## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. 2010 Real Estate Foreclosure, LLC , 2013 IL App (1st) 120711

Appellate Court Caption BA YVI EW L OAN SERVI CI NG, L L C, As Service r for Citi mortg ag e, I nc., Assigne e of Mortg ag e Electronic Sy stems, Inc., as Nominee for Credit Suisse First Boston Financial Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. 2010 REAL ESTATE FORECL OSURE, L L C, Interve nor-Appe llant (Mar k L askowski, The Ba

nk of Commerce, Under Mortg ag e Recorde d

as Document Number 0703908031
, Pacific Realty Group, L L C, Under M e mo r a n d u m a n d A f fidavit of Equitable Intere st, Recorde d as Document Number 0834555052, Nonre cord Claimants, Unknown Tena nts , and Unknown Owne rs, Def

endants).

District & N o. First District, Second D ivision Docke t No. 1-12-0711

Filed J une 25, 2013

Held (Note : Thi s syl l abus

con st it ute s no p a rt of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er o

f D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The denial of interve n o r’s motion to vacate the confirmation of a fore closure sale following a judgme nt of fore closure and an order of sale

was not an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding intervenor ’s contentions that plaintiff failed to reg ister as a collection ag ency under the Collection Ag ency Act, or prove it was exempt, and that plaintiff filed a defe ctive lis pendens
, since i n t ervenor failed to establish that plaintiff, the loan service r, was subje ct to the Act, and the lis pendens plaintiff filed

c o mp li e d w it

h th e M ortg ag e For eclosure L aw; there fore
, intervenor f a il e d
to prove that “just i ce was otherwise not done” pursuant to section 15- 1508(b) of

the For eclosure L aw.

Dec ision Under Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 09-CH-25261; the Hon. J esse G. Re y es, Judge, pr esiding

.J udg ment Affir med.

Counsel on Appea l Acumen L aw Group, L L C, of Chicag o (B ardia Fa rd, of counsel), for appellant.

L aw Offic es of Ira T. Neve l, L L C (Ira T. Neve l, of counsel), and Noonan & L i eb er m an, L td. (Ruth B. Sosniak, of counsel), both of Chicag o, for appellee

.

Panel PR E SI DI NG J USTI CE HARRI S delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Connors and Simon concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, B ay

view L oan Servicing
, L L C, a s service r for Citimortga g e, Inc., assig nee of Mortg ag e Electronic Reg istration Sy stems, I nc., as nominee for Cre dit Sui sse First Boston Financ ial Corporation (plaint iff), broug ht this mortg ag e fore closure action ag ainst defe ndants, Mark E. L askowski, the Ba nk of Commerce, under mortg ag e rec orded as document number 0703908031, Pacific Realty Group, L L C, under m emorandum and aff idavit of equitabl e interest, rec orded as document number 0834555052, nonrec ord claimants, unknown te n a

nts a nd unknown owner s (collec tively defe ndants) on J uly 23, 2009. Def endants are not parties to this appea l. After a judgme nt of fore closure and order of sale

was enter ed by the circ uit court, a judicial sale of the subject proper ty occur red. Upon the motion of plaintiff, the circ uit court confirme d the judicial sale. Interve nor, 2010 Real Estate For eclosure
, L L C, soug ht to vacate the confirmation of the sale pursuant to both se ction 2- 1301(e) of the I llinois Code of Civil Procedur e (Code) (735 I L CS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2010)) and section 15-1508(b) o f t he I llinois Mortg ag e For eclosure L aw (F orec losure L aw) (735 I L CS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2010)). Following a hear ing, the circ uit court denied intervenor ’s motion to vacate the confirmation of the sale. At issue here is whether th e ci rc u i t court abused its discre tion in denying intervenor ’s motion to vacate the confirmation of the sale. I nitially
, we note that we have only analy zed the component of intervenor ’s motion to vacate broug ht pursuant to s ec t i o n 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw. The component of intervenor ’s motion to vaca te broug ht pursuan t to section 2-1301(e ) of the Code is not applicable here be c a

u s e p la in ti f f in v o k e d th e ma

n d a to r y o b li g ations under section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw wh en it proper ly motioned for a confirmation of the sale. Under section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw, we hold that intervenor failed to car ry its burden of proving that sufficie nt g rounds exis ted to vacate the confirmation of sale in this case

. Specifica lly
, intervenor failed to show that “justice was otherwise not done ” in the judicial

-2-sale in acc ordanc e with section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw. Acc ording ly
, the circ uit

court did not abuse its discretion in denying intervenor ’s motion to vaca te the confirmation of the sale

.

¶ 2 J URI SDI CTI ON ¶ 3 On J anuar

y 17, 2012, the circ uit co u rt d en i ed i n t er v en o r’ s m otion to vacate the confirmation of the sale. On Marc h 30, 2012, this court allowed intervenor leave to file a late notice of appea l. Interve nor filed its late notice of appea l on April 4, 2012. Acc ording ly
, this
court has jurisdiction pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303 g overning
appea ls from final judgme nts enter ed below. I ll. S. Ct. R. 301 (ef f. Fe b. 1, 1994); R. 303 (ef f. May 30, 2008).

