97-167

 No. 97-167

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1998 MT 112

 ANITA K. BUELING, surviving spouse 

 and personal representative of the Estate 

 of DAVID S. BUELING,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

 DOUGLAS E. SWIFT, M.D. 

 and DAVID ANDERSON, M.D.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

 APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Cascade,

 The Honorable John R. Christensen, Judge presiding.

 COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 John C. Doubek; Small, Hatch, Doubek & Pyfer, Helena,

 Montana

 For Respondents:

 James E. Aiken; Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver,

Great Falls, Montana (for Dr. Swift); John Maynard, Marcia Davenport; Browning, 

Kaleczyc, Berry

 & Hoven, Helena, Montana (for Dr. Anderson)

 Submitted on Briefs: April 2, 1998

 Decided: May 5, 1998

 Filed:

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 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Appellant Anita Bueling (Bueling) appeals from the April 10, 1997

order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, denying Bueling's

motions to set aside the jury verdict and for a new trial. We reverse in part,

affirm in part, and remand for a new trial.

¶2 Bueling raises the following issues:

¶3 1. Did the District Court err in granting Respondents Dr. Douglas Swift

(Dr. Swift) and Dr. David Anderson (Dr. Anderson) four peremptory

challenges each?

¶4 2. Did the District Court err in granting Respondents' motion in limine

prohibiting Dr. Randall Schaffer (Dr. Schaffer) from testifying as a fact

witness for Bueling?

 Factual and Procedural Background

¶5 In the afternoon of September 11, 1993, Bueling's husband, David, who

was suffering from flu-like symptoms, visited the Doctor's Convenience Care

Clinic in Great Falls. The doctor on duty at the clinic, Dr. William Gertson

(Dr. Gertson), determined that David was quite ill and immediately ordered

that he be transported by ambulance to the Columbus Hospital Emergency

Room (ER). David's regular physician was not on call, and that doctor's

patients were being covered by Dr. Swift, an internist. Dr. Gertson contacted

Dr. Swift and informed him that David was very ill and being transferred to

the ER. 

¶6 David arrived at the ER at approximately 2:45 p.m., where he was

examined by Dr. Betty Kuffel (Dr. Kuffel). The parties dispute the time at

which Dr. Swift arrived at the ER. Bueling maintains that Dr. Swift did not

arrive until about 5:45 p.m., nearly three hours after David was admitted. Dr.

Swift testified that he arrived at about 3:30 p.m. The director of medical

records testified that Dr. Swift's notes indicated that he dictated David's

medical history and physical examination at 5:44 p.m. 

¶7 After examining David, Dr. Swift consulted with Dr. Anderson, a

pulmonologist, over the telephone. Dr. Anderson testified that he received the

phone call from Dr. Swift between 4:15 and 4:30 p.m. Dr. Swift told Dr.

Anderson that David was very ill with bilateral pulmonary infiltrates and

possibly pneumonia. Dr. Anderson agreed to see David and initiated his

transfer to the Intensive Care Unit. Dr. Anderson examined David at about

6:30 p.m. Dr. Anderson performed a bronchoscopy and inserted a Swan-Ganz

catheter into David's pulmonary artery to obtain cardiac output data. David

died of a heart attack before Dr. Anderson received the data. It was later

determined that David was suffering from hantaviral pulmonary syndrome, the

first reported case in Montana.

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¶8 Bueling filed a wrongful death and survival action against Drs. Swift

and Kuffel and Columbus Hospital. During the discovery phase, Bueling

amended her complaint to add Dr. Anderson as a defendant. Subsequently,

Bueling moved the District Court to limit the number of peremptory challenges

allowed the defendants collectively to four. Bueling argued that because the

defendants were not hostile to each other, they should not receive additional

peremptory challenges. At the pretrial conference, the District Court

determined that Drs. Swift and Anderson would each get four peremptory

challenges and that Dr. Kuffel and Columbus Hospital, who were represented

by the same counsel, would share four. 

¶9 At the pretrial conference, the District Court also granted Dr.

Anderson's motion in limine to prevent Bueling from calling Dr. Schaffer as

a witness. Dr. Schaffer is a family friend of the Buelings who examined

David's records at Columbus Hospital a week after his death. Bueling sought

to call Dr. Schaffer to testify as an expert witness on the standard of care and

as a fact witness regarding what he found in David's file. The District Court

found that Dr. Schaffer was not qualified as an expert and that the jury would

be likely to confuse his fact testimony with that of an expert. The District

Court ruled that Dr. Schaffer would not be allowed to testify.

¶10 Prior to trial, Bueling settled with Dr. Kuffel and Columbus Hospital. 

She did not ask the court to reconsider its decision on peremptory challenges

prior to trial. The case proceeded to trial, and Drs. Swift and Anderson each

exercised four peremptory challenges. A jury entered a verdict in their favor,

finding no negligence on the part of either doctor. Bueling filed motions to set

aside the jury verdict and for a new trial. The District Court denied her

motions. 

 Discussion 

¶11 1. Did the District Court err in granting Drs. Swift and Anderson four

peremptory challenges each?

¶12 In King v. Special Resource Management (1992), 256 Mont. 367, 374,

846 P.2d 1038, 1042, this Court specifically set forth a procedure for district

courts to follow in determining whether to grant additional peremptory

challenges: 

 Additional peremptory challenges are granted to multiple parties

 on one side only if they are hostile to one another. The trial

 court determines hostility prior to the beginning of voir dire and

 bases its decision only on the facts presented to it before its

 ruling. Whether or not the pretrial procedures were followed

 prior to the determination of hostility, if an appellate review

 determines that peremptory challenges were improperly granted,

 prejudice is presumed as a matter of law.

 The parties seeking additional peremptory challenges

 must request them prior to trial. In the rare instance when the

 District Court holds no pretrial conference, the question of

 peremptory challenges should be raised by appropriate written

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 motion filed prior to voir dire, setting forth all facts and

 references tending to support its claim of hostility. The trial

 court should rule on the peremptory challenge issue before voir

 dire begins. If a pretrial order is used, the District Court is

 required to include its decision on the number of peremptory

 challenges in the pretrial order. To afford a basis for review, the

 trial court should expressly set forth in the record the reasons for

 its ruling and the facts on which it relied in making its decision. 

 [Citations omitted.]

¶13 In this case, Bueling moved the District Court to limit the number of

peremptory challenges allowed the defendants collectively to four. At the

pretrial conference, the court granted four challenges to Dr. Swift, four to Dr.

Anderson, and four to Columbus Hospital and Dr. Kuffel. The following

discussion provides the District Court's rationale: 

 The Court: . . . [T]here is a question that was raised in

 the pretrial order regarding number of peremptory challenges. 

 My reading of the law is the doctors are adverse to each other,

 each of them will receive four peremptory challenges, Dr.

 Kuffel and Columbus Hospital, they will receive four

 peremptory between the two of them. They are represented by

 the same counsel, I don't believe their interests are adverse in

 this case.

 Mr. Walsh [counsel for Dr. Kuffel]: We agree.

 The Court: Mr. Dubek, I recognize the case you cited,

 but the answer to me that these doctors, reading the depositions

 and who they are going after, they are saying it's somebody

 else's problems rather than their own, they are --

 Mr. Dubek [counsel for Bueling]: For the record, I don't

 think anywhere in [any] of the depositions does one defendant

 point the finger at the other defendant, according to that case we

 cited, it's incumbent upon the defendants to seek out and

 demonstrate to the court they are hostile, and they haven't done

 that. Therefore, I think we are entitled to maintain that each

 side has four peremptory challenges.

 . . . . 

 Mr. Aiken [counsel for Dr. Swift]: I make the comment,

 Judge, certainly there is a clear delineation in care that occurred

 at 6:30. I don't know any of us of [sic] raised specifically

 somebody else's defense, I think the court is correct that at 6:30

 the transfer of care occurred.

 I think the court can do whatever it wants in the number

 of peremptories, and some sort, of either four to each of the

 physicians and four to the hospital, and Dr. Kuffel, or some

 compromise thereof, I think would be fair.

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 The Court: Okay. Mr. Walsh, do you have argument?

 

 Mr. Walsh: If you analyze the case in terms of breach of

 duty, the doctors pretty much agree. They all agree no one

 breached a duty. The case involves existence of duty. It looks

 that way. There are definite distinctions between physicians. 

 Dr. Kuffel -- I am taking the position, she never was the primary

 treating physician, and her duty was seriously limited. Dr. Swift

 may not agree with that. The issue of intent and when duties

 changed between Dr. Swift and Anderson, look at it that way;

 each need four separate. They are not necessarily attacking

 each other, but their interests are distinctly different. There is

 potential for one physician to escape liability at possibly the

 expense of another. That's all you need.

 

 . . . . 

 

 The Court: All right. I will stand by original ruling on

 that . . . .

Bueling argues that because the defendants failed to set forth sufficient facts

to show hostility and because the defendants did not move the court for

additional peremptories, the District Court erred in granting them.

¶14 We do not agree with Bueling that a defendant must move for

additional peremptories before the District Court is allowed to grant them. 

Bueling moved the court to consider the issue of additional peremptories, and

the District Court addressed it. However, in addressing the issue, the District

Court failed to make specific findings in the pretrial order or on the record to

explain its decision to grant additional peremptory challenges. The procedure

set forth in King is meant to afford this Court a basis of review, and the

District Court erred in disregarding it. As stated in Hunsaker v. Bozeman

Deaconess Foundation (1978), 179 Mont. 305, 317, 588 P.2d 493, 501, "if

there is not a sound basis in the record at the time of the ruling, and if the

reasons for the ruling are not set forth, we cannot say the parties have had the

benefit of the trial court's best judgment." However, King requires this Court

to review the District Court's grant of peremptory challenges regardless of

whether it followed the appropriate pre-trial procedures. King, 846 P.2d at

1042. Thus, we review the record at the time of the District Court's ruling to

determine whether the peremptory challenges were properly granted. 

¶15 Section 25-7-224, MCA, states that "each party is entitled to four

peremptory challenges . . . ." This Court has interpreted "each party" to mean

each side, unless the codefendants are hostile to one another. Leary v. Kelly

Pipe Co. (1976), 169 Mont. 511, 549 P.2d 813, overruled on other grounds by

King, 846 P.2d at 1042. As we noted in King, "district courts have no

discretion in granting additional peremptory challenges. Multiple parties on

one side are either hostile or they are not hostile." King, 846 P.2d at 1042-43. 

The district court must determine hostility on a case-by-case basis. King,

846 P.2d at 1044.

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¶16 We reviewed the district court's finding of hostility in Hunsaker, 588

P.2d at 493. Hunsaker was admitted to the hospital with heart problems and

suffered serious emotional strain resulting in nervousness, hallucinations, and

a seizure while in the hospital's care. Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 497. Ultimately,

Hunsaker was injured when he left his hospital security room, ran down the

hall, jumped through a solarium window, and fell twenty feet to the ground. 

Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 497. Hunsaker filed an action against Bozeman

Deaconess Foundation, operator of the hospital, alleging that the hospital was

negligent in caring for him. Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 497. He filed a separate

action against the treating physicians for their negligent diagnosis and care. 

Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 497. His wife also filed a negligence claim against the

hospital for loss of consortium. Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 497. Over Hunsaker's

objection, the district court consolidated the three actions and, at trial, granted

each defendant four peremptory challenges. Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 498. The

jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 497.

¶17 On appeal, Hunsaker argued that the district court erred in granting

additional peremptory challenges because the defendants had not made the

requisite showing of hostility. Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 498. This Court agreed,

finding that "[t]he defense theories of the hospital and defendant physicians

meshed like the finest gearshift mechanism." Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 500. We

noted that though each defendant was represented by separate counsel, each

essentially asserted no negligence on its part or on the part of the other

defendants. Further, we held: "Defendants did not try to pass the blame off to

each other. It is true each defendant had his own interest to protect in that

each could have suffered an adverse jury verdict--but there is no showing that

their interests were hostile to each other." Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 500-01.

¶18 At the pretrial conference, counsel for defendants argued that while

they "are not necessarily attacking each other, . . . their interests are distinctly

different. There is potential for one physician to escape liability at possibly

the expense of another. That's all you need." To the contrary, this Court held

in Hunsaker that a defendant's interest in protecting him or herself from an

adverse jury verdict does not necessarily indicate hostility toward

codefendants. 

¶19 Drs. Swift and Anderson argue that Bueling alleged separate acts of

negligence against each defendant occurring at separate times. Dr. Anderson

also asserts that Dr. Swift's theory--that David was in a stable condition when

care was transferred to Dr. Anderson--implicitly shifts responsibility to him. 

