## NO. 12

- 20

- 00143

- CV

IN THE COUR T OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS

IN THE INTEREST OF

C.R.D. AND B.R.D.,

CHILDREN §
§
§ APPEAL FROM THE 321ST

JU DICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
J.L.D. appeals the trial court’s order in a suit t o modify the parent

- child relationship

. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s refusal to interview one of the child ren in chambers, failu re to file findings of fact and conclusions of law , injunction of the parties’ protected speech,

p redetermin ation of the penalty for injunction violation , and conditio n al grant of the expanded possession order. We affirm.

B ACKGROUND J.L.D. is the father of C.R.D. and B.R.D., and S.E.J.M. is their mother. On March 6, 2019, the trial court signed an agreed order in a suit to modify the parent

- child relationship, appointing J.L.D. and S.E.J.M. joint managing conservators of the children , and naming S.E.J.M

.

as the parent with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children

. J.L.D.’s possession periods generally followed an alternating weekend pattern during the school year with alternating weeks during the summer months. On August 3 0, S.E .J.M. filed a petition to modify the parent

- child relationship , alleging that J.L.D. was harassing her and making harmfu l

statements to the children about her . She request ed t o be named sole managing conservator of the
children and that J.L.D. be pro hibited from having access to the children until he submitted to a psychological evaluation, or, alternatively, t hat hi s possession and access be supervised

. On September 3, J.L.D. filed a counterpetition alleging that S.E.J.M. abused and neglected the2 ch ildren , and re que sting that the trial court modify the designation of the parent having the exclusive right to de signate the primary residence of the children

. After a bench trial, the trial court found that modification of the previous order was in the
b est interest of the children. The court made no changes to conservatorship or S.E.J.M.’s exclusive right to desi gnate the primary residence of the children but ordered that J.L.D. participate in counseling regarding appropriate conversat ion boundaries wit h the children and appointed a coparenting consultant to assist the parents in formulating a coparenting plan. T he

court reduced the amount of J.L.D.’s possession periods to a standard possession order. However, u pon J.L.D.’s completion of six sessions wi th the coparenting consultant and four sessions with the counselor, his possessio n time would increase to the exp anded standard possession order. Finally, the court ordered that if either party violated the injunct ion against discussing the case, conserva torship, possession, or support with the children, a $5, 000.00 sanction would be levied against the party. This appeal followed.

F AILURE TO I NTERVIEW C HILD IN C HAMBERS In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the trial court reversibly erred by refus ing to
interview twelve

- year
- old C.R.D. in chamber s

. Standard of Review and Applicable Law Chapter 153 of the f amily code sets out the overarching policy of the State of Texas regarding child custody issues. In suits affecting the parent

- child relationsh ip,

(a) [t]he public policy of this state is to:
(1) assure that children will have frequent and continuing con tact with parents who have shown the a bility to act in the best interest of the ch i ld;
(2) provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child; and
(3) encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their child after t he pare nts have separated or dissolved their marriage.
T EX

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. § 153.001( a) (West 2014 ). Furthermore, “[t]he best interest of the ch ild

s hall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.” Id. § 153.002 (West 2014 ). Chapter 153 also provides the following:3 (a) In a nonjury trial or at a hearing, on the application of a party, the amicus attorney, or the attorney ad litem for the chi l d, t he court shall intervie w in chambers a child 12 years of age or older and may interview in chambers a child under 12 year s of age to determine the chi ld’ s wishes

as to conservatorship or as to the person who shall have the exclusive right to determine the child’s p rimary residen ce.

Id. § 153.009( a) (West 2014 ). The word “shall” imposes a duty unless the context in which it appears necessarily requires a different construction or a different construction is expressly provided by statute

. T EX

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. § 311.016 ( 2 ) (Wes t 2013 ). We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Molinet v. Kimbrell , 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011). Our primary objective in construing statutes is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. The plain meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative intent unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or
nonsensical results. Id.
A nalysis In J.L.D.’s counterpetition, he stated the followi ng:

[C.R.D.], the child the subject of this suit, will be twelve years of age or older on October 22, 2019 and will express to the Court in chambers, as provided in sectio n 153.009 of the Texas Family Code, the name of the person who is the ch i ld’s preference to have the exclusive right to desi gnate the primary residence of the child. [B .R.D.], while , only eight years of age, if given the opportunity, will express to the Court in cha mbers, the name of the person who is the child’s preference to have the exclusive right to designate the primary r esidence of the child.

Additionally, he filed a “Motion for Judge to Confer with Children ,” in which he made the following request:

For th e purpose of determining the best interest of the children, [J.L.D.] re quests the Court to confer with the childre n, in chambers, to determin e each child’s wishes as to who shall have the exclusive right to determine the child’s primary residence.

The t hree day bench trial in this case took place over the course of several weeks. On the second day of trial, Matthew Thigpen, the court

- appointed amicus attorney, told the court he was

aware that a motion to confer was before the court and C .R.D. was schedul ed to be interviewed that day. However, Thigpen received information that morning that C.R.D. had a “rough night , ” and he was concerned that C.R.D. might not be mentally prepared for the interview.4 Consequently, he asked a school counselor , Julie Surra t t, with whom C.R.D. had a good rapport, to speak with C.R.D. at lunchtime. If, after that meeting, Surratt believed C.R. D. was not mentally prepared for the interview and would be harmed by it, Thigpen would contest the
motion to confer.
After the lunch r ecess, Thigpen reported to the court that Surratt spoke with C.R.D. and
believed the intervie w would not be trauma tic to C.R.D. Later that day, during Thigpen’s cross

examination of S.E.J.M., he was alerted that the children had arrived at the courthouse, their