¶ 4 BA CKGROUND ¶ 5 Plaintiff b ro u gh t its complaint to fore close a mortg ag e ag ainst defe ndants on J uly 23, 2009. On J anuar

y 23, 2010, the circ uit court enter ed a judgme nt of fore closure and order of 1 sale. The circ uit court add i t i o n all y enter ed the following order s: summary judgme nt was enter ed ag ainst L askowski; the unknown owner s, unknown te n ants, and nonrec ord claimants

wer e dismissed; and an orde r of de fault wa s entere d ag ainst the rema ining de fenda nts. ¶ 6 On May 13, 2010, intervenor filed its appea ranc e and an emer g ency motion to “continue sale.” At this time, attorney Stephen Richek repr esente d intervenor

. In its motion, intervenor
argued that it was the succe ssful bidder at the fore closure sale conduct ed by the second mortg ag ee on the proper

ty

. I nterve nor further asser ted that it had “a [m ]ot ion pending to be hear d on J une 4, 2010 as to whether the sale of the second mortg ag e will be vacated due to b an k ru p tcy issues” and that “if [i t was] succe ssful in vaca ting the sale of the second mortg ag e then it needs to deliver the proper ty in the same condition as it was prior to the sale

so that the second mortg ag e can be in a position to decide whether it will pay off the first lien

or what it will do.” On May 17, the circ uit court enter ed an order allowing intervenor to intervene and stayed the sa le. ¶ 7 On J uly 1, 2010, a simil arly named entity
, “2010 Real Estate For eclosure
, L L C 1106 ” (1106), repr esente d by attorney Adam S. Trac ey , filed a motion to set aside the sale alleg ing that the sale of

the prope rty

violated a ba

nkruptcy stay

. ¶ 8 On J uly 14, 2010, plaintiff fi l ed a “m o t i o n fo r order approving the repor t of sale a nd distribution and possession.” Plaint i ff s t at ed that the j udicial s ale of the property occur red on J une 25, 2010. ¶ 9 On Novembe r 23, 2010, 1106 filed a motion to set aside the sa le of the pr operty , ag ain alleg ing the sale violated a bankruptc y

stay

. ¶ 10 On J anuar

y 5, 2011, plaintiff fil ed another m otion for an order approving the re p ort of

T he comm on add re ss for the s u b j ect pro per ty is 1106 E. Oakton Str eet , in Arl ingto n 1 Hei ghts, Illi noi s, 6 0004

.
-3-sale and for distribution and possession for the judicial sale that occur red on J une 25, 2010. 2 The repor

t of sale indicated a defic iency on the amount owed under the mortg ag e of $78, 7 8 9

. 2 3

. Al so on J anuar y 5, 2011, the circ uit court enter ed an order on “def endant’ s motion to set aside sale.” I n the caption, defe ndant was listed as “2010 Real Est ate, et al .” The order denied defe ndant’s motion without prejudice and stated “the movant not appea ring and plaintiff tender ing to the court an order annulling the stay enter ed by the bankruptc y court.” The rec ord is not clea r whether the defe ndant on this particula r motion was intervenor or the similarly

named pa

rty , 1106. ¶ 11 I nterve nor, now repr esente d by the Acumen L aw Grou p , L L C
, fi l ed a re sponse in 3 opposition to plaintiff’s motion for an order approving the repor t of sale and for distribution and possession. I

n its re sponse, intervenor alleg ed that there was a second mortg ag e on the
proper ty , al s o subject to a fore closure proce eding under case number “09-CH- 04354.” I nterve nor was the succe ssful bidder at the Fe bruar y 2, 2010, ju d i ci al sale broug ht by the second mortg ag ee on the subject proper ty

. Interve nor argued that the circ uit court should not confirm the sa le of the pr operty in the prese nt a ction beca use it would “ sever ely

prejudice
, and potentially moot, [i nterve nor’s] *** pending motion to vacate confirmation of sale in the [second] mortg ag e action.” I nterve nor asked the court to deny plaintiff’s motion to confirm the sale “pending a full adjudication”of its motion to vacate the sale in the second mortg ag e fore closure action. I nterve nor alleg ed that afte r it was the succe ssful bidd er at t he judicial sale of the proper

ty for the second mortg ag e, it lear ned that “a fra

udulent rele ase of the [first] mortg ag e had been rec orded with the Cook County Recorde r of Dee ds.” Interve nor further alleg ed that plaintiff filed a defe ctive lis pendens

. Acc ording to intervenor
, had it known of the alleg ed fra

udulent rele ase and defe ctive lis pendens
, it would not have bid on the proper ty at the judicial sale of the prope rty broug ht by

the sec ond mortg ag ee. ¶ 12 On September 26, 2011, plaintiff ref iled its repor

t of sale and distribution. On that same day , the circ uit court enter ed an or der c onfirming the judicial sale of the prope rty

