89–010 

Calendar No. 467 

111TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 2d Session 111–223 

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2010 

JULY 19, 2010.—Ordered to be printed 

Mrs. FEINSTEIN, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany S. 3611] 

The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 

original bill (S. 3611) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 

2010 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 

United States Government, the Community Management Account, 

and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass. 

CLASSIFIED ANNEX TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT

The classified nature of United States intelligence activities precludes disclosure by the Committee of details of its budgetary recommendations. The Committee has prepared a classified annex to 

this report that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations. 

The Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the 

Act and has the legal status of public law. The classified annex is 

made available to the Committees of Appropriations of the Senate 

and the House of Representatives and to the President. It is also 

available for review by any Member of the Senate subject to the 

provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976). 


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HISTORY OF THE BILL

This is the second report by the Committee of an Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. 

On July 22, 2009, the Committee unanimously reported S. 1494 

with an accompanying report, S. Rep. 111–55 (2009). With amendments to address several concerns of other committees, the Senate 

passed S. 1494 by unanimous consent on September 16, 2009. 155 

Cong. Rec. S9447–9480 (daily ed.). On September 17, 2009, S. 1494 

was sent to the House and held there at the desk, where it remains 

today. 

On June 26, 2009, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence reported its proposed Fiscal Year 2010 Authorization, 

H.R. 2701, with an accompanying report, H.R. Rep. 111–186 (2009). 

On February 26, 2010, the House passed H.R. 2701 with amendments by a vote of 235 to 168. 156 Cong. Rec. H936–951 (daily ed.). 

On March 15, 2010, the Director of the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) sent to the Intelligence Committees a letter setting forth the Administration’s views on S. 1494 and H.R. 2701. 

The letter identified thirteen serious concerns with provisions in either or both bills. The letter stated that three of these were so serious that the President’s senior advisors would recommend that he 

veto the bill if they were included in a bill presented for his signature. The veto-threat items were proposed amendments on notifications to Congress of sensitive intelligence matters and covert actions, amendments on the authority of the Government Accountability Office to conduct audits, investigations, and evaluations of 

elements of the Intelligence Community, and provisions on the 

amounts authorized for the National Intelligence Program. OMB 

provided in classified correspondence additional details about its 

concerns. On March 15, 2010, the Department of Justice also transmitted to the committees a letter stating its concerns about the 

constitutionality of various provisions in the House and Senate 

bills. 

The committees began a three-month process of reconciling the 

House and Senate bills and addressing the Administration’s concerns in order to produce a bill which, as a result of a conference 

or an exchange of messages between the House and Senate, would 

in the view of the committees’ leadership make a substantial contribution to national security and be able to pass the two chambers 

and be signed by the President. The process involved extensive 

meetings and exchanges of drafts with and among representatives 

of the leaders of the two committees and the Administration. 

On June 10, 2010, the OMB Director wrote to the leadership of 

the committees that the Administration had reviewed the proposed 

House-Senate agreement and, on the assumption there would be no 

material changes in either the unclassified bill or the classified 

annex, that the President’s senior advisors had determined that 

they would recommend that he sign the bill if it is presented for 

his signature. Among the accommodations specifically noted in the 

OMB letter were those responding to the Administration’s concerns 

on congressional notification and the authority of the Comptroller 

General. 

Although fiscal year 2010 has entered its final quarter, the significance of the legislative provisions of the fiscal year 2010 bill is 


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not time limited. Its provisions on authorities and oversight will 

have importance for years to come. 

Notwithstanding the opportunity to produce the first intelligence 

authorization in five years, no conference has yet been requested 

on the bills that have passed the Senate and House. Accordingly, 

both S. 1494 and H.R. 2701 remain, as of now, in the House of Representatives. 

In order to provide a public record of the agreement on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, and to urge Congress to complete action on this needed legislation, the Committee 

has determined to report the agreement as a new measure that the 

President’s senior advisors will recommend that he sign into law as 

soon as he is provided the opportunity to do so. The only substantive change from the text reviewed by the Administration for 

the OMB letter of June 10, 2010, is described in the sectional analysis for Section 333(c). 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

The following is a section-by-section analysis and explanation of 

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that is 

being reported by the Committee. 

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee recommended the provisions of this bill to the Committee as a reconciliation of a bill (S. 1494) that passed the Senate on September 

16, 2009, and the text of a bill (H.R. 2701) passed by the House 

on February 26, 2010. As described above, the reconciliation of the 

Senate and House bills is the product of communications with the 

Executive Branch and the leadership of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. 

This section-by-section analysis describes the differences between 

S. 1494, H.R. 2701, and this Senate bill, except for clerical corrections, conforming changes, and minor drafting and clarifying 

changes. 

TITLE I—BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS 

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations 

Section 101 authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2010 for the 

intelligence and intelligence-related activities of a list of United 

States Government departments, agencies, and other elements. 

Section 101 is identical to Section 101 of S. 1494 and to Section 101 

of the H.R. 2701. 

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations 

Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts authorized 

to be appropriated under Section 101 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal year 2010, and (subject to Section 103) the personnel levels authorized for fiscal year 2010, are 

contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of Authorizations will be made available to the Committees on 

Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to 

the President. 

Section 102 is identical to Section 102 of S. 1494. Section 102 of 

H.R. 2701 had provided that personnel authorizations for the Intelligence Community would be in terms of personnel ceilings, as in 


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prior intelligence authorizations, rather than as personnel levels 

expressed as full-time equivalent positions, as in S. 1494. This bill 

followed the Senate in this regard. 

The use of full-time equivalent positions will allow Intelligence 

Community elements to plan for and manage its workforce based 

on overall hours of work, rather than number of employees, as a 

truer measure of personnel levels. This approach is consistent with 

general governmental practice and will provide the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Congress with a more accurate measurement of personnel levels. For example, it will enable Intelligence Community elements to count two half-time employees as 

holding the equivalent of one full-time position, rather than counting them as two employees against a ceiling. 

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments 

Section 103 provides procedures to enhance the flexibility of the 

DNI to manage the personnel levels of the Intelligence Community. 

Section 103(a) allows the DNI to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number of full-time equivalent positions authorized under Section 102 by an amount not to exceed 

three percent of the total limit applicable to each Intelligence Community element. Before the DNI may authorize this increase, the 

DNI must determine that the action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions and notify the congressional intelligence committees. Section 103 of S. 1494 had provided 

that this authority could extend to five percent. Section 103 of H.R. 

2701 had set the additional amount at three percent. The agreement of three percent in part reflects the fact that employment 

above the number of full-time equivalent positions authorized 

under Section 102 is unlikely given the late date during the fiscal 

year of this bill. 

Section 103(b) establishes authority that will enable the DNI to 

reduce the number of Intelligence Community contractors by providing the flexibility to add a comparable number of government 

personnel to replace those contractor employees. Section 103(b) accomplishes this by permitting the DNI to authorize employment of 

additional full-time equivalent personnel if the head of an element 

in the Intelligence Community determines that activities currently 

being performed by contractor employees should be performed by 

government employees, and the DNI agrees with the determination. 

Section 103(c) requires the DNI to establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment 

under the personnel levels authorized under Section 102(a), of a variety of part-time arrangements. These include, but are not limited 

to, the circumstances set forth in subsection 103(c): student or 

trainee programs; re-employment of annuitants in the National Intelligence Reserve Corps; joint duty rotational assignments; and 

other full-time or part-time positions. 

Subsection 103(d) provides for notifications to the congressional 

intelligence committees of the exercise of authority under subsections 103(a) and 103(b). Subsections 103(b) through (d) are identical to subsections 103(b) through (d) of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did not 

have provisions similar to subsections (b) and (c). 


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Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account 

Section 104 authorizes the sum of $710,612,000 in fiscal year 

2010 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 

Director of National Intelligence. The Intelligence Community 

Management Account is part of the Community Management Account. The section authorizes 822 full-time equivalent personnel for 

the Intelligence Community Management Account, who may be either permanent employees or individuals detailed from other elements of the United States Government. Section 104 also authorizes additional funds and personnel in the classified Schedule of 

Authorizations for the Community Management Account. The DNI 

may use the authorities in Section 103 to adjust personnel levels 

within the Intelligence Community Management Account, subject 

to the limitations in that section. 

Section 104 is similar to Section 104 of S. 1494 and Section 104 

of H.R. 2701. 

Section 105. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities 

Section 105 provides that the authorization of appropriations by 

the Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct 

of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by the 

Constitution or the laws of the United States. Section 105 is identical to Section 105 of S. 1494 and Section 106 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 106. Continuation of prior authorization of funds for certain 

intelligence activities 

Section 106 amends Section 8079 of the Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111–118; 123 Stat. 3446) in 

order that the authorization of funds appropriated by that Act continue notwithstanding the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. A similar provision is included in section 301 of H.R. 4899, the emergency supplemental appropriations 

act for fiscal year 2010, as passed by the Senate. 

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT 

AND DISABILITY SYSTEM 

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations 

Section 201 authorizes appropriations of $290,900,000 for the 

Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund. Section 201 is identical to Sections 201 of S. 1494 and H.R. 2701. 

Section 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act 

Section 202 updates the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement 

Act to reflect the use of pay levels within the Senior Intelligence 

Service program, rather than pay grades, by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Section 202 is identical to Section 202 of S. 

1494 and similar to Section 512 of H.R. 2701. 


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TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS 

SUBTITLE A—PERSONNEL MATTERS

Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law 

Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be appropriated by 

this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal 

employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental 

amounts as may be necessary for increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law. Section 301 is identical to Section 301 of 

S. 1494 and Section 301 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 302. Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to elements of the Intelligence Community 

Section 302 expands from one year to up to two years the length 

of time that United States Government personnel may be detailed 

to elements of the Intelligence Community from other parts of the 

federal government on a reimbursable basis or on a non-reimbursable basis under which the employee continues to be paid by the 

home agency. To utilize this authority, the joint agreement of the 

head of the Intelligence Community element and the head of the 

detailing element is required. As explained by the DNI, this authority will provide flexibility for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), for example, to receive support from 

other elements of the Intelligence Community or other elements of 

the United States Government for community-wide activities where 

both the home agency and the ODNI would benefit from the detail. 

Section 302 of S. 1494 would have expanded the time available 

for reimbursable or non-reimbursable details to three years. Section 303 of H.R. 2701 allowed reimbursable or non-reimbursable 

details for periods not to exceed two years. While providing in this 

bill only for a two-year maximum for reimbursable or non-reimbursable details to the Intelligence Community, the Committee believes that the question of three year details merits further study. 

Section 303. Pay authority for critical positions 

Section 303 adds a new subsection (s) to section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–1) to provide enhanced 

pay authority for critical positions in portions of the Intelligence 

Community where that authority does not now exist. Subsection 

102A(s) allows the DNI, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB), to authorize the head of a department or agency with an Intelligence Community element to fix 

a rate of compensation in excess of applicable limits for a position 

that requires an extremely high level of expertise and is critical to 

accomplishing an important mission, to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an individual extremely well qualified for such position. A rate of pay higher than Executive Level II would require 

written approval of the DNI. A rate of pay higher than Executive 

Level I would require written approval of the President in response 

to a DNI request. 

Section 303 is identical to the corresponding portion of Section 

303 of S. 1494, with an additional notification requirement when 


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the authority is exercised by the employing department or agency. 

H.R. 2701 did not have a comparable provision. The section of S. 

1494 that contained this pay authority also would have provided 

additional authority to enable the DNI to harmonize personnel 

rules in the Intelligence Community. It would have enabled the 

DNI, with the concurrence of a department or agency head, to convert competitive service positions and incumbents within an Intelligence Community element to excepted service positions. It also 

would have granted authority to the DNI to authorize Intelligence 

Community elements—with concurrence of the concerned department or agency heads and in coordination with the Director of the 

Office of Personnel Management—to adopt compensation, performance, management, and scholarship authority that have been authorized for any other Intelligence Community element. The Committee agreed to study these additional provisions further and not 

include them in this compromise. 

Section 304. Award of rank to members of the Senior National Intelligence Service 

Section 304 adds a new subsection (t) to Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–1). Subsection 102A(t) 

authorizes Presidential Rank awards to members of the Senior National Intelligence Service (SNIS) and other Intelligence Community senior civilian officers not already covered by such a rank 

award program. 

According to the DNI, the authority to issue Presidential Rank 

Awards was originally enacted in 1978 as a program of the Senior 

Executive Service (SES) to honor high-performing senior career employees. The CIA and other elements of the Intelligence Community were exempted by statute from the SES, and thus not eligible 

for Presidential Rank Awards. Legislation enacted since 1978 has 

opened the eligibility for Presidential Rank Awards to senior civilian officers of exempt agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration, and members of the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service. 

Section 304 would authorize the President to recognize members 

of the SNIS and other senior civilian officers not already covered 

by such a program who deserve such recognition with Presidential 

Rank. This authority must be used in a manner consistent with 

rank awards conferred on other senior executives of the Executive 

Branch, and subject to regulations that protect the identity of such 

individual as a member or officer of the intelligence community, if 

necessary. 

Section 304 is based on Section 304 of S. 1494, which was modified to clarify the application of the provision to officers of the Intelligence Community who are undercover. H.R. 2701 had no comparable provision. 

Section 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence 

community 

Section 305 creates a new Section 506B in Title V of the National 

Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), an oversight mechanism that requires the DNI to conduct, in consultation with the 

head of the element of the Intelligence Community concerned, an 

annual personnel level assessment for each of the elements within 


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the Intelligence Community and provide those assessments with 

the submission of the President’s budget request each year. Section 

305 is a new oversight mechanism that will allow both the Executive branch and Congress to better oversee personnel growth in the 

Intelligence Community. 

The assessment consists of three parts. First, the assessment 

must provide basic personnel and core contract personnel information for the concerned element of the Intelligence Community (with 

civilian personnel expressed as full-time equivalent positions) for 

the upcoming fiscal year. It requires that the data be compared 

against current fiscal year and historical five-year personnel numbers and funding levels. The term ‘‘core contractor’’ is not defined 

in Section 305, but is intended to include those independent contractors or individuals employed by industrial contractors who augment civilian and military personnel by providing direct support to 

Intelligence Community elements—as opposed to commodity contractors (e.g., those working on the production or delivery of enduse items such as satellites) or commercial contractors (e.g., those 

providing services to Intelligence Community facilities, such as 

janitorial, landscaping, or food service personnel). 

Second, the assessment must include a written justification for 

the requested funding levels. This requirement is necessary to ensure that any personnel cost cuts or increases are fully documented 

and justified. Third, the assessment must contain a statement by 

the DNI that, based upon current and projected funding, the element concerned will have the internal infrastructure to support the 

requested agency and core contract personnel levels, training resources to support agency personnel levels, and sufficient funding 

to support the administrative and operational activities of the requested agency and contract personnel levels. 

To accommodate Executive branch concerns about the sensitivity 

of information concerning ongoing investigations, this bill does not 

include a requirement that the assessment contain a list of all contract personnel who have been the subject of an investigation by 

the inspector general of any element of the Intelligence Community 

during the previous fiscal year or who are or have been the subject 

of an investigation during the current fiscal year. The Committee 

expects the congressional intelligence committees to be notified 

under other provisions of law when such investigations involve a 

significant matter. 

The Committee believes that the personnel level assessment tool 

is necessary for the Executive branch and Congress to fully understand the consequences of managing the Intelligence Community’s 

personnel levels, particularly in light of a transition to managing 

personnel as full-time equivalents subject to available funds. In recent years, the congressional intelligence committees have been 

concerned that the sharp growth in personnel numbers since the 

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, is unsustainable. In particular, when overall budgets do not keep pace with inflation and 

decline in real terms, personnel costs as a percentage of the budget 

increase each year and divert funds from operations and modernization. 

Another longstanding concern of the congressional intelligence 

committees has been the Intelligence Community’s reliance upon 

contract personnel to meet mission requirements. The Committee 


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believes that the annual personnel level assessment tool will assist 

the DNI and the elements of the Intelligence Community in arriving at an appropriate balance of contract personnel and permanent 

government employees. 

Section 305 is similar to Section 305 of S. 1494 and Section 332 

of H.R. 2701. 

Section 306. Temporary personnel authorizations for critical language training 

Section 306 addresses the continuing lack of critical language-capable personnel in the Intelligence Community and the difficulty of 

sending employees to get critical language training to remedy this 

shortage. Section 306 gives the DNI the authority to transfer fulltime equivalent positions to elements of the Intelligence Community on a temporary basis, to enable these elements to replace individuals who are participating in long-term language training, or to 

accept temporary transfers of language-capable employees from 

other elements of the Intelligence Community. This provision complements Section 103, which authorizes the DNI to issue guidance 

on the treatment of personnel under personnel ceilings, to include 

exemptions from personnel ceilings for personnel engaged in longterm full-time training. Section 306 authorizes an additional 100 

full-time equivalent positions for the ODNI and notes that these 

positions are to be used specifically to implement the new authorities granted by this section. 

Section 306 refers to ‘‘critical language training,’’ rather than 

‘‘foreign language training.’’ The Committee understands that this 

phrasing will permit the DNI to use this new authority in situations where an employee of the Intelligence Community who 

speaks English as a second language needs further training in 

English in order to comprehend particular complex or technical 

subjects. The DNI is required to submit an annual report to the 

congressional intelligence committees on the use of this authority. 

Section 306 is based on Section 306 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did not 

include a comparable provision. 

Section 307. Conflict of interest regulations for intelligence community employees 

Section 307 adds a provision to section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–1) directing the DNI, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, to issue 

regulations prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the 

intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if 

such employment creates a potential conflict of interest. To the extent that the DNI considers regulations of the Office of Government Ethics on this issue to be adequate, the DNI may incorporate 

and supplement such regulations as appropriate. Section 307 also 

requires an annual report to the congressional intelligence committees describing all outside employment that was authorized by the 

head of an element of the intelligence community during the preceding calendar year. 

Section 307 is based on Section 305 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 did not 

have a comparable provision. The House provision would also have 

prohibited an officer or employee of an element of the intelligence 

community from personally owning or effectively controlling an enVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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tity that markets or sells for profit the use of knowledge or skills 

that such officer or employee acquires or makes use of while carrying out the employee’s official duties. The Committee expects the 

DNI to consider whether to include such a prohibition in the regulations issued pursuant to this section. 

SUBTITLE B—EDUCATION MATTERS

Section 311. Permanent authorization for the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program 

Section 311 provides a permanent authorization for the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP), which was originally 

authorized as a pilot program in Section 318 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 and has continued under yearto-year appropriations. The purpose of the PRISP is to provide 

funds for selected students or former students to continue academic 

training, or be reimbursed for academic training previously obtained, in areas of specialization where the Intelligence Community 

is deficient or likely to be deficient in the future. Section 311 would 

also authorize the use of funds to allow students participating in 

the program to receive funds for books, travel expenses and a stipend, and other expenses reasonably appropriate to carry out the 

program. 

The PRISP has provided education funds to over 800 individuals 

since its inception in 2004, with an attrition rate of less than one 

percent of program participants. Intelligence agencies have been 

supportive of the program as it provides them the flexibility to 

compete effectively with the private sector to recruit individuals 

who possess critical skills sought by the Intelligence Community. 

Section 311 is similar to Section 311 of S. 1494 and H.R. 2701. 

