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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

DANIEL DVORKIN 

 

Case No. 12 CR 500 

Judge Edmond E. Chang 

 

GOVERNMENT=S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

When defendant Daniel Dvorkin was faced with the prospect of paying over $8 million to 

Larry Meyer’s company, he opted to hire a hit man to kill Meyer rather than pay the judgment. 

To date, defendant has neither shown remorse nor taken any responsibility for his actions. 

Rather, at trial and in his post-trial briefings, defendant has portrayed himself as the victim, an 

old, infirm, talkative man who never intended to hurt Meyer. However, the evidence at trial 

revealed that defendant was anything but the victim. Rather, the evidence revealed defendant to 

be a calm, cool, collected business man who negotiated the price of a hit man as though he were 

closing a real estate deal, who showed only real concern for his bank account over the life of 

Meyer. 

The Presentence Investigation Report calculates the advisory Guidelines range to be 262 

to 327 months’ imprisonment. The government has no objection to the PSR, or its application 

of a two-level increase to the Guideline calculation in light of defendant’s attempts to obstruct 

the investigation and his prosecution. However, the government recognizes that the advisory 

Guideline range is lengthy, particularly for someone of defendant’s age and health. Defendant 

chose to commit this offense when he was in his 70s with medical issues, however, and he still 

must face the serious consequences that flow from his very serious crime. In light of these 

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circumstances, we recommend that the Court sentence defendant to a term of imprisonment no less 

than 11 years, to account for the ten-year statutory maximum on one 18 USC 1958(a) charge, plus 

one year to account for defendant’s obstruction of justice. 

BACKGROUND

On August 30, 2013, a jury found defendant guilty of one count of solicitation to commit 

a crime of violence (namely, the murder of Larry Meyer), in violation of Title 18, United States 

Code, Section 373 (Count One), and five counts of the use of interstate commerce facilities in the 

commission of murder-for-hire, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958(a) 

(Counts Two through Six) (Dkt. No. 102). 

This Court is well versed in the facts of this case, having heard the evidence at trial and 

read the parties’ post-trial memoranda that summarized that trial evidence. Accordingly, the 

government herein incorporates its summary of the evidence from its response to defendant’s 

motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, Dkt. No. 146, rather than repeat it all again. 

ARGUMENT

I. Probation’s Guideline calculation is correct.

The Presentence Investigation Report correctly calculations defendant’s adjusted base 

offense level for Counts One through Six to be 39. See PSR at ¶¶25-36. 

a) Offense Level Calculations

Count One 

The base offense level is 33, pursuant to Guideline ' 2A1.5(a). PSR at ¶25. 

The base offense level is increased by 4 because the offense involved the offer or the receipt of 

anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder, pursuant to Guideline ' 2A1.5(b). PSR 

at ¶26. 

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The base offense level is increased by 2 because defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 

attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, 

pursuant to Guideline ' 3C1.1. PSR at ¶31. 

Accordingly, the adjusted offense level for Count One is 39. PSR at ¶33. 

Counts Two through Six 

The base offense level is 33, pursuant to Guideline ' 2E1.4(a)(2). 

Grouping Counts One through Six 

Pursuant to Guideline ' 3D1.2(b), Counts One through Six of the indictment are grouped 

together. 

Pursuant to Guideline '3D1.3(a), the offense level applicable to the grouped counts is the 

offense level corresponding to the most serious of the counts comprising the Group. 

Accordingly, the adjusted base offense level for Counts One through Six is 39. PSR at 

¶36. 

b) Criminal History

The PSR cites no criminal history. PSR at ¶¶37-39. Accordingly, defendant=s criminal 

history points equal zero and defendant=s criminal history category is I. PSR at ¶39. 

c) Anticipated Advisory Sentencing Guidelines Range

Therefore, as stated in the PSR, the anticipated offense level is 39, which, when combined with 

the anticipated criminal history category of I, results in an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 

262 to 327 months= imprisonment, in addition to any supervised release and fine or restitution the 

Court may impose. 

 

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II. Defendant’s conduct warrants a two-level enhancement for obstruction of 

justice. 