. ¶ 13 On October 2 4
, 2 0 1 1
, i nterve nor filed a motion, pursuant to section 2-1301(e ) of the Code (735 I L CS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2010)), to vacate the confirmation of the fore closure sale and to intervene

. I nterve nor argued that it acte d diligently
, had meritorious claims, would be

sever ely penalized if the confirma tion of the sale is not vacated, and that plaintiff would not be prejudice d by a v ac at i o n o f the confirmation of the sale. Interve nor stated it had

unsucce ssfully attempted to vaca te the confirmation of the ju d ic ia l s a le broug ht by the second mortg ag ee. I n s u p p ort of its alleg ation that it had meritorious claims, intervenor relied on section 15-1508(b) (iv) of the For eclosure L aw (735 I L CS 5 / 1 5 -1508(b)(iv) (West 2010)), claiming that justice would not otherwise be done if confirmation of the sale was not vacated.

Pla int if f had al re ady fi le d the m oti on on J uly 14, 2010
, and re fi le d it on Dece m ber 15, 2010

. 2

Acumen Law Grou p, LLC, la te r fi le d an app ear anc e on beh al f of int er venor on J uly 8, 2011

. 3
T h e a p p e a r a n c e was not a sub st it ute app ear anc e and st at es Acumen Law Grou p, LLC, was the “I nit ia l Couns el of Reco rd, ” even tho ugh at tor ney Ste phe n Ric hek, on Ma y 13, 2010
, had pre viousl y fi le d an app ear anc e and an emergency m oti on to con ti nue t h e s a l e o f the pro per ty due to a ban krupt cy iss ue.

-4-To show that justice would not otherwise be done, intervenor rea lleg ed that plaintiff filed a

defe ctive lis pendens and that a fra udulen t re l ea s e of a mortg ag e occur red. Acc ording ly
, intervenor cl ai m ed that “[a]s a consequenc e of the fraudulent release of the first mortg ag e and the defe ctive lis pendens
, [i t] actua lly and rea sonably believed that it was purcha sing the [p] roper ty without the first mortg ag e encumbr ance .” Interve nor alleg ed that had it known of the first m o rt gage , it would not have bid at the fore closure sale broug ht by the second mortg ag ee. Additionally
, int er v en o r alleg ed that plaintiff was not licensed as a collection
ag ency under the I llinois Collection Ag ency Ac t (C ollection Act) (225 I L CS 425/1 et s eq. (West 2010)). Acc ording to intervenor
, plaintiff was require d under the Collection Act to be licensed. The ref

ore, inter venor a rgued that plaintiff’ s fore closure a ction was void. ¶ 14 As exhi b i t “A ” t o its motion, intervenor attache d a print out from the Cook County

rec o rd er o f d eeds website. I nterve nor highlig hted the section of the printout wher e the lis pendens was listed on the website. Under the heading “Gr antor/Trust No.” plaintiff’s name appea rs, and under the heading “Gr antee /Trust No.” the name of codef endant Mark L askowski appe ars. The following disclaimer a ppear s at the bottom of the print out:
“While the Cook County Recorde r of Dee ds (CCRD) attempts to ke ep this we bsite
up to date with exis ting law and policies, the CCR D does not g uara ntee the acc urac y of
any of the information contained here i n , i n cl u d ing, but not limit ed to, databa se information and document ima ges

. C CRD also does not guara ntee the leg ality of the do cu m en t s and databa se information contained here in and acc epts no liability for any damag es incurr ed, whe ther directly
, indirectly
, incidental, punit ive or consequential as

a re sult of any

err ors, omissions, or di scre pancie s in any information publ ished on this website or a

ny use of this we bsite, including, but not lim ited to use of on-line f orms or aff idavits.” ¶ 15 As exhibi t “B ,” int erve nor attached a copy of t he lis pen d en s fi l ed by plaintiff. The lis pendens contains a leg al descr iption of the proper ty with the common addre ss of 1106 East Oakton Street, Arling ton Heig hts, I llinois 60004, and states that a mortg ag e fore closure

ac t i o n was filed on J uly 23, 2009. The lis pendens lists the circ uit court case n u m b er an d identifies the par

ties to the case . I t list s Mark L askowski as the titleholder of re cord a nd as the mortg ag or. The mortg ag ee is identified as plaintiff. The date of the mortg ag e is listed as November 14, 2005. Th e Cook County rec order of deeds document number is listed as 0531847023. Under the heading “O t h er P ar ties in Intere st,” the lis pendens lists the d ef endants in the fore closure action, i.e. : “Mar k E. L askowski, The Ba

nk of Commerce, under mortg ag e rec orded as document number 07039080 3 1
, P ac ific Realty Group, L L C, under m em o ra n d um and aff idavit of equitable interest, rec orded as document number 0834555052, nonrec ord cla imants, unknown tenants and unknown owners.” ¶ 16 As exhibi t “C,” intervenor attache d a copy of its motion to vacate the confirmation of the judicial sale e ntere d in case number “ 09 CH 04354,” i.e. the fore closure a ction broug ht by the second mortg ag ee on the subject proper ty

