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AVIATION SAFETY: PILOT FATIGUE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, 

SAFETY, AND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 1, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

BRUCE H. ANDREWS, General Counsel 

ANN BEGEMAN, Acting Republican Staff Director 

BRIAN M. HENDRICKS, Republican Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota, 

Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina, Ranking 

Member 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on December 1, 2009 ........................................................................ 1 

Statement of Senator Dorgan ................................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 5 

Statement of Senator LeMieux ............................................................................... 27 

Statement of Senator Klobuchar ............................................................................ 30 

Statement of Senator Snowe ................................................................................... 32 

WITNESSES

Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration .............................................................................................. 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Basil J. Barimo, Vice President, Operations and Safety, Air Transport Association of America, Inc. ........................................................................................ 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Captain John Prater, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International ...... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 

William R. Voss, President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation ........................ 19 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20 

APPENDIX

Cargo Airline Association, prepared statement .................................................... 45 

Ronald N. Priddy, President, National Air Carrier Association (NACA), prepared statement ................................................................................................... 46 

Captain Paul Onorato, President, Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 47 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV to: 

Margaret Gilligan ............................................................................................. 49 

William R. Voss ................................................................................................ 49 

(1) 

AVIATION SAFETY: PILOT FATIGUE 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND

SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L. Dorgan, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA 

Senator DORGAN. We’re going to call the hearing to order. 

This is a hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Aviation. My colleagues will be joining me shortly, 

but I want to begin on time. 

The discussion today is on the subject of pilot fatigue. Now, let 

me describe my concern about this issue, and the concern of a number of my colleagues. The issue of pilot fatigue is not new. It has 

been on the National Transportation Safety Board’s most-wanted 

list for 19 years, since the list was created. Pilot fatigue has consistently been an issue with the NTSB and the FAA. The current 

flight rules, I believe, have been in existence—with respect to duty 

time and so on, have been in existence for some 40 or 50 years 

without much change. The NTSB investigations have found that 

pilot fatigue was either the probable or the contributory cause of 

20 air carrier accidents in the U.S., and has caused 273 fatalities 

between 1989 and 2008. So, this is not some issue without substantial consequence. 

The NTSB’s outstanding pilot-fatigue-related safety recommendation calls on the FAA to revise the flight- and duty-time limitations 

to take into consideration research findings on fatigue and sleep 

issues. 

While the FAA also limits the amount of flight and duty time a 

pilot may work in a day—and these—as I said, these limits have 

existed for decades—commuting time, which is an increasing phenomenon in recent decades, is not factored into this requirement at 

all. And I’ll talk just for a moment about that today. 

The stories that we have heard are fairly frightening. And I want 

to say, from the outset, my goal today is not to alarm the flying 

public, far from it. We have the safest skies in the world, in my 

judgment. But, the issue of pilot fatigue is serious and merits attention. While the skies are safe, they are not perfect. And the— 

2 

two events that focused more recent attention on pilot fatigue— 

there was a Minneapolis overflight recently, an incident last month 

that has sparked much comment on how two pilots could have 

overflown their destination by 150 miles. There was speculation 

that perhaps the pilots were asleep. The pilots indicated that they 

were working on electronic devices. No one, I guess, quite knows 

all of those answers at the moment. 

The second is, the tragic crash of Colgan Air flight 3407. We’ve 

held a couple of hearings that have discussed that at some length. 

The NTSB is still conducting its investigation into that tragic accident, and has yet to issue a report on the cause of the accident. 

But, we do know that both pilots commuted from across the country earlier that day, one from Florida and one from Seattle, to 

reach their duty stations in Newark. 

What I want to do is go through a few charts, if I might. And 

let me begin on the front side of this, with the first chart, talking 

about crew rest. These are just some things that most of you and 

I have heard and seen on investigative reports and official reports. 

This happens to be a Wall Street Journal article about fatigue. Tom 

Wychor, an 18-year veteran pilot, describing the routine of commuter flights with short layovers in the middle of the night, says, 

‘‘Take a shower, brush your teeth, pretend you slept.’’ ‘‘Take a 

shower, brush your teeth, pretend you slept.’’ 

Well, I don’t know Mr. Wychor, but that kind of comment by 

somebody in the cockpit makes you question the issue of fatigue 

and whether we have done all that is necessary to make certain 

that fatigue is not a contributing factor to problems in the cockpit. 

Another pilot—and again, pilots, of course, are not in a position 

to be able to speak very effectively or very candidly about these 

things. This is an anonymous pilot of a 737 jet flying to Denver. 

NBC News was quoting the pilot, when discussing fatigue. The 

quote is, ‘‘I have been doing everything in my power to stay 

awake—coffee, gum, candy. But, as we entered one of the most critVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:59 Jul 08, 2010 Jkt 054497 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\54497.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE

1201DORG3.eps
3 

ical phases of flight, I had been up for 20 straight hours.’’ Fatigue 

in the cockpit by that pilot? Perhaps. 

New York Times report on fatigue, ‘‘By the time Captain Paul 

Nietz parked his aircraft at the last gate of the night, he was exhausted, but he would be due back to work 8 hours and 15 minutes 

later.’’ Quote ‘‘At the very most,’’ he said, ‘‘if you’re the kind of person that could walk into a hotel room, strip, and lay down, you 

might get 4 and a half hours of sleep.’’ Fatigue? Seems to me, probably so. And I happened to have heard this sort of thing from a 

lot of pilots coming in late at night to an airport, and by the time— 

on a late flight—flying around, weather, and so on—by the time 

they get to their hotel and get some rest and are required to report 

back, the question of fatigue is a very real and a very serious question. 


1201DORG4.eps 1201DORG5.eps
4 

I also wanted to discuss, just for a moment, the issue of commuting. I’ve showed this chart once before. This was the Colgan Air 

chart, Colgan Air pilots commuting to the Newark base. And this 

is a different issue than duty time, but you can see pilots commuting all across the country to the duty base. In this case, the 

tragedy that occurred in Buffalo, New York, the person flying in 

the right seat commuted all night long from Seattle, Washington, 

to Newark. 

The next chart shows part of the product of commuting. This is 

a Washington Post report, ‘‘A pilot watches a movie on his computer at a crash house in Sterling Park, Virginia. The houses, 

which can have up to 20 to 24 occupants at a time, are designed 

to give flight crews from regional airlines a quiet place to sleep 

near their base airports. Many can’t afford hotels, so they use the 

crash house, where rent is generally $200 a month for a bed.’’ 


1201DORG2.eps 1201DORG6.eps
5 

Incidentally, on this issue, I ran into a pilot, about 2 weeks ago 

at an airport, a very young pilot, who told me that he had just 

started his career, but was now quitting. And I said, ‘‘Why?’’ And 

he said, ‘‘Because I’m going to work for a city’s police department, 

and my salary will be twice as much as my salary flying the commuter jet.’’ And it relates to this question of, Why can’t someone 

afford a hotel and, instead, uses crash pads as a part of their commuting across the country—in many cases, across the country—in 

order to reach their duty station? 

The FAA announced earlier this year that they are going to revise the flight- and duty-time rules. So, I’m glad they’re here today 

to tell us about that work. The FAA Administrator Babbitt has said 

the agency plans to issue those new rules by the end of next year. 

And, given the history on this issue, I think it’s important that 

they complete that work that was begun by soliciting the recommendations of an Aviation Rulemaking Committee. Another 

false start, and there have been several, would really, in my judgment, be unacceptable. 

I hope this hearing will bring some renewed focus to the issue 

of pilot fatigue, flight- and duty-time rules, and also, the issue of 

commuting. And I hope that we can take steps to remove fatigue 

as a factor in aviation safety. 

As I indicated when I started, there have been a fair number of 

accidents that the NTSB attributes to fatigue. With respect to commercial airlines, in my judgment, there’s no room for fatigue in the 

cockpit. We need to have duty times, flight times and crew rest periods that are sufficient so that we are not running into that problem. 

Let me make one additional point. Some will make the case, I 

think, today—and perhaps in questions and answers we’ll explore 

it more—there’s a change in the way we fly in this country. A lot 

of smaller planes, smaller commercial airplanes, regional commuter 

planes that are up and down, up and down, up and down all day 

long. And the take-offs and the landings are the period where pilots, of course, are straining and—I should—‘‘straining’’ is not the 

right word—but paying a great deal of attention. There’s no room 

for mistakes on take-offs and landings. And so, there’s a lot of tension in the cockpit and a lot of attention paid to the way that airplane is being flown. And so, that also creates fatigue. And I think 

this hearing can be a catalyst, and hopefully will be helpful to the 

FAA and the NTSB, in trying once again to put all the spotlights 

on the same spot when it comes to this issue of fatigue in the cockpit. 

Mr. Lautenberg, let me call on you for a couple-of-minutes opening statement and then we’ll begin with the witnesses. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

When we look at the details behind the questions that are being 

raised here now, it borders being shocking. Too much is demanded 

of our pilots. Too many hours on too little sleep, and operating complex machines with peoples’ lives in their hands. The slightest tip 

in this risky balancing act can cause a disaster, as we saw on the 

6 

Colgan flight number 3407. And I heard the Chairman’s review of 

that matter and the stress that was on the copilot, and it’s unfair 

to the individual. It certainly was disastrous for all of them, including the pilots, but the full airplane of travelers. 

And in this holiday season, planes are packed. The last thing a 

traveling family wants to worry about is a sleepy pilot. It’s an invitation to disaster. 

Now, we have a great system. And it has been safe. But, I think 

we’re nibbling at the margins and that just the courage, the response of a lot of well meaning people, has averted some significant 

miscues. And whether it was over the Hudson River, where two 

planes collided; one landed in the river—no area—and this is turning, for a moment, away from the pilots—but, turning to the rules 

that the FAA lays down for pilot training. You wouldn’t ask a brain 

surgeon to go—to take care of your need if he was up 8 hours doing 

surgery someplace else. And it’s inappropriate with the system, 

with the value that we have, in our aviation system, that we 

should ask pilots, who make, in many cases, barely above the minimum wage. The national minimum wage is $15,000 a year. They 

have pilots who are going to work—$20,000 a year. The incident 

that you talked about, Mr. Chairman, with the fellow going to the 

police—to a police uniform because he was going to make that—so 

much more money. A private in the Army, makes $16,800 a year— 

private in the Army. And here we’re asking someone who has a 

substantial amount of training in order to get as far as they do to 

get a commercial pilots license, and we’re discarding what is fair 

and appropriate to keep that person in the best of condition. Athletes don’t go out on the field without being ready to do it, or 

should not. And we see consequences of those incidents occurring. 

So, Mr. Chairman, it’s the right thing to do. And we—— 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Lautenberg—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I thank you for holding this hearing. 

Senator DORGAN. Well, Senator Lautenberg, thank you for your 

attention to all these aviation issues. As we’ve held hearings, 

you’ve constantly come to these hearings and been very active, and 

I know that you’ve spent a lot of time on them. I appreciate that. 

Let me appreciate the witnesses being here. 

We are joined by Ms. Peggy Gilligan, the Associate Administrator 

for Aviation Safety at the FAA; Mr. Basil Barimo, the Vice President of Operations and Safety, the Air Transport Association; Captain John Prater, President of Air Line Pilots Association; and Mr. 

William Voss, President and CEO of Flight Safety Foundation. 

I—let me, as I call on Ms. Gilligan, say, in response to what Senator Lautenberg said, we should not have to learn the same lesson 

twice, or three or four or five times. We’ve been through this, this 

is—you know like Groundhog’s Day—we’ve had discussion after 

discussion after discussion about fatigue. And they—the same has 

been true with the NTSB. And having it on the Most Wanted List 

for some 19 years is unacceptable. And I appreciate the fact that 

Administrator Babbitt is now in the process of taking action. We’re 

going to hear that from Ms. Gilligan. But, this has to be a catalyst—this hearing has to be a catalyst for insisting at last—at long, 

long last, after some 40 years or so—that we take a hard look at 

this and make the changes that are necessary. 

7 

Ms. Gilligan. 

STATEMENT OF MARGARET GILLIGAN, 

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Thank you, sir. Chairman Dorgan and Senator 

DeMint, members of the Subcommittee, I’m pleased to be here 

today to discuss the FAA’s efforts to mitigate pilot fatigue. 

As you know, the agency has been involved in revising the current regulations on flight and duty time for some time. And we are 

all frustrated by the amount of time we’ve spent. But, I can tell you 

that this time our efforts are different. 

Administrator Babbitt, himself a former commercial airline pilot, 

has made this a high priority issue for the FAA. In June, he chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee, comprised of labor, industry, and FAA representatives, to develop recommendations for 

a rule based on the current science of fatigue and a review of international approaches to this issue. 

The ARC was chartered to provide a forum for the U.S. aviation 

community to discuss the current science of fatigue, to discuss approaches to mitigating fatigue found in international examples, and 

to make recommendations to the FAA so that the United States 

could modify its regulations. The 18 members of the ARC, representing airlines and union associations, were selected based on 

their extensive, direct operational experience and their commitment to address this safety risk. The ARC met for over 6 weeks, 

beginning July 7, and on September 10, the ARC delivered its final 

report to the FAA. 

The Administrator has committed to issue a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking early in 2010. But, this effort is a difficult and complicated effort, and it has taken longer than any of us wanted or 

expected. The events of the last 15 years are evidence of the complexity of the issue and the strong concerns of all the parties involved. Those concerns are clear in the current rulemaking process, 

as well. At the same time, our focused efforts since June demonstrates the high priority that Administrator Babbitt places on 

overcoming these challenges and updating these regulations to enhance safety. While we will need additional time to complete our 

analysis and make sure that we get it right this time, I am confident we will get there. 

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, members of the Committee, 

this concludes my remarks, and I would be happy to answer questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gilligan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARGARET GILLIGAN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR

AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) efforts to mitigate pilot fatigue. Administrator Babbitt, himself a 

former commercial airline pilot, has made this a high-priority issue for the agency. 

The FAA has always been a leader in advancing measures targeted at preventing 

or mitigating pilot fatigue through our sponsored research, dissemination of training 

and educational materials, and, most significantly, through our regulatory requirements. We believe that it is critical, whenever possible, to incorporate scientific inVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:59 Jul 08, 2010 Jkt 054497 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\54497.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
8 

formation on fatigue and human sleep physiology into regulations on flight crew 

scheduling. Such scientific information can help to maintain the safety margin and 

promote optimum crew performance and alertness during flight operations. Our 

task is to translate that knowledge to the operational environmental in a sound and 

practical way. The complexity of our current pilot flight and rest regulations, with 

varying standards for a number of categories of aviation operations, developed 

through the years as the aviation industry grew, adopted more advanced technology, 

and employed diverse operational strategies. 

Preventing and mitigating the effects of fatigue is a shared responsibility that 

brings shared benefits in terms of increased safety, better working conditions and 

greater operational efficiencies. We at the FAA take our responsibility very seriously 

for investigating any threat to safety in the aviation system and establishing the 

regulatory framework to enhance the public’s safety. To that end, we are engaged 

in an effort to revise and update our rules on pilot flight and rest, which I will describe in more detail below. At the same time, carriers have the responsibility to 

conduct their operations at the highest level of safety. That includes adopting appropriate scheduling practices that provide the pilot a clearly identified opportunity to 

rest. And, finally, pilots have the responsibility to take advantage of the opportunity 

for rest and report for their assignments well rested and ready for duty. We know 

that in the vast majority of cases, carriers and pilots act in a professional manner 

and take this shared responsibility seriously. We have a common goal to ensure that 

all aviation operations are conducted safely. 

Current Regulations 

Current regulations place varying limits on the amount of time that a flight crewmember can fly (i.e. per day, week, month, quarter, and year), and require that a 

pilot be afforded a period of rest, free from obligation to the employer. Flight time 

limitations are based on the type of operation. For example, under current Part 121 

rules, pilots in a two-pilot crew, on domestic flights, can generally fly up to 8 hours 

per day. Their workday can extend up to 16 hours, including time on the ground 

between flights. In addition, there are no restrictions on flying during the middle 

of the night or making numerous takeoffs and landings. In addition to daily limitations, these flight crewmembers are limited to 30 flight hours in any 7 consecutive 

days. 

Flight crewmembers engaged in part 121 flag operations (international passenger 

flights), are limited to 32 flight hours in any 7 days. Part 121 supplemental operations (typically cargo, on-demand or charter operations) have no 7 consecutive day 

limitations. Flight crewmembers serving in part 121 domestic or flag operations are 

limited to 100 hours per calendar month while flight crewmembers serving in supplemental operations are limited to 100 flight hours in any 30 consecutive days. 

These differing regulations for different types of operations are inconsistent and 

complex, and can be easily misunderstood, especially when a pilot can be assigned 

to different types of operations. The different rules developed over time, as the aviation industry changed and expanded. While such variance in the rules may have 

been justified when they were first adopted, these differences may no longer be valid 

in today’s operational environment. Our rulemaking will address this. 

Current rules also require that a pilot be afforded an adequate rest period. The 

‘‘crew rest’’ elements of the regulation are designed to mitigate cumulative and 

acute fatigue, primarily through limitations on flight hours and defined hours of 

rest relative to flight hours. For example, the regulation for domestic operations outlines: 

• No more than 30 flight hours in any 7 consecutive days. 

