Filed 8/21/24 In re H.H. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re H.H. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B333897, B335057

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct.

 No. 20CCJP03745B, C)

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Tiana J. Murillo, Judge. Affirmed.

Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *

M.G. (mother) has filed two appeals. First, she challenges 

the denial of her request for a sibling bonding study. Second, she 

challenges the denial of her petition to reinstate reunification 

services and the finding she had not established a sibling 

relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights. 

Due to the intertwined issues involving the bonding study and 

the sibling relationship exception, this opinion addresses both 

appeals.

Finding no error in these orders, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

M.G. is the biological mother of H.H. (born December 2019) 

and I.H. (born May 2021).1 The children also have an older half

sister, L.E.2

1 I.H. was born after the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (the Department) filed the petition 

concerning H.H. H.H. and I.H. are children of Daniel H.

2 L.E. is not a party to this appeal. Throughout the pendency 

of this matter, L.E. and H.H. were placed together. In March 

2023 the court placed L.E. with her father, Ruben E.
3

Petition filed for H.H. and L.E.

The Department filed a petition under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 3003 on July 14, 2020, alleging mother’s 

actions endangered the health and safety of the children, H.H. 

and L.E. The petition alleged mother and Daniel H. engaged in 

violent verbal and physical fights in the children’s presence, and 

mother endangered the children through her substance abuse 

and her possession of drug paraphernalia and a blow torch in the 

home.

At the detention hearing a prima facie case that H.H. fell 

within section 300 was made. H.H. was placed with a caregiver. 

Later, mother submitted to the court’s jurisdiction, and the 

petition was sustained on all counts. Monitored visitation was 

ordered for both parents. Family reunification services were 

ordered for mother.

Petition filed for I.H.

On January 14, 2022, the Department filed a petition 

alleging I.H.’s health was endangered by the violent conduct 

between mother and Daniel H. (father) and by mother’s failure to 

enforce a criminal protective order against father. The 

Department also alleged mother failed to protect I.H. from harm 

based on mother’s substance abuse, including positive tests for 

marijuana during her pregnancy with I.H. The petition included 

allegations that I.H.’s siblings, H.H. and L.E, were already 

dependents of the juvenile court due to the violent conduct and 

substance abuse of the parents.

3 All further unattributed statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
4

During the hearing the court determined that sufficient 

evidence was presented to establish a prima facie case under 

section 300, leading to I.H.’s placement with a caregiver. At the 

jurisdictional hearing the court declared I.H. a dependent and 

placed him in the Department’s custody, with directions to make 

best efforts to place all three siblings together. Visitation and 

reunification services were ordered for mother.

H.H. and I.H. were placed in the home of Bessie H., along 

with half sister L.E. In March 2023, L.E. and was reunified with 

her father.

Struggles with substance abuse and termination of 

reunification services

Mother struggled with issues involving substance abuse 

throughout the dependency proceedings. At the September 1, 

2022 hearing on reunification services for H.H., the court noted 

mother had relapsed and her substance abuse had not improved 

after nearly two years of services.

4 As a result, reunification 

services were terminated for H.H.

At the April 25, 2023 status hearing on reunification 

services for I.H., the court found mother had missed drug tests 

and experienced another relapse. Following the hearings on 

reunification efforts, the court found mother’s progress had been 

“unsubstantial” and terminated family reunification services for 

I.H.

In June 2023, mother again relapsed and ceased visitation 

with the children for over six months. On December 18, 2023, 

4 The court also found mother had concealed her continued 

relationship with father, the relationship that was the basis for 

the domestic abuse allegations in the section 300 petition.
5

mother entered a residential treatment program. She resumed 

visitation with H.H. and I.H. in late December 2023.

Denial of mother’s request for bonding study

Mother filed a motion requesting a bonding study to 

evaluate the sibling relationship among H.H., I.H., and L.E. She 

argued the court lacked sufficient evidence to determine whether 

the loss of the sibling relationship outweighed the benefits of 

adoption. The Department opposed, asserting adequate

information about their relationship could be gleaned from 

Department reports on the children. The juvenile court denied 

mother’s motion both because a study would delay a permanent 

resolution for the children and the evidence and arguments could 

be made without a study.

Petition for reinstatement of reunification services

Mother filed two section 388 petitions seeking six 

additional months of reunification services as to H.H. and I.H. In 

support, mother provided evidence of her enrollment in the 

treatment program, her renewed commitment to sobriety, and 

her resumed visitation with the children. At the hearing mother 

testified to her progress in treatment. The juvenile court denied 

the petition, finding mother’s one month of sobriety did not 

constitute changed circumstances, and additional services were 

not in the children’s best interests given their need for 

permanency.

Permanency planning hearing

At the permanency planning hearings on January 22, 2024, 

and February 2, 2024, mother argued the parental benefit and 

sibling relationship exceptions to termination of parental rights 

should apply. The juvenile court found the parental benefit 

exception did not apply because mother did not show consistent 
6

visits, a beneficial relationship, or a detriment that would arise 

from terminating her parental rights.

As to the sibling relationship exception, the court 

acknowledged H.H., I.H., and L.E. shared a “very strong 

connection,” but found H.H. and I.H. had remained with their 

caregiver for nearly a year after L.E.’s departure “without any 

major or apparent detrimental impact.” The court also noted the 

caregiver had agreed to continue facilitating visits between the 

siblings postadoption. Ultimately, the court found mother had not 

met her burden of proving this exception applied and terminated 

her parental rights.

Mother filed timely notices of appeal.

5

DISCUSSION

Mother challenges (1) the denial of her sibling bonding 

study request, (2) the finding the sibling relationship exception 

did not apply, and (3) the denial of her section 388 petition to 

reinstate reunification services.

I. There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of 

mother’s motion for a sibling bonding study

A. Standard of review

While expert testimony can be useful to assess bonds 

between family members (see In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 

5 Mother has filed three appeals. The first, B329174, is 

directed at the denial of her request for the children to be placed 

with a relative. The denial was affirmed in In re H.H. (May 1, 

2024, B329174) (nonpub. opn.).

Her other two appeals, B335057 and B333897, are the 

subject of this opinion.
7

614, 633, fn. 4), the juvenile court has discretion to order a 

bonding study under Evidence Code section 730. (Evid. Code,

§ 730; In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080.) There is no 

requirement in statutory or case law for a juvenile court to obtain 

a sibling bonding study as a condition precedent to a termination 

order. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.) 

Accordingly, we review the denial of a request for a bonding 

study for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1341.) “A court exceeds the 

limits of legal discretion if its determination is arbitrary, 

capricious or patently absurd. The appropriate test is whether 

the court exceeded the bounds of reason.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 

Cal.App.5th 840, 851.)

B. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion

The juvenile court’s decision to deny mother’s request for a 

bonding study was well within the bounds of reason. The court 

properly considered two critical factors in reaching its decision: 

(1) the potential delay in permanency for the children, and (2) the 

sufficiency of existing evidence regarding the sibling relationship.

1. As reunification services had been terminated, 

the focus was on the children’s needs for 

permanency

The juvenile court expressed concern about further delay in 

achieving permanency for H.H. and I.H. Reunification services 

had been terminated for mother. “Once reunification services are 

ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for 

permanency and stability.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 

295, 309.) The court’s focus on the delay to the children’s needs 

was entirely appropriate. H.H. and I.H. had been in foster care 

for over three years and two years, respectively, when the study 

was requested. The court reasonably concluded that ordering a 
8

bonding study at this late stage would cause unwarranted delay 

in securing permanency for the children. The decision was not 

arbitrary or capricious, but rather a sound exercise of the court’s 

discretion to focus on the children’s needs for permanency.

Mother argues her delay in seeking the bonding study was 

necessitated by the Department’s repeated failures to provide 

court-ordered information about the sibling relationship. While 

the record reflects some deficiencies in reporting, the juvenile 

court was aware of the issues and took steps to address them by 

ordering additional information that was provided in reports filed 

on November 13 and November 14, 2023, thus addressing the 

deficiencies in the reporting and showing information about the 

relationship was available without a bonding study.

We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of mother’s 

request for a sibling bonding study.

2. Evidence of the sibling relationship could be 

offered without the requested study

The juvenile court also found the evidence of the sibling 

relationship could be offered without a bonding study. A review of 

the record shows significant evidence of the sibling relationship: 

(1) H.H. and I.H. were visiting consistently with L.E. since March 

2023; (2) L.E. was having overnight visits with H.H. and I.H. 

twice a month; (3) H.H. and L.E. were reported to be “well 

bonded”; and (4) a postadoption contact agreement had been 

signed, ensuring ongoing sibling visitation.

Furthermore, at the hearing mother’s counsel 

acknowledged there was “evidence of a bond that would cause 

harm to the children if that bond is severed” without a bonding 

study. This admission further supports the court’s conclusion 
9

that existing evidence was sufficient to evaluate the sibling 

relationship exception.

II. Finding mother did not establish the sibling 

relationship exception was not an abuse of 

discretion

Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights, 

arguing the juvenile court erred in finding the sibling 

relationship exception did not apply.

A. Standard of review

Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides for the 

termination of parental rights if family reunification services 

have been terminated and the juvenile court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted. Once 

reunification services have been terminated, “‘[f]amily 

preservation ceases to be of overriding concern . . . the focus shifts 

from the parent’s interest in reunification to the child’s interest 

in permanency and stability.’” (In re Richard C. (1998) 68 

Cal.App.4th 1191, 1195.) “Adoption, where possible, is the 

permanent plan preferred by the Legislature.” (In re Autumn H. 

(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.)

Although the statutory preference is in favor of adoption, 

section 366.26 lists certain exceptions that may preclude 

termination of parental rights, if the juvenile court finds “a 

compelling reason for determining that termination would be 

detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)

One exception is the sibling relationship. When 

determining whether terminating parental rights would 

substantially interfere with a sibling relationship, the juvenile 

court must first evaluate the nature and extent of that 

relationship, “including, but not limited to, whether the child was 
10

raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared 

significant common experiences or has existing close and strong 

bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s 

best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, 

as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through 

adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) This exception does not 

apply often. (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 174, quoting 

In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014 [“‘application of 

this exception will be rare, particularly when the proceedings 

concern young children whose needs for a competent, caring and 

stable parent are paramount’”].)

“If the court determines terminating parental rights would 

substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is 

then directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that 

sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by 

the permanency of adoption.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 

942, 952 (L.Y.L.).)

To show a substantial interference with a sibling 

relationship, the person opposing the termination of parental 

rights “must show the existence of a significant sibling 

relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the 

child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but 

would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the 

relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on 

termination, there is no substantial interference with that 

relationship.” (L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952, 

fn. omitted.)

We apply the substantial evidence standard to the juvenile 

court’s underlying factual determinations, and the abuse of 
11

discretion standard to the court’s weighing of competing 

interests. (In re D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.)

B. Substantial evidence supported the court’s 

findings

Mother argues insufficient evidence supports the court’s 

decision on the sibling relationship due to the court’s denial of 

her request for a sibling bonding study. However, it was mother’s 

burden to prove this exception applied. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 45, 61.) The court’s denial of her requested bonding study 

did not preclude mother from presenting other evidence to meet 

this burden.

Moreover, there was substantial evidence in the record 

showing termination of parental rights would not substantially 

interfere with the siblings’ relationship. The caregiver testified 

she intended to continue facilitating visits among the siblings 

postadoption. The caregiver maintained communication with 

L.E.’s father to coordinate visits, received L.E. into her home for 

overnight weekend visits, and intended on continuing the visits 

among the siblings. The caregiver had also entered into a 

postadoption contact agreement with L.E.’s father to preserve the 

sibling relationship. Substantial evidence, therefore, supports the 

court’s finding that termination of mother’s parental rights would 

not substantially interfere with the sibling relationship.

The benefits of adoption outweigh any potential 

interference with the sibling relationship. The children spent 

years in foster care and the focus was on achieving a permanent 

and stable home for them. Once they were in their placement 

with the prospective adoptive parent, they thrived.

Given the evidence that sibling contact would continue and 

the importance of providing H.H. and I.H. with a stable home, 
12

the court did not abuse its discretion when weighing the 

competing interests and concluding mother had not established

the sibling relationship exception.

III. There was no abuse of discretion in the denial of 

mother’s section 388 petition to reinstate services

Mother also challenges the denial of her section 388 

petition seeking additional reunification services for H.H. and 

I.H. As mother’s single month of sobriety did not show a changed 

circumstance nor that it was in the best interests of the children 

to reinstate services, we disagree.

“Section 388 allows a parent to petition to change, modify, 

or set aside any previous juvenile court order. [Citation.] ‘The 

petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the 

evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of 

circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in 

the best interests of the child.’” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 

833, 845.) “We review a juvenile court’s denial of a section 388 

petition for abuse of discretion, and review its factual findings for 

substantial evidence. [Citation.] We may disturb the exercise of 

the court’s discretion only when the court has made an 

unreasonable or arbitrary determination.” (Id. at p. 846.)

The juvenile court found mother failed to meet her burden 

on both prongs. Although mother entered a residential treatment 

program, she had been sober for only one month at the time of 

the hearing. Given mother’s history of relapse, the court could 

reasonably conclude this short period of sobriety did not 

constitute a significant change. (See, e.g., In re Cliffton B. (2000) 

81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [when there is a history of drug use and 

relapses, 200 days of sobriety is not enough to show changed 

circumstances].)
13

The court also found additional services were not in the 

children’s best interests. “‘[T]o prevent children from spending 

their lives in the uncertainty of foster care, there must be a 

limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a parent to 

become adequate.’” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 

Cal.5th 609, 627.) Mother had received two years of services for 

H.H. and over one year for I.H. The children had been in foster 

care for most of their lives. The court properly prioritized the 

children’s need for stability over mother’s interest in 

reunification. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)

On this record, the juvenile court’s denial of mother’s 

section 388 petition was not an abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

________________________

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________

LUI, P. J.

________________________

HOFFSTADT, J.