. As exhibi t “D,” intervenor attache d a copy of its ear lier filed response in opposition to plaintiff’s motion for an order approving the repor t of sale a nd distribution and possession. ¶ 17 On November 22, 2011, the circuit court allowed intervenor t o i n terve ne in the matter

-5-and allowe d plaintiff to file re sponsive pleading s. 4

¶ 18 I n response , plaintiff argued that intervenor did not act diligently in this matter and that since intervenor alre ady filed an objection to the confirmation of th e j u d i ci al sale, intervenor ’s motion should be considere d a motion to rec onsider. Fur thermore
, plaintiff

asser ted that it was exempt under section 2.03 of the Collection Act beca use it is a fiduciar

y of a f inancingand lendinginstitution. 225 I L CS 425/ 2.03 (West 2010). ¶ 19 I n reply
, intervenor argued that the circ uit court cannot deter mine as a matter of law that plaintiff is a fiducia

ry of a f inance and lendinginstitution. ¶ 20 At oral arg

ument befor e the circ uit court, the following exchang e occur red betwee n the circ uit court and c ounsel for inter venor: “THE COURT: A ll r ight. *** Wit h reg ard to lis pendens
, what is the purpose of lis pendens ?
MR. FARD [attorney for in te r v e n o r ]: Your Honor, to provide notice to third part[ies]. THE COURT: So someone is chec king the lis pendens , and ther e is indication that there are some other entities or parties or individuals listed. What does that do? Does that not provide notice? MR. FARD: Arguably , y es, your Honor. T here would be construc tive notice.
THE COURT: So the fac t that when y o u chec ked the lis pendens
, if y ou see [pl aintiff] list ed on ther e, wouldn’t that put your client on notice ?
MR. FARD: Had my clients actua lly
, I g uess, downloaded the document and looked
at the lis pe ndens
, y es, they would have a ctual notice a t that time. But I believe we had previously

submitt ed af

fidavits attesting to the fac t that that didn’t occur he re.” ¶ 21 I n response plaintiffs orally argued that the lis pendens was c orre ct and that inter venor should have actua lly checked the lis pendens
, not relied on the Cook County rec order of deed’ s website. ¶ 22 The circuit court de nied interve nor’s mot ion to vaca te t he order confirming the sale of the prope rty . The c ircuit court made the following finding s: “[N]um ber one , there was a lis pendens . The lis pendens did indicate that ther e wa s an entity here when the se arc h was done

. The case s are clea

r that what a lis pendens is supposed to do is put the parties on notice, put the parties on notice that there may or may not possibly be a cloud on the title.
There fore
, at that point in time, once the parties are place d on notice that there may

or may not be a cloud on the title, its incumbent upon the party conducting the sear ch to make a ny inquiries in determiningwhether or not there is a cloud on the title.

I t is unc le ar fr om the re cor d why int ervenor again sou ght an ord er al lowi ng it to int er vene 4 when the ci rc uit cou rt had al re ady al lowe d it to int er vene on Ma y 13, 2010

. I n it s re spo nse , pla int if f
que st ion ed whet her int er venor sho uld be al lowe d to int er vene unde r sec ti on 15- 1501 of the For ecl osu re Law. 735 I LCS 5/1 5- 1501 (W est 2 0 1 0). I nte rvenor , for it s par t, ar gued tha t it had al re ady bee n al lowe d t o i nte rvene in the m at te r.

-6-Her e the pa rties wer e plac ed on notice, give n the fa ct that there was indication that something ha d transpire d prior to the sea rch.” Reg arding whether intervenor had established that plaintiff was a collection ag ency subject to the Collection Act, the circ uit court made the following finding : “He re it hasn’t been established whether or not [pl aintiff] rea lly is a collection ag ency

or not. There ’s no indication that it’s reg istered as a collection ag ency with the Secre tary of State or with any other entity in the state with reg ard to how [pl aintiff] conducts itself. What has been prese nted in the pleading s is that [pl aintiff] is a service r. I t’s a service r of the loan. Now, no evidenc e has been established to ind i ca t e t h at the servicing of the loan is related to a collection ag ency or define d as a collection ag ency

. I t’s mere ly servicing the loan. And that’s the e ntity that’s in front of this Court with reg ard to this matter.” ¶ 23 On Marc h 30, 2012, this court allowed intervenor to file a late notice of appea l. On April 4, 2012, intervenor

filed its notice of a

ppeal.

