IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JOSE LOPEZ, by his wife and next best ) 

friend, Sandra Cardiel, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) Case No. 12 CV 05751 

 ) . 

 v. ) Honorable John R. Blakey, 

 ) Judge Presiding. 

STEVAN VIDLJINOVIC, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) JURY DEMANDED 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE NO. 1-18 

James G. Sotos 

Elizabeth A. Ekl 

Joseph M. Polick 

Laura M. Ranum 

THE SOTOS LAW FIRM, P.C. 

550 E. Devon Avenue, Suite 150 

Itasca, Illinois 60143 

Tel: (630) 735-3300 

Fax: (630) 773-0980 

jpolick@jsotoslaw.com

 Kelly C. Bauer 

 City of Chicago - Law Department 

 30 N. LaSalle Street - Suite 900 

 Chicago, Illinois 60602 

 (312) 744-5170 

 kelly.bauer@cityofchicago.org

 

 

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1. Motion to Bar Generalized Evidence of Alleged Police Code Of Silence, including 

any Statements Regarding Code of Silence Made by Mayor Emanuel 

 Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff, his attorneys, agents and/or witnesses 

from testifying to, arguing, or offering any testimony that officers generally lie, cover-up, or 

otherwise maintain a “code of silence” to protect their fellow officers. This Court should exclude 

such evidence because it is not relevant to the jury’s determination of any issues in this case or 

the credibility of the officers’ testimony (FED. R. EVID. 401) and would be overwhelmingly 

prejudicial to Defendants. (FED. R. EVID. 403.) 

 In this trial, the only relevant inquiry is whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights. As 

such, general evidence of a police “code of silence” or similar slander has no bearing on the 

jury’s assessment of Defendants’ conduct. See Basile v. Ondrato, 2003 WL 22953340, at *2 

(N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2003) (no evidence or argument may be offered regarding a police “code of 

silence” or widespread cover-up of police misconduct, including the use of the phrase “code of 

silence”). This case must be tried “on the basis of the evidence adduced in the courtroom, 

not on the basis of generalized and speculative arguments and innuendos about ‘what police 

officers or law enforcement agents do (or do not) do.’” Carlson v. Banks, 2007 WL 5711692, at 

*14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2007). In a court of law, justice is dispensed based on evidence of 

articulated and proven facts, not on generalized assumptions and prejudices.” Maldonado v. 

Stinar, 2010 WL 3075680, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2010) (quoting Sanders v. City of 

Indianapolis, 837 F. Supp. 959, 963 (S.D. Ind. 1992)). Additionally, because such generalized 

evidence has no specific relationship to the Defendants testifying in this case, it is not relevant to 

the jury’s determination of their credibility and is akin to impermissible propensity evidence. 

See, e.g., Ratliff v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL 5845551, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2012) 

(collecting cases); Martinez v. City of Chicago, 2016 WL 3538823 at *10 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 

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2016) (“...any “code of silence” or “all cops lie” would be unduly prejudicial and would 

constitute improper propensity evidence.”); Pierce v. Ruiz, 2016 WL 5912890 at *4 (N.D. Ill. 

Oct. 11, 2016) (“generalized allegations, separate and apart from what may be true of the officers 

named as defendants here, are not helpful and akin to impermissible propensity evidence.”) 

(citation omitted). 

Furthermore, even if general evidence of a police “code of silence” were somehow 

relevant in this case (and it is not), this Court should nonetheless exclude such evidence because 

its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. See Cooper v. Dailey, 2012 WL 

1748150, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2012); Bruce v. City of Chicago, 2011 WL 3471074, at *4 

(N.D. Ill. July 29, 2011); Hill v. City of Chicago, 2011 WL 3205304, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 

2011); Caldwell v. City of Chicago, 2010 WL 380696, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2010); Townsend 

v. Benya, 287 F. Supp. 2d 868, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Indeed, given its lack of connection to the 

specific issues and persons in this case, “‘[i]ts probative value is very, very slim, and its 

prejudicial [impact] is very, very high.’” Shaw v. City of New York, 1997 WL 187352, at *8 

(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997) (citation omitted). 

In support of his code of silence argument, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Compel 

Appearance and Testimony of Mayor Rahm Emanuel or, in the Alternative, Order Allowing 

Testimony Previously Given. (Dkt. 159.) For the reasons set forth herein, as well as those set 

forth in Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, Plaintiff should be barred from 

introducing generalized evidence of a code of silence, including any statements made by Mayor 

Emanuel regarding code of silence, his reformation of investigations of citizen complaints of 

alleged police misconduct, and any “task force” created to investigate complaints of police 

misconduct. 

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2. Motion to Bar Any Reference to Publicized Incidents of Alleged Police Misconduct 

 Defendants move in limine to bar Plaintiff from making any reference to publicized 

incidents of alleged police misconduct, including, but not limited to, this incident and the highly 

publicized incidents of police-involved shootings in this jurisdiction and others. Media accounts 

related to this case are unduly prejudicial and constitute inadmissible hearsay evidence. FED. R. 

EVID. 403 and 801. 

References to other incidents are similarly irrelevant, inadmissible and unduly prejudicial 

under FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, and 403. In recent years and months, allegations of misconduct 

by members of the Chicago Police Department, have received, and at times even dominated, 

media coverage in the City’s major newspapers, local news broadcasts and on the Internet. 

Certain allegations have even received nation-wide coverage. References to other allegations of 

police misconduct during this trial can only be intended to inflame the jury against the police in 

general and against Defendants in this particular case. Consequently, any testimony, evidence, 

argument or comments regarding the publicized actions of police officers should be barred 

pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, and 403. Such references have no probative value, are 

highly inflammatory and overly prejudicial, and are irrelevant to the issues presented in this trial. 

See, e.g., Pierce v. Ruiz, 2016 WL 5912890 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2016) (“Generally, ‘evidence 

of police conduct unrelated to the [defendants] in this case has only minimal probative value and 

is highly inflammatory and prejudicial.’”) citing Fox-Martin v. Cnty of Cook, No. 09 C 1690, 

2010 WL 4136174 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2010) (“Speculation that there may be instances in 

which such evidence might be admissible is insufficient to withstand a motion in limine seeking 

to limit evidence of publicized instances of police misconduct.”) Maldonado v. Stinar, 2010 WL 

3075680, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2010); Redmond v. City of Chicago, 2008 WL 539164, at *6 

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(N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2008); Saunders v. City of Chicago, 320 F. Supp.2d 735, 740 (N.D. Ill. 2004); 

Heflin v. City of Chicago, 1996 WL 28238, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 1996). 

3. Motion To Bar Evidence or Argument of Violations of CPD General Orders, Rules 

and Regulations 

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff, his attorneys, agents and/or witnesses 

from testifying to, arguing, or offering any testimony about the Chicago Police Department’s 

(“CPD”) internal directives, rules or regulations, or CPD’s general and special orders. CPD 

General and Special Orders and Rule and Regulations contain written directives for police 

activities both in specific situations and for general conduct. Any attempt to introduce such 

written directives promulgated by the CPD in an attempt to suggest that Defendants violated the 

internal procedures of the CPD in the course of their contact with Plaintiff would be improper. 

Such evidence is irrelevant, and any probative value it may have would be substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 

402, 403. 

At issue here is whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Introduction 

of evidence relating to CPD General Orders would be improper because “the violation of police 

regulations or even a state law is completely immaterial as to the question of whether a violation 

of the federal constitution has been established.” Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 

454 (7th Cir. 2006); Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003); Pasiewicz v. Lake 

County Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001). Courts look to federal law, not 

state or municipal regulations, to determine the existence and scope of personal liberties 

protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the “reasonableness” 

standard under the Fourth Amendment. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1215-18 

(7th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-95 (1989); Smith v. 

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Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Under § 1983, the issue is whether [the officer] 

violated the Constitution, not whether he should be disciplined by the local police force”). The 

Seventh Circuit has consistently held that “42 U.S.C. 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional 

violations, not violations of state laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police 

practices.” Thompson, 472 F.3d at 454. What may not be expressly authorized by a police 

department’s rules may be justified and constitutionally reasonable. The internal CPD guidelines 

also are irrelevant to Plaintiff’s state law claims. See, Passarella v. NFI Interactive Logistics, 

LLC, 12-CV-4147, 2016 WL 6134541, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2016). 

Permitting Plaintiff to present evidence or suggest to the jury that the individual 

Defendants or other police officers may have breached some obligation they had to their 

employer through an "alleged" rules violation would also be overwhelmingly prejudicial to the 

Defendants in the defense of this matter. A jury presented with such a "violation" would be 

unable to separate the purported rules violation, for which plaintiff has no claim, from the 

alleged constitutional violations regarding which the jury is deciding liability and damages. The 

jury’s inevitable confusion would only serve to obscure the central issues in this case. See 

Thompson, 472 F.3d at 456-57; Fed.R.Evid. 403. Accordingly, plaintiff should not be permitted 

to inject the possibility of rules violations into these proceedings by introducing evidence or 

arguing to the jury any CPD directives. 

4. Motion To Bar Any Evidence or Reference to IPRA’s Investigation and any FBI 

Investigation

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff, his attorneys, agents and/or witnesses 

from testifying to, arguing, or offering any testimony referencing in any way the Independent 

Police Review Authority’s (“IPRA”) investigation or any FBI investigation regarding this 

incident. Investigations or conclusions made by a third-party fact-finder after the incident are 

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irrelevant - the sole finder of fact at trial is the jury. Furthermore, the very fact that an 

investigation was opened is unfairly prejudicial and could mislead the jury to believe that IPRA 

or the FBI believed or at least suspected that Defendant Officers engaged in misconduct. 

Moreover, IPRA’s mission is to investigate officers for violating CPD regulations, not citizen’s 

constitutional rights. Therefore, the probative value, if any, is substantially outweighed by the 

unfair prejudice to Defendants. See, Bruce v. City of Chicago, 2011 WL 3471074 at *6 (N.D. Ill. 

July 29, 2011) (“The potential prejudice from testimony about the IPRA investigation 

substantially outweighs its questionable probative value[.]”); Paradiso v. Obaldo, No. 07-CV4247, 2009 WL 3272217 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2009) (“evidence that an investigation occurred 

and the decision reached [ ] are irrelevant” to constitutional claims). Thus all references to the 

IPRA and FBI investigations should be barred pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 401 and 403. 

The Parties have all identified as trial exhibits two witness statements provided to IPRA. 

(Pl.’s Exs. 161 and 162; Defs.’ Exs. 8 and 9.) Defendants have no objection to the use of these 

statements for the sole purpose of impeachment or refreshing recollection, so long as references 

to the statements are phrased neutrally without reference to IPRA or any form of an internal 

investigation. (e.g., refer to it as a “prior statement”). 

5. Motion to Bar Any Evidence or Reference to the Recent DOJ Investigation and 

Report 

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff, his attorneys, agents and/or witnesses 

from testifying to, arguing, or offering any testimony referencing in any way the Department of 

Justice (“DOJ”) investigation and the accompanying January 13, 2017 report. The DOJ report, 

released one week ago, includes findings regarding the CPD’s use of force. According to the 

report, the investigation included a review of 170 officer-involved shootings and over 425 

incidents of less-lethal force. (See, Pl. Ex. 200, p. 21.) The report does not include a 

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comprehensive list of all cases reviewed and provides no indication that the incident involving 

Plaintiff was included. Introduction of this evidence will send an indication to the jury that 

Plaintiff’s case was either included in the review or fits a larger pattern of misconduct. As such, 

the report is essentially a compilation of instances of unrelated police misconduct and should be 

excluded because it is irrelevant and highly prejudicial. See Saunders v. City of Chicago, 320 F. 

Supp.2d 735, 740 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Bruce v. City of Chicago, No. 09 C 4837, 2011 WL 3471074, 

at * 5 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2011). Defendants do not condone any instance of police misconduct 

and should not be associated with or forced to defend the conduct of others before the jury. 

Reference to the report, which is completely unrelated to this incident, will only serve to activate 

juror’s prejudices, stereotypes and to improperly inflame the jury against police in general and 

Defendant Officers in particular. Moreover, the goal of the DOJ Report, like an IPRA 

investigation, was broader than assessment of the constitutional issues applicable here. As such, 

the report is highly prejudicial. (See, Pl. Ex. 200, p. 21); Paradiso v. Obaldo, No. 07-CV-4247, 

2009 WL 3272217 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2009) (“evidence that an investigation occurred and 

the decision reached [ ] are irrelevant” to constitutional claims). Thus, any reference to the DOJ 

investigation or report should be barred pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, and 403. 

6. Motion to Bar Undisclosed Witnesses and Evidence 

 Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff, his attorneys, agents and/or witnesses 

from testifying to, arguing, or offering any testimony relating to witnesses or evidence which 

was not previously disclosed during discovery. The disclosure requirements of Rule 26 were 

written to prevent parties from springing surprises at trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1) mandates that 

if a party fails to disclose a witness or information pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (a) or (e), “the 

party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence [ ] at a trial, unless the 

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failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” See also, Fox-Martin v. County of Cook, No. 

09-CV-1690, 2010 WL 4136174, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2010) (“the parties are barred from 

using any witnesses, documents or other information not disclosed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 

and 37.”); Thomas v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., No. 10-CV-342, 2016 WL 1746366, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 

May 3, 2016) (holding that where late disclosure of witness was not substantially justified or 

harmless, “the automatic sanction of exclusion pursuant to Rule 37 is appropriate.”) To the 

extent Plaintiff’s proposed witnesses and exhibits include testimony or evidence which was not 

properly disclosed through the discovery process, it should be barred. 

7. Motion to Bar Argument Or Innuendo that the Jury Should Punish or “Send A 

Message” to the City 

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff from making any argument or innuendo 

that the jury should punish, admonish, warn, discourage or “send a message” to the City of 

Chicago by its verdict. See Caldwell v. City of Chicago, No. 08 C 3067, 2010 WL 380696, at *2 

(N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2010) (excluding argument that the jury should punish, admonish, warn, 

discourage, or send a message to the City for the defendant officers’ alleged misconduct). 

Sending a message, or punishment, cannot form the basis for any damages other than punitive 

damages. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). In any event, as 

a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages from the City of Chicago as a result of 

this occurrence (see 745 ILCS 10/2-102) and, therefore, any argument that an award sends a 

message to the City would be misleading and inappropriate. Moore v. City of Chicago, 2008 WL 

4549137, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2008). Additionally, any reference to the City being punished 

would risk substantial unfair prejudice against the Individual Defendants because they, and not 

the City, would be obligated to pay any punitive damages award. FED. R. EVID. 403. This Court 

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should not risk the unfair inference, and should bar argument regarding “sending a message” to 

or “punishing” the City. Caldwell v. City of Chicago, 2010 WL 380696, at *2. 

8. Motion to Preclude Plaintiff from Advancing New Arguments and, Specifically, 

from Asking Jury to Consider Specific Damages Award or Range for the First Time 

During Rebuttal Closing Argument 

 Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff from advancing new arguments and, 

specifically, from asking the jury to consider a specific damages award or range for the first time 

during rebuttal closing argument. The purpose of rebuttal closing argument “is to respond to the 

arguments of the opposing party,” not to advance new arguments. Curlin v. Seaboard Foods, 

LLC, 2015 WL 791290, at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 25, 2015). Plaintiff should abide by this general 

rule. In particular, if Plaintiff intends to ask the jury to consider a specific damages award or 

range, Plaintiff should raise the issue during his opening closing argument so that Defendants 

may respond accordingly. In other words, Plaintiff should be barred from advancing new 

arguments and, specifically, from asking the jury to consider a specific damages award or range 

for the first time during his rebuttal closing argument. See Ehrlich v. Cent. Transp., LLC, 2014 

WL 1404645, at *3 (N.D. W.Va. Apr. 10, 2014) (granting motion in limine to preclude the 

plaintiffs from arguing in rebuttal beyond the scope of issues raised in the defendants’ closing 

arguments and, specifically, any statements to suggest to the jury a figure or verdict range 

regarding the value of the plaintiffs’ alleged claims). 

9. Motion to Bar Counsel from Interpreting the CPD and CFD Office of Emergency 

Management and Communications Event Queries in their Questioning of Witnesses 

Without a Proper Foundation 

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff, his attorneys, agents and/or witnesses 

from testifying to, arguing, or offering any interpretation of the Office of Emergency 

Management and Communications (hereinafter referred to as “OEMC”) event queries entries for 

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the Chicago Police Department and the Chicago Fire Department without a proper foundation. 

Throughout depositions in this litigation, plaintiff’s counsel asked questions based on his own 

personal interpretation of the entries made in the OEMC event queries. Such questioning without 

a proper foundation at trial is inadmissible hearsay and should be precluded. FED. R. EVID. 801, 

802. 

10. Motion to Bar Reference to or Argument that City Employees are Paid to 

Testify/Professional Witnesses. 

Plaintiff should be barred from referring to the fact that some witnesses employed by the 

City of Chicago are testifying while “on the clock” or as part of their job duties, are professional 

witnesses, or are otherwise being paid for their testimony. FED. R. EVID. 401-403. Defendant 

City of Chicago has voluntarily agreed (at no cost to Plaintiff) to facilitate the attendance of City 

employees, including those requested by Plaintiff. It would be disingenuous and unfair for 

Plaintiff to repay the City’s professional courtesy by presenting in an unfair light the very 

measures required to make Plaintiff’s witnesses available in the first place. Such argument or 

evidence is unfairly prejudicial, misleading and distracting for the jury, and force Defendants to 

waste even more time explaining the context of an irrelevant collateral issue. Thus, such 

statements should be barred pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 401 and 403.

11. Motion to Bar Plaintiff’s Counsel from Bringing Jose Lopez into the Courtroom to 

Display Him to the Jury 

Defendants move in limine to preclude Jose Lopez’s presence from the courtroom. 

Plaintiff’s counsel advised Defendants that he intends to arrange for Jose Lopez to be brought 

into the courtroom in a wheelchair. However, there is no evidence that Jose Lopez is competent 

to testify, and the appearance of his “wife and next best friend” in this lawsuit evidences the 

contrary. Accordingly, Jose Lopez’s attendance at trial will only serve as prejudicial and 

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distracting demonstrative evidence of Lopez’s current medical condition that will improperly 

appeal to the jury’s emotions and sympathy, and unduly prejudice Defendants under FED. R. 

EVID. 403. As a result, Plaintiff should be barred from bringing Jose Lopez into the courtroom. 

12. Motion to Bar Any Evidence, Testimony, Argument or References to the Impact, 

Effect, or Loss of Relationship to Any Third Party as a Result of Plaintiff’s Injuries 

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff, his attorneys, agents and/or witnesses 

from testifying to, arguing, or offering any testimony that Plaintiff’s injuries impacted, effected, 

or resulted in a loss of relationship to any third party, including Plaintiff’s wife, children, 

girlfriend, siblings, and relatives. Not only are third-party damages inadmissible here, but they 

are also irrelevant to the jury’s determination of any issues in this case, and any probative value 

they may have would be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and confusion of the 

issues. Defendants. FED. R. EVID. 401 & 403. 

A party can only recover for indignities, humiliation and emotional distress that he 

personally experienced. “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be 

vicariously asserted.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014), quoting Alderman v. 

United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). Moreover, third-party damages, such as loss of society 

and emotional damages, are only appropriate in a wrongful death case or survival action. 740 

ILCS 180/1(2016); 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (2016). Under Illinois law, a survival action allows 

recovery of damages for injuries sustained by the decedent up to the time of death; a wrongful 

death action covers the time after death and allows recovery for the injuries suffered by the nextof-kin due to the loss of the decedent rather than the injuries personally suffered by the decedent 

prior to death. Wyness v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 131 Ill.2d 403, 409 (Ill. 1989). Here, 

Plaintiff is alive and there are no wrongful death or survival actions at issue. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s minor children do not have a cause of action for loss of society due to Plaintiff’s nonCase: 1:12-cv-05751 Document #: 164 Filed: 01/21/17 Page 12 of 27 PageID #:3530
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fatal injuries. Stevens v. Loverde, No. 93 C 6129, 1994 WL 14658 at 3* (N.D. Ill. 1994); See 

Reiser v. U.S., 786 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Karagiannakos v. Gruber, 274 Ill. App.3d 

155, 157 (1st Dist. 1995) (“[a] clear and consistent line of cases in the Illinois Appellate Court 

holds that a minor has no cause of action for loss of parental consortium when the parent 

survives, no matter how seriously the parent is injured.”); Van de Veire v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 

178 Ill. App.3d 794, 796 (1st Dist. 1989). Without a wrongful death action, any emotional 

damages potentially claimed by Plaintiff’s spouse and next of kin are also unavailable here. 

Hammond v. System Transport, Inc., 942 F. Supp.2d 867, 871 (C.D. Ill. 2013) (citing 740 ILCS 

180/1-180/2). 

Lastly, loss of consortium damages are not available to Plaintiff’s girlfriend or his wife. 

Loss of consortium claims must involve a legally recognized marital relationship – which he did 

not have with his girlfriend. Monroe v. Trinity Hosp. Advocate, 345 Ill. App.3d 896, 899 (1st 

Dist. 2004); Sostock v. Reiss, 92 Ill. App.3d 200, 206, 415 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (1980). Plaintiff’s 

wife, on the other hand, waived any potential loss of consortium claim when she failed to bring it 

at the pleading stage. Huffman v. Grinnell, 880 F. Supp. 1194, 1201-03 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding 

that a spouse’s pleading for “substantial loss of services” was insufficient to establish loss of 

consortium as a claim or constitutional violation under § 1983). 

Third-party damages are thus irrelevant to the jury’s determination of any issues in this 

case, and any probative value would be slight compared to the substantial prejudice and 

confusion of the issues. FED. R. EVID. 401 & 403.As such, any mention of third-party damages 

should be barred. 

 

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13. Motion to Bar Evidence or Argument that the City of Chicago will Indemnify any of 

the Individual Defendants for Compensatory Damages, or that the City is the “Deep 

Pocket”

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff, his attorneys, agents and/or witnesses 

from testifying to, arguing, or offering any testimony that Defendants may be indemnified by 

their employer, the City of Chicago, for any portion of a judgment that may be entered against 

them. Whether or not the City provides indemnity is irrelevant to the issue of whether 

Defendants are liable for any acts they performed which may have proximately caused injury to 

Plaintiff. Moreover, allowing Plaintiff to make such references would be highly prejudicial to 

Defendants. For example, the jury may feel that even if there was no liability, Plaintiff should be 

compensated for his time and efforts in bringing the lawsuit, particularly in view of the fact that 

the City has the “deep pocket.” Reference to indemnity is akin to reference to insurance, which is 

precluded by FED. R. EVID. 411. Walker v. Saenz, No. 91 CV 3669, 1992 WL 317188, at *3 

(N.D. Ill. 1992); Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513, 1518 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that instructions 

to jury on indemnification in § 1983 action required new trial); Green v. Baron, 879 F.2d 305, 

310 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that instructions concerning indemnification are extremely 

prejudicial); Griffin v. Hillke, 804 F.2d 1052, 1057 (8th Cir. 1986) (declaring indemnification 

instructions to constitute reversible error). Accordingly, Plaintiff should be precluded from 

adducing or implying that Defendants may be indemnified or reimbursed by the City. 

14. Motion to Bar Solicitation of Media Coverage 

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff, his attorneys, agents and/or witnesses 

from soliciting media coverage or communicating to the public or with members of the media 

about this lawsuit, Defendant Officers or the incident at issue in this case until the jury has 

delivered its verdict. Media coverage would likely include inadmissible evidence or arguments, 

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and could be consumed by potential jurors, thereby depleting the available pool of unbiased 

potential jurors and diminishing the parties’ opportunity for a fair trial. 

15. Motion in Limine to Bar Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert Phillip Hayden 

Defendants move pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 702 and 403 to bar the testimony of 

Plaintiff’s police procedures expert, Phillip Hayden, and in support thereof state 

Background

On July 22, 2011, at approximately 3:25 a.m., Plaintiff Jose Lopez’s girlfriend called 

“911" and informed the emergency operator that he was having trouble breathing. When Chicago 

Fire Department personnel arrived, they attempted to assess Lopez, but contend they could not 

do so because he was acting erratically, could not communicate intelligibly, and appeared to be 

under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Unable to safely assess Lopez, the Fire Department 

personnel called for police assistance. The police responded to the call, attempted to 

communicate with Lopez, but also contend they were unable to do so because he was acting 

erratically, could not communicate intelligibly, and appeared to be under the influence of drugs, 

specifically PCP. The police further contend that when one of the officers attempted to persuade 

Lopez to go to the ambulance, Lopez swung his arm at the officer prompting his partner to 

discharge his Taser one time at Lopez. After Lopez was Tased, the police and paramedics placed 

him on a gurney, and he was transported by the Fire Department ambulance to the hospital. 

 Plaintiff has retained Phillip Hayden, Ed.D. to offer expert testimony regarding police 

procedures. Defendants move to bar Hayden’s testimony pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 702 and 403. 

Argument 

The trial judge plays a “gatekeeping role” to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony 

or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). Expert opinions are admissible only if “(1) the 

proposed witness would testify to valid scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge and 

(2) his testimony will assist the trier of fact...A court is expected to reject any subjective belief or 

speculation.” Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc., 368 F.3d 809,816 (7th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the expert’s 

testimony would satisfy the Daubert standard.” Lewis v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 

705 (7th Cir. 2009). 

 The entirety of Hayden’s testimony should be excluded because it usurps the role of the 

judge and jury, and improperly tells the jury how he believes the case should be decided. 

Additionally, Hayden’s opinions violate well-established evidentiary principles and should be 

barred for the reasons discussed below. 

A. Hayden’s Testimony Should be Excluded in Its Entirety Because It is 

Unhelpful. 

 The core factual dispute in this case is whether Plaintiff was able to communicate with 

the Defendant Officers and Paramedics at the scene and refuse the medical attention that was 

called for him (as Plaintiff contends), or whether he was acting erratically, could not 

communicate intelligibly, appeared to be under the influence of drugs, and thus required 

emergency medical attention (as Defendants contend). With respect to Plaintiff’s excessive 

force claim, the factual inquiry predominately focuses on Defendant Officers Guettler and 

Vidljinovic’s interaction with Plaintiff. Defendants contend that when Guettler attempted to 

touch Plaintiff’s elbow to guide him toward the ambulance, Plaintiff swung at him with clenched 

fists. It is undisputed that Vidljinovic then Tased Plaintiff once, with the Taser prongs striking 

his abdomen. 

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 Hayden’s expert opinion is as follows: Officers Vidljinovic and Guettler used excessive 

force in subduing Mr. Lopez by approaching him, laying hands on him and utilizing the 

Electronic Controlled Device (ECD). (See Ex. A, Hayden Report, at p. 4). Hayden’s “conclusion 

. . . that the defendant used unreasonable force is not helpful to the jury and is inadmissible. He 

is simply telling the jury how to decide the case, and that he cannot do.” Davis v. Duran, 277 

F.R.D. 362, 372 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (barring similar opinion by police procedures expert). Such 

expert testimony has been held to constitute impermissible legal conclusion or to be otherwise 

unhelpful to the jury. Id. at 373 (and cases cited therein). 

 Expert opinions that an officer’s use of force was or was not excessive “are inadmissible 

under Rule 702 because they are simply characterizations of law, which do nothing more than 

purport to instruct the jury as to the proper standards for reasonableness in use of force cases.” 

Davis, 277 F.R.D. at 371. Such an opinion “would not be helpful, since under the Federal Rules 

of Evidence, it is the role of the judge, and not the witness, to instruct the jury on the applicable 

principles of law,” and “by definition does not aid the jury in making a decision; rather it 

undertakes to tell the jury what result to reach, and thus attempts to substitute the expert’s 

judgment for the jury’s.” Id., quoting Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 397 (2nd Cir. 

