UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 93-1664

_____________________

JOHN HALKIAS, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

JOHN HALKIAS and BARRY JACKSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

VERSUS

GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

_____________________________________________________

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_____________________

No. 93-1680

_____________________

JOHN ANTHONY CUREINGTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________________________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

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_____________________

No. 93-8204

_____________________

ALVIN STAUDT, on behalf of himself and

all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

GLASTRON, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

_____________________________________________________

(August 24, 1994)

Before WISDOM, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

These appeals present an issue of first impression in our

circuit: the limitations period for an action under the Worker

Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§

2101-2109. Both district courts applied the six-month period

provided by § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29

U.S.C. § 160(b). We AFFIRM.

I.

Two of the actions (Halkias' and Cureington's) are against

General Dynamics Corporation; one (Staudt's), against Glastron,

Inc. They concern not receiving timely notice in advance of a1 Although WARN is referred to as a "plant closing" law, it is

not addressed solely to the permanent closing of plants. First, it

addresses temporary closings. S ee 29 U.S. C. §§ 2101(a)(2),

2102(a). Second, and more important, it addresses "mass layoffs"

that result from far less than plant closure. S ee 29 U.S.C. §§

2101(a)(3), 2102(a); s ee also infra

, note 2. Nevertheless, the

dissent treats WARN as if it governed only plant closings, and this

treatment drives its conclusions. See infra , note 18.

- 3 - layoff, contrary to WARN, referred to by many as a "plant closing"

law. E .g.

, 134 Cong. Rec. S8546 (June 24, 1988) (Senator

Grassley); id. at S8665 (June 28, 1988) (Senator Specter). 1

WARN requires a business that employs more than 100 workers to

provide at least 60 days' written notice before a "plant closing"

or a "mass layoff". 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-02; s ee also id. §

2101(a)(3)-(4) (defining "plant closing" and "mass layoff").

Failure to provide such notice results in the business' liability

to those who suffered an "employment loss" for back pay and

benefits for each day of the violation. I d. § 2104(a)(1); see also

id. § 2101(a)(6) (defining "employment loss" as termination, layoff

exceeding six months, or reduction of hours of work by more than 50

percen t for six months). WARN provides for a federal action to

recover these damages, 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5), but does not include

a limitations period.

A.

1.

On January 7, 1991, the Department of Defense cancelled a

contract with General Dynamics, prompti ng it, one day later, to

institute a "mass layoff" at its facilities in Texas, Oklahoma, and2 WARN generally defines a "mass layoff" as a reduction in force

that is not the result of a plant closing and results in either an

employment loss at a single site for at least 33 percent of the

employees (provided that at least 50 employees suffer an employment

loss), or 500 employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3).

3 According to General Dynamics, different plaintiffs commenced

a WARN action in the Eastern District of Missouri within 10 days of

the January 8, 1991, layoff. Halkias attempted to intervene in

that action on May 4, 1992; however, that July, his motion to

intervene was denied as untimely. Although neither the motion nor

the order is part of the record, Halkias does not dispute General

Dy namics' statement. Halkias instituted his action five months

after the denial of his motion to intervene in the Missouri action

(which was filed more than one year after the layoff).

4 The district court certified the class as:

Each person (i) who has been an employee of General

D ynamics Corporation (ii) who, at the time of the

terminati on of his or her employment for General

Dynamics Corporation, was not represented by a

union, (iii) who, at that time was employed at

either the Fort Worth, Texas, plant or the Tulsa,

Oklahoma, plant of General Dynamics Corporation,

(iv) whose employment was involuntarily terminated

between the dates January 7, 1991, and Marc h 1,

1991, and (v) who did not receive written notice of

his or her termination of employment at least sixty

(60) days prior to such termination.

- 4 - Missouri. 2 Halkias was one of the affected employees at the Fort

Worth, Texas, facility. Almost two years later, on November 24,

1992, he and other General Dynamics employees at the Fort Worth and

Oklahoma (Tulsa) facilities filed a class action in district court,

claiming that they were laid off in violation of WARN. 3 In its

final form, the action was on behalf of approximately 2,000 former

salaried, non-union General Dynamics employees at the two

facilities. 4

General Dynamics moved for judgment on the pleadings,

assertin g that the six-month limitations period applicable to5 Cureington filed suit in state court on Janua ry 4, 1993,

nearly two months after Halkias filed his. General Dynamics

removed the case to district court.

6 Staudt states in his brief that the employees were non-union,

and advances this as one of the reasons for not adopting the NLRA

period. The record, however, is silent on this non-union claim,

but Glastron does not dispute it. As discussed infra , we give no

weight to union status v el non for fixing the appropria t e limitations period.

- 5 - unfair labor practice claims under § 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(b), should be borrowed, and if so, Halkias' action was timebarred. The district court agreed.

2.

Cureington's appeal arises out of the same facts; indeed, the

parties to his action agreed to transfer it to the district court

adjudicating Halkias', because the claim was identical to, and

embraced by, Halkias' class action. 5 Although Cureington's action

was never formally consolidated with Halkias', the district court

dismissed Cureington's complaint sua sponte , because he failed to

file within the six-month period.

B.

Staudt's class action against Glastron alleged that it "laid

off" over 250 employees at its New Braunfe ls, Texas, facility

between October 31 and December 31, 1990; but Staudt did not file

suit until December 17, 1992, approximately two years later. 6

Glastron's motion to dismiss, on the basis that the action was

barred by the limitations period that should be borrowed from the

NLRA, was granted.7 At various places in his briefs, Halkias seems to question the

propriety of utilizing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (allowing entry of a

"judgment on the pleadings") as a vehicle f or dismissing his

complaint; however, he never explicitly contends that a dismissal

under Rule 12(c) was inappropriate. Therefore, we do not consider

this issue to have been raised.

8 E.g.

, Newspaper & Mail Deliverer s' Union v. United Magazine

Co.

, 809 F. Supp. 185, 188-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Thomas v. North Star

Steel Co.

, 838 F. Supp. 970, 972-75 (M.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd sub nom.

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co. , Nos. 93-2008

and 93-7613, 1994 WL 415139, 1994 U.S . App. LEXIS 21132 (3d Cir.

Aug. 10, 1994).

9 E.g.

, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.

, 833

F. Supp. 467, 467-70 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd , Nos. 93-2008 and 93-

7613, 1994 WL 415139, 1 994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21132; A utomobile

Mechanics' Local No. 701 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv., Inc. , 830 F.

Supp. 432, 435-37 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Wholesale & Retail Food

Distrib. Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Serv., Inc.

, 8 26 F. Supp.

326, 329-31 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (applying California limit a tions

period after determining that defendants waived limitations defense

pursuant to NLRA); Frymire v. Ampex Corp.

, 821 F. Supp. 651, 653-55

(D. Colo. 1993); Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp. , 818 F. Supp. 192,

194-97 (E.D. Mich. 1993).

- 6 - II.

As noted, we address an issue of first impression for our

court: the WARN limitations period. 7 District courts addressing it

are divided: like the district courts in these cases, some have

applied the NLRA's six-mo nth period; 8 others, state limitations

periods. 9 The Second and Third Circuits, which a re the only other

circuits to have addressed this issue, rejected the NLRA period and

held that a state limitations period was appropriate

. U nited

Steelworkers of Am. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.

, Nos. 93-2008 and 93-

7613, 1994 WL 415139, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21132 (3d Cir. Aug. 10,

1994); United Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc.

,

999 F.2d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1993). Most reluctantly, we part company- 7 -

with our sister circuits, and hold that the NLRA period should be

applied.

A.

Congress' failure to provide a limitations period for WARN "is

often the case in federal civil law". D elCostello v. International

Bhd. of Teamsters , 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983). In such a case,

we do not ordinarily assume that Congress intended

that there be no ti me limit on actions at all;

rather, our task is to "borrow" the most suitable

statute or other rule of timeliness from some other

source. We have generally concluded that Congress

intended that the courts apply the most closely

analogous statute of limitations under state law.

Id. (footnote omitted). The task of borrowing an appropriate

limitations period has been accurately characterized as "a matter

of which round peg to stuff in a square hole." S hort v. Belleville

Shoe Mfg. Co.

, 908 F.2d 1385, 1393 (7th Cir . 1990) (Posner, J.,

concurring), cert. denied

, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991). Due to the many

competing reasons for borrowing various periods, this case is no

exception. Indeed, it is a classic example.

Complicating our task i s the need to consider whether a

federal limitations period provides a superior vehicle for WARN's

enforcement. S ee DelCostello

, 462 U.S. at 162 ("state statutes of

limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of

federal law"). To be sure, the Court continues to caution that

"resort to state law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations

periods." I d. at 171; accord Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &

Petigrow v. Gilbertson

, 1 11 S. Ct. 2773, 2778 (1991) (plurality)

("It is the usual rule that when Congress has failed to provide a10 This usual rule has its genesis in the Rules of Decision Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1652, originally enacted in 1789, which provides:

The laws of the several states, e xcept where the

Constitution or treaties of the United States or

Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,

shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil

actions in the courts of the United States, in

cases where they apply.

See Lampf

, 111 S. Ct. at 2778 (plurality) (discussing source of

state borrowing principle); see also DelCostello , 462 U.S. at 159

n.13:

As we recognized in [ Auto Wo rkers v. ] H oosier

[ Cardinal Corp. ], 383 U.S. [696,] 701 [(1966)], the

choice of a limitations period for a federal cause

of action is itself a question of federal law. If

the answer to that question (based on the policies

and requirements of the underlying cause of action)

is that a timeliness rule drawn from elsewhere in

federal law should be applied, th en the Rules of

Decision Act is inapplicable by its own terms.

11 The "norm" of borrowi ng state limitations periods has been

subject to steady erosion. Discussing L ampf

, one commentator noted

that "the Court furthered a decade-long drift away from the

traditional practice of `borrowing' the statute of limitations of

the forum state's most analogous cause of action and moved towards

the adoption of uniform national rules." The Supreme Court, 1990

Term

-- Leading Cases

, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 400 (1991). In many

respects, this erosion reflects the endorsement of a view once held

only in dissent. S ee Hoosier Cardinal

, 383 U.S. at 709-14 (White,

J., dissenting). For obvious reasons, this movement towards

uniform, national limitations periods for federal causes of action

has much to recommend it. See Leading Cases

, supra , at 409 ("The

pol icies advanced by adopting uniform limitations periods --

certainty, predictability, and minimization of litigation

-- would

be promoted by uniform periods for all federal statutes. In an age

of multis tate activity largely regulated by federal rather than

state law, the state borrowing rule may be an anachronism.").

