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NATO: A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR 

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 22, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., former Secretary of State, Principal, Albright 

Stonebridge Group, Washington, DC ................................................................. 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator John F. 

Kerry .............................................................................................................. 51 

Response to question submitted for the record by Senator Robert P. 

Casey. Jr. ....................................................................................................... 61 

Craddock, Gen. John, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander– 

Europe, U.S. Army, Myrtle Beach, SC ............................................................... 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator John F. 

Kerry .............................................................................................................. 52 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert P. 

Casey. Jr. ....................................................................................................... 60 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Jim DeMint .. 62 

DeMint, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from South Carolina, prepared statement ...... 23 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Kupchan, Charles A., professor of international affairs, Georgetown University, senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC ................. 42 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator John F. 

Kerry .............................................................................................................. 58 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 25 

Volker, Hon. Kurt, former Permanent Representative to NATO, senior fellow 

and managing director, Center on Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins 

University, Washington, DC ............................................................................... 36 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator John F. 

Kerry .............................................................................................................. 54 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert P. 

Casey. Jr. ....................................................................................................... 61 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Jim DeMint .. 63 

(III)

(1) 

NATO: A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR 

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Cardin, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, 

Lugar, Corker, DeMint, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. Thank you all 

for joining us this morning. 

Today we will discuss the future of our NATO alliance. Earlier 

this week in Afghanistan, I saw firsthand NATO’s single largest 

present-day commitment. Let me tell you, whatever our differences, 

we need to acknowledge that our allies have made enormous sacrifices in Afghanistan. They, too, are serving heroically. While 

questions remain on both sides of the Atlantic about the future of 

our Afghan mission, our confidence in the idea and the cohesion of 

NATO remains strong. Our commitment to defend our NATO allies 

is unwavering. 

NATO turned 60 this year. As we all know, there have been 

times when NATO’s critics called it ‘‘an alliance in search of a mission.’’ Today, as new challenges multiply and as old ones resurface, 

it’s become clear that as long as NATO continues to adapt, it will 

remain essential going forward. The Strategic Concept review is an 

important vehicle for NATO to evolve. Recalibrating its priorities, 

reinventing itself, and preparing to protect the West from challenges both new and old. That’s why, even as we grapple with 

Afghanistan, and other present concerns, it remains the right time 

for a public dialogue about NATO’s future. 

In a recent speech at the Atlantic Council, our ranking member 

and my friend Senator Lugar was once again ahead of the curve 

in emphasizing the need for the alliance to incorporate emerging 

threats, such as terrorism and drug trafficking. I agree with that. 

We don’t choose threats to our security, they choose us. If the alliance is serious about the security of its members, then it has to 

focus on the real threats. 

Of course, while the world has changed, we are still dealing with 

some of the same geostrategic and ideological concerns that 

2 

brought NATO into being initially; in particular, the deep and durable commitment by like-minded democracies to cooperate closely 

and deter aggression, with a promise to rise up in defense of any 

NATO member under attack. This guarantee has actually helped 

to keep the peace. NATO has a proven record as a positive transformative force in Eastern and Central Europe, where an aspiration to NATO membership helped to bring about democratic 

reforms and stability. I hope we can also use this hearing to 

address the prospects for future NATO enlargement, to include 

Balkan nations, Georgia, and Ukraine. NATO Secretary General 

Rasmussen has made the establishment of strong relations with 

Russia a priority. 

If we are to consider President Medvedev’s proposal for changes 

to Europe’s security architecture, we should realistically build on 

the foundations that we already have, such as the OSCE. The 

potential for constructive relations, frankly, is enormous, but it will 

take an investment of trust and of confidence in order to break the 

bad habits of the past. 

Finally, the impending passage of the Lisbon Treaty, which consolidates power within the EU, makes it all the more important 

that we get the NATO–EU relationship right. As the EU grows in 

importance, we need to find a way for those two organizations to 

collaborate effectively. This is an opportunity to help bring about 

the stronger European partner that we have always sought, one 

more willing to share the burden of defending our ideals. 

I think we have two very highly qualified, very special panels 

here today. It’s an honor to welcome our first witness, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, again coming back to this committee for I don’t know what number visit, but the umpteenth. She 

served as America’s top diplomat during a pivotal moment in 

NATO’s history, when NATO countries used military force to end 

ethnic cleansing inside Europe. And that is, incidentally, not a fully 

resolved issue. I’ve been meeting, in the last days, with folks deeply 

concerned about the turn of events in Bosnia and what is happening, something that a strong European leadership will be essential 

to help us resolve. 

Secretary Albright also made history by helping to initiate the 

accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. 

As the sole American representative in Secretary General Rasmussen’s Strategic Concept working group, Secretary Albright will help 

shape the future of an alliance to which she has already made 

extraordinary contributions. 

On our second panel, we have GEN John Craddock, who, until 

recently, served with distinction as Supreme Allied Commander– 

Europe. We also have Ambassador Kurt Volker, formerly America’s 

permanent representative to NATO. So, each of them bring firsthand experience to answering questions about the nature of NATO, 

the challenges that it faces, and its future. 

And finally, we are pleased to welcome Charles Kupchan, professor of international relations at Georgetown University, and a 

very respected scholar on European security. 

And I thank all of them for being here today. 

Senator Lugar. 

3 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to continue our examination of the future of the NATO alliance. And I would add, as a personal thought and thanks to you, 

Mr. Chairman, for your own remarkable diplomacy in the past 

week. I admire your stamina, your ability to be present for this 

important hearing today, and I think—— 

The CHAIRMAN. My body is here at least. [Laughter.] 

Senator LUGAR. Well, both in wisdom and in spirit, you are here. 

We appreciate that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator LUGAR. And I join you in welcoming Secretary Albright 

and our other distinguished witnesses. 

For decades, as you pointed out, discussions of NATO frequently 

have begun with the premise that the alliance is at a crossroads, 

or even in crisis. When evaluating NATO, I start from the presumption that after 60 years it is still a work in progress. If one 

takes the long-term view, current alliance deficiencies, though serious, do not seem insurmountable. It’s important to take stock of 

just how remarkable it is that NATO has enlarged from 12 to 28 

countries and is now involved in combat 3,000 miles from Europe. 

NATO possesses enormous geopolitical assets and a history of 

achievements that, with the proper leadership, can undergird success in the future. 

The paramount question facing NATO today is how to strengthen 

the credibility of Article 5. Recent developments have eroded some 

of NATO’s deterrent value. This erosion has occurred as members 

of the alliance have expressed less enthusiasm for NATO expansion 

and found an increasing number of reasons to avoid committing 

forces to Afghanistan. The decline in the deterrent value of Article 

5 became more apparent with the onset of a string of energy crises 

in Europe and the adoption by several West European governments 

of beggar-thy-neighbor policies with respect to oil and natural gas 

arrangements with the Russian Federation. 

The Obama administration’s decision to alter missile defense 

plans also has implications for alliance confidence in Article 5. Iranian missiles never constituted the primary rationale for Polish 

and Czech decisions to buy into the Bush administration’s plan; 

rather it was the waning confidence in NATO, and Article 5 in particular, that lent missile defense political credibility in those countries. The United States must be sensitive to events that have transpired in the broader European security environment since the 

Bush plan was proposed and negotiated. Our commitment to NATO 

remains the most important vehicle for projecting stability throughout Europe and even into the regions of Asia and the Middle East. 

It is critical that we reestablish the credibility of those assurances. 

An invigoration of NATO military exercises in Eastern Europe 

and joint planning for contingencies would be a first step. The 

administration also must raise the profile of United States political 

and economic cooperation with Eastern Europe and intensify military contacts with selected countries. The political and military 

reforms undertaken by NATO aspirants—to a large extent selfdriven and self-funded—have been not only an important element 

4 

of European stability during the last two decades, but also a foreign policy bargain for the United States and alliance taxpayers. 

We must continue to hold out the prospect of membership to qualified nations, including Ukraine, Georgia, and the entire Balkan region. 

We also must articulate a vision for NATO that both prepares for 

any potential threat from traditional rivals and develops new capabilities in meeting unconventional threats such as terrorism, drug 

trafficking, cyber warfare, WMD proliferation, and energy manipulation. The long-term success of the alliance may turn on how it 

deals with these threats. 

One particular gap in the last Strategic Concept, exposed by a 

series of crises and myopic responses, was its failure to incorporate 

energy security into NATO’s mission. At the 2006 Riga summit, I 

encouraged the alliance to make energy security an Article 5 commitment in which any member experiencing a deliberate energy 

disruption would receive assistance from other alliance members. 

We should recognize that an energy cutoff to an ally in the middle 

of winter could cause death and economic calamity on the same 

scale as a military attack. The Atlantic community must establish 

a credible and unified energy strategy. 

I have been encouraged that NATO has shown progress in making energy security part of its operational duties, including strategic planning, infrastructure protection, and intelligence analysis. 

This July, I witnessed firsthand how seemingly parochial interests 

can be surmounted for the common cause of energy cooperation. I 

was asked to represent the United States, along with our envoy for 

energy security, Ambassador Richard Morningstar, in Ankara for 

the signing of the landmark agreement among 12 countries and the 

European Union, to move forward on the so-called Nabucco gas 

pipeline, a breakthrough that had only dim prospects even 1 year 

ago. 

Though some allies have called for geopolitical retrenchment in 

response to perceptions that Article 5 guarantees have declined in 

value, I believe the proper response is to strengthen those guarantees and find creative ways to address the more nuanced threats 

we face today. A new Strategic Concept simultaneously must reaffirm the fundamental value of NATO and reinforce those principles 

that led to its creation. 

I look forward very much to our discussion this morning. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

Again, Madam Secretary, we’re delighted to have you here. 

Thanks so much for taking time. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, PRINCIPAL, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE 

GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am really delighted to be 

here again. 

And I do want to begin, Mr. Chairman, by congratulating you for 

your very creative and successful diplomacy in Afghanistan, and 

also to compliment the whole committee for holding this hearing. 

5 

NATO is, above all, an alliance of democracies. Public discussion 

is a key attribute of democracy, and a discussion about NATO’s 

present and future could not be more timely. Although I speak this 

morning only for myself, I am honored to serve as chair of that 

recently appointed group of experts which will offer advice to 

NATO Secretary General Rasmussen on a new Strategic Concept 

for the alliance. 

Last week in Luxembourg, our group participated in the first of 

four planned seminars as part of a broader process to collect a 

range of views about NATO’s strategy and operations. We plan to 

provide our conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary 

General by next May. After consulting with member governments, 

the Secretary General will then draft the Strategic Concept for consideration at the Lisbon summit. And, when approved, this document will serve as a guide for the alliance through the coming 

decade. 

Mr. Chairman, I think you’d agree that the stakes involved in 

the strategic review are very high. For 60 years, NATO has been 

the world’s preeminent multinational security institution, and, like 

many of you, or at least the more senior members, I grew up with 

this alliance. In fact, NATO’s birth was hastened by the Communist takeover in 1948 of my native Czechoslovakia. From then until 

the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO defended freedom in the West 

while preserving hope in Europe’s East, and as a daughter of 

Prague living in America, I had one foot on each side of that divide. 

Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has remained open to 

qualified new members, it has responded to threats both in and 

outside the North Atlantic region, and it has begun working with 

others to counter global threats, including proliferation and terrorism. Despite this, there are some who have raised doubts about 

NATO’s ongoing relevance. 

So, let me address the question directly. Does NATO still matter, 

or is it as obsolete as a Senate spittoon? The answer is clear. 

NATO was created in response to the Soviet threat, but not only 

in response to that threat; it was also designed to rein in the many 

national rivalries that had ripped Europe apart. And this purpose 

of creating a Europe whole and free did not disappear with the 

Soviet Union and has not grown obsolete over time. The same can 

be said of the core mission of collective defense. Under Article 4 of 

the North Atlantic Treaty, the allies, ‘‘will consult together whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of 

any of the parties are threatened.’’ Under Article 5, the allies agree 

that, ‘‘an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack 

against them all.’’ 

Now, these provisions were designed to protect the security of 

every ally against external threats, and making good on that commitment—in deeds, not just words—remains the heart of NATO’s 

purpose. Fulfilling that objective, however, is a more varied task 

than it was. Time and technology have brought many benefits to 

the world, but also new dangers, including weapons of mass 

destruction, missiles, cyber sabotage, and violent extremism. Not 

even NATO allows us to predict all the threats, but NATO does 

give us a predictable military and political framework for responding to even the most surprising perils. And in this sense, NATO is 

6 

as relevant to the security of its members as a fire department is 

to the well-being of a community. 

Most prominent among present dangers is that posed by alQaeda and its allies. Their attacks have been felt in many countries. But, if there is a center to the struggle, it is in Afghanistan, 

spilling over into Pakistan’s western frontier. NATO’s mission is to 

promote stability by helping Afghanistan’s security forces to protect 

local populations from the Taliban, and this effort has contributed 

to a stronger and more professional Afghan Army, but the mission 

has also suffered from divisions within the alliance and from the 

lack of a more effective government in Kabul. 

Thanks to your discussions in the past week, Mr. Chairman, the 

democratic process in Afghanistan has been strengthened, and the 

Afghan people should know that the United States and NATO are 

committed to helping them to exercise their rights fully, fairly, and 

safely. 

Yesterday, the National Democratic Institute, which I chair, 

listed some useful steps that should be taken between now and the 

November 7 election, including an effort by NATO and Afghan 

security forces to expand the area where voters can feel protected. 

I expect that the runoff election and issues related to it will be 

among the factors taken into account by President Obama as he 

continues to review U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. 

The opinions of our allies will be another vital factor. Based on 

my own discussions, I can say that NATO members agree on the 

right goals in Afghanistan. Our challenge now is to come together 

on behalf of the optimum means. Accordingly, it is essential that 

NATO members focus not on past difference but on how best to 

contribute to future success. As Secretary General Rasmussen 

recently declared, NATO’s operation in Afghanistan is not America’s responsibility or burden alone. It is, and will remain, a team 

effort. 

Obviously the NATO mission in Afghanistan is an important test 

for the alliance. However, NATO has known other tests and will inevitably face more. And that’s why the experts group will be looking ahead both broadly and well into the future. Among the many 

other issues we will consider is NATO’s preparedness in responding 

to emerging threats. We will look for ways to ensure that the capabilities of the alliance are brought into balance with its responsibilities. We will discuss the prospects for reforming NATO’s decisionmaking process. We will explore NATO’s relationship with the 

European Union, the U.N., and other international organizations. 

We will review ideas for helping people around the world to understand the alliance’s actions and aspirations. And we will be examining NATO’s future relationship with Russia. 

When I was Secretary of State, I spent many hours discussing 

NATO with my counterparts from Moscow. Our talks were typically cordial, but blunt. No matter how often I reassured my Russian friends about the alliance’s intentions, their suspicions 

remained. To them, NATO’s very existence served as an unwelcome 

reminder of the cold war. 

From what I’ve been able to observe in the past decade, this 

mindset has not changed, and this makes dialogue more difficult, 

but it does not make cooperation impossible. Russia and NATO 

7 

have important interests in common, and these include support for 

stability in Central Asia, countering terrorism and piracy, and 

curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 

Despite these shared interests, there are some in Moscow who 

would like Washington to choose between loyalty to our NATO 

allies and cooperation with Russia, as if these two options were 

mutually exclusive. In fact, the United States can and should combine strategic reassurance for allies and realistic engagement with 

Moscow. When I was Secretary of State, our policy was that, on 

matters of European security, Russia was entitled to a voice but 

not a veto. Both halves of that equation remain valid. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you know that the 

story of NATO and the United States was written, in significant 

part, by members of this committee. It was before this panel that 

Secretary of State Acheson first made the case for American participation, and it was here that administrations from both parties 

sought and received support during the difficult cold war years. It 

was to you that Defense Secretary Bill Cohen and I came in search 

of consent for NATO enlargement during the 1990s. For six decades, this committee has done a superb job of overseeing America’s 

participation in NATO and of helping our citizens to understand 

why this alliance matters and why its future should be of concern 

to us all. 

Today’s hearing is a continuation of that tradition, and I thank 

you again for the chance to participate, and I’d be very happy to 

answer whatever questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Albright follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF

STATE, PRINCIPAL, ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and thank you for 

the opportunity to be here. 

I want to begin by complimenting you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Lugar, for the 

outstanding work you are doing with this committee and also for holding this 

hearing. 

NATO is, above all, an alliance of democracies; public discussion is a key attribute 

of democracy; and a discussion about NATO’s present and future could not be more 

timely. 

Although I speak this morning only for myself, I am honored to serve as chair 

of the recently appointed Group of Experts, which will offer advice to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on a new strategic concept for the alliance. 

Last week, in Luxembourg, our group participated in the first of four planned 

seminars, as part of a broader process to collect a diversity of views about NATO 

strategy and operations. To this end, we listened to a number of distinguished scholars and former officials. We also met with NATO’s military leaders. 

We plan to provide our conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary General by next May. In close consultation with member governments, the Secretary 

General will then draft the strategic concept for consideration at the Lisbon summit 

toward the end of the year. When approved, the document will serve as a guide for 

the alliance through the coming decade. 

Mr. Chairman, I think you would agree that the stakes involved in this strategic 

review are high. For 60 years, NATO has been the world’s preeminent multinational 

security institution, and like many of you—or at least the more senior members— 

I grew up with the alliance. 

In fact, NATO’s birth was hastened by the Communist takeover, in 1948, of my 

native Czechoslovakia. From then until the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO defended 

freedom in the West while preserving hope in Europe’s east; as a daughter of 

Prague living in America, I had one foot on each side of that divide. 

Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has remained open to qualified new 

members; it has responded to threats both in and outside the North Atlantic region; 

8 

and it has begun working with others to counter global threats, including proliferation and terrorism. 

Despite this, there are some who have raised doubts about NATO’s ongoing relevance. So let me address that question directly: Does NATO still matter or is it 

as obsolete as a Senate spittoon? 

The answer is clear. NATO was created in response to the Soviet threat but not 

only for that purpose. It was also designed to prevent a repetition of Europe’s past, 

in which the capitals of the continent took up arms against one another. NATO was 

intended to ensure that the many national rivalries that had torn Europe apart 

would finally be reined in so that a larger, peaceful and democratic whole could be 

created. This worthy goal did not disappear with the Soviet Union, and it has not 

grown less urgent with the passage of time. A peaceful Europe and a democratic 

trans-Atlantic community are among the valuable assets and accomplishments of 

modern civilization. NATO helped bring them into being and continues to preserve 

them. The time and treasure we invest in the alliance toward that end alone would 

be well worth the price. 

This fact is highlighted by France’s recent decision to participate fully in NATO’s 

integrated military structure, hardly a sign that the alliance is diminishing in function or stature. The French move shows that country’s political commitment to the 

alliance and enhances prospects for even closer cooperation between NATO and the 

European Union (EU). This could help the organization to maintain its trans-Atlantic balance by increasing participation on the European side; and it validates the 

conviction that I had when in office, which is that NATO and European defense 

capabilities should be seen as mutually reinforcing. As Gen. Jim Jones recently 

pointed out, a strong and independent Europe is good for a strong and independent 

alliance. 

Of course, NATO does more than maintain the unity of its members. It also provides for their collective defense. A critic might scoff and ask what exactly that term 

means in the world today, but that question can be answered. Yes, international 

borders are vulnerable to dangers that are less obvious and tangible than foreign 

armies, but that does not mean that traditional forms of aggression are necessarily 

a thing of the past. Since the end of the cold war, the world has witnessed numerous attempts to change national borders through the use of force—in the Middle 

East, the Horn of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and even in South America. 

Under Article Four of the North Atlantic Treaty, the allies ‘‘will consult together 

whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties are threatened.’’ Under Article Five, the allies 

agree that ‘‘an armed attack against one . . . shall be considered an attack against 

them all.’’ 

These provisions were agreed upon to protect the security of every ally against 

external threats. Making good on that commitment—in deeds, not just in words— 

remains the heart of NATO’s purpose. 

Fulfilling that purpose, however, is a more varied task now than it was. Time and 

technology have brought many benefits to the world, but also new dangers, including weapons of mass destruction, missiles, cyber sabotage, and violent extremism. 

Not even NATO allows us to predict all threats; but NATO does give us a predictable military and political framework for responding to even the most surprising 

perils. In this sense, NATO is as relevant to the security of its members as a fire 

department is to the well-being of a community. 

Most prominent among present dangers is that posed by al-Qaeda and its allies. 

Their attacks have been felt in many countries but if there is a center to the struggle, it is in Afghanistan, spilling over into Pakistan’s western frontier. NATO’s mission is to promote stability by helping Afghanistan’s security forces to protect local 

populations from the Taliban. This effort has contributed to a stronger and more 

professional Afghan Army, but the mission has also suffered from divisions within 

the alliance and from the lack of a more effective government in Kabul. 

Thanks to your discussions this past week, Mr. Chairman, the democratic process 

in Afghanistan has been strengthened. The Afghan people should know that the 

United States and NATO are committed to helping them to exercise their rights 

fully, fairly, and safely. Yesterday, the National Democratic Institute listed some 

useful steps that should be taken between now and November 7, including an effort 

by NATO and Afghan security forces to expand the area where voters can feel 

protected. 

I expect that the runoff election and issues related to it will be among the factors 

taken into account by President Obama as he continues to review U.S. strategy in 

Afghanistan. The opinions of our allies will be another vital factor. Based on my 

own discussions, I can say that NATO members agree on the right goals in Afghanistan; our challenge now is to come together on behalf of the optimum means. 

9 

Accordingly, it is essential that NATO members focus, not on past differences, but 

on how best to contribute to future success. As Secretary General Rasmussen recently declared: ‘‘NATO’s operation in Afghanistan is not America’s responsibility or 

burden alone; it is and it will remain a team effort.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, NATO’s current missions in Afghanistan and off the coast of West 

Africa (to counter piracy) have cast new light on an old debate concerning the proper 

scope of NATO activities. Although a consensus exists that missions conducted outside the transatlantic region are sometimes necessary to protect populations within 

the alliance, there are no formally established criteria for separating appropriate 

missions from those that are not. 

Some suggest that these external missions have opened a faultline within the 

alliance, placing on one side those who believe that NATO should assume the role 

of global police and on the other those who insist that NATO stay close to home. 

I see no such faultline but instead a sensible search for a reasonable balance. There 

are limits to what NATO can do and also to what it should attempt; it is a regionally based security alliance and cannot be all things to all people. Article V and collective defense remain, properly, the cornerstone of our alliance. However, we must 

also be prepared to respond in a selective way to threats that arise beyond alliance 

territory, taking into account the urgency of those threats, the availability of other 

security options, and the likely consequences of acting or of failing to act. 

To our benefit, NATO is both a leader and a partner. The alliance is linked to 

a broader network that is addressing problems of peace, justice, development, and 

humanitarian response. Accordingly, we should draw a distinction between what 

NATO must do and what others can do—and between situations where the alliance 

must act on its own and where a team approach is preferable. NATO’s new strategic 

concept should recognize that the work of the alliance will often rely on a comprehensive approach, involving cooperation with such organizations as the U.N. in all 

its aspects, the EU, the OSCE, the African Union, other regional entities, and major 

NGOs. 

It is vital that NATO be able to work with others; it is also essential that NATO 

be understood by others. The story of the alliance is a proud one, even glorious, but 

it has grown more complex as new chapters have been written. Each year, across 

the globe, there are fewer people who recall NATO’s creation, fewer who remember 

its cold war resolve, and fewer who have a clear sense of why NATO’s survival and 

success should matter to them. So as we think about NATO’s strategic concept, we 

should bear in mind how such a document will be read not only within the EuroAtlantic community but by people in every region. The alliance must strive to 

explain its policies and actions persuasively and in real time, making full use of 

modern information technology. 

Communication is, however, a two-way street, requiring both an effort to explain 

and a willingness to listen. When I was Secretary of State, I spent many hours discussing NATO’s activities and plans with my counterparts from Russia. Our talks 

were typically cordial but blunt. No matter how often I reassured my Russian 

friends about the alliance’s intentions, their suspicions remained. To them, NATO’s 

very existence served as an unwelcome reminder of the cold war. From what I have 

been able to observe in the past decade, this mindset has not changed. This makes 

dialogue more difficult, but it does not make cooperation impossible. 

Russia and NATO have important interests in common. These include support for 

stability in Central Asia, countering terrorism and piracy, and curbing the spread 

of weapons of mass destruction. 

Despite these shared interests, there are some in Moscow who would like Washington to choose between loyalty to our NATO allies and cooperation with Russia— 

as if these two options were mutually exclusive. In fact, the United States can fully 

meet its obligations to allies without harming the legitimate interests of Russia. At 

the same time, we can seek the cooperation of the Kremlin on issues related to 

international stability without diluting our commitments within NATO. In fact, the 

United States can and should combine strategic reassurance for allies and realistic 

engagement with Moscow. 

When I was Secretary of State, our policy was that, on matters of European security, Russia was entitled to a voice but not a veto; both halves of that equation 

remain valid. In the interests of clarity, certain facts bear repeating. 

First, NATO’s purposes are defensive in nature. The resources of the alliance are 

not directed at any country, and the organization does not consider any country to 

be its enemy. 

Second, the alliance neither asserts, nor recognizes, a sphere of influence. On the 

contrary, NATO is a defender of the rights of nations to exercise sovereignty legitimately and independently within their borders. 

10 

Third, NATO governments remain open to a cooperative relationship with Russia, 

including regular consultations and, when possible, joint actions. Such a relationship can only mature, however, if Russia demonstrates a genuine willingness to 

engage with NATO in a constructive fashion. 

Fourth, when I was in government, I told Central European leaders that the 

United States would have no important diplomatic discussions about them without 

them. That policy, too, should remain our guide. 

Finally, we should reiterate that, whether or not Moscow approves, NATO’s doors 

will remain open to qualified candidates. Decisions about membership are for the 

alliance alone to make. Those decisions should be made on the basis of objective criteria related to the contributions and obligations the admission of a new member 

entails. No country outside the alliance should be permitted to exert influence over 

these internal judgments. At the same time, NATO membership must not be used 

to prove a political point about the alliance’s willingness to stand up to external 

pressure. NATO membership is not a status symbol or a bargaining chip; it is an 

agreement between old members and prospective new ones to make the alliance 

stronger and more effective for purposes that all can support. 

As NATO leaders draft a new strategic concept, they will also need to consider 

political and military reforms to ensure that the commitments made at next year’s 

Lisbon summit can be implemented. Such reforms will be critical in light of 

the limited financial and human resources that are likely to be available to the alliance in coming years. At this early stage in the work of the Group of Experts, it 

would be premature to pronounce on the specific reforms and implementation plans 

that should be considered. There can be no doubt, however, that there is room to 

improve the efficiency of NATO decisionmaking and the effectiveness of alliance 

expenditures. 

Mr. Chairman, during the cold war, NATO’s main objective was to defend freedom 

from the threat of aggression by the Communist Bloc. Today, we understand that 

neither the defeat of communism nor our own freedom is sufficient to guarantee 

security. NATO must strive for a world in which differences are resolved without 

violence; where people are allowed to live without fear of aggression or attack; and 

in which the rule of law is legitimately constituted, broadly recognized and widely 

enforced. 

By its nature, this is an enterprise to be waged on many fronts, simultaneously 

and continuously. It will lead not to some climactic or universal triumph, but to the 

hope that our children can grow up in a world more peaceful, free, and humane 

than it has been. For that to happen, NATO must operate in the future with all 

the energy and focus it has shown in the past—and each member of the alliance 

must meet its obligations fully and without fail. 

Looking back, we can see that many of the threats we faced have vanished or 

shifted in shape; looking ahead, we can expect that many of the problems we worry 

about today will also wax or wane. Global and regional dangers must naturally command NATO’s attention, but these impermanent perils must never define our 

alliance. 

In 1949, the founders of NATO came together not because they were afraid, but 

because of their faith in the values of democracy, free expression, and respect for 

the dignity of every human being. We have learned since that the organization must 

constantly adapt to the demands of political and technological change. But we have 

also learned what must not change. NATO’s strategic concept must begin and end 

with NATO’s founding ideals. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the story of NATO and the United States was written in significant part by the members of this committee. It was before this panel 

that Secretary of State Acheson first made the case for American participation. It 

was here that administrations from both parties sought and received support during 

the difficult cold war years. It was to you that Defense Secretary Cohen and I came 

in search of consent for NATO enlargement during the 1990s. 

For six decades, this committee has done a superb job of overseeing America’s participation in NATO, and of helping our citizens to understand why this alliance matters and why its future should be a concern to us all. 

Today’s hearing is a continuation of that tradition—and I thank you again for the 

chance to participate. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you. Thank you very much, Madam 

Secretary. We do have questions, and we’d love to explore some of 

the thoughts that you laid out, and others. 

The Strategic Concept is a vision of NATO’s future of, ‘‘How do 

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fill our ambitions?’’ And there’s been a lot of struggle through the 

years, as you know, to try to define that mission, and even a heavy 

lift to get people to say there ought to be some engagement in 

Afghanistan. It’s out of theater, different concept, et cetera. We’re 

there. But it’s been a very difficult process to assemble the means 

necessary to achieve the mission. When you make a mission, you 

want to achieve the mission, your relevance obviously is affected 

significantly if you don’t, and yet the troops, the equipment, the 

financing necessary for ISAF, are all a struggle, and they remain 

a struggle. They’re inadequate, in fact, today. 

As the President makes a decision about the numbers of troops, 

one of the impacting factors that hit me very hard in the last days 

is the lack of adequacy of two critical components of any effective 

counterinsurgency: governance and development. And those both 

depend significantly on a NATO commitment. 

How can we use the Strategic Concept to better prioritize our 

objectives and reform the structure of the alliance to get rid of 

some of this inefficiency and procrastination and reluctance to 

actually fulfill the mission? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, that is the challenge for this group 

of experts. We are looking at a variety of those issues through 

these seminars, and ultimately we’ll also be looking at the decisionmaking process, which does seem to have accreted in a way that 

makes it difficult to make decisions. Obviously, an alliance discarded—— 

The CHAIRMAN. ‘‘Accreted’’ is an interesting word. Can you fill 

that out a little more, maybe? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that what has happened is, 

as you look at an alliance that started at 12 and is now at 28, and 

it’s trying to sort out how the process works, there seem to be more 

and more levels where consensus is required and consensus is difficult to achieve. And so, as you look at the charts, which I have 

been doing recently, in terms of how decisions are made, ‘‘accreted’’ 

is the only term that seems to fit. Every month, it seems that a 

new subcommittee is being created. This makes it hard to diagram 

exactly how decisions are made. 

I think the point, again, is that re-reading the Washington 

Treaty is an exercise that’s worth doing. It is very elegant, and it 

is quite short. And there are articles within it that I think can be 

expanded on in some way, especially in response to the question 

you just asked. Article 2 has something to do with looking at development and looking at other aspects of what NATO could in fact 

do. I just put that on the table. 

I also think that we know more and more that civilian and military activities go together. You mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, that we should understand that the NATO 

allies are, in fact, contributing more than is sometimes evident in 

our press reporting on it. I think they could perhaps do more not 

just militarily, but also in helping on the civilian aspects of the 

mission. But I do think we need to keep in mind that there are 43 

countries on the ground in Afghanistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask about that. Does the NATO 

decisionmaking process—and I appreciate you may not agree completely with the premise of this question, but—to some degree, to 

12 

some people, there seemed like a fair acceleration of the pace to try 

to reach out to expand NATO, largely because for so many years 

it was the focus of the balance of power against the Soviet Union. 

And today, Russians are still sensitive to that fundamental premise 

upon which it was based. And we’ve seen that with the counterpressure and thoughts about spheres of influence and so forth. My 

question is, Does the decisionmaking have to refocus more effectively on these other kinds of threats somehow making Article 5 

and 4 less the center of its purpose today, I guess is the way to 

phrase it? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, the threats are clearly different. I 

mean, when you think about an alliance that was established 

against the threat of the Soviet Union crossing the frontiers with 

tanks and foot soldiers, it is very different from what is going on 

now. In our discussions in Luxembourg, we talked a lot about protecting populations, not just territory, and about the danger posed 

by cyber attacks and, as Senator Lugar pointed out, energy security is also an issue. Another question is, What does ‘‘armed attack’’ 

mean? And so, those are the kinds of questions that we are going 

to be exploring. 

The CHAIRMAN. Are there thoughts about actually changing— 

making recommendations with respect to amendments to the charter, et cetera? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. The truth is I can’t answer that yet. I 

don’t know. In some of the discussions last week people did talk 

about Article 5, and what it means under current conditions, while 

reiterating that it’s central to the alliance. I think everybody understood that. 

People are also looking at Article 4, which provides for consultation in circumstances that go beyond just dealing with an armed 

attack. So the question that you asked is totally central to what 

we’re going to be looking at, and all I can do at this point is tell 

you that these are questions that need to have public exposure. We 

are an alliance of democracies, which means that there has to be 

public support. And so, having open discussions about what this all 

means, I think, is crucial to the whole process. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I couldn’t agree with you more. And you 

are absolutely correct at how elegant and straightforward the 

treaty is. I’m holding it here, I’m looking at Article 4. One sentence. 

I think the same is true of Article 3. I mean, you run through 

it—— 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. It’s very simple, very straightforward. 

But, I have one last question pertaining to the relevance of today 

and the simplicity of that elegant treaty then. Given the recognition that Afghanistan’s struggle cannot be won solely by military 

force, of which we are all convinced—generals and civilians alike— 

it’s even more important than ever that the international community prepare and execute a coordinated civilian and governance 

assistance program. So far, the coordination has been, for better or 

worse, just absent; lacking. And so have the civilian resources. And 

that hit me full square in this trip, in the last days, as we think 

about what we can achieve on the ground in this country—where 

13 

I think there are great possibilities to achieve things, incidentally. 

I don’t want to suggest there isn’t the framework within which we 

can’t. We can. 

But so far, it’s just a mishmash. Countries are operating independently in their spheres of influence. UNAMA has not stepped 

up to provide the type of international coordination that’s required. 

That type of mandate is outside of NATO’s mission. So, the default 

position seems to be to allow the U.S. military to run the entire 

show, which winds up, in my judgment, not only sending the wrong 

message to Afghans about our motives, but actually undermines 

the very core of the mission itself. 

So, I wonder if you think there’s a way to quickly shape up 

NATO with respect to this, and even allies who aren’t part of 

NATO, who have an interest in the stability of this region. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I fully agree with you 

about the lack of organized assistance or functioning, here. And I 

think that part of what has happened is that the way things 

evolved over the last 8 years in terms of the military really taking 

over a large number of functions, frankly because some of our own 

civilian activities were not being fulfilled. There are also an awful 

lot of nongovernmental organizations that are operating on their 

own, and the United Nations, too. 

There are ways that NATO can help on this, especially in the 

more civil civilian aspect and on governance issues. Such an initiative might also help the various NATO members to feel that they 

are contributing in a more meaningful way to what is a joint effort. 

But, the organizational aspect of this is not easy and that is part 

of the problem with the decisionmaking process that I think we 

have to look at. 

I find the new Secretary General has been very forward-leaning 

on this, and has, in fact, indicated the importance of Afghanistan 

in this larger framework as something that is the role of NATO, 

and my sense is that he will push on these things. And we will, 

obviously, look at it also. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. I’m curious about your thoughts on the problems 

that governments in Europe have in either making available to 

their publics word about NATO, news about NATO, reasons for the 

importance of NATO, because I am under the impression that the 

general publics in several countries do not have either a great 

interest in this subject or are worried about obligations that may 

come, that have not been fully explained by their governments. 

Now, this seems to me to be especially the case with many countries in Eastern Europe. I don’t want to suggest a division in which 

Germany and France and maybe Italy and Spain are in one camp 

and those countries—Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, what 

have you—are in another; but, nonetheless, when I visited NATO 

headquarters, the EU—and two of our witnesses today, General 

Craddock and Kurt Volker, were extremely helpful, in my understanding, about a year ago—it was apparent to me that the Article 

5 issue arose very frequently and with regard to those that were 

close to Russia. And they were not really clear exactly who would 

14 

come, physically, they would ask you as an American, ‘‘Would you 

come?’’ And so, I think this is a critical situation. 

Now, it’s not entirely a function of energy. I’ve suggested this is 

an important point. Maybe it’s just sheer proximity. Maybe it’s history or ethnic groups within countries. But, addressing the energy 

question for a moment, I was impressed, at the summit in Ankara 

on the Nabucco signing, that two of the large German energy companies are, in fact, stockholders and very much involved with 

Gazprom. Another, RWE, is not. And I’ve been impressed, subsequently, to see Joschka Fischer, here in Washington, talking about 

RWE. Now, if Gerhard Schroeder was here, he might be talking 

about something else. So, even within Germany, an interesting 

division as to what ought to be the future of energy and its relationship to other countries has arisen. 

Now, I expressed the thought, in my opening statement, that 

when I raised this at the Riga summit in 2006, the response was 

very—not necessarily covert, but rather guarded. Foreign Ministers 

saw me in the hallway afterward and they said, ‘‘This is very 

important. But, this is so existential, we don’t talk about it publicly. This is something our country tries to deal with, the energy 

problem behind the barn, so to speak.’’ Now, it’s in front of the 

barn now, and we really are beginning to meet it. 

But, I raised this question in this complex way. Now, energy is 

very important to the publics of all the NATO countries—the security of jobs, heating of homes in the winter, all the rest of it. It is 

an existential question. Now, is it possible that—not that NATO 

needs a resurgence per se as the strategic group meets, tries to 

think through the future of this, there can be more concentration 

on—if not energy independence, energy dependence on NATO. Or 

the question of whether we would come to the rescue, that there 

is real relevance—even in the face of the fact that there might be 

al-Qaeda terrorists from time to time in European capitals or subways or what have you—but that thinking for most citizens and 

their industries comes down, right now, to the energy equation. I’d 

like some further discussion, as you’ve thought about this, and 

you’ve touched upon it a little bit in your opening remarks. This 

has come to the fore, perhaps, in some of your discussions. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, what we did in Luxembourg was kind of lay out the subjects that we would be talking 

about, and clearly energy is among those. There are different 

views, as you can well imagine. 

On the issue, generally, of communications—and I’ll return to 

energy in a minute—as the Secretary General, as well as other people that I’ve talked to there, are bound and determined to have a 

different approach on communications. Part of what they’re looking 

at is a new way of doing strategic communications and getting 

things up on a Web site. Everyone understands that this is going 

nowhere if, in fact, there is not an awful lot more done in terms 

of communication with the public. 

In our work plan, we are using this first several months as kind 

of a reflection period, where we’re bringing all the issues in, and 

then we’re going to go around as experts on consultations to all the 

NATO capitals and we even will have meetings outside of the 

NATO family. 

15 

The energy issue, I think, is absolutely key, and because nothing 

in life is simple, it also involves what’s going on in Turkey. I recently created a group of former Foreign Ministers and we met to 

talk about Turkey, and we had all these unbelievable maps of the 

pipelines that have to go in, around, and through Turkey, how one 

competes with another. This whole issue of the pipelines and who 

controls what is, I think, one of the major issues of the 21st century. It’s something that we will be talking about in some detail. 

An additional component that we’re looking at is the effect of 

global warming in the Arctic. One of our subjects for discussion is 

the High North and the issue of oil tankers and other vessels 

transiting Arctic waters. 

Senator, I read your speech to the Atlantic Council. I fully agree 

with the way that you’re framing the issue. Getting others to see 

the whole instead of just the component parts is what we’re going 

to be working on. But I think it is a big issue and one that does 

appeal to public understanding. 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Well, thank you very much. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, it’s a—— 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Senator, good to see you. 

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. Pleasure to have you back before 

the committee. It’s nice to see you. 

NATO has taken on a different meaning and a different role, and 

I just want to engage you a little bit as to what impact this is having on the recommendations that you are going to make. We look 

at countries today that view membership in NATO as graduating, 

as showing the nations in transition and innovation in Europe. 

I think of Bosnia-Herzegovina today and recognize that 14 years 

ago it was involved in a war. Genocide was occurring, and hundreds of thousands lost their lives. And now, Bosnia’s future is 

uncertain today. We have made progress. Most of the people you 

talk to about what’s happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina say that the 

prospect of joining NATO is one of the unifying factors, that it has 

the country focused on what it needs to do with constitutional 

reform. So, I would just like to get your observations as to how 

important NATO expansion is to the United States goal of stability 

in Europe, and whether that’s a factor as you look at when considering NATO in the future. 

For example, concerning membership application action plans, 

there is a question as to whether we should pursue one with Bosnia at this point or whether constitutional reform progress must be 

made in advance of an application. 

I guess I look at NATO today—I think we all do—as an extremely valuable institution, not just for its military presence and 

capacity, but also as an institution that shows that nations have 

something to look forward to and as an incentive to further 

progress in the region. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. First of all, let me just restate that I am 

here only in my personal capacity, and not as chair of this group. 

We don’t have any conclusions on anything like this yet. 

It’s interesting, Senator, I’ve been through this from the very 

beginning, because when we began the process of enlarging NATO 

16 

in the middle 1990s, and I was the Ambassador to the United 

Nations, I went around with General Shalikashvili, who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time, in order to lay out what the 

paths were. This is when we developed the Partnership for Peace 

and began to emphasize that NATO was not just some kind of a 

do-goody organization; there were responsibilities that came with 

it, privileges and responsibilities. 

And that—it was not an easy pass, and the Partnership for Peace 

was really a way to get people to make sure that there was civilian 

control over the military, that there were a series of governance 

aspects to it. That was something we looked into as we enlarged 

NATO in the first go-around. I think that there is a magnet 

approach, in terms of the hope of getting into NATO that does 

make people and the countries adapt their behavior in a positive 

way. 

And so what has happened in the intervening years is that more 

steps have been established—the membership action plan and individual national plans. So, I do think that the hope of coming into 

NATO is something that is a very good either catalyst or magnet 

that does serve a purpose, and that NATO is not just a military 

alliance. It also creates political space, and it does allow for movement in the right direction whether it’s in Bosnia or elsewhere. 

But membership in NATO is not a gift. It is a responsibility. And 

therefore those standards are very important. And I like the approach that it takes a while to get in, but that there is a goal at 

the end. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I agree with you, and particularly as it 

relates to Bosnia. There are some disturbing trends right now in 

that country. The one unifying factor that gives us hope for constitutional reform is that all sectors are convinced that NATO 

membership would be in Bosnia’s interest—— 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Right. 

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. Which gives up hope that we won’t 

slide back to the ethnic fighting that took place just a few years 

ago. 

I think, as we look at NATO in the future, it is a different organization when it has 28 members and more that are likely to be 

joining. We need to figure out a way in which it strengthens not 

just the reforms that take place—the responsibilities that nations 

undertake to become members—but also a continuing responsibility 

as members in NATO. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think—if I might add to one of the 

issues here—one requirement in the acceptance process is that a 

country, whether Bosnia or any other, should not have any internal 

fights. Therefore, an incentive is created to settle ethnic conflict as 

when Romania came into NATO. And that is another one of the 

attractive aspects of the magnet part of this. 

Senator CARDIN. Of course, in Bosnia one of the major concerns 

NATO has is whether there is a functioning government control of 

the military, rather than having it subject to local vetoes. But, 

that’s true really as a government, that you need to have a 

national government that can function and protect the rights of the 

nation. 

17 

So, you know, I just think that this is an important function as 

we look forward to NATO in the future. And I thank you for the 

work that you’re doing. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I had the opportunity to say a word to you, back before we came 

out, and sometimes preparation and opportunity sort of meet each 

other, and I just want to say in public that, as it relates to what 

you’ve done over the last week, I am proud of you and proud for 

you, and actually thought, when you stepped into the room there 

might be a standing ovation. But, anyway thank you for that. 

I also want to thank you for having this hearing. I know that 

this is result of a business meeting we had regarding the support 

of additional countries coming into NATO. I thank you for that, 

and Ranking Member Lugar. 

And with that, Madam, thank you for your tremendous service 

to our country, Ms. Secretary. I appreciate the long history you 

have with NATO, and your understandings, that many of us don’t 

have, because of that. 

I guess one of the—I’m a NATO supporter, but I do realize that 

NATO is evolving right now. And I guess one of the issues that I 

have, it appears to me that NATO is being divided between security providers and security consumers. Only 5 of the 28 countries 

that exist in NATO actually are living up to 2 percent of their GDP 

being utilized to support defense mechanisms. So, what’s really 

happening is, we have countries coming in to NATO. It almost 

appears, in some cases, we do that in a willy-nilly way. And we’re 

providing the security, it seems. We’re expending the American 

citizens’ dollars to make sure that NATO is protected, and certainly 

our lives—our military men and women’s lives—and yet, we have 

most of NATO being security consumers. That, to me, is troubling, 

and I wonder if you might comment on that. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that it is a very large alliance now, with different capabilities, but I think that if one looks 

at what the various countries are providing, many of them are, in 

fact, providing above what one would expect. I won’t go through the 

list with you. I do think that there is the issue—and we are going 

to be looking at this—of whether providing 2 percent of GNP to 

defense is the right way to measure support for the alliance. Perhaps there are ways to supplement defense contributions with 

efforts that are more in the civilian line. 

I think those are the kinds of questions that we have to ask. I 

do not think that anybody should be a free rider in this alliance. 

Senator CORKER. But they are. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think those are exactly the kinds 

of things that we are going to be looking at. 

Senator CORKER. Well, should we be adding new members that 

we know are going to be free riders, or should we change the way 

we look at this? And when people come in, they know that they 

have responsibilities not to be free riders. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I believe yes. I think that one has 

to make—that’s what I was saying to Senator Cardin is that basiVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 Jun 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\NATO(2).TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
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cally there has to be a set of standards that are met. Membership 

in NATO is not a gift; it is a responsibility. On the other hand, I 

think that we do need to understand the extent to which the prospect of NATO membership can help to generate changes that we 

want to see in particular places. 

I have to say, you know, that one of the reasons we spent so 

much time on the Balkans is that it was the missing piece of the 

puzzle in a Europe that we wanted to become whole and free. And 

a lot of what we did by having a NATO mission in Kosovo and in 

Bosnia was to pull this all together, not because we were just 

thinking about the goodness of Europe, but because it is in the 

United States national interest. 

Senator CORKER. And I want to be clear, I agree with that. I 

really do. And I thank you for making that point. But, I am concerned about this huge disparity in security providers and security 

consumers. 

I was in Georgia, about a week, right after the bombings. I went 

up to Gori. And I very much like President Saakashvili. I very 

much appreciated the Prime Minister that was in charge at that 

time. And some of the folks I met were in my office just yesterday. 

I have to tell you, when I realized that President Saakashvili, who 

I respect, and certainly appreciate what’s happening in Georgia 

right now—when I realized that he had—if, for lack of a better 

word, had ‘‘taken the bait’’—OK—with Georgia coming down—I 

mean with Russia coming down from where it was, that under 

Article 5, had they been in NATO at that time, I suppose there 

would have been some United States response to the fact that Russia came into part of their sovereign territory. And I just wondered 

if issues like that, in some of these more fledgling countries, caused 

you concern as it relates to Article 5. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think this is why we are looking 

at how Article 5 relates today; what does it mean, with so many 

more countries? But Article 5 is the central aspect of NATO, and 

these are the questions that the group is asking itself. 

There was a declaration at the Bucharest summit, that Georgia 

and Ukraine would ultimately become members, but they have to 

meet a set of standards to get there. 

