[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-12735

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:10-cr-00231-GKS-GJK-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TEODORO GONZALEZ-MENDIOLA,

a.k.a. Tio,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(April 14, 2016)

Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Teodoro Gonzalez-Mendiola appeals the district court’s denial of his 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence based on Amendment 782 to the 

sentencing guidelines. He contends that the district court erred when it denied his 

motion without considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

In 2011 Gonzalez-Mendiola pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to 

possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture containing

cocaine and 500 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), (vii), and 846. That offense 

carries a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 

At the sentence hearing, the district court calculated his base offense level at 34 

based on the drug quantity table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(3) (2010), and after 

the application of several adjustments, it assigned him a total offense level of 33. 

With his criminal history category of I, Gonzalez-Mendiola’s advisory guidelines 

range was 135 to 168 months. The district court sentenced him to 135 months. 

After Gonzalez-Mendiola was sentenced, the government moved for a 

reduction in his sentence based on the substantial assistance he had provided to the 

government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (“Upon motion of the [g]overnment, the 

court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by 

statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance

in the investigation or prosecution of another person. . .”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 

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35(b)(1) (“Upon the government’s motion . . . the court may reduce a sentence if 

the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating or 

prosecuting another person.”). The district court granted that motion and reduced 

his sentence to 100 months. 

In 2015 Gonzalez-Mendiola filed a § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his 

sentence, arguing that Amendment 782, which retroactively amended § 2D1.1, had 

lowered his offense level to 31 and his advisory guidelines range to 108 to 135

months. He asserted that the court could reduce his sentence below that range 

because he had previously received a below-guidelines sentence based on 

substantial assistance. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (“If the term of 

imprisonment imposed was less than the term of imprisonment provided by the 

guideline range . . . pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant’s 

substantial assistance to authorities, a reduction comparably less than the amended 

guideline range . . . may be appropriate.”). The government did not oppose

Gonzalez-Mendiola’s motion.

The district court denied the motion. It agreed that Amendment 782 had 

reduced Gonzalez-Mendiola’s advisory guidelines range, but noted that his 100-

month sentence already fell below that amended range. The court stated that it had 

already considered “all substantial assistance credit” and had determined that “no 

further comparable substantial assistance departure shall be applied.”

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On appeal Gonzalez-Mendiola contends that the district court erred when it

denied his § 3582(c)(2) motion without considering the sentencing factors listed in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He also argues that the district court applied the “wrong legal 

standard” in deciding whether to reduce his sentence because it considered his

previous sentence reduction instead of the § 3553(a) factors.

We review the district court’s decision to reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2) only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 

1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). We have held that the district court “must engage in 

a two-part analysis” when making that decision. United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 

778, 780 (11th Cir. 2000). First, the court must recalculate the defendant’s

sentence under the amended guidelines. See id. at 780–81. Second, it must decide 

whether and to what extent to reduce the defendant’s sentence — a decision that 

“should be made in light of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 781; 

see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. 1(B)(i). “The district court is not required to 

articulate the applicability of each factor, as long as the record as a whole 

demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken into account by the district 

court.” Williams, 557 F.3d at 1256 (quotation marks omitted). 

As far as we can tell from the record, the district court performed the first

part of this analysis. However, the district court’s order does not mention the 

§ 3553(a) factors, and neither does Gonzalez-Mendiola’s motion. No in-person 

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hearing was held on the motion at which Gonzalez-Mendiola could have objected 

to the district court’s failure to consider those factors. Without any indication that 

the district court weighed the § 3553(a) factors, we will vacate his sentence and 

remand so that we can be assured that the district court considers them. See

Williams, 557 F.3d at 1257; United States v. Douglas, 576 F.3d 1216, 1220 (11th 

Cir. 2009) (“[I]f it is not possible to determine from the record whether the district 

court considered the § 3553(a) factors, we must vacate and remand the case to the 

district court.”). We emphasize, however, that although the district court must 

consider the § 3553(a) factors on remand, “its decision whether to reduce 

[Gonzalez-Mendiola’s] sentence, and to what extent, remains discretionary.” 

Williams, 557 F.3d at 1257 (quotation marks omitted). 

VACATED AND REMANDED.

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