Question for the Record Submitted to 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by 

Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

February 25, 2010 

Question 1a: 

 

Islamist extremists continue to expand their operations in Africa and the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a critical program on the African continent. 

The budget documents show significant cuts in funding of this key program, thus 

suggesting counterterrorism programs in Africa are not of main concern. How high of a 

priority is the TSCTP and other counterterrorism programs in Africa? 

 

Answer: 

 The State Department strongly supports the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 

Partnership (TSCTP) and its East Africa counterpart, the East Africa Regional Strategic 

Initiative (EARSI). Preventing the spread of terrorism and extremism in Africa is a vital 

U.S. interest and we have and will continue to provide significant resources to support 

long-term sustained engagement on the continent. 

 TSCTP and EARSI are the USG’s primary tools supporting regional efforts to 

build long-term capacity in Northwest and East Africa to disrupt terrorist organizations 

and facilitation networks, secure vulnerable borders, extend effective government control 

over remote areas, discredit violent ideology and address underlying conditions that 

provide terrorists with recruits, sanctuary and resources. Department of State resources 

will continue to support training and equipping partner country militaries, law 

enforcement and intelligence units required to monitor and protect vulnerable border 

areas and difficult-to-govern areas exploited by terrorist organizations. State Department 

and USAID programming will focus on improving local government capacity to deliver 

basic services and providing educational and vocational training opportunities to 
populations potentially vulnerable to radicalization. USAID and State Department public 

diplomacy and strategic communications programs will continue to increase the capacity 

of moderate leaders to discredit extremist messages and promote democratic rule of law. 

Question 1b: 

 

Do the proposed cuts to the TSCTP stand at odds with the Administration’s stated intent 

to “assume a primary role in the USG strategy for countering terrorism through attacking 

terrorist networks and countering violent extremism?” 

Answer: 

 Funding levels for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) 

reflect our strong commitment to an effective and sustainable counterterrorism effort in 

the region. Although funding levels are adjusted each fiscal year to reflect specific 

programmatic requirements and partner country priorities, we have either increased or 

maintained State Department resources available for most key accounts. Programs 

receiving lower funding levels in FY 2011 are noted below. USAID will provide a 

separate response regarding its TSCTP activities funded with Development Assistance 

and Economic Support Funds. 

 The State Department’s TSCTP activities are supported by resources from several 

primary accounts including Economic Support Funds (ESF), Peacekeeping Operations 

(PKO), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and 

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). In past 

years, we supplemented those at times with Section 1206 and 1207 and Regional Security 

Initiative (RSI) programs; the funding source of these is Defense Department 
appropriations. The Department Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT) oversees the 

RSI. The Department of Defense also conducts training support using Title X authorities. 

 The FY 2011 levels projected represent the best current estimate but may be 

understated because some qualifying activities will not be identified until operational 

plans are finalized following enacted appropriations. The FY 2011 request for $5 million 

in State Department Africa Regional ESF matches our FY 2010 request. Our FY 2011 

request for $20 million in PKO matches our FY 2010 request and represents a $5 million 

increase from FY 2009 funding levels. The Administration’s request for FY 2011 AF 

Regional and NEA Regional NADR is $8.8 million. The overall FY 2011 NADR funding 

level represents a $7 million decrease from the FY 2010 level, but is consistent with FY 

2008 and FY 2009 requests. The Department’s Diplomatic Security Bureau, the Bureaus 

of African and Near East Affairs, and the Coordinator for Counterterrorism closely 

coordinated the establishment of the FY 2011 levels to ensure that critical NADR 

programs are adequately resourced. The FY 2011 request for INCLE is $5.5 million, a 

$1 million increase from the FY 2010 requested level. Increases in INCLE funding in FY 

2011 will support efforts to improve basic policing skills and organization and should 

also increase the effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Assistance programs building more 

specialized counterterrorism capability in partner country security forces. In addition, the 

new regional training center in West Africa, supported by INCLE funds, will conduct 

courses to support police professionalization. 
Question 2a: 

Zimbabwe

The budget request includes a $10 million increase in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for 

Zimbabwe. For what purpose will these funds be used and how will they be monitored? 

Answer: 

We intend to use the $10 million increase in ESF funding in FY 2011 to expand 

economic growth activities designed to accelerate Zimbabwe’s recovery and help the 

people of Zimbabwe realize the tangible benefits of the democratic transition process. 

The majority of the funding will be used to revive the agricultural sector through 

activities that increase production. The funding will also assist farmer unions and other 

agricultural associations to enhance their advocacy skills to demand policy reforms that 

will improve the agricultural environment. Agricultural research institutions will 

be assisted to improve seed varieties and livestock breeds. 

Funding will also include technical assistance to build the capacity of the Ministry 

of Finance – currently led by Tendai Biti of the Movement for Democratic Change 

(MDC) – and the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority to identify and stop revenue leakages, 

strengthen customs policy and procedures, facilitate trade, and improve tax 

administration. In addition, our funding will assist the Central Statistical Office in the 

Finance Ministry to conduct research and analysis that will improve decision making 

around monetary and fiscal reform. 

 

We carefully structure our assistance to comply with U.S. law, including any 

restrictions on assistance for the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ). This includes 
funding for the planned macroeconomic growth technical assistance to the Finance 

Ministry and Revenue Authority, which will go through grantees, contractors, and other 

third parties. We also scrutinize this funding to ensure that it does not benefit any 

individual or entity on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, which is 

maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in the U. S. Treasury 

Department. We routinely monitor entities that benefit from our assistance to ensure that 

resources are used for their intended purpose. Furthermore, annual audits track 

expenditures. 

Question 2b: 

How do you intend to continue to isolate the negative forces of the transitional 

government, particularly Robert Mugabe and his thugs, while strengthening reformminded elements? 

Our targeted OFAC sanctions are imposed specifically on individuals and entities 

that have hindered democracy and abused human rights in Zimbabwe. Negative forces in 

the transitional government are isolated via their inclusion on our Specially Designated 

Nationals (SDN) list. Our measures will remain in place until genuine, sustained 

democratic and political opening has taken place in Zimbabwe. 

Reform-minded ministers are embracing change, and abandoning the failed 

policies of the past, and we strongly encourage all political actors in Zimbabwe, of 

whatever party, to do the same. Our humanitarian, health, and democracy assistance is 

directed at strengthening the forces for reform while avoiding the hands of corrupt 

members of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party. We seek ways to ease the suffering of the 
people of Zimbabwe and strengthen the country’s institutions without aiding those forces 

who cling to power through repression and corruption. 

Question 3:

A. Where does PEPFAR fit into the Global Health Initiative? 

B. If PEPFAR will be at least partially (if not fully) absorbed by the Global Health 

Initiative, how do you intend to track spending on abstinence and fidelity 

programs in order to meet the statutory obligations under the Leadership Act? 

C. Given the Administration’s stated intent to press for full “integration of services” 

and expand access to family planning and reproductive health, please describe 

how you intend to preserve the Conscience Clause under the integration strategy. 

Answer A:

The Administration’s commitment to PEPFAR remains strong. In December 2009, 

PEPFAR released its Five-Year Strategy, outlining goals from the program that include, 

among others, providing direct support for treatment for more than 4 million people on 

treatment, prevention of more than 12 million new HIV infections, and care for more than 12 

million people, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children. 

The Global Health Initiative (GHI) is designed to build upon the impressive results 

and momentum of PEPFAR and other USG health programs – not replace them. It will 

leverage the full range of USG assets in supporting a long-term strategic approach to global 

health. It will carry forward existing commitments, enabling partner countries to improve 

health in communities impacted by HIV and other diseases. 

Answer B:

The Global Health Initiative is an umbrella of management, integration, and 

coordination among existing U.S. government health programs. PEPFAR will not be 

absorbed into the GHI; rather, it will be part of the GHI but remain distinct, consistent 

with its legislative authorization. At the same time, the unified whole-of-government 
approach across health issues under the GHI will enable PEPFAR to better achieve its 

goals and improve the health of people living with HIV. The GHI will not change the 

statutory obligations regarding tracking spending on abstinence and fidelity programs, 

and PEPFAR will continue to do so. 

Answer C: 

We will ensure that integration of services under the GHI will be done in such a 

way that programs remain compliant with all legislative requirements. We will continue 

to maintain open channels of communication with interested groups throughout PEPFAR 

to afford them an opportunity to raise any concerns with particular procurements. 

Question 4a: 

Maternal/Child Health versus Family Planning/Reproductive Health: Funding for 

Maternal/Child Health programs appears to be separated from Family Planning/ 

Reproductive Health in the budget explanation. However, the descriptive paragraph of 

FP/RH then identifies integration of FP/MCH and FP/HIV as if they are one-in-thesame. (See budget explanation page 57). 

Please provide the complete breakdown of funding for FP/RH across all accounts and 

agencies, including our contribution to UNFPA. 

Answer:

The FY11 FP/RH budgets by country and account, which total $715.4 million, 

are attached. They are also included in the FY11 CBJ summary tables at the following 

link: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138174.pdf. The FP/RH information 

starts on page 71 on screen and on page 63 in hard copy. 
Question 4b:

In terms of implementation of the GHI, are maternal health and family planning to be 

regarded as the same thing? By extension, are maternal health and reproductive health 

the same thing? 

Answer:

Since 2002, the GHCS account has been structured and appropriated by Congress into 

the following five categories: 

 Child Survival and Maternal Health 

 Vulnerable Children 

 HIV/AIDS 

 Infectious Diseases: TB, Malaria, Other ID (Avian flu, antimicrobial resistance, 

surveillance, etc) 

 Family Planning/Reproductive Health 

The funding streams and types of activities supported for FP/RH and MCH are 

distinct. The maternal health funds will finance activities that surround safe delivery and 

post-partum care for mothers; the family planning/reproductive health funds will support 

improved access to voluntary family planning and other RH activities, including actions 

against gender-based violence, fistula, female genital cutting, and child marriage. In 

many cases the health workers who deliver MCH information and services are the same 

ones who deliver family planning information and services. In these instances, it is often 

cost-effective to provide integrated training of these health staff. Likewise, logistical 

systems that supply health commodities to the same service delivery points can operate 

more efficiently through a single supply chain. In these instances, the funding would be 
apportioned commensurately with the hours of training or volume of supplies being 

provided. 

Question 5a: 

a. Please provide a description of the steps the Department has taken to investigate 

allegations regarding abuse of the personnel system (including tampering with the 

Foreign Service promotion process and not implementing competition for Civil 

service jobs) by senior HR managers.(IG/HR) 

b. Please provide the results of any such investigations (IG/HR) 

c. Please provide a detailed description of the measures the Department has taken or 

plans to take to correct systemic defects in the personnel system to prevent such 

alleged abuses in the future. (HR) 

d. Where does the appointment of a permanent Inspector General stand? (IG) 

Please provide a description of the steps the Department has taken to investigate 

allegations regarding abuse of the personnel system (including tampering with the 

Foreign Service promotion process and not implementing competition for Civil service 

jobs) by senior HR managers.(IG/HR) 

Answer: 

OIG Response: 

(Investigations) Since August 2008, OIG-INV has conducted two separate investigations 

based upon allegations of abuse of the personnel system and tampering with the Foreign 

Service promotion process. 

(Inspections) In 2007, the OIG conducted an inspection of the Bureau of Human 

Resources (Report Number ISP-I-07-45, September 2007.) 

Also, in 2009, the Office of Inspector General conducted an assessment of the Foreign 

Service promotion system. The Report entitled, Review of the Integrity and Fairness of 

the Foreign Service Selection Board Process (Report Number ISP-I-10-47, March 2010). 

The report was just completed and has been issued to the Department. Congressional 

distribution of the report will take place during the week of March 15, 2010. The report is 

attached and is presented as an advance copy for the Ranking Member. 

Question 5b: 

Please provide the results of any such investigations (IG/HR) 

Answer:

OIG Response: 
(Investigation results) Both of these investigations determined that there was no evidence 

that any personnel regulations had been violated nor any records altered to affect the 

promotion process. 

(Inspection Results) The 2007 inspection of the Bureau of Human Resources was focused 

on the performance of the entire bureau, but it included a review of the promotion 

process. The OIG inspection included the following key judgment: 

 The Foreign Service promotion process is managed well despite the perennial 

problem of recruiting panel members. Implementation of an electronic employee 

evaluation report (EER) process should help streamline the process. 

The specific 2009 assessment of the Foreign Service Promotion System was more 

highly focused on the promotion process. The key judgments in that report are: 

 OIG concludes the processes by which annual boards promote, low-rank, 

and award Foreign Service personnel are fundamentally fair and 

trustworthy. 

 The Office of Performance Evaluation (HR/PE) effectively organizes and 

supports the work of a multitude of annual boards that evaluate and reward 

Foreign Service personnel. Recruitment of personnel qualified to serve on 

the boards is a daunting task. 

 Procedural safeguards are adequate but should be enhanced. 

 Board members take their responsibilities very seriously, consider 

themselves bound by their oaths, and zealously protect the confidentiality 

of their deliberations. Other than the members, no one is allowed in the 

room where/when a board is voting. 

 The procedures for forwarding recommendations by the Department 

Senior Review Board (DSRB) for presidential awards to the Interagency 

Selection Board (IASB) and the Secretary of State should be better 

documented. 

 Longevity of service and depth of experience among key personnel in 

HR/PE result in a pattern in which members seem to perform their duties 

almost by rote. The complicated processes should be codified in a single 

procedural manual. 

 Incorporation of technological advances (particularly digital access to 

performance files) has increased the efficiency of promotion board 

deliberations. However, there are cogent reservations relative to the 

concept of moving to “virtual” boards – even though that might reduce 

costs and ease the burden of composing the boards. 
 The prospective, approximately 30 percent, expansion in the cadre of 

Foreign Service personnel between FY 2009 and FY 2013 will increase 

the workload on all aspects of performance evaluation. Implications for 

efficient management of the anticipated work should be addressed by 

Department management. 

Also, the report, Review of the Integrity and Fairness of the Foreign Service 

Selection Board Process did not document any abuses, but the review made 

thirteen recommendations including: 

 Recommendation 1: The Bureau of Human Resources should certify that 

the results of each selection or other performance board have been signed 

or initialed by each member of the respective board before that board is 

dismissed. (Action: DGHR) 



Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination 

with the Office of the Legal Adviser, should develop and implement a 

process to obtain a signed pledge from each member of a promotion or 

other performance board to protect the confidentiality of the materials and 

deliberations of the board on which he or she is a member. The pledge 

also should specify that any introduction into board deliberations of nonrecord material will be reported to the director of the Office of 

Performance Evaluation. A copy of each signed pledge should be retained 

as part of the final report of the board in question. (Action: DGHR, in 

coordination with L) 



Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Human Resources should amend 

relevant voting procedures to specify that a board member who is recused 

for any reason from consideration of a candidate’s file must, thereafter, 

refrain from assigning a rank-order score to that candidate or participating 

in any discussions relevant to the individual. The bureau should seek 

incorporation of appropriate, explicit language in future precepts. (Action: 

DGHR) 



Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Human Resources should consult 

with the Office of the Legal Adviser to formulate broader bases on which 

a Foreign Service employee can request recusal of a member of a selection 

board, then negotiate with the American Foreign Service Association to 

incorporate those changes in promotion board precepts. (Action: DGHR)

 Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Human Resources should discontinue 

annotation of any promotion lists provided to selection boards and to 

delete the relevant language from Selection Board Voting Procedures. 

(Action: DGHR) 
 Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination 

with the Executive Secretariat and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should 

clarify regulations to reflect the Secretary’s discretion in recommending 

candidates to the IASB. 

(Action: DGHR, in coordination with S/ES and L) 

 Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination 

with the Under Secretary for Management and the Executive Secretariat, 

should develop procedures to ensure that the decisions of the Secretary 

relative to recommendations and nomination of officers for presidential 

awards are made matters of record in the form of personnel channel action 

memoranda. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with M/PRI and S/ES) 

 Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Human Resources should negotiate 

with the American Foreign Service Association to incorporate in the 

Precepts, a requirement that the members of each specialist board include 

at least two nonspecialist Foreign Service personnel. (Action: DGHR) 

 Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination 

with the Office of the Legal Adviser, should develop and incorporate in 

Department regulations the definition of conditions leading to formation 

of a reconstituted board, its purpose, membership, authorities, and 

responsibilities. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with L) 

 Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Human Resources should develop 

and adopt a consolidated procedural manual for Office of Performance 

Evaluation operations and use it to brief and train assigned personnel. 

(Action: DGHR) 

 Recommendation 11: The Bureau of Human Resources should ascertain 

the adequacy of the number of personnel to process the performance 

evaluation workload that will emerge from the prospective increase in the 

numbers of Foreign Service personnel. This assessment should encompass 

the related issue of office space and automation that may be required 

within the Office of Performance Evaluation for both staff and 

performance boards. (Action: DGHR) 

 Recommendation 12: The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination 

with the Under Secretary for Management, should form a task force to 

analyze and make recommendations on plans to process the performancerelated workload that will emerge as a result of the expanded Foreign 

Service. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with M/PRI) 

 Recommendation 13: The Bureau of Human Resources should conduct a 

thorough cost/benefit analysis of the virtual board process including the 
communications-related security/privacy aspects implied in use of virtual 

boards before further implementation of the concept of virtual boards. 

(Action: DGHR) 

Question5d: 

Where does the appointment of a permanent Inspector General stand? (IG) 

Answer:

OIG Response: 

OIG is unaware of any nomination by the Administration of a permanent 

Inspector General for the Department of State. Currently, Amb. Harry W. Geisel 

serves as the Deputy Inspector General. 

Question 7: 

On the issue of Nyi Nyi Aung, the U.S. citizen imprisoned and tortured in Burma, I 

request the following information: has the State Department formally raised this case 

with officials from the Burmese junta? On what specific dates, at what specific locations 

and at what diplomatic level have these demarches been made? 

 

Answer: 

Throughout the detention of Kyaw Zaw Lwin (aka, Nyi Nyi Aung), the 

Department of State has engaged Burmese authorities at senior levels to press for his fair 

treatment, protest reported mistreatment, and urge more frequent consular access. We 

have repeatedly made clear to the Burmese government that Mr. Lwin's immediate 

release is a high priority for the United States Government, both within the 

Administration and within the Congress. 

Given the sensitivities surrounding the detention of Mr. Lwin and the importance 

of this case, we believe an in-person briefing is the best way to provide you with 

information on our diplomatic overtures in this case. The State Department is prepared to 

brief you and your staff about our efforts in Mr. Lwin’s case at your convenience. 
Question 8: 

Madam Secretary, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act is a key legacy issue of our 

former Chairman and dear colleague Tom Lantos. The State Department has informed us 

in writing (on February 5th) of some of the impediments to implementation of a 

Kimberley-like process to restrict the international trade in Burmese rubies and jadeite as 

was done with conflict diamonds. However, the State Department has nonetheless 

pledged to “continue to explore this issue with other governments” including Thailand, 

China, India and the EU. 

 What concrete measures will the Department undertake to ensure international 

support for implementation of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act? 

 

Answer: 

As noted in both the GAO report and in our correspondence with you on the Tom Lantos 

Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, there is little 

international support for the kind of global mechanism restricting trade in rubies and 

jadeite called for in the legislation. We will continue to discuss this issue with other key 

actors and we will continue to reaffirm with all relevant parties the need to maintain 

sanctions in the face of a lack of concrete progress by Burmese authorities. 

Question 9: 

For each category below, please provide us with the total amounts that you intend to 

spend in FY10 and (based on the budget request) in FY11 on the following activities 

prioritized in the North Korean Human Rights Act (P.L. 108-333), which was recently 

reauthorized and strengthened by Public Law 110-346: 

 Support for human rights and democracy programs aimed at North Koreans (Sec. 

102 of P.L. 108-333); Radio broadcasting for North Korea (Sec. 103); Actions to 

promote freedom of information inside North Korea (Sec. 104); and Humanitarian 

assistance to North Koreans outside of North Korea, including refugees and 

trafficking victims (Sec. 203). 

 

Answer: 

The U.S. Government remains deeply concerned about the deplorable human 

rights situation in North Korea, and the plight of North Korean refugees. Human rights 

are a top U.S. priority. Addressing human rights issues will have a significant impact on 

the prospect for closer ties between the U.S. and the Democratic People's Republic of 

Korea (DPRK). 
The U.S. Government continues to identify concrete ways to address the DPRK's 

human rights abuses, including working through nongovernmental organizations, 

international organizations, and with bilateral partners, to increase freedom of 

information and broadcasting efforts, and build the capacity of the human rights 

advocacy community. 

In FY2010, pending the Foreign Assistance Act’s required consultations with the 

Committees on Appropriations, we plan to allocate funds in the following areas: 

Support for human rights 

and democracy programs 

aimed at North Koreans 

Sec. 102 of P.L. 108-333 $2.5 Million 

Broadcasting for North 

Korea and actions to 

promote freedom of 

information inside North 

Korea 

Sec. 103 and Sec. 104 

Broadcasting Board of 

Governors 

$1 Million 

$8.256 Million 

In FY2011, we have requested funds for allocation in the following areas: 

Support for human rights 

and democracy programs 

aimed at North Koreans 

Sec. 102 of P.L. 108-333 $1.5 Million 

Broadcasting for North 

Korea and actions to 

promote freedom of 

information inside North 

Korea 

Sec. 103 and Sec. 104 

Broadcasting Board of 

Governors 

$1 Million 

$8.134 Million 

Both the FY2010 and FY2011 areas of spending are estimates. Funds may shift 

between the human rights and democracy category and the broadcasting and freedom of 

information category based on the absorptive capacity of the NGO community and 

evolving needs. In addition, we often fund programs that promote objectives across 
categories. These valuable crosscutting programs are often difficult to capture when 

estimating spending by specific area of work. 

 The Department is currently programming humanitarian assistance to North 

Koreans outside of the DPRK, including refugees and human trafficking victims, for 

FY2010 and intends to provide humanitarian assistance to this population in FY2011. 

We are happy to arrange a classified briefing on our current programs and projections. 