The Guideline calculation should be increased by two levels as a result of defendant’s 

obstruction of justice, relating to both defendant’s comments to Robert Bevis on May 11, 2012, 

after the FBI confronted defendant about the plot to murder Larry Meyer, and defendant’s 

comments to Ellie Farkas after she testified in the grand jury and defendant was under criminal 

complaint.1

Guideline U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 provides: 

If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or 

impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, 

or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct 

related to (A) the defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) 

a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 

Guideline § 3C1.1. The Guidelines provide examples of obstructive conduct, which include 

“threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror, 

directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.” Guideline§ 3C1.1, Application Note 4(A). 

 Here, defendant attempted to obstruct and impede the investigation when he told Bevis to 

lie to law enforcement about why defendant went to Bevis’ gun store on May 8, the morning after 

the FBI approached defendant about the plot to murder Larry Meyer. Specifically, during a 

portion of their conversation on May 11, 2012, defendant instructed Bevis to lie to law 

enforcement about what defendant and Bevis discussed on May 8, 2012: 

BEVIS: Alright, well those guys came over to my shop today. 

DVORKIN: Uh huh. 

BEVIS: And they came inside and started asking me, you know first they 

were real nonchalant about everything. Lookin= around and stuff. 

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While Probation found defendant’s comments to Farkas to be “too vague” to support an 

obstruction of justice enhancement, Probation did find that his comments to Bevis during the May 11 call 

were sufficient to apply the two-level enhancement. PSR at ¶29. 

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And then they started asking me if I know you and I=m like, ah, well 

yeah you=re the landlord and (clears throat) you know I and, and 

they started saying, ah, they started bringing up, you know Texas 

and they, they showed me photos of you and I together that Tuesday 

out front, you know as you were leavin=. They=re, they=re, they=re 

doin= surveillance. Okay. And they started asking me all these 

questions and, you know and I=m, I=m just playin= dumb, you know. 

I=m tellin= >em I don=t know anything about that and, you know they 

wanted to know-- 

DVORKIN: Tell them I was looking at guns. 

BEVIS: Yeah that=s basically what I told >em you=re in there lookin= at guns. 

We were talkin= about a, you know, ah, a pellet gun that you have 

about fixin= it up and stuff and, and then they, they start showing 

me these photos, you know of, of you and I together and I said 

yeah he was here talkin= about the guns. And then they, ah, they 

asked me if I-- 

DVORKIN: Hey and also we talked about the real estate. 

BEVIS: Yeah, well I didn=t-- 

DVORKIN: Your new unit. 

BEVIS: I-- 

DVORKIN: I haven=t even seen it yet. 

Gov’t Ex. 7 Tr. at 1:14-2:17. While defendant did not say the words, “lie to the agents,” his 

message and intent to Bevis in that call were clear – defendant wanted Bevis to falsely tell agents 

that defendant was in Bevis’ gun shop to look at guns and talking about real estate. See Tr. at 

520-21; see United States v. Robinson, 14 F.3d 1200, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district 

court’s finding of obstruction of justice based on defendant’s coded conversations to 

co-conspirator to shade the truth and not cooperate with the government despite the fact that 

defendant did not expressly tell the co-conspirator to lie). Defendant obstructed justice and a 

two-level enhancement is appropriate. 

Defendant also attempted to obstruct and impede justice when he approached his 

longtime employee and family friend, Farkas, and tried to intimidate her from telling the truth. 

At trial, Farkas testified that she worked for defendant for over eleven years, and that she knew 

defendant and his wife for over fifteen years. Tr. at 690-92. Farkas testified that she had a 

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personal relationship with both defendant and his wife, over the years attending Dvorkin family 

affairs, playing Mahjong with Mrs. Dvorkin, and singing in the choir with Mrs. Dvorkin at their 

synagogue. Tr. at 692. While this was excluded at trial pursuant to defendant=s motion in 

limine, Farkas told investigators that defendant approached Farkas after he was charged by 

criminal complaint and after she testified in the grand jury. According to Farkas, defendant asked 

her “You don=t want to see me go to jail, do you?” Farkas stated that she replied, “no,” and then 

walked away from defendant to end the conversation. When asked what she understood 

defendant to mean when he asked her that, Farkas replied, “Don=t say anything bad.” She also 

stated that she felt intimidated. 

