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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

WESTERN DIVISION 

LAVERTIS STEWART (A-15380) , ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 12 C 50273 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) Judge Philip G. Reinhard 

EVANSTON INSURANCE COMPANY as ) 

Special Representative for the Estate of ) 

ANTREAS MESROBIAN; JILL WAHL; ) 

IMHOTEP CARTER; WEXFORD HEALTH ) 

SOURCES, INC.; ARTHUR FUNK; JOHN ) 

DOE TWO; JOHN DOE THREE; JOHN DOE ) 

FOUR; JOHN DOE FIVE; JOHN DOE SIX; ) 

JOHN DOE SEVEN; JOHN DOE EIGHT; ) 

JOHN DOE NINE; JOHN DOE TEN; JOHN ) 

DOE ELEVEN; JOHN DOE TWELVE; JOHN ) 

DOE THIRTEEN; JOHN DOE FOURTEEN; ) 

and JOHN DOE FIFTEEN, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 

ORDER

 For the following reasons, defendant Wayne Steele’s motion to dismiss or sever 

claims III and IV [321] is denied. 

STATEMENT

 This case has a long procedural history, detailed in the court’s previous orders. 

See [154]; [189]; [300]. Familiarity with these matters is assumed. In relevant part, on 

April 20, 2017, plaintiff filed his sixth amended complaint [306], in which he named for 

the first time defendant Wayne Steele, former Assistant Warden of operations at Dixon 

Correctional Center. On June 5, 2017, Steele filed a motion to dismiss the claims against 

him, or in the alternative to sever the claims against him from those of the other 

defendants [321], along with a memorandum in support [322]. On July 3, 2017, plaintiff 

filed a response in opposition [330], on July 24, 2017, Steele filed a reply [332], and on 

August 8, 2017, plaintiff filed a surreply [337]. These matters are now ripe for the 

court’s review. 

 As noted, this court has detailed the relevant facts of this case in sufficient detail 

elsewhere, see [154]; [189]; [300], and as such familiarity with those facts is assumed and 

the court will only detail those additional facts relevant to the instant motion. 
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 In the Sixth Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges that he has at various time been 

issued 6-month No Black Box permits, which have occasionally been renewed and at 

other times have lapsed for no medically relevant purpose, necessitating that plaintiff 

undergo significant pain while he labors to have the permit reissued. 

 In October of 2016, plaintiff’s No Black Box permit had lapsed and he sought 

another one in January of 2017 from Dr. Chamberlain, a medical professional at Dixon 

with the authority to issue No Black Box permits. Dr. Chamberlain denied plaintiff’s 

request, informing him that new policies promulgated by Steele and Dr. Chamberlain’s 

Wexford supervisors prevented him from doing so unless an inmate had a broken wrist. 

 Nonetheless, in March of 2017, Dr. Chamberlain did issue a new No Black Box 

permit, after plaintiff showed obvious signs of harm from wearing the Black Box. 

Between plaintiff’s January conversation with Dr. Chamberlain and the reissuance of the 

No Black Box permit, plaintiff was forced to wear the Black Box during medical writs. 

When plaintiff asked Dr. Chamberlain in March why he had not issued plaintiff a No 

Black Box permit in January, Dr. Chamberlain stated that he had been following 

directives and pressure from Steele and his Wexford supervisors, despite Dr. 

Chamberlain’s belief that plaintiff should never have been subjected to the Black Box. 

Plaintiff also alleged that two other inmates were issued No Black Box permits between 

October of 2016 and March of 2017, despite not having broken wrists. 

 In the Sixth Amended Complaint, plaintiff raises an official capacity claim against 

Steele, seeking a permanent injunction preventing the use of the Black Box (Count III), 

and a deliberate indifference Monell claim against Steele in his individual capacity for 

promulgating and enforcing the policy of not issuing No Black Box permits without 

evidence that a plaintiff had a broken wrist. 

 In his motion to dismiss, Steele first argues that the official capacity claim against 

him is moot because he no longer works at Dixon. This argument is without merit, 

because the official capacity claim is not against Steele himself and thus can be 

substituted for the current Warden in his official capacity. Steele also argues that the 

injunction plaintiff seeks is moot, because he currently has a No Black Box permit and 

any possibility of future harm is speculative. This claim is without merit because 

plaintiff alleges a repeated pattern of No Black Box permits lapsing over the course of his 

incarceration without medical cause, which is why he seeks a permanent injunction. This 

rises above the level of speculation, at least for pleading purposes. 

 Next, Steele argues that plaintiff has pleaded himself out of court on his 

individual capacity Monell claims against Steele, noting that plaintiff pointed to other 

inmates that were given No Black Box permits without broken wrists, and also that 

plaintiff was ultimately given a No Black Box permit without a broken wrist. 

 As plaintiff points out, however, to plead himself out of court the complaint 

would need to allege “facts that establish an impenetrable defense to its claims. Put 

slightly differently, a plaintiff pleads himself out of court when it would be necessary to 
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contradict the complaint in order to prevail on the merits.” See Epstein v. Epstein, 843 

F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that “[a]lthough the defendants strenuously 

argue otherwise, the emails attached to the complaint do not conclusively defeat [the 

plaintiff’s] allegation that [the defendant] intercepted his emails contemporaneously with 

their transmission.”). 

 Here, plaintiff alleged that Steele promulgated and enforced through pressure a 

policy that inmates should not be given No Black Box permits without broken wrists. 

The allegations that No Black Box permits were issued to other inmates and eventually 

plaintiff himself do not conclusively prove that the policy did not exist and exerted some 

pressure on Dr. Chamberlain. It is consistent with plaintiff’s allegations to find that 

Steele implemented such a policy and that it caused Dr. Chamberlain to deny plaintiff’s 

request in January of 2017, but that Dr. Chamberlain ignored it in some instances, such as 

when he issued plaintiff a permit in March of 2017 after seeing signs of plaintiff’s 

deteriorating condition. At this early stage, the court finds that plaintiff’s allegations are 

not such that he would necessarily have to contradict the complaint in order to prevail on 

the merits. 

 The court notes that Steele appears to assert in his reply that plaintiff has alleged 

several possible constitutional claims against Steele regarding different aspects of the 

Black Box policy, each of which standing alone are potentially insufficient. The court 

disagrees with defendant’s reading of the Sixth Amended Complaint. Moreover, the 

court agrees with plaintiff that Steele’s “divide and conquer” mode of argument has been 

found improper by the Seventh Circuit, see Engel v. Buchan, 710 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 

2013), and imposes a higher pleading standard than is required at this stage, see E.E.O.C. 

v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). As such, Steele’s 

motion to dismiss is denied. 

 Finally, the court denies Steele’s motion to sever because the claims against him 

are part of the same series of occurrences as the claims against the medical defendants, all 

of which deals with the issuance or denial of No Black Box permits. Under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 20(a), these claims are properly joined, and there is significant reason to keep these 

claims together for trial convenience and the expedition of the final determination of 

disputes. See Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763, 

771 (7th Cir. 1973) (“The general policy [the joinder rules of] the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure in general, is the impulse toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of 

action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is 

strongly encouraged.”) (internal quotations omitted). As such, Steele’s motion to sever is 

denied. 

Date: 11/27/2017 ENTER: 

 ___________________________________ 

 United States District Court Judge 

 

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