Question 10: 

Madam Secretary, earlier this month U.S. Ambassador to Russia, John Beyrle, reportedly 

stated that the U.S. and Russia have agreed that a new arms control treaty (START) will 

mention a link between offensive nuclear arms and defenses against them. 

 Please comment on what exactly was agreed to on this issue and whether the 

language will explicitly or implicitly limit U.S. efforts to deploy missile defense 

systems for itself or its allies. 

 

Answer: 

 In the Joint Understanding issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev on July 6, 

2009, President Obama reaffirmed a long-standing U.S. position when he 

acknowledged the interrelationship between offensive and defensive systems. 

 It is not appropriate to comment on the details of an ongoing negotiation. 

However, the focus of the New START Treaty, as Presidents Obama and 

Medvedev agreed in London in April 2009, is strategic offensive arms, not missile 

defense systems. 

 The United States has expressed its readiness to discuss the topic of missile 

defense, including potential cooperation, with Russia in a separate venue. 
Question 11: 

What is the U.S. policy on this matter and what steps are being taken to implement that 

policy before France approves this dangerous arms sale? 

Answer: 

We understand that reports of this potential sale have raised concerns among 

some of Russia’s neighbors. Inflammatory comments from a senior Russian military 

officer added to this anxiety. Ultimately, details of this sale are a sovereign matter for 

France and Russia to decide, taking into account a host of factors, including international 

law and regional stability. We would urge all parties to focus on efforts to promote 

stability in the region and avoid actions that could escalate tensions. I made these points 

when I met with President Sarkozy in January. 

Question 12: 

Madam Secretary, please tell us whether the United States will provide defensive

weapons to the military forces of Georgia to help deter a future attack by Russia. If not, 

why not? 

Answer: 

The Administration remains committed to supporting Georgia’s sovereignty and 

territorial integrity. Our security assistance and military engagement with Georgia is 

focused on rebuilding Georgia’s defense and security architecture and enhancing selfdefense capabilities through an emphasis on doctrine, education, and training. This 

approach supports Georgian defense modernization and reform, helps Georgia in 

achieving its aspirations towards closer European and transatlantic integration, to include 
potential NATO membership, and improves Georgia’s ability to contribute to allied and 

coalition operations. 

 Additionally, the United States is assisting the Georgian Armed Forces train and 

equip infantry battalions for deployment to Afghanistan. Georgia will sustain this 

rotation for two years, has offered the forces without caveat, and will fight alongside the 

U.S. Marines as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Regional 

Command-South, Helmand Province. 

Question 13: 

What impact will Georgia’s contribution to Afghanistan have on their own security 

capabilities needed to defend against the type of Russian aggression it experienced in 

August 2008—and, more importantly, what assurances does Georgia have from us that its 

defense will be respected by Russia as it deploys troops to Afghanistan? 

Answer: 

We welcome Georgia’s continued support for the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, and Georgia’s previous commitments in 

Iraq. We are providing extensive pre-deployment training support to the Georgian 

battalion scheduled to deploy with the U.S. Marines in Afghanistan this spring. 

The United States maintains a bilateral security assistance program in Georgia, 

focused primarily on helping the Georgians with defense reform. We are also supporting 

the Georgian effort to deploy forces for service with ISAF in Afghanistan. We have 

pledged over $1 billion in assistance to Georgia in the post-conflict period, a pledge fully 

implemented when President Obama signed the June 2009 emergency supplemental 

appropriating the last tranche of $242 million. 
In addition, the United States continues to strongly support Georgia’s sovereignty 

and territorial integrity, including by urging Russia to implement its 2008 ceasefire 

commitments and participate productively in the Geneva process. 

Question 14: 

Madam Secretary, last week it was reported that Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, 

Sergei Riabkov, stated that Russia will honor a contract to deliver S-300 missiles to Iran

and that Russia is against “crippling sanctions” on Iran. 

 If not crippling sanctions, are we to assume Russia will only support weak and 

ineffective sanctions? Can these comments be interpreted as anything other than 

that Russia will not cooperate with us on issues relating to Iran? 

Answer: 

 We are working very closely and in cooperation with Russia on our shared goal of 

preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Russia does not support an 

Iran with nuclear weapons and – in addition to other helpful contributions to international 

nuclear nonproliferation efforts – voted in favor of the November 2009 IAEA Board of 

Governors resolution condemning Iran’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA, its refusal to 

suspend enrichment, and its failure to comply with its Safeguards Agreement. 

 President Medvedev has repeatedly expressed frustration with Iran’s uncooperative behavior and called for “well-thought out and smart sanctions” to bring Iran 

back to negotiations on its nuclear program. We are talking frequently with Russia 

about next steps and look forward to their continued cooperation in an effective 

international sanctions regime. 

 We have repeatedly raised our concerns with Russia about a transfer of S-300 

missiles, and to date that weapons system has not been delivered to Iran. 
 

Question 15: 

Madam Secretary, the U.S. is currently working with Central Asian countries to diversify 

our supply routes to Afghanistan. 

 How do we balance between the need to cooperate with Central Asian states in 

the important resupply of our forces fighting terrorists in Afghanistan and the fact 

that some of the Central Asian governments with whom we may cooperate may in 

turn be feeding Islamic insurgencies by their corruption and repression? 

 

Answer: 

We can and are pursuing both of our objectives to promote stability and 

development in Afghanistan as well as to encourage greater political liberalization and 

respect for human rights in Central Asia. 

The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is part of an overall strategy to 

support efforts in Afghanistan, and expanding cooperation with the Central Asia states to 

support efforts in Afghanistan is part of our overall strategy for Central Asia. Our 

Central Asia strategy includes other integrated priorities: we seek to promote 

development and diversification of the region's energy resources; we are working to 

encourage greater political liberalization and respect for human rights; we aim to help 

develop competitive market economies and promote economic reforms; and, we seek to 

address problems of poverty and food security. These issues are interconnected, and 

progress in one area can help reinforce progress in another area. 

The United States has a long history of addressing areas of concern in both 

bilateral meetings with the governments of the region and through multilateral fora such 

as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Department of 

State and USAID work with members of civil society and government officials to 
improve governance and the rule of law, foster independent media, and advance religious 

freedom and civil liberties in Central Asia.

To promote stronger ties and practical cooperation, we have launched Annual 

Bilateral Consultations with the countries of Central Asia. Led by Assistant Secretary of 

State Robert O. Blake, Jr., these consultations feature a structured dialogue to address the 

full range of bilateral issues. Each of the consultations covers inter-connected issues, 

such as energy, economic and political modernization, security, and people-to-people 

contacts. We aim to make progress in our relations with the countries of Central Asia in 

all of these areas. We understand that positive steps in one area can reinforce forward 

movement in others.

Question 16: 

Madam Secretary, in light of the stated intention by newly-elected President Yanukovych 

in Ukraine to seek closer relations with Russia, how will such a reorientation of 

Ukrainian foreign policy impact the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership that 

was signed by our two countries in 2008 and which focuses on enhanced cooperation in 

the areas of defense, economics, trade, energy, democracy and emphasizes enhanced 

engagement between NATO and Ukraine? 

Answer: 

 President Yanukoych has stated publicly that he supports strategic partnership with the 

United States and that he wishes to improve relations with Russia. We do not view these 

objectives as mutually exclusive, and we support Ukraine’s right to chart its own foreign 

policy. The Obama Administration supports the 2008 U.S.-Ukraine Charter and it will 

continue to form the basis of our strategic partnership with Ukraine. The United States 

supports Ukraine’s deepening ties to NATO and to the European Union, recognizing that 

how far and how fast to proceed is a Ukrainian choice. We note that President 
Yanukovych’s first foreign visit was to Brussels; he has since travelled to Moscow and 

has been invited to Washington to attend the Nuclear Security Summit in April. 

Question 17: 

What will the State Department do to directly provide bilateral assistance through INCLE 

to the individual police forces in the Balkan states for improved operations, capacity and 

training to fight narcotics trafficking in the Balkans that may be providing financial 

support to extremists seeking to use that region as a staging ground for terrorist 

operations? 

Answer: 

Promoting the development of strong justice systems and criminal justice sector 

institutions are among the U.S. Government’s principal foreign policy priorities in 

southeastern Europe. Rule of law is critical not only to the stability of the region, but to 

the aspirations of these nations for full integration into the European Union and EuroAtlantic institutions, such as NATO. 

The Department of State, through the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (INL), has active bilateral law enforcement and criminal justice 

programs ongoing in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, 

Albania, Bulgaria and Croatia, with an average budget of $25-30 million. The funding 

for these programs comes from the Assistance to Eastern Europe and Central Asia 

appropriation (AEECA), however, rather than International Narcotics, Crime and Law 

Enforcement (INCLE) funding. The U.S. Agency for International Development also 

plays an important role in U.S. rule of law efforts through its broader constitutional, court 

and rule of law programs. These are also AEECA-funded programs, rather than 

Development Assistance (DA). 
While each of the Department’s Balkan programs is unique, the common program 

goals for all of the Department of State’s programs include legal reform, police institution 

reforms, and capacity building for all parts of the criminal justice systems. Combating 

corruption is another cross-cutting priority. On the legal reform side, U.S. legal advisors 

– most of whom are Assistant U.S. Attorneys detailed from the U.S. Department of 

Justice – work with host government officials to modernize the criminal codes and 

criminal procedure codes and bring them into compliance with European and/or 

international standards – including provisions for the special investigative techniques 

needed to investigate and prosecute sophisticated criminal (or terrorist) organizations. 

They also work with local prosecutors to develop the skills needed to use those tools 

effectively and form task forces between host nation prosecutors and police to more 

effectively combat organized crime. INL has also provided support to develop and bring 

into operation an Organized Crime Court in Serbia. This court is currently hearing highprofile cases dealing with organized crime that affects not only Serbia, but the entire 

region. 

In our policing programs, U.S. experts provide assistance tailored to the needs of 

each country, ranging building effective modern law enforcement agencies (organization, 

management, and internal affairs) to sophisticated applications, such as 

detecting/investigating financial 

crime, trafficking in persons, and, in some cases, war crimes. INL also supports 

integrated border management programs in the Balkans, including the development of 

information technology systems for border crossings, which are routinely used in the 
investigation of criminal activity, and alerts officials of the movement of potential 

terrorists into (and between) Balkan countries. 

To encourage regional cooperation, especially to counter transnational threats 

such as the flow of Afghan heroin through the Balkans to Europe, the Department funds 

two important regional programs, the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) 

in Budapest and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative’s Center for Combating 

Trans-Border Crime (SECI Center) in Bucharest, Romania. The ILEA brings law 

enforcement and other justice personnel together from neighboring countries to develop 

not only new skills, but solid personal and professional relationships. The SECI Center 

(soon to be renamed the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center or “SELEC”) is an 

operational center staffed by police and customs officers from 13 countries of the region 

who facilitate information exchange and coordinate multi-country investigations and 

enforcement activities against criminal and terrorist groups. The program currently 

includes the assignment of a U.S. Department of Justice attorney-advisor who works with 

Center personnel to promote closer coordination between law enforcement operations and 

the critical follow-on prosecutions needed to dismantle criminal organizations. 

Terrorism is a present concern throughout the region, and U.S. programs seek to 

provide countries with the legal frameworks and skills to confront it in its many 

manifestations – from clandestine movements, fraudulent documents and false citizenship 

claims, to money laundering and terrorist financing. INL-supported anti-organized 

crime and corruption courses have direct application to fighting terrorism and complex 

terrorist groups as well. Participants in these training activities have included members 

of special surveillance teams and special measures teams, including courses on the 
following: informant management, advanced undercover techniques, advanced 

surveillance techniques, major case management, advanced firearms training, and 

fugitive tracking. 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, we worked with the government to 

establish a Foreigners Affairs Service which has professionalized the issuance of 

immigration documentation, and worked to investigate and revoke citizenships of known 

and suspected terrorists. We have also helped to establish a modern, professional federal 

policing agency (the State Investigation and Protection Agency - SIPA), capable of 

tackling crime groups as well as a special rapid-reaction unit. We achieved a lot in 

assisting Bosnia protect its borders, including but not limited to providing an integrated 

management border system that enabled Bosnian border officials to have not only realtime data at all Bosnian entry/exit border points, but also access to Interpol and local 

warrants and the US Watch List. We are starting a biometric visa program which will 

enable Bosnia to track and ensure that persons entering Bosnia are, in fact, those who 

obtained the visas. Our legal and law enforcement advisors mentor Bosnian police and 

prosecutors on task force approach and handling terrorism cases, which resulted in a 

recent successful police raid on a secluded Wahabi village, as well as in several ongoing 

terrorism trials. 

Question 18: 

EUR - Why does the FY2011 budget proposal for Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, 

Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funding for the Balkans reduce total NADR 

funding to the Balkans by 7% from last year, with a 41% cut for funds to Bosnia? 

However, NADR funding to Bulgaria would increase by 38% and to Montenegro by 

100%. Can you explain why these two countries would receive such a large increase 

when the rest of the region’s funding was reduced? 
Answer: 

The overall drop in requested bilateral NADR funding to the Balkans can largely 

be accounted for by the shift of most funding in two NADR sub-accounts, the 

Counterterrorism Financing Program, and the Terrorist Interdiction Program, from 

bilateral to global line items in the FY11 request. These shifts were requested to provide 

flexibility to meet priority needs as they emerge. Operational plans for FY2011 will 

detail planned uses of these funds, some of which are likely to remain in the Balkan 

region. Additionally, the S/CT Antiterrorism Assistance Program is reorienting funding 

to high priority countries globally, and has reduced its request for funding in the Balkans. 

Additional NADR funds for the Balkans are included in the PM/WRA global account 

request for the International Trust Fund for Humanitarian Demining and Mine Victims 

Assistance in the Balkans. 

For Bosnia, the shift in funding for the NADR Counterterrorism Financing subaccount from bilateral to global funding accounts for 17% of the drop in the request. The 

remaining 24% cut reflects the cyclical nature of funding for the Political-Military 

Bureau’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) Small Arms/Light 

Weapons Removal program in Bosnia: the funds appropriated in FY10 will suffice for a 

two year period. 

Funding requested for Bulgaria NADR programs actually decreased from 

$400,000 to zero in FY11, as previous-year funds will be used to maintain the program. 

The additional funding requested for Montenegro is for an ongoing Conventional 

Weapons Destruction program that received FY08 and FY09 funding out of the 
PM/WRA global account. The FY11 budget simply reflects a shift in the line items, not a 

change to the program. 

Question 19: 

How useful are a number of our NATO allies in standing up to terrorism, deterring 

aggression and bearing their share of the burden of military operations, and what 

concretely is the Department of State doing to support the President’s call for our allies to 

do so and to persuade them to end unwise arms sales to Russia, refuse to sell arms to 

China and so on? 

Answer: 

We deeply appreciate the contributions and sacrifices of our NATO Allies in the 

cause of ensuring peace and security for our transatlantic community and working closely 

to help build stability around the world. Nowhere is this commitment more clearly 

demonstrated than in Afghanistan, where our Allies provide over 36,000 troops to the 

NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (and non-NATO troop contributors 

provide another 3,000 personnel). Over 650 non-U.S. Allied servicemen and women 

have given their lives in Afghanistan. Moreover, Allies and ISAF contributors have 

responded to the President’s decision to deploy 30,000 more U.S. troops with a 

commitment to contribute approximately 9,500 more troops to the effort in Afghanistan 

in 2010. 

Our NATO Allies join us in many collective security efforts, both through NATO 

or bilaterally or through other key organizations like the EU. Such efforts include 

counter-terrorism and counter-piracy naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea and 

Indian Ocean, intelligence sharing, cooperation on homeland security, and close 

diplomatic coordination on non-proliferation and arms control issues. Finally, along with 

all of the new security challenges of the 21st century, our NATO Allies also remain 
dedicated to the core tenet of the Alliance – the Article 5 commitment to collective 

security and the proven deterrent that such a commitment has offered over the decades . 

 While we and our Allies do not always see eye to eye on every international security 

issue, these are more differences over tactics than over fundamental strategy and values. 

Broadly speaking, we engage in a constant, deep, and valuable dialogue with our NATO 

Allies and other European partners in seeking the right balance between legitimate 

economic interest and regional and global stability and security. 

Question 20: 

 

Could you please describe the Administration’s transition strategy for Iraq, more broadly, 

and the role of the State Department within that strategy, in particular? Has the State 

Department developed a written strategy for Iraq transition? If so, would you please 

provide it to the Committee? If not, would you please provide the Committee at the very 

least, a written outline. 

Answer: 

The Administration’s strategy is to responsibly end the war through a transition to 

full Iraqi responsibility; build a lasting partnership with the Iraqi people and government, 

and support Iraq’s productive reintegration into the region. 

The broad contours of the U.S. transition strategy have been largely set by the 

President’s Camp Lejeune speech, the U.S. – Iraq Security Agreement, and the U.S. – 

Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. The Administration has adopted a “whole of 

government” approach to the transition. Led by Vice President Biden, the Department of 

State, Department of Defense, USAID and the rest of the interagency are working 

together in lock-step to assure a smooth transition. Through a robust interagency 

committee structure – both here in Washington and in Baghdad– the State Department 

plays a lead role in determining which tasks currently performed by the U.S. military will 
transition to the Iraqis, which will transition to State or other civilian agencies, and which 

tasks will sunset. A separate but closely related committee structure within the 

Department is actively planning for the future of those tasks that will transition to State.

In addition, starting in May of 2009 and ending in November, the interagency 

undertook a long-term transition planning process, and determined the programs and 

capabilities vital for a smooth transition from DoD to the Iraqis, and from DoD to State. 

The results of this review process are carefully reflected in our FY10 Supplemental and 

FY11 request. 

An interagency team from State, DOD and USAID will jointly brief House and 

Senate oversight committee staffs and provide a detailed outline on transition planning on 

March 3rd and 4th. We plan to provide Sensitive but Unclassified documents at those 

briefings. We welcome the opportunity to provide this or a more detailed brief to you or 

your staff, upon request. 

Question 21: 

When will INL assume responsibility for the police training program in Iraq? What is the 

strategy and timeline for this process? 

 

Answer: 

The State Department, in partnership with the Government of Iraq (GOI), will 

assume full responsibility for police training in Iraq on October 1, 2011. 
Sustaining the progress that the Iraqi Security Forces have made over the past 

several years is vital to Iraq’s stability and future as a society governed by rule of law and 

is crucial to achieving a stable, secure, and self-reliant Iraq. The police development 

program, as it transitions to Department of State management, will shift from a 

counterinsurgency mission to a civilian police model focusing on community policing. 

The State-led program will provide senior levels of the Iraqi Police Services and Ministry 

of Interior with the management, leadership and technical skills to maintain Iraq’s 

internal security and support the rule of law. It will differ considerably from the current 

police training program, both in size and scope by emphasizing advanced professional, 

management, and leadership skills over basic training. The GOI has indicated to us that 

it wants the next phase of training to focus on such higher-order skills. The State-led 

program is designed to facilitate the transfer of responsibility for the police development 

mission to the GOI during the next several years. 

 The State Department is working closely with the Department of Defense to 

insure a smooth transition of responsibility for the police development program in Iraq. 

Some of the major milestones in the planning process are: 

March 2009 Ongoing planning for INL program development in

 to Present 

conjunction with GOI. 

August 2009 Police Development concept approved by Deputies Committee.

November 2009 Established police transition team. 

Summer 2010 Obtain GOI commitment for use of property/facilities. 

Sum/ Fall 2010 Upon receipt of funding begin aircraft and vehicle procurement 

and facilities upgrades. 
January to Senior police program management staff deploy. 

July 2011

August 2011 Facilities upgrades complete. 

September 2011 All remaining advisors and police program staff deploy. 

October 1, 2011 State assumes responsibility for Iraq police program. 

Question 23: 

As it pertains to United States security assistance to Yemen, could you comment on 

whether the Administration is considering developing a mechanism similar to the PCCF? 

a. Can you comment on the level of cooperation between the State Department and 

Defense Department as it pertains to the implementation of US security assistance 

programs to Yemen? How are our nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and 

related programs (NADR) (NAY-DUHR) and our anti-terrorism assistance 

programs coordinated with our FMF, 1206 and other activities to ensure that our 

programs are well-synchronized? 

b. Is the Administration looking at other models, such as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, to provide security assistance to Yemen? 

 

Answer: 

At the strategic level, all U.S. security assistance programs to Yemen (to include 

NADR, FMF, IMET, 1206, and others) are coordinated between staff at the Departments 

of State and Defense as well as through the National Security Council, which convenes 

interagency meetings when necessary to provide oversight and policy guidance. Country 

team personnel from all relevant agencies on the ground in Sana’a identify program 

needs, draft proposals, and synchronize assistance to prevent overlap and meet U.S. 

policy aims. 

The Administration continues to examine both existing and potential alternative 

models for providing security assistance, but has not requested an alternative mechanism. 
Question 25: 

Given the gravity of the situation in Yemen, would the Administration commit to provide 

to Congress a multi-year, comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan 

for long-term security and stability in Yemen, to include: A financial plan and description 

of the resources, programming, and management of United States foreign assistance to 

Yemen, including the criteria used to determine their prioritization; and a complete 

description of both the evaluation process for reviewing and adjusting the strategy and 

implementation as necessary, and measures of effectiveness for the implementation of the 

strategy? 

Answer: 

The Administration has a whole-of-government approach to Yemen that aims to 

mobilize and coordinate with other international actors to help Yemen address the root 

causes of instability, encourage political reconciliation, improve governance, and build 

the capacity of Yemen’s government to exercise its authority, protect and deliver services 

to its people, and secure its territory. Implementation plans for the Strategy are under 

continuous interagency review to incorporate changes in Yemen and internationally. 

USAID’s Yemen Country Strategy is publicly available online at: 

http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/documents/yemen/USAIDYemen2010-

2012Strategy.pdf 

The Administration looks forward to continuing to consult Congress through 

briefings and hearings. 

Question 26:

Regarding the $400 million in ESF for the West Bank and Gaza, what is our plan for 

phasing out this assistance to the Palestinians, particularly the use of the cash transfer? 