Though subtle and implied, when defendant approached Farkas, a longtime employee and 

family friend, he, again, attempted to impede and obstruct justice. See, e.g., United States v. 

Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court’s finding that a letter from the 

defendant to a codefendant which said, falsely, “you don’t know anything” about the subject 

matter of the prosecution was “a subtle and somewhat clever attempt to tell [the codefendant] 

‘don't spill the beans’” sufficient to support an obstruction of justice enhancement); United States 

v. Strode, 552 F.3d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s application of Guideline § 

3C1.1: “Though Strode never explicitly stated that he did not want Askew and Conway to 

cooperate with the government, indirectly implying a need for everyone to keep quiet is not a 

barrier to an obstruction enhancement.”). 

For all of these reasons, the PSR correctly applied a two-level upward variance to the 

Guideline calculation, pursuant to Guideline § 3C1.1. 

 

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III. The factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) warrant a sentence of no less than 11 

years’ imprisonment. 

The factors set forth in Section 3553(a) make clear that a sentence of no less than 11 years’ 

imprisonment is appropriate here. 

A. The Nature, Circumstances, and Seriousness of the Offenses. 

The nature, circumstances, and seriousness of the offenses favor a sentence of at least 11 

years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. '' 3553(a)(1) & (2)(A). First, it goes without saying that 

soliciting a murder-for-hire is a very serious crime for the obvious reason that the intended goal of 

the crime is murder. Thankfully, here, Larry Meyer was not murdered. However, that does not, 

and should not, detract from the seriousness of the crime. Defendant had Farkas locate Meyer – 

instructed her to even find his synagogue in Austin, Texas – and then defendant took the pages 

Farkas printed, which included a photo of Meyer, and handed them to Bevis after they returned to 

defendant’s office following their conversation in the parking lot about locating a hit man. Tr. at 

386-88, 698-99; Gov’t Exs. 8B and 8C. In addition, defendant created the real risk that two 

people could have ended up dead, as one of the handouts that Farkas printed for defendant 

identified a different Larry Meyer, see Gov. Ex. 8C. Moreover, the mechanics of the solicitation 

itself, specifically the distance, anonymity, and lack of accountability that existed between 

defendant and the hit man created the very real risk that the plan, once hatched, was very difficult 

to stop.2

 Try as he might to portray this as “just talking,” in his asking Bevis to locate a hitman 

 2

Dvorkin himself emphasized both the need for anonymity and the practical risk that he could not 

guarantee the result. See, e.g., Gov. Ex. 3 Tr. at 5:7-10 (“I don’t wanna know his [name]”); id. at 6:21 (“I 

don’t wanna know his name.”); Gov. Ex. 4 Tr. at 1:14-15 (“The other avenue only wanted ten percent 

down. You know the no refunds in this kind of work.”); id. at 2:4-5 (“I don’t know which group finally 

took it. He had two groups one was Mexican and one was Russian. I actually don’t wanna know.”); id. at 

2:17-19 (“Now if nothing happens by Friday after next week I’ll call you for another appointment. And 

we’ll go . . . .”); id. at 3:19 (“Now whether they get it done or not.”); id. at 4:1-15 (remarking several times 

that the cheaper assassin may not get the job done). 

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and providing Meyer’s name, photo, and location to Bevis, defendant unleashed (and stuck with) a 

chain of events that, but for Bevis going to the police, could have spiraled out of control and could 

have resulted in the death of Meyer. 

Second, the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of the crime must also account for the 

true victim in this case, Dvorin’s intended target, Larry Meyer. The defendant=s actions had an 

extraordinarily negative and traumatic impact on not only Meyer, but on his family and 

employees. In his Victim Impact Statement, Meyer recounted how, after learning that he was 

the target of a murder plot, his wife’s brother and mother both passed away and how the family 

had to attend the funerals in Georgia accompanied by private security. Meyer’s family 

members have sought counseling as a result of defendant’s crimes. What the Meyer family has 

endured should factor heavily in the Court’s determination of an appropriate sentence. 

B. History and Characteristics of the Defendant, and the Need for Deterrence and to 

Promote Respect for the Law. 

A sentence of at least 11 years’ imprisonment is appropriate in this case to take account of 

defendant=s history and characteristics, as well as the need for deterrence and to promote 

defendant=s respect for the law. 

