2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
11-24-2004 

# Liedy v . Gle nolde n P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-3539

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/120NOT PRECEDENTIAL IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT NO. 03-3539 DAV ID W. LIEDY ; KATH LEEN E. LIEDY, indivi dually and as co-pers onal representat ives of t he Estat e of Roxanne Liedy and as the g uardians o f Am anda L iedy, a minor, Ap pellan ts

v. BOR OU GH OF G LEN OLD EN; ED WA RD C OO KE, individually and as a pol ic e off

ic er; JOHN/J ANE DOE #1, EMPLOYEE OF GLENOLDEN POLI CE DEPARTMENT; COUNTY OF DELAWARE OFFI CE OF THE DI STRI CT ATTORNE Y; J OHN/ JANE DOE #2 , E MPLOYEE OF DEL AWARE COUNTY ; DELAWARE C OUNTY BOARD OFPRI SON I NSPE CTORS ; WACK ENHUT CORECT IONS CORP. , t a WWC; JOHN/ JANE DOE #3 , E MPLOYEE OF WACKEN HUT CORRECTIONS CORP.; MATTHEW ILLICH; RAQUEL LEWANDOWSKI On A ppeal Fro m the U nited States D istrict Court For th e Ea stern D istrict of P enns ylvania (Civ. A. No. 01-4361) Distric t Judg e: Th e H ono rable S tewa rt Da lzell

Submitte d Pursuant to LAR 34.1(a) November 19, 2004

Be for e: R OT H a nd S M ITH , Circuit Judges , and DEBEV OISE,* Distri ct Judge (Fil ed: November 24, 2004)

OPINI ON OF THE COURT * The Honorable Dickins on R. Debevoise, Senior Dist rict Judge for the District of New Jersey , si tti ng by des ignati on.2

SM ITH , Circuit

Judge Appellant s David and Kathle en Leidy are the brother and sister-i n-law of the dec ede nt , Ro xan ne Le id y , a nd the c o- per son al re pr es ent at iv es of h eres ta te . At th e t ime of the complai nt, Appel lants were also t he guardians of the t

hen-minor pl ainti ff, daugh ter of the dec edent, and ra pe victim, A mand a Leidy. The rem aining A ppellees are the Borough of Glenol den, i ts Poli ce Chief, Edward Cooke, and a Glenolden Pat rolman, Matthew Ill ich (col lectively “Glenolden Defendant s”). The Leidys sued the Glenol den Defendants al leging t

hat the ir fai lure to act deprived Roxanne and Amanda Leidy of their liber ty in viol ation of

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteent h Amendment of the United States Consti tuti on. The District Court granted summary j udgment for the Gle nol den Defe nda nt s. We Affirm. Facts The facts o f G erald B enne tt’s unsu ccess ful su rrend er on an arre st wa rrant six days before h e perpetrated the heinous c rimes on R oxann e and A mand a Leidy are cap ture d in gre at de tail in the D istrict Co urt’s opi nio n. See Leidy v. Glenolden , 277 F. Sup p. 2d 5 47, 55 0-55 7 (E.D . Pa. 20 03). W e reco unt h ere on ly those fa cts nec essary to our decis ion. Ge rald B enne tt served nearly a year in prison follow ing h is guilty plea to indecent assaul t. A condi tion of hi s February 1999 parole was t

hat he attend sex offe nder treatm ent cla sses. B ecau se B enne tt repea tedly failed to atten d treatm ent,3

