COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Frank and Clements

DEANNA PORTER MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 3093-03-1 PER CURIAM MAY 18, 2004 DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND NORFOLK STATE UNIVERSITY

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK Jerome James, Judge (Curtis T. Brown, on brief), for appellant. (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Joseph R. Carico, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Judith Willia ms Jagdmann, Deputy Attorney General; Guy W. Horsley, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Deanna Porter was employed by Norfolk St ate University (NSU) and was terminated effective January 10, 2003 pursuant to the issuance of a Group I II Written Notice. Porter initiated a grievance challenging her termination. Following an April 23, 2003 grievance hearing, the hearing officer upheld the termin ation. Porter then a ppealed to the Departme nt of Human Resource Management (DHRM), which affirmed the hearing offi cer’s decision on July 9, 2003. Thereafter, the circuit court affirmed DHRM’s decision in a November 10, 200 3 final order. Porter appeals to this Court from that order. On appeal, she argues she “was never afforded due process in this
matter.”

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the part ies, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decisi on of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. Background On December 13, 2002, NSU issu ed to Porter a Group II Wr itten Notice with termination effective January 10, 2003 for “failure to foll ow a supervisor’s instructions, perform assigned work, or otherwise comply with established policy.” The termination was based in part on NSU’s determination that Porter used her position within the school’s registrar’s office to register herself for classes. This registration violated NSU’s polic y because Porter had unpa id balances due NSU at the time. Upon receipt of the notice, Porter indicated she di sagreed with the charge. NSU conducted an investigation, reported its findings in writing, and determined the facts supported the charges against Porter. NSU also determined Porter had an active Gr oup III Notice on file for past misconduct. During the grievance review process, NSU i nvalidated the earlier Gr oup III Notice. NSU also rescinded the Decemb er 13, 2002 Group II No tice, finding the offens e was serious enough to warrant a Group III Notice. NSU issued the new Group III Notice, alleging an “abuse of her position and role within the University, and conspi ring to violate Univers ity policy for personal gain,” based upon the same acts as supported the earlier Gr oup II Notice. Porter timely challenged the new Group III notice. After the April 23, 20 03 grievance hearing, the hearing officer determined NSU had proven Porter abused her position and th at the Group III Notice with the sanction of termination was appropriate. In addition to he r appeal to DHRM noted above, Porter also appealed the hearing officer’s ruling to the Department of Employment Dispute Resolution (EDR), alleging the hearing officer violated the grievance procedure, state po licy, and her due process ri ghts. EDR concluded, in a July 25, 2003 order, that there was no violation of the gr ievance procedure by the hearing- 3 - officer either “prior to or during the hearing.” EDR also noted that “[t]o the extent [Porter’s due process violation] assertion is based on purporte d non-compliance with the grievance procedure, the claim fails.” EDR’s ruling did no t address the allegation of viola tions of state personnel policy, deferring, as required, to DHRM. See Code § 2.2-3006(A). In its ruling, DHRM found no violation of state personnel policy. The circuit court found Porter had failed to demonstrate the hearing officer’s decision was “contradictory to law.” Analysis Porter asserts in her question presented that the “decision of the hearing officer is contrary to the law and statutes in the issu ance of a Group II Written Notice being rescinded for a Group III Written Notice.” However, the only complaint she makes in the ar gument section of her brief is that she “was never given the opportunity to be heard, to confront witnes ses, or the opportunity to have counsel represent her prior to January 10 , 2003, the date of her termination.” We note that “[t]he General Assembly has clea rly vested review of policy issues involved in employee grievances in the Department of Human Resource Management, and not in the courts.” Va. Dept. of State Police v. Barton , 39 Va. App. 439, 446, 573 S.E.2d 319, 323 (2002). Thus, we are bound by the determination that ther e was no violation of the grievance procedure either prior to or during the hearing. See Tatum v. Dept. of Agr. and Consumer Serv. , 41 Va. App. 110, 122, 582 S.E.2d 452, 458 (2003). Therefor e, we address only Porter’s contention that she was not afforded her due pr ocess rights prior to her termination. Having created a property right in continued employment, a state may not constitutionally authoriz e the deprivation of such an intere st without “appropriate procedural safeguards.” Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill , 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). Prior to termination, a non-probationary, non-exempt employ ee of the Commonwealth is entitled to oral- 4 - or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the employe r’s evidence, and an opportunity to respond, appropriate to the nature of the case. Id. at 546. A more comprehensive post-termination hearing follows termination. See Grievance Procedure Manual § 5. The pre-termination notice and opportunity to be heard “need not be elaborate,” “need not definitively resolve the propriety of the di scharge,” nor provide the employee with an opportunity to correct her behavior. Loudermill , 470 U.S. at 545. It need only serve as an “initial check against mistaken decisions - - essentially, a dete rmination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges agains t the employee are true and support the proposed action.” Id. at 545-46. Porter was afforded sufficient pre-termina tion due process. She received notice of the reasons for the termination in the December 13, 2002 and January 13 , 2003 letters and the February 27, 2003 Group III Written Notice. She was provided an opportunity to respond to the charges and did so in conjunction with the investigation conducted by NSU’s human resources department. She was afforded further opportunity to respond to the allegations through the grievance process of which she availed herself. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the circuit court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.