GROVER S~S HID AU~TXN ,a. TEXAS

HonorableW. J. Townsend CountyAttorney Angellna County Lufkin, Texas

Dear Sir: opinionno. o-6629 Re: Under the given facts does the CommlsslonerslCourt of

., Angellna Countyhave the authority to use a portion of-the air port funds to gravel the road $.n question?

Your rOqU38t for an opinion on the above question
read8 a8 f911OW8:

“i&gOlh COUIIty Voted a iona hiSUe t0 purchase and establish an airport. With F p!rtion of the proceeda of 8aiabond issue, .~.. land vas purchased for the establishmentof an airport,which airportha8 been established on the land purchased by the county for 8UChpurpose.

“The airport is located about 3/b ,ofa mile from the statehighway leading to Lufkin, tiiah
18 a hard eurfacedhlghway. To make the airport available for the purpose for which it la built, it is necessary that said road leading from-~the airport to saidhighway be graveled orhard aurfaced. Would it be lawful for the Commisaloners~ Court to use a portion of the airport fun&s to gravel or hard surface the 3/4 of a mile of the public road leading from the airport to said atatehIghway, to make eaid airport available in all kIna of weather?"
Article 1269h, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, is in part 88 fol~ovs:

"Section 1. A- That the governingbody of any incorporated city in this State may receive through gift or dedication, and is hereby empowered to ac-Honorable W. J. Tovnsena, page 2 (o-6629)

'quire,by purchase without condemnationor by purchase through condemnationproceedings, and thereafter maintain and operate as an airport, or lease,
or sell, to the Federal Government, tracts of land either within orwithout the corporate limits of such city ana vithln the county In which such city his8itUatOd,EUIdthe cOUlllLt88iOllt3r8' COUI't Of any countymay likewise acquire,maintain and operate for likepurpose tracts of land within the limits of the county.

.“

. . . ,
“Sec. 2. (a)For thepurpose of condemning or purchasing, either or both, lands to be U8Od and matitalned as provided in Section 1 hereof, ana improving and equipping the same for such use, the governingbody of any oitg or the Commissioners' Court of any county, fallingvithln the terms of 8UCh Section,may issuenegotiablebonda of the city or of the county, as the casemay be, and levy taxes to provide for the interest anb slnking fUa8.of any suchbonds so issuea, the authorityhereby given for the issuance of such

_ - bond8 &Id lOVy and COlleCtiOn of 8uch taxes exercised in accordancewith theprovisions Chapter 1 of~Ti.tle 22 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1925.
"

. . . . to be of

'Sec.3. Any air port acquired under and by vlrtue,.ofthe terms of thisAct 8htilbe under the management and control of the governingbody of the city or the Commisaloners~, Court of the county acquiring the Fame,which is hereby expressly authorized and empowered to Improve,maintain and conduct the same as an air port, and for thatpurpose to make ana provide therein all necessary or fit lmprovements and facilities and to fix such reasonable charge8 for the use thereof a8 such governing body or CommissIoneratCourt shall deem fit, and to mslcerules and regulations governing the use thereof. All proceeds from such charge8 Shallbe devoted exclusively to the maintenance,upkeep, improvement and operation of such air port and the facllltles, StNCtUI'OS,and improvements therein," .*.

.Honorable W. J. Tovnsend, page 3, (O-6629)

Chapter 1, Title 22, of the Revised Civil Statute8 of Texas, 1925, is in part as follows:

'Article 701. Shallhold el&.tlon. l%ebonds of a county or an Incorporated city or town shall
never be i88UOd for any purpose unless a proposition for the issuance of suchbonds shallhave been first submitted to the qualifiedvoters who are property tax payers of such county, city or town.

"A&t. 

### 702. Qukstlon submitted; In all cases when the governingbody of a county, city or town shall order an election for the issuance of the bonds of the county, city or tovn or of any political subdivision or defined district of a county, .such body shall at the same time submit the question of whether or not a tax shallbe levied upon theproperty of ~suchcounty, city or town, political 8Ub-' division or defined district for thepurpose of paying the interest on the bonds and to create a sw funa for the redemption of thebonda.

UArt. 703. SUbmiSSiOn of proposition. The proposition tobe submitted shall di8tinCtly specify:

1. Thepurpose for vhzichthe bond8 are to be iSSUed;



### 2. The amount thereof;
3. &he rate of Interest;

4. he levy of taxes 8Uff$Cient to Pay ihe =ual interest and provide a sinkingArid to pay the bond8 at maturity;

5. Thematurity date, or that the bond8 may.be issuea to mature seriallywithin any given nuniber of years not to exceed forty."

h the case Of CarrOll vs. WilliamS, COUnty TIwaSUrOr, et al, 202 9. W. 

### 504, the Supreme Courthad under consideration thepower of the 

### Commiaslonera * Court to transferrolrey from one.fund to 

### another. while the fasts in that case are somewhatdifferent from thosehere being considered, the principle of law Is, In our opinion, the same. In that case the Comm18sloner8tCourt of Jefferson County, as part of a gocoral scheme for exacting from tarpayers and expending on road8 ana bridges moremoney than the ConstitutAon of this Statepermits to be rsised by taxation and emended for that-1

Honorable W. J. Tovnsend, Page 4, (O-6629)

purpose, deliberately 8nd purposesly levied, for various otherpurposes definedby said Constitution,which were known by that Court at the time of such levies thereof, to be much greater in amounts thanwere required to meet the current expenditures for such otherpurposea, and afterwards transferred such excesses in such funds to the Road and Bridge Fund, and expended same accordingly. inholding such practice to be unlawful.,the Court laid down the following principles of law which sre applicablehere:

~"Goingto the real gist of the main issuebefore
us, section 9 of article 8 of our state Constitution, supra, inhibits any and all transfers of taxmoney from one to another of the several classes of funds therein authorized, and, as a sequence, the expenditure, Por one purpose therein defined, of taxmoney raised ostensibly for another suchpurpose. The immediate purpose in soprescribing a separatemaximum tax rate for each of the classes of purposes there enumerated is, no doubt, to limit, accordingly, the amount of taxeswhich may be raised from the people, by taxation,declaredly for those several purposes or classes ofpurposes, respectively. But that is not all; The ultimate and practical and obvious design and purpose and legal effect is to inhibit excessive expendituresfor any suchpurpose or class of purposes. By necessary implication said provisions of section 9 of article 8 were desIgned, not merely to limit the tax rate for certain therein designatedpurposes, but to require that any and all money raisedby taxation for any suchpurpose shall be applied, faithfully, to thatparticular purpose, as needed therefor', and not to any other purpose or use whatsoever. Those constitutionalprovlslons control, not only the raising,but al80 the application, of all such funds; and such is the legal effect of articles 2242.and 7357, aupra,when properly construed and applied.

"True, the COn8titUtiOndo08 not 889, in 80 many Words, thatmoney raisedby a county, city or town, by taxation for one suchpurpose shall never ,beexpended for any otherpurpose - not even for another of the,five general classes ofpurposes defined and .approvedin said section 9 - but that, we thin&, is its plain and certainmeaning and legal effect. The very definitions of those several classes of purposea, a@ the declaration of authority to~tax the people therefor, respectively, coupled, as they are, in each instance,with a limitation of the tax rate for that class,must have been predicated upon theHonorable W. J. Townsend, page 5~ (O-6629)

expectation and intent that, as a matter of common honesty and fair dealing, taxmoney taken from the pOOplO 08ten8ibly for one such specifiedpurpose shallbe expended, as needed, 

### for thatpurpose alone, as veil aa that the tax rate for that particubr class, in any one year shallnot exceed theprescribedmaximum."

In the aase ofMoore, County Judge, et al vs. Coffman, et al, 200 3. W. 374, the Supreme Court was considering vhether the Commissionersl Court of Knox County could use the proceeds of bond8 voted forbuilding a bridge acroaa the Brazes River'at a designatedplace for building a bridge at anotherplace.' In holding that the proceeds~of saidbonds must be used for thepurpose stated, the Court held as follows:

"Itvaa the duty of the Commissioners*Court .ukderthe statute (art.606), in statingthe proposltion to be voted on in the bona eleotlon, to specify, both in its order for the election and in the notice of the election, thepurpose for vhioh the bonds were to be iaaued. The rosa09 of this requirement is that the voter8 in 8Uoh an election are entitled to know, beforehand, the specificuse to which their taxes levied in virtue of the election are'to'beput. The design of the statute 18 that thepurpose of the bonds shall-be.stated in suchway as to fairly and fully apprise the voter8 of it. Ro particular form is prescribed for it8 statement,and the way in vhlch it shallbe stated 80 as to accord with the apirlt of the statute Is neaessarily left to the Commissioners* court. In this instance, the oourt in defining the proposition in respect to the purpose of the bond8
saw fit to declare that it was not only to construct these two bridges, but to construct them at certain designatea locations. Stating thepurpose in this
manner contravenedno law% hence the court was privileged to thus announce it. Since the aourtby deliberate actionmade the location of the bridges
a part Of the proposition submitted, it i8 fair to conclude that their erection at the .locationa named constituted in the court13mind an essentialpart of thepurpose of the bonds. If so, it must have intended that the'voters in the election should uuder8tand that included in such purpose Was the building of the bridg& at theseparticular places. That the voters did so understand can hardly be denied.._

. I

Honorable W. J. Townsend, Page 6, (O-6629) ,~

"If it was within the lavfulpower of the court to so declare thepurpose of the bonds; if It intended that the voters shouldunderstand their purpose to be the erection of the bridges at these particular crossings;and the voter8 cast theirballots accordingly,we think that is
an end of the question. It thenbecomes simply a matter of keeping faith with thosewhose will the election expressed.

,"Tosay.,

as is urged, thatthe incorporation of the location of the bridge8 in the Commissioners1 .Courtlsstatement of thepurpose of thesebonds was surplusage and Is therefore of no effect, 18 to deny to those courts thepower of 80 declaring the purpose of a bona issue of this characteras a means of fully acquainting the property owningvoters of a county with thenexact use intended to be made of the bonds. For if the court had thepower to include in its definition of the purpose of thebonds 80material
.a matter a8 the prOPO8Od locations of the bridges, that part of the stated purpose cannotbe regarded a8 mere surplusage. It csn be 80 treated only upon Ahe theory that the court in 80 including it trsn- -8cendedIts authority, ma for that reaaon 18 not bound by it. We decline to sohold. The specific
use .towhich It is intendedby public officials that .publicmoneys shall be applied is always of concern to those upon whom tsxation rests the burden of the expenditure. In the matter of bond issues authorized by ,thevote of.the citizenshlp affected, in the submission of the proposltlon the law encourages, rather than frowns upon, a full and definite statement of their purpose. The location of an expensivepublic Improvement dependent upon suchbond issues is frequently 0f:as prime importanceas~its construction. In such cases,it is 6nly fair to the voters in the electioncalled to determine thematter to inform .themin advance of the intended~,location, 80 that the actual merits of the given proposal, into,vhich the question ~oflocation may largely enter,~shall decide the contest. When this is done, the location is a part of thevote~ana is entitled to an equivalent 'protection. Weecan perceive nothing in such a courae that elther.trenches upon or exceeds the authority possessed in these matters by Commissioners* Courts or municipal bOdiO8,~or that amoUntS, a8 18 contended to's surrender of their duty into otherhands."_-- .. _..

Honorable W. J. ToWnsend, Page 7, (C-6629)

In the a880 of **Levis** et dl **v8i** City of Fort Worth et al, 89 3. W. (26,) 975, the Supreme Courtwas considering whether ornot the City Counailhad authority to use theproCOed8 Of the 88&I Of oOrt8inbonds for **VEdOUS** named pUrpO808, 8nd the Court, in holding that 8UOhpurpossswere not foreign to the purposes for vhioh saidbond8 verb voted, laid down the following general rule of law:

"It 18 elementary that theproceeds ofbond8 voted by the people must be expended for the purposes for vhioh they were voted." Angelina Countyhaving votedbond8 for thepurpose of purohasing and 08t8bli8hiIlg an air port, it i8 our opinions that the prooeeds of saidbonds oannotbe U8Oa to gravel or hard 8XU'f8CO

thepub110 **road** leading from said air port to the StateHighway, 88 that would be using theproceeds Of SSidbond8 for 8 purpose different from that for vhluh raid **bonds** were voted and **V0ula** be in violation of the above rule8 Of **18V.**

we tlTlStthat this 88ti8f88tOrily **8ll6VOrO** yOUr ill@l'y.
Your6 very truly,

JWBrLJ:EAC ATTORJEYgElfEW& **OF** Tw;as
By /8/ Jas. W. Bassett

JaS W; Bassett ..ABsistant

.-._ APPROVED J-C-N 26 1945 APPROVED

- ....- OPmIoN IS/ Oar106G, Ashley COIdMITTEF.

BYBWB.'