The dissent contends that the Leading Cases note "in actuality

- 8 - statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, a court

`borrows' or `absorbs' the local time limitation most analogous to

the case at hand.") (citations omitted). 10 But, under appropriate

conditions, we may look to federal law to borrow the period. 11 Thesupports [its] conclusion". Dissent at 19 n.48. If its conclusion

is that the state borrowing rule is still the usual rule, then we

agree. On the other hand, if it believes that the note supports

the dissent's conclusion that the existence of a "trend away from

the state borrowing rule is pure conjecture", then we disagree.

- 9 - Court has stated that:

when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly

provides a closer analogy than available state

statutes, and when the federa l policies at stake

and the practicalities of litigation make that rule

a significantly more appropriate vehicle for

interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to

turn away from state law.

DelCostello

, 462 U.S. at 172; a ccord Lampf

, 111 S. Ct. at 2778

(plurality).

Consistent with the trend towards utilization of federal

limitations periods, discussed in note 11, supr a , our court has

borrowed the NLRA's limitations period in a number of cases since

DelCostello

. S ee

, e.g.

, Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n

, 901 F.2d

404, 410-14 (5th Cir.) (applying period to claim for breach of duty

of fair representation under Railway Labor Act), cert. denied

, 498

U.S. 895 (199 0); Trial v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. , 896 F.2d 120,

124-26 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); Aluminum, Brick & Glassworkers Int'l

Union Local 674 v. A.P. Green Refractories, Inc.

, 895 F.2d 1053,

1054-55 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying period to "pure" § 301 actions

under Labor Management Relations Act); Coyle v. Brotherhood of Ry.,

Airline, & S.S. Clerks

, 838 F.2d 1404, 1405-06 (5th Cir. 1988)

(applying period to breach of contract claim against union under §

2 of Railway Labor Act).- 10 -

The decision to apply a federal, rather than a state, period

is a "delicate" one. S ee Lam pf , 111 S. Ct. at 2778 (plurality).

I n DelCostello , the Court selected the NLRA's limitations period

after giving due consideration to whe ther the state period might

hinder the federal policy at issue, DelCostello , 462 U.S. at 162-

69, and noting the "family resemblance" between the federal statute

at issue and the NLRA. I d. at 170-71. In A gency Holding Corp. v.

Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc. , 483 U.S. 143 (1987), the Court

considered whether a unif orm period is desirable, i d. at 148-49,

and whether a federal statute provided a "far closer analogy

...

than any state law alternative", paying particular attention to the

"similarities in purpose and str ucture" between the two federal

statutes. I d. at 150, 152. It also focused on litigation

practicalities, particularly the potential for forum shopping

generated by application of diverse state periods. I d. at 153-54.

In Lampf , a plurality of the Court attempted to promulgate a

three-tier "hierarchical inquiry for ascertaining the appropriate

li mitations period". L ampf

, 111 S. Ct. at 2778-79 (plurality).

Following this approach, one first decides "whether a uniform

statute of limitations is to be selec ted", regardless of whether

that uniform period is to be a particular species of state periods

or a single, federal one. I d. at 2779 (plurality). If uniformity

is desirable, one next chooses either a species of state

limitations periods or a federal period, paying particular

attention to "the geographic character of the claim" and forum

shopping concerns. I d. (plurality). Finally, even if such12 The dissent charges that "[t]he language in Lampf pronouncing

the state bor rowing rule alive and well did not command `only a

plurality', as the majority and General Dynamics would have us

believe." Dissent at 3-4 (footnote omitted). That charge is

predicated on a misconstruction; we merely state that "the Lampf

hierarchy commanded only a plurality". At no point do we suggest

that "only a plurality" of the Court believes that state borrowing

rule is anything but the "usual" rule; however, part IIA of the

Lampf opinion was, in fact, joined by only four justices. And,

only those four justices expressly agreed with the "h ierarchical

inquiry" distilled in part IIA for dete rmining whether a federal

limitations period should be borrowed; no other justice wrote to

express a similar view. In any event, as discussed i nfra

, we approach our inquiry through a harmonious reading of DelCostello

, Lampf , and other Supreme Court precedent.

- 11 - con siderations counsel in favor of the federal period, one must

still decide that the "federal source truly affords a `closer fit'

with the cause of action at issue than does any available state-law

source." Id. (plurality).

Although the Lampf hierarchy commanded only a plurality, 12 its

structure is consistent with the earlier approach of eight members

of the Court in Agency Holding . On the other hand, the Court has

borrowed a federal period without first explicitly ascertaining the

need fo r uniformity. S ee DelCostello

, 462 U.S. at 165-71. In

fact, the discussion in Agency Holding of the desirability of a

uniform period for RICO claims ma y be embraced as a component of

DelCostello 's dictate that "litigation practicalities" and policy

implications be considered. S ee Agency Holding

, 483 U.S. at 149-50

("a uniform statute of limitations is required to avoid intolerable

uncertainty and time-consuming litigation") (internal quotations

and citation omitted) ; DelCostello , 462 U.S. at 172 (identifying

"litigation practicalities" and the effects on federal po licy as

factors in choosing a federal limitations period). Accordingly, we13 The dissent takes vigorous exception to the order of our

presentation, believing that Lampf mandates that we first address

the state lim itations period. Dissent at 4. As to L ampf 's

teachings, we are unable to distill the same meaning from the

Court's words that the dissent does. Nowhere does L ampf state that

federal courts, when confronted with the suggestion that a federal

limitations period is more appropriate than a state period, must

first address the relevant state period. Instead, Lampf , quoting

DelC ostello , invites a comparison: federal borrowing is "to be

made only when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly

provides a closer analogy

..., and when the federal policies at

stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."

Lampf

, 111 S. Ct. at 2778 (pl urality) (emphasis added; citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). Obviously, this comparison

i nvolves ascertaining the closeness of both the proposed federal

and s tate periods to the cause of action in issue, and then

comparing their fit. Whether one first looks to the state or to

the federal period, the resulting inquiry is still the same. Of

interest, the Lampf opinion itself did not even consider state law

alternatives, because it found "an express limitations period for

correlative remedies within the same [federal] enactment." I d. at

2782 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted). We do not read this to

m ean that " L ampf suggests that the only time a court can go straight to federal law is `where Congress has provided an express

limitations period for correlative remedie s within the same

enactment.'" Dissent at 5 (footnote omitted). In fact, the

Supreme Court in Agency Holding addressed the similarities between

RICO and the Clayton Act prior to discussing "the lack of any

s atisfactory state law analogue to RICO" and rejecting the

application of a state "catchall" limitations period. See Agency

- 12 - follow DelCostello 's general outline, recognizing that subsequent

cases have elaborated on that theme.

B.

We first examine whether the NLRA limitations period is more

analogous to WARN than available state periods. See DelCostello

,

462 U.S. at 172 (requiring that the federal period provide a

"closer analogy than available state statutes"). To undertake this

examination, we first describe the similarities betwe en the NLRA

and WARN, and then compare and contrast those similarities with the

available state period(s). 13Holding , 483 U.S. at 146-53.

14 In Carpenters , our court disagreed with the Third Circuit on

an aspect of WARN's damages provision. I d. at 1282-86 (disagreeing

with Third Circ uit's holding that WARN's remedial provision

requires "back pay" for each calendar day of violation; calculating

damages based only on work days within violation period).

- 13 - 1.

Agency Holding

, which held that the Clayton Act's limitations

period was applicable to RICO claims, noted that those acts shared

"similarities in purpose and structure". A gency Holding

, 483 U.S.

at 152. The same can be said of the NLRA and WARN.

WARN "requires some employers

-- generally those who are

curtailing or closing an operation

-- to provide sixty days notice

to those employees who will be laid off or whose hours will be

substantially reduced." C arpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't

Stores, Inc.

, 15 F.3d 1275, 1278 (5th Cir. 1994). 14 It imposes this

requirement to provide employees an opportunity to look for other

jobs or seek retraining. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1993).

"[T]he NLRA

... [was] enacted to protect the right of workers

to join together

... and collectively bargain for the terms and

conditions of employment." U nited Paperworkers

, 999 F.2d at 54;

see also 29 U.S.C. § 151. To provide such protection, the NLRA,

a mong other things, "conferr[ed] certain affirmative rights on

employees and [ p laced] certain enumerated restrictions on the

activities of employers." A merican Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB

, 380

U.S. 300, 316 (1965). For example, § 8(a) of the NLRA proscribes

"unfair labor practices" by employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).

Unquestionably, WAR N and the NLRA share similar structures;15 It is significa nt that the Department of Labor administers

WARN. In holding that a claim under the Employee Protection

Program of the Airline Deregulation Act should be subject to the

NLRA's period, the Third Circuit noted that, "as with the NLRA, the

Department of Labor has had a role in administering the EPP".

Haggerty v. USAir, Inc. , 952 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir. 1992).

16 Although the comments by NLRB General Counsel were farranging, the following is illustrative:

I think the two statutes are intended by Congress

- 14 - "the family resemblance is undeni able, and indeed there is a

substantial overlap" between them. S ee DelCostello

, 462 U.S. at

170 (not discussing WARN). In fact, the Department of Labor 1 5

borrowed extensively from the NLRA in promulgating regulations for

WARN. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(d) (1993) (defining "representative"

for WARN purposes by explicit reference to §§ 9(a) and 8(b) of the

NLRA); 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(1)(ii) ( 1993) (defining "reasonable

expectation of recall"); 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) (1993) (defining

"independent contractors and subsidiaries" by reference to

"existing legal rules", i.e.

, case law interpreting the NLRA); s ee

also 54 Fed. Reg. 16,045 (1989) (explicitly looking to NLRA for

guidance in promulgating 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) definition of

"independent contractors and subsidiaries"); 54 Fed. Reg. 16,044-45

(1989) (discussing promulgation of "reasonable expectation of

recall" language in 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(1)(i) by referring to NLRA

case law). After WARN's enactment, the NLRB's General Counsel

"predicted substantial interplay between the new law [(WARN)] ...

and the nation's basic labor law administered by the NLRB." NLRB

General Counsel Outlines Overlap Between Plant Closing Law and

Taft-Hartley , 226 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Nov. 23, 1988, at A-3. 16to operate essentially separately, but I think

because of the borrowing of concepts, one from the

other, and beca use of the impact on existing and

future collective bargaining relation ships that

this statute requires

... it is inevitab le that

there will be a fair amount of interplay between

the [two laws].

Id. (ellipses and brackets in original).