We have all signed onto the territorial integrity of Georgia, but, 

there has to be a way that some of the issues related to the internal problems of Georgia are properly resolved. 

But that is the question. That is absolutely the question. 

Senator CORKER. And it seems like it’s an important question. It 

seems like, as we continue to look at new nations coming in, new 

countries coming in, it’s important. 

This is my last question. I wasn’t going to talk about Afghanistan, but I noticed you brought it up in your testimony, and I’m, 

I think, one of the few Republicans that has actually said that I 

think it’s perfectly legitimate for President Obama to take some 

time to analyze where we are. I think taking too much time becomes a little Shakespearean, but you know, taking a little time 

looking at the situation, I certainly appreciate what Senator Kerry 

has done, as I mentioned. 

What I haven’t found particularly interesting is—I know, in February or March, when the President announced his new strategy, 

19 

everybody talked about it being a narrowed mission. I knew immediately that it was nation-building. And if you look at the matrix 

by which we’ve been measuring progress in Afghanistan, it is 

nation-building. And I notice you or Senator Kerry, one, mentioned 

governance and development being part of the NATO mission, civilian and military activities. I don’t know which said which. But, 

much of that leads to, in essence, what we now are embarked on 

in Afghanistan, which is nation-building. 

And I just—you mentioned that the NATO allies were allied in 

their goals in Afghanistan. I’m not trivializing the problems that 

we have there, but that’s never been articulated in a way that I 

can understand it. And since NATO is allied in what those goals 

are, I’d love for you to share with me what that is, and if you do 

see what we’re doing in Afghanistan today as being nationbuilding. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I apologize in saying 

this, but nation-building has gotten to sound like a four letter 

word. The term is thought by some to have all kinds of implications, which I don’t fully understand, because it seems like it is 

being portrayed as the worst thing you could possibly do. 

I think that what has to happen in Afghanistan—— 

Senator CORKER. You have to do that in counterinsurgency, 

right? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think, partially, what we’re trying 

to do is stop Afghanistan from being a place that provides a safe 

haven for al-Qaeda. After all, this is where the 9/11 people came 

from. 

I think it is very important that Afghanistan not be such a 

haven. Now, what does that really mean? 

Some of it does have a political context in terms of having a form 

of governance that the people can trust enough so that they don’t 

find themselves harassed or terrified by the Taliban. 

I think that one of the things that Chairman Kerry really did 

was to explain and make clear that there has to be some political 

context to it. 

We’re not trying to create a ‘‘perfect country’’ over there, but this 

is a society that was able to govern itself for some time. What we 

have to do is try to figure out a way that the political powers over 

there are not corrupt, the people are not terrified, and governance 

procedures are improved. 

So even though people hate the term ‘‘nation building.’’ I do 

think that the military and the civilian aspect of this go together. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good questions. Thank you. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I’d like to add my congratulations to you, and to echo what 

Senator Corker said, for all the energy that you have put into 

attempting to bring a proper resolution to this situation over the 

past couple of weeks. 

And also would like to express my appreciation for the decision 

to hold this hearing. I was one, along with Senator Corker, who 

had suggested this during the business meeting that we had. I 

20 

think it’s vitally important for us to have a good hold on what this 

relationship really is with NATO. 

And, Madam Secretary, I appreciate very much your testifying 

today. I’ve been watching a good bit of this hearing from my office. 

My major concern with respect to NATO is along the lines, a little bit, of what Senator Corker said at the beginning of his comments. I raised this issue in the Armed Services Committee last 

year and in this committee. We seem to have progressed from an 

alliance to a sort of a three-part entity in NATO, much more 

divided than it ever was when I was in the Pentagon 25 years ago, 

for instance, which I spent a lot of time in NATO. We have the 

United States now, as a—sort of, the principal military guarantor. 

The United States has always been more involved militarily than 

the other countries, as you know, from 1949 forward, when Eisenhower as SACEUR called for six divisions to be sent to Europe. 

When I was Assistant Secretary of Defense I did a lot of work for 

Cap Weinberger in NATO. At that time, we had 206,000–216,000 

Army soldiers alone in Germany—United States Army soldiers 

alone in Germany, and not including family members—which was 

about 60,000 more soldiers than the U.K. had in their entire army 

worldwide. There were a lot of discussions then about the United 

States, and the imbalance between the United States and others. 

But, that seems to me to have been accentuated in the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall. 

And we have a situation now where the United States remains 

the major military guarantor. Many of the other countries in the 

old alliance are repairing their relationships in Eastern Europe, 

their historical relationships in Eastern Europe, as well they 

should. And we’ve been bringing in these other countries that—you 

can put a label on them, you can call them an ally, but in reality 

they’re protectorates. 

So, the question really, for me—and I would appreciate hearing 

your thoughts on this—is, When we are obligating ourselves to 

come to the defense of countries that really are contributing very, 

very little in terms of their own military capabilities, which is the 

foundation of what you would call an alliance—where are we on 

this? This is more like a commonwealth than an alliance at this 

point. Or, what would your thoughts be? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I would not call the new 

members protectorates. We could talk about that. But, I think that 

it is clearly different; there’s no question. 

An alliance that was set up for one purpose has been reconfigured to do something else. I do think that the political aspect of 

it is important in terms of what it does to create an area where 

democracy and a variety of rule-of-law issues are taking hold— 

albeit slowly, but they are. 

And I think that—and again, I welcome your question so that I 

can make something very clear; I have always been a supporter of 

NATO, for a variety of reasons. 

But I took this assignment on for a very different reason, which 

is that I think it does need to be examined. That’s the whole point 

of this Strategic Concept. I don’t want to be a part of producing or 

delivering a set of information that is just kind of regurgitating all 

the various things that we’ve been saying for the last 60 years. 

21 

And so, I am taking this on in terms of looking at exactly the 

kind of questions that you and Senator Corker are asking, and others are asking, ‘‘What is this about?’’ And I think part of it is about 

keeping a linkage between the United States and North America 

with Europe. I think that despite whatever issues are out there, 

that continues to be a really important part. 

I find the trip that Vice President Biden is on right now to be 

significant in terms of the things that he was saying in Warsaw 

and Romania; he’s on his way to the Czech Republic. He is contributing to the sense of reassurance and trust that we need in a community of countries that I think can, in fact, be counted on for a 

variety of issues. 

But I want to look into exactly what you were all talking about. 

And what I hope is that I can come and visit with you more often 

through this process, because this does have to have the support 

of the American people. 

The Europeans have to get support from their people and we 

have to have these discussions and not just kind of say that we 

should continue on just because we’ve always done it this way. 

But I would not call them protectorates. I think that they, in 

many ways, are trying to figure out ways to be contributing members. We may not be asking enough of them. As we move ahead, 

we will be looking at the importance of a match between the problems we face and the capabilities that allies have. Finding the right 

match is what this is about. 

Senator WEBB. Well, I appreciate that response. First of all, I 

personally would still say, in classic military terms, they’re protectorates. They’re not really offering military capabilities to the strategic situation of the United States. But, setting that aside, it’s 

very interesting to hear your comment, because as you know, I 

spent 4 years in the Reagan administration in—under Cap Weinberger, and then as Secretary of the Navy—and what you just said 

was very much in line with what his mantra was, even 25 years 

ago. And I think Cap Weinberger’s actually a very underrated Secretary of Defense, in terms of history, when we look back at him. 

And the concept that he continued to push, when there were many 

questions then about the imbalance of the relationships, was that 

NATO was the vital link between the United States and the countries of Europe, for reasons beyond simply the military portion of 

it. And I wouldn’t disagree with that. 

But, I do have a lot of concern, when we start talking about 

expanding the number of countries and, as a result, even more 

than the issue of provoking Russia, mandatorily involving us in 

certain situations because of the nature of the treaty. I’m very 

happy to hear that you would want to come over and discuss this 

further, and I would look forward to that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. You raise 

very important and yet unresolved questions. But, you’re going to 

resolve them, right, Madam Secretary? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I will certainly push. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator DeMint. You’re up. Timely arrival. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being 

late. 

22 

Thank you, Madam Secretary, and I apologize if I’m asking a 

question that has already been discussed, but I’m particularly 

interested in the role of Russia in NATO, and the rumors of NATO 

going to Moscow to get their cues from Russia. And I know that’s 

not true, but I would just like to hear you talk a little bit about 

the impact of Russia and their goals, versus NATO, how that 

affects the strategic plan. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I mention in my testimony, Senator, that 

Russia could have a voice about what issues were going on in 

Europe, but never a veto. I think that the reality is that this alliance was set up to be against the Soviet Union, and the Soviet 

Union is gone. I had the rather interesting time, in the 1990s, 

when we were enlarging NATO, of going to Moscow any number of 

times and telling them that NATO was not against them, and they 

still have very much that mindset. 

But Russia and its relationship to Europe is complicated—and 

Senator Lugar was talking about the whole energy issue. The bottom line is that we need to reassure our allies and at the same 

time have some kind of a realistic relationship with Russia. 

Russia is not a member of NATO. There is a forum for developing a relationship between Russia and NATO, the Russia-NATO 

Council, where subjects are discussed—which is where the voice 

comes in—but they cannot veto anything that NATO decides. 

And so I don’t think anybody’s going to Moscow to get instructions. I think that, at some stage, our group of experts will have 

some consultations with the Russians, as we are going to with 

other countries and with various organizations. 

But it is a very—it’s an interesting mindset, when you look at 

an organization that was set up against something and then has 

to deal with a very different situation. 

Senator DEMINT. Right. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. And I did have a discussion with President Yeltsin at the time and he said, ‘‘Why are you doing this? This 

is a new Russia.’’ And I said, ‘‘Well, this is a new NATO. It is not 

against you.’’ 

And so, I think it is important to realize the presence of Russia. 

Moscow still does things that make some of its neighbors uncomfortable in terms of spheres of interest. And yet there are other 

aspects of their policies in which we can and should cooperate. And 

here I have in mind such issues as nuclear nonproliferation, the 

environment, drug smuggling, and some others. 

Senator DEMINT. Without the motivational glue that came from 

the threat of the Soviet Union, the sense of urgency to create 

NATO and to maintain it, do you sense, in your meetings and 

developing a strategic plan, that that sense of urgency to maintain 

a strong and united NATO still exits? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. We just had a seminar in Luxembourg, 

with a lot of different people—experts, military people. And I think 

that there is a sense that it is essential to figure out what the alliance is about. The new Secretary General sees a very strong role 

for NATO. He has laid out that it’s important to do the right thing 

in Afghanistan, develop some kind of a more functional relationship with Russia, and take on the assignment of developing a new 

Strategic Concept. 

23 

I do think there is the sense that the 1999 concept doesn’t work 

anymore. The word I kept hearing over and over again last week 

in Luxembourg was that we are living in a completely unpredictable time. And so, what people want to do is create some predictability in the form of what has been, and can continue to be, a 

major military alliance. 

This is why I welcomed this assignment, because I thought that 

it really does allow for a discussion on exactly the kinds of questions that you all are asking. And with the prejudice that this is 

an alliance that has been the greatest military alliance in the 

history of the world, so it has something going for it, but that we 

really do have to look at it and ask ourselves very honest 

questions. 

I personally do believe we gain a lot out of the NATO alliance. 

But in the course of this discussion we are asking these questions. 

Senator DEMINT. When I was in Brussels last year, we met with 

a number of European ambassadors. They tried to stress that, 

without strong U.S. leadership, NATO would not continue. The 

concern, obviously, the Europeans developing their own strategic 

forces could further dilute a NATO that maybe doesn’t have the 

same sense of urgency to exist that we did several decades ago. 

Again, as you go through this, do you feel like that the United 

States will play a parity role, a strong leadership role, a—what are 

the other NATO partners asking of us as part of this new strategic 

vision? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think that they are obviously prepared 

to contribute their share. I’m having trouble answering this, 

because I believe in American leadership. And I think that we 

would not want it in a way where NATO—where we don’t have a 

crucial role in NATO, and where we are the ones that are in charge 

of the command structure—this goes to Senator Webb’s point. 

And I think that we have to be careful, in terms of saying how 

to broaden the sense of responsibility, but, I believe in American 

leadership. And so, I would want to see that we continue to really 

have that. 

Now, on the EU structure, I think there are ways. We’re going 

to be meeting with the EU and trying to find ways where EU forces 

and NATO can cooperate. 

Senator DEMINT. Well, as you know, NATO has been one of the 

most important stabilizing forces in the world, and it—I believe 

that we need to continue it as a strong organization with American 

leadership. I very much appreciate your leadership and your service here. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ve got a full statement I’d like to submit for the 

record, and I’ll yield back—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it’ll be placed in the record. 

Thank you, Senator DeMint. 

[The prepared statement of Senator DeMint follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lugar, for holding this hearing today. 

Security and stability remain vital issues in the Transatlantic relationship and 

arguably this relationship sets a standard for the rest of the world. 

For more than 60 years NATO has flourished because it has defended the ideals 

of freedom, democracy, and stability not just for members of the alliance but for all 

24 

of Europe and indeed the world. Whether contributing to peacekeeping missions in 

Bosnia or on patrol in Afghanistan, NATO has been a leading contributor toward 

peace in the face of incredible challenges to global security. 

While NATO has much to celebrate from its storied past, we have constantly 

heard the refrain that now is ‘‘the’’ decisive moment for NATO. In the 20th century, 

NATO was created to counterbalance the growing influence of the Soviet Union, but 

since its collapse NATO has moved on. In the 21st century, some traditional threats 

still linger, but NATO has new threats to consider and confront. NATO at times has 

been slow to adapt to these emerging challenges. 

For these reasons and many more, NATO’s efforts to write a new Strategic Concept are helpful. The current Strategic Concept was written before September 11, 

Afghanistan, cyber warfare, energy manipulation, and Iran’s ballistic missile threat. 

STRATEGY DRIVES REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES

A new strategic concept should create a framework to resolve these important 

issues, but it should also provide a way for NATO’s partners to focus their effort 

in important areas like planning, procurement, and training. 

A focused NATO with an overarching vision of its purpose and mission in the 

world provides the necessary context to influence major decisions regarding defense 

procurement. Imagine the impact a strategic concept could have played in the September announcement of abandoning ground-based interceptors in Europe. In the 

vacuum of a clear vision for the organization, the GBI system became a victim and 

the alliance is now left with a less capable, more expensive, and unproven system. 

Further, NATO forces participating on the front lines of the battle against terrorism were trained for a conventional fight against Soviet tanks in the Fulda Gap. 

But the last 15 years have seen NATO forces conduct peacekeeping, humanitarian, 

and counterinsurgency missions. Few could predict that global conditions would dictate major operations in the Balkans, let alone in Afghanistan, but ‘‘out of area’’ 

operations will likely become more necessary to maintain stability in Europe. 

To construct a proper strategy, NATO must not only understand the heritage and 

purpose of the alliance from 60 years ago and its most recent past, they must recognize today’s context and more importantly the emerging challenges of the next 60 

years. 

EMERGING CHALLENGES

These challenges are both internal as well as external. NATO must transform 

itself and improve its processes. In a resource constrained environment this is 

vitally important. But removing duplication is also an external issue. 

NATO must remain the preeminent security structure in Europe, and I fear the 

duplication that can come from the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy. 

Parallel planning and operations structures duplicate effort. And if this and other 

organizations simply mean more demands on the same limited amount of resources 

and people, then no organization will be effective. Efforts to combat piracy off the 

Horn of Africa this past summer highlighted many of these problems. 

The list of external security challenges have been widely discussed and are well 

known, but my bigger concern with a new Strategic Concept is that it have sufficient flexibility for the alliance to respond to threats and challenges that no one can 

envision today, but may emerge in 5 years. 

THE ALLIANCE

That is why the Strategic Concept must address the development of a range of 

capabilities. Things like crisis management, stabilization and reconstruction operations, missile defense, counterterrorism, cyber security, energy security, and 

antipiracy operations are just a few of the skills sets NATO people must be able 

to perform and more importantly be able to scale the size of the situation. 

At the same time, the Strategic Concept must address the question some members 

are asking: ‘‘is NATO an alliance of equals or a two-tier alliance where some nations 

shoulder more than their fair share of the risks and burdens?’’ While the spectrum 

of NATO’s members’ resources and contributions will never allow a small country 

to match U.S. contributions many countries do fight above their weight. U.S. policy 

has always insisted that NATO is a single alliance, and the new strategic concept 

should maintain this. 

And this brings us to the bigger question of enlargement. Some argue that NATO 

is too large, consensus is too difficult to reach, and new members are a drag on the 

alliance. That is an easy view to express from inside the alliance. However, tell that 

to any country that has experienced a cyber attack, an invasion, or energy disruptions in the cold of winter purely for political reasons. 

25 

Every nation—including the United States—joined NATO because it faces security threats, and believed that working together provided more strength than standing alone. Any country that is dedicated to support and defend the principles set 

forth 60 years ago should be eligible for membership as long as they meet the criteria established by the alliance for all members. 

RUSSIA

I do have deep concerns about the role of Russia inside the alliance, especially 

in drafting a new Strategic Concept. The NATO-Russia Council is a useful mechanism for dialogue and finding areas of cooperation, such as supply lines and overflights to support operations in Afghanistan. 

However, Russia is not a member of NATO and they should have no role helping 

draft a new Strategic Concept. These is especially true because until there is some 

level of consensus on Russia inside the alliance, finding common ground on some 

of the most difficult issues for NATO will likely prove elusive. 

CONCLUSION

Nonetheless, NATO has endured because it has been successful, and the United 

States is the beneficiary of the alliance’s Article 5 commitments. Still to some in 

America, NATO’s processes can be frustrating and time-consuming, and things like 

caveats and decreasing defense budgets lead some to question European commitments to the alliance. 

However, in an uncertain world with a growing number of security challenges, 

NATO has proven to be one of the only security alliances that has actually worked. 

And it’s relevance to global security can only increase. 

I support moving forward with NATO strategic concept and I look forward to 

hearing your testimony on this important issue. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me add my 

congratulations and thanks for your work in Afghanistan. 

Madam Secretary, we’re delighted to have you here this morning. 

And I very much appreciate your pointing out the history that this 

committee has had with NATO over the years. 

I also have a statement that I’d like to submit for the record, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it’ll be placed in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

I want to thank Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar for holding this important hearing today and for their past efforts to build and foster the critical transAtlantic alliance. Today’s discussion builds on the active role this committee has 

played throughout the years in shaping the future of NATO. Just this spring, the 

Subcommittee on European Affairs held a hearing to mark the 60th anniversary of 

NATO and to consider our alliance’s future moving forward. 

We are thrilled to have Secretary Albright here today to discuss her leadership 

efforts in guiding NATO toward a sound, new strategic footing, which will ultimately help adapt and transform NATO to better meet the complex challenges of 

the 21st century. I want to welcome all of the witnesses here today. We look forward 

to your testimony. 

As each of you well know, the relationship between Europe and the United States 

touches nearly every critical global challenge. From national security to climate 

change to the international economy, a robust United States-Europe bond is vital 

to global stability and progress. We cannot afford to take this relationship for granted, and strengthening and adapting the NATO alliance to better meet today’s challenges should remain near the top of our trans-Atlantic agenda. 

As perhaps the most successful regional security alliance in history, NATO celebrated its 60th anniversary this year. Like any institution which has reached its 

sixth decade in existence, NATO must find a way to transform and reinvigorate 

itself on a regular basis in order to meet shifting realities and rapidly changing 

environments. The ‘‘Strategic Concept’’ process is an important opportunity to make 

26 

a bold and ambitious, yet realistic, statement on the future of this alliance. We 

should not let it slip by. 

As a coalition that operates on consensus, it will be difficult for NATO to find 

unanimous agreement among its 28 members on complex issues like NATO enlargement, the nature of its relationships or the scope of its missions. Despite the complexities, we should not avoid these discussions for fear of conflict. Disagreement 

should be a healthy exercise for any large, consensus-seeking body, and we should 

robustly engage in these important discussions in a transparent and constructive 

manner. 

In examining the challenges before the alliance, Afghanistan—NATO’s first ‘‘out 

of area’’ military commitment—remains the most pressing issue, and success there 

should be the priority for NATO into the near term. The question of enlargement 

remains contentious between alliance members. In addition, NATO’s complex and 

uncertain relationship with Russia permeates nearly all of the issues the alliance 

faces and will require our constant attention. It is equally important, however, that 

we also consider NATO’s evolving relationship with institutions like the EU and the 

U.N., as well as our ties with new and emerging partners in Asia and beyond. 

One of the more difficult areas to find consensus will be in determining the scope 

of NATO actions into the future. What will NATO do? What missions should it take 

on? When should NATO lead the international community? When should it take a 

back seat? 

The threats of the 21st century are more complex and ambiguous than ever 

before. Though territorial defense still remains a priority, new challenges like cyber 

warfare, climate change, energy security, missile defense, pandemic disease, and 

proliferation constitute threats to our alliance members. NATO will simply not be 

able to meet every challenge that threatens its members. With the understanding 

that NATO’s resources and capabilities are limited, the alliance will need to clearly 

define where and when it will engage on these threats. 

Consensus on any of these issues will be extremely difficult. All institutions—if 

they are to be successful in the long term—must make difficult decisions on their 

future. 

After two devastating world wars fought on European territory in the first half 

of the 20th century, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has succeeded in bringing together a Europe that is whole, free, and at relative peace over the last six 

decades. If our alliance is to be successful for another 60 years, we will need to 

tackle these difficult questions today. I hope the United States will take the opportunity of the ‘‘Strategic Concept’’ process to the lead in pushing the alliance to make 

bold, ambitious, and definitive decisions on the future of NATO. 

Senator SHAHEEN. You’ve talked a little bit about the Strategic 

Concept debate as an opportunity for us to rethink our commitment to NATO and what its role should be in the future. As we’re 

looking at that, what should the United States priorities be for 

developing the new Strategic Concept? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, my answer is in two parts. I think 

one is, obviously we are in NATO and believe in NATO because it’s 

good for American national interests. And I think we have to figure 

out to what extent it does address itself to these new threats and 

to what extent it is prepared to take on antiterrorist activity and 

issues having to do with cyber terrorism and energy. I think we 

need to prepare it to deal with new threats, since it’s no longer 

against the Soviet Union. 

I also think, though, that among our priorities has to be—and it’s 

some of what you all have been talking about—is how to make sure 

that the burden is shared better, that there really is an understanding. I do believe in American leadership, but not in the way 

that, you know, we do all the work and the heavy lifting. 

So, it’s a combination of making sure that the alliance actually 

does deal with the 21st century and also that there is an equitable 

distribution of what has to be done. 

27 

Senator SHAHEEN. How important is success in Afghanistan to 

the outcome of the Strategic Concept discussion? How will that be 

affected by Afghanistan and to the future of NATO? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. This, again, is one of the issues that we 

touched on in Luxembourg and that we talk about all the time. 

Clearly it is the prime NATO mission at this time. And people are 

saying that the success of NATO is dependent on the success in 

Afghanistan. I think it will play a very important role, but it isn’t 

the only thing that NATO has to look at. So, it’s very important, 

but I don’t think that the whole future of NATO should be judged 

on the basis of what happens in Afghanistan. 

But I do think NATO has to perform well in Afghanistan. And 

its role has to evolve a little bit, in ways that both the chairman 

and the new Secretary General have described. But I don’t think 

it can be the be-all and end-all for NATO. 

I think what is interesting is what has changed about NATO— 

and this is what we did in the 1990s—is to move it out of area. 

That is a very different issue. Do you deal with something that is 

not specifically in Article 5? And how far out of area is out of area? 

All I can tell you, as the person—I actually took NATO to war 

in Kosovo; that it was not a simple issue to persuade people that 

this was the right thing to do. It is an evolution. And I think that’s 

what we’re looking at in the Strategic Concept. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And so, how much will what’s happening in 

Afghanistan affect the burden-sharing discussion when it comes to 

the Strategic Concept? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I think it will affect it. There are discussions internally in the countries. I think there is this question 

about how much of the burden-sharing is all military and how 

much something else. But I definitely do think that it will. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And is the Strategic Concept process going to 

look at NATO’s role in the rest of the world, and what strategic significance it should have when it comes to Africa, say, or Asia, and 

what’s happening in other parts of the world? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes. We are going to have a seminar that 

looks at NATO in the wider world. We are also going to be consulting and dealing with other aspects of various organizations that 

are out there; obviously the OSCE is one of them. There is also the 

Istanbul initiative and ongoing activities in the Mediterranean. 

And piracy—antipiracy is one of the unpredictable 21st century 

issues. So, yes, we are going to be looking at that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. OK. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Kaufman. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to join what should be, 

and is, a chorus of folks thanking you for what you did these past 

several weeks. I think, to me, the single most important question 

we have to answer in Afghanistan has to do with governance and 

whether—as we know, in counterinsurgency there’s a battle between the government and the Taliban, not between the United 

States and the Taliban. And I think without what you did, we 

would be in real trouble over there, in terms of not moving the ball 

forward. And I think it was—having just returned from there— 

extraordinarily difficult to accomplish what you accomplished. So, 

28 

I want to thank you for what you did, and how important it is. And 

I think it’s one of the reasons why the President’s taking time to 

make his decision. Governance is an important part of it, and how 

the government over there behaves is key, and you really took us 

a long way toward being successful. 

Madam Secretary, you have just made my day. I’ve been a NATO 

supporter in the trenches all these years, and I’m really starting 

to have doubts. And what you said, in terms of how we should approach this, sums up my feelings on NATO. And I think that the 

members here have asked you good questions, everything from, 

‘‘Will it become an organization that just—you get in—it’s really 

important to get in, but after you get in you don’t do anything?’’ 

Is that the standard? Or is the standard we’re still a military 

alliance? 

And I’d like to kind of have you put on your former Secretary of 

State hat, as opposed to Commission, and just kind of go to 50,000 

feet on just two main questions. One is the military. You know, in 

Bosnia, 19 Foreign Ministers had to sign off on targeting, which 

was a nightmare. We now have 28 members. When you travel to 

Afghanistan—we keep coming to Afghanistan, because that’s really 

the test case for all this—and you start hearing about the caveats 

that individual NATO countries are required to have on each one 

of their involvement. Just give me some hope that there is—that 

NATO can really, honestly, be a military alliance that can work in 

the field to reach some kind of a military objective or political 

objective. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Senator, I think it can. I think that what 

has to happen—and we will get to this—is to look at the decisionmaking process. First of all, I’m sorry I made your day in that particular way, because I don’t want to sow doubts about the alliance, 

generally. I think that there are questions about what its role is 

and how it operates and how it moves in this very unpredictable 

environment that we’re in, but having been somebody that was a 

decisionmaker, there are not a lot of tools out there in order to 

accomplish what we want. 

And I think that a multilateral alliance, such as NATO, has been 

and will continue to be a very important way of operating in an 

unpredictable world. 

And so, what I’m hoping is that this particular exercise that 

we’re involved in will actually make NATO more useful for what 

we’re dealing with now. 

So, I don’t want you to think I’m not supportive of it, because I 

am; I just think it needs to be looked at within the tasks that are 

accepted now. 

The other part, though, that I have to tell you, we do want to 

run a completely transparent process, here. And so much of what 

we do these days has to do with public opinion, as it should. And 

if the United States begins to doubt the value of NATO, that will 

have a follow-on effect, in terms of what’s going on in other countries. So we have to ask these questions in a way that, I think, 

allows us to have an honest discussion, but without diminishing 

the importance of NATO, because, you know, all of a sudden people 

will start to say, ‘‘The United States doesn’t want to be in Europe.’’ 

And again, I point to Vice President Biden. He is involved in a 

29 

really important trip, in terms of giving the necessary reassurance. 

And I think that the Strategic Concept, one of its priorities, Senator Shaheen, is finding a way to reinforce this idea of reassurance. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, and I—and that’s where I am. I think 

there are real doubts. I mean, I think the questions raised here 

are, by and large, really valid in terms of going from 19 to 28. Can 

you make decisions? What are we trying to do? Are there free riders? And I think the fact that you’re addressing them is really 

what we need. And that’s the part that made my day. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. OK. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I just think—you know, the idea that you 

understand that there are doubts, that we all agree—I mean, Senator DeMint just said about how—the historical role that NATO 

has played. We all know that they’ve been great players in the 

past. They’ve been key. They’re important. And I don’t—frankly, 

don’t know what we’d do without them. But, in the meantime, we 

have to face these doubts about functioning in places like Afghanistan and Bosnia. Can we really have a decisionmaking process that 

works? 

Second part is the civilian surge. I mean, obviously a civilian 

surge is hard. And I just had a briefing yesterday from S/CRS and 

the State Department in how incredibly difficult it is to just have 

the right civilians available when you need them, who—at the time 

that you need them. And then going, again, to Afghanistan, and 

going around to each one of the PRTs and seeing the kind of civilian help they need, and how the different—you know, one country 

decides to give this, another country kind of gives this—like a food 

bank. You know, you just wake up one morning and you’ve got all 

this kind of food. You don’t know whether it’s really healthy for the 

people, but it’s all there. 

So, again from 50,000 feet, in terms of civilian surge, how are we 

going to operate that, with so many diverse players in the puzzle, 

to make sure that we end up with troops—civilians on the 

ground—that we need, when we need them? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that is a huge question. In 

the U.S. Government, it goes to the whole issue of the relationship 

between State and Defense. Internationally, I think that there are 

numbers of countries that want to help. And again, it’s the coordinating mechanism. And the question is whether that coordinating 

mechanism comes through NATO or through the EU or through 

the U.N., but something has to happen to coordinate that. I mean, 

the worst part that I’ve noticed is that there’s either no effort or 

a duplication of effort. And so, there has to be something there. 

The other part is that there has to be more reward, so to speak, 

for the civilians. We don’t focus enough on the dangers that are 

there for them and the hard work that they put in, and that they 

are very much a part of the effort. We need to recognize the very 

important part they play, and then push for a variety of coordinating activities. 

Senator KAUFMAN. One final thing. You’re at NDI; you’re an 

expert on strategic communications. What can we do in bettering 

strategic communications, not on the total mission, but where our 

troops are deployed? 

30 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. As you know, NDI is there in Afghanistan, and we’re going back for the planned runoff election. NDI’s 

efforts underline for me the importance of listening a little bit more 

to what Afghans have to say, instead of telling them what to do 

all the time. I think that what is interesting is the number of people that actually did go out and vote. You know, we’ve kind of forgotten about that. And the people that went there for NDI saw the 

bravery of the people coming out. And so, I think listening more 

to what they do have to say, and understanding that strategic communications is a two-way activity is valuable. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman. 

And I thank all my colleagues for their comments about the last 

few days. I appreciate it very, very much. 

Let me just very quickly say, because we have another panel— 

I’m informed we have a vote at around 11:50, and that means we’ll 

have a grace period, so we’ll have about half an hour before chaos 

will envelop us. So, I want to try to push it forward. But I did just 

want to ask you a question very, very quickly before we switch, if 

I may. 

It’s become clear that the European Union, through the European Security and Defense Policy, is something of a factor. Call it 

a major factor, but it’s certainly an important factor in transatlantic security policy decisionmaking. A lot of observers are concerned that cooperation between NATO and the EU is poor and 

inefficient. And now we have this kind of pyramid—convoluted 

defense-security relationships, none of which are streamlined and 

working as effectively as possible, and some of which leave out the 

enormously important countries, with respect to the kind of threats 

that we face today. 

So I haven’t figured it out yet, but I’m very troubled by the process. And I hope that you all are going to think very clearly about, 

Are we matching our methodology to the threat? And if I were to 

ask you today, ‘‘What is the greatest threat that, in your judgment, 

links the NATO members and the United States?’’ what would the 

answer to that be? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, I—— 

The CHAIRMAN. What is the biggest threat to our security? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT [continuing]. I think it is trying to deal 

with the combination of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and 

energy. 

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that, pretty much. I’d add, the overall climate change—— 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. But, that—it goes to the—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Energy piece, so, if you take that 

context, you’ve got to have Russia. You’ve got to think about the 

‘‘stans’’ and what’s happening there, and down into South Asia. 

And they don’t figure directly into NATO, except to the degree that 

NATO is in Afghanistan, which sort of leads you to say, ‘‘OK, why 

aren’t we getting a better effort out of them with respect to that?’’ 

So I would simply comment to you that we have to match the 

threat—the cold war was the cold war, very clearly delineated, 

East/West, bipolar relationship. And things were a lot simpler in 

31 

that context. And we exploited it, to a degree, because we were able 

to put almost every major decision in that context. That is not the 

world we live in today, but we live with NATO, which is not responding adequately to the reality of the real threat that we face. 

And nations that we need to have respond to that real threat are 

outside of it. 

So, there’s a fundamental paradigm conflict. I’d just leave it on 

the table, at the last moment here. It bears much more discussion, 

and I hope the second panel will get into that. But, it’s what troubles me in this conversation, Madam Secretary. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, Mr. Chairman, I do think that we 

are going to have a seminar of the experts looking at moving out 

of area in that particular way. I think that the whole world has 

shifted over to the East on this particular issue. And I agree with 

you on—specifically, we are going to have an experts meeting with 

the EU so that we can see some of those things. 

I hope very much that if we can’t solve everything, we will have, 

in fact, put all these questions on the table. But, we are all going 

to be working very, very hard. This expert group, I think, has a 

very good rapport already. We’ve kind of subdivided the work. We 

will be giving building blocks to the Secretary General. But, I hope 

very much that we can keep a running conversation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will, and this is probably a very, very 

poor analogy, but you know how kids get that little block, and it 

has round holes and—— 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Triangles and squares, and you fit 

the things in it? We’ve got to ask ourselves if we’re trying to take 

a whole brand new one and take one of the pieces from that and 

fit it into the old one and see whether or not it’s round or—— 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Square or triangular, and doesn’t fit 

any of the holes. I don’t know the answer, but we’re operating in 

a very convoluted—— 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Exclusively slow responding, and 

not completely fulfilling structure, and it is greatly complicating 

the challenge to us in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, proliferation 

and other issues. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know if other colleagues want to have any 

last words—before we—— 

Senator CORKER. I know it’s time to press on. I guess the bottom 

question would be, Should we wait until you complete your work 

to move ahead any more with any additional NATO admissions? 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Whether we should wait? Well, I don’t 

think there’s any immediate proposal. We’re supposed to be done 

with our work by the spring. But, really—that’s your problem. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CORKER. But—— 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. No. I really do—I think that there are 

various ways—— 

32 

The CHAIRMAN. I’ll bet you wouldn’t have said that if you were 

the sitting Secretary of State. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. There are some advantages to not being 

the sitting Secretary of State. 

Thank you all very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much—— 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. For being with us. 

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thanks. Yes. 

The Chairman. We really do appreciate it. 

Could we try to get the second panel up as rapidly as possible? 

And I think Senator Shaheen is going to chair the second-panel 

portion of this. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I’m happy to do that, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess what I’d like to ask the panelists, since, as you point out, 

we have a vote that starts at 10:50, so we’ve only got about a half 

an hour, is if you could try and condense your remarks, please. And 

we will get to the questioning, but I’m also going to shorten the 

question time so that each person gets 5 minutes, so that hopefully 

everybody who’s here will have a chance to get in their questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, why don’t you come up and take the 

chair here. 

Senator SHAHEEN [presiding]. Senator Kerry introduced our 

panel at the beginning of the hearing, so I would like to go ahead 

and begin, and ask General Craddock, who is the former Supreme 

Allied Commander in Europe, if he would begin with his statement. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK, U.S. ARMY (RET.), FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER–EUROPE, U.S. ARMY, 

MYRTLE BEACH, SC 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Senator Shaheen, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate 

you asking me to appear before this committee today to testify on 

the NATO Strategic Concept. 

As my last assignment on Active Duty, was as the Supreme 

Allied Commander of Operational NATO Forces, I will focus my 

comments on the military perspective of the Strategic Concept 

that’s being developed over the coming year. 

First, I firmly believe that development of the Strategic Concept 

must include timely and relevant input by the NATO military 

authorities, not only from the military committee, but also from the 

supreme commanders for operations and transformation. This 

input is essential to inform the process of just what the two components of NATO’s military forces—the command structure and the 

force structure—currently are capable of, and what changes or 

adjustments to those forces might be required based on strategy 

development. 

Now, while the military committee interfaces directly with the 

North Atlantic Council—the NAC—and is the recognized body in 

NATO to provide the NAC military advice, only commanders are 

responsible and accountable for NATO forces and therefore may 

have distinctly different views than the military committee. 

33 

That fact, plus the advice they may render, is not a result of a 

consensus process, and they both compel me to advocate that the 

strategic commanders be consulted in this development process. 

Second, much of the 1999 Strategic Concept document is still relevant today. And I might provide an example. A sentence from 

paragraph 4 is particularly cogent. It states, ‘‘The Alliance must 

maintain collective defense and reinforce the transatlantic link, 

and ensure a balance that allows the European allies to assume 

greater responsibility.’’ Indeed, all good words. The challenge today, 

as then, is not in the development of what NATO wants to do, 

should do, or feels compelled to do; the challenge for NATO is 

matching its level of ambition with political will to resource the 

means to accomplish its ambitions, or, more specifically, creating 

and sustaining military capability. The development of a strategy 

or strategic concept must address a vision of the endstate, the ways 

possible to accomplish that vision, and the means or the resources 

needed to create the required capabilities. 

The 2010 Strategic Concept must, unlike its predecessor, address 

the ways and means. I believe, absent that, once again the disconnect between the vision or level of ambition and the political 

will to commit the resources will continue. 

And while potentially a product of the consensus process, I 

believe the use of such terms and phrases, such as ‘‘allows greater 

participation,’’ in practice is not strong enough to accomplish the 

specified intent of greater burden-sharing. If the intent is for the 

next NATO Strategic Concept to strengthen the alliance, then that 

document must be written to mandate opting in, not accommodating opting out. 

Third, the Strategic Concept must address the development by 

both NATO collectively and nations individually of capabilities 

specified in the strategy. Capability development in the alliance is 

a complex and difficult task. Defense shares of national budgets are 

shrinking among NATO member nations. The Strategic Concept 

must address this critical area, not only from the context of balancing both NATO and national investments, but, additionally, I 

believe, opening linkages to regional and international organizations to enhance this military capability development. 

And last, may I offer two related points of consideration: 

First is, we have seen repeatedly over the last several years in 

every military operation NATO has undertaken, civil-military component to operations is critical and must receive more attention. 

The 1999 Strategic Concept gave this area short-shrift, dedicating 

about seven sentences to it. 

Second, NATO can’t continue to spar with the European Union 

concerning security capabilities. We’ve talked about cooperation, 

but have really not done much in terms of working together in any 

meaningful way. The new Strategic Concept must set the conditions for real, serious cooperation with the European Union. There 

have been, and will continue to be, myriad opportunities, and we 

must get this right. I believe this to be a priority political deliverable for the Strategic Concept. 

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to appear, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Craddock follows:] 

34 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK, U.S. ARMY (RET.), FORMER

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER–EUROPE, U.S. ARMY, MYRTLE BEACH, SC 

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for asking me to appear before this committee today to testify on the 

NATO strategic concept. As my last assignment on Active Duty—ending on the 2d 

of July this year—was as the Supreme Allied Commander of operational NATO 

forces—I will initially focus my comments on the military perspective of the strategic concept that is to be developed by NATO over the coming year, followed by 

addressing other key NATO issues that I believe may be germane to this committee’s areas of interests. 

First—I firmly believe the development of the strategic concept must include 

timely and relevant input by the NATO military authorities—not only from the 

military committee—but also from the Supreme Commanders for operations and 

transformation. This input is essential to inform the process of just what the two 

components of NATO’s military forces—the command structure and the force structure—currently are capable of and what changes or adjustments to those forces 

might be required based on the strategy development. While the military committee 

interfaces directly with the North Atlantic Council—the NAC as it is known—and 

is the recognized body in NATO to provide the NAC military advice, only commanders are responsible and accountable for NATO forces and therefore may have 

distinctly different views than the military committee. That, plus the fact the advice 

they may render is not a result of a consensus process, compels me to advocate that 

the strategic commanders be consulted in the strategy concept development process. 

Second—much of the 1999 strategic concept document is still relevant today. For 

example, a sentence from paragraph 4 is particularly cogent: ‘‘it (the alliance) must 

maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance 

that allows the European allies to assume greater responsibility.’’ Indeed, all good 

words. The challenge today, as then, is not in the development of what NATO wants 

to do, should do, or feels compelled to do. The challenge for NATO is matching its 

level of ambition with its political will to resource the means to accomplish its ambitions—or more specifically—creating and sustaining military capability. The development of strategy, or a strategic concept must address a vision of the end state, 

the ways possible to accomplish that vision, and the means—or the resources— 

needed to create the required capabilities. The 2010 strategic concept must, unlike 

its predecessor, address the ways and means. Absent that, once again, the disconnect between the vision—or level of ambition—and the political will to commit 

the resources, will continue. And while potentially a product of the consensus process—the use of such terms and phrases as ‘‘allows greater participation’’—in 

practice is not strong enough to accomplish the specified intent of greater burdensharing. If the intent is for the next NATO strategic concept to strengthen the alliance—then that document must be written to mandate ‘‘opting in’’—not accommodate ‘‘opting out.’’ 

Third—this strategic concept must address the development—by both NATO 

collectively and nations individually—of capabilities specified as required in the 

strategy. Capability development in the alliance is a complex and difficult task. 

Defense shares of national budgets are shrinking among NATO member nations. 

The strategic concept must address this critical area—not only from the context of 

balancing both NATO and national investments but, additionally, opening linkages 

to regional and international organizations to enhance this military capability 

development. 

Last—may I offer two related points of consideration. First—as we have seen 

repeatedly over the last several years in every military operation undertaken, the 

civil-military component to operations is critical and must receive more attention. 

The 1999 strategic concept gave this area short shrift—about 7 sentences. Second— 

we can’t continue to spar with the European Union (EU) concerning security capabilities. We have talked about cooperation but have really not done much in terms 

of working together in any meaningful way. This new strategic concept must set the 

conditions for real, meaningful cooperation with the EU. There have been and will 

continue to be myriad opportunities—we must get this right. I believe this to be a 

priority political deliverable for the strategic concept. 

If I may, I would like to touch on a few other topics relevant to this committee’s 

interest. 

First—the implications for NATO of operations in Afghanistan. While the 

saceur—and at every opportunity since—I have stated publicly and privately that 

NATO members must fully source the International Security and Assistance Forces 

(ISAF) in Afghanistan if the alliance is to prevail. First and foremost, NATO must 

resource the NATO training mission—Afghanistan—that the heads of state and govVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 Jun 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\NATO(2).TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
35 

ernment agreed to at the 60th summit this past April. Building competent, capable, 

uncorrupt security forces is the highest priority task in Afghanistan. I do not believe 

Afghanistan is on the verge of falling to the insurgents, but I do believe the insurgency has spread—not surprisingly—to the west and a bit to the north of the country. There are 2 reasons for this in my mind—a lack of security forces available in 

all districts and municipalities—but more importantly—a growing trend of lack of 

confidence in government at all levels by the people of Afghanistan due to increased 

corruption, inability by any level of government to deliver social services and infrastructure, and a general feeling of disenfranchisement. NATO is eagerly awaiting 

the outcome of the U.S. strategy/resource discussions and the decision that will follow. I believe once decided, another window of opportunity will be open to enlist 

greater NATO member contributions to ISAF and Afghanistan, both in the military 

and the civilian sector. 

Another key activity in NATO is the full participation of France in the military 

structure. My assessment is that effort is on track, though much remains to be 

done. An important and high visibility activity is the allocation of flag officer posts 

of the NATO command structure to NATO members to bid on—to include France. 

That process was completed by the military committee last spring, approved by the 

NAC, and is now—and for the next 9 months or so—a work in progress. Of note 

is the fact that two of the senior postions—the Supreme Allied Command for transformation and the Commander of the Joint Forces Command headquarters in 

Lisbon, Portugal—both changed to French-flag officers in July and September respectively. At the staff level, the French are now identifying staff officers and noncommissioned officers to fill positions on many of the NATO command structure 

headquarters staffs. In sum, my assessement is that all is working as intended at 

this time but it will be several months before a judgement can be made with regard 

to efficacy. 

NATO’s political leadership has stated that enlargement is in the best interest of 

NATO and its doors remain open. From the military perspective on enlargement, 

we must maintain the rigorous standards already established to ensure that new 

members are providers of alliance security—not consumers of security. Additionally, 

we have learned much over the past two decades concerning the processes and programs for enlargement—partnership for peace (PFP), membership action plan 

(map), etc. Based on that experience, it is now time to update our templates to 

reflect the new strategic environment and different security capablility assessment 

tools. Every potential member is unique and we must recognize that in our 

approach. With regard to Ukraine and Georgia—while military engagement, cooperation, and assessments are ongoing—any progress toward NATO membership 

remains firmly in the political arena. 

Military-to-military cooperation with Russia remains difficult and complex. NATO 

military authorities must receive political guidance to fully reengage with Russian 

military authorities—if that guidance has been forthcoming, it has been very 

recently. I believe the key for opening this effort is to find areas of common military 

interests for both NATO and the Russian Federation and pursue those. Counterproliferation, counterterrorism, humanitarian and disaster relief, and counternarcotics 

efforts are but a few of the areas of common interests. These become the start point 

for this essential cooperation. 

In my previous comments on the NATO strategic concept I indicated more must 

be done with the EU. My experience during my time as saceur was that from the 

military perspective, there was interest and enthusiasm on behalf of both EU and 

NATO military authorities to find opportunities to train and operate together. That 

same experience informs my judgement that significant political difficulties exist 

that, until eroded or breached, will prevent this needed cooperation. This is a highpriority area for the politicos of both NATO and the EU, and bilaterraly for the 

United States and European nation leaders. Our mil-to-mil efforts are repeatedly 

thwarted by old feuds and rivalries that do not serve alliance nor EU interests. 

They can’t continue to be ignored. 

Once again, Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your questions. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Next, we have the Honorable Kurt Volker, who is the former 

Permanent Representative to NATO and currently the managing 

director at the Center on Transatlantic Relations at Johns 

Hopkins. 

Very nice to have you here. Thank you. 

36 

STATEMENT OF HON. KURT VOLKER, FORMER PERMANENT 

REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO, SENIOR FELLOW AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, CENTER ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, 

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador VOLKER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank 

you, Senator Lugar, and all the Senators for being here. I have a 

written statement I’d submit for the record. 

As you know, I served as Ambassador for 1 year, and I’m very 

grateful to the members of this committee for supporting my nomination in 2008. 

In over 20 years of dealing with NATO issues, I’ve observed 

NATO transform a lot: from being a cold war alliance to one 

focused looking outward, engaged in civil-military operations, taking on a new range of security threats, together with partners and 

around the globe. 

Yet, despite this transformation, I’m deeply concerned about the 

state of our alliance today. NATO is in trouble. It faces significant 

challenges from both outside and from within. In my view, we need 

a renewed political compact on security between Europe and North 

America. The firm establishment of the past is fading. The establishment of a new compact at a political level should really be the 

central task of the ongoing effort to produce a new strategic concept. Such a compact would not change U.S. or any other allies’ 

obligations under Article 5; rather, it would constitute a fresh, common understanding of what those obligations are in today’s vastly 

changed security environment. 

At the heart of it is the idea that the United States remains committed to Europe itself, a reliable ally that will share decisionmaking and do its part to guarantee a strong, secure, democratic 

Europe. But in return, Europe must put its full weight behind joining the United States in tackling the global security challenges 

that affect us all. Such a compact would have to address a common 

approach to dealing with Russia; a common commitment to facing 

new threats and challenges, both inside and outside of Europe; a 

renewed commitment that our shared goal remains a Europe 

whole, free, and at peace; and a commitment that each of us will 

put the full measure of our human and financial resources behind 

making NATO’s work a success. 

There are a few fundamentals that I want to touch on; they’ve 

been addressed in some of the earlier question-and-answer. 

First, NATO has always been about values. Having an organization that serves as a means of pulling the transatlantic community 

together to produce joint action in support of shared democratic 

values remains essential. 

Second, NATO’s purpose was never really about perpetuating 

itself or its own relevance, but about helping people to live in freedom, democracy, and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO 

underpinned the growth of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, and 

that work is not done. We have Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia, 

Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia—many of Europe’s neighbors still 

struggling to implement democratic systems, economic reform, live 

in security, and be part of our community. 

Third, since the end of the cold war, there emerged serious new 

threats and challenges, and Senator Lugar spoke about these eloVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 Jun 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\NATO(2).TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
37 

quently. It’s a greater diversity of threats than at any time in the 

past. We have to come together at NATO as to how to deal with 

these. 

Fourth, it’s essential that the United States and Europe do work 

together to address common challenges. It doesn’t work for either 

of us to try to go it alone. We—it only is effective when we work 

together. 

And fifth, if I—if you permit me, I’d just like to observe that 

NATO has always been an issue that has enjoyed bipartisan support in this country. I think that’s terribly important and is one of 

the things that has contributed to the success of NATO over its 60- 

year life span. 

Despite NATO’s ongoing transformation, as it has transformed, 

differences have grown among allies at the same time. Today, I 

would say that our allies disagree over the importance of Afghanistan, the nature of our relationship with Russia, what constitutes 

an Article 5 threat; whether NATO is the principal venue for security and defense of Europe, whether, when, and how NATO should 

continue to enlarge, what solidarity means in the face of 21st century challenges, how much our societies should invest in security 

and defense, and how much NATO should focus inside the EuroAtlantic area versus outside. 

We need to rebuild a firm consensus on these issues, and that 

should be the work of the Strategic Concept group. I think we 

should feel lucky that we have a former Secretary of State representing the United States in this process. It needs to be a process 

that engages the political leadership of every allied country, 

because it has to, in the end, result in that political compact that 

I discussed. 

I’d be happy to go on in the question-and-answer, particularly to 

focus on Afghanistan, some of Senator Corker’s questions about 

enlargement and the future of that, dealing with Russia, and then 

energy issues and new threats and challenges. 

Thank you again for having me here. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Volker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KURT VOLKER, FORMER PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO, SENIOR FELLOW AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, CENTER ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and all the distinguished Senators here 

today for the opportunity to testify about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

As you know, I served as the 19th U.S. Permanent Representative on the North 

Atlantic Council, from August 2008 to May 2009. I remain extremely grateful to the 

members of this committee for supporting my nomination to that position in 2008. 

That posting came at the end of a career spanning over 20 years in government 

in which I worked on NATO issues from a number of different perspectives during 

the course of five U.S. administrations: 

• As a desk officer for NATO issues in the State Department; 

• As a political-military officer in Budapest when it was aspiring to join NATO; 

• Here in the Senate as a legislative fellow during the year of the Senate’s ratification of the first modern round of NATO enlargement; 

• As Deputy Director of the NATO Secretary General’s Private Office; 

• As a senior official in both the National Security Council and the State Department; 

• And finally as U.S. Ambassador. 

In these various capacities, I had the opportunity to contribute to NATO’s 1991 

and 1999 Strategic Concepts, NATO enlargement, NATO’s partnerships, NATO 

operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the 50th and 60th anniVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 Jun 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\NATO(2).TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
38 

versary summits, and countless ministerial and summit meetings. It has been a 

unique privilege to serve both my country and the greatest alliance in history in 

so many ways and I am thankful for the opportunity. 

During these two decades, I have seen NATO transform dramatically: from a cold 

war alliance focused on deterrence and preparing for the defense of Europe against 

the Soviet Union, to a much larger, outward looking alliance—one that is engaged 

in civil-military operations, and aimed at tackling a new range of security threats, 

together with many partners, in places around the globe. 

Despite this remarkable transformation, I am deeply concerned about the state 

of our alliance today. NATO is in trouble. It faces significant challenges from both 

outside and within. 

A NEW TRANSATLANTIC COMPACT

In my view, we need a renewed political compact on security between Europe and 

North America. The firm establishment of the past is fading. The establishment of 

a new compact, at a political level, should be the central task of the ongoing effort 

to produce a new NATO Strategic Concept. 

Such a compact would not change U.S. or any other allies’ obligations under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Rather, it would constitute a fresh, common understanding of what those obligations are in today’s vastly changed security environment. 

At its heart is the idea that the United States remains committed to Europe 

itself—a reliable ally that will share decisionmaking and do its part to guarantee 

a strong, secure, democratic Europe. And Europe, in turn, must be prepared to put 

its full weight behind joining the United States in tackling the global security challenges that affect us all. 

Such a political compact needs to encompass: 

• A coherent transatlantic approach to dealing with Russia; 

• A common commitment to facing new threats and challenges both inside and 

outside of Europe; 

• A renewed commitment that our shared goal remains a Europe whole, free, and 

at peace; and 

• A commitment that each of us will put the full measure of our human and 

financial resources behind making NATO’s work a success. 

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

Before discussing in greater detail these current challenges to NATO and ways 

to address them, let me stress some fundamentals. 

First, as clearly stated in its founding document, the Washington treaty, NATO 

has always been about values. Having an organization that serves as a means of 

pulling the transatlantic community together, to produce joint action in support of 

shared democratic values, remains essential today. 

After defeating fascism and faced with expansionist Soviet communism, the transatlantic community established NATO out of the recognition that the universal 

human values that underpin our societies—freedom, market economy, democracy, 

human rights, and the rule of law—remained under threat and had to be actively 

defended. 

We recognized that the democracies of Europe and North America—though by no 

means having a monopoly on values—nonetheless had a special place in defining, 

sustaining, protecting and promoting these values for ourselves, and in the world. 

This ‘‘values foundation’’ remains at the heart of NATO today. 

Over the years, we have seen that we cannot be indifferent when these fundamental values are under threat—whether within Europe or in other parts of the 

world—even if the threat to our own societies may seem less immediate. Our democracies are safest in a world where democratic values are in ascendance, and at ever 

greater risk when they are in retreat. 

Second, NATO’s purpose was never about perpetuating itself, or assuring its own 

‘‘relevance.’’ Rather, it has always been about helping people to live in freedom, 

safety, and growing prosperity—first by defending the West, and then, when possible, by being open to new members from the east and south joining this valuesbased community. 

In other words, NATO underpinned the growth toward a Europe whole, free, and 

at peace. This work is far from over, and indeed we have seen regression in recent 

years. We need to get back on track. 

The 15 years that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall marked a period of remarkable construction and progress in this historic mission. NATO grew from 16 countries in 1989 to 28 today. Likewise, the EU grew from 12 to 26 members. Today, 

39 

over 100 million people now live in free societies that are more prosperous and fundamentally secure, compared to the divided Europe of pre-1989. 

Yet the work of creating a Europe whole, free, and at peace is far from complete. 

Indeed, we have seen a rise in authoritarianism, and curtailments of freedom and 

justice in Russia and some other states of the former Soviet Union. We have seen 

flareups of nationalism and ethnic rivalry in the Balkans and even Central and 

Eastern Europe. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia and others 

of Europe’s neighbors need to continue their development—and thus far, they 

remain outside of NATO and the EU. 

Some argue that further growth of this democratic community is a ‘‘threat’’ to 

Russian interests. I firmly disagree: The growth of freedom, prosperity, and security 

in Europe is a threat to no one. There is no ‘‘zero-sum’’ between the interests of the 

Euro-Atlantic community as a whole, and Russian interests—we are part of a common space. Indeed, Russia should be a vital part of this democratic community in 

Europe—but to do so, Russia must live up to the same democratic, good-neighborly 

standards as the rest of us. 

Acceding to the logic that the growth of a democratic space in Eurasia is a 

‘‘threat’’ to Russia would subordinate the interests of the millions of people living 

in states near Russia to the wishes of an increasingly nondemocratic Russian 

leadership. 

It is essential that the transatlantic community renew momentum toward the creation of a Europe that is truly whole, free, and at peace, anchored on democratic 

values, for the benefit of all of its citizens, whether in the East, West, North or 

South. NATO remains vital to the realization of this vision. 

Third, since the end of the cold war, there have emerged serious new threats to 

the security of the allies. Indeed, there is a greater diversity of threats—in terms 

of both geography and nature of challenge—than at anytime in the past. 

Washington, London, Madrid, and Istanbul have all been subject to terrorist 

attacks linked to an ideology of violent extremism, and inspired from territories outside of Europe. Failed or weak states create havens for terrorism, crime, and proliferation. Our information societies are at risk from cyber attacks, and our developed economies can be at risk from energy shutoffs. All of these are examples of 

threats that can come, as one of my predecessors, Nick Burns, used to say, from 

‘‘the dark side of globalization.’’ 

But we must remember that state-level threats have not entirely disappeared. We 

see Iran developing missiles and nuclear technology. Last year, in Georgia, we saw 

Russia abuse its position as a peacekeeper to invade Georgia and break off Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia from Georgian territory by military force. This comes on top of 

Russia shutting off gas supplies to Ukraine, affecting NATO ally Bulgaria, and suspicions of Russian involvement in cyber attacks against Estonia. 

Fourth, it is essential that the United States and Europe work together to deal 

with our common challenges. The temptation for the United States to decide things 

on its own, or to assemble a coalition of willing states—or alternatively, the temptation that Europe should act on its own, or act as a counterweight to the United 

States—is a chimera. 

The United States and Europe share the same fundamental, democratic values; 

we face the same challenges in the world; and we can only deal with these challenges effectively if we deal with them together. It is hard work, but necessary. 

This is true in practice as much as it sounds good in theory: whether it is Afghanistan, or nonproliferation, or counterterrorism, or antipiracy, or dealing with a more 

assertive Russia, we are in fact working together everyday. We are most successful 

when we have the most coherent and committed transatlantic set of policies—and 

least successful when we don’t. 

That is why having a strong Europe, and a strong EU, is fundamentally in America’s interest. And also why being a ‘‘good European’’ must include also being a 

‘‘good Atlanticist.’’ 

And fifth among these fundamentals, permit me this observation: In contrast to 

a number of other foreign policy issues, NATO has always enjoyed bipartisan support and commitment in the United States. I believe this has contributed to the success and strength of NATO over the years, and I believe all of us must do whatever 

we can to continue this bipartisan support for NATO. 

These foundation stones—values, a Europe whole and free, facing real threats in 

the world today, genuine transatlantic partnership, and bipartisan U.S. commitment—are all essential. Let us not forget them. 

40 

NATO’S TRANSFORMATION THUS FAR

In building on these foundation stones, NATO has already adapted to the 21st 

century world in four principal ways: 

• By enlarging, in three waves thus far; 

• By creating partnerships—the Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean 

Dialogue, the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine, the Istanbul Initiative, the 

growth of partnership with friends around the globe, and the NATO-Georgia 

Commission; 

• By becoming operational—from zero operations before 1995 to Bosnia, Kosovo, 

Afghanistan, Iraq, Active Endeavor, airlift to Darfur, and humanitarian relief; 

• By moving away from large, heavy militaries to smaller, lighter, more expeditionary forces. 

Each of these aspects of transformation has been vital to NATO carrying out its 

founding mission of collective defense, but in a vastly different security environment. 

SERIOUS CHALLENGES FACING NATO TODAY—AND THE ROLE OF THE STRATEGIC

CONCEPT

Yet as NATO has transformed, the consensus within the transatlantic community 

about NATO’s roles and its future has weakened. Despite its successful transformation, we now find ourselves with a NATO that is at serious risk. 

Allies disagree on such key issues as: 

• The importance of Afghanistan; 

• The nature of our relationship with Russia; 

• What constitutes an Article 5 threat; 

• Whether NATO is the principal venue for the security and defense of Europe; 

• Whether, when, and how NATO should continue to enlarge; 

• What ‘‘solidarity’’ means in the face of 21st century challenges; 

• How much our societies should invest in security and defense; and 

• How much NATO should focus inside the Euro-Atlantic area, versus addressing 

threats that arise far from our own territory. 

Rebuilding a firm consensus on these critical issues should be the work of the 

Strategic Concept. We are lucky to have a person with the stature of a former Secretary of State representing the United States in this process. 

For the work of the Strategic Concept to succeed, however, it must become a personal priority for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic—at the Head of State and 

Cabinet levels. Otherwise, it risks becoming a piece of paper adopted by experts, but 

without harnessing the genuine political will and commitments to provide the necessary resources from each of the NATO nations. 

SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERN

Finally, I would like to make a few observations about some of the specific issues 

on which allies are divided. I’ll do so in three clusters. 

First is Afghanistan. What happens in Afghanistan is vital to the future of NATO, 

and indeed a test case for NATO. Can it survive in the 21st century or not? 

I believe that the attacks on September 11, 2001, and later in Madrid and London, and now the events in Pakistan today, all show that what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan is vital to the security of the wider region, to Europe, and to 

the United States. What happens there has a direct effect on our own security. 

In addition, the majority of people in Afghanistan and Pakistan want to live in 

a peaceful society open to improved economic growth, health care, education, human 

rights, and so forth—but they face an armed enemy hostile to these aspirations and 

they need our help. 

Unfortunately, allied leaders have seldom made the case to publics about the 

importance of Afghanistan for European security or human rights. If their own leaders are not explaining the case, publics are understandably deeply skeptical about 

NATO’s efforts there. 

And in turn, public skepticism means that many governments seek to minimize 

what they do in Afghanistan—making ‘‘contributions’’ but not taking ‘‘ownership’’ of 

the outcome. This applies to European civilian and financial contributions, including 

through the EU, as well as military contributions. 

This is a dangerous situation. By having agreed to the NATO operation, but then 

in the case of many allies failing to provide as much civilian, financial, and security 

support as possible and necessary, we risk failure on the ground, failure for NATO, 

and strain on the solidarity within the transatlantic community. In turn, it will 

41 

increase temptations within the United States to conclude that working within 

NATO, or even working with Europe more generally, is simply not worth the time 

and effort. 

Second is Dealing with Russia, and a host of issues that arise in association with 

Russia. The emergence of a more authoritarian Russia that seeks a sphere of influence in neighboring states has drawn divergent reactions from Europe. 

Central and Eastern Europe, which recently emerged from Soviet domination, 

seeks strategic reassurance and protection. 

Western Europe prefers a strategy of engagement with Russia, in the hopes of 

winning better Russian behavior. 

These two conflicting orientations play out within NATO and elsewhere—on 

issues such as NATO-Russia relations, Article 5 defense planning, Georgia, Ukraine, 

CFE, energy, democracy promotion, and the future of NATO and EU enlargement. 

In a way, both Central and Western Europe are right. Yet neither Central 

Europe’s demand for protection, nor West Europe’s demand for engagement, can 

succeed alone. Only if we do both simultaneously can we forge a unified transatlantic policy and conduct an effective approach to dealing with Russia and its 

neighbors. 

We need to be firm and clear in our expectations of Russia—especially on democratic values, and on the freedom, sovereignty, and independence of Russia’s neighbors—while at the same time stressing our desire that Russia be a part of our community, and our desire to work together with Russia in areas of common concern. 

There should be no limits to the extent of our cooperation with Russia, provided 

Russia implements in practice, both at home and in its neighborhood, the same 

democratic values we expect of ourselves. This is, afterall, the genius of the Helsinki 

Final Act and the foundation of the OSCE. 

In the past, the United States has played the role of uniting Europe around a set 

of policies, and we need to do so again today. I believe this set of policies should 

include: 

• Article 5 defense planning concerning the full range of potential threats facing 

NATO; 

• Continued commitment to the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace— 

including working actively with countries that seek to join NATO (Montenegro, 

Bosnia, Georgia, Ukraine) to assist them in implementing necessary reforms; 

and 

• Active engagement with Russia through the NATO-Russia Council wherever 

common interests make real progress possible. 

Third is the way we deal with new threats and challenges. There are those who 

point to the NATO treaty and say that NATO is meant to deal only with military 

attacks on the territory of NATO members. This view asserts a military and geographically limited view of NATO’s collective defense role. 

An alternative view, to which I subscribe, is that there are now many more actors 

and many more means of ‘‘attacking’’ a NATO member today than there were in 

1949, yet our obligations to each other for collective defense remain the same. 

As Senator Lugar has rightly pointed out, the effects on a society of seeing its 

energy shut off—deliberately, by an outside actor—can be just as devastating as any 

military attack. 

Thus our view of what can trigger NATO’s Article 5 collective defense commitment needs to change. Energy security, cyber attacks, terrorism, WMD proliferation, 

and the consequences of failed or weak states, such as in Afghanistan, all have the 

potential to be Article 5 issues. 

And similarly, our view of the ways in which NATO needs to deal with these 

threats also needs to change. We should not limit our thinking to military force, or 

to European geography. NATO should develop some civilian capacities—such as 

police training, which it is already leading in Afghanistan. NATO should work with 

other organizations and partners as much as possible. And NATO’s out-of-area operations—such as in Afghanistan or Iraq or off the coast of Somalia—are not exceptions, but the new norm. 

Neither should we limit our thinking to using NATO as the instrument for action 

just because we use NATO for broad-based strategic coordination. We should be able 

to use NATO for consultations, and agreement on joint action, even if we also agree 

that NATO as an instrument will not be in the lead on execution. 

U.S.–EU cooperation—as important as it is—is not a substitute for cooperation 

through NATO. The United States is not present in EU discussions, and when the 

United States and EU meet, we do so as partners across a table. NATO is the one 

place where all sit together around one table, deliberate, and agree common action. 

42 

Related to all this is a question of priorities and resources: The United States and 

Europe are diverging on the priority that our societies place on investment in security and defense capacities, and our willingness to use them. 

European spending on security and defense as a percentage of GDP is at record 

lows. European politics drives leaders toward coordination first within Europe, with 

transatlantic coordination as a far lower priority. Europeans are divided on the use 

of military force, even when Europe’s development, governance, and human rights 

goals cannot be achieved without the use of force when faced with armed groups 

such as we see in Afghanistan. 

CONCLUSION

Adopting a common view of these issues—the nature of the threats we face, how 

they relate to our commitments to each other as allies, on using NATO for strategic 

coordination, and on how far we go on using NATO as an integrating mechanism 

for civil-military efforts—must all be a core part of a new security compact embodied 

in the Strategic Concept. 

Mr. Chairman, the challenges facing NATO today are deep, complex, and 

extremely difficult to overcome. They threaten the very future of the alliance. Yet 

they can be overcome with political will and commitment—and followthrough—on 

both sides of the Atlantic. 

The effort to produce a new Strategic Concept is just getting started. It should 

be a shared goal for people who prize our democratic values on both sides of the 

Atlantic that this Strategic Concept rise to the monumental challenge of building 

a new transatlantic security compact for the 21st century. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. I’m sure you will get 

some of those questions as we get into the next phase. 

Dr. Charles Kupchan—am I pronouncing that correctly?—is the 

professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, and a 

senior fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Welcome. Please begin. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, PROFESSOR OF 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. KUPCHAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, Senator 

Lugar. I appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts with you. 

Let me begin simply by reiterating what General Craddock said 

a few minutes ago, and that is that it’s very important to get this 

right. And that’s in part for the reasons that we’ve been discussing 

this morning: the military effectiveness of NATO, collective 

defense, engaging Russia, succeeding in Afghanistan. But, I would 

throw one other idea into the hopper, and that is that NATO is not 

just a military alliance, but it is also perhaps the most important 

institution that binds the West together, that keeps the West a 

meaningful political community. 

And maintaining Western solidarity is not going to be as easy, 

moving forward, as it has been in the past, in part because I think 

there are different threat perceptions that have emerged—the 

United States looking globally, Western Europe focused mainly on 

expanding and consolidating the EU, Central Europe still very concerned about Russia—but also because I think we will not have the 

luxury of only focusing on the Atlantic community. The rise of 

China, India, Brazil and others means that the Atlantic community 

has to be as much focused outward as it is inward. And in that 

respect, I think we have our work cut out for us. 

43 

Let me just touch on the few key concepts that I would put at 

the core of a discussion about a new Strategic Concept: I’ll touch 

on collective defense issues; Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine; and 

then end with a comment on Afghanistan. 

I think that the core of the NATO alliance remains collective 

defense, and that if there is an issue that is at the heart of that, 

it is strengthening the European pillar within the alliance to make 

sure that there is a more equitable distribution of responsibility 

between the two sides of the Atlantic. 

And I think there are two pieces of good news on that front. One 

is the Lisbon Treaty, which is going to give Europe a more collective voice, and more centralized institutions; and the other is the 

reintegration of France into NATO’s integrated structure, which 

hopefully will mean less competition and more cooperation between 

NATO and the EU. 

But, there are also two pieces of somewhat less good news: One 

is, I think, is that beneath the service you are seeing the renationalization of politics in Europe, and if, for example, the conservatives win the next election in the U.K., as a party that is less 

pro-European, it will perhaps be more difficult to get the aggregation of European voices on defense. And I do think that if Europe 

does not aggregate its will and its resources, it will gradually 

become of less strategic relevance to the United States. We need 

to do everything we can to encourage Europe to become more selfstanding and more capable. 

I also worry about the Turkey question—rather, there are many 

Turkey questions. But a key issue is that Turkey is in NATO and 

not the EU, and we need to find some way of bringing Turkey into 

EU defense planning to get the NATO-European linkage better. 

On the question of collective defense in Central Europe, I sympathize with the concerns of Central Europeans about the reset 

button with Russia, about the change in missile defense plans, and 

I think the best response to those concerns is to increase NATO’s 

operational capability—more training, more planning, more exercises, more investment in modernization, particularly on the 

Europe side. I would not move forward with the remilitarization of 

NATO’s eastern frontier, as I simply think that a Russian threat 

to NATO countries is, at this point, a very, very low probability. 

Finally, I would add to the mix the importance of looking at new 

issues like cyber security, terrorism, and energy, but certainly not 

at the expense of core collective defense defined in a more traditional way. 

And finally, I think we do need to address decisionmaking. 

NATO is becoming bigger and bigger, more and more unwieldy, 

and I think it’s time to think about changing the decisionmaking 

rules away from consensus to a more flexible approach. 

On Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine, I think we are at a point in 

which we need to do as much as we can to anchor Russia in the 

post-cold-war settlement. And I fear that we aren’t doing enough 

to include the Russians as we did in 1815 when the Napoleonic 

Wars ended and France was brought in. In 1945, a defeated Germany was brought in. I think today we need to work as hard as 

we can to make sure that Russia is somehow anchored in the EuroVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 Jun 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\NATO(2).TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
44 

1For discussion of the alternative strategic visions that have emerged among NATO members, 

see Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, ‘‘Does a multi-tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic alliance 

and the process of strategic change,’’ International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2 (2009), pp. 211–226. 

Atlantic community. How we do that is less important than that 

we start a concrete work plan. 

And so, I think OSCE, working with the Collective Security 

Treaty Organization, the NATO-Russia Council, and concrete cooperation on issues like arms control—these are the best ways to 

advance that agenda. 

And on Georgia and Ukraine, I think our policy is where it 

should be. The door is open, but let’s move slowly while we try to 

get the relationship with Russia right. 

Finally, I think, on Afghanistan, it is great news that NATO is 

there. But I take away some sobering lessons about the degree to 

which NATO can be turned into a global alliance. I think one of 

the stories of NATO in Afghanistan is how difficult it has been to 

get unity of command, to get rid of national caveats. And moving 

forward, I would therefore be reluctant to see us try to turn NATO 

into something it’s not. Instead, I would focus more on getting 

NATO to do better what it already does well, and that is lock in 

democracy and security in Europe. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kupchan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY AND SENIOR FELLOW AT THE COUNCIL ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC 

NATO has undergone a remarkable transformation since the end of the cold war. 

Not only has the alliance persisted despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it 

has redefined its core purposes, extending democracy and stability into Central 

Europe, bringing peace to the Balkans, playing a major role in the effort to stabilize 

Afghanistan, and building a host of strategic partnerships in the Black Sea and 

Mediterranean regions. NATO has also demonstrated that it remains the primary 

institutional pillar of the West, consolidating the Atlantic democracies as a meaningful community of common interests and values. The durability of the alliance is 

testimony to the fact that North America and Europe remain each other’s best 

partners. 

At the same time, making the most of the Atlantic partnership requires recognizing that in a world of diverse threats, NATO no longer enjoys the unity and solidarity that it did during the cold war. Alliance members have diverging views of 

the nature and urgency of the operation in Afghanistan and have varying levels of 

capability to contribute to the mission, leading to an inequitable sharing of burdens. 

Disagreements have emerged across the Atlantic and within Europe on numerous 

other issues, including the future of NATO enlargement, alliance relations with 

Russia, and an appropriate division of labor between NATO and the European 

Union (EU). 

Such differences are hardly fleeting. Rather, they reflect alternative strategic 

visions for the alliance: The United States tends to see NATO as a tool for addressing global security challenges; members in Western Europe envisage NATO as a 

vehicle for tethering the United States to Europe and stabilizing and expanding 

Europe in step with the EU; Central European members focus more on the need 

to hedge against the potential resurgence of a threat from Russia.1 The alliance will 

not be able to overcome these deep-seated differences. Instead, members will need 

to learn how to tolerate them and strike reasonable compromises if NATO is to 

remain effective in the absence of a clear strategic consensus. 

The global nature of threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation begs the 

question of NATO’s geographic and functional scope. In addition, the West, which 

has been the strategic pivot of global affairs since World War II, is confronted with 

the challenge of adapting the international system to the rise of China, India, and 

other powers. In this respect, the Atlantic democracies no longer have the luxury 

45 

of focusing primarily on their own affairs, but must also address the role that the 

West should play in shaping the international order that comes next. 

In the analysis that follows, I lay out a risk-averse approach to NATO’s future— 

one based upon the supposition that it is preferable to conserve NATO’s integrity 

by keeping its will and resources in balance with its commitments, rather than to 

tax the alliance with responsibilities that risk compromising its credibility and 

coherence. NATO should continue to anchor the West while the Atlantic democracies address a global agenda, but efforts to turn NATO into a global alliance risk 

stretching it past the breaking point. Instead, NATO should serve as a model for 

and assist with defense cooperation and integration in other regions, meanwhile 

putting its focus on seeing through its mission in Afghanistan and addressing unfinished business in the broader European theater: improving its operational capability, in particular by strengthening its European pillar; locking in peace in the 

Balkans; deepening ties to partner countries to the south and east; building a more 

cooperative relationship with Russia; and addressing unconventional threats such as 

cyber attack, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. I begin by discussing NATO’s core 

purposes, then turn to NATO’s role in Europe and its responsibilities beyond the 

Euro-Atlantic area, and end with a brief reflection on Congress and the alliance. 

DEFINING PURPOSES

Anchoring the West. During its first 40 years, NATO’s main purpose was to integrate and defend the West. During the past 20 years, it has focused primarily on 

expanding the West and, following the attacks of September 11, contributing to the 

mission in Afghanistan. Looking forward, NATO’s defining purpose should be to 

anchor the West while simultaneously serving to coordinate its political and military 

engagement within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. It is essential to view NATO 

as much more than a military toolkit: it is perhaps the primary institution responsible for preserving the coherence and effectiveness of the West as a political community. That function, back-stopped by transatlantic cooperation in a multiplicity 

of other forms, will grow increasingly important over time as global power shifts 

away from the Atlantic democracies, and Western-dominated bodies such as the G8 

turn into far more diverse bodies such as the G20. 

Collective Defense. In the aftermath of the war in Georgia and the Obama administration’s outreach to Russia and alteration of plans for missile defense, Central 

European members of NATO have grown uneasy about the alliance’s commitment 

to collective defense and what they perceive as insufficient concern in Western 

Europe and the United States about Russian intentions. In this respect, NATO 

should bolster the integrity of Article 5 and reassure Central Europeans about its 

commitment to collective defense. The alliance can do so through planning, exercises, and military modernization and reform (including missile defense). Shortcomings in the NATO operation in Afghanistan (see below) further underscore the 

need to enhance NATO’s operational capability. At the same time, the remilitarization of NATO’s eastern frontier would be both unnecessary and needlessly provocative in light of the extremely low probability of overt Russian aggression against 

NATO territory. Looking forward, NATO should also pay increased attention to unconventional threats to its members, including cyber attack, terrorism, and nuclear 

proliferation. Energy security warrants a place on NATO’s agenda, although that 

issue should be addressed primarily through EU efforts to formulate a coherent 

energy policy and through EU–U.S. consultation. 

Complete the Pacification of Europe. NATO, working in tandem with the EU, 

needs to consolidate peace in the Balkans and work to extend stability to Ukraine, 

Georgia, and other states on Russia’s periphery. It should meanwhile pursue 

engagement with Russia and, should Moscow prove to be a willing partner, work 

toward drawing Russia as well as its neighbors into the Euro-Atlantic community. 

Engage Beyond Europe, But With Due Modesty. Many of the most pressing international challenges of the day arise from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO has 

a role to play in meeting some of these challenges, but seeking to globalize NATO 

would saddle it with unsustainable burdens and insurmountable political divides. 

The mission in Afghanistan, although a top priority for NATO, continues to reveal 

the difficulties entailed in sustaining alliance solidarity in out-of-area missions. 

Accordingly, even as it stays the course in Afghanistan, NATO should view additional missions outside the Euro-Atlantic area with caution, and in general limit the 

scope of its global engagement to training and assistance, serving as an exemplar, 

and helping other regional bodies help themselves. 

46 

NATO IN EUROPE

NATO remains the primary institution of the Euro-Atlantic security order. As it 

seeks to broaden and consolidate the Euro-Atlantic community, NATO should seek 

to strengthen its ties both to the EU and to those countries in Europe’s east which 

have yet to be formally included in either NATO or the EU. A more capable and 

more collective EU and better linkages between NATO and the EU are needed to 

help rebalance the Atlantic partnership. The Atlantic link will be well served if the 

EU enhances its ability to share burdens and be a more equal partner of the United 

States. Meanwhile, by reaching out to Russia and its neighbors, NATO has the 

opportunity to spread its pacifying and integrating effects further eastward and 

southward. 

The European Pillar. With the United States bearing the burden of two costly 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a wide range of commitments elsewhere, 

strengthening the EU pillar within the alliance is of growing urgency. Unless EU 

members do a better job of aggregating their political will and resources, Europe 

risks becoming of declining strategic relevance to the United States. On the other 

hand, if EU members allocate their defense spending more effectively and take 

advantage of the institutional changes foreseen in the Lisbon treaty to forge a more 

common security policy and assume greater international responsibilities, NATO 

and the Atlantic link will be primary beneficiaries. France’s integration into NATO’s 

military structure advances the prospect for better cooperation between the EU and 

NATO, helping the two organizations reinforce, rather than compete, with each 

other. Overcoming Turkey’s discomfort with European defense—perhaps by including it in EU deliberations and planning on security matters—would also advance 

the cause of strengthening the EU pillar. Building a more capable EU is primarily 

up to Europeans: they must increase their deployable military and civilian assets 

and ensure that the more capable institutions envisaged in the Lisbon treaty are 

not offset by the renationalization of European politics. But the United States can 

help by making clear its unequivocal support for a strong Europe and engaging the 

EU at the collective level as its institutions mature. 

Decisionmaking. In addition to strengthening its European pillar, NATO must 

also address potential changes to its decisionmaking apparatus to ensure its effectiveness. In the absence of the unifying threat posed by the Soviet Union, NATO 

solidarity is more difficult to sustain—as made clear by the inequitable division of 

labor in Afghanistan. To ensure that divergent perspectives do not become a source 

of paralysis, the alliance should consider moving away from a consensus-based 

approach to taking decisions. Options such as the formation of coalitions of the willing and the use of constructive abstentions (members opt out of rather than block 

joint action) are worth exploring to provide NATO greater flexibility in decisionmaking. 

Russia. As the new Secretary General of NATO recently affirmed, it is time for 

the alliance to embark on a ‘‘new beginning’’ with Russia. This objective is in line 

with the Obama administration’s call for ‘‘resetting’’ relations between Washington 

and Moscow. Russia has indicated a willingness to explore these potential openings. 

President Medvedev has called for a ‘‘new European security architecture’’— 

although it is not yet clear what the Kremlin has in mind. More importantly, it remains to be seen whether Russia pursues policies toward Iran, Georgia, arms control, energy, and other issues that would indicate its willingness to be a reliable 

partner of the West. 

If such cooperation from Moscow is indeed forthcoming, then the United States, 

NATO, and the EU should work together to anchor Russia in the Euro-Atlantic community. What form such inclusion can and should take needs to be determined as 

the options become clearer. At this point, efforts should focus on making more of 

the NATO-Russia Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE), engaging Moscow’s call to explore potential links between NATO 

and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, and advancing concrete cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan, arms control, missile defense, and 

maritime security. 

Ukraine and Georgia. As the United States and its NATO partners reach out to 

Russia, they should make clear that a ‘‘new beginning’’ depends on Russia’s willingness to respect the independence and autonomy of Ukraine, Georgia, and other 

countries on Russia’s periphery. Moscow may well rebuff the West’s overtures and 

instead opt for a more distant relationship. But should confrontation prevail, it 

should be the consequence of Moscow’s missteps, not because the members of NATO 

failed to do their best to include Russia in Europe’s post-cold-war settlement. In this 

respect, even as NATO’s door remains open to Georgia and Ukraine, the question 

of membership is best dealt with later rather than sooner. Neither country is ready 

47 

for entry and many European leaders have reservations about moving forward on 

membership. Moreover, by focusing on concrete work plans rather than formal membership, the alliance can advance its links with both countries while simultaneously 

buying time for its relationship with Russia to deepen. The EU also has an important role to play in the broader Black Sea area, especially if NATO moves cautiously 

on the pace and scope of its engagement. As a strategy of anchoring Russia in the 

Euro-Atlantic space advances, then dealing with Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO becomes a much less complicated and volatile issue. 

NATO BEYOND EUROPE

Afghanistan. Afghanistan will remain at the top of NATO’s agenda for as long as 

its mission there continues. There is much good news about the NATO operation, 

including the fact that the alliance invoked Article 5 after the United States was 

attacked and proceeded to contribute to a multinational coalition that consists of 41 

countries and some 35,000 non-American troops. Nonetheless, the mission exposes 

the imposing obstacles to NATO engagement in areas far from alliance territory. 

Public skepticism about the mission has constrained the size and operational scope 

of many national contingents—even while the Canadians, British, Danes, Dutch, 

and Romanians have taken on more demanding missions. Unity of command has 

proved elusive, as has coordination between NATO and EU efforts. At this point in 

the mission, it would be unrealistic to expect major new troop contributions from 

Europe, which is more likely to focus additional efforts on training Afghan soldiers 

and police and on civilian assistance—tasks which promise to take on increasing 

importance as U.S. and NATO strategy evolve. Moreover, it will be no easy task 

maintaining the NATO coalition at current levels, with domestic pressure mounting 

in several Member States for the winding down of their national contributions. 

In drawing lessons from its shortcomings in Afghanistan, the alliance should concentrate on improving operational effectiveness. Providing for common funding of 

alliance missions, doing away with national caveats, setting requirements for spending on modernization and interoperability, improving unity of command—these are 

the types of reforms that can enhance NATO’s ability to conduct coalition warfare 

and improve its performance on the battlefield. 

A Global NATO? NATO’s experience in Afghanistan also provides good cause for 

being soberly cautious about the alliance’s ability to become an all-purpose alliance 

on a global basis. To be sure, fashioning useful partnerships with willing nonmembers such as Australia, as NATO has done in Afghanistan, makes good sense. 

But in most regions of the world beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, constraints on the 

political will and capabilities of Member States mean that the alliance will usually 

have to limit its engagement to providing training and assistance and helping 

defense organizations elsewhere do for their own regions what NATO has done for 

Europe. In this respect, it would make sense for NATO to enhance significantly the 

manpower and technical skills that would enable it to contribute more effectively 

to training programs and civilian assistance. 

Preventing NATO’s overstretch and husbanding its political will and solidarity is 

especially important as the West heads toward a global landscape in which it enjoys 

less material—and perhaps ideological—primacy. The Atlantic democracies should 

make the most of their common interests and values as they work to adjust the 

international system to the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging powers. 

Even as NATO completes its mission in Afghanistan, reaches out to Russia, and 

consolidates the pacification of southeastern Europe, it must continue to serve as 

the institutional and political anchor of the West amid a changing world. 

BIPARTISANSHIP AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

During the second half of the 20th century, American engagement abroad rested 

on solid bipartisan foundations. Faced with the strategic imperatives of defeating 

Soviet expansionism and communism, legislators generally heeded Senator Arthur 

Vandenberg’s call in 1950 ‘‘to unite our official voice at the water’s edge.’’ Since the 

end of the cold war, however, the domestic politics of foreign policy have become 

more fractious. Bipartisanship has eroded, regularly exposing the conduct of 

statecraft to deep political cleavages. 

The Western alliance and America’s link to Europe constitute a notable exception. 

The time-tested value of the alliance, the fact that it has withstood countless 

strains, and the thriving transatlantic commerce that has grown alongside strategic 

partnership have won NATO well-deserved support across the political spectrum. 

Not only has NATO earned the indefinite continuation of such bipartisan support, 

but perhaps the political lessons learned from NATO’s continuing successes can help 

rebuild the bipartisan foundations of U.S. foreign policy in the years ahead. 

48 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all very much. 

General Craddock, you talked about the importance of getting 

buy-in from military commanders, on changes to NATO. More and 

more it seems to me that the threat is not just conventional military might, but it’s coming from terrorism—certainly that’s what 

we’re fighting in Afghanistan—and that one significant element in 

being effective against terrorism is getting the right intelligence 

and being able to share that intelligence in a way that allows us 

to go after the terrorists. How comfortable are you that intelligence-sharing is where it should be among the NATO nations? And 

is there more that needs to be done on that? And should the Strategic Concept address that specifically in other ways than have 

been done in the past? 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Senator. 

The short answer to your question is intelligence-sharing is still 

inadequate in the alliance; more must be done. Within the past few 

years, we have established in NATO an intelligence component. It’s 

colocated in the United Kingdom, along with a United States intelligence organization. It is resourced by nations, but the United 

States is the lead framework nation. It is not a part of the command structure. 

I think that needs to be developed further. The output, the analysis, from that goes to commanders in the field—in the field— 

where we find the problem. 

We still have too many national restrictions in the sharing of 

intelligence. We’ve been able to, in Afghanistan, develop categories 

of intelligence that would enable us to share with partner nations 

who are participating there, as well as optimize what can be 

shared from national sources with alliance members. 

So, in the operational theater, there’s still more to do, but we 

have come a long way. 

Second, I think the Strategic Concept should address it in a 

framework context and along with other aspects, not just intelligence, of how, in operations, nations must subordinate their forces 

and functions to the unity-of-command effort. That is where the 

addressment needs to be, as opposed to the ability to address each 

specific item, which, I think, then, quite frankly, will get bogged 

down in the consensus-approval process. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So, when you were talking about opting in 

versus opting out, is that a place where that might be done? And 

how do you see that being structured? 

General CRADDOCK. Indeed, it could be there. I think that what 

we have to do also is recognize that, through no malintent or malfeasance, the command structure in Afghanistan, the arrangement 

of forces—national forces—is something that, upon scrutiny and 

analysis, we would never do again, knowingly. But, we did that in 

order to get nations to go, to buy in, to arrange themselves in a 

short period of time. And those decisions, individually, were fine. 

Collectively now, over time, as the environment has changed, they 

have led to constraints and restraints and inflexibility for the commanders on the ground. And I think we also must address that. 

When you commit your force, you provide it under operational control, and if you have a caveat, then I think NATO has a reject 

clause in that operation. 

49 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Ambassador Volker, you talked about NATO, inside and outside. 

Most of our conversation today has been on the outside efforts of 

NATO. Can you briefly say whether you think there are any institutional reforms inside NATO that need to be addressed as part of 

the Strategic Concept, recognizing that I only have 42 seconds left? 

Ambassador VOLKER. Yes. Substantial. [Laughter.] 

Senator SHAHEEN. So, we’d be happy to take some of this for the 

record. 

Ambassador VOLKER. Yes, I’d be happy to. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The information to the question above is covered in a question from Senator Kerry to Ambassador Volker on 

page 57 in the Additional Material Submitted for the Record.] 

Ambassador VOLKER. One quick word, though. I don’t think the 

issue is decisionmaking by consensus. We need everyone’s buy-in 

when they make a decision, so they’ve got to be part of the decision. What we need is political will to implement and execute, and 

I think we need to focus the NAC and the decisionmaking of the 

alliance upward strategically, and leave the execution to the Secretary General and to our military commanders. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I just appreciate each of the three statements. I thought they 

were really remarkable, and I will—we’ll all review them carefully—that is, the full statements, in addition to the precise answer 

that you gave. 

I’d just like to ask you, Mr. Volker—and this may sound very 

simplistic—but, as the nations go through the criteria you’ve suggested, could there be a decision on the part of some of the members to opt out of the alliance? In other words, as the criteria become very difficult politically or economically for them, could some 

say that, ‘‘By and large, you just can’t count on us. Our public support and our country would not support these problems which impinge upon our sovereignty of our decisionmaking in some way?’’ 

Most countries probably don’t act in such decisive, abrupt ways as 

that, but, nevertheless, the debate internally may commence which 

may lead an undermining of enthusiasm for the alliance. What 

thoughts do you have, even as you impose these stricter criteria? 

Ambassador VOLKER. I think it’s a very fair question to raise, 

because we see those kinds of debates in allied countries today. 

I take it back to first principals again, which is why I even mentioned some fundamentals in my statement, because I think if we 

allow that to happen, as leaders on either side of the Atlantic, 

we’re digging our own graves. We need to be together to deal with 

the type of world that we live in. If we don’t, we’re doomed to be 

failures at this. 

So, while that would be a temptation that would exist, I would 

think, in some European countries—it may even exist in this country—I think it would be a very dangerous road to go down to see 

that. Rather, I think we—part of the political compact of our alliance is that we owe it to each other to roll up our sleeves and figVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 Jun 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\NATO(2).TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
50 

ure out how, rather than just walking away and saying, ‘‘Well, I 

don’t want to.’’ 

Senator LUGAR. What would be the reaction, leaving aside our 

NATO allies, of Russia to these new criteria, as Russians take a 

look at that discussion? Now, granted, each of you, in a way, have 

said, ‘‘Well, we ought to be continuing a more intense, comprehensive dialogue with the Russians while we’re doing this strategic 

work ourselves.’’ But, nevertheless, they peer into this conversation. And what is their reaction likely to be? 

Ambassador VOLKER. That’s a—it’s a very interesting question. 

And Madeleine Albright, when she testified, addressed that to 

some degree. 

We have to start by remembering that Russia is not a democratic 

country today. It is talked—it has talked about ‘‘spheres of influence’’ in neighboring countries. So, we have to be—we have to know 

what kind of Russia we’re talking about when we’re talking about 

the way Russia reacts. 

I would say that, as many have, we need to be inclusive of Russia in our thinking. We need to think of Russia as a European 

country. We need to want Russia to be part of a Euro-Atlantic community. But, simultaneous with that, Russia, therefore, would take 

on obligations, like the rest of us, to adhere to democratic values 

and good neighborly relations. And we need to hold those standards 

very high. And as an alliance, we need to be prudent about the way 

we deal with a country that doesn’t share those values today. 

Senator LUGAR. Madam Chairman, in view of the fact that the 

vote has been underway for a bit, I will yield back whatever time 

that I have. 

And I thank, again, the witnesses very much. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would—we are very short of time, but I would like to just follow 

up on the one question that you asked, with Dr. Kupchan, about 

Russia, because, recognizing your comments about further engaging Russia, having sat next to the Foreign Minister of Poland and 

hearing, in very great detail, his concern about United States further engaging Russia, how do we do that in a way that doesn’t 

threaten the other countries in Eastern Europe that, as Ambassador Volker, in Russia, has said, they consider part of their sphere 

of influence? So, how do you balance that need to further engage 

without creating other issues within NATO? 

Dr. KUPCHAN. It’s a tough act, and I think the United States has 

to work on two fronts simultaneously. One, is to reassure the Central Europeans about their status in the alliance and the integrity 

of Article 5. And I think doing things like Vice President Biden’s 

trip, deploying Patriots, doing defense planning, are the types of 

things that need to be done on that front. 

At the same time, I think that we have to realize that there are 

differences in threat perceptions within the alliance, and that we 

should do what we can to engage Russia—with our eyes wide open, 

making it clear to the Russians if they cross certain red lines such 

engagement would end, and these lines would include threatening 

the autonomy or the independence of countries like Ukraine and 

Georgia. 

51 

But, I think, while we have the opportunity to do so, we should 

have an open-door policy to Russia. Not open-door in the sense 

that, ‘‘We want you to be members.’’ Maybe, yes, one day. But, for 

now, let’s look at the concrete ways that the United States and 

Russia, that NATO and Russia, can work together. And it may well 

be that, 2 years down the road, once that relationship has been 

repaired, then the whole question of the defense of Central Europe, 

whether or not Ukraine and Georgia are in NATO, those issues 

become much, much easier to solve. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you all very much for appearing here. We apologize that 

we’ve gotten cut a little short due to votes. That happens often 

around here, as you know. 

The record will stay open until Monday for members to submit 

their questions. 

Thank you. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY MADELEINE ALBRIGHT TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. At the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl NATO summit, the participatory heads of 

state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting on April 4, 2009, 

acknowledged the progress of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on ‘‘cooperation with NATO, including through implementation of its current IPAP, and 

the country’s expressed intention to apply for MAP at an appropriate time.’’ The 

declaration also urged ‘‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to take further 

genuine steps to strengthen state-level institutions and reinvigorate the reform 

process to advance the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.’’ 

The Summit Declaration also welcomed Montenegro’s ‘‘successful and active 

implementation of its current Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with 

NATO’’ and expressed encouragement regarding ‘‘the reforms it has made in a number of areas that are essential to its Euro-Atlantic integration and also by its contributions to cooperation and security in the region. . . . The Council in permanent 

session is keeping Montenegro’s progress under active review and will respond early 

to its request to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), on its own 

merits.’’ 

• Can Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro contribute to NATO’s security 

rather than act as net consumers of it? As the alliance considers enlargement, 

what specific capabilities could these two countries add to NATO? How, if at 

all, do Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro currently contribute to NATO? 

Answer. The question of admitting specific new members to NATO is one for alliance members to decide. The Group of Experts may discuss more generally the 

mechanisms for interacting with prospective members and partners, but at this 

stage of the process, no recommendations have been formulated. 

Question. Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are essential elements of U.S. and European security? Does Russia object to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro’s further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions in the 

same way it perceived Georgia’s relationship with the West? Should this matter? 

How, if at all, should NATO address such concerns? 

