_____________ 

 

_____________ 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

January 2014 Term FILED 

April 10, 2014 

released at 3:00 p.m. 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

No. 13-0234 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

DEAN LOWE AND MARTHA LOWE, INDIVIDUALLY
 

AND AS TRUSTEES OF THE DEMAR REVOCABLE TRUST,
 

Petitioners
 

V. 

JOSEPH C. RICHARDS AND JOYCE A. RICHARDS, AND
 

HUGH E. HEGYI, TRUSTEE OF THE HERMAN HEGYI TRUST,
 

Respondents
 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County
 

Honorable John C. Yoder, Judge
 

Civil Action No. 11-C-979
 

REVERSED AND REMANDED
 

Submitted: March 25, 2014
 

Filed: April 10, 2014
 

Michael L. Scales, Esq. Charles F. Printz, Jr., Esq. 

Martinsburg, West Virginia Jonathan T. Mayhew, Esq. 

Attorney for Petitioners, Bowles Rice LLP 

Dean and Martha Lowe Martinsburg, West Virginia 

Attorney for the Respondents, 

Joseph C. and Joyce A. Richards 

CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
 

1. “Whenever it is determined that a court has no jurisdiction to entertain 

the subject matter of a civil action, the forum court must take no further action in the case 

other than to dismiss it from the docket.” Syllabus point 1, Hinkle v. Bauer Lumber & Home 

Bldg. Center, Inc., 158 W. Va. 492, 211 S.E.2d 705 (1975). 

2. The circuit courts of West Virginia have subject matter jurisdiction to 

resolve an interstate boundary line dispute between private litigants involving the issue of 

whether real property is located within the State of West Virginia or another state. Under the 

decision in Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S. Ct. 242, 11 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1963), resolution 

of the boundary line issue by a circuit court is not binding on the affected states. 

3. “When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is 

plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the 

courts not to construe but to apply the statute.” Syllabus point 5, State v. General Daniel 

Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959). 

4. Under W. Va. Code § 29-23-2 (1987) (Repl. Vol. 2013) the Boundary 

Commission has a mandatory duty to investigate state, county, and municipal boundary line 

i 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

disputes when requested to do so by the governor or Legislature. The statute does not 

authorize private citizens to make such a request to the Boundary Commission. 

5. “Under Rule 19(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure a party 

becomes an indispensable party if he has an interest relating to the subject of the action and 

is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may as a practical matter impair 

or impede his ability to protect that interest.” Syllabus point 1, Pauley v. Gainer, 177 W. Va. 

464, 353 S.E.2d 318 (1986). 

6. In a real property action involving private parties that requires the 

determination of the boundaryline between West Virginia and another state, neither the State 

of West Virginia nor the other state are required parties to the litigation. 

ii 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Davis, Chief Justice: 

Dean and Martha Lowe, petitioners herein, (“the Lowes”) appeal from an order 

of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County dismissing their counterclaim and third-party 

complaint.1 In the actions filed by the Lowes, they sought to obtain real property claimed by 

respondents Joseph and Joyce Richards (“the Richards”) and Hugh Hegyi as Trustee of the 

Hegyi Trust (“the Hegyi Trust”). The property in question is situated on the border of West 

Virginia and Virginia. The circuit court determined that it did not have subject matter 

jurisdiction to resolve the Lowes’ claims because they involved a determination of a 

boundary line between West Virginia and Virginia. The circuit court also found that the 

Lowes failed to join indispensable parties to the litigation, i.e., the States of West Virginia 

and Virginia. Here, the Lowes contend that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction 

over the claims and that the States of West Virginia and Virginia were not indispensable 

parties.2 After a careful review of the briefs, the record submitted on appeal, and listening 

to the arguments of the parties, we reverse and remand. 

1

The Lowes filed their actions individually and as Trustees of the Demar 

Revocable Trust. 

2

Although the Lowes set out six assignments of error, all issues can be resolved 

by addressing the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and indispensable parties. 

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I.
 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
 

This matter began in November 2011 when the Hegyi Trust filed an action 

against the Lowes seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction.3 The Hegyi Trust owned 

approximately 29 acres of real estate on the eastern boundary line of Frederick County, 

Virginia. The Lowes owned approximately 50 acres of real estate on the western boundary 

line of Berkeley County. The Lowes’ property adjoined the Hegyi Trust property on the 

north and east. The Hegyi Trust filed its action against the Lowes to obtain a right of way 

across the Lowes’ property so that it could access its property in Virginia. 

In 2012, the Lowes filed a counterclaim against Hegyi Trust and a third-party 

complaint against the Richards alleging claims for ejectment and adverse possession. The 

third-party complaint alleged that the Richards owned 9.89 acres of real estate in Frederick 

County, Virginia, that was adjacent to the Lowes’ property. The Lowes’ third-party 

complaint alleged that part of the property claimed by the Hegyi Trust and the Richards was, 

in fact, located in Berkeley County, West Virginia. Consequently, the Lowes sought title to 

such property through adverse possession.4 

3

The Hegyi Trust also named as a defendant a man named George Sekel. A 

default judgment was entered against Mr. Sekel, and he is not a party to this appeal. 

4

The Lowes’ claims for ejectment and adverse possession were based upon 

their surveyor’s determination that the boundary line between West Virginia and Virginia, 

(continued...) 

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The Richards filed a motion to dismiss the Lowes’ counterclaim and third-party 

complaint.5 On February 15, 2013, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. In doing 

so, the trial court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the Lowes’ claims because 

those claims had to be litigated in the United States Supreme Court or in a state 

administrative proceeding. The trial court also ruled that the Lowes failed to join two 

indispensable parties, those being the States of West Virginia and Virginia. As a result of 

these two rulings, the trial court also determined that the Lowes’ third-party complaint failed 

to set out a cause of action against the Richards. The Lowes now appeal the dismissal of 

their claims against the Richards. 

II.
 

STANDARD OF REVIEW
 

In this proceeding, the trial court granted the Richards’ motion to dismiss the 

Lowes’ claims against them based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to join 

4

(...continued) 

in relation to the property claimed by the Hegyi Trust and the Richards, was N. 50° 16' 09" 

West. The Lowes contended that any of the real property claimed by the Hegyi Trust and the 

Richards that was north of this line was in West Virginia. 

5

Although the Richards styled their motion as one seeking dismissal of the 

counterclaim and third-party complaint, they sought only dismissal of the third-party 

complaint against them. The counterclaim, of course, was against the Hegyi Trust. The 

Hegyi Trust did not join the Richards’ motion, and the Trust did not file a separate motion 

to dismiss. The Hegyi Trust filed a motion with this Court requesting that it not participate 

in this appeal, which was granted. 

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indispensable parties, and the failure to state a claim for relief. We have held that 

“[a]ppellate review of a circuit court’s order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de 

novo.” Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 

461 S.E.2d 516 (1995).6 This same standard applies to our review of statutes and rules 

relevant to this case. As we held in Syllabus point 1 of Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax 

Department of West Virginia, 195 W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995), “[i]nterpreting a 

statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de 

novo review.” Mindful of these applicable standards, we will consider the substantive issues 

raised by the parties. 

6

The parties submitted exhibits to support their respective positions on the three 

theories for dismissing the action, i.e., lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to join 

indispensable parties, and failure to state a claim for relief. Even though a trial court 

considers materials outside the complaint on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, this “does not convert the motion into a Rule 56 summary judgment motion.” 

Franklin D. Cleckley, Robin Jean Davis and Louis J. Palmer, Jr., Litigation Handbook on 

West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, § 12(b)(1), p. 328 (4th ed. 2012). It also has been 

recognized that consideration of materials outside the complaint on a motion to dismiss for 

failing to join indispensable parties does not result in the motion being converted to a 

summary judgment motion. See Cleckley, et al., Litigation Handbook § 12(b)(7), p. 397 (“A 

court may consider evidence outside the pleadings when ruling on a motion under Rule 

12(b)(7).”). On the other hand, consideration of materials outside the complaint on a motion 

to dismiss for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted requires the motion 

“be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of under Rule 56.” Cleckley, et al., 

Litigation Handbook, § 12(b)(6), p. 393. Although the trial court’s dismissal of the Lowes’ 

claims, on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, was technically a summary 

judgment dismissal, our standard of review of that aspect of the dismissal is still de novo. 

See Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (“A circuit court’s 

entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.”). 

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III.
 

DISCUSSION
 

Resolution of the Lowes’ appeal requires this Court to address two dispositive 

issues. We first must determine whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to 

resolve the Lowes’ claims. Then, we must decide whether the States of West Virginia and 

Virginia are required parties. We will address each issue separately. 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

The circuit court granted the Richards’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) 

of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court believed that it did not have 

subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the issues. This Court has recognized that “[w]henever 

it is determined that a court has no jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of a civil action, 

the forum court must take no further action in the case other than to dismiss it from the 

docket.” Syl. pt. 1, Hinkle v. Bauer Lumber & Home Bldg. Ctr., Inc., 158 W. Va. 492, 211 

S.E.2d 705 (1975). See Syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. Dale v. Stucky, 232 W. Va. 299, 752 S.E.2d 

330 (2013). The circuit court determined that it could not resolve the Lowes’ claims without 

establishing that a boundary line of N. 50° 16' 09" West existed between the States of West 

Virginia and Virginia. The circuit court further believed that this issue had to be litigated 

before the United States Supreme Court or administratively pursuant to W. Va. Code § 29­

23-2 (1987) (Repl. Vol. 2013). We disagree. 

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1. Exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over 

boundary disputes between two or more states. The circuit court found that any dispute 

involving the location of a boundary line between two states had to be litigated in the United 

States Supreme Court. In making this determination, the circuit court recognized that 

Congress has expressly decided that the United States Supreme Court “shall have original 

and exclusive jurisdiction of (1) all controversies between two or more states.” 28 U.S.C.A. 

§ 1251(a) (1978). See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735, 101 S. Ct. 2114, 2123, 68 

L. Ed. 2d 576 (1981) (“The Constitution provides for this Court’s original jurisdiction over 

cases in which a ‘State shall be a Party.’ Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Congress has in turn provided 

that the Supreme Court shall have ‘original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies 

between two or more States.’ 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).”). The problem with the circuit court’s 

ruling is that neither West Virginia nor Virginia were named parties in the Lowes’ action. 

On at least two occasions, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of private 

parties litigating state boundary line disputes. As shown below, in both cases, the Supreme 

Court has ruled that its original jurisdiction is not invoked when private parties dispute the 

location of boundary lines between non-party states. 

The first case decided by the Supreme Court that involved private parties 

litigating the location of the boundary lines of two states was Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 

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84 S. Ct. 242, 11 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1963).7 In Durfee, two plaintiffs filed an action in a 

Nebraska trial court against a Missouri resident to quiet title to certain land located on the 

Missouri River. The main channel of the river formed the boundary between the states of 

Nebraska and Missouri. The defendant contested subject matter jurisdiction and argued that 

the disputed land was in Missouri. The trial court found that the land was situated in 

Nebraska and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the 

judgment. The defendant did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 

certiorari to review that judgment. Instead, the defendant filed an action against the plaintiffs 

in a Missouri trial court alleging that the land was in Missouri. The suit was removed to a 

federal district court. The federal district court expressed the view that the land was in 

Missouri, but that the judgment of the Nebraska Supreme Court was res judicata and binding 

upon the court. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed after concluding that the 

district court was not required to give full faith and credit to the Nebraska judgment. The 

Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. In finding 

that the Nebraska decision was res judicata, the Supreme Court determined that state courts 

could resolve interstate boundary line property disputes by private citizens but that such 

determinations are not binding on the affected states. The Supreme Court addressed the 

issues as follows: 

7

In fairness to the circuit court, neither party cited to the decision in Durfee 

when the circuit court considered the motion to dismiss. In fact, it was not until the Lowes 

filed their reply brief in this appeal that the Durfee decision was relied upon. 