Section 312. Modifications to the Louis Stokes Educational Scholarship Program 

Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 

402 note) authorizes the National Security Agency (NSA) to establish an undergraduate training program to facilitate recruitment of 

individuals with skills critical to its mission. The program is known 

as the Stokes Educational Scholarship Program, named for Representative Louis Stokes, a former chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives. 

Section 312 is intended to expand and strengthen the Stokes program. Section 312(a) expands the Stokes program to authorize the 

inclusion of graduate students. Section 312(d) amends Section 16 

to permit the NSA Director to protect intelligence sources and 

methods by deleting a requirement that NSA publicly identify to 

educational institutions students who are NSA employees or training program participants. Deletion of this disclosure requirement 

will enhance the ability of NSA to protect personnel and prospective personnel and to preserve the ability of training program participants to undertake future clandestine or other sensitive assignments for the Intelligence Community. 

The Committee recognizes that nondisclosure is appropriate 

when disclosure would threaten intelligence sources or methods, 

would endanger the life or safety of the student, or would limit the 


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employee’s or prospective employee’s ability to perform intelligence 

activities in the future. Notwithstanding the deletion of the disclosure requirement, the Committee expects NSA to continue to prohibit participants in the training program from engaging in any intelligence functions at the institutions they attend under the program. See H.R. Rep. No. 99–690, Part I (1986) (‘‘NSA employees attending an institution under the program will have no intelligence 

function whatever to perform at the institution.’’). 

Section 312 is also intended to make the program more effective 

by clarifying that ‘‘termination of employment’’ includes situations 

where employees fail to maintain satisfactory academic standards. 

According to the DNI, failure to maintain satisfactory academic 

performance has always been grounds for default resulting in the 

right of the government to recoup educational costs expended for 

the benefit of the defaulting employee. Section 312(b) would also 

expand the program by authorizing NSA to offer participation in 

the Stokes program to individuals who are not current federal employees. 

Finally, Section 312(e) authorizes other intelligence agencies to 

establish undergraduate or graduate training programs for civilian 

employees or prospective civilian employees that are similar to programs under Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act. Section 312 is similar to Section 312 of S. 1494 and Section 313 of 

H.R. 2701. 

Section 313. Intelligence officer training program 

Section 313 authorizes the Intelligence Officer Training Program 

(IOTP), which builds on two pilot programs that were authorized 

in previous years: the NSA ‘‘Pilot Program on Cryptologic Service 

Training,’’ described in Section 922 of the Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108–375 (2004) (50 U.S.C. 402 

note), and the Director of Central Intelligence pilot program ‘‘Improvement of Equality of Employment Opportunities in the Intelligence Community,’’ under Section 319 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–177 (2003) (50 

U.S.C. 403 note). The purpose of the IOTP is to encourage the 

preparation, recruitment, and retention of civilian personnel for careers in the Intelligence Community. It is also to help ensure that 

the Intelligence Community can better recruit and retain a workforce that is ethnically and culturally diverse so that it can accomplish its critical national security mission. 

The IOTP is to consist of two parts. First, the program would 

provide financial assistance to individuals through existing Intelligence Community scholarship authorities to pursue studies in 

critical language, analytic, scientific, technical, or other skills necessary to meet current or emerging needs of the Intelligence Community. Second, building on the ODNI’s successful Centers for Academic Excellence program, the IOTP would solicit colleges and universities from across the country to apply for grants on a competitive basis to implement academic programs that will help students 

develop the critical skills needed for careers in the Intelligence 

Community. Although the Committee did not include the specific 

language of H.R. 2701 that would have authorized grant programs 

for historically Black colleges and universities, the Committee understands that such colleges and universities have been the recipiVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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ents of such grants in the past. Further, the Committee encourages 

the ODNI to continue to reach out to historically Black colleges and 

universities, as well as Hispanic-serving institutions, tribally controlled colleges and universities, Alaska Native-serving institutions, 

and Native Hawaiian-serving institutions, in its efforts to recruit 

and retain a diverse workforce. 

Students attending participating colleges and universities and 

taking the prescribed course of study may competitively apply for 

financial assistance including, but not limited to, a monthly stipend, tuition assistance, book allowances, and travel expenses. Students who receive a threshold amount of assistance are obligated 

to serve in the Intelligence Community. The ODNI is to develop application requirements for students, which could include the successful completion of a security background investigation. 

Section 313 builds on a NSA pilot program that provided grants 

to academic institutions. The original NSA pilot program, with its 

focus on cryptologic service at NSA, although beneficial to NSA, no 

longer meets the variety of the Intelligence Community’s critical 

skills requirements. The IOTP, with its broader scope, is intended 

to assist the Intelligence Community in establishing and building 

partnerships with academic institutions and ensure a continuous 

pool of qualified entry-level applicants to Intelligence Community 

elements, tailored to changing priorities of an evolving Intelligence 

Community enterprise. 

Section 313 repeals the authorizations for the following programs 

that are either incorporated into or replaced by the IOTP: the pilot 

program authorized by Section 319 (but not the section findings) of 

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 

108–177 (2003) (50 U.S.C. 403 note); the scholarship program authorized by Section 1043 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act, Section 1003 of the National Security Act, Pub. L. 

No. 108–458 (2004) (50 U.S.C. 441g–2) (Intelligence Reform Act); 

and the pilot program authorized by Section 922 of the Ronald W. 

Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 

Pub. L. No. 108–375 (50 U.S.C. 402 note). Section 313 is similar 

to Section 313 of S. 1494 and Section 312 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 314. Pilot program for intensive language instruction in African languages 

Section 314 permits the DNI, in consultation with the National 

Security Education Board established under section 803(a) of the 

David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991, to establish a pilot program to provide scholarships for programs that provide intensive language instruction in any of the five highest priority African languages for which scholarships are not currently offered. The pilot program will terminate five years after the date on 

which it is established. 

The intent of the program is to begin building capability in African languages spoken in areas where U.S. national security interests may be affected, but where insufficient instructional capability 

exists in the United States. For example, the program may use intensive immersion instruction both in the United States and 

abroad in languages like Somali, Hausa, Amharic, Tigrinya, and 

Kituba. 


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Section 314 is intended by the Committee as a component in the 

development of a comprehensive plan for meeting national intelligence linguistic requirements, as required by Section 1041 of the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The Committee 

believes it is important for the Intelligence Community to be 

proactive in identifying languages from around the globe that are 

in need of attention and further resources. The Committee expects 

that the DNI will develop an overall language strategy that anticipates the Intelligence Community’s future needs and allocates resources accordingly. 

Section 314 is identical to Section 314 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. 

SUBTITLE C—ACQUISITION MATTERS

Section 321. Vulnerability assessments of major systems 

Section 321 adds a new oversight mechanism to the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) that requires the DNI to 

conduct an initial vulnerability assessment for each major system 

and its significant items of supply in the National Intelligence Program. The provision also requires the DNI to conduct subsequent 

vulnerability assessments throughout the procurement of a major 

system. The intent of the provision is to provide Congress and the 

DNI with an accurate assessment of the unique vulnerabilities and 

risks associated with each National Intelligence Program major 

system, which should enable a determination of whether funding 

for a particular major system should be modified or discontinued. 

The vulnerability assessment process will also require the various 

elements of the Intelligence Community responsible for implementing major systems to give due consideration to the risks and 

vulnerabilities associated with such implementation. 

The timing of when an initial vulnerability assessment must be 

completed under Section 321 depends upon whether a major system has reached Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision. 

For new major system acquisitions, the DNI must complete a vulnerability assessment and submit it to the congressional intelligence committees prior to completion of Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision. For major systems that have already completed Milestone B or will complete Milestone B during the sixmonth period following such enactment, the DNI must complete a 

vulnerability assessment within one year of enactment of the Act. 

The DNI also has the authority to extend the deadline for a major 

system by an additional six months, provided the DNI notifies the 

congressional intelligence committees and includes a justification 

for the extension. Thus, the DNI will have up to 18 months to complete the vulnerability assessments for existing major systems. 

The minimum requirements of the initial vulnerability assessment are fairly broad and are intended to provide the DNI with 

significant flexibility in crafting an assessment tailored to the proposed major system. The DNI is required to use, at a minimum, an 

analysis-based approach to identify vulnerabilities, define exploitation potential, examine the system’s potential effectiveness, determine overall vulnerability, and make recommendations for risk 

reduction. The Committee expects that these required elements 

will be weighted differently depending upon the nature of the 


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major system at issue. For example, a major system that is based 

upon cutting-edge technology may require a more careful examination of the system’s potential effectiveness than a system based 

upon time-tested technology. Also, certain major systems may 

share a common supply chain that can be assessed once, but incorporated into numerous vulnerability assessments. The DNI is obviously free to adopt a more rigorous methodology for the conduct of 

initial vulnerability assessments. 

Section 321 contains an enforcement mechanism to ensure that 

major system vulnerability assessments are completed in a timely 

fashion so that Congress and the DNI can make informed funding 

decisions. If a major system vulnerability assessment is not completed and submitted to the congressional intelligence committees 

within the deadlines required by subsection (a)(1), no funds appropriated for the major system may be obligated for a major contract 

until Congress receives the assessment. 

Vulnerability assessments should continue throughout the procurement of a major system. Numerous factors and considerations 

can affect the viability of a given major system. For that reason, 

Section 321 provides the DNI with the flexibility to set a schedule 

of subsequent vulnerability assessments for each major system 

when the DNI submits the initial vulnerability assessment to the 

congressional intelligence committees. The time period between assessments should depend upon the unique circumstances of a particular major system. For example, a new major system that is implementing an experimental technology might require annual assessments, while a more mature major system might not need such 

frequent reassessment. The DNI is also permitted to adjust a major 

system’s assessment schedule when the DNI determines that a 

change in circumstances warrants the issuance of a subsequent 

vulnerability assessment. Section 321 also provides that a congressional intelligence committee may request that the DNI conduct a 

subsequent vulnerability assessment of a major system. 

The minimum requirements for a subsequent vulnerability assessment are almost identical to those of an initial vulnerability assessment. There are only two additional requirements. First, if applicable to the given major system during its particular phase of 

development or production, the DNI shall also use a testing-based 

approach, if applicable, to assess the system’s vulnerabilities. The 

testing approach is obviously not intended to require the ‘‘crash 

testing’’ of a satellite system. Nor is it intended to require the DNI 

to test system hardware. However, the vulnerabilities of a satellite’s significant items of supply might be exposed by a rigorous 

testing regime. Second, the subsequent vulnerability assessment is 

required to monitor the exploitation potential of the major system. 

A subsequent vulnerability assessment should, therefore, monitor 

ongoing changes to vulnerabilities and understand the potential for 

exploitation. Since new vulnerabilities can become relevant and the 

characteristics of existing vulnerabilities can change, it is necessary to monitor both existing vulnerabilities and their characteristics and to check for new vulnerabilities on a regular basis. 

Section 321 requires the DNI to give due consideration to the 

vulnerability assessments prepared for the major systems within 

the National Intelligence Program. It also requires that the vulnerability assessments be provided to the congressional intelligence 


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committees within ten days of their completion. The Committee encourages the DNI to share the results of these vulnerabilities assessments, as appropriate, with other congressional committees of 

jurisdiction. 

Finally, the section contains definitions for the terms ‘‘items of 

supply,’’ ‘‘major system,’’ ‘‘Milestone B,’’ and ‘‘vulnerability assessment.’’ 

Section 321 is similar to Section 321 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no similar provision. 

Section 322. Intelligence community business system transformation 

A business enterprise architecture incorporates an agency’s financial, personnel, procurement, acquisition, logistics, and planning systems into one interoperable system. Historically, Intelligence Community elements have pursued unique, stovepiped systems that do not leverage the investments of other elements of the 

Intelligence Community. More recently, there has been a more collaborative effort among the Intelligence Community elements on 

the development of business systems, but true transformation to an 

integrated Intelligence Community architecture has not been 

achieved. Section 322 will help ensure that the DNI effectively and 

efficiently coordinates Intelligence Community business systems. 

Section 322 adds a new Section 506D to the National Security 

Act of 1947. It will prohibit the obligation of appropriated funds for 

any system costing more than three million dollars that has not 

been certified by the Director of the Office of Business Transformation of the ODNI as complying with the enterprise architecture, as necessary for national security, or as an essential capability. The certification process is to be supported by investment review procedures that meet the requirements of Section 11312 of 

title 40, United States Code, relating to maximizing the value, and 

assessing and managing the risks, of information technology acquisitions. The review process will be led by a board that will recommend business transformation policies and procedures to the 

DNI and review and approve major updates to the enterprise architecture and any plans for Intelligence Community business systems 

modernization. 

Section 322 will also require the ODNI to identify all ‘‘legacy systems’’ that will be either terminated or transitioned into the new 

architecture, and to include within the annual budget submission 

details on each business system being funded. Further, this section 

will require the DNI to report to the congressional intelligence committees annually for five years on the progress being made in implementing the new architecture. 

Section 322 requires the DNI to revise the enterprise architecture that was submitted to the congressional intelligence committees in December 2009 and to more clearly define all Intelligence 

Community business systems, as well as the functions and activities supported by those business systems, in order to issue detailed 

guidance on implementation of interoperable Intelligence Community business system solutions. Section 322 requires the revised enterprise architecture to be submitted by September 30, 2010. In addition, the enterprise architecture is to be supported by an implementation plan that includes an acquisition strategy for new sysVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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tems needed to complete the architecture. The acquisition strategy 

is to be submitted by March 31, 2011. 

Section 322 is based on Section 322 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 323. Reports on the acquisition of major systems 

Sections 323 and 324 amend Title V of the National Security Act 

of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) by creating Sections 506E and 506F 

to regulate the oversight of major system acquisitions within the 

Intelligence Community. In the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982, Congress created a statutory scheme 

(commonly referred to as ‘‘Nunn-McCurdy’’) which was designed to 

curtail cost growth in weapons procurement programs. The acquisition reforms contained in this Act are intended to bridge the current gap in the Intelligence Community major system acquisition 

process in a manner similar to the major defense acquisition process. Specifically, Section 506E is modeled on 10 U.S.C. 2433, which 

governs the submission of unit cost reports for major defense acquisitions. 

Definitions 

Sections 506E and 506F use terminology that is very similar to 

that used in the major defense acquisition process. However, some 

of these terms have been simplified to include terminology already 

familiar to the Intelligence Community. Some of the definitions in 

subsection (a) are not addressed here because they are either selfexplanatory or merely cross-reference existing statutory definitions. 

The term ‘‘cost estimate’’ appears only twice in Sections 506E 

and 506F and is used to alleviate concern by the Intelligence Community that they would have to conduct a full ‘‘independent cost 

estimate’’ under Section 506A of the National Security Act at certain points in the major system acquisition process. Section 506E 

requires the DNI to re-baseline any major system that is currently 

in breach of either the significant or the critical cost growth thresholds and permits the DNI to re-baseline any other existing major 

system. Given that the Act only allows a six-month period for the 

completion of such re-baselining, the Committee agreed that it 

would be unrealistic to expect a revised current Baseline Estimate 

to be based upon an independent cost estimate. 

A similar timing consideration is present in Section 506F, which 

allows the DNI to restructure a major system that has met or exceeded its critical cost growth threshold. The DNI must submit a 

Major System Congressional Report and a certification to Congress 

within 90 days after receiving notice of the critical cost growth 

breach. As part of that process, the DNI is required to establish a 

revised current Baseline Estimate. Again, the Committee recognized that 90 days was an insufficient time period to complete a 

formal independent cost estimate as part of this congressional reporting process. Thus, the definition allows the DNI to assess and 

quantify all of the costs and risks associated with each affected 

major system based upon reasonably available information at the 

time such cost estimate is conducted. 

The definition of the term ‘‘critical cost growth threshold’’ is a 

simplified version of the same term in the major defense acquisition process. As is discussed below, Sections 506E and 506F do not 


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differentiate between the terms ‘‘original Baseline Estimate’’ and 

‘‘current Baseline Estimate.’’ Instead, these sections simply utilize 

‘‘current Baseline Estimate,’’ which is subject to revision only in 

very limited circumstances. Also, these sections do not differentiate 

between ‘‘program acquisition unit costs’’ or ‘‘procurement unit 

costs.’’ The single term ‘‘total acquisition cost’’ is used to encompass 

both of these concepts, because it is currently used and understood 

by Intelligence Community acquisition and budgetary professionals. In addition, the definition of ‘‘critical cost growth threshold’’ is simplified to mean a percentage increase in the total acquisition cost for a major system of at least 25 percent over the total 

acquisition cost for the major system, as measured against the current Baseline Estimate for the major system. For example, if the 

current Baseline Estimate for a major system is 500 million dollars, the major system will reach its critical cost growth threshold 

when the total acquisition cost meets or exceeds 625 million dollars. 

The term ‘‘current Baseline Estimate’’ merges the concepts of 

‘‘original’’ and ‘‘current’’ baseline estimates used in the major defense acquisition process. There are only three circumstances in 

which a current Baseline Estimate may be established or modified. 

The first occurs when the DNI approves the projected total acquisition cost of a major system at Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision. This is the equivalent of an ‘‘original Baseline Estimate’’ and may be in the form of an independent cost estimate. The 

second occurs only if a major system has experienced a critical cost 

growth breach and the DNI has decided to restructure the major 

system and establish a revised current Baseline Estimate. The 

third may only occur during the six-month grandfather period following the enactment of the Act, when the DNI revises the current 

Baseline Estimates for existing major systems pursuant to subsection (h). Other than these three situations, the section contains 

no authority for the past practice of periodic re-baselining of major 

systems within the National Intelligence Program. Since this periodic re-baselining option has been taken off the table, the Committee expects that the incentive for accuracy of the independent 

cost estimates for major systems required by Section 506A will increase. If the independent cost estimate that drives the current 

Baseline Estimate is too low, the major system will likely breach 

its significant or critical cost growth thresholds. If the independent 

cost estimate is too high, it might be difficult to obtain funding for 

the major system from Congress. 

The term ‘‘major contract’’ is based upon but slightly different 

than the definition of the same term in 10 U.S.C. 2432(a)(3). 

The term ‘‘Milestone B’’ was derived from the definition of the 

term ‘‘Milestone B approval’’ in 10 U.S.C. 2366(e)(7) substituting 

the DNI for the Secretary of Defense. 

The term ‘‘program manager’’ has a meaning that is different 

from the usual understanding of the term. This definition does not 

include the individual who is responsible for the day-to-day administration of a particular major system. Rather, the term includes 

the head of the element of the Intelligence Community who is responsible for the budget, cost, schedule, and performance of a major 

system, or, if the major system is within the Office of the DNI, the 

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formance of a major system. The definition was constructed in this 

manner to ensure that Intelligence Community agency heads are 

fully cognizant and accountable for any major system cost overruns 

within their agency. 

The term ‘‘significant cost growth threshold’’ was derived in a 

manner similar to that previously described in the discussion of the 

term ‘‘critical cost growth threshold’’ and is a simplified version of 

the identical term in the major defense acquisition process. A significant cost growth threshold is reached when there is a percentage increase in the total acquisition cost for a major system of at 

least 15 percent over the total acquisition cost for the major system 

as measured against the current Baseline Estimate for the major 

system. For example, if the current Baseline Estimate for a major 

system is 500 million dollars, the major system will reach its significant cost growth threshold when the total acquisition cost meets 

or exceeds 575 million dollars. 

Major System Cost Reports 

Section 323 requires Intelligence Community program managers 

to submit a quarterly major system cost report to the DNI for each 

major system. These cost reports will keep the DNI updated on the 

progress of each major system as it progresses through the acquisition process. A major system cost report shall consist of four elements: (1) the total acquisition cost for the major system; (2) any 

cost or schedule variance in a major contract for the major system; 

(3) any changes from a major system schedule milestones or performances that are known, expected, or anticipated by the program 

manager; and (4) any significant changes in the total acquisition 

cost for development and procurement of any software component 

of the major system, schedule milestones for such software component, or expected performance of such software component that are 

known, expected, or anticipated by the program manager. These 

routine major system cost reports are due to the DNI within 30 

days after the end of the reporting quarter. 

Program managers are also required to submit a major system 

cost report immediately to the DNI if they determine at any time 

during the quarter that there is reasonable cause to believe that 

the total acquisition cost has triggered a significant or critical cost 

growth breach. 

Major System Congressional Reports 

Unlike the Department of Defense acquisition process, Section 

506E does not require the submission of detailed quarterly Selected 

Acquisition Reports to Congress for each major system. Instead, the 

DNI is only required to submit a Major System Congressional Report whenever the DNI determines the total acquisition cost of a 

major system has met or exceeded a significant or critical cost 

growth threshold. The elements of a Major System Congressional 

Report in subsection (f) track very closely with the elements contained in the congressional report required pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 

2433(g)(1) under the defense acquisition process. The deviations are 

largely the result of terminology differences between the two processes or based on the fact that the Selected Acquisition Report is 

not included in the Intelligence Community major system acquisition process. Major System Congressional Reports for significant 


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cost growth breaches must be submitted to Congress no later than 

45 days after the date on which the DNI receives the major system 

cost report that identified such breach. 

If the DNI determines that the total acquisition cost of a major 

system has met or exceeded the critical cost growth threshold, then 

the DNI is required to follow the procedures set forth in Section 

506F, which includes a presumption of termination of the major 

system. If the DNI decides not to terminate a major system that 

has experienced a critical cost growth breach, the DNI will be required to submit a Major System Congressional Report and a certification pursuant to Section 506F(b)(2). Section 506F(b)(1) requires that such Major System Congressional Report and certification be submitted within 90 days after the date the DNI receives 

the major system cost report that identified the critical cost growth 

breach. 

Prohibition on Obligation of Funds 

To ensure that these reports and certifications are submitted to 

Congress in a timely fashion, Section 506E contains an enforcement mechanism that is very similar to that found in the major defense acquisition process at 10 U.S.C. 2433(e)(3). Subsection (g) 

prohibits the obligation of funds for a major system if the DNI fails 

to submit the required reports and certification within the 45-day 

deadline for a significant cost-growth breach or the 90-day deadline 

for a critical cost-growth breach. The prohibition on obligation of 

funds is not triggered by the DNI’s determination that there has 

been a significant or critical cost-growth breach under subsection 

(d). Rather, it is triggered by the failure of the DNI to submit the 

required congressional reporting within the statutory deadlines established in subsection (e)(1) and Section 506F(b)(1). 

The prohibition on obligating funds for a major system will cease 

to apply 45 days after Congress receives the required Major System 

Congressional Report in the case of a significant cost-growth breach 

or the required Major System Congressional Report and certification in the case of a critical cost-growth breach. The only real difference between this provision and that used by the major defense 

acquisition process is the use of a straight-forward 45-day time period as compared to the ‘‘30 days of continuous session of Congress’’ 

formulation used in 10 U.S.C. 2433(e)(3). 

Grandfather Clause 

To ease the transition into this new Intelligence Community 

major system acquisition process, the Committee agreed to construct a grandfather clause that would require the DNI to establish 

a revised current Baseline Estimate for all major systems with a 

current total acquisition cost equal to or greater than its significant 

or critical cost-growth threshold and permit the DNI to establish 

a revised current Baseline Estimate for the remaining major systems. The DNI has six months after enactment of the Act to complete this process and submit a report to Congress describing the 

DNI’s determinations and each revised current Baseline Estimate. 

The grandfather clause also allows the DNI to include the estimated cost of conducting any vulnerability assessments in any such 

revised current Baseline Estimate. 


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Reports on Acquisitions of Major Systems 

Section 323 also clarifies that any determination of a percentage 

increase under Section 506E is required to be stated in terms of 

constant base year dollars. In addition, any report required to be 

submitted under Section 506E is required to be submitted in a classified form. Finally, Section 323 also clarifies that nothing in the 

Intelligence Community major system acquisition process shall be 

construed to exempt an acquisition program of the Department of 

Defense from the requirements of chapter 144 of title 10, United 

States Code or Department of Defense Directive 5000, to the extent 

that such requirements are otherwise applicable. 

Section 323 is based on Section 323 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. The Committee agreed to modify Sections 

323 and 324 in part to address concerns of the ODNI and to reflect 

changes made in Title 10 of the United States Code by the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–23 

(May 22, 2009). 

Section 324. Critical cost growth in major systems 

Section 324 amends Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 

(50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) by creating Section 506F to regulate the 

oversight of major system acquisitions within the Intelligence Community in the case of excessive cost growth. Specifically, Section 

506F is modeled very closely on 10 U.S.C. 2433a, which governs 

the critical cost growth in major defense acquisition programs. 

Reassessment of Major System 

If the DNI determines under Section 506E(d) that the total acquisition cost of a major system has increased by a percentage 

equal to or greater than the critical cost growth threshold for such 

system, then the DNI is required to determine the root causes of 

the critical cost growth and carry out an assessment of the projected costs, any reasonable alternatives, and the need to reduce 

funding for other systems to compensate for the cost growth of the 

major system. This reassessment of the major system will be used 

by the DNI in deciding whether the major system should be terminated or restructured. 

Presumption of Termination 

After conducting a reassessment of the major system that has 

reached its critical cost growth threshold, the DNI is required to 

terminate the major system unless the DNI submits a Major System Congressional Report and a certification to Congress that justifies the continuation of the major system. The Major System Congressional Report and certification are due to Congress not later 

than 90 days after the date the DNI received the major system cost 

report that provided the basis for the DNI’s determination under 

506E(d). 

The Major System Congressional Report for a critical cost growth 

breach contains all of the elements required by Section 506E(e) for 

the Major System Congressional Report required in the case of a 

significant cost growth breach, but also requires the following additional elements: (1) the root cause analysis and assessment required by subsection (a); (2) the basis for the determinations made 

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ued; and (3) a description of all funding changes made as a result 

of the growth in the major system, including the need for any reductions made in funding for other systems to accommodate such 

cost growth. In essence, the Major System Congressional Report, in 

the case of critical cost growth, provides Congress with the detailed 

factual basis necessary to determine whether funding for the major 

system should be extended or terminated. 

The certification is intended to make the DNI accountable for the 

decision to proceed with a major system that has experienced a 

critical cost growth breach. The required elements of the certification are straight-forward. First, the DNI must certify that the 

continuation of the major system is essential to national security. 

The second element is closely related to the first. The DNI must 

certify that there are no less costly alternatives to the major system that will provide acceptable capability to meet the intelligence 

requirement. 

Third, the DNI must determine that the new estimates of the 

total acquisition cost are reasonable. If the DNI’s analysis and assessment reveal that the new estimate of the total acquisition cost 

of the affected major system is unreasonable, then this certification 

element cannot be satisfied and a revised current Baseline Estimate should not be prepared. 

The fourth certification element requires the DNI to prioritize 

the affected major system relative to other systems whose funding 

must be reduced to accommodate its cost growth. The DNI must 

certify that the affected major system in question is a higher priority than any of the other major systems, otherwise this element 

cannot be satisfied. 

The final certification element is an accountability requirement. 

The DNI must certify that the management structure for the major 

system is adequate to manage and control the total acquisition 

cost. Depending upon the particular circumstances, the DNI may 

need to take steps, in coordination with the major system program 

manager, to ensure that the management structure is capable of 

controlling the total acquisition cost of the affected major system. 

If the DNI does not certify to all five of these elements, then the 

DNI is required to terminate the major system under subsection 

(b). 

Actions if a Major System Is Not Terminated 

There are some additional actions that the DNI must complete 

if the DNI elects not to terminate a major system that has 

breached the critical cost growth threshold. These actions are in 

addition to the submission of the Major System Congressional Report and certification requirements of subsection (b). First, the DNI 

must restructure the major system in a manner that addresses the 

root causes of the critical cost growth. The DNI must also ensure 

that the system has an appropriate management structure. Second, 

the DNI is required to rescind the most recent Milestone approval 

for the major system. Third, the DNI must require a new Milestone 

approval for the major system before taking any action to enter 

into a new contract, exercise an option under an existing contract, 

or otherwise extend the scope of an existing contract under the system. The requirement applies except to the extent determined necessary by the Milestone Decision Authority, on a non-delegable 


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basis, to ensure that the system may be restructured as intended 

by the DNI without unnecessarily wasting resources. Fourth, the 

DNI is required to establish a revised current Baseline Estimate 

for the major system based upon an updated cost estimate. This revised current Baseline Estimate for the affected major system will 

be used to calculate future breaches of the significant or critical 

cost growth thresholds. Finally, the DNI is required to conduct regular reviews of major systems that have experienced a critical cost 

growth breach. 

Actions if a Major System Is Terminated 

If the DNI decides to terminate a major system, the DNI is required to submit a brief report to Congress that explains the reasons for the termination, the alternatives considered to address the 

problems with the major system, and the course the DNI plans to 

pursue to meet any intelligence requirements otherwise intended to 

be met by the terminated major system. 

Waiver 

The Department of Defense major defense acquisition process 

provides for a waiver of the Selected Acquisition Report requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2432 and other Nunn-McCurdy requirements 

when 90 percent of the items to be delivered to the United States 

(90 percent of planned expenditures) have been made under a 

major defense acquisition program. The DNI requested that a similar 90 percent waiver provision be added to Section 506F. 

The Committee agreed to a somewhat more limited waiver provision. Under subsection (f), the DNI may waive certain specified requirements in Sections 506E and 506F (e.g., the prohibition on obligation of funds, the presumption of termination) if the DNI determines that at least 90 percent of the amount of the current Baseline Estimate for the major system has been expended. If the DNI 

exercises this authority, the DNI is required to provide a written 

notification to the congressional intelligence committees that includes the basic information required for a Major System Congressional Report under Section 506E(f). 

If the DNI grants the 90-percent waiver, the program manager 

is still required to submit quarterly major system cost reports on 

such major system to the DNI. If the major system cost report reveals a significant or critical cost growth breach, then the DNI 

must submit the additional written notice required by subsection 

(f)(2)(A) to the congressional intelligence committees. This notification process will facilitate Congress monitoring closely any waived 

major system that experiences a significant or critical cost growth 

breach during the last 10 percent of its estimated acquisition cost. 

It also creates an incentive for program managers to ensure that 

cost growth is minimized during the entire procurement of a major 

system. 

Section 324 is based on Section 324 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 325. Future budget projections 

Section 325 adds a new Section 506G to the National Security 

Act of 1947. It requires the DNI, with the concurrence of the Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB), to provide the congressional inVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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telligence committees with two future budget projections that together span ten years. Section 325 thus ensures that the Intelligence Community will make long-term budgetary projections that 

span the same time frame as the funding needs of programs it initiates in the budget. 

Section 325 requires first a Future Year Intelligence Plan for at 

least four years after the budget year, which includes the year-byyear funding plan for each expenditure center and for each major 

system in the National Intelligence Program. Section 325 also requires lifecycle cost and milestones for major systems and a Longterm Budget Projection five years beyond the Future Year Intelligence Plan, but at a much higher level of budget aggregation. Section 325 requires that the Long-term Budget Projection include a 

description of whether, and to what extent, the projection for each 

year for each element of the Intelligence Community exceeds the 

level that would result from applying the most recent OMB inflation estimate to that element. Both budget projections must be submitted to Congress with the President’s budget request. 

Section 325 ensures that the Executive branch and Congress will 

be fully aware of the long-term budgetary impact of a major system 

acquisition prior to its development or production. This is achieved 

through a requirement for a major system affordability report. This 

report will assess whether, and to what extent, a new acquisition, 

if developed, procured, and operated, would cause an increase in 

the most recent Future Year Intelligence Plan and Long-term 

Budget Projection. The affordability report is required before the 

time that the President submits to Congress the budget for the 

first fiscal year in which appropriated funds are anticipated to be 

obligated for the development or procurement of the system. This 

affordability report will be updated whenever an independent cost 

estimate must be updated. Section 325 is based on Section 325 of 

S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had no comparable provision. 

Section 326. National Intelligence Program funded acquisitions 

Section 326 adds a new subparagraph (4) to the acquisition authorities of the DNI collected in Section 102A(n) of the National Security Act of 1947. Existing subparagraph (1) authorizes the DNI 

to exercise the acquisition and appropriations authorities referred 

to in the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (CIA Act). Although subparagraph (1) is not explicit, those authorities are found 

in Sections 3 and 8 of the CIA Act, except, as provided in subparagraph (1), for the CIA’s authority under section 8(b) to expend 

funds without regard to laws and regulations on Government expenditures for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency 

nature. 

Subparagraph (4)(A) authorizes the DNI to make acquisition authority referred to in Sections 3 and 8(a) of the CIA Act also available to any Intelligence Community element for an acquisition that 

is funded in whole or in majority part by the National Intelligence 

Program. Among Intelligence Community elements, the National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) already exercise these or similar authorities 

either directly or through the CIA. The grant of this authority to 

the DNI is part of an effort to ensure that the DNI has the ability 

to manage the elements of the Intelligence Community as a comVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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munity by enabling the DNI to make available throughout the Intelligence Community, when warranted, authority originally enacted for one of its elements. 

Subparagraphs 4(B)–(G) establish procedures and controls on the 

grant of this authority. The head of an Intelligence Community element, without delegation, must request in writing that the DNI 

make the authority available. The request must explain the need 

for the acquisition authority, including an explanation why other 

authorities are insufficient and a certification that the mission of 

the element would be impaired if the requested authority is not exercised. In turn, for the authority to be provided, the DNI, the 

Principal Deputy DNI, or a designated Deputy DNI must issue a 

written authorization that includes a justification supporting the 

use of the authority. 

Requests from the head of an Intelligence Community element 

that are within the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury shall be transmitted to the DNI 

in accordance with procedures established by the heads of those departments. Also, to ensure periodic review, authorities may not be 

granted for a class of acquisitions beyond a renewable 3 years, except for a renewable 6 years if the DNI personally approves the authority. The congressional intelligence committees shall be notified 

of all authorizations granted under subparagraph (4). 

Section 326 is similar to Section 326 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

SUBTITLE D—CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, PLANS, AND REPORTS

Section 331. Notification procedures 

Section 331 amends requirements concerning congressional oversight in Sections 501–503 of the National Security Act of 1947. It 

is based on Section 321 of H.R. 2701 and Sections 331–334 of S. 

1494. 

Section 501(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 provides that 

the President and the congressional intelligence committees shall 

each establish such procedures as are necessary to carry out the accountability provisions of Title V of that Act, which include the requirements for reporting on intelligence activities and covert actions. Section 331(a) amends Section 501(c) to clarify that the procedures required by subsection (c) be written procedures. 

Section 331(b) amends Section 502(a)(2) of the National Security 

Act to specify that the requirement to provide the congressional intelligence committees with any information or material concerning 

activities other than covert actions includes the legal basis under 

which the significant intelligence activity is being or was conducted. A similar amendment is made by Section 331(c) to Section 

503(b)(2) with respect to covert action. In addition, Section 331(c) 

specifies, in an amendment to Section 503(c), that any covert action 

finding shall be reported in writing and that the President shall 

also provide in writing the reasons for any limited access to a finding or notice of significant change in a finding. 

Section 331(c) also sets forth, as an amendment to Section 

503(d), six factors that the President shall consider, among other 

relevant factors, in determining whether an activity constitutes a 

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tification is required. These factors include: significant risk of loss 

of life; expansion of existing authorities; the expenditure of significant funds or other resources; notification under Section 504, pertaining to funding of intelligence activities; significant risk of disclosure of intelligence sources or methods; or a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious risk of damage to diplomatic relations if such 

activity were disclosed without authorization. Finally, Section 

331(c) also adds a new subsection (g) to Section 503 to require the 

President to maintain a record of the Members of Congress to 

whom a limited access finding—or notice of significant change in 

a previously approved covert action or in any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding—was reported 

and the date on which each such Member receives such a finding 

or notice. The President must also maintain the written statement 

required to be made of the reasons for not notifying all Members 

of the intelligence committees of such a finding or notice. 

Over the years that the intelligence committees have engaged in 

oversight of the Intelligence Community, many elements of the 

process for notifying Congress concerning intelligence activities, including covert actions, have emerged from practice that reflects a 

sense of comity between the two branches and a shared sense of 

responsibility for national security matters. 

There have nonetheless been serious disputes over the implementation of these practices—and over the meaning of the provisions 

on which they are based—with respect to notification regarding 

certain intelligence activities. The modifications to the notification 

provisions adopted in this section are intended to clarify and improve certain specific and important elements of this practice, but 

should not be construed to be anything more than specific requirements that procedures, findings, and reasons be in writing, and information on legality be provided. The modifications contained in 

this section do not alter the fundamental compact between the Executive and Legislative branches with respect to national security 

oversight. Moreover, nothing in these provisions is intended to infringe on the President’s constitutional authority in this area or on 

the constitutional authority of Congress to conduct oversight of 

U.S. intelligence activities. 

Section 332. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements 

Section 332 requires the head of each element of the Intelligence 

Community to submit a certification on an annual basis that the 

element is in full compliance with Title V of the National Security 

Act of 1947, which requires that the congressional intelligence committees be kept fully and currently informed of intelligence activities. The head of each element of the Intelligence Community must 

also certify that any information required to be submitted to the 

congressional intelligence committees has been submitted. The first 

certification shall be submitted within 90 days of enactment of the 

Act. 

If the head of an element is unable to submit the certification required by this section, the section requires an explanation as to 

why the certification cannot be made, a description of information 

required to be submitted, and an affirmation that the head of the 

element will submit such information as soon as possible. 


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Section 332 is based on Section 336 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 did not 

have a comparable provision. 

Section 333. Report on detention and interrogation activities 

Section 333 requires the DNI, in coordination with the Attorney 

General and the Secretary of Defense, to provide the congressional 

intelligence committees a comprehensive report on five matters by 

December 1, 2010. The report may be submitted in classified form. 

Pursuant to subsection (a)(1), the report shall contain the policies 

and procedures of the United States Government governing participation by an element of the Intelligence Community in the interrogation of individuals detained by the United States who are suspected of international terrorism with the objective, in whole or in 

part, of acquiring national intelligence. This reporting requirement 

applies to policies and procedures and is not intended to require a 

description of interrogations on a detainee-by-detainee basis. However, with respect to policies and procedures, the report is intended 

to be comprehensive. It includes not only interrogation directly by 

an element of the Intelligence Community (a term that includes the 

CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence elements 

of the FBI) but also interrogation undertaken with the support of 

an element of the Intelligence Community or by any interagency 

body established to carry out interrogation. 

The report shall include, in accordance with subsection (a)(2), the 

policies and procedures of the United States Government for any 

detention by an individual suspected of international terrorism by 

the Central Intelligence Agency. Section 4(a) of Executive Order 

13491 (74 Fed. Reg. 4893) directed the CIA to close any detention 

facility that it operated at the time of the issuance of the order, on 

January 22, 2009, and not to operate any such detention facility in 

the future. However, Section 2(g) of the Executive Order defined 

‘‘detention facility’’ as not referring ‘‘to facilities used only to hold 

people on a short-term, transitory basis.’’ The report required by 

subsection (a)(1)(B) does not distinguish between long-term and 

short-term detention, but embraces all detention of individuals suspected of international terrorism by the CIA. 

Pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the comprehensive report shall describe the legal basis of the interrogation and detention policies 

and procedures described in subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2). This 

should include the legal basis of such policies and procedures under 

applicable statutes, international agreements, and Executive orders. 

In August 2009, the Special Task Force on Interrogation and 

Transfer Policies established by Executive Order 13491 (74 Fed. 

Reg. 4893) recommended that the United States form a specialized 

interagency interrogation group that would coordinate the deployment of experienced, interagency interrogation teams, develop a set 

of best interrogation practices for training purposes, and establish 

a program of scientific research on interrogation approaches and 

techniques. Under subsection (a)(4) of Section 333, the report 

should describe the actions taken to implement these recommendations of the Special Task Force concerning research relating to interrogation practices and training on interrogation in the Intelligence Community. 


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Finally, pursuant to subsection (a)(5), the report should describe 

any actions taken to implement the section of the Detainee Treatment Act that provides for the protection against civil or criminal 

liability, as well as counsel fees and other expenses, for U.S. Government personnel who had engaged in officially authorized interrogations that were determined to be lawful at the time. 

Section 333(b) provides to the extent that the report required by 

Section 333 addresses an element of the Intelligence Community 

within the Department of Defense or the Department of Justice, 

that portion of the report must also be submitted to the congressional armed services committees or the congressional judiciary 

committees. 

Section 333(c) requires the DNI to provide the appropriate committees of Congress with any significant modification or revision of 

the charter and procedures for the specialized interagency interrogation group, known as the ‘‘High-Value Detainee Interrogation 

Group’’ (HIG), within 30 days after their approval. Section 333(c) 

also requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate committees of 

Congress a report setting forth an analysis and assessment of the 

lessons learned as a result of the operations and activities of the 

HIG within 60 days of enactment of this Act. The appropriate committees of Congress are the appropriations, armed services, judiciary, homeland security and intelligence committees. The requirement of reporting to the appropriations, armed services, judiciary, 

and homeland security committees as well as to the congressional 

intelligence committees is intended to conform to the provision of 

the Senate-passed supplemental appropriations measure requiring 

that updates of the HIG charter, HIG procedures, and the lessons 

learned report be provided to those committees. This reporting is 

subject to the requirement, also in subsection (b), that it be consistent with the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and 

methods. The reporting provisions of Section 333(c), which have 

been reviewed with the ODNI, are the only provisions of the bill 

that have been modified, for other than technical corrections, following the OMB letter of June 10. 

Section 333(d) clarifies that any submission required under Section 333 may be submitted in classified form. 

Section 333 merges Section 336 of S. 1494 with Section 352 of 

H.R. 2701. Several of the specific report matters identified in Sections 352 and 358 of H.R. 2701 may be addressed in response to 

the requirement for a report on policies and procedures in Section 

334. H.R. 2701 also included a number of additional provisions governing the operation and conduct of interrogation activities. Before 

taking action on legislation that would change the law on interrogations, the Committee decided it was important to receive information on the new system of detainee detention and interrogation 

that will be described in the report. The Committee therefore decided not to attempt to address the operation and conduct of interrogation activities in this bill. The following sections from H.R. 

2701 are thus not included in this bill: Section 412, prohibition on 

the use of private contractors for interrogations involving persons 

in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency; Section 416, requirement for video recording of interrogations of persons in the 

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bition on use of funds to provide Miranda warnings to certain persons outside of the United States. 

Section 334. Assessments on national security threat posed by 

Guantanamo Bay detainees 

Section 334 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees the written threat analyses prepared on each 

Guantanamo Bay detainee by the Guantanamo Task Force established pursuant to Executive Order 13492. It also requires the DNI 

to provide the congressional intelligence committees with any new 

threat assessment prepared by any element of the intelligence community of a Guantanamo Bay detainee who remains in detention 

or is pending release or transfer. In both cases, the DNI is also required to provide the congressional intelligence committees with access to the intelligence information that formed the basis of such 

threat analyses and assessments. It is not the intent of the Committee that the DNI create new assessments specifically to meet 

the reporting requirements under this section. 

Section 334 is based on Section 337 of S. 1494 and Section 367 

of H.R. 2701. 

Section 335. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism 

of detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba 

Section 335 requires the DNI, in consultation with the Director 

of the CIA and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA), to make publicly available an unclassified summary of intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly 

held by the Department of Defense at the United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay and an assessment of the likelihood that 

such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. The unclassified summary must be 

made available 60 days after the enactment of the Act. 

Section 335 is based on Section 350 of S. 1494 and Section 351 

of H.R. 2701. Section 335 extends to 60 days the amount of time 

provided to the DNI to make the unclassified summary publicly 

available, rather than the 30 days provided in Section 350 of H.R. 

2701. 

Section 336. Report and strategic plan on biological weapons 

Section 336 provides for a report by the DNI on the intelligence 

collection efforts of the United States against biological weapons or 

the threat of biological weapons in the hands of terrorists, rogue 

states, or other actors, both foreign and domestic. The report also 

must describe intelligence collection efforts to protect the United 

States bio-defense knowledge and infrastructure. 

The report required by Section 336 must include the following 

elements: (1) an accurate assessment of the intelligence collection 

efforts of the United States dedicated to detecting the development 

or use of biological weapons by state, non-state, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic; (2) detailed information on fiscal, human, 

technical, open source, and other intelligence collection resources of 

the United States for use against biological weapons; and (3) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the overall effectiveness 

of United States intelligence collection and analysis to identify and 


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protect biological weapons targets, including intelligence collection 

gaps or inefficiencies, inadequate information sharing practices, or 

inadequate cooperation among agencies or departments of the 

United States. 

Additionally, Section 336 provides that this report include a strategic plan prepared by the DNI, in coordination with the Attorney 

General, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Homeland Security, that provides for a coordinated action plan for the Intelligence 

Community to address and close the gaps identified in the report. 

This strategic plan shall also include a description of appropriate 

goals, schedules, milestones, or metrics to measure the long-term 

effectiveness of the plan and any long-term resource and human 

capital issues related to the collection of intelligence against biological weapons or the threat of biological weapons. The report 

shall also include any recommendation to address shortfalls of experienced and qualified staff possessing relevant scientific, language, and technical skills. 

Section 336 requires that the DNI submit this report to the congressional intelligence committees no later than 180 days after the 

enactment of this bill. The DNI is required to begin implementing 

the strategic plan within 30 days of submitting the report. 

Section 336 is identical to Section 339 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 337. Cybersecurity oversight 

Section 337 sets forth a preliminary framework for executive and 

congressional oversight to ensure that the government’s national 

cybersecurity mission is consistent with legal authorities and preserves reasonable expectations of privacy. Section 337 also requires 

an Inspector General report on the sharing of cyber threat information and a plan for recruiting, retaining, and training an Intelligence Community workforce to secure the networks of the Intelligence Community. Finally, Section 337 requires annual reports 

from the DNI on guidelines and legislation to improve the cybersecurity of the United States. 

Section 337(h) defines three terms: national cyber investigative 

joint task force, critical infrastructure, and cybersecurity program. 

The definition of the term ‘‘cybersecurity program’’ in Section 

337(h) is intentionally a narrow one. The definition of cybersecurity 

programs in this section intentionally excludes firewalls, anti-virus 

programs, and other routine programs. Likewise, by requiring a 

class or collection of similar cybersecurity operations, the definition 

of cybersecurity programs intentionally excludes individual cyber 

operations or cyber information-sharing conducted in a non-programmatic fashion, such as the sharing of a piece of information 

for a particular cybersecurity, foreign intelligence, or national security investigation. 

Section 337 instead focuses on multi-agency cybersecurity programs in which large amounts of information are characterized, 

screened, or inspected for the purpose of protecting government 

networks. These programs use more effective technologies to integrate cyber defenses among government entities that wish to, or 

are directed to, participate. These types of programs pose challenging new legal and privacy questions that make congressional 

and Executive branch oversight particularly important. Because 


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the section seeks to provide a framework of oversight of only those 

programs that involve significant potential privacy implications, 

the term ‘‘cybersecurity program’’ is also limited by the requirement that the programs involve personally identifiable data. 

Section 337(a) requires the President to notify Congress of cybersecurity programs and provide Congress with five types of information or documents: the program’s legal basis; any certifications of 

the program’s legality under 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(a)(ii) or other statutory provision; any concept of operations; any privacy impact statement; and any plan for independent audit or review of the program 

to be carried out by the head of the relevant department or agency, 

in conjunction with the appropriate inspector general. The notification requirements of subsection (a) are designed to ensure that 

Congress is aware of significant legal, privacy and operational 

issues with respect to each new cybersecurity program. 

The Department of Justice has expressed concern about providing to Congress any certifications of the legality of a cybersecurity program under Section 2511(2)(a)(ii) of Title 18 of the United 

States Code—certifications which serve to insulate from litigation 

providers of wire or electronic communication who provide information to the government—on the basis that those types of certifications are not routinely provided to Congress. Because of the 

broad scope of possible operations under cybersecurity programs as 

defined by this section, however, the Committee believe that a certification under Section 2511(2)(a)(ii) prepared for a cybersecurity 

program would be different than a certification provided in other 

current investigations and law enforcement activities. Rather than 

assessing the legality of a single instance of providing information 

to the government, any certification for a ‘‘cybersecurity program’’ 

would have to address the legality of the program as a whole. A 

certification for a cybersecurity program therefore has the potential 

to authorize providers of wire or electronic communication to provide significant assistance to the government, without fear of litigation. Given the potential impact of any certification, the Committee 

believes that significant congressional oversight is warranted. 

For existing cybersecurity programs, the notification and documents must be provided no later than 30 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act. For new programs, the notification and documents must be provided not later than 30 days after the date of 

the commencement of operations of a new cybersecurity program. 

Section 337(b) requires the heads of agencies or departments 

with responsibility for a cybersecurity program, in conjunction with 

the inspector general for that department or agency, to prepare a 

report describing the results of any audit or review under the audit 

plan and assessing whether the cybersecurity program is in compliance with, and adequately described by, the documents submitted 

to Congress. This subsection is designed to provide an independent 

check that the agencies are conducting cyber operations in a manner consistent with Executive branch guidance and to supply Congress more information about the operation of those programs. In 

addition, these reports should help identify the key difficulties and 

challenges in the cybersecurity programs. 

Section 337(c) requires the inspectors general of the Department 

of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Community to prepare 

a report on the sharing of cyber threat information both within the 


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U.S. government and with those responsible for critical infrastructure. This report should be submitted one year after the enactment 

of this Act. In their report, the inspectors general should identify 

any barriers to sharing cyber threat and vulnerability information 

and assess the effectiveness of current sharing arrangements. 

Section 337(d) provides the head of an element of the Intelligence 

Community the authority to detail an officer or employee to the Department of Homeland Security or the National Cyber Investigative 

Joint Task Force to assist with cybersecurity for a period not to exceed three years. This section will allow Intelligence Community 

experts to be made available to the Department of Homeland Security, which serves as the civilian cyber defense manager but where 

funding for cyber security has not been given the same level of priority as the Intelligence Community. In recognition of the intelligence committees’ ample support for cyber over the last few years, 

the provision permits these details to be provided on a nonreimbursable basis. This detail authority, however, is restricted to a period not to exceed three years to prevent details from being used 

as an alternative to building expertise at civilian cyber defense 

agencies. 

Section 337(e) requires an additional plan from the DNI for recruiting, retaining, and training an adequate cybersecurity workforce, including an assessment of the capabilities of the current 

workforce, an assessment of the benefits of outreach and training 

with private industry and academic institutions, and an examination of best practices for making the Intelligence Community workforce aware of cybersecurity best practices and principles. 

Section 337(f) requires the DNI, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Director of the NSA, the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator, and any other officials the DNI considers appropriate, to submit three annual reports containing guidelines or legislative proposals to improve the capabilities of the Intelligence 

Community and law enforcement agencies to protect the cybersecurity of the United States. The report shall include guidelines or recommendations on: improving the intelligence community’s ability to 

detect hostile actions; the need for data retention requirements; improving the ability of the intelligence community to anticipate nontraditional targets; and the adequacy of existing criminal statutes 

to successfully deter cyber attacks. 

Finally, Section 337(g) provides that the requirements of subsections (a) through (e) will terminate on December 31, 2013. During the next three years, the Executive branch will begin new and 

unprecedented cybersecurity programs with new technology and 

new legal and privacy challenges. Section 337 will allow Congress 

to follow these developments closely and gain a deeper and broader 

understanding of cybersecurity issues so that, upon the termination 

of this section, it may be replaced with a permanent framework for 

oversight. 

Section 337 is based on Section 340 of S. 1494 and Section 356, 

Section 360D, Section 360F, and Section 507 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 338. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community 

Section 338 requires the DNI to report on the Intelligence Community’s proficiency in foreign languages within one year after the 


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date of enactment of the Act, and then biennially for four years. 

The report should include information on: the number of positions 

within the Intelligence Community that require foreign language 

proficiency; foreign language training; the number of personnel 

hired with such proficiency; and efforts to recruit, hire, train, and 

retain personnel who are proficient in a foreign language. The section requires detailed reporting for each foreign language. In addition, the report should include identification of critical gaps in foreign language proficiency and recommendations for eliminating 

such gaps. 

Section 338 is identical to Section 334 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 did 

not have a comparable provision. 

Section 339. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence community 

Section 339 requires the DNI, in coordination with the heads of 

the elements of the Intelligence Community to submit a report on 

the plans of each element to increase diversity within the Intelligence Community. 

This report must include specific plans: to achieve the goals articulated in the DNI’s strategic plan on equal opportunity and diversity; plans and initiatives to increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates; specific plans and initiatives to improve retention 

of diverse federal employees; a description of specific diversity 

awareness training and education programs; and a description of 

performance metrics to measure the success in carrying out the 

plans, initiatives, and programs. The report is due not later than 

a year after the enactment of the Act. 

To carry out its mission most effectively, the Intelligence Community needs personnel that look and speak like the citizens of the 

countries in which it operates. In the past, the Intelligence Community has not properly focused on hiring a diverse workforce, and 

the capabilities of the Intelligence Community have suffered. The 

Intelligence Community must be deliberate and work hard to hire 

a diverse workforce that improves its operational capabilities and 

effectiveness. 

Section 339 is similar to Section 353 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 340. Report on intelligence community contractors 

Section 340 requires the DNI to provide a report on the use of 

personal services contracts in the Intelligence Community, including the impact of such contracts on the Intelligence Community 

workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into Federal Government employment, and accountability mechanisms that 

govern the performance of such contractors. This report is seeking 

information on core contractor personnel, those independent contractors or individuals employed by industrial contractors who augment civilian and military personnel by providing direct support to 

Intelligence Community elements. The report should not include 

information on commodity contractors, such as those who work on 

the production or delivery of end-use items, or commercial contractors, such as those who provide services to Intelligence Community 

facilities. 


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The report required by Section 340 must include the following: 

a description of any relevant regulation or guidance relating to the 

minimum standards for contract personnel and how those standards differ from those for Federal Government employees; an identification of contracts where the contractor is performing substantially similar functions to a Federal Government employee, as well 

as an estimate of the number of such contracts; an assessment of 

the costs incurred or saved by the use of contracts; an assessment 

of the appropriateness of using contractors to perform the activities; a comparison between contractor and Federal employee compensation; an analysis of Federal Government attrition; a description of the positions that will be converted to Federal employment; 

an analysis of the oversight and accountability mechanisms and 

procedures applicable to personal service contracts; and an identification of best practices for oversight and accountability. The report must be submitted by February 1, 2011. 

Section 340 is identical to Section 338 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. The comprehensive report is intended to 

provide the congressional intelligence committees information 

about the Intelligence Community’s large contractor work force, to 

aid in conducting oversight of these contracts and to assist in devising any appropriate policy solutions. 

Section 341. Study on electronic waste destruction practices of the 

intelligence community 

Section 341 requires the Inspector General of the Intelligence 

Community to conduct a study on the electronic waste destruction 

practices of the Intelligence Community and report the results of 

the study to the congressional intelligence committees not later 

than one year after the enactment of this Act. The study should assess the both the security of the Intelligence Community’s electronic waste disposal practices and the environmental impact of 

those practices. It should also propose methods to improve both the 

security and environmental impact of those disposal practices. 

Section 341 is identical to Section 344 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 342. Review of records relating to potential health risks 

among Desert Storm veterans 

Section 342 requires the Director of the CIA to conduct a classification review of CIA records relevant to known or potential health 

effects suffered by veterans of Operation Desert Storm. Those 

health effects were described in a November 2008 report by the Department of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory Committee on Gulf 

War Veterans Illnesses. Section 342 also requires the Director of 

the CIA to report to Congress the results of the classification review, including the total number of CIA records determined to be 

relevant, within a year after enactment of the Act. To the extent 

that a classification review for a relevant set of records has already 

been conducted according to current classifications standards, the 

Director should report this to Congress with information concerning the review and the location of such records. 

Section 342 is identical to Section 348 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. 


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Section 343. Review of Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise of 

enforcement jurisdiction in foreign nations 

Section 343 requires the Director of the FBI, in consultation with 

the Secretary of State, to conduct a review of constraints under 

international law and the laws of foreign nations to the assertion 

of enforcement jurisdiction with respect to criminal investigations 

of terrorism offenses under U.S. law. Such review should look specifically at investigations conducted by FBI agents using funds 

made available by the National Intelligence Program. 

Section 343 is based on Section 354 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no similar provision. Section 354 of H.R. 2701 required the Director 

of the FBI to submit the report within sixty days after enactment 

of the Act. Section 343 extends this time frame to require submission of the report to the appropriate congressional committees 

within 120 days of enactment of the Act. 

Section 344. Public release of information on procedures used in 

narcotics airbridge denial program in Peru 

Section 344 requires the Director of the CIA to make publicly 

available within 30 days an unclassified version of the CIA Inspector General report entitled ‘‘Procedures Used in Narcotics Airbridge 

Denial Program in Peru, 1995–2001,’’ dated August 25, 2008. In releasing such report, the Director may declassify and release any 

additional information he deems appropriate related to the narcotics airbridge denial program and its subsequent investigation. 

Section 344 is identical to Section 355 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 345. Report on threat from dirty bombs 

Section 345 requires the DNI, in consultation with the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, to submit a report summarizing intelligence relating to the threat to the United States from weapons 

using radiological materials. The report must be submitted within 

180 days after the enactment of the Act. 

Section 345 is identical to Section 360B of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no similar provision. 

Section 346. Report on creation of space intelligence office 

Section 346 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a report on 

the feasibility and advisability of creating a national space intelligence office to manage space-related intelligence assets and access 

to such assets. This report must be submitted within 60 days after 

the enactment of the Act. 

Section 346 is based on Section 360E of H.R. 2701. Section 410 

of S. 1494 had proposed establishing a National Space Intelligence 

Office and had described the mission of the Office. Although the 

Committee followed the House on this provision, there is significant interest in establishing a National Space Intelligence Office in 

the future. The Committee therefore expects that, if the DNI determines the creation of a national space intelligence office to be feasible and advisable, the report required by Section 346 will describe 

how such an Office would be established, including a description of 

the proposed organizational structure of the Office and the manner 

in which it would be staffed. 


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Section 347. Report on attempt to detonate explosive device on 

Northwest Airlines flight 253 

Section 347 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a report on 

the attempt to detonate an explosive device aboard Northwest Airlines flight number 253 on December 25, 2009. This report should 

describe any failures to share or analyze intelligence or information 

and the measures the Intelligence Community has taken to prevent 

such failures in the future. In the report, the DNI should describe 

the roles and responsibilities of various elements of the Intelligence 

Community to synchronize and analyze terrorism information; assess the technological capabilities of the Federal Government to assess terrorist threats; describe watchlisting training and procedures; describe the steps the Intelligence Community has taken to 

improve its tradecraft and processes; and assess how to meet the 

challenge of exploiting the ever-increasing volume of information 

available to the Intelligence Community. In addition, the DNI 

should provide any legislative recommendations deemed appropriate to improve the sharing of intelligence relating to terrorists. 

The report must be submitted no later than 180 days after enactment of this Act. 

Section 347 is based on Section 360L of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. The Committee has conducted an inquiry 

into the attempted December 25, 2009, terrorist attack and has 

issued a report, S. Rep. No. 111–199 (2010). Section 347 therefore 

asks the DNI to provide a description of steps taken to respond to 

any findings and recommendations provided to the DNI from any 

review by the congressional intelligence committees in addition to 

providing the information requested by Section 360L of H.R. 2701. 

Section 348. Repeal or modification of reporting requirements 

The congressional intelligence committees frequently request information from the Intelligence Community in the form of reports, 

the contents of which are specifically defined by statute. The reports prepared pursuant to these statutory requirements provide 

the committees with an invaluable source of information about specific matters of concern. 

The Committee recognizes, however, that congressional reporting 

requirements, particularly recurring reporting requirements, can 

place a significant burden on the resources of the Intelligence Community. It is therefore important for the Congress to reconsider 

these reporting requirements on a periodic basis to ensure that the 

reports it has requested are the best mechanism for the Congress 

to receive the information it seeks. In some cases, annual reports 

can be replaced with briefings or notifications that provide the Congress with more timely information and offer the Intelligence Community a direct line of communication to respond to congressional 

concerns. 

In response to a request from the DNI, the congressional intelligence committees examined some of these recurring reporting requirements. Section 348 eliminates certain reports that were particularly burdensome to the Intelligence Community in cases where 

the information in the reports could be obtained through other 

means. It also eliminates reports whose usefulness has diminished 

either because of changing events or because the information conVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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tained in those reports is duplicative of information already obtained through other avenues. 

Because the majority of recurring reports provide critical information relevant to the many challenges facing the Intelligence 

Community today, the Committee has proceeded carefully in eliminating only six statutory reporting requirements. In addition, the 

Committee changed the requirement of one report to make its submission biennial, rather than annual, and making another report 

annual, rather than a semiannual report. The Committee believes 

that reduction in the number of reporting requirements will help 

the Intelligence Community to allocate its resources properly towards areas of greatest congressional concern. 

The Committee recognizes the concern expressed by the Intelligence Community about the impact of reporting requirements. 

The Committee suggests that the ODNI submit, even in advance 

of the Administration’s formal requests for legislation, facts (including the cost of preparing particular reports and the use of contract 

personnel, if any, to prepare reports) and proposals (including the 

possible consolidation of reports and lengthening the intervals between them) that will enable a fuller evaluation of alternatives for 

providing information to Congress. Also, for reports that by law are 

unclassified, the Committee requests that the ODNI advise the 

congressional intelligence committees about any system that is in 

place, or should be put in place, for their public dissemination. 

Section 348 is based on Section 341 of S. 1494 and Section 360M 

of H.R. 2701. 

Section 349. Incorporation of reporting requirements 

Section 349 incorporates into the Act by reference each requirement contained in the classified annex to this Act to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees. Section 349 is 

based on Section 360N of H.R. 2701. Because the classified information in the annex cannot be included in the text of the bill, incorporating the reporting provisions of the classified annex is the 

only available mechanism to give these reporting requirements the 

force of law. The Committee therefore chose to include Section 349 

to reflect the importance they ascribe to the reporting requirements 

in the classified annex. 

Section 350. Conforming amendments for report submission dates 

Section 350 contains conforming amendments to the National Security Act made necessary by this Act. 

SUBTITLE E—OTHER MATTERS

Section 361. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations 

Current law (5 U.S.C. 7342) requires that certain federal ‘‘employees’’—a term that generally applies to all Intelligence Community officials and personnel and certain contract personnel, spouses, 

dependents, and others—file reports with their employing agency 

regarding receipt of gifts or decorations from foreign governments. 

Following compilation of these reports, the employing agency is required to file annually with the Secretary of State detailed information about the receipt of foreign gifts and decorations by its employVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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ees, including the source of the gift. The Secretary of State is required to publish a comprehensive list of the agency reports in the 

Federal Register. 

With respect to Intelligence Community activities, public disclosure of gifts or decorations in the Federal Register has the potential to compromise intelligence sources (e.g., confirmation of an intelligence relationship with a foreign government) and could undermine national security. Recognizing this concern, the Director of 

Central Intelligence (DCI) was granted a limited exemption from 

reporting certain information about such foreign gifts or decorations where the publication of the information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources. Section 1079 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 

108–458) extended a similar exemption to the DNI in addition to 

applying the existing exemption to the CIA Director. 

Section 361 provides to the heads of each Intelligence Community element the same limited exemption from specified public reporting requirements that is currently authorized for the DNI and 

CIA Director. The national security concerns that prompt those exemptions apply equally to other Intelligence Community elements. 

Section 361 mandates that the information not provided to the Secretary of State be provided to the DNI, who is required to keep a 

record of such information, to ensure continued independent oversight of the receipt by Intelligence Community personnel of foreign 

gifts or decorations. 

Gifts received in the course of ordinary contact between senior officials of elements of the Intelligence Community and their foreign 

counterparts should not be excluded under the provisions of Section 

361 unless there is a serious concern that the public disclosure of 

such contacts or gifts would adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods. 

Section 361 is identical to Section 351 of S. 1494 and Section 363 

of H.R. 2701. 

Section 362. Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities 

Section 362 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B) (governing the 

funding of intelligence activities)) with the text of Section 

102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403–1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as 

amended by Section 1011(a) of the Intelligence Reform Act (governing the transfer and reprogramming by the DNI of certain intelligence funding). 

The amendment replaces the ‘‘unforeseen requirements’’ standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) with a more flexible standard to govern 

reprogrammings and transfers of funds authorized for a different 

intelligence or intelligence-related activity. Under the new standard, a reprogramming or transfer is authorized if, in addition to the 

other requirements of Section 504(a)(3), the new use of funds would 

‘‘support an emergent need, improve program effectiveness, or increase efficiency.’’ This modification brings the standard for 

reprogrammings or transfers of intelligence funding into conformity 

with the standards applicable to reprogrammings and transfers 

under Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947. The modification preserves congressional oversight of proposed 


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reprogrammings and transfers while enhancing the Intelligence 

Community’s ability to carry out missions and functions vital to national security. Section 362 is identical to Section 352 of S. 1494 

and Section 361 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 363. Protection of certain national security information 

Section 363 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act of 

1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties involving 

the disclosure of the identities of undercover intelligence officers 

and agents. 

Section 363(a) amends Section 601(a) to increase criminal penalties for an individual with authorized access to classified information who intentionally discloses any information identifying a covert agent, if the individual knows that the United States is taking 

affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent’s intelligence relationship to the United States. Currently, the maximum sentence 

for disclosure by someone who has had ‘‘authorized access to classified information that identifies a covert agent’’ is 10 years. Subsection (a)(1) of Section 364 of this Act increases that maximum 

sentence to 15 years. 

Currently, under Section 601(b) of the National Security Act of 

1947, the maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who ‘‘as a 

result of having authorized access to classified information, learns 

of the identity of a covert agent’’ is 5 years. Subsection (a)(2) of Section 364 of this Act increases that maximum sentence to 10 years. 

Subsection (b) of Section 363 amends Section 603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) to provide that the 

annual report from the President on the protection of identities of 

certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources, also include an assessment of the need, if 

any, for modification to improve legal protections for covert agents. 

Section 363 is based on Section 354 of S. 1494 and Section 362 of 

H.R. 2701. 

Section 364. National Intelligence Program budget 

Section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–53 (2007) (50 U.S.C. 

415c), requires the DNI to disclose the aggregate amount of funds 

appropriated by Congress for the National Intelligence Program for 

each fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 2007. Section 601(b) provides that the President may waive or postpone such disclosure if 

certain conditions are met, beginning with fiscal year 2009. 

Section 364 amends Section 601 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 to require additionally that, on the date that the President submits to Congress 

the annual budget request, the President shall disclose to the public the aggregate amount of appropriations requested for that fiscal 

year for the National Intelligence Program. Also, in addition to the 

President’s authority under present law to waive or postpone disclosure at the end of the fiscal year, the Committee agreed to provide for presidential waiver authority related to the public disclosure by the President of the aggregate amount of funds requested 

by the President. 

Section 364 is based on Section 355 of S. 1494, except for the 

waiver provision that the Committee has added and the omission 


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from Section 364 of the congressional findings in Section 355 of S. 

1494. H.R. 2701 had no comparable provision. 

Section 365. Improving the review authority of the Public Interest 

Declassification Board 

Section 365 clarifies that the Public Interest Declassification 

Board may conduct reviews in response to requests from the committee of jurisdiction or an individual member of such committee. 

It also clarifies that the Board may consider the proper classification level of records, rather than simply consider whether or not 

they should be classified. This authority is important to address 

questions of excessive compartmentation or other over-classification 

that may impede needed information sharing, adequate reviews 

within the Executive branch, or oversight by the Congress. 

Section 365 is identical to Section 356 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 366. Authority to designate undercover operations to collect 

foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 

Various provisions in the United States Code preclude the government from conducting the following activities: (1) the deposit of 

funds in a financial institution; (2) the lease or purchase of real 

property; (3) the establishment and operation of a proprietary business on a commercial basis; and (4) the utilization of proceeds of 

the operation to offset necessary and reasonable operational expenses. In recognition, however, of the important role such activities may play in the conduct of undercover operations, Pub. L. No. 

102–395 (1992) (28 U.S.C. 533 note) provides a mechanism for the 

FBI to obtain an exemption from these otherwise applicable laws. 

Under Pub. L. No. 102–395, an exemption may be obtained if the 

proposed activity is certified by the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General as being necessary to the conduct of the undercover 

operation. For national security investigations, the Director of the 

FBI may delegate certifying authority to an Assistant Director in 

the Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, or Cyber Divisions at 

the FBI, and the Attorney General may delegate such authority to 

the Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice. 

Section 366 amends the current delegation level for both the FBI 

and the Department of Justice. It allows the FBI Director to delegate certifying authority to a level not lower than a Deputy Assistant Director in the National Security Branch. It also allows the Attorney General to delegate the certifying authority to a level not 

lower than a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the National 

Security Division. It should be noted that this delegation level for 

the Department of Justice remains at a higher level than that 

which is currently required in criminal undercover operations. 

The Committee is concerned that, because of both statutory and 

administrative limitations, the current delegation levels are insufficient to allow for timely processing of undercover exemptions. The 

success and safety of undercover operations can depend in part on 

the ability to do such simple tasks as open a bank account or rent 

an apartment for cover purposes in a timely manner. While the creation of the National Security Division at the Department of Justice has led to more efficient processing of some exemption reVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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quests, there remains room for improvement. The Committee believes that the new delegation levels established in Section 367 will 

encourage and facilitate further internal and administrative improvements in processing undercover exemptions both at the FBI 

and the Department of Justice, without sacrificing needed oversight within the FBI and Department of Justice. 

Section 366 is identical to Section 357 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did 

contain a comparable provision. 

Section 367. Security clearances: reports; reciprocity 

Section 367 requires a series of reports and audits on the security clearance process and measurement of improvements in the 

timeliness of security clearance process. The reports and audits required under this section are intended to provide Congress with 

metrics to evaluate the efficacy of the security clearance process. 

Subsection (a) of Section 367 amends Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 to add a new section 506H, requiring an audit 

and an annual report. Under new Section 506H(a), the President 

must conduct an audit every four years of how the Executive 

branch determines whether a security clearance is required for a 

particular position in the Federal Government. This audit must be 

submitted to Congress within 30 days of its completion. 

New Section 506H(b) requires an annual report on the number 

of employees and contractors within the Federal Government who 

held or were approved for security clearances; the amount of time 

taken for each element of the Intelligence Community to process 

security clearance determinations; the number of security clearance 

investigations that have remained open for extended period of time; 

and the results of security clearance investigation and determinations. The Committee intend for this requirement to cover all contractor employees, including those employed by commodity contractors and commercial contractors. 

Section 367(a)(2) requires a report on security clearance investigations and adjudication, to be submitted no later than 180 days 

after the enactment of this Act. That report requires information 

on security clearance adjudication guidance and metrics, a plan to 

improve the professional development of security clearance adjudicator, metrics to evaluate the investigation quality and the effectiveness of interagency clearance reciprocity, and an assessment of 

the feasibility, counterintelligence risk, and cost effectiveness of reducing the number of agencies that conduct the investigation and 

adjudication of security clearances. The President may also consider the advisability of reducing the number of agencies involved 

in the investigation and adjudication of security clearances. 

Under Section 367(c), the Inspector General of the Intelligence 

Community must conduct an audit of the reciprocity of security 

clearances in the Intelligence Community. This audit will include 

an assessment of the time required to obtain reciprocal security 

clearance for an Intelligence Community employee or contractors 

detailed to, or seeking permanent employment with, another Intelligence Community element. This audit must be submitted to the 

congressional intelligence committees no later than 180 days after 

enactment of the Act. 

While the reports required by Section 367 focus on the security 

clearance process, the Committee recognizes that safeguarding naVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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tional security information depends upon ensuring not only that 

new individuals successfully complete the security clearance process, but also that current holders of clearances receive appropriate 

and ongoing scrutiny for their continued fitness for access to classified information. The Committee encourages the DNI, in consultation with the Office of Personnel Management if necessary, to develop more effective methods for identifying, on a continual basis, 

current holders of security clearances within the Intelligence Community who may pose a security risk. 

Section 367 is based on Section 366 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. Section 366 of H.R. 2701 had also included a provision requiring the DNI to appoint an ombudsman for 

intelligence community security clearances, who would annually report to the congressional intelligence committees on the concerns, 

complaints and questions received from persons applying for security clearances. 

Section 368. Correcting long-standing material weaknesses 

Section 368 requires the heads of the five intelligence agencies 

that have been specifically required to produce auditable financial 

statements (CIA, DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA) to designate each 

senior management official who is responsible for correcting longstanding, correctable material weaknesses, and to notify the DNI 

and the congressional intelligence committees of these designations. 

Under Section 368, the term ‘‘material weakness’’ has the meaning given that term under OMB Circular A–123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, revised December 21, 2004. In 

particular, ‘‘[a] material weakness in internal controls is a reportable condition, or combination of reportable conditions, that results 

in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of 

the financial statements, or other significant financial reports, will 

not be prevented or detected.’’ 

The Committee has been dissatisfied with the lack of progress in 

correcting material weaknesses. Section 368 is intended to ensure 

there is clear accountability about who is responsible for correcting 

these deficiencies. 

Section 368 pertains only to ‘‘long-standing’’ material weaknesses, defined as those that were identified in annual financial reports prior to fiscal year 2007. Also, Section 368 pertains only to 

material weaknesses that are correctable in the near term—i.e., 

those where correction is not substantially dependent on a business 

information system that will not be fielded prior to the end of fiscal 

year 2010. The head of an element of the Intelligence Community 

may be designated as the responsible official. 

Section 368 also requires a senior intelligence management official to notify the head of the element of the Intelligence Community when a long-standing material weakness is corrected. The determination that the specified long-standing correctable material 

weakness has been corrected must be based on the findings of an 

independent review conducted by an independent auditor, who may 

be an auditor in the office of the agency’s inspector general. The 

element head shall notify the congressional intelligence committees 

that the material weakness has been corrected. 


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The Committee believes that this legislative step is necessary to 

establish clear accountability for correcting these long-standing correctable material weaknesses. Section 368 is based on Section 358 

of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had no comparable provision. 

Section 369. Intelligence community financial improvement and 

audit readiness 

Section 369 requires the DNI to conduct a review of the status 

of auditability compliance of each element of the Intelligence Community and to develop a plan and timeline to achieve a full, unqualified audit of each element of the Intelligence Community by 

September 30, 2013. This review and development of a plan must 

be completed within 180 days after enactment of this Act. 

Section 369 is based on Section 368 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. The Committee has removed the sense of 

the Congress contained in Section 368 of H.R. 2701. Although Section 348 of this bill repeals an annual report on progress in 

auditable financial statements, the Committee expects to be informed of the status of the review required by Section 369, as well 

as the plan and timeline established to achieve full, unqualified audits. 

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE 

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 

SUBTITLE A—OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Section 401. Accountability reviews by the Director of National Intelligence 

Section 401 provides that the DNI shall have new authority to 

conduct accountability reviews of elements within the Intelligence 

Community and the personnel of those elements. The primary innovation of this provision is the authority to conduct accountability 

reviews concerning an entire element of the Intelligence Community in relation to failures or deficiencies. 

This accountability process is intended to be separate and distinct from any accountability reviews being conducted internally by 

the elements of the Intelligence Community or their Inspectors 

General, and is not intended to limit the authorities of the DNI 

with respect to his supervision of the CIA. 

Section 401 requires that the DNI, in consultation with the Attorney General, formulate guidelines and procedures that will govern accountability reviews. The Committee envisions that these 

guidelines will govern the process by which the DNI can collect sufficient information from the Intelligence Community to assess accountability for a given incident. 

Any findings and recommendations for corrective or punitive action made by the DNI shall be provided to the head of the applicable element of the Intelligence Community. If the head of such element does not implement the recommendations, then the congressional intelligence committees must be notified and provided the 

reasons for the determination by the head of the element. 

In addition, to avoid a construction that a committee of Congress 

on its own could require such a review over the objection of the 

DNI, a concern raised by the ODNI, the section makes clear that 


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the DNI shall conduct a review if the DNI determines it is necessary, and the DNI may conduct an accountability review (but is 

not statutorily required to do so) if requested by one of the congressional intelligence committees. 

The Committee hopes that this modest increase in the DNI’s authorities will encourage elements within the Intelligence Community to put their houses in order by imposing accountability for significant failures and deficiencies. Section 401 will enable the DNI 

to undertake an accountability review in the event that an element 

of the Intelligence Community cannot or will not take appropriate 

action. 

Section 401 is based on Section 401 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 402. Authorities for intelligence information sharing 

Section 402 amends Section 102A(d)(2) of the National Security 

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–1(d)(2)) to provide the DNI statutory 

authority to use National Intelligence Program funds to quickly address deficiencies or needs that arise in intelligence information access or sharing capabilities, even if those needs arise outside the 

Intelligence Community. 

The new Section 102A(d)(2)(B) authorizes the DNI to provide to 

a receiving agency or component, and for that agency or component 

to accept and use, funds or systems (which would include services 

or equipment) related to the collection, processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence information. The new Section 102A(d)(2)(C) grants the DNI authority to provide funds to 

non-National Intelligence Program activities for the purpose of addressing critical gaps in intelligence information access or sharing 

capabilities. 

