U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

46–056 CC WASHINGTON : 1998

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE WATER MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1997/98 EL NIN ̃O

OVERSIGHT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER AND POWER

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 30, 1997, WASHINGTON, DC

Serial No. 105–58

Printed for the use of the Committee on Resources

(
(II)

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana

JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado

JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

KEN CALVERT, California

RICHARD W. POMBO, California

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho

LINDA SMITH, Washington

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina

WILLIAM M. (MAC) THORNBERRY, Texas

JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona

JOHN E. ENSIGN, Nevada

ROBERT F. SMITH, Oregon

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

JOHN PETERSON, Pennsylvania

RICK HILL, Montana

BOB SCHAFFER, Colorado

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada

MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho

GEORGE MILLER, California

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia

BRUCE F. VENTO, Minnesota

DALE E. KILDEE, Michigan

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

OWEN B. PICKETT, Virginia

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey

CALVIN M. DOOLEY, California

CARLOS A. ROMERO-BARCELO ́ , Puerto

Rico

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York

ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam

SAM FARR, California

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

ADAM SMITH, Washington

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

CHRIS JOHN, Louisiana

DONNA CHRISTIAN-GREEN, Virgin Islands

RON KIND, Wisconsin

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas

LLOYD A. JONES, Chief of Staff

ELIZABETH MEGGINSON, Chief Counsel

CHRISTINE KENNEDY, Chief Clerk/Administrator

JOHN LAWRENCE, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER AND POWER RESOURCES

JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California, Chairman

KEN CALVERT, California

RICHARD W. POMBO, California

HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho

LINDA SMITH, Washington

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

WILLIAM M. (MAC) THORNBERRY, Texas

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

JOHN E. ENSIGN, Nevada

ROBERT F. SMITH, Oregon

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

GEORGE MILLER, California

OWEN B. PICKETT, Virginia

CALVIN M. DOOLEY, California

SAM FARR, California

ADAM SMITH, Washington

RON KIND, Wisconsin

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas

————— —————

————— —————

ROBERT FABER, Staff Director/Counsel

VALERIE WEST, Professional Staff

STEVE LANICH, Democratic Counsel
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held October 30, 1997 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of Members:

Doolittle, Hon. John T., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California ................................................................................................... 1

Statement of Witnesses:

Andrews, Richard, Director, Governor’s Office, Emergency Services, California .............................................................................................................. 27

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 74

Friday, Elbert W., Director, Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research,

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of

Commerce ...................................................................................................... 3

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 34

Georgakakos, Aris, Director, Georgia Water Resources Institute, Georgia

Institute of Technology ................................................................................. 22

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 60

Georgakakos, Konstantine, President, Hydrologic Research Center,

Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San

Diego .............................................................................................................. 20

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 58

Hall, Stephen K., Executive Director, Association of California Water

Agencies ......................................................................................................... 29

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 78

Leetmaa, Ants, Director, Climate Prediction Center, National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce ................... 5

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 39

Schaefer, Mark, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Water and Science, Acting Director of U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior ........ 8

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 44

Sorooshian, Soroosh, Professor, Department of Hydrology, University of

Arizona ........................................................................................................... 25

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 73
(1)

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE WATER MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1997/98 EL

NIN ̃ O

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1997

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER

AND POWER, COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES, Washington,

DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room

1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. John T. Doolittle

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. DOOLITTLE. [presiding] The Subcommittee on Water and

Power will come to order.

The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony concerning

the water management implications of the 1997/98 El Nin ̃ o. The

current El Nin ̃ o event is expected to be the most severe El Nin ̃ o

since 1982/83. Indeed, many scientists believe that it is the most

severe event of this kind since records have been kept, about 150

years ago. But what does that mean for our weather? Will every

quirk in the weather this season be seen as a manifestation of El

Nin ̃ o?

There are some pretty good indications that this El Nin ̃ o will

mean serious flooding in portions of the United States, probably on

the West Coast. It is equally probable that we are going to have

drought conditions somewhere as well. The real challenge is to

know when and where these conditions are going to develop. And

will we know that information early enough to make a difference?

Knowing that we have a significant El Nin ̃ o event that is likely

to affect our weather, it is much like knowing we are going to have

a severe winter along the eastern seaboard. We still don’t know

whether there are going to be bitter cold temperatures or snowstorms which will shut down New York City, Boston, or Washington, DC on any given day. That information will only be known

a few days in advance, and of course, like all predictions, they can

be off, as we know from watching the nightly weather forecast.

Much of the press coverage and most of the speeches in the political arena might lead one to believe that flooding is the only concern. However, as important as flooding is, it is only one of the critical issues associated with the El Nin ̃ o phenomenon. The impact on

water supply could be almost as significant. Millions of people in

this country rely on water stored in reservoirs to meet their munic-
2

ipal, industrial, and agricultural water supplies. The western half

of the United States is particularly dependent on these reservoirs

for water supplies about 6 months out of every year.

Initially, you might think that more rainfall and snowfall would

translate into fuller reservoirs and expanded water supplies. Unfortunately, the reverse can happen. Every year, prior to the months

when most of the precipitation occurs, the water level in reservoirs

is lowered to accommodate the anticipated flood flows. However,

significant water is retained in the reservoirs for water supplies in

case the rain never materializes. The challenge throughout the

rainy season is to respond to the storms, trying to pass the flood

flows as they occur.

If good information is available, reservoir managers can provide

extra protection by releasing water even before a storm begins to

affect a reservoir, but there is the dilemma. If a reservoir does not

refill, water shortages are a very real probability. In some cases the

available advanced warning will allow time to avert flooding; in

others it will not. The critical question is: How far in advance will

water managers and flood control experts know that a crisis is

pending in a given watershed?

With all of the general storm information available, the data to

make a decision in any particular watershed will only be known 48

hours to 72 hours in advance. Many factors affect the ability to predict accurately whether a given watershed or reservoir will receive

enough precipitation to justify releasing the water before the storm

begins. If a reservoir manager fails to make releases, there is a

greater chance there will be flooding on the river system. If the reservoir manager decides to begin releases and the water is not recovered that season, hundreds of thousands of acre feet of water

can be lost that will be needed for deliveries in the summer

months.

If the wrong decisions are made often enough, much of the water

stored in Federal, State, and private reservoirs will be lost. Such

a scenario is not only highly possible, it in fact occurred in California on a smaller scale during this past 1996/97 water season. It

is possible that the El Nin ̃ o brewing in the Pacific will dissipate

and cause no significant impact. It is also possible that we may

have a long, wet winter with storms evenly spaced over the season,

which will be easier to manage. It may be that all of the storms

pass over the extreme southwestern and southern part of the country, but, based on past El Nin ̃ o events, it is also highly possible

that we could have a long, wet rainy season with erratic and unpredictable impacts in many different parts of the country. Certainly, any portion of the western United States could be affected.

The strongest El Nin ̃ o ever recorded so far occurred in 1982

through 1983. It was responsible for 2,000 deaths and $8 to $12 billion damages worldwide. The current El Nin ̃ o event appears to be

even stronger than that one. If we are to avoid or mitigate some

of those impacts, we must build on what we know, but also realize—and I think this is key—what we don’t know.

In river systems without reservoirs or with inadequate reservoir

capacity, we will not be able to blunt the effects of these storms.

Even in river systems with adequate reservoirs, we will not have

perfect knowledge, and we run the risk of either flooding and/or re-
3

leasing water that will be lost for delivery when needed next summer.

We, clearly, have better data today than we had when the last

big El Nin ̃ o hit us in 1982/83. It gives us an opportunity to prepare

much more than we had then. But while witnesses will talk about

what we know now, I am asking them in their oral testimony to

focus on what we still do not know. I am asking them to also focus

on the difficulties facing water managers in determining when and

how much water to release and what are the weak links in communications and in placing reliance on the new information.

Finally, I ask the witnesses to focus on how we can learn from

this El Nin ̃ o to improve our response to similar events that will

come upon us in the future. I look forward to hearing our witnesses.

We have our first panel seated already, and let me ask you,

please, if you will rise and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Let the record reflect that each answered in the

affirmative.

And, gentlemen, thank you. You may be seated. We appreciate

your coming here today.

The custom of the Committee is to use those lights before you as

a rough guide to the length of your testimony, which I think with

one exception is going to be 5 minutes. If you have further things

to say, just because the red light goes on, don’t feel obliged to stop

in mid-sentence, and feel free to complete the sentence or the paragraph, and if we don’t have too many Members, the time limitation

is not going to be particularly relevant. But they’re a guide for you,

and I think the yellow light will go on at the beginning of the fifth

minute.

And with that, our first witness is Dr. Elbert W. Friday, who is

Director of the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research for the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration within the Department of Commerce. Dr. Friday.

STATEMENT OF ELBERT W. FRIDAY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT

OF COMMERCE

Mr. FRIDAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I request that

my written testimony be entered into the record and I would like

to give a few brief comments in response to your charge to the witnesses today.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I appreciate that, and let me say that your statement and all others will be entered into the record, as you have

submitted them. So please feel free to share with us your views

during the oral testimony.

Mr. FRIDAY. Thank you, sir. It is, indeed, a pleasure to be here

to address what you have identified, and I think we all agree, is

a very, very important issue.

The El Nin ̃ o situation that exists today is, indeed, being blamed

for everything, and yet we have to be very careful that we don’t

overattribute meteorological and hydrological events to this particular pattern. You were very correct in pointing out that we know
4

a lot more today than we did in 1982 and 1983. Indeed, in the

1982/83 event, we didn’t even understand that El Nin ̃ o was occurring until we were about halfway through the event. We recognized

during that event that we needed to learn a great deal more about

it in order to be able to better respond to the next major event that

occurred.

In a 10-year period, beginning in 1984, we did a remarkable

number of things. We instrumented the Pacific Ocean and the tropical regions, so that we could identify changes in the ocean long before they began to affect the atmosphere, this coupled system that

we have. We were able then this year, using the information from

that research data base, to begin to predict the beginning of the El

Nin ̃ o in January, and Ants Leetmaa, who will be testifying next,

was then able to go out with an actual forecast for a very strong

El Nin ̃ o in the springtime of this year, long before we started to

see these major effects starting.

We made a conscious decision in NOAA and in the Federal Government in general that it was important, even though we were

basing this on research results, that we try to provide to the user

community the information that we had, recognizing that it was

not complete, but recognizing it was better than not having any information at all, and that’s a critical point that we need to make.

It is important also to understand—you asked for the uncertainties that we have in the process—that when we talk about the effects of El Nin ̃ o, we are talking about not absolutes, but relatively

shifting a probability distribution of wet or dry, of warm or cold.

We’re talking about loading the dice, if you would, so that they

may come up slightly more frequently a 7, but they will still come

up an occasional snake eyes. Our job in the forecast process is to

try to understand ahead of time how they’ve been loaded in the

various sections of the country.

The ability that we have now to integrate all of these data are

based on the fact that we have been archiving data for a very long

period of time. You indicated records going back 150 years. Detailed records for every meteorological and oceanographic parameter are archived in various aspects of the government, and those

data are now being mined in order to be able to understand more

completely how these effects occur, what kind of information that

we can say about the future events.

The observation system that we have out in the Pacific Ocean

has clearly demonstrated its advantage to being able to predict the

onset of an El Nin ̃ o, and this array of instruments out in the tropical ocean, it is absolutely critical that we continue to maintain and

monitor that. And, indeed, we in NOAA are certainly looking forward to Congress supporting the operational funding of that, which

we have in the President’s budget this year.

NOAA has not operated by itself in this. The effort of research

has been a cooperative effort across many aspects of the Federal

Government. It includes National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Science Foundation, National Air and Space

Administration, and Office of Naval Research from the Department

of Defense doing the initial research into this activity.

This year virtually every aspect of the Federal Government is

working together, as you see from the witnesses that are here at
5

this table, to be able to pass the information that we have developed onto the user community, to allow them the best possible information in making their decisions.

Again, I want to stress that these are not absolutes. It is difficult

to attribute any individual weather event to the El Nin ̃ o. What we

do know about the patterns that exist is the fact that it tends to

affect the overall interactions between the ocean and the atmosphere. So it tends to affect the storm tracks. It tends to affect the

jetstreams. And, yet, we still don’t know the precise manner in

which this is going to occur.

You were correct in pointing out, sir, that the important information for the day-to-day management of all of our activities, including reservoir management, is going to be much more short-term in

the nature, on the order of two or 4 days. We are beginning to be

able to extend, through the National Centers for Environmental

Prediction, that forecasting capability out to 10 days, and we hope

to be able to improve that, but that’s an area that we really have

to work on.

We have a capability now that we’ve demonstrated in at least

one location in the country of being able to provide probability distributions of river stages out in the future going out to several

weeks, and, again, that’s a development effort that we need to continue to pursue and work with the user community to make sure

that that can be effectively applied to all of the various users of the

information.

The forecast process that we’re undergoing now represents a lot

of research that has gone on. We have just taken action within

NOAA to announce that we are going out over the next few weeks

to identify things additionally that we need to observe during this

event, so that we will have the data base, we will have the information base necessary to truly evaluate this entire situation, so

that we can do a better job on the next one.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Friday may be found at end of

hearing.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Our next witness will be Dr. Ants Leetmaa.

STATEMENT OF ANTS LEETMAA, DIRECTOR, CLIMATE PREDICTION CENTER, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC

ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Mr. LEETMAA. Yes.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. He is the Director of the Climate Prediction Center within NOAA and the Department of Commerce. Dr. Leetmaa.

Mr. LEETMAA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to come here and talk to you. I would like to discuss, first,

the nature of what the El Nin ̃ o forecasts are for coming seasons,

then outline some of the expected impacts, especially over the western region of the U.S., and some of the forecast issues as you alluded to, because there are many of those.

Both Joe Friday and I have with us here Dr. Danny Fread of the

Office of Hydrology, who is directly involved in the hydrological

forecasting. So if some questions come up regarding that, he is here

to help us.
6

Let me start with the forecast for El Nin ̃ o itself. The Climate

Prediction Center is forecasting the current event to peak around

the end of this year or early next year. Present observations show

that the event is still slowly growing. Hence, the forecast for the

next 3 months are pretty much on the mark.

At the end of the year, this event in amplitude and spatial extent

will be comparable to the 1982/83 one, which until now had been

considered the event of the century. Most of the model forecasts—

and there are many model forecasts besides those done at the National Centers for Environmental Prediction—forecast that this

event will decay toward normal or in some cases even cold conditions, La Nin ̃ a conditions, by next summer. How fast it decays—

and there is some disagreement here—is critical to the U.S. forecast during late winter and spring.

In 1982/83, many of the heaviest impacts were in the Februaryto-April period. So although the event is decaying at that time, because of the tropics are warming up, because of the annual cycle,

the sea surface temperatures in fact will remain anomalously

warm, and so the Climate Prediction Center is forecasting that we

will basically be under the influence of strong El Nin ̃ o conditions

through the January-to-March period.

As Dr. Friday indicated, the onset of this event and its evolution

have been well-predicted three to 6 months in advance, and this is

letting us do something which we haven’t been able to do before in

the past, which is to anticipate what might take place and then try

to mitigate potential harmful impacts.

The forecasts for El Nin ̃ o are reasonably well-established. The

forecast for El Nin ̃ o impacts over the United States are less so.

Currently, we use two primary sources of information. The historical record is stratified according to when moderate or large El

Nin ̃ os have taken place. This gives us an indication of what we

think the average El Nin ̃ o response would look like. Equally importantly, it lets us know what the probabilities are that such an

event will take place or such impacts will take place. Clearly, each

El Nin ̃ o does not have the same impacts.

We also routinely run atmospheric model forecasts out to the

next several seasons. Both of these give us very much the same picture of what might happen, but there are differences in detail. So,

basically, at the present time we still base our forecasts, the seasonal forecasts, primarily on the statistics, but modify those in regions where we think the models are adding something.

One of the major issues that we face is that this event is obviously not an average El Nin ̃ o, and one might ask the relevance of

what using the moderate El Nin ̃ o criteria, and so we anticipate and

we already know that the impacts will depend on the size of El

Nin ̃ o. So in discussing what might happen in this particular event,

we make the comparison to 1982/83, which was an event of the

same size.

There was one other event comparable to both of these events in

recent history, and that occurred in 1877/78, but the data for that

at the present time over much of the United States is limited, and

so we’re limited in terms of what we can say.

Although much of the U.S. is forecast to be impacted, let me

focus for this hearing on California. California, during winters with
7

moderate El Nin ̃ os, receives about 130 to 140 percent of normal

rainfall during its rainy season from November to March. This converts to about 5 extra inches of rain averaged over much of the

State. During 1982/83, which is a plausible scenario, California, as

much of the Southwest, received 150 to 200 percent normal rainfall. This translates over coastal California and central California

and the southern Sierras to approximately 10 extra inches of rain

spread over that area, and for much of northern California the

amount was greater than about 16 inches. So that’s a lot of water.

These two estimates, one for the average impact for moderate El

Nin ̃ os and what happened in 1982/83, give one estimate of the possible spread of impacts. Ranges in forecasts, however, result from

both the chaotic component of Nature and the uncertainty and the

limitations of our current forecast capabilities. Although research

will improve the forecasts, this range in what we forecast will always remain.

If, for example, Nature could repeat the next two seasons several

times over, keeping in place the same El Nin ̃ o anomalies, the impacts for each of those winters, in fact, would be slightly different.

For example, during 1877/78, another event of the century, central

and northern California received more rain than in 1982/83, while

southern California received less.

Many serious shortcomings of the current forecasts are in the nature of the forecasts themselves. We, basically, at present forecast

seasonal averages. As you indicated, El Nin ̃ o rains come as storms.