¶ 24 ANALYSI S ¶ 25 Be fore this court, intervenor argues that the circ uit court err ed when it denied its motion
to vaca te t h e confirmation of sale. As support, intervenor arg ues that plaintiff failed to reg ister as a collection ag ency under the Collection Act, and that plaintiff filed a defe ctive lis pendens

. In respo n se, plaintiff argues that it is exempt from the require ments of the Collection Act and that it filed a proper lis penden s i n this matter. W e allowed plaintiff t o supplement its brief and to include additional authority

. Interve nor did not file a reply brief 5 befor e this court. ¶ 26 I nitially
, we must make note of the s t at e of the rec ord in this case

. There appea r to be
many inconsistencies in the rec ord, many of the pleading s appear t o b e o u t of order
, and pleading s or orders m ay be mi ssing from the record. For ex am p l e, i n t ervenor opposed the motion to confirm the sale and fil ed responsive pleading s. Absent from the rec ord is any transcr ipt of what occur

red at the hear ing, if there even was a hear ing, or whether the circ uit
court ruled on the issues brought up in intervenor ’s response

. The rec ord only shows that on September 26, 2011, the circ uit court enter ed the order confirming the judicial sale. I t is also unclea r why intervenor repe atedly motioned to be allowed to intervene even t h o u gh the circ uit court had allowed it to do so as ear ly as May 13, 2010, albeit under a differ ent attorney

. We remind i nterve nor t h at i t i s the burden of t he appellant to prese nt a complete

rec o rd o f p ro ce eding s. In re Marriage of Gulla
, 234 I ll. 2d 414, 422 (2009). Further more, “[a]ny doubts which may arise from the completene ss of the rec ord will be resolved ag ainst the appe llant.” Foutch v. O ’Bryant , 99 I ll. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). ¶ 27 Additionally
, we must addre ss the proce dural posture of this case , an issue neither pa rty addre ssed in its briefs bef ore this cour

t. We do so now beca

use it ha s direc t be aring on our

We not e that pla int if

f’ s ini ti al bri ef

was fi le d by the la w of

fi ce of I ra T . Nev el , LLC. T he 5
sup ple m ent al br ie f, h owever, was fi le d by the la w fi rm of Noon an a nd Li ebe rman.

-7-analy sis of the issue at hand. I nterve nor broug ht its motion to vacate pursuant to se ction 2- 1301(e) of the Code, which provides “[t] he court may in its discretion, befor e final order or judgme nt, set aside any defa ult, a nd may on motion filed within 30 day s afte r entry there of
set aside any final order or judgme nt upon any terms and conditions that shall be rea sonable.” 735 I L CS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2010). To prove i t had a meritorious claim, intervenor additionally argued “justice was not otherwise done” acc ording to section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw. Sec tion 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw pr ovides, in releva nt part: “Upon motion and notice in acc ordanc e with court rules applicable to motions g ener ally
, which motion shall not be made prior to sale, the court shall conduct a hear ing to confirm the sale. Unless the court finds that (i) a notice required in accor dance with subsection (c) of Section 15-1507 was not g iven, (ii) the terms of sale wer e unconsciona ble, (iii) the sale was conducte d fraudulently
, or (iv) that justice was otherwise not done, the court shall then enter

an orde r conf

irming the sale.” 735 I L CS 5/ 15-1508(b) (West 2010). ¶ 28 A panel of this court held that relief acc ording to section 2-1301(e ) of the Code was not available to a defe ndant seeking to vac at e a confirmation of a sale. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Barnes
, 406 I ll. App. 3d 1, 4-5 (2010). The Barnes court held, rathe r, that the defe ndant could only proce ed under section 1 5 -1 5 0 8(b) of the For eclosure L aw, a nd rea soned: “The For eclosure L aw g overns the mode of p ro cedur e for mortg ag e fore closures in I llinois [citation]
, and ‘any inconsistent statutory provisions shall not be applicable ’ (735 I L CS 5/15-1107(a ) (West 2008)). Sec tion 15- 1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw provides that, afte r the fore closure judgme nt a nd judicial sale, the circ uit c ourt shall confirm the sale unless the court finds that (i) a requi re d n o t i ce was not g iven, (ii ) t he terms of t he sale were unconscionable
, (iii) the s ale was conducte d fra udulently
, or (iv) th at justice

was otherwise not done. 735 I L CS 5/15-1508(b) (W es t 2008). Be cause section 15- 1508(b) limit s the court’s discretio n t o ref use confirmation of the sale to those four specifie d g rounds, it is more restric tive than and, thus, inconsist en t wi th section 2- 1301(e) of the Code. I f section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw did not pre vail over section 2-1301(e ) of the Code, then the latter would evisce rate the former beca use parties could thwart section 15-1508(b) by filing petitions t o v acate nonfinal judgme nts even afte r fore closure sales have been held. Such a prac tice would undermine the sale proce ss beca use bidders would have no confide nce that sales would be co n fi rm ed. There fore
, defe ndant could not utiliz e section 2-1301(e ) of the Code to circ umvent section 15- 1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw afte r [pl aintiff] filed its motion to approve the sale.” Id. at 4-5. ¶ 29 Rece ntly
, the S ec o n d Di s t ri ct o f t h is court disag ree d with this district’s holding in Barnes. W

ells Fargo Bank, N.A. v

. McCluske y , 2012 I L App (2d) 110961, appeal allowed
, No. 115469 (I ll. Mar. 27, 2013). The Second District, in McCluske y , held t hat a section 2- 1301(e) motio n m ay be enter tained by the circ uit court even afte r the judicial sale of a proper ty has occur

red. Id. ¶ 14. In ruling as it did, the Se cond District relied upon its own decision in Merc hants Bank v. Roberts
, 292 I ll. App. 3d 925 (1997), and on the languag e of section 15-1107(a ) of the For eclosure L aw. McCluske y , 2012 I L App (2d) 110961, ¶¶ 11-13. After revie wing the above authorities, we find no rea son to depar t with our o wn d i s t rict’s