• At least 24 hours of consecutive rest during any 7 consecutive days. 

• Varying rest requirements relative to hours flown in any 24-hour period. 

The rule also defines rest period activities and prohibitions, and provides provisions for circumstances under which flight time limitations can be exceeded, such 

as in adverse weather operations. As of late 2000, an FAA legal interpretation clarified that a pilot crew member, flying under domestic flight rules, must ‘‘look back’’ 

24 hours and find 8 hours of uninterrupted rest before beginning any flight segment. 

Pilots also have a regulatory responsibility to not fly when they are not fit, including being fatigued. Thus, while the carrier schedules and manages pilots within 

these limitations and requirements, the pilot has the responsibility to rest during 

the periods provided by the regulations. The FAA has long held that it is the responsibility of both the operator and the flight crewmember to prevent fatigue, not 

only by following the regulations, but also by acting intelligently and conscientiously 

while serving the traveling public. This means taking into consideration weather 

9 

conditions, air traffic, health of each flight crewmember, or any other circumstances 

(personal problems, etc.) that might affect the flight crewmember’s alertness or 

judgment on a particular flight. 

FAA Actions 

The FAA has initiated a number of fatigue mitigation efforts in recent years: 

1995 Proposal for Pilots: In 1995, the FAA proposed a rule to change flight time 

and rest limits. The agency received more than 2,000 comments from the aviation community and the public. Most of those comments did not favor the rule 

as proposed, and there was no clear consensus on what the final rule should 

say. The FAA recently withdrew this proposed rule because it will be superseded by the current rulemaking effort described below. 

1998 ARAC: In July 1998, the FAA Administrator asked the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to work with the industry to reach a consensus and develop a new proposal. If no consensus could be reached, the FAA 

would continue to enforce the current regulations. In February 1999, ARAC reported that there was no consensus in the aviation community. The group offered five different proposals to update the flight and rest regulations. 

1999 Federal Register Notice: In response to concerns raised by the pilot community, the FAA Administrator notified the aviation community on June 15, 

1999, that it had 6 months to ensure that it was in full compliance with the 

agency’s current flight time and rest requirements. Reviews of airline scheduling practices conducted in December 1999, and discussions with pilot unions 

and airlines confirmed that the vast majority of pilots were receiving the 

amount of rest required by the FAA’s rule. 

2000 FAA letter: On November 20, 2000, the FAA responded to a letter from 

the Allied Pilots Association that set forth specific scenarios that could affect 

a very small number of all commercial pilots. The FAA’s response, known as 

the ‘‘Whitlow Letter,’’ was consistent with the agency’s long-standing interpretation of the current rules. In summary, the FAA reiterated that each flight crewmember must have a minimum of 8 hours of rest in any 24-hour period that 

includes flight time. The scheduled flight time must be calculated using the actual conditions on the day of departure regardless of whether the length of the 

flight is longer or shorter than the originally scheduled flight time. 

2001 Federal Register Notice: The FAA published a notice in the Federal Register on May 17, 2001, to reiterate its long-standing interpretation of its pilot 

flight time and rest rules. The notice informed airlines and flight crewmembers 

of the FAA’s intent to enforce its rules in accordance with the Whitlow letter 

interpretation. Each flight crewmember must have a minimum of 8 hours of 

rest in any 24-hour period that includes flight time. That calculation must be 

based on the actual conditions on the day of departure regardless of whether 

the length of the flight is longer or shorter than the originally scheduled flight 

time. The FAA did not anticipate that the notice would result in major disruptions to airline schedules. It stated that, beginning in November 2001, the FAA 

would review airline flight scheduling practices and deal stringently with violations that came to light. 

2001 ATA/RAA Request: The FAA denied requests made on June 12, 2001, on 

behalf of the Air Transport Association (ATA) and Regional Airline Association 

(RAA) to stay all agency action regarding the November 20, 2000, Whitlow letter of interpretation and the May 17, 2001, Federal Register notice of the FAA’s 

enforcement policy regarding pilot flight time and rest. The FAA’s letter and 

Federal Register notice were consistent with the agency’s long-standing interpretation of the current rules. The documents were consistent with the statutory mandate to issue rules governing the maximum hours or periods of service, 

the use of plain language in regulations and the regulatory history of the rules. 

ATA subsequently petitioned for review of the Whitlow letter and the enforcement policy. 

On Sept. 5, 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia granted 

a motion by the ATA to stay the May 17, 2001, Federal Register notice. On May 

31, 2002, the court denied ATA’s petition for review, ruling in favor of the FAA. 

As a result, the FAA has continued to enforce the current regulations consistent 

with the Whitlow letter. 

2008 FAA Fatigue Symposium: In June 2008, the FAA sponsored the Fatigue 

Symposium: Partnerships for Solutions to encourage the aviation community to 

proactively address aviation fatigue management issues. Participants included 

the National Transportation Safety Board, the Institutes for Behavior ReVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:59 Jul 08, 2010 Jkt 054497 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\54497.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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sources, Inc., and many of the world’s leading authorities on sleep and human 

performance. The symposium provided attendees with the most current information on fatigue physiology, management, and mitigation alternatives; perspectives from aviation industry experts and scientists on fatigue management; 

and information on the latest fatigue mitigation initiatives and best practices. 

Ultra Long-Range Flights: In 2006, the FAA worked with Delta Air Lines to develop and approve fatigue mitigation for flights between John F. Kennedy International Airport and Mumbai, India. The flights were operated for more than 

16 hours with four pilots provided that the airline followed an FAA-approved 

plan to manage rest and mitigate the risk posed by fatigue. The mitigation, approved as an Operations Specification issued to Delta Air Lines, was specific for 

that city pair. Although that specific route is no longer flown by Delta, the FAA 

viewed Delta’s fatigue mitigation strategy as a model program. 

As a result of Delta’s efforts, the FAA proposed in November 2008, to amend 

Delta, American, and Continental’s Operations Specifications to incorporate fatigue 

mitigation plans for their ultra long-range flights. Based on comments received from 

the three air carriers, the FAA withdrew the proposed amendments on March 12, 

2009. The FAA is currently working with airlines to gather data that will help the 

agency enhance the safety requirements for ultra long-range flights. The agency believes that it is in the best interest of passenger and crew safety for airlines to use 

an FAA-approved fatigue mitigation program to reduce the risk of pilot fatigue. 

Rulemaking Underway 

In June 2009, the FAA chartered the Flight and Duty Time Limitations and Rest 

Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) comprised of labor, industry, 

and FAA representatives to develop recommendations for an FAA rule based on current fatigue science and a thorough review of international approaches to the issue. 

The ARC was chartered to provide a forum for the U.S. aviation community to discuss current approaches to mitigate fatigue found in international standards and 

make recommendations on how the United States should modify its regulations. The 

ARC consisted of 18 members representing airline and labor associations. The members were selected based on their extensive certificate holder management and/or 

direct operational experience. 

Specifically, the FAA asked the ARC to consider and address the following: 

1. A single approach to addressing fatigue that consolidates and replaces existing regulatory requirements for Parts 121 and 135. 

2. Generally accepted principles of human physiology, performance, and alertness based on the body of fatigue science. 

3. Information on sources of aviation fatigue. 

4. Current approaches to address fatigue mitigation strategies in international 

standards. 

5. The incorporation of fatigue risk management systems (FRMS) into a rulemaking. An FRMS is a data-driven process and systematic method to monitor 

and manage safety risks associated with fatigue-related error. 

The ARC met over a 6-week period beginning July 7, 2009. Early on, the FAA 

told the ARC members that it was very interested in the ARC’s recommendations, 

but that the agency retained the authority and obligation to evaluate any proposals 

and independently determine how best to amend the existing regulations. The agency reiterated that participation on the ARC in no way precluded them from submitting comments critical of the NPRM when it was published. On September 10, 2009, 

the ARC delivered its final report to the FAA. 

We cannot discuss further particulars of the FAA’s rulemaking efforts at this 

time, however, we are working as quickly as possible to complete a draft Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).I will readily acknowledge that this effort has been 

difficult, and has taken us longer than we wanted or expected. The events of the 

last 15 years evidence the complexity of the issue and the strong concerns of the 

parties involved, and those are clear in the current rulemaking as well. At the same 

time, our focused effort since June demonstrates the high priority that Administrator Babbitt and I, along with the rest of the FAA team, place on overcoming 

these challenges and updating these regulations to enhance safety. I am confident 

we will get there. 

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, members of the Subcommittee, this concludes 

my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might 

have. 

11 

Senator DORGAN. Ms. Gilligan, we will have a lot of questions, 

so I appreciate your being here and your testimony. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Basil—is it ‘‘Barreemo’’? 

Mr. BARIMO. Yes, that’s correct. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Basil Barimo, Vice President of Operations 

and Safety, Air Transport Association. You may proceed. 

Let me say, to all four of you, that your entire statements will 

be made a part of the permanent record and you may summarize. 

STATEMENT OF BASIL J. BARIMO, 

VICE PRESIDENT, OPERATIONS AND SAFETY, 

AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. 

Mr. BARIMO. Thank you. Good morning. I am Basil Barimo, Vice 

President of Operations and Safety of the Air Transport Association of America. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the 

opportunity to join you this morning as you consider the impact of 

pilot fatigue on aviation safety. This important subject demands a 

collaborative, thorough, and science-based response. 

ATA participated in the ARC that Ms. Gilligan mentioned. It was 

a productive effort, but we must all recognize that the ARC operated under significant time constraints. It wrapped up its work in 

a 6-week period. Consequently, we may expand upon the views 

that we expressed in the ARC and that I’ll outline this morning. 

We support a duty-day regulation designed to account for fatigue 

risks, including circadian cycles, time awake, time on task, and acclimation to time zones. Our goal is to mitigate fatigue risk by reducing the duty time of pilots, expanding scheduled rest opportunities to ensure adequate rest, and increasing pilots’ awareness of fatigue risk in their personal role in mitigating that risk. As in other 

aviation safety efforts, success here will depend on data-driven 

analyses and rigor in translating those analyses into regulatory action. 

The recommendations that we, in conjunction with the Cargo 

Airline Association and the Regional Airline Association, provided 

to the ARC were divided into substantive and procedural considerations. 

We had five substantive issues: 

First, we recommended that any new regulation establish a minimum of 10 hours scheduled rest, before the beginning of a flight 

period, at a domestic station and 12 hours at an international station. And we went on to suggest that additional detailed rest requirements were appropriate for certain international flights. 

Second, any new regulation should require each air carrier to 

adopt an FAA-approved fatigue mitigation program. An advisory 

circular could provide guidance in the necessary flexibility to update fatigue mitigation programs as we gain experience. 

Third, we urge that any new regulation account for the wide variety of operational environments, just as the current regulation 

does. These include domestic and international passenger operations, as well as cargo operations, and on-demand charter operations. Science-based principles, judiciously blended with decades 

12 

of operational experience, will allow the various air carrier models 

to continue to operate safely. 

Fourth, there also needs to be a focus on the individual in the 

regulations. Regulatory language should clearly prescribe the responsibility of the crew member to properly prepare him- or herself 

for flight. No fatigue policy, without such an admonition, can be regarded as comprehensive. 

And fifth, the FAA should endorse controlled cockpit napping, 

conducted in accordance with FAA-approved procedures, to facilitate alertness during the critical phases of flight. Previous NASA 

research has shown, overwhelmingly, that controlled napping significantly mitigates fatigue risk. 

On the procedural side, we had three issues: 

We’re particularly concerned about the ultimate scope of any proposed regulation. Extraneous consideration should not burden our 

efforts to improve aviation safety. A rulemaking proceeding is not 

the forum in which to resolve collective-bargaining issues. 

Second, we are also concerned about the effect of proposed duty 

and rest regulations on managers, who are also qualified as line pilots. If time spent on administrative duties, such as checking email or making a phone call, count as duty, we risk losing linequalified pilot managers. These pilot managers have played an essential role in safe airline operations, and the consequence of this 

rule on those management positions must be carefully considered. 

And finally, as with any major regulatory change, covered parties 

will need time to implement new policies requiring programming 

and training. That is particularly so here, where crew schedules 

will be impacted. We therefore ask that FAA provide a transition 

period of at least 2 years after the regulation is published. 

ATA members are committed to using the best science available, 

combined with proven operational experience, to better manage 

pilot fatigue. We look forward to working with the Committee, the 

FAA, and other stakeholders in this endeavor. 

That concludes my statement, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barimo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BASIL J. BARIMO, VICE PRESIDENT, 

OPERATIONS AND SAFETY, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. 

The Air Transport Association of America appreciates this opportunity to discuss 

pilot duty time and fatigue management issues with the Subcommittee. This important subject demands a collaborative, thorough and science-based response. 

ATA participated in the FAA Flight and Duty Time Limitations and Rest Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (‘‘the ARC’’). That was a productive effort 

but we all must recognize that the ARC operated under significant time constraints. 

In any future rulemaking proceeding, consequently, we may expand upon the views 

that we expressed in the ARC and that are outlined below. 

We support a duty-day regulation designed to account for fatigue risks, including 

circadian cycles, time awake, time on task and acclimation to time zones. Our goal 

is to mitigate fatigue risk by: 

• reducing the duty time of pilots, 

• expanding scheduled rest opportunities to ensure adequate rest, and 

• increasing pilots’ awareness of fatigue risk and their personal role in mitigating 

that risk. 

As in other aviation-safety undertakings, success here will depend on data-driven 

analyses and rigor in translating those analyses into regulatory action. 

13 

The recommendations that we, in conjunction with the Cargo Airline Association 

and the Regional Airline Association, provided to the ARC were divided into substantive and procedural considerations. 

Substantive Issues 

With respect to substantive issues, we recommended that any new regulation establish a minimum of 10 hours of scheduled rest before the beginning of a flightduty period at a domestic station and 12 hours of scheduled rest at an international 

station, with the possibility of a reduction of 1 hour in actual operations. We suggested additional, detailed rest requirements for certain international flights. 

Any new regulation should require each air carrier to adopt an FAA-approved fatigue mitigation program documenting its mitigation policies and training. Detailed 

means of compliance should be provided in an accompanying FAA-issued Advisory 

Circular. Use of an AC will provide the necessary flexibility to update airline fatigue 

mitigation programs as we build on future experience. 

Different air carrier operational environments must be recognized. These include 

domestic and international passenger operations, domestic and international cargo 

operations, and on-demand (nonscheduled) charter operations. We strongly urge 

that any new regulation account for the wide variety of operations, just as it does 

today. Nothing in fatigue and sleep research justifies a one-size-fits-all approach. 

Science-based principles, judiciously blended with many years of operational experience, will allow the various air carrier models to continue to operate safely. 

There also needs to be a focus on the individual in the regulations. Regulatory 

language should clearly prescribe the responsibility of the crew member to properly 

prepare himself for a flight. No fatigue policy without such an admonition can be 

regarded as comprehensive. Such language will also help address the pilot commuting issue. 

The FAA should also endorse controlled cockpit napping conducted in accordance 

with FAA-approved procedures to facilitate alertness during the critical phases of 

flight. Previous NASA research provides overwhelming evidence that controlled napping significantly mitigates fatigue risk. We must act on that evidence. 

Procedural Issues 

We are particularly concerned about the ultimate scope of any proposed regulation. Extraneous considerations should not burden our efforts to improve safety. In 

particular, a rulemaking proceeding is not the forum in which to resolve collective 

bargaining issues. 

We are also concerned about the effect of proposed duty and rest regulations on 

managers, who are also qualified as line pilots. If time spent in administrative duties counts as ‘‘duty’’ for cumulative purposes, or if a management pilot cannot have 

the discretion to check e-mail or use the telephone during a scheduled rest period, 

the possible result could be the end of line-qualified pilot managers, chief pilots or 

directors of operations. Since the beginning of commercial aviation, these pilot managers have played an essential role in safe airline operations, and the consequence 

of this rule on those management positions must be carefully considered. We recognize, of course, the need for appropriate rest prior to flight. This might be more appropriate for inclusion in a fatigue mitigation advisory circular. 

Finally, as in any major regulatory change, covered parties will need time implement new policies requiring programming and training. That is particularly so here 

where crew schedules will be affected. We, therefore, ask that the FAA provide a 

transition period of at least 2 years after the final regulation is published. 

Conclusion 

ATA members are committed to using the best science available combined with 

proven operational experience to improve pilot duty time and fatigue management. 

We look forward to working with the Committee, the FAA and other stakeholders 

in this important endeavor. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Barimo, thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony. 

Captain Prater—I think I called you Captain ‘‘Pratter.’’ I didn’t 

mean that—Captain Prater, welcome. You may proceed. 

14 

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT, 

AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL 

Mr. PRATER. Thank you. Chairman Dorgan, Ranking Member 

DeMint, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for having us 

here today to represent the views of the more than 53,000 members 

of the Air Line Pilots Association, International. 

