*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 9/3/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

VALERIE ENGLAND, a/k/a Valerie Cerivan,

a/k/a Valorie Foreman, a/k/a Valorie Cummings,

 Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-6355

(D.C. No. CR-94-92-C)

(W.D. Oklahoma)

____________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

____________________________________

Before BRORBY, EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

____________________________________

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

Valerie England, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
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pauperis, appeals the denial of her motion for return of property pursuant to Fed.

R. Crim. P. 41(e). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see

United States v. Madden, ___ F.3d ___, ___ n.1 (No. 96-6118) (10th Cir. Sep. 3,

1996), and affirm.

Ms. England pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute and to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 

Ms. England did not appeal her conviction and sentence. Ms. England later filed

a motion for return of property pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e). Ms. England

sought the return of (1) $1,167.00 seized and administratively forfeited to the

Drug Enforcement Administration; and (2) $3,873.00 forfeited to the Oklahoma

Department of Public Safety in a judicial forfeiture proceeding held in Oklahoma

County District Court, No. CJ-94-1914. The district court denied the motion,

stating as follows:

The cash in question was seized from defendant on November 30,

1993, pursuant to a lawful search warrant, and on December 16,

1993, after a traffic stop. The cash seized on these two occasions

was administratively forfeited by the DEA and the Oklahoma

Department of Public Safety, respectively. Ms. England received

notice of the forfeiture actions and does not deny any of these

relevant facts. Defendant argues that her disclaimer of interest in the

money was uncounseled, coerced, and as a result of false promises. 

She seeks return of the property.

Defendant concedes the lawfulness of the search and seizure of

the cash on both occasions, and further concedes the receipt of notice
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of the administrative forfeiture. It is settled that a defendant may not

bypass her administrative remedy, i.e., she is not permitted to pursue

the equitable remedy allowed by Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) after failing

to challenge the forfeiture. This court will not exercise jurisdiction

under these circumstances.

In effect, the district court rejected Ms. England's contention her disclaimers were

coerced and found they were voluntary, and that by signing those disclaimers, she

forfeited her right to obtain equitable relief in a proceeding under Fed. R. Crim.

P. 41(e).

Ms. England now contends the district court erred when it denied her

motion. We disagree. We review the district court's finding Ms. England

voluntarily disclaimed her right to the property in question for clear error, United

States v. Maez, 915 F.2d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104

(1991), and find none. Furthermore, in light of this finding, we find no fault with

the district court's conclusion Ms. England was not entitled to equitable relief.

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court:

WADE BRORBY

United States Circuit Judge