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i 

52–356 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–76] 

RAISING THINKING FROM THE TACTICAL 

TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: 

JPME I AND JPME II AT THE 

SERVICES’ AND JOINT COMMAND 

AND STAFF COLLEGES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 25, 2009 
(II) 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KRUSE, Professional Staff Member 

THOMAS HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member 

TREY HOWARD, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, June 25, 2009, Raising Thinking from the Tactical to the Operational Level: JPME I And JPME II at the Services’ and Joint Command 

and Staff Colleges ................................................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, June 25, 2009 ......................................................................................... 35 

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 2009 

RAISING THINKING FROM THE TACTICAL TO THE OPERATIONAL 

LEVEL: JPME I AND JPME II AT THE SERVICES’ AND JOINT COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman, Oversight 

and Investigations Subcommittee ....................................................................... 1 

Wittman, Hon. Rob, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ............................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Cardon, Brig. Gen. Edward C., USA, Deputy Commandant, Army Command 

and General Staff College .................................................................................... 8 

Damm, Col. Raymond C., Jr., USMC, Director, U.S. Marine Corps Command 

and Staff College .................................................................................................. 13 

Jackson, Brig. Gen. Jimmie C., USAF, Commandant, Air Command and 

Staff College ......................................................................................................... 10 

Kasun, Brig. Gen. Katherine P., USA, Commandant, Joint Forces Staff College ........................................................................................................................ 3 

Wisecup, Rear Adm. James P., USN, President, Naval War College ................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cardon, Brig. Gen. Edward C. ......................................................................... 109 

Damm, Col. Raymond C., Jr. ........................................................................... 140 

Jackson, Brig. Gen. Jimmie C. ........................................................................ 131 

Kasun, Brig. Gen. Katherine P. ...................................................................... 44 

Snyder, Hon. Vic ............................................................................................... 39 

Wisecup, Rear Adm. James P. ......................................................................... 79 

Wittman, Hon. Rob ........................................................................................... 41 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 159 
(1) 

RAISING THINKING FROM THE TACTICAL TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL: JPME I AND II AT THE SERVICES’ 

AND JOINT COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, June 25, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:08 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order. 

Good morning and welcome to the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations’ third formal hearing on in-residence officer Professional Military Education. In our previous session, we looked at 

the role of the senior schools, that is the war colleges, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in educating strategists. 

Today we have the commandants and directors of the intermediate schools representing the individual services’ command and 

staff colleges and the Joint Forces Staff College. These schools are 

focused on taking competent tacticians and raising their thinking 

to the next higher level, that of the ‘‘operational art.’’ 

In our next hearing, we will hear from the commandants and directors of the service academies and career schools, and at a subsequent hearing we will also invite those responsible for setting overarching Department of Defense joint and Service guidance on Professional Military Education. 

Mr. Wittman, any opening comments you would like to make, 

please? 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROB WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you so much to Chairman Snyder, and good morning to 

our witnesses. And we appreciate you being here today, especially 

Admiral Wisecup who is here making his second appearance. And 

you are logging some frequent flier miles with us. We appreciate 

that. 
2 

Today’s hearing focuses on the first level of Joint Professional Officer Education, which comes after an officer is well-grounded in 

his or her service, selected for field grade rank and is ready for 

broader responsibilities. 

More importantly, completion of the intermediate level of education, or Joint Professional Military Education I (JPME 1), is expected of all majors and lieutenant commanders. Therefore, unlike 

the war colleges, these schools are the only schools which educate 

all officers attaining the rank of O–4 and are thus an important 

touchstone of the Joint Professional Education System. 

While concentrating on operational matters of their respective 

services, the schools provide an important early joint education 

through more than the subjects taught. The use of other service 

faculty and attendance by other service, international, and interagency students in these seminar-based courses provide a broadening perspective. 

The witnesses will understand, then, our interest in questions of 

faculty quality and diversity of experience and the ability of the 

services to support each other with excellent faculty and students. 

Without a solid mix of other service and agency faculty and students, none of your institutions can provide a credible joint education. I would appreciate hearing both your success stories and 

your obstacles in attaining these goals as you testify today. 

Our preliminary research indicates that the Army and Navy programs are in transitional periods. In fact, it seems that the Army 

may believe it overreached in its stated goal of sending all majors 

to an in-residence intermediate education in Fort Leavenworth and 

may scale back these plans. 

It would be useful to have on record the reasons the Army determined to educate all majors in residence and the difficulties it has 

faced in reaching the goal. 

I am less concerned with service differences and school organization and placement in the service bureaucracy. What is important 

is getting the right people, both faculty and students, and funding 

to do the job. 

Mr. Chairman, since I would like to hear from our witnesses, I 

am mindful that our defense—or, excuse me, our National Defense 

Authorization bill is being debated on the floor. I will stop here and 

thank you for your time and leadership. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. 

Our witnesses today are Brigadier General Katherine Kasun, 

United States Army, Commandant of the Joint Forces Staff College; Rear Admiral James Wisecup, United States Navy, President 

of the Naval War College; Brigadier General Edward Cardon, Deputy Commandant, Army Command and General Staff College; Brigadier General Jimmie Jackson, United States Air Force, Commandant of the Air Command and Staff College; and Colonel Raymond Damm, U.S. Marine Corps, Director of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College. 

And before we begin, General Cardon, don’t you have a guest 

here with you today? 
3 

General CARDON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have my son, Specialist 

Chris Cardon. 

Dr. SNYDER. Stand up for us please, if we won’t embarrass you 

terribly. 

Thank you. We are pleased to have you here. Appreciate your 

service, too. 

Specialist CHRIS CARDON. Thank you. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

We will start with General Kasun. We are going to put the fiveminute clock on, but it is more just to be kind of a speed bump for 

you. If you decide to go rapidly over the speed bump, that is your 

business, too. 

But if you have that thing it is good to say beyond the five minutes, just feel free to go ahead, but just to give you an idea of 

where the time is. 

We will begin with you, General Kasun. 

General KASUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I probably will go over that speed bump today—— 

Dr. SNYDER. Yes, that is fine. 

General KASUN [continuing]. A couple of minutes—— 

Dr. SNYDER. Yes, that is fine. 

General KASUN [continuing]. Because I have two schools. 

Dr. SNYDER. Right. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. KATHERINE P. KASUN, USA, 

COMMANDANT, JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE 

General KASUN. All right, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to come before you to discuss Joint Professional Military 

Education at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). The Joint 

Forces Staff College is a unique institution championed by General 

Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz over 60 years ago. 

In 1946, General Eisenhower emphasized that our college was 

the only institution in the military educational system where the 

basic mission will be to give instruction on the theater and major 

joint task force level. 

Despite many changes in the world since then, this statement 

still holds true. Our enduring mission is to educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and 

interagency operations. We accomplish this important mission 

through four major schools and a host of short courses. 

Today I will discuss four points concerning our two primary 

schools which provide resident JPME: our intermediate level, 10- 

week Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) and our 11- 

month intermediate and senior level Joint Advanced Warfighting 

School (JAWS). 

For the first point, allow me to reemphasize JFSC’s uniqueness. 

We are a joint institution which focuses on joint planning at the 

operational level of war. Our military faculty is almost equally divided between the Army, Air Force and Navy with a representative 

number of Marines. 

Our student body is also divided proportionately among the services. 
4 

Since 1993, when the congressional review of the Skelton Panel’s 

recommendation was conducted at JFSC, the two schools have 

graduated approximately 3,500 Army officers, 4,400 Air Force officers and 3,400 Navy and Marine Corps officers, numbers which illustrate our true joint nature. 

All JFSC students study in a joint learning environment. JCWS 

students are also required to share housing with officers from other 

services during their 10 weeks on campus. Our curriculum assumes 

the officers arrive with a solid understanding of their service competencies from their service staff colleges. We build upon this service expertise to create planners who are strategically minded critical thinkers and skilled joint warfighters. 

The second point that I wish to make is how our curricula on 

academic methodologies excel in supporting the joint multinational 

interagency planning community. Both JCWS and JAWS immerse 

our students in academically rigorous programs using active and 

collaborative learning techniques. 

Students engage in active learning in over 90 percent of their 

classroom time and are required to demonstrate their skills by 

practical application, case studies, research, writing, and examinations. 

The Joint and Combined Warfighting School conducts four graduate-level JPME Phase two classes a year. They focus on joint 

planning at the operational level, ensuring that graduates are prepared for duty in a joint environment and can quickly become a 

productive leader of a joint planning group. 

We have agreements with 15 colleges which grant our JCWS 

graduates anywhere from 3 to 19 graduate-level credits. Joint Advanced Warfighting School, JAWS, continues to fulfill the vision of 

an advanced joint program as first recommended by Congressman 

Skelton and the HASC panel in 1989. 

JAWS students earned 36 graduate-level credits while completing a rigorous 11-month curriculum designed to create master 

joint planners. The curriculum uses military history and theory to 

lay the foundation for the study of national strategy and an indepth focus on Joint Operational Campaign Planning. 

The course of study culminates with the completion of a thesis, 

a three-hour oral comprehensive examination and the awarding of 

a Master of Science degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. 

Both curricula are designed to be relevant and current with continuous updates that include compelling planning issues and other 

special areas of emphasis such as theater campaign planning, irregular warfare, building partnership capacity, strategic communications and defense support to civil authorities. 

Our faculty and curriculum developers maintain constant communication with subject matter experts in the joint, multinational, 

and interagency commands and staff in order to evolve the curricula to meet the most pressing needs of the planning community. 

Our methodologies and techniques have been validated over the 

years. The Middle States Commission on Higher Education has 

awarded full accreditation to JFSC through National Defense University since 1997. Last year, under the chairman’s Process for Ac-
5 

creditation of Joint Education, JAWS met all the standards required for 6-year accreditation. 

Dr. SNYDER. Ignore those bells. I have never heard that before 

in my life. [Laughter.] 

I don’t know what that was. [Laughter.] 

General KASUN. I still get my minutes. [Laughter.] 

Dr. SNYDER. You still get your minutes. [Laughter.] 

General KASUN. During the same evaluation, JCWS was reaffirmed for the third time and met all accreditation standards 

with the exception of the required student-to-faculty ratio. 

Since then, National Defense University funded 10 additional civilian Title X billets to alleviate that situation, although gaps in 

the military billets continue to be a problem. 

I would like to close this second point by noting that we routinely 

hear suggestions that the JCWS course could be shorter. However, 

the increasing complexity of modern warfare is such that we effectively use the entire 10 weeks to execute a very rigorous academic 

program with very little white space left on the calendar. 

Given that joint warfare has grown more complex and the operational environment is more challenging than ever before, we fully 

support the Skelton Panel’s conclusion that we must resist pressures to shorten the length of this school any further. 

My third point involves educating the right student at the right 

time. Ideally, JCWS students should arrive to the college en route 

to or within 12 months of being assigned to a joint command. Unfortunately, only about 1⁄3 of the JCWS student meet this criteria. 

Moreover, if other officers do not come en route, joint commands 

are frequently unwilling to lose their officers for 10 weeks. Based 

on surveys of former students and their supervisors, those officers 

who attend our course are more productive earlier in their Joint assignment if they are able to attend JCWS en route to or earlier in 

their tour. 

For JAWS, having the right students means having one who can 

fill a joint planning billet immediately following graduation. However, we have noticed that the service struggled to ensure that over 

half of our graduates go to joint assignments immediately following 

their graduation. 

Annual selection decisions and assignments policies limit the 

number of graduates reaching JAWS-coded joint billets. To date, 

JAWS graduates have filled less than 20 percent of available coded 

billets, and some billets have never received one of our graduates. 

As the combatant commanders become more familiar with the 

skills of our graduates, we are convinced the demand for our graduates will grow exponentially. 

My fourth and final point concerns the future. 

Mr. Chairman, while we are successful in attracting international students, efforts to increase the number of interagency 

students remain a challenge. We need to increase the number of 

interagency students to expose more mid-level government professionals to an effective whole-of-government approach to solving 

complex problems. 

We must also increase the number of Reserve and National 

Guard students attending JCWS. The need to educate the reserve 

component in joint matters is essential since they are deploying as 
6 

individual augmentees and populating joint staffs with increasing 

frequency. 

Finally, we must continue to encourage services to provide the 

right education to the right person at the right time. 

Mr. Chairman, I am very proud of our college. The quality of our 

faculty and staff and students are unsurpassed. Jointness permeates everything we do. We play a vital role in preparing the 

military to fight today’s enemies as well as those yet unknown of 

tomorrow. 

Thank you for this opportunity to be here with you today. 

[The prepared statement of General Kasun can be found in the 

Appendix on page 44.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General. 

Admiral Wisecup? We will see if you get the same squeaking 

thing. [Laughter.] 

Normally, this system breaks. We have never actually had it 100 

percent work before. 

It was your lucky day, General. [Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JAMES P. WISECUP, USN, 

PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

Admiral WISECUP. Good morning. 

Chairman Snyder, Representative Wittman, distinguished ladies 

and gentlemen of the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee, I 

am Rear Admiral Phil Wisecup, President of the Naval War College, and I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you again. 

Let me begin by assuring you the Navy now has a distinct curriculum for the intermediate-level course as recommended by the 

Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress headed by Representative Ike Skelton. 

Today, our intermediate courses focus on building operationallevel expertise, a key emphasis of Admiral Gary Roughead, the 

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The college’s intermediate-level 

graduates are skilled in applying operational art through the Navy 

and joint planning processes and are critically thinking leaders 

with operational-level perspectives. 

They are familiar with a range of challenges of operating in the 

maritime domain and are competent in employing Naval capabilities in conjunction with other services, other agencies and partner 

nations to achieve strategic objectives in war and peace. 

Further, the Chief of Naval Operations determined that unrestricted line Navy officers in the grade of commander must have 

completed an intermediate-level professional military course with 

embedded JPME Phase I before assuming command. Likewise, 

most staff and restricted line officers must have also completed 

that level of PME before assuming command equivalent positions. 

This CNO decision requires nearly all Navy officers to complete 

intermediate level PME and ensures those with the greatest potential will complete it. 

The intermediate-level course, resident and non-resident, consists 

of three academic programs. The National Security Decision-Making Course instructs in theater strategic planning, the economic, 

political, organization and behavior factors affecting selection, command, and the use of military forces and the operational level crit-
7 

ical thinking skills essential to the work of complex national security organizations. 

The course’s capstone exercise requires each seminar to produce 

an executive-level strategic estimate of the future security environment, a theater strategic vision that advances U.S. national interests and a prioritized list of new or improved concepts capabilities 

necessary to advance the strategy. 

The strategy and war course, as opposed to the senior course, 

which is strategy and policy, is designed to develop a deeper understanding of the interaction of strategy and the operational use of 

military force. The course sharpens the students’ ability to assess 

how alternative operational courses of action best serve to achieve 

overall strategic objectives. 

After reviewing the classical theories, the 11-week course explores a different war weekly, each with a discrete political purpose, normally examined through the lens of a theater of operations. For this academic year, for example, the maritime domain 

dominates in 5 of the 10 cases. Irregular warfare was the focus of 

three cases and a substantive part of three others. 

The longest course of study is the 17-week Joint Maritime Operations Course. In it students study the operational level of war 

throughout the range of military operations with an emphasis on 

the maritime environment. 

Once firmly grounded in operational art, students use Navy and 

joint planning processes to develop alternatives for applying Naval, 

U.S. and partner nation capabilities toward strategic objectives. A 

major planning exercise requires each seminar to develop alternative courses of action supporting operational orders including the 

Joint Force Maritime Commanders. 

The course’s capstone war game involves a crisis development 

and deployment planning phase, a humanitarian assistance phase, 

and a transition phase, all using collaborative technology tools in 

a distributed environment. 

Together, these courses develop an operational knowledge base 

and perspective required to contribute on a major staff. The resident curriculum is the basis for the four non-resident programs. 

We are confident our educational approach, which uses an executive perspective in a seminar-centered environment, requiring an 

appreciation of alternative viewpoints and the synthesis of complex 

ideas using multidisciplinary tools remains on target. 

We expect application of principles to case studies of real events 

and issues and require our students to provide written analysis of 

complex open-ended issues. Grading clearly sustains the academic 

rigor. 

Through such endeavors, we believe we can well judge if our students are achieving the required educational outcomes. 

I have found the college to be a place where morale is high, faculty and staff members are satisfied they are doing meaningful 

work that makes a difference, students are highly motivated professionals, many coming right off the front lines, who take their duties seriously. 

They continue to challenge themselves and me every day. 

On behalf of the students, faculty and staff representing each of 

our armed services, many of our international partners, and nu-
8 

merous Department of Defense and other federal activities, we 

thank you for your continued support within Congress and your 

commitment to professional military education. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Wisecup can be found in the 

Appendix on page 79.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Cardon. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. EDWARD C. CARDON, USA, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT, ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE 

General CARDON. Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman and 

honorable members of the committee, I would like to extend to each 

of you a warm welcome from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Thank 

you for this opportunity to speak about professional military education at the Army’s Command and General Staff College. 

I came to the position of deputy commandant from 5 years of 

service in Third Infantry Division with 29 months in Iraq between 

2003 and 2008. This experience directly influences how I view my 

job today. 

First, for my personal experience and observation, our graduates 

are doing well in supporting the operations around the world, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. I recognize that their state of readiness is a combination of their experience, training and education, 

but it is clear that the college is contributing to the success of these 

majors. 

Second, there is more we can do to prepare this next generation 

of leaders. We often say we train for certainty but we educate for 

uncertainty. This concept is more important than ever given the 

unknowns of the future environment. 

We must broaden our focus, planning and executing operations 

in environments that include extended operations over time. We 

need a richer, joint interagency, intergovernmental, multinational 

experience. And we need to continue to focus on ill-structured problems. 

And we need to educate our officers on comprehensive soldier fitness to preserve the force. 

A considerable amount of the current success of military education is directly attributed to the implementation of recommendations on the report of the Panel of Military Education. We strive 

and will continue to strive to meet your intent for rigorous, quality 

education that prepares our officers to operate in an ever-changing 

environment. 

Strategic leaders develop over time. We are an important stop in 

this journey as our students, who are already confident in tactics, 

will understand operational art, and will be educationally prepared 

to start or build on a strategic study. 

Numerous thoughtful questions have been raised that we attempted to address in our written statements, but I just want to 

highlight a few points. 

Education: We believe leaders develop though education, training 

and experience. Training is great if it is the right training. Experi-
9 

ence is great if it is the right experience, and education provides 

the intellect to see the difference. 

Educating for uncertainty allows us to operate in these complex 

environments, to work on these ill-structured problems, and to operate in a more decentralized environment with increasing interaction to coalition and non-military partners. 

For our students, the Army adopted the concept of universal resident intermediate-level education for all active-duty and select reserve component majors, which continues to be an intriguing debate for our Army. 

This concept is under stress today due to the operational demands of the force. The Army needs all of its majors to be successful, and the increasing complexity of the environment makes education even more important. 

One of the greatest values to resident education—is the interaction between Army officers, district service officers, international 

officers and a growing number of interagency officers. 

For curriculum, we have an integrated curriculum based on educational outcomes using an adult education model that includes 

time to reflect while providing rigor in upholding graduate standards and evaluating student work. It is possible to fail. 

We incorporate history and history studies in the curricula of 

students in an appreciation for examining the past to prepare for 

the future. Our task is to provide the best education we can offer 

to every officer attending the college and we are very fortunate to 

have a select number of students attend a second year of study in 

operational art at the School of Advanced Military Study. 

The faculty has changed dramatically, going from a predominantly military faculty to a current faculty construct that consists 

of approximately 65 percent civilian with more than 95 percent of 

the civilians having active-duty experience. 

Our number of Ph.D.s is growing. Our military faculty, including 

the joint military faculty, is critical. They are the role models who 

coach and mentor, bring recent operational experience to the classroom, and provide context in our current military environment. 

The challenge is balancing the needs of the college with the personnel pressures on all our formations and organizations and we 

need our sister service officers to receive joint credit as the current 

system negatively influences officers from other services in their interest to serve as an instructor at Fort Leavenworth. 

For the future, I want to highlight three initiatives. Historically, 

interagency participation in education has been minimal, whether 

they were civilians from the Army or outside agencies. We have 

had minor faculty support from some agencies but almost no civilian students attending. 

The need to add interagency faculty, students and curriculum is 

paramount. Over the last two years, we have talked to dozens of 

agencies and done our best to market this program. The story is 

uniformly the same. 

These agencies understand and support the initiative, but lacked 

the education and training account of people to support the efforts. 

We have developed an intern program for Army officers to help 

mitigate the manning issues of participating agencies, but we need 

additional help to better attract interagency students. 
10 

We also have interagency faculty from the Department of State, 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a great start, but there is more to be done. 

This is an area we can also use your support. 

Our current policy sets standards for joint representation within 

the student body. We feel a similar system to support interagency 

participation at the intermediate level is appropriate. 

The second initiative I want to showcase is the Student Health 

Program, which has been added to the college. It saves lives. Three 

years ago, the leadership began to see signs and symptoms of 

stress in the student population, and upon further investigation, 

we discovered that the majors were in worse physical condition 

than our colonels. 

The program was developed and resourced. We have a complete 

wellness program for our majors. But the next step is to implement 

the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, including resiliency 

programs to help our students deal with the stress of today’s and 

tomorrow’s environment. 

And the final initiative I want to highlight is our emphasis on 

preparing our majors to use information. Every student must write 

for publication, must be interviewed by the media, complete a public speaking engagement and touch the blogosphere. 

Early results of having our students engaged with the public are 

inspiring. There are great stories to tell and important messages 

that they bear I think people should hear. This is having an immediate impact on our Army. 

In closing, we are unbelievably proud of the men and women who 

serve at Fort Leavenworth, both in the military and our dedicated 

civilians. We are extremely grateful for the committee for the support to Professional Military Education. We strive and will continue to strive to meet your intent for rigorous, quality education. 

Both teaching and learning is strong and will remain strong. 

We will continue to evolve and adjust to meet the needs of the 

future. We have a sacred trust to ensure our education prepares 

our officers, our leaders to lead our soldiers in formation. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Cardon can be found in the 

Appendix on page 109.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

General Jackson. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JIMMIE C. JACKSON, USAF, 

COMMANDANT, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 

General JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 

thank you for this opportunity to appear and testify about the Air 

Command and Staff College (ACSC). I would like to submit my 

written statement as a part of the official record and look forward 

to addressing any questions you may have after my opening remarks. 

Dr. SNYDER. All written statements are a part of the record. 

Thank you. 

General JACKSON. I understand the focus of your current efforts 

is on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the House Armed 

Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Military Education Report 
11 

from 1989, and what their influence has been shaping Professional 

Military Education. 

I can personally attest to the influence they have had on Air 

Command and Staff College. I was a faculty member at ACSC during the 1998–1999 timeframe, and in September 2007 returned as 

the ACSC commandant. 

What I found in 2007 is significantly different than when I left 

in 1999. ACSC is a programs that is academically rigorous, steeped 

into our operations and a college that educates airmen who are 

agile, critical thinkers prepared to meet any challenge. 

Unique to ACSC with respect to other PME institutions is its aircentric operational focus. But this service perspective is balanced 

by a comprehensive curriculum that stresses joint, interagency and 

multinational planning and operations. 

ACSC does not rest on its past laurels but continues to address 

key faculty, curriculum and resource challenges to sustain this 

level of success. I want to emphasize that we consider our faculty 

as our center of gravity. 

Faculty make or break our institution. 

I believe, and student feedback supports, that ACSC has a wellprepared, motivated faculty and staff. However, we must continue 

to focus on faculty and faculty development to sustain these qualifications and credentials. 

ACSC faculty considerations include the mix of Air Force, sister 

service and civilian instructors. When I was on the faculty, we had 

two civilian faculty members. Today we have 31. Congressman 

Skelton’s support in attaining Title X authority was key to this effort. 

The increased civilian faculty has been a significant factor in creating a more academically rigorous program. In addition, all Air 

Force Officer Professional Military Education schools are co-located 

within the Carl A. Spaatz Center for Officer Education at Maxwell 

Air Force Base. 

We are able to draw upon the synergies of the seven colleges and 

schools, their civilian and military faculty members, to interagency 

advisors, to mentors assigned to every person. 

It is important that the college establish the right mix with its 

military faculty. The right mix begins with Air Force sister service 

ratio. Sister services have been very supportive in providing outstanding faculty members, but an issue is joint credit for faculty 

duty at Air Command and Staff College. 

I believe there is justification for all military faculty members at 

the service intermediate level colleges to receive joint credit. Your 

subcommittee may be able to help us with this effort. 

We are working to address both the quantity and the mix of Air 

Force military faculty expertise. We must continue to emphasize 

that PME faculty duty is valued in an individual’s career in the Air 

Force. 

As I referenced in the written comments, ACSC recognizes the 

need to invest in the professional development of its entire faculty 

as teachers, scholars and practitioners. The key is maintaining the 

currency and relevancy of the curriculum and remaining on the 

leading edge of teaching methodology. 
12 

The ACSC resident class forms a diverse, uniquely-experienced 

population. The class contains a mix of operational and functional 

expertise from the non-host military department, air reserve components, international officers, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and representation from other agencies. 

The caliber of the students attending ACSC has remained high. 

The move in 1994 to integrate the international officers for the full 

academic year has had a significant positive impact on the ACSC 

program, especially as we increased our regional and cultural emphasis. 

The ACSC curriculum today is very focused on operational art. 

One challenge I face as the commandant are frequent requests for 

insertions into the curriculum. ACSC has established the context 

of a core curriculum that serves as the basis for curriculum 

changes, insertions and additions. 

The Air Force has also established an Air Force Learning Committee to screen these recommendations similar to the process used 

by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over insertions into 

joint PME. 

The joint approach serves as a good model for the curriculum 

change by the Air Force. 

Every element of the core is reviewed and updated to ensure that 

each is relevant to the needs of today’s warfighters and prepares 

those warfighters for the challenges they will face tomorrow. 

Examples of ACSC’s adaptability include institutionalizing 

jointness across the curriculum, embracing a robust regional and 

cultural studies program, embedding concepts and ideas about 

operational-level warfare throughout our core courses and reemphasizing irregular warfare and the nuclear enterprise. 

Another improvement I noted upon my return was a stronger 

emphasis on focused research. ACSC student papers are read by 

senior military leaders generating ideas affecting operations and 

military strategies. 

We have already had reports that academic year 2009 student 

research is being used to change the way DOD handles field distribution, how Congress may view weather control, and how intelligence operations may be executed. 

In summary, there has been broad sweeping change at ACSC 

since the initial implementation of joint education. ACSC has matured from the joint track approach in 1998 to full integration and 

the use of jointness as our primary language. 

Process changes mandated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and by 

the panel have now been institutionalized. Our students are receiving the education necessary to critically reflect upon today’s issues 

while preparing to address the unforeseen challenges of the future. 

Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for the opportunity to testify 

and the chance to talk about Air Command and Staff College. I 

have been honored to serve as the commandant for the past two 

years, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Jackson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 131.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Jackson. 

Colonel Damm. 
13 

STATEMENT OF COL. RAYMOND C. DAMM, JR., USMC, DIRECTOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 

Colonel DAMM. Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Wittman, 

distinguished subcommittee members, good morning. On behalf of 

General Gardner, Marine Corps University president, thank you 

for allowing me to tell you about the accomplishments of your Marine Corps Command and Staff College. 

Informed by the study of history and culture, the college’s 

present mission is to educate and train its joint, multinational and 

interagency professionals to overcome diverse 21st century security 

challenges. 

We teach warfighting and the context in which that warfighting 

occurs. We rely heavily on a combination of seminars, practical applications, case studies and student self-direction. 

As its director, my intention is to create an atmosphere of professional excellence by employing a world-class faculty and staff, 

working with energetic, motivated students in a supportive, challenging and forward-looking educational environment. 

Our graduates are regarded by operational commanders as outstanding planners, accomplished communicators, both orally and in 

writing, innovative thinkers and sound decision makers who have 

raised their thinking above the tactical level. 

They should be adept at solving the complex problems of an inherently ambiguous and dangerous world and to perform effectively 

at the operational level of war. In short, we seek to produce graduates who can think creatively, reason critically and act decisively. 

Our students are accomplished professionals, aggressive, bright, 

savvy and, in this year’s class, more than 80 percent combat veterans. Knowing they will soon return to the fight, they are eager 

to learn. 

Our task is to continue to challenge them professionally and intellectually. To do this requires a first-class faculty and a challenging and relevant curriculum. The college is blessed with both. 

Let me talk about our faculty for a few moments. 

The faculty is the college’s center of gravity. Our unique combination of military officers and civilian academics, paired as faculty teams, create the learning environment in the college. Congressman Skelton’s panel over 20 years ago found much about 

which to be concerned. 

Our faculty of only 24 had just a single Ph.D. We had limited 

operational and academic credentials among the military faculty. 

That has changed. 

Just this month, we said good-bye to 12 of our 19 military faculty. More than half departed because of promotion to colonel or to 

take command. All of our military faculty have advanced degrees. 

Our civilian faculty, including the one Ph.D. resident at the time 

of the Skelton Panel, are a mix of variety of specialties and backgrounds. 

Some are former military. Others have no military background. 

All 19 civilian faculty are Ph.D.s. 

Our core curriculum consists of four courses. Our newest addition 

to the curriculum is Culture and Interagency Operations. This 

course improves the understanding of culture in today’s security 
14 

environment and looks at interagency operations as ways to employ 

all the instruments of national power. 

Our electives program provides additional depth to the curriculum and responds to student interests. Among our electives are 

courses on armed groups, insurgency from an insurgent’s perspective, and religion and violence. 

The Defense Language Institute supports our survival-level language instruction and our negotiations practical exercise. Next 

year, we will offer five languages: Arabic, French, Chinese and two 

Afghan dialects, Dari and Pashtu. 

Students examine matters of professional significance through 

the college’s accredited Master of Military Studies program. Also 

noteworthy is the college’s exercise program, designed both to enhance the planning skills of our students as well as to increase 

their cultural and interagency awareness. 

Our vision for the college is to remain closely attuned to the 

needs of the operating forces, to retain and hire higher quality faculty without sacrificing that quality and to increase the sophistication of the technologies that support our curriculum. 

Our graduates face enormous challenges in the operating environment that awaits them once they leave us. 

The college is committed to doing all we can to assist them in 

their professional and intellectual development to become more 

skilled at their craft and mentally agile to adapt to un-anticipated 

situations. 

As Lieutenant General John Allen, Deputy Commanding General, Central Command (CENTCOM), told our graduating class 

earlier this month, ‘‘you may have 35-year-old bodies, but education 

is about having a 5,000-year-old brain.’’ 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the chance to speak with you 

today. I welcome the subcommittee’s questions. 

Semper Fidelis. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Damm can be found in the 

Appendix on page 140.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you all for your opening statements, and 

thank you for your service. This subcommittee greatly values what 

you do, and that is why we are spending as much time on this topic 

as we have. 

And as you all know, full committee Chairman Ike Skelton feels 

very strongly about the work that you do. We are not trying to replicate the work that the Skelton panel did 20 years ago. It is not 

that extensive of a—we don’t have that level of staffing, and the 

situation is different now. 

But it is very important that we provide the kind of oversight 

and constructive help that, you know, the country wants and that 

you all want. And so we appreciate your presence here today. 

I go back to the days of Easter egg hunts—I am going to use a 

metaphor here—you know, now you get that they do Easter egg 

hunts with plastic eggs, and so when June comes if you still find 

the plastic egg, the dollar bill inside is still good. 

I am old enough when you actually hid real eggs, and if you 

found that missing egg in June, you really didn’t want to be anywhere near it. Like if you are doing some gardening and hit it with 

a shovel. 
15 

Your opening statements, those were very good. It was a bit like 

the old-time Easter egg hunt. It is a little bit challenging to find 

those places where you are actually acknowledging you have got 

some problems and challenges. So I am going to run through these 

quickly, and tell me if—I want you to respond and amplify on them 

and then any other issue that you have. 

General Kasun, you specifically mentioned the timing—I think 

your phrase was while no education is a waste, the timing of it— 

it is page 25 of your statement—the issue of sending the officers 

to JCWS at the right time. You also, on page 28 of your statement, 

discuss this issue about the billets. 

Just because a graduate is—to date, JWS graduates have filled 

less than 20 percent of available coded billets, and some billets 

have never received one of our graduates. I want you to amplify on 

that. 

On the next page, you talk about you have got some aging facilities. And then on page 30 you talk about the importance of outreach, making sure your faculty stays current. Those are four of 

the points that I picked up where you thought you perhaps needed 

some work. I want you to amplify on those. 

And then, Admiral Wisecup, you have mentioned faculty, I think 

it was on page 22 of your statement, where you say the challenges 

in attracting the very best Navy officers and again because this 

issue of jointness and where that fits into a career. I would like you 

to amplify on that. 

General Cardon, you specifically brought the issue of the majors, 

how many majors are being educated and what that does to the 

long-term goals of your mission. And page 11 you talk about—let 

us see here—oh, yes, again the issue of jointness with regard to 

faculty in attracting faculty and this, on page 17 and 18, you talk 

about the—getting both students and faculty from the interagency, 

that that continues to be a challenge. 

