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53–985 PDF 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

111TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

S. PRT. 

2009

111–37 

STRIKING THE BALANCE: 

U.S. POLICY AND STABILITY IN GEORGIA 

A R E P O R T 

TO THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 22, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


seneagle
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

Republican Leader designee 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 

Background .............................................................................................................. 2 

Analysis .................................................................................................................... 4 

Security Assistance .......................................................................................... 4 

Breakaway Regions .......................................................................................... 6 

Early Warning and Maritime Security ........................................................... 8 

Recommendations .................................................................................................... 8 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 9 

APPENDIXES

Appendix I.—Meetings With Individuals in Georgia and Washington, DC ....... 11 

Appendix II.—U.S. Assistance to Georgia, 1992–2009 ......................................... 12 

Appendix III.—U.S. Security Assistance and Training in Georgia ..................... 14 

(III)

(v) 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, December 22, 2009. 

DEAR COLLEAGUE: From October 26 to November 1, 2009, I directed my Senate Foreign Relations Committee professional staff 

member for European Affairs, Marik String, to travel to Georgia to 

evaluate U.S. security assistance and policies to promote regional 

stability. During the trip, staff met with U.S. embassy and senior 

Georgian national security officials, as well as with monitors from 

the European Union and other international donors. 

In the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict between Georgia 

and Russia, the United States pledged $1 billion in assistance to 

Georgia to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the Georgian 

people and assist in rebuilding the Georgian economy. As this infusion of post-conflict assistance is concluded, the United States must 

develop a long-term policy for moving Georgia towards Euro-Atlantic institutions, while averting a renewal of armed conflict. Even as 

the Obama administration pursues a more productive relationship 

with Russia on arms control, nuclear security, Iran, Afghanistan, 

and other issues, we must raise the profile of diplomatic efforts to 

mitigate deep tensions that remain between Georgia and Russia. 

Russia’s 2008 foray into Georgia seriously damaged Georgia’s 

military capacity, and Russian threats to sanction entities engaging 

in arms deals with Georgia have left it unable to procure many defense articles, even as some NATO allies explore unprecedented 

military sales to Russia. The United States, too, has not provided 

lethal defense articles to Georgia since the 2008 war but has focused instead on the intellectual aspects of defense reform such as 

doctrine and training. As Georgia continues reforms in the direction of Euro-Atlantic institutions, the United States and NATO allies must reconcile a policy that leaves a dedicated NATO partner 

unable to provide for its basic defense requirements. These efforts 

will be most effective if they are undertaken on a multilateral 

basis. The Alliance must come to grips with the reality that Georgia will require coordinated security support from America and European nations for some years to come. 

This staff report examines how the United States can enlist 

greater diplomatic support among NATO partners for a coordinated 

strategy on Georgia, which includes regional arms sales, non-use of 

force agreements, and confidence building measures in South 

Ossetia and Abkhazia. It also explores how addressing these interVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:12 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 H:\DOCS\53985.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
vi 

related sources of insecurity on a multilateral basis could benefit 

the Russian Federation. 

Given the role of Congress in reviewing assistance proposals for 

Georgia, I am hopeful that this report can provide useful background and advance policy avenues in support of stability and political progress in Georgia and the entire region. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Ranking Member. 

(1) 

1 In January 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev asked his government to ‘‘restrict or 

cut military-technical and military-economic cooperation’’ with entities providing weapons to 

Georgia. 

STRIKING THE BALANCE: 

U.S. POLICY AND STABILITY IN GEORGIA 

From October 26 to November 1, 2009, minority professional 

staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee travelled to Georgia to assess the security situation and U.S. foreign assistance provided since the August 2008 conflict with Russia. Staff met with 

U.S. embassy officials as well as senior defense and national security officials from the Georgian Government, opposition leaders, 

international donors, members of the NGO community, think-tank 

representatives, and international monitoring officials. At the direction of Senator Richard Lugar, the purpose of the visit was to: 

• Assess the $1 billion assistance package pledged to Georgia following the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict;

• Investigate the mix of security assistance provided to Georgia 

prior and subsequent to the 2008 conflict; 

• Examine the security situation with regard to the breakaway 

enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and 

• Generate policy recommendations for advancing stability in 

Georgia and the region. 