- 15 - Given the linguistic overlap between WARN and the NLRA, it is

not surprising that, like the Department of Labor, federal courts

have turned to NLRA case law in interpreting WARN. For example, in

Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp.

, 739 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Ky. 1990),

aff'd

, 945 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1991), the district court was

required to resolve "the extent to which laid off persons are to be

included in the calculation of `employees' for purposes of the WARN

Act." I d. at 342. Its resolution of that issue followed the lead

of the Department of Labor and looked to the NLRA:

The specific WARN Act analysis requires a

determination of whether an employee would

"reasonably experience an employment loss". Rather

than await case law development of this phrase, the

Secretary [of Labor] adopted a substantially

similar analysis formulated under the National

Labor Relations Act by the National Labor Relations

Board's [NLRB] use of the "reasonable expectation

of recall" test. The NLRB case law interpretation

of that term, used in determining voter eligibility

for representation elections, could then be

utilized for the WARN Act. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,044.

The parties appear to agree with this

suggestion by the Secretary and it, likewise,

appears to this court to be an equal ly applicable

phrase in determining those persons t o be counted

for WARN Act purposes.

Id. at 344. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, once again employing "the

NLRB analogy". See Damron , 945 F.2d at 124-25.- 16 -

The NLRA is more than just analogous to WAR N; in fact, WARN

may be thought of as an outgrowth of the NLRA, because §§ 8(a)(1)

and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5), have been

interpreted to require an employer to notify a union of its

decision to close a plant.

In order to meet its obligation to bargain

over the effects on employees of a decision to

close, an employer must condu ct bargaining in a

meaningful manner and at a meaningful time. A

concomitant element of meaningful bargaining is

timely notice to t he union of the decision to

close, so that good fai th bargaining does not

become futile or impossible.

Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB

, 706 F.2d 18, 26 (1st Cir.)

(citations and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied

, 464 U.S.

892 (1983); see also Metropolitan Teletronics Corp. , 279 N.L.R.B.

957, 958-59 & n.14 (1986) (finding NLRA § 8(a)(5) violation because

of company's failure to notify union of decision to close and

relocate plant), enforced

, 819 F.2d 1 130 (2d Cir. 1987). In a

sense, WARN amends the NLRA by setting a specific time period for

notice, in addition to expanding coverage to all employees,

regardless of union status.

Furthermore, as noted, collective bargaining agreements

frequently require notice of layoffs, shutdowns, and the like. S ee

First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB

, 452 U.S. 666, 684 (1981)

(describing that such provisions are "prevalent"); see also Dubuque

Packing Co.

, 303 N.L.R.B. 386, 394 n.23 (1991) (rec ognizing

collective bargaining agreement that required "6 months' notice be

given prior to closing"). Viewed from this perspective, WARN

merely codifies a frequent practice facilitated by the NLRA. In- 17 -

fact, the regulations implementing WARN provide:

The provisions of WARN do not supersede any laws or

collective bargaining agreements that provide for

additional notice or additional rights and

remedies. If such law or agreement provides for a

longer notice period, WARN notice shall run

concurrently with that additional notice period.

Collective bargaining agreements may be used to

cla r ify or amplify the terms and conditions of

WARN, but may not reduce WARN rights.

20 C.F.R. § 639.1(g) (1993). Thus, the Department of Labor's

regulation injects WARN into collective bargaining agreements, both

by providing that the WARN notice period automatically increases if

provided for by the agreement, and by allowing WARN's "terms and

conditions" to be clarified or amplified by the agreement.

These similarities notwithstanding, the Second Circuit held

that "the NLRA is not sufficientl y analogous to override the

traditional a ssumption that a state limitations period should be

applied." United Paperworkers , 999 F.2d at 55. In comparing the

acts' purposes, it stated:

The purpose of WARN, unli ke that of the NLRA, is

not to ensure labor peace but to alleviate the

distress as s ociated with job loss for both the

workers and the community in which they live. This

is demonstrated by the provision in the statute of

causes of action for local governments as well as

f or individual workers and unions. When a union

brings an action, it th us serves only as the

representative of the class of employees t hat has

been harmed. The NLRA, in contrast, does not

protect community interests in avoiding job loss.

Id. at 54; see also United Steelworkers

, 1994 WL 415139, at * 4

,

1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21132, at *15 (Third Circuit statement that

"WARN serves very broad societal goals

-- to protect workers, their

families and their communities in the wake of potentially harmful- 18 -

emp loyment decisions."). Its rejection of the NLRA limitations

period hinged on one essentia l perceived difference between WARN

a nd the NLRA: the NLRA "specifically regulate[s] the collective

bargaining relationship", while WARN "remain[s] peripheral to that

concern." U

nited Paperworkers

, 999 F.2d at 55. It found that

"WARN, therefore, neither `encourages nor discourages' collective

bargaining, thus differing in purpose from the NLRA." I d. ; see

also United Steelworkers

, 1994 WL 415139, at *4, 1994 U.S. App.

LEXIS 21132, at *14 (Third Circuit stating, at best, WARN has a

"tangential" effect on collective bargaining).

As noted, we disagree. A strict identity of purposes is not

a requisite for borrowing a limi tations period from one federal

statute for use in another. To the contrary, a federal statute's

limitations period is to be borrowed if, among other things, it

"provides a closer analogy than available state statutes".

DelCostello

, 462 F.2d at 171-72 (emphasis added); accord Lampf

, 111

S. Ct. at 2779 (plurality) ("affords a `closer fit' with the cause

of action at issue than does any available state-law source");

Agency Holding

, 483 U.S. at 152 (relying, in part, on "similarities

in purpose and structure"). If an identity of purposes were

required, it would seem that the Court would not have borrowed the

Clayton Act's limitations period in establishing a uniform period

for RICO. See Agency Holding , 483 U.S. at 156.

The purposes of the NLRA are similar to those of WARN. Both

regulate labor-management relations: WARN, by requiring notice of

impending layoffs and terminations; the NLRA, by facilitating17 The dissent finds this comparison of purposes "weak". Dissent

at 12 n.32. We think this discussion, along with the other points

made in this section (several of which the dissent does not

address), to be far "more convincing than the fact that both were

passed by Congress." I d. at 12-13 n.32. This becomes all the more

apparent when one considers, as discussed, that the NLRA proscribes

conduct almost identical to that proscribed by WARN.

18 The dissent dis misses the relationship between the NLRA and

WARN, and does so for essentially one reason: its disagreement

with our "shaky premise that the policy favoring th e rapid

- 19 - concerted action by employees and governing collective bargaining

procedures. Both do so to achieve similar objectives. WARN's

broad purpose is to protect "workers, their famil ies and

communities" by providing notice so that workers who will be

terminated may seek other jobs or retraining. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a)

(1993). The NLRA's stated purpose, though broader, embraces

similar objective s by "encouraging the practice and procedure of

collective bargaining

... for the purposes of negotiating the terms

and conditions of [workers'] employment or other mutual aid or

protection." 29 U.S.C. § 151. As discussed s upra

, this purpose is

achieved, in part, by the proscription of "unfair labor practices"

by employers. WARN's purpose may be seen as a subset of the

NLRA's: WARN provides a s pecific protection for workers by

requiring that employers render advance notice of terminations or

mass layoffs, while the NLRA generally defines an d regulates the

relationship between employers and employees to promote peaceful

labor relations. 17

In sum, WARN and the NLRA share similar language; they

undoubtedly overlap. In addition, they share similar, though by no

means identical, purposes. The "fit" is reasonably close. 18resolution of labor disputes (presumably so that everyone can get

back to business) applies to a situation where the company has

closed a plant (and there will be no more business)." Dissent at

7. The dissent returns to this point again and again; a

particularly colorful rep rise follows: "Once a plant has closed

... there c an be no resolution of a labor dispute. The plant is

gone, workers are wit hout jobs, the community is left reeling."

Dissent at 17-18.

There are several reasons why the policies of WARN would be

bette r served by application of the NLRA's six-month limitations

period, and these reasons are discussed infra

, part II.C. For now,

four points will suffice. First, as noted, WARN is not merely a

plant closing law; it also governs "mass layoffs". Second, to the

extent WARN concerns itself with layoffs (in which there is an ongoing business and the possibility that the affected employee may

be re-employed), the NLRA's six-month limitations period is

consistent with federal law's preference for rapidity in resolving

labor disputes -- even those having nothing at all to do with the

collective bargaining relationship. S ee infra

, note 34 (discussing

Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII claims). Third,

to the extent that WARN does concern itself with plant closings,

the need for pr omptness in asserting claims becomes even more

intense, as is discussed later. Fourth, the six-month NLRA period

does apply to any unfair practice claim under the NLRA which might

arise from a plant closing without notice; Congress did not create

a special limitations period for unfair labor practices connected

with a plant closing.

19 Although Halkias' action includes Oklahoma plaintiffs from

General Dynamics' Tulsa facility, no party su ggests borrowing an

Oklahoma pe riod. This lends credence to our concern, discussed

infra

, that in a choice of law situation involving borrowing a

state limitations period, a district court will look to that of the

forum state.

20 A brief was filed on behalf of appellants by the following

amici curiae : Texas AFL-CIO, Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers,

United Mineworkers of America, Automobile Mechanics' Local No. 701,

NLG/Sugar Law Center for Economic and Social Justice, and the UAW.

- 20 - 2.

The question remains, however, whether a state period provides

as close or closer "fit" to WARN than does the NLRA. Several Texas

limitations periods 19 have been suggested by appellants and amici

curiae 20 as proper analogies to WARN: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code21 But, at oral argument, when asked which Texas period should be

applied, Staudt's counsel replied that he was "afraid you were going to ask that". Although Staudt urged the tort period in his

brief, by oral argument, he evidently had changed his mind, stating

a preference for the residuary period, and expressly disavowing a

preference for the contracts period (the period selected by the

Second Circuit). Given the difficulty in identifying a single

Texas limitations period that is most analogous, we concur with a

sentiment expressed by the Third Circuit in its decision to apply

the NLRA's limitations period to actions under the Employee

Protection Program of the Airline Deregulation Act: "[I]t is not

easy to find a state limitations period that is an appropriate

analogy." Haggerty , 952 F.2d at 786.

22 We decline to do so. We review freely, and rule on, legal

issues such as this; there is no reason to remand to district

courts that have already held that the NLRA presents a closer

analogy to WARN than any Texas period.

- 21 - §§ 16.003 (tw o-year tort statute), 16.004 (four-year breach of

contract statute), and 16.051 (four-year residual statute).

Conspicuously absent from these suggestions are persuasive

discussions of why any of these s tatutes contain appropriate

limitations periods for WARN. Halkias contends only that "[i]t is

clear that the applicable state statute of limitation should be

either" from the tort or contract statute. Likewise, Staudt

asserts (in his brief) that either the tort or contract limitations

period should be applied, although evidencing a preference for the

former, on the basis that the failure to give a WARN notice

"constitute[s] a taking or conver sion of the employee's right to

continued employment." 21 And, the a mici avoid the issue altogether,

suggesting that all three periods a re suitable candidates, but

requesting a remand for the district court to select the closest

one. 22

a.23 Tort claims exist to compensate an individ ual for an injury

proximately caused by the defendant. But, even if a terminated

worker in a WARN situation gets a higher paying job the day after

his termination, and therefore arguably has no "injury", WARN still

seems to provide for two months pay if the requisite notice was not

given. See 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1-2), (7).

- 22 - As for the tort period, we disagree with St audt's assertion

that a WARN claim more closely resembles a claim for "conversion of

an employee's right to continued employment" than it does an action

under the NLRA. Texas is an employment at will State. E .g.

, Pease

v. Pakhoe d Corp. , 980 F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir. 1993). But, even

assuming that this is a tort in Texas, it presents a poor analogy

to a WARN claim. WARN has nothing to do with a right to continued

employment; it concerns only advance notice of an "employment

loss". Regardless of whether notice is given, the employer is free

to terminate or lay off the employee, or reduce his or her hours of

work. Likewise, WARN's resemblance, if any, to any other

traditional tort claim is nowhere near as obvious as its

resemblance to the NLRA. 23

b.

The request that we apply Texas' residual statute, § 16.051,

may be quickly dismissed. As a general matter, the borrowing of a

"catchall" period is not favored. S ee Agency Holding

, 483 U.S. at

152-53; Wilson v. Garcia

, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985). More

specifically, it can hardly be said that § 16.051, which applies to

a tremendous diversity of claims, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

Ann. § 16.051, Notes of Decisions (Vernon 1986), is as analogous,

or more analogous, to WARN than the NLRA is. See also Haggerty

,24 The breach of contract period may come closer than any other

Texas period. And, if nothing else, utilizing it would create some

semblance of uniformity, given the Second Circuit's borr owing a

state contract limitations period. But, the rationale utilized by

the Second Circuit in choosing this period does not necessarily

dictate the same result when Texas law supplies t he period. The

Second Circuit reasoned that the cont ract period should govern

because it is the period for workers' compensation claims and

"wrongful discharge" claims in Vermont. United Paperworkers , 999

F.2d at 57. In Texas, however, a workers' compensation claim must

be submitted to the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission within

one year. Tex. Lab. Code. Ann. § 409.003 (West 1994). Texas'

traditional cause of action for wrongful discharge for asserting a

workers' compensation claim was s ubject to the two-year tort

limitations period. S ee Almazan v. United Services Auto. Ass'n

, 840 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing wrongful

discharge action under Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8307(c) (West

1994) (repealed 1993)), error denied (March 3, 1993). Thus,

following the Second Circuit 's reasoning may produce a very

different result in Texas than it did in Vermont, underscoring the

need for uniformity provided by borrowing the limitations period

from a federal statute.

25 The Third Circuit recognized that state law provided less than

a "perfect analogy". But, because the actions were timely under

any of the four potential state periods, it left unanswered which

of the four, ranging from two years to six years, is more analogous

to WARN than the NLRA. U nited Steelworkers

, 1994 WL 415139, at *7

& n.5, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21132, at *25-26 & n.5.

- 23 - 952 F.2d at 786 (finding that a state's residual limitations period

"offers no analogy [to the federal cause of action at issue], it is

simply a fallback position").

c.

Finally, the breach of contract limitations period, § 16.004,

likewise fails to provide as close an analogy to WARN as does the

NLRA. 24 As noted, Texas is an employment at will State. After all,

as discussed, no contractual right to continued employment is

implicated by WARN.

In sum, canvassing the possible Texas periods reveals none as

analogous to WARN as the NLRA. 2 5 None seeks to accommodate the26 Recall, as discussed supra

, that the NLRA has been interpreted

to require WARN-like notice.

27 General Dynamics suggests that if a Texas period is to apply,

it should be the six-month period under the Texas Pay Statute. S ee Tex. Rev. Civ. Code Ann. art. 5155, § 5(a). This provision may be

more similar to WARN than those offered by appellants and amici ;

however, it does not provide as close an analogy as does the NLRA.

WARN does not compensate for past services rendered.

- 24 - same, or very similar, interests as WARN, much less govern an

action that will frequently overlap with WARN. 26 And, needless to

say, none embraces causes of action that share common language with

WARN. 27

C.

Borrowing the NLRA period is supported by litigation

practicalities and policy considerat ions. S ee DelCostello

, 462

U.S. at 172 (counseling use of more analogous federal limitations

period "when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities

of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate

vehicle for interstitial lawmaking").

1.

The first litigation practicality we consider is forum

shopping. S ee Lampf

, 111 S. Ct. at 2779 (plurality); Agency

Holding

, 483 U.S. at 154 ("the use of state statutes would present

the danger of forum shopping"). Raising this concern is the

breadth of WARN's venue provision, which permits an action to be

brought not only in "any district in which the violation is alleged

to have occurred", but also, in any district " in which the employer

transacts business ". 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5) (emphasis added). The

S econd and Third Circuits were not as troubled as we by this28 WARN only applies to emp loyers with "100 or more employees,

excluding part-time employees" or "100 or more employees who in the

aggreg ate work at least 4,000 hours per week". 29 U.S.C. §

2101(a)(1)(A-B).

- 25 - generous venue provision, and the concomitant possibility that a

p arty could manipulate it through forum shopping. T he Second

Circuit began its analysis of this issue by quoting the United

Paperworkers district court:

The term "plant closing" as defined by the Act is

limited to single sites of employment, and venue is

limited to the district where the violation is

alleged to have occurred or where the employer does

business; unless a single plant site straddles the

boundary between two states, it is unlikely

prospective plaintiffs will have a broad choice of

fora in which to bring their claims or that doubt

will arise as to i n which state triggering events

occurred. Therefore, geographic considerations do

not counsel for the applicati on of a uniform

federal limitations period for WARN Act claims.

United Paperworkers , 999 F.2d at 56 (citing and quoting district

court); see also United Steelworkers , 1994 WL 415139, at *6, 1994

U.S. App. LEXIS 21132, at *22 (Third Circuit relying upon the above

United Paperworkers quote to dismiss forum shopping concerns)

.

Afte r endorsing the assertion that plaintiffs would not have "a

broad choice of fora" -- a conclusion somewhat at odds, it seems,

with the judicially-noticeable fact that many businesses with 100

or more employees 28 "transact business" in more than one state --

the Second Circuit then quoted another dist rict court for the

proposition that

choice of law rules would likely point to borrowing

the law of the site since that would be the place

of the injury, and probably the place of the

unlawful action as well. Therefore, it is u nlikely

that a WARN plaintiff would be able to forum shop- 26 - for a locale with the most advantageous state of

limitations; the law of the site of the layoff

w ould likely be chosen no matter where the sui t

happened to be filed.

United Paperworkers

, 999 F.2d at 56 n.9 (citation omitted; emphasis

added). Choice of law rules appear, however, to pose greater

problems than this.

A WARN action is, of co urse, a federal question case. The

choice of laws issue that would be presented to a forum that does

not include the site of the WARN violation would be which state's

limitations period should be borrowed, and the outcome of that

inquiry seems by no means certain. A district court's choice of

law principles in a federal question case are derived from federal

common law, as the Second and Third Circuits h ave recognized.

Corporacion Venezolona de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp.

, 629 F.2d

786, 795 (2d Cir. 1980) ("This is a federal question case ... and

it is appropriate that we apply a federal common law choice of law

rule ..."), cert. denied

, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); see Gluck v. Unisys

Corp.

, 960 F.2d 1168, 1179 n.8 (3d Cir. 199 2) ("A state court or

legislature does not necessarily seek to further or even consider

fed eral laws when it develops its choice of law provisions. A

federal choice of law rule would address those concerns."). If the

district court follows the forum state's choice of law principles

as a surrogate for federal common law, statutes of limitations are

viewed by many jurisdictions as "procedural"; and thus a forum will

follow its own period, regardless of the period that would apply in

the state in which the cause of action arose. S ee generally Eugene

F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws §§ 3.9( b), 3.10, 3.11 at29 Texas courts generally describe statutes of limitations as

procedural and apply their own. S ee

, e.g.

, Hollander v. Capon

, 853

S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("The statute of limitations

is a procedural issue. If the action is barred by the statute of

limitations of the forum court in which the lawsuit is pending, no

action may be maintaine d even if the action is not barred in the

state where the cause of action arose.").

30 The dis sent does not attempt rigorous analysis of what the

effect of choice of law rules would be; it merely states that the

"threat of forum shopping ... is stemmed by choice of law rules

which dictate that the law of the site of the layoff ... would be

chosen no matter where the suit was filed." Dissent at 16-17. To

support this conclusion, the dissent relies on the district court

opinion in Automobile Mec hanics' . But, that opinion contains no

citation of authority for its sweeping statement that "choice of

law rules would likely point to borrowing the law of the site".

Automobile Mechanics' , 830 F. Supp. at 436.

- 27 - 58-64 (2d ed. 1992). 29 This result, of course, would be completely

different from that suggested by the Second Circuit. 30

Moreover, examining borrowing cases involving a conflict over which

state's limitation period should apply, we find a consistent

preference for borrowing the forum state's. S ee Wang Lab., Inc. v.

Kagan , 990 F.2d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1993) ("In an ERISA case, we

ordinarily borrow the forum state's statute of limitations ....")

(emphasis added); G luck

, 960 F.2d at 1179-80 (after reviewing a

conflict regarding which state's statute of limitations should be

borrowed for an ERISA claim, court decides to "follow the general

rule and borrow a limitations period applicable to the forum state

claim most analogous to the ERIS A claim ...") (emphasis added);

Champion Intern. Corp. v. United Paperworkers

, 779 F.2d 328, 332-33

(6th Cir. 1985) (refusing to apply forum state's borrowing statute;

applying forum state's limitations period to federal cause of

action).31 Without deciding the issue, because it is not before us, a

class action for several different sites, each of which satisfies

WARN's "single site" requiremen t, appears to be appropriate when

the decision to close each site was simultaneous and arose out of

the same exigency. S ee 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2) ("single site"

requirement); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a-b) (class action

requirements).

