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54–812 PDF 2010

UPDATE: THE FEDERAL AVIATION 

ADMINISTRATION’S CALL TO 

ACTION ON AIRLINE SAFETY 

AND PILOT TRAINING 

(111–86) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

February 4, 2010 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

PHIL HARE, Illinois 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

BETSY MARKEY, Colorado 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THOMAS S. P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

HARRY TEAGUE, New Mexico 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

JOHN A. BOCCIERI, Ohio, Vice Chair 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

MARK H. SCHAUER, Michigan 

THOMAS S.P. PERRIELLO, Virginia 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Babbitt, Hon. J. Randolph, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration ... 8 

Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin, Inspector General, United States Department of 

Transportation ...................................................................................................... 8 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 36 

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 37 

Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas .................................................................. 46 

Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona ....................................................................... 49 

Oberstar, Hon. James L, of Minnesota .................................................................. 51 

Richardson, Hon. Laura, of California ................................................................... 57 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Babbitt, Hon. J. Randolph ...................................................................................... 60 

Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin ........................................................................................... 68 

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(1) 

UPDATE: THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION’S CALL TO ACTION ON AIRLINE 

SAFETY AND PILOT TRAINING 

Thursday, February 4, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jerry F. Costello 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Committee will come to order. 

The Chair will ask all Members, staff, and everyone to turn electronic devices off or on vibrate. 

The Subcommittee is meeting today to receive an update on the 

Federal Aviation Administration’s Call to Action on airline safety 

and pilot training. 

I will try and give a brief statement, and then we will call on 

the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for his statement or any remarks 

that he may have, and then we will go to our witnesses. 

Let me say that we expect to be called to the floor of the House 

for a vote in about 15 or 20 minutes, so I will try and be brief. The 

important thing is that we hear from the Administrator and General Scovel. 

I welcome everyone to the Aviation Subcommittee hearing today 

for an update on the FAA Call to Action on airline safety and pilot 

training. I would like to especially thank and welcome the family 

members of Flight 3407, some of whom are with us here today. 

Two days ago, the NTSB determined the probable cause of the 

crash of a regional airline near Buffalo, New York, occurring almost a year ago. The crash is considered one of the most significant 

accidents in recent years because it revealed a gap in the level of 

safety between major airlines and regional carriers. 

I want to commend the board for doing an outstanding job. I am 

hopeful that their safety recommendations to the FAA, many of 

which are included in our bipartisan legislation, H.R. 3371, the 

′′Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of 2009,′′ approved overwhelmingly by the House last October, will encourage 

the FAA and the airline industry to act quickly to improve pilot 

training standards, address pilot professionalism, fatigue, remedial 

training, pilot records, and stall training. 

After this Subcommittee held a hearing on regional air carriers 

and pilot workforce issues on June 11, 2009, Department of TransVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:43 Jun 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\54812 JASON
2 

portation Secretary Ray LaHood and FAA Administrator Babbitt 

initiated an airline safety and pilot training Call to Action to gather information from the airlines and labor organizations to ascertain industry best practices and seek voluntary compliance with a 

number of safety programs. 

Last September, this Subcommittee held a hearing on the Call 

to Action. I praise the FAA’s quick reaction to the Colgan tragedy 

and the lapses in regional carrier safety that it revealed. I put the 

FAA on notice then that I would hold a follow-up hearing to examine the Call to Action final report. And today’s hearing will be an 

opportunity for Administrator Babbitt to provide this Subcommittee with an update and to hear from the Department of 

Transportation inspector general on his assessment of the FAA’s 

progress. 

Administrator Babbitt, in the Call to Action final report, acknowledged that, and I quote, ′′This is a snapshot of our work, 

which is by no means finished. We will continue to aggressively 

push forward with these initiatives that we believe will raise the 

safety bar even higher,′′ end of quote. 

We want to work with you, Administrator Babbitt, to achieve 

these goals you have set forth. And I believe the real measure of 

the agency’s success will be whether it can successfully drive its 

safety initiatives to a timely conclusion. 

I respect and appreciate the FAA’s determination since our last 

hearing in September to set aggressive deadlines to develop key 

safety initiatives. My concern is not simply that the FAA is a few 

months behind on any one rule. I am concerned that these delays 

stem from historic patterns of industry opposition to any form of 

regulation and that key safety reforms have not been implemented 

nearly a year after 50 people died on Flight 3407, despite promises 

of swift action from the FAA. 

As I have said before, I believe that unless this Subcommittee 

and Congress pursue aggressive oversight or unless legislative 

mandates are in place, the time it takes for the FAA to address the 

most critical safety issues raised by the accident is far too long. 

That is why we introduced H.R. 3371, to address many of these 

issues raised in the Call to Action. 

I want to discuss the status of several key FAA safety initiatives 

discussed in the Call to Action final report. 

First, in 1995, the FAA proposed a fatigue rule based on the recommendations of an aviation rulemaking committee. We have waited 15 years and we are still waiting for a final rule. Last year, the 

FAA withdrew the 1995 proposal, formed another ARC, and 

planned to publish another fatigue proposal by the end of 2009. Yet 

we are now being told that the FAA’s date to publish a rule has 

already slipped to the spring of 2010. 

Second, in January of 2009, the FAA published a proposal to 

overhaul crew training regulations that included increased use of 

flight simulators and stronger upset recovery training requirements, something that the NTSB has recommended and that we 

have mandated in H.R. 3371. 

Administrator Babbitt, you testified before this Subcommittee 

last June that the FAA’s proposal was, quote, ′′the most comprehensive upgrade to FAA training requirements in 20 years,′′ end 

3 

of quote. After extending the comment period, the FAA received 

3,000 pages of comment and now plans to revise and republish its 

proposal in the spring. 

Finally, the Call to Action plan states that the DOT and the FAA 

review co-chair arrangements between air carriers and their regional partners. This is particularly important given that the majority of air travelers are unaware when they purchase a ticket 

from a main line airline that they may actually fly on a regional 

airline. In fact, the NTSB expressed the need to look more closely 

at safety issues surrounding co-chair arrangements during its February 2, 2010, meeting on the Colgan final accident report. Chairman Oberstar and I have requested that the Department of Transportation’s inspector general conduct a review of domestic co-chair 

relationships. 

There have also been positive developments resulting from the 

FAA’s Call to Action that we should not ignore. For example, more 

airlines appear to be willing to adopt voluntary safety best practices, like establishing flight operations quality assurance programs. However, the FAA and this Subcommittee will need to follow up in the coming months to see if carriers actually follow 

through on their commitments that they have made. 

In addition, the FAA published an advanced notice of proposed 

rulemaking yesterday to strengthen the training requirements and 

the flight hours necessary to be an airline first officer. 

I will continue to keep my commitment to exercise aggressive 

oversight to strengthen airline safety and pilot training qualification standards. I assure the families of Flight 3407, those who are 

with us today and those who could not be here today, and the 

American people that we will continue to push for the provisions 

of H.R. 3371 that requires the first officer to hold an Airline Transport Pilot certificate, in addition to receiving training to function effectively in an air carrier operational environment, and know how 

to fly in adverse weather conditions, including icing. 

Before I recognize Mr. Petri for his opening statement or his remarks, I ask unanimous consent to allow 2 weeks for all Members 

to revise and extend their remarks and to permit the submission 

of additional statements and materials by Members and witnesses. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member 

of the Subcommittee for his opening statement or comments, Mr. 

Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

thank you for scheduling this important follow-up hearing to our 

2009 hearings on air carrier safety and the FAA’s Call to Action 

issued following the tragic Colgan 3407 accident almost 1 year ago. 

While statistically the U.S. commercial aviation system is very 

safe, there is obviously always room for improvement. With today’s 

hearing, we continue our focus on the common goal of improving 

our safety record. 

As the families of the victims of Colgan Flight 3407 remind us, 

we can and must do everything in our power to ensure that what 

happened on the day they lost their loved ones never happens 

again. I believe we are all committed to that shared goal. 

4 

In the aftermath of the Colgan accident, this Subcommittee explored many issues related to the safety of the airline system, with 

special emphasis on regional air carriers. In addition, Mr. Costello, 

Mr. Mica, Mr. Oberstar, and I introduced the bipartisan H.R. 3371, 

the ′′Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of 2009,′′ 

to address the critical safety issues considered at our hearings. 

H.R. 3371 was approved by the House of Representatives on October 14th last year, and similar provisions have been included in the 

Senate Commerce Committee’s FAA reauthorization package. 

At roughly the same time, the FAA launched a Call to Action on 

air carrier safety. I thank the administrator for joining us this 

morning and look forward to his update on the progress of the 

wide-ranging initiatives included in his plan. 

At Tuesday’s Transportation Safety Board hearing on the Colgan 

accident, the board approved recommendations to the FAA regarding many of the issues explored during our hearings, including 

strategies to prevent flight crew monitoring failures, pilot professionalism, fatigue, remedial training, access to pilot records, stall 

training, and airspeed selection procedures. 

In addition, the NTSB’s probable cause determination for the 

Colgan accident approved by the board on Tuesday included among 

the contributing factors to the accident the flight crew’s failure to 

adhere to sterile cockpit procedures. In fact, in four of the last six 

regional carrier accidents, pilot performance and unprofessional behavior have been listed as contributory factors. 

I applaud Administrator Babbitt for demanding a higher level of 

professionalism from all those involved in aviation, including airline pilots. As the safety regulator for the industry and a former 

airline pilot himself, Administrator Babbitt understands not only 

the trust passengers quite literally place into pilots’ hands but also 

the responsibility pilots must be ever mindful of while on duty. I 

look forward to hearing from the administrator what specific actions the FAA, airlines, and the pilots’ unions are taking to improve peer auditing and professional conduct. 

In addition, I am interested in updates from the FAA about the 

ongoing regulatory efforts at the FAA to address pilot training, 

record availability, and fatigue. Finally, I am also interested in 

what improvements can be put in place to improve air carrier hiring practices and training oversight. 

Since the FAA’s Call to Action began last summer, the Office of 

the Inspector General has been reviewing the agency’s effort, and 

I look forward to Inspector General Scovel’s assessment of efforts 

thus far on the part of the FAA, airlines, and unions, as well as 

continuing oversight of long-term commitments made during the 

Call to Action process. 

Lastly, I would like to note the dedicated efforts of the families 

of Colgan Flight 3407. The families’ efforts have helped this Committee to address key safety issues, and I urge our Senate colleagues to pass its FAA’s reauthorization bill so we may finalize 

these improvements and send a final bill to the President. 

I thank the witnesses for their participation, and yield back what 

time I might have. Mr. Graves was hoping to say something for a 

minute. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you want to yield to Mr. Graves? 

5 

Mr. PETRI. I would yield to Mr. Graves. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate this hearing quite a little bit, and I want to thank 

FAA Administrator Babbitt for being here, and the inspector general too. 

But in October of last year, we did pass H.R. 3371, which is the 

′′Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act.′′ While I recognize this legislation moves in the direction of improving pilot 

training standards, I couldn’t support it at the time. 

Specifically, my concerns lie with the 1,500-hour minimum flight 

requirement for 3371 that establishes the issuance of an Airline 

Pilot Transport certificate for all crew members. Currently, only 

the captain is required to hold that ATP certificate, not the copilot. 

I know all too well that pilot training is a complex process and 

focuses on the quality of pilot education and training as opposed to 

the overall flight hours, and I believe it is a more reasonable approach. With that said, I am not opposed to increasing the minimum number of flight hours, but I think we have serious concerns 

with the 1,500 hours. I think it is simply too much. 

And, look, folks, just so you understand where I am coming from, 

and I am not trying to diminish in any way the losses that we have 

had out here, but myself, I am a 2,000-hour commercial pilot, and 

I have flown with all classes of pilots out there in high-performance 

aircraft. And I know military pilots who have 500 hours that I 

want to put my kids in a plane with, and I know commercial pilots 

that only have 500 hours that I trust my kids with. But I also 

know military pilots who have 2,000 hours, and I wouldn’t put my 

kids in a plane with them for anything, and I know commercial pilots who have over 2,000 hours that I wouldn’t put my kids in a 

plane with. 

This is about quality of training; it is not quantity of training. 

And we need to take a serious look at that. Just requiring 1,500 

hours and an ATP certificate doesn’t mean you are a fantastic pilot 

when it comes to some of the complex things that you get into 

when you are flying an aircraft, icing being one of those main factors that obviously played a big part in the accident that took 

place. 

Again, I understand where we are going with this, but I think 

it is the wrong direction. And I am a perfect example of exactly 

what is wrong with the process. Again, it is quality of hours, and 

it is the person in the cockpit is who we need to be looking at, not 

the number of hours. That is the wrong approach. I want to make 

sure that the aircraft and airlines and our skies and the ground 

are just as safe as we can possibly get it, and that is the reason 

we need to change this focus a little bit. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity. I thank you for having this hearing. I think it is a very important hearing to the overall safety of the public out there. And I appreciate your letting me 

make a few comments. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Missouri. 

And let me just state for the record—and we will get into these 

issues in a little bit. I just want to be clear that H.R. 3371 does 

not just deal with the number of hours in order to be either in the 

6 

first seat or the first officer. It does far more than that, and we will 

get into that later. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Boswell. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would prefer to wait 

for Q&A, but the way the schedule is today, I may not be able to 

be here for that. But I want to make a couple of comments. 

First, thank you for doing this. I think Mr. Graves made some 

good points that I agree with. I think he is saying don’t knee-jerk, 

and I don’t think you are going to. We have discussed, we went 

to—we flew together and talked and so on, and I think you are on 

the right track. 

I think we have to leave flex room here. I don’t want to push, 

for example, general aviation back because of us going too far too 

fast and so on. We have to walk through this, and I think that is 

what you intend to do. 

And, depending on how they accumulate the experience, we all 

know, it makes a lot of difference. You know, the 250-hour commercial pilot, if he went right through a program and, you know, did 

everything one right after the other, he is pretty darned proficient 

versus a person who it maybe took him 2 or 3 years. And there is 

a difference. I mean, there is. I used to be an IP, and I am sure 

you did too. It makes a difference. 

And so, as we think about how we get these folks safer and more 

proficient and so on, why, somehow, if you can, if you can have 

some flexibility in there because of the way they obtain the experience. You know, Mr. Chairman, it may take 850 hours for some situations, or it may be more. Who knows? But then, in other situations, if this is tailored where they can be intensified and follow 

right through day after day and then go right out into the field and 

start executing and using that, it makes a big difference. So I 

would hope that somehow you can keep that flexibility in there. 

And I think you can; I think it can be done. 

So, you are heading the right way. I read some of your statements there, and I think that you are on the right track, and this 

is good. The public wants it. I want it. The Chairman wants it. We 

all want it. So, thank you very much. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Iowa. 

Let me inform Members and our witnesses that we have been 

called for votes. We have 13 minutes left in the vote. What I intend 

to do is to recognize Ms. Titus from Nevada and Mr. DeFazio from 

Oregon for brief statements, and then we will break. We will go to 

the floor to vote, and then we will come back and go right to our 

witnesses. 

So I would ask Members other than Ms. Titus and Mr. DeFazio 

to enter their statements into the record. 

And, Mr. Graves, your statement that you have given us will be 

put into the record as well. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Titus. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would 

just like to begin by saying how pleased I am to be able to join this 

important Subcommittee. 

Tourism is a critical part of southern Nevada’s economy, and ensuring safe and efficient travel at McCarran Airport and around 

the country is just critical to our tourism industry and to our local 

7 

economy, and that is why it is important for me to serve on this 

Committee. So I look forward to working with our Members to ensure that civil aviation is safe and that the aviation community in 

Las Vegas has the resources that it needs to shuttle tourists and 

visitors. We like them coming to Las Vegas, back and forth. 

Today’s hearing is critical as we work to reassure these travelers 

the Federal Government is doing everything possible to enhance 

aviation safety. The Colgan Air accident last year brought to light 

some of the flaws that exist in aviation safety. And I appreciate 

that the FAA has detailed these flaws in its Call to Action plan on 

airline safety and pilot training. 

So I am looking forward to hearing from the witnesses as we address the issues of pilot flight time and fatigue, pilot training, professionalism, and safety, so that we can do all we can to protect the 

public and assure them that that is, indeed, the case. 

So I would thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look 

forward to coming back and hearing what you have to say that the 

FAA is doing along these lines. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the gentlelady from Nevada. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have an administration and an 

FAA that is acting in the spirit of the law that was amended after 

the tragic crash in Florida a number of years ago during the Clinton administration. 

Prior to that, I had been arguing for more than a decade that the 

FAA could not both regulate in the public interest and assure safety and promote the industry. Unfortunately, even after that horrible accident and I got the law changed finally, there are some 

within the agency who still think it is their duty and there are 

some in Congress who think it is their duty to promote the industry. No, we are here, first off, to assure safety, and then, secondly, 

we want to have a healthy industry that is safe. 

And, just hearing the earlier comments regarding quality versus 

number of hours, I have been raising the concern since, you know, 

the early 1990s that I don’t believe that you can provide, no matter 

how high the quality is, an adequate amount of training for a commercial pilot in difficult conditions with the minimums we have 

today. And there are a heck of a lot of carriers who believe that, 

too, because they won’t hire someone with that number of hours. 

But there are the low budget carriers, which drive the industry 

down to the lowest common denominator of operators who will hire 

pilots with the bare minimum of training. And there are those who 

will defend that practice. It has to end. 

You know, I still don’t believe, as I said then, that to be a manicurist in Oregon requires twice as many hours of training as the 

current minimum training requirement to be a pilot. So I don’t 

want to hear people say, ′′Oh, well, we just can’t mandate higher 

minimum hours. We just want to look at quality.′′ No, it is hours 

and quality. And quality will come with more hours and comprehensive well-thought-out training. 

So I am fully in support of what the Chairman has proposed and 

where it seems the Administrator is headed. But we are going to 

8 

continue to push to make sure we get there, because we know there 

is tremendous pushback from the industry. I mean, even those who 

will only hire pilots with an extra number of hours of training have 

a little farm team out there, which is the low-budget carriers, and 

then some of the big carriers like the low-budget carriers because 

they drive against their competition of people who are trying to 

provide higher-quality regional air service. 

And we should never have another tragic event like we had, I 

mean, you know, that crash of Colgan Air. I mean, what kind of 

training could a pilot have with a stall warning, you know, to pull 

the nose up? You know, that is beyond belief. 

So we have to fix these problems, and it is going to take both 

more hours and better quality. And I support any efforts that will 

get us there. And they are going to cost something, but what I always say is I have never met someone at 40,000 feet who is thrilled 

that they saved a dollar on their ticket because their pilot up front 

is just learning how to fly. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the gentleman, and the gentleman’s point 

is well-taken. And the point that I made, that our bill, H.R. 3371, 

just does not deal with increased number of hours. It deals with 

comprehensive preemployment screening and a lot of other things. 

So I appreciate the gentleman’s comments. 

We have five votes on the floor right now, so I would ask our witnesses and everyone else that wants to come back to return to the 

room by 11:10, if you want to get a cup of coffee. And we will resume the hearing at that point and go directly to the testimony of 

Administrator Babbitt and General Scovel. 

So, at this time, the Subcommittee is in recess until 11:10. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. The Chair 

again welcomes Administrator Babbitt and also General Scovel to 

the Subcommittee hearing today. 

Administrator Babbitt, let me say that I am frustrated, as are 

family members and others, with the time that it is taking to move 

forward with some of the provisions on our bill, H.R. 3371, and the 

time that it has taken the FAA to work through the process. Now, 

having said that, let me say that I have worked with a number of 

administrators over the past 21 years, and I spoke to an organization this morning that said I believe that we have an administrator 

now that is trying to move the agency forward and to do the right 

thing. 

I hope that in your testimony, which I have had a chance to review, that you will address some of the issues as to why it is taking 

the time that it is taking, and to talk a little bit about where we 

go from here. 

So with that the Chair now recognizes Administrator Babbitt. 

TESTIMONIES OF HON. J. RANDOLPH BABBITT, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; AND HON 

CALVIN SCOVEL, III, INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. BABBITT. Well, thank you, Chairman Costello, Congressman 

Petri and Members of the Subcommittee. First, I appreciate your 

confidence and your opening statement. I also would like to thank 

9 

you for inviting me here today to provide you with an update on 

the FAA’s call to action on airline safety and pilot training. Given 

the recent NTSB hearing on the Colgan accident and this being the 

1-year anniversary of that tragedy, this gathering is especially 

timely. 

One of the misconceptions that I would like to address this morning is that the FAA’s actions are either ineffective or insufficient. 

I really believe this is a disservice to the hard-working safety professionals who have been working tirelessly on these as well as 

other safety issues. 

Obviously, since I have become the administrator, I have seen 

firsthand how dedicated the FAA workforce actually is. I have also 

spent quite a bit of time trying to figure out what I can oh do to 

promote a better, more accurate understanding of what we do and 

the safety impact that it actually has. 

I am well aware that there is always room for improvement as 

well, but the vehemence of the criticism the FAA receives does not 

comport with the safety statistics. I believe that one reason for this 

misconception is that the FAA seems to be measured primarily by 

how long it takes us to issue and finalize rulemakings. And while 

I appreciate the importance of regulation, the rulemaking process 

is a deliberative one, and that, by definition, can take quite a bit 

of time. I think the criticism also fails to take into account the 

many other tools that the FAA has that result often in relatively 

immediate safety improvements. 

When Secretary LaHood and announced the call to action last 

year, one of the repeated criticisms that I heard was that we were 

not compelling action, we were requesting voluntary action. I think 

I attempted to make clear at that point, we were working to build 

a consensus on what should be done to improve safety and professionalism and ask the industry and all the professionals to work 

together to get it done as soon as possible. 

I explained at that time that requesting voluntary action was, in 

my opinion, the fastest way to move forward, and I wanted the 

most immediate results that I could get. I also told the Committee 

that I thought the best approach for receiving faster results was to 

achieve consensus and move forward on those wherever possible. 

I sensed some skepticism at that time and I continue to get complaints that we failed to live up to our initial goals. But, again, I 

am concerned that no one is taking into account the benefits that 

we actually have achieved and the progress that we have made as 

detailed in our final report. 

Chairman Oberstar charged me to use my bully pulpit, if you 

would, to influence actions of the industry, and that is exactly what 

I tried to do. In the aftermath of the call to action, the FAA initiated a two-part focused inspection of air carrier flight crew member 

training, qualification and management practices. FAA inspectors 

observed 2,419 training and check events during the evaluation. 

At the start of the evaluation, 76 carriers had systems that complied with remedial training requirements, 15 carriers had some 

component of remedial training and 8 carriers didn’t have any remedial training provisions whatsoever. Those that lacked any component of remedial training were identified by us as having greater 

risk, and, therefore, they warranted additional scrutiny. 

10 

Today, seven months after the call to action, all carriers that 

were evaluated have some component of remedial training. With 

respect to FOQA, 11 FOQA programs have been approved since 

July of 2009 and one application is currently pending. 

Similarly, three of the carriers that did not have any ASAP reporting programs, now have an ASAP for at least one employee 

group in place, and four other carriers have established additional 

ASAP programs for additional employee groups. 

We also asked air carriers to meet with their smaller partner airlines to exchange safety practices and to encourage the adoption of 

best practices. FAA is encouraging the carriers, they are doing it 

and we are encouraging them to continue to meet with their partner airlines periodically, and to ensure a continuous exchange of information. As I sit here today, I am pleased to tell you this is currently happening now at all scheduled airline carriers that have regional partners. 

In addition, the ATA Safety Council has now included the safety 

directors from the National Air Carriers Association, as well as the 

Regional Airline Association in their quarterly meetings. 

There are many other examples of recent accomplishments that 

I hope to mention during the course of this hearing, but I would 

like to announce the agency’s advanced notice of proposed rulemaking on crew training requirements, which was posted on the 

Federal Register’s Web site this morning. I look forward to hearing 

from the industry and the public on the range of issues that we 

need to consider as we move forward. 

As I have stated repeatedly, there is a difference in my mind between knowing that a pilot has been exposed to all critical situations during targeted training versus assuming that simply flying 

more hours automatically will provide that exposure. 

Unlike some things in life, safety is not a game. It doesn’t have 

a goal line. We reach one goal only to set out for a new one. Safety 

professionals do not cross a goal line and claim victory. We are forever searching ways, new ways, to advance safety through technical and procedural improvements, as well as through a continued 

emphasis on professionalism. 

And just because the final report on the call to action is issued, 

doesn’t mean that our efforts will stop. No one should assume that. 

They shouldn’t even assume they will slow down. I have been very 

gratified with the response that I have received to this effort, and 

I think the collective efforts of the FAA, the airlines, the labor 

unions involved and, of course, our friends here in Congress will 

continue to work together, and I am certain that it will result in 

implementing advance best practices, transferring of pilot experience and achieving an overall improvement in airline safety. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks, and I would be happy 

to answer any questions that you or the Committee may have. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Administrator Babbitt. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognize the Inspector General 

for the Department of Transportation, General Scovel. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri, Members of 

the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss 

the status of FAA’s efforts to improve air carrier safety. After last 

11 

year’s Colgan accident, FAA took swift action by creating its callto-action plan. 

FAA has made progress in implementing the plan’s 10 initiatives, including holding safety forums across the country. However, 

progress has been slow in implementing initiatives with the greatest potential to improve safety, specifically those related to pilot fatigue, training and professionalism, and efforts to strengthen air 

carriers voluntary safety programs. My testimony today focuses on 

concerns related to these initiatives. 

To address concerns about pilot fatigue, FAA established a special rulemaking committee to propose new crew rest requirements. 

The committee met its September 2009 deadline. However, FAA 

missed its milestone to issue an NPRM by December 2009 and now 

plans to issue it this spring. However, if past is prologue, the new 

rule could be years in the making. Numerous attempts to update 

these requirements, which were last modified in the 1980s, have 

failed due to disagreements among FAA airlines and pilot unions. 

FAA is facing similar challenges with revising crew training requirements. FAA issued an NPRM on the new requirements over 

a year ago and received over 3,000 pages of comments. FAA now 

plans to issue a supplemental notice in the very near future. 

At the same time, FAA’s reviews of air carriers’ flight crew training and qualification programs lacked the rigor needed to assess effectiveness. We questioned the thoroughness of these reviews because FAA did not provide specific criteria to inspectors, many of 

whom had never assessed remedial training programs for pilots. 

FAA surveillance questions also raised concerns, as a number 

we’re not relevant to many air carriers’ operations. Moreover, some 

questions were not comprehensive enough to detect flaws in training programs. For example, while inspectors observed more than 

2,400 pilot evaluation and training events, there were no questions 

on whether pilots completed the evaluations successfully, a key 

measure of a training program’s effectiveness. 

FAA has also been slow to address concerns regarding a lack of 

pilot professionalism, an issue raised by NTSB in four of the last 

six fatal accidents involving regional airlines. To better ensure pilots adhere to professional standards and flight discipline, FAA 

plans to implement a mentoring program. However, FAA has not 

specified how or when it will accomplish this. While professionalism cannot be mandated, FAA can take actions such as expediting training and fatigue rulemakings and facilitating communication between mainline and regional air carriers that would directly impact pilot performance. 

Another key goal of FAA’s call to action is to expand regional carrier participation in voluntary safety efforts in areas such as pilot 

records and voluntary safety programs. While FAA requested commitments from air carriers, its progress toward completing this initiative has been mixed. Specifically, 80 carriers responded to FAA’s 

request for safety improvements, but many were vague as to the 

actions they plan to take and their timelines, and 14 did not commit to expand their pilot record review during the hiring process. 

With regard to FOQA and ASAP, the most important voluntary 

safety programs, 22 carriers responded that they did not plan to 

implement FOQA, and 8 stated they would not implement ASAP. 

12 

While cost, equipment availability, and fleet size present significant obstacles for smaller regional air carriers to implement voluntary safety programs, FAA has not presented any plans to encourage carriers to establish these important safety programs. 

Further, FAA failed to follow up with carriers to ensure their 

planned actions will effectively meet safety goals or that the carriers will set completion milestones. FAA also did not follow up 

with those carriers that submitted vague responses or no response 

at all. Yet, FAA concluded this initiative achieved its intended outcome. 

Before closing, I would like to note other critical safety concerns 

highlighted during hearings after the Colgan crash but not addressed in the call to action plan. These include pilot domicile, differences in pilot training and hiring, and pilot experience and pay. 

These issues present significant challenges for FAA, Congress, and 

industry stakeholders in determining the nature and extent of actions needed. 

At the request of Congress, we are reviewing the potential impact these issues have on pilot safety and plan to report our findings later this year. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy 

to answer any questions you or Members of the Subcommittee may 

have. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, General Scovel. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me ask you to elaborate on one of the final 

points you made. You indicate in your testimony that while FAA 

received written responses from 80 of the 98 carriers, many were 

only partial commitments or no commitment at all. In addition, we 

found many carriers responses were either vague and lacked detail 

as to actions and timelines or stated that they did not intend to 

take any action. 

I guess, Mr. Scovel, before I ask you to elaborate, I would ask 

Administrator Babbitt to respond. 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir. I think we need to be cautious with the 

numbers that we are talking about. That 82 percent represents 99 

percent of all the passengers carried in this country. 

Also, FOQA is a program for gathering data, comparing it across 

a fleet and looking for trends. That is the purpose of FOQA. If you 

have only one or two aircraft in a fleet, bluntly speaking, the 

logbooks provide that trend for you. You don’t need to gather data. 

And so what we have seen of the experience of the carriers not 

participating, it is for the most part people who have small fleets 

or older airplanes that simply don’t have the capability to provide 

that data in a digital format to be gathered. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Would you agree with that, General Scovel? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Mr. Chairman, I will acknowledge the validity of 

Mr. Babbitt’s statement that FAA’s air carrier commitment initiative covers the majority of aircraft in operation in the country 

today. Our point has to do mainly with FAA’s lack of a follow-up 

effort in response to the air carrier commitments. What the administrator had asked for was that all recipients of his request respond 

to him. 

And of the 80 who responded, our analysis showed with respect 

to the most important aspects of that request, pilot records, 14 carVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:43 Jun 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\54812 JASON
13 

riers either didn’t commit or submitted letters that did not state 

their intention on this issue. One carrier stated that it already had 

a rigorous pilot selection process, and another carrier stated that 

it complied with PRIA, which, in fact, was not the subject of the 

Administrator’s request. 

One carrier, most interestingly, remarked to us when my team 

was on site at their location, that while they appreciated the FAA’s 

desire to expand pilot records review for utility during the hiring 

process, they wondered why FAA purged records of accidents and 

incidents at the 5-year mark, because that carrier thought that 

that information might be valuable to it in making hiring decisions. 

Now we realize that there may be statutory or regulatory requirements to purge records at designated intervals, but recognizing that carriers may be hungry for that information, we would 

encourage the agency to do what it could to honor their request. 

With regard to voluntary safety programs, FOQA being one, 25 

of the 80 carriers responded to the agency that they did not plan 

to implement or they gave a nonspecific response. Again, given the 

importance of FOQA to aviation safety, acknowledging that NTSB 

just this week recommended that FAA mandate the implementation of FOQA in all carriers we would expect the agency to follow 

up with those carriers that submitted insufficient responses. 

With respect to ASAP, 11 carriers signaled to the administrator 

that they did not plan to implement it or submitted nonspecific responses. Again, ASAP has been held up by FAA as a key cornerstone of aviation safety and its record among the major carriers 

has been quite good. We would expect the agency to follow up, even 

down to the smallest carrier, in an attempt to further increase 

every aspect of aviation safety. 

Finally, with regard to contract provisions, and this was the 

question that the administrator asked, does the carrier have procedures in place to ensure that regional and main line carriers are 

sharing best safety practices? Fifteen carriers either did not respond or submitted unclear responses. Again, we would hope that 

the agency would follow up. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You know, just a few weeks ago, I heard an interview, someone interviewing President Obama, and he was asked to 

grade himself on his first year in office. Let me ask you to grade 

the FAA. You have talked about the positive things, some negative 

things, some challenges, what grade would you give the FAA at 

this point on the call to action? 

Mr. SCOVEL. On the call to action, sir, as our statement makes 

clear, we would regard it with mixed success. If you were to press 

me for an actual grade, and I have resisted that in hearings in the 

past, I would have to tell you, sir, that I would grade it incomplete. 

I certainly wouldn’t grade it pass/fail at this point because, as 

Mr. Babbitt has acknowledged, very much needs to be done. I 

couldn’t rate it an A, a B, or even a C. I would have to give it incomplete at this point. I do want to acknowledge that the FAA 

under Mr. Babbitt’s leadership has signaled an intent to engage on 

two of the most important initiatives and that is the rulemaking 

having to do with fatigue and the rulemaking having to do with 

crew training. 

14 

On fatigue, sir, we are in a fix. As you pointed out in your opening statement, we are working now under a rule that was promulgated in 1985 based on medical science that is even older than 

that. Since that rule was issued, much medical research has been 

done by FAA itself and by NASA at the request of the Congress 

and funded accordingly. Yet the current rule doesn’t incorporate 

that. 

Despite the effort in 1995, which met vociferous resistance from 

the industry, FAA, in the intervening years, 15 years until Mr. 

Babbitt arrived, chose not to engage on this front. I give great credit to Mr. Babbitt for signaling publicly in the call to action that he 

is going to press home on fatigue and crew training requirements. 

That said, as our statement makes clear, we would take issue 

with how FAA designed, implemented, and followed through on a 

number of its initiatives to include attention to the professionalism 

matter, the initiative attempted to do that through mentoring. Second, the air carrier commitment to its most effective safety practices, I discussed that in the last question, sir, and finally on the 

focused inspection initiative which yielded, we think, some important information for the agency but because of flaws in the design 

and implementation, and specifically some lack of guidance to inspectors who were designated to carry it out, lost some of its impact. So for those reasons, sir, I would have to give it an incomplete 

grade at this point, recognizing that there is room to improve and 

time to do so. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank you. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I think Inspector Scovel in his testimony made reference to the fact that in four 

of the last six fatal accidents, there was a lack of pilot professionalism and performance that was cited as a contributory factor, 

and I would like to ask Administrator Babbitt, what is in the works 

to deal with that problem? 

Mr. BABBITT. Thank you. As I stated in my testimony, in our call 

to action, one of the things we did, we had 12 meetings around the 

country that were well attended. And from those we also called in 

both the air carriers themselves as well as pilots unions. I have already had one meeting just with the leadership of the pilot unions 

representing about 95 percent of all the commercial pilots in this 

country. We are scheduled for another meeting next week. 

I do appreciate the concern, that some of these things are moving 

less quickly than some would like, but I would have to remind everybody that the industry didn’t get to this state where we see serious gaps in professionalism and in the cockpit overnight. It took 

years and it is going to take years to bring it back. 

And I am pleased to tell you that I have had a wonderful response. I could cite, and if you would like, I would submit for the 

record. I received a report from the Air Line Pilots Association that 

they have now done a university outreach program. 

I have with me here, a publication by the Independent Pilots Association, the pilots that fly for UPS. This is a special publication 

issue devoted entirely to professionalism. On the back is the code 

of professionalism. This was never printed or circulated before this. 

15 

Several of the carriers have done this. I have been asked to submit pieces on professionalism to several different individual pilot 

unions. So I would say we have gotten their attention and I would 

say they are taking very, very proactive actions, working with us 

and working with their companies. So I am actually very pleased. 

And, to be candid, it is difficult for me to understand why people 

can’t see some of the positive, actions that are resulting from this. 

Mr. PETRI. Well, I certainly would agree that we need to be focusing on and working hard for years to maintain professional 

standards in the cockpit, but I hope it doesn’t take years to achieve 

those standards because people are going to be flying in meantime, 

and we want them to be flying under professional conditions. 

Mr. BABBITT. In addition, if I may, the carriers have indicated, 

several of them, that they are working with their pilot groups to 

revise the transition training when a pilot goes from being a senior 

first officer to a captain, and refresher training for captains, to reinforce professionalism. It is their duty, it is their obligation, and 

it is something you see in a lot of places. Sometimes people just 

have to be reminded and the training revised to put it in front and 

center of them. And I am pleased to see both carriers and their pilots recognizing that and working together to help achieve overall 

safety. 

Mr. PETRI. General Scovel, we have been wrestling with the area 

of sterile cockpit rules here. The violation of those rules have been 

a notable factor in both the Lexington and Buffalo accidents and 

have prompted the National Transportation Safety Board to recommend the FAA take action to prevent further violations of those 

rules. 

What specific steps might be taken to step up enforcement of 

sterile cockpit conditions? 

Mr. SCOVEL. You raise a very interesting point, Mr. Petri, because while it is often said that professionalism cannot be mandated—and I fully agree with that—it is a concept. When you take 

apart that concept and recognize that there are discrete behaviors, 

whether they relate to fitness for duty, training, the obligation to 

behave professionally in the cockpit, those discrete behaviors can 

be regulated, not to say that they always should be. 

Sometimes the voluntary or consensus method is the way to go, 

and those should always be impressed and reinforced, but sometimes enforcement methods should be in place. I am not in a position now, because I don’t have a body of work, frankly, on which 

to speak, but I would say that we have instances that are common 

knowledge where we can say that—some enforcement methods 

have been put in place. 

For instance, a professional pilot will not report to work under 

the influence of alcohol. Do we rely on the judgment of that individual to sustain that standard? No, we have got a bottle the throttle rule. 

The professional pilot doesn’t report for work overly fatigued. 

Again, do we rely on individual initiative or judgment? No. For the 

benefit of that pilot and his or her employer, we have crew rest requirements. 

There are a number of other actions. When we get to sterile cockpit, that is going to be a tough one. NTSB, in its Colgan report just 

16 

this week, tried to address these points when it recommended 

workload management training, leadership training, and a complete FAA-required ban by the carriers on personal electronic devices in the cockpit. Those are the kinds of enforcement reactions 

that can occasionally be necessary. 

I would urge this analytical framework, if we were contemplating 

enforcement, what is the nature of the problem? What is the extent 

of the problem? What is the danger to safety if the problem continues? What alternatives are there to address it. Disadvantages 

and advantages to those alternatives? My office, GAO, and a few 

others in government, can help this Committee and the Secretary 

identify those, and it becomes a policy question thereafter. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank you. Mr. Petri had to go to vote in another Committee. He will return very shortly. Let me just comment, and then I will call on other Members to ask questions. 

Administrator Babbitt, you indicated that we didn’t get where we 

are overnight, and it may take years to bring it back. I understand 

we didn’t get where we are overnight, but I don’t agree that it is 

going to take years to get it back, and that is one of the reasons 

why we introduced H.R. 3371, because of our fear that it would 

take so long through the rulemaking process to address some of 

these issues. 

And we are not just talking about the ATP, the requirement for 

additional hours, it is both the qualitative training and experience 

needed to be a pilot, and you have covered that many times. But 

in our legislation we provide comprehensive preemployment screening, pilots, including assessment of skills, aptitude, airmanship, 

suitability for functioning, the airline’s operational environment. 

We raised the minimum requirement, of course, to the ATP, 

which there is some agreement on, but there are a number of other 

things that pilots must receive training, function effectively in an 

air carrier operational environment, adverse weather conditions, 

including icing, high-altitude operations and multi-pilot crew. 

Those are things that need to be addressed, and that should not 

take years to bring us back. 

That is why we acted so quickly to introduce this legislation after 

this tragedy. That is why we did it in a bipartisan way and passed 

it through the Committee and through the House of Representatives. 

Unfortunately, it has been pending in the other body, like many 

other things, and we hope that very shortly they will take this legislation up too so that we can hammer out whatever differences we 

may have and come up with a bill that addresses many of the 

needs that need to be addressed sooner rather than later, and I 

think you agree with that. 

With that, the Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Nevada, Ms. Titus— Ms. Titus went to vote in another Committee, I 

am told, so she will return. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Schauer. 

Mr. SCHAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Thank you, 

gentlemen, for testifying. I have two very distinct and different 

questions and the first one I would ask, Mr. Babbitt, if you could 

take just a short amount of time to address. My district, and Battle 

Creek, Michigan, is the home of Western Michigan University ColVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:43 Jun 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\54812 JASON
17 

lege of Aviation, I think the finest university-based pilot training 

program. 

How are the call to actions recommendations integrated into university pilot training programs, and will today’s notice of proposed 

rulemaking provide them an opportunity to offer alternatives, and 

you can both respond to that briefly, if you would light like. 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir. To answer, number one, as I indicated, 

several of the pilot associations have started an outreach so that 

you can begin to train young pilots on the value of professionalism 

and have living examples right in the classroom doing guest-speaking appearances, helping with the curriculum. I know several of 

the pilot organizations are part of a board that sets curriculum. 

And so we have encouraged that, and I am pleased to see that they 

are actually engaging in that. 

Second, the proposed rulemaking that we have out, the advance 

notice, certainly recognizes the variance. And I would note here for 

the record that we were discussing this prior to the point in time 

when people began to focus on this. I was concerned, myself, that 

a commercial pilot’s license was not sufficient training or previous 

qualifications. Having a lot of light shown from this accident and 

others I felt we needed to improve. 

So we have tripled the number of hours in our advance notice of 

proposed rulemaking, I think we are seeking comments on 750 

hours, and we added a number of very key elements so that a pilot 

would be trained with today is high fidelity simulations, and the 

schools can teach the academic side of it. The pilots today come out 

with training and academic exposure to management of energy. 

These are large machines, hundreds of thousands of pounds. And 

stopping them on a runway requires some knowledge of how you 

manage all of this energy. All of these things are in the curriculum. 

We have not ruled out anything. Perhaps one of the solutions is 

more time or more training interchangeably, but we certainly offer 

and welcome the academic community to comment for us. 

Mr. SCHAUER. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Being from Michigan, as you know, we nearly had a terrible tragedy over Detroit on Christmas. I know our time is very limited. 

And your testimony talks about accidents and airline safety. There 

are other serious threats involving airplanes in the air and on the 

ground. 

And there has been a great deal of media attention continuing 

in my State on what happened. I don’t think we know yet, but I 

wonder if you could at least comment briefly on the FAA’s jurisdiction over this type of incident in the air and on the ground and the 

protocols involved, including on the ground—I am sure you have 

been following that—and whether you can comment as to whether 

those were followed in the air and on the ground. 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir. You are referring to the flight with the attempted terrorist. 

Mr. SCHAUER. Flight 253. 

Mr. BABBITT. Flight 253. Yes, sir, we, of course, obviously, controlled that flight through air traffic control procedures, the controllers. The aircraft landed. They indicated they had a problem. 

There was a communication gap between the cabin and the flight 

deck crew. The flight deck crew reported that they had someone 

18 

who had attempted to set firecrackers off. So it didn’t elevate to 

anyone, whether it was the cockpit or air traffic control, to anything of great seriousness at that point. 

However, it began to escalate, and if you follow the timeline, we 

have a very robust system set up with Homeland Security, the 

Transportation Security Administration. All of those procedures 

were tracked, followed. We isolated the airplane as soon as it was 

known to us what we were dealing with. 

We also then began very quickly to expand notification. Using 

our communication system, the domestic events network, we 

reached out to all of the carriers in the country, explained to them 

what was going on, and set up procedures so that either we or they 

could contact their crews to put them on alert of the situation as 

it developed. 

Mr. SCHAUER. Thank you. Within the jurisdiction of this Committee, I look forward to further opportunities to talk about that. 

And I know there are multiple agencies with multiple jurisdictions. 

The Chairman has been very helpful. We immediately had a closed 

briefing on the matter involving a number of agencies. But it is of 

grave concern. I thank God there wasn’t a loss of life in that situation, and hopefully this will be another incident that we can learn 

from. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Michigan 

and now recognizes the gentlelady from West Virginia, Ms. Capito. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the gentlemen for their testimony. 

As we know, it has been a year. And I have met with many of 

the family members who are here today who have suffered a tragic 

loss, and are moved by their effort to make the skies safer. So we 

join with them, and I certainly hope that we can push the Senate 

to pass this bipartisan ′′Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act.′′ 

First of all, I would like to say, Administrator Babbitt, I am from 

West Virginia, and I would like to thank you and your agency’s cooperation. As you know, last month, a U.S. Airways flight overran 

the runway, which you don’t want to do in West Virginia because 

we are situated on the top of a mountain. We had 30 passengers 

and three crew members. But because our airport had an EMAS, 

which is an Engineered Material Arresting System, a new technology, that halted the plane on the ramp and saved a lot of lives 

and a lot of injuries. And I know that the FAA has helped with us 

in getting the rapid rebuild of that system at our airports. So 

thank you for that. 

Two things I would like to ask about: the commuting thing that 

we talked. We learned in the tragic accident the commuting times 

of the pilots. One, in particular, was very lengthy and questionable, 

leading to fatigue. You mentioned commuting, but is it possible to 

quantify the possible hazards of commuting? And how are you facing this and how are you interfacing this with the conversation I 

had with my regional air crew members on Monday, that this is 

going to be an issue that is going to be very difficult for them as 

they try to hold their job and live in different areas? 

So, a response. 

19 

Mr. BABBITT. Well, the primary focus that we have is on crews 

being rested. We want every crew to show up for work both mentally and physically prepared to go to work. And that is without exception. That is the charge, that is the challenge, and it is our responsibility, a shared responsibility with the crews, to make certain 

that happens. 

There has been some focus on the fact that pilots do commute, 

and that happens. Different carriers handle it different ways. We 

are literally on the brink. We have discussed a little bit of the 

delay issue. It took somewhat longer, not dramatically longer. I sat 

in this very chair in 1992 and testified on this very subject for the 

Airline Pilots Association, so I appreciate how long it has taken. 

But we are talking about a delay that is measured in weeks, not 

years, so we are very close. 

And our proposal, our notice of proposed rulemaking, will include 

a provision where we will seek comment on, what do people believe 

is the appropriate thing? How can we limit this? I can give you lots 

of letters that I have received on both sides of this argument. It 

is a serious issue. But we are focused on fatigue and management 

of fatigue and recognition of fatigue. And we have several ideas as 

to how to deal with that. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Well, I certainly think—you know, I applaud you 

for that. I would like it sooner than later. And the fatigue issue, 

I am certain it is hard to quantify. Certainly, individuals have different levels of, you know, sustainability with certain hours of 

sleep. 

The other question that came up repeatedly in the last hearing 

that we had was, were the major carriers mentoring with the 

regionals, more seasoned pilots helping the younger pilots, pairing 

them. I think we had testimony from numerous people who said 

the best way to learn after you attain that license is to have somebody right next to you that can show you the ropes and help you 

meet the difficulties of any kind of situation that you might be in. 

Is a mentoring program really going to come off here? And is it 

going to be a situation—this is what I fear. It is going to be a situation that the main carriers who have the more seasoned pilots, the 

pilots will say, ′′I will mentor, but it is going to cost another 

extra—I want to be compensated for mentoring. You know, this 

isn’t something I am going to voluntarily do.′′ 

What is your perspective on that and also on the pilot pairing? 

Either one. Administrator? 

Mr. BABBITT. Sure. The mentoring is a natural event over the 

course of a normal airline. You get hired, you spend a number of 

years flying as copilot, you learn a lot of things. And that is part 

of the mentoring process. That is where the experience is built up. 

One of the things that we are trying to do—— 

Mrs. CAPITO. If I can interrupt for just a second, the plane I was 

on on Monday, I don’t know who was mentoring who in the cockpit 

there. They both looked like my 25-year-old children, quite frankly. 

Mr. BABBITT. Well, the model I described for you is a traditional 

airline that has been around for a long time and has senior pilots 

to mentor the younger pilots. 

One of the concerns today is, quite often, a new airline will form 

in order to provide service for another carrier, and every pilot at 

20 

the airline is new. And, therefore, how do we ensure that these pilots have had that exposure? 

Well, we know they meet the regulatory requirements. All of 

them do. So we have asked the carriers—and I am very pleased to 

say that they are all engaging in this. Many carriers in this country today, main line carriers that carry passengers, now have a 

program to exchange information among their flight ops people 

with the leadership and the union representatives of the other carrier that feeds them as their regional partner. 

We want to see how that develops. Is that providing the information transfer that we are looking for? Are there other curriculum 

courses? Should we introduce this into recurrent training? All of 

these are areas, but we all recognize the need for it. It is a question 

of how best to deliver it. We have certainly better academic tools 

today. We have high-fidelity simulation today. We have science 

today that we did not have. 

So we are going to try to find the best ways to achieve these 

goals and work with everyone to do that. 

Mrs. CAPITO. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and now recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to continue the line of questioning that the Chairman started. 

Mr. Babbitt, I appreciate your comment that the fastest way to 

implement a safety improvement program is for it to be done voluntarily. But, at the same time, I share the inspector general’s concerns that, when that was the case, that some airlines, a lot of 

them regional airlines, either didn’t respond or responded in some 

kind of vague way. So I haven’t really heard from you what you 

plan to do next, either through the carrot or the stick, to get these 

other airlines to establish these safety programs. 

And, second, I know that many times a program is just written 

and put on the shelf. Do you have any kind of timeline or any 

plans to follow up with those airlines that did submit programs to 

see that they really are being implemented? 

Mr. BABBITT. That is a very good point. And, yes, ma’am, we 

have. First off, remember that we pressed this into service very 

quickly. We wanted a very rapid amount of focused attention on everybody in the industry. We wanted to get their attention. 

I think, again, a misconception might be that we were going to 

go out and evaluate all of their programs, and that is not what we 

asked to be done. We asked to confirm the existence of programs. 

The follow-on will now be to go back. Now that everyone is confirming that, yes, okay, we are going to have these programs, the 

follow-on is to now go back and say, ′′Well, how refined is this program? Are you just filling a square for us, or are you actually developing a program?′′ And we can see some of these programs are 

very robust; some of them aren’t. We will have to go back with our 

inspectors. 

Remember what we asked these inspectors, again, to do was to 

confirm that there was, in fact, a program, and they did that. We 

asked them to look at some of the programs. Some of the elements 

of what we were asked to look at simply don’t exist. So, yes, we 

21 

did get some answers that said this was not applicable or not observable because they may not do that particular maneuver at that 

carrier. So, yes, we got some vague answers and things, but you 

need to put them in the context of what our inspectors were looking at. 

I will put something else in context for you. We use a system of 

calculated risk. I was part of a review team that went out and reviewed the risk management that we use in this country to ensure 

the safe levels. And so, you know, we focus on areas. If someone 

didn’t have a program, we put them on notice: You are going to 

have focused attention. If you don’t have a program, you are going 

to be subjected to future scrutiny from us. And, of course, that is 

the stick. They usually say, ′′Well, you know what? Maybe it is a 

better idea that we get a program.′′ And that is exactly what we 

want to inspire. 

Ms. TITUS. I would just ask the inspector general to comment on 

that, if you have any suggestions or you think that is going to be 

adequate, or a timeline on which we need to do this. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Thank you, Ms. Titus. I appreciate the opportunity. 

I would commend FAA, under Mr. Babbitt’s leadership, for pursuing remedial training programs. 

I would like to remind the Committee that remedial training programs were first suggested in guidance from FAA to the aviation 

industry in 2006. It was suggested, it was put on record as guidance at that point. It wasn’t mandated. 

Yet, under the urgency of the Call to Action initiative—which, 

again, I give credit to Mr. Babbitt for initiating—it was discovered 

that a sizable number of airlines at that point didn’t yet have remedial training programs. They do now. So they have certainly 

checked the box, to use Mr. Babbitt’s phrase. They have something 

on the shelf, to use your phrase. 

And we would encourage FAA diligently to follow up sooner rather than later in evaluating the effectiveness of those programs. And 

the guidance that FAA headquarters provides to its inspectors in 

the field will be absolutely key. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Graves. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I wanted to kind of clarify what I was stating 

earlier, because I still believe this is about quality of training and 

not quantity of training. 

I heard two comments that this isn’t just about the number of 

hours, and I agree with that because we have other things in here, 

obviously, high-altitude training, weather training, besides being 

an ATP. But being an ATP, that is the biggest limiting factor here, 

because it takes 1,500 hours. 

And, all due respect to the statement that was made earlier, a 

combat veteran who has 300 hours in a plane and all the training 

in the world isn’t just learning how to fly. They are a very qualified 

individual. And I do not want to limit this to folks that only have 

1,500 hours with an ATP certificate. Getting an ATP certificate 

doesn’t make you a good pilot. What makes you a good pilot is a 

whole lot of other things that are out there. 

22 

We need to be concentrating more on hiring practices with some 

of the airlines and weeding some of these folks out that do not belong in the cockpit. And every person in this room who is a pilot 

knows there are people in the cockpit today who do not belong 

there, and I don’t want them commanding an aircraft that I have 

my family on, even if they have an ATP certificate and have had 

high-altitude training and icing training and severe weather training and everything else. 

But there are also people out there who have had 500 hours or 

750 hours who have been trained in some very capable schools, 

who are military trained, who are very qualified to sit in the right 

seat and move along through the process. 

But I understand what we are talking about here, and I know 

it isn’t just about the number of hours. But the fact of the matter 

is, that is a huge limiting factor on the folks out there who we 

should have in the cockpit as that backup person, as that rightseater. 

Now, as far as a question—that was a statement, obviously—I 

am curious—and I think, Mr. Babbitt, you gave me the answer, too. 

Obviously, just a commercial certificate isn’t enough, and you mentioned that. Number of hours, total number of hours, though, I 

think you mentioned 750. Did you throw that out, or is that actually a recommendation? 

Mr. BABBITT. In our advance notice, I believe that is the number 

we put in. That is three times the amount of time. But with that 

goes a requirement to have a number of training elements and academic requirements. So it is not just accruing 250 times three. It 

is accruing more flight time and accruing a portfolio of education, 

exposure, high-fidelity training. 

If I could, I will give you an example. In 1974, I was a fairly 

young—imagine that—copilot for Eastern Air Lines, and we 

merged with an airline called CariBair. And Caribair flew exclusively out of San Juan, Puerto Rico, all through the Caribbean, as 

you might guess from the name. They integrated into our seniority 

list, and I began to fly with the CariBair pilots. They were excellent pilots. I flew with 25-year veterans. But I was surprised, when 

I first went to New York with a CariBair pilot who had never seen 

snowfall on an airplane. Twenty-five years of experience, 15,000 

hours, the pilot wasn’t trained for the mission. 

Conversely, we began to fly in their operations. My entire life, I 

had flown the east coast—a lot of weather, a lot of approaches. 

And, suddenly, we are in a day VFR, unradar-controlled environment. I was not trained for that mission either. I had plenty of 

time, but this is what I am trying to shed light on. Just accruing 

the hours doesn’t necessarily assure us that you have been exposed 

to these things. And I would tell you, the simplest thing I could say 

is, sure, 1,500 hours. Let’s just move on, 1,500. I don’t believe that. 

I believe that we need more than the 1,500. I am not ruling out 

1,500. I believe people need more training elements, and we need 

to know that they have received them, not that we think they received them just because they had a lot of flight time. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Richardson. 

23 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I would like to commend Mr. Babbitt. I think, from 

the time when you came in, you acknowledged the long delays that 

were clearly not your responsibility and your fault; however, you 

took the responsibility for them and committed to begin work immediately. 

And I have been here now a little less than 3 years, and that is 

the most glowing recommendation I have ever heard from Mr. 

Scovel. And I am sure he didn’t intend it as a recommendation, I 

understand that. But I think the comments acknowledge at least 

some of the initial work that needed to be done. 

In light of that, however, Mr. Scovel, in his testimony, has said 

very specifically that the FAA has not implemented key 

rulemakings on new crew fatigue and training requirements. The 

FAA’s special investigations of air carrier training programs were 

ineffectively designed and implemented. And then the other key 

one that I wanted to highlight that he noted is that the FAA has 

missed its milestone for establishing programs to improve pilot professionalism. 

And although you have talked about some delays, I think, for the 

American flying public, tolerance is not acceptable, and it is not 

okay to say that we are doing better. We have to fix it, and we 

have to fix it now. 

So, Mr. Babbitt, what would be your response to Mr. Scovel’s testimony? 

Mr. BABBITT. Well, first, I have a great deal of respect for the 

general, and I have a great deal of respect for their observations. 

I find them very helpful. Obviously, I can’t watch everything that 

the FAA does. I have my own goals, and we try to do things, and 

I appreciate that they can put some bright lights on some things 

that we haven’t done so well. And we take those things that they 

suggest to us very seriously. So I appreciate—— 

Ms. RICHARDSON. But do you agree with them? 

Mr. BABBITT. Let me take the fatigue as an example. I came to 

the FAA 4 months after this accident happened. I have been here 

7-1/2, 8 months. In that 8 months, we have promulgated four rules. 

I have outlined a number of things that we have done. And I have 

really tried to convince people, or at least shed some light on, in 

that 8 months, we are going to release a rule here in another 

month. 

Now, this is a very deliberative process. Rulemaking is a deliberative process. Making legislation is a deliberative process. The 

work that NTSB does—this accident happened a year ago. It took 

a year to have the hearing. It is a deliberative process. I appreciate 

what they go through. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Babbitt, I apologize. Being a relatively new 

Member, I only have 2-1/2 minutes. And my question is, do you 

agree with Mr. Scovel’s assessments? 

And although things do take a while, I will also tell you that, as 

a new Member, I sat, as many of my colleagues did, when we got 

a call from Secretary Paulson and Bernanke, who were saying the 

sky was crumbling and we had to react and we had to react in 2 

days. So sometimes, depending upon the issue, the reaction has to 

be different. 

24 

So do you or do you not agree with the testimony of Mr. Scovel, 

which is not just limited to rulemaking? And now I have a minute 

and 47 seconds. 

Mr. BABBITT. All right. In 15 seconds, I get an A-plus on milestones for professionalism. Training, I get an incomplete. And I get 

a B on fatigue. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. But do you agree with his assessment in that 

area? 

Mr. BABBITT. I agree with some of his assessments, yes, I do. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. We look forward to your immediate reaction to them. And I would say I would rather see you come to us 

and be creative and think out of the box and maybe have to figure 

out how we can do things differently. Because I think the confidence of the American public is reducing every day that we delay, 

and I think there is room for us to think creatively and do it differently. And I would look forward to helping you. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BABBITT. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the gentlelady and now recognize the 

gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Boccieri. 

Mr. BOCCIERI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Babbitt and Mr. Scovel, for attending this hearing today. 

Mr. Babbitt, I have spoken to you offline a number of times, and 

I appreciate the professionalism that you are bringing to the agency and your sense of urgency to tackle some of these big issues that 

should have been addressed decades before your arrival here before 

this Committee today. And I want to just stress some things that 

I think are very key to this discussion that we are having right 

now. 

Number one, we are talking about pilot experience, and we are 

talking about something that is even proposed in the NPRMs by 

the FAA: to train like you fly and fly like you train. These were 

very experienced pilots, by some measure—5,600 hours between 

them—but even the best pilots, who have hundreds of thousands 

of hours, if they climb into an airplane and they are not trained 

on the safety procedures and the safety equipment in that airplane, 

I don’t care who they are, they are going to have trouble recognizing and implementing recovery procedures. 

And, in fact, the NTSB report suggests the Q400 check pilots 

interviewed demonstrated instruction of the aircraft pusher system 

is not even part of the training syllabus at Colgan Air. In 1991, 

2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, the captain of this airplane failed his 

check rides—incomplete, lack of remedial training. This was a tragic accident, but it was completely avoidable, in my opinion. 

Since 1973, the NTSB has been required and asking the FAA to 

implement procedures that advises the training and stall recovery 

should go beyond the approach to a stall to include stall training/ 

recovery from a full stall condition. The NTSB has further said 

that these are open and unacceptable responses by the FAA. 

Now, all this happened before you got there, but the inspector 

general just reported that, over the last year, a year later, the FAA 

has not finalized the rule for training requirements as established 

in the Call to Action. 

25 

Since 1973, the NTSB has had a Call to Action. In the last year, 

nothing has happened, even though in October this Congress and 

the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution 

suggesting that they will recognize and avoid a stall of an aircraft, 

and it will require simulation. 

So I want to know why, after a year, after decades, we are not 

having any movement with respect to this, sir. 

Mr. BABBITT. Well, it is a very valid question. If I can take you 

through the timeline, a year ago January the new proposed rules 

that cover training were submitted and comments were taken. The 

volume of comments was absolutely incredible. Three thousand 

pages of observations came in. And they ranged from training procedures, better ideas, questions about what we were proposing, 

lack of technical capability to actually do them. 

Simulators don’t necessarily do everything that an airplane can 

do. And so, if you ask someone to do this in a simulator and the 

simulator is not capable of doing that, then someone would raise 

their hand and say, ′′Well, we can’t do that because the simulator 

won’t replicate it.′′ However, we are on the verge of—today’s highfidelity simulation actually can. And I know you are a seasoned 

pilot yourself. We wouldn’t put people in a real airplane in harm’s 

way. 

I have actually done a full stall in a 777. It is one of the most 

violent maneuvers, I think, I have ever been in in an airplane, 

number one. And, number two, it damages the airplane. I mean, 

you wouldn’t ever sell that airplane after you have full-stalled it, 

it is so big. 

But that doesn’t mean we can’t simulate it, and that is what this 

rule proposes. A supplemental will be going out, and I look forward 

to having that out also this spring and put this to bed. 

Mr. BOCCIERI. We need to put it to bed after decades and decades 

of nonaction by the FAA with respect to this. 

In fact, the NTSB has said that the issues in the Colgan investigation are not new ones or unique to regional airlines. And, in 

fact, when they further pressed Colgan as to why they didn’t even 

have the safety features of this airplane as part of their curriculum, they suggested the FAA didn’t require it. 

So, where we have seen these regional airlines who are now 

doing more take-offs and landings than our large airlines around 

the country, where they have met and exceeded them in the past, 

they are now shooting for the minimums. And I find this completely unacceptable when the minimums don’t include in any of 

the training syllabuses a requirement for understanding and recognizing and recovering with the safety features that are on the airplane. 

So the Congress is moving. I expect the FAA to move, too, sir. 

And you have done a good job of moving and shaking and showing 

this sense of urgency. But it is very clear in here that this will be 

part of simulation, and we are not going to rest until this is now 

passed. So I look forward to further Committee hearings where we 

press this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the gentleman. 

26 

And the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Being exceedingly new to this job, just 3 months, I understand 

your situation. But when I looked at your name, I thought perhaps 

I had gone back to where I was in the mid-1990s with Secretary 

Babbitt, when I was his Deputy Secretary. 

We did a lot of rulemaking at that time, and it is a process that 

can be exceedingly slow. Have you set out a definitive timeline? 

Mr. BABBITT. With regard to the fatigue rule, yes, sir. And I will 

offer you the same apology that I offered this Committee. We set 

a timeline. I asked for a timeline that we would have a rule out 

by the end of 2009. I was overly ambitious, and we ran into some 

technical issues. 

It is an incredibly complex rule. For the first time, we are going 

to take science into consideration. We are taking input from both 

managements that run the carriers as well as the pilots themselves 

and the various unions involved. 

So it took us longer, and we do plan to have it out this spring, 

which will be 8 months from when I indicated we would try it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am really not surprised. My own experience 

at writing rules is that the unanticipated is guaranteed to happen, 

and the delays will always be more than you anticipate. 

Therefore, my question goes to the legislation that this Committee has passed, that the House has passed and is now in the 

Senate. Do you support that legislation? 

Mr. BABBITT. I do. If you go through and look at the elements 

that we tried to advance, we certainly took, a great deal of guidance from the legislation. We felt that we could, perhaps, move 

these things along. 

I understand that legislation itself is a deliberative process. And 

if we could be moving these things in parallel, I expressed privately 

to the Chairman I would love to say, you know, ′′We just passed 

all these things, and the FAA got them done. Thank you.′′ I would 

love for that to happen. So we are working pretty robustly—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So you do support the legislation publicly and 

in the Senate? 

Mr. BABBITT. Well, I haven’t been asked by the Senate, but, yes, 

sir, we support the goals that you have set forth here, yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you support the legislation then? You do 

support the legislation? 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. I think you may find that, as slow 

as the Senate is, it may be faster than the regulatory process. 

Mr. BABBITT. Well, what is interesting, I think everybody, certainly the inspector general, who I have a great deal of respect for, 

this Committee, everybody, we all have the same goal. We all want 

to improve safety. 

The NTSB can be critical of us from time to time, but I respect 

that. We need that attention. But I would note, when we talk about 

deliberative process, I just got a set of recommendations 2 weeks 

ago on my desk from the NTSB from an accident that happened 

3 years ago. It is a deliberative process for them, too. I just got the 

recommendations from a 3-year-old accident. 

27 

So all of us have this process. We would love to move it faster. 

I think we all share the common goal of safety. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, there are some elements in all of these 

issues that are common and agreed to and for which there is relevant information readily available now. Those might move ahead 

while others that have unknowns and need additional information 

may be left out for a later time. 

Are you considering that process as you go through your rulemaking proposals? 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir. And I would love to talk to you when we 

have more time, and I would be happy to. But one of the things 

that we have tried to do was take and use, in Chairman Oberstar’s 

words, the bully pulpit to get people to do things voluntarily with 

a lot of pressure and with a lot of visibility. I published the names 

of every carrier who didn’t respond to us. We made them public. 

You would turn us down at your risk if you chose not to comply. 

So we did as much as we could do voluntarily because we could 

do that quickly, and then put many of the things that we are trying 

to do with regulation or with the help of your legislation in place. 

But we wanted to get as much as we could done on a voluntary 

basis because it resulted in immediate action. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. My point, more than that, is, in my experience 

in writing regulations, sometimes it is better to separate issues and 

to write one set of regulations for things that can be done immediately for which there is knowledge and information and then hold 

the other piece. Sometimes, if you wait for the last piece, there are 

going to be a lot of dead people. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Scovel, in your testimony where you were talking about the 

special inspections, the air carrier training programs were ineffectively designed and implemented, I find some disturbing elements 

in there. And I would like you to expand on them a little bit, and 

then I will ask Administrator Babbitt to respond. 

We were talking about responses. It says, ′′FAA headquarters 

only captures ’no’ responses in any roll-up analysis of carriers’ compliance. A true evaluation of an air carrier training program should 

have included a review of the program’s effectiveness, not just compliance with requirements,′′ i.e., we checked the boxes, but, you 

know, did it take, did it work, did we get the desired result? 

What sort of measures should there be? How would we get to 

measuring the effectiveness? How would the FAA do that? And 

why don’t they do it? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Sir, we have a project under way at the request of 

the Congress to assess FAA’s determination of the validity of training programs. And we intend to follow up on that point. 

On this key one, I will note two aspects. The first goes to a point 

that Mr. Boccieri raised earlier, and that is the poor-performing 

pilot and the pilot in the Colgan crash who repeatedly failed certain training evaluations. The direction to FAA inspectors in the 

field in phase 1 of this focused inspection initiative was to assess 

28 

how carriers are able to identify, track, and manage low-time pilots 

and poor-performing pilots. 

FAA issued specific guidance to its inspectors in the field on how 

to define a low-time pilot. FAA didn’t issue any guidance to inspectors on how they should identify whether carriers were properly 

following poor-performing pilots. As a result, when my team went 

out to the field, we found disparate approaches between inspectors 

at different locations. How did one team identify poor performers? 

How did the other? It calls into question the validity of that part 

of this initiative at this point. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, in fact, I think you said elsewhere that, in 

the regional airlines, few of them have an automated system to 

track poor performance and/or prevent pairing of two poor-performance pilots. Is that correct? 

Mr. SCOVEL. That is true for scheduling purposes, yes, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And are there requirements coming along that are 

going to make them establish systems since some of our regional 

airlines, the better ones, have figured out how to do that? Why do 

we allow these other substandard programs to continue? 

Administrator Babbitt, can you respond to that? 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir. One of the things—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I would assume Colgan probably falls in the category of not having that program. 

Mr. BABBITT. And you are absolutely right. 

We have a safety advisory for flight operations that addresses 

this and it gives them the basics of this. But what our—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. It recommends or requires? 

Mr. BABBITT. The Call to Action, at that point in time, which 

was, you know, me 6 weeks on the job, the Call to Action was to 

go out and find out who has these programs and who doesn’t have 

them. Just find the existence of the programs, and put scrutiny on 

those who don’t. The good news is they now have all begun to move 

that direction. 

And I mentioned earlier in testimony—you might not have been 

in here—that our next phase of this is to now go back and evaluate 

the actual program. What are the elements you are tracking? And 

let us make certain that we have a good, solid program in place, 

and we will audit that. 

But the good news is now they all have a program. How robust 

it is remains to be seen. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. So, I mean, that doesn’t give me tremendous 

confidence. I mean, it is an improvement, but we need some sort 

of reportable metrics for how many pilots they have identified that 

have performances problems. You know, there should be some sort 

of requirement, it seems to me, as to what steps they are taking 

or have taken with those pilots in order to give them remedial 

training or perhaps to curtail their duty or only pair them as copilots or, to track, what sort of steps they are taking actively once 

they have identified problem people. 

It seems to me there should be some burden on the airlines: 

Identify these people, track them, and report to us what you have 

and what you are doing about it. Are you envisioning that? 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

29 

One of the things that we have said all along, is that I think part 

of what will come of this in time is increased responsibility on behalf of the carriers. Yes, in this case, we have identified some errors that pilots made. But there is an obligation on the carriers to 

make certain that they have the quality training, that the tools are 

out there. And it is our obligation to make certain that they provide the highest standard we possibly can. So it is a burden on all 

of us. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And I would go a little further. And I am not sure 

what you mean by ′′carriers.′′ In this case, we have a contract carrier for a major airline. I would say the responsibility goes to both 

the contract carrier and to the major airline. There should be some 

responsibility, instead of going for the lowest bidder there should 

be some responsibility for them to determine that this lowest bidder is actually a qualified bidder. And I don’t think we have that 

kind of system now, except for the market-based system where people say, ‘‘Oh, gee, they lost, they have a crummy regional carrier. 

I think I will stay away from that airline.’’ 

Mr. BABBITT. Right. And I appreciate and we have certainly gotten a lot of comment and dialogue on that issue. 

I do think, when we talk about, you know, the carriage rights 

and those types of things, we are on the safety side. Those agreements made between commercial operations are probably at a higher level of the Department of Transportation. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right, but at least notification. I mean we have 

fought over this for years. It is like you think you have bought a 

ticket on Continental, but actually, you are flying this leg with 

Colgan. 

Mr. BABBITT. Right. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. At least that level of disclosure, I think, would be 

useful. And perhaps I don’t know whether that is within the jurisdiction of the FAA directly or whether that comes from some other 

part of—— 

Mr. BABBITT. There is a requirement, but the requirement is 

rather small and often after the fact, where, when you arrive at the 

gate, they are obliged to tell you with notification that it is being 

operated by—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yeah, it is a little late at that point, you know. 

Mr. BABBITT. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I mean, you are kind of far—, I think the original 

idea was people would be notified at the time of booking. Isn’t that 

correct, Mr. Chairman? 

And so I guess we need to figure out a way to translate that. Because I want to advantage and benefit those regional carriers that 

are doing better and not allow them to be out-competed and 

dragged down by the ones who aren’t. And that is the system we 

have today: Lowest common denominator rules. That is a problem 

I have had with both the RTA and the big association, the ATA. 

And I have said that to a number of their directors over the years. 

You do not benefit your high-performing airlines by representing 

the lowest-value people in your organization. I know you want their 

dues, but these other people—we need to be bringing them up, not 

dragging other people down. 

30 

The current system drags other people down, and we have to fix 

that problem. Part of that is why we are arguing over hours and 

training and so that they can’t shortcut there, but part of it goes 

to some of these other things which are—, there has to be some 

chain of responsibility here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you. 

And you are correct in your assumption about the bill that we 

have passed out of the House. It does two things. Number one, 

there is a provision that says truth in advertising, and it mandates 

that the Internet Web sites that sell airline tickets disclose to the 

purchaser on the first page of the Web site the air carrier that operates each segment of the flight. And we also make them print it 

on the ticket, as well. 

So the Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognizes the 

gentlelady from Texas. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I 

apologize for being late, but Dr. Ehlers and I have been running 

between Committees. 

I would like to ask unanimous consent to put my opening remarks in the record. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection. 

Ms. JOHNSON. And, Administrator Babbitt, I know that your 

hands are probably full, but keep in mind that people are increasingly concerned about flying, and yet we don’t want to see that 

stop. 

Could you tell me what your review entails when you review the 

crew member training, the qualifications, and management practices? 

Mr. BABBITT. Sure. One of the areas that we are very focused on 

and we are actually working with Congress and this Committee on 

is to remove the possibility that someone in the hiring process 

doesn’t have—or someone who is responsible for the hiring, for the 

acquisition of a new pilot, that that person, he or she, has a complete record of this pilot’s history. And that would include the pilot’s military history, their history within the FAA, their history at 

other air carriers. 

We realized, unfortunately, through tragedies, that that wasn’t 

always the case. And we passed PRIA, which is the Pilot Records 

Improvement Act, which gives the carriers that. But we left an unintended consequence there that the pilot has to, because of privacy 

issues, the pilot has to give people the permission to do that. 

And so we are trying to work through this so that there should 

be one place where you can say, ′′I am about to hire this pilot. I 

would like to know their entire record.′′ We have uniform traffic 

violations. If I got a speeding ticket in Texas and I got another one 

in Virginia, it is going to show up. And that is what we want to 

see here. 

If someone has had a problem—the problem we have seen is they 

say, ′′Oh, well, they failed one check ride. That is not so bad.′′ If 

they failed one in the military, if they failed two in front of the 

FAA, if they failed two more at their last carrier, that is a trend, 

and that is what we need to be able to put light on. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. Now, do you focus strictly on pilots? 

31 

Mr. BABBITT. These bills, yes, ma’am, this is focused on pilot hiring. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Because other crew members should have some 

training standards, as well. 

Mr. BABBITT. Uh-huh. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Mr. Scovel, you have made the statement that you 

cannot regulate professionalism, and you are exactly right. But 

what action, if any, can FAA and the industry take to address the 

key safety concerns? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Ms. Johnson, thank you. 

I think my oral statement was that we cannot ′′mandate′′ professionalism; my written statement says ′′regulate.′′ There is a little 

bit of difference there. And to draw that distinction more finely, I 

think that certain key aspects of professional behavior can be regulated and, on occasion, should be. 

Mr. Babbitt has outlined a voluntary approach, a consensusbuilding approach, to enhance professionalism across the aviation 

industry through all pilots, and we certainly endorse that. We 

would urge the agency, as well, when significant safety problems 

are identified in the professionalism area, that regulation be considered truly as a tool in the toolkit rather than exclusive reliance 

on a consensus or voluntary approach. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentlelady, and it is good 

to see you back with us. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Dr. 

Ehlers. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize, as the 

gentlewoman from Texas has. We were both in another Committee, 

and I also had a markup going on. 

I did want to comment on something that disturbed me very 

much. I read most of the transcript, all of the important parts of 

the Colgan incident, and I was just exclusively astounded and dismayed at the lack of professionalism that was displayed in the 

transcript. I think that is a very key factor. 

Now, I am familiar with some pilots who have gone to probably 

the best aviation school in the country, perhaps in the world. And 

I won’t name it because I will get in trouble with everyone else. 

But I am just very impressed at the knowledge that this person 

has and the ability. And this person did fly in the industry for 

some time and left for various reasons. But when talking to this 

person about it, you know, he was just astounded that anyone 

would be allowed in the cockpit that displayed the lack of professionalism and the lack of confidence that the Colgan pilots did. 

The question I think we have to worry about is, how do you teach 

professionalism? I am not sure you can. How do you communicate 

it? I think you can do that by example. 

And perhaps the best way is that the right-seat person trains 

with excellent pilots in the left seat who have exhibited a teaching 

ability, a teaching skill, even if they are not part of the same particular airline, but usually airlines are related. So perhaps a commuter airline candidate would fly with some of the larger planes 

32 

for a brief time and just observe what the experienced and welltrained pilots do. 

And, for example, we know the current administrator of the FAA 

was in the Airline Pilots Association, and I have talked to him 

about the good old days when I used to be able to fly in the cockpit, 

as the rest of our Committee was. And it was just so clear the incredible professionalism of the average pilot in the airline industry. 

And, perhaps, maybe the candidates for positions have to ride for 

half a year in the jump-seat of a large jet and watch how carefully 

and thoughtfully the experienced pilots operate and the professionalism that they have. I don’t think you can teach professionalism in a class. You can teach responsibility and then give 

them the opportunity to work directly or to observe directly welltrained pilots who have been in the business a long time. I think 

that would certainly do a lot more than requiring more hours 

would, because if a pilot is not well-trained, you can require more 

hours but they will just practice the same bad habits. 

So, having rambled for a bit, I would just appreciate the comments of either of our witnesses on the points I have raised and 

potential solution I have offered. 

Mr. Babbitt? 

Mr. BABBITT. Dr. Ehlers, thank you very much. I share your 

views. 

One thing I would like to clear up. We have made a lot of observations. Right now, today, over this country, we are going to have 

about 50,000 flights. That will mean tens of thousands of airline 

pilots are going to be flying those flights. The men and women who 

do this day-in and day-out are going to carry 2 million people, and 

they are incredibly professional. We got to see a very bad exposure 

that resulted in a tragedy from a less than professional crew. But 

so many of the crews do conduct themselves professionally. 

And my goal in this strive for professionalism is to put it in front 

of them to make everybody in the cockpit aware that, when we 

have a sterile cockpit violation, there are two people in a conversation. Otherwise, it would be a monologue. And what I want is, 

when one person violates the sterile cockpit rule, the other person 

says, ′′Excuse me, we are below 10,000, we will conduct this on the 

ground,′′ or, ′′Let’s finish this climb. We will talk about this when 

we get out of the sterile environment.′′ Somebody has to be reminded. 

And what we have had is, in some cases, lapses like we have 

seen. And it has put the bright light on it. I think we can do a lot 

with training. I think we can do a lot by simply bringing it to their 

attention. You used a phrase I like, and that is, you know, you repeat bad habits. You know, practice just makes permanent. What 

we want is to practice the right thing and show people the right 

procedures and the right way to be a professional in the cockpit, 

and that is what these programs are trying do today. 

And I think we are going to bear fruit with it. I see a lot of interest in it. I know myself, we didn’t have to ride for half a year, but 

we had to ride for about a half a month when I was a new pilot. 

We had to just sit in the jump-seat and watch the crew for our first 

half a month on the line, watch a crew. Today, they have initial 

operating experience; they actually sit in the seat. 

33 

But, we can find what works better and enhance them and expand on them. But I completely agree with you. 

Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Scovel? 

Mr. SCOVEL. I would agree with Mr. Babbitt on this point: mentoring, leadership by example. I think all of us in our professional 

lives can look back, no matter what our field is, and recognize the 

value that that kind of experience has brought to us in enhancing 

our own professionalism. 

I think the NTSB’s point, however, is also a good one, in its report on the Colgan crash released just the day before yesterday. 

And that is that specific aspects of behavior, like leadership training, like workload management, ought to be required by mandate 

in carriers’ training programs. 

Key, too, I think is the fact that we are victims today of all the 

many potentially distracting electronic devices that are available to 

us. And most unfortunately in the Colgan crash, there is evidence 

that the first officer had been text-messaging when she should 

have been observing the sterile cockpit rule. 

Now, she wasn’t called on it by her pilot, but if there were a rule 

banning such devices from the flight deck, as NTSB has recommended now, perhaps she would have followed that rule. Again, 

no guarantees, but as part of a rule, as part of training, as part 

of follow-up by a diligent pilot, maybe that particular aspect of the 

Colgan crash wouldn’t have happened or been recorded. 

Mr. EHLERS. Yes. Although, given the transcript I read, I am not 

sure it would have helped that much. 

But let me just say, what I was trying to get at when talking 

about having observed pilots, I don’t think it would help much for 

a Colgan pilot to observe another Colgan pilot if there is a problem 

there already. I am talking about having them observe a pilot who 

has 5,000 hours or something and knows the rules very well and 

follows them. 

And most anyone who is in charge of the pilots would know who 

is best at that, who is not a grumpy pilot and wouldn’t, sort of, 

snarl at the newcomers, but who would be very friendly and enjoy 

teaching, et cetera. It wouldn’t be too hard to identify those, and 

I think that would be a real plus. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You yield back. The Chair thanks the gentleman 

and now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to ask a question of General Scovel, following up 

on a concern expressed by Mr. DeFazio and others about how you 

have a competitive industry under a lot of economic pressure and, 

yet, have a framework that protects and ensures safety, rather 

than people being put under increasing pressure to cut corners. 

And the result is what we all fear, and that is that we have an increase in accidents and loss of life. 

And the industry, itself, has kind of a hierarchal relationship. 

There are the international carriers and the national carriers, and 

then there are the people who subcontract sometimes with one, 

sometimes with more than one carrier, to provide regional service 

and so on. 

34 

Should we be building on that and relying on the major carriers 

to regulate the regionals? Or should we be making sure the Federal 

Government regulates everyone and maybe also regulates the way 

they contract with each other? I mean, do you have some comment 

on how we can deal with this hierarchal situation and the pressure 

it is putting on some of the performances of the regionals? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Mr. Petri, a tough question. Let me take a stab at 

it. 

First off, we have to acknowledge that, by statute, FAA’s primary 

mission is aviation safety. So that reach must extend throughout 

the aviation carriers that are under the jurisdiction of the FAA. 

The Committee may recall that, about 10 years ago, at the 

Congress’s request, my office did work concerning the responsibilities of U.S. carriers with regard to their international code-share 

partners. At that point, the concern was, again, that there were 

safety lapses, and U.S. carriers had no role or no responsibility in 

seeing that those were mitigated. The rules have changed now, and 

U.S. carriers do, indeed, have an obligation to at least audit the 

safety programs and the training programs, the maintenance programs of their international code-share partners. 

And that is a model that I think may have led to Chairman 

Oberstar’s and Chairman Costello’s request to my office yesterday 

that we examine, on the domestic market, whether U.S. mainline 

carriers should have such a relationship with their domestic regional partners as well. We just got the request yesterday. We will 

certainly turn to it most expeditiously. We hope to have some information and data that will be helpful to the Committee as it considers that point. 

Mr. PETRI. Well, it is complicated because sometimes it is not 

just one carrier, and it may be an additional safety, but you 

couldn’t think it could be a primary delegation of oversight or 

whatever. I don’t know. You are going to have to respond to that 

question. 

But this is a concern, whether there should be one regulator or 

there should be multiple regulators, some hierarchy of regulation. 

We really would appreciate your thoughts on how we should be 

making sure we get to the highest common denominator rather 

than this flight to the bottom that we all fear in a competitive economic environment. 

Mr. SCOVEL. I understand. And we will do our best to bring you 

that information, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member. 

And let me thank you, General Scovel, for your good work, as always. You have testified before this Subcommittee many times, and 

we give you plenty of work to do. And I can assure you that we 

will continue to do that, as we sent our latest request in to you yesterday. 

Administrator Babbitt, let me commend you. I said earlier I 

know that there are people, including myself, who get frustrated 

because of the process and the time that it takes to get something 

done. But, as I said earlier, I have dealt with a number of administrators since I have been on this Subcommittee, and you have acted 

very quickly. And, given the fact that the bureaucracy is as it is, 

you have had some success because of your action. We are seeing 

35 

the airlines voluntarily do some things that they should have been 

doing on their own before. And we trust that you will follow up, 

as we will, as this Subcommittee will, to make certain that what 

the airlines have agreed to do they will, in fact, follow up on and 

carry out. 

Let me also say that, in spite of your best efforts, it is going to 

take legislation to address some of these issues. That is why we introduced our legislation. You and I have met several times about 

a number of issues in the legislation. I am pleased that you stated 

today your support for the legislation, and I would hope that, as 

I said, the Senate will act so that we can move forward and actually pass some legislation, get to conference, and get it to the President. So I appreciate your support, and we trust that you will continue to work with us to perfect any legislation that we might bring 

through the Congress. 

To the families, let me say again: Thank you for being here 

today. We appreciate your continued support. We appreciate the 

fact that you take time out of your lives to be here to push this 

legislation and to push us, not only the agency, the FAA, but the 

Congress into action. And I would encourage you, as well, to contact your United States Senators to encourage them to address the 

airline pilot and safety issues that we have put in our bill and to 

stress the importance that they need to act so that we can, in fact, 

move legislation and into law. 

So let me again thank you, Mr. Scovel, Administrator Babbitt, for 

being here. 

And that concludes this hearing. The Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:56 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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