*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 15, 2006*

Decided November 28, 2006

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 06-2024

MARY WALLSKOG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION, et al.

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, South Bend Division

No. 3:03-CV-125RM

Robert L. Miller, Jr.,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Mary Wallskog, an African-American employee of the Indiana Department of

Correction (“INDOC”), claims that her former supervisor subjected her to racial

discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to

the defendants on all counts. We affirm. 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 06-2024 Page 2

 In 2001 Wallskog was hired as one of INDOC’s affirmative action

coordinators. Her duties included investigating discrimination complaints from

INDOC staff and designing programs to promote fairness for racial minorities,

women, and people with disabilities. Wallskog’s supervisor was Harry Howe. 

According to Wallskog, Howe had always treated her differently from white

employees, and became especially spiteful after she investigated a gender

discrimination claim against him. In the report she filed on this claim, Wallskog

found “problems” with Howe’s behavior and recommended sensitivity training. 

After she had completed her investigation, Howe removed Wallskog from the

Human Resources office and placed her in a separate, isolated office down the

hallway. Wallskog states that more than once, Howe purposefully bumped into her

in order to knock documents from her hands. Wallskog also claims that Howe had

earlier promised to increase her salary, but never did so.

Wallskog had other job-related difficulties that did not involve Howe. She

was audited in 2002, after INDOC received several complaints about her work. The

first complaint involved an INDOC employee who was fired because Wallskog

reported that he had used racial slurs; this report was later determined to be

untrue. Wallskog’s interview techniques were also faulted for being accusatory and

unobjective. Additionally, the audit discovered that she was late in filing at least

nine different reports, and that the files in the affirmative action office were in

“complete disarray.” Based on this information, Wallskog was demoted to

administrative assistant. 

Believing that the demotion was a retaliatory action spearheaded by Howe,

Wallskog filed this complaint. The district court granted summary judgment for

the defendants, determining that Wallskog failed to establish a prima facie case of

either racial discrimination or retaliation. 

On appeal Wallskog first argues that she presented the district court with

sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her race discrimination claim. 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Burks v. Wis. Dep’t of

Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2006). Wallskog admits that she has no direct

evidence of racial discrimination and proceeds under the indirect method

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). The

indirect method requires Wallskog to demonstrate that (1) she belongs to a

protected class, (2) she performed her job satisfactorily, (3) she suffered a materially

adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated employees outside of her

protected class were treated more favorably. Id.; Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust

Co., 411 F.3d 854, 861 (7th Cir. 2005). The district court properly concluded that

Wallskog failed at the second step. The evidence uncovered in the 2002 audit

establishes that she was not adequately performing her job. Moreover, the district

court properly concluded that she failed at the fourth step: Wallskog claims that
No. 06-2024 Page 3

white female employees were treated better, but provides no evidence to support

this assertion. 

Because she was not meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations,

Wallskog’s retaliation claim is similarly unsuccessful. A plaintiff may survive

summary judgment on a retaliation claim if she shows that (1) after lodging a

complaint about discrimination, (2) she, but not similarly situated employees who

did not complain, was (3) subjected to an adverse employment action even though

(4) she was performing her job satisfactorily; unless (5) the employer presents

evidence of a lawful reason for the action. Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Util.

Div., 281 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 2002). As mentioned above, the district court

properly concluded that Wallskog was reassigned because of complaints about her

work, and that Howe played no role in the decision to transfer her. Wallskog also

failed to provide the district court with evidence that similarly situated employees

who did not complain about discrimination received better treatment. See

Treadwell v. Office of the Ill. Sec’y of State, 455 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2006)

(affirming summary judgment for defendant where evidence showed that decision to

transfer plaintiff was unrelated to his filing an EEOC complaint, and where

plaintiff failed to identify a similarly situated employee that did not complain of

discrimination and was treated more favorably). 

AFFIRMED.