32 Short 's discussion merits reiteration:

From the perspective of practitioners litigating

- 28 - Augmen ting the dangers that forum shopping may occur, and

highlighting the complexity of a federal court's decision as to

which limitations period sh ould be borrowed, WARN claims could

involve several different states by virtue of the maintenance of a

class action. For instance, the district court certified Halkias'

class action, allowing him to press WARN claims from facilities in

both Texas and Oklahoma. Moreover, as discussed supra , there was

another po tential forum, Missouri. 3 1 Given the possibility for

multistate WARN litigation, the issue of which state's limitations

period should control might become an issue of time-consuming

litigation. And, it goes without saying, courts do not have time

to waste.

Considering, collectively, the likelihood of forum shopping,

and the possibility for multistate WARN class actions, the question

arises: Should federal courts even address themselves to the

vexatious question of which state's period should gove rn a WARN

claim, when the NLRA provides a uniform period? We think not. If

nothing else, valuable time a nd resources should not be consumed

litigating such issues. S ee Short

, 908 F.2d at 1389 (discussing

pre- Lampf limitations period for securities fraud actions). 32cases originating in many states (especially class

a ctions), the situation is a nightmare. Lawyers

and courts alike devote untold hours to identifying

proper state analogies and applying multiple

(conflicting or cumulative) tolling doctrines.

"This uncertainty and lack of uniformity promote

forum shopping by plaintiffs and result in wh olly

unjustified disparities in the rights of different

parties litigating identical claims in different

states. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants can

determine their rig hts with any certainty. Vast

amounts of judicial t ime and attorneys' fees are

wasted."

Short , 908 F.2d at 1389 (citation omitted).

- 29 - Accordingly, we conclude that a uniform, single limitations period

is desirable for WARN claims, a conclusion militating in favor of

applying the NLRA's.

2.

This conclusion is buttressed by resort to an examination of

WARN's policies, and the likely effect on those policies of

applying diverse, and often quite long, limitations periods. See

DelCostello

, 462 U.S. at 172 (urging use of more analogous federal

limitations period "when the federal policies a t stake ... make

that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial

lawmaking").

First, we recognize that federal labor policy has long favored

the rapid settlement of disputes between an employer and an

employee. In applying the NLRA's period to § 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), the Seventh

Circuit reasoned that "[t]he six-month limitation period wi l l

encourage prompt resolution of labor disputes." H ofmeist er , 950

F.2d at 1348. Appellants urge that this rationale is inapplicable33 Referring to § 301 of the Labor-Management Act of 1947, 29

U.S.C. § 185.

34 In fact, federal law's preference for rapidity i n labor

dispute resolution explicitly extends to areas that have nothing to

do with the collective bargaining process. S ee 29 U.S.C. §

626(d)(1) (180-day filing period before EEOC for claims under Age

Discrimination in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (180-

day filing period with EEOC for Title VII claims).

35 Appellants protest that WARN claims are too difficult to

prepare within six months. We disagree; moreover, many WARN

plaintiffs have brought their claims within six months after the

accrual of their cause of action. S ee, e.g.

, Local 217, Hote l &

Restaurant Employees Union v. MHM, Inc.

, 976 F.2d 805, 807 (2d Cir.

- 30 - to WARN, contending that although promptness is of unique concern

t o the collective bargaining process, it is not applicable to

WARN's notice requirement.

We disagree. As the Seventh Circuit explained in rejecting a

similar a rgument against the application of the NLRA's period to

"`pure' section 301 actions": 33 "The six-month limitations period

in section 10(b) was adopted in order to `bar litigation over past

events "after records have been destroyed, witnesses have gone

elsewhere, and recollection of the events in question have become

dim and confused."'" J ohnson v. Graphic Communications Int'l Union

Local 303

, 930 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir.) (citing, inter alia

,

Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB

, 362 U.S. 411, 419 (1960)), ce rt.

denied

, 112 S. Ct. 184 (1991). 34 This concern is no less present

in a WARN c laim; indeed, given that WARN is often triggered by

plant closings or relocations, the need for promp t litigation is

even greater. Allowing a party several years in which to bring a

WARN claim could create untold problems concerning availability of

evidence. 351992) (within approximately five months of closing of hotel by

emp loyer); L ocal 397, Int'l Union of Electronic, Electrical,

Salaried Mach. & Furniture Workers v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc.

, 763

F. Supp. 78, 80-81 (D.N.J. 1990) (within three months of plant

closing). Indeed, General Dynamics states that the Missouri action

was filed within 10 days of the layoffs at that facil ity. S ee

supra , note 3.

Likewise, we reject the suggestion that utilization of a sixmon th period is incompatible with WARN's requirement that a

workload reductio n or temporary layoff last more than six months

before becoming actionable. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6) (defining

"employment loss" as termination, layoff exceeding six months, or

reduction in hours of work exceeding six months). The parties'

pleadings are less than clear on exactly what sort of "employment

loss" they suffered. If predicated on termination, their claims

accrued upon termination, see Automobile Mechanics' , 830 F. Supp.

at 434; 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6)(A), and a six-month limitations

period is not incompatible with such a situation. Because the

issue is not before us, we leave for another day when a WARN claim

accrues, particularly in the diminished workload or layoff

situation. Assuming, without deciding, that a layoff or reduced

workload must persist for six months befo re becoming actionable,

the limitations period would not begin to run until after that

period expired. S ee Automobile Mechanics'

, 830 F. Supp. at 434

(noting differences in time of accrual if claim is predicated on

termination or layoff; and, while accrual issue not clear from

pleadings, finding action would be timely whether claim arose from

layoff or termination). In any event, whether the appellants

suffered a layoff or a termination, their claims are untimely, in

light of the six-month limitations period we adopt. The question

that Halkias presents, "When does the layof f action accrue?", is

one that exists regardless of the length of the limitations period.

We also reject the sugges tion that a six-month period is

unworkable because, unl ike the NLRA, WARN does not provide a

"complex administrative structure" for pursuit of cla ims. S ee

United Paperworkers

, 999 F.2d at 55. The Supreme Court has applied

the NLRA l imitations period to actions brought by an employee

against his employer for breach of the coll ective bargaining

agreement and against his union (under § 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act) for breach of the duty of fair

representation, s ee DelCostello , 462 U.S. at 154-55, 170-72; s ee

als o Coyle , 838 F.2d at 1405 (discussing D elCostello ; describing

action in DelCostel lo as a "hybrid action

... under § 301"), a

cause of action that requires some effort to bring because "the

employee will often be unsophisticated in collective-bargaining

matters .... He is called upon, within the limitations period, to

evaluate the adequacy of the unio n's representation, to retain

counsel, to investigate substantial matters ..., and to frame his

- 31 -suit". D elCostel l o

, 462 U.S. at 166. By contrast, a WARN

plaintiff need only know that he was terminated or laid off without

notice; p rovided his situation comports with the requisites of

WARN, he can sue. Indeed, the absence of a "complex administrative

structure" may be emblematic of the simplicity of a WARN claim,

rather than a justification for a lengthy limitations period.

The dissent emphasizes that the plaintiffs in these cases are

not represented by unions, and thus are deprived of "union legal

representation". As discussed supra , an employee bringing hybrid

§ 301 actions against his union for b reach of the duty of fair

representation (and against his employer for breach of the

collective bargaining agreement) is, after DelCostello

, required to

bring his claim within the N LRA's six-month limitations period.

And, as discussed, he faces obstacles at le ast as great as those

faced by one seeking to assert a simple WARN claim. Yet he, too,

will lack union legal representation.

The dissent similarly opines that we "hold[] the plaintiffs to

a deal they did not make: They suffer the six-month requirement

but benefit from no corresponding protect ion of their rights."

Dissent at 9 (footnote omitted). Of course, WARN confers specific

rights on workers, and provides remedies for their violation. It

is not as if workers after the enactment of WARN -- even with the

application of a six-month limitations period -- "benefit from no

corresponding protection of their rights."

The dissent prompts a question: Can anyone imagine that, with

"thousands of workers" in "distress" after a termination or layoff

without WARN notice, see dissent at 9, 12, a lawyer (or lawyers)

will not be far behind? This seems especially probable given

WARN's provision of attorneys' fees for prevailing parties. S ee 29

U.S.C. § 2104(a)(6).

- 32 - Moreov er, as discussed s upra

, failure to give WARN notice

often may create a concurrent claim under the NLRA. When a claim

under one federal statute is also an "unfair labor practice under

the NLRA, it seems particularly appropriate to borrow the NLRA

limitations period." Hofmeister , 950 F.2d at 1348.

Finally, and most important, application of expansive

limitations periods would disserve WARN's most specific objective:

the provision of a cushion of time for employees to explore other

job opportunities and, if nece ssary, seek retraining. S ee 2036 Of course, prompt filing does not necessarily mean prompt

resolution. That will depend on numerous factors, including

discovery and the district court's caseload. But, obviously, the

sooner suit is filed, the sooner the resolution from the date of

the employment loss.

The dissent asserts that the application of a six-month period

would "stymie WARN's true objective". Dissent at 18. The reason

proffered for this assertion is that "companies can relax a bit and

rest assured that they may `make redu ndant' many legally

unsophisticated and unsuspecting workers" with a six-month period,

while a longer period would deter violations of WARN. Obviously,

the rationale presupposes that an employer chooses not to comply

with WARN coldly and rationally. It is quite questionable that a

company would intentionally violate WARN in re liance on the

possibility that a worker wou ld not sue. In fact, if just one

worker approaches a lawyer, then the possibility of a class action

becomes very real. In these circumstances, a decision to violate

WARN on the basis assumed by the dissent would be illogical.

Moreover, if this premise of the dissent has merit, one would

suspect that emp loyers would "just relax a bit" regarding the

sexual harassment of, or age discrimination against, their "legally

unsophi sticated and unsuspecting workers" because of the short

limitations periods attaching to Title VII or the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act. S ee supra note 34. Current

events suggest otherwise.

- 33 - C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (1993) ("Advance notice provides workers

... some

transition time to adjust to the prospective loss of employment, to

seek and obtain alternative jobs and, if necessary, to enter skill

training or retraining ...."). Obviously, providing funds to

workers several years after their termination does not serve that

objective. Cf. Lloyd v. Department of Labor , 637 F.2d 1267, 1270

(9th Cir. 1980) ("In order to serve the [Trade] Act's purposes of

retraining, adjustment, and relocation, it was impor t ant that

workers claim and receive benefits promptly after discharge. There

were also other advantages

-- such as freshness of records and

other evi dence -- to be gained by promptness.") (citations

omitted). 36In addition, the dissent invites a false choice. While the

borrowing of state limitations periods may in several states result

in long periods (so long that their application to a plant closing

or mass layoff seems ina ppropriate), a state limitations period

could be as short as the NLRA's, e.g.