Pilot fatigue has loomed as a safety issue for our unions since it 

was founded in 1931. During the difficult years following 9/11, 

these long standing concerns have intensified with bankruptcy, 

concessionary contracts, and the layoff of thousands of pilots, forcing many of those who are still working to fly longer hours and 

more grueling schedules. It is a dire situation that I have experienced in my own cockpit. 

Just one example from several years back: Flying on the backside 

of a 5-day trip that took me from Newark to Japan and back to 

Newark, my copilot and I were so fatigued from crossing and recrossing numerous time zones that we were barely able to stay 

awake to make a predawn landing during a stop in Honolulu. At 

that time, I was in command of a 767 with over 240 passengers onboard. While this segment was legal to fly with only two pilots because it was a few minutes short of the 8-hour limit, it would have 

been far safer had we had the third pilot to augment the crew, as 

had been the case for every other leg of that specific trip. That 

would have allowed both me and my first officer to catch a couplehour nap in the cabin. 

Current U.S. flight- and duty-time rules date from 1954, when 

the DC–3 was the state-of-the-art. Times and equipment have 

changed, but the rules have not. Since 1989, the National Transportation Safety Board has issued more than 70 fatigue-related 

safety recommendations. Few would deny that modern, sciencebased regulations are urgently needed. 

From our view from inside the cockpit, a rule must be grounded 

on three basic tenets. One, it must be based on science. Two, it 

must apply equally to all flight operations. No exceptions, no carveouts, no loop holes for air cargo or charter operations. Three, a new 

rule must allow and encourage air carriers to implement fatigue 

risk management systems, known as FRMS. 

During the past 60 years, scientists’ understanding of sleep, fatigue, and human performance has grown significantly. Several recent studies have focused directly on aviation fatigue. This science, 

gained through field and simulator studies, confirms that current 

rules can lead to fatigue that impairs pilot performance. The 190- 

nation International Civil Aviation Organization, or ICAO, has 

mandated that flight limitation rules be based on scientific principles to ensure that flight crew members are well rested and alert. 

The United States is compelled to comply with this international 

standard. But, unfortunately, we don’t, because the FAA current 

rules are not science-based. 

Second, one level of safety in flight- and duty-time regulations is 

absolutely essential. The current FAA flight-time limit for passenger-carrying pilots is 30 hours in 7 days for domestic operations 

and 32 hours in 7 days for international flights. But, air cargo pilots can fly up to 48 hours in a 6-day period, or 60 percent more 

than domestic passenger-carrying pilots. No science exists to supVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:59 Jul 08, 2010 Jkt 054497 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\54497.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
15 

port multiple sets of flight-time/duty-time limits. No rational argument can be made for different fatigue rules for pilots based on 

whether they fly passengers or cargo, domestic or international. 

ALPA maintains that uniform rules are indispensable if our industry is to truly address pilot fatigue. Exceptions or carve-outs would 

kill long overdue efforts to ensure all pilots are well rested. Worse, 

carve-outs would undermine the one level of safety principle that 

must remain our ultimate goal. 

Finally, the new regulation must enable carriers to transition to 

a fatigue risk management system, a collaborative, nonpunitive environment, where management and flight crews work together to 

ensure that crew members operate alertly and safely under all circumstances. It is also imperative that the FAA require air carriers 

to implement fatigue education and training programs for their 

crews, their managers, and their schedulers. 

I’m very encouraged that we finally appear to be on the verge of 

securing the modern, science-based flight- and duty-time rules that 

we know are vital to enhancing aviation safety. ALPA will continue 

to do all we can to carry on this momentum. Seven ALPA pilots, 

representing all aspects of our industry, worked on the FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking Committee. In October, our executive board 

unanimously approved new policy that reflects our values of science 

and the one level of safety for all. And it ensures our vision for ensuring pilots are well rested. 

We look forward to evaluating the FAA’s proposed rule, and we 

applaud efforts to create a final rule by mid-next-year. The current 

regulatory framework is a fabric-and-wire biplane struggling to 

stay aloft in a supersonic age. I ask for your help in giving the flying public a new consistent level of safety by ensuring that every 

pilot in the United States starts every trip alert and rested. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prater follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am Captain John Prater, 

President of the Air Line Pilots Association, International (‘‘ALPA’’) which represents 53,000 professional pilots at 36 airlines in the United States and Canada. 

ALPA appreciates this opportunity to discuss pilot fatigue because we know that 

it is a significant flight safety issue. Pilot fatigue is as important to flight safety 

as metal fatigue, wiring insulation fatigue and other component fatigue. 

The FAA has a statutory responsibility to prescribe minimum standards to prevent all fatigue that impacts safety. While the agency has been responsive to other 

types of fatigue, the FAA has not yet fulfilled its responsibility regarding pilot fatigue. 

Pilot fatigue has been a major issue for ALPA since it was founded in 1931 and 

it has been particularly onerous during the difficult years since 9/11. 

The financial crisis in the airline industry has brought bankruptcies and concessionary contracts which have resulted in pilots being required to fly up to the 

legal limits without receiving adequate rest. We receive daily reports of scheduling 

that causes pilots to be virtual ‘‘zombies.’’ The domestic flight and duty rules were 

last amended in 1985 with the promise that the FAA would revisit these rules in 

2 years. Twenty-five years later we are still waiting to review them. 

The current rules for International and Supplemental Operations were promulgated in 1954 when the DC–3 aircraft was state-of-the-art. At that time, it was not 

uncommon to carry a radio operator and mechanic on the aircraft. Today, the Airbus 

380 airplane carries 600+ passengers 8,200 miles at a speed of 560 miles per hour. 

Times and equipment have changed but the flight and duty time rules have not. 

They were not designed to address our modern environment and equipment. 

16 

The National Transportation Safety Board issued three recommendations to the 

DOT in 1989 following several accidents involving operator fatigue: 

1. Expedite a coordinated research program on the effects of fatigue, sleepiness, 

sleep disorders, and circadian factors on transportation system safety. 

2. Develop and disseminate educational material for transportation industry 

personnel and management regarding shift work, work and rest schedules, and 

proper regimes of health, diet, and rest. 

3. Review and upgrade regulations governing hours of service for all transportation modes to assure that they are consistent and that they incorporate the 

results of the latest research on fatigue and sleep issues. 

Since 1989, the Safety Board has issued more than 70 fatigue-related safety recommendations which were the result of major accident investigations, special investigations, or safety studies that identified operator fatigue as a factor. This includes 

more than 15 significant accident reports or studies concerning aviation operations 

conducted under Parts 91, 121 and 135 (see table). 

Listing of Selected Fatigue-related aviation investigations and studies conducted by the National 

Transportation Safety Board since May 1989 

Location of accident or topic of the study that 

identified fatigue-related issues Accident Date NTSB Report Number 

Aviation 

Accident investigation: 

Molokai, Hawaii 10/28/89 AAR–90–05.

Brunswick, Georgia 04/05/91 AAR–92–03.

Pine Bluff, Arkansas 04/29/93 AAR–94/01/SUM.

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba* 08/18/93 AAR–94–04.

Kansas City, Missouri* 02/16/95 AAR–95–06.

Cheyenne, Wyoming 04/11/96 AAR–97–02.

Everglades, Florida 05/11/96 AAR–97–06.

Little Rock, Arkansas 06/01/99 AAR–99–60.

Nimitz Hill, Guam 08/06/97 AAR–00–01.

Tallahassee, FL* 07/26/02 AAR–04–02.

San Diego, CA 10/24/04 AAB–06–05.

Kirksville, MO 10/19/04 AAR–06–01.

Cleveland, OH 02/18/07 AAR–08–01.

Travers City, MI 04/12/07 AAR–08–02.

Clarence Center, NY (Colgan 3407) 02/12/09 Open (NTSB Preliminary ID No. 

DCA09MA027).

Special Investigation: 

Commercial space launch incident, 

Cape Canaveral, Florida 08/17/93 SIR–93–02.

Safety study: Report Date 

Flight crew-involved accidents 02/03/94 SS–94–01.

Commuter airline safety 11/30/94 SS–94–02.

Aviation safety in Alaska 12/01/95 SS–95–03.

*Air Cargo accident. 

In addition to the accident reports indicated above, the Board acknowledged that 

fatigue can result in degraded performance in flight crews and that disruption of 

the sleep/rest cycle may have played a role in the Air Transport International 

(Swanton, OH) DC–8 cargo crash on February 15, 1992 (AAR–92–05). 

17 

The Board has not made distinctions between reforms needed for the rules applicable to passenger and all-cargo operations in its reports and recommendations to 

the FAA; rather the Board has recognized that the effect of fatigue is the same 

whether a pilot is carrying cargo or passengers, or operating a scheduled or nonscheduled flight. Fatigue is an equal opportunity killer. 

Pilot fatigue has been on the Safety Board’s list of Most Wanted Transportation 

Safety Improvements since the list’s inception in 1990. Other, more specific, recommendations have followed. The Board’s current Most Wanted List (August 2009) 

specifies the following objective to reduce accidents and incidents caused by human 

fatigue in the aviation industry: Set working hour limits for flight crews based on 

fatigue research, circadian rhythms, and sleep and rest requirements. 

I believe that there is universal agreement that there is an urgent need for modern flight time regulations. 

This brings us to ‘‘what should a modern flight time regulation prescribe?’’ There 

are three basic principles for a new rule. One, it must be based on science. Two, 

it must apply equally to all operations: domestic, international and supplemental. 

There is no basis for any ‘‘carveouts’’ for air cargo or charter operations. Three, it 

must include the ability for air carriers to transition to a Fatigue Risk Management 

System, or FRMS. 

First, let me address the science. 

There is a large body of sleep science available and there are several recent aviation fatigue studies. Over the past 60 years, scientific knowledge about sleep, sleep 

disorders, circadian physiology, fatigue, sleepiness/alertness, and performance 

decrements has grown significantly. Some of this scientific knowledge, gained 

through field and simulator studies, confirms that aviators experience performanceimpairing fatigue from sleep loss resulting from current flight and duty practices. 

There are also several fatigue models available. These models can analyze a schedule and predict whether the pilot will have an adequate level of alertness to fly the 

schedule. 

The International Civil Aviation Organization, (‘‘ICAO’’), a United Nations organization, has 190 member countries including the United States. Its role is to establish standards for the safe operation of civil aircraft throughout the world. ICAO has 

mandated that flight limitation rules be based on science and they have recently 

implemented a new standard for flight time rules which states in part: 

‘‘For the purpose of managing fatigue, the State of the Operator shall establish 

regulations specifying the limitations applicable to the flight time, flight duty 

periods, duty periods and rest periods for flight crew members. These regulations shall be based upon scientific principles and knowledge, where available, 

with the aim of ensuring that flight crew members are performing at an adequate level of alertness.’’ 

The United States is bound to comply with this standard. Our current rules are 

simply not based on science and therefore do not comply with the ICAO standard. 

Second, I will address the need to have one level of safety in flight time limitation 

regulations. Scheduled passenger, all-cargo and charter air carrier operations are no 

different when it comes to the actual operation of the aircraft. All three types of operations use the same aircraft, the same airspace, and the same airports in the 

same cities. As such, there is no rational basis for cargo or charter pilots to have 

different or more liberal fatigue rules than scheduled passenger operations. 

Domestic pilots who carry passengers under FAR Part 121 have a flight time 

maximum of 30 hours in 7 days, while International (Flag) passenger-carrying pilots 

are allowed up to 32 hours in the same 7 days under the current FAA regulations. 

These current ‘‘flight time’’ limits only account for the time pilots spend actually operating the airplane. The current flight time limits do not account for the time pilots 

spend in pre-flight and post-flight duties, the time spent at airports between flights, 

the time spent going through security or traveling to and from the airport to hotels, 

or the time spent in training and other ground-based duties. Even with the existing 

30- and 32-hour weekly ‘‘flying time’’ limits applicable to pilots carrying passengers, 

there is widespread acknowledgement of the existence of serious pilot fatigue problems throughout the industry and widespread acknowledgement that reform of the 

rules based on modern scientific principles is long overdue. On the other hand, charter and air cargo pilots flying under today’s supplemental rules can fly 48 hours in 

a six-day period or 60 percent more than domestic passenger-carrying pilots. We believe that these supplemental rules significantly reduce available safety margins 

and put all-cargo and charter operation crewmembers, passengers and persons on 

the ground at risk. A uniform modernization of the flight time/duty time rules including harmonized rules for the cargo industry is long overdue, and needed to enhance safety. 

18 

1 ALPA’s White Paper on Fatigue Risk Management Systems (2008) may be found here: 

http://public.alpa.org/portals/alpa/pressroom/inthecockpit/FatigueRiskMSWPl6–2008.pdf. 2 ALPA’s current guidelines for a scientifically-based flight limitation regulation may be found 

here: http://public.alpa.org/FTDTFightingFatigue/tabid/3370/Default.aspx. 3http://public.alpa.org/portals/alpa/fatigue/MagazineInsert10–2008lFatigueGuide.pdf. 

Third, any new regulation dealing with pilot fatigue should provide a method for 

carriers to transition to a FRMS. This is the gold standard of pilot fatigue management to ensure that pilots have an adequate level of alertness. Ideally it would be 

a part of a Safety Management System, or SMS. However, FRMS can operate independently of a SMS. 

The purpose of a FRMS is to ensure that flight crew members are sufficiently 

alert so that they can operate to a satisfactory level of performance and safety under 

all circumstances. 

A FRMS supplements prescribed flight and duty-time regulations and competent, 

independent scientific research-based software scheduling tools by applying safety 

management principles and processes to proactively and continuously manage fatigue risks through a partnership approach which requires shared responsibility 

among management and crew members. FRMS can, therefore, only operate in circumstances where all stakeholders—particularly the pilots—support the operation 

of FRMS. Accordingly, an open reporting system and non-punitive working environment is a prerequisite for FRMS because honest and accurate crew feedback is an 

essential component of the program. A FRMS must specify the prescriptive regulatory scheme upon which it is based. In the event of suspension, termination or 

revocation of a FRMS, the carrier’s affected operations shall revert to the baseline 

prescriptive scheme.1

Over the last 3 years, ALPA’s Flight Time/Duty Time Committee has developed 

guidelines for a flight limitation regulation that have a rational, scientific foundation and also incorporate years of operational experience. These guidelines are harmonized with ICAO and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association 

and deal with seven major areas: duty limits, including block-hour limits, rest requirements, extension of duty in irregular operations, cumulative fatigue, augmentation rules that consider the quality of the on-board rest facility, reserve rest requirements and rules for implementing a FRMS.2

These guidelines represent ALPA’s views as to the minimum requirements a regulation must have to insure an adequate level of pilot alertness. 

ALPA also believes that it is important that the FAA require air carriers to implement a fatigue education and training program for flight crew members. Such a program should include, at a minimum, information on the detrimental effects of fatigue and strategies for avoiding and countering fatigue. ALPA has implemented its 

own fatigue training program and we have published and distributed to our members The Airline Pilots Guide to Fighting Fatigue.3

In closing, I would like to say that I am encouraged that it appears we will finally 

get new flight limitation rules. As you know, FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt, in 

June of this year chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (‘‘ARC’’) to develop 

a new flight time rule. ALPA along with other members of the industry participated 

in this process. In addition to having an ALPA pilot, Captain Don Wykoff, serve as 

a co-Chair, we had four members and two alternates serve on the Committee who 

fly for domestic, international, cargo and regional airlines. The ARC presented its 

report in early September to Administrator Babbitt. Mr. Babbitt has publicly stated 

that he will publish a NPRM on Flight Time by December 31, 2009. We expect a 

short comment period and hopefully a final rule by mid–2010. 

We badly need a new flight and duty-time regulation. While we have been told 

it will be done in mid–2010, we have seen too many times in the past that the FAA 

has not delivered on its promises with regard to pilot fatigue regulations. We respectfully solicit Congress’ active support in ensuring that this new regulation becomes a reality. 

Senator DORGAN. Captain Prater, thank you very much. We appreciate your being here. 

Mr. William R. Voss is the President and CEO of The Flight 

Safety Foundation in Alexandria, Virginia. 

Mr. Voss, welcome. 

19 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. VOSS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION 

Mr. VOSS. Thank you. Chairman Dorgan, Ranking Member 

DeMint, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank 

you for giving us an opportunity to testify. 

Fatigue in aviation has been in the headlines lately, but it has 

been scientifically researched for decades, as you’ve noted. In 1979, 

NASA first studied fatigue and decisionmaking in simulators. Decades of research have followed by institutions around the world. It 

has taken a long time and a lot of data for the industry to reach 

consensus on this issue, but the tragedy of the Colgan Air crash 

has pushed us along toward a conclusion. 

Regardless of how we got here, the Foundation supports the 

FAA’s current effort to develop rules that reflect a scientific understanding of fatigue. 

In writing these rules, the FAA is faced with a daunting task. 

Human fatigue is too complex to deal with just the classic approach 

of regulations and compliance. Ideally, we’d implement a comprehensive fatigue risk management system across the whole industry, but it’s unrealistic to think that every operator could adopt 

such an approach. So, the FAA will have to write traditional, prescriptive rules, while also allowing large operators to take a more 

comprehensive fatigue risk management approach. 

