circumstances, donors will have to play an essential 

role in assisting Haitians with picking up the pieces of their country and building a more sustainable, responsible, and just future. 

(9) 

A P P E N D I X 

HAITI AT A CROSSROADS 

Fig. 1: The Presidential Palace in Haiti remains in ruins, and 

there are no signs of demolition or reconstruction underway. Several containers and makeshift buildings are being used as temporary meeting spaces on the grounds of the Presidential Palace. 

June 8, 2010 


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10 

Fig. 2: Tents and primitive structures in the Ancien Ae ́roport 

Militaire Camp house approximately 50,000 residents. Sites are becoming increasingly permanent, with slabs of corrugated metal reinforcing flimsy walls and tarps. June 7, 2010 


win2.eps
11 

Fig. 3: Adolescent boys play in the Ancien Ae ́roport Militaire 

Camp. The boys in the foreground are standing on a set of showers 

that were installed several weeks prior by an international NGO. 

The night before staff’s visit, criminal gangs had torn down the 

showers, leaving just the concrete slab. Gang violence and criminality are on the upswing at the camp. In addition to harassing the 

camp population, gangs have targeted the water delivery, latrines, 

showers, and sanitation facilities provided by NGOs. Crumbling 

buildings affected by the earthquake are in the background. June 

7, 2010 


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Fig. 4: Women stand in line with their children at a medical 

clinic run by an international NGO at the Ancien Ae ́roport 

Militaire Camp. Disease remains a big problem in Haiti, but health 

care has actually improved since the earthquake due to the influx 

of outside aid money. While minimal, the services provided in the 

camp are often better than services Haitians can access outside of 

the camp, creating an incentive for people to remain in camps for 

the longer term and presenting a serious challenge for reintegrating people back into their communities. June 7, 2010 


win4.eps
13 

Fig. 5: Tabarre Issa Emergency Relocation Camp is one of the 

few planned relocation sites for people who were displaced by the 

earthquake. This photograph illustrates the impressive organization of the camp, with adequate space between tents, sufficient 

sanitation facilities, and lighting around the roads. While the emergency relocation camp concept has been successful when implemented, the system as a whole lacks the resources to sufficiently 

address the overwhelming needs of Haiti’s population. More land 

needs to be identified for resettlement and relocation of displaced 

people, but until thorny land tenure issues are resolved, Haitians 

will continue living in the squalor of makeshift tent camps, such 

as the Ancien Ae ́roport Militaire Camp. June 8, 2010 


win5.eps
14 

Fig. 6: ‘‘T-shelters,’’ semi-permanent transitional shelters, are 

being constructed at many relocation sites, including at the 

Tabarre Issa Emergency Relocation Camp. While durable, the Tshelters have been more expensive than budgeted, and their construction has been delayed due to supplies being held up by Haitian Customs officials. It has been estimated that 125,000 T-shelters have been donated (which could house up to 600,000 people), 

but the land upon which to build and place them has yet to be 

identified by the Government of Haiti. June 8, 2010 


win6.eps
15 

Fig. 7: School children in Port-au-Prince walk amidst the rubble 

to get to their classrooms. Education remains a huge challenge in 

Haiti. The earthquake destroyed an estimated 4,228 schools as well 

as the Ministry of Education building itself, leading to the deaths 

of around 38,000 students, 1,347 teachers, and 180 education personnel. One of the principal challenges in the education sector in 

Haiti is that 85% of the schools are private and unregulated, with 

little or no oversight by the Government of Haiti. The vast majority 

of schools are ineffective, have no money to pay for teachers, few 

teaching materials and an unstructured curriculum. Approximately 

80–90% of university facilities in Haiti were demolished by the 

earthquake. The lack of higher education, vocational, and professional training is a huge and widening gap for Haiti. June 8, 2010 


win7.eps
16 

Fig. 8: Piles of files from the Ministry of Education rescued from 

their collapsed building are stacked outside in a semi-protected 

area, not sheltered sufficiently to be protected from the rain. Many 

important records, such as international exam scores, matriculation 

records and qualification tests for teachers were lost in the earthquake and many of the files that did survive are strewn across 

rooms and piled in corners. The destruction of so many records creates enormous challenges for teachers and students in Haiti’s educational system. June 8, 2010 


win8.eps
17 

Fig. 9: Even five months after the earthquake, rubble blocks and 

slows travel on roads in many parts of Port-au-Prince, leading to 

horrific traffic congestion and continuing to make sections of the 

city impassable. Rubble removal is the first critical step towards reconstruction; it is a precursor to accessible roads, ports, airports, as 

well as improved infrastructure such as water, sewage and electrical systems. Until the rubble is removed, Haitians will not be 

able to return to their pre-earthquake communities. June 8, 2010 

Æ 


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