, the six-month period of the

Texas pay sta tute, s ee supra note 27, dissent at 14 n.36, or

perhaps even shorter.

37 The enactment of § 1658 reflected concern by both Congress and

the Federal Courts Study Committee that the process of borrowing

limitations periods for federal causes of action was, to say the

least, problematic. See H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.

24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6870.

- 34 - D.

Halkias and the amici urge that if we apply a federal

limitations pe riod, it should be the four-year federal residual

period, 28 U.S.C. § 1658. But, by its terms, it applies only to "a

civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the

date of the enact ment of this section". I d. Section 1658 was

enacted on December 1, 1990, well after WARN's enactment. C ompare

Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114-15 (1990) (§ 1658

enactment) with Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (WARN

enacted on August 4, 1988). 37

Despite § 1658's plain language, amici urge that we borrow it,

if we are to borrow federal law. Specifically, they contend that

§ 1658 's legislative history indicates that Congress refused to

give it retro active effect only because doing so would undermine

the settled expectations of parties in those inst ances where the

courts have already sett led the limitations period issue.

Reasoning that WARN's limitations period has not been so settled,

they contend that we should borrow § 1658 despite its plain

language to the contrary.38 He also contend s that Congress likewise violated the

Fourteenth Amendment, which, by its terms, applies only to the

States.

- 35 - We refuse to reject that plain language. Moreover, we cannot

see how the federal residual statue presents a closer analogy to a

WARN claim than does the NLRA's six-month period. Also, the

application of § 1658 would undermine WARN's central purpose, by

discouraging the prompt resolution of WARN claims. For these

reasons, traditional borrowing principles do not favor application

of § 1658 to WARN claims.

E.

Halkias' last contention is that Congress violated the Fifth

Amendment by failing "to prescribe a limitation period for a WARN

Act violation", thereby requiring a plaintiff to "`guess' at which

statute the federal courts will `borrow'". 38 We assume Halkias does

not wish to invalidate WARN itsel f, inasmuch as that statute

provides the basis for his requested relief. Rather, we assume

that he wants to be excepted from the application of an unforeseen

limitations period. We see no need for such an exception.

Generally, Fifth Amendment due process is not affected by the

traditional practice of borrowing limitation periods. Cf. Agency

H olding , 483 U.S. at 157-65 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)

(tracing history of "borrowing" limitations periods). Indeed, the

borrowing of limitations periods is a normal component of statutory

interpretation, see DelCostello

, 403 U.S. at 158-62; and a borrowed

federal limitations period has been applied by the Supreme Court to

the litigants before it. See Lampf , 111 S. Ct. at 2782; see also39 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).

40 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109.

- 36 - Lampf

, 111 S. Ct. at 2786 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (objecting to

Court's application of newly- announced limitation period to "the

very case in which it announced the new rule").

This is not to say that we do not sympathize with Halkias'

underly ing concern; we do. Indeed, the rationale of this

contention illust rates the necessity for a uniform limitations

period for WARN claims, a result we herald by adopting the NLRA's

six-month period.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district

courts are

AFFIRMED.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

This is a difficult case. Reasonable minds can disagree on

the proper outcome. To my mind, however, the United States Supreme

Court has provided a framework whose strictures dictate the result.

Because I find the majority's diligen t attempt to escape that

outcome unconvincing, I respectfully dissent.

I.

The issue presented, as correctly framed by the majority, is

whether the district court erred in applying the six-month statute

of limitations from § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act

(NLRA) 39 to the plaintiffs' claims under the Worker Adjustment and

Retraining Notification Act (WARN) 40

. This is not only a question41 The certified class represented by John Halkias and Barry Jackson

consists of about two thousand non-unionized former employees of

General Dynamics's Fort Worth and Tulsa operations.

42 See United Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc.

, 999 F.2d 51, 53 (2nd Cir. 1993); United Steelworkers of A m. v.

Crown Cork & Seal Co.

, Nos. 93-2008 and 93-7613, 1994 WL 415139 (3d

Cir. Aug. 10, 1994).

43 501 U.S.

__, 115 L. Ed. 2d 321, reh'g denied

, 501 U.S.

__, 115 L.

Ed. 2d 1109 (1991). of first impression in this Circuit, we are the only Court of

Appeals to consider applying the NLRA's statute of limitations to

n on-unionized WARN plaintiffs. 4 1 The majority reluctantly parts

ways with the Second and Third Circuits on this question and holds

that the NLRA six-month limitations applies to WARN. 42 I believe

that our sister circuits got it right.

I agree with the majority that this case presents a "classic

example" of "which round peg to stuff in a square hole". All three

consoli dated appeals focus on the same task: We must fill in a

blank left by Congress, namely, what statute of limitations applies

to cases brought under the WARN? Whenever courts are left to a

task of this nature, they become part sleuth, part improvisor. The

truth is, we do not know what Congress wo uld have preferred and,

so, are lef t with our best guess as to what would most closely

approach congressional intent

-- if it had an intent on the

subject.

II.

The starting point in resolving the p resent issue is the

r ecent Supreme Court decision in L ampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &

Petigrow v. Gilbertson 43

. In that case, the Court held that, when

Congress creates a federal cause of action but does not include a44 Id . at __, 115 L.Ed.2d at 331 (citations omitted).

45 Id

.

46 DelCostello v. International Bd. of Teamsters , 462 U.S. 151, 161

(1983).

47 Lampf

, 501 U.S. at

__, 115 L.Ed.2d at 331-32 (quoting R eed v.

United Tr ansportation Union , 488 U.S. 319, 324, 102 L.Ed.2d 665

(1989)). S ee also

, United Paperworkers

, 999 F.2d at 53 ("[The]

S upreme Court has set forth limited circumstances under which it

might be preferable to borrow a federal limitations period").

- 38 - sta tute of limitations, the courts are to presume that Congress

intended for the analogous state statute of limitations to apply. 44

The Supreme Court summarized this general rule as follows:

It is the usual rule that when Congress has failed to

provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of

action, a court " borrows" or "absorbs" the local time

limitation most analogous to the case at hand. . . .

This rule is founded on the Rules of Decisi on Act which "has

enjoyed sufficient longevity that we may assume that, in enacting

remedial legislation, Congress ordinari ly intends by its silence

that we borrow state law." 45

This general rule is subject to a limited exception. If a

state statute of limitations would be "at odds with the purpose or

operation of federal substantive law", the courts should ignore the

state limitations perio d and instead borrow the most analogous

federal limitations period. 46 This exception, however, remains

that; it is "a closely circumscribed exception" to the general rule

that st ate, not federal, limitations periods apply when Congress

fails to specify a limitations period for a federal cause of

action. 47

Moreo ver, it is important to underscore that this exception48 Lampf , 501 U.S. __, 115 L.Ed.2d at 331.

49 DelCostello , 462 U.S. at 161.

50 Slip op. at 11.

51 Justice Scalia did not join part II.A of Justice Blackmun's

plurality opinion. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia said:

"In my view, absent a congressionally created limit ations period

state periods govern

, or if they are inconsistent with the purposes

of the federal act, no limitations period exists ". L ampf

, 501 U.S.

at

___, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 337 (Scalia, J., concurri ng) (emphasis

added). Justices Stevens and Souter dissented. Justice Stevens's

dissent explicitly disagrees with "[t]he Court's rejection of the

traditional rule of applying a state limitations period when the

federal statute is silent . . ." Id . at __, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 339

(Stevens, J., dissenting) (emph asis added). Finally, Justices

O'Connor and Kennedy dissented from the Court's refusal to make its

decision prospective o nly. Even they agreed, however, with the

view that the plaintiffs's "claims were gove rned by the s tate

statute of limitations for the most analogous state cause of

action". I d

. at

__, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 340 (O'Connor, J.,

dissenting) (emphasis in original).

- 39 - applies only when the state statute of limitations would

"frustrate" the policies of WARN. 48 This approach to the exception

makes sense for, as the DelCostello Court explained, it would be

"in appropriate to conclude that Congress would choose to adopt

state rules at odds with the purpose or operation of federal

substantive law". 49 Unfortunately, the majority's decision deviates

dramatically from this established framework.

The language in L ampf pronouncing the state borrowing rul e

alive and well did not command "only a plurality", as the majority

and General Dynamics would have us believe. 5 0 In fact, a simple

head count proves the opposite. Four Justices joined in part II.A

of the Court's opinion fr om which the quoted rule comes. The

remaining Justices took positions e ven more hostile to General

Dynamics's position than Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion. 5152 At oral argument a member of the panel asked counsel for General

Dynamics if it was true that the Court had to look to state law

first, before considering federal law. Counsel conceded the point.

The following exchange took place.

Judge: "When we wr ite this, we have to go through the

state statutes first before we get to the federal

statutes".

Counsel: "I completely agree with that. That is the proper

analysis, there is no doubt."

53 The Court in Lampf c ited both the D elCostello case and Agency

Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. , 483 U.S. 143, 97

L.Ed.2d 121 (1987)

-- both of which the majority cites extensively

in support of its position

-- for the proposition that federal law

may supply the suitable period "when the operation of a state

- 40 - The Court actually was unanimous in Lampf in expressing the view

that state statutes of limitation generally govern if Congress

attaches no limitations period to a federal cause of action.

III.

Lampf and DelCostello create a flow chart inquiry. We always

look to the state statute of limitations first to see if an

analogous state law exists. 52 The majority's explanation of the

Lampf "hierarchy," however, places the choice between a federal and

state statute on par with one another, both subject to the criteria

of which provides the best fit in the light of forum shopping

concerns and the geographic character of the claim.

That is not Lampf 's teaching. The hierarchy is vertical;

Lampf is clear that state statutes of limitations are the rule,

federal rules the exception. Courts do not make a simple choice

between the federal and state rules. If an analogous state statute

of limitations is found, it should be used, provided it is not at

odds with the federal substantive law. 53 This approach embodies thelimitations period would frustrate the po licies embraced by the

federal enactment" (here, WARN). Id . at __, 115 L.Ed.2d at 331.

54 Id . at __, 115 L.Ed.2d at 332.

55 See Id

. at

__, 115 L.Ed.2d at 335-36. S ee also United Parcel

Service v. Mitchell , 451 U.S. 56, 68 n.4, 67 L.Ed.2d 732, 744 n.4

(1981) (Stewart J., concurring) (state borrowing rule is more appropriate when applied to a congression ally created cause of

action as opposed to an implied one).