2005). 

 As a corollary to his main opinion, Hayden concludes that rather than using force the 

officers should have contacted mental health professionals to deal with Plaintiff. (Ex. A, pp. 6, 

8.) However, he cannot identify these mental health professionals, or whether they were even 

available. (Ex. B, Hayden Dep. Tr. at pp. 162-65.) Hayden is not a medical doctor, psychiatrist, 

psychologist, or mental health expert. Id. at pp. 17-19. Nor does he hold himself out as having 

any expertise as a mental health professional. Id. at p. 19. Thus, his testimony provides no 

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specialized knowledge that would assist the jury’s understanding of the evidence. FED. R. EVID. 

702. It is speculative at best. All his opinion does is tell the jury, with the benefit of hindsight, 

that the Defendant Officers should have done something different. This is an improper analysis 

under the “objective reasonableness” standard set forth in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 

(1989) for use of force claims, and is therefore contrary to the law on which the court will 

instruct the jury. 

 Accordingly, Dr. Hayden should be barred from opining that the Defendant Officers’ use 

of force was excessive or unreasonable under the circumstances. 

B. The Bases for Hayden’s Opinion Regarding the Defendant Officers’ Use of 

Force are Improper and Inadmissible. 

 As bases for his opinion, Hayden contends the sources police departments rely on to 

guide them in the use of ECDs come from standards established by the International Association 

of Chiefs of Police (IACP), as well as cases from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the 

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Graham. (Ex. A, p. 4.) He then uses the IACP 

standards and the three factors set forth in Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, (severity of the crime; 

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and, 

whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or evade arrest by flight) as an outline to address 

the bases for his opinion. (Ex. A, pp. 4-7.) 

 In addition to being an improper attempt to instruct the jury, Hayden’s reliance on the 

three factors specified in Graham is legally misplaced, and therefore misleading to the jury. The 

Court did not intend this to be an exclusive list subject to mechanical application. 490 U.S. at 

396 (“including the severity of the crime at issue, . . .)(emphasis added); accord Kingsley v. 

Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). Rather, the reasonableness of the use of force 

depends on the totality of the “facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Graham, 490 

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U.S. at 396; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985). Hayden’s reliance on Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals cases is also misplaced. The controlling law here is the Seventh Circuit, which 

has had occasion to consider police use of force cases involving ECDs or Tasers. See, e.g, Abbott 

v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2013); Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856 

(7th Cir. 2010). 

 Furthermore, testimony that the Defendant Officers violated police practices, policies or 

procedures is inadmissible because it misleads and confuses the jury, is irrelevant, and is more 

prejudicial than probative. FED. R. EVID. 401, 403. The Seventh Circuit “has consistently held 

that 42 U.S. C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state 

laws or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.” see e.g., Thompson v. City of 

Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006). “In other words, the violation of police regulations 

or even a state law is completely immaterial as to the question of whether a violation of the 

Federal constitution has been established.” Id. In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court 

ruled that, because police practices and regulations vary over time and from place to place, they 

are an unreliable gauge by which to measure the reasonableness of police conduct under the 

Fourth Amendment. 517 U.S. 806, 815-16 (1996). 

 Comparisons to national or IACP standards are irrelevant because the reasonableness of 

“an officer’s actions in apprehending a suspect under the Fourth Amendment is ‘not capable of 

precise definition or mechanical application.” Thompson, 472 F.3d at 454, quoting Abdullahi v. 

City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2005). The IACP standards utilized by Hayden 

“[shed] no light on what may or may not be considered ‘objectively reasonable’ under the Fourth 

Amendment giving the infinite sets of disparate circumstances which officers might encounter.” 

Thompson, 472 at 454. Thus, both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have made it clear 

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that opinion testimony based on standards of this nature is irrelevant and inadmissible. 

Accordingly, the bases for Hayden’s opinions are irrelevant and inadmissible and should be 

barred under FED. R. EVID. 702 and 403. 

C. Hayden’s Opinions Regarding the Parties’ Credibility Are Inadmissible.

 Hayden’s opinions regarding the credibility or plausibility of the parties’ testimony are 

also inadmissible. “It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the believability of a 

witness. . . An expert is not permitted to offer an opinion as to the believability or truthfulness of 

a witness’s story.” United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999); accord, Davis, 

277 F.R.D. at 370. Nor are expert witnesses “allowed to sort out possible conflicting testimony 

or to argue the implication of those inconsistencies.” Davis, 277 F.R.D. at 370. Accordingly, 

Hayden should be barred from offering the opinion that Officers Vidljinovic and Guettler are the 

only two officers who said they felt threatened by Plaintiff, whereas several others on the scene 

(officers, paramedics and firefighters) did not feel that either of these two officers looked like 

they were in danger. (Ex. A, p. 6.) This is simply a credibility argument. This and all other 

credibility-related opinions are clearly inadmissible. FED. R. EVID. 702. 

D. Opinions Regarding the State of Mind of Parties or Witnesses Are 

Inadmissible. 

Similarly, Hayden should be barred from offering opinions as to the mental state, intent 

or motives of any party or witness. He opines that “[i]t appears Officers Vidljinovic and 

Guettler’s own heightened anxiety overwhelmed them, and they made a conscious decision to 

become aggressive.” (Ex. A, p. 6.) As to Plaintiff, Hayden surmises he could well be frightened 

because he was in fear of his life as officers approached him, (Ex. A, p. 6); that he made a 

conscious decision not to engage with the police or paramedics because he might have 

considered that unsafe, id.; and that he displayed fears of the police and firefighters. (Ex. A, p. 

