No. 3--01--0924

_________________________________________________________________

							IN THE

							APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

							THIRD DISTRICT

							A.D., 2002 

INIn  REre Precious W., PRECIOUS W.,  Precious W.,             				)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

	a Minor					)	of the 10th Judicial Circuit,

							)	Peoria County, Illinois

(The People of the State of		)

Illinois,						)

							)

	Petitioner-Appellee,		)	No. 99--JA--252

							)

	v.						)

							)	

Blanche B.,					)	Honorable

                                )	Jerelyn D. Maher,

	Respondent-Appellant).		)	Judge, Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:

_________________________________________________________________

	The trial court found the respondent, Blanche B., to be an

unfit parent because of her habitual drunkenness and drug

addiction (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 2000)), and because she

failed to make reasonable progress (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West

2000)).  The court terminated her parental rights regarding her

daughter, Precious W. (705 ILCS 405/2--29(2) (West 2000)).  On

appeal, the respondent argues that (1) the trial court erred in

finding her unfit due to habitual drunkenness and drug addiction

because it considered evidence exceeding one year prior to the

State filing its petition to terminate her parental rights; (2)

the State did not prove her habitual drunkenness and drug addiction by clear and convincing evidence; (3) the State did not

prove that she failed to make reasonable progress by clear and

convincing evidence; (4) the court abused its discretion at the

fitness hearing by admitting certain health care records under a

hearsay exception; and (5) it was not in her daughter's best

interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.  We affirm.

BACKGROUND

	The State filed a juvenile petition on December 15, 1999,

alleging that Precious was neglected because her environment was

injurious to her welfare.  The petition contended that the

respondent was abusing drugs and alcohol during the pregnancy and

after Precious' birth.  At a shelter care hearing that same day,

the court placed Precious in the temporary custody of the

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

	The court found Precious to be neglected on January 11,

2000.  The court's February 22, 2000, dispositional order stated

that the respondent was unfit.

	On December 5, 2000, the State petitioned to terminate the

respondent's parental rights.  In this petition, the State

alleged that she was unfit because she had failed to make

reasonable progress.  The State filed a supplemental petition on

March 19, 2001, contending that the respondent was also unfit

because of her habitual drunkenness and addiction to drugs for at

least one year immediately prior to the supplemental petition. 

In an order issued the same day, the court found that "the one

year period commences with today's filing and does not relate back to [the] filing of [the] original [petition for termination

of parental rights]."

	At the fitness hearing, the parties disagreed concerning the

time period for the habitual drunkenness and drug addiction

count.  The respondent argued that the evidence should be limited

to the one-year period from March 19, 2000, to March 19, 2001. 

The State contended that the time period included, but was not

limited to, that one-year period.  The court agreed with the

State.

	Later during the unfitness hearing, the respondent objected

to the admission of various health care records of the respondent

and an older child of hers.  The respondent argued that the

records were not admissible under the hearsay exception in

section 2--18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS

405/2--18(4)(a) (West 2000)).  The court overruled the

respondent's objections and admitted the records.  These records

show that the respondent was admitted to the hospital smelling

heavily of alcohol four days before giving birth to one of

Precious' siblings in 1994.  At the time of that child's birth,

the respondent was described as a severe alcoholic with a

consistent history of drug abuse.  That baby was born exposed to

cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol.

	On September 20, 1999, while pregnant with Precious, the

respondent's urine specimen tested positive for cocaine.  On

November 11, 1999, she reported that she drank alcohol daily,

ingested cocaine nightly, and smoked marijuana once every two to three months.  On November 19, 1999, the respondent had a blood-

alcohol level of .075.  She was diagnosed as alcohol dependent

and abusing cocaine and marijuana.  Precious was born on

December 10, 1999.

	During the fitness hearing, Pamela Coats testified that she

was the DCFS caseworker when Precious was born.  Coats referred

the respondent to a drug and alcohol treatment program and a

parenting program on March 6 or 7, 2000.  The record shows that

the respondent committed the offense of possession of cocaine on

March 9, 2000.

	The DCFS case was transferred to Dana Coventry, who urged

the respondent to begin her drug and alcohol treatment program

several times between April 6, 2000, and June 7, 2000.  During

one of her visits, Coventry asked the respondent to complete a

urine specimen drop, but the respondent refused, complaining that

she was ill.  Coventry testified that, other than this one time,

she did not schedule the urine specimen drops with the

respondent.  The drops were to be scheduled by the drug and

alcohol treatment program, which the respondent was not attending

at that time.

	The respondent went for a drug and alcohol assessment on

June 14, 2000.  At this assessment, the respondent admitted that

she had drunk 6 to 12six to twelve beers daily since she was 13 years old. 

She said that she last drank alcohol on May 25, 2000.

	The drug and alcohol treatment staff attempted to contact

the respondent several times during the remainder of the summer of 2000.  The respondent first attended treatment on

September 18, 2000, but her attendance was sporadic thereafter. 

Her urine specimens tested positive for cocaine on September 25,

2000, and October 25, 2000.  On November 14, 2000, the respondent

began serving a two-year prison sentence for the above-mentioned

cocaine possession conviction.  The judge in this case ruled that

the respondent was unfit both because she failed to make

reasonable progress and because of her habitual drunkenness and

drug addiction.

	At the best interest hearing on October 10, 2001, the court

considered the best interest report prepared by DCFS.  The report

states that Precious was doing well and appeared to be happy in

her foster home.  She had bonded with her foster parents and

their children.  The foster parents were willing to adopt

Precious.  She was attending preschool, which she seemed to

enjoy.  DCFS recommended that the respondent's parental rights be

terminated so that Precious could be adopted by her foster

parents.

	The parties stipulated that the respondent's release date

from prison would be December 21, 2001.  While in prison, she had

completed eight months of voluntary substance abuse treatment. 

The respondent's attorney urged the court to consider the

respondent's rehabilitative potential.

	The court ruled that it was in Precious' best interest to

terminate the respondent's parental rights.  The respondent

appealed.

ANALYSIS

I. FITNESS

A. Habitual Drunkenness and Drug Addiction

	The respondent argues that the court erred in finding her

unfit because of her habitual drunkenness and drug addiction. 

She contends that the court should not have considered evidence

beyond one year prior to the State filing its supplemental

petition to terminate her parental rights.  She also submits that

the State failed to prove this count of unfitness by clear and

convincing evidence.

	A parent is unfit if the parent exhibits habitual

drunkenness or addiction to drugs for at least one year

immediately prior to the commencement of the unfitness

proceeding.  750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 2000).  At the trial

court, the State must prove parental unfitness by clear and

convincing evidence.  A finding of unfitness will not be reversed

on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the

evidence.  In re J.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 817, 737 N.E.2d 1080 (2000).  Even if the State alleged more than one count of

unfitness, only one count need be proved to find a parent unfit. 

In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 736 N.E.2d 678 (2000).

1. One-year Period

	Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the same

time period question that is at issue in this case.  In re J.J., No. 90539 (June 20, 2002).  The court ruled that the State must

prove that the respondent was habitually drunk or addicted to drugs during the one year immediately prior to filing the

petition.  If that burden is met, the State also may submit

evidence of habitual drunkenness or drug addiction prior to that year.

	With exceptions not applicable here, an appellate court

reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion.  Jackson v. Graham, 323 Ill. App. 3d 766, 753 N.E.2d 525 (2001).

	In the present case, the State submitted evidence of the

respondent's habitual drunkenness and drug addiction for the

relevant one-year period.  The State also provided evidence from

before that period.  Under J.J., the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence from before the one-year

period.

	The respondent also argues that the trial judge's March 19,

2001, ruling limited the scope of the evidence to one year.  The

record does not support the respondent's argument.  The judge's

ruling merely clarified that the one-year period was to be

calculated from March 19, 2001, rather than from December 5,

2000.

2. Clear and Convincing Evidence

	The respondent contends that the only evidence of her

habitual drunkenness and drug addiction during the one-year

period was (1) drinking 6 to 12six to twelve beers on May 25, 2000, and (2)

urine specimens indicating cocaine use on September 25, 2000, and

October 25, 2000.  She submits that such evidence does not clearly and convincingly show habitual drunkenness and drug

addiction during that year.  She also argues that because the

State's supplemental petition alleged drunkenness "and" drug

addiction, rather than the statute's language of drunkenness "or"

drug addiction, the State initially was required to prove both

drunkenness for the year and drug addiction for the year.

	A finding of habitual drunkenness depends on proof that the

individual (1) had a fixed habit of drinking to excess, and (2)

used alcohol so frequently that the individual could not control

the need or craving for it.  J.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 817, 737 N.E.2d 1080.  "Addiction to drugs" under section 1(D)(k) means

the inability or unwillingness to refrain from the use of drugs

where frequent indulgence has caused an habitual craving,

manifested by an ongoing pattern of drug use.  As with habitual

drunkenness, evidence of indulgence without intermission is not

necessary to prove drug addiction.  It is sufficient to show that

a person has demonstrated an inability to control his or her

habitual craving.  In re D.M., 298 Ill. App. 3d 574, 699 N.E.2d 212 (1998).

	In this case, the one-year period was from March 19, 2000,

to March 19, 2001.  The State's evidence showed that the

respondent admitted drinking 6 to 12six to twelve beers daily from the age of

13 through May 25, 2000.  This evidence, therefore, covered a

period from March 19, 2000, through May 25, 2000.  It was not

necessary for the State to show that she was continuously abusing

alcohol during the entire year in question.  This evidence clearly and convincingly showed that the respondent drank

excessively on a daily basis and could not control her craving

and need for alcohol.

	The respondent's urine tested positive for cocaine on two

occasions during the one-year period after she entered the

treatment program, knowing that the program scheduled random

urine specimens.  This evidence clearly and convincingly showed

that the respondent could not control her habitual craving for

the drug.  Therefore, the State proved both that the respondent

was habitually drunk and that she was addicted to drugs during

the one-year period.

	Having met its initial burden, the State's evidence of the

respondent's drug and alcohol abuse before the one-year period

showed the habitual nature of her drunkenness and drug addiction

even more clearly and convincingly.  We rule that it was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence for the court to have

found the respondent unfit on this basis.  Having held that the

respondent was unfit on this count, we need not address whether

the respondent was unfit because of her lack of reasonable

progress.  See J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 736 N.E.2d 678.

B. Health Care Records 

and the Hearsay Exception

	The respondent submits that the court erred by admitting

health care records of the respondent and another of the

respondent's children under section 2--18(4)(a) of the Juvenile

Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2--18(4)(a) (West 2000)).  The respondent argues that (1) the health care records of the

respondent and the respondent's older child were not "records

relating to" Precious; (2) the records admitted at the fitness

hearing were not part of "an abuse, neglect, or dependency

proceeding"; and (3) because termination petitions are filed

under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)) rather than the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq. (West 2000)), the hearsay exception in section 2--18(4)(a) of the

Juvenile Court Act is inapplicable to termination proceedings

under the Adoption Act.  Section 2--18(4)(a) states: that

		"/AA[a]ny writing, record, photograph or x-ray of any

hospital or public or private agency *** made as a

memorandum or record of any condition, act,

transaction, occurrence or event relating to a minor in

an abuse, neglect or dependency proceeding, shall be

admissible in evidence as proof of that condition, act,

transaction, occurrence or event ***."  705 ILCS 405/2-

-18(4)(a) (West 2000).

1. Health Care Records of the Respondent 

and Precious' Older Sibling

	A trial court may admit the health care records of the

respondent of a termination petition under section 2--18(4)(a) at

a fitness hearing.  In re M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 569 N.E.2d 1282 (1991).

	Where the intent of a statute can be determined from its

plain language, that intent must prevail.  Unless otherwise defined in the statute, terms are to be ascribed their ordinary

and popularly understood meanings.  Lukwinski v. Stone Container Corp., 312 Ill. App. 3d 385, 726 N.E.2d 665 (2000).

	The State relies upon D.M., 298 Ill. App. 3d 574, 699 N.E.2d 212, for the proposition that the health care records of a

respondent's child, other than a child who is the subject of the

termination petition, are admissible under section 2--18(4)(a) at

a fitness hearing.  D.M. does not so hold.  The facts of D.M. state that the health care records of one of the respondent's

other children were admitted in evidence.  However, the

respondent in D.M. did not contest the admissibility of these records.  Therefore, we find D.M. to be inapposite to the present case.  Nonetheless, we find that under the plain language of

section 2--18(4)(a), the health care records of one of Precious'

older siblings concerning the condition that brought about

Precious' removal from the respondent (habitual drunkenness and

drug addiction) related to Precious.

2. Whether a Fitness Hearing is 

"an Aabuse, Nneglect, or Ddependency Pproceeding"

	As we recently noted in In re Yasmine P., 328 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 767 N.E.2d 867 (2002), section 2.1 of the Adoption Act specifically provides that the Adoption Act "shall be construed

in concert with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987."  750 ILCS 50/2.1

(West 2000).

	In this case, we hold that when the two acts are construed

together, a fitness hearing under the Adoption Act is a continuation of the abuse, neglect, or dependency proceedings of

the Juvenile Court Act.

3. Whether Section 2--18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act

is Applicable in a Proceeding under the Adoption Act

	In Yasmine P., 328 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 767 N.E.2d 867 (2002), we held that the hearsay exception in section 2--18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act is applicable in a fitness hearing brought

under the Adoption Act.  Therefore, we reject the respondent's

argument that section 2--18(4)(a) was inapplicable in this case.

	The health care records of the respondent and Precious'

older sibling were admissible under section 2--18(4)(a).  The

trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting these

records in evidence.

II. Best Interest

	The respondent contends that it was not in Precious' best

interest to terminate respondent’sher parental rights.

	First, the respondent relies upon this court's ruling in In re B.C., 247 Ill. App. 3d 803, 617 N.E.2d 1207 (1993), for the proposition that at the trial court, the State must prove by

clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of

the child to terminate the parent's rights.  She acknowledges

that more recently, this court ruled in In re V.O., 284 Ill. App. 3d 686, 673 N.E.2d 439 (1996), that consideration of a child's

best interest does not require clear and convincing evidence from

the State, but, rather, is within the sound discretion of the

trial judge.  In V.O., we specifically set aside our previous holding concerning the burden of proof in B.C.  We see no reason to disturb V.O.  Thus, we reject the respondent's assertion that the State must prove that termination is in the child's best

interest by clear and convincing evidence.

	Next, the respondent submits that the trial court's

termination of a parent's rights will not be reversed unless it

is against the manifest weight of the evidence.  She relies upon

the recent ruling in In re M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 762 N.E.2d 701 (2002), by the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth

District, for this standard of review.  We respectfully disagree

with the Fourth District's holding in M.F.  Again, we see no reason to disturb V.O.,, , in which we ruled that the termination of a parent's rights based on a child's best interest will not be

reversed absent an abuse of the trial court's discretion.  V.O., 284 Ill. App. 3d 686, 673 N.E.2d 439.

	In determining a child's best interest, the trial court

shall consider (1) the physical safety and welfare of the child;

(2) the child's sense of attachment; and (3) the child's need for

permanence, including stability and continuity of relationships

with parent figures.  705 ILCS 405/1--3(4.05)(a), (d), (g) (West

2000).

	Applying the standards of proof and review articulated in

V.O. to this case, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  The record showed that the respondent had not

demonstrated that she could control her habitual drunkenness and

drug addiction outside the structured environment of prison, which directly affected Precious' physical safety and welfare. 

The best interest report noted that Precious had developed

attachments to her foster parents, their children, and to her

preschool.  The record indicated that Precious' need for

permanence weighed against waiting to see if the respondent could

control her substance abuse problems once released from prison. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding it in Precious'

best interest to terminate the respondent's parental rights.

CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

Peoria County circuit court.

	Affirmed.

	HOMER and HOLDRIDGE, J.J., concur.