FILED

June 30, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

 ______________________________________________

WILLIE MAE VANN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Shelby Circuit No. 75667 T.D.

Vs. C.A. No. 02A01-9809-CV-00246

CALVIN HOWELL and

YOUTH VILLAGES, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________________________________________________________________

FROM THE SHELBY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

THE HONORABLE JAMES E. SWEARENGEN, JUDGE

Lanier Fogg of Memphis

For Appellant

B. J. Wade, James F. Horner; 

Glassman, Jeter, Edwards & Wade of Memphis

For Appellee, Youth Villages

John D. Richardson, Teresa A. Newsom;

The Richardson Law Firm of Memphis

For Appellee, Howell

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART

Opinion filed: 

W. FRANK CRAWFORD,

PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

DISSENTS:

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

CONCURS:

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE

This is a premises liability action. Plaintiff/appellant, Willie Mae Vann (Vann), appeals

the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to defendants/appellees, Calvin Howell

(Howell) and Youth Villages, Inc.
1Although Youth Villages rented offices on the third floor of the building, this

informational meeting was held in empty space on the second floor with Howell’s permission.

2

Youth Villages is a private, nonprofit organization involved in placing troubled children

with foster parents. It leases offices on the third floor in a building owned by Howell. On

January 28, 1995, Vann accompanied her daughter to a Youth Villages’s informational meeting.

This meeting was held in empty offices on the second floor of the building.1

 The elevator

servicing the building had both a front and back door. The back door opened only when a button

inside the elevator was pushed. Following the meeting, Vann stepped onto the elevator, and she

moved to the rear of the elevator as people entered. Prior to the elevator moving, someone

unintentionally hit the button which opened the rear door. Vann fell through the opening and

was allegedly injured. 

Vann filed suit against both Howell and Youth Villages alleging the back elevator door

opening unexpectedly constituted a dangerous condition which the defendants should have

remedied or warned against. Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment which the

trial court granted after a hearing. Vann filed a timely appeal and asks this Court to determine

whether summary judgment was appropriate.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant demonstrates that

there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary judgment bears the

burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d

618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest

legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences

in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Id. In Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d

208 (Tenn. 1993), our Supreme Court stated:

Once it is shown by the moving party that there is no genuine

issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must then

demonstrate, by affidavits or discovery materials, that there is a

genuine, material fact dispute to warrant a trial. In this regard,

Rule 56.05 [now Rule 56.06] provides that the nonmoving party

cannot simply rely upon his pleadings but must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial.

Id. at 211 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
2Vann cites several provisions in the lease in which she claims Youth Villages had

assumed various responsibilities to keep common areas in a safe and passable condition. After

examination of the pertinent provisions, we have determined that Youth Villages did not assume

control over common areas of the building.

3

Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn

from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26

(Tenn. 1995). Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness

regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622. Therefore, our

review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before this Court.

Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).

WefirstexamineVann’sclaimagainstYouthVillages. SheassertsthatYouthVillageshasadutytoexercise

reasonablecareinkeepingapproachestothebusiness,includingtheelevator,inasafecondition. Vannspendsmuch

ofherbriefarguingthatpossessorsofpropertyhaveadutyofreasonablecaretoprotectagainstdangersonthepremises.

Inthepresentcase,wearenotdealingwithaninjurythatoccurredontheleasedpremises,butonethatoccurredin a

common area leading to Youth Villages.

Theexistenceofadutyisaquestionoflawforthecourt. Blairv.Campbell,924S.W.2d75(Tenn.1996).

ThetrialcourtgrantedsummaryjudgmentonthebasisthatYouthVillageshadnolegaldutytoVannasamatteroflaw.

The general law in this area is described in 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elevators and Escalators § 24 (1996):

Atenantwhocontrolsanelevatoronleasedpremisesisliablefor

injuriesresultingfromnegligentoperationandmanagement. Ifthetenanthassole

controloftheelevator,he,notthelandlord,hasthedutytowarnandprotectthe

personswhomhe invitestousethe elevator.... However,ifthetenant

has no control over the elevator or its shaft, he is generally

charged with no duty to protect others on the premises

therefrom.

(emphasis added).

Underthetermsoftheleasenomentionismadeforthecontrolofthecommonareasortheelevator.2 By

affidavit, Paula Jones, Director of Support Services at Youth Villages, states in pertinent part:

6. Thisaddressisacommercialofficebuildingcontainingfourfloors. Inthe

officebuildingtherearetwoelevatorswhichservethefourfloors. Theelevators

arenotpartoftheleasedpremisespursuanttotheLeaseAgreementbetween

Youth Villages, Inc. and H.P.I., Inc.

7. Theelevatorsarepartofthecommonareaofthebuildingforusebyall

tenants.

8. YouthVillages,Inc.didnotleaseorcontroleithertheelevatorinJanuary,

1995,whenthePlaintiffallegedlywasinjured,norhasitleasedorcontrolledthe

elevators at any other time.
3

Inexplicably, plaintiff did not sue the landlord.

4

Nootherevidencewassubmittedconcerningcontrolovertheelevator. Fromtheevidenceprovided,itisundisputed

that Youth Villages did not exercise control over the elevator.

VannassertsthatthisCourt’sopinioninRobertsv.TennesseeWesleyanCollege,450S.W.2d21,

60Tenn.App.624(1969)imposesadutyuponYouthVillagestokeeptheelevatorinareasonablysafecondition. In

Roberts,plaintiffbroughtanactionagainstadanceschoolandacollegeforinjuriessustainedwhenshefellonthe

stepsoutsideacollegeauditoriumtemporarilyleasedbythedanceschool. Thecollegemaintainedcontrolofthe

entrancewayincludingthestepswheretheaccidentoccurred;yettheRobertsCourtheldthatboththedanceschool

andthecollegehadadutytokeeptheapproachinareasonablysafecondition. Id.at25-26. AsthisCourtnotedin

Gladman v.RevoDiscountDrugCntrs.,Inc.,669S.W.2d 677 (Tenn.App. 1984),Roberts“simply

requiredthelesseetoprovidereasonableingressandegress.” Id.at679. Intheinstantcase,asinGladman,Vann

was some distance from the approach to the Youth Villages premises. This case is not an ingress or egres

WhileplaintiffarguesthatRobertsispersuasive,Gladmanismoreanalogoustothecaseatbar. In

Gladman,plaintifffiledsuitagainstRevcoforinjuriessufferedwhenheslippedandfelloniceintheparkinglot.3

Theparkinglotinquestionservedamultiplestoreshoppingcenter,andthecourtstatedinpertinentpart:“Wedonot

believethatitwouldbereasonabletorequireasinglelesseetocleantheentireparkinglotofamultiple-storeshopping

centerinordertomeetthisingressandegressrequirement.” Id.at679. Similarly,thepresentcaseconcernsan

elevatorthatservicesseveralbusinesseslocatedwithinthebuildingownedbyHowell. YouthVillagesneverassumed

responsibilityorcontroloftheelevator,andthereforewebelieve,astheGladmanCourtdid,thatitwouldbe

unreasonable to impose a duty on Youth Villages to keep the elevator in a reasonably safe condition.

WemustnextdeterminewhethersummaryjudgmentwasappropriateastoHowell. TheleaseYouthVillages

andHowellenteredintomakesnomentionofthecontrolofthecommonareasofthebuilding;however,wherethe

premisesareleasedtodifferenttenantsandcertainareasarereservedfortheuseincommonofthedifferenttenants,

thelandlordhasadutyimposedbylawtokeepcommonpassagewaysinasafecondition. Woodsv.ForestHill

Cemetery,192S.W.2d987,991,183Tenn.413,424(1946). Tennesseelawregardingalandlord’sdutyasto

common areas was defined in Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d 343 (Tenn. App. 1987).

[W]herethelandlordretainspossessionofapartofthepremisesforusein

commonbydifferenttenants,thelandlordisunderacontinuingdutyimposedby

lawtoexercisereasonablecaretokeepthecommonareasingoodrepairandsafe

condition....[A]lthoughthelandlordisbynomeansaninsurerofhistenants’

safety,Tennesseecommonlawhaslongheldthelandlordresponsibleforthe

condition of common areas under his control.
5

Id. at 347-48.

Theelevatorinthepresentcasewhichservicedtheentirebuildingconstitutesacommonarea. “Alandlord

whoretainsthecontrolandmanagementofanelevatorprovidedforthecommonuseofhistenantsmayberesponsible

forinjuriestohistenants,theiremployees,andsuchotherpersonsasmaylawfullyusetheelevator.” 26Am.Jur.2d

Elevators and Escalators § 22 (1996). 

Thelandlord’sdutyincludestheobligationtoremoveorwarnagainstanydangerousconditiononthepremises

ofwhichlandlordisawareorshouldhavebeenawarethroughtheexerciseofreasonablediligence. Eatonv.

McLain,891S.W.2d587,593-94(Tenn.1994). AsthisCourtnotedinOatesv.GlenstoneLodge,Inc.,No.

03A01-9712-CV-00545, 1998 WL 251763 (Tenn. App. May 19, 1998):

Generally,“[a]riskisunreasonableandgivesrisetoadutytoactwithduecare

iftheforeseeableprobabilityandgravityofharmposedbydefendant’sconduct

outweightheburdenupondefendanttoengageinalternativeconductthatwould

havepreventedtheharm.” McCallv.Wilder,913S.W.2d150,153(Tenn.

1995).

Id. at *2.

Itappearsforeseeablethatpersonsenteringtheelevatorwouldmovetothebackoftheelevator,depending

onthecrowdontheelevator,andcouldbeagainsttherearwalloftheelevator,or,asinthiscase,thedoorofthe

elevator. Therecordreflectsthattherewerenowarningsignsthatthereardoorwasanoperatingdoor. Italsoappears

fromtherecordthatthereardoorcouldbelocked,andthatinfactthelandlordhadlockeditforotherfloorsonthe

building.

Inafewstates,theownerandoperatorofanelevatoralsohasamorestringentdutythanthatofreasonable

care.See26Am.Jur.2dElevatorsandEscalators§14 (1996).Tennesseeisonesuchstatewhichholdsthe

ownersandoperatorsofelevatorshavean“obligationtopassengersonelevators...[that]isthesameasthatofcommon

carrierstopassengers,andthattheymustuseandexercisethehighestdegreeofcareandprecaution.” Southern

Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Lawson, 37 S.W. 86, 87, 97 Tenn. 367 (1896). 

ThereismaterialevidenceinthiscasethatestablishesthatHowell,asownerandoperatoroftheelevatorin

question,owedVannthedutyofacommoncarriertokeeptheelevatoringoodrepairandsafecondition.Whether

HowellbreachedthatdutytoVann,andifso,whethercomparativefaultbecomespartoftheanalysisare,inouropinion,

issuestobedecidedbythejuryandnotthetrialjudge. SeeOatesv.GlenstoneLodge,Inc.,No.03A01-9712-

CV-00545,1998WL251763,at*1 (Tenn.App. May19,1998);Robertsv.TennesseeWesleyanCollege,

450S.W.2d21,26,60Tenn.App.624,634(1969). Therefore,webelievethatsummaryjudgmentwasinappropriate

for the defendant Howell.
6

TheordergrantingsummaryjudgmenttoYouthVillagesisaffirmed,andtheordergrantingsummaryjudgment

toHowellisreversed,andthecaseisremandedforsuchfurtherproceedingsasarenecessary. Costsoftheappealare

assessed one-half to appellee, Howell, and one-half to appellant.

_________________________________

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, 

PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

CONCURS:

____________________________________

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE

DISSENTS: ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE