Filed 10/10/23 In re Lilly R. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re LILLY R., A Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B315074

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00722A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FAIZAH S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Pete R. Navarro, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Dismissed.
2

Maureen L. Keaney, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________

INTRODUCTION

Faizah S., mother of infant Lilly R., appeals from the 

juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order 

declaring Lilly a dependent child of the court, removing her from 

Faizah, and placing Lilly with her father, Pedro R., with 

monitored visits by Faizah. The juvenile court sustained a 

petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 360, 

subdivision (c),

1 assuming jurisdiction based on a previously 

sustained petition under former section 300, subdivision (b)(1),

and proceeding to a new disposition hearing at which the court 

issued the challenged orders.

While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court held a 

review hearing under section 364 and terminated its jurisdiction 

with orders awarding Pedro sole custody of Lilly and requiring 

Faizah’s visits with Lilly to be monitored. Faizah separately 

appealed from these orders terminating jurisdiction and 

determining custody and visitation (exit orders).

2 This court

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.

2 “When terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has 

been declared a dependent child of the court, section 362.4 

authorizes the juvenile court to issue a custody and visitation 
3

subsequently dismissed Faizah’s appeal from the exit orders after 

her counsel filed a no-merit brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H.

(2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, and Faizah did not file a supplemental 

brief raising issues for our consideration. (See In re Lilly R., 

(July 27, 2023), B322321.)

Because we cannot provide Faizah any effective relief—that 

is, relief that “can have a practical, tangible impact on the 

parties’ conduct or legal status” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 

277)—we conclude her appeal is moot. In addition, we invited the 

parties to file briefs addressing whether we should exercise our 

discretion to consider the merits of this moot appeal under In re 

D.P. Neither party filed a response. Accordingly, we decline to 

exercise our discretion to consider Faizah’s moot appeal on its 

merits and dismiss.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Faizah and Pedro are Lilly’s parents. Lilly was born in 

February 2021.

Two days later the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral 

reporting that, while at the hospital for Lilly’s birth, Faizah 

tested positive for methamphetamine on two separate tests 

administered 12 hours apart. Lilly’s toxicology screen was 

negative, and she had no medical issues. Faizah admitted past 

order (commonly referred to as an ‘exit order’) that will become 

part of the relevant family law file and remain in effect in the 

family law action ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent 

order.’” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.)
4

use of methamphetamine but denied using any drugs during her 

pregnancy.

On February 17, 2021 the Department filed a petition on 

Lilly’s behalf under former section 300, subdivision (b)(1), for 

Faizah’s alleged substance abuse and Pedro’s alleged failure to 

protect.

3 The petition was subsequently amended to remove the 

count pertaining to Pedro.

On April 5, 2021 the juvenile court sustained the amended

petition and found Lilly to be a person described by former 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1), based upon Faizah’s substance 

abuse. The count sustained by the court stated: “The child Lilly 

3 Former section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provided, in relevant 

part, that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 

court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk 

that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a 

result of the failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian 

to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the 

inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the 

child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, 

developmental disability, or substance abuse.” Effective 

January 1, 2023, Senate Bill No. 1085 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) 

(Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1) amended section 300, subdivision (b)(1),

by enumerating the existing bases for dependency jurisdiction in 

separate subparagraphs (b)(1)(A) through (D). The legislation 

also added section 300, subdivision (b)(2), which now provides, “A 

child shall not be found to be a person described by this 

subdivision solely due to any of the following: 

[¶] (A) Homelessness or the lack of an emergency shelter for the 

family. [¶] (B) The failure of the child’s parent or alleged parent 

to seek court orders for custody of the child. [¶] (C) Indigence or 

other conditions of financial difficulty, including, but not limited 

to, poverty, the inability to provide or obtain clothing, home or 

property repair, or childcare.”
5

R[.]’s mother, F[.]S[.] has a history of substance abuse including, 

amphetamine and methamphetamine and is a current abuser of 

methamphetamine and amphetamine, which renders the mother 

incapable of providing regular care of the child. On 02/11/2021, 

the mother had a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine. 

The mother used methamphetamine and amphetamine during 

the mother’s pregnancy of the child. The child is of such young 

age requiring constant care and supervision and the mother’s 

substance abuse interferes with the mother providing regular 

care and supervision of the child. Such substance abuse by the 

mother, endangers the child’s physical health and safety and 

places the child at risk of serious physical harm and damage.”

On April 21, 2021 the juvenile court held the disposition 

hearing. The court found Lilly was a person described by former 

section 300 and terminated its jurisdiction with an order for the 

parents to participate in a period of Department supervision.4

The court terminated the case because it found no nexus between 

concerns of Faizah’s drug use and Lilly’s safety. The court 

ordered Lilly released to Faizah and Pedro under the supervision 

of the Department. Both parents agreed to a voluntary family 

maintenance services contract, in which Faizah agreed to 

participate in drug testing, a substance abuse program, and 

parenting and family preservation services.