mat ernal grandmother had left the courtroom to speak with them , and “something was going on.” During a rece ss, Thigpen spoke with C.R.D., who said that he was feeling sick, his stomach hurt, he was very concerned, and he did not want to be “stuck in the middle of all of this.” Thigpen
told the court that previously i n his office, he observed C.R.D. develop phy sical manifestations
of stress including stomachache and vomiting. Consequently, Thigpen concluded that the
interview would harm C.R.D. and r equested that the trial court suspend the motion to confer until
the case was resolved. The trial court concurred and did not interview C.R.D. that day, agree ing that when a child exhibits physical manifestations of stress related to coming to the courtho use to talk to the judge, he is being traumatized. The case was then recessed for just under a month.
On the ne xt day of trial, during closing arguments, Thigpen reported to the court that he
interviewed the children in his office the previous day. He said that C.R.D. exhibited every physical symptom of significant acute anxiety and long term depression. He repor ted that C.R.D. could not verbalize any statement but sat with a skull mask over his face, a hoodie on,
and his head down. When Thigpen aske d him about his parents’ houses, he appeared to fall asleep. Thigpen then told him to give him a thumbs up or thum bs down so he would not have to speak and be further traumatized. When asked whether he felt safe at each parent’s house, C.R.D. gave a thumb s up. When asked whether he loved each of his parents, he gave a thumbs

up. When asked what he would change about the possession schedule if he could, C.R.D. shrugged. After the parties presented their closing arguments, the trial court asked J.L.D. ’s c ounsel whether he was still urging his motion to confer w ith the child

. J.L.D. ’s counsel responded in pertinent p art as follows:

If you’re thinking of changing the conservatorship schedule, to harm my client with it, yes, I want you to talk to the child f irst.5 If you’re not, then, there’s no reason. I know, no matter what the child says, you’re not going to change the primary. Okay. I’m not concerned about that.
My suggested relief is to leave the conservatorship, support, and visitation just like it w as[.] And if you’re going to do supervised, or any of that kind of thing, before you do that, I want you to talk t o the child[.]

The trial court then recessed the case to consider its ruling

. The next day, after the trial court ruled that J.L.D.’s poss ess ion be reduced to a standard possession order until he fulfilled the counseling requirements, J.L.D.’s counsel stated that he was puzzled by the ruling because Th igpen recommended a seven

- days

- on/seven

- days

- off
schedule. 1 Subsequently, the following ex change occurred:

TRIAL COURT: [A]t this point, whether Mr. Thigpen recommended it or not, I am not going to grant a seven
- on/seven

- off visitation schedule. I don’t think that’s appropriate in this

case.

J.L.D.’S COUNSEL : But you didn’t talk to the child

. TRIAL COURT: I didn’t supervise your client’s visitation either, Mr. Rosenstein.
If you feel that that’s fodder for appeal, then so be it.
But there is ample evidence that this child was traumatized by the thought of coming to talk to me, and I’m not going to put that child in that position. Just not going to do it.

Nothing more was said regarding the motion t o confer. On appeal, J.L.D. argues that t he trial court abused its discretion by refusing to interview
C.R.D. in chambers to determine his wishes regarding conservatorship or the person who shall have the exclusive right to determine the child’s primary residence. S.E.J.M. argues that the trial

c ourt did not err by refusing to interview C.R.D. because it heard evidence of C.R.D.’s desires , f ound that the interview would harm C.R.D., and found that the interview would not provide necessary evidence. Alte rnatively, S.E.J.M. argues that the error was harmless. We agree with S.E.J.M. that the trial court did not err, and further observe that th e issue was not preserved for
our review. Before a complaint may be presented for appellate review, the record mu st show that it was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion. T EX

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. P. 33.1( a)(1).

1 The record shows that Thigpen recommended the expanded standard possession o rder.6 However, a complaint that is subsequently withdrawn is waived. See Lemos v. State , 27 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tex. Ap p.

— San Antonio 20 00 pet. ref'd) (counsel’s comment “I withdraw my objection to that” waived complaint on appeal). In J.L.D. ’s motion to confer, he properly invoke d Section 153.009( a) , but he later withdrew that request

. Although change in conservatorship was originally requested by bot h parties, by the end of the evidence and closing arguments, neither party was contesting conservatorship or who would have the exclusive rig ht to designate the primary residence of the chil dren. The parties agreed that they did not get along and the chil dren

wer e caught in the middle. The dispute centered on which party was putting the children in the middle of the ongoing conflict. S.E.J.M. argued that J.L.D. was the one at fault and his ac cess and possession should be reduced or supervised. J.L.D. arg ued that S.E.J.M. was the on e at fault, her attempted modification was frivolous, and nothing should be changed. Thigpen
concurred that both parties’ coparenting abilities and communication were poor and the children
were stuck in the middle

. He recommen ded that they remain joint managing conservators with
strict in junctions and counseling orders. After closing arguments , when the trial co urt asked whether J.L.D. was “still ur ging the motion that I visit with [C.R.D.],” J.L.D. responded that he was “no t concerned” about whether
the court was going to “change the primary,” but wanted the court to visit with C.R.D. only if it was considering changing the v isitat ion schedule or ordering supervised visitation. We construe
this statement as a withdrawal of J.L.D.’s request that the court interview C.R.D. regarding his
wishes as to conservatorship and the person who would have the exclusive right to determine his primary residence , and a re quest that the cour t interview C.R.D. regarding his wishes as to

posse ssion and access. Section 153.009(b) provides that a trial court may interview a child in chambers to determine his wishes as to possession, access, or any oth er issue in the suit affecting the parent

- child relationship. T EX

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. § 153.009 (b) (Wes t 2014). Whether to
conduct such an interview i s discretionary with the court. See T EX

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. § 311.016( 1 ) (West 2013) (“ may ” cre ates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power). J.L.D. does not argue on appeal that the trial cour t erred by failing to grant a discretionary interview of C.R.D. under Section 153.009(b) regarding his wishes as to possession and acces s. B ecause J.L.D. withdrew his request that the court interview C.R.D. under Section 153.009(a) , we conclude that he wa ived t his complaint on appeal

. See Lemos , 27 S.W.3d at 47

.7 Furthermore, even if J.L.D. did not waive his complaint, we c an not conclude the court erred in this case because the evidence shows that an interview would endanger C.R.D.’s safety
and welfare so that it could not be in his best interest. See T EX

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. § 153.002 ( best interest of child is primary consideration in deter minin g conservato rship, possession, and access issues). T he plain meaning of Section 153.009( a) is that an interview wi th a child who is at least twelve years old regarding the person who shall have the exclusive right to determine the child’s primary res idenc e is mandatory up on the application of a par ty

. However, when the court finds that conducting an interview would e ndanger the child’s safety and welfare so that it could not be
in his best interest , a mandatory interview would undermine the primary c onsid eration the court
is to follow under Section 153.002 and lead to an absurd result

. See id. ; Molinet , 356 S.W.3d at
411. The Texas Supreme Court provided guidance on the interplay between Section 153.002 and other mandatory provisions in the Texas F amily Code in In re Lee , 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013). In that case, the par ties executed a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) giving the mother periodic access to and possession of the child and enjoining her registered sex offender husband from being wit hin f ive miles of the child at any time. Id

. at 447. After hearing the
evidenc e

— w hich included evidence that the mothe r previously allowed her husband to have

contac t and reside in the house with the child in violation of his community supervision
condit ions

— the district court concluded that entry of judgment on the MSA was not in the best
interest of the child and conseq uently refused to enter judgment. Id. at 448. At the time, Section
153.0071 provided in pertinent part as follows:

( d ) A mediated set tleme nt agreement is binding on the parties if the agreement: (1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that i s in boldfaced type or capital letters or underlined, that the agreement is not subject to revocation; (2) is signed by each party to t he ag reement; and (3) is signed by the party’s attorney, if any, who is presen t at the time the agreement is signed

. ( e) If a mediated settlement agreement meets the requirements of Subsection (3), a p a rty is entitled to judgment on the mediated settleme nt ag reement notwithsta nding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of law. ( e
- 1) Notwithstanding S ub section s (d) and (e), a court may decline to enter a judgment on a mediated settlement agreement if the court finds that: (1) a party t o the agreement was a victim of family violence, and that circumstance impaired the party’s abi l ity to make decisions; an d (2) the agreement is not in the chil d’s best interest.8 Id. at 4 51

- 52

. 2
The mother petition ed the court of appeals for a writ of mand amus ordering the trial court to enter judgment on the MSA. Id. at 449. The court of appeals denied the petition, holding that “the trial court [did] not commit[] a clear abuse of discretion in refusing to enter judgment on a mediated settlement agre emen t that [was] not in the child’s best interest.” Id. Subsequent ly, the mother petitioned the supreme court for a w rit of mandamus

. Id. The father argued that, based on Section 153.002’s mandate that “[t]he best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining issues of conservatorship and possession,” trial courts had discr etion to void an MSA that was not in the child’s best interest.
Id. at 452. A divided court conditionally granted the mandamus relief a nd o rdered the trial court to withdraw its order denying entry of judgment on the MSA. Id. at 4 61

. Justice Lehrmann de livered the court’s opinion , joined in full by three justices and in part by Justice Guzman

. In the opinion, Justice Lehrmann identifie d th e sole issue as whether a trial court may deny a motion to enter judgment on a validly executed MSA based on a broad best interest inquiry. Id. at 450. The court held it may not. Id. at 457

- 5 8. Justice Green filed a dissenting opinion, joined by th ree justice s , identif ying the issue as
whether a trial court may deny such a motion based on a determination that the MS A e ndanger s the child’s safety and welfare and, thus, is not in the child’s best interest

. Id. at 468 (Green, J., dissenting)

. He opin ed t hat it may. Id.
Justice Guzman filed a concurring opinion addressing both issues. Id. at 461

- 66 ( Guzman, J., conc urring)

. She concurr ed with Justice Green , for a majority of the court , that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to ent er judgment on a n MSA that could endanger the safety and welfare of a child. Id. at 461. Her opinion diverged from Justice
Green ’s in that she b e lieved mandamus was appropriate in the case because the evidence of endangerment was legally in sufficient to support the trial c ourt’s decision to set aside the MSA.
Id. at 46 2

. In analyzing whether a broad best interest in quiry was appropriate before entering judgment on an MSA , the supreme court addressed the father’s argument that despite Section

2 The legislature has since added that a trial court may decline to enter judgment on an MS A if it finds that the agreement would permit a person with a history or pattern of physical or sexual abuse to reside in the same household as or have unsup ervised a ccess to the child, and the agreement is not in the child’s best interest. T EX

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. § 153.00 71( e
- 1)(1)(B), (2) (West Supp. 2020 ).9 153.007 1’s plain language, trial courts could consider the best interest of the child based on
Section 153.002

. Id. at 45 4 (ma jority opinion)

. It concluded t hat , to the extent the two statutes

co n flicted, the applicable rules of construction required a holding that Section 153.0071 prevailed. Id. First, the court reasoned that the use of the word “notwithstanding” indicated th e legislature intended Section 153.0071 to control. Id. (citing Molinet , 356 S.W.3d at 41 3

- 14). Next, it observed that the specific sta tuto ry language of Section 153.0071( e) trump s Section 153.002’s more general mandate. Id. at 45 5 (citing T EX

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. § 311.0 2 6 ( b ) ; Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings , 351 S.W.3d 290, 297 (Tex. 2011) (reiterating rule that specific statuto ry p rovisions prevail over general mandates ) )

. Finally, the court observed that Section 153.0071 prevailed as the statut e latest in date of enactment. Id. at 455 (citing T EX

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. § 311.0 25 ( a ) ; Jackson , 351 S.W.3d at 297 ). For those reasons, t he c ourt held that “[S]ection 153.0071(e) encourage s parents to peaceably resolve their child

- related disput es through m ediation by foreclosing a broad best interest inquiry with respect to entry of judgment on properly executed MSAs[.]” Id.
The concurr ing and dissenting opinions agreed that a broad best in terest inquiry was inappropriate. Id. at 463 ( Guzman, J., concur ring) , 470 (Green, J., dissenting)

. In explaining why a broad best interest inquiry is not required before entering judgment on an MSA, e ac h opinion cite s the presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their children. Id. (citing
Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 68, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L

. Ed. 2d 49 (2000))

. Justice Green, although disagreeing that the appropriateness of a br oad best interest inquiry was the issue before the court, stated that he “would not hold that a trial court can refu se to enter judgment on an MSA based on any one of the factors we listed in Holley v. Adams as pertinent to a best interest
determinatio n.” 3 Id. at 476 (Green, J., dissenting)

. He agreed that Section 153.0071 d oes not require a court to determine that an MSA i s in a child’s best interest before entering judgment on
it and believed th e lack of such a requirement ma kes sense because courts gen erally delegate to MSA parties the role of ensuring the child’s best interest is protected. Id. at 470 (citing T EX

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. § 15 1 .00 1 ( a)(2) (“A parent of a child has the following rights and duties . . . the

3 This nonexhaustive list of factors includes (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physica l needs o f the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking

cu stody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed plac ement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent

- child relatio nship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. A dams , 544 S.W.2d 367, 371

- 72 (Tex. 1976).10 duty of care, control , protection, a nd r easonable discipline of the child [.]”) )

. Justice Green
believed that “ courts , therefore, should refrain from perfor ming a broad best interest inqui ry or conducting a full evidentiary hearing on every MSA presented.” Id. at 470. Similarly, Justice
Gu zman “agree[d] with the Court that se ction 153.0071 in fact forecloses a broad best

- interest inquiry,” and opined that “ [ i]n doing so, the statute furthers the time

- honored ‘presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of the ir children. ’ ” Id. a t 46 3 ( Guzman, J., concurring)

. In analyzin g whether a trial court could deny a motion to enter judgment on an MSA
base d on a determination that it would endanger the child’s safety and welfare , Justice Green opined that when the court believes, based on evid ence, that the parties executed an MSA

w ithout safeguarding the child’s best interest, the pr esumption that the part ies act in the child’s best interest can be rebutted or negated. Id. at 470 (Green, J., dissenting)

. In this rare situation,
the famil y co de allows the court to ensure that the child’s safety and welfare are protected by refusing to enter judgment on an MSA that places the child in danger. Id. In addition to the clear policy that courts must ensure protection of a child’s best interest as defined in Sec tions 153.001 and 153.002, more than one hundred code sections contain specific provisions to protect
children’s best interests , reflecting that children’s interests are to be paramount in legal

procee dings and judges have the power to sa fegu ard children from endangerment. Id. at 471 &

n. 6 (citing provisions)

. When reading Section 153.0071 in context and in harmony with these provisions, Justice Green could not conclude that the legislature intended the absurd re sult of disallowing court s di scretion to reject an MSA that jeopardizes a child’s safety and welfare. Id. Justice Guzman agreed , for a majority of the court, that a contextual reading of the code allows a narrow inquiry into wheth er entering judgment on an MSA could endanger a ch ild’ s safety and welfare, and that requiring a court to enter a judgment that could endanger a child would be an
absurd result. Id. at 463

- 6 4 ( Guzman, J., concurring)

. Our analysis of a trial court’s duty under Section 153.009 is similar to the supreme

c ourt ’s analysis of a trial court’s duty under Section 153.0071. First, as Section 153.0071 ’s plain language d id not aut horize a court to refuse to enter judgment on an MSA unless the family violence requirements were met , Section 153.009 ’ s plain language does not authorize a court to refuse to interview a twelve

- year
- old child after a party applies for such an interview

. See id. at
453 (majority opinion)

. Next, as Section 153.0071 ’s specific statutory language trumps Section 153.002’s more general mandat e , s o does Section 153.009’s specific statutory language

. See id.11 at 455 ; see also T EX

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. § 311.026( b ) (W est 2013 ) ; Jackson , 351 S.W.3d at 297

. Because Sections 153.002 and 153.009 were enacted at the same time, neither prevails as the

statu te l atest in date of enactment. See Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 20, § 1, eff. April 20, 1995;
Lee , 411 S.W.3d at 455; see also T EX

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. § 311.025( a ) (West 2013); Jackson , 351 S.W.3d at 297

. Finally, a s a broad best interest inquiry wa s not requ ired u nder Section
153.0071 because courts presumed that the parties act ed in the children’s best interest when
executin g an MS A unless the family violence exception applied , a broad best interest inquiry is not required under Section 153.0 09 because court s al so presume that a part y act s in the child’s
best interest when applying for an in chambers interview. See Lee , 411 S.W.3d at 463 ( Guzman, J., concurring) , 470 (Green, J., dissenting) ; see also T EX

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. § 151.001( a)(2);
Troxel , 530 U.S. at 6 8

. For these reasons , we conclude that trial court s should refrain from performing a broad best interest inquiry or con ducting a full evidentiary hearing on every application for an in chambers interview with a child twelve years of age or older and would err to refuse to inte rview such a child base d on a broad best interest inquiry

. See Lee
, 411 S.W.3d at
457

- 58 (majority opinion) , 462 ( Guzman, J., concurring) , 470 (Green, J., dissenting)

. We further conclude that when a court believes, based on evidenc e, that a party applied
for an in chambers interview with a child without safeguarding the child’s best interest, the presumption th at the parties act ed in the child’s best interest can be rebutted or negated. See id

. at 470 (Green, J., dissenting)

. We w ould therefore hold, similarly to a majority of the court in
Lee , that in that situation, a contextual reading of the fa mily code allows a narrow inquiry into whether interviewing a child in chambers could endanger the child’s safety and welfare

. See id.

at 4 64 ( Guzman, J., concurring) , 471 (Green, J., dissenting)

. R equiring a trial court to interview
a child when the int erview could endanger his safety and welfare would be an absurd result

. See
id. Accordingly, when a court finds that an interview coul d en danger a child’s safety and welfare, it s refusal to conduct the interview is not error if the evidence is sufficient to support the finding. See id. at 464 ( Guzman, J., concurring) (evidence was insufficient to support finding) , 475 (Green, J., dissen ting ) (evidence was sufficient to support finding). Having held that a trial court does not err by refusing to intervie w a child in chambers
after a sufficiently supported finding that the interview would endanger the child’s safety and welfare, we next d eter m ine whether the evidence in this case is legally sufficient to support such12 a finding

. 4 E vidence in support of the finding is abundant and includes evidence that tend s to show C.R.D. was inappropriately involved in the litigation and that involvement was causing
him severe emotional distress and r esulting physical distress that was exacerbated by the prospect of talki ng to the judge in chambers

. The record reflects the court was concerned that conducting the interview could be
detrimental to C.R.D. It h eard considerable evidence as to the extent that C.R.D. was caught in

t he middle of the parents’ ongoing disputes an d the physical manifestations of stress and anxiety he exhibited when brought to the courthouse to be interviewed. Thigpen’s closing ar gume nts addressed how C.R.D. was involved in the parents’ dispute and litigation, he put himself in the
middle of the di spute, and his anxiety and depression symptoms are “so far down the road of trauma that that’s not going to get any better.” He reurged tha t C.R.D. not be required to talk to
the court. An amicus attorney is “an attorney appointed by the court in a suit . . . whose role is to provide legal services necessary to assist the court in protecting a child’s best interests[.]” T EX

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. Among other duties, an amicus attorney must

(B) seek to elicit in a developmentally appropr iate manner the child’s expressed objectives of representation ; (C) consider the impact on the child in formulating the attorney’s pres enta tion of the child’s expressed objectives of representation to the court;
(D) investigate the facts of the case to t he extent the attorney considers a ppropriate; [and]

. . . . (G) take any action consistent with the child’s interests that the attorne y co nsiders necessary to expedite the proceedings[.]

Id. 107.003(a)(1) (B), (C), (D), (G) (West Supp. 2020 ). The amicus attorney is appointed to assist the court, not to represent the child or either of the parents. Zeifman v. Nowlin , 322
S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex . App.

— Austin 2010, no pet.). Ther e fore, it is the trial court, not the parties, to whom the amicus attorney is resp onsible for the limited purposes delineated in the

st at ute. Id. In charging an amicus attorney with these duties, the legislature cle arly intended

4 The trial court’s statement that “there is ample evidence that this child was traumatized by the thought of comi ng to tal k to me, and I’m not going to put that child in that position” sufficiently indicates it m ade this finding.13 trial courts to consider the amicus attorney’s presentation of facts related to the child’s i nterests in ma king its determina tions. See id. Thigpen was an officer of the court and appointed as an amicus attorney to assist the court in prote ctin g the children’s best interests. Thus, the trial court
would not have erred by consider ing Thigpen’s statements in d etermining whether an interview
in chambers would endanger C.R.D.’s safety and welfar e

. Moreover, the trial court would not
have rever sibl y erred by considering Th igpen’s statements even if such consideration was improper because J.L.D. did not object to either the statements or the trial court’s consideration
of them. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 33.1( a)(1).
In addition to Thigpen’s statements abo ve regarding C.R.D.’s anxiety , depression, and physical symptoms

— particularly on the day he was scheduled to talk to the judge and felt sick in
the hallwa y, T higpen offered other statements that support the trial court’s determination that the
intervie w wo uld endanger C.R.D.’s safety and welfare

. C.R.D. told Thigpen that J.L.D. showed
him the court ’s previous order

. H e was also shown screenshots of J.L.D. telling S.E.J.M. which injunctions she violated. C.R.D. further knew that the injunctions were re ferr ed to as the “Bishop injunctions.” In addition to Thigpen’s statements, other evidence supports the trial court’s
d etermination. Some of this evidence tends to further show that C.R.D. was inappropriately
involved in the litigation. First, Surratt t esti fied that when she spoke with C.R.D. about talking to the judge, he expressed a belief that because he was twelve yea rs old, he could choose whi ch parent he lived with. Furthermore, although J.L.D. denied showing C.R.D. the injunctions , he
admitted te llin g C.R.D. that S.E.J.M. must tell him when the children have doctor’s appointments. He also admitted that he showed C .R.D. a text message he sent to S.E.J.M. asking her why she did not tell him about one of the children’s doctor’s appointments. Russel l Ba iliff, a private therapist who saw the children several times in late 2018 and early 2019, t estified that showing C.R .D. the injunctions or t elling him when a parent has violated them could exacerbate
his an xiety. Additionally, Bailiff gave further te stim ony about C.R.D.’s mental state that supports the
trial court’s determination. He testified that when he was seeing the children, he was concerned
about the ir level of preoccupation with parental strife. C.R.D. showed symptoms of anxiety
based on the pare nts’ fighting. He also had symptoms of depression secondary to his anxiety

. In one session, C.R.D. was under so much stress that he was exhibiting unique dysregulated motor14 movements and took a considerabl e amount of time to calm down. Although Baili ff b elieved that an interview with the judge in chambers would “probably be helpful” to C.R.D., he also agreed that it co uld be “putting him back in the middle of things.” Finally, Surratt provided further testimony supporting a determination that an inte rvie w would endanger C.R.D.’s safety and welfare

. She believed that C.R.D. had severe anxiety about
the case. W hen C.R. D. was experienc ing a high level of anxiety, he showed physical symptoms including rubbing his stomach as if he were sick and vomiting. Re garding a possible interview in chambers, he was nervous that his parents would find out what he said and afraid he w ould hurt their feelings. In concurring with Thigpen’s recommendation against interviewing C.R.D. when he was brought to the cour thou se, the court stated, “ This is a child welfare court, so our desire is to protect children from trauma at all costs. ” Co nsidering the extensive evidence of C.R.D.’s inappropriate involvement in the case, emotional trauma , resulting physical symptoms, the

ongo ing nature of the trauma and symptoms , and the relationship between increased trauma symptoms and the interview in ch ambers, we could not conclude that the trial court abuse d its discretion by finding that an interview in chambers would endanger C.R.D. ’s s afety and welfare and refusing to interview him even if the complaint were properly preserved on appeal

. See Lee , 41 1 S.W.3d at 463

- 64 ( Guzman, J., concurring) , 466 (Green, J., dissenting)

. Accordingly, we
overrule J.L.D.’s first issue.

F AILURE TO F ILE F INDINGS OF F ACT AND C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW In J.L.D.’s second issue, he argues that the trial court erred by failing t o file findings of fact and conclusions of law, and that the error is harmful. Applicable Law Any party may file a request for finding s of fact and conclusions of law in any case tried without a jury within twenty days after the judgment is signed. T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 296. If the trial court fails to respond to the request within twenty days, the requesting party must file a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law within thirty days of the original request. T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 29 7

. A party w ho fails to file such a notice or files it untimely waives any compla int

on a ppeal of the trial court’s failure to file findings of fac t an d conclusions of law. In re S.M. , 616 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2020 , no pet.)

.15 Analysis In this case, the rec ord shows that J.L.D. timely filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law on April 6, 2020, four days after the trial co urt’ s order was signed. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 296. The record further shows that J.L.D. untimely filed a notice of past du e findings
of fact and conclusions of law thirty

- seven days later on May 13

. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 297. No written findings of fact and conc lusions of l aw appear in the record. On appeal, J.L.D. concedes that he missed the deadline for filing his notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law but contends the notice was nonetheless timely because the Texas Supreme Court exte nded the deadlin e to July 15. In support of this contention, he cites the following langu age from the Texas S upreme C our t’s Twelfth Emergency Order Regarding
the COVID

- 19 S tate of Disaster:

3. Subject only to constitutional limitations, all courts in Texa s ma y in any case, civil or crimina l

— a nd must to avoid risk to court staff, parties, attorneys, jurors, and the public

— wi thout a participant’s consent:

a. Modify or suspend any and all deadlines and proc edures, whether prescribed by statute, rule, or orde r, s pecifically including those in Section 263.401 of the Family Code and in all proceedings under Subtitle E, Title 5, of t he F amily Code, for a stated period ending no later than 30 days after the Governor’s state of disaster has been lifted;

. . . . 5 . A n y deadline fo r the filing o r service of any civil case that falls on a day between March 13, 2020, and June 1, 2020, is extended until July 15, 2020. This does not include deadlines for perf ecting appeal or for other appellate proceedings, requests for re l ief from which should be directed to the court involved and should be generously granted.

Twelfth Emergency Order Reg arding the COVID

- 19 State of Disaster , Misc. Docket No. 20

- 9059 , ¶¶ 3, 5 ( Tex. Apr. 27, 2020).
We fail to see why J.L.D. conclude s tha t th is order extend ed the deadline for filing his notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law

. Under Par agraph 3 of the order,
deadline modification was mandatory only if meeting the current deadline would cause r isk to court staff, par ties , attorneys, jurors, or the public; otherwise, deadline modification was discretionary. See i d. ¶ 3. J.L.D. names no r isk th at filing his past due notice within thirty days of his original request would have caused , and we know of none

. Thus, we can not conclude that deadline modification was mandatory under Paragraph 3

. See id. Furthermore, J.L.D. gives no reason why t he trial court’s failure to employ its discretion to modify the deadline constitutes an16 abuse of d iscretion, and we know of none. Th eref ore, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to modify the deadline under Paragraph 3

. See id.
Nor can we conclude that the deadline was extended under Paragraph 5 of the order. J.L.D. does not explain how filing a no tice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law constitutes “the filing o r service of [a] civil case,” and we concl ude that it does not. See id. ¶ 5. Because the deadline was not modified by the supreme court’s emergency order, we conclude
that J .L.D .’s past due notice was untimely, and his complaint that the trial court erred by failing to file findings of fact and c onclusions of law is waived on a ppeal. See S.M. , 616 S.W.3d at 59. Accordingly, we overrule J.L.D.’s second issue.

P RIOR R ESTRAIN T ON F REE S PEECH
In part of J.L.D.’s third issue, he argues that the trial court’s injunction s against discussing the case , conservatorship, possession, or support with the children constitute an impermissible prior restraint on the parties’ right to fre e sp eech guara nteed under A rticle I,
S ection 8 of the Texas Constitution. Before a complaint may be presented for appellat e review, the record must show that it was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 33.1( a)(1 ). J.L.D. did not argue in the trial court that any of the injunctions constituted a prior restraint on his right to fre e speech under A rticle I, S ection 8 of the Texas Constitution and, therefore, has
faile d to preserve his complaint for our review. See id. ; In re S.V. , 599 S.W.3d 25, 40 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2017, pet. denied). Furthermore, even if J.L.D.’s complaint w as pr eserved, we could not grant him relief. As S.E.J.M. observes in her brief, the injunctions against discussing the case, conservators hip, possession, or support with the children were not newly imposed but were included in the agreed
order. A party cannot complain on appeal that the trial court took a specific action the complaining party reques ted, a doc trine known as the invited erro r do ctrine. Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp. , 1 71 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. 2005). Because J.L.D. agreed to the injunctions and
ask ed the trial court to impose them, he cannot complain on appeal that the trial court took the action he requested. See id.
For the rea sons discussed above, we overrule the portion of J.L.D.’s third issue compl aining of an infringement on his right to fre e speech.17 P REJUDGMENT OF P UNISHMENT AND I LLEGAL P UNISHMENT Also i n J.L.D.’s third issue, h e argues that the sanction for injuncti on v iolation exceeds the amount allowed by law

. He further argues that the trial court’s prejudgment of punishment
for inj unction violation contravenes due process. Before a complaint may be presented for appellate review, the record must show that it

w as m ade to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 33.1( a)(1). J.L.D. did not argue in the trial court that the sanctions are excessi ve or that their preasse ssment by the trial court violates his right to due process. T here fore, he has failed to preserve these complaint s for our review. See id. Furthermore, even if the complaints were pre served, we c ould not address the m because they are not ripe for our review. The courts of this state are not empowered to give advis ory opinions. Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & S e

. Tex

. , Inc. , 971 S.W.2d 439, 443 ( Tex. 1998). This prohibit ion extends to cases that a re not yet ripe. Id. A case is not ripe when its resolution depends on contingent or hypothetical fa c ts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass. Id. In this case, J.L.D. does not claim that the sanction has been levied against him. Consequently, we conclude that the complaint is not ripe and we cannot give an advisory opinion
in the matter. See id.
Fo r the reasons discussed above, we overrule the portion of J.L.D.’s third issue complaining of the preassessment and amo unt of sanctions.

M ODIFICATION OF P OSSESSION S CHEDULE In part of J.L.D.’s fourth issue, he argues that the trial court erred by mod ifyi ng his periods of possession and access

. Standard of Review and Applicable Law A trial court may modify an order tha t provides for periods of possession and access if
modification would be in the best in terest of the child and

the circumstances of t he c hild, a conservator, or other party affected by the order have materially and substantially changed since the earlier of:
(A) the date of the rendition of the order; or
(B) the date of the signing of a m ediated or collaborative law settlement agreeme nt o n which the order is based[.]18 T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 156.101( a)(1) (West 2014 ). We review such a modification for an
abus e of discretion. In re H.D.C. , 474 S.W.3d 758, 763 (Tex. Ap p.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) . A trial court abuses its discret ion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id.
It is the factfinde r’s role to resolve evidentiary conflicts and determine the weight and credibility of witness testimony. Lilley v. Lilley , 43 S.W. 3d 703, 7 05 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2001, no pet.). As long as some evidence of a substantive and probative chara cter exists to su pport the trial court’s decision, we will find no abuse of discretion. H.D.C. , 474 S.W.3d at 763. Analysis J.L.D. argues that th e trial c ourt abused its discretion by modifying his possession and access periods because there is no evidence either of a s ubstantial change in circumstances or
that the modification is in the best interest of the children. We disagree. Although J.L.D. now argu es that there is no evidence of a substantial change in circumstances, he alleged in his counterpetition that “[t]he circumstances of the children, a conservator, or other party affected by the order to be modified have materially and substantiall y changed since the date of the signing of the mediated settlement agreement on which the order to
be modified is based

. ” On e party’s allegation of changed circumstances of the parties constitutes a judicial admission of the common element of changed circ umstances of the parties in the other party’s similar pleading. In re A.E.A. , 406 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2013 , no pet.). A dmissions in trial pleadings are judicial admissions in the case in which the pleadings are
filed. Id. The facts ju dicially admitted require no proof and preclude the introduction of evidence to the contrary. Id. A judicial admission is c onclusive upon the party making it , relieves the opposing party’s burden of proving the admitted fact, and bars the admitting party
from dis puting it. Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Co., Inc. , 858 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1993).
Because J.L.D. judicially admitte d the substantial change in circumstances in his counterpetition,
he is barred from challenging the trial court’s finding of a subs tantial c hange in circumstances on appeal

. See A.E.A. , 406 S.W.3d at 410; Hennigan , 858 S.W.2d at 372. Regarding the best interest determination, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the modification is in the children’s b est inter est. The trial court heard
abundant evidence about the inordinate amount of stress the children were enduring , and abundant evidence from which the court could conclude that J.L.D.’s actions were a major cause19 of that stress. Fir s t, the record c ontains e vide nce that J.L.D. frequently spoke to the children about his relationship with S.E.J.M. She testified that every time the children return from J.L.D.’s house, B.R.D. says

Mom, he moved down here for you. He

— he was engaged to Ms. Sophia, and he left her for you. And, you know, you

— you don’t want to be with him. And he just loves you more than anything, and he just wa nts our family back. And he doesn’t understand why you don’ t love him anymore and why

— why you don’t want our family back. And

— and h e’ll do a nything, Mom. He ’ll

— he'll do anything for you.

S.E.J.M. asked C.R.D. whether J.L.D. cries , and he said, “Yeah. Da ddy still cries. And it hurts,
and I don’t

— I don’t know what

— what to do when he does, so I just kind of walk away.” Although J.L.D. denied te lling the children he wants his f amily back, he admitted telling them
that S.E.J.M. “chose Sebastian.” 5
Other evi dence shows that J.L.D. was speaking to the children abo ut the litigation. Thigpen told the trial court that the children said they saw the c ourt order, and C.R.D. said J.L.D.
showed it to him. J.L.D. denied showing C.R.D. the injunctions but admitted he told C.R.D. that
S.E.J.M. has to tell him when the children have doctor ’s appointments

. He further admitted that
he show ed C.R.D. a text mes sage he sent to S. E.J.M. asking her why she did not tell him about
one of the children’s doctor ’s appointment s. Th e foregoing evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that J.L.D.’s participat ion in counseling regarding appropriate conver sation
bo undaries with the children is in the children’s best interest. Further evidence supports the trial court’s dete rm ination that J.L.D.’s participation in coparenting consultation is in the children’s best interest. The evidence tends to show that J.L.D.

r egularly accuses S.E.J.M. of injunction violation and other arguably bad conduct while simultaneously violating inj unctions and engaging in arguably bad conduct. J.L.D. testified that
S. E.J.M. violated the court order by refus ing to allow the chi ldren to call him at specified times,
allow ing Sebastian to remain in the home after 8:00 p.m., allowing the children to sta y at Sebastian’s home overnight, and failing to inform him of doc tor’s app ointments and

5 The record shows that Sebastian was S.E.J.M.’s fiance at the time of trial.20 parent/teacher conferences. In response to these per ceived transgressions, 6 J.L.D. sent the following excoriating m essages t o S.E.J.M. via the Our Family Wizard 7 appli cation:

(1) Here is a copy of our order in case you’ve forgotten.
Sebastian is not allowed nor does he have authority in any way s hape or f orm to give corporal punishment “p ush ups”, to our ch i ldren for any reason!

This is and has been a continued viola tion of our o rders! I suggest you fix this immediately!
In addition; if [sic] I do not want to hear from our children ever again of how poor ly Sebastian treats them, or that he screams at them, for any reason.
This is a violation of the Karen Bishop inju nctions in our orders.

(2) Per o u r orders the kids are to [sic] to be overnight with a person whom you’re romantically involved. A ttached i s the injunction in o u r order.
Lol, and the kids busted you smoking ! After you made me quit and after your dad die d of cancer. Wow
Live your life as you please, all I ask is that you abide by the orders you signed and agreed to.

(3) Sebastian i s not the ir father and he ne ver will be. He is the man you got caught cheating with and always will be.
Don’t forget how yo u, your mother, and Amy Hobbs terrorized Sophea and I for a year until you ran her off.
You have spent NO quality time with our chi ldren at all this whole summer, and now you have Sebastian send them l etters... wow ! He is n ot their f a th [sic] He is not th eir parent: He is a home wrecker, that destroyed their family.

(4) I find it very amusing that you expect and demand that I abide by the or ders, but you don’t think you have to. How many injunctions are you going to continue to violate?

Despite J.L.D. ’s vehement demands that S.E.J.M. follow the injunctions, other evidence
tends to show that J.L.D. violated various injunctions. Fi rst , he a llowed h is friend Maddi to stay overnight with him and the children on their beach vacation. Although J.L.D. claim ed that he

6 S.E.J.M. admitted only to failing to inform J.L.D. of on e doctor’s appointment.

7 Our Family Wizard is a website designed to facilitate communications bet ween divorced or separa ted parents. See OUR FAMILY WIZARD FEATURES IN REVIEW, https://www.ourfamilywizard.com/about

us/OFW

- review

- for

- parents

.21 and Maddi were not romantically involved, a private investigator hired by S.E.J.M testified that
he observed them at the beach a nd could tell they were more than just friends. Moreover, J.L.D. admitted taking the children to a second counselor without informing S.E.J.M. Finally, S.E.J.M.
testified that J.L.D. violated the order to communicate through Our Family Wizard by c alling

an d yelling at h er over the phone. S he hung up the phone, and he called her back and left an excoriating voice messa ge, which was admitted into evidence. Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court could have reasonably found that coparenting consulta tion for these parents is in
the best interest of the children.
Under the circumstances of this case , we cannot sa y that the trial court abused its discretion by reducing J.L.D. ’s possession time and requiring that he participate in counseling

an d coparen t con sultation before his possession time is increa sed. See H.D.C. , 474 S.W.3d at
763. Accordingly, we overrule t his part of J.L.D.’s fourth issue.

C ONDITIONAL G RANT OF E XPANDED P OSSESSION O RDER Also i n J.L.D.’s fourth issue, he argues that the trial court erred by conditioning its grant of the expanded standard possession order on his performance of impossible a cts or acts the possibility of which depend s on the acts of others

. Conditioning Grant on Impossible Acts First, J.L.D. claims tha t the tri al court erred by conditioning his grant of the expanded standard possession order on his participation in counseli ng sessions with Georgia Be ard because his participation became impossible when Beard declined to counsel hi m. We disagree.
The tr ial court orally pronounced its order for J.L.D. to participate in counseling with Beard on January 15, 2020 , a nd signed the written order on April 2. The written order states that “within seven (7) days from the entry of this order, [J.L.D.] shall contac t Georgia Beard, 13359 Hwy. 155, Tyler, Texas, 75703, (903) 266

- 1030, to schedule his initial appointment.” On April
15 , J. L.D. filed his “ F irst S upplemental M otion to M odify, C orrect, or R eform J udgment and
M otion for N ew T rial,” claiming in part that it is impos sible for him to comply with the order to participate in counseling with Beard because she declined to perform the required services

. H e attached to his motion a letter purportedly from Beard. The letter i s dated April 14 and read s as follows:22 As of Apr il 1, 2020, I will no longer be accepting new clients. Due to the Covid 19 Mitigation rules, our offices are closed , and we are only connecting with clients virtually. I am sor r y if this is an inconvenience. Since we have been recomme n ded through the court system, we can recommend another therapist if necessary.

T he record contains no indication that J.L.D. request ed a hearing on the motion or that the trial court expressly ruled on the motion

. J.L.D. has fail ed to preserve this issue for our review. In general, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that “the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion” and that “the trial court . . . ruled on the request, objection, or motion, e ither exp ressly or implicitly . . . or . . . refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and the complaining part y objected to the refusal.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 33.1( a). In a civil case, the overruling by operation of law of a motion for new trial or a moti on to modify the judgment p re serves for appellate review a compl a int properly made in the motion, unless taking

ev idence was necessary to properly pr esent the complaint in the trial court. Id. 33.1(b). Although the record before us contains J.L .D.’s mot ion for new trial raising the impossibility issue, and the motion was overruled by operation of law, the over rulin g of the
motion did not preserve J.L.D.’s complaint for our review because taking evidence was necessary to properly present the comp laint in the trial court. See id. The letter attached to the
motion alone is insufficient to establish that Beard decline d to perform the services for J.L.D.
because it is unauthenticated and contains no addressee

. J.L.D. did not request an evidentiary hearing a nd does not argue on appeal that the trial court should have held a hearing on the
motion. Because taking evidenc e was necessary to properly present the complaint in the trial court, the overruling by operation of law of J.L.D.’s motion for new t rial did n ot preserve his
issue for our review. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 33.1( b). Similarly, even if we were to review this
is sue, we could not grant J. L.D. relief because insufficient evidence exists in the record to support his claim. Accordingly, we overr ule this part of J.L.D.’s fourth issue. Conditioning Grant on Acts that Depend on Others Next, J.L.D. claims that the tria l court erred by conditioning his grant of the expanded standard possession order on his participation in coparenting sessions becaus e his att endance at the sessions requires S.E.J.M.’s attendance and payment. Again, we disagree. Nothing in the
trial cour t’s oral pronouncement or written order indicates that J.L.D. would not be able to23 participate in the copa renting sessions if S.E.J.M . failed to attend or make her payments. Accordingly, we conclude that this part of J.L.D.’s fourth issue lacks merit , and we overrule it.

D ISPOSITION Having overruled Appellant’s first, second, third, and fourth issue s , we affirm the trial court’s judg ment.
B RI AN H OYLE Justice
Opinion delivered August 25 , 2021. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J

.

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

AUGUST 25 , 2021

NO. 12

- 20

- 00 143

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.R.D. AND B.R.D., CHILDREN

Appe al from the 321st District C ourt of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 18

- 2165

- D ) THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and brief ( s ) filed herein, and the same being consider ed, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDER ED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of
the court below be in all things affirmed , all costs of this appeal a re assessed against the
A ppellant., J

. L

. D

. , and tha t this decision be certified to the court below for observance. Brian Hoyle , Justice

. Pane l consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.