Section 402(b) makes clear that the head of any department or 

agency is authorized to receive and utilize funds or systems made 

available to the department or agency by the DNI. Without these 

new authorities, development and implementation of necessary capabilities could be delayed by an agency’s lack of authority to accept or utilize systems funded from the National Intelligence Program, inability to use or identify current-year funding, or concerns 

regarding the augmentation of appropriations. 

These authorities are similar to those granted to the NGA for developing and fielding systems of common concern relating to imagery intelligence and geospatial intelligence. See Section 

105(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403– 

5). 

Section 402 is based on Section 402 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. The Committee placed the authorities in 

Section 102A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, rather than 

Section 102A(g) of the National Security Act of 1947, as was in S. 

1494, to ensure that any transfers pursuant to this authority would 

be subject to the terms and conditions governing transfers and reprogramming. Because the terms and conditions governing transfers and reprogramming include prior notice to the congressional 

intelligence committees, which would allow the congressional intelligence committees to assess the use of this authority, the Committee also eliminated the reporting requirements included in Section 402 of S. 1494. 


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Section 403. Location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Section 403 addresses the issue of the location of the Office of the 

DNI. Section 403 repeals the ban on the co-location of the Office 

of the DNI with any other Intelligence Community element, which 

took effect on October 1, 2008, by replacing that provision of the 

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3) with a new subsection 103(e) that allows the ODNI to be located outside the District of Columbia within the Washington Metropolitan Region. 

In his 2008 legislative request for the fiscal year 2009 authorization, the DNI asked, for the first time, that Congress provide that 

‘‘[t]he headquarters of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may be located in the District of Columbia or elsewhere in 

the Metropolitan Region, as that term is defined in Section 8301 

of title 40, United States Code.’’ The purpose of this section is to 

provide statutory authorization for the location of the ODNI outside of the District of Columbia. 

Section 72 of Title 4, United States Code—a codification enacted 

in 1947 which derived from a statute signed into law by President 

George Washington in 1790—requires that ‘‘[a]ll offices attached to 

the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by 

law.’’ In 1955, just eight years after the 1947 codification, Congress 

granted statutory authority for the Director of Central Intelligence 

to provide for a headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency either in the District of Columbia ‘‘or elsewhere.’’ 69 Stat. 324, 349. 

Pursuant to the Committee’s direction during consideration of 

the fiscal year 2009 authorization act, the ODNI requested guidance from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel 

(OLC) about the need for a statute authorizing the location of the 

ODNI outside the District of Columbia. The ODNI has informed 

the Committee that OLC informally advised the ODNI that there 

is no basis to exclude the ODNI from the requirement of 4 U.S.C. 

72 and that a specific exception is needed to authorize the location 

of the ODNI headquarters outside the District of Columbia. The 

Committee urges the ODNI to continue to study, and report to the 

congressional intelligence committees, about the impact if any of 

the ODNI’s current location outside of the District of Columbia on 

the daily implementation of the ODNI’s responsibilities with respect to the President, the Congress, and the elements of the Intelligence Community. 

Section 403 is based on Section 404 of S. 1494 and Section 401 

of H.R. 2701. 

Section 404. Title and appointment of the Chief Information Officer 

of the Intelligence Community 

Section 404 expressly designates the position of Chief Information Officer in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as 

Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community (IC CIO). 

The modification to this title is consistent with the position’s overall responsibilities as outlined in Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3g). Section 404 also eliminates 

the requirement that the IC CIO be confirmed by the Senate while 

retaining the requirement that the IC CIO be appointed by the 

President. The continued requirement of presidential appointment 


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emphasizes that the IC CIO has important responsibilities for the 

Intelligence Community enterprise architecture with respect to the 

whole of the Intelligence Community. 

Section 404 is identical to Section 406 of S. 1494 and similar to 

Section 405 of H.R. 2701. Section 405 of H.R. 2701 did not eliminate the requirement that the IC CIO be confirmed by the Senate. 

To accommodate the possibility that ODNI might not have individuals who meet the requisite requirements of the Vacancies Act to 

serve in an acting capacity in Presidentially appointed and Senate 

confirmed positions, a concern the ODNI had raised with respect 

to the IC CIO position, Section 302 of H.R. 2701 provided authority 

for temporary appointment to fill vacancies in Senate confirmed positions in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Because Section 404 eliminates the requirement that the IC CIO be 

confirmed by the Senate, the Committee did not include Section 

302 of H.R. 2701 in this bill. 

Section 405. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 

Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform Act authorizes the DNI 

to establish an Office of Inspector General if the DNI determines 

that an Inspector General (IG) would be beneficial to improving the 

operations and effectiveness of the ODNI. It further provides that 

the DNI may grant to the IG any of the duties, responsibilities, and 

authorities set forth in the Inspector General Act of 1978. The DNI 

has appointed an IG and has granted certain authorities pursuant 

to DNI Instruction No. 2005–10 (September 7, 2005). 

As the congressional intelligence committees have urged in reports on proposed authorization acts for fiscal years 2006 through 

2009, a strong IG is vital to achieving the goal, set forth in the Intelligence Reform Act, of improving the operations and effectiveness of the Intelligence Community. It is also vital to achieving the 

broader goal of identifying problems and deficiencies, wherever 

they may be found in the Intelligence Community, with respect to 

matters within the responsibility and authority of the DNI, including the manner in which elements of the Intelligence Community 

interact with each other in providing access to information and undertaking joint or cooperative activities. By way of a new Section 

103H of the National Security Act of 1947, Section 405 of this Act 

establishes an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in 

order to provide to the DNI, and, through reports, to the Congress, 

the benefits of an IG with full statutory authorities and the requisite independence. 

The Office of the IG is to be established within the ODNI. The 

Office of the IG created by this bill is to replace and not duplicate 

the current Office of the IG for the ODNI. The IG will keep both 

the DNI and the congressional intelligence committees fully and 

currently informed about problems and deficiencies in Intelligence 

Community programs and operations and the need for corrective 

actions. The IG will be appointed by the President, with the advice 

and consent of the Senate, and will report directly to the DNI. To 

bolster the IG’s independence within the Intelligence Community, 

the IG may be removed only by the President, who must communicate the reasons for the removal to the congressional intelligence 

committees. To ensure that this language is not construed to prohibit an immediate personnel action otherwise authorized by law, 


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the Committee added the same clarifying language found in the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110–409). 

Under the new subsection 103H(e), the DNI may prohibit the IG 

from conducting an investigation, inspection, audit, or review if the 

DNI determines that is necessary to protect vital national security 

interests. If the DNI exercises this authority, the DNI must provide 

the reasons to the congressional intelligence committees within 

seven days. The IG may submit comments in response to the DNI’s 

justification to the congressional intelligence committees. 

The IG will have direct and prompt access to the DNI and any 

Intelligence Community employee, or employee of a contractor, 

whose testimony is needed. The IG will also have direct access to 

all records that relate to programs and activities for which the IG 

has responsibility. Failure to cooperate will be grounds for appropriate administrative action. 

The IG will have subpoena authority. However, information within the possession of the United States Government must be obtained through other procedures. Subject to the DNI’s concurrence, 

the IG may request information from any United States Government department, agency, or element. They must provide the information to the IG insofar as is practicable and not in violation of 

law or regulation. 

The IG must submit semiannual reports to the DNI that include 

a description of significant problems relating to Intelligence Community programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the DNI. Portions of the reports involving a component 

of a department of the United States Government are to be provided to the head of the department at the same time the report 

is provided to the DNI. The reports must include a description of 

IG recommendations and a statement whether corrective action has 

been completed. Within 30 days of receiving each semiannual report from the IG, the DNI must submit it to Congress. 

The IG must immediately report to the DNI particularly serious 

or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies. Within seven days, 

the DNI must transmit those reports to the intelligence committees 

together with any comments. In the event the IG is unable to resolve any differences with the DNI affecting the duties or responsibilities of the IG or the IG conducts an investigation, inspection, 

audit, or review that focuses on certain high-ranking officials, the 

IG is authorized to report directly to the congressional intelligence 

committees. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 contains 

similar language with regard to reports by the CIA Inspector General on high-ranking CIA officials. (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)). 

Intelligence Community employees, or employees of contractors, 

who intend to report to Congress an ‘‘urgent concern’’—such as a 

violation of law or Executive order, a false statement to Congress, 

or a willful withholding from Congress—may report such complaints and supporting information to the IG. Following a review 

by the IG to determine the credibility of the complaint or information, the IG must transmit such complaint and information to the 

DNI. On receiving the complaints or information from the IG (together with the IG’s credibility determination), the DNI must 

transmit the complaint or information to the congressional intelligence committees. If the IG finds a complaint or information not 

to be credible, the reporting individual may still submit the matter 


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directly to the congressional intelligence committees by following 

appropriate security practices outlined by the DNI. Reprisals or 

threats of reprisal against reporting individuals constitute reportable ‘‘urgent concerns.’’ The congressional intelligence committees 

will not tolerate actions by the DNI, or by any Intelligence Community element, constituting a reprisal for reporting an ‘‘urgent concern’’ or any other matter to Congress. Nonetheless, reporting individuals should ensure that the complaint and supporting information are provided to Congress consistent with appropriate procedures designed to protect intelligence sources and methods and 

other sensitive matters. 

For matters within the jurisdiction of both the IG of the Intelligence Community and an IG for another Intelligence Community 

element (or for a parent department or agency), the Inspectors 

General shall expeditiously resolve who will undertake the investigation, inspection, audit, or review. In attempting to resolve that 

question, the Inspectors General may request the assistance of the 

Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum (a presently 

functioning body whose existence is ratified by Section 405). In the 

event that the Inspectors General are still unable to resolve the 

question, they shall submit it to the DNI and the head of the agency or department for resolution. 

An IG for an Intelligence Community element must share the results of any investigation, inspection, audit, or evaluation with any 

other IG, including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who otherwise would have had jurisdiction over the investigation, inspection, audit, or evaluation. 

Consistent with existing law, the Inspector General must report 

to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint 

received by the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal 

criminal law. 

Section 405 also provides for the transition from the Office of the 

IG of the ODNI to the Office of the IG of the Intelligence Community. The Committee provided that Section 8K of the Inspector 

General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. Note), which pertains to the 

former office, is repealed on the date that the Senate-confirmed Inspector General assumes the duties of the Office of the IG of the 

Intelligence Community. 

Following the reporting of the conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress enacted the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–409. In light of 

this recent determination by the Congress to protect and augment 

the authority of Inspectors General throughout the Government, 

Section 405 contains conforming changes in the IG provision in this 

conference report. Among these provisions is authority for the IG 

to appoint a counsel. Section 405 makes clear that it is not to be 

construed to alter the duties and responsibilities of the General 

Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

Section 405 is similar to Section 407 of S. 1494 and Section 406 

of H.R. 2701. 

Section 406. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community 

Section 406 amends Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 

(50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) to establish in statute a Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community (IC CFO) to assist the DNI in 


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carrying out budgetary, acquisition, and financial management responsibilities. 

By way of a new Section 103I of the National Security Act of 

1947, under Section 406, the IC CFO will, to the extent applicable, 

have the duties, responsibilities, and authorities specified in the 

Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990. The IC CFO will serve as the 

principal advisor to the DNI and the Principal Deputy DNI on the 

management and allocation of Intelligence Community budgetary 

resources and shall participate in overseeing a comprehensive and 

integrated strategic process for resource management within the 

Intelligence Community. Section 406 charges the IC CFO with ensuring that the strategic plan and architectures of the DNI are 

based on budgetary constraints as specified in the future budget 

projections required in Section 325. 

Section 406 also charges the IC CFO with receiving verification 

from appropriate authorities that major system acquisitions satisfy 

validated national requirements for meeting the DNI’s strategic 

plans and that such requirements are prioritized based on budgetary constraints as specified in the future budget projections required in Section 325. To guarantee this is achieved in practice, 

under Section 406, prior to obligation or expenditure of funds for 

major system acquisitions to proceed to Milestone A (development) 

or Milestone B (production), requirements must be validated and 

prioritized based on budgetary constraints as specified in Section 

325. 

Section 406 requires that the IC CFO preside, or assist in presiding, over any mission requirement, architectural, or acquisition 

board formed by the ODNI, and to coordinate and approve representations to Congress by the Intelligence Community regarding 

National Intelligence Program budgetary resources. An individual 

serving as the IC CFO may not at the same time also serve as a 

CFO of any other department or agency. 

Section 406 is based on Section 408 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 407. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials 

Section 407 confirms in statute that various offices are housed 

within the ODNI: (1) the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community; (2) the Inspector General of the Intelligence 

Community; (3) the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); (4) the Director of the National Counter Proliferation 

Center (NCPC); and (5) the Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community. It also expressly provides in statute that the 

DNI shall appoint the Director of the NCPC, which is what has 

been done by administrative delegation from the President. 

Section 407 is identical to Section 409 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 408. Protection of certain files of the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence 

In the CIA Information Act, Pub. L. No. No. 98–477 (October 15, 

1984) (50 U.S.C. 431), Congress authorized the Director of Central 

Intelligence to exempt operational files of the CIA from several requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), particularly 

those requiring search and review in response to FOIA requests. In 


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a series of amendments to Title VII of the National Security Act 

of 1947, Congress extended the exemption to the operational files 

of the NGA, NSA, NRO, and DIA. It also provided that files of the 

Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) should 

be treated as operational files of the CIA (to the extent they meet 

the criteria for CIA operational files). 

Components of the ODNI, including NCTC, require access to information contained in CIA and other operational files. To that 

end, section 408 adds a new section 706 to the National Security 

Act of 1947 to make clear that operational files of any Intelligence 

Community component, for which an operational files exemption is 

applicable, will not lose their exemption from FOIA search, review, 

disclosure, or publication solely because they have been provided to 

the ODNI. 

The new Section 706 provides several limitations on what records 

can be considered operational files. The exemption does not apply 

to records that contain information derived or disseminated from 

an operational file, unless that record is created for the sole purpose of organizing the operational file for use by the ODNI. It also 

does not apply to records disseminated beyond the ODNI. 

As Congress has provided in the operational files exemptions for 

the CIA and other Intelligence Community elements, subsection (d) 

provides that the exemption from search and review does not apply 

to requests by United States citizens or permanent residents for information about themselves (although other FOIA exemptions, such 

as appropriate classification, may continue to protect such files 

from public disclosure). The exemption from search and review 

would also not apply to the subject matter of a congressional or Executive branch investigation into improprieties or violations of law. 

Subsection (e) provides for a decennial review by the DNI to determine whether exemptions may be removed from any category of 

exempted files. This review shall include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in the subject matter of those 

categories and the potential for declassifying a significant part of 

the information contained in them. The Committee underscores the 

importance of this requirement, which applies to the other operational exemptions in Title VII. The Committee also expects the 

DNI to submit the results of such review to the congressional intelligence committees in a timely manner. 

Subsection (f) describes the manner of judicial review of the 

question of whether the ODNI has withheld records improperly 

under the operational file exemption. In particular, subsection (f)(2) 

permits the ODNI to meet its burden to prove the validity of the 

exemption by submitting a sworn written submission that exempted files likely to contain responsive records are records provided to 

the ODNI by an element of the Intelligence Community, from the 

exempted operational files of such element. 

Section 408 is identical to Section 411 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did 

not contain a comparable provision. 

Section 409. Counterintelligence initiatives for the intelligence community 

Section 409 amends Section 1102(a) of the National Security Act 

of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a) to eliminate the requirement that the 


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NCIX perform certain security functions more appropriately carried 

out by other components of the Intelligence Community. 

Section 409 is identical to Section 412 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 410. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to 

advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (5 

U.S.C. App.) to regulate the use of advisory committees throughout 

the Federal Government. FACA sets forth the responsibilities of 

the Executive branch with regard to such committees and outlines 

procedures and requirements for them. As originally enacted in 

1972, FACA expressly exempted advisory committees utilized by 

the CIA and the Federal Reserve System. Section 411 amends 

FACA to extend this exemption to advisory committees established 

or used by the ODNI if the DNI determines that for reasons of national security such advisory committee cannot comply with the requirements of the Act. The section also requires the DNI and the 

Director of CIA each to submit annual reports, which may be classified, on their use of these exemptions. 

Section 410 is based on Section 414 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did not 

contain a comparable provision. 

Section 411. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on 

the Transportation Security Oversight Board 

Section 411 substitutes the DNI, or the DNI’s designee, as a 

member of the Transportation Security Oversight Board established under section 115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States Code, in 

place of the CIA Director or CIA Director’s designee. The Transportation Security Oversight Board is responsible for, among other 

things, coordinating intelligence, security, and law enforcement activities affecting transportation and facilitating the sharing of intelligence, security, and law enforcement information affecting transportation among Federal agencies. 

Section 411 is identical to Section 415 of S. 1494 and Section 402 

of H.R. 2701. 

Section 412. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of 

the National Counterintelligence Executive 

Section 412 amends the authorities and structure of the NCIX to 

eliminate certain independent administrative authorities that had 

been vested in the NCIX when that official was appointed by and 

reported to the President. Those authorities are unnecessary now 

that the NCIX is to be appointed by and is under the authority of 

the DNI. Section 412 is identical to Section 416 of S. 1494 and Section 423 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 413. Misuse of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence name, initials or seal 

Section 413 prohibits the unauthorized use of the official name, 

initials or seal of the ODNI. Section 413 also permits the Attorney 

General to pursue injunctive relief for such unauthorized use. The 

provision is modeled on Section 13 of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 


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U.S.C. 403(m)) which provides similar protection against misuse of 

the name, initials, or seal of the CIA. 

Section 413 is identical to Section 417 of S. 1494 and similar to 

Section 365 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 414. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center 

energy efficiency reports 

Section 414 requires the DNI to develop a plan to implement 

across the Intelligence Community the recommendations of the Environmental Protection Agency report on improving data center energy efficiency (submitted pursuant to Pub. L. No. 109–431, 120 

Stat. 2920). This planning requirement is intended to encourage 

the Intelligence Community to fulfill its responsibility to assess the 

use of environmental resources with regard to the power, space, 

and cooling challenges of Intelligence Community data centers and 

to promote the use of energy-efficient technologies to reduce consumption of resources by the Intelligence Community’s data centers. 

Section 414 is similar to Section 404 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 did 

not have a comparable provision. 

Section 415. Director of National Intelligence support for reviews of 

International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Export Administration Regulations 

Section 415 provides that the DNI may support any review conducted by a department or agency of the federal government of the 

International Traffic in Arms Regulations or Export Administration 

Regulations, including a review of technologies and goods on the 

U.S. Munitions List and Commerce Control List that may warrant 

controls that are different or additional to the controls such technologies and goods are subject to at the time of the review. 

Section 415 is identical to Section 407 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. 

SUBTITLE B—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Section 421. Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Section 421 amends Section 5(a)(4) of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 

U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)), which authorizes protective functions by designated security personnel who serve on CIA protective details. 

Section 421 authorizes the CIA Director on the request of the DNI 

to make CIA protective detail personnel available to the DNI and 

to other personnel within the ODNI. 

Section 421 is identical to Section 421 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did 

not include a comparable provision. 

