UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 19-2190 (TJK)

JUAN SYLVESTER BARNES,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT J. CONTEE III et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In 2011, Metropolitan Police Department officers in the District of Columbia arrested Juan 

Sylvester Barnes on drug-related charges and seized about $5,000 in his possession. A few months 

later, the Drug Enforcement Administration adopted that seizure and began administrative proceedings to forfeit those funds to the United States. In April 2012, the funds were formally forfeited. In July 2019, Barnes sued to challenge that forfeiture. In his operative complaint, he sued 

in their official capacities the “ADA for D.C.”—the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia—

and the DEA, among others. The U.S. Attorney and the DEA move to dismiss and for summary 

judgment. Because the undisputed facts show that Barnes’s lawsuit is untimely, the Court will 

grant the motion. 

I. Background 

In October 2011, Metropolitan Police Department officers arrested Barnes on drug-related 

charges and seized about $5,000 from him. ECF No. 19-1 ¶¶ 1–4; ECF No. 19-3 at 2–3. That 

same day, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia filed charges against Barnes in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 4; United States v. Barnes, No. 2011 CMD 

020047 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2011); see also D.C. Code § 23-101(c). 
2

In December 2011, the DEA adopted the seizure of funds and commenced administrative 

proceedings to forfeit them. ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 6; see also 18 U.S.C. § 981 et seq. In early January 

2012, the DEA sent Barnes written notice of the seizure with instructions on how to contest the 

forfeiture by certified mail to the address of record it had for him, and the letter was signed for and 

accepted by Barnes’s mother. ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 7; ECF No. 19-2 at 10–11; ECF No. 21 at 6; ECF 

No. 24 at 3–4; see also Barnes v. Med. Dep’t Wash. Cnty. Jail, No. DKC-12-1994, 2013 WL 

4176961, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2013). Soon after that, realizing that it had misstated the amount 

of money at issue, the DEA resent written notice of the seizure with instructions on how to contest 

the forfeiture by certified mail to the same address that it had previously sent notice. ECF No. 19-

1 ¶¶ 10–11; ECF No. 19-2 at 13. This time, the letter was returned as undeliverable. ECF No. 19-

1 ¶ 12; ECF No. 19-2 at 14. The DEA also published a revised notice of the seizure in the Wall 

Street Journal for three successive weeks in February 2012, with the last such notice being published on February 21, 2012. ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 13; ECF No. 19-2 at 15–17. On April 9, 2012, 

having not received a properly executed claim, the DEA administratively forfeited the funds to the 

United States. ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 17; ECF No. 19-2 at 18; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1609(b).

In March 2015, Barnes sued the DEA in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, seeking to recover the forfeited funds. ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 20; ECF No. 19-6 at 2; Barnes v. United States, 122 

Fed. Cl. 581, 582 (Fed. Cl. 2015). In July 2015, that court dismissed the case for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, among other reasons. ECF No. 19-6 at 6; Barnes, 122 Fed. Cl. at 584. 

In July 2019, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Barnes filed this suit. ECF No. 1. 

Because of several deficiencies with his original filing, Barnes was ordered to file an amended 

complaint by February 2021. ECF No. 6 at 3. In June 2021, Barnes filed an amended complaint. 

ECF No. 7. In it, he sued the “ADA for D.C.”—the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia—
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and the DEA in their “official capacity,” along with the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department and “Officer John Doe.” Id. at 1, 8; see also D.C. Code § 23-101(c). As relevant here, in 

that complaint he alleged that he “did not get due process”—that is, adequate notice—about the 

forfeiture of his funds and explained that he sought their return. ECF No. 7 at 5–7. Then the John 

Doe defendant was dismissed, and the case was assigned to the undersigned for further proceedings. ECF No. 8; Docket Entry of June 29, 2021. 

After suing, Barnes wrote the DEA twice. See ECF No. 19-1 ¶¶ 17–19; ECF No. 19-4 at 

4–13; ECF No. 19-5 at 2–5. In one of those letters, he said that he had “been writing [to the DEA] 

since 2012” to try to get his funds returned. ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 19; ECF No. 19-5 at 5.

Now, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia and the DEA (“Federal Defendants”)

jointly move to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment, asserting several independent 

grounds on which they argue that Barnes’s claim against them fails. See ECF No. 19 at 11–22.

1

The Court advised Barnes of the consequences of failing to respond to their motion, and Barnes 

later filed two responses. ECF No. 20; ECF No. 21; ECF No. 24.2

1 Their deadline to respond to the operative complaint was originally January 7, 2022. See ECF 

No. 13; ECF No. 16 at 1. In December 2021, an Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) 

entered an appearance for the DEA and moved for an extension of time, which the Court granted. 

See ECF No. 15; ECF No. 16 at 1; Minute Order of December 30, 2021. On the day of the extended 

deadline, that same AUSA entered an appearance for the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia and then filed Federal Defendants’ motion. See ECF No. 18; ECF No. 19 at 6 n.1, 23. In the 

motion, the AUSA explains that she had overlooked entering an appearance for the “ADA for 

D.C.,” had thus failed to include the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia as a party seeking 

an extension of time in her prior motion, and moves nunc pro tunc for the same extension of time 

on behalf of the U.S. Attorney. ECF No. 19 at 6 n.1. Barnes does not oppose the requested 

extension. See ECF No. 21; ECF No. 24. The Court will grant it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).

2 After submitting these responses, Barnes also submitted an unsworn filing in which he requested 

a court order for certain “discovery” about his arrest—specifically, “police reports” and information about his arresting officers—that he suggested was needed to “provid[e]” a “genuine dispute” of “material fact.” See ECF No. 35 at 1, 3. The Court rejected this request for several 
4

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court must grant summary judgment if the 

movants show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movants are entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is appropriately granted when, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in his favor. See Lopez v. Council on Am.-

Islamic Rels. Action Network, Inc., 826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

III. Analysis

Federal Defendants argue that Barnes’s claim against them fails for several reasons. See 

ECF No. 19.3

 Among them, they argue that Barnes’s claim is untimely. The Court agrees.

In his operative complaint, Barnes seeks the post-forfeiture return of funds that the Metropolitan Police Department seized in relation to Barnes’s Superior Court case and that the DEA 

later administratively forfeited to the United States. See, e.g., ECF No. 7 at 5; see also ECF No. 

21 at 1. Thus, the Court construes his claim against Federal Defendants as a claim to set aside the 

forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 983(e), which is the “exclusive remedy” for a party “seeking to set 

reasons. See Minute Order of August 25, 2022. The Court also notes that none of this requested 

“discovery” would have any relevance to the Court’s resolution of Federal Defendants’ motion, 

which turns on facts that Barnes has not attempted to dispute or even suggested that he could 

dispute. In any event, Barnes’s request does not “show[] . . . that, for specified reasons, [he] cannot 

present facts essential to justify [his] opposition” to that motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Thus, 

the Court will not “defer considering” it or otherwise delay its resolution. See id.

3 The Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department was not served until briefing on this motion 

was ripe. See ECF No. 28 at 3. He has since moved to dismiss. See ECF No. 31. The Court will 

separately address that motion.
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aside a declaration of forfeiture” like the DEA’s here. 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(5); United States v. 

Brown, 185 F. Supp. 3d 79, 84 (D.D.C. 2016).

4

Under § 983(e)(1), any “person entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture 

proceeding who does not receive such notice” may move to “set aside a declaration of forfeiture 

with respect to that person’s interest in the property.” The Court must grant such motion if “(A) the 

Government knew, or reasonably should have known, of the moving party’s interest and failed to 

take reasonable steps to provide such party with notice; and (B) the moving party did not know or 

have reason to know of the seizure within sufficient time to file a timely claim.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 983(e)(1). That said, such a claim “may be filed not later than 5 years after the date of final 

publication of notice of seizure of the property.” Id. § 983(e)(3). 

The parties do not dispute that final publication of notice of the seizure was February 21, 

2012. ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 13. Thus, the five-year statute of limitations began to run at that time and 

expired in February 2017. Barnes did not sue until July 2019. See ECF No. 1. Thus, his lawsuit 

was more than two years late, and his claim under § 983(e) is untimely. See, e.g., Ford-Bey v. 

United States, No. 19-cv-2039 (BAH), 2020 WL 32991, at *9 (D.D.C. Jan. 2, 2020).

Barnes does not explicitly argue for equitable tolling, and it is not clear that the February 

2017 deadline under § 983(e)(3) is subject to equitable tolling. See Ford-Bey, 2020 WL 32991, at 

*9. After all, § 983(e)(3) “seems designed to cut off rights in full after a lengthy period of time 

4 Barnes’s complaint could also be construed as seeking damages from Federal Defendants based 

on a procedural due process claim under the Fifth Amendment or an excessive-fines claim under 

the Eighth Amendment. See ECF No. 7 at 7. To the extent he raises such claims, the Court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over them because Federal Defendants, as agencies of the United States, 

are shielded from suit by the United States’ sovereign immunity absent an applicable waiver and 

§ 983(e)(1) is the only applicable waiver. See, e.g., McKinney v. U.S. DOJ DEA, 580 F. Supp. 2d 

1, 2–4 (D.D.C. 2008); Rangolan v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 10-cv-391 (HHK), 2010 WL 

908754, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2010); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 483–86 (1994).
6

for a person who failed to receive the requisite statutory notice.” Vazquez v. U.S. DEA, 823 F.3d 

280, 282 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). But even assuming equitable tolling could apply here, 

Barnes has not shown that it should, and the undisputed facts show that it does not.

Equitable tolling is “appropriate only in rare instances where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct—it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period 

against the party and gross injustice would result.” Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763, 778 (D.C. 

Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The party seeking equitable tolling “must show 

(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 

stood in his way.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This is a “high threshold.” Id. 

Here, the second element is undisputedly absent. “An extraordinary circumstance must be 

an ‘external obstacle to timely filing,’ meaning beyond a litigant’s control.” Williams v. United 

States, No. 17-cv-783 (JEB), 2017 WL 11493266, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2017) (quoting Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 256 (2016)). Barnes himself told the 

DEA that he had been writing to it “since 2012” to get his funds back, showing that he was aware 

of the DEA’s forfeiture basically since it occurred. See ECF No. 19-5 at 5. And any doubt that 

Barnes knew that he had a potentially actionable claim and had the ability to pursue it before the 

statute of limitations ran is dispelled by his 2015 lawsuit in the Court of Federal Claims, in which 

he sought to recover the funds in question here. See ECF No. 19-1 ¶ 20; Barnes, 122 Fed. Cl. at 

582. Further, even if the pendency of the Court of Federal Claims action supported equitable 

tolling—though it does not, see Young v. SEC, 956 F.3d 650, 655–57 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Williams 

v. Perdue. --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2020 WL 1892045, at *9–10 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2020)—that case 
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was dismissed in July 2015, giving Barnes more than a year to sue before the statute of limitations 

expired. See Barnes, 122 Fed. Cl. 581. Thus, equitable tolling is unavailable here.5

IV. Conclusion and Order

For all these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, nunc pro tunc and for excusable neglect 

shown, that the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia’s motion for an extension of time to 

answer or otherwise respond to Barnes’s complaint is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that 

the U.S. Attorney and the DEA’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 19, is 

GRANTED; the undisputed facts entitle them to summary judgment because Barnes’s claim 

against them is time barred. 

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly 

TIMOTHY J. KELLY

United States District Judge

Date: September 20, 2022 

5 Even if Barnes’s claim were not timed-barred, his claim against the U.S. Attorney would likely 

be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim because his operative complaint—and all his 

other filings, for that matter—lacks factual allegations that would permit “the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the [U.S. Attorney] is liable for,” or even has any meaningful connection 

to, the allegedly wrongful forfeiture. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). And his 

claim against the DEA likely would fail on the merits for the reasons argued in Federal Defendants’ 

motion. See ECF No. 19 at 17–22.