As a minimum, these prescriptive provisions should address the 

relationships between assigned duty and time of day, the cumulative effects of consecutive duty periods, and the effect of multiple 

short-haul flights. These provisions will not be perfect, but they 

will—and they will be a compromise; but, for smaller operators, 

they’ll be practical. And they will significantly improve the level of 

safety. 

Now, for those operators who are able, they should be encouraged to go beyond the basic rules and adopt the fatigue risk management system, or FRMS. FRMS addresses fatigue systematically. 

It increases the responsibility of the operator and its employees to 

jointly manage the risk. 

Broadly speaking, FRMS offers three layers of protection that include prevention, which is the proactive strategic risk reduction, 

such as scheduling correctly based on science; mitigation at the 

operational level, to make sure you execute the plan you’ve put in 

place and you have a realistic execution of that plan; and intervention, for when something goes wrong, you still need to have the 

ability to intervene and reduce the risk of a flight. No matter what 

you do, there will be times things don’t go right. 

That brings me to the subject of one of the more controversial 

interventions, and that’s the controlled cockpit rest or napping. No 

matter what rules are written, there will always be times when pilots become fatigued. When that happens, many countries have determined that safety is best served by allowing and regulating rest 

in the cockpit. Regulations ensure this is done safely, they specify 

what happens during the crew rest, who’s responsible for various 

actions, and a post-rest briefing. 

Of course, controlled rest cannot be used to replace responsible 

planning and scheduling. Every flight must begin with a well-restVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:59 Jul 08, 2010 Jkt 054497 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\54497.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
20 

ed crew. But, when things go wrong, controlled rest is an important 

tool to keep things safe. 

There are some other fatigue issues that deserve consideration. 

Even though much research has been done, there are still some 

gaps. More research is still needed in the area of high-frequency/ 

high-cycle operations. We understand the Regional Airline Association is willing to conduct studies in this area. The Foundation 

strongly supports those efforts and calls on the FAA to consider 

these findings in the proposed rules. 

We focus so much on the flight crew that we often overlook fatigue in the rest of the industry. Last year, the Foundation published a long article about the danger of fatigue among aviation 

maintenance workers. This has also been examined by ICAO, 

which has cited several accidents in which fatigue among maintenance workers has been a contributing factor. The Foundation 

strongly urges the FAA to consider maintenance personnel in future rules. 

Finally, a concerted effort should be made by the FAA, industry, 

and labor to educate the aviation safety workforce on matters associated with fatigue risk. Countless operators are in the process of 

developing fatigue training materials for their workforce. If we 

pooled these efforts, we could do much more, and do it quickly. Just 

as regulators, labor, and industry came together 20 years ago to 

deal with the problem of controlled flight into terrain, we can come 

together again to deal with this threat. The Flight Safety Foundation is working with the Regional Airline Association and others to 

make this happen. 

In summary, I’m gratified by the cooperation we’re seeing around 

this issue, and I’m optimistic that the FAA proposed rules will be 

scientifically-based and will include all the latest research and experience. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Voss follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. VOSS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and distinguished members of 

the Committee: My name is William Voss and I am the President and Chief Executive Officer of Flight Safety Foundation. 

Flight Safety Foundation is an independent, nonprofit, international organization 

engaged in research, auditing, education, advocacy, and publishing. Its mission is 

to pursue the continuous improvement of global aviation safety and the prevention 

of accidents. We have members all around the world representing every facet of the 

aviation industry. On behalf of the Foundation, I appreciate your providing me this 

opportunity to testify about the important issue of fatigue, our views of the Federal 

Aviation Administration’s (FAA) potential recommendations, and other recommendations from the Foundation. 

The tragedy of the Colgan Air crash in Buffalo on Feb. 12, 2009, like so many 

other accidents, need not have happened. While we cannot bring back the victims 

of the Colgan Air crash, we can honor their lives by using the knowledge we gained 

during this investigation to revamp how we deal with fatigue management. We are 

pleased to see the FAA and industry—with management working well with labor— 

addressing this issue as a high priority, and pledging to apply the science we know 

to bring about very soon practical and needed reforms. 

My background in aviation is diverse. I’ve been a pilot, an air traffic controller, 

a certified aviation mechanic, and a regulator and standard-setter, both at the FAA 

and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). I know firsthand how the 

issue of fatigue can affect every aspect of this industry. We all know that fatigue 

21 

affects our performance, but normally our own drowsiness or lack of sleep does not 

have catastrophic consequences. 

Fatigue Risk Management Systems—The Preferred Approach 

To cut to the chase, we recommend that civil aviation authorities immediately 

adopt effective fatigue risk management systems (FRMS). FRMS is a proactive approach to addressing fatigue in a systematic, comprehensive manner that does not 

rely solely on adherence to a set of prescribed hourly limits of duty and required 

time off. Instead, it decreases the role of the regulator and increases the responsibility of the operator and its employees to jointly manage the risk. In its broadest 

interpretation, FRMS takes a systematic, three-pronged, incremental approach to 

managing fatigue risk: 

• Prevention—This fundamental first step can be characterized as proactive strategic risk prevention. It includes such measures as scientifically defensible 

scheduling, suitable hotels for sleep, crew augmentation, and education and 

training about sleep hygiene and fatigue. We believe that this step should also 

include medical identification and treatment of sleep disorders, such as sleep 

apnea, which are known to increase with aging; however, the FAA’s annual 

medical examination for air transport pilots (FAA Form 8500–8; Application 

Process and Examination Techniques) has no requirement to identify possible 

sleep disorders. 

• Mitigation—This second step encompasses risk mitigation at the operational 

level. It includes such measures as responsible trip planning, including pre-trip 

rest and commuting if necessary, crew rest facilities (both at the airport and 

in flight for augmented crews), meal planning, anticipation of irregular operational events, and crew resource management (CRM) training that addresses 

fatigue effects on crew performance. 

• Intervention—This final step recognizes the inevitable fact that crews sometimes experience significant fatigue despite their and the operator’s best efforts 

to prevent it. It includes those actions that can be invoked to manage the risk 

until the flight is safely concluded. This intervention can include tailored procedural guidelines, enhanced CRM, timely intake of caffeine, and controlled rest 

on the flight deck. 

An FRMS’s comprehensive range of safeguards is designed to control the risk associated with both transient and cumulative fatigue. FRMS is data-driven, monitoring situations in which fatigue risk occurs and in which safety may be jeopardized. It then allows for generating new scheduling solutions or other strategies to 

mitigate measured fatigue risk. At the same time, FRMS provides operators with 

flexibility to seek the most efficient safe crewing solutions to meet operational 

needs. 

An FRMS enhances the capability of prescriptive flight-time limitation concepts 

to provide an equivalent or enhanced level of safety based on the identification and 

management of fatigue risk relevant to the specific circumstances. Use of an FRMS 

can allow greater operational flexibility and efficiency while maintaining safety by 

relying on in-flight measurements of sleep and alertness, including subjective reports by crewmembers, to monitor how scheduling affects flight crew and cabin crew 

alertness during flight duty. 

Fatigue Management—Abundant Study, Not Enough Action 

Flight Safety Foundation has worked on this issue for many years, including creating the Ultra-Long Range (ULR) Crew Alertness Steering Committee, which in 

2005 published guidance for conducting flights that last 16 hours or more, and the 

Fatigue Countermeasures Task Force, which created the Principles and Guidelines 

for Duty and Rest Scheduling in Corporate and Business Aviation in 1997. In addition to these task forces, Flight Safety Foundation has written about the issue of 

fatigue extensively in our publication, AeroSafety World, as well as in older Foundation publications. 

The problem of fatigue in aviation has been highlighted in the headlines over the 

past year, but it is an issue that has been the target of decades of scientific research. In 1979, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) undertook the first study to examine the effects of fatigue on decisionmaking in an aircraft simulator. Shortly after that, Congress directed NASA to undertake a multiyear study to understand the impact of crew fatigue and jet lag. This led to a collaborative study with laboratories in the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of 

Germany, and Japan and produced some outstanding results. 

22 

Federal Aviation Administration Actions 

We are supportive of FAA efforts to establish new rules that reflect a much better 

scientific understanding of fatigue. With the announcement on November 24, 2009 

of the withdrawal of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking from 1995, we anticipate 

that new rules will be proposed soon. The industry and regulators have been studying fatigue for many years, and there has been gradual progress in finding a consensus. In writing this new rule, the FAA is faced with a daunting task. Quite simply, 

human fatigue is too complex a subject to be dealt with using the classic approach 

of regulations and compliance. To deal with the problem of fatigue risk effectively, 

it is necessary to implement a comprehensive fatigue risk management system. 

Many major operators will do this, but it is unrealistic to think that every operator 

is going to take such a sophisticated approach. For that reason, the FAA will have 

to write a rule that has imperfect, but improved, prescriptive provisions, but also 

encourages the use of fatigue risk management systems where appropriate. 

At a minimum, these prescriptive provisions within the new regulation should address the relationship between assigned duty and the time of day, the cumulative 

fatigue effects of consecutive duty periods, and the effect of multiple short flights 

during the duty day. These provisions will not be perfect, but for smaller operators, 

simplicity is more important than perfection. 

Another challenge the FAA will face is the fact that the fatigue research, while 

extensive, is somewhat uneven. A great deal of research has been done on the effects of ultra-long range flights, but relatively little research has been done into the 

fatiguing effect of frequent short flights. The FAA will have to find a way to put 

a regulation in place quickly, while allowing for adjustments as new information becomes available. 

Global Examples—Useful Examples 

Several airlines and civil aviation authorities have adopted FRMS. One of the 

first airlines was easyJet, which began the system as a research program to gather 

data on pilots’ sleep and fatigue-related performance. The research effort yielded revised work schedules, continuing data collection and more information on fatigue 

risks, a procedure for crewmembers to report fatigue within a just culture, and a 

process for investigating the role of fatigue in all incidents. This is a process that 

could be easily replicated and should be a part of any FAA proposed rulemaking. 

An FRMS is easily integrated into any safety management system (SMS). This 

is the approach taken by Transport Canada. An FRMS is one element of an SMS, 

while the just culture and non-punitive safety reporting that are called for in FRMS 

are integral parts of SMS. Flight Safety Foundation has publicly stated its support 

for Transport Canada’s embrace of safety management systems. 

Canada is one of many countries that have determined that safety is best served 

by allowing—and regulating—controlled napping in the cockpit. This is a position 

that Flight Safety Foundation heartily endorses and calls on the FAA to do the 

same. Of course, controlled napping must never take the place of a good night’s 

sleep and sensible, scientifically defensible scheduling. But on occasion, a pilot may 

unexpectedly feel extra-fatigued due to conditions out of his or her control. In that 

case, it is far safer to have a procedure in place to allow the fatigued pilot to sleep 

for a prescribed amount of time with the full knowledge of the co-pilot and the rest 

of the flight crew. The regulations developed by Canada outline a procedure that 

takes into account all possible variables and leads to safer operations. It includes 

requirements covering how napping shall be undertaken, what happens during crew 

rest, and who is responsible for various actions as well as a post-rest briefing. 

The idea of controlled rest in the United States is, unfortunately, colored by wellpublicized episodes of uncontrolled rest. We hope that the FAA will consider the 

science and the successful experiences in many other countries to guide them on 

this aspect of FRMS, rather than alarmist concerns from individuals who have not 

studied this issue. Many countries and airlines allow for controlled napping, including France, Australia, Singapore and Canada. The aviation safety records of those 

countries speak for themselves. 

The Foundation also urges the FAA to capitalize on its June 2008 fatigue management symposium and its ULR experience to further develop and implement FRMS 

on a trial basis within the context of current prescriptive flight-time limitations. As 

in other countries, close cooperation and support among airline management, pilot 

organizations and regulators will be critical to achieving success. In addition, since 

ICAO is the appropriate body to establish mutually acceptable worldwide standards 

and recommended practices for FRMS, the Foundation strongly encourages the 

FAA’s continued participation in and support of ICAO’s efforts to use FRMS as an 

alternative to flight- and duty-time limits. 

23 

Other Fatigue Issues 

We focus so much on the performance of pilots and possibly the rest of the flight 

crew, we often overlook the rest of the industry when we think about fatigue. Last 

year, AeroSafety World published a long article about the dangers of fatigue in aviation maintenance workers (April 2008). This has also been an issue examined by 

the ICAO, which cited several accidents in which fatigue on the part of maintenance 

workers was a contributing factor. 

North of our border, the Canadians are working on initiatives to incorporate 

FRMS for both flight crews and maintenance personnel as a mandatory portion of 

an operator’s SMS. Australia is also moving toward implementation of FRMS in 

aviation maintenance. 

Flight Safety Foundation strongly urges the FAA to include maintenance personnel in its proposed rules addressing fatigue. 

Another area that calls for more research is that of high-frequency/high-cycle operations. An eight-hour work day means two different things for the ultra-long 

range operator and the regional operator. Multiple take offs and landings over that 

time period can lead to a higher level of fatigue due to the higher work load activities. We understand the Regional Airline Association has committed to lead new 

studies to examine the relationship between these types of operations and fatigue. 

Flight Safety Foundation strongly supports those efforts and calls on the FAA to include these research findings in the proposed rules. Broadening the research into 

the short-haul flights is also a recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 

In addition to the recommendation on increased research on short-haul flights, the 

NTSB has issued recommendations that address the issue of undiagnosed sleep 

apnea and other sleep disorders. The FAA’s current guidance to aviation medical examiners does not include a discussion of risk factors for sleep apnea, nor does the 

application for an airman’s medical certificate ask if there is a history. According 

to the NTSB, other Federal agencies overseeing other forms of passenger transportation already gather this sort of information or are in the process of revising forms 

and guidance in order to do so. 

Finally, a concerted effort should be made by the FAA, industry and labor to educate the aviation safety workforce on matters associated with fatigue risk. This 

doesn’t require regulatory action, and would have a significant positive effect in the 

near term. We can start putting tools into the hands of those people who could make 

a difference, including managers, schedulers, pilots, flight attendants, maintenance 

technicians, and others. Countless operators are in the process of developing fatigue 

training materials for their work force. If we pooled these efforts, we could do much 

more, and do it quickly. Just as regulators, labor and industry came together 20 

years ago to deal with the problem of controlled flight into terrain, we can come together again to deal with this threat. The Flight Safety Foundation is working with 

the Regional Airline Association and others to try to make that happen. 

The United States should be leading the world on fatigue management as it has 

led the world on so many advances in aviation safety. Civil aviation authorities all 

around the world are using the research undertaken by NASA and ICAO to mitigate 

the risk that comes from a fatigued aviation work force. The time is now for the 

FAA, the operators, management, and labor to come together and develop a consensus on this vital issue. I’m personally gratified by the level of cooperation we are 

seeing and I’m hopeful that the FAA’s proposed rules will meet the challenges of 

being scientifically based and inclusive of all the latest research and experiences. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today. I would be pleased to 

answer any questions. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Voss, thank you very much. 

Let me begin with you. I think, what I heard you say was that 

there should be two different standards of regulations or processes 

dealing with fatigue, one for the larger carriers, which can do it 

more comprehensively, and then a separate approach for the smaller carriers. That would not be very comforting to a passenger that 

gets on an airplane that is not one of the larger carrier planes, because—seems to me fatigue is fatigue, no matter the size of the 

plane that—and that people in the cockpit that are flying it. If 

they’re fatigued, there are risks. So, expand on that. You’re telling 

us you think there ought to be two standards? 

Mr. VOSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

24 

Actually, to be very clear, what I’m trying to say is, is that regulations have to be written in a way that can be complied with. And 

sometimes you need straightforward rules, as I believe we will be 

able to put together through this regulatory process, to serve as the 

limit, as the safety net. However, there is still an opportunity, 

here, to go beyond the basics. We can ensure a strong level of safety, make a big improvement in the industry, but we need to pay 

attention to the fact that there are new processes out there, called 

fatigue risk management, which allow us to take the data we get 

from everyday operations and see where problems are developing 

and implement things that even go beyond the rules. 

And so, I’m saying that we need to put good rules in place. We 

need to also make provisions for us to grow beyond the rules that 

exist. 

Senator DORGAN. But, again—maybe, Captain Prater, you can 

respond to this—we have developed, in recent years, this system of 

the large trunk carriers and then the regional carriers. The regional carriers are a very important part of our system. They have 

one-half of the flights and carry one-fourth of the passengers every 

year. Let me say that again, one-half of the flights and one-fourth 

of the passengers are on regional carriers. They get on an airplane 

that has the markings, in many cases, of the large carriers, but it’s 

not the large carrier, it’s a regional carrier. And it seems to me 

that the question of fatigue is a question that is not separate by 

the size of the cockpit or the size of the airplane. 

Captain Prater, you described fatigue—you used the term, ‘‘dire’’. 

What’s your sense of whether there should be one standard or two 

or—as Mr. Voss suggests. And I understand why he suggests it. I 

have difficulty agreeing that we should move in that direction. He 

says it would be more difficult for the smaller regional carriers to 

comply to more comprehensive rules. 

Mr. PRATER. Well, let me begin with—I’ll restate. We believe that 

there should be one set of strong underlying regulation that creates 

the foundation, regardless of the size of airplane or the cargo behind the cockpit door. That would be the first. The second level, 

then, would say, How do we enforce that? And how—and I think 

maybe Bill was alluding to—how can we improve upon that level 

of foundation? But, the first foundation, the regulation should 

apply to all equally. It doesn’t matter whether you’ve got one passenger or 500 in the back of your airplane. 

The FRMS would allow us to look at specific situations. Just take 

one case, the ultra-long range. If I get into a 777 and go from Newark to Hong Kong, it’s going to be about 16-and-a-half hours. That 

exceeds the current regulation. But, with a FRMS, we could come 

up with the rules on how to conduct a specific flight like that. I 

think that’s where Bill’s trying to go. 

Senator DORGAN. Captain Prater, you said that the fatigue rules 

in the U.S. do not comply with the ICAO standards. What do you 

mean by that? 

Mr. PRATER. ICAO has called for the flight-time/duty-time rules 

to be science-based. Ours currently are not science-based. The future ones, when we get them done, as long as someone doesn’t try 

to delay this like they have the last several attempts, will be 

25 

science-based, which would bring us into compliance with the ICAO 

provisions. 

The last thing I would say on the first subject, sir, was the controlled napping. Again, napping should not be seen or viewed as 

somehow keeping pilots on duty even longer. In other words, I can 

hear the scheduler now, ‘‘Well, I’m pretty tired, I shouldn’t start 

this flight.’’ ‘‘Aw, don’t worry, you can catch a nap en route.’’ No, 

that’s not a sound strategy for being alert on the other end. You 

are, once in a while, going to be caught in a position where you 

need a nap, and you’ll coordinate it with your—with the other pilot. 

But, remember, at that point, there’s one pilot in the cockpit. Our 

system of safety is based upon redundancy after redundancy. And 

now you want to say, ‘‘Well, only one pilot has to be awake.’’ Well, 

I can tell you right away, trying to come up out of a nap to make 

a snap decision, or to make even a long-range decision, is difficult. 

It has to be well planned. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator DORGAN. Ms. Gilligan—— 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator DORGAN.—can you respond? What is the agency’s response to the difference between Mr. Barimo and Captain Prater 

on the one-size-fits-all approach with respect to fatigue? I think 

that the ATA argues that you don’t want one-size-fits-all. Captain 

Prater said, I think, that one-size-fits-all is—ought to be the minimum standard. What does the FAA say to that? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Well, sir, the ARC actually presented us a framework recommendation that has one approach. And I think what the 

science does indicate is that things that contribute to fatigue are 

common across individuals, across humans, and it has less to do, 

perhaps, with the environment. 

There are some environmental issues that need to be considered. 

You, yourself, mentioned multiple take-offs and landings is a little 

bit different environment than long—than the ultra-long-range 

flight, for example, that Captain Prater referred to. And the rules 

need to acknowledge that. 

So, the framework will be a common framework. But, I think 

what you’ll see in the proposal that the ARC put forward is a bit 

of a sliding scale that allows us to take into account the time of 

day that the schedule may encompass and the number of take-offs 

and landings it may encompass, so that we can properly balance 

the contributing factors to fatigue. 

Senator DORGAN. I’m going to call on Senator Lautenberg in a 

moment, but one final point. We will have Administrator Babbitt 

in front of us—I think it’s next week—— 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator DORGAN.—or the week after. Can you give us—give us 

the timeline on fatigue. You’re talking about the ARC and so on, 

but, as I said when I started, this goes back 40 or 50 years, and 

then two aborted attempts in the—— 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes. 

Senator DORGAN.—1990s to deal with this issue. What’s the 

timeline here? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Well, the Administrator had announced that we 

would have a final—a proposal out by the first of next year. UnforVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:59 Jul 08, 2010 Jkt 054497 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\54497.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
26 

tunately, we have run into some additional analysis. What the ARC 

provided was, as I said previously, a very good framework. But, 

they did not provide specific recommendations on particular elements of the rule. And we are now having to fill in the blanks and 

analyze the effect, based on recommendations that the ARC made, 

but, again, without their specific agreement on what particular 

hours ought to be included. 

Senator DORGAN. Are you saying the first of the year is a time 

deadline that has been sliding? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. We will, unfortunately, miss the first of next year. 

We have agreed with the Administrator that we will complete all 

of our analysis by the end of January. And then the rule will need 

to go through administration review. 

Senator DORGAN. All right. I’m going to ask a series of additional 

questions of you and others about this and—but I want to have my 

colleagues have the opportunity. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And I must say that what we’ve heard from our panel here today 

confirms the view, unanimously, that what it is now is not adequate, and that we have to make changes. And it’s—the rules are 

antiquated, based on where the system is today, the number of passengers that come, the different types of aircraft. 

And I would ask you this. Might we be looking at something 

more than just the fatigue factor? There’s a stress factor that, even 

if there’s adequate sleep, there are other things that are—that can 

interfere with clear thinking, not the least of which is income. 

Now—and I don’t know how we get this across, but there ought to 

be some standard. 

What are the requirements now for a commercial pilot’s license, 

Captain? 

Mr. PRATER. About 250 hours of flight time, instruction time in 

a single-engine airplane. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And how about—are there any other educational requirements? 

Mr. PRATER. There are no other educational requirements for 

even up to an airline transport pilot rating. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Are there any physical—what are the 

physical requirements that must accompany the application for a 

license? 

Mr. PRATER. There are solid physical requirements—basically, 

good health, correctable vision to 20/20. And most pilots, twice a 

year, have to meet those physical standards; once a year, if—I believe, if you’re under 35. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Forty. 

Mr. PRATER. Forty. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Are there any prohibitions about alcohol 

use in advance of taking command or getting into the pilot seat? 

Mr. PRATER. Yes, sir, very strict rules, both time-wise as well as 

blood alcohol content. Those—that’s not—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But, they’re not—the pilot isn’t—they 

don’t give a blood sample every time they go to—— 

Mr. PRATER. No, but we are subject to random events. And I will 

tell you that the—it’s a rule that pilots take very seriously, obviVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:59 Jul 08, 2010 Jkt 054497 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\54497.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
27 

ously. And some companies are—even have time limits that exceed 

the safety limits that the FAA has established. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes, because, with all of these things that 

do exist—and you get back to the starting pay for a pilot or copilot, 

second to you—when someone is in that seat, are they fully prepared, in your view, to take over command, if necessary? 

Mr. PRATER. That is one of the responsibilities of command, in 

fact, is to assess your fellow crew member. And whether or not it 

was as a—cite—you cite the concern of alcohol—most of us watch 

that very, very closely in each other. And I’m proud to say that we 

have very, very good success in recognizing those individuals that 

have a problem. And we have very good success—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, the problem is—that doesn’t suggest 

that that’s a long-time thing. It can be a single episode—— 

Mr. PRATER. Right. 

Senator LAUTENBERG.—but the point I get to here is that the requirements, if met even to the current standard, are pretty heavyduty things. But, still in all, we have these outrageous examples 

of pilots not responding to a radio inquiry. Should there be a list 

of infractions kept that says, if a pilot doesn’t answer a radio call 

in 5 minutes or 3 minutes or something like that, that that ought 

to be listed as an infraction and a record kept on that? 

Mr. PRATER. Sir, I think we would quickly determine that the 

airspace and flying an airplane is very complicated. And the fact 

is, there can be either missed radio calls or miscommunications, 

but we are very successful in trapping those errors, either using 

other airplanes, whether it’s monitoring the emergency frequency 

of 1215, we do catch those errors. And, in fact, we take it to the 

next level. When a professional makes an error, under the ASAP 

systems, you turn yourself in. You report yourself. To me, that’s 

the height of professionalism, because you want somebody else to 

not make that same error. And those are the systems that we are 

trying to protect, and they are working very well. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, when you hear a pilot say that, ‘‘We 

were distracted,’’ that’s not sufficient reason to fly for lots and lots 

of minutes, more than an hour—not quite—without responding to 

the—to a tower or a station along the way. It’s shocking. And there 

should be a rule that’s consistent with rapid response on radio 

calls. It is crowded up there, and equipment is moving more rapidly 

than it used to, so I think there are rules that have to be established that demand of the pilot certain behavioral things, so that 

the tower knows what’s going on and can respond. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Lemieux. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What we’ve heard today is pretty distressing about the lack of 

sleep by some of these folks who are flying our planes. I mean 

when someone walks onto a plane, onto an aircraft, you know that 

they are entrusting their life to you. And I think there’s a larger 

issue here about fatigue that goes beyond pilots. There is fatigue 

in society. And you only have to go to the back of the plane to see— 

28 

once the plane takes off, nearly everybody on a plane, these days, 

is asleep. I think because we’re all under increasing demands 

where—you know, we’re on our BlackBerries all the time, we’re 

staying up late with kids, we’re doing all the things that we have 

to do in life, and everybody’s tired. So, not only may you have DC– 

3 rules, you also live in a world where people are a lot more tired. 

I mean, I think the sleep studies show that America is one of the 

worst nations in the world for how much sleep the average American gets every night. 

So, I’m encouraged that you’re going to get these rules done, and 

hope that you will get them done, and get them done as soon as 

you possibly can, so that we have something that’s scientificallybased. 

I want to bring up three things that occurred to me as someone 

who’s just a frequent traveler on airplanes and, in Florida, have 

done a lot of these short-leg trips. On the Continental planes, 

which were very similar to that crash that occurred in Buffalo, 

there are a couple of things. One is, I see that folks who are on 

airline crews oftentimes now commute to their work—and I think 

this happened in Buffalo, where you had a Tampa-based pilot. 

We’re talking about being well-rested for the start of the flight, not 

just being able to say, ‘‘OK, I can take a nap when I’m on the 

plane,’’ if that’s the way the rule changes, but to be well-rested 

when the flight begins. How important is it that the crew member 

spend the night before they start on their leg, in their home, in 

their home bed? I mean it worries me that we are flying people 

from Tampa to Buffalo to go to work, and that that’s the first part 

of their segment, and then they’re going to actually start flying 

when they get to Buffalo or get to Atlanta. 

I experience this all the time, in talking to crewmembers, how 

many people don’t live in Atlanta, for example. You know, Delta 

has its base there. There are a lot of crewmembers who fly to Atlanta to go to work. You know, is this something that’s going to be 

addressed—the initial getting-to-work, commuting to your job, as a 

crewmember, which has to also increase the wear and tear on the 

crew member? So, I’d like to discuss that. 

The second thing I’d like to hear some comment on is, what 

availability for sleep rooms are there for pilots? How good are those 

sleep rooms? Is this something that’s being discussed as providing 

places where pilots can sleep in between flights? Something that’s 

not going to be a place where they’re sitting in a lounge where they 

are not going to really get good rest, but where they’d actually have 

an opportunity to get in a cot or a bed and get some real sleep between flights. 

And the third thing is, who’s in charge? My sense, and maybe it’s 

wrong, is that the pilot is in charge. Are there supervisors, that are 

at the airports, who are looking over these pilots before they get 

on the plane? Maybe other senior pilots—I don’t know how it 

works—who would say, you know, ‘‘Captain Prater’s too tired, he 

just came in from Hong Kong. He thinks he can go on this flight. 

I don’t think he can go on this flight. I’m going to tell Captain 

Prater has got to take some time off, because he’s not ready to 

make this flight.’’ Is there a chain-of-command that puts somebody 

in charge at the airports to make these decisions? 

29 

So, traveling to destinations, sleep rooms, and supervision. And 

I’ll ask Ms. Gilligan if she would like to start on that. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Sure. Thank you, sir. On the issue of commuting, 

the Aviation Rulemaking Committee recommended that the pilot 

be required to report to work fit for duty. That is consistent with 

our regulations at this point. They did not make a recommendation 

to change the regulation. However, commuting is one of the areas 

that we are looking at as we prepare our proposal, to see if there 

are additional requirements that we want to include in that particular area. So, that is something that will be addressed, and we 

will certainly ask for comment on, in the proposal. 

On the issue of sleep rooms, there are two things. First, there 

are—especially for the cargo carriers, there are a number of major 

cargo carriers who actually provide rooms—temperature-controlled, 

quiet rooms for pilots to sleep. And one of the recommendations 

from the ARC was to give consideration to that kind of rest, and 

to perhaps add additional time to the duty day. We will look at proposals in that area and ask for comment on that, as well. 

For the ultra-long flights, or the flights where we have what we 

call ‘‘augmented crew,’’ there are sleeping facilities on board the 

aircraft. The ARC recommended that the higher-end facilities be 

given more credit than where an operator might expect a pilot to 

sleep in a first-class seat, for example. The proposal will look at 

those differences and ask for comment on whether credit ought to 

be given in those areas, as well. 

We are trying to address all of these various issues that, while 

not the main issue of fatigue, certainly contribute to helping the pilots better manage fatigue. 

Senator LEMIEUX. What about supervision? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Ah, I’m sorry. In the last issue, the regulations 

will likely propose that both the operator and the pilot will have 

responsibility. The rule would say the ‘‘operator may not allow’’ and 

the ‘‘pilot may not accept.’’ Many of our rules are written in that 

way to have that shared responsibility so that, as Captain Prater 

pointed out, we can be sure that we have the checks and balances 

that we need within the system. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Captain Prater, can you talk to those three 

points? 

Mr. PRATER. I’d be glad to, Senator. 

First of all, I think we need to understand that commuting is a 

fact of life. Whether I’m driving from Richmond to D.C., that might 

take me 3 hours, or whether I’m flying from St. Louis to D.C., 

which would take me an hour and 45 minutes, I am commuting to 

work. I’m starting my day ahead. It comes down to the professional 

responsibility of, ‘‘What do I have ahead of me that day?’’ If I’m just 

flying an easy trip, I’m flying one leg to Florida, yes, I’ll come up 

that morning. I’ll be there for several hours, and then I’ll go to 

work and I’ll feel fine. If I’m flying an all-nighter, to Sao ̃ Paulo, I’ll 

come up the night before and get some rest during the day. Those 

are just facts of—as you say, of the life we live in. 

Now, you have to know your schedule. It’s more difficult for reserve pilots. Most reserve pilots are within 2 to 3 hours of their 

duty station. But, even there, if you live in—on Long Island and 

30 

you’re trying to get to Newark, it can easily take 3 hours. So, you 

do have to plan far ahead. 

I do not see it as the problem. One of them that has been cited 

so many times is that the first officer commuted from Seattle to 

Newark to fly her trip. What should be said is—or should be pointed out is, she could have flown that trip as a pilot the night before 

and been legal to fly the trip to Buffalo. So, it’s not just commuting, 

it’s the overall issue of how our flight-time/duty-time rules work. 

Who’s in charge? Well, I think it starts and ends with the captain, but the carrier does have responsibility. The carrier’s got a responsibility to accept my word, and they’re not going to fire me or 

discipline me if I say, ‘‘I’m too tired to go on.’’ We still fight that 

problem. We call it ‘‘pilot pushing.’’ Because if the airplane doesn’t 

go, the revenue sits on the tarmac. If they don’t have enough pilots 

because they’ve cut back so much, that trip is canceled. Those economic pressures live every day. We have to fight them. 

The last one is the sleep rooms—totally, wholly inadequate at 

most airlines. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Klobuchar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

I also wanted to acknowledge—I know that some of the Colgan 

families are out there, from the crash. Thank you again for being 

here and being a—just a moral compass for us as we work on this 

important topic and try to get these rules down. 

And I appreciate, Ms. Gilligan, your saying that these will get 

done. I was just shocked to learn, at a hearing a few weeks ago, 

that the deicing rules are 12 years old, that they haven’t even gone 

in the recommendations, and that, finally, actually, I talked to 

Cass Sunstein, the Director of OIRA, and Secretary LaHood, and 

they’re finally out for public comment after sitting there in some 

bureaucratic morass for 12 years. So, I want to thank you for pushing on these, and encourage you to do this as quickly as possible. 

I think one of the things, to follow up with what Senator 

LeMieux was talking about, was just this changing culture. And I 

think that these rules that we have, the FAA’s policies on pilot fatigue, are something like a half-century old, and it doesn’t reflect 

new technologies, new ways of living, or new information that we 

have about fatigue. And one of the things that I’ve been very focused on is looking at fatigue, is what Senator Dorgan was saying, 

what, half the flights are regional and a—half the flights are national, and a quarter of the passengers are regional, yet the rules 

seem to be different with the regional and the national flights. 

And, I guess, my first question was—I know that some of the 

large carriers reimburse pilots for hotel costs so that they can get 

some sleep between shifts. Do regional carriers do the same thing? 

And would this be a solution to some of the problems? 

Captain Prater, do you want to start with that? 

31 

Mr. PRATER. I would say most carriers do not provide for the reimbursement of the expenses for coming to work, to be well rested. 

So, they don’t pay for hotel rooms where you start and end your 

trip. 

Part of the problem, Senator, is that the system doesn’t provide 

for a mechanism to provide the pilots with a decent salary, because 

we have a marketplace system that we’ve had over 160 failures of 

airlines. We keep seeing, in calling these airlines something other 

than what they are—‘‘regional carrier,’’ what does that mean? They 

fly from Canada to Mexico. These are ‘‘airliners.’’ We need to get 

away from trying to pigeonhole them because they’re flying ‘‘just’’ 

50 passengers. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Right. In fact, I know one of the things we 

discussed—and maybe you want to comment on this, Mr. Voss—is, 

arguably, the regional pilots, some of them are flying shorter 

flights. Their flying time is more stressful because it involves more 

take-offs and landings, and they’re actually doing more during that 

time. And I wondered, Mr. Voss, if—should we take that into account, as opposed to just simply looking at time in the air? 

Mr. VOSS. Yes, thank you, Senator. Certainly should take that 

issue in account of the frequency of the legs and the workload, and 

so on, that that involves. And it is interesting that that area is— 

had probably the least amount of research done to it. A lot of work 

has been done on ultra-long-haul and time-zone shifts. More work 

is being done in that area, and I think that’s a critical area we 

need to take into account. And, as I understand the rules that were 

described by the ARC, we’ll take this up-and-down factor into account. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And then. what do we do about learning 

from what other countries have done? You know, I know one of the 

things they’ve talked about is actually allowing for one pilot to nap 

if the other one’s awake, and they have done things like that. Is 

that in the works? Does that controlled-napping idea, does that 

make any sense for longer flights? 

Mr. VOSS. Yes, absolutely, we are supporting that very much in 

the Foundation. Since 1994, I believe, is when the first airline 

started doing this sort of controlled-napping, and it’s found to be 

a very effective countermeasure. When you try to do everything 

right, but you still end up with a fatigued crew because of weather 

or whatever happens, this is a last-ditch effort. And it has proven 

to be a very safe procedure. And it has been adopted in many countries around the world. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Ms. Gilligan? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Just follow up on some of these questions 

with the reimbursements, this idea of actually more stress on pilots, whether we call them ‘‘regional’’ or not, but that have shorter 

flights. And then, also this idea of, Should we look at this controlled-napping? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. As Mr. Voss indicated, the ARC did recommend 

that we consider both the time of day when the pilot begins their 

schedule, as well as the number of operations or segments that 

they’ll fly, as part of, sort of, a sliding scale of how many hours of 

duty time and flight time they should be permitted. However, the 

32 

ARC did not agree on exactly how many hours of flight time and 

duty time that ought to allow, and that is what we are in the midst 

of now analyzing. But, the framework that they presented, and 

that we will be putting forward, will take into account the time of 

day. So, if you’re flying at night, what they call ‘‘back side of the 

clock,’’ that may reduce the number of hours that you’re available. 

If you have a high number of take-offs and landings, that may reduce the number of hours. We will seek comment on all of that to 

understand better how to accommodate those factors that can contribute to fatigue. 

On the issue of controlled rest, we have not issued standards for 

that. We have not proposed to permit that. And at this point, I do 

not expect that we will be proposing that. As Captain Prater pointed out, we believe that the crew needs to come to work prepared 

for the schedule that they are undertaking. Additionally, we believe 

that we can manage and mitigate their fatigue through the new 

regulations sufficiently that they should be alert throughout that 

flight. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. All right. Thank you very much, I appreciate it. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Thank you. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Snowe. 

STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Gilligan—— 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator SNOWE.—obviously, we hope that the FAA is going to 

move expeditiously on this proposed rulemaking. I think it’s essential. It’s obviously languished for more than a half a century, and 

it has been on the National Transportation Safety Board’s Most 

Wanted List since 1990. So, clearly, this is an issue that deserves 

immediate attention. And I think you’ve given all the testimony 

that has been presented to this committee in the factors of fatigue. 

To follow up on the question that Senator LeMieux made with 

respect to commutes, many of the regional airlines obviously have 

pilots that commute long distances. In fact, one of the regional carriers has, you know, a quarter of their crew that commute more 

than 1,000 miles. How are you factoring that into the rulemaking? 

Is that going to be something that’s going to be part of the rulemaking process next year in some way that—and contributes to fatigue? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. That is an issue that, as I mentioned, the Aviation 

Rulemaking Committee did not recommend we make changes to. 

They recommended that we continue to see commuting as a pilot 

responsibility, as Captain Prater indicated. We are still considering 

whether there are additional elements that we can or should regulate. And that may well be a part of our proposal. We’ve not yet 

completed that part of our analysis. But, either way, we will be 

asking for comment on whether there are additional regulatory requirements that should be put in place related to commuting. 

33 

Senator SNOWE. Captain Prater, how do you see the FAA addressing this question—if at all? I mean, do you see it essential to 

addressing this commuter issue? 

Mr. PRATER. If anything, I believe that—you know, as I stated 

before, I do believe that it is a personal responsibility thrust upon 

you by the circumstances. You could live in your base, and the next 

day your base is closed, and you’re expected to fly out of New York 

instead of Cincinnati. You’ve got three kids in school, you just can’t 

do it overnight. Most regional carriers don’t pay for paid moves. I 

know pilots who have had five base changes in 1 year. You just 

can’t move. So, it’s not a whole lot different than many jobs in our 

society, except on the other end of it, we have to be in command 

of that cockpit. 

So, it does start with personal responsibility. I think, if anything, 

when those circumstances—the carrier must ensure that the pilot 

is able to get to work with the least amount of hassle at all. It’s 

no different than flying from St. Louis to D.C. to begin your workday here. It’s the same thing for us. But, it shouldn’t take me 8 

or 10 hours to fly from St. Louis to D.C. to start that work. 

So, there are things that could be done. But, I believe it’ll be 

done more—unfortunately, maybe—but in the collective-bargaining 

arena, where we come up with the solution with our employers 

versus a mandate by the FAA. 

Senator SNOWE. Well, do you think it’s workable in what Ms. 

Gilligan mentioned, about the pilot and the operator making the 

decision, in terms of whether or not a pilot is fatigued, or too fatigued, to make the trip? 

Mr. PRATER. I believe—— 

Senator SNOWE. I mean, I see the operators are most likely to resist the pressure from that situation, because obviously they need 

the pilot. So, it seems to me they’d be most likely—— 

Mr. PRATER. It’s—— 

Senator SNOWE.—to come and make the wrong decision in that 

question, if a pilot is fatigued. 

Mr. PRATER. You know, it comes down to our physical, that we 

take every 6 months. We have to determine, Are we fit to fly, that 

day? It doesn’t matter whether I’ve got a cough or a cold or I didn’t 

sleep last night because my baby cried all night. I have to make 

that decision. All we ask is the protection that the employer and— 

their responsibility under the regulation should be, ‘‘You will accept—when a pilot calls in and says he or she is too fatigued to fly, 

you’ll accept that call.’’ 

Senator SNOWE. On another issue, I happened to run into an airline pilot last week, for a legacy carrier, and he was very much concerned about the lack of experience of pilots and copilots on these 

regional aircraft, with the requirement of 300 hours of flight time 

compared to what he had, for example, as a commercial pilot, 3,000 

hours of flight time. In fact, he was asked for some tips by the captain of one of these regional carriers on one flight, and the copilot 

wasn’t even familiar with some of the issues that they were discussing. And he described it as ‘‘scary.’’ 

So, I was wondering if I could have your views on that. If you 

combine the issue of fatigue, low salaries, lack of experience in the 

House of Representatives, for example, there’s a piece of legislation 

34 

that’s being considered, a 1,500 hours minimum requirement to become a commercial pilot—all of these amount to a potentially dangerous situation for passengers and pilots. Can you address that? 

Mr. PRATER. Yes, ma’am. We are fully supportive of H.R. 3371, 

and hope that the Senate will pick that up in the near future. It 

does raise the bar. It raises the bar for experience before a pilot 

can become an airline transport pilot in service of carrying passengers. 

Now, first of all, let me say, I believe that we’re one of the most 

critical professions, on ourselves. You never have enough experience. The fact is that the captain—the senior captain sharing and 

discussing issues with that crew is not a bad thing. Two years ago, 

our economy was going in such a way that pilots were being hired 

right out of flight school, with 250 to 350 hours. And it did show 

a crack. We can do better than that. It takes a lot more training 

at the airline level. 

But, again, training is expensive. Many airlines like to cut costs 

at every corner they can. That’s one we can’t. In fact, we need to 

expand some of the training requirements. And much of that is covered in that House legislation. 

Senator SNOWE. I appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Snowe, thank you very much. 

So, Ms. Gilligan, let me bear in a little on this question of when, 

because, you know, the fact is, this issue has been around—the 

NTSB has had this on its most-wanted list for 19 years. I appreciate the fact that you’ve started a process, that—but much more 

important is that you end the process. And you end the process 

with the kind of recommendations that are science-based, and that 

can be implemented, and that we don’t have to have these hearings. 

So, you indicated that the time is now sliding. Not unusual with 

Federal agencies. But, disappointing in—given the circumstances 

we now face and the urgency with which we had communicated to 

the FAA that we want to move on this. Give me your best judgment about when those of us who are waiting for these recommendations and the implementation of new rules and regulations dealing with fatigue—when we can expect action. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. The Administrator is finally committed to 

completing this project. I need to make that absolutely clear. I will 

certainly share that with you next week, when he appears here, as 

well. He’s also committed to getting it right. This is an area in 

which he is personally knowledgeable, given his own experience as 

a pilot. And as we have presented to him the framework that the 

Aviation Rulemaking Committee provided, and the kinds of detailed specifics that we have to analyze, he has agreed that we 

need some additional time in order to make sure we get it right. 

We have committed to having our analysis completed by the end 

of January, a month later than we had hoped to complete it, and 

it will go into the final review, both within FAA and throughout 

the Administration. We have commitment from the Secretary to 

keep that review as short as we can keep it. And we will be working with the Office of Management and Budget in that same vein, 

as well. 

35 

So, I can assure you the Administrator is fully committed to completing this notice and getting it out as quickly next year as we 

can. 

Senator DORGAN. But—thank you for the answer, but you have 

just described the FAA, OMB, DOT, all agencies that would have 

to take reasonably effective and expeditious action in order to get 

something in place here. And I’ve had too much experience with 

OMB, FAA, and DOT to believe that this works very well. And, because I referred to two aborted attempts in the 1990s to do this, 

and because I’ve referred to—I think—is it 19 years of being on the 

most-wanted list—you know, we’re just out of patience here. So 

you’re saying a month. This has slid a month—because I—let me 

ask it a different way. 

I assume that, when the FAA decided to embark on this and set 

a deadline, it is set—it set a deadline based on their judgment of 

doing it the right way. Now you’re saying you need more time to 

do it the right way, but my guess is you would have set the deadline based on doing it the right way. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. That was certainly our expectation. However, while the ARC gave us a good framework, they did not give 

us all the specifics that need to be included in the rule and that 

need to be fully analyzed so that we can present these for comment. I think the ARC members would acknowledge that they did 

not give specific recommendations, due to, to some extent, the time 

limits, as well as how complicated and difficult these issues are. 

As the Administrator said at that time, we are prepared to make 

these kinds of difficult and specific decisions. And those are the decisions that he is facing right now. And that requires some additional time. 

Senator DORGAN. I don’t disagree at all. They are complicated, 

they are difficult. I understand all that. I just—I think—when I 

started, today, by citing the number of people who’ve lost their 

lives in the last 20 years or so because of accidents related to fatigue, and then understanding that we have this issue of fatigue 

in front of us and can’t come to closure, I’m—what I’m going to do 

is—well, I will certainly ask the Administrator next week in some 

detail, but I’m going to write an official letter—and I assume my 

colleagues would join me on it—month after month as we go along 

here to find out, Where is it? When is it going to happen? Who has 

it now? How long do you expect them to have it? I’m going to write 

them, as well—OMB, DOT. We need to move on this. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator DORGAN. And we just need to get it done. It is complicated. But, you know, it’s not like sending a person to the Moon. 

We can surely figure out what we need to do to address what Mr. 

Prater says is a ‘‘dire problem.’’ I happen to agree that it’s dire, because—when I showed the charts over here today, I—you know, 

we’re talking about crew rest and duty time, but I—also, my colleague Senator Snowe, I believe, talked about commuting. I don’t 

know what we should do about commuting, but I think we should 

not ignore it. And I think, Ms. Gilligan, you’ve just indicated that 

this process will ignore commuting. 

Well, you know, again, in the Colgan crash, someone that flew 

all night long from Seattle, Washington, to finally get to a duty staVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:59 Jul 08, 2010 Jkt 054497 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\54497.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
36 

tion, and then to hang around the lounge for a couple of hours, 

based on what we know—the investigation is not complete—that is 

not a pilot that is well rested in the cockpit. Aside from all the 

other questions, putting pilots and the copilots in the cockpit that 

didn’t know what—had never trained on a stick pusher. Never 

trained on it, not even in—I mean, it’s unbelievable to me. So, at 

least the piece that we can understand here, the piece that we can 

and should understand, is fatigue, if nothing else, and try to move 

as expeditiously as we can to address it. 

Now, let me—I want to ask a couple of other questions. This 

issue of napping. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes. 

Senator DORGAN. The notion of solving the fatigue issue by taking naps in the cockpit, you know, I understand why someone 

might suggest that as an alternative. And perhaps some carriers 

overseas use it. But, I also understand Captain Prater’s notion 

about this. And I have—I’ve flown airplanes very minimally. I 

mean, I flew when I was younger. But—very few hours—but I understand, in a cockpit, if you’re napping and a bell or a whistle or 

a light goes off as an—some sort of emergency, you don’t wake up 

from a nap, doing—just like that, to decide, ‘‘Here are the actions 

I take as an experienced, professional pilot with 200 people on the 

back. Here are the actions to take right now, in an emergency to 

address this.’’ That’s not what you do, waking up from a nap. 

You’re drowsy. So, I don’t understand this issue about solving a fatigue issue by napping. 

Mr. VOSS. Mr.Barimo, you’ve advanced it, I guess. 

Mr. BARIMO. Yes, I’m glad to elaborate. We don’t view napping 

as a silver bullet for fatigue. It’s one of the many tools in that 

FRMS toolbox. So, airlines would not build schedules that incorporate napping as a requirement to complete a trip. It’s a way to 

manage fatigue as it arises, on a real-time basis. And it’s, we think, 

a smarter approach, managing that napping process, than allowing 

things to evolve the way they have previously, where you run the 

risk, potentially, of both pilots falling asleep. We think there’s a 

way to do it. We believe that NASA has done adequate research 

into this. And Bill Voss is certainly the expert, but it is one of the 

many tools that get factored into this new equation. And that’s the 

beauty of FRMS, it allows you to take tools like this, like napping 

facilities on the ground, break rooms and sleep rooms, and incorporate them all into a comprehensive program that really helps you 

more effectively manage risk. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Voss. 

Mr. VOSS. Yes, thank you. I’m suggesting, again, there are layers 

that have to be applied here. The first layer is, we have to make 

the rules better in the first place so that people show up to work— 

have the opportunity to show up to work—rested. And people have 

to live up to their responsibility to do so and show up to work rested. 

Then, last, in the event that all of our best efforts are spoiled by 

the realities of the world, weather and everything else, and somebody needs to take a rest—you put one last layer of defense in and 

have a controlled procedure where they can obtain that rest. It 

would just be used as an exception, not as a rule. 

37 

Thank you. 

Senator DORGAN. I’m going to call on Senator Lautenberg, but, 

Mr. Prater, you want to respond to that? 

Mr. PRATER. I think I addressed it adequately. Again, you 

couldn’t prevent a nap if a pilot is that tired, but it has got to be 

a last-ditch effort so that you can at least feel good enough on the 

other end. The trick we used to use, when I was flying all-nighters, 

was, about 5 minutes before landing, to bite into a fresh-cut lemon 

to give you such a jolt that you would wake up and be able to apply 

it. That’s pushing the human body way too far. And we don’t need 

that. That’s what we need the underlying rules for. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. Ms. Gilligan—— 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG.—the Chairman’s questions about when the 

report might be done were questions that I was going to talk about, 

as well. But, I think that ground has been covered. 

The thing that I would suggest, when you talk to the Chairman—talk to Mr. Babbitt—one of the things that we’ve not discussed is safety, in totality. We’re discussing a part of what’s required. Another part is to make sure that the towers are in the 

condition that they should be. And when I look at the schedules for 

manning, and I see Newark Liberty is—staffing standard there is 

40; they have 26, plus 8 trainees. Kennedy Airport, 37 full time— 

24 are there, 15 trainees. And so it goes. And I think that one of 

the questions that I’d like us to review when Mr. Babbitt’s here is, 

What are they doing in contemplation of the retirements, et cetera, 

and including the staffing levels right now? 

The other thing, Mr. Barimo, do you think that $20,000 a year 

is an acceptable salary for someone who has the responsibilities of 

pilots? 

Mr. BARIMO. Senator Lautenberg, what I would say is that seniority is king in the airline industry. And what that means is that 

salary is negotiated between the union and the company. It generally favors the more senior pilots. What we’re talking about is a 

pay scale that starts fairly low and ends fairly high. There are certainly ways to level that out and have pilots coming in earn more 

and pilots at the senior end earn a little bit less. There are ways 

to do that, again, that’s a negotiated element. It’s an issue that has 

certainly been at the forefront of many discussions. But, again, it’s 

an element that’s negotiated between the airline and the union. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes, I know that. And I don’t mean to be 

impatient, but the simple question is whether or not someone making $20,000 a year, and particularly with those that have to commute distances—and I’ve met lots of pilots who drive 150 miles 

from their home to get to their flight—so that—the question is 

whether or not—with the responsibility that is inherent in the job, 

whether $20,000 is a decent salary. Because many times there will 

be a second job that these folks have to take in order to keep their 

heads above water, and that plays a terrific role in establishing 

stress or fatigue, whichever is the factor. But, it is an invasion of 

good sensibility. 

38 

Mr. BARIMO. Senator, what I’d offer is that airlines are subject 

to the requirements of FAR Part 121, whether they’re commuter 

airlines or mainline carriers. There is one set of—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But, there’s no—they don’t—but, they 

don’t recommend their own salaries—— 

Mr. BARIMO. There’s one set of recommendations. Airlines prepare pilots to operate the equipment that they’re flying. And it’s irrespective of the amount of money that the pilot gets paid. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. OK. Well—— 

Mr. BARIMO. It’s the same requirement. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. —you said something—you said ‘‘seniority 

dictates.’’ If I was home on a particular day, I would have seen an 

airplane pass my window on its way to landing in the Hudson 

River. That’s—the building I live in, in New Jersey, is right on the 

river, and it’s about the height that I live coming down from— 

where the pilot had to head for lower altitude. Captain Chesley 

‘‘Sully’’ Sullenberger, the pilot for U.S. Airways flight 1549, known 

as ‘‘The miracle on the Hudson,’’ said, in a hearing in the House 

earlier this year, that his pay has been cut 40 percent in recent 

years, and he started a consulting business to maintain a middleclass standard of living. This was a guy with terrific experience 

and, obviously, great skills. 

So, I think we’re at a point in time when we’re going to have to 

say that there are certain standards that must be met. And I don’t 

know how to implement them. That’s not my job here. My job is 

to make sure that, whatever we do, we have the safety of the public protected as—to whatever extent we can possibly do it. And 

again, we’ve all admitted that safety record’s pretty good. But, 

there are possibilities that are relatively high risk that we should 

avoid. 

And I would say this, when we’re looking at salaries and we look 

at what’s happening in the regional, Captain Prater, versus the 

majors, the regionals are doing pretty well, in terms of profitability. 

SkyWest made $200 million in the year up to 2009—2008–2009. 

American Eagle made $122 million. Express Mesa made $16 million. Pinnacle Colgan made $76 million. So, what’s to say that they 

should exert themselves a little bit, in terms of trying to attract the 

best that they can get, and, once they get them, to keep them alert 

and satisfied with their job and paying attention to the minutest 

detail that they have to. And now, at a—particularly when jobs are 

too few, Mr. Barimo, that it simply can’t be left to a negotiation, 

I don’t think—— 

Mr. BARIMO. Right. 

Senator LAUTENBERG.—between the union and the company, because people want to work. But, their willingness to work has to 

be accompanied by an ability to be as skillful, as alert, and as in 

command as they can be. Do you agree? 

Mr. BARIMO. I certainly agree. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. OK. I wasn’t sure. There was the bit of silence that I heard. 

Mr. BARIMO. The industry has taken a beating since September. 

It has impacted every employee in the industry, not just pilots. 

You mentioned a few airlines posting profits. What I will say is 

that the industry, as a whole, continues to lose billions of dollars 

39 

each year. So, I would be hesitant to view a couple of data points 

that show up in the black, as an indication that the industry is performing well. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, I’ll tell you, when it’s a commodity 

like air travel, there may have to be a look-back at where we were 

at one time in our history and say, ‘‘Just because you can raise 

some money to start a new airline doesn’t mean that you ought to 

be in the industry,’’ when we are paying for the whole infrastructure—the FAA and airport development, et cetera, et cetera. So, 

we’re not going to have time, nor the ability, right now to examine 

that question in its entirety, but it’s one, in my view, that ought 

to be examined. 

Thanks very much, to all of you. Very interesting testimony, and 

valuable. Thank you. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Lautenberg, thank you very much. 

Let me ask a question about—Ms. Gilligan, let’s assume that 

your recommendations are done, OMB sees them come in the door 

and says, ‘‘You know what, we’re going to work on this quickly and 

move it out.’’ DOT says, ‘‘God bless you for all your work. We see 

this, and we’re a Federal agency, we intend to get things turned 

around quickly.’’ And all of a sudden, we have this process complete. 

Now, turn just for a moment to a circumstance that has prodded 

us to do more work in this area. That is, the Colgan crash. And 

the right-seat pilot flew from Seattle to Memphis—I believe 

deadheaded on a—I think it was a FedEx plane—and then flew to 

LaGuardia. And the pilot flew from Florida up to LaGuardia. 

There’s no evidence of either them having a hotel room for rest 

purposes. There’s evidence of both being in a crew rest lounge of 

some type. Evidence that the left-seat pilot was doing e-mails 

through a fair part of the night. So, it appears to me, with respect 

to whatever caused that crash—perhaps pilot/copilot not understanding what a ‘‘stick pusher’’ means—pulling the nose up and 

stalling the plane rather than having that nose pushed down because of ice, and restoring your airspeed and so on—it’s entirely 

possible that a portion of what caused that crash was fatigue. Assuming that everything that you are doing is done, and we are all 

ready to announce significant progress for the first time in many, 

many years, how will it—or how would it have affected the circumstances of the pilot and the copilot I’ve just described, both of 

whom flew a fair piece across the country and without any evidence 

of having rest prior to the flight on that regional carrier? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Sir, I think, as we’ve heard a lot, there will always 

be a responsibility for the pilots to manage their rest periods appropriately. The rule will offer an opportunity for rest with sufficient time to sleep, consistent with what the signs of fatigue tells 

us, which is that you should sleep 7 to 8 hours a night. At the end 

of the day, the pilots will then have to take responsibility for assuring that they take advantage of that rest opportunity in a way that 

prepares them to report to work. They will always have that responsibility. And the operator will have the responsibility to determine that the crew member is, in fact, prepared to work at that 

time. 

40 

The regulatory framework can only set, just that, the framework 

that allows for the operator and the pilot to properly prepare themselves to provide safe transportation. 

Senator DORGAN. I understand the responsibility of the pilot. 

That’s the responsibility of a professional to himself or herself in 

the profession, and the responsibility to the passengers they’re 

transporting. What I don’t quite understand is, when we finish this 

whole process, nothing will have changed with respect to the circumstances that existed in that cockpit with respect to fatigue, if 

it existed as a part of the cause of this crash, because—if we have 

the chart that shows the Colgan commutes. 

We know that something significant has changed with respect to 

air travel in this country. And I’ll describe it just this way. In— 

if you’ll put that down for just a moment—in North Dakota, where 

I grew up, the airlines that served our capital city were Republic, 

a regional carrier—but that—but, they didn’t fly small planes; they 

flew DC–9s and 737s, and so on—Western Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and Frontier Airlines. All of them flew jets—737s, 727s, and 

DC9s. And my guess is that people in the cockpit, three—a threemember crew in the 727s by the way, and two-member crew in the 

others—my guess is that there wasn’t somebody in a right seat 

with any one of those carriers, 30 years ago, that was being paid 

the equivalent of today’s $18,000 or $20,000 a year. It just wasn’t 

the case. 

Then what happened is, our system morphed into something different. Those carriers merged and merged and merged again, became much larger, and then created a network of regional carriers 

that flew smaller equipment and had a different system for hiring 

outside of the trunk carriers. And so, we now have developed a system where one-half of the flights and one-fourth of the passengers 

are carried in circumstances where you have less experience in the 

cockpit. 

And one of the other things that has happened, especially in the 

last couple of decades as we’ve morphed into this new system, is 

this chart, which shows that everybody’s commuting everywhere. 

Now, it shouldn’t be lost on any of us, including Captain Prater— 

you’re a pilot—and it shouldn’t be lost on us that this chart is demonstration of a significant potential problem. You’ve got people, 

whose work station is on the East Coast, flying from all over the 

country just to get to a station where they should go to work. 

And, Ms. Gilligan, what you are saying, and what some others 

have said, is, ‘‘Well, you know what. It’s their responsibility.’’ Well, 

let me ask the obvious question. Atlas Air, for example, a cargo 

company, they were having problems attracting qualified pilots, 

and so they instituted what was called a ‘‘Gateway Travel Program.’’ Been very successful. They actually pay commuting pilots to 

come to their duty station, and they provide hotel accommodations 

overnight for them. And they require them to be there for an overnight. This—that’s how one cargo company decided to do it. 

If you’re going to have people, living in Seattle or Los Angeles, 

working out of New York, the question is,‘‘ How do you make that 

happen? How does that work?’’ And my great concern is—and I’m 

not suggesting that people shouldn’t commute; I am suggesting 

that if you’re going to have this kind of substantial commuting, 

41 

you’d better understand that you’re going to have some problems 

related to it, with respect to fatigue, unless the carriers and the pilots get there and have rest and find a bed, go to sleep, and show 

up in that cockpit fully rested. 

That was not the case in the Colgan plane, with all due respect. 

I’ve read the transcripts. I understand at least enough of the facts 

to understand, neither of those pilots, I believe—and I—again, and 

I feel bad, because they’re not with us and not able to defend themselves—but, it appears to me, neither of them had a night’s sleep. 

And I just—when we’re done with this issue, Ms. Gilligan, I don’t 

think we will have altered the circumstances that allowed that to 

exist. And somehow, I think we must. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Well, sir—— 

Senator DORGAN. Your response? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. —as I mentioned, the Aviation Rulemaking Committee did not make recommendations in this area. It is an area 

that we are looking at to see just how the Federal Government 

might address this in a regulatory framework. As you suggest, it 

can be difficult. As Captain Prater suggests, people drive from 

Fredericksburg to work in Washington, D.C. at DCA, and that’s a 

long drive. That is not the same as flying. How to approach it is 

hard. But, we know that we do need to address it. And whether 

we should address it in the rule itself or in guidance in training 

materials for the pilots and for the airlines, we have not yet completely reached that conclusion. But, we agree with you. It is a risk 

factor that must be addressed, both by the airline and by the pilot. 

Senator DORGAN. It just seems to me that would be a better 

time, or a more appropriate or more required time, to do it than 

now, when you’re actually addressing fatigue in the cockpit? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator DORGAN. And, Mr. Prater, my guess is—you run a pilots 

organization and you’re going to want to say, ‘‘You know what, they 

have a right to commute wherever they want to commute from. 

They have a responsibility to get some rest before they fly.’’ I understand all that. But, do you believe that there’s simply no issue 

here, no problem at all with this substantial amount of commuting 

that is—that has morphed into this—particularly the regional carriers, and the trunk carriers, in recent decades? 

Mr. PRATER. I would not say there is not an issue, sir. There is 

an issue. And I give you our commitment that we’ll continue to 

work with, not only the FAA, but with our employers, to find the 

solution to these problems. This is the reality. The reality is that 

the workforce has become very mobile, none more so than ours. 

And the fact is that the companies keep moving the flying around. 

I’ve said, they—the regional carriers, especially, they lose a contract and all of a sudden people who have lived in Cincinnati for 

20 years, flying out of their home base, now have to commute, overnight. Those type of decisions are going on throughout our system. 

So, we need to do a better job working with our carriers to make 

sure that pilots, if they have to fly to get to work, they’re able to 

do so quickly, easily. It’s a mirror image, if you will, of the Atlas 

program that you identified. NetJets, other operators, cargo operators, do the same thing. FedEx, UPS, they get their pilots to where 

they pick up their flight. It may be overseas, sir. So, there are sysVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:59 Jul 08, 2010 Jkt 054497 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\54497.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
42 

tems out there, and we can do a better job, both as a union and 

as our employers and the associations that represent them, ensuring that the pilots show up ready to go. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Voss, do you think the commuting is a part 

of this issue? 

Mr. VOSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, clearly, commuting 

sets up a situation where things can go wrong. And we’ve seen 

some things go wrong. And so, I think what we have here is a problem. But, it’s a difficult problem to deal with in a regulatory format. Clearly, there has to be an obligation for the airline to provide 

the opportunity for rest. And, of course, then there’s the—they 

have to take that opportunity up. 

I think the—a long-term way to look at this, though, is the fatigue risk management system we talked about, but haven’t explained well. It puts a lot of sensors into the operation; and so, tells 

you if you have a problem on a given set of segments because of 

tired pilots or poorly trained pilots or other things. You need to be 

able to look at the data from your operation, and deal with it, and 

put in place the mitigations. Maybe it’s an improved rest facility 

and so on. But, those are the type of things we need to do. That’s 

why I am such a supporter of the data-driven and more sophisticated approaches that we can take in this industry. 

Senator DORGAN. All right. Mr. Barimo, you have a response? 

Mr. BARIMO. I would just reiterate that, as Captain Prater said, 

commuting is a part of the commercial airline business today. 

We’re much smarter today, and we’re getting smarter each day, 

when it comes to fatigue management. I think we have a challenge 

before us in how to factor commuting into fatigue management. I 

think we recognize that as an issue, and we’re committed to resolving it, however that turns out to be. 

Senator DORGAN. But, you—in some ways, this is like looking at 

a picture and not seeing it. You know, the three of you suggest that 

commuting is a part of an issue here, part of a problem. What Ms. 

Gilligan and the FAA is going to give us, at some point, is something that doesn’t address that. And it just seems to me that all 

of these things relate to the circumstances that we know cause additional risk. 

You know, from the hearings I have held—I was on a regional 

carrier a while back, and I happen to know, from the hearings, of 

the type of training that particular carrier did with their regional. 

They have identical training requirements, and they own the regional, and they—so, I sort of felt, well, this is an interesting carrier. Identical to the trunk carrier in training in every respect. On 

the other hand, my guess is, Captain Prater, if you fly regionals, 

you might get on one sometime—and you know a little more about 

it than some others—and see people in the cockpit that have a few 

hundred hours, and wonder if they’re able to handle this plane as 

well as I am, speaking of yourself, with all the experience you 

have. 

A lot of things have changed, with respect to regionals. They are 

a very important part of our air transportation system. We need 

them. But, we need to make sure that we’re dealing with the issues 

that relate to—the issues that have become self-evident to us in recent years. 

43 

The issue of fatigue is not just a regional issue. The issue of fatigue relates to every cockpit everywhere and how we address that. 

Ms. Gilligan, I have not meant to ‘‘heckter’’ you, with respect 

to—— 

Ms. GILLIGAN. No, not at all. 

Senator DORGAN.—but, I do intend to in the future—— 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. GILLIGAN. I’ll look forward to it. 

Senator DORGAN.—because it is very important. Randy Babbitt is 

a new administrator with a great deal of promise, in my judgment. 

He knows the industry. He has spent a lot of time in the air, commanding airplanes. And I have high hopes for some excellent work 

coming out of the FAA. And that will include your work and many 

others. But, it is essential that we consider these things urgent, 

based on what we now know—or ‘‘dire,’’ as the Captain indicated. 

And it’s essential that it be science-based. But, it’s essential, after 

all of these years, all of these many, many years and lives that 

have been lost, it’s essential that we get this done. And so, I’m 

going to be—in my part of the country, we call it a ‘‘bur under the 

saddle,’’ but I’m really going to keep pushing, because we need to 

get this done. 

I appreciate that—we’ve gone a little longer, but I appreciate the 

fact that all four of you have come to testify. We’ll have the Administrator here next week—— 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator DORGAN.—and begin to reach, I think, some conclusion 

on some of these issues. 

And I hope, Ms. Gilligan—and I will write to the Administrator— 

I hope also to talk at some length about commuting, with the Administrator, in addition to the other fatigue issues. 

Let me thank you very much. 

And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(45) 

1The Cargo Airline Association is the organization representing the interests of the United 

States all-cargo air carrier industry. U.S. airline members are: ABX Air, Atlas Air, Capital 

Cargo International, FedEx Express, Kalitta Air and UPS Airlines. 2The Association has no intention of repeating its comments made to the FAA in the course 

of the ARC. Those comments are on file with the FAA and have been provided to Committee 

Staff. Rather, the brief comments below only relate to the testimony presented on December 1, 

2009. 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE CARGO AIRLINE ASSOCIATION

On December 1, 2009, the Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation held a hearing to examine the issue of pilot fatigue and the status of the FAA Rulemaking on 

Flight Crewmember Duty and Rest Requirements. 

The Cargo Airline Association (the ‘‘Association’’) 1 did not testify at that hearing, 

but, as a full participant in the FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) which 

was chartered to examine this issue, is extremely interested in the outcome of this 

process. Several comments made at this hearing, however, raise concerns that need 

to be addressed.2

First, in her written testimony, Margaret Gilligan, FAA Associate Administrator 

for Aviation Safety, stated that ‘‘. . . differing regulations for different types of operations are inconsistent and complex, and can be easily misunderstood, especially 

when a pilot can be assigned to different types of operations. The different rules developed over time, as the aviation industry changed and expanded. While such variance in the rules may have been justified when they were first adopted, these differences may no longer be valid in today’s operational environment. Our rulemaking 

will address this.’’ Testimony, p. 3. 

While the Association recognizes the need to update the current regulations which 

have been developed over a number of years and have been subject to several legal 

interpretations, any implication that a ‘‘one size fits all’’ solution to pilot fatigue is 

simply incorrect. As a practical matter, today’s aviation marketplace is comprised 

of various industry segments, with different operating characteristics driven by the 

underlying business model and different opportunities for crewmembers to rest. For 

example, the time it takes to sort and load cargo onto an all-cargo aircraft at a hub 

facility allows time for crewmembers to rest. Similarly, security concerns at certain 

foreign airports would make it imprudent to schedule overnight stays; rest can better be addressed through on-board rest accommodation and other means. Those 

unique differences must be taken into consideration. Indeed, FAA Administrator 

Randy Babbitt, at an ALPA Safety Forum on August 5, 2009, specifically noted that 

‘‘In rulemaking, not only does one size not fit all, but it’s unsafe to think that it 

can.’’ In addition, during the course of the ARC, FAA representatives specifically 

recognized the different characteristics of the all-cargo industry and invited the 

Cargo Airline Association to submit a cargo-specific proposal. Therefore, any notion 

that the all-cargo carriers are asking for a ‘‘carve out’’ from the rulemaking is simply false. 

Faced with these realities, all-cargo interests cannot be simply subsumed into a 

‘‘one size fits all’’ rule, but rather must be separately considered, taking into account 

the operational characteristics on this industry segment. That is not to say that the 

FAA must have separate sets of regulations. Rather, the FAA can and should apply 

a common framework to the rules to avoid confusion and thus reducing the need 

to issue legal interpretations, but also recognizing differing operational and environmental characteristics. 

Another subject that generated significant comment at the December 1 hearing 

was the subject of ‘‘commuting’’. While everyone agrees that flight crews must 

present themselves for service in a fit condition, there appears to be significant disagreement on the FAA’s role in assuring that flight crews are not fatigued when 

they report for duty. Although there were statements that the ARC did not recVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:59 Jul 08, 2010 Jkt 054497 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\54497.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
46 

1 NACA carriers include: Air Transport International, Allegiant Air, Atlas Air, Miami Air 

International, North American Airlines, Omni Air International, Ryan Air International, Southern Air, Sun Country Airlines, USA3000 Airlines and World Airways. 

ommend any FAA action in this area, the Association submission (which was transmitted to the FAA as part of the ARC recommendation) did, in fact, address this 

issue. Indeed, an entire section entitled ‘‘The FAA Must Address Pre-Duty Required 

Rest’’ was included in the Association proposal, with the notation that ‘‘. . . any regulations covering flight/duty limitations and rest requirements must also address 

pre-duty required rest of individual flight crewmembers and put teeth into the 

FAA’s enforcement of crewmember responsibility to report to work fit for duty’’. Association Submission, p. 26. During the hearing, the FAA repeatedly said the delay 

in the rulemaking process and its subsequent later than expected release was largely due to the ARC not addressing commuting. 

The Association appreciated the opportunity to participate in the ARC process and 

looks forward to filing comments when the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is issued. 

If the Subcommittee needs any further information, please do not hesitate to contact 

us. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD N. PRIDDY, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR CARRIER ASSOCIATION (NACA) 

The National Air Carrier Association (NACA), a member of the recent Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight and Duty Time Limitations and Rest Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC), appreciates the opportunity to 

present written testimony for the record of the hearing on ‘‘Aviation Safety: Pilot 

Fatigue’’ which was held on December 1, 2009. 

NACA,1 founded in 1963, is comprised of 11 air carriers that fill a unique niche 

in the air carrier industry offering low cost scheduled air transportation as well as 

non-scheduled all-cargo and passenger air transportation worldwide. While diverse 

in our operations, all members operate under the same high safety standards and 

requirements as the major scheduled airlines, 14 CFR Part 121. In addition to providing significant, leading edge air transportation for customers and commercial 

partners on most every continent, all of NACA member air carriers are partners 

with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 

program. We provide significant lift capacity for our soldiers and their cargo in support of U.S. DoD missions around the globe. On any given day, NACA member airlines are providing the majority of the civil air transportation in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation. Iraqi Freedom. 

NACA member airlines support science-based changes to the FAA flight, duty and 

rest regulations. We have participated in every aviation rulemaking committee 

(ARC) on this subject since the early 1990s. We were instrumental in the changes 

that produced the cabin attendant duty and rest regulations in 1994. Since then, 

we have participated in each of the FAA duty and rest related ARCs. When consensus in those ARCs did not materialize, the NACA Board of Directors invited then 

FAA Administrator, Jane Garvey, to NACA’s offices in May 2002 and appealed to 

her to get on with the rulemaking. We recommended fatigue mitigating regulations 

based upon flight duty period limitations, not on flight time. We included deadhead 

time and all non-commercial (Part 91) flying in our proposal, in addition to a regulation for reserve crewmember duty and rest. We were disappointed the SNPRM did 

not materialize, and we have willingly participated in the current ARC efforts. Representatives from approximately half of our member airlines participated as principals or as observers of one or more ARC sessions. 

However, we are particularly concerned to now have the FAA witness in these 

hearings, Ms. Peggy Gilligan, state in her public testimony that they are crafting 

a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ regulatory approach. This is contrary to the recommendations of 

all the Nation’s airlines in strong written statements submitted as final ARC proposals from the Air Transport Association of America, the Cargo Airline Association, 

NACA and the Regional Airline Association opposing a ‘‘one-size-fits all’’ approach. 

This is also contrary to the public statements made by the Administrator, in a 

speech delivered to the Air Line Pilots Association Safety Forum in which, referencing the work of this ARC that was underway and the rulemaking process in 

general, he stated ‘‘Nil rulemaking, not only does one size not fit all, but it’s unsafe 

to think that it can.’’ See, ‘‘We Can’t Regulate Professionalism,’’ remarks of Administrator Randy Babbitt before ALFA Safety Forum, August 5, 2009. His statement 

bears repetition for this Senate Subcommittee, ‘‘one size does not fit all.’’ While there 

was little consensus in the ARC beyond a science-based regulation, ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ 

47 

2 Caldwell, J. A., Mallis, M. M., Caldwell, J. L., Paul, M. A., Miller, J. C., Neri, D. F., Aerospace Medical Association Aerospace Fatigue Countermeasures Subcommittee of the Human 

Factors Committee . Fatigue Countermeasures in Aviation. Aviat Space Environ Med 2009; 

80:29–59, p. 33. 

is contrary to the process and advice many participants represented in the ARC. Not 

only is it ‘‘unsafe to think that’’, as the Administrator stated, an inflexible set of 

FAA flight duty period and rest restrictions, versus flexible regulations, threaten 

much of today’s nonscheduled all-cargo and passenger operations that are safely operating under 14 CFR 121, Subpart S. Furthermore, it could have significant impacts on national security, as all DOD commercial charter air transportion must operate under the individual air carrier’s full DOT and FAA certification; its operation 

specifications; and the incumbent safety and regulatory standards. More than 90 per 

cent of the passenger capability and more than 40 per cent of the all-cargo capability for defense mobility is supplied by U.S. air carrier members of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Flexibility is critical. Unless the ‘‘size’’ is large and flexible, one-sizefits-all will only support scheduled operations. 

This is not about the cost of hiring more pilots or any other financial consideration. This is about safely and prudently sustaining the regulatory infrastructure 

to conduct these non-scheduled operations on a worldwide basis. It is about continued leadership of U.S. airlines in an extremely competitive environment, where we 

are already the safest segment of the world’s airline industry. It is also about national security. 

Concerning fatigue science, most fatigue scientists state that prescriptive regulations are not the solution to fatigue mitigation in air transportation. A number of 

those scientists worked together to prepare a position paper for the American Medical Association. It states, ‘‘The prescriptive rule-making approach commonly used 

by regulatory agencies to regulate crew rest and flight and duty times is not derived 

from the foundational scientific research addressing the interaction of sleep and circadian processes and their effects on performance.2

NACA, with its commitment to resolving safety issues, including those resulting 

from fatigue, supports a requirement for each airline to have a FAA approved Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS). That FRMS and strategy should be part 

of an individual air carrier’s FAA approved safety management system (SMS). To 

that end, NACA has hired world renowned fatigue scientist Dr. E. Curtis Graber 

to advise us on those strategies. To date, the program would include a commitment 

by senior management, schedulers, dispatchers and pilots to FRMS. It would include fatigue training programs for all involved; suggested personal strategies for 

pilots for sleep and fatigue mitigation; crew scheduling and dispatch strategies for 

assuring robust sleep opportunities; cockpit resource management training tailored 

to fatigue mitigation, including a recommendation to FAA to permit controlled rest 

on the flight deck; and a continuous audit process for identifying fatigue 

vulnerabilities. 

Finally, we want to comment about commuting. We agree with the Committee, 

that is the unknown in this whole discussion about pilot fatigue. It was virtually 

taken off the table for discussion in the ARC. We recommend it be formally addressed. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN PAUL ONORATO, PRESIDENT, 

COALITION OF AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATIONS

Chairman Dorgan, members of the Committee, on behalf of the 28,000 pilots who 

fly for the member associations of the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations 

(CAPA), we want to thank you for the opportunity to comment on the issue of pilot 

fatigue. CAPA has been working on fatigue and flight and duty time issues since 

its inception in 1997 and we appreciate your holding this important hearing to lay 

the issues on the table. 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) puts fatigue near the top of its 

most wanted list. ‘‘The Safety Board has long been concerned about the effects of 

fatigue on persons performing critical functions in all transportation industries including flight crews.’’ We agree wholeheartedly with NTSB. The need to address 

pilot fatigue is long overdue. There is no more critical safety issue before the FAA 

and the time to address it is now. 

CAPA recently held three seats on the FAA Aviation Rulemaking Committee 

(ARC) on Flight and Duty time and Rest Requirements, which focused on reducing 

fatigue for pilots in commercial aviation. As such, CAPA supports the adoption of 

48 

a science based approach to new regulations on duty time, the primary factor in fatigue and flight time, a secondary factor related to time on task and workload. 

We have worked closely with the FAA on these issues and look forward to seeing 

the new regulations shortly. While we have made very specific recommendations to 

the ARC regarding flight and duty limitations, one important principal stands out 

for the pilot members of CAPA—An increase in the current flight or duty times in 

any given block of time throughout the day is simply unacceptable. CAPA cannot 

agree to any policy change that would claim to address fatigue by allowing pilots 

to fly more hours in any in a scheduled duty day time than current rules stipulate. 

CAPA strongly supports a minimum 8 hour sleep opportunity in a rest period that 

includes travel time. A rest period that includes travel time should not be confused 

with actual sleep opportunity and needs to be 11 to 12 hours at a minimum to provide a real opportunity for 8 hours of sleep. A minimum of 10 hours at the rest facility would be another good way to define the minimum rest period. We also believe 

that regulations that include adequate recovery rest after ‘‘disruptive duty’’ which 

includes daytime rest, night flying, time zone crossings, and circadian instability. 

Essentially, any work schedule that does not allow a pilot to sleep during his normal 

sleep cycle is ‘‘disruptive duty.’’ 

CAPA supports adequate prescriptive preflight rest for all operations, which 

would include prescriptive rest for all reserve crewmembers as well as relief pilot/ 

augmentation guidelines that consider the quality of the onboard rest facility in determining the allowable extension to flight and duty times. 

CAPA has thousands of cargo pilots amongst its members and does not support 

any carve out for cargo operations. CAPA is firm in its belief in ‘‘One Level of Safety’’ for all commercial flight operations and no science supports different regulations 

based on what the aircraft are carrying i.e., passengers or cargo. 

CAPA does not support cockpit napping and believes that properly regulated 

flight and duty time limits will eliminate the need for naps. Complex commercial 

aircraft are certified for two pilots that require more multi-tasking than one pilot 

can safely accomplish on a regular basis. A second pilot is also part of the greatest 

safety protection—redundancy. Everything on the aircraft has redundant back-up 

systems in the event of failure and backup systems are not ‘‘rested’’ but are ready 

to go at a moment’s notice. In any emergency the flying pilot continues to fly while 

the monitoring pilot accomplishes procedures required by an emergency checklist including shutting down failed engines in the event of fire or catastrophic failure. If 

a pilot is needed to go from napping to performing, science has proven that approximately 20 minutes is needed to overcome ‘‘sleep inertia.’’ A napping pilot would not 

know if the other pilot has become incapacitated. 

The issue of commuting has come into the public’s eye as a result of the Continental Connection Flight 3407 accident investigation. While commuting is an unusual situation to those outside of the aviation industry, it has become an accepted 

and normal practice within the industry. One of the root causes of the increase in 

commuting is the result of the extreme instability of airline employment. A junior 

pilot literally waits on each month’s system bid to find out where he/she will be 

based next. Moving every time the airline decides to change your domicile is an impossible situation both from a financial and practical viewpoint. Airline pilots have 

learned how to adapt to these conditions. In CAPA’s view, the perceived problem 

with commuting is another symptom of the race to the bottom in pilot compensation, 

qualification and experience. The primary reason commuting hasn’t come under fire 

until recently is that airlines have dramatically reduced the qualifications and compensation of new hire pilots, and prior to those economic measures, commuting was 

done by choice—not necessity, and thus was not as widespread, nor as much of a 

problem. These changes have brought inexperienced pilots to the industry who do 

not possess the judgment, experience, or the means to self police their own rest 

needs. 

Rather than trying to legislate a new lifestyle for aviation professionals, CAPA 

supports another approach. We strongly support the requirement that all pilots 

working in Part 121 commercial aviation—Captains and First Officers alike, have 

an FAA Airline Transport Pilot’s certificate (ATP). This would require a minimum 

of 1,500 hours of flight time in a myriad of conditions and would assure that professionalism is in the cockpit is increased. Senator Charles Schumer has introduced 

S. 1744, which would require that all pilots have an ATP as a minimum condition 

for employment with commercial Part 121 carriers. We strongly support Sen. Schumer’s bill and urge this committee to consider it as a part of the FAA Reauthorization package. If we take such steps to ensure that professional pilots are flying in 

both seats in the cockpit, we can solve the key problems with commuting and many 

other issues within the industry. 

49 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO MARGARET GILLIGAN

Question 1. In what ways should the new flight and duty time rules be changed 

to reflect modern fatigue research? 

Answer. In developing the new flight and duty time rules, the FAA tasked its 

Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) with considering current fatigue science and 

information on fatigue, as well as international standards for flight time limitations. 

The ARC considered human physiology, including the biological requirement for 

sleep; the effect of task-related factors, such as workload or duration of the duty period, on fatigue; and the effect of circadian rhythm on fatigue. 

Other international standards have already addressed these issues and provided 

the ARC with examples of fatigue countermeasures that address them. The ARC is 

specifically considering: 

• Structuring rest periods so crewmembers receive 8 hours of sleep opportunity 

in each 24 hours; 

• Providing an extended rest period weekly to recover from cumulative fatigue; 

• Limiting the length of a duty period; 

• Considering other duties that may contribute to fatigue as part of the duty period; 

• Reducing the length of a duty period, based on encroachment into a crewmember’s Window of Circadian Low (WOCL) or the number of flight segments 

flown during the duty period; 

• Extending the length of a duty period, based on the quality of an in-flight rest 

opportunity; 

• Providing cumulative limits on flight time and duty periods to prevent cumulative fatigue. 

Question 2. Do you believe that training and repositioning flights should count toward a pilot’s flight time under the rule regulating the number of flight hours a 

pilot may perform in a day? 

Answer. Yes. Training and repositioning flights should count toward a pilot’s 

flight time under the rule regulating the number of flight hours a pilot may perform 

in a day. Fatigue science identifies ‘‘time on task’’ as one of the factors likely to affect a person’s fatigue. ‘‘Time on task’’ is the length of time a person has been continuously performing a job without a break. Additionally, ‘‘time awake’’ since a last 

major sleep opportunity contributes to fatigue. Both ‘‘time on task’’ and ‘‘time 

awake’’ could be affected by including training and repositioning flights in a pilot’s 

schedule. Other international standards do consider other duties, such as training 

and repositioning flights, toward total flight duty period or duty period limitations; 

but not daily flight time limitations. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO WILLIAM R. VOSS

Question 1. In what ways should the new flight and duty time rules be changed 

to reflect modern fatigue research? 

Answer. The rules should be updated in two specific areas. First the rules have 

to reflect human performance and the time of day. We now know that it is radically 

different dealing with fatigue when a pilot is operating on the ‘‘backside of the 

clock’’ or his nighttime cycle. Second, it is critical that the regulation address the 

overall work period that may extend across several days. We now know for a fact 

that fatigue is cumulative, so we must guard against cumulative effects of things 

such as multiple early morning wake-ups and so on. 

Question 2. Do you believe that training and repositioning flights should count toward a pilot’s flight time under the rule regulating the number of flight hours a 

pilot may perform in a day? 

Answer. Yes, fatigue is not tied to revenue. A pilot gets just as tired when he or 

she is flying for free as when they are on the clock. 

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