IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SANDRA V. BOYD,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No. 12 C 2786

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Sandra Boyd (hereinafter, “Boyd” or “Plaintiff”)

asks this Court to reverse or remand the Commissioner of Social

Security’s conclusion that she is not disabled. For the reasons

stated herein, the Court declines to do so. As such, the Court

denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Prior to 2008, Sandra Boyd worked as a check processor, data

entry clerk, school food service provider, and day-care provider. 

She claims that she stopped working in early 2008 after she

slipped on ice in December 2007 and tore her rotator cuff. 

On June 20, 2008, Boyd underwent arthroscopic surgery to

repair her shoulder. Since that time, she has been diagnosed

and/or treated for: carpel tunnel syndrome, asthma, arthritis,

depression, bilateral median neuropathy at the wrist, herniated
discs at the neck, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, coronary

artery disease, a myocardial infarction, and Raynaud’s

phenomenon. 

The medical evidence in this case is voluminous and relates

to several impairments. Boyd claims that her case hinges on the

Administrative Law Judge’s (the “ALJ”) evaluation of her hand and

thumb impairments and her carpal tunnel syndrome. In light of

this, the Court focuses its attention on these impairments, and

summarizes Boyd’s other medical conditions only briefly.

A. Boyd’s Medical History

Shortly after Boyd injured her rotator cuff in late 2007,

she visited her primary physician, Dr. Daniel Montalvo. At this

time, Dr. Montalvo ordered an MRI and referred Boyd to Dr. Jay

Booker for further assessment and treatment. 

On December 26, 2007, Dr. Booker diagnosed Boyd with severe

impingement to the right shoulder. He performed a subacromial

injection and began physical therapy. Despite this treatment,

Boyd reported minimal improvement. Because of this, Dr. Booker

referred Boyd to Dr. Gregory Primus, an orthopedic specialist. 

After Dr. Primus examined Boyd, he recommended arthroscopic

surgery, which he performed on June 20, 2008. 

After her surgery, Boyd continued to report pain and

stiffness in her shoulder, neck and arms. Due to these

complaints, Dr. Primus ordered a Nerve Conduction Study which was

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administered on December 22, 2008. The study revealed mild to

moderate carpal tunnel syndrome. 

In February 2009, Dr. Primus ordered an MRI of Boyd’s

cervical spine. The MRI revealed disc herniation and disc

protrusions. After reviewing the MRI, Dr. Primus referred Boyd

to Dr. Mark Chang, a physician at Midwest SpineCare.

On March 3, 2009, Dr. Chang examined Boyd and reviewed her

MRI. He then recommended injection treatments for the herniated

discs. Boyd reported that these treatments provided her only

minimal relief. 

On April 18, 2009, Boyd suffered a heart attack while

undergoing the placement of stents in her right coronary artery. 

She went through cardiac rehab from July 2009 to October 2009. 

The medical records reveal that by June 2009 Boyd demonstrated

substantial improvement and by September 2010, Boyd had good

exercise capacity. At this time, she denied any chest pain or

shortness of breath. 

Also, in September 2010, Boyd was diagnosed with benign

essential hypertension. This is a mild condition with minimal

treatment and has little effect on Boyd’s ability to perform work

related tasks. The same is true with respect to Boyd’s diabetes

mellitus. 

During the time Plaintiff was recovering from her myocardial

infarction, she continued to see Dr. Primus for her shoulder pain

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and carpal tunnel syndrome. In April 2010, Boyd continued to

complain about pain in her hands. On April 27, 2010, Dr. Primus

noted edema (a large amount of fluid) in Boyd’s right hand. On

June 17, 2010, Boyd again saw Dr. Primus and continued to

complain about hand pain. Because of this, he ordered her to

wear a splint. 

On November 19, 2010, Boyd had another appointment with Dr.

Primus. She claims she told him that she was getting weaker, but

denied having numbness or tingling in her hands. Dr. Primus then

referred Boyd to Dr. Robert Coats, a hand specialist.

Dr. Coats examined Boyd’s hand x-rays and determined that

Boyd had bilateral CMC arthritis. Dr. Coats noted that Boyd had

obliteration of joint space, but was “clinically . . . doing

quite well.” Pl.’s Memo. in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J. at 6. 

In March 2011, Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Dr. 