56 Slip op. at 12.

57 Id

. at 12. This mistake is repeated throughout the majority's

opinion. For example, after detailing its perceived similarities

in purpose and structure between WARN and the NLRA, the majority

then states: "The question remains, however, whether a state period

provides as close or closer 'fit' to WARN than does the NLRA." I d

. at 20. Again, the majority has the flow chart running in the wrong

direction. We first look to state law and, if it fits and is not

at odds with the federal statute, we use it.

- 41 - "presumption of state borrowing". 54 In fact, L a mpf suggests that

the only time a court can go straight to federal la w is "where

Congress has provided an express limitations period for correlative

remedies within the same enactment." 55 While that was precisely the

case in Lampf , it has nothing to do with the case at hand.

The majority's inverted approach is evidenced by its starting

point: "We first examine whether the NLRA limitations period is

more analogous to WARN than available state periods." 56 That is not

the proper first step and dangerously mis places the proper

emphasis. Instead, L ampf requires that we first select the most

analogous state period and determine whether it is at odds with the

federal substantive law. Hence, the majority's next statement that

it will "describe the similarities between the NLRA and WARN, and

then compare and contrast those similaritie s with the available

state period(s)" is a task improperly undertaken. 5758 Judge McBryde's opinion quoted the following passage from Judge

Garcia's:

[T]he court concurs with the conclusion that "the federal

policy warranting rapid resolution of [labor and

employment] disputes favors the NLRA's shorter

limitations period; and that a standardized limitations

period would promote uniformity in enforcing the WARN

act."

Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp.

, 825 F. Supp. 123, 125 (N.D. Tex.

1993).

- 42 - IV.

Even taken on its own terms, however, the majority's opinion

cannot stand. The district courts relied on the mistaken

impression that WARN causes of action are analogous to lawsuits

brought under the NLRA and, accordingly, within the exception laid

down in D elCostello

. The majority reiterates that assertion by

painting the NLRA and WARN as statutes with similar purposes and

structures. I disagree.

Th i s case boils down to the length of time in which a

plaintiff may file suit. The main policy reason advanced by the

district courts for the restrictive six- month limit was the

national interest in the quick resolution of labor disputes

. 5 8

Unlike the NLRA, however, nothing in the cause of action created by

WARN requires or counsels in favor of an accelerated resolution.

Without explanation, the majority adopts the shaky premise that the

policy favoring the rapid resolution of labor disputes (presumably

so that everyone can get back to business) applies to a situation

where the company has closed a plant (and there will be no more59 The majority criticizes my dissent for failing to appreciate that

WARN governs not only plant closings, but mass layoffs and

temporary closings. S ee Slip op. at 3 n.1, 20 n.18. The severance

of the employment relationship and the repercussions that follow

are the same for the victim of a mass layoff as for one who loses

his job through a plant closing. That is true even if, in the case

of a layoff, the possibility of reuniting the fired employee and

the employer exists. Hence, my discussion of the different

purposes of WARN and the NLRA applies with equal force to all of

the job loss scenarios contemplated by WARN's provisions.

- 43 - business). 59

This is where the majority's statement that the statutes bear

a "family resemblance" breaks down. Even a cursory analysis

reveals the purposes of these statute s to be markedly different.

The reason for preferring rapid resolution of an ordinary labor

dispute is that when the dispute is resolved, employees will go

back to work, production will resume , the employer's sales will

increase, and the positive effects of the business on the overall

economy will return. Because strikes disrupt the status quo and

hurt the economy, it is important to minimize the economic damage

to the company and the community by ending them swiftly.

Understandably, the NLRA sets a comparatively short limitations

period (six months) as a means of doing achieving these goals.

Those co nsiderations, unfortunately, have no place in a

s cenario where WARN comes into play. When a WARN dispute is

resolved, the plant stays closed. Employees fired e n masse stay

fired. Production does not resume. The economy does not return to

the status quo ante. Plant closings hurt the economy, but once the

closing occurs, the damage is done. Resolution of any resulting

WARN Act clai ms will not remedy that harm. In sum, there is no60 See also

, Crown Cork & Seal

, 1994 WL 4151 39, at *4 (WARN'S

"broader purpose" is to "protect workers, their families and their

communities in the wake of potentially harmful employment

decisions".).

61 I make this distinction in response to G eneral Dynamics's

assertion that the rapid resoluti on of disputes will better

alleviate the distress of job loss by ensuring that the statute's

remedies are promptly pursued. The statute presumably was passed

w ith the belief that proper advance notice would be given,

rendering the remedial provisions unnecessary in those cases.

- 44 - reason to require that they be rushed to resolution within six

months or not at all.

The Second Circuit recognized this fundamental distinction:

"The purpose of WARN, unlike that of the NLRA, is not to ensure

labor peace but to alleviate the distress associated with job loss

for both the workers and the community in which they live". 60 No

reason to expedit e those claims beyond what the state prescribes

for the most analogous state limitations period exists. It is

important to understand that this alleviation o f distress comes

from the advance notice of the plant closing, not from the backpay

award that comes when a company fails to comply with WARN's

provisions. 61 Moreover, we must remember that a plaintiff is not

paid the day he files suit. If he wins at trial and upon appeal,

his backpay award could be years away. The majority's decision

will compound

-- not dissipate

-- the distress that thousands of

workers experience annually.

The most severe aspect of the maj ority's holding is its

decision to subject the non-unionized employees in this case to the62 I t bears emphasizing that the plaintiffs in both cases are no t

represented by labor unions.

63 In this way, the present case is drastically differ ent from the

statute at issue in Lampf

. In L ampf

, the Court held that a federal

statute of limitations applied to actions brought pursuant to Rule

10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b),

and Securities and Exchange C ommission Rule 10(b)(5). The Court

looked to the c ontemporaneously enacted remedial provisions that

d id supply a limitations period. S ee Lampf

, 501 U.S. at

__, 115

L.Ed.2d at 333-34. Hence, the Court had the benefit of the balance

struck by the Congress in limiting similar provisions of the same

act. Unfortunately, we are not presented with those circumstances.

64 The Second Circuit appreciated this distinction. I n criticizing

the district court's Staudt decision now before us, the court in

United Paperworkers stated:

Those courts which have deemed the NLRA period most

applicable to W ARN actions have failed to grasp this

crucial distinction between statutes which specifically

regulate the collective bargaining relationship and those

which remain peripheral to that concern.

United Paperworkers , 999 F.2d at 55.

- 45 - strictures of the NLRA, the act governing collective bargaining. 62

Returning to the round peg, square hole metaphor, this truly

baffles the laws of geometry. The NLRA protects the right to

bargain collectively but exacts as a price for that protection that

disputed cases be filed within six months. Yet, in this case, the

majority holds the plaintiffs to a deal they did not make: They

suffer the six-month requirement but benefit from no corresponding

protection of their rights. 63

The Supreme Court has drawn an important distinction between

statutes that involve the collective bargaining process and those

that do not. 64 For example, in D elCostello

, the Supreme Court

stated that it would borrow a federal limitations period because of

the national concern for "stable bargaining relationships and65 DelCostello

, 462 U.S. at 171 (citation omitted); U nited

Paperworkers , 999 F.2d at 53.

66 Reed , 488 U.S. at 394; United Paperworkers , 999 F.2d at 53-54.

67 Fort Halifax Pa cking Co., Inc. v. Coyne , 482 U.S. 1, 20-21, 96

L.E d.2d 1 (1987) (internal quotations omitted) (evaluating Maine

plant closing law).

68 WARN defines a "mass layoff" sufficient to invoke its terms as a

reduction in work force of (1) at least 33 percent of the employees

(excluding any part-time employees) and (2) at least 50 employees

(excluding any part-t ime employees); or at least 500 employees

- 46 - finality of private settlements". 65 The R eed case is equally

illustrative. The s tatute at issue there did not directly touch on

collective bargaining concerns and so the Court applied the usual

state limitations period. 66 This distinction is well-founded, for

a plant c losing law "provides protection to individual union and

non-union wor kers alike, and thus neither encourages nor

discourages the collective bargai ning processes that are the

subject of the NLRA". 67

The unfairness of applying the NLRA's limitations period to

non-unionized workers is magnified by the practical obstacles that

WARN plaintiffs face. Unionized plaintiffs presumably enjoy the

benef i t of union protection and, probably, union legal

representation. The union will be well-versed in the applicable

statute of limitations for claims of that sort and the plaintiffs

will be advised accordingly. In other words, unionized WARN

plaintiffs can rest assured that the union "will handle it".

Non-unionized WARN plaintiffs, on the other hand, are unlikely

to have sufficient information to be able to bring suit within six

months. 68 Whereas unions are readily able to determine whether a(excluding any part-time employees). 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3)(B).

69 The majority's respon se to the practical problems that the sixmonth limitations period will cause is a statement that "many WARN

plaintiffs have brought their claims within six months.

. . ."

Slip op. at 31 n.35. It is telling, however, that the cases the

majority cites for evidence of that proposition had unions for

plaintiffs. The majority never addresses the additional burdens

that non-unionized potential WARN plaintiffs face.

- 47 - sufficient number of their members had lost their jobs to invoke

WARN's remedies, non-union employees must learn about the scope of

a layoff by talking to co-workers and gradually compiling a list of

those affected. This will be a time-consuming laborious

undertaking. 69

But workers will hardly be able to direct the energy and

attention necessa ry to that task -- they will be out hunting for

work. NLRA plaintiffs are preoccupied with going back to their

jobs with their company; WARN plaintiffs are preoccupied with

finding a new job to replace the one they just lost. The strain

they are under will be intense as they will be competing with the

perhaps thousands of others similarly situated for any scarce

employment opportunities. In spite of this all-too-real scenario,

the decision of the Court today requires that they file suit within

six months to get the backpay to which they are entitled, knowing

that the ultimate award if they win will be far away and

ineffective to help with their present needs.

Although the equities seem to me plain, this distinction goes

beyond a question of fairness, it is the core of our analysis. For

when the purpose of the NLRA is at odds with the purpose of WARN,

there is no way that the NLRA can provide a "closer fit" than an7 0 The majority's weak comparison of the statutes's purposes

implicitly concedes this. WARN's purpose is to protect workers and

their families by requiring notice, 20 C.F.R. § 639.1 (a) (1993),

whereas the NLRA's purpos e is to facilitate the process of

collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 151. The majority's statement

that they are similar in that both "regulate labor-management

relations," slip op. at 19, is only slightly more convincing than

the fact that both were passed by Congress.

- 48 - analogous state statute of limitations.

Not only is there no strict identity of purposes as the

majorit y reminds us is unnecessary, these are fundamentally

different statutes, enacted for very different reasons, creating

very different causes of action. 70 The purpose of WARN is to give

employees advance notice of plant closings and a cause of action

when the employer fails to comply. The imposition of the NLRA

statute of limitations is at od ds with that purpose in that it

unduly burdens potential WARN plaintiffs by making them pursue

those actions within a very tight time frame.

Comparing these statutes to the securities law at issue in

Lampf

, where the Court did adopt a uniform federal limitations

period, is instructive. In L ampf

, the Court was able to borrow the

federal limitations period from the remedial provisions passed by

the same Congress for the same purpose. Hence, the Court's task

was, in many ways, easier. Both the borrowed period and Rule 10(b)

were "to protect investors a gainst manipulation of stock prices

through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges. . .

. " In Lampf , the Court's borrowed period had a near-identity of

purpose with Rule 10(b); we do not.

The majority opinion is no more convi ncing as to structure.71 Cf

. Crown Cork & Seal

, 1994 WL 415139, *3 ("the mere fact that a

statute touches upon issues of labor law does no t mean that the

Court must resort to the statute of limitations contained in §

10(b) of the NLRA").

72 United Paperworkers , 999 F.2d at 53-54.

73 Id . at 54.

- 49 - The majority incants the WARN regulations that the Depart ment of

Labor borrowed from the NLRA, but fails to explain the significance

of that comparison. The borrowing of concepts is understandable:

both laws operate within the larger c ontext of employer-employee

relations. The Department of Labor is the natural oversight agency

for both and the case law applicable to the interpretation of one

will likely be us eful in construing the other. Still, that they

were born into the same extended family does not mean that they

bear a family resemblance. 71

In conclusion, I would join the other Courts of Appeals to

have cons idered this issue -- the Second Circuit in U nited

Paperworkers and the Third Circuit in Crown Cork & Seal

-- and hold

that WARN lawsuits should be governed by state limitations periods,

as suggested by a harmonious reading of Lampf and DelCostello

. 72

I, like those courts, believe that "[a] WARN cause of action does

not fit the limited circumstances under which a federal statute of

limitation should be applied". 73

V.

The next step is to decide which state limitations period

ought to be borrowed. Although several Texas statutes have been

suggested, it is my feeling that the Texas statute of limitations74 The other good candidates are:

(1) The two-year Texas limitations period for personal

injury, wrongful discharge, and employment discrimination

claims, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 ;

(2) The four-year Texas residual statute of limitations, Id

. § 16.051;

(3) The six-month limitations period of the Texas Pay

Statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5155; and

(4) The four-year federal residual statute of limitations

Congress recently enacted for all federal causes of

action that do not include their own limitations period,

28 U.S.C. § 1658.

At first glance, nu mber (4) appears to cover exactly the

instant case. Unfortunately, as the majority correctly indicated,

§ 1658 by its terms applies only to "civil action[s] arising under

an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this

section ." Because WARN was enacted before § 1658, § 1658 does not

directly control in WARN cases. Several federal district courts

have recognized that § 1658 sup ersedes the Supreme Court's L ampf

analysis for causes of action filed after § 1658 took effect, but

bec ause WARN preceded § 1658, the Supreme Court's L ampf analysis

governs this case.

75 See Del Costello , 462 U.S. at 171 ("[A]s the courts have often

discovered, there is not always an obvious state-law choice for

application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to state

law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods.").

- 50 - for contract claims provides the best analogy. 74 Under Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004, then, WARN plaintiffs would have

four years in which to institute their actions.

As all seem to agree, the fit will never be perfect; that is

why it is a question of which round peg to stuff in a square hole.

The Texas limitations period for contract claims works in that it

is the most analogous state statute. 75 I view an action under WARN

as

essentially an action for dam ages caused by an alleged

breach of an employer's obligation.

. . . Such an action76 Auto Workers v. Hoosier Car dinal Corp. , 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.7.

See also

, Frymire v. Ampex Corp. , 821 F. Supp. 651, 655 (D. Colo.

1993) (applying state contract statute of limitations to WARN

claim); Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp.

, 818 F. Supp. 192, 196 (E.D.

Mich. 1993) (same).

77 United Paperworkers , 999 F.2d at 53, 57.

78 See Reed

, 488 U.S. at 327; Frymire

, 821 F. Supp. at 655. I note,

however, that I would h ave assented to a remand order to the

district court to find which state limitations period was most

appropriate.

79 DelCostello

, 462 U.S. at 172. Though I do not wish to beat a dead

horse, I reiterate that studying the litigation practicalities and

policy cons iderations is our last task -- we reach it only if we

have found a state statute that is at odds with the operation of

WARN. That is not the case here.

- 51 - closely resembles an action for b reach of contract

cognizable at common law. 76

The Second Circuit in U nited Paperworkers agreed and applied

V ermont's six-year residual limitations period for all contract

claims. 77 Even acknowledging that Texas is an employment-at-will

state, the backpay provisions of WARN resemble damages for a breach

of implied contract. Simply put, I perceive no evidence that the

Texas contract claim limitations period is at odds with WARN's

substantive provisions. 78

VI.

Following the proper framework, we look las t to whether

litigation practicalities and policy considerations make the use of

the NLRA limit a tions period "a significantly more appropriate

vehicle for interstitial lawmaking". 79 The majority, raising the

specter of endless forum shopping among WARN litigants, concludes

that they do. I come out the other way.

To start, the forum shopping concerns raised by the majority80 See United Paperworkers , 999 F.2d at 56 (forum shopping concerns

are not great because "plant closing" is limited to a single site

of employment and WARN actions will be filed where the injury took

place or the employer does business).

81 A uto Mechanics Local 701 v. Santa Fe Term. Serv. , 830 F. Supp.

432, 436 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

82 383 U.S. 696, 701 (1966).

83 Id

. at 702 (internal quotations omitted); DelCostello

, 462 U.S.

at 162.

- 52 - could be raised in reference to almost any federal law for which we

were considering borrowing a state li mitations period. If

anything, WARN diminishes t he threat of forum shopping. 8 0 Any

threat of forum shopping that results from the right to file suit

wherever the employer does business is stemmed by choice of law

rules which dictate that the law of the site of the layoff (and,

thus, injury and violation) would be chosen no matter where the

suit was filed. 81

We also examine the policy considerations to determine whether

WARN calls for a particular degree of uniformity. To me, they do

not. The Supreme Court in A uto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp. 82

instructed that the value of uniformity is far greater under the

NLRA t han under non-collective bargaining statutes. Even if we

concede that the subject matter of WARN is "peculiarly one that

calls for uniform law," national uniformity is less important

because WARN does not involve

those consensual processes that federal labor law is

chiefly designed to promote

-- the formation of the

collective agreement and the private settlement of

disputes under it. 83

WARN is decidedly not about collective bargaining. It is about84 Slip op. at 30.

85 Slip op. at 33.

- 53 - what happens when there will be no more employer-employee

relationship and, thus, nothing left to bargain for.

The majority's other policy considerations are undercut by

experience and common sense. For example, the majority states that

the prompt resolution of labor disputes militates in favor of a

six-month limitations period. Once a plant has closed, however,

whether notice has been given or not, there can be no resolution of

a labor dispute. The plant is gone, workers are without jobs, the

community is left reeling. Although the majority is appropriately

concerned with the availability of witnesses and evidence down the

road, 84 the state legislatures measure those concerns against other

public policy considerations when they enact their statutes of

limitations.

The majority also asserts that an expansive limitations period

would disserve WARN's objective of providing a time cushion in

which to seek other employment options. The majority states that

providing funds to workers several years later does not serve that

objective. 85 The majority has confused time cushions.

The time in which to file suit is not the time cushion

Congress sought to give workers; the time cushion is the advance

notice th at the workers would be losing their jobs. The workers

could then prepare for the coming changes whi le still collecting

their paychecks. Congress hoped that notice would be given (the

time cushion) and that these causes of action would never accrue.- 54 -

Once they have accrued, however, the restrictive six-month

limitations period serves to take away any remedial cushion that

workers might get in compensation for their injury.

Worse, the six-month time frame will actually serve to stymie

WARN's true objective of giving workers and communities advance

notice of impending hard times. By severely limiting the time

frame in which potential WARN plaintiffs may file suit, companies

can relax a bit and rest assured that they may "make redundant"

many legally unsophisticated and unsuspecting workers

--

particularly non-unionized workers

-- without suffering the

community backlash that will foll ow an announcement and, better,

without the threat of future litigation. An extended limitations

period, on the other hand, would function as a deterrent and, thus,

an enforcement mechanism.

VII.

The major ity gives a detailed explication of the trend away

from borrowing state statutes of limitations in favor of uniform

national rules. Even if that trend does exist -- and I do not

concede that it does

-- L ampf explicitly instructs that borrowing

state limitations period is still the law. I do not doubt that

uniform federal limitations periods might promote certainty,

predictability, and mini mization, but Congress is well aware of

those values and yet frequently (as in this case) chooses to ignore

them and leave the question open. Hence, if the state borrowing

rule is truly becoming an anachronism, I will look to Congress, not86 At the risk of overkill, I note that the Harvard Law Review note

upon which the majority relies as support for this trend in

actuality supports my conclusion: "Writing for a plurality, Justice

Blackmun acknowledged the continuing validity of the state

borrowing rule." T he Supreme Court, 1990 Term

-- Leading Cases

, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 400 (1991). The article details that the

exception to this accepted rule is just as I have stated: when the

federal period "clearly provides a closer analogy" and when federal

policies at stake make the federal rule a "significantl y more appropriate vehicle" than the state rule. I d

. Any reliance, then,

on some perceived trend away from the state borrowing rule is pure conjecture, particularly in the face of the clean rule announced in

Lampf

.

- 55 - to a law review, for evidence of its decline. 8687 WARN has no cruelty provision and, so, Glastron fired three

hundred employees on Christmas Eve.

- 56 - VIII.

The plaintiffs, among countless others, have suff ered the

indignity of losing their employment without notice

-- in violation

of federal law. 87 In seeking the redress to which Congress has made

them entitled, this Court has closed the gate on them one last

time, on a legal principle so tenuous in foundation, it appears as

but an academic exercise. Unfortunately for John Halkias, John

Cureington, a nd Alvin Straudt and thousands of other workers

similarly situated, it is anything but that.

Because I believe that th e Court's decision today promotes

expediency and uniformity at the expense of the rights of workers,

I dissent.