I think there are some creative things that can be done there, or 

have been done there. 

General Jackson, you mentioned specifically, on page three, faculty. And I think the one thing I picked up from your statement, 

Colonel Damm, was, although it was not necessarily a problem, the 

fact the high turnover, which represents both the good and the bad. 

Those are the kind of the Easter eggs I picked up from your all 

statements and, I am sorry, General, we need to go ahead and start 

the clock. But if I could get each of you to maybe amplify on those 

a little bit, but also, this is your time. We need to hear where you 

all see problems. 

And I think sometimes while we want you to be upbeat about 

what you are doing, this is your chance to lay out where your needs 

are because we are trying to find out where things could be improved. 

So, General, we will start with you and amplify those. 

General KASUN. Sir, it keeps buzzing when it is my turn. [Laughter.] 

Dr. SNYDER. That means we are 15 minutes away from going 

into session. 

General KASUN. Okay, sir. I won’t—— 
16 

Dr. SNYDER. So you don’t have anything to worry about, here. 

Okay. [Laughter.] 

General KASUN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time and your 

comments and your questions. I will try to do this very succinctly. 

Bringing the students in at the right time—I have mentioned a 

couple of times that it is a difficulty. We only have about 1⁄3 of the 

students that show up for JCWF, our 10-week program, that are 

on their way to joint assignment. Fifty percent of them are on the 

backside of their Joint assignment. 

So when they come to our school, at that point, they are on their 

way to another service assignment or a regular command. 

My opinion, sir? Is that what you are asking for? 

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. Yes. 

General KASUN. What to fix? 

Dr. SNYDER. And how to fix it and whose responsibility it is to 

fix. 

General KASUN. Okay, sir. 

Well, there is legislation already there basically stating that students need to be educated prior to going to a Joint assignment. And 

I think just enforcing that legislation would make a difference. 

Dr. SNYDER. Some of us might say that that would, you know, 

be like going to medical school, that I think it is generally a good 

idea to have completed medical school before you practice medicine, 

but—that is just—we didn’t think we would really have to legislate 

that, but go ahead. [Laughter.] 

General KASUN. Sir, we do find that on our surveys, like I mentioned during my point, that the graduates that have actually gone 

to the school prior to or that within the 12 months have gained a 

lot more—— 

Dr. SNYDER. A lot more—— 

General KASUN. And it is truly an investment in our officers’ 

education. 

So the 20 percent of JAWS students—we have about 41 students 

that come through a year. Thirty-six of them are military. They are 

based on the 1⁄3, 1⁄3, 1⁄3, air, land and sea forces that come through. 

But that is an even balance of O–4s and O–5s. 

However, only 20 percent of them have actually been assigned to 

JAWS-coded billets. About 60 percent of them have actually gone 

to the different joint forces—I mean, the joint billets, but not necessarily in a JAWS billet. 

So they may not be planners. They are master planners, but they 

are not actually going into planning billets. And again, sir, I would 

suggest that communication, working with the services and trying 

to put that up front when they are assigned to JAWS, they have 

a following. 

Dr. SNYDER. Because you are creating a valuable asset. 

General KASUN. Yes. Yes, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. And that valuable asset, I suspect, wants to be used 

to their fullest capacity, and yet too often, in your opinion, they are 

not being used to that capacity. 

Thank you. 

General KASUN. That is correct, sir. 

And, one other point on that specifically, we are both an intermediate and a senior-level college—I mean, a senior-level course 
17 

there. So we have the O–4s to O–6s, predominately O–4s and O– 

5s, but there are O–6s, and because it can be either Intermediate 

Level Education (ILE) or Senior Level Education (SLE), which was 

an agreement made when JAWS started 5 years ago, and that was 

in order to provide the services with flexibility, currently it is a single-phase JPME. They get JPME I and II. 

But depending on the service decision, which one they get, 

whether they get ILE or SLE. So my point with that is that it is 

an advanced warfighting school equivalent to our services, and I 

believe that the O–4s and O–5s actually making them master campaign planners is much more useful. 

I see a point where there are O–6s coming through, but they are 

more on the high side of the position rather than the actual workers. 

Sir, you asked about the aging—I had mentioned about the aging 

buildings. We have buildings that have been there actually since 

the 1940s, but the majority of the ones that we have are about 47, 

almost 50 years old. And it costs over $1 million a year for maintenance and upkeep. We are refurbishing the exterior of the existing 

buildings to support more classes, and we had some issues with 

post-9/11 security. 

We are putting a gate in and, of course, funding. We are still 

working on getting funding for that. We have the human capital. 

We are sending students through, about 255 students, every 10 

weeks through our school, and we have them 4 times a year for our 

JCWS. 

We have just enough faculty—actually, we are just a few short— 

basically, we have just enough faculty, sir, to be able to teach those 

students over and over and over and there is about a week and a 

half in between, there is no white space for the faculty. 

So that our human faculty, we have some outstanding faculty. 

We have 2⁄3 military and 1⁄3 civilian, but there is no time to do any 

research. And we are working on getting another manpower increase but, again, it is going to have to be built in to make sure 

that that is authorized. 

Because currently, right now, for the ratio, the 3.5-to-1—I am not 

sure which student gets 1⁄2 a leg—but the ratio of 3.5-to-1 studentsto-faculty, we are about 4-to-1. So the faculty is working all the 

time. 

We actually have several of our faculty who have gone down 

range. Since 2003, we have had 18 faculty and staff that have deployed in support of a variety of outreach operational missions in 

the following areas: the Horn of Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, 

Saudi Arabia and we also have other faculty members working specifically on teams to help develop political and military policy in 

Bulgaria, the Ukraine and Georgia. 

We have frequent opportunities for billets out working for the 

COCOMs, and that is one of my missions or one of my visions that 

I plan to continue that. But again, that is taking faculty out of the 

class when they need to do the research. 

When they do come back, when the faculty comes back, whether 

they are the Title X’s or the military, they bring that new freshness 

to the students. Of course, our student population being joint with 
18 

all services, almost everyone has gone downrange either one, two 

and even three times. 

So to keep that freshness within the students—I mean, the faculty with the students is very, very important. 

The interagency attendance, I don’t know, sir, if you mentioned 

that, but I know I did. It is difficult at best. I know that the 10- 

week course, it makes it very difficult to sell to the interagency. My 

two brother schools at Indy U, National War College and Industrial 

College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), have a great following. They 

can actually attract more. But they are in the D.C. area. 

And we find ourselves down in Norfolk in a hub with a great 

deal of experience. We have tradeoff. We have all the different 

services at the operational level, but for the 10-week course, we 

have some difficulty attracting interagency because the interagency 

looks at it as a gap when it is 10-weeks. 

But they look at it when they come to the JAWS course or 11- 

month course, they get a Masters degree, and it is an investment. 

I find that both courses are an investment in their people. 

Thank you, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman, I have run out of time. My suggestion 

is we let them respond to this, and then I think that we have got 

a five-person panel. We will let you take as much time, if that is 

all right with you, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. That is fine. Yes. 

Dr. SNYDER. So Admiral Wisecup, if you would continue that discussion? 

Admiral WISECUP. Yes, sir. 

You asked about the issue about attracting the very best Navy 

officers to join the faculty since you are not credited with joint 

duty. 

This is an issue that I have seen now as I have only been here 

seven months, and this is one of those things that I am becoming 

aware of. You know, we did have one of our officers screened to be 

carrier air group commander, which I thought was a very good development, okay? 

But JDAL, the Joint Duty Assignment List issues is a policy 

issue I probably need to work on as I have not yet really made the 

case on the quality versus the joint assignment. So what happens 

is naval officers look at the broad range of duties they can go to, 

come into the Naval War College, a Navy guy, you don’t see the 

jointness. You don’t see the joint experience. 

I could probably make the case, and I need to do that, okay, that 

they’re actually getting a joint experience there. And we have, for 

example, 35 faculty members from other agencies and other services, of course, an Army officer coming to the Naval War College 

will very easily get joint credit on the JDAL, the Joint Duty Assignment List. 

But it is probably harder to make the case for a naval officer to 

get Joint Duty Assignment credit coming to the Naval War College. 

But that is something that I will work to try to make that case. 

Dr. SNYDER. I mean, because it is a real problem if you have 

some of your, you know, kind of the folks that you want to be faculty members if they don’t think coming to your place helps their 

career. 
19 

Admiral WISECUP. Sure. 

Dr. SNYDER. I mean, it sure is a problem. 

General. 

General CARDON. Sir, I will just carry on there first with the 

joint faculty. 

It used to be that sister service officers who came to the Command and General Staff College received joint credit. Now they 

don’t. They have to apply for it. And as the admiral said, the problem with that is it is a quality cut because you have to be jointqualified to advance. Officers know that. 

And because that is not seen as an automatic joint qualification, 

it is not seen as desirable of an assignment which brings a degree 

of negativeness. 

Sir, on the ILE issue, universal ILE for the majors, a number of 

reasons why this was formed. I will just highlight two. 

One is we used to have a 50-percent cut on the majors. So 50 

percent went to the resident course, 50 percent did the box of 

books. The challenge is that the 50 percent that did not go viewed 

themselves as disadvantaged. At the same time, we are trying to 

retain them to do important jobs for the Army. 

So the Army said if they are majors in the United States Army, 

they should all receive quality educations. 

What has complicated this has been the wars and the—— 

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry, has been the—— 

General CARDON [continuing]. The wars and the rotational Army. 

Because of the demands on the force now, not all of the majors are 

coming to ILE and we have a significant backlog already. 

So now the question is are we sending the right majors, because 

what is happening is as majors stay out and the captains then get 

promoted to major and stay out, and even if we actually have a 

couple of hundred majors that are in the primary zone for lieutenant colonel who have not been to any form of intermediate-level 

education. 

Now, half of those are probably our best officers serving as operation officers, executive officers, in both our battalions and brigades 

today. And so the Army is trying to address how to do this. 

But the complexity of the environment, I think, almost demands 

that we have to have—the officers need more education, not less. 

Because if you look to the future, it doesn’t look like anything is 

becoming more clear. It is more complex. You need to educate to 

do that. 

Sir, interagency, 10 years ago when I was a young field grade officer, I had no involvement with the interagency to speak of. Nowadays, our captains are dealing with the interagency with the 

guards and things like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams out on 

the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq and, even more importantly, 

heavy integration with the intelligence agencies to the levels that 

I have never seen before. 

But we do nothing to help them operate in this environment and, 

you know, General Caldwell has started a number of initiatives to 

try and bring interagency to the college. And we are moving in the 

right direction, but we need help in and, as I said in my statement, 

the agencies do not have a pool of officers from which they can 

choose. 
20 

So we have tried to give the interagency officers, but every major 

we give them in exchange for a major to come back, that is a reasonable level, but to grow to the 96 seminars we want, to have 96 

interagency officers at the Command and General Staff College, I 

think, we are going to need some additional help. 

Sir, for military officers, the challenge is with the—and I think 

you are referring here to the—to confirm that you are talking about 

military faculty—there is no floor on military faculty. And what I 

mean by that is as the numbers—as the demands of the war increased, the number of military officers in the college have continued to drop. 

And General Caldwell and I are trying to hold the line at about 

30 percent. But there is nothing written and I am not sure anything has to be written. But the challenge is how do you ensure 

you get the best military officer and have the right number of military officers? 

We think the military officers are critical for role modeling current experience and—well, it is role modeling and current experience being most important. 

So we don’t need help. But I would say it is a challenge if the 

demands for majors continue. Why is the demand for majors continuing to increase? An example is the Security Force Assistance 

Missions that the Army is taking on, which is very officer-heavy, 

has put another levy of demands on our captains and majors, 

which directly impacts, now, availability to go to school and availability for majors assignments worldwide. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

General Jackson. 

General JACKSON. Sir, thanks for the opportunity to talk about 

our faculty. 

Sir, I view the faculty as my weapons system. And, as a result, 

I spend a lot of time resourcing, rewarding them and making sure 

that they are recognized for the great things they do. 

Chairman Skelton then was very, very instrumental in Title X 

authority that allowed us to hire great civilians. In fact, I had two 

different phenomena. On my civilian side, I have great quality, not 

necessarily quantity, but it is a product of our success. 

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we have reorganized 

that area of our university to put all our officer PME under one 

center. That means from lieutenants all the way through colonels. 

But as a result some of my Ph.D.s are moving as a natural progression to the other seven colleges and schools. 

So it is a never ending piece, but the quality of the civilian faculty is actually exponentially better than when I was there 20 

years ago. 

For my military faculty, we have the quantity, but quality is 

what I am trying to instill in. We have some initiatives that we are 

undertaking from the Air Force and their university to instill the 

idea that being a faculty member at their university is valued in 

your Air Force career. 

Jointness would help us as an incentive. We are also trying to 

get the word out. We have been able to promote our folks from 

major to lieutenant colonel exceeding the Air Force rate for the last 
21 

4 years. And on Tuesday of this week, four of my active members 

were selected for O–6. 

So we have a good process, but in terms of getting volunteers and 

people with the right degrees, we still have a little bit of challenge 

that we are working at without—— 

Dr. SNYDER. Colonel. 

Colonel DAMM. Mr. Chairman, you asked a specific question on 

the turnover rate. Sir, I see that as a challenge and not a detractor. 

We are very excited about hiring faculty that have one, commanded, two, have Masters degrees, and then the third iteration 

is Top Level School (TLS). 

So, occasionally we don’t get the TLS, but we want upwardly-mobile, good faculty members and the backside of that is that we lose 

them. As I say, we had six up for O–6 this year and we had five 

selected. So immediately when they are selected, they leave. 

The analogy I will use is that as I start off as an F–4 pilot and 

I moved from that analog airplane to F–16s for an exchange tour 

with the Air Force, and as a guy who had somebody in the back 

seat helping me out, an F–4’s to a guy who was doing it all by myself in F–16’s for the first iteration of students, I was about a step 

and a half ahead of them. 

So it causes our instructors to work a little harder for the first 

month of school. We will get them here in about two weeks. But 

we like having good people. We like having people who are 

upwardly mobile and we think they fit perfectly with that. 

One of our challenges I think is our building was built in 1919. 

It was renovated in 1997. It is not digital-friendly and we are working through that right now, sir, and that is probably one of the bigger challenges we have that—to make that better as we go along 

with the students. 

Dr. SNYDER. When you say work through that, does that mean 

trying to find money? 

Colonel DAMM. Some, sir. We can try to do wireless, which is not 

that expensive. When we do one of our exercises, we run wireless 

throughout the system. But right now with Navy, Marine Corps 

Internet (NMCI) that can’t work all the time. 

Now, our students can go over to our Gray Research Center facility and they are much better at their digital connecting than we 

are and the college itself. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Wittman, as much time as you need. 

Mr. WITTMAN. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to ask some specific questions and then go into a 

suite of general questions for each of you. I will begin with General 

Kasun. 

The Joint Forces Staff College obviously is your purview, but I 

wanted to ask are you adequately being resourced for the Joint Advanced Warfare School and, if not, is there a plan for that to happen or how do you think that should happen? 

Secondly, when you talked about aging facilities, is there currently a military construction (MILCON) in place or is this on the 

unmet needs list? I am just wondering where that is in the process 

if we are identifying that as something that needs to be addressed. 

Where are we in that process? 
22 

And then what I will do is just put some general questions out 

there for the rest of the panel members. 

I wanted to get a sense from you about how you survey students 

and graduates to assess quality and how you use that to manage 

and adjust your programs. 

Secondly, as we talked about keeping faculty, and I think that 

goes to not only—actually, in two areas, recruiting and retaining. 

And I wanted to get your ideas about how you think we should recruit and retain top-tier civilian faculty. I want to focus a little bit 

on that. You talked about uniformed faculty there, but civilian faculty and what do you have in mind as the definition of top-tier and 

what are the things that go into that effort to attract those folks? 

And then, lastly, we have heard a lot about this in some of our 

previous hearings about how do we, at this level, identify promising 

officers with the potential for high-level strategic thinking at this 

particular point in their career? And how do we do that? 

And then, how do we take that information and use that to develop these officers to their full potential, and is there something 

after the intermediate schools where these officers can be tracked 

and monitored to make sure that we have the best and brightest 

making their way into these key, critical leadership positions. 

And I know that is a lot, but I wanted to try to go ahead and 

get at that and—— 

General KASUN. Sir, I was just trying to make sure I got all 

those notes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. Absolutely. [Laughter.] 

Thank you. 

General KASUN. You want me to start out and then pass it and 

then come back? 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. That will be great. 

General KASUN. I will answer one that way. It won’t bog down 

the deal here. 

Are we adequately being resourced? That is a good question, sir. 

I believe that, at this point, we have for our 41, 42 students that 

arrive, we have just enough. We have 10 faculty, and so we have 

three seminars. 

Currently, we are going to get another faculty member and we 

have intent to increase to four seminars, but that is not another 

12 people because right now we have 14 in each. We are dropping 

it down. So it’s really about seven or eight additional students. 

Again, my intent would be to increase the JAWS school to approximately 60, if that was going to be possible. We are looking for 

master campaign planners out in the field. The COCOM and the 

Joint Staff have asked for approximately 120 billets, JAWS-coded 

billets. We can’t do that, sir. 

At this rate, the way they are being assigned, certainly, like I 

mentioned in my speech, we are not even meeting some of those. 

They are not even being touched because they are being put into 

different jobs. We have one JAWS graduate who is a speech writer. 

A great writer. He does very well. 

So, we have them all over, but they are not in the right billet. 

So if we determine to do that, then I would suggest that we expand 

it. Like I said, again, it is on the equation of the other advanced 

warfighting schools. 
23 

So I believe that it would be a good point to see if we can do that. 

That would take more funding. Yes, sir. More resources, both faculty as well as support in the classrooms as well. 

Our aging facilities. Sir, we are working on a MILCON request. 

But right now because we have our air conditioning system in the 

buildings, they are very antiquated, we are looking at getting them 

refurbished. We had funding. It has now been bumped. We have 

to make a determination if we need to build new buildings by putting in a new air conditioning system because there is still the asbestos issue. 

So, that is something, yes, sir, that I believe that we could look 

at and probably could utilize your help on. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

Admiral. 

Admiral WISECUP. I am sorry, sir, if one of the questions was directed at me, I missed it entirely. I apologize. 

Mr. WITTMAN. No, no. That is all right. I just kind of gave that 

suite of questions and wanted to try to get everybody’s thoughts on 

that about how to attract top-tier civilian faculty, how do you survey your students about quality, and then also how do we use the 

process to identify those high-level strategic thinkers and make 

sure that that follows them through their career so that each 

branch is getting the best and putting them into positions where 

they can succeed and do the most for each branch. 

Admiral WISECUP. Sir. No, I am sorry. 

Mr. WITTMAN. That is all right. 

Admiral WISECUP. We recently had an opening in our strategy 

and policy department, and I will tell you we had 60 applicants for 

the position. In the end, this is civilian faculty, of which you know 

we have a good number. We have about I want to say 63 percent 

of our faculty is civilian. 

I think, in those terms, the only difficulty is the fact that we are 

a war college which is a little off-putting, but we are working on 

that. We are reaching out, we are coming more on line, we are 

shining a light on ourselves so that others understand. 

We also use our network. I mean, we have a very, very good network with Fletcher School, Yale, others, people who are faculty 

know and we use that network hard on the civilian side. 

With respect to the survey system, frankly, our students actually 

complain that they are over-surveyed. Each course at graduation, 

graduates, alumni at the two-year mark and five years post-graduation, and then what we call our academic policy council reviews 

those results. 

I feel confident that, you know, we are getting the kind of feedback that we need to keep the curriculum current and fresh. 

And then, I am sorry, I can’t remember the last point. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The last one is just how do we identify high-level 

strategic thinkers and then what do we do to nurture them to 

make sure that they get further advancement and get tracked and 

monitored to make sure we are getting the best out of them and 

putting them into positions where they can succeed? 

Admiral WISECUP. Yes, sir. 

Our, I mean, our graduates are all earmarked in the personnel 

system. For me, having thought about this for a while now since 
24 

I have been there and also having talked with Representative Skelton, that is one of the places I want to zero in because trying to 

identify these people early is really the challenge. 

And sometimes, you know, even before they come to the War College that is part of getting the right people also to the War College. 

But in the end, what I find is that our faculty who actually touches 

these students are in a very, very good position to be tapped and 

so what I am shooting for is George Marshall’s little black book so 

that we know who these people are, of course, there are ways to 

get that into the system formally. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Cardon. 

General CARDON. Sir, we also do extensive surveys on our students and the faculty also does an assessment and we assess post— 

once they leave. And we just finished another survey. The stack of 

data is about this thick and that goes back into our curriculum. 

We feel pretty good that we got an assessment means to fix it. 

Some of the data that comes back is rather interesting. For example, we have a rotational model that we are using now. The force 

generation was not seen as value-added then, but I think it is seen 

much more as value-added now. 

So, there is some assessment that has to be done there as well. 

Recruiting and retaining top faculty. We have tried to—we have 

three previous points. One is we have tried to implement a chair 

program. That needs money. And we are trying to do that with our 

foundation. 

The second way that we attract top faculty is to try and get the 

niche areas such as history, strategic studies or ethics, et cetera, 

that has a draw where it can influence, this year it will be up to 

1,500 majors. So there is a draw on that. 

We do have a challenge with top-tier faculty because of our location at Kansas City or Fort Leavenworth, which is a lot different 

than many of them living around the top universities. However, we 

are doing a lot more with the University of Kansas. 

All of our faculty have to teach, and that is the other thing that 

goes against top-tier faculty, because a lot of them want to write 

as well, and we are not set up that way right now. It is something 

that Dr. Ping and I will have to look at here in the future. 

And, sir, the last thing for identifying promising officers, I think 

there are three ways we are doing that. One is they self-select. We 

have the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) that celebrated its 25th anniversary, well-known, but that is a self-select 

program. But it is very demanding to get in. 

The second is there is an elective program that gives you what 

we call a six Zulu identifier which identifies you as a strategist. We 

are looking for two parts. We actually have a functional area in the 

army for strategists, but they don’t command. And then we have 

commanders that we want to be strategists. I think we need both. 

And so both programs work in those directions. 

Now, are we getting absolutely the best officers to be our strategists? The Army now has what they call a Leader Development 

Panel which, as captains, tries to identify those officers that have 

specific skill sets in certain areas that we want to further develop. 
25 

I don’t think that it is working as well as it could be because of 

the demands on the force, that we have a lot of opportunities out 

there, but we have a lot of requirements that have to be filled by 

the combatant commanders. 

That is all I have. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

General Jackson. 

General JACKSON. Sir, to maintain a great curriculum, we need 

to stay relevant and current. As such, we must listen to our external and internal customers. We do that with a myriad of survey 

initiatives like a few of my other colleagues have mentioned—as we 

look at it lesson by lesson, daily comments from the students and 

the faculty, we have focus groups, interviews and special surveys 

as needed. And of course, at the end of the course all of the students will compile a survey and highlight the good things that happened. 

At the end of the year, all of the students that are doing the 

graduation week complete a survey that will allow us to prepare 

for the next upcoming point. Our alumni and alumni supervisors 

will be contacted 12 months after graduation to ensure that we are 

instilling the right skills with our customers as they receive our 

services. 

And we have a variety of external sources, the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education, operational readiness, the president 

of the Southern Association of Schools and Colleges, our own POV 

and our command board of advisors who are the vice commanders 

of our major commands. 

We ask their inputs to see if we are actually producing the kinds 

of folks that they would like. 

With respect to recruiting and retaining students and faculty, I 

look at faculty development as a great investment. For every dollar 

I put into the program, I will get a return of about 10. And as such, 

we send our civilian faculty to various professional symposia. We 

recruit from those means. 

We try to attract and develop relationships with great schools 

like the University of Denver or Gonzaga so that we can identify 

some folks that may want to come to our school. Once they get 

identified to the school, we review their C.V.’s to see if they are the 

kind of folks that can bring the tools that we would like to have 

to instill and develop in front of our students. 

We have a very good program. We also have a sabbatical. Since 

we are all located at Maxwell Air Force Base, we have the Maxwell 

Research Institute, which will allow our Ph.D. folks to do the 

things that are important to maintain their academic credentials, 

and that is publish, research. 

We have an opportunity for them to take a 1-year sabbatical to 

work issues that are of interest to them or to the United States Air 

Force and the joint community at large. 

Sir, to identify high-level thinkers, last week we graduated the 

18th class of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. This 

is similar to the SAMS program. This is where we identify our best 

intermediate-level majors, lieutenant colonels, or international officers. We steep them in another year of academic rigor to filter that. 
26 

We will look at where the special experience identifier for them 

and continue on with a possibility of establishing a Ph.D. program 

at our school that will allow us to continue the opportunity but also 

be very sensitive to the command opportunities so that we can develop a true warrior-scholars. 

Colonel DAMM. Congressman, thank you for your questions. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

Colonel DAMM. With our students, all of our students are boardselected. I have sat on a couple of those boards myself throughout 

my career. And so we consider about 1⁄3 of the Marines can go to 

resident course. So, we select those and to attend the other schools 

as well. 

On the survey issue, we survey our students throughout the 

year. We survey them at the end of the year for the entire class, 

and then we survey them about six, eight months after they have 

been out. And that is kind of important for us because I talked 

about our cultural interagency operations course. They hated it last 

year—it was one of the newer courses—and then six months after 

they were out in the fleet said that was the best thing we could 

have gotten. 

So, we read all those surveys. We try to apply them to our curriculum review board and make changes where changes apply, but 

we don’t change everything because of that. 

We also survey the commanders. It is very important for us to 

know whether the commanders are getting the graduates that they 

want. And that is where we come up with the fact that they want 

them to be able to read, write, speak and make decisions. 

Our civilian faculty, when we went to the Title X hiring process, 

it made it a much better process for us because we can hire and 

pay world-class faculty. And we believe we have gotten that opportunity. 

We were looking for four for the next year. We had 31 applicants. 

Those applicants came from referrals. Those applications came 

from personal networking of our own faculty that we had and then 

also via an electronic system that the request goes out. 

How do we retain them? I think some of our faculty will come 

and tell us that I will be here for four or five years, and I would 

like to move on. Some of our faculty come because they get tired 

of academia. Some of our faculty come—they are former military— 

they come for the reputation of the school and where we are, 30 

miles south of D.C. And then some faculty come just because they 

love Marines and they love teaching. 

We have Dr. Bittner who is starting his 35th year with us this 

year. And how we keep them? We have another one, Dr. DiNardo, 

he is publishing his sixth book I think this fall. He has been here 

for a while. 

As you know, we bridge the tactical to the operational and then 

we bridge to the strategic and the school. 

How do we I.D. our tactical—or our strategic thinkers, excuse 

me. We have the same process and our School of Advanced 

Warfighting (SAW) program was modeled after SAMS at Fort 

Leavenworth. We actually board-select—it is voluntary—but we 

board-select them to go to the school and it is one of the nice things 
27 

is we have recently opened it up about three years ago to non-resident courses because not every Marine can get to a resident course. 

So, but they still have to interview and get themselves in. We 

also tag them with a Military Occupational Specialty, 0505, so you 

can find them amongst the 200—almost 200,000 Marines, now. You 

can figure out who they are. 

We also look at the published papers through the year for our 

thinkers and we look at those who are outstanding teachers we 

think become the strategic leaders of the future. 

As for the college itself, we have had a wonderful thing. As you 

know, General Gardner, today I will head back south and attend 

his retirement ceremony. But he has been there for 5 years, 54 

years of service in the Marine Corps. And the nice thing about having him there was he has given us a strategic vision for the school 

and that is where our fiscal vision, our strategic vision has come 

from. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Colonel. 

General Kasun. 

General KASUN. Thank you, sir. 

As for the surveying the students, we actually do queries as well. 

We do the surveys during the school time, but afterwards we send 

out surveys to both the students as well as the graduates as well 

as their supervisors to find out if they are—just like some others— 

are getting what they want. 

And we have been getting very, very good feedback as long as the 

students came to them already educated or if they have gone and 

let them go to come back. If they have actually invested—and I use 

that word because I believe it is investing in education and the people—if they have invested their time to let it go, let that person go 

for a bit, then they are very, very happy with the quality and what 

they are getting. 

However, many of our surveys that go out, they go out to the supervisors, and they are the service supervisors, and it is ‘‘thank you 

very much, but he is a commander, doing a great job.’’ Or as a 

planner, if they are on staff, they are not necessarily a planner, 

but, yes, he understands joint. She understands joint. 

But that is how that works. 

On the flipside with our JAWS graduates, everybody is extremely 

happy when they have a JAWS graduate on their staff no matter 

where they are at. Again, we prefer to put them in the planning 

position where they are supposed to be or a JAWS-coded billet, but 

they are very satisfied with the education that they are getting 

through the JAWS. 

And the students, the graduates, are very happy for the most 

part. 

The senior officers that are coming through, all of the O–6s that 

are coming through certainly because now there are not more waivers, most of them have been joint, in joint billets and joint staffs 

many times, so when they are coming by to get their education way 

back after the backside of their careers, it is okay. They say yes. 

Good training. Good education. 

Civilian faculty. How do we recruit and retain? We actually advertise in every possible venue to make sure that everybody across 
28 

the board has the opportunity, and then we go through a very rigorous matrix and a hiring process. 

So I feel that we do get the highest quality and we can attract 

them there in the Norfolk area. It is only three-and-a-half hours 

away from the big city. 

Their main concern, any faculty that we do hire on the civilian 

side is that there is very little white space for them to do any 

thinking outside the box, any stopping and working on research 

and publishing. However, we have had many published papers 

from some of our faculty, but they are doing it on their own time 

because truly there is no white space there. 

We are looking to fund and establish a writing program. We have 

found through the JCWS and the JAWS that the students need a 

writing refresher. And that is through the thesis as well as the papers that they are writing. People aren’t doing that well. 

So, that is what we need to look forward as well. We are looking 

to a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for a couple of additional people. Of course, that is going to build out the need for 

some space and time, or space and equipment. But we are looking 

to hopefully pull on two more people to get that set up. 

Identifying the high level of strategic thinkers. We have to defer 

to our service, our brothers and sisters in the services to actually 

choose the planners. They are the ones who actually send the students to our college. As a joint college, we don’t choose who comes. 

They choose who comes, how they are vetted, how they get there 

to the JAWS and there is not always the same boarding as they 

are sent to the war colleges. And I find that just a little bit disconcerting because I feel that we do need just as strong a vetting 

process. 

For the placement, again, the services choose where they are 

placed. So, it would be great if we can get that kind of fixed up 

and online, but it is not much different than the service schools. 

When they choose the—to go to these schools and specifically the 

SAMS and SAWS and the Advanced Warfighting Schools, they 

have a plan. 

But the services each, as I understand it, tag their service personnel differently. So, they will follow them, and if you are a planner, some of them will follow. But they don’t necessarily tag them, 

or tag them as joint planners. 

So, thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. 

How often do the five of you get together, and when was the last 

time you were all together? 

Sorry? 

Colonel DAMM. Mr. Chairman, we were at the Military Education 

Coordination Council (MECC), and then we had a pre-MECC meeting in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas about 3 months before that. 

Twice this year, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. Do you all formally try to get together on a regular 

basis? Is that helpful or not? It sounds like you have some similar 

issues. At least give you a chance to poach each other’s faculty, I 

would think. [Laughter.] 
29 

Is it something you find helpful, or do you meet on a formal basis 

to sit down with each other, or is it more kind of random? 

General KASUN. Sir, I would say that it would be very helpful to 

get together more often, but we have, with our schedules, sir, we 

haven’t been doing that. 

Dr. SNYDER. You have some similar concerns. 

Colonel, I am going to start with you and go the other way. 

How are you chosen for this job and where does it fit into your 

career? Will you retire out of this job, or how does your service 

view your service or how were you selected? 

Colonel DAMM. Sir, I am probably a little bit of a different case 

because, at this point, I just passed my 29th year. So, I will retire 

out of this job, next year. 

What happens in the schools is the school is actually a requisition that goes up to the commandant, he will pick some folks, and 

then the commandant will choose that person. 

But I think the lead-up to me coming to be the director of the 

school was I was at our Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTAF) 

staff training program just before I came there, which goes around, 

and it is another model after the Army’s Battle Command Training 

Program, which I also had the pleasure of spending two years on. 

They go out and they train staffs, we train staffs before they 

went out to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). So, I was there for two years as a deputy, and 

then my name went up and the commandant approved it for me 

to go down to the college. 

So, besides that, sir, I have taught Air Force guys how to fly F– 

16s. I spent two years teaching youngsters how to fly F/A–18s, 

which was a wonderful experience, down at Oceana. And, so, I had 

a lot of opportunity to teach people. 

I have to teach them how to think now, not how to fly, though. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Jackson. 

General JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I will retire from the Air Force 

in 19 days, but that is a good thing—I think our process works. Of 

course, our chief gets involved. We view, as you know, sir, military 

education is very, very high importantly. I think I was a little unusual. I am the 40th commandant of former commandant at Air 

Command and Staff College but the first that has been on the faculty. 