Section 422. Appeals from decisions involving contracts of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Section 422 amends Section 8(d) of the Contract Disputes Act of 

1978 (41 U.S.C. 607(d)) to provide that an appeal from a dispute 

arising out of a CIA contract shall be filed with whichever of the 

Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the Civilian Board of 

Contract Appeals is specified by the contracting officer and that 

such board shall have jurisdiction to decide the appeal. 


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Section 422 is based on Section 422 of S. 1494 and Section 413 

of H.R. 2701. 

Section 423. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Section 423 provides for a Deputy Director of the CIA in a new 

Section 104B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 

et seq.). Under the new Section 104B, the Deputy Director of the 

CIA shall be appointed by the President, shall assist the Director 

of the CIA in carrying out the Director’s duties and responsibilities, 

and shall assume those duties and responsibilities in the event of 

the Director’s absence, disability, or when the position is vacant. 

Prior to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004, Congress had provided by law for the appointment by the 

President, with Senate confirmation, of a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The Intelligence Reform Act abolished that position and was silent on any deputy to the Director of the CIA. Since 

enactment of the Intelligence Reform Act, the position of Deputy 

Director at the CIA has been solely a product of administrative action. 

Given the sensitive nature of the CIA’s operations, the position 

of Deputy Director merits consideration through the process of 

presidential appointment. The Committee agreed that the position 

would not be subject to the requirement of Senate confirmation, as 

was called for in Section 423 of S. 1494. 

Section 423(c) provides that the amendments made by Section 

423 apply prospectively. Therefore, the individual performing the 

duties of Deputy Director of the CIA on the date of enactment will 

not be affected by the amendments. Section 423 is identical to Section 414 of H.R. 2701 and similar to Section 423 of S. 1494. 

Section 424. Authority to authorize travel on a common carrier 

Section 424 amends Section 116(b) of the National Security Act 

of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)). Section 116(b) of the National Security 

Act of 1947 allows the DNI to authorize travel on common carriers 

for certain intelligence collection personnel, and it further allows 

the DNI to delegate this authority to the Principal Deputy Director 

of National Intelligence or to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Section 424 permits the Director of the CIA to redelegate this authority within the CIA. 

Section 424 is identical to Section 424 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 425. Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Section 425 amends Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)), which established a statutory CIA 

Inspector General. The amendment updates and clarifies the statute in light of revisions made by Congress in the Inspector General 

Reform Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110–409) and the recommendations in a recent semiannual report of the CIA IG. Among other 

provisions, Section 425 expands the protections against reprisals 

that now apply to CIA employees who bring complaints to the CIA 

IG to any CIA employee who provides information to the CIA IG. 

Section 425 provides that the CIA IG has final approval of the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with the 

Office of the IG and may appoint a counsel who reports to the IG. 


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Section 425 provides that this is not to be construed to alter the 

duties and responsibilities of the General Counsel of the CIA. 

Section 425 is based on Section 425 of S. 1494. Section 415 of 

H.R. 2701 expanded the protections against reprisals to any CIA 

employee who provides information to the CIA IG. 

Section 426. Budget of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Section 426 further amends Section 17 of the CIA Act to require 

the DNI to provide to the President the budget amount requested 

by the CIA IG and to provide that information to the congressional 

appropriations and intelligence committees, together with any comments of the CIA IG. These changes are similar to revisions made 

by Congress in the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 

No. 110–409) with respect to the budgets of other inspectors general within the federal government. 

Section 426 is identical to Section 426 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 427. Public availability of unclassified versions of certain 

intelligence products 

Section 427 requires the Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency to make publicly available unclassified versions of four documents which assess information gained from the interrogation of 

high value detainees. These documents are dated April 3, 2003, 

July 15, 2004, March 2, 2005, and June 1, 2005. 

Section 427 is identical to Section 427 of S. 1494. The House bill 

had no comparable provision. 

SUBTITLE C—DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS

Section 431. Inspector general matters 

The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) establishes a 

government-wide system of inspectors general, some appointed by 

the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and others 

‘‘administratively appointed’’ by the heads of their respective Federal entities. These IGs are authorized to ‘‘conduct and supervise 

audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations’’ 

of the government and ‘‘to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and. . .to prevent and detect 

fraud and abuse in, such programs and operations.’’ 5 U.S.C. App. 

2. They also perform an important reporting function: ‘‘keeping the 

head of the establishment and the Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of. . .programs and operations and the necessity for and 

progress of corrective action.’’ Id. The investigative authorities exercised by inspectors general, and their relative independence from 

the government operations they audit and investigate, provide an 

important mechanism to ensure that the operations of the government are conducted as efficiently and effectively as possible. 

The IGs of the CIA and Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury are appointed by the 

President with the advice and consent of the Senate. These IGs— 

authorized by either the Inspector General Act of 1978 or Section 

17 of the CIA Act—are independent within their organizations, 


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subject to certain specified authorities of the head of their respective departments or agencies. They also have explicit statutory authority to access information from their departments or agencies or 

other United States Government departments and agencies and 

may use subpoenas to access information (e.g., from an agency contractor) necessary to carry out their authorized functions. 

The NRO, DIA, NSA and NGA have established their own ‘‘administrative’’ Inspectors General. However, because they are not 

identified in Section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978, they 

lack explicit statutory authorization to access information relevant 

to their audits or investigations, or to compel the production of information via subpoena. This lack of authority could impede access 

to information in particular, information from contractors that is 

necessary for them to perform their important function. These inspectors general also lack the indicia of independence necessary for 

the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to recognize their annual financial statement audits as being in compliance with the 

Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101–576). The 

lack of independence also prevents the DoD IG, and would prevent 

the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, from relying 

on the results of NRO, DIA, NSA, or NGA inspector general audits 

or investigations when such audits must meet ‘‘generally accepted 

government auditing standards.’’ 

To provide an additional level of independence and to ensure 

prompt access to the information necessary for these IGs to perform their audits and investigations, Section 431 amends Section 

8G(a)(2) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 to include the NRO, 

DIA, NSA, and NGA as ‘‘designated federal entities.’’ As so designated, the heads of these Intelligence Community elements will 

be required by statute to administratively appoint inspectors general for these agencies. 

Also, as designated inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978, these inspectors general will be responsible to the 

heads of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA. The removal or transfer 

of any of these inspectors general by the head of their office or 

agency must be promptly reported to the congressional intelligence 

committees. These inspectors general will also be able to exercise 

other investigative authorities, including those governing access to 

information and the issuance of subpoenas, utilized by other inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

To protect vital national security interests, Section 431 permits 

the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the DNI, to prohibit 

the inspectors general of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation they 

are otherwise authorized to conduct. This authority is similar to 

the authority of the CIA Director under Section 17 of the CIA Act 

with respect to the Inspector General of the CIA and the authority 

of the Secretary of Defense under Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 with respect to the DoD Inspector General. It will 

provide the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the DNI, a 

mechanism to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources and 

methods or other vital national security interests. The Committee 

expects that this authority will be exercised rarely by the DNI or 

the Secretary of Defense. 


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Section 431 is identical to Section 431 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 432. Clarification of national security missions of National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for analysis and dissemination 

of certain intelligence information 

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 

No. 104–201 (Sept. 23, 1996) (NIMA Act)) formally merged the imagery analysis and mapping efforts of the Department of Defense 

and the CIA. In the NIMA Act, Congress cited a need ‘‘to provide 

a single agency focus for the growing number and diverse types of 

customers for imagery and geospatial information resources within 

the Government. . .to harness, leverage, and focus rapid technological developments to serve the imagery, imagery intelligence, 

and geospatial information customers.’’ Section 1102(1) of the 

NIMA Act. Since then, there have been rapid developments in airborne and commercial imagery platforms, new imagery and 

geospatial phenomenology, full motion video, and geospatial analysis tools. 

Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108–136 (Nov. 24, 2003)) changed the name 

of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to the National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The name change was intended to 

introduce the term ‘‘geospatial intelligence’’ to better describe the 

unified activities of NGA related to the ‘‘analysis and visual representation of characteristics of the earth and activity on its surface.’’ See S. Rep. 108–46 (May 13, 2003) (accompanying The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, S. 1050, 

108th Cong., 1st Sess.). 

Though the NGA has made significant progress toward unifying 

the traditional imagery analysis and mapping missions of the CIA 

and Department of Defense, it has been slow to embrace other facets of ‘‘geospatial intelligence,’’ including the processing, storage, 

and dissemination of full motion video (‘‘FMV’’) and ground-based 

photography. Rather, the NGA’s geospatial product repositories— 

containing predominantly overhead imagery and mapping products—continue to reflect its heritage. While the NGA is belatedly 

beginning to incorporate more airborne and commercial imagery, 

its data holdings and products are nearly devoid of FMV and 

ground-based photography. 

The Committee believes that FMV and ground-based photography should be included, with available positional data, in NGA 

data repositories for retrieval on Department of Defense and Intelligence Community networks. Current mission planners and military personnel are well-served with traditional imagery products 

and maps, but FMV of the route to and from a facility or photographs of what a facility would look like to a foot soldier—rather 

than from an aircraft—would be of immense value to military personnel and intelligence officers. Ground-based photography is 

amply available from open sources, as well as other government 

sources such as military units, United States embassy personnel, 

defense attache ́s, special operations forces, foreign allies, and clandestine officers. These products should be better incorporated into 

NGA data holdings. 


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To address these concerns, Section 432 adds an additional national security mission to the responsibilities of the NGA. To fulfill 

this new mission, NGA would be required, as directed by the DNI, 

to develop a system to facilitate the analysis, dissemination, and 

incorporation of likenesses, videos, or presentations produced by 

ground-based platforms, including handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations or available as open-source information, into the national 

system for geospatial intelligence. 

Section 432 also makes clear that this new responsibility does 

not include the authority to manage tasking of handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence 

collection organizations. Although Section 432 does not give the 

NGA authority to set technical requirements for collection of 

handheld or clandestine photography, the Committee encourages 

the NGA to engage other elements of the Intelligence Community 

on these technical requirements to ensure that their output can be 

incorporated into the national system for geospatial-intelligence 

within the security handling guidelines consistent with the photography’s classification as determined by the appropriate authority. 

Section 432 is identical to Section 435 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no similar provision. 

Section 433. Director of Compliance of the National Security Agency 

Section 433 amends the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 

U.S.C. 402 note) to establish a statutory Director of Compliance, 

appointed by the Director of the NSA. The Director of Compliance 

is responsible for the NSA’s compliance programs over mission activities and is therefore responsible for ensuring that the components within NSA are adhering to rules and restrictions governing 

surveillance activities. 

The Committee understands the challenges involved in ensuring 

that the NSA’s mission activities, which involve complicated and 

ever-changing technology, are conducted in a manner consistent 

with laws, rules, and restrictions governing surveillance. Having a 

Director of Compliance, who has expertise in both the legal and 

technical arenas of surveillance, will help minimize the risk of noncompliance. 

Section 433 is based on Section 425 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 did not 

have a comparable provision. Section 425 of H.R. 2701 would have 

created the position of Associate Director of the National Security 

Agency for Compliance and Training and would have given the Associate Director responsibility for ensuring that all NSA programs 

and activities were conducted in a manner consistent with all applicable laws, regulations and policies and that the training of relevant personnel was sufficient. The National Security Agency appointed its first Director of Compliance in July 2009. This official 

reports to the Director of the National Security Agency and is responsible for developing and maintaining a program of compliance 

for all of NSA’s mission activities. Section 433 reflects the office 

and responsibilities of the Director of Compliance as they have 

been established administratively within the NSA. Codifying the 

new position in statute underscores its importance and conveys the 

Committee’s belief that one individual should be responsible for the 

mission compliance program of NSA. 


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SUBTITLE D—OTHER ELEMENTS

Section 441. Codification of additional elements of the intelligence 

community 

Section 441 restores, with respect to the United States Coast 

Guard, the prior definition of ‘‘intelligence community’’ in the National Security Act of 1947 applicable to that service. See 50 U.S.C. 

401a. Section 1073 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 modified the definition of ‘‘intelligence community,’’ inadvertently limiting the Coast Guard’s inclusion in the Intelligence Community to the Office of Intelligence or those portions 

of the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis of intelligence. Section 441 clarifies that all of the Coast Guard’s intelligence elements 

are included within the definition of the ‘‘intelligence community.’’ 

Section 441 also codifies the joint decision of the DNI and Attorney General to designate an office within the Drug Enforcement 

Administration as an element of the Intelligence Community. Section 441 is identical to Section 441 of S. 1494 and similar to Sections 421 and 422 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 442. Authorization of appropriations for Coast Guard National Tactical Integration Office 

Section 442 provides authorization of appropriations for research 

and development (R&D) to the Coast Guard National Technical Integration Office (NTIO), which is the Coast Guard counterpart to 

the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities programs in each 

of the military services. The NTIO explores the use of national intelligence systems in support of Coast Guard operations. Section 

442 is intended to enable the National Technical Integration Office 

to monitor the development, procurement, and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment and to conduct related research, development, and test and evaluation activities within the 

context of the Coast Guard’s existing R&D authority. 

Section 442 is identical to Section 442 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 443. Retention and relocation bonuses for the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Section 443 makes permanent the authority of the Director of the 

FBI to pay bonuses to retain certain employees, such as those who 

have unusually high or unique qualifications or who are likely to 

leave the Federal service, and to pay relocation bonuses to employees who are transferred to areas in which there is a shortage of 

critical skills. 

Section 443 is identical to Section 443 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 444. Extension of the authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to waive mandatory retirement provisions 

Existing law permits agencies to exempt law enforcement officers 

from mandatory retirement (generally applicable at age 57 with 20 

years of service) until age 60. Under 5 U.S.C. 8335(b)(2), pertaining 

to the Civil Service Retirement System, and 5 U.S.C. 8425(b)(2), 

pertaining to the Federal Employee Retirement System, the Director of the FBI may exempt FBI officers from mandatory retirement 


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until age 65, if such an extension is in the public interest. Section 

444 extends the waiver authority, which expired at the end of 2009, 

until the end of 2011. 

Section 444 is identical to Section 444 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had 

no comparable provision. 

Section 445. Report and assessments on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Section 445 requires the Director of the FBI, in consultation with 

the DNI, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, 

not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, a report describing the long-term vision for the intelligence capabilities of the 

FBI’s National Security Branch, a strategic plan for the National 

Security Branch, and the progress in advancing the capabilities of 

the branch. Among other things, the report is to include a description of the intelligence and national security capabilities that will 

be fully functional within the 5-year period beginning on the date 

the report is submitted and a description of the metrics, timetables, 

and reforms. The report must also describe the activities being carried out to ensure the NSB is improving its performance and 

should address the issues pertaining to mandatory reassignment of 

FBI supervisors after serving in a position for seven years. In addition, Section 445 requires the DNI, in consultation with the Director of the FBI, to conduct for five years an annual assessment of 

the NSB’s progress based on those performance metrics and timetables. 

As described in the unclassified letter of the Director of Management and Budget setting forth the Administration’s views on the 

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, as passed by 

the Senate and House of Representatives, this FBI report was tied 

to a fence on funding in the classified annex. The fence was removed at the request of the Executive branch, in light of the timing 

of the enactment of this authorization bill late in the fiscal year, 

but the Committee requires the report to be completed within 180 

days of enactment and will revisit the issue of a fence if the report 

is not completed on a timely basis. Section 445 is based on Section 

445 of S. 1494 and Sections 339 and 349 of H.R. 2701. 

TITLE V—REORGANIZATION OF THE DIPLOMATIC 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM OFFICE 

Section 501. Reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications 

Service Program Office 

Section 501 provides for the reorganization of the Diplomatic 

Telecommunications Service (DTS) which is comprised of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS–PO) and 

the DTS Network. The purpose of the DTS–PO is to establish and 

maintain a DTS Network that is capable of meeting the worldwide 

communications service needs of United States Government departments and agencies operating from diplomatic and consular facilities including their national security needs for secure, reliable, and 

robust communications. Section 501 replaces a reorganization plan 

enacted in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 

and formally amends that Act that will appear in Title 22 of the 

U.S. Code. 


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Section 501 establishes a Governance Board that shall direct and 

oversee the activities of the DTS–PO. The Director of OMB shall 

designate from the departments and agencies that use the DTS 

Network those departments and agencies whose heads will appoint 

members of the Governance Board from among their personnel. 

The OMB Director shall designate the Chair of the Board from 

among its five voting members and also designate from among the 

users of the network the department or agency that shall be the 

DTS–PO Executive Agent. 

The Governance Board shall determine the written arrangements, which may be classified, for managing the DTS–PO. The 

Board shall have the power to approve and monitor the DTS–PO’s 

plans, services, policies, and pricing methodology, and to provide to 

the DTS–PO Executive Agent the Board’s recommendation with respect to the approval, disapproval, or modification of the DTS–PO’s 

annual budget requests. The Board will also approve or disapprove 

of the Executive Agent’s nomination of a Director of the DTS Program Office. 

Section 501 authorizes two-year appropriations for the DTS–PO. 

It requires that the DTS–PO shall charge users only for bandwidth 

costs attributable to that department or agency and for specific customer projects. 

In requesting enactment of Section 501, the DNI advised the 

Committee as follows about its purpose: ‘‘The appropriations authorized by this measure will promote modernization of the [DTS] 

network and the expansion of its architecture. With the authority 

to recover bandwidth costs, the DTS–PO can vastly improve the 

overall business management and effectiveness of DTS–PO operations. The measure will facilitate the establishment of a financial 

management system that employs a single system of records, that 

increases transparency and traceability in customer billing, that 

promotes responsiveness to customer requirements, that insures 

timely acquisition of bandwidth and receipt of vendor payments, 

and that promotes cost-conscious behavior among DTS–PO customers.’’ 

Section 501 is substantially similar to Section 501 of S. 1494. 

H.R. 2701 did not include a comparable provision. 

TITLE VI—FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION 

COMMISSION ACT 

Title VI establishes a Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission (Commission) to provide, in a year from the appointment 

of its members, recommendations to improve foreign intelligence 

and information collection, analysis, and reporting through the 

strategic integration of the Intelligence Community and other elements of the United States Government with regard to the collection, reporting, and analysis of foreign intelligence and information. 

Title VI is similar to Title VI of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had no comparable provision. In addition to revisions of particular matters 

concerning the Commission, the Committee agreed not to include 

the findings in Section 602 of S. 1494. 

Section 601. Short title 

Section 601 provides that this title may be cited as the ‘‘Foreign 

Intelligence and Information Commission Act.’’ 


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Section 602. Definitions 

Section 602 provides definitions, including subsection 602(3) 

which defines ‘‘information’’ to include information of relevance to 

the foreign policy of the United States collected and conveyed 

through diplomatic reporting and other reporting by personnel of 

the Government of the United States who are not employed by an 

element of the Intelligence Community, to include public and opensource information. 

Section 603. Establishment and functions of the Commission 

Section 603 establishes and sets forth the functions of the Commission. The Commission shall evaluate any current processes or 

systems for the strategic integration of the Intelligence Community, including the DNI’s Open Source Center, and other elements 

of the United States Government, including the Department of 

State, with regard to the collection, reporting, and analysis of foreign intelligence information. 

The Commission shall provide recommendations on a number of 

matters. It shall recommend how to improve or develop such processes or systems including by development of an interagency strategy. It shall also provide recommendations on how to incorporate 

into the inter-agency strategy the means to anticipate future 

threats, challenges, and crises, including by identifying collection, 

reporting and analytical capabilities that are global in scope and 

are directed at emerging, long-term, and strategic threats. 

