Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1605-JV-1032 | April 11, 2017 Page 1 of 10

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Corey L. Scott

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

C.J.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner.

April 11, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1605-JV-1032

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn A. 

Moores, Judge

The Honorable Gary Chavers, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1409-JD-2319

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] C.J. appeals from the juvenile court’s order modifying a dispositional decree 

following his adjudication as a delinquent child for battery, as a Class A 
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misdemeanor when committed by an adult. C.J. presents a single issue for our 

review, namely, whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it placed 

him with the Department of Correction (“DOC”). However, because C.J. has 

been released from the DOC since he initiated this appeal, we dismiss the 

appeal as moot.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 18, 2014, then fourteen-year-old C.J. and three of his friends 

battered A.A. outside the entrance of a Family Dollar store in Indianapolis. 

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department officers arrested C.J., and, on 

October 9, after C.J. admitted the allegations in the State’s delinquency 

petition, the juvenile court adjudicated him a delinquent for committing battery, 

as a Class A misdemeanor when committed by an adult (“JD-2319”). At the 

dispositional hearing on November 6, the juvenile court placed C.J. on 

probation.

[3] In the meantime, on October 22, the State filed a delinquency petition against 

C.J. alleging that he committed what would be armed robbery, as a Level 3 

felony if committed by an adult; battery, as a Level 5 felony if committed by an 

adult; criminal recklessness, as a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult; 

dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an 

adult; carrying a handgun without a license, as a Class A misdemeanor if 

committed by an adult; and resisting law enforcement, as a Class A 

misdemeanor if committed by an adult. On November 6, C.J. admitted to 

having committed what would be armed robbery, as a Level 3 felony if 
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committed by an adult, and dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A 

misdemeanor if committed by an adult. The State dismissed the other charges. 

The juvenile court entered true findings and placed C.J. on probation with 

suspended commitment to the DOC (“JD-2566”). The court also ordered C.J. 

to participate in the “Cross System Care Coordination program” and placed 

him at Transitions Academy. Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 94.

[4] After spending five months at Transitions Academy, shortly after his release

C.J. was arrested for an incident that “involved a gun[.]” Tr. at 37. The State 

filed a delinquency petition, but it ultimately dismissed the charges stemming 

from that incident.

[5] Following two failed drug screens, the State filed its fourth petition to modify 

disposition requesting that the juvenile court place C.J. in the DOC. Following 

a hearing on that petition, on April 14, 2016, the juvenile court issued its 

dispositional order stating in relevant part as follows:

IV. ORDERS.

A. Respondent is awarded to the Guardianship of the Indiana 

Department of Correction for housing in any correctional facility 

for children until the age of 21, unless sooner released by the 

Department of Correction. The respondent is detained pending 

transfer. The Court recommends the respondent be committed 

for a period of 12 months. The Court recommends the 

respondent complete drug/alcohol counseling, complete [a] 

counseling program and complete a Vocational and/or GED 

program.

* * *
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C. This disposition is consistent with the safety and best 

interest of the child and is the least restrictive and most 

appropriate setting available close to the parent(s)’ home, least 

interferes with the family’s autonomy, is least disruptive of family 

life, imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and 

the child’s parent, guardian or custodian; and provides a 

reasonable opportunity for participation by the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian.

V. REASONABLE EFFORTS. Title IV-E and Statutory (IC 

31-34-5-2) Findings:

The Court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to be 

removed from the home environment and remaining in the home 

would be contrary to the welfare of the child because:

• of the allegations admitted

• the allegations listed in the petition

• the nature of the probable cause affidavit

• the child has received numerous services with this court

• Respondent is on a suspended commitment to the 

Department of Correction for Armed Robbery, Dangerous 

Possession of a Handgun[,] and Battery.

Respondent was in placement at Transitions from December 

2014 until June 2015. Since being released from Transitions 

respondent has had four separate petitions to modify filed of 

which two were found true. Respondent has had numerous 

community[-]based services with Cross System Care.

Respondent has had positive drug screens including a December 

2015 positive test for cocaine.

Dr. Danielle Nance conducted an updated psychological 

evaluation on [C.J.] on March 7th[,] 2016. Dr. Nance concluded 

that [C.J.] has a diagnostic impression of conduct disorder, 

substance abuse, and anxiety disorder. Dr. Nance noted that 
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[C.J.]’s “behaviors are concerning” and he “continues to present 

with a propensity to act in antisocial ways.” Dr. Nance added 

that [C.J.] is “impulsive[/]aggressive and shows a disregard for 

his own and others[’] safety.” Dr. Nance recommended 

residential treatment.

The respondent scored as a high risk on his most recent IYAS 

tools.

The Court finds that reasonable efforts were made by Marion 

County Probation Department to prevent or eliminate the need 

for removal of the child. The statements of reasonable efforts as 

set forth in the pleadings, reports, and documents of Marion 

County Probation Department and/or all other service providers 

filed herein are incorporated by reference.

The Court finds responsibility for the placement and care of the 

child is ordered or continues to be ordered to the Department of 

Correction.

Appellant’s App. at 23-26. On April 18, C.J. filed an emergency motion to stay 

commitment to the DOC and for reconsideration of the dispositional order, 

which the juvenile court denied. This appeal ensued.1

[6] C.J. was released from the DOC in October 2016. On February 22, 2017, we 

issued an Order to Show Cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as

moot. In his verified response, C.J. alleged that, due to possible negative 

 

1

 We note that the parties include cause numbers for both JD-2319 and JD-2566 in the captions for their 

briefs on appeal. The juvenile court’s order from which C.J. appeals, however, lists only the cause number 

for JD-2319. We also note that, while C.J. filed his notice of appeal on May 10, 2016, due to delays in the 

trial court and various defects, the case was not fully briefed until February 16, 2017.
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collateral consequences he would face as a result of the DOC placement, his 

appeal was not moot.

Discussion and Decision

[7] C.J. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it awarded 

wardship over him to the DOC. But we do not reach the merits of C.J.’s appeal 

because the issue is moot. “Mootness arises when the primary issue within the 

case ‘has been ended or settled, or in some manner disposed of, so as to render 

it unnecessary to decide the question involved.’” S.C. v. S.B. (In re M.B.), 51 

N.E.3d 230, 233 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 

1991)). In other words, “[w]hen a court is unable to render effective relief to a 

party, the case is deemed moot and usually dismissed.” J.M. v. Ne. Ctr., Inc. (In 

re J.M.), 62 N.E.3d 1208, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Here, because the DOC 

released C.J. in October 2016, we cannot render effective relief to C.J., and the 

appeal is moot. Id. Indeed, in the context of sentencing an adult after a 

conviction, our supreme court has stated that, “[o]nce ‘sentence has been 

served, the issue of the validity of the sentence is rendered moot.’” Lee v. State, 

816 N.E.2d 35, 40 n.2 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Irwin v. State, 744 N.E.2d 565, 568 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).

[8] Still, “Indiana courts have long recognized that a case may be decided on its 

merits under an exception to the general rule when the case involves questions 

of ‘great public interest.’” In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 37. Cases found to fall 

within the public interest exception typically contain issues likely to recur. Id. 
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For instance, in In re Lawrance, the issue presented on appeal was “whether the 

parents of a patient in a persistent vegetative state may authorize the 

withdrawal of artificially provided nutrition and hydration from their nevercompetent daughter.” Id. at 34. Our supreme court addressed the merits of the 

appeal because, “irrespective of the death of the patient in this litigation, many 

Indiana citizens, health care professionals, and health care institutions expect to 

face the same legal questions in the future.” Id. at 37. In addition, this court 

has consistently held that the “question of how persons subject to involuntary 

commitment are treated by our trial courts is one of great importance to 

society.” In re J.B., 766 N.E.2d 795, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Accordingly, we 

routinely consider the merits of appeals brought by persons alleging insufficient 

evidence to support involuntary commitments. See, e.g., In re J.M., 62 N.E.3d at 

1208.

[9] Here, we cannot say that the issue of C.J.’s placement with the DOC involves a 

question of great public interest.2Indeed, in response to this court’s order to 

 

2

 We note that this court has addressed the merits of juveniles’ appeals of short-term detention orders while 

citing the “great public interest” exception to the mootness doctrine. See, e.g., W.R.S. v. State, 759 N.E.2d 

1121, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); B.L. v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). However, in 

each of those cases, the ultimate reason given for addressing the otherwise-moot appeal was “because the 

issues [were] likely [to] arise again but w[ould] evade appellate review[.]” See, e.g., W.R.S., 759 N.E.2d at 

1123 (citing A.D., 736 N.E.2d at 1276, and B.L., 688 N.E.2d at 1312 n.1). Our supreme court has rejected 

this court’s reliance on the “likely to evade review” element in deciding whether to resolve a moot case on 

the merits under the great public interest exception. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 37 n.2. Moreover, the 

issues raised in W.R.S. and B.L. involved alleged statutory violations, or issues that were likely to recur if not 

resolved by an appellate court. In contrast, here, C.J. alleges that the juvenile court abused its discretion 

when it placed him with DOC. There is already Indiana case law providing guidance on this issue, and we 

need not apply the great public interest exception to the mootness doctrine here. See, e.g., D.P. v. State, 783 

N.E.2d 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
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show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot, C.J. made no 

contention that this appeal concerns a question of great public interest. Rather, 

C.J. asserted that we should exercise our discretion to hear the appeal only 

because “‘leaving the judgment undisturbed might lead to negative collateral 

consequences.’” Appellant’s Response to Show Cause Order at 2 (quoting 

Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)) (emphasis added). In 

other words, C.J. argues that his appeal is not moot.

[10] In support of that contention, C.J. maintains that “[a]warding wardship of a 

juvenile to the DOC has several collateral consequences.” Id. In particular, 

C.J. asserts that the DOC placement: would give “an inaccurate impression to 

a potential future juvenile judge” and “invites the State to argue at any future 

dispositional hearings that only DOC placement would be appropriate”; could 

be used as an aggravating factor in a future delinquency case; could be 

considered as a factor in determining whether C.J. is “beyond rehabilitation 

under the juvenile justice system” in order to waive him into adult court in the 

event of a future delinquency proceeding; and could be considered as an 

aggravating factor if C.J. finds himself charged with a crime as an adult in the 

future. Id. at 3-4.

[11] In J.B. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (In re S.D.), 2 N.E.3d 1283 (Ind. 

2014), our supreme court addressed the merits of a mother’s appeal of a CHINS 

determination despite the fact that the child had since been returned to the 

mother’s custody and the CHINS case closed. The court held that the appeal 

was not moot because of the negative collateral consequences to mother as a 
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result of a prior CHINS determination, namely, the statutory grounds for 

“relax[ing]” the State’s burden for terminating parental rights; “adverse job 

consequences[,] . . . such as precluding Mother from employment with any 

DCS contractor”; and disqualification from becoming a foster parent. Id. at 

1290. The court supported each of the listed consequences with citations to

Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 and DCS websites.

[12] In contrast to the concrete and supported examples of collateral consequences 

listed in J.B., C.J.’s alleged collateral consequences are either not supported by 

the law or are speculative. First, C.J. cannot show that his commitment to 

DOC makes a future commitment more likely because this court has explicitly 

rejected a juvenile court’s reliance on a “presumption of recommitment” under 

such a circumstance. See E.L. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)

(rejecting “as counter to the court’s duty” the alleged “unwritten policy adhered 

to in the Marion County Juvenile Court, in which juvenile offenders who have 

previously been committed to the Department of Correction are recommitted 

upon a subsequent offense”). Second, C.J. can only speculate that a prior DOC 

placement “could be used” as an aggravating factor in a future juvenile

adjudication. Appellant’s Response to Show Cause Order at 3. C.J. does not 

explain how, in the event of a future juvenile adjudication, the fact of a prior 

DOC placement would be a substantial aggravating factor when compared to 

other existing aggravators, such as probation violations and prior true findings.

[13] Third, with respect to possible waiver into adult court, if such a circumstance 

were to someday come to pass, it would be the result of C.J. having at some 
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future time committed what would be a felony if committed by an adult. C.J.’s 

assertions regarding the potential impact of a prior DOC commitment in the 

sentencing of such a case is thus speculation. Finally, in the event of a future 

conviction as an adult, C.J. does not explain how a prior juvenile commitment 

to DOC would necessarily or even likely be considered a significant aggravator 

apart from other failed placements, past violations of probation, criminal 

history, and the underlying juvenile adjudication or criminal conviction on 

which he would be sentenced. In sum, we are not persuaded that the collateral 

consequences alleged by C.J. justify our review of the merits of his appeal.

[14] C.J. has been released from the DOC, and, were we to review the merits of this 

appeal, we would be unable to grant C.J. the relief he requests if we agreed with 

his arguments. As such, his appeal is moot, and C.J. does not allege that this 

appeal presents a question of great public interest to justify consideration of the 

merits of his appeal. We reject C.J.’s contentions that his appeal is not moot in 

light of possible negative collateral consequences. We dismiss his appeal as 

moot.

[15] Dismissed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.