I bring a different perspective to the school and, as I mentioned 

in my remarks, it has changed exponentially better from the late 

1980s when I was there as a student and as a faculty. It is a very, 

very focused program. 

I think about it a little bit because I had seen things out there 

that we are doing. I have also considered that the faculty needs to 

be looked at very, very strongly. We have that look from our interuniversity commander and our former interuniversity commander 

was promoted to four-star, and he is now a commander of the Air 

Education and Training Command, so we did a lot of focus on ensuring that we have the right resources and the faculty to do our 

job for the United States Air Force and the joint community, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Cardon. 

General CARDON. Sir, I know the secretary and the chief had 

something to do with this. I am not exactly sure how I was se-
30 

lected. I was told 3 months before I arrived back from my 15-month 

tour there in Iraq. 

I am not retiring. I am trying to stay in the Army a while longer, 

and I think the Army did look pretty hard because the three previous deputy commandants have retired. And that is not the trend 

that has been in this position, which, if you look at the wall of previous deputy commandants, they have all gone on into much more 

senior positions in the Army. 

Admiral WISECUP. Sir, I can honestly say that, you know, I got 

the call from Admiral Roughead asking me to come and be president of the Naval War College. I came off Operational Fleet Command. I was out at the Carrier Strike Group 7 in charge of the 

Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group. 

So, operationally, very current, and that is necessary for background, credibility with the students and the war gaming piece of 

the Naval War College. 

But as you look down our corridor which, you know, now has portraits of presidents over 125 years, it is mixed. So, in the end, I 

come into this job, and I tell everyone I am on a day-to-day contract, and I am just going to work as hard as I can, and I don’t 

know what the future holds. 

But if you look over time, many of these presidents have gone on 

to other positions after. Stansfield Turner, for example, in the 

1970s went on to be Director of the CIA. Those kinds of things. 

But in terms of Navy, I can’t answer that question, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. General. 

General KASUN. Sir, I have a somewhat unique background. I 

was the Deputy Commanding General of the Intelligence Security 

Command at Fort Belvoir as an Individual Mobilization 

Augmentee. As a reserve officer, I was called up and said that my 

name is being put into the hat as the nominee for the Army Reserve to be the Commandant for the Joint Forces Staff College. 

That was sometime in June. 

In August, I was somewhere over Australia on Capstone, and I 

got an e-mail saying that you are now the Commandant of the 

Joint Forces Staff College. And so about one month later I took the 

staff and thrilled to be there. I believe that I am at the right place 

at the right time. 

For my future, sir, I am in a two-star billet. I am very honored 

to be there. It is up to the chairman as well as my Chief of the 

Army Reserve what happens to me now. [Laughter.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

You all may have touched on this when Mr. Wittman was asking 

about looking for strategists, but I hope I am not asking you something repetitive, but do you all look for potential Ph.D. candidates 

and, if so, what mechanisms do you have for considering, you 

know, calling to somebody’s attention or shepherding them into a 

program. 

Again, Colonel Damm, I will start with you. 

Colonel DAMM. Mr. Chairman, no, I would say that we probably 

do not do that. But they can be identified generally through our 

faculty. As my dean sits behind me, he was an Army officer, a 

graduate at West Point, that type of thing. And we can point them 

in the right direction to do that. 
31 

But I will say that the Marine Corps does not look at our program as a pre-Ph.D. program. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Jackson. 

General JACKSON. Sir, we have a couple of opportunities for our 

faculty and also our students. I currently have 10 folks that are in 

Ph.D. pipeline. We normally get between three and four of our faculty members to go to a school to get a Ph.D.—I currently have 11 

military faculty members that are products of that kind of organization. 

We have looked to build strategists and Ph.D.s in particular. 

Once they finish Air Command and Staff College they are vetted 

to a board, get selected for a slew of advanced air and space higher 

studies. 

We have looked at the possibility of increasing the rigor in that 

program to get them all but dissertationed, and then allow them 

to go back to the field to get operational command or things to fill 

up their portfolio professionally and then bring them back as a research fellow at senior development education, probably at Air War 

College, and allow them to write their dissertation so that we can 

allow them to think strategically, get an operational pause, command, and an operational opportunity and then come back and become the strategist of the future, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Cardon. 

General CARDON. Sir, we don’t do it that way. 

When we met in Fort Leavenworth, when we heard about what 

the Air Force was doing with their advanced program, we are looking at that for our SAMS program. But we have no—we do not use 

the school to identify strategists for Ph.D. programs at this time. 

Dr. SNYDER. And when I mentioned Ph.D., I don’t specifically 

mean in strategy in terms of Ph.D.-quality people. 

General CARDON. Sir, Ph.D.s for the Army are really in two—I 

would say two places. One is you do it as a junior officer, in other 

words as a captain where you have a lot of time, so by the time 

they come to the school, that time has already passed. Or they are 

going to go to a job that requires a Ph.D. 

For example, they are going to go teach at West Point and the 

decision is that they want you to go to a Ph.D. program. So, I think 

once you get past major, there is little opportunity for a field-grade 

officer to attend school for that amount of time without going in to 

a very specific billet. 

Dr. SNYDER. Right. 

Admiral WISECUP. Sir, what I have seen in my short time is that 

there is a very nice, informal network managed centrally in the Officer Personnel Information System (OPINS) staff, that is Admiral 

Doug Crowder’s folks who manage things like Federal Executive 

Fellowships, graduate programs and things like that, Arthur Morrow scholarships up to Fletcher, those types of things. 

But I think that we have the possibility to keep our eye open for 

good talent and, like one of the gentlemen said the faculty is very 

helpful in identifying those people. And I talk to a lot of students, 

too. 

You can tell when you talk to some of these folks that not only 

are they bringing operational experience and they are going to be 

the big thinkers, okay, but you read some of their papers and you 
32 

know immediately that these are the kind of guys we want to keep 

our eye on. 

For me, personally, it is, right now, it is an informal feedback 

network to talk to the people who are actually trying to keep their 

eyes out on their staff. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Kasun. 

General KASUN. Sir, for the Joint Forces Staff College, we just 

went through a large surge, and not all of them were Ph.D.s, so 

we are not going out exclusively for them. But, however, within the 

actual hiring contract, they have to roll within a Ph.D. program 

within the 3 years. 

There are eight universities, local universities, that have doctorate courses that they can actually enroll in, or, of course, there 

are others. 

So, yes, sir, we need it for the JAWS as well as for our accreditation. 

Dr. SNYDER. For the faculty. I got you. 

Colonel Damm, I had just one specific question for you. You all 

have been perhaps more aggressive about language, formal language training, and what kind of feedback do you get from your 

graduates as far as whether that language training has been helpful or not, in terms of trying to get specific language skills, and 

where they are going to end up and how it has worked out for 

them? 

Colonel DAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. 

We kind of have come to the realization on the language that we 

have looked at a couple of different things, sir. We have looked at 

a full year program. We have found that that is not really cost effective. What we should probably do for a language, if we truly 

want Marines to have that language skill, is to start it at TBS, at 

The Basic School, and then have them followed. 

They are already doing some tagging with foreign area officer 

stuff where they actually get tested on that language and use it 

and have some cultural program that they are part of. 

What we have figured out is that if we give them a year at school 

it doesn’t work very well. So, what we have gone to is the negotiation exercise where last year was the first year we did it this way. 

We used to do it all in one block. Last year, we just finished. Excuse me sir. 

We had the Defense Language Institute (DLI) come out in the 

fall, give them instruction for a couple weeks on specific languages. 

We only had four this year. Korean was part of it last year. And 

next year, as I told you, we are going to switch to the Afghan dialects. 

Then we give them Rosetta Stone and have them practice that 

throughout the year, and then in the spring we come to the negotiation exercise where we just want them to have survival-level 

language training where they do the niceties of the cultural, hello, 

you know, how are you, who is that, who is the big guy around 

here, that type of thing, and then turn it over to a negotiator. 

So, the feedback from this year, and as I talked about the cultural piece, I am going to—I would like to see what it is eight 

months from now. But the feedback was good, but that was about 

the right amount for them. 
33 

We also involve our international students a little bit in that as 

part of the negotiator or the negotee that they are talking to. So, 

it works now. I would like to see, and I think the commandant 

would like to see, much more of the language piece that follows a 

Marine through his entire career. 

But I don’t think we can do it in the 10 months that we have 

them. 

Dr. SNYDER. Right. 

Doesn’t have any of the—I don’t remember if you and I have ever 

talked about it, Colonel Damm, but I have always thought is that 

when we are not talking enlisted now that it ought to start the 

first day of Marine Corps boot camp. That you have a—you don’t 

get to relax very much at Marine Corps boot camp from enlisted, 

but like at either—like lunchtime that you would have a foreign 

language, perhaps, native speaker that would let the lunchtime be 

a relaxed thing if people spoke in that language and learned to 

talk. That it would just be a way of making it part of—wouldn’t 

take any much more time away from the rifle range or the obstacle 

course or anything. 

But we would just bring home, you know, this may actually help 

you sometime. Because it has got to start early. And then you 

would identify the people that you think are important or that 

value the language. 

I think we have probably kept you all here long enough. I am 

sure we will have some formal questions for the record and probably some informal phone calls and so on as time goes by. I hope 

you will feel free to share with us any thoughts you have, if you 

think of something after you leave here, and just send us something or call us up. 

We are going to continue to look at this over the next several 

months and we continue to value your input. 

General Jackson, seeing as how you have got, like, 181⁄2 days to 

go, this is your last chance to say anything you want to say to the 

Congress. [Laughter.] 

General JACKSON. I just appreciate the opportunity to serve and 

what the committee and Congress has done for our United States, 

sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. Well, we appreciate your service. 

Thank you all. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 25, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 25, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 25, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide your school’s mission statement. 

General KASUN. The mission of the Joint Forces Staff College is to educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency operations to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives. Its vision is to be the premier institution for educating national security professionals in planning and executing joint operations. 

The mission of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) is to produce 

graduates capable of creatively and effectively planning operational level 

warfighting for joint and combined military forces while integrating the effects of 

the United States Government, non-governmental organizations, and international 

organizations to ensure the success of Combatant and Joint Task Force Commanders operating within an uncertain operating environment. 

The mission of the Joint Advance Warfighting School (JAWS) is to produce graduates who can create campaign-quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners and be creative, conceptual, adaptive and innovative. 

Dr. SNYDER. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the 

quality of military faculty members? What is your average tour length for military 

faculty members? Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? What is the percentage 

of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified? 

General KASUN. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased the 

quality and credentials of military faculty members assigned to JFSC. Seventyseven percent (77%) of the JAWS and seventy-eight percent (78%) of the JCWS military faculty have combat/operational experience. The vast majority of these military 

faculty members have been deployed in support of current operations. Many have 

been deployed on multiple occasions. This battlefield experience increases their understanding of planning and executing operations in complex contingencies and enhances their ability to facilitate the dialogue with students in the learning environment during planning exercises. The percentage of U.S. military students with combat/operational experience over the past two years in the JAWS/JCWS classes is 

seventy-nine percent (79%) 

The typical military faculty is ordered to the College for a three year tour. Some 

faculty retire prior to completion of their tour; in accordance with DoD regulation, 

they must spend at least one year on board before retiring. Others extend beyond 

the three years to bring them up to their retirement date. 

The credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications have improved. The JAWS and JCWS military faculty members have a 

wealth of operational experience. Three of the four JAWS military faculty are currently enrolled in PhD programs and all four are fully-JQO qualified. A greater percentage of JCWS military faculty have graduate level degrees and there has been 

an increase in the number who are fully JQO qualified from 59% to 68% during this 

period. 

As shown by the data below, faculty is more qualified now than they were several 

years ago in terms of education and joint qualifications. Military faculty assigned 

to JFSC without JPME II completion are normally enrolled as students in a JCWS 

JPME II class immediately upon arrival. On occasion, at the discretion of their 

Service, JAWS and JCWS instructors may receive credit for completing Phase II 

after teaching the course twice and demonstrating mastery of the entire curricula. 

Therefore, by the time they depart most faculty are eligible to be designated a JQO. 
160 

Dr. SNYDER. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned billets for faculty? 

What are your gaps? 

General KASUN. While Services fill the billets, there are often gaps between the 

time a person detaches and the next one reports. Service representative are actively 

working to get faculty members ordered into the College. 

When officers report, they may be placed in either the Joint and Combined 

Warfighting School (JCWS) or the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) depending on their qualifications. We currently have eleven gapped billets, all at the 

O–5 (LTC/LtCol/CDR) level affecting these two schools. JCWS is authorized 64 billets which achieves the 4:1 student to faculty ratio for 256 students. JFSC does not 

have any assigned agency billets. However, through Memorandum of Agreements 

Academic Chair billets are currently available with the Department of State and the 

National Security Agency. The State Department Academic Chair detached on 7 

AUG 09; his relief is not yet identified but the Department of State is actively contacting potential personnel. The National Security Agency Academic Chair is filled. 

Dr. SNYDER. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage of Stability, 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations given that DOD has put 

them on a par with combat operations? 

General KASUN. The Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) curriculum 

includes Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations 

throughout contingency and crisis action planning lessons and exercises. SSTR is 

addressed as part of military support for whole-of-government approaches to national security issues. There is an increased emphasis on planning operations that 

set the conditions for SSTR implementation during the early phases of war. Students also study the considerations and concepts necessary for successful post conflict/disaster operations and practice planning SSTR phases in a number of scenarios that are described in the answer to question five. 

SSTR Operations are discussed throughout the Joint Advanced Warfighting 

School (JAWS) curriculum. In the TH6100 Theory and History of War block of instruction SSTR Operations are looked at in the historical context of the Post WWII 

era in comparison with the occupation of Iraq beginning in 2003. During the ST6300 

Strategic Foundations block of instruction SSTR Operations are discussed in the 

broader context of national strategy, defense strategy and State Department strategy. During the student visit to the State Department they are given a brief by the 

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization on the role of S/CRS. 

Throughout the OP6500 Operational Art/Campaign Planning block of instruction 

in JAWS, SSTR Operations are emphasized. Practical exercises which entail approximately 60 total classroom days commence with phase 0 and work through 

phases 1–5. Specially, SSTR Operations are discussed in the context of Campaign 

Design in OP6504. In OP6509, the students take an in-depth look at operational 

plans for OIF with emphasis on the SSTR Operations. During the deliberate planning portion of the curriculum (OP6517–6538), SSTR Operations are incorporated 

into phase 3, 4 and 5 planning as appropriate to the planning scenario. Finally, the 

students engage in two Crisis Action Planning exercises, OP6543 and OP6547, 

where SSTR Operations are again considered across the spectrum of the plan with 

particular emphasis on the transition and return to civilian control phases. OP 6543 

and OP6547 scenarios are based on potential real-world complex SSTR issues with 

only minor traditional warfare components. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation exercises and 

war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and irregular warfare concepts? 

General KASUN. Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) and Irregular Warfare (IW) concepts are woven throughout the Joint and Combined Warfare School (JCWS) and Joint Advanced Warfare School (JAWS) curricula. SSTR is 

addressed as part of military support for whole-of-government approaches to national security issues. IW is addressed during lessons about the nature of anticipated operations. 
161 

JAWS executes Joint Operational Planning for three distinct scenarios under the 

current curriculum. The first two scenarios incorporate detailed aspects of traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive threats represented by complex sets of 

state and non-state actors in weak or failing state scenarios. Careful emphasis is 

placed on the thorough assessment of and response to these complex ‘‘Hybrid’’ 

threats in a coherent balance. SSTR activities are fully addressed by balanced analyses and courses of action, with direct application of contemporary lesson learned 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. They also reflect consideration of the published Joint Operating Environment (JOE) and Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), both 

of which consider future environmental and threat trends. 

The final scenario is not established far in advance of the exercise, but typically 

derives from real-world emerging crises which involve less traditional and conventional military employment. The emphasis remains the same although this scenario 

is usually much more strongly balanced toward SSTR than the previous two scenarios. 

The Wargaming section of the Information Technology Division provides role-playing Computer-Assisted Exercises (CAX) for both JAWS and JCWS. The following 

scenarios are used: 

PURPLE ECLIPSE (JCWS) 

A five day role-playing exercise that presents the students with a daunting political-military crisis in northern Africa that includes significant multinational and 

interagency issues. Although the scenario involves regular force engagements, IW 

aspects are threaded throughout. The students not only construct a detailed Operation Plan for Phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authority) but set the conditions for SSTR during Phases I, II and III (Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate) to 

ensure success of SSTR during Phases IV and V. In this exercise, students are required to apply Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures during a time-sensitive scenario. This exercise highlights the collaborative planning as the Combatant Commander and Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters staffs are conducting parallel 

planning in support of the objective. This is the capstone exercise in the JCWS 

(JPME II) course. 

PURPLE LIGHTNING (JCWS) 

A faculty guided practical exercise involving a humanitarian crisis brought on by 

religious strife, terrorism, and an insurgency in a central African country. This scenario gives the students the opportunity to develop solutions using U.S. and coalition forces and coordinating with U.S. agencies, private humanitarian organizations 

and other nations to employ the SSTR and IW concepts. Specifically students are 

asked to apply an understanding of the relationships and activities of governmental 

agencies, and non-governmental agencies (NGOs); prepare a concept of operations 

for integrating the governmental, non-governmental, and private volunteer organizations into provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Nigeria; and plan 

to transfer control of the humanitarian assistance from coalition military to the 

NGOs. 

PURPLE GUARDIAN (JCWS and JAWS) 

A one day simulation-model assisted, student role-playing exercise. The exercise 

is designed to provide students with an opportunity to explore the unique intricacies 

and special demands of the homeland security/homeland defense mission. It involves 

a number of domestic homeland security threats in which the military provides support to federal, state, and local government agencies. Although not normally described as SSTR, these support activities and capabilities can be related to SSTR. 

Role playing as a member of the USNORTHCOM Standing Joint Force Headquarters, students experience the challenges of establishing relevant situational 

awareness while simultaneously being faced with tough decision-making scenarios 

in an unfamiliar environment. A certain level of ambiguity, fog, friction, and uncertainty is desired in this fast paced exercise. 

The scenarios consist of two terrorist attacks within CONUS requiring the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to assess potential tasking. Command and Control relationships and the actions required to pre-empt future attacks are stressed. The 

third vignette of the exercise consists of a LNG tanker approaching the U.S. that 

may have been taken over by a group of terrorist crew members. The seminar uses 

this inject to compare and contrast Homeland Security and Homeland Defense, the 

roles of the Navy and USCG, and the interagency relationships between DoD, DHS, 

and the other federal agencies. 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide the most recent survey results from your graduates 

and their supervisors. 
162 

General KASUN. The answer to this question is being provided for both the Joint 

Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) and the Joint and Combined Warfighting 

School (JCWS). 

JAWS Graduate and Supervisor Surveys (Class 07–08, graduated June 

2008) 

Process: Approximately nine months after graduation in June 2008, each of 41 

07–08 JAWS graduates and their supervisors were contacted individually via a 

Commandant-signed letter with a link to an electronic survey. 

Questions asked: In addition to demographic and general program questions, 

graduates and supervisors were asked questions that related to the 10 Graduate 

Competencies. This report will focus on the responses to the Competencies. 

Graduates were asked to assess their level of preparation for their current assignments as measured by the following 10 JAWS Graduate Competencies. Available responses were Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, and Strongly Agree: 

1. I am able to communicate cross-culturally in a joint environment, while fostering trust internally and externally. Others will find me versatile at tailoring communication to audiences. 

2. I am confident and at ease making decisions in the absence of complete information, responding quickly, effectively and proactively to emerging and ambiguous conditions and opportunities. 

3. I am able to effectively communicate and build teams through persuasive influence, collaboration, negotiation, and consensus building. Through active listening, I modify my communications in response to feedback. 

4. I am able to recognize patterns and changes, and am comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. 

5. Others find me versatile and creative and able to develop innovative solutions, thinking in time and context within the complex environment. 

6. I habitually think in terms of systems/linkages (effects) and function as an expert learner. 

7. I am able to conduct campaigning and statecraft and understand the role of 

war and politics. Maintaining an integrated understanding of globalization 

and its effects on defense, domestic and foreign policy, I use this understanding to inform strategic visioning. 

8. I am capable of integrating joint, interagency and multi-national capabilities 

within physical, virtual and human domains in time, space and purpose in 

terms of operational art. I demonstrate a broad understanding of battle-space 

systems and their interdependencies. 

9. I understand and employ Service core competencies, demonstrating this expertise through integrating and leveraging Service and joint doctrine. 

10. I maintain an understanding and awareness of Service-centric biases and tendencies (in myself and others) that may compromise mission success. Exercising this awareness, I work to eliminate biases and tendencies such as selfinterest-careerism and Service provincialism or parochialism. 

Supervisors were asked to respond to 10 questions related to the graduate’s preparedness in terms of the 10 JAWS Graduate Competencies. Available responses 

were Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, and Strongly Agree. 

1. This graduate is a cross-cultural communicator in a joint environment, able 

to foster trust internally and externally. The graduate is versatile at tailoring 

communication to audiences. 

2. This graduate is self-confident and at ease making decisions in the absence 

of complete information, responding quickly, effectively and proactively to 

emerging and ambiguous conditions and opportunities. 

3. This graduate effectively communicates and builds teams through persuasive 

influence, collaboration, negotiation and consensus building. As an active listener, the graduate modifies communications in response to feedback. 

4. This graduate is able to recognize patterns and changes, and is comfortable 

with uncertainty and ambiguity. 

5. This graduate is versatile and creative, and is able to develop innovative solutions, thinking in time and context within the complex environment. 

6. This graduate thinks in terms of systems/linkages (effects) and functions as 

an expert learner. 
163 

7. This graduate is able to conduct campaigning and statecraft and understands 

the role of war and politics. Maintaining an integrated understanding of 

globalization and its effects on defense, domestic and foreign policy, the graduate uses this understanding to inform strategic visioning. 

8. This graduate is capable of integrating joint, interagency, and multi-national 

capabilities within physical, virtual and human domains in time, space, and 

purpose in terms of operational art. The graduate demonstrates broad understanding of battle-space systems and their interdependencies. 

9. This graduate understands and employs Service core competencies, demonstrating this expertise through integrating and leveraging Service and joint 

doctrine. 

10. This graduate maintains an understanding and awareness of Service-centric 

biases and tendencies (in self and others) that may compromise mission success. Exercising this awareness, the graduate works to eliminate biases and 

tendencies such as self-interest-careerism and Service provincialism or parochialism. 

End process: Our review of the 07–08 graduate and supervisor survey data found 

many similarities with the two previous graduated classes. The surveys suggest 

strong post-graduate benefits, particularly in the data from graduates who are currently assigned to planning billets. The results were provided to the JAWS Director 

for use in ensuring the curriculum remained current and relevant. 

Survey results: For 41 JAWS students of Class 07–08, the response rate was 63% 

for the Graduate Survey and 68% for the Supervisors. 

The percentage of graduates indicating they agreed or strongly agreed that they 

had been prepared in the following competency areas is shown below: 

The percentage of supervisors indicating they agreed or strongly agreed that 

graduates demonstrated the competencies is show below: 
164 

JCWS Graduate and Supervisor Surveys (all four 2008 JCWS classes) 

Process: Approximately six months after graduation, graduates were contacted via 

email with a link to an electronic survey. The email also contained a link to the 

supervisor survey and asked the graduate to forward the email to their immediate 

supervisor. The most recently completed report was based on survey data was for 

all four classes from Academic Year 2008 (1 October 2007–30 September 2008). 

Questions asked: In addition to demographic and general program questions, 

graduates and supervisors were asked 14 questions related to Learning Objectives 

(LOs) 

Graduates were asked 14 questions related to the LOs in terms of applicability 

and usefulness. 

Supervisors were asked 14 questions related to the usefulness of the JCWS 

program in terms of the LOs. 

Questions asked to both Graduates and Supervisors: 

Apply appropriate strategic security policies and guidance used in developing joint 

operational plans across the range of military operations to support national objectives. 

Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic 

objectives. Focus on the proper employment of the military instrument of national 

power at the joint force level both as a supported instrument and as a supporting 

instrument of national power. 

Synthesize the capabilities and limitations of all Services (own Service, other 

Services—to include SOF) in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint 

operations 

Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in achieving the 

appropriate strategic objectives in coalition operations. 

Analyze the capabilities and limitations of the interagency processes in achieving 

the appropriate strategic objectives in joint operational plans. 

Comprehend the attributes of the future joint force and how this force will organize, plan, prepare and conduct operations. 

Value a thoroughly joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available 

to commanders through joint, combined, interagency efforts and teamwork. 

Analyze the principles, capabilities, and limitations of information operations 

across the range of military operations—to include pre- and post-conflict operations. 

Analyze the use of information operations to achieve desired effects across the 

spectrum of national security threats. 
165 

Synthesize examples of campaign/theater planning and operations. Focus on the 

use of planning concepts, techniques and procedures as well as the integration of 

battlespace support systems. 

Analyze complex contingency operations for use of appropriate planning principles. 

Apply current technology, modeling, simulation and wargaming to accomplish the 

synchronization, employment, support and transportation planning of the joint force. 

Analyze the appropriate mix of battlespace support systems and functions to develop joint operational plans. 

Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desire outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena. 

End Process: Survey data for all four classes was aggregated, analyzed and reported to the Director of the JCWS for use in ensuring the curriculum remained current and relevant. 

Survey results: There were 1,008 graduates from the four JCWS classes in 2008; 

339 completed the survey for a 34% response rate. Forty-seven supervisors completed their survey, an increase from last year’s thirty-three respondents. 

The percentage of graduates indicating that they agreed or strongly agreed 

that the learning objective was relevant to their current job is shown below: 

The percentage of graduates indicating that they agreed or strongly agreed 

that the learning objective was useful in their current job is shown below: 
166 

The percentage of supervisors indicating that they agreed or strongly agreed 

that the learning objective information was useful for the graduate in his or her 

current job is shown below: 
167 

Graduates were also asked to list any areas they believed were important for their 

joint job, but not taught at JFSC. The two areas most repeatedly listed were (1) the 

POM/Budgeting Process and (2) Interagency Focus/Communication. 

When graduates were asked if attending JFSC was a valuable and worthwhile experience, 94 percent responded positively (agreed or strongly agreed). This compares 

favorably with last year’s 90 percent positive rating to the same question. 

Dr. SNYDER. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit for their nonhost service military faculty in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. We 

know that the tours of those who were grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it 

that these JDAL positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience? 

General KASUN. Neither JAWS nor JCWS are impacted by this restriction. However, faculty billets in the Joint Command, Control, and Information Operations 

School (JC2IOS) were removed from the JDAL even though, as with JCWS and 

JAWS, the subject matter, faculty, and student body are innately joint. Though not 

a Joint Professional Military Education qualifying school, the JC2IOS faculty provide specialized instruction to JCWS and JAWS. 

JC2IOS courses are chartered by the Joint Staff, built from joint doctrine and policy, and prepare students for assignments to Joint Task Force and Unified Combatant Command staffs. As a result of the billets being removed from the JDAL, it is 

more difficult to get quality faculty assigned to the school and retain them for a controlled (three-year) tour. These instructors, as those assigned to JCWS and JAWS, 

truly get a joint experience. These billets should be restored to the JDAL. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe your school’s use of historical case studies to teach strategy. 

General KASUN. The Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) uses several 

historical case studies to examine strategy and the enduring principles of military 

operations. Historical case studies are used to reinforce strategic concepts and principles, bringing students from the knowledge level to the analysis level of education. 

JCWS cases studies include: 

Yorktown, 1781 

Gettysburg, 1863 (Optional) 

Operation Torch, North Africa 1942 

Operation Overlord, 1944 

Operation Iceberg, Invasion of Okinawa, 1945 

Beirut, 1983 

Liberia, 2003 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003–Present 

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) has a 137 contact hour block focused on history. It is a broad, conceptual survey of classical through contemporary 

theories of the nature of conflict and the application of armed force in the land, sea 

and air domains. This block focuses on developing critical thinking skills with a distinct focus on analyzing the art, science and nature of war and its evolving character and conduct—past, present, and future. A series of historical case studies provides the opportunity to analyze and evaluate techniques for leading strategic 

change and building consensus among key constituencies, including Service, multinational, and interagency partners within the changing nature of conflict and national security. This course requires students to synthesize techniques and skills 

necessary for leading and sustaining effective organizations in a complex joint, 

interagency, and multinational environment. The curriculum includes a study of 

timeless patterns of force application, investigation of engines of transformation, 

analysis of the relationship between national security strategies and warfighting 

concepts, and the importance of personality and leadership at strategic-operational 

levels. A module exploring three tectonic cultural clashes is included in the curriculum and specifically addresses Islam, Russia, and China as well as contemporary lessons from the War on Terror. A highlight of the first portion of this curriculum is a week-long staff ride/field research visit to the Gettysburg battlefield to 

explore the confluence of the human dimension of warfare with other intangibles at 

the strategic and operational levels of war. 

Specific cases studies in the JAWS curriculum include: 

Yorktown, 1781 

Gettysburg, 1863 

Post WWII to include Korean War 

Mao’s Insurgency Campaign, 1933–1949 

Beirut, 1983 

Panama, 1989 
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Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1990–1991 

Somalia, 1993–1994 

Bosnia, 1994–1996 

Kosovo, 1999 

Afghanistan, 2001–Present 

Iraq, 2003–Present 

Additional current case studies which focus on the history of the conflict as a part 

of mission analysis include Nigeria, Darfur, Congo, and Zimbabwe. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the faculty? How 

transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think the faculty members 

have all the power, in a non-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited 

power. How do you avoid these extremes? 

General KASUN. The NDU–P has the sole authority to approve renewal or nonrenewal of Title 10 employees (faculty). In accordance with NDU Policy 690–4 paragraph 8b: 

Subsequent consecutive terms of employment, that is renewals, will normally be 

for periods not to exceed three years, although the NDU–P may authorize 

longer renewals in exceptional circumstances. No faculty member is entitled to 

renewal. Non-renewal at the expiration of an employment term is not an involuntary termination of employment. . . . The Commandant/Component Director 

may make a recommendation to renew an employee based upon demonstrated 

exceptional professional experience and competence. When hired or renewed, 

the employee understands that his/her experience, expertise and skills are the 

basis for his/her employment and that the extent to which he/she sustains his/ 

her currency in the field (i.e. continues to maintain and improve their expertise) 

and their performance of their duties will be considered in any decision to 

renew. . . . If the determination [for non-renewal] is made, based on the reasons 

provided below, the Commandant submits a recommendation to the NDU–P to 

either terminate the Title 10 appointment or request the appointment not be 

renewed. The employee would be notified, in writing, as early as possible. 

NDU 690–4, paragraph 12b(2) addresses other reasons for non-renewal: 

The Commandant/Director has the authority to recommend termination of the 

employment of Title 10 employees prior to the expiration of their employment 

terms for the following reasons: 

(a) Change in mission, resources, workload or organizational changes, or other 

similar and compelling reasons may require a change in the number of Title 10 

civilian positions. Commandants/Directors, with the concurrence of COO/VPA, 

will decide which positions shall be abolished. If practicable and possible, at 

least six months notice of termination will be given to the individual(s) affected, 

but in no event will the notice be less than 60 days. 

(b) Loss of Security Clearance. Any faculty member who for any reason fails to 

obtain and maintain a security clearance (if required) for his/her position will 

be terminated from that position. 

(c) Termination for Cause: A Title X employee may be terminated for misconduct or unsatisfactory performance. Proposed termination actions will be initiated by the Commandant/Director/Vice President by providing a ‘‘Notice of 

Proposed Termination’’ to the employee in writing setting forth the grounds for 

the proposed termination. The employee will be given a reasonable opportunity 

to respond to the proposed termination. After consideration of the employee’s response, the Commandant/Director/Vice President will make a recommendation 

through proper channels to the NDU–P. Commandants and Directors should 

seek both UGC and Director, HRD guidance and assistance. NDU–P is the final 

decision maker in all termination cases. This includes those that may require 

terminating a Director or a Vice President. 

The Joint and Combined Warfighting School and Joint Advanced Warfighting 

School faculty are generally retained on three-year contracts, which are renewed if 

they have demonstrated satisfactory performance. During this time, the faculty 

member must prepare a portfolio of their accomplishments in the areas of teaching, 

research, and outreach with specific outcomes. While Title X employees are not 

tenured, there does appear to be a long-term commitment between JFSC and these 

faculty members. Only two faculty members since 1997 have not had their contract 

renewed, which prevents the appearance of the school having unlimited power. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is your school’s role in identifying promising officers with the 

potential for high-level strategic thinking at the appropriate point in their careers? 
169 

General KASUN. Joint Forces Staff College provides an equal educational opportunity to all students sent to the school by the Services. We do not specifically identify promising officers; however certain officer’s academic achievements are recognized via our awards program. This information is provided back to the services for 

their further consideration and evaluation of the officer’s potential. 

Dr. SNYDER. How do you specifically measure the quality of the faculty and staff 

in the PME environment? 

General KASUN. Each military and civilian faculty member is evaluated at least 

annually by his/her Director. The Director takes into account the person’s contribution to the college, student evaluations, outreach, and research activities. The contributions of military personnel are documented using their Service process with the 

Commandant being the Senior Rater. The contributions of civilian faculty are documented using the Title X evaluation system. 

Staff members are evaluated at least annually by their supervisor, who takes into 

account the effectiveness of their contributions to the College as defined in their position description. As with faculty members, the contributions of military personnel 

are documented using their Service process. The contributions of civilian staff are 

documented either using the Title X evaluation system or the National Security Personnel System as appropriate. 

Dr. SNYDER. How were you chosen to be school’s commandant? How was your 

dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background should the Chief 

of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting individuals for these positions? 

Should the focus be on operational leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing in a training institution) background or both? 

General KASUN. The current Commandant was notified by the U.S. Army reserve 

General Officer Management Office (GOMO) in June 2008 that she was being nominated for the vacancy as the most qualified candidate for the Army Reserves by the 

Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). She was 

notified in August 2008 that she had been selected as the first Reserve general/flag 

officer to fill this position. Further questions on how she was selected should be directed to GOMO and/or CAR. 

BG Kasun is filling a two star position. Her future will be decided upon by a 

board of senior Active Duty and Reserve general officers and the Chief, Army Reserve. 

The Commandant should have both extensive operational experience and joint 

senior level education commensurate with the authorized billet. The Commandant 

needs a minimum of a master’s degree, should be fully joint qualified, and have had 

some exposure to adult education. The Commandant should have experience in 

managing a large dynamic organization. 

The Academic Dean was selected through the Title X competitive process. The 

Academic Dean plans to retire in 2012 after 33 years of federal service. 

The Academic Dean should have a doctorate in a relevant field such as education 

or national security studies, have attained the academic rank of full professor, have 

had exposure to the military environment, have experience in higher education and 

administration, and have an extensive background in managing and supervision of 

large dynamic organizations. 

Dr. SNYDER. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier civilian faculty? 

How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the elements that would attract 

the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their 

government retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.? 

General KASUN. Top tier faculty are those who are nationally recognized by their 

peers as experts in their field of study. Teaching faculty are attracted by the promise of high-quality, motivated students, the freedom to teach the subject assigned 

by any appropriate means, and a sufficient compensation package including pay, vacation time, and retirement. The flexibility of the Title X pay scale, through which 

exceptional performers may be appropriately recognized, is also an incentive. To 

help ensure we attract the best faculty, we advertise for openings at multiple educational and employment institutions as well as the on the government web site. 

Currently, we have superb faculty, but just enough to cover classroom requirements without any in reserve, which stresses both the teaching and curriculum development faculty. The problem is exacerbated by gaps when filling military billets 

as well as by the time needed to qualify some military faculty to teach the curriculum. Increased funding would allow us to attract additional highly qualified civilian faculty, which in turn would allow those on board to conduct research and 

publish, another important incentive for top-tier civilian faculty. 

Dr. SNYDER. What are the policies at your school regarding academic freedom? 

What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure? Describe how your faculty 
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may be called upon to respond to press inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are allowed to respond in a timely manner. 

General KASUN. The Joint Forces Staff College fully supports academic freedom 

as outlined in the National Defense University’s policy below: 

NDU policy states that we subscribe to the 1940 American Association of University Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure 

• ‘‘freedom to pursue research and publication in concert with other academic duties, freedom in the classroom to discuss his or her subject, and the right to 

speak on nonacademic issues just as an ordinary citizen’’ 

• ‘‘faculty members also have the responsibility to uphold the reputation of their 

profession and institution’’ 

• ‘‘freedom to discuss relevant subject matter in classrooms, even if controversial 

with attendant responsibility to remain on the subject and consciously and consistently avoid intruding material that has no relation to the subject they are 

teaching’’ 

For reference to the statement itself: http://www.higher-ed.org/resources/ 

AAUP_1940stat.htm 

Recent controversies regarding academic freedom have led to a recent AAUP Report: 

Freedom in the Classroom (2007): Response to help faculty with what they can 

and can’t say in the classroom . . . .especially on controversial or political issues. ‘‘We 

out to learn from history that the vitality of institutions of higher learning has been 

damaged far more by efforts to correct abuses of freedom than by those alleged 

abuses. . . . We ought to learn from history that education cannot possibly thrive in 

an atmosphere of state-encouraged suspicion and surveillance. . . The essence of 

higher education does not lie in the passive transmission of knowledge but in the 

inculcation of a mature independence of mind.’’ 

Middle States Accreditation Standard 6: Integrity, ‘‘In the conduct of its programs 

and activities, involving the public and the constituencies it serves, the institution 

demonstrates adherence to ethical standards and its own states policies, providing 

support for academic and intellectual freedom.’’ 

Academic freedom, intellectual freedom, and freedom of expression are central to 

the academic enterprise. These special privileges, characteristic of the academic environment, should be extended to all members of the institution’s community. . . .’’ 

Æ Academic and intellectual freedom gives one the right and obligation as a scholar to examine data and to question assumptions. It also obliges instructors to 

present all information objectively because it asserts the student’s right to know 

all pertinent facts and information. A particular point of view may be advanced, 

based upon complete access to the facts or opinions that underlie the argument, 

as long as the right to further inquiry and consideration remains unabridged. 

Æ To restrict the availability or to limit unreasonably the presentation of data or 

opinions is to deny academic freedom. 

Æ Intellectual freedom does not rule out commitment; rather it makes it possible. 

Institutions may hold particular political, social, or religious philosophies, as 

may individual faculty members or students; but both individuals and institutions should remain intellectually free and allow others the same freedom to 

pursue truth. 

Æ ‘‘At NDU we seek to understand issues, policies, and strategies so we can, as 

scholars, future leaders, and current advisors, best articulate, assess, defend, 

critique, and improve those policies and strategies over time.’’ (former NDU 

president Paul Gaffney) 

Legal standing: 

Based on constitutional protection of 1st amendment to the U.S. Constitution— 

academic freedom as a special concern of the 1st amendment 

Adler v. Board of Education (K–12) ‘‘there could be no academic freedom in an 

environment where teachers are under surveillance and feared for their jobs’’ 

Sweezy v. New Hampshire (higher education) ‘‘to impose any straight jacket upon 

the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of 

the nation’’ (Chief Justice Warren). Four essential freedoms of the university (Justice Frankfurter): who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, who 

may be admitted to study. 

Regents of the University of Michigan v Ewing ‘‘Academic freedom thrives not only 

on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students 
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. . . but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by the 

academy itself 

Faculty members’ academic freedom in the classroom is limited by the academic 

freedom of the institution to determine what shall be taught (establishing curriculum, relevance to mission) and how it shall be taught (setting teaching standards) multiple cases 

Faculty in private institutions do not have constitutional protection and must rely 

on contracts with the institution to protect academic freedom (i.e. the AAUP statement) 

Ethical Considerations 

Central to the values of education is the ‘‘search for truth’’ 

Academic freedom is necessary for discovery 

‘‘Truth seeking and discovery are facilitated when professors and their institutions 

remain free to pursue scholarship, wherever it may lead’’ 

‘‘Scientific and scholarly progress cannot be made if so-called heretical views are 

not brought to light to be subjected to the scrutiny of others through observation, 

research, and whatever objective, scientific method is appropriate to the subject 

matter at hand.’’ 

NDU Non-Attribution/Academic Freedom Policy 

1. Academic Freedom is defined in the university’s values as: Providing the climate to pursue and express ideas, opinions, and issues relative to the university purpose, free of undue limitations, restraints, or coercion by the organization or external environment. It is the hallmark of an academic institution. 

2. The National Defense University subscribes to the American Association of 

University Professors’ statement on academic freedom, issues in 1940. That 

statement defines academic freedom in terms of: 

a. Freedom of research and publication of results 

b. Freedom of classroom teaching 

c. Freedom from censorship when faculty speak or write as citizens 

3. The statement also includes faculty responsibilities in academic freedom: 

a. Faculty, when action as private citizens, should make every effort to indicate that they are not institutional spokespersons. 

b. Controversial issues not pertaining to the subject should not be introduced. 

c. Peer review is vital and encouraged. 

d. Institutional missions could limit academic freedom. 

4. Free inquiry is essential to the National Defense University because the senior 

officers and government officials who are educated here will assume a variety 

of roles in their future assignments, as future policy makers, advisors, and 

leaders. NDU graduates must be ready to discuss, challenge, question, and determine national policy. 

5. So that guests and university community members may speak candidly, the 

university offers its assurance that presentations will be held in strict confidence. Our policy on non-attribution provides that, without the expressed permission of the speaker, nothing will be attributed directly or indirectly in the 

presence of anyone who was not authorized to attend the lecture. 

APPLICABLE REGULATION: Title 10, United States Code; DoD Directive 

5230.0, Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release; NDU Reg. 360–1, Academic Freedom and Public Information 

Press inquiries are directed to the Public Affairs Office, who determines whether 

or not current faculty or students have expertise in the field/areas of the inquiry. 

PAO will inform the school director of the faculty/student member. If the faculty/ 

student member is available/willing to respond, the response will be reviewed by the 

PAO who will then forward the response to the entity making the inquiry. 

Dr. SNYDER. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general purpose forces to 

be educated and trained in understanding contracting and contractors. Civilians, 

contracting, and contractors on the battlefield—how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce, need to know? 

General KASUN. The battlefield is comprised of military, civilians and contractors. 

It is imperative that officers are familiar with the contracting process. When working with contractors, they must understand the appropriate interactions and legal 

constraints that affect working relationships. 

In 2009, at the recommendation of the MECC, the Chairman designated ‘‘Operational Contract Support Education for Non-Acquisition DoD personnel’’ as a JPME 

Special Area of Emphasis. Additionally, the October 2008 issuance of a relevant 

Joint Doctrine publication (JP 4–10 ‘‘Operational Contract Support’’) is available to 

underpin efforts. 
172 

Dr. SNYDER. What level of support do you receive from your University? The 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? JCS/J7? The Secretary of Defense? OSD? Who advocates for your budget requirements in what forums? 

General KASUN. NDU provides us with our allocation of the budget and POM’s 

our issues. They provide us with policy guidance. They also provide us with our 

manpower allocation and maintain hiring authority. They provide our legal support 

and select subject matter experts. We also share library databases and the IT system. We have our regional accreditation under NDU. We are satisfied with the level 

of support provided by NDU. 

The Chairman provides us with curriculum guidance via the Officers Professional 

Military Education Program (OPMEP). The Faculty Education Conference provides 

yearly training to the faculty on key joint issues and new joint doctrine. Any guidance provided by the SECDEF/OSD to NDU applies to JFSC. Both NDU and OSD 

advocated for our budget requirements in the POM cycle. 

Dr. SNYDER. Are you being adequately resourced for the Joint Advanced Warfare 

School? If not, what is your plan for becoming so? 

General KASUN. The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) is adequately 

resourced. There are no significant budget issues at this time. JAWS has dedicated 

classrooms which have the most advanced technology of any at JFSC. The school 

has adequate faculty to meet the mission; however there is no redundancy to allow 

for seamless turn-over of faculty or additional tasking of faculty to include research 

and writing time. Additionally, the Director must teach in order to meet the student 

to faculty ratio of 3.5:1. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe any IT challenges you may have. What are your other resource challenges, if any? 

General KASUN. Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) requires the replacement of 

critical network servers that provide all of the required services to the command. 

Critical services such as electronic mail, network security, database management, 

Continuity of Operations Program (COOP), and file storage are supported by the 

servers. A total of 40 servers currently support the College. The cost to replace these 

servers is $210,000. 

JFSC also requires the replacement of critical network switches that provide the 

infrastructure to support the College’s local area network. The switches provide the 

connectivity needed to extend the network to the entire College and allow users access to network services such as electronic mail, file storage/retrieval, and database 

management systems. The JFSC network infrastructure currently has approximately 75 access switches and 7 distribution switches. Through lifecycle replacement, the cost to replace these switches is $150,000/year. 

The classified JFSC SIPR network should be utilizing a tape backup system. The 

current system was purchased in FY00 and requires replacement. Security requirements specify that a backup system must be in place that will allow the College 

to be able to backup vital data on external media and store it in an offsite location 

in case of emergency or catastrophic loss to a system which is onsite. The cost for 

such a system is $25,000. 

In addition to the SIPR network, JFSC uses a Storage Area Network that provides approximately three terabytes of unclassified information storage. The Storage 

Area Network provides the ability to address continuing user storage requirements. 

Network size has continued to grow and it is more economical to purchase a Storage 

Area Network than to purchase the servers that would be needed to meet our growing requirements. This type of solution enables a backup solution that is faster than 

tape backup solutions. The Storage Area Network could not be used for classified 

information because doing so would make the entire system classified. The cost for 

a Storage Area Network is approximately $93,000. 

The JFSC backbone relies on a central Core switch which acts as a traffic cop for 

all network data. The Core switch controls connectivity to all devices within the College, including all user workstations, war gaming suites, and seminars. All computers that try to gain any information from the internal or external network are 

routed through the Core switch. All outlying switches/pc’s/hubs/LAN drops/etc. attach to this central Core switch. The current Core switch was replaced in FY 07, 

and should be replaced every 3 years. The cost for a replacement is approximately 

$63,700. 

The audio visual infrastructure and equipment are aging and in need of modernization. As an example, the infrastructure in the war game suites in Okinawa 

Hall and the Distance Learning Center in Normandy Hall is over 10 years old. The 

systems are heavily used to conduct exercises, provide video teleconferencing links, 

and enable distance learning with combatant commands to enhance the education 

of our students. All are well beyond their life-cycle. Internal equipment in these facilities is no longer supported by the manufacturer and consequently it requires an 
173 

increased amount of time and money to keep them at minimal operational levels. 

The cost for this update is approximately $5,169,000. 

The College is designing its classroom of the future that will be incrementally implemented over the FYDP. The current classroom structure has five computers 

being shared by up to twenty students and three faculty members. The classroom 

of the future will need to provide computer access for all students and faculty. The 

front-end assessment has identified critical requirements for computing capability 

for the individual student, classroom flexibility, and interactive display devices. The 

solution will incorporate laptop computers to serve as both an electronic reader and 

IT asset. A wireless network for both Normandy and Okinawa Halls will enable the 

flexibility required for these classrooms and have a significant impact on network 

infrastructure. Interactive whiteboards will enable students and faculty to electronically capture application-level educational experiences in the classroom. In addition, 

the Joint and Combined Warfare School (JCWS) has 355 electronic readers (eBooks) 

that the students and faculty use to access the curriculum and reference materials. 

These readers will need to be replaced with a newer version of an electronic reader 

or laptop computers. The cost for JCWS classroom modernization is $5,400,000 over 

four years. The cost for the wireless network $1,200,000. Each electronic reader or 

laptop will cost $330–$450. 

An additional challenge is outside access to computer files. Many students and 

faculty take work home. Due to concerns for system security, people are currently 

unable to use thumb drives or access files from outside the college. Issuing government owned laptops to each student and faculty member may be the only way to 

restore homework access capabilities. The cost to do this is approximately $1,270 

per person. 

Dr. SNYDER. Is the Joint Advanced Warfighting School going to be ILE or SLE? 

We have heard conflicting stories. 

General KASUN. The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) was established 

in 2004 for O4 and O5 officers. In 2005 the program was expanded to allow O6 officers to attend. The CJCSI 1800.01C Officer Professional Military Education Policy 

(OPMEP) listed JAWS as both ILE and SLE. As such students received either ILE 

or SLE credit depending on their rank. The Director, Joint Staff signed an update 

to this policy on 15 July 2009. In CJCSI 1800.01D Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) JAWS is now listed as only SLE. The current class which 

graduates 18 June 2010 will be the last class to have students who receive ILE credit for JAWS. 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide your school’s mission statement. 

Admiral WISECUP. The mission of the Naval War College is to: 

(1) Develop strategic and operational leaders: The College shall provide professional military education programs that are current, rigorous, relevant, and accessible to the maximum number of qualified U.S. officers and Navy enlisted personnel, civilian employees of the U.S. Government and non-governmental organizations, and international officers. The desired effect is a group of leaders of character 

who have trust and confidence in each other and are operationally and strategically 

minded, critical thinkers, proficient in joint matters, and skilled naval and joint 

warfighters. 

(2) Help CNO define the future Navy and its roles and missions: The College shall conduct research, analysis, and gaming to support the requirements of the 

Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Combatant Commanders, 

the Navy Component Commanders, the Navy’s numbered fleet commanders, other 

Navy and Marine Corps commanders, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and other 

departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. The desired effect is a program 

of focused, forward-thinking and timely research, analysis, and gaming that anticipates future operational and strategic challenges; develops and assesses strategic 

and operational concepts to overcome those challenges; assesses the risk associated 

with these concepts; and provides analytical products that inform the Navy’s leadership and help shape key decisions. 

(3) Support combat readiness: The College shall conduct training, education, 

leadership and assessment activities to support the ability of the Navy’s Joint Force 

Maritime and Navy Component Commanders to function effectively as operational 

commanders. This effort shall include supporting the needs of the Combatant Commanders, Navy Component Commanders, and the Navy’s numbered fleet commanders for operational planning, analysis, and war gaming to respond to emerging 

operational requirements. The desired effect is to improve the capability of Navy 

commanders to lead maritime, joint and combined forces and their staff members 

to plan, execute and assess and function cohesively as a maritime headquarters organization. 
174 

(4) Strengthen maritime security cooperation: The College shall bring together senior and intermediate level naval officers from other countries to develop 

leaders for high command in their navies; promote an open exchange of professional 

views; encourage friendship and cooperation; and study operational planning methods. The desired effect is to build and strengthen national and international maritime relationships and to improve the ability of U.S. and partner nations to operate 

together in the maritime domain. 

Status and Command Relationships. The Naval War College is a shore activity in an active, fully operational status under the command of a President who reports to the Chief of Naval Operations for mission accomplishment, broad policy 

guidance and governance. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Total Force 

serves as the College’s Resource Sponsor and Budget Submission Office. 

Dr. SNYDER. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the 

quality of military faculty members? What is your average tour length for military 

faculty members? Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? What is the percentage 

of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified? 

Admiral WISECUP. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have clearly enhanced the quality of those military faculty members at the U.S. Naval War College 

who have had this experience. Recent combat experience provides instant credibility 

and enables our military faculty members to connect with students who have recently returned from combat operations. Recent faculty combat experience is also instrumental in making sure that our curriculum is current and relevant. We have 

used the individual augmentation program periodically as a professional development opportunity for selected military faculty members. The challenge is that combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan only cover one aspect of the range of military operations and we must teach the full spectrum. 

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have also affected the perception among students especially those with combat experience that such experience is a discriminator. Those military faculty members without combat experience must work to 

build that credibility and prove their value in the classroom. 

However, there were problems with gapped billets for military faculty members 

especially during periods with the highest tempo of operations. 

The average tour length for military faculty is between two and three years, with 

most seasoned officers staying for a full tour and the more junior commanders/lieutenant colonels or junior captains/colonels often departing closer to the twenty fourmonth mark. Clearly, the full tour allows these officers to contribute significantly 

in both teaching and curricula development. Most of the faculty members who depart after only two years are on the fast track to promotion and command and these 

are exactly the officers that we want to have in the seminar with both our intermediate and senior level students. 

The credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications have not diminished at all during this period. Forty-seven percent of S&P’s 

military faculty members have held O–5 command. All have the requisite PME and 

hold a master’s degree with eighteen percent having a PhD or enrolled as doctoral 

candidates. 

Among the JMO Department’s military faculty, sixty-nine percent have held O– 

5 command, and over ninety four percent are graduates of an intermediate or senior 

level service college and hold a master’s degree; forty-one percent hold multiple master degrees. Sixty percent of the NSDM military faculty has had O–5 command and 

sixty-seven percent hold multiple master’s degrees. 

Approximately 20% (13/66) military faculty members are fully JQO qualified. In 

fact, the percentage of JQO faculty has remained steady over the past ten years. 

Dr. SNYDER. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned billets for faculty? 

What are your gaps? 

Admiral WISECUP. Yes, the military services and agencies are filling their assigned billets at the Naval War College. Moreover, each of the other military departments have provided military faculty members who provide the skills, professional 

experiences, and generally the education outlined in the Memorandum of Agreement 

on Assignment of Military Faculty at the Service Senior Level Colleges dated 30 December 2005. 

That Memorandum of Agreement covers the portion of the other Service faculty 

at the Naval War College which meets the CJCS definition for PME faculty, those 

who ‘‘teach, prepare, or design PME curriculum or conduct research related to 

PME.’’ Faculty members assigned to NWC’s College of Operational and Strategic 

Leadership, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, the Naval Command College, 

and the Naval Staff College do not fully meet this definition and are not counted 

as PME faculty unless they actively teach in the Elective Program. The information 
175 

below is in reference to the PME faculty which is related to this Subcommittee’s inquiry. 

For the upcoming academic year, the following billets for teaching faculty are currently gapped with no replacement yet identified: 

CIA—none (1 of 1 billets filled) 

Maritime Administration—none (1 of 1 billets filled) 

NCIS—none (1 of 1 billets filled) 

Royal Navy—none (1 of 1 billets filled) 

U.S. Air Force—1 of 11 billets (9%) 

U.S. Army—1 of 13 billets (8%) 

U.S. Coast Guard—none (1 of 1 filled) 

U.S. Marine Corps—none (5 of 5 billets filled) 

U.S Navy—3 of 42 billets (7%) 

U.S. State Department—none (2 of 2 billets filled) 

The Army had problems with timely fills in Academic Years 2006–2007 and 2007– 

2008, but rectified them last academic year. As with all shore stations, Navy manning is less than 100%, but the College, as a matter of practice, places high priority 

on filling the PME faculty positions and absorbs the manning decrement with the 

research and gaming faculty and staff positions. 

Dr. SNYDER. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage of Stability, 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations given that DOD has put 

them on a par with combat operations? 

Admiral WISECUP. Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations are an important part of the curricula at the U.S. Naval War College. The 

College has held fast to the belief, first articulated by its Founding Father, Rear 

Admiral Steven B. Luce, USN that ‘‘The War College is a place of original research 

on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the 

prevention of War.’’ For the past 125 years, our focus has never been solely on conventional wars or high-intensity conflicts. We have examined the full spectrum of 

combat operations. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent end of the Cold 

War as we know it, the College has increasingly emphasized both SSTR and irregular warfare. 

Failing and low-performing states are a perfect environment for these difficult operations. Our students have read and studied about operations in Beirut and Panama since the early 1990s. We continue to study operations in the Balkans that occurred during the Clinton years. Clearly there is a linkage between unstable environments like these and irregular war and insurgencies. We see this complexity as 

a part of the comprehensive whole. 

The NSDM Capstone Exercise asks students to look into the future security environment (6 years) to develop a seminar presentation that addresses creation of a 

future national security strategy, national military strategy, a regional strategic estimate, a theater strategic vision, and a list of new or improved concepts/capabilities 

necessary to advance the regional strategic vision. This exercise requires students 

to carefully consider all kinds of potential future operations, including SSTR operations. 

In addition, NSDM uses several case studies that touch on past events related to 

SSTR operations including: 

• The use of Marines in Beirut in the early 80s 

• Darfur 

• Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles 

The Strategy and Warfare course includes a diverse assortment of case studies. 

SSTR concepts are clearly discussed in many of these case studies. Consequently, 

it is often an area that students discuss on their final examination. 

During the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) course, students are required to 

complete a major research paper. There are many topic suggestions that include 

SSTR subjects; 36 students this past academic year chose SSTR topics. 

In the session on Introduction to Operational Art, students explore the application 

of operational art not only in conventional force-on-force constructs, but ask the 

questions, ‘‘Can operational art be applied across the range of military operations?’’ 

extending the consideration through the traditional Phase 4 and Phase 5 construct. 

In the lesson on Military Objectives and the Levels of War, exploration of the desired end state leads students into consideration of SSTR issues. 

Specific to naval operations, one question students entertain in the lesson on the 

Employment of Naval Forces Across the Spectrum of Conflict, is ‘‘Discuss the type 

and range of missions conducted by maritime forces in time of peace?’’ Discussion 
176 

leads to many roles for naval forces within SSTR. Another question in the session 

asks students to consider the application of naval forces to peace keeping and peace 

enforcement, two elements that have roles within SSTR. 

Interagency coordination and cooperation get consideration in several seminar 

sessions. In the lesson on the Department of State and the Country Team, the interaction between a Joint Task Force and the DoS/Country Team are considered specifically in SSTR operations. The JMO session on military decision making and 

planning continue the theme by asking students to consider planning not only for 

conflict but also for post-conflict operations. 

Many sessions in contemporary operations look at SSTR considerations. These include Failed States; a session devoted to a lecture on SSTR, Security Cooperation 

Planning, Interagency Coordination, and a panel discussion featuring representatives from nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations and civilian contractors. The Post-Conflict Operations seminar looks at three SSTR case studies, 

Post-WWII Germany, Post-Operation Just Cause in Panama, and stability operations in Kosovo. The class on Civil-Military Operations features the investigation 

of establishing relationships early in an operation with a mind to ensuring coherent 

action in SSTR. The session on Peace Operations also includes SSTR considerations. 

Likewise, sessions on insurgency, counter-insurgency, and complex irregular warfare 

explore the gap between where a region or country is where it needs to be, and how 

it gets there through the lens of SSTR considerations. A seminar on Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations concludes the seminar series and through analysis of Operation Unified Assistance looks to identify lessons relevant to SSTR concerns. Overall, the JMO course weaves SSTR operations and considerations 

throughout the sixteen week course with concentrations interspersed. 

There are also several electives and workshops that cover SSTR and an Area of 

Studies with electives devoted to Irregular Warfare. These include: 

Employment of Special Operations Forces: A Case Study Approach 

Advanced Studies in Special Operations Forces 

Directed Research in Special Operations Forces 

Small Wars: An Introduction to Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Guerilla and Partisan Warfare Colonial Wars, 1846–1902 

Irregular Warfare 

Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism Technological and Policy Foundations 

Confronting Armed Groups: 21st Century Challenges to U.S. National Security 

Iraq: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 

Contemporary Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Counter-Terrorism 

Also, our resident faculty members have recent experience and expertise with 

SSTR especially the military faculty that have recently returned from operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. Faculty members in the Wargaming Department work closely 

with the teaching faculty to remain current and share their experiences. 

In addition, in 2008, the Naval War College created a Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) in order promote and support research and teaching on irregular warfare and armed groups. The Center also helps to fund research 

projects on irregular warfare and armed groups. CIWAG hosted a conference that 

brought U.S. and international scholars together with military scholars and practitioners to analyze the national and international security challenges posed by armed 

groups and irregular warfare. CIWAG is taking a complex and rapidly evolving 

problem and exploring ways to help scholars and military leaders develop a sufficient understanding of the unique challenges posed by armed groups and irregular 

warfare. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation exercises and 

war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and irregular warfare concepts? 

Admiral WISECUP. At the Naval War College, our seminar-based educational 

methodology requires students to demonstrate mastery of theory and concepts 

through analysis, application, synthesis, and evaluation throughout the academic 

year through a variety of means including comprehensive case studies, exercises and 

simulations, and war games. 

In the National Security Decision Making course, the final exercise requires students to look into the future security environment (6 years); they create their own 

scenario based on their assessment of the global and regional trends affecting their 

assigned geographic area of responsibility. The exercise requires the seminar to develop a presentation that addresses creation of a future national security strategy, 

national military strategy, a regional strategic estimate, a theater strategic vision, 
177 

and a list of new or improved concepts/capabilities necessary to advance the regional 

strategic vision. 

This exercise requires students to carefully consider all kinds of potential future 

operations, including SSTR operations and irregular warfare and determine the 

likelihood and risk of them to the security of the region and the United States. 

NSDM also uses two case studies involving SSTR operations and irregular warfare concepts: 

• The use of Marines in Beirut in the early 80s 

• Darfur 

The Strategy and War course includes a diverse assortment of case studies focusing on irregular warfare (IW) and the challenges of countering belligerents that utilize irregular strategies. IW is defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations and encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism. IW theory 

and practice is analyzed by students using historical and contemporary cases studies. Students read the famous study On Protracted War by Mao, perhaps the most 

successful fractioned and celebrated theorist of IW. A number of case studies involving IW and hybrid wars—the role of armed groups and militias in determining the 

outcome of the American War for Independence, the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan 

Emergency, Vietnam, the insurgencies in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and current operations in Afghanistan—receive in-depth examination. Moreover, the Strategy and War course emphasizes the importance of understanding how 

and why superiority in conventional military capabilities do not automatically translate into strategic success, when weaker adversaries adopt asymmetric, irregular 

methods of warfare to protract the fighting and diminish the will of their opponent. 

It is important to note that IW is taught in context so that the geopolitical, economic, historical, social, and cultural environments surrounding the conflict are also 

assessed in order to develop realistic strategies and counter-strategies. 

In the examination of IW, culture and religion figure prominently in the strategy 

courses. A conflict studied is the Algerian war to gain independence from France. 

This struggle raises troubling questions about the strategic effectiveness of a major 

western power—in this case, France—fighting in another cultural and religious setting against an adversary employing terrorism and insurgency. 

In addition, IW in the joint and interagency environment is exhaustively studied. 

On Vietnam, for example, students read Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional 

Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam, the classic study authored by 

Robert Komer, who headed the most successful phase of the United States pacification effort during the Vietnam War. Meanwhile, Andrew Krepinevich’s provocative 

study The Army and Vietnam provides insights into the problems facing armed 

forces in adapting to strategic realities. Students examine institutional constraints 

that hamstrung the performance of the United States on the civil and local security 

aspects of the war. These include the faulty coordination of our diplomatic and military instruments, the lack of unified plans, the misuse of AID tools, poorly equipped 

staffs on several agencies that also could not understand each other’s perspective 

or mission, and above all the lack of unified management both across civil and military functions and within each sphere. 

Students also examine the arguments made by the eminent Harvard academic, 

the late Samuel Huntington that the terror war is a culturally or religiously driven 

‘‘clash of civilizations.’’ (That, indeed, is how Al Qaeda has been predisposed to portray the war.) The Strategy and Policy Department provides a valuable reading, entitled In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium, consisting of primarysource documents, which allows students to engage in ‘‘cultural intelligence’’ by assessing first hand AQAM’s ideological view of the world, peculiar version of history, 

and image of the United States, as well as their political objectives, strategies, information operations, and internal divisions and debates. In addition, Usama Bin 

Laden’s speech, ‘‘Come to Jihad: A Speech to the People of Pakistan,’’ covering a 

substantial change in AQ’s strategic rhetoric, is examined. In it, Bin Laden formally 

calls for war against the Pakistani state in a fashion which may mark another turning point in the Long War’s evolution. Readings by well-known experts on the Middle East Fawaz Gerges and Gilles Kepel provide astute analyses of the cultural 

roots of current-day conflicts. Other readings and lectures provide an ethnographic 

break-down of tribal society along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, and some of 

the key ‘‘cultural terrain’’ features in it that effect military operations. 

AQAM has exploited the revolution in information technology to craft and control 

their messages to an unprecedented degree of sophistication and to make possible 

tactical training, operational planning, and strategic debate in a decentralized organizational framework. Another reading by Bruce Hoffman, a longtime RAND Cor-
178 

poration expert on terrorism, analyzes the ‘‘virtual battleground of cyberspace’’ and 

the different ways in which AQAM leaders and operatives have used the internet 

to advance their cause. AQAM has used new means of communication to try to 

impel a wide range of Muslim audiences to transcend their multiple national, ethnic, and tribal sources of identity and embrace a single, extreme, religious identity 

as a global umma (community) in mortal confrontation with infidels. AQAM also addresses Western audiences with words as well as propaganda of the deed. Its package of terrorism and strategic communication seeks to achieve psychological, economic, and political effects that, it presumes, will bring an end to the Western presence in the Muslim world. The deep attention paid to Al Qaeda’s world-view, messages, and efforts in the strategy courses also provides a solid backdrop against 

which to compare and evaluate the United States’ own efforts. 

Two major scenarios consider SSTR within the Joint Maritime Operations course. 

The first is a notional case study of a conflict on the island of Borneo. Within it, 

students are exposed to a conventional, maritime-based conflict with irregular warfare concerns. Within it, students are expected to plan for U.S. and coalition operations, including SSTR operations. The second and capstone exercise looks at the 

implosion of the DPRK in the year 2012. The entire exercise centers on conflict 

avoidance and SSTR efforts. As a result of years of food shortages and repression 

of the people, the DPRK leadership is unable to provide either security of basic 

human services. DPRK infrastructure is incapable of supporting the population and 

the U.N. estimates that, as winter approaches, up to 2 million DPRK citizens may 

starve or freeze to death. The U.S.-led Combined Task Force (CTF) Morning Calm 

conducts humanitarian assistance operations to assist DPRK government in maintaining order and restoring basic human services in order to ease human suffering 

and prevent regional instability. This exercise was designed as an SSTR/Irregular 

Warfare exercise to synthesize the course learning objectives. 

In addition, in 2008, the Naval War College created a Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) in order promote and support research and teaching on irregular warfare and armed groups. Part of its mission is to hold a series 

of conferences that bring scholars, both American and international, together with 

military scholars and practitioners to analyze the national and international security challenges posed by armed groups and irregular warfare. CIWAG contributes 

to curriculum development in the strategy, joint military operations, and electives 

courses taught at the Naval War College. This focus on increasing the faculty’s expertise on SSTR and IW extends to our War Gaming Department, which executed 

a number of other SSTR and IW wargames over the past year involving faculty 

throughout the College. These include: 

1. NAVCENT BILAT Game Series. Classified, scenario-based war game explored 

the irregular warfare threat to maritime infrastructure in the NAVCENT 

AOR. This war game served as a theater security cooperation instrument for 

NAVCENT to build partnership capacity among oil-producing coalition partners. 

2. Navy-Marine Corps Command Relationship Game. Scenario-based war game 

explored the issues and problems associated with various command relationship constructs for employing embarked Marine Forces. A range of scenarios 

from low-intensity conflict to MCO were analyzed. 

3. Global 08. Four different alternative future scenarios used: ‘‘Made in East 

Asia,’’ ‘‘Global Chaos,’’ ‘‘United We Stand,’’ and ‘‘Tri-Polar’’. 

4. Global 09. Classified scenario addressing Sea Control in an anti-access environment against a capable adversary. 

5. Force Design Workshop. Scenario focused on high-end anti-access and irregular maritime warfare across the most stressing Defense Planning Scenarios. 

6. Final Destination 2 Game. SECRET–NOFORN level, included multiple, asymmetric attacks on the U.S. homeland and U.S. forces abroad. 

7. U.S.-Australia Electronic Warfare Interoperability Game. Designed to identify 

gaps, deficiencies, and issues with respect to U.S. and Australian Electronic 

Warfare actions in combat conditions. Two scenarios were presented, the first 

of which focused on Major Combat Operations against a near-peer competitor. 

The second scenario explored the challenges of conducting EW operations in 

later-phasing (e.g., post-major combat, stability and rebuilding operations) in 

a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) environment. 

8. Maritime Infrastructure Protection Symposium Scenario-Based Planning Activity. The scenario presented simulated attacks on a variety of physical infrastructure assets (i.e., oil platforms, agricultural experiment station, LNG 

holding facilities, and commercial assets). participants were divided into four 
179 

multi-national groups, and explored the events from the specific lenses of indications and warnings, analysis and assessment, mitigation, and incident response. 

9. Maritime Homeland Security/Homeland Defense War Game Series. Focus of 

all scenarios is on asymmetrical threats coming from the maritime environment (VOI, COI, POI threats). The series incorporates robust play from U.S. 

maritime forces as well as both the Canadian military and civilian senior 

leadership and an advancing Mexican involvement. Scenarios included: maritime assault teams inbound to Vancouver Olympics, small boat threat to oil 

platforms in GOMEX, VBIED inbound to Hampton Roads, and transiting vessel exhibiting personnel with radiation poisoning declaring force majeure for 

a U.S. Port. 

10. Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) War Game Series. The game 

includes significant U.S. interagency participation with the overarching goal 

of creating and implementing a single, unified U.S. government approach to 

an emerging irregular warfare threat. Scenarios included: suspected WMD 

being shipped to U.S. waters, chemical weapons shipments inbound through 

St Lawrence Seaway, and POI onboard vessels transiting through U.S. 

waters. 

11. Office of Defense Cooperation/EUCOM Theater Engagement. The scenario 

based war game reinforced the concepts of joint operational planning. All scenarios focused on IW threats to critical energy infrastructure and WMD in a 

joint maritime environment. 

12. Deterrence and Escalation Game and Review 09. The objectives for this game 

were to explore escalation dynamics after an adversary’s first use of WMD. 

The game was conducted primarily at the operational and strategic levels of 

war. 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide the most recent survey results from your graduates 

and their supervisors. 

Admiral WISECUP. The U.S. Naval War College routinely surveys graduating students, alumni, and naval and joint leaders. With the significant change of intended 

educational outcomes and the corresponding curriculum revision implemented in 

academic year 2006–2007, surveys to our alumni and senior leaders regarding the 

outdated intermediate-level course would have served no useful purpose. We have 

begun to solicit feedback on the revised course, but have not yet collected all of the 

data. Likewise, the College has not yet analyzed the data from our graduating students for the last academic year. However, the analysis from Academic Year 2007– 

08 follows. 

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed 

upon request.] 

Dr. SNYDER. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit for their nonhost service military faculty in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. We 

know that the tours of those who were grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it 

that these JDAL positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience? 

Admiral WISECUP. Billets at the U.S. Naval War College remained on the JDAL 

because our military faculty members teach both intermediate level PME with 

JPME I and Senior level PME with JPME II. To date, officers in these billets have 

received joint credit. However, previously the Joint Staff queried whether our faculty should receive full joint credit since they also teach the intermediate level 

JPME course. 

The long-term concern is that a bureaucratic decision may affect our teaching billets. Therefore we fully support returning these billets to the JDAL. 

Discussions with the Bureau of Naval Personnel indicates that a lack of joint 

credit makes it more difficult to assign commanders still competitive for promotion 

and recently promoted captains to faculty positions at the other intermediate level 

colleges. However, these billets are filled by more experienced officers, who do not 

absolutely require joint duty credit. Returning those faculty billets to the JDAL 

would be most beneficial. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe your school’s use of historical case studies to teach strategy. 

Admiral WISECUP. The study of history has formed a part of the curriculum since 

the founding of the Naval War College. The College’s first President, Stephen B. 

Luce, argued: ‘‘Naval history abounds in materials whereon to erect a science, and 

it is our purpose to build up with these a science of naval warfare.’’ (Stephen B. 

Luce, ‘‘On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science’’ Proceedings, 1886) Historical 
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case studies provided the foundation for frameworks of strategic thought that could 

guide the making of strategy and operations. Alfred Thayer Mahan used historical 

case studies to develop his concepts of sea power and grand strategy in the lectures 

delivered to students attending the College. These lectures, transformed into his famous book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan stated: ‘‘It is . . . particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value.’’ 

(p. 9) Mahan’s famous history remains a part of the College’s courses on strategy. 

Historical case studies, then, have long formed a vital part of the curriculum on 

strategy at the Naval War College. 

Mahan’s works on naval history, and those of his near contemporary Sir Julian 

Corbett, have lost none of their power for spurring critical thought on strategy. The 

noted policy commentator Robert Kaplan believes that an understanding of the current-day and future strategic environment ‘‘requires an acquaintance with two books 

published a century ago: Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660– 

1783 . . . and Julian S. Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.’’ (Robert D. 

Kaplan, ‘‘America’s Elegant Decline,’’ Atlantic Monthly, November 2007) The historical case studies drawn upon by Mahan and Corbett, as well as their acute strategic 

analyses, remain an integral part of the education on strategy provided by the 

Naval War College. 

The study of strategy is an integral element of the Naval War College’s intermediate-level education programs, resident and non-resident. Through the core curriculum, students examine the formulation and implementation of strategy, assess 

its execution and effectiveness, and evaluate the subsequent adaptation and revision 

of strategy. For intermediate-level students, our focus remains at the operational 

level emphasizing the application of operational art and operational level leadership. 

The nexus of strategy and operations is then a major emphasis of the core curriculum. While our students analyze the national level strategies, their studies require them to synthesize and evaluate theater strategies and the corresponding 

campaigns, operations, and activities. 

Historical case studies are a significant element of the College’s educational methodology, especially so in our study of strategy covered mostly by the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) and the Strategy and Warfare (S&W) courses. NSDM 

uses historical case studies extensively to teach both the development and implementation of strategy and policy, though the faculty has found case studies to be 

more effective in examining how strategy was implemented than in how it was developed. NSDM also uses historical case studies extensively to teach leadership. 

Most of the historical case studies used were developed by NSDM faculty members to illustrate various course concepts. Historical case studies related to strategy 

and policy development and implementation that have recently been used include: 

• Use of Marines in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984 

• The United States and Russia—Rekindling the Cold War 

• The Cuban Missile Crisis 

• North Korea 

• A Time of Our Choosing: Confronting Saddam 

• Darfur 

• The 1973 Arab-Israeli War 

• All midterm and final exams involve student analysis of case studies. 

These cases are used in conjunction with other required readings as necessary 

preparation for graduate-level seminar discussions. Those discussions are important 

to developing course concepts and applying the three general analytical frameworks 

offered by the NSDM course. The first conceptual framework considers how national 

interests, national strategies, and the security environment affect the ways and 

means combatant commanders develop and execute theater strategy cooperation activities. The second conceptual framework is designed to prepare students to lead 

and effectively participate in a dynamic staff environment, applying management 

and leadership skills to organizational assessment, strategy formulation, strategy 

implementation, and measurements. The third conceptual framework describes the 

environment with and external to the staff ensuring leadership styles, staff structure, organizational behavior and culture as well as the influence on the staff of 

U.S. government higher authority, and elements of the international community are 

considered during the strategic process. Through seminar discussions, a 14–17 page 

analytical essay exploring an existing strategy, a military strategic concept, or an 

emerging security challenge, and examinations involving student analysis of case 

studies, the NSDM course teaches strategy. 
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The Strategy and Warfare course examines the complete strategic process through 

the use of historic case studies. This course uses required historic readings and faculty lectures to provide the baseline for exploration through seminar discussions and 

two analytical essays of 8–10 pages each. Students are provided nine interrelated 

course themes as a starting point for undertaking critical strategic thinking. Those 

themes are applied repeatedly via the historic case studies, the essay papers, and 

often the course’s written final examination. 

A hallmark of the courses developed by the Strategy and Policy Department, including Strategy and Warfare, is the many different types of wars and the wide 

range of operations covered in historical case studies. By using historical case studies, the students have an opportunity to evaluate and discuss the ways in which political leaders, military and interagency planners in the real world have successfully 

(or unsuccessfully) grappled with the strategic challenges associated with the use 

of force to attain national objectives. The historical case studies in strategy examine 

diverse types of wars, featuring a variety of operations and different keys to success. 

The strategy courses show how success in one type of war may be followed by failure in another. An important aspect of strategic leadership is the ability to adapt 

to different types of wars. The curriculum analyzes the strategic success and failure 

of leading great powers and non-state actors over long periods of time. The goal in 

using historical case study is to expand the horizons of the officers studying at the 

College. Admiral Stansfield Turner argued for the value of this method for the study 

of strategy: ‘‘Studying historical examples should enable us to view current issues 

and trends through a broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. Approaching today’s problems through a study of the past is one way to ensure that 

we do not become trapped within the limits of our own experience.’’ 

These historical cases lead up to the strategic problems confronting today’s decision makers and emerging security challenges. In each case study, the students can 

study the actions of famous strategic leaders—such as, Washington, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Marshall, Eisenhower, Mao, and others. The case studies on strategy, 

then, are concerned with strategic leadership that can effectively deal not only with 

current problems in policy and strategy but also those that might emerge in the future. 

The study of history is also essential so that our students know about the books 

influencing the Nation’s top decision makers. A recent example is provided by 

former President George Bush, who studied the historical case study of the Algerian 

war for independence against France. Henry Kissinger recommended that President 

Bush read Alistair Horne’s book Savage War of Peace. This book shaped President 

Bush’s views about the problems facing outside great powers fighting in the Middle 

East. This book, too, is part of the core curriculum on strategy at the College. In 

the courses offered by the Strategy and Policy Department, historical case studies 

give students an awareness of what is read by the country’s leadership. Secretary 

of Defense Robert Gates highlighted in the journal the importance of Robert 

Komer’s book Bureaucracy Does Its Thing for grasping the institutional impediments standing in the way of strategic effectiveness in fighting an insurgency. (Foreign Affairs, January-February 2009). The historical case study in the strategies of 

the Vietnam War employs this book with great effect. Many students returning from 

service in Afghanistan and Iraq have commented on the value of reading this book 

that captured some of the salient lessons of the hard-won experience of the long war 

in Vietnam. 

Our adversaries, of course, also turn to the past to make strategic sense currentday conflicts. We at the Naval War College must equip our students with an understanding of our enemies’ construction of the past. For example, Osama bin Laden, 

in a famous speech delivered in 2004, drew upon the experience of the Soviet Union 

in Afghanistan to explain why he remained confident of ultimate victory over the 

United States in the terror war. ‘‘[We have] experience in using guerrilla warfare 

and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the 

mujahidin, bled Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat. . . . So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point 

of bankruptcy.’’ (October 29, 2004) Understanding the strategy of our Nation’s enemies requires an examination of history and the enemy’s interpretation of it. The 

Naval War College’s curriculum thus uses historical case studies to understand the 

ends, ways, and means employed by adversaries, as well as the role of cultural and 

religious considerations in the making of strategy. 

The strategy courses also examine the part culture played in the major conflicts 

fought in East Asia in the twentieth century. The study of these wars shows the 

violent interaction between the peoples within the region and with outside powers. 

In particular, students examine the Pacific theater in World War II, the Korean 

War, and the Vietnam War. In the strategy courses, students examine the rise of 
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Japan as a major power, the growth of Japanese nationalism during the first half 

of the twentieth century, and Japan’s collision with China, Russia, and the United 

States. The students also examine the rise of China. In recent years, the strategy 

courses have sought to give more prominence to the history of conflicts in South 

Asia. This historical background is an essential element of cultural literacy and for 

understanding today’s dangerous flashpoints in Asia. 

An education in strategy entails an understanding of our own Nation’s past. Cultural studies must begin with knowing about one’s own history. The Strategy and 

Policy Department’s courses provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the 

American way of war and strategic thought. The late Russell Weigley’s landmark 

study The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and 

Policy provides essential background on how the United States has waged war. The 

history of the United States’ interaction with the world and its wars offers invaluable background on the evolution of the international strategic environment as well 

as our own country’s history. The Strategy and War Course examines the founding 

of the Republic in the midst of a highly competitive international environment and 

great-power wars. The victory at Yorktown is examined as a case study in successful 

joint and combined operations. The Strategy and War Course also follows the rise 

of the United States as a world power. The strategy courses examine as well the 

strategic challenges that have confronted the United States and the way our country’s institutions have changed and adapted over time to provide for the Nation’s 

security. Historical case studies provide the opportunity to delve into the topic of 

service cultures and civil-military relations. History, then, provides a rich vein of 

experience to understand the making of strategy in a joint and interagency environment and the barriers that can thwart strategic effectiveness. 

The courses on strategy offered by the Strategy and Policy Department thus employ in-depth examination of historical case studies. Strategic theory is put to the 

test offered by the hard reality of history. The study of history can hone the skills 

of critical analysis that are essential for understanding principles of war, the interrelationship of ends, ways, and means, and the dynamics of strategic interaction. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the faculty? How 

transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think the faculty members 

have all the power, in a non-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited 

power. How do you avoid these extremes? 

Admiral WISECUP. The process of retaining faculty at the U.S. Naval War College 

is an open, orderly and fair one. Though the College does not employ a system of 

tenure and has no intention of doing so, it accords its faculty reasonable contractual 

security consistent with the College’s mission and its quality standard for faculty. 

As a practice, the College renews contracts as early as 364 days in advance prior 

to their expiration. All faculty members are notified at least six months prior to the 

expiration of their contract. As highlighted in the Faculty Handbook, in all but extraordinary circumstances, notification of non-reappointment will be given by 1 December prior to the expiration of the contractual term. 

Faculty members with more than six years of continuous employment at the 

Naval War College have the right to request a peer review of their non-reappointment. (Six years is the typical length of time it takes to make tenure at a civilian 

university.) A Non-Reappointment Review Committee will be appointed to consider 

their appeal. This process is delineated in the Faculty Handbook. There has only 

been one request for peer review of a non-reappointment since the original Skelton 

Report was published in 1989. Non-reappointment of faculty members who have 

served more than six years is rare. 

The College is well aware of the unique governance system under which it operates. The Chief of Naval Operations essentially serves as the governance board for 

the College. Faculty members have neither tenure system nor a faculty senate. The 

formal voice of the faculty is represented by the departmental chairs who are members of the Academic Policy Council, the President’s advisory body on academic policy, practices, procedures, and resources. While there are a number of institutional 

practices and procedures to provide the faculty’s voice formally and informally, they 

are simply not the same as their counterparts at civilian universities and colleges. 

But neither is our multi-disciplinary approach to education, our faculty-built and 

taught single curriculum, or our bias toward faculty teaching teams. Faculty members must work together much more closely at NWC to accomplish departmental 

curriculum development. Faculty members must become collegial, team players to 

a much greater extent than their colleagues at civilian educational institutions. Individual faculty members who have difficulty adjusting to our unique approach to 

curriculum development and teaching a shared curriculum or simply chose not to 

adjust are generally identified in their first contractual term, well before they would 
183 

normally qualify for tenure at a civilian college or university, and depart on their 

own terms. 

Our current educational paradigm dates from 1972, when Admiral Stansfield Turner instituted the graduate-level case-study based, seminar model and expanded 

considerably the number of civilian scholars on the NWC faculty. Admiral Turner 

believed the faculty was the critical cog in a quality educational experience. To this 

day, we still contend our faculty is our center of gravity. As the College’s ‘‘Guiding 

Principles’’ from our Strategic Plan 2008–12 state ‘‘The Naval War College’s true 

strength lies in the creativity, energy, and intellectual capital of our people.’’ And 

our values in that same plan include ‘‘Academic Responsibility’’ which ‘‘means that 

one of our key duties as an academic institution is to ‘seek and state truth without 

bias.’ Our faculty enjoys full freedom of dispassionate inquiry with no limitations 

other than adherence to security classification. Within this context, faculty members 

are expected to extend and transmit knowledge to their respective fields of expertise.’’ In the ensuing thirty-seven years since Admiral Turner transformed NWC, 

this critical value of the faculty is ingrained in the culture of the College. 

This value placed on the faculty also imparts great responsibility to them. They 

take pride in their ownership of the curricula and the academic programs. They 

drive themselves relentlessly to ensure what we teach remains challenging, current, 

and relevant. Our culture of self-assessment begins with the faculty and permeates 

the institution. Continual improvement is the unspoken motto. First and foremost, 

we continue to thrive because the faculty knows the trust and confidence placed in 

them by the College’s leadership. They accept fully the responsibility and are selfdriven to excel. Continued mission success, not tenure, provides them job satisfaction and security. They, in turn, place their confidence and trust in the College’s 

leadership to be fair and judicious in its actions toward them and the College’s mission. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is your school’s role in identifying promising officers with the 

potential for high-level strategic thinking at the appropriate point in their careers? 

Admiral WISECUP. Students in the College of Naval Command and Staff take the 

Strategy and War course, which comprises 28% of the core academic curriculum. 

This course is designed to teach students to think strategically. Aside from building 

a baseline for growth in strategic analysis and thought in every student, this also 

serves as an opportunity for the faculty to discern truly exceptional students with 

potential in this area. Faculty members often use their informal networks to identify and introduce these talented leaders. On the rare occasion where a student is 

truly exceptional, he or she is formally identified with remarks on their fitness reports upon graduation. In many cases, faculty members identify superb students 

and request that they consider a tour of duty at the College in the following years. 

Departments communicate and track these students for potential assignments at 

the College. 

The U.S. Naval War College also has a number of selective programs to enable 

students and faculty to work closely on strategic issues. These include the Advanced 

Research Program, Mahan and Halsey Scholars. The Advanced Research Program 

offers highly qualified students the opportunity to participate in one of several collaborative research groups as well as substitute an in-depth research project for 

some other segment of the academic program. Selected students may join an already 

established research group and at the direction of the group’s faculty mentors, participate in the development research and analysis products of that group. Alternatively, select students can either develop a topic or chose from a list of pre-approved topics from which a major research paper is completed in place of one of two 

core courses. 

The Warfare Analysis and Research (WAR) Department conducts relevant research into current and future war fighting issues using select Naval War College 

students working under the mentorship of experienced research professionals. Collaborative research efforts are coordinated through student participation in one of 

the Halsey or the Mahan Scholars research groups while individual research work 

is guided by faculty from not only within the WAR department but also by faculty 

throughout the college as appropriate. This analysis is used to inform key policymakers, commanders and other defense and security professionals. 

Students in these programs work closely with faculty members for the duration 

of their year at the College. As a result, they receive higher contact time and significantly more mentorship than normal studying a variety of issues with strategic implications. The two major benefits of these programs are: 

1. They yield an Additional Qualification Designator (AQD) for Navy students 

which identify them for their expertise. The AQD is a personnel code which 
184 

identifies a skill set that can be matched to billet requirements throughout the 

Navy and Joint force. 

2. These professors each have continuity with these research topics and have developed a network within the Navy and the Department of Defense that enables them to identify outstanding students to other subject matter experts. 

Dr. SNYDER. How do you specifically measure the quality of the faculty and staff 

in the PME environment? 

Admiral WISECUP. CJCS PME standards for faculty members establish certain 

qualifications. The Naval War College aims for incoming faculty members to meet 

or exceed those qualifications. We then have high expectations for our qualified faculty members to continue to learn and grow as an integral element of their professional development. 

Regarding qualifications we expect our uniformed faculty to have expertise in 

their area of specialty (i.e., submarines, infantry, surface ships, aviation, logistics, 

etc.). We seek officers who have commanded as commanders or lieutenant colonels 

or held equivalent positions in the restricted line or staff communities and prefer 

officers who have also commanded as a captain or a colonel. We seek combat experience or operational experience in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. We 

seek experience at the strategic or operational levels. We expect them to be intermediate-level school graduates with JPME Phase I and expect most of them to also 

be senior-level graduates. We seek officers with joint experience, preferably Joint 

Qualified Officers. For civilian education, we expect them to possess a master’s degree at a minimum. Although a majority of our faculty have advanced degrees in 

international relations, history, political science, or military or political history, the 

discipline is not as important as their teaching ability. Our faculty has advanced 

degrees in a variety of disciplines and this diversity adds to the richness of our education. 

As stated in our Faculty Handbook, ‘‘The Naval War College expects all civilian 

faculty members whose primary duties are not primarily administrative to engage 

in professional research and exhibit a sustained commitment to scholarship. It expects most of them to publish at least some of the results of their research. Military 

members are not expected to publish, but are encouraged to do so in their areas 

of expertise.’’ For civilian professors teaching in the three core academic departments, there are common elements in every faculty member’s performance appraisal; teaching performance, curriculum development, research and publication, 

and service to the College’s larger mission. Individual faculty members meet with 

their departmental Chairs and establish personal plans annually to develop more 

specific criteria for those common areas and any distinct areas relevant to the professor’s performance. Additionally, the Faculty Handbook established criteria for 

consideration for promotion to the ranks of Associate Professor and Professor which 

includes research and publication expectations. Thus, their annual appraisals, their 

potential for promotion, and ultimately their reappointment rest, in part on their 

productive scholarship. Military faculty members are expected to research and contribute to curricula development and are judged in their appraisals accordingly. 

For PME faculty members, teaching and curriculum development are the priorities. During their first year, the primary focus is on teaching responsibilities within 

the core curriculum. Once their teaching is mastered, they expand into other areas. 

Perhaps the best published indication of our expectations for faculty quality is expressed in our Faculty Handbook’s section on qualifications for promotion, which are 

cited below: 

(a) From Instructor to Assistant Professor. The most basic criterion for promotion 

from Instructor to Assistant Professor is completion of the terminal degree when required or the attainment of sufficient professional expertise to warrant the higher 

rank. Those eligible for this promotion will also be evaluated on the basis of teaching and service done while an Instructor and promise shown of the ability to be a 

productive contributor to the work of his or her Department and the mission of the 

Naval War College. 

(b) From Assistant Professor/Assistant Research Professor to Associate Professor/ 

Associate Research Professor. The key criteria for promotion to Associate Professor/ 

Associate Research Professor are continued improvement and maturation in the faculty member’s performance of his or her duties; initial evidence of professional productivity, including first curricular products, research, publications, or other outputs 

relevant to the faculty member’s duties and area of expertise; clear evidence of further promise of scholarly or professional achievement, as defined by the leadership 

of the relevant department or unit of the College; and a demonstrated commitment 

to understanding and considering issues of jointness (to include interagency and 
185 

multinational as well as interservice collaboration) in the faculty member’s teaching 

and/or research, analysis and gaming activities at the College. 

(c) From Associate Professor/Associate Research Professor to Professor/Research 

Professor. This is an especially significant step for both the faculty member and the 

College. The criteria here include excellence in teaching or research, not simply a 

satisfactory level of performance; significant contributions to either the NWC’s educational mission or the NWC’s research, analysis, and gaming function; active engagement and visibility in the faculty member’s academic or professional community; significant productivity in scholarly publication or professional research; a consistent commitment in the faculty member’s teaching and/or research, analysis, and 

gaming to fostering critical thinking from a joint perspective and cultivating the 

ability of students/officers to function effectively in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment; a demonstrated commitment to teamwork with other faculty 

members across the departments and codes of the Naval War College; and the ability to develop or advance new ideas that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency 

of both the faculty member’s department and the College as a whole. 

Faculty members undergo two regular types of evaluation in the course of an academic year at the Naval War College. After each term of instruction, the teaching 

performance of faculty members who have taught in a core course and/or an elective 

will be evaluated by their students. At the end of each year of instruction, the overall performance of faculty members will be evaluated by their Department Chairs 

or program directors. In addition, on occasion, and as coordinated between the faculty member to be evaluated and his/her Chair or Director, the teaching of a faculty 

member will receive a formal or informal evaluation by another faculty member 

after observation of classroom performance. 

(1) Civilian Faculty Members 

(a) Teaching Evaluations. The Academic Departments, the Electives Program, the 

Naval Staff College, and the College of Distance Education each use somewhat different mixes of methods for evaluating teaching proficiency. All make use of questionnaires, critiques, or surveys filled out by students, but the items included and 

questions asked may vary from course to course. In addition to written forms of 

evaluation, direct observation of teaching performance takes place as well. The College of Distance Education, with its extensive program of periodic Site Visits to 

Fleet Seminars, makes the most formal use of direct observation of one faculty 

member’s teaching proficiency by another faculty member, although in residential 

departments that use a team-teaching approach there is much informal observation 

by faculty colleagues. On occasion, a lecture or a seminar may be visited by Department Chairs or Executive Assistants, Division or Deputy Division Heads, directors 

of programs, other senior administrators or the President. Such monitoring is not 

meant to encroach upon academic freedom and is not used simply for purposes of 

evaluation; it serves to aid curriculum development, enhance pedagogical skills, and 

otherwise help maintain the high quality of the instructional environment at the 

Naval War College. Department Chairs and the Director, CDE, may elect to incorporate the results of teaching evaluations into the annual overall appraisal of a faculty member’s performance. 

(b) Performance Appraisal and Review System. Civilian faculty members are evaluated annually in accordance with standard procedures established in the Performance Appraisal and Review System (PARS). The PARS annual appraisal period is 

1 July to 30 June or, in the case of initial appointments, from the beginning date 

of appointment until 30 June. At the beginning of the appraisal period, faculty 

members are apprised of the ‘‘job elements’’ and ‘‘performance standards’’ by which 

they will be assessed—for example, curriculum development, research and publication, teaching performance, and extra-departmental service to the Naval War College. Toward the middle of the year there is a ‘‘progress review.’’ At the end of the 

year, Department Chairs, Directors, or other supervisors make full written assessments of the performance of each of their faculty members. Faculty members have 

the right to grieve performance appraisals and other matters relating to the appraisal program in accordance with NWCINST 12430.1 (series). 

(2) Military 

(a) Teaching Evaluations. All military officers on the teaching faculty participate 

in the same teaching evaluation process that civilian faculty members do. 

(b) Fitness Reports. Fitness Reports on military faculty members are submitted 

periodically and upon detachment of officers or reporting senior. Normal due dates 

are specified by individual Service directives. The appropriate Dean is responsible 

for coordinating and processing Navy reports. The Service Advisors coordinate prep-
186 

aration of faculty and staff evaluations for the members of their respective services, 

in conjunction with the Department Chair. 

The College collects data on faculty performance from graduate and alumni surveys. The feedback continues to be very positive about the quality of the education, 

the performance of the faculty, and the relevance and currency of the curriculum. 

Dr. SNYDER. How were you chosen to be school’s commandant? How was your 

dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background should the Chief 

of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting individuals for these positions? 

Should the focus be on operational leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing in a training institution) background or both? 

Admiral WISECUP. Selection of the President of the NWC is accomplished through 

a highly competitive administrative slating and nominative process, and ultimate 

appointment by the Secretary of the Navy. 

There are four parts to the institution’s mission: 

(1) Develop strategic and operational leaders. 

(2) Help CNO define the future Navy and its roles and missions. 

(3) Support combat readiness. 

(4) Strengthen maritime security cooperation. 

If Rear Admiral Wisecup were selecting the College’s President, he would select 

based upon an assessment of the Navy’s flag officers who could fulfill all four parts 

of this mission statement. Rear Admiral Wisecup believes in addition to strong leadership the President needs expertise at the operational level of war, a comprehensive understanding naval and joint warfighting, strategic level experience, experience in the international area, and credibility with the Navy’s senior leadership, 

Rear Admiral Wisecup does not plan to retire at the completion of this tour although he serves at the pleasure of the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy. In fact 

two of the last three Presidents have not retired from this job. 

The Naval War College employs both a Provost, who is the chief operating officer 

and dean of faculty, and a Dean of Academics. Those positions provide the necessary 

educational and teaching expertise for the College’s successful mission accomplishment. Thus, it is not essential that the president have academic or teaching experience. We recently conducted a selection process to select both the Provost and the Dean 

of Academics. Both executive positions were advertised in a number of scholarly 

journals including The Chronicle of Higher Education. Well qualified candidates 

were invited to undergo the interview process here at the College. The selection 

boards included retired senior flag and general officers, faculty members, and distinguished scholars from local colleges and universities. 

Dr. SNYDER. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier civilian faculty? 

How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the elements that would attract 

the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their 

government retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.? 

Admiral WISECUP. Since the U.S. Naval War College PME faculty teach both the 

intermediate and senior courses, it is very difficult to answer this in simply an intermediate-level context. We believe we possess a top-tier civilian faculty consisting 

of a balance of academic scholars and retired professionals with superb experience 

supported by solid academic credentials. We believe both are necessary, especially 

at the intermediate-level, to perform the educational focus especially that required 

by USC Title X and CJCS Officer PME Policy. 

Many of our faculty’s stalwarts today have invested most of their professional life 

in this College and its mission. We hired most of them as younger scholars of great 

promise, retained them, and nurtured them wherever possible. They grew into seasoned, top tier faculty members. What attracted most of them was the opportunity 

to intermix with a faculty replete with esteemed scholars and the concentrated expertise of their colleagues. We believe the lure of teaching graduate-level courses to 

unique professional students (rather than introductory courses to college students) 

was a major consideration for faculty interested in job satisfaction. Our competitive 

pay and generous benefits certainly contributed to their hiring. Accreditation also 

proved significant because it meant their professional time at NWC generally met 

established academic standards, offering opportunity to retain their professional 

path of development as a professor. Our emphasis on teaching and curricula development as our principal mission vice publishing is a bit of an impediment, but for 

younger scholars there is clear evidence that publishing while at NWC is not only 

possible but encouraged. In order to continue to attract and retain top-notch scholars, it is vital that we continue to allow faculty to copyright their work under the 

conditions that currently prevail at NWC and other top PME institutions. 
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Attracting top tier, full professor faculty members from other civilian institutions 

has it challenges. Pay can be an issue. Likewise, the teaching and curriculum development responsibility can be an issue as it may compete with time for writing and 

research. For top tier civilian faculty members who have been practitioners, like retired State Department personnel, they must forfeit their annuity to join our faculty. Rectifying that would be most helpful in our continued search for such talent. 

Our current educational paradigm dates from 1972, when Admiral Stansfield Turner instituted the graduate-level case-study based, seminar model and expanded 

considerably the number of civilian scholars on the NWC faculty. Admiral Turner 

believed the faculty was the critical cog in a quality educational experience. To this 

day, we still contend our faculty is our center of gravity. As the College’s ‘‘Guiding 

Principles’’ from our Strategic Plan 2008–12 state ‘‘The Naval War College’s true 

strength lies in the creativity, energy, and intellectual capital of our people.’’ And 

our values in that same plan include ‘‘Academic Responsibility’’ which ‘‘means that 

one of our key duties as an academic institution is to ‘seek and state truth without 

bias.’ Our faculty enjoys full freedom of dispassionate inquiry with no limitations 

other than adherence to security classification. Within this context, faculty members 

are expected to extend and transmit knowledge to their respective fields of expertise.’’ In the ensuing thirty seven years since Admiral Turner transformed NWC, 

this critical value of the faculty is ingrained in the culture of the College. 

This value placed on the faculty also imparts great responsibility to them. They 

take pride in their ownership of the curricula and the academic programs. They 

drive themselves relentlessly to ensure what we teach remains challenging, current, 

and relevant. Our culture of self-assessment begins with the faculty and permeates 

the institution. Continual improvement is the unspoken motto. First and foremost, 

we continue to thrive because the faculty knows the trust and confidence placed in 

them by the College’s leadership. They accept fully the responsibility and are selfdriven to excel. Continued mission success, not tenure, provides them job satisfaction and security. They, in turn, place their confidence and trust in the College’s 

leadership to be fair and judicious in its actions toward them and the College’s mission. As stated in our Faculty Handbook, ‘‘The Naval War College expects all civilian faculty members whose primary duties are not primarily administrative to engage in professional research and exhibit a sustained commitment to scholarship. 

It expects most of them to publish at least some of the results of their research. 

Military members are not expected to publish, but are encouraged to do so in their 

areas of expertise.’’ For civilian professors teaching in the three core academic departments, there are common elements in every faculty members’ performance appraisal; teaching performance, curriculum development, research and publication, 

and service to the College’s larger mission. Individual faculty members meet with 

their departmental Chairs and establish personal plans annually to develop more 

specific criteria for those common areas and any distinct areas relevant to the professor’s performance. Additionally, the Faculty Handbook established criteria for 

consideration for promotion to the ranks of Associate Professor and Professor which 

includes research and publication expectations. Thus, their annual appraisals, their 

potential for promotion, and ultimately their reappointment rest, in part on their 

productive scholarship. Military faculty members are expected to research and contribute to curricula development and are judged in their appraisals accordingly. 

When the College revised its criteria for assignment of civilian professorial ranks 

and the criteria for promotion and published it in the Faculty Handbook, we publicly identified our key indicators of quality at each professorial rank. The specific 

criteria for promotion to the rank of professor best describe our standard for toptier faculty. The criteria are ‘‘excellence in teaching or research, not simply a satisfactory level of performance; significant contributions to either the NWC’s educational mission or NWC’s research, analysis, and gaming function; active engagement and visibility in the faculty members academic or professional community; significant productivity in scholarly publication or professional research; a consistent 

commitment in the faculty member’s teaching and/or research, analysis, and gaming 

to fostering critical thinking from a joint perspective and cultivating the ability of 

students/officers to function effectively in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment; a demonstrated commitment to teamwork with other faculty members 

across the departments and codes of the Naval War College, and the ability to develop or advance new ideas that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of both the 

faculty members department and the college as a whole.’’ 

Dr. SNYDER. What are the policies at your school regarding academic freedom? 

What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure? Describe how your faculty 

may be called upon to respond to press inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are allowed to respond in a timely manner. 
188 

Admiral WISECUP. The practice of academic freedom by faculty members at the 

U.S. Naval War College is robust. While the Congress, the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and CNO are rightfully involved in professional military education policy and engaged in determining professional educational standards, the College’s executive leadership has been successful in preserving the autonomy of the College and its faculty in deciding what to teach and 

how to teach it. Faculty members are allowed great scope for experimenting with 

different teaching methods and for expressing different points of view in the classroom. Aside from projects assigned to researchers in the Center for Naval Warfare 

Studies, faculty members have been free to choose the subjects of their research and 

writing. 

The Naval War College endorses the key elements of the 1940 statement of principles on academic freedom issued by the American Association of University Professors, as quoted in the following three items: 

‘‘(a) Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of 

results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties. . . . 

(b) Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, 

but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter 

which has no relation to their subject. . . . 

(c) College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, 

and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they 

should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position 

in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, 

they should remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise 

appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should 

make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution.’’ 

(d) As employees of an educational institution in DoD, faculty members have obligations that go beyond those incumbent upon professors in civilian educational institutions. While the leadership of the Naval War College encourages faculty members 

to write, make speeches, and give interviews in any forum, they shall not reveal 

classified information. In expressing opinions they must issue explicit disclaimers 

that they do not speak for the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, the 

Department of the Navy, or the Naval War College. Faculty members who are active-duty military officers are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 

must refrain from speech that is disparaging or contemptuous of public officials, insulting toward superior officers, harmful to good order and discipline in the military, 

or harmful to the interests of the United States. 

Hardly a week passes without Naval War College professors publicly expressing 

opinions and offering expertise on current political and military issues in a wide variety of mass media—television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and journalistic 

websites. Individual faculty members ensure this material contains a disclaimer 

identifying it as the opinion of the author and not the College. The College prides 

itself on respect for academic freedom; at the same time, the idea that the exercise 

of academic freedom should be informed in practice by a sense of responsibility is 

widely accepted among faculty members dealing with issues of great national and 

international importance. There have never been any allegations that a faculty 

member’s contract was not renewed because of his views or opinions. 

Faculty members inform their departments when they have provided or are about 

to respond to press inquiries, interviews or expert advice. Individual faculty members know they can respond timely, but must, as with their written work, provide 

a verbal disclaimer to the interviewer that the opinions and positions represent the 

individual and not the College, the Navy or DoD. Previously, faculty members had 

to travel to Providence to appear on local or national television stations for interviews. Within the last few years, the College built a television studio on campus in 

which we now facilitate such interviews. The College has recently funded the appropriate equipment to send high-quality broadcast audio from campus to support faculty radio interviews with the likes of National Public Radio or BBC. 

Dr. SNYDER. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general purpose forces to 

be educated and trained in understanding contracting and contractors. Civilians, 

contracting, and contractors on the battlefield—how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce, need to know? 

Admiral WISECUP. Civilians, contracting, and contractors on the battlefield are an 

important part of the curricula at the U.S. Naval War College. Operational Contract 

Support was recently approved as one of the 2009 Joint Professional Military Education Special Areas of Emphasis. For planning and conducting military operations 
189 

through the full spectrum of conflict, contractors on the battlefield are an integral 

part of the planning process and are included in our curricula. Contractors have 

been on battlefields during every major conflict of our nation’s history. 

In the Joint Maritime Operations course, there is a specific session on contractors, 

Nongovernmental and Intergovernmental Organizations/Contractors in the Operating Environment. The focus of the session is getting students to know that an 

operational commander cannot ignore the presence of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), and contractors in the contemporary operating environment. Objectives for the session include comprehending 

the differences in culture between military, NGO/IGO, and contractor communities. 

Students analyze the impact these differences may have on building unity of effort 

throughout the phases of an operation. In seminar they explore the capabilities and 

requirements for NGO/IGOs and contractors operate under in the joint environment. 

This session also addresses the practical challenges and risks associated with civilian contractors in the contemporary operating environment. Students come to understand that contractors are employed by most U.S. government agencies, as well 

as by IGOs and NGOs. NGOs may also be contractors. All of them may also employ 

contracted security providers. This is nothing new or unusual—contractors in one 

form or another have almost always been present on the battlefield and at sea. In 

the seminar we note there is limited service doctrine (Army doctrine, largely addressing logistics contractors) and less joint doctrine governing contractors (only 

those accompanying U.S. armed forces). Nevertheless, no joint force commander can 

hope to plan and execute operations effectively without carefully considering contractors; especially with respect to their consequences for key operational functions, 

including command and control, operational security, force protection, and logistics. 

The presence of contractors in an area of operations also raises complex and mostly 

not yet resolved legal issues concerning Status of Forces Agreements, Rules of Engagement, and the Law of Armed Conflict, not to mention problems of fiduciary responsibility. Adding contractors to the mix makes the problem of maintaining unity 

of effort with other U.S. government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs even more challenging for the JFC. We ask students to consider, among others, these questions: 

What can a joint force commander do to mitigate the risks posed by contractors, 

NGOs and IGOs? 

What considerations must be made for loss of capabilities provided by contractors? 

What are the responsibilities of the joint force commander for contractors in his 

area of operations (e.g., force protection)? 

How do contractors affect the management of operational security? 

In what ways do contractors alter the level of risk for the joint force commander? 

Is the risk military, political, or both? 

Dr. SNYDER. Explain the Naval War College’s civilian tenure program. 

Admiral WISECUP. Though the U.S. Naval College does not employ a system of 

tenure and has no intention of doing so, it accords its faculty reasonable contractual 

security consistent with the College’s mission. The process of retaining faculty is an 

open, orderly and fair one. The College continues to sustain its quality standard for 

faculty. As a practice, the College renews contracts as early as 364 days in advance 

prior to their expiration. All faculty members are notified at least six months prior 

to the expiration of their contract. As highlighted in the Faculty Handbook, in all 

but extraordinary circumstances, notification of non-reappointment will be given by 

1 December prior to the expiration of the contractual term. 

The retention rate at the College is quite high for faculty beyond the six year 

mark, when many colleges and universities begin to grant tenure. In fact, the College identified just the opposite problem, a graying faculty, several years ago. Job 

satisfaction is high among our faculty members who know they possess the significant responsibility of curricula ownership for a Navy’s profession of arms and the 

obligation to prepare the future military leaders of this nation for the challenges 

ahead. 

Dr. SNYDER. Have the Navy intermediate (College of Naval Command and Staff) 

and senior (College of Naval Warfare) courses been differentiated enough? Should 

they have been? They share a faculty. What are the challenges and benefits of that? 

Students also start at various times throughout the school year and are integrated 

with other students who have been there longer. What are the benefits and challenges of that? 

Admiral WISECUP. Yes, the Navy intermediate (College of Naval Command and 

Staff) and senior (College of Naval Warfare) at the U.S. Naval War College have 

been differentiated enough. Today, the intermediate courses taught by the Naval 

War College focus at the operational level of war and operational-level leadership. 
190 

Building operational level expertise in the Navy is one of the key focuses of Admiral 

Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations. The College contributes by producing intermediate-level graduates who are planners skilled in applying operational art through the Navy and Joint planning processes, leaders with operational-level perspectives who have honed their critical thinking skills through a 

rigorous, academic program, and effective maritime spokespersons familiar with the 

range of challenges of operating in the maritime domain and are competent in employing naval capabilities in conjunction with other Service, other agencies, and 

partner nations to achieve strategic objectives in war and peace. 

The intermediate-level course, resident and non-resident, consists of three core 

academic programs: National Security Decision Making, Strategy and Warfare, and 

Joint Maritime Operations. Together these courses focus on developing the operational knowledge base, operational-level perspective, critical thinking skills, and 

leadership required to contribute on a major staff. The senior course focuses at the 

strategic level examining national strategic and theater strategic perspectives, 

issues, and challenges. 

One of the most significant challenges with a single faculty teaching both intermediate and senior level courses is that it takes much more time than previously 

to do curriculum development because the two courses are so different. In the past, 

because of their parallel nature, there was more time available for faculty professional development or other teaching responsibilities. Additionally, the learning 

curve for new faculty members is higher since they have to learn to teach two different courses. 

The chief benefit with a single faculty is that both courses are aligned well and 

changes to the curriculum can be made easily. Both the senior and intermediate 

courses complement each other and there are efficiencies created with a single faculty. It allows the faculty to provide a progressive education experience. Our faculty 

must also meet the higher CJCS and U.S.C. Title X standards required to teach the 

JPME II curriculum. As a result, our service mix for military faculty is more robust 

than required for schools and colleges teaching intermediate-level PME with JPME 

I. Moreover, the faculty has a more comprehensive appreciation of the joint educational requirements for both JPME I and JPME II and how they work together. 

Before September 11, 2001, it was only the Navy and Marine Corps students who 

started three times per year, a schedule devised to meet their Services routine rotational deployments. These options offered flexibility for school assignment within 

tight and demanding career paths built on a culture of command and operational 

expertise. Subsequent to September 11, 2001, all Services found that their operational tempo has driven the assignment process. Now all Services avail themselves 

of the opportunity to align student academic years with their operational tempo and 

start the academic year at different times. Students rotating back from Iraq and Afghanistan are not forced to wait until the next summer rotation to start the academic year. It provides efficiency of personnel assignment without markedly affecting educational effectiveness. 

There are challenges with students starting at various times during the school 

year. In most schools, reading and writing ability and study skills are honed during 

the first 8–10 weeks of the academic year. We do this on an ongoing basis since 

there are always students that have recently started the curriculum. Additionally, 

there is an administrative overhead incurred with three different starts. The Dean 

of Students conducts three orientations and three graduation ceremonies as opposed 

to a single orientation and graduation ceremony at most other institutions. The departments must also distribute the students equitably to ensure that a single seminar does not have all new students. 

In terms of curriculum, the faculty must develop stand-alone courses for each trimester. In terms of curriculum development, faculty must be very aware of the incoming student foundational knowledge base and must on occasion provide succinct 

foundational material to facilitate transition into the course. Faculty must guard 

against redundancy especially since the curriculum is only progressive within each 

finite trimester. Having worked this educational model for nearly three decades, the 

faculty has most of the kinks out and the systematic means to assess and keep the 

core curriculum distinct, aligned and complementary. 

There are also benefits with students starting at various times during the school 

year. One of the main benefits is that students have an opportunity to master and 

synthesize the curriculum reinforcing concepts during each trimester. The exchange 

between students is high as often incoming students learn from the other students 

in a variety of informal venues and forums. In fact, it closely parallels the paradigm 

of our civilian higher education system so students readily adjust. Acculturation is 

an integral aspect on an in-resident education. The daily interaction builds trust 

and confidence and establishes career-long and life-long associations and networks. 
191 

Since our students change seminars each trimester, they closely associate with more 

of their fellow students as seminar mates extending their network of personal associates significantly more than their peers at other institutions. This process also enables them to meet three times as many their international and interagency classmates. Further, student gouge on courses and faculty passes readily between classes 

creating a sustained student memory not present in other PME schools and colleges. 

This lingering reputation positively affects the faculty and the staff who work hard 

to maintain positive reputations. 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide your school’s mission statement. 

General CARDON. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) 

educates and develops leaders for full-spectrum joint, interagency, and multinational operations and advances the art and science of the profession of arms in 

support of Army operational requirements. 

Dr. SNYDER. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the 

quality of military faculty members? What is your average tour length for military 

faculty members? Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? What is the percentage 

of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified? 

General CARDON. Faculty either returning from combat or enroute to combat operations are not always sent to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The 

same can be said of students. The typical tour length is three years; it has shortened since 9/11 with the average tour being around two years. Military faculty continue to arrive with the appropriate credentials and experience, but some aspects 

of their preparation have changed. The officers we receive now have significantly 

greater experience based upon more time in service (more lieutenant colonels versus 

majors) and repetitive combat tours. They almost universally have graduate degrees, but because of past reductions in the Army’s Advanced Civil Schooling programs fewer of them have experience in a residential graduate program. The one 

area of greatest change is with senior faculty members. A decade ago most of our 

department directors were former brigade commanders, but that is becoming the exception now rather than the norm. 

Approximately 7% of the ILE/JPME–I military faculty are JQOs. While this number may not be as high as we would like it, many of the officers returning from the 

combat zones have worked in a joint, interagency, multinational environment due 

to the demands of these wars. This means that while only 7% of our uniformed faculty are formally qualified, a much greater percentage has hands-on experience with 

joint, interagency, and multinational operations that can transferred into the classrooms. We are working very diligently to achieve a 30:70 ratio of military to civilian faculty at the Command and General Staff College. The true benefits of a mixed faculty entail differing perspectives to broaden the learning aperture of our students. 

While many of our civilian faculty are indeed retired military, we also hire purely 

academic faculty as well to ensure our academic credentials demonstrate our commitment to excellence. Two challenges affect the quality within this target ratio. 

First, the current demands of the war preclude the sustained assignment 

of our best and brightest officers. Second is the challenge of recruiting and retaining the top tier faculty because of our commitment to teaching. Publishing and 

research are more difficult with the teaching loads required at military schools, and 

restrictive copyright laws make us less attractive to many scholars. 

Dr. SNYDER. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned billets for faculty? 

What are your gaps? 

General CARDON. The Services are providing as many faculty and staff as they 

can spare because most are in the Contemporary Operating Environment. The personnel provided are qualified, dedicated professionals who take the mission of educating officers seriously. 

A current snapshot shows we currently have 275 civilian faculty members, 249 

of which have active duty experience that sums to more than 4,700 years of service. 

The military faculty projected for this summer consists of 90 Army and 17 sister 

service (10 Air Force, 4 Navy, and 3 Marine). Within our civilian faculty, 32 served 

in our sister services, which yields a comparable joint representation in the civilian 

faculty. 

Our sister services, to their credit, continue to send highly qualified officers to the 

Command and General Staff College as faculty, for they also see a clear benefit to 

the joint force in doing so. The recent selection of the Air Force Element and Navy 

Element Commanders for command is indicative of this level of quality. However, 

there are indications the services cannot sustain this effort and still meet service 

and joint requirements. Further, this creates a second order effect by decreasing the 

number of viable career officers with potential for further promotion, thus degrading 
192 

the quality of faculty. When the issue of the JDAL position changes in the NDAA 

is added to the other stresses that our sister services face, this could lead to the 

assignment of officers at the Command and General Staff College who are not promotion eligible and don’t represent the best their service has to offer. This will be 

discussed in more depth in question #7. 

We currently have three Interagency faculty members who serve full time on our 

faculty. Representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of 

State, and the National Geospatial Agency occupy exchange billets with the College 

and act as subject matter experts for our students and faculty, along with providing 

a conduit for information to and from the agencies they represent. This capability 

has shown great potential and our faculty would be greatly strengthened if more 

agencies would build in the capacity for a regular exchange at the intermediate level 

staff colleges. 

Dr. SNYDER. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage of Stability, 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations given that DOD has put 

them on a par with combat operations? 

General CARDON. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) has enhanced 

its curriculum in regards to SSTR (Stability Operations). CGSC’s U.S. Army FullSpectrum Operations (FSO) Curriculum balances combat operations and SSTR doctrine and application exercises. The course curriculum is presented in two major 

portions: Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Common Core and the Advanced Operations Course (AOC). 

ILE COMMON CORE 

The Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations (DJIMO) introduces the concept of SSTR in its Joint Functions and Capabilities lessons (C302/ 

4/5/7/8). These lessons review the functions and capabilities of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Special Ops, and Multinational Ops. 

The Center for Army Tactics (CTAC) conducts a 3 hour class—C422 Full Spectrum Operations (3 hours)—dedicated to studying the Army’s role in SSTR. The Department of Command and Leadership (DCL) curriculum includes 6 hours using 

case studies from contemporary full spectrum operations to prepare leaders to operate effectively in complex, uncertain operational environments. 

AOC 

This course provides greater emphasis on FSO and the balance between combat 

operations, SSTR, and the important transitions between them. Specific areas of instruction include: 

Campaign planning (67 hours). This area focuses at the operational level of war 

and includes SSTR planning and execution. The block concludes with a four day 

planning exercise totally focused on Phase IV Stability Operations and includes 

multinational, interagency, and joint force interactions. 

Full-Spectrum Operations (150 hours). This area focuses on land operations at the 

tactical level of war. This block includes 64 hours devoted to SSTR in a complex 

operational environment. The remaining 86 hours are focused on conventional operations, but includes transitions and stability operations planning as a part of full 

spectrum operations. 

Force Generation (36 hours). This area focuses on how Army forces are generated, 

trained, readied, and prepared to conduct full-spectrum operations including both 

combat operations and SSTR. 

Historical analysis (16 hours). The Department of Military History (DMH) modified its H300 Block, Roots of Today’s Operational Environment, to study several historical SSTR related events/periods. 

Leadership Case Studies (6 hours). The DCL curriculum uses case studies from 

contemporary operations (FSO) to prepare leaders to operate in the contemporary 

environment. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation exercises and 

war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and irregular warfare concepts? 

General CARDON. The ILE Common Core Course culminates with two application 

exercises that provide basic insights into Full Spectrum Operations, including Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) and irregular warfare. The 

main focus of these exercises is on planning skill development using both Joint and 

Service doctrinal planning tools. They are foundational in nature. The instructional 

operating environment is hybrid, but the focus is on the skills needed in any environment. 
193 

The Advanced Operations Course (AOC) O199 exercise is a ‘‘whole of government’’ 

approach. It is a 24-hour Joint Operational Level Planning exercise entirely focused 

on planning for actions, after major conflict operations have ended, through the 

transition to local national civil control. This exercise simulates the actions of a 

Joint Force Land Component staff planning SSTR operations in an environment 

where hybrid warfare (irregular warfare in which some of the insurgent fighters 

have technologically advanced systems) is occurring. The challenge for the students 

is to visualize what the operational environment will be based on a post conflict scenario, where there are remnants of conventional forces operating as well as insurgent activities and large displaced populations. The compound and complex situation includes a weak to non-functioning infrastructure, environmental concerns, a 

large number of non governmental agencies as well as cultural and social challenges 

between all the various players. The students are to develop a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach to the situation where there are multiple levels of transition from 

military to civilian control of operations as well as local to national level host nation 

transition of authority and control. The students face a resource constrained situation where they must plan to work with local authorities to restore the rule of law, 

provide essential services and train and prepare the host nation forces to work without significant outside support. The exercise is not computer supported, but rather 

a planning exercise developing a workable resourced-constrained concept in a limited timeframe. 

The AOC O399 exercise is a 36-hour practical exercise entirely focused on planning and executing actions envisioned during the O199 exercise. This exercise simulates the actions of a Brigade Combat Team planning and executing SSTR operations in a hybrid warfare environment that is facing and reacting to the challenges 

identified in the O199 exercise, including those of the integration of ‘‘Other U.S. 

Governmental Agencies’’ (Whole of Government) as well as local official and unofficial leadership and non-governmental agencies. The College is piloting with several 

possible computer support tools and simulations but no decision has been reached. 

The simulation exercises for both of these courses are supported by Interagency faculty resident at the College, augmented by personnel from their agencies. Our Distinguished Professor of National Intelligence Studies, a CIA position, provides support to these exercises in the operational and strategic use of intelligence and the 

exchange faculty member from NGA, along with augmentation from his agency, supports student requests for imagery and geospatial data. Other Interagency partners 

are being solicited to provide support to these exercises in the future. 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide the most recent survey results from your graduates 

and their supervisors. 

General CARDON. In January 2009, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College (CGSC) surveyed 9,910 Intermediate Level Education (ILE) graduates from 

academic years 2006–2008. The number of respondents was 3,476 graduates. Graduates indicated that CGSC met ILE purposes and missions; the 31 ILE-Common 

Core learning objectives; the six common Advanced Operational Warfighting Course 

(AOWC) learning objectives; the four Joint Advanced Warfighting Seminar (JAWS) 

track learning objectives; and the three W300 (Brigade Combat Team Operations) 

objectives. 

The summary report of our most recent graduate survey is attached for the committee’s use. 

CGSC has not done a supervisor survey in the last year. 

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed 

upon request.] 

Dr. SNYDER. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit for their nonhost service military faculty in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. We 

know that the tours of those who were grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it 

that these JDAL positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience? [Question #7, for cross-reference.] 

General CARDON. We recognize the value of the civilians teaching at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), but also must convey the essentiality of 

military faculty. Army officers with the right education and experience are the lifeblood of the College. The Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) 

process has provided CGSC the joint service officers critical to infusing the joint 

service perspective into the Army’s school house. However, with the NDAA of 2007 

a change was made to the rules for granting joint credit to non-host faculty teaching 

at CGSC. These billets were previously on a list of assignments receiving joint duty 

credit (JDAL) and from the College’s standpoint this was both necessary and appropriate. This JDAL listing made teaching at CGSC attractive for sister service faculty because it assured them joint credit. There is now a different system in place 
194 

which removes the JDAL status for our sister service slots. The new process does 

allow officers assigned to CGSC to apply for this credit after the fact, but joint officers consider the previous system much better, which influences their interest in 

coming to Ft. Leavenworth. The second related issue is more critical. Because our 

sister service faculty positions were dropped from JDAL status they are a much 

lower fill priority for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. They are not ‘must fill’ jobs. 

Recommendation 2 from the Skelton Report emphasized the criticality of recruiting 

and retaining a high quality faculty; having these positions on the JDAL better 

achieves this goal than the changes made with the NDAA of 2007. The Military 

Education Coordination Council (MECC) unanimously supports returning all sister 

service joint teaching billets to the JDAL. 

We truly appreciate the opportunity to address the impacts of change in rules for 

joint duty authorization list credit for non-host military in joint professional military 

education schools. This change directly impacts the quality of instruction for our officers attending Intermediate Level Education. This is all the more relevant given 

that all Command and General Staff College equivalent PME rates Joint Professional Military Education I accreditation. As discussed at the Military Education 

Coordination Council chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff, all members agreed 

that we need to revisit this critical issue. The impact from revising National Defense 

Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2007 on joint duty authorization list credit is two-fold. 

First, this change eliminates a powerful incentive for officers from these services to 

view this assignment as both developmental and career enhancing, thus narrowing 

the aperture of highly qualified officers. Second, because our sister service faculty 

positions were dropped from joint duty authorization list status they are a much 

lower fill priority for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. They are not ‘must fill’ jobs. 

Therefore, given the current strategic environment and its inherent joint, interagency, and multinational nature, we request Congress authorize joint credit for 

non-host faculty positions in joint professional military education schools. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe your school’s use of historical case studies to teach strategy. 

General CARDON. The Department of Military History teaches a required 60-hour 

military history curriculum designed to contribute to historical consciousness, critical thinking, and problem-solving skills at the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels of war for Field Grade Officers. This curriculum consists of three discrete 

blocks that address, respectively, the evolution of the Western Way of War, Military 

Innovation and Transformation, and the Roots of the Contemporary Operating Environment. Each block focuses on history, theory, doctrine, and application within the 

three main themes addressed, using history to illuminate and inform the contemporary challenges that the Officers will face when they graduate and go back into 

the field. In addition to the Military History curriculum required of all students, the 

Department of Military History also offers a slate of 36 electives. 

The Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations (DJIMO) 

teaches a 34-hour block of instruction on the Strategic Environment. The block includes a case study on the 1956 Suez Crisis. The case study addresses the political 

background and military planning leading up to and including the July-November 

1956 crisis. The actions by Egypt, France, Britain and Israel resulted in an uncoordinated series of attacks, with frequent disconnects between national political authorities and their military subordinates as well as between the vital interests of 

different nation states. This lesson has three purposes: (1) enhances student understanding of the complexities and ambiguities at the strategic level of war and the 

inter-relationships between decisions made at the strategic and operational levels; 

(2) reinforces an appreciation of the value of military history as a professional tool, 

developed throughout the H100, History block of instruction; and (3) serves as an 

opportunity to apply the concepts of ends-ways and means. The lesson further challenges the students to assimilate much of what they learned throughout the Strategic Environment block of instruction. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the faculty? How 

transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think the faculty members 

have all the power, in a non-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited 

power. How do you avoid these extremes? 

General CARDON. Title 10 faculty members are initially appointed to two year 

term contracts, with the first year being a probationary period. Upon successfully 

meeting the requirements of the probationary period, faculty members are eligible 

for reappointment at the end of their initial contract to term contracts of greater 

lengths, depending on their level of performance. Term contracts can be from 1–5 

years, with 3 years being the standard contract for those that meet College requirements. 

Title 10 faculty members who do not meet the performance standards set by their 

immediate leadership team may not be eligible for standard term contracts and may 
195 

be offered contracts of lesser duration or no contract at all. This can be true at the 

completion of the initial two year contract or at the conclusion of any successive 

term contract. Contracts of lesser duration than the standard indicate performance 

that is below the expected level and carries with them the assumption that performance must be brought up to standards by the next renewal period. Failure to meet 

performance standards by the end of the non-standard contract may result in nonrenewal of Title 10 employment and termination. Contracts of greater duration than 

the standard indicate performance that is above the expected level and carries with 

them the distinction of superior performance. 

Title 10 faculty members apply for reappointment not earlier than nine months 

and not later than six months before the end of their current contract. The application for reappointment is staffed beginning with the faculty member’s immediate 

leadership and through the appropriate channels to the Deputy Commandant, who 

approves all reappointment actions. 

If an initial appointment is not renewed, the school director will make a reasonable effort to provide three months advance written notice of the decision to the affected faculty member. If a subsequent appointment is not renewed, the director will 

make a reasonable effort to provide six months advance written notice of the decision to the affected faculty member. 

These procedures are outlined in our Faculty Manual (dated 2008), so that every 

member of the faculty knows the policies and procedures for contract renewal early 

on in their employment. The process allows for remediation with short duration contracts if the leadership believes a faculty member has shortcomings that must be 

addressed to meet College standards. Final decisions on all renewals or non-renewals are made by the College’s Deputy Commandant, after detailed review and recommendation of the academic leadership up through the Dean of Academics. 

Our mix of faculty includes military, Title 10, and Title 5 civilians. The military 

provide us currency and are not truly involved in the renewal discussion. The Title 

5 civilians are the closest thing we have to tenured faculty members. Serving at the 

GS–12 through 14 grades, they do not require contract renewal and have provided 

academic continuity for the College for many years. There are less than 10 of these 

individuals left on the faculty, but they continue to serve as senior faculty members 

in both Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and the School of Advanced Military 

Studies (SAMS). The bulk of our faculty are Title 10 civilians, the population that 

this question mainly addresses. They are contract faculty, similar to many faculty 

members at civilian institutions, who serve 1–5 year contracts. By law, they can be 

released at the end of their contract, but by custom at the College they serve as 

long term members of the faculty. There is occasionally consternation from some 

Title 10 faculty members as to their status whenever the Army looks at possible 

changes to the ILE program, but the majority of these faculty members get on with 

their duties confident that if they perform well in the classroom they will be given 

the continuing opportunity to serve. One step that has been taken to try and relieve 

any faculty consternation and avoid the extremes mentioned in the question is to 

also hire the senior academic civilians in the College using the Title 10 authority. 

The Dean of Academics and Associate Dean of Academics are both Title 10 faculty 

members, as are the Directors of the Department of Command and Leadership and 

Department of Military History. By creating a single system through which the faculty and their civilian academic leadership are all in the same renewal process, the 

College avoids the perception of a have and have-not system of extremes within the 

institution. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is your school’s role in identifying promising officers with the 

potential for high-level strategic thinking at the appropriate point in their careers? 

General CARDON. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) mission is to 

educate future leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Inter-Agency at the 

graduate level to be agile and adaptive leaders who think critically at the strategic 

and operational levels to solve complex ambiguous problems. The School runs two 

programs. One is a Senior Service College (SSC) Fellowship titled the Advanced 

Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF) with the role to educate future leaders 

of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Inter-Agency at the graduate level to be 

agile and adaptive leaders who think critically at the strategic level to solve complex 

ambiguous problems. The second program is the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) which educates future leaders of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and 

the Inter-Agency at the graduate level to be agile and adaptive leaders who think 

critically at the operational level to solve complex ambiguous problems. 

The military officers who attend the AOASF must have been selected through 

their service’s process and board for senior service college (SSC) attendance. SAMS 

recruits for AOASF students from the published SSC list. Military officers who volunteer to attend the AMSP compete in a rigorous selection process which concludes 
196 

with a local Command and General Staff College (CGSC) board. After volunteering, 

the individual competes in a selection process which begins with the Intermediate 

Level Education (ILE) Staff Group Advisors (SGA) preparing an evaluation of the 

student’s potential. Applicants also take an entrance exam composed of objective 

questions and essay questions. The SGA evaluation and applicant’s exam results are 

then reviewed by SAMS senior leaders, who subsequently conduct personal interviews with each applicant. This initial effort produces a board file with: Officer 

Record Brief, individual’s application & goals statement, entrance exam score and 

essay, SGA evaluation, applicant interview sheet, and letters of recommendation. 

The CGSC board, composed of colonels and civilian PhD faculty, conduct an objective review of each file over a week, to produce an Order of Merit List (OML). This 

overall effort is similar to formal Department of the Army selection boards and enables the command to identify and select the most qualified officers for SAMS. The 

OML is subsequently forward from the Commandant, CGSC to HQDA G1, G3, and 

the Human Resources Command CG for final approval. 

Dr. SNYDER. How do you specifically measure the quality of the faculty and staff 

in the PME environment? 

General CARDON. In response to this question, let us first deal with the quality 

of faculty. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) monitors the quality of 

its faculty both systemically and individually. From a systemic point of view, CGSC 

adheres to Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) guidance to ensure the 

requisite number of instructors from the other services and complements that mix 

as possible with selected specialists from other agencies. In addition, CGSC also employs a small number of exchange instructors from other armies such as Canada, 

Australia and the United Kingdom. The range of mixture of requisite faculty specialties and credentials figures directly in the hiring process in order to yield a composite faculty that meets institutional needs. 

CGSC manages the quality of individual faculty in two distinct stages based on 

initial hiring and subsequently on performance. Initial hiring is based upon the requirements for each specific faculty position. Some teaching positions, such as in the 

Department of Tactics, place a premium on relevant experience in the field but also 

require at least a master’s degree. Other positions, such as those in the Department 

of Military History, place more emphasis on formal academic credentials. Accordingly most of our historians hold a doctoral degree and have a track record of research and publication. 

Measurement of faculty quality performance after hiring is shaped by our Faculty 

Manual. The Faculty Manual identifies four domains of performance for faculty 

members and lays out the expectations of faculty members based upon their academic rank. The four domains that we use would look very familiar to faculty members at most academic institution and consist of Teaching, Scholarship, Service, and 

Faculty Development. First of all, because CGSC is foremost a teaching institution, 

excellence in classroom instruction is paramount. CGSC employs peer observation 

of teaching as well as student surveys to gage the performance of faculty in the 

classroom. Input from each of these sources offers instructors constructive advice on 

how to improve. While teaching makes up the largest part of any faculty member’s 

performance evaluation, the other three domains require attention. Faculty members are expected to contribute to the scholarly and professional body of knowledge 

in their discipline, be it tactics or history. As faculty progress through the ranks towards Associate Professor or Professor of Discipline, publication will become a more 

important part of their evaluation. In the same vein, all faculty members are evaluated in the areas of service and faculty development, as defined in the Faculty Manual, but these requirements grow as faculty members become more senior. 

In turn, the measurement of staff performance corresponds to the specific requirements of each position as well as to the rules under which each hiring action occurred, whether under General Schedule, the National Security Personnel System 

(NSPS), or Title 10. Senior staff positions requiring some knowledge of the functioning of academic institutions may demand a combination of academic as well as 

administrative or managerial experience. Each staff job description specifies performance career criteria in the form of job objectives against which results can be 

evaluated on an annual basis. 

Dr. SNYDER. How were you chosen to be school’s commandant? How was your 

dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background should the Chief 

of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting individuals for these positions? 

Should the focus be on operational leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing in a training institution) background or both? 

General CARDON. The Deputy Commandant is chosen as part of the general officer 

assignment process lead by the Army Chief of Staff. I will not be retiring from this 

job. The Dean of Academics was chosen after a nationwide academic search. A hir-
197 

ing panel, made up of senior members of the College leadership and members from 

the Army War College, interviewed final candidates and recommended a candidate 

to the Deputy Commandant and Commandant. The final decision was made by the 

Commandant, at that time GEN Petraeus. The Dean’s position is focused on the 

academic and teaching experience; in this case the Dean spent over 15 years on the 

faculty at the United States Military Academy and had an outstanding national reputation as a scholar and administrator. The Deputy Commandant’s position requires 

less of a focus on academic expertise and more on the operational leadership skills 

and experience. The Deputy Commandant is responsible for the content of the programs at the College and, as such, must have the recent experience necessary to 

guide the modification and maturation of the curriculum in relation to the Army’s 

mission. While the Dean provides advice and counsel on the systems and methods 

of curriculum change and faculty management, the Deputy Commandant must be 

the guiding force at the College who represents the Chief of Staff and the Commandant in forming the right programs to meet the Army’s current and future 

needs. 

Dr. SNYDER. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier civilian faculty? 

How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the elements that would attract 

the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their 

government retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.? 

General CARDON. The ongoing challenge for the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is to attract top-tier faculty who meet highly specific institutional 

needs. Overall, CGSC is successful in identifying and hiring highly qualified faculty 

members due both to actively advertising position openings and its reputation 

across the military community as a good place to work. 

CGSC defines top-tier according to position requirements. Top-tier for a tactics instructor may well mean that the individual has experience in battalion command 

or as a brigade-level staff officer. In addition, the individual should have earned at 

least a master’s degree sometime during his or her career. Most CGSC faculty positions fit this general paradigm and require significant experience as an officer in 

one of the armed services. Thus, the competition for their services will come less 

from civilian academia than from other Intermediate Level Education (ILE) institutions or civilian contractors. The pool of individuals with the requisite mix of career 

experience and academic credentials is limited. Tenure, pay, and retirement benefits 

all figure heavily in successful recruitment. 

Of course, there are some positions, especially those related to military history, 

international security, or strategy, in which CGSC must often compete with civilian 

academia. In such instances, the relative importance of tenure, research opportunities, or the ability to copyright and publish one’s work increases. CGSC has generally found that its salaries, especially at entry level, are quite competitive with 

those in civilian academia. However, in contrast to a typical system of civilian university tenure, the Title 10 system for faculty hiring provides only for renewable, 

term appointments. Nevertheless, CGSC has a commendable record to date of keeping the overwhelming majority of high-performing teaching faculty. 

Another challenge in hiring and retention stems from the higher classroom teaching loads generally expected of CGSC faculty. Accordingly, the time available to 

focus on research is less than it would be at typical civilian research universities. 

Therefore, expectations concerning publication align more closely with those of small 

liberal arts or teaching-focused colleges. As a result, CGSC considers top-tier faculty 

in these fields to be outstanding teachers who have proven their ability to research 

and publish and are recognized in their respective fields. The opportunity to publish 

has remained a bit problematic because federal law denies federal employees the 

right to copyright work that has been accomplished during government duty time. 

In other words, in order to retain the freedom to dispose of a given work as the author wishes, it is necessary for him or her to complete this work outside of duty 

hours and not use any government facilities or equipment. Not surprisingly, this 

rule clashes with the expectations of many faculty in civilian academia who are accustomed to the unencumbered right to publish freely. 

Dr. SNYDER. What are the policies at your school regarding academic freedom? 

What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure? Describe how your faculty 

may be called upon to respond to press inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are allowed to respond in a timely manner. 

General CARDON. Like most civilian academic institutions, the Command and 

General Staff College (CGSC) subscribes to the American Association of University 

Professors (AAUP) official statement on academic freedom. In practice, CGSC determines the general configuration and learning objectives of the curriculum, but 

leaves it up to individual instructors to shape all classroom dialogue. CGSC remains 

wholly committed to an environment of open, critical discussion. 
198 

As for dealing with the press, CGSC invites all faculty members to respond to 

press inquiries, as well as to submit letters to the editor or participate in online discussions. The College asks only that faculty members observe federal law with respect to the release of sensitive or classified information and that they apprise the 

Public Affairs Office of formal interviews with members of the press. 

Dr. SNYDER. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general purpose forces to 

be educated and trained in understanding contracting and contractors. Civilians, 

contracting, and contractors on the battlefield—how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce, need to know? 

General CARDON. The officers’ education should cover all aspects of operational 

contracting support as it relates to the requirements of being a Field Grade Officer. 

This education should include his/her understanding on how to manage Logistics Civilian Assistance Program (LOGCAP) operations. They first need to understand why 

the Gansler Commission Findings were initiated and what was found to be an issue 

throughout the force. Each student should be educated on the different ‘‘colors’’ of 

money and how they are allocated by law, such as Operations, Maintenance, and 

Acquisition (OMA), Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), and specific funding lines. Additional education in the contracting arena is required to understand contracting from the perspective of how to manage contracting officers and 

contracting representatives in their respective units. This would include: Joint and 

Army Contracting command and control architecture; Theater contracting command 

and control architecture; understanding how the joint acquisition review process and 

the Coalition Acquisition Review Board (CARB) validates requirements; how to interpret a contracting support annex in a theater; understanding the intrinsic aspects of Money as a Weapons System; CERP; understanding the contracting process 

in a theater of operations; being able to develop a performance work statement 

(statement of work); how to develop an Organizational Needs Statement (ONS) and 

finally how to manage contracting support of our Brigade Combat Team (BCT) 

which would include hiring, accounting for funds and managing the Brigade Contracting Officers Representatives (CORs). 

Dr. SNYDER. The Universal Intermediate Level Education program has put a 

strain on the other services to provide sufficient instructors and students. Has this 

initiative watered down the joint experience for those officers attending? 

General CARDON. The resident faculty mix of Army and other Military Department Faculty meets the requirements of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy 

(OPMEP). The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) teaches in staff groups 

(seminars) of 16 students. Under the CGSS model which is based on the OPMEP 

rules, each staff group should include one sea and one air service officer. Resident 

Class 09–02 currently in session and Class 10–01 scheduled to begin 10 August, include a total of 92 staff groups. Class 09–02 is short two sea service officers and 

10–01 will be short one Air Force officer and eight sea service officers. CGSS mitigates shortages to the extent possible. No staff group is without both sister service 

students and all staff groups short a sister service officer have an interagency student. This helps ensure diversity and different perspectives during seminar discussions. Also, to the extent possible, sister service faculty members are assigned to the 

staff groups without sister service students. Although we know service mix is vitally 

important, we believe mitigation efforts have reduced the impact of shortages. For 

a number of reasons the policy Universal Intermediate Level Education is currently 

being reexamined by the Army. Our ability to meet the OPMEP standards at CGSS 

is certainly important concern for the Army, but there are other issues within the 

current operation tempo that also must be addressed to assure that the Army is providing its future strategic leaders the best possible education. 

Dr. SNYDER. What opportunities do your students have to study language and culture? 

General CARDON. We at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) have 

begun our analysis of what are the needs for officers over the next ten years. As 

a product of our self-assessment, there are a number of initiatives in military education ongoing at CGSC, one of which is the teaching of language and culture. 

The Army now has a strategy for addressing the development of culture and language skills within the service. CGSC has already added more cultural education 

and created language opportunities. Culture is part of the foundation curriculum 

required for all Army majors. Further, of eight required electives, every student 

must take at least one from a list of approved cultural electives, usually a regional 

studies course. After this initial volley, culture becomes a component of the integrated curriculum discussed in my previous testimony. Students learn to conduct 

cultural analysis to address the impacts of culture on military operations, particu-
199 

larly as they practice or exercise their planning skills using scenarios crafted to require cultural understanding. 

Teaching language as an additional subject in a 10-month warfighting course is 

an educational challenge. Consider that Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLI) courses to bring students to a rudimentary working level of 

proficiency are all immersion experiences lasting from nine months to over a year, 

depending on the relative difficulty of the language. Language instruction is needed at CGSC, but must be prudently implemented. In January 2006, CGSC implemented Iraqi and Pashto language familiarization programs for students who upon 

graduation would join units deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 

and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). CGSC developed these programs with the 

support of DLIFLC. They helped develop the concept and provided native-speaking 

instructors. Currently, CGSC offers operational language familiarization classes in 

Iraqi dialect Arabic and Dari. These are the prominent languages used in current 

operations and are consistent with Military Training Team (MiTT) language training conducted at Ft Riley, KS. The 48 hour mandatory courses prepare students for 

OIF/OEF deployment assignments. The courses not only introduce students to Iraqi 

and Dari languages, but also Arab and Afghan interpersonal cultural. The course 

increases awareness of cultural norms, values, customs and events. Since the 2006 

elective term, all students can enroll in self-study language electives to study a language of their choice (self development) using Rosetta Stone, available through 

Army Knowledge Online (AKO). Students may choose from any of the languages offered in Rosetta Stone online through Army E–Learning (Arabic, Chinese, Danish, 

Dutch, Farsi (Persian), French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Hindi, Indonesian, Italian, 

Japanese, Korean, Dari, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swahili, Swedish, 

Tagalog, Thai, Turkish, Vietnamese, Welsh). In April 2008, CGSC developed a strategic language program that allows students to study Chinese, French, Spanish or 

Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) in a modified year-long program employing directed 

self-study, distance learning, and resident instruction conducted by DLIFLC instructors. Students acquire basic knowledge of the language in listening, speaking, reading and writing, to include the basic grammar, syntax and cultural information. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is the impact of not being able to hold copyright, especially on 

civilian faculty? 

General CARDON. The inability to hold copyright has in some instances acted on 

a constraint on faculty publication. For example, a faculty member who intends to 

publish with an academic press must do the writing on his or her own time. Alternatively, work done on duty time must be offered to a government press for first 

right of publication. Whether or not a government press chooses to publish the work 

in question, the inability to copyright is an impediment to outside publication since 

all academic and commercial publishers expect to copyright the works they publish. 

Thus, in order to meet legal requirements, a work initially authored on duty time 

must undergo substantial revision outside of duty time to be considered copyrightable. Needless to say, many civilian faculty chafe under this restriction and consider 

it a deterrent both to research and publication. While we have no specific evidence 

of this affecting the employment decisions of prospective civilian faculty has been 

noted, it could be perceived as a deterrent if we are in competition with a non-government academic institution. 

Dr. SNYDER. What expanded Title 10 authorities are needed? 

General CARDON. Current Title 10 authority has, thus far, been used extensively 

in Intermediate Level Education (ILE) to meet our mission requirements. For Professional Military Education (PME) overall, the largest problem with Title 10 authority is the requirement in the law that a course be 10 months in length to qualify 

for Title 10 faculty. A relaxation of this requirement would permit a broader use 

of the Title 10 authority to meet faculty needs. 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide these two documents: 1) CGSC Student Text 2010, 

Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis, August 2007 and 

2) Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Program Information, August 2007. 

General CARDON. The latest version of the two referenced documents, updated for 

the class beginning in February 2009, is attached for your use. 

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed 

upon request.] 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide your school’s mission statement. 

General JACKSON. Air Command and Staff College’s (ACSC) current mission statement is to prepare field-grade officers to develop, employ and command air, space 

and cyberspace power in joint, combined and multinational operations. ACSC reviews the mission statement as a part of its strategic planning processes to ensure 

it is focused on producing agile, critical thinkers to meet future challenges. Based 

on the latest review the statement is being changed to prepare field-grade officers 
200 

to develop, employ and command air, space and cyberspace power in joint, multinational and interagency operations. The minor change more accurately reflects the 

environment in which ACSC graduates will be operating. 

Dr. SNYDER. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the 

quality of military faculty members? What is your average tour length for military 

faculty members? Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? What is the percentage 

of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified? 

General JACKSON. Current operations have actually increased the quality of military faculty members. First hand operational experience provides instant credibility 

with students. The experience is an excellent source of real-world examples/cases 

and contacts that can be exploited for curriculum material and faculty development 

opportunities. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) now has a high percentage 

of faculty members who have had experience, either in command or in staff positions, who have dealt with the challenges of combat, stabilization, and reconstruction. The challenge is getting faculty members from the highly stressed career fields. 

ACSC works closely with the Air Force Personnel Center to minimize the impact 

of deployments on faculty manning. Coordination and timing of 179-day and 365- 

day deployments are keys to minimizing impact. 

Tour lengths for our military faculty members are typically 3 years. We often 

allow shorter tours to support members selected for key command and leadership 

positions. This flexibility and support is an incentive for making faculty assignments 

more attractive. 

Credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees have not diminished. 

The ACSC Advanced Academic Degree (AAD) program has been instrumental in increasing the academic credentials among the military faculty members. These are 

Air Force-sponsored programs that select highly qualified military faculty members 

for funded study at civilian institutions to acquire advanced (doctoral or master’s 

level) degrees in fields directly applicable to the ACSC curriculum. Most ACSC faculty members have joint operational experience; however, only three percent are 

fully JQO qualified. 

Dr. SNYDER. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned billets for faculty? 

What are your gaps? 

General JACKSON. Sister services have been very supportive in providing outstanding faculty members but an emerging issue is joint credit for faculty duty at 

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). Faculty requirements for ACSC are outlined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). The mix of military faculty members 

whose primary duty is student instruction of Joint Professional Military Education 

should be a minimum of 5 percent from each non-host Military Department. ACSC’s 

current requirement based on this policy is 7 Army, 5 Navy, and 2 Marine faculty 

members. ACSC does not have faculty billets for other agencies. Faculty and advisory positions from the other agencies are assigned at the Spaatz Center for Officer 

Education or Air University and ACSC draws upon these resources for interagency 

expertise. ACSC is currently short two Naval faculty members with one projected 

fill in November 2009. A significant contributing factor is the Navy Fiscal Year 09 

Permanent Change of Station funding shortfall. 

Dr. SNYDER. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage of Stability, 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations given that DOD has put 

them on a par with combat operations? 

General JACKSON. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes that the 

planning and conduct of post-conflict operations are as important as combat operations. Accordingly, the college has added both lectures and seminars that pertain 

specifically to SSTR. Draft revision to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) includes 

a Learning Area Objective that specifically requires Intermediate Level Colleges to 

address the topic. The wording of the objective in the draft states that students 

should ‘‘comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff 

in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans to include Weapons of 

Mass Destruction/Effect (WMD/E), irregular warfare, information operations, Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) and strategic communication.’’ The International Security Studies course covers weak and failing states and 

the problems surrounding stability operations. The course examines not only military options, but diplomatic (i.e. international/multinational to include nongovernment organizations and intergovernmental organizations) and economic resources 

and strategies related to this topic. The Warfare Studies course has curriculum time 

devoted to war termination and conflict resolution, with focus on operations in 

Kosovo. The course also includes curriculum time directly focused on stability oper-
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ations in Afghanistan. The Joint Campaign Planning course devotes a lecture and 

seminar to planning considerations for conducting SSTR operations in irregular 

warfare. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation exercises and 

war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and irregular warfare concepts? 

General JACKSON. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) principally uses two 

scenarios to support educational objectives concerning SSTR and irregular warfare 

operations. These scenarios also support SSTR and irregular warfare educational 

objectives in the Joint Advanced Warfare Elective Series (JAWES). The first scenario is the Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey (GAAT) scenario and the second is the Joint Forces Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (JFCOM/ 

NATO) Zoran Sea scenario. The GAAT scenario is used during the annual Intermediate Level Education Exercise with the Army Command and General Staff College and a variant of the GAAT scenario is incorporated into the Joint Planning Exercise of the Joint Planning course and the Joint Air Exercise during the Joint Air 

and Space Operations course. 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide the most recent survey results from your graduates 

and their supervisors. 

General JACKSON. The Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) executes an aggressive closed-loop feedback process to assess quality and constantly improve our 

program. While any student can critique any event, each week during the academic 

year we task one fourth of the ACSC class in rotating groups to provide feedback 

for the lectures, seminars, readings, and guest speakers delivered that week. These 

surveys provide a method to detect and influence immediate trends. At the end of 

each of our 11 courses, all students and the faculty who taught the course are asked 

to provide feedback on the effectiveness, structure, relevance, and workload of the 

course as well as whether the course achieved its stated educational objectives. Just 

prior to graduation, we survey the students on the overall program, soliciting their 

feedback on whether the program achieved our published educational outcomes, the 

proportion of curriculum devoted to various topics, the variety and quality of instructional methodologies employed, the support, the value, and so on. Satisfaction 

rates are over 85 percent positive in virtually all categories surveyed, and return 

rates give us a 95 percent confidence that the survey results accurately reflect the 

opinion of the student population within 5 percent. Finally, surveys are sent to 

graduates and the graduates’ supervisors approximately one year after graduation. 

The survey to our graduates consists of questions dealing with broad areas such as 

mission effectiveness, program value, career institutional impact, and areas that reflect how well the curriculum helped them in their current duties. Results from the 

last two classes on these surveys showed satisfaction levels of over 85 percent in 

every area measured. In fact, most areas exceeded 95 percent satisfaction. Supervisor results on questions that parallel those we ask the graduates were unanimously (100 percent) positive. A remarkable trend that we’ve observed is that the 

already-high satisfaction levels on the exit surveys are even higher on the post-graduate surveys. This further substantiates the lasting value of the resident professional military education experience. All survey data are used to inform decisions 

of the curriculum builders and is briefed to the commandant as part of the course 

approval process. 

In addition to the routine graduate and supervisor surveys ACSC seeks feedback 

from the Command Board of Advisors (CBOA). The CBOA is chaired by the Air 

Education and Training Command vice commander and consists of the vice-commanders of the major commands. This body includes the key stakeholders in the 

ACSC educational program. The CBOA provides information about the educational 

needs of the commands and their level of satisfaction with ACSC (and other Air 

University schools) graduates and programs. At the last meeting of the CBOA members indicated Air University programs (including ACSC) perform well in meeting 

the needs of Airmen, developing warrior-leaders for the Air Force and providing 

education in the right eight areas prescribed by the Air Force Competency List. 

Dr. SNYDER. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit for their nonhost service military faculty in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. We 

know that the tours of those who were grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it 

that these JDAL positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience? 

General JACKSON. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College. 

The long-term effect of restricting JPME I institutions from adding billets to the 

Joint Duty Assignment List has yet to be determined. While having the joint duty 
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designator for faculty member positions is a selling point when soliciting volunteers, 

there are a number of assignment policies that can positively impact the quality and 

number of candidates. The Department is exploring these options in concert with 

the Military Services. In addition, the Department has indicated no objection to the 

withdrawal of the statutory prohibition provided that these positions are vetted 

along with all other potential joint qualifying assignments. It is possible that given 

the right mixture of duties and responsibilities, faculty members can meet the statutory definition of joint matters. If the statutory prohibition is lifted, these positions 

can be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe your school’s use of historical case studies to teach strategy. 

General JACKSON. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College. 

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) is focused at the operational level of war 

and the strategy taught is operational strategy from the joint force commander’s 

(JFC’s) perspective. The entire Warfare Studies course deals with the concepts of 

operational warfare and strategy, the factors that influence and have led to changes 

in operational art and strategy, and examines in great detail the differences between regular warfare and irregular warfare strategies. Case studies include the attrition warfare on the Western Front in World War I, mechanized warfare in World 

War II, airpower operations in Kosovo, irregular warfare and stability operations in 

Afghanistan, T.E. Lawrence in the Middle East, and counterinsurgency operations 

in Iraq. The Air, Space and Cyberspace course specifically examines strategies for 

the development and employment of air, space and cyberspace power. This involves 

study of classical and contemporary air power theory, and the evaluation of historical air power strategies as well as air, space and cyberspace strategies in ongoing 

operations. Through historical case studies of air power in the Korean and Vietnam 

Wars, the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, students analyze the evolution of U.S. air 

power strategies since WW II. Coalition air power strategy is examined through lessons on Operations Deliberate Force and Provide Promise, along with operations in 

the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. Lessons on Chinese and Soviet air power in the 

Korean War and Israel’s recent conflict with Hezbollah provide insight into air 

power strategies employed by other countries. These historical studies encourage assessment of the effectiveness of diverse air power strategies in different geopolitical 

and military contexts. Students are prompted to take lessons from these historical 

cases and apply them to the development of effective air power strategies for future 

operations. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the faculty? How 

transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think the faculty members 

have all the power, in a non-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited 

power. How do you avoid these extremes? 

General JACKSON. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College. 

The initial appointment of faculty is based on the applicant’s meeting the minimum criteria for each academic grade established as described in Air University 

Instruction 36–2314, Academic Rank. All civilian faculty members new to federal 

service serve a one-year probationary period. The reappointment process normally 

begins 12 months prior to the expiration of a faculty member’s current appointment. 

Air University (AU) policy requires that any non-renewal decision must be communicated to the faculty member in writing at least 12 months before the effective date 

for those on an appointment of 2 years or longer. The faculty member’s supervisor 

prepares a staff summary sheet which details the faculty member’s current appointment data and the requested reappointment terms. The faculty member’s vita or resume is attached as supporting documentation and forwarded to the Dean of Academic Affairs and the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) Commandant for review. The ACSC Commandant signs the staff summary sheet and sends the renewal 

package to the AU Commander for approval. Once approved, the faculty member’s 

supervisor explains the terms of reappointment approved by the AU Commander to 

the faculty member. Faculty members are reappointed for a period of 1 to 5 years. 

Reappointment occurs when significant contributions to AU and ACSC are expected 

for the term of the reappointment. Any member of the faculty may be removed for 

cause (such as misconduct or poor performance) regardless of academic tenure, faculty status, or length of appointment according to applicable statutory and regulatory provisions governing federal employment. 

The renewal and non-renewal process is very transparent. Information and processes related to reappointment and termination/non-reappointment are included in 

Air Force and Air University instructions (AFI 36–804, Civilian Faculty Pay Plan 

for Air University and the USAF Academy and AU Supplement 1) and the Air Uni-
203 

versity Faculty Handbook. Each publication is posted on the Air University website. 

Individuals are briefed on the processes as a part of their initial faculty orientation. 

AU and ACSC avoid the extremes and arbitrariness through transparent personnel policies and the involvement of faculty in administrative and curriculum development processes. For example, the ACSC curriculum is created, reviewed, and 

approved by the full-time faculty members through a rigorous, academic, corporate 

process. Curriculum guidance is strategic in nature with primary responsibility for 

the content, quality, and effectiveness of the curriculum placed with the faculty. 

This strategic guidance ensures ACSC remains focused on the mission of the college 

while providing flexibility for the faculty to design courses to achieve the strategic 

objectives. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is your school’s role in identifying promising officers with the 

potential for high-level strategic thinking at the appropriate point in their careers? 

General JACKSON. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College. 

Air Command and Staff College’s (ACSC) primary role in identifying promising 

strategic thinking officers rests in providing opportunities for academic preparation. 

The school’s Joint Advanced Warfare Elective Series (JAWES) focuses on preparing 

U.S. and international students for second year programs such as the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), School of Advanced Military Studies 

(SAMS), and the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW). During Academic Year 

2010, ACSC will expand the number of students participating in JAWES from 85 

to 102. The mission statement of SAASS is to produce strategists through advanced 

education in the art and science of air, space, and cyberspace power to defend the 

United States and protect its interest. One of the means of identifying officers with 

the potential for high-level strategic thinking is through the highly competitive selection process for the school. ACSC also has a Distinguished Graduate program 

that identifies the top 10 percent of the graduating class. This indicates the individual has excelled in a program that is focused on producing critical and strategic 

thinkers. This designation is entered into the individual’s training report that becomes a part of the permanent personnel record. 

Dr. SNYDER. How do you specifically measure the quality of the faculty and staff 

in the PME environment? 

General JACKSON. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College. 

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) measures quality based on credentials at 

the time of appointment/assignment and performance on elements or factors in the 

faculty member’s work plan. We measure the quality of faculty members in three 

distinct areas: teaching, research and publication, and service. A strong faculty development program is key in developing and sustaining a high quality faculty. 

The college’s unique mission requires a distinctive mix of faculty qualifications 

and credentials. Traditional civilian academics provide the depth and breadth of 

subject-matter expertise to guarantee the academic rigor of the college’s offerings 

while simultaneously ensuring adherence to validated teaching theory and practice. 

Military officers contribute unparalleled currency and expertise in the operational 

topics so critical to the college’s success. 

ACSC sets high standards for its military faculty members to ensure its high 

standards for educational excellence are never compromised. Military faculty requirements are communicated to the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) for use in 

assignment of individuals to faculty duty at ACSC. With the unique hiring process 

(non-volunteers) for active duty AF faculty members, we use their level of educational credentials and prior professional experience to determine if they are academically qualified (terminal degree) and/or professionally qualified (graduate degree plus applicable professional experience). Military members must have completed the appropriate levels of professional military education (PME), functionalarea education and training, and offer expertise relevant to the College’s core curriculum. In addition, ACSC strives to ensure that 75 percent of its military faculty 

members have completed intermediate or senior level PME in residence or earned 

qualification as a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). 

Our civilian faculty members are hired as academically qualified; we recruit civilians based on their terminal degree and research experience/interests in areas of expertise applicable to the ACSC educational program. We expect all faculty members 

to continue their professional development through professional activities such as 

conference attendance, research and publications/presentations. 

To ensure a continuous level of improvement in the execution of the educational 

program (instruction) we use several feedback methods including student assessment of instruction and peer/supervisor observation and evaluation. Additionally, 

through our faculty development colloquia, faculty members inform each other re-
204 

garding current events, classroom best practices and re-emphasize successful instructional techniques. 

Military faculty members are evaluated through the Air Force personnel evaluation system and through annual instructional reviews within the college or when 

a change in reporting official occurs. These performance reports are completed in accordance with established Air Force (or other Service) personnel policies using the 

appropriate official form. Each civilian faculty member is evaluated based on three 

primary criteria: teaching effectiveness; research, scholarship, and publication; and 

service. Assessment of these criteria is based on the work plan established for the 

individual at the beginning of the appraisal cycle. Civilian faculty members’ merit 

pay and cash/time off awards are based on this assessment. 

Dr. SNYDER. How were you chosen to be school’s commandant? How was your 

dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background should the Chief 

of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting individuals for these positions? 

Should the focus be on operational leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing in a training institution) background or both? 

General JACKSON. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College. 

The commandant and all military faculty members are selected through the Air 

Force assignment system. The Air Force General Officer Management Office works 

to ensure that a highly qualified individual is selected to lead Air Command and 

Staff College (ACSC). There is no academic qualification for the commandant (O– 

7 position). The recommendation is coordinated with the Commander, Air Education 

and Training Command, and presented to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for approval. The group reviews leadership, operational, and educational experiences to 

identify an individual with appropriate credentials to lead an educational program 

that is academically accredited, steeped in joint operations, and that graduates students who are agile, critical thinkers prepared to meet any challenge. 

The ACSC Dean of Academic Affairs is coded in the personnel system as an O– 

6 position requiring an advanced academic degree. The ACSC Commandant, Spaatz 

Center Commander, and Air University Commander work with the Air Force Colonel Management Office to identify Air Force O–6s with advanced academic degrees 

who are eligible for reassignment. This list is reviewed and bids placed for officers 

with credentials that most closely align with the ACSC requirements and desires. 

Brig Gen Jimmie C. Jackson, Jr., retired from the job after serving 2 years as the 

commandant. He was only the second commandant to retire from the position over 

the last 30 years. The position is viewed as a command-level position and individuals normally serve for a 2-year period similar to other Air Force command assignments and move on to other positions in the Air Force or Joint community. 

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force should look for an individual with strong leadership credentials and operational and educational experiences that complement 

other Air University senior leadership. This is important because of the synergies 

gained in having all officer professional military education collocated in one location 

and organization. At ACSC, the Commandant and Dean of Academic Affairs are 

viewed as military leadership assignments. Focus should be on a balance of operational leadership credentials and academic/military education experience. Because 

of the diversity of the student body it is important that the commandant articulate 

his/her leadership perspective and share operational experience with the class. 

Dr. SNYDER. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier civilian faculty? 

How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the elements that would attract 

the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their 

government retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.? 

General JACKSON. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College. 

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) uses Title 10 U.S. Code authority to hire 

civilian faculty members. Strategies for recruiting and retaining civilian faculty 

members depend on ACSC’s needs at the time. The search must be comprehensive, 

transparent and consensus-driven. In all aspects of the hiring process the objective 

should be a comprehensive search of the best available candidates and a transparent and inclusive hiring procedure that encourages maximum participation. 

Comprehensive and rigorous recruitment and screening processes are used to obtain 

civilian faculty members, assisted by the Civilian Personnel Office in recruiting advertisements in USAJobs.Com, Chronicle of Higher Education, and targeted professional journals. ACSC also directly targets respected higher education institutions, 

professional organizations and centers of excellence related to the discipline or professional area of focus. ACSC also encourages current faculty members to become 

recruiters at professional conferences and in their research collaboration efforts. 

General criteria used for evaluating candidates for initial appointment include pro-
205 

fessional competence, as evidenced by educational achievement and experience (degrees earned or other professional recognition); academic activity and service; publishing record; evidence of effective teaching; reputation in a field of academic or 

professional specialization; and promise of significant contribution to the mission 

and operation of Air University (AU) and its schools. 

Defining ‘‘top-tier’’ faculty occurs within the relevant disciplines and within the 

academic rank level being focused. Each discipline and rank has its own specific criteria, but they always involve a combination of scholarship, teaching and service. 

Top-tier definition for young first-time faculty members are based more on presumptive potential for effective teaching, research, and consultation while those more mature in the discipline it is based on demonstrated evidence. ACSC defines a top 

quality civilian faculty as those who have: experience in the subject matter sought 

in the vacancy, evidence of academic activity and service, a record of publication in 

peer-reviewed outlets in the subject matter sought or related fields, and evidence 

of outstanding teaching. Top tier faculty members within professional military education are multi-role professionals who possess military and/or civilian education 

credentials, are capable of research and publishing, and effective teaching. 

Degree-granting authority and regional accreditation play an intrinsic role in attracting top-tier civilian faculty members. Accreditation signifies high standards and 

serves as a common denominator among academic institutions. High-caliber professors are more likely to seek out teaching and research opportunities at accredited 

institutions. Air University’s accreditation has been a key factor in enabling ACSC 

to continue to attract and retain top-tier civilian faculty. Attracting top-tier faculty 

also requires a wide range of incentives. No single incentive can be solely relied 

upon to attract the quality of faculty required to educate intermediate-level students. The best quality faculty members necessarily want to achieve prominence 

and respect within their disciplines; therefore the elements that attract the highest 

quality faculty are those elements that enable them to achieve excellence in their 

discipline. Tenure is an issue for some faculty candidates. There have been in the 

past some candidates vying for vacant faculty positions who have either voiced their 

concerns or withdrawn themselves from consideration after discovering we do not 

have a tenure track. The most often cited benefits of a tenure system would be to 

protect faculty members from the vagaries of faculty management policy changes 

and to provide additional reassurances on the promise of academic freedom. Academics respond to attractions of pay and benefits no differently than other job seekers. Support for research travel, technology support and flexibility in establishing 

an individual’s research agenda are important in attracting some civilian faculty 

members. 

Dr. SNYDER. What are the policies at your school regarding academic freedom? 

What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure? Describe how your faculty 

may be called upon to respond to press inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are allowed to respond in a timely manner. 

General JACKSON. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College. 