The Commission shall also provide recommendations related to 

the establishment of any new Executive branch entity, or the expansion of the authorities of any existing Executive branch entity, 

as needed to improve the strategic integration of foreign intelligence and information collection. 

In addition, the Commission shall provide recommendations on 

strategies for sustaining human and budgetary resources to effect 

the global collection and reporting missions identified in the interagency strategy. 

Section 604. Members and staff of the Commission 

Section 604 establishes that the Commission shall be composed 

of 10 members, eight of whom shall be voting members. The voting 

members shall be two members appointed by the Majority Leader 

of the Senate, two members appointed by the Minority Leader of 

the Senate, two members appointed by the Speaker of the House 

of Representatives, and two members appointed by the Minority 

Leader of the House of Representatives. Of the two nonvoting 

members, one shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence and the other shall be appointed by the Secretary of State. 

Members of the Commission shall be private citizens with knowledge and experience in foreign information and intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis; knowledge and experience in issues 

related to the national security and foreign policy of the United 

States gained by serving in the Department of State, other appropriate agency or department or independent organization with expertise in the field of international affairs; or knowledge and experience with foreign policy decision making. The congressional leaders, the DNI, and the Secretary of State shall consult among themselves prior to the appointment of members in order to achieve a 


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fair and equitable representation of points of view on the Commission. 

The members of the Commission shall designate one of the voting members to serve as chair. Five voting members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting 

the business of the Commission. 

Subsection 604(b) provides for the selection of an Executive Director by an appointment of the chair with the approval of a majority of the voting members of the Commission. The chair is also authorized, in consultation with the Executive Director, to appoint 

other Commission personnel. The Committee agreed to set the salary limits for Commission staff to those applicable to the maximum 

annual rate for employees of a standing committee of the U.S. Senate. 

Section 605. Powers and duties of the Commission 

Section 605 provides the powers and duties of the Commission, 

including holding hearings, taking testimony and receiving evidence. The Commission may secure directly from a department or 

agency of the United States information that the Commission considers necessary to carry out the title. Upon request of the Commission chair, the head of each department or agency shall furnish 

such information to the Commission, subject to applicable law. S. 

1494 had provided subpoena authority to the Commission, but the 

Committee agreed that the Commission would not have the power 

to issue subpoenas. 

Section 606. Report of the Commission 

Section 606 provides that no later than 300 days (approximately 

10 months) after the appointment of members, the Commission 

shall submit an interim report to the congressional intelligence 

committees. No later than 60 days thereafter, the Commission 

shall submit a final report to the President, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 

Section 607. Termination 

Section 607 provides that the Commission shall terminate 60 

days after the submission of the Commission’s final report. 

Section 608. Nonapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act 

Section 608 provides that the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 

U.S.C. App.) does not apply to the Commission. 

Section 609. Authorization of appropriations 

Section 609 authorizes the appropriation of such sums as may be 

necessary to carry out this title. The sums shall be available until 

expended. 


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TITLE VII—OTHER MATTERS 

Section 701. Extension of National Commission for the Review of 

the Research and Development Programs of the United States 

Intelligence Community 

The National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community was 

authorized by Title X of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107–306 (2002) and lapsed on September 1, 2004, when the time for the final report of the Commission was reached without completion of the appointment process 

for the Commission. 

The Congress established the Commission after determining that 

there was a need for a review of the full range of current research 

and development programs within the responsibility of the Intelligence Community with the goal of ensuring a unified research 

and development program across the entire Community. As this remains an important objective, Section 701 renews authority for this 

Commission by extending the reporting deadline to one year after 

the date that members are appointed and requiring that new members be appointed to the Commission. This section also authorizes 

the appropriation of funds for the Commission, which shall remain 

available until expended. 

Section 701 is based on Section 501 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no similar provision. 

Section 702. Classification review of executive branch materials in 

the possession of the congressional intelligence committees 

Section 702 authorizes the DNI to conduct classification reviews 

of materials in the possession of the congressional intelligence committees that are at least 25 years old and were created, or provided 

to that committee, by the Executive branch. The DNI may only exercise this authority at the request of one of the congressional intelligence committees, in accordance with procedures established by 

that committee. 

Section 702 is based on Section 503 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had 

no comparable provision. Section 503 of H.R. 2701 had stated that 

the DNI ‘‘shall’’ conduct classification reviews in accordance with 

committee rules. In Section 702, the Committee clarified that classification reviews would only be conducted at the request of the 

congressional intelligence committees. 

TITLE VIII—TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS 

Section 801. Technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 

Section 801 makes technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to correct typographical and grammatical errors. Section 801 is identical to Section 701 of S. 1494 

and Section 514 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 802. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence 

Agency Act of 1949 

Section 802 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 

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flect amendments made by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004. Section 802 is identical to Section 702 of 

S. 1494 and Section 511 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 803. Technical amendments to title 10, United States Code 

Section 803 corrects a number of technical errors in the United 

States Code arising from the enactment of the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Section 803 is identical to 

Section 703 of S. 1494 and Section 519 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 804. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 

1947 

Section 804 makes a number of technical corrections to the National Security Act of 1947 arising from enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Section 804 

is identical to Section 704 of S. 1494 and Section 518 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 805. Technical amendments to the multiyear National Intelligence Program 

Section 805 updates the ‘‘multiyear national intelligence program’’ to incorporate organizational and nomenclature changes 

made by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004. Section 805 is identical to Section 705 of S. 1494 and Section 

517 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 806. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

Section 806 makes a number of technical and conforming amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004. Section 806 is substantially similar to Section 706 of S. 1494 

and Section 516 of H.R. 2701. 

Section 807. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule 

Section 807 makes technical amendments to the Executive 

Schedule to correct outdated and incorrect references to ‘‘Director 

of Central Intelligence,’’ ‘‘Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence,’’ 

and ‘‘General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director.’’ Section 807 is identical to Section 707 of S. 1494 and Section 513 of 

H.R. 2701. 

Section 808. Technical amendments to section 105 of the Intelligence 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 

Section 808 changes the reference to ‘‘the Director of Central Intelligence’’ to ‘‘the DNI’’ in Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108–77 (December 13, 

2003)) to clarify that the establishment of the Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis within the Department of the Treasury, and its reorganization within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (Section 222 of the Transportation, Treasury, Independent 

Agencies, and General Government Appropriations Act, 2005 (Division H, Pub. L. No. 108–447 (December 8, 2004))), do not affect the 

authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as an element of the Intelligence 

Community. Section 808 is identical to Section 708 of S. 1494 and 

Section 515 of H.R. 2701. 


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Section 809. Technical amendments to section 602 of the Intelligence 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 

Section 809 changes references to ‘‘the Director of Central Intelligence’’ in Section 602 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 to ‘‘the Director of National Intelligence’’ or to ‘‘the 

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency’’ as appropriate. Section 

809 is identical to Section 709 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did not have 

a comparable provision. 

Section 810. Technical amendments to section 403 of the Intelligence 

Authorization Act for fiscal year 1992 

Section 810 makes technical amendments to Section 403 of the 

Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992, to reflect the creation of the position of the Director of National Intelligence and the 

appropriate definition of the Intelligence Community. Section 810 

is identical to Section 710 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did not have a 

comparable provision. 

GENERAL MATTERS

Items not included 

In addition to items not included in the bill as described above, 

certain other sections from S. 1494 and H.R. 2701 were not included because: these sections were unnecessary; the requirements 

in the section had been or would be otherwise fulfilled; the sections 

related to activities for which funds would not be available; or for 

other reasons. 

Section 335 of both S. 1494 and H.R. 2701 provided for audits or 

investigations of the Intelligence Community by the GAO. On 

March 15, 2010, in a letter providing the views of the Administration on the House and Senate bills, the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) noted that the Administration 

continued to ‘‘strongly object’’ to the GAO provisions, indicated that 

‘‘current law expressly exempts intelligence and counterintelligence 

activities from GAO review,’’ and stated that the President’s senior 

advisors would recommend that he veto a bill that included the 

GAO provisions. On March 18, 2010, the Acting Comptroller General sent a letter to the intelligence committees indicating his disagreement with the description of GAO’s authorities contained in 

the OMB Director’s letter, and noting that existing statutes ‘‘provide GAO with the required authority to perform audits and evaluations of [Intelligence Community] activities.’’ 

In light of this, the Committee believes it is important to explore 

further the scope of current GAO arrangements with the Intelligence Community, the history of GAO’s work on classified matters 

outside of the Intelligence Community, existing GAO procedures for 

working with classified information, and the extent to which future 

GAO investigations and audits of the Intelligence Community can 

be conducted by mutual agreement. In this regard, the leadership 

of the Committee has in this Congress and the last Congress asked 

the DNI and Comptroller General whether they can identify selected oversight subjects regarding which GAO has expertise and 

for which assistance could be provided by agreement between the 

Intelligence Community and GAO in a manner consistent with national security. 


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The Committee continues to believe that GAO can make a significant contribution to the oversight of the Intelligence Community and that the intelligence committees should continue to work 

with the DNI and the Comptroller General to find ways to bring 

GAO’s significant skills to bear. 

The bill also eliminates a series of reporting requirements from 

S. 1494 and H.R. 2701 with the expectation that the information 

required by these reports would be obtained by the congressional 

intelligence committees during the course of normal oversight activities. The ODNI has offered to provide the information requested 

in these reports in briefings or hearings. In particular, the bill does 

not include from H.R. 2701: Section 331, report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets; Section 333, semiannual reports on nuclear weapons programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea; Section 

340, report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan; Section 341, report on international traffic in arms regulations; Section 342, report on nuclear trafficking; Section 343, study 

on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information; Section 346, study on college tuition 

programs for employees of the Intelligence Community; Section 

359, report on dissemination of counterterrorism information to 

local law enforcement agencies; Section 360, report on intelligence 

capabilities of state and local law enforcement agencies; Section 

360A, Inspector General report on over-classification; Section 360C, 

report on activities of the Intelligence Community in Argentina; 

Section 360G, report on missile arsenal of Iran; Section 360H, 

study on best practices of foreign governments in combating violent 

domestic extremism; Section 360I, report on information sharing 

practices of Joint Terrorism Task Force; Section 360J, report on 

technology to enable information sharing; Section 360K, report on 

threats to energy security of the United States; and Section 506, 

review of intelligence to determine if foreign connection to anthrax 

attacks exists. The elimination of the report on global supply chain 

vulnerabilities required by Section 347 of H.R. 2701 is discussed in 

more detail in the classified annex. 

Section 314 of S. 1494 required the DNI to review certain educational grant and scholarship programs and report on whether 

those programs could be combined or otherwise integrated. The 

Committee encourages the DNI to consider this issue in future 

budget and legislative submissions. For future intelligence authorizations, the congressional intelligence committees will be interested in determining whether the ODNI’s promise of methods of 

providing information other than through reports has worked to 

satisfy the oversight interest underlying the inclusion of these sections in the House and Senate bills. 

The bill also does not include sections of H.R. 2701 and S. 1494 

that have already been enacted into law. These sections include: 

Section 345 of H.R. 2701 and Section 338 of S. 1494, each of which 

required a report on retirement benefits for former employees of 

Air America; Section 357 of H.R. 2701 which reiterated an existing 

requirement to submit report on terrorism financing; and Section 

428 of H.R. 2701, which required the submission of a charter for 

the National Reconnaissance Office. The Committee expects compliance with those existing reporting requirements. Similarly, because 

the National Defense Authorization Act has temporarily suspended 


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pay authority under the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel 

System pending the submission of findings and recommendations 

by an independent organization, the bill does not include Section 

304 of H.R. 2701, which contained provisions relating to the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System. 

Both Section 403 of H.R. 2701 and Section 405 of S. 1494 provided additional statutory duties for the DNI’s Director of Science 

and Technology. Internal reorganization within the ODNI has obviated the need for this provision. 

In addition, the following sections from H.R. 2701 are not included: Section 369, sense of the Congress on monitoring of northern border of the United States; Section 411, review of covert action programs by the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 

Agency; Section 502, expansion and clarification of the duties of the 

program manager for the information sharing environment; and 

Section 505, sense of the Congress honoring the contributions of 

the Central Intelligence Agency. The Committee honors the contribution of the CIA and all other elements and personnel of the 

Intelligence Community but believes it is preferable that the intelligence authorization act not be the vehicle for expressing the sense 

of the Congress on various matters. 

The following additional sections from S. 1494 are not included: 

Section 353, limitation on reprogrammings and transfers of funds; 

Section 403, authorities for interagency funding; Section 413, applicability of the Privacy Act to the Director of National Intelligence 

and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Section 432, 

confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components of the 

Intelligence Community; and Section 434, DIA counterintelligence 

and expenditures. Also not included was Section 364 of H.R. 2701, 

exemption of dissemination of terrorist identity information from 

the Freedom of Information Act. These are matters that may be the 

subject of further study by the congressional intelligence committees. 

Compliance with Rule XXI, CL. 9 (House) and with Rule XLIV 

(Senate) 

Clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives 

and rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate require publication of a list of the ‘‘congressionally directed spending items’’ (the 

term used in the Senate rule) or ‘‘congressional earmarks’’ (the 

term used in the House rules) that are included in the conference 

report, the joint explanatory statement, or the classified schedule 

of authorizations accompanying the conference report. The list 

must include the name of each Senator, House Member, Delegate, 

or Resident Commissioner who submitted a request to the committee of jurisdiction for each item so identified. 

The House and Senate rules also require the listing of limited 

tax or tariff benefits. The conference report, the joint explanatory 

statement, and the classified schedule of authorizations contain no 

limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits as defined in the applicable House and Senate rules. 

There were no congressionally directed spending items (as defined in the Senate rule) or congressional earmarks (as defined in 

the House rule) in either S. 1494 or H.R. 2701 on the Intelligence 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Consistent with the deterVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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mination of the Committee not to create any direct spending items 

or earmarks, none have been newly created in this bill, the report 

to accompany it, or the classified schedule of authorizations. 

Congressionally directed spending items or earmarks for intelligence or intelligence-related activities in Fiscal Year 2010 were 

contained in the previously enacted Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111–118) or in the Military Construction and Veterans Administration Appropriations Act, 2010 

(Pub. L. No. 111–117). In accordance with the request of the Administration that the authorization of these congressionally directed spending items or earmarks should remain in effect after 

passage of this Act, this bill does not remove the authorization for 

those congressionally directed items or earmarks contained in the 

Defense Appropriations Act, 2010. A definitive statement under the 

Senate and House rules of the congressionally directed spending 

items or earmarks contained in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 and the Military Construction and Veterans Administration Appropriations Act may be found respectively in the 

Committee Print of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House 

of Representatives, on H.R. 3326/Public Law 111–118, beginning on 

page 434, and in the conference report to accompany H.R. 3288, 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, H. Rept. 111–366, beginning on page 1362. 

COMMITTEE ACTION

Vote to report the committee bill 

On July 15, 2010, a quorum for reporting being present, the 

Committee voted to report the bill, by a vote of 15 ayes and no 

noes. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman 

Feinstein—aye; Senator Rockefeller—aye; Senator Wyden—aye; 

Senator Bayh—aye; Senator Mikulski—aye; Senator Feingold—aye; 

Senator Nelson—aye; Senator Whitehouse—aye; Vice Chairman 

Bond—aye; Senator Hatch—aye; Senator Snowe—aye; Senator 

Chambliss—aye; Senator Burr—aye; Senator Coburn—aye; Senator 

Risch—aye. 

ESTIMATE OF COSTS

Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to include 

an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of 

this report due to the classified nature of the operations conducted 

pursuant to this legislation. The Congressional Budget Office 

(CBO) prepared cost estimates for H.R. 2701 and S. 1494. The June 

25, 2009 cost estimate for H.R. 2701 and the August 6, 2009 cost 

estimate for S. 1494 are posted on the CBO website. On July 15, 

2010, the Committee transmitted this bill to the CBO for any further review that is warranted, beyond those posted estimates, regarding the costs incurred in carrying out the bill’s provisions. 

EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no substantial reguVerDate Mar 15 2010 16:25 Jul 20, 2010 Jkt 089010 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR223.XXX SR223

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latory impact will be incurred by implementing the provisions of 

this legislation. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAWS

In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to dispense with 

the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the business of the Senate. 


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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR ROCKEFELLER 

The Congressional notification provisions in the bill that we are 

reporting out today constitute an important improvement over the 

status quo. They require that the congressional intelligence committees and the President establish written procedures regarding 

the details of notification processes and expectations; that the 

President provide written notice about intelligence activities and 

covert actions, including changes in covert action findings and the 

legal authority under which an intelligence activity or a covert action is or will be conducted; that the President provide written reasons for limiting access to notifications to less than the full committee; and that the President maintain records of all notifications, 

including names of Members briefed and dates of the briefings. 

I support these provisions because I expect that they will go a 

long way toward correcting past deficiencies. However, I believe 

that additional clarity is needed regarding whether or not the full 

committee will be aware of three critical facts in circumstances of 

less-than-full-committee notifications: (1) the fact that such a limited access notification has occurred, (2) the general subject of the 

limited notification, and (3) the reasons for limiting access. 

There are situations in which a limited notification is appropriate and even necessary, but those situations are rare. Congressional notification procedures—and practices—should reflect that 

rarity. Most importantly, they should prevent limited notification 

from impeding the committees’ oversight responsibilities, because 

effective congressional oversight of intelligence activities is critical 

to the national security interests of the United States. 

As Senator Snowe and I noted in our additional views to the 

Committee’s July 22, 2009 report of an earlier version of this bill, 

the Committee has supported clarity on these matters in four consecutive intelligence authorization bills. I will continue to work 

with my colleagues in establishing written notification procedures 

that resolve any ambiguities in favor of full committee awareness. 

The Congressional notification provisions in the bill that we are 

reporting out today are a good first step—but only a first step. 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, IV. 


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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FEINGOLD 

The version of the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization 

bill reported out by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

July 15, 2010, retains a critically important provision—the establishment of an independent commission to address structural impediments to global coverage and our ability to anticipate terrorist 

and other threats and crises before they appear. I am also pleased 

that the bill includes a number of provisions that would improve 

accountability and save taxpayer dollars. Unfortunately, the bill removes many other important provisions that were in the Senatepassed bill that were aimed at improving oversight and transparency, as well as accountability. 

The so-called ‘‘Gang of Eight’’ provision of the National Security 

Act should be eliminated entirely so that all members of the congressional intelligence committees can be notified of all intelligence 

activities. The earlier version of the bill required merely that all 

members receive basic information about matters only briefed to 

the Chairman and Vice Chairman, yet this compromise has been 

removed. The current version also removes a provision ensuring access to the Intelligence Community by the Government Accountability Office, as well as provisions requiring that the heads of the 

NSA, NGA and NRO be confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Furthermore, the bill waters down an amendment I offered with Vice 

Chairman Bond and Senator Wyden requiring the president to submit an unclassified top-line budget request for the National Intelligence Program by adding a presidential waiver. This amendment 

was intended to make possible a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to improve congressional oversight by passing a separate 

intelligence appropriations bill, a structural reform that would be 

seriously complicated by the year-to-year uncertainty of a presidential waiver. 

Because of these and other modifications, the bill falls short of 

what should be reported out by the Committee this year, or in future years. However, while I will continue to fight for the reforms 

included in the original version, I do not wish to stand in the way 

of finally passing an intelligence authorization bill that includes 

the establishment of the independent commission as well as other 

important provisions. 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD. 

Æ 


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