Answer. As I said in my testimony, I believe that NATO’s doors should remain 

open to qualified candidates. Decisions about membership are for the alliance alone 

to make. Those decisions should be made on the basis of objective criteria related 

to the contributions and obligations the admission of a new member entails. No 

country outside the alliance should be permitted to exert influence over these internal judgments. NATO membership is not a status symbol or a bargaining chip; it 

is an agreement between old members and prospective new ones to make the alliance stronger and more effective for purposes that all can support. 

52 

Question. NATO has already assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in 

reforms to the countries’ military and ministry of defense, allowing further participation with the alliance through programs such as Partnership for Peace. 

• Based on your experience as Secretary of State, could NATO help reform Bosnia 

and Herzegovina’s political and economic situation, as well as help calm ethnic 

tensions? In what ways has the alliance already helped resolve such issues in 

Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere? 

Answer. In my experience, the prospect of NATO membership and/or partnership 

can provide an incentive for countries to resolve internal problems, especially those 

stemming from historic ethnic rivalries or a lack of effective democratic institutions. 

NATO members possess a wealth of expertise about how to address such difficulties 

and have helped to spur progress in Central Europe, the Balkans, and elsewhere. 

Question. As NATO’s relations with the EU evolve, how can the two organizations 

cooperate and complement each other, especially on 21st-century challenges, such 

as energy and cyber security, post-conflict reconstruction and global climate change? 

How can NATO and the EU effectively delineate shared responsibilities and 

resources on issues like these that combine civilian and military capabilities? How 

are you coordinating and consulting with the EU in formulating the new Strategic 

Concept? 

Answer. The issue of coordination between NATO and the EU (and between 

NATO and international organizations more generally) is an important one and central to the deliberations of the Experts Group. Accordingly, the Experts Group will 

be holding formal meetings with the EU, among others, to share perspectives and 

ideas. I should point out that there has been an extensive history of dialogue 

between NATO and the EU, and that the two organizations continue to work 

together as partners in Kosovo. 

Question. Do you think NATO should make energy security an Article Five commitment? If, so, how? 

Answer. Energy security is one of many topics that will be discussed by the 

Experts Group and its interlocutors as the process of developing a new NATO Strategic Concept goes forward. Similarly, the interpretation and application of Article 

V in a changing world environment will also be a subject of great concern. 

Question. How should the new Strategic Concept address the issue of NATO 

reform? More broadly, what reforms should be made to NATO’s operational and 

political decisionmaking? How, if at all, should the position of NATO Secretary General evolve? 

Answer. There is widespread interest on the part of the Secretary General and 

members of the Experts Group in the issue of NATO efficiency and internal reform. 

The Experts Group is currently in the ‘‘listening phase’’ of its deliberations and will 

be soliciting ideas on the subject from a wide range of sources. The Group is scheduled to present its conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary General by 

the beginning of May 2010. 

Question. How would you describe the current relationship between NATO and 

Russia? NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has spoken of building a more constructive relationship. What are the opportunities and limits of that relationship? 

Answer. Russia and NATO have important interests in common. These include 

support for stability in Central Asia, countering terrorism and piracy, and curbing 

the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 

Despite these shared interests, there are some in Moscow who would like Washington to choose between loyalty to our NATO allies and cooperation with Russia— 

as if these two options were mutually exclusive. In fact, the United States can and 

should combine strategic reassurance for allies and realistic engagement with Moscow. When I was Secretary of State, our policy was that, on matters of European 

security, Russia was entitled to a voice but not a veto; both halves of that equation 

remain valid. 

RESPONSES OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Much has been said about the necessity of training Afghan National 

Army and Afghan police forces. Training would appear to be one area where NATO 

countries can make substantial contributions without alarming their publics at 

home or violating restrictions on use of force. However, there continues to be an 

apparent lack of resources on this front. The EU had pledged about 400 trainers 

53 

for its police training mission last year, yet there are only about 230 on hand. What 

are the chances of persuading the EU and NATO to dramatically increase their commitment to this vital task? 

Answer. While I do not believe both EU and NATO nations (21 Euro nations are 

in both the EU and NATO) will ante up what we believe they are capable of, I do 

believe with new NATO leadership in Brussels and a greater focus by European 

nations on the soft components of effective counterinsurgency strategies the likelihood is better than in the past. There are many civil components for which help 

is needed in Afghanistan that are resident in EU and NATO nations. U.S. leadership will be essential in creating a ‘‘can’t say no’’ environment for these nations to 

opt in. But for this to happen the United States will have to develop a framework 

which will permit these nations to buy into with resources and capabilities. 

Question. In your October 22, 2009, testimony, you stated that ‘‘from the military 

perspective on enlargement—we must maintain the rigorous standards already 

established to ensure that new members are providers of alliance security—not consumers of security.’’ 

At the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl NATO summit, the participatory heads of state and 

government at the North Atlantic Council meeting on April 4, 2009, acknowledged 

the progress of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on ‘‘cooperation with 

NATO, including through implementation of its current IPAP, and the country’s 

expressed intention to apply for MAP at an appropriate time.’’ The declaration also 

urged ‘‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to take further genuine steps to 

strengthen state-level institutions and reinvigorate the reform process to advance 

the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.’’ 

The Summit Declaration also welcomed Montenegro’s ‘‘successful and active 

implementation of its current Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with 

NATO’’ and expressed encouragement regarding ‘‘the reforms it has made in a number of areas that are essential to its Euro-Atlantic integration and also by its contributions to cooperation and security in the region. . . . The Council in permanent 

session is keeping Montenegro’s progress under active review and will respond early 

to its request to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), on its own 

merits.’’ 

• Can Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro contribute to NATO’s security 

rather than act as net consumers of it? As the alliance considers enlargement, 

what specific capabilities could these two countries add to NATO? How, if at 

all, do Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro currently contribute to NATO? 

Answer. I fully believe that after the MAP process runs its course both Bosnia 

and Herzegovina and Montenegro can contribute to NATO security in a meaningful 

way. The MAP process is an orderly, rigorous process to develop democratic security 

institutions through structure and practice. This process takes time and focus from 

appropriate NATO political and military authorities. In the future, the development 

of niche capabilities needed by NATO—likely small, technical capabilities—such as 

movement control, deployable surgical capability, air-traffic control, etc.—would 

enhance both alliance and national military capabilities. Currently Bosnia and Herzegovina contribute two personnel to ISAF. Montenegro is preparing to deploy a platoon of infantry to ISAF. 

Question. Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina are essential elements of 

U.S. and European security? Does Russia object to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 

Montenegro’s further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions in the same way it 

perceived Georgia’s relationship with the West? Should this matter? How, if at all, 

should NATO address such concerns? 

Answer. I am of the opinion that stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an essential element of European security given the history of this region. As for the United 

States, not so much, but rather as how the pursuit of stability and security in this 

region impacts relationships with the Russian Federation. During my tenure as 

SACEUR I did not experience the Russian Federation approaching Bosnia and 

Herzegovina in any context like that of Georgia or Ukraine. NATO has held for 

some time that while Russia may be consulted with regard to NATO enlargement 

plans, they do not have a veto over those plans. Issues in this context can be discussed by NATO in the NATO-Russia Council forum. 

Question. NATO has already assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in 

reforms to the countries’ military and Ministry of Defense, allowing further participation with the alliance through programs such as Partnership for Peace. 

• Based on your experience, could NATO help reform Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 

political and economic situation, as well as help calm ethnic tension? In what 

54 

ways has the alliance already helped resolve such issues in Central and Eastern 

Europe and elsewhere? 

Answer. NATO’s MAP program addresses political institutions as well and security and military institutions, so yes, a NATO MAP for Bosnia and Herzegovina 

could further the political and economic institutions. However, there are other organizations that can do that better than NATO—OSCE and the EU are but two as 

an example—for judicial, political, and economic institutions. NATO should offer its 

good offices to engage these other regional and functional organizations. 

Question. In your October 22, 2009, testimony, you stated that the ‘‘Strategic Concept must address the developments—by both NATO collectively and nations individually—of capabilities specified as required in the strategy.’’ 

• How should the new Strategic Concept differ from the 1999 Strategic Concept 

regarding its focus on capabilities? What is NATO’s formal process for developing capabilities and shifting transformation to match the new Strategic Concept? In your estimation, how long does it take to reorient NATO capabilities 

to align with a new Strategic Concept? 

Answer. I believe the next Strategic Concept must address the habitual tension 

between national interests and NATO force capability development. Budgets for 

security and defense needs are declining throughout the alliance. We can no longer 

describe the capabilities needed by NATO and see which of these that nation(s) may 

be willing to resource given that those nations need that capability also. This process is far too problematic, complex, and untimely to support the alliance’s needs in 

any relevant way. And this situation is further aggravated by fast-paced technology 

changes that to date NATO has been unable to react to. The Strategic Concept must 

prescribe a framework for development of NATO capability packages and the ground 

rules for participation by nations. In my opinion, a strong, focused addressing of the 

NATO capability development process in the Strategic Concept will be essential to 

achieve reasonable progress by the alliance within the 5 years. 

Question. As NATO’s relations with the EU evolve, how can the two organizations 

cooperate and complement each other, especially on 21st-century challenges, such 

as energy and cyber security, post-conflict reconstruction and global climate change? 

How can NATO and the EU effectively delineate shared responsibilities and 

resources on issues like these that combine civilian and military capabilities? How 

is NATO coordinating and consulting with the EU in formulating the new Strategic 

Concept? 

Answer. I believe that in both the military and political components of each organization continuous and transparent dialog must be established concerning both current and potential missions. Such dialogue is essential to discover opportunities for 

shared or autonomous operations, shared capability development, focused, niche 

capability development, and reduction in research, development, and procurement 

costs. The NATO/EU military information-sharing is gaining momentum, but has 

yet to yield any big wins. Unfortunately, the political dimension of Cyprus and Turkey are such—that for NATO—we have been precluded from going further due to 

protests from a Member Nation of our failure to follow prescribed operating procedures between the two organizations—yet no agreements on operating procedures 

are extent to address these types of issues. NATO and EU political leadership must 

bring the problem nations to the table to work out arrangements which will 

enhance—not impede—coordination and cooperation. 

Question. Do you think NATO should make energy security an Article Five commitment? 

Answer. If in this context the term ‘‘energy security’’ means a denial of access 

based on contractual agreements that could lead to widespread suffering and potentially loss of life—yes. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR KURT VOLKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Much has been said about the necessity of training Afghan National 

Army and Afghan police forces. Training would appear to be one area where NATO 

countries can make substantial contributions without alarming their publics at 

home or violating restrictions on use of force. However, there continues to be an 

apparent lack of resources on this front. The EU had pledged about 400 trainers 

for its police training mission last year, yet there are only about 230 on hand. 

55 

• What are the chances of persuading the EU and NATO to dramatically increase 

their commitment to this vital task? 

Answer. EU civilian police training has indeed been a disappointment. It is difficult for civilian police to operate without an adequate overall security environment, 

which the EU cannot provide on its own. The EU’s ability to reach an agreement 

with NATO on the security, reinforcement, and potential evacuation of its personnel 

is limited by the institutional blockages between the EU and NATO. (These are 

caused mainly by EU-Turkey and Cyprus-Turkey issues.) I see little prospect for 

substantial new EU police training contributions. 

On the NATO side of the equation, allies agreed at the NATO summit in April 

2009 to establish a NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A) aimed at bringing new European contributions into the ongoing police training effort. These new 

contributions were aimed at focusing in particular on the training of Afghan paramilitary police, using European gendarmerie capabilities such as those from France, 

Italy, and Turkey. My understanding is that this work is progressing, albeit slowly. 

Paramilitary police trainers integrated into the larger U.S. training mission should 

have the capacity to deploy throughout the country with Afghan units without 

encountering the institutional blockages that EU trainers face. 

Provided the initial augmentation of European paramilitary police trainers proves 

successful, there should indeed be potential for expanding this training capacity 

over time. 

Question. At the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl NATO summit, the participatory heads of 

state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting on April 4, 2009, 

acknowledged the progress of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on ‘‘cooperation with NATO, including through implementation of its current IPAP, and 

the country’s expressed intention to apply for MAP at an appropriate time.’’ The 

declaration also urged ‘‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to take further 

genuine steps to strengthen state-level institutions and reinvigorate the reform 

process to advance the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.’’ 

The Summit Declaration also welcomed Montenegro’s ‘‘successful and active implementation of its current Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO’’ 

and expressed encouragement regarding ‘‘the reforms it has made in a number of 

areas that are essential to its Euro-Atlantic integration and also by its contributions 

to cooperation and security in the region. . . . The Council in permanent session 

is keeping Montenegro’s progress under active review and will respond early to its 

request to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), on its own merits.’’ 

• Can Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro contribute to NATO’s security 

rather than act as net consumers of it? As the alliance considers enlargement, 

what specific capabilities could these two countries add to NATO? How, if at 

all, do Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro currently contribute to NATO? 

Answer. NATO’s first operational missions were the air campaign to stop Bosnian 

Serbs from shelling Sarajevo, the IFOR and SFOR peacekeeping missions in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, the Kosovo air campaign, and the ongoing KFOR operation in 

Kosovo. These missions were undertaken because of security and humanitarian 

challenges in the Balkans that threatened broader security in Europe. 

So in a very important respect, the most important contribution each of these 

countries can make to the security of the alliance, and Europe as a whole, is to be 

a source of stability, prosperity, interethnic integration and security—both within 

their own borders, and in contributing to a better Balkans region. In other words, 

to build a better neighborhood, so that NATO never has to intervene in the Balkans 

again. The prospect of NATO and EU membership can be an important incentive 

to getting countries to implement such reform. 

This notion of building a common security space for NATO members is entirely 

consistent with the original development of NATO. Countries such as Luxembourg 

or Iceland offered little direct military capacity, and even somewhat larger founding 

members, such as Belgium and Portugal, had relative small military capacities compared to those of the United States, the United Kingdom, or France. But by their 

joining together to form a larger shared security space, they made a vital contribution to the security of Europe as a whole. 

Montenegro, despite continuing difficulties in dealing with organized crime, corruption, and in protecting democratic rights, is making faster progress in these 

areas than Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in my view should be admitted to NATO’s 

Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the December 2009 meeting of NATO Foreign 

Ministers. 

Montenegro has had particular success in seeing its ethnic Albanian minority 

integrated in society in ways that exceed what other Slav-majority states in the BalVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:26 Jun 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\NATO(2).TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
56 

kans have been able to achieve. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been regressing and 

is not, in my view, ready for MAP at this time. 

Even as non-NATO members, both countries have made modest contributions to 

NATO operations. Given their small size, one should not expect massive contributions. As they become more stable and prosperous, they have the opportunity to 

develop niche capabilities that can make valuable, albeit small, contributions to 

NATO operations. And as they eventually become NATO members, they should be 

able to make modest contributions to operations on a par with other small NATO 

allies. 

Question. Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina are essential elements of 

U.S. and European security? Does Russia object to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 

Montenegro’s further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions in the same way it 

perceived Georgia’s relationship with the West? Should this matter? How, if at all, 

should NATO address such concerns? 

Answer. I believe that long-term security and stability in the Balkans is a vital 

interest of the United States. I say this because if security breaks down again as 

it did in the 1990s, it directly affects the security of U.S. allies—to whom we are 

bound by treaty—and it is highly likely that the United States would again have 

to intervene militarily in the Balkans, together with European allies, to stop any 

fighting. It is far easier, far cheaper, and far better for the people of the region to 

prevent such a breakdown of security by building stable democratic, market economic structures, than to neglect the region until it is too late, and only a new intervention would put things right. 

As for Russia—I believe that Russian concerns about NATO enlargement are seriously misplaced and we should not allow our decisions on enlargement to be affected 

by such outdated, zero-sum thinking. Rather, we should demonstrate through our 

actions—as has been done in the cases of Poland, the Baltic States, and longstanding NATO members such as Norway and Turkey—that NATO membership 

does not pose any threat to Russia. Indeed, the presence of democratic, prosperous 

and stable nations on Russia’s borders is in the interests of all of Europe, including 

Russia. 

NATO should also be open and transparent in its dealings with Russia. We should 

seek to build better understanding and confidence that NATO does not see Russia 

as an enemy and does not threaten Russia. And Russia should make similar efforts 

vis-a-vis NATO. We should seek to have NATO and Russia work together in tackling common security concerns. But we should not give Russia a veto over the rights 

of people living in sovereign, independent nations in Russia’s (and Europe’s) neighborhood. 

Indeed, one must think first about the interests of those very real people living 

in real countries, rather than the power political models of leaders in the Kremlin. 

NATO has not enlarged because it sought to grow bigger: Rather, NATO enlarged 

because people living in countries on the outside of NATO’s borders were clamoring 

to get in. They have long historical memories of insecurity—and in some cases 

Soviet domination—and seek simply to be part of a common, defensive security community so their futures need not look like their past. NATO provides such a blanket 

of security, without threatening anyone. In doing so, it therefore also provides a 

space for democratic and economic development. 

Russia does indeed seem to draw a distinction between the potential NATO membership of States in the Balkans (which it could tolerate) and states that were part 

of the Soviet Union (Georgia and Ukraine). This distinction, however, is again based 

on an outmoded, enemy image of NATO as a threat, which has nothing to do with 

the NATO of today. 

Question. NATO has already assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in 

reforms to the countries’ military and Ministry of Defense, allowing further participation with the alliance through programs such as Partnership for Peace. 

• Based on your experience, could NATO help reform Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 

political and economic situation, as well as help calm ethnic tensions? In what 

ways has the alliance already helped resolve such issues in Central and Eastern 

Europe and elsewhere? 

Answer. Yes, I believe that NATO can help to play a wider role in stimulating 

political and economic reform, and defusing ethnic tension. To do so, NATO should 

be even more clear than it has been thus far about the prospect of eventual NATO 

membership—as well as the conditions that must be fulfilled in order for a country 

to receive a membership invitation. NATO leaders can use visits and diplomatic and 

military engagement to push for continued reform. A visit by the North Atlantic 

57 

Council to Sarajevo and Banja Luka, for example, could convey important messages 

of both commitment and expectations to the parties inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

That said, NATO is not alone in promoting such reform. The EU in particular also 

has an important role to play—both through offering the realistic prospect of EU 

membership, and through the day-to-day work of the EU High Representative in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

In recent years, the perception has grown that both NATO and the EU have lost 

commitment behind their enlargement processes—and this has coincided with a rise 

in ethnic tension and lack of movement on reform. That negative cycle needs to be 

reversed through a positive commitment to further enlargement that demands positive movement on reform. 

Question. As NATO’s relations with the EU evolve, how can the two organizations 

cooperate and complement each other, especially on 21st century challenges, such 

as energy and cyber security, post-conflict reconstruction and global climate change? 

How can NATO and the EU effectively delineate shared responsibilities and 

resources on issues like these that combine civilian and military capabilities? How 

is NATO coordinating and consulting with the EU in formulating the new Strategic 

Concept? 

Answer. NATO–EU cooperation remains hamstrung by EU-Turkey-Cyprus issues, 

by institutional bureaucratic and cultural differences, and by the preference of some 

European states to conduct strategic consultations through the European Union and 

not through NATO. As a result, formal NATO–EU coordination on the NATO 

Strategic Concept is severely circumscribed, although informal contacts take place, 

and some nations that are members of both organizations provide visibility in both 

directions. 

On substance, however, both NATO and the EU face complex challenges that 

span civil and military dimensions. Both organizations should have some measure 

of both civil and military capacities, though each will have its own relative strengths 

and weaknesses. Coordination and delineation of responsibilities should be done on 

a case-by-case basis, taking account of relative capacities brought to the table, and 

the security environment, in each particular case. 

Thus far, some NATO members have blocked NATO from adopting certain civil 

capacities. This needs to change. For example, NATO should increase its capacities 

in the area of police training, recruiting and staffing PRTs where civil and military 

skills are integrated, and in providing civilian, diplomatic engagement in areas 

where NATO is engaged operationally. 

NATO is also the only venue that brings the United States and European allies 

under a single roof for strategic consultations. While the U.S.–EU relationship 

should also serve as a vehicle for consultation, it has thus far not been effective in 

providing a vehicle for genuine consultation among all Member States and forging 

common action. In this respect, NATO’s role as the principal forum for consultation 

among the allies, and the venue for decision on issues affecting the security and 

defense of its members under the Washington treaty, should be reinforced. 

Question. Do you think NATO should make energy security an Article Five commitment? 

Answer. Article 5 expresses a commitment of allies to consult and take appropriate actions in the event of an attack. This should not change. We should, however, recognize that the security environment in which we must carry out this 

commitment has changed dramatically over time. 

I believe that the shutoff of energy supplies to a NATO Member State—if done 

deliberately by an outside actor to influence or cause harm—should be considered 

an ‘‘attack’’ just as if it were a military attack. This does not mean that all energy 

issues, including supply disruptions, should be seen as Article 5 issues. But it does 

mean they have the potential to be Article 5 issues, depending on the circumstance. 

With that in mind, NATO should consult among allies at strategic levels, coordinate with outside entities, such as the EU, national energy ministries, and energy 

companies, and conduct prudent planning that in the event energy disruptions do 

rise to the level of an ‘‘attack’’ and thus an Article 5 concern. 

Question. How should the new Strategic Concept address the issue of NATO 

reform? More broadly, what reforms should be made to NATO’s operational and 

political decisionmaking? How, if at all, should the position of NATO Secretary General evolve? 

Answer. The new Strategic Concept should focus principally on defining what 

NATO is for in today’s world. It should articulate a view on the security environment NATO faces in the early 21st century, and on NATO’s role in providing for 

the security of its members within that environment. 

58 

While there are substantial organization and reform issues that should be dealt 

with, I do not believe that the Strategic Concept is the right vehicle for tackling 

them. One exception could be a reaffirmation that policy decisions at NATO should 

be made by consensus. Such a statement would a broad framework within which 

reforms could be implemented by the Secretary General over time. 

That said, substantial reform needs to be enacted within NATO. Far too often, 

nations micromanage NATO action, blocking actions needed to implement agreed 

political decisions. Nations assert the need to reach consensus on microlevel decisions such as staffing, budgetary allocations, personnel assignments, or other 

aspects of implementing in military operations decisions already taken by the North 

Atlantic Council at various political levels. 

The work of the North Atlantic Council has increasingly become an ‘‘operations 

oversight’’ board—with weekly (or even more frequent) briefings on NATO operations, extensive question and answer sessions, and little or no new decisionmaking 

at ambassadorial level. 

This should be fundamentally changed. The NAC should act at a strategic level, 

not a micromanagement level. It should act as a decisionmaking body giving strategic guidance to NATO civil and military authorities, based on clear guidance from 

capitals. Proposed decisions should be written up in advance, and meetings called 

principally to debate and agree final decisions. 

In addition, while reinforcing that broad policy decisions will only be made by consensus of the Member States, the role of the Secretary General should be strengthened to become more like that of a CEO. The Secretary General should have broad 

authority over the organization of the NATO Headquarters and staff, budgets, staffing assignments, and implementation of agreed policy decisions. He should be held 

accountable for results on implementing policy decisions—not micromanaged in how 

to carry out those decisions. 

The military structure of NATO should be radically streamlined. We have far too 

many headquarters and officer staff assigned to headquarters, with too few people 

in the field. We should reject the idea of a geographic footprint for the headquarters 

structure, and instead adopt of a model of overlapping geographic and functional 

responsibility. 

We should also look for ways to eliminate the practice of imposing political caveats on military forces assigned to NATO operations. Practical caveats—such as no 

night missions for troops that lack night vision and mobility—are appropriate. But 

political ones—such as geographic limitations on the deployment of forces within 

NATO’s theater of operations—should be eliminated. Once nations make the decision to commit force to a NATO operation, they need to understand that military 

effectiveness and the political solidarity of the alliance depend upon a unified effort. 