Air University (AU) has a clearly articulated policy on academic freedom which 

is an amended form of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) 

definition of academic freedom. AU Instruction 36–2308, Academic Freedom states: 

‘‘Air University faculty, students, and staff are members of a learned profession, 

and members of their respective educational organizations. The free exchange 

of opinions and ideas is essential to the educational process and, to the greatest 

extent possible, faculty, students, and staff are encouraged to speak and write 

freely. Even in this academic setting, however, the importance of the University’s military mission requires limits on some types of expression. For example, 

in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), commissioned 

officers, officer trainees, and cadets may not use contemptuous words toward 

the President, Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 

of the Air Force, and others. In addition, military members may not make disrespectful remarks about a superior commissioned officer, nor may an enlisted 

member make a disrespectful statement toward a superior noncommissioned officer. In addition to these specific restrictions on military members, faculty, students, and staff should remember that the public might judge the armed forces 

or Air University by their spoken or written statements. In any public forum, 

Air University faculty, students and staff members should make every effort to 

indicate clearly that the opinions they express are personal to the member, and 

do not represent the official views of their organization, Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the U.S. government, or any other government or academic community.’’ 
206 

Academic freedom is further enhanced and safeguarded though AU’s policy of 

‘‘non-attribution.’’ ACSC encourages guest lecturers, faculty and students to state 

their opinions and support or offer critical opinion of any objective, policy, strategy, 

or tactic while pursuing knowledge, understanding, and improvement of the military 

profession. In the articulation and defense of ideas and positions on issues, individuals should endeavor to be accurate, should show respect for the opinions of others 

and should make every effort to indicate they do not speak for the university. It is 

acceptable to say ‘‘a previous speaker’’ made a particular statement, but the speaker’s identity may not be divulged without permission. 

The role of academic freedom is equally important in tenure and non-tenure environments. Although ACSC civilian faculty members do not receive tenure ACSC ensures procedures are in place to safeguard and protect academic freedom. This is 

foundational to the full freedom of research and the publication of the results. Academic freedom is fundamental in producing students who are agile, critical thinkers 

capable of leveraging new ideas in the complex and fast-paced environment of military operations. Freedom for faculty to discuss their subject in the educational setting is key to the critical thought process. 

AU faculty members are called upon to respond to the press regarding matters 

in their respective field(s) of expertise and they are encouraged to respond in a timely manner. The only limitation to any response concerns discussions of sensitive 

subjects and, depending on the scope of the request, coordination with senior-level 

Public Affairs staff may be appropriate. In addition, notifying supervisors and leadership of the press inquiry is standard practice. How faculty respond depends on 

the manner in which a request is made; for instance, whether through direct contact 

with the faculty member or through a request to Public Affairs. Faculty members 

may respond independently or may request Public Affairs facilitation. All requests 

are handled with utmost awareness of press deadlines and every effort is made to 

respond in a timely manner. 

Dr. SNYDER. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general purpose forces to 

be educated and trained in understanding contracting and contractors. Civilians, 

contracting, and contractors on the battlefield—how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce, need to know? 

General JACKSON. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired. Answer is provided by Air Command and Staff College. 

A general understanding of the acquisition and budgeting processes is appropriate 

because of the staffing and leadership roles that Air Command and Staff College 

(ACSC) graduates fill. ACSC addresses the acquisition reforms/issues through readings, lectures, and seminar discussion. The key focus is the impact of having the 

right equipment, at the right time to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace. Discussions of the impact of civilians and contractors on the battlefield are 

included in our warfare studies courses and the leadership and command lessons. 

These discussions are incorporated into the learning area objective related to the 

role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various 

theater policies, strategies and plans, and building partnerships. 

Dr. SNYDER. Regarding languages, regional studies, and cultural competency— 

how much can be taught at the intermediate level and for what purpose? What feedback have you been receiving from your students on your foreign language training? 

What changes have you effected on the basis of that feedback? 

General JACKSON. NOTE: Brigadier General Jackson has retired and the answer 

is provided by Air Command and Staff College. 

Modern leaders need to grasp the broader context of modern military operations, 

comprehending both the challenges and opportunities that confront the United 

States in the 21st Century. They must also understand the security policies, national planning systems and resulting strategies through which the U.S. will employ 

instruments of power to engage regionally and globally. This involves regional studies, development of cultural competency and a familiarization or understanding of 

the nuances of languages in a region. 

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) responded to the Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force initiative to introduce language training into the college’s curriculum in Academic Year 2007. During the first 2 years of implementation the program consisted 

of completing an assigned number of language software modules in Rosetta Stone 

in one of the four strategic languages (Spanish, French, Mandarin Chinese or Arabic). Students were required to take the Defense Language Aptitude Battery Test 

as a data point in determining which languages students were vectored to. Students 

were offered optional use of Defense Language Institute’s (DLI) mobile training 

teams. The program for Academic Year 2010 will shift to a mandatory program of 

30 hours of face-to-face mediated instruction with DLI instructors. Software tools 

will be available to students to supplement classroom instruction. 
207 

Surveys of students conducted at the end of the language familiarization program 

and at graduation revealed some of the lowest levels of satisfaction of all the areas 

measured. ACSC’s assessment of the program indicated that it is very difficult to 

gain language proficiency within the time allotted for the program without significantly impacting the critical time needed to focus on the core curriculum. The college now uses the term ‘‘language familiarization’’ and ‘‘language enhancement’’ to 

describe the language program. The Air Force vision is to focus language capability 

development and proficiency earlier in an individual’s career and provide enhancing 

opportunities throughout the career. The Air Force Culture and Language Center 

located at Air University provides the strategic leadership and guidance for the language program. 

ACSC’s Regional and Cultural Studies course focuses specifically on regional and 

cultural competencies. Tools for understanding and interacting with and within 

other cultures and the broad regional differences are a major component of the 

course. ACSC has introduced culture-general and culture-specific concepts and skills 

and integrated them into the existing curriculum. This course has also improved the 

integration of the over 70 International Officer students into the educational process 

of understanding regions and cultures. 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide your school’s mission statement. 

Colonel DAMM. Informed by the study of history and culture, Command and Staff 

College (CSC) educates and trains its joint, multinational, and interagency professionals in order to produce skilled warfighting leaders able to overcome diverse 21st 

Century security challenges. 

Dr. SNYDER. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the 

quality of military faculty members? What is your average tour length for military 

faculty members? Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications diminished during this period? What is the percentage 

of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified? 

Colonel DAMM. How have ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan affected the 

quality of military faculty members? I would say that the ongoing operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan have positively affected the quality of military faculty members. 

We now have a generation of field grade officers with multiple deployments in combat environments—nothing beats experience and the subsequent ability to pass 

along that knowledge to the next level of warfighter. 

What is your average tour length for military faculty members? The average tour 

length for military faculty members is two years. Over the last several years the 

tour length for the majority of Marine faculty has been only one year, but it is a 

good news story. This is because the rate of selection for promotion to O–6 and selection for Command has been very high among our Marine faculty and, once they 

are selected, they are reassigned. The College and Marine Corps University have 

made the conscious decision to accept capability over continuity; we ‘‘hire’’ highly 

competitive Officers as our Instructors. As long as the level of quality among the 

Marine faculty remains high, we will live with the fact that some may be leaving 

earlier than they otherwise are slated. 

Have the credentials of military faculty in terms of graduate degrees and JQO 

qualifications diminished during this period? No, the credentials of military faculty 

in terms of graduate degrees and JQO qualifications have not diminished as the 

services, and the Marine Corps in particular, has continued to promote officer professional military education during this period of high operational tempo. 

What is the percentage of military faculty who are fully JQO qualified? 

Fifty percent of our Military teaching faculty are JQO. 

Dr. SNYDER. Are the services and agencies filling their assigned billets for faculty? 

What are your gaps? 

Colonel DAMM. Yes, the sister services and agencies are fulfilling their assigned 

billets for our faculty. At present we have two United States Air Force (USAF) officers, two United States Army (USA) officers, two United States Navy (USN) officers, 

and one International Military Officer (IMO) from Norway on staff here at CSC. 

This is in addition to the twelve United States Marine Corps (USMC) officers, eighteen Terminally Degreed civilian faculty members, and a number of adjunct Marine 

Corps University (MCU) chair faculty available to our student population. 

At present, I would not say that we have any identifiable gaps within our faculty 

as we are as strong as we have ever been in the history of our school. 

Dr. SNYDER. To what extent has the curriculum enhanced its coverage of Stability, 

Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations given that DOD has put 

them on a par with combat operations? 

Colonel DAMM. Prior to 2005 approximately 17% of the curriculum was dedicated 

coverage of Irregular Warfare subject matter. Beginning with Academic Year 2005– 

2006, Marine Corps Command and Staff College began implementing a comprehen-
208 

sive redesign of its curriculum in response to emerging lessons from Afghanistan 

and Iraq with the objective of maintaining the highest degree of currency and relevancy with regard to the challenges and opportunities of the contemporary security 

environment. Now in its fifth year, this effort has yielded impressive results as they 

relate to the coverage of irregular warfare, to include both counterinsurgency 

(COIN) operations and Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. In the Operational Art (OpArt) and Culture and Interagency Operations 

(CIAO) lines of operation, fully 47% of total curriculum hours (164 of 348) are dedicated to these subjects for AY09–10. This coursework provides students with extensive exposure to the historical, social, and cultural factors that influence the application of all instruments of national power during operations. Likewise, our leadership 

line of operation provides coverage in 144 out of 318 total hours (45%) including 

courses in negotiations, ethics in a COIN environment, and strategic communications. Finally, the Warfighting . . . from the Sea (WFTS) line of operation dedicates 

237 of 563 hours (42%) to these topics, to include an entire, seminar-based block 

of instruction on Irregular Warfare, complemented by two major practical application exercises focused on campaign planning for long-term stability and security. 

The first of these, COINEX, is based on an historical scenario set in the Long An 

Province of South Vietnam during the period 1969–1972. The second, more comprehensive, ‘‘living’’ exercise (NINE INNINGS) is based on current events in a country in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility and involves the development of a 

‘‘whole of government’’ interagency campaign plan that fosters stability and security 

and advances U.S. strategic interests in the region. Overall, Marine Corps Command & Staff College dedicates 545 of 1229 curriculum hours (44%) to irregular 

warfare-related subject matter. This total does not include the electives block, which 

also includes a number of electives that deal directly with these subjects. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe the scenarios that you use for your simulation exercises and 

war games. To what extent do they incorporate SSTR and irregular warfare concepts? [Question #5, for cross-reference.] 

Colonel DAMM. 

BARBARY DAGGER OVERVIEW 

COURSE DESCRIPTION. As the second block of instruction (of eight) 

Warfighting . . . From the Sea (WFTS) practical application Exercise BARBARY 

DAGGER provides students with an opportunity to employ the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) in a relatively simple scenario against an opponent employing 

‘‘traditional’’ methods. The focus of this exercise is on the planning process itself, 

with the goal of ensuring that all students have a grasp of the Marine Corps’ approach to planning, and of the basic planning ‘‘toolkit’’ as outlined in the Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Planning lesson within the MAGTF Operations 

block. Employing a ‘‘crawl, walk, run’’ approach, this exercise begins to lay the intellectual foundation for the more sophisticated planning exercises that follow. Though 

this exercise scenario exists in a ‘‘traditional’’ setting the student will be exposed 

to and discuss how to deal with challenges associated with a locally displaced or disrupted population that may be hostile or belligerent to the U.S. military presence. 

69 hours are dedicated to this block of instruction with basic incorporation of SSTR 

and irregular warfare concepts. 

PACIFIC CHALLENGE OVERVIEW 

COURSE DESCRIPTION. As the fourth block of instruction (of eight) WFTS 

practical application Exercise PACIFIC CHALLENGE provides students with an opportunity to build upon the knowledge obtained during Exercise BARBARY DAGGER to employ the MCPP in a more complex, MEF-level operational planning scenario against an opponent employing ‘‘traditional’’ methods. The focus of this exercise is not only on the continued refinement of student understanding of the planning process itself, but also on the viability and sophistication of the proposed solution(s). As the last ‘‘traditional’’ planning problem for AY09–10, it provides students 

with a thorough test of their understanding of the Marine Corps’ approach to planning and of the basic planning ‘‘toolkit’’ as outlined in previous coursework. Future 

planning exercises will require the adaptation of these basic tools to meet irregular 

challenges. 93 hours are dedicated to this block of instruction with basic incorporation of SSTR and irregular warfare concepts. 

COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) EXERCISE OVERVIEW 

COURSE DESCRIPTION. Building on previous coursework and practical application exercises on the Marine Corps approach to planning and the MCPP, and augmented by the lessons provided during WFTS Block 5 (Irregular Warfare) and related Culture and Interagency Operations (CIAO) and Operational Art (OpArt) seminars on Vietnam, this sixth block of instruction (of eight) WFTS practical applica-
209 

tion (COIN Exercise) provides students with an opportunity to adapt the basic planning ‘‘tool kit’’ to address the unique characteristics and challenges of irregular operations. The COIN Exercise introduces students to the seminal problem of our day: 

the conduct of ‘‘whole of government’’ campaign design and planning to address an 

unstructured problem posed by an enemy employing irregular methods. The objective is the ‘‘hearts and minds’’ of a contested population rather than terrain captured or enemy units destroyed; more precisely, the challenge centers on the establishment and maintenance of the mechanisms of political control over a population—all in competition with similar mechanisms that define the political and social alternative offered by a thinking enemy. 54 hours are dedicated to this block 

of instruction with thorough incorporation of SSTR and irregular warfare concepts. 

NATIONAL RESPONSE TO CATASTROPHIC AND DISRUPTIVE THREAT 

EXERCISE OVERVIEW 

COURSE DESCRIPTION. WFTS Block 7, National Response to Catastrophic 

and Disruptive Threats (NRCDT) block of instruction, is designed to educate midcareer professionals in the myriad of threats to the homeland, the organizations and 

plans in place that drive DoD support in these scenarios, and the challenges associated with joint crisis action planning to support a national response to a catastrophic incident. Developed in partnership with the Joint Staff J–8 (Joint Requirements Office-CBRN), United States Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center, and Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF–CS), this experience familiarizes students with the military’s role in domestic consequent management planning and 

execution. The methods used to achieve these educational objectives include lectures, seminars, and selected readings, all of which lay the intellectual foundation 

necessary to conduct the culminating event of the block—a student practical exercise involving interagency representatives from the state, local and federal levels. 

The end state is to prepare students to serve as future commanders and staff officers in units that may be called upon to support USNORTHCOM in responding to 

a natural or man-made disaster. Though this scenario takes place within CONUS 

the students are required to think through how to support USNORTHCOM in dealing with security and stability type situation that might occur due to a disaster 

within the borders of the United States. 39 hours are dedicated to this block of instruction with aspects similar to SSTR. 

NINE INNINGS OVERVIEW 

COURSE DESCRIPTION. Building on all previous seminar-based coursework 

and practical application exercises within the WFTS line of operations (LOO), and 

augmented by the material covered in the CIAO, Op-Art and Leadership LOOs, the 

final WFTS practical application exercise (Exercise NINE INNINGS) is designed to 

test student understanding of all of the material covered during the Command & 

Staff College academic year . . . and then some. Students will be challenged to think 

critically about, and to develop viable solutions for, a myriad of problems that fall 

well outside of the typical officer’s intellectual comfort zone; to demonstrate their 

ability, to use General Petreaus’ words, to serve as ‘‘ ‘pentathlete leaders’—individuals who, metaphorically speaking, are not just sprinters or shot putters but can 

do it all.’’ The exercise affords an opportunity, in an unclassified venue and working 

with our counterparts from within the interagency, to develop a ‘‘whole of government’’ plan for confronting a range of issues centered on a country within 

SOUTHCOM AOR, to include the loss of U.S. influence in the region, transnational 

terrorism, multiple insurgencies, the potential for civil war, and the threat of a 

broader regional conflict with emerging powers. It is a ‘‘living exercise’’ in that it 

relies on existing conditions/events—as gleaned from various open source venues— 

rather than a pre-scripted, canned scenario. 

Students will serve as planners in a Joint Interagency Planning Group (JIPG), cochaired by Senior Mentors playing the roles of the U.S. Ambassador and the Commander of the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF). The mission of the 

JIPG is to design a four-year, ‘‘Phase 0’’ interagency campaign plan that fosters stability and security in the country and advances U.S. strategic interests in the region. A number of resources will be made available to the students to support the 

accomplishment of these daunting tasks, to include the large-scale participation of 

Subject Matter Experts from a wide variety of joint, combined, interagency, NGO, 

media, think tank, and academic organizations. However, all of these resources 

merely supplement the issue at hand—one final opportunity to apply critical and 

creative thinking to a challenging, contemporary operational problem. 115 hours are 

dedicated to this block of instruction with thorough incorporation of SSTR and irregular warfare concepts. 
210 

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide the most recent survey results from your graduates 

and their supervisors. [Question #6, for cross-reference.] 

Colonel DAMM. The raw data collected by our Marine Corps University survey section from graduates and supervisors is included as an enclosure following these 

questions. 

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed 

upon request.] 

Dr. SNYDER. The intermediate level schools lost Joint Duty credit for their nonhost service military faculty in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act. We 

know that the tours of those who were grandfathered are ending. What will the effect of this be? How will it affect the quality of your faculty? How important is it 

that these JDAL positions be restored? Do the instructors truly get a joint experience? 

Colonel DAMM. The requirement for Joint Duty in the National Defense Authorization Act is an important one for the growth and training of our forces. As we 

have added this necessary requirement, we need to realize the benefits of a wellrounded Officer as we find ways to allow them to fulfill the requirement. To understand your own warfighting culture, you must experience it first; only then can you 

represent your service position as you branch out into the other services. To do that, 

you need time. My own example would be I had to learn how to fly my own aircraft 

before I could shift my focus to training others how to fly. If we let Officers get joint 

credit at other service institutions, we satisfy a requirement for them to attain Flag 

Officer rank without requiring another tour outside their respective service. In the 

Marine Corps, we look at an Officer file and check for credibility in his own Military 

Occupational Specialty before we promote that Officer or send them to school. The 

effect of not receiving joint credit as an ‘‘exchange’’ instructor is that the quality of 

the Officers may suffer as there is no incentive other than wanting to learn more 

about another service. It is very important to restore joint credit so we can continue 

to attract high quality Officers to our respective programs. 

Officers do get joint experience. First they must immerse themselves in other 

service culture to learn and then teach in each curriculum. As an example, one of 

the first things in our program of instruction is the Marine Corps Planning Process; 

it is our baseline. We have Army, Navy and Air Force Officers teaching that process. 

The absolutely best way to learn is to teach. They are also inculcated with our culture beginning with faculty development in the weeks before the students arrive. 

Development included visits to an amphibious ship and a wing to not just talk about 

a Marine Air Ground Task Force, but to show a Marine Air Ground Task Force. 

The year is truly a joint experience. 

Dr. SNYDER. Describe your school’s use of historical case studies to teach strategy. 

Colonel DAMM. The Command and Staff College is an intermediate-level school 

within the hierarchy of professional military education. As such, it is expected to 

educate its students in matters relating primarily to the Operational Level of War, 

that is, the level that forms the bridge between strategy and tactics. The level at 

which campaigns are planned. The level of the Combatant Commander. The College’s mission is not focused primarily on teaching strategy. In the course of establishing and examining the context in which campaigns are planned and executed 

it is necessary to examine both strategy and strategic issues and tactics and tactical 

issues. In all of these areas case studies play an important educational role. Marine 

Corps Doctrinal Publication 1–1, Strategy (Italics), broadly defines strategy as the 

process of interrelating ends and means. Through a series of lectures and seminars, 

reinforced by case studies and practical applications, the College requires the students to examine the relationships between ends and means. Students read and discuss the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National 

Military Strategy, among other strategic issues, as part of their understanding of 

the context of the current operating environment. The planning processes they learn 

and employ in practical exercises during the year are all about defining the ‘‘ways’’ 

in which ends and means will be reconciled. The precise character of the various 

exercises conducted at the College are explained in response to Question #5. In the 

Operational Art and Culture and Interagency Operations courses they examine historical and contemporary situations ranging from, for example, the British experiences confronting the Malayan Emergency from 1948–1960, or the French Experience in Algeria, 1954–1962, or the American experiences in Operations DESERT 

STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM or IRAQI FREEDOM, or the Allied dilemmas in 

defining the modern Middle-East in the aftermath of World War I, the challenges 

of bringing stability to post-War Japan and Germany in 1945, the responses to insurgency in the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, or the interagency challenges of 

the current array of overseas contingency operations. In these and other cases the 

questions associated with reconciling ends, ways, and means are central to seminar 
211 

discussion. So the College contributes to the development of strategic thinkers and 

the College does teach strategy, although not in quite the structured way that the 

sub-committee’s question suggests. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is the process for renewal and non-renewal of the faculty? How 

transparent is the system? In a tenure system people think the faculty members 

have all the power, in a non-tenure system it appears that the school has unlimited 

power. How do you avoid these extremes? [Question #9, for cross-reference.] 

Colonel DAMM. Civilian faculty members are hired under Title 10 authority granted to the President of Marine Corps University by the Secretary of the Navy. Civilian faculty members are offered a one, two or three-year appointment based on the 

needs of the college and the individual’s qualifications. New civilian faculty members undergo a one-year probationary period during which their performance is evaluated. During the period, they are supervised and counseled on a periodic basis regarding their performance by the Director and the Dean of Academics. 

The faculty evaluation and renewal system is extremely transparent to the individual. He/she will receive periodic counseling as well as an annual performance appraisal. Renewals can be for periods of one, two, or three years. The College’s informal policy has been to offer three year renewals. At least seven months prior to the 

end of the faculty member’s appointment, the Director of the College recommends 

to the President of the University whether the faculty member’s appointment should 

be renewed and for what period of time. If the University does not intend to retain 

an individual, the individual will be formally and informally counseled regarding 

his/her substandard performance and be given the means to improve. If he/she fails 

to improve, his/her performance appraisal will document the fact and state the reason for termination. 

To avoid arbitrariness, the College leadership manages the civilian faculty in an 

upfront and forthright manner, providing maximum transparency while maintaining 

open, two-way lines of communication. First, the College ensures that all rules governing policies and procedures are clearly delineated and equitably applied. Each 

faculty member is provided a College Faculty Handbook and Marine Corps University Title 10 Faculty Handbook which outlines the policies for the handling of reappointments, terminations, appeals, and grievances. 

Second, demonstrating its long-term commitment to its faculty, despite the absence of a formal program of tenure, the College invests time and funds into an aggressive faculty development program. The program seeks to advance faculty members’ abilities through participation in functional area and academic meetings, panels, conferences, symposium, field studies, courses, and classes. By investing in each 

faculty member’s development, the College develops a stronger cadre of instructors 

while recognizing the symbiotic and mutually supportive relationship between the 

individual and the institution. 

All but one of the College’s civilian faculty members possess a Doctorate degree. 

The sole exception is the Deputy Head of the College’s Warfighting Section. The individual is a former career officer in the Air Force whose professional background 

and experiences made him the ideal choice to fill this newly created position. He 

has multiple Master’s Degrees but it is his professional military expertise that made 

him the proper individual for this non-teaching position. 

The benefits or pitfalls of a tenure system have never been issues at the College. 

During the interviews for prospective faculty, the process of hiring and renewals is 

explained to applicants so they understand how the system works. Since 1992, when 

the Title 10 faculty began to be hired, only one faculty member has been released 

prior to the completion of an appointment. Currently there are several civilian faculty who left tenured positions in civilian academic institutions to join the College 

faculty because of the opportunity to work in the kind of forward-looking and supportive educational environment that we have been able to establish and maintain 

over the past 17 years. 

Dr. SNYDER. What is your school’s role in identifying promising officers with the 

potential for high-level strategic thinking at the appropriate point in their careers? 

Colonel DAMM. During our Academic year we identify students with the potential 

for strategic thinking as candidates for the School of Advanced Warfighting. They 

must go through an interview process and be selected to attend this resident followon school. A notable graduate of this school is LtGen John Allen, currently the Deputy Commanding General of CENTRAL COMMAND, hand selected by General 

Petraeus to be his Deputy. We also acknowledge superior performance in our students through our Distinguished Graduate and Writing Programs. Many of these 

students are indentified as potential future instructors by our Faculty (both Military 

and Civilian). The corporate memory resides in our civilian instructors as many 

have been here for many years, as names come up for military faculty, we use them 

as the ultimate litmus test. 
212 

Dr. SNYDER. How do you specifically measure the quality of the faculty and staff 

in the PME environment? 

Colonel DAMM. I think this question may be asked incorrectly . . . the Faculty, both 

military and civilian, are ‘‘hired’’ because of their quality. That quality is measured 

by looking into their professional and academic experiences. Then we ‘‘measure’’ 

their quality by how they impart our constantly evolving curriculum to our student 

body. The ‘‘measurement’’ is how the student body does; papers, exercises, and outside accolades of their work (one of our students has been the recipient of the Secretary of Defense writing award two years running). We monitor each other through 

our Director, Deputy and Academic Dean as we attend seminar. Another method of 

measurement is through student surveys, something included in this document at 

question #6. We read every word of those surveys and after deliberation, implement 

changes when necessary. 

Dr. SNYDER. How were you chosen to be school’s commandant? How was your 

dean chosen? Will you be retiring from this job? What background should the Chief 

of Naval Operations be looking for in selecting individuals for these positions? 

Should the focus be on operational leadership skills or academic and teaching experience (not instructing in a training institution) background or both? 

Colonel DAMM. The Academic Dean came from the Civilian Faculty as delineated 

in the next paragraph. I was chosen by the Commandant of the Marine Corps from 

a number of names submitted by Manpower to the President of Marine Corps University. From that list, Active Duty Marines are recommended by the President and 

forwarded to the Commandant for his approval. My view is that individuals should 

be chosen for the important responsibility of training future leaders of all of our 

services and agencies based on both their operational and educational background. 

It is not just an academic responsibility. The Director should have a professional 

pedigree students can relate to and admire. In my case, although an aviator, I have 

commanded a squadron in combat and have attended both resident intermediate 

level education and top level school. I am also JPME II qualified and have joint 

credit. The only service I have not served personally with is the Coast Guard, although I have attended resident school with Coast Guard Officers. The Commandant should look at well rounded Officers who have shown a penchant for lifelong learning and are credentialed in their Military Occupational Specialty as Commanders and operators; they will command the respect of their students. 

My intention is to retire out of this position merely due to service limitations and 

non-selection to O–7. Promotion to Flag Officer has happened from this position and 

from some of our other schools, but not in my case; but, the selection rate to General 

Officer in the Marine Corps is a very small percentage of the O–6’s eligible so that 

is not an indictment of the system at all, it is just the way it is. The benefit is my 

career brings 29 years of leadership and learning to this billet, and I am still excited 

about being a part of the Marine Corps. 

The current dean of academics was hired as an associate dean in 1992, after a 

career of 24 years of active service in the United States Army. That service included 

considerable time in operational assignments, but also included service on the faculties of both West Point and the Army’s Command and General Staff College in 

teaching, curriculum design and development, and leadership positions. He also possessed a terminal degree from an outstanding university. The dean of academics of 

the college at that time was an active duty Marine O–6. In 1998, when the College 

was about to name its 5th military dean in 6 years, the Director named the civilian 

associate dean previously described to assume the position of dean of academics. In 

other words he promoted from within. Subsequently the position has been validated 

as a civilian, Title 10, GM–15 (Colonel equivalent) position and the Marine Corps 

University has put the active duty O–6 billet to use elsewhere. 

Dr. SNYDER. How should intermediate schools attract top-tier civilian faculty? 

How do you specifically define top-tier? What are the elements that would attract 

the highest quality of faculty—tenure, copyright, resources, pay, ability to keep their 

government retirements, research and administrative assistance, etc.? 

Colonel DAMM. Our definition of a ‘‘top quality’’ civilian faculty member is a scholar and educator who possesses 1) expertise in his/her respective field of study, 2) 

operational experience in curriculum-related areas, 3) a general knowledge of adult 

educational methodology and most importantly, 4) a passion for developing curriculum and teaching our unique type of student. Such an individual should possess 

a terminal degree, yet remain a life-long student of his/her craft, continuously pursuing greater understanding of the subject through reading, research, reflection, and 

participation in scholarly form. He/she should be proficient in written and oral communications, able to translate complex issues into understandable terms applicable 

to any audience—students or scholars. 
213 

The principal attractions for top notch people to join the College faculty are intangible. There is much to be said for being paid a fair and equitable salary and participating in a good retirement program. The University is committed to doing that so 

that we do not under value those who we hire. There is also much to be said for 

being located in the area of the Nation’s capitol with the attendant access to organizations and people that further research and enrichment in academic disciplines. 

Tenure is a topic already addressed in response to Question #9. But the most compelling attractions for top-tier faculty have to do with three things. The first and 

foremost reason is our experienced, aggressive, and motivated professional students. 

Having the privilege of being involved with their professional and intellectual development is enormously attractive to top notch faculty. Second, the quality of faculty, 

both military and civilian, is compelling to those who perhaps have not worked in 

such a collegial environment. Third, the combination of the two previous factors has 

created over time a well deserved reputation for excellence that makes people want 

to be part of who the College is and what the college does. 

Dr. SNYDER. What are the policies at your school regarding academic freedom? 

What is its proper role in a PME setting without tenure? Describe how your faculty 

may be called upon to respond to press inquiries in the field of expertise and whether and how they are allowed to respond in a timely manner. 

Colonel DAMM. All candidates for positions at the College are asked their definitions of academic freedom during their interviews. They are also asked whether or 

not they believe they will have any difficulty reconciling their sense of what academic freedom means in a military environment. The definition of academic freedom 

commonly expressed is couched in terms of being able to state judgments, do research, publish the results of that research, based on evidence, without fear of retribution or sanction. Faculty recognize that there are, and should be, boundaries defined by professional courtesy, common decency, and security classifications. Otherwise they are free to stimulate free and open discussion. Our faculty have never expressed any concerns about being limited in their academic freedoms. In fact, those 

who have more recent experience in the civilian academic world have testified that 

the environment at the College is more conducive to true academic freedom than 

the institutions where they previously taught, which might have cloaked particular 

agendas in the garb of academic freedom. 

Lack of tenure does not affect the ‘‘academic freedom’’ enjoyed by the faculty of 

the College. We believe that ‘‘academic freedom’’ is fostered by a positive organizational culture, not guaranteed employment. It springs from an academic environment in which faculty and students alike are encouraged to voice their judgments 

on any relevant subjects in open, scholarly debate without risk of rebuke or reprisal. 

Such judgments should be expressed in a well-researched, well-reasoned, and rationale manner, based on valid, empirical data and devoid of emotion. The College’s 

strict non-attribution policy also safeguards academic freedom. It allows faculty, students and guest speakers voice their thoughts without fear of further dissemination. 

As an institution manned by a number of leader scholars, we have continuous requests for our faculty to join seminars or respond to the press. We endeavor to allow 

them to do as much as possible as long as it does not interfere with their primary 

responsibility of teaching our students. We are now blessed with a large enough 

quality faculty to cover down if there is a requirement for one of our Conference 

Group leaders to be out. As for requests from the press, we just ask that a disclaimer be added that their comments reflect their own opinions and not those necessarily endorsed by the school. We consider requests for our faculty as part of our 

outreach program, necessary for the academic growth of our faculty as well as a 

good news story about our University. 

Dr. SNYDER. Acquisition reforms all call for more of the general purpose forces to 

be educated and trained in understanding contracting and contractors. Civilians, 

contracting, and contractors on the battlefield—how much do officers, outside the acquisition workforce, need to know? 

Colonel DAMM. We approach this problem from the view that contractors on the 

battlefield come in all shapes and forms. They can sometimes be lumped in to the 

interagency or non-governmental groups we have turned to for many of the day to 

day requirements our forces need to operate. It is most prevalent on our final exercise NINE INNINGS where we have our students build a campaign plan for engagement using a real country and real time unclassified information. During that exercise, we bring in numerous subject matter experts (including contractors) to expand 

the students understanding of the operational environment before them. As a side 

note, this academic year we will be partnering with SOUTHCOM to set two hundred minds loose in their area or responsibility, in the Central American countries 

of Guatemala and Honduras (we actually chose this area before the current coup). 
214 

Dr. SNYDER. Regarding languages, regional studies, and cultural competency— 

how much can be taught at the intermediate level and for what purpose? What feedback have you been receiving from your students on your foreign language training? 

What changes have you effected on the basis of that feedback? 

Colonel DAMM. Our language program has undergone a number of changes due 

to our looking at the program and realizing we were not reaping the benefits we 

desired. The options are either a full year language course as part of the curriculum, 

or some other language program tied in to a cultural immersion program. The first 

program would be the best as long as it was tied to an Officers career, as studies 

show one year of language without continuous practice after the fact is a poor investment. It would also, if the program wasn’t tied to past language capability, require us to drop something from our curriculum. The Marine Corps is looking at 

tying a young Lieutenant to a specific area as a life long area of expertise, to include 

language training. That is under review at this time. The benefit of a language and 

cultural immersion is where we believe we can do the most good for the Marine 

Corps and the individual Marines as language is a tremendous component of culture. We bring in the Defense Language Institute (DLI) (the teaching specialist in 

language indoctrination) in the beginning of the year and immerse our students in 

a particular language. Throughout the year, students are expected to practice their 

skills through different available language training software. In the Spring, we 

bring back DLI and refresh our students, and then have them engage in a Negotiation exercise. In the exercise, students must communicate in a rudimentary fashion 

to a non-English speaker in the chosen language and eventually turn over the negation to an interpreter. Last academic year was our first using this methodology. The 

initial feedback was very positive, but we would like to check that feedback against 

a later survey after things have sunk in for a little while. 

Æ