4 Section 360, subdivision (b), provides that “[i]f the court 

finds that the child is a person described by Section 300, it may, 

without adjudicating the child a dependent child of the court, 

order that services be provided to keep the family together and 

place the child and the child’s parent or guardian under the 

supervision of the social worker for a time period consistent with 

Section 301.”
6

In July 2021 the Department filed a section 360, 

subdivision (c), petition.5 That petition alleged the disposition 

had been ineffective because Faizah failed to submit to drug 

testing on nine occasions from April to July 2021, and “failed to 

consistently participate in a substance abuse program. The 

mother and the child’s father . . . have failed to consistently 

participate in Family Preservation causing Family Preservation 

services to be terminated. Further, on 7/23/21 the mother and 

father refused Family Preservation services. Remedial services 

failed to resolve the family’s problems in [that] the parents have 

failed to participate in services to address the mother’s substance 

abuse. Such failure to comply with Juvenile Court ordered 

services by the mother and the father endangers the child’s 

physical safety and places the child at risk of serious physical 

harm, damage and danger.”

On September 10, 2021 the jurisdiction and disposition

hearings were held. The juvenile court took notice of the prior 

sustained section 300 petition, court findings, and orders. The 

court sustained the section 360, subdivision (c) petition and 

declared Lilly a dependent of the court. The court further 

ordered that Lilly remain in Pedro’s custody under the 

5 Section 360, subdivision (c), provides that “[i]f the family 

subsequently is unable or unwilling to cooperate with the services 

being provided, the social worker may file a petition with the 

juvenile court pursuant to Section 332 alleging that a previous 

petition has been sustained and that disposition pursuant to 

subdivision (b) has been ineffective in ameliorating the situation 

requiring child welfare services. Upon hearing the petition, the 

court shall order either that the petition shall be dismissed or 

that a new disposition hearing shall be held pursuant to 

subdivision (b).”
7

Department’s supervision with monitored visits with Faizah, 

ordered reunification services for Faizah, and ordered Faizah to

participate in drug treatment, parenting and individual 

counseling, and drug testing. The court admonished Faizah that 

she had failed to hold up her end of the bargain by complying

voluntarily with drug testing and the case plan.

Three days later Faizah filed the present appeal seeking 

review of the juvenile court’s September 2021 jurisdiction 

findings and disposition order.

While this appeal was pending, in July 2022 the juvenile 

court held a review hearing under section 364, terminated 

jurisdiction, awarded Pedro sole legal and physical custody of 

Lilly, and ordered Faizah’s visits with Lilly to be monitored, with 

no visit to occur if Faizah was under the influence of drugs or 

alcohol.

6 Faizah separately appealed from these orders. (In re 

Lilly R., supra, B322321.) In that appeal, Faizah’s counsel filed 

an opening brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H. stating there were 

no arguable issues, and advising Faizah of her opportunity to 

show that an arguable issue exists. Faizah did not file a 

response. Because Faizah did not file a supplemental brief, this 

court dismissed her appeal pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (See 

In re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1096.) That 

dismissal is now final. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(1).)

This court invited the parties to submit letter briefs 

addressing whether this appeal is moot and whether this court 

6 We take judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code 

sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459 of the record in Faizah’s 

appeal from the juvenile court’s July 2022 termination of 

jurisdiction and exit orders. (In re Lilly R., supra, B322321.) 
8

should exercise its discretion to reach the merits. (See In re D.P., 

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) Neither party filed a response.

DISCUSSION

A. The Mootness Doctrine in Dependency Appeals

“A court is tasked with the duty “‘to decide actual 

controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and 

not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,

or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the 

matter in issue in the case before it.’”” (In re D.P., supra,

14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) In dependency cases, the reviewing court 

decides on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events 

render a case moot and whether the court’s decision would affect 

the outcome of a subsequent proceeding. (Ibid.) A dependency 

case becomes moot when events “render[ ] it impossible for [a] 

court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant 

him any effect[ive] relief.” (Ibid.; see In re N.S. (2016) 

245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“the critical factor in considering whether 

a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can 

provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error”].) To show 

the reviewing court can provide effective relief, the appellant first 

“must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be 

redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome [the 

appellant] seeks.” (In re D.P., at p. 276.)

In In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266, the Supreme Court 

explained that “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, 

tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’

[Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the 

plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from 
9

a change in legal status. Although a jurisdictional finding that a 

parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally 

stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to 

sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect 

on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being redressed by 

a favorable court decision.” (Id. at p. 277.) Examples of non-moot 

cases include those where a jurisdiction finding affected parental 

custody rights, curtailed a parent’s contact with his or her child, 

or resulted in disposition orders that continued to adversely 

affect a parent. (Id. at pp. 277-278.) In re D.P. further noted that 

“speculative future harm” is insufficient to avoid mootness. (Id.

at p. 278.) But “when a parent has demonstrated a specific legal 

or practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal,” 

however, “the case is not moot, and merits review is required.” 

(Id. at p. 283.)

“When a parent has not made such a showing, the case is 

moot, but the court has discretion to decide the merits 

nevertheless.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283; see id. at 

p. 282 [reviewing court has “‘inherent discretion’” to reach the 

merits of an appeal even where the case is moot].) A reviewing 

court decides on a case-by-case basis whether to reach the merits 

of a moot appeal. (Id. at p. 287.) Generally “when ‘the case 

presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’ 

‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the 

parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s 

determination’” courts may appropriately consider the merits of a 

moot appeal. (Id. at p. 282.)

Dependency appeals are uniquely prone to mootness, and 

often “[p]arents may appeal an order that is later changed, or 

jurisdiction over the child may terminate before an appeal is 
10

finally resolved, as in this case.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

p. 285.) Accordingly, In re D.P. identified several additional 

factors reviewing courts may consider when deciding whether 

discretionary review is warranted. (Id. at pp. 284-286.) First, 

whether the challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current 

or future dependency proceedings (for example, by influencing a 

child protective agency’s decision to file a new dependency 

petition or a juvenile court’s determination about whether to 

order further reunification services). (Id. at p. 285.) Second, 

“whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly 

pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285-286.) The 

“more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the 

parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.) 

Third, a court may also consider “why the appeal became moot”: 

“[p]rinciples of fairness” may favor discretionary review of cases 

rendered moot “by the prompt compliance or otherwise laudable 

behavior of the parent challenging the jurisdictional finding on 

appeal.” (Ibid.)

In deciding whether to exercise their discretion, reviewing 

courts “should be guided by the overarching goals of the 

dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection 

for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as 

well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional wellbeing of the child.’” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286; see 

§ 300.2, subd. (a).)

B. Faizah’s Appeal Is Moot

As noted above, in this appeal Faizah challenges the 

September 2021 jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring 

Lilly a dependent child of the court, removing Lilly from Faizah, 
11

and placing Lilly with Pedro, with monitored visits by Faizah. 

But her appeal from those orders was rendered moot by the 

subsequent July 2022 orders terminating jurisdiction and 

awarding Pedro sole custody of Lilly. Although Faizah appealed 

from the July 2022 exit orders, her appeal was dismissed under 

In re Phoenix H. and that dismissal is now final. An exit order is 

a final judgment and is not subject to collateral attack through an 

appeal from a previous disposition order. (See § 302, subd. (d) 

[“Any custody or visitation order issued by the juvenile court at 

the time the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction . . . shall be 

a final judgment and shall remain in effect after that jurisdiction 

is terminated.”]; see also Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 

1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1165 [where the juvenile court terminates its 

jurisdiction and issues an exit order, “the exit order ‘shall be a 

final judgment and shall remain in effect after [the juvenile 

court’s] jurisdiction is terminated’”].)

Because Faizah’s appeal from the exit orders was dismissed 

and is now final, we do not have jurisdiction to review and change 

them, and “the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct 

further hearings in the now-closed case.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 

63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164; see In re Michelle M. (1992) 

8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 [“where jurisdiction has been terminated 

and is final . . . jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the 

appellate court”]; see also § 304 [juvenile court has exclusive 

jurisdiction to hear proceedings regarding custody “until the time 

that the petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated”]; Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.620(a) [same].) Accordingly, even if we 

were to reverse the September 2021 jurisdiction and disposition 

orders, that would have no effect on the July 2022 exit orders.
12

In short, because we cannot provide Faizah any effective 

relief—that is, relief that “‘can have a practical, tangible impact 

on the parties’ conduct or legal status’” (In re D.P., supra, 

14 Cal.5th at p. 277)—we conclude this appeal is moot.

C. Discretionary Review of Faizah’s Moot Appeal Is Not 

Warranted

Despite our request for additional briefing, Faizah did not 

submit a response asking us to exercise our discretion to decide 

this moot appeal on the merits. Additionally, Faizah’s appeal 

does not present circumstances that generally warrant 

discretionary review of a moot case, such as an issue of broad 

public interest that is likely to recur, the likelihood of a 

recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or a material 

question that remains for the court’s determination. (See In re 

D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.)

Further, this is not a case rendered moot “by the prompt 

compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent 

challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (In re D.P., 

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) Rather, the juvenile court restricted

Faizah’s custody and visitation rights because she failed to 

submit to drug testing and comply with court-ordered substance 

abuse and parenting programs and counseling. Denying merits 

review in this case would not “perversely incentivize 

noncompliance” with a juvenile court’s orders. (Ibid.)

Finally, the jurisdiction findings based on Faizah’s drug 

use are not sufficiently “egregious” or “stigmatizing” conduct

warranting exercise of our discretion to reach the merits of this 

moot case. While dependency jurisdiction by definition

necessarily involves conduct harmful to children, our assessment 
13

of severity or perniciousness is a relative analysis. We do not 

find the jurisdiction findings against Faizah to be based on 

particularly stigmatizing or pernicious conduct such that our 

concerns over not insulating erroneous and stigmatizing 

jurisdiction findings from review would prompt us to review the 

merits in light of all other factors. Therefore, on balance the 

factors the Supreme Court identified in In re D.P. do not warrant 

discretionary review of Faizah’s moot appeal.

We note that Faizah is not without a remedy. Under 

section 302, subdivision (d), she may seek modification of the exit 

orders if she can “demonstrate ‘there has been a significant 

change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order 

and modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.’” 

(In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 165, fn. 7.)

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot.

MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.