NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT E. RANDOLPH,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD,

Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

Respondent-Appellee.

______________________ 

2014-7069

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 13-2481, Chief Judge Bruce E. 

Kasold.

______________________ 

Decided: August 11, 2014

______________________ 

ROBERT E. RANDOLPH, of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, pro 

se. 

VERONICA N. ONYEMA, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondentappellee. With her on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Assistant Attorney General, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

Director, and MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., Assistant Director. 
2 RANDOLPH v. MCDONALD

Of counsel on the brief were Y. KEN LEE, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and AMANDA R. BLACKMON, Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of 

Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and HUGHES, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Robert E. Randolph (“Randolph”) appeals from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 

Claims (“Veterans Court”) denying his petition for a writ 

of mandamus. See Randolph v. Shinseki, No. 13-2481, 

2013 WL 6169316 (Vet. App. Nov. 22, 2013) (“Order”). 

Because Randolph’s arguments challenge only factual 

findings and an application of law to fact, we dismiss for 

lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

On August 16, 2013, Randolph filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus at

the Veterans Court, alleging that the Secretary: (1) removed, destroyed and mutilated relevant evidence in 

Randolph’s claim file; (2) refused to process Randolph’s

claim for dental benefits; (3) refused to address Randolph’s complaints of racial discrimination and constitutional violations; (4) reevaluated Randolph’s already 

service-connected disabilities without prior notice; (5) 

intentionally delayed Randolph’s claims; (6) attempted to 

unlawfully reduce Randolph’s benefits for his serviceconnected disabilities; (7) found Randolph less credible 

solely because of his race; and (8) ignored the Department 

of Veterans Affairs’ (“VA”) own rules and regulations. Id.

at *1.

Randolph’s petition requested that the Veterans 

Court order the Secretary to: 
RANDOLPH v. MCDONALD 3

(1) provide [Randolph] with all letters, directives, 

procedures, forms, and methods by which acts of 

discrimination asserted by veterans are addressed; (2) address any racially discriminatory 

acts that have adversely affected the outcome of 

any decision in his claims; (3) investigate his 

claims of constitutional violations and racial discrimination, to include acts of intentional delay, 

and destruction and removal of evidence; (4) certify and expedite his pending appeal to the Board of 

Veterans’ Appeals [(“Board”)]; and (5) process a 

claim for dental benefits.

Id. On September 23, 2013, the Veterans Court denied 

the petition. Id. Randolph filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Veterans Court granted. Id. The Veterans Court then withdrew its initial order denying 

Randolph’s petition and entered a new order. Id.

In the new order, the Veterans Court again denied 

Randolph’s request for a writ of mandamus. Id. First, 

the Veterans Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to 

compel discovery of the procedures and documents relating to the VA’s processing of allegations of discrimination 

by veterans. Id. Secondly, the Veterans Court held that 

Randolph failed to provide evidence in support of his 

allegations of intentional delay, racial discrimination, and 

the destruction or removal of documents from the record. 

Id. at *2. The Veterans Court also noted that Randolph 

failed to establish jurisdiction with respect to those allegations because the allegations involved neither a final 

Board decision nor a petition that would lead to a final 

Board decision. Id. Third, with respect to his dental 

claim, the Veterans Court found that Randolph had not 

demonstrated delay amounting to an arbitrary refusal to 

act that would warrant granting the writ. Id. Fourth, the 

Veterans Court held that Randolph failed to demonstrate 

a delay in his hypertension claim that was so extraordinary that it constituted a refusal to act. Id. And finally, 
4 RANDOLPH v. MCDONALD

the Veterans Court rejected as unsupported Randolph’s 

allegations that the VA’s opening of a claim for total 

disability based on individual employability was done 

solely to delay the appeal of his hypertension claim. Id. 

Thus, the Veterans Court denied the petition. Id. 

On February 7, 2014, the Veterans Court granted 

Randolph’s motion for panel review, but affirmed the 

single-judge decision on the ground that Randolph failed 

to show that the Veterans Court overlooked or misunderstood any point of fact or law with respect to its rejection 

of Randolph’s arguments. See Randolph v. Shinseki, No. 

13-2481, 2014 WL 496857 (Vet. App. Feb. 7, 2014)

Randolph then appealed to this court seeking to invoke our jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292.

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a Veterans 

Court decision is limited. We may review a Veterans 

Court decision with respect to the validity of a decision on 

a rule of law or the validity or interpretation of any statute or regulation that was relied upon by the Veterans 

Court in making the decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). We 

may also review a Veterans Court decision with respect to 

legal questions raised in an appeal that challenge the 

Veterans Court’s denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus. Lamb v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1378, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 

2002). Except with respect to constitutional issues, we 

“may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to 

the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 

Randolph argues that the Veterans Court misconstrued the facts underlying his petition and further disputes the Veterans Court’s determination that such facts 

were insufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. However, those arguments challenge only the Veterans Court’s 

fact-finding and application of law to the facts of Ran-
RANDOLPH v. MCDONALD 5

dolph’s case, which are matters outside of our jurisdiction. 

See id.; see also Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1372 

(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile we can review questions of law, 

we cannot review applications of law to fact.”). Here, the 

Veterans Court decision did not involve any questions 

regarding the validity or interpretation of a statute or 

regulation. Rather, the Veterans Court merely applied 

established law to the facts of Randolph’s case. See 

Order, at *1–2. Moreover, nowhere does Randolph allege 

that the Veterans Court erroneously applied the mandamus doctrine.

Randolph further alleges constitutional due process 

violations in his informal brief. However, the Veterans 

Court did not address any constitutional issues in its 

decision. Without an explanation providing an adequate 

basis for Randolph’s claims, they are constitutional claims 

in name only and thus outside of our jurisdiction. Helfer 

v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Characterization of an appeal as “constitutional in nature does not 

confer upon us jurisdiction that we otherwise lack.”).

We have considered the additional arguments presented in Randolph’s informal appeal brief but do not find 

them persuasive. Randolph raises neither a substantial 

constitutional issue nor other legal question. For the 

foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction.

DISMISSED

COSTS

No costs.