Please elaborate. 

Answer:
The achievement of a comprehensive Middle East peace that includes a two-state 

solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a U.S. national security priority and a focus 

of U.S. Government programs in the region. The Department’s $400.4 million request in 

FY2011 for the West Bank and Gaza ESF program provides support for the Palestinian 

Authority (PA) to build transparent, accountable, and credible institutions of government; 

encourage economic development that can provide jobs for the Palestinian people; 

deliver higher quality government services; promote the rule of law in areas under the 

PA’s control; and continue humanitarian and recovery assistance to the people of Gaza. 

Our assistance matches the priorities in PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s two-year 

reform and institution-building program, which aims to establish the foundations of an 

independent, viable Palestinian state that can meet the needs of its citizens without 

reliance on external donor support. 

Prime Minister Fayyad has proven to be a good steward of donor resources, using 

donor support in a transparent and accountable manner to provide services to the 

Palestinian people, pursue institutional reforms, and improve the PA’s fiscal position by 

paying off accumulated arrears. Prime Minister Fayyad’s institutional reforms are 

lowering the PA’s dependency on donor assistance. In 2008, the PA required $1.8 billion 

in foreign donor assistance to meet its recurrent expenses. In 2009, the PA’s recurrent 

deficit dropped to $1.45 billion. The PA anticipates that it will need $1.2 billion in 2010 

to meet its recurrent expenses, and that external budgetary support will drop to 16% of 

GDP this year from 22% in 2009. Continued support from the U.S. government and the 
international community for Prime Minister Fayyad’s institution-building priorities will 

help the PA continue this positive trajectory. 

Question 27a: 

Could you elaborate on the FY 2011 request for $250 million in ESF for Egypt? 

Answer: 

Economic assistance supports development objectives in Egypt as well as our 

bilateral engagement on political and economic reforms. We believe it crucial to 

maintain a robust ESF program focused on human resource development that provides 

visible assistance to the Egyptian people. Funds will improve coverage of primary health 

care among underserved populations and promote reforms and systematic improvements 

in the education sector. Together with job-creation programs, these initiatives will allow 

more sustained and broad‐based economic growth for the 40 percent of Egyptians living 

in poverty. ESF for Egypt will continue to support efforts to increase access to justice 

and the protection of human rights, strengthen participatory local governance, and 

enhance the capacity of civil society organizations and the media. 

USAID plans to ramp up its focus on basic and higher education to improve the 

quality of education available in Egypt, while the economic growth program will focus 

on workforce constraints to help more Egyptians transition from school to work. We will 

also provide assistance to support reforms prioritized in the reinvigorated trade dialogue 

and to boost capacity in the health sector. Programs will also continue the important 

work of promoting democracy and governance in Egypt. USG activity in these sectors 

will go a long way towards improving the lives of Egyptians as well as reinforcing 

positive messages about U.S. policy in Egypt. 

Question 27b: 
What performance metrics and evaluation mechanisms does the Administration have in 

place to ensure that these funds are spent effectively? 

Answer: 

USAID complies with the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 

1993 which establishes requirements for strategic planning and performance 

measurement for all USG agencies. USAID/ Egypt, in conjunction with its counterparts 

in Washington is responsible for measuring progress towards the results identified in the 

planning stage of all projects to achieve foreign assistance objectives. The concept of 

performance management encompasses the tools used by the mission for assessing, 

learning, and reporting. 

Performance Management tools used by USAID/Egypt include: 

1. A mission developed performance management plan (PMP) that includes sets of 

indicators, with established targets, measuring results identified in the planning 

stage of each project. The PMP is used in monitoring the achievements of 

program operations. 

2. Mission conducts semi-annual portfolio reviews of implementation and 

performance for each project. The portfolio reviews allow the mission to analyze 

performance information to track progress toward planned results. The mission 

uses performance information and evaluations to influence decision-making and 

resource allocation. 

3. Formative evaluations are conducted on a periodic basis to identify the reasons for 

success or lack of it, to assess effects and impacts, or to indicate which, among a 
range of program or project/activity alternatives, is the most efficient and 

effective. Summative evaluations are conducted at the end of projects to draw 

lessons for future interventions. 

4. The USAID/Egypt mission is in the process of developing a performance 

management information system that will standardize tracking of performance 

and facilitate information retrieval and analysis. 

Question 27c: 

Given Egypt’s continued failure in meeting economic and political reform benchmarks, is 

the Administration planning to phase out ESF to Egypt? 

Answer: 

The USG remains committed to supporting programs that promote political 

pluralism, good governance, and greater respect for the rule of law and human rights, in 

order to improve the implementation of constitutional and legal guarantees for rights, 

freedoms, and accountable public institutions. A similar percentage of the bilateral 

budget as in the past will fund programs addressing three priorities: access to justice and 

the protection of human rights, participatory local governance, and civil society 

(including the media). 

The USG also remains committed to supporting economic growth and 

development in Egypt. Programmatically, decreasing the ESF program would severely 

limit our ability to carry out the USAID economic growth portfolio, including the USG 

Trade Initiative, particularly given the significant amounts of ESF earmarked for 

education and democracy and governance programming. 
The policy implications of any unilateral cut to ESF would be substantial. 

Unilateral reductions will be seen by Egypt as a declining measure of the importance of 

U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship, which would undermine bilateral cooperation on 

regional policy efforts in which Egypt is a significant actor, and undercut a robust 

development package aimed at building a more prosperous and democratic Egypt. 

Question 28: 

Madam Secretary, in FY 2010, the Administration contributed over $267 million to 

UNRWA, even as we ran up trillion-dollar deficits. Last year, when Deputy Secretary 

Lew testified before our Committee on your FY 2010 budget request, he stated that 

UNRWA receives “the highest level of scrutiny” by the State Department. But UNRWA 

does not even vet its staff and aid recipients through U.S. watch lists for ties to violent 

extremist groups, in contravention of U.S. law – and State still has not required them to 

do so. The homicide bomber who killed 7 Americans at a base in Afghanistan previously 

worked in an UNRWA camp and had significant radical Islamist ties. UNRWA also 

continues to agitate against Israel and in favor of groups like Hamas. But the 

Administration just announced another $40 million for UNRWA. 

Madam Secretary, what’s it going to take for the Administration to cut off UNRWA? 

 

Answer: 

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 

East (UNRWA) provides critical humanitarian services for 4.7 million Palestinian 

refugees and is a critical force for stability, especially in Lebanon and the Palestinian 

Territories. The Department continues to value UNRWA as a counterweight to 

extremism in the region. Without UNRWA, basic life-sustaining needs would either not 

be met or, more likely, would be met by extremist groups for political rather than 

humanitarian reasons. The Department of State continues to be vigilant about complying 

with U.S. laws designed to prevent potential support to terrorists and has taken significant 

steps to ensure that UNRWA remains effective, neutral, and impartial, including but not 
limited to monitoring UNRWA’s conformance with funding conditions of section 301(c) 

of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, as amended. 

With funding provided in the FY 2009 supplemental appropriations bill to review 

programs in the West Bank and Gaza, the State Department’s Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG) conducted a limited-scope review of UNRWA staff union elections in 

Gaza. The OIG issued its report on February 26, 2010, which noted that the “Bureau of 

Population, Refugees, and Migration and UNRWA have extensive policies and 

procedures to monitor and evaluate compliance with both the UN neutrality policy and 

section 301(c).” UNRWA takes significant steps to prevent its programs from benefitting 

terrorists. For example, the Agency: (1) conducts criminal background checks on 

potential employees; (2) shares lists of its staff with relevant governments, including 

Israel; (3) prohibits staff participation in political activities; (4) notifies staff regularly 

on UN neutrality policies and procedures; and (5) screens against the UN 1267 list on a 

semiannual basis the names of all 4.7 million registered Palestine refugees, all UNRWA 

staff members and all persons and entities to whom or to which the Agency makes 

payments.

The Department will continue to monitor UNRWA closely to ensure that USG assistance 

is used as intended to support critical humanitarian services for Palestinian refugees. 

Question 29: 

Madam Secretary, on February 26, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 

resolution that again endorses, if this time implicitly, the biased “Goldstone Report” 

which accused Israel of deliberately targeting Palestinian civilians for attack during 

Operation Cast Lead. While the U.S. has opposed multiple UN measures to endorse the 

Goldstone Report, Administration officials have also repeatedly legitimized the Report, 

claiming that it raises “serious” issues and needs to be considered “seriously”. Will the 
Administration commit, consistent with House Resolution 867, to opposing any 

consideration of the Goldstone Report in international forums? 

 

Answer: 

We have repeatedly expressed our view that the Goldstone Report is deeply 

flawed, even as we strongly support accountability for alleged human rights and 

international humanitarian law violations in relation to the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict. 

Among the Report’s shortcomings are its unbalanced focus on Israel, the negative 

inferences it draws about Israel’s intentions and actions, its failure to deal adequately 

with the asymmetrical nature of the Gaza conflict, and its failure to assign appropriate 

responsibility to Hamas for deliberately targeting civilians and basing itself and its 

operations in heavily civilian-populated urban areas. The Goldstone Report is also 

problematic in its many overreaching recommendations and its sweeping legal and 

political conclusions. 

We have consistently maintained that thorough, independent and credible 

domestic investigations and follow-up are the appropriate measures for addressing the 

allegations contained in the report. 

The United States opposed the February 26 UN General Assembly resolution 

following up on the Goldstone Report. In a statement to the General Assembly, we 

reiterated our view that the allegations in the Goldstone report should be resolved by 

credible domestic investigations and follow up, as well as our commitment to 

safeguarding the ongoing efforts to restart permanent status negotiations between Israel 

and the Palestinians. 
As we move forward, we will continue to work with Israel and other key 

countries to promote a constructive approach that emphasizes the key role of domestic 

investigations and serves to further our ultimate goal of achieving a comprehensive peace 

in the Middle East based on a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. 

Question 30: 

Madam Secretary, the budget request includes over $75 million for the UN Development 

Program. UNDP's board is chaired by Iran. UNDP has been accused of mismanagement 

and misuse of funds from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. Further, UNDP is now reopening in 

North Korea, which it left after allegations that it allowed assistance to benefit Kim Jong 

Il's regime. And UNDP admits that it will select North Korean personnel from a list 

handpicked by the regime. 

A. So why, Madam Secretary, are we continuing to send money to UNDP? 

B. Why should U.S. taxpayers be indirectly supporting the regime in Pyongyang? 

C. Why are U.S. officials continuing to attend UNDP board meetings, in violation of a 

Congressional prohibition on attending meetings of international organizations run by 

state sponsors of terrorism like Iran? 

 

Answer: 

 As required by section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 

the United States withholds from U.S. contributions to UNDP the U.S. share of UNDP 

funds expended in North Korea and other specified countries. As a result, the amount the 

Department provides to UNDP continues to be less than appropriated.