admitt ed to usi ng drugs, and refused to divulge hi s address , his probati on officer obtain ed a b ench wa rrant fo r his arre st, and in structed Ben nett to tu rn him self in to pol ice. At 5:42 p.m. on August 26, 1999, Bennett appeared at t he Glenolden Pol ice Stati on to surrender on the warrant. Bennett t old the of ficer on duty , Matthew Il lich, that he wa s turnin g him self in a t the dire ction o f his p roba tion of ficer, b ut did n ot tell Illich the n atur e of the c har ges for wh ich h e w as o n pa role , nor did he g ive h is ad dre ss. Glen olden ’s dep artme ntal po licy require d a “h ard co py” verif ication of the wa rrant to take into custod y a person surrend ering on a b ench w arrant. Illich took Ben nett’s identi fication information, and, according to Glenol den practice, Ill ich cont acted the Delaware County Emergency Communicati ons Center ( “DelCom”) to confi rm the exis tenc e of the w arra nt. The D elCom dispatcher’s ch eck of tw o electronic da tabases and the De laware Co unt y “be nch boo k” in dica ted th at an out stan din g w arra nt fo r Be nne tt’s ar rest e xiste d. After relating this info rmation to Illich, the D elCom dispatcher then called the D elaware Co unty Priso n’s Inta ke U nit, wh ere the actua l war rants w ere ke pt, to co nfirm its existence. Becauseof a communicati on error between the DelCom dispatcher and the Intake Unit’s clerk, the clerk found neither a li sting of the warrant in the el ectronic li st of all Delaware County bench warrant s nor thewarrant i tsel f in the file cabinet . Il lich and PoliceChief Edward Cooke, who by this time had been consul ted byIll ich and who1 The Delaware County and Glenolden Poli ce Department pol icyof confirmi ng the

existence of the warr ant with t he Intake Unit has t

hree rel ated rational es. Fi rst, the elect ronic dat abases and t

he “bench book” are not legal documents. Second, becaus e they are m erely deriv ative o f w arrants , these so urces add a layer of h um an erro r (pote ntially indicating a warrant on a citizen when non e ever existed), and i nclude “stale” warrants, the inf ormation of

which has not y et been updated in thedatabase (potentiall y showing a s “activ e” a w arrant th at has b een re scind ed). T hird, the prison will no t accep t an inm ate unless t he constabl e has a warrant for the pe rson in c ustody . Confirmi ng warrants thus protec ts citizen s from wro ngf ul arres t by reduc ing cle rical erro r and ensu ring tha t only acti ve warrants are enforc ed. 4 hims elf ha d talke d w ith Be nnett, d eterm ined th at with out a “ hard copy” o f the w arrant, they cou ld no long er ho ld Be nnett. 1 Ben nett left th e polic e station at app roxim ately 6: 28 p .m. While DelCom and the Int ake Unit were checki ng for Bennett ’s warrant , Il lich had contacted ConstableJerry Bosch to dri ve to thestation to t ransport Bennett t o the prison. When informed that the warrant

could not belocat ed at the pris on, Bosch

co nt ac ted th e I nt ak e U ni t h im se lf, an d r ela yin g B en ne tt’s in fo rm ati on ac cu ra tel y, determi ned that

in fact the warrant

for Bennett ’s arrest was on fi le at the pri son. When Bosch notifi ed Ill ich, Ill ich went i n fruitless s earch of Bennett , who had left the st ation just five t o ten minut es before. Six day s later, Bennett st rangled and kill ed Roxanne Leid y, in who se ho use h e had been boar ding , and ra ped A man da L eidy at kn ifepo int. Jurisdic tion and Standard of Review The Distri ct Court e xercis ed federalquesti on juri sdiction, 28 U.S. C. § 1331, over the pla intiffs’ c ivil rights c laim, 4 2 U .S.C. § 198 3. W e hav e jurisd iction o ver this2 The D istrict Court also exercised supplem ental jurisdiction over the p laintiffs’ state tort

clai ms against

the indi vidual de fendants, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, but the Lei dys ha ve not appealed t

he District Court ’s det ermination that the defendant s before us are immune from liabili ty on these cl aims. 5 appeal of t

