IG-00-015

AUDIT

REPORT SPACE FLIGHT OPERATIONS CONTRACT PHASE IICOST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

March 14, 2000

National Aeronautics

and

Space Administration

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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Acronyms

SFOC Space Flight Operations Contract

USA United Space Alliance
W March 14, 2000

TO: A/Administrator

FROM: W/Inspector General

SUBJECT: INFORMATION: Space Flight Operations Contract Phase II -

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Report Number IG-00-015

The NASA Office of Inspector General has completed an audit of the Space Flight Operations

Contract (SFOC ) Phase II - Cost Benefit Analysis. We found that NASA had not performed

a cost-benefit analysis prior to consolidation of Space Shuttle prime contracts into one prime

contract with the United Space Alliance (USA). Therefore, the Agency is not relying on a

complete analysis and documentation of estimated benefits for the consolidation. In addition,

the Agency does not have a good baseline, which would have been established during a costbenefit analysis, to evaluate the outcome of the consolidation. As a result, NASA cannot be

certain that further consolidation of about $10 billion in Space Shuttle contracts will result in net

savings to the Government.

Background

The USA became the prime contractor responsible for all Shuttle missions in 1996. As the

prime contractor, USA assumed responsibility for ensuring all Shuttle missions manifested by

NASA are successfully accomplished. The contract has two phases within which NASA

consolidates prior prime contracts over several years as USA assumes more responsibility. The

contract is currently in Phase II; however, the most significant portion of Phase II has not been

completed, specifically the portion related to the Space Shuttle main engines, external tanks, and

reusable solid rocket motors.

Recommendations

We recommended that the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight (1) perform a

cost-benefit analysis before further consolidation of Space Shuttle contracts into the SFOC and

(2) evaluate at least annually whether estimated benefits are realized.

2

Management Response and OIG Evaluation

Management concurred with Recommendation 1 and concurred with the intent of

Recommendation 2. In response to Recommendation 1, the Associate Administrator for the

Office of Space Flight will ensure that an appropriate cost-benefit analysis is applied in all

phases of the SFOC management cycle. NASA will implement a structured cost-benefit

analysis into the processes used to determine the overall impacts and effects of consolidating

any additional contracts into SFOC. In response to Recommendation 2, NASA will increase

the focus of the continuous Program budget assessments of realized cost performance under

SFOC as compared to previous performance under individual contracts.

Management comments were responsive to the recommended corrective actions. The

recommendations are resolved but will remain undispositioned until agreed-to corrective actions

are completed. We are monitoring the recommendations for reporting purposes pending

implementation of agreed-to corrective actions.

[Original signed by]

Roberta L. Gross

Enclosure

Final Report on Audit of Space Flight Operations Contract Phase II -

Cost-Benefit Analysis
FINAL REPORT

AUDIT OF SPACE FLIGHT OPERATIONS CONTRACT PHASE II -

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
W March 14, 2000

TO: M/Associate Administrator for Office of Space Flight

FROM: Assistant Inspector General for Auditing

SUBJECT: Final Report on the Audit of Space Flight Operations Contract Phase II -

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Assignment Number A9906400

Report Number IG-00-015

The subject final report is provided for your use and comment. Our evaluation of your response

is incorporated into the body of the report. Management comments were responsive to the

recommended corrective actions. However, management did not specify an estimated

completion date for the corrective action on Recommendation 2. We request that information

by April 13, 2000, in response to the final report. Also, please notify us when actions have

been completed on the recommendations, including the extent of testing performed to ensure

corrective actions are effective. The recommendations will remain open for reporting purposes.

If you have questions concerning the report, please contact Mr. Dennis E. Coldren, Program

Director, Human Exploration and Development of Space Audits, at (281) 483-4773, or Mr.

Dennis Clay, Auditor-in-Charge, at (281) 483-0482. We appreciate the courtesies extended

to the audit staff. The final report distribution is in Appendix E.

[Original signed by]

Russell A. Rau

Enclosure

cc:

B/Chief Financial Officer

B/Comptroller

BF/Director, Financial Management Division

G/General Counsel

JM/Director, Management Assessment Division

AA/Director, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
2

bcc:

AIGA, IG, Reading Chrons

W/Program Director, Human Exploration and Development of Space Audits

W/Auditor-in-Charge

JSC/BD5/Audit Liaison Representative
NASA Office of Inspector General

IG-00-015 March 14, 2000

 A9906400

Space Flight Operations Contract Phase II -

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Introduction

The NASA Office of Inspector General has performed an audit to evaluate management of

Phase II of the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC). Specifically, our objectives were to

determine whether contract requirements were properly determined, fair and reasonable pricing

was obtained, and cost savings and other SFOC goals have been achieved. We identified a

condition regarding a cost-benefit analysis that warrants timely action by NASA management.

We will issue a report on the other objectives later. Details on our objectives, scope, and

methodology are in Appendix A.

NASA began consolidating Space Shuttle contracts in 1996 under the SFOC with United Space

Alliance (USA).1 (See Appendix B for overall contract details.) Under the USA contract,

NASA identified 12 contracts to be combined during Phase I and 15 contracts to be combined

during Phase II as NASA gains confidence in USA's abilities to assume more responsibility.

Results in Brief

NASA has not performed a cost-benefit analysis to ensure that consolidation of Space Shuttle

contracts is in the best interest of the Government. Instead, NASA has proceeded with the

consolidation based on an assumption that consolidation will be cost-effective and in the best

interest of the Government. Without a cost-benefit analysis, NASA cannot be certain that

further consolidation of about $10 billion in Space Shuttle contracts will result in a net savings to

the Government.

Background

In September 1996, NASA entered into a contract with USA as the prime contractor for Space

Shuttle Program2 and International Space Station Program3 activities to ensure that all missions

manifested by NASA are successfully accomplished in accordance with the applicable flight

 

1

The contract, NAS 9-20000, is a cost plus, award fee, incentive fee, and performance fee contract (original

cost was $6.339 billion and fee was $.610 billion).

2NASA's plan for the SFOC was designed to include a subset of the Shuttle Program contracts and activities

specifically focused on the operational functions of the Shuttle Program. Development activities were not

targeted for consolidation and neither were science activities or institutional activities required to support the

Shuttle Program.

3

The Space Station Program activities targeted for SFOC were very limited and focused primarily on the

mission operations functions integrally associated with flight controller support, mission planning, and

training.
2

definition and requirements, schedule, and implementation plan. The original contract value was

$6.949 billion4 with a 6-year period of performance, October 1996 through September 2002.

The contract contained two options to extend the period of performance for 2 years each that, if

exercised, would extend the contract another 4 years through September 2006.

The contract has two phases within which NASA is consolidating prior prime contracts over

several years as the USA demonstrates the ability to assume more responsibility. During Phase

I, which began in October 1996, the USA assumed overall responsibility for the fleet of orbiter

vehicles. During Phase II, which began in September 1997, NASA has transitioned more prime

contracts under SFOC for work either to be performed by USA or to subcontract with USA.

Table 1 shows the Phase II effort that NASA and USA have negotiated.

Table 1. Phase II Consolidations

(Millions)

Description

Modification

Value

Modification

Date

Kennedy Base Operations* $ 9 Sept. 1997

Waste Collection System 5 Sept. 1997

Flight Software 140 June 1998

Flight Equipment 183 June 1998

Solid Rocket Boosters 596 June 1998

Total $933

*NASA added elements of the Kennedy Space Center Base Operations contract to the SFOC.

However, the most significant portion of Phase II has not been completed. Table 2 shows the

contracts remaining to be consolidated.

Table 2. Future Contract Consolidations

(Millions)

Description

Contract

Value

Planned

Consolidation

Date

External Tanks $4,589 July 2000

Space Shuttle

Main Engines 1,481 July 2001

Reusable Solid

Rocket Motors 3,880 July 2001

Total $9,950

 

4

The contract value was $8.607 billion as of October 1, 1999 (per contract modification number 380, cost was

$7.915 billion and fee was $.692 billion).
3

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Finding. NASA did not perform a cost-benefit analysis prior to consolidation of Space Shuttle

contracts under the SFOC. The Associate Administrator of the NASA Office of Space Flight

directed the consolidation of Space Shuttle contracts in 1995 based on recommendations of an

independent review team commissioned by the NASA Administrator. Without a cost-benefit

analysis and periodic evaluation, NASA cannot be certain it will achieve net savings from further

consolidation of Space Shuttle contracts valued at about $10 billion, specifically, for Space

Shuttle main engines, external tanks, and reusable solid rocket motors.

Requirement to Perform a Cost-Benefit Analysis

NASA Deputy Administrator. In a March 1997 memorandum, the Acting NASA Deputy

Administrator directed all NASA personnel to use a cost-benefit analysis in the process of

considering issues related to consolidation, downsizing, outsourcing, and research or program

elimination.5 The memorandum stated that, in order for NASA to meet its goals, the Agency

must make decisions based on the best information available. Independent and up-front costbenefit analyses should be a key element in NASA's decision-making process. Further, all

NASA offices are required by the memorandum to perform the analyses in a reasonable and

timely manner. The analyses should be sufficient to provide NASA management with the

information it needs to make the best decisions as well as withstand the scrutiny of others.

Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94. Office of Management and Budget

Circular A-94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs,"

October 29, 1992, provides general guidance for conducting benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness

analyses. Circular A-94 applies to all agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal

Government and is intended to promote efficient resource allocation through well-informed

decision making by the Federal Government. Circular A-94 recommends verification as an

element of an analysis (see Appendix C for details). Periodic verification is necessary to

determine whether anticipated benefits and cost savings have been realized.

NASA's Basis for Consolidation

Kraft Review. In November 1994, the NASA Administrator commissioned an independent

review team to evaluate the Space Shuttle Program. The team was chartered to appraise the

current set of processes used in performing Shuttle operations at the Johnson Space Center,

Kennedy Space Center, Marshall Space Center, and Stennis Space Center and to recommend

alternative operational concepts that could significantly reduce operating costs. The team was

asked to develop an approach that would aid in the transition of Agency functions to any

proposed new organizational and/or management structures. The review, known as the Kraft

review,6 concluded in a February 1995 report that the Space Shuttle Program and its elements

 

5

The Deputy Administrator addressed the memorandum to Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Offices;

Directors, NASA field installations; and the Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

6Dr. Christopher Kraft, former director of the Johnson Space Center, was Team Chairman.
4

should be consolidated and that NASA involvement and oversight should be reduced. The

Kraft review did not perform a cost-benefit analysis to support its conclusion.

Associate Administrator Briefing to Industry. In August 1995, the Associate Administrator,

Office of Space Flight, and the Program Director, Space Shuttle Program, presented a Space

Shuttle Restructuring Industry Briefing and issued a synopsis to potential contractors. In the

briefing, NASA outlined the guidelines for consolidation of contracted routine Space Shuttle

operations and started the process for the procurement.

Joint Venture. In 1995, Rockwell International Corporation and Lockheed Martin

Corporation held 69 percent of the dollar value of Shuttle-related prime contracts. In response

to NASA's desire to competitively consolidate the prime Shuttle contracts, the two corporations

formed USA, a joint venture, in order to obtain the contract for Shuttle operations. The joint

venture ensured that NASA would have to negotiate with USA in order to avoid a more difficult

transition to a single prime contractor.

Justification for Other than Full and Open Competition. In November 1995, the NASA

Administrator submitted to Congress a justification for other than full and open competition to

negotiate a single prime contract with the USA to become the new Shuttle Flight Operations

Contractor and to assume responsibility for Space Shuttle operations. The Administrator stated

that awarding a single prime contract for Space Shuttle operations should reduce Shuttle

program costs in two ways. First, NASA would provide incentives to eliminate unnecessary or

duplicative work. Second, NASA would no longer be heavily involved in the management of

day-to-day Shuttle operations; therefore, fewer civil servants would be required to manage the

program.

Budget and Civil Servant Reductions

The Space Shuttle Program Business Management Office provided budget data to support its

assertion that there were savings associated with the SFOC. The Space Shuttle Program's

annual budget has declined before and after the SFOC began in fiscal year 1997. Also, the

associated civil servant workforce on the Space Shuttle Program has declined during the same

timeframe. Table 3 shows details on the reductions.

Table 3. Space Shuttle Program Reductions

Fiscal Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Budget Reductions (millions) $222 $348 $30 $204 $83

Civil Servant Reductions 365 363 401 241 176

However, these reductions are for the total Space Shuttle Program. The Business Management

Office did not conclusively show the amount of reductions attributed to the SFOC alone, as

opposed to the annual reductions for the total Shuttle Program. While the reductions show a

downward trend for the Shuttle Program, reduced spending for the total Program does not imply

SFOC savings and, therefore, cannot justify the consolidation based on cost savings.
5

Cost-Benefit Analysis Provides a Needed Cost Baseline

A cost-benefit analysis establishes the basis for an agency decision and provides a baseline

that can be used for future evaluation of that decision. The rationale for the program should

be clearly stated in the analysis and all assumptions should be explicit. For example, the

USA contract adds additional cost and fee to its subcontract cost before billing NASA.

USA must manage those subcontracts and is entitled to cost and fee associated with that

task. However, for there to be overall cost savings as a result of the SFOC, there must be

cost reductions elsewhere to offset the additional USA cost and fee. These cost reductions

may be due to reductions in civil servants, reductions in subcontractor personnel, or

reductions in subcontract content. The analysis and resulting baseline provides the basis for

future evaluation to determine whether anticipated benefits and costs have been realized.

Cost-Benefit Analysis Should Address Critical Skills

The proper civil servant workforce and skill mix is a challenge as NASA adjusts to budgetary

and personnel constraints. Therefore, NASA should have a good business reason for the

consolidation and downsizing of its workforce, which should be based on a cost-benefit analysis.

The analysis should identify the critical skills in its civil servant workforce and the associated cost

to provide adequate management of the Shuttle Program and contractors as NASA transfers

more responsibility for Shuttle operations to a single prime contractor.

Analysis and Periodic Evaluation is Needed

The Agency should comply with the Acting Deputy Administrator's direction for performing a

cost-benefit analysis before additional consolidation during Phase II of the SFOC. As a sound

business practice, NASA should have performed a cost-benefit analysis before starting

consolidation of the Space Shuttle operations contracts in 1996. Although NASA did not

specifically require a cost-benefit analysis when the SFOC consolidation began, the Agency

subsequently required it. Since consolidation is not complete, a cost-benefit analysis and

periodic evaluation would be beneficial and could provide NASA reasonable assurance that

further consolidation is the best decision for the Government.

Recommendations, Management's Response, and Evaluation of

Response

The Associate Administrator for Office of Space Flight should:

1. Perform a cost-benefit analysis before further consolidation of Space Shuttle

contracts into the SFOC. The analysis should include the cost and fee received by

the USA for the administration of its subcontracts and any reductions in civil

servants, subcontractor personnel, or work content.
6

2. Evaluate at least annually whether estimated benefits are realized.

Management's Response. Concur with Recommendation 1, and concur with the intent of

Recommendation 2. In response to Recommendation 1, the Associate Administrator for the

Office of Space Flight will take action to ensure that an appropriate cost-benefit analysis is

applied in all phases of the SFOC management cycle. NASA will implement a structured costbenefit analysis into the processes used to determine the overall effects of consolidating

additional contracts into SFOC. In response to Recommendation 2, NASA will increase the

focus of the continuous Program budget assessments of realized cost performance under SFOC

as compared to previous performance under individual contracts. The complete text of

management's comments is in Appendix D.

Evaluation of Response. The actions planned by management are responsive to the

recommendations. In a separate correspondence, management provided an estimated

completion date of June 16, 2000, for corrective action on Recommendation 1, but did not

specify an estimated completion date for the corrective action on Recommendation 2. We

request that information in response to the final report. The recommendations are resolved but

will remain undispositioned until agreed-to corrective actions are completed.
7

Appendix A. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Objectives

The overall objective was to evaluate management of the SFOC Phase II. Specifically, the

objectives were to determine whether contract requirements were properly determined, fair and

reasonable pricing was obtained, and cost savings and other SFOC goals have been achieved.

This report identifies a condition regarding a cost-benefit analysis that warrants timely action by

NASA management. We will issue a report on the other objectives later.

Scope and Methodology

Our audit included a review of the rationale and plan for consolidation. We reviewed budget

and spending data for fiscal years 1994 through 1999 provided by the Shuttle Program Office.

We also reviewed contract files for the completed Phase II negotiations. We interviewed

Shuttle Program personnel to understand the history of the procurement and the possible future

of the SFOC. We did not assess the reliability of computer-processed data, because we did

not rely on computer-processed data to achieve our objectives.

Management Controls Reviewed

We reviewed management controls relative to a cost-benefit analysis as described in the NASA

Deputy Administrator's March 1997 memorandum,7 and Office of Management and Budget

Circular A-94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs,"

October 29, 1992.8

We determined that controls needed to be strengthened to ensure that NASA performs costbenefit analysis (see the Finding).

Audit Field Work

We performed the audit field work from August 1999 through January 2000. We conducted

the audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

 

7

The memorandum directed all NASA personnel to use a cost-benefit analysis in the process of considering

issues related to consolidation, downsizing, outsourcing, and research or program elimination.

8

The Circular provides general guidance for conducting cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses.
8

Appendix B. Space Flight Operations Contract

Brief Description of the Statement of Work. United Space Alliance (USA) has overall

responsibility as the prime contractor to include all Space Shuttle Program and International

Space Station Program activities defined in the contract. The work shall be performed so that

all missions manifested by NASA are successfully accomplished in accordance with the NASA

Space Transportation System 07700, Volume III, Space Shuttle Flight Definition and

Requirements Directive and NASA Space Transportation System 08178, Space Shuttle

Program Schedules for:

• overall flight definition and planning guidelines,

• near-term flight assignments, characteristics, and configuration,

• flight preparation configuration freeze point definitions,

• follow-on flight rate requirements by fiscal year,

• required capability enhancements in support of flight missions, and

• orbiter maintenance and down period schedule.

USA shall perform all work during the contract period necessary and appropriate to support

scheduled missions pursuant to the mission profile. The Space Shuttle vehicle elements for

which the USA has overall responsibility consist of the fleet of orbiter vehicles; solid rocket

boosters and reusable solid rocket motors; external tanks; Space Shuttle main engines; flight

crew equipment; and ground support systems, flight software, and integration of payloads

manifested by NASA.

Date Awarded and Price. The SFOC contract NAS 9-20000 was awarded September 26,

1996, for $6.949 billion. The contract value was $8.607 billion as of October 1, 1999 (per

contract modification number 380).

Contract Type. The contract is a cost plus, award fee, incentive fee, and performance fee

contract.

Completion Date. The basic contract is a 6-year contract with a period-of-performance from

October 1996 through September 2002. The contract has two options to extend the periodof-performance for 2 years each that, if exercised, would extend the contract another 4 years

through September 2006.

Contractor. The contractor is United Space Alliance, a joint venture between Boeing and

Lockheed Martin.

Primary Locations of Performance. The Johnson Space Center and the Kennedy Space

Center are the primary locations of performance on the contract.
9

Costs Incurred to Date. NASA has disbursed $4.074 billion as of October 6, 1999, on the

contract.
10

Appendix B

Cost And Schedule Performance. The USA has declared $105 million of cost underruns.9

Other Performance Information. The USA award fee scores have ranged from 81 to 86,

out of a possible score of 100.

 

9

This underrun represents an increase of $29 million compared to the $76 million underrun referenced in the

draft of this report.
11

Appendix C. Elements of Cost-Benefit or Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

The Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for

Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs," October 29, 1992, provides the following

guidance on the elements of a cost-benefit analysis.

1. Policy Rationale. The rationale for the Government program being

examined should be clearly stated in the analysis. Programs may be

justified on efficiency grounds where they address market failure,

such as public goods and externalities. They may also be justified

where they improve the efficiency of the Government's internal

operations, such as cost-saving investments.

2. Explicit Assumptions. Analyses should be explicit about the

underlying assumptions used to arrive at estimates of future benefits

and costs. In the case of public health programs, for example, it may

be necessary to make assumptions about the number of future

beneficiaries, the intensity of service, and the rate of increase in

medical prices. The analysis should include a statement of the

assumptions, the rationale behind them, and a review of their

strengths and weaknesses. Key data and results, such as year-byyear estimates of benefits and costs, should be reported to promote

independent analysis and review.

3. Evaluation of Alternatives. Analyses should also consider

alternative means of achieving program objectives by examining

different program scales, different methods of provision, and

different degrees of government involvement. For example, in

evaluating a decision to acquire a capital asset, the analysis should

generally consider: (i) doing nothing; (ii) direct purchase;

(iii) upgrading, renovating, sharing, or converting existing

government property; or (iv) leasing or contracting for services.

4. Verification. Retrospective studies to determine whether

anticipated benefits and costs have been realized are potentially

valuable. Such studies can be used to determine necessary

corrections in existing programs, and to improve future estimates of

benefits and costs in these programs or related ones.
12

Appendix D. Management's Response
13

Appendix D
14

Appendix D
15

Appendix D
16

Appendix E. Report Distribution

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters

A/Administrator

AI/Associate Deputy Administrator

B/Chief Financial Officer

B/Comptroller

BF/Director, Financial Management Division

G/General Counsel

H/Associate Administrator for Procurement

HK/Director, Contract Management Division

HS/Director, Program Operations Division

J/Associate Administrator for Management Systems

JM/Director, Management Assessment Division

L/Associate Administrator for Legislative Affairs

M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight

NASA Centers

Director, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center

Director, Marshall Space Flight Center

Director, John F. Kennedy Space Center

Chief Counsel, John F. Kennedy Space Center

Non-NASA Federal Organizations and Individuals

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Policy

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division, Office of Management and

Budget

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch, Energy and Science Division, Office

of Management and Budget

Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, Defense

Acquisitions Issues, General Accounting Office

Professional Assistant, Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space
17

Appendix E

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member – Congressional Committees and

Subcommittees

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies

House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology

House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

House Committee on Science

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science

Congressional Member

Honorable Pete Sessions, U.S. House of Representatives
NASA Assistant Inspector General for Auditing

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Major Contributors to the Report

Dennis Coldren, Program Director, Human Exploration and Development of Space Audits

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