Since March 2007, when UNDP suspended its operations in North Korea, the 

State Department has worked with UNDP management and other members of the 

Executive Board to institute a set of management and program monitoring mechanisms 

for UNDP programs. These include the following oversight mechanisms: 
 (a) Human resource management, including discontinuing sub-contracting of 

national staff members by the government, more competitive recruitment, staff 

evaluation and selection entirely at the discretion of UNDP, agreement directly with 

an individual to become a UNDP staff member, and direct payment of salaries and 

entitlements to individuals; 

(b) Finance and banking, including local payments made in local currency and the 

agreement by the government to meet global UNDP banking standards; 

(c) Strengthened monitoring and evaluation, with the addition of an international 

monitoring and evaluation specialist in the country office, regular visits to projects, 

and ample reporting on a regular basis on the implementation of these measures as 

well as on the overall program. 

(d) Transparent communication, in line with UNDP worldwide standards. 

 In the North Korean context, the Government of the DPRK has agreed to give 

UNDP unhindered access to project sites and given assurances that UNDP will be able to 

physically verify the appropriate use of all project equipment and assets. UNDP will also 

establish a website on its DPRK program that will include detailed information on 

procurement and operations and will be available to the public. 

 Based on UNDP’s commitment to enhanced oversight mechanisms for the DPRK 

program and because of our general principle to help the people of developing countries 

make positive changes to improve their political and economic well-being, the United 

States agreed with the majority of the UNDP Board to resume operations in North Korea. 

 We will monitor UNDP's implementation of their new management and oversight 

plan and work to ensure that UNDP operations serve the people, not oppressive regimes. 
When we are aware of reports of irregularities or concerns in UNDP programs, we follow 

up with the management to address them immediately. 

 As a member of the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board, it is important that the 

United States participate in the negotiation, formulation, and approval of decisions that 

guide the policy of the UNDP. If the United States does not send delegations to the 

Executive Board, it cannot engage in the direct diplomacy critical to shaping the 

Executive Board’s guidance for the organization in a way that reflects U.S. policies and 

concerns. 

 Iran's presidency of the UNDP Board expired at the end of 2009. The nation of 

Antigua and Barbuda is the new 2010 President of the Executive Board. 

Question 31: 

Madam Secretary, our Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, has spoken of a “new 

approach” at the UN consistent with a “new era of engagement.” But the key element of 

this “new approach” is that the U.S. has unconditionally surrendered our strongest 

leverage to produce real change at the UN: our funding. Instead of conditioning our 

contributions on real reform, the U.S. has paid billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars to the UN 

– no questions asked, no matter what outrages the UN commits. And what did we get in 

return? The AP reported last month that “The United Nations has cut back sharply on 

investigations into corruption and fraud within its ranks, shelving cases involving the 

possible theft or misuse of millions of dollars.” 

So what’s it going to take, Madam Secretary, for the U.S. to finally condition our 

contributions to the UN on real reform? 

Answer: 

We take very seriously our responsibility to U.S. taxpayers that our contributions 

to the UN are being spent in a transparent, ethical, efficient, and effective manner. The 

United States has long insisted that the UN must robustly guard against fraud, waste, and 

mismanagement. Our commitment is unwavering. 
We believe that the Office of Internal Oversight Services is and must be at the 

forefront in this effort. Due in large part to U.S. efforts, working with a coalition of likeminded states, the UN General Assembly agreed in December 2008 to transfer the 

functions of the Procurement Task Force (PTF), which had been established on a 

temporary basis, into the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). While that 

transition has not gone smoothly, we continue to advocate for a robust investigation 

function in OIOS. 

We have been working to ensure that consistent with the mandate from the UN 

General Assembly, the OIOS Investigations Division has the expertise, capacity, and 

independence to effectively investigate allegations of fraud, corruption, and misconduct 

in the procurement area. 

In general, we do not support withholding U.S. assessed contributions. It is 

important that we honor our treaty obligations. In addition, we do not believe that 

withholding has been shown to be an effective means of influencing an organization’s 

policies. Withholding can make the work of a Secretariat more difficult, but has not 

swayed the decisions made by the governing bodies, where policies are determined. 

The United States is committed to making further improvements in UN 

management, accountability, and transparency. The United States will continue to 

engage closely with Secretary-General Ban and other UN members to seek collaborative 

approaches to improving the UN’s effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency. 

We will continue to be a driving force for efforts to promote ethical conduct, 

accountability, and oversight throughout the UN system. U.S. leadership is essential to 

continued progress on UN management reforms. 
Question 32: 

 

Madam Secretary, last year the U.S. joined the misnamed UN “Human Rights Council,” 

seeking to change it from within. Many of us criticized that decision at the time, 

believing the Council was deeply structurally flawed and that U.S. participation would 

only legitimize the Council’s biased behavior. Several months later, the Council remains 

a swamp of anti-Israel, anti-freedom bias. It mandated and endorsed the anti-Israel 

Goldstone Report. And UN Watch, which monitors the Council, recently reported that 

the Council remains unchanged, and that the U.S. has taken few real steps at the Council 

to advance our interests or combat human rights abuses. 

a. Madam Secretary, where’s the beef? 

b. If the U.S. joined the Council to change it from within, why has the U.S. not 

called for a special session of the Council on Iran, even as Iran has repeatedly and 

brutally repressed its own people? 

c. Why has the U.S. not introduced and pushed for a resolution condemning the 

Iranian regime’s human rights violations? 

d. Why has the U.S. not called for a special session of the Council on North Korea, 

or Syria, or Sudan? 

e. Why has the U.S. not introduced and pushed for a resolution condemning human 

rights violations by Cuba, or Syria, or Sudan? Or by Saudi Arabia, or Venezuela, 

or Russia? 

Answer: 

The U.S. has a clear strategy for the Human Rights Council -- promoting and 

helping the Council operate in a more effective way. This way must be based on human 

rights principles and focus effectively on those places where human rights abuses are 

occurring. We have four clear objectives 1) supporting strong and unbiased country 

mandates; 2) ending the disproportionate attention to Israel; 3 strengthening the special 

procedures mechanisms; and, 4) planning a thoughtful and a thorough process to the 2011 

HRC review. Iran is one of our most pressing human rights concerns. As the result of 

robust U.S. diplomacy, Iran’s Universal Periodic Review featured strong statements from 

over 20 like-minded countries highlighting the poor state of human rights in Iran and over 

145 on-the-record recommendations to the Government of Iran on how to improve the 
state of human rights in the country. We believe it is also very important for the Council 

to focus on the human rights abuses that are taking place in Burma, North Korea, Sudan, 

and other countries of concern, and to ensure that focus on these abuses is maintained and 

addressed. Even before we became a full member, for example, we worked with our 

allies to preserve the Council’s mandate on human rights in Sudan. 
Return to TOe 

Table 12h: Family Planning and Reproductive Health by Account 

FY 2011 

($000) 

63 
Return to TOe 

Table 12h: Family Planning and Reproductive Health by Account 

FY 2011 

(SOOO) 

64 
Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by 

Representative Shelley Berkley 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing 

Promoting Security through Diplomacy and Development: The Fiscal 

Year 2011 International Affairs Budget 

February 25, 2010 

(Received after printing of transcript) 

Question 2a: 

Iran – Nuclear Weapons and Sanctions

The most recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report indicated that Iran has 

already begun efforts to enrich uranium to a 20 percent level, while its stockpile of low-enriched 

uranium is well over 4,500 pounds. When do you expect to see action by the Security Council 

on a new Iran resolution? 

Answer: 

There is growing understanding in the international community that Iran should face 

consequences for its defiance of international obligations regarding its nuclear program. 

All of our partners in the P5+1 agree that we share a crucial goal of not allowing Iran to 

obtain a nuclear weapons capacity. And we all remain committed to achieving that goal via a 

dual-track policy – engagement and pressure. 

We are having very serious and high-level conversations with our P5+1 partners and 

others about the importance of holding Iran accountable, including discussing how to 

operationalize the pressure track in more specific ways. 

We want to make sure that at the end of this process, we have the appropriate measures in 

place to secure Iran’s compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and UN Security 

Council Resolutions. We are making progress toward such an outcome, but it is unclear how 

long this will take. 

Question 2b: 

 

Once that vote takes place, when would you expect the sanctions to actually come into place? 

Answer: 

Generally speaking, once the UN Security Council adopts a Chapter VII resolution, 

Member States are obligated to begin taking steps to implement the adopted provisions. 
Question 2c: 

Once sanctions are actually in place, how long before they actually have an impact? 

Answer: 

In the past, we have seen some provisions make impacts very quickly. For example, the 

financial provisions of UNSCRs 1737, 1747 and 1803 resulted in multiple banks around the 

world, including major institutions like Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered, and 

HSBC, freezing accounts and eventually cutting off business altogether with Iran. With other 

provisions, it depends on the ability of the UN Member State to implement the measures 

domestically. 

Question 2d: 

If other Security Council members do not support sanctions, what is our alternative strategy? 

Answer: 

Our focus at the moment is on building support for an UNSCR so as to sharpen the 

choices that Iran faces. 

Question 2e: 

What are our next steps if sanctions fail? 

Answer: 

Our focus at the moment is on getting the international community behind the most 

effective sanctions possible. 

Question 2f: 

Can the U.S. impose sanctions unilaterally to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear program? 

Answer: 

The United States has a number of tools at its disposal to deal with the Iran nuclear issue, 

including through implementation of existing UNSCRs and Executive Orders. At this time, we 

are focused on getting the international community behind the most effective sanctions possible. 

Question 2g: 

In light of Iran’s non-responsiveness to our offers of engagement, the Administration has 

indicated it will pursue sanctions targeted at Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 

How optimistic are you that such sanctions can be effective in time to avert Iranian success in 
achieving nuclear-threshold status and when do you think Iran will achieve that status? How can 

we be certain that the IRGC will not be able to circumvent such sanctions? 

Answer: 

We believe that the IRGC is at the core of many of Iran’s most troublesome nuclear 

activities. We believe that the international community should focus its attention and pressure 

on the IRGC in order to address critical ties between Iran and those that supply its nuclear 

program. Even if potentially imperfect, pressure against the IRGC is the right thing to do. 

Question 4: 

 

The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 2007 claimed Iran stopped its covert nuclear 

weapons program in 2003. However, the IAEA stated in its most recent report that it had 

concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities, which it believes continued well beyond 2004. 

 Does the State Department believe Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003? 

 Will there be a new NIE to address these questions? 

 

Answer: 

The U.S. Intelligence Community, including the Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research (INR), continually reviews available information about Iran’s nuclear program. INR is 

among the agencies that coordinate NIEs and has been participating in the coordination of a 

Memorandum to Holders – or update – of the 2007 NIE on Iran’s nuclear program. That 

document has not yet been completed, so I am not in a position to comment on its conclusions. 

I would note that, in his annual global threat testimony to the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, DNI Blair stated, “We 

continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. ... We do not 

know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.” In addition, the DNI’s 

most recent Unclassified Report to the Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Weapons (the “721 report”) 

reaffirmed that, “in fall 2003, Iran halted its nuclear weapon design and weaponization 

activities.” You may also have seen that DIA Director Burgess told Voice of America in January 

2010, “The bottom line assessments of the NIE still hold true.” 

 

Question 5:

What actions has the State Department taken to implement the Iran Sanctions Act? Specifically, 

what companies are investing in Iran’s petroleum sector, and what sanctions will be applied to 

them? 

Answer:
The Department of State takes its obligations under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) very 

seriously and we have reviewed dozens of reports of potentially sanctionable activity under the 

Act. In addition to this ongoing process, we recently conducted a preliminary review of a 

number of reported activities that were mentioned in the letter that you, along with 49 other 

Members of the House, sent to President Obama in October. During the course of this review, 

we found the activities of some companies to be problematic and therefore warranting more 

thorough consideration under the standards delineated in the ISA. We are continuing to collect 

and assess information on these cases. It is worth noting that the Iranian government, in its 

efforts to deny its increasing international isolation, promotes and publicizes all manner of 

transactions and reputed investments that may or may not have any truth to them. 

We work aggressively on three fronts to ensure that our review of such reports is serious 

and thorough and that we have a rigorous process in place for implementation of the ISA. First, 

we raise in our bilateral engagement with numerous countries the need to strengthen our 

cooperation in promoting a united front of restricting investment in Iran’s energy sector. Second, 

we supplement our efforts by working with our Embassies overseas to collect information on 

potentially sanctionable activity. Finally, we review with the intelligence community reports of 

activities of some companies that warrant further scrutiny under the ISA. Through these 

mechanisms we ensure that credible reports are examined fully while reports with no substance 

to them are put to rest. We look forward to sharing with you the conclusion of our review when 

it is complete. 

Question 6a: 

What steps are you and Senator Mitchell taking to urge President Abbas to resume negotiations 

without preconditions? 

Answer: 

We are engaged in intensive discussions with the parties to re-launch negotiations as soon 

as possible. Special Envoy Mitchell has traveled to the Middle East in recent weeks to 

emphasize to the parties the importance of taking actions that build confidence on both sides for 

credible negotiations. 

Question 6b:

Do you believe President Abbas has the political will and strength to make the compromises 

necessary for any peace agreement with Israel? 

Answer: 

President Abbas is the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people 

and has consistently demonstrated his commitment to a peaceful resolution of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict through negotiations toward the two-state solution. While compromises will 

be necessary, we believe that President Abbas shares our common objective of a better future for 
the Palestinians and that, through good faith negotiations, an outcome can be achieved that 

reconciles both sides’ goals. 

Question 6c:

We have not heard much about steps the Arab States are taking to promote peace and bolster 

President Abbas. What should the Arab states be doing and how does that compare with what 

they are actually doing? 

Answer: 

We continue to call on all parties to take steps that promote an environment for 

successful negotiations. As President Obama has said, Arab states must recognize that the Arab 

Peace Initiative was an important beginning but not the end of their responsibilities. We have 

asked Arab states to enter into a regional dialogue with Israel on issues of common concern—

such as health, education, and water—in parallel with the resumption of direct negotiations 

between the parties. We continue to emphasize to our friends in the region the key importance of 

supporting President Abbas so he has the political strength necessary to be a true partner for 

peace. 

Question 6d:

Some in the Palestinian leadership have called for a strategy of unilaterally declaring a 

Palestinian state; some in the EU are talking about recognizing such a state. What would the U.S. 

response be to such an effort? 

Answer: 

The U.S. has consistently affirmed that the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 

establishment of a Palestinian state can only be achieved through negotiations between the 

parties. Our position—and the position of the Quartet, of which the EU is a member—is that 

unilateral actions taken by either party cannot prejudge the outcome of negotiations and will not 

be recognized by the international community. 

Question 7a: 

I am concerned about the direction Turkey is heading in. Of late, they have made several 

disparaging comments about Israel and they excluded Israel from joint naval exercises. 

 What is your assessment of Turkey’s direction? Are they hoping to integrate more with 

the Arab world, or are they leaning more toward the western world and the EU in 

particular? 

 

Answer: 

The United States and Turkey share a vital partnership based on a long history of 

cooperation, our shared values, our common strategic interests, and our membership in NATO. 
From the Balkans to Afghanistan, we are working together to help stabilize regions of the world 

where instability affects us all. 

We continue to support strong relations between our allies Turkey and Israel, and hope 

that they will continue to maintain a close relationship. Following Israeli Defense Minister Ehud 

Barak’s visit to Turkey in January, both governments confirmed to us their commitment to their 

bilateral relationship. 

President Obama stated in his address to the Turkish Parliament in April 2009 that 

Turkey has been a resolute ally and a responsible partner in transatlantic and European 

institutions. Turkey continues its EU accession process, which we strongly support, and has 

pledged to accelerate implementation of EU reforms in 2010. 

Question 7b: 

The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, James Jeffrey, recently stated in an interview that, Turkey is “a 

peaceful country. It doesn’t invade its neighbors. It has security concerns in Cyprus.” As you 

know, there are more than 40,000 Turkish troops occupying Cyprus. 

 Is it U.S. policy that Turkey did not invade Cyprus? 

 Does the State Department believe Turkey has legitimate security interests in Cyprus? 

 

Answer: 

As I noted earlier in my testimony on February 25 in response to Rep. McMahon’s 

question, our policy on Cyprus remains unchanged. The United States supports a just and lasting 

settlement that reunifies the island into a bi- zonal and bi-communal federation. To this end, we 

support the ongoing Cypriot-led negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary General’s 

Good Offices Mission under Alexander Downer. 
Question for the Record Submitted to 

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by 

Representative Elliot Engel 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing 

Promoting Security through Diplomacy and Development: The Fiscal 

Year 2011 International Affairs Budget 

February 25, 2010 

(Received after printing of transcript) 

Question 1: 

 Drug Policy: We need a more holistic approach to our counternarcotics strategy in the 

Western Hemisphere. 

I strongly support the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), the Merida Initiative and the 

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). But, we need to do a better job weaving 

these efforts together. 

What efforts are you taking to better integrate these efforts, so that our successes 

in certain countries do not contribute to problems in other countries? 

I have suggested designating a coordinator at the State Department to oversee all 

of our Western Hemisphere security initiatives. Would you consider doing this? 

Answer: 

As the dynamic of the illicit drug trade throughout the Western Hemisphere varies from 

country to country, we are working with our bilateral and inter-agency partners to implement 

multiple programs and initiatives in a coordinated, integrated fashion to help prevent drugs from 

reaching the United States, build local capacity to address criminality, and provide alternative 

and economic opportunities outside of the drug trade. 

 

We are implementing distinct initiatives in the Andes, Central America, Mexico, and the 

Caribbean to address the different circumstances in each region. By keeping these initiatives 

separate but coordinated, we will ensure that the individuals responsible for developing and 

implementing our programs have the regional expertise required to succeed, and we will ensure 

that these initiatives are complementary. Our initiatives throughout the hemisphere recognize 

that all stages of drug cultivation, production, and trafficking must be addressed, and that all subregional areas must be addressed simultaneously in order to achieve sustainable results. 

Our counternarcotics programs in the Western Hemisphere are geared to build effective 

partnerships that can better develop, mobilize, and sustain the capabilities of the whole region. 

The Colombian National Police (CNP), which have benefited from significant U.S. training and 

equipment, are at the forefront of sharing their expertise with other police forces throughout the 
hemisphere. From 2007 to 2009, Colombia trained more than 5,800 Mexican security and 

judicial officials, and more than 150 police officers from 18 other Latin American countries. We 

envision similar initiatives under the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and 

the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and we are working with our partners in both 

regions to best see where regional expertise can serve to develop and reinforce host-nation 

capabilities. 

Other training facilities in the Western Hemisphere have capitalized on the assistance 

provided by the U.S. and are creating economies of scale by training their counterparts in the 

region. For example, Mexico, with U.S. assistance, is developing the capacity at their new 

Corrections Academy to train corrections officials from around the region, and the canine 

academy in Guatemala also provides expert, regional training. 

 We agree that these initiatives must be well coordinated, and we also want to ensure they 

are mutually supportive. The existing coordination processes and mechanisms within the 

Department of State and with other federal agencies involved in supporting these initiatives 

allows us to do this effectively and does not necessitate creating a new position at this time. 

Question 2:

Yesterday, the OAS’s human rights agencies criticized Venezuela for its deteriorating human 

rights situation. This follows their recent condemnation of President Chavez’s closure of RCTV 

and several other cable TV stations. 

How are you working with our partners in the OAS to call attention to the closing of democratic 

space in Venezuela? 

Answer:

 OAS bodies have recently been frank and outspoken about the erosion of basic 

democratic freedoms in Venezuela, and we and other OAS member states have drawn attention 

to these issues in the OAS Permanent Council. We also continue to provide strong support to the 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the follow-up mechanism to the InterAmerican Corruption Convention, and OAS election observation missions, which allow the OAS 

to gauge the state of democracy in our region, including in Venezuela. 

 On March 3, at the first meeting of the Permanent Council after the IACHR released its 

highly critical February 24 report on the state of democracy in Venezuela, U.S. Permanent 

Representative to the OAS Carmen Lomellin underscored our support for the work of the 

IACHR and urged Venezuela to address the issues in the report rather than smear its authors. 

Canada, Panama, and Argentina joined the United States with statements of support for the 

IACHR, and other members, including Brazil, admonished the Venezuelans’ disrespectful and 

undiplomatic tone. 
 At the February 3 meeting of the Permanent Council, Canada drew attention to the threat 

to freedom of expression in Venezuela represented by the new restrictions the Venezuelan 

government had imposed on RCTV, provoking an ad-hominem attack from the Venezuelan 

Permanent Representative. The United States, Guatemala, and Panama all endorsed Canada’s 

remarks. Others spoke more generally in support of freedom of expression. 

 The United States consistently supports OAS programs that seek to strengthen respect for 

human rights and freedom of expression, support crisis prevention, and open space for 

independent civil society within the Inter-American system and within OAS member states, 

including in Venezuela. At a special meeting of the Permanent Council March 3 with candidates 

for Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General of the OAS, the United States called on 

the OAS leadership to provide “strong and consistent support for human rights and fundamental 

freedoms, including freedom of expression” as well as “more effective mechanisms for 

foreseeing and counteracting emerging threats to democracy.” Several other member states, 

including Canada, Chile, Panama, and St. Kitts and Nevis (speaking on behalf of the 14 

Caribbean Community members) made similar comments, and both candidates agreed to explore 

ways to act more “swiftly and flexibly” in defense of democracy. The U.S. Mission is working 

with other like-minded delegations to follow up on those commitments. 

Question 3: 

I am extremely concerned about the imprisonment of USAID contractor Alan Gross in Cuba. I 

understand his health is deteriorating, and I hope he will be released as soon as possible. 

Can you please update me on the State Department’s efforts on this situation? 

Answer: 

United States Interest Section (USINT) personnel have visited Mr. Gross on two separate 

occasions and have requested an additional visit. USINT personnel have delivered 

correspondence and much-needed medicines to Mr. Gross and are monitoring his condition 

carefully. We are in close touch with Mr. Gross’ family to facilitate their efforts to maintain 

contact with Mr. Gross and address his continuing health problems. During Migration Talks 

held in Havana on February 19, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Craig Kelly raised Mr. 

Gross’ condition and incarceration with Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Dagoberto Rodriguez on 

three separate occasions. The U.S. delegation noted this is a matter of grave importance to the 

United States and called for Mr. Gross to be released on humanitarian grounds and allowed to 

return to his family. We also pressed for Mr. Gross to be allowed regular contact with his 

family. We are continuing to pursue every available avenue to work towards Mr. Gross’ release. 
Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton by 

Representative Eni F.H. Faleomavaega 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing 

Promoting Security through Diplomacy and Development: The Fiscal 

Year 2011 International Affairs Budget 

February 25, 2010 

(Received after printing of transcript) 

Question 1: 

Would you stop in American Samoa during your upcoming trip to Australia, New 

Zealand and Papua New Guinea? 

 

Answer: 

American Samoa has an important role to play in the Asia-Pacific and we work 

with its territorial government on a wide-range of maritime and regional issues. We are 

still considering the itinerary for the upcoming trip and hope to have a clearer picture of 

specific stops in the near future. 

Question 3: 

Madam Secretary, it has been 10 years since the OSCE held a security summit (in 

Istanbul). The security context that was defined in Istanbul was drastically altered after 

September 11, 2001. New security threats and challenges have emerged (post 9/11) that 

endanger not only Europe but the United States as well. From my perspective, an OSCE 

meeting, bringing together all member states, to discuss and come to solutions regarding 

the security of all nations will be beneficial to the United States. Can you and the 

President support this summit? 

Answer: 

The Administration is considering Kazakhstan’s proposal to host an OSCE 

summit in 2010. The Administration believes that any such high-level meeting should be 

based on having sufficient substance, and we are looking for progress in the Corfu 

Process discussions on European security, initiating two OSCE border projects in 

Afghanistan, and establishing an OSCE mission in Georgia, among other priorities in our 

OSCE agenda. 

In June, OSCE participating States will have an opportunity to review the 

Kazakhstani Chairmanship’s report summarizing the results of the Corfu Process 

discussions to date. This report will be a key decision point with respect to a summit. 
Question 4: 

Madam Secretary, it has been 10 years since the OSCE held a security summit (in 

Istanbul). The security context that was defined in Istanbul was drastically altered after 

September 11, 2001. New security threats and challenges have emerged (post 9/11) that 

endanger not only Europe but the United States as well. From my perspective, an OSCE 

meeting, bringing together all member states, to discuss and come to solutions regarding 

the security of all nations will be beneficial to the United States. Can you and the 

President support this summit? 

Answer: 

The Administration is considering Kazakhstan’s proposal to host an OSCE 

summit in 2010. The Administration believes that any such high-level meeting should be 

based on having sufficient substance, and we are looking for progress in the Corfu 

Process discussions on European security, initiating two OSCE border projects in 

Afghanistan, and establishing an OSCE mission in Georgia, among other priorities in our 

OSCE agenda. 

In June, OSCE participating States will have an opportunity to review the 

Kazakhstani Chairmanship’s report summarizing the results of the Corfu Process 

discussions to date. This report will be a key decision point with respect to a summit. 

Question 5: 

I understand that you have requested $13 million for USAID programs for Pacific Island 

nations in FY 2011 including $9.5 million for global climate change adaptation, $2.5 

million for HIV/AIDS programming in Papua New Guinea, and $1 million for disaster 

management and mitigation in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands. 

Can you give us some more detail on how the funds will be allocated by country? 

 

Answer: 

 The bulk of the FY 2011 funding for the new mission is $9.5 million for global 

climate change. USAID will design this program over the next several months, working 

through regional institutions, such as the South Pacific Regional Environment Program 

(SPREP) and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) so that U.S. aid dollars will benefit eligible 

nations in the region. 

 Seven island-nations will be potential recipients of USAID regional assistance – 

Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Tuvalu; 

additional countries in the region also may benefit through our work with SPREP and 
PIF. Although Fiji will be the site of the headquarters of the new regional Mission, we 

do not anticipate providing bilateral assistance to Fiji given the current political situation. 

 All other island-nations in the region are either protectorates of other 

developed nations, or freely associated with the U.S., with the exception of Vanuatu, 

which has better development indicators than its neighbors and is the recipient of a 

$65.69 million Compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 

 As cited in the question, USAID also plans to allocate: 1) $2.5 million for 

HIV/AIDS programs in Papua New Guinea to improve the capacity, quality, and 

effectiveness of activities for prevention, support, and treatment of at-risk populations 

and those living with the disease; and, 2) $1 million to improve readiness for responding 

to disasters in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall 

Islands, based on the USAID-DHS (FEMA) agreement to provide relief and 

reconstruction assistance in these countries in the event of a declared (by the U.S. 

President) disaster. 
Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton 

Representative Michael T. McCaul 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing 

Promoting Security through Diplomacy and Development: The Fiscal 

Year 2011 International Affairs Budget 

February 25, 2010 

(Received after printing of transcript) 

Question1a: 

In recent months, thousands of Iranians peacefully protested the actions of their 

government; however, retaliatory use of force by the Iranian regime resulted in hundreds 

of citizens imprisoned and countless others killed. Today, I am introducing a resolution 

that expresses my concern over the Government of Iran’s continued oppression of its 

people and which calls on the Administration to take measured action. Support of those 

interested in a positive change in Iran’s government is key, especially as elements of that 

government are currently supporting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

In Iraq, how do you propose to counter Iranian influence, especially as U.S. military 

forces are drawn down? 

 

Answer: 

Iraq and Iran share a long history and are bound by extensive economic, cultural 

and religious linkages. We accept that Iran has legitimate interests in Iraq, and we 

respect its ties with Iraq. A proper relationship between Iraq and Iran will be predicated 

on Iran’s full respect for Iraq’s sovereignty. However, we do not accept Iran pursuing its 

interests in ways that jeopardize the safety of Iraqi citizens and U.S. and Iraqi forces, or 

that undermine the sovereignty and stability of Iraq. 

We think that supporting a self-reliant, democratic, and stable Iraq is the best way 

to counter the illegitimate exercise of Iranian influence. This includes supporting Iraq's 

security forces, expanding the country’s governmental capacity, strengthening its 

democratic institutions and promoting its economic development. Our forces will 

continue to work with Iraqi security forces to expose and counter enemies to Iraqi 

national security, including Iranian supported militants. We will also continue to urge 

regional and international actors to support the Government of Iraq and increase their 

engagement with Iraq, its institutions and people. The more extensive Iraq’s ties with 

others, the easier it will be to minimize Iran’s activities. Finally, as the Iraqi government 

continues to increase its regional and international engagement and expand legitimate 

trade and investment ties, we are confident it will continue a policy on Iran that 

encourages constructive, peaceful relations based on mutual respect. 
Question 1b:

In Afghanistan, how do the civilian efforts by the State Department and USAID outlined 

in this budget and in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy work to 

support US military efforts and address Iranian influence in the region? 

Answer:

The challenges in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are immense. The civilian 

efforts outlined in the budget and Stabilization Strategy, combined with U.S. combat 

operations and efforts to build Afghan and Pakistani security capacity, constitute an 

innovative, whole-of-government approach to protect our vital interests in this volatile 

region of the world. For example, in Afghanistan, our focus is to assist Afghan 

institutions to develop the capacity to withstand and diminish the threat posed by 

extremism, and to deliver high-impact economic assistance – especially in the 

agricultural sector – to create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from 

poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off the battlefield. With the help of U.S. advisors 

and specialist, Afghan Ministries are at the forefront of delivering assistance in ISAF 

cleared areas, as demonstrated recently during Operation Moshtarak in Marjah. These 

important civilian efforts immediately following military operations, greatly enhance the 

trust and confidence in the Afghan government and our coalition partners in ISAF. Our 

efforts also stabilize areas, thus making it much harder for militants to move back in. 

The U.S continues to encourage the Afghan government to promote good relations with 

its neighbors, including Iran, and to tackle cross-border narcotics and commercial goods 

trafficking. The international community is helping the Afghans build a sustainable, selfsufficient security force to make the Afghan government more capable, credible, and 

responsive to the needs of the Afghan people. By doing so, we are helping to build an 

Afghanistan more capable of defending itself against undesired outside influences. 

Question 3: 

Does the State Department have the resources to effectively manage PCCF? Given that 

most of the expertise on what is required for this initiative resides within the Department 

of Defense, specifically CENTCOM, how closely will you consult with DoD? 

 

Answer: 

The Department of State (DOS) historically has played a strong role in the 

management of security assistance programs that provide critical support to key partners 

and allies around the globe and has both the capacity and institutional capability to 

manage PCCF. The Bureau of Political Military Affairs currently manages over $5.5B in 
military assistance annually, including Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International 

Military Exchange and Training (IMET) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). 

 The Department of State (DoS) has and will continue to work closely with DoD 

and CENTCOM to ensure a seamless transition of PCCF from DoD to DoS management. 

This included close State-Defense coordination on the development of State’s internal 

PCCF management processes. To ensure the success of this endeavor, we are dedicating 

the necessary resources both in terms of experienced personnel and funding to support 

effective program management. 

Question 4: 

 

The proposed budget includes a dramatic increase in aid to Yemen, from $67M in 

FY2010 to $109M in FY2011, purportedly to assist with nation building efforts. Given 

the wide-spread corruption within the government and the internal conflicts, how do you 

propose we effectively manage this funding? What type of additional support should we 

accept from our allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia? 

Answer: 

It is important to clarify that we do not give cash or budgetary assistance to the 

government of Yemen for development assistance. While we do work with the various 

ministries in the design and implementation of our aid programs, all funds go through 

USG accounts to implementing partner organizations. All USAID grantees are vetted 

before receiving funds, and must provide performance and financial reports on a 

quarterly basis. The USAID prime grantees are checked against Department of State, 

OFAC, and United Nations lists before receiving funds. 

As part of our policy review of Yemen that began last year, USAID has 

developed a new country strategy for Yemen, which it will begin to implement in the 

coming months. Of the FY 2011 request for $106.6 million, $55 million is for USAID, 

an increase of $7 million over the FY 2010 estimate of $48 million. One objective of 

USAID's new governance program is to improve Yemeni governmental capacity 

to manage and account for donor funds that run through its institutions. This objective is 

in part designed to respond to concerns expressed by Gulf state donors that they cannot 

fulfill their donor pledges because of the Yemeni government’s poor management, lack 

of transparency, and corruption. 

The FY 2011 request for $51.6 million for security funding is a $32.4 million 

increase over the FY 2010 Estimate of $19.25 million. This includes a $22.5 million 

increase in FMF primarily to regularize funding for the FY 2009 1206 FMF program. 

The FY 2011 increase also includes a $10 million increase in INCLE to initiate a robust 

criminal justice sector reform program in Yemen that provides equipment and training to 

the Yemen police and develops Yemen judicial system capacity. All equipment 

transferred to Yemeni forces is covered by end-use agreements, which ensure 
transparency by requiring Yemen to grant the U.S. government full access to monitor 

how the equipment is being used. 

Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s other Gulf neighbors continue to work with the 

government of Yemen to increase the level and effectiveness of international aid. The 

Gulf Cooperation Council Secretary General will host a meeting of Gulf and other 

partners of Yemen in Riyadh on 27-28 February. This meeting will share analysis on the 

barriers to effective aid in Yemen, leading to a joint dialogue with the government of 

Yemen on priority reforms.