he District Court ’s fi nal judgment , 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 Ou r rev iew of th e D istrict Co urt’s gra nt o f su mm ary jud gm ent is plen ary. DeFelice v. Aetna Hea lthcare , 3 46 F. 3d 4 42, 445 (3 d Ci r. 200 3) . We app lyth e s ame test used by the District Court, i.e. , whether, viewing the evidence in the li ght most favorabl e to thenon-moving part y, the moving party has met it s thre shold burde n of sho win g th e ab sen ce o f a g enu ine is sue of m ateri al fa ct. O’Donnell v. Unit ed State s , 891 F.2d 1079, 1081- 82 (3d Cir. 1989). Ess entia lly , the inquiry becomes “ whether the evide nce p resen ts a suf ficien t disagr eem ent to re quire s ubm ission to a jury or w hethe r it is so one- sided t

hat one party must prevai l as a matter of l aw.” And erson v. Libe rty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Further , “[i ]t fol lows from the[] settled pri nciple s [of summary j udgment standards] t hat if the fact ual cont ext rende rs [the nonmoving parti es’] c laim i mplausibl e . . . [the y] must come forward with more persuas ive evidence to support t

heir cl aim than would ot herwise be nec essary .” M atu shita Ele c. v Zen ith R adi o, 475 U.S . 574, 5 87 (1 986 ); see Will iams v. West Chester , 891 F.2d 458, 460 n.2 (3 d Cir. 199 0) (“M atsushita’s principles argu ably apply only to summary judgment moti ons in antitr ust cas es. At t

he veryleast , however, this language reinforces the poi nt made more genera lly in Libert y Lobby .”). Discussi on6

Section 1983 provides a ci vil remedy for plaint iffs who have been deprived of a right se cured by the C onstitu tion or f edera l law b y a perso n actin g un der co lor of s tate law
. Parratt

v. Tayl or , 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Although the s tategeneral ly has no affirmative d uty to protect citizens from the violent acts of p rivate parties, this Court has joi ned severalcourts of appeals in recogni zing § 1983 cl aims under t he “statecreate d dan ger the ory of liab ility.” The L eidys bas e their c ivil rights c laim o n this th eo ry. The state-cre ated d ange r theor y was f irst sugg ested b y the Su prem e Co urt in De Sha ney v . Winn ebag o C oun ty . 489 U .S. 189 , 201 ( 198 9) (no ting tha t § 19 83 liab ility

ma y lie if th e sta te pla yed a par t in cr eatin g, or ren der ing a pe rson mo re v uln erab le to, a danger). This Court adopted the theory in Kniepp v. Tedder . 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1996) . The st ate-c reate d danger the ory requires a plai ntiff to est ablis h each of four

commo n elements :

(1) the harm ultima tely cause d w as fo reseea ble an d fairly direct ; (2) the st ate actor acte d in will ful dis regard for the safety of the pla intiff; (3 ) there e xisted s om e relation ship between the s tateand the pl ainti ff; (4) the st ate actors used their au thority to cre ate an opp ortun ity that otherw ise w ould not have existed for the third p arty’s crime to occur. Kniepp , 95 F.3d at

1208 (quoti ng Mark v. Borou gh of Hatboro , 51 F.3d 1137, 1152 (3d Cir. 1995 )). The Leidys ’ failure on the f ourth el ement of the s tate -created danger anal ysi s was the “ fun dam enta l reas on” the D istrict Co urt re jecte d th e pla intif fs’ c ivil rig hts c laim
.7

We agree with the D istrict Co urt’s de termin ation re gard ing this elem ent, an d w e limit our d iscussio n to it. Often stated in te rms of the di fference between affirmati ve acts by government off icials , in w hich cas e § 1 983 liabi lity ma y attac h, see Wood v. Ostrander , 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9t

h Cir. 1989) (acts of arres ting a driver, impounding hi s vehicl e, and l eaving a woman alone at ni ght in a hi gh-cri me area a suffi cient “assertion of gove rnment pow er”); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake , 880 F.2d 348, 357 (11th Cir . 1989) (placi ng inmates i ncarcer ated for violent crimes i n work releas e program without adequate s upervis ion “affi rmative ly creat ed a potentiall y dangerous sit uation” ), and