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It is argued that an exception to this rule of jurisdictional 

finality should be made with respect to cases involving real 

property because of this Court’s emphatic expressions of the 

doctrine that courts of one State are completely without 

jurisdiction directly to affect title to land in other States. This 

argument is wide of the mark. Courts of one State are equally 

without jurisdiction to dissolve the marriages of those domiciled 

in other States. But the location of land, like the domicile of a 

party to a divorce action, is a matter to be resolved by judicial 

determination. The question remains whether, once the matter 

has been fully litigated and judicially determined, it can be 

retried in another State in litigation between the same parties. 

Upon the reason and authority of the cases we have discussed, 

it is clear that the answer must be in the negative. 

It is to be emphasized that all that was ultimately 

determined in the Nebraska litigation was title to the land in 

question as between the parties to the litigation there. Nothing 

there decided, and nothing that could be decided in litigation 

between the same parties or their privies in Missouri, could bind 

either Missouri or Nebraska with respect to anycontroversythey 

might have, now or in the future, as to the location of the 

boundary between them, or as to their respective sovereignty 

over the land in question. Either State may at any time protect 

its interest by initiating independent judicial proceedings here. 

Durfee, 375 U.S. at 115-16, 84 S. Ct. at 247, 111 L. Ed. 2d 186 (internal quotations and 

citation omitted). In a terse concurring opinion by Justice Black, he made the following 

pertinent observation: 

we are not deciding the question whether the respondent would 

continue to be bound by the Nebraska judgment should it later 

be authoritatively decided, either in an original proceeding 

between the States in this Court or by a compact between the 

two States under Art. I, s 10, that the disputed tract is in 

Missouri. 

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Durfee, 375 U.S. at 117, 84 S. Ct. at 248, 11 L. Ed. 2d 186 (Black, J., concurring).8 

The issue of a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the location of 

boundary lines between two states was addressed again by the Supreme Court in Mississippi 

v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 113 S. Ct. 549, 121 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1992). The decision in that 

case started out in federal district court in Mississippi as a dispute between private plaintiffs 

and private defendants as to the ownership of land that was situated along the west bank of 

the Mississippi River near Lake Providence, Louisiana. The plaintiffs were Mississippi 

residents who claimed ownership of the land as being in Mississippi. The defendants were 

Louisiana residents claiming ownership of the land as being situate in Louisiana. The State 

of Louisiana intervened in the case and filed a third-party complaint against the State of 

Mississippi seeking a determination of the boundary between the two states. The district 

court ultimately ruled that the disputed land was located within the territorial boundaries of 

Mississippi rather than Louisiana. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The 

Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two issues: (1) whether the district court had 

subject matter jurisdiction over Louisiana’s third-partycomplaint against Mississippi and (2) 

8

During oral argument, counsel for the Richards attempted to argue that Durfee 

was limited to disputes involving the location of state boundary lines in rivers or bodies of 

water. There is no language in Durfee that restricts its application to only interstate water 

boundary line disputes. The intent of Durfee was simply to acknowledge that not all 

interstate boundary line disputes had to be litigated in the United States Supreme Court. 

Under Durfee, private litigants have the right to have interstate boundary lines determined 

as between the litigants in a local state court. 

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whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction of the dispute between private 

parties as to the location of the boundary line between the two states. As to the first issue, 

the Supreme Court held “that 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), granting to this Court original and 

exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two States, deprived the District Court of 

jurisdiction of Louisiana’s third-party complaint against Mississippi.” Mississippi, 506 U.S. 

at 74, 113 S. Ct. at 551, 121 L. Ed 2d 466. As to the second issue, the Supreme Court found 

that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute of private parties as to 

the location of the boundary line between the two states. The opinion addressed the second 

issue as follows: 

The District Court is conceded to have had jurisdiction 

over the claims of the private plaintiffs against the private 

defendants, and in deciding questions of private title to riparian 

property, it may be necessary to decide where the boundary lies 

between the two States. Adjudicating such a question in a 

dispute between private parties does not violate § 1251(a), 

because that section speaks not in terms of claims or issues, but 

in terms of parties. The States, of course, are not bound by any 

decision as to the boundary between them which was rendered 

in a lawsuit between private litigants. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 

U.S. 106, 115, 84 S. Ct. 242, 247, 11 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1963). 

Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 78, 113 S. Ct. at 553, 121 L. Ed. 2d 466. 

The issue of litigating in a trial court an interstate boundary line dispute 

between government officials and private litigants was addressed in People ex rel. Scott v. 

Dravo Corp., 295 N.E.2d 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). In Scott, various Illinois officials filed 

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an action in state court against three private corporate defendants seeking a declaration that 

an island called Dog Island was within the territorial limits of the State of Illinois and not the 

State of Kentucky. The declaration was sought so that the three corporate defendants, which 

had entered into contracts to perform construction work on Dog Island, would be required 

to comply with Illinois tax laws. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court applied Durfee and held that 

the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the property was situated within the state 

of Illinois: 

The State of Illinois is not seeking to tax property or 

activity in Kentucky, nor is it claiming the power to tax because 

of some incidence or connection with some activity in 

Kentucky. Rather, it is asserting judicial jurisdiction over 

activity wholly within its own boundary. If the plaintiffs 

succeed in establishing as fact what they allege in their 

complaint, clearly they will be entitled to the relief they seek. 

Nothing appears at this juncture that will deprive the Illinois 

court of jurisdiction. Indisputably, the defendants will not be 

foreclosed from proof that, as a matter of fact, Dog Island is a 

part of Kentucky, and the Illinois court is accordingly without 

jurisdiction to render a valid judgment. But the Illinois court, 

under the rules of judicial jurisdiction and Res judicata 

discussed in the Durfee case, may receive evidence regarding 

the location of Dog Island with reference to the State boundary 

line, and therefrom make a determination of its jurisdiction. 

We do not see this action as an intrusion into the 

exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between States conferred 

upon the Supreme Court by article III, section 2 of the 

Constitution of the United States. . . . The two States are not in 

contention here nor are the issues tendered in the complaint 

sufficient to engage them in controversy. 

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Scott, 295 N.E.2d at 290. See River Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino Cnty., 

252 Cal. App. 2d 604, 612 (1967) (“A state court has the power to determine, as between 

private contestants, the disputed question whether real property is within its boundaries or 

is in a neighboring state[.]”); Kissell v. Stevens, 261 S.W. 299 (Ark. 1924) (allowing private 

parties to litigate issue of whether property was located in Arkansas or Tennessee); U. S. 

Gypsum Co. v. Uhlhorn, 232 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Ark. 1964) (determining private parties 

could litigate issue of whether property was located in Arkansas or Tennessee). 

Based upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Durfee and the other 

authorities cited, we now hold that the circuit courts of West Virginia have subject matter 

jurisdiction to resolve an interstate boundary line dispute between private litigants involving 

the issue of whether real property is located within the State of West Virginia or another 

state. Under the decision in Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S. Ct. 242, 11 L. Ed. 2d 186 

(1963), resolution of the boundary line issue by a circuit court is not binding on the affected 

states. 

It is clear from our holding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction 

over the Lowes’ claims against the Richards. Insofar as the States of West Virginia and 

Virginia are not parties to this litigation, the case did not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction 

of the United States Supreme Court. See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22, 23-24, 116 

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S. Ct. 290, 292, 133 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1995) (“We held that there was no jurisdiction in the 

District Court, or in the Court of Appeals, to grant any relief in the quiet title action to one 

State against the other, that authority being reserved for jurisdiction exclusive to this 

Court.”); California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164, 167-68, 102 S. Ct. 2335, 2337, 72 L. Ed. 2d 755 

(1982) (“[T]his dispute is a controversy between two States within our original jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).”). 

2. The West Virginia Boundary Commission. The circuit court’s order also 

found, as an alternative ground for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that the Lowes’ dispute 

was required to be resolved under W. Va. Code § 29-23-2 (1987) (Repl. Vol. 2013). The 

relevant language of this statute provides as follows: 

(a) There is herebycreated a boundarycommission which 

shall consist of three members, who shall be residents and 

citizens of the state, all of whom shall have experience 

involving map reading or surveying. The commission members 

shall investigate state, county and municipal boundary disputes 

when requested to do so by the governor or Legislature. The 

commission members shall be appointed bythe governor, byand 

with the advice and consent of the Senate, no later than the first 

day of July, one thousand nine hundred eighty-seven. No more 

than two members may belong to the same political party. The 

commission members shall serve a term concurrent with that of 

the governor’s term in office. Commission members may be 

reappointed to additional terms. 

W. Va. Code § 29-23-2(a). 

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In our review of a statutory provision, it is essential to afford the enactment an 

interpretation that comports with the intent of the Legislature. We have held previously that 

“[t]he primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 

Legislature.” Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Commn'r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 

S.E.2d 361 (1975). In order to ascertain legislative intent, it is necessary to consider the 

wording of the statute at issue. “Where the language of a statute is clear and without 

ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of 

interpretation.” Syl. pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968). Thus, 

“[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute 

should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to 

construe but to apply the statute.” Syl. pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, 

Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959). 

Applying these tenets to the statute presently before us, we conclude that the 

relevant language in W. Va. Code § 29-23-2(a) is clear and unambiguous. This statute 

creates a Boundary Commission that has a nondiscretionary duty to “investigate state, county 

and municipal boundary disputes when requested to do so by the governor or Legislature.” 

W. Va. Code § 29-23-2(a). This statute expressly limits the authority of the Boundary 

Commission to act only when requested by the governor or Legislature. The statute does not 

authorize private parties to request the Boundary Commission to investigate a boundary 

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dispute. In view of the clear language of the statute, we now hold that under W. Va. Code 

§ 29-23-2 (1987) (Repl. Vol. 2013), the Boundary Commission has a mandatory duty to 

investigate state, county, and municipal boundary line disputes when requested to do so by 

the governor or Legislature. The statute does not authorize private citizens to make such a 

request to the Boundary Commission. 

It is obvious from the statute and our holding that even if the Lowes went to 

the Boundary Commission and made a request for a boundary line determination, as 

suggested by the circuit court, the statute did not authorize the Boundary Commission to act 

on the request. Thus, it is clear that the circuit court committed error in finding that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the Lowes had to file their dispute with the 

Boundary Commission.9 

9

The Richards have argued in their response brief that the issue of the boundary 

line between West Virginia and Virginia “is a non-justiciable political question committed 

to the legislative and executive branches of government under the law of nations and 

pursuant to W.Va. Code §§ 29-23-1 (1987) et seq.” The “political question” argument made 

by the Richards simply has no application to this litigation. See, e.g., State ex rel. League of 

Women Voters of W. Va. v. Tomblin, 209 W. Va. 565, 574, 550 S.E.2d 355, 364 (2001) 

(“Questions involving perceived conflict between the legislative and executive branches are, 

by and large, political questions, which do not present issues with which this Court can, or 

should, concern itself”); State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 196 W.Va. 208, 216-17, 470 

S.E.2d 162, 170-71 (1996) (“Respected authorities have called for judicial deferral to the 

political branches regarding the meaning and adequacy of constitutional amendment 

procedures.”); Killen v. Logan Cnty. Comm’n, 170 W. Va. 602, 624, 295 S.E.2d 689, 711 

(1982) (Neely, J., dissenting) (“The issue of taxation is, probably more than any other 

subject, first and last an issue for the legislature. It is the classic political question into which 

(continued...) 

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B. Indispensable Parties 

The circuit court also granted the Richards’ motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure because it reasoned the Lowes failed 

to join indispensable parties to the litigation, those being the State of West Virginia and 

Virginia. We disagree. 

“Rule 12(b)(7) allows dismissal for failure to join a party under Rule 19.” 

Cleckley, et al., Litigation Handbook, § 12(b)(7), p. 397. 

Under Rule 19(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure 

a party becomes an indispensable party if he has an interest 

relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the 

disposition of the action in his absence may as a practical matter 

impair or impede his ability to protect that interest. 

Syl. pt. 1, Pauley v. Gainer, 177 W. Va. 464, 353 S.E.2d 318 (1986). The circuit court found 

that the rights of West Virginia and Virginia would be affected by its ruling; therefore, the 

States were indispensable parties. The order addressed the matter as follows: 

9

(...continued) 

courts should not intrude themselves.”). As indicated above, the United States Supreme 

Court has held that neither the federal constitution nor a federal statute prohibits private 

parties from litigating interstate boundary line disputes in state courts. To the extent that the 

“political question” doctrine has anyapplication to interstate boundaryline disputes, it would 

be limited to the context of a dispute between two or more states. However, even in that 

context, the doctrine cannot be invoked to prevent the United States Supreme Court from 

presiding over a dispute between two or more states. 

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Both the States of Virginia and West Virginia are 

indispensable parties to the determination of the physical 

location of the border between the two states. A decree setting 

the boundary between Virginia and West Virginia would 

distribute territory between the two states, diminishing the area 

of one state to the benefit of the other. Any decree of the border 

without the presence of the states as parties would impair the 

rights of those states to protect their sovereign territory and thus 

cannot be made without their presence. 

The circuit court’s ruling is inconsistent with the pronouncements made by the 

United States Supreme Court in Durfee and Mississippi v. Louisiana, supra. In both cases 

the Supreme Court recognized that states are not bound by decisions resolving interstate 

boundary line disputes between private parties. Durfee held that “[e]ither State may at any 

time protect its interest byinitiating independent judicial proceedings here.” Durfee, 375 U.S. 

at 116, 84 S. Ct. at 247. The decision in Mississippi also held with reservation that “[t]he 

States, of course, are not bound by any decision as to the boundary between them which was 

rendered in a lawsuit between private litigants.” Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 78, 113 S. Ct. at 

553. Based upon these authorities, we hold that in a real property action involving private 

parties that requires the determination of the boundary line between West Virginia and 

another state, neither the state of West Virginia nor the other state are required parties to the 

litigation. 

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Therefore, it is clear from our holding that the circuit court committed error in 

dismissing the Lowes’ action on the grounds that West Virginia and Virginia were 

indispensable parties.10 Under the authority of the United States Supreme Court and our 

holding today, the rights of neither state will be impaired or impeded by the circuit court’s 

decision on the merits of the Lowes’ claims.11 

IV.
 

CONCLUSION
 

The circuit court’s order of February 15, 2013, dismissing the Lowes’ 

counterclaim and third-party complaint is reversed. The case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Reversed and Remanded. 

10The circuit court’s decision that the Lowes’ claims should be dismissed, for 

failure to state a claim for relief, was based solely upon the determination that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction and that the Lowes failed to join indispensable parties. Insofar as 

we have found the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction and indispensable parties rulings 

were error, we summarily reverse the third basis for the circuit court’s decision to dismiss 

the claims, i.e., failure to state a claim for relief. 

11We wish to make clear that in this appeal we have not considered the merits 

of the Lowes’ claims. Rather, determination of the merits of the Lowes’ claims is reserved 

for resolution on remand. 

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