UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

 

SAGAR MEGH CORPORATION, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE 

CO., 

 Defendant. 

NATIONAL REPUBLIC BANK OF 

CHICAGO, 

 Intervening Plaintiff. 

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Case No. 12-cv-4959 

Judge John W. Darrah 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Sagar Megh Corporation, filed a Complaint against Defendant, United National 

Insurance Co. (“United”), on June 21, 2012, asserting United breached its obligations to Sagar 

Megh under an insurance policy it issued and that United acted in bad faith. Sagar Megh moves 

for partial summary judgment, seeking: summary judgment on its breach of contract claim and 

awarding Sagar Megh $1,740,042.67, plus pre-judgment interest accruing on and after July 6, 

2011, arising from the coverage under the policy and further reserving all rights of Sagar Megh 

to pursue its claims relating to Count II of the Complaint, which seeks declaratory relief and 

Count III, which asserts bad faith on the part of United. United filed a cross-motion for 

summary judgment, seeking judgment entered on its behalf for all three claims asserted in the 

Complaint, on the basis that Sagar Megh failed to comply with the protective safeguard 

condition set out in the Insurance Policy. These motions have been fully briefed. 

 
2 

BACKGROUND 

Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to provide “a 

statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue . . . .” 

Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the nonmoving party to admit or deny each factual statement 

proffered by the moving party and concisely designate any material facts that establish a genuine 

dispute for trial. See Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). A 

litigant’s failure to dispute the facts set forth in an opponent’s statement in the manner dictated 

by Local Rule 56.1 results in those facts’ being deemed admitted for purposes of summary 

judgment. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) further 

permits the non-movant to submit additional statements of material facts that “require the denial 

of summary judgment . . . .” 

To the extent that a response to a statement of material fact provides only extraneous or 

argumentative information, this response will not constitute a proper denial of the fact, and the 

fact is admitted. See Graziano v. Village of Oak Park, 401 F. Supp. 2d 918, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 

Similarly, to the extent that a statement of fact contains a legal conclusion or otherwise 

unsupported statement, including a fact which relies upon inadmissible hearsay, such a fact is 

disregarded. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1997). 

Here, United’s cross-motion fails to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56.1, 

which provides that a statement of material facts be filed in addition to the supporting 

memorandum of law. Instead, United simply included eight statements of “undisputed material 

facts” in the middle of its supporting memorandum of law with its cross-motion for summary 

judgment. The statement of facts required in Local Rule 56.1 has been described as such: 

 It is a document separate from the supporting memorandum; it is neither a 
3 

supplement to nor a surrogate for the memo. Rule 56.1 statements should 

contain neither a narrative section nor a recitation of the summary judgment 

standards. . . . Likewise, 56.1 statements do not abrogate a party's obligation to 

recite its version of the facts in its supporting memorandum; it is inappropriate in 

one's memo to simply refer the Court to the 56.1 statement. The purpose of the 

56.1 statement is to identify for the Court the evidence supporting a party's 

factual assertions in an organized manner: it is not intended as a forum for 

factual or legal argument. 

Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (emphasis added). “Courts in this district 

have broad discretion to enforce the rule, and the Seventh Circuit regularly upholds strict 

enforcement of Local Rule 56.1.” Mach Mold v. Clover Associates, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 

1025 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citation omitted). Accordingly, these purportedly undisputed facts 

submitted in United’s brief in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment is stricken. 

United did, however, submit a separate set of undisputed material facts in conjunction with its 

cross motion, and Sagar Megh had the opportunity to respond to those facts; the facts asserted 

properly under the Local Rules will be considered. 

The following facts1

 are taken from the parties’ statements of undisputed material facts 

submitted in accordance with Local Rule 56.1. Sagar Megh is an Illinois corporation; United is a 

Pennsylvania insurance company licensed to do business in Illinois. (Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 1-2.) 

Personal jurisdiction is proper as Sagar Megh is domiciled in Illinois and United regularly 

conducts business in Illinois, and venue is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). (Pl.’s 

SOF ¶¶ 4, 6.) Subject matter jurisdiction exists on the basis of diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

 

 1

 Admitted Statements of Material Facts by Sagar Megh are designated as “Pl.’s SOF” 

with the corresponding paragraph referenced; Admitted Statements of Material Facts by United 

are designated as “Def.’s SOF” with the corresponding paragraph referenced. 
4 

Sagar Megh and the Lake Motel 

Sagar Megh was created by Dipak Patel and his father, Ramanlal Patel, in 2003. (Def.’s 

SOF ¶ 1.) Sagar Megh purchased a motel building located at 9101 South Stony Island Avenue in 

Chicago, Illinois, and operated the Lake Motel at that property. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 1; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 7.) 

Sagar Megh was run as a family business, with Dipak and his wife, Alka, managing the day-today business of the Lake Motel and Ramanlal being involved in occasional activities. (Def.’s 

SOF ¶ 2.) At the time of the event in question, Dipak and Alka resided at the Lake Motel. 

(Def.’s SOF ¶ 16.) 

To purchase the property, Sagar Megh obtained a loan from the National Republic Bank 

of Chicago (the “NRB”), a loan from the Small Business Administration, and a loan from TCB 

Investments, with all three creditors taking mortgages on the property. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 6.) When 

Sagar Megh applied for the NRB loan, Dipak indicated he had a net worth of $1,069,188.00 and 

an annual income of $51,939.00; he had a credit bureau rating of “fair.” (Def.’S SOF ¶ 11.) 

When Sagar Megh applied for a loan modification in 2010, Dipak indicated his net worth was 

$34,408.00. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 11.) Beginning in 2008 or 2009, Dipak stopped receiving any 

payroll compensation from Sagar Megh. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 39(a).) 

In 2004, Sagar Megh obtained another loan with another mortgage from the NRB, to 

perform renovations to the property. (Id.) Some of these loans were secured with personal 

guaranties by the Patel family. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 9.) Prior to the fire in March 2011, Sagar Megh 

had large outstanding loan balances, declining revenue, and increasing late loan payments. 

(Def.’s SOF ¶ 7.) In 2009, Sagar Megh was sued by the City of Chicago for violating the city’s 

municipal building code. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 8.) 

 
5 

On or about September 30, 2010, United issued a commercial property insurance policy 

(the “Policy”) to Sagar Megh. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 11.) Subject to the Policy’s provisions, fire is a 

covered loss under the Policy, including fire damages caused to the Lake Motel as the result of 

an intentional fire. (Pl’s SOF ¶¶ 13-14.) A Policy endorsement provides that “as a condition of 

this insurance, [Sagar Megh is] required to maintain” “functional smoke detectors” in “all 

buildings, occupancies, or units.” (Def.’s SOF ¶ 3; Policy at 52.) The policy further provides 

that United would not pay Sagar Megh “for loss or damage caused by or resulting from fire, if, 

prior to the fire, you: (1) Knew of any suspension or impairment in any protective safeguard 

listed in the Schedule above and failed to notify us of that fact; or (2) Failed to maintain any 

protective safeguard listed in the Schedule above, and over which you had control, in complete 

working order.” (Policy at 52-54.) 

The Fire 

Early in the morning of March 5, 2011, a fire started in Room 109 of the Lake Motel. 

(Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 15-16.) That day, the Sagar Megh employees present at the Lake Motel were 

Dipak, housekeeper Gabriella Valdez, guest reception desk clerk Ella Edwards, and assistant to 

the housekeeper Emsil “Ronnie” Hammond. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 14.) Dipak had a master key, and 

the housekeepers would occasionally receive individual room keys or the master key to clean 

rooms. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 16.) 

Edwards recalled that Dipak was at the Lake Motel when she arrived to work at 7:00 p.m. 

and was still there when she was made aware of the fire at 3:00 a.m. on March 5, 2011. (Def.’s 

SOF ¶ 15.) Dipak was in an office with surveillance camera monitors, and he could exit that 

office without Edwards knowing. (Id.) Valdez recalled that Dipak was at the Lake Motel at the 

time of the fire and that, while he would normally come in later, she saw Dipak at the Lake 
6 

Motel when she arrived at 10:00 p.m. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 17.) Valdez was first instructed to clean 

two rooms on the front side of the Lake Motel but then was instructed to clean four or five rooms 

on the rear side of the building. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 18.) While she cleaned the rooms to the rear of 

the Motel, Valdez did not see Dipak. (Id.) After cleaning those rooms, Valdez returned to the 

laundry room to wait for Hammond, her assistant, but after waiting too long, went to clean the 

two rooms at the front of the Lake Motel. (Id.) 

Using a key to open the door to the first room she was to clean, Valdez noticed smoke. 

(Def.’s SOF ¶ 19.) In the bathroom, Valdez observed a charred piece of paper on the floor, a 

hole in an interior partition wall separating the bathroom from the bedroom, and fire within the 

interior partition wall with what appeared to be insulation burning in the wall. (Id.) Each motel 

room contained a smoke alarm. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 8.) She grabbed a towel from the floor and a 

smoke alarm fell out. (Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 17-18.) Dipak knew that when people smoked in rooms and 

the smoke alarms would sound, the sound would bother guests, and so people would remove the 

batteries from smoke detectors. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 5.) No wire mesh or “bird cage” type wiring was 

installed around the smoke detectors. (Id.) 

Edwards, the receptionist, did not have any reports of people who should not have been 

in the room going into Room 109 the evening of the fire. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 21.) She also was not 

aware of anyone saying that the last guests of Room 109 were in that room before the fire began. 

(Id.) After she learned there was a fire, Edwards knocked on Dipak’s office. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 20.) 

Dipak left his office and was rubbing his eyes, which Edwards observed were red. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 

20.) 

Dipak stated he was watching the surveillance camera monitor and observed Hammond 

walk from Room 109 with linens, including towels, leading Dipak to conclude that Room 109 
7 

was more than half way cleaned. (Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 20, 22.) Dipak went to speak to Hammond, 

who informed Dipak that some smoke was found in Room 109. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 22.) Dipak said 

“it must be a cigarette butt or something,” and sent Hammond to check a basement in another 

area of the Lake Motel. (Id.) Dipak asserts he was never in Room 109 on the evening of the fire. 

(Def.’s SOF ¶ 23.) Dipak did not attempt to recover the surveillance camera data for this 

evening, and a few days after the fire, the surveillance camera system was stolen. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 

23.) None of the employees of Sagar Megh, including Dipak, attempted to use a fire 

extinguisher to put out the fire. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 39(i).) 

John Morris, the last registered guest of Room 109, stated that the room was clean when 

he and his female guest entered the room. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 38.) Morris further stated that neither 

he nor his guest smoked in the room, or smoked at all, and that there were no cigarette or cigar 

butts in the room when he left to return the key. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 38.) Morris indicated that neither 

he nor his guest brought anything into the room. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 38.) 

Two other guests of the Lake Motel that night, Clifton Carter, Jr. and Brandon Brown, 

stated that they woke up on March 5, 2011, to the smell and presence of smoke and did not hear 

any smoke alarms sounding. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 4.) At 3:43 a.m., the first fire engine from the 

Chicago Fire Department (the “CFD”) was dispatched to the Lake Motel. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 19.) 

CFD Lieutenant Timothy O’Toole was on location during the fire and heard smoke detectors in 

rooms of the Lake Motel. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 20.) 

Sagar Megh is unaware of anyone who would have any motive to set a fire at the Lake 

Motel. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 24.) After the fire, the City of Chicago issued a demolition order, and the 

Lake Motel was demolished. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 30.) 
8 

The Investigations of the Fire 

A CFD fire marshal who investigated the fire, Karl Solms, arrived at the Lake Motel at 

approximately 4:22 a.m. on March 5, 2011. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 24.) Solms investigated Room 109 and 

found that a localized fire had occurred within that room. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 27.) Based on the burn 

damage he observed, Solms believed the fire started in the bathroom of Room 109 and entered 

into the wall. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 28.) 

Solms prepared a report of his findings regarding the investigation of the fire (the “CFD 

Report”). (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 31.) The CFD Report concludes that the fire originated in the bathroom 

of Room 109 and was the result of the open flame ignition of rubbish. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 32.) As the 

term is used by the CFD, “open flame” does not denote specifically either an intentional or nonintentional source. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 33.) Solms stated he did not find a smoke detector in Room 

109. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 29.) According to the CFD Report, “After a thorough fire scene examination 

and after ruling out any accidental or natural causal factors it is the opinion of the [Reporting 

Fire Marshal] that this fire was caused by the open flame ignition of rubbish within the bathroom 

of Unit 109 that then extended through the adjacent wall to the roof above and throughout the 

subject structure.” (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 36, Pl.’s SOF Ex. I at 7.) The CFD Report continued, “[t]here is 

the possibility that this fire was caused by the careless use of smoking materials[;] whether or not 

there is criminal culpability shall be the subject of the [Chicago Police Department Bomb & 
9 

Arson] Unit.”2 (Pl.’s SOF Ex. I at 7.) Solms did not investigate who may have started the fire or 

why someone may have started it, but he determined that the fire was ignited as the result of a 

human act. (Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 26-27.) Solms was aware that the last registered guest of Room 109 

was John Morris, but he did not interview him. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 28.) 