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7.) It is well established that witnesses (whether expert or lay) are not permitted to speculate on 

the mental state, intent or motivations of others. Davis, 277 F.R.D. at 369, citing DePaepe v. 

GMC, 141 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 1998): FED. R. EVID. 602, 702. Moreover, Defendants 

Vidljinovic & Guettler’s (or any other Defendant’s) subjective intent is irrelevant because the 

reasonableness inquiry in an excessive force case is objective and does not consider the officer’s 

underlying intent or motivation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.; FED. R. EVID. 401, 403. Therefore, 

these and all other state of mind opinions should be barred. 

E. Opinions Regarding the Propriety of the Defendant Officers’ Pre-Seizure 

Actions Should Be Barred. 

 Hayden also takes issue with Officers Vidljinovic and Guettler’s decision to approach 

Plaintiff. He describes this decision as non-essential, tactically poor, and concludes it should not 

have been made. (Ex. A, p. 6.) Hayden also concludes that by physically approaching him, the 

officers created the hazardous situation in which Mr. Lopez was severely injured. (Id. at p. 8.) 

Here, Plaintiff was not seized until he was Tased by Officer Vidljinovic. Officer Guettler’s 

attempt to touch Plaintiff to which Plaintiff responded by swinging at Guettler does not 

constitute as seizure. See, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 956 (7th Cir. 1992). Furthermore, an 

officer’s pre-seizure activity is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See, Felton v. City of 

Chicago, 827 F.3d 632, 635-636 (7th Cir. 2016); Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (7th 

Cir. 1992). Thus, these opinions, and any other opinions regarding the propriety of the Defendant 

Officers’ or Defendant Paramedics’ “pre-seizure actions or decisions are irrelevant, FED. R.

EVID. 401, and will not “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 

issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702(a). Such opinions are also inadmissible because they are misleading 

and confusing to the jury, and any probative value they may have would be substantially 

outweighed by the danger of prejudice. FED. R. EVID. 403. 

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 For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this court bar the 

testimony of Philip Hayden, and for such other relief the Court deems appropriate. 

16. Motion in Limine to Bar Certain Opinions of Plaintiff’s Economist, Stan Smith. 

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff’s expert Stan Smith, Ph.D. from 

testifying to, arguing, or offering any testimony that Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for 1) 

damages resulting in loss of household and family services to his spouse and children, and 2) 

loss of enjoyment of life. The damages for loss of household and family services are irrelevant 

to the jury’s determination of any issues in this case. FED. R. EVID. 401. The loss of enjoyment 

of life damages are inadmissible under the standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and FED. R. EVID. 702. Furthermore, the probative 

value of any such damages evidence would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues and misleading the jury. FED. R. EVID. 403. 

According to Smith, the damages he calculates for loss of household and family services 

include housekeeping, home management, and family guidance. Thus, these are not damages 

experienced by the Plaintiff himself, but rather damages for losses experienced by his spouse and 

children as the alleged result of Plaintiff’s injuries. As explained above in Defendants’ Motion 

No. 12, Plaintiff can only recover for damages that are personal to him, and not to others. This is 

not a wrongful death action in which damages for loss of society, loss of services, and loss of 

familial guidance are evaluated by the jury for the benefit of the next of kin. Plaintiff’s spouse 

and children are not plaintiffs in their own right in this case, and no loss of household or family 

services or loss of society have been pled on their behalf. Loss of household services can be 

considered a component of loss of consortium damages. Johanek v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 

509 N.E.2d 1295, 1306 (1st Dist. 1987). However, Plaintiff’s wife waived any potential loss of 

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consortium claim when she failed to bring it at the pleading stage. Huffman v. Grinnell, 880 F. 

Supp. 1194, 1201-03 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (held that a spouse’s pleading for “substantial loss of 

services” was insufficient to establish loss of consortium as a claim or constitutional violation 

under § 1983). 

Thus, Smith’s damages calculation for loss of household and family services are 

irrelevant, and any probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. FED. R. EVID. 401, 403. Therefore, Smith 

should be precluded from testifying to such losses. 

The loss of enjoyment of life damages, also known as hedonic damages, and Smith’s 

quantification of them in this case do not pass muster under Daubert or Rule 702 because they 

are based on an unreliable methodology and will not assist the jury. Smith contends that his 

estimate for the value of life is based on many economic studies regarding what a contemporary 

society actually pay to preserve the ability to lead a normal life. The studies Smith relies upon 

assign a value to life based on data such as consumer behavior and purchases of safety devices, 

wage risk premiums to workers who perform higher risk jobs, and cost-benefit analyses which 

purportedly calculate the costs of reducing risk and saving lives by using certain safety measures. 

However, other than life expectancy, Smith’s report does not reference any specific information 

regarding how Plaintiff valued his own life. 

Notably, most courts in this district that have evaluated Smith’s methodology and 

opinions on the loss of the enjoyment of life have determined it is unreliable and thus 

inadmissible under Rule 702. See e.g., Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 871 (7th Cir. 

1992)(affirming district court’s decision to exclude Smith’s testimony); Bolden v. Walsh Group, 

No. 2012 WL 1079898 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 20120; Ayers v. Robinson, 837 F. Supp. 1049, 

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1059-64 (N.D. Ill. 1995); but see, Richman v. Burgeson, 2008 WL 2567132 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 

2008). Other district courts have followed this reasoning to exclude Smith’s testimony on 

hedonic damages. See, e.g., Castrillon v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Center, Inc., 2015 

WL 3448947 at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 29,2015); Stokes v. John Deere Seeding Group, 2014 WL 

675820 at*1-6 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014). 

Because Smith’s methodology regarding loss of the enjoyment of life damages is 

unreliable, it would not be helpful to the jury in assessing damages in this case. Therefore, 

Smith’s should be barred from testifying on loss of the enjoyment of life damages and presenting 

damage calculations on the loss of enjoyment of life to the jury. FED. R. EVID. 702. 

17. Motion to Bar Any Argument or Reference to the Existence of Any Video or Audio 

Recording or the Failure to Preserve or Produce any Such Recording 

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff from arguing or referencing that any 

“dash cam” or “in-car” video mechanism existed in any CFD or CPD vehicle at the time of the 

incident and failed to capture the incident; or that any video or audio tape from this incident 

exists and was not produced. This Court should exclude such argument or reference because it is 

not relevant to the jury’s determination of any issues in this case or the credibility of the officers’ 

testimony (FED. R. EVID. 401) and would be extremely prejudicial to Defendants. (FED. R. EVID.

403.) 

There is no evidence any dash cam videos captured the incident. Evidence adduced 

during discovery reflects that only one of the three responding squad cars (#8509) was equipped 

with a dash cam on the date of the incident, but there were no event video recordings from that 

dash cam at or around the time frame of the incident. (Pl.’s Ex. 30, ¶¶ 18-21.) Plaintiff does not 

dispute this fact. However, Defendants anticipate Plaintiff will argue or suggest that the reason 

there is no video footage of the incident is because officers affirmatively tampered with either 

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the cameras or the tapes in this case. This speculative argument, which was fully explored during 

discovery, has no basis in fact. 

Even assuming footage from Squad Car 8509 existed at some point in time, the mere fact 

that evidence was destroyed is insufficient to create an unfavorable inference. Park v. City of 

Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 615 (7th Cir.2002); Rummery v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 250 F.3d 553, 558 (7th 

Cir. 2001). “Rather, to draw such an inference, the [evidence] must have [been] destroyed ... in 

bad faith.” Park, 297 F.3d at 615; S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 

Co., 695 F.2d 253, 258 (7th Cir.1982). “The crucial element is not that evidence was destroyed 

but rather the reason for the destruction.” S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 695 F.2d at 258. In 

summarily dismissing Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Lieutenant Dubiel, this 

Court held that Plaintiff provided “no evidentiary basis” for the inference that “CPD may have 

affirmatively tampered with either the cameras or the tapes in this case.” (See Dkt. 158, p. 10.) It 

follows that there is no evidence that any of the Individual Defendants tampered with the 

cameras or, otherwise destroyed, any dash-cam video tapes in bad faith. Any suggestion to the 

contrary, through questions or argument, would prove extremely prejudicial, is not supported any 

evidence and should not be allowed. 

Likewise, despite an inspection and examination of the Taser used in the incident by all 

parties during discovery and deposition testimony indicating the Taser was not equipped with a 

video, Defendants anticipate Plaintiff will attempt to suggest to the jury that such a video or 

video capability exists. In light of discovery in this case, any argument or suggestion to the jury 

that a Taser video exists is improper and not made in good faith. 

Similarly, Defendants anticipate Plaintiff will try to argue Defendants’ inability to 

produce the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) or “911” audio 

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tape of the incident is the result of some wrongdoing on their part. However, there is absolutely 

no evidence to support any Individual Defendants’ participation in any such untoward conduct. 

Discovery in this matter revealed the “911” tape regarding the incident was recycled pursuant to 

a retention schedule prior to any party requesting, issuing a subpoena, or seeking a court order 

that it be preserved. 

Tellingly, Plaintiff has not asserted a spoliation claim. Indeed, there is insufficient 

evidence to support an allegation. As a result, Plaintiff should not be allowed to imply or argue 

that any video or audio recording exists and was withheld or inappropriately destroyed. 

18. Motion to Bar Visual Evidence, Including “Video in the Life of José Lopez” (Pl.’s 

Ex. 128.) 

Defendants move in limine to preclude Plaintiff, his attorneys, agents and/or witnesses 

from presenting visual evidence regarding Jose Lopez’s life before and after the injuries 

sustained on July 22, 2011. Plaintiff has advised Defendants that he intends to present to the jury 

evidence related to Plaintiff and his life before the injuries he sustained on July 22, 2011 as well 

as after. This evidence takes the form of a montage of photos of Plaintiff immediately following 

his surgery and video excerpts that would be presented as a single self-serving video depicting 

Plaintiff and his family at various unidentified points in time both before and after his injury. 

Photographs of Plaintiff immediately following his surgery are also presented in the video. So 

far as Plaintiff will claim this information is relevant to his damages, Plaintiff will already be 

presenting three experts regarding his injury and prognosis, testimony from family members 

regarding how his injury has impacted his life and his medical records. This visual evidence is 

cumulative and highly prejudicial. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403. Additionally, the video contains 

conversations between Plaintiff’s family members in Spanish, which are impermissible hearsay 

pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 802. Accordingly, Defendants move to bar all visual evidence. 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1746 that on January 

21, 2017, I electronically filed the attached Notice of Motion with the Clerk of the Court using 

the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the below service list. 

Plaintiff’s Counsel 

John P. DeRose & Associates 

15 Spinning Wheel Road 

Suite 428 

Hinsdale, IL 60521 

(630) 920-1111 office 

(630) 920-1170 fax 

john@johnderoselaw.com 

Franco N. Carone 

Carone Law Offices 

1559 North Mannheim Road 

Suite 2A 

Stone Park, Illinois 60665 

(708) 856-8311 

franco@caronelawoffices.com

 /s/ Elizabeth A. Ekl 

 Elizabeth A. Ekl, Attorney No. 06242480 

 One of the Attorneys for Defendants 

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