-8-decision in B a r n es that the proper avenue to challeng e the confor mation of sale is under section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw. Unlike the Second District in McCluske y , we do
not believe Roberts direc tly addre ssed whether s ec tion 2-1301(e ) of the Code could be utiliz ed to circ umvent section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw. Rather, the Roberts court analy zed the issue as a section 2-1301(e ) motion, but then rema nded the matter “for a hear ing in acc ordanc e with the provisions of section 15-1508” of the For eclosure L aw. Roberts
, 292 I ll. App. 3d at 932. The Roberts court, there fore
, did not answe r whether there was a conflict betwee n section 2-1301( e) of the Code and section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw. Id. The McCluske

ycourt a lso held that the Barnes court improper ly relied upon the following lang uag e in sec tion 15-1107(a) of the F orec losure L aw: “ ‘I f a mortg ag e lien is being fore closed under this Article and one o r m o re n o n

mortg ag e liens or encumbr ance s is being fore closed or enfor ced in the same proce eding s, reg ardle ss of the respe cti v e p riorities of the various liens or encumbr ance s, the
proce dures and all other provisions of this Article shall g overn such proce eding s, and any inconsistent statutory provisions shall not be applicable .’ ” McCluske y , 2012 I L App (2d) 110961, ¶ 12 (quoting735 I L CS 5/ 15-1107(a ) (West 2008)).
The McCluske

y court rea soned t h at “[ n]either in Barnes nor in this case wer e any nonmortg ag e liens or encumbr ance s at issue. Thus, the Barnes court’s relianc e on section 15- 1107(a) was misplaced.” Id. Although it appea rs that the Barnes court d i d q u o t e from the above cited languag e in section 15-1107(a ) of the For eclosure L aw, the McCluske y court failed to c ite the final sente nce of section 15-1107( a), which provides: “Without limit ing the fore g oing, any provision of Article XI I or any other Article of the Code of Civil Procedur e shall apply unless inconsistent with this Article and, in case of such inconsistency
, shall not be applicable to actions under this Article.” 735 I L CS 5/15- 1107(a) (West 2008).
Ba sed on the final sentenc e of section 15-1107(a ) of the For eclosure L aw, we believe section 15-1107(a ) does pr ovide the nec essar y languag e for

the holding in Barnes. ¶ 30 We further find support for the rationale contained in the Barnes decision in our supreme court’s opinion in Household Bank, FSB v. Lewis
, 229 I ll. 2d 173, 178-79 (2008). Although the issue decide d in Lewis is differ ent from the issue prese ntly befor e us, our supreme court did hold that the word “shall” in section 15 -1 5 0 8 (b ) o f the For eclosure L aw mandated obligations on the circ uit court upon motion of confirma tion of a judicial sale. Id. at 178. Our
supreme court rea soned, “a court *** has mandatory obligations to (a) conduct a hear ing on confirmation of a judicial sale wher e a motion to confirm has been made and notice has been
g iven, and, (b) following the hear ing, to c onfirm the sale unless it finds that any of the four specifie d exceptions are prese nt.” Id

. Fur thermore
, our supreme court held that a motion
reque sting confirma

tion of a judicial sale invokes the mandatory require ments of section 15- 1508(b) of the For eclosure L aw. Id. In this case , as plaintiff alre ady invoked the mandatory requi re m ents of section 15-1508(b)
, it follows that the circ uit court must look to the require ments of section 15-1508(b) of the For eclosu re L aw to vacate a confirmation of a judicial sale. ¶ 31 Acc ording ly
, we agree with the Ba r n es d ec i s i o n t h at s ec t i o n 1 5 -1 508(b) of the

-9-For eclosure L aw is the proper avenue for a par ty , such as intervenor in this case , to utiliz e afte r section 15-1508(b) has been invoked. To the extent that McCluske y conflicts with our holding in this case, we respe ctfully decline to f

ollow it. S ee O’Casek v. C hildren’s Home & Aid Society of

Illinois
, 229 I ll. 2d 421, 440 (2008) (under the doctrine of stare decisis, “the opinion of one district, division, or panel of the appellate court is not binding on ot h er districts, divisions, or panels”). Theref ore, in this matter we will only addre ss intervenor’ s arguments conce rning section 15-1508( b) of the For eclosure L aw. We note that intervenor has only argu ed t h at justice was not done under section 15-1508(b) (iv) (735 I L CS 5/15- 1508(b)( iv) (West 2010) ) beca use of an alleg ed defe ctive lis pe ndens and beca use plaintiff alleg edly failed to reg ister under the Collection Act. Interve nor did not alleg e that notice of the sale was improper, that “the terms of the sale wer e unconsciona ble” or that “the sale was conducte d fra

udulently ” under section 15-1508( b )(i) throug h (iii) of the For eclosure L aw. 735 I L CS 5/ 15-1508(b) (i)-( iii) (West 2010). ¶ 32 Circuit courts are g iven broad discretion in confirming or reje cting judicial sales. Lewis
, 229 I ll. 2d at 178. Absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the circ uit c ourt’s decision whether to confirm a judi ci al s al e. Id