Montalvo completed a medical source statement for Boyd. In the

report, Dr. Montalvo noted that Boyd’s diagnosis included

Raynaud’s phenomenon and that her ability to handle and

manipulate objects was “OK.” Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for

Summ. J. at 4. 

In April 2011, Boyd saw Dr. Coats for a follow-up visit. At

this time, Dr. Coats noted that Boyd’s x-rays revealed

significant arthritic changes. His notes further indicated that

Boyd reported she experienced pain with certain activities, but

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was “able to do most things without too much discomfort.” ECF

No. 9-13, Page ID # 843. 

B. Procedural History

On June 10, 2008, Boyd applied to the Social Security

Administration (the “Administration”) for Social Security

Disability benefits alleging a disability onset date of May 27,

2008. 

After a hearing, in February 2010, Administrative Law Judge

Patrick Nagle (“ALJ Nagle”) determined Boyd was not disabled. 

She appealed the decision. Ultimately, the Appeals Council

granted Boyd’s request for review and vacated ALJ Nagle’s

decision. 

In September 2011, a new hearing was held before

Administrative Law Judge Curt Marceille (“ALJ Marceille” or “the

ALJ”). In October 2011, ALJ Marceille issued a decision denying

Plaintiff’s claim. Again, Boyd appealed. However, this time the

Appeals Council denied review, rendering ALJ Marceille’s decision

final. 

On April 16, 2012, Boyd initiated the instant suit in this

Court. In her Complaint, she contends that the decision of ALJ

Marceille was erroneous. She requests that this Court reverse

the decision and find her disabled. 

On November 9, 2012, Boyd filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment. In her Motion, she argues she is entitled to judgment

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because (1) ALJ Marceille’s decision was unsupported by

substantial evidence; (2) ALJ Marceille selectively omitted

evidence favorable to Plaintiff; (3) ALJ Marceille erred in

finding that Boyd’s hand and thumb problems were not severe; (4)

the Appeals Council erred in failing to remand the case on

grounds of new and material evidence; and (5) ALJ Marceille’s

credibility finding was erroneous and unsupported by substantial

evidence. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court’s role in the instant action is limited to

ensuring that ALJ Marceille applied the correct legal standard

and had substantial evidence to support his decision. See

Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cri. 2004). 

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.

Because an ALJ “is in the best position to determine the

credibility of witnesses,” this Court affords the ALJ’s

credibility determinations “considerable deference” and only

overturns such determinations if they are patently wrong. Craft

v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008); Prochaska v.

Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006).

Disabled is defined as the inability “to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

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determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted and can be expected to

last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. To evaluate a disability claim, an ALJ

must use the five-step analysis in 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). If

a claimant is found “not disabled” at any step, the inquiry ends

and the claim is denied. Id. 

At Step One, a claimant is not disabled if she is currently

performing substantial gainful activity. Dixon v. Massanari, 270

F.3d 1171, 1776 (7th Cir. 2001). At Step Two, a claimant is not

disabled unless she has a “severe” medical impairment. Id. At

Step Three, a claimant is disabled if her impairments meet or

equal the listings at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. If

they do not, the analysis continues. Before proceeding to Step

Four, the ALJ determines a claimant’s Residual Functional

Capacity (“RFC”); that is, what work she can do despite her

limits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). At this stage, the ALJ

considers all record evidence and all of the claimant’s

impairments, severe or not. Id. At Step Four, a claimant is not

disabled if she has the RFC to perform her past work. Dixon, 270

F.3d at 1176. At Step Five, a claimant is not disabled if she

can do any work in the national economy based on her RFC, age,

education, work experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(g).

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An ALJ must consider all relevant evidence and may not

“cherry-pick” only facts that indicate non-disability; however,

he need not discuss every piece of evidence. Goble v. Astrue,

385 Fed. Appx. 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2010). That is, the ALJ must

“build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his

conclusion.” McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir.

2011). 

On review, this Court critically reviews the evidence, but

does not reweigh it, resolve conflicts, or substitute its own

judgment for the Commissioner’s. McKinzey, 641 F.3d at 889. 

Because this Court reviews only a cold record, an ALJ’s

credibility findings receive special deference. Castile v.

Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2010). However, mere

boilerplate determinations do not suffice. Punzio v. Astrue, 630

F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2011). Finally, review is limited to the

ALJ opinion’s stated rationale. Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d

299, 306. 

III. DISCUSSION

At Step One of his decision, ALJ Marceille concluded that

Boyd did not engage in any substantial gainful activity between

May 27, 2008 and October 6, 2011. At Step Two, he found four

severe impairments: asthma, bilateral rotator cuff tear,

cervical herniated disc, and the status of Boyd’s right shoulder

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after her surgery. He noted that these conditions impose “more

than minimal limitations” on Boyd’s ability to work. He then

concluded that Boyd’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed

impairment, and proceeded to determine her RFC.

After considering Boyd’s medical records and testimony, ALJ

Marceille found that Boyd’s impairments “could reasonably be

expected to cause” the symptoms Boyd complained of, but found her

statements concerning the “intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects” of the symptoms lacked merit. ECF No. 9-3; Page ID #

46. He then determined that Boyd has the RFC “to perform light

work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b).” ECF No. 9-3; Page ID

# 49. 

In finding credibility issues with Boyd’s allegations, ALJ

Marceille compared her testimony regarding her physical

limitations with the evidence of her work history, medical

records, and daily living activities. In doing so, the ALJ found

a number of inconsistencies. For example, while Boyd claimed

repeatedly that she endured disabling hand pain, the record

indicated that Boyd admitted she was able to “watch television,

shop, clean, wash dishes, sweep, drive, exercise, attend church,

and go the mall.” Id. The ALJ determined that performing these

activities was inconsistent with the reported physical

limitations. 

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Boyd attacks the ALJ’s ruling on five points. First, she

argues that ALJ Marceille’s decision was unsupported by

substantial evidence. Second, she claims the ALJ omitted

favorable evidence. Third, she contends that it was erroneous to

find that her hand and thumb ailments were not severe. Next, she

argues that the Appeals Council erred in failing to remand the

case. Finally, Boyd claims that the ALJ’s credibility finding

was erroneous. The Court considers each issue in turn.

A. Substantial Evidence

Plaintiff argues that ALJ Marceille’s determination that her

hand and thumb impairments were not a severe impairment was a

finding unsupported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Boyd

argues that the ALJ placed too great an emphasis on a report by

Boyd’s primary care physician, Dr. Montalvo. Boyd argues Dr.

Montalvo’s April 2011 statement that Boyd’s ability to grasp,

handle, or manipulate objects was “OK” cannot provide substantial

evidence that Boyd’s hand and thumb condition is non-severe. If

this were the only evidence on which the ALJ relied the Court may

agree; however, this is not the case. 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions that the ALJ relied too

heavily on Dr. Montalvo’s reports, in his opinion, the ALJ noted

that he gave only “minimal weight” to Dr. Montalvo’s assessment. 

ECF No. 9-3; Page ID # 50. He noted that since Dr. Montalvo was

only a general internist and not a specialist, and only saw Boyd

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for acute problems, his opinion was not afforded as much weight

as Boyd’s treating surgeon, Dr. Gregory Primus. See id. at Page

ID # 51. Indeed, when finding Boyd’s thumb and hand ailments

non-severe, the ALJ also relied on the 2009 report from Dr.

Primus which indicated that Boyd could participate “unrestricted

in work, sports, and gym activity . . . [.]” Id. 

“A treating physician’s opinion regarding the nature and

severity of a medical condition is entitled to controlling weight

if it is well supported by medical findings and not inconsistent

with other substantial evidence in the record.” Clifford v.

Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the ALJ did not

simply “substitute his own judgment” for one of Boyd’s

physicians, and ignore the medical evidence. Id. Instead, the

ALJ considered both Dr. Primus’ report and Dr. Montalvo’s opinion

in making his determination. Moreover, this assessment is

consistent with Dr. Coats’ treatment notes, and with the report

from Dr. David Mack, (the reviewing physician from the state

agency). See generally, ECF No. 9-3, Page ID # 50. Therefore,

the Court rejects Boyd’s contention that the ALJ’s decision was

against substantial evidence. 

B. Omission of Favorable Evidence

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored favorable

evidence. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s failure to discuss any

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of the records regarding Boyd’s treatment of her hand and thumb

problems constitutes reversible error. 

“An ALJ may not selectively consider medical reports,

especially those of treating physicians, but must consider all

relevant evidence.” Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir.

2009). Boyd argues that the only record the ALJ discussed

regarding Boyd’s hand and thumb impairments was one entry from

Dr. Coats that indicated Boyd was doing well after she received

an injection. However, after reviewing the ALJ’s decision and

the medical records from Dr. Coats, the Court disagrees. 

First, Boyd concedes that the ALJ’s decision stated that

Boyd’s medical records revealed “complaints of numbness and

tingling due to mild to moderate carpal tunnel syndrome,” and

that in April 2011, Boyd had “X-rays of the bilateral thumbs

[which] showed significant arthritic changes . . . [.]” ECF No.

9-3; Page ID # 43. Plaintiff complains that the ALJ failed to

include the language from the April 2011 report that indicated

that Boyd had “complete obliteration of the joint space with the

subluxation of the metacarpal base.” Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot.

Summ. J. at 11. While Court acknowledges that this line is not

included in the ALJ’s decision, “the ALJ is not required to

discuss every piece of evidence.” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d

503, 516 (7th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the phrase “arthritic

change” describes abnormalities to the joints and the ALJ

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included in his decision that Dr. Coats’ report noted significant

arthritic changes. ECF No. 9-3; Page ID # 43. Thus, this is not

a case where the ALJ “ignored an entire line of evidence that is

contrary to [] [his] findings” or only mentioned “the medical

evidence favoring the denial of benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter,

245 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the Court rejects

Plaintiff’s argument that ALJ Marceille’s decision should be

reversed because he omitted evidence favorable to Boyd. 

C. The Severity of Boyd’s Hand or Thumb Impairment

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in finding Boyd’s

hand and thumb problems and her heart attack were not severe. 

The Commissioner responds that this argument is legally

irrelevant since the ALJ found that Boyd had at least one severe

impairment. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that the ALJ determined that Boyd

had four severe impairments - a bilateral rotator cuff tear,

asthma, a cervical herniated disc, and the status of Boyd’s right

shoulder after her surgery. After making this determination the

ALJ considered “the impact of all impairments – severe or not

severe” on Boyd’s ability to work. Curtis v. Astrue, 623

F.Supp.2d 957, 968 (S.D. Ind. 2009). The analysis at this point

included a discussion of Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome,

hypertension, myocardial infarction, and the history of coronary

artery disease. See ECF No. 9-3; Page ID # 43. Because of this,

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the Court finds the ALJ evaluated all relevant evidence - severe

or not - and therefore did not commit reversible error because he

failed to label Boyd’s hand and heart impairments as severe. See

Curtis, 623 F.Supp.2d at 968 (finding “[a]s long as the ALJ

proceeds beyond step two, . . . no reversible error could result

solely from his failure to label a single impairment as

‘severe.’); see also Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th

Cir. 2012) (stating that courts uphold an ALJ’s decision if the

evidence supports the decision and the ALJ analyzes a claimant’s

impairments in combination). 

D. Appeals Council & Failure to Remand

Plaintiff contends that the Appeals Council erred in failing

to remand her case because of new and material evidence. 

Plaintiff points to a January 2011 assessment from Dr. Coats

which states that the pain Boyd suffers from her bilateral thumb

arthritis limits here ability to grasp or pinch objects. See ECF

No. 9-13; Page ID # 850. Plaintiff relies on Farrell v. Astrue

to support her argument. Farrell v. Astrue, 692 F.3d 767 (7th

Cir. 2012). 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides that a reviewing court may

consider additional evidence “only upon a showing that there is

new evidence which is material.” The Seventh Circuit has held

that when reviewing the decision from the Appeals Council to

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reject a claimant’s appeal, a district court should examine

whether the Appeals Council made an error in applying regulations

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470. However, “[i]n the absence of

any such error . . . the Council’s decision whether to review is

discretionary and unreviewable.” Farrell, 692 F.3d at 771. 

In denying Boyd’s appeal, the Appeals Council stated that it

examined Boyd’s case, the reasons she disagreed with the ALJ’s

decision and the additional evidence she submitted. The Appeals

Council found that the “information [] [did] not provide a basis

for changing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.” ECF No.

9-3; Page ID # 29. 

In Farrell, the Seventh Circuit determined that this

language, while ambiguous, is indicative of a finding that the

Appeals Council determined that the additional evidence is not

new or material. Id. at 771-73. Thus, this Court now must

examine whether this determination was erroneous. 

Even assuming that Plaintiff can establish that Dr. Coats’

January 2011 medical assessment constitutes new evidence, the

Court does not find this evidence material. See Schmidt v.

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating “[n]ew

evidence is “material” if there is a “reasonable probability”

that the ALJ would have reached a different conclusion had the

evidence been considered”).

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While Plaintiff argues that the language in the assessment

regarding Boyd’s limited ability to pinch and grasp objects would

have changed the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff fails to take into

account the other remarks in the assessment that support the

ALJ’s decision. For example, the assessment notes that with

treatment, Boyd’s hand condition has improved. ECF No. 9-13;

Page ID # 850. Moreover, the assessment indicates that Dr. Coats

believes Boyd can walk, stand or sit for an 8 hour work day and

reveals that Boyd has no restrictions on occasionally lifting 10

pounds or carrying objects. This evidence supports a finding

that Boyd’s hand ailments were not severe and that Boyd could

perform “light work” as defined in the regulations. 

In addition, Dr. Coats’ subsequent April 2011 report states

that Boyd was doing well clinically and that she reported that

“although it hurts with certain activities, more so on the left

than the right; she is able to do most things without too much

discomfort.” ECF No. 9-13; Page ID # 843. 

Thus, after examining Plaintiff’s new evidence in its

entirety, the Court does not find there to be a reasonable

probability that it would have changed the way the ALJ ruled on

the case. Barnhart, 395 F.3d at 742. Therefore, the Court does

not find that the Appeals Council erred in rejecting Boyd’s

second appeal. 

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E. Adverse Credibility Finding

Finally, Boyd argues that the ALJ’s credibility finding is

erroneous because it is unsupported by substantial evidence. 

Specifically, Boyd argues that the ALJ failed to consider the

factors in Social Security Ruling 96-7 in making his

determination. 

This Court gives the ALJ’s credibility findings “special,

but not unlimited deference.” Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690,

696 (7th Cir. 2012). “The Court will uphold an ALJ’s credibility

finding if the ALJ gives specific reasons for that finding,

supported by substantial evidence.” Romo v. Astrue, No. 10-C6044, 2013 WL 250639 *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2013). In making

credibility determinations, the ALJ must consider a number of

factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), and “must support [his]

credibility findings with evidence in the record.” Id. 

After reviewing the evidence and the ALJ’s decision, the

Court finds the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s credibility reasonably. 

The ALJ did not merely state that he found Boyd’s allegations

incredible because they were “inconsistent with the judge’s

assessment of [] [her] residual functional capacity.” Id.

Instead, the ALJ went through the factors listed in Social

Security Ruling 96-7 to make his finding. 

First, the ALJ noted that while Boyd claimed that her

disability onset date was May 27, 2008, her earnings records

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demonstrated that her last reported income was in 2006. ECF No.

9-3; Page ID # 49. The ALJ found this discrepancy significant

because Boyd stated that she started her own day-care business

and “earned approximately $11,000 through her business and

reported this income in her tax filings, [] [however,] there is

no documented income from 2007 and 2008.” Id.

As further support, the ALJ noted that Boyd’s own reports

were inconsistent with her allegations regarding her physical

limitations. This is one of the factors an ALJ should consider

in assessing personal complaints. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c)(3)(I). Moreover, the ALJ did not determine that

Boyd’s ability to perform her daily activities meant that she

could perform full-time work. Instead, he found such allegations

inconsistent with her complaints. The Court agrees with this

finding. Specifically, the Court finds it strange that Boyd

reported that she was able to sweep, wash dishes, and drive, but

at the same time claimed she has “a hard time squeezing a towel.” 

Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.

In addition to this, the ALJ compared Boyd’s complaints with

the treatment records from her orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Primus,

and her primary care physician, Dr. Montalvo, when determining

that Boyd’s allegations were not entirely credible. After

reviewing the notes from both physicians, specifically the notes

from Dr. Primus which indicated consistently that Boyd’s

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condition was unchanged or improved, the ALJ determined that

Boyd’s self-proclaimed limitations were excessive. 

Thus, the Court finds the ALJ’s credibility determination

sufficiently individualized and substantive and declines to

reverse the decision on this basis. See Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d

556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court

Date:3/12/2013

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