On March 10, 2011, Scientific Expert Analysis Limited (“SEA”) was hired by United to 

investigate the cause and origin of the fire. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 40.) Sarah Pendley conducted the 

investigation and prepared the Cause & Origin Report (“C&O Report”) on behalf of SEA, using 

the National Fire Protection Association’s published guidelines as a guide. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 41; 

Def.’s SOF ¶ 31.) Pendley first visited the Lake Motel on March 11, 2011; by that time, boards 

were placed over the windows and doors of the motel. (Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 42-43.) Pendley noticed 

that the building appeared to have been vandalized; in particular, the heating and air conditioner 

units were damaged. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 44.) Pendley observed a fence being placed around the 

perimeter of the Lake Motel on March 11, 2011. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 46.) The Fire Marshal told 

Pendley that there was a burnt towel found at the origin site, but she never found such a towel. 

(Def.’s SOF ¶ 33.) Pendley determined that the most severe fire damage was within the cavity of 

the partition wall of Room 109. (Def.’s SOF ¶ 34.) According to the C&O Report, there are two 

potential ignition scenarios for the fire: “the ignition of combustible materials, due to the 

discarding of smoking materials, or the intentional ignition of combustible materials.” (Pl.’s 

 2

 Sagar Megh submitted, in support of its summary judgment motion, a report it contends 

was prepared by the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) Bomb & Arson Unit regarding the 

CPD’s investigation of the fire. However, this evidence was not authenticated. The “evidence 

relied upon to establish facts for summary judgment purposes must be of a type admissible at 

trial, including ‘properly authenticated and admissible documents or exhibits.’” Callpod, Inc. v. 

GN Netcom, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 815, 826 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Smith v. City of 

Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, the CPD Report is not evidence to be 

properly considered for purposes of ruling on summary judgment. 
10 

SOF ¶ 47.) Pendley concluded the fire was the result of a “human act,” that is, a human being 

took an action with a heat-producing item that placed it in the proximity of a fuel source. (Pl.’s 

SOF ¶ 51.) United does not dispute the C&O Report. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 50.) 

The SEA investigation determined that the Room 109 smoke alarm was located in the 

wastebasket of Room 109, and Pendley identified a mounting bracket on the ceiling of that room 

that was similar to the mounting brackets used in the other rooms of the motel. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 52.) 

A 9-volt battery was located in a plastic cup in Room 109, and the smoke alarm recovered from 

the room required that type of battery. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 53.) Pendley concluded someone had 

physically removed the battery from the smoke alarm. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 54.) The SEA investigation 

was unable to determine whether the smoke alarms it removed from the Lake Motel had sounded 

alarms during the fire. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 55.) Pendley did not determine who caused the fire. 

(Def.’s SOF ¶ 32.) 

The Insurance Claim

Sagar Megh reported the fire to United, and on March 9, 2011, United hired Greg Martin, 

an independent property adjuster, to evaluate Sagar Megh’s losses under the Policy. (Pl.’s SOF 

¶¶ 57-58.) That same day, Sagar Megh hired the Alex N. Sill Company to evaluate its losses 

under the Policy. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 59.) Both Martin and the Alex N. Sill Company determined that 

the actual cost value damages resulting from the fire was $1,740,042.67. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 60.) 

A Sworn Statement Proof of Loss, prepared by Sagar Megh and Martin, was submitted to 

United and asserted the amount of $1,740,042.67 as the actual cost value of the motel building. 

(Pl.’s SOF ¶ 62.) United sent a letter to Sagar Megh denying coverage under the Policy on April 

25, 2012, on the basis that Sagar Megh intentionally misrepresented and/or concealed material 

facts and circumstances surrounding its claim. (Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 63-64.) 
11 

LEGAL STANDARD

 Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials 

on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The moving party bears 

the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the 

evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving 

party cannot rest on conclusory pleadings but, rather, “must present sufficient evidence to show 

the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial.” Serfecz v. 

Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986)). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to 

oppose a motion for summary judgment, nor is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. 

Robin v. Espo Eng. Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Rather, the 

evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Pugh v. City of Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving 

party’s favor. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 255). The court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting 

evidence. Id. In reviewing cross-motions, the Seventh Circuit’s “review of the record requires 

that we construe all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration 
12 

is made.” Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal 

quotations omitted). 

ANALYSIS 

Sagar Megh moves for summary judgment in its favor against United, asserting United 

breached the terms of the Insurance Policy and is liable to Sagar Megh, relating to the actual cost 

value of the motel building, in the amount of $1,740,042.67 plus pre-judgment interest since July 

6, 2011, and also finding in favor of Sagar Megh on all other claims asserted against United, 

including declaratory relief and bad faith. United opposes Sagar Megh’s motion and further 

moves for summary judgment in its favor against Sagar Megh, on the basis that Sagar Megh 

failed to comply with the Policy’s protective safeguard condition. 

Sagar Megh asserts that no genuine issue of material fact remains with respect to 

United’s breach of the insurance contract. Under Illinois law, the elements of a breach of an 

insurance contract are: “(1) the existence of a valid, enforceable contract; (2) performance by the 

plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4) resultant injury to the plaintiff.” Bryant 

v. Jackson Nat. Life Distributors, LLC, Case No. 12 C 9391, 2013 WL 1819927, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 

April 30, 2013) (citations omitted). The parties agree that a valid, enforceable insurance contract 

exists. It is also clear that United has not paid Sagar Megh under the terms of the Policy. 

Protective Safeguards 

The issue addressed by both of the cross-motions is whether or not Sagar Megh 

adequately complied with the protective safeguard condition of the Policy. In particular, the 

Insurance Policy provided that Sagar Megh was required to maintain functional smoke detectors 

in each of the motel rooms. The Policy further indicates that Sagar Megh could not recover 

under the policy if a fire resulted in damage where, prior to the fire, Sagar Megh either was 
13 

aware of a suspension or impairment to the smoke detectors and failed to notify United, or if 

Sagar Megh failed to maintain any protective safeguard, including smoke detectors, over which 

Sagar Megh had control, in complete working order. (Policy at 52-54.) 

Sagar Megh asserts it complied with this condition, because smoke detectors were 

present in each of the Lake Motel rooms at the time of the fire. However, it is unclear from the 

undisputed material facts if the smoke detectors in each room were in complete working order. 

Further, it is possible that the smoke detector in Room 109, where the fire originated, was 

removed at the time of the fire. Factual questions remain as to who may have removed the 

smoke detector and when it was removed. 

Moreover, even if the smoke detector was removed by an individual beyond Sagar 

Megh’s direction or control, it is not apparent from the undisputed facts whether or not Sagar 

Megh breached its duty by failing to incorporate additional safeguards, such as the construction 

of mesh or wire cages around the smoke detectors, to prevent motel guests from tampering with 

the smoke detectors. 

In light of these issues, questions of material fact remain unanswered. “Summary 

judgment is appropriate only if the jury could draw but one conclusion from the evidence.” 

Aebischer v. Stryker Corp., 535 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Kedzierski v. Kedzierski, 

899 F.2d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 1990)). These questions of fact regarding the condition of the smoke 

detectors, and the duties owed by Sagar Megh, are more appropriately considered by a jury, and 

it is improper to render summary judgment as to the issue of protective safeguards at this stage of 

the proceedings. 
14 

The Cause of the Fire

The parties also hold contradictory positions about Sagar Megh’s role in the cause of the 

fire. Sagar Megh asserts that there is no evidence to suggest that the fire was caused by an 

intentional act, nor any evidence suggesting Dipak or someone employed by Sagar Megh caused 

the fire to ignite. United opposes that contention and suggests that the facts support its theory 

that Sagar Megh or its officers caused the fire. Both sides agree that the fire was caused by a 

human act and was likely caused by smoking materials or open flame ignition. 

Many of the facts asserted regarding the cause of the fire are unknown. United relies on 

information from the last registered guest of Room 109, John Morris, who insisted he and his 

guest did not have cigarettes or smoking materials in the room. United further contends that 

Dipak had motive to cause arson, due to his ongoing financial problems, and had the opportunity 

to start the fire, because he was located in an office where he could leave without being detected 

by the employees of the motel. 

However, “evaluations of motive and intent are generally inappropriate for summary 

judgment . . . .” Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 698 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Bartman v. AllisChalmers Corp., 799 F.2d 311, 312 (7th Cir. 1986)). It is improper, in considering motions for 

summary judgment, to make determinations of credibility or weigh conflicting evidence; these 

matters are best left in the hands of a jury. Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 

697, 704-705 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Therefore, it would be inappropriate at this 

juncture to weigh the conflicting evidence regarding the undetermined cause of the fire, and 

summary judgment will not enter on this issue. 
15 

CONCLUSION 

Simply put, too many unsettled questions and factual disputes remain to permit summary 

judgment to enter in favor of either party. The issue of whether or not Sagar Megh adequately 

complied with the protective safeguard conditions required by the Policy and the issue of who 

caused the fire are fact-intensive inquiries best left to a jury. Based on the foregoing analysis, 

both motions for summary judgment filed by Sagar Megh [120] and United [212] are denied. 

Date: November 6, 2013 ______________________________ 

 JOHN W. DARRAH 

 United States District Court Judge