RESPONSES OF CHARLES A. KUPCHAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Much has been said about the necessity of training Afghan National 

Army and Afghan police forces. Training would appear to be one area where NATO 

countries can make substantial contributions without alarming their publics at 

home or violating restrictions on use of force. However, there continues to be an 

apparent lack of resources on this front. The EU had pledged about 400 trainers 

for its police training mission last year, yet there are only about 230 on hand. What 

are the chances of persuading the EU and NATO to dramatically increase their commitment to this vital task? 

Answer. As U.S. strategy shifts toward building up the Afghan state and its army 

and police, the training function will grow in importance. Whereas I do not expect 

to see European countries make substantial new contributions of fighting forces to 

Afghanistan, I do believe that it is possible to expedite and increase Europe’s contribution of trainers and civilian assistance. These missions are much less controversial than those involving combat forces. It would make good sense for the 

United States to stress this issue in its diplomacy with Europe; it will not only 

cause less tension than focus on combat troops, but also will more likely result in 

concrete deliverables. It would be advisable to look to the EU to step forward on 

the training mission as an investment in its ability to deploy missions abroad. If 

so, it will be important to improve NATO–EU linkages to ensure good cooperation 

and communication. It is worth noting that at the recent meeting of NATO Defense 

Ministers in Slovakia, European officials expressed strong support for the Obama 

administration’s strategy in Afghanistan. 

59 

Question. At the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl NATO summit, the participatory heads of 

state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting on April 4, 2009, 

acknowledged the progress of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on ‘‘cooperation with NATO, including through implementation of its current IPAP, and 

the country’s expressed intention to apply for MAP at an appropriate time.’’ The 

declaration also urged ‘‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to take further 

genuine steps to strengthen state-level institutions and reinvigorate the reform 

process to advance the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.’’ 

The Summit Declaration also welcomed Montenegro’s ‘‘successful and active 

implementation of its current Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with 

NATO’’ and expressed encouragement regarding ‘‘the reforms it has made in a number of areas that are essential to its Euro-Atlantic integration and also by its contributions to cooperation and security in the region. . . . The Council in permanent 

session is keeping Montenegro’s progress under active review and will respond early 

to its request to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), on its own 

merits.’’ 

• Can Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro contribute to NATO’s security 

rather than act as net consumers of it? As the alliance considers enlargement, 

what specific capabilities could these two countries add to NATO? How, if at 

all, do Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro currently contribute to NATO? 

Answer. The urgency of bringing into NATO all the countries of the Balkan 

Peninsula is in the first instance about consolidating peace in the region, not 

strengthening NATO. The prospect of NATO membership, as it has done in other 

parts of Central Europe, serves as an important incentive behind political and military reform. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the allure of NATO membership 

may help bring about much-needed political reform—of immediate importance due 

to the dysfunction and ethnic division that continues to compromise the country’s 

stability and integrity. Indeed, defense reform has been one of the few areas of institutional progress in Bosnia since the Dayton Agreement. From this perspective, 

integrating Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo 

are important investments in the future, making it less likely that NATO will again 

have to intervene in the region. 

That having been said, even countries with small defense establishments can 

make important contributions to NATO missions. Albania, for example, sent a sizable contingent to Afghanistan, and Georgia, another prospective NATO member, 

dispatched troops to Iraq, as did Bosnia. Moreover, the countries of Central Europe 

often share America’s strategic perspective on key issues, making them important 

players in helping to forge consensus within the alliance. 

Question. Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina are essential elements of 

U.S. and European security? Does Russia object to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 

Montenegro’s further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions in the same way it 

perceived Georgia’s relationship with the West? Should this matter? How, if at all, 

should NATO address such concerns? 

Answer. Russia opposes the enlargement of NATO whenever and wherever it 

occurs. However, apart from its staunch opposition to the independence of Kosovo, 

developments elsewhere in the Balkans are not of direct and intense interest to 

Moscow. Whereas Russia for now takes a firm position against NATO membership 

for Georgia and Ukraine, membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina or Montenegro 

is not likely to cause undue strain between NATO and Russia. Moreover, Russia has 

no interest in another round of bloodshed in the region, and thus may grudgingly 

accept NATO enlargement as a useful instrument of stability. The immediate priority is breaking the political stalemate in Bosnia and advancing its fortunes as a 

unitary state. Diplomacy with Moscow is hardly irrelevant, but it should not loom 

large as the United States and NATO advance their own diplomacy in the Balkans. 

Question. NATO has already assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in 

reforms to the countries’ military and Ministry of Defense, allowing further participation with the alliance through programs such as Partnership for Peace. 

• Based on your experience, could NATO help reform Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 

political and economic situation, as well as help calm ethnic tensions? In what 

ways has the alliance already helped resolve such issues in Central and Eastern 

Europe and elsewhere? 

Answer. The political discipline that regularly results from earnest efforts to qualify for NATO membership holds out hope of prompting political reform in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina. Civilian control of the military is another important by-product 

of the process of accession. 

60 

NATO has already made clear that it expects Bosnia and Herzegovina to move 

expeditiously to reform its constitution so that the central government can function 

effectively. The alliance has also identified measures needed to strengthen the civilian chain of command. Moreover, all three of the country’s three main communities 

support NATO membership, giving the alliance considerable leverage over political 

reform. The prospect of joining the EU offers an over-the-horizon incentive for 

Bosnia to put its house in order. Inasmuch as NATO membership can occur more 

quickly and speaks directly to the country’s security and integrity, it provides a 

more immediate impetus behind political reform. 

NATO, in contrast to the EU, does not have a direct role to play in speeding economic growth. But accession to the alliance will certainly help create the political 

and security conditions needed to attract foreign investment. 

Question. As NATO’s relations with the EU evolve, how can the two organizations 

cooperate and complement each other, especially on 21st-century challenges, such 

as energy and cyber security, post-conflict reconstruction and global climate change? 

How can NATO and the EU effectively delineate shared responsibilities and 

resources on issues like these that combine civilian and military capabilities? How 

is NATO coordinating and consulting with the EU in formulating the new Strategic 

Concept? 

Answer. The transatlantic community sorely needs a stronger European pillar, 

one that would strengthen both the EU and NATO. As part of that development, 

it is important to deepen institutional linkages and channels of communication 

between the two bodies. Some issues, such as climate change, do not fall squarely 

on NATO’s agenda. Accordingly, it may make sense to upgrade and institutionalize 

U.S.–EU contact. Especially if the institutional reforms contained in the Lisbon 

Treaty succeed in providing the EU with more effective leadership and a more 

common voice, U.S.–EU linkages should evolve in step with Europe’s collective 

character. 

Question. Do you think NATO should make energy security an Article Five commitment? 

Answer. No. NATO should prepare for operations to defend energy infrastructure, 

such as ports and pipelines. But energy security requires a much broader energy 

policy, much of which lies beyond the scope of NATO. Moreover, expanding the definition of Article V might risk diluting its core and essential purpose—collective territorial defense. 

RESPONSES OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION IN NATO

General McChrystal’s strategic priority in Afghanistan—securing the population— 

requires an integrated and comprehensive civilian-military approach that includes 

our NATO allies’ military and civilian forces, nongovernmental organizations, and 

local Afghans. 

Question. General Craddock, in your statement, you mentioned that the civil-military component to operations is critically important. In regard to Afghanistan, what 

role should our NATO allies play in contributing to the civilian surge supported by 

the Obama administration? For NATO allies unlikely to commit more troops, can 

we expect a commitment to assist with reconstruction efforts or Afghan police and 

military training? 

Answer. Our NATO allies can contribute far more in civilian expertise than they 

have done so to date. Every nation in NATO is a democracy, with democratic institutions more mature than the current state of representative government in Afghanistan. Our allies have capabilities and capacities to deploy civilian experts to 

Afghanistan and employ them in a coordinated, integrated effort with UNAMA and 

other international and nongovernmental organizations. The U.S. Department of 

State has made assessments of which nations have a depth of capacity which would 

permit them to send civilian trainers and mentors to both federal and provincial 

ministries in Afghanistan to build their capabilities. Can we expect that contribution? Not without a strong push by the alliance leader—the United States. With 

regard to our allies’ commitment to train the police and military—a good step forward is NATO’s agreement to support a NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan— 

NTM–A. NATO has yet to provide the needed resources for that new mission—and 

61 

once again—U.S. leadership will be essential for pushing the alliance to resource 

this critical mission. 

Question. NATO’s 2008 Comprehensive Approach created a framework to improve 

civilian-military cooperation and coordination in operations planning, stabilization 

and reconstruction, and public outreach. What is your sense of the status of the 

implementation of the Comprehensive Approach on the ground in Afghanistan? 

Answer. In my estimate the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach in 

NATO is a mixed bag. In the fall of 2008, NATO produced a document called the 

Comprehensive Strategy for the Political-Military Program (CSPMP) in Afghanistan. Tasks were identified and assigned to various NATO agencies for action. 

Unfortunately, few metrics were established, nor was a program for periodic review 

and assessment implemented, thereby leading to an uneven or unevaluated 

response. I believe the military component of NATO in Afghanistan—ISAF—used 

the CSPMP well as an additional tool for resource prioritization and assessment, as 

it fit nicely with the construct of the ISAF Operations Plan. With new leadership 

in NATO headquarters, the time is right to push the Secretary General for greater 

visibility and focus on the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach through 

the CSPMP and the military operations plans. 

RESPONSE OF SECRETARY MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. Our European allies provide about half of the troops in the NATO-led 

International Security Force (ISAF). I commend them for their bravery and sacrifice 

that is often overlooked. I do often hear complaints, however, of the caveats imposed 

by ISAF contributors regarding where and how their forces can fight. 

• Secretary Albright, do you anticipate the new NATO strategic concept to limit 

the number and types of caveats that NATO participants can impose? 

Answer. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan will be a primary source of discussion 

both within the Experts Group and between the group and outside interlocutors. We 

will be particularly interested in the lessons that can be learned both about the 

positive and the more troublesome aspects of the NATO mission. One challenge the 

alliance will face is that of applying such lessons in an appropriate and effective 

way to future, perhaps as yet unforeseen, contingencies. Certainly, the controversy 

surrounding the so-called caveats exercised by some allies in Afghanistan will fall 

within the confines of this discussion. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR KURT VOLKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

NATO AND RUSSIA

Despite the NATO-Russia Council partnership and common interests such as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, preventing the spread WMD’s and counternarcotics 

with NATO, Russia continues to view NATO as a chief threat to its security. 

Question. In your opinion, does Russia really want to maintain a comprehensive 

partnership with NATO? 

Answer. I believe that in the 1990s, Russia did indeed want to build up a genuine 

partnership with NATO. 

Today, however, we have seen the emergence of a more authoritarian Russia 

whose priority is to reestablish a sphere of influence in neighboring states. It is 

increasingly apparent that this Russia does not seek a genuine partnership with 

NATO, but rather seeks to constrain NATO. At home, the Russia deliberately fans 

a ‘‘NATO-as-enemy’’ sentiment through state-controlled media as a means of rallying the public to the Kremlin’s more aggressive policy both at home and in neighboring states. 

Russia’s current engagement with NATO seems opportunistic at best, and often 

aimed at sharpening differences among allies—particularly between Central and 

West Europe—while agreeing to work together with NATO only in a few select 

areas. 

Question. What can be done to alleviate the level of mistrust that exists between 

Russia and NATO? Given its incursion into Georgia and its increasingly autocratic 

tendencies, can Russia truly remain a valuable partner on what NATO and the 

United States perceive as common interests? 

62 

Answer. By simple virtue of the fact that NATO and Russia must live side by side 

on the Eurasian landmass, we must actively seek to engage with Russia, and to 

work together on common interests. But we must do so based on three things: a 

clear sense of standing up for our democratic values; a realistic assessment of Russia’s own actions, such as in breaking off part of Georgian territory; and a willingness to combine both engagement and firmness. 

NATO can also provide some measure of reassurance—such as noting that it is 

a defensive alliance and threatens no one. And that while open to new members, 

it insists on nations being stable, democratic, and contributors to common security 

in the Euro-Atlantic area in order to be admitted to the alliance. 

At the moment, NATO is not living up to such an approach. NATO is deeply 

divided over how to deal with Russia—with Central Europeans demanding protection and West Europeans insisting on constructive engagement. With no unified 

position, there is no capacity for firmness, and Russia continues to see benefit in 

acting assertively in its neighborhood and treating NATO somewhat 

opportunistically. 

NATO needs to come to a common, balanced, and realistic view of dealing with 

Russia. If we manage this, however, we then will have a strong and confident basis 

from which to engage with Russia. Whether this leads to Russia acting as a valuable partner is in Russian hands, but this kind of strong, confident outreach from 

NATO offers the best chance to build such partnership. 

RESPONSES OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JIM DEMINT

Question. Afghanistan has brought the issue of burden-sharing among the alliance 

members to the forefront. Do you see the issue of resources for NATO missions as 

largely a political problem or purely a lack of assets? As the former commander in 

Europe, what concerns do you have about allies’ forces and capabilities? What 

strengths do they bring to the table? How would you describe the contributions from 

the newer members of NATO to alliance missions (those who joined the alliance in 

1999 and since)? 

Answer. I see the sourcing of forces and capabilities for NATO missions as both 

a political and a military capabilities problem. I also believe that if all the military 

capabilities were present as needed, shortfalls would still exist in ISAF due to a lack 

of political will by many NATO nations to accept the burden of financial cost and 

the risk of casualties assumed by the deployment of forces. While it is true that several of the military capabilities needed in Afghanistan are either in short supply or 

not available outside the United States—in the mainstream the capabilities exist. 

What most of the allies have not done well is to provide their forces with all the 

combat enablers needed to effectively operate in the austere Afghan environment— 

either because they don’t have those enablers in their force structure (yet to transform) or because for national reasons they refuse to deploy them. With regard to 

contributions to alliance missions from the newer nations—it has exceeded on a per 

capita basis the contributions from most of the older NATO nations. If the newer 

nations can get help from partners for the enablers or modules they may not have 

in their force structure—and sometimes airlift and fiscal support—they send their 

forces almost always when pressed. I believe the severity of the economic downturn 

in Eastern and Central Europe will negatively impact on their ability to finance continued high levels of support to these missions. 

Question. Do we have the appropriate force structure in Europe to meet the training needs and requirements of the alliance as well as maintain our bilateral security 

relationships? If not, what recommendations would you make? 

Answer. I am on the record—for the past 2 years—of holding the position that 

the objective U.S. force posture in Europe is inadequate for the missions and tasks 

assigned to the U.S. European Command. Of particular note will be—by 2012 if not 

changed—an acute shortage of ground forces and a shortage of tactical fighter aircraft. I have recommended to the Department of Defense on several occasions to 

freeze the EUCOM force structure at current levels. Key to this is four brigades of 

Army forces (currently in the U.S. Army Europe force structure) and no downsizing 

of fighter aircraft from current numbers. 

63 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR KURT VOLKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JIM DEMINT

Question. I am sure you still maintain close relationships with your former colleagues at NATO. From their perspective, what type of role do they believe the 

United States needs to play right now in Europe and global security? Is the United 

States leading the way they want or need us to? 

Answer. I believe that our allies continue to want the United States to provide 

committed leadership to NATO, while consulting closely and reaching decisions 

jointly. Allied capabilities are limited, and political will is diminishing for the mission in Afghanistan—yet they are committed as an alliance to our common cause. 

In this context, and especially in the wake of ISAF Commander McChrystal’s recommendations, they seek to agree together within NATO on our common strategy, 

and are looking for clear signals of U.S. resolve, commitment, and political leadership on Afghanistan. 

A second major issue is Russia. Allies are deeply divided over how to deal with 

a newly assertive, authoritarian Russia: Central Europe seeks strategic reassurance 

and protection, while Western Europe favors a policy of entangling Russia through 

engagement. Only the United States can play the role of unifying the transatlantic 

community around a common, well-balanced strategy for dealing with Russia, and 

allies are looking for the United States to assume this role. 

Question. Some have argued that NATO is not worth the effort any more, that 

the United States puts far too much into the alliance for what we get out and that 

NATO’s bureaucracy can rival that of the United Nations. And with this backdrop, 

even more people argue that NATO enlargement should not occur—especially for 

countries in the Balkans or Eastern Europe that may be seen as a burden on 

NATO’s resources rather than contribute to them. 

• What are your thoughts on the importance of the existing alliance, its enlargement, and where we go from here? 

Answer. Thank you for this important question. It gets to the heart of NATO 

issues today. 

First: NATO has a number of serious problems—but these are not the result of 

NATO enlargement, nor are they a reason to block further enlargement. 

The new members of NATO are among the most committed of allies, providing 

significant contributions to NATO operations as percentages of population and 

national troop strength. Estonia has more troops in Afghanistan per capita than any 

other ally. Every ally, no matter how small, has troops in Afghanistan. Because of 

their history and geography, they intrinsically grasp the importance of close alliance 

with the United States—supporting the United States in global security efforts, 

while urging continued U.S. engagement in security within Europe. 

Moreover, NATO enlargement has increased the secure space in Europe where 

democracy and free markets flourish—enriching the lives of over 100 million people, 

and eliminating what would otherwise be a security vacuum and strategic vulnerability for NATO in the heart of Europe. This is a strategic, security value for the 

United States. 

Second, the spread of democracy, prosperity, security and stability throughout 

Europe is in the long-term strategic interest of the United States, Europe, and the 

world. NATO enlargement has facilitated the movement toward a Europe whole and 

free, and should continue to do so. 

Western Europe has developed a sense of enlargement fatigue—particularly 

because EU enlargement, with its economic integration, has gone hand in hand with 

NATO enlargement. The ‘‘Polish plumber’’ featured in the French referendum 

against the EU Constitution because French voters feared that past and future 

enlargement would take away French jobs. 

Here again, NATO’s newest members—because of their history—are the most 

ardent advocates of further NATO enlargement. They see more clearly than others 

the strategic value for our own security of further development of democratic, market-oriented, stable and secure societies throughout the entire Euro-Atlantic area. 

Europe is incontrovertibly better off with an enlarged NATO and enlarged EU, 

and the process of performance-based enlargement should continue. 

Third, NATO is in serious trouble because of a fundamental lack of consensus 

among the old members of NATO on some of the basics of today’s security environment: how important is Afghanistan, how to deal with Russia, whether NATO is the 

principal forum for Europe’s security and defense, how much to invest in defense 

capabilities, and whether NATO should take on certain civil as well as military 

dimensions of global challenges. New members are closer to American views on 

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these issues. Old members have differing perspectives, leading to ‘‘conditional’’ contributions. 

To Americans, this is deeply frustrating, given our massive commitments within 

NATO. But the fact is that without our allies, America would be facing the challenges in Afghanistan, or Kosovo, or piracy, or counterterrorism alone. Afghanistan 

would be ‘‘America’s war’’ rather than the democratic international community supporting the weak population against the strong (and well-funded) violent extremists. 

NATO is not working well today. But for NATO to work well, America must lead 

within NATO—offering ideas, sharing decisionmaking, leading with commitments 

and implementation, and in doing so, bringing NATO allies together and bringing 

NATO as a whole forward effectively as a strategic contributor to our shared foreign 

policy requirements. 

Question. It appears that Europeans more often are using other organizations and 

structures to discuss important issues—including security. Do you believe this is 

true and if so what are the implications for NATO and the larger issues of U.S., 

European, and global security? What should the United States do to address these 

developments? 

Answer. Yes—to a significant degree, some European allies prefer to consult, 

decide, and act within the EU rather than NATO. This was especially apparent over 

the past year in decisionmaking about dealing with piracy off the Horn of Africa. 

There should be no doubt: The emergence of a stronger, more cohesive, more decisive, and more effective Europe is clearly in the U.S. interest. We need global partners dedicated to democratic ideals, and the stronger and more effective they are, 

the better. 

That said, there are serious risks that must be avoided at the same time. Thus 

far, the EU has not proven itself to be a strong, effective partner. To the extent that 

European nations restrict NATO’s freedom of maneuver in order to protect a weak 

EU, we run the risk of letting global problems spiral out of control. 

This is a serious danger on its own merits, but also because it exposes a larger 

problem. Some Europeans have in the past seen the EU, or ‘‘Europe’’ as an alternative to transatlantic partnership with the United States. To the extent this attitude would persist, it would become a strategic problem, because it divides the 

democratic, prosperous, transatlantic community into pieces. 

The one place where the European nations and the United States sit together at 

one table is NATO—and for this reason alone, it is critical that NATO continue to 

serve as a vehicle for strategic consultation and decisionmaking among the U.S. and 

European allies. 

To address this set of challenges, the United States should actively support the 

development of the European Union, and work to build an effective U.S.–EU relationship. This will take a great deal of time, and in large measure depends upon 

Europeans overcoming internal divisions within the EU. 

But the United States should never allow U.S.–EU consultations to become a substitute for U.S. engagement within NATO on security and defense issues, where we 

all sit together around a single table. This is the one place where effective U.S.- 

European consultations are guaranteed—provided the United States does its part in 

bringing its own strategic deliberations to the table. It is also the one place that 

assures interoperability between U.S. and European forces, and recognizes the preponderant weight of U.S. capabilities in overall transatlantic security efforts. Thus 

our work within NATO must be maintained, even as the EU increases its own 

capabilities. 

Question. After the invasion of Georgia last year, NATO suspended the NATORussia Council and over the past year Russia has endorsed the idea of a new PanEuropean security concept. With your personal experience in Brussels, what role 

have you seen Russia play inside the alliance, and their effect on policies and the 

ability to reach consensus? What role do you believe they should play in developing 

a new Strategic Concept? 

Answer. During my year in Brussels, Russia had no serious interest in NATORussia cooperation, and instead viewed the NATO-Russia relationship opportunistically: how Russia could take advantage of, and even sharpen, differences among 

NATO allies over issues such as missile defense, Kosovo, nuclear deterrence, and 

more. When NATO opted to resume NATO-Russia military-to-military cooperation 

after a hiatus because of Russia’s invasion of Georgia, Russia itself held back on 

such cooperation. 

Russia’s call for a new pan-European security concept appears to be an effort to 

break up the three pillars of the Helsinki Final Act, which has served as the heart 

of European security in a broad sense since the 1970s. Russia seeks a new deal on 

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hard security in Europe, divorced from human rights and economic freedoms. While 

being open to specific Russian proposals to improve existing arrangements, the 

United States and Europe should oppose efforts to dismantle the fundamental architecture of European human, economic, and hard security that has proved its worth 

over 30 years. 

As for NATO’s Strategic Concept, Russia should play no role whatsoever. Because 

of the commitment that allies have toward each other through the Washington 

treaty, the Strategic Concept is a document for their agreement only. It is intended 

to record consensus among allies on the nature of today’s security environment, and 

NATO’s role in addressing it. As a country that is not a member of NATO, Russia— 

as well as any other nonmember—should have no role. 

Question. Do you believe energy or climate change are issues that should be dealt 

with in the context of the NATO alliance? If so, do you believe they should be 

included under the guarantees of Article V? 

Answer. Climate change itself should not be an Article 5 issue. There is no 

‘‘attack’’ involved. The consequences of climate change could, in their most extreme, 

theoretical variants, contribute to localized conflict. Insofar as this occurs, NATO 

should address this on a case-by-case basis. 

Energy security is a different matter. Article 5 expresses a commitment of allies 

to consult and take appropriate actions in the event of an attack. This should not 

change. We should, however, recognize that the security environment in which we 

must carry out this commitment has changed dramatically over time. 

I believe that the shutoff of energy supplies to a NATO Member State—if done 

deliberately by an outside actor to influence or cause harm—should be considered 

an ‘‘attack’’ just as if it were a military attack. This does not mean that all energy 

issues, including supply disruptions, should be seen as Article 5 issues. But it does 

mean they have the potential to be Article 5 issues, depending on the circumstance. 

With that in mind, NATO should consult among allies at strategic levels, coordinate with outside entities, such as the EU, national energy ministries, and energy 

companies, and conduct prudent planning in the event that energy disruptions do 

rise to the level of an ‘‘attack’’ and thus an Article 5 concern. 

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