DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

STEVEN GOODSTEIN, as Personal Representative of the Estate of 

Andrew Scott Goodstein,

Appellant,

v.

SHELLEY GOODSTEIN, as Conservator for BLAKE GOODSTEIN and

CHANDLER GOODSTEIN, and GRANT GOODSTEIN,

Appellees.

No. 4D18-2382

[January 9, 2019]

Appeal of nonfinal orders from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth 

Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Jessica Ticktin, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

2017CP003754XXX.

George L. Sigalos and Jennifer B. Carroll of Simon & Sigalos, LLP, Boca 

Raton, and Jay Kauffman of Day Pitney/Chapin Ballerano & Cheslack, 

Delray Beach, for appellant.

Jenna G. Rubin, Norman A. Fleisher, and Jacob W. Warren of Gutter 

Chaves Josepher Rubin Forman Fleisher Miller P.A., Boca Raton, for 

appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Steven Goodstein, personal representative (“P.R.”) for Andrew 

Goodstein’s estate, appeals the trial court’s non-final orders granting the 

beneficiaries’ petition to designate a trust company as a depository for 

estate assets. The P.R. argues that the court erred by granting the petition 

based upon a local policy without finding “other cause” under section 

69.031(1), Florida Statutes (2017). We affirm because the record provides 

support for a restricted depository, but we reprove any local policy that 

presumes the need for a restricted depository in all cases. Whether there 

is cause for a restricted depository should be decided on a case-by-case 

basis. 

The decedent, Andrew, was survived by an adult son and two minor 

children (“the beneficiaries”). The will named the Andrew’s father, Steven, 
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the P.R. The beneficiaries initially objected, but then mediated a 

settlement agreeing to Steven’s appointment. Subsequently, they 

complained that by restricting information about estate assets he did not 

comply with the terms of their agreement. The beneficiaries then 

petitioned for an order designating a restricted depository for the assets. 

The petition cited two grounds for a restricted depository. First, the 

beneficiaries believed that a recently-enacted local policy required 

restricted depositories in all probate cases, and Andrew’s estate avoided 

the requirement only because it opened before the policy started. Second, 

the beneficiaries disputed the P.R.’s marshalling and expenditure of estate 

assets. At the hearing, they also requested a depository because of the 

litigious nature of the case. 

The trial court agreed that restricted depositories were a matter of 

course in all probate cases in its jurisdiction, pursuant to local policy. It 

explained that the policy was intended to prevent assets from pouring out 

during probate administration. The court believed the policy also reduced 

expenses and increased productivity by encouraging attorneys to resolve 

cases more quickly. Therefore, it granted the beneficiaries’ petition and 

entered a separate order designating a depository. The court was willing 

to reconsider the order if the use of a restricted depository increased 

litigation or became problematic. 

Given that the issue on appeal turns on the interpretation of a statute 

as it relates to a local policy, this court utilizes a de novo standard of 

review. See J.M. v. Gargett, 101 So. 3d 352, 356 (Fla. 2012). To interpret 

a statute, this court primarily looks to the plain meaning of the statute, 

and if the language is clear and unambiguous, then the language controls. 

See id. 

According to section 69.031(1):

When it is expedient in the judgment of any court having 

jurisdiction of any estate in process of administration by any 

guardian, curator, executor, administrator, trustee, receiver, 

or other officer, because the size of the bond required of the 

officer is burdensome or for other cause, the court may order 

part or all of the personal assets of the estate placed with a 

bank, trust company, or savings and loan association . . . 

designated by the court . . . .

(Emphasis added). 

The emphasized language makes it clear and unambiguous that a 

blanket policy providing for a depository to be used in all probate cases is 

improper. See e.g., Sarasota All. for Fair Elections, Inc. v. Browning, 28 So. 
3

3d 880, 886 (Fla. 2010) (“A local government enactment may be 

inconsistent with state law if (1) the Legislature ‘has preempted a 

particular subject area’ or (2) the local enactment conflicts with a state

statute.” (quoting Lowe v. Broward Cty., 766 So. 2d 1199, 1207 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2000))). Under the statute, there are only two situations in which a 

court may order a restricted depository be used: (1) when the size of the 

bond required of the administrator or other officer is burdensome or (2) 

“for other cause.” See § 69.031(1). Trial courts must look at each case

carefully to determine whether it falls under one of these two situations. 

Considering the application of section 69.031(1) to this case, no bond 

was required; however, the record presented grounds for the trial court to 

properly find “other cause” requiring a restricted depository. There is no 

dispute that the estate has significant assets, and the trial court believed 

the general goals of the local policy applied to preserve the assets and 

encourage efficient administration. Further, at the time of the hearing, 

neither the beneficiaries nor trial court knew how estate assets were being 

spent. It is also notable that the court repeatedly agreed that it would 

reconsider the depository requirement if necessary. Lastly, the record 

evidenced great tension between the P.R. and beneficiaries due to the 

parties’ litigiousness—which included a lawsuit concerning the P.R.’s 

failure to timely provide information about estate assets. Thus, the 

circumstances provided support for a restricted depository due to “other 

cause.” 

Accordingly, we affirm the designation of a depository in this case, but 

admonish the trial court that it may not have a blanket policy requiring 

restricted depositories in all cases. “Other cause” for a restricted 

depository must be considered on a case-by-case basis. See § 69.031(1).

Affirmed.

GERBER, C.J., CIKLIN and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.