With respect to defendant’s history and characteristics, defendant is a man motivated by 

greed, looking for an easy way out, with no regard or respect for human life or the law. By all 

accounts, over the years defendant built a successful commercial real estate practice and lived a 

very comfortable life. The investigation and witness accounts revealed that the defendant and his 

wife lived in a large home, flew around on private planes, threw frequent parties, and generously 

donated to charitable and religious organizations. But when the $8 million judgment was entered 

(relating to private planes he purchased years earlier), defendant himself was personally liable 

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(along with his two LLCs). See Gov. Ex. 9; Tr. at 229-30. And in spring 2012, after the 

mediation fell apart and his prospects to stay collection on the judgment grew bleaker and bleaker, 

defendant opted to pursue hiring a hit man to kill Meyer rather than just pay the money. 

The Court should also take account of Dvorkin’s very cool, calm, and collected manner 

during the recorded conversations that defendant had with Bevis. Defendant haggled over the 

price of a hit man as though he were negotiating the price of a car. Defendant displayed no regard 

for human life. Nor did he ever end the plan to murder Meyer of his own volition. Rather, 

defendant only stopped the plan when he knew that law enforcement was onto him. 

Moreover, defendant has shown no remorse for his actions, nor has he accepted 

responsibility. Instead, he portrayed at trial, and continues to portray, Bevis as the criminal in this 

case. But for Bevis, however, Meyer might be dead right now. 

Defendant also sought to impede the investigation. Defendant told Bevis to lie to federal 

agents after defendant had been approached by the FBI and was, thus, aware that the FBI was 

investigating him in relation to a murder-for-hire scheme. Later, after he was criminally charged 

and knew that Farkas’ computer has been searched and that she has testified in the grand jury, he 

exploited their history and friendship by attempting to guilt her into lying. Such arrogant actions 

reflect a man who believes he is above the law. 

 Finally, a significant sentence is necessary in this case not only to deter defendant but to 

deter others, to send the strong signal that there are significant repercussions if you choose this 

path of soliciting a hit man to deal with your problems. While defendant’s age and health should 

be considered by the Court, clearly those conditions did not prevent him from committing the 

crimes for which he now stands convicted and he, personally, needs to be deterred as well. A 

significant sentence will send the proper message, not just to defendant but to all people of all ages 

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and circumstances, that no one is above the law. 

The government acknowledges that the defendant is now 76 years old and suffers from 

various health conditions. But those two factors should not result in a free pass for defendant in 

this case, where the crime was seriousness, the impact to Meyer and his family significant, and the 

strong need to generally deter others. Nor should those factors overshadow defendant’s history 

and characteristics, particularly his conduct and demeanor as they relate to the instant offenses – a 

man who regards his personal finances over the life of Meyer and arrogantly obstructs justice. 

However, the government recognizes that the advisory Guideline range is lengthy in light of 

defendant’s age and health. In light of that, and taking into account the factors discussed above, 

the government recommends that the Court sentence defendant to no less than 11 years’ 

imprisonment. 

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Conclusion 

The government seeks a sentence of not less than 11 years’ imprisonment in this case. 

Such a sentence is well supported under Section 3553(a), as it will reflect the seriousness of the 

offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate 

deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public from future crimes of defendant, properly 

account for defendant=s history and characteristics, and ensure a fair and uniform sentence. 

Dated: June 26, 2014 Respectfully submitted, 

 ZACHARY T. FARDON 

 United States Attorney 

By: /s/ Heather K. McShain 

HEATHER K. McSHAIN 

JEFFREY D. PERCONTE 

 Assistant United States Attorneys 

 United States Attorney=s Office 

 219 South Dearborn Street 

 Chicago, Illinois 60604 

 (312) 353-1414 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned Assistant United States Attorney hereby certifies that, in accordance 

with Fed. R. Crim. P. 49, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5, LR 5.5 and the General Order on Electric Case Filing 

(ECF), the Government=s Sentencing Memorandum was served on defense counsel pursuant to 

the District Court=s ECF system, on June 26, 2014. 

 

By: /s/ Heather K. McShain 

HEATHER K. McSHAIN 

Assistant United States Attorney 

219 S. Dearborn Street 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

(312) 353-1414 

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