INTRODUCTION

Despite extraordinary economic commitments by the United 

States and international community, comprising over $4.5 billion 

since the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, Georgians convey an 

acute sense of insecurity. No international observers or non-governmental organizations have been granted access to South Ossetia, 

only a 45 minute drive from Tbilisi. Russian troops, instead of 

withdrawing to pre-war positions and reducing troop strength to 

pre-war levels as the French-brokered 2008 ceasefire requires, are 

constructing permanent bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

As a result of Russian diplomatic pressure and threats to restrict 

commercial ties with entities selling defense articles to Georgia,1

the Georgian military has been unable to replenish much of its 

military capacity that was eviscerated in the war. While U.S. instruction in military doctrine and advice on institutional reform 

continues apace, even the United States, under substantial Russian 

diplomatic pressure, has paused the transfer of lethal military articles to Georgia, and no U.S. assistance since the war has been directly provided to the Georgian Ministry of Defense. Consequently, 

Georgia lacks basic capacity for territorial defense, and stability 

2 

2See testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip H. 

Gordon, ‘‘Georgia: One Year After the August War,’’ hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, August 4, 2009. 3See NATO Freedom and Consolidation Act of 2007, which became law (P.L. 110–17) on April 

9, 2007. 4See Declaration of Heads of State and Government, Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, Bucharest, Romania, April 3, 2008. 5For example, France has approved the sale of a Mistral-class amphibious assault ship to 

Russia, reportedly one of the largest military sales ever from a NATO country to Russia. Mistral-class ships can carry landing barges, tanks, and helicopters, providing littoral combat capability. Russian Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy has boasted that in the 2008 conflict with Georgia, 

‘‘a ship like that would have allowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes, not 26 hours, which is how long it took us.’’ 

along the administrative line with South Ossetia has been achieved 

largely through a delicate political balance facilitated by unarmed 

monitors from the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). 

The current state of affairs in Georgia has left the United States 

and allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in a 

tenuous situation. The Obama Administration,2 the United States 

Congress,3 and NATO Heads of State4 have expressed support for 

Georgia’s integration within NATO. Nonetheless, Georgia has 

lacked the influence to acquire many capabilities that form the 

basis of territorial defense planning. Meanwhile, certain NATO allies are exploring unprecedented military agreements with the Russian Federation.5

Failing a coordinated, NATO-led strategy for security assistance 

in the region, allies run the risk of disturbing an already fragile political balance and engendering an excessive nationalization of 

Georgian defense policy. In the longer-term, a continuation of the 

status quo appears to ensure that Georgia will not only have difficulty providing for its own territorial defense needs but remain 

susceptible to the internal strife and external manipulation that 

often accompany such national insecurity. 

This report assesses the role the United States has played in stabilizing the situation in Georgia since the 2008 conflict and offers 

policy recommendations on how the United States and international community can avert renewed violence in the region. 

BACKGROUND

Spanning the political fault lines of Europe and Asia, Georgia 

and the nations of the Caucasus have prospered and suffered for 

centuries as a result of imperial rivalry. The United States has developed a close partnership with Georgia since its independence in 

1991 and has provided $1.67 billion in foreign assistance dollars 

from 1992 to 2009, the largest amount to any country in the South 

Caucasus (see Appendix II). After President Mikheil Saakashvili 

and a cadre of Western-oriented officials came to power in 2004, 

Georgia has sought to burnish its position not simply as a strategic 

ally but as a reform-minded, democratic one. 

Within the former Soviet Union, nearly all armed conflict that 

has occurred since 1991 has been in the Caucasus. Georgia, in particular, has struggled with separatist movements and irredentist 

claims of outside powers. Following conflict with separatist regions 

in the early 1990s, tensions escalated again during the tenure of 

President Saakashvili, whose overtures for new negotiation frameworks were rebuffed by de facto separatist authorities. War was 

3 

6 Helsinki Final Act, Questions Relating to the Security of Europe, 1(a)III states that parties 

‘‘shall regard as inviolable all one another’s frontiers . . . and therefore they will refrain now 

and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any 

demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating 

State.’’ Questions Relating to the Security of Europe, 1(a)IV states that ‘‘participating States will 

likewise refrain from making each other’s territory the object of military occupation . . . or the 

object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or 

acquisition will be recognized as legal.’’ 7 According to the World Bank’s Joint Needs Assessment, the conflict caused $394.5 million 

in damage in Georgia and reduced its economic growth for 2008 from 9 percent to 3.5 percent. 8 Vice President Joseph Biden noted at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009 that 

‘‘We will not agree with Russia on everything. For example, the United States will not recognize 

Continued 

again sparked in August 2008 between Georgia and Russia, constituting the first extra-territorial use of force by Russia since the demise of the Soviet Union. 

On August 26, 2008, Russia formally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, breaching core principles of 

the Helsinki Final Act; 6 only Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela 

have followed suit. Notably, Russian attempts to secure broader 

recognition at meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(comprised of Russia, China and Central Asian nations) and the 

Collective Security Treaty Organization have been unsuccessful. 

The conflict left Russian relations with the West at a post-Cold 

War nadir. Ambassadorial and ministerial contacts at the NATORussia Council were suspended for the remainder of 2008; thenSecretary of State Condoleezza Rice also asserted that Russia was 

‘‘more and more becoming the outlaw in this conflict.’’ In September 2008, the Bush administration withdrew from Congressional consideration the U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. 

In response to hostilities that decimated the Georgian economy 

and military,7 the United States pledged $1 billion in aid over a 

two-year period. The assistance package has addressed the acute 

humanitarian needs of internally-displaced persons; sorely-needed 

projects focusing on economic growth; and the building and reform 

of public institutions. The Congressional Notification for the last 

tranche of $242 million was transmitted on December 7, 2009. In 

order to mollify Russian concerns and target pressing humanitarian needs, no lethal defense items have been provided to Georgia since the 2008 conflict. 

Several months after the war, Georgia was buffeted by another 

political force: the Obama administration’s announcement of a 

‘‘reset’’ in U.S. relations with the Russian Federation. Given the deteriorated state of Russian-Georgian relations that has taken on 

extremely personal dimensions, this change in U.S. policy has had 

the potential to drastically affect the direction of U.S. policy towards Georgia. 

In outlining the mutual U.S.-Russian interests that will be pursued as part of its new policy towards Russia, senior administration officials have mentioned the fight against the Taliban and alQaeda in Afghanistan and the opening of an alternate supply distribution network through Russia; nuclear security and non-proliferation; and Iran. While administration officials have repeated 

that U.S.-Georgian relations will not suffer as a result of a ‘‘reset’’ 

in policy, statements reflect the sentiment that the administration 

expects disagreements over the situation in Georgia to persist.8

4 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. But the United States and Russia can disagree and still work together where our interests coincide.’’ 9 According to staff interviews and testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

See testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander 

Vershbow, ‘‘Georgia: One Year After the August War,’’ hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, August 4, 2009. 10The United States has not been the only NATO country to develop enhanced security cooperation with Georgia. For example, France has funded a military training center in the mountainous area of northern Georgia, which France reportedly pressured Russian forces not to destroy during the 2008 conflict. 11 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin. 

After meetings in Moscow in October, Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton asserted that the United States ‘‘will help the Georgian 

people to feel like they can protect themselves.’’ The focus of U.S. 

assistance has been on intellectual issues like doctrine and personnel management, as well as ongoing training of Georgian troops 

to deploy in Afghanistan. The situation in Georgia is being addressed in Geneva through Status Conference Meetings with delegations from Georgia, Russia, the United States and representatives from de facto Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities. 

ANALYSIS

Georgian national security officials remain deeply wary of the 

Obama administration’s recalibration of U.S.-Russian relations and 

still view Russian troops as an existential threat to the Georgian 

state. As one senior Georgian defense official noted, ‘‘we hear the 

same words [from the Obama and George W. Bush administrations], but how deep in practical terms the U.S.-Georgian relationship will be is still vague.’’ Other Georgian officials expressed the 

view that the current administration appears unsure as to what 

shape U.S. policy in Georgia will take. When pressed on this point, 

however, Georgian officials conceded that they have seen only modest tangible changes in the United States commitment to Georgia. 

Security Assistance 

One such tangible change has been in the realm of security assistance. Staff met with U.S. and Georgian security assistance officials in Washington, D.C. and Tbilisi to assess past and current 

U.S. security assistance programs in Georgia. As detailed below 

(see Appendix III), U.S. train-and-equip programs have undergone 

several iterations in Georgia, but since the 2008 conflict, senior Department of Defense and security assistance officials have reported 

that no lethal assistance has been provided through Section 1206, 

Foreign Military Financing, or Foreign Military Sales.9

The United States has developed close military-to-military cooperation with Georgia since its independence in 1991.10 U.S.-Georgian security cooperation has been an especially sore point in Russia’s relationship with Georgia, even though enhanced cooperation 

began during the term of former Georgian President (and former 

Soviet Foreign Minister) Eduard Shevardnadze and was initially 

focused on addressing threats of terrorism raised by Russia. 

After the 2008 conflict, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 

asserted that the United States had been ‘‘arming Georgians to the 

teeth.’’ More recently, Russian officials have alleged that renewed 

military assistance has been ‘‘under the guise of humanitarian 

aid’’ 11 and that Georgia’s ‘‘military potential is much higher today 

5 

12 Russian Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Nikolai Makarov. 13Georgia has been one of the highest per capita contributors of troops to coalition efforts in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, having deployed over 7,500 troops to OIF and 800 troops to ISAF. 

than last August.’’ 12 While some senior Russian Government 

sources assert that the United States is in the midst of replenishing Georgia’s military potential, other officials single out only 

third countries. 

Given this fusillade of accusations, the United States must move 

forward in a highly transparent manner, in coordination with our 

European and NATO allies, in order to dispel misinformation and 

to lessen any risk of miscalculation. If the United States does alter 

the mix of assistance being provided to Georgia, a multilateral and 

transparent strategy will assure others that regional stability is 

the ultimate concern. 

U.S. defense officials were quick to point out how U.S. security 

assistance programs had been crafted to avoid augmenting Georgia’s force-on-force or territorial defense capacity due to Russian 

concerns. Although equipment and training provided nominally for 

one mission cannot be completely walled off from potential utility 

in other types of missions, the bulk of U.S. security assistance has 

been focused on efforts to train agile, counter-terror personnel to 

deploy away from Georgian soil. These programs have been focused 

on preparing Georgian troops to deploy in support of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and NATO’s International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.13

Enhanced cooperation began in 2002 with the initiation of the 

Georgian Train-and-Equip Program (GTEP) to enhance Georgian 

counter-terrorism capacity to address the threat posed by Chechen 

rebels, who had taken refuge in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. Prior to 

GTEP, the Russian military had reportedly pressured Georgia to 

allow Russian troops to pursue these rebels into Georgia. GTEP 

foreclosed this possibility, allowing Georgia to subdue the rebels 

with its own military capacity. This program consisted of an 18- 

month, $64 million investment to train around 2,000 light infantry 

soldiers and a small number of police and border guards and equip 

them with small arms and communications gear. 

GTEP was used as a basis for the Georgian Sustainment and 

Stability Operations Program (GSSOP), which provided another 

$159 million from 2005–2008 to continue to train three brigades of 

2,000 soldiers to deploy to OIF in support of coalition activities. 

Apart from training, items provided included anti-IED devices, radios, and other equipment. Troops deployed gained skills in 

counter-insurgency, traffic and entry-point control and base camp 

security. According to Department of Defense officials, regular 

briefings on GTEP and GSSOP were offered to the Russian military. 

In total, four brigades were trained under GTEP and GSSOP. At 

the time hostilities broke out between Georgia and Russian forces 

in South Ossetia on August 7, 2008, one brigade was in Iraq, two 

were in Georgia, and a fourth Georgian brigade was being trained 

for deployment to Iraq by approximately 80 U.S. servicemen. Pursuant to a prior agreement for the United States to provide transport for Georgian troops to and from Iraq, the United States airlifted the 1,800 Georgian soldiers back from Iraq on August 10 and 

6 

14 Inspectors General, U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program,’’ August 31, 2009. 15Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander 

Vershbow, ‘‘Georgia: One Year After the August War,’’ hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, August 4, 2009. 

11. Thus, during the peak of hostilities with Russia, Georgia’s most 

capable forces, constituting over one-fifth of Georgia’s active armed 

forces, were not present in Georgia. 

GSSOP was augmented by $6.5 million in Section 1206 funds for 

FY 2007 to conduct ‘‘combined military operations with the U.S. 

Armed Forces.’’ 14 Funds provided for Harris Falcon II radios and 

spare parts, Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Systems 

(MILES) for tactical engagement simulation, and training by U.S. 

contractors. These programs supported the deployment of 850 soldiers to support OIF. In FY 2008, an additional $11.5 million in 

Section 1206 funding was authorized to train and equip Georgian 

special forces. HF/VHF communications equipment, ground sensor 

systems, Humvees, and training teams were provided with these 

funds. 

Since the 2008 conflict, the profile of U.S. assistance has changed 

dramatically. Of the $1 billion package, no funding has been provided to the Ministry of Defense. No lethal defense equipment has 

been provided, either through Section 1206, Foreign Military Sales, 

or Foreign Military Financing. U.S. defense officials noted that 

training of Georgian special forces has also ceased. While Georgian 

defense officials have requested information on the availability and 

prices for anti-tank and air defense articles, they have been told 

that those sales will not go forward at this time. In fact, Georgian 

officials argue that they are under a de facto arms embargo and 

are having great difficulty procuring any lethal defense items, 

which they attribute to Russia’s threat of sanctions against any 

entities participating in such sales. Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Alexander Vershbow has explained this policy as a ‘‘phased approach’’ that is meant to ensure that assistance is not ‘‘counterproductive to our goals of promoting peace and stability in the 

region.’’ 15

On August 31, 2009, United States forces began training 730 

Georgian soldiers for deployment to NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan using $24 million in Coalition Readiness Support Program (CRSP) funds. The first deployment departed on November 

16, 2009. According to senior U.S. defense officials, any equipment 

used for training must be taken out of Georgia after training is 

completed, and a Section 1206 proposal has been submitted so that 

non-lethal training equipment can remain in country. 

Breakaway Regions 

While Abkhazia has enjoyed relative autonomy and greater economic prospects due to its Black Sea coastline, South Ossetia has 

had close ethnic and political links to the Russian district of North 

Ossetia with fewer opportunities for economic development. Georgian troops fought to suppress movements for greater autonomy in 

South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1990–1992 and 1992–1993, respectively, after which cease-fires were concluded. In Abkhazia, the 

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was given 

7 

a mandate to observe cease-fire implementation, as well as the 

peacekeeping force comprised of soldiers from the Commonwealth 

of Independent States. In South Ossetia, the OSCE Mission in 

Georgia was provided a mandate for monitoring joint peacekeeping 

forces. Due to Russian opposition, both missions were ended following the 2008 conflict. 

On August 26, 2008, Russia formally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and international telephone 

access codes have reportedly been changed from Georgian to Russian. Only Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have followed suit in 

recognizing the independence of the enclaves. 

While several humanitarian organizations and NGOs have received access to Abkhazia, staff was informed that none have been 

active in South Ossetia at the time of the visit. South Ossetia’s de 

facto authorities demand that any aid groups enter the enclave 

from the north through Russia, but doing so would jeopardize the 

organization’s relationship with Tbilisi. International donors, NGO 

representatives, and U.S. assistance officials noted that Tbilisi is 

still struggling to formulate policies towards the breakaway enclaves with regard to access of multinational and humanitarian organizations. The United States and international donors should 

continue to dedicate expertise to assist Georgian authorities in the 

development of a policy reintegration, while continuing to emphasize that any attempt to solve the situation militarily would be disastrous. 

The European Union Monitoring Mission for Georgia, present in 

Georgia since October 1, 2008, has approximately 225 unarmed 

monitors in country, which is slightly fewer than the number of 

military and police monitors present under UNOMIG and the 

OSCE prior to the 2008 conflict. The EUMM was created through 

a memorandum of understanding with the Georgian Government. 

While the EUMM’s mandate is to monitor the ‘‘withdrawal of 

Russian and Georgian armed forces to the positions held prior to 

the outbreak of hostilities,’’ EUMM, in practice, monitors solely the 

Tbilisi-side of the administrative boundary line with South Ossetia 

and has no access, apart from satellite imagery, to the Russian-controlled enclave. Although Russia has no formal agreement with 

EUMM, monitoring officials noted that EUMM’s presence has been 

welcomed by Russia as EUMM conducts inspections of Georgian 

police and military installations; EUMM has been effective in dispelling Russian assertions of Georgian troop build-ups near the administrative boundary line. 

Before the war, approximately 2,000 Russian ‘‘peacekeeping’’ 

troops were stationed in Abkhazia and 1,000 in South Ossetia. Although the French-brokered peace plan requires Russian troop 

strength to return to pre-war levels, monitoring officials note that 

Russia maintains troops well above those levels. Despite its role in 

conferring Russian citizenship to ethnic Ossetians in Georgia by 

distributing passports before the war and its heavily armed forces 

serving without UN or multilateral mandates, Russia continues to 

insist that its role in South Ossetia is one of dispassionate peacekeeper, tantamount to the EUMM. Russia has relied in part on the 

argument that Russian agreements for Friendship, Cooperation, 

and Mutual Assistance with Abkhazia and South Ossetia trump 

8 

other international obligations and allow de facto authorities to request the number of Russian troops they see fit. Hence, there is no 

international group present in South Ossetia at this time apart 

from the Russian Federation. 

EUMM not only lacks physical access to South Ossetia but has 

no direct line of communication with de facto authorities; its only 

hotline is directly to Moscow. In October 2009, over a dozen wood 

collectors were arrested by de facto authorities for straying across 

the administrative boundary from the Tbilisi-administered side. 

This and similar incidents have been attributed to unclear boundary markings and disparate maps. In this case, the hotline was 

used, and escalation was avoided, but EUMM officials noted that 

they do not have high confidence that more time-sensitive crises 

can be handled efficiently without direct lines of communication to 

de facto authorities. 

Early Warning and Maritime Security 

Senior Georgian national security officials reported that the Russian military destroyed all military and civilian radars in the 2008 

conflict. While some radars have been replaced, these are allegedly 

designed for civilian use and ill-suited for early warning. Hence, 

Georgia reportedly still cannot monitor all of its airspace, and even 

the airspace that is covered by radar lacks early warning capabilities. 

Through the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement 

(GBLSE) and Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 

programs, the United States has provided direct assistance to the 

Georgian Coast Guard for capacity building (the Coast Guard and 

Navy have been merged into one service since the 2008 war), focusing on radars and other infrastructure. Funds totaling $850,000 

have been dedicated to repairing the fleet, dredging the Poti Coast 

Guard base, and overhauling two U.S. donated patrol boats. 

GBSLE has also built maritime radar stations in five locations to 

detect and interdict illicit traffic and materials, provide search and 

rescue capacity, and monitor maritime activities. The stations 

allow monitoring of the full coast from Turkey to Russia. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

It has been one year since the first tranche of the $1 billion 

pledge arrived in Georgia to alleviate the most pressing humanitarian needs of the Georgian population. As the situation in Georgia transitions from post-conflict, the United States Government 

must grapple with the challenge of charting a long-term policy. 

This policy must be closely informed by the territorial and defense 

challenges that Georgia is facing today. 

The United States Government should: 

• Work with NATO allies in crafting a comprehensive, transparent approach to security assistance and military sales in 

the region. While Georgia has encountered great difficulty in 

procuring equipment from NATO countries to provide for its 

basic territorial defense needs, some allies have pursued significant military deals with Russia that could upset the military balance. A transparent and multilateral approach to secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:12 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\53985.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
9 

rity assistance would aid in dispelling conspiracies in Russian 

media and preclude an excessive nationalization of Georgian 

defense policy. 

• Place the internationalization of the situation in South Ossetia 

high on its agenda with the Russian Federation and within the 

United Nations (UN) and the OSCE, two venues where Russia 

has wielded its veto to prevent an international presence in 

Georgia. Currently, neither humanitarian aid organizations 

nor EUMM monitors have physical access to South Ossetia. 

Greater transparency must be brought to both the activities of 

the Russian Federation in South Ossetia and the plight of 

South Ossetian citizens affected by the 2008 conflict. 

• Encourage the opening of direct lines of communication between EUMM authorities and de facto authorities within 

South Ossetia. Russia has insisted that all such communications are channeled through Moscow. Following a number of 

border incidents in recent months, such a step would build confidence, while reducing the risk of miscalculation in an administrative boundary area where tensions remain high. 

• Work towards facilitating a non-aggression pact between Georgia and Russia. The French-brokered peace plan contains a 

clause on the non-use of force, but Russia has insisted that this 

clause was binding only between Georgia and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and that Russia, like 

France, was a mere mediator to the conflict. 

• Continue to explore avenues for confidence-building measures 

between the parties to the conflict, including in the energy and 

water sectors, where mutual reliance on both sides of the administrative boundaries could be furthered, as well as youth 

and business exchange programs. 

• Assist the Georgian Government in setting forth a reintegration strategy for the breakaway enclaves, including issues of 

access to multinational corporations, humanitarian aid organizations, etc. Such efforts should include finding workable definitions of humanitarian assistance so that ostensible humanitarian aid is not used in other sectors like institution building. 

U.S. and international officials must continue to emphasize 

that attempts to solve the situation militarily would be disastrous. 

CONCLUSION

Even as the Obama administration seeks to develop more productive ties with the Russian Federation on other national security 

challenges, tensions in Georgia remain high, and mutual suspicion 

risks tipping the balance towards renewed conflict. The United 

States must garner greater support among NATO and EU partners 

for crafting a long-term strategy towards the region that aims to 

reassure all parties to the conflict. 

Particularly in the realm of security assistance, such coordination is critical. While Georgia finds itself under a de facto arms embargo, other NATO allies are pursuing record military deals with 

the Russian Federation. Georgia has become an exceptional conVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:12 Dec 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\53985.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
10 

tributor to international security through its contributions to missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A strategy to enable Georgia to 

similarly provide for its own territorial defense will require close 

cooperation with NATO allies to preserve stability in the region. 

An internationalization of monitoring and humanitarian activities in these enclaves would bring transparency to a situation 

where miscommunication and extremist appeals threaten to reignite armed conflict. Given that Russian arguments concerning its 

role in Georgia have relied heavily on international law, the United 

States and our partners must also not be reluctant to continue to 

highlight Russia’s own failures to meet its international legal obligations. 

Addressing these interrelated sources of insecurity on a multilateral basis would also benefit Russia by reducing the risk of miscalculation, preventing Georgia from excessively nationalizing its 

defense policy, and reconditioning Russia’s international image. 

Even the development of niche military capacity in countries like 

Georgia can promote shared interests with the Russian Federation 

in combating terrorism that has spilled from the North Caucasus, 

promoting stability in United Nations-mandated missions, and 

interdicting hazardous weapons and material. 

The United States must continue to emphasize that economic 

and political development in the former Soviet sphere is not a zerosum endeavor and that the development of confident, prosperous 

nations on Russia’s periphery can create more effective partners for 

Russia as well as the West. A coordinated strategy with European 

allies will assist in maintaining a peaceful balance and forging 

more productive relationships throughout the South Caucasus. 

(11) 

A P P E N D I X E S 

Appendix I.—MEETINGS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN GEORGIA

AND WASHINGTON, DC 

U.S. Officials 

Ambassador John Bass, United States Ambassador to Georgia 

Jock Conly, Mission Director, United States Agency for International Development 

Other Country Team members 

Ambassador John Tefft, former United States Ambassador to 

Georgia 

Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 

Department of State 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense 

Millennium Challenge Corporation 

Office of the Coordinator of Assistance to Europe and Eurasia 

Georgian Officials 

Ekaterine Zguladze, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs 

Irakli Porchkhidze, Deputy Secretary, National Security Council 

Vasil Sikharulidze, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President, 

former Minister of Defense 

Nikoloz Vashakidze, Deputy Defense Minister 

Dimitri Gvindadze, Deputy Minister of Finance 

Other Individuals 

Ambassador David Smith, Director, Georgian Security Analysis 

Center 

Irakli Alasania, Chairman, Our Georgia-Free Democrats Party 

Representatives from local and international NGOs 

Representatives from the European Union Monitoring Mission 

Representatives from the European Commission 

Representatives from the International Monetary Fund 

Representatives from the World Bank 

Representatives from the United Nations Development Programme 

Representatives from the International Organization for Migration 

12 

Appendix II.—U.S. Assistance to Georgia, 1992–2000 (Part I) 

($ millions, by fiscal year) 

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

GEORGIA 

Economic Growth ............................................... 0.94 1.79 11.94 7.81 10.14 10.12 33.85 32.61 35.26Governing Justly & Democratically ................... 0.21 2.04 4.11 3.08 4.28 5.37 16.66 15.68 20.50Humanitarian Assistance .................................. 0.53 22.95 32.60 34.98 6.35 8.52 24.23 14.47 21.04Investing in People ........................................... 0.15 0.44 0.95 0.80 0.60 1.00 3.75 5.30 4.04Peace & Security ............................................... 0.00 2.80 0.00 0.10 0.60 0.79 19.47 21.39 28.30

GEORGIA TOTAL ............................................. 1.83 30.02 49.60 46.77 21.97 25.79 97.95 89.45 109.13

*Does not include $315 million supplemental Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriation for Georgia under the Disaster Relief and Recovery Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 

(Division B, P.L. 110–329) 

**Does not include $242 million supplemental AEECA appropriation for Georgia under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111–32) 

13 

Appendix II.—U.S. Assistance to Georgia, 2001–2009 & FY 92–09 (Part II) 

($ millions, by fiscal year) 

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 FY 92–09 

GEORGIA 

Economic Growth .................................... 41.17 33.45 32.09 26.84 35.26 27.54 23.39 18.54 20.69 403.41Governing Justly & Democratically ......... 12.89 21.75 19.79 12.57 13.79 13.92 12.59 13.73 15.40 208.36Humanitarian Assistance ....................... 12.30 14.18 11.05 2.00 1.90 2.12 1.84 1.84 2.46 215.37Investing in People ................................. 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.88 11.90 7.98 7.16 8.24 7.88 71.05Peace & Security .................................... 29.00 21.93 24.24 20.15 23.38 15.94 13.25 7.71 5.56 234.60

GEORGIA TOTAL .................................. 95.36 91.31 87.17 72.43 86.23 67.49 58.23 50.06* 52.00** 1,132.79

*Does not include $315 million supplemental Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriation for Georgia under the Disaster Relief and Recovery Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 

(Division B, P.L. 110–329) 

**Does not include $242 million supplemental AEECA appropriation for Georgia under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111–32) 

14 

Appendix III.—U.S. Security Assistance and Training in Georgia 

($ millions) 

Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF) Section 1206 

Georgia Train 

and Equip 

(GTEP) 

Georgia 

Sustainment 

and Stability 

Operations Program (GSSOP) 

Coalition Readiness Support 

Program (CRSP) 

Foreign Military 

Sales Deliveries 

International 

Military Education and 

Training Program (IMET) Total 

FY 2002 ........................................... 55.5 — 64.5 — — 3.6 .889 124.5FY 2003 ........................................... 6.9 — — — — 9.8 1.18 17.88

FY 2004 ........................................... 12 — — — — 7.3 1 20.3

FY 2005 ........................................... 11.9 ———— 11.5 1.4 24.8FY 2006 ........................................... 11.8 — — 60 — 10.5 1.26 83.56FY 2007 ........................................... 9.7 6.5 — 28 — 25 1.15 70.35FY 2008 ........................................... 9 11.5 — 71 — 72.3 .799 164.6FY 2009 ........................................... 11 ————— 1.15 12.15

Total FY 2002–2009 ................... 127.8 18 64.5 159 — 140 8.9 518FY 2010 (request) ....................... 16 — — — 24 — 2 43

Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Æ