. A motion reque sting confirmation of a judicial sale invokes the ma ndatory require ments of sec tion 15-1508(b) of the F orec losure L aw. Lewis
, 229 I ll. 2d at 179. An interested party seeking to oppose the judicial sale bear s the burden of proving that sufficie nt g rounds exis t to disapprove of a judicial sale. Sewickle y, LLC v. Chicago Titl e Land Trust Co.
, 2012 I L App (1st) 112977, ¶ 35. An abuse of discretion occur s when t h e circuit court’s ruling is unrea sonable, fanc iful or arbitra ry , or wher e no rea sonable person would ag ree with the view of the circ uit court. Blum v. Koster
, 235 I ll. 2d 21, 36 (2009). Wit h these principles in mind, we will now addre ss whether justice

was done in acc ordanc e with section 15-1508(b) (iv) of the For eclosure L aw (735 I L CS 5/15- 1508(b)( iv) (West 2010)) ba sed on the foll owing rea sons, as prese nted by intervenor

in its motion to vacate: wh et her plaintiff failed to obtain a license under the Collection Act and whether plaintiff filed a

defe ctive lis pendens

.

¶ 33 Collection Act ¶ 34 I nterve nor first argues that the confirma tion of the judicial sale must be vacated bec ause plaintiff failed to reg ister as a collection ag ency under the Collection Act and failed to prove it was exempt from doing so. 225 I L CS 425/1 et seq. (West 2010). Pl ai ntiff responds that intervenor cannot avail itself of any relief under the Collection Act due to a lack of a “debtor /cre ditor nexus” betwee n i t an d p l aintiff. Specifica lly
, intervenor is a third party bidder at a junior mortg ag ee’ s judicial fore closure sale and was not a customer of plaintiff’s. Fur thermore
, plaintiff arg

ues that it is exempt, under section 2.03, from the Collection Act. 225 I L CS 425/2.03 (West 2010). In its supplemental brief, plaintiff asser ts that it is licensed under the Residential Mortg ag e L icense Act of 1987, specific ally as a service r under section 1-4(q) . 205 I L CS 635/ 1-1 et seq. (West 2010). ¶ 35 Section 2.03 of the Collection Act pr ovides, in releva nt part: “This Act doe s not apply

to persons whose c ollection activities are confine d to and ar e direc tly related to the operation of a business other than that of a collection ag ency , and

-10-specific ally does not include the f

ollowing:
1. Ba nks, including trust depar tments, aff

iliates, and subsidiaries t h ereof, fiduciar ies, and financ ing and lending instit utions (except those who own or operate collection ag encie s);
* * *
8. L oan and f

inance companies[.]” 225 I L CS 425/ 2.03 (West 2010).
I nterve nor, both in its briefs befor e this court and be fore the circ uit c ourt, appea rs to arg ue that plaintiff bear s the burden of proving that the Collection Act does not apply to it. Be fore 6 this court, intervenor

argues that “assuming loan servicing is equivalent to debt collec tion, [p] laintiff is require d to reg ister under the Colle ct i o n Age n cy Act.” We reiter ate that an interested party seeking to oppose a judicial sal e, such as intervenor in this case , bear s the burden of proving that sufficie nt g rounds exis t to disapprove of a judicial sale. Sewickle y, LLC
, 2012 I L App (1st) 112977, ¶ 35. We hold that intervenor has failed to meet its burden here

. I nterve nor prese nted no evidenc e that plaintiff, as the service r of the loan, is not exempt from the Collection Act un d er s ec t ion 2.03. 225 I L CS 425/2.03 (West 2010). Simi larly
, intervenor prese nted no evidenc e that plaintiff is even subject to the Collec t i on Act. We
ag ree with the circ uit court’s finding s that intervenor failed to establish that plaintiff is rea lly

a collection agen cy and failed to prese nt any evidenc e that indicated that loan servicing is related to the ac tions of a collection ag ency

. Ba sed on this lack of evide nce, w e ca nnot say the circ uit court abused its discretion when it discounted intervenor ’s asser tion that plaintiff failed to re g ister as a

collection ag ency

under the Collection Act.

¶ 36 Lis Pendens ¶ 37 I nterve nor argues that plaintiff filed a defe ctive lis pendens
, which in turn led the Cook County rec order of deeds to incorre ctly list the lis p en den s on its website. Acc ording to intervenor
, the lis pendens is defe ctive beca use it listed, al b ei t under the heading “[o] ther parties of interest,” the second mortg age o n the proper ty , which it char acte rizes as “unre quired [ sic ].” After se arc hing the Cook County rec order of dee ds website, interve nor

succe ssfully

bid at a judicial for eclosure sale conducte d by the second mortg ag ee, which it inadver tently believed to hold the f

irst mortga g e on the pr operty

. ¶ 38 I n response , plaintiff argues that a revie w of the lis pendens it filed in this case meets the require ments of section 15-1503 of the For eclosure L aw (735 I L CS 5/15-1503 (West 2010)), and that it was intervenor ’s duty in this case to actua lly examine the lis pendens
, not to rely solely on the Cook County

rec order of dee ds’ website. ¶ 39 Section 15-1503 of the For eclosure L aw g overns the filing of lis pendens in m o rt gage fore closure a ctions, and it provides in rele vant par t:

At o ra l a rgum ent bef

ore th is cou rt , co uns el fo r i nte rvenoradmitt ed t hat it hadth e bu rde n 6 of sho wing tha t grounds exi s t e d t o vacat e the con fi rmati on of the sal e. Couns el
, however
, was dis cus si ng it s bur den in con te xt of pro cee din g unde r sec ti on 2- 1301 (e ) of the Code. 735 I LCS 5/2

- 1301 (e ) ( We st 201 0).

-11-“(a ) A notice of fore closure, whether the fore closure is initiated by complaint or counter claim, made in acc ordanc e with this Section and rec orded in the county in which the m ortg ag ed real estate is located shall be co nstructive noti ce of the pendency of t he fore closure to e very person claiming an intere st in or lien on the mortg ag ed rea l e state, whose i n t er es t or lien has not been rec orded prior to the rec ording of such notice of fore closure. Such notice of fore closure must be executed by any part y or any party ’s attorney and shall include (i) the names of all plaintiffs and the case number, (ii) the court in which the action was brought, (iii) the names a nd title holders of rec ord, (iv) a lega l descr iption of the re al estate sufficie nt to identify it with rea sonable cer tainty
, (v) a

common addre ss or description of t he location of t he real estate and (vi) ident i fi ca t ion of the mortg ag e soug ht to be fore closed. An incorre ct common addre ss or descr iption of the loca t i o n , o r an immaterial err or in the identification of a plaintiff or title holder of

rec ord, shall not invalidate t h e l i s p endens eff ect of the notice under this Section. A notice with this section shall be deemed to comply with section 2-1901 of t he C ode of Civil Procedur e and shall have the same eff ect as a notice filed pursuant to that Section; howeve r, a notice which complies with Sec tion 2- 1901 shall not be constructive notice unless it also complies w it h the require ments of this Section.” 735 I L CS 5/15-1503 (West 2010). ¶ 40 Our review o f t h e l is pendens filed in this case , as attache d to intervenor ’s motion to

vacate the confirmation of the sale, shows that plaintiff complied with all aspec ts of section 15-1503 of the For eclosure L aw. 735 I L CS 5/15-1503 (West 2010). The lis pendens lists the mortg ag e at issue in this case as the mortg ag e to be fore closed and lists the second mortg ag e under the title “[o] ther parties of interest.” I t appea rs that intervenor relied solely on the Cook County rec order of deeds’ website instead of actua lly revie wing the l i s pendens itself. Counsel for intervenor admitted as much at o ra l argume nt befor e the circ uit court, stating “had my clients ac tually , Ig uess, downloade d the document a nd looked at the lis pendens
, y es, t h ey would have actual notice at t hat t ime. But I believe we had previously submitt ed aff idavits attesting to the fac t that that didn’t occur here .” We will no t v ac ate the 7 confirmation of a judicial sale at the insistence of an interested party whose complained- of

err or was the result of its own neg lige nce. Blancett v. T a yl o r , 6 I ll. 2d 434, 438 (1955) (“c ourts will not ref

use to confirm a judicial sale at the instance of an interested party , wher e the mat t er co m p lained of is the result of his own conduct or neg lige nce” ). There fore
, intervenor has also failed t o s h o w t h at the lis pendens filed in this matter was sufficie nt g rounds to vacate the conf irmation of sale. ¶ 41 Over all, intervenor failed to car ry its burd en of proving that sufficie nt g rounds exist ed
to vaca te t he conf

irmation of sale in this case

. Sewickle y, LLC , 2012 I L App (1st) 112977, ¶ 35. Specifica lly
, intervenor failed to s h o w that “justice was otherwise not done” in the judicial sale in acc ordan ce with section 15-1508(b) (iv) of the For eclosure L aw. 735 I L CS 5/15-1508(b)( iv) (West 2010)

. Acc ording ly
, we hold that the circ uit c ourt did not abuse its discretion in deny

ing inter venor’ s motion t o vacate the conf irmation of the sale

.

T he r eco rd is devoid of

any suc h af

fi davit s. 7

-12-¶ 42 CONCL USI ON

¶ 43 The judg ment of the c ircuit court is af firmed.

¶ 44 Affir

med.

-13-