14-2031-cv 

Tremblay v. Mohegan Sun Casino

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 7th day of April, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

SUSAN L. CARNEY, 

Circuit Judges,

JOHN GLEESON,1

District Judge. 

_____________________________________ 

Elizabeth Tremblay, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

 14-2031-cv 

Mohegan Sun Casino, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Elizabeth Tremblay, pro se, Griswold, CT 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Proloy K. Das and Andrew L. Houlding, 

 Rome McGuigan, P.C., Hartford, CT. 

 1 The Honorable John Gleeson, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 

of New York, sitting by designation.
2 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 

(Chatigny, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Elizabeth Tremblay, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s 

judgment dismissing her discriminatory discharge claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). We assume the parties’ familiarity 

with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

 We review de novo a district court decision dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), accepting all material factual allegations as true. Triestman v. 

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). Dismissal is appropriate “when the 

district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” the matter. Makarova v. 

United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). A plaintiff bears the burden of proving the 

existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 

The district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Title VII claim was proper because Title VII 

expressly excludes American Indian tribes from its definition of covered employers. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e(b). The exclusion extends to the arms and agencies of an American Indian tribe. See 

Garcia v. Akwesasne Housing Authority, 268 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2001). Because the defendant 

here is a corporation owned by an agency of a federally recognized American Indian tribe, see 

Kizis v. Morse Diesel Inter., Inc., 260 Conn. 46, 48−49 & n.1 (2002), it is not an employer under 

Title VII. Accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Tremblay’s Title 

VII claim because Congress has expressly exempted the defendant from suit.
3 

 Unlike Title VII’s definition of employer, the ADEA’s definition of employer does not 

exclude American Indian tribes. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII), with 29 U.S.C. 

§ 630(b) (ADEA). Nonetheless, “[a]s a matter of federal common law, an Indian tribe enjoys 

sovereign immunity from suit except where ‘Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has 

waived its immunity.’” Garcia, 268 F.3d at 84 (quoting Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs, Inc., 

523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998)). Agencies of a tribe enjoy “the same presumption of immunity” in a suit 

for damages. Id.; see also Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 358 (2d Cir. 2000). 

The Supreme Court has explained that, “[t]o abrogate tribal immunity, Congress must 

unequivocally express that purpose,” and “to relinquish its immunity, a tribe’s waiver must be 

clear.” C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 

(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress has not unequivocally expressed its purpose 

to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity pursuant to the ADEA, Garcia, 268 F.3d at 86, nor has 

plaintiff identified any applicable waiver of immunity from such suits in federal court. 

Accordingly, tribal sovereign immunity barred Tremblay’s ADEA claim. 

 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk