NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KARLYN JAYE BLASER, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

KENDALL C. KAISER, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0453

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2014-095114

The Honorable David King Udall, Judge

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART

COUNSEL

Blaser Consulting, Tucson

By William B. Blaser

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, P.L.C., Phoenix

By Matthew L. Cates, John J. Egbert

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

FILED 6-28-2018
BLASER v. KAISER

Decision of the Court

2

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Karlyn Blaser appeals from judgment entered on a jury 

verdict in favor of Kendall Kaiser and the trial court’s order denying her 

motion for new trial. She also appeals a post-judgment order requiring her 

to obtain and pay for trial transcripts and denying her motion for 

reconsideration. For the following reasons, we dismiss the portions of the 

appeal related to the transcripts and motion for reconsideration, and affirm

the remaining orders.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In October 2012, Kaiser rear-ended a vehicle driven by Blaser

on a Phoenix-area freeway. Two years later, Blaser filed a complaint 

alleging Kaiser’s negligence caused her personal injury.1 In his answer, 

Kaiser admitted “fault for causing this accident” but denied causation and 

damages. After a four-day trial, the jury found in Kaiser’s favor. Blaser 

moved unsuccessfully for a new trial and then timely appealed the 

judgment and the order denying the motion for new trial. 

¶3 Thereafter, Blaser provided notice that she had ordered 

certain transcripts necessary for her appeal. Kaiser designated additional 

transcripts he believed were necessary to resolve the issues on appeal. Over 

Blaser’s objection, the trial court ordered her to obtain and pay for the 

additional transcripts Kaiser designated and then denied Blaser’s motion 

for reconsideration. Blaser submitted an amended notice of appeal from 

the post-judgment transcript orders. Blaser ultimately filed only one 

transcript of a February 2017 pretrial conference.

JURISDICTION

¶4 “This court has an independent duty to examine whether we 

have jurisdiction over matters on appeal.” Camasura v. Camasura, 238 Ariz. 

179, 181, ¶ 5 (App. 2015) (citing Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 191 Ariz. 

464, 465 (App. 1997)). We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the final 

judgment and denial of the motion for new trial pursuant to Arizona 

Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),2 -2101(A)(1), and (A)(5)(a).

 

1 Blaser also alleged other forms of damages but voluntarily dismissed 

those claims prior to trial.

2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version.
BLASER v. KAISER

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 Blaser suggests the transcript orders qualify as special orders 

after a final judgment, appealable pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2). To 

qualify as such, the orders must: (1) raise an issue “different from those that 

could have been raised on appeal from the underlying judgment,” and 

(2) “either affect the judgment or relate to its enforcement.” Vincent v. 

Shanovich, 243 Ariz. 269, 271, ¶ 9 (2017) (citing Reidy v. O’Malley Lumber Co., 

92 Ariz. 130, 136 (1962), and Arvizu v. Fernandez, 183 Ariz. 224, 226-27 (App. 

1995)). The transcript orders do not affect the judgment, relate to its 

execution, or stay its enforcement, and their appeal is not otherwise 

authorized by statute. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the 

transcript orders and dismiss the appeal to the extent Blaser challenges 

them.

DISCUSSION

¶6 Blaser argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying her request 

to deem causation and damages admitted; (2) denying her motion for a trial 

continuance and request for late disclosure; (3) denying her motion to 

prevent Kaiser’s independent medical examiner from testifying about 

matters outside his expertise; (4) allowing Kaiser to impeach Blaser’s 

credibility with evidence of two subsequent car accidents; (5) denying her 

motion for mistrial based upon admission of subsequent-accident evidence; 

and (6) denying her motion for new trial. We review rulings on evidentiary

and discovery issues, the denial of a motion to continue, and the denial of 

a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion resulting in unfair prejudice. 

Larsen v. Decker, 196 Ariz. 239, 241, ¶ 6 (App. 2000) (evidentiary rulings) 

(citing Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 185 Ariz. 493, 506 (1996)); Marquez v. 

Ortega, 231 Ariz. 437, 441, ¶ 14 (App. 2013) (discovery rulings); Sandretto v. 

Payson Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 234 Ariz. 351, 361, ¶ 38 (App. 2014) (motion 

to continue) (citing Alberta Sec. Comm’n v. Ryckman, 200 Ariz. 540, 543, ¶ 11 

(App. 2001)); Cervantes v. Rijlaarsdam, 190 Ariz. 396, 398 (App. 1997) (motion 

for mistrial) (citing E.L. Jones Constr. Co. v. Noland, 105 Ariz. 446, 452 (1970)). 

We review legal questions de novo. McNamara v. Citizens Protecting Tax 

Payers, 236 Ariz. 192, 194, ¶ 5 (App. 2014) (citing Lincoln v. Holt, 215 Ariz. 

21, 23, ¶ 4 (App. 2007)).

I. Admission to “Fault”

¶7 Blaser first argues the trial court erred by denying her request 

to deem a statement in Kaiser’s answer and deposition testimony admitting

“fault for causing this accident” as a judicial admission to the elements of 

duty, breach, causation, and damages necessary to her negligence claim. 
BLASER v. KAISER

Decision of the Court

4

Blaser argues by denying her request, the court adopted a definition of fault 

different from that prescribed by Arizona law. We disagree.

¶8 A judicial admission is: 

an express waiver made in court or preparatory to trial by the 

party or his attorney conceding for the purposes of the trial 

the truth of some alleged fact, and has the effect of a confessory 

pleading, in that the fact is therefore to be taken for granted; 

so that the one party need offer no evidence to prove it and 

the other is not allowed to disprove it.

Clark Equip. Co. v. Ariz. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Fund, 189 Ariz. 433, 439 (App. 

1997) (quoting IX John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2588 (1981)) (emphasis 

added). We do not construe Kaiser’s statements as a concession of liability 

for negligence. Rather, Kaiser admitted only the facts of the accident as 

alleged by Blaser — specifically, that he rear-ended Blaser’s vehicle with his 

own while traveling on the highway. He then denied the remaining 

allegations in Blaser’s complaint. Kaiser did not, through these statements, 

admit that he fell below the standard of care or that the collision caused 

Blaser any damages; indeed, in a joint report, Blaser acknowledged that 

Kaiser “admitted his fault for causing the collision but denie[d] causation 

and damages.” Accordingly, we find no error.

II. Motion to Continue

¶9 Blaser argues the trial court erred in denying a motion to 

continue the trial on the ground that she would need additional time to 

conduct discovery if the court were to deny her motion to deem Kaiser’s 

answer and deposition testimony an admission to liability. The record 

reflects, however, that Kaiser made the statements in question in March and 

May 2015. Blaser then waited until December 2016 to file a motion to deem 

the statements as admissions to liability and, although aware that motion 

could be unsuccessful, waited until March 2017 to file a motion to continue. 

Blaser offered no explanation for the delays, and her claim of surprise is 

belied by her concession that she moved for a continuance anticipating that 

her motion to deem Kaiser’s statements as admissions would be denied.3

 

3 For the same reasons, we find no error in the denial of Blaser’s March 

2017 request for late disclosure, which she describes as a “last ditch effort 

to try to re-level the playing field” and obtain admissible evidence of 

damages after the court declined to deem Kaiser’s statements as admissions 

to liability.
BLASER v. KAISER

Decision of the Court

5

On this record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in concluding 

Blaser failed to establish good cause for a continuance.

III. Expert Witness Testimony

¶10 Blaser argues the trial court erred in allowing Kaiser’s expert 

witness to testify regarding matters outside his expertise. See generally Ariz. 

R. Evid. 702 (setting forth the permissible form and substance of expert 

witness testimony). But as the appellant, Blaser bears the burden to ensure 

the record on appeal contains the transcripts necessary to consider the 

issues raised. See ARCAP 11(c)(1)(A). Blaser did not submit any trial 

transcripts and argues these materials are unnecessary to resolve her 

appeal. However, in the absence of a transcript of the expert’s testimony, 

we do not know the nature or extent of what was said at trial. Accordingly, 

we must presume the transcript would support the court’s exercise of 

discretion, see Renner v. Kehl, 150 Ariz. 94, 97 n.1 (1986) (citing Visco v. 

Universal Refuse Removal Co., 11 Ariz. App. 73, 76 (1969), and Auman v. 

Auman, 134 Ariz. 40, 42-43 (1982)), and find no error.

IV. Subsequent Accidents

¶11 Blaser argues the trial court erred by allowing Kaiser to 

impeach her credibility with limited evidence concerning her involvement 

in two subsequent motor vehicle accidents and then permitting Kaiser to 

exceed the limitations of its ruling. Because Blaser did not include 

transcripts of the trial proceedings evidencing admission of prejudicial 

evidence over Blaser’s objections, we again presume the transcripts support 

the court’s exercise of discretion and find no error. See supra ¶ 9.

V. Motion for Mistrial

¶12 Blaser argues the trial court erred by denying her motions for 

mistrial based upon the purported improper admission of subsequentaccident evidence. Because we find no error in the admission of the 

evidence, see supra ¶ 10, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in 

denying a mistrial on this basis.

VI. Motion for New Trial

¶13 Blaser argues the trial court erred by denying her motion for 

new trial on the grounds that the errors noted herein collectively deprived 

her of a fair trial. As far as the limited record reveals, Blaser was afforded 

notice and a meaningful opportunity at trial to offer evidence, confront 

adverse witnesses, and present argument in support of her claims. See 
BLASER v. KAISER

Decision of the Court

6

Curtis v. Richardson, 212 Ariz. 308, 312, ¶ 16 (App. 2006) (“Due process 

entitles a party to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 

time in a meaningful manner. Due process also entitles a party to offer 

evidence and confront adverse witnesses.”) (citing Comeau v. Ariz. State Bd. 

of Dental Exam’rs, 196 Ariz. 102, 106-07, ¶ 20 (App. 1999), and In re Levine, 

97 Ariz. 88, 91-92 (1964)). Accordingly, Blaser failed to prove any error in 

the trial proceedings, and we find no abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶14 The judgment entered upon the jury verdict and order 

denying the motion for new trial are affirmed. The portions of the appeal 

related to the transcripts and motion for reconsideration are dismissed. As 

the successful party, Kaiser is awarded his costs incurred on appeal upon 

compliance with ARCAP 21(b).