Series of storms are what cause problems. Research is indicating

that the number of storms and their intensity is a function of the

strength and type of El Nin ̃ o. Depending also on the type of storm,

we can either get rain or snow. It’s the rain events that cause a

lot of flooding, although ultimately the snow melts and there can

be problems then also.

So, basically, we have issues that we haven’t addressed yet,

which is exactly how El Nin ̃ o modifies the nature of the storms, the

number of the storms, the intensity, and also what’s going to happen to the snow pack.

As we look toward the future, ultimately, what we want for effective water management practices is a suite of forecast products of

different lead times from hours, to days, to a week, to 2 weeks, to

a month, to a season, and even decadal. Currently, the Weather

Service produces short-range forecasts which are the most accurate

and have the most local detail. For this event, the Weather Service

is also developing a weekly update, a threat assessment, trying to

extend the forecast into that week two area, so we can give emergency managers a heads-up as to what potentially might be happening in terms of the intense flooding events.

The Weather Service also provides the link between meteorological forecasts and reservoir operations through the River Forecast

Centers. These work side by side with the Bureau of Reclamation,

the Corps of Engineers, USGS, and State personnel. As part of the

Weather Service modernization, they will start using the seasonal

forecasts to ultimately extend hydrologic forecasts out to several

seasons also.

Let me conclude by saying that it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future or ever we will have meteorological forecasts of the ac-
8

curacy that water managers ideally would like to see. Nature inherently has an unpredictable component. The key is for the providers of the forecasts and the users to work together on an interagency basis, so each understands the other’s capabilities and limitations and needs, and works toward enabling the transfer of this

information into operations. Although we have started working in

that direction, we need to accelerate the efforts.

Also, I hope that the newness and the uncertainty of the seasonal forecasts associated with this El Nin ̃ o do not lead to an

underestimation of the potentially harmful impacts that might take

place. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leetmaa may be found at end of

hearing.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you.

Our next witness, who will be recognized for 10 minutes, is Dr.

Mark Schaefer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Water and Science

and Acting Director of the U.S. Geological Survey within the Department of the Interior. He will be accompanied by Dr. Thomas

J. Casadevall, Regional Director of the Western Region, U.S. Geologic Survey, Water Resources, and by Dr. David A. Matthews,

Manager of River Systems and Meteorology within the Bureau of

Reclamation.

Dr. Schaefer, you’re recognized.

STATEMENT OF MARK SCHAEFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WATER AND SCIENCE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Mr. SCHAEFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon.

We appreciate the opportunity to be here to discuss the Department’s activities related to El Nin ̃ o. This episode is of particular interest and concern to the Department because changes in precipitation and temperature, stream flow, et cetera, all impact our facilities and the responsibilities that we have for managing land and

water resources.

Across the Nation, the U.S. Geological Survey is monitoring

stream flow at more than 7,000 locations. Nearly half of these

transmit information in real time that is made available to individuals through the Internet and through other means. This network

will provide first indications of the effects of El Nin ̃ o on rivers and

streams and reservoirs, and it forms the basis for the flood forecasting and warning activities that my colleagues have just described.

The Department has been extensively involved in evaluating current El Nin ̃ o forecasts. Daily stream flow data from 50 years of

USGS records reveals marked increase in short-term flood during

El Nin ̃ o episodes, even when total seasonal stream flow is not profoundly affected. Studies also show that previous El Nin ̃ os are

linked with many of the most severe floods in southern California

and other southwestern States. The USGS has been active in communicating these lessons to others and in incorporating this information in our management activities.

You asked about what we don’t know. The predicted strength of

this event raises unusual problems for us because we do not know

whether the most intense El Nin ̃ os simply yield more intense ver-
9

sions of the regional water resources and hazard effects that we

typically see with El Nin ̃ os, large or small, or whether they result

in whole new patterns of effects. For example, during the strong El

Nin ̃ o of 1982 and 1983, most of the West Coast experienced substantial increases in rainfall.

The Bureau of Reclamation has been closely tracking the longrange forecasts, with support of the National Weather Service’s

River Forecast Centers and their Climate Prediction Center, and

their Technical Service Center in Denver. Reclamation is developing a procedure to integrate all of this information into its operations at its various facilities around the country. Water operations

managers in the five regional offices and in the 60 area and project

offices are being kept informed of any changes in forecast. They’re

getting information on a weekly and daily basis, and they are going

to incorporate that into any management decisions that they make.

Reclamation has also begun the process of informing all water

managers of the potential impacts of this El Nin ̃ o, as well as the

current state of our climate predictions. The Bureau has opened dialog with its water managers and climate researchers from the National Weather Service and from other agencies. We’re working together on this, and as my colleagues pointed out, we have a lot

more information available to us today than we did in the early

eighties, and we think we’re in a good position to respond to whatever may occur.

As you know, the Bureau of Reclamation has many dams and

reservoirs, and I just wanted to underscore this through one of our

charts here. We have 596 dams and reservoirs, and as you pointed

out, Mr. Chairman, in the western United States, in particular, individuals and businesses, farmers, and so on, depend on the decisions that the Bureau of Reclamation makes. It’s a tricky balancing

act to try to respond to weather predictions and ensure that we’re

preserving public health and safety, while at the same time maintaining the water levels we need for agriculture and for other uses.

Long-range forecasts are too general for us to target the specific

watersheds and the precise locations that may be affected by storm

events related to El Nin ̃ o. However, past events and current information suggests that we should prepare for frequent heavy precipitation this winter in the mountains of California, Arizona, New

Mexico, and other areas that affect the operations of reclamation

in the mid-Pacific, upper and lower Colorado, and southern Great

Plains regions. This translates into potentially high water levels in

reservoirs of the Central Valley Project, Colorado River Storage

Project, Lake Powell, Lake Mead, and the Rio Grande Basin

Projects, as well as smaller projects in these areas.

And as you know, Mr. Chairman, the Central Valley Project is

Reclamation’s largest and most complex project, comprised of storage dams, reservoirs, pumping plants, canals, and so on, and delivers water throughout about a 40,000-square-mile area. The 1982/

83 water year was the wettest on record throughout the Central

Valley Basin, and record precipitation throughout that winter led

to very large spring snowmelt runoff that lasted until June.

Reclamation is tracking weather forecasts. It’s incorporating the

forecasts into ongoing modeling activities, and it’s planning possible management actions to respond to whatever may be on the
10

horizon. Significant operational actions to accommodate potential

high inflows next spring are already underway. Reclamation’s

water operations and management activities in each project area

are already in a delicate balance of supply and demand.

USGS is using El Nin ̃ o forecast information in conjunction with

historical El Nin ̃ o flood discharge relations to evaluate the status

and condition of its stream-gauging equipment in regions where

floods are likely, and this will help ensure that our gauges are fully

operational when storms do occur.

Our coastal and marine program, in cooperation with NOAA/

NASA, is evaluating the potential land loss in coastal areas from

severe storms, and USGS is developing a variety of geospatial data.

It’s preparing maps and other products, and these will be available

on an emergency basis. We have teams that can work around the

clock in order to develop whatever products are needed.

USGS is collaborating with Reclamation and various NOAA operational and research groups and State agencies to test and improve

the hydrologic value of current weather and climate forecasts.

The USGS is also contributing valuable information regarding

the potential for landslide occurrences associated with El Nin ̃ o

weather effects, and I’d like to give you an idea of what some of

this information looks like. These are two maps. This shows the

landslide hazard outlook for October through December this year,

and this shows the outlook for January through March. Now this

is a product that was developed jointly by USGS and by NOAA. In

fact, I think this is the way of the future, where the agencies will

work more closely to develop integrated data products that will be

useful to the public and to resource managers.

But what you can see here, these are the areas of high landslide

potential in the U.S. So this is the map that was developed by

USGS. We overlaid that on NOAA’s information related to the El

Nin ̃ o episode, and what you want to look for are the purple or dark

blue areas, where we’re expecting high precipitation and where

there is already a high landslide potential. So you can see we took

two fairly simple datasets and have developed some information

that we think is very powerful and will be useful in helping to ensure that people are prepared in regions like this, some areas along

the California coast, for this type of event.

In addition, the floods and droughts associated with El Nin ̃ o can

seriously affect water quality. Increased loads of nutrients and

toxic chemicals may be washed into rivers during flood conditions.

The USGS has a national water quality assessment program that

does water quality monitoring. It does that generally over the long

term, but these individuals are available on a short-term or emergency basis to evaluate water quality, if that becomes necessary in

a particular area.

These planned actions are expected to meet the needs of water

managers and mitigate the effects of extreme weather events that

may arise from this El Nin ̃ o. However, unanticipated needs may

arise, some of which may require the attention of Congress. We’ll

work closely with you, should such needs arise.

Long-term future needs include enhanced stream-gauging operations in areas where flood probabilities are increased. I’d like to

show you another visual here. This is the USGS stream-gauging
11

network nationwide. The network is an extensive network, obviously, but, in addition, it has decreased by 5 percent in the last 7

years, from about 7,400 stations in 1990 to about 7,000 stations in

1997.

Now that’s a bit of the bad news. The good news is that the number of stations that are telemetered, that have the link to satellites,

so that we can virtually instantly get that information, has gone

up significantly. And let me demonstrate that in this figure.

Here you can see our overall number of stream gauges has been

constant or slightly decreasing, but the proportion of stations that

have the telemetry, which is indicated here by these dark bars, has

actually increased, and this is what’s particularly important to the

Weather Service and to our managers. We get this information out

on the World Wide Web typically with a 4-hour delay, and under

emergency conditions we can get it out much more quickly.

So we’re increasing our telemetered sites. We’re decreasing

slightly on our total number of sites, and we’re trying to address

total issue, and we’re trying to make sure that we can keep adding

to the telemetered sites. Right now we’re at about 43 percent with

no telemetry; 57 percent that have telemetry.

We look forward to working with Congress and with this Subcommittee as this unprecedented event unfolds. And, again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear here this afternoon, and my colleagues and I would be happy to try to answer any questions you

may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schaefer may be found at end of

hearing.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. At this point we’ll recess for the vote and then

reconvene for questions.

[Recess.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Well, thank you for waiting for us, for me.

Dr. Leetmaa, was it you that referred to the storm of—was it

1878?

Mr. LEETMAA. Yes.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Yes.

Mr. LEETMAA. 1887.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you, 1887——

Mr. LEETMAA. 1877/78.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. 1877/78?

Mr. LEETMAA. Right.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. And I guess we don’t have too much data on

that, but we have some, and that was a storm, if I understood you

correctly, where it was wetter in northern California than in southern California.

Mr. LEETMAA. That’s right. We had several stations. We had Red

Bluff, which I think is California still.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Yes.

Mr. LEETMAA. San Francisco, Sacramento, and San Diego. And

if you look at the comparison of that one to 1982/83, what you had

in San Francisco for the January, February, March period, 280 percent normal rainfall versus 215 for 1982/83; Sacramento, you had

240 percent versus 200 percent in 1982/83; Red Bluff was 400 percent versus 280 percent.
12

Obviously, after this event, we’ll have some more confidence in

knowing how these big events behave. So one of the ways we obviously try to bracket what’s going to happen is to try to look at comparable kinds of things. So this is one more piece of evidence that,

in fact, it probably will be quite wet in not only just southern California, but central California and northern California also.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I apologize. This speaker went off up here, and

I only sort of half-heard your last two or three sentences. Could you

just restate that again?

Mr. LEETMAA. As I indicated, for any given El Nin ̃ o event, there

is an uncertainty in how much, what the range of precipitation

might be. There’s an unpredictability, in essence, and one of the

ways we can study that unpredictability is to look events that look

similar to the ones that we’ve observed or we can use numerical

models, and both of those would then give you some spread on

what happens. So this particular event is indicating that it probably is appropriate to think about both central and northern California also being heavily impacted this year.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Was the 1877/78 event an unusually large El

Nin ̃ o event?

Mr. LEETMAA. Yes, scientists look back, and when they compare

sort of the characteristics, the global characteristics, it certainly

was comparable to 1982/83.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. It’s interesting to hear that testimony because so

much focus has been given to Southern California and the extraordinary amounts of rainfall they’re supposed to have, which of

course may, in fact, happen, but it could also happen that Northern

California instead might get that impact.

Mr. LEETMAA. Yes.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. And for cities like Sacramento, that could be particularly serious—well, for the whole State’s water supply, if a reaction to this prediction or estimate is to release too much water

in anticipation of the 200 or 400 percent rainfall that they had at

Red Bluff over 100 years ago. And really it’s going to be tough. And

what I’m getting out of this is it’s just a rough guess. Yes, we know

a lot more than we did, but it’s still a rough guess that could be

right or might not be right.

Mr. LEETMAA. That’s right. I think the climate forecasts are always going to have a degree of uncertainty. I mean, they’re basically pushing the mean rainfalls in a certain direction, but around

those mean rainfalls there will be a spread; there will be a range.

And so even 10 years from now or 20 years from now, it would be

unlikely if we can basically narrow that spread down. So one has

to look at the historical record and get some sense of what that

spread looks like.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Was it you who said that your short-range forecasts tend to be the most accurate?

Mr. LEETMAA. Yes, that was probably in my statement.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. But, even with that, isn’t there a high degree of

inaccuracy, even with the short-range forecasts?

Mr. LEETMAA. Perhaps I should let Dr. Friday, who used to be

the head of the Weather Service, address that.

[Laughter.]
13

Mr. DOOLITTLE. All right. I’d be curious to know—it seems like

somewhere I heard or read that there’s about 50 percent accuracy

on your short-range weather forecasts.

Dr. FRIDAY. Oh, actually, I believe the 50 percent accuracy number, it’s the low end of the range on some of the seasonal outlooks.

The short-range weather forecast, as far as storm events are concerned, heavy rain, thunderstorms, the accuracy on those forecasts

are now up in the 80 percent range. That did not used to—that was

not the case five or 6 years ago, before we put in the next-generation weather radars around the country.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Oh, OK. So we’ve improved dramatically.

Dr. FRIDAY. We have dramatically improved the accuracy of

storm and rain event forecasting since the introduction of the modernized National Weather Service.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Dr. Friday, I was interested—and I don’t think

I knew about the weather buoys, that they’re floating out there, I

guess in the eastern Pacific, that were installed a few years ago in

order to track El Nin ̃ o. I am curious to know more about that. It

seems that would have been quite a feat. How many of those were

installed and how far apart are they? I’d like to know a little bit

about that.

Dr. FRIDAY. It is a spectacular engineering and scientific success.

After we looked back after the 1982/83 El Nin ̃ o and we said, ‘‘Wow,

what was that that hit us?’’, we recognized the fact of what it was

and identified the fact that we really didn’t know it was coming because of the limitations of the data-observing systems of the time

was so great that we didn’t have anything to base understand how

it evolved.

An international research program was put together with cooperation from many countries around the globe, and in the United

States, as I indicated, it was supported by NOAA, NASA, National

Science Foundation, and the Office of Naval Research in DOD.

Technology was developed, because people had indicated that you

couldn’t put data buoys out in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and

have them stay in one place—it was just an engineering nightmare—technology was developed at NOAA’s laboratory in Seattle,

the Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, which allowed us to

install in water that was 3, 3.5 miles deep data buoys right on the

equator, and within a few degrees north and south of the equator.

And over a 10-year period, we have installed 70 of those data

buoys, all the way from the coast of South America, all the way

over to Indonesia.

Now one of our NOAA ships operates full time out there just

simply maintaining these data buoys, going out and repairing components and replacing components that fail. It is this information

that not only measures the surface temperature, but it also measures the temperature below the surface of the earth down to 500

meters all the way across this area, and it was the subsurface information that gave us the hint back in January that we starting

to see the development of an El Nin ̃ o. And it was that subsurface

information, coupled with the beginning of the surface impacts,

that allowed Ants Leetmaa to be able to forecast the significance

of this back in the springtime of this year. So we have maintained

those buoys under a research component for many years, and in
14

this year’s Presidential budget we are asking for those to be funded

as a fully operational system, so that we maintain that throughout—in perpetuity, to keep track of this phenomena.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Could you explain how they keep these buoys in

place?

Dr. FRIDAY. I was afraid you were going to ask that.

[Laughter.]

Dr. FRIDAY. The buoys themselves are relatively small, and they

are connected to an anchor on a very long nylon cable, and the design of the equipment on the buoy is so that it wasn’t literally carried along with the equatorial current. The specific design to

dampen the vibrations that would occur and all of that—the way

they handled the moorings, the way they handled the coupling,

that was the engineering feat, and it was a very complex design of

those systems, so that it would not be literally carried away by the

current.

But, in addition to the 500 meters of instrumented cable, with

temperature sensors and in some cases salinity sensors that are directly under the buoys, there is another three miles of heavy-duty

nylon cable that goes all the way to the surface of the bottom of

the ocean, and there are large weights attached there to hold it in

place.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. So each of these buoys is actually anchored to

the bottom of the ocean?

Dr. FRIDAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. That’s amazing.

Dr. FRIDAY. What I said, this was an amazing engineering feat,

and it has resulted in a tremendous success story in being able to

understand how the ocean and the atmosphere links together to

cause the change in water resources capacity for California.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Did somebody have to go down to the bottom of

the ocean?

Dr. FRIDAY. No, sir, they’re deployed from—they have been deployed from the NOAA vessels, operating research vessels, and we

now have, as I indicated, one vessel, the KAIM’MIMOANA, which

operates out of Hawaii, that its full-time job is to go out and maintain those buoys.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. So this is a heavy weight resting on the bottom

of the ocean?

Dr. FRIDAY. Actually, it’s usually three or four railroad wheels.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Railroad weights?

Dr. FRIDAY. The wheels from a railroad——

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Oh, railroad wheels?

Dr. FRIDAY. They’re very heavy.

[Laughter.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. That’s very interesting.

Dr. FRIDAY. I would invite you, sir, if you’re interested in this

technology, to visit the laboratory in Seattle. All the capabilities,

all the engineering work has been done in the NOAA laboratories

there, and it is a spectacular engineering site.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. So if it’s nylon cable, I guess that has an indefinite lifespan?

Dr. FRIDAY. No, sir, it does not. It does eventually decay. Also,

we have not eliminated all the problems with that. These cables ac-
15

tually hum a little because of the currents passing them, and

sharks don’t like that. So when you pull up this equipment, you

find a lot of shark teeth and shark prints on the instrument chain

and on the upper reaches of the moorings.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. And how many years have these been there?

Dr. FRIDAY. The network was completed in 1994, and we have

been operating it as a complete network ever since. We are now involved in trying to put some additional buoys in the northern Pacific because we know that although the tropical Pacific El Nin ̃ o

signal accounts for a large amount of the variability, there is also

some changes in the northern Pacific Ocean that we are beginning

to recognize that may affect the exact way that the El Nin ̃ o storm

system plays out. But the difficulty is the northern Pacific is much

more hostile than the tropical Pacific is. The type of storms that

affect the tropical Pacific are relatively mild compared to the tremendous storms up coming off the Gulf of Mexico and in that

arena, that may have waves that just are incredibly large. And so

we have another major engineering feat to be able to do that.

Our laboratory in Seattle says that they have solved that problem. They have now installed two of the buoys out there, and this

winter is going to tell us whether they’re really solved that problem

with the winter storms there or not.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Can you describe briefly what’s different about

those than the ones you’ve got?

Dr. FRIDAY. No, sir, I can’t, but I can provide that information

to you.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. OK. Maybe they’re just heavier weights and

thicker cable or something.

[The information referred to follows:] —————

The ATLAS buoys in the TAO array moored along the Equatorial Pacific are 2.3m

diameter fiberglass torroids. They are inexpensive to fabricate, structurally rigid,

and very stable instrument platforms. However, they have high drag due to the hull

shape and limited weight capability. A new buoy has been designed for the North

Pacific with lower drag and increased weight capability. An effort has been made

to keep the cost down by using proven design and fabrication methods employed in

the production of the torroid buoys. The new buoys are approximately 30 percent

larger and require larger mooring components including wire rope, nylon line, hardware, and anchors. Consequently a high latitude mooring costs more that an equatorial mooring—probably an additional $10,000 each. The top of the instrument

tower is typically 4 to 5 meters above the water surface.

The initial effort to move into the North Pacific was driven by a NOAA funded

project to develop a real-time Tsunami Reporting system using open ocean observations and satellite communications. (PMEL received additional funding from

DARPA.) Two moorings were deployed in FY 97 and additional deployments of these

moorings are scheduled in the future (see http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami-hazard/

). We are also supported by the National Ocean Partnership Program to place two

air-sea/upper ocean climate reference station moorings in the North Pacific during

FY98-99. The first will be at Ocean Weather Station P. and the second will be NW

of Hawaii near 165W. These buoys will carry a very different sensor package than

the Tsunami buoys, but the buoy is the same. You correctly stated in your testimony

that our goal has been to develop a mooring system that can carry out a variety

of tasks in the ice-free but still very demanding North Pacific environment.

Dr. FRIDAY. There is also something to do with the exact design

of the instrument chain itself, so that it’s better able to ride the

waves, and the fact that the mooring line itself is not taut here,

but it’s flexible, so that the buoy can ride up and down on that. But
16

I don’t know—I’m sorry, I just simply don’t know the precise details of that.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Just out of curiosity, have you had problems

with ships running into those or something?

Dr. FRIDAY. Every time I have an opportunity of addressing any

of the marine community, I try to point out the fact that buoys are

their friends. They should not be used to tie up ships and they

should not be used for target practice, because that happens to frequently the buoys, not only the deep ocean buoys along the coast.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. And these buoys are 6 or 8 feet high?

Dr. FRIDAY. They’re probably on the order of 20-feet tall. They’re

on the order of around 10-foot across, and as I indicated, the instrumentation chain goes down for about 500 meters below the surface.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Well, that’s very impressive. What did each of

those cost?

Dr. FRIDAY. They cost approximately $50,000 to $60,000 apiece,

but it does take the operation of one entire oceanographic research

vessel to maintain them on an annual basis.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. So that just plies the waters back and forth.

Dr. FRIDAY. Back and forth. The total annual operating cost to maintain this network is approximately $5 million a year. Now

that, in one respect, seems like a lot of money, but when you understand, as you read off the impacts of the 1982/83 El Nin ̃ o, with

the economic loss and the loss of life associated with that, that’s

a very small cost to pay to be able to have the information to provide advanced forecasts of the situation as it evolves.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Well, it certainly seems to me that it’s money

well-spent. I commend you and the organization for being able to

cause that to occur and hope you can get the next phase taken care

of.

Dr. Schaefer, you indicated that a number of stream gauges have

been taken offline in recent years. Could you explain why that’s

happening when the need for these gauges and additional data

seems ever more critical?

Mr. SCHAEFER. I’ll give you the beginning of the answer, and

then I’d like to turn, if I may, to Dr. Casadevall to expand on that.

We’ve been, of course, under funding pressure in general at the

USGS, and we’ve had to make some difficult choices to fund our

projects. I think, in general, what we’re seeing right now are indications that we’re beyond cutting into fat, and we’re beginning to

cut into the meat of some parts of our program. We recognize that

this is a problem, and we want to address it, and I hope to be able

to address it in the coming fiscal year, and to some extent in this

fiscal year.

Also, what’s happening is this system is really a system that

comes about through the work of many cooperators on the State

and local level, and our cooperators are also under financial pressure. Most of our gauging sites actually exist because of a 50/50

cost share. So when one of the cooperators pulls out, we’re not in

the position to pick up the other 50 percent. Now in some cases we

have been successful in finding others that are able to do that, and

we’ve been able to retain some stations that otherwise would have

been lost.
17

But let me, if I may, ask Dr. Casadevall to expand on that.

Mr. CASADEVALL. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.

With regard to the gauge system, as Dr. Schaefer showed you in

the graphic, we have about 7,000 gauges nationally. The image he

showed you was the coterminous U.S. We also have gauges in the

States of Hawaii and in Alaska.

Over the last few years, we’ve decreased the number of gauges

from about 7,400 down to about 7,000, but what we’ve increased

are the number of gauges that send data in real time through radio

telemetry. And for the kinds of issues that we’re addressing here

in relation to El Nin ̃ o, it’s really essential that managers, water

managers, dam and reservoir managers, city planners, and others

have data in real time. So, on the one hand, we’ve decreased the

number of total gauges, but some of those gauges, remember, were

only visited on a monthly basis, and data is retrieved or was retrieved from those static sites on a monthly basis. On the real-time

telemetry, we can get data as frequently as every 15 minutes. This

is really the essential data that planners need and that folks in the

Bureau of Reclamation and the folks in the Flood Forecast Office

of NOAA need to be able to make decisions that affect people’s lives

and safety, which really is the first priority for us in this activity.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Could you describe a gauge? In the Sacramento

River, how big would one be? How costly is it? Where is it typically

located?

Mr. CASADEVALL. Well, if you’ve ever crossed a bridge, for example, going across a river—and on the Sacramento River we can use

an example—you’ve probably noticed a small house that, for better

comparison, it looks like an outhouse; it looks like a portapotty. It’s

about 8 feet tall; it’s about 4 feet on a side. Often on the top you’ll

see an inclined panel. That’s a solar panel that is used to power

the electrical components that are part of the gauge. What you

don’t see is that extending out from the gauge house down into the

river is a hydraulic sensor or a pressure sensor that passes under

to the base of the river. And it’s information from that pressure

sensor that gets recorded in the gauge house. That information

then gets—if it’s a telemeter site, radio-telemetered or satellitetelemetered back to a recording station in Sacramento, for example,

at our USGS Water Resources District Office.

On the other hand, if it’s a site that’s only visited once a month,

a hydro-tech, a hydro-technician will go out and retrieve the record.

The record will be recorded right there onsite.

So you’ll often see these, and I invite you the next time you’re

on a bridge driving across the river, keep an eye out for the outhouse, and if we’re smart, you’ll see the new USGS logo in bright

green letters. We plan to put these on our more than 7,000 stream

gauges around the country.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. And that sits in the bottom of the river and

measures the velocity of the water?

Mr. SCHAEFER. Well, it measures the pressure of the water on

the bed or the river, and as you add more water to the stream or

to the river, of course, the pressure or the hydrostatic——

Mr. DOOLITTLE. OK.

Mr. SCHAEFER. [continuing] head increases on that. In addition,

we’ve made very precise cross-sectional measurements, and we do
18

what we call calibrating that gauge, so that when there is a pressure change, we know, because of calibration, we know how much

additional water is now being carried by the channel.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Does all of that data feed into, I guess in the

case of California, or at least the Sacramento area, into that place

on El Camino there, the State and Federal Governments joint operation center?

Mr. SCHAEFER. In El Camino—in Menlo Park, California or——

Mr. DOOLITTLE. No, no.

Mr. SCHAEFER. Oh, up in Sacramento?

Mr. DOOLITTLE. El Camino and Watt in Sacramento.

Mr. SCHAEFER. The data from our continuous telemetered sites,

the majority of those in the State of California are available on the

Internet, on the USGS California State website. If we had a computer here right now, we could find the river closest to your home

near Sacramento and we could find what gauge was there——

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Oh, OK.

Mr. SCHAEFER. [continuing] and we could look at the stage of the

river right now in real time with data that’s up to 4 hours old.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Is there a standard cost on a stream gauge?

Mr. CASADEVALL. Well, let’s suppose there’s a gauge already

there and we wanted to add telemetry. To add telemetry, we’re

talking about a telemeter package costing between about $3,500

and about $5,000. To install a gauge itself, to put the outhousetype structure in, to put the piping in, to put the pressure transducer in, and the associated equipment, I believe there’s a range

in prices depending on where the site it and how much hardening

of the site you have to do, but my recollection from years ago, that

it’s in the range of $35,000 to $60,000 per site. Once again, it depends on how hard we want the site to be, how hardy the site

should be, to withstand flood conditions.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Well, I think the Committee analysis mentioned

that the middle fork of the American River is not very well-monitored, and I don’t know what it takes to have it be well-monitored,

but, obviously, we’re spending the money out in the Pacific, which

is money well-spent. Are there plans to, especially in a State like

California with high mountains and the short distance from the

mountains to sea level, et cetera, and right there on the coast, the

first to receive the brunt of El Nin ̃ o or some bizarre storm—are

there some plans to increase monitoring in some of those types of

areas?

Mr. SCHAEFER. Well, right now in the State of California we have

more than 700 stream gauges. That’s about 10 percent of our network nationally. I would have to check with my colleagues to find

out what the plans are for this winter, and we’d be happy to get

that information for you, and——

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Well, I’d be interested in that, and interested in

supporting your efforts to increase your stations, both in the ocean

and on land.

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I guess I’m going to have to run out for a vote

again. If we ask a couple more questions, we’ll excuse you folks, because it’s a half hour’s worth of votes, apparently.
19

For Dr. Matthews, how do Bureau of Reclamation managers factor snow melt and runoff into reservoir management decisions?

Mr. MATTHEWS. The Bureau of Reclamation works very closely

with the National Weather Service in their forecasting systems,

and we take the snow water equivalent analyses throughout the

mountainous West from the National Operational Hydrologic Remote Sensing Center. Their data has up to one kilometer resolution. We incorporate that through the National Weather Service

River Forecast System to forecast runoff, where that’s available.

We also look at that data directly and evaluate what the

snowpack snowwater equivalent is and use that. We have some research tools that are currently being used to physically estimate

the runoff from both accumulated snow and temperature forecasts.

So that snowpack information is used on a routine basis throughout the spring runoff season.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. We had instances in California where they’ve

had a lot of snow, and then a tropical storm comes in and melts

it. I think 1986 was one of those events. Is that likely to be the

case or is it a small possibility? El Nin ̃ o is a warmer phenomenon,

right? So are we more vulnerable to receiving storms that might

melt our snowpack?

Mr. MATTHEWS. We could be. In many of the El Nin ̃ os, we have

a subtropical jet stream which brings in warm air out of the subtropics, and in that case there could be an earlier snowpack meltdown, which is what happened to a certain extent in the California

flood January, 1997, I believe.

Chet Bowling is the expert here from our Central Valley Operations Office. I think he would be in a better position to describe

the California events than I would.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. OK, we’ll come back to him.

Dr. Schaefer, Dr. Friday, in his testimony, stated that some regions of the U.S. are relatively more vulnerable to the effects of El

Nin ̃ o. Does the USGS concentrate its stream gauging in the areas

that are more sensitive to climate variability?

Mr. SCHAEFER. In part it does, and in part it doesn’t. I’m sorry

to give you a two-handed answer there. The stream gauge network

really originally advanced for other than flood control and monitoring reasons. It was really put in place to help people monitor

water conditions for use in irrigation, for example. And so that

means that it does make sense for us to step back periodically and

say, all right, now that we have this dual-use for this system and

we’re beginning to apply it to flood-related questions, where should

we look strategically to put additional sites? And that’s the reason

why we’re not only concerned about the overall downward trend in

sites, but, frankly, we’d like to have it be an overall upward trend,

so that we can begin to fill those gaps.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I’d like to encourage you, as the chairman of this

Subcommittee, to get that trend going back the other direction upward, because I think it’s clear we’re going to need to know as

much as we can. Even knowing more now than we did before, we

still are in the dark to a large extent.

I will have further questions, and I’ll just tender them in writing

and ask you to supply the answers as expeditiously as possible, and

hold the record open for that point.
20

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. And then I’ll excuse the first panel, and thank

you all very much for your testimony.

Yes, sir?

Mr. SCHAEFER. Sir, I’d just like to thank you. This is a very technical area, and people don’t often ask questions about how our

monitoring systems operate. We appreciate your interest, and we

would like to work with you in making sure that we’ve got the

most robust monitoring system that we can get.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you. We’ll excuse this panel and we’ll recess. When we come back, we’ll begin the final panel.

[Recess.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for persevering. We had an unusual series of votes, and they’re going to

have an even more unusual series shortly. So we’ll try and do this

in the little period between that.

Let’s call up the second panel, and please come forward and raise

your right hands, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Let the record reflect that each answered in the

affirmative.

Thank you, gentlemen. Please be seated.

Our first witness will be Dr. Konstantine Georgakakos, president

of the Hydrologic Research Center, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, the University of California at San Diego. And Dr.

Georgakakos, you’re recognized.

STATEMENT OF KONSTANTINE GEORGAKAKOS, PRESIDENT,

HYDROLOGIC RESEARCH CENTER, SCRIPPS INSTITUTION

OF OCEANOGRAPHY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN

DIEGO

Mr. KONSTANTINE GEORGAKAKOS. Thank you very much, Mr.

Chairman, for the opportunity to testify concerning the involvement of the Hydrologic Research Center in the forecasting and in

forecasting research associated with the predicted El Nin ̃ o event.

The Hydrologic Research Center is a nonprofit research corporation

in San Diego, California, and in this testimony I will focus in particular on Center research activities pertaining to operational

stream flow forecasting (as opposed to climate forecasting) for flood

warning and water resources management.

Two Center research activities are directly relevant. The first

one, assisting the California–Nevada River Forecast Center of the

U.S. National Weather Service in improving the short-and longterm forecasts of Folsom Lake inflow in east central California.

These forecasts will be used in the operation and management of

the Lake waters and flow release.

And the second one, assessing the utility of integrated forecastcontrol methodologies for the operation and management of reservoir systems. Case studies in Iowa and California are now being

conducted for this research.

Our research relies on mathematical hydrologic models of the

watershed processes and of the flow forecast uncertainty. Watershed process considered for the case studies are snow accumulation

and melt, and surface and subsurface flow. The flow forecast uncer-
21

tainty exists for three reasons. No. 1, incomplete coverage of watershed area by sensors—and I mean by precipitation sensors, temperature, wind, and so on—No. 2, large errors in meteorological

forecasts used to drive the hydrological models, and that’s a very

large source of uncertainty for the smaller-scale hydrological models; and then mathematical model approximations of complex, natural processes.

Our results so far support the following conclusions:

No. 1, Snowmelt volume estimates in hydrologic forecasts are

strongly affected by the density of the recording precipitation sensors in mountainous areas such as California. The accuracy of the

computed snowmelt volumes within the 1,800, roughly, square

miles of Folsom Lake Watershed decreases substantially with decreased watershed coverage by precipitation measurement sensors.

For example, there are currently large areas drained by the Middle

Fork of the American River with poor precipitation sensor coverage.

No. 2, substantial improvement of operational flow forecasts is

attained when the current flow forecast systems are upgraded to

include models for uncertainty and updating from flow measurements in real time. The improvement is mainly in the reduction of

forecast errors for unusually high or low flow rates. Thus, in many

cases meteorological forecasts with large uncertainty, as obtained

in mountainous California during a storm event, can be used to derive useful hydrologic forecasts.

No. 3, the third conclusion, in a case study involving data since

1904 from the Iowa River at the Iowa City gauging station in Iowa,

statistically significant seasonal stream flow associations to ENSO

were found. Analogous associations were not found for the American River at Folsom Lake. These studies are ongoing, and although strong associations between ENSO and seasonal stream

flow volumes in extremes in the Southwestern U.S. have been

found, no such statistical associations have been identified for central and northern California. It doesn’t mean they don’t exist. It is

possible that the three-to-seven-year ENSO signal is concealed by

the extreme year-to-year variability of stream flow in the Folsom

Lake Watershed.

The fourth conclusion, substantial benefits for operational reservoir water management were obtained for the Saylorville Reservoir in Iowa, one of our case studies, when flow forecasts were

used as input to the decision process with due account for forecast

uncertainty, and that is important. On the basis of extensive computer simulations of the watershed-reservoir system, it was found

that using coupled forecast-control methodologies reduces reservoir

management sensitivities to climatic variability and to the large

uncertainties associated with the forecast of such variability by

current climate models. Analogous simulations are in progress for

Lake Folsom in California, and my brother, Professor Aris

Georgakakos of Georgia Tech, will testify to that effect.

I wish to make the following topical recommendations:

One, conduct detailed studies to quantify the uncertainty associated with the estimation of precipitation and snowmelt over the Sierra Nevada in California.
22

Two, advanced stream flow forecast procedures should be implemented and utilized in parallel to current operational ones to

evaluate increased benefits to operations. Such procedures should

include models for uncertainty of meteorological forecasts and

should utilize stream flow observations to improve the forecasts

continuously in real time.

Third, in parallel to No. 2 above, coupled forecast-control methodologies with due account for forecast uncertainty should be implemented in prototype watersheds. In this context, the utility of

climate forecasts for increasing the benefits of reservoir management should be quantified.

Real-time flow forecasting and reservoir water management are

important operational functions for mitigating natural disasters.

These functions, vital for present-day communities, have their

bases on hydrologic science and engineering and water resources

systems analysis. As the requirements of the public for safety and

reduction of damage losses from natural disasters increase, it is important to formulate a national plan for the increased effectiveness

of these operational functions.

I have argued elsewhere in the scientific literature that to

achieve these goals and in analogy to the establishment of our National Center for Atmospheric Research in the atmospheric

sciences, it appears necessary to establish a National Center for

Hydrology and Water Resources. I firmly believe that, with the establishment of such a national center, much progress will be made

almost immediately on a national level by concerted efforts to enhance the flow of information from research to operations. Such a

center is envisioned as a collaborative effort among universities,

the Federal Government, and the private sector.

With this last important recommendation, I now conclude my

testimony. I will be pleased to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Konstantine Georgakakos may

be found at end of hearing.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you, sir. And our next witness is Dr. Aris

Georgakakos, director of the Georgia Water Resources Institute,

Georgia Institute of Technology. Dr. Georgakakos.

STATEMENT OF ARIS GEORGAKAKOS, DIRECTOR, GEORGIA

WATER RESOURCES INSTITUTE, GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF

TECHNOLOGY

Mr. ARIS GEORGAKAKOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is, indeed,

a pleasure and an honor to testify before this Committee. I’m an

expert in the operational management of reservoir systems, and my

testimony particularly addresses the value of climate and hydrologic forecasting in reservoir operation.

With proper management, reservoirs can provide vital services to

human communities, including the mitigation of severe floods and

droughts, the generation of hydroelectric energy, the provision of

water supply to urban, industrial, and agricultural areas, recreation, navigation, and the sustainable management of riverine ecosystems.

However, the extent to which reservoirs succeed in providing

these services depends critically upon the manner in which they

are operated. Consider, for example, the Folsom Reservoir in east
23

central California, shown on figure 1 of my written testimony,

which is expected to provide flood control, generate electricity, provide water supply for irrigation, and maintain a certain downstream flow rate in the American River for water quality and ecosystem preservation. In the interest of hydropower, the reservoir

should always be full to create the highest possible hydraulic head

for the turbines and maximize their power output. However, from

a flood control standpoint, there is a need to draw the reservoir

level down in anticipation of floods, free up storage space, and accommodate flood volumes without causing downstream damage.

In a world without uncertainty, the reservoir managers would

know the magnitude of the flood precisely and could run the turbines at full power prior to the flood to lower the reservoir just

enough to receive and contain the flood volume. This scenario

would be ideal because it would avoid downstream damage; it

would pass the entire flood through the turbines without wasting

power to spillage, and it would maintain the reservoir as high as

possible, maximizing its value for hydropower, flood prevention,

and the other water uses.

Unfortunately, in the real world in which we live, reservoir managers can only guess the magnitude of the upcoming floods through

imprecise climate, weather, and stream flow forecasts, and the

challenge is to balance the risk for flood damage against the adverse impacts on hydropower and other reservoir uses. Whether

their decisions are successful or not depends critically on two factors: First, the quality of stream flow forecasts and, second, the

ability to fully utilize them through an integrated and flexible decision system and process.

In principle, good, quality stream flow forecasts are expected to

benefit reservoir management. However, the actual benefits depend

on many system-specific factors, such as the lead time and reliability of forecasts, reservoir size related to inflow volume, hydrologic characteristics of the outlet structures, turbine discharge capacities, flood damage thresholds, and the levels and timing of

other water demands.

Thus, to assess the value of stream flow forecasts in the management of Folsom, I developed a computer model which includes a

forecasting, a decision, and a simulation component. A brief description of this model and its underlying assumptions appears in

my written testimony and will not be elaborated here, other than

to say that it represents most Folsom features, which were kindly

provided by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Folsom operators,

and is designed to assess the relative differences in reservoir performance under different forecast scenarios of low, intermediate,

and perfect skill. These assessments are made by recreating the

Folsom response over the historical period from 1964 to 1995, assuming that the reservoir was operated with the guidance of the

decision support system.

Folsom’s performance is measured in accordance with three criteria: flood damage in millions of dollars, annual energy generation

revenue in millions of dollars, and annual spillage in million cubic

feet. The results indicate that Folsom would benefit substantially

from improved forecast skill. Most notably, flood damage would be

mitigated from approximately $5.3 billion in the case of low-skill
24

forecast to about $220 million in the case of intermediate-skill forecast. Relative to energy generation, the value of intermediate over

low skill forecasts is approximately $1 million per year. And in the

extreme scenario of perfect forecast skill, flood damages would be

fully mitigated, and energy revenues would be increased by another

$2 million per year.

While the previous results are annualized, the actual year-byyear benefits would be much higher. For example, figures 3 and 4

of my written testimony illustrate this comparison for the high-flow

year of October 1, 1996 to September 30, 1965. For this particular

period, the low-skill forecast scheme would cause heavy flood damages, on the order of $4.3 billion, whereas the other two would completely avoid flooding. Similarly, energy revenues would increase

by approximately $4 million from the low to the intermediate-skill

forecast scenario, and almost $8 million from the intermediate to

the perfect case.

One last point to emphasize is that the above-referenced benefits

can only be realized if forecasts are used in connection with dynamic decision schemes that fully account for forecast uncertainty.

By contrast, static reservoir rule curves, which are traditionally

used in the operation of reservoir systems, would fall short of realizing the value of improved forecasts.

I have so far argued that good quality, long-lead stream flow

forecasts, coupled with appropriate decision support systems, improve reservoir management. An important and relevant question

is: By how much can stream flow forecasts actually be improved?

A reliable answer to this question can only come from the continuing research on coupled climate, weather, and hydrologic prediction systems. My experience with such integrated approaches in

the midwestern U.S., east-central Africa, and South America is

promising, albeit at a preliminary stage.

The most concrete improvements in short-range—that is, up to

one month—stream flow forecasting can be realized from the use

of hydrologic watershed models. To assess the value of such models, I also conducted an experiment using an adaptation of the National Weather Service River Forecast System, coupled with the

Folsom decision system, in collaboration with Dr. Konstantine

Georgakakos of the Hydrologic Research Center in San Diego, California. The results were comparable to those of the intermediateskill forecast experiment mentioned earlier, indicating that such

forecast decision systems could accrue significant operational benefits.

Lastly, as a first step toward assessing the value of El Nin ̃ o information in the management of Folsom, I investigated the correlation between sea surface temperatures at the equatorial Pacific

Ocean and monthly Folsom inflows. I was unable to find any significant relationship between these two variables, which led me to

conclude that a strong El Nin ̃ o does not necessarily imply a predictable change in the weather patterns over the Folsom drainage

basin. This conclusion, however, may not apply to other regions of

the western United States. In fact, similar case studies have shown

that, if strong enough, this correlation between El Nin ̃ o and stream

flows does improve forecast skill and reservoir operations.
25

In conclusion, I’d like to reiterate that integrated forecast decision systems can significantly mitigate flood damage, increase the

value of energy generation, and potentially benefit all other water

uses. However, the magnitude of these benefits are system-specific

and can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

In addition, better forecasting procedures do not by themselves

imply operational improvements. Such improvements can only be

realized through coupled forecast decision systems and institutional

processes. In this regard, there is a pressing need to make water

resources professionals fully aware of the capabilities and benefits

of integrated decision systems and processes relative to traditional

operational practices. An effective means to stimulate this transfer

of technology from researchers to the user community is through

the support of prototype demonstration projects throughout different regions of the U.S. with the involvement of both groups. I

would like to urge the Committee to support such demonstration

projects through existing or new funding programs, an example of

which is the GENEX Continental Scale International Project

(GCIP) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA).

Thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony on the

implications of recent advances for the management of water resources.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aris Georgakakos may be found

at end of hearing.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you, sir.

Our next witness will be Dr. Soroosh Sorooshian, professor of the

Department of Hydrology, University of Arizona. Dr. Sorooshian.

STATEMENT OF SOROOSH SOROOSHIAN, PROFESSOR,

DEPARTMENT OF HYDROLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

Mr. SOROOSHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we’ve heard

today and read in many places, we do know that this year’s El

Nin ̃ o is the strongest yet recorded. We also know that statistical

evidence points to above-average winter precipitation for the Southwest United States. However, these facts do not constitute sufficient information for water resources and emergency managers to

initiate major changes in operating practices. Such decisions require reliable information about the expected arrival time of significant storm systems, their expected duration, and intensities.

A storm system that arrives during warm weather may not result in snow accumulations at high elevations, but may instead

produce large amounts of runoff and potential flooding. Without accurate information about the timing and quantities of precipitation

and stream flow, it is very difficult to plan timely evacuation from

flood-prone areas or to pre-release large quantities of stored reservoir water to help mitigate the flooding.

On the other hand, precipitation which arrives during a cooler

period may accumulate as snow at high elevations. In this case,

water resources managers have greater flexibility to evaluate options and to decide on an appropriate operational strategy. Under

this scenario, it would be a lot less risky to commit to other reservoir releases, knowing that melting of the above-average
26

snowpack will provide the water necessary to fill the reservoirs

later in the season.

However, rapid warming could cause sudden large releases of

melt water leading to late winter and/or spring flooding. It is critically important, therefore, that accurate estimates of the volume of

water in the snowpack and timely and accurate temperature forecasts during the melt season be available.

I wish to strongly emphasize that sound water resources management decisions in the Southwest will require far more information than merely the knowledge of a strong El Nin ̃ o signal. Water

resources managers are rightly reluctant to order early reservoir

releases without further information. In the few instances that I

know of where early decisions have been made regarding reservoir

releases and other water management issues, the knowledge that

this will be a strong El Nin ̃ o year has been only one of several useful pieces of information, but not the sole decision factor.

For instance, the Salt River Project, which supplies water to the

greater Phoenix area, has incorporated the information about the

strong El Nin ̃ o signal into its decision to reduce ground water

pumping by some 40,000 acre feet this year. This requirement will

instead be satisfied from the reservoir system based on expectations that an above-average spring snowmelt runoff will fill the reservoirs to their normal level.

Water resources and emergency managers are accustomed to

making decisions based on probabilistic information. While the

knowledge of a strong El Nin ̃ o year has enhanced the probability

for a wetter-than-average year in the Southwest, it has not reduced

uncertainty of many other factors critical in making decisions regarding major deviations from normal operating practices. In order

to enhance the quality and usefulness of both short-term, meaning

hours to days, and extended, weeks to months, forecasts, the reliability of hydrologic prediction systems for the western U.S. must

be improved. The primary components of this system are the quantitative precipitation forecasts, extended stream flow prediction,

and more accurate methods for estimating snow accumulation, particularly in the mountainous regions, and high resolution accurate

rainfall measurements are critical for forecasting rapidly developing flood events.

The strength of the current El Nin ̃ o signal has attracted a lot of

media attention and has generated much-needed public attention

to this climatic phenomenon. The climate research community is to

be commended for developing the capability of predicting it with

such a high degree of accuracy. Perhaps the greatest benefit of this

prediction to the water resources management community has been

in encouraging very close cooperation among the Federal and state

agencies responsible for various aspects of water resources management and hydrologic services.

As an example, the cooperation over the past several months between the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the National Weather Service’s Colorado Basin River Forecast Center, and the USGS has resulted in close coordination for sharing modeling and observational

information required for improved management of the reservoir

systems on the Colorado River. Continued cooperation among these

agencies will be critical to the development of an operational hydro-
27

logic prediction system for the western U.S. to be used for water

resources management in both El Nin ̃ o and non-El Nin ̃ o years.

It’s worth noting that while statistical evidence points to a wetter-than-average year in the Southwest during a strong El Nin ̃ o

year, the wettest winter on record, which was 1993 in the White

Mountains and the surrounding areas of southern Arizona, was not

an El Nin ̃ o year. A reliable hydrologic prediction system is crucial

for the efficient management of western water resources, irrespective of whether we are experiencing an El Nin ̃ o weather pattern or

not.

Finally, most of the Southwest at the current time is below average in terms of its precipitation. In the Tucson area, we are about

three inches below normal, and I hope you and other folks here will

pray for us to receive the additional precipitation expected from a

strong El Nin ̃ o year. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sorooshian may be found at end

of hearing.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you, sir. Our next witness is Mr. Richard

Andrews, director of the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services,

the State of California. Mr. Andrews.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD ANDREWS, DIRECTOR, GOVERNOR’S

OFFICE, EMERGENCY SERVICES, CALIFORNIA

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, and thanks for the opportunity to

speak today on the many activities underway in California in preparation for El Nin ̃ o, as well as issues related to Federal policies

and practices that influence our preparedness and disaster recovery

efforts.

Despite the considerable uncertainties about what the impacts of

El Nin ̃ o will be, we are confident that State and local governments

will be well-prepared to meet the challenges that severe winter

weather may bring. As is well-known, California has in this decade

had repeated and varied experience in coping with the consequences of natural disasters, including large fires, earthquakes,

and floods. We have improved our local and State response systems

after each event. California has, I believe, the most effective emergency response system in the Nation.

The El Nin ̃ o forecasts have helped accelerate ongoing preparedness efforts that followed this January’s historic floods in central

and northern California. In January 1997, the State experienced

serious flooding in 48 counties, with damages totaling nearly $2 billion. These floods came only two years after a series of winter

storms in the first quarter of 1995, where losses also totaled $2 billion, led Governor Wilson to declare for the first time in the State’s

history all 58 counties as disaster areas.

At the height of the 1997 winter storms, Governor Wilson established the Flood Emergency Action Team to review the lessons and

to establish long-term strategies to protect Californians from future

flood disasters. Following a series of hearings throughout the impacted region, the Flood Emergency Action Team made more than

50 recommendations that had been implemented to improve the

State’s flood-fighting systems, including improving emergency response coordination between public safety agencies at the local and

State level, the Army Corps of Engineers, and local flood mainte-
28

nance organizations, improving also and expanding existing flood

data. To expand the State’s existing flood data, the California Department of Water Resources has installed telemetry linking nearly

50 stream-gauging sites in areas that have high flood probability.

On October 6, Governor Wilson convened an El Nin ̃ o Summit in

Sacramento. In this Executive Order, signed on that date, the Governor directed that OES and the Department of Water Resources

establish technical assistance teams and conduct a series of regional workshops throughout the State to review specific State and

local preparedness action. Governor Wilson also signed legislation

allocating $7.4 million for El Nin ̃ o preparedness measures, including the prepositioning of flood-fighting resources as forecasts become more specific.

In addition to the actions being undertaken by the State, local

governments, community groups, and businesses are taking unprecedented preparedness measures. Supplies have been stockpiled,

storm drains cleared, evacuation procedures reviewed, and strategies for the care and shelter of individuals updated. Many cities

and counties have held special flood preparedness drills and developed specific emergency plans for possible El Nin ̃ o impacts. California will continue to provide the public with the best available information through the Internet, briefings and workshops, training

sessions, technical assistance teams, and the stockpiling of equipment.

The Federal Government is an important partner in the State’s

overall preparedness effort and plays an essential role in helping

communities recover from the impacts of natural disaster. In a letter to President Clinton on October 6, Governor Wilson urged action on several concerns about the current Federal policies and

practices that impacted the pace of recovery from past floods and

which also affect current and future preparedness and recovery efforts, including, first, urging the Army Corps of Engineers to accelerate the timetable to make repairs to levies damaged in central

California in January 1997. Policy disputes between Corps officials

in California and Washington slowed recovery during the spring

and summer months. Progress is now being made, and if we’re fortunate to have winter storms hold-off until the end of November,

we have received indication from the Clinton Administration that

all but one of the critical central California flood control repairs

should be in place to handle the flows. We would hope that this

year’s experiences of unnecessary delays would not be repeated following future flooding.

In the event levies are not fully repaired, direct the Corps to undertake response preparations to improve their emergency response

under Public Law 84–99. Again, we have received general assurances from the administration that these suggestions will be acted

upon.

Second, direct all Federal regulatory agencies to consolidate the

needed approvals for flood channel clearance. Governor Wilson has

directed all State agencies to place the highest priority on expediting approvals for this work. A large number of Federal agency

approvals are also needed. Local agencies need clear and consistent

permit requirements and procedures from Federal agencies.

On October 24, the Corps of Engineers issued a nationwide 31

permit for channel-clearing and sediment removal in Los Angeles
29

County. Over this past weekend, the county began some of this important work. Governor Wilson remains concerned, however, that

the Environmental Protection Agency has indicated that it will

seek a policy review of the cumulative impacts of channel-clearing

activities with the intention of requiring further mitigation work.

Fourth, direct FEMA and the Corps of Engineers to modify policies for local agencies that conduct flood fights on flood control

works. As a result of Federal policies arising from the 1993 Midwest floods, there now exists in some important instances a disincentive for local agencies to assist in flood fights.

Finally, direct FEMA to implement the recommendations relating to public assistance processes and policies made by the California congressional delegation in a September 15th letter to the

FEMA Director.

All Californians are grateful for the assistance we received from

Congress and the administration as we join together on the levies

to battle the flood waters of last year’s storms. We are also grateful

for the assistance we continued to receive in the flood’s aftermath

as communities and individuals worked to repair the damage and

clean up homes, farms, and businesses. State agencies, local governments, community groups, and individuals are currently engaged in an unprecedented preparedness effort in advance of this

year’s winter. Our common goal is to reverse Mark Twain’s famous

aphorism: ‘‘Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does

anything about it.’’

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Andrews may be found at end of

hearing.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. The next witness and final witness is Mr. Stephen K. Hall, executive director of the Association of California

Water Agencies. Mr. Hall.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN K. HALL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA WATER AGENCIES

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you may know, the agencies that we represent are the local

agencies that are the closest to the flooding when it occurs. So we

have a lot at stake in this discussion, and we thank the Committee

for its interest.

I’d like to make three quick points regarding the weather in California and what we’ll do about it. First, as you’ve heard this afternoon, and as we all well know, the weather in California is highly

variable and unpredictable. In the last 20 years, we’ve had 2 years

that have fallen into the normal range in rainfall totals. Every

other year has either been dry or wet.

And there’s probably no better example of the variability of

weather than 1997, when we were both dry and wet. In January

of this year, we received 30 inches of rainfall in the northern California watershed. Our largest flood control reservoir nearly filled in

a week’s time. The flooding that occurred caused $2 billion in damage; 120,000 people were put out of their homes, 9 people lost their

lives. The spring that followed was the driest that we’ve had in 104

years, and so at the end of the irrigation season we faced the in-
30

credible situation of having record rainfall and flooding followed by

delivery cutbacks to irrigators late in the season.

That was due in part to the extreme weather variability, but also

due to the state of the system that we use to operate for flood and

water supply. We’ve done a pretty good job—in fact, I would say

a very good job—in recent years of improving our capabilities to

manage the system for both flood control and water supply, but the

system itself is outdated and undersized. The heart of the system

is in the Central Valley, our largest watershed. It’s an impressive

system, has 23 reservoirs, over 1,800 miles of levies and channels,

but most of that was built before modern construction techniques

were available, and as the 1997 floods showed, it is very vulnerable. We will not finish all of the repairs necessary from those

floods before the next flood season begins.

It also lacks storage. As an example, on the Colorado River they

average 15 million acre feet of annual runoff. They have 60 million

acre feet of storage, 4 years’ worth of annual runoff.

On the Sacramento River system, we have 16 million acre feet

of storage to take care of 22 million acre feet of runoff, less than

one year. That’s why we floo so often. That lack of capacity means

water managers have to make a lot of tough choices. The same system that protects lives and property also serves the Nation’s largest economy. Water managers will always err on the side of public

safety, as they should, but that means there is even more stress

to operate for water supply.

We’ve made great strides in stretching supplies, but the problem

is getting worse because in the last 20 years our population has essentially doubled. We have done nothing to add to our flood control

or water supply infrastructure.

That leads to my third point: Not only have we not grown the

system, there have been substantial new demands placed on it. The

Bay-Delta Estuary, which is the heart of our water supply and

flood control system, is also an estuary that contains over 120 species, some of which are endangered. We have dedicated several million acre feet of water to protection of those species in the last several years. That has put a substantial additional demand on the

system which is straining our water supplies even further.

I might note that the environment also suffers from floods as

well as water shortages. This year biologists are very concerned

about the impacts to salmon populations from the floods early in

the year that wiped out substantial habitat. New storage on the

system would help regulate flows to protect lives, the economy, and

the environment.

From these observations that we will continue to have variable

weather, we do have a system that is too small and out of date,

and that we have put substantial new demands on the system in

recent years, one has to conclude that we need to improve and add

to our existing system. We are in support of a recently announced

study by the Corps of Engineers to undertake a comprehensive reassessment of the flood control system in the Central Valley. We,

likewise, appreciate what the Wilson administration is doing to

prepare for the El Nin ̃ o year that we’re facing, and we agree with

them about the need to take action at the Federal level.
31

Perhaps most importantly, we are actively involved in the

CALFED process, a comprehensive look at the Bay-Delta to focus

on ecosystem restoration, improved flood control, and improved

water supply. We believe that it is our best hope in the foreseeable

future to bring about the kinds of improvements necessary in our

system to meet the needs of the people of the State.

We appreciate the fact that the Federal Government has been involved in the CALFED process because there is clearly a Federal

interest in doing so. We look forward to working with you, Mr.

Chairman, and with the Congress in future years to complete the

planning process in CALFED, and then move on to implementing

the plan that it produces.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall may be found at end of

hearing.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you. Well, we got through that, and I only

missed one vote, but I can’t miss another one. So let’s take advantage of what time we have for questions.

Mr. Hall, your testimony talks about the need for additional

water storage in California. Are you referring to on-stream storage,

off-stream, or both?

Mr. HALL. We’re certainly open to both. Certainly, there is a

need for improved flood control on-stream, and there are great potential advantages to off-stream storage, even for flood control, as

well as water supply. So we would support certainly a lot of offstream storage, and in selected cases on-stream.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you.

Mr. Andrews, do you agree with Mr. Hall’s general assessment

about the strains on California’s water supply system?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, absolutely, and as part of the second phase

of the Governor’s Flood Emergency Action Team work, we’re addressing issues of the long-term strategy that’s needed because,

clearly, as Mr. Hall indicated, the system itself is simply limited,

and we can operate it as effectively as we possibly can, using the

best forecasting information available, but there are simply inherent limitations to the system that can only be addressed by a more

long-term comprehensive solution.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. To what extent has the State water project been

evaluated for the potential impacts of the El Nin ̃ o event?

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, the Department of Water Resources is continually working with NOAA and with the National Weather Service, with the Reclamation groups, to evaluate it. David Kennedy,

the Director of Water Resources, is confident that they’re taking

every measure that they can, given the uncertainty of the forecast

right now, to try to make sure that the system can handle, to the

extent it can given its overall capacity, what is now being forecast.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you.

Dr. Sorooshian, in your opinion, how well are other water agencies and utilities which operate dams, which may or may not have

the flood control component, integrated in the decisions taking

place between state and Federal agencies—excuse me—in the discussion taking place between state and Federal agencies?

Mr. SOROOSHIAN. Mr. Chairman, as I pointed out, it’s really a

wonderful thing out of this El Nin ̃ o year that much closer coopera-
32

tion is already taking place. Certainly, once this period is over, I

think the agencies should be encouraged to evaluate to see how

their cooperation has improved the amount of exchange of information to minimize—for instance, in the late ’80s there was an episode of warming in the Colorado which resulted in major flooding

and damage to the Grand Canyon Dam. When one in hindsight

looks at it, if better information exchanges had taken place, perhaps better operating policies could have been implemented to

avoid situations like that.

So, in general, I am very optimistic, and we see a lot more interaction between agencies.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you.

Dr. Konstantine Georgakakos, how important is it in your opinion to be able to get real-time data from all the stream gauges, if

we are to make substantial improvement of operation flow forecasts?

Mr. KONSTANTINE GEORGAKAKOS. I think it’s very important, especially in view of the uncertainty in the meteorological forecasts,

and probably for short hydrologic forecast lead time, say between

6 and 18 hours.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Andrews, you said that through the Department of Water Resources, California has installed nearly 50

stream-gauging sites in areas that have high flood probability. To

what extent is that data collection activity coordinated with USGS?

Mr. ANDREWS. The initial intent was to have the USGS join in

that effort, and my understanding is that, because of funding limitations, they were not able to deploy additional instruments or to

provide real-time telemetry on additional instruments. So that the

state went ahead and both installed additional instruments, but

the major step was to link the 50 states with real-time telemetry.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. So, do you forward that information along to

USGS anyway?

Mr. ANDREWS. Oh, yes, the information is forwarded onto USGS.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. OK.

Mr. ANDREWS. It’s just that we had hoped for a more robust

array than we were able to find——

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I think we’re going to have to find them some

more money to do their part of the bargain here.

Dr. Aris Georgakakos, you state that the benefits to reservoir

management that you describe in your testimony can be realized

only if forecasts are used in connection with dynamic decision

schemes, but that static reservoir rule curves, which are traditionally used in the operation of reservoir systems, would fall short of

realizing the value of improved forecasts. Could you elaborate some

on what you mean by that, dynamic decision schemes versus static

reservoir rule curves?

Mr. ARIS GEORGAKAKOS. The main difference is really the ability

to incorporate the uncertainty of the hydrologic forecast. The usual,

the traditional operating rules of reservoirs do not really handle

that very well. While dynamic systems follow the hydrologic forecast, they incorporate the uncertainty within them and have a better sense of the operation of the system, and that’s basically what

I meant.
33

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Gentlemen, I sincerely regret that I haven’t had

more time to ask you and the other panel more questions. I’ll ask

you, if you would, please, to respond to some of our written questions.

[The information referred to may be found at end of hearing.]

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I appreciate the work that you are doing and the

efforts that you have made to come here this afternoon, and now

into this evening. I hope we aren’t making you miss your plane

flights.

We will hold the record open and would ask you to respond as

quickly as possible to those supplementary questions.

And with that, the hearing is concluded.

[Whereupon, at 6:04 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned subject to

the call of the Chair.]

[Additional material submitted for the record follows.]
34

STATEMENT OF ELBERT W. FRIDAY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: The past fifteen years have

witnessed remarkable advances in the observations, understanding and predictions

of climate variability, especially as related to El Nino. This is an outstanding scientific success story in which NOAA research has played a leading role. We have

entered a new era where we can now observe and closely monitor El Nino conditions

as they develop, and can also provide measurably skillful forecasts of future conditions for at least a few seasons in advance. We have further established connections

between El Nino and regional and global climate variations which can begin to be

incorporated into decision making in climate-sensitive sectors, such as energy and

water resources.

These are extraordinary steps forward. At the same time, it is important to keep

in mind that the science of climate prediction is still in its infancy, and is developing

rapidly. Therefore, much of what I describe will be products of ongoing research by

NOAA and its partners and, clearly, much more remains to be done in this area.

I must also emphasize that climate predictions are by their nature probability forecasts. That is, El Nino alone will not determine what happens in our Nation’s

weather over the next year, but rather it will shift probabilities in such a way as

to make certain climate events more likely, and others less likely. Further, El Nino

does not influence all parts of our Nation’s weather in the same way, and some regions are relatively more vulnerable to its effects. My testimony will outline principal features of El Nino, describe the status of the current event, and summarize

recent research results on climate risks associated with El Nino over the United

States.

BACKGROUND

What is El Nino, and how is it related to larger scale patterns of climate variability? In brief, El Nino refers to a naturally occurring phenomenon in the equatorial Pacific Ocean which is characterized by an unusual warming of the sea surface temperatures extending from the South American coast to near the dateline.

The flip side of El Nino, often called La Nina, is characterized by abnormally cold

sea surface temperatures over the same region. Both El Nino and La Nina have

major effects on global and regional climate. El Nino (and La Nina) events happen

on average every two to seven years and, once established, persist for six to twelve

months (Exhibit 1). The persistence of such conditions provides one key as to why

El Nino is potentially useful for climate predictions.

A second key is that El Nino is not an isolated oceanic phenomenon but, rather,

involves coupled ocean-atmospheric interactions in the tropical Pacific. The coupled

phenomenon is called the El Nino—Southern Oscillation, or ENSO, where Southern

Oscillation refers to systematic changes in tropical atmospheric pressure patterns.

El Nino conditions, such as we are experiencing now, are associated with a pronounced weakening of the trade winds which ordinarily blow from east to west

across the tropical Pacific. The tropical rainfall patterns also shift, with the heaviest

rainfall moving eastward following the warmer water. The changes in tropical rainfall alter the global wind patterns and, in particular, the jet streams, which in turn

affect our Nation’s weather. La Nina also exerts important effects on global wind

patterns through essentially the same processes, although in many cases the climate

changes are reversed. For North America, the largest and most systematic effects

on climate with either El Nino or La Nina events are usually experienced in winter

and spring.

By the early 1980s, there was growing recognition in the climate research community that ENSO was a major source of climate variability, and that potentially useful seasonal predictability of this phenomenon was possible. However, in 1982, the

onset of the largest El Nino in this century was not even recognized, let alone predicted. The failure to identify the initiation of this major event was due to inadequacies in data, to deficiencies in our conceptual understanding of fundamental causal

mechanisms, and to the rudimentary nature of prediction models at that time.

To address important challenges in ENSO observations and prediction, a new research program on the Tropical Oceans and Global Atmosphere, or TOGA, was initiated in 1985. TOGA was sustained by cooperative efforts of four agencies: NOAA,

the National Science Foundation, NASA, and the Department of Defense’s Office of

Naval Research, with NOAA leading the interagency research program on interannual climate variability since 1982. As noted in a 1996 report of the National Research Council, the TOGA program, which formally ended in 1994, has left a series

of important legacies, including:
35

(1) an observational system supported by NOAA, called the TOGA TAO (Tropical

Atmosphere—Ocean) Array, that provides a vital set of in situ observations for monitoring El Nino conditions and for initializing computer models for El Nino forecasts;

(2) the ability to project El Nino conditions in the tropics a few seasons in advance

with measurable skill;

(3) an improved ability to estimate the global atmospheric response to projected

oceanic conditions in the tropical Pacific;

(4) the increased use of climate information and forecasts as a factor in decisionmaking in climate-sensitive areas.

These major advances are all critical to today’s discussion. As one example, unlike

1982, the current ENSO observing system has allowed us to identify and describe

the evolution of this year’s major El Nino event as it is occurring, rather than after

the fact. The in situ observations also provide fundamental input data for the computer models that are now being used to forecast the evolution of this event.

The 1997 El Nino Event

NOAA is closely monitoring the evolution of the 1997 El Nino event, and is making its data and analyses available in real-time through various media, including

the World Wide Web, through sites at the Climate Diagnostics Center (CDC), Pacific

Marine Environmental Laboratory (PMEL), Climate Prediction Center (CPC), and

Office of Global Programs (OGP). The latest TAO array data indicate that very

strong El Nino conditions continue in the tropical Pacific, with sea surface temperature anomalies exceeding 4.5C (9F) in the eastern Pacific. Sea surface anomalies

through much of the central and eastern tropical Pacific are at the highest observed

values in at least the last 50 years, exceeding even the 1982-83 event at this time

of year. It is important to note that by early last winter, the National Centers for

Environmental Prediction (NCEP) coupled model was forecasting a transition to

warm conditions over the summer, and by May, NCEP was confident in predicting

that this would be a major El Nino event.

To get a further picture of the magnitude of the current event, it is useful to compare its evolution with that of the six prior strongest El Nino events over the last

50 years (Exhibit 2). The measure used for this purpose is an index that includes

tropical winds, pressures, cloudiness and sea surface temperatures, to more accurately reflect the coupled nature of the ENSO phenomenon. By this measure, this

event is by far the strongest we have seen for this time of year, and second only

to the 1982-83 event in absolute magnitude, with the latter event reaching a peak

in late winter to early spring of 1983. Another important aspect of the current El

Nino is that it experienced the most rapid sustained growth of any event of the

record, from its initiation in spring through this past summer. Although the latest

data point (for August-September) suggests a leveling off, note that such behavior

has also occurred in earlier events, including 1982-83, and therefore should not be

taken as a clear indication that the event has peaked. It is both the rapid growth

and absolute magnitude of this event which have raised legitimate concerns about

adverse climate impacts, both in the U.S. and worldwide.

So far, extreme climate events associated with this event have been mainly outside the North American sector, although the strong suppression of hurricane activity in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico is quite likely connected to this event, as are

the unusual northward paths of tropical cyclones along the west coast of Mexico into

the southwestern U.S. As indicated earlier, however, the strongest and most systematic effects of El Nino on North American climate typically occur in winter and

spring. I will now discuss some research results on potential future climate risks

associated with this event.

Potential Climate Risks

Climate predictions are inherently probability forecasts, with the fundamental

goal being to estimate how the probability distributions of various quantities, such

as temperature and rainfall, will change subject to particular conditions; in this

case, El Nino. An important new direction of NOAA’s recent research efforts in this

area is toward the development of extreme event predictions at extended range (beyond several days). A basic goal of this research is to identify regions and time periods where the risk of large-scale extreme events, such as droughts or floods, is significantly increased (or decreased).

So how do we do this? There are two basic approaches: first, through analysis of

past behavior (an empirical approach) and, second, through application of numerical

forecast models through a relatively new technique called ensemble predictions. The

approaches are complementary, and both are being actively pursued in NOAA, although here results derived from the former approach will be emphasized.
36

An example is shown in Exhibit 3, and is derived from one hundred years of data.

The figure shows the regions at highest risk for seasonal precipitation extremes in

spring following El Nino winters and, for comparison, also following La Nina winters.

Based on past El Nino events, the areas at highest risk for much above normal

precipitation in winter and spring include the Southern California coast, much of

the Southwest extending into the southern Plains, and portions of the Gulf Coast

and Southeast. Areas at increased risk of much below normal precipitation include

portions of the far northern Rockies and northern Plains in winter and the northern

Ohio Valley in late winter to early spring. Other analyses also strongly support the

possibility that portions of California and the Southwest are at significantly increased risk of much above normal precipitation, and that high stream flow values

and floods are much more frequent in these areas in El Nino years. For example,

more detailed analyses for the lower Colorado basin suggest approximately a 60 percent chance of much above normal precipitation (defined as wettest 20 percent of

all seasons) in springs following El Nino winters.

In contrast, the Southwest is particularly vulnerable to drought in springs following La Nina winters. This was the case in 1995-96, when a severe drought affected the Southwest, Texas and portions of the southern and central Plains, resulting in several billion dollars in losses. A potential positive aspect of this year’s El

Nino is that there is a significantly reduced risk of drought in these areas, particularly as compared to La Nina years. The strong ENSO signal in the Southwest, together with the high sensitivity of this region to hydrologic variations, suggest that

this is a critical region to consider for issues concerning climate variability and

water management.

It is important to briefly mention other aspects of weather and climate pertinent

to U.S. water management. First, although ENSO is the most widely-recognized

mode of climate variability, it is not the only one, and scientists are now studying

other modes of variability, such as the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAG) and Pacific

Decadal Oscillation (PDO), to gain additional predictive ability. Second, critical

water management issues extend over a broad array of time scales, both shorter and

longer than ENSO variability. For example, although El Nino may increase the likelihood of flooding in a given region, in general, it will not determine the timing of

a specific flood event. Short range prediction of floods is the operational responsibility of NOAA, and research efforts are also underway to extend the maximum lead

times for identifying risks of specific flood events. Some preliminary work between

NOAA and USGS scientists for the Merced River suggests that use of ensemble

model forecasts from the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP)

provides useful lead time information on flow variability out to approximately ten

days. An additional issue is longer-term climate variations, such as multi-year or

decadal droughts, that have episodically affected large portions of the U.S., as in the

1930s. Such events would have potentially devastating consequences were they to

recur. Understanding and predicting longer-term climate variability is also an area

of active research by NOAA.

New climate research products discussed above and others are being developed by

NOAA and its research partners for a broad array of potential applications. At

present, there is ongoing coordination between NOAA and other agencies including

the National Weather Service River Forecast Centers, the Bureau of Reclamation

and the Natural Resources Conservation Service in developing usable information

for assessing flood and drought risks in areas showing empirical ENSO-related signals.

Focused research on regional climate variations and their hydrologic impacts

should rapidly increase our ability to predict extremes of high and low water availability. This new information can be put to use in water management systems, with

the potential for substantial economic and other benefits. The present need is for

continuing intensive research on prediction of extreme weather and climate events,

the regional hydrologic response to climatic extremes, and effects of hydrologic extremes on water demand, water management, and aquatic resources generally.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. I thank you for this opportunity to

discuss El Nino and potential U.S. climate risks which may affect water management decisions. Recent substantial advances have been made in understanding and

predicting climate variability, and these research advances hold great potential to

benefit society. I believe the future holds even greater promise for return on our research investment.

I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of the

Committee may have.
37
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39

STATEMENT OF ANTS LEETMEA, DIRECTOR, CLIMATE PREDICTION CENTER, NATIONAL

CENTERS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PREDICTION, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC

ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Fifteen years ago a small group of scientists and research managers based the development of a major research effort in climate on the premise that patterns of extreme weather were not totally random events and that the key to predictive insight

lay in the interaction between the ocean and the atmosphere. That international

multidisciplinary research effort today in the foundation underlying the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) world-recognized advances in

forecasting climate based on dynamical predictions of the states of El Nin ̃ o. These

advances are leading towards an understanding of the connections between El Nin ̃ os and U.S. temperature and rainfall variability, and the possible utilization of this

predictive information into decision-making in water and energy sectors. We currently are in the maturing stages of the 1997/98 El Nin ̃ o which is forecast to be comparable in strength the 1982/83 event, the previous ‘‘event of the century.’’ During

1982/83 the United States suffered roughly $3 billion in losses related to storm damages and flooding. It is appropriate for the Chairman and the Members to ask how

much better prepared we are for this event and the potential eventualities associated with it than the 1982/83 one and what we might do in the future to be better

prepared.

El Nino and Forecasts for the 1997/98 Event

In simple terms, the distribution of sea surface temperatures in the tropical Pacific determines the overlying atmospheric circulation. However, the overlying tropical circulation through current conditions and its past history determines the sea

surface temperature. This coupled interaction between the atmosphere and the

ocean results in a quasi-periodic oscillation termed the E1 Nin ̃ o/Southern Oscillation

(ENSO) which has a period of 4 to 7 years. When the tropical Pacific is warmer than

normal, this is the El Nin ̃ o phase; when it is colder than normal, this is the La Nin ̃ a phase. Both phases have strong impacts on precipitation and temperature patterns

over the U.S.

Forecasts for E1 Nin ̃ o at NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center (CPC) are made

using coupled numerical models of the ocean and atmosphere that require supercomputers for their execution.

The initial conditions for the forecasts utilize ocean measurements from the

ENSO observing system, measurements from satellites, and reports from volunteer

observing ships. Forecasts out to a year in advance are made once a week. The first

forecasts that indicated a likelihood of an El Nin ̃ o episode this year were made in

November of 1996. El Nin ̃ o conditions began to visibly develop in March of this year;

subsequently positive departures from normal sea surface temperatures rapidly increased, reaching record levels for the period August-September. The current El

Nin ̃ o is forecast to peak at the end of the year or early next year. At that time its

magnitude and spatial extent will be comparable to the 1982/83 event, previously

considered the event of the century. Conditions are forecast to return to about normal during the summer of 1998.

El Nin ̃ o causes large scale shifts in the distribution of tropical rainfall. This is

expected to result in a stronger than normal jet stream over the eastern North Pacific and southern United States during the 1997-98 winter and continuing through

the early spring of 1998. This pattern is expected to result in wetter than normal

conditions across much of the southern United States from California eastward to

the Carolinas. Drier than normal conditions are forecast over the northern High

Plains and Ohio valley. During 1982/83 many of the areas expected to be wetter

than normal, e.g. states such as California, Utah, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, and

Louisiana, experienced extensive flooding and storm damage.

Forecasts for United States Rainfall and Temperature

Currently the forecasts for El Nin ̃ o impacts are made using both statistical techniques and dynamical forecasts. If rainfall and temperature records are ranked for

the past 102 years according to when moderate or strong El Nin ̃ o were present, the

tendency for much of the southern third of the U.S. to be wetter than normal (and

drier than normal during a La Nin ̃ a) is clear (figure 1) while regions of below normal rainfall include the areas surrounding Montana and the Ohio valley. The magnitude of the impacts and the regions that are impacted vary with season. Strongest

impacts are experienced during our winter. These average rankings, conditioned on

the presence of a moderate or strong El Nin ̃ o can be converted to percent of normal

rainfall. The seasonal maps for the temperature and rainfall impacts for the United

States, as well as more detailed state by state summaries for states that will be
40

likely impacted can be found on the web site for the CPC (http://nic.fb4.noaa.gov).

The most likely scenario for given regions is that given by what has been observed

for moderate El Nin ̃ os, e.g. figure 1. However, since the 1997/98 event is not a moderate event, but another event of the century, what happened in 1982/83 should be

considered as a plausible scenario. The dynamical model forecasts, which are just

coming on line as forecast tools, suggest some truth to this plausible scenario. The

impacts for California and the major river basins are discussed in the following:

California: California during winters with moderate El Nin ̃ os receives about 130

to 140 percent of normal rainfall (figure 2). This converts to about five inches extra

rain for most of the state. During 1982/83, an event comparable to the current one,

California, as well as much of the southeast, received 150 to 200 percent of normal

rainfall. Over coastal southern and central California and the southern Sierra this

resulted in about ten inches extra rain for the January through March period. For

much of northern California the amount was even greater at about 16 inches. This

was the result of more storms during this period that on average carried more rainfall per storm. However, we don’t anticipate that these storms will reach the intensity of those during last year, December 1996–January 1997, although this cannot

be precluded. These drew their moisture and temperature from the deep tropics,

whereas the moderate El Nin ̃ o and 1982/83 storms picked up their moisture and

temperature from the mid-latitude Pacific.

Colorado Basin: During moderate El Nin ̃ os the Basin receives from normal rainfall in western Colorado to over 190 percent of nominal in southern Arizona. Generally the northern part of the basin has a weaker rainfall signal associated with

El Nin ̃ o than the southern part. Southern Arizona has the largest signal. Since the

overall region receives little rainfall, the large percent of normals for a season only

amount to a few inches. During 1982/83 most of the region, except for western Colorado, received greater than nominal rainfall with 125 percent of normal in the

northern part to over 200 percent or so in southwest Arizona. Despite the modest

rainfall amounts, the observed Colorado river water year runoff reached its largest

values for the past 45 years in 1982/83 of roughly 23 Million Acre Feet or about

180 percent of normal during the spring of 1983.

Columbia Basin: For moderate El Nin ̃ os in fall and winter there are weak probabilities for below normal rainfall in western Washington, British Columbia, Idaho,

and western Montana. The probabilities are also increased for warmer than normal

temperatures with the largest warm anomalies on average being present in March

and April. These conditions lead to a lower than average snowpack in late winter

and early spring with higher early spring runoffs and lower ones later. The potential exists for water allocation problems in summer. However, during the strong

1982/83 event, much of the region received above normal rainfall; hence, there is

a possibility these conditions might not arise.

Upper Missouri Basin: Deviations from normal rainfall and temperature conditions over the upper Missouri regions, Montana, Wyoming, and northwestern North

Dakota during moderate El Nin ̃ os are much the same as over the Columbia Basin

except that the likelihood of below normal rainfall is enhanced. However, over Nebraska and Kansas wetter than normal conditions are to be expected. Without feeding these impacts into river and reservoir flow models, it is not clear what the integral effects on Missouri River flows will be. During 1982/83 the pattern of above and

below rainfall deviations described earlier was observed.

Other Factors Influencing Western U.S. Rainfall: Decadal Variability

The history of rainfall variations for coastal southern California, Arizona, and

New Mexico since 1930 indicates that, in addition to El Nin ̃ o and La Nin ̃ a impacts,

there have been strong decadal variations in the amount of rain received. The signal

in the Pacific northwest is the opposite of that in the southwest, e.g. when the

southwest tends to have above normal rainfall, the northwest tends to have below

normal rainfall. The period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s was one where the

southwest received below normal rainfall. Since then rainfall amounts have been

greater than normal, e.g. a relative climatic optimum. When a La Nin ̃ a has been

present, the southwest almost always experiences below normal rainfall. The most

recent case of this was during 1995-96 when the region experienced a severe

drought which cost the nation roughly $4 billion. When an El Nin ̃ o is present, conditions tend to be wetter than normal, and the probability of being wetter than normal roughly doubles.

This decadal variability is referred to by researchers as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). The spatial pattern of rainfall variations over the United States associated with it is quite similar to that of El Nin ̃ o (figure 1). This suggests that the

same kind of ocean-atmosphere interactions are responsible for both. Although understanding the origins of the PDO is still a research issue, its impacts are already
41

included in the CPC seasonal climate forecasts. The forecasts include a component

of features that persist for 10 to 15 years. A more common appreciation of this

decadal variability could be of use for water managers.

The Future

NOAA’s Strategic Plan has a Goal, Implement Seasonal to Interannual Climate

Forecasts, that has a focus in the implementation of a capability to forecast water

resources up to several seasons in advance. This has to be a cooperative program

with other Federal and State Agencies, Universities, and the private sector. Floods

and droughts, especially the Great Flood of 1993, have emphasized the need for improved short term and seasonal predictions to support flood/drought and water management and damage mitigation. In addition to these improvements in

hydrometeorological predictions, NOAA is modernizing its hydrologic predictions

with an Advanced Hydrologic Prediction System (AHPS). AHPS builds on the current capability of the National Weather Service’s River Forecast Centers who currently issue stage forecasts for only one, two, and three days into the future at most

forecast points and crest forecasts out to about one week for a few selected forecast

points. AHPS will build upon the skill of NOAA’s seasonal forecasts to provide new

hydrologic forecast products out to seasons in the future. The seasonal forecasts are

required to predict the likelihood of extreme events such as droughts and floods

happening, whereas, the short term forecasts are needed to predict the details and

magnitude of such events. The allocation of water among competing demands (e.g.

fisheries, irrigation, hydropower and municipalities) looms as a national problem.

AHPS and the NWS River Forecast Centers are the logical links to the operations;

practices of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers. AHPS has been

implemented in the Des Moines River Basin and in that location has successfully

demonstrated the coupling between hydrology, meteorology, and climatology on

daily, weekly, monthly, and seasonal time-scales. Demonstrable products for the Des

Moines AHPS project can be seen at http://www.crh.noaa.gov/dmx/ahps.

Significant challenges still remain to be overcome in order to fully integrate the

effects of El Nin ̃ o and decadal variability into the operating practices of agencies

that manage water resources. Many of these are technical and no doubt will be more

fully described by the other experts at this hearing. Nevertheless, one can anticipate

that the general tone of their testimonies is one of optimism that the time is here

to start this process. Indeed the current event has initiated a number of studies into

seeing what the limitations currently are and how far the current technology can

be pushed in bringing the climate forecasts down to the river basin scales. These

studies over the next six months will significantly accelerate the progress towards

utilization of climate forecast in water management.

One of the lessons from this event will be that an enhanced focus resulting from

urgency gets people’s attention and cooperation. The challenge after this event will

be to maintain this momentum. No one Agency has all the required expertise. Getting the necessary Agencies to work towards a common focus, especially under current budgetary constraints will not be easy. What can be done, what needs to be

done, the directions to be taken, and the potential partnerships will be much more

evident as the 1997/98 El Nin ̃ o proceeds.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. I want to thank you and the Committee for this opportunity to discuss the current El Nin ̃ o and the possible impacts

on water resources in the west. Let me finish by giving a partial answer to the question I posed at the beginning of my testimony—‘‘How much better prepared we are

for this event and the potential eventualities?’’ In 1982/83 we did not know until

September of 1982 that we were in an event, let alone the ‘‘event of the century,’’

nor what the potential regional impacts would be over the United States. For this

event the forecasts started indicating a likelihood of an event about a year ago, and

we knew from the forecasts and the observations that this would be a major event

by late May of this year. We also knew by that time the potential for heavy rainfall

in California and much of the southwest this coming winter for this coming winter—

a full six months in advance!

I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members might

have.
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STATEMENT OF KONSTANTINE P. GEORGAKAKOS, SC.D., PRESIDENT, HYDROLOGY

RESEARCH CENTER, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, my name is Konstantine

Georgakakos. I am the President and Founding Director of the Hydrologic Research

Center, a nonprofit research corporation in San Diego, California. I am also a Research Scientist IV with the Scripps Institution of Oceanography of the University

of California in San Diego. I consider it an honor to be here and to be invited to

testify concerning the involvement of the Hydrologic Research Center in the forecasting, and in forecasting research, associated with the predicted El Nin ̃ o event.

In this testimony I will focus in particular on Center research activities pertaining

to operational streamflow forecasting for flood warning and water resources management.

Two Center research activities are directly relevant:

(a) Assisting the California–Nevada River Forecast Center of the U.S. National Weather Service, in improving the short- and long- term forecasts of Lake

Folsom inflow in east central California. These forecasts will be used in the

operational management of the Lake waters and flow releases.

(b) Assessing the utility of integrated forecast-control methodologies for the

operational management of reservoir systems. Case studies in Iowa and California are now being conducted for this research.

Both activities were initiated earlier this year and in both cases, the El Nin ̃ o

Southern Oscillation (or ENSO) phenomenon is an important consideration. These

activities are funded by the Federal Government, the former by the Bureau of Reclamation and the latter by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Our research on the aforementioned issues builds on earlier research results obtained for the midwestern and south-central U.S. It relies on proven mathematical

hydrologic models of the watershed processes and the flow forecast uncertainty. Watershed processes considered are snow accumulation and melt, and surface and subsurface flow. The flow forecast uncertainty exists for three reasons:

—incomplete coverage of watershed area by sensors;

—large errors in the long lead-time meteorological forecasts used to drive the

hydrologic models;

—mathematical model approximations of complex natural processes.

Our results so far support the following conclusions:

(1) The accuracy of the computed snowmelt volumes within the Folsom Lake watershed decreases substantially with decreased watershed coverage by precipitation

measurement sensors. For example, there are currently large areas drained by the

Middle Fork of the American River with poor sensor coverage. The Middle Fork

drains approximately 28 percent of the 1861-square-mile Lake Folsom watershed.

In the record flood of 1964 it contributed more than 40 percent of the peak flow rate

of 148,000 cubic feet per second.

(2) Substantial improvement of operational flow forecasts is attained when the

current flow forecast systems are upgraded to include models for uncertainty and

updating from flow measurements in real time. The improvement is mainly in the

reduction of forecast errors for unusually high or low flow rates.1

(3) In a case study involving data since 1904 from the Iowa River at the Iowa

City gauging station in Iowa, statistically significant seasonal streamflow associations to ENSO phenomenon were found.2 For example, for El Nin ̃ o conditions, there

is a 70 percent chance to have above-normal streamflow, lagged three to five seasons from the reference time of El Nin ̃ o. Such associations may be used in long-lead

forecasting operations. Studies, in progress using streamflow data from the American River, have not revealed a strong statistical association with ENSO. It is possible that the 3-7 year ENSO signal is concealed by the extreme year-to-year variability of streamflow in the Folsom Lake watershed.

(4) Substantial benefits for operational reservoir water management were obtained for the Saylorville reservoir in Iowa when flow forecasts were used as input

to the decision process with due account for forecast uncertainty. On the basis of extensive computer simulations of the watershed-reservoir system it was found that

using coupled forecast-control methodologies reduces reservoir-management sensitivities to climate variability and to the large uncertainties associated with the

forecast of such variability by current climate models. Analogous simulations are in

progress for Lake Folsom in California collaboration with Professor Aris

Georgakakos of the Georgia Institute of Technology. Preliminary results show again

the effectiveness of such coupled forecast-control methodologies.

I wish to make the following topical recommendations:
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(1) Conduct detailed studies to quantify the uncertainty associated with the estimation of precipitation and snowmelt over the Sierra Nevada in California. Such

studies should be supported by newly established special dense sensor networks,

which should be left in place for 5-10 years. The effects of such uncertainty on the

streamflow forecasts for Rivers draining the Sierra Nevada may be then quantified,

and steps may be taken to improve the accuracy and reliability of the streamflow

forecasts.

(2) Advanced streamflow forecast procedures should be implemented and utilized

in parallel to current operational ones to evaluate increased benefits to operations.

Such procedures include models for uncertainty of meteorological forecasts and utilize streamflow observations to improve the forecasts continuously. Several watersheds within the U.S. should be identified prototypes for this effort.

(3) In parallel to (2) above, coupled forecast-control methodologies with due account for forecast uncertainty should be implemented in the suggested prototype watersheds to evaluate increased benefits to operational reservoir management. In this

context, the utility of climate forecasts for increasing the benefits of reservoir management should be quantified. Our studies to date make me confident that it is

through the research and implementation of such methodologies we will be able to

utilize the uncertain long-range climate forecasts.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, real-time flow forecasting and

reservoir water management are important operational functions for mitigating natural disasters. These functions, vital for present-day communities, have their basis

on Hydrologic Science and Engineering, and Water Resources Systems Analysis. As

the requirements of the public for safety and reduction of damage losses from natural disasters increase, it is important to formulate a national plan for the increased

effectiveness of these operational functions. I have argued elsewhere in the scientific

literature that to achieve this goal and in analogy to the establishment of our National Center for Atmospheric Research in the Atmospheric Sciences, it appears necessary to establish a National Center for Hydrology and Water Resourcest.4 I firmly

believe that with the establishment of such a national center much progress will be

made almost immediately on a national level by concerted efforts to enhance the

flow of information from research to operations. Such a center is envisioned as a

collaborative effort among universities, the Federal Government and the private sector. With this last important recommendation I now conclude my testimony. I will

be pleased to answer your questions.

References

1 Hydrologic Research Center Technical Report 1, June 1996: Implementation and

Testing of the HFS Operation as Part of the National Weather Service River Forecast System (NWSRFS); Hydrologic Research Center Technical Note 3, May 1996:

Improvement of Hydrologic Model Forecasts Using a Real Time Updating Technique.

2 Guetter, A.K., and K.P. Georgakakos, 1996: Are the El Nin ̃ o and La Nin ̊ a Predictors of the Iowa River Seasonal Flow? Journal of Applied Meteorology, 35(5), 34-35. 3 Georgakakos, K.P., Bae, D.-H., Mullusky, M.G., and A.P. Georgakakos, 1995: Hydrologic Variability in Midwestern Drainage Basins: Diagnosis, Prediction and Control. Chapter II-2 in Preparing for Global Change. A Midwestern Perspective, SPB

Academic Publ. bv, 61-90.

4 Georgakakos, K.P., 1995: On the Establishment of a U.S. National Center for Hydrologic Research and Technology Transfer. Journal of Hydrology, 172, 15-21.
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STATEMENT OF SOROOSH SOROOSHIAN, PROFESSOR, DEPT. OF HYDROLOGY AND

WATER RESOURCES, THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, TUCSON, ARIZONA

Honorable Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

As early as last winter, the scientific evidence based on observations and model

simulation results clearly indicated that a strong El Nino weather pattern has been

developing in the western equatorial Pacific Ocean. With further observations, it has

become clear that this El Nino is going to be one of the strongest weather patterns

on record. Several coastal countries located near the Equator have already been impacted. The west coast of Mexico experienced disastrous consequences as a result

of Hurricane Pauline. Chile is experiencing record amounts of rainfall, resulting in

major flooding.

The effects on the United States (so far) have been relatively small. The exception

is the precipitation resulting from Hurricane Nora, which was mostly confined to

southeastern California, western Arizona, extreme southeastern Nevada, and the

southwest portion of Utah. However, the current predictions are that higher thanaverage precipitation will occur in California and the Southwest United States between November and February.

The impact of a strong El Nino on water resources is expected to be significant.

Statistical analyses correlating historical precipitation amounts over the Southwest

U.S. with El Nino years indicate a strong likelihood of above-average precipitation

(and associated runoff). Water resources managers are, therefore, evaluating the potential impact of El Nino on their decisions and strategies for operation of water

resources systems. Reservoir releases for the purposes of water supply and power

generation, etc., must be scheduled, and emergency management plans must be

drawn up to minimize the adverse impact of potential flooding. These decisions pose

a major challenge, due to the type of information which is required.

We do know that this year’s El Nino is the strongest yet recorded, and that the

statistical evidence points to above-average winter precipitation for the Southwest

United States. However, these facts do not constitute sufficient information for

water resources and emergency managers to initiate major changes in operating

practice. Such decisions require reliable information about the expected arrival

times of significant storm systems, their expected durations, and intensities, etc. A

storm system that arrives during warm weather may not result in snow accumulation at higher elevations, but may, instead, produce large amounts of runoff and potential flooding. Without accurate information about the timing and quantities of

precipitation and streamflow, it is very difficult to plan timely evacuations from

flood-prone areas or to pre-release large quantities of stored reservoir water to help

mitigate the flooding. On the other hand, precipitation which arrives during a cooler

period may accumulate as snow at higher elevations. Water resources managers

then have greater flexibility to evaluate options and to decide on an appropriate

operational strategy. Under this scenario, it would be a lot less risky to commit to

early reservoir releases, knowing that melting of the above-average snow pack will

provide the water necessary to fill the reservoir(s) later in the season. However,

rapid warming could cause sudden large releases of meltwater, leading to late-winter and/or spring flooding. It is critically important, therefore, that accurate estimates of the volume of water in the snow pack and timely and accurate temperature

forecasts during the melt season be available.

I wish to strongly emphasize that sound water resources management decisions

in the Southwest will require far more information than merely the knowledge of

a strong El Nino signal. Water resources managers are, rightly, reluctant to order

early reservoir releases without further information. In the few instances that I

know of, where early decisions have been made regarding reservoir releases and

other water management issues, the knowledge that this will be a strong El Nino

year has been only one of several useful pieces of information, but not the sole deciding factor. For instance, the Salt River Project—which supplies water to the

greater Phoenix area—has incorporated the information about the strong El Nino

signal into its decision to reduce ground-water pumping by some 40,000 acre-feet

for this past year. This requirement will instead be satisfied from their reservoir

system, based on expectations that an above-average spring snowmelt runoff will fill

the reservoirs to their normal level.

Water resources and emergency managers are accustomed to making decisions

based on probabilistic information. While the knowledge of a strong El Nino year

has enhanced the probability for a wetter-than-average year in the Southwest, it

has not reduced the uncertainty of many other factors critical in making decisions

regarding major deviations from normal operating practice. In order to enhance the

quality and usefulness of both short-term (hours to days) and extended (weeks to

a month) forecasts, the reliability of the hydrologic prediction system for the West-
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ern United States must be improved. The primary components of this system are:

the Quantitative Precipitation Forecasts (QPFs), Extended Streamflow Prediction

(ESP), more accurate methods for estimating snow accumulation, particularly in the

mountainous regions, and high-resolution accurate rainfall measurements critical

for forecasting rapidly developing flood events.

The strength of the current El Nino signal has attracted a lot of media attention

and has generated much-needed public attention to this climatic phenomenon. The

climate research community is to be commended for developing the capability of predicting it with such a high degree of accuracy. Perhaps the greatest benefit of this

prediction to the water resources management community has been in encouraging

very close cooperation among the Federal and state agencies responsible for various

aspects of water resources management and hydrologic services. As an example, the

cooperation over the past several months between the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,

the National Weather Service’s (NWS) Colorado Basin River Forecast Center

(CBRFC), and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has resulted in close coordination

for sharing modeling and observational information required for improved management of the reservoir system on the Colorado River. Continued cooperation among

these agencies will critical to the development of an operational hydrologic prediction system for the Western U.S. to be used for water resources management in

both El Nino and non-El Nino years. It is worth noting that, while statistical evidence points to a wetter-than-average year in the Southwest during a strong El

Nino year, the wettest winter on record (1993) in the White Mountains and the surrounding areas of southern Arizona was not an El Nino year. A reliable hydrologic

prediction system is crucial for the efficient management of western water resources

irrespective of whether we are experiencing an El Nino weather pattern or not.

SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET

Sooroosh Sorooshian

Dept. of Hydrology and Water Resources

Harshbarger Buiding 11; Room 122

Tucson, Arizona 85721

Phone: (520) 621-1661

FAX: (520) 626-2488

STATEMENT OF RICHARD ANDREWS, DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Richard Andrews, Director of Emergency Services for Governor Pete Wilson.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on the many activities in California

in preparation for El Nino and issues related to Federal policies and practices and

their influence on our preparedness and disaster recovery efforts.

Background

As has been widely publicized, a large El Nino event is underway and is forecast

to continue through the winter months. Though the specific forecasts continue to be

updated and, at this time, remain uncertain, we have been told by various meteorologists and climatologists to expect substantially more rainfall than normal, especially in the central and southern coastal areas of California. Some forecasts suggest

that the storms may come as early as November and, if the initial rains are sufficient to soak the ground, we could have an early and long flood season. Based on

the records from past El Nino episodes, the flood risk would be higher in the coastal

and mountain areas of southern California and not as great on major Central Valley

rivers arising in the Sierra.

Higher ocean levels are expected, one-third to one-half foot above normal. Coastal

damage and erosion are most severe when storm waves coincide with peak high

tides. Potential coastal impacts include: structural damage from wave overtopping,

onshore flooding and wave impact, and land loss due to cliff failure and beach erosion.

Public lands and infrastructure, as well as private property, are at risk. State

beaches are some of the most vulnerable properties, with bulkheads, seawalls, parking lots and restrooms in danger. Boating facilities and boats are also at risk. During the winter of 1982-83, also a strong El Nino period, over $100 million of damage

occurred to the public and private coastal infrastructure. One third of the damage

(approximately $35 million) occurred to public recreational facilities along the coastline in Central and Southern California. Farther north, while the Central Valley
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flood control system performed well, ten Delta islands were flooded due to levee failures. Impacts to inland watersheds could be highly variable. The Department of Fish

and Game notes that the impact to California’s inland rivers and streams will depend upon the condition of the watersheds. For watersheds that are stable, the high

volume of rainfall and runoff that frequently accompanies an El Nino may wash

sediment out of the gravel, thereby improving spawning conditions for fish. For unstable watersheds, El Nino may pose a more severe threat, as it can cause hillsides

to collapse into rivers or streams.

State Preparedness

Despite the considerable uncertainties about what the impacts of El Nino will be,

we are confident that the state and local governments will be well prepared to meet

the challenges that a severe winter weather season may bring. As is well known,

California has, in this decade, had repeated and varied experience in coping with

the consequences of natural disasters, including large fires, earthquakes and floods.

We have improved our local and state response systems after each event; California

has, I believe, the most effective emergency response system in the nation.

The El Nino forecasts have helped accelerate on-going preparedness efforts that

followed this January’s historic floods in central and northern California. In January 1997 the state experienced serious flooding in forty-eight of the state’s fifty-eight

counties, with damages totaling nearly $2 billion. These floods came only two years

after a series of winter storms in the first quarter of 1995—where losses also totaled

$2 billion—led Governor Wilson to declare all fifty-eight counties as disaster areas,

the first time in the state’s history that the entire state was impacted by a natural

disaster.

At the height of the l997 winter storms, Governor Wilson established the Flood

Emergency Action Team (FEAT) to coordinate the review of the lessons learned

from the historic flooding and to establish long-term strategies to protect Californians from future flood disasters. Following a series of hearings throughout the impacted region, the FEAT’s final report made more than fifty recommendations that

have been implemented to improve the state’s flood fighting systems, including:

• Improving emergency response coordination between public safety agencies at

the local and state level with the Army Corps of Engineers and local flood maintenance organizations.

The Office of Emergency Services (OES) has conducted a series of workshops on evacuation procedures, emergency alerts, the requirements for

care and shelter of large numbers of evacuees, procedures for handling

evacuations of livestock and pets, and the emergency closure of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta waterways during flood conditions.

Together with the Department of Water Resources, OES has worked with

reclamation officials on procedures for requesting resources and coordinating with the state’s Standardized Emergency Management System.

OES’s training facility at San Luis Obispo is conducting training courses

specifically focused on flood fight management.

• Improving and expanding existing flood data. To expand the state’s existing

flood data, the California Department of Water Resources has installed nearly

50 stream gauging sites in areas that have high flood probability. Earlier this

year the state called on the U.S. Geological Survey to expand its surface water

data collection program so that we might obtain better and earlier data about

flood threats. Unfortunately, due to budget limitations, the Federal Government

has indicated that such expansion is unlikely.

On October 6, Governor Wilson convened an El Nino summit in Sacramento for

all state agencies and local leaders. In his Executive Order signed on that date, Governor Wilson directed the Office of Emergency Services and the Department of

Water Resources to establish technical assistance teams and conduct a series of regional workshops throughout the state to review specific state and local preparedness actions. The first workshop was held in Long Beach on October 24, a second

will be held in San Diego on November 3, with six additional workshops scheduled

across the state in the coming weeks.

Governor Wilson also signed legislation allocating $7.4 million for El Nino preparedness measures, including the propositioning of flood fighting resources as forecasts become more specific. Moreover, Governor Wilson declared this week, October

27-31 as Winter Storm and Flood Preparedness Week throughout the state, with a

series of events being held to provide continuing focus on the need for all residents,

businesses and local governments to take basic emergency preparedness measures.

In addition, all state agencies have been carrying out El Nino preparedness measures, including:
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• California was one of the first entities to provide comprehensive information

on El Nino on the Internet. The Office of Emergency Services’ home page contains comprehensive information on preparedness measures, current weather

forecasts, and situation reports. CERES, the California Environmental Resources Evaluation System, one of the world’s largest environmental web sites,

provides comprehensive information on the El Nino phenomenon, and links to

other home pages containing pertinent information.

•The California Conservation Corps, one of the state’s most valuable emergency

response resources, is offering sandbagging workshops throughout the state.

•The Department of Parks and Recreation, who’s facilities sustained significant

damage in the 1982-83 El Nino, is cleaning drainage channels and taking general preparedness measures at its facilities.

•The state Department of Transportation, as part of its general winter preparedness efforts, is stockpiling additional emergency response and road clearing resources at its facilities throughout the state.

In addition to the actions being undertaken by state agencies at the direction of

Governor Wilson, local governments, community groups and businesses throughout

the state are taking unprecedented preparedness measures. Supplies have been

stockpiled, storm drains cleared, evacuation procedures reviewed and strategies for

the care and shelter of individuals who may be displaced by the winter weather developed. Many cities and counties have held special flood preparedness drills and

developed specific emergency plans for possible El Nino impacts.

California will continue to provide the public with the best available information

through the Internet, briefings and workshops, training sessions, technical assistance teams and the stockpiling of equipment. Local and state agency preparedness

will continue throughout the coming weeks.

Coordination with Federal Water Management Agencies

There are several areas of coordination between state and Federal agencies that

need to be enhanced.

The state’s Department of Water Resources has the primary responsibility for

working with Federal water management agencies. Flood operations and reservoir

management can be divided into five major geographical regions in California where

there are significant flood control reservoirs on the major river and stream systems.

Most flood control reservoirs are multi-purpose in that flood control is one of several

purposes for which the reservoirs were authorized and constructed.

In California, most reservoirs that have Federal flood control reservations are operated by State, Federal or local water management agencies. The flood control reservation and seasonal operation rules are predetermined by the U.S. Corps of Engineers. Any deviation from the Corps’ reservoir operation rules must be coordinated

with the Corps. Last January, local, state and Federal coordination was exceptional.

The regional scenarios for this winter include:

• San Francisco Bay Area—Significant damage occurred in 1982-83 from high

winds and high tides, and localized flooding, particularly in the Alviso district

of San Jose. The potential for damage this winter depends on the timing and

intensity of storm systems, and whether storms occur during high tides.

• Sacramento River Watershed—Forecasts indicate that rainfall and runoff are

expected to be slightly above normal. A review of historical records indicates

that extreme events, like those experienced in February 1986 and January of

this year, do not correlate with strong El Nino events. In 1982-83 rainfall and

runoff was well distributed through the flood season and the flood control system—with the exception of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta—was able to

safely regulate runoff through the flood control reservoirs and the levee system.

Peak releases from flood control reservoirs were much less than experienced

this past January. For example, Oroville Dam released a maximum of 60,000

cubic feet per second (cfs) in 1982-83 versus 160,000 cfs in January 1997; Folsom Dam released 35,000 cfs in 1982-83 vs.115,000 cfs this January.

• Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta—While the levied Sacramento Flood Control

System performed well during the last strong El Nino, in 1982-83 the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta experienced significant problems. High tides combined with the nearly half-foot rise in sea level as a consequence of El Nino,

causing levee failures at five Delta islands. The state has expended nearly $100

million to strengthen Delta levees.

• San Joaquin River Watershed—In 1983 an extremely large snowpack and

spring runoff impacted the San Joaquin. This year, runoff from a similar event

would likely be regulated safely through the flood control reservoirs; but, the

levied flood control system in the San Joaquin valley would likely experience

high water for a long period. Considering the vulnerable condition of the newly
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repaired flood control levees to erosion and under seepage, a heightened state

of alert will need to be in place for this critical watershed.

• Tulare Lake Basin Watershed—As in the San Joaquin, snowmelt runoff in

the spring will likely be safely regulated through the flood control reservoirs.

However, excessive runoff—similar to that of 1983—will likely flood the Tulare

Lakebed and potentially threaten surrounding communities.

• South Coast Basin Watershed—This region was hardest hit by the 1982-83

El Nino. Coastal wave damage was severe as were flash floods in the interior

counties. Flood control reservoirs and debris basins, primarily operated by local

flood control agencies, performed well in the past and are expected to perform

effectively this winter. Flood control reservoirs and debris basins, primarily operated by local agencies to Corps regulations, performed well in 1982-83. Since

that time, reservoir operational plans have been updated as a result of changes

in channel capacities and conditions downstream of reservoirs. Earlier notification procedures have been implemented in recent years for warnings based on

reservoir operations.

Issues Requiring Additional Attention

The Federal Government is an important partner in the state’s overall preparedness efforts and plays an essential role in helping communities recover from the impacts of natural disaster.

In a letter to President Clinton on October 6, Governor Wilson urged action on

several concerns about current Federal policies and practices that impact the pace

of recovery from past floods and winter storms and will also affect current and future preparedness and recovery efforts, including:

• Urge the Army Corps of Engineers to accelerate the timetable to make repairs

to levees damaged in central California during the January 1997 floods. Policy

disputes between Corps officials in California and Washington slowed recovery

during the spring and summer months. Progress is now being made, and if

we’re fortunate to have winter storms hold off until near the end of November,

we have been assured by the Administration in an October 24 response to Governor Wilson’s letter that all but one of the critical central California flood control repairs should be in place to handle the flows. We would hope that this

year’s experiences of unnecessary delays would not be repeated following future

flooding.

• In the event the levees are not fully repaired, direct the Corps to undertake

necessary response preparations to improve the Corps emergency response

under Public Law 84-99. Some steps in implementing this strategy have already

been taken; several others are needed. In advance of high water, the Corps

should used their authority under Public Law 84-99 to do the following:

• Direct emergency repairs at the most critical sites if rainfall interferes

with the construction schedule. This could be accomplished through appropriate contract provisions change orders.

• Redesign the repairs at unrepaired critical sites to employ materials and

equipment appropriate for wet condition if rainfall impacts construction.

• Award contracts with construction firms and aggregate suppliers in the

central valley in advance of high water. These time and materials contracts

would allow the Corps to simply direct the contractor to make repairs even

as the repair is being redesigned.

• Secure equipment and materials that are difficult or time consuming to

obtain during an emergency. Examples include expandable vinyl bladders

for raising effective levee heights, and barges for working in the waterway.

Items could be mobilized or stockpiled upon forecasts for high water, provided they are secured in advance.

• Direct all Federal regulatory agencies to consolidate the needed approvals for

flood repair and preparation work. Governor Wilson has directed all state agencies to place the highest priority on expediting approvals for this work, a large

number of Federal agency approvals are also needed. Local agencies need clear

and consistent permit requirements and procedures from Federal agencies. Governor Wilson has designated the Department of Water Resources the principal

state agency to coordinate needed state agency approvals. Such a ‘‘one stop

shop’’ strategy should be considered for future permitting processes for essential

public safety related facilities.

On October 24 the Corps issued a Nationwide 31 permit for channel clearing

and sediment removal. Over this past weekend Los Angeles County began some

of this important work. Governor Wilson remains concerned, however, that the

Environmental Protection Agency has indicated that it will seek a policy review
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of the cumulative impacts of channel clearing activities with the intention of requiring further mitigation work.

• Direct the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Corps of

Engineers to modify policies for local agencies that conduct flood fights on flood

control works. As a result of Federal policies arising from the 1993 Midwest

floods, there now exists a disincentive for local agencies to assist in flood fights.

The Federal Levee Policy asserts that the Corps is the primary Federal agency

for flood fighting. Since the adoption of this policy, FEMA has established a virtual ‘‘hands off’’ policy for funding flood fighting on any flood control work.

FEMA states that the Corps is responsible for flood fighting on all flood control

works, and that FEMA is therefore prohibited by the Stafford Act from funding

such efforts. At the same time, the Corps has responsibility for conducting flood

fighting operations, but finds itself, in extreme events like the January storms

in California, overextended and unable to respond in a timely manner to every

request. The Corps is forced to prioritize its limited resources, omitting or deferring some essential flood fighting projects. Because of the requirements for

prompt action, local agencies cannot wait for the often cumbersome Corps contracting processes to be implemented. However, if they take action to meet immediate flood fight needs without going through the Corps, the local agencies

find themselves unable to receive reimbursement from either FEMA or the

Corps. This illogical Federal policy creates a perverse disincentive that results

in more damage than necessary.

• Direct FEMA to implement the recommendations relating to Public Assistance

processes and policies made by the California Congressional delegation in their

September 15, 1997 letter to the FEMA Director.

Conclusion

All Californians are grateful for the assistance we received from Congress and the

Administration as we joined together on the levees to battle the floodwaters of last

year’s storms. We are also grateful for the assistance we continue to receive in the

flood’s aftermath as communities and individuals work to repair the damage and

clean up homes, farms, and businesses.

State agencies, local governments, community groups and individuals are currently engaged in an unprecedented preparedness effort in advance of this winter’s

weather. While the exact outcome of El Nino remains to be seen, we still have time

to undertake needed common-sense actions to prepare for the worst, and prevent

the loss of life and property damage we suffered earlier this year and in the last

El Nino.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN K. HALL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ASSOCIATION OF

CALIFORNIA WATER AGENCIES (ACWA)

I. Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for providing me an

opportunity to submit this statement regarding the water management implications

of the 1997/98 El Nin ̃ o on behalf of the Association of California Water Agencies

(ACWA). ACWA is a statewide, non-profit association which represents more than

440 public water agencies who collectively manage and deliver 90 percent of the

state’s urban and agricultural water.

It is important to understand the role our members play in managing water resources, the uniqueness and fragility of California’s water system and how a weather event like El Nin ̃ o can play havoc on a water system already stressed to the

breaking point.

Local water agencies serve several functions in California’s water management

system, but the responsibilities most relevant to the discussion of El Nin ̃ o are flood

control and water supply. While there has been a deluge of attention on the disastrous flooding that can be caused by an El Nin ̃ o, much less attention has been given

to the water supply issue. There are several points that need to be made about California’s flood control and water supply system in such a discussion.

First, California’s weather is hard to predict and extremely variable. The norm

is arrived at by averaging the extremes of drought and flood. So-called ‘‘normal

years’’ rarely occur.

Second, California’s water managers at the Federal, state and local level have

done an excellent job of managing flood control and water supply given the constraints under which they operate. However our constraints are enormous. Much of

California’s water system was built decades ago, before modern construction techniques were available. Not only is California’s system outdated, it is inadequate.
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Our storage capability is far below what we see on other river systems. This outdated, undersized system has created tension between flood control and water supply for those charged with managing this system.

Third, added to the tension between managing our system for flood control and

water supply, we have placed substantial new demands on the system by releasing

large quantities of water for fish and other environmental purposes.

These observations lead to the inescapable conclusion that we must act now to

shore up our existing system and expand it in order to meet California’s legitimate

flood control, environmental and water supply needs.

In California, water agencies routinely balance flood control and water supply

needs. Specifically, water managers must keep enough reservoir storage space available to manage floods during heavy precipitation, while ensuring that adequate

water is stored to meet water supply needs for cities and farms and to protect

against drought.

II. California’s Weather Picture: Feast or Famine

Even without an El Nin ̃ o in the mix, California’s weather is highly unpredictable.

Planning for a new water year is often akin to reading tea leaves.

According to the California Department of Water Resources, weather in our state

has become increasingly unpredictable over the last 50 years. Whether that variability is due to global warming, cyclical changes or some other explanation, erratic

swings from too much to not enough make it very difficult to map out management

plans for the state’s water systems.

Adding insult to injury, we have the variability of El Nin ̃ o, which could bring either floods or drought to the state. During California’s protracted seven-year

drought, an El Nin ̃ o in 1991-92 helped cause a critically dry year. Conversely, a

strong El Nin ̃ o in 1982 caused devastating floods similar to conditions predicted for

this current El Nin ̃ o.

Since 1950, California has experienced 12 El Nin ̃ o events; eight of which have

been similar in strength to the current El Nin ̃ o. Of those 12, five have led to drier

than normal conditions, while seven have resulted in above normal precipitation.

In the past 20 years, California has experienced only two years that experts can

call ‘‘normal’’—where water supplies for the year have ended up close to the average. And even in those years—1989 and 1993—large swings in the weather pattern

surprised forecasters and planners. Large amounts of rain can come in the first few

months of fall, and that could be the last rain we see all year. Such was the case

in 1997—a year of devastating floods. (See Exhibit 1.)

III. 1997: Floods and Drought

Water officials recently closed the book on a 1997 water year that included some

of the worst flooding we’ve seen this century. While not an ‘‘El Nin ̃ o year,’’ the 1997

floods are being viewed as a model, due to their warm, El Nin ̃ o-like characteristics.

Over the three-day period centered on New Year’s Day, more than 30 inches of

rain poured onto Sierra Nevada watersheds already saturated by one of the wettest

Decembers on record.

The deluge overwhelmed many of the water systems in Northern California. The

sheer volume of runoff exceeded the flood control capacity of Don Pedro Dam on the

Tuolumne River and Millerton Reservoir on the upper San Joaquin River with large,

uncontrolled spills of excess water. In just a week’s time Shasta, the largest reservoir in our system, filled to near capacity 1.4 million acre-feet—taking in nearly

two million acre-feet. At its peak, inflow was measured at a record 236,700 cubicfeet-per-second. Most of the other large dams in Northern California were full or

nearly full at the end of the storms.

The effects of last January’s storm have been far-reaching. Total flood damages

reached nearly $2 billion, including $300 million in damage to flood control facilities

and $206 million in damages to various public facilities. Nearly 300 square miles

of agricultural land were flooded, causing close to $300 million in damage to agriculture. In addition, 120,000 people were forced from their homes and nine lives

were lost.

The damage could have been even more catastrophic. State and Federal water

projects stemmed the worst of the floods, due in large part to the changes to the

system implemented after the 1986 flood. Millions of homes and businesses were

spared as a result.

1997 was the third wet year in a row for Northern California. State water officials

say total runoff statewide was 145 percent of average. But, perhaps even more dramatic than the deluge of rain in January was the lack of rain that followed. The

spring of 1997 was the driest in 104 years. The wet pattern began in November,

culminated in January, then shut off like a switch for the rest of the year.
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Water shortages forced the Bureau of Reclamation to cut some deliveries by 10

percent. Statewide, we begin the next water year with only average supplies in storage.

IV. California’s Flood Control and Water Supply System

To deal with California’s weather extremes, flood control plans were established

for the Sacramento Valley beginning in the late 1880s to improve navigability and

protect population centers. Once called the ‘‘Nile of the West,’’ the Sacramento River

yields about 35 percent of the state’s water supply.

The flood plan evolved into one of the most complex flood management and water

distribution systems. Today’s integrated Federal, state and local flood management

network includes 23 reservoirs with flood detention space and 1,760 miles of Federal

levees, channels, and overflow bypasses and weirs in the Central Valley.

This network, in concert with other Federal, state and local facilities, also supplies fresh water for urban, agricultural and commercial demands—the majority of

which are in the drier regions of central and southern California—and flood protection for the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys. Water supply provided by these

projects also helps to fuel California’s $800 billion economy.

Key projects include the Federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and California’s

State Water Project (SWP). The CVP has a storage capacity of 11 million acre-feet

and delivers about 7 million acre-feet of water to agricultural and urban uses. The

SWP delivers about 2 million acre-feet annually to farms and cities. The single most

important aspect of California’s complicated water system is the Sacramento-San

Joaquin River Delta. Its channels through the state and Federal projects provide

drinking water for two-thirds of the state, in addition to irrigation water for more

than 4.5 million acres of the nation’s most productive farmland.

This is an impressive system, but it is far less than what we see on other river

systems. According to the California Department of Water Resources, total storage

on the Sacramento River system with average annual runoff of 22 million acre-feet

is less than one-year or 16 million acre-feet. In comparison, the Colorado River system—with an average annual runoff of only 15 million acre-feet—boasts a storage

capacity of 60 million acre-feet or enough for a four-year supply.

The lack of storage capacity has led to the tension between operating the system

for flood control, the protection of life and property, and operating the system for

water supply to meet the needs of the nation’s largest economy. And the problem

is growing worse. Since the last major element of our water management system

was added in the early 1970s, the state’s population has essentially doubled. Local

water managers have done a good job in balancing this tension. Urban water managers have managed to meet the needs of the rapidly growing population through

conservation, reclamation and innovative water transfers and exchanges. Meanwhile, California agriculture is today producing 50 percent more in food and fiber

with the same amount of water that it was using 20 years ago. We’re also doing

a better job of protecting lives and property. It is widely acknowledged that the

floods that have occurred in recent years could have been far more devastating had

it not been for strong efforts to coordinate the local, state and Federal flood control

operations.

However, the experience of 1997 has shown the deficiencies in our system that

not even innovative management can overcome. The devastating floods of January

1997, followed by water delivery cutbacks later in the year, point out that our existing system must be irked and expanded in order to protect California from floods

while maintaining a healthy environment and a strong economy.

Governor Pete Wilson reinforced this theme in a recent letter sent to President

Bill Clinton, In the letter, Wilson expresses concern about the state of the Central

Valley’s levee system severly damaged by last year’s floods. Wilson stated, ‘‘. . . I am

deeply concerned that the Corps’ work will not be completed in time . . . There is

a substantial risk that not all repairs will be completed prior to this November

when heavy rains are expected throughout California.’’

V. The Environmental Factor

The experience of recent years also points out that we have new demands on the

system unrelated to growth in our population or economy. The Bay-Delta system—

the hub of our water management system—also forms the largest estuary on the

west coast and serves as a unique habitat for the more than 120 species of wildlife,

some of which are protected under the Federal Endangered Species Act (ESA), such

as the winter run Chinook salmon and delta smelt.

Fisheries are also affected by weather extremes. Many experts are concerned that

this year’s El Nin ̃ o may be bad news for already-depleted salmon and trout populations. Many fish populations were decimated due to damage from last year’s high
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waters. With another year of heavy rainfall predicted, concern is mounting for salmon populations especially—as one expert put it, ‘‘For salmon, there’s a strong apprehension bordering on mild panic.’’

While fresh water flows are by no means the only consideration in producing

healthy fish populations, those flows are certainly one of the factors viewed as essential to produce healthy habitat throughout the system. To the extent our water

management system falls behind in meeting our environmental water supply and

flood control needs, conflict over those competing priorities will continue to increase.

VI. How The System Is Being Operated Today

As we review the statistics from the extraordinary storms of 1997 and others

which preceded it, we are reminded that tremendous precipitation and runoff do not

necessarily equate to a bonanza in terms of water supply benefits. Several times

over the past two decades, vast quantities of fresh water ran out to the Pacific

Ocean because we don’t have enough reservoirs to store the water. Capturing storm

runoff which is excess to Delta environmental needs could provide sorely-needed

water for urban, agricultural and environmental needs.

As water managers struggle to maintain the balance between flood control, environmental and water supply needs working within existing storage constraints,

water supply tends to suffer the most.

Again, the 1996-97 water year is a case in point. With a tremendously wet January, water delivery commitments were made from both the state and Federal

projects including voluntary operations in the Bay-Delta to benefit fisheries. As the

wet months turned to dry, the state and Federal projects strained to make all delivery commitments to urban and agricultural water users. In the end, Federal customers did not receive full deliveries.

Initiated in 1994 as part of the historic Bay-Delta Accord, the CALFED Bay-Delta

Program, a joint state-Federal partnership, has been charged with developing a

long-term plan to address the environmental decline and water supply reliability

issues in the Bay Delta system. Included within the scope of work is the need to

better address Bay-Delta conflicts such as those brought about by balancing flood

control with water supply and environmental needs.

As dictated by the accord, further constraints have been applied to both the CVP

and SWP to protect fisheries. Approximately 850,000 acre-feet of project yield in

critical periods is now being dedicated to the environment—over and above the

original 3.65 million acre feet required under prior water rights decisions.

In addition to efforts by CALFED, the U.S. Corps of Engineers is preparing a

comprehensive reassessment of the CVP flood supply system, which is sorely needed. We must rethink our overall approach to flood control and water supply as we

prepare to meet the needs of California into the next century.

VII. Conclusions

Through the benefit of our collective experiences, water agency managers and environmental regulators are beginning to reach common ground on the need and potential strategies to improve our approach to flood control and water supply issues.

First, there is general agreement that we need to improve our overall water system by addressing the need for additional water storage and by improving our water

delivery system. This will also necessitate a need for even tighter operating regimens.

Second, there is general recognition that both have a tremendous stake in finding

workable solutions to these challenges, including the need to expand the evershrinking water pie.

As this testimony has sought to highlight, the time to act on the consensus to improve our water management system is now. Those of us in the water management

community believe that CALFED provides the best opportunity to take such action.

That is why we are strongly supporting CALFED and are participating actively in

the CALFED process. We believe it is imperative that CALFED produces a plan

that will restore the ecosystem comprised of the Bay-Delta and its watershed as well

as produce an implementable plan to improve our water supply and flood control

capabilities into the next century. There is consensus in California along those lines,

and we hope and trust the U.S. Congress will agree that there is not only a state

but a Federal interest, and that the Federal Government will actively participate

in preparing and implementing the CALFED plan.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak before you today to underscore the importance of focusing on the water supply implications of weather events like El Nin ̃ o

and opportunities that exist to deal with those impacts.