PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LISA A. JOHNSON; GILBERT A. 

HERBERT, on behalf of themselves

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.  No. 08-2186 ADVANCE AMERICA, CASH ADVANCE

CENTERS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

INCORPORATED, d/b/a Advance

America Cash Advance Centers,

d/b/a Advance America,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.

(2:07-cv-03447-PMD)

Argued: October 29, 2008

Decided: December 12, 2008

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and AGEE,

Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the

opinion, in which Judge Traxler joined. Judge Agee wrote a

separate opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and

concurring in the judgment.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Barry Goheen, Michael C. Russ, KING & SPALDING, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant. Joe R. Whatley, Jr., WHATLEY DRAKE & KALLAS, LLC, New York,

New York, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jonathan R. Chally,

KING & SPALDING, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia; William

Douglas Smith, JOHNSON SMITH HIBBARD & WILDMAN LAW FIRM, L.L.P., Spartanburg, South Carolina;

Thomas C. Brittain, HEARN, BRITTAIN & MARTIN, P.A.,

Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Preston

Strom, Jr., Mario A. Pacella, STROM LAW FIRM, L.L.C.,

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

Lisa Johnson and Gilbert Herbert, citizens of South Carolina, filed an action on behalf of themselves and all other "citizens of South Carolina," who were similarly situated, against

Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of South Carolina,

Inc., alleging that Advance America, in making "payday

loans" to the plaintiffs, violated South Carolina law, which

prohibits unconscionable loans and requires good faith and

fair dealing in contracts. Alleging minimal diversity under the

Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(2)(A), Advance America removed the action to

federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). It claimed that it satisfied the requirement of "minimal diversity," as defined in

§ 1332(d)(2)(A), because either (1) it is a citizen of Delaware,

where it was incorporated, even though it is also a citizen of

South Carolina, where it has its principal place of business, or

(2) some of the class members had moved from South Carolina and were citizens of other States.

2 JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA
On the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, the district court found

that Advance America failed to establish minimal diversity

under § 1332(d)(2)(A) because, even though Advance America is a citizen of Delaware, it is also a citizen of South Carolina, and all members of the plaintiff class are citizens of

South Carolina. The court further found that the class action

fell within the "home-state exception" to CAFA jurisdiction

in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) because in a class limited by

definition to "citizens of South Carolina," at least two-thirds

of the class members necessarily are citizens of South Carolina. Accordingly, the district court remanded the case to state

court. We granted Advance America’s petition for permission

to appeal the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).

Because Advance America cannot carry its burden of demonstrating that any member of the plaintiffs’ class is a citizen

of a State "different from" Advance America, as required by

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), we affirm. Advance America is a

citizen of South Carolina, albeit also a citizen of Delaware,

and the class is defined to include only citizens of South Carolina, thus excluding persons who may have moved from South

Carolina and established citizenship elsewhere at the time the

action was commenced.

I

In their complaint, filed in the Georgetown County Court

of Common Pleas in South Carolina, Johnson and Herbert

alleged that they entered into numerous payday loans with

Advance America and that under the loan agreements, they

agreed to repay the principal amount plus 15% interest two

weeks after receiving the loan. They alleged that they currently carry open loans with Advance America, which they

renew every two weeks by paying only the interest with additional payday loans. Because of fixed financial obligations,

which nearly equal their incomes, they alleged that they are

now unable to pay the loans.

JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA 3
Johnson and Herbert claimed that Advance America, in

issuing the payday loans, violated South Carolina statutory

law prohibiting unconscionable loan agreements, S.C. Code

§ 37-5-108, and South Carolina common law duties of good

faith and fair dealing. They alleged that Advance America

failed to conduct credit checks to verify customers’ finances

and ability to repay loans before entering into the agreements

and that the agreements contained unconscionable arbitration

clauses. For relief, they seek a declaratory judgment that

Advance America’s conduct violated South Carolina law;

injunctive relief prohibiting Advance America from issuing

any payday loans until it modifies its business practices; and

damages.

Johnson and Herbert purport to represent themselves and a

class of other South Carolina citizens who are similarly situated. In their complaint, they defined the proposed class to

contain three subclasses, each defined as follows:

Injunctive Relief Class: All citizens of South Carolina who are domiciled in South Carolina and who

borrowed money from Defendant in the three years

preceding the filing of the complaint or who will

borrow money from Defendant in the future.

Damages Subclass One: All citizens of South Carolina who borrowed money from Defendant in the

three years preceding the filing of this complaint

whose total monthly obligations exceeded 55% of

their gross monthly income.

Damages Subclass Two: All citizens of South Carolina who renewed a loan with Defendant by repaying

only the interest and received a new loan.

Proceeding under CAFA, Advance America filed a notice

of removal to federal court under the authority of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1453(b), alleging that federal jurisdiction was conferred by

4 JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Johnson and Herbert filed a motion

to remand, claiming that Advance America had improperly

removed the action to federal court because minimal diversity

did not exist among the parties under § 1332(d)(2)(A). Moreover, they claimed that, even if there was minimal diversity

under § 1332(d)(2)(A), CAFA’s home-state exception, 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B), defeated federal jurisdiction.

The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion by entry of an

order of remand dated April 25, 2008. We granted Advance

America’s petition for permission to appeal, by order dated

October 29, 2008. This appeal is thus limited to whether minimal diversity under CAFA exists in this case and whether

CAFA’s home-state exception applies.

II

Congress enacted CAFA in 2005 to address abuses of the

class action device. Such abuses, it found, had the effect of,

among other things, "undermin[ing] . . . the concept of diversity jurisdiction . . . in that State and local courts are—

(A) keeping cases of national importance out of

Federal court; 

(B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate

bias against out-of-State defendants; and

(C) making judgments that impose their view of

the law on other States and bind the rights of

the residents of those States."

CAFA § 2(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005), 28

U.S.C. § 1711 note. In light of these findings, Congress

enacted CAFA to

restore the intent of the framers of the United States

Constitution by providing for Federal court considerJOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA 5
ation of interstate cases of national importance under

diversity jurisdiction.

CAFA § 2(b)(2). CAFA amended, among other things, the

concept of diversity jurisdiction for class actions to require

only minimal diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). It also liberalized the requirements for removing class actions to federal

courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).

Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, the diversity

requirements were amended to confer jurisdiction on district

courts over "any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of

interest and costs, and is a class action in which . . . any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from

any defendant." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).

The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction on the

removal of a class action is on the removing party. See Strawn

v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2008).

Advance America contends that the minimal diversity

requirement is satisfied in this case. It argues first that

because Advance America is incorporated under the laws of

Delaware and is therefore a Delaware citizen, its citizenship

is different from the citizenship of the class members.

Although Advance America is also a citizen of South Carolina, where it has its principal place of business, it asserts that

its "dual citizenship in South Carolina does not destroy the

minimal diversity created by certain alleged South Carolina

citizens suing a Delaware corporation." Stated otherwise, it

maintains that "Advance America’s dual citizenship is sufficient to establish minimal diversity under CAFA," regardless

of the citizenship of the plaintiffs.

Advance America is correct in noting that it, as a corporation, has dual citizenship for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction. "[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a

6 JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of

the State where it has its principal place of business." 28

U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (emphasis added). The statute’s use of

the conjunctive gives dual, not alternative, citizenship to a

corporation whose principal place of business is in a State different from the State where it is incorporated. Therefore, for

purposes of diversity jurisdiction, Advance America is a citizen of both Delaware, its State of corporation, and South Carolina, the State of its principal place of business. Yet,

Advance America relies on its Delaware citizenship to create

minimal diversity, ignoring the fact that it is also a citizen of

South Carolina. Whether it is entitled to rely on only one citizenship where its other citizenship would destroy federal

jurisdiction is resolved by the statutory language itself and by

the burden of proof imposed on removing parties.

As noted, the burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction

remains with Advance America. Thus, to establish minimal

diversity under CAFA, Advance America must demonstrate

that "any member of [the] class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a

State different from any defendant." 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). It cannot, however, demonstrate that the plaintiffs, who are South Carolina citizens,

are citizens of a State different from Advance America. This

is because Advance America is a citizen of South Carolina,

even though it is also a citizen of Delaware. Because Advance

America has South Carolina citizenship, it cannot carry its

burden of demonstrating that the citizenship of the South Carolina class members is different from its own. The language

of the statute imposes a requirement on Advance America to

prove the negative—i.e. that it is not a citizen of South

Carolina—and that it cannot do.1 Accordingly, we reject its

1Because we conclude that Advance America’s dual citizenship precludes it from meeting its burden in this case of demonstrating jurisdiction

under CAFA, we need not determine whether Advance America and

plaintiffs are citizens of different States for Article III purposes. Cf. Grupo

Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 577 n.6 (2004). Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction over controversies "between Citizens of different States." U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1. 

JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA 7
argument that its dual citizenship entitles it to rely on its Delaware citizenship to establish minimal diversity under CAFA.

See Sundy v. Renewable Envtl. Solutions, LLC, No. 07-5069-

CV-SW-ODS, 2007 WL 2994348, at *3 n.4 (W.D. Mo. Oct.

10, 2007) ("The court does not agree with Defendant’s suggestion that minimal diversity exists unless a member of the

class is a citizen of both Missouri and Delaware"). But see

Fuller v. Home Depot Servs., LLC, No. 1:07-CV-1268-FLV,

2007 WL 2345257 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2007) (reaching the

opposite conclusion).

III

Advance America also contends that the district court erred

in "rejecting undisputed evidence establishing that minimal

diversity on the Plaintiffs’ side exists." As Advance America

explains:

While Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition is purportedly limited to "citizens of South Carolina," the

Complaint does not define when such citizenship is

to be determined. As a result, under Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition, fairly read, Plaintiffs’ class

contains any individual who (1) entered into a [payday loan] with Advance America and (2) was at any

time a South Carolina citizen. Advance America

demonstrated to the district court that many of these

individuals are now, and were at the time Plaintiffs

filed their Complaint (the time relevant for determining diversity jurisdiction under CAFA), citizens of

states other than South Carolina.

(Emphasis added). Advance America presented affidavits

demonstrating that at least 19 customers had moved out of

South Carolina and "resided" in 19 other States.

Johnson and Herbert respond that Advance America "mischaracterizes" the definition of the class they purport to repre8 JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA
sent by suggesting that it includes persons who were "at any

time a South Carolina citizen." We agree.

The complaint defines three subclasses whom plaintiffs

purport to represent, and each is defined as a group of "citizens of South Carolina." For example, the class for injunctive

relief defines the class as:

All citizens of South Carolina who are domiciled in

South Carolina and who borrowed money from

Defendant in the three years preceding the filing of

the complaint or who will borrow money from

Defendant in the future.

(Emphasis added). In short, each of the subclasses is defined

as a group of South Carolina citizens who engaged in certain

transactions or satisfy certain factual criteria. Thus, under the

definition in the complaint, if one of Advance America’s customers had in fact established domicile outside of South Carolina before the complaint was filed, as Advance America’s

affidavits suggest,2 such customers would not be "citizens of

2While we assume for purposes of our opinion that some of the persons

who obtained payday loans had moved from South Carolina and were

thereafter "citizens" of States other than South Carolina, Advance America’s affidavits only indicated that these persons "resided" outside of South

Carolina. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, residency is not sufficient

to establish citizenship. See Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil

Co., 145 F.3d 660, 663 (4th Cir. 1998). To be a citizen of a State, a person

must be both a citizen of the United States and a domiciliary of that State.

Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989). Domicile requires physical presence, coupled with an intent to make the State

a home. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,

48 (1989); Jahed v. Acri, 468 F.3d 230, 236 (4th Cir. 2006); Webb v.

Nolan, 484 F.2d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir. 1973) ("The law seems clear that to

effect a change of citizenship from one state to another there must be residence in the new domicile and an intention to remain there permanently

or indefinitely"). Advance America’s affidavits are in this manner deficient in demonstrating that the 19 persons are "citizens" of a State different from South Carolina. 

JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA 9
South Carolina" at the time the complaint was filed and therefore would not be members of the proposed class. See 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7) (providing that citizenship is to be determined as of the date of the complaint or other paper that first

indicates the existence of federal jurisdiction).

To be sure, the plaintiffs in this case have taken care to

restrict the scope of their allegations so as to avoid federal

jurisdiction under CAFA. Yet the plaintiffs, as masters of

their complaint, can choose to circumscribe their class definition in this way. See Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81,

94 (2005) (holding that because the plaintiffs did not name as

a defendant a party who had an interest in the action, the

defendant need not have alleged that party’s citizenship upon

removal); id. at 91 ("In general, the plaintiff is the master of

the complaint and has the option of naming only those parties

the plaintiff chooses to sue, subject only to the rules of joinder

[of] necessary parties" (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)); Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1165 (4th Cir.

1996) ("[T]he plaintiff is master of his complaint[,] and [this]

generally permits plaintiffs to ‘avoid federal jurisdiction by

exclusive reliance on state law’" (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987))). In this case, the plaintiffs, as masters of their complaint, limited the class to citizens

of South Carolina, determined as of the time the complaint

was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7).

Thus, under the class definition set forth in the complaint,

if a putative class member had in fact changed his or her State

of domicile by the time the complaint had been filed, then the

person no longer would qualify as a member of the class and

accordingly would have no impact on whether minimal diversity exists. And if the person established citizenship in another

State after the complaint was filed, it would not affect jurisdiction that existed at the time the complaint or notice of

removal was filed. See Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9

Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824); see also Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S.

at 570-71; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7).

10 JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA
Accordingly, we also reject Advance America’s second

basis for claiming that minimal diversity exists in this case.

IV

Because we conclude that Advance America has not demonstrated the minimal diversity required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(2)(A), we need not reach the issue whether the

home-state exception in § 1332(d)(4)(B) was satisfied. But we

observe, as a matter of logic, that if the class is limited to citizens of South Carolina, it could hardly be claimed that twothirds of the class members were not citizens of South Carolina.

V

CAFA has indeed relaxed the requirements for demonstrating diversity jurisdiction and for removing class actions to

allow federal courts more readily to supervise those class

actions that are "interstate cases of national importance." See

CAFA § 2(b)(2). But in enacting this legislation to remedy

state court abuses of the class action device, Congress did not

give federal courts jurisdiction over all class actions, specifically excluding those consisting of "primarily local matters."

See Sen. Rep. No. 109-14, at 6 (2005) ("This Committee

believes that the current diversity and removal standards as

applied in interstate class actions have facilitated a parade of

abuses, and are thwarting the underlying purpose of the constitutional requirement of diversity jurisdiction. [CAFA]

addresses these concerns by establishing ‘balanced diversity[,]’ a rule allowing a larger number of class actions into federal courts, while continuing to preserve primary state court

jurisdiction over primarily local matters") (emphasis added)).

Nor did Congress purport to alter through CAFA our federal

system of dual sovereignty where we presume state courts to

be competent. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-59

(1990).

JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA 11
This case, we conclude, falls into that class of cases which

Congress found appropriate to leave to the States under

CAFA. The plaintiffs are South Carolina citizens and the class

they purport to represent is comprised exclusively of South

Carolina citizens. The defendant is a citizen of South Carolina, albeit also a citizen of Delaware. All the transactions

addressed by the complaint took place in South Carolina and

are alleged to have violated only South Carolina law.

Undoubtedly, the plaintiffs could have expanded their action

to fall under the provisions of CAFA, but, as the masters of

their complaint, they opted to bring their suit only under

South Carolina law and to name only those parties who were

South Carolina citizens involved in entirely South Carolina

transactions. This they were entitled to do. See Lincoln Prop.,

546 U.S. at 91.

The district court’s order of remand is accordingly

AFFIRMED.

AGEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part,

and concurring in the judgment: 

I agree with the majority opinion that Advance America

fails to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)

on the basis of its dual citizenship. I write separately because

I respectfully disagree, in part, with the conclusion in the

majority opinion that the language of the Complaint has limited the classes of plaintiffs to only South Carolina citizens as

of the time the Complaint was filed. Nonetheless, I concur in

the judgment of the majority because Advance America failed

to meet its burden of proof to establish the citizenship of any

plaintiff in a state other than South Carolina.

The Complaint sets out three classes of plaintiffs as follows:

Injunctive Relief Class: All citizens of South Carolina who are domiciled in South Carolina and who

12 JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA
borrowed money from Defendant in the three years

preceding the filing of the complaint or who will

borrow money from Defendant in the future.

Damages Subclass One: All citizens of South Carolina who borrowed money from Defendant in the

three years preceding the filing of this complaint

whose monthly obligations exceeded 55% of their

gross monthly income.

Damages Subclass Two: All citizens of South Carolina who renewed a loan with Defendant by repaying

only the interest and received a new loan.

(J.A. 11) (emphasis added).

Advance America contends that these class definitions

include "any individual who (1) entered into a deferred presentment services agreement with Advance America and (2)

was at any time a South Carolina citizen." (Br. Appellant 17.)

Advance America then argues that the classes would include

plaintiffs "who borrowed money" from it while a South Carolina citizen, but who thereafter became citizens of another

state before the Complaint was filed. The majority finds this

argument unpersuasive based on its reading of the classes as

defined in the Complaint and concludes that "if one of

Advance America’s customers had in fact established domicile outside of South Carolina before the complaint was filed

. . . such customers would not be ‘citizens of South Carolina’

at the time the complaint was filed and therefore would not

be members of the proposed class." Supra at 9-10. For the

reasons that follow, I agree with the majority as to the Injunctive Relief Class but disagree as to Damages Subclass One

and Damages Subclass Two (collectively, the "Damages Subclasses").

The plain language of the Complaint defining the Injunctive Relief Class describes its members in the present tense,

JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA 13
that is, South Carolina citizens "who are domiciled in South

Carolina." (Emphasis added). This language establishes a

class of plaintiffs who are South Carolina citizens even

though the ultimate class membership is further restricted to

those South Carolina citizens "who borrowed money from

Defendant in the three years preceding the filing of the complaint." If a person is not "domiciled in South Carolina" at the

time the Complaint was filed then that person, by definition,

cannot be a member of the Injunctive Relief Class.

The majority opinion correctly points out that the plaintiffs

are "masters of their complaint," supra at 10, and have considerable leeway in defining who is, and is not, within the

class or classes of the Complaint. In this case, the plaintiffs

have circumscribed the membership of the Injunctive Relief

Class to include only South Carolina citizens, at least as of the

filing of the Complaint. However, for whatever reason, the

plaintiffs have not similarly delineated the members of the

Damages Subclasses.

The definition of the members of the Damages Subclasses

are not drawn in the present tense as is the Injunctive Relief

Class. The limiting phrase "who are domiciled in South Carolina," or other similar denotation of present status, is missing.

Instead, the Damages Subclasses are defined in the past tense,

that is, South Carolina citizens "who borrowed money from

Defendant in the three years preceding the filing of this complaint" or who "renewed a loan with Defendant." Thus, to be

a member of the Damages Subclasses, a person need only

have borrowed from Advance America over the last three

years, or renewed a loan, while a South Carolina citizen.

These past actions while a South Carolina citizen speak not at

all to that person’s subsequent status as a South Carolina citizen at the time the Complaint was filed.

The plaintiffs, as master of their complaint, have defined

the members of the Damages Subclasses in a way that could

include members who were South Carolina citizens when they

14 JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA
initially borrowed or renewed a loan, but who ceased to be

South Carolina Citizens before the Complaint was filed. The

failure of the Complaint to place a certain temporal requirement on class membership leaves open the potential membership to persons who were not South Carolina citizens when

the Complaint was filed, even though they were South Carolina citizens when their transactions with Advance America

took place. If such persons with other than South Carolina citizenship do exist in fact, then the minimal diversity requirements enunciated in CAFA would be met and jurisdiction in

the district court would be established. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)

(2006).

However, as the majority opinion correctly notes, "the burden of establishing jurisdiction remains with Advance America," supra at 7, the party seeking removal to federal court.

"[T]he party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must . . .

demonstrate the basis for federal jurisdiction." Strawn v.

AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2008). Even

though, as pointed out above, the Damages Subclasses could

include non South Carolina citizens, it is Advance America’s

burden to show that there were indeed such members.

Advance America failed to meet its burden of proof to show

diverse citizenship in the Damages Subclasses as a matter of

law. The only evidence proffered by Advance America to sustain its burden of proof was an affidavit declaring that certain

customers "changed their residence and, therefore, citizenship." (J.A. 22.) As the majority recognizes in footnote 2, citizenship is determined not by residence but by the jurisdiction

in which a citizen is domiciled. "[S]tate citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction depends not on residence, but

on national citizenship and domicile, and the existence of

such citizenship cannot be inferred from allegations of mere

residence, standing alone." Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 145 F.3d 660, 663 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted).

As Advance America’s only evidence of non South Carolina citizenship is a possible change of residence, not domiJOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA 15
cile, it fails to meet its burden of proof as a matter of law.

Accordingly, even though I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Complaint’s definition of the Damages Subclasses limits their membership to citizens of South Carolina

at the time the Complaint was filed, Advance America has

failed to show any non South Carolina citizen actually exists.

I thus concur in the judgment of the majority because

Advance America has failed to demonstrate the existence of

federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).

16 JOHNSON v. ADVANCE AMERICA