In Kudrna v. Comet Corp. (1977), 175 Mont. 29, 572 P.2d 183, this Court did

state that allegations of separate acts of negligence against each defendant

suggest hostility. Kudrna is distinguishable; in that case, not only did each

party present a separate defense, but also blamed the negligence of the other

for the accident. Kudrna, 572 P.2d at 187. In this case, both doctors assert

that they were not negligent in their diagnosis and care of David. Dr. Swift

did not plead any affirmative defenses or cross-claim against Dr. Anderson,

and Dr. Anderson's affirmative defenses, i.e., failure to state a claim and

contributory negligence, do not suggest any hostility toward Dr. Swift. 

Further, we do not agree that by maintaining that his care of David was not

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negligent, Dr. Swift was necessarily implying that Dr. Anderson's care was

negligent. Nothing in the record supports such an implication. 

¶20 Dr. Swift argues that he and Dr. Anderson retained separate counsel,

filed separate answers, conducted separate discovery, and were insured by

different insurers. In Hunsaker, each defendant retained separate counsel, and

the claims against each were brought in an entirely separate action; however,

we determined that the defendants' interests and theories of defense were not

hostile. Hunsaker, 588 P.2d at 500. Likewise, in this case, the record does not

contain sufficient evidence on which to base a finding of hostility. We hold

that the District Court erred in granting Drs. Swift and Anderson additional

peremptory challenges.

¶21 This Court has held that when one side is granted additional peremptory

challenges in error, a new trial must be granted. King, 846 P.2d at 1042. In

King, we noted that with a grant of additional peremptory challenges comes

a tactical advantage that is unmistakable, but nearly impossible to prove. 

King, 846 P.2d at 1042. The difficulty of proving that one was prejudiced by

the improper grant of additional peremptories caused this Court to overrule its

previous case law and hold that "if an appellate review determines that

peremptory challenges were improperly granted, prejudice is presumed as a

matter of law." King, 846 P.2d at 1042 (overruling Leary, 549 P.2d at 813). 

¶22 Accordingly, we hold that Bueling was prejudiced by the District

Court's grant of additional peremptory challenges. We reverse and remand for

a new trial.

¶23 2. Did the District Court err in granting Respondents' motion in limine

prohibiting Dr. Schaffer from testifying as a fact witness for Bueling? 

¶24 A district court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is

admissible; thus, we will not overturn a district court's evidentiary ruling

absent an abuse of discretion. Waller v. Hayden (1994), 268 Mont. 204, 885

P.2d 1305. In this case, the District Court found that the jury would likely

confuse Dr. Schaffer's testimony with that of a medical expert. Thus, it

precluded Dr. Schaffer from testifying regarding his review of David's medical

records. 

¶25 Dr. Schaffer resides in Ohio and has been a friend of the Bueling family

for about 20 years. When he was in town for David's funeral, the family asked

Dr. Schaffer if he would review David's records at Columbus Hospital. 

Bueling contends that Dr. Schaffer was prepared to testify that when he

reviewed David's records the week after his death, he found them void of a

history and physical examination. Bueling argues that Dr. Schaffer's testimony

would have supported her theory that David did not receive adequate or timely

care and that the history and physical examination found in David's records

were fabricated by Dr. Swift after the fact. 

¶26 Under Rule 403, M.R.Evid., relevant evidence may be excluded "if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . ." After reviewing Dr.

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Schaffer's deposition, the District Court found his proffered testimony to have

minimal probative value. When asked about whether he recalled seeing the

history and physical examination in David's medical records, Dr. Schaffer

testified: "I don't recall seeing that. Now, that doesn't mean it wasn't there. 

I'm just saying I don't recall seeing it." We agree with the District Court that,

assuming Dr. Schaffer's testimony was relevant, it was of minimal probative

value. 

¶27 Further, Bueling called other medical doctors to testify as experts at

trial regarding the standard of care. The District Court determined that if it

allowed Dr. Schaffer to testify as to his review of David's records, the jury

would likely confuse his testimony with that of an expert. We hold that the

District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the minimal probative

value of Dr. Schaffer's testimony was outweighed by the possibility of

confusing or misleading the jury and prejudicing Drs. Anderson and Swift. 

Thus, we affirm the District Court's granting of the motion in limine

prohibiting Dr. Schaffer from testifying. 

¶28 Based on the foregoing, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand

to the District Court for a new trial.

 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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