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ORGANIZING TO COMPETE IN THE POLITICAL 

TERRAIN

Nadia Schadlow

July 2010

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iii

FOREWORD

Since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began, 

analysts have engaged in a rich, often heated, and 

always lively debate about the degree to which the 

United States Army should be restructured to meet 

threats posed by this era of “persistent conflict.” Much 

of these debates has centered on the degree to which 

the Army should specialize for counterinsurgencies 

and how much would be lost in terms of traditional 

warfighting functions by doing so. In many respects, 

the Army’s new Capstone Concept (December 2009) 

rights this debate by pointing out that the Army 

“must prepare for a broad range of missions and 

remain ready to conduct full spectrum operations (i.e., 

simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or 

support operations) to contribute to the attainment of 

national policy aims.”1

That concept also recognizes that one important 

part of achieving this aim will involve cooperation 

with nonmilitary personnel on the ground. Indeed, 

regarding this issue, a large discourse on civil-military integration has arisen—with much discussion 

over how to best organize to achieve “unity of effort” 

among various actors, so that security and stabilization can unfold and allow for the withdrawal of American personnel and the shift to local agencies. In this 

monograph, Dr. Schadlow aims to take a closer look at 

this issue of civil-military integration. She argues that 

much of these debates about how to best organize for 

unity of effort revolve, essentially, around the question of who should shape the political landscape during war—that is, who rules contested territory. It is an 

issue that is central to striking the appropriate balance 

between civilian and military assets in stabilization 
iv

and reconstruction operations. And it is key to determining how much to shift the Army toward so-called 

irregular war as opposed to so-called conventional capabilities. Decisions about the military’s appropriate 

role in shaping political outcomes in war are fundamental to resolving these debates and will determine 

the degree of organizational and educational changes 

that the United States Army must make to meet current and future security threats.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

ENDNOTE

1. Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet (TRADOC) 525-

3-0, The Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability—Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of 

Persistent Conflict 2016-2028, Fort Monroe, VA: Department of 

the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, 

December 21, 2009, p. 9, available from www.tradoc.army.mil/ubs/

pams/tp525-3-0.pdf.
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

NADIA SCHADLOW is a senior program officer at the Smith Richardson Foundation, where she 

identifies strategic issues that warrant further attention from the U.S. policy community and manages 

and develops programs and projects related to these 

issues. She has helped to create grant portfolios on 

key topics, including improving the U.S. military’s 

approach to stability and reconstruction operations; 

building and strengthening networks of moderates 

in key Muslim-majority countries; understanding the 

challenges posed by Islamist radicalization; and challenging traditional approaches to foreign aid and development by emphasizing models that recognize the 

importance of local actors. She served on the Defense 

Policy Board from September 2006-June 2009; and is a 

full member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. 

Schadlow’s dissertation, “War and the Art of Governance: The U.S. Army’s Role in Military Government 

from the Mexican War to Operation Just Cause,” examined 13 cases of the U.S. Army’s experiences with 

political and economic reconstruction. She continues 

to write on issues related to defense policy and the 

Army—particularly its role in governance and stability and reconstruction operations. Her articles have 

appeared in Parameters, The American Interest, the Wall 

Street Journal, Philanthropy, and several edited volumes. Dr. Schadlow holds a B.A. degree in government and Soviet studies from Cornell University and 

M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the John Hopkins Nitze 

School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). 
vi

SUMMARY

The degree to which military forces can and should 

shape the political landscape during war—that is, who 

rules contested territory—is at the root of several ongoing debates about how to restructure the U.S. Army. 

It is an issue that is central to striking the appropriate 

balance between civilian and military assets in stabilization and reconstruction operations, and it is key 

to determining how much to shift the Army toward 

so-called irregular war as opposed to so-called conventional capabilities. Decisions about the military’s 

appropriate role in shaping political outcomes in war 

are fundamental to resolving these debates and will 

determine the degree of organizational and educational changes that the United States Army must make 

to meet current and future security threats. 

This monograph first explains that the character 

of future armed conflict will require an Army that is 

capable of shaping political outcomes in war. Second, 

it highlights how current debates over organizing 

civilian and military assets in a wartime theater are 

linked, fundamentally, to the question of who should 

shape politics in a war. Third, the monograph argues 

that, partly due to inherent limitations in civilian capacities—but also due to the nature of war—the Army 

must embrace and prepare for governance-related 

missions through changes in organization and education. 
1

Organizing to Compete in the Political Terrain

Peace may or may not be a “modern invention” but it 

is certainly a far more complex affair than war.

 Michael Howard1

The degree to which military forces can and 

should shape the political landscape during war—that 

is, who rules over contested territory—is at the root 

of several ongoing debates about how to restructure 

the U.S. Army. It is an issue central to striking the appropriate balance between civilian and military assets in stabilization and reconstruction operations. It 

is also a key factor in determining how much to shift 

the Army toward so-called irregular war capabilities, 

as opposed to conventional capabilities. Decisions 

about the military’s appropriate role in shaping political outcomes during war are fundamental to resolving these debates, and will determine the degree of 

organizational and educational changes that the U.S. 

Army must make to meet current and future security 

threats. 

 This monograph first explains that the character of 

future armed conflict will require an Army that is capable of shaping political outcomes in war; second, it 

highlights how current debates over organizing civilian and military assets in a wartime theater are linked, 

fundamentally, to the question of who should shape 

politics in a war; and third, the paper argues that partly due to inherent limitations in civilian capacities, but 

also due to the nature of war, the Army must embrace 

and prepare for governance-related missions through 

changes in organization and education. 
2

THE CURRENT AND FUTURE SECURITY 

ENVIRONMENT

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 

Staff, and the Army have all identified a current and 

future environment in which the U.S. military must 

be prepared to deal with a range of uncertainties. In 

this environment, evolving political, economic, and 

security problems will generate instability, which will 

in turn place a range of demands—from combat, security, engagement, and relief to reconstruction—on 

U.S. military forces around the world.2

Conflict in the near and medium term will involve 

violence between states, as regional actors compete 

for military and economic power, prestige, and influence. It will involve wars fought within states, among 

tribes, and between sectarian and ethnic groups, and 

will be fueled by nonstate armed groups such as terrorists, insurgents, militias, and criminal enterprises.3

Traditional competitions among great powers such as 

China and Russia will also continue as these states seek 

to reassert their power in key domains and regions 

around the world. Moreover, technological trends and 

advancements will increase the intensity and potential dangers stemming from even localized conflicts. 

Globalization and its attendant instruments—access 

to information, networks, news media, and money—

lead to actors within and across regions being linked 

with relative ease. They can exchange messages rapidly and, as a result, with greater effects; they have 

many opportunities to learn and adapt quickly. 

Given this environment, U.S. military forces will 

need to prepare for a combination of regular and irregular wars between states, many of which are remote 
3

from, and inhospitable to, the United States. Army 

forces in particular must be prepared to defeat what 

some have described as hybrid enemies: hostile states 

and nonstate enemies who combine a broad range of 

weapons capabilities including regular, irregular, and 

terrorist tactics. Enemies will continuously adapt to 

effectively avoid U.S. strengths and attack what they 

perceive as weaknesses.4

 As the principal land force, 

the Army will need to engage in relief and reconstruction in crisis zones and may need to intervene to prevent or mitigate the outbreak of conflict. 

It does not matter whether these threats and conflicts are characterized as small wars, irregular wars, 

or hybrid wars; what is common to virtually all such 

contingencies is that the political landscape will drive 

the character of these conflicts. Indeed, in virtually any 

scenario in which the U.S. Army might be involved, 

the politics of the situation on the ground will shape 

the context of the intervention and how the conflict 

will unfold. In war, politics is as contested as territory.

Moreover, in key parts of the world, from the Middle 

East to South Asia, the political terrain will be shaped 

greatly by a potent mix of deeply held religious, cultural, and ideological beliefs.

This political dimension of war is not new to the 

U.S. Army. Throughout its history, the Army has engaged in politics on the ground. Virtually all of the 

wars in which it has fought have involved the problem of managing local actors in order to restore stability and basic order. U.S. Army officers directly supervised the creation of new governments in a range 

of wars. These include the well-known success stories 

of Germany and Japan following World War II, and 

the lesser known cases of Italy and Korea. In addition, 

cases that have traditionally garnered less attention 
4

include reconstruction after the Mexican War of the 

1840s, during the Civil War, and in Puerto Rico and 

Cuba during the Spanish American War. Governance 

operations took place during the Cold War period as 

well in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 

1983, and Panama in 1989. Army personnel under the 

theater commander’s operational control supervised 

and implemented political and economic reconstruction in all cases except those that took place during 

the Cold War. In virtually all of the Army’s major 

contingencies, Army personnel who remained on the 

ground overseeing the political transitions were essential to the consolidation of victory. Nonetheless, up 

until recently, a consistent feature of the political and 

bureaucratic landscape in Washington and the Army 

has been the failure to institutionalize the lessons 

learned from these arenas of competition and to create an organization expert in engaging in governancerelated tasks. 

TODAY’S DEBATES

Military historians, strategists, and soldiers have 

analyzed the political dimension of war at the strategic level. The Army’s publication of Field Manual 

(FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, marked an 

important step toward affirming the intensely political character of war. Most recently, the Army’s Capstone Concept (ACC) emphasizes the importance of 

continuously assessing and reassessing the strategic 

and political contexts in order to defeat enemies.5

 In 

addition, there is a burgeoning literature, mostly from 

recent practitioners in Iraq and Afghanistan, which 

describes the tactical requirements related to the restoration of basic security and order in counterinsur-
5

gency (COIN) operations and related stabilization efforts.6

 Yet there remains a gap, both historically and in 

the more recent literature, related to the operational 

achievement of these political goals—a gap regarding 

the organization in the field necessary to match and 

build upon local successes to achieve political objectives. Good doctrine does not guarantee the effective 

execution of governance-related tasks; sound operational approaches are required as well. 

Both historically and in the current wars, military 

and civilian actors have faltered over the problem 

of how to create an organization that can effectively 

employ the economic, diplomatic, and security instruments necessary to shape desired political outcomes. 

The enemy has not been so hampered. As Kim Kagan 

has observed about the insurgency in Iraq: “The enemy had developed a system of allocating resources; 

command and control; financing; logistics; recruitment; training capabilities; information operations; 

force projection capacities; and methods for reinforcing priorities—not just in local areas, but hierarchically within the theater.”7

 A central problem in Iraq and 

Afghanistan has been how to organize U.S. resources 

to shape the political dimensions of these wars. American political and military leaders can solve this problem, but they are hampered by the recurring concern 

in American political culture over placing the military 

in charge of achieving political goals in war. As a result, the operational approach has favored unity of effort among civilian and military actors. Unity of effort, 

however, is not an operational model, but an amalgam of ad-hoc resources and approaches designed to 

manage political sensitivities. 

An early success in Afghanistan occurred in 2003, 

when two key actors—a U.S. ambassador, Zalmay 
6

Khalilzhad, and a three-star general, Lieutenant General David Barno—created an integrated civil-military 

strategic planning cell to ensure the concerted use of 

all instruments of U.S. power to accelerate the defeat of 

the Taliban and to begin the reconstruction of Afghanistan.8

 Lieutenant General Barno (now retired), the 

then-newly installed commander of Combined Forces 

Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), placed his personal 

office adjacent to Ambassador Khalilzad’s inside the 

embassy. More than a symbolic move, this decision 

fostered a level of coordination and communication 

among civilian and military staffs, which in turn had 

a ripple effect in the field, helping to jumpstart the 

operational civil-military teams known as Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Moreover, CFC-A personnel were posted to fill empty civilian spots inside 

the embassy, allowing for improved communication 

among military and civilian experts as they organized 

for reconstruction efforts.9

 This example was an ad-hoc 

solution driven by two extraordinary individuals who 

happened to be in the right place and the right time. 

Clearly, operational adaptability is a key strength of 

the American military, but what deserves further exploration is why, at the operational level, these sorts 

of examples are perhaps too plentiful. It is important 

to note that the relationship today between the commanding general and the ambassador in Afghanistan 

is markedly different.

There remain several weaknesses at the operational level with how to organize command relationships 

and resources to achieve political outcomes. First and 

foremost, there remains a persistent resistance to the 

creation of unified management/command structures 

in a theater to control civil and military resources related to stabilization and reconstruction tasks despite 
7

the fact that such structures have been created and 

used effectively in the past. Almost a decade of war 

now has reaffirmed the depth of this resistance. There 

is also a need to improve the development of integrated civil-military campaign plans, which describe how 

to achieve political outcomes during the course of war 

(How are political considerations reflected in a campaign plan? What resources are needed to build upon 

local successes and ensure that they form a foundation 

for continuing success?). Third, there are still weaknesses in building and sustaining an organizational 

apparatus that would train, support, and essentially 

grow cadres of people, both military and civilian, to 

implement such a plan. However, improvements in 

the latter two areas will not be of any significant use 

unless they can be integrated into a unified command 

structure. 

There have been several recent efforts to balance 

the military’s role in governance related tasks with 

improvements in civilian capabilities. A key initiative 

as the Bush administration left office, which was also 

endorsed by the Obama administration, was the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management 

Act. This allowed the necessary authorities to create a 

civilian corps to respond to crises abroad and perform 

governance related tasks in conflict situations.10 There 

have also been efforts by the Department of Defense 

(DoD) to transfer spending authorities for reconstruction related tasks to the State Department.11 These 

initiatives, though important steps toward improving 

overall U.S. Government (USG) capabilities related to 

stabilization and reconstruction tasks, do not resolve 

the fundamental disagreement about how to manage 

or organize for political transitions in a conflict zone.

The current range of solutions adds to the menu 

of ad-hoc capabilities but avoids the need to make 
8

political decisions in Washington. Under the existing 

unity of effort approach, an increase in the number 

of deployable civilians adds valuable expertise to the 

in-theater effort, but does little to improve the critical 

“unity” side of the equation. The failure to agree on a 

unified command arrangement is due to a reluctance 

to see the military take the lead in shaping political 

outcomes on the ground, combined with a reluctance 

to place civilians—even those in a line of fire—under 

military authority. By the same token, there is also resistance to placing military assets under civilian control in a wartime theater. 

This reluctance is rooted in American political and 

military history and culture. Although much attention 

has been paid to current parallels (or lack thereof) between Vietnam and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and the lessons learned (or not) from that conflict, 

much less attention has been paid to the enormous 

effort that went into creating the integrated civil-military structure in Vietnam known as civil operations 

and revolutionary development support (CORDS). 

That structure provided the critical organization for 

civilian experts and military personnel to work side 

by side to implement the country-wide pacification 

strategy adopted in 1967. Until then, “civilian agencies steered clear of the military’s business,” and the 

military “long eschewed involvement in police and 

pacification matters.”12 The PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan did not duplicate the level of integration achieved 

under CORDS. A full explanation of why this was 

the case has yet to be written, though one should be. 

Unfortunately, the CORDS model’s utility and importance were not fully appreciated, partially, it seems, 

due to the deeply divided interpretations of the Vietnam War. 
9

 Even with a greater absolute number of deployable civilians, problems remain in shifting more reconstruction efforts to civilian agencies. First, the State 

Department and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) community have not gone 

through the organizational catharsis equivalent to the 

one generated by FM 3-07 and other recent defenseled efforts. Certainly, there is a range of experts, both 

inside and outside the government, exploring new approaches to development. There is substantial support 

among many constituencies for greater USAID and 

State Department funding. Yet even experienced diplomats concede that “no wealth of doctrine or counsel 

exists for DoD’s civilian counterparts.”13 Thus, even 

with an increase in the absolute number of deployable 

civilians, it will take considerable time to improve the 

expeditionary mindset and approaches of the State 

Department. Even excluding embassy posts in war 

zones, a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found a twice greater vacancy rate 

at hardship posts compared to nonhardship posts.14 In 

addition, the Department continues to lag in providing proper support to those Foreign Service Officers 

who do serve in the more difficult or dangerous posts. 

An implicit recognition of the problem is found in 

the 2010 House Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 

which calls for a “more modern and expeditionary 

Foreign Service.”15 Moreover, there is still significant 

debate within the USAID community about the extent 

to which aid should be used to shape or influence U.S. 

foreign policy goals, clearly a constraint in any competition over the political landscape in war. 

Despite the current emphasis on unity of effort and 

on the contributions of nondefense agencies to reconstruction in war, limitations in civilian capacity will 
10

continue to impact the Army in several ways. First, 

governance tasks are central to the competition inherent in war and the Army, as the principal land force, 

and will need to play a central role in any such competition. They have in the past, and will continue to 

do so in the future. It is hard to imagine giving up a 

key element of war that is so essential to sustaining 

control over territory. The Army will need to continue to develop expertise in governance-related areas, 

building upon the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Such lessons and expertise must be reflected in Army 

organizations and units or it will be lost. Army culture is linked to, and derived from, its branches and 

units, their expertise, and their shared experiences. A 

cultural shift in the Army, which values and rewards 

the skills required to manage the political dimension 

of war, will require a concomitant reflection in Army 

organizations.

The ACC is a step in the right direction. It explains 

the importance of the ability to fight as a combined 

arms team, whereby the integration of different skills 

compensates for the weakness of any one arm. It is 

significant that the ACC also highlights the fact that 

“seizing and retaining the initiative in complex environments will require the expansion of the concept of 

combined arms to include the integration of efforts 

critical to consolidating gains and ensuring progress 

toward accomplishing strategic objectives.”16 This 

will be important for fully realizing the ACC’s emphasis on operational adaptability—changes made in order to adjust midcourse to the evolving demands of a 

war. Operational adaptability is more likely to be successful against the backdrop of an organization with 

“depth” in a particular area. As the ACC explains, 

“competency in combined arms operations, based on 

effective unit organizations, training, and leadership, 
11

is an essential element of operational adaptability.”17

Successful operational adaptability in the face of governance-related problems is much more likely if the 

Army achieves effective unit organization, training, 

and leadership in governance-related skill sets. This 

type of adaptability is likely to take place in the political domain of the competition if there is a culture that 

values the kinds of adaptations being sought. 

Second, given the limitations in civilian capacity 

noted earlier, the Army’s leadership should focus on 

identifying how to create a unified command structure 

in a wartime theater and how to best integrate civilian 

and military expertise. The Army can take into account 

the complicated political landscape of Washington, 

while nonetheless taking a page from General Eisenhower’s position during World War II when, due to 

his responsibility for “the success of the operations,” 

he believed that it was “essential that final authority in 

all matters in the theater rest in me.”18 In the aftermath 

of Vietnam, one of the most cogent observers of and 

participants in the war, Robert Komer, described how 

the American bureaucracy was a critical part of the 

failure there. Komer later asked, 

Why did the U.S . . . settle for such conventional, diffuse, and fragmented management structures . . . ? 

It is surprising that when we saw its need so clearly, 

and so many advocated at various times management 

changes to help generate better GVN and U.S. performance, we did so little to create the necessary machinery. Senior officials did recurrently focus on this problem. However, we didn’t ever do enough about it.19

Obviously, decisions about a unified command arrangement are larger than the Army alone can resolve, 

but the Army has an important voice at the table.
12

The Army’s continuing central involvement in 

shaping political outcomes in war does not mean that 

its presence in a country is indeterminate, nor does 

it mean that the Army should transform itself into a 

long-term development agency. As security is established, circumstances will dictate a need for a shift 

from shorter-term to longer-term goals, a corresponding shift from military toward civilian actors, and a 

full transition to indigenous entities. But getting to the 

desired end state is more likely to occur if the operational level is working most effectively.

Moreover, any lasting transition and consolidation 

of political objectives will require a commitment by 

Congress to fund desired objectives. Unless Congress 

fully understands the political objectives and concomitant resource requirements, serious pause should be 

given to involvement at the outset of a conflict. During 

the Vietnam years, Komer commented on the simple 

fact that most of the war effort was financed by “relatively unfungible” U.S. defense appropriations, with 

civilians needing to find ingenious ways to get DoD 

funds to do double duty by also supporting pacification and anti-inflation efforts.20 Sadly, the similarities 

today are striking.

An important strength of the new ACC is its refusal to endorse the false dichotomy, which has emerged 

over the past few years, regarding how to balance resources between a so-called conventionally focused 

Army versus a COIN-centric one. The new Concept 

describes how “Army forces must be capable of conducting simultaneous actions—of both a military and 

a political nature—across the spectrum of conflict.”21

It recognizes that the political dimensions of war will 

permeate the full spectrum of conflict. It does not let 

labels (i.e. “hybrid,” “irregular,” “small”) trump the 
13

fundamental nature of war. It recognizes that, in order 

to win, Army personnel will be called upon to actively 

and persistently shape the political competition inherent to war.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace, New Haven, CT: 

Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 1-2. 

2. These four categories of military activity are identified in 

the Joint Capstone Concept.

3. See Richard Schultz and Andrea Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, New York: 

Columbia University Press, 2006. 

4. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-

0,The Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability —Operating 

Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, 2016-2028, Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 

December 21, 2009, p. 15, available from www.tradoc.army.mil/

tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf. (Hereafter ACC.)

5. Ibid. 

6. For example, see Colonel William Ostlund, “Tactical Leader Lessons Learned in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom 

VII,” Military Review, July-August 2009.

7. Kimberly Kagan, unpublished paper, “III Corps AAR,” 

May 5, 2008, cited in Army Capstone Concept, Draft, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, September 21, 

2009, p. 51. 

8. Quote by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, in Christopher 

Griffin, “A Working Plan: Hope Isn’t the Only Strategy For Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Journal, April 2007, available from www.

afji.com/2007/04/2587549/.
14

9. Ibid. 

10. To put the resources behind this civilian initiative in perspective, in 2009 the Civilian Stabilization Initiative requested 

some $250 million to strengthen civilian capacity to manage and 

implement reconstruction and stabilization related tasks (which 

included the funding for the active, standby, and reserve Civilian Response Corps across eight different agencies). The entire 

Corps however, is envisioned to be about 250 active members 

(who would be deployed within 2-3 days), a standby component 

of 2,000 additional members, and a 2,000-member reserve. 

11. See Nina M. Serafino, Department of Defense, “Section 1207,” 

Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional 

Concerns, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 

3, 2009, available from www.roa.org/site/DocServer/CRS_DoD_Security_and_Stabilization_4_Jun_09.pdf?docID=17541; and DoD Authorities for Foreign and Security Assistance Program: A Comparison 

of the FY 2010 House and Senate Armed Services Defense Authorization Bills, Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, Stimson Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense, July 20, 2009, p. 2, 

available from www.stimson.org/budgeting/pdf/FY2010_House_and_

Senate_Armed_Services_Defense_Authoritzation_Bills.pdf. 

12. Robert Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the 

Vietnam Conflict, Boulder, CO, and London, UK: Westview Press, 

1986, p. 149.

13. See Kurt Amend, “The Diplomat as Counterinsurgent,” 

Foreign Service Journal, September 2009, p. 22.

14. See Susan R. Johnson, “President’s Views: Mind the Gap: 

Addressing FS Readiness,” Foreign Service Journal, December 

2009, p. 5. 

15. Available from frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.

cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h2410rfs.txt.pdf.

16. ACC, p. 20.

17. Ibid., p. 19.
15

18. EISENHOWER CONCERNED OVER HIS CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR’S DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY (Msg, Eisenhower to 

Marshall, 19 Sep 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 8213), in Harry L. 

Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, U.S. Army in World War II, Special 

Studies. Civil Affairs: When Soldiers Become Governors, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992, available from 

history.army.mil/books/wwii/civaff/ch02.htm#b5.

19. Komer, p. 94.

20. Ibid., p. 42.

21. ACC, p. 27. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. Nadia Schadlow

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil