United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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Nos. 10-2732/2792

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United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff/Appellant, *

*

Alabama Department of Environmental *

Management; Linn County; Polk *

County; Shelby County; State of *

Georgia; State of Illinois; State of * Appeals from the United States

Indiana; State of Iowa; State of * District Court for the

Missouri; State of Nebraska; State of * District of Minnesota.

North Carolina; State of North Dakota; *

State of Ohio, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Intervenor Plaintiffs, *

*

v. *

*

Cargill, Incorporated, *

*

Defendant/Appellant. *

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Submitted: May 9, 2011

Filed: June 13, 2011

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Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.
In 2006, Cargill entered into a consent decree between itself and the United

States to resolve a dispute involving Cargill's alleged violation of various provisions

of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, at twenty-four of its plants located

in thirteen states. The consent decree required Cargill to install pollution control

equipment in the subject plants pursuant to a timetable set forth in the decree. The

earliest the consent decree could be completed was the year 2016. When the consent

decree was submitted to the district court for its approval, the district court entered

a handwritten edit to the decree which purported to limit its jurisdiction over the

matter "to and until December 31, 2009," more than seven years earlier than the

consent decree could be completed.

In May 2010, Cargill filed a motion to enter an unopposed modification to the

consent decree. Citing its handwritten edit limiting jurisdiction to December 31,

2009, the district court denied the motion, stating it "no longer retains jurisdiction in

this case." The district court also denied a Rule 60(b) motion filed by the United

States, Shelby County, Tennessee, Memphis, Tennessee, and Cargill asking the

district court to reconsider its denial because of a district court's continuing

jurisdiction over consent decrees. Both Cargill and the United States filed timely

appeals ofthe district court's order refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the requested

modification to the consent decree.

"[A] district court retains the inherent authority to modify or enforce a consent

decree." Picon v. Morris, 933 F.2d 660, 662 (8th Cir. 1991). The district court's

inherent jurisdiction over consent decree remains "even without a provision in the

decree which provides for continuing jurisdiction." Id.; see also McDonald v.

Armontrout, 908 F.2d 388, 390-91 (8thCir. 1990) (confirming a district court's power

to order modifications to a consent decree even when the decree "neglected to assert

the District Court's continuing authority."); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.

106, 114 (1932) ("A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is

subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need [even if] the reservation

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had been omitted."). A district court cannot abdicate its continuing jurisdiction over

a consent decree. See Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The

injunctive quality of consent decrees compels the court to . . . retain jurisdiction over

the decree during the term of its existence[.]").

Because the district court clearly erred when it purportedly declined to exercise

jurisdiction over the parties' May 2010 request for a modification to the consent

decree, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

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