om issio ns b y them , in w hich cas e § 1 983 liabi lity is pre clud ed, see Estate of Amos v. City of Page , 257 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir . 2001) ( poor resc ue att empt did not increa se the d ange r to per son w ho lef t the sce ne of an ac ciden t); Gregory v. Cit y of Rogers , 974 F.2d 1006, 1012 (8th Cir . 1992) ( en banc) (removing designated dri ver from vehic le, leavin g intox icated occu pant w ho late r crash ed ca r did n ot aff irmativ ely place occupant in dange r), this Court has noted the di fficul ty in drawing t his di sti nction in p artic ular cas es. M orse v . Low er M erion Sch. D ist. , 132 F.3d 902, 914 -15 (3d C ir. 1997) (ci ting Bow ers v. D eVito , 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir . 1982). To better distinguish cases in which a state actor can b e said to hav e “created” a theretofore nonexistent opport

unity for a third party t o perpetr ate a crime from thoseconsti tuti ng a “mere” fai lure to protect , we have observe d that “ the dis positive fact or appears to be8

whether the state in some way pl aced the pl ainti ff in a danger ous position that was foreseeabl e, and not

whether the act was more appr opriatelycharact erize d as an aff irma tive a ct or an o mis sion .” Morse , 132 F.3 d at 9 15. In Kniepp , poli ce officer s int ercept ed a couple i n a shouti ng match as t hey

wa lked h om e from a bar la te on a cold n ight. T he po lice allow ed the husb and to contin ue ho me to care f or their c hild. So on th ereaf ter, the o ffice rs left a “ seve rely inebri at[ed] ” Samantha Kneipp unattended. She was later discovered unconscious on an embankment. She suf fered compli cati ons from hy pothermia which rendere d her severel y di sabled. We determined that a re asonable j ury could inf er from the submitted evidence t

hat byallowing t

he husband to l eave the s cene, t he polic e impli ed that

they would see Mrs. Kniepp home safe ly . Thus, we re versed the District Court ’s grant of

summ ary judgmen t and rem anded the case fo r a trial “as to wheth er the police of ficers affirmatively

placed Samantha

in a posi tion of danger.” Kniepp , 9 5 F. 3d a t 1 211 . By separating a vis ibly

intoxi cated Samantha

Kniepp from her husband, her “sour ce of protect ion” at the ti me, we reasoned t hat when theyabandoned her, the poli ce incr eased the d ang er th at M rs. K niep p w oul d su ffe r ha rm. Id . at 1210. In Morse , bycontras t, aback door to a school, which was normally locked, was kept unloc ked and occasi onally propped open while various contrac tors worked on t he school. A mentallyilllocal resi dent ent ered the school, likely through the uns ecured back door, and fatal ly shot a teacher, Diane Morse. The vict im’s family br ought a §9

198 3 actio n alleg ing tha t the sch ool’s a ction o f un lockin g the d oor a nd allo win g pu blic access to Morse’s cla ssroom subj ected her to a danger ous sit

uation. Although unlocking t

he back door and enabl ing unfettered a ccess t o the schoolwas arguablyan affirm ative a ct, we denie d the c ivil rights c laim b ecau se the “ dead ly attack w as no t a foreseeabl e and fairly direct resul t of defendant s’ behavi or.” Morse , 132 F.3d at 915- 16. H er e, t he D ist ric t C ou rt c ha ra cte riz ed th e d ef en da nt s’ f ail ur e to ar re st a s s im pl y a fail ure to pr otect

citi zens from Bennett

by not incapaci tati ng him, and obse rved that the lesson of DeShaney and th e state-c reated dang er line o f case s is that a f ailure to protec t, with out “s om ething mo re,” do es no t satisfy § 19 83. 27 7 F. S upp . 2d at 5 60; id. at 561 (illustrating that the “som ething mo re” m ay be an offic ial instiga tion of private violenc e, offi cers “pl ac[ing] people i n harm’s way who would otherwise not have been at risk ,” or off icers “cu t[tin g] p eop le of f fro m th eir p riva te so urc es o f pr otec tion ”). Af ter notin g that th e state p rotecte d citizen s from Ben nett ea rlier by imp risonin g him and placi ng him on paroleupon his re lease, and att empted to do so by issui ng a bench

wa rrant, the Distric t Cou rt conc luded : “In the abse nce o f any state action , Ben nett still

wo uld h ave c om mitted these o ffen ses, or, to put it an other w ay, there is n o evid ence to conclude that he would not have. St ate action neit her made Bennett

more viole nt nor made Roxanne Leidy and Amanda Leidymore vulnerable to Bennet t.” Id. at 56 0. We agree w ith this assessmen t, and reject the plaintiffs’ argu ment that the D istrict Court10

mis und ersto od t he e ssen ce o f the ir cla im. The plaintiff s con tend th at the G lenold en D efen dants did n ot sim ply fail to protect the Leidy s; rather, theyassert that t he “somethi ng more” was that the defendants ’ failure to ar rest Bennett pl aced the vi ctims i n harm’s way by embolde ning Bennett t o commit thes e extre me acts of vi olence. The plaintiffs further hypothesi ze that t he warrant i tsel f “placed s tres sful i nfluences on Bennett, ” and that his “nar row[] escape” fr om police after the warr ant’s issuanc e may have l ed Bennett “to belie ve that he could thumb his nose at the Courts , Probation Office, and societ y, ” thus making Be nne tt’s h eino us c rime s m ore likel y. The plaintiff s’ imp lausible conje cture, so far rem oved from the ev idenc e, cou ld not lea d a factfi nder to reasonably conclude that thedefendants ’ conduct “ placed the plaint iff i n a dangerous pos iti on that was foreseeabl e.” Morse, 132 F.3d at 915 . Ben nett voluntarily

atte mpted to turn himsel f in on an arrest warrant. There was no indi cati on that the officers knew Bennett was capable of com mitting such violent, heinous crimes, much less t

hat he was on the verge of doi ng so. Bennett si mply s tate d that hi s probation officer told hi m to turn hi mself in f or viol ating hi s parol e. Absent an i ndication from Bennett hi mself, the defendant s had no way of knowing t hat theviolat

ion underl yi ng Bennett’ s parol e involve d a sex cri me. As the pl ainti ffs note, Bennett had no reported criminal conta ct with pol ice i n the si x month int erim between his parol e and August 26, 1999, nor di d Bennett pr ovide an addr ess to I lli ch or Cooke that would have enabled11

them to tra ck d ow n an d ar rest B enn ett on ce th e ex isten ce o f a w arra nt w as v erif ied. Indeed, Bennet

t’s t ransi ence was a factor

that l ed the probation off icer to seek a bench warrant for

his ar rest . This obs ervati on speaks not only to the i nabili ty of Glenolden police to seek Ben nett in th e days b etwe en his attem pted s urren der an d his c rimes , it also ind icate s tha t the d efe nda nts w ere u nab le to f ore see the L eidys a s po tenti al vic tims
. See Mo rse , 132 F.3d at

913 n.12 (“Where t

he state actor

has all egedlycreat ed a danger towards the public general ly , rat her than an indivi dual or gr oup of indivi duals, holding a state actor

liabl e for the injuries of foreseeabl e plai ntiff s would expand the s cope of the state-created danger

theorybeyond i ts usef

ul and intended li mits. ”). The Glenol den De fen dan ts w ere th us e ntitle d to sum ma ry judg me nt as a m atter of la w. We note for the s ake of complet eness that becaus e we conclude that there was no consti tuti onal tor

t in t his cas e, there al so is no muni cipal liabi lit y t o atta ch to the Bo rou gh o f G leno lden
. Mon nell v. Dep’t of Social Serv’s of the City of New York , 436 U.S . 658, 6 91 (1 978 ); Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs . Trai ning Inst. , 318 F.3d 473, 482 (3d Cir. 2003). The j udgment of the Dis tri ct Court i s affirmed.